ABSTRACT


Denise Shupiko, Ph.D., 2014

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In recent decades, transnational advocacy networks (TANs) for women’s rights have become major players in the international arena, but have also struggled to maintain egalitarian and democratic practices within their ranks, as members from different world regions attempt to have their voices heard. In this dissertation, I question what strategies TANs can employ to more effectively and democratically push states for change on important social issues.

To address this question, I carry out a case study of the development of the Russian movement against human trafficking from 1998 to 2008, with particular focus on the organization that served as leader of this movement, the Angel Coalition. To better understand the global forces that gave rise to this development, I examine two transnational movements that collided in Russia in the late 1990s: the contemporary transnational movement against human trafficking, and the movement...
by the United States and other Western governments to promote the growth of civil societies in developing and post-socialist countries as part of democracy aid programs.

This dissertation contributes to transnational civil society theory and transnational feminist theory. The Angel Coalition, an organization run by activists from Russia, other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Western countries, and which received the majority of its funding from Western governments and foundations, overcame obstacles both to organizing across cultural and power differences and to influencing policy of the Russian Federation, a state known to reject the influence of foreign governments and foreign-funded civil society. I argue that two factors were especially important to the success of the Angel Coalition, as part of a transnational counter-trafficking network, in pushing the Russian state to take action against human trafficking: 1) counter-trafficking activists demonstrated a practiced understanding of the political environment of Russia; and 2) activists effectively communicated to the state how it would benefit from collaboration with civil society. Finally, I argue that organizational practices of the Angel Coalition, as a multinational NGO, facilitated its ability to implement these strategies. Most importantly, activists utilized their differences as resources and expressed respect for the unique contributions of all members of the coalition.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN COUNTER-TRAFFICKING MOVEMENT: THE ANGEL COALITION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON CIVIL SOCIETY, FEMINISM, AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING

By

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Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2014

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Professor Seung-kyung Kim
Professor Cynthia L. Martin
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experience you have shared, and I admire the work you do to advance the field of
women’s studies.

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Angel Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALBA</td>
<td>Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America</td>
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<td>ANNA</td>
<td>No to Violence Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CATW</td>
<td>Coalition Against Trafficking in Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWGL</td>
<td>Center for Women’s Global Leadership at Rutgers University</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLF</td>
<td>Development Loan Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council of the United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFW</td>
<td>Foundation For Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSU</td>
<td>former Soviet Union</td>
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<td>G-7</td>
<td>Group of Seven nations</td>
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<td>GAATW</td>
<td>Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GONGO</td>
<td>government-organized non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>GRO</td>
<td>grassroots organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIID</td>
<td>Harvard University Institute for International Development</td>
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<td>ICA</td>
<td>International Cooperation Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>intergovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>IRB</td>
<td>Institutional Review Board</td>
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<td>IREX</td>
<td>International Research and Exchanges Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRI</td>
<td>International Republican Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOTOS</td>
<td>League for Emancipation from Sexual Stereotypes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCGS</td>
<td>Moscow Center for Gender Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCRB</td>
<td>Network for Crisis Centers for Women in the Barents Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute for International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NED</td>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEWW</td>
<td>Network of East-West Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>NeZhDI</td>
<td>Independent Women’s Democratic Initiative</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NSWP</td>
<td>Network of Sex Work Projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>RACCW</td>
<td>Russian Association of Crisis Centers for Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAFO</td>
<td>Free Association of Feminist Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEED</td>
<td>Support for Eastern European Democracy program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STV</td>
<td>Foundation Against Trafficking in Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States Program of the European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAN</td>
<td>transnational advocacy network</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCA</td>
<td>Technical Cooperation Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIP Office</td>
<td>United States Department of State’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIP Report</td>
<td>United States Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFN</td>
<td>transnational feminist network</td>
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<tr>
<td>TVAC</td>
<td>Angel Coalition Trafficking Victims Assistance Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>TVPA</td>
<td>United States Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVPRA</td>
<td>Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN Protocol on Trafficking</td>
<td>United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Human Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIA</td>
<td>United States Information Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWR</td>
<td>Union of Women of Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAVE</td>
<td>Women against Violence Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCF</td>
<td>Women and Children First</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOR</td>
<td>Women of Russia</td>
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Language Note

I use a modified Library of Congress system for transliteration of Russian words. Exceptions are proper names that have a standard transliteration in English language press (e.g., Yeltsin instead of El’tsin and Nizhny Novgorod instead of Nizhnii Novgorod) and the names of individuals and organizations that have designated an alternative English spelling of their names. Translations from the Russian are mine, unless otherwise noted.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Over the past several decades, the transnational women’s movement has emerged as a major player in the international arena, wielding the power to challenge economic globalization practices that accelerate inequality and demonstrating the ability to influence the policies of states and intergovernmental organizations on important social issues. While directing its energy to advocating for gender equality and social justice in countries around the world, the transnational women’s movement also faced the challenge of overcoming patterns of domination and inequality within its own networks. Replicating global hierarchical power relations, women from the North and West often served as leaders of these networks, determining the structure of network interactions and deciding which issues were most worthy of network attention, while women from the South and East reported feeling underrepresented and having their concerns marginalized by the movement. As a result of such conflicts, in recent years, transnational feminists have increasingly placed as much emphasis on strengthening equality within the movement as on lobbying states and intergovernmental organizations for egalitarian policies. In this dissertation, I examine one particular transnational network for women’s rights, as I address the question of how activists around the world can overcome cultural and power differences to work towards shared strategic goals.

To address this question, I carry out a case study of the development of the Russian movement against human trafficking from 1998 to 2008, with particular focus on the organization that served as the leader of this movement, the Angel Coalition. To better understand the global forces that gave rise to this development, I examine two
transnational movements that collided in Russia in the late 1990s: the contemporary transnational movement against human trafficking, which had been gaining momentum since the 1970s, and the movement by the United States and other Western countries to promote the growth of civil societies in developing and post-socialist countries as part of democracy aid programs, which had been in existence throughout the cold war era. Additionally, in order to understand the domestic factors that contributed to the development of Russia’s counter-trafficking movement, I examine the social, economic, and political conditions that characterized the post-Soviet transition and that facilitated the rise of human trafficking in Russia as well as the development of state-civil society partnerships to fight this crime. I devote particular attention to the effects of the post-Soviet transition on women, who became one of the population groups most vulnerable to human trafficking while at the same time gaining the right to form independent women’s organizations and crisis centers on the issue of gendered violence, which would be the first to respond to the problem of trafficking in Russia.

In this dissertation, as I chart the development of the Russian movement against human trafficking, I engage in conversation with three bodies of literature. First, I review literature on the provision of foreign aid by the United States and other Western states to developing and post-socialist countries for the purpose of building civil societies, with particular focus on the provision of such aid to Russia. This literature examines the intentions behind the implementation of such aid programs by Western countries, the conditions in recipient countries that made their governments amenable to the acceptance of aid, and the consequences of aid for the development of civil societies in these countries and for the shifting political relationships between their governments. While
such aid programs were expected to foster the values of democracy, participation, horizontal networking, and solidarity between citizens, scholars writing in this field have documented ways in which the structure of aid programs often had the opposite effect.

Especially in post-Soviet countries such as Russia, where an independent civil society had just begun to take root, foreign aid at this early stage of civil society development had a significant impact on the emerging shape of the sector. Namely, a plethora of competitive grant programs offering short-term funding for the production of certain outputs, i.e., the organization of conferences, the publication of newsletters, etc., contributed to the fragmentation, hierarchization, NGO-ization, and unsustainability of much of Russia’s civil society. In this dissertation, I engage with this literature in discussing how foreign aid both facilitated and posed challenges to the development of Russia’s movement against human trafficking and how its leading organization, the Angel Coalition, responded to and overcame many of these challenges.

Second, I engage in conversation with literature on transnational feminism and women’s movements, with particular attention given to the Russian women’s movement and Western-Russian women’s networks. Focusing on the development of the contemporary transnational women’s movement since the 1970s, I review the achievements of this movement on the international scene; its strong connections to the United Nations, including the movement’s expansion through the UN World Conferences on Women and the incorporation of many of its concerns into UN structures and agendas; and efforts within the movement to develop more inclusive, egalitarian, and representational forms of organizing. This literature outlines the issues that most inspired women activists from around the world to unite their efforts in a common agenda,
especially the issues of economic justice and violence against women, the latter of which was defined to include trafficking in women. I analyze the formation of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) among women activists as an effective organizing practice that strengthened the women’s movement’s ability to influence governments and intergovernmental organizations on issues concerning women’s rights.

Additionally, I review literature specifically on the growth of the Russian women’s movement and its links to movements in other countries and regions. Reflecting the themes identified in the literature on civil society reviewed above, this literature addresses the impact of foreign aid on the development of Russia’s women’s movement and ways in which historical power differences and cultural misunderstandings between Russian and Western women activists posed challenges to their relationships. I engage in conversation with this literature as I discuss how the transnational feminist issues of violence against women and human trafficking were adopted and reframed by Russian women activists to fit the Russian environment, and how the Russian women’s movement provided the foundation out of which the counter-trafficking movement later emerged.

Third, I engage in conversation with the literature on human trafficking and the development of transnational movements against human trafficking, both historically and in the contemporary period. This literature addresses conditions that have fueled practices of human trafficking since the late-nineteenth century to the beginning of the twenty-first century, consequences of these practices for the individuals involved, and the responses of societies on both sending and receiving ends of trafficking networks. Additionally, this literature examines the development of international movements
against these practices, from the movement against “white slavery” at the turn of the twentieth century, and the fading attention to the issue in the middle decades of the twentieth century, to the resurgence of activism against human trafficking beginning in the 1970s and 1980s. By 2000, the burgeoning transnational movement against human trafficking had drawn the attention of states and intergovernmental organizations to the issue and propelled them to take action, resulting in the passage of the United States Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA) and the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN Protocol on Human Trafficking), two of the leading international instruments in the global campaign to combat human trafficking.

In conversation with this literature, I examine the development and implementation of these international instruments, the strong influence of counter-trafficking TANs on these processes, and the political divisions between states and TANs in debates over whether to focus on the abolition of prostitution as the best tactic to fight human trafficking or whether to increase recognition of sex workers’ labor rights in order to make them less vulnerable to this crime.

Finally, I devote attention to the specific patterns of human trafficking into, out of, and within Russia in the contemporary period; ways in which the implementation of international counter-trafficking norms and funds have both facilitated and limited the development of Russia’s counter-trafficking movement; and ways in which Russian counter-trafficking organizations have responded to the Western-led debates on the issue of prostitution and either found a way to fit themselves into these debates or resisted the imposition of Western labels onto their organizational philosophy.
My dissertation puts these literatures into conversation with each other as I draw upon and contribute to all three while providing a detailed and robust case study of the Russian movement against human trafficking. I demonstrate how the far-reaching global forces of transnational feminism, the international movement against human trafficking, and the Western push to develop civil societies coalesced in Russia to facilitate the emergence of an activist network that took the lead in the Russian movement against human trafficking and successfully lobbied the Russian government to take action against the problem. At the same time, I highlight the agency of Western and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)\(^1\) activists who took advantage of the opportunities made available through these global movements to develop a unique organization, the Angel Coalition, which proved capable of overcoming tremendous obstacles to secure long-term and consistent levels of funding, develop collaborative relations with a government known for its distrust of independent civil society and of foreign influence within its borders, and provide services to large numbers of the Russian public. Thus, while providing a historical contextualization of the rise of this movement, I specifically examine the organizational factors and personal attributes that enabled the Angel Coalition to successfully work across cultural and political differences to lead a strong and sustainable activist network capable of influencing the actions of the Russian state.

\(^1\) Although the focus of my study is the Russian movement against human trafficking, counter-trafficking activists from other CIS countries are involved in this movement and categorize themselves collectively as a group separate from Western activists, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6. The CIS is a union comprised of most of the states of the former Soviet Union, including Russia, and was formed in December 1991. While the CIS has few supranational powers, its member states have entered into agreements in the areas of trade, finance, lawmaking, security, and crime control.
1.1 Theoretical Perspective and Research Methodology

In outlining the research methods I will use in this study, I will first discuss my theoretical orientation, since the methods researchers choose to employ are of necessity influenced by our epistemological assumptions. This follows the importance I place on making self-evident the assumptions and politics that lay behind the production of knowledge. I draw upon the work of feminist sociologist Nancy Naples, who asserts “Our epistemological assumptions also influence how we define our roles as researchers, what we consider ethical research practices, and how we interpret and implement informed consent or ensure the confidentiality of our research subjects.” Because my work focuses on the reproduction of and resistance to inequalities both within feminist communities and within our larger globalizing world, I am especially attentive to the potential for power imbalances to affect the research process. As a result, I choose methods that reflect my aims of reducing power differences between researcher and participant, making clear my theoretical assumptions and my position in the field, and honoring the voices of my participants, the meanings they assign to their work and lives, and the theoretical framework though which they understand their counter-trafficking activities.

1.1.1 Theoretical Perspective

Reflecting my research goals, I choose to make clear that I employ a theoretical lens that closely follows the “materialist feminist” framework as outlined by Naples, a framework that facilitates the production of knowledge for social change and that seeks to confront

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3 Ibid., 3.
inequities in the knowledge production process.⁴ Therefore, before discussing my research methodologies, I will provide some background on the material feminist perspective and how I will apply it to my topic of study. In utilizing this perspective, I build upon the work of many materialist feminists, including Naples but also Rosemary Hennessy, Chrys Ingraham, and Valentine Moghadam. Hennessy and Ingraham explain that materialist feminism developed out of Marxist feminism and socialist feminism and “was the conjuncture of several discourses—historical materialism, marxist and radical feminism, as well as postmodern and psychoanalytic theories of meaning and subjectivity.”⁵ Although materialism and postmodernism are often viewed as opposing theoretical approaches, Naples too highlights the intersection of these viewpoints. She writes, “I view my development of a materialist feminist standpoint theory that incorporates important insights of postmodern analyses of power, subjectivity, and language as a powerful framework for exploring the intersections of race, class, gender, sexuality, region, and culture in different geographic and historical contexts.”⁶

While materialist feminism draws upon these various approaches, what distinguishes this perspective is its emphasis on the division of labor and class as determining features of human life. According to Hennessy and Ingraham, historical materialism “takes as its starting point real living individuals and what they need in order to produce their means of subsistence, that is, in order to survive.”⁷

⁴ Ibid., 12.
⁶ Naples, 7.
⁷ Hennessy and Ingraham, 4.
materialism sees the production of life as a collective process that takes place through a system of related activities. As Hennessy and Ingraham note, “Historically, these activities have taken the form of divisions of labor or relations of production.” Under capitalism, the relations of production have been between a small number of people who own the means of production and a larger number of people who actually produce.

Discourse analysis is important to this arrangement since cultural ideologies can legitimate labor relations. Because an elite group owns the majority of mainstream media sources, it has the ability to broadcast its views of “reality” and “normality” through the many publishing companies, television channels, film production companies, etc., owned by members of this group. However, in a democracy, oppositional groups also have the ability to voice their knowledge of the world and to contest the mainstream “norm.” Thus, not only material bodies and goods are important in materialist feminism, but also the culture and ideologies that affect how individuals live their lives. Hennessy and Ingraham state, “The tradition of feminist engagement with marxism emphasizes a perspective on social life that refuses to separate the materiality of meaning, identity, the body, state, or nation from the requisite division of labor that undergirds the scramble for profits in capitalism’s global system.”

While traditional Marxism has been criticized for its gender-blindness and Marxist feminism criticized for analyzing class and gender to the exclusion of other sources of oppression, the materialist feminist approach I utilize recognizes the multitude of identities that affect individuals’ positioning in contemporary economic and social structures. In past decades, the ascendancy of postmodernism has exposed the multiple

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8 Ibid., 4.
9 Ibid., 1.
and shifting identities of human beings and the complexity of power relations. Antonio Callari and David Ruccio describe the postmodern perspective:

Because... subjects are multiple and irreducible, social spaces (economic, political, and cultural) are characterized not as homogeneously structured spaces..., but as spaces or sets of processes punctuated by states of contingency, fragmentariness, and decentering. Moreover,... [subjects] will not have singular identities, ...but rather multiple identities, coalesced and condensed in no fixed ways.... It is the postmodern current that, in our view, has elevated these states of contingency, fragmentariness, and decentering and the surplus of being of social subjects to the status of strategic privilege.10

The materialist feminist approach that I use incorporates some of the insights generated by postmodern theorists by acknowledging the importance of race, sexuality, religion, ability, ethnicity, age, and many other identities in analyzing individuals’ position in social systems. My perspective takes up Callari and Ruccio’s call for “identities and forms of political struggle [that] are concretely determined outside and apart from any single functional logic.”11 “Politics,” they write, “is a practice of negotiation and struggle among emergent social identities and agents that is not governed by any origin, subject, or end.”12 The challenges postmodernism has posed for materialism have led it to become a more inclusive and flexible theoretical and political perspective.


11 Ibid., 42.

12 Ibid., 42.
Following this, a second critical feature of materialist feminism is that it is both a theory of society and a theory for social change. As Callari and Ruccio contend, “Marxist theory cannot construct an identity of itself as merely a theory about society, a reflection of an already constituted position in that society, but must recognize its own involvement in the process of social change, as part of the universe of competing discursive formations, in the creation of social identities, particular forms of perception and agency.” Similarly, Hennessy and Ingraham write, “Historical materialism offers a systemic way of making sense of social life under capitalism that simultaneously serves as an agent for changing it.” Like Callari and Ruccio, I believe materialism continues to be a necessary theory for social change as it provides both “a class analysis of social processes and formations and an imaginary of social transformation.”

A third important feature of materialist feminism is its emphasis on the connection between epistemology and methodology. While researchers are commonly advised to use the method that is most appropriate for their specific research questions, Naples cautions that “the methods we choose are not free of epistemological assumptions and taken-for-granted understandings of what counts as data, how the researcher should relate to the subjects of research, and what are the appropriate products of a research study.” As illustrated by Naples, our epistemological assumptions infuse every aspect of the research process. As such, she echoes the assertion by many feminist researchers

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13 See Callari and Ruccio, 10.
14 Ibid., 23.
15 Hennessy and Ingraham, 4.
16 Callari and Ruccio, 7.
17 Naples, 5.
that there is no neutral knowledge. Instead, materialist feminism encourages an embodied perspective though which the researcher explicitly reveals her roles in the research process. Similar to Donna Haraway’s concept of “situated knowledges” and Sandra Harding’s concept of “strong objectivity,” an embodied perspective “emphasizes how researchers’ social positions (not limited to one’s gender, race, ethnicity, class, culture, and place or region of residence) influence what questions we ask, whom we approach in the field, how we make sense of our fieldwork experience, and how we analyze and report our findings.”  

Drawing upon these “standpoint” epistemologies, I aim to “situate” my research in two important ways. First, by naming my theoretical perspective, I attempt to make apparent the assumptions that guide my examination of this research topic. Namely, employing a material feminist perspective, I see the growing class divide as a major source of the oppression of women and other vulnerable groups in the contemporary world. Here, I work with a broadly defined concept of “class” in referring to how social, political, and economic structures benefit certain groups of people at the expense of others. Much feminist research has demonstrated how modern globalization processes have heightened inequalities among groups within nation-states and among nation-states themselves. These gendered, racialized, and class-based processes have accelerated the profitability of multinational corporations while making it more difficult to identify the owners of this capital and creating divisions among workers who produce this profit. Although the concept of “scattered hegemonies” illustrates how the subjectivities of the

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18 Ibid., 197.

oppressors and the oppressed are multiple and shifting, I see these local and flexible hegemonies as supported by the global political economy, whose wealth is concentrated in multinational corporations based in Western and Northern countries, in institutions of global governance such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and in Washington, D.C.  

I share Valentine Moghadam’s belief that the “nexus of capital, class, and gender determines how women and men are involved in and affected by the economic, political, and cultural dimensions of globalization in various parts of the world.”

In addition to naming my theoretical perspective and locating myself within the research process, my work can also be considered “situated” through the historical, contextualized approach I take to my research topic. By definition, a materialist feminist approach situates its subject matter both temporally and geographically and analyzes the economic, political, and cultural processes that shape any topic of study. I contextualize my study of the development of the Russian counter-trafficking movement by analyzing the positions of CIS and Western activists within the capitalist world-system and within the counter-trafficking networks in which they participate. This includes examining the economic positions of various activists and their roles within these networks as well as analyzing broader economic and political developments in and relationships between activists’ countries of origin. I explore political relations between Russia and Western countries and relationships between transnational counter-trafficking networks and these national governments.


21 Ibid., 17.
Viewing my subject matter through a materialist feminist lens, I acknowledge the class differences between CIS and Western activists. On the whole, during the time period of my research study, Westerners had more access to resources and more publishing power, and hailed from countries that provided the majority of funding for counter-trafficking work. In contrast, Russia was the country receiving counter-trafficking funds and was viewed as a main site of the problem where intervention needed to take place. My analysis of class differences will of necessity recognize the complex nature of class relations between activists. In the networks that I observe, there is not a dichotomous relationship between two separate and distinct classes, but more complex patterns of interactions involving multiple subjects and groups. Thus, for example, I must be sensitive to the positioning of disporic CIS or Western activists who participate in the counter-trafficking networks I study, in addition to others who do not neatly fit into the “CIS” or “Western” categories.

Finally, as a materialist feminist, my research is geared not only to theorizing about counter-trafficking networks but also to participating in change within these networks. As a Westerner engaged in relationships with activists while also analyzing these relationships, my presence and my research necessarily impacted my field site. Drawing upon Naples’s discussion of standpoint epistemology as “achieved in community” and as “shifting over time and place,” I, like Naples, “recognize the agency of research subjects who also contribute to what can be seen and how to interpret what comes into view.”22 As such, I incorporated the insights of my participants in collecting and analyzing my research data. While my participants assisted in the gathering of my research material, I also hope that the research process provided them with valuable

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22 Naples, 198.
insights about their relationships and their work. In addition, while in the field, I attempted to constantly improve my role as a researcher in that particular setting and improve my ability to contribute to the organization’s work.

1.1.2 Research Methodology

In light of the dual aims of my research project both to historically contextualize the development of the Russian movement against human trafficking through a broad analysis of the economic, political, and societal factors that gave rise to this movement, and to carry out a detailed case study of the work and achievements of the Angel Coalition, the movement’s leading organization, I employ a range of methods to tackle these goals.

First, to provide an historical contextualization of both the global forces and the particular conditions in Russia that gave rise to this movement, I carry out an analysis of primary and secondary textual materials. The primary sources that I analyze in constructing this history include the texts of international conventions, national laws, speeches by national officials, and reports from United Nations conferences. In addition, I consult secondary sources that analyze these materials and that examine the history of the international movement against human trafficking, the international women’s movement, and the movement by Western countries to develop civil societies in developing and post-socialist countries, as well as sources on contemporary developments in these fields. The secondary sources I consult include both scholarly analyses in books and journal articles, and journalistic accounts in newspapers and magazines. These textual materials enable me to contextualize the development of the Russian movement against human trafficking both geographically and temporally and to
analyze the economic, political, and social processes that shaped this movement. Additionally, I draw upon textual materials in order to better understand the political relationships between Russian and Western countries, and relationships between national governments and counter-trafficking networks.

Second, to provide a detailed case study of the work of the Angel Coalition (AC), I employ the qualitative methods of participant observation, interviewing, and analysis of textual materials produced by the AC. By utilizing the methods of interviewing and participant observation, I seek to understand AC activists’ worlds and the meanings they impart to the processes and structures in which they are involved. In particular, I inquire into the roles the participants play in the organization, their views on human trafficking, the goals they have in their activist work, and their relationships with other activists. Additionally, I carry out an analysis of AC publications, such as research reports, newsletters, pamphlets, brochures, and website materials, as further sources of information which may support and/or contradict the data I gather in interviews. I compare the “official” representation of organizations’ work through their published documents with what I learn from individual activists.

My use of qualitative methods in conducting a case study of the AC reflects my purpose of seeking to understand my participants’ worlds. My understanding of qualitative research closely follows that of Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln:

Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs,
recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.²³

In my research, I draw upon several components of this definition. Working from a materialist feminist perspective, I aim not only to describe the world, but also to participate in its transformation. Hence, I was an active participant in the organization I studied. Following this, I remained aware of my presence in the research site and I located myself within the site in my research data and findings. I recognize how my research findings arose through interpretation and through interactions with my participants and do not represent some supposed “objective reality.” For this reason, I follow an interpretive, interactionist approach to qualitative data collection and analysis. Because of these goals, maintaining dialogue with my participants and reflecting on my role within the field setting was important during the duration of my fieldwork.

Employing these methods will allow me to gain a deeper understanding of the participants’ worlds and to better convey this understanding to my audience. As argued by many qualitative researchers, the use of multiple methods strengthens research findings.²⁴ While this approach has traditionally been referred to as “triangulation,” Laurel Richardson replaces the image of a triangle with that of a crystal in her conception of the research process. In contrast to the concept of “triangulation,” which implies that an object of study can be fully understood by viewing it from all sides, “crystallization”


²⁴ See Denzin and Lincoln, 5.
recognizes that there is no singular reality, but instead multiple perspectives, voices, and interactions that continuously shape the world and the representations that researchers construct of the world. Richardson writes that the crystal “combines symmetry and substance with an infinite variety of shapes, substances, transmutations, multidimensionalities, and angles of approach. Crystals grow, change, alter, but are not amorphous. Crystals are prisms that reflect externalities and refract within themselves.”

In recognizing the multiple influences that shape my findings, not only my research methods, but also my theoretical perspective, the voices of my participants, and the interactions among all these influences, I draw upon the crystal as an organizing metaphor for my research project. While I do not aim to capture “objective reality” in my research, I do seek to represent the meanings that circulate in my research setting and that drive the work of counter-trafficking networks.

Following this, the methods that I choose also reflect my theoretical perspective as a materialist feminist. Working from this perspective, I am aware of the unbalanced power relationships that are common in transnational activist networks, but also of the power imbalance between researcher and participant. Therefore, like other feminist researchers, I attempt to utilize methods that will help to reduce the power difference in the researcher-participant relationship. Although the methods of open-ended interviewing and participant observation that I employ are generally seen as addressing this power divide because they give participants greater voice in how they are represented, these methods also create new challenges in the research process. Namely, I

must work to balance my voice with participants’ voices in the final research report and to avoid exploitation of friendships forged through the research process.

I attempted to address these challenges by maintaining reflexivity and dialogue with participants throughout the research process. In regards to reflexivity, I engaged in reflexive memoing during the processes of data collection and analysis, and I discuss my role in the research setting in the report of my case study in chapter 6. In following a dialogic approach, I explained my research goals and procedures to participants before beginning data collection and asked them to review and sign informed consent forms, which had been approved by the University of Maryland, College Park Institutional Review Board.26 During the data collection stage, I privileged participants’ voices when seeking out leads for further questioning and inquiry. During the early data analysis stage, I requested participants’ feedback regarding emerging themes and findings. Remaining in dialogue with my participants during the research process allowed me to privilege their words, their conceptual frameworks, and the connections they draw between different phenomena, instead of trying to fit their lives into a predetermined theoretical framework. However, my dialogic approach had limits, as I was not in dialogue with my participants during the final stages of my research analysis and the writing up of my dissertation, and the final conclusions are mine alone. Expanding the role of participants in the data analysis and writing up stages of research is a goal I would like to pursue in future research endeavors. I discuss my processes of data collection and analysis in more detail in chapter 6.

26 Copies of these forms can be found in Appendices IV, V, VI, and VII.
The validity and reliability of my case study are strengthened by the interactive analysis of data from the multiple methods I employ. In addition, I enhance the validity of my study through quality craftsmanship throughout all stages of the research process. Following Steinar Kvale, I understand quality craftsmanship to include “continually checking, questioning, and theoretically interpreting the findings.” As Kvale states, “In a craftsmanship approach to validation, the emphasis is moved from inspection at the end of the production line to quality control throughout the stages of knowledge production.” In applying this approach to my research, I built regular checks into my processes of data collection and analysis. These checks included considering many different interpretations of the research data, looking for evidence that contradicted emerging themes and theories, analyzing exceptions or extreme cases to emerging patterns to better understand the complexity of my participants’ worlds, attempting to validate patterns by checking for multiple instances of such patterns, discussing my emerging themes with participants, and being reflexive about the assumptions I bring into the research process and the effect I have on the research setting. In addition, I checked the validity and reliability of my study by considering my conclusions in light of research conducted in similar topical areas. This approach to validity complements the interpretive approach to data collection and analysis that I follow in my research.

27 See Denzin and Lincoln, 8.


29 Ibid., 27.
1.2 Research Questions and Chapter Outline

The remainder of this dissertation is divided into six chapters that enable me to chart the myriad of forces that influenced the development of the Russian movement against human trafficking. While I seek to illuminate the specific historical factors that gave rise to this movement, I also aim to apply insights from my study to more general questions about how transnational advocacy networks operate and how they can more effectively and democratically produce change on the national and international levels. Therefore, in this dissertation, my research is directed at answering the following questions:

1. What social, political, and economic conditions existed in Russia during this time period (1998-2008) that allowed human trafficking to flourish while also enabling the development of a movement to counter this practice?

2. How can TANs, such as transnational advocacy networks against human trafficking, influence the policy and practice of states on important social issues, such as the issue of human trafficking?

3. What insights can transnational feminist theory offer to enhance the effectiveness and egalitarian practices of TANs?

In chapter 2, “The Concept of ‘Civil Society,’ and the Push by Western Governments to Promote Civil Society Growth in Developing and Post-Socialist Countries,” I discuss the theoretical development of the concept of civil society, review various understandings of the concept, and set out the definition of “civil society” that I use in this dissertation. In addition, I review the establishment of foreign aid programs by Western governments, especially the United States, designed to promote the growth of civil societies in developing and post-socialist countries. I examine the intent and
purposes behind these programs by donor governments and the effects of such programs on the countries in which they were implemented. Although civil society aid programs grew out of Western development and democracy funding to countries in Latin America, Africa, and South Asia in the 1970s and 1980s, they were extended to Russia and other post-socialist countries after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. This chapter provides the theoretical and conceptual foundation for the following chapters, in which I specifically examine Russian societal conditions that contributed to the emergence and operation of the Russian movement against human trafficking.

In chapter 3, “The Development of Russian Civil Society, 1991-2008,” I narrow my focus to examine the development of civil society in Russia in the post-Soviet era. I review the political, economic, and social changes that occurred during the transition period and discuss how these changes impacted the emerging shape of Russia’s civil society. Additionally, I examine the flow of foreign aid from the West, primarily from the United States, to Russia to assist in the economic and political transition, and consider how the implementation of these aid programs affected the developing post-cold war relationship between Russian and the West. While analyzing civil society aid programs in terms of their impact on Russian-Western relations, I highlight the agency of Russian civil society activists who took advantage of available foreign funds to construct a civil society that was in line with their activist visions and responsive to the needs of their communities. Thus, while both Russian governmental policies and the availability of significant amounts of foreign aid impacted the growth of Russia’s post-Soviet civil society in these early years of its development, I argue that Russian activists skillfully
utilized available resources and navigated around political and economic obstacles to play the lead role in establishing the scope and direction of civil society growth.

Chapter 4, “The Development of the Russian Women’s Movement, 1991-2008,” examines the particular impact of the post-Soviet transition on women and the emergence of a women’s movement to counter the negative consequences of the transition period and to provide a platform for women to contribute their voices to the important social reforms occurring during this period. I begin with a brief overview of women’s organizing in Russia from a historical perspective, particularly focusing on the gendered structure of life under the Soviet Union and women’s responses to opportunities or lack of opportunities to improve their lives during this era. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, women activists seized the opportunity to organize and to work for the betterment of their communities. I discuss the arrival of Western feminists in Russia, their contributions to the development of Russia’s women’s movement, and the growing, but often challenging, relationships between Western and Russian women activists.

Likewise, I analyze the arrival of foreign aid targeted towards Russian women’s organizations, and discuss how the availability of these funds shaped the development of Russia’s women’s movement. Although civil society aid specifically directed at Russian women’s organizations had many of the same impacts as did aid directed at Russian civil society as a whole, the Russian crisis center movement on the issue of gendered violence proved to be an exception to the pattern of short-term, unsustainable funding that had stimulated the founding, and eventual closure, of many women’s organizations.30 Instead, the relatively large amounts of aid directed at crisis centers, the commitment of

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30 In Russia, the crisis center movement incorporated activism against all forms of violence against women, including rape, domestic violence, and later, human trafficking.
the movement’s leaders, and the resonance of crisis centers with the needs of Russian society enabled the crisis center movement to flourish and to provide a strong foundation out of which the Russian movement against human trafficking would emerge at the turn of the twenty-first century.

In chapter 5, “Transnational Movements against Human Trafficking, 1800s to 2008,” I review the development of international movements against human trafficking, from campaigns against white slavery at the turn of the twentieth century, the decline in attention to the issue in the middle decades of the twentieth century, and the revival of a strong movement against human trafficking at the turn of the twenty-first century. I discuss the work of feminists in initiating and leading movements against human trafficking, and explore how feminist debates regarding prostitution and sex work have informed the broader counter-trafficking movement and helped to shape the political divisions that mark the contemporary movement. I examine the emergence of strong TANs on both sides of the prostitution debate, and the role of these TANs in the development and implementation of international counter-trafficking instruments, including the UN Protocol on Human Trafficking and the U.S. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act. Finally, I examine the spread of counter-trafficking activism to Russia in the late 1990s, specific patterns of human trafficking that existed in Russia, and the unique counter-trafficking movement that developed through the combined influence of international counter-trafficking norms and funding, the assertion of Russian state interest concerning this issue, and the determination of activists to induce state action to combat this crime.
In chapter 6, “A Case Study of the Angel Coalition, 1998-2008,” I present the findings from my qualitative study of Russia’s leading counter-trafficking organization. I discuss the factors that contributed to the organization’s development and the many counter-trafficking projects it carried out to raise the awareness of the Russian public about the issue, directly assist affected individuals, develop a national response system to the crime, and serve as a leader of the national movement. I analyze the AC both as a part of Russian civil society, examining its struggle to survive as an NGO in an environment with limited funding opportunities and burdensome government regulations on foreign-financed NGOs, and as a part of a transnational network against human trafficking, exploring its stance on the prostitution debate, its alliance with like-minded organizations and funders, and its participation in international policymaking forums. Through this case study, I demonstrate how a unique combination of personal and organizational factors enabled the AC to thrive as a sustainable organization in a volatile environment and to amass the influence needed to push the Russian state to action on the issue of human trafficking.

In chapter 7, “Conclusion,” I summarize my research findings and suggest how these findings can contribute to the further development of theory on transnational civil society and transnational feminism. My contribution to scholarship on transnational civil society is to suggest ways that NGOs in states with closed political environments can utilize their resources and their transnational ties to navigate around political obstacles and press their governments for change. In regards to scholarship on transnational feminism, I draw upon insights from my case study of cross-cultural activists working together towards shared goals to recommend ways in which transnational feminist
networks can further promote the values of egalitarianism, democracy, and respect for diversity within their ranks. I argue that, through the development of progressive, egalitarian organizing practices, transnational feminist networks can serve as leaders in the area of cross-cultural communication in the growing transnational civil society arena. In strengthening communication and organizing practices among their diverse members, transnational advocacy networks will only enhance their effectiveness in acting as representatives of the global public and in pushing states and intergovernmental organizations for more responsive and humane policies.
Chapter 2: The Concept of “Civil Society” and the Push by Western Governments to Promote Civil Society Growth in Developing and Post-Socialist Countries

In charting the development of the Russian movement against human trafficking and the founding of its leading organization, the Angel Coalition, it is important to understand the domestic and international factors that gave rise to this movement. The confluence of several global forces, namely, the international women’s movement, the international movement against human trafficking, and the push by Western countries to promote the growth of civil societies in developing and post-socialist countries, created conditions in post-Soviet Russia in the 1990s that facilitated the emergence of a domestic counter-trafficking movement. In this chapter, I examine the efforts by Western countries to strengthen civil societies in developing and post-socialist countries in order to illuminate the political goals and interests that lay behind such foreign aid programs and the impact such programs had on bilateral relations between countries providing such aid and those receiving it.

As will be discussed in this chapter, “civil society aid” programs administered by Western countries grew out of their more general “democracy aid” programs to

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1 “Democracy aid” is a term used by many Western governmental agencies and foundations to describe aid programs aimed at developing democratic institutions and practices in recipient countries. This type of aid is provided separately from humanitarian aid and military aid and, despite its name, has not always been perceived as being implemented democratically by recipient countries. Within the U.S., leading providers of democracy aid are the United States Agency for International Development, the United States Information Agency, the Department of State, and the National Endowment for Democracy. Some providers of this type of aid outside the U.S. are the European Commission, the British Council, and the Canadian International Development Agency.
developing,² and later, post-socialist countries. Thus, one of the main purposes of civil society aid programs was to promote the development of democratic political systems in line with Western understandings of democracy. As a “healthy civil society” came to be seen as an essential component of a “healthy democracy,” Western countries, led by the United States, increasingly incorporated aid directed at civil society development in their foreign aid budgets. In the eyes of Western policymakers, this approach had the added benefit of placing assistance funds directly in the hands of activists or average citizens in these countries, and bypassing government officials, many of whom had come to be seen as corrupt after mishandling funds provided under earlier democracy aid programs. Such democracy aid programs existed alongside other foreign aid programs, including programs of economic and military aid.

As democracy aid programs emerged during the cold war era, they were largely aimed at providing assistance to developing countries, which were viewed as vulnerable to Soviet influence. Hence, an implicit goal of such programs was to draw these countries closer into the U.S. sphere of influence and away from the threat of Soviet cooptation. Thus, when Russia itself, the former leader of the Soviet Union, became a recipient of these aid programs in the 1990s, it made for a unique, and paradoxical, situation. As the former head of an expansive empire, Russia was accustomed to doling out funds and benefits to its allied countries, not the other way

² I use the term “developing country” to reflect the literature with which I am working, although I am aware of debates regarding the appropriateness of this term and assumptions concerning proper stages of “development” that inform the usage of this term in Western countries. See, for example, David Hulme and Michael Edwards, eds., NGOs, States, and Donors: Too Close for Comfort?, (New York: St. Martins, 1997); and Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).
around. However, with the fall of the Soviet Union causing a major shift in global power relations, Russia was open to a new global structure, in which it renewed its allegiance with “the West” and accepted Western assistance to rebuild its economic and political systems to more closely resemble the Western models.  

In this chapter, I tell the beginning parts of this story, as I review the development of Western programs to promote democracy and civil society and the initial efforts to implement such programs in the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s. In the next chapter, I will continue this story and go into more detail on the specific consequences of such Western aid to Russia. However, first, I begin with a theoretical discussion on the concept of “civil society,” and on the relationship of “civil society” to “the state,” which takes different forms in different national contexts, in order to better understand the interest of Western countries in promoting the development of this societal sector. I examine different models of “civil society-state relations” in Western and post-Soviet countries, and review how these models reflect the differing social histories and political structures on which they are based. Although civil societies can take on the role of either cooperative partner or opposition figure to the state, the very existence of a civil society implies a degree of democracy, in that independent social or political organizing is permitted to occur outside of state structures.

3 The use of the term “the West” and the practice of comparing Russia with “the West” have been much debated among scholars. Although I am aware of these debates, I choose to employ this term and to examine “Western-Russian relationships” to reflect the conversations taking place within the literatures I am exploring and to honor the meaning-making systems of the activists I studied, who also use this term and contrast Russia with “the West.” In this dissertation, when speaking of “the West,” I am referring to North American and Western European countries. See Julie Hemment, Empowering Women in Russia: Activism, Aid, and NGOs (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 153, no. 3, who makes a similar argument for use of “the West” as an analytical category.
2.1 Understanding the Concept of “Civil Society”

What is “civil society” and how is it related to government? Various literatures employ contrasting meanings of the concept and include different actors under this umbrella term. In this section, I provide an overview of the development of the concept of civil society, discuss differing ways the concept is used in the literatures to be covered in this dissertation, and present the definition that will be employed in the remainder of this text.

2.1.1 History of the Concept of “Civil Society” in Western Thought

Although many theorists throughout the history of Western thought, including John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, David Hume, G. W. F. Hegel, Karl Marx, Adam Smith, and Alexis de Tocqueville, among others, have contributed to the development of this concept, civil society was much neglected in the modern era both as a subject of scholarly interest and as a tool for political analysis until capturing popular attention in the 1980s. A major catalyst for this renewal of interest was the emergence of the dissident movements in Eastern Europe. After decades of authoritarian rule in Soviet bloc countries, usually with little space for the organization of groups not sponsored by the government, the success of these movements in uniting populations and igniting revolutions that ended Soviet rule led scholars, policymakers, grant providers, and average citizens to gain interest in the concept of civil society as a positive, constructive force that can help

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5 See Ibid., 2; Carothers (1999), 207; and Hemment (2007), 50.
maintain democracy in the world. During this same period, human rights movements developed in South America as countries on that continent adopted democratic forms of government, which strengthened the conclusion that a strong “civil society” is important to promoting democracy.\(^6\)

One of the most influential scholars to publish during this period was Robert Putnam, whose 1993 book *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* laid out a neo-Tocquevillian theory of civil society upon which both scholars and practitioners of democracy aid would base their work for years to come. In the book, Putnam examines the development of regional governments across Italy starting in 1970 and argues that the “more civic” regions, characterized “by a dense network of local associations, by active engagement in community affairs, by egalitarian patterns of politics, by trust and law-abidingness” established more effective governments with greater levels of citizen satisfaction than “less civic” regions characterized by lack of citizen involvement in civic associations, suspicion, corruption, and lawlessness.\(^7\) He contends that “social capital,” such as networks and norms of reciprocity and trust among individuals, promotes collaborative decision making, which is an essential feature of democracy.

Putnam invokes Alexis de Tocqueville often in his work, reviving Tocqueville’s emphasis on the importance of associations for democratic governance. A Frenchman visiting “the most democratic country on the face of the earth” in the

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\(^6\) Carothers (1999), 207-208.

1830s, Tocqueville sought to understand the benefits and dangers of the American form of democracy in order to transport its most favorable aspects to French soil. Arguing that the United States was the only country “where the citizens enjoy unlimited freedom of association for political purposes,” Tocqueville examined the impact of such freedom on democracy. He notes, “When the members of a community are allowed and accustomed to combine for all purposes, they will combine as readily for the lesser as for the more important ones.” Furthermore, “Civil associations… facilitate political associations; but, on the other hand, political association singularly strengthens and improves associations for civil purposes.” Admiring the American tendency to “constantly form associations” for a multitude of purposes, Tocqueville concludes:

Among the laws that rule human societies there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions [i.e., democratic governance] is increased.

Building upon Tocqueville’s argument, Putnam contends that when citizens interact frequently in voluntary associations (Putnam emphasizes non-political

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9 Ibid., 115.

10 Ibid., 117.

11 Ibid., 115.

12 Ibid., 106.

13 Ibid., 110.
associations such as soccer clubs, choral societies, bird watching groups, literary circles, etc.), they build “habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public-spiritedness,”
democratic values that incline them to become involved in public affairs.\textsuperscript{14} When such values are deeply imbedded in a society, the population is more likely to become active in decision-making processes and to be willing to compromise with other individuals and groups. At the same time, citizens in “civic” communities expect better government and are prepared to act collectively to achieve it, leading to more stable and effective democratic institutions.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, Putnam concludes, a vibrant civil society strengthens democratic governance. He later furthered this conclusion with his research on civil society in the United States.\textsuperscript{16} In the transition period in post-Soviet countries, practitioners of democracy aid and scholars on the region’s growing civil societies seized upon Putman’s argument to support the idea that active and free civil societies would help democracy succeed in the region.

Putnam’s theory of civil society helped popularize the concept in modern-day scholarship and has guided the efforts of many practitioners of democracy aid since the early 1990s; however, to better understand how the term is employed in the literatures of concern, I will review the broader theoretical foundations of the concept. Historically, the concepts of “civil society” and of “democracy” have often been tied together, because civil society, as understood by many theorists, emerges when the public is no longer subsumed under state domination and instead establishes an arena

\textsuperscript{14} Putnam (1993), 89-90.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 11, 182.

that can interact with the state. As Adam Seligman argues, “It is after all the very existence of a free and equal citizenry—of that autonomous, agentic individual—of the private subject that makes civil society possible at all.”

He notes:

The concept of civil society as a collective entity existing independently of the State has… been critical to the history of Western political thought…. And although the concept of civil society was defined differently by the different theorists of the French, Scottish, and German Enlightenments, what was common to all attempts to articulate a notion of civil society was the problematic relation between the private and the public, the individual and the social, public ethics and private interests, individual passions and public concerns.

Seligman traces the emergence of the concept of civil society to the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a period of societal and economic transformation across Europe and North America. Seligman writes, “The general crisis of the seventeenth century—the commercialization of land, labor, and capital; the growth of market economies; the age of discoveries; and the English and later North American and continental revolutions—all brought into question the existing models of social order and of authority.” As people began to challenge the generally accepted notion of social order as determined by an external force, such as

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17 Seligman, 5.
18 Ibid., 5.
19 Ibid., 15.
God, King, or tradition, the concept of civil society arose in European social thought as a model for explaining the workings of society.²⁰

Jurgen Habermas, like Seligman, locates the advent of civil society (which he refers to as the “public sphere of civil society”) in Europe to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but focuses specifically on the role of the early capitalist commercial economy in bringing about this societal development. Whereas under feudal society, rulers presented laws to their subjects with no expectation of debate, early capitalism produced a class of merchants, bankers, and entrepreneurs that was influential enough to challenge state regulations disagreeable to their interests. Early capitalist commercial economies and the nation states that arose on their basis shook up the old social order and required new understandings of the “public” and the “private” spheres.²¹ This development was understood as ending state domination, by requiring laws to be debated in public by members of the “bourgeois public sphere,” which, in truth, was formed by a small minority of people.²²

In the eighteenth century, publics expanded due, in part, to the proliferation of the press and campaigns for general franchise. Whereas, previously, the bourgeois public sphere presented a relatively unified front to the state, the entry of the “common people” into the public sphere created an arena of competing interests. Habermas notes, “Laws passed under the ‘pressure of the street’ could hardly be understood any longer as embodying the reasonable consensus of publicly debating

²⁰ Ibid., 15-16.


²² Ibid., 27.
private persons." In place of a sphere that stood in opposition to state domination, the enlarged public sphere was composed of competing interest groups lobbying the state with their individual demands, which contributed to the formation of a centralized, bureaucratized state to meet these demands.

Habermas contends that these societal changes led to the “breakdown of the public sphere”: “While it penetrated more spheres of society, it simultaneously lost its political function, namely: that of subjecting the affairs that it had made public to the control of a political public.” Habermas’s description of the public sphere as a force opposing state domination, or in its weakened form, serving as a check on state power, differs from the theory set out by Tocqueville and Putnam, which focuses on voluntary cooperation between civil society and the state, and plays an important role in current scholarly debates on the function of civil society.

In recent years, many civil society scholars have emphasized contradictions in theorizations of the concept and have developed models to explain variations in civil society development in differing contexts. Michael Foley and Bob Edwards review what they call the “two broad versions of ‘the civil society argument’” and find fault with both of them due to a lack of attention to political variables. What they call the “Civil Society I argument,” represented by Putnam and Tocqueville, among others, stresses the importance of voluntary associations in inculcating norms of trust, reciprocity, and cooperation among citizens and groups of citizens. In this version,

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23 Ibid., 132.

24 Ibid., 140.

cooperative relations between civil society and the state help to maintain healthy
democratic practices. Putnam, their chosen spokesperson for the Civil Society I
argument, stresses the importance of “inclusive” and “cross-cutting” nonpolitical
associations, such as choral societies or bird-watching clubs, that do not lobby for
special interests and that are open to all individuals, regardless of political orientation,
because they enable citizens with diverse backgrounds and interests to come together
and learn the value of cooperation and compromise. 26 Foley and Edwards contend
that Putnam’s neglect of political associations is due to “the fear that if such
associations follow too closely the pattern of divisive political solidarities, they may
well sharpen social cleavages and actually undermine the capacity for effective
governance.” 27

In contrast to this position, the “Civil Society II argument,” which Foley and
Edwards maintain was advocated by scholars on and activists involved in the
democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America, emphasizes civil
society as a sphere that is separate from the state and is capable of guarding against
tyrranical rule. In this version, the oppositional nature of civil society is said to
strengthen democracy by preventing the state from backsliding into authoritarianism.
This argument stresses the importance of nonpolitical associations because, “[i]n
contexts of democratic transition, …where established political parties have been
repressed, weakened, or used as tools by the authoritarian state, autonomy from
traditional politics seems to be a prerequisite for oppositional advocacy.” 28

26 See Putnam (1993), 90.
27 Foley and Edwards, 46.
Foley and Edwards argue that both broad civil society arguments neglect the “political variable,” and they emphasize how specifically political associations and advocacy groups do much of the work of upholding democratic practices. Theorists of civil society, they argue, must pay attention to the context in which these theories developed. Tocqueville and Putnam discovered more cooperative relations between civil society and the state, they maintain, because they were studying established, stable democracies where the rules of the game had already been set. In contrast, activists in Eastern Europe and Latin America were attempting to create an independent sphere to counter state tyranny, and thus they focused on the oppositional nature of civil society. Additionally, Foley and Edwards stress that theorists must recognize the interdependence between the spheres of civil society and the state. The “paradox of civil society,” they explain, “is that a democratic civil society seems to require a democratic state, and a strong civil society seems to require a strong and responsive state.”

Thus, in their theorization, civil society in most contexts is neither subservient to the state nor totally opposed to it. Instead, the relations between these two spheres remain complex, with multiple checks of power and overlaps characterizing their relationship.

2.1.2 Liberal and Statist Models of Civil Society: Which Model is Best for Russia?

Scholars have developed models of civil society with the specific aim of explaining the different trajectories of civil society development in the West and in Russia. While some scholars use other labels for these contrasting models, here I follow

28 Ibid., 46.

29 Ibid., 47.
Henry Hale, who has provided one of the most thorough discussions on such theories, in referring to them as the “liberal model” and the “statist model.”

To summarize such theories, a liberal conception of state-civil society relations is based on the assumption that states tend towards authoritarianism and that the function of civil society is to prevent the state from becoming too powerful. These assumptions are based on the writings of such theorists as John Locke and John Stuart Mill, who, according to Vladimir Shlapentokh, “distinguished ‘natural liberty’ and the freedom to choose one’s government as the necessary conditions ‘for the progress of civilization.’” In a liberal civil society, groups and organizations should be as autonomous from the state as possible and should promote the interests of their constituency to the state in a setting in which other groups and organizations are representing their own constituencies. Thus, such a model assumes competition between groups for scarce resources. Structurally, this model “envisions society as a set of associations standing between the private sphere (encompassing individual and family activities) and the state, acting independently of the state.”

George Hudson argues that such a model of civil society develops when independent groups form at the beginning of the nation-building process, as occurred in the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In such a “bottom-up”

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31 Shlapentokh, 981.

32 Hale, 307-308.

33 Ibid., 307.
model, as Hudson refers to it, “civic groups form spontaneously and influence the government, directly or indirectly.” Hale adds that, while support for the liberal model is not unique to the United States:

[T]he dominance of this view in American policymaking and academic circles can be seen as growing out of the American political experience…. The founders of the American polity proceeded from a strong tradition of local self-government. Their ability to realize the benefits of a larger polity, given this tradition of localism, could only be achieved politically by building in institutional guarantees that the new central government would not eventually lead to tyranny.35

In contrast to the liberal understanding of civil society, the statist conception of state-civil society relations is based on the assumption that a strong state is desirable and that civil society should support the strengthening of the state. This model draws from classical thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, who “believed that ‘order’ and effective law enforcement were the primary conditions for human survival.”36 In place of interest groups competing to gain state resources for their own particular constituencies, the statist model prefers a stable mechanism of “two-way transmission of interests between the state and nonstate society.”37 With less time wasted in debates and lobbying sessions, it is assumed that a cooperative

34 Hudson, 215.
35 Hale, 308.
36 Shlapentokh, 981.
37 Hale, 309.
relationship between civil society and the state will allow the state to more effectively meet the needs of its citizens.

While the liberal model advocates that civil society should structurally be independent from the state, the statist model “sees the state and society as integrally related, part of the same organic whole. Indeed, the state itself grows out of and cannot be distinguished clearly from society since the state is inhabited, constituted, and continually reconstituted by individuals who are themselves ‘also’ part of society in capacities outside their roles as state employees.” 38 This model assumes that a cooperative relationship between civil society and the state will prevent the state from becoming too powerful, but that the state must also place restrictions on civil society to prevent it from becoming destructive to the state, e.g., by criticizing national history and culture or becoming overly confrontational. Thus, the state should take an active role in developing a civil society that would support state functioning.

In such a “top-down” model, as Hudson refers to it, “the government may initiate or otherwise encourage the formation of civic groups by creating policies and procedures that, in turn, yield the conditions for the groups to be established.” 39 Hale argues that support for a statist model of state-society relations in the Russian political establishment is due to Russia’s history and political culture. Writing in 2002, he states:

[T]he experience of the past ten years, with its precipitous decline in stability, security, and incomes for a majority of people, has done much to associate the

38 Ibid., 309.

39 Hudson, 215.
lack of state control over nonstate society with problems resulting from the particular path chosen after communist rule collapsed.\textsuperscript{40}

Thus, Hale concludes, while Americans’ primary fear is tyranny, the most pressing fear for Russians is anarchy. The models of civil society that have developed in these two states reflect their underlying national values and histories.

Scholars on Russian civil society have debated which of these two models are more appropriate for post-Soviet Russia. In the years preceding the collapse of communism, many scholars argue, the roots of a “liberal model” of civil society, or a model following the “Civil Society II argument” described by Foley and Edwards, began to take hold in Russia, with civil society opposing communist authorities and precipitating the fall of the Soviet empire. While not amassing the strength of oppositional civil societies in some Eastern European countries, civil society actors in Russia did appear in the late 1980s to challenge the authority of the state. Shlapentokh writes, “The true expansion of Russian civil society began in 1987 when Gorbachev’s \textit{perestroika} took its liberal course…. The advocates of liberal capitalism in the Soviet Union became committed enemies of the state.”\textsuperscript{41} Shlapentokh argues that a liberal civil society in Russia reached its peak between 1988-1991, when thousands of informal organizations were founded, a national miners’ strike led the population to put its faith in a new political opposition, and the first free elections were held in the Soviet Union. By 1990, he writes, millions of people were

\begin{footnotes}
\item[40] Hale, 310.
\item[41] Shlapentokh, 984.
\end{footnotes}
participating in political activism meetings across the country to oppose the Communist Party. \(^\text{42}\)

After 1991, however, liberal civil society declined as political and economic reforms such as “shock therapy” were put into place from above with little consultation with civil society actors. Shlapentokh writes, “The process of privatization demoralized society, established corruption as a normal part of Russian life and made the masses politically indifferent and highly individualistic.” \(^\text{43}\)

Alexander Domrin argues that the refusal of Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1992 to meet with the Civic Union, “the most promising and influential democratic organization standing in opposition to the domestic and foreign policies of the Russian government in general, and to the disastrous course of Anatolii Chubais’s privatization and the experiments of market bolsheviks with the Russian economy in particular,” signaled that the state no longer desired to cooperate with civil society. \(^\text{44}\)

Shlapentokh contends that an even stronger message was sent in October 1993, when Yeltsin used tanks to dismantle the Russian parliament and arrest its leaders, symbolizing the end of the fledging liberal era of Russian civil society. \(^\text{45}\)

David Ost, writing about the role of civil society in ending communist rule in Poland, notes a pattern in many countries’ post-communist transitions: “[A]ll of civil society was now pushed to the background. It had made political democracy possible, but now that democracy existed, its role was to accept these changes

\(^{42}\) Ibid., 984.

\(^{43}\) Ibid., 985.

\(^{44}\) Domrin, 197.

\(^{45}\) Shlapentokh, 991.
peacefully." In Russia, in place of average citizens calling for change, after 1991, elites took control of the process of reform, many with the aim of obtaining personal advantages through the privatization of the economy. In what several scholars recognize as the “betrayal of civil society,” intellectual leaders of the oppositional movements abandoned the masses to join the elites in seeking economic and political benefits in the transition period. Leaders of the liberal movement asked their followers for patience and trust as Russian authorities and their Western advisors steered the transition process; as they waited, the long-awaited outcomes of “democracy,” “freedom,” and “reason” turned into valorization of the market economy.

After 1991-1993, many scholars contend, a more statist model of state-civil society relations began to develop in Russia. Hudson writes, “Since 1991 the Russian government has been a sponsor and, it says, a protector of civil society by passing national legislation to guarantee the existence of civic groups and to regulate them at the same time….It thus reinforces the role of the center in civil society.” In Shlapentokh’s terms, after 1993, a liberal feudal civil society emerged in which the central government remained weak and a small elite “enjoyed freedoms and a degree

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47 See Shlapentokh, 985; and Ost, 191-193.

48 Ost, 193.


50 Hudson, 216.
of influence on the ruling of society.”\textsuperscript{51} Namely, he writes, administrative officials, tycoons, oligarchs, and criminal structures disproportionately benefited from and exerted influence over developments in Russian society, while the central government and the masses played limited roles. Shlapentokh contends that Russian leadership wanted to encourage a mix of liberal and statist elements in civil society that would pose the weakest challenge to the power of the president and the elite.\textsuperscript{52} He writes:

When [Russian President Vladimir] Putin came to power he curtailed the activity of the NGOs that claimed to influence the central administration, while governors and mayors did the same at the local level. Though the Kremlin made the development of genuine civil society impossible, it took great trouble to give the impression that it supported the creation of civil society. The Kremlin was convinced that a good civil society should trust the government, cooperate with it “on the basis of dialogue” and offer “additional resources” that would help the state achieve its goals. There was, of course, never a word about how civil society would influence the state.\textsuperscript{53}

Writing in 2003, Shlapentokh argues that, despite Putin’s firm approach, oligarchs continued to grow in power and even joined the Kremlin in creating mimicked independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Scholars remain divided, however, on which model is the most advantageous for Russia. Shlapentokh notes that both liberal and statist influences existed in post-Soviet civil society but emphasizes the importance and necessity of the statist

\textsuperscript{51} Shlapentokh, 985.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 991-992.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 996.
elements. Shlapentokh points to the government’s establishment of the Civic Forum in 2001 as an illustration of the strengthening of the statist model. While the stated purpose of the Forum was to unite the efforts of “all non-governmental organizations and the state for the creation of genuine civil society in Russia,” Shlapentokh notes that independent organizations perceived to pose a threat to the state were not invited to join the Forum.\textsuperscript{54} A reason for excluding the stronger organizations, Shlapentokh suggests, was the relative weakness of the Russian state, which made it ill-prepared to work constructively with oppositionist groups. This weakness, Shlapentokh argues, stemmed from the liberal model of civil society pushed on Russia by native reformers and their Western advisors, a model that “downgraded the importance of an effective state, which is necessary for enforcing law in society.”\textsuperscript{55} In such a context, strengthening the state took precedence over developing a liberal civil society, as a strong state was needed to build and enforce a legal foundation upon which civil society could function.

Like Shlapentokh, Domrin also stresses the need for order and the rule of law in supporting healthy state-society relations. He argues that the reforms undertaken by supporters of the liberal system in the 1990s led to the pillaging of Russia and a host of economic and social problems that plagued Russia at the turn of the twenty-first century. Domrin writes, “To be successful, civil society in Russia must develop in tandem with the strengthening of Russian statehood…. Russians are tired of the

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 996.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 1000.
state-weakening activities of radical social groups and organizations that came to existence at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s.”

Domrin supports his arguments by referring to the results of public opinion polls in Russia that he says demonstrate the public’s lack of trust in civic organizations and the democratic process. One such poll, conducted in 2000, found that 81 percent of Russians believed that order was the “most important issue for the country at present,” “even if it is necessary to break some democratic principles and limit people’s personal freedoms to establish it.” Another poll, conducted in 2001, found that “only 5 percent of Russian citizens are active in public organizations, 73 percent said they would not like to work in any public organization, versus 15 percent who said that they would.” Domrin notes that legal systems and national cultures develop gradually over centuries, and that a vibrant civil society cannot be expected to flourish in Russia only in a matter of decades. Writing in 2003, he states that Russia was in a state of crisis and that “destitute people are unable to form a civil society.” Instead, he argues, Russians must focus on strengthening the Russian state.

While Shlapentokh and Domrin support a more statist model of state-civil society relations in Russia, Hudson and Hale suggest that a liberal model may in fact be more beneficial in the Russian context. Like Shlapentokh, Hudson discusses the Civic Forum, but he views the event differently. While Shlapentokh emphasizes the

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56 Domrin, 202.
57 Ibid., 206.
58 Ibid., 204-205.
59 Ibid., 211.
groups that were excluded, Hudson stresses the Forum as a constructive first step taken by the government in developing a “partnership” between state institutions and NGOs.\(^{60}\) Hudson points to several trends that demonstrate the potential of a liberal civil society in Russia, including the large number and activity of NGOs, governmental efforts to communicate with civil society, the diverse funding sources of Russian organizations, and the guarantees of free speech and assembly in the Russian Constitution. Based on the evidence he reviews, Hudson finds “a symbiotic relationship between NKOs [noncommercial organizations] and the Russian government that suggest a departure from the traditional Russian state-society relationships that Domrin discusses.”\(^ {61}\) He argues that out of this symbiosis a vigorous civil society could grow in Russia.

Similarly, Hale promotes the viability of a liberal model of civil society in Russia. He argues that, while a statist model prioritizes the need to prevent anarchy over the need to prevent tyranny, the threat of tyranny is actually greater in Russia. He writes:

> The advantage attributed to the statist option depends on two important assumptions that are at least questionable in the Russian context. The first is that autonomous nonstate social organizations are actually threatening to the state. . . . The second questionable assumption . . . is that the state itself is a functional institution, that it is not destructive of Russian nationhood, of society, or, indeed, of itself.\(^ {62}\)

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\(^{60}\) Hudson, 217.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., 221.
Examining the government’s regulation of political parties, mass media, human rights organizations, and economic associations, Hale concludes that the Russian state poses a larger threat to national stability than does civil society. He challenges Domrin’s conclusions regarding public opinion polls and suggests alternative readings of such polls. Whereas Domrin references a poll showing that Russians prioritize order over democracy, Hale cites a 2000 poll that “found that only 15 percent supported restoring order ‘at all costs’ and that a majority (51 percent) thought that this must be done ‘without violating rights.’” In addition, Hale notes that although polls have shown Russians to be mistrustful of civic organizations, they also show Russians to be mistrustful of state institutions. Domrin himself references this finding, but uses it to argue that state institutions must exert stronger control over Russian society. In contrast, Hale contends that the statist approach has “tended to facilitate arbitrary abuses of power by state authorities, which ultimately have weakened the Russian state and caused the rest of society to suffer.” Hale argues, “[T]he uncontrolled realm of individuals that some statists fear only appears to be a problem because the state has not yet learned how to compromise and to work with, and not over, nonstate society.” While Hale agrees that the Russian state needs to be strengthened, he also suggests that a more independent civil society in the liberal tradition may be beneficial for Russia.

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62 Hale, 313.
63 Ibid., 318.
64 Ibid., 319.
65 Ibid., 313.
In the years after the 2002-2003 debate between the aforementioned writers, relations between civil society and the state continued to develop along statist lines. In the conclusion to their edited volume on Russian civil society published in 2006, Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom and Laura Henry write:

Undoubtedly the Russian state plays the dominant role in state-society interaction. The state’s traditional monopoly on organizational resources has led to its continued control over many of the institutions and funds that are commonly associated with civil society development.\(^{66}\)

They note that the strong presence of the state in civil society builds upon “the long-standing Russian tradition of statism…which originated well before the Soviet period.”\(^{67}\) This trajectory of civil society development in Russia has led many scholars to question the expectation that a stronger civil society will keep the power of the state in check and promote democracy. It has also caused many to debate the effectiveness of Western funding programs that are based on the assumption that Russian civil society will develop according to the liberal model. These issues will be explored in more depth in chapter 3.

In place of the concept of “civil society,” some scholars on Russia prefer the idea of the “third sector.” As James Richter explains:

*Civil society* refers to an overlapping network of autonomous voluntary associations—formal and informal, political and nonpolitical—that creates a space for public action between the individual and the state…. The *third*


\(^{67}\) Ibid., 316.
sector, on the other hand, refers more narrowly to the formal, functionally differentiated, and frequently professional nonprofit organizations that interact with state and market actors.  

Structurally, a civil society model is based on the conception of three societal actors, namely, (1) the state, (2) private individuals and families, and (3) voluntary organizations standing between state institutions and individuals, with some theorists including private businesses in the civil sphere of voluntary organizations. In contrast, a model of the third sector envisions a triad of (1) the state, (2) the market, and (3) voluntary organizations, each of which cooperates and negotiates with the other parties as equal partners. While the civil society model is unclear as to the role of private businesses, the third sector model downplays the contribution of informal social networks to the functioning of society.

As norms associated with civil society, such as trust, cooperation, and solidarity among citizens, remained weak in Russia, some authors argue it is more appropriate to say that a third sector, not a civil society, emerged in the country. A strong civil society implies relatively open channels of communication between governmental institutions and citizens and the development of social movements that attract large constituencies based on shared beliefs among citizens. In contrast, the professionalized, bureaucratized organizations that arose in Russia, often with the aid

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69 See Hemment (2007), 51, 60.

of Western support, frequently served more as career-building vehicles for their staff than as institutions promoting horizontal, local ties among citizens.

While arguing that a third sector has taken root in Russia, Julie Hemment and Richter critique the model’s suitability for the Russian context.\(^71\) The model is based on the assumption that NGOs can interact on an equal basis with the state; however, as noted above, the state plays the dominant role in state-society relations and permits limited input from civil society actors. In addition, it is largely former elites who achieved leadership roles in the sector. Thus, whereas the civil society model aimed to challenge the hierarchy of the old Soviet *nomenklatura* and give voice to the masses, the growth of the third sector simply reproduced traditional networks and practices, but this time with the support of Western governments and foundations. The third sector model fit easily with the Western goal of promoting democracy in Russia through short-term projects of building NGOs, but scholars such as Hemment and Richter argue that the model does not encourage far-reaching changes in Russian society that are necessary to sustain the democratization project.

In light of the strong role of the state in Russian civil society, Janet Elise Johnson, a political scientist at Brooklyn College, sought an alternative to strict interpretations of liberal and statist models of civil society. She examines and criticizes the prevalence of “flex organizing” in Russia in which “there is a blurring of the lines between state institutions and [NGOs].”\(^72\) In this practice, “state social services and state university departments have created parallel NGO crisis centers so

\(^71\) Hemment (2007), 60; Richter, 55-56.

that they exist as both state institutions and societal organizations. In a situation of limited domestic resources, this permits such structures to be eligible for foreign grants to NGOs while remaining under some degree of state control.

In place of the more statist approach of “flex organizing,” Johnson supports a “third way” in which state institutions and NGOs remain separate but coordinate on initiatives. She discusses one of the few examples of such an arrangement that she found in Russia, a working group uniting activists on women’s issues and state officials in Barnaul that was successful in improving state-society communication and coordination on the issue of violence in the family. Johnson contends that maintaining the boundaries between NGOs and state structures is important in promoting transparency in state-society relations and in strengthening democratic practices in Russia. In a context in which the state is often suspicious of autonomous organizations, the third way allows state authorities a window into organizational activities while protecting the independence of NGOs and their ability to hold the state accountable for its promises. Johnson argues that such a delicate balance between independent organizing and state oversight illustrates a more realistic model for civil society development in Russia than the strictly liberal model of a civil society standing in opposition to the state.

2.1.3 Outlining a Definition of “Civil Society”

Before concluding this section, I will review definitions of civil society used in the literature and outline the definition to be employed in this dissertation. Although civil

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid., 278-279.
society has been defined in a variety of ways, the definition I use must be suitable for the subject of this dissertation and must reflect the theoretical understandings of other scholars in the field, namely, the study of the democratization project of Russia and Eastern Europe.

As scholars in the field recognize, many Western grant programs to aid civil society development in Russia were based on the theory of civil society laid out by Robert Putnam. Putnam argued that voluntary associations among citizens, especially nonpolitical organizations, instill habits of trust, solidarity, and compromise among citizens that encourage them to become active participants in democracy. Western governments and foundations drew upon this understanding to legitimize their aid programs in the region, contending that a more active citizenry would prevent the formerly communist regimes from slipping back into tyranny. As scholars in the field note, however, most Western aid programs were designed specifically to fund NGOs that lobby the government on social and political issues, whereas Putnam based his theory on community groups without political agendas.

The main area of contention in defining civil society in the field, then, centers on whether the definition should follow the theoretical understanding of civil society as encompassing all informal social networks, including those based on ethnicity, language, religion, or kinship, or follow the practical application of the concept by funding agencies, which centered on organizations involving citizens acting collectively, usually through NGOs. A broader definition of civil society as including all social networks could stretch the concept to such an extent that it loses its explanatory power. On the other hand, limiting the definition to NGOs could be
viewed as imposing a Western framework on a non-Western setting and obscuring local meaning-making systems.\textsuperscript{75}

As one of the aims of this dissertation is to better understand the effects of Western aid programs on Russian society, I draw upon the practical understanding of civil society in studying how NGOs and similar associations have impacted the dynamics of state-society interaction. At the same time, I recognize the dangers of employing a definition that is too narrow. Thus, throughout this dissertation, I remain aware of the differences between theoretical understandings of civil society and practical applications of the concept by funding agencies and acknowledge the many elements of Russian civil society beyond simply NGOs.

Scholars in the field have debated which types of groups should be included under the umbrella term of civil society. Most scholars are in agreement that civil society serves as an intermediary between state and society and that civil society organizations should be relatively autonomous from the state. However, there is disagreement over which types of organizations serve this intermediary function and what degree of autonomy is necessary to be considered part of civil society. For example, as discussed above, Foley and Edwards critique Putnam and others who downplay the role of political associations, such as political parties, in civil society and argue that such associations serve as the main intermediary between state and society by “mobilizing people and stimulating debate.”\textsuperscript{76} Among theorists


\textsuperscript{76} Foley and Edwards, 48.
specifically studying Russian civil society, however, political parties are commonly left out of their definition, since most parties aim to take control of the state. Laura Henry and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom offer a definition representational of many scholars in the field:

We contend that civil society is a space of citizen-directed collaborative action, located between the family and the state, and not directed solely toward private profit. As a consequence, we exclude from our definition political parties (which aim to capture seats of government), business firms and organized crime groups (which are profit-oriented), groups employing violence to achieve their goals, and individual activities that are not publicly oriented. Nonetheless, we argue that it is essential to consider the role played by business elites, organized crime networks, and for-profit and state-owned media outlets in the development of Russian civil society due to their influence on governance and the broader environment in which civil society operates in postcommunist Russia. 77

Speaking more specifically about what civil society does include, Sundstrom, elsewhere, writes, “Civil society is viewed most appropriately as a realm of collective, publicly oriented activity by non-governmental actors that is often formally organized (as NGOs, social movement coalitions, clubs, associations, and so on) but also includes many less formal networks of public discourse, such as

nongovernmental mass media and informal networks among neighbors in a community.”

The definition of civil society that I use in this dissertation follows closely the above two definitions. I employ the term civil society to mean citizen-led collective action, including both groups that push for societal change and those without any political agenda, but excluding political parties, businesses, and criminal groups. The question of autonomy from the state is difficult, since many Russian NGOs are at least partially dependent on the government, but I include those groups led by private citizens and with at least some degree of independence from the state as part of civil society. In addition, like most scholars, I consider that civil society groups must not be organized for profit or engaged in criminal activities. While my main focus will be on the work of NGOs and related groups and their ability to interact with the government and influence change in society, I remain aware that other types of associations, often less formally organized, also influence societal developments and provide channels for state-society interaction.

2.2 Democratization Programs and the Push for Civil Society

While the previous section focused on theoretical understandings of the concept of “civil society,” this section explores the practical application of the concept in development and democratization programs. The literature on development and democratization dates back further than the literature on civil society growth in Russia and Eastern Europe, initially examining aid programs in Latin America, Africa, and South Asia. After communism collapsed and Western donors sought to

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influence developments in the post-Soviet sphere, such programs were introduced in this region as well. Examination of the broader literature is important in establishing the historical foundation of the aid programs that appeared in Russia. Scholars on the development of Russian civil society have given little attention to this broader literature, although it provides insights that would be helpful in understanding the impact of democratization programs in Russian society. In this section, I put these two literatures in conversation with each other, in order to highlight the common trends and impacts of democratization programs in developing and post-socialist countries.

2.2.1 History of U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs

The movement to stimulate the development and democratization of “Third World” countries in the second half of the twentieth century was led by the United States, although several Western European states later joined this effort. On January 20, 1949, newly inaugurated President Harry S. Truman laid out his vision for a foreign aid policy that would come to serve as the foundation for many of the United States’ foreign aid programs in the modern era. President Truman declared:

[W]e must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their

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poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life.\textsuperscript{80}

Of course, an underlying assumption of Truman’s foreign aid policy was that in the long run, the United States would benefit economically and politically from helping to advance the productivity of non-communist countries.\textsuperscript{81}

To implement the new foreign policy to assist developing nations, Truman established the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) in 1950. By mid-1951, the TCA was working in 28 countries and the number of countries benefiting from the program increased annually. Aid primarily took the form of technical assistance in the areas of agriculture, education, government administration, health, and transportation.\textsuperscript{82} The TCA changed names several times, becoming the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) in 1955 during President Dwight Eisenhower’s administration. Eisenhower expanded the development aid program by adding financial assistance as a major component in addition to the sharing of technical expertise. After several years of debate within his administration, Eisenhower proposed a Development Loan Fund (DLF), which Congress approved.\textsuperscript{83} DLF provided low-interest, long-term loans to support the national development plans of developing countries. Samuel Hale Butterfield argues that, in the early 1950s,


\textsuperscript{81} Butterfield, 1.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 8.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 9.
Americans were “naively optimistic” about the potential of technical assistance to quickly transform the economies of developing countries. However, by the end of the 1950s, the U.S. foreign policy community had come to understand the complexity of this task and the need to provide longer term assistance.

Building upon the foundation for foreign aid programs established in the 1950s, U.S. foreign assistance grew tremendously in the 1960s. Thomas Carothers argues that foreign aid in the 1950s was based on a simple security rationale: “economic and security assistance would bolster friendly governments, whether dictatorial or democratic, against the spread of Soviet influence.” It was not until the 1960s that foreign aid began to be understood as a tool that could strengthen democracy abroad. Known for its idealistic bent, the administration of President John F. Kennedy saw development aid as a beneficial foreign policy tool, and promoted the belief that the United States had the unique destiny to “help third world nations rise out of poverty and move from dictatorship to democracy.” The Kennedy administration based its strategy to achieve the dual goals of combating communism and supporting development on modernization theory. As described by Carothers, [M]odernization theory conceived of development as a linear process ending up in an American-style social, economic, and political system…. Translated into policy terms, modernization theory promised that promoting economic development in the third world would simultaneously do good (reduce

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84 Ibid., 9.
85 Carothers (1999), 19.
86 Butterfield, 9.
87 Carothers (1999), 20.
poverty) and serve the goal of fighting communism: helping countries grow economically would prevent empty stomachs from making revolutions and would foster democratic, therefore pro-Western, systems.88

Thus, although U.S. officials at the time began to link foreign aid with strengthening democracy in developing countries, they approached this goal indirectly, assuming that economic aid would accelerate development, which would in turn enhance democratic practices in these countries. As a step towards achieving these aims, the Kennedy administration increased U.S. foreign aid by 33 percent and established the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) by consolidating the ICA and DLF.89 This approach proved disappointing, however, when many of the Latin American countries that had received U.S. aid came under the control of military dictatorships during the decade. As a result, the Kennedy administration abandoned its aim of strengthening democracy in the region, but continued to support military dictatorships with the expectation that such support would make the region less susceptible to Soviet influence.90

Later in the 1960s, some U.S. officials began to rethink the indirect approach to promoting democracy through economic aid, fearing that economic gains would fall mainly into the hands of elites instead of supporting widespread economic and political development. Consequently, several members of the U.S. policy community began to push for a policy that would specifically support increased popular

88 Ibid., 20-21.
89 Ibid., 21; Butterfield, 9.
90 Carothers (1999), 22.
participation in the development process. In 1966, Representatives Donald Fraser and Bradford Morse of the House Foreign Affairs Committee sponsored Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, a legislative directive to USAID, which stated:

In carrying out programs authorized by this chapter, emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum political participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and local government institutions.

The language of Title IX represented a shift in foreign policy toward direct aid to build democratic institutions. However, this shift was not reflected in practice. Title IX resulted in a number of conferences and research projects on participation in the development process and in the establishment of a Title IX division within USAID, but not in concrete aid programs to promote democracy.

By the end of the 1960s, disappointment over the failure of foreign aid to produce the expected results led to a questioning of modernization theory. In his 1968 book Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel Huntington challenged modernization theory by arguing that “economic progress in underdeveloped countries did not lead inevitably to democratization but in fact was often destabilizing and conducive to the rise of authoritarianism.” Such a sentiment, shared by others in the U.S. foreign aid bureaucracy, contributed to the emergence of a new approach

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91 Ibid., 22-23.
93 Carothers (1999), 23.
95 As summarized by Carothers (1999), 27.
to foreign aid under the administration of President Richard Nixon when the idea of the U.S. helping other countries democratize was shelved and instead the focus of aid shifted to providing assistance for governments to meet their citizens’ basic needs for food, shelter, medicine, and so forth. By the mid-1970s, interest in promoting popular participation in development had waned, and Title IX was all but forgotten.96

In the late 1970s, President Jimmy Carter re-established the idea of the United States as moral leader in the world and made human rights, along with a standard of non-intervention into the affairs of other states, a focus of his foreign policy agenda. Carothers explains Carter’s human rights policy: “A human rights focus…meant attention to basic violations of rights—torture, political murder, and other serious forms of repression—rather than to higher-order political norms such as free expression, freedom of association, and the right to genuine, periodic elections.”97 In addition, instead of directly opposing human rights abuses in other countries, this administration emphasized the “universalistic grounding of human rights advocacy in international law.”98 As a result, the provision of democracy aid during Carter’s administration was limited, and few new democracy aid programs were initiated. Although Carter promoted a policy of non-interventionism, Carothers contends that his support for a human rights doctrine contributed to later democratic transitions in Latin America by drawing attention to issues of political freedom.99

96 Ibid., 28.
97 Ibid., 28.
98 Ibid., 28.
99 Ibid., 29.
The attention Carter gave to human rights in his foreign policy agenda may have contributed to the shift in foreign aid policy in the 1980s when the administration of President Ronald Reagan expanded foreign aid beyond military assistance and humanitarian programs to encompass what came to be called “democracy promotion.” These are, of course, the very kinds of programs that would permit funding of NGOs like the Angel Coalition, and yet the legacy of the Reagan-era democracy promotion programs was contradictory. On the one hand, we can recognize in them the origins of the kinds of assistance that encouraged the emergence of a Russian civil society. On the other hand, because these programs, in the 1980s, were driven by Reagan’s anti-Soviet foreign policy agenda and, in practice, were used to support electoral parties and labor unions friendly to U.S. interests and to undermine more progressive or independent forces, they undoubtedly contributed to post-Soviet wariness of such programs. Indeed, although some of the programs were funded by USAID, a significant number were funded by the newly established National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a “private foundation” created by Congress and entirely financed by public funds, that had been established to circumvent the limits Congress had earlier imposed on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In Central American countries and the Philippines, NED legally did what the CIA had often done, secretly, in the post-World War II and Vietnam eras to counter leftist influences.

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the heralded “worldwide democratic revolution,” the 1990s saw the expansion of democracy promotion...
programs both in the U.S. and around the world.\textsuperscript{100} The largest increase in democracy aid was seen in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU). President George H. W. Bush adopted a policy of directly supporting transitions to democratic governance and market economies.\textsuperscript{101} Carothers notes, “That policy had a strong diplomatic component consisting of high-level U.S. cajoling and pressure to encourage political and economic reforms. It also had an assistance component.”\textsuperscript{102} To provide aid to Eastern Europe, the Bush administration and Congress implemented the Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) program, which included economic, social, and political support, with funds of approximately $300 million a year. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, they established a number of initiatives to aid former Soviet countries, including programs under the 1992 Freedom Support Act and the Defense Department’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program, with funds of about $2 billion a year.\textsuperscript{103} In both the SEED program and assistance provided through the Freedom Support Act, the political component to promote democracy represented only between 5 percent and 10 percent of the total amount allocated, although the amount was still substantial enough to fund major democracy projects in the region.\textsuperscript{104} NED and the Eurasia Foundation, established by Congress in 1993, also provided democracy-related aid to Eastern Europe and the FSU.

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 40.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 41.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 41.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 41.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 41.
Altogether, by the end of the 1990s, the U.S. government spent almost $1 billion on democracy programs in formerly communist countries in the region.  

2.2.2 Democracy and Neoliberalism

By the 1990s, a new understanding of development had emerged among aid providers that facilitated the expansion of democracy assistance. Whereas, during the 1960s and 1970s, aid providers had conceived of development in largely social and economic terms and paid little attention to a country’s form of government when implementing aid programs, beginning in the 1980s, donors began to consider the importance of governance in a country’s economic success. By the 1990s, the idea that a country’s political development greatly influenced its socioeconomic development was widely accepted in the donor community and programs reflecting this new thinking began to emerge.

At the same time, the trend in the 1980s towards market economics, or neoliberalism, strengthened the case for a united economic/political approach to development aid. U.S. conservatives asserted a natural connection between so-called economic freedom (market economics) and political freedom (democracy). They argued that market reform policies “would strengthen democratization in developing countries by increasing economic growth…, shrinking ‘bloated’ government and creating new centers of power outside governments.” Democratization, in turn,

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105 Ibid., 41.
106 Ibid., 46.
107 Ibid., 46.
108 Ibid., 46.
would support market reforms by “increasing government accountability and
transparency, promoting the rule of law, and fostering respect for citizens’ rights and
other limits on government power.”

Although not everyone in the development
community agreed with the necessity of linking democracy with market economics,
neoliberal economic theory would come to infuse the foundation of many
development programs and would spark the later focus on civil society expansion.

As many scholars in the field recognize, a “New Policy Agenda” had come to
dominate development policy in the post-cold war era.

Steven Commins writes:

The New Policy Agenda is a reflection of the triumphalism associated with
the belief that the end of the Cold War has vindicated a market-centered
approach to social organization and economic development. The donor-
driven [agenda] emphasizes the central importance of free markets, efficient
use of limited government resources, a reduced role for the state and the need
for good governance in low income countries.

Analyzing the New Policy Agenda, Michael Edwards and David Hulme
explain that it “is not monolithic—its details vary from one official aid agency to
another—but in all cases, it is driven by two basic sets of beliefs organized around the
two poles of neoliberal economics and liberal democratic theory.”

\[109\] Ibid., 46.

\[110\] The term “New Policy Agenda” was coined by Mark Robinson in “Governance, Democracy, and
Conditionality: NGOs and The New Policy Agenda,” in Governance, Democracy, and Conditionality:
What Role for NGOs?, ed. Andrew Clayton (Oxford: International NGO Training and Research
Centre, 1993).

\[111\] Steven Commins, “World Vision International and Donors: Too Close for Comfort?” in NGOs,
Martins, 1997), 141.
beliefs revolves around the assumption that markets and private initiative are the most efficient means of attaining economic growth and providing most services to a population.\textsuperscript{113} According to this tenet, “[g]overnments ‘enable’ private provision but should minimize their direct role in the economy; because of their supposed cost-effectiveness in reaching those who are poorest, official agencies support NGOs in providing welfare services to those who cannot be reached through markets.”\textsuperscript{114} The second set of beliefs is based on the idea that NGOs and grassroots organizations (GROs) are “vehicles for democratization and…essential components of a thriving civil society, which in turn are seen as essential to the success of the agenda’s economic dimension.”\textsuperscript{115} NGOs and GROs are expected to act as a counterweight to state power by “protecting human rights, opening up channels of communication and participation, providing training grounds for activists, and promoting pluralism.”\textsuperscript{116} The dominance of these assumptions in development aid programs led agencies to target an increasing amount of funds towards NGOs and GROs.

As the New Policy Agenda became a major influence in the donor community, a growing number of NGOs and GROs had appeared to respond to the new funding mandate. A review of the development field in the 1980s and 1990s reveals an “associational revolution” in developing and post-communist countries in

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\textsuperscript{113}Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{114}Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{115}Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{116}Ibid., 2.
\end{flushright}
which the number of NGOs and GROs increased exponentially. Complementing this numerical increase, a number of key NGOs grew in size to service millions of people in developing countries. In addition, as Edwards and Hulme write, “NGOs’ access to decision makers in both North and South is greater than ever before; their advocacy role continues to expand, and they are courted in debates over policy and practice.” Edwards and Hulme contend, “The overall picture is one in which NGOs are seen as the ‘favored child’ of official agencies and as something of a panacea for the problems of development.”

Although I discussed general understandings of “civil society” in the previous section, it is also important to examine how this concept, along with the concept of “non-governmental organization,” is used by scholars in the specific fields of development and democratization. The concept of “civil associations” has been discussed since the time of Tocqueville’s writings in the 1830s-1840s. Jude Fernando and Alan Heston write:

Organizations similar to NGOs and the debate surrounding the meaning of the term go back at least to the middle of the nineteenth century…. Most of these

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118 Edwards and Hulme (1996b), 1.

119 Ibid., 1.

120 Ibid., 3.

121 See Tocqueville, 115.
associations were known as public associations, voluntary associations, social welfare organizations, charities, and missions during the colonial period.\textsuperscript{122}

In 1907, when 132 international organizations decided to cooperate with each other, they declared themselves the “Union of International Associations.” In the 1920s and 1930s, the League of Nations referred to its liaisons with “private organizations.”\textsuperscript{123} The term “non-governmental organization” came into being with the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, which sought to differentiate participation rights for intergovernmental specialized agencies and international private organizations.\textsuperscript{124} The United Nations spelled out its participation policies for NGOs in Article 71 of Chapter 10 of the United Nations Charter, which states:

> The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consulting with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the member of the United Nations concerned.\textsuperscript{125}


\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.

This article provided for a consultative role with the United Nations for private bodies, which were understood as “independent from government control, not seeking to challenge governments either as a political party or by a narrow focus on human rights, non-profit making and non-criminal.” In 1948, the United Nations created the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council, which serves as “a watchdog of NGO interests in the consultative system and as a framework for NGO cooperation in a number of fields of common interest.” Although coined as a technical term by the United Nations to facilitate its work, “NGO” eventually became part of popular discourse, especially since the early 1970s.

While NGOs have participated in the work of the United Nations since its founding, their role in UN activities, and indeed in many national and international forums, has greatly expanded in recent decades as the “associational revolution” has touched all regions of the globe. Scholars debate the reasons behind the rise of civil society, some highlighting the role of governments and agencies in pushing NGO development while others argue political and social trends “organically” led to the growth of a more active civil sector. A United Nations report notes:

Thousands of Civil Society Organizations today participate in the major UN conferences and participate in many other UN activities—increasingly as active participants, not just observers…. Is this huge industry all built on one

126 Willetts.


128 Willetts.
flimsy, conditional sentence in the UN’s Charter? This clause may have opened a door at the outset, but the importance of civil society within the UN system reflects more the changing nature of the world we live in and the contemporary challenges of global governance than the deliberate efforts of the UN to elevate the contributions of NGOs.  

Edwards and Hulme contend, however, that “there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that the rise and growth of NGOs…are directly related to the increasing availability of official funding under the New Policy Agenda.” Most authors recognize the influence of both pressures from “below,” in the form of grass-roots initiatives, and from “above,” in the form of government or foundation support for the voluntary sector, in contributing to the upsurge in NGO activity.

An additional issue under debate by scholars is the effect of “globalization” on the growth of civil society. While virtually all agree that globalization has played a role in strengthening civil society, there is disagreement over exactly what this role has been. Definitions of globalization vary; however, the concept is widely understood within this literature to refer to the reorganization of the relationships among nation-states, their citizens, and international institutions. As economic processes increasingly traversed national borders, international organizations gained control over global monetary flows and the role of the nation-state in providing for all

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130 Edwards and Hulme (1996b), 3.

131 See Salamon, 112-115. He proposes three reasons for the expansion of the voluntary sector: pressures from “below,” “above,” and “the outside.” He argues that Western NGOs and official aid agencies represent an “outside” pressure for civil societies to develop in the developing world, while governments have acted as a pressure from “above” in their own countries by encouraging the private sector to take on increasing responsibilities as the state attempts to reduce social spending and tap into citizens’ expertise.
the needs of its citizens declined.\footnote{Ibid., 115-116.} As a result, NGOs began to increasingly take on responsibilities that had once been the realm of governments. While some authors believe this trend reflects the “withering away” of state sovereignty, others maintain that civil society is strengthening in conjunction with the expansion of states’ control over their populations.\footnote{See Fernando and Heston, 9, 14.}

As donor foundations and agencies became aware of the growing salience of the model of civil society, many began to direct funds to this area. One of the key assumptions underlying this focus was the theorized connection between civil society and democracy promotion. Scholars in the fields of civil society theory, development and democratization, and Russian civil society (to be discussed in the next chapter) have supported the proposition that a strong civil society encourages democratic practices.\footnote{See, for example, Hudson, 212; Harry Blair, “Donors, Democratization and Civil Society: Relating Theory to Practice,” in NGOs, States, and Donors: Too Close for Comfort?, ed. David Hulme and Michael Edwards (New York: St. Martins, 1997), 28; Sarah L. Henderson, Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 2, 56.}

Development scholars have demonstrated how the growth in aid to civil societies over the past twenty-five years has been, in large part, fueled by funding agencies’ acceptance of a “myth” of civil society that lauds aid to NGOs as a “panacea” or “magic bullet” to solving the problems of development.\footnote{See David Hulme and Michael Edwards, “Conclusion: Too Close to the Powerful, Too Far from the Powerless?,” in NGOs, States, and Donors: Too Close for Comfort?, ed. David Hulme and Michael Edwards (New York: St. Martins, 1997), 277; Carothers (1999), 248; Edwards and Hulme (1996b), 3.} The expectations of funding agencies that civil society assistance would serve as a temporary crutch to aid countries in transitions to democracy, however, were based
on mistaken assumptions and scant empirical evidence. While aid officials and field workers tend to focus on finding immediate solutions to problems on the ground and providing positive reports to funders, few academics have stepped up to empirically study the results of democratization programs.\(^{136}\) Instead, aid programs remain based on assumptions by democratic states that “their kind of political system would be beneficial for people in nondemocratic or partially democratic countries and [they] would like to help them achieve it.”\(^{137}\) In turn, NGOs have “few reasons (and no money) to disseminate the positive lessons of development and many more powerful reasons to conceal the negative lessons than to institutionalize, remember, and disseminate them.”\(^{138}\) Stemming from a lack of shared knowledge among democracy promoters, common problems in the implementation of civil society programs tend to be repeated in developing and post-communist countries around the world. In the section that follows, I examine some of the major achievements and challenges of civil society aid programs in developing countries. Many of these same phenomena would repeat themselves in post-communist countries a decade later.

### 2.2.3 Achievements and Limitations of Civil Society Assistance Programs

In this section, I review some of the common outcomes of civil society assistance programs in developing countries in Latin America, Africa, and South Asia, in order

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137 Carothers (1999), 349.

to compare and contrast these outcomes with programs implemented in post-socialist
countries in the FSU.

Civil society assistance programs grew out of two interrelated beliefs: first,
that civil society constituted an arena separate from the state towards which donors
could direct development funds in order to avoid governmental corruption and
inefficiency; and second, that strengthening civil society would promote democratic
governance in transitional countries by providing a check on state power and
providing an avenue for citizens to express their needs to state authorities. Despite
the theorized separation between civil society and the state, the implementation of
these programs in developing countries demonstrated the necessary interdependence
of these two sectors. Where governmental power was too weak to enforce policy,
reforms advocated by civil society groups could not take hold.

Scholars have argued that a strong state is necessary for a fully functioning
one of three forms. The first is where “NGOs are in a dependent client position \emph{vis-à-vis} the government, in which NGOs implement state-prepared programs and/or
receive funding through the state (a dependency of money, ideas and resources).”
The second type of relationship is “adversarial in which there are no common starting
points and no wish from either side to search out areas of agreement.” The third and
most productive relationship, Clark argues, is “a collaborationist one in the sense of a
genuine partnership to tackle mutually agreed upon problems, coupled with energetic
but constructive debate on areas of disagreement.” Like Clark, many scholars in the development field believe that civil societies in transitional countries should support state growth as well as the growth of their own sector in order to achieve balance between the sectors and to advance the well-being of their countries as a whole. In so doing, they could avoid the trend of NGOs, in some countries, taking on past responsibilities of the state in the social welfare area, which reduces public resources and the state’s capacity to respond to the claims of its population.

Evaluating the impact of civil society assistance programs across developing countries, many common outcomes are apparent. For example, one assumption on which civil society assistance programs were based is the belief that NGOs’ special relationship with their beneficiaries and their moral commitment to the poor give them a comparative advantage over governmental institutions in carrying out development projects. According to backers of this position, “Government-citizen relationships are said to be based on control and authority, whereas NGOs are able to form unambivalent relationships with their clients.”

Although civil society aid programs generally assumed that NGOs are effective representatives of their communities, studies have revealed that organizations dependent on foreign aid often weaken their links with their


141 See Bebbington and Riddell, 121.

beneficiaries as they grow closer to the agencies funding them. Hulme and Edwards write:

What [seems] to be happening… is a more gradual and less visible process in which a significant proportion of NGOs move closer and closer to donors and to the support of donor interests. It commences with the agreement to use aid monies: progresses with the adoption of donor techniques for programming, implementing, monitoring and accounting for performance…; subsequently it moves on to shaping the nature of appointments and the internal structures of NGOs with the recruitment of English speaking, logical framework experts and information departments which function as public relations units; eventually the organizational culture is attuned to donors—and the local, indigenous and informal features that have underpinned NGO and GRO activity are lost.143

As NGOs devote increasing amounts of energy to fulfilling expectations of funders, such as quantifying the results of their programs and meeting short-term project goals, they become less able to respond to the needs of their constituents, which often call for a long-term commitment and gradual improvements.

As NGOs in developing countries have had to wrestle with their responsibilities to multiple parties, scholars have begun to speak of the importance of “multiple accountabilities” both upward to the state and donors, and downward to NGOs’ beneficiaries and members.144 Research has demonstrated the tendency for NGOs to prioritize upward accountability in order to retain funding and remain

143 Hulme and Edwards, (1997a), 278.
144 Edwards and Hulme, (1996b), 8.
However, a focus on quantifying results for donors often detracts from the larger goals the NGO is trying to attain. By contrast, NGOs can bring about sizable change only if they remain in tune with their constituents and act as representatives of their interests. As NGOs work towards demonstrating accountability to their multiple stakeholders, scholars call for funding agencies to improve their practices by acknowledging and supporting the essential relationships between NGOs, their constituents, and local institutions that impact NGOs’ work.

An additional pattern resulting from NGOs’ dependence on foreign funding is problems with sustainability. As Carothers writes, “A large percentage of the NGOs that the United States and other donors have funded in the name of strengthening civil society are almost entirely dependent on foreign financial support and would fold if it became unavailable.” Carothers notes that, when aid officials began developing civil society assistance programs, they focused on getting out funds quickly to help start up a large number of NGOs. The sustainability of these NGOs for the long term was not a concern at the time. When it became apparent that NGOs in developing or post-communist countries had few other sources of support, some aid officials began to examine the issue but found that there were few options if their funding was to end. Carothers writes:

The difficulties are usually great: membership fees or personal contributions are difficult to collect or attract; corporate sponsorship is often not available due to lack of incentives, traditions, or sources; charging fees for services or

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146 Carothers (1999), 219-220.
publications usually proves a limited source…. The NGO model pushed by U.S. civil society assistance simply may not be appropriate as a generalized approach to building civil society in many transitional countries. The professionalized NGO model comes out of a society that has wealthy, private grant-making foundations, a large middle class with considerable discretionary income, and a corporate world with a tradition of philanthropy. The model does not do well in societies with none of those characteristics.\textsuperscript{147}

In attempting to address sustainability, aid officials began to include attention to the issue in their grant programs and to encourage “local resource mobilization,” an approach that encourages NGOs to find alternative sources of support. While there have been some success stories, finding long-term support remains problematic for most NGOs in developing countries, and it has become commonplace for many NGOs to operate only temporarily on project-based grants.

Research has demonstrated several other patterns that frequently result from the implementation of civil society assistance programs in developing countries. In contrast to the common perception that civil society signifies an arena of cooperation and reciprocity among grassroots groups lobbying for common interests, scholars have found that civil societies in many countries are dominated by NGOs staffed by members of the elite who compete with one another for funding and influence. Thus, the availability of foreign funding has contributed to the fragmentation of civil society networks and to the development of a hierarchy of NGOs based on access to aid funds. As recognized by scholars who prefer the concept of the “third sector,” NGOs have served as a vehicle for many well-connected individuals in transitional societies

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 220-221.
to advance their careers. Although claiming to represent civil society, these NGOs usually have a weak popular base.\textsuperscript{148}

While funding agencies had begun by promoting civil society in developing countries, after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the FSU in 1989-1991, many agencies turned their attention to this region of the world. Studying the impact of civil society funding in post-communist countries, scholars have found that, although there were some differences from the developing world, there were many similar outcomes as well. When aid providers began funding NGOs in Eastern Europe and the FSU, they tended to import the same approach used in aid programs to developing countries, namely, the “external project method” in which the donor organization runs many aspects of the project, often using its own workers as staff.\textsuperscript{149}

While this method saw some successes in developing countries, it was less effective in Eastern Europe and the FSU, a region with a relatively well-educated population and in which many nations had even served as aid providers to parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.\textsuperscript{150}

Western aid was a sensitive issue in a region so accustomed to antagonistic relationships with the West. During the so-called “honeymoon phase” of Russian-Western relationships from 1991-1993, many Russian groups welcomed Western aid, believing that the United States and Western European countries had accepted the FSU as part of the democratic world and would honor their promises to help in the transition period. As in many developing countries, aid to help democratize countries

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 215-218.

\textsuperscript{149} Carothers (2004), 114.

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 113.
of the FSU was tied up with economic assistance. Larry Diamond argues that FSU
countries accepted the “implicit bargain” that if they went along with the often radical
and painful economic conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank, foreign investment and voluntary bank loans would follow to help
sustain their new market economies.\footnote{Larry Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors, Instruments, and Issues,” in
Democracy’s Victory and Crisis, Nobel Symposium No. 93, ed. Axel Hadenius (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 342-343.} However, both Diamond and Carothers
contend that the failure of the West to follow through on their promises left post-
communist countries in financial crisis and dampened support for developing
Western-style political systems. Instead of the limited and short-term support offered
by Western governments, Diamond and Carothers agree that a long-term commitment
to economic assistance could have helped to stabilize the economies of Eastern
Europe and the FSU, garnered support for the democratic process, and laid a strong
foundation for the development of democratic institutions.\footnote{Ibid., 343-344, Carothers (2004), 112.}

As with economic assistance to post-communist countries, Western donors
approached aid for civil society as a short-term investment. However, as transitions
in many Eastern European and FSU countries progressed more slowly than expected
and stagnated in some cases, civil society assistance came to be seen as a more long-
term endeavor and necessary to counter anti-democratic impulses in some places.
Carothers writes:

Western aid for civil society development in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union was originally conceived and portrayed as the key to an initial
democratic breakthrough. It has assumed a much wider, more lasting role, as
a critical tool in overcoming the many entrenched obstacles to the consolidation of democracy and the achievement of economic success.\textsuperscript{153}

In the next chapter, I will examine the consequences of aid specifically to Russia in more detail.

\textit{2.3 Summing Up: The Impact of Civil Society and Democracy Aid Programs}

Development scholars have identified both achievements and limitations of civil society assistance programs. One achievement has been to broaden democracy assistance from its initial focus solely on holding elections and reforming state institutions. Grants to civil society provide funding agencies an additional avenue to encourage democratic values among average citizens and to guard against “show democracies” that nominally permit democratic processes such as elections but continue to limit political freedoms among its population. Carothers points out that many local NGOs have teamed up with international networks in such areas as human rights, women’s issues, and the environment to bring ideas and resources into their countries.\textsuperscript{154} He contends that women’s NGOs have a particularly strong track record in transitional societies, as the commitment level of their leaders and members is often high and they represent true constituencies.\textsuperscript{155} Fernando and Heston note that, in many countries, NGOs have opened up dialogue about important social issues and drawn governmental attention to these issues. In addition, they write:

\textsuperscript{153} Carothers (2004), 115.

\textsuperscript{154} Carothers (1999), 216.

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 217.
In situations where civil liberties are suppressed, NGOs are the only means of expressing people’s concerns. NGO participation in the policy dialogue on international issues is likely to increase further, as NGOs are considered to be more reliable and authentic representatives of the people than governments are.\textsuperscript{156}

Finally, civil society promotion programs have been successful in that they, in many cases, served their function of strengthening democratic governance. Diamond maintains that NGOs have accomplished this function in numerous ways, including: scrutinizing and containing the power of the state; educating people about public affairs, political issues, and their civic rights and duties; increasing citizen participation, efficacy, and skill; developing a democratic culture of tolerance, moderation, and willingness to compromise; providing additional channels for interest representation; recruiting and training new political leaders; monitoring elections and government performance; and generating democratic constituencies for market reforms.\textsuperscript{157}

Along with their achievements, civil society promotion programs have faced numerous limitations. Most scholars in the field acknowledge that civil society can do little to transform political systems on its own. It can draw attention to issues and lobby governments, but to be effective, forming relationships with other societal sectors is essential. Civil society programs tend to find success in countries where governments are already receptive to democratic reform and civil society growth; in countries hostile to democratic reform, civil society programs are less likely to gain a

\textsuperscript{156} Fernando and Heston, 18-19.
\textsuperscript{157} Diamond, 341.
foothold. Recognizing that civil society assistance programs do not bring about rapid or decisive change, Carothers stresses the need for long-term commitment from funders in order to work towards gradual improvement in cooperation with NGOs and government institutions of the recipient country.\(^{158}\)

Carothers also cautions that funding agencies should not assume recipient countries will develop democratic institutions following the Western model. He argues that the “uneasy, precarious middle ground between full-fledged democracy and outright dictatorship is actually the most common political condition today of countries in the developing world and the postcommunist world.”\(^{159}\) In such countries, even small steps towards democracy should be considered a positive outcome.

In addition, civil society assistance programs are hindered by many of the issues mentioned above: programs do not reach the poorest of the poor, participation of the grassroots in NGOs is weak, civil society often represents the interests of the established elite, NGOs struggle to achieve sustainability, etc. Scholars and practitioners alike have strived to address these issues and to redesign aid programs in light of the lessons learned through the history of democracy and civil society funding.

Research on the impact of democracy promotion and civil society assistance programs to NGOs in the developing and post-communist world is important, because, as many scholars recognize, such programs are here to stay. Diamond notes that “the world community is embracing a shared normative expectation that all states

\(^{158}\) Carothers (1999), 351.

\(^{159}\) Carothers (2004), 180.
seeking international legitimacy should manifestly ‘govern with the consent of the governed’—in essence, a ‘right to democratic governance.’”

He points out that the right to democratic governance is being articulated more and more forcefully in documents of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization of American States, and the European Union. As a condition for membership, the European Union explicitly requires applicant states to exhibit democratic practices and institutions.

As a result of this international consensus on democracy, most governments and other aid providers now tie development assistance with democracy promotion efforts, believing that development and democracy go hand-in-hand. Carothers points out that almost every established democracy engages in some type of program to encourage democratic governance in other countries. Although he believes that democracy promotion efforts will continue into the future, he emphasizes the limits of such efforts and the necessity of learning from past mistakes. In order for the field of democracy assistance, and its subfield of civil society assistance, to grow and remain in tune with the changing needs of societies around the world, Carothers argues that aid officials must improve their knowledge of the countries in which they are working, base their efforts on proven methods, increasingly coordinate their initiatives with other aid agencies, and commit to longer term engagement in the recipient societies. In addition, he calls for more scholars to become involved in the

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160 Diamond, 334, including quote by Thomas Franck.
162 Ibid., 260.
development field to provide practical and critical analysis of efforts on the ground.\textsuperscript{163}

The experience and knowledge gained by democracy promoters in developing countries would be put to the test in the post-communist region beginning in the late 1980s to early 1990s. As the next chapter will demonstrate, learning has been slow, as many of the same difficulties with aid programs to the developing world would be repeated in post-communist Russia.

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., 263-264.
Chapter 3: The Development of Russian Civil Society, 1991-2008

In this chapter, I provide a history of the development of Russian civil society from 1991 to 2008, focusing on the influence of Western-led democracy promotion efforts and of Russian state laws and regulations on civil society. I examine this period in order to better understand the influences and events shaping civil society growth at the time of the Angel Coalition’s founding in 1999 to the end of my fieldwork in May 2008. As I flew out of Russia on May 6, 2008, the day before Dmitry Medvedev was sworn in as president, the second term of Vladimir Putin’s presidency (if not Putin’s impact on political affairs) officially came to an end. Hence, I limit my attention specifically to the Yeltsin and Putin presidencies in my discussion of Russia’s civil society development. In this chapter, I also compare the effects of democracy promotion programs on civil society in Russia to the effects of similar programs in developing countries to demonstrate the common consequences of these programs across societies with very different social and political backgrounds, while making apparent the consequences that are unique to the Russian case.

Although some scholars have framed the development of Russian civil society as a struggle for control between the Russian state and Western governments and foundations, I highlight the agency of civil society actors in negotiating with both Russian and foreign authorities to attain the resources needed to pursue their own goals. This analysis of Russian civil society and its ties to international agencies and transnational networks is important to understanding the growth of the Russian counter-trafficking movement, which will be examined in chapter 6.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, scholars and funding agencies alike got caught up in the excitement over the newly discovered powers of “civil society.” Credited with toppling monolithic communist regimes, civil society was seen by many in the West as the best hope of supporting democracy in the former communist bloc and reducing the threat of a slide back into authoritarianism. Oppositional movements had played a role in the fall of communist regimes in several Eastern European countries, but the Solidarity movement in Poland was held up as the shining example of what civil society could accomplish. Formed in a context in which the Communist Party held a monopoly on power and independent organizing was outlawed, Solidarity’s only option was to work in opposition to the state and to call for its abolition, a goal it eventually achieved.

Thus, the model of civil society extolled during this period was an oppositional model in which the main role of civil society was to keep the power of the state in check and guard against tyranny. However, as scholars would later point out, this model of civil society is suitable only in a small of number cases, namely, when independent actors seek to oppose a tyrannical state. In the majority of cases, including in the Western states exporting civil society promotion programs in the 1990s, civil society has a more collaborative relationship with the state and many civil society organizations receive state funding. Indeed, once oppositional movements achieved their aim of ending communism in Eastern Europe and Russia,
they lost their unifying purpose and fractured, leaving a space for new civil society structures to develop in the transition period as new political and economic structures also took shape. In this section, I examine the development of Russian civil society after the fall of the Soviet Union and analyze its relationships with the Russian state and with foreign, primarily Western, aid providers.

3.1.1 The Reorganization of Russia’s Political, Economic, and Social Spheres during the Post-Soviet Transition Period and the Role of Civil Society

For the purpose of understanding the growth of Russian civil society, this section views the post-communist transition as a political, economic, and social process that involved the reorganization of these three spheres and of the relationships between them. Although civil society actors played a key role in bringing about the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, after its collapse, civil society as it was known in the perestroika period (1985-1991) dissipated as some activists dropped out of civil society to focus on their private concerns and others turned to new opportunities in the political or economic realms. Relatively few remained to help construct the post-communist “third sector.” This opened the door for a drastic redesign of Russian civil society and of the separation of responsibilities and powers among the political, economic, and social spheres.

The late perestroika period was a time of tremendous change for the Russian state and its political system. The mass mobilization of Soviet citizens expressed through the formation of thousands of independent organizations, the miners’ strikes in 1989 and 1991, and the demonstrations on Manezh Square in Moscow in 1990-
1991 played a critical role in building momentum toward the defeat of communism.¹ On August 19, 1991, thousands of people rallied outside the Russian White House to protest the coup attempt by Communist Party hard-liners to wrestle control from Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The image of Boris Yeltsin, the recently elected Russian President, climbing atop of a tank that day to defy the coup plotters and defend the course toward Russian sovereignty and liberalization became a defining moment in the regime change. Across the world, millions of people put their faith in Yeltsin as the leader of Russian democracy as the Soviet Union was officially dissolved a few months later, on December 26, 1991.

However, in these chaotic times, Yeltsin feared losing control of the transition process if power was shared too widely. The Fifth Congress of People’s Deputies granted Yeltsin dual powers as president and prime minister of Russia and gave him special decree powers for one year.² Although many Russian supporters of democracy pushed for immediate elections, Yeltsin waited two years, until December 1993, to hold the first legislative elections in newly independent Russia. Yeltsin’s strategy was to eschew party politics and rely on a broad public mandate as the source of his executive authority. However, instead of allowing Yeltsin to build support for his reform package, this delay only caused parties, in the absence of a clear unifying principle, to fragment.³


² Weigle (2000), 207.

³ Ibid., 196.
By failing to institutionalize strong democratic procedures and structures, Yeltsin’s power base was unstable, and by 1993 Yeltsin had lost his public mandate and the support of political society.\textsuperscript{4} As relations between Yeltsin and the parliament deteriorated, Yeltsin dissolved the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet on September 21, 1993. The ten-day battle for power that ensued between the president and the parliament ended as the Russian army took Yeltsin’s side and arrested the leaders of the resistance. Thus, the promise of a smooth transition to democracy in Russia, in which many had placed their hopes in August 1991, faded as the tough work of building the post-Soviet political system became apparent.

Equally momentous changes were occurring in the economy. Long dependent on the communist state to provide goods and services, Russians lost their safety net as an economic crisis accompanied by rapid inflation and rising unemployment served as a shocking introduction to life under a market economy. Karl-Olov Arnstberg and Thomas Boren provide a summary of the economic effects of the transition on the average Russian:

In the end of 1992, retail prices went up 25 times, and wholesale prices 34 times. At the same time production fell by at least 35 percent. The newly formed Russian state responded by printing more money, a measure which itself started an inflationary spiral that, apart from inhibiting investments oriented towards long-term production, made people’s—sometimes lifelong—savings worthless. This loss of one’s savings and the steep increase in prices, together with the irregular—if at all—payment of wages and pensions, were

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., 249.
generally speaking the most important changes in the structural part of
people’s everyday economy. For many it led to economic disaster.  

As the economic crisis deepened, the state retreated and was unable to meet
the needs of its population. From 1991-1995, state spending on social issues,
“including welfare, public health, education, and culture declined 39 percent.”6 As a
result, “the state was unable to fully provide the social services—free education,
universal health care, pension plans, and other aspects of the Soviet cradle-to-grave
social-welfare net—it had guaranteed under communism.”7 By 1999, the United
Nations Development Program declared, “A human crisis of monumental proportions
is emerging in the former Soviet Union. The transition years have literally been
lethal for many people.”8

In the years immediately following the end of the Soviet Union, civil society
actors were largely absent from decision-making processes, as political and economic
elites took control of the transition process. Although many scholars charged that the
elites “smothered” civil society and excluded activists from the transition process,
Marcia Weigle stresses the fact that civil society was too weak and fragmented to
play a leading role in democratic reforms in any case.9 Although civil society had


6 Henderson (2003), 43.

7 Ibid., 43.


united on the goal of ending the Communist Party’s monopoly on power, activists had widely differing opinions on how the post-communist state should be run.\textsuperscript{10}

A main reason for the weakness of civil society under the Soviet Union was the Communist Party’s strict limitations on independent organizing, which prevented Russians from gaining the experience and organizational skills needed to build strong coalitions. Even in the \textit{perestroika} era, state ministries restricted the autonomy of groups and tried to bring them under the control of the Communist Party.\textsuperscript{11} In the absence of a strong democratic movement promoting a coherent reform package, it fell to the state to steer the “post-communist liberal project.”\textsuperscript{12} As the strongest actor in the Russian political system, the state was charged with striking a balance between consolidating enough power to lead the country through the necessary reforms and institutionalizing enough limits on its power to permit the development of a liberal political culture. As Weigle recognizes, given the history of authoritarianism in Russia, entrusting this much power to the Russian state was a dangerous step.\textsuperscript{13}

As a dominant state replaced the mass mobilization of civil society as the main driving force for democratic and market reforms, what had been a revolution “from below” became a devolution “from above.”\textsuperscript{14} From 1991-1993, the Russian state consolidated its authority to lead the transition process. During this period, elites, including many former managerial \textit{nomenklatura} of the Communist Party, took

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 14, 137.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 17.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 2; Bertram Silverman and Murray Yanowitch, \textit{New Rich, New Poor, New Russia: Winners and Losers on the Russian Road to Capitalism} (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2000), 130.
\end{flushright}
control of the project of state reconstruction, accumulating power and resources for themselves in the process. Although the state hoarded power, it remained vulnerable due to its weak support base among the population and its failure to develop effective and transparent links with the legislature and political parties. Democratic structures and mechanisms of communication among branches of the government and between the various societal spheres had not yet been institutionalized.\(^\text{15}\)

As the state and the economic elites looked to each other to secure control of the reform process, the interests of the elites came to overshadow the needs of the Russian population at large. Weigle writes:

\begin{quote}
The collusion between political leaders and business elite at both the regional and state levels would fundamentally shape the process of state construction and the path of the postcommunist transition in the first decade of Russian independence. During this period, Yeltsin was caught between the demands of a market economy and the interests of the sectoral lobbies and oligarchs—the most powerful group to emerge in the postcommunist period. Not only did the oligarchs control much of the economy but, through their financial and media empires, had the potential to control the fate of the presidency.\(^\text{16}\)
\end{quote}

In 1992, the Russian state officially began transitioning to a market economy and Yeltsin appointed Yegor Gaidar prime minister to oversee the process. Gaidar implemented the policy of “shock therapy,” which was designed to complete the transition as soon as possible and minimize unemployment and disruption to the industrial and business sectors. Instead, the policy, supported by international

\(^{15}\) Weigle (2000), 254.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 260.
financial groups, only furthered the disparity between the majority of the Russian population, which experienced a drastic decline in its standard of living, and a small clique of business elites, who strengthened their hold on the Russian economy.\footnote{Ibid., 256.}

Russian activists in civil society, who had placed their hopes in a democratic transition process, were disheartened by the effects of the reforms and the corruption they perceived among those spearheading the process. Weigle argues:

The impact of liberal economic reforms in the first year of the postcommunist transition turned the tide of public opinion against “the democrats” and their liberal reforms: The vibrant associational life that emerged during the Soviet period seemed to dissipate into an empty shell of apathy and cynicism, produced by the perception that the great transition experiment had been reduced to “politics as usual.”\footnote{Ibid., 16.}

Although many of the more politically motivated activists dropped out of Russian civil society during this period, others who were focused on meeting the material needs of their communities began to organize associations to address the economic consequences of the reforms. The work of these post-Soviet groups will be addressed later in this chapter.

\textit{3.1.2 The Impact of Western Aid on the Transition Process and the Development of Russian-Western Relationships around Economic Aid}

Several scholars have examined the role that Western governments and international financial groups played in the Russian transition. These analyses can help us better
understand the development of relationships between Westerners and Russians in a variety of spheres, including the economic, political, and civic realms. On the Western side, the United States was a leader in pushing for economic reforms in Russia. Although the break-up of the Soviet empire symbolized the end of the Cold War, the United States remained fearful of external threats and of a backsliding to communism. George H. W. Bush, who was president of the United States when the Soviet Union collapsed, proclaimed the emergence of a new global order in which “great nations of the world are moving toward democracy through the door of freedom…[and] toward free markets through the door to prosperity.” Robert Ivie argues that Bill Clinton, who succeeded Bush as president, placed even greater emphasis on the leadership role of the United States in guiding the reform process in the former Soviet republics, especially Russia. Reacting to both a sense of victory over the end of the Cold War and a fear of new threats, Clinton supported U.S. funding to guide the transition process in Russia as a means of promoting global (and U.S.) security.

Much has been made of the West’s “failure” in Russia. Instead of successfully integrating Russia into the Western democratic “community,” the Western-approved Russian reform package alienated many Russians through the devastating effect it had on Russia’s economy and the attitude of superiority that many Russians perceived from the experts dispatched to “help” Russia. While opinions differ as to the extent that blame for the chaos of the transition period can be


20 Ivie, 252-256.
laid on Western institutions, there is little debate that the West’s involvement left an overwhelming feeling of disappointment among Russians.²¹

Janine Wedel argues that a severe disconnect between the expectations of Eastern Europeans and Russians and the resources provided by the West led to a sense of disillusionment that characterized East-West relationships for years to come. Following speeches by Clinton calling for support and investment in former communist countries, talk of a “new Marshall Plan” among U.S. policymakers, and optimistic promises by aid officials, those in Eastern Europe came to expect significant amounts of aid that could bring about substantial growth in their economies.²² However, while the Marshall Plan, which provided aid to rebuild Western Europe following World War II, consisted primarily of monetary grants, the billions of dollars promised to Eastern Europe largely took the form of loans and technical assistance, such as expert advice and training sessions. Analyzing the impact of this approach, Wedel writes:

Western donors had tended to assume that the East would take whatever was offered. After all, the aid was a gift. Why were they complaining? What the donors had failed to see was that to many Central and Eastern Europeans, a gift was something that was designed to meet the needs of the recipients.…


²² See Wedel, 16-17.
The realization that Western “help” now often meant advice, not cash, hit hard.23

Thus, the short “honeymoon” between East and West in the early 1990s, which Wedel calls the Triumphantist period, was followed by the phase of Disillusionment in the mid-1990s.24

Even more so in Russia than in other Eastern European countries, Western donors dampened prospects for the development of stable economic and political structures by entrusting the majority of aid monies to a particularly small clique of “reformers.”25 As international lending institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Group of Seven (G-7) countries pushed for economic reforms and the privatization of state-owned industries, this clique, which Wedel refers to as the “St. Petersburg Clan,” came to control millions of dollars of donor funds.26 The Clan was comprised of a group of politically oriented, long-term friends from St. Petersburg, many of whom came to serve as advisors to Yeltsin and later in other governmental posts.

The St. Petersburg Clan gained its advantage when it took part in 1991 meetings with Harvard professor Jeffrey Sachs and other Western economists. The key Russians involved were Gaidar, the first “architect” of economic reforms in Russia, and Anatoly Chubais, who was a member of Gaidar’s team and who would

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23 Ibid., 41
24 Ibid., 7.
25 Ibid., 125.
26 Ibid., 125; Weigle (2000), 260-261.
replace him as chief of reforms in December 1992. Throughout the course of the reforms, the Clan worked closely with the Sachs-affiliated Harvard University Institute for International Development (HIID), both pushing for policies of shock therapy and rapid privatization. Together, the Clan, HIID, and HIID associates established a Moscow-based program, known as the Harvard Project, that attracted millions of dollars in USAID and G-7 aid, subsidized loans, and other Western funds. Explaining the connection between HIID and USAID, Wedel writes:

Without experience in Russia and under obligation to carry out congressional spending mandates, an insecure USAID was persuaded to largely delegate responsibility for America’s role in reshaping the Russian economy to the Harvard Institute group. The Institute’s first award from USAID for work in Russia came in 1992, during the Bush administration. Over the next four years, between 1992 and 1997, with the endorsement of influential proponents in the Clinton administration, the Institute received $40.4 million from USAID in noncompetitive grants for work in Russia. It was slated to receive another $17.4 million, but USAID suspended its funding in May 1997, citing allegations of misuse of funds. Approving such a large sum of money as a noncompetitive “amendment” to a much smaller award…was highly unusual, according to U.S. officials. Also highly unusual was the citing of “foreign policy” considerations—that is, the national security of the United States, as the reason for the waiver.

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27 Wedel, 126.
28 Ibid., 125.
Over time, Wedel writes, the interests of the Harvard Institute group and the St. Petersburg Clan became “one and the same.” Increasingly loyal to each other, group members were able to concentrate funds and privileges among themselves, preventing other voices from significantly impacting the reform process.

Instead of encouraging the development of transparent channels of communication and accountable institutions in Russia, the behind-the-scenes collusion between the Russians and Westerners leading Russia’s transition only reinforced the patron-client relationships that had dominated Soviet-era political dealings. The practice of obtaining benefits and goods, including food, household products, employment opportunities, and political positions through informal networks instead of through official channels was a common survival strategy in the Soviet Union. In both the public and private spheres, Soviet citizens tended to privilege membership in small groups and personal connections to those in power over the need to form broad social networks.

Although the stated purpose of many Western aid programs was to promote democratic practices and encourage increased social participation in decision-making processes, Wedel maintains that the actual process by which Western aid was implemented enhanced the power of small groups of well-connected elites. As a result, many Russians “came to associate the terms ‘market economy’, ‘economic reform’, and ‘the West’, with dubious activities that benefited only a few people while others experienced a devastating decline in their standard of living—a far cry

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29 Ibid., 130.
30 Ibid., 129.
from their secure lives under socialism."\textsuperscript{31} After the high of the Triumphalism period of the early 1990s and the low of the phase of Disillusionment in the mid-1990s, Wedel argues that a period of Adjustment followed as both Russians and Westerners modified their expectations of the “other side.” As Westerners learned more about the effects of aid in Russia and Russians took increased ownership over the transition process, East-West relationships stabilized and later projects were able to build on some of the lessons learned in the early post-Soviet years.

3.1.3 The Emergence of Post-Soviet Civil Society in Russia

As international lending institutions and Western governments were pushing for economic change in Russia, they also supported calls for the strengthening of civil society. Hemment writes:

In keeping with the neoliberal vision that was hegemonic at Cold War’s end, [international development agencies’] diagnosis for Russia was to cut back the state and place responsibility upon the individual or private actors…. According to this formulation, citizens groups and associations of civil society…would play an increasingly active role, fulfilling the responsibilities of the crumbling state sector.\textsuperscript{32}

Some of the patterns characterizing Russian-Western relationships in the economic sphere during the transition period would be replayed as Western donors began funding Russian civil society, but there were also differences. In both spheres, Western donors tended to prioritize the development of relationships with a small

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 141.

\textsuperscript{32} Hemment (2007), 46.
number of organizations or individuals with whom they could establish trust and feel comfortable granting further funds, sometimes for years to come. Thus, one outcome was the concentration of a large portion of civil society funding in the hands of a few organizations and individuals. In addition, cultural differences and expectations concerning the purpose of aid and the outcomes to be achieved through aid posed challenges in Russian-Western relationships. Grant programs sponsored by Western donors often had different priorities than the issues pursued by Russian activists, leaving Russian activists to bridge the gap between the purpose of a grant and the needs of their local constituents. Likewise, Western aid officials, especially in the early years of civil society funding, frequently had little knowledge of the social context in which Russian activists worked, including the rigid bureaucracy that had to be confronted to carry out projects in Russia, and expected results that were impractical in the time frame given.

Despite similarities in Russian-Western relationships in both efforts to reform Russia’s economic sphere and efforts to build the civic sector, Sarah Henderson highlights important ways in which these efforts diverged:

Civil society aid was spread out to enough recipients so that, even though it encouraged them to protect their funding sources, it did not evoke the same reaction as economic aid did among those controlling the state. The state embezzled or misappropriated billions of dollars of economic reform loan money. In contrast, civic activists did not steal the money; the money involved simply often provided incentives for them to value their own careers and the institutionalization of their organizations at the expense of building
more long-term community ties. The money was merely misused, occasionally wasted, but it was not stolen. This in and of itself represents enormous progress from previous aid attempts that channeled money to the state.\textsuperscript{33}

Thus, in the early 1990s, concomitant with the political and economic changes occurring in Russia, civil society had also begun to reemerge. Although the nascent civil society of the \textit{perestroika} years had demobilized after the fall of the Soviet Union, new civil society actors surfaced to construct a post-Soviet civil society. Weigle explains that while the nascent civil society that formed in the Gorbachev period was not protected by law but rather dependent on the will of the hegemonic Communist Party and thus remained weak, it laid the foundation for an institutionalized civil society to emerge in the post-communist regime by establishing patterns of associational activity, demanding laws to protect an autonomous public sphere, starting independent newspapers, and promoting a culture of citizen self-organization.\textsuperscript{34} Following Weigle, Henderson argues that a large portion of Russian activists’ energies throughout the 1990s went to “carving out a sphere of independent public activity protected by law.”\textsuperscript{35} They faced many challenges to achieving this goal, including gaining the respect of the state, which was accustomed to a quiescent public, and developing constituencies among average citizens, most of whom had retreated into the private realm in the turbulent transition years and were unfamiliar with the idea of a “third sector.”

\textsuperscript{33} Henderson (2003), 168.

\textsuperscript{34} Weigle (2000), 33.

\textsuperscript{35} Henderson (2003), 41.
In terms of numbers, the presence of civic groups increased drastically throughout the 1990s. As a benchmark, it was estimated that 60,000 independent groups were active in 1989, before groups had achieved the right to autonomy. After the right to form independent groups was established in 1990, NGOs began to register with the state, and by May 1993, 8,479 NGOs had been registered across Russia. By January 1997, 160,000 groups had registered, and by January 2000, 274,284 groups. As of 2001, more than 450,000 organizations had been officially registered. However, Henderson contends that the numbers can be misleading as many organizations existed in name only and that as few as 25 percent of the groups registered were active.

Of the organizations formed, most focused on materialist concerns of economic and physical security. Since the state was no longer meeting the needs of the most vulnerable populations, citizens’ groups organized to “fill in the gaps” by providing services for certain segments of the population, including the poor, veterans, the disabled, children, and pensioners. Some organizations, although now formally independent, were reconfigured Soviet-era groups, such as the Union of Women of Russia, which grew out of the defunct Soviet Women’s Committee. Fewer in number than the materialist-oriented organizations, issue-oriented NGOs

36 Ibid., 42.
37 Ibid., 6.
38 Ibid., 42.
39 Ibid., 43-44.
40 Ibid., 43.
41 Ibid., 44.
also formed to advocate for social change. The most popular causes taken up by Russian organizations included human rights, environmental protection, soldiers’ rights, and women’s activism.

Despite the dramatic increase in the number of Russian organizations, most were structurally weak, minimally integrated into the larger civil and political systems, and had few resources to draw upon. Henderson argues that organizations “tended to be small, insular, and usually survived on the commitment of the founder.”\(^{42}\) She notes that the average staff size for NGOs was one to three people and that most employees held other jobs to support themselves. Almost one-third of all NGOs had no paid staff.\(^ {43}\) Outside of these small circles of staff and volunteers, most NGOs had poor connections to the Russian public.\(^ {44}\)

State support to civil society groups was minimal; where it did exist, it was mostly in-kind, i.e., the provision of free or reduced cost office space or telephone lines, not funding to run programs. Support by businesses or corporations was also miniscule; those corporate funding programs that did emerge in the late transition period were severely regulated by the Russian government, and support of any controversial causes was viewed with suspicion. In addition, there was no tradition of check-book activism in Russia; most Russian citizens, in the event they even had resources to spare, had little incentive to pay dues to a sector they little understood. Given the dearth of domestic resources, many Russian organizations were eager to apply for grants by foreign donors when such an opportunity became available.

\(^{42}\) Ibid., 53.

\(^{43}\) Ibid., 53.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., 54-55.
3.2 Foreign Aid Programs to Develop Post-Soviet Civil Society in Russia

3.2.1 Overview of Civil Society Aid Providers and Programs

The need for alternative sources of funding by Russian NGOs coincided with the new priority of many Western governments and foundations to promote civil society programs as a way of strengthening democracy in transitional states. As discussed in the previous chapter, the assumption of such programs was that encouraging average citizens to participate in associations and become active in social and political affairs would help keep the power of the state in check and prevent a slide back into authoritarianism.45

Many donors were inspired by the publication of Putnam’s Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, in which he argued that “the strength and stability of liberal democracy depends on a vibrant and healthy sphere of associational participation.”46 While drawing upon Putnam’s more collaborative model of state-society relations, donors also were influenced by the oppositional model of civil society glamorized in the downfall of communism. Many donors thus promoted a vision of civil society in which average citizens were active, not primarily in collaborating with the state, as endorsed by Putnam’s theory, but in organizing independently of the state, lobbying for the interests of a particular constituency, and guarding against abuses of state power. In addition, in contrast to Putnam’s model, which highlighted the importance of many types of citizens’ associations, donors


targeted most of their funding to one specific associational type: the NGO, and, in particular, the advocacy NGO.

Although a few foreign donors were active in Russia in the late *perestroika* period, including the MacArthur Foundation and foundations affiliated with George Soros, it was not until after the fall of the Soviet Union that foreign funders arrived in mass to promote civil society in Russia.⁴⁷ Henderson lists the leading sources of support:

Major donors included government agencies of Western countries (primarily the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Norway) as well as multilateral organizations (such as the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Bank). These efforts were supplemented by the work of a wide array of Western nongovernmental and non-profit organizations, ranging from large foundations (such as the Open Society Institute, the Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, and the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation) to international nonprofit organizations (such as the Eurasia Foundation, IREX, World Learning, and the Institute for Sustainable Communities).⁴⁸

The United States was the leading promoter of civil society in Russia, both in ideological terms and in the total amount of funds allocated.⁴⁹ In order to transform political support for the transition to democracy into material assistance, the U.S. Congress passed the Freedom Support Act in 1992 to provide aid to Russia and other former Soviet republics, which followed the Support for Eastern European

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⁴⁷ Sundstrom (2006a), 32.

⁴⁸ Henderson (2003), 63.

⁴⁹ Wedel, 86; Sundstrom (2006a), 35.
Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 that provided funds to advance democratization in Poland and Hungary. Several U.S. governmental agencies became involved in assisting the Russian transition and developed programs to promote economic restructuring and democratic reforms, among other priorities. Support for civil society was generally included under the category of democratic reforms. Various U.S. governmental structures, including the State Department and the United States Information Agency (USIA), supported Russian NGO projects, but USAID controlled the largest portion of civil society funds.\textsuperscript{50} USAID created a Democracy and Government Program with the goal of promoting the rule of law, encouraging good governance, strengthening political processes, and supporting civil society.\textsuperscript{51} In addition, USAID developed an NGO sustainability index to measure the strength and viability of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe and in Eurasia.\textsuperscript{52} Originally, the United States considered civil society assistance a temporary measure, with USAID predicting that their goal of strengthening civil society in Russia could be achieved by 1999. Later, the date was extended to 2002, but in 2002, the idea of an exit date was dropped.\textsuperscript{53}

Only rarely does USAID grant funds directly to Russian NGOs; most often, USAID contracts out funds to U.S. NGOs or quasi-governmental agencies. Some of its leading contractors have been quasi-governmental agencies such as the Eurasia Foundation, the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic

\textsuperscript{50} Henderson (2003), 69.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 67.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 67.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 69.
Institute for International Affairs (NDI); nonprofit organizations such as the Institute of Soviet-American Relations, the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), and World Learning; and Russian organizations such as the Sakharov Center and the Moscow Helsinki Group.\textsuperscript{54}

Although comprising only a small percentage of the total U.S. aid package to Russia, civil society assistance nevertheless has been significant enough to fund numerous NGOs and effect noticeable change in Russia’s civil sphere.\textsuperscript{55} According to Sundstrom, USAID spent $133.8 million in the category of “Democratic Reform” in Russia between 1992 and 1999.\textsuperscript{56} Overall, she estimates that, between 1990 and 2002, the United States spent approximately $860 million to promote democracy in Russia.\textsuperscript{57} Although the dollar amount of civil society assistance is more difficult to calculate within the larger category of democratic reform, it was estimated that USAID devoted roughly $92 million to civic initiatives and NGO support programs in Russia from 1992 to 1998.\textsuperscript{58} Since the largest amount of foreign assistance to Russian NGOs, by far, came from the United States, Sundstrom argues that “it is the American version of NGO development assistance, with its relatively strict

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 70.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{55} In the 1990s, approximately 2-3 percent of U.S. aid to Russia fell into the category of democracy assistance. See Sundstrom (2006a), 12; Wedel, 87; Sarah E. Mendelson and John K. Glenn, “Introduction: Transnational Networks and NGOs in Postcommunist Societies,” in The Power and Limits of NGOs: A Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, ed. Sarah E. Mendelson and John K. Glenn (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 4-5.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{56} Sundstrom (2006a), 203-204.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 12.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 13.}
predefinition of specific priorities and emphasis on infrastructural development, that has dominated the community of donors."\(^{59}\)

While the United States was an early promoter of civil society aid as a means of encouraging economic and democratic reforms, the trend soon spread to other donor states and, by the late 1990s, nearly every foreign donor had developed programs directed at NGOs.\(^{60}\) After the United States, the European Union (EU) was the largest donor to Russian civil society.\(^{61}\) Until the late 1990s, all EU democracy assistance was through the European Commission’s Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program. Between 1991 and 2001, the TACIS program spent 750-800 million euro on democracy promotion programs in Russia.\(^{62}\) After a series of problems related to the running of TACIS, the program was redesigned in 1999, and its democracy component, now called the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), was put under the jurisdiction of the European Commission’s Delegation to Russia.\(^{63}\)

EIDHR offered three kinds of grants, for targeted projects, macro-projects, and micro-projects. Targeted project grants were won by organizations from EU member states to carry out activities related to the European Commission (EC)’s current area of focus in Russia. Macro-projects were substantially larger than micro-grants and ranged in value from 500,000 to 1 million euro. The process of obtaining

\(^{59}\) Ibid., 38.

\(^{60}\) Ibid., 36.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., 35.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., 12-13. Between 1990-1999, 19 percent of the EU’s aid to Russia fell into the category of democracy assistance. See Mendelson and Glenn, 5.

\(^{63}\) Sundstrom (2006a), 206.
a macro-grant was extremely long; it took an average of eighteen months from proposal submission to proposal start date. Micro-project grants were for smaller amounts, but the decision time for these grants was shorter, usually five to six months, since the program was administered by the EIDHR Moscow office. The micro-projects program was mostly demand-driven, as Russian NGOs could propose their own ideas for projects within the broad categories of rule of law, parliamentarianism, independent media, and NGO development.64

Several other Western governments provided significant amounts of funding to Russian NGOs. The British government, another leading donor, funded projects to promote civil society, human rights, an independent media, trade unions, and women’s groups, among other initiatives, through the Department for International Development and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy.65 The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) funded civil society programs under its Good Governance portfolio, and the Canadian Embassy in Russia provided grants to organizations whose projects encourage “the emergence of an effective civil society in Russia.”66 The Swiss government implemented a program to support the growth of civil society in Russia and to promote human rights.67 The Netherlands provided funds for Russian NGOs through its Matra program, which aimed to support the rule of law, public participation in decisions, and proliferation of NGOs.68

64 Ibid., 206-207.
65 Henderson (2003), 70.
66 Canadian International Development Agency, quoted in Henderson (2003), 70.
67 Henderson (2003), 70.
68 Sundstrom (2006a), 209.
In addition to states, private foundations have been major supporters of Russian civil society. The leading funders have been the Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, George Soros’s Open Society Institute, and the Charities Aid Foundation, an independent charity in the United Kingdom. These foundations provide grants both directly to Russian NGOs and to Western NGOs seeking to promote Russian civil society. Unlike governmental agencies such as USAID, private foundations are not reliant on a congressional mandate and thus have more flexibility in the types of grants they offer and the activities they fund. In addition, they are able to make longer term commitments to working in a particular country.

To illustrate some dollar amounts directed at the building of Russian civil society, from 1993 to 2002, the Charities Aid Foundation Russia granted over $6 million; from 1994 to 2002, the Mott Foundation issued almost $12 million in grants; and from 1991 to 1998, the MacArthur Foundation distributed over $17 million to initiatives across the former Soviet Union. In 2000 alone, the Open Society Institute-Russia granted over $56 million to Russian NGOs. From 1999 to 2002, the Ford Foundation distributed more than $6 million in grants.

A number of small private foundations have also granted funds to support Russian civil society. For example, the U.S.-based Global Fund for Women and the Netherlands-based Mama Cash Foundation have provided grants in the area of

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69 Ibid., 212; Henderson (2003), 70.

70 Henderson (2003), 71.

71 Ibid., 71.

72 Ibid., 71.
women’s rights. Smaller foundations are usually not large enough to support overseas offices, and thus, most of their communication with Russian NGOs is by email, fax, or postal mail.

Finally, multilateral organizations and international non-governmental organizations have provided substantial support to Russia’s civil society. As multilateral organizations, both the United Nations and the World Bank have developed programs aimed at strengthening civil society in Russia. International non-governmental organizations often receive funding from Western governmental agencies and private foundations “to administer grant competitions, workshops, and training to foster ‘citizen participation.’” Some of the international organizations most active in Russia have been the Eurasia Foundation, IREX, Save the Children, Institute for Sustainable Communities, and Initiative for Social Action and Renewal. While international organizations administered grant competitions to Russian NGOs, they were dependent on larger donors to fund these competitions. As a result, the types of grants they offered and the priority issues they identified reflected the policies of their funders.

A key factor influencing the form and focus of civil society programs that is often overlooked is donors’ own need for survival. Although the overall goal of most

73 Sundstrom (2006a), 213.
74 Ibid., 213.
75 Henderson (2003), 67, 70, 151.
76 Ibid., 71.
77 Ibid., 71; Sundstrom (2006a), 210-211.
78 Henderson (2003), 71.
foreign-funded civil society programs is to encourage the increased participation of Russian citizens in the political and civic arenas, the real constituents of funding programs are the citizens of the country providing the funding (for government agencies) or stockholders (for private foundations). Henderson writes, “In addition to reflecting altruistic impulses and facilitating democracy, civic development is also a business—a multimillion-dollar industry that employs numerous academics, consultants, and practitioners whose careers depend on supplying justifications and rationales for continued civic aid.”

Thus, the attention of Western donor organizations is necessarily divided between two constituencies, “the community they are supposed to serve abroad and the sources of their own funding.”

Given the great deal of competition among nonprofit organizations to receive grants from a foundation or governmental agency, organizations are under pressure to produce the quickest results possible. As a result, implementing organizations tend to focus on short-term projects that can provide numbers (number of newsletters distributed, journals published, people serviced, etc.) and to utilize public relations techniques to advertise their “success stories.” Consequently, Henderson argues, long-term aims in building civil society are neglected as organizations are constantly writing up reports to validate their effectiveness to their home office. In addition, although many assistance programs attempt to work with local Russian communities and fund projects on issues of local concern, the topics they support are often limited,

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79 Ibid., 65.
80 Ibid., 66.
81 Ibid., 84-85.
82 Ibid., 85.
and sometimes predetermined, by the source of their funding. As noted, the many assistance programs supported by the U.S. government must reflect U.S. interests in order to receive congressional approval.\textsuperscript{83} While scholars have theorized on the power imbalance inherent in the donor-recipient relationships built through democracy aid, Henderson notes that Russian NGOs give their foreign supporters one major gift: “a raison d’être for funders’ continued and future funding from their own funding source.”\textsuperscript{84}

Although foreign funding represented the best option for many Russian NGOs seeking support, it was unpredictable and unable to afford NGOs a sense of security. Funding levels increased or decreased depending on the interests of the donor. As donor agencies and organizations evaluated their programs and attempted to develop better methods of promoting civil society, Russian NGOs had to constantly adapt to the new requirements and new priorities set by their funders. For example, in the mid-1990s, when several foreign funders sought to shift their focus outside of Russia’s largest cities to the regions, many Moscow- and St. Petersburg-based NGOs proposed networking projects in order to avoid the loss of funding.\textsuperscript{85} The development of the crisis center movement throughout Russia has been well documented as an example of women’s NGOs taking on the organizational form desired by donors in order to qualify for grants. Once successful in developing a

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 85.

\textsuperscript{84} Sarah L. Henderson, “Selling Civil Society: Western Aid and the Nongovernmental Organization Sector in Russia,” \emph{Comparative Political Studies} 35, n. 2 (March 2002), 163.

“crisis center,” organizations then had to adapt to changing priority issues, e.g., from rape to domestic violence to human trafficking, in order to maintain their funding.86

While some changes in program priorities are attempts by donors to respond to the Russian context, other changes appear to simply reflect fads within the Western assistance community.87 Having to adapt to constantly shifting requirements of donor agencies and “chase” after funds limits NGOs’ ability to solidify their organizational focus and institutional identity. In addition, as will be discussed below, these funding patterns have contributed to the emergence of a “supply-driven” civil society in which many Russian NGOs respond to the priorities of foreign donors while neglecting the interests and concerns of their local communities, which prevents them from building constituencies and weakens their sustainability. Issues that may strike a chord with many Russian citizens, such as reproductive rights, are bypassed as being too controversial to gain U.S. congressional approval.88

The reality of donors’ own funding sources and their multiple accountabilities belie the rhetoric of partnership and equality often used to describe the relationships between Russian and Western organizations. Even when Russian-Western collaborations were officially presented as partnerships, they were usually based on the idea of Western experts teaching Russians how to correctly run their organizations. For example, in the 1990s, USAID-funded programs such as World


87 Henderson (2003), 145; Richter, 71-72.

Learning’s NGO Sector Support Program, the Institutional Partnerships Program, Sustaining Partnerships into the Next Century, and the Partnerships, Networking, Empowering, and Roll-Out Program were designed to pair start-up Russian NGOs with experienced Western NGOs to allow them to learn knowledge and skills from their “partners.” In addition to these federally funded programs, many smaller scale and grassroots programs, such as the U.S. sister city model, supported partnerships between Russian and Western NGOs.

Although these programs sometimes saw positive and effective results with Russian NGOs gaining valuable knowledge and the smaller programs allowing for especially close relationships to develop among participants, labeling such programs “partnerships” obscures the expert-recipient exchanges that structured these programs. Both Hemment and Henderson note that the Western “experts” who developed assistance programs and ran seminars for Russians often had little knowledge of Russian language, culture, or history and devoted little time to learning about Russian realities. As a result, Hemment writes, “many of the Russian people who were initially most enthusiastic and Western-oriented grew steadily more disenchanted about the potential for these so-called East-West exchanges to offer arenas for dialogue, mutual learning, and respect.”

In addition, lying beneath the neutral-sounding slogans of “democratization” and “participation” were the political and ideological agendas of funding

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89 Henderson (2003), 77.
90 Ibid., 78.
92 Hemment (2007), 22.
organizations and governments. Hemment argues that, as socialist ideology collapsed in the former Soviet Union, capitalism appeared victorious and democratization programs based on a neoliberal vision of economic development quickly arrived in the region to fill in the ideological vacuum. As described in chapter 2, a “New Policy Agenda” came to drive democratization programs in the hope of triggering economic growth and establishing new markets for Western investment. This new agenda, Hemment writes, “foresaw an economic restructuring process and a redrawing of state/societal relations along neoliberal lines, where, ideally, civil society is strong and the state ‘cut back’ like an unruly perennial.” The question of how NGOs would be financed was given little attention. Most Western aid providers initiated civil society assistance programs with the expectation that funding was a temporary measure and would end once Russian civil society had been “developed.” However, with little indigenous sources of support, most Russian NGOs had to drastically curtail their activities, or close down, when foreign funding ended. The fact that the countries and institutions providing funds for NGOs to service the population were many of the same that had supported the policies of shock therapy and privatization was not lost on all Russian activists.

93 Ibid., 10, 139.
94 Ibid., 139.
95 Ibid., 139.
96 Henderson (2003), 174.
3.2.2 Outcomes of Foreign-Funded Civil Society Assistance Programs

Given the fact that advocacy NGOs and Western-style social movements had scant roots in Russian society, the efforts of foreign funders to promote these new phenomena had a noticeable impact on the structure and functioning of Russia’s emerging civil society. In this section, I examine the outcomes of foreign aid efforts to Russian civil society.

Although a common outcome of civil society assistance across world regions was the tendency for NGOs to direct much of their energy to building relationships with foreign supporters, this tendency was even more pronounced in Russia and many post-socialist states due to the influence of decades of state socialism. As mentioned, the tradition of patronage that permeated Soviet life led citizens to value the establishment of small informal groups and close ties with individuals in positions of power over the need to form broad social networks. Strict control of public life by the Communist Party led to a sense of powerlessness among the Soviet population in their ability to affect public policy. As a result, a system of patron-client relations came to dominate political processes, as those lower on the social ladder came to depend on connections with elites in order to wield influence or obtain benefits.

As Henderson argues, the design of aid programs in which NGOs’ funding depended on satisfying the criteria of foreign funders resulted in a system of “principled clientelism.” Like Henderson, Hemment also contends that Russia’s third sector “reinforces old networks and hierarchies and enables the reproduction of old dependencies.” She presents the view of Valentina, the founder of a women’s

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97 Henderson (2003), 154-155.
NGO, that foreign foundations have stepped “into the slot vacated by the Soviet state, occupying the same structural position and affecting people’s psychology.”

Valentina explained:

Under socialism, we went to the government and asked for and received funds. Now we go to foundations. It’s the same process, the same psychology. Capitalism or socialism—what’s the difference? .... We used to live from Party congress to Party congress, but now we live from grant deadline to grant deadline!

Instead of encouraging individual initiative and consciousness raising among the population, which Valentina had expected to develop through the budding third sector, she saw it as promoting the same mentality of passivity and complacency that had infused Soviet society.

If civil society assistance programs aimed to foster equality, reciprocity, and strong horizontal networks, why is it that they so often promoted the opposing norms of elitism, competitiveness, and principled clientelism? To better understand the effect that foreign assistance had on Russian organizations, Henderson compared the operation of funded NGOs to the operation of NGOs that received no foreign funding. Based on extensive research of NGOs across Russia, she concluded that “the activities, goals, and structure of groups that receive foreign assistance differ substantially from those who rely primarily on domestic funding.”

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98 Hemment (2007), 63.

99 Ibid., 67.

100 Ibid., 67.

aid has provided for a degree of stability and enhanced the capacity of funded organizations, Henderson found four “paradoxical” results. First, although many Western agencies aimed to support grassroots organizations, funded NGOs tended toward top-heavy and bureaucratic organizational infrastructure. Second, funded NGOs lacked sizable constituencies. Third, by supporting those NGOs whose goals and language most coincided with the aims of donors, foreign funding furthered the establishment of a “civic elite” who were located primarily in Russia’s central cities, especially Moscow. Fourth, while many donors sought to foster democratic values of cooperation and trust among groups, funded groups tended to hoard information and resources, engaging in competitive behavior with other organizations. These outcomes will be expanded upon in the discussion of the effects of foreign assistance below.

As noted, the implementation of civil society assistance programs often reinforced the very values these programs claimed to reject. While preaching norms of transparency and equal opportunity, foreign funders tended to rely on established contacts and closed personal networks in making grant decisions. Consequently, many funders gave repeated grants to those individuals or organizations with whom they had already established trust. Russian activists quickly learned that links to foreign donors or membership in the emerging civic elite were the easiest way of obtaining grant money.

102 Ibid., 9-10.
103 Ibid., 10-11.
A related outcome of foreign funding was fragmentation of organizations into ever smaller NGOs or so-called non-governmental individuals. Since grants usually only provided for the salary of one or two leaders of an NGO, a way for other group members to obtain support was by breaking off and starting their own NGO through which to apply for funding. While this practice could give the impression that the number of “new” NGOs was growing and donors were spreading funding among more organizations, a large portion of funding remained concentrated among Russia’s civic elite.

In place of the egalitarian horizontal networks funders had hoped to encourage among Russian activists and NGOs, the civic elite soon came to dominate Russia’s third sector. As Henderson writes, “foreign aid strengthened the division of the civic community between the haves and the have-nots and centralized resources in the hands of the NGOs that had connections with the West.” A major criterion for membership in the elite was a track record of obtaining grants from foreign foundations, although such an approach often overlooked the extent to which grant monies had actually been put to effective use. A second criterion was location. As noted, many of Russia’s civic elite were from Moscow and St. Petersburg, where activists made early contacts with donors, established trust, and served as project organizers when donors wanted to branch out into Russia’s regions. Even in the

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105 See Mendelson, 235; and Sperling, Ferree, and Risman, 1178.
106 Henderson (2003), 20.
107 Ibid., 10; Henderson (2002), 158.
109 Ibid., 158.
regions, a few strong resource centers built with donors’ funds tended to monopolize foreign connections and grants and serve as representatives of large expanses of the country. A third factor opening the door for an individual to enter the new civic elite was power and status gained in the previous regime. As in the economic and political spheres, many former members of the Communist Party redirected their accumulated social capital to take advantage of opportunities in newly democratic Russia. Eventually, many would utilize the practice of “flex organizing” by holding governmental positions while simultaneously presenting themselves as independent activists to foreign donors.

In fueling a dramatic increase in the number of Russian NGOs, especially advocacy NGOs that have not attracted large public support, foreign funding organizations have promoted a vision of “supply-driven” civil development, in contrast to “demand-driven” civil development where most of the pressure to organize comes from below. Overall, interest among Russian citizens in forming associations in the public sphere has been low, and those issues that evoke substantial concern among the Russian population, such as providing for the material needs of citizens and improving the social safety net, rarely fit into the frameworks of foreign funding programs. Supply-driven civil societies look different and attract different types of people than demand-driven civil societies. Instead of rewarding the most talented and committed individuals, who may not speak the language of civil society


aid or be willing to change their mission to suit funders, the availability of large grants (compared to other sources of income in Russia) attracted many entrepreneurial personalities seeking to take advantage of a temporary opportunity.\[^{114}\]

Given that one of the leading purposes of the model of civil society promoted by foreign donors is to develop an arena for citizens to express their concerns to the state, citizen participation in civil society should be a key factor in measuring the success of these funding efforts. Therefore, the absence of sizable constituencies among the majority of Russian NGOs is a surprising outcome of civil society assistance programs.\[^{115}\] One reason many Russians do not become involved in the third sector is lack of knowledge about the sector and lack of trust in its intentions. Numerous scholars have cited surveys showing that the majority of Russians do not trust civil society organizations and express little desire to work with such organizations.\[^{116}\] Henderson notes that Russia has one of the lowest rates of organization among formerly communist countries, which together have a low membership mean of 0.91 organizations per person, compared to a mean of 2.39 for older democracies.\[^{117}\] Given the public’s misinformation about and mistrust of the civic sector, it is especially important for foreign donors to encourage recipient organizations to strengthen ties to their local communities.

In her comparison of NGOs that had received foreign funding with those that had not, Henderson found that funded groups’ primary form of “interaction” with the

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\[^{115}\] See Henderson (2003), 10, 113.

\[^{116}\] See, for example, Domrin, 204-205; Hale, 318; Johnson (2006), 276; Henderson (2003), 54-56.

\[^{117}\] Henderson (2003), 54-55.
public was through the production and distribution of newsletters, brochures, or other materials instead of listening to a constituency and responding to their needs. In contrast, many unfunded groups focused their activities on “providing a range of support and services to members within the group, which included everything from providing a shoulder to lean on to finding alternative housing.”

A second difference was in the language used by the organizations: “Groups that had received funding tended to reflect the post-materialist values of the donor, such as concerns for gender equity, environmentalism, or respect for human rights, rather than the survivalist, materialist bent of many organizations that relied solely on domestic sources of financial support.” Hence, while funded groups used theoretical language that helped them communicate with their funders and transnational networks, unfunded groups focused on the pragmatic concerns of daily life.

On the other hand, a similarity between funded and unfunded groups was that both displayed little interest in boosting the size of their organizations. While funded NGOs focused on conducting informational projects with relatively small staff sizes, unfunded groups concentrated on serving small-scale support groups rather than searching for new members.

Comparing the objectives of funded and unfunded groups, Henderson notes that funded groups often aimed to effect large-scale change in the political and social

118 Ibid., 111.
119 Ibid., 112.
120 Ibid., 10.
121 Ibid., 113.
122 Ibid., 113, 138.
systems, while unfunded groups focused on finding practical solutions to members’ immediate life problems. Based on her visits to offices of both funded and unfunded organizations, Henderson contrasts the work of these organizations. Describing the work of unfunded groups, she writes:

> Often, in sitting down with these groups, I listened to a very articulate listing of problems, whether it was the price of medication, the status of health care, or the situation of disabled children…. They were more interested in adapting to the system than changing it. Thus, they often had cultivated relations with the local administration in order to fight for immediate benefits for their members.\(^{123}\)

By contrast, describing her visits to funded groups, Henderson states:

> Many donor-supported organizations had impressive offices, produced a large collection of NGO publications, and could speak the right language of advocacy, civil society, and democracy. Some of them…were operating at full capacity and were working on timely, interesting projects that provided valuable services to their clientele. But for the majority of funded organizations, the offices remained unvisited and the publications usually sat on a shelf with a multitude of other brochures, newsletters, bulletins, guides, and directories that had been published and distributed only to the same circle of NGOs.\(^{124}\)

Thus, Henderson concludes, building constituencies is one of the leading challenges for Russian NGOs. While both funded and unfunded groups tend to be small in size,

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\(^{123}\) Ibid., 140.

\(^{124}\) Ibid., 153.
donors can use their influence to encourage their grant recipients to devote more attention to developing constituencies, and thereby work to increase trust in the civil sphere among the Russian population.

One factor that greatly impacts the success of civil society assistance programs is the degree to which the values they promote coincide with local norms. When projects supported by foreign funders complement local organizational cultures or demonstrate tangible improvement on issues of local concern, communities are likely to accept such projects and take advantage of the techniques they advocate.\textsuperscript{125} In comparing soldier rights’ organizations to women’s organizations, Sundstrom found that organizations supporting soldiers’ rights were more successful in gaining recognition and respect in Russian society because they appeal to norms against bodily harm instead of to the theoretical concept of individual human rights. While a legalistic discourse on human rights is popular in many Western countries, especially the United States, she argues that the norm against violations of physical dignity is nearly universal and is widely accepted in Russia.\textsuperscript{126} Thus, although employment discrimination and sexual harassment of women are pervasive problems throughout Russia, Sundstrom contends that foreign-funded campaigns on these issues failed to garner public support because they appealed to the importance of women’s rights, an idea largely rejected by the Russian public.\textsuperscript{127} One exception to the general invisibility of women’s organizations in Russia is the growth of the crisis center

\textsuperscript{125} Mendelson and Glenn, 23; Mendelson, 241.

\textsuperscript{126} Sundstrom (2006a), 55, 73. Here, Sundstrom draws upon the well-known work of political scientists Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, which will be further discussed in chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{127} Sundstrom (2006a), 89.
movement. Sundstrom maintains that foreign-funded crisis centers were able to gain respect in Russian society because they draw attention to an issue of bodily harm, namely domestic violence against women.\textsuperscript{128}

Another factor that impacts the effectiveness of civil society assistance programs is the local political atmosphere. As Hemment notes, some foreign-funded NGOs have developed cooperative relations with local governments.\textsuperscript{129} Given the limited budgets of many local administrations, the availability of foreign funds to tackle some regional problems provides an incentive for officials to collaborate with NGOs they otherwise might have ignored. In addition, some state institutions have created parallel NGOs within their own structures in order to qualify for foreign funding.\textsuperscript{130}

However, foreign funding has also produced negative outcomes in that local governments are sometimes suspicious of the motives of foreign groups and dismiss the relevance of NGOs with no domestic constituencies. As president, Vladimir Putin furthered the suspicion of foreign-funded groups in both his speeches and his policies on the civic sector. In his 2004 State of the Nation address, Putin argued that the primary purpose of some citizens’ associations is to obtain “funding from influential foreign or domestic foundations” or to service “dubious group and commercial interests.”\textsuperscript{131} As a result, he suggested, these organizations were not addressing the real needs of the Russian population. Instead, Putin promoted the efforts of

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 91.

\textsuperscript{129} Hemment (2007), 144.

\textsuperscript{130} See Johnson (2006), 272-274.

organizations that share the values of the Kremlin leadership and that will assist the
government in pursuing its goals for society. Putin backed up his rhetoric with
measures to regulate the work of NGOs, such as establishing a Public Chamber
comprising mainly Kremlin-friendly NGOs to represent the voices of the civic sector
and increasing the registration requirements for NGOs, especially foreign NGOs. In
addition, the arrest and imprisonment of oil baron Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who had
founded the Open Russia Foundation (modeled after George Soros’s Open Society
Institute), sent the message that domestic funding efforts that countered the interests
of the Russian state would be punished.

As discussed, the neoliberal philosophy that lay behind many civil society
assistance programs promoted a model of civil society in which citizens take on roles
previously held by the state. Many scholars have noted the role of Russian NGOs in
“filling in the gaps” left when state-provided social services declined. Studying the
Russian environmental movement, Laura Henry finds that one of the main functions
of environmental organizations is “filling in for partially dismantled state bureaucracy
and services.” For example, grassroots groups “leapt in to fill the loss of recreation
opportunities for children and public maintenance of city parks,” and professionalized
groups “adopted tasks previously carried out by the state’s scientific research

132 Alfred B. Evans, Jr., “Vladimir Putin’s Design for Civil Society,” in Russian Civil Society: A
Critical Assessment, ed. Alfred B. Evans, Jr., Laura A. Henry, and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom (Armonk,
NY: Sharpe, 2006), 149-152.

133 See Janet Elise Johnson, Gender Violence in Russia: The Politics of Feminist Intervention
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 61, 177, no. 32; and Sarah L. Henderson, “Shaping
Civic Advocacy: International and Domestic Policies toward Russia’s NGO Sector,” in Advocacy
Organizations and Collective Action, ed. Aseem Prakash and Mary Kay Gugerty (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 269.

Assessment, ed. Alfred B. Evans, Jr., Laura A. Henry, and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom (Armonk, NY:
Sharpe, 2006), 223.
institutions and environmental inspectorate, including monitoring, antipoaching efforts, and the development of green technology."\textsuperscript{135} In contrast to grassroots and professionalized groups, which had minimal collaboration with state agencies, government-affiliated environmental groups were the most adamant that one of their main goals was to “help” the government or to enforce government regulation.\textsuperscript{136} Scholars point out that, through their professional expertise, independent perspective, and sometimes private funding sources, NGOs are often expected to act as “innovators” of programs that, once proven effective, the government will take over and institutionalize.\textsuperscript{137} Such a collaborative arrangement between NGOs and the state depends, however, on the level of trust between the two parties and on the capacity of the state to take on new programs.

Thus, the model of state-civil society relations promoted not only by civil society assistance programs, but also by Western-led economic and political reform efforts in Russia has influenced the developing relationship between Russia’s third sector and the state. However, the neoliberal model imported from the West has collided with Russian political traditions that prescribe a dominant state. The precise outcomes of the meeting of these dueling influences will be outlined in the next section.

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 223.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 221.

Overall, many scholars agree that foreign funding was successful in supporting the growth of a third sector, but not a civil society, in Russia.\textsuperscript{138} Thousands of NGOs were active promoting their causes and finding ways to interact with, and sometimes partner with, local or regional governments. Yet few NGOs reached out to more than a small number of Russian citizens, and the values that Western donors were so eager to inculcate among the Russian population, including trust in state and civil society structures, widespread participation in public life, and solidarity and reciprocity with other citizens, have shown scant evidence of taking root. Henderson argues, “Ironically, although aid can improve NGO capacity, it can simultaneously discourage groups from functioning as a civil society…. Foreign aid has weakened the nexus between the organizations and the society they supposedly represent.”\textsuperscript{139}

Most aid programs are geared to generating fast, quantitative results to demonstrate productivity to stockholders or tax payers in the donor’s home country. This has resulted in what Henderson calls a “virtual civil society” in which “Donors and recipient NGOs to some extent kept up a pretext of carefully documenting activities, success stories, and future needs in order to justify their continued existence.”\textsuperscript{140} What this approach left out, however, was sufficient attention to building the infrastructure and teaching the values necessary to sustaining a strong, domestically oriented civil society. Instead, civil society assistance programs have

\begin{flushleft}\textsuperscript{138} See, for example, Henderson (2003), 167; Richter, 70; Mendelson, 233; Hemment (2007), 61-62, 68.\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}\textsuperscript{139} Henderson (2003), 28.\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 166.\end{flushleft}
often contributed to the decline of democratic practices as they encourage competitiveness and hierarchical relations among groups.\textsuperscript{141} A true “civil society” can only develop gradually, representing the interests and organizational culture of a domestic constituency and respecting the contours of domestic political power. In order to support the growth of a sustainable civil society in Russia, donors must work toward longer term goals in civic development, broaden the types of citizen groups they fund beyond just NGOs, and practice what they preach in modeling transparent and egalitarian organizational procedures.

In terms of strengthening democracy in Russia, there is general agreement that the ability of foreign aid to institutionalize democratic practices or shift the balance of state-civil society relations is limited.\textsuperscript{142} While international aid has led to some changes, these changes are usually small (i.e., micro-level changes in the norms or behaviors of a group of activists, not macro-level changes in state behavior) and affect more the outward appearance of democratic structures than the functioning of these structures.\textsuperscript{143} Thus, a state may have a democratic constitution, hold regular elections, and permit a degree of independence in the media and civic sector but continue to manipulate the workings of power and employ autocratic means of governance.\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{141} Mendelson, 234-235.
\textsuperscript{142} See Henderson (2003), 169; Mendelson and Glenn, 22; Mendelson, 233, 236.
\textsuperscript{143} Mendelson, 233.
\textsuperscript{144} Carothers (2004), 110, 171-172.
3.3 State-Civil Society Relations in Post-Soviet Russia

In addition to foreign assistance, a major factor influencing the development of Russian civil society is the relationship between citizens’ associations and the Russian state. By definition, civil society is meant to represent the voices of citizens organizing outside of state structures. In reality, both in Russia and in most other countries, it can be hard to draw a strict line where state intervention ends and citizen initiative begins. With a legacy of strong state control in Russia, the reach of governmental power into the civic sphere is potentially greater than in the liberal-style civil societies of many Western countries. Thus, although foreign assistance has played a large role in launching many citizens’ organizations, overall civil society development has followed a uniquely Russian path that reflects the historic relations between the public and a state that tends toward authoritarianism. While the state is the dominant player in this relationship, citizens’ organizations have also benefited from the breadth of state power by drawing on state resources, such as office space, telephone lines, and university privileges, to carry out civic activities.

In studying relations between civil society and the Russian state, some of the leading questions that scholars have posed are: (1) to what extent do state policies on civil society facilitate versus restrict the work of NGOs, (2) to what degree does the state seek to coopt NGOs versus partner with them on social initiatives, and (3) how closely can NGOs collaborate with state structures without losing the ability to critique state policy and push for change? I address these questions as I examine the shifting relations between civil society and the post-Soviet Russian state in this section.
The legacy of the Soviet past continues to influence the development of civil society in “democratic” Russia. As discussed previously in this chapter, independent organizing was strictly limited under the Soviet Union as the Communist Party sought to control all aspects of public life. Sundstrom and Henry argue that, in the post-Soviet period, the tradition of the strong state in Russia has led many citizens to “continue to believe that the state’s authority should be largely unquestioned” and “occupants of bureaucratic and political positions…to believe in the state’s extensive and unique role in governing all areas of society.” Russian activists and groups, used to appealing to the state for benefits, had to learn to interact with the state more as partners than supplicants. For many Russian activists, seeing themselves as agents of social change was difficult.

3.3.1 State-Civil Society Relations during the Yeltsin Era

Immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991-1992, the focus of the Yeltsin administration was to “demobilize” existing civil society in order to prevent opposition to shock therapy and other economic reforms. With the first post-Soviet elections not held until December 1993, Yeltsin initially directed his energy toward strengthening the executive branch of government at the federal and regional levels, gaining the support of former leaders in the Communist Party, and encouraging the emergence of new interest groups at the elite level. During this

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145 Sundstrom and Henry, 318.
146 Henderson (2003), 56.
147 McFaul, 112.
148 Ibid., 113.
period, Russian civil society was relatively passive, with few vocal critics of Yeltsin’s reforms. Until the Russian Constitution was put into force in 1993, there was little legal foundation for groups to operate or attempt to collaborate with state structures; thus, they had scant influence on policymaking.

While Yeltsin’s administration attempted to protect the government from societal pressures during this time, it did not seek to suppress the development of civil society.149 Indeed, Yeltsin’s government established the legal foundation upon which civil society could grow. The 1993 Constitution granted the rights required for a functioning civil society: freedom of speech, press, religion, association, and peaceful assembly. In 1995-1996, Yeltsin signed a series of laws concerning citizens’ organizations, the Law on Public Associations, the Law on Philanthropic Activities and Organizations, the Law on Noncommercial Organizations, and the Law on Local Self-Government, which established the legal status of independent groups, outlined the rules regulating their activities, and articulated their rights.150 Based on this legal framework, citizens could organize independently of the state, and even act in opposition to the state, for the first time in Soviet and Russian history.151

Despite this achievement, the Russian legal system remained weak and the laws were confusing and inconsistent at the federal, regional, and local levels. In addition, few legal reforms followed to build upon these initial laws. For example, unlike in some other democratic countries, there was no law allowing tax breaks for

149 Ibid., 113.

150 Ibid., 113; Weigle (2002), 121; Henderson (2010), 260.

151 McFaul, 113.
individuals or businesses contributing to charitable organizations, providing one less incentive for Russians to contribute to a sector they little understood.\footnote{Henderson (2010), 261.}

An additional factor hampering the development of civil society was a lack of clear mechanisms for NGOs to communicate with state structures. Organizations could attempt to form relations at the federal level with administrative offices, but such contacts were usually based on personal connections, not institutionalized channels of communication.\footnote{Ibid., 261.} Although civil society-state relations were covered in Russian legislation, as was characteristic of the Yeltsin era, there was a gulf between what existed on paper and the reality of the Russian political system.\footnote{Ibid., 262; Weigle (2002), 121-122.}

While NGOs had little success in communicating with state structures at the federal level, they found more opportunity at the local and regional levels. Most city and regional governments had an administrative unit specifically designated to communicate with “social actors,” defined as media, political parties, and/or NGOs.\footnote{Henderson (2010), 262.} In addition, in 1994, the Yeltsin administration encouraged regional governments to set up public chambers (obshchestvennye palaty) for representatives of registered NGOs to take part in reviewing legislation before the regional Duma (legislatures).\footnote{Ibid., 262.} In 1995, a similar measure was included in the federal Law on Local Self-Government, which mandated that draft legal acts on the local level be subject to examination by representatives of civil society. Based on this law, civil society
activists worked to create local “social-government” councils in which representatives of independent organizations and local officials came together to discuss pending legislation. However, the implementation of these initiatives varied widely, with some regional and local governments more accepting of cooperation with NGOs than others.

Thus, although Yeltsin did not actively seek to suppress civil society, the political system that he helped to construct presented few opportunities for civil society to influence policymaking. Yeltsin’s focus on strengthening the executive branch on both the federal and regional levels led him to overlook the importance both of establishing a stable multi-party electoral system and of developing a mechanism for state-civil society communication. With a weak party system and a weak legislature in Russia, NGOs looking to effect social change had to target the executive branch, which was the most difficult to reach.

Overall, the weakness of the Russian state and economy under Yeltsin presented the greatest obstacle to effective state-civil society collaboration. With limited financial resources and a high level of corruption in the government, even if Yeltsin’s government had been willing to work with civil society actors, it would have had difficulty responding to their demands. Many citizens’ organizations, with little incentive to lobby a weak state for benefits, instead became insular and focused on filling the gaps left when state social service provision dried up. Analyzing the obstacles to civil society growth under Yeltsin, Weigle concludes:

The absence of strong federalism, an effective state, a developed middle class, a free enterprise system, and independent news media that uphold ethical

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standards are all cited by activists as contributing to the weakness of civil society development…. Russian activists consider an active middle class, a free enterprise system, and a vibrant civil society to go hand in hand.  

Although many theorists and democracy assistance promoters stress the need for civil society to counter the development of an overpowering state, the opposing scenario of a weak state unable to respond to the demands of civil society is also not conducive to a healthy state-society relationship. Weigle argues that Russian activists believe in the “strong state-strong society” model: “The institutionalization of state power is a prerequisite for civil society development, and a strong civil society is vital to ensuring the state’s democratic orientation.” This model would soon be put to the test during the regime of Vladimir Putin, who prioritized the strengthening of the Russian state during his terms as president. In the meantime, Yeltsin’s “benign neglect” approach toward Russian society had permitted civil society to grow but severely limited its ability to influence political affairs.

3.3.2 State-Civil Society Relations during the Putin Era

After Putin assumed the Russian presidency in 2000, he focused his attention on rebuilding the image and power that Russia once held in the international arena and putting Russia’s somewhat chaotic domestic affairs into order. As part of his efforts to strengthen and stabilize the Russian state, he looked at the state’s relationship with civil society and implemented policies to increase state involvement with citizens’

159 Ibid., 127.
organizations. His approach generated both positive and negative responses from Russian activists, with some appreciative of additional opportunities to communicate with state structures and others fearful that the state would attempt to control their organization’s activities.

Activists’ reactions to Putin’s policies often differed according to their organizational type. Those organizations that sought to “help” the state and that worked on one of Putin’s stated priority areas of improving Russians’ healthcare, housing, agriculture, or education largely benefited from the state’s increased attention and enjoyed a policy environment that helped them meet their goals.\textsuperscript{161} On the other hand, advocacy organizations that aimed to press the government for change or that received substantial funding from foreign donors sometimes felt unwelcome in a state where civil society’s interests were expected to coincide with the administration’s agenda. In particular, Putin’s suspicion of foreign-funded groups led him to create obstacles for these groups’ operations in Russia and to promote a “nationalist approach” to civil society development both through improved communication channels between society and the state and through increased governmental funding of organizations supporting the state’s interests.\textsuperscript{162}

Coming into office, Putin was faced with the political outcomes of Yeltsin’s “weak” leadership, namely, a system of “superpresidentialism” that neglected the development of other political institutions and a disorganized civil society that had scant influence on policymaking.\textsuperscript{163} Putin took advantage of both of these legacies in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Henderson (2010), 269.
\item Ibid., 267.
\end{enumerate}
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rebuilding the Russian state. With a strong grip on power and a weak civil society to check his actions, Putin was able to further increase the dominance of the executive branch while challenging the oligarchs with whom Yeltsin had shared power.

However, Alfred Evans argues that, unlike the monopoly the Community Party held on power during the Soviet era, Putin sought a “hegemonic” centralization of power:

so that many groups and institutions that retain token independence, remaining formally outside the vertical executive hierarchy of the state, have become…part of the base of support for the administrative structures headed by Putin. It is also part of Putin’s mode of operation to offer rewards for organizations that are integrated into his pyramid of support, while he makes it clear, usually by deeds rather than words…that there will be penalties for resisting subordination to centralized authority.  

Evans contends that, using this approach, within a few years after becoming president, “Putin was able to decrease pluralism in the mass media in Russia, curtail the independence of regional governors, ensure that the national parliament would accept his leadership with docility, and intimidate the ‘oligarchs’ of the business world so that they would not stand in the way of his political moves.”

Under Putin, organizations or individuals who too blatantly challenged the government’s hold on power would be subject to penalties ranging from harassment to imprisonment.

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163 Evans, 153.
164 Ibid., 148.
165 Ibid., 148-149.
166 Ibid., 149.
Unlike Yeltsin, Putin extensively addressed the strengthening of civil society in both his speeches and his policies.\textsuperscript{167} For example, in his 2004 State of the Nation Address, he stated:

Without a mature civic society, there can be no effective solution to people’s pressing problems…. There are thousands of citizens’ associations and unions working constructively in our country but far from all of them are geared towards defending people’s real interests. For some of these organizations, the priority is rather different—obtaining funding from influential foreign or domestic foundations. For others it is servicing dubious group and commercial interests…. It is, thus, necessary gradually to transfer to the non-state sector the functions which the state should not carry out, or is incapable of carrying out efficiently. It also makes sense to make use of the experience of the work of public chambers, gathered in a number of Russia’s regions. Such standing non-state organizations can ensure public scrutiny of the most important regulatory instruments which directly affect the interests of the country’s citizens.\textsuperscript{168}

As in many of Putin’s speeches, contradictions were apparent in this address. While officially supporting the development of civil society and the “freedom” and “independence” of Russian citizens, Putin raised suspicion over organizations not representing “people’s real interests” and those receiving foreign funding.\textsuperscript{169}

\textsuperscript{167} Domrin, 193; Henderson (2010), 266-267.

\textsuperscript{168} Putin.

\textsuperscript{169} In the conclusion to his 2004 State of the Nation Address, Putin states, “I consider that the creation of a free society of free people in Russia is our most important task…. It is the most important because an individual who is not free and not independent is incapable of taking care of himself, his family or
In Putin’s vision, civil society organizations should work to support the government and to unify the population in support of the overarching goals of the Russian nation. Thus, instead of a liberal model of civil society, in which diverse interest groups compete for influence or lobby for rights, Putin supports a more statist model of civil society. In this model, “people, participating in civil society, will regard as of primary importance not so much the idea of freedom, not so much the idea of interests, as the idea of service to a certain common cause.” This vision, of course, calls for civil society to remain subordinate to the authority of the state and to work on issues that meet the state’s approval.

Sensing danger in this approach, Evans argues that the Putin administration “interprets civil society as a network of organizations that, while remaining technically outside the state, will be co-opted to assist the leadership of the political regime in pursuing the objectives that it has chosen for society.” Again, however, unlike the Soviets, Putin did not seek to completely absorb civil society into the state. On this point, Evans notes:

Putin seeks to dominate society but not to absorb it completely, partly because he does not want the state to shoulder full responsibility for providing material resources to all nongovernmental organizations. Also, unlike the Bolsheviks, Putin is not inspired by an ideology that calls for comprehensive social transformation. He has shown a tendency to create some key GONGOs

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170 Vladimir Putin, quoted in Henderson (2010), 266. Note that here, Putin downplays the importance of “freedom.”

171 Evans, 152.
[government-organized non-governmental organizations], while manipulating rewards and punishments to ensure compliance from existing groups and marginalizing other groups that attempt to preserve their independence.\textsuperscript{172}

While Putin’s administration directly penalized only a small number of prominent organizations, Evans contends that, for most groups refusing to toe the Kremlin’s line, the result was simply irrelevance and lack of influence over the political process.\textsuperscript{173}

Putin’s “nationalist” approach to building civil society led his administration to create hurdles in the path of foreign-funded groups and of organizations that too harshly criticized the government. Evans argues that Putin’s administration had been putting pressure on human rights groups with foreign ties for two years prior to his 2004 address. In addition, from 2002 to 2004, “the Russian government had terminated the U.S. Peace Corps program, expelled the head of the AFL/CIO affiliate in Moscow, and pressed dubious charges against Russian researchers and journalists who were accused of having revealed state secrets to foreign governments.”\textsuperscript{174}

However, after Putin’s 2004 speech, attacks on organizations that did not enjoy governmental support became more blatant. In the months following Putin’s speech, numerous newspaper articles and statements by government officials charged the Russian human rights movement with serving foreign interests intent on

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 154.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 149.

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., 150.
weakening the Russian state. In the central Russian city of Kazan, masked men entered the Human Rights Center and smashed computers and other equipment.\textsuperscript{175}

While hampering the work of organizations that appeared to threaten the Kremlin’s interests, Putin also took constructive steps to develop a civil society in line with his vision. One of his first steps was to convene a national Civic Forum in November 2001 with the goal of creating new channels of communication and encouraging greater cooperation between NGOs and the state. Work on organizing the Forum began on June 12, 2001, when Putin and a few administration representatives met with ten civic leaders that had been chosen for the event by the Kremlin. Meeting organizers Gleb Pavlovsky, Putin adviser and director of the Fund for Effective Policy, and Viacheslav Surkov, deputy head of the Presidential Administration, originally envisioned the Civic Forum as a means toward establishing a “Union of Civic Organizations” or another permanent structure through which civil society activists could communicate with federal officials.\textsuperscript{176}

After the June 12 meeting, NGO representatives that had been in attendance gave an address in which they called for the Civic Forum to contribute to the realization of a “Great Russia” founded on the “best national traditions of service to society.”\textsuperscript{177} They argued that “free citizens in close union with the government will be able to establish an order in which personal initiatives are not degraded and each individual realizes his own potential.”\textsuperscript{178}

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., 150.

\textsuperscript{176} Alexander Nikitin and Jane Buchanan, “The Kremlin’s Civic Forum: Cooperation or Co-optation for Civil Society in Russia?” \textit{Demokratizatsiya} 10, n. 2 (Spring 2002), 148.

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 148.
Other civil society activists were skeptical of the purpose of the Forum and demanded changes if their organizations were to participate. Some feared the Forum was an attempt by the government to exert greater control over civil society and to coopt its resources toward governmental aims. One reason for this fear was the proliferation of government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs), such as Zeleny Krest (Green Cross), KEDR (Constructive Ecological Movement of Russia), and Grazhdanskoе Obshchestvo (Civil Society), which had been used “to demonstrate ‘unity’ of opinion on policy between the administration and the public.” Grazhdanskoе Obshchestvo participated in helping to select organizations across Russia to take part in the Civic Forum.

Another reason that some activists were hesitant to participate in the Forum was that it too closely resembled Communist Party conferences, “whose attendance would be limited to reliable delegates and regional delegations hand-picked by Kremlin and local government structures.” If the Civic Forum followed this model, activists feared that the small number of NGO representatives invited to the Forum would vote on a permanent structure that would regulate state-civil society communication for all NGOs across Russia and that could be manipulated to demonstrate support of the current administration.

178 Ibid., 148.
179 Weigle (2002), 133.
180 Nikitin and Buchanan, 149.
181 Ibid., 148.
182 Ibid., 148-149.
Many of Russia’s largest NGOs, including Narodnaia Assembleia (People’s Assembly), an umbrella group of several established organizations such as the Moscow-Helsinki Group, Memorial, the Social Ecological Union, and others, had not been invited to serve on the organizing committee for the Civic Forum and refused to attend what they saw as a government attempt to coopt civil society for its own purposes. The government, recognizing the negative publicity surrounding the event and the lack of support from influential and respected NGOs, realized it had to broaden its approach to the Forum.

On August 20, Surkov went to the Moscow office of Memorial to meet with a group of NGO leaders to discuss the conditions under which they would consider taking part in the Forum. 183 While some activists refused on principle to take part in a Forum initiated by the government, those willing to join the discussions demanded numerous changes. First, they insisted that the Forum not serve as a congress for civil society representatives to make decisions for civil society as a whole and that no elections be held. Instead, the Forum should be a “working gathering for NGO activists interested in some degree of cooperation with the government to jointly solve pressing social problems.” 184 Thus, the Forum would comprise multiple roundtable discussions on a variety of topics. Second, they demanded that the Forum’s organizing committee be restructured to include a broader range of societal representatives. Members of the original organizing committee would constitute only one-third of the committee, while representatives of previously uninvited human rights and environmental organizations would make up another third, and members of

183 Ibid., 149.
184 Ibid., 150.
the Presidential Administration would make up the final third. Activists were
adamant on the last point, as they saw the Civic Forum as an opportunity for civil
society representatives to make direct contact with administration officials.

In mid-September, after the administration agreed to the proposed conditions,
the new 81-member organizing committee began the second-stage of preparations for
the Civic Forum. While some *Narodnaia Assembleia* representatives remained wary
of the government’s intentions for the Forum, the new organizing committee quickly
came to agreement on the composition of a 21-member working group to lead Forum
preparations. In early October, the working group sent an open letter to the civic
sector outlining the Forum’s new goals, welcoming input, and inviting all interested
civil society actors to take part in the Forum. On October 12, the working group
released a two-page statement, “On the Goals and Tasks of the Civic Forum,” that
laid out the framework for all subsequent Forum activities. The statement, signed
by both civic and governmental representatives on the committee, stated that the main
goal of the Forum was to be “a working discussion on the developmental path of
Russian civil society and its interaction with the government.”

Civil society is not a vassal of the authorities, just as it is not an opponent of
them. It exists as a natural and equal partner of the government in the creation

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185 Ibid., 150.
186 Ibid., 151.
187 Ibid., 151.
188 Ibid., 151.
189 Ibid., 151.
of a strong and prosperous state. And effective government similarly exists as a natural partner of civil society and its daily activities.\textsuperscript{190}

The confrontation between civil society representatives and the authorities in planning the Civic Forum demonstrates the strength that civil society had amassed in ten years of activity since the end of the Soviet era. Well-known activists led the movement to reject the framework of the Forum as proposed by the original organizing committee and reformulated the purpose and goals of the Forum to better suit their interests. However, while able to effectively assert its position against the authorities in this instance, civil society was still far from an equal partner to the government, despite the rhetoric of the Forum.

With the working group of the organizing committee finalized in late September, it had only two months to complete preparations for a conference that would bring together several thousand civic leaders and governmental officials.\textsuperscript{191} The committee worked with a federally sponsored budget of $1.5 million, but it also expressed hope that international donors would fund the participation of organizations that otherwise lacked the funds to attend.\textsuperscript{192} With the goal of extending participation to as many activists as possible, the organizing committee designed the following system to allocate five thousand participant slots: three thousand representatives of civic organizations (no more than one participant per organization); three hundred representatives of all-Russian and international organizations registered in Russia;

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., 151.

\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., 154.

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., 155.
seven hundred “working group quota” participants; and one thousand guests, including government officials, journalists, and international observers.\textsuperscript{193}

In order to have representation of groups across Russia, a quota system was created with participant slots apportioned by region, based on formulas taking into account both population and level of civic activity.\textsuperscript{194} Civic organizations in each region were to form local organizing committees by mid-October, hold pre-Forum conferences to discuss issues of local concern, and process application forms for the Civic Forum that would then be sent to the central organizing committee.\textsuperscript{195} Sixty to eighty percent of participant slots were to be allocated based on this application process, with the remaining regional spots to be given to regional or all-Russian organizations that sent their applications directly to the central organizing committee. Although most regions followed this process in preparing for the Forum, about thirty regions failed to hold conferences, and thus some regions did not fill their quotas. In addition, Moscow, with over nineteen thousand organizations, was subject to different procedures.\textsuperscript{196}

Although the local and central organizing committees worked hard to prepare for the Civic Forum, preparations were rushed and programs were not fully fleshed out. By early November, some were calling for the Forum to be delayed for a few weeks, but since the logistical arrangements had already been made, it was decided to hold the Forum, as planned, on November 21-22, 2001.

\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., 154.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 154.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., 154.
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., 154-155.
The Civic Forum began with a plenary session in the Great Kremlin Palace attended by the majority of forum participants.\textsuperscript{197} The keynote speaker and session chair was Moscow Helsinki Group leader Ludmila Alekseeva, who had been exiled in the Soviet era for her dissident activities.\textsuperscript{198} In her address, Alekseeva drew attention to the achievements of civic activists in Russia, but also noted the disconnect between civil society and governmental authorities, “which necessitates constructive efforts both at the forum and beyond it to create a dialogue to resolve sociopolitical and economic problems.”\textsuperscript{199}

Upon completing her address, Alekseeva introduced President Putin, who entered the room to greet Forum participants. Alexander Nikitin and Jane Buchanan write, “That Putin’s remarks followed Alekseeva’s introduction and that the president would then sit next to the former dissident symbolized that indeed profound changes in Russia were under way, despite continuing suspicion between government and citizens.”\textsuperscript{200}

In his speech, Putin voiced support for increased cooperation between civil society and the state and rejected the idea that the government desired to control or coopt civil society. He argued that it is “absolutely unproductive and, in principle, impossible and indeed dangerous to attempt to construct civil society ‘from above.’”\textsuperscript{201} In addition, he recognized the diversity of independent groups in Russia,

\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 155.
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., 155.
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid., 156.
\textsuperscript{200} Ibid., 156.
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., 156.
“their different goals and expectations from the government, and the fact that many vehemently oppose the state on principle on questions of government policies.”

This diversity, Putin contended, was important for the functioning of a strong democratic state. In his opinion, the state’s role was to create favorable conditions for the development of a flourishing civil society and to promote dialogue between the first and third sectors. Toward this aim, he stated:

We recognize that the efficacy of this dialogue to a considerable degree depends on us, on representatives of the state, on the state as a whole. In this, we are prepared to take necessary organizational, and, if needed, legal measures, and are prepared to develop effective two-way communication between society and state apparatuses.

Putin called for “calm, concentrated, systematic work” to realize the goal of improved state-society relations and to “unite the resources of a strengthened state and the energy of a democratic society.”

After Putin finished his address, he took his seat next to Alekseeva and listened to the speeches of the other high-level governmental representatives in attendance. When these speeches were completed, Putin departed along with the governmental representatives and did not have the chance to hear from any representatives of civil society. As Nikitin and Buchanan write, “These actions very much gave the impression that not only was the forum not a priority for the president, but that those surrounding Putin arranged the schedule so that he would remain

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202 Putin, quoted in Weigle (2002), 137.
203 Nikitin and Buchanan, 156.
204 Ibid., 156.
insulated from information or situations that might have proved unpleasant for him.”205 In addition, despite Putin’s verbal recognition of the importance of civil society, Nikitin and Buchanan note that many activists doubted the sincerity of his comments since “what the president says so eloquently very often fails to correspond with events as they actually occur.”206 Weigle, on the other hand, emphasizes that even the verbal recognition of civil society by Putin was a hard-won achievement for civic activists. She points out that “Putin is on record as recognizing the autonomy, diversity, and policymaking potential of Russia’s NGOs.”207 For many activists who had worked for nearly a decade in obscurity under Yeltsin, Putin’s words held significant meaning.

After the plenary session, Civic Forum participants spent the remainder of the day engaged in twenty-one large group discussions (with up to three hundred participants). Topics included local self-government, social policies, military reform, educational reform, mass media and freedom of information, public health and the environment, and Chechnya, among other issues.208 The goal of these discussions was to prepare positions or statements that would serve as the basis for the second day’s meetings with governmental representatives.209

On the next day, NGO representatives met with government officials in smaller roundtable groups. In these sessions, civil society and governmental

205 Ibid., 157.
206 Ibid., 157.
207 Weigle (2002), 137.
208 Ibid., 136; Nikitin and Buchanan, 157.
209 Nikitin and Buchanan, 157.
representatives successfully formed many working groups that would continue to meet after the Forum had adjourned. However, the Forum produced few concrete agreements on issues of importance to civic activists, leaving many disgruntled with what they perceived as the state’s reluctance to accept civil society as an equal partner. Especially in discussion groups on controversial issues, such as environmental protection and Chechnya, conversations turned divisive with officials unwilling to fully answer activists’ questions. In contrast, groups on less controversial issues, such as local government, proved more fruitful as officials and activists found greater common ground. Again, much of the difference of opinion among activists on the success of the Civic Forum seemed to be divided according to organizational type: representatives of advocacy NGOs, including human rights and environmental groups, were disappointed that government representatives failed to fully address the issues they raised or to negotiate with them as equal partners, while representatives of other groups, especially service-provision organizations, expressed appreciation that the state was now paying them greater attention and respect.

At the end of the second day, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov represented the government in place of Putin, and Deputy Prime Minister Valentina Matvienko served as meeting chair at the closing plenary session. Twenty-one presenters gave summaries of results of the thematic discussions and roundtables, which, according to Nikitin and Buchanan, were “generally positive and relatively benign commentary

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210 Ibid., 158-159.

211 Ibid., 159; John Squier, “Civil Society and the Challenge of Russian Gosudarstvennost,” Demokratizatsiya 10, n. 2 (Spring 2002), 177-178.

212 Nikitin and Buchanan., 159.
One presenter, environmental activist Grigory Pasko, spoke about the importance of freedom of information and independent media, at which point the entire audience, including Prime Minister Kasianov, applauded. However, a month later, Pasko, a former navy captain and journalist who had reported illegal dumping of nuclear waste by the military, was convicted of high treason and sentenced to four years in a hard labor prison. Of this case, Nikitin and Buchanan write, “For journalists, environmentalists, scientists, human rights advocates, and others, the results of the Pasko case deliver a much clearer message about the actual relationship between government and its citizens than any speech delivered during the two days of the Civic Forum.”

Some activists and scholars agreed with Nikitin and Buchanan’s skeptical take on the intent and outcomes of the Civic Forum. Similar to the viewpoint of many advocacy organizations that were hesitant to attend the Civic Forum, Evans argues that the Forum was just one attempt by the Russian state to “make it gradually more difficult for existing NGOs to operate independently of state domination.” As suggested by the Forum’s proceedings, organizations that are too critical of the government may be marginalized and their concerns sidelined.

On the other hand, other scholars, along with activists who sought to work with the government, identified a number of benefits produced by the Forum. Weigle argues that activists left the Civic Forum “generally optimistic about the potential of

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213 Ibid., 159.
214 Ibid., 159.
215 Ibid., 159.
216 Evans, 149.
the forum to usher in a new era in Russia’s state-society relationship.” She notes that, following the Forum, “Follow-up conferences with local government officials, NGO representatives, the mass media, and forum participants took place throughout Russia.” Thus, although the event did not match its rhetoric of elevating civil society to equal partnership with the state, it did increase governmental officials’ awareness of the work of civil society, grant state approval to this work, and improve dialogue between civic and state actors. Even Nikitin and Buchanan recognize that the Forum resulted in greater attention to the development of civil society in Russia, with the media producing an unprecedented number of articles on civil society and civic activists finding new ways to interact with each other and with state officials.

Finally, although some contend that the Kremlin sought to sow division within civil society, especially among opposition groups, through the Forum, the work of organizing the event actually encouraged these groups to strengthen their ties. Throughout preparations for the Forum, leading human rights and environmental groups made concerted efforts to present a unified front and avoid criticizing each other.

If the Civic Forum was an early indicator of Putin’s approach to state-civil society relations, other measures would follow to make his intentions even more clear. As did Yeltsin, Putin supported the idea of public chambers through which citizens could provide feedback on proposed legislation and governmental actions.

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217 Weigle (2002), 137.
218 Ibid., 138.
219 Nikitin and Buchanan, 161.
220 Ibid., 161; Squier, 177.
Such a permanent structure of citizen representation was similar to what the government had first proposed when preparing for the Civic Forum, but, as noted, opposition from activists prevented the Forum from morphing into such a structure. Three years later, in September 2004, following a series of terrorist attacks that culminated in the bombing of an elementary school in Beslan, Putin responded with a speech calling for greater state control over society and proposing the formation of a federal Public Chamber to serve as an official consultative body to the government. In December 2004, Putin submitted the bill on the Public Chamber to the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian legislature. The bill subsequently passed and came into force on July 1, 2005. Describing the Chamber’s purpose, Henderson writes:

> The key function of the Chamber is to submit recommendations to members of the Duma about domestic policy and proposed legislation, and to request investigations into potential breaches of the law as well as request information from, and monitor, state agencies. The members of the Chamber also serve on one of eighteen commissions that examine bills or provide advice and expertise to the Duma on a variety of pressing issues, such as public control over the activities of law enforcement and reforming the judicial system, communications, information policy and freedom of expression in the media, culture, healthcare, environmental policy, and so on.

Membership in the Public Chamber was elected from the top down. The President chooses the first third of the members; those members then choose the next third; and these two-thirds choose the final third nominated by regional social groups.

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221 Henderson (2010), 267; Evans, 151.

222 Henderson (2010), 267.
for a total of 126 members. This structure was replicated on a smaller scale in most of Russia’s eighty-nine territorial units.\textsuperscript{223}

As with the Civic Forum, the creation of the Public Chamber elicited both positive and negative reactions from activists and scholars. Sundstrom writes, “NGOs that are independent of the state have heavily criticized the chamber as being designed to control civil society rather than to seek diverse input into policies.”\textsuperscript{224} Constituted mostly by civic representatives who are supportive of governmental policies, the Chamber excludes activists openly critical of the state, resulting in a council that is not representative of the diversity of Russia’s civil society. On the other hand, many citizens and NGO leaders receptive to the Kremlin’s favored model of state-society relations eagerly accepted the opportunity to serve as consultants to and collaborators with the government.

The Putin administration also signaled its approach to civil society development with new legislation and financial support to NGOs. The 2003 Federal Law on Local Self-Governance, which began to be put into effect in some regions in 2006, further delineated the division of authority between federal, regional, and local power structures and provided avenues for citizen participation on issues of “local significance,” such as “the formation and execution of municipal budgets, the provision of utilities and other government services, and…housing reform and city planning.”\textsuperscript{225}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{223} Ibid., 267.
\item \textsuperscript{224} Sundstrom (2006a), 181.
\item \textsuperscript{225} Henderson (2010), 268.
\end{itemize}
In addition, the federal government provided funds for NGO activities, in part to lessen the dependence on foreign assistance. In 2006, the federal government authorized the Public Chamber to disburse 500 million rubles (US $15 million) to NGOs through a grant competition. In the following years, the amount disbursed was increased and the Public Chamber began contracting out management of the grant competitions to several NGOs.\textsuperscript{226}

Putin encouraged business leaders to support Russian civil society by declaring 2006 the year of philanthropy and calling on businesses to contribute to organizations working on Kremlin-defined priority issues. While corporate giving has increased among Russian businesses, the range of NGOs supported in this manner remains small, mainly comprising service-oriented NGOs and organizations promoting Russian culture. Advocacy NGOs have received little corporate support, especially following the imprisonment of Khodorkovsky and the closure of his philanthropic Open Russia Foundation.\textsuperscript{227}

In 2006, Putin pushed for the passage of a new law placing stricter conditions on the registration process and operation of NGOs. This law, Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, amended existing laws regulating the civic sector.\textsuperscript{228} Although the Russian Constitution allowed citizens to form independent associations without formally registering with the government, registration granted organizations a number of privileges, including the right to open

\begin{footnotes}
\item[226] Ibid., 268-269.
\item[227] Ibid., 269.
\item[228] Ibid., 269.
\end{footnotes}
a bank account, to own or rent property, to apply for government funding, and to bid for government service contracts, among other rights.229

Before 2006, the most comprehensive law regulating the civic sector had been the 1995 Law on Public Associations, which outlined procedures for NGOs to register with justice authorities and set a June 30, 1999, deadline for all organizations registered under previous laws to re-register in order to retain their legal status. Depending on the territory and the scope of operations, organizations had to either register with the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice or with a regional or local branch. As Henderson points out, registration requirements were inconsistent and burdensome, with the location and cost of registration and the amount of necessary paperwork differing for various organizations.230 As a result of the ensuing confusion or a lack of time and money to complete the often extensive registration requirements, many NGOs did not re-register or did not submit their documents on time.

According to the law, even organizations that did meet the deadline could have their registration denied for a variety of reasons, including “advocating the violent change of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation, damage to the security of the state, creation of an armed organization, or inciting social, racial, ethnic, or religious conflict.”231 Although the stated purpose of the law was to remove NGOs formed for such illegal purposes or NGOs that were no longer active, John Squier argues that some officials used the law “to rid themselves of troublesome organizations—particularly trade unions and ecological and human rights

229 Squier, 170; Weigle (2002), 122.
231 Squier, 170.
organizations—that were too openly critical of the officials or their policies.” 232 Contrary to the law, some organizations had their re-registration denied or delayed due to officials’ rejection of the organization’s name, structure, or (legal) activities. 233 Overall, Squier notes, the number of organizations officially registered with the government substantially decreased after the deadline to re-register passed. 234

Since 1999, organizations had been periodically required to re-register with state officials, ostensibly so that the government could keep accurate records of the number of NGOs operating in Russia. 235 While the registration process allowed the government a degree of oversight over civil society development and permitted authorities to penalize those activists most critical of state policies, for the majority of NGOs, registration was simply a technical matter with little impact on their organizational activities except for the time spent filling out paperwork. However, the stricter NGO law that Putin signed into effect in 2006 drew criticism from both foreign observers and Russian NGOs for dramatically increasing the state’s powers of supervision over civil society. Passage of the law followed the “color revolutions” that occurred in the neighboring countries of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, in which foreign-funded organizations were credited with helping to put democratic leaders into office, and the law was interpreted as an effort by Putin to prevent foreign organizations from having such an influence in Russia. 236 Indeed, Putin gave

232 Ibid., 170-171.

233 Ibid., 171.

234 Ibid., 171.


236 Henderson (2010), 254.
credence to this interpretation by speaking out against the meddling of foreign donors on several occasions.  

Earlier, and stricter, drafts of the 2006 law had resulted in criticism from members of the U.S. Congress and administration officials, “strongly worded statements from the European Council,” and public complaints by Russian NGOs and the Public Chamber. In response, Putin called on the Duma to modify the bill, leading the body to remove several of the harsher requirements. Henderson cites this case as an example of the success Russian civil society can have in influencing state actions. Nevertheless, passage of the law was denounced both within Russia and internationally, and NGOs in Russia have had to deal with its new regulations.

The 2006 law introduced several new requirements for both Russian and foreign NGOs. Prior to the passage of the law, foreign NGOs had been operating in Russia with little oversight from the Russian government. The new requirements “restrict who may form an organization in the Russian Federation, expand the reasons for which registration may be denied, and increase the supervisory powers of the state.” Foreign NGOs operating in Russia were particularly concerned with the condition that they can be denied registration if their “goals and objectives… create a threat to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, unique character, cultural heritage and national interests of the Russian

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238 Ibid., 36.

239 Henderson (2010), 271.

240 Ibid., 269.
Since these terms were not clearly defined in the law, it gave the registration authority a great deal of power in applying the law.

The law also substantially increased the reporting burden on both Russian and foreign NGOs. Russian NGOs were obligated to submit reports on their activities and finances on an annual basis, including all funds received from foreign sources and how those funds were used. Foreign NGOs had to complete an extensive number of documents in order to register and then submit several reports each year on their accounts. Finally, the law increased the supervisory powers of the registration authority by giving it the right to demand internal documents of NGOs, to send representatives to an organization’s meetings, and to ban foreign NGOs from transferring funds or resources to recipients in situations that are found to be threatening to the Russian state. Overall, the law was seen as increasing the number of criteria for which NGOs could be penalized, thus, giving the state more power to selectively determine which NGOs could wield influence in the Russian political system.

After the October 18, 2006, deadline to re-register passed, many organizations had their operations terminated or suspended, either because they failed to complete the required paperwork or because of officials’ rejection of the organization’s stated purpose or activities. Russian lawyer Olga Gnezdilova states that, as of January 1,

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241 Ibid., 269.

2009, 219,802 Russian NGOs had been removed from the government’s records.\textsuperscript{243} Most, she notes, were removed for not turning in their accounts; thus, the registration authority made the assumption that they no longer exist. However, some closures seem to be politically motivated. For example, the British Council, which conducted English classes and sponsored cultural activities in Russia, had a long history of problems with the Russian government, reflecting strains in political relations between Russia and the United Kingdom. In 2007, the Russian Foreign Ministry ordered the closure of two regional offices of the Council, claiming that they were operating illegally. When the British Council refused to shut down the offices, arguing that Russia’s actions violated international law, Russian Foreign Minister Mikhail Kamynin replied that “any other actions [besides closure] would be provocative and build up bilateral tensions.” Ultimately, the offices were permanently closed, but Russia continued to take actions against the Council’s sole remaining office in Moscow.\textsuperscript{244}

In addition, a number of NGOs have had their applications for registration rejected because the authorities found fault with the organizations’ purpose or the wording of their charters. Gnezdilova notes that the Ministry of Justice sets a quota each year for the number of organizations that will be denied registration.\textsuperscript{245} One case that attracted the attention of the human rights movement was the denial of


\textsuperscript{245} Gnezdilova.
registration to the Bisexual, Gay and Transgender Organization "Rainbow House," on the grounds that the group’s advocacy of “non-traditional sexual orientation” could be considered to undermine the “spiritual and cultural values” and the “territorial integrity” and “national security” of Russia. 246

One of the biggest problems the law caused for both foreign and Russian NGOs was the substantial paperwork now required to register or simply operate an NGO in Russia. As the Moscow Helsinki Group and Human Rights without Frontiers note:

It has been estimated that setting up a new NGO now requires submitting at least 60 pages of documentation and takes eight weeks or more, compared to ten days for a commercial company. NGOs often resort to legal assistance to finalize their applications, and the total costs involved in registering NGOs have been estimated to be 40% higher than in the case of commercial entities. 247

In addition, a lack of clear guidelines on how to complete the paperwork and inconsistency in how the law was applied in different regions created a great deal of confusion and difficulty for NGOs trying to conform to the new requirements.

Henderson offers a different perspective on the 2006 law, arguing that most NGOs did not suffer negative consequences from the law’s implementation, apart from the increased paperwork that it required. Citing a 2007 survey of NGOs in twenty regions of Russia, she notes that the majority of survey respondents had not

246 Moscow Helsinki Group and Human Rights without Frontiers, 17.
247 Ibid., 16.
complied with the law.\textsuperscript{248} According to the Federal Registration Service, only 32 percent of NGOs had submitted the required documents. However, NGOs in the 2007 survey did not report any penalties for lack of submission. In addition, respondents did not feel that the law had been disproportionally applied against human rights or advocacy organizations. Henderson suggests that advocacy groups may have been more likely to file their paperwork, due to fears that they would be targeted for any breach of the law. Nonetheless, she states, “as of the end of 2007, the biggest cost to them of the legislation, according to Russian NGOs themselves, was time spent in filling out the papers.”\textsuperscript{249}

Compared to the Yeltsin presidency, Putin made stronger efforts both to increase civil society’s access to the state and to regulate its activities. As Henderson notes, “The conventional wisdom regarding President Putin’s policy agenda toward NGOs is that he is trying to crush the sector by erecting too many barriers and imposing too many costs for most, if not all, advocacy organizations.”\textsuperscript{250} Evans concurs with this assessment, contending:

While Putin has made many statements giving token endorsement for the development of civil society, it is now apparent that his vision is of a quasi-civil society…in which social organizations are subordinated to the authority of the state and express demands within the parameters of the program of the highest executive leadership.\textsuperscript{251}

\textsuperscript{248} Henderson (2010), 274.

\textsuperscript{249} Ibid., 274.

\textsuperscript{250} Ibid., 275. See Benardo and Neier for a similar assessment of Putin’s policies toward civil society.

\textsuperscript{251} Evans, 149.
He goes on to argue, “Putin has proved largely successful in narrowing the boundaries for the expression of competing interests arising from Russian society, but he cannot eliminate the root causes of pluralism in society.”

Evans believes that the system Putin constructed will suffer from the same inherent weakness of the Soviet system: the lack of a mechanism to express the diversity of interests that emerge in a highly developed and educated society. He maintains that, if only loyal NGOs benefit from the state-civil society relationship, the importance of personal connections and the pervasiveness of corruption, which characterized the Soviet era, will continue to dominate post-Soviet Russia. Unless the Russian leadership learns from the Soviet past, Evans suggests, citizens may find more disruptive means of expressing interests that are not represented in established institutions.

Henderson, in contrast, argues against the perception that Putin was trying to “crush” civil society. Rather than seeking to suppress all advocacy NGOs, the Putin administration “has designed a system to favor the supply of NGOs that work on issues that align with the national interest.” While now having the power to punish NGOs that are too critical of the government, the Kremlin’s system rewarded NGOs that provided essential social services to the population or that addressed issues signaled as priorities by the state. The system provided “domestic institutional incentives to replace the role of international donors in impacting supply and demand for advocacy.”

In establishing institutions of civil society-state interaction, such as

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252 Ibid., 155.

253 Ibid., 155-156.

254 Henderson (2010), 254.

255 Ibid., 254.
the Public Chamber, and offering grants to organizations working on issues that it itself selected, the Kremlin diminished the influence of foreign funders on the development of Russia’s civil society. Additionally, in contrast to the Yeltsin era, the increased legislative and policy infrastructure put into place by the Putin administration enabled NGOs, including advocacy groups, to increase their presence in both national and regional policy circles. Thus, instead of smothering civil society, Putin’s policies created more opportunities for NGOs, especially those in the regions, to communicate and collaborate with governmental officials and structures.

In her research, Henderson found that:

NGO activists, while wary of the intent and meaning of the changes at the federal level, were nonetheless cognizant that this provided a political window for many of them that had not existed previously. For many NGOs,…the new opportunities offered by Putin’s changes meant they had to walk the fine line between cooperation and cooptation, but that this was an improvement from standing on the sidelines, watching policy being made without their input.

Maintaining that the civil sector largely benefited from Putin’s policies, Henderson argues: “[T]he largest problem facing NGOs today is not potential capture and cooptation by an all-powerful state, but the inability to captivate the average Russian citizen, who still remains suspicious and leery of organizational activity.” NGOs would have more success collaborating with the state and lobbying for change if they could claim the support of large constituencies, not just foreign donors.

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256 Ibid., 254-255.
257 Ibid., 273-274.
258 Ibid., 275.
3.3.3 Overarching Themes Characterizing Civil Society-State Relations in the Yeltsin and Putin Eras

Through the widely divergent presidencies of Yeltsin and Putin, several consistent themes emerged in the realm of government-civil society relations. One of these themes was the extreme variation in the strength of such relations, and of civil society itself, in Russia’s various regions. Under Yeltsin, civil society development was seen as a local, rather than federal, process due to this variation and the lack of centralized institutions or mechanisms of state-civil society interaction. This changed with Putin’s more heavy-handed measures, but Henderson notes that, at the end of Putin’s second term in 2008, governors still had “enormous latitude to interpret Kremlin policy as they see fit.” She argues that politically moderate or progressive governors and mayors interpreted Putin’s greater interest in civil society “as a sign to either initiate dialogue with or deepen preexisting relationships with NGOs, develop channels for policy input, or design relatively open government-funded grant competitions.” Thus, in these more progressive regions, steps were taken to replicate the measures occurring on the federal level in the sphere of state-society relations. In addition, several local and regional governments passed legislation allowing NGOs to implement social policy and experimented with contracting out social services to NGOs.

261 Ibid., 272.
262 Ibid., 272.
In contrast, in less progressive regions, leading officials saw Putin’s policies as a green light to “coopt civic actors and direct their activities.” In cities such as Rostov, Krasnodar, and Vladivostok, local administrations strengthened their ties to only select NGOs, disappointing the larger community of NGOs, especially those whose hopes had been raised by developments at the federal level. Hence, while some local and regional governments viewed NGOs as potentially beneficial partners or contractors, others saw NGOs as threats to the stability of the current political order that needed to be either coopted or sidelined. Sundstrom notes that, even on the local level, NGOs pay consequences for challenging governmental authorities. She writes:

These hindrances to NGO development often happen in the form of “random” tax inspection visits, pressure on media sources not to cover NGO activities, or restrictive regulations on public assembly. In the most friendly cases, NGOs that are critical of the government are simply excluded from any institutionalized dialogue, if not actively punished.

Despite the difficulties in some regions, overall, Russian activists have been more successful in collaborating with government officials and influencing policy on local and regional, rather than on the federal, levels.

Sundstrom also points out differences in the character of local government-civil society relations in big cities as compared to small towns. While activists in the largest cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg had a relatively ample number of

263 Ibid., 272.
264 Sundstrom (2006a), 103.
265 Ibid., 104.
opportunities to meet with local governmental officials at conferences and roundtables to discuss policy matters, these activists often characterized their relations with the city government as “negative” since they did not find that officials actually implemented their policy recommendations.\(^{266}\) By contrast, in smaller towns, activists were more likely to report “positive” relations with the local government even when their policy recommendations were not implemented, and they seemed satisfied by the opportunity to merely meet with members of the local government. Sundstrom believes part of the reason for this difference is the increased “transnational exposure” of activists in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Knowledgeable on the more extensive role civil society plays in policy processes in Western nations, Moscow and St. Petersburg activists may have had greater expectations of what they could achieve at this still early stage in Russia’s civic development.\(^{267}\) Sundstrom also points out that activists in smaller cities felt “closer” to their local governments, which could lead to positive collaborations in cases where governments were open to working with civil society actors.\(^{268}\)

A second theme characterizing state-civil society relations in the post-Soviet period was the tendency for these relations to replicate patterns common in the Soviet past. Legacies of the past, including a tendency toward patron-client relations, patronage, and lack of transparency in filling position and organizing societal structures, continued to influence the development of civil society in post-Soviet Russia. For example, when government structures were willing to work with civil

\(^{266}\) Ibid., 132.

\(^{267}\) Ibid., 133.

\(^{268}\) Ibid., 166.
society, they frequently created GONGOs or engaged in practices similar to “flex organizing” in which the boundaries between government and NGO were blurred. State university departments and state social services created “hybrid” structures by forming parallel NGOs that existed as both state institutions and societal organizations.\textsuperscript{269} While this practice indeed encouraged state-civil society interaction, it also presented a misleading image of such organizations to the public and potential donors, and some critics claim it permitted too much governmental control over civil society. In addition, the lack of transparency behind the development of hybrid organizations often led to charges of patronage, as friends and colleagues of the founders benefited from roles in the new organization.\textsuperscript{270}

Following this, a third theme that characterized both the Yeltsin and Putin eras was the dominant role of the state in its relations with civil society, in other words, the emergence of a more statist model of state-society relations. As the Russian state survived a period of disorder under Yeltsin and withstood calls by Putin for equal partnership with civil society, it maintained the upper hand in its interaction with the third sector. With civil society unable to harness broad support from the Russian public, the state took increasing measures to keep the influence of civil society in check.

Analyzing the dynamic between civil society and the Russian state, scholars emphasize the historical legacy of \textit{gosudarstvennost}, or “statism,” which grew out of Russia’s traditional political culture.\textsuperscript{271} As Weigle explains, \textit{gosudarstvennost} is the

\textsuperscript{269} Johnson (2006), 266.

\textsuperscript{270} Ibid., 275-276.
tradition “of state intervention into social and economic processes.” As in Western European democracies, this tradition led Russia to establish a democracy in which “the state intervenes or plays a strong mediating role in social life and the economy.” With the tradition of gosudarstvennost firmly rooted in the minds of both the Russian public and Russian state officials, scholars and activists have come to find that the best approach to dealing with the state is not opposition, but collaboration. As Sundstrom and Henry argue, “organizations in Russian civil society are likely to make more progress in changing state policies and behavior in their issue areas by forming avenues of cooperation with state organizations than by opposing the state directly.” The challenge, many scholars have noted, is for an organization to establish such cooperation with the state without losing its own sense of identity and purpose. Sundstrom writes, “this balance of ‘constructive engagement’—neither standing in complete opposition to cooperation with state power, nor falling into a relationship of submission and dependency with state institutions—is extraordinarily difficult to achieve.”

271 Sundstrom and Henry, 316; Squier, 166; Weigle (2002), 139.
272 Weigle (2002), 139.
273 Ibid., 139.
274 Sundstrom and Henry, 317-318.
275 Ibid., 317.
277 Sundstrom (2006b), 190.
Russian activists’ vision of a “strong state-strong society” has not yet been realized.\textsuperscript{278} While the tradition of \textit{gosudarstvennost} led both governmental officials and activists to expect the Russian state to play the dominant role in state-society relations, the state was not as powerful as it often presented itself to be. Jonathan Weiler argues that human rights abuses significantly increased in post-Soviet Russia, as the state withdrew much of its oversight over public life. While the “neoliberal project” empowered Russia activists to organize into NGOs, including NGOs that monitor human rights violations, “larger social forces, especially the chaotic economic changes and the attendant social displacement…, have created large pools of individuals who are in socially vulnerable circumstances, and NGOs have done little to bring political elites closer to accountability for widespread suffering in the face of those larger forces.”\textsuperscript{279} These “socially vulnerable groups,” including women, prisoners, and residents of the Chechen region, were increasingly unable to defend their most basic rights in the face of widening economic inequalities and governmental indifference to their problems.\textsuperscript{280} Weiler contends that, without state commitment and monetary resources to defend human rights, NGOs have limited ability to act in this arena.

Thus, as argued previously, a strong civil society cannot exist without a strong state. In addition to protecting human rights, a strong state is necessary to provide the legal foundation upon which civil society can operate and to counter attempts by

\textsuperscript{278} Weigle (2002), 127.

\textsuperscript{279} Jonathan D. Weiler, “Human Rights in Post-Soviet Russia,” \textit{Demokratizatsiya} 10, n. 2 (Spring 2002), 269.

\textsuperscript{280} Ibid., 258-259.
oligarchs, mafia, and corrupt regional leaders to manipulate legal and economic processes for their own benefit. However, as Weigle points out, there is no guarantee that a strong state will act in the interests of its citizens. Therefore, as state power ebbs and flows, civil society must remain constantly vigilant to protect citizens’ interests against incursions by the state and to utilize opportunities to lobby for its rights in societal forums.

A fourth major theme characterizing state-civil society relations in the post-Soviet era is the agency of Russian activists as they negotiated with the state to defend their autonomy and achieve their organizational goals. Although the Russian state was the dominant player in the “partnership” with civil society throughout both the Yeltsin and Putin eras, Russian activists took advantage of opportunities to protect their position in the state-society balance of power. As demonstrated in the discussion of the 2001 Civic Forum, activists opposed to the framework developed by the state were adamant on the changes they sought and participated in a redesign of the Forum to better suit their interests. In addition, members of Russian civil society, including the Kremlin-backed Public Chamber, were vocal in contesting the 2006 law tightening the restrictions on NGOs, contributing to the Duma’s removal of the law’s harshest measures.

Throughout the Putin era, while Western observers denounced the stringent measures imposed on civil society, most Russian activists remained committed to working with state officials and building long-term mechanisms of dialogue on social and policy issues. Indeed, most accepted the statist model that came to define state-

\[281\] Weigle (2002), 139.
\[282\] Ibid., 140.
society relations and put their energies into the practical work of cooperating and compromising with officials to push their platforms forward.\textsuperscript{283} Countering the notion that Putin aimed to destroy civil society, Henderson writes:

\begin{quote}
[T]he experience of NGOs indicates that there are numerous interests at work in shaping the civic space, and the variation in advocacy paths indicates a lack of monolithic state control, rather than an excess of it. Local, regional, and federal elites all have different agendas, as do the NGOs that choose to try to leverage the increased points of access in the system.\textsuperscript{284}
\end{quote}

With the state only one of many “partners” with whom Russian NGOs collaborated, activists exercised their agency in developing multiple relationships to maximize the benefits to their organization. Many organizations formed relationships with foreign funders or international advocacy networks to take advantage of resources not easily obtainable domestically. Thus, in negotiating with both state agencies and foreign funders, Russian activists demonstrated repeatedly that they are not merely pawns in the struggle for control of Russia’s civic sphere between Western interests and the Russian state. Instead, I conceptualize Russian activists as playing the leading role in the development of Russia’s civil society. They may not have reached the status of equal partners with the Russian government or with their foreign supporters, but many activists utilized their networking and organizational skills to navigate the systems in which they were embedded and make the most of opportunities presented to them.

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\textsuperscript{283} Squier, 180; Weigle (2002), 140; Henderson (2010), 274.
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\textsuperscript{284} Henderson (2010), 270.
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3.4 Summing Up: Statist and Liberal Influences in the Development of Russian Civil Society

This chapter has provided an overview of the development of Russian civil society in the post-Soviet era, from the “benign neglect” period under Yeltsin to the “vigilant state” approach of Putin.285 If under Yeltsin, the burgeoning growth in civil society was weakened by the lack of institutionalized connections to state structures, under Putin, the expanded role of some civil society actors in national affairs occurred along with the increased regulation and selective penalization of other types of NGOs.

Both presidencies bore witness to the consequences of the collision of the neoliberal model of state-society relations promoted by Western interests with the statist traditions of Russian political society. The neoliberal project supported by Western actors to restructure Russia’s economic, political, and civic spheres had both positive and negative consequences for the Russian population. This project, in calling for increased civic activity along with reduced governmental intervention into the social and economic arenas, widened income inequalities and destabilized the life conditions of the most socially vulnerable populations, who could not depend on a weakened state to protect their rights. At the same time, it stimulated the development of the most formidable civic sector that had ever existed in Russian society.286 Arguing that civil society development represents a “considerable achievement for Western democracy-building,” Squier writes, “For possibly the first time in Russian history, some counterweight to the Russian state’s ability to act

286 Weiler, 258.
arbitrarily has been set in place."²⁸⁷ In addition, scholars studying Russian civil society found that most Russian activists continued to place more trust in foreign agencies to provide funding than in the Russian state, which they perceived as a bigger threat to their long-term autonomy.²⁸⁸

However, while the Western neoliberal project called for limiting the state’s reach into the social arena, Russia’s statist traditions prescribed that the state remain the preeminent player in all domestic affairs. The historical legacy of gosudarstvennost led both governmental officials and the Russian public to expect the state to take the lead in societal development. The post-Soviet Russian government permitted civil society to exist but expected civil society to support the priorities of the state and to work in collaboration with the state (as a junior partner) in pursuing shared goals. Thus, while foreign funding made possible the scope and strength of Russian civil society, the Russian state established the rules that NGOs had to abide by in order to exert influence in the policy arena.

Given the Russian government’s intervention into the civic arena, the question turns to how it intervenes and who benefits from this intervention. One advantage of civil society is that it is more flexible than the government, which enables it to respond more quickly to new social phenomena. As will be discussed in chapter 6, this flexibility allowed NGOs to initiate work on the issue of human trafficking before the Russian government passed comprehensive legislation on the issue. A second advantage of civil society is that it is usually more pluralistic than the governmental bureaucracy, facilitating the expression of a greater number of

²⁸⁷ Squier, 181.

²⁸⁸ Hemment (2007), 66; Sundstrom and Henry, 313 (reviewing the findings of several authors).
perspectives and interests. For example, in a context in which there was little governmental attention to lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender issues, civil society provided an arena where such issues could potentially be discussed. However, extensive governmental intervention into the civic arena, as occurred in Russia, restricts which voices may be expressed and, to an even greater degree, which voices are permitted to influence governmental decision making. When the state sets national priorities and offers funds to organizations working on these priority issues, some groups are served while others are not.

In the statist version of civil society with its neoliberal influences that has developed in Russia, activists utilized their agency in taking advantage of the resources and contacts that were most beneficial to their organization’s growth. Neither Western nor Russian funding presented a perfect solution to the problem of NGO sustainability, but each offered distinct gains to organizations. While foreign-funded NGOs often lack constituencies at home, this type of funding is usually more substantial and reduces the threat of government cooptation. In contrast, while Russian governmental funding by and large excludes NGOs addressing controversial issues, organizations that do receive this type of support and validation have a greater potential to impact governmental policy. Responding to the opportunities presented by partnerships with foreign funders or with the Russian state, many activists carefully navigated a path to access the gains of these different funding sources while minimizing their dangers.
Although strong democracies and strong civil societies are theorized to go hand-in-hand, the potential for a “free” and “vibrant” civil society to develop in Russia is called into question due to the “limited” democracy that has been established in the Russian Federation. As scholars have observed, the values of “freedom” and of “order” have been in constant conflict in post-Soviet Russia. The development of Russia’s civil society from 1991 to 2008 presents a unique case that allows scholars to examine the collision of Western and Russian political traditions in this particular context. This era was characterized by a new openness in Russia to international influences, but after a brief period of experimentation, Russia’s statist traditions again began to define the Russian political space. As Russian civil society develops into the future, scholars continue to assess how its multiple influences will shape the outlines of Russia’s state-society relationship. If future developments reflect past experiences, civil society actors will continue to defend their positions in negotiations with a dominant state and will utilize the resources and opportunities available to them in pushing their agendas forward.

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289 See, for example, Henry and Sundstrom (2006b), 4; Henderson (2003), 5, 33-35; Henderson (2002), 140; Sundstrom (2006a), 6; Weigle (2002), 118; Hudson, 212.

290 Carothers (2004), 175.

291 Henderson (2010), 266; Domrin, 206; Hale, 318.
Chapter 4: The Development of the Russian Women’s Movement, 1991-2008

In this chapter, I examine Russian women’s organizations, which comprise one segment of Russian civil society. While illustrating in greater detail some of the tendencies of civic development described in the previous chapter, I also draw attention to the unique issues and debates shaping the Russian women’s movement, including understandings of gender and feminism and discussions of such previously taboo topics as domestic violence and rape.

As women’s organizations represented one of the priority areas targeted by foreign donors, the development of the Russian women’s movement was strongly influenced by the models and values promoted through civil society assistance programs. The crisis center movement that arose in Russia in the mid-1990s, supported largely through foreign funds, has been cited as one of the few examples of a liberal-style social movement developing in the post-Soviet period.¹ Foreign funding was also one of the major triggers that led Russian women activists to begin addressing the issue of human trafficking in the late 1990s. While responding to funding fads and drawing upon foreign models of social organizing, Russian women adapted these resources to fit the needs of their local communities and the demands of their local political environments. As with activists in other areas of civil society, activists in the women’s movement demonstrated that flexibility, perseverance, and

the ability to negotiate with multiple partners were key to success in Russia’s civic arena.

In this chapter, I chart the development of the Russian women’s movement, including both organizations that received foreign funding and those that depended on other sources of support, as they addressed issues important to women in the period from 1991 to 2008. The women’s movement formed the foundation from which the movement against human trafficking would emerge in Russia at the turn of the twenty-first century; I will shift my attention to counter-trafficking movements in the next chapter.

4.1 History of Russian Women’s Movements prior to 1991

In order to better understand the development of Russian women’s movements in the post-Soviet years, it is useful to examine the legacies of women’s changing positions in Russian society and of Russian women’s organizing in previous historical periods. A Russian women’s movement that fought specifically for women’s rights is cited by scholars as beginning in the 1860s; however, historically, most Russian women have rejected activism that focused solely on women for what they saw as the more urgent causes of populism, socialism, loyalty to the Soviet Union, or state resistance. In the late nineteenth century, *ravnopravniki* (equal rights activists), mostly educated bourgeois women, were in dialogue with “first-wave” feminists from the United States, England, and other European countries. This pre-revolutionary Russian

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women’s movement was not as large or as unified as many movements in Western Europe, but it was driven by passionate women espousing a variety of feminist perspectives.

Beginning in the 1890s, women were involved in Marxist groups, and the main issue dividing feminist-oriented women turned to the appropriateness of class struggle. Socialist feminists believed that women’s emancipation would only be achieved through socialist revolution, while so-called bourgeois feminists focused on gaining political and economic rights. Both camps, however, saw the source of their oppression as the Tsarist state and advocated social change to liberate both women and men from Tsarist autocracy.

At the turn of the twentieth century, a variety of political parties took on the “woman question” as a means of attracting support for their platforms. The promise to advance women’s rights was part of the platform of the Bolsheviks when they took power in 1917. That year, women were given the right to vote by the Provisional government, and through the 1920s the Communist Party granted women rights to full employment, education, abortion, and fault-free divorce.

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4 Ibid., 7.
5 Ibid., 7.
6 Ibid., 7.
7 The popularity of the “woman question” as a political issue stemmed from socialist debates beginning in the early nineteenth century on the appropriate position of women in society. Due to women’s reproductive function, they were seen as “special” members of the working class, a class whose liberation would theoretically come through equal ownership of and participation in the productive labor process. Because of women’s “difference,” debates hinged on how to incorporate women into a workforce in which equal treatment and full employment were expected of all workers.
Thus, Russian women achieved legal equality and concomitant rights earlier than women in most Western countries. However, it has been widely noted that the “equality” granted on paper did not match the reality of Russian women’s lives in the Soviet Union.9 As Tatiana Klimenkova writes, “Only after women had won these rights did the extent of their insufficiency become clear; in practice they had only received the possibility to act on a masculine field with masculine methods.”10 Holmgren notes that these rights were indeed not “won” by an organized women’s movement, but were instead “imposed…on an uninvolved populace” by the Community party-state.11 One of these rights, “the right to work” was granted more as a responsibility than liberation, and Soviet women ended up with the oft-cited “double burden.”12 While women were now expected to work full-time in productive labor, they were also expected to bear and raise children, keep house, and care for sick or elderly relatives. The Soviet state did implement policies to help women manage their multiple roles, such as guaranteeing maternity leaves and providing state-run day-care centers, but it was widely acknowledged that these services were inadequate, with the demand for day care outstripping supply, for example.13

Despite the official commitment to the equality of the sexes in the Soviet Union, virtually no attention was paid to the cultural bases for women’s oppression.

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11 Holmgren, 21.

12 Ibid., 21.

Holmgren notes that “essentialist notions of men’s and women’s capabilities and roles went unchallenged in daily practice and general social and cultural attitudes.”

While women were expected to work in the “masculine field” of productive labor, men were not encouraged to participate in the “feminine field” of domestic labor. Instead of encouraging men to take on new responsibilities, as Soviet women had done, proposed solutions to women’s double burden usually involved increases in state services, such as widening access to day care and lengthening maternity leaves. One reason for this was the primacy the Soviet state ascribed to perfecting the public sphere, while widely neglecting, and devaluing, work done in the private sphere. With the Soviet state regulating the lives of both women and men and tacitly approving of women’s double burden, Soviet women came to direct their grievances against the Communist Party. As under Tsarist rule, Russian women perceived their oppressors not as men, but as the autocratic leadership that suppressed the potential of both women and men.

While women held influential positions in the Bolshevik party when it rose to power in 1917 and campaigned for women’s rights during the first years of the Soviet era, the number of women in leadership positions rapidly declined following the revolution and their concerns were sidelined by a singular focus on overcoming class divisions. By the end of the 1920s, “any special emphasis on women’s social subordination in communist propaganda or campaigning came to be regarded as a

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14 Holmgren, 21.


16 Buckley (1989), 267-269.
capitulation to bourgeois feminism; the [women’s] movement’s aim was no longer
the advancement of women but their mobilization for the advancement of the
Comintern.”

In 1930, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin declared that the “woman question” had been solved and closed the Women’s Departments (zhenotdely) that had been established to ensure women’s participation in societal affairs. Throughout most of the Soviet era, women’s issues were subordinated to issues of socialist development, which theoretically would lead to the full emancipation of both women and men. In 1941, a new women’s organization, the Soviet Women’s Anti-Fascist Committee, was formed in order to help mobilize women to support Soviet efforts in World War II. After the war, it became the Soviet Women’s Committee, and it would serve as the only legal organization representing Soviet women until 1990. However, like other state institutions, the Soviet Women’s Committee was designed not to respond to the needs of the population, but to organize women to meet Party goals. Linda Racioppi and Katherine O’Sullivan See write that the Committee “became the state’s chief propagandist on women’s issues, explaining how communism had solved the ‘woman question.’” Women seeking to improve the position of their sex in the

17 Waters, 51. Comintern is the abbreviation for the Communist International.


Soviet Union had no authority to turn to and no legal means of organizing on their own.

Although Stalin had ended discussion of the “woman question,” the less politically restrictive “thaw” period under Nikita Khrushchev during the late 1950s to early 1960s permitted debate on the topic to begin once again.\(^\text{22}\) Khrushchev encouraged the development of *zhensovety* (local women’s councils) to address issues of concern to women, mainly problems resulting from the combination of their family and work responsibilities. Then, in the late 1960s, with the Soviet Union now under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev, Party officials admitted that unsolved problems and “nonantagonistic contradictions” remained in the Soviet Union, and the “woman question” became “unsolved.”\(^\text{23}\)

In the 1970s, falling birthrates in Russia led to the deployment of pronatalist campaigns that stressed women’s maternal roles, while continuing to proffer increased state services as the solution to women’s problems.\(^\text{24}\) As Party congresses drew attention to women’s double burden, some women journalists and writers began to document their lives in ways that contradicted the official representation of womanhood in the Soviet Union.\(^\text{25}\) By the late 1970s and early 1980s, what is now known as the second wave of Russian feminism had begun. The first feminist *samizdat*\(^\text{26}\) publication was the journal *Almanakh: Zhenshchinam o Zhenschinakh*

\(^{22}\) Buckley (1989), 265-267.

\(^{23}\) Ibid., 266-267.


\(^{25}\) Hemment (2007), 75.

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(Almanac: For Women about Women), edited by Tatyana Mamonova in 1979, which covered issues such as “discrimination against women in politics, abortion, the appalling conditions in maternity hospitals and women’s prisons, violence against women, issues that officially did not exist in the USSR.” As with many other samizdat publications, distribution of this journal was suppressed, and its editors were imprisoned and then exiled to the West.

In the mid- to late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost softened some of the restrictions on individual expression and women found new ways to explore feminist issues. Some of this activity occurred within governmental bodies. In 1986, Gorbachev called for the expansion of zhensovety under the structure of the Soviet Women’s Committee. By 1988, there were reportedly 236,000 zhensovety with approximately 2.3 million members across the Soviet Union. In this period of openness and renewed attention to women’s issues, members of the Soviet Women’s Committee broke with custom and critiqued the male domination of the Communist Party. At the All-Union Conference of Women in 1987, participants openly discussed negative aspects of women’s lives in the Soviet Union and made the novel proposal that men become more involved in housework and childrearing. However, outside of a few instances in which the Soviet

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26 Literally, “self-published.” In the Soviet Union, samizdat writings were a popular means of discussing politically censored topics in dissident circles. Produced illegally, these writings were usually distributed hand-to-hand among dissidents.

27 Hemment (2007), 75.

28 Sundstrom (2006a), 79.

29 Racioppi and See, 77.

30 Buckley (1989), 271.
Women’s Committee and the zhensovetы under its wings challenged the status quo in an effort to improve women’s lives, these organizations were largely politically passive and most Russian women viewed them as helpmates to the state.\textsuperscript{31}

In the late 1980s, interest in feminism and women’s issues also arose among individual scholars and small women’s groups. Many of the leaders of this budding movement were feminist academics who had become acquainted through the state-sponsored seminars on women during the \textit{perestroika} years and began to set up their own informal organizations.\textsuperscript{32} These feminists, who worked in positions within or connected to state structures, found themselves in demand to conduct research on newly popular women’s issues.\textsuperscript{33} At the same time, interest in feminism arose among the younger generation of women scholars. In research institutions, some scholars gained access to English-language feminist texts not available to the general public.\textsuperscript{34} In addition, a few young women scholars, mainly in prestigious universities in Moscow or St. Petersburg, were allowed to write dissertations on women’s issues.\textsuperscript{35}

Thus, the late-Soviet “second wave” women’s movement differed in several ways from U.S. and Western European women’s movements. In contrast to these more broad-based movements that sought popular support among women and geared much of their activity to advocating publicly for women’s social and political rights, the second wave Russian women’s movement was “the project of an urban, mostly

\textsuperscript{31} Sundstrom (2006a), 79.

\textsuperscript{32} Sperling (1999), 103-4.

\textsuperscript{33} Hemment (2007), 78; Sperling (1999), 105.

\textsuperscript{34} Hemment (2007), 75.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 75-76.
Moscow-based, well-connected privileged few” who used feminism as a lens to make sense of their lives at that particular point in time.\textsuperscript{36} For many, feminism was a useful tool for reviving the connection between Russian and European scholarship and debate, a tradition that had been stifled during the Soviet era. For example, many women scholars were researching the work of early Russian suffragists and their international ties to suffragists in other countries, especially Germany and England.\textsuperscript{37} In addition, many early women’s groups used feminism as a tool for “self-realization” and consciousness-raising.\textsuperscript{38}

Although Russian feminists drew inspiration from their Western counterparts, few had interest in building a broad-based movement uniting women on the basis of gender, like those that had arisen in the West. After decades of “women’s emancipation” enforced from the top down and the Soviet Women’s Committee officially representing all women, most Russian feminists welcomed the opportunity to focus on individual development and avoid the imposition of another collective identity. Hemment notes:

Soviet feminists did not represent a nascent civil society waiting to rise up and engage in civic activities and democracy. They were small circles and did not have broad legitimacy…. Their feminism was profoundly non-mobilizational, and few groups were truly open to newcomers.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 76.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 76.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 76.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 77.
Furthermore, their feminism was directed primarily against the Soviet state, rather than against men or patriarchy, “leaving aside the issue that it was clearly a male-dominated state.”

In contrast to the small groups of well-educated women embracing feminist principles, most Russian women rejected feminism as having any relevance to their lives. Since Soviet leaders had branded feminism as a bourgeois capitalist ideology but claimed to have achieved “women’s liberation,” feminism was seen both as too Western and too Marxist. While feminism was blamed for causing women’s double burden and the distortion of relations between the sexes under socialism, it was also denounced as a foreign ideology seeking to destabilize Russian society and turn women against men. Thus, for a variety of reasons, most Russian women saw little value in adopting a feminist perspective.

Even the movement to return women “back to the home” in the 1980s and 1990s drew little resistance. Concern with the falling birthrate in Russia, plans for a streamlined labor force, and growing attention to the poor working conditions for many women led politicians and scientists at the time to once again take up the “woman question.” Breaking with the Soviet ideology of valorizing women’s dual roles as mothers and workers, politicians and scientists highlighted the special nurturing qualities of women, which they claimed made women more suited for the

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40 Ibid., 76.
roles of mothers and homemakers than of workers.\textsuperscript{43} In his 1987 book \textit{Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World}, Gorbachev wrote:

> Over the years..., we failed to pay attention to women’s specific rights and needs arising from their role as mother and homemaker, and their indispensable educational function as regards children. Engaged in scientific research, working on construction sites, in production and in the services, and involved in creative activities, women no longer have enough time to perform their everyday duties at home—housework, the upbringing of children and the creation of a good family atmosphere. We have discovered that many of our problems—in children’s and young people’s behavior, in our morals, culture, and in production—are partially caused by the weakening of family ties and slack attitudes to family responsibilities. This is a paradoxical result of our sincere and politically justified desire to make women equal with men in everything. Now, in the course of perestroika, we have begun to overcome this shortcoming. That is why we are now holding heated debates in the press, in public organizations, at work and at home, about the question of what we should do it make it possible for women to return to their purely womanly mission.\textsuperscript{44}

The answer to this “question” that received the most support within the Gorbachev administration was to encourage women to choose motherhood over career.\textsuperscript{45} However, it would be each woman’s individual “choice” as to whether she

\textsuperscript{43} Bridger, Kay, and Pinnick, 22-28; Racioppi and See, 57.

\textsuperscript{44} Mikhail Gorbachev, quoted in Racioppi and See, 56.
wanted to be a worker or a mother. As Sue Bridger, Rebecca Kay, and Kathryn Pinnick write, “As the [1980s] progressed, this concept of ‘choice’ was energetically taken up by writer after writer in the Soviet press and earnestly discussed by the new generation of TV journalists.” Indeed, many women found the “choice” to remain at home “liberating.” After decades of trying to balance multiple responsibilities, Soviet women welcomed the idea that their workload would be reduced and that they would have more time for their children and families. In addition, in a regime in which the state watched and regulated nearly all aspects of public life, the home and family became a site “of psychological and moral refuge.” Thus, while Western feminists interpreted the campaign to “return women to the home” as a way of limiting women’s societal participation, many Russian women embraced it as a sign that society finally valued their domestic work and as a way of staying on the sidelines of the maligned public sphere.

However, while the call for women to return to their “purely womanly mission” was framed in the language of “choice,” the state’s preference was clear. As Barbara Alpern Engel notes, “virtually every policy initiative aimed to encourage women to bear and raise children, rather than to help them advance on the job or combat discrimination at the workplace.”

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45 Bridger, Kay, and Pinnick, 24.
46 Engel, 254.
47 Bridger, Kay, and Pinnick, 26.
48 Engel, 254-255.
49 Holmgren, 21.
50 Engel, 255-256.
time off for mothers to care for sick children was increased, and opportunities for part-time work were expanded.\textsuperscript{51} Scholars such as Engel and Racioppi and See have argued, however, that these policies actually disadvantaged working women. First, these benefits applied almost exclusively to mothers, not fathers; thus, when women took time off work to care for children or other relatives, their professional qualifications dropped below the level of their male counterparts.\textsuperscript{52} In addition, since the costs for maternity leaves fell to the enterprise where a woman worked, many enterprises were reluctant to employ young women, especially those with children. As a result, women were often the first to go when an enterprise laid off workers, and many women who took maternity leaves were not welcomed back.\textsuperscript{53} Finally, while the ideology of returning women to the home appealed to many Russians, both women and men, it proved unrealistic for many families dependent on the earnings of a woman.

An ideological principle supporting the “back to the home” movement was an essentialist notion of the differences between women and men. Although cultural understandings of the differences between the sexes never disappeared during the Soviet era, many argued that Soviet engineering to treat women and men as complete equals had distorted relations between the sexes. Men were “emasculated” as the Soviet state took over their fatherly functions, and women were “over-emancipated” by having to work like men, often in hard-labor and agricultural jobs. By the 1970s, such engineering came to be viewed as contributing to a falling birthrate in Soviet

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 256; Bridger, Kay, and Pinnick, 26.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{52} Racioppi and See, 48.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{53} Engel, 256.}
Russia and, as noted, pronatalist campaigns were developed to emphasize women’s motherly functions. These campaigns drew upon the work of educational theorists who believed that girls and boys should be educated differently in order to inculcate the values necessary for each to play her or his part in creating stable and fertile marriages. For boys, the traits that should be emphasized included “strength, activity, bravery, inventive and investigative behavior,” while the traits of “weakness, emotionalism, intuition and nurturant qualities” were emphasized for girls. As for women, Bridger, Kay, and Pinnick argue, “For the best part of a decade before the advent even of perestroika, women’s characters [in the media] were being habitually portrayed as inextricably bound up with their sexuality.”

By the 1980s, the discourse on inherent sex differences had become mainstream among both the public and Soviet officials. Marina Malysheva of the Moscow Center for Gender Studies (MCGS) of the Russian Academy of Sciences remarked in 1991 that “the gulf between the sexes in the current generation is probably greater than at any time in Soviet history.” This Soviet legacy influenced the gendered impact of the transition to a market economy, when women’s and men’s “unique” qualities would be emphasized even more so than under socialism.

Whereas men were seen to possess the qualities necessary to succeed in the business

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54 Bridger, Kay, and Pinnick, 22-23; Buckley (1989), 268.
55 Bridger, Kay, and Pinnick, 23.
56 Ibid., 23.
57 Ibid., 166.
58 Marina Malysheva, quoted in Bridger, Kay, and Pinnick, 166.
world, such as competitiveness and entrepreneurship, women’s reproductive and sexual nature was said to best suit them for the role of mother or whore.  

### 4.2 History of Russian Women’s Movements post-1991

#### 4.2.1 Effects of the Post-Soviet Transition on Women

The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the ensuing period of economic, political, and cultural transition shook up the discourse on gender roles and directly impacted the daily lives of Russian women and men. A wide range of socio-economic indicators suggested that a disproportionate share of the costs of the transition fell on the shoulders of women. Many obstacles, including sex discrimination in hiring and firing practices, growing occupational segregation by gender, and the loss of child care services, contributed to female unemployment. From the early to mid-1990s, women constituted around 70 percent of Russia’s unemployed.

However, women suffered from underemployment even more than from unemployment. Large numbers of women with higher education who had worked as engineers, economists, or scientists lost their jobs, and most employment opportunities for women were for low-skilled positions such as secretaries, cleaners,

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60 Manning and Tikhonova, 32; Wendy Rhein, “The Feminization of Poverty: Unemployment in Russia,” Journal of International Affairs 52, n. 1 (Fall 1998) [electronic version].

61 Engel, 258; Olga Viktorovna Lavrova and Natalia Viktorovna Masliuk, “Neravenstvo ne v tom, chto my rasnye” [“Inequality doesn’t stem from our differences”], in V interesakh vsei Rossii [In the interests of all Russia], ed. Tatiana Nikolaevna Kataeva (Elista: Dzangar, 2001), 52.

62 Engel, 258; Bridger, Kay, and Pinnick, 40.
The ideology of women’s family responsibilities led many women to accept any job available in order to support their families while their male partners embarked on lengthy searches for a respectable job. Although women’s pay averaged seventy percent of men’s pay in the late Soviet period, by 1994, women were making only forty percent of men’s salaries. While the pay differential between women and men increased, the workforce became increasingly stratified, with women concentrated in lower-paying fields at the same time that they were pushed out of traditionally “feminine” fields, such as banking and insurance, that had proven more profitable in the post-Soviet era.

In addition, so-called protectionist laws that banned women from working in certain occupations and granted women special rights that had to be paid for by their employers made women less desirable employees. A labor code initiated in July 1996 banned women from over 400 professions, arguably to protect the reproductive health of women. As Wendy Rhein notes, “the Labor Code is most harmful for women who have worked in such professions for many years and now find themselves unemployed with no transferable or practical skills. In many instances, their health is already damaged and they will not receive the extended benefits for which they have worked.”

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63 Engel, 258.


65 Engel, 259-260.

66 Nadezhda Aleksandrovnna Shvedova, “Prava zhenshchin v sovremennikh rossiiskikh realiiakh” [“Women’s rights in contemporary Russian realities”], in *V interesakh vsei Rossii [In the interests of all Russia]*, ed. Tatiana Nikolaevna Kataeva (Elista: Dzangar, 2001), 299.
Working women in Russia were also legally entitled to extended paid maternity leave, vacation time when children are small, and sick child leave, the costs of which were to be paid by employers.\textsuperscript{68} As a result of these protectionist measures, many employers were reluctant to hire women and fired women first when cutting staff. Analyzing the results of transition policies, Engel notes, “By the late 1990s, at least a quarter and perhaps as much as half of the Russian population qualified as poor or very poor and over two-thirds of those poor were female.”\textsuperscript{69}

Women’s presence also declined in the political arena. In the 1970s and 1980s, women comprised approximately 35 percent of deputies to the Republic-level Supreme Soviets. With the loss of quotas in 1990, women’s representation dropped to 5.4 percent in Russia.\textsuperscript{70} In the first post-Soviet parliamentary elections in 1993, a women’s political party, Women of Russia (WOR), surpassed the five percent threshold on the party list vote for the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament. Receiving a total of 8.1 percent of the vote, WOR was able to send 21 candidates from the party list to the Duma. In total, 60 women served in the first Duma from 1993-1995, 13.5 percent of all representatives.\textsuperscript{71} In the 1995 elections,\

\textsuperscript{67} Rhein, 5.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 3-4.

\textsuperscript{69} Engel, 260.

\textsuperscript{70} Buckley (1997), 162.

however, WOR failed to clear the threshold, receiving only 4.6 percent of the vote, and it dissolved as a political faction.  

Even with the loss of the WOR faction, women maintained a presence of about 10 percent of deputies to the Duma throughout the post-Soviet period. However, in 2007, women occupied only five percent of seats in the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament and 20 percent of the 126 seats in the Public Chamber, even with the Chamber representing the “feminized” sphere of civil society. In addition, there were only a handful of prominent female politicians widely recognizable to the public, with Valentina Matvienko, the governor of St. Petersburg from 2003-2011, being one of the few exceptions.

In light of the reduced number of women in political positions during the democratic transition, Valentina Konstantinova of the Moscow Center for Gender Studies argues, “The important thing is that the introduction of democratic election procedures and the formation of democratic structures have improved the quality of women’s participation and representation, the token and marionette position being replaced by a more responsible one.” However, Mary Buckley points out that these changes were occurring as “automatic [Communist Party] lines on social protection for women and encouragement to be employed outside the home were coming under

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72 Buckley (1997), 157-163.


attack.” Thus, although the political positions that women held in newly democratic Russia might have been more meaningful, they constituted a small minority at a time when radical societal restructuring, with strong impacts on women’s lives, was taking place.

All of the gendered changes in the economic and political spheres meant that women, as a social category, became more vulnerable after the collapse of socialism. Studies found high rates of violence against women, including both domestic violence and rape. Officials, advocates, and scholars estimated that between fourteen and fifteen thousand women were murdered every year by their spouses, although the Ministry of Internal Affairs put the number officially at three thousand. While police response to violence against women was lacking under the Soviet Union, women could turn to various collectives, such as trade unions, workplace Party committees, and zhensovet to help resolve problems in the home. However, as privatization of the domestic sphere occurred during the transition, public organizations lost their authority to intervene in family life and police became even more reluctant to respond to “private” matters. Thus, although data suggest that violence against women was increasing in the post-Soviet era, its importance among law enforcement and state officials was decreasing.

75 Buckley (1997), 162.
76 Weiler, 266-267.
77 Hemment (2007), 96.
78 Johnson (2009), 27-32.
79 Ibid., 30-32.
These changes accompanied another major development in the post-Soviet period: the growth of the sex industry. Although Russian women found limited job openings in many high-skill fields, one field that did not lack for opportunities for women was the sex industry, which offered work in pornography, prostitution, erotic massage, strip tease shows, telephone sex, and other areas.\textsuperscript{80} After decades of strict censorship by the Soviet state, which largely prohibited sexual imagery, within months of Russia’s independence, “it had become commonplace for pornography to festoon virtually any public space where trading was taking place.”\textsuperscript{81} While photographs of naked or near-naked women were almost inescapable in public places in Russia in the early 1990s, prostitution also increased and was often described as “the only way for women to make a lot of money.”\textsuperscript{82} Large numbers of women did turn to prostitution, but Russian politicians, scholars, and media generally ignored this trend or used it as a reason to blame women for society’s “moral crisis.”

An additional phenomenon that appeared after the end of the Soviet era was the trafficking of Russian women across national borders for the purpose of sex work. Every year, recruiters, many tied to criminal networks, promised well-paying jobs abroad to tens of thousands of Russian women, most from depressed towns and villages and living in desperate economic conditions. Many of these women ended up in situations of sexual servitude, forced to engage in various types of sex work in exploitative and abusive conditions.\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{80} Attwood, 113.

\textsuperscript{81} Bridger, Kay, and Pinnick, 165.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 174.

\textsuperscript{83} Engel, 263-264.
4.2.2 The Emergence of the Post-Soviet Russian Women’s Movement

While many socio-economic indicators suggested that women, as a group, lost out during the transition period, democratization made possible the emergence of an autonomous women’s movement to protest the social changes taking place. After the passage of the 1990 law permitting organizations to operate independently of the Communist Party, the isolated pockets of women’s organizing that had emerged during *perestroika* grew into a stronger and more diverse movement.\(^{84}\)

Many women academics who had taken interest in women’s issues in the *perestroika* years began to formalize their activities. Members of the LOTOS group (League for Emancipation from Sexual Stereotypes), which had been founded in 1989 by researchers Anastasiia Posadskaiia, Olga Voronina, Valentina Konstantinova, and Natalia Zakharova, set up the Moscow Center for Gender Studies (MCGS) under the Russian Academy of Sciences in 1990. The Center would play a leading role in advocating for women’s rights in Russia when large-scale societal transformations were taking place.

Alongside academic and feminist-oriented groups created by highly educated women, many grassroots women’s organizations also formed in response to the direction of political and economic reforms. Numerous self-help groups and employment training organizations emerged, “trying to bridge the gap that the collapse of the centrally planned welfare state had left behind.”\(^{85}\) Many of these grassroots groups coalesced around women’s role as mothers and worked to protect

\(^{84}\) Sperling (1999), 19.

\(^{85}\) Ibid., 18.
the rights of women and children as the economic crisis deepened. The most well
known of these organization was the Union of Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of
Russia.\textsuperscript{86} In addition, in 1990, the Soviet Women’s Committee transformed into the
Union of Women of Russia (UWR), now a voluntary union of zhensovety and NGOs,
officially independent of the state.\textsuperscript{87} Despite its formal independence, the UWR
largely maintained its Soviet-era hierarchy with a head office in Moscow and local
divisions throughout Russia, most of the same leaders, governmental and
international contacts, and free office space. Thus, the UWR had an advantage over
smaller organizations that were just beginning to form.\textsuperscript{88}

The first attempt to connect and transform the newly emerging women’s
organizations into a movement occurred in March 1990 when researchers-activists
Olga Lipovskaia and Natalia Filippova convened a meeting of representatives of
many small women’s groups, which together established the organization SAFO
(abbreviation for the Free Association of Feminist Organizations) to provide support
and psychological counseling for women.\textsuperscript{89} In July 1990, MCGS contributed to the
formation of this movement by hosting a seminar on “Women in Politics and Policy
for Women,” which attracted many women activists, including Olga Lipovskaia.
Lipovskaia, along with other seminar attendees, then created a new organization
called “NeZhDI,” an acronym standing for the Independent Women’s Democratic

\textsuperscript{86} Sundstrom (2006a), 61.

\textsuperscript{87} Racioppi and See, 78.

\textsuperscript{88} Sundstrom (2006a), 41, 80.

\textsuperscript{89} Rosalind Marsh, “The Russian Women’s Movement: Anastasiia Posadskaya, the Dubna Forum and
The Independent Women’s Movement in Russia,” in \textit{Women in Russia and Ukraine}, ed. Rosalind
Initiative and translating to “Don’t Wait” in Russian. Rosalind Marsh writes that this name reflected women’s impatience with the slow pace of reforms and their desire to take steps to change their situation for the better. As did researchers with the MCGS, NeZhDI produced reports refuting essentialized Soviet notions of natural differences between women and men and critiqued the path of reform.

The largest and most notable effort to organize a women’s movement in these early years was the convening of two Independent Women’s Forums in 1991 and 1992. Both forums were held in Dubna, a small city outside of Moscow. The first forum, organized by LOTOS, MCGS, SAFO, and NeZhDI, among other organizations, provided 172 women representing 48 groups across Russia the opportunity to become acquainted with one another, share information, and begin to form collaborative relationships. Another aim of the forum, which took on the slogan “Democracy without Women Is No Democracy,” was to analyze the position of women in the course of political and economic reforms. The final document drawn up by forum participants discussed the many forms of discrimination against women, both before and after perestroika. A final major goal of the forum was to demonstrate the independence of women’s organizing from the state. As the first independent women’s conference in Russia since 1918, the forum stressed that organizations “were no longer being set up on orders from above, but were being

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90 Ibid., 289.
91 Ibid., 289.
93 Marsh (1996b), 290; Sperling (1999), 106.
established on the initiative of women themselves.”94 Despite disruptions from city and law enforcement officials due to charges of “lesbianism,” the forum was successful in bringing together a diverse array of women activists, including both academics and grassroots organizers, and in drawing attention to the fledging Russian women’s movement.95

The Second Independent Women’s Forum, held in Dubna a year later, benefitted from the information network set up at the first forum as organizers were able to advertise the event more widely and attracted over 500 participants. More Western women were present than at the first forum, with attendees from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Scandinavia, and Australia.96 In addition, the second forum was successful in winning some early financial support from the West.97 The forum program was also more ambitious. Operating under the slogan “From Problems to Strategy,” the forum aimed to devise strategies to integrate women and women’s issues “into the economic and political systems developing in Russia and the former Soviet republics.”98 In her introductory speech to the forum, co-chair of the organizing committee Anastasiia Posadskaiia called for resolutions that could change public consciousness “so that women’s problems will not be regarded as secondary problems which will automatically be solved after the situation as a

94 Marsh (1996b), 290.
95 Sperling (1999), 106; Henderson (2003), 94.
96 Marsh (1996b), 290.
97 Henderson (2003), 95.
98 Sperling (1999), 106.
whole has been transformed, but as an essential, integral and extremely important component of the general process of social reform.\textsuperscript{99}

As did the first forum, the second forum stressed the “independence” of the Russian women’s movement. In her introductory remarks, Posadskaia stated:

After decades in which they were puppets, politically manipulated and totally integrated into the totalitarian state system, women have decided to organize themselves, to discuss problems that concern them…. At the same time, and this is particularly important, the independent women’s movement does not attempt to speak in the name of all women, does not abrogate to itself the authority of an all-Russian women’s organization, but presents an open forum for any women’s organization and any woman who seeks her own answer to “the woman question.”\textsuperscript{100}

Many women activists agreed with this sentiment. In contrast to the vertical structures of power that characterized Soviet-era organizing, they emphasized the importance of horizontal networking to build an egalitarian women’s movement.\textsuperscript{101}

However, with the long legacy of state dependency, many Russian women found it difficult to view themselves as “independent” and to take initiative on social issues.\textsuperscript{102}

As a result, activists in the early years of the transition made one of their goals the


\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 301.

\textsuperscript{101} Racioppi and See, 218-219.

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 220-221.
empowerment of women to “develop a sense of themselves as autonomous, self-defining individuals.”  

Analyzing the significance of this event, Marsh argues, “The Second Forum was a watershed in that it proved that a genuine and widespread ‘women’s movement’ now existed in Russia and the post-Soviet states, consisting of many different strands and representing a variety of viewpoints.”  

Although Posadskai expressed hope that Independent Women’s Forums would continue to be organized on a yearly basis, no additional forums were held after 1992.  

Instead, organizers transformed the “Independent Women’s Forum” into a women’s NGO that advocated on women’s issues and critiqued the course of reforms.

As the Independent Women’s Forums took place in the early 1990s, the number of women’s organizations was growing. In 1991, fifty women’s organizations had officially registered with the state; in 1992, two hundred were registered; and by 1993, over 300 organizations were registered.  

Many more groups were operating unofficially, not having filled out the considerable paperwork required to register. Organizations represented a variety of ideological perspectives and carried out a range of activities, “from lobbying, holding conferences and seminars, publishing feminist magazines, and conducting research to conducting self-help groups or providing social services for unemployed women, single mothers, and

103 Ibid., 220.  
104 Marsh (1996b), 290.  
105 Posadskai, 303; Marsh (1996b), 292.  
106 Johnson (2009), 40.
artists.”\textsuperscript{107} Johnson argues that, while some of these organizations “embraced feminism; most were de facto feminists in their challenge to the status of women, both in their actions and in simply organizing.”\textsuperscript{108} Groups also varied in size. Some groups were smaller and operated only in one locale, while others were nation-wide and comprised several branches.\textsuperscript{109} Networks connecting women’s organizations also multiplied, which facilitated information-sharing and collaboration on issues of common concern.\textsuperscript{110}

One of the biggest divides within the Russian women’s movement was between academic and feminist-oriented organizations, which often drew upon Western feminist theory in analyzing the position of women in Russian society, and grassroots and service-provision organizations, which usually took a more practical approach in addressing the immediate needs of their members and local communities. Henderson notes that the majority of women’s organizations had pragmatic goals: “to survive and to step in and provide services that the state could no longer secure for its population in this period of severe dislocation.”\textsuperscript{111} Such “pragmatic” organizations provided social services to vulnerable populations, such as single mothers, disabled children, or pensioners; formed support groups to offer moral and psychological assistance to members; and organized educational and re-training programs to help women improve their qualifications in the new market economy. Some of the latter

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 40.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 40.
\textsuperscript{109} Engel, 265.
\textsuperscript{110} Sperling (1999), 20-21.
\textsuperscript{111} Henderson (2003), 96.
groups were professional organizations that united women from various professions, such as law, business, journalism, and so forth, and aimed to help members increase their job opportunities.  

A second broad category of women’s organizations were those that explicitly identified themselves as feminist or that organized for the specific purpose of advocating for women’s rights. These organizations were smaller in number than those focused on support or service provision and were mainly located in Moscow or St. Petersburg. They tended to have academic orientations, often taking the form of research centers, and produced materials on the status of women in Russian society. Despite their high level of activity, these organizations had little connection to the population at large.

There were, of course, overlaps between these two broad categories of organizations. As the 1990s progressed, crisis centers for victims of family or gender violence became an increasingly popular form of women’s organizing. In both raising awareness of the issue of gender violence and providing services to the public, crisis centers successfully united the “feminist” and the “pragmatic” branches of the women’s movement.

In the early 1990s, contact with Western feminists and with Western aid providers was also growing steadily among Russian women’s organizations. Hemment notes that, at the Dubna forums, Western feminists entered into dialogue with Russian women for the first time. She writes, “These connections led to

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112 Ibid., 96-97.
113 Ibid., 98-100.
numerous intellectual and private exchanges and collaborations; activists began to think of themselves as belonging in a global movement.”\textsuperscript{115} After years of isolation from their Western counterparts, many Russian women were eager to make contact and gain access to Western feminist knowledge. At the same time, large numbers of Western feminists arrived in Russia, excited to share their experience and help to build a women’s movement.\textsuperscript{116} The first offers of financial support to Russian women’s organizations were also made during this period, “mostly from private individuals and small feminist donor organizations.”\textsuperscript{117} Soon, aid that began as a “dribble” in the early 1990s became a “torrent” in the mid-1990s as “all the main agencies in Russia that promoted civil society development began to target women’s groups for a portion of this aid.”\textsuperscript{118} This new funding mandate reflected a shift in the agenda of global development agencies, as the concept of “gender” was mainstreamed into their priorities.\textsuperscript{119}

\textbf{4.2.3 Introducing “Gender” and the “Global Feminist Consensus” into the Agendas of International Funding Agencies}

From the 1970s to the 1990s, when international aid began to be provided to Russian civil society in significant amounts, a focus on gender issues had been increasingly

\textsuperscript{114} Hemment (2007), 80.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 80.


\textsuperscript{117} Hemment (2007), 80.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 80.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 81.
incorporated into the agendas of international funding agencies. Many feminists lauded this as a major achievement of the international women’s movement, but over time, contradictions in funding practices towards NGOs became apparent. Tied into the neoliberal restructuring process in Russia, aid to Russian women’s NGOs often carried the expectation that NGOs would become the new providers of social services that had been cut by the state during the restructuring process. Additionally, although many women involved in Russia’s emerging women’s movement emphasized the principles of independence and horizontal organizing with other activists and women’s groups, those who sought to benefit from foreign aid found themselves in a position of dependency on donors and in competition with their fellow activists for scarce funds. Thus, the provision of foreign aid to support the development of a newly independent women’s movement entailed several contradictions that Russian women were left to unravel.

Beginning in the 1970s, international feminists had lobbied development agencies and the UN system to devote more attention to women in their development programs.¹²⁰ This lobbying eventually led to the organizing of the 1975 World Conference on Women in Mexico City and the launching of the UN Decade for Women from 1975 to 1985.¹²¹ As additional World Conferences on Women were held, in 1980 in Copenhagen and in 1985 in Nairobi, the development community increasingly incorporated the issues raised by women activists into their agendas. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, “the notion of women’s rights [had]  

¹²⁰ Ibid., 81, 164, no. 10. The approach promoted by feminists, to make women more central in development programs, is known as the Women in Development (WID) paradigm.

¹²¹ Ibid., 164, no. 10.
moved from its rather peripheral location on the map of donor agencies to center stage.”¹²² Part of the reason that feminist efforts to prioritize women were so successful was that they appealed to the economic considerations of the New Policy Agenda (discussed in chapter 2). Arguing that improving women’s status boosted a country’s economic performance, feminist policy researchers persuaded lending agencies such as the World Bank and grant-making agencies such as USAID to implement women-centered programs.¹²³ Analyzing the success of this approach, Hemment writes:

The status of women is now held to be an important indicator of development. International campaigns around women’s rights gained momentum in the 1990s, culminating in the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. This event marked the enlargement and democratization of participation in international campaigns; the parallel NGO forum permitted thousands of women to attend who were not government officials but the representatives of independent, grassroots associations. Indeed, Beijing marked the first entry of independent Russian women activists to the international stage.¹²⁴

As a gendered lens became the latest tool through which to measure the success of everything from poverty reduction and effective governance to the health of civil societies, the “global feminist consensus” on violence against women also

¹²² Ibid., 10.
¹²³ Ibid., 10, 164, no. 10.
¹²⁴ Ibid., 10–11.
made its mark on the development community. Johnson notes that the issue of violence against women united activists from the Global North (industrialized democracies such as the United States, Canada, Western Europe) and the Global South (developing countries in South America, Africa, South and Southeast Asia) and helped them to overcome the divisions that had hampered international meetings of women since the 1970s. At the UN Conferences in Mexico City and Copenhagen, women from these two world regions had confronted class and cultural divides. Johnson writes:

For many from the Global South, the universalistic agenda of Northern feminists erased important differences among women, veiled global inequality, and silenced their concerns. For some, drawing from postcolonial critiques, feminism became a new kind of imperialism within a global context of increasing economic and political divides.

By the mid-1980s, women activists at the United Nations responded to such critiques by restructuring the conferences on women and the terms on which conversations were taking place. Symbolizing an approach more sensitive to the differences and inequalities among women, the third conference was held in Africa and included more women from the developing world than from the industrialized world. The new “global feminism” that activists sought to construct revolved

125 Johnson (2009), 3.
126 Ibid., 3.
127 Ibid., 3.
128 Ibid., 19.
129 Ibid., 19.
around norms of inclusivity, “politics of solidarity,” and autonomous organizing. Utilizing this approach, women at the Nairobi Conference in 1985 found agreement on the issue of violence against women, a concept that linked women’s rights with human rights. This broad concept encompassed issues of concern to women in both regions, including rape, domestic violence, genital cutting, and human trafficking, and facilitated the creation of alliances between women on the basis of common interests, not on an imagined common identity.

A “politics of solidarity” permitted women to ally with each other on local or global levels in instances of strategic importance but also to organize separately according to wishes of each group. This point is especially important for underrepresented groups who may feel that their concerns are misunderstood or minimized by the majority. Thus, while feminists continued the difficult work of addressing inequalities and acknowledging differences in viewpoints on a variety of issues, violence against women served as a key issue on which feminists could unite their efforts. On the basis of this new approach to global activism, women created transnational feminist networks comprised of organizations around the world, which would soon become a leading force in the fight for gender equality. Although women activists also coalesced around a concern with economic justice, the broad frame of “violence against women” struck a chord with the development and human rights communities and became the issue most identified with the burgeoning global women’s movement.

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130 Ibid., 3.
131 Ibid., 19.
132 Ibid., 3.
The global feminist consensus on violence against women helped push the issue to a level of international prominence. Hemment notes that, by linking women’s rights with human rights, campaigns against gendered violence garnered the support of diverse constituencies, including donors and politicians across the ideological spectrum. Feminists drew on this international support in multiple ways. First, the global feminist consensus, outlined in international documents such as the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Program for Action and the 1993 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, formalized new global norms against gender violence. As Johnson writes, “These norms can then be appropriated and translated by local activists, giving them some international cachet and perhaps new and powerful ways to articulate their demands locally.” Additionally, by the late 1980s, human rights activists began to accept the validity of the “women’s rights as human rights” frame and increasingly allied with feminists as they added monitoring of gender violence to their activities. Finally, the global feminist consensus led to partnerships with donors, who provided funds to women’s organizations across the world. After the Beijing Conference in 1995, many major U.S. and European foundations made violence against women a funding priority. Summing up the impact of the feminist “consensus,” Johnson writes:

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133 Hemment (2007), 94-95.
135 Ibid., 13.
136 Ibid., 13.
137 Hemment (2007), 95.
By the late 1990s, violence against women had been incorporated almost everywhere: by the leading intergovernmental agencies (e.g., the United Nations, the International Organization for Migration, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), by Western governments’ international development agencies, and by virtually all large foundations open to funding initiatives focused on women.\textsuperscript{138}

Despite the success of feminists in promoting “gender” and the issue of violence against women, several contradictions became apparent in the way that Western governments and funding agencies addressed these “hot topics.” Hemment notes that in Russia, as in other former Soviet states, development programs advancing women’s rights and the growth of women’s NGOs were “part and parcel of the very economic restructuring processes that have undermined women’s status in the post-socialist period.”\textsuperscript{139} Hemment explains:

In Russia, women’s rights and empowerment schemes were promoted at the same time that welfare systems were cut back. Indeed, feminist schemes have been promoted by the very same agencies that have overseen this dismantling. During the same period they were promoting civil society development and women’s rights, international lending institutions such as the World Bank and foreign advisors put pressure on the new democratic government to follow policies of structural adjustment.\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{138} Johnson (2009), 23.

\textsuperscript{139} Hemment (2007), 6.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 6.
As a result, women’s groups, even those founded with very different intentions, felt pushed “into a gendered division of labor where they are made responsible for providing services formerly guaranteed by the socialist state.”\textsuperscript{141}

The rise of the violence against women frame pushed women even further into service provision and away from analysis of the material forces that oppress women. Hemment argues:

\begin{quote}
[G]ender mainstreaming marks less the triumph of radical social movements than their demobilization and cooptation…. The feminist conception of gender has been hitched to new, unsavory projects, displacing class and contributing to the “post-socialist condition” where it becomes increasingly difficult to speak of structural violence or economic issues.\textsuperscript{142}
\end{quote}

Both Johnson and Hemment note that, in campaigns against trafficking in women, states have employed the language of global feminism to legitimate coercive measures to fortify national borders and penalize the women they claim to help.\textsuperscript{143}

A second contradiction of gender mainstreaming was the “bureaucratization of feminist knowledge” and the “disempowerment” of women activists who felt themselves dependent on the whims of donors.\textsuperscript{144} Hemment argues, “Gender mainstreaming and the new emphasis on ‘women’s issues’ operates as a mode of power that constitutes some women and some issues as deserving of support and

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., 6-7. \\
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 12. \\
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 12; Johnson (2009), 124-126. \\
\textsuperscript{144} Hemment (2007), 83.
\end{flushright}
excludes others.” Initially, feminists had seen the insertion of women’s concerns into the agendas of powerful agencies as an achievement of the women’s movement. Once this goal was achieved, however, the flow of influence was reversed. Development agencies took those feminist principles that most matched their agendas and created grant competitions that led activists to fight for the limited positions of agency affiliation and support. The post-Soviet Russian women’s movement, founded in a spirit of independence and egalitarianism, found itself once again drawn into a set of competitive and hierarchical relationships.

4.2.4 Implementing “Gender” as a Funding Priority in Russia

Gender mainstreaming and the rise of the violence against women paradigm saw concrete results in Russia. Foreign funding soon became the leading source of financial support for the women’s movement. Several studies found that, by the late 1990s, approximately half of all women’s NGOs had received aid from a foreign source, a percentage significantly higher than other sectors of Russian civil society. A large portion of this aid went specifically towards activism against gendered violence. By 2006, more than $10 million had been awarded by U.S. donors, including USAID, the U.S. State Department, and the Ford Foundation, to organizations addressing violence against women.

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145 Ibid., 83.
146 Ibid., 3.
147 Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, “Women’s NGOs in Russia: Struggling from the Margins,” Demokratizatsiya 10, n. 2 (Spring 2002), 222.
148 Henderson (2003), 92; Sundstrom (2002), 222; Sperling (1999), 228.
Early on, the Ford Foundation had become a leading supporter of women’s NGOs. Between 1994 and 1999, it gave over $2 million in grants to help institutionalize the women’s movement.\(^{150}\) In 1998, the Ford Foundation turned its attention to the specific goal of developing crisis centers for women and, between 1998 and 2005, gave over $1.6 million to crisis centers across Russia.\(^ {151}\) USAID also joined in on the effort to establish a crisis center movement and granted nearly one million dollars to thirty-five crisis centers between 1999 and 2002.\(^ {152}\) A third significant source of support for the crisis center movement was the Network for Crisis Centers for Women in the Barents Region (NCRB), representing Nordic countries, which had their own multilateral relations with Russia. NCRB had received approximately $300,000 from the European Union and Nordic sources to support a network of organizations addressing gender violence in Finland, Sweden, Norway, and northwest Russia.\(^ {153}\)

Other donors that have provided significant funds to the Russian women’s movement include foreign governments, such as the British, Canadian, and German governments and the European Union, and private foundations, such as the Open Society Institute, the MacArthur Foundation, and the Eurasia Foundation.\(^ {154}\)

\(^{149}\) Johnson (2009), 2.

\(^{150}\) Henderson (2003), 121.

\(^{151}\) Johnson (2009), 58-59.

\(^{152}\) Ibid., 58.

\(^{153}\) Ibid., 58.

addition, numerous donors, including charities and small feminist groups, have contributed smaller amounts of funding to women’s groups.

Many donors shared the belief that empowering women would lead to stronger civil societies and more representative democracies. In discussing the dynamics of foreign funding specifically to Russian women’s organizations, Richter notes that most donors geared their funds to three tasks, building NGO infrastructure, strengthening public advocacy, and promoting community outreach, in order to support the development of the Russian third sector. Richter argues that multidimensional grants geared towards building the infrastructures of a few organizations to act as “resource centers” or umbrella organizations had the strongest effect on the women’s movement. Such long-term grants “pay for the salaries, office space, and other operational costs of a few select organizations that in turn are expected to provide a range of services to other organizations in the sector, including training, legal and financial consultations, facilitating and arranging seminars and conferences, and distributing information regarding the activities of other women’s organizations in Russia and around the world.” Such grants established several core women’s organizations that were designed to act as clearinghouses of information for other women’s groups throughout Russia.

In addition to multidimensional infrastructural grants, foreign donors also provided infrastructural grants in the following areas: minigrants to help small organizations become established; unidimensional grants awarded to organizations to

155 Henderson (2003), 91.

156 Richter, 62-63.

157 Ibid., 64.
produce specific outcomes, many of which were focused on strengthening women’s networks, e.g., organizing training sessions and conferences, publishing brochures or newsletters, establishing internet connections, and so forth; individual grants to finance training programs to teach activists general principles of organizational administration; and travel grants and exchange programs to enable activists to attend conferences or visit other organizations within Russia or abroad.\textsuperscript{158}

The second major goal of donors was to support the public advocacy function of women’s organizations. Grants for public advocacy aimed to help activists better articulate their interests to governmental officials and to hold the government accountable for its policies on women. Receiving such an advocacy grant, for example, the Moscow Center for Gender Studies undertook a “gender expertise” program that “analyzed upcoming legislation and its effects on women and organized seminars, press conferences, and publications to disseminate the findings.”\textsuperscript{159}

Another type of “public advocacy” grant, according to Richter’s schema, were those that funded the training of law enforcement officials on such issues as domestic violence and human trafficking. Such trainings educated local police on the seriousness of the problem and taught methods of enforcement that had proven effective in other countries.\textsuperscript{160}

Finally, donors promoted the community outreach function of women’s organizations. Although donors devoted relatively little attention to this goal in comparison to the others, the development of the Russian crisis center movement was

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 67-68.

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 68-69.

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., 69.
an example of a foreign-funded initiative that proved successful in helping women’s groups connect with average citizens and build their constituencies.\footnote{Ibid., 69-70.}

The pervasiveness of foreign funding among women’s organizations had a strong impact on the development of the Russian women’s movement. One of its biggest impacts was on the size of the movement. Foreign funding made possible the very existence of numerous women’s organizations at a time when domestic support for women’s NGOs, and indeed civil society organizations as a whole, was lacking. Donors financed scores of projects geared to help women and increase knowledge on gender issues that most likely would have been impossible without these funds. This support played a large role in expanding the scope of the Russian women’s movement, which had grown to approximately two thousand registered organizations by 1998.\footnote{Sundstrom (2006a), 81.}

The emphasis of many donors on connecting women’s NGOs across Russia led them to finance e-mail connections, national and regional conferences, networking projects, and newsletters and journals, which enabled activists throughout the country to communicate and collaborate as never before. Additionally, foreign funding enhanced communication between Russian women and the international community of women’s rights activists. By supporting the travel of Western feminists to Russia and the travel of Russian women abroad, donors facilitated an exchange of knowledge that many Russian women found beneficial to the growth of their organizations.\footnote{Russian activists’ participation in international networks of}
women broadened their opportunities to act on both national and international levels. Russian women often found that their international connections increased the legitimacy of their work in the eyes of local officials, and they drew upon global gender norms, such as those outlined in the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), when pressing the state for social change.\textsuperscript{164}

In spite of the many positive outcomes of foreign funding for the Russian women’s movement, this funding also presented challenges to the further development of the movement. Similar to the consequences of aid to Russian civil society as a whole (discussed in the previous chapter), aid specifically to women’s groups contributed to the fragmentation of the movement and competition between groups; the establishment of a hierarchy of organizations with the “feminist elite” at the top; closed networks reluctant to share resources with outsiders; lack of ties between NGOs and the public; problems with organizational sustainability; and, overall, the “NGO-ization” of the Russian women’s movement.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the presence of foreign funds at a time when domestic sources of support are scarce often leads organizations to compete with each other for limited funds and to fragment into ever smaller groups (or individuals) in order to qualify for more grants. Thus, despite the emphasis of donors on encouraging cooperation and networking among women’s groups, the rules of

\textsuperscript{163} Kay (2000), 207, 215.

foreign funding have in fact discouraged women activists from collaborating too closely. Sperling, Ferree, and Risman provide an example of this tendency in their case study of a series of three-day seminars for women activists held in seven cities throughout Russia in 1995-1996. These seminars, funded by the Eurasia Foundation and MacArthur Foundation, were led by an American woman and a Russian woman and were organized around the purpose of developing “a ‘women’s agenda’ in each region that could be implemented by a coalition of women’s groups.”¹⁶⁵ The techniques covered in the seminars included conducting media relations, lobbying elected officials, and building coalitions. However, since the seminars represented a valuable opportunity for the Russian participants to make contact with Westerners, competition and controversy marked several of the occasions. Sperling, Ferree, and Risman note, “There were recurrent, sometimes literally tearful, struggles over which local organization was more legitimate or deserving of Western funds as well as over which particular individual could be said to be the president or secretary or other formal representative of a specific group.”¹⁶⁶ Based on their research, the scholars conclude that the logistics of aid complicate “the movement-building process, since it is clearly in the interest of groups to maintain an individual identity rather than collaborate with other groups and risk being absorbed.”¹⁶⁷

Additionally, foreign funding contributed to the development of a hierarchy of women’s organizations and a “feminist elite” that commanded a disproportionate share of control and prestige within the movement. As noted, many of the leaders of

¹⁶⁵ Sperling, Ferree, and Risman, 1164.
¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 1177.
¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 1178.
the Russian women’s movement were academics who were familiar with Western feminist theory and literature. Rebecca Kay writes:

[T]hese women and their organizations quickly became associated with western activists and organizations working in Russia and began to be specifically identified in terms of this relationship…. Thus in addition to historical differences in status, power and access to resources, the development of increasingly close relations between certain Russian women’s organizations and western counterparts introduced a new, but equally powerful, factor to the formation of factions, elitism and competition, resentment and suspicion rather than solidarity between Russian women’s organizations. What is more, the choice of academic women as the principal Russian partners and first points of contact for western bodies seeking to work in Russia reinforced a preexisting “class” difference between the Russian intelligentsia and other sections of Russian society.\(^ {168}\)

As women with knowledge of Western feminism and the English language were the first to form relationships with foreign donors, they earned their trust, often leading to repeat funding and the opportunity to recommend new groups to funders. Those most closely associated with donors and with the Russian “feminist elite” were perceived to be at the top of the hierarchy of women’s activists, or the “big sisters” of Russian feminism.\(^ {169}\) Kay illustrates this phenomenon through her discussion of the Independent Women’s Forum, an organization that grew out of the Dubna forums and that sought to improve communication and cooperation among women’s

\(^{168}\) Kay (2000), 194.

\(^{169}\) Ibid., 194-195.
organizations. Donors sent grant announcements, application forms, and other information sources to the Forum with the understanding that such materials would be made available on an egalitarian basis to all of the Forum’s member organizations and other contact organizations. In contrast to the official goal of the Forum, however, many women activists reported being left out of the information loop due to their low positions in the “pecking order” of the Forum.\textsuperscript{170} They felt they had purposely been denied access to information due to lack of ties or strained relations with movement leaders. This problem was especially acute for women outside of Moscow, who largely relied on the main Moscow organizations to pass along information on funding opportunities.\textsuperscript{171}

As the structure of the women’s movement grew increasingly hierarchical and many groups closed themselves off to outsiders, the flow of information was interrupted. Instead of encouraging more women to join the ranks of movement participants, seminars and training sessions drew only the same small group of movement “regulars” who frequented such events.\textsuperscript{172} As Henderson notes, “[T]he effects of aid were often contained within the very circles to which it was distributed; the networking was insular rather than designed for outreach. In addition, foreign aid did not encourage funded groups to radically extend their memberships.”\textsuperscript{173} Henderson discusses the funding practices of the Ford Foundation in order to

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., 203.

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., 204; Hemment (2007), 84.

\textsuperscript{172} Sperling, Ferree, and Risman, 1178; Henderson (2003), 134.

\textsuperscript{173} Henderson (2003), 118.
illustrate how foreign aid contributed to the exclusivity that was growing within the
women’s movement. She writes:

[T]he Ford Foundation’s philosophy of “building partnerships” and providing
almost cradle-to-grave financial support to certain organizations also meant
that a few organizations in an extremely large country were institutionalized
often at the expense of a vast number of smaller, less-well-connected, but
active organizations. Thus, the Ford Foundation solidified a portion of the
women’s movement and, in doing so, tended to privilege the groups that had
managed to develop a relationship with the foundation early on and shut out
other groups that also wanted to gain access to the foundation’s resources. 174

Hence, while both foreign donors and early leaders of the women’s movement
emphasized the importance of horizontal networking and worked to expand the
movement on an egalitarian basis, the consequences of foreign aid combined with the
legacies of state socialism often produced the opposite outcome. Many women’s
groups, especially those seeking to obtain foreign grants, remained small, insular, and
mistrustful of the intentions of outsiders. This tendency left the women’s movement
with a minimal base of support among the Russian population.

While the Russian women’s movement grew in size and scope, it faced the
curious dilemma of being little understood or accepted at home. As Hemment
explains:

Russian women’s groups do not have legitimacy among most Russian women.
Most people are unaware of their activities, and many of those who are aware
of them are suspicious of their goals. For complex historical reasons there is

174 Ibid., 133-134.
no commonly held perception of gender discrimination in Russia, and most people greet the notion of women organizing as women with suspicion.…

Like other internationally supported nongovernmental organizations, these groups are considered to be far from most people’s concerns.175

As mentioned, part of the Russian public’s resistance to feminism stemmed from the socialist ideology promoted during the Soviet era. With women’s equality enshrined in the law but no means for women to legally advocate for their rights, Soviet women were left in a “blind alley.”176 The zhensovet enjoyed the benefits of closeness to the Communist Party but did little to actually improve the lives of Soviet women. Therefore, most Soviet women viewed them as powerless to address the contradictions arising out of women’s “double burden.” Sundstrom argues:

There is thus an unfortunate convergence of societal rejection of past Soviet policies on women and basic acceptance of the Soviet view of feminism. Russian women tend to perceive feminist organizations as espousing an alien Western ideology unsuited to their conditions. At the same time, they view nonfeminist women’s organizations that stem from the old zhensovet organizations as state-dominated and having no interest in resolving women’s real problems.177

The negative connotations of the term “feminism” in Russia led even many leaders of the women’s movement to reject the label “feminist.” Sundstrom notes that only three percent of women’s NGOs in a database of movement organizations

175 Hemment (2007), 5.

176 Sundstrom (2002), 216.

177 Ibid., 216.
claimed to be “feminist” in orientation, even though many more asserted goals of fighting discrimination against women or improving women’s status in society.\textsuperscript{178}

She also found dismissive attitudes towards feminism among female staff members in the Russian offices of foreign donors to civil society. Some argued that women’s organizations did not count as part of “civil society,” since they advocated only for one portion of the population.\textsuperscript{179} The general public, Sundstrom notes, tends to perceive women’s organizations as “useless” in solving the problems that plague Russian society.\textsuperscript{180}

While negative attitudes towards feminism and women’s organizing predated the arrival of foreign funding, donors did little to improve the public’s opinion of the women’s movement. First, donors granted a large portion of their funding to groups that identified as “feminist” or that aimed to advocate for women’s rights at a societal level, in the belief that such groups could effect greater change in Russian society. Although this was a well-intentioned goal, these groups had much weaker connections to domestic constituencies and less overall support from the population than did groups focused on service provision.\textsuperscript{181}

Second, donors distributed few funds to outreach activities that would have encouraged their grant recipients to connect with average citizens. Instead, funded organizations devoted most of their energy to producing quantifiable results that

\textsuperscript{178} Sundstrom (2006a), 89.

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., 15-16.

\textsuperscript{180} Sundstrom (2002), 215.

could be reported back to funders, such as hosting conferences, publishing brochures and newsletters, and building databases of women’s NGOs, activities targeted towards a small group of women’s activists.\textsuperscript{182} In contrast, leading activities for organizations without foreign funding included listening to the concerns of members and providing practical assistance to help them solve immediate life problems.\textsuperscript{183} Thus, while unfunded groups often had some base of support from average Russian citizens, funded groups usually did not. Henderson argues that, although foreign funding helped women’s groups increase their level of “activity,” it was less successful in improving organizations’ “impact” on civil society development and on the public’s understanding of the women’s movement.\textsuperscript{184}

The effects of dependency on foreign funding relate to what many scholars have called the “NGO-ization” of women’s movements. As Hemment notes, foreign funding presented new opportunities to women’s organizations, but it also imposed constraints on their activities.\textsuperscript{185} While women had been able to organize somewhat informally during the early 1990s, for example, at the Dubna forums, the arrival of foreign donors led many women’s groups, especially those with academic and feminist orientations, to repackage themselves as NGOs in order to qualify for grants and conduct the “professional” activities that donor agencies required. As organizations were “professionalized,” they grew closer to donors and states and further from their local constituencies. In addition, their once radical aims were

\textsuperscript{182} Henderson (2003), 140-145.

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., 112-113.

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., 142-145.

\textsuperscript{185} Hemment (2007), 16.
“tamed” as they increasingly served the interests of their senior “partners.”

Hemment writes, “In the new marketplace of NGOs, gender and gender-based organizing have ironically become a specialized system of knowledge and a new basis for professional expertise.”

Studying how women’s movement activists perceived this process of NGO-ization, Hemment finds that while some women quickly adapted to the career-building mentality of the third sector, others were troubled by the contradictions in their work and struggled to balance their personal passions and sense of responsibility with the bureaucratic limitations of their jobs. However, Hemment argues that, unlike in Latin America and some other regions, NGO-ization of the Russian women’s movement was not a cooptation of an already existing grassroots movement. Instead, with foundations arriving just as the Russian women’s movement was taking off, donors partnered with highly educated women and reinforced the notion of feminist organizing as an elite activity.

While the arrival of foreign funding and the concomitant NGO-ization of the women’s movement provided women’s organizations with much-needed support on a grant-to-grant basis, it presented problems for the long-term sustainability of the movement. As noted, several studies found that approximately half of all women’s organizations had received foreign funding. Additionally, a study specifically on feminist and human rights NGOs found that these organizations overall received 90

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186 Johnson (2009), 46.


188 Hemment (2007), 72-73.

189 Ibid., 74.
percent of their funding from Western donors.\textsuperscript{190} With this degree of dependency, it is especially important that donors encourage grant recipients to establish other means of financing before they pull out. However, given the lack of support for women’s organizing in Russia, women’s NGOs have had little success in attracting contributions from either the Russian public or Russian businesses.

As an alternative to foreign funding, many organizations have found ways to utilize Russian state support to their best advantage. At times this support has been in-kind, in the form of office space, telephone lines, or free advertising provided by local governments. Other times, women’s NGOs have been able to survive by partnering with state-affiliated bodies in flex organizations or hybrids that blur the line between public and private.\textsuperscript{191} With no stable sources of support emerging in the first decade of the twenty-first century, women’s organizations utilized their creativity in finding ways to survive.

4.3 The Russian Crisis Center Movement

4.3.1 Founding and Institutionalization of the Crisis Center Movement

The development of the crisis center movement has been one of the most successful collaborations between foreign funders and Russian women’s organizations. The seeds of this movement were first sown at the Dubna conferences in 1991 and 1992, when leading Russian feminists brought the “global feminist consensus” on violence against women to the attention of the larger Russian women’s movement.\textsuperscript{192} Inspired

\textsuperscript{190} Sundstrom (2002), 222.

\textsuperscript{191} Johnson (2009), 46; Wedel, 145-153.
by the transnational activism on these issues and the Western model of a “crisis center,” some Russian women began to more formally address violence against women.\(^\text{193}\)

In 1993, ANNA (an acronym for the No to Violence Association) was founded in Moscow as a one-person hotline. The organization, which would later become a leader in the crisis center movement, held a training for new hotline counselors in 1994, and officially registered with the Russian government in 1995.\(^\text{194}\) A second Moscow crisis center, Syostri (Sisters), was founded around the same time, but while ANNA focused more on domestic violence, Syostri concentrated on sexual assault.\(^\text{195}\) A similar process occurred in St. Petersburg with the founding of the St. Petersburg Crisis Center. The Center began offering some services in 1991, officially opened in 1994, and began operating a regular hotline in 1995.\(^\text{196}\) Soon after these early crisis centers opened in Moscow and St. Petersburg, similar organizations began appearing in the regions. For example, in Saratov, a one-million-person city on the Volga, activists founded the Interregional Association of Women Lawyers in 1994 to

\(^{192}\) Johnson (2009), 53; Johnson (2006), 267-268.

\(^{193}\) In the United States and Western Europe, organizations and shelters addressing violence against women tend to specialize on specific issues, e.g., rape, domestic violence, sexual harassment, etc. However, when this model of organization was introduced in Russia, the scarcity of resources for violence against women across the country meant that it made more sense to consolidate activism against all these forms of violence into one type of organization: the crisis center. The crisis center movement thus incorporates activism against all forms of violence against women, although some crisis centers focus more on one type of violence than others.

\(^{194}\) Johnson (2009), 49.

\(^{195}\) Ibid., 49.

\(^{196}\) Ibid., 49.
coordinate legal aid to victims of sexual violence and operate a hotline, among other activities.  

In October 1994, ANNA activists established the Russian Association of Crisis Centers for Women (RACCW) to connect the newly emerging crisis centers across Russia and to facilitate collaborative projects to raise awareness and lobby for legislative reform.  

The founding members of RACCW were located in Moscow, the Moscow Region, St. Petersburg, Nizhny Tagil, Ekaterinburg, and Kamchatka. By this time, there were already seven to ten crisis centers, with varying degrees of activity, operating in Russia.  

In these early years of the crisis center movement, Russian activists heavily borrowed from Western feminist theories on how to respond to violence against women. Johnson notes that many Russian leaders of crisis centers met with Western feminists or traveled to North America or Western Europe to observe the operation of women’s shelters.  

In addition, the translation and publication of the Western feminist text *How to Start a Crisis Center for Women* allowed the crisis center model to reach even more Russian activists.  

Foreign donor funds supported the dissemination of five thousand copies of the text to women’s NGOs.  

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197 Ibid., 49-50.  
198 Ibid., 50.  
199 Ibid., 50.  
200 Ibid., 53.  
202 Johnson (2009), 53.  
203 Hemment (2007), 96.
Hemment observes that the methods and theoretical frameworks accompanying the crisis center model could be learned by activists and transferred even further. Describing the methods promoted by this model, Hemment writes:

These were techniques taken from Western European and U.S. crisis centers—nondirective active listening skills, crisis counseling—and were backed up by a broad feminist paradigm that offered an explanation for gendered violence: here, rape is seen not as a sexual act, but as an expressions [sic] of male dominance and power. This conception offered a robust counter-model both to old Soviet ideological explanations for interpersonal violence and to new “expert” explanations that placed the blame on women for “asking for it.”

While borrowing from foreign paradigms, Russian activists applied the crisis center model in ways that fit local conditions and needs. In contrast to North American organizing against gender violence, which had started as a grassroots movement featuring sister-to-sister support, the Russian movement began as a more professionalized sphere in which many un- or underemployed psychologists, scholars, and lawyers offered their services to women. Johnson notes:

The Russian version of the crisis center is an organization led by a few individuals (typically professionals receiving some compensation), a hotline staffed by volunteer counselors for several hours a day several days of the week, often some in-person counseling or support groups, and usually some sort of broader advocacy work. Volunteers would listen to callers’ concerns

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204 Ibid., 96.

205 Johnson (2009), 53-54.
and try to help callers see new options. Often, because of the virtual collapse of the welfare system and social conditions, there is very little that they can do except try to empower the victim to feel entitled to a better life.206

Although the inexpensiveness of this model permitted its viability in a resource-poor environment, a lack of funds severely limited the aid that activists were able to offer clients. While several crisis centers made attempts to establish shelters for women seeking to leave abusive relationships, these attempts were usually stymied by “financial realities and oppressive post-Soviet regulations.”207 Nonetheless, by 1997, there were at least eight established and stably functioning crisis centers providing direct help to women and several additional organizations working on the theme of violence against women. Johnson argues that the mid-1990s were a period of “institutionalization” of the crisis center, “which quickly replaced other kinds of organizations as the repertoire for action against gender violence.”208

4.3.2 Proliferation of Crisis Centers

By the late 1990s, foreign donors had begun to allocate significant funds to assist the growth of the Russian crisis center movement. Funding activism against gender violence became a foreign aid priority of the United States government following the 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing.209 After the Conference, then first-lady Hillary Clinton, who had led the U.S. delegation, pushed for increased attention to

206 Ibid., 51-52.
207 Ibid., 52.
208 Ibid., 51.
209 Ibid., 96.
gender issues from U.S. development aid providers. Her efforts contributed to the
development of the 1996 USAID Gender Plan of Action, which aimed to integrate
gender concerns, including domestic violence, into all USAID activities.\textsuperscript{210} USAID
and the U.S. State Department began to develop initiatives addressing domestic
violence as part of their women in development, democracy assistance, and rule-of-
law programs.\textsuperscript{211} Then, while attending a Russia-United States conference on
domestic violence in Moscow in 1998, Clinton promised U.S. assistance to Russian
crisis centers.\textsuperscript{212} Subsequently, USAID granted almost one million dollars in aid
between 1999 and 2002 to thirty-five crisis centers throughout Russia for start-up and
expansion costs.\textsuperscript{213}

Another major U.S. donor was the Ford Foundation, which allocated more
than half a million U.S. dollars to ANNA between 1998 and 2001. The foundation
dispersed another quarter of a million U.S. dollars to crisis centers in Irkutsk and St.
Petersburg.\textsuperscript{214} A third important source of assistance for the growth of the movement
was the Network for Crisis Centers for Women in the Barents Region, which
provided financial and sister-to-sister support to crisis centers in northwest Russia.\textsuperscript{215}

\textsuperscript{210} Ibid., 96.
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid., 96.
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid., 58.
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid., 58.
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid., 57-58.
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid., 58.
Other large donors to Russian crisis centers included the Open Society Institute, the British Know How Fund, and the EU’s TACIS program.\textsuperscript{216}

Transnational feminists also provided a great deal of support to Russia’s crisis center movement, both in working with funders and in collaborating directly with Russian women’s organizations. Following the achievement of the “global feminist consensus” on violence against women, feminists created transnational feminist networks (TFNs) to help promote their cause on both national and international levels. Transnational feminist networks have been defined as “structures organized above the national level that unite women from three or more countries around a common agenda, such as women’s human rights, reproductive health and rights, violence against women, peace and antimilitarism, or feminist economics.”\textsuperscript{217} Valentine Moghadam argues that TFNs “ensure that women’s issues remain on the international agenda, and that local activists receive solidarity and support.”\textsuperscript{218}

Several TFNs had a strong presence in Russia and played significant roles in the development of the Russian crisis center movement. For example, the Network of East-West Women (NEWW), founded in 1991, helped Russian women make contact with activists in other regions or countries and organized exchanges. The Consortium of Women’s Nongovernmental Associations (formerly the NIS-US Women’s Consortium), which was founded to connect women’s organizations in the U.S. and in the post-Soviet states, provided nearly $100,000 in seed grants to women’s NGOs,

\textsuperscript{216} Ibid., 176, no. 26.

\textsuperscript{217} Moghadam, 4.

\textsuperscript{218} Ibid., 19.
including Syostri and the St. Petersburg Crisis Center.\textsuperscript{219} In 1997, the Vienna-based Women against Violence Europe (WAVE) was formed to link “activists, policymakers, and others with an interest in reducing violence against women in nearly all European countries.”\textsuperscript{220} Noting the importance of WAVE in supporting the Russian crisis center movement, Johnson writes:

[WAVE] serves as a discursive space for information exchange among professionals and activists, a library and archive, and a database of addresses, as well as a resource for women who are victims of domestic violence to find help within specific countries. From the beginning Russian crisis centers, including Syostri and later ANNA as the Russian focal point, were involved, solidifying the Russian crisis center movement’s participation in global feminism.\textsuperscript{221}

In addition, transnational feminists aided the growth of the crisis center movement through alliances with donors. In promoting the “global feminist consensus” on violence against women, feminists had encouraged many development agencies, human rights organizations, and large charitable foundations to support women’s activism in Russia.\textsuperscript{222} Several charitable foundations and international development agencies professed a commitment to global feminism and included global feminists in the process of designing and implementing aid.\textsuperscript{223} As a result of

\textsuperscript{219} Johnson (2009), 52-53, 175, no. 12.

\textsuperscript{220} Ibid., 57.

\textsuperscript{221} Ibid., 57.

\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., 45.

\textsuperscript{223} Ibid., 150.
this inclusion, many donors incorporated feminist principles by prioritizing the participation of local activists in the aid process, giving grant recipients more control over projects, and using feminist “best practices” to combat violence against women in Russia.\textsuperscript{224}

Johnson argues that this approach to funding helped crisis centers to overcome many of the challenges that hindered other foreign-funded women’s NGOs in Russia and to become one of the most successful sectors of Russian civil society.\textsuperscript{225} She points out that, while crisis centers were “NGO-ized and somewhat fragmented,” they maintained relatively strong networks, demonstrated closer ties to local communities, and actively worked for social and political change.\textsuperscript{226} In addition, by providing support to the crisis center movement over a number of years, foreign donors helped the movement survive a difficult time in Russia’s economy.\textsuperscript{227} Finally, the relationship between crisis centers and their funders was successful in that activists were able to build upon this aid to attract some support from the Russian government.\textsuperscript{228}

Despite the success of the crisis center movement, some scholars pointed out problems that arose when transnational feminists and foreign donors attempted to push the Western crisis center model too rigidly onto Russian groups without taking the time to understand the local context. In her study of women’s NGOs and crisis

\textsuperscript{224} Ibid., 118, 187, no. 27.

\textsuperscript{225} Ibid., 60. See also Sundstrom (2006a), who came to a similar conclusion, 43-44.

\textsuperscript{226} Johnson (2009), 60.

\textsuperscript{227} Ibid., 60.

\textsuperscript{228} Ibid., 60.
centers throughout Russia in 1997 and 1998, Hemment found that, when the crisis center model was first introduced, many women activists were confused by or even objected to the need to address gender violence. In a period of economic dislocation, many activists were focused on resolving issues such as unemployment, lack of living space, alcoholism, and military service. However, with foreign donors promoting the issue of gender violence, activists felt compelled to address this topic. Of the mismatch between the aims of transnational donors and of Russian activists, Hemment writes:

Privately, many Russian activists involved in the campaigns admitted that they did not think gendered violence was the most pressing issue facing Russian women. In the light of major socioeconomic upheavals such as the decay of the free healthcare system, the erosion of state-sponsored day care, and a sharp decline in living standards, they were concerned that the issue had such high priority and that so many resources were put into it. I was struck that many of those engaged in the ideological work of the antiviolence campaign (organizing the conferences, publishing materials) even objected to them. One of my friends, Irina, who worked for an organization that supported antiviolence campaigns, rolled her eyes upon learning that I was working with a group to set up a crisis center. “Crisis centers, crisis centers! That’s all you can think about. But let me tell you, there are good Russian

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229 Hemment (2007), 14. See Henderson (2010), 264, for a similar finding on the disparity between donor emphases on the issue of violence against women and Russian activists’ perceptions of the needs of their local communities.
families, you know. I know there is really a serious problem in America, but in Russia it is different.”

Hemment notes that she began to see transnational campaigns against gender violence as a form of cultural imperialism in Russia. The imported framework of “violence against women” was based on Western assumptions of the form of interpersonal and economic relations between women and men; transnational activists and donors failed to take into account the specificity of the Russian context and history. Although violence, of course, existed in the private realm, Hemment argues that neither women nor men saw it as a “gender” problem. As it was commonplace in post-Soviet Russia for multiple generations of families, or even multiple families, to live together in communal apartments, “domestic conflict most commonly expressed itself in the form of tension over rights to living space, interpersonal strife, or alcoholism.”

When Russian activists tried to express their concerns to foreign donors, they felt “unheard.” Hemment writes:

[The framing of violence against women] not only screened out local constructions of events but deflected attention from other issues of social justice also, notably the material forces that oppress women. During conferences and seminars, I noted that when Russian activists attempted to expand discussion of “violence” to encompass other issues, such as economic or structural violence, agency representatives seemed to reject these out of

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231 Ibid., 98.
232 Ibid., 99.
hand. I found that many North American or Western European feminists dismissed discussions of economic factors... as either Communist holdovers or as rationalizations for male perpetrated violence.... Within the campaigns, economic issues and structural violence became unnarratable. In this way, I saw that the campaigns contributed to the neoliberal restructuring process. 233

Given the gulf in understanding between the Western leaders of the campaign against gender violence and Russian women activists, activists responded by adapting the Western model to fit their local contexts. 234 Although formally existing as “crisis centers for women victims of gender violence,” many crisis centers welcomed clients, both women and men, from multiple demographic groups experiencing various forms of “crises” in their lives. 235 Visiting several crisis centers, Hemment found that clients called crisis center hotlines to discuss issues such as “unemployment, unpaid wages, loneliness, alcoholism, loss of children to the military service, as well as domestic or sexual violence.” 236 Since violence against women was a new topic for Russia, few clients called to discuss it. 237 When women did call to discuss violence, they often spoke about it in relation to economic problems. Counselors responded by placing a high priority on clients’ material problems, concluding that “it made no

233 Ibid., 99-100.
234 Ibid., 98, 101-102.
235 Ibid., 101.
236 Ibid., 101.
237 Ibid., 101.
sense to specialize too narrowly." In the end, Hemment finds, the work of crisis centers "both embraced and exceeded the gendered violence narrative."

Despite the early bumps in the road, the development of the crisis center movement brought several benefits to Russian women and the communities they served. First, the funding activists received permitted them to do the work they saw as necessary and to offer important services to the local population. Activists were able to use the funding creatively, often to support already existing projects. Second, crisis centers provided local women with jobs and the opportunity to volunteer and gain valuable work experience. Third, the centers frequently promoted a sense of community and acted as a support center for local women. Finally, they allowed Russian women to act as active participants in the transnational movement against gender violence, albeit on their own terms.

Support from transnational feminists and donors, along with strategies women activists developed to make such support work in Russia, enabled the crisis center movement to advance from its “institutionalization” phase to its “proliferation” phase. Between 1998 and 2001, new crisis centers for women were established at a rapid pace, and already existing centers expanded their activities. In 1998, ANNA was a bustling crisis center with twelve staff members and dozens of volunteers running a

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238 Ibid., 102.
239 Ibid., 130.
240 Ibid., 130.
241 Ibid., 102.
242 Ibid., 145.
243 Johnson (2009), 54-55.
hotline and providing group consultations, serving over two hundred women a month.\textsuperscript{244} By 2001, ANNA activists were national leaders in the crisis center movement and were participating regularly in American Bar Association Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative (ABA-CEELI) conferences.\textsuperscript{245} These conferences brought together social service professionals (psychologists, healthcare providers, social workers), law enforcement personnel, and women activists.\textsuperscript{246} In addition, ANNA was conducting two large national media and public awareness campaigns.\textsuperscript{247} At the same time, the number of crisis centers across Russia was increasing. By the summer of 2002, RACCW had grown to forty members, and numerous other crisis centers were operating outside of this network. A RACCW leader estimated that there were a total of 120 organizations in Russia working on the topic of gender violence.\textsuperscript{248}

To illustrate the phenomenon of crisis center proliferation, in Barnaul, a southwestern Siberian city of 780,000 residents, three centers were established during this period. One, the Women’s Alliance (Zhenskii Al’ians), grew out of a women’s organization originally formed in 1993.\textsuperscript{249} As with many other crisis centers, the main activity of the Women’s Alliance was operating a hotline, but the crisis center

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\textsuperscript{244} Ibid., 54.
\textsuperscript{245} Ibid., 54.
\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., 54.
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid., 54.
\textsuperscript{248} Ibid., 55.
\textsuperscript{249} Ibid., 55.
also carried out other activities, such as on-site counseling and support groups.\textsuperscript{250} Between 1998 and 2002, the Women’s Alliance assisted “6,500 victims—most of them female victims of violence.”\textsuperscript{251} The other two crisis centers that emerged in Barnaul during this period were Response (Otklik), a project run out of the local university’s sociology department, and the Altai Crisis Center for Men, a state social service organization that was restructured to take on the issue of domestic violence.\textsuperscript{252} The latter drew notice as the first Russian crisis center designed specifically for men, and included programs on prevention of violence among male offenders, as well as broader programs on the “physical, psychological, and social health of working-age men.”\textsuperscript{253}

Another area that saw significant growth in crisis centers during this period was northwestern Russia. By 2001, there were at least ten women’s crisis centers in the Barents region of Karelia, Murmansk, and Arkhangelsk.\textsuperscript{254} In 1998, following years of activism against gender violence by women’s NGOs, the Republic of Karelia founded its own, state-supported shelter for women with children who had been in situations of domestic violence. Formal collaboration between the state and the NGO sector on gender violence in Karelia began in 1999, following a multidisciplinary seminar on domestic violence organized by the director of the Karelian Center for

\textsuperscript{250} Ibid., 55.
\textsuperscript{251} Ibid., 55.
\textsuperscript{252} Ibid., 55.
\textsuperscript{253} Johnson (2006), 271-272.
\textsuperscript{254} Johnson (2009), 56.
Gender Studies.\textsuperscript{255} The next year, a seminar conducted by an independent women’s crisis center in the area produced a protocol of cooperation between NGOs, the Karelian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Center of Family Planning, and the juridical clinic of the Petrozavodsk state university.\textsuperscript{256} This protocol improved procedures for responding to instances of domestic violence in the republic. For example, the protocol prescribes that, when a woman enters a shelter, a female police officer meets with her to explain her legal options and to support her decisions. In addition, the Karelian Ministry of Internal Affairs began to train public safety officers on “violence against women in the family.”\textsuperscript{257}

These changes in the domestic violence response system were assisted by international organizations and networks. U.S.-based Project Harmony supported the development of the protocol on cooperation, and the Nordic Network for Crisis Centers for Women in the Barents Region brought Nordic activists and public officials to Karelia to share their experiences with multidisciplinary collaboration.\textsuperscript{258} This exposure to international methods, and even the opportunity to visit Nordic countries to observe their response systems, led one police officer to report that such experiences “had shown him and his colleagues that with a different approach to violence and more preventative work, more serious crimes could be averted.”\textsuperscript{259}

Overall, the director of the Karelian Center for Gender Studies believes that these

\begin{footnotes}
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\item[255] Ibid., 115.
\item[256] Ibid., 115.
\item[257] Ibid., 115.
\item[258] Ibid., 115-116.
\item[259] Ibid., 116.
\end{footnotes}
initiatives drew increased attention to the problem of violence in the family from multiple ministries and organizations in the republic and led such violence to be seen not as solely a private issue, but as a public matter that violates norms of morality and human rights.\footnote{260}

In 2000, scholars affiliated with the crisis centers in northwestern Russia carried out a survey of the crisis centers in their region and two in St. Petersburg to provide a snapshot of the crisis center movement.\footnote{261} Of the crisis centers included in the survey, all had hotlines and provided psychological counseling, and ten out of twelve also offered legal counseling and self-help groups. Like most Russian crisis centers, these centers took a professionalized approach in treating women victims as clients and “were not particularly concerned about overriding the wishes of the client in some circumstances.”\footnote{262} Although focused on domestic violence, most centers also addressed sexual abuse, rape, incest, and, in some instances, sexual harassment.\footnote{263}

The survey found significant differences between government and independent crisis centers. The independent centers were more activist-oriented: they were slightly more likely to identify as feminist and much more likely to have links to the international women’s movement.\footnote{264} They were somewhat less hierarchical than government centers, and their viability largely depended on the management and

\footnote{260}Ibid., 115. 
\footnote{261}Ibid., 56. 
\footnote{262}Ibid., 56. 
\footnote{263}Ibid., 56. 
\footnote{264}Ibid., 56-57.
fundraising skills of the director.\textsuperscript{265} By contrast, government crisis centers could rely on more stable, even though limited, funding. However, they were strictly regulated by the authorities and highly vulnerable to shifts in the local political environment. The authors of the survey also concluded that workers at government centers were less competent, perhaps stemming from the fact that they had received no education on gender violence prior to beginning work at the center.\textsuperscript{266} In regards to funding, the government centers had received no foreign grants, and, in turn, only one independent center had received a small amount of municipal funding. One crisis center relied completely on the work of volunteers.\textsuperscript{267}

Additionally, there were a growing number of hybrid organizations that blurred the lines between the state and civic sectors. Such organizations received state funding while presenting themselves to donors as NGOs. By 2004, one-third of organizations affiliated with RACCW, which had initially resisted the incorporation of state centers, were hybrids.\textsuperscript{268} However, hybrid organizations have been criticized by scholars of Russian civil society for lacking transparency, furthering networks based on patronage, and extending state control over civil society.\textsuperscript{269} Despite these criticisms, Johnson argues that in the case of crisis centers, hybrids served a positive function in expanding activism against gender violence. While feminists lamented the state’s decreasing responsibilities for social service provision and protection of

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\textsuperscript{265} Ibid., 57.
\textsuperscript{266} Ibid., 57.
\textsuperscript{267} Ibid., 57.
\textsuperscript{268} Ibid., 55.
\textsuperscript{269} Ibid., 55-56; Johnson (2006), 275-276 (reviewing the work of several scholars).
}
the population in the post-Soviet era, hybrid organizations represented a new way for the state to take responsibility for violence against women.\textsuperscript{270} In addition, hybrids increased the number of individuals working against gender violence by drawing in state workers previously unaffiliated with the crisis center movement.\textsuperscript{271} By attracting state resources but ensuring that they had a role to play in the deployment of these resources, women activists used the hybrid model to its best advantage. In addition, these affiliations with governmental structures gave women’s activists increased visibility and legitimacy in the state sector.

With the crisis center movement flourishing across Russia by 2001, the movement was increasingly drawing upon maternalist and neotraditional frames, which emphasized women’s role as mothers, to advance its work domestically. Johnson writes that the strategy of new leaders of the movement was to “balance maternalism and global feminism.”\textsuperscript{272} Crisis centers activists more frequently used the concept of “violence in the family” instead of “violence against women” in order to connect with the Russian public and state officials. As one leader of the movement explained, using maternalism was the best way to bring attention to domestic violence because “women [as a category of rights-bearing citizens] are not heard in Russia.”\textsuperscript{273} This framing of gender violence also helped activists to find common ground with the many maternalist women’s groups that had emerged in Russia. However, while appealing to traditional values, crisis center activists still insisted on holding batterers

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{270} Johnson (2009), 55-56.
  \item \textsuperscript{271} Ibid., 56.
  \item \textsuperscript{272} Ibid., 100.
  \item \textsuperscript{273} Ibid., 100.
\end{itemize}
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accountable for their actions and not reverting to the tendency to blame women for violence in the household. Johnson writes, “the movement adjusted the global concept of domestic violence to fit the Russian context even while continuing to challenge the gender order.”

She argues that the feminist-inspired approach of donors to the crisis centers allowed this “successful transplantation” to occur, as donors gave women’s groups more leeway to modify the international model to fit Russian society.

4.3.3 Transformation of the Crisis Center Movement

By the start of 2002, there were over one hundred autonomous, state-funded, and hybrid crisis centers operating actively throughout Russia. However, Johnson writes, “Just as the movement was set to take off, international donors began to shift gears.” Starting in 2002, she argues, crisis centers entered the phase of “defunding” and “transformation.”

After the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, many donors transferred their attention to new hotspots. In 2002, USAID, one of the major funders of crisis centers, suddenly stopped providing aid for activism against domestic violence. Other donors, ready to wean Russian grant recipients after a decade of funding, shifted their focus to teaching skills of self-

274 Ibid., 100.

275 Ibid., 54, 187, no. 27.

276 Ibid., 60.

277 Ibid., 49, 60.

278 Ibid., 60. See also Hemmen (2007), 136.

279 Johnson (2009), 60.
sufficiency, such as fundraising. By 2003, Johnson contends, donors had lost much of their interest in funding women’s organizations. 280

As numerous aid providers ended their commitment to Russia’s crisis centers, two main sources of support were left. The first comprised projects supported by the EU, such as AIDOS-Focus and the Nordic NCRB for northwestern Russia. However, these projects required Russian organizations to have European partners, who often took a large portion of the grants, and most of the projects were geared to the Eastern and Central European countries that sought to become EU members. The second major funder was the Ford Foundation, but it provided funds only to the ANNA crisis center. 281 Other crisis centers were left to search for new sources of support. Johnson comments, “The global alliance between transnational feminists and democracy assistance donors [on the issue of] domestic and gender violence was over.” 282

As democracy assistance for domestic violence crisis centers ended, funding opportunities began to appear for activism against human trafficking. In the earlier phases of the crisis center movement, with little funding geared towards counter-trafficking work, only a handful of centers had taken up this topic. Few Russian women activists saw human trafficking as a priority issue within their communities or had expressed interest in working on the issue. 283 However, similar to the situation when domestic violence was introduced as a priority of international funders, some

280 Ibid., 60.
281 Ibid., 61.
282 Ibid., 61.
crisis centers began to take on the issue of trafficking as funds became available and activists adapted the new funding “fad” to fit the reality of their local context.\textsuperscript{284}

The passage of the UN Protocol on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and of the U.S. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA) in 2000 raised the issue to a level of international prominence and led to increasing amounts of funds becoming available for counter-trafficking projects. At the time, it was estimated that at least 700,000 persons were trafficked every year across national borders for the purpose of labor or sexual exploitation.\textsuperscript{285} The United States offered more than \$300 million in aid for counter-trafficking initiatives, including support for NGOs, training for journalists, and projects led by U.S. embassies to revise other countries’ legislation.\textsuperscript{286} Along with these funds, the TVPA gave the U.S. administration authority to evaluate other countries’ counter-trafficking efforts according to its own grading system and to apply sanctions to those not making the grade. Johnson writes:

Those countries not meeting minimal standards, nor making any significant efforts, would then be subject to the termination of non-humanitarian and non-trade-related foreign assistance, not just from the United States, but from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the leading international lending institutions, upon which the United States has great impact…. For the first time on behalf of women, the United States explicitly legislated itself as

\textsuperscript{284} Johnson (2009), 61; Hemment (2007), 136.


\textsuperscript{286} Johnson (2009), 125.
the global policeman, threatening economic sanctions for noncompliance with U.S. legislation.  

However, Johnson points out that, unlike for interventions targeted at domestic violence, the United States did not include feminists in the implementation of these initiatives to “help women.” She contends, “This has led to an intervention that is, at best, a pseudofeminist policy, that is, a concerted response to problems women tend to face couched in language that appears feminist, but with no opposition to the sex/gender hierarchy.” For example, although the TVPA included provisions on trafficking prevention, it prioritized the prosecution of traffickers both domestically and in its evaluation of other countries’ counter-trafficking efforts. Such a priority reflects the desire of states to police their borders and combat organized crime over their desire to empower women and fight gender discrimination. In order to receive the services offered for those who had been trafficked, women must act in the role of “victim,” and, in many states, they must also cooperate with law enforcement in prosecuting their traffickers. Thus, instead of a “woman-centered” policy, these so-called “gendered interventions” actually reflect mainly the interests of states and intergovernmental organizations.

As counter-trafficking activism expanded across Russia, crisis centers in Moscow, Petrozavodsk, Yekaterinburg, and Krasnodar received a grant from USAID for “trafficking prevention and information dissemination.” Centers in Barnaul and

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287 Ibid., 125.
288 Ibid., 124.
289 Ibid., 122-125.
290 Ibid., 61.
Saratov received funding from USAID for public awareness campaigns and the implementation of crisis intervention services.\textsuperscript{291} Thirteen women’s organizations in the Russian Far East and Siberia won a similar grant to carry out informational campaigns, but also to provide training in job skills and small business development and to offer consultations to women at high risk for trafficking.\textsuperscript{292} A crisis center in Novgorod received a smaller grant to compile a trainer’s portfolio on trafficking. Additional funds were dispersed to individuals as part of an “International Visitor Exchange Program on Trafficking of Women and Children” that sponsored the visits of Russian experts to Washington, D.C., to learn about U.S. programs.\textsuperscript{293} Johnson notes that these grants were generally modeled on earlier gender violence grants in Russia and were distributed through traditional development channels.\textsuperscript{294}

However, Johnson notes, the new type of funding offered by the U.S. State Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP Office) went to the MiraMed Institute and the Angel Coalition (AC), new participants in the Russian movement against gender violence.\textsuperscript{295} MiraMed had been founded in 1991 by American doctor Juliette Engel and was registered both as an American nonprofit and a Russian NGO.\textsuperscript{296} Originally founded with a focus on improving Russian birthing centers and orphanages, MiraMed began to organize programs on human

\textsuperscript{291} Ibid., 61.
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid., 61.
\textsuperscript{293} Ibid., 61.
\textsuperscript{294} Ibid., 61.
\textsuperscript{295} Ibid., 61.
\textsuperscript{296} Ibid., 61-62.
trafficking in the late 1990s, as Engel became aware of girls being trafficked out of orphanages for the purpose of sexual exploitation. In collaboration with twenty Russian NGOs, MiraMed founded the Angel Coalition in 1999 to coordinate the efforts of organizations working specifically to combat human trafficking. By the beginning of 2003, the AC had thirty-three member organizations across Russia, and more in other post-Soviet republics. Seven of these NGOs collaborated to operate hotlines and five organized temporary “safehouses” for trafficked women who had returned to Russia. 297

Although most member organizations of the Angel Coalition were unaffiliated with the crisis center movement, there was some overlap. Six were members of RACCW, and several more were part of the broader Russian women’s movement. 298 For example, the Psychological Crisis Center in St. Petersburg was under the direction of Natalia Khodyreva, an early leader in the crisis center movement and official president of the Angel Coalition. 299 In 2003, the Psychological Crisis Center was operating a hotline to offer consultations to people considering work abroad and managing a nine-woman shelter that provided psychological counseling, medical assistance, and education and job training to victims of trafficking. 300 In contrast, the affiliate of the AC in Kazan, the capital of the Russian Republic of Tatarstan, operated on a much smaller scale. Originally a micro-financing women’s organization, the organization managed to obtain a rented apartment to use as a

297 Ibid., 62.
298 Ibid., 62.
299 Ibid., 62.
300 Ibid., 62.
safehouse, where it hosted one woman who had been deported back to Russia in the summer of 2004.\textsuperscript{301}

Johnson contends that the availability of counter-trafficking funds, and specifically the politics behind the distribution of these funds, deepened divisions within the Russian crisis center and women’s movements. During the 1990s, as the transnational movement against human trafficking was gaining momentum, feminists around the world found themselves drawn to different sides of the debate on prostitution and its connection to trafficking. Some feminists, often referred to as abolitionist feminists or radical feminists, saw the practice of prostitution as inherently exploitative towards women, a means through which men demonstrate their power over women and their right to use women for sex according to their whims. Thus, abolitionist feminists saw little need to distinguish between trafficking and prostitution and advocated for the criminalization of both, while also urging states and organizations to protect women from such violence.

Other feminists, known as sex workers’ rights feminists or human rights feminists, drew a distinction between forced prostitution, in which women are compelled to work in the sex industry through the use of violence, threats, debt bondage, or other forms of coercion, and voluntary prostitution, in which women themselves choose to engage in such work. Sex workers’ rights activists supported the freedom of women to choose to work as prostitutes, and they advocated for worker and migrant rights to improve prostitutes’ autonomy and working conditions. Since they saw prostitution as an acceptable form of work, they argued that counter-

\textsuperscript{301} Ibid., 62.
trafficking efforts should be focused on combating the exploitation or forced movement of workers in any field, not on abolishing the practice of prostitution.

There are, of course, varying versions of these perspectives, along with other approaches to human trafficking, which will be reviewed in more depth in the next chapter. For the purpose of understanding how these debates affected the distribution of funds to the Russian counter-trafficking movement, however, here I will focus on these two leading perspectives on trafficking.

As U.S. funding was distributed to NGOs in other countries, U.S. counter-trafficking activists monitored the use of these funds and the organizations to which they were given. A strong coalition of radical feminists and political conservatives in the United States that had supported the passage of the TVPA continued to emphasize the severity of the trafficking of women and children for prostitution and pressed the U.S. government to take an abolitionist stance in its counter-trafficking efforts abroad. One of the leading monitors of U.S. counter-trafficking funding to Russia was Donna Hughes, a professor of women’s studies at the University of Rhode Island and later a board member of the MiraMed Institute, who has published widely on the topic of human trafficking, including in the Russian context.

In fall 2002, Hughes wrote an article in the *National Review* claiming that the Angel Coalition, which had received U.S. funding during its first years of operation, subsequently had all of its grant applications rejected by the U.S. due to the Coalition’s abolitionist views. Hughes accused the U.S., because of its support through USAID to crisis centers such as Syostri, of promoting prostitution in
Russia.\textsuperscript{302} She writes that a “pro-prostitution mafia” consisting of the U.S. State Department, U.S.- and Dutch-funded NGOs, and the Union of Right Forces, a Russian political party, were conspiring to “muscle out the Angel Coalition and install their own NGOs.”\textsuperscript{303} Hughes argues that, since the Angel Coalition refused to go along with a plan to legalize prostitution in Russia, other NGOs refused to associate with it, representatives of the U.S. embassy in Moscow turned “hostile and accusatory,” and a “disinformation campaign was initiated against the work and reputation of the Angel Coalition.”\textsuperscript{304}

As a result of its alleged prejudice against the Angel Coalition, Hughes contends, the U.S. government rejected or cancelled all MiraMed proposals for funding in Spring 2001, and instead gave a $2 million grant to a “pro-prostitution” organization. Hughes’s critique was supported by an international coalition that condemned the distribution of funds to Russian organizations that did not claim an “abolitionist” perspective. A coalition of “human-rights and women’s-rights policy organizations, churches, and faith-based groups” wrote to President Putin exhorting him to take a stand against U.S. prostitution supporters.\textsuperscript{305} In addition, Johnson writes, many abolitionists in the United States sent letters to U.S. Congress members, and the U.S. embassy in Moscow was repeatedly called upon to explain itself.\textsuperscript{306}


\textsuperscript{303} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{304} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{305} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{306} Johnson (2009), 63.
While Hughes provided no evidence supporting her claims of a “pro-prostitution mafia” existing among U.S. officials, Johnson argues that there was also no evidence that any of the women’s NGOs supported the legalization of prostitution in Russia. At the same time, they were not clearly “abolitionist” organizations. In the Russian context, many women activists felt that they could not simply “import” foreign stances on the issue, and instead were developing their own views on the legalization of prostitution. Some remained open to discussing the matter, but none of the organizations Johnson studied had come out in support of legalization. In contrast to organizations that had not yet declared a position on the prostitution debate, the Angel Coalition and MiraMed professed a strict abolitionist viewpoint, which coincided with the views of the administration of George W. Bush, who was president of the United States at the time.

While the U.S. embassy and Russian women’s organizations defended themselves against Hughes’s charges, Johnson argues that the abolitionist campaign supported by Hughes and the TIP Office had more influence with the Bush administration. As part of the reauthorization of the TVPA legislation in 2003, the administration announced that the United States would stop funding groups perceived as encouraging sex work. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 mandated that an organization pledge “in either a grant application, a grant agreement, or both, that it does not promote, support, or advocate the legalization or

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307 Ibid., 63.
308 Ibid., 63.
practice of prostitution” in order to be eligible for U.S. funding. This required oath became known as the “anti-prostitution pledge.” The requirement was also included in the Global AIDS Act of 2003, which prohibited “international agencies from receiving funds unless they explicitly sign an oath that they do not support or condone prostitution in its many manifestations.”

In line with this new policy, the Bush administration came out in support of the Angel Coalition, due to the organization’s clear abolitionist stance.

Johnson argues that the controversy surrounding counter-trafficking organizations in Russia created a rift between many women’s crisis center leaders and the MiraMed/Angel Coalition. In the next round of U.S. counter-trafficking funding following this controversy, in 2004, the Angel Coalition won a grant of nearly half a million dollars to coordinate more shelters, while only one women’s crisis center affiliated with RACCW received a small grant, for $6,060. Johnson contends that, “Because of the lines that were drawn, the conflict led to the closing-off of most long-term, feminist women’s crisis centers from U.S. funds.”


312 Johnson (2009), 63.

313 Ibid., 63.

314 Ibid., 63.
In light of the limited sources of funding for the crisis center movement following the shift away from a focus on domestic violence and towards human trafficking, crisis centers searched for new ways to support themselves. By 2005, the Russian government was supporting twenty-two state-run centers, but independent crisis centers had few options. By the end of the year, eighteen crisis centers had closed.  

Remaining crisis centers turned to new tactics in an attempt to survive. To illustrate this trend, Johnson describes the tactics employed by RACCW.

Until 2001, the crisis center network of RACCW and the crisis center ANNA had been intermingled, with overlapping leadership and shared resources. However, USAID, which encourages clear accountability structures, criticized this arrangement and the organizations’ structures were split. RACCW lost access to the funding that the Ford Foundation had granted to ANNA, and it could no longer rely on the effective fundraising skills of ANNA leader Marina Pisklakova. In addition, Johnson writes that the prostitution controversy had closed off the possibility of receiving funds from USAID.

Fortunately, RACCW was able to find a new feminist partner, Women’s Aid, a British network of organizations against domestic violence, which received British and EU funding. In 2003, they, in collaboration with several other crisis centers, initiated a multi-year project targeting ethnic minorities and migrant communities in Russia. However, the project struggled. With open discussion of gender violence

315 Ibid., 64.
316 Ibid., 64.
317 Ibid., 64.
318 Ibid., 64.
still a new phenomenon in Russia and racism widespread even among the country’s leaders, few ethnic minorities were willing to turn to NGOs or the Russian state for help, or even to admit that domestic violence existed in their communities.\textsuperscript{319} Johnson writes, “In Russia, such an admission would legitimate common Russian assertions that ethnic minorities are to blame for society’s ills, especially for violence.” Johnson argues that the project’s approach “threatened to foster racist arguments that domestic violence was a problem \textit{only} for ethnic groups.”\textsuperscript{320} When the project came up for renewal, the EU concluded that RACCW had failed to meet its goals and terminated the grant. As a result, RACCW was left without any support. In 2005, it existed only on the unpaid work and small donations of its two leaders. In 2006, it lost its Moscow office. Likewise, independent crisis centers with whom RACCW had collaborated in Saratov, Kazan, Nizhny Tagil, Voronezh, and Barnaul lost their primary funding sources. As Johnson comments, “It was the end of the era of autonomous feminist mobilization against gender violence.”\textsuperscript{321}

One of the crisis centers with which RAACW had collaborated on the ethnic minorities project was Fatima. Fatima was located in Kazan, the capital of the Republic of Tatarstan, an ethnic homeland of approximately 48 percent mostly Muslim Tatars and 43 percent ethnic Russians.\textsuperscript{322} Although the crisis center movement had initially been dominated by those of Russian ethnicity, by 2004, centers had begun appearing in communities with large populations of ethnic

\textsuperscript{319} Ibid., 64.
\textsuperscript{320} Ibid., 64.
\textsuperscript{321} Ibid., 65.
\textsuperscript{322} Ibid., 65.
minorities. Since Kazan was recognized as a gateway for trafficking to Turkey, Fatima tried to obtain counter-trafficking funds, but only received small grants through RACCW. Fatima activists also collaborated with the Angel Coalition affiliate in Kazan. For example, for the one deported women who was staying at the AC-network safehouse, Fatima activists were providing psychological support and helped her search for employment and permanent housing. However, while the AC affiliate received foreign funds, Fatima activists worked for free. The small grants Fatima received through RACCW gave the organization some base of support, but once RACCW’s EU grant was terminated, Fatima was left with no financial support and its founders left the organization.

Some crisis centers turned to the Russian state for support. The feminist organization Women’s Alliance in Barnaul, which had been the only independent crisis center in a city with several hybrid centers, was also left with virtually no funding once RACCW’s EU grant ended. Their financial difficulties existed even as the organization was recognized by the U.S. edition of the women’s magazine *Marie Claire*, which, in 2004, declared staff member Elena Shitova one of the top ten women in the world. As the organization’s director Natalia Sereda searched for support, the regional administration made plans to open a government crisis center for women, and invited Sereda to become the center’s director. Sereda accepted the position, but on the condition that she be allowed to maintain her connection with the

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323 Ibid., 65.
324 Ibid., 65.
325 Ibid., 65.
326 Ibid., 66.
independent women’s movement, believing that the position would aid her in continuing to pursue her activist goals. Soon, however, Sereda became frustrated with the government center’s sole focus on social service provision, and she returned to the Women’s Alliance. As foreign funding became more difficult to obtain, many crisis centers followed this route of turning to the state for support or entering into “hybrid” partnerships that allowed them to draw upon state resources. Although this approach carries some benefits, activists must be cautious of shifts in the political environment that can affect the viability of government crisis centers and must remain mindful of their own goals to prevent being coopted into the government’s agenda.

Another route that women’s crisis centers took to remain operational was to align themselves with public universities. As many of the leaders of the Russian women’s movement had emerged from academia, Russian feminism has always had a strong connection to the academy. Some crisis centers, such as Moscow-based Yaroslavna, had been formed within universities, while others developed university ties later. Since these crisis centers received state-subsidized space and faculty time, they could survive with little external funding.

In 2005, one remaining crisis center within a university was Bridges of Mercy in the city of Arkhangelsk. Established in 1999 on the basis of a borrowed telephone line, the organization was officially registered when a senior professor at the university secured an office for the organization. With this stable operational base,

327 Ibid., 66.
328 Ibid., 66.
329 Ibid., 66.
330 Ibid., 66.
the organization was able to obtain some funding from USAID, NCRB, and other Nordic sources. In 2005, this external funding ended, and Bridges of Mercy was left with no financial resources.331 However, the organization survived due to the support of three professors who led the crisis center and university-provided office space. To give back to the university, Bridges of Mercy offered work experience to social work and psychology students.332 Although university affiliation may be the best option for long-term crisis center survival, Johnson argues that this route “represents a scaled-down feminist mobilization.”333 She writes that Bridges of Mercy’s feminist leaders were exhausted and most of its volunteers saw their work as a practical step to acquiring job experience.334 Without a feminist consciousness, Johnson argues, crisis center workers may simply reinforce neotraditional gender roles that assign women responsibility for peace in the family.335

Employing creative tactics in their search for support enabled many crisis centers to survive into the first decade of the twenty-first century. In fact, the number of organizations even grew in the first half of the decade. By 2004, RACCW had grown to 47 organizations as more NGOs and state hybrids applied for membership.336 By 2004, ANNA had also developed its own, overlapping, network of 121 organizations in Russia with which they had collaborated. Altogether in 2004,

331 Ibid., 66.
332 Ibid., 66-67.
333 Ibid., 67.
334 Ibid., 67.
335 Ibid., 67.
336 Ibid., 67.
there were 229 organizations in Russia that identified a focus on combating violence against women and/or trafficking in women, which Johnson writes may be the high point of the movement in terms of the number of organizations.\(^{337}\) She argues, however, that the large number of organizations may not paint an accurate portrait of the strength of the crisis center movement. Given the difficulty organizations had in finding support, most crisis centers could offer only limited services and their period of operation was short. Of the 229 organizations Johnson counted, only thirty-eight “had proven longevity by lasting more than a couple of years.”\(^{338}\) In addition, the quality of their services suffered, as organizations could not afford to pay high salaries, or sometimes any salaries at all. As a result, crisis centers had a high rate of turnovers and many were run completely by volunteers.\(^{339}\) In 2007, movement leaders counted only nineteen functioning women’s crisis centers remaining.\(^{340}\)

In her study of the crisis center movement, Johnson examined the success of centers in addressing different issues, namely, sexual assault, domestic violence, and human trafficking. She found that crisis centers were most effective at raising awareness and influencing changes in practices and policies on the issue of domestic violence, because the distribution of funds towards activism on this topic reflected the input of transnational feminists and was substantial enough to support sizeable initiatives.\(^{341}\) Activism against sexual assault was less successful because, while

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\(^{337}\) Ibid., 67.  
\(^{338}\) Ibid., 67.  
\(^{339}\) Ibid., 67.  
\(^{340}\) Ibid., 67.  
\(^{341}\) Ibid., 96-99.
transnational activists provided a great deal of networking and informational support in attempting to “blame and shame” the Russian government, donors did not back this up with funding.342 Meanwhile, activism against human trafficking was less effective because the international interventions were too aggressive and did not center women’s concerns.343 The Russian state made some nominal changes in its laws and practices to avoid international censure, but the heavy-handed approach of the U.S.-led campaign did not win Russia’s sympathies or encourage in-depth reform.

Johnson argues that a major reason for the differential outcomes in the campaigns against domestic violence and against human trafficking was that feminists did not come to a consensus on the issue of trafficking. The transnational feminist consensus on the issue of gender violence, by contrast, produced a neatly packaged cause that feminists could lobby to be included in the programs of international development agencies. When development agencies agreed to take on the issue of gender violence, many also welcomed the input of feminists in designing grant programs around the issue. As a result, these programs were designed to, and many times did, produce transformative and long-term improvements in how domestic violence was addressed by a wide array of institutions in Russian society. In centering women’s interests, these programs also sought to promote women’s right to self-determination.

On the issue of human trafficking, however, feminists devoted a great deal of energy to debating the legality of prostitution and did not present a unified front to

342 Ibid., 78-79.
343 Ibid., 124.
states or to the United Nations when they were passing initiatives on the topic.\textsuperscript{344} With little feminist influence in the U.S. camp, the legislation that the U.S. encouraged Russia to pass may even have made the situation worse “because of the punitive nature of the law, leaving trafficked women even more likely to be arrested and prosecuted.”\textsuperscript{345} Johnson argues that feminists should seek a role in designing and implementing U.S. counter-trafficking initiatives and, while acknowledging their differences in perspective on the issue of prostitution, should present a united front in pressing for programs that center women’s rights.\textsuperscript{346}

Another important argument that Johnson makes is in response to critics of the neoliberal democratization programs. These critics maintained that the drive to develop civil societies in post-Soviet countries legitimated the loss of welfare entitlements and the retreat of the state from its duty to protect its citizens, while placing the burden on NGOs to pick up the slack.\textsuperscript{347} In response to such concerns, Johnson contends:

\begin{quote}
The activism and impact of the women’s crisis centers in postcommunist Russia demonstrates how foreign-funded NGOs can become much more than instruments of neoliberalism…. Most activists were not ready to absolve the state of responsibility to address gender violence; instead, they were making
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{344} Ibid., 68.

\textsuperscript{345} Ibid., 135. See Hemment (2007), 12, for a similar argument as to how the reforms encouraged by international counter-trafficking campaigns “criminalize women without helping them.”

\textsuperscript{346} Johnson (2009), 156.

powerful arguments for the resumption of some previous state responsibility and the addition of new responsibilities.\textsuperscript{348}

Johnson emphasizes that, through their work in crisis centers, women activists were not just service providers, but were also advocates for change in Russian society. Russian state officials responded to the advocacy of these women by mimicking autonomous women’s crisis centers in the establishment of local and regional governmental crisis centers for women based on their model.\textsuperscript{349} This was true, Johnson notes, especially on the issue of domestic violence, for which foreign donors gave funding substantial enough to support the growth of the movement. It was less true, however, on the issue of sexual assault, for which crisis centers became “excuses for the police to do nothing” in response to charges of rape.\textsuperscript{350} Thus, Johnson concludes, substantial, long-term funding by donors distributed in ways that respect local cultures and privilege women’s concerns can lead to noticeable improvements in the status of women and in the socio-political systems in which they live.\textsuperscript{351}

\textit{4.4 Partnerships between Women’s Organizations and the Russian State: The Importance of Domestic Connections}

While Russian women were active participants in transnational feminist networks, ultimately, the main goal of most was to improve the social, economic, and political

\textsuperscript{348} Johnson (2009), 150.

\textsuperscript{349} Ibid., 68.

\textsuperscript{350} Ibid., 91-92.

\textsuperscript{351} Ibid., 10, 150.
situations of women living in Russia. As a result, in addition to feminist networking, Russian activists devoted a great deal of energy to working with Russian state officials on local, regional, and national levels. Although women’s organizations received little funding and little respect from the state in the early years of the post-Soviet period, by the first decade of the twenty-first century, many had succeeded in forming productive relations with governmental officials. These relations enabled women activists to provide services to greater numbers of individuals, exert influence on policymaking, and to receive state support for their activities. Working in cooperation with the state in hybrid organizations and coordinated community response systems, women activists helped to develop comprehensive models of support for victims of violence.

As noted, funding from the Russian state to women’s organizations was minimal, especially in comparison to the amounts offered by foreign donors.\(^{352}\) However, throughout the course of the post-Soviet period, many governmental bodies began to provide support to women’s NGOs. In her study of over 150 women’s organizations in 1998-1999, Henderson found that 22 percent of organizations had received support from local administrations, compared to 36 percent who had support from foreign donors and 32 percent who had support from local businesses.\(^{353}\) While foreign donors favored women’s groups that were seen as promoting “democracy” in Russia, local governments tended to give to “Soviet-era organizations such as groups uniting youth or the disabled.”\(^{354}\) In addition, whereas foreign funders often provided

\(^{352}\) See Henderson (2003), 23; Sundstrom (2006a), 143.

\(^{353}\) Henderson (2003), 51.
grants of sizable amounts to women’s groups, state bodies were more likely to offer in-kind support in the form of free office space or telephone lines.

However, some local governments did sponsor grant competitions.\textsuperscript{355} For example, the Moscow regional government started an annual grant competition in 1996 to grant funds for “socially meaningful” projects, mainly defined as projects providing social services to the population.\textsuperscript{356} In Yekaterinburg, a municipal grant competition was organized in 2000 with the input of NGO representatives and was designed to focus on two or three different issue areas each year.\textsuperscript{357} Some NGO activists complained, however, that local grant competitions were politically biased in favoring organizations with ties to the municipal administration.\textsuperscript{358}

 Particularly on the issue of violence against women, local governments often supported the growth of the women’s movement by establishing their own crisis centers or creating centers in cooperation with independent women’s groups (hybrid crisis centers). In St. Petersburg, for instance, lobbying by women activists led the city to open a shelter to provide assistance to “women in danger.”\textsuperscript{359} Although activists were involved in running the shelter, they found that cooperating with the city required several compromises on feminist principles. For example, the city was interested in helping only women of childbearing age, which led to age limits and

\textsuperscript{354} Ibid., 51.
\textsuperscript{355} Ibid., 52.
\textsuperscript{356} Sundstrom (2006a), 107.
\textsuperscript{357} Ibid., 116.
\textsuperscript{358} Ibid., 107-108.
\textsuperscript{359} Johnson (2009), 113.
eventually a requirement that sheltered women have children.\textsuperscript{360} Despite disagreements on such policies, the shelter was seen as a success in that it lasted over ten years on the government’s budget and fostered a new understanding of domestic violence among the city’s police.\textsuperscript{361} Likewise, in Izhevsk, the city administration founded a municipal shelter for women and children in collaboration with local activists. It also worked with activists to organize seminars and conferences on family violence, along with other themes.\textsuperscript{362} By 2005, there were 22 state-supported crisis centers for women throughout Russia, which Johnson argues demonstrates Russia’s “new commitment to women living in violent relationships.”\textsuperscript{363}

In many regions, the administration partnered with women’s organizations to develop coordinated community response systems to assist women victims of violence. The coordinated community response model, advocated by prominent TFNs and supported by a number of Western donors, calls on state criminal justice and human service agencies to work with women’s NGOs in developing comprehensive response systems for victims, which often involves training police, psychologists, and social workers on the issue of domestic violence.\textsuperscript{364} As mentioned, in Karelia, the protocol on cooperation between women’s NGOs and state

\textsuperscript{360} Ibid., 113.
\textsuperscript{361} Ibid., 114.
\textsuperscript{362} Sundstrom (2006a), 121.
\textsuperscript{363} Johnson (2009), 64, 108.
\textsuperscript{364} Ibid., 96, 111-112.
institutions improved the coordination of services for women experiencing domestic violence and increased public awareness of the issue.\textsuperscript{365}

In addition, foreign aid supported the development of coordinated community approaches to domestic violence in several other cities throughout Russia. These programs have seen concrete results as services to victims of violence have expanded. In Tomsk, for example, a coalition of Russian psychologists, physicians, journalists, law faculty, state social services, and gender experts with Amnesty International and Project Harmony developed a program in which the local legal clinic, state youth center, and gender center provided coordinated services for battered women.\textsuperscript{366} Additionally, Johnson highlights the creation of a working group in Barnaul that consisted of crisis center activists, social workers, administrative officials, health officials, educators, the head doctor of a private hospital, and others that established new patterns of collaboration between state and civic actors and the police in responding to domestic violence. The working group organized a number of roundtables on “Safety in the Family” that attracted widespread attention from both civic leaders and state officials. Following the roundtables, police began collecting statistics on domestic violence and a local journalist reported that domestic violence had become an issue of public concern in the city.\textsuperscript{367}

Initiatives on the issue of violence against women were also introduced at the federal level. Following the 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing, the Russian government implemented policies to comply with commitments they made to the

\textsuperscript{365} Ibid., 115.

\textsuperscript{366} Ibid., 112.

\textsuperscript{367} Ibid., 116.
international community; however, most of these policies were declaratory and carried no resources for implementation.\textsuperscript{368} For example, the National Action Plan on Improving the Status of Women in the Russian Federation and Promoting their Role in Society was approved in 1996, but no funds were allocated to implement the plan.\textsuperscript{369} Nonetheless, Russian activists reported that Russia’s participation in the Conference legitimated their claims on the state. Olga Samarina of the Department for Family, Women, and Children within the Russian Ministry of Labor and Social Development commented:

[The Conference allowed us to] have all of this passed as government policy, and in general to prove to the male majority located in all areas of power that it’s not nonsense coming from some separate department or a handful of women. It showed that this is definitely the direction in which the whole world is going.\textsuperscript{370}

Moreover, the contributions of Russian women’s organizations during preparations for and throughout the course of the Beijing Conference gained them the respect of state officials and facilitated further collaborative work.\textsuperscript{371}

In addition, connections made in Beijing led to the 1998 U.S.-Russian conference on domestic violence in Moscow attended by Hillary Clinton. This conference brought together governmental officials from all branches and thirty-two

\textsuperscript{368} Sundstrom (2006a), 86-87; Sperling (1999), 253.

\textsuperscript{369} Sundstrom (2006a), 98-99; Johnson (2009), 108; Sperling (1999), 253.

\textsuperscript{370} Sundstrom (2006a), 98. Samarina’s department was created as part of Russia’s preparation for the Beijing Conference and afterwards became a permanent department.

\textsuperscript{371} Sperling (1999), 252-253.
of Russia’s regions, leaders of the crisis center movement, and American feminists.\textsuperscript{372} The conference resolution declared that the government of the Russian Federation “recognizes the problem of violence against women, including domestic violence, as one of top priority, which is of special concern in Russia.”\textsuperscript{373}

In 2001, and again in 2005, the National Action Plan on women underwent revisions that called for more active cooperation on matters of violence in the family between the Ministry of Labor and Social Development, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the General Prosecutor’s Office. The revised plan also called for the establishment of state-supported shelters and crisis centers.\textsuperscript{374} These elements of the latter plans would bring about governmental action, in part reflecting the growing influence of the Russian women’s movement and crisis center movement.

As gender violence was increasingly accepted as an important issue in Russian society, crisis center leaders began to work with state officials on the federal level. For example, ANNA started to work with the Ministry of Labor and Social Development, carrying out joint research, training social workers, and establishing a governmental crisis center in Moscow.\textsuperscript{375} By 2004, the successor ministry, the Ministry of Health and Social Development, was collaborating with the RACCW, hosting a conference on coordination between crisis centers and social services in preventing violence in the family. ANNA, through the Ministry of Internal Affairs,

\textsuperscript{372} Johnson (2009), 107-108.
\textsuperscript{373} Ibid., 108.
\textsuperscript{374} Ibid., 108.
\textsuperscript{375} Ibid., 110.
also led police trainings. In addition, the parliamentary Committee on Women, Family, and Children conducted roundtables with relevant ministries and the leading Moscow crisis centers on the issue of domestic violence.

These are just some of the civil society-state partnerships established around gender violence on the federal level. Such efforts helped to push forward some reforms, although much work remained to be done. One sign of progress was that the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which oversees law enforcement, began to collect statistics on the relationship between the perpetrator and victim of a crime, which would make it possible to identify instances of domestic violence. However, there has been much criticism of police response to domestic violence from human rights groups. Groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented police inaction to charges of domestic violence, including refusals to accept complaints from women; a lack of mechanisms, such as protection orders, for immediate defense of victims; the rarity of prosecution and conviction in domestic violence crimes; and a lack of shelter space. In addition, despite the increased attention of state officials to the issue of violence against women, the state failed to pass a law to formalize their commitment to addressing domestic violence. Johnson puts Russia’s reforms into perspective:

Although there is no new domestic violence law—nor any substantial national reforms of criminal law—domestic violence is on the agenda of the Ministry

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376 Ibid., 110.
377 Ibid., 113.
378 Ibid., 113.
379 Ibid., 112.
of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Health and Social Protection, and several regional governments have passed regional laws or implemented new procedures to respond to domestic violence. Even though less than global feminists might hope, these changes have the potential for transforming the sex/gender hierarchy. Global experience suggests that gender revolutions move at a glacial pace and not in a linear fashion.\textsuperscript{380}

4.5 Summing Up: The Neoliberal Restructuring Process, Transnational Feminism, and Russian Women Activists

Global feminists, human rights activists, and like-minded academics have directed a great deal of criticism towards Western governments and intergovernmental institutions for pressing a neoliberal model of societal organization onto Russia that called for the retrenchment of the welfare state and the development of a civil society to take over the state’s former responsibilities. These neoliberal policies, critics point out, led to a decline of the living standards of most women and made them more vulnerable to poverty, sexual exploitation, and domestic violence.

As the division between the public and the private spheres was widening, women were increasingly pushed out of the “public” sectors of business and politics and encouraged to return to the more feminine “private” sphere to care for their families and communities, either through housework or involvement in civil society organizations.\textsuperscript{381} The growing concentration of women in the civic sector reflected the understanding of civic activism as the “housework” of politics, where women’s

\textsuperscript{380} Ibid., 117-118.

\textsuperscript{381} Hemment (2007), 51, 53-54.
issues, not important enough to merit the attention of male politicians, are addressed.\textsuperscript{382}

In addition, the strategy of foreign donors to encourage women activists to focus on the issue of gender violence instead of addressing the underlying economic problems further deflected attention from the structural processes subverting women’s status.\textsuperscript{383} As women were “empowered” to take on new responsibilities, questions on how Russia’s social and political system could be reformed to respond to women’s needs were neglected. The burden fell on women as individuals, or as “civic activists,” to solve the problem.\textsuperscript{384}

Moving beyond this critique, however, feminist scholars point out that Russian women activists were not just victims of the restructuring process. Instead, they were active agents constructing solutions to the challenges presented to them and negotiating with multiple parties to advance their causes. As scholars have noted, activists in all societies are faced with the task of navigating the obstacles and the opportunities in the political process as they work to achieve their goals. In the case of the Russian women’s movement, activists negotiated with both Russian state officials and foreign partners to bring about results they saw as most beneficial for their communities. When foreign resources became available for projects against gender violence, even though many activists did not see this as the most pressing issue, they took advantage of the funding and used it in ways that made sense in their local context. They drew upon international norms against gender violence and

\textsuperscript{382} Johnson (2006), 271; Sperling (2006), 175; Johnson (2009), 47.

\textsuperscript{383} Hemment (2007), 99-100.

\textsuperscript{384} Ibid., 52-3.
transnational feminist networks to lobby Russian governmental officials to devote more attention to the issue, which eventually led to the establishment of a successful crisis center movement supported by both international agencies and the Russian state. When foreign funding for projects against domestic violence declined, activists employed creative means to continue work on this topic, creating hybrid organizations with state bodies or assisting in the development of governmental crisis centers.

As with most forms of social or political activism, these state-society partnerships required compromises, which Russian women skillfully managed in order to make progress on issues important to them. While the neoliberal restructuring process may have pushed the state’s former responsibilities onto women activists, these same activists pushed some of these responsibilities back onto the state, this time with women’s concerns more central in their community response model. In some ways, then, the response of the Russian state to gender violence improved over the course of the post-Soviet era. Although responsibility for addressing violence against women is now shared between the state and the civic realm, Russian women activists have a larger influence in constructing the response to gender violence than they did when the state accepted full responsibility.
Chapter 5: Transnational Movements against Human Trafficking, 1800s to 2008

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the issue of human trafficking was a “hot button” issue for activists, lawmakers, and the general public alike. The most common estimates at the time held that between 600,000 to 800,000 persons were trafficked across international borders each year, with millions more trafficked within national borders.¹ These estimates also claimed that the majority of trafficking victims (approximately 80 percent) were women and girls. Some estimates were even higher, approximating that over a million persons were trafficked across international borders each year.² However, it is widely acknowledged that it is impossible to provide an accurate count of trafficking victims due to the clandestine nature of the problem. Therefore, these numbers are only a guess at the actual number of people affected by human trafficking. Despite the lack of significant and concrete knowledge on the problem, there was wide agreement that human trafficking was an atrocious crime that needed to be immediately attacked through the efforts of law enforcement, state legislators, migration officials, anti-trafficking NGOs, and international cooperation. However, as movements against human trafficking developed into the first decade of the twenty-first century, activists and officials gained experience and knowledge in fighting this crime and assisting its victims.

¹ This estimate was originally calculated by the United States Department of State, but afterwards was widely quoted by many scholars, NGOs, and the governments of other countries.

² In the late 1990s and early 2000s, International Organization for Migration estimates held that approximately 4 million persons were trafficked across international borders each year.
In this chapter, I review the development of the modern-day movement against human trafficking. I discuss the historical precedent of this movement in the campaigns against “white slavery” at the turn of the twentieth century, the decline in international attention to the issue in the middle decades of the century, and the emergence of an active counter-trafficking movement in the last decades of the twentieth century. As the global movement grew in strength in the 1990s, Russian activists and officials became aware of the problem occurring across their newly opened borders and made tentative efforts to address the issue. I examine the development of the Russian counter-trafficking movement between 1998 and 2008 and the relationship of this movement both to international networks against human trafficking and to Western programs promoting democracy and civil society in Russia.

Human trafficking is a complex issue connected to many other social problems such as global inequality, economic restructuring, organized crime, and gender discrimination, and as such has required a multidisciplinary response from practitioners and scholars. Experts have variously analyzed human trafficking as an issue of migration, national security, crime control, labor markets, human rights, women’s rights, or sexual morality, among other approaches. In this dissertation, with my focus on civil society organizations and women’s movements that advocate for the human rights of their constituents, I employ a feminist lens that attempts to center the perspectives and needs of trafficked persons, as counter-trafficking NGOs set out to do. Unfortunately, the voices of trafficking “victims” are under-represented in the literature and NGOs are not always successful in centering the perspectives of
their clients. However, as counter-trafficking NGOs seek to represent the interests of trafficked persons, as opposed to the interests of governments, transnational corporations, or law enforcement, my approach also seeks to better understand the situations of trafficked persons.

Thus far, the trafficking of women and children, especially for work in the sex industry, has received greater attention among activists and scholars than the trafficking of men. As a result, in reviewing the literature and outlining international efforts against human trafficking, this chapter will reflect the greater focus on the trafficking of women and children. However, it is unknown whether women and children are in fact trafficked in greater numbers than men. Hence, wherever possible, I include attention to the trafficking of men as well.

5.1 History of Activism against Human Trafficking and the “White Slave Trade”:

1800s-1970s

The practices of forcibly extracting labor from individuals and of forcibly transporting individuals from one geographical location to another date back to the beginning of the historical record.3 Likewise, movements condemning these practices also have a long history. The historical precedent of the modern movement against human trafficking was the movement against “white slavery” that emerged at the turn of the twentieth century. This movement, which flourished across North America and Europe, was organized to combat what was perceived to be the widespread abduction

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and transport of white women for prostitution.\textsuperscript{4} As industrialization, urbanization, and unequal distribution of wealth fueled increased migration of both women and men in the late nineteenth century, the growing number of women traveling abroad for work, including sex work, caused great anxiety among the middle-classes and elites and set off a racialized panic over the “White Slave Trade.”\textsuperscript{5} Similar to the contemporary movement against human trafficking, the movement against white slavery captured popular imaginations and garnered international attention.

Describing the scope of the movement against white slavery, Jo Doezema writes, “There were organizations world-wide devoted to its eradication; it received extensive coverage in the world’s media; was the subject of numerous novels, plays, and films; and led to a number of international conferences, new national laws, and a series of international agreements.”\textsuperscript{6}

The panic over white slavery at the turn of the twentieth century was rooted in North American and European nineteenth-century discourses on prostitution and on gendered international migration.\textsuperscript{7} Over the course of the nineteenth century, a category of persons known as “prostitutes” was constructed in both the United States and Europe and was perceived to require management by the middle class. Prior to


\textsuperscript{6} Doezema (2000), 25.

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 26; Kempadoo (2005), x.
the nineteenth century, prostitution was more often treated as just one of many
criminal offenses, and prostitutes were not seen to comprise a separate, morally
deviant group.⁸ Many women engaged in commercial sex work on a transitory and
fairly casual basis.⁹ For example, before the 1860s in Great Britain, “Prostitutes were
not particularly identified as a special class and were thus allowed some opportunity
for mobility out of prostitution. They were part of the community in which they grew
up.”¹⁰ Our contemporary understanding of prostitutes as a class of women standing
outside of moral society and in need of special attention and help thus began to form
out of these nineteenth-century discourses.

In Britain, the passage of the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1864, 1866, and
1869, which mandated “the medical examination of ‘prostitutes’ in England’s
garrison and port towns, to protect the armed forces,” was the first legal regulation of
a category of “prostitutes.”¹¹ Activist Josephine Butler, who organized the Ladies
National Association in Britain to campaign for the repeal of the Acts, saw the Acts
as sanctioning prostitution in order to serve the interests of men. The access of men
to prostitutes was ensured and their health protected, but the Acts did nothing to
uphold the rights of prostitutes or improve their safety in brothels. Instead of viewing
prostitutes as criminals who should be policed and punished, Butler saw them as

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¹⁰ Barry (1979), 20.
¹¹ Agustin, 110.
victims who needed to be rescued and rehabilitated. Butler noted that not only women working as prostitutes, but all women living in areas covered by the Acts were subject to their provisions. A statement issued by the Ladies National Association read:

Unlike all other laws for the repression of contagious diseases, to which both men and women are liable, these two [Acts] apply to women only, men being wholly exempt from their penalties. The law is ostensibly framed for a certain class of women, but in order to reach these, all women residing within the district where it is in force are brought under the provisions of the Acts. Any woman can be dragged into court, and required to prove that she is not a common prostitute.

Historian Judith Walkowitz argued that the Acts “were designed to force prostitutes to accept their status as public women by destroying their private identities and associations with the poor working-class community.” Once identified, prostitutes could be either regulated by the state or “saved” by middle-class women and religious groups. In England, as in other countries such as France, Australia, and Russia, responses to prostitution were based on the “principle of incarceration: brothel, hospital, ‘home’ and prison were all institutions to which women were to be

12 Doezema (2000), 27.
13 Barry (1979), 15.
14 Ibid., 16.
15 Judith Walkowitz, quoted in Barry (1979), 20.
confined, providing a structure for women believed to lack one." Social reformers and philanthropists, including many middle-class women, set up penitentiaries to offer shelter and rehabilitation to “fallen women.”

The movement for female liberation from “sexual slavery” spearheaded by Butler played a major role in bringing about the repeal of the Contagious Disease Acts in 1886. However, by this time, the conditions for prostitutes had worsened and their status as a “special class” of public women had been solidified. As Barry writes:

Separated from their neighborhoods into distinct red-light districts and brothels made identification of the women as prostitutes more specific and therefore their ability to leave prostitution much more difficult. In the early years of the Acts, most prostitutes were young and single; by the late nineteenth century the rigidifying of this social role resulted in women’s remaining in prostitution longer. Their social mobility had been effectively curtailed.17

While efforts to regulate prostitution through the Acts were a leading force behind the creation of this special class of women, both Barry and Agustin suggest that the movement against regulation also played a role. Barry notes that, although Butler initiated the movement against the regulation of prostitution, the movement was later taken over by purity crusaders more interested in “protecting women’s virtue and preserving the family” than safeguarding women’s rights.18 While Butler had worked

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16 Agustín, 122. For a discussion of shelters for “downtrodden” women run by philanthropic groups in Russia in the late 1800s and early 1900s, see R. C. Elwood, Inessa Armand: Revolutionary and Feminist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 30-32.


18 Ibid., 28.
to effect change in state structures and destroy sexist double standards, purity crusaders focused on the need to purify women and keep them within the confines of Victorian morality. In the judgment of purity crusaders, women who did not meet their standards of morality had to be identifiable and separated from virtuous middle-class society.\textsuperscript{19}

In addition to campaigning against the regulation of prostitution in England, the coalition of women’s liberation activists and religious moralists also condemned the traffic of English women and girls to Continental Europe, a phenomenon that came to their attention around 1880.\textsuperscript{20} As the purity crusaders increasingly dominated the movement, they applied their moral standards to the “victims” of international trafficking as well. With a paternalistic approach, the purity crusaders constructed the “madonna-whore standard, condemning all prostitutes except the innocent and pure victims.”\textsuperscript{21} Barry argues that the influence of the religious moralists also led to an increase in sensationalist accounts of trafficking, which described “sweet, innocent young things being chloroformed and dragged off to foreign brothels.”\textsuperscript{22} These sensationalized, and likely often fictionalized, accounts cast doubt among many as to the actual occurrence of trafficking in women. However, historians have documented the migration of significant numbers of British women for prostitution as far back as the 1860s.\textsuperscript{23}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[19] Ibid., 31.
\item[20] Barry (1979), 21, 24.
\item[21] Ibid., 30.
\item[22] Ibid., 31.
\end{footnotes}
Thus, along with discourses on prostitution, discourses on gendered international migration also helped to shape the emerging international movement against white slavery. The wave of large-scale international migration that took off in the mid-nineteenth century included women who were migrating for sex work of various kinds. Eileen Scully argues that the demand for sex workers was augmented by the migration of large numbers of single males.\textsuperscript{24} As Kamala Kempadoo explains:

Predominately poor and working-class men and women crossed borders, clandestinely or not, to find new futures, enduring systems of bonded labor and indentured servitude that positioned and maintained them as cheap, disposable labor forces. Women sought to independently move or were moved through organized channels—commonly as sexual and domestic partners—servicing and reproducing the migrant workforce, sometimes obtaining new freedoms through non-marital sexual relations and work that could include prostitution.\textsuperscript{25}

By the mid-1890s, established routes for women seeking to travel for sex work existed throughout Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and the Americas.\textsuperscript{26} While some women migrated and engaged in prostitution voluntarily, others faced various forms


\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 75.

\textsuperscript{25} Kempadoo (2005), x.

\textsuperscript{26} Scully, 82.
of coercion. Often coercive procurement of women increased as trafficking routes increased in scope and profitability.\textsuperscript{27}

As activists and government officials in North America and Western Europe became increasingly aware of women’s migration for sex work in the 1890s and early-twentieth century, the concepts of prostitution and trafficking became linked and inspired a series of international meetings and conventions. The term “white slavery,” which had previously been used by activists to refer to the regional traffic of English women to Belgium and France, was internationalized and used to describe the entire phenomenon of travel for sex work across national borders.\textsuperscript{28} Barry writes:

While the term was initially meant to distinguish the practice from nineteenth-century black slavery, it had immediate appeal to racists who could and did conclude that the efforts were against an international traffic in white women. So in addition to being sweet, innocent, and young, victims were also coming to be seen only as white, despite the evidence that the traffic included black, brown, and yellow women. The term eventually embodied all the sexist, classist, and racist bigotry that was ultimately incorporated within the movement dominated by religious morality.\textsuperscript{29}

As the furor over “white slavery” increased, the first international conference on trafficking was organized in Paris in 1895.\textsuperscript{30} In 1899, another international conference was held in London, the hotbed of the growing panic over white slavery.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 75, 78.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 84.

\textsuperscript{29} Barry (1979), 32.

Scully argues that it was at the London conference that the campaign against white slavery “burst into public discourse, as conferees learned of a European-wide network of procurers and brothels and established an international bureau to coordinate among national committees and disseminate propaganda.”

The first international convention against white slavery was drafted in Paris in 1902 at a conference arranged by the French government. This convention, the International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, was passed at a meeting of representatives of sixteen, mostly European, states in Paris in 1904; soon afterwards, it was signed by a number of these states. The convention established white slavery as a juridical concept in international law and required states to collect and exchange information on “the procuring of women or girls for immoral purposes abroad,” to identify victims, to supervise employment agencies, and to oversee railway stations, ports of embarkation, and travel routes. However, it contained no provisions on the punishment of traffickers, which limited the application of the convention.

Recognizing the weakness of the 1904 Convention, many of the signatory states met again in Paris in 1910 to draft the International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic. The 1910 Convention took a stronger stance in urging states to punish traffickers and expanded the definition of trafficking.

31 Scully, 84.
32 Ibid., 96; Doezema (2002), 23.
33 Scully, 96; Long, 20; Barry (1979), 32-33.
Whereas the 1904 Convention focused on protecting women who had “suffered abuse or compulsion” in their recruitment into prostitution, the 1910 Convention made trafficking punishable regardless of a women’s consent. Article 1 of the 1910 Convention reads:

Whoever, in order to gratify the passions of another person, has procured, enticed, or led away, *even with her consent*, a woman or girl under age, for immoral purposes, shall be punished, notwithstanding that the various acts constituting the offence may have been committed in different countries.

Signatory states were urged to pass new laws or amend existing legislation to facilitate the punishment of traffickers.

One perspective on this convention holds that, with the addition of the phrase “even with her consent,” the 1910 Convention marks the beginning of the abolitionist tradition in international law. Prostitution was held to be inherently immoral and thus all migrant prostitutes were seen to be victims of traffickers. However, another perspective argues against viewing the 1910 Convention as an abolitionist document as it did not address the keeping of brothels or domestic prostitution. Prostitution occurring within national borders continued to be subject to domestic, not international, law; the Convention did not address cases in which women were held against their will in brothels, or for the matter, the larger issue of the legality of prostitution.

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35 *International Agreement for the Suppression of the “White Slave Traffic,”* May 18, 1904.


37 See Obokata, 14-15; Doezema (2002), 23.
In the United States, the issue of “white slavery” had not captured the same degree of interest as it had in Europe; thus, the United States government was slower to take action and was hesitant to sign the European conventions. American delegates attended the 1899 London conference but “opted not to bring home with them the ‘white slave trade’ phenomenon.”38 The United States did not accede to the 1904 convention until 1908. Until 1909-1910, migratory prostitution received only minor attention in the United States, addressed mainly as an issue of law and order by the government. However, the increasing influence of purity campaigners and social activists throughout the decade put pressure on the United States to sign the expanded 1910 Convention. Ultimately, the United States declined to sign the convention due to concerns over its constitutionality and issues of federal-state separation.39 Instead, acting in compliance with the 1904 Convention, the United States passed the 1910 Mann Act, which made it a felony to knowingly transport a girl or woman across state lines or abroad for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery or other immoral purpose.40

Noting the ambiguity of the term “immoral purpose,” Barry argues that the Mann Act demonstrates the extent to which the purity movement had succeeded in becoming guardians of “women’s virtue.” She writes that “‘immoral purposes’ could and would eventually be defined by the courts according to prevailing male definitions of morality.”41 Scholars find that the Act in fact penalized the behavior of

38 Scully, 85.
39 Ibid., 86.
40 Ibid., 86; Barry (1979), 33.
41 Barry (1979), 33.
prostitutes more so than the actions of procurers. Women arrested as prostitutes were commonly detained in harsh conditions, uninformed of their rights, and women with illegal immigration status were deported. Thus, in many cases, there was no “victim” available to testify against procurers. Additionally, the ambiguity of the law allowed it to be used for political purposes to prosecute unpopular persons. Doezema notes that “prostitutes’ husbands and boyfriends were targeted as pimps, especially if they were black or ‘foreign.’” Thus, instead of curtailing prostitution or protecting sex workers from the “white slavers” who were said to control them, the Mann Act penalized the very individuals it claimed to defend. Doezema points out the irony that “The original, emancipatory thrust of the abolitionist movement, dedicated as it was to decreasing state control over poor women, ironically evolved to support a ‘social purity’ agenda that would give the state new repressive powers over women and subaltern men.”

By 1910, the white slavery panic incited by London purity groups had taken “full hold of the American imagination.” Scully writes: “Lurid stories of sullied white womanhood and organized syndicates linking major cities helped bring on board southerners who otherwise would have argued states’ rights in the face of a

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43 Zakhari, 127.


46 Scully, 86.
broad expansion of federal police powers.”47 In both North America and Europe, an essential part of the campaign against white slavery was the need to create sympathy for its victims.48 Doezema explains:

The “innocence” of the victim was established through a variety of rhetorical devices: by stressing her youth/virginity; her whiteness; and her unwillingness to be a prostitute. The “innocence” of the victim also served as a perfect foil for the “evil trafficker”; simplifying the reality of prostitution and female migration to a melodramatic formula of victim and villain.49 Doezema argues that while the impetus for the white slavery movement was the mass migration of thousands of women from Europe, including Russia, between 1860 and 1914, the success of the movement lie in organizers’ ability to rouse the public’s emotions to a fever pitch.50 The sordid images and sensationalized stories generated by the “white slavery myth” gained more support for the movement against white slavery than abolitionism ever could.51

Although rooted in an actual social phenomenon, the sensationalism of the campaigns against white slavery obscured the dynamics of the issue and the true interests behind the campaigns. While the movement against white slavery was ostensibly about the protection of women, Doezema argues that “to a large extent, the

47 Ibid., 86.
49 Ibid., 28.
50 Ibid., 27.
51 Ibid., 39.
welfare of the ‘white slaves’ was peripheral to the discourse.”

Instead, the movement was rooted in deeper fears over “women’s growing independence, the breakdown of the family, and loss of national identity through the influx of immigrants.” The movement also reflected racial anxieties, casting white women as the victims of dark-skinned foreign men, a category that at the time included Jews.

In contrast to this imagined narrative, Scully maintains that the majority of trafficking victims were women of color from various regions of the world, but mostly from colonial areas. Additionally, the extreme tactics described in published reports of traffickers deceiving women and trapping them in a life of forced prostitution made it difficult for the public to recognize elements of trafficking in less extreme cases.

Ultimately, the white slave panic reinforced the madonna/whore standard that required victims to be white and pure, while women who exercised some agency in becoming prostitutes were seen as social deviants or criminals.

Abolitionist feminists had been key in jumpstarting the movement against white slavery, both in the United States and Western Europe, but lost control over the movement as religious and social purity organizations gained influence. While Butler and some fellow feminists condemned the repressive tactics of the social purists, who viewed all (free) prostitutes as immoral women, other feminists joined

52 Ibid., 40.
53 Ibid., 40.
54 Ibid., 29-30.
55 Scully, 87.
56 Barry (1979), 33-35.
the purity campaigners in upholding an idealist standard of feminine morality. In her 1912 book, *A New Conscience and an Ancient Evil*, Jane Addams demonstrates the ambiguity of the abolitionist feminist perspective toward prostitution. Addams argues forcefully against police harassment of prostitutes, but portrays prostitutes as deserving a share of the blame for their fate. She writes:

> Although economic pressure as a reason for entering an illicit life has thus been brought out in court by the evidence in a surprising number of cases, there is no doubt that it is often exaggerated; a girl always prefers to think that economic pressure is the reason for her downfall, even when the immediate causes have been her love of pleasure, her desire for finery, or the influence of evil companions.\(^{58}\)

Writings such as these illustrate the uncertainty of the feminist position toward prostitution. Many feminists refrained from criticizing prostitutes, but at the same time expressed a “moralistic, middle-class urge” to protect the virtue of young, innocent women from the evils of this line of work.\(^{59}\) In contrast to those who focused on the sexual immorality of prostitutes, however, were feminists such as Butler, Christabel Pankhurst, and Emma Goldman, who focused on the economic and political conditions that fueled the prostitution industry.\(^{60}\)

The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 slowed the momentum of the international movement against white slavery, as the world’s attention shifted onto other issues and migration across national borders decreased. After the war, however,  

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\(^{58}\) Jane Addams, quoted in Doezema (2002), 23.  

\(^{59}\) Doezema (2002), 23.  

\(^{60}\) Barry (1979), 36-37.
anti-white slavery groups coalesced once again and pushed for further measures to combat the trafficking of women. Although European emigration declined significantly following the war, regional and local prostitution expanded due to the continued military presence in much of Europe. Additionally, while some trafficking routes dating to the pre-war period were less traveled, “the postwar reopening of commerce and frontiers provided fertile ground for a dramatic increase in the volume and intensity of the traffic in women and children.”

In 1920, the newly established League of Nations took on the responsibility of combating traffic in persons. By this time, the term “white slavery” had fallen out of favor due to its racial connotations and “traffic in women and children” became the preferred term that would be used in League of Nations, and later United Nations, reports and conventions. In 1921, the International Conference on Traffic in Women and Children was held in Geneva, which led to the Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children. This Convention expanded upon previous international conventions to include trafficking in boys and prescribed three approaches to combat trafficking: prosecuting persons who traffic children; licensing and supervising employment agencies; and protecting migrant women and children. Scully writes that “optimism and expansiveness” characterized early League

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61 Scully, 87.
62 Ibid., 88.
63 Ibid., 88; Barry (1979), 32.
64 Scully, 88, 97.
65 Ibid., 97; Long, 20.
proclamations on the subject. Delegates to the 1921 conference envisioned “a comprehensive, multilateral attack on public and private fronts, to ‘vanquish this powerful evil.’”

Despite such optimism, the League of Nations did not have the authority to force compliance with its conventions. In its efforts to fight trafficking, the League relied on self-reporting by signatories, annual conferences, and travelling commissions to investigate reports of trafficking. The United States, which had become a leader in the movement against trafficking in the years prior to World War I, deferred to the League of Nations after the war as immigration declined and human trafficking was seen as a “foreign” problem.

Scully contends that the modern-day dismissal of early twentieth-century counter-trafficking campaigns as “paternalist, elitist, [and] racist” overlooks the wide diversity of approaches to fighting trafficking that existed in the period between the two World Wars. Then, as is true today, some campaigners focused their efforts on long-term solutions and structural transformations to improve women’s status and job opportunities, while others attended to the more immediate problems of tightening immigration controls, punishing traffickers, and protecting victims. In an attempt to protect women, delegates to the 1921 conference proposed such measures as “special passport requirements for women; bans on women traveling alone; registration with

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66 Scully, 88.
67 Ibid., 88, including quote by League of Nations.
68 Ibid., 88.
69 Ibid., 90; Long, 20.
70 Scully, 90-91.
local police when working abroad; [and] forced repatriation and retraining of prostitutes.”71 However, women’s groups throughout Europe opposed measures that sought to “protect” women by restricting their freedoms. Instead, they called for tactics targeting procurers.

The League of Nations sponsored a second convention, The International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women, which was adopted in 1933. This convention built upon the conventions of 1910 and 1921 and required signatory states to punish any person who, “in order to gratify the passions of another person, has procured, enticed or led away even with her consent, a woman or girl of full age for immoral purposes to be carried out in another country.”72 As with the previous treaties, the 1933 Convention focused on the trafficking of women across national boundaries and neglected trafficking and prostitution occurring domestically. Tom Obokata argues that both conventions sponsored by the League of Nations were ineffective “mainly because they continued to treat prostitution as a matter of domestic concern, and therefore did not oblige States to abolish the practice.”73 Recognizing that the existence of brothels was one factor fueling international trafficking, the League of Nations prepared a draft convention in 1937 that promoted the international abolishment of brothels and called for the punishment of brothel owners and managers.74 This draft convention was to be concluded in 1940, but the

71 Ibid., 92.
73 Obokata, 16.
74 Ibid., 16.
outbreak of World War II interrupted these plans and work on the convention was abandoned.

In the final analysis, Obokata and Scully both argue that pre-World War II efforts to combat human trafficking achieved few of their objectives. Although evidence suggests that international trafficking did decrease, this was due to reduced migration and other socio-economic factors, rather than the influence of anti-trafficking campaigns. In locations where the number of foreign prostitutes decreased, local women simply took their place. A reason for the ineffectiveness of anti-trafficking campaigns, Scully maintains, was the lack of a “global prohibition regime.” Unlike the movement against the African slave trade, which achieved a consensus as to the evil and illegality of this trade, campaigns against trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution achieved no such consensus. Although the abolitionist position had a clear influence on international law, the legality of prostitution remained an issue of debate in many states and among anti-trafficking campaigners. Even feminists did not voice a common perspective as to the meaning and morality of prostitution. Scully argues that a lack of consensus on the issue, combined with the ease of concealing trafficked women and the durability of demand, prevented campaigners from effectively halting the international procurement of women for prostitution and the practice continued for years to come.

75 Scully, 92.

76 Ibid., 92.

77 Ibid., 92-93.
Following the onset of World War II in 1939, troop deployment hampered international efforts to control prostitution. However, most women migrating for work in prostitution remained in local or regional areas. After the war, the newly formed United Nations assumed responsibility for international efforts against human trafficking and took over the reporting functions previously performed by the League of Nations. Figures collected in 1948-1950 show that most routes travelled by women were relatively short in distance, “for example, back and forth from Syria and Lebanon to Palestine/Israel; between Vietnam and Cambodia; Costa Rica and Panama; Somaliland and Aden; France and Poland; between and among Bulgaria, Turkey, Iran, Germany, Greece, Yugoslavia; and the United States, Canada, and Mexico.” Scully argues that most postwar traffic in women was generated by standing troops.

In 1949, in its first major action in the fight against human trafficking, the United Nations sponsored the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, which would serve as the primary international instrument on human trafficking for the next fifty years. The 1949 Convention built upon the 1937 draft convention and consolidated and superseded the previous international agreements of 1904, 1910, 1921, and 1933. The Convention’s preamble lays out the premises upon which it was written, stating that:

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78 Ibid., 93.
79 Ibid., 93.
80 Ibid., 93.
81 Ibid., 93.
[P]rostitution and the accompanying evil of the traffic in persons for the purpose of prostitution are incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person and endanger the welfare of the individual, the family, and the community.  

Borrowing much of the language used in previous international treaties, Article 1 of the 1949 Convention reads:

The Parties to the present Convention agree to punish any person who, to gratify the passions of another:
1) Procures, entices or leads away, for purposes of prostitution, another person, even with the consent of that person;
2) Exploits the prostitution of another person, even with the consent of that person.

While sharing some similarities to previous conventions, the 1949 Convention broke new ground by using the gender-neutral “persons” in place of “women and children” and by explicitly linking trafficking and prostitution, as seen in the title. It no longer defined trafficking as occurring solely across national borders, which made local and regional trafficking punishable under the standards of the Convention. In addition, the 1949 Convention also called upon states to punish persons involved in the running of brothels within their borders. Thus, while previous conventions had taken care not to step into domains governed by domestic law, the provision against

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83 Ibid., 136.

84 Obokata, 16-17.
brothel owners demonstrates that international law was moving closer to a standard of abolitionism. However, the Convention did not go so far as to require states to outlaw prostitution altogether. Obokata writes that this omission was due, in part, to a fear that laws prohibiting prostitution would only drive prostitution further underground and would be used to penalize prostitutes rather than clients.\(^{85}\)

Along with calling for the punishment of procurers and brothel owners, the 1949 Convention also encouraged states to take measures to prevent trafficking, rehabilitate trafficking victims, and ensure oversight of points of entry into the country and transportation routes to identify possible victims. In addition, it requested that states establish centers to coordinate investigations on trafficking and develop mechanisms of communication with other states in order to exchange information on trafficking cases. Despite the scope of the Convention and the high moral ground it claimed, it carried only weak enforcement mechanisms and relied on signatory states to submit reports on domestic developments.\(^{86}\) Malka Marcovich argues that many states that signed the Convention did not adhere to its provisions and some even passed laws that contradicted the standards of the Convention.\(^{87}\) At the same time, as the leading international instrument on human trafficking for fifty years, the 1949 Convention served as a model for many domestic laws against

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\(^{85}\) Ibid., 17.


\(^{87}\) Marcovich, 8.
trafficking. As of 2012, 82 states were parties to the Convention; the United States was not among them.

After the adoption of the 1949 Convention, the issue of human trafficking faded from public attention for the next several decades and did not appear again on the international agenda until the 1970s and 1980s. During the height of the Cold War following World War II, labor and migration were largely regulated by state governments. As Barry pointed out in 1984, “Since [1949], except for a few efforts from some individuals and a few non-governmental organizations, the United Nations has virtually abandoned the problem, allowing the traffic in women to become invisible once again.” Despite the lack of attention to the issue mid-century, human trafficking and migration for sex work continued. In an international survey presented to the United Nations in 1966, Dr. Mohamed Awad, U.N. Special Rapporteur, reported that slavery was still a major world problem and proposed that the United Nations establish a committee to address this problem. His proposal found little support, however, and the issue again disappeared from the international agenda.

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90 Kempadoo (2005), xi.


92 See Barry (1979), chapter 4.

93 Ibid., 62-63.
Barry notes that the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) was also aware of trafficking in women during the middle decades of the twentieth century and produced reports on the topic for the United Nations; however, these reports were not made available to the public. After considerable effort, Barry was able to obtain a copy of a report produced by INTERPOL in 1974, which described routes that women travelled, voluntarily or involuntarily, for sex work. These routes included South American, primarily Argentine, women, traveling to Puerto Rico, the European Mediterranean countries, or the Middle East; French women and South American women traveling to European countries such as Luxembourg and Germany; women from Europe traveling to African countries such as the Ivory Coast and Senegal; and women from Thailand and the Philippines traveling to other countries.

The INTERPOL report, which was based on a survey of 69 countries, acknowledged that data on human trafficking was incomplete and therefore its findings should be treated with caution, but concluded that:

There are hardly any cases of traffic in women in which the victims have been forcibly kidnapped in one country and taken to work as prostitutes in another country. Nearly always the women concerned are apparently consenting—most of them have already worked as prostitutes in the country in which they are recruited. However, there are a certain number of naïve women who are attracted by the promises made to them by some employment agencies or by organizers of artistic tours, etc., and who eventually find themselves in a

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94 Ibid., 58-59.
95 Ibid., 59-60.
situation where they are forced into prostitution and may finally think that this is the only way they can earn their living.\textsuperscript{96}

Indeed, Barry argues that the reason that human trafficking was abandoned as an international issue mid-century is that the United Nations, INTERPOL, and many international human rights organizations “came to accept the popular misconception that most prostitution is voluntary work and therefore does not constitute a fundamental violation of women’s human rights.”\textsuperscript{97} Thus, the abolitionist position had begun to lose its hold in the international arena. However, in 1974, the year this INTERPOL report was submitted, the United Nations formed a Working Group on Slavery, which constituted one of the first actions taken in the revival of the international movement against human trafficking in the final decades of the twentieth century.

\section*{5.2 The International Movement against Human Trafficking: 1970s to 2000}

Beginning in the 1970s, several factors contributed to the reemergence of interest in the issue of human trafficking. At first the issue garnered the attention of only small groups of activists and officials; eventually, however, campaigns against human trafficking grew to comprise one of the largest international movements of the early twenty-first century. In this section, I chart the development of the modern-day movement against human trafficking, from the seeds planted in the 1970s to the popularization and diversification of the movement at the turn of the twenty-first century.


\textsuperscript{97} Barry (1984b), 21.
In the 1970s, economic globalization policies, an increase in international tourism and migration, the expansion of the sex industry, and the growth of women’s movements all contributed to a rekindling of interest in the trafficking of women. The effects of economic globalization policies on national economies and on changing gender roles in developing countries led many women to migrate in search of work.\(^98\) While overall labor migration was increasing, the percentage of women among labor migrants also grew, and scholars began to refer to the “feminization” of migration.\(^99\) In a globalizing world characterized by the growth of the service sector in industrialized countries and the move of manufacturing jobs to developing countries, women came to be seen as the “ideal worker,” flexible and compliant enough to fulfill jobs in both sectors.\(^100\)

As globalization was restructuring economic relations between nations and stimulating an increase in migration, the sex industry was also expanding.\(^101\) Arguing that prostitution was “industrialized” beginning in the 1970s, Barry writes:

Prostitution has overtaken populations of women, especially in newly industrializing economies…. The industrialization of sex has produced a


\(^99\) Tiuriukanova (2005), 98.

\(^100\) Ibid., 98; Agustin, 24.

multibillion-dollar global market in women, at home and abroad, in highly organized trafficking and in the most diffused, informal arrangements. 102

The “industrialization” of prostitution, Barry contends, was the result of the recruitment of women for military prostitution, the development of tourist industries in developing countries, and export-oriented economic development policies. The first cases of “trafficking in women” to receive attention in the 1970s concerned women working in military camps or in the tourist industry in Southeast Asia. Troops stationed in Southeast Asia during World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War supported the growth of an extensive sex industry in the region. In particular, U.S. troops fighting in the Vietnam War helped to fuel the beginning of sex tourism in Thailand and the Philippines as they took their “rest and recreation” breaks in these locations. 103 As troops withdrew from the region following the end of the Vietnam War, the sex tourism industry grew to attract a steady stream of clients for sex businesses. 104 At the same time, practices of military prostitution also continued as significant numbers of troops remained in the area.

James Petras and Tienchai Wongchaisuwan describe how the convergence of economic globalization policies and military interests spurred the growth of the sex industry in Thailand:


103 Ibid., 132.

The “success” of the sex industry is based on a “special relation” of shared interests among a complex network of military leaders, police officials, business tourist promoters, godfathers and pimps. At the international level, airline and hotel chains have worked closely with the local business-military elite to promote the sex-tourist industry. The World Bank’s support for the open economy and export oriented development strategy results in financial support of tourism.105

Kempadoo asserts that concern “with the social impacts of the reconstruction and development of the Southeast Asian region in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the continued stationing and servicing of U.S. military troops in the region” was the spark that first led feminists to “rediscover” the issue of trafficking in women.106 Around the same time, feminists also became aware of forced prostitution in other areas of world, and the issue of trafficking gradually made its way onto the agenda of the second-wave feminist movement.

A major publication that helped to reignite the Western feminist movement against trafficking in women was Kathleen Barry’s 1979 book *Female Sexual Slavery*. Writing from a radical feminist perspective, Barry cites practices of rape, pornography, prostitution, and the trafficking of women around the world as just some examples of the ways that men have sexually “colonized” women. As one of the first publications to address trafficking in women from a feminist perspective in many years, she documents that the practice of trafficking in women continued throughout the twentieth century and addresses reasons for the invisibility of the issue

106 Kempadoo (2005), xi.
at the time of her writing. Namely, Barry discusses the prevailing belief among authorities mid-century that prostitution is non-exploitative and that women enter the profession by choice, and the ensuing conclusion that such women are not deserving of the same protections as “moral” women. She writes that such beliefs served the interests of authorities, whether it be those who profited directly from the prostitution industry or those who resisted change to the status quo.107

Barry credits two developments with helping to put prostitution and trafficking in women back onto the U.S. feminist agenda: the growth of the movement against wife battery in the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which provided a model for understanding the victimization of women, and the proliferation of pornography in the 1970s, which brought illustration of the victimization of women into the lives of average Americans.108 The publication of *Female Sexual Slavery*, along with Barry’s activism against trafficking in women, inspired increased attention to the issue among Western feminists, and Barry became a leader in a burgeoning international movement against trafficking.

Feminist interest in the issue of trafficking in women grew alongside, and sometimes as part of, campaigns against violence against women as a whole. In the 1980s, violence against women would become a leading international feminist issue. However, in the 1970s, campaigns against the various forms of bodily injury to women remained local phenomena, and the issues were not prominent in international meetings of women. Before the concept of “violence against women” came into

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107 Barry (1979), xi, 8-9.

108 Ibid., xi-xii.
being, these disparate issues were not seen as connected. Political scientists Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink write:

What existed first was not the general category “violence against women” but separate activist campaigns on specific practices—against rape and domestic battery in the United States and Europe, female genital mutilation in Africa, female sexual slavery in Europe and Asia, dowry death in India, and torture and rape of political prisoners in Latin America. It was neither obvious nor natural that one should think of female genital mutilation and domestic abuse as part of the same category. The category “violence against women” had to be constructed and popularized before people could think of these practices as the “same” in some basic way.109

The composite concept of “violence against women” as a unifying theme for international feminists would grow out of the UN Conferences on Women in the 1980s. Prior to the first UN World Conference on Women in Mexico City in 1975, “discrimination” and “equality,” not “violence against women,” had served as the master frames for understanding women’s issues both for Western feminists and in the UN system. Violence against women was not a major topic at the 1975 conference, and indeed scholars note that this conference “disintegrated into a heated debate among feminists from Western countries who stressed discrimination, and women from the developing world who stressed what they considered the more pressing issues of development and social justice that affected both men and

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women.”\textsuperscript{110} In the document adopted at the conference, the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace of 1975, only one out of thirty principles directly addresses violence against women. Principle 28 states:

Women all over the world should unite to eliminate violations of human rights committed against women and girls such as: rape, prostitution, physical assault, mental cruelty, child marriage, forced marriage and marriage as a commercial transaction.\textsuperscript{111}

In 1979, the United Nations made another notable effort to promote women’s rights when it adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). This document would come to serve as the main normative legal code on women’s rights.\textsuperscript{112} However, like the 1975 Mexico Declaration, CEDAW does not prioritize the issue of violence against women. The one exception was article six, which addressed trafficking in women and reads, “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women.”\textsuperscript{113}

At the next UN Conference on Women in Copenhagen in 1980, neither violence against women nor human trafficking were prominent issues. Attendees

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 170.


\textsuperscript{112} Keck and Sikkink, 166.

spent much of the conference trying to overcome the so-called North-South split that had emerged at the Mexico City Conference.\textsuperscript{114} Barry notes that, despite considerable effort by feminists to get the issue of trafficking in women added to the conference agenda, the planning commission for the official governmental conference failed to do so. Only at the last minute did the planning commission for the informal NGO forum agree to add the issue to their agenda.\textsuperscript{115} Indeed, it was at this forum that “seeds of an international network on violence against women were planted.”\textsuperscript{116} Charlotte Bunch, a U.S. feminist leader in the international women’s movement, had organized a series of panels on international feminist networking at the NGO forum, which ran parallel to the official conference. Bunch states:

We observed in that two weeks of the forum that the workshops on issues related to violence against women were the most successful….They were the workshops where women did not divide along north-south lines, that women felt a sense of commonality and energy in the room, that there was a sense that we could do something to help each other…. It was so visible to me that this issue had the potential to bring women together in a different way, and that it had the potential to do that without erasing difference.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{114} Keck and Sikkink, 170.

\textsuperscript{115} Barry (1984b), 22.

\textsuperscript{116} Keck and Sikkink, 177.

\textsuperscript{117} Charlotte Bunch, quoted in Keck and Sikkink, 177.
Several of these sessions were on the topic of “female sexual slavery.” Barry writes that feminist momentum built in these sessions and resulted in an advisory committee and a plan to develop an international network against trafficking in women.\(^{118}\)

Building on the momentum initiated at the sessions on trafficking in women in Copenhagen, activists began planning an international conference specifically on the issues of trafficking and prostitution. Barry and Bunch, both U.S. feminists, and Shirley Castley, an Australian feminist, spearheaded the organizing efforts and ultimately brought together thirty-four women activists from twenty-four countries, half from the developing world, at the Global Feminist Workshop to Organize Against Trafficking in Women in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, in April 1983.\(^ {119}\) The goal of the workshop was to develop a network of activists from around the world to take action against trafficking and related forms of violence against women, such as forced prostitution and sex tourism.

An early effort at international feminist organizing, the planners of the workshop took seriously the need to be inclusive of participants from a wide variety of backgrounds and to develop a network that represented the interests of all participants. In her opening paper to the conference, Barry argued against the tendency to view exploited groups as “special” or as “other” and against “one-way benevolence,” which she sees as “antithetical to feminist work.”\(^ {120}\) She writes:

What this means is that Western women must be as concerned with the exploitation and enslavement of women in their own countries and cultures as

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\(^ {118}\) Barry (1984b), 22.

\(^ {119}\) Keck and Sikkink, 178.

\(^ {120}\) Barry (1984b), 31.
they are with that of women in other parts of the world. It is only in this context that feminists can begin to work with a full definition of woman’s human rights by beginning with the self, the subject and therefore extending into international work not through concern for the objectified other but as woman to woman, subject to subject. It is there that the authenticity of international feminist work is established.121

In order to avoid centering the network in the West, workshop participants decided to develop regional organizational structures that would allow information to circulate and connections to be made from region to region and internationally.122

However, despite the success of the workshop in stimulating meaningful discussion among participants and devising a common plan for action, the envisioned international network failed to materialize. As Keck and Sikkink explain, one reason was that “third world women did not want the network to be based in the north, but no organizations in the south could shoulder the financial and infrastructural burden of coordinating it.”123 And second, there was disagreement between activists who advocated the abolishment of prostitution and those who argued that prostitution could be a choice. Although the workshop did not produce a long-standing network, it was important historically because it “explicitly argued that the issue of sexual

121 Ibid., 31.


123 Keck and Sikkink, 178.
slavery needed to be situated in a broader debate about women’s human rights.”

Finally, and significantly, the workshop marked the beginning of the contemporary international movement against human trafficking.

Two years later, at the 1985 UN Conference on Women in Nairobi, the frames of “violence against women” and “women’s rights as human rights” became even more prominent as women from the North and from the South found consensus on these issues. While previous attempts to find common ground on such issues as discrimination or imperialism had often led to divisions between women of different cultural backgrounds, women from around the world found they could relate to the issue of violence and this frame helped participants to overcome the “north-south split.”

As mentioned above, the frame of “violence against women” encompassed a range of practices that impinged upon the bodily integrity of women “from household brutality to the violence of state security forces,” and thus became a widely recognized concept that could unite women and inspire activism. In social movement theory, Keck and Sikkink argue that “violence against women” can be seen as a “condensation symbol,” which “evokes the emotions associated with the situation” and “provokes mass responses because it condenses threats or reassurances into one symbolic moment.” They note that “Nairobi was the first step in securing agenda attention to the issue, for initiating the change in discursive positions of governments,

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124 Ibid., 178.
126 Keck and Sikkink, 170.
127 Ibid., 181, including quote by Murray Edelman.
and for strengthening linkages among women’s groups working on the issue.”\textsuperscript{128} The report of the Nairobi conference was the first to make substantial recommendations on the issue of violence against women.\textsuperscript{129}

Following the Nairobi conference, networks and campaigns around “violence in women” continued to grow. As before, the development of feminist networks against gendered violence remained intertwined with UN activities. Keck and Sikkink write:

By 1987 sufficient interest and pressure had built, that the UN organized a meeting on violence in the family and commissioned a study, \textit{Violence against Women in the Family}, the first comprehensive survey of research on the subject. From this point on there was growing attention to the issue, with an “explosion of organizing” in NGOs.\textsuperscript{130}

Women activists increasingly moved away from the “discrimination” frame as they took on “violence against women” and the associated frame of “women’s rights as human rights.” Since the violence against women frame dealt with bodily injury to women, activists could connect it to the human rights frame, which was already well embedded in the UN system. However, the human rights frame largely addressed the violation of human rights by state actors, covering such issues as state-sanctioned slavery and the torture of political prisoners, not by private actors, which was the case for most issues associated with violence against women. Hence, feminists criticized the “public-private” divide that kept states from protecting women from violence in

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 179.

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., 170.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 179.
the household and lobbied to have violations by private actors covered by human rights treaties.¹³¹

As women’s NGOs and networks combating violence against women proliferated, new organizations and networks specifically addressing prostitution and trafficking in women also emerged. In the United States, the organization Women Hurt in Systems of Prostitution Engaged in Revolt (WHISPER) and the Council for Prostitution Alternatives were both founded in the mid-1980s.¹³² In Europe, the Foundation Against Trafficking in Women (STV) was founded in the Netherlands in 1987.¹³³ In Asia, activism on the issue of trafficking in women was particularly strong. Much of the region’s activism was centered in Thailand, where Siriporn Skrobanek, an early leader in the movement, helped to organize the Foundation For Women (FFW), which focused on “issues of women’s labor, prostitution, and violence against women.”¹³⁴ STV and FFW collaborated on campaigns against sex tourism and against the trafficking of Asian women to Europe.¹³⁵

While feminist networks against trafficking in women were developing on the global level, prostitutes’ rights organizations had been operating quietly for years, often with little recognition from the global movement. With the emergence of second wave feminism in the 1970s, prostitutes had begun to articulate a public voice

¹³¹ Ibid., 180.
¹³³ Chew, 67-68.
¹³⁴ Bertone, 97, including quote by Leslie Anne Jeffrey.
¹³⁵ Ibid., 101.
and organize for their rights on a larger scale than ever before.Prostitutes’ rights
groups were active in many regions of the world, but those most documented in the
literature and integrated into international networks tended to be located in North
America and Western Europe, with Third World sex workers underrepresented both
in the literature and at international sex workers’ conferences. Kempadoo notes:

Prostitutes and other sex workers were fighting to keep brothels open,
challenging the various stigmas about prostitution, and exposing corruption
within sex industries in many different countries—yet very few people had
heard about these courageous steps.

Despite the many successes of sex workers’ groups in influencing legislation that
affected their rights, there was minimal collaboration between prostitutes’ rights
movements and movements against human trafficking. However, many feminists
have argued for the importance of including the perspectives of sex workers in anti-
trafficking campaigns.

By the late 1980s, two distinct international feminist networks against human
trafficking, each with a different perspective on the legitimacy of sex work, had
begun to develop. In 1988, Kathleen Barry and Dorchen Leidholdt founded the
Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW), which would become the leading
representative of the abolitionist perspective, which views prostitution as inherently

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136 Outshoorn, 143-144.


138 Ibid., 1-2.

CATW was the first international NGO to focus on human trafficking, and it obtained Consultative Status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1989. It unites national coalitions in various regions of the world, but is headquartered in the United States. In viewing prostitution as an inherent violation of women’s human rights, CATW does not distinguish between trafficking and prostitution and advocates for the criminalization of both, while also calling upon states to protect women from sexual violence.

Another strand of the international feminist movement against human trafficking, the sex workers’ rights perspective, also referred to as the “human rights,” perspective, is most prominently represented by the Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women (GAATW). GAATW was officially founded in 1994 in Thailand, but grew out of several years of activism and networking against trafficking in the Asian region. As FFW, under the leadership of Siriporn Skrobanek, became the center of anti-trafficking activities in Asia, the organization became the “host” of GAATW when it was launched at an International Workshop on Migration and Traffic in Women at Chiangmai University, Thailand, in October 1994. GAATW would grow to unite NGOs in countries around the world, but remained based in Bangkok, Thailand. Like CATW, GAATW has Consultative Status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council. GAATW’s member organizations include “migrant rights organizations; anti-trafficking organizations; self-organized groups of migrant

140 Marcovich, 15; Barry (1995), 5.
142 Chew, 69-70.
143 Ibid., 70-71; Bertone, 104.
workers, domestic workers, survivors of trafficking and sex workers; human rights and women's rights organizations; and direct service providers.”

GAATW’s perspective on trafficking is broader than CATW’s focus on prostitution as inherently exploitative. GAATW seeks to combat exploitative working conditions or forced movement in any field of labor, instead of focusing solely on sex work. Therefore, GAATW distinguishes between prostitution and trafficking. It opposes forced prostitution and trafficking, but accepts the right of individuals to choose to work as prostitutes and supports these individuals by working for migrant rights and improved labor conditions.

Thus, just as feminists developed transnational feminist networks on the broader issue of violence against women, feminists and other activists created transnational advocacy networks (TANs) specifically to combat human trafficking by working to persuade states and international organizations to take on the issue, to influence them to enact policies in line with activists’ own perspectives on human trafficking, and to hold states and international organizations accountable for enforcing the policies they put into place. The influence of counter-trafficking TANs can be seen through an examination of their participation in UN conferences and other international meetings, in policy debates surrounding anti-trafficking laws within states, and in the discussions toward the creation of UN instruments and conventions.

In the early 1990s, there were a series of international meetings and conferences addressing the newly popular concept of “violence against women.”

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these meetings, counter-trafficking activists worked to ensure that attention was paid to the specific issue of trafficking in women. At the same time, UN conferences and other international meetings played a large role in supporting the formation of TANs on the issue of human trafficking. Thus, through the early 1990s, the relationship between the UN system and the developing movement against human trafficking was largely symbiotic, as early activists pressured the United Nations to take on the issue, and UN meetings and conferences provided an arena for activists to make connections and expand their networks.

One of the first opportunities for TANs on the issues of violence against women and human trafficking to influence international policy came during the preparations for the UN-sponsored 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. Keck and Sikkink note that, originally, discussion of women’s rights was not on the conference agenda. This omission gave women’s rights activists a target around which to rally their organizing efforts, and groups employed a variety of techniques to get discussion of women’s rights onto the agenda. In February 1993, four months before the conference, the Center for Women’s Global Leadership (CWGL) at Rutgers University held the International Women’s Strategic Planning Meeting to bring together women from around the world to prepare for the conference. CWGL coordinated with the International Women’s Tribunal Center and the International YMCA in circulating a worldwide petition “calling on the 1993 Conference to comprehensively address women’s human rights at every level of the proceedings and demanding that gender violence be recognized as a violation of

145 Keck and Sikkink., 183.
146 Ibid., 185.
human rights requiring immediate action.”  The petition drive collected over 300,000 signatures in 123 countries and twenty languages; more than 800 groups became co-sponsors of the petition. Other feminist efforts to prepare for the conference included NOVIB, the Dutch cofinancing agency, convening a “reference group” of regional networks of women’s groups from Asia, Latin America, Africa, Europe, and North America to discuss strategies for the conference, and the International Women’s Rights Action Watch advising its members on how to participate in the conference in both direct and indirect ways.

The feminist strategy that received the most attention was the organization of a Tribunal for Women’s Human Rights in Vienna, which ran parallel to the conference proceedings. The idea for the tribunal originated at CWGL’s strategic planning meeting, and it was carried out by an international coordinating committee. At the Tribunal:

Thirty-three women from twenty-five countries testified before three judges and an audience about their own experiences with violence or as advocates for others. The Tribunal heard specific stories of what violence means for women’s lives and how human rights instruments could begin to address it. The testimonies attracted the attention of conference delegates and the media.

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147 Ibid., 186.
148 Ibid., 186.
149 Ibid., 186.
150 Ibid., 187.
The efforts of feminist activists proved successful when discussion of women’s rights was added to the agenda of the Vienna Conference. Many feminist activists agree that a major breakthrough of the conference was integrating concern over women’s rights into the broader “human rights” agenda. In addition, the conference strengthened connections between feminist networks and human rights networks. Keck and Sikkink note, “The result was the application of the ‘human rights methodology’ to the cause of women’s rights, and a fuller appreciation within mainstream human rights organizations of the problems with the public-private divide that had characterized their work.”

The final document of the conference, the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, explicitly recognized “gender-based violence,” including rape, sexual harassment and exploitation, and trafficking in women as human rights violations. The Vienna Declaration also called upon the United Nations to adopt a (at that time draft) declaration on violence against women and urged states to “combat violence against women in accordance with its provisions.” In addition, the Declaration supported the decision of the Commission on Human Rights to consider appointing a special rapporteur on violence against women. However, not all feminists were satisfied with the conference results. At the conference, Kathleen Barry of CATW

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151 See Ibid., 186; Chew, 70.
152 Keck and Sikkink, 183.
154 Ibid., Article 38.
155 Ibid., Article 40.
had attempted to present a proposed Convention Against Sexual Exploitation, which would define all prostitution as sexual exploitation, but this agenda item was rejected.\(^{156}\) Barry argues that the Vienna Declaration did not do enough to protect women’s rights and that the new rhetoric of “women’s rights as human rights” was accompanied only by unfunded educational campaigns, not programmatic change.\(^{157}\) Despite its limitations, the Vienna Conference represented a big step forward in promoting the importance of women’s rights in the international community and in forging connections with other activist networks.

The success of feminist activists in getting the issues of violence against women and human trafficking on the agenda at the Vienna Conference demonstrates the ability of TANs to draw attention to issues and influence the positions of states and international organizations.\(^{158}\) At the same time, it fueled the continuing efforts of TANs as they prepared to advocate their positions in upcoming international meetings, including the planned 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing.

In the two years before the Beijing Conference, several international events occurred that further demonstrated the influence of the TANs and presented them with opportunities to expand their networks. In December 1993, the United Nations passed the (non-binding) Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, which elaborated the definition of “violence against women” as including rape, sexual


\(^{158}\) Keck and Sikkink, 186.
abuse, sexual harassment, and “trafficking in women and forced prostitution.”¹⁵⁹ Feminist scholars note that the Declaration signaled the international community’s move away from abolitionism as it condemns only trafficking and “forced prostitution,” not all prostitution.¹⁶⁰ In 1994, the United Nations appointed Radhika Coomaraswamy of Sri Lanka as Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, a position endorsed by the Vienna Declaration and mandated by the Commission on Human Rights.¹⁶¹ The rapporteur is charged with traveling to specific countries to investigate claims of human rights violations and with presenting reports on violence against women to the United Nations. The issues of “forced prostitution” and “trafficking” were included in the original mandate of the special rapporteur on violence against women as types of violence she should investigate.¹⁶²

Two important conferences specifically on the issue of human trafficking also took place in 1994. As mentioned, the International Workshop on Migration and Traffic in Women at Chiangmai University, Thailand, out of which GAATW was launched, was held in October 1994. In addition, in November 1994, the International Conference on Traffic in Persons, organized by several Dutch Human Rights Institutes, took place in Utrecht, the Netherlands.¹⁶³ The conference brought together experts on human trafficking from around the world, who discussed issues


¹⁶¹ Keck and Sikkink, 187.

¹⁶² Chew, 71.

¹⁶³ Murray, 52-53.
contributing to human trafficking and made recommendations to combat the problem. Like the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, the Report of the Utrecht Conference moved away from the abolitionist approach to trafficking, as it condemned only forced prostitution and acknowledged that prostitution could be a freely chosen occupation. It called for prostitution and other activities in the informal sphere to be recognized as legitimate forms of work in order to improve the labor conditions of these workers. Furthermore, the report recognized that trafficking in persons can involve various forms of work, not only prostitution. Thus, the report largely aligns with the human rights approach to human trafficking, as it emphasizes the use of force, rather than the nature of work to be performed, in its definition of trafficking.\(^{164}\)

Following these conferences, in December 1994, the United Nations adopted a Resolution on Traffic in Women and Girls, which expressed “its grave concern over the worsening problem of trafficking, particularly the increasing syndication of the sex trade and the internationalization of the traffic in women and girl children.”\(^{165}\) In addition, the resolution urged governments to take action to address the problem of trafficking and ensure that victims are provided with the necessary assistance, and invited governments and organizations to promote increased public awareness of the issue, among other recommendations. The resolution followed the trend away from abolitionism by condemning only “trafficking,” not all prostitution, and by


recognizing that trafficking can involve various forms of work. However, the resolution was limited in that it covered only the trafficking of women and children, not men, and focused mainly on sexual exploitation.

By 1995, feminist networks on violence against women and human trafficking had grown in size and strength as they prepared for the strategically important UN Conference on Women in Beijing. Years of advocacy on the violence against women frame would culminate in Beijing, where the frame would be solidified as a leading and enduring symbol for feminist activism. However, despite general agreement on the centrality of the violence against women frame for the women’s movement, disagreements over specific issues characterized conference proceedings.166

The issue of human trafficking was one that divided conference participants, with at least three different perspectives represented in conference discussions. One lobby group, the NGO Coalition Against Exploitation in Women, was supported by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and led by CATW. After failing to get their proposed Convention Against Sexual Exploitation onto the agenda at the 1993 Vienna Conference, CATW joined forces with other anti-trafficking NGOs to present a petition at the Beijing Conference for their proposed convention to replace the 1949 UN Convention on the Suppression of Trafficking in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others.167 As noted above, the proposed convention would define all prostitution, even consensual, as

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166 Keck and Sikkink, 188.
167 Murray, 60.
sexual exploitation and would require signatory states to punish procurers and clients of prostitutes while providing assistance to “victims,” i.e., prostitutes.¹⁶⁸

A second lobby group at the Beijing Conference was led by GAATW, which differentiated itself from CATW by opposing the abolitionist perspective and acknowledging sex work as a legitimate occupation that could be freely chosen. GAATW collaborated with sex workers’ groups at the conference to contest the proposed Convention Against Sexual Exploitation. However, Alison Murray, a researcher in human geography and sex workers’ rights advocate, argues that GAATW’s collaboration with sex workers’ groups did not go far enough.¹⁶⁹ While GAATW recognized the legitimacy of sex work, it devoted most of its energy to combating forced prostitution instead of supporting the rights of sex workers or denouncing the moral and cultural attitudes that paint prostitution as unacceptable. Murray suggests that it is these attitudes that most harm prostitutes, not the danger of being “trafficked.”¹⁷⁰

Finally, the third lobby group on the issue of human trafficking was the Network of Sex Work Projects (NSWP), which coordinated a “small, but staunch” sex worker presence at the conference.¹⁷¹ The sex workers’ perspective dismisses the “free/forced” dichotomy commonly found in debates on trafficking in women and holds that an emphasis only on “forced prostitution” marginalizes those who have

¹⁶⁸ See ibid., 60-61; and “Proposed Convention Against Sexual Exploitation,” in Barry (1995), 323-344.

¹⁶⁹ Murray, 60.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 52.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 61-62.
freely chosen the profession.\textsuperscript{172} While the dichotomy implies that “forced” prostitutes are “victims” in needs of services and support, it suggests that the “others” are immoral or sexually depraved. Instead of focusing on the issue of “consent” as do many anti-trafficking organizations, sex workers’ groups support measures that enhance their human rights, improve their working conditions, ease travel restrictions, and address what they view as the true causes of trafficking situations, namely, economic, political, and gender inequalities, not the nature of the sex industry. Murray contends that, although small, the sex worker presence in Beijing made a significant impact at both the official UN Conference and the parallel NGO Forum. Working in collaboration with GAATW and other anti-trafficking groups, NSWP helped to defeat Section 230(o) of the Draft Platform for Action, which would have led to the creation of an abolitionist Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Sexual Exploitation.\textsuperscript{173}

Despite disagreements among conference participants on specific topics, overall the Beijing Conference proved to be a great success for TANs on the broad issue of violence against women. The frame of “women’s right as human rights” was further validated as a global norm and “violence against women” was featured in the final conference document, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, as one of twelve “critical areas of concern.” In the Declaration, “violence against women” was defined as including physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family; physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community; and physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 52.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 62.
by the State. 174 “Trafficking in women and forced prostitution” is included in the category of physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community. 175 In using the phrasing “trafficking in women and forced prostitution” instead of “all prostitution” as desired by CATW and its allies, the Declaration further moved away from the old international standard of abolitionism and endorsed the “free/forced” dichotomy that was now popular in discussions of human trafficking within the international community. In addition, the Declaration broadened the traditional understanding of “trafficking in women” by recognizing “forced labor” as one objective of trafficking, in addition to forced prostitution. 176

Much of the final document was shaped by the discussions that occurred among activists and officials at the conference, and some language was even provided directly by NGOs. 177 On the issue of human trafficking, the lobbying groups of NSWP and of GAATW and its allies proved most effective at promoting their perspectives on the issue in conference discussions and at influencing the language used in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.

GAATW and sex workers’ groups also found support in the views of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women Radhika Coomaraswamy, who recognized the wide variety of situations of sex workers, including those who are trafficked and those who have freely chosen the occupation and work in good


175 Ibid., Section IV, Paragraph 113.

176 Ibid., Section IV, Paragraph 130(b).

177 Keck and Sikkink, 188.
conditions. In a report on the topic in 1997, however, Coomaraswamy lamented the lack of effective action against trafficking networks and the absence of a consensus on the definition of “human trafficking.” She writes, “Unfortunately, the women’s movement is deeply divided over this debate, preventing a concerted international effort to bring about necessary and important changes with regard to international standards.” Coomaraswamy called upon “different camps of activists and Governments which have fought so valiantly for the human rights of trafficked women over the years [to] engage in a constructive dialogue with a view to collectively evolving international standards and mechanisms to provide redress for women victims.” Indeed, within a few years time this call would be answered, as states and activists with a variety of views on prostitution and trafficking would engage in tense negotiations over a new UN Convention to combat human trafficking.

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180 Ibid., Paragraph 75.

181 Ibid., Paragraph 76.

During the course of the 1990s, as awareness of and activism against human trafficking grew on the international level, the increasing visibility of human trafficking cases and expanding media coverage of the issue brought the problem to the attention of state officials and the general public in many countries. In the United States, several cases involving the forced labor of migrants raised the awareness of the American public of the issue of human trafficking. One case involved the discovery in 1995 of 72 Thai immigrants locked up in a sweatshop in El Monte, California, many of whom had been held for years behind razor wire and forced to work in horrendous conditions.\(^\text{182}\) Then, in 1997, two additional cases came to light. One was the “Cadena case,” in which Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents discovered a string of brothels in the Miami area run by members of the Cadena family in which Mexican women immigrants were forced to engage in sex work in exploitative conditions. Since the crime of “human trafficking” did not yet exist in the U.S. legal code at this time, the members of the Cadena trafficking ring were charged with conspiracy, alien smuggling, organizing prostitution, and violating the women’s civil rights.\(^\text{183}\) Another case, which came to light around the same time as the Cadena case, involved the discovery of over forty deaf Mexican immigrants in New York City forced to sell trinkets on the subway system while being housed in


\(^{183}\) DeStefano, 5.
cramped apartments and subject to sexual assault and torture. The ringleaders of the trafficking operation were indicted on various charges ranging from alien smuggling to slavery.\textsuperscript{184} These cases drew attention to the various circumstances in which smuggling and forced labor could take place and the various forms of labor that migrants were coerced to perform. They also illustrated the need for a broader concept that could encompass the complexity of this newly visible type of crime.

Meanwhile, in Western Europe, it was the influx of women from former communist countries working in the sex industry that drew increased attention to human trafficking. Since the late 1980s, women’s groups had led efforts to combat trafficking of women into countries of the European Union (EU), but as public awareness of the problem grew in the 1990s, these efforts expanded to include other activists and groups.\textsuperscript{185} Sally Stoecker and Louise Shelley write, “As a result of citizen activism—especially their publicizing of the enslavement and abuse of women in…brothels—parliamentary hearings were held, government reports were produced, and the European Union began to focus seriously on the issue of human trafficking.”\textsuperscript{186} To illustrate the scope of the problem, Akee et al. report that “in the mid- to late 1990s, an estimated 175,000 women were trafficked [annually] out of Russia and the Eastern European counties—70% of them into Western Europe, especially Germany, Italy, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Greece, Austria and

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., 6.


\textsuperscript{186} Stoecker and Shelley, 2.
England, while 3% or 5,000 women were trafficked into the United States and Canada.”

As governments in North America and Western Europe devised policies to respond to the problem of human trafficking, the United States emerged as a global leader on the issue. One of the first legislators to take action against human trafficking was Senator Paul Wellstone, a Democrat from Wisconsin. His attention was drawn to the issue in 1997 after police raided a brothel in Bethesda, Maryland, a suburb of Washington, D.C., and discovered that a number of Russian and Ukrainian women had been trafficked into the establishment and had been beaten and traumatized by the brothel’s owners. Encouraged by his wife, Sheila Wellstone, also a human rights advocate, Senator Wellstone introduced a Senate resolution denouncing human trafficking on March 10, 1998. Using as visual aids maps of routes taken by emigrants from the former Soviet Union, he decried that the international community had ignored the problem and argued that the proposed resolution would put the U.S. Congress on record “as opposing trafficking for forced prostitution and domestic servitude, and acting to check it before the lives of more women and girls are shattered.” Wellstone recounted what by then had become the


188 DeStefano, 10, 14.

189 Ibid., 14.

190 Ibid., 14.
common narrative of the trafficking scenario: “unsuspecting women and girls [lured] into lives of prostitution with promises of lucrative jobs.”

Although Wellstone acknowledged that women were also trafficked into domestic labor, his presentation focused on trafficking for the purpose of sex work. This focus on sex trafficking, and on the oft-repeated narrative of the “duped victim,” would dominate U.S. policy and U.S. popular discourse on human trafficking for years to come. In the end, Wellstone’s proposed resolution was passed by the Senate, and a companion measure introduced by Representative Louise McIntosh Slaughter was passed by the House of Representatives. The resolutions asked the U.S. government to report on the issue to Congress, with a focus on legal barriers that prevented effective governmental responses and methods to help victims. It also called upon federal officials to continue working internationally to raise awareness of human trafficking.

Almost simultaneously in March 1998, President Clinton announced an Executive Order on Trafficking in Women and Children, which outlined a comprehensive and integrated policy framework to guide the United State’s anti-trafficking efforts both domestically and abroad. The order introduced the policy framework that would later become widely known as the “three P’s,” which consisted of a focus on (1) prevention, (2) protection and assistance for victims, and (3) prosecution of and enforcement against traffickers. The Clinton administration

191 Ibid., 14.
192 Ibid., 15.
began establishing bilateral working relationships and joint counter-trafficking initiatives with numerous countries, and also spearheaded the development of a new UN instrument on human trafficking.

Thus, as the U.S. Congress worked toward the creation of a domestic anti-trafficking law, the Clinton administration was focused on developing an international protocol to combat human trafficking. Journalist Anthony DeStefano notes: “[I]t was fortuitous that the United States had started to focus on human trafficking just as the United Nations awoke to the problem; as a consequence, U.S. interest served as a catalyst for much of what happened in the international agreements.”194

By the end of 1998, U.S. officials had outlined a draft protocol on human trafficking to guide UN deliberations.195 However, Argentina had developed a draft protocol of its own. The United States and Argentina worked to combine their proposals into the “Revised Draft Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Women and Children,” which they presented at the first session of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in Vienna, Austria in March 1999.196

One of the main differences between the original proposals had been the more specific emphasis of Argentina on trafficking in women and children as compared to

194 DeStefano, 18.
195 Ibid., 19.
the broader emphasis of the United States on trafficking in persons. Therefore, the combined draft alternated between the terms “trafficking in women and children” and “trafficking in persons,” leaving the committee to decide which term to incorporate into the final document. Another difference between the proposals was the United State’s emphasis on the use of force or coercion in defining trafficking situations, except for situations involving children in which consent was irrelevant, while Argentina’s definition of “trafficking in women” implied that trafficking situations could occur even with a woman’s consent.197 The draft “proposed promotion and facilitation of cooperation among nations to prevent, investigate, and punish trafficking for sexual exploitation or forced labor.”198

The overarching purpose of the protocol was to bring about consensus among nations on the criminalization of human trafficking—in other words, to make trafficking a crime.199 Although awareness of human trafficking was growing around the world, not all countries had criminal laws that addressed trafficking. A major step toward this goal was to achieve agreement on the definition of “human trafficking.” The ad-hoc committee spent nearly two years in negotiations revising the document and debating the definition of “human trafficking” before reaching a hard-wrought consensus among participants. The negotiation process for the trafficking protocol, which took place in Vienna and is often referred to as the “Vienna process,” was


198 DeStefano, 20.

199 Ibid., 21.
unusual in that it involved more than 120 states, an unprecedented number of NGOs, and an informal group of intergovernmental agencies that sought to ensure that the final document would represent “a net advance for the human rights” of women, children, migrants, and other affected persons. 

Throughout the process, however, the United States maintained a large presence, with a strong team of governmental representatives led by the State Department providing recommendations on the protocol and with U.S.-based NGOs dominating the lobbying factions that sought to shape the final document according to their views on human trafficking.

Meanwhile, in the United States, Congress continued to work toward a domestic counter-trafficking law. Hearings were held to educate Congress about the issue, and several U.S.-based NGOs were invited to testify on the scope of the problem. In March 1999, Representative Chris Smith, a Republican from New Jersey, introduced the “Freedom from Sexual Trafficking Act of 1999” in the House, while Wellstone introduced the “International Trafficking of Women and Children Victim Protection Act of 1999” in the Senate and Slaughter introduced the same bill in the House. As suggested by the titles of these bills, they were focused more on sex trafficking and on the protection of women and children than on the broader issue of human trafficking for any type of forced labor.

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200 Gallagher, 975, 1002.
201 DeStefano, 23-25; Bertone, 24.
202 Bertone, 168.
On June 28, 1999, Smith called a hearing entitled “The Sex Trade: Trafficking in Women and Children in Europe and the United States” before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and invited NGO representatives and other trafficking experts to speak about the problem. One expert present at the hearing was Steven Galster, Executive Director of the Global Survival Network, which had produced the film “Bought & Sold” documenting underground trafficking networks in Russia that recruited women into prostitution. Galster testified on the extent of the trafficking of women into the United States and Europe.\(^\text{204}\) As with prior hearings and presentations on human trafficking before Congress, this hearing continued the theme of focusing on the sex trafficking of women and children.

Kimberly Williams notes that, including this hearing before the CSCE, there were a total of three Congressional hearings and one public legislative markup session held between June 1999 and April 2000 to hear expert testimony on what lawmakers of both houses referred to interchangeably as “trafficking” or “sex trafficking.”\(^\text{205}\) The bulk of the testimony came from 13 NGO researchers and activists, including five survivors of sex trafficking, who were involved with campaigns targeted directly at combating sex trafficking.\(^\text{206}\)

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\(^{204}\) Bertone, 166, 169.


\(^{206}\) Ibid., 135-6.
In addition to focusing on sex trafficking, many of these hearings focused on Russia and other former communist nations as source countries for the problem. At the June 28, 1999 hearing on “The Sex Trade,” Smith stated:

Although trafficking has been a problem for many years in Asian countries, it was not until the end of communism in East-Central Europe and the break up of the Soviet Union that a sex trade in the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] region began to develop. This appalling trade has grown exponentially over the ensuing decade. Trafficking is induced by poverty, lack of economic opportunities for women, the low status of women in many cultures, and the rapid growth of sophisticated and ruthless international organized crime syndicates.  

Indeed, both Williams and Andrea Bertone argue that the identity of sex trafficking victims as Russian or Eastern European contributed to Congress’s willingness to take action on the issue. Members of the U.S. Congress, who were predominately white and male, could better relate to the “racially white” Russian and East European women who were being trafficked, than they could to Asian victims of trafficking. Members of Congress were called upon to think of their “daughters” in supporting legislation to protect victims of sex trafficking. Hence, a desire to safeguard “those of their own kind” influenced lawmakers to support the legislation.

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207 Bertone, 169-170.

208 Ibid., 170, 191; Williams (2008), 133.


210 Williams (2012), 97.
Another strategy used to gain support for the legislation during the Congressional hearings was to liken human trafficking to the African slave trade. Laura Lederer, an invited expert from the counter-trafficking organization The Protection Project, predicted that the number of women trafficked for work in the global sex industry would soon equal the number of Africans enslaved during the transatlantic African slave trade in the eighteenth century. Following Lederer’s introduction of this analogy, other witnesses employed it in their own testimonies. Wendy Young of the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, referred to sex trafficking as “an increasingly prevalent phenomenon” equivalent to “modern day slavery,” and Theresa Loar of the President’s Interagency Council on Women called sex trafficking “one of the most egregious violations of our time” and a “modern form of slavery.” Additionally, Department of Justice civil rights attorney William R. Yeomans referred to trafficking as “slavery in its modern manifestations.” The use of this analogy appealed to Congress’s view of the United States as the “global human-rights leader” and also its desire to assuage its guilt over the United State’s role in the African slave trade.

An additional influence that served to build support for counter-trafficking legislation was Amy O’Neill Richard’s April 2000 report for the U.S. Department of State, “International Trafficking in Women to the United States: A Contemporary Manifestation of Slavery and Organized Crime,” which received wide publicity

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211 Ibid., 95-96.
212 Ibid., 96.
213 Ibid., 96.
214 Ibid., 95-96.
throughout the United States.\textsuperscript{215} Although instances of trafficking were known to the public and to legislators, the report drove home the magnitude of the problem. Richard wrote that “trafficking in persons, particularly in women and children, was significant on nearly every continent; and the United States had become a destination for trafficked persons working in the sex, agricultural, and garment industries as well as in domestic settings.”\textsuperscript{216} While acknowledging that it was impossible to accurately count the number of trafficking victims, Richard repeated government and NGO estimates claiming that between 700,000 and 2 million women and children were trafficked around the world each year, with 45,000 to 50,000 trafficked to the United States.\textsuperscript{217} This estimate would later be found to be too high; nonetheless, her report provided a sense of the pervasiveness of human trafficking and fueled the public outcry against the practice.\textsuperscript{218}

As support for legislation against human trafficking grew, debates turned to specific provisions of the law and to the definition of “human trafficking.” One debate concerned the degree to which the law would emphasize sex trafficking over trafficking for any purpose. Wellstone and Smith continued to serve as leaders in developing the legislation, but their proposed bills had different thrusts. On October 27, 1999, Wellstone had submitted a bill entitled “Comprehensive Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 1999” to the Senate, while Representative Sam Gejdenson submitted the same bill to the House. On November 8, 1999, Smith, along with eight co-

\textsuperscript{215} DeStefano, 32.
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid., 32.
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid., 32.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid., 32.
sponsors, including Gejdenson, had submitted the “Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 1999” to the House.²¹⁹ Wellstone’s bill focused on all forms of human trafficking, but Smith’s bill placed a special emphasis on trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Both Wellstone and Smith proposed the establishment of an interagency task force to monitor and combat trafficking, but Smith wanted the task force to pay special attention to sex trafficking and to study the phenomenon of international sex tourism.²²⁰ Smith’s bill also included separate provision to address the sex trafficking of children, including revising the U.S. criminal code to require harsh punishments for these offenses and developing a list of countries that serve as origin, transit, or destination points for child trafficking.²²¹

As noted, most of the invited experts on human trafficking at the Congressional hearings had focused on sex trafficking; some had also used the platform to push an abolitionist agenda. For example, Laura Lederer had presumed to “safely speak for many women’s organizations” when she praised Smith’s efforts to pass anti-sex trafficking legislation, maintaining that “sex and labor aren’t the same and can’t be equated.”²²² Lederer declared that the “commercial sexual exploitation of women and children is one of the last…of the issues, but definitely not the least to be examined by our society” and suggested that legislators had the opportunity to

²¹⁹ Bertone, 171.

²²⁰ DeStefano, 36.

²²¹ Ibid., 36.

²²² Williams (2008), 142.
advance women’s rights by protecting vulnerable women and children from traffickers.\(^{223}\)

A second debate impacting the development of counter-trafficking legislation concerned the proposed use of U.S. sanctions to encourage other states to fight human trafficking. Wellstone’s bill proposed a “carrot-and-stick sanction approach,” through which the president would be authorized to withhold law enforcement support, foreign aid, and other assistance to countries making little progress in counter-trafficking efforts. Smith’s bill proposed a stricter sanctions regime that would set minimum standards that foreign countries must meet in combating human trafficking in order to avoid U.S. sanctions, including the withholding of non-humanitarian aid and U.S. pressure on institutions such as the World Bank to deny loans or other funds.\(^{224}\) However, the Clinton administration opposed the use of sanctions, especially Smith’s harsher approach, in favor of engaging in cooperative efforts with other countries to encourage counter-trafficking measures.\(^{225}\) Because many countries’ efforts to fight trafficking were still “in the early stages,” the Clinton administration believed that unilateral sanctions would be counterproductive and that a more effective approach would be to assist countries in expanding their counter-trafficking programs.\(^{226}\)

On May 9, 2000, Smith’s bill, the “Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 1999” was passed by a voice vote in the House. After its passage in the House,

\(^{223}\) Ibid., 141.

\(^{224}\) DeStefano, 36-37.

\(^{225}\) Ibid., 37; Chuang, 449.

\(^{226}\) Chuang, 455-456.
Wellstone and Senator Sam Brownback, a Republican from Kansas, worked to revise the bill into the “Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000,” which unanimously passed in the Senate on July 27, 2000. The House and Senate versions of the Act were then negotiated into one bill. On October 6, the reconciled bill was passed by the House, and on October 11, it was passed by the Senate. It was then sent to the White House, and on October 28, President Clinton signed into law the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, which would often be referred to in shortened form as the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA).

Modelled on the Clinton administration’s “three P’s” framework, the legislation included innovative measures aimed at prosecuting traffickers, preventing trafficking, and protecting trafficked persons. The focus on the victims of trafficking during the Senate hearings helped to influence lawmakers to include significant human rights protections in the final law.

The provisions of the TVPA included some compromises on key issues. Regarding the debate over whether or not to prioritize sex trafficking, proponents of a more comprehensive focus on all forms of human trafficking were satisfied that the law criminalized trafficking of persons into any type of work. At the same time, the law also satisfied some activists who wanted the law to focus on trafficking for sexual exploitation by including a definition of “sex trafficking” that did not require a “trafficking victim” to be coerced into the situation. In not requiring evidence of coercion, the TVPA gave some support to the abolitionist stance that all sex work is

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227 DeStefano, 44.
228 Ibid., 44.
229 Bertone, 172; Chuang, 450.
exploitative of women and should be prohibited. However, while offering a
definition of “sex trafficking,” most of the provisions of the TVPA apply only to
“severe forms of trafficking in persons,” which do require evidence that coercion had
taken place. Specifically, “severe forms of trafficking in persons” is defined as:

(A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud,
or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not
attained 18 years of age; or (B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation,
provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of
force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude,
peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.230

In addition to criminalizing trafficking in persons and related offences, the
TVPA increased penalties for such crimes; required convicted traffickers to make
restitution to their victims; made victims of trafficking in the United States eligible
for certain immigration benefits, such as the T-visa, which allows victims to remain
in the country on the conditions that they would suffer extreme hardship if deported
and that they assist law enforcement in prosecuting their traffickers; and made victims
eligible for health care, legal aid, and other services offered through federal
agencies.231 Recognizing that efforts to combat human trafficking into the United
States requires strong prevention measures abroad, the TVPA also established
programs, including funding programs for NGOs, to strengthen other countries’

§7101, Sec. 103.

231 DeStefano, 44.
domestic legal responses, to provide economic alternatives to victims, and to conduct public awareness campaigns. 232

The law also specifies that any foreign government not complying with U.S. minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and not “making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance” will be denied “nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related foreign assistance.” 233 Sanctioned governments also face U.S. opposition to non-humanitarian, non-trade-related assistance from international financial institutions and multilateral development banks, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 234

The TVPA established the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons under the State Department, which was charged with producing an annual Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP Report) to analyze the counter-trafficking efforts of other countries. 235 Based on the assessments, the TIP Report ranks countries according to whether they (1) comply with the minimum standards (Tier 1); (2) do not yet fully comply but are making significant efforts to do so (Tier 2); or (3) are not making significant efforts to comply (Tier 3). 236 In addition, there is also a “Tier 2 Watch List” of countries that require special attention in the following year due to increasing numbers of trafficking victims or a ranking that is based on the promise to carry out additional measures over the course of the year. Countries that the State


234 Chuang, 452.

235 Miko, 16.

236 Ibid., 453.
Department puts into Tier 3 may be subject to sanctions if they do not bring themselves into compliance within 90 days. During this grace period, the State Department works closely with the governments to develop plans of action. Countries that make a significant effort to comply during this period will not be sanctioned. The president may also waive sanctions if (1) continued financial assistance would help support TVPA’s goals or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States, or (2) withdrawing assistance would negatively impact vulnerable populations, including women and children.\textsuperscript{237}

While the TVPA was being developed in the United States, negotiations continued in Vienna toward the development of a UN Protocol on Human Trafficking. The protocol would supplement a new Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, which was drafted under the auspices of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (UN Crime Commission). The purpose of the convention is to “promote international cooperation in order to combat transnational organized crime more effectively,” and it includes protocols addressing the specific transnational crimes of human trafficking, migrant smuggling, and trafficking in firearms.\textsuperscript{238} States must ratify the convention before ratifying any of its protocols.

There was disappointment among human rights advocates that the convention was being drafted by the UN Crime Commission rather than the UN Commission on Human Rights. They feared that, as a convention focused on crime control, it would downplay human rights protections for trafficking victims and would legitimize

\textsuperscript{237} Ibid., 454.

\textsuperscript{238} Gallagher, 978.
stricter border controls and migration requirements as a means of fighting human trafficking.\textsuperscript{239} They believed that restrictive immigration policies would drive labor migration further underground and would actually lead to an increase in trafficking. Thus, a major topic of debate during the negotiations on the counter-trafficking protocol was the extent to which human rights protections would be included in this crime control instrument. A second major topic of debate, similar to the debate during negotiations on the TVPA, concerned whether the protocol should focus on the sex trafficking of women and children as inherently exploitative and therefore aim to abolish prostitution, or whether the protocol should include sex trafficking as only one form of trafficking among others and emphasize the need to combat forced or coerced labor in any field.

In the debate concerning the protocol’s position on prostitution, most states and NGOs were polarized into two camps. One group of states, supported by a coalition of NGOs called the Human Rights Network (the Network), took an abolitionist perspective and viewed any distinction between forced and voluntary prostitution as morally unacceptable.\textsuperscript{240} This camp opposed any definition of human trafficking that included a coercion requirement and argued that all migration for sex work should be criminalized. Another group of states, including the United States and supported by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and a group of NGOs known as the Human Rights Caucus (the Caucus), took the position that including

\textsuperscript{239} Chuang, 446.

\textsuperscript{240} Bertone, 25.
non-coerced migration for sex work would blur the distinction between trafficking and migrant smuggling and would divert resources away from the real problem.\textsuperscript{241}

The final version of the Protocol, entitled the “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,” reflected a compromise between the two opposing camps on the prostitution issue. This compromise can be seen in the title of the protocol. The title pleased the Caucus and its supporters in that it covered trafficking of all persons. At the same time, it sought to appease the Network and its supporters by including the phrase “Especially Women and Children.” The compromise can also be seen in the definition of “trafficking in persons” in the protocol, which is as follows:

(a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;

(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;

\textsuperscript{241} Chuang, 444; Gallagher, 985.
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in persons” even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;

(d) “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.242

Both camps also claimed victory in regards to the definition. The Caucus and its allies were satisfied that the definition included trafficking for various forms of work, not just prostitution; that it defined trafficking as a crime of coercion, fraud, etc., meaning that voluntary migration for sex work was not criminalized; and that the definition included trafficking in men in addition to trafficking in women and children. This definition marked an advance from the previous international convention against human trafficking, the 1949 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, which criminalized only trafficking for the purpose of prostitution and did not require evidence of “coercion,” thereby promoting an abolitionist approach. On the other hand, the Network and its allies also claimed victory in that the definition of “exploitation” explicitly mentioned “the exploitation of the prostitution of others,” and that the definition of “trafficking in persons” included the clause, “The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation … shall be irrelevant” when coercion, fraud, etc., are involved. The Network interpreted these provisions to mean “that any migration that involves sex work now falls under trafficking and that

all migrating sex workers can be treated as victims of trafficking.” However, the Caucus holds that the protocol intentionally did not define “the exploitation of the prostitution of others” in order to permit states to regulate domestic sex industries on their own.

Thus, the achievement of this internationally recognized definition of human trafficking did not end debates on the relationship between trafficking and prostitution. Each camp interpreted the definition in line with its own ideology. However, legal experts largely support the Caucus’s interpretation that the protocol does not criminalize prostitution, but leaves the regulation of prostitution to individual states. In addition, excluding consensual migration for prostitution from the trafficking definition allowed states to treat human trafficking and migrant smuggling as two separate offenses.

While the Caucus’s lobbying faction at the negotiations included sex workers’ groups, many sex workers were not pleased with the compromises in the protocol. The amount of time spent debating the definition of human trafficking left little time for the Caucus to lobby for human rights protections for trafficking victims and migrant sex workers. Doezema points out that the protocol “in no way prevents governments from persecuting, criminalizing, and denying equal protection of the law to sex workers in the name of fighting ‘trafficking.’”

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243 Outshoorn, 150.
244 See Chuang, 445; DeStefano, 26; Bertone, 27-28.
245 Chuang, 445-446.
247 Ibid., 24.
for a new frame to replace the “forced/chosen” dichotomy that has characterized international discussions on human trafficking. They note that simply excluding voluntary prostitution from the definition of “human trafficking” does not advance sex workers’ rights and that, without labor protections, more prostitutes are likely to suffer abuses. Doezema proposes that a new framework to replace “trafficking” would “incorporate elements of labor rights, insisting that sex workers be treated as legitimate workers, rather than as moral reprobates.”

A second major debate that divided delegates in Vienna was whether the protocol should address human trafficking as primarily a crime and border control issue or as a human rights issue. During negotiations, human rights advocates argued that “successful prosecutions depend on trafficked persons’ meaningful cooperation, which in turn requires assurances that their human rights will be protected.”

Human rights advocates also lobbied for the protocol to address the root causes of trafficking by offering broader rights protections to women and other vulnerable groups, e.g., by promoting the rights of equal access to education, economic opportunities, and bodily integrity.

In the end, however, human rights protections received relatively little attention during negotiations, and human rights advocates were unable to convince states to include important trafficking-specific human rights protections. For example, states refused to include a provision granting trafficked persons protections against prosecution for offenses such as illegal migration, undocumented work, and

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248 Ibid., 25.
249 Chuang, 447.
250 Ibid., 447.
prostitution. While the protocol does call on states to provide assistance and protection to trafficked persons, it is “mostly couched in aspirational terms rather than as a matter of hard obligation.” On the positive side, the protocol granted more attention to human rights than would be expected in a crime and border control instrument. Although the protocol does not “break new ground or grant new rights,” “[e]xisting rights have been confirmed and there is little in the final texts to suggest a significant dilution of the responsibility which states owe to trafficked persons.”

After a hard-wrought consensus had been achieved on these issues after nearly two years of negotiations, the protocol was complete. On November 15, 2000, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and two of its protocols, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea. A conference was convened for the signing of the convention and its two accompanying protocols in Palermo, Italy, on December 12-15, 2000. By the last day of the conference, the convention had been signed by 121 nations and the protocol on human trafficking had been signed by 81 nations; the United States was a signatory to both. However, for the convention or a protocol to come into force, it had to be ratified domestically by at least forty countries. After meeting this threshold, the convention came into force.

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251 Ibid., 447-448.
252 Ibid., 448.
253 Gallagher, 1003-1004.
254 The third protocol, the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, was adopted by the General Assembly in May 2001.
on September 29, 2003, and the protocol on human trafficking came into force on December 25, 2003.\textsuperscript{255}

While the UN Protocol on Human Trafficking represented a remarkable achievement in establishing an internationally recognized definition of human trafficking and broke new ground in criminalizing all forms of human trafficking, it included only weak enforcement mechanisms, which prevented the United Nations from assuming a leadership role in the fight against human trafficking. Bertone argues that “the United States took advantage of the global leadership vacuum on enforcement of anti-trafficking norms.”\textsuperscript{256} A few months after the TVPA was signed into law by Democratic President Clinton, Republican President George W. Bush, and his more conservative administration, took over the White House. While the Clinton administration had concerns about the sanctions component of the TVPA, the Bush administration quickly put the sanctions regime into place and implemented the provisions of the TVPA with the support of conservative activists and officials. Bertone notes:

Between 2001 and 2006 feminist abolitionists and conservatives in the United States were fully empowered to pursue their anti-prostitution agenda because of the control of a Republican White House and a Republican Congress…. Democratic support of the trafficking issue almost disappeared; there were no Democratic champions of the trafficking issue left in Congress.”\textsuperscript{257}

\textsuperscript{255} DeStefano, 28-29.

\textsuperscript{256} Bertone, 187.

\textsuperscript{257} Ibid., 183.
In implementing the TVPA’s tier-ranking system and sanctions regime, Chuang contends that “the United States has proclaimed itself global sheriff on trafficking.” She argues that this “raises grave concerns both as a matter of international law and as a matter of global anti-trafficking strategy.” Outlining her argument, Chuang states:

By injecting U.S. norms into the international arena, the sanctions regime risks undermining the fragile international cooperation framework created by the Palermo Protocol. The sanctions threat arguably elevates U.S. norms over international norms by giving the former the teeth the latter so often lack. In doing so, the sanctions regime presents a ready opportunity for the United States to impose—by the threat of sanctions—its own anti-trafficking paradigm onto other states.

One of the biggest concerns regarding the U.S. ranking system is the inconsistency of its standards with international norms set by the protocol on human trafficking. Chuang notes that “the legal norms the United States encourages other governments to adopt employ selective (and sometimes misleading) references to the Palermo Protocol norms.” Critics charge that the United States has substituted “its own domestic standards in place of those to which the international community has already agreed.” For example, in the document entitled “Legal Building Blocks to

258 Chuang, 439.
259 Ibid., 439.
260 Ibid., 439.
261 Ibid., 439-440.
262 Ibid., 457.
Combat Trafficking in Persons” that the State Department provided to governments to help them bring their domestic anti-trafficking efforts up to U.S. minimal standards, the definition of trafficking in persons cites the UN Protocol on Human Trafficking as a reference, implying that its definition is derived from the protocol. However, the definitions are different in that the U.S. “Legal Building Blocks” defines “exploitation” as including “pimping, pandering, procuring, profiting from prostitution.” In contrast, the protocol had left “exploitation of the prostitution of others” purposely undefined in order to allow states to make their own determinations as to the legality of prostitution within their borders. Therefore, as the Bush administration increasingly promoted an abolitionist agenda, it also imposed these standards on the countries it was assessing. Chuang argues, “While governments technically are not required to incorporate the Legal Building Blocks into their domestic legislation, the threat of sanctions nonetheless pressures governments to conform to U.S. preferences.”

One of the TPVA’s provisions was to grant funding to NGOs in order to provide assistance to victims, conduct public awareness campaigns, and carry out other activities to aid the fight against human trafficking. In the first several years after the TVPA was implemented, the U.S. Congress made available hundreds of millions of dollars for these purposes through international development aid mechanisms, namely, USAID, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Department of Labor. The lobbying groups that had been involved in the creation of the TVPA

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263 Ibid., 468.
264 Ibid., 468.
and in the negotiation process for the UN Protocol on Human Trafficking remained active and attempted to influence how the funds would be distributed. With the United States under the conservative Bush administration from 2000-2008, abolitionists and other conservative groups gained influence over such decisions. Bertone points out that “Conservative and Christian faith-based organizations enjoyed increased access to funding to combat human trafficking both domestically and internationally, regardless of whether their project proposals or implementation models were sound or effective.”\(^\text{266}\)

In contrast to the support given to conservative-leaning groups, Bertone states that “In the early years of the TVPA implementation, more liberal-minded, human rights activists began to be silenced and essentially ‘went underground’ for a number of years.”\(^\text{267}\)

Conservative lobbyists’ views were supported by some changes made to the TVPA when it was renewed in 2003 through the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA). The TVPRA increased the amount appropriated to finance the provisions of the law to $106 million a year, with about $61 million earmarked for “overseas assistance to protect trafficking victims and help foreign states meet the minimum standards of activity and policy as monitored by the state department’s yearly country reports.”\(^\text{268}\)

Significantly, the law limited organizations eligible to receive U.S. funding to those that pledged not to “promote, support, or

\(^{265}\) Bertone, 182.

\(^{266}\) Ibid., 184.

\(^{267}\) Ibid., 185.

\(^{268}\) DeStefano, 102.
advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution.”269 This required oath, which came to be known as the “anti-prostitution pledge,” caused particular consternation among liberals. As Chuang argues:

The requirement that NGOs take an “anti-prostitution pledge” or else be disqualified from U.S. financial assistance will continue to alienate service providers whose contribution to anti-trafficking norm development is vital. These include a number of NGOs with some of the most extensive experience working with trafficked persons. Not only do NGOs have valuable access to victim populations, but they have rare firsthand exposure and insight into the long-term impact of trafficking on survivors that is crucial to informed anti-trafficking norm development…. In a field as new and complex as trafficking, and in such need for input from all sectors of civil society, this dynamic severely undermines the transnational interactive process.270

Overall, the U.S. minimum standards and sanctions regime have seen positive results in that they have led governments around the world to enact counter-trafficking legislation and develop domestic infrastructure to combat the problem. However, Chuang questions whether these actions have resulted from a genuine commitment from governments to fight trafficking or whether governments have simply complied with U.S. standards in order to avoid sanctions. She contends that international leadership on the issue of human trafficking should be focused not only on quantitative goals, i.e., increasing the number of states with counter-trafficking laws, but also on qualitative goals, i.e., promoting cooperation among states on

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269 Bertone, 184-185.

270 Chuang, 491-492.
human trafficking and encouraging states to internalize international counter-trafficking norms. On these qualitative measures, she argues that the U.S. sanctions regime has failed to uphold the international consensus forged in Vienna. Chuang maintains that, in order for the United States to strengthen the effectiveness of its sanctions regime and continue in an international leadership role in counter-trafficking efforts, it should show deference to the UN Protocol on Human Trafficking when working with foreign governments.

Since the adoption of the UN Protocol on Human Trafficking and the passing of the TVPA in 2000, the international community has continued to develop methods of combating human trafficking and to improve international cooperation. Both the United Nations and the United States remain leaders in the international fight against trafficking. In 2004, the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights appointed a special rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, who reports on human trafficking and makes recommendations on how to protect the human rights of trafficking victims. In the United States, the TVPA was reauthorized again in 2005, 2008, and 2013 with improved provisions on combating trafficking and protecting victims based on the experience gained since the passing of the original law.

As demonstrated in this section, advocacy networks have exerted a strong influence on the development of both national and international instruments against human trafficking. In the United States, testimonies by experts on sex trafficking demonstrated the seriousness of the issue to lawmakers and helped win their support for a comprehensive counter-trafficking law that would deploy U.S. resources to

\footnote{Ibid., 465.}
other countries in order to fight the problem. In addition, activists’ focus on the
victims of trafficking, rather than its impact on, e.g., the national economy or crime
control efforts, influenced lawmakers to include pioneering human rights protections
for victims in the TVPA.

Through the Vienna process leading up to the adoption of the UN Protocol on
Human Trafficking, networks of NGOs with opposing views on prostitution and
trafficking lobbied for the title and text of the protocol to reflect their network’s
perspective on how to best combat human trafficking. As noted, TANs on both sides
of the debate claimed some victories in regards to the language of the final document.
Additionally, the lobbying efforts of both camps, focused as they were on the victims
of trafficking rather than on crime control, influenced the decision of states to include
the following in the final version of the protocol: 1) specific references to
international law, including human rights law, refugee law, and humanitarian law; 2)
an anti-discrimination clause; and 3) the protection of human rights as a principal
objective.272 The Vienna process represented the achievement of a “fragile
consensus” between states and TANs with markedly different perspectives on the
connection between prostitution and trafficking.273 Through this process, the
interdependency of states and TANs grew stronger, as states came to increasingly rely
on TANs for information and support.

272 Gallagher, 1003.
273 Chuang, 438.
5.4 The Development of the Russian Movement against Human Trafficking

In this section, I provide a brief history of the development of the modern Russian movement against human trafficking before turning to a case study of the leading counter-trafficking NGO in Russia, the Angel Coalition, in the next chapter.

As noted previously, in the modern era, human trafficking from and into Russia was first recognized as a problem following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The economic and political chaos that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the transition to a market economy in the early to mid-1990s produced conditions that contributed to a rise in human trafficking. The demise of a state-controlled economy meant that the state no longer guaranteed the economic security of its citizens; this resulted in economic dislocations for many. At the same time, instability in the political system during the transition period contributed to the growth of organized crime and corruption among governmental officials, both of which facilitated human trafficking. While job prospects declined in the Russian Federation, a globalizing economy produced demand for low-skill, low-wage workers in many parts of the world. After Russia relaxed border controls and travel restrictions in the early 1990s, many Russians were able to travel abroad to seek their fortunes elsewhere.

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274 Note: An historical precursor to the modern Russian movement against human trafficking existed in the 1800s and early 1900s when the Russian government and women’s philanthropic groups responded to increased prostitution in Russia that resulted from industrialization, urbanization, and general social instability. One technique of women philanthropists was to meet trains coming into urban areas from the countryside in order to “save” peasant girls by enrolling them in shelters before pimps could recruit them. For the government’s part, their response was to legalize prostitution in an effort to control it through a system of regulation that included weekly medical inspection of prostitutes. See Elwood, 30-32.

Although the transition to a market economy created difficulties for both women and men, many scholars have noted the especially harsh effects it had on women, as women suffered more from underemployment and from cutbacks in social welfare benefits. As a result, significant numbers of Russian women sought opportunities abroad for education, employment, or marriage. Women found job opportunities through advertisements in the media, recruitment agencies, direct contact with companies abroad, friends and family members, and other sources. Although some of these opportunities were legal, some recruiters operated illegally, and some even blatantly misled women as to the location or the nature of the promised job. To reach their destinations, some women travelled with the required documents, while many trafficking victims had falsified documents or traveled with only tourist visas that would expire after a short period of time. Thus, there was a wide range of scenarios that accounted for women’s labor migration out of Russia.

The first form of human trafficking from the Russian region to receive attention was the trafficking of women from Russia and other former communist countries for the purpose of sex work. As noted in the previous section, the trafficking of women from former communist states received a great deal of attention in both the United States and Western Europe and even served as a catalyst to the development of counter-trafficking legislation in several countries. In the 1990s, according to estimates, Russian women and women from other Slavic states of the former Soviet Union came to constitute one of the largest groups of foreign sex workers trafficked to Western Europe. Sally Stoecker states that Slavic and Baltic

276 Sally Stoecker, “Human Trafficking: A New Challenge for Russia and the United States,” in Human Traffic and Transnational Crime: Eurasian and American Perspectives, ed. Sally Stoecker and
women from the former Soviet states were seen as “exotic and desirable in the ‘developed’ industrial countries of Europe, North America, Asia, and the Middle East.”

By the late 1990s, it was estimated that tens of thousands of Russian women and girls were being “trafficked” across Russia’s borders each year to Central and Western Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and North America for the purpose of sex work. While many of these women were aware of the nature of the work they were to perform, others were not, and some were forcibly coerced to engage in prostitution. Media stories and anti-trafficking campaigns focused on the latter category of “victims,” and stories of Russian women tricked into lives of sexual slavery were sensationalized and produced the new “narrative” of the Russian trafficking victim.

In addition, the tale of the Russian “mail order bride” also became notorious throughout the West. Many women left Russia not for employment in the paid sector, but for marriage. Marriage agencies sprung up to connect Russian women with

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277 Stoecker, 15.


desiring men, primarily from North America and Western Europe, but also some from Asia. It is believed that thousands of marriages resulted from the services of marriage agencies, but the cases that received the most attention in the West were those in which the woman ended up being abused or exploited by her husband. While it is important to document cases in which women are abused in either sex work or marriage, there were also many cases in which women entered into these arrangements freely and experienced no exploitation. Sensationalizing the issue served to attract the attention of many people, but also obscured the true dynamics of the phenomenon. Additionally, although fewer in number, there were also cases of Russian women being trafficked for other forms of labor, such as domestic work.

A particularly challenging problem in post-Soviet Russia was the trafficking of children. The loss of state-sponsored social protections meant that many families could no longer afford to properly care for their children. This resulted in the problem of “artificial orphans,” which A. V. Orlova describes as “children abandoned by their families because of economic difficulties and raised in state institutions, in the best case scenario, or on the streets in the worst.” The number of state institutions that cared for children was reduced due to lack of funds and the remaining facilities were overcrowded, especially those that cared for children with special needs. Neglect and abuse in these institutions often led children to run away, resulting in an increase in the number of street kids in Russian cities. Those who


281 A.V. Orlova, quoted in Hartl, 11.
remained in the institutions received inadequate education and preparation for life after their graduation out of orphanages, usually around age seventeen. Thus, street children and graduates of orphanages were especially vulnerable to recruitment by traffickers, many of whom specifically targeted this population.282 Some of these children, particularly girls, were trafficked outside of Russia for the purpose of sex work, while others faced exploitation within Russia’s borders in both sex work and other types of labor. Internal trafficking was particularly common from Russia’s rural areas into major cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg.

In addition to Russian women and children being trafficked both internally and to other states, women and children from less prosperous countries in the region, including the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, were trafficked to and through Russia for the purpose of sex work and other forms of labor such as work in the domestic and agricultural spheres. There were also cases of women and children from Central and Eastern Europe and from Africa trafficked into Russia for sex work. In 2006, it was estimated that there were 80,000-130,000 sex workers in Moscow alone, with an additional 20,000-30,000 in Saint Petersburg.283 Experts believe that the majority of women and children involved in commercial sex work in these cities are migrants from other countries or from neighboring towns and villages, many of whom have been trafficked.284 While not as numerous, there were cases of Russian men being trafficked into Western Europe for forms of hard labor.

282 Hartl, 11-12.
283 Tiurukanova (2006), 36.
especially construction work.\textsuperscript{285} Men were also trafficked from other countries in the region to and through Russia for construction work, agricultural work, and other forms of hard labor.

Loosened travel restrictions in the post-Soviet period allowed citizens of former communist states to travel to neighboring countries to look for work. However, their often illegal residency status in these countries and the lack of social support networks made them highly vulnerable to human trafficking.\textsuperscript{286} The 2006 Report of the United Nations/International Organization for Migration (IOM) Working Group on Trafficking in Human Beings in the Russian Federation states:

The growth in migration and the size of the shadow economy exacerbate Russia’s labor exploitation situation, with cautious estimates placing the shadow economy to comprise up to 22.4 percent of the country’s GDP [Gross Domestic Product], with other estimates as high as 40 percent. This enormous demand for mass labor force is met by illegal migrants, of which Russia has 3-5 million. Approximately two-thirds of these illegal migrants are from CIS countries, operating in the shadow economy, which frequently contains elements of slavery and human trafficking. Over 75 percent of illegal migrants are paid cash “under the table,” and 80 percent have no written contracts with their employers, creating easy conditions for employers to exploit conditions frequently bordering on slavery.\textsuperscript{287}

\textsuperscript{285} Kleimenov and Shamkov, 38.

\textsuperscript{286} Hartl, 12.

\textsuperscript{287} Tiurukanova (2006), 34.
Based on the extensiveness of Russia’s shadow economy, the UN/IOM Report concludes that “trafficking for the purpose of exploitation of labor and slave labor, or its component parts in general, is the most common type of human trafficking in Russia and dominates at least in terms of scale.”  

It was estimated that nearly one million of the illegal migrants to Russia experienced some form of labor exploitation. The populations most vulnerable to labor exploitation included young and middle-aged men and women, especially those with low education levels, and the sectors where instances of labor exploitation were most often found included construction and renovation, transportation, trade, lumbering, or seasonal farming.

One of the primary reasons for the high rate of labor trafficking in Russia was the government’s goal of raising its GDP while at the same time experiencing a severe demographic crisis, which creates conditions for increased reliance on migrant labor in both the immediate and more long-term future. Jennifer Ann Hartl argues that “the government’s efforts to build an economy as cheaply and as quickly as possible contribute either directly or indirectly to the perpetuation of human trafficking.”

Likewise, Mikhail Kleimenov and Stanislav Shamkov note:

The recent construction boom in Moscow would never have been possible had it not been for slave labor of immigrants from other CIS countries. Many of them come to Russia, find jobs, and stay illegally. There are well-established

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288 Ibid., 35.
289 Ibid., 35.
290 Ibid., 32, 34.
291 Ibid., 33. The 2006 UN/IOM report predicted a one million decrease in able working citizens in Russia by 2016.
292 Hartl, 2.
recruitment agencies that have offices in neighboring countries and that specialize in supplying slave laborers to Russia. Local authorities choose not to notice this, as construction companies are major taxpayers to local budgets.\footnote{Kleimenov and Shamkov, 38.}

Thus, Russia is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children for both labor and sex trafficking. However, as in Western countries, the sex trafficking of Russian women and girls has received more attention from the Russian government, counter-trafficking activists, and the media than other forms of trafficking. Fortunately, trafficking for labor exploitation began to receive increased attention from the Russian counter-trafficking movement as it developed in the 2000s.

Human trafficking first came to the attention of activists in Russia in the mid-1990s. MiraMed, one of the first organizations in Russia to address human trafficking, was founded in Moscow in 1991 but only began to devote attention to trafficking in the mid-1990s. MiraMed, which was registered both as an American nonprofit and a Russian NGO, began to coordinate with Russian women’s organizations on counter-trafficking work. In 1999, MiraMed, along with several women’s organizations, founded the Angel Coalition as a network to unite organizations across Russia and the CIS that were undertaking projects on human trafficking. Angel Coalition member organizations conducted informational campaigns in order to raise the Russian public’s awareness about human trafficking, ran hotlines to provide information on trafficking and help to its victims, opened shelters offering rehabilitative services to victims, and worked to build collaborative relationships with Russian governmental officials in order to better combat the crime.
The issue of human trafficking did not appear on the agenda of the Russian government until it signed the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children on December 12, 2000. In April 2001, the Commission on Improving the Status of Women under the Russian president held a meeting on the issue of trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of sexual exploitation.\textsuperscript{294} The meeting resulted in a “Program of Action” that assigned responsibilities to various departments of the Russian government for the purpose of combating the sexual exploitation of women and girls. One of the tasks was to develop federal legislation to address human trafficking. The UN Protocol on Human Trafficking called upon states to develop comprehensive policies to address trafficking, and Russian NGOs, led by the Angel Coalition, lobbied the government for a comprehensive law against human trafficking that would criminalize the various components of the crime while developing the infrastructure necessary to help victims and the framework for collaboration among governmental agencies.

Between October 2002 and April 2003, a draft Federal Law to Combat Trafficking in Persons in Russia was developed at the initiative of the State Duma Committee for Legislation and Judicial Reform with the support of the Office of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of Russia in the Central Federal District.\textsuperscript{295} The draft law, however, was never adopted. Instead, in October 2003, President Putin introduced amendments to the criminal code of the Russian Federation that would criminalize human trafficking and related offences, such as the use of slave labor, both of which could be punished by up to fifteen years

\textsuperscript{294} Tiuriukanova (2005), 110.

\textsuperscript{295} Stoecker and Shelley, 9.
imprisonment. In addition, the amendments increased the maximum punishments for crimes such as recruiting minors into prostitution and organizing prostitution rings. The amendments were passed by the Duma in December 2003.  

Although the passing of these criminal laws demonstrated that Russia was taking some steps to combat human trafficking, its efforts did not meet the minimum standards set by the United States. In the following year’s TIP Report, Russia was placed on the Tier 2 Watch List, where it would remain for nine consecutive years until it was demoted to Tier 3 in 2013. The reluctance of the United States to demote Russia to Tier 3 for so many years is widely believed to be due, in part, to political factors and the risk of damaging U.S.-Russia relations. However, it is also due to other measures Russia took to combat human trafficking during this time, including developing collaborative relations with other countries in order to fight the crime, establishing specialized counter-trafficking divisions within Russian ministries, improving governmental cooperation with counter-trafficking NGOs, and providing small grants to support NGO counter-trafficking activities.

Hence, the movement against human trafficking in Russia from 1998-2008 was led by Russian NGOs, most of whom were part of the Angel Coalition, that worked to develop cooperative relationships with the Russian government and to encourage governmental efforts on the issue.  

[References]

296 Ibid., 9.


298 See Tiurukanova (2006), 65; Hartl, 32, 39.
across Russia and the CIS and a large number of smaller organizations that carried out short-term counter-trafficking projects. By 2004, the Angel Coalition had 33 member organizations in Russia and dozens more in other countries.\footnote{Johnson (2009), 62.}

As the Russian counter-trafficking movement began to gain momentum in 2001-2002, a debate over the legalization of prostitution occurred in Russia. This debate paralleled similar discussions taking place in other European countries over ways to address prostitution and the growth of sex trafficking. In 2000, the Netherlands, where prostitution was already legal, also legalized the running of brothels, and Germany legalized prostitution in 2002.\footnote{Marieke Van Doorninck, “A Business Like Any Other? Managing the Sex Industry in the Netherlands,” in \textit{Transnational Prostitution: Changing Global Patterns}, ed. Susanne Thorbek and Bandana Pattanaik (London: Zed Books, 2002), 1; Annegret Staiger, “The Economics of Sex Trafficking since the Legalization of Prostitution in Germany in 2002,” \textit{The Protection Project Journal of Human Rights and Civil Society}, n. 2 (Fall 2009), 103.} By contrast, Sweden implemented a law in 1999 that criminalized the purchase of sexual services (but not the sale of such services in order to protect the women “victims” from prosecution).\footnote{Arthur Gould, “Sweden’s Law on Prostitution: Feminism, Drugs and the Foreign Threat,” in \textit{Transnational Prostitution: Changing Global Patterns}, ed. Susanne Thorbek and Bandana Pattanaik (London: Zed Books, 2002), 201.} In Russia, the legalization of prostitution was proposed as a possible method of addressing sex trafficking. However, to U.S. abolitionists monitoring the allocation of U.S. counter-trafficking funds, even discussing this option was akin to “promoting prostitution.”

As the counter-trafficking movement took off in Russia, the substantial Western support for this movement meant that Western frameworks and concepts were also imported into Russia. The debate between abolitionists and sex workers’
rights advocates that had shaped the Western counter-trafficking movement had less grounding in Russia. As Russian counter-trafficking activists began to grapple with these concepts, many made an effort to understand the arguments of each side of the debate and to consider what effects each approach would have in the Russian context. However, MiraMed and the main office of the Angel Coalition immediately affirmed the strict abolitionist approach that they had always promoted.

As noted, Donna Hughes, an abolitionist feminist affiliated with MiraMed and a leading monitor of U.S. counter-trafficking funding to Russia, began to lobby the U.S. government to deny funding to Russian organizations that did not clearly declare an abolitionist perspective. In 2002, she claimed that the Angel Coalition had been denied U.S. funding that instead went to an organization that she labeled as “pro-prostitution.” Hughes was supported by an international coalition of “human-rights and women's-rights policy organizations, churches, and faith-based groups” that urged Putin to take a stand against U.S. “prostitution supporters” in Russia. 302 In addition, many abolitionists in the United States sent letters to members of Congress to condemn U.S. funding to organizations that had not proclaimed an abolitionist perspective. 303

The U.S. conservative lobby was successful in influencing funding patterns to Russia as part of the new requirement of the “anti-prostitution pledge.” 304 As the women’s crisis centers implicated in the controversy were left to defend themselves to their U.S. funders and Russian supporters, the Bush administration came out in

302 Hughes.

303 Johnson (2009), 63.

304 Ibid., 63.
explicit support of the Angel Coalition and invited them to a Washington, D.C., conference on trafficking, and the secretary of state praised them in a speech. In the next round of U.S. counter-trafficking funding in 2004, the Angel Coalition received a grant of almost half a million dollars to develop more shelters, while only one women’s crisis center received a small grant.

The politics behind these funding decisions left Natalia Khordyreva, then president of the Angel Coalition but also a long-time advocate for women’s crisis centers, critical of the ways that transnational counter-trafficking organizations “subordinate the Eastern organizations… to their standards and frameworks.” These funding decisions contributed to a rift between many women’s crisis center leaders and the MiraMed/Angel Coalition. Instead of encouraging cooperation among Russian organizations that sought to protect women’s rights, U.S. funding policies that encouraged allegiance to one particular ideological stance deepened divisions between organizations whose missions were in reality quite similar. In the end, in the debate over prostitution in Russia, the anti-legalization cohort, supported by Presidents Bush and Putin, prevailed and prostitution remained prohibited in Russia.

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305 Ibid., 63.
306 Ibid., 63.
307 Natalia Khordyreva, quoted in Johnson (2009), 63.
308 Johnson (2009), 63.
309 Schuckman, 87-88. The organization of prostitution and pimping were criminal offenses in Russia, while the sale of sexual services was a civil offense. This difference meant that prostitutes faced less harsh punishments as compared to pimps or those organizing prostitution rings.
Since the beginning of the modern Russian movement against human trafficking, the Angel Coalition has remained a leading force that works to advance the movement by encouraging collaboration among the Russian government, NGOs, international organizations, and foreign governments, and by improving services to the Russian public and to victims of human trafficking. In doing so, the Angel Coalition has operated both as an organization within Russian civil society and as an actor in the transnational counter-trafficking movement. In the next chapter, I examine how the Angel Coalition carries out both of these roles. I argue that a unique combination of organizational attributes has permitted the Angel Coalition to effectively work toward its counter-trafficking goals as it navigates both the Russian bureaucracy and the requirements of foreign funders in order to achieve success in both of these arenas.
Chapter 6: A Case Study of The Angel Coalition, 1998-2008

In 1990, Dr. Juliette Engel, an American physician who had specialized in providing ultrasound exams for expectant mothers, toured Russia for the first time and visited several state-run birthing centers. Appalled by the unsafe conditions in these centers, Engel was inspired to contribute her skills to improving maternity care in Russia. Searching for a new passion after becoming disheartened with the medical profession and selling her radiology and diagnostic practice in Bellevue, Washington State, Engel founded the MiraMed Institute in 1991. MiraMed, whose name derived from the Russian words “Mir,” which means both peace and world, and “Med” for medicine or healing, was registered in the United States as an international public charity and in Russia as a non-governmental charitable organization. With offices in Seattle and Moscow, MiraMed’s initial mission was dedicated to improving maternal care in Russia, but within a few years, it expanded to providing aid to orphanages as well, in order to address the problem of children abandoned or orphaned at birth.¹

In the mid-1990s, while supplying aid to orphanages, Engel began to notice a disturbing trend of children disappearing from orphanages. As described by Donna Hughes:

Juliette Engel…discovered the scourge of epidemic trafficking while working with orphanages, from which groups of girls were mysteriously disappearing. Vans would arrive at the orphanages to take girls on field trips. They packed

their lunches and overnight bags and hopped into the vans, never to be seen again.²

Engel investigated the disappearances of these children, mostly teenage girls, and found that many were victims of human trafficking, a phenomenon that was new to her at the time. As she learned more about trafficking practices and discovered that many traffickers specifically targeted orphans, one of Russia’s most vulnerable population groups, she became determined to combat trafficking and added this goal to MiraMed’s mission of protecting Russia’s orphans. MiraMed’s campaigns against human trafficking grew in strength as Russian civil society’s awareness of the problem also expanded. In 1999, MiraMed, along with a number of Russian women’s organizations, founded the Angel Coalition, Russia’s first coalition devoted specifically to combating human trafficking. Through this joint Russian-American action, the Russian movement against human trafficking was born.

In this chapter, I carry out a case study of the Angel Coalition’s establishment and its counter-trafficking work from 1998 to 2008. I examine the Angel Coalition (AC) both as an organization within Russian civil society that had to navigate the changing policies of the Russian government toward NGOs, and as an actor in the transnational counter-trafficking movement that had to negotiate with camps espousing different views on trafficking and prostitution. I analyze the unique combination of organizational attributes that set the Angel Coalition apart from the majority of Russian NGOs and that contributed to its success in counter-trafficking work both within Russia and in the international arena. In addition, I examine the AC’s funding situation. As an organization with both Russian and international roots,

² Hughes.
the Angel Coalition struggled to define its identity, and this struggle is apparent in its search for funding. As large U.S. governmental counter-trafficking grants became less available to the AC in the mid-to late 2000s, AC activists faced the dilemma of increasingly turning to the Russian state for support, and thus losing some of their independence, or searching for other international sources of short-term grants, which would threaten the organization’s stability and longevity.

I address these topics through a discussion of the operation of the Angel Coalition Trafficking Victims Assistance Center (TVAC) as activists carry out counter-trafficking projects and interact with Russian governmental officials, foreign contacts, and NGO partners throughout the CIS; analysis of interviews conducted with eight AC activists; examination of AC publications, such as brochures, website materials, and research reports; and a review of literature published on the AC by outside sources, such as articles in newspapers, journals, and other periodicals. Through this case study, I seek to provide a compelling illustration of an advocacy NGO with both local and transnational identities that strived to advance its activist, human rights agenda at home and in the expanding international arena.

6.1 Methodology

Since a main purpose of my case study of the Angel Coalition is to better understand the worlds of activists, with the goal of providing insight into the operation of transnational counter-trafficking networks, I rely largely upon the qualitative methods of participant observation, interviewing, and textual analysis of materials produced by the Angel Coalition. These methods helped me to understand the meaning-making
systems of participants in regards to human trafficking and their work in the counter-trafficking field. In addition, I employ analysis of textual materials, mainly articles in newspapers, magazines, or journals, published about the Angel Coalition by outside sources. This method provided additional data on the history of the Angel Coalition and helped me to contextualize my case study. Analyzing these outside sources also provided me with differing perspectives on the work of the Angel Coalition.

My research draws from six months of fieldwork that I carried out at the TVAC in Moscow, Russia, from November 2007 to May 2008. Before beginning fieldwork, my research protocol was approved by the University of Maryland, College Park, Institutional Review Board (IRB) on August 30, 2007. During my fieldwork, I worked as a full-time volunteer intern at the TVAC (40 hours per week). My primary duties included translating organizational materials, such as conference reports, website materials, and grant applications from Russian to English; searching for funding opportunities for AC member organizations; and conducting research on human trafficking cases in Russia and counter-trafficking strategies being developed by the international community. While working at the TVAC, I took daily fieldnotes based on my observations of AC activists as they carried out counter-trafficking projects and communicated with their various partners. All of my participants signed informed consent forms approved by the University of Maryland IRB and were told that the research was being conducted for a Ph.D. dissertation in the Department of Women’s Studies. My observations helped me to better understand the many

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3 Participants who were working at the TVAC office at the time of my research signed consent forms for both interviews and participant observation, while others signed consent forms for interviews only. Consent forms were made available to participants in both Russian and English. Copies of these forms can be found in Appendices IV, V, VI, and VII.
processes involved in effectively carrying out counter-trafficking projects and running a Russian civil society organization, while also perceiving the meanings that activists imparted to their work. I reviewed my fieldnotes weekly and wrote memos on emerging patterns and themes, and on newly arising questions that I wanted to explore further.

In addition, I conducted interviews with eight AC activists. Seven of these interviews took place at the TVAC office in Moscow during my fieldwork, and one interview took place in the MiraMed office in Washington, D.C., in November 2008 after I had returned to the United States. The eight activists I interviewed had all directly worked on AC counter-trafficking projects at one time or another. Seven of the activists were working on AC counter-trafficking projects at the time of the interview, and one had worked on AC counter-trafficking projects previously. I use the term “Angel Coalition activist” to refer to any private individual, paid or unpaid, who was directly involved in the AC’s work. The AC activists whom I interviewed fit into the following categories: past or present employees of the TVAC, past or present employees of MiraMed, and past or present volunteers. My interviewees were diverse in terms of the positions they held in relation to AC counter-trafficking projects. Some held leadership positions, some were in mid-level positions, and some were volunteers with little authority over AC projects. I do not include governmental officials who worked with the AC in the definition of an “AC activist.” I have

4 MiraMed opened an office in Washington, D.C. in 2007 after they merged with another U.S.-based organization. The AC activist I interviewed in Washington, D.C., was working in the U.S. at the time of my fieldwork in order to help get the D.C. office set up and running. However, the merger turned out to be unsuccessful, and MiraMed’s D.C. office closed in 2009.
assigned pseudonyms to all my research participants, which I use when reporting my data.

I conducted four of my interviews with CIS activists, and four with American activists. I use the term “CIS activist” to refer to activists from Russia and other CIS states. I group this set of activists together in one category due to my small sample size in order to avoid identifying specific AC workers by nationality and also because this category was commonly used by AC activists themselves to distinguish between the different groups of activists involved in the AC’s work. All of the activists in this group were from a CIS country and were of a CIS nationality. The CIS, or Commonwealth of Independent States, is a union of most of the former states of the Soviet Union, including Russia, that cooperate on issues of trade, finance, lawmaking, security, and crime control, among others. While only some activists that I categorized as “CIS activists” were Russian, I have given them all Russian pseudonyms due to my small sample size to avoid identifying them by nationality.

In addition to CIS activists, there were also activists from the U.S. and other Western countries involved in the AC’s work. I use the terms “CIS countries” and “Western countries,” to honor the meaning-making systems of the activists I studied, and to reflect the conversations taking place in the literatures I am exploring. AC activists, from both “the CIS” and “the West,” frequently used these categories and contrasted between “the CIS” and “the West” in interviews and in the course of their everyday work while I was at the TVAC. Multiple scholars on Russian civil society and Russian feminisms have also documented the common use of these terms among the activists they studied. Therefore, although I am aware of the debates among some
scholars over comparing “Russia” or “the CIS” to “the West,” I choose to employ these categories in my dissertation to honor the terms used by my participants and to reflect the literary conversations within which I am writing.

The four Western activists that I interviewed during the course of my research were all of U.S. nationality, although activists from other Western countries, including Great Britain, Canada, and Sweden, had been involved in AC counter-trafficking projects up to the time of my research. Although I did not specifically seek to interview activists of U.S. nationality, the foreign activists most involved with the AC’s work at the time of my fieldwork happened to be Americans. Additionally, as noted, the AC had a history of strong U.S. ties, being co-founded by MiraMed, a U.S. organization, and received significant U.S. financial support in the early years of its operation. Thus, I will refer to my second group of interviewees as “American activists.” Regarding the gender of my eight participants, I interviewed seven women and one man.

The interviews were open-ended/semi-structured in format in order to privilege the voices of the participants. I had several main topic areas and several central questions that I asked interviewees, but I allowed them some control over the flow of the interview. The goal of my interviews was to better understand the perspectives of individual activists on their own work with the AC and on the broader goals and ideologies of the organization as it sought to combat human trafficking and to build relationships with Russian, CIS, and foreign partners.

As stated above, I conducted seven of these interviews at the TVAC office in Moscow, and one in the MiraMed office in Washington, D.C. At the TVAC, AC

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5 The interview guide, in English and in Russian, can be found in Appendices II and III.
activists shared offices, but I was able to conduct most interviews with some degree of privacy. I conducted most interviews in the kitchen area of the TVAC either before or after the lunch break, so that I was alone with the interviewee for the majority of the interview. I conducted other interviews in participants’ offices on days when their office companions were out. In a few cases, I was not able to interview a participant in privacy but conducted the interview in a language that their office mates did not understand, lending a degree of privacy. However, I did not feel that a lack of complete privacy caused much discomfort among most interviewees or led them to hold back information. AC activists working at the TVAC were close and generally very open with each other. Most of my interviewees seemed open to sharing information with me, as they were with their colleagues. The interview that I conducted at the MiraMed office in Washington, D.C., was in a private setting.

The length of interviews ranged from approximately thirty minutes to just over two hours. Some of the longer interviews were conducted over two sessions.

Five of the interviews were conducted in English, three in Russian.\textsuperscript{6} Seven of the interviews were recorded, with my participants’ permission. For one interview, I relied on taking notes during the interview. Soon after conducting each interview (on the same day), I set aside time to reflect on the interview and write a memo on how I felt the interview went, in regards to my rapport with the interviewee; their reactions to my questions; any problems that arose, e.g., any interview questions that were difficult to understand; and any information I gathered during the interview that brought up new questions that I wanted to explore. After completing this process, I

\textsuperscript{6} One of my interviews with a CIS activist was conducted in English. In quoting from this interview, I make minor grammatical corrections to improve the flow of the statements and make the meaning more clear.
began to transcribe the interviews. For the interviews conducted in Russian, I translated them and transcribed them into English. I began transcribing the interviews while conducting my fieldwork in Moscow, but completed most of this process in the United States.

In addition to carrying out participant observation and interviews, I also collected textual materials produced by the Angel Coalition, including website materials, informational brochures and pamphlets on human trafficking, reports from conferences, a protocol on combating human trafficking in Russia, logs containing details on the human trafficking cases reported to the AC’s hotline, research reports on human trafficking written by AC staff, among other informational, practical, and research materials produced by the organization. Employing the method of textual analysis of organizational materials allowed me to obtain more detailed information on many aspects of the organization’s work as compared to the data I had gathered during interviews, and also enabled me to compare data gathered from these distinct methods to check for consistency. Overall, I found most of my data, gathered from interviews, participant observation, and textual analysis of organizational materials, to be consistent. I did not find any major discrepancies between descriptions of the AC’s work shared with me during interviews or participant observation and descriptions reported in the organization’s written materials.

After completing the data collection stage, I began to focus on analysis of my collected materials. I reviewed all of my qualitative materials, including interview transcriptions, fieldnotes, memos, and texts produced by the AC, to look for emerging themes. Thus, I followed a largely inductive approach to data analysis, looking for
patterns that emerged during reading and re-reading my research materials, instead of imposing predetermined categories onto the data. The interpretive, interactionist approach that I took to analyzing my fieldnotes and interview transcriptions follows closely that of John VanMaanen, Robert Emerson, Rachel Fretz, and Linda Shaw, and also draws upon the interpretive approach described by Kathleen DeWalt and Billie DeWalt and the constructivist approach to grounded theory discussed by Kathy Charmaz.7 According to Charmaz, such an approach “places priority on the phenomena of study and sees both data and analysis as created from the shared experiences of researcher and participants and the researcher’s relationships with participants.”8 In using an interpretive approach toward data analysis, I attempted to “recognize” themes that emerged from the data; however, at the same time, I acknowledge my role as researcher in “interpreting” the data and “constructing” codes according to how I understand particular pieces of data. Hence, unlike grounded theorists who view themes and theories as “discovered” in research data, an interpretive approach acknowledges both the inductive and deductive features of qualitative data analysis. Although I aimed to develop codes and themes that reflected the lived experiences of my participants and the meanings they attached to these experiences, I remain aware that my theoretical perspective and my position in the field influenced how I interpret the research data.

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8 Charmaz, 677.
After identifying consistent themes based on my interpretation of the data, I began to code my fieldnotes and interview transcriptions, using words or short phrases to signify various themes, concepts, or ideas that I found in the data set. In later stages of coding, after I had reviewed my fieldnotes and transcriptions multiple times and refined my codes, I sorted the codes into a smaller number of stronger themes to better organize my data and demonstrate how codes related to one another. I used the software program Atlas.ti to record the codes on my fieldnotes and interview transcriptions. For the textual materials collected from the Angel Coalition, I wrote the codes directly on the materials.

In addition to utilizing these qualitative research methods, I also collected and analyzed materials published on the Angel Coalition by outside sources, mainly articles in newspapers, magazines, and journals, and also some books. This method allowed me to gather additional information on the Angel Coalition and to examine alternative perspectives on the organization’s work. While some of these sources were celebratory of the organization’s accomplishments, others were critical. As discussed in previous chapters, the transnational counter-trafficking arena is politically divided into several “camps” with very different views on human trafficking, especially on trafficking for the purpose of sex work. Authors with contrasting perspectives on human trafficking tended to evaluate the work of the Angel Coalition differently. Analyzing these external sources helped me to flesh out the political environment in which the AC operated in the international arena, a topic that was not extensively addressed in my qualitative materials. In addition, it
permitted me to view the organization from new perspectives and consider different conclusions to my research.

During the data collection, analysis, and writing processes, I remained reflexive and open to new ideas or conclusions that emerged from my data set to avoid relying on preliminary hypotheses from earlier research stages. I followed the approach of DeWalt and DeWalt, who believe that “continual reexamination is an essential component of checking one’s conclusions against the real world data.”\(^9\) I utilized the technique of “constant validity check” to continually search in my research data for evidence that challenged, as well as supported, my preliminary conclusions.\(^10\) I believe the multiple research methods that I employed helped me to develop a deep understanding of many facets of my participants’ worlds and to convey this understanding through my case study. During the writing process, I remained reflexive of my presence in the research site and the ways my presence may have influenced the data collected. Although I have explored various viewpoints on the Angel Coalition’s work and made efforts to center the participants’ voices in data analysis, I acknowledge that this case study represents my interpretation of the Angel Coalition’s work and is influenced by my theoretical assumptions, political leanings, and relationships in the field.

### 6.2 History of the Angel Coalition, 1998-2008

As noted, the MiraMed Institute played a major role in the founding of the Angel Coalition. In 1992, a year after its establishment, MiraMed acted upon a request from

\(^9\) DeWalt and DeWalt, 190.

\(^10\) Ibid., 191.
the Russian Ministry of Family Affairs to study the plight of children abandoned or orphaned at birth. This effort led to MiraMed’s first aid programs to orphanages. By the mid-1990s, MiraMed was supplying direct aid to several orphanages in Russia and also organizing teams of American volunteers to work in orphanages, teaching subjects such as English, computer skills, and carpentry.

In the course of this work, Engel and other MiraMed staffers became aware of teenage girls being recruited out of the orphanages into prostitution rings in Eastern Europe. In response, MiraMed staffers began to investigate the phenomenon of human trafficking and developed a program to educate at-risk girls about its dangers. In 1998, with growing awareness of the extensiveness of the trafficking of girls from Russian orphanages into sex work abroad, MiraMed applied for, and received, a grant from the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) to begin an anti-sex trafficking educational campaign for high-risk girls in the rural regions of Russia. In the course of carrying out this campaign, MiraMed worked with Russian NGOs, formalizing partnerships with over 100 of them, many of which addressed the issue of violence against women and would later become allies in the fight against human trafficking. These burgeoning partnerships represented the beginnings of an activist network that would be formalized the following year as the Angel Coalition. Also in 1998, the MiraMed Institute was recognized for its work in Russia by the United Nations and was granted Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).\textsuperscript{11}

Following the success of its 1998 educational campaign against sex trafficking, MiraMed received grants in 1999 from the U.S. Department of State’s

\textsuperscript{11} MiraMed Institute, “MiraMed History.”

At the time of the founding of the Angel Coalition, a number of Russian NGOs had already become aware of the trafficking of Russian women abroad and had begun to implement projects to combat this trend. However, they faced difficulties in coordinating their activities across such a large expanse of land and in obtaining grants geared toward counter-trafficking work. The formation of the Angel Coalition in conjunction with MiraMed allowed these women’s NGOs to improve inter-organizational coordination in their fight against human trafficking and to benefit from MiraMed’s international connections and experience in obtaining large grants. Nadezhda, a CIS activist working at the Angel Coalition, described the founding of the coalition in her own words:
there was a base of women’s organizations, social organizations, that were already doing something on this topic, each on their own. Then they joined together and decided, there, we have the Angel Coalition, and that they would all work together on these programs. In my view, this was the right thing to do because our society is very big and they are all located very far apart from one another, and it’s very difficult if you are in Petrozavodsk and something happens, where, in Vladivostok, to do something…. And such enthusiastic people decided to found the Angel Coalition. And of course, Juliette [Engel] played a big role. In general, sometimes we call her “Mama,” because she takes care of this organization so much, and it was through her enthusiasm that the Angel Coalition appeared…. The MiraMed Institute and the Angel Coalition, they are thanks to her. Afterwards, we started to work on our own, but all the ideas and the initiative to create such an organization were hers.14

Initially, the Angel Coalition was registered in St. Petersburg both as an NGO and as an association of women’s organizations, with twenty original member organizations. The first president of the Angel Coalition was Natalia Khordyreva, director of the Psychological Crisis Center for Women in St. Petersburg, and the crisis center served as the first headquarters out of which the AC operated. In the first years of its operation, the Angel Coalition focused much of its efforts on trafficking prevention.

In 2001, the AC, in partnership with MiraMed, organized a large-scale counter-trafficking public education and media campaign across Russia. This joint campaign was supported by grants from the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of

14 Interview with Nadezhda, January 17, 2008.
Educational and Cultural Affairs and Soroptimists International. To launch the campaign, simultaneous press conferences were held in six cities in five different Russian oblasts, which were attended by more than 100 radio, television, and newspaper journalists.\(^\text{15}\) The campaign kick-off received extensive media coverage in all regions and on the national level. After the press conferences, Russia’s largest daily newspaper, *Pravda*, ran a series of articles about trafficking, and a national Russian television station aired a program about trafficking that reached an estimated audience of 20 million people.\(^\text{16}\) As part of the first large-scale national media campaign on human trafficking, these reports helped to educate people who knew little or nothing about the phenomenon. During the educational campaign, a volunteer “army” in each of the six cities visited schools, colleges, and community organizations and met with leaders to educate them about human trafficking. As a result of these visits, Duma representatives in many regions pledged their support for new laws against trafficking. In addition, the campaign helped to establish ties between counter-trafficking NGOs and the Russian government and built the foundation from which many future collaborative efforts would grow.\(^\text{17}\)

In 2001, the Angel Coalition also opened a Moscow office, which then became the headquarters of the Angel Coalition network of NGOs. The Moscow office took over the responsibilities of building collaborative relations with Russian governmental structures and international organizations, coordinating the work of AC


\(^{16}\) MiraMed Institute (2002), 1.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 4.
member NGOs, and searching for funding for member NGOs.\textsuperscript{18} Because the Angel Coalition was not yet self-supporting at that time, the new office, according to the AC’s newsletter, was presented to the AC as a “gift” from MiraMed, which also covered the salaries of the office’s director and coordinator.\textsuperscript{19} Marianna Solomatova, a counter-trafficking activist and organizer from Chelyabinsk, was hired to take over as Angel Coalition director. With a furnished and technologically equipped office in Moscow (in close proximity to MiraMed’s office) and two paid staff positions, the hope was that these resources would enable the Angel Coalition to attain self-sufficiency, an aim which would require the staff to devote a great deal of time to applying for grants and meeting with Russian and international contacts to establish the AC as a legitimate partner in the counter-trafficking field.

Also in 2001, the MiraMed-Angel Coalition family expanded to include two additional organizations that focused, in part, on human trafficking. The Russian organization Women and Children First (WCF) was founded in Moscow by MiraMed in order to extend MiraMed’s mission of protecting Russian women and children.\textsuperscript{20} Similar to the founding of the Angel Coalition, the establishment of WCF as a Russian organization provided further support toward the achievement of MiraMed’s mission. As Russian organizations, the AC and WCF had greater opportunities to collaborate with the Russian government, influence Russian legislation, restructure

\textsuperscript{18} Angel Coalition, “Novii Direktor Moskovskogo ofisa” [“New Director of the Moscow Office”], Koalitsiia Angel Vypusk Novostei [Angel Coalition Newsletter] (2001), 3.

\textsuperscript{19} Angel Coalition, “Novii ofis Koalitsii Angel” [“New Angel Coalition Office”], Koalitsiia Angel Vypusk Novostei [Angel Coalition Newsletter], (2001), 1.

Russia’s social policy, etc., than MiraMed did as a foreign organization. But whereas the AC focused mainly on the trafficking of adults, especially women, WCF’s emphasis was on advocating for children, including trafficked children, but also children who had experienced other forms of trauma or were living in vulnerable situations.

In addition, in 2001, MiraMed initiated collaboration with the Russian organization Theatre for Change, a newly established social action theater company in Nizhny Novgorod. Together, MiraMed and Theatre for Change developed a play entitled “Let’s Go to Paris,” which acted out a common trafficking scenario with life-size puppets to be performed in Russian schools. Performances of the play were combined with discussion on the dangers of human trafficking and distribution of AC’s educational materials. The success of “Let’s Go to Paris” led MiraMed and Theatre for Change to apply for a three-year grant from USAID, which they received, to create a series of in-school plays focusing on increasing tolerance for socially marginalized populations, such as orphans, individuals with disabilities, and those living with HIV/AIDS. Among MiraMed employees and AC activists, these three Russian organizations, the Angel Coalition, Women and Children First, and Theatre for Change, are understood to be part of the “MiraMed family,” with MiraMed often seen as a “parent figure” to these three Russian offshoots that it helped to birth and grow toward future independence.

The Angel Coalition continued to expand its counter-trafficking activities in 2001 by initiating a training program for foreign consulates in St. Petersburg, a program that was extended to embassies in Moscow in 2002. The program was targeted toward staff in the visa-granting sections and educated participants on human trafficking, particularly patterns of trafficking common in Russia, and on techniques to identify potential victims when they arrive in visa sections or as part of tourist groups. Participants were given AC brochures to distribute to individuals applying for visas, which warned about the risks of traveling abroad and provided information about travelers’ rights and who to contact for help in a foreign country. The training program was conducted mainly in embassies of European countries, including the embassies of the Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{22}

In 2002, the Angel Coalition began working with the Legislative Committee of the Russian State Duma in an effort to pass a comprehensive federal counter-trafficking law. As noted, the 2003 draft law was not passed, but amendments to the criminal code were adopted in that year that made human trafficking and related crimes illegal. However, there was still no overarching framework to coordinate the work of the government and NGOs against trafficking. Therefore, AC activists continued to lobby for a comprehensive law that would allocate funding specifically for counter-trafficking work; assign responsibilities to Russian ministries and governmental agencies in combating the crime, providing aid to victims,

communicating with foreign governments in repatriating victims, etc.; and outline a plan of cooperation between the government and NGOs.

The Angel Coalition experienced major growth in 2003, the year in which it received funding to transform its Moscow office into the Angel Coalition Trafficking Victims Assistance Center and, in partnership with MiraMed, to develop a network of safehouses for trafficking victims throughout Russia. A grant from the U.S. Department of State’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP Office) to MiraMed and AC funded the opening of the TVAC in June 2003 and provided sub-grants of $20,000 each to five organizational members of the Angel Coalition network in St. Petersburg, Murmansk, Petrozavodsk, and Kazan to establish regional safehouses.23 Oleg Kouzbit, a media and public relations specialist from Nizhny Novgorod, was appointed the director of the TVAC. The main purpose of the TVAC was to work with the Russian government and international agencies to coordinate the return of Russian victims of trafficking (primarily women) who had experienced exploitation abroad. Victims could then receive rehabilitative services in one of the regional safehouses. These five safehouses were the first for trafficking victims in Russia and provided medical, psychological, and legal services to help reintegrate victims back into their communities.24 According to MiraMed, in its first year of operation, the TVAC assisted in the rescue and repatriation of 65 victims of trafficking from foreign countries, and over 100 victims received services at the

23 The grant, administered through the International Organization for Migration’s Moscow office, funded the opening of two safehouses in St. Petersburg.

TVAC and the regional safehouses. In 2004, four new safehouses were established with TIP funding in Yaroslavl, Nizhny Novgorod, Chelyabinsk, and Irkutsk and joined the Angel Coalition network.

Angel Coalition activists, at both the TVAC and the regional centers, carried out several projects related to the opening of the safehouses, including the development of a health and rehabilitation protocol to be used in the shelters. In 2003, with funding from the Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation to MiraMed, TVAC staff organized international exchanges for safehouse staff to visit operating shelters in nine European countries that were providing services to Russian victims of human trafficking. Following the visits, participants took part in a five-day “protocol writing” session in Moscow along with governmental representatives from the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Duma, and the Moscow City Duma. This working group developed the first draft protocol for providing assistance to victims of trafficking in Russia; its recommendations were accepted by governmental officials as an exemplar of “best practices” for safehouse operation in Russia and were implemented in the nine safehouses in the Angel Coalition network. This protocol was published as the “Trafficking Victims Assistance Protocol” in June 2003.


27 MiraMed Institute, “MiraMed and Angel Coalition conduct high level federal trainings in Petrozavodsk, St. Petersburg, Murmansk, Kazan, and Yaroslavl,” MiraMed Institute Annual Report
In 2004, the Angel Coalition initiated one of their most well-known and far-reaching projects when they launched a toll-free Russian language hotline throughout Russia and in several foreign countries. Initially, the hotline was available in Russia, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium; later it was extended to Switzerland and the United States as well. The hotline targeted, first of all, Russian-speaking human trafficking victims in Russia or foreign countries who could call the number for assistance in being rescued from a trafficking situation, if necessary, and in returning home. In addition, the hotline was designed to provide consultations to Russians preparing to travel abroad to inform them of precautions for safe travel and provide phone numbers of important contacts abroad in case they should find themselves in difficult situations.

When TVAC staff received calls from victims of human trafficking abroad, they worked with their contacts in the Russian government and law enforcement and in foreign countries to assist in the rescue of the victims and connect them with safehouses in the destination country to receive rehabilitative services until they could be repatriated to Russia. Once victims arrived back in Russia, TVAC employees met many of them at an airport or train station and arranged transportation for them to travel home or to a safehouse or rehabilitation center. In addition to receiving calls directly from victims, the hotline also received many calls from relatives of victims or from those who were fearful a family member had become a victim of human trafficking.

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trafficking. In such situations, TVAC staff connected family members to authorities who could further investigate the cases. The AC also exerted a great deal of effort in advertising the hotline, both in Russia and in foreign countries, to increase awareness of this service through means such as billboards, posters in metro stations, brochures available at Moscow embassies and airports and airports abroad, and pens, tarot cards, or other informational materials distributed directly to Moscow sex workers.

Additionally in 2004, the AC, in partnership with the Swedish women’s organization Kvinnoforum, began to organize regional “Safe Rescue and Return” conferences and trainings to build the capacity of the TVAC and the regional safehouses in coordinating the repatriation of Russian trafficking victims from abroad and providing rehabilitative services. This project was funded by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the U.S. State Department’s TIP Office.\(^{29}\) From 2004 to 2007, these conferences and trainings were held in Moscow and the eight regions of Russia where AC safehouses were located and were geared to respond to the specific needs of each region. In addition to local NGO activists, Russian governmental and law enforcement officials and foreign experts in the counter-trafficking field participated in the conferences, which helped to build collaborative partnerships between these groups. The President’s Administration of the Russian Federation endorsed the “Safe Rescue and Return” conferences and mandated that each regional governor appoint representatives to attend.\(^{30}\) As a result, high-level governmental officials were present at most of the conferences.

In addition to establishing collaborative relationships, training participants contributed to the development of a counter-trafficking protocol that outlined recommended procedures to follow during the rehabilitation and repatriation processes and a recommended division of responsibilities for various governmental agencies and NGO partners in responding to and prosecuting trafficking-related crimes. In 2004, in the absence of an official governmental protocol, the Angel Coalition published the “Counter-Trafficking Protocol and Plan of Action for the Russian Federation,” which served as a guide on how governmental structures and NGOs should coordinate their efforts to combat human trafficking.31 This protocol was further revised based on continuing conference discussions and recommendations from participants. The NGO-governmental relationships established during these trainings and the protocol were utilized to simplify and improve the repatriation of Russian trafficking victims from foreign countries. In 2007, with renewed funding from SIDA, this project was expanded to Central Asia, and conferences and trainings were organized in the CIS countries of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

In 2005, the Angel Coalition, with many programs in place to assist women victims of human trafficking, turned its attention to the much-neglected issue of child trafficking. Describing the problem of child trafficking in Moscow, MiraMed writes: “As the nation’s largest and most influential city [Moscow] serves as a magnet not only for homeless children looking for work but for pimps and traffickers who import

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women and children into Moscow from economically depressed regions and former Soviet republics for prostitution.” MiraMed cites the Moscow militia estimate that, in 2005, over 70,000 victims of trafficking for prostitution were living in the city, that 90 percent of them were women and girls, and that 80 percent were under 18 years of age. Although many of these were teenagers, even children younger than ten were found to be victims of sex trafficking.

Exacerbating the situation was the fact that there was no system of rescue and rehabilitation for trafficked children. In the absence of shelters for victims of child trafficking or other forms of child exploitation, police and social service workers randomly sent such children to hospitals, shelters for homeless children, or juvenile detention centers; children from other regions or countries were commonly deported back to their native areas. Many social workers were aware of the deficiencies in the system but did not have the tools or the training to address this problem. In an effort to begin the process of reforming the child welfare system in Moscow to be more responsive to traumatized children, the Angel Coalition, in partnership with MiraMed and Women and Children First, initiated the Moscow Child Rescue Project in 2005 with funding from the World Childhood Foundation. The project aimed to develop methodologies for a new rehabilitation model for traumatized children; provide training for detention center staff, police, social workers, medical personnel, and other workers who frequently come into contact with trafficked or exploited children;

33 Ibid.
and raise the awareness of senior governmental officials of the problem in order to begin reforming the system.

To carry out the Moscow Child Rescue Project, AC, WCF, and MiraMed worked to establish constructive relationships with the Moscow juvenile police and staff at the Altufovo Temporary Detention Center for Juvenile Delinquents, which was run by the Moscow police and was the only facility in Moscow that provided care to street children from other regions and countries. The relationships established with the Moscow juvenile police led AC and its partners to offer a course of police training designed by the AC psychologist, an expert in police psychology. In May 2006, the Moscow Department of Internal Affairs signed an agreement with the Angel Coalition permitting the AC to provide professional training to Moscow law enforcement personnel. From 2006 to 2008, several thousand Moscow police officers, detectives, and police psychologists received training on identifying and working with trafficked and exploited children. At the Detention Center for Juvenile Delinquents, the AC and its partners created two specially furnished, child-friendly rooms: one for relaxation therapy for children, and the other for psychologists to interview children while police or social workers watched from the other side of a one-way mirror. The “interviewing room” was also used during AC training sessions to demonstrate to participants how to interview children in non-traumatizing


35 Ibid.
ways and how to obtain as much evidence as possible for criminal cases without causing further harm.\textsuperscript{36}

In addition to training law enforcement personnel and creating the child-friendly rooms in the detention center, the Moscow Child Rescue Project was also directed at raising the awareness of senior governmental officials on child trafficking in order to implement system-wide reforms. One of the most difficult aspects of the project was transforming the discourse and understanding of city officials of these children as “vagrants” or “juvenile delinquents” and demonstrating to them the abuse and exploitation that many of the children had experienced. Although the Moscow Child Rescue Project was initiated in 2005, it was not until 2007 that the term “trafficked children” was accepted as an official term in discussing the scope of the problem. In an April 2007 meeting sponsored by the AC and WCF and attended by city officials, law enforcement officials, and representatives of the Moscow Department of Social Protection, the Moscow Department of Education, and the President’s Administration, government officials acknowledged the problem of “child trafficking” for the first time.\textsuperscript{37} Once the problem of child trafficking was officially recognized, government-sponsored agencies and institutes were authorized to begin projects addressing the issue on a wider scale, and the Moscow Child Rescue Project moved to implement sustainable, long-lasting reform in the system.


In addition to the above-mentioned reforms, the Moscow Child Rescue Project also accomplished the following achievements: it developed the concept methodologies for a new rehabilitation model for traumatized children that was incorporated into a federal governmental project on reforming the child welfare system; it set up model therapeutic play rooms at additional pilot sites, including city shelters, rehabilitation centers, and orphanages, with staff trained in using the space for therapeutic work; it elicited an agreement from the Federal Ministry of Education to co-fund pilot rehabilitation programs in city shelters for children; it facilitated the open discussion of child abuse and child trafficking among officials on both the city and federal levels, along with commitments to address these problems; it developed, in partnership with the Moscow University of Psychology and Pedagogy, the first trauma rehabilitation module of a new professional qualification for child welfare workers; among many other achievements. These accomplishments represent not only the implementation of projects aimed at serving trafficked and abused children, but also the construction of a stronger and more responsive foundation from which the Russian child welfare system could continue to grow.

The example of the Moscow Child Rescue Project demonstrates the ability of transnational actors to influence reforms in the social welfare system in Russia, which is often perceived, both at home and abroad, as a strong state that rejects foreign interference. In this particular project, the World Childhood Foundation, an international organization based in Sweden, provided funding to MiraMed, AC, and WCF, hybrid Russia-U.S. organizations, to provide services directly to Russian law enforcement personnel, shelter and orphanage staff, governmental officials, and other
social welfare workers. The collaborative relationships established through this project led to new rehabilitation models, educational curricula, and training programs that were accepted by the Russian government and, in many cases, taken over by Russian governmental agencies. Thus, in contrast to Russia’s perceived rejection of foreign influence over its domestic affairs, this example illustrates that, on issues of importance to all parties, e.g., the welfare of Russia’s children, the parties were willing to work together and take advantage of their combined experience to implement beneficial reforms for this system.

In 2007, reflecting the success of the Moscow Child Rescue Project and the need for continued reforms, MiraMed, AC, and WCF received additional funding from the World Childhood Foundation to expand the project. Acknowledging the enormity of attempting to reform Russia’s child welfare system, the renewed Moscow Child Rescue Project was split into two parts: the Angel Coalition took charge of the police trainings and expanded them outside of Moscow city to the broader Moscow Region and the city of Nizhny Novgorod; and Women and Children First took on the reform of Russia’s shelters and rehabilitation programs. The renewed program focused not just on providing training to professionals in Moscow’s child welfare system but also developing a group of committed advocates for change who would spread their knowledge to their colleagues and continue to push for system-wide reform after the Moscow Child Rescue Project ended.

As of 2008, the Moscow Child Rescue Project was endorsed by the Moscow Ombudsman for Children’s Rights and the Moscow City University of Psychology and Education and was authorized as part of the national government’s Education
In 2008, MiraMed received two grants from the Moscow Department of Social Protection for the reprinting of educational materials for specialists working with child victims of violence and for a rehabilitation program for adolescents in the pilot sites. Women and Children First was invited to apply for further grants from the Moscow government to continue developing methods for the rehabilitation of children and adolescents. Thus, in many ways, AC and WCF acted as full-fledged partners of the government in the effort to reform the child welfare system in Russia.

The relationships that AC, WCF, and MiraMed formed with Russian governmental structures around the issues of human trafficking and the child welfare system demonstrate the willingness of the government to partner with Russian NGOs and international organizations when such partnerships further national goals.

In 2008, the AC further expanded its police training programs by initiating a project that focused on police who work with adult victims of trafficking. Recognizing the abusive treatment that many trafficking victims faced at the hands of Russian police, several law enforcement divisions asked the Angel Coalition for help in improving their methods of working with victims in order to protect victims’ human rights and encourage more of them to participate in criminal cases against traffickers. In response, the AC, with funding from the European Commission, implemented the “Changing Stereotypes, Building Partnerships” project, through which they conducted joint police/NGO trainings to educate local police about human

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39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.
trafficking and to further the development of law enforcement-NGO partnerships in five regions of Russia. The AC carried out this project in Moscow, Chelyabinsk, Yaroslavl, Nizhny Novgorod, and Petrozavodsk in partnership with four of the most active AC-member organizations over a 14-month period from 2008 to the beginning of 2009. These training sessions built upon the law enforcement-NGO relationships developed during the “Safe Rescue and Return” trainings in these regions.

The training sessions aimed to teach police to treat trafficking victims as victims of crime rather than as criminals; to recognize the exploitation and trauma that many of them had experienced; and to understand the human rights of trafficking victims and how to avoid violating these rights. For example, police were taught to not use force against individuals who exhibited characteristics of possible trafficking victims (i.e., who wore clothing not appropriate for the season, who spoke poor Russian, appeared in ill health, etc.), to ensure that these individuals felt they were in a safe location before questioning them, and to allow women to be interviewed by women police officers or social workers, if possible. Local NGOs monitored the implementation of human right standards for treatment of victims of human trafficking in each region. Trafficking survivors who had undertaken AC-network rehabilitation programs also participated in the project and gave recommendations to law enforcement on working with victims. A hope was that, by treating trafficking victims more humanely, more would agree to cooperate in criminal proceedings against traffickers and their accomplices, thereby increasing the prosecution rate and putting more traffickers behind bars (a main goal of the participating police officers).

The project resulted in the launching of a website providing law enforcement personnel and NGO activists access to counter-trafficking resources; distribution of 20,000 pocket-sized brochures for police on “identifying potential victims of human trafficking” in the participating regions; the publication of a textbook on human trafficking developed by the AC in partnership with several governmental institutions; the strengthening of partnerships between local law enforcement agencies and NGOs; and the development of a police training module that could be replicated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in other Russian regions. In 2008, 350 participants took part in these training sessions, including 200 key law enforcement and governmental officials and 150 NGO representatives. With most of the participating law enforcement officials in leadership positions, the intention was to have them pass along the knowledge they gained to their staff.

In addition to the expanded police training program, in 2008, the Angel Coalition implemented a trafficking awareness program to directly educate juveniles about the risks of human trafficking and other forms of abuse and exploitation. Working with the Moscow juvenile police, the AC conducted training sessions for teenagers aged 14 to 17 in nine schools in the Moscow Region and the Altufovo Temporary Detention Center for Juvenile Delinquents on recognizing signs of potential trafficking situations, obtaining work safely and legitimately, and developing decision-making skills to lead healthy and secure lives. More than 220 students participated in these sessions through schools, and 58 youth participated at

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42 Ibid., 7.
the detention center. Additionally, the AC conducted training sessions for juvenile police officers and teachers on leading such trainings, with the goal that the program would eventually be taken over by the Moscow Department of Education and law enforcement officials. The Moscow Department of Internal Affairs recognized the Angel Coalition’s work with a letter thanking the organization for its continued education of juvenile police and psychologists.

In addition, in 2008, the AC prepared to take its first international case on human trafficking to the European Court. The AC lawyer worked on the case, “N. M. Rantsev against Cyprus and Russia,” in collaboration with lawyers from London and Yekaterinburg. The AC planned to take a second case to the European Court in 2009.

Besides the major Angel Coalition projects outlined above, the AC carried out many additional activities between 1998 and 2008, including several educational campaigns on human trafficking, many collaborative projects with MiraMed and Women and Children First, and continuous efforts to build relationships with governmental officials, NGO representatives, and international organizations both in Russian and abroad. From a network of twenty organizations in 1999, the Angel Coalition grew to comprise more than sixty NGOs from 27 regions of Russia and nine

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44 Ibid. 10.

CIS countries in 2008.\footnote{Angel Coalition, “About Us,” \textit{Angel Coalition Trafficking Victim Assistance Center Report 2009} (2009), 3. Available on-line at: http://www.miramed.org/pdf/AngelCoalition2009.pdf (accessed February 7, 2013).} Over the course of this decade, the AC experienced many successes in raising the awareness of the Russian public, government, and law enforcement on human trafficking; transforming the issue of human trafficking from a taboo topic among policymakers to an issue seriously addressed by nation-wide committees and federal ministries; directly preventing the trafficking of numerous at-risk individuals and assisting in the rescue and rehabilitation of many victims; serving as a major partner in the reform of the Russian child welfare system and victim rehabilitation system; pioneering new models of collaboration between the Russian government, international organizations, and Russian NGOs; and leading and coordinating the multifaceted Russian movement against human trafficking.

However, the Angel Coalition faced many challenges in its efforts to combat human trafficking and not all of its initiatives proved to be sustainable. Among other obstacles, the AC was hampered by the lack of receptiveness of many government structures to working with NGOs, lack of support in Russia for work on women’s issues (as compared to children’s issues), dependency on personal ties to governmental officials rather than institutional connections, difficulties of coordinating with partner NGOs in conditions of poor communication and financial infrastructures, and reliance on short-term and project specific funding.

One of the AC’s most important projects, the network of safehouses that it developed, did not last beyond the duration of the grant from the U.S. Department of State’s TIP Office. By 2008, the AC’s safehouses had closed and TVAC employees
could only send victims to a rehabilitation center operated by the International Organization for Migration in Moscow. However, IOM’s center focused mainly on medical and, secondarily, psychological rehabilitation and victims could stay only for up to a month, which was in contrast to the more comprehensive services offered at AC’s safehouses, which included educational and career training, legal aid, and community reintegration, and which allowed victims to stay for longer periods of time. Additionally, trafficking victims from abroad were offered the opportunity for rehabilitation at the IOM center only immediately upon their repatriation without the possibility of visiting family members first. With victims from various regions of Russia, many made the decision to return to their home regions rather than remain in Moscow for rehabilitation. Finally, according to TVAC employees, IOM brought in police officers to talk to all victims, while AC safehouses had allowed victims to choose whether or not to cooperate with law enforcement. Thus, AC activists felt a great void was created by the closing of the regional safehouses, and, during the period I was in Moscow, they continuously searched for funding with the hope of re-opening the safehouses.

In the following two sections, I explore in more detail the challenges that the Angel Coalition faced in working to achieve its counter-trafficking goals and the unique organizational factors that enabled the AC to achieve much success both within Russia and internationally. Drawing upon the background research in previous chapters, I explore how the Angel Coalition operated both as a part of Russian civil society and as part of the international movement against human trafficking and how it responded to the particular demands and constraints of each arena.
6.3 The Angel Coalition as Part of Russian Civil Society

As discussed in chapter 3, Russian and foreign NGOs faced numerous difficulties in operating as part of Russian civil society in the period from 1998 to 2008. These difficulties related both to NGOs’ efforts to build relationships with the Russian state and to NGOs’ efforts to maintain sufficient levels of funding for their organization’s survival. In this section, I address how the Angel Coalition responded to challenges in both of these areas.

6.3.1 The Angel Coalition’s Efforts to Build Relationships with the Russian State

NGOs confronted a number of challenges in attempting to collaborate with Russian state structures and in maintaining good standing with the Russian state. First, the tradition of the “strong state” in Russia and the Russian government’s promotion of a statist model of civil society led to the development of a system that privileged organizations that addressed government-identified priority issues and penalized organizations that too overtly challenged state policies. Thus, advocacy organizations, which pressed the government for change, had to work cautiously in this politically sensitive environment.

Second, and related to this, NGOs faced increasingly strict and burdensome regulations on the registration and operation of their organizations during this period. The substantial time and fees required to complete the official registration process and to submit annual reports drained the resources of many organizations, and the increasingly strict requirements resulted in more organizations’ registration applications being rejected. Foreign NGOs and NGOs whose activities were not
focused on areas of national priority faced greater scrutiny, and foreign NGOs were subject to even stricter registration and reporting requirements. As a result, many advocacy NGOs operated in a state of uncertainty about their future in Russia.

Third, NGOs faced challenges in obtaining financing for their operations, a task that proved more difficult than in many Western states due to limited support from the Russian public and Russian corporations, whose minimal financial donations went largely to state-proclaimed priority areas. As a result, most active Russian NGOs depended on a mix of funding from the Russian state and foreign funders, each of which had its own advantages and pitfalls. A lack of long-term funding for most Russian NGOs meant that few had the opportunity to achieve longevity and gain the trust and respect of Russian governmental officials in order to significantly impact public policy.

A fourth major obstacle to operating an NGO in Russia was the continued lack of understanding and respect of civil society by both the Russian public and Russian governmental officials. Most members of the Russian public and many governmental officials were unaware of the meaning of “civil society” or of the type of work that NGOs did even during the time of my fieldwork in 2007-2008. This lack of understanding hampered the ability of NGOs to garner public support for their activities and limited their influence in the political sphere. In the remainder of this section, I examine the work of the Angel Coalition from 1999-2008 and demonstrate how the organization tackled and overcame many of these obstacles to implement successful counter-trafficking programs in Russia.
The Angel Coalition’s unique history distinguished it from the majority of Russian advocacy NGOs, many of which struggled for survival with limited funding and limited Russian and foreign support. Co-founded by Engel, a U.S. activist with ties to U.S. and international funding agencies and with a history of social activism in Russia, the Angel Coalition from the start had access to greater funding opportunities, a fledging network of key Russian and foreign contacts, and a degree of status with Russian governmental officials due to its association with MiraMed. While many of the Angel Coalition’s partner NGOs in the counter-trafficking and women’s rights arenas lived from grant to grant and often suspended operation at times of low funding or disbanded altogether after a few years of operation, Engel’s commitment to the Angel Coalition over this ten-year period helped the organization to survive during tough times and to develop a degree of self sufficiency. As noted, when the Angel Coalition opened its Moscow office in 2001, MiraMed covered the rent of the office along with the salaries of the office’s director and coordinator. These start-up funds allowed the AC time to build up its own grant and project history, cultivate contacts within the transnational counter-trafficking movement, and establish a reputation with Russian governmental officials.

Depending on grants for organizational survival was a time-consuming process, with staff needed to search for grant opportunities, write grant applications, ensure projects were carried out to the specifications of the funders, and compile reports for funders upon the completion of projects. Unlike many other NGOs, however, the AC had paid staff to carry out these tasks. At the time of my fieldwork in 2007-2008, an American activist, formally employed by MiraMed, worked at the
TVAC office with the main responsibilities of searching for funding for the AC, writing grant applications, and ensuring the requirements of the grants were met. With a more permanent base of paid staff than other Russian counter-trafficking NGOs, the AC was able to achieve a degree of sustainability and longevity, which enabled it to gain the trust of many government officials. Additionally, the AC and MiraMed were able to obtain grants jointly, utilizing their combined Russian and international expertise.

Thus, the dual U.S./Russian nature of the Angel Coalition provided it with advantages that few Russian NGOs had. U.S. and other Western activists utilized their familiarity with the expectations of Western funders and with the terminology and theoretical concepts used by these funders to write successful grant applications for the AC’s projects. In addition, they helped the AC make connections within the transnational counter-trafficking movement and build international networks to aid in their fight against trafficking in Russia. However, as foreigners in Russia, Western activists had little influence over domestic Russian affairs. Thus, CIS activists used their positionality to advocate for the rights of trafficking victims within Russia and to press the government for improved counter-trafficking policies. Describing the benefits of having both Russians and Westerners working at the AC, Michael, an American activist stated:

[This collaboration] makes it more flexible, because operating in Russia is extremely difficult for Westerners. It takes a different type of thinking to know how to deal with the government structures and all of that. You need Russians to be able to navigate that. At the same time, all of our funding
comes from the West, and most of the Russians don’t understand the accountability procedures and the report-writing procedures and how to apply for a grant properly and all those things and that’s where Western thinking and Western expertise is especially important, as well as just making connections. And of course, the language thing. It doubles the potential of the organization. It can potentially work effectively with the entire English-speaking world and the entire Russian-speaking world.47

The unusual organizational characteristics of the Angel Coalition helped it to overcome challenges both of working with foreign funders and with the Russian government. Due to the nature of the issue of human trafficking, collaborating with Russian government structures was essential to the AC’s work. As a complex, transnational issue, human trafficking demanded a comprehensive and multidisciplinary response from many sectors of society, especially the government. Although the Russian government did not take on leadership of the counter-trafficking movement in Russia, the AC continually pushed the government to fight this crime, protect victims, and alleviate societal conditions that contributed to trafficking. Svetlana, a CIS activist, discussed the importance of the AC’s collaboration with government structures:

[W]ithout the government we can’t work…. With victims, what can we do? We can just help or assist them, but we cannot work against crime and this organized crime. We can’t just fight all these criminals and put them in jail…. Governments, they have responsibility, and this is their work, so they must do

47 Interview with Michael, January 30, 2008.
that work. So we just try to help them, assist them and cooperate with them. Even if they don’t want to continue to do that.\textsuperscript{48}

For AC activists, the most important governmental action needed to fight trafficking in Russia was the passage of a comprehensive, federal counter-trafficking law. As discussed, AC activists worked with the Legislative Committee of the Russian State Duma during development of a draft counter-trafficking law in 2003. The draft law was not passed, but amendments to the criminal code were passed in that year that made human trafficking and related crimes illegal. Since that time, the Angel Coalition continued to serve on a legislative working group charged with developing a federal law. Between 2003 and 2008, several CIS countries passed comprehensive counter-trafficking laws, but a federal law was never passed in Russia. In the absence of such a law, the AC published the “Counter-Trafficking Protocol and Plan of Action for the Russian Federation” in 2004, which served as guide on the division of responsibilities among government structures and NGOs in responding to human trafficking.

Reflecting on why the counter-trafficking law was not passed in Russia, AC activists felt the government was reluctant to commit the large amount of funds that would be required to finance the counter-trafficking activities mandated by the draft law. In addition, some activists reported that a number of corrupt government officials were involved in human trafficking operations and opposed the counter-trafficking law because it would hurt their profits. In 2004, a witness-protection law was passed that provided funds to protect victims and witnesses of crimes, including

\textsuperscript{48} Interview with Svetlana, February 6, 2008.
human trafficking, but the funds allocated for this program were minimal and few trafficking victims benefitted from this law.

When the AC lobbied government structures to support counter-trafficking programs, such as assistance for victims or publication of trafficking awareness materials, officials often claimed lack of funds to support such programs. A counter-trafficking law would resolve this problem by providing a specific budget for counter-trafficking activities. Indeed, the Russian government had committed to develop such a law and support such programs when it signed the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the accompanying Protocol on Human Trafficking in 2000. The reluctance of the Russian government to commit such funds left the door open for foreign funders to finance Russian counter-trafficking programs. Russian activists took advantage of foreign funding, and the Russian government accepted some foreign-financed programs, because these programs helped the state meet its international obligations and demonstrated Russia’s willingness to fight human trafficking.

One of the largest foreign-financed counter-trafficking programs accepted by the Russian government was the AC’s training program for Russian police. Recognizing the key role that law enforcement officers played in human trafficking cases, the AC had sought to establish collaborative relationships with law enforcement structures since the early years of its operation. However, law enforcement agencies were reluctant to work with NGOs, due to a lack of familiarity with the NGO sector. In addition, some law enforcement officers expressed suspicions that NGOs were working for foreign governments. For several years, AC
activists worked sporadically with contacts in law enforcement agencies, but these connections were based on personal, not institutional, ties, and the connections were often lost when an official moved to a different position or retired. However, the AC utilized these fledging ties and received permission from the Moscow Department of Internal Affairs in 2006 to train juvenile police in Moscow as part of the World Childhood Foundation-funded Moscow Child Rescue Project. As noted, in 2007, upon receiving permission from the appropriate departments, this project was expanded to the broader Moscow Region and to Nizhny Novgorod, and in 2008, the European Commission funded a training program that focused on police who work with adult victims of trafficking in five regions of Russia.

These training programs taught police to treat individuals who had been trafficked as victims rather than criminals and to implement more humane procedures in working with victims to avoid re-traumatizing them. Human trafficking was a difficult crime to prosecute, since it relied on proving coercion or deception rather than on physical evidence and since victims were often unwilling to testify; as a result, many police officers were reluctant to devote time to the problem. To encourage the participation of police in these trainings, the AC demonstrated how the trainings would serve law enforcement’s own interests and help them improve their prosecution rates.

AC activists reported that, as the trainings progressed, they won an increasing amount of respect from law enforcement officials. Through these programs, law enforcement officials also became more familiar with the work of the NGO sector as a whole and expressed more willingness to cooperate with NGOs on important issues.
Although there were still many law enforcement structures that were hesitant to work with NGOs, these training programs opened up more possibilities for AC-law enforcement cooperation. In addition, upon completion of the projects, the publications, films, and other resources used during the trainings were distributed to law enforcement agencies for continued use during internal police trainings. Several law enforcement agencies expressed interest in taking over the programs and institutionalizing them as part of their police education system. Thus, the projects also helped the AC to make progress toward its broader goals of encouraging state action against human trafficking and instituting widespread change in the governmental response system toward victims.

However, AC activists reported that they began to lose some of their connections to law enforcement after their safehouses were shut down and that they no longer worked as closely with police on trafficking cases. Previously, when the safehouses were in operation, police referred trafficking victims to the AC for medical and psychological care. With the AC no longer providing such concrete victim services, police were less willing to work with the organization. This situation illustrates the position of the Russian government on working with NGOs, including foreign-financed NGOs. In cases when these NGOs have something to offer that is beneficial to the state, government structures have shown a willingness to take advantage of such offers. In the case of police training, government structures recognized the importance and value of the trainings, as they contributed to the state goals of fighting crime, increasing prosecution rates, and demonstrating to the international community a willingness to take action against human trafficking.
Although human trafficking was not one of the state-identified priority areas for social activism, AC activists demonstrated how the interests of the government and counter-trafficking NGOs collided on this issue.

While these trainings allowed the AC to form closer relationships to law enforcement structures, the AC never secured the status of a full partner to the state. Instead, the AC, like other Russian NGOs collaborating with governmental bodies, viewed its role more as a help-mate to a powerful state. Nadezhda, a CIS activist, explained the attitude of state and law enforcement structures toward NGOs and why the idea of law enforcement paying NGOs for a service was unrealistic:

[I]n Russia, there is the idea that if you are civil society activists [obshchestvenniki], then you work for society. What money? What, you need money for your work? So, you also need to understand the psychology of the system in our country and the relationship between society and those in power, and that… budget workers [biudzhetniki], they sit with the budget in the law enforcement agencies, they don’t earn too much, and if they pay us, that also wouldn’t work out. Not only ordinary people who work there, but also the bosses. So, because of such complicated relationships, it is difficult to say that we demand money from law enforcement agencies. First of all, they don’t have it, and second of all, the structure of relationships is not such that they can do it. ⁴⁹

As reflected by this statement, similar to the situation in many Western democracies, civil society in Russia is often perceived as the “feminine” sphere of social activism as compared to the “masculine” sphere of state control. Civil society

⁴⁹ Interview with Nadezhda, January 18, 2008.
is seen as the “soft” sphere, in which people work out of the good of their hearts, not for compensation. And indeed, it is a sphere that many well-educated and professional women turned to in the post-Soviet period when women’s representation in the government was minimal and women’s issues were neglected by the state. In the transition period, as the state focused on strengthening the economy and rebuilding Russia as a global power, civil society was left to take on the issues that were no longer state priorities, including responding to the needs of vulnerable populations such as abused women, trafficking victims, exploited children, and orphans. Only when civil society activism coincided with state interests did the government prove receptive to activists’ overtures in these areas. As the sphere of civil society remained undervalued and underappreciated by both the Russian public and the Russian state, activists continued to advocate for the needs of vulnerable groups and push the government for action on these issues.

Another way that the AC stepped in to fill a void in the Russian trafficking response system was through the launch of their toll-free international counter-trafficking hotline in 2004. As mentioned, this Russian-language hotline operated in Russia and in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States. Like most AC projects, the hotline was supported mainly by foreign funds. According to AC activists, when they were preparing to launch the hotline, the U.S. Department of State was set to fund this project, but then U.S. funding was suddenly canceled. Since then, the AC was able to secure little direct funding to cover the operation of the hotline. Instead, they wrote hotline operating costs into the budgets of their larger project grants, and they relied on smaller grants from various sources to
fund different aspects of the hotline. For example, in 2006-2007, the AC received funding from the Swiss Agency for Cooperation and Development to specifically finance the Swiss portion of the hotline.

In addition, the AC relied on small grants from various sources to fund hotline advertising campaigns in order to raise public awareness of this resource. For example, in 2006, the AC obtained some of its first offers of support from Russian government sources when the Moscow Duma and the government of the Moscow Oblast provided the in-kind donations of free advertising space on billboards, bus stops, and metro stations in the Moscow Region for hotline advertisements. The design and production of the advertisements were covered by the general Angel Coalition budget. In 2007-2008, the International Women’s Club of Moscow supported the AC’s distribution of brochures advertising the Russian, European, and U.S. hotlines and the production of billboards for this purpose, and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation funded the distribution of brochures specifically promoting the Swiss hotline. The City of Moscow provided advertising space for this 2008 informational campaign.

The Angel Coalition used the contacts it had established with Russian government and law enforcement officials and with law enforcement and NGOs in other countries to take a leadership role in coordinating the rescue and repatriation of Russian-speaking trafficking victims who called the hotline, along with other victims who were referred to them. Since the AC’s hotline served as the first point of contact for many trafficking victims seeking to escape their situations, the AC took responsibility for initiating rescues. The hotline was in operation 24 hours a day, 7
days a week. Generally, the hotline received several thousand calls per year from all
the countries it covered, with several hundred calls coming directly from trafficking
victims. In 2004, the hotline’s initial year of operation, hotline calls led to the rescue
of over 350 victims;\(^{50}\) in 2008, the hotline received 5434 calls, with 1141 calls
directly from trafficking victims.\(^{51}\) Based on statistics collected on calls received in
2008, the age of the trafficking victims who called ranged from 20 to 53 years old; in
terms of gender, 996 callers were women and 145 were men.\(^{52}\) In addition to calls
directly from trafficking victims, the hotline also received calls from people whose
family members were missing or who they feared were in situations of human
trafficking; from average citizens reporting suspicious activity; from students,
journalists, and others seeking more information on human trafficking; and from
individuals preparing to travel abroad.

Calls to the AC’s hotline were answered at a call center in Moscow contracted
by the AC. Call center operators underwent training to answer general questions
about the AC and about human trafficking. When calls came in from victims,
victims’ family members, or others needing urgent attention, operators transferred
these calls to AC staff members. Responsibility for answering hotline calls outside of
working hours rotated among AC staff members, so that one person was available to
answer calls at all times. When individuals in situations of trafficking called the
hotline, they were often in need of immediate help. AC activists would notify their

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\(^{50}\) MiraMed Institute (2004h).

\(^{51}\) Angel Coalition, “Hotline in 2008--5434 Calls for Help,” Angel Coalition Trafficking Victim
Assistance Center Report 2009 (2009), 4. Available on-line at:

\(^{52}\) Ibid.
appropriate governmental and law enforcement contacts to try to initiate a rescue, if
needed, and local NGO contacts to provide rehabilitation or other assistance to the
individual. In addition, AC activists contacted embassy officials who could restore
the passports, visas, work permits, etc., of victims whose documents had been taken
from them. However, AC activists had to deal sensitively with issues of privacy and
confidentiality, as some victims did not want to cooperate with police investigations
and some did not even want family members to know about their situations. Larisa, a
CIS activist, describes the situations of such callers:

[T]here have been cases in which girls themselves called, but they are very
scared that their parents will find out what kind of work they are doing. They
left to make a career for themselves abroad, to earn money, to support and
help their family, and when they arrive and are forced to engage in
prostitution, sometimes a girl doesn’t want to talk about this with her parents.
Usually, these girls are from villages, not big cities, where everyone knows
everyone. So if one goes back to her village, her small town and this
information becomes known, the girl simply won’t be able to live. Everyone
will say, “Look at her, a prostitute.”

A larger number of calls came from victims’ family members or friends, who
many times had been contacted by the victim in need of help. Other times, family
members suspected a case of human trafficking because a relative had traveled abroad
and had not been in touch for a long period of time. In these cases, AC activists
helped them to file a missing persons report or to initiate an investigation if the family

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53 Interview with Larisa, February 18, 2008.
members had information about their relative’s location, employer, etc. Larisa describes typical calls from family members:

There are various types of calls to the hotline. If someone calls and says, “My daughter disappeared.” How did she disappear? We begin to ask additional questions. What do you mean, she disappeared? She walked out onto the street and disappeared? It has happened. She went to go visit her girlfriend and didn’t return? It has happened. Here, specifics are needed…. We ask, “How did she disappear?” “Did she travel abroad?”…. “She walked outside and disappeared” may mean she ran away to a lover and she doesn’t want her parents to know about it….  

Next, if she disappeared and has been missing a long time… we ask if they have filed a statement with law enforcement agencies or the prosecutor’s office. If such a statement hasn’t been filed, then we make parents understand that they have to go and file such a statement…. Because without a statement, we don’t have the right to start any kind of further investigation.  

But if there are obvious signs—a statement hasn’t yet been filed, but there is information that yes, their daughter traveled to Spain or Italy and they have her telephone number and she has already made attempts to let her parents know that there is a problem, then we of course begin to take action even without a statement…. We ask the parents for her telephone number, we call the girl and start to talk to her. We begin to clarify what kind of situation she is in, because usually girls hide information from their parents….
The first question is “Can you talk or not? Are you free to talk now?” If the girl says, “Yes, I can talk,” we continue the conversation. If the girl says, “No, I can’t talk now” or gives the impression that she simply cannot talk, we try to connect with her and give her the number of the hotline so she can call us. If she is in [a country where the hotline operates], she can call us for free. If she is in some other country, then we try to call her periodically and find out how serious it is.\(^{54}\)

Although the hotline is operational in only six countries, the hotline response team has intervened in trafficking situations in many other countries as well. Through its governmental, law enforcement, and NGO contacts in many regions of the world, the AC has assisted in the rescue and rehabilitation of trafficking victims throughout Europe, North America, the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia. Outside of Russia, the countries with the highest number of victim assistance cases coordinated by the AC were Israel, Germany, Spain, Turkey, and Greece, with the number of cases in Italy, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United States growing during the period of my fieldwork in 2007-2008. For these countries, the AC coordinated the return of Russian-speaking victims to Russia or other CIS countries. However, by this time, Russia had become a leading destination country for human trafficking as well, with many cases of internal trafficking of individuals for sexual or labor exploitation from remote regions of Russia to large cities, especially Moscow and St. Petersburg, and with a great deal of regional trafficking from other former Soviet states, especially Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and

\(^{54}\) Ibid.
Uzbekistan. In these cases, the AC helped to coordinate the return of individuals to their home region within Russia or in other CIS countries.55

In speaking with AC activists, several told me that it was often easier to work with police in foreign countries in coordinating rescues than in CIS countries. In Western countries, police would respond to a tip from the AC about a trafficking situation almost immediately. In contrast, in many cases, Russian police structures were reluctant to respond to tips from NGOs and, when they did, they required a written request and detailed information about the situation, which was often difficult for the AC to obtain in advance. Svetlana describes the AC’s efforts to work with law enforcement:

[W]ith other countries, of course, it’s easier. We can directly call the police and they will react really quickly and start to work. They don’t need any official things. But to cooperate with our law enforcement, you can’t call and tell them and they will start their work. They’ll ask you for an official letter to be sent to the head and then to someone else and then to someone else. But it’s also because of the law. This is the reality. We have such legislation which says that they cannot get the information only over the phone. They have a special procedure…. If the legislation will change, of course, they will work more easily. So this is a big problem. Not only with them [Russian

police] that they don’t want to work, but also because of the legislation and some bureaucratic things which is really different in Europe and in U.S.  

To illustrate the work of the AC in providing assistance to trafficking victims, I will provide specific examples of two different cases, which were described by the AC on their website (with identifying characteristics of victims changed). In the first case, the International Organization for Migration’s Belarus office had contacted the AC and requested help for a Belarusian citizen, “Liudmila,” who was believed to be in a situation of sexual slavery in the Moscow Region. Liudmila had called her boyfriend in Belarus and asked for his help. She told him that she was being held in an apartment under the watch of a “madame” who would not allow her to leave. The AC was able to contact Liudmila on her cell phone and asked her to call a taxi and to think of an excuse to leave the apartment. Liudmila told the madame that she was going to see a client, and she was able to leave the apartment. She took the taxi to the nearest metro station, as per the instructions of the AC. Liudmila then called the AC on her cell phone to give them her location. She did not have any documents on her. An AC activist took the metro to meet Liudmila, and paid the taxi driver. Liudmila then told the AC activist her story, which is as follows.

A young, single mother, Liudmila had been living with her adoptive parents in Belarus. Her adoptive mother had some acquaintances who told her about an opportunity to work in a McDonald’s Restaurant in Moscow. Liudmila would be able to send her earnings home to support her son. Liudmila agreed to take the job. The

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56 Interview with Svetlana.


58 All names of victims and their relatives have been changed.
acquaintances bought Liudmila a train ticket, and when she arrived in Moscow, a woman met her at the train station and took her to her home. The woman took Liudmila’s documents for “safe keeping,” bought her clothes, and fed her well. After a few days, Liudmila was taken on a train to a small town outside of Moscow. There she was led to a guarded “market,” where girls were sold for the purpose of prostitution, and Liudmila then understood her intended occupation. Liudmila was sold for 9,500 rubles and taken to a new apartment. She ran away from her first client, but without her documents, e.g., passport, work permit, she felt there was no place she could go, so she returned to the apartment. She was sold a second time for 7,000 rubles and began servicing clients. One of her clients picked her up in his car, and then stopped to pick up three of his friends. The four of them took her to a forest and raped her. After this experience, Liudmila had called her boyfriend for help. He contacted IOM Belarus, which contacted the AC, which coordinated Liudmila’s escape. After meeting Liudmila, the AC activist took her to the IOM Rehabilitation Center. The AC then transferred Liudmila’s case to IOM Belarus, which coordinated the restoration of Liudmila’s documents and her travel home.

Second, I would like to illustrate a case of the AC assisting in the return of a Russian trafficking victim abroad back to Russia. “Ekaterina” called the AC’s hotline and reported that her sister “Irina” was being forced to work as a prostitute in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Irina was from a small town in the Russian Urals and had lived with her grandmother since her parents died in a car accident several years earlier. An acquaintance of Irina who knew that she was looking for work had told her about an opportunity to work in a night club in Dubai. Irina and a friend of hers,
who had also agreed to the job, were promised “clean work” that did not involve the provision of sexual services. The aforementioned acquaintance had travel documents processed for Irina and her friend, and they flew to Dubai.

However, when Irina and her friend arrived in Dubai, they found that they would be forced to work as prostitutes. Irina called her sister, who was also living outside of Russia at the time, and asked her for help. Irina told her sister that she was forced to work all night and that if she didn’t get help soon, she would kill herself. She said that the “trafficker” had threatened her and the other girls, saying that if any of them contacted the police, he would kill them and no one would know.

Irina’s grandmother “Elena” also called the hotline to provide additional details on the case. She said that two girls who were friends of Irina and who had engaged in the same type of work in Dubai had already returned home. One had been deported and the other had been rescued by a Russian man who met her and flew her back to Russia. Elena spoke to Irina by phone and told her to go to the Russian embassy in UAE, but Irina said that she was fed very little and that she didn’t have enough strength to go to the embassy. Irina’s grandmother was worried that she would kill herself.

AC activists contacted an NGO that they worked with in Dubai, the Dubai police, and international law enforcement structures. Irina was found and was freed from her situation. She spent some time in prison in UAE, but as a witness, not as a criminal, while her travel documents were being restored. When Irina’s documents were ready, she flew to Moscow. An AC activist met her at the airport and offered
her a course of rehabilitation. However, Irina wanted to return home, and the AC activist assisted her in continuing her journey back to her home town.

As seen from the above cases, the AC offers services to individuals who have been qualified as a trafficking “victim,” but victims do not always accept these offers of help. Victims are given some freedom in deciding which services they wish to receive. Likewise, the AC does not force victims to work with the police, but offers them this opportunity and encourages them to do so. Larisa explains how the AC handles the many situations in which victims do not want to work with police:

Many girls don’t want to work with the police for the reason that they are there [in a foreign country] illegally. Their visa has expired. Three months have passed, and they can deport her. So she doesn’t want to work with the police. When there are difficult circumstances like rape—there have been cases in the United Arab Emirates and Turkey—…they need immediate help. But if the girl doesn’t want to, we don’t have the right to force her or compel her to, “You are required to work with the police.” It is her choice.

Maybe…we have a debate about whether we should force her, but unfortunately, our policy is such that we don’t force the girls. But, if we force a girl, she may stop talking to us. She’ll become scared and say, “I won’t give you any information at the present time” and she won’t respond to our calls. So with the police, we are of course very careful, but of course for results, we say, “You need to work with them. Today it’s you, tomorrow it will be someone else. Think about other girls like you.” We try to raise their consciousness somehow. But for some reason, many girls provide more
information about traffickers located outside of Russia…. But there are also recruiters who are located in Russia…. Girls don’t give information about Russia, about recruiters here, because there will be… calls to her family. If she opens her mouth, then her family—most of them are women and girls who have children—unpleasant things will occur.

And, unfortunately, our police can’t protect them. They can offer to put them in a safehouse, but there are so many girls, where can they go? We have a safehouse here, the IOM rehabilitation center, but girls can only stay there a month, maybe a little longer. But if a court case is started, the girl needs to be hidden one or two months, it can go on for a few years. And you don’t only need to hide her, but her whole family that she is worrying about. So girls don’t cooperate here in Russia, but they do give information on what is happening abroad.  

As pointed out in Larisa’s statement, the absence of an adequate number of safehouses created many problems in Russia’s counter-trafficking efforts. Not only did many trafficking victims suffer from lack of appropriate rehabilitative services, but many also declined to press charges against their traffickers or to participate in court cases because of the weak protection for victims in Russia. Thus, the lack of victim services directly impacted the prosecution rate in trafficking cases. As noted, after the AC’s network of safehouses closed in 2007, the International Organization for Migration Rehabilitation Center in Moscow was the only shelter for trafficking victims. AC activists felt the operation of regional safehouses was essential to combating trafficking in Russia, and they continued to search for funding for shelters.  

59 Interview with Larisa.
Despite the closing of the shelters, the safehouse project provided invaluable experience in the counter-trafficking field to the nine AC-member organizations that had run the shelters, many of which continued to provide some types of services to trafficking victims.

In contrast to the TVAC, few other AC-member organizations in Russia had consistent levels of funding, and for this reason, few carried out large projects on a permanent basis. Instead, the operation of many AC-member organizations tended to ebb and flow, with activity increasing when they received a grant and decreasing in periods of little to no funding. However, even in periods in which they had little funding, activists in these smaller organizations displayed commitment to the cause of fighting human trafficking, and many continued to help victims. Discussing some of the AC’s smaller organizational partners, Svetlana noted:

Some of them are not really active. But when we need any help, in that region for example, if we have a victim, we always can call there and ask “Can you help?” and usually always they help. Even if they don’t have money. But we don’t always need to assist victims with money, so they can just meet them in the airport, they can help us to find their relatives there, or other information.\(^{60}\)

Hence, in a period in which the Russian government failed to take a leadership role in Russia’s counter-trafficking movement and in which foreign funding offered only an unstable means of support, the AC and its partners took on a large part of the responsibility of leading this movement through programs to combat trafficking and assist victims.

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\(^{60}\) Interview with Svetlana.
Finally, another obstacle presented by the Russian government to NGOs seeking to work in Russian civil society were the regulations on NGO operation, especially foreign NGOs and Russian NGOs with foreign workers. During the time of my fieldwork in 2007-2008, Angel Coalition and MiraMed activists were still adapting to the new regulations on NGOs put into effect by the Russian government in 2006. As discussed in chapter 3, the 2006 law increased the registration and reporting burden on NGOs, which were required to file substantial amounts of paperwork to re-register their organizations with the state and to submit reports on their activities and finances on a regular basis. These regulations impacted both Russian and foreign NGOs, although foreign NGOs, such as MiraMed, had to complete additional paperwork and faced stricter registration requirements. In addition, the law expanded the reasons for which registration could be denied, including NGOs having goals or objectives that posed a threat to the sovereignty or “national interests” of the Russian Federation, criteria that were to be interpreted by registration officials. As a result of the law, the government increasingly denied the registration of organizations. In MiraMed’s 2006 Annual Report, Russia Country Director Vladislav Suprunov addressed the new legislation and how MiraMed was responding to it:

Fears have been raised that [the new legislation] will be a way of screening out human rights groups and NGOs supporting political opposition. Additional panic was raised when each of the first 60 NGOs to submit their papers were rejected. We are one of many foreign NGOs trying to cope with

While MiraMed and the AC’s re-registration applications were ultimately accepted, the new regulations created bureaucratic difficulties in running both organizations. The additional paperwork that was required substantially reduced the amount of time staff had to devote to other projects, and stricter requirements for foreigners to work in Russia made it difficult for MiraMed and the AC to invite foreign workers. In addition, as a Russian organization, the AC had a limit on the number of foreigners, including citizens of other CIS countries, that it could employ, and these individuals had to obtain a Russian work permit. Finally, during the time of my fieldwork, it became known that the government was planning to introduce new requirements for foreign volunteers, which would permit them to stay in Russia for only three months at a time. Thus, there was concern that I, along with my fellow interns, would be the last group of foreign volunteers permitted to remain in Russia for longer periods.

6.3.2 The Angel Coalition’s Efforts to Obtain Stable Funding

In addition to the obstacles in working with Russian governmental structures, the AC also confronted challenges in obtaining funding in order to carry out its role as leader of the Russian counter-trafficking movement. As noted, the minimal Russian support for counter-trafficking efforts led the AC to rely mostly on foreign support for its
projects. This reliance on foreign grants led to a sense of instability in the organization, as activists were never sure if they would receive another grant to fund their activities and, if they did, what the amount and conditions of the grant would be. However, its partnership with MiraMed provided the AC with several advantages. First, MiraMed and the AC frequently applied for grants jointly, and their combined Western-Russian expertise was often valuable in the eyes of funders, making them more likely to receive grants. Second, although there was little tradition of charitable giving and fundraising in Russia, and Russian citizens were unlikely to give donations to a counter-trafficking organization, AC’s partnership with MiraMed allowed it access to U.S. fundraising dollars. As a result, the AC did not feel pressured to apply for grants on the latest “funding fad” just to keep their organization running. Nor did they feel the need to change their organization’s philosophy just to suit the demands of donors. From the time of its establishment, the AC had worked from an anti-prostitution perspective on trafficking. That is, they did not work with current sex workers on harm reduction or apply for grants that would require them to service this population.

However, beyond keeping its issue of focus—human trafficking—and its perspective on this issue—the anti-prostitution view—intact, the AC did adapt its projects to meet the specific demands of foreign grants. For example, providing training to police had not been an original goal of the AC, but when funding became available in this area, they applied for and received a grant for this purpose. In addition, although in the early 2000s, human trafficking was a “hot topic” among international donors and a significant number of grants were available in this area, by
the latter part of the decade, funding on the issue had declined. However, children’s issues remained a priority issue of many international donors. The availability of grants to work on child trafficking contributed to the AC’s decision to expand their work in this area. Thus, while the AC expanded its work in various areas as determined by the grants it received, activists did not lose sight of their overall goals and objectives.

Second, the superior resources and the relative stability of the AC also helped the organization to meet the demands of funders more readily than could other Russian NGOs. With Westerners working at the AC, the organization was better able to write up reports in the required format and to keep their accounts in the manner expected by donors. However, even with the aid of Westerners to communicate with funders, donors’ expectations of efficiency and predictability often conflicted with Russian realities. The AC sometimes had difficulty in explaining to donors the conditions of Russian life that could complicate the fulfillment of a project. For example, the reluctance of some governmental officials to work with the AC and the overall slowness of the Russian bureaucracy delayed the achievement of some project goals or changed the direction of a project. Especially when the AC served as the sub-granter of funds to smaller organizations, such as with the safehouse project or the regional conferences and trainings, the AC had to account to donors on why conditions in these local areas often held up the achievement of project goals. In such instances, the power differences between the donor and the AC were clear, as activists had to answer for conditions that were out of their control. However, as the
AC developed a strong track record of successfully implementing grants in the unpredictable Russian environment, they gained the trust of many funders.

A third common challenge facing NGOs with foreign funding was how to remain connected to their local communities while carrying out the extensive work required to fulfill the conditions of their grants. Again, the AC’s superior resources helped them to overcome this challenge. With several permanent staff members at the AC and a grant writer employed by MiraMed, the AC had enough staff to work on multiple fronts. The AC remained connected with their broader target audience, the Russian public as a whole, including potential trafficking victims and family members of victims, through their educational and media campaigns and the operation of the hotline, which received calls from CIS citizens with a range of questions. In addition, the AC directly serviced trafficking victims through the operation of the hotline, the coordination of victim rescue and rehabilitation, and the provision of rehabilitation services through its safehouse project. These far-reaching activities raised the awareness of many members of the Russian public about the work of the Angel Coalition, in contrast to the situation of many smaller NGOs that had little public recognition. Thus, although AC activists always had hectic schedules and were pressed to meet their deadlines, they did not suffer the burn-out experienced at many smaller NGOs that were run by only a handful of activists, and sometimes only by one.

A fourth common challenge to NGOs with foreign funding was the tendency to horde resources and enter into relationships of competition, rather than cooperation, with other NGOs in order to protect their funding sources. In contrast,
one of the AC’s main goals was to build and support a network of NGOs throughout Russia and the CIS in order to provide services to trafficking victims and raise the Russian public’s awareness of the problem. While the AC started as a network of 20 NGOs in 1999, by 2008, it had grown into a network of more than sixty NGOs from 27 regions of Russia and nine CIS countries. The main AC office, the TVAC since 2003, provided support to AC-member organizations in writing grants and making international connections. The TVAC worked closely with the most active NGOs in this network, which partnered with the TVAC in hosting conferences and trainings in their local regions and, for several of them, in running safehouses. In addition, the TVAC maintained close working relationships with many of its partners in coordinating the rescue and rehabilitation of trafficking victims. Building a strong NGO network was key to the AC’s overarching goal of achieving long-term, sustainable change in the Russian trafficking response system.

However, previous research suggests that U.S. governmental funding to the AC during a period of debate over legalizing prostitution in Russia contributed to a split within the crisis center movement in the early 2000s. As discussed in chapter 5, as the Russian movement against human trafficking was taking off in 2001-2002, a debate took place over the possibility of legalizing prostitution as a way to fight trafficking. Donna Hughes, an abolitionist feminist affiliated with MiraMed and a leading monitor of U.S. counter-trafficking funding to Russia, had lobbied the U.S. government to deny funding to Russian organizations that did not proclaim a strict abolitionist perspective. The lobbying efforts that Hughes inspired were successful in influencing funding patterns to Russia as part of the new requirement of the “anti-
prostitution pledge.”\textsuperscript{62} In the next round of U.S. counter-trafficking funding after this controversy, in 2004, the Angel Coalition received a grant of almost half a million dollars to implement its second set of shelters, while only one women’s crisis center received a small grant.\textsuperscript{63}

Janet Elise Johnson argues that this controversy and the charges against NGOs that did not take a strict abolitionist perspective “created a painful rift, both institutional and ideological, between many women’s crisis center leaders and the MiraMed/Angel Coalition.”\textsuperscript{64} In this case, MiraMed and the AC used their strong international connections, including with the U.S. government, the leading funder of counter-trafficking activities in Russia at the time, to advocate for the position on sex trafficking that they believed was most valid—the abolitionist perspective.

Based on my research at the AC, I did not find the organization’s actions as reported in the controversy opportunistic. The AC has proclaimed an abolitionist perspective since its founding and has consistently promoted this perspective in fighting trafficking. AC activists do not accept funds that require them to work with sex workers or to accept the sex workers’ rights perspective. In addition, they do not collaborate with international organizations that support the sex workers’ rights perspective, such as GAATW. Thus, while it is consistent with my findings that the AC would decline to work with non-abolitionist organizations, their overall policy has been to promote networking and collaboration among Russian NGOs. The AC

\textsuperscript{62} Bertone, 184-185.

\textsuperscript{63} Johnson (2009), 63.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 63.
may not collaborate with non-abolitionist counter-trafficking organizations, but their reasons are ideological, not a desire to protect a funding source.

Another major challenge for NGOs that relied on foreign funding was achieving sustainability. As discussed above, although far from stable, the AC achieved greater sustainability than many Russian NGOs thanks to its ability to win large foreign grants and its access to MiraMed’s fundraising dollars. This stability allowed the AC to survive through several tough economic periods when other NGOs failed. Through this longevity, the AC was able to build a reputation for itself based on its successes both with foreign funders and within Russia. The relationships that the AC established with Russian governmental officials allowed it to have a greater impact in policy circles and to gain support for its work in training law enforcement officials and in coordinating with law enforcement, embassies, the prosecutor’s office, etc., in working on trafficking cases and coordinating rescues. These relationships also led to the first offers of Russian governmental support for the AC’s counter-trafficking work, e.g., through the in-kind donations of free advertising space. Finally, the relationships that the AC built with Russian government officials and the effectiveness of its work led officials to begin to institutionalize AC’s projects into government programs, which contributed to the achievement of the AC’s goal of long-term transformation of the Russian trafficking response system. Hence, although the long-term survival of the AC was always a concern to activists, their counter-trafficking projects and methodologies achieved a degree of sustainability through the government’s support for their work and its take-over of several AC initiatives.
Thus far, I have demonstrated how the AC overcame many of the common challenges of relying on foreign funding through their unique organizational features. However, there were also some criticisms of foreign funding that remained applicable to the organization’s operation, namely, the tendency of funders to provide additional grants to organizations with which they had established trust and the development of a “civic elite” in Moscow. First, as discussed, the degree of sustainability that the AC achieved allowed it to build a reputation with donors and to show a strong track record of successfully implementing grants. Many funders were more likely to award grants to organizations with which they had a personal connection and which could demonstrate past successes. Again, this was an advantage that the AC had over many smaller organizations. Second, this pattern of funding contributed to the development of a “civic elite” in Moscow. The AC can be considered part of the “civic elite,” or an organization with well-educated and professional activists, many of whom have a good command of English and have traveled internationally. With its Western roots, MiraMed and the AC were structured in a similar way to many Western organizations, making their accountability procedures more acceptable to donors.

These tendencies, to re-fund successful organizations and to support the development of a civic elite, have several downfalls, as such funding priorities can overlook smaller, grassroots organizations that carry out beneficial work and that maintain stronger ties to their local communities than many “NGO-ized” organizations. Such tendencies make it difficult for smaller organizations to break into funding circles and make the connections they need to secure grants. In a country as large as Russia, these tendencies also leave many geographical areas and
many sub-groups of NGOs cut off from foreign funding. Finally, these tendencies open the way for personal alliances and ideologies, rather than quality of grant applications, to drive funding decisions. Such practices have allowed well-established, Moscow-based organizations, such as the AC, to thrive while smaller organizations in the regions struggle. In the AC’s case, although organizational factors allowed it to survive and grow while other NGOs failed, the AC did not horde its resources but shared them with smaller organizations within its network. As one of the AC’s main goals was to support the development of a strong counter-trafficking movement in all regions of Russia, and in the CIS, activists placed a great deal of importance on helping regional organizations grow.

The AC experienced much success, not only in achieving a degree of sustainability for itself, but also in supporting the growth of its partner organizations. In the case of Russia’s counter-trafficking movement, such a structure may make sense. Few of the AC’s partner organizations had comparable success in grant-getting or in collaborating with foreign partners. The AC’s experience “trickled down” to help its partners in these areas. In several of its projects that included sub-grants to partner organizations, the AC played the role of “translator” between local activists and foreign funders, as many CIS activists did not speak English or were not familiar with the expectations or the particular discourse of funders. Hence, in the case of the Angel Coalition Network of NGOs, the centralized structure with the head in Moscow and smaller NGOs in the regions worked well in coordinating between funders and local activists and in providing resources to smaller NGOs that otherwise might not have received funding. At the same time, some NGOs were left out of this
structure. As noted in the discussion of the funding controversy in the early 2000s, the AC collaborated mainly with organizations that shared its ideology on sex trafficking. Thus, organizations that supported sex workers’ rights or provided services to sex workers could be left out of this network. This is one downfall of such a centralized structure.

Many Western governmental agencies, foundations, and international organizations have recognized the common pitfalls of funding practices and have made attempts to improve their practices in recent years. Some funders have dropped the practice of automatically re-funding previously successful grant recipients in favor of more transparent procedures, while others have decided to provide long-term funding to one organization only in order to advance the sustainability of the chosen organization. In spite of this critique of foreign funding practices, however, it is important to emphasize the benefits that such funding has granted to organizations. Although imperfect, the AC has helped numerous trafficking victims and their families who otherwise would likely have had nowhere to turn and has raised the awareness of the Russian public as a whole, with special attention given to high-risk populations. In addition, the AC has utilized its resources and connections to make inroads into the “closed” Russian governmental structures in order to spur the government to action on the issue of human trafficking. In the absence of substantial funding from the Russian government, foreign funding provided an

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65 I employ the term “closed” governmental structure to reflect the term used by AC activists in discussing the inaccessibility of the Russian state to civil society (“zakrytnost’ gosudarstva”), and also to reflect the literature on transnational civil society, e.g., Keck and Sikkink’s discussion of open and closed political structures. See Keck and Sikkink, 201-202.
invaluable resource that permitted AC activists to work toward the important goal of combating human trafficking in Russia.

In conclusion, the unique organizational characteristics of the Angel Coalition allowed it to overcome many common challenges of working both with the Russian government and with foreign funders in order to serve as the leader of the Russian movement against human trafficking. The dual Western/CIS nature of the AC, combined with its access to more substantial and more stable sources of funding, enabled the AC to thrive while other foreign-funded advocacy NGOs struggled. Such stability permitted the development of long-term relationships with governmental officials and structures, which furthered the AC’s counter-trafficking work. The AC’s success was also in large part due to the commitment displayed both by Juliette Engel, the co-founder of the AC, and by the CIS activists who worked there on a daily basis. For over a ten-year period, Engel committed immense time and resources to helping the AC grow, with the goal of eventually developing it into a self-sustaining Russian organization. Engel’s financial and leadership commitment over this ten-year period allowed the organization to survive and remain active through several difficult periods.

Equally important to the AC’s success was the commitment of the CIS activists who worked for the organization. The activists that I met displayed a passion and drive to combating human trafficking, by helping as many victims as possible and fighting through seemingly endless government red tape to reach their objectives. Although many activists had families of their own, they worked late and on weekends to meet their deadlines. Often they answered hotline calls in the middle
of the night and began coordinating assistance to victims. Activists carried out this work despite the relatively low pay and benefits of working for a Russian NGO. Although the AC’s office was located in central Moscow, many activists could not afford the high rents of living in Moscow City, and traveled long distances on public transportation to get to work every day. None of the activists with whom I worked owned cars. Their paychecks, dependent on the receipt of grant funds, were often delayed.

Despite the limited compensation they received, activists went beyond their work duties to help victims. Often, when victims returned from countries with warmer climates, such as Israel, Turkey, or the United Arab Emirates, they brought with them few belongings and no warm clothes. In these cases, AC activists frequently donated their own clothes and shoes to victims. In addition, although the official focus area of the AC was human trafficking, activists tried to respond to all calls for help on their hotline, even if the caller’s problem was not a clear-cut case of trafficking. For example, numerous calls came from migrant workers from other CIS countries working without contracts on Russian construction projects or agricultural areas. In such cases, callers had often worked for months without being paid, and were left with no way to travel back to their home country. If employers had not taken these workers’ travel documents and they were free to leave the worksite, the case was not considered human trafficking. However, AC activists still responded to these calls and tried to put callers into contact with organizations in their local areas that could help them further. Additionally, AC activists often responded to calls from Russian citizens abroad who were in a variety of emergency situations or were having
problems with authorities.\textsuperscript{66} The passion that AC activists displayed for their work is a major factor behind the success the AC experienced in transforming the Russian trafficking response system. In the face of the often emotional and draining work of helping trafficking victims in very traumatic situations, the activists I met were fully committed to continuing their work of leading the Russian counter-trafficking movement.

6.4 The Angel Coalition as Part of the Transnational Movement against Human Trafficking

In chapter 5, I discussed the development of the transnational counter-trafficking movement and the work of this movement in pressing national governments, intergovernmental organizations, and international NGOs for change. In this section, I examine how the AC acted as part of this transnational movement and worked to influence counter-trafficking policies on the international level.

As noted previously, during the period that I am studying, the transnational movement against human trafficking was sharply divided into two networks with strikingly different views on how to fight trafficking. One network, led by CATW, was comprised of organizations that promoted the abolitionist perspective and focused on fighting sex trafficking (especially of women and children), which they saw as the most severe form of human trafficking. The second transnational counter-trafficking network, led by GAATW, connected organizations that promoted a human

\textsuperscript{66} This finding parallels the findings of Julie Hemment, who studied the development of foreign-funded crisis centers for women in Russia. Hemment reports that, despite being officially named crisis centers for “women,” both women and men called these centers for help with a variety of issues, not just gender violence (Hemment (2007), 101-102). Likewise, in a context with little social support for individuals in need, the AC expanded its reach in trying to help all those who called its hotline.
rights, or sex workers’ rights, perspective on human trafficking. Organizations in this network viewed sex trafficking and labor trafficking as equally reprehensible and sought to combat both, while supporting the right of individuals to choose to work as prostitutes.

As discussed, the Angel Coalition adopted an abolitionist position in its counter-trafficking work and, on the international level, it acted as part of the abolitionist network against human trafficking. However, while the AC was founded with a specific focus on the trafficking of women and children, it broadened its projects to include attention to the trafficking of men as well when activists became aware of such cases. Thus, the AC’s area of focus was broader than that of other abolitionist organizations that aimed only to help women and children victims of trafficking.

The AC partnered with CATW on several occasions. For example, in 2006, the AC, along with MiraMed, partnered with CATW to carry out a public awareness campaign on human trafficking in three cities in Russia’s Volga region. The “Campaign on the Volga River” aimed to “change the community’s attitude toward trafficking as an organized crime against women”\(^67\) and “publicly link prostitution and trafficking to demand.”\(^68\) Reporting the outcomes of this campaign, MiraMed writes, “Results show an increased awareness in the population about human trafficking and how to better ensure one’s own safety…, as well as a decrease in the


number of women expressing a desire to go abroad, particularly in hopes of finding a spouse or a job.”\(^{69}\) As such reports demonstrate, the AC based its educational campaigns on an abolitionist approach, in contrast to a human rights or sex workers’ rights approach, which would include attention to the needs of sex workers. In addition to partnering with international counter-trafficking organizations espousing the abolitionist perspective, the AC partnered only with foundations and government agencies that supported work in line with this perspective. Prior to receiving grants, the AC made its abolitionist approach clear to funders, and accepted only grants that did not require it to compromise its values.

Within Russia and the CIS, the AC also partnered with NGOs that espoused similar views on the connection between prostitution and trafficking, and its coalition did not include any sex workers’ rights organizations. In contrast to the situation in some countries, there had been few efforts by Russian sex workers to organize and lobby for their interests, and few organizations that service sex workers existed in Russia. Thus, it is not surprising that the AC did not count any such organizations among its partners. However, it is curious as to why the AC did not partner with the leading crisis centers for victims of gender violence in Russia, which were also located in Moscow. As noted, Johnson points to U.S. funding policies on counter-trafficking projects as contributing to a long-term rift between leaders of these national movements.

The complete lack of mention of crisis centers by AC activists during my interviews and participant observation provides some support to Johnson’s argument.

that such a rift occurred between these organizations, and suggests that a rift indeed still existed at the time of my fieldwork. When I questioned AC activists about their NGO partners in Moscow, I was told that their only Moscow partners were IOM, an international NGO, and Kesher, a Jewish organization that carried out educational campaigns on human trafficking targeted mostly toward Jewish women. This example shows how U.S. funding policies influenced the composition of the AC’s NGO network and discouraged the inclusion of Russia’s crisis center movement leaders, who could have potentially served as valuable members of the network, with their more flexible ideological perspectives and connections to broader constituencies.

During my fieldwork at the Angel Coalition, activists discussed their perspectives on prostitution and human trafficking with me, and I observed several instances of how this perspective was applied in the AC’s work. All of the activists with whom I discussed the issue expressed support for the “Swedish approach” to fighting sex trafficking. The “Swedish approach” is based on the legislation implemented in Sweden in 1999 that criminalized the purchase of sex, along with pimping and the running of brothels, but not the selling of sex. The Swedish approach is based on the assumption that all those who sell sex are victims of exploitation due to the lesser power they wield in relations with clients. In this approach, while clients, pimps, and brothel owners are punished, prostitutes are offered rehabilitative and vocational services in order to help them get out of prostitution and find work in other fields.
Much of the AC activists’ knowledge about this approach stemmed from several collaborative projects the AC had carried out with Swedish partners and trips activists had taken to Sweden. Most notably, the AC partnered with the Swedish women’s NGO Kvinnoforum on several occasions, e.g., in organizing the “Safe Rescue and Return” conferences and trainings in nine regions of Russia and in Central Asia from 2004 to 2007. In addition, the AC maintained relationships with Swedish funders, such as the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), which funded these conferences. These collaborations with Swedish partners strengthened and reaffirmed the AC’s abolitionist perspective.

In contrast to the broad support for the Swedish approach, AC activists expressed opposition to the approach of countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, which had legalized prostitution. Activists stated that visits to these countries and conversations with partners in Germany and the Netherlands had confirmed their position that legalization of prostitution is not the best way to fight trafficking. Larisa stated:

I’m against the legalization of prostitution…. In countries where prostitution is legal, they also have human trafficking. For example, we work with Germany. Prostitution is legal there and our girls are constantly transported to Germany and they work there illegally. Why? ….. At a conference in Kiev, I also asked [German representatives] the question, “Why, if you have legalized prostitution, are our girls still working there and providing services and end up in very difficult situations.” As matter of fact, they said, when a person goes into a brothel, he knows that to buy a certain girl, he has to pay a specific
amount of money and that girl has to do such and such things. But that girl
does not permit violence and does not provide types of intimate services that
she doesn’t like. There are rules in every house…. Many don’t go for that.
They want a girl, to carry out some form of violence on her, to be the exploiter
of this girl. So, they pay less for them. So, they transport girls from Russia
and other regions, the CIS as well, who work illegally and the clients that they
receive, they pay a lot less for them, first of all, and second of all, they can do
anything that they want with this girl. They can be violent—do perverted
things to her…. So, for more services, they use illegal girls.70

As Larisa explains, even in countries with legalized prostitution, trafficked women
are desirable because they can be forced to provide services that legally working
prostitutes will not, and for lower prices. Thus, the already established demand for
sex services in these countries, along with the societal acceptance of prostitution as a
legitimate business, fuels the desire for more prostitutes and more sex services to
meet this demand.

Because AC activists favored an abolitionist approach, they did not carry out
projects geared toward sex workers, including harm reduction projects such as the
distribution of condoms or the provision of health services, because they saw such
services as encouraging women to remain in prostitution. In multiple instances
during my fieldwork, AC activists made clear that their target audience was “victims”
of human trafficking, or individuals who had been forced or coerced into prostitution
against their will. An activist explained the AC’s area of focus to a person who called
over the phone:

70 Interview with Larisa, February 20, 2008.
No, we don’t help prostitutes. We help women who got into prostitution against their will or want to get out of it and don’t know how. Our first task is to help people, especially women and children, who are victims of human trafficking. People who were sent somewhere against their will or forced to work against their will. Basically, we help women who have not been working as prostitutes very long, women who have been forced into it. These women do not see prostitution as work. We think it is hardly possible for a woman to choose to be a prostitute.\footnote{As paraphrased in my fieldnotes.}

However, although the AC’s projects were not directed toward currently working prostitutes or women who had chosen the profession freely, the organization also did not turn away any prostitutes who came to it for help. Svetlana explains the AC’s understanding of all prostitutes as victims:

[F]or us, a prostitute is a victim. Because prostitutes never work alone. If any third person gets money from that, it’s prostitution. So, for us, they are all victims. Even if we meet sometimes… people and women who are very happy and say, “I like this work. I make lots of money, and I like it, and I will go and work again.” For us, she is still a victim, because she is so traumatized. Maybe now she says that. After a week, if we will work with her and psychologists will work with her, she will say something else. She will say really what she thinks about this…. Our experience shows that 99 percent, 98, 99 percent of victims, they were from difficult families. They
were, many of them were raped when they were a child, like by their relatives.\textsuperscript{72}

Nadezhda also offered some explanation as to why the AC was willing to help all women who came to it for help, even those who may initially have chosen to work as a prostitute. In describing her understanding of the definition of human trafficking, Nadezhda stated:

Here, naturally, I am talking about trafficking. I am not speaking about situations when a woman on her own says, “Take me, I am ready to work as a prostitute. I want to earn money.” I am not talking about such situations. I don’t think that that is trafficking. However, in principle, this can be considered trafficking, because if they beat her, brutalize her, there are many such situations. She is still a victim, she has suffered. And, in general, to some degree, on a philosophical level because prostitutes are women who, we are speaking about women who decided to become prostitutes, it is also not their choice. Something happened to them, for them to say, “I don’t have a good relationship with my family, so I choose this. It will give me a better life.”\textsuperscript{73}

While the AC was willing to provide services to women who initially decided voluntarily to work as prostitutes, Russian law enforcement did not accept these women as true “victims.” Larisa explains:

Law enforcement agencies don’t work with girls who left [Russia] voluntarily…. We take them, we work with them, but law enforcement

\textsuperscript{72} Interview with Svetlana.

\textsuperscript{73} Interview with Nadezhda, January 17, 2008.
agencies don’t want to work with them, even if she has been recognized as a victim, if she was really exploited by a third person who took a percentage of her money. Law enforcement agencies won’t work with such girls. They think that they went on their own, they, um, agreed to that on their own, and that once she receives monetary assistance, she will go to work doing the exact same thing the next day, work as a prostitute. That is, she agreed to let a third person take a percentage of her money…. When those girls who left on their own and worked on their own return, we still work with them.74

Thus, while AC activists had difficulty evoking police sympathy even for trafficking victims who had been physically forced into prostitution, they found it nearly impossible to gain police support for cases in which a woman had initially agreed to work as a prostitute. Although prostitution was illegal in Russia, it was not considered a serious crime by police, and most punitive action taken in such cases was directed at the prostitute rather than the client or pimp. Many law enforcement officials believed that women who agreed to work in this criminal profession should be punished and had difficulty understanding the difference between trafficking cases and non-trafficking cases. With the AC’s philosophy that viewed all prostitutes as potential victims, however, the organization extended its services to all women (and men) who came to it for help.

As noted, the AC acted as part of the abolitionist network against human trafficking on the international level. It worked mainly with international abolitionist organizations, and it maintained close ties with many foundations and governments that voiced support for the abolitionist perspective. Because it became a part of the

74 Interview with Larisa, February 20, 2008.
transnational counter-trafficking movement only in 1999, the AC had little involvement in the development of two of the leading international counter-trafficking instruments, the U.S. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act and the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, both of which were passed in 2000. However, since then, the AC has actively participated in this global movement and has worked to influence international policies on human trafficking.

Since 1998, MiraMed has held Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN and has appointed UN representatives to lobby for MiraMed’s and AC’s interests on the international level. Until 2004, MiraMed’s UN representative was Dr. Anele Heiges, and from 2004-2008, the representative was Lois Herman. Although officially the representatives worked for MiraMed, in practice, they represented the interests of both MiraMed and the AC in UN affairs. As early as 2000, Heiges was speaking out against human trafficking on behalf of MiraMed and the AC, as she participated in the UN Commission on the Status of Women meetings in New York in March along with Soroptimist International and the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women.

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76 MiraMed Institute (2004b).

77 MiraMed Institute (2000b).
In April 2004, newly appointed representative Herman visited the United Nations Geneva office with MiraMed Russian Country Director Vladislav Suprunov, who addressed international delegations on the necessity of counter-trafficking cooperation between sending and receiving countries and presented the Angel Coalition Counter-Trafficking Protocol and Plan of Action.\(^\text{78}\) Herman continued Heiges’s role in attending UN Commission on the Status of Women meetings, and also participated in the UN Human Rights Commission, served as a consultant for the UN Secretary General’s Violence Against Women Study, and worked as coordinator of the Women’s UN Report Network.\(^\text{79}\) In addition, Herman maintained regular communication with the UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons and the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women. Outside of the UN System, Herman participated in many international conferences on women’s rights and human trafficking, such as International Interdisciplinary Congresses on Women (also known colloquially as “Women's Worlds Congresses”) and Network for European Women’s Rights conferences.\(^\text{80}\) In 2006, MiraMed took part in the launching session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva and participated in the one panel at the session dedicated to gender issues.\(^\text{81}\)

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\(^{78}\) MiraMed Institute (2004b).


\(^{80}\) Ibid.

In addition to work at the United Nations, MiraMed and the Angel Coalition have participated in meetings of many transnational organizations and councils. For example, both MiraMed and AC representatives have taken part in meetings on human trafficking at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and served on an OSCE counter-trafficking working group. Additionally, an AC representative worked with the Council of Europe in Strasburg, France, and represented Russia in the writing of the European Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.\textsuperscript{82} As noted previously, the AC has also worked in close cooperation with the International Organization for Migration both within Russia and the CIS and with IOM offices in other countries. In meetings and conferences with these international organizations, the AC shared its experience and its perspective on combating human trafficking and lobbied for an abolitionist approach to be included in international counter-trafficking practices. At the same time, participation in these meetings granted the AC an opportunity to expand its international contacts and to establish the AC’s international presence.

As the Angel Coalition’s visibility in the international arena grew, members of the transnational counter-trafficking community came to recognize the AC’s expertise on human trafficking in Russia and the broader CIS region. AC activists increasingly were invited to speak on panels and serve on committees and working groups on human trafficking. In 2006, the AC was invited by the U.S. House of Representatives International Relations Committee to give testimony on the trafficking of Russian women to Germany for prostitution in order to warn the international community about the possibility of increased trafficking during the World Cup of soccer being

\textsuperscript{82} MiraMed Institute (2004b).
held in Germany that year. Since prostitution was legal in Germany, it was a common destination country for women from Russia and other CIS countries trafficked into prostitution. In two different sessions, in April and June of 2006, Juliette Engel and two trafficking survivors assisted by the AC testified before the Committee on the extensiveness of sex trafficking to Germany and the harm the practice does to victims.¹³

Finally, the AC worked to combat human trafficking on the international level by taking cases to the European Court. As mentioned, in 2008, the AC initiated its first international legal case, N. M. Rantsev versus Cyprus and Russia, in collaboration with lawyers from London, United Kingdom and Yekaterinburg, Russia, which it presented to the European Court. At the time, the AC was also preparing to take a second case before the European Court.¹⁴

In discussing the AC’s international advocacy with activists, they reported many positive outcomes of international collaboration in that it allowed them to make contacts in other countries and develop networks to better assist trafficking victims. In addition, because many anti-trafficking organizations in other parts of the world had longer histories than the Angel Coalition, AC activists were able to learn a great deal from the experience of these organizations in fighting trafficking. However, one difficulty AC activists reported in working with organizations outside of Russia was understanding the different standards used for identifying victims and trafficking


¹⁴ Angel Coalition (2009c).
crimes, and the different methods used to respond to trafficking cases. For example, Nadezhda states:

Standards for transporting victims are different in every organization. For example, in Germany, in Turkey, in Russia, they are different. That is a big problem because then we have to come to agreement…. Also identification of victims. The rules of identification are different everywhere…. There should be some kind of single standard. Whenever we go to international conferences, we always speak about that and we understand that it is very difficult, and we need to try to understand one another.85

Additionally, activists reported that different standards of rehabilitation left trafficking victims from Russia and CIS countries unprepared for the limited rehabilitative services available in the region. Larisa discusses the expectations of some trafficking victims who received rehabilitation services in other countries before returning to Russia:

[W]hen a victim ends up in a rehabilitation center abroad, social workers, they treat them like victims…. Social workers, abroad that is, treat victims with pity…. But, in fact, we don’t need to pity victims, but to make them understand that “After you leave the doors of the rehabilitation center, you will enter real life and you will need to make your own decisions and you will need to adapt on your own and nobody will be solving your problems for you.” This especially concerns those victims who went through a long period of rehabilitation in a center, and when they return home, to their native country…., we can’t constantly support them…. We often have situations in

85 Interview with Nadezhda, January 18, 2008.
which we give them our telephone number and victims, girls, they turn to us for help… because “You are obliged to help us. We are victims.”…. And when… you start to talk to the girls, you understand why, why she acts that way, why she thinks that she is entitled. It’s because “That’s what they told me there. They said that you have to give me money. And you have to pay me some kind of stipend.”

The mismatch between the availability of rehabilitative services in Russia as compared to many countries where trafficking victims originally received services, e.g., Germany, Italy, the United Arab Emirates, came as a shock to many victims returning to Russia. As AC activists emphasized, unifying standards on rehabilitative care on the international level and giving victims realistic expectations of what type of services to expect once they are repatriated to their home country is important to avoid further alienating victims on the already difficult road to recovery.

Since its entry into the international counter-trafficking arena, the AC has advocated for polices that reflect its counter-trafficking position and that are centered on the needs of victims. Signifying the respect it has gained within the international community, the AC attended meetings with high-level national and international officials, served on international committees, and testified on human trafficking before the U.S. Congress. The longevity and visibility of the AC led it to become a leading representative of the counter-trafficking movement in Russia and the broader CIS in the international arena, and it often served as the voice of counter-trafficking NGOs in the region. Although the international counter-trafficking arena grew dramatically from 1998–2008, the AC continued to draw attention to gaps in the

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86 Interview with Larisa, February 20, 2008.
international trafficking response system, to advocate for the specific needs of
Russian and CIS populations, and to reaffirm the efficacy of the abolitionist approach.

6.5 The Angel Coalition Looking into the Future: Moving Closer to Foreign Funders
or to the Russian State?

Since its founding, the Angel Coalition relied largely on grants from foreign
governments and foundations to support its counter-trafficking work. Indeed, the
AC’s founding in 1999 resulted in part from a U.S. State Department grant to
MiraMed to expand the organization’s counter-trafficking activities, and in 2003, the
U.S. State Department provided additional funding to support the opening of the
AC’s TVAC office in Moscow. Nearly all of the AC’s activities, including the
coordination of nine safehouses through Russia, the international hotline, police
training programs, embassy training programs, public information campaigns, and so
forth, had been funded by foreign sources, with the Russian government providing
only minimal support, usually through in-kind donations of billboard or poster space
for advertisements.

However, at the time of my fieldwork in 2007-2008, the situation had begun
to change. AC activists had grown dissatisfied with the process of constantly
searching for grants and the time it took away from carrying out their programs. The
U.S. government, which had been one of the leading funders of the AC since its
founding, had reduced funding to Russian counter-trafficking projects. Meanwhile,
the AC’s relationship with Russian governmental structures was improving. This
situation led some AC activists to feel as though the AC should seek to establish
closer relations with the Russian state, even perhaps becoming part of a Russian governmental structure, rather than continuing to depend on foreign funding. However, other AC activists noted the difficulty of obtaining funding for counter-trafficking projects, and projects on other women’s issues, within Russia and believed that the AC should continue to seek foreign sources of support. Nadezhda shared a sentiment common among AC activists. When asked how the organization’s funding situation could be improved, she stated:

[T]he simplest way would be if some of our programs were funded by the government. For example, the shelters could be financed by the government, but that’s not realistic. We could try it, but our present-day political and economic situation doesn’t allow that to happen. And the level of societal and governmental awareness of this problem doesn’t allow that to happen. So, as far as that is not yet possible, probably we just need to intensify our search for grants.  

Recognizing the challenges of maintaining stable and consistent funding for the organization, some activists, like Nadezhda, recommended that the organization look for ways to broaden its foreign support. Activists suggested that the AC, in cooperation with MiraMed, increase fundraising efforts in the United States. Another suggestion was for the AC to hire a grant specialist to interact and meet regularly with funders and give presentations on the AC’s work. Several activists recognized the importance of continuing to have Westerners work at the AC to write grant applications. Finally, some activists stressed the importance of AC’s ties with

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87 Interview with Nadezhda, January 17, 2008.
MiraMed and the need for this relationship to continue in order for the AC to flourish.

As Natalie, an American activist stated:

[W]ithout MiraMed, Angel Coalition would be much smaller, much less effective... and also Russian law is so strict for NGOs…. There’s so much reporting…. It requires so much support and we can’t fund that all through grants. I mean, we have to do fundraising. And we can’t do fundraising in Russia, so we have people in the United States to do fundraising, and that supports all the extra people.\(^88\)

Those activists who believed that continuing to rely on foreign funding represented the best option for the AC’s future success pointed to the Russian government’s lack of commitment to the issue of human trafficking and the difficulty of obtaining funding from any Russian source, governmental or non-governmental, for such a controversial and unpopular issue. As discussed previously, many activists felt that the difficulty in getting a comprehensive counter-trafficking law passed in Russia stemmed from the government’s unwillingness to pledge substantial funds to address the problem. Although the Russian government signed the UN Protocol on Human Trafficking, it had not provided the funds to back up its verbal commitment to the issue.

A second reason some activists were reluctant to become dependent on Russian sources of funding was the unpopularity of the issue of human trafficking in Russia. While charitable giving by Russian corporations, businesses, and even individuals, had slowly become more common during the Putin era, such donations were largely directed toward the government-identified priority issues of improving

\(^{88}\) Interview with Natalie, February 27, 2008.
Russians’ healthcare, housing, agriculture, or education, and especially toward children’s issues. By contrast, human trafficking remained a controversial issue that many Russians were reluctant to talk about, let alone combat through monetary donations. Likewise, “women’s issues” in general received little support from Russian citizens or corporations, who preferred to donate to children’s or family causes rather than those that focused on women alone. For example, while the AC struggled for Russian support, its partner organization Women and Children First, with its focus on children’s and family issues, received a great deal of domestic governmental and charitable support and was transitioning much more quickly from a Western-founded and -funded organization to an indigenously supported Russian organization.

With an emphasis on human trafficking, the AC remained vulnerable not only to the lack of support within Russia but also to the instability of funds for human trafficking internationally. While the popularity of children’s issues, both nationally and internationally, allowed Women and Children First to thrive and envision a stable future, the continued availability of large grants for counter-trafficking work was much less certain. Although human trafficking was a “hot topic” of funding agencies at the turn of the twenty-first century, some governments and foundations had already begun to turn their attention to other issues and to reduce funding for counter-trafficking work in Russia. The AC took advantage of the emphasis on children’s issues by winning grants specifically to implement projects on child trafficking, but there remained gaps in the AC’s budget that were difficult to fill.
Given the uncertain future of foreign funding for counter-trafficking work in Russia, some AC activists voiced a preference for the stability that Russian governmental support would provide. When asked about the goals of the AC, Larisa responded:

[O]ur goals are, of course, to be, live, and work with governmental structures. And so that our organization didn’t have to, for example, apply for grants and constantly ask for money and prove that such a problem [human trafficking] exists. To be like a governmental structure. Since we already have work experience, we would like the government to accept us and, um, the potential of the experience we have on this problem, our staff, our information, our hotline…. But when that will happen, and if it is even possible… we don’t know.89

Further emphasizing this argument, when asked about the future development of the AC, Larisa said:

If it is as an organization that is part of the government structure, as a Russian governmental structure, then we won’t worry about if we will be able to provide help tomorrow, if we will be working tomorrow, if we will have problems with our grants. Honestly, I, like my co-workers, worry about the hotline closing. Because, if funding ends, the hotline ends. So, people who won’t have anywhere to turn, we receive many words of thanks from them on the telephone, from the relatives that we helped, and they… have even lit candles in churches for our work, the work that we do and for everything we do for those people that society has just turned its back on. I’m speaking of

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89 Interview with Larisa, February 20, 2008.
even law enforcement agencies that you turn to when your daughter leaves to work as a prostitute. Nobody will work on it…. So, here, I feel a lot of significance in that our organization is so needed and our… hotline is so needed and that we provide help, maybe not to everybody that we would like to, but thanks to their gratitude, I would like to keep working and continue to do more.90

Like Larisa, the majority of AC activists whom I interviewed, from both the CIS and the West, indicated that receiving Russian governmental funding would be the ideal situation for the organization, although only a few considered this as a realistic possibility in the near future. In contrast to the fear expressed by many theorists on Russian civil society that government support for NGOs would lead to cooptation and loss of independence for organizations, many AC activists welcomed the idea of such a take-over and emphasized their role in “helping” the state to take action against human trafficking. Whether the end result of such an arrangement would still allow substantial input from counter-trafficking experts in the civil sector is questionable, but, with the relationships of trust that had been established between AC activists and many government officials, activists were willing to take this chance. However, as noted, governmental support at the time of my fieldwork was minimal. Thus, while AC activists continued to build strong relationships with government officials and to place their hope in the passing of the counter-trafficking draft law, they also continued to search for alternative means of funding.

90 Ibid.
6.6 The Angel Coalition: Insights of the Case Study for Counter-Trafficking

 Movements and Transnational Feminist Networks

As I have demonstrated in this chapter, the unique organizational characteristics of the Angel Coalition enabled it to overcome many of the challenges of working with the Russian state and managing the requirements of foreign funders in order to successfully influence counter-trafficking policy both within Russia and on the international level. The commitment that Juliette Engel and the CIS activists displayed both to fighting human trafficking in Russia and to upholding the AC’s core values allowed the organization to survive during difficult periods and attain a degree of longevity and sustainability that earned it the respect of officials on the national and international levels. This longevity was made possible, in large part, through the AC’s partnership with MiraMed, an American organization with pre-established connections to many international funders and counter-trafficking networks and with fundraising capabilities in the United States. The superior financial resources of the AC compared to most other foreign-funded Russian NGOs enabled it to thrive while many other NGOs struggled for survival. Finally, the dual Western/Russian nature of the Angel Coalition provided it with an important advantage, as the contributions of both Westerners and Russians were necessary to make the work of the AC possible during the period of my study. Thus, I argue that these unique organizational characteristics enabled the AC to attain the status necessary to be accepted as a partner to the Russian government and a member of the international community, and to influence policy on both the national and international levels.
In addition to these organizational characteristics, another factor that contributed to the AC’s success was its focus on the issue of human trafficking. Although the Russian state had not declared combating human trafficking as one of its national priorities, the state signaled the importance of the issue through the signing of the UN Protocol on Human Trafficking and domestic efforts to criminalize this practice and prosecute traffickers. However, despite taking these initial steps and verbally committing to combat human trafficking, the state did not follow through with the allocation of substantial funds to support counter-trafficking efforts. As a result, NGO activists took over leadership of Russia’s counter-trafficking movement and pressed the government to fulfill its commitment to the problem.

In a situation with scarce domestic resources for this governmental commitment, the state was willing to partner with Russian NGOs and accept foreign funds to advance toward its counter-trafficking goals. However, the Russian state ensured that it remained the dominant partner in such partnerships and retained control over the implementation of these foreign-funded projects. AC activists accepted their status as a “junior partner” in these relationships and saw the arrangement as fulfilling their role as a “helper” to the state. After all, the AC’s main goal was to spur the government to action on the issue of human trafficking and urge it to fulfill its own obligations to the issue. In the process, the AC also demonstrated the ability of transnational networks to influence the domestic policy of the Russian state.

In studying the Angel Coalition, another question I pose is whether the international counter-trafficking networks of which the Angel Coalition was a part
(including the AC’s network within CIS countries) could be considered part of the transnational feminist movement. Although the AC helped men as well as women and children, it was founded with a focus on women, and most of its partner NGOs also focused on women as victims of human trafficking. Additionally, many of its educational and media campaigns were targeted toward women as potential victims of human trafficking.

Furthermore, most of the AC’s projects, even those that were not directed toward women, such as the police training programs, were based on the methodological approaches of a “gender perspective,” an “empowerment perspective,” and a “human rights perspective,” with the first two of these approaches focused specifically on promoting women’s rights.91 Employing a “gender perspective” means devoting attention to the unequal gender relations between men and women that leave women in positions of vulnerability, in this case in danger of being trafficked, while the “empowerment perspective” emphasizes the importance of empowering women to regain a sense of self-worth after surviving situations of trauma and abuse.

The AC’s philosophy on gender issues was influenced by several of its partners, most notably by its strong partnership with Swedish women’s groups, which devoted a great deal of attention to issues of gender inequality and women’s empowerment. In this way, although the AC did not label itself a “women’s organization” or a “feminist organization,” I include it as part of the transnational women’s movement due to its primary focus on women and the extensive work it has

91 I am using the terms employed by the AC in its work with funders, in grant applications, project reports, etc.
done to protect women and uphold women’s rights in Russia and abroad. In addition, most of its organizational partners, both in Russia and abroad, are self-identified women’s organizations.

In examining the AC as part of the transnational women’s movement, it is necessary not only to study the impact of the AC in influencing national and international counter-trafficking policies, but also to question how insights gathered from the organization’s experiences can contribute to the development of transnational feminist theory. The aim of transnational feminist theory is not simply to influence social policy but also to continuously develop as a body of knowledge and practice that is capable of reshaping itself to respond to constantly emerging global challenges and representing the interests of its participants on an egalitarian basis.

As discussed throughout this dissertation, the relationships that ground the transnational feminist movement, including relationships between funders and recipients, relationships between women activists in the North and West with those in the South and East, and relationships between established women’s networks and fledging women’s groups, have been hampered by historical and institutional power imbalances. While working to reduce gender inequality and ameliorate the harmful effects of long-standing economic and political disparities on women around the world, many transnational women’s networks have reproduced the very power dynamics that they sought to combat.

In the conclusion chapter that follows, I present my findings on the Angel Coalition, both as a successful NGO in Russian civil society that has been able to
influence counter-trafficking policies on the national and international levels, and as a site of global-local intersection in the transnational feminist movement. Analyzing the work of the AC, I question what insights transnational feminism can draw from this case to further the development of egalitarian, dialogic, and reflexive practices for feminist research and activism.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

In this conclusion chapter, I present my findings on the effectiveness of the Angel Coalition, and the larger transnational counter-trafficking movement of which it was a part, in influencing actions of the Russian state on the issue of human trafficking from 1998 to 2008. My conclusions in this area build upon the findings of scholars on transnational civil society who demonstrate the growing power of transnational advocacy networks and other civil society actors in influencing the policies of states on social issues that are important to citizens in countries around the world. Additionally, I examine the Angel Coalition as a site of local-global intersection in the transnational women’s movement and question how insights from this case study can aid in the development of more egalitarian and democratic networks between activists from different corners of the globe. In its efforts to create more open and responsive forms of dialogue, the transnational feminist movement can serve as a leader in the area of cross-cultural communication for other transnational social movements, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of these movements in representing the voices of average citizens and pushing states and intergovernmental organizations for change.

7.1 Contribution to Scholarship on Transnational Civil Society

In recent decades, theorists of transnational civil society have noted the expanding role that transnational civil society actors play in world politics and the increasingly strong influence that transnational advocacy networks wield on the actions of states.
My research in this dissertation provides additional support to this conclusion as I demonstrate the ability of the transnational counter-trafficking network to impact the actions of the Russian government, a government notably unwelcoming to the interference of foreign states or of Russian civil society actors in domestic affairs. In its first decade of operation, the Angel Coalition, a joint Russian-American organization, led the Russian counter-trafficking movement, and through the passionate work of activists who were committed to fighting trafficking, they demonstrated to the Russian government the benefits of state-civil society collaboration on this issue. Positioning themselves as “helpers” or “junior partners” to the Russian state, these activists were successful in getting the Russian state to take action against human trafficking and to accept the expertise of civil society actors in designing and implementing counter-trafficking programs. The case study of the Angel Coalition demonstrates that, when transnational activists work creatively and flexibly in response to the particular opportunities and constraints of the policy environment in which they operate, they have the potential to impact the actions of even relatively “closed” states such as Russia.

However, due to the shifting policies of foreign aid to Russian civil society organizations and the increasingly strict policies of the Russian state towards foreign aid, the success of the Angel Coalition in this ten-year period does not guarantee future success, or even survival. AC activists, along with other Russian civil society activists, must continually search for funds to support their activities and find new ways to engage in dialogue with a state sector that is in constant flux. In the period after the conclusion of my research, the Russian state’s policies on foreign support of
Russian civil society became even more strict. In July 2012, Vladimir Putin, once again President of the Russian Federation, signed into law a bill requiring foreign-funded NGOs to register as “foreign agents” in Russia and allowing an unlimited number of inspections and checks on these NGOs.¹ In defending his signing of this bill, Putin stated:

No one has the monopoly of speaking on behalf of the entire Russian society, let alone the structures directed and funded from abroad and thus inevitably serving foreign interests. Any direct or indirect meddling in our internal affairs, any forms of pressure on Russia, on our allies and partners is inadmissible.²

A few months later, in September 2012, the Russian Federation expelled USAID after accusing the agency of meddling in Russian politics. Prior to the expulsion, USAID had worked in Russia for two decades and spent nearly 3 billion dollars in aid towards democracy and development, including towards Russian civil society.³ A statement from Russia’s foreign ministry explaining the ejection stated:

The decision was taken mainly because the work of the agency's officials far from always responded to the stated goals of development and humanitarian cooperation. We are talking about attempts to influence political processes through its grants.⁴


² Ibid.

As these actions and statements suggest, the Russian state has often interpreted foreign, especially Western, aid to Russian civil society as an attempt by foreign actors to influence Russia’s internal affairs and promote policies that are contradictory to Russia’s national interest.  

While many transitional and post-communist countries have “graduated” from foreign development and democracy assistance programs once they reached a certain level of development, the ways in which Russia unilaterally declared its own graduation from these programs and the tone in which it did so reflects the historic power relations between Russia and the West, especially the United States. Since the end of the Soviet period in the early 1990s and the arrival in Russia of many Western advisors, foundations, and government agencies pressing liberal-style reforms on Russia, the Russian government has accepted many of these offers of help, while attempting to retain control over how foreign resources are deployed on Russian soil. In the chaotic political era under Yeltsin, the Russia government lost a degree of control over the reform process as Russian oligarchs and Western advisors financially benefited from Western-led programs to reshape Russia’s economy. However, following the Yeltsin era, the Russian government under Putin and Medvedev tightened its reins over Russia’s internal affairs and increased oversight over foreign agencies and foreign-funded Russian organizations operating in Russia.

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4 Ibid.

When foreign assistance programs proved useful to the Russian government, Russian officials took advantage of them and used these resources to further national development goals and strengthen the Russian state. As the Russian economy expanded and the state reclaimed a level of political prominence on the international stage, it gradually expelled foreign organizations that no longer proved useful and implemented checks on Russian organizations that accepted foreign aid. To provide some examples, in 2002, Russia expelled the U.S. Peace Corps, which had been operating in Russia for ten years, with the charge that some Peace Corps volunteers had been working as U.S. spies.\(^6\) Additionally, as discussed in chapter 3, in 2007, the Russian state ordered the closure of two regional offices of the British Council, claiming that they were operating illegally. After working in Russia for almost twenty years, conducting English classes and sponsoring cultural activities, the Council was left with only its main office in Moscow out of which to conduct its activities. Finally, in 2012, the Russian state expelled USAID from the country.

Commonly, the graduation of countries from development and democracy assistance reflects broader political relations between the donor and recipient countries involved. Regarding U.S. development aid, as of 2004, 25 countries had graduated from U.S. assistance programs after moving out of the category of “developing countries” into the category of “middle income countries.”\(^7\) Notable graduates of U.S. aid programs that effectively utilized this aid to help them build strong economies were Chile, Costa Rica, South Korea, and Taiwan. Some of these

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\(^7\) Butterfield, 276.
25 graduating countries went on to develop foreign aid programs of their own.\(^8\) As of 2011, USAID, the main U.S. agency distributing development aid to foreign countries, still had 80 aid missions and programs in over 100 countries, with a plan to graduate additional countries (not including Russia) by closing seven programs by 2015.\(^9\)

In planning a country’s graduation, USAID prefers to identify in advance, often in consultation with the recipient country, a suitable pull-out date after a significant number of development objectives have been met, and to develop a transition plan to facilitate a shift in the country’s relationship with the United States from aid recipient to partner. As Daniel Runde argues:

> If USAID country missions are closed without establishing a plan to transition bilateral relationships, then the United States risks throwing away a number of years of effort and often hundreds of millions of dollars of investment.\(^10\)

Many countries, especially those who desire to maintain positive relations with the United States, have cooperated with USAID in closing missions in their countries and transitioning to bilateral relationships based on partnership. However, other recipient countries have taken control of the process by “graduating” themselves from these programs and expelling USAID in order to send a political message that it is no longer in need of U.S. aid, or that it opposes U.S. policies or activities within its borders.

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\(^8\) Ibid.


\(^10\) Ibid.
For example, in June 2012, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), an international cooperation organization promoting social, political and economic integration of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, published a resolution calling upon heads of states of alliance members to expel USAID missions from their countries due to the interference of USAID in the national politics of ALBA countries through “financing non-governmental organizations and actions and projects designed to destabilize the legitimate governments which do not share their common interests.” The resolution was signed by the governments of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Dominica, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.

In May 2013, Bolivia’s President Evo Morales followed through by expelling USAID while criticizing U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s remark calling the Western Hemisphere the United State’s “backyard.” Morales’s action raised fears within the United States that other countries in the region would similarly expel USAID or drastically restrict the type of aid that they would accept. In a similar way, Russia’s expulsion of USAID in September 2012 sent a political message regarding its relations with the United States.

The provision and receipt of foreign aid constitutes only one of several dimensions of political relations between countries, with diplomatic, military,

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12 Note: After the publication of the resolution, Dominica denied that it had signed it.

economic, institutional, and cultural dimensions also playing major roles in these relationships. The various dimensions of political relations between countries frequently overlap and influence one another. As such, the decision to provide or accept foreign aid often reflects developments in other spheres of these relations and serves as a symbol of the form and strength of these relations. Similar to the belief by many analysts that Russia’s decision to close the regional offices of the British Council was a result of controversy surrounding the British investigation into the poisoning death of Alexander Litvinenko, a former Russian secret service agent, in London in 2006, along with many other cases of tit-for-tat punitive measures between Russia and Western countries, observers have also interpreted deeper political meanings behind Russia’s ejection of USAID. Indeed, after the closure of Russia’s USAID office, the United States retaliated by quitting the joint U.S.-Russia Civil Society Working Group to protest Russia’s increasingly strict restrictions on civil society.

Reflecting the contentious relationship between Russia and the United States, Russia’s decision to expel USAID most likely was intended not only to provide a check on the growing strength of Russia’s civil society, especially of some oppositional groups, but also to signal a growing wariness of U.S. intervention into its

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14 Carothers (2004), 111.

15 “Russia Expels USAID Development Agency.”

16 Rosenberg.

internal affairs. With Russia’s return to a position of international prominence, it sought to shift its relationship with Western countries from one of recipient of foreign aid to one of equal partner, or in some cases, adversary. During the period in which Russia did receive significant amounts of foreign aid, the United States and other Western countries implemented programs to promote a vision of a stable, democratic Russia in line with their own values and goals. At the same time, Russia’s leaders increasingly sought to control the direction of this aid through expanded regulation and oversight of foreign organizations and foreign-funded Russian organizations.

With the availability of foreign funding for Russia’s civil society dependent both on decisions by foreign governments and their citizens to provide these funds and on the authority of the Russian government to permit or deny the disbursal of these funds, Russian civil society activists are caught in the middle. At the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century, domestic sources of financial support remained scarce, leaving activists to continually search for new means to support their organizations and initiatives. Although the shifting sphere of civil society aid, both foreign and domestic, will likely have a significant impact on the shape of Russian civil society for years to come, Russia activists have shown that they are willing to fight through tremendous obstacles to achieve their aims. Regarding the Russian counter-trafficking movement, the strong networks that have been built within Russia and the CIS, and with organizations in other countries and regions, have created a solid foundation for the continued work of the movement into the future. With strong links to transnational networks, a deep commitment to its cause, and the flexibility to respond to the ever-changing domestic political environment, the
Russian movement against human trafficking is well positioned to continue its work in influencing Russian state action against human trafficking.

This dissertation has demonstrated that transnational advocacy networks, in collaboration with national-level organizations, can have a significant influence on the actions and the policies of even “closed” states such as Russia. In my case study of the Angel Coalition, two factors proved particularly important for the success of the organization and the transnational counter-trafficking network of which it was a part: 1) counter-trafficking activists evinced a practiced understanding of the political environment of Russia, the state in which they sought to effect change, and 2) they effectively communicated to the state how it would benefit from collaboration with civil society groups and from taking action on their particular advocacy issue, human trafficking.

In regards to the first factor, understanding the political environment, activists gained knowledge and experience of governmental policies and practices through several years of progressively advancing collaboration with state officials and structures, which they drew upon in designing counter-trafficking initiatives that involved partnering with state structures or that required state approval. In regards to the second factor, communicating the benefits of state collaboration with the counter-trafficking movement, activists effectively demonstrated to the state how it would benefit from working with counter-trafficking organizations to combat human trafficking, namely, that such collaboration would advance the national goals of fighting crime, raising prosecution rates, and helping the state to meet its international
obligation to combat trafficking as a signatory of the UN Protocol on Human Trafficking.

Despite many statements by Russian governmental officials, especially after the start of Putin’s first presidency in 2000, that the state rejected the influence of foreign actors or foreign-funded Russian advocacy organizations, and despite regulations implemented to restrict foreign organizations and foreign-funded organizations, the Angel Coalition and the transnational network of which it was a part were able to overcome these barriers through the strategic use of the two tactics discussed above.

These tactics helped the Angel Coalition to influence Russian state actions against human trafficking in many ways, including the following examples. In 2003, the AC organized a workshop to develop a protocol on providing assistance to victims of trafficking in Russia and invited governmental representatives to attend. Representatives from the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Duma, and the Moscow City Duma attended this workshop and contributed to the development of the protocol. Upon publication of the “Trafficking Victims Assistance Protocol” by the AC, it was accepted by governmental officials as an exemplar of “best practices” for safehouse operation in Russia.

Beginning in 2004, the AC organized “Safe Rescue and Return” conferences in various regions of Russia, which the President’s Administration mandated that regional representatives attend. In these conferences, NGO and governmental representatives collaboratively developed a counter-trafficking protocol that outlined the responsibilities for various governmental agencies and NGOs in responding to
human trafficking. Upon publication of the “Counter-Trafficking Protocol and Plan of Action for the Russian Federation” by the AC in 2004, it was accepted by governmental officials as a guide on government-NGO cooperation on the issue.

Starting in 2005, the AC served as a leader in the reform of the Russian child welfare system through the Moscow Child Rescue Project, in which the AC, along with MiraMed and WCF, trained state workers, such as juvenile police, social workers, medical personnel, and detention center staff on serving trafficked and exploited children; created new methodologies for rehabilitation programs for children and new training programs for workers to be taken over by state structures; and raised awareness and helped change the discourse of senior governmental officials on the issue. During the course of the Moscow Child Rescue Project, state structures took over and institutionalized some of the programs created by AC, WCF, and MiraMed, and even provided some funding for the project, thereby demonstrating the state’s acceptance of these organizations as legitimate partners in the reform of the child welfare system.

In 2008, the AC implemented a program to train Russian law enforcement officials who work with adult victims of trafficking in several regions of Russia. In addition to leading the trainings during this project, the AC also published a textbook on human trafficking in partnership with several governmental institutions, and developed a training module that could be replicated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in other Russian regions.

These are just some of the examples that demonstrate the Angel Coalition’s leadership of the Russian counter-trafficking movement from 1999-2008. In effect
allowing the AC to serve as the leader of this national movement and to act as a partner to the state on counter-trafficking initiatives, the Russian state permitted the AC to take on some governmental functions and authorized the AC’s programs to become state programs. Hence, the AC not only influenced state action against human trafficking, but in fact replaced the state in some policymaking settings.

My research findings support previous scholarship on the ability of transnational advocacy networks and other transnational civil society actors to influence the actions of states by authors such as Keck and Sikkink, Ann Florini, and Daphne Josselin and William Wallace. These scholars note that, although TANs and other civil society actors aim to influence state policy and practice on specific issues, the boundary between state and civil society is often blurred, as state actors work in partnership with or participate in civil society organizations and networks and as civil society actors take on state roles.18

Focusing specifically on TANs, Keck and Sikkink examine the ability of TANs to influence states in a variety of ways and argue that key factors affecting their ability to exert such influence are “issue characteristics” and “actor characteristics.”19 Regarding issue characteristics, they contend that, in order for TANs to encourage states to act on an issue,

[E]ither the values in question must plausibly coincide with the “national interest” or the government acting must believe (correctly or not) that the


action is not costly (or at least that it is less costly than not acting). Part of what networks do is try to transform state understandings of their national interests, and alter their calculations of the costs or benefits of particular policies. Moreover, the activists promoting the issue must seek state actors who are either network members themselves (in terms of their willingness to take costly action to promote issues they care deeply about) or who have other incentives to act.\textsuperscript{20}

Keck and Sikkink posit that two types of issues, those involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals and those revolving around legal equality of opportunity, are likely to be influential across different political and cultural contexts.\textsuperscript{21} My research supports the argument on the importance of issue characteristics for the success of TANs in influencing states, as I argue that part of the AC’s effectiveness stemmed from its ability to demonstrate to the Russian state how taking action against human trafficking, an issue involving bodily harm to vulnerable populations, coincided with the national interest to fight crime and meet state obligations to international treaties.

In terms of actor characteristics, Keck and Sikkink emphasize characteristics both of the network seeking to affect change and of the target state or institution. They argue that the most effective networks are “dense, with many actors, strong connections among groups in the network, and reliable information flows.”\textsuperscript{22} The most effective networks also contain “nodes,” or well-connected organizations,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 203-304.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 204.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 28.
\end{itemize}
within the target country. These characteristics fit the TAN that I studied, with the Angel Coalition a well-organized domestic NGO operating as part of a dense and dynamic transnational counter-trafficking network.

Additionally important are characteristics of the target state. Keck and Sikkink maintain that in order to be open to the influence of TANs:

Target actors must be vulnerable either to material incentives or to sanctions from outside actors, or they must be sensitive to pressure because of gaps between stated commitments and practice…. Countries that are most susceptible to network pressures are those that aspire to belong to a normative community of nations.24

They contrast countries with open political structures and those with closed political structures and argue that “closed political structures in societies where participatory channels are blocked or limited may lead citizens to seek international linkages to press their claims more effectively.”25 Keck and Sikkink refer to this practice as the “boomerang pattern,” in which domestic NGOs bypass their state and reach out to international allies to try to bring pressure on their state from outside.26

In my case study of the influence of a transnational counter-trafficking network on Russia, Russian state officials claimed to be “closed” to influence both by domestic advocacy organizations funded from abroad and by foreign organizations and states. Thus, Russian counter-trafficking activists did not activate the boomerang pattern, but

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23 Ibid., 206.
24 Ibid., 29.
26 Ibid., 12.
partnered with transnational networks and successfully circumvented this blockage by utilizing the two factors discussed above, namely, basing their actions on a practiced understanding of the Russian political environment and demonstrating to the state the benefits of taking action against the issue of human trafficking, factors also identified as important in Keck and Sikkink’s theory of transnational advocacy networks.

In addition to Keck and Sikkink’s examination of the ability of TANs to influence states, they, along with Florini and Josselin and Wallace, also point to the eroding boundaries between TANs, other transnational civil society actors, and states, as states partner with and participate in TANs, and as civil society actors take on state roles. My research supports this finding as I demonstrate how the Angel Coalition went beyond simply influencing the Russian state to taking on state roles in leading the Russian counter-trafficking movement. The Angel Coalition drew upon financial, informational, and tactical resources from the broader transnational counter-trafficking network of which it was a part to create training programs for state employees who encounter the issue of human trafficking in their work; develop the first safehouses for victims of human trafficking in Russia along with the state-approved methodologies for operating them; take a lead role, along with MiraMed and WCF, in the reform of Russia’s child welfare system; and publish a government-approved protocol outlining the responsibilities of NGOs and various government ministries in combating human trafficking and a plan of coordination of the work of these units; along with many other initiatives to fight human trafficking in Russia and the CIS.
The contribution of my research to the literature on transnational civil society is to extend the scholarship on the effectiveness of transnational civil society actors in influencing and interacting with states by scholars such as Keck and Sikkink, Florini, and Josselin and Wallace. My research supports many of the conclusions of these authors on state-civil society interaction outlined above while illustrating the specific example of one domestic advocacy organization working in conjunction with a transnational network to influence the Russian state in a particular time period.

In my case study of the Angel Coalition, I argue that two factors were especially important to the AC’s success in influencing Russian state actions against human trafficking and leading the Russian counter-trafficking movement: a practiced understanding of the political environment of Russia and the ability to demonstrate to the Russian state the benefits of taking action on this issue. Moreover, I argue that the unique organizational factors of the AC, including its dual Russian-Western nature, the long-term commitment of its members, and its flexibility and creativity in responding to obstacles in the political environment, enabled it to put these factors into play in its relationship with the Russian state. While my findings reflect the influence of one particular TAN, a transnational counter-trafficking network, in the specific domestic political environment of the Russian Federation from 1998-2008, they also offer support for the broader theory on the influence of transnational advocacy networks worldwide and can be used to extend this theory to contexts in which domestic political structures are relatively closed both to the influence of oppositional domestic organizations and to the influence of foreign actors. Further research is necessary to examine the applicability of my findings in other settings.
7.2 Contribution to Scholarship on Transnational Feminism

In its efforts to fight human trafficking, the Angel Coalition focused not on crime control, border protection, or labor markets, as did many states and intergovernmental organizations, but on the human rights of victims and potential victims of human trafficking. More specifically, during the period of 1999-2008, the Angel Coalition focused most of its counter-trafficking programs on protecting women and girls from the dangers of sex trafficking, although it also addressed other forms of trafficking and the trafficking of men and boys when such cases came to its attention.

On the issue of sex trafficking, the AC used a strict abolitionist approach to guide its programs, through which it advocated the eradication of prostitution as the most effective way to combat trafficking. The organization aimed to support women and girls in leaving the profession of prostitution, and it did not carry out harm reduction programs geared toward currently working sex workers. In designing its counter-trafficking efforts, the AC based many of its programs on the methodological approaches of a “gender perspective,” an “empowerment perspective,” and a “human rights perspective,” the first two of which focused specifically on promoting women’s rights. Although the AC did not identify itself as a “feminist organization” or a “women’s organization,” its emphasis on advocating for women’s rights and its close links with many women’s organizations throughout Russia and the CIS and abroad led me to include it as part of the transnational women’s movement. I argue that the extensive work of the AC within transnational women’s networks has contributed to the development of the transnational feminist movement.
In examining the AC as a part of the transnational feminist movement, I question not only how it influenced Russian state actions against human trafficking, but also how insights gained from its operation as a joint Russian-Western organization can contribute to the development of transnational feminist theory. The goal of the transnational feminist movement is not only to improve the position of women in a globalizing world, but to challenge the global structures that maintain this inequality, while struggling to uphold egalitarian practices within its own networks. The unique nature of the Angel Coalition, as an organization founded and successfully run over a ten-year period by activists from both the CIS and the West, has the potential to offer important insights that can aid the further evolution of transnational feminist theory.

As discussed in chapter 4, relations between Russian women activists and their Western partners, especially Western feminists and Western funding organizations or agencies, in the post-Soviet period were built on a foundation of historic power imbalances and cultural and political misunderstandings. Wielding greater power in these relations, with superior financial, institutional, and ideological resources, Westerners arrived to import their versions of feminism, civil society, and democracy into Russia. While the values they advocated emphasized the importance of equal participation, two-way dialogue, respect for difference, and openness to reciprocal learning in building these new relationships, many times assistance programs had the opposite effect. In structuring many of these relationships as the deliverance of the necessary Western expertise to rebuild Russia’s transitional society, Westerners made many assumptions not only as to the superiority of their
financial contributions to these relationships, but also as to the superiority of their political and economic values. As a result, many relationships between Russian activists and their Western supporters got off to a shaky start, with many Russians feeling that their knowledge, experience, and viewpoints were underappreciated by their Western partners.

In response to the challenges that arose in many Western-Russian women’s networks, scholars on Russia’s women’s movement have suggested ways to address these conflicts and misunderstandings. Several note that simply calling these networks “partnerships” is not enough, as the practice obscured the power imbalances that characterized these relationships. Instead, they seek to draw attention to ways in which Western and Russian participants in these networks both contributed to and benefited from these collaborations. One of the points that Sperling, Ferree, and Risman make is that benefits are not merely economic. Although greater financial resources did flow from West to East in these relationships, other benefits flowed from East to West. For example, Western women have gained many career benefits from their work with Russian women’s organizations, such as “increased credibility among sponsors and reputation building that could be transferred to their own related activist or academic enterprises.”

27 Sperling, Ferree, and Risman, 1176.

feminism and to scholarship on women’s issues in locales around the world. As Kay points out:

[A] more flexible approach to funding is needed, and above all a new awareness that expertise and insight emerging from within Russia may be used to adapt Western experience, theories, and practices. Persistent assumptions that “know-how” lies in the West and that it can and should be imported wholesale to the East deprive both sides of what could be a mutually beneficial process of exchange and two-way learning and development.

While my focus in this dissertation has been on the inequalities in relationships between Russians and Westerners in building Russia’s civil society, and especially in developing Russia’s women’s movement, transnational feminist scholarship has demonstrated that difficulties in building egalitarian relationships are common in transnational feminist networks around the world. Scholars such as Valentine Moghadam have lauded the rise of transnational feminist networks as a force to counter globalization practices that disadvantage women and sharpen

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29 Holmgren, 27.


inequalities within and among countries. \(^{32}\) Highlighting the potential of TFNs to oppose global hegemony and oppression, Moghadam argues:

The network form of feminist organizing… suggests a form of organization that may be more conducive to the era of globalization, as well as more consistent with feminist goals of democratic, inclusive, participatory, decentralized, and nonhierarchical structures and processes. \(^{33}\)

Making use of new information and computer technologies, Moghadam notes, “TFNs are now able to perform optimally without having to become formal or bureaucratic organizations. Avoiding bureaucratization is particularly important to feminists.” \(^{34}\)

Moreover, while Moghadam acknowledges cultural, class, and ideological differences among women around the world, she emphasizes that class boundaries are increasingly blurred as TFNs bring together women from diverse backgrounds who find common cause around personal, economic, and social issues. \(^{35}\)

In contrast to Moghadam’s generally positive view of TFNs, other scholars of transnational feminism have noted the reproduction of hegemonic and bureaucratic tendencies within these networks. These tendencies are well illustrated by transnational feminist work on the issues of violence against women, prostitution, and human trafficking. While one category of women, the professional feminist, is constructed as an expert, another category, the victim of domestic violence, rape, prostitution, or sex trafficking, is constructed as a potential client in need of her

\(^{32}\) Moghadam, 19-20, 191.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., 17.

\(^{34}\) Ibid., 17.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 20, 192.
assistance. Professional transnational feminists have assisted in the implementation of international gender norms outlined in such documents as CEDAW and the UN Protocol on Human Trafficking in countries around the world. Working within the mandates of funding agencies, professional feminists often have little need to consult with local women who are designated as the recipients of these new rights. Criticism of this trend, in which professional feminists speak for “voiceless” local women, has led some transnational feminist scholars to instead call for the creation of spaces in which underrepresented populations can speak for themselves, defend their own interests and rights, and pursue opportunities to improve their lives.36

Transnational feminist scholars have pointed to the bureaucratization of women’s organizations and their dependency on international funding agencies as a major reason for the furthering of hegemonic and divisive tendencies through this transnational movement. Discussing the development of transnational networks between women’s organizations in Mexico and international women’s organizations in the early 1990s, Sylvia Marcos notes that, after several years characterized by mutual enthusiasm and hopeful networking, she began to notice a change in direction. She states:

[T]he moment when it started to develop into an institutional organization where you need to have an infrastructure, where you need to have hours of work, salaries or other forms of payment, all these nitty-gritty daily things, the spirit of the movement started to change. First you almost do not recognize it, then it starts to be manipulation and finally sheer imposition. In North

America the funding agencies will simply not give the funding if you do not comply with their excessive and sometimes elusive requirements. Marcos notes that her attempts to teach the American women involved in these networks “different but equally valuable” ways of organizing that may have been more suited to the Mexican context failed. Instead, she discovered, “All they wanted from me was to operate like an American with a Mexican face and Mexican language, looking like a Mexican and acting like an American.” That is, instead of treating Marcos as an “other,” the American women wanted her to join their group, but without taking the time to understand her individual viewpoint or the viewpoint of her community.

In her years of experience with transnational feminist networks, Marcos found this trend common among international feminists. Many were interested in expanding their networks to more and more countries, often with the aim of truly helping women, but few made an effort to understand the specific concerns of women in different parts of the world. Instead, they recruited “Third World” women to act as ambassadors of international feminism, frequently with the promise of funding and support. As these women became more involved in transnational networks and closer to funding agencies, many lost ties to their constituencies at home. Marcos argues that this trend gave rise to an “international breed of women who are no longer rooted anywhere. They are global products.”

38 Ibid., 145.
of the transnational women’s movement and its dependency on funding agencies contributed to an environment in which much of the movement’s work is geared towards fulfilling bureaucratic objectives, e.g., expanding to more countries, recruiting more local representatives, etc. In contrast to such a top-down organization, in which local women are expected to act in the interests of the hierarchal movement structure, Marcos favors a flexible structure that is more responsive to women in multiple locations and that values and facilitates an open exchange of ideas among women around the world.

In recognition of the difficulties of communicating and collaborating across cultural and power differences, transnational feminist theorists have searched for ways to overcome these obstacles. Several feminist theorists have focused on the need for improved dialogue to ensure that all parties in these networks have the opportunity to express their viewpoints and contribute equally to transnational feminist projects. Michele Rivkin-Fish calls for prioritizing the very act of dialogue itself, instead of simply viewing it as a means of accomplishing transnational feminist goals.\(^\text{40}\) Similarly, Natalya Riegg proposes a “communicative approach” to women’s empowerment, which she defines as a “two-way dialogue” and “subject-to-subject” (as opposed to “subject-to-object”) communication.\(^\text{41}\) Riegg calls for women in

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 146.


transnational networks to communicate openly with each other about their lives and their struggles, instead of lecturing about the proper way to live. Discussing the benefits of a communicative approach to empowerment, Riegg argues:

Discursive practices could also better reflect a truly inclusive, equality-based spirit of democracy than does the current, domineering style of the Western-type empowerment. Women even would have a better hope for inspiring each other cross-culturally by expressing their passions and convincing each other by their visionary notions—because they can only exercise the power of conviction through communication.\(^{42}\)

Basing transnational feminist networks on subject-to-subject dialogue, rather than assuming that the “less developed” parties are to learn from the “more developed” parties will enhance the transnational learning process for all parties and ground the networks in a firmer, more egalitarian foundation from which to work towards shared strategic goals.

Marguerite Waller draws inspiration from “chaos theory” in developing an approach to challenge the hierarchical and homogenizing tendencies of Western feminism. She writes:

“White” academic feminism in the United States has, in fact, been criticized for at least the past three decades for its tendency to domesticate difference, to see as its mission the choreographing of heterogeneous phenomena into something like the unified field theory sought by Western physics. Even U.S.-based feminist theory that draws to one degree or another upon

\(^{42}\) Ibid., 22.
deconstruction has found itself forging powerful, ontologically definitive metaphors that aim for a certain epistemological mastery.\textsuperscript{43}

Waller argues that U.S. academic feminism, like the broader academic fields of the humanities and social sciences, privileges the assertion of expertise over the facilitation of exchange in order for scholars to establish their professional reputation.\textsuperscript{44} When U.S. academic feminists began to network with women in other countries, this tendency often extended to these relationships as well, as U.S. feminists tried to fit these women’s stories into the academic frameworks they devoted their careers to building and defending. Their relationships with women in less developed countries often were directed at trying to “fix” the problems of these women with their expert knowledge, instead of remaining open to new viewpoints and perspectives that may have challenged the assumptions upon which their theories are based. The conflict between these two different approaches to transnational networking frequently led to break-downs in communication, which stalled the development of these networks.

In order to open up space for exchange among differently situated subjects, Waller suggests that feminists consider the insights raised by scientific scholars of chaos theory. Scientists use this theory to explain nonlinear systems, characterized by complex interactions, such as those involved in weather and fluid dynamics, that seemingly break the “laws of nature.”\textsuperscript{45} They note that the “laws of nature” shown in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid., 115.
\item Ibid., 124-125.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
textbooks operate only under controlled conditions. When exposed to non-controlled conditions, or chaos, these laws prove untenable. In such conditions, “the solvable, orderly, linear systems” prove to be the aberrations.\textsuperscript{46} Waller uses chaos theory as a metaphor “for the ‘knowledges’ that become possible when and where exclusionary and universalist logic breaks down.”\textsuperscript{47} For example, Waller discusses the Western concept of “identities” as discrete entities that are measurable, predictable, and self-consistent.\textsuperscript{48} She notes that this concept was developed in patriarchal societies, where constructed categories presuming sameness of all those included facilitated the domination of some identity categories over others. Despite their efforts to dismantle patriarchy, U.S. feminists still rely on notions of identity and difference that permit the valuation of some identity categories over others. In order to enter into true dialogue with women in other regions, U.S. feminists need to be open to other frameworks, or cosmologies, of understanding the world. In contrast to the individualistic, hierarchical Western concept of identity categories, for example, some cultures rely on more collectivistic understandings of identity focused on the idea of the complementarity of, rather than competition between, social categories. That is, instead of seeing difference as a weakness that needs to be overcome, difference can be viewed as a resource to strengthen the potential breadth and impact of transnational feminist networks.

In sum, scholars on transnational feminism have detailed the tremendous progress that has been made in building progressive, reflexive, and effective

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 125, including quote by James Gleick.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 125.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 127.
transnational networks among women in order to counter the practices of
globalization that have exacerbated inequality among and between nations and that
have furthered gender discrimination. At the same time, feminist scholars have
pointed out work that still needs to be done to strengthen democratic and dialogic
practices within these networks. As TFNs pressure states and intergovernmental
organizations to implement more egalitarian policies, they also continue to reaffirm
egalitarian practices within their own ranks. The challenge to transnational feminists
is to remain constantly vigilant and to work to resolve the exclusions and silences that
arise within their networks. Importantly, the possibility to continue this work has
been assured through the existence of numerous TFNs already working to advance
women’s rights worldwide. As more TFNs emerge, the strength and impact of cross-
cultural dialogue and connections will undoubtedly increase.

In light of the on-going conversation among transnational feminist scholars on
how to strengthen TFNs by recognizing and valuing differences among women
worldwide, my dissertation offers some practical insights on how to address
challenges of transnational women’s networking. Within the Russian-Western
counter-trafficking movement that I studied, one of the leading factors contributing to
the success of the Angel Coalition as a vibrant activist network and leader of the
Russian counter-trafficking movement was the commitment displayed to this cause
by both Western and CIS activists. The level of commitment displayed by AC
activists stood in marked contrast to the common pattern of Russian-Western activist
networks in the 1990s and 2000s, which were typically temporary in nature, with
Western funders and supporters pulling out after the completion of short-term
projects. In point of contrast, the commitment of American co-founder Juliette Engel to growing and maintaining the AC over a ten-year period was a major factor that enabled the organization to thrive and partner with the Russian state on several counter-trafficking initiatives. Engel’s connections to Western funding agencies and to key players in the international counter-trafficking movement helped the organization to obtain necessary financial support and to establish its standing in the international community. Equally important was the commitment of CIS activists, who used their in-depth knowledge of the domestic political and social environment to lead implementation of the AC’s projects in Russia and to build ties with Russian governmental officials.

The experience of the AC can serve as a resource for other transnational activist networks working through cross-cultural differences. One reason the AC thrived was the mutual respect afforded to the contributions of activists from both the CIS and the West. The knowledge and experience of activists from both parts of the world was valued and utilized to make the network stronger. Although conflicts related to cultural, language, and power differences did arise among AC activists, the commitment to seeing these conflicts through helped activists to overcome their differences and build a strong multi-national collective. Thus, while the goal of combating human trafficking was the initial impetus that brought AC activists together, organizational practices that emphasized mutual respect and cross-cultural understanding enabled the organization to build a strong sense of community and to survive periods of tremendous pressure from outside forces.
Finally, my case study of the AC emphasizes the importance of maintaining ties to a constituency and grounding a network’s actions on issues of concern to a community. Unlike other Russian-Western women’s networks that focused their efforts on building a professionalized women’s movement in Russia, with few links to the Russian public, the AC forged strong connections to a sector of the Russian population in need of representation and assistance. Hence, the AC was successful in balancing its responsibility to fulfill the requirements of its funders with its mission of serving the Russian public. The AC’s commitment to its constituency provided it with the motivation to fight through seemingly endless Russian governmental red-tape to maintain its presence in Russia and to constantly apply for foreign grants in order to fund its work. It was this constituency that inspired the AC to continue to struggle for existence in times when financial and governmental support was weak.

My findings echo those by other scholars on transnational feminist movements that the short-term investments commonly made by international funding agencies and professional feminists are often not adequate to allow them to gain a full understanding of problems faced by local communities or to develop initiatives comprehensive enough to address these problems. Instead of seeking quick fixes to ingrained problems, more energy needs to be devoted to enhancing dialogue, listening to women in diverse settings, and practicing mutual respect. My research, along with the growing body of transnational feminist literature, suggests that these skills will empower activists to build effective and democratic transnational networks that can challenge states and intergovernmental organizations on issues of importance to women, their families, and communities.
7.3 Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have demonstrated how activists for women’s rights from various parts of the world can successfully work together towards shared goals. My research builds upon and contributes to literature on transnational civil society by emphasizing two key factors that were essential to the success of the Angel Coalition in influencing Russian state action against human trafficking between 1998 and 2008: a practiced understanding of the political environment of Russia and the ability to demonstrate to the Russian state the benefits of taking action on this issue.

Additionally, drawing upon and contributing to literature on transnational feminist theory, my research stresses the importance of dialogue, openness to different ways of knowing, and respect for diversity in building strong, resilient transnational networks capable of influencing states and intergovernmental organizations. My research on the Angel Coalition suggests that key features of transnational networks are flexibility and creativity in finding ways to operate in different cultural and political environments. Lastly, my research highlights the necessity of equal commitment by all parties in transnational networks to working through and with difference and to achieving shared, strategic goals. Through its attention to developing egalitarian and representational cross-cultural networks, the transnational feminist movement can serve as a leader in the area of effective and communicative organizing practices in the burgeoning transnational civil society arena.
## Appendix I

### Important Events in the History of the International Movement against Human Trafficking, 1895-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>The Penitentiary Congress of Paris, the first international conference on trafficking in women, was held.</td>
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<td>1904</td>
<td>The International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic was passed.</td>
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<td>1910</td>
<td>The Mann Act was passed in the United States.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>The International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic was passed.</td>
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<td>1921</td>
<td>The Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children was adopted by the League of Nations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>The International Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women was adopted by the League of Nations.</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>The United Nations established a “Working Group on Slavery.”</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>The first UN World Conference on Women was held in Mexico City, Mexico; it adopted the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was adopted by the United Nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>The second UN World Conference on Women was held in Copenhagen, Denmark; it produced the Report of the World Conference of the United Nations for Women, Equality, Development and Peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>The Global Feminist Workshop to Organize Against Trafficking in Women was held in Rotterdam, the Netherlands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>The third UN World Conference on Women was held in Nairobi, Kenya; it produced the Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 (June)</td>
<td>The UN World Conference on Human Rights was held in Vienna; it adopted the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 (December)</td>
<td>The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women was passed by the United Nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 (March)</td>
<td>The United Nations appointed a Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 (November)</td>
<td>The International Conference on Traffic in Persons was held in Utrecht, the Netherlands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>The fourth UN World Conference on Women was held in Beijing, China; it adopted the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 (October)</td>
<td>The U.S. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act was signed into law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>The United Nations appointed a Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix II

Interview Guide in English

Theme 1: Personal Background and Anti-Trafficking Work

1. What led you to become involved in campaigns against human trafficking? When did you first become involved in this type of work?

2. What personal goals do you have in your anti-trafficking work?

3. Describe “trafficking” in your own words. If someone asked you to define “trafficking,” how would you define it?

4. How did you understand “trafficking” before you began to work for this organization?

5. How do you understand “trafficking” now?

6. If your understanding has changed, what led you to understand “trafficking” differently?

7. How did you become involved in this particular organization? When did you begin to work here?

8. What is your role in the organization? What are your job responsibilities? If you have worked on anti-trafficking projects, describe the projects you have worked on.

9. Does working for this organization help you reach your personal goals? If yes, how?

Theme 2: Structure and History of the Organization

10. Tell me about the history of your organization. When was it founded? Who founded the organization? If your organization is part of the Angel Coalition, how did it become part of the Coalition?

11. Describe the structure of your organization. Does the organization have different departments or divisions? If so, what are they? What is the management structure?

12. What are the nationalities of people who are involved in your organization?
13. How does having both Russians and foreigners collaborating in the organization affect its work? What would be different about the organization’s work if it was conducted only by Russians or only by foreigners?

14. What are the challenges of Russians and foreigners working together? Do any challenges arise due to language or cultural differences? Do any challenges arise due to different understandings of trafficking?

15. How have activists in your organization responded to these challenges? How do activists react when conflicts arise?

16. Do any other challenges arise in collaborative work among activists? If yes, how have activists responded to these challenges?

17. What are the benefits of Russians and foreigners working together?

18. What do Russians contribute to the organization’s work?

19. What do foreigners contribute to the organization’s work?

Theme 3: Organizational Anti-Trafficking Strategies

20. In your opinion, what factors contribute to trafficking from Russia? How do economic, political, social, or other factors contribute?

21. In your opinion, what are effective ways to combat trafficking? Which approaches are best at combating trafficking?

22. How does your organization combat trafficking? What types of projects and/or campaigns does it sponsor?

23. What do you think of the organization’s work?

24. What challenges does your organization face in achieving its goals?

25. How do you foresee the organization’s work progressing into the future?
Appendix III

Interview Guide in Russian

Тема 1. Личный опыт и работа по борьбе с торговлей людьми

1. Что заставило Вас заняться борьбой против торговли людьми? Когда Вы занялись этим впервые?

2. Какие личные цели у Вас есть в Ваше работе при борьбе с торговлей людьми?

3. Опишите, что значит «торговля людьми» своими словами. Если Вас спросят дать определение «торговле людьми», как Вы бы ответили?

4. Каково было ваше понимание «торговли людьми» перед тем, как Вы начали работать на эту организацию?

5. Как Вы понимаете «торговлю людьми» сейчас?

6. Если Ваше понимание изменилось, что заставило вас изменить свое мнение о торговле людьми?

7. Как Вы ступили в эту организацию? Когда Вы начали работать здесь?

8. Какую роль Вы играете в организации? Каковы ваши обязанности? Если Вы участвовали в проектах по борьбе с торговлей людьми, расскажите об этих проектах.

9. Помогает ли работа в этой организации достичь личных целей? Если да то как?

Тема 2. Структура и история организации

10. Расскажите мне об истории организации. Когда она была основана? Кто был основателем? Если Ваша организация часть Коалиции Ангел, то, как она стала частью Коалиции?

11. Опишите структуру вашей организации. Имеет ли организация разделы и подразделения? Если да то каковы они? Какова структура руководства?

12. Какие национальности людей вовлечены в организацию?
13. Как сотрудничество русских и иностранцев влияет на работу организации? В чем было бы различие, если организацию составляли только русские или только иностранцы?

14. Какие препятствия стоят перед русскими и иностранцами при работе вместе? Возникают ли препятствия в работе из-за культурных и языковых различий? Возникают ли препятствия в связи с различным пониманием торговли людьми?

15. Как активисты вашей организации реагируют на такие препятствия? Как реагируют активисты на возникновение конфликтов?

16. Возникают ли какие другие препятствия при совместной работе среди активистов? Если да, то, как они на них реагируют?

17. Какова польза от сотрудничества русских и иностранцев?

18. Какой вклад вносят в работу организации русские?

19. Какой вклад вносят в работу организации иностранцы?

Тема 3. Организационная работа при борьбе с торговлей людьми

20. По вашему мнению, какие факторы способствуют развитию торговли людьми в России? Как экономические, политические, социальные и другие факторы влияют на это?

21. По Вашему мнению, каковы самые эффективные методы по борьбе с торговлей людьми? Какие способы являются наиболее эффективными?

22. Как ваша организация борется с торговлей людьми? Какие кампании она спонсирует?

23. Что Вы думаете о работе организации?

24. Какие препятствия стоят перед организацией при осуществлении намеченных целей?

25. Как Вы видите развитие организации в будущем?
Appendix IV

Consent Form for Interview in English

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Russian-Western Anti-Trafficking Networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Why is this research being done?</td>
<td>This is a research project being conducted by Dr. Claire Moses and doctoral student Denise Shpilko at the University of Maryland, College Park, USA. We are inviting you to participate in this research project because you work to combat human trafficking. The purpose of this research project is to better understand the work of activists involved in Russian-Western anti-trafficking networks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What will I be asked to do?</td>
<td>The procedures involve an open-ended interview that will last for approximately two hours. The interview may be completed in one session or split into more than one session. The interview will take place at a location mutually agreed-upon between you and the researcher. The interview will consist of questions about your work in an anti-trafficking organization. Following are sample questions that will be asked during the interview. You may decline to answer any interview questions and you will not be penalized in any way. What led you to become involved in campaigns against human activism? When did you first become involved in this type of work? What is your role in the organization? What are your job responsibilities? Tell me about the history of your organization. When was it founded? Who founded the organization? What are the challenges of Russians and foreigners working together? What are the benefits of Russian and foreigners working together? In your opinion, what are effective ways to combat human trafficking? Which approaches are best at combating trafficking? How does your organization combat human trafficking? What types of projects and/or campaigns does it sponsor?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Russian-Western Anti-Trafficking Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| What about confidentiality?       | We will do our best to keep your personal information confidential. To help protect your confidentiality, your name and identifying information will be changed and a pseudonym will be used in all research material. Only the student investigator, Denise Shupiko, knows your identity, and she will use a pseudonym for you in all data generated by this interview. Interview notes and transcriptions will be filed under your pseudonym, not your actual name. All research materials will be stored in the home of the student investigator, and only she will have access to these materials. If we write a report or article about this research project, your identity will be protected to the maximum extent possible. A pseudonym will be used in any reporting or presentation of the research data. Your information may be shared with representatives of the University of Maryland, College Park or governmental authorities if you or someone else is in danger or if we are required to do so by law. The research project involves making an audio recording of our interview.  
  ____ I agree to be audiotaped during the interview.  
  ____ I do not agree to be audiotaped during the interview.  
  The audio recordings are made to help the student investigator remember what was said during the interview. Transcriptions will be done of the interviews under a pseudonym. The audio recordings will be stored at the home of the student investigator and only she will have access to them. Audio recordings will be destroyed at the end of the research study. |
| What are the risks of this research? | There are no known risks associated with participating in this research project. |
| What are the benefits of this research? | This research is not designed to help you personally, but the results may help the investigators learn more about transnational anti-trafficking networks. The research results may provide insights to aid in the building of transnational networks in the future. |
| Do I have to be in this research? May I stop participating at any time? | Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to participate in this research, you may stop participating at any time. If you decide not to participate in this study or if you stop participating at any time, you will not be penalized or lose any benefits to which you otherwise qualify. |
**Project Title**
Russian-Western Anti-Trafficking Networks

**What if I have questions?**
This research is being conducted by Dr. Claire Moses and Denise Shupiko at the University of Maryland, College Park, USA. If you have any questions about the research study itself, please contact Dr. Claire Moses at 2101 Woods Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA, 1-301-405-7209, cmoses@umd.edu, or contact Denise Shupiko at 2101 Woods Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 20742, USA, denway11@yahoo.com. In Moscow, you can contact Denise Shupiko at: 14-1 Prostornaya St. Apt. 271, Moscow, 107392, Russia, 7-495-162-9590.

If you have questions about your rights as a research subject, please contact: Institutional Review Board Office, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 20742, USA; (e-mail) irb@deans.umd.edu; (telephone) 1-301-405-0678
This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects.

**Statement of Age of Subject and Consent**
Your signature indicates that:
- you are at least 18 years of age;
- the research has been explained to you;
- your questions have been fully answered; and
- you freely and voluntarily choose to participate in this research project.

**Signature and Date**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF SUBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIGNATURE OF SUBJECT</td>
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<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
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</table>

IRB APPROVED EXPIRES ON AUG 30 2008 UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND COLLEGE PARK
### Соглашение для интервью

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Название проекта</th>
<th>Русско-западные сети по борьбе с торговлей людьми</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Какова цель проведения исследования?</td>
<td>Это исследование проводится профессором Клэр Моисс (Claire Moses) и аспиранткой Денис Шупико (Denise Shupiko) в Университете Мэриленда, Колледж Парк (США). Мы предлагаем Вам принять участие в исследовании, так как Вы участвуете в борьбе против торговли людьми. Целью исследования будет ознакомление и изучение работы активистов занятых в Русско-западной борьбе против торговли людьми.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Что от меня будет требоваться?</td>
<td>В исследовании будет включено открытое интервью, которое продлится около двух часов. Интервью может быть закончено в одну сессию или разделено на несколько сессий. Интервью будет проходить в месте заранее согласованном между Вами и исследователем. В интервью будут включены вопросы о вашей работе по борьбе с торговлей людьми. Вот примерные вопросы, которые будут заданы в течение интервью. Вы можете перестать отвечать на вопросы интервью в любой момент без негативных последствий.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Что заставило Вас заняться борьбой против торговли людьми? Когда Вы заинтересовались этим впервые?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Какую роль Вы играете в организации? Каковы Ваши обязанности?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Расскажите мне об истории организации. Когда она была основана? Кто был основателем?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Какие препятствия стоят перед Русскими и иностранцами при работе вместе?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>По Вашему мнению, каковы самые эффективные методы борьбы против торговли людьми?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Как Ваша организация борется с торговлей людьми? Какие проекты и кампании она спонсирует?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Название проекта</td>
<td>Русско-западные сети по борьбе с торговлей людьми</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Конфиденциальность</strong></td>
<td>Мы сделаем все возможное, чтобы сохранить Вашу информацию конфиденциальной. Для защиты Вашей информации Ваше имя будет изменено на псевдоним, который будет использоваться во всех материалах исследования. Только аспирантка исследователь- Денис Шупико (Denise Shupiko) будет знать Ваше настоящее имя и будет использовать псевдоним во всей информации полученной от интервью. Все заметки и записи по ходу интервью будут содержать Ваш псевдоним, а не имя. Все материалы по исследованию будут храниться дома у аспирантки исследователя, и только она будет иметь к ним доступ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Если мы напишем отрывок или статью основанную на этом интервью Ваша информация будет надежна защищена. Псевдоним будет использован в презентации материалов исследования. Ваша информация может стать доступной представителям Университета Мэриленда, Коллеже Пик или представителям правительства в том случае если Вам или кому-то грозит опасность или так распорядился суд.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>В проекте исследование будет включена аудио запись Вашего интервью.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>И согласен(а) быть записан на пленку.</td>
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<tr>
<td>И не согласен(а) быть записан на пленку.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Аудио запись поможет аспирантке исследователю запомнить, о чем Вы рассказывали в течение интервью. Запись с интервью будут сделаны с использованием Вашего псевдонима. Аудио записи будут храниться дома у аспирантки исследователя, и только она будет иметь к ним доступ. По окончанию исследования все записи будут уничтожены.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Какова опасность этого исследования?</strong></td>
<td>Нет никаких известных рисков при участии в этом проекте исследования.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Какова польза этого исследования?</strong></td>
<td>Данное исследование не направлено на помощь Вам лично, но зато результаты такого интервью помогут исследователям лучше ознакомиться с транснациональными сетями по борьбе с торговлей людьми. Результаты исследования могу помогать лучшему пониманию при создании транснациональных сообществ в будущем.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Должен ли я участвовать в исследовании?</strong></td>
<td>Ваше участие в этом исследовании абсолютно добровольное. Вы можете и не принимать никакого участия. Если Вы решите принять участие Вы можете остановиться в любой момент. Если Вы решите не принимать участие или остановиться в любой момент Вы не будете оштрафованы и не потеряетете привилегии Вам обязаны.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Могу ли я остановиться в любую минуту?** | }
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Название проекта</th>
<th>Русско-латинские сети по борьбе с торговлей людьми</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Что если у меня возникнут вопросы?</td>
<td>Это исследование проводится Клер Монос (Claire Moses) и Денис Шупико (Denise Shupiko) в университете Мэриленда, Колледж Пэйр (США). Если у Вас возникнут вопросы по сутки исследования, пожалуйста, свяжитесь с Claire Moses в 2101 Woods Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA, 1-301-405-7209, <a href="mailto:cmoses@umd.edu">cmoses@umd.edu</a>, или с Denise Shupiko в 2101 Woods Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA, <a href="mailto:denway11@yahoo.com">denway11@yahoo.com</a>. В Москве Вы можете связаться с Denise Shupiko в: Россия, 107392, Москва, ул. Просторная, д. 14, кор. 1, кв. 271, (тел.) 7-499-162-95-90. Если у Вас есть вопросы по поводу Ваших прав как участника исследования обращайтесь: Institutional Review Board Office, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 20742, USA; (e-mail) <a href="mailto:irb@deans.umd.edu">irb@deans.umd.edu</a>; (telephone) 1-301-405-0678 Это исследование было рассмотрено согласно правилам University of Maryland, College Park IRB по исследованиям включающим людей.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Утверждение возраста и согласия об участии</td>
<td>Ваша подпись утверждает что: Вам 18 или более лет; Суты исследования были Вам объяснены; Вы получили ответы на все вопросы; Вы свободно и добровольно решили принять участие в исследовании.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Подпись и дата</td>
<td>Имя участника</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Подпись участника</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Дата</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

IRB APPROVED EXPIRES ON AUG 30 2008 UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND COLLEGE PARK
Appendix VI

**Consent Form for Interview and Observation in English**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>Why is this research being done?</td>
<td>This is a research project being conducted by Dr. Claire Moses and doctoral student Denise Shapiko at the University of Maryland, College Park, USA. We are inviting you to participate in this research project because you work to combat human trafficking. The purpose of this research project is to better understand the work of activists involved in Russian-Western anti-trafficking networks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>What will I be asked to do?</td>
<td>The procedures involve an open-ended interview that will last for approximately two hours and observation of work activities. The interview may be completed in one session or split into more than one session. The interview will take place at a location mutually agreed-upon between you and the researcher. The interview will consist of questions about your work in an anti-trafficking organization. Observation will be ongoing and will occur in the workplace. The researcher will observe your anti-trafficking work and take notes regarding work activities. Following are sample questions that will be asked during the interview. You may decline to answer any interview questions and you will not be penalized in any way. What led you to become involved in campaigns against human trafficking? When did you first become involved in this type of work? What is your role in the organization? What are your job responsibilities? Tell me about the history of your organization. When was it founded? Who founded the organization? What are the challenges of Russians and foreigners working together? What are the benefits of Russian and foreigners working together? In your opinion, what are effective ways to combat human trafficking? Which approaches are best at combating trafficking? How does your organization combat human trafficking? What types of projects and/or campaigns does it sponsor?</td>
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<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What about confidentiality?</strong></td>
<td>We will do our best to keep your personal information confidential. To help protect your confidentiality, your name and identifying information will be changed and a pseudonym will be used in all research material. Only the student investigator, Denise Shupiko, knows your identity, and she will use a pseudonym for you in all data generated by this interview. Interview notes and transcriptions will be filed under your pseudonym, not your actual name. All research materials will be stored in the home of the student investigator, and only she will have access to these materials. If we write a report or article about this research project, your identity will be protected to the maximum extent possible. A pseudonym will be used in any reporting or presentation of the research data. Your information may be shared with representatives of the University of Maryland, College Park or governmental authorities if you or someone else is in danger or if we are required to do so by law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I agree to be audiotaped during the interview.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I do not agree to be audiotaped during the interview.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The research project involves making an audio recording of our interview.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The audio recordings are made to help the student investigator remember what was said during the interview. Transcriptions will be done of the interviews under a pseudonym. The audio recordings will be stored at the home of the student investigator and only she will have access to them. Audio recordings will be destroyed at the end of the research study.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This study will also involve observation of work activities. The student investigator seeks to observe and take notes regarding situations in which you discuss human trafficking and your anti-trafficking work in order to better understand human trafficking, your anti-trafficking work, and the collaboration of transnational anti-trafficking activists. These notes will be taken using a pseudonym. The notes will be stored in the home of the student investigator and only she will have access to them. This will occur from the present to June 2008. Please indicate your willingness to participate in this aspect of the study.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I agree to be observed by the student investigator during my work activities and to allow the student investigator to take notes about my work activities.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I do not agree to be observed by the student investigator during my work activities and to allow the student researcher to take notes about my work activities.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Russian-Western Anti-Trafficking Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the risks of this research?</td>
<td>There are no known risks associated with participating in this research project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the benefits of this research?</td>
<td>This research is not designed to help you personally, but the results may help the investigators learn more about transnational anti-trafficking networks. The research results may provide insights to aid in the building of transnational networks in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do I have to be in this research? May I stop participating at any time?</td>
<td>Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to participate in this research, you may stop participating at any time. If you decide not to participate in this study or if you stop participating at any time, you will not be penalized or lose any benefits to which you otherwise qualify.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What if I have questions?</td>
<td>This research is being conducted by Dr. Claire Moses and Denise Shupiko at the University of Maryland, College Park, USA. If you have any questions about the research study itself, please contact Dr. Claire Moses at 2101 Woods Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA, 1-301-405-7209, <a href="mailto:cmoses@umd.edu">cmoses@umd.edu</a>, or contact Denise Shupiko at 2101 Woods Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 20742, USA, <a href="mailto:denwayne11@yahoo.com">denwayne11@yahoo.com</a>. In Moscow, you can contact Denise Shupiko at: 14-I Prostornaya St. Apt. 271, Moscow, 107392, Russia, 7-495-162-9590.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you have questions about your rights as a research subject, please contact: Institutional Review Board Office, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 20742, USA; (e-mail) irb@deans.umd.edu; (telephone) 1-301-405-0678

This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Russian-Western Anti-Trafficking Networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Statement of Age of Subject and Consent | Your signature indicates that:  
you are at least 18 years of age;  
the research has been explained to you;  
your questions have been fully answered; and  
you freely and voluntarily choose to participate in this research project. |
| Signature and Date  | NAME OF SUBJECT                           |
|                     | SIGNATURE OF SUBJECT                      |
|                     | DATE                                     |
Appendix VII

Consent Form for Interview and Observation in Russian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Название проекта</th>
<th>Русско-западные сети по борьбе с торговлей людьми</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Какова цель проведения исследования?</td>
<td>Это исследование проводится профессором Клэр Моис (Claire Moses) и аспиранткой Денис Шушико (Denise Shapiko) в Университете Мериленда, Колледже Парк (США). Мы предлагаем Вам принять участие в исследовании, так как Вы участвуете в борьбе против торговли людьми. Целью исследования будет ознакомление и изучение работы активистов занятых в Русско-западной борьбе против торговли людьми.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Что от меня будет требоваться?</td>
<td>В исследование будет включено открытое интервью, которое продлится около двух часов, и наблюдение рабочей деятельности. Интервью может быть закончено в одну сессию или разделино на несколько сессий. Интервью будет проходить в месте заранее согласованном между Вами и исследователем. В интервью будут включены вопросы о вашей работе по борьбе с торговлей людьми. Наблюдение будет непрерывным и будет проводиться на рабочей месте. Исследователь будет наблюдать Вашу работу по борьбе с торговлей людьми и делать записи по рабочей деятельности. Вот примерные вопросы, которые будут заданы в течение интервью. Вы можете перестать отвечать на вопросы интервью в любой момент без негативных последствий.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Что заставило Вас заняться борьбой против торговли людьми? Когда Вы записались этим впервые? Какую роль Вы играете в организации? Каковы Ваши обязанности? 
Расскажите мне об истории организации. Когда она была основана? Кто был основателем? Какие препятствия стоят перед Русскими и иностранцами при работе вместе? Когда в Вашем мнении, наиболее эффективные методы борьбы против торговли людьми? Как Ваша организация борется с торговлей людьми? Какие проекты и кампании она спонсирует? |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Название проекта</th>
<th>Русскоязычные сети по борьбе с торговлей людьми</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Конфиденциальность</td>
<td>Мы сделаем все возможное, чтобы сохранить Вашу информацию конфиденциальной. Для защиты Вашей информации Ваше имя может быть изменено на псевдоним, который будет использоваться во всех материалах исследования. Только аспирантка исследователь- Денис Шупико (Denise Shupiko) будет знать Ваше настоящее имя и будет использовать псевдоним во всей информации полученной от интервью. Все заметки и записи на протяжении интервью будут содержать Ваш псевдоним, а не имя. Все материалы по исследованию будут храниться дома у аспирантки исследователя, и только она будет иметь к ним доступ. Если мы напишем отчет или статью основанную на этом интервью Ваша информация будет надежна защищена. Псевдоним будет использован в презентации материалов исследования. Ваша информация может стать доступной представителям Университета Мэриленда, Колледже Парк или представителям правительству в том случае если Вам или кому-то грозит опасность или так распорядился суд. В проект исследование будет включена аудио запись Вашего интервью. Я согласен(a) быть записан на пленку. Я не согласен(a) быть записан на пленку. Аудио запись поможет аспирантке исследователю запомнить, о чем Вы рассказывали в течение интервью. Записи с интервью будут сделаны с использованием Вашего псевдонима. Аудио записи будут храниться дома у аспирантки исследователя, и только она будет иметь к ним доступ. По окончанию исследования все записи будут уничтожены.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

523
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Название проекта</th>
<th>Русско-западные сети по борьбе с торговлей людьми</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Конфиденциальность</td>
<td>Это исследование включает наблюдение рабочей деятельности. Аспирантка исследователь стремится наблюдать и сделать записи о ситуациях, в которых Вы обсуждаете торговлю людьми и Вашу работу по борьбе с торговлей людьми, чтобы лучше понять торговлю людьми, Вашу работу по борьбе с торговлей людьми и сотрудничество транснациональных активистов по борьбе с торговлей людьми. Записи будут проводиться с использованием псевдонимов. Записи будут храниться дома у аспирантки исследователя, и только она будет к ним доступ. Это будет происходить с настоящего момента по июнь 2008 г. Пожалуйста, проставьте Ваши инициалы, если согласны участвовать в этой части исследования.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>___ Я согласен(а) наблюдаться исследователем во время рабочей деятельности и разрешать исследователю делать записи о моей рабочей деятельности.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>___ Я не согласен(а) наблюдаться исследователем во время рабочей деятельности и разрешать исследователю делать записи о моей рабочей деятельности.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Какова опасность этого исследования?</td>
<td>Нет никаких известных рисков при участии в этом проекте исследования.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Какова польза этого исследования?</td>
<td>Данное исследование не направлено на помощь Вам лично, но результаты такого интервью помогут исследователям лучше ознакомиться с транснациональными сетями по борьбе с торговлей людьми. Результаты исследования могут помочь лучшему пониманию при создании транснациональных сообществ в будущем.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Должен ли я участвовать в исследовании?</td>
<td>Ваше участие в этом исследовании абсолютно добровольное. Вы можете и не принимать никакого участия. Если Вы решите принять участие, Вы можете остановиться в любой момент. Если Вы решите не принимать участие или остановиться в любой момент, Вы не будете оштрафованы и не потеряете привилегии Вам обязаны.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Могу ли я остановиться в любую минуту?</td>
<td>Ваше участие в этом исследовании абсолютно добровольное. Вы можете и не принимать никакого участия. Если Вы решите принять участие, Вы можете остановиться в любой момент. Если Вы решите не принимать участие или остановиться в любой момент, Вы не будете оштрафованы и не потеряете привилегии Вам обязаны.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Что если у меня возникнут вопросы?</td>
<td>Это исследование проводится Клер Моес (Claire Moses) и Денис Шапико (Denise Shapiko) в университете Мериленда, Колледж-Парк (США). Если у Вас возникнут вопросы по сути исследования, пожалуйста, свяжитесь с Claire Moses в 2101 Woods Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA, 1-301-405-7209, <a href="mailto:cmoses@umd.edu">cmoses@umd.edu</a>, или с Denise Shapiko в 2101 Woods Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA, <a href="mailto:denway11@yahoo.com">denway11@yahoo.com</a>. В Москве Вы можете связаться с Denise Shapiko в: Россия, 107392, Москва, ул. Просторная, д. 14, кор. 1, кв. 271, (тел.) 7-499-162-95-90. Если у Вас есть вопросы по поводу Вашего приглашения к участию в исследовании, обращайтесь в Institutional Review Board Office, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 20742, USA; (e-mail) <a href="mailto:irb@deans.umd.edu">irb@deans.umd.edu</a>; (telephone) 1-301-405-0678. Это исследование было рассмотрено и одобрено Университетом Мериленда, Колледж-Парк, IRB по исследованиям включающим людей.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Утверждение возраста и согласия об участии</td>
<td>Ваша подпись утверждает что: Вам 18 лет или более; Суть исследования была Вам объяснена; Вы получили ответы на все вопросы; Вы свободно и добровольно решили принять участие в исследовании.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Подпись и дата</td>
<td>Имя участника</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Подпись участника</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Дата</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Инициалы дата

![IRB APPROVED EXPIRES ON AUG 30 2008 UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND COLLEGE PARK](image)
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