Title of Document: THE DEVELOPMENT OF GLOBAL EDUCATION POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF EL SALVADOR’S EDUCO PROGRAM

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The Education with Community Participation (EDUCO) program began in El Salvador in early 1991, near the end of the twelve-year civil war. It not only represented an extreme form of decentralization in that it transferred the responsibility for hiring, firing and supervising teachers to rural communities, but it was also the first reform of its kind in Latin America. During the ensuing 20 years, the program has received tremendous attention. Indeed, within the country it became the central program through which the education sector was rebuilt and expanded in the post-war era of the 1990s and 2000s. Internationally, the program has been widely recognized as a successful and desirable example of community-level education management decentralization. In fact, the program has become a “global education policy” in that it has been and continues to be recognized, promoted and adapted around the world.
To date, however, the majority of research on this program has been ahistorical in nature and has focused narrowly on whether the program “worked” – statistically speaking and with regard to such outcomes as student achievement. In contrast, in this dissertation, I analyze the dynamics of how the policy was developed. I shed new light on the trajectory of the EDUCO program by focusing, from an international political economy framework, on how the program was developed, scaled up, and internationally promoted. In so doing, I am able to highlight relevant political economic structures that impinge on education reform, as well as the various mechanisms of transnational influence that contributed to its advancement within and beyond El Salvador. In a number of different ways, international organizations are central to the policy development process.

Methodologically, I focus not only on the process of development itself, but also on the ways in which actors and forces from multiple levels (local, national, international) interact and intersect in that process. Theoretically, by choosing to analyze EDUCO’s origins, I attempt to contribute to our understanding of how (i.e., through which mechanisms of transnational influence) and why certain policies come into existence and subsequently go global.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF GLOBAL EDUCATION POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF EL SALVADOR’S EDUCO PROGRAM

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Dedication

To those in El Salvador and around the world who dedicate their efforts to working towards more equitable, democratic, and inclusive societies.
Acknowledgements

My dad has been instrumental in my getting here. He taught me the value of working hard, but also the value of working smart. He always said, “you need to get a good education.” But I don’t think he ever imagined I’d spend eight years in graduate school. (What was I doing with my time?)

My mom has offered constant encouragement and support along the way, even though I’m sure she didn’t really know what I was up to. It’s been wonderful to have someone who never doubted me, and who would try to understand my various projects along the way.

Margi and Patrick, thank you for the moral support. Thanks also for listening (or, should I say, smiling and nodding) to my crazy ideas these past six years.

Sachi, my wife, gets a special acknowledgement for her patience and understanding. I’ll try to return the favor next year, when I get to watch you write your dissertation.

None of this would have been possible without my advisor, Steve Klees. Sincere thanks go to you for shepherding me through this process. It has been a true pleasure. Perhaps my biggest debt, though, is for all those letters of recommendation, which I know opened so many doors. I’ll try to pay it forward.

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Paula Beckman is responsible for first introducing me to El Salvador. Without that first trip in January of 2009, it is unlikely that I would have gone down the rabbit hole that is EDUCO. Thank you for bringing this program to my attention.

To my friends in the International Education Policy program, thanks for enriching the journey.

Dave DeMatthews gets a special mention for being the voice in my ear these past six months, always telling me I should have been further along. But remember: Just because you finished first doesn’t make it better than mine.

To Cristina, Pauline and Julián, thank you for making my time in El Salvador not just enjoyable but memorable. It’s the people you meet along the way that make all the difference.

To Mauricio Trejo, thank you for making me feel welcome at the Universidad Centroamericana. Your support was instrumental in securing the Fulbright to come to El Salvador for data collection.

To that end, data collection was only possible because of the help of a great number of people. In addition to the informants and interviewees, I owe a debt of gratitude to Eduardo Salvador Cárcamo, without whom I never would have gained access to the trove of documents at the Escuela Superior de Maestros.

I would be remiss if I didn’t thank Evelyn Avalos, who transcribed no less than 45 of my interviews. Your consistency and diligence were much appreciated.

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List of Acronyms

ACE – Community Education Association
ADB – Asian Development Bank
ADES – Association for the Economic and Social Development of Santa Marta
AED – Academy for Educational Development
ARENA – Nationalist Republican Alliance
BEMP – Basic Education Modernization Project
CDE – School Management Committee
CIAZO – Popular Education Foundation
CIPE – Critical International Political Economy
EDUCO – Education with Community Participation Program
FEPAGE – Business Foundation for Educational Development
FUSADES – Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development
FMLN – Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
GTZ – German Technical Cooperation
GIZ – German Agency for International Cooperation
HIIID – Harvard Institute for International Development
IDB – Inter-American Development Bank
IMF – International Monetary Fund
IPEPF – International Process of Education Policy Formation
MINED – Ministry of Education
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
OEDC – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
RTI – Research Triangle International
SABE – Strengthening Achievement in Basic Education Project
SBM – School-based Management
SIMEDUCO – Union for EDUCO Teachers
SSRP – Social Sector Rehabilitation Project
TNCS – Transnational Civil Society
TYP – Ten Year Plan
UCA – Central American University
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO - United Nations Education, Science, and Culture Organization
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID - United States Agency for International Development
WCEFA – World Conference on Education For All
WDR – World Development Report
WTO – World Trade Organization
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Chapter 1: Introduction

In this introductory chapter, I begin by laying out the problem that the dissertation addresses. This is followed by the presentation of the central research questions. Next, I briefly characterize the underlying concept which helps to bound this study. Subsequently, I overview the research methodology on which I rely to investigate the phenomenon of interest. In the final three sections, I comment on the significance, scope, and structure of the dissertation.

1.1 Description of the Problem

The Education with Community Participation (Educación con Participación de la Comunidad, EDUCO) program began in El Salvador in early 1991. This was just as the twelve-year (1980-1992), U.S.-backed civil war was beginning to wind down between the Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), an organization of five rebel groups fighting for social and economic opportunities for the poor majorities, as well as political participation and access to the justice system. In this context, the EDUCO program, which decentralized the management of education from the central to the community level, was pursued for a number of reasons. The stated reasons range from addressing a lack of educational access after 11 years of civil war (particularly in rural areas), to enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the education system, to increasing the participation of parents in their schools. This reform – the first of its kind in Latin America – represented an extreme form of decentralization in that it transferred to the community level the responsibility for hiring, firing and supervising teachers.
During the ensuing 20 years, the program has received a tremendous amount of attention, both within and outside of El Salvador. Indeed, within the country it went on to become the central program through which the education sector was rebuilt and expanded in the post-war era of the 1990s and 2000s. Internationally, the program has been widely recognized by international development agencies as a successful and desirable example of community-level education management decentralization. In fact, the program has become a “global education policy” in that it has been, and continues to be, recognized, promoted and adapted around the world (Verger, 2012). One of the most striking examples of EDUCO’s global character is the fact that it went on to be featured in the World Development Report (WDR) 2004 – “Making Services Work for Poor People” – the flagship publication of the World Bank (at times, I will simply refer to this institution as the “Bank”) (World Bank, 2003).

However, before EDUCO became a recommendation for publications by international institutions on how to reform the provision of education, it received significant attention from researchers. In their studies, researchers have been primarily concerned with various dimensions of the program’s impact (Cuéllar-Marchelli, 2003; Jimenez & Sawada, 1999; Jimenez & Sawada 2003; Sawada, 2000; Sawada & Ragatz, 2005; Umanzor et al., 1997), as well as its cost (Sastry, Melamid, & Ross 1995), and its operation generally (Meza, Guzmán, & de Varela 2004a,b). The majority of studies focused on the effect of specific variables and on specific outcomes, including student achievement, attendance, and retention; parental participation in schools; and teacher effort and pay.
Only Gillies (2010), Poppema (2012), and Reimers (1997b) have examined the EDUCO program from a perspective that explicitly incorporates a political dimension. They discuss the emergence of the EDUCO program with regard, both, to the relationship between El Salvador and the United States and to the role of international organizations such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Nevertheless, it is argued here that their research reveals only part of the story. That is to say, although these authors help to draw our attention to macro-political issues and to the influence of international organizations, there are important aspects of the development of the EDUCO program which should not only be more fully investigated within the context of El Salvador but which also should be understood within the international political economy of education policy reform (Verger, Novelli, & Kosar-Altinyelken, 2012).

This dissertation thus represents research that attempts to address these issues. It seeks to explain in a detailed way the multi-level (i.e., local, national, and international) politics of how the EDUCO program was formed in El Salvador. Put differently, this dissertation sheds new light on the history of the EDUCO program by taking as its focus the process by which this program emerged, was scaled up, and was incorporated into national education policy. In deciding to focus on these issues, I necessarily place at the center of the analysis those dynamics which have heretofore tended to be neglected in research on the EDUCO program – e.g., the action and interaction of local, national, and international actors, as well as the mechanisms of influence which contributed to the program’s evolution.
1.2 Research Questions

Given the above-mentioned focus, I ask the following overall question and sub-question in this dissertation:

What was the process by which the EDUCO program developed into a national education policy in El Salvador? In what ways (i.e., through which mechanisms), and with what implications, was this process transnationally influenced?

By asking these questions, this dissertation makes an inquiry not only into the process by which the EDUCO program emerged, but also into the ways in which key institutional actors impacted each other and altered the trajectory of education reform in El Salvador.

1.3 Transnational vs. International

In this dissertation, I distinguish between the terms “international” and “transnational.” Following the work of Moutsios (2010), transnational is used in relation to the concept of influence. For example, I use it to indicate that power (as manifested in individuals, institutions, events, language) does not manifest “out there,” beyond the nation state in some in between “international” space; rather, it, at times, manifests in and through actions, interactions, discourse, and structures that may span boundaries or may travel from one country to another – or may be perceived to do so. In these cases, the exercise of influence is more appropriately characterized as “transnational.” Put differently, while actors may be international in the sense that they come from elsewhere (i.e., beyond the nation state), the forms of
influence which they might exercise or to which they might be subject may be transnational.

The term international, on the other hand, rather than being used to characterize influence, will be used to indicate that elements such as actors, institutions, or discourse can indeed originate from beyond a given country. “International,” thus, is used to say something about the nature of a particular entity or phenomenon as lying outside or beyond the geopolitical boundaries that demarcate countries. To summarize, then, the use of the term international gives an indication of the origin of an entity while the use of the term transnational is associated with the exercise of particular forms of influence. Additional discussion of these and related terms can be found in chapter four of this dissertation.

1.4 Guiding Concept: International Processes of Education Policy Formation

While I draw implications in this dissertation for the concept of global education policy, I do this by focusing on process. That is so say, while I reflect on the contributions of my findings for the phenomenon of global education policy, I do so by investigating the process through which EDUCO developed. As such, it is necessary that I define that processual space, in order to bound the unit of analysis. To that end, the guiding concept which undergirds this study is international process of education policy formation (IPEPF).

In previous research (Edwards 2012a, 2013), I elaborated this concept by drawing on a number of scholars whose work relates to the tradition of international political economy (e.g., Dale, 1999a,b, 2005; Engel, 2008; Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu, & Zegarra, 1990; Jakobi, 2009; Samoff, 2007, 2009; Steiner-Khamsi, 2004; Steiner-
Drawing on Edwards (2012a, 2013), IPEPF are those transnationally influenced processes in which national level political, governmental, and, specifically, ministry of education (MINED) representatives engage in order to formulate or authorize an official policy text, whether it be an education system development plan, a reform strategy paper, a legal decree, or other form of official policy statement. With regard to the manifestation of transnational influence at the national level in these processes, it can appear in variety of ways – each of which is discussed in chapter four of this dissertation.

In researching the EDUCO program, the task at hand follows from this definition. That is, I endeavor to understand the IPEPF through which EDUCO was generated. In so doing, I aim to explicate how and why various forms of transnational influence – but particularly influence from international actors – manifested during its initial development as a program and then during its inclusion in the reform policy of the MINED. In the end, the concept of IPEPF is seen as useful because it clearly delineates the limits of the phenomenon under study, a phenomenon which can often be difficult to pin down for analytic purposes due to its dynamic, multi-level, and processual nature.

Relatedly, it is necessary to briefly define two key terms which are integral to the concept of IPEPF. The first is “policy,” which is defined as “positions taken by the state” (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010, p. 4). The second is “policy process,” which is taken generally to refer to “the chronology of an issue coming onto the policy agenda” and specifically to “the construction of a policy text” which represents the
position assumed by the state (p. 14).\(^1\) Having these terms clearly circumscribed is important not only for conceptual reasons, but also because it enables one to describe more clearly and operationalize more precisely the research methods on which I will rely.

1.5 Research Methodology

Methodologically, I approach this research as a longitudinal case study (Jensen & Rogers, 2001). This methodology corresponds with the needs of the study because, as Jensen and Rogers (2001) explain,

Longitudinal case studies ... focus on political entities or institutions ..., on a particular agency (see Wood, 1988), or on policies, programs, or decisions. [They] may be quantitative or qualitative in character and may involve a formal report and analysis of critical events or processes. ... Time is the organizing device and the dynamics of change are the primary focus. (p. 38)

Thus, for multiple reasons, the choice of a longitudinal case-study approach is appropriate. For example, this study is political in nature and is concerned with the development of a program (EDUCO) over time (from the late 1980s to mid 1990s). Furthermore, the research necessarily examines processes (in this case, processes of policy formation), and does so by focusing on both critical events and the “dynamics of change” of the policy formation processes across which the EDUCO program was initially created, subsequently scaled up, and eventually crystallized in the country’s education policy (Jensen & Rogers, 2001, p. 38).

\(^1\) In this dissertation, “state” refers to national governmental institutions (Krasner, 1984).
In order to operationalize this methodology, I employed a number of specific practices rooted in the matrix-related strategies of Miles and Huberman (1994) and the case study tactics of Yin (2003). I adopted and adapted these methods because they facilitate the explication of how processes of education policy formation evolve generally as well as the delineation of influence among multiple actors at multiple levels (i.e., the local, national, and international levels) specifically. An extensive discussion of these methods can be found in chapter five.

1.6 Significance of the Research

This research is significant for three reasons. First and foremost, it is significant because it uncovers an aspect of EDUCO’s history which has received insufficient attention and which is, as a result, poorly understood. The gravity of this gap in our knowledge becomes more apparent when one considers that the EDUCO program has indeed become a globally-renowned program which has been emulated by numerous countries around the world. The implication is that development practitioners and scholars in the field of comparative and international education poorly understand the origins one of the most influential education reforms to emerge in recent decades.

Secondly, the significance of this research stems from its ability to clearly unpack – and hence problematize – the dynamics of interaction among local, national, and international actors as they engage in the development of policies in a particular country (El Salvador). Certainly, an understanding of such processes which goes beyond the official story regarding EDUCO’s development has much to offer, for it can suggest lessons to policymakers, education specialists, development workers,
scholars, and activists who either currently find themselves in similar situations or who wish to alter how IPEPF proceed in practice.

Third, and finally, investigating the case of EDUCO is valuable because it allows us to take a thorough look at how transnational influence affects (or can affect) the way in which education policy is created – particularly, though not exclusively, in developing countries. That is, theoretically, this research contributes an in-depth case study that has implications for how we conceptualize education policymaking in an increasingly globalized world, where actors, institutions, and ideas from elsewhere are increasingly interconnected, not only among themselves but also with actors at the national and sub-national levels.

1.7 A Note on Scope

This dissertation is not an evaluation or case study of the EDUCO program and its effects at the community level, although through my future research I intend to make contributions at that level. This dissertation is neither a case study of how the EDUCO program worked at the national level, though this aspect of the program’s experience will be addressed to the extent necessary in order to answer the research questions stated above. Third, this dissertation does not primarily examine how the EDUCO program has gone on to become a global education policy which has been promoted to and copied by numerous countries around the world. Finally, this dissertation does not place front and center the more recent developments through which the EDUCO program was modified (read: undone) beginning in 2011 by President Mauricio Funes – the first president to be elected in the post-war period from the FMLN. These developments, too, will be the focus of my future research.
Rather, this study is about education policymaking in contexts and through processes in which actors and influence from within and beyond a country are central. In other words, this study focuses on processes of development of educational reform, policy, and practice – and the ways in which actors, ideas, and agendas from the international and national spheres interact. The central point is to understand the institutions, interests, and interactions that gave way to the creation and formalization of EDUCO in El Salvador.

1.8 Dissertation Structure

The remaining chapters in this dissertation proceed as follows. In chapter two, I review both the trends in thinking behind decentralization in development as well as the approaches of international institutions that have accompanied those trends. In chapter three, I review the existing literature on the EDUCO program. Following that, in chapter four, I specify the theoretical foundations, conceptual space, and analytic framework which guide the analysis in this dissertation. I then use chapter five to detail the methods employed to answer the stated research questions. Next, in chapter six, I characterize the national and international context in the years prior to the beginning of EDUCO’s development. After this point, in chapter seven, I present the findings related to how the EDUCO program developed. In chapter eight, I discuss the findings presented in the previous chapter and begin to consider the theoretical implications. In the penultimate chapter, I engage in a discussion of the significance of the EDUCO experience, in addition to reflecting on the implications of the dissertation for the concept of global education policy. Finally, in chapter ten, I offers a few concluding remarks and makes suggestions for future research.
Chapter 2: Trends and Institutions in Development and Decentralization

The value of the EDUCO case is not only in what it tells about how international organizations and ideas interact with national actors and how they influence education policy at the national level, but also in what the case of EDUCO means historically. That is, in addition to understanding the dynamics among national and international actors, we must place those dynamics into historical context in order to reveal the significance of the EDUCO program in relation to the larger trends of decentralization that we observe in the post-WWII context. In order to accomplish this task, I periodize overarching trends in the thinking around decentralization and development since the 1950s. In so doing, I not only overview the general approach to decentralization in each period but will also specify how educational decentralization was conceptualized. To begin, however, I provide a few preliminary comments to contextualize both my review of decentralization trends as well as the focus that I will place on the role of international institutions in relation to those trends.

2.1 Trends of Decentralization in Development and Education

In the years following WWII, many newly independent countries and former colonies engaged in efforts at nation-building and “development.”\(^2\) In ways that will be explained below, these efforts had implications for the organization of government generally and education systems specifically. Over time, three more or less distinct

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\(^2\) Despite my reservations about this term, I use if for lack of a suitable alternative. See Esteva (1995) for a critical discussion of its meanings.
periods of decentralization can be identified – the first being from the end of WWII to the mid 1970s, the second from the mid 1970s to the early 1980s, and the third from the mid 1980s to the present (Cohen & Peterson, 1999).

Over the course of these three periods, multilateralism has gradually influenced to a greater degree education policy in developing countries. In practice, what stands out is the rise of the World Bank, especially since the 1970s, at which point it became not only the “largest single source of development finance,” but also the “largest single provider of finance for educational development” (Mundy, 1998, p. 466-7). Indeed, by 1970, World Bank lending to education, at $409 million, already outstripped the total regular budgets of both the United Nations Education, Science, and Culture Organizations (UNESCO) ($355 million) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) ($51 million) combined (Mundy, 1998, p. 459). Education sector lending from the World Bank reached just over $2 billion by 1995 (Mundy, 1998, p. 467). And by 2004, lending approximated $4 billion (World Bank/IEG, 2006). Furthermore, in addition to financing development projects, the World Bank is also widely regarded as a leader in the research and thought that undergirds and promotes policy for development and education reform worldwide (Jones, 2004; Mundy, 1998).

With regard to education decentralization specifically, Barrera-Osorio, Fasih, Patrinos, and Santibánez (2009) noted that a full 18 percent of all World Bank project lending between 2000-2006 was dedicated to it. More recently, in 2010, in a World Bank review of all lending to primary and secondary education since 2001, it was found that the percentage of projects incorporating school-level decentralization has
continued to increase. That is, while 48 percent of projects between 2001-2005 included support for school-level governance, this number jumped to 64 percent between 2006-2009 (World Bank/IEG, 2010, p. 28). Thus, not only is the World Bank a leader in both development financing and thought, but it also commits significant resources to its policy preferences, at least in the case of local-level decentralization.

The implication, then, is that an attempt at unpacking general trends in approaches to decentralization in developing countries should also highlight the related thinking and policies of the World Bank. Indeed, the World Bank has since the early 1980s acted as the primary barometer for reform trends pursued in developing countries (Mundy, 1998). Thus, in what follows, after delineating the three overarching periods of thinking related to decentralization and development in the post-WWII period, I then focus on the World Bank’s approach to decentralization in the most recent period, the period in which the EDUCO program came into existence.

Of course, in the development arena, the World Bank is not the only institution, though its research and financing are often the most influential. To be sure, there is a range of other international organizations, each with interests that converge and diverge with those of the World Bank. As such, after discussing the World Bank’s approach to decentralization, I then present that of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), German Technical Cooperation
(GTZ),[^3] the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and UNESCO. Presenting the approach of these organizations to decentralization will serve as important background information for later chapters of this dissertation.

### 2.1.1 Period 1: 1950s – 1970s: Nation-Building and Diverse Decentralization-Related Concerns

In developing countries in the post-WWII period from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s, decentralization was, as Conyers (1984) notes, “characterized by the establishment or strengthening of local governments in a number of countries, many of which were then still under colonial jurisdiction” (p. 188). Then, as Cohen and Peterson (1999) explain: “In the early 1960s proponents of decentralization focused on using the intervention [of decentralization] to assist colonies in beginning a transition to independence, achieving political equity, and responding to rising demand for public goods and services” (p. 1; see also Conyers, 1983, and Rondinelli, 1980).[^4] National development and – relatedly – the establishment of national education systems were two of the main foci of developing countries. Indeed, the creation of the latter was seen as a hallmark of a modern nation (Boli, Ramirez, & Meyer 1985; Hanson, 1970; Williams, 1997). To some extent, even rural village schools were understood to play a role in the modernization process (Nash, 1965).

[^3]: Note that in January 2011 GTZ was combined with two other German organizations to form the German Agency for International Cooperation, known as GIZ.
In the international education literature of the time, few discussions of decentralization exist, particularly in relation to developing countries. What literature does exist, however, was written within the context of nation building and, concomitantly, expanding school systems. For example, scholars discuss decentralization in relation to the following: The desirability of local curriculum control in China (Lauwerys, 1957); the establishment of community schools in Ethiopia to increase access, to “counteract the overacademic nature of the country’s educational system,” and to protect the community from “the danger of being dominated by the central government” (Wodajo, 1959, p. 29); the inculcation of democratic and individualistic principles in Korea and Japan, along with decentralized control of the education system (Adams, 1960a,b); and the expansion of both government oversight and educational provision at the sub-national level in Malawi and Tanzania (Rimmington, 1966; Dodd, 1968). The literature thus reflects many tensions which persist today as diverse countries wrestle with educational governance reforms: The protection of community schools from central government intervention, the promotion of locally-determined curricula, and the institutionalization of both centrally directed programs and monitoring at the local (or sub-national) level.

Fundamentally, however, this period was about the expansion of educational provision and the “modernization” of school systems. Additionally, in the context of post-war intervention and Cold War ideological battles, it is not surprising that the literature reflects tensions around the incorporation of democratic and individualistic values in countries such as Japan, Korea and China. Only towards the end of this
period do we begin to see the development of, and preoccupation with, administrative theories of decentralization (Chapman, 1973; Hanson, 1970, 1972) – a focus which would continue and intensify in the following period.

2.1.2 Period 2: Mid 1970s – Early 1980s: Decentralization and Administrative Development

During this time, aid agencies pressed decentralization reforms for a variety of related reasons. As Cohen and Peterson (1999) explain, this was done “in order to promote … improved management and sustainability of funded programs and projects, equitable distribution of economic growth, and facilitation of grassroots participation in development processes” (p. 1; see also Murray, 1983). The United Nations report, *Rural Cooperatives and Planned Change in Africa*, provides one concrete example of the thinking around decentralization in development generally at this time (Apthorpe, 1972; see Conyers, 1984, for more examples). This document, and others like it, reveal that, in various parts of Africa (e.g., Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania⁵) and China, decentralization was conceived of as social and economic transformation through the centrally initiated projects of rural land reform, worker-owned farm cooperatives, and local development committees (Apthorpe, 1972; Rondinelli, 1980; Rodinelli, Nellis, & Cheema, 1983; Samoff, 1979). Broadly speaking, there was attention, at least at the discursive level, to the ways in which the poor could be agents in their own development (Cornwall, 2006, p. 55).⁶

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⁵ See Ishumi (1984) for more on the role that education played in community development in Tanzania during this time.

⁶ For extensive literature in this regard, see the citations in Conyers (1984).
Mundy (1998) summarizes the thrust of the times: “The poverty-alleviation approaches to international development and education that emerged in the 1970s could be considered an attempt to construct ‘an international welfare program to be carried out as far as possible by the poor themselves’” (Mundy, 1998, p. 467). For example, Robert McNamara, then-president of the World Bank, commented in 1975 that, with regard to alleviating poverty and balancing development, “experience shows that there is a greater chance of success if institutions provide for popular participation, local leadership and decentralization of authority” (World Bank, 1975, p. 90-98, as cited in Rondinelli, 1980, p. 133). Though the approaches of this time were not without their own challenges and shortcomings, they demonstrate a very different approach to decentralization than that which has predominated since the beginning of the third phase, as will be shown in the following sections.

Education systems around the world continued to modernize and expand during this second phase of decentralization. Relatedly, the overarching concern was with “administrative development” (not decentralization specifically); planners approached education systems as complex organizations and created reform strategies for their improvement based on rational and technical logic (McGinn, Schiefelbein, & Warwick, 1979; Zadja, 2002). At the same time, many educational systems experienced challenges, problems that one would expect to accompany a period of rapid expansion of education. For example, many school systems were described as disorganized, in disarray, and unwieldy (Eliou, 1978; Hanson, 1983, 1984; Bray, 1985).
In this context, decentralization to the sub-national level emerged in some countries as an attractive policy option to improve the quality of the education system (Hanson, 1983, 1984). In a number of cases, where some form of administrative decentralization either already existed or was then being implemented, matters of both politics and organizational capacity altered or hampered the reform as designed. This was the case, for example, in parts of Africa and Latin America, as well as Papua New Guinea (Bray, 1985; Hanson, 1983, 1984, 1989; McGinn & Street, 1986).

In contrast to later forms of decentralization, which would concentrate on the community or school level, these policies focused on provincial, regional, or state level administration (Bray, 1985; Hanson, 1983; 1984). Moreover, the implementation of these policies highlighted the fact that decentralization to provincial, regional, or state levels was a process inescapably bound up in politics and complex organizational dynamics, despite the best efforts of central planners at rational planning. Going forward, and as a reaction to the problems caused by such politics, proponents of decentralization would emphasize its implementation in accordance with the principle of efficiency, which implied the reduction of state bureaucracies, as will be discussed.

2.1.3 Period 3: Mid 1980s – Present: Decentralization as Efficient and Effective Provision of Public Services

This third phase began to pick up steam in the mid-1980s. It has been characterized by the promotion of decentralization policies by international development organizations in order to, in the words of Cohen and Peterson (1999), “facilitate more efficient and effective production and provision of public goods and
services and to establish market-oriented economies in which public sector tasks can be privatized” (p. 2). Before delving into what that meant in practice, it is useful to point out two features of the broad reform context that have facilitated the predomination of such a focus in the third period.

First, the international economic and political landscape changed with the election of President Ronal Reagan in the United States in 1980 and Prime Minister Margaret in 1979 Thatcher in the Britain, both of whom privileged neoliberal policy prescriptions across all areas of government and society, including education (Clark & Astuto, 1986; Smith & Exley, 2006). Moreover, the Reagan and Thatcher governments reflected and embodied a neoliberal perspective on education reform that had been gaining momentum in recent decades (Easton & Klees, 1992; Klein, 2007; Whitty & Edwards, 1998). Their elections, thus, had the effect of shifting the dominant global discourse around the role of the state and the provision of public services such that neoliberal policy prescriptions were elevated (Harvey, 2005).7

Second, and at the same time, so too did the development lending landscape change. That is, the World Bank established itself as financially and intellectually independent in the realm of education for development (Jones, 2007a,b; Mundy, 1998). Heretofore, the Bank had only a “small education projects division” which relied on UNESCO for technical assistance until the early 1980s (Chabbot, 1998, p. 209). With the emergence and growth of human capital theory since the 1960s and 1970s, however, the World Bank had a rationale for supporting education that it could, within the new international political economy, easily promote because it

7 This trend affected not only developing but also developed countries, such as Australia (Abu-Duhou, 1999) and New Zealand (Dale, 2001; Peters, 1995).
theoretically aligned with the needs of a neoliberal economic framework (Mundy, 1998). In this context, the World Bank dramatically increased, both, loans for its education development projects as well as the size of its education research department (Mundy, 1998). Consequently, beginning in the late 1970s and continuing into the 1980s and beyond, one sees the increasing influence of World Bank thinking in education development policy (Verger & Mundy, forthcoming). To that end, the following section examines the development of Bank thinking with regard to decentralization – both generally and with regard to education.

Conceptually, however, there is an important distinction to be made before moving on to the next period. As noted above, this period has been about the ideas of efficiency\(^8\) and effectiveness in service provision and about the introduction of policies that are based on market principles and which lead to the privatization (Cohen & Peterson, 1999). This is separate from a focus on political decentralization. For example, while democratization and political decentralization were often the mantra of USAID during the 1980s, as will be discussed in a section below, the idea of decentralization in the development arena during this third period was increasingly associated with efforts at reducing the responsibilities of the state, minimizing its bureaucracy, shifting its functions to the private sector, and/or reforming the provision of public services so that they operated more like the private sector. These tendencies are further highlighted and unpacked below by focusing on the discourse

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\(^8\) Only since the 1960s has the term efficiency been imbued with a technical, economic definition. For an interesting discussion of the development of its meaning over time, see Rutgers and van der Meer (2010).
of the World Bank from the 1980s onward, both generally and with respect to
education.

2.2 International Institutions and Decentralization

Having characterized the overall trends in thinking with regard to
decentralization and development since the 1950s, this section turns to the approaches
of individual international organizations. In that international organizations played a
role in the formation of the EDUCO program, it is necessary to have an idea of their
approach to and interest in the issue of decentralization. This is particularly true of
the World Bank and USAID, the two institutions that would be most heavily involved
in education reform in El Salvador in the 1980s and 1990s.

2.2.1 The World Bank, Decentralization, and EDUCO

Just as did the Reagan and Thatcher administrations, the World Bank began
the 1980s by denouncing the inefficiency of the State. In its World Development
Report (WDR) 1980, the Bank first indicated that it considered the organization and
operation of central governments to be fundamental obstacles to progress (World
Bank, 1980). Three years later, this idea was taken further when the WDR 1983
centered on theme of “Management for Development” (World Bank, 1983). This
report emphasized economic efficiency through privatization and the reorientation of
government in order to make bureaucracies more responsive. By the end of the
1980s, the concept of “good governance” emerged as a way to achieve that
responsiveness. This is evident from the 1989 declaration by Barber Conable, then-
president of the World Bank:
A root cause of weak economic performance in the past has been the failure of public institutions. Private sector initiative and market mechanisms are important, but they must go hand-in-hand with good governance – a public service that is efficient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to its public. (World Bank, 1989, p. xii, emphasis added)

Decentralizing the responsibility for the provision of government services was seen as a prime way to achieve good governance. In theory, a shift in control of public services from the central government to more local levels would increase the influence of the voice of local populations and thereby make those services more relevant, appropriate, responsive, and accountable to those who consumed those services. To continue to encourage a redefinition of the state and the spread of the idea of good governance the World Bank issued a plethora of publications on these ideas in the 1990s (Burki, Perry, & Dillinger, 1999; Litvack, Ahmad, & Bird, 1998; Peterson, 1994; World Bank, 1991a, 1992, 1994c, 1997c).

Similarly, in the realm of education, the idea of decentralization first emerged in the mid 1980s. For example, in their report on “Financing Education in Developing Countries,” Psacharopolous, Tan and Jimenez (1986) singled out the idea of “decentralizing management.” For them, this meant permitting more private schools and relaxing restrictions on community-run schools. They explain the rationale for the latter in the following terms:

In some countries, restrictions apply not only to schools owned by individuals or religious institutions but also to those operated by community groups –
parents, neighborhood associations, occupational guilds or even entire local political subdivisions, such as villages or districts. Such constraints often prevent private and local schools from responding adequately to their constituents’ changing needs. As a result, not enough school places are offered, and the type and quality of education may not be what parents and students want. To counteract this inefficiency, central authorities could loosen … their administrative and financial control over educational systems. Schools would then be accountable to both central authorities and local groups, including parents, villages, neighborhood associations, and other forms of local government. (Psacharopolous, Tan, & Jimenez, 1986, p. 33, emphasis added)

Thus, Bank professionals working in the education sector made it clear that they, too, saw decentralization as desirable for its ability to engender more efficient and accountable management, not to mention for its ability to raise additional resources. Indeed, if parents and the community were responsible for the management of education, they could also pay fees to support the school’s budget (Psacharopolous, Tan, & Jimenez, 1986). In addition to making schools more responsive, paying fees\(^9\) would reduce their dependence on the national government – something that was seen as inherently positive due both to the perceived undesirability of government-provided services and because the governments of developing countries were experiencing budget constraints from the debt crisis of the 1980s (Harvey, 2005;

\(^9\) The World Bank placed much emphasis on the paying of school fees in the 1980s and beyond. See, for example, Thobani (1984). For a critique of Thobani and school fees, see Klees (1984).
In the decade following 1986, when the above-comments were made by Psacharopolous, Tan and Jimenez (1986), one can see the World Bank’s continued interest in the concept of educational decentralization exemplified in a few publications. Two that stand out are by Winkler (1989) and Prawda (1993). The former discussed at length the principles and potential benefits of decentralization at regional and local levels, while the latter reviewed the experiences of four countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico) in Latin America, none of which had decentralized to the community level. Noticeably, these two reports evince a continued interest in conceptually elaborating the benefits of decentralization and in evaluating mid-level forms of decentralization in terms of their efficiency, effectiveness, and ability to generate additional revenue.

What they did not present, however, was empirical evidence that community-level decentralization led in practice to the results that had been suggested by Psacharopolous, Tan, and Jimenez (1986). Nevertheless, in its 1995 publication, *Priorities and Strategies for Education* (World Bank, 1995a), the Bank chose to further highlight the ideas that had been advanced nearly a decade prior. This document stated that, in addition to contributing directly or indirectly to the cost of education, “households … could participate in school management and oversight, along with their wider communities” (World Bank, 1995a, p. 120). The implication is that World Bank continued to prominently highlight the idea of community management of education, though studies had not yet shown the effectiveness of such a strategy in practice.
It was not until the late 1990s that the World Bank had what it considered to be acceptable evidence of the benefits of community-level decentralization (Jimenez & Sawada, 1999; Jimenez & Sawada 2003; Sawada, 2000; Sawada & Ragatz, 2005; Umanzor et al., 1997). By that time, the studies which garnered attention were evaluations of El Salvador’s EDUCO program, which had been in place and expanding since early 1991 with the financial and technical assistance of the World Bank. While a later section of this chapter specifically discusses the EDUCO studies referenced above, suffice to say here that those studies generated a good deal of excitement within the Bank because they were believed to confirm some of the benefits of what Bank staff working in the education sector thought to be possible based on the theory of community level decentralization. By the end of the 1990s, while El Salvador was not the only country to have begun a program for the community-level decentralization of education management (examples at the time included Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, among others around the world), it was the case that received the most attention at the time.

To that end, a couple of events capture the magnitude of the attention that the program received, as well as the gravity of EDUCO’s example in the development arena more broadly. With regard to the attention it received, what stands out is that in 1997 EDUCO was labeled a “flagship program” by, and was awarded the Award for Excellence from, the World Bank, beating out hundreds of innovative development programs from other countries (Eriksson, Kreimer, & Arnold, 2000). With regard to the gravity of the EDUCO program internationally, one must remember that the

EDUCO was centrally featured in the WDR 2004, titled “Making Services Work for Poor People” (World Bank, 2003). While EDUCO’s appearance in this WDR occurred for a variety of reasons – ranging, for example, from the positive studies that emerged in the late 1990s to its internal promotion by Bank staff who worked on the program in El Salvador – what is most relevant for us here is that these events raised the profile of community-level education decentralization as a desirable reform which should be emulated in developing countries around the world. Indeed, in that the WDR 2004 has since its publication been seen by development professionals as template for how to reform governmental service provision for increased accountability through decentralization, the EDUCO program has garnered significant attention.

Of course, while the EDUCO program was perhaps the most well-known example of community-level decentralization, it should be noted that the World Bank did not restrict its attention to this case alone, and that it promoted the idea globally. For example, the World Bank, in its 1999 Education Sector Strategy, made decentralization one of the Bank’s official lending priorities (World Bank, 1999a). With regard to the practice of reform, that same document declared: “Virtually all of the Bank’s client countries are tackling education reforms that often involve decentralizing management” (World Bank, 1999b, p. ix). In the 2000s, decentralization remained on the short list of preferred reforms of the World Bank,

11 Speaking to the content of the 1999 Education Sector Strategy, H. Dean Nielsen (2007), a Senior Evaluation Officer in the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group, notes: “The Bank’s Education Sector did not define what it meant by decentralization in the paper, nor did it offer any evidence that decentralization made a difference in valued education outcomes, but there was clearly a determination to support countries in their movements towards more local decision-making” (p. 84).
and, as such, featured in high-profile publications that continued to discuss its theory and implementation (World Bank, 2005).

In more recent years, however, there have been shifts in the World Bank with regard to educational decentralization. First, beginning in the late 2000s, the World Bank began to de-emphasize community decentralization through/to parent councils in favor of decentralization through “school-based management” (SBM) (Barrera Osorio, Fasih, Patrinos, & Santibáñez, 2009). The difference is that the concept SBM does not restrict decision-making authority to parent councils alone (as in the case of EDUCO). SBM considers that responsibility for school-related decisions should be transferred away from the central level and to “a combination of principals, teachers, parents, and other community members” (Barrera Osorio, Fasih, Patrinos, & Santibáñez, 2009, p. 3).

The second shift has become evident with the publication of the Bank’s Education Strategy 2020: Learning for All (World Bank, 2011). What this publication makes explicit is that the Bank now sees it as necessary to reform not only community-level provision of education in terms of accountability-based relationships but also entire national education systems and “all learning opportunities in a given society” along these same lines (World Bank, 2011, p. 29). Whereas accountability relationships were previously primarily conceptualized at the community level between parent councils and teachers, it is now suggested that such relationships should also exist between the central ministry of education and individual schools on the basis of student achievement.
2.2.2 USAID and Decentralization

Like the World Bank, the work of USAID has for decades related to the concept of decentralization. This work can be divided into three periods, the first being from the 1960s to the 1980s, the second being from the end of the 1980s to the 2000s, and the third having begun in the late 2000s (Dinino, 2000). In what follows, I briefly detail each of these periods.

With regard to the first period, a report by Dinino (2000) is instructive. As she writes:

From the 1960s to the 1980s, the Agency [(i.e., USAID)] has funded hundreds of projects in local communities. Through its community development programs, USAID supported rural development, principally by providing technical assistance to local governments on animal husbandry, sanitation, education, and health. The Agency also supported municipal development by providing credit for local housing and infrastructure, training in management techniques, and technical assistance on establishing new systems for taxation, personnel, and services and in developing regional development plans. (p. 3).

When one considers that USAID is an arm of U.S. foreign policy, it is not surprising that the organization focused on community development and local government, particularly because, as Cornwall (2006) points out, the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 explicitly stated that “‘emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions’” (p. 55). A further observation of this period is that the
approach of USAID corresponded generally with the dominant trend of the time in that it focused on rural development and improving the administrative capacity of sub-national levels of government. Of course, given the context of the Cold War during this period, the rhetoric and work of USAID should also be seen as a form of soft diplomacy through which the U.S. Government sought to spread democracy, to encourage market capitalism, and to win the hearts and minds of people in developing countries (Melissen, 2005).

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, USAID has, according to Dinino (2000), highlighted democratization while also incorporating the perspective that decentralization enhances effectiveness (see also USAID, 1998). In Dinino’s (2000) words:

Based on lessons learned and given the proliferation of newly emerging democracies, the Agency revised its approach to local government assistance in the late 1980s. Most importantly, it began to emphasize the democratic aspects of local government programs. Decentralization became a means to empower citizens locally and to disperse power from the central government to localities, as well as a means to improve local administration. Indeed, the Agency has realized that the active participation of an informed citizenry significantly enhances the effectiveness and the sustainability of development efforts at the local level. (p. 4)

Notably, however, and in contrast to the typically market-based mechanisms of the World Bank, USAID perceives that effectiveness of local development is secured through accountability mechanisms such as “town meetings, public hearings on major
issues, participatory planning and budgeting, and opinion surveys” (Dinino, 2000, p. 4). Thus, while USAID began to focus on the increasingly popular concept of effectiveness, it did so in ways that did not center on market principles. Instead, more liberal ideas of participation were at the heart of their concept of decentralized planning (Edwards & Klees, 2012).

In the most recent period – i.e., since the early 2000s – the foreign policy of the United States has taken place in a post-9/11 context. While democracy promotion now has been generally conflated with the Global War on Terror, and while it is seen as a means to stability in conflict-ridden, fragile and transitional states, what is most relevant here is that USAID itself continues to encourage democratization and decentralization through the Office of Democracy and Governance, which, as of 2005, was funded to the tune of $1.3 billion annually (Melia, 2005). Lastly, with regard to this most recent period, it should be noted that the economic rationale for decentralization has been elevated. That is to say, in addition to decentralization’s potential to bring political stability, to create more transparent political institutions, and to improve democratic participation, an additional dimension highlighted is the ability of decentralization to allow sub-national governments to “promote the conditions for investment and economic development in a number of dimensions, including public infrastructure investments, pro-growth regulatory and tax environments, human resource development, and public-private partnerships” (USAID, 2009, p. 24).

Though USAID can be seen as a form of soft diplomacy working on behalf of the U.S. government, it has not until recently tended to emphasize an explicitly
economic rationale for decentralization. Put differently, while the U.S. government began to promote neoliberal economic rationales for the reform of government, it was not until the late 2000s that USAID underlined that decentralization of responsibility for economic policy to sub-national levels could be advantageous for reasons of investment and growth. In contrast, from the 1960s to the 1980s its priorities were rural development and the strengthening of municipal governments; then, from the 1980s to the early 2000s, the priority was democratic local governance and increased effectiveness through citizen involvement in participatory planning and feedback mechanisms. As will be shown in this dissertation, USAID’s involvement in El Salvador during this period not only reflected overall trends of the time but also went beyond them in that it acted in other ways to advance the interests of the U.S. Government.

To conclude this section on USAID and decentralization, I briefly summarize its approach to decentralization with regard to education specifically. Just as with the dominant trends described earlier, USAID focused on the extension and rational planning of education during the 1960s and 1970s (see, e.g., McGinn & Warwick, 2006). Then in the 1980s, USAID’s approach to education decentralization followed its more general approach to decentralization at the time, as described above. In other words, USAID supported initiatives that would help move the administrative responsibility for education management to sub-national levels (Hanson, Garms, & Heymans, 1986). In Latin America, this focus complemented a commitment made in 1979 by education ministers to organize, within their countries, regional-level education management systems (McGinn & Street, 1986).
In education, it was not until the 2000s that USAID began to focus on community-level decentralization, and even then it was not a central priority; rather, it was one of a list of priorities for the organization at the time (see, e.g., USAID, 2003b). By the time that community-level decentralization entered the agenda of USAID, it was seen as one step to take towards ensuring that public services were efficient, effective, and available (USAID, 2003b). Interestingly, in 2003, when USAID produced a document titled “Approaching Education from a Good Governance Perspective,” it advocated the decentralization of educational authority in tandem with the establishment of accountability mechanisms in the form of learning outcomes and educational standards, just as the World Bank had done in its 1999 Education Sector Strategy Paper (USAID, 2003a; World Bank, 1999b). It should be emphasized, however, that USAID has not focused exclusively – or even primarily – on education decentralization to the community level, and that it has continued to fund decentralization initiatives at a range of sub-national levels. In retrospect, then, it stands out that community-level education decentralization has been primarily a thrust of the World Bank, particularly during the decade of the 1990s.

2.2.3 Decentralization and Other International Organizations

Importantly, the World Bank and USAID are not the only two international organizations to support decentralization. To be sure, other notable international organizations have. Bergmann (2002), for example, noted that the German Organization for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) has promoted school-level decentralization because it believes that it helps to strengthen institutions and improve the management of education. Similarly, a 2005 UNESCO document indicates that
this organization has also been interested in decentralization, albeit in the context of system-wide analysis and to the extent that its implementation at various levels helps to achieve the Education For All goals (UNESCO, 2005). Unlike the World Bank and other international organizations, UNESCO has not supported decentralization for reasons of efficiency and effectiveness; instead it has advocated a conception of decentralization known as “nuclearization” in order to expand access and to strengthen the connections among communities, civil society organizations, and the ministry of education (Picón, 1990).

In addition, there is, for example, the Asian development Bank (ADB), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). To summarize, the first of these mirrors the thinking of the World Bank in that it focuses on market principles, the efficiency of resource allocation, community-financing of education, and the downsizing of central bureaucracies (Behrman, Deolalikar, & Soon, 2002). Likewise, the second of these (i.e., the OECD) singles out allocative efficiency and the ability to hold government officials accountable as the primary reasons to decentralize government generally (Jutting, Kauffmann, McDonnell, Osterrieder, Pinaud, & Wegner, 2004). Finally, the UNDP takes a more sector-wide approach when it analyzes the question of decentralization. For this organization, the question is how to increase institutional capacity such that decentralization can be supported and participatory planning practices can be implemented (Altmann, Cariño, Flaman, Kulessa, & Shulz, 2000; Scott, 2006).

Clearly, then, there are a number of organizations that engage with the idea of
decentralization in the international arena. While this is the case, the decision to focus, primarily, on the World Bank and USAID stems from the fact that these two organizational actors are most relevant to decentralization in the Salvadoran context. Thus, although it is useful to have an idea of the range of global and regional actors that variously support and advance the notion of decentralization, the case of EDUCO necessitates a nuanced understanding of the World Bank and USAID in particular.

2.3 EDUCO, Decentralization, and Trends in Development

From a long-term perspective, four observations can be made at this point about the place of EDUCO in relation to larger trends around decentralization in development. The first is that the EDUCO program came about during the most recent wave of reforms that have fallen under the label of decentralization. In contrast to earlier waves that occurred in the post-WWII period, this final wave has focused on decentralization as a strategy to reduce the size of the central government, to transfer the primary responsibility for the management of public services closer to the local level, and to institute relationships of accountability that – in theory – result in increased efficiency and effectiveness. While such reforms have been promoted in (though not necessarily implemented by) such developed countries as the United States and the United Kingdom, it has been the World Bank which has led the call for such reforms to be instituted in developing countries.

Second, we see that EDUCO began at a particular point in time. That is, in 1991, though the World Bank had recently begun to theorize the benefits of regional and community decentralization (Psacharopolous, Tan, & Jimenez, 1986; Winkler, 1989), it did not yet possess empirical evidence to confirm that the suggested benefits
would arise in practice. Third, once studies started to emerge in the second half of the 1990s about the EDUCO program, we see that it not only received accolades from the World Bank itself, but also became an example which was held up for other countries to follow. Fourth and finally, in that EDUCO was the first community-level education decentralization program for which the Bank had evidence that it considered rigorous and reliable, this program helped to solidify this type of reform on the shortlist for global lending priorities in the education sector.

Notably, however, an overview of decentralization trends in the development arena in the post-WWII period does not give a sense of why the EDUCO program initially began. That is to say, by its nature, the act of characterizing international trends necessarily glosses over the complex and multi-level politics that influenced the development of EDUCO. What is more, for all the attention that this program has received, the details of its beginnings are virtually unknown. To that end, I address in the next chapter that which previous research has revealed about EDUCO’s origins, operation, and outcomes.
Chapter 3: Literature on EDUCO

A dissertation on the development of the EDUCO program begs the question of what we already know. In this chapter, I not only review political analyses related to how EDUCO was formed, but also literature that is more evaluative in nature. Doing so will bring us up to date with what is already known about the EDUCO program. As well, doing so will help to point to the necessity of revisiting how the EDUCO program began and developed – for, indeed, these latter two issues are those that have yet to be fully explored and explained. In addition to political analyses, I also review four other groups of EDUCO-related literature. In total, then, five separate literatures will be assessed.

In terms of sequence, the first group of literature to be explored contains the existing political analyses. By reviewing this group, we get a sense of issues that have already been illuminated from a political perspective. Beyond a focus on their findings, however, the review will also be attentive to the limits of the data sources and frameworks employed in those studies. Not all political frameworks are equivalent, and the findings generated through their application may be constrained if relevant information is not incorporated.

The second set of literature I review relates to EDUCO’s implementation over time. A summary of this literature is valuable because it shows the increasing centrality of the EDUCO program to the Salvadoran education system over the course of the 1990s, as well as the way in which MINED policy towards EDUCO has shifted
in the 2000s. In this section, the information I provide helps to contextualize the studies reviewed in the third group.

The third section of this chapter is the longest. Here, I critically review in detail the available evaluations of the EDUCO program. I include those studies performed by researchers within and outside the World Bank. Although these studies take as their object the outcomes of the EDUCO program in implementation – and not the process of policy formulation itself – a review of them here is still instructive because it goes beyond a recounting of findings. Put differently, I critically appraise their conclusions in relation to their evidentiary basis, their methods, and the larger political-economic context in which the studies were performed. By doing this, I will provide some indication of the extent to which the World Bank sought to demonstrate that the EDUCO program would produce positive results. In other words, by unpacking the context and limitations of these evaluations, we gain a sense of the extent to which key personnel at the World Bank desired to demonstrate significant impacts from the EDUCO program. In this dissertation, the knowledge contained in existing program evaluations is not viewed in isolation, but rather is understood as a tool in a political process.

Next, I present the fourth group of literature. This literature is characterized neither by program evaluations nor by in-depth political analyses. Instead, this literature is promotive of the EDUCO program. As will be shown, it is also reflective of the extent to which international institutions during 1996-2006 elevated EDUCO around the world. This literature circulates globally, and it is salient to the case study at hand because it will facilitate, later in this dissertation, a discussion of the larger
implications that can stem from processes of policy formation in developing countries.

The fifth and final group of literature brings us up to the present day with regard to the status of EDUCO globally. At this point, I will review literature which suggests that EDUCO is in the burn-out phase of its career (Steiner-Khamsi, 2010). After 2005/6, while a few of the World Bank’s EDUCO studies continue to be relevant for global education policy, the EDUCO program no longer enjoys its status as a prominent policy on the global stage. In terms of this dissertation, arriving at a discussion of EDUCO’s progressive withdrawal from the limelight brings us back to the unanswered question of how EDUCO began – an issue which this dissertation unpacks in later chapters.

3.1 Politically-Focused Analyses of EDUCO

Five studies are reviewed in this section, three of which are concerned directly with a political analysis of EDUCO’s development (Bejar, 1997; Gillies, 2010; Poppema, 2012), while two are only indirectly so (Moncada-Davidson, 1995; Reimers, 1997b). Together, they show the extent of what previous research has revealed about the process that generated EDUCO.

The most comprehensive study of education reform in El Salvador in the post-war period has been carried out by John Gillies (2010) and a group of researchers working with the Academy for Educational Development (now known as FHI360), an international NGO that has for many years worked with USAID to provide technical assistance in El Salvador. For this study, the researchers conducted extensive reviews of academic literature and loan documents, conducted interviews with former senior
MINED officials, and drew on their own knowledge from their long-term engagement. In so doing, they were able to explain educational change in El Salvador in political, institutional, and technical terms.

With regard to the origination of the EDUCO program, however, the findings are at once insightful and vague. An example is when Gillies (2010) speaks to the national and international contexts that surrounded the initiation of EDUCO. As he explains, EDUCO was “initially created out of necessity – and reinforced by the national emphasis on democratization, the global discourse on access and community participation, and the almost unflagging support from donors” (Gillies, 2010, p. 73). Unlike other pieces on EDUCO, the findings by Gillies (2010) directly indicate that it was not, as the MINED has at times claimed, a simple case where the then-Minister of Education decided one day in 1991 to create the EDUCO program after taking a field trip to the countryside to investigate the state of education there as the war was winding down (MINED, 2006). To the contrary, and as Gillies (2010) finds, the creation of EDUCO was at the nexus of national educational needs (particularly, a lack of access to education in many regions of the country due to the war), global trends in thinking about education (e.g., as exemplified by the World Conference on Education For All in 1990), and the interests of international donor institutions (e.g., IDB, UNICEF, USAID, World Bank, etc).

However, while this piece represents a significant contribution to our knowledge, it refrains from unpacking to a greater degree the dynamics of these factors – i.e., perceived needs at the national level, global trends, and international institutional interests. It may be the case that the work by Gillies (2010) and
colleagues, sponsored and published by USAID, avoided more explicit statements about such sensitive dynamics due to the institutional context of their work. In the findings section of this dissertation, I attempt a more revelatory account of how those factors interacted and played out in El Salvador, and with what implications for EDUCO.

A more recent piece is by Margriet Poppema (2012), a researcher at the University of Amsterdam. This piece is particularly valuable in that it brings attention to the regional and international contexts related to education reform in Central America in the early 1990s. Specifically, it applies a critical lens to the analysis of political and economic factors that contributed to the development of community-level decentralization in Nicaragua and El Salvador. In so doing, Poppema (2012) rightly points out that Central America was, in the 1980s, a hot spot of U.S. intervention due to the context of the Cold War and the fear that these small countries would turn into beachheads of socialism in the back yard of the United States.

However, in her chapter, Poppema (2012) attributes the creation and initial funding of the EDUCO program to USAID. As she writes, “USAID was directly involved in the conceptualisation of the EDUCO strategy. Their subsequent funding was channeled through the 1990-1999 Strengthening Achievement in Basic Education (SABE) project, funded with US$33 million” (p. 171). In addition, she goes on to say: “Thereafter the EDUCO programme became actively supported by the World Bank and the [IDB]” (p. 191). While it is true that USAID was heavily involved in education reform in El Salvador in the early 1990s, and while the SABE
program was certainly influential in terms of bringing attention to a range of issues (e.g., curriculum reform, textbooks, teacher training, etc.), it was the World Bank and other institutions that had a hand in the creation of the EDUCO program, as will be shown in the findings chapter (chapter seven) of this dissertation. It is suggested here that the difference in findings between this dissertation and the work of Poppema (2012) is due to the limited and difficult-to-acquire nature of information on how the EDUCO program began.

A third piece of research – by Bejar (1997) – falls in the same vein as the two pieces discussed above in that it analyzes education reform dynamics in El Salvador during 1989-1996. While Bejar (1997) does an excellent job of providing global context and describing many important aspects of education reform in the early 1990s (aspects that will be more fully discussed in the findings chapter of this dissertation), there is a noticeable lack of attention given to institutional agency. An example of Bejar’s (1997) account is bereft of a sense of agency is the following statement: “The pilot plan was prepared [in 1991] and the EDUCO program was prepared and negotiated with the World Bank” (Bejar, 1997, p. 55). We are left wondering about how the pilot plan was prepared, by whom, and under what conditions, as well as about the nature of the negotiations and how the agreements reached between the MINED and the World Bank influenced the way in which EDUCO developed. These are gaps that I hope to fill through the present research.

Beyond the studies by Bejar (1997), Gillies (2010), and Poppema (2012), there is other research on education reform in El Salvador which relates to the EDUCO program. Notably, however, this research does not take as its objective
either dynamics or policymaking process. Nevertheless, they do provide information of which we should be aware and which should be kept in mind. These pieces are by Moncada-Davidson (1995) and Reimers (1997b).

The first of them – by Lilian Moncada-Davidson (1995), a professor at the City University of New York – appeared in *Comparative Education Review* in 1995 and relied on interviews with MINED officials, teachers, and parents at various times from 1990 to 1993, in addition to extensive literature and document review. This research focuses on the potential for education reforms enacted in the immediate post-war period to contribute to the building of a peaceful society. While this article does discuss the EDUCO program, the majority of its attention is directed at critically appraising the economic and social policies (including education) passed by President Alfredo Cristiani, elected in 1989 from the right-wing party of the Nationalist Repulican Alliance (ARENA). Thus, though not primarily an analysis of EDUCO, it does comment on two issues that are understood to have impacted the program’s generation.

The first is international agreements and international conferences. Namely, these were the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, developed in 1989, and the World Conference on Education For All, which took place in 1990 and which was also referenced by Gillies (2010). The second issue raised by Moncada-Davidson (1995) is that the EDUCO program was not only based on the politically-charged, popular-education practices\(^\text{12}\) begun during the war in rural areas of the country in the absence of government-provided educational services, but also that the

\(^{12}\) See Hammond (1998) for more on popular-education during the civil war in El Salvador.
government’s decision to institute the EDUCO program was a strategy to co-opt these popular-education practices, which were understood by the government to be part and parcel of left-wing strategies to educate and inculcate people in FMLN-controlled regions such that they, too, would join the movement for socialist reform of the country. In going forward with my case study of EDUCO, I pay particular attention to the relevant and impact of these issues.

Lastly, a study is found in the literature by Reimers (1997b) that also touches on the first half of the 1990s. It should be noted that Reimers’ (1997b) chapter was written after he had spent a few years intimately engaged in El Salvador, where he facilitated policy-related discussions and policy-related research which was funded by USAID (see, e.g., Reimers & McGinn, 1997). As with Moncada-Davidson (1995), the chapter is not about policy formation and is focused instead on an assessment of EDUCO’s experience in practice and its implications for equity. Yet, given Reimer’s depth of knowledge on how education policy was made – particularly during the years 1993-1995, when EDUCO was in the process of becoming official policy – it is suggested that his observations should be noted here and taken into account later in relation to the findings of this dissertation. Reflecting on education reform, he writes:

The education sector lacks a process of defining policies. At present the definition of policies is not forward looking, but instead is conditioned by the availability of resources, international cooperation, and available information. In this sense there is no vision guiding the sector’s development efforts and connecting them to larger objectives beyond those of the education system. The lack of information and of systems that permit the development of a
broad vision translates into a budget process unconnected to planning. Next year’s allocations are the same as last year’s, a mechanism that repeats the status quo more than it promotes change and educational innovation (Reimers, 1997b, p. 154)

Without mentioning EDUCO, he raises a number of issues directly related to policy-making. In reconstructing the series of events that led to EDUCO’s being made official, it will be interesting – and necessary – to investigate the claims made by Reimers (1997b), that formal processes did not exist and that the definition of policy was conditioned by resource availability, interests of international organizations, lack of information, and the absence of a broad vision of education’s role in society. More than testing the general validity of these assertions, however, the question in this dissertation is the extent to which these factors existed and, if so, how they impacted the development of EDUCO as a policy.

To summarize, the studies reviewed above have tended to focus on the interests of different actors, as well as the dynamics of interaction of those actors during the early 1990s generally. Noticeably, however, the reviewed studies did not sufficiently unpack EDUCO’s development. That is to say, while they speak to issues related to the EDUCO program, they did not adequately interrogate the multiple and competing interests in El Salvador at the time and, concomitantly, how those interests influenced EDUCO. Looking ahead, the literature reviewed for the next section has allowed me characterize what is known about the experience of EDUCO in practice.
3.2 EDUCO in Practice

There are a number of pieces that speak to EDUCO in implementation (Cuéllar-Marchelli, 2003; Gillies, 2010; Meza, Guzmán & Varela, 2004a; Reimers, 1997b; Sastry, Melamid, & Ross, 1995). These pieces include information on (a) when EDUCO commenced in practice, (b) how EDUCO operated, (c) where EDUCO operated, (d) the program’s institutional structure, (e) the way in which it was scaled up, and (f) the relationship between the EDUCO program and official policy of the MINED. To overview here the information contained in the literature on these aspects of the EDUCO experience is helpful because it provides valuable background information to keep in mind when discussing the process of EDUCO’s development. Additionally, fleshing out such information at this point allows one to identify additional gaps between what is already known and that which I aim to delineate with this dissertation.

3.2.1 Commencement of EDUCO in Practice

I reviewed in the previous section the existing explanations in the literature about how EDUCO became official policy, and I showed that there is uncertainty regarding when and how – exactly – the EDUCO program began in practice. Some of this uncertainty is addressed by the literature on EDUCO’s implementation. On the one hand, for example, Reimers (1997b) notes that “EDUCO began in May 1991” (p. 155) and that the program was funded with “a loan from the World Bank” (p. 157). On the other hand, you have a description by Bejar (1997) that is less precise in terms of timing and which mentions two funding organizations:
In 1991, MINED began to implement a program funded by the World Bank and UNICEF and aimed at rehabilitating, through institutional reforms, the public sector’s capacity to efficiently administer and provide health and education services. In the education field, priority was given to preschool and primary level basic education in the rural sector and the program on Education with Community Participation (EDUCO) was created (p. 51, emphasis added).

Thus, though there seems to be consensus that EDUCO began in practice in 1991, it would be useful to triangulate (a) the date, (b) the antecedents to the program’s beginning, and (c) the way in which UNICEF and the World Bank contributed to that beginning, especially since existing publications (with the exception of Poppema [2012]) almost exclusively mention only the World Bank as having supported EDUCO’s initiation. This dissertation is primarily focused on tracing the process by which EDUCO became official policy, but it will also be able to clarify these issues because I ground the explanation of the policy process in a political economic analysis of the context of – and antecedents to – that process.

3.2.2 How EDUCO Operated

The EDUCO program was constituted by a particular set of arrangements that had the community level at the center (Reimers, 1997b). To begin with, a group of five volunteer parents from each community was elected on two-year terms to form a Community Education Association (ACE), an entity which was given legal status and which was charged with contracting and paying (with funds transferred from the MINED to the ACE via bank account) the teacher(s) that would work in their schools.
These ACEs were thought to act as accountability levers that reduced teacher absenteeism and resulted in increased teacher effort in the classroom, especially since teachers were hired on one-year contracts and did not belong to teachers’ unions.\footnote{This was done by requiring that ACEs hire teachers who were not members of the official MINED career system (World Bank, 1994). If a teacher was not a member of that system, they were not eligible to join a teachers’ union.}

Communities either had to have a student population of at least 28 students per grade or be located in an area where no other educational services were available in order to be eligible to join the EDUCO program (Cuéllar-Marchelli, 2003).

With the funds provided by the MINED, each ACE additionally had the responsibility of purchasing necessary didactic materials. Moreover, given their autonomous legal status, ACEs were able – and, to some extent, expected – to carry out fund raising activities by contacting national and international governmental organizations and NGOs. In practice, ACEs were initially formed by the MINED without the provision of school space or the funds necessary to construct a schoolroom. Communities frequently donated time, materials, and labor to build schools (Lindo, 1998).

The MINED, on the other hand, was responsible for a range of tasks. These included the following: facilitating the creation of the ACEs; training the members of the ACEs in administrative and accounting procedures; setting the minimum criteria for teacher selection by the ACEs; designing and providing curricula; and overall coordination, supervision, and monitoring of the program as it was scaled up (Reimers, 1997b).\footnote{For additional details on the technical aspects of the EDUCO program, see Gilles, Crouch and Flórez (2010).} Some of these tasks, such as the provision of curricula and books...
as well as regular supervision of the teachers, proved difficult, particularly in the first years of the program since funding was not provided, at that time, to finance them in practice (Sastry, Melamid, & Ross, 1995).

On a system-wide basis, the implementation of the arrangements described above were, in theory, thought by EDUCO’s proponents to make more efficient what was perceived as a highly centralized and overly bureaucratic MINED. On one side, accountability and enhanced quality were supposed to result from the community-level management of teachers, as described above. On the other side, in terms of cost, a number of features functioned to reduce costs traditionally incurred by the MINED. These included costs for the construction of schools. Because the MINED, in the beginning, did not provide for the construction of schools when it created ACEs, community members either made use of existing space in a community member’s house or worked together to build a classroom. Initial budget assumptions for the EDUCO program also did not include costs of capital – i.e., textbooks and desks (World Bank, 1994a). Lastly, cost savings were projected because the EDUCO teachers – while required to have a university teaching certificate in order to be contracted – were paid at a rate below that of teachers with equivalent credentials and who were members of the official MINED career system – a saving which worked out to $3 per student per year, on average (Sastry, Melamid, & Ross, 1995).  

15 Over time, the payment of EDUCO teachers was modified. For example, starting in 1995, they began to receive bonuses ($40/month) for working in rural areas (Gillies, Crouch, & Flórez, 2010). With this bonus, EDUCO teachers made, on average, 7 percent more than teachers in traditional schools (Gillies, Crouch, & Flórez, 2010, p. 61). For more salary comparisons, see Rodriguez (2003). Then, in 2007, they began to be paid according to the official MINED pay scale, though they
In practice, despite the savings measures mentioned above, an early cost analysis done in 1995 shows that EDUCO is a less-costly option only if EDUCO teachers are not paid according to their credentials and if EDUCO schools are not provided with adequate school supplies (Sastry, Melamid, & Ross, 1995). The possibility that EDUCO was less costly in practice than traditional public schools was further reduced when, in the mid-1990s, funding to the program increased through a series of loans from the World Bank and IDB. That funding, as well as additional funds from the MINED, ensured that the EDUCO program was well-resourced.\footnote{The loans from the World Bank, for example, covered costs related to the following: Teachers’ guides, classroom libraries, school supplies, teacher training, ACE training, teacher trainers, management information systems, and the design and implementation of supervision system, among other things (World Bank, 1997).}

3.2.3 Where EDUCO Operated

The EDUCO program has always operated in rural areas. When the program began, the rural areas were most in need of education, the official provision of which had discontinued during the civil war. When the MINED began to offer education again in the conflict-affected areas, it did so through the EDUCO program. This means that, in practice, EDUCO was initially targeted and implemented in areas that were not only rural, but also among the poorest in the country, not to mention previously-controlled by the FMLN. As Reimers (1997b) stated, “EDUCO has been established disproportionately in the eastern part of the country in the areas that had been in conflict, in spite of the fact that there are higher percentages of children of school age out of school in the western part of the country” (p. 157). This fact lends \footnote{still did not have the job security afforded to teachers who were members of the MINED career system (Ramírez, 2007).}
credence to the notion that the MINED sought to neutralize the “loosely organized network of popular teachers who identified with the opposition during the war” (Reimers, 1997b, p. 157). Over time, however, EDUCO was expanded to all rural areas of the country and some urban areas, as Gillies, Crouch and Flórez (2010) detail.

3.2.4 EDUCO’s Institutional Structure

Initially, an EDUCO program coordination office was established in the MINED. This office performed such tasks as supervision, teacher training, curriculum design, administration, finance, and communications (Bejar, 1997; World Bank, 1994a). Three regional education offices were responsible – from 1993-1995 – for technical assistance at the community level (MINED, 1994a). In 1995, the functions of the EDUCO coordination office began to be integrated into the existing administrative units of the MINED, and in 1997, with assistance from USAID, the MINED created 14 departmental directorates which matched the political-administrative structure of the country and which provided community-level technical assistance for EDUCO from that point onwards (Gillies, 2010).

3.2.5 Amplification of EDUCO

As will be shown later in this dissertation, EDUCO received tremendous attention from the MINED and donor agencies alike because (among other reasons) it was the first instance of community-level education management decentralization. Between the popularity of the program and the desire of the MINED to once again provide education services in rural areas, the EDUCO program expanded rapidly and
was implemented extensively, and it came to serve as the driving force for reform within the MINED during the 1990s, as noted by Gillies (2010). Numerically, while the EDUCO program started as a pilot in only six schools in 1991, at the end of 1994 it already covered 2,316 teachers and 74,112 students (Cuellar-Marchelli, 2003). Ten years later, in 2004, these figures had risen to 7,381 and 378,208, respectively. Approximately 55% of rural public schools (which make up two-thirds of all schools in El Salvador) would operate under the EDUCO program (Gillies, Crouch, & Flórez, 2010).

One can also examine the expansion of EDUCO in terms of grade-level coverage. While the EDUCO program was initially only intended as a strategy to provide education at the preschool level and in grades 1-3, it was subsequently expanded in 1994 to cover through grade 6 and then again in 1997 to cover through grade 9 (Meza, Guzmán, & Varela, 2004a). After 2005, even some high schools became EDUCO schools (Gilles, Crouch, & Flórez, 2010).

Until 1999, the MINED allowed EDUCO and traditional schools to co-exist through what it called ‘mixed’ schools (Lindo, 1998). Here, a traditional school would also receive funding from the EDUCO program and the community would establish an ACE. With the funding received, the community would hire a teacher for lower grades (grades 1-3). The school would then use its non-EDUCO budget to pay a teacher to provide grades 4-6. As mentioned, the EDUCO program was initially targeted to communities where educational services were not provided during the civil war. However, as the MINED began to scale up the program it did so by creating ‘mixed’ schools, as well.
Over the course of EDUCO’s amplification, it is important to note that not all aspects were continued. In particular, the ‘parents school’ did not last. Initially, through this function of the EDUCO program, parents from the community would meet with EDUCO teachers once per month to learn basic literacy and numeracy and to strengthen relations between the community and school (Reimers, 1997b; World Bank, 1994). As Reimers (1997a) notes, however, the percentage of EDUCO schools that fulfilled this function dropped from 50 to 25 between 1992 and 1993.

In conjunction with the expansion of EDUCO, the MINED also decided to expand the application of the principles on which the EDUCO program was founded. That is, in 1998, after receiving the President’s Award for Excellence from the World Bank for the EDUCO program in 1997, the MINED decided to move all schools in the country to school-based management. Traditional public schools have since been governed by school boards (in Spanish known as a consejo directivo escolar, or CDE) (Gillies, 2010). CDEs differ from ACEs in that they are comprised of three parents plus the school principal, two teachers, and two students (older than 12 years). With the exception of the school principal, CDE members are elected, for a period of two years. In addition, and in contrast to EDUCO, the teachers belong to the official MINED career system and are not contracted directly by the CDE (MINED, n.d.). Like ACEs, however, CDEs are responsible for managing the financial and human resources of the school, and for maintaining the school structure and environment (MINED, n.d.).
3.2.6 EDUCO and MINED Policy

Curiously, for all that has been written about EDUCO, very little literature has examined how EDUCO entered MINED policy. This was shown in the review of politically-focused analyses of EDUCO presented earlier in this chapter. Contrary to what one might expect, it is a piece by Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003), which is primarily concerned with assessing the outcomes of the EDUCO program, that clearly references EDUCO’s official entrance into MINED policy. As she writes, “the already initiated decentralization and privatization process within Salvadoran education is formalized through the education reform plan 1995-2005” (Cuéllar-Marchelli, 2003, p. 152). The education reform plan to which Cuéllar-Marchelli refers is known as the Ten Year Plan (TYP). For this dissertation, then, the primary task is not only to understand how EDUCO began in practice, but, just as importantly, to explain the relationship between how EDUCO began and how it entered the TYP, with emphasis on the ways in which international influence affected each. Interestingly, once the MINED announced in the TYP its intention to dramatically scale up the EDUCO program, it received commitments totaling at least $78.2 million in loans from the World Bank and the IDB to support the progression of the EDUCO program (Sastry, Melamid, & Ross, 1995). By offering loans, both the World Bank and the IDB signaled their interest in the program and their desire for it to succeed.

Yet it is important to emphasize that MINED policy toward EDUCO has changed over time. For example, as the program grew, its administration was incorporated into the regular institutional structure of the MINED, as mentioned above. However, after receiving immense attention from 1991-1998, the program
entered a period of time – under a new Minister of Education – in which it was relatively neglected and the quality of its management declined. The perception was that the EDUCO program had done well, and was no longer a priority.

Subsequently, a former champion of EDUCO within the MINED became the Minister of Education in 2004 and once again took up the cause of EDUCO. In addressing the weaknesses of the EDUCO program that had emerged during the preceding five years, and in order to appease EDUCO teachers, the new Minister agreed, in 2007, to recognize the credentials and years of service of EDUCO teachers and to pay them according to the official MINED pay scale (Gillies, Crouch, & Florez, 2010). ACEs remained the hiring authority, however. EDUCO teachers were still not eligible for job security.

Since 2009, more policy changes have occurred. Conspicuously, these changes come as part of a party shift in government. The right-wing ARENA party held power in El Salvador for 20 years, from 1989 until 2009, during which time the MINED implemented the EDUCO program. In 2009, Mauricio Funes became the first nominee of the FMLN to reach the presidency. As part of his campaign, Funes made a promise to the teachers’ unions that he would revise the EDUCO program, a program the unions had long fought for many reasons, including the lack of job security for EDUCO teachers, inadequate support, inappropriate treatment of teachers by some ACE members, and the selling of teaching positions in some cases by ACEs (Gillies, Crouch, & Flórez, 2010, SIMEDUCO, 2011).

Since being elected Funes has taken two actions. The first, which went into effect at the beginning of 2011, transferred all EDUCO teachers to the official
MINED career system and, in effect, removed the hiring authority from the ACEs (Rivas, 2010a,b). ACEs have since then continued to exist, but without performing the function which was seen by proponents as the heart of the EDUCO program – i.e., the ability to hire and fire teachers. Nevertheless, they continued to carry out other management duties, such as purchasing didactic materials. The second action taken by Funes came in November 2012 and relates to the ACEs themselves. They will now be converted to CDEs, beginning in 2013 (Rivas, 2012). Thus, while parental participation will continue to be an element of school management, its role is being reduced and fused with input from teachers, students, and school principals.

The preceding sections have, among other things, discussed how the EDUCO program operated in practice, its amplification over time, and how official policy toward EDUCO changed over time. In the mid 1990s, once EDUCO had entered official policy and as the MINED was expanding it dramatically, a number of evaluations were performed. In the next section, I review those evaluations.

3.3 EDUCO Evaluations

The literature review includes nine evaluations of the EDUCO program, all of which were conducted between 1997 and 2005, the time during which the EDUCO program was not only being scaled up by the MINED but was also receiving significant attention internationally. Seven of these nine evaluations were financed and conducted by the World Bank or its consultants. Of these seven, five have continued to receive attention internationally (Umanzor et al., 1997; Jimenez & Sawada, 1999, 2003; Sawada, 2000; Sawada & Ragatz, 2005). As I discuss in more detail below, there are two commonalities among these five: First, they reach
conclusions which are favorable to community-level education management decentralization, and, second, they are based on quantitative methods – methods which are seen within the World Bank and among development specialists to be rigorous and preferable when determining a program’s impact (Khandekar, Kookwal, & Samad, 2010). On the other hand, and as I detail below, the two World Bank studies which have not received sustained attention were either based on qualitative methods (Lindo, 1998) or offered a less sanguine interpretation of the data on the EDUCO program (Parandekar, 2002). I discuss each of these two groups of World Bank studies.

I also discuss the two studies which were not carried out by the World Bank (Cuéllar-Marchelli, 2003; Reimers, 1997b). Besides not being carried out by World Bank staff, these studies similarly did not employ methods which are seen as rigorous; nor did they offer particularly positive interpretations of the data. Unlike the World Bank’s evaluations, these studies have not been featured in the global education literature on decentralization. They did not resonate with the pro-community-level decentralization message put forward by the World Bank and like-minded institutions in the 1990s and 2000s; neither were they promoted in international institutional publications and international fora.

With these comments in mind, the present section proceeds in the following way. First, I review the studies performed by the World Bank. For discussion purposes, I divide this group into those that have been well-received and promoted and those that have not. Second, I discuss the non-World Bank studies. Throughout, my review is critical. That is to say, I do not recount only the findings suggested by
the authors; instead, I review the findings in light of the methods and offer critical commentary on issues that may have been under-emphasized or glossed over by the authors themselves. I also consider the political-economic context of the production of these studies. Table 3.1, below, summarizes key points in the following discussion of these studies.

3.3.1 World Bank EDUCO Studies – Group 1

What I refer to here as “Group 1” are those five studies performed by the World Bank which were based on quantitative methods, which offered optimistic interpretations of the data, and which have subsequently been featured internationally in support of community-level education management decentralization (Umanzor et al., 1997; Jimenez & Sawada, 1999, 2003; Sawada, 2000; Sawada & Ragatz, 2005). I review them in the order in which they were conducted. Despite the positive reception of these studies internationally, I will argue that the conclusions warranted may not always be as strong or favorable as those offered by the authors.

As I proceed with the review, it is important to keep in mind four characteristics of the international and national context. First, and on a most general level, by the time these studies emerged development professionals generally, but the World Bank in particular, had been promoting the decentralization of public sector governance for at least 15 years. Second, though literature had emerged which theorized benefits of education decentralization in developing countries, countries had, by and large, only experimented with administrative decentralization to regional or municipal offices. Third, and relatedly, because the EDUCO program was the first of its kind, and because it had existed since 1991, (continued after table)
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| 1   | Umanzor et al. (1997) | Ex post, two group comparison with 1996 data | - ACE members feel that they have more influence in schools decisions (though they did not make more decisions in practice)  
- ACE members visit schools more often  
- EDUCO teachers meet/contact parents more often | - Authors conclude that EDUCO schools are no worse than traditional public schools because student learning scores not statistically significantly worse |
| 2   | Jimenez & Sawada (1999) | Regression (OLS) analysis with Heckman two-step correction for sample selection bias with 1996 data | - Effect of EDUCO on language scores is positive & significant  
- EDUCO significantly reduces student absences | - The more fully specified models are not significant  
- Endogeneity: EDUCO students possess unobserved characteristics that correlate negatively with achievement outcomes; cannot parse out impact of intervention  
- Reduction in absences could have been result of timing of new school construction/new educational services offered (shortly before data collection in 1996) |
| 3   | Sawada (2000) | Regression (OLS) analysis with instrumental variables with 1996 data | - Community participation positively and significantly related to teacher wages  
- Community participation (i.e., ACE member school visits) enhances teacher effort (i.e., meetings) with parents.  
- Community participation in EDUCO associated with lower student-teacher ratio  
- EDUCO participation positively and | - Not the case in more fully specified model  
- In model where EDUCO dummy and community participation variables are significant, the former is negatively related to teacher wages  
- Simultaneity; not possible to separate effects or directionality of influence between variables  
- It could be correlation, not causation; i.e., EDUCO schools in sample have fewer students  
- The participation variable with an effect is not specific |
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<td>- Endogeneity: those unobserved characteristics that affect the likelihood of participating in EDUCO negatively effect decision to stay in school</td>
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<td>Sawada &amp; Ragatz (2005)</td>
<td>Regression (OLS) with PSM and Heckman two-step correction with 1998 data</td>
<td>- EDUCO schools produce more frequent community participation (i.e., meetings with parents) and teacher effort (i.e., teaching hours), and fewer teacher absences.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lindo (1998)</td>
<td>Qualitative methods</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Parandekar (2002)</td>
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<td>- EDUCO school directors are younger, have less experience, also serve as teachers - Infrequent EDUCO teacher training - Internal inefficiency (i.e., student repetition) higher in EDUCO schools</td>
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<td>Reimers (1997b)</td>
<td>Case study and ex post two group comparison based on data</td>
<td>- High EDUCO teacher turnover - Community participation only by ACE members</td>
<td>- Author concludes that EDUCO has not “substantially increased school quality, internal efficiency, or even community participation” (p. 159).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|   | from 1993 | - ACEs work better where no school located previously  
|   |  | - No significant differences for teacher absences, instructional time, or supervisor visits  
| 9 | Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003) | Qualitative methods  
|   |  | - EDUCO parents pay higher (unofficial) school fees  
|   |  | - EDUCO parents donate labor equivalent to 28 percent of work done by all MINED administrative and support staff assisting all public schools  
|   |  | - Community participation varies  
|   |  | - The author relied on interviews, document review, available research studies  

**Key:** OLS = ordinary least squares; PSM = propensity score matching.

**Notes:** *Data from 1993 is based on a stratified multistage method where departments and municipalities were sample for urban and rural strata and for EDUCO and traditional schools. The sample of 122 schools included 21 that were EDUCO. Data from 1996 is based on random sample of 311 schools with a third grade section of at least 10 students. The surveys administered included language and math tests, in addition to a household survey and questionnaires for the director, third-grade teacher, parents, and two ACE members. Data from 1998 added new student learning tests and teacher and parent surveys to the information collected in 1996. The comparison group for all quantitative studies was traditional rural public schools.

**The general characteristics of the three groups of studies can be summarized as follows: Group 1 studies exhibit favorable findings, have been based on quantitative methods, and have been featured in global literature on EDUCO. Group 2 studies, while performed or financed by the World Bank, have been less sanguine in their findings and conclusions. The non-World Bank studies have been both quantitative and qualitative, and have also been less positive in their assessment of the program.*
much excitement and anticipation surrounded its effects in practice, particularly within the World Bank. Finally, by the time these studies began to emerge in 1997, the MINED had already committed to the expansion of the EDUCO program in its Ten Year Plan, which had been created in 1995. Moreover, the MINED had for years already been receiving international assistance from various organizations – IDB, UNICEF, World Bank – for this program, a program in which it had invested itself and on which the expansion of its education system depended. The MINED, too, wanted to demonstrate positive results. Both nationally and internationally, the performance of the EDUCO program was under close observation and high expectations.

In this context, the first study was conducted by the World Bank and a few staff from the MINED. It was an impact evaluation and it relied on data collected in 1996 (most future studies would return to these data as well) through a random sample of 311 schools. The population of schools from which the sample was drawn had to have a third grade section with at least 10 students. At each school, in addition to administering language and math tests to third-grade pupils, the team interviewed and gave a questionnaire to the director (or person in charge), the third-grade teacher, five randomly selected 5th-grade students, their parents, and two members from the ACE. The questionnaire collected background data. Although the sample initially included four types of schools – i.e., EDUCO, mixed, traditional public, and private – the 1997 impact study only looked at EDUCO schools and traditional public schools located in rural areas.
Underlying these data is an important feature to note before continuing with the study’s results. Though the EDUCO sample was identified in a random way, this is negated by the fact that the MINED initially chose the communities which would participate in a non-random way. That is, as discussed previously, the MINED purposefully selected the poorest and most disadvantaged communities (located where the government had not maintained control during the civil war) for the program (economists refer to this strategy as endogenous program selection), thus indicating that selection bias would be a problem inherent to the quasi-experimental studies conducted later.

With these data, Umanzor et al. (1997) ran a series of ex-post matched comparisons between the EDUCO schools and the traditional public schools on a number of characteristics of interest. They focused on associations between school and family characteristics and the outcomes observed in the school. They found both similarities and differences in general characteristics across groups. For example, on average, and to a statistically significant degree, EDUCO teachers had a higher level of education, but less experience. EDUCO schools also had less access to electricity, but more of them had classroom libraries (most likely because a separate USAID program funded classroom supplies). Despite better libraries, EDUCO schools did not have more textbooks. Additionally, EDUCO students were found to live in much more rudimentary homes (as in, without electricity or piped water, but

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17 Meaning that the EDUCO schools and the traditional schools were selected for comparison after the EDUCO intervention began.
18 This is because, at the outset, ACEs were required to hire teachers who had at least a university level teaching certificate. The excess supply of university-trained teachers in the early 1990s also contributed to this.
with dirt floors), yet parents were not found to help with homework any less than parents in the comparison group. In terms of school-community interaction, ACE members felt that they had more influence in school decisions, though they did not actually make more decisions in the school’s management (Umanzor et al., 1997). ACE members also visited their community’s school more often than did parents on the school councils of traditional rural schools. Likewise, EDUCO teachers met with parents more often and contacted parents more frequently when students were absent. Lastly, with regard to the variables that have received the most attention, there were differences in neither student absenteeism, dropout, grade repetition nor student achievement on either the math or language tests (Umanzor et al., 1997).

Some of these differences are cause for optimism – as with ACE parents being more involved in the school and EDUCO teachers meeting more with parents. Nevertheless, educational interventions are assessed primarily in terms of their ability to increase student achievement. Moreover, in this case, the theory of the EDUCO program is in part based on the notion that community-level management would result in increased teacher effort, which would lead to better student learning. Although the comparison of the treatment and control group in this study did not show that EDUCO students had significantly better achievement than students in rural traditional public schools, these students also did not score significantly worse.

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19 According to the two group comparison by Umanzor et al (1997) between pure EDUCO and traditional rural schools, there was not a significant difference in the number of decisions made by “the school” – meaning the principal. This was according to the members of the parents’ committees for both types of schools, who were asked about whom makes decisions regarding pedagogy, school administration, personnel, and incentives. Nevertheless, the members of ACEs for EDUCO schools perceived that they exercised greater influence in school decision making.
than their counterparts in public schools. Umanzor et al. (1997) took this as a positive sign, given the relatively worse economic conditions of EDUCO students, and thus conclude that EDUCO students thus exhibit “better than expected academic performance” (p. 26).

The second study – by Jimenez and Sawada (1999) – emerged two years later. Here, Jimenez and Sawada (1999) employed more advanced econometric techniques to assess whether EDUCO had an effect on either student achievement or student absences. In order to answer these questions, they used the same 1996 data as Umanzor et al. (1997) and applied regression analyses along with the Heckman two-step correction (Heckman, 1979) in order to attempt to correct for the sample selection bias inherent in the EDUCO treatment group. In their study, they

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20 It should be noted that Emmanuel Jimenez was at that time a member of the World Bank’s influential Development Economics Vice-Presidency, and was well respected among his peers. The fact that he took up the cause of EDUCO by doing research on it attracted the attention of others within the Bank.

21 The Heckman two-step correction is employed where there are issues with sample selection bias. Sample selection bias is normally a problem for regression analysis because, when the treatment and comparison groups systematically differ on a range of characteristics, we cannot be sure that the effect observed for the treatment (e.g., EDUCO) is unbiased. That is, the effect (or lack of it) could be due to unobserved variables related to the treatment (labeled by economists as endogeneity). Under endogeneity, we can also not be sure of the extent to which the estimates for the other variables in equation are biased as well (Berk, 1983). The best way to address this issue is to first draw a representative random sample of participants from the population of interest. In most cases this is not possible, especially in social science research. Such was the case with EDUCO, where participating communities were not chosen randomly and where participating communities differed systematically from a nationally representative sample.

Thus, to deal with this common issue, James Heckman developed his now famous correction technique which treats sample selection bias as specification error (Heckman 1979). Per this technique, a separate estimator term is added to the principal regression equation of interest (i.e., the “substantive equation”). This term is arrived at by estimating through a (probit) selection equation the likelihood of a student being placed, for example, in an EDUCO school, given a set of selected
successively added controls for student, family, teacher, classroom, school, and community participation characteristics. Throughout, the comparison group is traditional rural schools.

In their discussion of student achievement, the authors state: “EDUCO’s … effect on language test scores is positive and significant, while its effect on math performance is positive and not significant” (Jimenez & Sawada, 1999, p. 428). Yet, this statement is quickly followed by a concession: “Our measure of EDUCO’s advantage in language may be imprecise. The estimate of the EDUCO coefficient is

characteristics. This probability, then, is fed back into the substantive equation as part of a ratio (the inverse Mills ratio) that represents the probability that a child with given characteristics will be excluded from the sample from which results are generalized, conditional on participation in EDUCO (Berk 1983). Ideally, then, the added estimator is a sample selection correction term that adjusts for the fact that certain characteristics are overrepresented in the sample being examined. From the regression output, one can then interpret a statistically significant result for this term’s coefficient as indicating that there is sample selection bias. That is, a statistically significant coefficient signals that certain characteristics are over or under-represented.

Fundamental issues surface in practice, however. For a thorough review of the many issues that can and do arise in practice through the use of the Heckman two-step correction, see Bushway, Johnson and Slocum (2007). For example, if the same variables appear in both the selection equation and the substantive equation, the issue of multicollinearity arises (Bushway, Johnson and Slocum 2007). That is, in concrete terms, if the same variables used to predict a student’s participation in EDUCO are also used to predict a student’s test scores, then the correction term added to the equation for test scores may well co-vary with the other independent variables. What’s more is that this technique assumes that the error terms for both the selection and substantive equation are jointly normal, meaning that they are independent of each other (Heckman 1979). However, the error terms will be correlated if there are unobserved characteristics (omitted variables) relevant to the dependent variables of both the selection and substantive equations. It should be noted that, in the case of EDUCO, this is almost certainly the case. The reason is as follows: Socioeconomic conditions determined who participated in EDUCO; these same poverty related characteristics always influence student achievement. Ultimately, then, although this fix works well in theory, in practice it actually worsens issues of misspecification because there are now two linked regression equations to specify correctly, and which themselves must not be correlated.
sensitive to the specification of the participation equation” (p. 428). What they allude to is that their *more completely specified models clearly show that the results for both language and math achievement are not significant*. Nevertheless, the authors make inferences in the concluding section to their paper from models missing controls for school inputs or community participation. They state: “[EDUCO] has improved language scores” (p. 440).

In addition to the specification issue, there is the matter of endogeneity stemming from sample selection bias. That is, the results provided by Jimenez and Sawada (1999) are confounded by the fact that the students who attended EDUCO schools also possessed unobserved characteristics that correlated with student achievement outcomes. Jimenez and Sawada (1999) recognize this when they write, “The error terms of the participation and achievement equations are negatively correlated. This means that EDUCO students have unobserved characteristics that are negatively correlated with achievement test scores” (p. 428). Under conditions of endogeneity, one cannot truly parse out the impact of the intervention on student achievement because the participation of the student in the intervention is correlated with other factors which are also correlated with student achievement.

Additionally, alternative conclusions can be drawn from the student achievement regression results, keeping in mind their limitations. In math, for example, although the EDUCO variable is not significant, what does contribute to improved test scores is the availability of sanitary services. With regard to language test scores, it is having a classroom library that contributes positively. For both math and language, more frequent visits to the school by ACE parents is positively
associated with higher student achievement. The data thus support the conclusions that schools in which parents are involved and which possess basic resources encourage better student performance. Given that the focus of the evaluation was to determine EDUCO’s impact, these findings are not highlighted by the authors.

The second question posed by Jimenez and Sawada (1999) is whether there is an EDUCCO effect on student attendance. They use the same data and controls as with their models for student achievement, changing only the dependent variable to indicate the number of days the student was absent in the month prior to the survey. Here, they find that EDUCCO significantly reduces the number of days a student was absent. They thus conclude that the accountability relationships instituted between parents and teachers which EDUCCO are responsible for reducing student absences.

However, if we decompose the effect of the EDUCCO variable according to when the EDUCCO schools were built, the picture changes (Jimenez & Sawada, 1999). If the EDUCCO school was built between 1991-1995, there was no effect; however, if the school was built in 1996, it significantly decreased student absences. As opposed to attributing the effect to relationships of accountability, the result could simply be due to the fact that students received a new school in the same year that the survey was administered. The presence of a new school – where there had not been one previously – could significantly increase student attendance.

Nevertheless, the authors chose to highlight a particular conclusion, one that resonated with the theory of community-level accountability relationships and their ability to lead students and teachers to perform better (Jimenez & Sawada, 1999). These conclusions are powerful, particularly given the fact that they are offered by
the World Bank and the fact that they were derived from methods that are widely seen as rigorous and objective. To that end, the literature shows that other authors have repeated these conclusions, as did Barrera-Osorio, Fasih, Patrinos, and Santibañez (2009) in their review of the effectiveness of school-based management in developing countries. In this way, conjecture becomes consensus around the idea that community-level decentralization can lead to fewer student absences.

The third study was conducted by Sawada (2000) and attempted to determine if the EDUCO program had an effect on student achievement, teacher pay, teacher effort, or classroom inputs. Numerous models were estimated using largely the same data and controls as were employed by Jimenez and Sawada (1999), the difference being that Sawada (2000) uses instrumental variables in an attempt to remedy the endogeneity which results from the nature of the sample. In the end, four conclusions were drawn, each of which is reviewed here.

The first conclusion stated that community participation was positively related to teacher wages. However, although Sawada (2000) runs eight different models to test this, under the most complete specification neither is the community participation variable nor the EDUCO variable significant. The author refers in his conclusion to an OLS regression which did not control for teacher characteristics.

22 Instrumental variables are employed in regression analysis under conditions of endogeneity. The idea is that one seeks to “find a variable (or instrument) that is highly correlated with program placement or participation but that is not correlated with unobserved characteristics affecting outcomes” (Khandker et al., 2010, p. 87). Instrumental variables must be selected thoughtfully, as a weak instrumental variable – one that is correlated with unobserved characteristics or omitted variables – can worsen the bias of coefficient estimates. Ideally, the instrumental variable serves as a proxy for program participation while eliminating issues of endogeneity. See the previous footnote for more on endogeneity.
Moreover, in this particular model, while it is true that community participation (defined as the number of times parents on the ACE visit the school monthly) is positively associated with increased wages, what Sawada (2000) chooses not to mention is that EDUCO is significantly and negatively related to wages. Thus, while Sawada (2000) finds a significant effect of community participation, this is not related to the EDUCO program. In contrast, the EDUCO-related finding – that EDUCO teachers receive less compensation than their traditional school counterparts – is not highlighted.

Second, Sawada (2000) highlights the relationship between teacher effort and community participation in EDUCO schools. Here, the model does indeed show a statistically significant relationship between school visits by ACE members and the number of hours teachers spend each month meeting with parents. However, the latent constructs, as measured and specified here, experience simultaneity and, as such, it is not possible to separate the effect of community participation from teacher effort. This is not to say that there is not a relationship between the two variables. To be sure, parents spending more time at school would be intertwined with the number of hours teachers spend meeting with parents. What remains unclear is the nature and directionality of the relationship. Nevertheless, Sawada (2000) concludes: “Community participation seems to enhance the teacher effort level” (p. 26).

For the third finding, Sawada (2000) reports that there is a connection between community participation and teacher-student ratio. In particular, the finding is that the former causally decreases the latter. This is a curious findings because the relationship between community participation and teacher-student ratio is not clear.
That is, one wonders why teacher-student ratio would be a function of community participation. While Sawada (2000) does not offer an explanation of why this would be, I suggest that this may be the result of the nature of the sample: EDUCO schools were located in particularly rural areas, where there tended to be fewer children per teacher.

*Fourth and finally, Sawada (2000) speaks to student achievement.* Although the EDUCO variable was not in any of the model specifications significantly related to test scores, the study is bookended by statements which, at first glance, indicate the contrary. At the beginning and at the very end of the paper, Sawada (2000) writes, “We observe consistently positive and significant EDUCO participation effects on standardized test scores” (pgs. 1, 25, emphasis added). What he refers to, however, is not a variable that represents parental participation in EDUCO, but rather a variable for parental participation generally. The problem with this wording is that the parental participation variable which was shown to be associated with student achievement is not specific to EDUCO. Instead, it is a variable that represents participation in schools generally – by either parents of EDUCO students or parents of students in traditional rural public schools.\(^{23}\) Such statements can filter through to future reviews of empirical work on EDUCO and decentralization more generally.

In the fourth study, Jimenez and Sawada (2003) attempt once more to uncover an EDUCO effect. This time, they return to the question of whether participating in EDUCO is associated with staying in school over the two-year period 1996-1998. To answer this question new data collected in 1998 – from student

\(^{23}\) The parents associations for traditional schools were known as Sociedades de Padres de Familia, or Family Parent Societies (Sawada, 2000, p. 3).
learning tests and teacher and parent surveys (Lindo, 1998, p. 21) – is added to the 1996 data and then run through regression analyses (specifically, they use probit models) which utilize the Heckman two-step correction for sample selection bias and the same controls as their other studies (Jimenez & Sawada, 1999; Sawada, 2000). In this case, however, they include in their sample the mixed EDUCO schools.\footnote{In their words, they had “878 students in 35 pure and mixed EDUCO schools and 107 pure and mixed traditional schools” (Jimenez & Sawada, 2003, p. 18). They do not state how many students were in each type of school; nor do they define the difference between a mixed EDUCO school and a mixed traditional school.}

Once again, the authors acknowledge the inherent limitations they face due to sample selection bias and the effects of this on their results. Importantly, recall that, in practice, sample selection bias means that we cannot be sure of the extent to which coefficients are biased. To continue, in this study, Jimenez and Sawada (2003) reveal that, with regard to the Heckman two-step correction, the error terms for the selection and substantive equations are negatively correlated. As a result, “unobserved characteristics regarding the children, households, and communities might positively affect the likelihood of selecting an EDUCO school and might negatively … affect a student’s decision to continue in school” (Jimenez & Sawada, 2000, p.21-22). Yet the findings of Jimenez and Sawada (2003) can be found cited in the literature on education decentralization in developing countries (Barrera-Osorio, Fasih, Patrinos, & Santibañez, 2009). The cited results pertain to model 1 and indicate that attending an EDUCO school increases the probability of remaining in school for two years by 64%.

The **fifth and final study** came about in 2005, this time by Sawada and Ragatz (2005). It builds on Jimenez and Sawada (1999). In this version, the study
asks how decentralization affects administrative processes, teacher behavior, and student achievement. In addition to using the Heckman two-step correction procedure, it also makes use of propensity score matching – a strategy through which the compared treatment and control communities are matched along a series of characteristics to ensure that they are as identical as possible, given the communities in the sample. In their analysis, Sawada and Ragatz (2005) eliminated the mixed schools included by Jimenez and Sawada (2003), thus reducing the sample to 37 EDUCO schools and 96 traditional schools. In some models, the same controls as before were used. I discuss below those instances where the controls were different.

The results are interesting in that they are not what the authors expected. In terms of administrative processes, the only activity to occur more often at the school level in EDUCO schools concerns hiring and firing teachers (Sawada & Ragatz, 2005). Neither determining teacher salaries, giving teachers incentives, evaluating teachers, nor spending school money occurred more often at the school level in EDUCO than in traditional public schools. Not surprisingly, the results show that teachers’ association relations occurred more often in traditional rural public schools. This was the case because teachers hired by ACEs are non-union, and thus there was no teachers’ association activity to observe.

For teacher behavior, interpreting the results is like reading an Ouija board. There are models for 19 different dependent variables. Each dependent variable tells us something different about teacher behavior – for example, how many hours per week the instructor teaches, how many hours s/he meets with parents, or how often s/he is absent. Further complicating the picture is that each model is then run four
different ways – using (a) standard (that is, Ordinary Least Squares) regression with 42 independent variables, (b) the Heckman two-step procedure, (c) revised OLS regression with 32 independent variables, and (d) propensity score matching with 32 independent variables. The problem across these 76 different combinations is that there is tremendous variability in terms of what is significant. Those results that are significant under propensity score matching with 32 controls are then nonsignificant in the OLS regression with 42 controls, for example. Elsewhere, the Heckman models return significant coefficients, but, in these cases, the other models do not. In the end, none of the outcome variables are significant across all four forms of regression. Sawada and Ragatz (2005) still report, however, that “many key measures survived the bias tests, including meeting with the parents, teacher absence, and hours dedicated to teaching” (p. 295). Through this statement, they are claiming that EDUCO leads to more frequent meetings with parents, less teacher absenteeism, and more hours dedicated to teaching.

In addition to the above finding, the authors offer two additional conclusions based on their interpretation of the regression results. The first is as follows:

The results indicate that community participation seems to enhance the teacher effort level, possibly because of intensive monitoring of teacher behaviors and the implicit threat that exists because hiring and firing of teachers occurs at the community level (Sawada & Ragatz, 2005, p. 295). And, second: “Community participation not only uses relevant information that outside government agencies are not likely to have, but also imposes commitment on

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25 Propensity score matching could not be run using all 42 variables because the communities were too dissimilar, according to Sawada and Ragatz (2005).
teachers, which leads them to exert greater effort” (p. 295). I would suggest that these assertions are not borne out by the regression results, given the variability and inconsistency across models discussed above. It seems that the authors were either confident in the regression results or had a predilection to explain the results in terms of accountability relationships that resonate with the World Bank’s theory of community-level education management decentralization, or both.

The final question of this study pertained to student achievement. This time, the results look promising, for language scores. We are presented with the output for a handful of coefficients across four specifications. Three of the four models show significant effects of being in an EDUO school compared with being in a traditional rural public school. What the models do not show, however, are the authors’ controls, though the footnote to the table does note that child and household characteristics were taken into account. What the authors choose not to mention, however, is that many of the available – and relevant – controls were not applied. That is, Sawada (2000) and Jimenez and Sawada (1999) ran the same models with additional controls for teacher quality, classroom quality, and school quality, and under those circumstances they did not find an EDUO effect on student achievement. One wonders if Sawada and Ragatz (2005) purposefully specified their models to generate significant effects. There is no way to know for certain. Nevertheless, the fact that they chose not to use the available controls puts in question the conclusion they offer: That “EDUO program governance leads to better effort of teachers, which improves educational outcome” (Sawada & Ragatz, 2005, p. 299).
Many of the interpretations offered by Sawada and Ragatz (2005) raise concerns. Nevertheless, one conclusion suggested by the findings is that ACE parents, compared with parents on the school councils of traditional rural public schools, have and use the ability hire and fire teachers more. Given the provisions on which the EDUCO program has rested all along, this is to be expected. Other findings from this study are more controversial and uncertain, and seem to be intended to positively skew the perception of EDUCO.

In light of the critical review contained in this section, I suggest that we can interpret these five regression analysis studies as repeated attempts to find evidence that supports the beneficial effects of a particular version of decentralization. It was shown throughout this section that World Bank researchers frequently offered interpretations which were questionable (based on the limitations of their methods and data and the possible alternative explanations). In view of the reappraisal above, which is summarized in Table 3.2, below, vis-à-vis the program’s theorized benefits, I argue that not one of the studies reviewed definitively shows that the EDUCO program produced positive and significant results on the variables of most interest to the World Bank and the MINED. Based on these studies, we can conclude that community-level decentralization does not lead to improved student achievement, student attendance, student retention, or teacher absenteeism when the available controls are applied.

26 That they use this ability is noteworthy, though the question that current research leaves unanswered is what criteria the parents use when hiring and firing teachers.
Table 3.2: Re-appraisal of EDUCO’s Evidence Base vis-à-vis Theorized Program Benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefit</th>
<th>Logic</th>
<th>Evidence shows …</th>
<th>Comment*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Access</td>
<td>EDUCO is the best way to quickly increase access</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>EDUCO shown to facilitate rapid expansion of access, but no counterfactual exists (Cuéllar-Marchelli, 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Quality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Student learning</td>
<td>Increases from improved teacher effort</td>
<td>Factors limiting quality:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>**EDUCO teachers infrequently receive training, EDUCO directors have less experience and more responsibilities (Parandekar, 2002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High EDUCO teacher turnover (Reimers, 1997b)</td>
<td>Questionable claims provided by Jimenez &amp; Sawada (1999), Sawada (2000), Sawada &amp; Ragatz (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Teacher effort</td>
<td>Increases from community accountability, one-year contract</td>
<td>No difference in instructional time between EDUCO and non-EDUCO teachers (Reimers, 1997b)</td>
<td>Questionable evidence provided by Sawada (2000) and Sawada &amp; Ragatz (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Teacher attendance</td>
<td>Increases from community accountability, one-year contract</td>
<td>No difference between that of EDUCO and non-EDUCO teachers (Reimers, 1997b)</td>
<td>Questionable evidence provided by Sawada &amp; Ragatz (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Student attendance</td>
<td>Increases from community ownership of education</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Questionable claim provided by Jimenez &amp; Sawada (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Efficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Student retention</td>
<td>Increases from improved teacher and school quality</td>
<td>EDUCO schools exhibit higher student repetition (Parandekar, 2002)</td>
<td>Questionable evidence provided by Jimenez &amp; Sawada (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Social efficiency</td>
<td>Increases because parents’ preferences met through ACE</td>
<td>***ACE members felt that they had more influence in school decisions (Umanzor et al., 1997)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Technical efficiency</td>
<td>More efficient mix of school inputs because ACEs purchase supplies to meet their needs</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>No studies have attempted to examine this</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Cost</td>
<td>Savings from reduction in central bureaucracy and more efficient management by ACEs</td>
<td>EDUCO estimated to incur fewer costs (a) because teachers paid less (initially), (b) if schools are not provided with adequate materials, (c) if supervision is minimal, (d) if ACEs not compensated, and (e) if capital costs are not considered (Cuéllar-Marchelli, 2003; Sastry, Melamid, &amp; Ross, 1995; World Bank, 1994a)</td>
<td>Political commitment to the program existed prior to, and independently of, cost studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Equity</td>
<td>Increases system-wide as (a) education offered in rural areas and (b) as schools compete</td>
<td>EDUCO parents pay higher (unofficial) school fees (Cuéllar-Marchelli, 2003) EDUCO parents not compensated for ACE work (Cuéllar-Marchelli, 2003)</td>
<td>****Competition aspect abandoned in 1994; enrolment growth only through EDUCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Social cohesion</td>
<td>Increases through more frequent interaction among community and teachers</td>
<td>***ACE members visit school more often (Umanzor et al, 1997)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Community participation</td>
<td>Increases when community members work on ACE, when community votes on members of the ACE</td>
<td>Great variation in community participation, though communities have or can acquire capacity to implement EDUCO (Lindo, 1998) Community participation only by ACE members (Reimers, 1997b)</td>
<td>Questionable evidence provided by Sawada &amp; Ragatz (2005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Key:* MINED = Ministry of Education, WB = World Bank
Nevertheless, EDUCO did engender increased parental participation in schools through the ACEs. Participation was not pursued for intrinsic reasons, however; rather, it was seen as instrumental. For EDUCO proponents, to the extent that participation does not lead to the theorized outcomes, it is a less attractive policy option. By extension, alternative forms of participation are likewise not considered.

Based on the above critique, it would appear, that the concepts on which community-level education decentralization has been promoted are not necessarily supported by the World Bank’s research. Yet, the production of these studies during 1997-2005 served to maintain attention on the EDUCO program within and beyond the World Bank (Desmond, 2009; Gillies, 2010; Gershberg, Meade, & Andersson, 2009), and the sanguine interpretations served to reinforce and engender upbeat perceptions of the possibilities of community-level decentralization. Subsequently, the sanguine interpretations of the data offered by the authors of these studies have been repeated in academic and agency literature (an issue which is addressed in more detail later in this chapter) and have been used to suggest that community-level decentralization can produce a range of positive benefits. Furthermore, beyond the development literature on decentralization, it should be noted that these studies have an effect in that they are used to justify loans to countries around the world in support of community-level decentralization. Governmental ministries become more receptive in light of such an evidence base. Thus, in addition to influencing the
perceptions of development specialists, these studies can be leveraged to influence education system governance in practice.

3.3.2 World Bank EDUCO Studies – Group 2

In contrast to the studies discussed previously, two evaluations were performed by World Bank staff and consultants which have not received much attention (Lindo, 1998; Parandekar, 2002). The absence of such attention is evidenced, for example, by the fact that Google Scholar does not show any citations of these evaluations, in contrast to the group 1 studies, which have been cited repeatedly. As with before, I review these two studies in the order in which they were produced.

The first study in this group was performed by Lindo (1998) and it qualitative in nature. In this case, Lindo (1998) visited 36 communities (drawn randomly from the World Bank’s original 1996 sample of EDUCO schools) and conducted interviews with 86 teachers and 50 parents. The purpose of the investigation was to evaluate the relations of participation between the community and the schools. As such, the results present rich descriptions of this aspect of the EDUCO program. Lindo (1998) also derived a number of summary findings. These include the following: (a) There is enormous energy and capacity at the community level that allow them to take advantage of the EDUCO program; (b) when the community participates, it contributes materials and also leads to “civic health”; (c) the success of one ACE helps other ACEs because they support each other; (d) there is great variation is the extent to which communities participate in the EDUCO schools; and (e) it is possible to foment participation habits in communities where they do not exist.
(Lindo, 1998). Thus, these findings are clearly positive with regard to community participation in EDUCO schools – an issue which has been secondary among researchers who have tended to focus on student achievement.

Despite this, and despite the fact that it is the only piece to take an in-depth qualitative look at EDUCO, this piece does not seem to have had an enduring impact on the development literature, or on the promotion of the EDUCO program in particular. It is not cited elsewhere and has not been presented at international conferences featuring EDUCO. I suggest that this may be the result of a combination of a number of factors: first, its qualitative nature does not tend resonate as well in research and policy circles where researchers and policymakers prefer quantitative evaluations. Second, the report was published exclusively in Spanish, thus restricting its accessibility to non-Spanish speakers. Third, despite being commissioned by the World Bank, representatives in this institution chose not to include the report in its well-known working paper series. Fourth, timing matters. That is, when the report was produced, other studies had already emerged which were econometric in nature and which were more accessible (i.e., English-language) (Umanzor et al., 1997; Jimenez & Sawada, 1999).

The second study in group 2– and the final one discussed here that was produced by the World Bank – came out in 2002. This study, by Parandekar (2002), compared 54 EDUCO schools and 127 traditional rural schools from the original 1996 sample using means tests to discover differences related to select inputs and outcomes. Overall, the difference between this study and the others does not have to do with findings on dimensions such as school infrastructure, didactic materials and
student achievement outcomes, for the findings of Parankekar (2002) in that regard mirror those of previous studies. Rather, the difference is that this piece highlights a number of issues upon which other World Bank authors did not touch, and it offers critical commentary on them. Namely, those issues relate to school director characteristics, teacher training, and internal efficiency.

I begin with school director characteristics. To summarize, Parandekar (2002) found that EDUCO school directors were younger (31.4 years vs. 40 years), have fewer years of experience (3.3 years vs. 8.2 years), and more frequently teach a class in addition to fulfilling director duties (100% vs. 71%). This final characteristic is to be expected since the teacher who is designated as the director of an EDUCO school is always one of the teachers who has been tasked with additional administrative responsibilities.

Parandekar (2002) also brings attention to the “generally low levels of [teacher] training” (p. 172). When asked to list the areas in which they had received professional training in the previous year, EDUCO teachers mentioned training in teaching values (20 percent), school-community relationship (6 percent), and school nutrition (33 percent). In light of these responses, Parandekar (2002) comments: “With clear deficiencies in the professional development programme, it is perhaps not surprising to observe that EDUCO teachers are not doing better when it comes to ‘active’ teaching practices” (p. 173). He continues, and speaks to the limitations that the community faces to address training shortcomings:

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27 With regard to teachers in traditional rural schools, it was found that 23, 14, and 35 percent mentioned received training in these areas, respectively (Parandekar, 2002, p. 173).
EDUCO teachers know for a fact that they are accountable to the local community for their performance in the job and, at the same time, they are saddled with the realization that the same community is powerless to provide access to the training that they need in order to provide a good performance. (p. 173)

Following this statement, he concludes his commentary on professional development by arguing for an increased sensitivity to the needs and desires of teachers: “If the decentralized model of service delivery is to lead to improvement in the quality of education, a greater effort should be made to include the needs and aspirations of teachers in the delivery of the educational programme” (p. 174). Each of these comments is critical, and their sentiment is uncommon for a World Bank publication. Yet they underline issues to which we arguably should be more attentive when designing and implement community-level decentralization.

To continue, internal efficiency is an outcome examined by Parandekar (2002). The other studies by the World Bank using the 1996 dataset did not single out this variable. The results are not positive in favor of the EDUCO program. Indeed, compared with traditional rural public schools, EDUCO schools demonstrated higher rates of student repetition (10.91% vs. 4.91%). Relatedly, and in contrast to the theory of community-level decentralization, teachers were absent more frequently (5.3 days/year vs. 3.2 days/year).

To be certain, Parandekar (2002) put forth commentary which did not align with what had been the rhetoric of the World Bank and which was comparatively critical. He did this, for example, by calling for increased attention to teachers’ needs
and by elaborating on some of EDUCO’s shortcomings. In addition, Parandekar’s (2002) study relied on simple means tests, whereas Jimenez and Sawada (1999) had already employed more advanced econometric techniques to evaluate EDUCO, and they offered more encouraging conclusions. One’s findings will not be promoted within an institution if they are discordant with its mission or priorities, particularly one such as the World Bank, where discordant findings are often prevented from surfacing, let alone ignored once they are in print (Broad, 2006). Institutional research is at a further disadvantage if it is seen as methodologically inferior in comparison with alternative research that the institution can put forward to advance its agenda. The chance that research garners attention is slim if it does not have initial institutional support.

3.3.3 Non-World Bank EDUCO Studies

The final two studies in the literature on the EDUCO program were not produced by the World Bank. They bring different approaches to the assessment of this program’s effects and operation in practice, and, unlike the majority of World Bank evaluations, their findings are consistently less sanguine. First I examine Reimers (1997b), followed by Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003).

As opposed to zeroing in on a particular outcome variable, the study by Reimers (1997b) is an exploration of how EDUCO functioned in practice. His findings are based both on personal observations28 and a survey in 1993 of 122

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The number of EDUCO schools was reduced in the course of research because the schools were closed on the day that the researchers arrived. They were replaced with traditional rural schools because the protocol directed the researchers to use the next closest school available to the EDUCO school selected for the sample. In the end, 21 of sample schools were EDUCO (Reimers, 1997b).
High teacher turnover and limited community participation may contravene education quality and may jeopardize assumed accountability relationships.

In addition to these general findings, the survey administered to the sample schools revealed a lack of significant differences along specific outcomes. Between EDUCO schools and traditional schools, there were significant differences for neither teacher absences, school closings, instructional time, nor supervisor visits (Reimers, 1997b). Interestingly, these findings run counter to the theory that improved teacher effort results from the theorized accountability relationships that accompany community-level education decentralization. While we should be cognizant that Reimers’s (1997b) findings are based on data collected during the second year of the program’s implementation, we should also remember that later studies, upon critical review, did not necessarily produce more definitive or positive findings.

Ultimately, Reimers (1997b) arrives at a somber conclusion. He writes, “In sum, while students in EDUCO schools perform at levels comparable to those of students in other schools, there is no indication that this innovation has substantially increased school quality, internal efficiency, or even community participation” (p. 159). Not surprisingly, these findings have not been well received either within El Salvador or by those who would promote EDUCO. This is clear in various ways. First, as Reimers (1997a) shares, the MINED leadership in El Salvador was not receptive to his findings. In one of his pieces, he writes:

30 Beginning in 1996, schools had to choose one or the other modality, with the end point being a school with either an ACE or CDE (Merino, Ycardo, & Jacir de Lovo, 1999)
The author’s experience in trying to share the results, which suggested that there were problems which needed attention with the EDUCO programme, with key decision-makers in the programme, is that it was very difficult to discuss these in a frank manner. Those committed to the program very quickly became defensive and found multiple reasons to deny the validity of the findings of our survey. (Reimers, 1997a, p. 167)

Importantly, by this time, MINED leadership had committed to the program politically, as Reimers (1997a) notes. Subsequently, they had an aversion to unflattering evidence in terms of the program’s operation and outcomes.

World Bank staff have exhibited similar tendencies. Reimer’s (1997b) work has primarily been used by the World Bank, and in ways that did not engage with the findings of his which I mention above. The first example is Coudouel (2006). In a book on the distributional impact of public sector reform, Reimers (1997b) is cited to support a statement that, I would argue, does not speak to the content of his research. Coudouel (2006) writes, “An evaluation of El Salvador’s experience with community-managed schools suggests that the poorest children can obtain education results equivalent to those obtained by their richer counterparts only if their parents are prepared to work hard (Reimers, 1997b)” (p. 271). Reimers (1997b) did not make such claims, particularly not with regard to equivalent outcomes being dependent upon parents being prepared to work hard. The second example is the WDR 2004 (World Bank, 2003). Reimers (1997b) is cited here, but his findings are not discussed. World Bank (2003) instead draws on Reimer’s (1997b) comments on the
The final study I review is Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003). This piece is the result of a dissertation completed at Teachers’ College, Columbia University. The author assesses many different aspects of the EDUCO program in practice. In order to do this, Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003) conducted interviews with MINED officials, reviewed MINED literature and documents on the EDUCO program, and appraised the evidence available through research articles and evaluation reports.

The evidence on four dimensions was considered critically. These dimensions were: Access, equity, productive efficiency, and social cohesion. In reviewing the evidence on access, Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003) carefully notes the rapid expansion of the EDUCO program. However, unlike some proponents of EDUCO, she notes that increased access to education is not necessarily an outcome of the EDUCO program itself; rather, it is a by-product of the government’s decision to pursue an educational intervention that would necessarily increase coverage. The real question is not whether the implementation of EDUCO was accompanied by an increase in student enrollment, but rather whether the same outcome would have been attained if the government had pursued an expansion of traditional public schools, or some other strategy, in the post-war context. In the absence of a counterfactual, an assertion in favor of the EDUCO program over traditional public schools as regards access cannot be made.

Equity is the next dimension. Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003) not only finds that fees are charged to parents, but, on average EDUCO parents paid more than parents in
traditional public schools. She also draws attention to the fact that EDUCO parents on ACEs donated labor equivalent to 805 staff working full-time per year. In her words, this “represents about 28 percent of the work done by all MINED’s administrative and support staff assisting all public schools” (Cuéllar-Marchelli, 2003, p. 159).

The third dimension is productive efficiency. This is defined as output per unit cost. Per Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003), “in spite of its importance, this question [(of productive efficiency)] has no definite answer so far, for evaluations on the EDUCO program have mainly examined its effectiveness in improving education regardless of its actual costs” (p. 160). Moreover, with regard to education quality, she concludes that, “it is still unclear to what extent EDUCO has a comparative advantage over traditional public schools” (p. 160). It should be noted that Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003) arrives at this conclusion after reviewing the same studies that I have reviewed here (i.e., Jimenez & Sawada, 1999; Sawada, 2000; Umanzor et al., 1997).

Last is the social cohesion dimension. Here, Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003) echoes Lindo (1998) when she finds that social cohesion is achieved through community participation, which “varies across communities” (Cuéllar-Marchelli, 2003, p. 162). Likewise, Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003) reinforces Reimers (1997b) when she observes the following: “While EDUCO purports greater social cohesion, its success depends greatly on the existing social cohesion capacity” (Cuéllar-Marchelli, 2003, p. 162). The implication is that the EDUCO program has tended to rely on the pre-existing capacity of and connections among community members, as opposed to facilitating the strengthening of these things.
In comparison with the ‘group 1’ studies, both the ‘group 2’ studies and the non-World Bank studies arrived at less than positive conclusions in terms of a wide range of programmatic aspects. Not surprisingly, in the context of excitement that characterized development thinking the 1990s and into the 2000s with regard to decentralization, the findings of these latter two groups of studies were not elevated. To the contrary the international promotion of the EDUCO program echoed the tone and findings communicated in the ‘group 1’ studies. The next section explains this in more detail.

3.4 The Global Promotion of EDUCO

Alongside the numerous evaluations of the EDUCO program which emerged during 1996-2006, a parallel and, to be sure, not entirely unrelated process occurred wherein the EDUCO program was promoted, both directly and indirectly. This process occurred on three levels. First, within El Salvador, the numerous studies being carried out by the World Bank served to maintain the focus of the MINED on EDUCO, as Gillies (2010) noted. Secondly, within the World Bank, those same research studies began to draw the attention of staff working outside of Central America. Gershberg, Meade, and Andersson (2009) take note of this. Based on personal observation, they write “Jimenez and Sawada (1999) was influential in convincing World Bank staff that EDUCO was a successful model” (p. 198).31 Finally, internationally, Desmond (2009) observes that “information on EDUCO and

31 Alec Gershberg served as a senior education economist for the World Bank during the late 1990s.
its outcomes has been disseminated to nations throughout Latin America and Africa” (p. 18).

The international dissemination to which Desmond (2009) refers occurred in many ways. That is, it resulted from the interest and promotion of a range of actors – actors operating on a global scale. Consider the numerous examples below, in Box 3.1, from 1996-2006, which provide some idea of the sustained attention which EDUCO was given. Keep in mind that these events are in addition to those publications of the World Bank which highlighted the desirability of community-level decentralization generally, such as the 1999 Education Sector Strategy (World Bank, 1999b). Recall that chapter two of this dissertation detailed the intense focus of the World Bank on decentralization beginning in the early 1980s.

Based on the events in Box 3.1, one observation is that the World Bank and the IDB – both institutions which financed EDUCO in the 1990s – not only featured EDUCO frequently, but did so in ways that were promotional. A second observation is that EDUCO has not only been globally promoted, but also has, from the perspective of international development institutions, it has become a policy worthy of global reproduction. In these processes, national-level actors can and do play vital roles.

This is an important point, for national-level ministerial actors participated in seven of the twenty events listed above (see, e.g., Meza, 1997; Merino, Ycardo, & Jacir de Lovo, 1999; Meza, 2001; Jacir de Lovo, 2000; Najarro, 2003; Meza, Guzmán, & de Varela, 2004a, b). In each of those seven events, national actors were either invited or recruited by international organizations, [continued after table]
Box 3.1: The Global Promotion of EDUCO, 1996-2006

- 1996 – A UNESCO Bulletin on meeting the EFA goals in Latin America mentions the EDUCO program as an example of decision-making power being transferred to the local level (UNESCO, 1996).

- 1997 – A regional seminar for Central America is financed by the World Bank to disseminate the lessons of EDUCO (Meza, 1997).

- 1997 – EDUCO wins the President’s Award for Excellence from the World Bank (Eriksson, Kreimer, & Arnold, 2000).

- 1997 – EDUCO is labeled a flagship program by the World Bank (Eriksson, Kreimer, & Arnold, 2000).


- 1998 – The Revista Latinoamericana de Innovaciones Educativas features the findings on EDUCO of the special mission of the IDB to El Salvador (Merino, Ycardo, & Jacir de Lovo, 1999).

- 1999 – EDUCO is identified in a regional UNESCO Bulletin as a strategy for providing quality education to underprivileged and/or excluded youth (Rivero, 1999).


- 2000 – The World Bank commissions the creation of teaching materials on the EDUCO program. Edge (2000) creates a “resource-kit” on EDUCO.

- 2000 – In the IDB’s Primary and Secondary Education Strategy, EDUCO is mentioned as an exemplar of reform based in local management and accountability. It is claimed that “research has shown that school attendance and student achievement improved significantly as a result of these reforms” (IDB, 2000, p. 19). IDB (2000) additionally asserts that “community monitoring can also help to reduce absenteeism by putting community pressure on offending teachers” and that “El Salvador’s EDUCO program has been particularly effective in these approaches” (p. 19).

- 2000 – In a book published by IDB, a former Minister of Education from El Salvador contributes a chapter on the benefits of community participation (Jacir de Lovo, 2000).32

32 The same minister of education would later also contribute a chapter on EDUCO in a book published by a Salvadoran think tank (Jacir de Lovo, 2003).
• 2001 – At an international workshop in Lima, Peru, co-financed by the World Bank and titled the “International Workshop on Participation and Empowerment for Inclusive Development,” the case of EDUCO is highlighted by the World Bank (Meza, 2001).


• 2001 – A conservative education think tank – the Partnership for Education Revitalization in the Americas (PREAL) – led by the former Minister of Education from El Salvador focuses on the potential of EDUCO to address issues of educational coverage (PREAL, 2001).

• 2003 – At an international workshop sponsored by the Organization of American States (OAS) to promote knowledge sharing among countries, a Salvadoran MINED representative presents on EDUCO (Najarro, 2003).

• 2004 – The World Bank features the gains of the EDUCO program in its En Breve publication (Meza, Guzmán, & de Varela, 2004b).

• 2004 – World Bank consultants from El Salvador present on the successes of the EDUCO program at a conference in Shanghai, China themed “Reducing Poverty on a Global Scale: Learning and Innovating for Development” (Meza, Guzmán, & de Varela, 2004a). A book is produced by the World Bank based on this conference, in which EDUCO’s virtues are again noted (Moreno-Dodson, 2005).

• 2004 – In its flagship publication, the World Development Report, the World Bank spotlights EDUCO as the prime example of public service decentralization in education along lines of accountability and for reasons of efficiency and effectiveness (World Bank, 2003). Per the Bank’s own admission (World Bank, 2011b), this report has been tremendously impactful, both within and beyond the Bank. Within the Bank, its regional strategies and programmatic activities at the country level were realigned in terms of WDR 2004’s accountability framework. Externally, the World Bank has seen the influence of WDR 2004 on DFID’s work.

• 2005 – In a book produced by the World Bank on revising service delivery, EDUCO is singled out as a reform that engendered access, efficiency, and equity (Fiszbein, 2005).

• 2006 – The publication En Breve of the World Bank again covers the EDUCO program, this time to speak to issues of access and quality (World Bank, 2006).

• 2006 – The World Bank suggests to China at a conference in Peking on successful development interventions that it base its approach to rural education on the EDUCO model (Ramírez, 2006).

but primarily the World Bank, to share the experience of EDUCO. In concrete terms, the World Bank recruited Meza (1997) to present at a Central America regional
seminar; Meza (2001) to present at a conference in Peru; Meza, Guzmán and de Varela (2004a) to present in China; and Meza, Guzmán and de Varela (2004b) to publish their experiences in the Bank’s *En Breve* journal. Of note is that these outlets (i.e., conferences and journals) are the Bank’s own, as well. That is to say, with regard to the use of Salvadoran MINED actors, the World Bank either relied on existing outlets (i.e., *En Breve*) or created new ones (i.e., the conferences in Central America, Peru, and China) to promote its preferred policy options – such as EDUCO. As other studies have found (Steiner-Khamsi, 2006; Steiner-Khamsi, Silova, & Johnson, 2006), the World Bank extended staff positions to these national level EDUCO proponents. Indeed, in the late 1990s and beyond, the World Bank leveraged at the global level the experience of Salvadoran advocates of EDUCO by lending them its institutional clout.

The IDB acted similarly, though much less intensively, in its use of national-level actors. As noted above, it featured research by Salvadoran EDUCO experts in Colombia in 1998 at the meeting of the board of governors (IDB, 1998) and included a chapter by a former Minister of Education in a book it produced (Jacir de Lovo, 2000). The OAS, on the other hand, simply invited one Salvadoran representative to disseminate El Salvador’s experience with EDUCO at a knowledge sharing conference for MINED staff from Latin America and the Caribbean (Najarro, 2003).

As an additional point, in interpreting the list elaborated above, it should be noted that the events included are restricted to those which appear in a review of the literature, and do not include, for example, the numerous study tours financed by the World Bank for MINED staff of various countries in Latin America and Africa to
learn from the EDUCO program first hand. Neither does the list above include the many trips financed by the World Bank for Salvadoran MINED staff to travel to other countries to share insights into how the EDUCO program worked. Given the tidal wave of positive press about the EDUCO program during this time period, it is easy to see how less rosy studies by Cuéllar-Marchelli (2003), Parandekar (2002), and Reimers (1997b) were drowned out. Additionally, given the trends of the 1980s-1990s, the overall context of excitement and promotion, the highly-visible and positive studies by renowned World Bank researchers, the widespread involvement of the World Bank at the country level, and the desire of MINED officials to pursue reforms perceived as effective and potentially cost-saving, it should come as no surprise that the EDUCO model spread to other countries. Guatemala, Honduras, Nepal, and Uganda are but a few examples (Desmond, 2009). Of course, even where not directly (or officially) emulated, the EDUCO program has helped to extend and reinforce the notion that community-level decentralization was desirable.

Interestingly, the events listed above not only demonstrate that the World Bank and IDB shed light on the EDUCO more frequently and intensively, but also that each organization tended to elevate the EDUCO program for reasons that aligned with its interests. On the one hand, the World Bank and IDB consistently underscored EDUCO’s presumed ability to lead to enhanced efficiency, accountability and effectiveness, while UNESCO, on the other hand, repeatedly saw in EDUCO a way to extend education services to marginalized populations, to meet the EFA goals, and to promote community participation for reasons other than efficiency or effectiveness. Thus, from its beginnings, EDUCO drew the attention of
a range of international institutional actors. Over time, these same actors continued to highlight distinct aspects of the EDUCO experience. Attention to EDUCO has persisted in the most recent period, albeit in a different way.

3.5 EDUCO in Global Literature

A review of the global development literature shows that the EDUCO program has continued to have an impact since 2006, even if it is no-longer actively held up as an exemplar of education reforms by international institutions. At this point, the review indicates that the impact of EDUCO persists because of the evidence base produced by the World Bank during 1997-2005. That is, the quantitative studies reviewed above which were favorable to EDUCO (i.e., the “group 1” studies) have become artifacts in the landscape where development professionals work. These studies still serve to bolster arguments for education reforms related to notions of accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, and participation. As such, they continue to be cited and reviewed by scholars writing on community-level decentralization in developing countries (see, e.g., Di Gropello & Marshall, 2011).

The same is true of international institutions. Put differently, the group 1 EDUCO studies have filtered into the global literature produced by international institutions – including, but not limited to, the World Bank. In Box 3.2, below, I provide examples of how the evidence base created by the World Bank has been used by this and other international institutions in the most recent period.
Box 3.2: Examples of EDUCO in Global Literature

- 2005 – A United Nations Task Force on Education and Gender Equality identified EDUCO as “probably the most celebrated case of successful parental control,” as well as a key strategy for improving primary school effectiveness (Birdsall, Levine, & Ibrahim, 2005, p. 67).

- 2006 – The evidence base for EDUCO is drawn upon in a World Bank report which elevates and compares educational decentralization in four Central American countries, suggesting them as good examples of teacher accountability (Di Gropello, 2006; see also Di Gropello 2005).


- 2007 – A report prepared for UNICEF suggests that the EDUCO experience can provide lessons for decentralization in emergency/post-conflict settings in Africa (Beleli et al., 2007).

- 2007 – In a UNESCO (2007) report on how decentralization can help to ensure the provision of education as a human right, the EDUCO program is featured.

- 2007 – An article on decentralization in three Central American countries by World Bank researchers reviews the group 1 studies and signals that such reforms lead to improvements in student learning and teacher accountability (Umansky & Vegas, 2007).

- 2008 – A report by the Brookings Center on improving development effectiveness spotlights EDUCO as “an example of how a small innovation can be scaled up to a national level and have a significant impact on national education systems” (Hartman & Linn, 2008, p. 47).

- 2009 – The Global Partnership for Education (2009) focused on EDUCO as a “way to ensure that the community contributes to improved educational outcomes” (p. 96).

- 2009 – A World Bank review of experience with decentralization (or, in this case, “school-based management”) underscored the EDUCO program and rehearsed by the benefits claimed by group 1 studies (Barrera-Ósorio, Fasih, Patrinos, & Santibañez, 2009).

- 2011 – In a review of evidence on accountability mechanisms in education, the World Bank again focuses on the EDUCO program as one of the “stronger” examples (Bruns, Filmer, & Patrinos, 2011).
• 2011 – The Global Monitoring Report on armed conflict and education suggests that EDUCO provides a good example of a course of action when governments fail to provide educational services (UNESCO, 2011).

• 2012 – A website for exemplary educational innovations in Latin American and the Caribbean features the EDUCO program (UNESCO, n.d.).

Noticeably, the evidence in Box 3.2, is less promotive in nature than the events presented in the previous section. Not now the center of attention on its own, EDUCO comes into play through reviews of decentralization experiences as well as through the suggestions of a range global actors.

Institutionally, a few observations stand out. First, the IDB has clearly reduced its focus on EDUCO. This institution does not even register as promoting or making use of the EDUCO program.33 A similar finding is true of the World Bank. There are no-longer events that isolate and elevate the EDUCO program, though Bank staff still tend to make use of the evidence base produced by colleagues during the height of attention to EDUCO. For example, as they review and write on the findings related to decentralization in practice they draw on EDUCO studies, despite their limitations, and in so doing signal what is, from their perspective, the enduringly positive and strong example of EDUCO (see, e.g., Di Gropello, 2006, 2007; Barrera-Osorio, Fasih, Patrinos, & Santibañez, 2009; Bruns, Filmer, & Patrinos, 2011; Umansky & Vegas, 2007).

Yet, there is some evidence that the sentiment within the Bank toward EDUCO’s evidence base is shifting. One example is a relatively more recent

33 For more on IDB and its involvement in Central America since 1990, see Large (2005).
publication on school-based management by the World Bank’s Human Development Network (World Bank, 2008). Here, the authors stated that “it is very likely” (World Bank, 2008, p. 11) that the measure used by Jimenez and Sawada (1999, 2003) to correct for sample selection bias was invalid – the implication being that their coefficients are unreliable. Incidentally, this coincides with feelings among Bank staff that they have better studies now on which to draw to support community-level decentralization, school-based management and accountability-centered reforms (World Bank, 2008).

As with the World Bank, so too do other institutions continue to draw on the “group 1” EDUCO studies reviewed in an earlier section. This is evident from the above list, which demonstrates that institutions as diverse as the Brookings Center, the Global Partnership for Education, and UNESCO continue to find EDUCO relevant. In assessing the reports by these institutions, it becomes clear that the legacy of the EDUCO program is the various benefits claimed by the group 1 studies reviewed in this chapter. Given the wide range of claims made by these studies, the above mentioned institutions have pointed to EDUCO as a program with lessons relevant not only to instituting community involvement (Global Partnership for Education, 2009), but also to extending system coverage rapidly (UNESCO, n.d.), achieving educational and gender equality (Birdsall, Levine, & Ibrahim, 2005), providing education in post-conflict contexts (Beleli et al., 2007; UNESCO, 2011), and ensuring the provision of education as a human right (UNESCO, 2007). In these ways, we see how evidence base created by the World Bank continues to echo
throughout the development landscape, albeit in a less intense form than it did previously.

Of course, the reduced prominence of EDUCO has not come about in a vacuum. Globally, the focus of development institutions and development practitioners has shifted to include other neo-liberal reform concepts as they become popular, such as public-private partnerships (Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio, & Guáqueta, 2009), merit-based pay for teachers (Woessman, 2011), and conditional cash transfers (Tarabini, 2008). Vouchers remain a perennial policy priority as well (Berends, Springer, Ballou, & Wallberg, 2009). In addition, as noted in chapter 2, the World Bank has in recent years begun to de-emphasize decentralization through/to parent councils in favor of decentralization through “school-based management” (Barrera Osorio, Fasih, Patrinos, & Santibáñez, 2009). This term is broader in that school councils can include teachers and principals in addition to parents. Finally, at the national level, the EDUCO program fell out of favor politically once a president from the left-wing FMLN party was elected in 2009, after twenty years of rule by right-wing, ARENA governments which were sympathetic to neoliberal reforms.

Thus, while the list above demonstrates that the EDUCO experiment lives on via the studies produced by the World Bank during the program’s heyday, the longevity of this experiment is itself subject to development trends. The World Bank has taken up the mantle of other reform concepts, while also shifting slightly the theory and practice of decentralization towards school-based management. Likewise, the MINED in El Salvador now responds to the political climate there, one that does not favor EDUCO. The international and national levels seem to align (or not) based
on constellations of political and institutional factors across each of these levels. One might hypothesize that, in order for a given reform experiment to become global, the political dispositions at the national level must align (voluntarily or otherwise) with the institutional preferences of involved international organizations. In addition, international institutions – or possibly transnational civil society networks – can facilitate the emergence of global education policies to the extent that they are able to generate and disseminate reputable knowledge, engage policy entrepreneurs, and activate inter-institutional networks (Verger, 2012).

3.6 EDUCO – Looking Forward and Backward

Looking forward, it seems likely that the EDUCO program will gradually fade from prominence. In other words, it seems that the EDUCO program, after being disseminated and promoted intensely from the mid 1990s to the mid 2000s by international institutions, is now in the twilight of its career. Steiner-Khamsi (2010) refers to this as the burnout phase of policy diffusion.

This supposition is reinforced by the fact that the World Bank does not focus on community-level decentralization in its current Education 2020 strategy paper, though it is still preoccupied with the notion of accountability (World Bank, 2011a). The difference, as Edwards (2012b) has noted, is that the World Bank is now interested to scale up accountability mechanisms to the national level using standardized testing, as opposed to implementing accountability mechanisms at the community level using school councils. The perception that EDUCO is moving out of the spotlight is bolstered by the observation that the studies by Jimenez and Sawada (1999, 2003) and Sawada and Ragatz (2005) were removed from the World
Bank 2020 Education Strategy. This occurred sometime between the elaboration of the draft strategy and the final production and approval of the World Bank’s new strategy document.34

In retrospect, one thing this review has not been able to fully unpack and clarify is the origin of the EDUCO program and its solidification as an official MINED policy in El Salvador. In other words, while this chapter has reviewed the implementation of the EDUCO program, its evidence base in the literature, the way in which it has been promoted transnationally, and its recent status as a feature of the development landscape, what remains unclear is how the program began, not to mention the policy process through which it entered the Ten Year Plan for education reform in 1995. Answering these questions requires a focus on the dynamics between international actors and national actors in the context of El Salvador. That task also requires one first to explain the theoretical perspective in which such an analysis is grounded. The next chapter thus turns in that direction.

34 As of November 28, 2012, the draft of the Education Strategy 2020 document was still available online here: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/ESSU/Education_Sector_Strategy_draft_for_comment.pdf
Chapter 4: Theoretical Perspective, Conceptual Space, Analytic Framework

In recent decades, various perspectives on how education policymaking is transnationally influenced have gained currency. In this dissertation, I draw on what might be called a critical international political economic theoretical perspective in my analysis of IPEPF (international processes of education policy formation). In this chapter, in addition to explaining this theoretical perspective, I also wish to more fully clarify the specific conceptual space under investigation. As indicated in the introductory chapter, that conceptual space is labeled IPEPF. To define the boundaries, contours, and dynamics of that space is essential because research methods must follow from the nature of the phenomena being investigated and the question one wishes to answer. The clarification I offer here will facilitate both more accurate conceptual discussion and more precise operationalization of research methods in the remainder of this dissertation. Additionally, specifying what is meant by IPEPF will reduce the conceptual ambiguity that can characterize investigations of how transnational forces influence education policymaking at the national level in developing countries.

The final issue on which I elaborate in this chapter concerns the particular forms of influence to which I will be attentive in my analysis. These forms of influence are derived from the work of Dale (1999b) and Samoff (2009) and relate to “external effects” of globalization and to “pathways of influence” of foreign aid. In that the central question of this dissertation is how transnational forces have impacted
education policy formation in El Salvador, the forms of influence distilled by Dale (1999b) and Samoff (2009) constitute a useful analytic framework when brought together, as will be shown. This framework is particularly applicable to the present research not only because the authors on which it draws are grounded in an international political economic perspective but also because it is, as we will see, relevant to the conceptual space represented by IPEPF. There is thus alignment among the theoretical perspective, conceptual space, and analytic framework employed in this dissertation.

The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I briefly set out two premises from which my theoretical orientation departs. Second, I characterize the literature on policy borrowing, in relation to which the present dissertation can and should be understood. Third, I discuss in more detail the tenets of my particular theoretical framework. Fourth, I not only define IPEPF but also distinguish it from associated concepts. Fifth and finally, I detail the analytic concepts I will operationalize in order to examine how transnational influence manifested in the formation of EDUCO as an official education policy in El Salvador.

4.1 Theoretical Premises

Theoretically, in this dissertation, I depart from two premises. The first is that education policymaking occurs in the context of neoliberal capitalist globalization (Carnoy & Rhoten, 2002; Dale, 1999a; Daun, 2002; Stromquist, 2002; Stromquist & Monkman, 2000; Verger, Novelli, & Altinyelken, 2012). The second, related premise is that global politics matter for how those policies are made (Steiner-Khamsi, 2004). These two premises are connected, for as Robertson, Bonal, and Dale (2002) have
written, “globalization is the outcome of processes that involve real actors – economic and political – with real interests” (p. 472).

4.2 Policy Borrowing

The issue of globalization and its implications for education are taken seriously in the field of comparative and international education (Dale, 1999a; Verger, Novelli, & Kosar-Altinyelken, 2012). One particularly prominent strand of research to do so relates to the concept of policy borrowing (Phillips & Ochs, 2004; Schriewer, 2000; Steiner-Khamsi, 2004, 2006; Steiner-Khamsi & Waldow, 2012). Increasingly, despite the use of the term borrowing, much research in this area is concerned with political and economic factors that contribute to the ways in which educational policies travel from one country to another (Steiner-Khamsi, 2006, 2010; Steiner-Khamsi & Waldow, 2012). This relatively recent focus is in contrast to the historical focus on trans-atlantic and trans-pacific flows of ideas, which tended to focus on political issues alone (Steiner-Khamsi, 2012).

Along with this increasing focus on political as well as economic factors, scholars have issued challenges to those of us who would attempt pursue research in this vein. Rappleye (2010), for example, has suggested that the research on policy borrowing has tended to lack a temporal dimension. He also suggested that more attention be paid to issues of policy transfer during periods of political transition (Rappleye, 2010). Separately, Steiner-Khamsi (2012) continues the tradition in the field of comparative and international education of urging scholars to draw on concepts and frames from other disciplines, such as political science and sociology, in order to ensure that our theoretical and empirical focus goes beyond the education
sector alone. Lastly, Steiner-Khamsi (2012) recently encouraged policy transfer studies which endeavor to understand “local policy contexts against the backdrop of larger transnational or global developments” (p. 4). By engaging with these suggestions, we are likely to produce more nuanced, accurate, and comprehensive explanations of the nature and meaning of policy transfer.

Broadly speaking, I attempt to respond to these challenges in this dissertation. This is evident in that I ground my study in the concept of IPEPF (which draws our attention to how the process of policymaking occurs over time). Moreover, and as will be demonstrated in chapter seven, I respond to Rappleye’s (2010) suggestions in that my findings focus squarely on the movement and development of policy ideas as El Salvador transitioned between presidential administrations in the late 1980s. As will be shown in what follows, I also respond to both of Steiner-Khamsi’s (2012) points. I begin to do so by grounding my study not in an analysis of education politics narrowly but rather by grounding my study in a theoretical tradition that will facilitate an analysis of the politics and economics of education policy development more broadly (Dale, 2005).

As a final point on policy borrowing, while I do not study policy transfer between countries directly, the present study can be seen as making a contribution to this research area. This is because I unpack the development of a policy that subsequently was the focus of much policy borrowing and lending. My research thus takes a step back and endeavors to investigate the stage prior to the point at which a policy begins to be transferred beyond a particular nation state.
4.3 A Critical International Political Economic Perspective on Education Reform

The theoretical framework that I employ relates to work by authors who attempt to understand the making of education policy by situating their analysis in relation to the multi- (i.e., international, national, and/or local) and cross-level spaces and interactions where policy is made and through which education policy is impacted (e.g., Carney, 2008; Dale, 2005; Ginsburg, Cooper; Raghu, & Zegarra, 1990; Roberston, 2011; Verger, Novelli, & Atltinyelken, 2012). In departing from the work of such authors, the theoretical foundations of this dissertation are based on a broad yet related group of scholars whose work, collectively, could be labeled critical international political economy (CIPE)\(^\text{35}\) (Berman, 1992; Campbell, 1998; Cerny, 1997; Cox, 2002; Dale, 2000; Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu, & Zegarra, 1990; Harvey, 2005; Jessop, 2001; Jones, 2006, 2007a,b; Klein, 2007; King, 2007; Moutsios, 2009, 2010; Mundy, 1998; Mundy & Ghali, 2009; Robinson, 2006; Samoff, 1993, 2007; Thompson, 1977).\(^\text{36}\)

The CIPE perspective is particularly appropriate for my purposes because I am interested to analyze the various manifestations of power in explaining the interaction of a range of forces and actors on and across multiple levels (e.g., international, national, local) as they impact processes of education policymaking in El Salvador. In addition, CIPE is appropriate because I understand those actors, their actions, and the processes, events, and contexts in which they engage to be simultaneously shaped and constituted by the following: Historical-structural

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\(^{35}\) The term critical international political economy is drawn from Germain (2007).

\(^{36}\) Alternatively, the theoretical perspective elaborated in this section could be understood as a critical perspective on global governance (Karns & Mingst, 2010).
conditions; multi-level politics and the involvement of a range of inter-related political-institutional (international, national, and local) actors; the institutional nature of international organizations; strategic-relational interaction; and ideational factors. I briefly comment below on what is meant by each of these five theoretical tenets. While each tenet can be distinguished from the others, they are, of course, not entirely separable. In other words, these tenets are linked; changing an assumption about one would necessarily affect how we understand the others.

4.3.1 Historical-Structural Conditions

To begin, while Cox (2002) reminds us that historical structures are “those conditions not of their own choosing within which people make history” (p. 80), Torres (1989) gives more clarity with regard to what the application of the historical-structural approach means in practice. As he writes, the historical-structural approach is one in which individuals have choices, though “they are prescribed or constrained by historical circumstances, conjunctural processes, and the diverse expressions of power and authority (at the micro and macro level) through concrete rules of policy formation” (Torres, 1989, p. 83). We can further distinguish among structural determinants and conjunctural ones. According to Torres (1989), the former “have a historical-organic origin” (p. 94). While he does not elaborate, I take this to mean that sub- and supra-national structural determinants evolve incrementally over time and are based on long-standing political-economic relations. One example of a structural determinant would be the Cold War context with all the associated geopolitical implications – e.g., the real and rhetorical global political and economic competition between capitalism and socialism (Klein, 2007). Conjunctural
determinants, on the other hand, affect policy formation “at a particular point in time” through “the short-term crystallization of a peculiar constellation of forces” (Torres, 1989, p. 94). One example of such a short-term crystallization of forces may be the way that international organizations such as the United Nations agencies and the World Bank engulf and intersect with national ministries in reconstruction efforts in post-conflict settings. Ultimately, the value of these politically-attuned, historical-structural understandings lies in the fact that, without them, “it would be difficult to understand the particular rationale of resource assignment and the underlying motives for the creation (or elimination) of institutions, services, plans or policies” (Torres, 1989, p. 95).

4.3.2 Multi-Level Politics

Numerous authors have expounded on the fact that the making of education policy around the world – and particularly in developing countries – is affected by actors at various levels, from the local to the international (see, e.g., Dale, 2005; Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu, & Zegarra, 1990; Jones, 2007a,b; Moutsios, 2009, 2010; Mundy & Ghali, 2009; Steiner-Khamsi, 2004). More than simple involvement, however, authors such as Moutsios (2009) have remarked how “important political decisions are taken … within transnational networks of power rather than by the weakened national institutions of representation” (p. 469).

For Moutsios (2009), these transnational networks of power operate in and through a range of international organizations, but especially institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
While these institutions certainly constitute an important actor and an unavoidable layer of ideology and managerial bureaucracy in the international landscape of education reform, states – or, perhaps more appropriately, the national ministries that represent their interests – are still relevant and purposeful actors, even if their actions are constrained (see below section on strategic-relational interaction). As Moutsios (2010) states, “power is located in the strategies and decisions of policy-making elites, which act in the transnational space constituted by global business, states, international organizations and interstate entities” (p. 127, emphasis added).

Thus, while the ministries of the state may not entirely – or predominantly – retain the locus of control in processes of policymaking, state representatives are still vital actors (Dale, 1999b). In the words of Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu and Zegarra (1990),

Nation-states in the core and periphery may be seen as active in relation to the world economy in general and to multinational firms, corporate foundations, international organizations, bilateral agencies, and universities. They do not just respond to what is offered, nor do they merely accept what is given, but economic and state elites (among other less powerful actors) actively seek aid for their own purposes or attempt to redirect the uses of resources provided for other tasks (p. 489).

Of course, state ministries are not the only actors at the national level, just as the World Bank, IMF, OECD, and WTO are not the only international-level actors. Other institutional actors that originate from the national level may include national NGOs, think tanks, businesses, philanthropic organizations, teachers’ unions,
universities, and social movements. Likewise, from the international level, you may have many similar actors, such as multinational corporations (van Fleet, 2011), international philanthropic organizations (Berman, 1979), international non-governmental organizations, global civil society, trans-national social movements (Chabbott, 1998; Mundy with Ghali, 2009; Mundy & Murphy, 2001), global universities (Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu, & Zegarra, 1990), regional organizations (Dale & Robertson, 2002), bi-lateral aid agencies (Berman, 1992; Mundy & Ghali, 2009), and other multilateral agencies not mentioned above, such as the United Nations and its agencies (UNESCO, UNICEF) (Jones, 2005; Mundy, 1999).

To be sure, the differences are not absolute between the actors classified above as national and international. That is, what is national and what is international may not always be clear: Individual actors from various countries (developing or not) may “move up” to work for the World Bank, while actors that have worked for international organizations may “move down” to occupy a position in a national ministry, for example. Thus, while I suggest that it is conceptually useful to employ the designations international and national (not to mention local) when it comes to the level from which the institution in question operates, I also suggest, as have others, that it is necessary to consider the origins of individual institutional actors, whether they have moved across levels, and the implications of that for the policy role they play (Moutsios, 2009; Robertson, 2012; Steiner-Khamsi, 2006; Steiner-Khamsi, Silova, & Johnson, 2006).

Considering such implications can be important because, for example, an actor who moves from the World Bank or UNESCO into a position with a Ministry of
Education may well possess and exercise specialist knowledge and clout that perhaps allows them to influence the content of reform agendas or the policy prescriptions taken up. Conversely, depending on the context of origin and individual characteristics, we may not expect a researcher or policy actor from a developing country, for example, to have the same type of effect if they were to move up to work with an international organization. It is perhaps more likely that such an actor may be strategically employed to further the agenda of the hiring institution, and not to make changes to it.

Separately, the local level can also be relevant to a discussion of education reform, as Vavrus and Bartlett (2009) have shown. In terms of actors specifically, it is recognized that there are various at this level which can be relevant to educational change. These primarily include NGOs, such as community groups, activist groups, and interest groups, though social movements can also operate at – and often originate from – the local (or grassroots) level (Sutton & Arnove, 2004). While these actors can be relevant, the present study does not take them to be a focal point, though I may in my future research on educational change in El Salvador related to EDUCO. That is not to say, however, that the local level is not considered in this dissertation. To the contrary, the politics of the local level – which are certainly important in the case of EDUCO – will be taken into account. The difference is that local level politics will serve primarily as context, rather than as the central realm for analysis.

Having gone from the international to the local level, it is necessary now to turn back to the national level in order to provide an additional comment on the nature of the state and its relationship to education. To that end, the theoretical stance
I adopt is drawn from McLennan (1984), who asserted the following: “The State in education is understood not as a single and unified entity but as a set of agencies, departments, tiers and levels, each with their own rules and resources and often varying purposes” (p. 3, as cited in Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu, & Zegarra, 1990, p. 490). That said, actors within the state generally and within the Ministry of Education specifically are thought to engage in both symbolic and real education policy reform in order to respond to legitimacy crises, such that they “maximize the political gain to be derived from the design of educational reforms and … minimize the political cost of implementing them” (Weiler, 1988, p. 265). Given the above theoretical tenets, the state is thus seen as a site of struggle wherein individuals not only maneuver for position within its ministries but also through which various groups from the local to the international level compete to influence the direction of education reform.

4.3.3 The Institutional Nature of International Organizations

In the previous section, in discussing the multi-level politics and political actors involved in the international political economy of education reform, the role of international organizations was underscored. Here, it is necessary to further comment on the institutional nature of those organizations. This is because their institutional nature combines with, and often enhances, the dominant position they can occupy vis-à-vis national actors, particularly in the case of the World Bank.

Moutsios (2010), drawing on the seminal work of Barnett and Finnemore (2004), explains this well. As Moutsios (2010) writes, “IOs are bureaucracies. … They are created by states and as such they appear rational, impartial and technical.
They are characterised by the attributes of bureaucratic authority” (Moutsios, 2010, p. 125). In the practice of policymaking, this bureaucratic authority has two key implications: First, they are seen as “in authority” because “they have the role that national societies recognise as legitimate for them to exercise power”; second, they are “an authority” because “they handle data and demonstrate expertise” (Moutsios, 2010, p. 125). The result is that these organizations are “valued as superior and neutral agencies of policy formulation” (Moutsios, 2010, p. 125).

For their part, international organizations attempt to maintain their authority and reinforce the perception that they are neutral by engaging in ostensibly impartial and technocratic practices that will contribute to their being seen as contributing to a legitimate social purpose (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). Concisely stated by Barnett and Finnemore (2004), “the authority of [international organizations] … lies in their ability to present themselves as impersonal and neutral – as not exercising power but instead serving others” (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, p. 21). Despite the projection of such characteristics, organizations of course advance or support certain objectives, goals, purposes, or principles over others. While international organizations are frequently clear about their prerogatives, they often also have the ability to entrench their perspectives and policy preferences through rules and procedures. Importantly, these rules and procedures can effectively lead to the “mystification of knowledge and power relations” and can “constrain and set priorities” in a way that is “barely discernible, and thus, generally inaccessible” since it happens through a seemingly apolitical and neutral institutional process (Samoff, 2007, p. 72). In conjunction with these procedures, international organizations often take care to “rely heavily on
specialist knowledge” because, in the words of Moutsios (2010), “it supports scientifically political pursuits and indicates ‘solutions’ to pre-defined ‘problems’” (p. 125). Specialist knowledge and formal, rationalized processes represent formidable and often taken-for-granted aspects of policy formation.

Given that this dissertation is concerned with transnational influence in education policymaking, explaining how one understands the institutional nature of international organizations, as I have done, is seen to be important. This is particularly so given that the range of international institutions discussed in the previous section constitute an apparatus of specialist knowledge and international bureaucratic machinery through which national education polices are frequently affected, particularly in developing countries (Jones, 2007b; Moutsios, 2009). On the other hand, theorizing how national level agents interact with that apparatus is thought to be equally essential. I address this issue next.

4.3.4 Strategic-Relational Interaction

In the above sections, I have discussed historical-structural conditions, multi-level politics, the range of actors that operate on and across those levels, and the institutional nature of those actors. At this point, it is necessary to detail how institutional actors are understood to interact with each other and with those historical-structural conditions. Fundamentally, this is necessary because the concept which guides this dissertation – i.e., IPEPF – is a dynamic one, characterized, both, by relations among unequal institutions and by the presence of constraints in the form of what Jones (2007a) calls the “global architecture of education” (p. 325).
In conceptualizing these dynamics, I draw on the work of Jessop (2001) and his strategic-relational approach to explaining the interaction between structure and agency. For him, agency relates to structure in that free-willed – yet still socialized and, I would add, ideologically malleable – agents make structurally oriented strategic calculations which they put into practice through recursively selected strategies and tactics (Jessop, 2001, p. 1224). That is, actors “orient their strategies and tactics in the light of their understanding of the current conjuncture and their ‘feel for the game’” (p. 1224). At the same time, however, “the recursive selection of strategies and tactics depends on individual, collective, or organizational learning capacities and on the ‘experiences’ resulting from the pursuit of different strategies and tactics in different conjunctures” (p. 1224).

Put plainly, actors initially scan and interpret the institutional and political context in which they are nested and then they take strategic action within the constraints they face. In determining the appropriate action, actors take account of (a) those actions which are possible, (b) the lessons they have learned (either personally or through the experience of others) regarding those actions which are likely to be rewarded, and (c) their own “feel for the game.” The structural aspect of actor decision-making becomes clear when one considers “the tendency for specific structures and structural configurations to reinforce selectively specific forms of actions, tactics, or strategies and to discourage others” (Jessop, 2001, p. 1224). Institutional actors are often aware of which actions will be rewarded by the structural configurations in which they are embedded – and subsequently act accordingly.
4.3.5 Ideational Factors

Drawing on the work of Béland (2005), Campbell (1998), Cox (2002), and Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu and Zegarra (1990), I recognize that ideational factors also influence policymaking. That is to say, one cannot analyze the institutional, political, historical, and structural aspects of educational reform without also considering the role of ideas. Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu and Zegarra (1990) summarize well the fact that the ideational dimension must be considered in relation to the others. As they write,

The struggle at the ideological level, like at other levels, does not occur among individuals and groups with equal resources and power. Those with greater control over and access to the public and private modes of mass producing and mass distributing ideas tend to define the major issues in particular ways that shape the overall discourse. Voices expressing alternative frames for analyzing and addressing the problems may go unheard or be marginalized. The use of mass media and reports of government, corporate foundation, or international agency commissions must be understood as strategies for giving and denying voice (Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu, & Zegarra, 1990, p. 493).

In terms of analysis, the result is that, “When we examine educational reform efforts in any country or region, we need to investigate how the global structural and ideological contexts constrain and enable individual and group actors’ transactions concerning education” (Ginsburg, Cooper, Raghu, & Zegarra, 1990, p. 493-494).
Global structural and ideological contexts do not, however, create themselves. As various authors have discussed and shown, active agents, often based in or associated with international organizations play a role by advocating—directly or through research—for particular reform visions, principles, and programs (Campbell, 1998; Haas, 1992; Jones, 2007b; Samoff, 1996, 1999; Verger, 2012). To the extent that those international institutions—either independently or in tandem with other institutional or powerful political actors—operate on and influence various levels, they are able to develop multiple levels of complementary ideas. For example, while a multilateral institution may promote on a global level a neoliberal reform paradigm, at the country level the representatives of that institution will advocate particular programs that align with that paradigm (Campbell, 1998; Hall, 1993). In doing so, these policy entrepreneurs rely on framing strategies that invoke symbols and concepts that will, on a normative level, help policymakers to legitimize chosen policy solutions to the public (Campbell, 1998; see also Mintrom, 1997; Verger, 2012). Over time, continued promotion of a particular paradigm by international and national actors can lead to changes in public sentiment, such that, in addition to policymakers, societies and the “international public sector” (Forman, 2002) come to understand the world, policy problems, and solutions through a particular paradigmatic lens (Campbell, 1998; Carney, 2008; Cox, 2002; Flyvbjerg, 1998).

By extension, the above discussion of ideas has implications for how institutional actors strategically engage in policy reform. Put differently, there are

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37 Note, however, that semiotics is not the only way that international forces can influence national-level policymakers. The range of forms of influence examined in this dissertation will be discussed in a later section of this chapter (Samoff, 2009).
linkages between the institutional promotion of certain ideas, on one hand, and the strategic-relational dynamics discussed in the previous section. As was stated, policymakers scan and interpret the political, structural, and institutional contexts in which they are embedded. The point here is that the circulation of ideas influences, at least in part, how those actors (a) understand their constrained situation, (b) identify the problems to be addressed, and (c) and perceive those policy solutions which are appropriate and which will yield the greatest benefit given the constellation of forces and interests in relation to which they must act. To the extent that these ideational dynamics are driven by powerful international aid agencies, they are embedded in what Samoff (1996) labels a “financial-intellectual” complex.

4.3.6 Summary of CIPE

There are thus a number of tenets that serve as the foundation for the theoretical perspective that I bring to the study of policy formation in this dissertation. To summarize, these tenets first suggest that one should take into account the historical and structural aspects of context understudy. As indicated, this means considering both long standing political and economic divisions within and among countries as well as short-term conjunctural constellations of political and economic events, actors, and forces that serve as constraints on context and actor interaction. Second, the tenets hold that actors – but particularly institutional actors – from multiple levels are relevant in relation to education reform. In this regard, significant attention is directed to the involvement of international institutions and the ways in which they interact with representatives of the state (e.g., ministerial actors), for the state itself is seen as a contested space in and through which a range of actors from
the local to the international level attempt to influence the direction of education reform.

Per the third tenet, large international organizations are seen as occupying a central role. This has to do with the effects of their institutional nature. As bureaucracies that are organized to appear rational, impartial, and technical, they possess bureaucratic authority. In practice that authority plays out in two ways – first in that they are seen as legitimate and second in that they perform analysis and deploy specialist knowledge in the service of decision-making. The veneer of technical rationality and impartial knowledge often serves to entrench and conceal institutional interests. Finally, for policymaking, the cumulative effect of international institutions’ knowledge production and required processes is that they constitute a somewhat diverse but mostly unavoidable layer of bureaucratic machinery and ideology on the world stage. While the range of international institutions (but primarily bi- and multi-lateral institutions, international NGOs, global universities, and think tanks) and their representatives compete among themselves, this organizational web also often becomes something which national actors must navigate and with which they must contend.

To that end, the fourth and fifth tenets of CIPE speak to how national (but also international) actors react to that web. On the one hand, the fourth tenet states that actors make structurally oriented strategic calculations which they continuously activate through selected strategies and tactics (Jessop, 2001). While these calculations are based on those actions that will be rewarded – e.g., professionally, politically, financially – by the institutional and structural configurations in which
they are nested, the calculations are also at least partially influenced by ideational factors. Those factors are thus the basis of the fifth tenet, which asserts that historical, structural, political, and institutional aspects must be considered together with ideational ones. Specifically, this tenet emphasizes that there are multiple levels of ideas and that, within the international political economic context, networked institutional actors advocate complementary paradigmatic visions and programmatic concepts by employing particular frames that help to legitimize policy solutions cognitively and normatively (Campbell, 1998). Taken together, tenets four and five thus maintain that actors respond to their structural constraints, but also that the circulation and selling of ideas can influence how policymakers understand the nature of their situational constraints and, subsequently, which course of action will be most rewarded. Structural constraints and ideational factors may often, though certainly not always, point in the same direction (Samoff, 1996).

4.4 International Processes of Education Policy Formation and Related Concepts

Having laid out the general tenets that undergird my theoretical perspective, I wish in this section both to distinguish and to clarify the concept that I use to bound my study. As stated previously, this concept is IPEPF – or international processes of education policy formation. Beyond simply defining this concept, it is also necessary to distinguish it from – and to show its complementarity with – related concepts that have been elaborated in recent years by scholars working on the issue of education reform from an international political economic perspective. To be specific, these related concepts are global architecture of education, global policy field, global
education policy, and transnational policymaking. As will be shown, these concepts, while distinct, are closely related.

4.4.1 Global Architecture of Education

To begin, “global architecture of education” has less to do with the processes by which education policies are made and more to do, not surprisingly, with the surrounding structures. As Jones (2007a) states, the global architecture of education is the “emerging, expanding and increasingly significant system of transnational influence” that complements national systems of education (p. 330). For Jones (2007a), while part of this architecture can be “examined in organizational terms, through structured international bodies such as those of the United Nations system,” the global architecture of education also refers to “patterns of thought and behavior giving rise to pluralism and interdependence” as well as “the emergence of epistemic communities, being transnational networks of like-minded actors” (p. 330). With this definition, it becomes clear that Jones (2007a) is focused on contextual elements that impinge upon processes of policy formation and not necessarily those processes in and of themselves. Moreover, I would suggest that what Jones (2007a) terms the global architecture of education is subsumed by the tenets of CIPE, detailed above, in that the CIPE perspective takes care to account for the interdependence of actors (particularly national and international institutional ones) as well as the organizational, ideational, and agential dimensions of education reform.
4.4.2 Global Policy Field

The concept of global policy field has been offered by Jakobi (2009). Figure 4.1, below, is a visual representation. According to Jakobi (2009), the global policy field is characterized as a multidimensional space in which one finds “not only… national policymaking bodies and representatives of national society, but increasingly international organizations, international non-governmental actors, international exchange of goods and services, as well as a global public or findings from an internationalized scientific community” (p. 474). To continue, the global policy field is thought to be a common international political space “in which policy agencies compete for influencing the shape of national and international education policy” (Jakobi, 2009, p. 477).

Based on this definition, the concepts of global policy field and IPEPF are complementary. That is to say, the global policy field is a larger conceptual space within which IPEPF can be located. Put differently, while the global policy field encapsulates both the national and international levels of action, IPEPF explain those – vertical – processes through which actors and ideology from both levels interact in the course of developing and instituting education policy in a given country.
4.4.3 Global Education Policy

Antoni Verger, Mario Novelli, and Hulya Kosar-Altiyelken (2012), in the introductory chapter to their book, *Global Education Policy and International Development*, state the following:

Similar education reforms and a common set of education policy jargon are being applied in many parts of the world, in locations that are incredibly diverse both culturally and in terms of economic development. Education policies and programmes such as child-centered pedagogies, school-based management, teachers’ accountability, public-private partnerships or conditional-cash transfer schemes are *being discussed and implemented*
everywhere, to the point that they have acquired the status of ‘global education policies’ (p. 3).

This description conveys well the sentiment of what is meant, in this dissertation, by global education policy, though the use of the term “everywhere” may best be understood as hyperbole. The point is that global education policies are those policies which circulate around the world, which are on the short list of reforms that are seen as desirable and preferable, and which are put into practice in numerous countries. In Moutsios (2010) terms, they are the “common set of education policies worldwide” (Moutsios, 2010, p. 131).

EDUCO can be said to have been an example of a global education policy. As was shown in Chapter three of this dissertation, the EDUCO program became widely discussed in the 1990s and 2000s and was implemented in a range of other countries. While the above definition of global education policy does not include a temporal dimension, it will be interesting to see if research on global education policies tends to demonstrate a common lifecycle (Steiner-Khamsi, 2010).

4.4.4 Transnational Policymaking

Transnational policymaking is a concept with two parts. On the one hand, the “transnational” component underscores the idea that education policymaking happens in a space that is “instituted and sustained by nation states, international organizations, inter-state entities and global corporations” (Moutsios, 2010, p. 122). As Moutsios (2010) notes, this space is “not international, in the traditional sense, as major policies are no longer made in the context of clearly distinguished relations between nation states; nor is it supra-national, as policies are not made
above or beyond nation states” (p. 122). Thus, just as Jakobi (2009) defines the overall global policy field as encompassing the national and international levels, Moutsios (2010) emphasizes that the act of policymaking itself does not occur on only one or the other, but at the nexus of the two.

On the other hand, the “policymaking” component of “transnational policymaking” is understood to refer to the exercise of power in that transnational space. As Moutsious (2010) writes, “power in contemporary education policy lies in the interaction between global capital, states and transnational institutions and the strategies, arrangements and decisions of their policymaking elites who are able to mobilize economic, institutional and discursive resources to realize their agendas” (p. 129). By mobilizing such resources, policymaking elites attempt to ensure that certain “policies and discourses cross borders and flow in and out of the nation states’ arenas of power” (p. 122). These are exactly the issues which I try to unpack in this dissertation.

4.4.5 International Processes of Education Policy Formation

The concept of IPEPF is central to this dissertation, and, in ways I will discuss, it fills a conceptual gap in literature on education policy development. As I have discussed in both the introductory chapter and elsewhere (Edwards, 2012a, 2013), IPEPF are those transnationally influenced processes in which national level political, governmental, and, specifically, MINED representatives engage in order to formulate or authorize an official policy text, whether it be an education system development plan, a reform strategy paper, a legal decree, or other form of official policy statement. As I explained in Edwards (2012a), transnational influence at the
national level can manifest in these processes in variety of ways which differ in their intensity, duration, and effects, for example. I will not discuss at this point the range of specific ways through which transnational influence enters IPEPF since I present later in this chapter those numerous pathways – based on the work of Dale (1999b) and Samoff (2009) – which I am interested to analyze in the case of El Salvador. Suffice to say here that those pathways reflect and extend the theoretical tenets discussed earlier and the concept of power in transnational policymaking from Moutsios (2010). The important point here is that the concept of IPEPF draws attention to the processual dimension of interaction with, engagement by, and influence from transnational forces (Robertson, 2012).

Practically, however, the concept of IPEPF requires two further definitions in order to be operationalized – one for “policy” and one for “policy process.” First, “policy” is defined as “positions taken by the state” (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010, p. 4). Second, “policy process” is taken – generally – to refer to “the chronology of an issue coming onto the policy agenda” and – specifically – to “the construction of a policy text” which represents the position assumed by the state (p. 14).38 In practice, then, research must be done in such a way that one can not only trace the chronology of an issue coming onto the policy agenda, but also the dynamics of the way that the policy in question becomes a position taken by the state and crystallizes in a policy text.

On the whole, then, and by bringing each of the aspects of IPEPF together, we see that IPEPF are fundamentally about the constitutive interactions among

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38 In this dissertation, “state” refers to national governmental institutions (Krasner 1984).
international, national, and local organizational actors (governmental, nongovernmental, bi/multilateral, and/or for-profit) during the evolution of education reform agendas and the production of those official texts that contain educated-related positions assumed by a government. A variety of elements (i.e., events and subprocesses) shape such processes and, along with the actors, form the basis for interaction. Elements may include, for example, the conduct, presentation, and diffusion of research and information; advocacy work; processes of national consultation; national commissions; international conferences and seminars; and international agreements, among others. Such a definition of IPEPF (and the terms that comprise it) brings to the fore the multilevel, complex, and contested nature of transnationally influenced policy production (Edwards, 2013).

4.4.6 Conceptual Complementarity

As a final point, I wish to point out the complementarity of the terms discussed in this section. That is, the set of terms defined and discussed above can be used in conjunction, for they highlight distinct aspects of what could be termed the political economy of global education policy dynamics. To begin, on a basic level, global education policies are those education policies which have become common worldwide. Next, Jakobi’s (2009) notion of global policy field defines the overall space within which global education polices are conceived to operate. In turn, Jones’ (2007a) terminology of the global architecture of education characterizes the topography of the terrain of the global policy field. To continue, Moutsios’ (2010) concept of transnational policymaking can be used as a term to describes the activity that occurs in the exercise of power transnationally in order to influence education
policy. Finally, IPEPF constitute those processes through which transnational policymaking can be seen to occur in relation to a particular country. All together, then, we have a vocabulary that allows us to distinguish among (a) an outcome of interest (global education policies), (b) the processes by which they may be born (IPEPF), (c) the types of action – though not the specific “external effects” or “pathways of influence” – that bring them about (transnational policymaking), (d) the conceptual space in which those cross-level and cross-country interactions occur (global policy field), and (e) the features of that space (global architecture of education).

I would also like to point out that, to my knowledge, a discussion of this nature about the above terms has not been advanced previously. It may thus be the case that the understanding I have here proposed regarding the distinctions among these terms could be useful more generally in the field of comparative and international education. The understandings suggested for these related terms could reduce confusion around the conceptual subtleties that they embody. If not useful for scholars of comparative and international education generally, the above proffered distinctions may perhaps be practical for scholars who tend to work within political economic frameworks.

In moving forward, and while keeping these definitions in mind, we can turn our attention to the specific mechanisms of transnational influence that affect how education policies develop.
4.5 Mechanisms of Transnational Influence: An Analytic Framework

The research question stated in Chapter 1 makes it clear that one issue which I seek to understand clearly is the operation of transnational influence in the development of the EDUCO program. While I stated in both the preceding section and the introduction that I conceptualize this dissertation as an analysis of the process by which EDUCO was formed, I detail in the current section the analytic framework which will guide the analysis of that process. This framework builds on both “external effects” and “pathways of influence.” The former have been discussed by Dale (1999b) in relation to the ways in which globalization affects national policymaking, while the latter have been discussed by Samoff’s (2009) in relation to the ways that foreign aid – with an emphasis on the World Bank – impacts the creation of a country’s education policy. On one hand, the focus of each author is rather distinct: Dale’s (1999b) external effects tend to speak to the “horizontal” dimension, to use Jakobi’s (2009) terminology, of global education policy diffusion, while Samoff’s (2009) pathways tend to apply more to the “vertical” influence of foreign aid agencies in a given country, though these differences are not absolute. On the other hand, both sets of mechanisms are similar in that they pertain to the transnational aspect of power in the construction of education policy.

In any event, these mechanisms can be brought together under the label of “mechanisms of transnational influence” in that they both pertain to the nexus of the international and national levels, and in that they both address the operation of power in and through that nexus. Thus, Box 4.1, below, summarizes (continued after table)
Box 4.1: Mechanisms of Transnational Influence

1. Dissemination: External agents highlight, spread knowledge about, and recommend certain policies or programs through information-sharing mediums (e.g., through annual reports, best practices databases and technical assistance).

2. Harmonization: A set of countries mutually agrees on the implementation of common policies in a certain policy area (e.g., the configuration of the European Space for Higher Education).

3. Standardization: The international community defines and promotes adhesion to a set of policy principles and standards that frame the countries’ behavior (e.g., international performance tests, such as PISA, contribute to the standardization of curricular content at the global level).”

4. Installing Interdependence: Occurs when country governments and international organizations agree to achieve common objectives and to tackle problems that require international cooperation (e.g., climate change, ‘education for all’).

5. Conditionalities: Foreign aid agencies attach conditions to the approval or disbursement of loans.

6. Technical Assistance: Representatives of foreign aid instruct borrowers on what they should do, when, and how.

7. Loan-Related (Documentary and Supervisory) Actions: Loans are enmeshed in a web of documents that include, for example, early studies, pre-appraisals, sector analyses, public expenditure review, implementation and management reports, and evaluations, etc. These reports specify what has been done, what has yet to be done, and what should be done. Ignoring the content of these reports can compromise loan eligibility.

8. Certification: The approval of certain foreign aid agencies, but specifically the World Bank, indicates to other development partners that a country government is taking appropriate steps in a satisfactory fashion, and that it is therefore trustworthy. This is how aid providers often determine whether or not a country is, for example, making progress along an agreed-upon trajectory, implementing the activities for which it received foreign support, fulfilling its commitments to modify spending patterns or decentralize authority or democratize political competition.

9. Aid Relationship Management: The administrative and managerial processes required as part of the aid relationship can be cumbersome and can drain ministerial capacity. Over the years, administrative requirements have related to discrete projects, sector-wide support, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and the Comprehensive Development Framework.
10. **Global Point of Reference**: Certain aid agencies, but namely the World Bank, may possess more professional capacity than others and may wield more macroeconomic leverage than others, even when not the largest lender. Such agencies may often oversee the provision and use of other agencies’ funds – and as such they become the primary point of reference for how to organize and manage development assistance. In policy coordination bodies, their voice often carries the most weight.

11. **Structuration of National Education Policy Processes**: Foreign aid can influence who participates and with what impact in national education policy processes. Lenders often ensure that they are an insider for discussions of national education policy, though they formally defer decision-making to national governmental actors. Lenders may also ally themselves with the finance ministry (or the ministry of planning), which controls the national budget. Shared epistemic perspectives facilitate this, and make it likely that the concerns, orientations, and priorities of aid agencies are internalized by these national actors.

12. **Research**: The World Bank and other funding and technical agencies have become research entrepreneurs. (The first of these also attempts to serve as a knowledge bank for best practices in development.) The numerous studies conducted by international institutions are influential when it comes to establishing reform priorities around the world. There is also commissioned research, which can be for studies required for project approval or for sector-wide support, for example. The technical, rational, and objective appearance of the research lends credibility to the findings. Commissioned studies can guide education policy in part by providing findings that justify certain policies.

13. **International Events**: International actors use their resources to highlight, communicate, sell, and ingrain a particular message about education through events such as international conferences/summits, seminars, workshops, colloquia, and study tours.

14. **National Actor Recruitment and Socialization**: Aid agencies selectively recruit professionals from developed and borrower countries who can help the agency advance its agenda. Not surprisingly, those professionals often carry with them particular assumptions, frameworks, and expectations that align with those of their host organization. At the same time, many of these agencies are powerful socializing institutions that are more resilient, more persistent, and more penetrating than its individual employees. Employees tend to share certain analytic orientations and core ideas, not only about education, but also about how it should be studied and assessed.

*Note: I do not discuss Dale’s (1999b) notion of imposition because this idea is elaborated in a more nuanced fashion through the mechanisms defined by Samoff (2009). For the same reason, I do not include dissemination or cross-national achievement tests, as suggested by Samoff’s (2009).*

*Source: Adapted from Dale (1999b), Samoff (2009), and Verger, Novelli, and Kosar-Altinyelken (2012).*
the mechanisms of transnational influence on which I will draw when discussing the findings of this dissertation. In all, 14 mechanisms are discussed.

The analysis in this dissertation is helped by the inclusion of this set of mechanisms. First, this is because there is conceptual alignment between these mechanisms, the phenomena of IPEPF, and purpose of the present study. Moreover, in that mechanisms of transnational influence permeate the process of EDU CO’s development, the application of the framework presented in Box 4.1, above, helps us to discuss in more conceptually specific ways the effect of influence from beyond the nation state. Second, this framework is helpful because it focuses the analysis not only on the influence of foreign aid in El Salvador but also on the wider context of the global policy field (e.g., relations among countries) and the possibility that additional elements (e.g., international conferences) in the global architecture of education can influence the decision-making of national policy actors, for example.

It should be noted, however, that the application of this framework is not intended to be a one-way street. That is, while the framework is valuable in that it serves as guide and ensures that the numerous ways in which the global education architecture can influence education policy are taken into consideration, it is also suggested that the present investigation of the EDU CO program can suggest modifications and/or additions to these mechanisms. The point is that theory and research can – and should – inform one another.

4.6 Transition

With this chapter, I have attempted to clarify a number of issues. I began by stating the premises which underlie my theoretical perspective on education
policymaking. Next, I elaborated on that theoretical perspective – labeled critical international political economy. In so doing, I presented five tenets. These tenets pertained to historical-structural conditions, multi-level politics, the institutional nature of international organizations, strategic-relational interaction, and ideational factors. Subsequently, I engaged in an explication of IPEPF and related terms. Through that explication, I demonstrated the distinct yet complementary nature of the terms global architecture of education, global education policy, global policy field, transnational policymaking, and IPEPF. Finally, I derived and delineated an analytic framework from the scholarship of Dale (1999b) and Samoff (1999) – two authors who have for many years examined and theorized the nature of transnational influence on national education policymaking.

Importantly, over the course of this chapter, I have attempted to scaffold, and clarify the concepts and frameworks on which I rely. After discussing the relevance of the policy borrowing literature and then explaining the general theoretical tenets of critical international political economy, I defined those key concepts which are related to the phenomenon of interest in this dissertation and which have been elaborated by scholars who also operate within the international political economy paradigm. To continue, in the final part of this chapter, I fleshed out an analytic framework that not only integrates with the concepts presented in the preceding section but which also meshes with the theoretical tenets of the critical international political economy perspective that grounds this dissertation. Having tackled these tasks in chapter four, I now turn to a discussion of research methods in chapter five.
Chapter 5: Methodological Considerations

When it comes to the generation of knowledge, six issues – many of which intertwine – must be addressed. **First**, on a general level, there is the link between ontology and research methodology: How one understands the nature of reality – and the extent to which it can be known – influences the choice of methodology. **Second**, and at the same time, the researcher must select a research methodology which allows him/her to produce insights that respond to the research question being posed. **Third**, as Lincoln and Guba (2000) point out, while the methodological question asks, “How can the knower go about obtaining the desired knowledge and understandings?,” there is also an epistemological question which mediates the relationship between methodology and ontology. This epistemological question asks, “What is the nature of knowledge and the relationship between the knower and the would-be known?” (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). The **fourth** issue concerns theory while the **fifth** pertains to those specific steps or methods in which one engages to facilitate data collection, analysis, and extrapolation. The former (i.e., theory) relates back not only to methodology – for the research methodology implemented is fundamentally operationalized in order to respond to a question that speaks back to a theory of how the world works – but also to specific methods. This is because while individual methods contain steps in which one engages to collect and manipulate data, the interpretation of that data and the production of insights are inseparable from both those (meta) theories which guide how one understands the world generally as well as those concepts which explain the specific phenomena under study. **Sixth** and finally,
there are assorted issues to which it is good practice to respond. These issues are related to study origin, data integrity, ethical and political considerations, and study limitations.

In this chapter, I attempt to respond to each of these issues. In the first section, I speak to the origin of the study. In the second, I address the ontological, epistemological, theoretical, and methodological implications of my grounding in the philosophical tradition of critical realism. In the third section, I present my particular research methodology (longitudinal case study). Then, in the fourth section, I discuss at length the data collection, data management, and data analysis strategies of which I made use. Finally, in the fifth section, I tackle a wide range of issues related to the conduct of research. These include the following: Researcher positionality, data integrity, ethical and political considerations, and study limitations.

5.1 Study Origin

The study that I present in this dissertation is the result of the cumulation of many years of activity – both within and outside the university. The explanation I offer below of the origin of my dissertation research is a purposeful attempt to be reflexive – that is, to be transparent about my own intellectual development and about those experiences which have shaded the lenses through which I tend to see the world.

To begin, my first engagement in Central America came during the summer after my junior year of university, during 2004. I worked in a neighborhood just outside Managua as an intern with a micro-finance NGO, the Association for the Economic and Social Development of Nicaragua. During my two months living and
working in this municipality (known as Ciudad Sandino) I found myself preoccupied with questions of development – questions that pertained to why certain countries seemed to “develop” while others did not. At that point in time – 2004 – Nicaragua was one of the poorest countries in Latin America; as such, it was a context of poverty and inequality to which I had not been exposed previously.

I furthered explored these questions for the remainder of my time as an undergraduate at the University of Maryland, College Park, where I studied not only Spanish but also Latin American Studies and Finance. In particular, the courses I took on “Issues in Latin American Studies” attracted my attention because of the critical lens that the professors brought to the study of history and politics. The continual involvement and intervention of the U.S. military and other actors in the national politics of Latin American countries, particularly during the twentieth century, was something I had not learned about previously. These courses provided the opportunity to begin to explore these issues, as well as issues of colonialism, indentured servitude, economic dependence, and the deleterious effects of free trade agreements for Latin American populations (but those in Central America specifically).

Upon graduation from university, rather than pursue a job in finance, I followed my interests in matters of inequality and joined Teach For America. For two years I was part of a corps of recent graduates who dedicated their time to working in under-resourced schools in the United States. My placement was in Philadelphia. As a Spanish teacher at a secondary school, my experiences showed me not only the importance of education but also of the effects that larger issues had,
such as community development and economic policy. As my time in Philadelphia came to an end, I had more questions about these issues as well as the desire to study their inter-relations. On the one hand, my questions were driven by my first-hand experiences as a teacher and my knowledge of the difficulties that my students faced; on the other hand, my intellectual curiosity was guided by the work of Paulo Freire. I had been exposed to his work through a course I completed as part of the Master’s of Education that I obtained from the University of Pennsylvania at the same time that I served as a teacher.

Having completed the Master’s of Education at the University of Pennsylvania while teaching for two years, I returned to the University of Maryland, College Park, to pursue a PhD in International Education Policy. This program provided an excellent opportunity to explore and analyze – from a critical perspective – issues at the nexus of history, politics, economics, development thought, community empowerment, and education policy. It also exposed me to the importance of institutional involvement (e.g., bi- and multi-lateral institutions, among others) in educational reform in developing countries. Since matriculating, I have consistently sought out courses, employment, and research opportunities that would allow me to further familiarize myself with these topics. A few experiences stand out. These include: (a) an internship with the Organization of American States in the Education and Culture Department during the spring of 2008, (b) a study abroad trip to El Salvador during January of 2009, (c) a consultant position with the World Bank Institute during the spring of that same year, and, finally, (d) a visiting scholar
position at the University of Amsterdam’s Institute for Social Science Research during the 2010-2011 academic year.

After the study abroad trip piqued my interest in El Salvador, I used a few of my remaining courses to explore more recent education policy developments in that country (Edwards, 2013). In addition, through these experiences, I learned of the EDUCO program and gained some appreciation for the fact that it had become a well-known program among development professionals working on education. Lastly, I used these courses as an opportunity, first, to explore literature on education policy formation in developing countries. This literature attracted my attention because, often, it tended to focus on the dynamics of process. Processual and dynamic perspectives on educational change resonated with me, particularly those perspectives which were grounded in more general political-economic theories of development.

Thus, by the time that I joined to the University of Amsterdam as a visiting scholar in the fall of 2010, my research had a twin focus. First, it was grounded in understanding the EDUCO program, a program to which I was drawn because it seemed to be at the center of the various issues that drove my intellectual curiosity and personal politics (i.e., theories of international development, US intervention in Central American affairs, the impact of international institutions, community empowerment, and education policy). Second, my research at that point was directed at exploring theoretical perspectives not only on the political economic nature of educational change, but also, more specifically, on theoretical perspectives which could explain how and why certain education policies, such as EDUCO, became widely influential among in the development industry and around the world while
others did not. While I continued to work independently on both issues, my time at the University of Amsterdam provided exposure to ideas related to the second. To that end, I became aware of, or more familiar with, concepts related to “global education policy,” not to mention the work of Roger Dale, Susan Robertson, Mario Novelli, Thomas Muhr, Xavier Bonal, and Antoni Verger, among others – all of whom bring critical political economic and political sociological approaches to the study of educational reform around the world, but particularly in low-income countries. As a final point, I should mention that it was also at this time that I became aware of the philosophical approach of critical realism – an approach which I have continued to explore subsequently.

To summarize, the current study of the origins of the EDUCO program encapsulates and reflects the issues, pressures, and perspectives to which I have been drawn for nearly a decade. Put differently, the present study of EDUCO allows an opportunity to conduct a case study which gets at how matters of power, history, politics, economics, and community empowerment intersect with education policy – primarily within El Salvador, though also, to a certain extent, beyond its borders. That said, it becomes essential to clarify the implications of the philosophical tradition within which that research has been conducted; namely, that tradition is critical realism.

5.2 Critical Realism

The questions to which I respond in this dissertation ask that two separate, yet related, phenomena be explained. First, I must explain the process by which the EDUCO program developed into a national education policy in El Salvador. Second,
I must explain in what ways, and with what implications, this process was transnationally influenced. To answer these questions requires not only that one engage in a structural and processual analysis of policy formation, but also that one identify the mechanisms and effects of transnational influence in that process. To that end, critical realism is a particularly appropriate, for it lends itself to the study of structures, mechanisms, and events as regards the explanation social phenomena.

5.2.1 Ontology, Epistemology, and Theory

Critical realism departs from a number of tenets, the key ontological and epistemological of which are presented in Box 5.1, below. As can be seen, this tradition begins, first, from the (ontological) premise that the world exists independently of our knowledge of it and, second, from the (epistemological) premise that our ability to understand the world is fallible and mediated by the theories – implicit or explicit – that we bring to our observation and interpretation of that world. Two quotes help to emphasize and extend these points. First, as Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, and Karlsson (2002), have written, “All knowledge is conceptually mediated and thus it is impossible to make neutral observations of ‘facts’ about reality. The observations are always theory-laden. This does not determine, however, what reality is like – it exists independently of our knowledge about it” (p. 41). Second, Cox (2002) speaks to the problematic nature of facts and data, those basic informational elements upon which we rely as the basis for knowledge creation. As he explains, [continued after table]
Box 5.1: Key Ontological and Epistemological Characteristics of the Critical Realist Philosophical Tradition

1. The world exists independently of our knowledge of it.

2. Our knowledge of that world is fallible and theory-laden. Concepts of truth and falsity fail to provide a coherent view of the relationship between knowledge and its object. Nevertheless knowledge is not immune to empirical check, and its effectiveness in informing and explaining successful material practice is not mere accident.

3. There is necessity in the world; objects—whether natural or social—necessarily have particular causal powers or ways of acting and particular susceptibilities.

4. The world is differentiated and stratified, consisting not only of events, but objects, including structures, which have powers and liabilities capable of generating events. These structures may be present even where, as in the social world and much of the natural world, they do not generate regular patterns of events.

5. Social phenomena such as actions, texts and institutions are concept-dependent. We therefore have not only to explain their production and material effects but to understand, read or interpret what they mean. Although they have to be interpreted by starting from the researcher’s own frames of meaning, by and large they exist regardless of researchers’ interpretations of them.

6. Knowledge is largely—though not exclusively—linguistic, and the nature of language and the way we communicate are not incidental to what is known and communicated. Awareness of these relationships is vital in evaluating knowledge.

7. Social science must be critical of its object. In order to be able to explain and understand social phenomena we have to evaluate them critically.

Note: This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather only summarizes some of the key ontological and epistemological characteristics of critical realism.

Source: Adapted from Sayer (1992, p. 5-6).

knowledge deals with facts, i.e., ‘mades’ not ‘givens’. The Latin languages are clearer concerning this distinction. Factum derives from the Latin verb to make, just as datum does from the verb to give. The fact incorporates intention and action; it has a meaning to be discovered. The fact is not only
observed from without, but challenges you to understand it from within as the
consequence of human activity (Collingwood, 1946). Data are just there; they
have no meaning in themselves. (Cox, 2002, p. xxii)

It is because facts and data do not explain themselves that being clear about one’s
theoretical foundations is imperative.

However, apart from the important role that theory assumes as a result of
critical realism’s stance on epistemology, there is an additional ontological point that
needs to be made. It is this: Critical realism assumes that fundamental elements of
the nature of the world include mechanisms, structures, and events. More
specifically, it holds that structures are the sources of generative mechanisms which
influence a range of events, only the latter of which we are able to directly observe.
Structures, in turn, are defined as sets of “internally related objects,” where objects
can be natural and/or social in nature (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, & Karlsson,
2002, p. 41). Put differently, structures are composed of objects39 which condition
one another and which, through their relations, produce mechanisms (i.e., “causal
powers”) which can effect and explain events, when forces external to the structure
do not mitigate their operation (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 2002, p.
55). These ontological elements are represented visually in Figure 5.1, below.
Together, the vertical and horizontal dimensions reflect the supposition that, in
reality, there are multiple, simultaneously existing structures, mechanisms, and
events. Moreover, as the figure indicates, structures, mechanisms, and events are

39 Examples of objects which make up structures include landlords/tenants,
capitalists/wage laborers, men/women, etc. (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, &
Karlsson, 2002)
thought to be nested (Sayer, 1992). What the figure does not communicate, however, is that, in reality, there exist multiple levels of structures. Phenomena (i.e., events) are nested within, and are affected by, multiple mechanisms and multiple structures.

Figure 5.1: Ontological elements per Critical Realism


Theory then picks up where ontology leaves off. That is, while critical realism assumes, on the one hand, that the world exists independently of our knowledge of it and, on the other, that reality is constituted and impacted by

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Sayer (1992) makes an additional point with regard to the vertical dimension: “In the vertical dimension, some readers may want to add a fourth level above events to cover meanings, experiences, beliefs and so forth, but as these can form structures, function as causes, or be considered events, I would suggest that they be taken as already included” (p. 116).
structures, mechanisms, and events, what the philosophical tradition of critical realism does not stipulate is how (i.e., by what theory) that reality is thought to operate. Stated differently, critical realism propounds that reality should be understood in terms of structures, mechanisms, and events, but it does not offer theories for explaining the natural and social phenomena that can be observed in terms of structures, mechanisms, and events. As applied to research, this philosophical tradition thus requires that scholars bring their theories into the research process – and in a dialectical fashion.

5.2.2 Methodological Implications

Per the tradition of critical realism, empirical research is informed by theory, while at the same time the results of that research help to modify the theory which has guided the investigation a social phenomenon. In essence, then, when conducting research, we first define the phenomenon under study through the elaboration of abstract concepts (as in chapter 4 of this dissertation). Those concepts guide our attention and point to the issues or variables which are thought to be most relevant to understanding and explaining a particular phenomenon. Subsequently, our initial abstractions are refined through research in which they have been applied to the real world. Of course, in practice, in order for this “double movement” of theory influencing research and vice-versa to be achieved, one must engage with a methodology and with specific methods which, in conjunction with theory, allow for the reconstruction, interpretation, and explanation of the phenomenon of interest
(Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 2002). Thus, in what follows, I present a brief discussion of methodology, followed by a lengthy discussion of specific research methods.

5.3 Research Methodology: Longitudinal Case Study

Conceptually, in this dissertation, I focus on explaining a process of education policy formation and how it is transnationally influenced. In accordance with this focus, methodologically, the approach I adopt is known as longitudinal case study (Jensen & Rogers, 2001). Jensen and Rogers (2001) explain this methodology in the following way:

Longitudinal case studies ... focus on political entities or institutions ..., on a particular agency (see Wood, 1988), or on policies, programs, or decisions. [They] may be quantitative or qualitative in character and may involve a formal report and analysis of critical events or processes. ... Time is the organizing device and the dynamics of change are the primary focus. (p. 38)

For multiple reasons, then, the choice of a longitudinal case study approach is appropriate. For example, my study is political in nature and is concerned with the development of a program (EDUCO) over time (from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s). Furthermore, the research necessarily examines processes (in this case, the process of policy formation), and does so by focusing on both critical events and the “dynamics of change” of the policy formation processes across which the EDUCO process

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41 In the parlance of critical realism, the research acts of reconstruction, theoretical interpretation, and explanation – as regards social phenomena – are embodied in the terms abduction and retroduction (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 2002).
program was initially created, subsequently scaled up, and eventually crystallized in
the country’s education policy (Jensen & Rogers, 2001, p. 38).

On the whole, then, one can see that, in the present dissertation, the
ontological, epistemological, theoretical, conceptual, and methodological dimensions
fit together. First, ontologically, there exists a “real world” in which social
phenomena can be explained in terms of structures, mechanisms, and events. To
continue, theoretically, I understand these ontological elements (i.e., structures,
mechanisms, and events) to operate according to the tenets of CIPE (critical
international political economy). Epistemologically, the tenets of CIPE mediate how
I interpret the data I have collected; at the same time, the tenets of CIPE guide the
conduct of research because they point to the issues which are understood to be
relevant to explaining educational reform. To continue, conceptually, as has been
mentioned, the specific phenomena which I explain in this dissertation – and to which
I generalize – are processes of policy formation and the mechanisms of transnational
influence that impact them. Finally, methodologically, I have stated that my approach
is a longitudinal case study. In that this methodology encourages an analysis of
processes and critical events over time in order to assess the dynamics of change as
regards the evolution of policies and programs, it aligns well with the nature of that
around which this dissertation centers – namely, IPEPF (international processes of
education policy formation). Despite the multi-level complementarity described here,
the key to producing insights that facilitate the production of knowledge and the
revision of our guiding concepts is methods – that is, those specific strategies and
practices through which one performs data collection and data analysis.
5.4 Research Methods

In this section, I begin by reflecting on the tasks that the methods employed must be able to accomplish. These tasks necessarily follow from the questions asked, from the underlying theory I employ, and from the nature of the phenomena being researched. I then discuss in detail the specific data collection, data management, and data analysis strategies that align with the needs of the study.

As has been stated, the purpose of this research is, first, to explain the dynamic process (i.e., IPEPF) by which EDUCO was formed, and, second, to unpack transnational influence in that process. By reflecting on these purposes, and while also considering the theoretical tenets of CIPE (i.e., critical international political economy), one can distill ten inter-related tasks for the methods that will be employed. In particular, with regard to the nature of IPEPF, the methods used must help one to accomplish the following tasks:

i) Delineate the political-economic and ideational context of El Salvador prior to and during the development of the EDUCO program;

ii) Specify the point at which the particular policy formation process of interest commences and concludes.

iii) Detail the evolution of the EDUCO program from initial inception to its concretization as part of the MINED’s official education policy;

iv) Determine the constitutive interactions and elements that comprise and delimit the process of policy formation;

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42 Portions of this section draw on Edwards (2012a)
v) Document the creation and content of successive policy-related documents and reports;

vi) Identify the relevant domestic and international actors immediately prior to and during the policy formation process;

vii) Trace the emergence, trajectory and interaction of involved actors over time;

viii) Isolate the actions and roles of the concerned international and domestic actors in relation to each other and among themselves;

ix) Explain, based on tasks i-viii, EDUCO’s overall process of policy formation; and Interpret the general dynamics and specific forms of influence that characterize IPEPF in El Salvador; and

x) Specify the mechanisms of influence through which international, national, and local actors impacted the development of the EDUCO program.

To the extent that I have been able to carry out these tasks, I am able in the present dissertation to explain the IPEPF through which the EDUCO program entered official MINED policy. I am also able to discern the mechanisms of influence through which its development was impacted. As will be shown, that influence has been primarily international in nature.

It should be noted, however, that I will not walk the reader through each of the above-enumerated tasks in this dissertation. Rather, they are tasks which must be accomplished as part of the research process. What will be presented in the findings (chapter seven) of this dissertation is simply the resulting explanation of the policy formation process and how it was transnationally influenced. These findings are contextualized in Chapter six.
Going forward, I will present the particular methods I utilize in order to accomplish these tasks. As will be discussed, I rely on established case-study methods (Yin, 1994), as well as other specific matrix-related analytic strategies (Miles & Huberman, 1994).

5.4.1 Data Collection

Data collection occurred from approximately August 2011 to September 2012. Within this period, I was able to spend nine months in El Salvador due to financial assistance from a Fulbright Student Research Grant from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the U.S. Department of State. Throughout this time, I relied on three sources of information: literature, documents, and interviews. While the first of these typically includes academic publications – for example, books, journal articles, book chapters – the second are typically individual files, reports, evaluations, and other texts which are documentary in nature and which may or may not be publically available.

I relied on these sources for a number of reasons. To begin, the information obtained as one reads related literature, gathers documents, and conducts interviews helps one to understand the basic features of the context and process under study. That is, in the natural course of reading the literature, collecting documents, and performing interviews I began to understand El Salvador’s political-economic and ideational context, to comprehend the elements and events which comprised and delimited the process of policy formation through EDUCO developed, and to identify the domestic and international actors involved.

With regard to literature specifically, historical analyses can provide
information on the political, economic and social contexts surrounding the policy-formation process of interest. Separately, documents generated in relation to specific events in the policy-formation process themselves contain valuable facts and figures, provide data on the nature of those events and on the agendas being constructed and contested, as well as give an indication of where and by whom legitimate information was produced. Similarly, documents such as institutional reports, official legislation, education sector assessments, workshop proceedings, MINED statements, and newspaper articles, among others, can contribute to a more complete understanding of who participated and how, the context of that participation, and the structure of the overall process of policy formation. They also help to identify absences – that is, those voices, actors and perspectives which were not included in such processes (Jupp, 1996).

Furthermore, interviews with local, national, and international actors provide information of a similar nature. In one respect, however, interviews have an advantage over documents: They help one better ‘to gain an understanding of the ways in which ... educational policy is [was] being interpreted, negotiated, and produced in relation to various pressures, and how policy is [was] interpreted by various system actors’ (Engel, 2007, p. 96). Interview data also help one to first identify and then interpret the roles of actors involved in such processes. Lastly, interviews can reveal alternative accounts to the official record that is reflected in government documents. For these reasons, they constitute a valuable source of data.

With regard to the present case of EDUCO’s development, I cast a wide net in gathering documents. This was to ensure that data collection was as inclusive as
possible. In the summer of 2011, before departing for El Salvador, I began to search for documents and to conduct interviews within those institutions which I knew from my literature review had participated in the process of policy formation in El Salvador since the late 1980s. Examples of these institutions include the Academy for Educational Development (AED), Harvard University, the IDB, USAID, and the World Bank. With the exception of Harvard University, these institutions all make available a great deal of documentation through online repositories; in addition, the World Bank also has extensive physical archives. Thus, via the online databases, I was able to access numerous documents related to the engagement of these institutions in EDUCA’s development. To be specific, the types of documents gathered from AED, IDB, USAID, and the World Bank included various reports, evaluations, country studies, workshop proceedings, grant- and loan-related documents, project-specific documents, USAID budgets, and statements of global, regional, and country-level institutional agendas. In addition, before departing to El Salvador, I was able to conduct a number of interviews with key actors from the above-named institutions.

It should be noted, however, that access to World Bank’s physical archives was not possible until my return from El Salvador, in July 2012, due to the considerable amount of time (ten months) the archivists at the World Bank required to retrieve and make available the requested documentation. Moreover, some of the requested documents were subject to special approval processes since they were not yet at the time of request 20 years old. Fortunately for this dissertation, upon my return from El Salvador I was in fact able to review hundreds of internal World Bank
documents related to this institution’s involvement in El Salvador – both generally and with regard to the education sector specifically. Valuable information which had not been publicly released or had not been digitized and uploaded to the online repository was found in these archives, which contained additional project-related documents, loan-approval documents, and personal communication among World Bank staff and between World Bank staff and their Salvadoran counterparts.

For both document collection and the conduct of interviews, my previous experiences and institutional associations were integral. In my case, familiarity with the above-mentioned document sources, as well as the identification of key institutional informants, was made possible through prior research on education policy formation in El Salvador (Edwards, 2013), as well as through a previous consultancy with the World Bank’s Human Development Division. In addition, access to document collections and interviewees located in El Salvador was facilitated by visits to El Salvador twice during 2009 to participate in, and then to help lead, a study trip on education in rural areas. By following up with contacts made during those trips and through the conduct of research (Edwards, 2013) I was able to cultivate the institutional affiliations necessary in order to apply for and be selected to receive a Fulbright Research Grant. These Salvadoran affiliations – with a university (Central American University, UCA), a think tank (Business Foundation for Educational Development, FEPADE), and an educational consulting firm (Centro Alfa) – were vital because these institutions both house documents related to EDUCO’s develop and have themselves been involved in multiple rounds of educational reform in El Salvador. These institutions thus contained valuable
documentation, provided me with access to key actors in Salvadoran educational politics, and lent me credibility as I went about collecting data.

Using the documents obtained and interviews conducted before arriving in El Salvador as a guide, I was able to identify and explore additional archives while in country, often with the help of my institutional connections. In particular, in El Salvador, I explored the archives of the Central American University (UCA) – which houses the largest library in the country and which has a special collection of government documents), Business Foundation for Educational Development (FEPade), Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development (FUSADES), the MINED, and the two largest newspapers in the country (La Prensa Gráfica, El Diario de Hoy). To be sure, these archives contained documentation not available elsewhere. That is to say, while the documentation I collected from the online databases of international institutions was certainly valuable, the documents I gathered from archives in El Salvador provided additional information and insights.

Table 5.1, below, details the types of documents that I collected from each of the archives upon which I relied. As this table indicates, I collected a wide range of documents. Among these many documents, a few have proven to be particularly valuable for their revelatory nature. I refer, in particular, to the personal collection of documents to which I was granted access by an education expert at FEPade. This personal collection was assembled by the education specialist from UNICEF who worked first as a consultant with the MINED in 1990 and then from 1991-1994 as the first director of the EDUCO office within the MINED. Among other documents, this collection, which spanned 1990-1994, contained personal [continued after table]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Archive Source</th>
<th>Description of Documents Collected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AED</td>
<td>Project documents, evaluations, workshop proceedings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEPADe</td>
<td>Internal government documents related to the implementation of World Bank education loans; a personal collection of documents from a former UNICEF education specialist working in El Salvador in the early 1990s; EDUCA evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUSADES</td>
<td>Consulting reports, evaluations performed by IDB and FUSADES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Documents related to IDB education loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINED</td>
<td>Year-end reports on education system, evaluations, progress reports, education statistics, curricula, training documents, documents related to World Bank projects, documents related to USAID-funded programs, UNESCO publications, education laws, informational documents on education programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salvadorian Newspapers</strong></td>
<td>Articles from two national newspapers: El Diario de Hoy, La Prensa Gráfica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCA</td>
<td>MINED documents; masters’ theses; FEPADe publications; evaluations of – and literature related to – popular education; literature on political, economic, and educational history of El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Documents related to USAID-funded projects and programs, education sector assessments, project evaluations, USAID strategy documents (world-, regional-, and country-level), USAID budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Documents related to World Bank education loans, related projects, and structural adjustment loans to El Salvador; evaluations; country studies; strategy documents; personal communication among World Bank staff and between World Bank staff and their Salvadoran counterparts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

communications between the UNICEF education specialist and staff of the MINED as well as a variety of documents related to the establishment, operation, and evaluation of EDUCO during its early stages. According to the education expert from FEPAGE who granted me access to this collection of documents, it had not been previously shared with other individuals and had not yet been analyzed.

One other set of documents proved to be especially informative. I refer here to loan- and grant-related documents from IDB, USAID, and World Bank, such as loan- and grant-preparation, loan- and grant-approval, and the evaluation of loan- and grant-funded programs and projects. These documents often contained candid assessments of El Salvador’s political, economic, and social context, as well as the risks and obstacles associated with implementing reforms. They thus provided a window into the thinking of key actors within these influential institutions.

Moving on, the strategy for accessing interviewees in El Salvador was very similar to that for locating documents. I began by approaching those key actors with whom I spoke during previous research. For that research, I began by collecting as many documents as I could directly related to events in the process of policy formation between 2003 and 2005 (such as event reports, sector assessments, etc.), and then proceeded to email or call each author and/or participant listed in the documents. In following this strategy for my dissertation, although many of my attempts to contact individuals were unsuccessful, a few were not, and the snowballing process accelerated the more that I obtained the endorsement of well-known actors, particularly those actors who were currently holding – or who had previously held – high-level positions within the MINED. In tandem with this
strategy, I relied on my new institutional affiliations for recommendations. Finally, it should also be noted that I relied on the contacts that I made in 2009 (when studying rural education in El Salvador) in order to gain access to local-level actors, such as community members and popular education teachers. Overall, then, I followed purposive and snowball sampling techniques in order to locate interviewees (Berg, 2007).

In total, I interviewed 82 actors for this dissertation. This is above the average of 36 for case-study research (Mason, 2010). Table 5.2, below, lists the institutional actors with whom I spoke, as well as their level (i.e., international, national, local). In all, as can be seen, I spoke with representatives from government (MINED, National Assembly), multilateral institutions (UNICEF, World Bank), bilateral aid agencies (German Organization for Technical Cooperation, USAID), international NGOs (AED, Research Triangle International), Salvadoran think tanks (FEPADE, FUSADES), academia (Central American University), local NGOs (ADES, CIAZO), teachers unions (Union for EDUCO Teachers [SIMEDUCO], Bases Magisteriales), teachers from the popular education movement, and international consultants, among others.

Conceptually, as was pointed out in Chapter 4, the distinction between the levels international, national, and local is not always clear. Thus, while the institution for which one works tends to be associated with a particular level, what is more important than simply theorizing differences among levels is that we problematize how actors from these levels interact, use their power, and are shaped by the power of others. That is to say, while the (imperfect) distinction among [continued after table]
Table 5.2: Interviewees by Level and Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level/Category</th>
<th>Institutional Entity/Actor Description</th>
<th># Ints.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Level Actors (44 total international interviewees)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Agencies</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral Donors</td>
<td>German Organization for Technical Cooperation</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International NGOs</td>
<td>Academy for Educational Development</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Research Triangle International</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Harvard Institute for International Development</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Consultants and Researchers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Level Actors (31 total national interviewees)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental Officials</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MINED</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Note: MINED interviewees included former ministers and vice-ministers of education, EDUCO office personnel, education country directors, unit directors within the MINED, and other specialists, advisors, trainers, and staff.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Stakeholder Groups</td>
<td>Teachers’ Union Representatives</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- SIMEDUCO (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Bases Magisteriales (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think Tanks</td>
<td>Salvadoran Found. for Economic and Social Development (FUSADES)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business Foundation for Educational Development (FEPADE)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>Central American University</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local Level Actors (7 total local interviewees)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGOs</td>
<td>Association for the Econ. and Social Dev. of Santa Marta (ADES)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Popular Education Foundation (CIAZO)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Stakeholders</td>
<td>Popular Education Teachers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # Interviewees</td>
<td></td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

international, national, and local levels is to some extent useful as a classificatory system for involved actors, we must, during analysis, be sure to investigate how, for example, “international” actors from outside El Salvador enter into and impact those
“national” spaces where education policy is made and influenced (Robertson, 2011). Likewise, we must do the same for national actors: We must be attuned to how, for what purposes, and with what effects those actors enter into spaces beyond El Salvador’s borders, as well as those spaces within the country where transnational influence tends to circulate. To the extent that local level actors enter into either national or international level spaces, the same can be said of them. The idea is simply that we must assess how actors primarily associated with one level affect the actors, actions, agendas, and mechanisms of the other levels.

To continue, while the above table specifies the total number of interviewees, what is more important is confidence that I have interviewed as many relevant actors as possible from each level and type of actor. One gains this confidence by continuing to perform and seek new interviews until one has successfully spoken with all those actors whom documents and other interviewees suggest are important. Saturation is the other way in which one obtains confidence regarding the extent and accuracy of the data collected through interviews (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006; Mason, 2010). Evidence of saturation around a particular interview topic or from a particular subgroup begins to emerge when interviewees largely repeat the same stories, offer the same explanations, and give the same information. That said, even when one begins to experience saturation, one should continue to seek out under- and/or unrepresented voices and perspectives. In my research, I erred on the side of caution by conducting as many interviews as possible and by continuing to seek out under-represented voices and perspectives.

Through these strategies, I was able to access many key actors who were
integral to education reform during the early-to-mid 1990s and beyond in El Salvador. Included in this group of key interviewees, there are the following:

- Staff from the MINED in the early 1990s – including all Ministers of Education from 1990-2009, the advisor to minister at the time of EDUCO’s adoption, a number of the initial and subsequent staff of the EDUCO office, and staff from the office that handled international cooperation within the MINED;
- Members of the initial teams from UNICEF and the World Bank that interacted with MINED officials in the early 1990s;
- High-level personnel from the USAID office in El Salvador – including the director and sub-director of the Office of Education from the late 1980s and early 1990s, and other programmatic staff;
- Long-serving representatives of teachers unions, whose experiences date back to the 1970s;
- Members of the popular education movement and individuals who have worked in local level NGOs that act on their behalf;
- A key actor from Harvard’s Institute for International Development; and
- Educational consultants from El Salvador, Chile, and the United States.

As will be shown, through the data collected from these interviews, I was able to accomplish many of the necessary analytic tasks delineated above.

On a technical level, the interviews I conducted were semi-structured or, in Berg’s (2007) terms, “semi-standardized” (p. 95); they were conducted in either English or Spanish, as appropriate; they were performed at a location chosen by the
interviewee; and, lastly, they were recorded, provided the interviewee gave consent (Siedman, 2006; Berg, 2007). The duration of interviews ranged from 30 minutes to two hours, with the average length being just under an hour. Additionally, I did not perform member checks. In cases where member checks may have been useful, I was able to clarify issues through triangulation. This was possible due to the large number of interviews that I conducted.

The questions dealt with the interviewee’s experience with, knowledge of, and perspective on the development of the EDUCO program. Questions were both general and specific, and tailored to the level and prior experiences of each interviewee. I asked about the events that made up the process through which EDUCO was developed; about the involvement, actions and influence of international actors in them; about the dynamics of interaction among and between international, national and local actors; and about the ways in which these factors affected the emergence and path of EDUCO. As will be shown, by asking such questions, I collected data that serve to amplify and problematize those official and prevailing accounts of the development of the EDUCO program in El Salvador which were produced by and/or for the government and the World Bank (both of which have created a great deal of research and literature related to EDUCO).

Although the discussion above has focused on data collection, in qualitative research it is not possible to completely separate data collection from data analysis. The former is an inherently iterative process, as analyzing the data one has collected facilitates identification of gaps in the data obtained and points to remaining data needs. Furthermore, with regard to document collection, one must have a way to
ensure that the texts retained for further future analysis are relevant. Thus, as with Engel (2007), during the process of document gathering, I evaluated “each document ... for its usefulness for analysis” against the data analysis tasks driving the study (p. 101). As Engel (2007) does, I relied on the set of specific questions developed by Guba and Lincoln (1981) in order to establish each document’s appropriateness for analysis. This set of questions includes, for example, the following: Who is the author and what is the author trying to accomplish? For whom was the document intended? What other documents may supplement this one? What is the subject of the document? How is the subject of the document articulated? What is the location where the document was generated? What is the context in which the document was written? What is the date/time of the document? Some documents provide more information than others, and it is important to distinguish which to retain for more in-depth analysis. This was accomplished by evaluating each document in light of the questions listed above. However, once documents are collected and interviews have been conducted, the question of data management emerges.

5.4.2 Data Management

I developed systems to manage the dozens of interviews and hundreds of documents that I collected. First, I created an interviewee database using Excel. In this file, I kept a record of all the potentially relevant interviewees, as I became aware of them. That is to say, as I read documents and conducted interviews related to EDUCO’s development and to education reform more generally, I recorded names wherever they were mentioned. I would then search documents and the internet for additional information on the involvement of those actors within and outside El
Salvador in education reform. At the same time, I would look for contact information. Many times, I was able to acquire contact information for hard-to-locate actors through the relationships I developed with key institutional actors. Other times, interviewees were able to provide such information, in addition to providing commentary on the careers, intentions, and current locations of those actors I had noted as being potentially relevant. In the interviewee database itself, I stored each of these pieces of information (e.g., organizational experience, whether they were seen by other as being particularly relevant, contact information). While the final number of actors interviewed for this dissertation was 81, the interviewee database ultimately contained over 250 individuals who were involved in education reform in El Salvador since the late 1980s.

After conducting interviews, I noted them in an interview tracking table. This table contained the pseudonym I assigned for each interviewee (though not their names) along with other important information. I recorded, for example, the language (English vs. Spanish), date, and duration of the interview. I also noted whether or not I had an audio file (as opposed to only hand written notes) for each interview. In addition, since I transcribed some but not the majority of interviews, I specified who the transcriber was, whether the transcription had been completed, and whether the transcriber had been paid. This tool was helpful for staying organized.

The final tool that I created to facilitate data management was a document database. In the software program Excel, I created a spreadsheet in which I catalogued the titles of all the documents and literature I collected. Along with the names, however, I also catalogued the following: author name, author institutional
affiliation, year and month of publication, and whether the document was relevant to the development of the EDUCO program. To complement this information, I classified each document as either academic (i.e., journal articles, book chapters, books) or institutional (i.e., documents produced in relation to institutional operations) in nature and added to this a sub-classification that further indicated the type of information that could be found in each document. Table 5.3, below summarizes this classification scheme. The sub-classifications are clearly not mutually exclusive; in applying these labels, I assigned that which, upon review of the document, stood out as most appropriate. The last two columns in the spreadsheet noted in which folder on my computer each document is stored (if I have a digital copy) and whether or not I have a printed copy of the [continued after table]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Classification</th>
<th>Sub-Classification</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>Doc in scholarly outlet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>E.S Background</td>
<td>History/Background on El Salvador, not specific to education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>Education in E.S</td>
<td>Related to education in El Salvador generally (but not EDUCO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Relevant, but not specific to El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News</td>
<td>Doc in newspaper</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Published by an institution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Contains Institutional Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Informative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Evaluative</td>
<td>Contains assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Promotional</td>
<td>Meant for public consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Created to train institutional staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Procedural or not for public consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Communicates laws/decrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Not academic or institutional in nature</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
document. As a final comment on managing the documents I collected, I mention that I brought with me to El Salvador a scanner with which to digitize the majority of documents amassed. These have been stored on my computer, where I have a folder for each institution’s documents.

5.4.3 Data Analysis

A number of data analysis strategies were employed, for which I drew from Miles and Huberman (1994) and Yin (1994). The description of these methods – presented below – should not be interpreted as a strictly linear sequence, but rather as a set of inter-related analytic activities that inform each other and often occurred simultaneously, though some techniques were naturally more relevant at the beginning or end of the data analysis. I define each strategy (many of which I employed previously in Edwards, 2013) and discuss its application to the case of EDUCO’s development in El Salvador. Table 5.4, below, summarizes each of the eleven strategies employed.

The first step involved reviewing the literature that I collected. This included literature on El Salvador’s political and economic context during the 1980s and 1990s, as well as literature related to the landscape of education reform worldwide in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Reviewing such literature helped to understand the pressing issues within El Salvador that would have impacted government reform during this time, as well as the larger backdrop of geopolitical trends (e.g., the Cold War) and trends in thinking around development (e.g., the rise of neoliberalism).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Strategy Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Literature Review</td>
<td>Review literature gathered and establish, for example, political-economic country context within which policy formation occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Repeatedly Analyze and Code data</td>
<td>Assess for IPEPF context, isolate facts about IPEPF and EDUCO (dates, events, actors involved, etc.), and, code data (e.g., interviewee statements re dynamics, influence, process mechanisms, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Memoing</td>
<td>Consider data gathered and record emerging findings, reflections, or insights into meaning of interrelationships among data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Perspectival flow chart</td>
<td>Aggregate actors’ characterizations of events and processes by level and period, and then analyze cross-sections for themes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Events listing</td>
<td>Create a chronological listing of all events during policy formation process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Critical events timeline</td>
<td>Distill events timeline to only include those events, actions, and actors around which data converge; include commentary on significance and dynamics of each event, based on repeated analysis and evolving understanding of process dynamics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Policy content tracing</td>
<td>Follow emergence of policy content across process-related documents produced by various actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Actor-Influence Matrix</td>
<td>Distill and summarize by time period actions and forms of influence of actors, as well as shifting structural characteristics; analyze for themes in conjunction with other analytic strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Context charts</td>
<td>Visually represent the linkages among the essential events, actors, and context for each period of IPEPF. The focus is on mapping context, rather than attributing causation in the process of policy formation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Logic models</td>
<td>Elaborate the interplay of context, events, and actors, and explain the ways in which each of them acted and interacted to influence, constrain, or enable IPEPF generally while facilitating, inhibiting or otherwise affecting the development of the EDUCO program specifically.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Causal diagrams</td>
<td>Departs from the logic model and “Display[s] … the most important independent and dependent variables in a field of study (shown in boxes) and of the relationships among them (shown by arrows). The plot of these relationships is directional, rather than solely correlational” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, 153).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The analytic strategies are iterative and cumulative; thus, while certain tasks are associated more with particular analytic strategies, they are not entirely separable from the adjacent steps in the analysis.*

Source: Adapted from Edwards (2012a)
The second data analytic step in which I engaged consisted of repeatedly analyzing and coding the data. However, although I began to repeatedly analyze the document and interview data during the data collection phase (e.g. in order to identify gaps in the information collected), moving to the stage of more formal analysis was different (a) in that the process was more structured, (b) in that it took into account all the data that I had collected, and (c) in that I began to code the data as well. Document and interview data were repeatedly analyzed in order to identify and extract factual information on who participated, when, how, through which events, and under what constricting or enabling structural conditions. During analysis of interview transcriptions, I also coded relevant sections of text that communicated the ways in which involved institutions participated in the process by which EDUCO was developed into an official policy. This first strategy was crucial, as repeated interrogation of the data allowed for incisiveness during subsequent analytic stages. Lastly, the initial analysis contributed to the identification of emergent themes which I was able to explore and refine as I moved through later steps.

Memoing was the third strategy that I employed. Here, as I considered the data gathered, I recorded incipient insights, reflections and findings regarding the meaning of and interrelationships among data. These insights emerged through the analysis of individual and multiple sources of data and related both to minor and major issues - for example, the meaning of one interviewee’s statements, or a more nuanced understanding of how certain actors strategically engaged in a series of events to systematically influence agenda construction. This step was particularly important, since it was by reflecting on and drawing connections among the gathered
data that I was able, among other things, to more concretely discern the boundaries of EDUCO’s process of policy formation. That is to say, while the conclusion of the process by which EDUCO entered official policy was not particularly difficult to identify, the bounding the commencement of that process was more challenging since it required me to identify the point at which domestic and international actors begin to engage specifically for the purpose of policy formation.

It should be noted that memoing was also important for developing an understanding of the structural issues that constrained certain actors and enabled others. This is because structural issues tended not to be readily evident. Thus, as I become familiar with the laws, regulations, aid relationships, loan conditionalities, and other forces which impinged upon the actions of involved actors and undergirded the entire context, it was essential that I recorded those insights in memo form so that I could revisit and revise them following subsequent data analysis. Lastly, given that many of the strategies described below provided structured spaces in which to organize and analyze the data collected, memos provided, in contrast, a valuable, free-form space in which to pursue insights and engage in reflections on the relations among multi-level data and the complex contexts to which they pertain. Thus, though memoing is the third strategy described here, it is an important method with which I engaged throughout the data analysis process.

The fourth strategy related to what can be called a perspectival flow chart. The purpose of this data analysis tool is to record and analyze how actors characterize periods of – or events and interactions within – IPEPF. These characterizations can be derived from interviewee recollections, institutional documents and previously
published reports. Given both the potentially numerous sources and levels from which characterizations flow, as well as the many events and processes to which they may pertain, the advantage of this flow chart was that it helped to group and array data in such a way that it facilitated analysis. More extended thoughts on the data contained in such a chart can be recorded in memos. Table 5.5, below, provides an example of a perspectival flow chart.

**Table 5.5: Example of a Perspectival Flow Chart**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform periods/ Actors</th>
<th>IPEPF 1</th>
<th>IPEPF 2</th>
<th>IPEPF 3</th>
<th>Themes / comments across IPEPF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-period 1</td>
<td>Sub-period 2</td>
<td>Sub-period 1</td>
<td>Sub-period 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind. actors</td>
<td>Actor 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat. actors</td>
<td>Actor 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local actors</td>
<td>Actor 1</td>
<td>Actor 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Themes / comments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Edwards (2012a)

The fifth and sixth strategies were closely related. Respectively, these strategies were creating an **events listing** and then creating a **critical events timeline**. In the former, I created a chronological listing of all events during the process of EDUCO’s development until it became official policy, as understood on the basis of repeated interrogation of the data. It built directly on strategy number two. This listing was more extensive and inclusive than the critical events timeline, which only included those events around which data converged. Furthermore, the critical events timeline included space to record commentary on the significance of the actions which occurred during and around each event, process or sub-process. Over the
course of analysis, findings may begin to emerge by critically evaluating and reflecting on events. Importantly, the picture arrived at by constructing the events timeline and then reducing it to the critical events timeline was not assumed to be complete and total; however, on the basis of repeated analysis of the data and convergence of multiple data sources around a handful of events, actions and actors, I was able to interpret and gain insight into the way in which certain circumstances and variables shaped and influenced various stages of EDUCO’s development. Table 5.6, below, provides an example of how I constructed the critical events timeline.

**Table 5.6: Example of a Critical Events Timeline**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>(Ongoing) Event(s) Information</th>
<th>Commentary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Period 1</strong></td>
<td>Sub-Process(es)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-period 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-period 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Period 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-period 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-period 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Edwards (2012a)

**Policy content tracing** constituted the seventh strategy. As the name implies, in this step I was attentive to the evolution of discussion around EDUCO in documents from the the IDB, MINED, USAID, and World Bank. This step, in conjunction with analysis of the interviews, provided valuable information on how, when, and why the EDUCO program and the ideas behind it (before they were known as “EDUCO”) began to enter documents produced by the MINED.

The eighth strategy I employed aggregates and summarizes the actions and
influence of multiple levels of actors during the process of policy formation. It is similar in design and purpose to the perspectival flow chart, and is labeled an actor-influence matrix. Like the perspectival flow chart, it accommodates a summary of things over time. It is different, however, in that the perspectival flow chart contains characterizations provided by interviewees, while the actor-influence matrix is populated by the researcher on the basis of their (by now) revised, refined and indepth understanding both of the process in general as well as the specific actions, intentions, and forms of influence of the relevant actors. Beyond a representation of the actors’ own perspectives, then, it helps to clarify when actors became involved in EDUCO’s development, the ways in which they engaged with that development, what their intentions were, and how they influenced the program’s trajectory. Furthermore, unlike the perspectival flow chart, this matrix can include a row in which to record notes on developments in the political-economic (i.e. macro or structural) conditions in which each the process took place. Through this strategy, then, I was able to juxtapose in a single location the actions, intentions and influences of multiple levels of actors, along with macrostructural features (e.g. World Bank loan conditionalities) that affected how and when EDUCO entered official MINED policy. Table 5.7, below, is an example of an actor-influence matrix.
Table 5.7: Example of Actor-Influence Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform Periods/Actors</th>
<th>IPEPF 1 Sub-period 1</th>
<th>IPEPF 1 Sub-period 2</th>
<th>IPEPF 2 Sub-period 1</th>
<th>IPEPF 2 Sub-period 2</th>
<th>IPEPF 3 Sub-period 1</th>
<th>IPEPF 3 Sub-period 2</th>
<th>Themes/comments across IPEPF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intl. actors</td>
<td>Actor 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actor 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actor 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natl. actors</td>
<td>Actor 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actor 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actor 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local actors</td>
<td>Actor 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actor 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actor 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bias of the system</td>
<td>Aspect 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Themes/comments across levels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Edwards (2012a)

The ninth analytic strategy was to create a context chart. As Miles and Huberman (1994) explain, a context chart is “a network, mapping in graphic form the interrelationships among the roles and groups (and, if appropriate, organizations) that go to make up the context of [overall] behavior” (p. 102). The process of working with the data to produce such a graphic relies on the tactics of identifying patterns of interaction as well as “subsuming particulars into the general” (p. 104). As such, in large part, it is a distillation and visual representation of the information that the actor influence matrix contains. Importantly, the process of creating a context chart leads the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of the linkages among the events, actors and context for each period of IPEPF. One is “not simply drawing a ... chart, but ... mapping salient properties of the context” (p. 104). Because two-dimensional context charts are inherently static, in my research on El Salvador I produced multiple context charts to reflect the changing dynamics and relations among actors between the late 1980s and 1995. Lastly, it should be mentioned here that context charts, as their
name implies, are characterized not so much by the attribution of causation in producing policy as by their inclusion and mapping of a process’s overall constitutive events and contributing actors.

Below, I present an example of a context chart in Figure 5.2. This figure charts the interrelationships among the research methods employed for this dissertation. Note that the first strategy mentioned about – literature review – is not included in the chart. Also note the bidirectional arrows among strategies, indicating the iterative and complementary nature of these proposed strategies. Lastly, reading this context chart from top to bottom indicates that general sequence in which I engaged in the strategies described in this section (though, as noted above, they process of analysis was inherently iterative).

The **tenth** strategy was to elaborate a **logic model**. Crucially, the purpose of this strategy is to explain the overall process of policy formation and the ways in which various actors impacted EDUCO. In so doing, I condensed a large amount of data in order to zero in on the most salient features, as parsed out by previously engaging in the series of analytic strategies described above. In the end, as Miles and Huberman (1994) explain, “if you’ve done it [i.e created a logic model] right, you will have respected the complexity of local causality as it ... played out over time, and successfully combined ‘process’ and ‘variable’ analyses” (p. 160). Thus, it demonstrates causal relationships by explaining how certain conditions lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships (Yin, 2003). In the words of Yin (2003), it deliberately stipulates “a complex chain of events over time ... in repeated cause-effect-cause-effect patterns, whereby a [continued after table]
dependent variable (event) at an earlier stage becomes the independent variable (causal event) for the next stage” (p. 127). With regard to form, a logic model is a tightly wound narrative that succinctly conveys only those particularities and contextual features necessary to explain how the policy formation process proceeded,
and, within that, how various actors and forces impacted the development of EDUCO.

The results of the logic model constitute the majority of what is presented in the findings chapter of this dissertation. To be sure, the writing of the logic model was difficult, due to the amount and complexity of the data. I relied on the insights gained by engaging in each of the strategies outlined above. By continually working with the data in each of these ways, I arrived at findings that fed into the development and improvement of the logic model. More specifically, in order to ensure construct validity (i.e. explanatory power) of the logic model, I (a) used triangulation strategies, (b) sought convergence among data, and (c) considered rival interpretations of key events and data (Yin, 2003). Additionally, I followed Miles and Huberman’s (1994) suggestions for making causal assertions: They should be based on specificity, coherence, and plausibility. The recommendations of both Miles and Huberman (1994) and Yin (2003) were particularly useful strategies for dealing with the limitations inherent in the types of data upon which I relied. For example, there were missing (read: unattainable) documents and, potentially, aspects of the process about which I had little or no information with which to make inferences. As a final note, in addition to the suggestions of Yin (2003) and Miles and Huberman (1994), recall that the theoretical tenets I set out in chapter 4 also served as a guide for interpretation where data was limited.

Lastly, while a logic model is a verbal explanation, the eleventh and final strategy, a causal network, is a visual depiction. As Miles and Huberman (1994) write, “[a] causal network is a display of the most important independent and
dependent variables in a field of study (shown in boxes) and of the relationships among them (shown by arrows)” (p. 153). The plot of these relationships is directional, rather than solely *correlational*. It is assumed that some factors exert an influence on others’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 153, emphasis in original). Thus, “[i]n the causal network, the analyst traces the emergence and consequences of a particular theme and orchestrates it with others” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 160).

In the present research, the particular case is the EDUCO program, and the causal network presented in the findings chapter portrays its development as impacted by various actors. It is on the basis of the causal network and the logic model combined that analytic generalizations are made. As a final word on this strategy, it should be noted that, although the visual diagram contains, in the words of Miles and Huberman (1994), only those “most important dependent and independent variables” (p. 153), the process of arriving at the final causal network was neither quick nor easy. Just as with the logic model (from which the causal network departs), I had to return time and again to the earlier tables and matrices to repeatedly refine it and ensure that the final depiction was as accurate as possible.

To provide an idea of how a causal networks might look, I present one in Figure 5.3, below. This figure is drawn from my previous research on education policy in El Salvador. As has been mentioned, that research focused on the dynamics of policy development between 2003-2005, as a particular policy – “Plan 2021” – was being formed. The figure – which maps the actors, events, creation and flow of informational inputs, and presence of legitimating events – should be read from the bottom to the top. Keep in mind, however, that without [continued after table]
Figure 5.3: Causal Network of Process Dynamics in Formation of Plan 2021 in El Salvador during 2003-2005

Source: Edwards (2013)

the accompanying logical model, which explains in detail the relationships among
these elements over time, the causal network is difficult to fully understand.

In the preceding pages, I have elaborated upon eleven distinct yet connected strategies for data analysis. Importantly, these strategies respond to the needs of the study – that is, to the analytic tasks derived from the stated research questions. I enumerated these analytic tasks at the beginning of this section. To the extent that the eleven inter-related and iterative analytic strategies delineated above respond to these tasks, my research on EDUPO’s development is able to explain, broadly, the process by which it occurred and, specifically, how multiple actors from multiple levels contributed to shaping that evolution. In the final section of this chapter, before moving on to an analysis of country context in the late 1980s in the following chapter, I tackle a number of issues that arise in the conduct of research.

5.5 Related Issues

In this final section, I briefly tackle a range of issues associated with the conduct of research. I begin with the matter of researcher positionality, followed by discussions of data integrity, ethical and political consideration, and study limitations.

5.5.1 Researcher Positionality

In addition to being reflexive about my intellectual development and those experiences which have influenced the theories that I personally bring to the conduct of research (see section 5.1), it is also possible that the perception others held of me influenced the process of performing this research. That is to say, in relation to those with whom I interacted in the collection of data, my positionality – or the advantages and disadvantages associated with my position in the world – could have had
important effects (Hopkins, 2007). It is likely that – beyond being generally open, cordial, and accommodating – gatekeepers and interviewees were influenced to some degree by a number of characteristics. These include, for example, the fact that I am male, Caucasian, from the United States, and a student in a PhD program. In addition, the fact that I was a recipient of a Fulbright Research Grant was well received. From my perspective, based on interactions with a range of actors over nine months in El Salvador, the above combination of characteristics at least somewhat influenced at least a portion of the individuals upon whom I depended for information, either directly or indirectly. To put this in perspective, on a number of occasions, my Salvadoran colleagues remarked that, if they were to walk into a certain government office and ask for information or for an interview with a certain official, the process would not have been as simple or as hassle-free as it often was for me. On the other hand, to the extent that interviewees held anti-American sentiment, my positionality also could have limited me.

5.5.2 Data Integrity

Another set of issues to discuss with regard to methods pertains to quality issues. All methods have their strengths and weak points. To that end, Mertens (2005) – drawing on various works by Yvonne Lincoln and Egon Guba – has elaborated a number of dimensions to take into account when performing qualitative research. These include: Credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability, and authenticity. In this section, I attend to each of these in turn.

Considering credibility is equivalent to considering whether the findings of a study are valid. More specifically, in the words of Mertens (2005), the issue of
credibility relates to the extent to which “there is a correspondence between the way the respondents actually perceive social constructs and the way the research portrays their viewpoints” (p. 254). A strategy I used to enhance credibility was triangulation. With this strategy, the researcher confirms facts and interpretations by looking across the data collected to see if multiple sources (e.g., documents, interviews) indicate a common finding.

Transferability relates to the degree to which findings can be generalized to other situations. In the end, this is a decision that only the reader can make; however, the researcher must “provide sufficient detail to enable the reader to make such a judgment” (Mertens, 2005, p. 256). As such, I have been sure to offer detailed descriptions of the context, events, actors, and processes that constitute the case education policy formation and educational change related to EDUCO in El Salvador.

It should be noted, however, that, for the present research, analytic generalization is just as important as generalizations regarding the transferability of findings to other settings. As Small (2009) notes, in case study research, the central question is the extent to which the case helps to refine theory. This approach to transferability and generalizability is consistent with the philosophical tradition of critical realism which undergirds this dissertation.

Associated with transferability is dependability. This concept is concerned with the extent to which others can inspect and trace the protocol and steps taken by a researcher (Mertens, 2005). At heart, the issue relates to whether others can trust one’s methods. To address this concern, I have included earlier in this chapter
extensive details about how data I collected, managed, and analyzed the data for this dissertation.

Confirmability is the next dimension of quality. Mertens (2005) writes that confirmability “means that the data and their interpretation are not figments of the researcher’s imagination” (p. 257). To respond to this point, I cite, to the extent possible, the portion of the data from which my interpretations have emerged. I also attempt to make clear the logic which led to my interpretations. Yin (1994) refers to this as constructing a “chain of evidence.”

The last dimension is authenticity. Here, the concern is whether the researcher presents “a balanced view of all perspectives, values, and beliefs” (Mertens, 2005, p. 257). When reading one’s findings, conclusions, and interpretations, others want to know if the researcher has systematically neglected certain perspectives present within the data. My response to this dilemma has been to interview as many relevant actors as possible and to seek out during data collection those perspectives which might be under-represented. Ultimately, however, the analysis presented in this dissertation is critical in nature. When appropriate, I make clear where data may have been insufficient, where there were incongruous interpretations among actors, and where the interpretations offered have been suggested more by theory than evidence (Mertens, 2005). That said, however, my underlying philosophical tradition – i.e., critical realism – assumes that my analysis and findings – while based on the systematic collection and analysis of data – are necessarily guided by partial evidence and are inherently mediated by my theoretical
tenets. The net result is that, while authenticity is an ideal, it can only be approximated in practice.

5.5.3 Ethical and Political Considerations

All researchers should consider whether there are ethical issues to take into account. With regard to the present research, there were two issues: informed consent and confidentiality. In order to address informed consent, I explained to each participant the purpose of the research – that is, to understand how the EDUCA program developed in El Salvador in the early 1990s – and for what their interview responses were to be used. As well, I requested participants’ permission to digitally record the interviews. Where this permission was not granted, I took notes by hand. I also stressed to the interviewees that confidentiality would be maintained.

Due to the political and potentially sensitive nature of the interview topics, ensuring the confidentiality of each participant’s responses was essential. After data collection, interviews were anonymized by separating identifying information from the transcriptions. An identification key was created to which only I have had access. These strategies were intended both to protect the identity of the participant and to help build trust between myself and the participants.

5.5.4 Study Limitations

The limitations of this study relate primarily to its scope. Three limitations stand out and can be characterized in the following way:

1. The focus of the dissertation only extends until 1995, when EDUCA enters official policy, and so does not focus primarily on the trajectory of
the program thereafter. It should be noted, however, that I made a concerted attempt to address this limitation through the extensive literature review presented in chapter three. Through that literature review, I detail insofar as possible the trajectory of the program in the years following 1996.

2. The focus of the dissertation does not examine how EDUCO operated at the local level, but rather largely at the dynamics of national and international actor interaction for the most part. How EDUCO operated at the local level certainly deserves an in-depth and critical assessment. I can do this in future research, as I collected data at the local level in two separate communities on how EDUCO worked.

3. An additional, and inherent, limitation in this dissertation relates to the number of years that have passed since the phenomenon of interest occurred and the ability of my interviewees to accurately remember events 15 or more years after they transpired. In response to this issue, I took care to triangulate interview data with the information contained in documents which were created more near to the moment at which relevant events occurred.

Despite these limitations, it is hoped that the present dissertation makes a valuable contribution to the literature. To that end, the next chapter presents the national and international contexts within which the EDUCO program was developed.
Chapter 6: National and International Context

This chapter sets the stage such that the dynamics of education reform can be discussed in chapter seven. That is to say, in this chapter, I characterize the national and international contexts relevant to El Salvador from the late 1970s to 1990. Where appropriate, I also discuss the nexus between these two contexts, for, as will be shown, both actors and structural relationships from beyond El Salvador impinged on Salvadoran politics during this time. Throughout this chapter, the goal is to convey the political economic context at the end of the 1970s, show how the features of that context interacted and changed over time, and explain the genesis of the circumstances with which education reformers would be confronted in the early 1990s. In short, I attempt to explain the conditions which created the conditions within which EDUCO would eventually emerge.

To accomplish these tasks, I move through eight sections in this chapter. In the first section, I characterize the roots of the unequal and repressive situation found in El Salvador by the 1970s. Second, I discuss the emergence of armed resistance to that context in the 1980s. Third, I explore the origins and characteristics of the educational strategies that emerged during the war in conflictive areas. Fourth, I overview the rationale and nature of US government involvement in El Salvador during the 1980s in response to the conflict. In the fifth section, I then detail the contours of Salvadoran electoral politics. This section shows how those in power at the national level moved from an alliance with the inward-looking, landed oligarchy
to being a new, outward-looking, export-oriented elite. In the sixth section, I then present and analyze the engagement and re-engagement of key national and international organizational actors. These actors are the organizations that would later be relevant to education reform in the early 1990s. In the penultimate section, I mention the World Conference on Education For All, which subsequently would be a referent for those involved in Salvadoran educational reform. In the final section, I briefly conclude.

6.1 The Roots of Conflict

As Meade (2010) notes, the elite in El Salvador evolved in a manner distinct to that of the Somoza family in neighboring Nicaragua. Not entirely dependent on the United States, they “evolved as a force in their own right” – though they accepted humanitarian and military aid and were “quick to call on the [United States] … if they proved unable to manage their affairs alone” (p. 291). Since the mid-1800s, there has been “a small landed elite known popularly as the ‘Fourteen Families’” who “owned 60 percent of the farmland, the entire banking system, and most of the nation’s industry” (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 34). Moreover, as Acevedo (1996) notes, by the late 1970s, “42 percent of urban workers were earning an income that placed them below the official poverty line” – a situation that was sure to be worse in rural areas (p. 27). In terms of inequality, Acevedo (1996) notes that, by 1974, while the poorest 20 percent of the population received only 2.8 percent of total income, the richest 20 percent were bringing in 66.4 percent.

43 From this farmland, they produced and exported coffee, sugar, beans, and corn, in addition to processed food and textiles (Meade, 2010).
Beyond control of the country’s political and economic systems, the elite also controlled the military and had their own loyal armies (or “death squads”). With such power, they created a police state in the 1970s in reaction to government efforts at land redistribution, protests regarding the inequality that increasingly beset El Salvador since the 1960s (at which point 12 percent of the peasantry had no land), and the influence of liberation theology throughout the country, but particularly in rural areas. This repression, combined with the ideology of liberation theology, played a key role in engendering the armed resistance that would emerge.

Events came to a head in 1980 in El Salvador. During that year, a number of key figures were assassinated for speaking out, resisting repression, and working against social and economic injustice (Meade, 2010). Among these key figures was archbishop Oscar Romero, the leading Catholic cleric in El Salvador and champion of the poor. In addition to denouncing the murder of other priests in the country, whom he was convinced were killed by the military for trying to assist the poor, he also began to call for an end to US military aid to El Salvador because, he asserted, the state would continue to kill innocent civilians so long as it received assistance (Meade, 2010). The final straw was his petitioning individual soldiers to disobey their superior officers as they ordered the execution of civilians.

His death on March 24, 1980, is seen as a turning point, and is often referenced in relation to the escalation of the domestic unrest into civil war (Montgomery, 1995). Subsequent investigations have revealed that the assassination of Oscar Romero was ordered by Robert D’Aubuisson, a former army major who controlled death squads at the time and who, in 1980, founded the Nationalist
Republican Alliance (ARENA). This is the same extreme-right political party that would later gain control of the presidency in 1989, and would retain it until 2009.

The early 1980s were thus characterized by an oppressive and violent context in which death squads sought out subversives and murdered an estimated 30,000 civilians during 1980-1981 (Meade, 2010). By 1983, the total rose to as many as 40,000 (Orr, 2001). This was accompanied and exacerbated by misery, malnutrition, and multiple failed attempts at land reform over the previous decade (Montgomery, 1995). Groups of Salvadorans armed themselves to combat this dire situation.

6.2 FMLN and Armed Resistance

In November 1980, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) was formed from five pre-existing political-military organizations operating in different areas of El Salvador (Montgomery, 1995). These five organizations either re-emerged or formed in the 1970s after a multi-decade period of intense repression of those suspected of being communist. In the late 1970s, the combination of the conditions described above along with electoral fraud and the military prevention of progressive political and economic change through peaceable means engendered armed resistance (Montgomery, 1995).

The first offensive launched by the FMLN occurred on January 10, 1981. By six months later, the country was locked in a military stalemate, despite the comparatively small, ill-equipped, and un-trained nature of the guerrilla groups.

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44 These five political-military organizations were known as the Popular Forces of Liberation, National Resistance, Revolutionary Army of the People, Communist Party of El Salvador, and Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (Montgomery, 1995).
which have been estimated to contain (at the time) 4,000 soldiers, with another 5,000 militia (Montgomery, 1995). Throughout the 1980s, the civil war would be a relatively low intensity conflict that unfolded primarily in the departments of Chalatenango, Cabañas, Morazán, and San Miguel, in the northwest of the country. See Figure 6.1, below, for a map of the departments of El Salvador.

**Figure 6.1: Map of El Salvador**

![Map of El Salvador](http://www.elsalvador.law.pro/cdinf-mapa-sp.php)

The policy goals of the FMLN came into focus during the 1980s. Upon victory, they sought to implement a number of structural reforms, including the nationalization of “banks, external commerce in major exports, the entire energy

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45 By 1984, the FMLN counted between 9,000 and 12,000 combatants (Montgomery, 1995, p. 169).
system, and ‘monopolistic enterprises in industry, commerce, and services’” (Montgomery, 1995, p. 118). This would be complemented by other urban, agrarian, tax, and banking reforms designed to redistribute land, increase government revenue, and ease credit for small and medium-sized businesses. Socially, they wished to reduce unemployment by creating jobs and to implement massive projects in housing, health, education, and culture, with the end goal being a “just distribution of the wealth, the enjoyment of culture and health, and the effective exercise of democratic rights of the great majorities” (Montgomery, 1995, p. 119).

The FMLN did not have a chance to institute these reforms because it did not win the war. Nevertheless, in those portions of Chalatenango, Morazán, Cuscatlán, San Vicente and Usulután controlled by FMLN, there were, in the words of Montgomery (1995), “outlines of revolutionary local government” (p. 119). Though these local governments took different forms in different areas, “there was a universal effort … to organize collective or cooperative farms; to introduce literacy classes for civilians and guerrillas and compulsory education for children; and to institute medical care in areas where most people had never seen a doctor” (p. 122). In contrast to liberal democracies, the FMLN placed emphasis on preparing people for “direct participation in daily decision-making and cooperation toward common goals” (p. 126).46

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46 See Montgomery (1995, p. 119-122) for more on the participatory forms of local government attempted by the FMLN.
6.3 Popular Education

During the 1960s and 1970s the liberation theology of the Catholic Church was generally influential in Latin America, but particularly so in El Salvador. During this time, the Catholic Church turned its attention to poverty and injustice, rather than restricting its focus exclusively to the realm of the spiritual. Catholic priests not only began to defend the rights of the oppressed and to criticize the ills of capitalism, but also to promote and engage in grassroots organization through which community groups were created with the purpose being to study the bible with an eye toward structural injustices which worked against the self determination of the poor (Montgomery, 1995). By the late 1970s, these community groups were targets of repression by death squads in El Salvador and, as such, became recruits for the political-military organizations that would later form the FMLN (Hammond, 1998). Others who did not join became supporters of these organizations covertly.

As Hammond (1998) notes, once the war began, the FMLN recognized the need to organize and educate their base, and so turned to the strategy of popular education. Those who implemented this educational strategy drew on the pedagogy of liberation theology and built on the methods of Paulo Freire (1970), with the idea being to “read the word and read the world” – that is, to identify, understand, and take action against various forms of social, cultural, political, and economic oppression (Freire & Macedo, 1987). In El Salvador, once the war began, the role of the church declined; by the mid-1980s, popular education was supported by community councils with no relation to the church.
Popular education was practiced during the 1980s in areas controlled by the FMLN, as well as in refugee camps in Honduras, and on the front lines during periods of non-conflict (ADES, 2005; Alvear, 2002; Hammond, 1998). Popular education represented the only source of education in these spaces during the civil war, for government-provided educational services were either a non-option or had ceased due to the conflict. Teachers assigned to teach in rural areas often refused to assume those positions (Gillies, 2010). For the FMLN, in addition to a key source of literacy, popular education also represented a way to introduce participants to the political and ideological perspectives for which they were fighting. Ultimately, despite the make-shift nature of this educational arrangement and the lack of resources experienced by popular educators, there were, by the early 1990s, approximately 1,000 teachers and 13,500 students participating in this alternative educational system (Alvear, 2002, p. 189, 200).

6.4 U.S. Governmental Involvement

The first offensive by the FMLN – on January 10, 1981 – occurred just before the conclusion of Jimmy Carter’s presidency in the United States. Because he would leave office on January 20th of that same year, his administration “rushed in $10 million in military assistance” along with military advisors to contain and counter the actions of the FMLN (Montgomery, 1995, p. 113). Despite this reaction, it should be noted that the Carter administration had followed a course of foreign policy seen by many as being particularly tolerant. Nevertheless, despite the easing – somewhat – of Cold War tensions during the 1970s, while Presidents Gerald Ford (1974-1977) and Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) were in office, friction began to build once again in
Central America after the Somoza regime in Nicaragua fell in 1979 to a socialist revolutionary group – the Sandinista National Liberation Front.

Ronald Reagan, the incoming president of the United States in 1981, did not want another Nicaragua in its proverbial backyard (LeoGrande, 1998). As LeoGrande (1998) writes, the “Reagan Doctrine” was a reaction to the policy of tolerance advanced by the previous administration under Jimmy Carter: “Where Carter promoted human rights as a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, Reagan would renew U.S. alliances with anti-communist authoritarian regimes” (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 5). He continues, speaking to the importance of the region at the time, “Central America was the last major battle of the Cold War. Reagan’s policy cannot be understood outside that context” (LeoGrande, 1998, p. x).

Indeed, as others have observed, Reagan exhibited “almost obsessive anticommunism” (Martín-Baró & Cardenal, 1995, p. 5). This led to massive amounts of funding. Whereas the United States provided approximately $150 million in aid to El Salvador from 1963 to 1979, it jumped to approximately $6 billion between 1980 and 1992 (Robinson, 2003, p. 89). In 1985, military aid alone amounted to $533 million (Booth, Wade, & Walker, 2006, p. 105). This aid went “to increase the size of the government forces by nearly 600 percent, to training and advice, [and] to the provision of modern weaponry, including land, air, and sea-based weapons systems of command, control, communications, and intelligence” (Robinson, 2003, p. 89). In absolute terms, as a result of military aid, the Salvadoran army quintupled during 1980-1987, reaching 56,000 members (Montgomery, 1995, p. 198-199).
Perhaps more importantly, the aid provided by the United States is understood to have tilted the advantage in favor of government forces. As Booth, Wade and Walker (2006) write, funds from the United States supported a “failing Salvadoran military and thus profoundly altered the balance of forces between the regime and insurgents” (p. 105). Montgomery (1995) perceives that the FMLN would have won the war were it not for the support of the United States government and the provision of technology that permitted air-based attacks on guerrilla forces.

Yet it should be noted that military assistance was only one prong of the strategy pursued in El Salvador by the US government. Funds directed at political, economic, and social outcomes were also provided in order to influence national politics and induce its preferred policy orientations and measures. Robinson (2003), for example, in writing on the issue of U.S. economic aid during the 1980s reveals that “funds were earmarked specifically for use by private sector groups” and these funds “played a key role in the development of new economic agents and the redistribution of economic and political influence” (p. 89). The creation of “new economic agents” in El Salvador was seen as necessary because the dominant political actors at the time (i.e., the Duarte administration) whom the United States felt compelled to support, at the time, for the sake of the country’s stability did not share the same predilections for economic policy reform.

Thus, while the United States was an actor that significantly affected the political-economic circumstances in which Salvadoran politics unfolded, the reality was that the United States still had to respond to national political dynamics. The next section characterizes the important interaction of these two forces. As will be
shown, by the late 1980s, these interactions as well as further steps taken by the United States created the conditions for a neoliberal reorientation of the Salvadoran elite.

6.5 Dynamics of Salvadoran Electoral Politics

Salvadoran politics at the national level moved through three distinct periods from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. As will be discussed, over the course of these periods those in power at the national level moved from being an alliance with the inward-looking, landed oligarchy to being a new, outward-looking, export-oriented elite. Multiple players are relevant to this transition, including not only the Salvadoran armed forces, national political parties, and distinct factions of the elite, but also political and organizational actors from the United States, as will be shown.

6.5.1 Military Control: 1979 – 1983

The period 1979-1983 of Salvadoran politics has been described by historian Tommie Sue Montgomery (1995) as a “descent into anarchy”. This period began with a coup against President Carlos Humberto Romero, who had been elected through fraudulent elections in 1977 and who governed until late 1979 as a military dictator. In response to the increasing tensions and repression and a lack of action to address the socio-economic inequalities that frustrated Salvadorans, a coup against Humberto was executed in October 1979 by moderate military officers and a junta of progressive civilians, the latter of whom wanted to reign in military repression and
pursue socio-economic reform.\textsuperscript{47} By January of 1980, however, the civilians on the junta grew tired of the military’s recalcitrance with regard to the promised reforms, and so issued their resignation. While the alliance between the military and the progressive junta was short-lived, it still served to sever the historically strong ties between the former and the country’s oligarchy.

From that point onward, three groups followed multi-track strategies. The most right-wing and conservative sector of the oligarchy began to form its own death squads and created its own political party – ARENA. The army retained control of the government while promising reform. Finally, the United States, financed the Salvadoran military’s response to the FMLN while also attempting to ensure political stability by supporting a strengthening of democratic processes that would appease the citizenry through the possibility of reform by electoral means. Covertly, the United States would also influence the outcomes of national-level economic and electoral politics in the name of economic growth and democratic reform (Montgomery, 1995).

Although the military and Ministry of Defense retained their grasp on national politics during the early 1980s (despite the existence of an official junta government populated with civilians), they allowed new presidential elections to be carried out in early 1984. This came about as a result of the counterinsurgency strategy advocated by the U.S. administration at the time, of which governmental reform was one part

\textsuperscript{47} In addition to two young, reform-minded military officers, there were three civilians on the junta. One was Mayorga Quiroz, the rector of the Central American University, a Jesuit institution. The second was Mario Andino, a businessman chosen by the business community. The third civilian was Guillermo Manuel Ungo, a lawyer who was the secretary general of the National Revolutionary Movement and whose father had helped found the Christian Democratic Party (Montgomery, 1995).
(Montgomery, 1995). The outcome of both the 1984 and 1989 presidential elections, as well as the intervening politics and circumstances which constrained them, would irreversibly alter the trajectory of Salvadoran political, economic, and educational reform that would be pursued in the early 1990s.

6.5.2 Attempts at Moderate Presidential Politics: 1984-1989

In the lead-up to the presidential elections of March 1984, the United States did not favor either of the main candidates. Too far to the left was José Napoleón Duarte, a populist who represented the Christian Democrat Party. He favored land redistribution and social welfare programs, called for a “social pact,” and pledged to end death squad violence. On the other side was Roberto D’Aubuisson, who, as mentioned previously, had close ties with death squads and who was the founder of the extreme right wing party ARENA. Ultimately, the United States supported Duarte because he was acceptable to the U.S. Congress, many members of which wanted to avoid the exacerbation of conflict and preferred to seek a political middle-ground that would lead to stability and to the institution of democratic processes. To facilitate Duarte’s victory, the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States spent $2.1 million. In addition, the U.S. State Department organized and paid ($10.5 million) to conduct the 1984 elections (LeoGrande, 1998).

From the perspective of the business community, the Christian Democrats were “barely distinguishable from the Marxist guerrillas” (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 127). In the words of one member of one of the wealthiest families in El Salvador, Duarte was “just a Communist who happens to believe in God” (LeoGrande, 1999, p. 128). The ARENA party was supported by the conservative elite and El Salvador’s business sector. The party exhibited antagonism to agrarian reform and social welfare programs (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 251). See section 6.5.3 of this dissertation for more on how this party changed during the 1980s.
After the election, Duarte was completely handicapped as president. The rightist majority in the National Assembly neutralized the agrarian reform that had been initiated by the civilian junta officially in power prior to 1984. The army tolerated Duarte because his retention of the presidency ensured that aid money would continue to be approved by the U.S. Congress, though Duarte knew that they “retained effective veto power over any initiative they disapproved” (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 261). Moreover, “Washington pressed Duarte to go slow on all fronts [regarding reform]” for fear of “a backlash in the private sector and the armed forces” (p. 261).

Despite Duarte’s inability to accomplish his reformist policy objectives or to engage in real dialogue about ending the war, his message of peace resonated with the Salvadoran people, and the Christian Democrats subsequently won a majority of seats in the National Assembly in 1985. This was a wake-up call for the right-wing ARENA party, which began to realize that their association with death squads was detrimental politically – both in the eyes of Salvadorans and from the perspective of the US Congress. In response, ARENA shed D’Aubuisson as the head of the party and replaced him with Alfredo Cristiani – “scion of one of the nation’s wealthiest families and head of the coffee growers association” (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 264). Cristiani fit the bill because he had been educated at Georgetown, spoke English perfectly, “knew how to talk to gringos … [and] had never been linked to the paramilitary violence of ARENA’s origins” (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 264).

See Montgomery (1995, pgs. 137-138, 187) for more on the agrarian reform. In short, this reform, which had first begun in 1980, sought to nationalize large farms (over 100 hectares) and to transfer ownership of land to those who rented it. In early 1985, the budget for this program was eliminated by the National Assembly.
Duarte was secure in office after 1985 because the United States passed a law that automatically cut off aid to El Salvador in the event of a coup. Despite this, and despite the fact that his party controlled the National Assembly, he was still limited in his abilities as president – on the one hand by the military and on the other by insistence from the Reagan administration for economic reforms. Washington perceived that the civil war was contained – due in no small part to military aid and air fire power it provided – and so turned its attention to economic reform (LeoGrande, 1998; Montgomery, 1995).

To be sure, the economy and the social sectors of Salvadoran life were in dire circumstances by 1985. To summarize, the war was claiming 50 percent of the national budget (and would continue to do so until the end of the 1980s), the government ran an annual deficit of $100 million (which Washington financed), inflation was at 22 percent, real income for agricultural workers had fallen by 30 percent since 1980, foreign debt reached $1.986 billion (double 1984 total revenues from exports of goods and services), and debt service reached $262.3 million. In education, 4,500 teachers had fled the country, many others refused to assume posts outside either the capital or major cities, 1,200 primary schools were closed, and illiteracy rose to 65 percent (and over 90 percent in certain departments) (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 278-279; Montgomery, 1995, p. 190).

Duarte initially resisted prodding by the Reagan administration to implement an economic stabilization plan that would curb the government’s deficits. He nevertheless was compelled to comply when threatened with reductions in aid. In early 1986, he enacted reforms that cut public sector spending, devalued the currency,
raised import taxes, limited imports of luxury goods, and proposed a “war tax” on the wealthy. In an attempt to cushion the effect on the poor, Duarte raised public sector wages, froze the price of basic foods, and increased the minimum wage (which few employers paid). In spite of this attempt, the effect of the package of reforms was immediate and spelled doom for Duarte. The prices of all goods with any imported component rose dramatically. Gasoline prices and bus fares increased by 50 percent and 25 percent, respectively. The poor opposed the package because it exacerbated inflation and degraded their standard of living. The rich, on the other hand, opposed the package because they were subject to higher taxes (LeoGrande, 1998).

While Duarte was looked upon favorably by the U.S. Congress, he was enmeshed in a frustrated situation in El Salvador. His economic reforms created pushback among national actors, and he was never able to address the two priorities he had set as president: Ending the war and improving the quality of life for the poor. The final years of his term were further marred, first, by an earthquake that devastated the capital in 1986, and, second, by a diagnosis of cancer in 1988 which left him unable to accomplish much in his final year as president (LeoGrande, 1998).

6.5.3 Emergence of the New Right: 1989-1994

In the mid-1980s, a group within the ARENA party led by its new leader, Alfredo Cristiani, began to favor economic reforms that aligned with the neoliberal platform being promoted globally by the Reagan and Thatcher administrations along with key multi-lateral organizations (Arno, 1997; Harvey, 1995; Klees, 2008; Mundy, 1998; Peck & Tickell, 2002). The new policy orientation of this group – which differed markedly from the traditional oligarchy, which was comprised
predominantly by landed elite who preferred to remain inward looking – was engendered not only by ARENA’s losses in the 1985 National Assembly elections but also by the actions of USAID within El Salvador. Indeed, during the mid-1980s, USAID worked actively to support and strengthen a faction of the Salvadoran elite which was open to neoliberal economic reforms (Foley, 1996; Quán, 2005). This coincided with the gradual weakening and transformation of that portion of the oligarchy which depended on traditional agricultural exports – a result of the war, the concomitant abandonment of coffee producing lands, and the limited agrarian reform from the early 1980s which appropriated some of the larger farms, in addition to efforts of USAID described above (Robinson, 2003).

As the 1989 presidential elections neared, this “New Lucid Right” was “squeezed between the revolutionary forces and limited reform” of the Duarte government (Robinson, 2003, p. 87). Without a doubt, while Duarte had in 1986 instituted reforms geared to address the government’s deficits, he had not liberalized the country’s economy in the way either ARENA’s new business elite or the Reagan administration would have liked. Cristiani thus ran on a platform of economic recovery and a quick end to the war: “He even pledged to negotiate peace with the guerrillas – an amazing policy reversal for ARENA that reflected how desperately the population wanted peace” (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 566). This reversal also reflected a further realization by Cristiani and the New Right: As long as the war was ongoing their business interests in banking and industry would continue to suffer and it would be difficult to attract international loans and investment (Foley, 1996; Quán, 2005). Finally, in contrast with the traditional oligarchy and the military, Cristiani accepted
the need for some social change – in order to engender social harmony and peace (Boudreax, 1992) – and tolerated moves toward the enhanced functioning of democratic processes, though, as Quán (2005) notes, Cristiani still held a “very circumscribed view of democracy (p. 281).

Cristiani and the ARENA party won the presidential elections of March 29, 1989, and assumed office in June of that same year. Subsequently, a chain of events was initiated that set the country down the path to peace and economic restructuring. With regard to the former, Cristiani immediately called for peace talks to begin with the FMLN. Peace Accords were finally signed in January 1992 with the help of the United Nations – and despite major set backs during late 1989 in the form of a final guerrilla offensive on San Salvador and the retaliatory killing by the military of six Jesuit priests, who were seen as the intellectual leaders of the left (LeoGrande, 1998). In actuality, the gruesome assassination of the priests by the military, combined with the realization that conflict could not be resolved by the use of force, worked in favor of ARENA. This is because while the White House was not fazed by these high-profile civilian murders, the US Congress was “stunned” and immediately began to increase its pressure for a negotiated solution (LeoGrande, 199, p. 570). For more detail on the key events between early 1989 and early 1991 that led to the signing of the Peace Accords, see Table 6.1, below.
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<th>No</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>March 29 1989</td>
<td>Cristiani wins Salvadoran presidency and immediately calls for peace talks to begin with the FMLN.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>November 11 1989</td>
<td>FMLN final offensive in San Salvador.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>November 16 1989</td>
<td>Jesuit priests killed.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>April 1990</td>
<td>Government and guerrillas resume with seriousness negotiations facilitated by the United Nations.</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>July 1990</td>
<td>The government and FMLN sign an agreement to end human rights abuses and to have UN observers monitor compliance once a cease-fire was in place. Talks deadlock, however, around reform of the military.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>October 1990</td>
<td>Senate in U.S. approves Dodd-Leahy language related to point #4 above. The House had already voted on this language in June 1990. This legislation in the U.S. Congress would cut military aid by 50 percent immediately and entirely unless the government made an effort to investigate the death of the 6 Jesuit priests. That same bill allowed the president to restore military aid fully if the FMLN refused to “negotiate in good faith or launched an offensive that threatened the government’s survival” (LeoGrande, 1998, p. 573).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>March 1991</td>
<td>Legislative elections for National Assembly. The leftist Democratic Convergence wins 12% of the vote and 8 seats, showing that the electoral system offered real possibility for the guerrillas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>April 1991</td>
<td>Negotiations produce a major agreement on constitutional changes that strengthened the independence of the judiciary, reorganized the security forces into a single civilian-controlled police force, and created a Truth Commission to investigate the human rights abuses of the 1980s. Changes would begin upon the signing of a cease-fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>September 1991</td>
<td>Marathon negotiations in New York between Cristiani and FMLN’s principal military commanders. Under pressure from Washington, Cristiani made concessions to reduce the size of the military by half and to create an independent civilian commission to review the human rights records of individual officers. All fundamental political and military issues dividing the two sides had been resolved in principle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>December 1991</td>
<td>More negotiations in New York. The U.S. pressured Cristiani to make concessions while a “group of friends” (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Spain) encouraged the FMLN to do the same. A peace agreement was reached, though it was not signed until January 16th in Mexico City.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>February 1 1992</td>
<td>Cease-fire goes into effect. A National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace is installed. The 6-8,000 FMLN combatants and 63,000 were to demobilize by October 31st.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With regard to economic restructuring, the Cristiani administration quickly took steps. As documents from the World Bank (1991b) indicate, in the month following the assumption of power, Cristiani “initiated a major stabilization and structural adjustment program” in order to “create a more liberalized, private-sector led economy” (p. 5). The first structural adjustment loan from the World Bank would be approved in 1991, followed by a second one in 1993.51 While these structural adjustment loans had far reaching implications for the Salvadoran economy, a separate set of loans from the World Bank and the IDB would be approved in the early 1990s that were specifically directed at financing and reforming social sectors such as education and health. The process by which these loans were produced will be the focus, in part, of chapter seven of this dissertation.

The following section addresses the ways in which key national and international organizations engaged and emerged in 1980s. Having already discussed in this chapter the structural constraints that characterized the 1980s, it is now imperative that we understand the genesis and activity of these organizations in the period leading up to and following the election of President Cristiani, for they set the stage and created the conditions under which the EDUCO program was born in the early 1990s. As will be discussed, these organizations were created prior to the election of Cristiani’s administration and then strategically channeled both personnel and informational inputs to it.

51 These were followed with a “public sector modernization” loan from the World Bank in 1996. For more on the significance of these loans in the context of total aid during the 1990s, see Rosa and Foley (2000).
6.6 Engagement and Reengagement of Key Organizations

The development, involvement, and interaction of various organizations must be clarified in order to adequately understand the policy formation dynamics present in El Salvador following the election of Alfredo Cristiani. I focus on the dynamics around FUSADES (the Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development) first, followed by FEPANDE (the Business Fund for Educational Development), and, lastly, United Nations organizations and the IDB. Throughout, where appropriate, I address the influence of USAID and the World Bank.

6.6.1 FUSADES

During the 1980s, USAID supported the creation of two influential NGOs. The first was FUSADES in 1983. As Foley (1996) notes, FUSADES became “the most influential think-tank in El Salvador” precisely because it had the backing of USAID, which was “driven by the Reagan administration’s enthusiasm for private enterprise and committed to creating a string of business organizations throughout Central America to support export-oriented policies” (p. 71-72). In specific terms, while wealthy Salvadoran funders put up about $1,600 each to start FUSADES, this amount was quickly dwarfed in 1984 by a contract that would eventually be worth $50.46 million as part of USAID’s Industrial Stabilization Recovery Program (Foley, 1996). Ultimately, between 1983-1993, USAID would award FUSADES no less than $150 million in contracts (Robinson, 2003).

During 1985-1988, the clout of FUSADES increased exponentially. On the one hand, this was because the think-tank served as an “incubator for … intellectuals … and for private sector leaders who began to provide political and financial support
for [ARENA]” (Robinson, 2003, p. 95). On the other hand, in addition to serving as a “who’s who” of the local technocratic elite (Robinson, 2003, p. 95), FUSADES became the primary conduit through which dominant international actors would work to ensure that neoliberal economic and social reforms would be pursued. Robinson’s (2003) research, for example, reveals the following: “In 1988, in anticipation of ARENA’s electoral victory, the FUSADES drafted an Economic and Social Program. For this purpose, [USAID] and … FUSADES contracted twenty-five international advisors, among them Arnold Harberger of the University of Chicago, one of the original ‘Chicago Boys’” (p. 96). In the research conducted for the present dissertation, multiple interviewees also mentioned the presence and importance of the “Chicago Boys” at the time. Indeed, when I asked one interviewee if the so-called Chicago Boys came “directly” from the University of Chicago, the reply was: “Yes, of course, to work with us in FUSADES – and from there all the priority lines for what would be the government’s plan took shape” (MINEDNL18).

In addition, according to the work of Peter Sollis (1993), at least one economist from the World Bank – José Marques – was on leave in order to work on the economic team at FUSADES (Sollis, 1993). The close ties among such international agencies as the World Bank, FUSADES, and the Salvadoran government are further evident when one considers that the wife of Marques became the Minister of Planning once Cristiani assumed the presidency. Such connections engendered a “significant … positive informal dialogue … between [World] Bank staff and the staff of FUSADES” (Eriksson, Kremer, & Margaret, 2000, p. 29).

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52 See Klein (2007) for more on the history and impact of the “Chicago Boys”.
Formally, though, the involvement of the World Bank was minimal until the late 1980s, having not issued any new loans to El Salvador since 1979, with the exception of a loan for reconstruction after the earthquake of 1986 (World Bank, 1991c).

Close personal and intellectual ties between FUSADES the Cristiani administration were common, however. Eriksson, Kremer, and Margaret (2000) note that the significance of the relationship between FUSADES and the government “became obvious when in mid-1989 the newly elected president, Alfredo Cristiani, who had himself come from FUSADES, selected his reform-minded economic team, including the ministers of planning and finance, as well as the head of the Central Reserve Bank, from key FUSADES staff” (p. 29). In all, not only would “at least 17 business leaders and persons linked with … [FUSADES] became part of the new government” (Segovia, 1996, p. 55). Additionally, just as importantly, “the organization’s Department of Economic and Social Studies drafted the structural adjustment plan which became the basis for the economic program of the new ARENA government in 1989” (Foley, 1996, p. 72). What followed subsequently “was sweeping neo-liberal reform, including trade liberalization, devaluation of the currency, privatizations, the lifting of subsidies, the promotion of non-traditional exports, and the expansion of free trade zones and maquiladora activities” (Robinson, 2003, p. 96).

The implication is that USAID used its resources, first, to identify Salvadoran elite who were amenable to its preferred economic policy positions, and, second, to facilitate the development of an influential national think-tank through which it could create the foundation for later reform. Once in place, the World Bank likewise
participated intimately in the work of FUSADES toward the same policy objectives. Since its' founding, FUSADES has been – and continues to be – an influential actor in national politics.

6.6.2 FEPADE

In the realm of education, USAID founded a second organization in 1986 that would be dedicated to training for those technical, vocational, and business skills which the private sector deemed necessary and which “modern” public sector management required (FEPADE, 2013; McIlwaine, 1998). However, beyond the enhancement of Salvadoran human capital through training programs to create technocrats and a “work-ready workforce” (INTACT29), FEPADE also prepared diagnostics and reports on the education system for the government (MINEDNL18), and even managed the Central American Technical Institute (ITCA) once it had been privatized (MINEDNL15). Notably, the privatization of ITCA was the first time in El Salvador that a public educational institution had been taken over by the private sector (MINEDNL15).

While USAID funded FEPADE, it was managed by “members of the entrepreneurial class” (Moncada-Davidson, 1995, p. 72). To an extent, FEPADE was to the education system that which FUSADES was to the economy. That is, FEPADE was a source of technically capable specialists who offered conservative thought and analysis about the role and needs of the education sector; unlike FUSADES, however, it was also a hands-on organization that implemented programs. For our purposes, though, perhaps one of the most salient aspects of FEPADE was its close relationship with both USAID and the MINED (INTACT29; MINEDNL18). In
the words of a former education consultant who worked with USAID and FEPADE: “[FEPADE] had really good ties with both government and the private sector and that was something valuable to [US]AID, so everybody got along” (INTACT29).

Beyond immediate relationships, however, there are multiple levels on which the institutions of FUSADES and FEPADE should be understood. That is to say, one should consider national institutional dynamics but also the international political economic context of the time. Two quotes emphasize this point. First, with regard to the dynamics of Salvadoran institutions, a consultant who worked with USAID on education reform during the early 1990s commented:

In the early 90s and late 80s, when the struggle was still going on for El Salvador, USAID had supported really the creation of parallel ministries or ministries in waiting. Because even though you have an ARENA government, … the public service was still controlled by public service unions which were more linked to the FMLN. … [Moreover], during this time … there wasn’t a lot of investment in public health, public education, etc … So you had sort of a more abandoned sector at that point … You had this sort of paralysis …. They were a response to that because the public service unions, including the teachers, were aligned with the FMLN. It’s like they needed a separate education ministry … or planning ministry because those ministries – because the public servants, even the higher ranking ones, anyone who wasn’t a political appointee, had come through a very structed unionized system, and so were sympathetic to, or at least nominally sympathetic, to the social democratic party, you know Duarte’s government, the farmer. They weren’t necessarily sympathetic with the front – FMLN” (INTACT14).

With regard to the international political economic context in which El Salvador was nested, that same consultant observed:

“[FUSADES and FEPADE] were a parallel ministry of planning [and] ministry of finance. … So whereas FEPADE was … nominally linked to the business community focused on education, FUSADES was linked to the private sector, but in that time it didn’t mean private sector, it meant pro-US. … The support of FEPADE, like I said, it was part of larger strategy in El Salvador to promote these parallel sort of government in waiting ministries. … Lots of money, lots of development aid went into El Salvador for
geopolitical reasons … FEPADEx became, you know, to a degree an operational arm of [US]AID (INTACT14).

FUSADES and FEPADEx, thus, were not only key organizational players through which Salvadoran elite and neoliberal thinking were fostered, they also served, practically, as “parallel ministries,” through which key planning and analytical tasks could be diverted away from the government’s traditional ministries.

FUSADES and FEPADEx served as alternative sites of activity for governmental tasks as well as alternative entry points during the late 1980s and early 1990s through which (neoliberal) reform-minded individuals could transfer to high-level positions within the government. Indeed, as will be discussed in chapter seven, the Salvadoran Minister of Education from 1990-1998, was first a program manager within FEPADEx. Overall, then, not only were these two institutions at the nexus of international and national political-economic interests, but they served as “ministries in waiting” that entered the government in 1989 with the election of Cristiani. By creating the institutional platforms of FUSADES and FEPADEx in the mid-1980s, USAID ensured that its agenda and those of the entrepreneurial elite they supported would be able to enter the highest of government positions and thus begin the reform work for which they had been planning.

6.6.3 United Nations Organizations and the IDB

While both the United Nations as well as the IDB would play integral roles in the reform and reconstruction of El Salvador from the early 1990s onward (Eriksson, Kremer, & Margaret, 2000; Orr, 2001; Rosa & Foley, 2000; de Soto & del Castillo, 1994), they did not represent significant forces in the context that preceded the
initiation of education reform in 1990. That is to say, while the United Nations (and its associated organizations) would be instrumental in the negotiation and implementation of the Peace Accords and related programs, and while the IDB would extensively fund a wide array of programs in the post-1990 context, the fact is that the involvement of these institutions was minimal during the 1980s and into 1990 (Rosa & Foley, 2000). According to its’ archives, the IDB, for example, provided only two small loans in the 1980s to El Salvador – one in 1987 for $30,000 which provided technical assistance to facilitate the “modernization of the state” and a second in 1988 for $587,000 for the institutional strengthening of FUSADES.

United Nations organizations, on the other hand, while not at all active in El Salvador prior to 1990, were active elsewhere in the world, and in ways that would soon be relevant to education reform there (i.e., in El Salvador). To be specific, it was the work of UNICEF in Bolivia in the second half of the 1980s that would come into play in the politics of Salvadoran education reform a few years later. During these years in Bolivia, the country was experiencing the effects of the structural adjustment program implemented in 1985 (van Dijck, 1998), and to counter the negative effects of austerity multilateral institutions were experimenting with emergency social funds (Reddy, 1998). Such funds were, at least in part, due to

53 To be specific, emergency social funds have been defined as follows: “Emergency Social Funds are intermediary institutions intended to disburse funds from governments to public, private, and voluntary implementing organisations in a rapid manner so as to meet social protection and other objectives. Their characteristic features are that they are multi-sectoral (i.e. they fund projects of a broad variety, typically including employment generation, infrastructure development, and social service provision), largely demand-driven (i.e. they release funds on the basis of proposals from local institutions, municipalities, and non-governmental organisations), intended to be transitory (i.e. designed to accomplish specific social or
advocacy by UNICEF and others during the 1980s for “adjustment with a human face” (Cornia, Jolly, & Stewart, 1988). It is in this context in Bolivia that UNICEF implemented projects for those most affected by the structural adjustment program – for example, projects aimed at literacy for indigenous communities and empowerment for mine workers (whose mines had been closed) (Basso, 1987; INTACT18). Both these grassroots programs and the emergency social fund implemented in Bolivia received recognition in the development community as successes – recognition that would later lend credibility to consultants who transferred from Bolivia to El Salvador (Reddy, 1998; INTACT18).

6.7 World Conference on Education For All

Internationally, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, much attention was drawn to the idea that “participation” was a central component of “good” development strategies. As has been mentioned earlier in this dissertation, by the late 1980s, such international institutions as the World Bank had begun to explore how to increase client participation in market-based development strategies (Edwards, 2012b), USAID raised the issue as a means to promote democracy and the effectiveness of public institutions (Montero & Samuels, 2004), and UNICEF sought to pursue participation at the grassroots level in order to increase literacy and foment empowerment of the disadvantaged (Basso, 1987). In March 1990, the high-profile declaration of the World Conference on Education for All (WCEFA) enhanced this political tasks in a specific period of transition or social strain), and administered by autonomous or semi-autonomous bodies specifically created for this purpose. Additionally, emergency social funds are often predominantly externally financed.” (Reddy, 1998, p. 4).
focus on participation by asserting that “partnerships at the community level … should be encouraged” because “they can help harmonize activities, utilize resources more effectively, and mobilize additional financial and human resources” (WCEFA Secretariat, 1990, p. 58, as cited in Bray, 2003, p. 32). For our purposes, then, WCEFA not only elevated the necessity of enrolling all children in school, but did so in a way that reinforced the notion that this should be accomplished by incorporating community-level partnerships as a primary strategy. To be sure, this aspect of WCEFA would be referenced by multiple parties working on education reform in El Salvador, each doing so in order to justify their particular version of participation, as will be shown.

6.8 Conclusion

In this chapter, I explained both the international political economic context of the 1980s as well as the transformation of national political dynamics that occurred within and – in large part – because of that international political economic context. In so doing, I have also attempted to demonstrate the powerful influence (both formally and informally) of such international organizations as USAID and the World Bank. To be sure, by the end of the 1980s, the Cristiani administration was not only on the same page as USAID and the World Bank, but was intimately networked with, and took a cue from, them – and other neoliberal reformers – with regard to the way forward for El Salvador. Within El Salvador, FUSADES and FEPADE became key spaces for the circulation and promotion of neoliberal thinking, both in terms of economic and educational policy. Due to their connectedness, extensive resources, and well-respected national and international experts, these organizations would
remain primary actors in processes of policy reform into the 1990s. It is to one of those processes – i.e., the process by which EDUCO emerged – to which I now turn in the next chapter.
Chapter 7: Transnational Influence and the Development of EDUCO as MINED Policy

In this chapter, I detail the dynamics of the process by which the EDUCO program entered governmental policy. I also explain the ways in which transnational influence impacted this process. In so doing, I provide findings that answer the two questions to which this dissertation responds. As will be shown, the overall process can be subdivided into multiple stages which span 1988-1995. The process of policy formation can be said to culminate with the inclusion of EDUCO in the Ten Year Plan, which was finalized in November 1995. Per the definition utilized in this dissertation for IPEPF (International Processes of Education Policy Formation), I present findings up to the point at which the TYP was produced, since this is the point at which EDUCO entered the government’s official reform strategy. As is often the case, the strategy pursued by a MINED in practice does not necessarily align with or reflect the reform policies contained in policy documents. El Salvador provides an instance where this is true, in that EDUCO began in practice long before it entered the Ten Year Plan, as will be shown.

To continue, while I do explain in this chapter the various ways in which the development of the EDUCO program was transnationally influenced, further discussion of these various transnational forms of influence will also be provided in the next chapter. In other words, the present chapter identifies and explains the
influence, while the subsequent chapter critically and comprehensively discusses it and the implications which follow.

In all, I have identified three stages between 1988 – 1995 that characterize the development of the EDUCO program as an element of MINED policy. The first stage occurred between 1988 – 1991 and reflected competing ideas of decentralization. The second stage took place during 1991 – 1993 and shows how EDUCO took root and began to be scaled up. The third and final stage covered 1993 – 1995 and led not only to EDUCO’s institutionalization in practice but also to its formalization in policy. In each section, in addition to explaining the dynamics of interaction of the involved actors and discussing the forms of transnational influence which manifest, I also characterize changes in context, as appropriate.

7.1 Stage One, 1988 – 1991: Competing Ideas of Decentralization

The first stage in the long process that eventually led to EDUCO being crystallized in the Ten Year Plan is two and a half years in length. This stage begins in the lead up to when Cristiani took office in June 1989 and concludes with the decision by the Minister of Education to base the reform of the education system on a model of community management. In the interim, between late 1988 and February 1991, what the education reform process reflected was a period in which multiple institutions favored different conceptions of decentralization. I unpack this stage below by explaining three sub-periods.
7.1.1 Prior to the Election of Alfredo Cristiani

In the second half of 1988, various organizations – such as FEPADE, FUSADES, and USAID – worked together to explore options for educational reform that Alfredo Cristiani could pursue after the elections (MINED, 1999). As part of these efforts, USAID funded a report for FUSADES which was produced by the Miguel Kast Foundation, a conservative neoliberal think tank based in Chile and named after Miguel Kast, one of the original Chicago Boys who held prominent positions as Labor Minister and as Governor of the Central Bank during the Pinochet Dictatorship (Gauri, 1998). That USAID would hire consultants from this think tank is not surprising, as Chile during the 1970s and 1980s was promoted by the Reagan administration as a model for economic and social reform (Klein, 2007). Similarly, FUSADES and the new business elite in El Salvador looked to Chile for inspiration – and even took study trips in 1988 to learn about the economic reforms being implemented there (INTACT36).

The report produced by the Kast Foundation included recommendations based on the Chilean experience with education reform (Kast Foundation, 1988). For a summary of the key Chilean education reforms between 1979-1987, see Table 7.1, below. In short, in the Kast Foundation report, there were three propositions. The report suggested (a) that there should be general deconcentration of administrative functions to regional or departmental units, (b) that the government should incentivize the private provision of education (e.g., by stimulating the creation of private education, or by allowing NGOs, funded with public resources, to manage schools),

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54 See Gauri (1998) and Schiefelbein and Schiefelbein (2000) for more on Chile’s education reforms during the 1980s.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Key Issues</th>
<th>Reform Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December, 1979</td>
<td>Transfer of schools to municipalities</td>
<td>Law of Municipal Revenues of 1979 served as the legal foundation for the transfer of schools and primary health clinics to municipalities. In Article 38 it declared a new municipal prerogative: &quot;[Municipalities] can also assume control of services that are being provided by public or private sector entities”. Municipal mayors, most of whom were military officers, were ordered to assume control of educational services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June, 1980</td>
<td>Legal and accountability framework for municipalization; Teacher privatization</td>
<td>A June 1980 decree (a) described the contracts required for the transfer of state properties to municipalities; (b) outlined the regular audits of municipal finances and subventions that the Comptroller General of the Republic, the government agency responsible for audits and issues of constitutionality, would perform; and, crucially, (c) stipulated that personnel working in transferred services would have the option of either surrendering their status as civil servants, transferring their pension benefits to a private pension manager, and receiving severance pay, or remaining under the government salary and pension benefit systems without receiving severance pay. The severance pay was set high enough to win over the support of teachers in the transferred schools, enticing almost all of them to enter the private sector in 1981.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August, 1980</td>
<td>Subvention (voucher); Privatization of school construction and ownership</td>
<td>A decree law of August 1980 established a uniform subvention for private and municipal schools. The subvention's value was to be tied to an indexed unit of account, and would vary according to the costs associated with the level of education being taught and the geographic location of the school. This decree authorized the Corporation for the Construction of Educational Establishments, the legal entity that possessed the title to the school buildings, to enter into leasing contracts with the municipalities for periods of ninety-nine years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept, 1980</td>
<td>School management by private corporations and not-for-profit organizations</td>
<td>A September 1980 decree law authorized extraordinary payments to municipalities to cover the costs associated with the transfer of schools and health clinics. The same decree permitted municipalities to delegate the management of schools and clinics to subsidiary private corporations. The amendment held that municipal governments, &quot;for the purposes of the administration and operation of [transferred services], will be able to form … together with organizations of the community interested in the said services, one or more not-for-profit, juridical persons of private standing&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Completion of Municipalization</td>
<td>In 1987 the military government transferred those schools that remained under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education to municipalities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and (c) that there should be a voucher system through which parents could choose among schools (Kast Foundation, 1988).

**7.1.2 Cristiani’s Election and Three Proposals for Decentralization**

Upon election in 1989, the Cristiani administration immediately turned its attention to instituting economic reforms that would allow it to qualify for a structural adjustment loan from the World Bank (World Bank, 1995b). Also in the post-election period, Cristiani appointed a new Minister and Vice-Minister of education, both of whom came from the “hard core” of ARENA (INTACT18). By August of 1990, Cecilia Gallardo de Cano, who had previously worked as an education specialist with FEPADE, not to mention with FUSADES and Chilean consultants on Cristiani’s proposal for social sector reform, moved from being Vice-Minister to being the Minister of Education. She was not only politically ambitious, but also politically savvy, and passionate about education. It was these traits that helped her replace her predecessor, who, while also an integral member of the ARENA party, was more of a diplomat than a reformer (MINEDNL21). Importantly, Cecilia Gallardo would remain the Minister of Education for eight years.

As explained in chapter six, once in office, Cristiani adopted the economic and social reform priorities that had been established by FUSADES. With regard to education, FUSADES had, in turn, relied on the proposal put forth by the Kast Foundation (Marques & Bannon, 2003). The result was that Cristiani’s

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55 Beyond coming from the “hard core” of ARENA, Cecilia Gallardo had a close relationship with Alfredo Cristiani. Their families knew each other well, and he put a great deal of trust in Cecilia’s abilities within the Ministry of Education.
Socioeconomic Development Plan 1990-94, in addition to stating a focus on programs for the rural poor, also called for improvements in the delivery of basic social services and “institutional improvements in the overly centralized … [Ministry of Education] to gradually decentralize management responsibilities to the regional and local levels” (World Bank, 1991c, p. 21).

With these strategic lines in mind, various international actors began to collect data on the state of the education system. For a summary of the dire state of the education system in the late 1980s, see Table 7.2, below. Additionally, from mid-year 1990 onwards, these international actors began to offer more specific recommendations regarding the form that decentralization would take. Between May and September three reports emerged – one each from the World Bank, the Kast Foundation, and UNESCO.

Noticeably, activity around education reform began to pick up steam during the time these reports were being produced. This was for two reasons. First, in April 1990, the government and the guerillas resumed peace negotiations, led by the United Nations, with a seriousness which suggested that an end to the civil war could be a possibility. Second, the World Bank had made it clear since late 1989 that it intended to engage with the government of El Salvador to provide a loan for the education and health sectors. Both of these events, together with the publication of the government’s Socioeconomic Development Plan 1990-94, prompted involved actors to gather data and to explore concrete options around how education reform would proceed.
### Table 7.2: State of Salvadoran Education System during 1988-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education Completion Averages</td>
<td>Urban population completed 6 years of schooling, while the rural population completed only 3.1 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population with no education = 30%, rural population with no education = 42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment rates</td>
<td>Primary (net enrollment): 70% in 1988, in rural areas primary enrollment estimated at 60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-primary: Only 14% of El Salvador's approximately 600,000 children between the ages of four and six were enrolled in pre-school, and almost 90 percent of these children were from middle and upper class families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>265,000 children between ages of 7 and 12 lacked access to primary education, mostly in rural areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37% of children ages 7-14 were out of school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools offer few grade levels</td>
<td>66% of the schools offered less than six grades and 29% only offered between one and three grades. In rural areas, 82% of the schools offered less than six grades and 40% only had between one and three grades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools closed/destroyed</td>
<td>Due to the war, 877 out of 3,000 schools were closed in 1982, and 575 remained closed in 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student/teacher ration</td>
<td>National average = 52 students per teacher; Urban areas = 46; Rural areas = 62. In some rural areas, student/teacher ratio of over 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher salary</td>
<td>Real wages fell by over 67 percent between 1968 and 1989; Moonlighting was widespread; teachers frequently held not just one-two other jobs to maintain their previous income level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher abandonment</td>
<td>Teachers refused to teach in many rural areas due to on-going conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher surplus</td>
<td>6,000 qualified unemployed teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding to education</td>
<td>Real public expenditures in education fell by over 40% between 1980 and 1988, and remained below the 1979 expenditure level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>As a percentage of the GDP, education expenditures fell from 3.9% in 1980 to 1.8% in 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>96% of the MINED’s budget was dedicated to teacher salaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign aid</td>
<td>Represented 20% of spending on education sector in 1989, majority from USAID, IDB, UNDP, UNICEF, UNESCO, and OAS provided minor support and technical assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The World Bank’s report appeared first – in May 1990 – and echoed the content of the report by the Kast Foundation from two years earlier. That is, it suggested “opening channels for the participation of local levels of government, the private sector and NGOs in the delivery of education” (World Bank, 1990, p. 4). The idea was that “the decentralization of school administration and resources to local levels of government” could occur through the creation of “non-profit private corporations,” also termed “associations of municipalities” (p. 4). Individual municipalities were thought to be too small and did not have the capacity in 1990 to successfully or efficiently administer educational services (World Bank, 1990). According to the World Bank, these corporations “would be private non-profit organizations that would operate under the technical supervision of the [Ministry of Education] and under the financial supervision of the Treasury,” in addition to being audited by independent auditors (p. 39). The board of directors of these corporations would be composed of the mayors of the associated municipalities, as well as representatives of teachers and parents.

In the second report from 1990, the Kast Foundation built on and further detailed its original recommendations from 1988. They again proposed the following actions: Administrative deconcentration to the regional level, empowerment of the municipal level to manage education services, the promotion of private schools, and a system through which educational subsidies would follow the child – in effect a voucher system (Kast Foundation, 1990). Both the World Bank and Kast Foundation proposals mirrored the education reforms of the 1980s in Chile (Gauri, 1998). The
primary difference between the World Bank and Kast Foundation recommendations related to the question of whether to devolve certain responsibilities either to individual municipalities or to groups of them.

The report by the Kast Foundation was produced during June and July of 1990. Up to that point, the MINED was on board with the idea of creating a more central role for municipal mayors in the governance of education. Indeed, as of late July, internal documents from the World Bank reveal that the MINED’s priorities were “largely consistent with … Bank … recommendations.”56 Moreover, the World Bank was, at this point, planning to provide technical assistance “for reorganization of administrative functions within decentralized departments.”57

While the World Bank, which did not have a permanent mission in El Salvador, was intent on supporting its version of decentralization, the third report was being created. This report was produced at the end of September by a consultant from UNESCO – the same consultant who had implemented large scale literacy campaigns for indigenous communities in Bolivia a few years prior. As a consultant for UNESCO, she was on a six-month contract in order to produce a report that characterized the education system based on data collected in all fourteen departments in El Salvador. Significantly, when the team led by this UNESCO consultant went to the countryside to collect data on the state of education services, it was the first time that outsiders linked with the government had visited many of the rural areas of the country in over a decade.

56 Memorandum, Ana-Maria Arriagada to Kye Woo Lee, July 27, 1990; IFC; WB IBRD/IDA, Social Sector Rehabilitation Project, Volume 1; 620491, World Bank Group Archives.
57 Ibid.
Two aspects of this report stand out in contrast with the reports of the Kast Foundation and the World Bank – first, its ethos, and, second, its recommendations. With regard to the former, the fact is that, rather than lamenting the centralization of the Ministry of Education, the inefficiency of government bureaucracy, and the difficulty of firing teachers, this report emphasized the importance of the variety of specialists found within the Ministry of Education. It also called for collaboration among all actors and stakeholders in education, in addition to stating that the role of teachers and other education personnel should be recognized and optimized (UNESCO, 1990).

In terms of recommendations, the UNESCO consultant based her ideas on what she observed in the field. Not surprisingly, what the team had observed was the community provision of education, both within and beyond areas formally controlled by the FMLN. In part, what they witnessed were popular education schools; however, the phenomenon of community-provided education was not restricted exclusively to popular education in FMLN territories – it had also emerged in other areas that lacked government-provided services during the war. That said, the strongest forms of community provision and participation were indeed witnessed in those areas associated with the FMLN (UNESCO, 1990). In all cases, what the team witnessed were volunteer teachers who were paid by the community either with a nominal donation or with the provision of food. A later report estimated that 1,000 schools had community-provided education in 1990 (World Bank, 1991c).

On the basis of such observations, the UNESCO consultant recommended that the government should build on the community strategies which had developed
during the war. She also recommended support at the community level for adult education, in order “to create community consciousness about the rights and basic educational needs of children” (UNESCO, 1990, p. 98). For her, the empowerment of the community level was an important aspect of development, one which the government should support. Moreover, she was opposed to the Chilean model. She thought it had been unsuccessful in Chile and that it had no place in El Salvador, where there was an organic model of community management that could serve as an example of the way forward. She had always combated the privatization of education, and she saw her role in El Salvador as one of resistance to the model that the World Bank and others were putting forward. She strove to “transform the strategy … that came from the Bank” (INTACT18).

In that the UNESCO consultant delivered her report at the end of September, it came at an opportune time. The MINED was then in preliminary discussions with education specialists from the World Bank; both sides knew that the plan was to approve an education sector loan during mid-year 1991. Additional pressure to decide the direction that education reform would take was generated by the fact that a structural adjustment loan with the World Bank was in its final stages of preparation and would be presented to the Bank’s board of directors on February 12th, 1991. The immediate relevance for the education system of the structural adjustment loan was that it (i.e., the structural adjustment loan) would require guarantees of increased funding from the government for this sector. Education was drastically underfunded, and if the government did not increase funding it would not be able in subsequent years to absorb and institutionalize new social sector reforms.
7.1.3 Countervailing Forces and the Need to Make a Decision

By October of 1990, a complex context had emerged in which a number of (somewhat) countervailing forces were in play. Although the end result would be a decision to pursue a pilot program based on the community participation model observed by the UNESCO consultant during her field visits, there are a number of factors which must be unpacked to understand this outcome. These include the desire of the government to subjugate FMLN-controlled areas, the anti-union sentiment among key actors, the persistent pressure to imitate the example of Chile, the confounding actions of teachers’ unions, the political astuteness of the Minister of Education, and the need to put in place a project which the World Bank would be amenable to financing. I explain the intersection and interaction of these factors in what follows.

To begin, one must recall that the relationship between the government and the FMLN was at this point in time – when the conflict was still ongoing – still very antagonistic, and would be for many years. This antagonism had repercussions in practice. As one education specialist who worked with USAID in the early 1990s commented:

They, at times, would sabotage … anything that would get moving forward with [the FMLN]. … They would just not be in agreement that part of this money [(i.e., international assistance)] would go to them … And that … negative response toward the rebels was, you know, sort of like a rich man, poor man kind of thing. … If they behave and stay in their place, they’re okay, but, if they don’t, then … we need to get rid of them. And she, the minister,
had that attitude – not to deal with them. … And when it came to the [popular education] schools, they wanted them to disappear (INTACT4, p. 15). More than wishing to avoid working with the FMLN, the government did not want development partners such as USAID implementing programs for them (the FMLN) either. Likewise, the government had very low tolerance for those who sympathized with the rebels and, in the course of reform, sought to undo the popular education system that operated in certain regions of the country.

The second issue at the time pertained to anti-union sentiment. The World Bank as well as the government itself sought to break the teachers’ unions, which represented 30 percent of all public workers (World Bank, 1990). In the words of the UNESCO consultant working in El Salvador at that time, “Yes, the government in that moment, and the MINED, as a subsystem, aimed to decouple and dismantle the teachers’ unions. The teaching syndicate was a great force and it applied great pressure, pressure that made Cristiani’s government very uncomfortable” (INTACT18). Thus, in addition to overcoming the FMLN, the government sought to undermine the unions, which were closely aligned with the FMLN.

The third factor is that, in this context, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the consultants from the Kast Foundation all strongly supported the Chilean model, as mentioned earlier. In the words of a senior MINED official from that time, “the great pressure of the World Bank, of all the organizations, was to decentralization the schools to the municipalities” (MINEDNL21). In addition, even the Minister of Education herself initially intended to follow this path, because, ideologically, it was compatible with her worldview and
with the goals of the Cristiani administration (INTACT18). To be sure, not only would the Chilean model lead to decentralization at the level of the municipalities, it would also engender privatization of public education and serve as a blow to teachers because they would be contracted directly by private schools and therefore without the job security that accompanied employment with the Ministry of Education.

However, by October of 1990, the Minister realized that it would not be possible to pursue this option. In large part, this was because of the fourth factor – i.e., the reaction of the teachers’ unions. These unions objected strongly to the possibility of the Chilean model: “[They] were still strong … they paralyzed everything, and they were aggressive,” said a high-ranking MINED official from the time (MINEDNL21). Many of the mayors were intimidated. Beyond that, mayors lacked the capacity to govern education in their jurisdiction due to inexperience and a shortage of human resources (MINEDNL21).

While experiencing this convergence of factors, the Minister of Education needed to look for a suitable alternative. To that end, one member of the UNESCO consultant’s team from 1990 recounted the following: “[The Minister] said, suggest to me something so that we can get these kids in the system quickly [and] give employment to the teachers, but through other mechanisms, not the current mechanisms” (MINEDNL19). The Minister did find an alternative to the traditional system – one based in the community models that had been documented in the report by the UNESCO consultant at the end of September 1990.

In a move that would change the course of Salvadoran education reform, Minister Gallardo recruited this consultant shortly after the UNESCO report was
finalized in order to elaborate the design of a strategy to provide education at the preschool and lower primary level (grades 1-3). Between October and December the consultant worked with the Minister, showing her that a model based on community control could work. On this point, a member of the office within the MINED that coordinated international assistance during 1990 commented the following: “Once the Minister sought to create something different, … [the UNESCO consultant] was the first person to start the design, the person charged with … bringing EDUCO into the world” (MINEDNL2).

Notably, however, the World Bank was not initially on board with this model. The Bank had for at least six months been under the impression that the MINED would pursue the Chilean model. UNESCO’s consultant was able to overcome their initial apprehension by relying on her previous experiences and the credibility she had amassed as a result. As she says:

I was coming from working with many communities in Bolivia for years, with the poor, with women, with community participation. And, well, we showed that it was something that wasn’t going to scare anyone, that they could have a high impact with this, and that evidently it was going to increase coverage in a proper (propia) and efficient way (INTACT18).

Beyond the initial idea, however, moving forward required evidence that the program could work under the mantle of the MINED.

Thus, with minimal funding from UNICEF through its Expansion of Educational Services project, the MINED began in December a three-month pilot program in six communities (MINED, 1994a). The key for the MINED was to show
that they could create and operationalize the systems and legal protocols necessary for communities to form ACEs (Community Education Associations) and to be responsible for the hiring, management, firing, and payment of teachers – with the funds for payment being transferred from the MINED to the bank accounts of the ACEs (MINED, 1995a). A separate task for the UNESCO consultant and the Minister of Education was to overcome the initial hesitation of the government. As this consultant recounted: “The Cristiani government was afraid that the program was too leftist\(^{58}\) for them, but, quickly, once they began to see the results of the pilot experience, the government began to engage with it” (INTACT18). The point here is that the government’s aversion to the program – the design for which had been based, in part, on the experience of the popular education schools – started to dissolve once it realized that this program allowed the government to accomplish its goal of implementing an alternative, decentralized form of management that could weaken the teachers’ unions and co-opt through incorporation those areas controlled by the FMLN.

For many of the same reasons, the aversion of the World Bank was further diminished over the course of the pilot program. Despite the roots of the program being based in the experience of the rebels, the World Bank, too, started to see such a model as a real possibility once representatives of this institution had the opportunity to see it in action. Indeed, there were two supervisory missions between November 1990 and February 1991, the purpose of which was to investigate if the pilot operated in practice as UNESCO’s consultant had suggested it would (MINEDNL17). This

\(^{58}\) Leftist here refers to the fact that the model was based on a strategy which emerged from FMLN communities.
consultant characterized her interaction with Bank staff during these supervisory
missions in the following way:

I defended the program a lot on all the missions, always with firmness, with
technical proficiency. I have training in education and … political science,
very solid training that allowed me to imagine all possible scenarios and to put
my back into the questions, the questioning, in such a way that the World
Bank would have more confidence [in the program] (INTACT18).

There were two results of these missions and the defense offered by UNESCO’s
consultant. First, the World Bank observed, first-hand, that a new and extreme form
of decentralization was possible in practice. Second, the World Bank saw an
opportunity: This model of decentralization shifted accountability dynamics away
from the central ministry and towards the community, while at the same time offering
the possibility of instituting cost recovery mechanisms – meaning that parents would
contribute either in cash or in kind to finance the school. Cost recovery schemes
were, in addition to decentralization, one of the themes with which the World Bank
was primarily preoccupied during these years (Psacharopoulos, Tan, & Jimenez,
1986).

In the scheme of things, important shifts in the intentions of key actors had
occurred by the end of February 1991. To be sure, this month constituted a crucial
moment in the trajectory of education reform in El Salvador. Although the consultant
from UNESCO was able to redirect the attention of both the World Bank and the
Minister of Education, the structural constraints of the moment ensured that no
program would be successful which departed from the country’s neoliberal trajectory
under Cristiani. Put differently, the Minister of Education and the World Bank considered the pilot program to be a legitimate model which could be replicated and scaled up not because it empowered the community and not because it engendered increased participation, but rather because it fulfilled the exigencies of the moment. Indeed, going forward, although the government and the Bank would emphasize the participation aspect and the ability of the program to increase coverage in areas where government-provided educational services were lacking, the fundamental issue at this point in time was that the pilot program represented an avenue through which the Cristiani administration, with the support of the World Bank, could attempt to shock what it perceived as the overly-bureaucratic and lethargic nature of the central ministry of education, create quasi-privatization arrangements at the community level, weaken teachers’ unions (since teachers were not eligible to join the unions if they worked for the program), and bring the popular education schools under the supervision of the government. In addition, it was thought that the program offered a comparatively less expensive way to increase access to preschool and primary education, given that funding was not initially provided for creation of school structures in participating communities. For political reasons, these issues overwhelmed ideas of community empowerment and the conscientization of adults about childrens’ right to education, though the rhetoric around what would become the EDUCO program would certainly still draw on such ideas.

Concretely, then, by February 1990 the Minister of Education had decided that she would bet on community management of education. Given the larger context and the forces in play, she knew that community management represented the best
option for success. Scaling up such a program provided her with an opportunity to make a name for herself. She could set the MINED down a new path, one which represented innovation and which resonated with the worldviews and prerogatives of key governmental staff and World Bank representatives. If this program succeeded, her profile would be raised within the ARENA party, and she would be eligible for more prominent governmental positions. Many interviewees attested that she sought a successful and high profile career for herself. In terms of the overall process, however, the point here is that both the Minister of Education and key representatives of the World Bank were on board with pursuing community management of education. As will be shown, after this point, and thanks to the overwhelming support of the World Bank, community management of education would be set on a completely different trajectory.

7.2 Stage Two, 1991-1993: EDUCO Takes Root

A great bit of activity occurred around the program for community management of schools from March 1991 to June 1993. This activity can be divided into four groups, with each group of activity occurring more or less in chronological order. To be specific, I will detail, first, the negotiation of the first World Bank education loan, second, the rapid implementation and expansion of the program for community management, third, the negotiations between the government and the popular education teachers, and, fourth, how the program increasingly drew attention.
7.2.1 The World Bank Social Sector Rehabilitation Project

During the beginning of March 1991 representatives of the World Bank were in El Salvador to appraise the MINED’s proposal for the Social Sector Rehabilitation Project (SSRP). This is the loan for which the World Bank and the government had been preparing for nearly a year. In appraising and discussing the community management strategy, the Bank suggested that the approach be called EDUCO, or Education with Community Participation. By this time, the World Bank was excited, if somewhat tentative, regarding this new, previously untested approach. As one member of the World Bank team working in El Salvador recalled, “We thought EDUCO was the ultimate way of decentralization” (INTACT12).

The Minister of Education was equally enthused, and having committed to pursuing education reform through community-management, she sought large quantities of funding to put this strategy into action. The World Bank, though, had its doubts about the MINED’s capacity at that time. As a result, the Bank insisted on a lower loan amount, in order to ensure that the program would be manageable. To that end, a key World Bank team member stated:

The Minister wanted a lot of money … there were so many demands. They wanted a lot of money to solve all the problems that they had. … And she was not pleased with the things that I was cutting because … the capability was very low. And I tried to convey to her this message: Much better for us to do something that is focused, that has impact, than to do all kind of things. I told her, I said, “listen, Cecelia, if we … really implement a very tight and well-done project, later we are going to get money from every place.” And this happened. (INTACT12)

In the end, rather than issuing a loan for $46 million, as the Minister had requested, the World Bank included $10.3 million for education in the SSRP.
Table 7.3, below, summarizes the funding issued by the World Bank during 1991-1995 for the reform of the education system. To put these loan amounts in perspective, the total government budget for education in 1992 was approximately $109 million (MINED, 1994b). Moreover, 96 percent of this amount was dedicated to teacher salaries (MINED, 1999), meaning that the MINED could not use its own funds for experimentation or expansion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Total WB Project Funding*</th>
<th>WB Funding for EDUCO**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Sector Rehabilitation Project (1991-1996)</td>
<td>$26 million</td>
<td>$10.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Education Modernization Project (1995-2001)</td>
<td>$34 million***</td>
<td>$17.5 million****</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *Figures in this column represent funding negotiated from World Bank. Total amounts for each loan surpassed these figures; contributions of other organizations and counterpart funding from government not are included here. **Note that these figures are conservative, as the EDUCO program benefitted from other project components and the funding designated to them. ***An additional $37.3 million was contributed by the Inter-American Development Bank under the Basic Education Modernization Project (BEMP). ****Represents actual funding; initial funding expected to be allocated to EDUCO under BEMP was $12.5 million.

Over the course of negotiations for the SSRP, which culminated in May 1991, many other recommendations and requirements would emerge. Indeed, my archival research for this dissertation revealed that a series of agreements, assurances, and conditions were attached to this loan; they have been summarized in Table 7.4, below. We see that, in addition to obtaining agreements around formative evaluations and cost recovery, as well as assurances around staff selection and the implementation of a communication campaign, the World Bank also made the loan conditional on the following: (a) World Bank approval of the national budget for education for 1992 (not to mention assurances regarding increased funding in subsequent years) and (b) the creation of a clear legal basis for teachers to be managed by ACEs. The World Bank also required that participating communities must be accessible to Bank staff on its supervision visits – visits which occurred between one and three times annually during the life of the SSRP. In all, there would be nine supervision visits between July 1991 and February 1996, the majority lasting from 4 to 10 days (World Bank, 1997a).

The government took action in response to these conditions. First, according to internal Bank documents from mid-1990, the government provided the Bank assurances that it would increase public spending in education from 1.6 percent of GDP in 1991 to 2.7 percent in 1994.59 Between 1991-1996, the government more than doubled the MINED’s budget, though in real terms spending held constant (World Bank, 1997a). Separately, the President, Alfredo [continued after table]

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59 Memorandum, Jean-Jacques de Saint Antoine to Alfred Heron, March 7, 1991; IFC; WB IBRD/IDA, Social Sector Rehabilitation Project, Volume 1; 620491, World Bank Group Archives.
Table 7.4 – Agreements, Assurances, and Conditions related to the World Bank Social Sector Rehabilitation Project (1991-1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Evaluations: The MOE would (i) submit terms of reference for the formative evaluations of the community operated school programs, no later than six months after project effectiveness; (ii) submit, no later than March 31 of each year during project implementation, the results of the respective formative evaluations; and (iii) prepare action plans including a timetable for implementation and implement such action plan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Cost Recovery: The criteria for selection of communities to benefit from the pre-primary and primary education programs under the proposed project would include counterpart contributions (in cash, kind or labor) equivalent to at least 10 percent of the resources provided by the MINED.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Assurances</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Communication Campaign: The Government would present to the Bank for review an action plan for purposes of promoting and disseminating information about the community operated school program and timetable for implementation by December 31, 1991.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Staff Selection: At negotiations, assurances were obtained that Project Coordination Unit staff, with qualifications, experience, functions, and terms of employment satisfactory to the Bank, would be maintained.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. National Education Funding: Prior to effectiveness, the Government will consult with the Bank regarding the 1992 budget before its presentation to the National Assembly, to assure the Bank that additional resources for pre-primary and primary education will be available.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Legal Framework: The President and the Ministry of Education would approve norms and procedures (&quot;reglamento&quot;) to regulate implementation of community operated schools including eligibility criteria for CCG, satisfactory to the Bank, and would furnish to the Bank evidence of contracts (convenios) with 27 community groups.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Legality: The government would present legal opinion assuring there are no legal impediments for community groups to hire teachers and administer schools.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Auditors: The Government would prepare, satisfactory to the Bank, terms of reference to be used by the auditors for the auditing of community operated schools.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Community Access: Loan proceeds would not be disbursed in municipalities which would be inaccessible for purposes of project implementation and supervision according to Bank assessment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Loan Disbursement: Loan proceeds would not be disbursed for any project activity carried out by a community group unless such community group has signed a contract (convenio) with the MOE.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank (1991c) and World Bank Group Archives.60

60 Memorandum, Kye Woo Lee to Mirna Lievano de Marques, March 15, 1991; IFC; WB IBRD/IDA, Social Sector Rehabilitation Project, Volume 1; 620491, World
Cristiani, issued a decree which ensured that the EDUCO program operated on the basis of unambiguous legal terrain. This presidential decree was issued on June 17, 1991, just two days before the World Bank’s Board of Directors approved the SSRP (MINED, 1994b).

The above-mentioned agreements, assurances, and conditions pertain, primarily, to foundational elements of the EDUCO program, such as counterpart funding and legal framework. What these stipulations did not encompass were the specific actions to which funding from the World Bank was to be dedicated. Nevertheless, given that 96 percent of the MINED’s budget was consumed by teacher salaries, the SSRP provided the government with the resources necessary to fund reform actions – actions which I discuss in the following section.

7.2.2 EDUCO’s Rapid Implementation and Expansion

As part of SSRP negotiations, the UNESCO consultant who inspired the community management pilot became the coordinator of the EDUCO Project Office within the MINED. Over time, this office, which was located directly under the Minister of Education, would serve as the mechanism through which MINED leadership would leverage reform – i.e., “modernization” – of the entire education system. Such leverage would be possible because of the success of this office in widely implementing a program that was seen as highly innovative. To that end, three elements were key to this program’s success in practice, in addition to the

Bank Group Archives; Memorandum, Michelle Riboud to Shahid Hussain, May 2, 1991; IFC; WB IBRD/IDA, Social Sector Rehabilitation Project, Volume 1; 620491, World Bank Group Archives.
Minister’s political commitment and the World Bank’s funding. These elements were: (a) The scale of EDUCO’s implementation, (b) technical assistance from the World Bank, and (c) the EDUCO communication campaign.

With regard to the first element, the staff of EDUCO’s office worked assiduously during 1991-1993 to implement the program. Initially, the program was targeted to about 80 communities, though it was quickly scaled up to 236, primarily in three departments. These departments were, not surprisingly, in the heart of FMLN territory (World Bank, 1991c). As Table 7.5, below, indicates, during 1991-1993 the EDUCO program more than quadrupled in terms of the number of participating ACEs, teachers, and students. Table 7.5 also shows that, by 1993, enrollment in EDUCO represented the equivalent of 10.2 percent of the student population in traditional public schools between preschool and grade four. As can be seen, these upward trends would continue, and by 1995 EDUCO would serve the equivalent of 26.7 percent of students in those levels (preschool-grade four) in public schools.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ACEs</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>EDUCO enrollment as % of Traditional Public Enrollment for Preschool through Grade 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>8,416</td>
<td>4.2%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>1,009</td>
<td>32,288</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>1,311</td>
<td>41,952</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1,334</td>
<td>2,316</td>
<td>74,112</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1,341</td>
<td>2,918</td>
<td>113,664</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This figure represents the enrollment in EDUCO as a percentage of preschool through grade 6 enrollment in traditional public schools; data are not available by grade level for the public sector for 1991.


61 To be specific, the departments to which EDUCO was targeted under SSRP were Sonsonate, Chalatenango, La Paz, Cabañas, Morazán and La Unión (World Bank, 1991c).
In terms of timing, the table above also indicates that EDUCO not only had been created but was rapidly expanding before the Peace Accords were signed in January 1992. Put differently: Before much of the country had even experienced peace, let alone the opportunity to engage in education reform, the World Bank and the MINED had already negotiated and begun to implement a new form of education governance. This new form of governance was the central prong of reform for the education system, and was, as will be shown, non-negotiable in the post-war period.

In practical terms, the expansion of the EDUCO program was an intense task, given that its coordinating office during stage two only contained three staff, the coordinator and two other functionaries. They dedicated themselves to the operationalization of the program, which required the development, testing, and revision of a number of administrative processes, such as the creation of thousands of bank accounts and the approval of bank transfers from the MINED to ACEs. In addition, as can be seen in Table 7.6, below, the augmentation of the EDUCO program entailed not just the formation of ACEs at the community level, but also a range of other tasks, such as training for EDUCO supervisors and ACE members, not to mention an on-going communication campaign. By 1993, the program reached all fourteen departments, and the MINED started the process of deconcentrating to its three regional offices those tasks related to technical assistance for EDUCO communities. Respectively, the years 1991-1993 represent periods of experimentation, implementation, and expansion. An indication of Bank satisfaction with MINED’s efforts during this time is the fact that, [continued after table]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Characterization</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1991 | Experimentation  | - Pilot project with 6 schools  
- Creation and revision of bureaucratic processes 
- Establishment of legal basis for ACEs 
- Negotiation of loan with World Bank 
- Implementation of program in three departments 
- Training for EDUCO supervisors and for ACEs 
- Definition of roles for MINED staff 
- Execution of communication campaign to sensitize communities, stimulate interest, and assuage fears of teachers’ unions |
| 1992 | Implementation   | - Preparation of technicians to promote EDUCO 
- Identification of communities for program 
- Creation of new EDUCO sections 
- Training for EDUCO supervisors and ACEs 
- Improvement of bureaucratic processes 
- Reception of World Bank supervision visit 
- Execution of communication campaign 
- EDUCO begins to receive international study delegations |
| 1993 | Expansion       | - Expansion of EDUCO in all 14 country departments 
- Deconcentration of technical assistance to three administrative regions of the country 
- Regional offices assume responsibility for program expansion 
- Increase in EDUCO program budget to expand its central coordination unit personnel 
- EDUCO identified by Minister as central mechanism through which to increase enrollment and modernize the entire MINED going forward 
- Creation of libraries in EDUCO schools 
- Reception of World Bank supervision visit 
- Execution of communication campaign |
| 1994 | Appropriation   | - Salvadorans assume leadership of EDUCO office 
- Delegation of financial management to regional offices 
- Rapid incorporation of communities into EDUCO 
- EDUCO program begins expansion through grade 6 
- Training for EDUCO supervisors and ACEs 
- Execution of communication campaign 
- Reception of World Bank supervision visit |
| 1995 | Institutionalization | - Integration of EDUCO office responsibilities into structure of MINED 
- Negotiation of new loan with World Bank 
- Rapid incorporation of communities into EDUCO 
- Training for EDUCO supervisors and ACEs 
- Execution of communication campaign |

Source: Derived from interviews and from MINED (1994a).
on the basis of program accomplishments, the former (World Bank) saw and referred to the achievements of the latter (MINED) as “magnificent work.”

While the staff of the EDUCO office performed the tasks listed in Table 7.6, it should be noted that the World Bank also contributed technical assistance, particularly during its supervision visits. According to staff from the EDUCO office during its early years, representatives of the World Bank came and wanted to see results. One staff person mentioned that “the World Bank doesn’t play” – that beyond review of statistics and reports, they also wanted to visit some of the communities where EDUCO was being implemented, to see if it was working as reports suggested (MINEDNL17).

Apart from observation, however, World Bank staff were interested to eliminate any obstacles to the program’s success. For example, they were interested to resolve issues around the delayed payment of teachers, since this caused frustration. Moreover, and interestingly, upon noticing that teachers would transfer from EDUCO to traditional schools as soon as they had the opportunity, the World Bank also stipulated that EDUCO teachers should receive additional financial incentives in order to encourage them to remain in the program. More generally, however, with regard to World Bank technical assistance, a long-time education

62 Memorandum, Ana-Maria Arriagada to Kye Woo Lee, August 3, 1992; IFC; WB IBRD/IDA, Social Sector Rehabilitation Project, Volume 2; 1121342, World Bank Group Archives.
63 Ibid.
64 Although EDUCO teachers were paid less than traditional teachers, by 1995 the MINED began to offer a monthly bonus of $40 for rurality to EDUCO teachers. With this bonus, EDUCO teachers made, on average, 7 percent more than teachers in traditional schools (Gillies, Crouch, & Flórez, 2010). Initially, according to World Bank documents, EDUCO teachers at the preschool level were to be paid $160 per month (World Bank, 1991c).
specialist with the MINED who worked with the EDUCO program early on explained:

In the 1990s, this country advanced in education like few countries in the world have. … It’s because the World Bank guaranteed that the country was going to meet its commitments, and because they monitored us very closely. … We were here with constant visits from World Bank people … from the [Team Leader] and her army – at times there were up to twelve consultants and they came to see the finances, the accounting, the audits, the curriculum, the training, the evaluation system, the technology, etc. (MINEDNL19).

Representatives of the World Bank were, thus, clearly invested in the success of the EDUCO program.

Similarly, the World Bank sought to develop interest on the part of education stakeholders in El Salvador – both at the community level and within the teachers’ unions. They did this by including financing in the SSRP for a communications campaign. While exact figures for this campaign from the SSRP are not available, documents show that, in the second World Bank education loan (discussed in more detail in a section below), $1.3 million was included for the communication strategy (Basaninyenzi, 2011). As the World Bank team leader for El Salvador would later recount, “At the beginning of the project, a big effort was made to persuade people of the benefits of the EDUCO education reform program and minimize the propaganda of the opposition groups,” particularly “teachers unions and members of the guerrilla movement” (Basaninyenzi, 2011, pgs. 2, 4).

The communication strategy itself contained three prongs. First, staff of the MINED engaged in awareness raising campaigns (campaña de socialización) at the local level in which they held workshops and went to communities to explain what EDUCO was and to begin to create ACEs (MINEDNL13, MINEDNL14). Second,
the MINED disseminated information through multiple mediums. They created radio programs, hosted televised discussions, made informational videos, and, in particular, utilized the newspapers, where interviews with the Minister of Education would be published (INTACT18, MINEDNL21). Newspapers were an especially valuable outlet for information on EDUCO because the MINED was able to publish weekly reports in the Sunday edition, which had a “short journal annex with information on the progress of projects and the results of enrollment by region” (Basaninyenzi, 2011, p. 3). Figure 7.1, below provides an examples of how the EDUCO program was announced in newspapers.

The third and final prong of the communication campaign involved direct interaction between World Bank staff and opposition groups. For example, the task team leader from the World Bank engaged in conversations with teachers unions and the FMLN members (Basaninyenzi, 2011). As this task team leader has said: “I held very open and frank discussions about the development and plans of the Ministry,” and, though “the negotiations with these opposition groups took a long time, … they finally succeeded in persuading these groups that most parties shared the same goal – providing education to the poorest communities” (Basaninyenzi, 2011, p. 2).

In the end, due to such public relations victories, the World Bank perceived that the communication campaign was a success. In their words: “The communication interventions made an impact on stakeholder relations, including those originally opposed to EDUCO” (Basaninyenzi, 2011, p. 3). It should be noted, however, that not everyone was persuaded to join EDUCO; a few communities in
FMLN strongholds opted to remain independent, thus seeking other sources of funding for their schools in order to preserve their autonomy (ADES, 2005).

**Figure 7.1: Newspaper Experts from the EDUCO Communication Campaign**

![Newspaper Experts from the EDUCO Communication Campaign](image)


### 7.2.3 Government Negotiations with Popular Education Teachers

In relation to the above point, it should be mentioned that the MINED, without the World Bank, engaged in negotiations with the popular teachers as the EDUCO program was being scaled up. At the end of 1991, in anticipation of negotiations in the post-war period, popular education teachers in departments such as
Morazán and Chalatenango, among other areas, began to collect information about the popular education teachers (LOCACTNM1). During negotiations, which began sporadically in 1992, the popular educators communicated with the MINED through a few grassroots organizations, as well as through the public school teachers’ union, which supported the cause of the popular teachers (Hammond, 1997).

Through negotiations, popular educators wanted, both, to keep their autonomy and to be recognized by the MINED (Hammond, 1997). That is, the coalition of approximately 1,000 popular educators, which served approximately 13,500 students, did not wish to abandon the parallel system that they had developed in the preceding years (Alvear, 2002). At the same time, however, they wanted their status as teachers and the educational attainment of their students to be accepted by the MINED. They also desired governmental funding.

The response of the MINED was to offer funding only if the communities accepted the EDUCO program. The MINED also required that the popular education teachers attain their teaching certificates in order to be eligible for a position either with EDUCO or within a traditional school. In practice, this meant that that if communities accepted government funding, they would be abandoning the approach of popular education.

According to Hammond (1997), during 1992-1993, the MINED stalled when it came to offering, or even approving, equivalency courses so that popular educators

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65 Examples of these grassroots organizations include the following: Trustees for the Development of the Communities of San Miguel and Morazán (Patronato para el Desarrollo de las Comunidades de San Miguel y Morazán), the Association of Communities for the Development of Chalatenango, and the Educational Coalition of El Salvador (Concertación Educativa de El Salvador).
could work towards their teaching certificates (Hammond, 1997). While Hammond’s (1997) research was in Chalatenango, other research done in neighboring Cabañas (ADES, 2005) found that the MINED did in fact recognize the high-school equivalency classes taken by the popular education teachers. Even in the latter case, however, it should be noted that the process of attaining the minimum teaching credentials required about ten years for the popular teachers (ADES, 2005). Due to the low initial levels of education, these teachers had to complete a high school equivalency and then attend university classes on the weekends while working fulltime (as teachers who were unrecognized by the MINED and who were compensated minimally through donations from community members and NGOs).

It is only because of the scholarships and funding provided by local and international NGOS and USAID, as well as by universities from Spain, that these teachers were able to complete this process, as the MINED was not forthcoming with resources for this effort. Similarly, it is only because of contributions made by NGOs and the Catholic Church that a few communities were able to resist the EDUCO model long enough such that they could wait to hire their own popular education teachers, once they attained the required credentials (ADES, 2005). Indeed, most communities where the popular education approach had been implemented joined EDUCO before that could happen due to dire financial circumstances; they needed the MINED’s resources in order to continue to fund their school.
7.2.4 Increasing Attention to EDUCO: International Delegations and Dissemination

On an international scale, and unlike with the popular education communities, the EDUCO program experienced increasingly positive attention once word got out about it. Indeed, during stage two, as news of the EDUCO program and its success in implementation circulated within and beyond the Central American region, the MINED not only began to receive international delegations but it was also asked to send representatives to other countries to speak about the program.

With regard to the former (i.e., international delegations), the first occurred in September 1992. The Minister of Education of Guatemala, who was also in the process of negotiating a loan with the World Bank (and following the conclusion of a civil war there, no less), contacted the Salvadoran MINED to arrange a study tour.\footnote{See Poppema (2009) and Gershberg, Meade, and Andersson (2009) or more on Guatemala’s version of community-managed education, which was adapted from the EDUCO model.} This would be the first of many international study tours to examine the EDUCO experience. To be sure, the data collected reveal that other governmental study groups came in subsequent years from Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Equatorial Guinea, Honduras, and Thailand, as well as additional study groups from Africa, the Caribbean, and Europe.

Furthermore, interviews revealed that the World Bank played a key role in financing these study trips, which was not an unusual practice at the time. An education specialist from the World Bank explained this with reference to El Salvador:
They had an open door for delegations to come and learn about the EDUCO program. The bank was actually instrumental when we were able to finance or support countries from other continents to come and do study programs for different programs – Colombia to look at Escuela Nueva, El Salvador to look at EDUCO, Brazil to look at Bolsa Escola. So, for a long period, the Bank facilitated those exchanges. Of course, for delegations to come into a country, the local authorities, the local MINED had to have an open-door policy, which was the case of El Salvador. Again the difference of El Salvador, and I want to stress that, is that they presented their model without packaging it, but just allowing those delegations that would come from Thailand, Bangladesh, African countries to be able to absorb the principles, some of the lessons learned, to be able to develop their own school based management with community participation programs. But, yes, I think for a while El Salvador became a common place for foreign delegations to come to learn about community participation in management of schools (INTACT34).

A combination of factors thus raised EDUCO’s profile internationally – these being the MINED’s openness combined, first, with World Bank financing and, second, with an example of reform that was taking root on the ground in El Salvador. By the late 1990s, the MINED reported that it had received more than twenty such delegations (MINED, 1999).

The MINED’s own role in promoting EDUCO went beyond accepting delegations, though. Indeed, MINED representatives themselves went to numerous other countries. Interviewees mentioned that, over time, they were sent by the World Bank to such countries as Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Spain, and the United States.

One key functionary, who worked with the EDUCO program early on, and for many years, mentioned that she would eventually “know all of Latin America … and a great part of the world because of EDUCO” – about 25 to 30 countries in all (MINEDNL8). According to her, “people wanted to know how it was possible that illiterate rural people could manage, could hire, could fire teachers, how it was that
the poor could be interested in school. That is, was people had a hard time understanding” (MINEDNL8). More recently, in 2011, this same interviewee was sent by the World Bank to Afghanistan to discuss the EDUCO model. For the World Bank, such Salvadoran education specialists have played a key role in EDUCO’s promotion. In the words of the above-mentioned interviewee, “I helped a lot with the community theme. When people [(i.e., governments)] were scared to give money to the parents, I helped to make the school boards and transfer the funds to the schools … in many places” (MINEDNL8). This Salvadoran education specialist served as reinforcement when officials in other countries were reluctant.

To continue, informational trips disseminated the EDUCO model while also reinforcing the EDUCO model at home. From the perspective of MINED representatives, these trips were not only inherently desirable for the ability to travel to other countries, but they also served as status symbols and created jealousy. This was because, in the words of the UNESCO consultant who coordinated the EDUCO program, staff within the MINED saw the World Bank as the “paradise” to which they wanted to arrive – a paradise that might be attainable by working with the EDUCO program (INTACT18). While very few MINED staff would be able to work for the World Bank as a result of the EDUCO, what the years after 1993 evinced was an even more central role for this program within the broader reform of the Salvadoran education system.
7.3 Stage Three, 1993-1995: EDUCO’s Institutionalization and Formalization

On the basis of the actions and accomplishments of stage two, both the MINED and the World Bank dedicated themselves to continuing with the expansion and institutionalization of EDUCO in stage three. This would be the period during which EDUCO would shift from being the preferred education governance mechanism of the MINED in practice to being the official mechanism of the MINED as reflected in policy. The MINED strategy document that would in fact officially incorporate community level decentralization was the Ten Year Plan, which would be finalized in November 1995.

Stage three thus extends from mid-year 1993 through the end of 1995. As will be shown, two separate processes manifested in stage three – one through which the World Bank and the MINED engaged to reinforce EDUCO and institutionalize it as the foundation of the education system, and another, more public process through which USAID and other organizations would engage, also along with the MINED, in order to discuss areas of education reform not directly related to the governance of the system. At the last moment – and in ways that will be detailed – these two processes dovetailed.

In order to explain stage three, I unpack a range of issues across four subsections. In the first section, I address the larger context of public sector modernization. In the second, I briefly detail five separate developments from 1994. In the third, I discuss the second education loan from the World Bank. And in the fourth section, I review and problematize the relationship between EDUCO and the more formal and public process of policymaking which occurred during 1993-1995.
7.3.1 Public Sector Modernization and EDUCO

In 1993, while EDUCO was sailing along and gaining attention, preparations were being made for another structural adjustment loan from the World Bank, this one for $75 million. Just like the first one of these (which spanned February 1991 – June 1993), the second one would also focus on neoliberal economic reform; the difference is that the second one would seek “a comprehensive public sector modernization effort” (World Bank, 1996, p. i). According to World Bank documents, public sector modernization had been a policy priority for President Cristiani since his election in 1989, though he was not able to give priority to this issue until 1993, presumably due to the demands of the Peace Accords and the numerous actions that were being implemented in accordance with the first structural adjustment loan (World Bank, 1996).

In practice, this second structural adjustment loan, together with the technical assistance that accompanied it, focused on the privatization, decentralization, debureaucratization, and restructuring of governmental ministries. It also meant the elimination of the Ministry of Planning (World Bank, 1993). The other element of note to emerge from the technical assistance which accompanied the structural adjustment loan was the Public Sector Modernization Action Plan. Not only was the basis of this Action Plan created by World Bank technical assistance but, just as had happened with FUSADES and President Cristiani plan for economic and social reform, the Action Plan provided a “foundation for the incoming Government [of President Armando Calderón Sol] to develop and implement a Public Sector Modernization Program” (World Bank, 1997b, p. 15).
Thus, in late 1993 and early 1994, in the lead-up to the election of ARENA’s candidate, Armando Calderón Sol, who took office in June 1994, the focus on government-wide modernization had implications for the education sector. This was particularly so because the Ministry of Planning (before its elimination) declared that “one of the strategic priorities in the modernization of the public sector should be to technicize, debureaucratize, and decentralize systems of financial management, public investment, and governmental control” (MINED, 1994a, p. 27). In the education sector, EDUCO fit the bill – and, as such, efforts around its amplification and institutionalization would only strengthen, both on the part of the MINED and the World Bank. The largest action to that end would come about in early 1995, when the MINED would negotiate its next education loan with the World Bank. However, in the interim, that is, during 1994, there were a number of relevant developments that must be detailed. I discuss these briefly in the next sub-section.

7.3.2 Developments around EDUCO during 1994

Five developments stand out during 1994. The first was the decision by the Minister of Education that the expansion of education in rural areas would only be permitted through EDUCO. Not surprisingly, this decision occurred in the context of heightened attention to government-wide modernization, explained above. The point, to reiterate, is that, with regard to the education system, EDUCO aligned with the push by the government and the World Bank to “modernize” the public sectors.

The second development was the departure of the UNESCO consultant as the coordinator of the EDUCO program. Her exit occurred not only because there was increasing jealousy around the program’s management, but also because it was
undesirable to have an international consultant managing the MINED’s key program. For these reasons, the Minister of Education decided to place EDUCO under the leadership of one of the Salvadorans who had experience with the program.

Third, the capacity of the EDUCO program office was expanded through the doubling of its’ staff from three to seven. Additional capacity was necessary to accommodate the growing size of the program. By 1994, there were 1,334 ACEs, 2,316 teachers, and 74,112 students in the program – and it would only continue to expand. In that respect, 1994 was the first year that EDUCO schools began to educate students in grade four.

Fourth, the World Bank made clear its intentions of using the EDUCO program as a model for the nation. It did this in a mid-1994 study in which it stated that – pending the outcome of a first quantitative evaluation – it would prepare “a strategy for expanding the program as the preferred delivery system for pre-primary and primary education in all rural areas in the next five years” (World Bank, 1994b, p. 43). That same study mentioned that EDUCO could possibly be adapted to urban areas.

Fifth, just before the end of the year, the World Bank produced a cursory evaluation. This evaluation was mentioned in the first public World Bank report to overview the EDUCO program (World Bank, 1994a). According to this report, the cursory evaluation of the EDUCO program showed better first and second grade mathematics test scores for students from EDUCO schools, when no controls were used (World Bank, 1994a). Though the positive effects of EDUCO disappeared when background controls were applied, the findings still garnered significant attention,
especially within the World Bank and the MINED (INTACT35). With this report in hand, preparation for the next education loan proceeded in earnest.

### 7.3.3 The World Bank Basic Education Modernization Project

While the government had doubled the budget of the MINED between 1991 and 1994, it sought additional funds and technical assistance from the World Bank in order to continue to expand the EDUCO program (MINED, 1994b). To that end, a second World Bank education loan was put together in early 1995. The project that it financed was known as the Basic Education Modernization Project (BEMP), and it (the loan) would eventually provide an additional $17.5 million to support EDUCO (World Bank, 2002). Among other things, the resources from this loan would be directed at scaling up the program through grade six and creating 3,000 new ACEs (World Bank, 1995c).

As with the SSRP, the World Bank obtained agreements and assurances in relation to the BEMP, as well as attaching conditions. Notably, however, the agreements, assurances, and conditions established for BEMP did not relate to the EDUCO program. Whereas the first education loan – SSRP – focused on EDUCO, the second one was preoccupied with other reforms within the MINED, such as the consolidation of multiple departments in order to streamline administrative processes. The EDUCO program was already entrenched and doing well. As such, the role of the BEMP with regard to EDUCO was to ensure that sufficient funding and technical assistance were provided for its continued augmentation countrywide and its integration to the other administrative departments within the MINED.
7.3.4 A Separate, Public Process of Education Policy Formation

It should stand out by this point that the findings presented in this chapter, while they have detailed the birth, expansion, and institutionalization of EDUCO, they have not discussed any formal policymaking processes. To that end, through the research conducted for this dissertation, though I found that there was a more public and formal policymaking process which took place during 1993-1995, it seems to have performed more of a symbolic function – and, as such, seem to have had very little bearing on EDUCO’s trajectory. That said, it should be noted that the education strategy document produced during 1993-1995 did officially make the governance strategy which EDUCO represented a key priority. I will explain this below, in addition to summarizing and commenting on this parallel policy formation process.

Others’ research reveals that, between late 1993 and late 1995, there were four events and sub-processes that led to the finalization of the Ten Year Plan (Guzmán, 2005; MINED, 1999; Reimers & McGinn, 1997). They can be summarized in the following way:

1. **Education Sector Assessment (October – December 1993):** A USAID-funded education sector assessment was carried out by international and local consultants and was simultaneously discussed by a pluralistic advisory committee of key actors from across the Salvadoran political continuum (Reimers, 1995). The advisory committee not only helped to inform the on-going research but was also important because it helped to build the relationships and consensus that would later facilitate the finalization of the resulting education strategy. The process of conducting
both the sector assessment and the dialogue of the advisory committee were led by the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) in conjunction with the Central American University (UCA) – a private, Jesuit institution – and FEPADE.

2. **Promotional Workshops (January 1994):** HIID, UCA and FEPADE conducted workshops on results of the sector assessment with key groups of governmental, educational and private-sector stakeholders in the country. For the rest of the year, an inter-institutional promotional committee (“comité dinamizador”) comprised of individuals from influential political and technical organizations (including unions, private universities, NGOs, and the MINED) continued to share the study with stakeholders from the education sector who would be integral to developing and implementing changes in policy that resulted from the study.


4. **Consultative Forum (January 1995):** With financing from USAID and administrative support from FEPADE, the aforementioned inter-
institutional promotional committee organized a final “consultative forum” attended by over 200 people from a wide range of institutions, including the National Legislative Assembly, teachers’ unions, donor organizations, women’s groups, community-based NGOs, universities and the MINED, among others, in order to share and receive feedback on both the education sector assessment as well as directions for education reform in general (MINED, 1995b).

5. **Education Strategy Finalization (November 1995):** The MINED finalized and published the Ten Year Plan, taking into account the sector assessment, the process of consultation, and the report of the National Education Commission. The five objectives of the Ten Year Plan were to improve educational quality; to increase the efficiency, efficacy and equity of the education system; to expand coverage; to create “new modalities of service provision”; and to strengthen “teaching of human, ethical, and civic values” (MINED, 1995c, p. 11).

During these two years, an enormous amount of time and energy was dedicating to conducting these events, performing research, and soliciting feedback. Upon review, however, it is striking that the EDUCO program was almost entirely overlooked. It was barely mentioned in the education sector assessment, and not at all in the report of the National Education Commission. Where it was mentioned, for example, in the consultative forum, discussion tended to pertain to how better to incorporate it into the MINED, not whether or not it should be a central strategy for the provision and governance of education.
When I asked an education specialist familiar with the EDUCCO program how it was that this program ended up in the Ten Year Plan, she simply informed me that, within the MINED, the people who were responsible for creating the Ten Year Plan were the exact same people who favored EDUCCO (NATACTN1). Thus, from an insider’s perspective, it was not – and should not be – surprising that EDUCCO (or, more specifically, the strategy that it represents) featured prominently in the Ten Year Plan. EDUCCO had key supporters in the MINED, and these supporters influenced those priorities which would be crystallized in the Ten Year Plan.

Most relevant for our purposes, however, is the fact that that EDUCCO did not enter this more formal and public process of determining priorities for education reform until the finalization of the Ten Year Plan – that is, in November 1995. Moreover, when it did become part of the MINED’s official strategy, its manifestation was veiled. That is to say, while the MINED called for decentralization, increased community participation, and “new modalities of service provision,” it did not single out EDUCCO specifically (MINED, 1995c). Scholars have referred to this phenomenon as internalization – when national actors remove traces of transnational influence in order to enhance their legitimacy before their stakeholders (Spreen, 2004).

Nevertheless, the point here is that, by including these priorities in the MINED’s education strategy document, it created an official policy document through which EDUCCO had been incorporated, if only symbolically. The principles and approach which EDUCCO embodied had finally been crystallized in a document which, at least nominally, represented the priorities that would guide the MINED for
the ensuing ten years. As such, though the implementation of EDUCO would continue for many more years, the IPEPF that generated EDUCO can be said to have concluded at this point.

Having explained the process by which EDUCO evolved and entered MINED policy, I now turn to a further discussion in the next chapter about mechanisms of transnational influence in regard to that that process.
Chapter 8: Discussion of EDUCO’s Development and Transnational Influence

In the preceding chapter, I provided a detailed account of the development of EDUCO during 1988-1995. In the present chapter, I continue by focusing more squarely on the mechanisms of transnational influence that were in operation, as well as the implications of the combination of these mechanisms for education reform in El Salvador more generally. I break this discussion down into two sections.

In the first, I briefly summarize the process by which EDUCO developed and then delve into a detailed assessment of those mechanisms which the findings in chapter seven brought to the fore. In my assessment of these mechanisms, I begin by highlighting those mechanisms which were contained in the analytic framework which I presented in chapter four (the analytic framework based on the work of Dale, 1999, and Samoff, 2009). I then continue my assessment by reflecting on the implications of my findings regarding EDUCO’s development for the analytic framework itself. That is to say, point out those mechanisms that appeared to be in operation in EDUCO’s development which are not currently suggested by the dominant frameworks for understanding mechanisms of transnational influence.

In the second part of this chapter, I move from considering mechanisms individually to considering them together. Stated differently: I will contemplate the effects that resulted from the simultaneous and sequential operation of numerous mechanisms. These implications will then be juxtaposed with a discussion of the importance of the role of local and national actor agency. Finally, I will conclude this
section by placing emphasis on the development of the national context itself, for mechanisms do not operate in a vacuum and must be considered in relation to the nature of the context in which they are received.

8.1 The Development of EDUCO and Transnational Influence

We have seen how transnational influence was pervasive in the case of EDUCO. To that end, Figure 8.1, below, is a causal network which visually depicts the evolution of institutional relationships and process dynamics in relation to EDUCO’s development. Also below is Table 8.1. This table is a timeline of the critical events associated with EDUCO’s development. As such, it is a companion to Figure 8.1. Together Figure 8.1 and Table 8.1 convey the most essential aspects of EDUCO’s development between late 1988 and late 1995. Both Figure 8.1 and Table 8.1 are meant to anchor the discussion that follows, and will be referenced as appropriate.

8.1.1 Summary of EDUCO’s Development

In chapter seven, the dynamics depicted in Figure 8.1 were broken down into three stages. I briefly summarize these three periods in order to contextualize a discussion of the implications of transnational influence. To start, the first period (December 1988 – February 1991) not only began with a change of administration at the highest level of Salvadoran government, but was also characterized by the presence of multiple conceptions of decentralization. [Paragraph continues after Figure 8.1 and Table 8.1.]
Figure 8.1: Causal Network of Process Dynamics in Development of the EDUCO program and the Ten Year Plan

Source: Author.
### Table 8.1: Critical Events Timeline of EDUCO’s Development

#### Stage One: December 1988 – March 1991: Competing Ideas of Decentralization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>USAID, FUSADES, and FEPADE explore options for education reform in 1989, after the presidential election. USAID funds report by Kast Foundation, from Chile, for FUSADES. This report recommends deconcentration, municipalization, privatization, and vouchers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>FUSADES takes study trip to Chile to study governmental reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USAID, FUSADES, and FEPADE explore options for education reform in 1989, after the presidential election. USAID funds report by Kast Foundation, from Chile, for FUSADES. This report recommends deconcentration, municipalization, privatization, and vouchers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crisitani administration assumes government, produces a Socioeconomic Development Plan 1990-1994 which calls for MINED decentralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
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<td></td>
<td>August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October – December</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Stage Two: March 1991 – June 1993: EDUCO Takes Root, Scaled Up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March – May</td>
<td>Negotiation of World Bank’s Social Sector Rehabilitation Project, used to scale up EDUCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>Peace Accords signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>MINED negotiations with popular education teachers begin; they continue into 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>The World Bank makes clear its intention to use EDUCO as a model for the nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>February – March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>BEMP approved by Bank Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Ten Year Plan (TYP) finalized. The TYP states that the governance model represented by EDUCO is a key priority for education reform during 1995-2005.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Noticeably, the World Bank and the Kast Foundation were advocating for decentralization-oriented reforms which, while not identical, were both based on the model of reforms implemented in Chile in the 1980s. Such reforms would have implied three actions: (a) a shift in responsibility for education to the municipal level, (b) privatization through the creation of for-profit non-governmental education service providers, and (c) the creation of a voucher scheme.

Just as these institutions were advancing these concepts, a UNESCO consultant began to strongly argue for a form of decentralization which would be based on the experience of the community management of education which emerged during the civil war due, in part, to a lack of government-provided services. As explained in chapter six, for many (though not all) communities, the education that they provided to their students in this context was based on the approach of popular education, which tended to be associated with those areas of the country where the FMLN had strongholds. In all, there were about 1,000 communities across El Salvador that had secured a teacher for their children, both within and outside FMLN areas, without assistance from the national government.

Due to pressure from teachers’ unions, combined with a lack of mayoral capacity at the municipal level, the Minister of Education could not pursue the strategy being advocated by the World Bank and the Kast Foundation.67 This is

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67 According to Montgomery (1995), ARENA experienced a “victory in the 1988 legislative and mayoral elections” (p. 213). In the 1991 municipal elections, ARENA won 181 municipalities while the next largest party – the Christian Democrats – won 70 (Montgomery, 1995, p. 223). The outcome of both elections would indicate that political affiliation did not influence the decision of the Minister of Education not to pursue the municipalization strategy.
reflected in Figure 8.1 by the X has been placed over the word municipalization. The other option at the time was that being suggested by the UNESCO consultant.

Despite the fact that this latter strategy originated from an educational approach primarily, though not exclusively, associated with the rebels, the Minister came to see that a reform program based on this model would be acceptable. This was because it allowed her to meet the expectations to which she was subject – namely, that she pursue a reform strategy that would “innovate” by engaging with non-traditional arrangements for the provision of education services. At the time, pursuing a non-traditional strategy meant selecting one that would both circumvent the central bureaucracy of the MINED and weaken the teachers’ unions, which represented a major oppositional force within the country. Ultimately, by building on and, to be sure, modifying the governance model that desperate and/or rebellious communities had implemented during the civil war, the Minister of Education was able to meet these requirements.

This strategy would also debilitate FMLN communities. By setting teacher certification requirements for popular education teachers for which they would require numerous years to fulfill, the MINED also ensured that FMLN communities and their approach of popular education would be co-opted to join the regular education system. Indeed, in the post-war period, as international assistance to the conflict-affected areas and the NGOs that worked there diminished, those communities which were associated with the FMLN and which followed a popular education approach joined the EDUCO program in order to receive funding from the government. Without such funding, the majority of communities could not sustain,
let alone improve the quality of, their education. But governmental funding came along with teacher requirements that popular education teachers could not immediately meet. As such, not only were these communities forced by their circumstances to join the EDUCO program, but they were also required to hire teachers other than those that had worked previously in their communities during the civil war.

At the outset, however, the seeds of EDUCO were contained in a pilot program organized by the UNESCO consultant and funded by UNICEF. This program was possible due, in late 1990, to the Minister of Education’s amenability to seeing if the model of community management could work in practice. On the one hand, the pilot program of six schools showed that such an arrangement could work if managed by the MINED; on the other hand, the conviction and persistence of the UNESCO consultant won over the staff of the World Bank, who previously were convinced that municipalization would be the best option. To be sure, World Bank staff watched the pilot program closely, due to their initial skepticism regarding its feasibility.

Just like the MINED, however, once the World Bank realized that the community-management model aligned with its interests (see sections 2.2.1 and 7.1.3 for more on this), it pursued it vigorously. That is to say, once representatives of the World Bank’s task team working in El Salvador were on board, they saw that the community-management model represented a form of education governance that would allow them to experiment with an extreme form of decentralization. Importantly for them, not only would this form of decentralization be centered on the
community level, but parents would be formally responsible for hiring and firing teachers. For the World Bank, this was the most appealing aspect of what would become the EDUCO program – more so than concept of efficiency or effectiveness, as I will discuss further in a section below (INTACT30). Here, the point is that the World Bank was attracted to the possibility of weakening teachers’ unions and reducing the monopoly of the State, for this resonated with what had been a decade’s worth of World Bank thinking, thinking that was explained in chapter two of this dissertation.

With regard to EDUCO’s development in El Salvador, however, the second stage began in earnest in May 1991, once both the Minister of Education and the World Bank were committed to pursuing the community management model. Fundamentally, this stage was about ensuring that the EDUCO program had not only the legal and institutional foundation that it needed but also the financial and technical resources to ensure that it could be scaled up quickly. Noticeably, these reforms began in January 1992, a full year before the signing of the Peace Accords, though during a period of reduced conflict.

In the third stage (July 1993 – November 1995), the rapid expansion of the EDUCO program continued. There was no doubt about the centrality of this reform to the efforts of the MINED during this time, as the Minister of Education made it clear that the EDUCO program would, from them on, be the only option for expanding coverage in the rural areas of the country. Despite the fact that EDUCO became the mode through which public education services were provided to much of the country, the cost of implementing the program was born by the community
members themselves. Parents in disadvantaged rural communities were asked to assume responsibilities traditionally borne by the State, and without compensation. In addition, community members were expected to provide the time, labor, and materials either to construct or maintain their local school – and this was in addition to the informal school fees they already incurred to cover basic costs associated with schooling.

During this stage, it was of note that the legitimacy of the EDUCO program was never truly in doubt or challenged. Though teachers’ unions and many FMLN communities were initially opposed to the program, the steadfastness of the Minister of Education and the World Bank ensured that its implementation and expansion proceeded. Similarly, though a range of issues were discussed during the formal, two-year process of policy formation that occurred in El Salvador between late 1993 and late 1995, the incorporation of the EDUCO program into the MINED was never really questioned. Along the way, a few teachers raised concerns about various aspects of the program during the national consultation, but by that time the commitment of the Minister of Education had already been solidified. Community-level decentralization thus entered the TYP (Ten Year Plan) at the end of 1995 as one of the four main priorities for system-wide education reforms going forward, a reform which would continue to grow and serve as a cornerstone of the Salvadoran education system for many years to come.

8.1.2 Transnational Influence in EDUCO’s Development

In chapter seven, in the summary provided above, and in Figure 8.1, it is clear that numerous forms of transnational influence were at play in relation to the EDUCO
program. While the above summary of EDUCO’s development glossed over the various forms of transnational influence which manifested, I discuss them in detail here. Subsequently, I will discuss their implications for theory.

For a summary of each mechanism of transnational influence during 1988-1995 in relation to the development of EDUCO which will be discussed, see Table 8.2, below. In discussing the content of this table, I will provide commentary on each of the mechanisms; after doing so, I will also reflect on their significance for the predominant analytic frameworks used to assess the operation of transnational influence in relation to national education systems. These frameworks are those elaborated by Dale (1999) and Samoff (2009), both of which were previously discussed and then combined in chapter four. In that chapter, see Box 4.1, where I defined 14 separate mechanisms of transnational influence. In Table 8.2, below, I invoke those same mechanisms, where appropriate, to label the forms of influence present in relation to EDUCO’s development, as can be seen in the third column.

It should be noted, however, that not all of the mechanisms listed in Table 8.2 have been suggested previously by Dale (1999) and Samoff (2009). This is because the findings from chapter seven of this dissertation indicate that there are additional mechanisms of transnational influence through which education reform at the national level was affected in El Salvador. In my discussion of transnational mechanisms, I begin by focusing, primarily, on the manifestation of those mechanisms which scholars (i.e., Dale and Samoff) have suggested previously. Then, in the latter part of my discussion, I dedicate more attention to highlighting the additional mechanisms which the case of EDUCO’s development suggests.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Instance(s) of Transnational Influence in relation to Development of EDUCO</th>
<th>Associated Mechanism(s) of Transnational Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Circulation of international rhetoric around participation, decentralization, Education For All, Convention on the Rights of the Child, etc.</td>
<td>Dissemination, International Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Reports and studies by Kast Foundation, World Bank, UNESCO</td>
<td>Dissemination, Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UNESCO consultant implements the pilot program</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>UNICEF funding for pilot program; World Bank funding for EDUCO program</td>
<td>*Financial resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Chicago Boys elaborate Socioeconomic Development Plan 1990-1994 for Cristiani administration; World Bank staff draft the Public Sector Modernization Action Plan for the Calderon Sol administration</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Guidance from World Bank to MINED on amount of education loan for Social Sector Rehabilitation Project</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Support in designing administrative processes; identifying communities to participate; creating training manuals and implementing training; correcting problematic procedures; etc.</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Loan requirements to increase education sector spending, introduce legal framework for EDUCO program, etc.</td>
<td>Conditionalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Agreements and assurances secured by World Bank from MINED at loan negotiations regarding program evaluations, cost recovery, staff selection, etc.</td>
<td>Loan-Related Actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Communications campaign to raise awareness about EDUCO, secure buy-in from oppositional actors, and create demand for the program</td>
<td>Dissemination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Supervisory visits by the World Bank</td>
<td>Loan-Related Actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Passion, enthusiasm, dedication, and persistence on the part of World Bank staff regarding EDUCO’s possibility, example, and success</td>
<td>*Transnational Excitement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Delegations of foreign officials participate in study tours to El Salvador to learn about the EDUCO</td>
<td>*Transnational Excitement, International Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Salvadoran MINED staff travel abroad to share the experience of the EDUCO program</td>
<td>International Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Creation and support of FUSADES and FEPADE, both new, national-level institutional actors</td>
<td>*Intermediary Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Economists in FUSADES and government (e.g., Minister of Finance) previously worked with key international organizations, namely the World Bank; the coordinator of the EDUCO project office in the MINED transferred from UNESCO</td>
<td>*Policy Entrepreneur Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Persistent presence of the World Bank</td>
<td>*Global Reach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * indicates that the mechanism is being suggested here, and was not present in the analytic framework presented in section 4.4 of this dissertation.

Source: Unless otherwise indicated, mechanisms of transnational influence drawn from Dale (1999b) and Samoff (2009). See section 4.4 of this dissertation for more on each mechanism.
As chapter six of this dissertation made clear, there were numerous examples of how actors and ideas from elsewhere influenced the course of events in El Salvador. Some of the mechanisms at play were dissemination, technical assistance, international events, conditionalities, and loan-related actions. Below, I briefly comment on the examples related to EDUCO that can be associated with each mechanism:

**Dissemination:** The mechanism of dissemination was activated repeatedly. With regard to the process that produced EDUCO, it began when the Kast Foundation produced a report in which it recommended a model of education system reform based on Chile. Dissemination then continued when the World Bank did the same. The UNESCO report, though it advocated for a model based on the Salvadoran experience of community-based management, also constitutes an example of dissemination because it spread information on Education For All and the Convention on the Rights of the Child – both of which the report mentioned and invoked as justifications for the path of reform it suggested.

Moreover, it is important to recognize that the buzzwords (e.g., participation, decentralization) and international rhetoric found in the reports of the Kast Foundation, World Bank, and UNESCO did not circulate on their own. That is to say, institutional actors enabled and promoted dissemination through technical assistance and international events. In this way, the mechanisms reinforce one another.
As a final comment on dissemination, we saw in the case of EDUCO that dissemination also occurred at the sub-national level. That is to say, World Bank representatives purposively engaged in dissemination across El Salvador. It did this, first, by financing a communications campaign to spread favorable coverage of EDUCO and, second, by meeting directly with the oppositional groups.

**Technical assistance:** The mechanism of technical assistance was also in play at various points. As mentioned above, through the technical assistance offered by international actors, certain recommendations made their way into key reports. Separately, technical assistance was integral when, for example, the Chicago Boys worked directly with FUSADES to define the priorities that would serve as the basis for the Socioeconomic Development Plan of President Cristiani. A similar example occurred in 1994, when World Bank staff drafted the Public Sector Modernization Action Plan for the administration of President Calderón Sol. Technical assistance also played a key role in the elaboration of the loan requirements targeted at bolstering the EDUCO program, as well the operationalization of the pilot program and the EDUCO program itself. Indeed, without the technical assistance of international actors, it is unlikely that the idea of basing education reform around the community-level would have arisen, let alone succeeded, considering the antagonism felt between the central government and FMLN communities, as well as the limited capacity which characterized the MINED in the early 1990s.

**International events:** The mechanism of international events was present in two primary ways. On the one hand, there were the delegations of foreign MINED officials which traveled to El Salvador to study EDUCO’s example; on the other
hand, representatives of the Salvadoran MINED traveled abroad to share the experience of EDUCO. Importantly, both of these types of international events were, in the context of El Salvador, financed by the World Bank in order to spread knowledge of this new type of decentralization and to increase demand for its replication. As the mechanism of international events demonstrates, financial resources themselves are crucial. To that end, I will later suggest that financial resources should be understood as a separate mechanism.

**Conditionalities:** This mechanism, which has received much attention over the years for its ability to act as a lever of imposition, also impinged on the case of EDUCO in El Salvador. As explained in chapter seven, the World Bank drew on this mechanism for two reasons: First, in order to ensure that the MINED would increase its funding to education in the coming years and, second, in order ensure that an unambiguous legal footing existed upon which to base the program. For other, less fundamental issues, the World Bank chose to activate different mechanisms (e.g., other loan-related actions, discussed below). However, out of a recognition of the importance of constructing a solid foundation for this program, the Bank elected to rely on its most blunt mechanism for influencing the actions of national governmental actors.

**Loan-related actions:** Loans documents from the World Bank often contain more than one type of mechanism. This was true in the case of El Salvador. In addition to conditionalities, there were a series of “agreements” and “assurances” recorded in the education loans. These pertained to the implementation of a communications strategy and cost recovery mechanisms at the community level, not
to mention staff selection and the conduct of program evaluations. Though these loan-related actions carry less weight than conditionalities, they do explicitly indicate to the borrowing government the expectations of the World Bank. In addition, by entering into these agreements and by providing such assurances, the recipient MINED is placed – literally – in the debt of the World Bank, which ultimately decides if sufficient progress is being made on project implementation. To that end, the final loan-related action of note was the regular supervisory trips performed by World Bank staff to monitor progress and address any shortcomings. In this way, one sees how the mechanisms of loan-related actions and technical assistance worked together to enhance the influence of the World Bank.

While the findings of the present dissertation revealed the operation of the five mechanisms explained above, they were not the only ones to affect EDUCO. The above examples of transnational influence, rather, were those that accord with the mechanisms which have been identified previously by scholars – namely, Dale (1999) and Samoff (2009). In what follows, I discuss other mechanisms which emerged during analysis.

8.1.3 Implications of EDUO for Mechanisms of Transnational influence

As Table 8.2, above, indicates, the other mechanisms present during the evolution of EDUO were financial resources, transnational excitement, intermediary organization, policy entrepreneur transfer, and global reach. Below, I will explain what these mechanisms are and how they operated in relation to EDUO. I will also suggest that these mechanisms should be considered for incorporation into future analytic frameworks for understanding transnational influence.
Financial resources: The first mechanism I would like to highlight here may also be the most basic. Indeed, it may come as a surprise that I would suggest the need to mention financial resources as a separate mechanism, particularly given the emphasis that researchers often place on the importance of loans in influencing education reform (especially in developing countries). That said, it stands out to me that the two primary scholars who have written on transnational influence (Dale, 1999, and Samoff, 2009) do not discuss this mechanism in isolation, as they do in the case of loan conditionalities and other loan-related actions.

In the case of EDUCO, while we see that loans, and the mechanisms associated with them, are important, this is not the same as suggesting that financing can operate as stand-alone mechanism. On one hand, financing often does come in the form of loans, which are themselves associated with conditionalities, agreements, assurances, supervision, and a host of administrative requirements; on the other hand, it is not uncommon for financial resources to be provided in the form of grants, particularly in development contexts. A prime example of this in the case of EDUCO would be the financing that UNICEF provided to fund the pilot program on which EDUCO would be based. Similarly, USAID, among many other bilateral organizations, provided large sums to the MINED in the form of grants for education reform (MINED, 1999). For these reasons, I suggest that provision of financial resources be considered its own mechanism in terms of the transnational influence.

Transnational excitement: The mechanism of transnational excitement repeatedly emerged in the data that I collected. As mentioned in chapter seven, the passion, enthusiasm, commitment, persistence, and attention to detail that the staff of
the World Bank exhibited was infectious. Cumulatively, this excitement affected the staff of the MINED and the seriousness with which they took the EDUCO program. It also led to jealousy and competition, for the staff within the MINED knew that those who worked with this program would be given preferential treatment; they would be first in line for a promotion. It should be noted, though, that the World Bank was not the only actor to contribute to the mechanism of transnational excitement. The fact that international delegations came from many countries to study EDUCO’s example reinforced the excitement.

Though many projects are financed by international organizations, I would suggest that few have been the subject of the kind of intense and sustained attention that EDUCO experienced beginning in the early 1990s. Importantly, such excitement on the part of international actors can serve to build or sustain motivation and momentum at the national level. This can be important – from the perspective of those who would wish to advance a particular kind of reform – especially when the reform context is not especially propitious. With this in mind, I suggest here that it may be useful to be aware of the operation of this mechanism in future research.

Intermediary organizations: Perhaps one of the most important mechanisms to affect education reform generally and the development of EDUCO specifically was the creation of intermediary organizations. As I explained in chapter six, USAID took specific steps during the early-to-mid 1980s to facilitate the creation of both FUSADES and FEPADe. Later, and in ways were discussed in chapter seven, both of these organizations were integral to the reform context. To be sure, the creation of FUSADES and FEPADe was part of a wider strategy aimed at promoting a specific
strand of the Salvadoran elite. This strand not only tended to be associated with the new business sector but was also pro-U.S. and favored the neoliberal policy reforms (in the economic and social sectors) that were being advocated by USAID, among other organizations, such as the World Bank and FUSADES.

In the context of El Salvador during the mid-1980s, the importance of these organizations is better understood if we recall that the presidency at the time was occupied by Duarte’s social democratic party. USAID thus facilitated the founding of FUSADES and FEPADE in order to create spaces in which both Salvadoran and international policy entrepreneurs (see subsequent discussion) could operate. By fostering and coordinating with FUSADES, USAID was able to contribute to ensuring that its preferred candidate – Alfredo Cristiani – would assume the presidency in 1989.

Even after the presidential elections, however, FUSADES and FEPADE remained active and influential. FUSADES continued to act a key node in the circuit that connected El Salvador with international reform trends. For its part, FEPADE remained at the forefront of education reform and education projects that benefitted the business sector. Moreover, as mentioned in chapter seven, the Salvadoran Minister of Education during 1990-1998 first worked as an education specialist with FEPADE.

Based on the integral and instrumental role that these organizations played, it seems that it would be useful to consider their creation and operation as a key mechanism of transnational influence. With regard to future research, it may also be productive to look for the presence of this mechanism in other reform contexts.
Policy entrepreneur transfer: This mechanism is similar to one which has been previously identified by Samoff (2009) – namely, national actor recruitment and socialization. In the latter case, however, international organizations recruit actors from various countries – developed and developing – to work with the organization and help it advance its agenda. In the case of policy entrepreneur transfer, however, it is the international organization that supplies a particular actor to another organization for the purpose of advancing an agenda or policy that is favored by the former.

There are three examples of this which stand out in the present research. In two cases actors transferred from the World Bank to positions in El Salvador. In the first instance, an economist from the World Bank took a sabbatical in order to assume a position with FUSADES, which, as mentioned above, was significant because this organization worked closely with the government to establish the direction of policy reform. In the second instance, an economist from the World Bank left this institution and assumed the important role of Minister of Finance (Hacienda). The importance of this latter actor was clear during my interviews with key MINED staff from the early 1990s. As they indicated to me, the Minister of Finance was a strong supporter of EDUCO who had no problem approving funding increases to this program, which he saw as an example of positive governmental reform. The third case of policy entrepreneur transferred occurred when the UNESCO consultant became the coordinator of the EDUCO project office, a key position which she maintained for long enough (2.5 years) to create a solid foundation for the program. Thus, while scholars have pointed out previously how international organizations
absorb and leverage national actors to their advantage (Steiner-Khamsi, 2006; Steiner-Khamsi, Silova, & Johnson, 2006), I suggest that a mechanism of which we should also be aware is policy entrepreneur transfer, through which international actors are deployed to other (typically national) organizations to enable certain reforms.

**Global reach:** This is the final mechanism that I wish to discuss in relation to the period 1988-1995. With this mechanism, I would like to draw attention to the fact that exercising one’s global reach – or global presence – can act as a form of influence. For organizations, global reach allows them to stay plugged into political changes and reform opportunities as they arise in various countries. It may be said, then, that the mechanism of global reach is one which organizations such as the World Bank engage consistently in order to seek out and remain aware the emergence of policy windows or favorable reform contexts.

At the national level, the influence of the global reach mechanism occurs as a result of the presence and/or involvement of international actors in those processes and actions which may (at least initially) pre-date the execution of reform. In these situations, the global reach of particular actors may induce actors from the local and national levels to react to their presence or participation. The primary function of this mechanism, however, is to ensure that international actors continue to remain abreast of important opportunities at the national level and across the globe.

The words of a long-time World Bank education specialist speak to this mechanism in relation to the EDUCO program. He said:
EDUCO – the Bank did not invent EDUCO. The Bank saw it, and had a person in the right place at the right time – look at it, brought it to the Bank, the Bank study it, analyze it, learn what it was, and once we were comfortable with it, push it. It’s not the way you think. It’s not that we have the “semilla germinal” (original idea) – no, because we are, like the holy spirit, almost everywhere. Many times, we have the right people in the right place at the right time, and we take advantage of it (INTACT35, interview 2).

Aside from indicating the value of the mechanism of global reach, what these words also indicate is that, in practice, this mechanism works in tandem with others which assist the World Bank in “pushing” a particular reform idea.

8.2 Multiple Mechanisms of Influence, the Agency of Local and National Actors, and the Climate of Reception

To this point, I have primarily focused on individual mechanisms of influence. What I have not yet done, however, is consider these mechanisms together. Nor have I incorporated an assessment of the importance of local and national actor agency. I attempt to address both of these issues here, in addition to examining issues around the initial development of the overall climate of reception in El Salvador.

8.2.1 Multiple Mechanisms of Influence

In the preceding two sections, I discussed a total of 10 mechanisms of transnational influence. To summarize, these were dissemination, technical assistance, international events, conditionalities, loan-related actions, financial resources, transnational excitement, intermediary organizations, policy entrepreneur
transfer, and global reach. While it is useful for our knowledge of EDUCCO’s development to discuss the specific mechanisms of transnational influence, it is also necessary to place the net effect of the combination of these mechanisms into perspective, noting that some influences are stronger than others and not all are pushing in the same direction.

To that end, we can be sure that EDUCCO would not have developed in the way that it did were it not for the operation of multiple mechanisms, and in a particular order. First, USAID facilitated the creation of FUSADES and FEPADÉ. Second, these intermediary organizations then served not only as spaces for the dissemination and circulation of reports by international actors, but also as spaces through which to promote a Salvadoran elite which would move into government and which concurred with the preferences of the dominant international organizations operating in El Salvador at the time. This local elite, either as staff of FUSADES and FEPADÉ or as officials within the government, then served as a counterpart to the technical assistance provided by the World Bank, the Kast Foundation, and UNESCO. Via the mechanism of global reach, the World Bank was able to remain aware of early developments within El Salvador, specifically the important change in direction committed by the Minister of Education when she decided to orient away from municipalization and towards community level management.

To continue, through the technical assistance provided by international organizations, specialists advocated for specific reform strategies, strategies which then served as the basis for grant money from UNICEF and education loans from the World Bank. World Bank loans were then accompanied by further mechanisms, such
as conditionalities other loan-related actions, not to mention additional technical assistance to ensure that EDUCO’s implementation would be as successful as possible. During this time, both the World Bank and UNESCO also transferred policy entrepreneurs to El Salvador, where they would work in key governmental and NGO positions, positions that were integral to the success of the reforms under way.

Once the program’s implementation began, another set of mechanisms became relevant. Across El Salvador, a communication campaign was carried out with financing from the World Bank and technical expertise provided by the UNESCO consultant, who had begun to work in the MINED as the coordinator of the EDUCO program. The idea was to disseminate a particular message about the EDUCO program through community meetings, workshops, TV, radio, and newspapers, not to mention direct meetings between the World Bank and the oppositional groups (e.g., the FMLN and teachers’ organizations).

The final two mechanisms during 1988-1995 were a series of international events and transnational excitement. These international events were delegations of MINED staff from foreign countries, as well as travel by Salvadoran MINED staff to other countries. These events were complemented in El Salvador by the persistent excitement, conviction, and dedication exhibited by World Bank staff as the EDUCO program grew. Ultimately, as previously explained, both of these mechanisms reinforced the commitment of key actors within the MINED.

In these ways, then, transnational influence encompassed the entire development of the EDUCO program. Indeed, while EDUCO was the primary outcome of this period of education reform in El Salvador, it is clear that any reform
that would have emerged from during the early 1990s in El Salvador would have been
unavoidably impacted by transnational influence in a number of ways. To that end,
by the time the EDUCO program began, not only the education sector but the country
as a whole had been engulfed in a context that had been thoroughly penetrated by
transnational influence for more than a decade. Initially, this influence came in the
form of U.S. military, economic, and social aid. Only later, towards the end of the
1980s, did the influence begin to appear in the form of mechanisms with relevance
for education reform.

8.2.2 National and Local Actor Agency

However, despite all that has been said above about the predominance of
transnational influence, it is important to recognize the agency of local and national
actors. With regard to the former, the issue of agency cannot be overemphasized.
That is to say, while the rebels themselves also received some assistance from
international actors (e.g., transnational civil society, Cuba, the revolutionary
government of Nicaragua, United Nations organizations), the locus of control (in the
revolutionary effort) remained with the FMLN. In other words, the FMLN refused to
capitulate, despite the fact that they were fighting against a government and military
forces which were backed by training and significant amounts of resources from the
United States, as detailed in chapter six. Importantly, both the will of the FMLN and,
realtedly, the will of the popular teachers to carry on with their cause in the face of
such obstacles constituted a key constraint in the Salvadoran context throughout the
1980s and into the early 1990s. Indeed, as explained in chapter seven, the Minister of
Education saw the FMLN controlled areas generally and the popular education schools specifically as primary challenges to the reform of the education system.

Similarly, national actors’ agency was integral to the evolution of education reform. We have seen, for example, how the Minister of Education decided, first, to approve the pilot program in early 1991 and, second, to bet on the EDUCO model as the central reform to finance through World Bank loans. I have also explained how the staff within the MINED participated in the implementation of the EDUCO program, and eventually came to promote it themselves. Each of these instances figure as key contributors to the overall trajectory of EDUCO.

Yet, none of the actions taken by national level actors should be surprising. This is because the theoretical framework elaborated in chapter four recognizes that structurally constrained actors will select the most strategic path to follow. With regard to the Minister of Education, this meant betting on the EDUCO program once she perceived that municipalization would fail due to the dual constraints imposed by teachers’ unions and mayors’ lack of capacity. The later decision by certain national actors to act as a champion of the EDUCO program is likewise understandable. Salvadoran education specialists working with the EDUCO program perceived that their association with the program would have positive consequences for their professional careers, particularly if they were able to elevate and advance the cause of the EDUCO program.

Time has shown that these decisions were well calculated, in both cases. The structural circumstances in the early 1990s were favorable to a program such as EDUCO, given not only that it aligned with the reform agenda of the Cristiani
administration but also that it had the support of the World Bank. This type of informed decision-making has been labeled by Dale (1999) as paradigmatic learning because it reflects the structural and ideological exigencies of the moment. At the time, the exigencies centered around notions of “modernization” and “innovation” – both of which implied the pursuit of reform in a way that would (in theory) reduce central government bureaucracy, introduce market mechanisms, and move the system toward decentralization. This is not to say that the Minister did not also consider the needs of the Salvadoran education system (e.g., around access), only that one of the primary constrains which had to be taken into account when selecting a reform strategy was the preferences of the organizations which constituted structural constraints (and provided structural enablers).

Due to the various mechanisms that have been discussed in this chapter, the structural conditions were even more propitious a few years later, in 1993-1994. By that time, the profile and promise of the EDUCO program had already been “proven.” Informal competition thus arose among Salvadoran staff within the MINED – both to work with the EDUCO office as well as to become the next director of it. Just as the Minister of Education had done in 1990-1991, key Salvadoran education specialists analyzed their structural environment and assessed the various possibilities for advancing their careers. These actors then followed these calculations by repeatedly engaging in strategic action to position themselves advantageously vis-à-vis structural opportunities.
8.2.3 The Climate of Reception

Although I have highlighted the importance of agency on the part of local and national actors, it is necessary to take the discussion one step further. That is to say, rather than concluding my discussion of EDUCO’s origins by focusing on the centrality of individual actors within El Salvador, I would like to shift the attention to the climate of reception (Dale, 2013). Put differently: I see it as necessary to move the issue of national context itself to the forefront of my analysis. The reason for this has to do with the extent to which shifts in the national context subsequently affect the effectiveness of the mechanisms of transnational influence.

As explained in chapter six, the U.S. government and USAID dedicated an enormous amount of resources – financial, institutional, political – to El Salvador during the 1980s. These resources were dedicated, on the one hand, to ensuring that the FMLN would not be victorious in its battle against the Salvadoran government. On the other hand, these resources were directed at engendering fundamental changes in terms of El Salvador’s political and economic structures. Over the course of this decade, USAID identified and sponsored a new business elite and their associations (Robinson, 2003). The purpose of these actions was to stimulate and strengthen a class of entrepreneurs who would be receptive to the neoliberal macroeconomic reforms that had been promoted strongly by the United States and England since 1980.

This strategy was successful and, over time, the Salvadoran elite who emerged were not only receptive but eager to implement such reforms. They recognized the mis-alignment between the preferences of the dominant force of the United States
government and those of landed oligarchy that had for many years controlled Salvadoran political and economic life. In response, the new business elite took advantage of the supports available to them through USAID (which helped Cristiani’s presidential campaign), FUSADES (which brought in the Chicago Boys to establish economic and social reform strategies), and the World Bank (which clarified those actions it would be necessary to take in order to qualify for structural adjustment loans). By tapping into these supports, combined with the failure of the Duarte presidential administration, Cristiani followed the path toward success that had been mapped out by key international actors.

Once the new business elite was on the same page as USAID and the World Bank, fundamental changes to the economic and political power structure within El Salvador accelerated. Thus, by 1990, the climate of reception for all sectors had been modified – and any reform program that would make more than a minor impact had to accord with these fundamental changes. Though numerous international organizations operated in El Salvador in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the two largest and most influential were USAID and the World Bank. This meant that successful reform programs, in addition to responding to local constraints, had to integrate with the neoliberal agenda for state and sector reform. High priorities in this agenda were, for example, the reduction of the state generally, the incorporation of market mechanisms in the provision of services, and the implementation of various kinds of decentralization.

It should be clear, then, that the changes that took place in terms of El Salvador’s political and economic structure had serious implications for the climate
of reception in 1990, when international actors such as the Kast Foundation, the World Bank, and UNESCO began to make suggestions regarding education reform strategies. Indeed, those structural alterations had the effect of creating a political space in which many of the mechanisms of transnational influence could operate with a greater likelihood of success than they would have otherwise. Importantly, mechanisms which stand out in this regard are those that operated at the outset, when the process through which EDUCO developed first began. These mechanisms include, for example, dissemination of international exemplars and technical assistance from the World Bank and UNESCO.

Put into broader perspective, we see that USAID created conditions for the success of the Cristiani administration, while later the World Bank created conditions for the “success” of EDUCO. In the interim, the UNESCO consultant pointed to a strategy that fit with the exigencies of the local and global context at the time. Ultimately, however, it was the World Bank rather than UNESCO that served as a primary constraint on the Salvadoran context. For this reason, while the basic outline of the strategy suggested by UNESCO’s consultant was retained, its purpose and features were different than they would have been otherwise. This is further evidence of the climate of reception at the time: Notions of community empowerment, adult education, and the rights of the child were sanitized in favor of teacher accountability and cost recovery.

Thus, in accordance with Dale (2013), I would like to suggest that the climate of reception be an element which is kept in mind when analyzing the development of education policies. That is to say, beyond individual mechanisms, we must
understand the nature of the national context in which they operate. This is particularly important when considering how policies first develop. That said, I would now like to turn to a further discussion of the implications of the full trajectory of the EDUCO program.
Chapter 9: Implications for Global Education Policy

While the primary focus of this dissertation has been the development of the EDUCO program during 1988-1995, it is important to emphasize that mechanisms of transnational influence continued to operate in the post-1995 period. This was made obvious in the literature review chapter (chapter three), when I detailed the ways in which EDUCO was promoted globally. At this point, I suggest that further consideration of the information presented previously about that global promotion is necessary. In particular, this is so because we can gain additional insights into the significance of EDUCO from a long-term perspective (i.e., in the post-WWII context). Finally, with the entire process in mind through which EDUCO emerged and has evolved, I can offer a set of implications for the development of global education policy.

Thus, I begin in the present chapter by engaging in a re-assessment of what is known about EDUCO’s post-1995 trajectory. That is to say, in the first section, I analyze the mechanisms that were at play in EDUCO’s global promotion from the mid-1990s onward, with grounding in the information which was presented in chapter three. In the second section, I briefly reflect on EDUCO’s full trajectory, from 1988 onward. In the third section, I locate our more comprehensive understanding of the EDUCO program in the post-WWII context. In so doing, I consider the significance of the EDUCO program in relation to the other periods of decentralization that we have witnessed. In the fourth and final section, I then present a series of implications
for the development of global education policies which follows from the experience of EDUCO.

9.1 EDUCO’s Post-1995 Trajectory and Mechanisms of Transnational Influence

In chapter three of this dissertation, I discussed a number of issues related to EDUCO’s trajectory in the post-1995 period. To be specific, in section 3.4, I detailed the program’s global promotion during 1996-2005/6; then, in section 3.5, I reviewed the ways in which EDUCO has continued to be a feature of the global education literature. Also as part of chapter three, I engaged in an extended discussion of the numerous studies produced during this time. Going forward, I would like to take into consideration what that information – when considered collectively – reveals about the mechanisms of transnational influence that facilitated EDUCO’s continued rise.

While I engage in that task in this section, it should be remembered that the post-1995 period was not the primary period of analysis for this dissertation. As such, there may have been additional mechanisms at play which I do not discuss here. Future research should further investigate the insights that I offer below.

There were five mechanisms of transnational influence which merit our attention. In the language of the analytic framework presented in chapter four, the mechanisms at play in the post-1995 period were international events, research, certification, dissemination, and national actor recruitment and socialization. Table 9.1, below, summarizes key examples of these mechanisms, each of which I discuss in what follows.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Mechanism of Transnational Influence</th>
<th>Examples (and Year) of Mechanism Manifestation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>International Events</td>
<td>EDUCO is featured at a regional seminar held in Central America by World Bank (1996); the IDB features EDUCO at the 1998 meeting of its board of governors; A workshop in Peru financed by the World Bank emphasizes EDUCO (2001); EDUCO is a featured program at a World Bank conference in Shanghai, China (2004)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Certification</td>
<td>World Bank confers the President’s Award for Excellence on the EDUCO program (1997) and also labels it as a flagship program (1997); the IDB’s Strategy paper for primary and secondary education highlights EDUCO as an exemplar (2000); EDUCO is spotlighted in the World Development Report 2004 as a model for the reform of education sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dissemination</td>
<td>A special issue of the <em>World Bank Economic Review</em> features the study by Jimenez and Sawada (1999); the journal <em>En Breve</em>, of the World Bank, presents on the experience of EDUCO (2004, 2006); a World Bank book on service delivery singles out EDUCO (2005); articles and reports by World Bank education specialists underscore EDUCO (Barrera et al., 2009; Bruns et al., 2011; Di Gropello 2005, 2006, 2007; Umansky &amp; Vegas, 2007)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>National Actors Recruitment and Socialization</td>
<td>Salvadoran education specialists who worked with EDUCO were recruited for multiple events, including: a Central America regional seminar (1997), a meeting of the board of governors of the IDB (1998), an international workshop in Peru (2001), and an international conference in China (2004). In addition, Salvadoran education specialists were invited to contribute academic publications to journals and books produced by the World Bank and the IDB (Jacir de Lovo, 2000; Meza, 1997; Meza, Guzmán, &amp; de Varela, 2004b).</td>
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**Note:** This list of mechanisms is meant to be indicative but not exhaustive, as it is based on the literature review contained in chapter three. Additional research may reveal additional mechanisms.
International Events: As mentioned previously, El Salvador received international delegations and also sent staff from the MINED abroad to share the EDUCO experience. In the post-1995 period, a number of other international events also took place. These began, for example, with a regional seminar being organized in 1996 by the World Bank in Central America. Subsequent events at which EDUCO was also featured included the 1998 meeting of the board of governors of the IDB in Colombia, a World Bank workshop in Peru in 2001, and, later, a World Bank conference during 2004 in Shanghai, China. From a long-term perspective, then, we see that international events began by bring foreign delegations to El Salvador early on (as early as September 1992) and then continued with not only sending MINED staff abroad, but also by incorporating EDUCO into a number of international functions. Notably, though not surprisingly, the institutions that utilized this mechanism of influence were those – the World Bank and the IDB – that financed the program within El Salvador and had a stake in its success.

Research: From a chronological perspective, research was the next mechanism to be activated. A few years after the international events had begun, research began to emerge which offered “favorable findings,” as noted extensively in chapter three. Seven studies financed by the World Bank came out in all: 1997 was the year of the first study, while the year of the final one was 2005.68 Two features of these studies lent credibility to the EDUCO program and raised its profile. The first feature is the

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68 As discussed in chapter three, there were more than seven studies of EDUCO produced in all. Here, I refer exclusively to those produced by the World Bank. This is because the present discussion is focused on mechanisms of transnational influence in relation to the program’s ascendance. The non-World Bank studies were not favorable to the program and, as such, would not function as a mechanism of transnational influence which served to promote the program.
fact that the studies were performed by staff of (and published by) the World Bank—an institution which not only produces more research than any other on issues around development, but which, importantly, is perhaps the most-well respected by many development specialists (Squire, 2000, in Broad 2006, p. 395). The second important feature of these studies in terms of transnational influence was the fact that the majority of them (or at least those which were subsequently promoted) either showed positive outcomes or offered positive interpretations of their results. In ways that will be discussed, the mechanism of dissemination has gone hand-in-hand with the research studies of the World Bank.

Certification: Shortly after the research studies began to emerge, the mechanism of certification was operationalized. At least four separate instances of certification can be identified, two of which occurred in 1997. In that year, EDUCO was conferred the President’s Award for Excellence by the World Bank, beating out other “innovative” projects from around the world. Also in that year, EDUCO was labeled a flagship program by the Bank. Three years later, in 2000, EDUCO was cited by the IDB in its Primary and Secondary Education Strategy as an exemplary program; and then, in 2004, the most notable example of certification came to pass when EDUCO was spotlighted in the World Bank’s leading publication – its World Development Report, or WDR – as the primary example for reform for education systems in developing countries. The magnitude of this latter example should not be underemphasized, as this edition of the WDR, which was titled “Making Services Work for Poor People,” has been seen by many (though certainly not all) international development institutions and practitioners as a key point of reference for the reform
of public services (World Bank, 2003). The fact that the IDB strategy mentioned above and the WDR 2004 are also publications leads me to the next mechanism: Dissemination.

**Dissemination:** It is common for international actors to promote a particular reform through the production and distribution of publications and reports. This was certainly the case with regard to the EDUCO program. In the beginning, studies were created specifically to highlight the EDUCO program – such as those studies discussed above in relation to the research mechanism. There were also articles in the World Bank’s *En Breve* journal which briefly summarized the EDUCO experience and the benefits that, from the perspective of the Bank, accompanied it (Meza, Guzmán, & de Varela, 2004b; World Bank, 2006b).

However, the study that was perhaps most influential – that by Jimenez and Sawada (1999) – was featured in a special issue of the *World Bank Economic Review* which was dedicated to educational programs. Thus, in addition to being seen as a study with a credible methodology, and in addition to presenting findings that EDUCO produced comparatively higher student achievement on language tests, not to mention lower student absenteeism, this study’s dissemination was being greatly amplified by its inclusion in “the most widely read scholarly economic journal in the world.”

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69 As Gershberg, Meade, and Andersson (2009) note: “Jimenez and Sawada (1999) was influential in convincing World Bank staff that EDUCO was a successful model” (p. 198). In that Alec Ian Gershberg was a senior education economist working the Bank at the time that the Jimenez and Sawada (1999) studied emerged, this observation should be given some weight.

In the 2000s, studies of the program continued, as Table 9.1 indicates. Also in the 2000s, EDUCO’s inclusion in other, thematic publications, which were not geared to the program exclusively, also became more common. Prime examples include a World Bank book on the delivery of public services (Fiszbein, 2005), as well as numerous articles, book chapters, and reports by World Bank education specialists (Barrera-Osorio, Fasih, Patrinos, & Santibañez, 2009; Bruns, Filmer, & Patrinos, 2011; Di Gropello, 2005, 2006, 2007; Umansky & Vegas, 2007). As a final comment in this regard, and as a result of the research base created by the World Bank, knowledge of the EDUCO program continued to be disseminated in that it was included in reports by a number of other organizations, including the United Nations, UNICEF, UNESCO, the Brookings Center, and the Global Partnership for Education. (See section 3.5 of this dissertation for more information on these reports.)

**National Actor Recruitment and Socialization:** In addition to featuring EDUCO at international events, the World Bank also repeatedly recruited Salvadoran nationals on whom it could rely to produce and/or present favorable results for the EDUCO program. As discussed under the “international events” mechanism above, these national actors were sent, for example, to Peru, Colombia, and China. These same actors were relied upon to contribute academic publications to journals and books produced by the World Bank and the IDB (Jacir de Lovo, 2000; Meza, 1997; Meza, Guzmán, & de Varela, 2004b). Such interactions were mutually beneficial, for while the World Bank gave these national actors more credibility, the World Bank
was, in turn, also able to borrow from the credibility of certain actors who were integral in implementing EDUCO in the Salvadoran context.

Thus, based on the above discussion, not only do we see that numerous mechanisms operated in the post-1995 period, but we also see that the mechanisms reinforced one another. For example, while international events often relied on national actors that had been recruited by the World Bank, research studies with sanguine findings enhanced the program’s desirability and increased the clout of those national actors who would share their experience with the program. In this way, the simultaneous and complementary operation of multiple mechanisms served to increase the global reach of the program.

At the same time, however, the post-1995 mechanisms should not be assessed in isolation. I suggest that they should be considered in view of the foundation that was created in El Salvador during 1988-1995. Only then can we appreciate the full trajectory of the EDUCO program and reflect on its implications for the development of global education policies.

9.2 Consideration of EDUCO’s Full Trajectory

Despite the strategic nature of the post-1995 mechanisms of transnational influence, they cannot be considered separately from the developments of the prior period. That is, while the combination of the post-1995 mechanisms was instrumental in raising the profile of EDUCO and in ensuring that this program would become widely known and emulated, the in-depth understanding of EDUCO that I present in this dissertation suggests that such mechanisms would not have been possible – or, at least, as successful – had it not been for the foundation that had been
established during 1988-1995. In other words, the post-1995 mechanisms of the World Bank and the IDB (the two primary institutions to promote EDUCO) would not have been nearly as successful, if at all operable, were it not for the breadth of its implementation and the extent to which it was entrenched in the Salvadoran context.

Indeed, the World Bank built on and reinforced the extent to which the Salvadoran MINED took on EDUCO as a program that it (i.e., the MINED) sought to implement as fully as possible, as explained in chapter seven. Furthermore, because of the buy-in from Salvadoran MINED actors, it was easier for the World Bank to enact a number of key mechanisms, including: Study trips for foreign delegations, the participation of Salvadoran actors at international events, and the conduct of research studies. Subsequently, and as mentioned previously, these mechanisms fed into and strengthened the other mechanisms of dissemination and certification. Ultimately, then, as we have seen, the EDUCO program went from being a pilot program in six schools in 1991 to being featured in the *World Bank Economic Review*, the WDR 2004, and, more recently, many other reports by international organizations that operate on a global scale.

9.3 EDUCO’s Trajectory in Long-Term Perspective

As noted in chapter two, there have been multiple periods in the post-WWII context. Across these periods, the dominant thinking around development and decentralization varied. In the first period (mid-1950s – mid-1970s), educational decentralization was mentioned in relation to the creation of national school systems. This happened as many developing countries were gaining independence and incorporating citizens into newly created systems of political representation.
In the second period (1970s – early 1980s), educational decentralization was associated with the expansion and rationalization of the state’s administrative bureaucracy. This often occurred as many countries were preoccupied with expanding and improving the operation of multiple levels of government as well as the number of services offered to citizens, but especially the poor.

In the third and most recent period (early 1980s – present) the focus of development changed. As explained previously, the state was seen as the problem. Ministries and systems of service provision were viewed by many development practitioners (but particularly mainstream development economists) as inefficient, cost-ineffective, cumbersome, and overly-centralized. In response, a primary concern of development was to reduce the size of the state, in addition to making the management of the state’s components more efficient, cost-effective, and accountable.

Education was an area of central concern. Indeed, in that this sector often consumes a significant portion of state budgets, neoliberal reformers from the 1980s onwards have tended to focus on reforms that would, from their perspective, improve the operation and management of this sector. Likewise, to the extent that teachers’ unions have constituted obstacles to reform, policy entrepreneurs looked for ways to weaken them (Compton & Weiner, 2008). Thus, in the third post-WWII period, where education policies could help to minimize the size of the central government, could introduce market mechanisms to the provision of education, and/or could serve to the detriment of teachers’ unions, the more popular they would be with the dominant reform-minded interests of the time, such as World Bank and USAID.
This was a primary reason why EDUCO was received – internationally – with such excitement in the 1990s, once news of its “success” started to emerge from El Salvador. This is not to suggest that EDUCO was the first innovation to align with neoliberal reform preferences, for the example of vouchers in Chile emerged many years prior, itself serving initially as inspiration for education reform in El Salvador, as explained in chapter seven. The difference was that EDUCO represented the first innovation wherein the dominant preferences of the time were enacted through a model of community-level education decentralization.

However, beyond simply transferring to parents the responsibility for hiring and firing teachers, much of the attention that the program received stemmed from its implications for teachers’ unions. Indeed, those teachers who were hired by EDUCO schools could not also belong to the unions, as explained in chapter three. Thus, by serving as a blow to the unions, the program was all the more popular with those actors within and outside El Salvador who sought to implement or spread reforms that would have similar effects.

Overall, one key implication of this discussion is that, in part, EDUCO’s popularity resulted not from the mechanisms on which I have elaborated in this dissertation but rather from the extent to which it matched the pre-existing preferences of policy entrepreneurs. In general, since the early 1980s, neoliberal reformers had been interested to reform the nature of the state; then, beginning in the second half of the 1980s, World Bank education specialists also began to take interest in applying the idea of decentralization to the education sector. The point here is that,
by the time the experience of EDUCO began to emerge, these actors were primed for a successful example of reform that could do what EDUCO was claimed to do.

Importantly, it was never necessary to advertise, publicly, this aspect of the EDUCO program. That is to say, in addition to being politically unpopular (at least with teachers’ unions), advocates of EDUCO were able to highlight other aspects of the program’s success, aspects which were likely to engender less resistance. Examples included enhanced community participation and the supposed efficiencies which resulted. Most importantly, however, advocates were able, after a few years, to point to the World Bank studies which began to emerge and which showed positive results on student achievement and student attendance, for example. With these studies in hand, neoliberal advocates could point to the theory and results of the program, rather than the more contentious issue of how the program affected teachers’ unions. Ultimately, EDUCO’s example met both those official and unofficial priorities shared by actors in policy-relevant positions – thereby enhancing its attractiveness as a reform option and increasing its status as a global education policy.

9.4 EDUCO and Global Education Policy

To that end, it is necessary to step back and consider the implications of EDUCO for the phenomenon of global education policy. In accordance with the critical realist ontological tradition on which this dissertation is based, these implications (or generalizations) could also be stated as hypotheses about the nature of the world. In delineating these implications, I will take both mechanisms and issues of structure into account.
These implications should be understood as an attempt to explain how the phenomenon of global education policy works. That said, the points offered below should also be understood as directed toward similar situations, situations which themselves should be further investigated through future research in order to more completely understand and perhaps problematize global education policies that have emerged in a manner similar to that of the EDUCO program. Possible examples include vouchers in Chile and outcomes-based education in South Africa. In both of these cases, contexts of conflict and crisis preceded the development of policies which subsequently achieved the status of global education policy.

In terms of EDUCO and what we know about its trajectory, a number of variables, arranged in a particular sequence, and based on a particular context, would seem to be necessary for a policy to originate which would later become a global education policy. This is not to suggest that there is only one way for a policy to develop and then go global; the suggestion, rather, is that the EDUCO program provides insights into one particular way in which that can happen. With that in mind, I now present and discuss a series of implications.

Based on the findings in this dissertation around the development, evolution, and diffusion of EDUCO, I suggest that the case indicates the following with regard to the phenomenon of global education policy. Each suggestion is accompanied by brief commentary.

1. **Particular contexts lend themselves to serving as the foundation for global education policies.** These are contexts in which the climate of receptivity is high, or in which the ability to resist external influence is low. From an international political
economic perspective, investigating the development of the national context and the ways in which international actors have contributed to changes in its nature can reveal, on one hand, important structural developments that increase or decrease the climate of receptivity and, on the other, why national actors may or may not be likely (or able) to resist transnational influence. In more specific terms, there is need in future research to be critical of the nature and development of the national context itself, as well as the role of international institutions (or their intermediary organizations) in that regard.

Relatedly, one issue to investigate further is whether other global education policies have emerged from contexts of conflict, crisis, or vulnerability. Indeed, these contexts may lend themselves to the development of a favorable climate of receptivity. While change in government and periods of political transition are commonly associated with education reform (Ginsburg, 1991), the question here pertains to whether contexts of particularly high need and uncertainty, such as conflicted-affected contexts, have served elsewhere as jumping off points for policy experiments which later became global education policies.

2. A particular sequence of mechanisms facilitates a policy of interest being pursued, implemented, and scaled up at the national level. That sequence would entail technical assistance, followed by financial resources, conditionalities, loan-related actions, international events (e.g., foreign delegations), and research. While technical assistance precedes the other mechanisms, it also continues throughout. Additionally, this series of mechanisms is likely to be more successful if it is introduced in a highly receptive national context.
In terms of theory, a further point can be made here, particularly with regard to Jakobi’s (2009) concept of global policy field (see section 4.3.2 of this dissertation for more). To be specific, the sequence of events specified here would pertain to the vertical dimension. Through the combination of technical assistance, financial resources, conditionalities, and loan-related actions, international organizations influence, in a vertical sense, the development of education policies and programs at the national level. As discussed below, the horizontal transmission of influence is more relevant subsequently.

3. *Once a solid foundation has been established at the country level, a separate (though related) set of mechanisms encourages the evolution of the policy internationally.* The point here is that international promotion is made possible by leveraging the foundation created at the national level. The mechanisms involved are international events (e.g., foreign delegations, international workshops, Salvadoran MINED staff abroad), research, certification, dissemination, and national actor recruitment. Among these mechanisms, the production of credible research is a crucial in that it not only adds legitimacy to the other mechanisms but also endures longer than the others, as discussed in chapter three of this dissertation (see section 3.5).

Theoretically, these mechanisms would correspond with the horizontal dimension of Jakobi’s (2009) global policy field. This is because these mechanisms are not geared towards developing the education policy in question in a particular national context but rather serve to disseminate the policy example across countries. At the same time, it should be noted that policy traveling along the horizontal
dimension does not occur in the absence of the vertical dimension. Put differently, horizontal transmission is frequently facilitated by mechanisms which are activated, in a vertical sense, by international organizations. Indeed, during this stage, the vertical and horizontal work in tandem to the extent that dispersion among countries (horizontal dispersion) of an idea or policy is made possible by international organizations who leverage the experience of a particular country by activating mechanisms such as international events, research, certification, dissemination, and national actor recruitment.

4. **It matters which organization predominates in a particular country.** In El Salvador, the most influential organizations were USAID and the World Bank. This is significant because these organizations, like all organizations, have preferences regarding the nature of education reform. In addition to being among the most powerful international actors working in the field of development, they also dedicate significant resources to education, often more so than other involved institutions, and in ways that carry greater influence.

In the context of El Salvador, the significance of the above comments becomes more clear when we recall that USAID and the World Bank were not the only involved international organizations. As explained in chapter seven, the consultant from UNESCO was also integral. This consultant successfully persuaded the Minister of Education to take a risk on the community-level pilot program. Moreover, this consultant saw it as her personal mission to try to disrupt the education reforms that were being advanced by the World Bank and the consultants from Chile who were brought in by USAID. In the end, while this consultant was
able to place an alternative reform concept on the agenda (community decentralization rather than vouchers/municipalization), its ethos and form were altered in the process by the World Bank and the MINED. As explained previously, because the World Bank held the most clout and sway in the early 1990s in El Salvador, the staff of this institution were able to ensure that the community-based model of education decentralization aligned with their preferences for reform.

To that end, were EDUCO to have been driven by the interests of UNESCO, rather than being subsumed by the World Bank, it is likely that a number of features would have been different. For example, it is probable (a) that the adult education component of EDUCO’s initial design would have been maintained; (b) that a focus on literacy and quality rather than efficiency and accountability would have been central; (c) that support from the MINED for the local level would have remained strong, rather than dissipating once the UNESCO consultant left her post as program coordinator; (d) that community empowerment would have been pursued for reasons of its intrinsic, rather than instrumental, value; (e) that community participation would have gone beyond a few parents managing the teacher; and (f) that education reform would have been seen from a perspective that values human rights and involvement in political processes, rather than education reform for system efficiency, the debilitation of teachers’ unions, and the creation of human capital. With regard to the case of El Salvador, it is for these reasons why the issue of which organization predominates is of great importance. That said, the issue of organizational dominance is closely linked with geopolitical context.
Before proceeding to the next implication, however, the irony of EDUCO’s development should not be lost. I refer to the fact that a program which started as a progressive grassroots initiative was eventually co-opted by the World Bank (with the consent of the Salvadoran Ministry of Education) and transformed into a model for neoliberal education reform. While the FMLN and many of the sympathetic communities which supported them had worked for social justice and a more egalitarian society, the EDUCO program subverted their efforts and brought them into a system where community involvement meant the accountability of teachers to parents and the weakening of the FMLN’s support base. Not only were popular education teachers not eligible to work in EDUCO schools (due to insufficient training and inadequate credentials), but EDUCO teachers could not belong to the teachers’ unions. Thus, FMLN communities had to hire outside teachers, and the unions experienced a setback. Community struggle for structural transformation and the benefit of all became a group of parents managing a few teachers (in each community).

5. *The dominant geopolitical context matters.* Geopolitics influence international organizations, which often serve as mechanisms for the furtherance of a given country’s foreign policy. Prime examples are USAID and the World Bank, which have for decades advanced notions of free-market capitalism and (IN the case of USAID) representative democracy, often in ways that protect or extend U.S economic and political interests (Robinson, 1996). The point here is not that these two international organizations are the only relevant ones, but rather that these have been among the two most influential because they act in strategic ways and are
controlled by the United States, which has since 1991 been the world’s sole superpower.\textsuperscript{71}

Furthermore, as agents of U.S. government interests, these institutions help to establish the dominant discourse around development, as discussed in chapter two. The implication is that these organizations promote a particular discourse around development while also working at the country level to develop and implement policies which align with the principles and examples embedded in that global discourse. EDUCO is an example of how a policy developed at the national level can feed back into and reinforce global level rhetoric that corresponds with dominant interests.

Going forward, it will be interesting to see how changes to the geopolitical landscape affect the global architecture of aid for education. In particular, it will be important to study the ways in which such countries as Brazil, Russia, India, and China gain more autonomy and create and strengthen their own development agencies. At the same time, it will be important to focus on how the recent withdrawal (again) of U.S. funds from UNESCO affects the ability of this institution to advance its priorities.

6. \textit{It may be necessary to modify how we understand the role of the World Bank in relation to the origin of global education policies}. As this dissertation has shown, it was not the World Bank which originally proposed the idea of community-

\textsuperscript{71} Until recently (2010), the United States held a sufficient number of votes in the World Bank to veto any policy change with which it did not agree. For this reason, the United States has unilaterally appointed each of the Bank’s presidents. Furthermore, it should be noted that, effectively, the United States continues to possess a sufficient number of shares to control World Bank policy, in that it has 15.85\% of the 16\% of votes required to veto policy changes.
level decentralization. Rather, it was an innovation born of necessity during the Salvadoran civil war, which the consultant from UNESCO later propounded. Only once the World Bank recognized the utility of this model for its own purposes did this institution actively begin to support (an altered version of) it.

The implication is that the World Bank, first, relies on its global reach to scan for policies (or policy contexts) that concur with its reform preferences and, upon locating one, then provides the necessary inputs to ensure its success, assuming the national climate is receptive (either voluntarily or otherwise). Prior research has suggested that the World Bank has pursued this strategy in other locations. Examples include conditional cash transfers in Brazil and Mexico (Bonal, Tarabini, & Rambla, 2012), Escuela Nueva in Colombia (McEwan & Beneviste, 2001), and vouchers in Chile (Gauri, 1988; Schiefelbein & Schiefelbein, 2000). This is perhaps a different conception of Bank behavior than is typically suggested, given that the World Bank is often seen as an organization that imposes its will and requires that its policy preferences be implemented. While this may be true to some extent, the point here is that, with regard to policy innovation, the World Bank may more frequently borrow (or usurp and reshape) the ideas of others, at least in the field of education.

9.4 Conclusion

With the present chapter, I have attempted to do two things. On the one hand, I engaged in an assessment of the mechanisms at play in the second half of the EDUCO experience – i.e., the portion of EDUCO’s trajectory that developed after 1995. On the other hand, I sought to reflect on what we know about EDUCO’s full trajectory. To that end, I considered EDUCO’s significance in the post-WWII
context, and then elaborated on the implications of this program for the development of global education policies more generally. Many of these implications, which were elaborated in last section of this chapter, serve both as tentative findings around the nature of global education policy as well as the basis for future research. At this point, now that I have discussed the meaning of this dissertation’s findings, I now turn to the final chapter, in which I will offer a few concluding remarks and briefly discuss the contribution of the dissertation overall.
Chapter 10: Conclusions

In this short concluding chapter, I offer a number of comments. First, I reflect on the contributions of the dissertation overall. Second, I point out issues of concern which emerge from the findings I have presented. Third, I elaborate on avenues for future research. Fourth and finally, I delineate a number of suggestions for future action.

10.1 Contributions of the Dissertation

I have attempted to accomplish a number of tasks with this dissertation. Most centrally, I sought to unpack the origins of an education policy – EDUCO – which went on to become well-known and popular around the world. In order to do this, I relied on the concept of IPEPF (i.e., international process of education policy formation). The value of this concept was that it helped to delimit, from an analytic standpoint, the space that was under investigation. Moreover, the concept of IPEPF was useful because it drew my attention to the processual aspect of how education policies are developed. This was precisely the aspect of the phenomenon of global education policies which I aimed to unpack. I felt that there was a need to better understand and problematize the dynamics of how, exactly, from an international political economic perspective, education policies first develop and then go global. It is my hope that by investigating the case of the EDUCO program, I have contributed in a meaningful way to these ends.
Theoretically, I have also attempted to contribute something to the way that we understand transnational influence. To summarize, I began in chapter four by presenting an analytic framework of mechanisms of transnational influence. This framework was based on the work of Dale (1999) and Samoff (2009) – two scholars who have been instrumental in shaping our thinking around the ways in which globalization and foreign aid influence education policy at the national level. Then, in chapters eight and nine, I drew on this framework in order to explain how transnational influence affected EDUCO’s trajectory; in addition, however, I also used the case of EDUCO to suggest additional mechanisms, mechanisms which are distinct from and complementary to those previously identified by Dale (1999) and Samoff (2009). In this sense, my use of existing theory was not confining but rather dialogic. The mechanisms which I have identified and suggested that we further consider for their incorporation into the framework of mechanisms of transnational influence are: Financial resources, transnational excitement, intermediary organization, policy entrepreneur transfer, and global reach.

Finally, though this dissertation did not focus primarily on the implementation of EDUCO in practice, this dissertation has made a contribution in that regard, particularly through chapter three. In a way, this chapter serves as a response to the overwhelmingly positive attention that EDUCO has been given since its inception. To summarize, the following characteristics of the EDUCO experience should prompt us to temper sanguine interpretation of its merits: (a) It required socioeconomically disadvantaged families to take on additional managerial responsibilities without compensation; (b) it extracted unpaid time and labor from rural communities
members in order to construct or maintain local schools (particularly during the early years of the program); (c) it deprived teachers of job security by precluding them from joining teachers’ unions;\textsuperscript{72} and (d) it limited the notion of participation to parents acting as an accountability mechanism through which to punish teachers.

Beyond these features – and beyond their important negative implications for equity – we also saw in this dissertation that, in practice, EDUCO was not a cheaper alternative to traditional rural public schools\textsuperscript{73} and that, based on the critical review of the World Bank’s studies, the desired outcomes of the program were not achieved. More than that, however, Parandekar (2002) reported that school directors were younger and had fewer years of experience, that teachers received no professional development (in the year prior to his study), and that EDUCO schools had higher rates of student repetition and teacher absenteeism. As pointed out in chapter three, the points discussed above run counter to both the theory and rhetoric around EDUCO. Ultimately, though some parents and communities may have valued the opportunity to be involved in their local school’s management, the program’s larger implications should not be ignored. It is in that regard that this dissertation has made a contribution.

\textsuperscript{72} A recent report on the experience of EDUCO teachers has, furthermore, shed light on the fact that (a) female EDUCO teachers were at times subject to sexual harassment by the parents on the ACE, (b) ACE members would in some cases misappropriate part of the teacher’s income, and (c) that ACE members would at times sell teaching positions in their community (SIMEDUCO, 2011).

\textsuperscript{73} Particularly not after 1995, when EDUCO teachers received salary increases that put their earnings 7 percent above that of teachers in traditional public schools.
10.2 Issues of Concern

It is my hope that the readers of this dissertation perceive the findings to be concerning. Indeed, it stands out to me that there are a number of disconcerting issues around how the experience of the EDUCO program developed. In what follows, I briefly specify and comment on a few of these issues.

1. The fact that the World Bank and the MINED decided on EDUCO before the Peace Accords. Six months before the Peace Accords were signed, the MINED and the World Bank concluded negotiations on the SSRP, the education loan through which EDUCO was initially scaled up. Given the timing of these negotiations, the implication is that the country had not even ended the conflict, let alone formally begun discussion around policy reform. The MINED and the World Bank thus set the trajectory for reform of education governance while out of view of the public. In that education is a public good, reform processes can and should be more open, transparent, and democratic.

2. The conditions under which the MINED made its decision. I do not wish to suggest that there is, inherently, an issue with transnational mechanisms of influence. The provision of technical assistance, for example, can certainly be advantageous, and is not necessarily harmful. Rather, the issue to which I refer here is the fact that the exigencies driving the Salvadoran MINED were, in large part, external. It is true that the Minster of Education also experienced local level constraints, such as the FMLN and popular education teachers, but the force driving the reform process came largely from the World Bank. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the government was hurriedly taking the steps necessary to qualify for structural adjustment loans.
Similarly, the Minister of Education was searching for a reform that would align with the preferences of the World Bank. Moreover, it had to do so according to the World Bank’s internal timeline for negotiating and approving the education loan. In contrast with the above, interaction between national and international actors should be collaborative rather than coercive, and it should respond to the needs of those who are most in need within the country, rather than the requirements and preferences of the Bank or any similar institution.

3. *The way in which the World Bank used its research.* Based on my critical literature review of World Bank EDUCO studies in chapter three, there is evidence to suggest that researchers in this institution were primarily interested in proving that EDUCO worked. Both the sample and the methods on which these studies relied were problematic, as I attempted to explain. I also attempted to demonstrate that alternative interpretations were possible. The World Bank, however, continued to offer findings which were overly rosy. Alternative forms of research and alternative explanations were not pursued.

4. *The fact that, during this historical period, many policies which tend to spread globally also tend to be neoliberal in nature.* EDUCO is one example of a global education policy. I have mentioned others at various times in this dissertation (e.g., vouchers, merit-based teacher pay, charter schools, public-private partnerships). The issue that I wish to point out here is that many of these policies tend to be neoliberal in nature. This is concerning because, as forms of privatization, such policies tend to have negative implications for equity, diversity, inclusion, public school quality, and the functioning of a healthy democracy.
10.3 Future Research

This dissertation has highlighted areas for future research. These areas depart from the study’s limitations (as noted previously in section 5.5.4). Seven areas for future research which stand out in particular.

1. Local level operation: The primary focus of my research has been the interaction of the international and national levels. While I have addressed the local level, my commentary in that regard has tended to center around the fact that the local level – i.e., communities sympathetic with the FLMN and popular teachers – constituted a constraint on the national context. Going forward, research should attempt to unpack how the program operated at the community level. The only other qualitative study at that level is the one conducted by Lindo (1998), which I discussed in chapter three.

Even though El Salvador’s President – Mario Funes – began to undo EDUCO beginning in 2011, I was able to collect retrospective data from parents and teachers at the community level in two separate communities. I was able to complement this with data from EDUCO specialists and MINED representatives at the departmental. Together, once analyzed this information may provide additional insights into the benefits and limitations of EDUCO in practice.

2. Resistance: As noted in this dissertation, prior research on EDUCO tended to focus on whether or not the program worked – statistically speaking and with regard to certain outcomes, such as student achievement and student and teacher attendance. Thus, a major gap in the literature relates to the experience of those communities where popular education operated during and after the civil war. A
number of these communities strove, with varying degrees of success, to maintain their approach to education, rather than joining the EDUCO program. There is extremely limited information on this resistance, however.

Research should go beyond the initial resistance, though. I also suggest that any study conducted also investigate the ways that these communities (a) adapted to the EDUCO program, once they had (for reasons of financial necessity) to join it, and (b) used the program to their own benefit, by hiring, where possible, their own popular teachers. At present, I am in the process of finalizing a study on one community which has been particularly successful not only at resisting the initial adoption of EDUCO, but also at using the program for their own ends once they became a part of it. This same community has also been adept at applying pressure to the government in order to procure additional resources for their school, resources which they would not have received otherwise through the EDUCO program.

3. Actor perspectives: Future research may illuminate to a greater extent the perspectives of certain groups of actors (e.g., MINED staff, teachers, community members, the FMLN) in relation to EDUCO and the process through which it developed. The primary focus of this dissertation was not to examine or present the perspectives of involved actors, per se, but was rather to explain the origins and evolution of the EDUCO program. Further presenting and comparing perspectives across actor groups could provide interesting insights – for example, it could add additional nuance (a) to how we understand the experience of being involved in the process of developing and implementing global education policy, (b) how we
interpret their meaning, and, by extension, (c) how actors may attempt (or wish) to respond to them.

4. **Organizational dynamics:** In particular, I refer to the internal dynamics of the World Bank. This area is important to research because it will help us get a better understanding of how this institution works, particularly with regard to the adoption and promotion of policy innovations. Such research may help us understand how EDUCO went from being a policy to which World Bank staff were initially averse to one which World Bank staff widely held up and promoted, for example, through the WDR 2004. At present, I have data that can shed light on these issues – data that I collected by interviewing numerous World Bank representatives at multiple levels within the organization. In the future, I plan to interrogate the information that I have to see what insights it yields.

5. **Post-1995 trajectory:** In chapters three and nine, I analyzed the trajectory of EDUCO in the post-1995 period. This was done by conducting – and drawing inferences from – an extensive literature review. While this analysis produced a number of valuable insights into how the EDUCO program was used and promoted after 1995, further research could provide additional findings regarding how the World Bank and others contributed to its trajectory. For example, it is likely that the World Bank’s policies for country-level staff relocation after 3-7 years contributed to the geographic dispersion of the program’s influence. If so, this would be an additional mechanism of transnational influence of which we should be aware. Such research would complement the study suggested in number three, above.
6. **EDUCO’s undoing in El Salvador:** As mentioned above, Mario Funes, the president of El Salvador who was elected in 2009, recently began to transform the EDUCO program. Notably, Funes’ election represented the first time that a candidate from the FMLN reached the presidency. The ARENA party had controlled this office since 1989, when Cristiani was elected. The point here, however, is that research does not yet exist which examines this recent period of education reform – either generally or with regard to how and why it is that EDUCO, specifically, has been transformed. That said, we do know that Funes has provided EDUCO teachers with job security. He did this by moving all EDUCO teachers to the regular governmental teacher system (they can now join the unions), and by removing from parents the ability to hire and fire teachers.

7. **Other global education policies:** EDUCO is, of course, only one among a number of policies that have become globally popular. Others include vouchers, outcomes-based education, merit-based teacher pay, conditional cash transfers, charter schools, public-private partnerships, etc. Additional case studies should be conducted which investigate the development of these policies over time, from their inception to their elevation as global education policies. Such research could, where appropriate, help to critique such policies individually, as well as to draw attention to the potentially problematic manner in which such policies have evolved and been spread around the globe.

10.4 **Recommendations**

In this final section, I offer a few brief recommendations for future action which depart from some of the issues that were brought to the fore in this dissertation.
1. Development practitioners and national-level actors should be more critical of the origins of global education policies, as well as the claims and research base which accompany them.

2. Efforts should be made to support transnational civil society (TNCS) – and in ways that help TNCS to participate, monitor, and apply pressure at multiple levels of the policymaking, policy implementation, and policy evaluation process. Work has begun in this area since the emergence of the EDUCO program (e.g., Mundy & Murphy, 2001; Verger & Novelli, 2012). A good example at the moment is the Global Campaign for Education.74

3. Steps should be taken to build alternative sources of research on education policy, sources which are not guided exclusively by the principles of efficiency, accountability, cost-effectiveness, innovation, and entrepreneurship at the expense of equity, social cohesion, and the creation of an egalitarian society. A current example is the Privatisation in Education Research Initiative, which sponsors research that applies a social justice lens to its interpretation of the effects of education reform.75

4. Quantitative methodologies should not be prioritized to the exclusion of alternatives. Ethnographic evaluation (Whitehead, 2002), discourse analysis (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002), geo-spatial approaches (Lubienski, Gulino, & Weitzel, 2009), vertical case studies (Vavrus & Bartlett, 2009), narrative methods (Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, & Zilber, 1998; Moen, 2006), and

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74 For more, see: http://www.campaignforeducation.org/en/
75 For more, see: http://www.periglobal.org/
matrix-based strategies (Miles & Huberman, 1994), among others, can provide valuable insights, and they should not be ignored.

5. Alternative funding channels for education should be developed and/or strengthened. The channels to which I refer are unrelated to the World Bank and other development institutions which advance neoliberal policies and principles, often through coercive means. As part of these efforts, the national level is not necessarily the only or the best counterpart with whom to work. Working directly at the local level to develop or strengthen promising education programs is an option which should likewise be pursued. Interesting work on one example – the Bolivarian Alternative for the peoples of our America (ALBA) – has been done (Muhr, 2008, 2011).

6. Efforts by the MINED and international actors (e.g., international NGOs, bi- and multi-lateral agencies, and TNCS) should be directed at developing the technical capacity of national-level education specialists. In my experience in El Salvador, the staff of the MINED, education specialists who worked with education NGOs, and professors of education at the best universities in El Salvador all lacked (or felt they lacked) sufficient abilities with regard to research methodologies. This contributed to their dependence on external evaluators and their recommendations.

From a critical perspective, moving toward some of these suggestions may have positive implications for how policies are developed, implemented, disseminated, and received, as well as for their effects in practice. Both this dissertation and these suggestions have been aimed at problematizing the current nature of the dominant
approach to development, as well as at encouraging future efforts which can not only lessen its negative consequences, but also build towards progressive alternatives.
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