

ABSTRACT

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WORKER IN PRISON

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The US incarcerates close to one percent of the adult population. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) detains over 200,000 men and women. In order to manage this substantial prisoner population, the Bureau of Prisons employs close to 40,000 individuals. Using multilevel modeling and drawing on data from the yearly Prison Social Climate Survey administered by the BOP, this study poses three questions: (1) How do prison workers perceive institutional power derivation? (2) Do power adoptions impact prison worker perception of effectiveness in inmate management? (3) Does alienation harden prison workers and reduce their ability to effectively manage inmate populations? Results indicate that prisons largely promote formal and constructive power adoptions and these power adoptions improve prisoner management. In addition, alienation harms effective prisoner management and hardens prison workers. Discussion includes implications for theory, policy, and practice.

ALIENATION AND POWER: THE PRISON WORKER IN PRISON

By

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Dedication

To Katie Grace. Thank you. I love you.

Acknowledgments

To Charles Wellford: thank you for your sharp eye, direct critique, and persistent support. Your guidance and advice were truly beneficial. Your knowledge and reach extend far beyond normal borders. I hope retirement is a joy. The department will miss you dearly. To Ray Paternoster: I could not thank you enough for your patience, quick and keen insight, and spectacular theoretical vision. You are the humble master of a large land and I am greatly indebted to your support and wisdom. To David Maimon: I thank you for your kind and unrelenting mentorship. I am incredibly grateful.

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1: Alienation and Power: The Prison Worker in Prison

The US incarcerates one percent of its adult population (Pew Center on the States 2008). Prisons house 1.5 million men and women. Jails house an additional 726 thousand (Minton 2012). Six times as many men and women are incarcerated today as compared to the early nineteen seventies (Pettit and Western 2004). With 4.2 million on probation and over 800 thousand on parole, recent estimates conclude that about 3% of American adults are under correctional supervision (Pew Center on the States 2009). Of the 2.3 million incarcerated men and women in the US, Federal institutions supervise about 217,000 (USDOJ 2012).¹ This requires a federal correctional staff of over 38,000 (Samuels 2012). Assessing these federal prison workers, this study evaluates the impact of prison management and the process of confinement on prison workers perception of power and inmate supervision. Notable contributions to prison management (DiIulio 1987; DiIulio 1991a), worker alienation (Seeman 1959), and power adoption (Hepburn 1985) frame this inquiry.

I propose that the degree of alienation and the perception of power shape the prison worker's perspective of his institution, his job, and his charges. Increased institutional legitimacy – or the general belief that the prison has a right to punish and punishes fairly within that right – presumably results in increased formal rule adherence, ostensibly reducing informal and inconsistent management deployment. Prisons need workers to subscribe to the overall institutional goals and to cooperate with one another. Staff reductions in goal

¹ 28,484 of those inmates are in privately managed institutions (as of 09/13/2012). Bureau of Prisons does not survey staff at those 16 institutions.

subscription or in cooperation could generate security and safety concerns for prisoners and for prison workers.

Recent Context and Formal control

In 1958, Gresham Sykes argued that due to the nature of incarceration and the close confinement of inmates, prison subcultures unavoidably form. Sykes suggested that attempts to limit subculture generation could be counter to effective safety management since these subcultures would actively resist external (or foreign) intervention and sanction. This perspective fed the development of the *New Penology* (DiIulio 1991), a philosophy that promoted inmate self-policing. Several systems adopted variations on this practice. In Texas, officials chose select inmates – labeled “building tenders” and “turnkeys” (Marquart and Roebuck 1985) – to oversee housing units and notify authorities of rule violations. The essential premise: “prisons must be governed by prisoners themselves” (DiIulio 1991:72). Correctional officers in Texas largely outsourced the direct management of housing populations. This strategy failed. Appeals courts eventually overturned self-governing inmate practices as cruel and unusual punishment (Marquart and Roebuck 1985). Prisoners did not protect their “constituents” from excessive and systematic abuse and harm (Marquart and Roebuck 1985). One potential lesson from this dangerous adoption: prison workers (and only prison workers) should directly manage and discipline prisoners.

Inmate subcultures may evolve into aggressive and resistant bodies. But democratic governance is not a plausible course of action for successful control and oversight of institutional charges. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, research emerged that promoted effective management strategies (DiIulio 1987) and riot prevention (Useem and Kimball 1989) through increased focus in security and command structure. DiIulio (1987; 1991)

contended that improved levels of security (order), amenity, and service effectively arrive through “politically astute leadership, an organizational culture built around ‘security-first’ goals, and a paramilitary organizational structure” (DiIulio 1991: 82). In addition, prison riot analysis suggested that 1970s prison violence was avoidable (Useem and Kimball 1989). Management failed to follow protocol and failed to utilize tools and measures within its arsenal that would have protected officers and inmates from lethal violence. It was not management per se but inattentive and even careless management that led to those horrific and lethal outcomes (Useem and Kimball 1989).

Complexity for Prison Managers

Contemporary prison management philosophies illustrate formal acknowledgment that detainment is punishment enough and that no inmate should suffer from assault, rape, or murder (DiIulio 1987; Jurik and Musheno 1986; Bureau of Prisons 2011). Prisons operate as key limiters on human freedom. The legitimacy of corrections is compromised without this condition. But legitimacy may be impacted by additional complications. Fairness and consistency in oversight is inherent in legitimacy. Uniform procedures may not be sufficient for prisoner management. Effective control measures may actually violate institutional code *and* simultaneously reduce friction with supervisors and with charges:

“A guard cannot rely on the direct application of force to achieve compliance for he is one man against hundreds; and if he continually calls for additional help he becomes a major problem for the shorthanded prison administration...the guard, then, is under pressure to achieve a smoothly running cellblock not with the stick but with the carrot, but here again his stock of rewards is limited. One of the best “offers” he can make is ignoring minor offenses or making sure that he never places himself in a position to discover infractions of the rules” (Sykes 1956: 260).

This unsanctioned yet sanctioned role is complex and necessarily brings a series of conditions that may alter the officer’s perception of power and further distance the officer

from institution ethos and confined charges. The additional burden of discretion increases confusion – especially for unseasoned officers.

The burden further increases when considered in relation to philosophy of punishment. What do we want prisons to accomplish? If we believe that they are the only institutions that can simultaneously incapacitate, rehabilitate, deter and avenge (see DiIulio 1987) – and the prescribed punishment depends on the particulars of the offender – then we ask correctional officers to swallow a certain amount of complexity in order to effectively complete daily tasks.² Even line-staff correctional officers play a significant role in effectively meting out these divergent goals of prison punishment. Failure to understand meaning in orders may reduce the likelihood that orders are prioritized.

The prescriptions of the job itself create ambiguity. The specific and concrete need to confine individuals is less ambiguous.³ It would be presumptuous to assume that the prison officer marks or labels the newly incarcerated individual independent of, and without assistance from, general social consensus. Prison sentencing is a social statement about the fitness of the individual to conduct himself properly – generally due to prior conduct but arguably with the implicit assumption that it is predictive of future conduct. This judgment begins in the social conscience, reinforced by social demand for prisons, reinforced by crime rates, reinforced by general consensus, and present upon institutional admission:

“the interpretative scheme of the total institution automatically begins to operate as soon as the inmate enters, the staff having the notion that entrance is *prima facie* evidence that one must be the kind of person the institution was set up to handle...A man in prison must be a lawbreaker...” (Goffman 1961: 84)

² Unless prisons (by their very nature) accomplish these four goals without the explicit knowledge of, or help from, the prison staff.

³ This refers to the mere practice of confinement – day-to-day operations – and not to the philosophy of punishment.

But it is a reasonable assumption, by the prison officer, that those entering prison as inmates are in fact lawbreakers. It is reasonable in that it reflects belief in the rule of law, in the fairness and objectivity of the state, and of due process. There is nothing inherent in this assumption alone – one that is based on the foundation that prisons do exist and that men and women are held in them against their will – that is problematic. The problem arises when the status gained by admission to a facility earns particular responses regardless of the individual's present behavior but based upon that status. Goffman's (1961) assumption appears to be that institutional staff act on inappropriate bias. It is generally agreed, and formally condoned, that prison officers and administrations view prison itself as punishment enough (DiIulio 1987; Jurik and Musheno 1986). Beyond strict confinement, inmates are not to be subject to additional physical or emotional harm. Rather than actively target prisoners as Goffman implies, it is plausible that prison workers who subscribe to institutional code more frequently ignore or disregard prisoners. This dehumanization of the prison worker has not been adequately assessed. Increases in technology, specifically in adopted surveillance measures, may reduce gross physical violations. It is less clear and even unlikely that they impact neglect and indifference.

Correctional officers are asked to oversee antisocial populations that have largely expressed little concern for the social order and to do so without bias and without emotion. This arrangement is an ideal setting for alienation from work, from peers, and from charges. It is likely that different settings, even those operating on the same mission statements and overall code of conduct, could understand and employ power in largely divergent fashions. Therefore, attention will be paid to variations in officer placements. It is also likely, however, that highly centralized prison systems like the U.S. Bureau of Prisons may have

less variation across prisons. Therefore this is not merely a question of institutional variation but also what types of factors – within and across prisons – promote commitment, improve inmate management, and reduce emotional hardening of prison workers. Specifically, what role can and does prison management play in the promotion of power, the advancement of prisoner oversight, and the reduction of dehumanization?

2: Review of Relevant Literature

Purpose

This study asks three central questions: (1) how do prison workers perceive institutional power derivation; (2) do power adoptions impact prison worker perception of effectiveness in inmate management; and (3) does alienation harden prison workers and reduce their ability to effectively manage inmate populations. Particular interest focuses on potential divergence between officer placements.⁴ To achieve these ends, this study targets federal correctional facilities. The U.S. Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employs over 38,000 men and women (Samuels 2012). The role and perspective of this keeper warrants serious investigation not simply if we are to continue to demand confinement as our primary method of punishment but also if we are to effectively employ rehabilitative measures within prison walls.

Bureau of Prisons

In 1930, the year of its conception, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) detained about 13,000 inmates across 14 facilities (USDOJ 2011). Until the 1890s, housing of Federal

⁴ Prior research has not evaluated the interaction between security level, alienation, and power adoptions and its potential impact on efficacy, commitment, and emotional hardening. Infrastructure and protocol vary across security levels (Camp et al 1997; USDOJ 2011) and it is likely that work experiences and perceptions vary. Evidence does exist that suggests security level may differ in its impact on prison worker perceptions (Hepburn and Albonetti 1980). Although researchers have suggested that average custody score may provide a more accurate indicator of inmate population (e.g. Camp et al 2003), strict environmental restrictions (fences, guard towers, cells versus dormitories etc) vary based on security level and the most dangerous offenders are housed in high security prisons and the least dangerous are housed in minimum security prisons. Of course, this does not preclude the possibility that high security prisons with higher average custody scores impact workers differently than high security prisons with lower average custody scores. Future studies should take this into consideration.

detainees in state institutions had been the standard. But with the passage of the Three Prisons Act in 1891, the Federal government assumed control over its own prisoners (DiIulio 1991). For forty years this oversight was minimal. Regional directors largely had control over their facilities. The resulting inmate conditions were deplorable, unsanitary – even inhumane. It appeared clear that weak central organization created an inability to provide effective and meaningful management. And by 1930, President Hoover signed into law the creation of the BOP and gave oversight to a strong central authority.⁵

The size of the inmate population today is largely reflective of policies over the past 30 years and not a gradual increase over the last 80 years. BOP currently houses over 215,000 inmates in 117 prisons (Samuels 2012).⁶ As late as 1980, the total Federal inmate population was only 24,242 – spread out across 24 institutions. Each of the two concluding decades of the 20th century saw the Federal inmate population more than double – once in the 1980s and again in the 1990s. At the close of the 20th century close to 140,000 inmates were in federal custody (USDOJ 2011). Most of the growth is credited to increases in the use of mandatory sentencing and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (USDOJ 2011).⁷ In particular, a sizeable amount of this growth is due to the changing practices in the sentencing

⁵ The First BOP director was Sanford Bates, an effective manager who tactfully gave BOP necessary and real power over its facilities. See DiIulio (1991) for a more detailed history on the Bureau's development and early administrators.

⁶ Bureau of Justice Statistics puts the exact number of inmates at 206,968 (Glaze and Parks 2012). Director Charles E. Samuels suggests the number is closer to 217,000 in his 2012 *Memorandum For all Bureau Inmates*. The BOP website lists 217,249 as the current inmate population (as of February 21, 2013). End of month totals (January 2013): 199,500 are sentenced; 176,120 are inmates in BOP facilities; 29,128 are inmates in privately managed secure facilities; and 12,649 are in other contract facilities (community corrections, jail, home confinement, etc). See <http://www.bop.gov/about/facts.jsp> for more information.

⁷ Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 abolished parole, directed newly formed U.S. Sentencing Commission to develop federal sentencing guidelines – or determinate sentencing – and dramatically limited judicial discretion.

of drug offenders (Blumstein and Beck 1999). Of those currently serving sentencing in Federal prison, 48.2% are drug offenders.⁸

Prison growth, and the specific type of growth, is of particular interest to prison management. More prisoners means more prison workers. Samuels (2012) claims about 38,000 staff work at BOP. A little under half of those are correctional officers.⁹ As recent as 2005, ratio estimates of inmates per correctional officer were as high as 10.3, up from 9.0 in calendar year 2000 (Stephan 2008). This ratio includes officers that do not directly supervise inmates. The ratio of correctional officers to inmates in housing areas is likely to be much greater, which increases management difficulties. Due to BOP shift rotations, it is not possible to isolate correctional officers who have only worked in housing units.

Part of the perceived danger of corrections, guided or misguided as this may be, is the disadvantage in numbers. Prisoners critically outnumber correctional officers. Not only do conflicts among inmates reduce the likelihood that inmates consider their greater numbers but also mere day-to-day survival with ratios this high suggest the potential for a considerable amount of justified and unjustified inmate grievance. Expectations of impartiality and consistency may be extremely difficult to meet in situations where (potentially) volatile, needy, and underserved populations vastly outnumber staff.

The BOP adopts seven specific goals for operation. Safety and security are critical goals of prisons and the BOP emphasizes the importance of population management in its

⁸ Weapons offenders – including arson and explosives – the next largest detained population accounts for only 15.9% of the overall prison population (Bureau of Prisons 2012)

⁹ Bureau of Justice Statistics (Stephan 2008) identified 102 Federal facilities in the US, 17 were maximum security, 42 were medium security, and 43 were minimum security. About 29,755 employees were listed in this report with 14,165 correctional officers (Stephan 2008). It is important to note that this statistic may be misleading. According to BOP: “all employees are ‘correctional workers first.’ This means everyone is responsible for the security and good order of the institution” (USDOJ 2011: 4). To improve clarity, the term prison worker is used in this study to include *all* prison workers. Correctional Officer is used only in reference to those whose official duty is as a Correctional Officer.

first goal: “*the BOP will proactively manage its offender population to ensure safe and secure operations*” (USDOJ 2009:2, italics in original).¹⁰ BOP also promotes worker advancement, oversight, and innovation – encouraging diversity and implementing novel and effective programming for inmates. Offending populations are not always malleable, not always receptive. Prisons are crowded and chaotic even when well ordered and well managed. The question is not how the BOP formally sees itself but what types of officers the BOP fashions. The BOP has an organized and well-conceived set of core values. If this environment still creates emotionally hardened officers that largely promote informal power strategies then it may stand to reason that prison itself – the institution that forcibly houses those unfit for social commerce - may fashion the officer, outside the intentions of management.

Keeper Philosophy and Prison Management

In his notable confrontation with sociological dogma, DiIulio (1987) contends that proper prison administration is sufficient and necessary for effective order maintenance. Although greatly outnumbered in the facility, effective prison managers may successfully provide quality oversight that reduces disorder, improves treatment facilitation, and may even produce less dire recidivism rates (see DiIulio 1987: 40-48). This quality prison management model does not rely on inmate approval or buy-in per se but instead depends principally on order, amenity, and service. If injected appropriately, these components should ensure humane detention oversight (DiIulio 1987: 11-12). DiIulio’s (1987) model arguably imposes rationality and consistency into management style. The resultant structure is largely hierarchical and almost dictatorial in its approach to prison management:

¹⁰ It is perhaps clear that current attempts to assess rates of victimization through legislation such as the “Prison Rape Elimination Act” have only solidified federal insistence on the importance of such a goal

“A paramilitary prison bureaucracy, led by able institutional managers and steered by a talented executive, may be the best administrative response to the problem of establishing and maintaining higher-custody prisons in which inmates and staff lead a calm, peaceful, and productive round of daily life” (DiIulio 1987: 256).

According to DiIulio (1987) it is a central role of government to maintain safe and humane prisons (263). This is no small task. Wardens and line officers must conduct daily business with populations that may horrify the general public (DiIulio 1987: 169). But their role, and the purpose of detainment, is not to augment the already meted out prison sentences with inhumane treatment. Instead, correctional officers strive to adhere to a strict “*keeper*” philosophy: “[w]hatever the reason for sending a person to prison, the prisoner is not to suffer pains beyond the deprivation of liberty” (DiIulio 1987: 167; see also Jurik and Musheno 1986). The prison worker must regularly confront antisocial, violent, and manipulative actors. The experience cannot be without consequence. It is suggested here that the maintenance of the admirable “*keeper*” philosophy – in an environment potentially overrun by consistently unreasonable charges – comes with certain physical and social costs (or at least inconsistency in preservation of this “*keeper*” attitude and behavior).¹¹

Order also impacts safety. In prison, safety involves both employee and detainee safety. The breakdown of administrative control, or mismanagement largely due to miscommunication or lack of mission clarity, arguably led to a series of riots in the 1970s and 1980s in which both officers and inmates fell victim to violence (Useem and Kimball 1989). Poor administrative care and misguided trust in inmate self-government appears to lead to ineffective protection of the most needy and vulnerable of inmate populations (see Useem and Kimball 1989; Marquart and Roebuck 1985; DiIulio 1991b). Strong central

¹¹ Nevertheless, and irrespective of real costs, an important corollary, perhaps, suggests that since the “*keeper*” philosophy does not approve of aggravating the prison experience for prisoners then improving inmate standards of treatment – via rehabilitation for example – is not in conflict with this perspective.

organization, without ceding valuable discretion away from the correctional officer, allows for transparency in rule enforcement. This arrangement is favorable from an order maintenance and safety perspective. But these ideas are not new. Two and one half centuries ago, Beccaria (1963 [1764]) insisted that “[c]rimes will be less frequent, in proportion as the code of laws is more universally read and understood.” Knowing the rules and knowing that those rules will be enforced fairly and appropriately may impact behaviors in and out of prisons. This is rational oversight. This applies to prison workers as well as to inmates. Prison workers arguably perceive their environments and appropriate management of those environments through supervision and training.

Strict order maintenance appears to protect inmates from this physical harm (DiIulio 1987). Prisons are not free-societies nor are they intended to be. It may be conceded that a control emphasis improves the likelihood of inmate compliance due to its consistency and clarity of message (urbane inmate populations are unlikely; therefore nuanced approaches to supervision, which rely on informalities, are likely to increase the probability of abuse). But strong administrative authorities that depend solely on strict consistency and uniformity may not be sufficient. Individual discretion permits officers to solve individual – and perhaps even unique – problems that arise throughout the course of their tour. This ability to employ discretion may be linked to employee morale. Increasing certain aspects of decision-making by line-staff may result in greater uniformity due to augmented respect and subservience toward the host’s mission and perspective. Targeted increases in autonomy may increase compliance with overall management policy. And a close connection or bond to the employer, and to the mission of the institution, should improve employee morale and improve the consistency with which conflict and problems are addressed (DiIulio 1987).

Manager-staff bonding may be improved by continuity and personal dedication in leadership. DiIulio (1987) stresses the value of organizational commitment by the director. Long tenured directors with proactive and intimate knowledge of their facilities who are extremely loyal breed high morale among their staff (DiIulio 1987: 242). Management practices (and perceptions thereof) may directly impact officer attitude toward the institution, which may then directly impact the ability of a prison to run safely and humanely. In addition, a sense of fairness may also impact inmate and correctional officer morale. The manner in which problems and grievances are tackled by supervising bodies (for both inmates and officers) as well as the predictability of that body's support, should affect morale. It is unsurprising that distant and unsympathetic oversight may erode the effectiveness of management and strict staff rule adherence – thereby opening the door for an individualized system where independent operators are merely concerned with avoiding blame (see Lombardo 1989).

Main Inferences

- Well-supervised institutions increase commitment.
- Well-supervised institutions improve inmate management.
- Institutions with lower perception of supervision harden prison workers.
- Fearful institutions decrease commitment.
- Fearful institutions aggravate inmate management.

Custodial and Treatment Attitudes

Positive relationships between officers and inmates do not necessarily generate corrupt staff or clog the effectiveness of prison management. In 1970s Auburn Prison, Lombardo observed: “a positive relationship allows the inmate to approach the officer when

a problem is developing, allowing the officer time to defuse it” (1989: 65). During this era, officers at Auburn attempted to keep inmates reasonably supervised and content through advocacy, counseling, and provision of basic services (see Lombardo 1989: 61-64). But by the 1980s, this model began to evaporate, replaced by a more professional and static role:

“officers [came] to rely on “directives” and directions to determine job tasks and procedures. While it was [in earlier years] relatively common for officers to alter verbal orders to fit individual situations and avoid problems, now the tendency appears to be one of following directives and using directives to justify one’s actions to inmates and to superiors” (Lombardo 1989: 69).

Custody orientations largely replaced treatment orientations. Lombardo (1989) details this identity transformation through observations in the 1980s (specifically at Auburn prison in New York state but arguably reflective of a larger trend).¹² Note that Lombardo (1989) emphasizes the value in justification of actions to superiors. This illustrates the hierarchical nature of the command structure *and* demonstrates the general need for officers to operate within the expectations of individual (and perhaps institutional) supervisors.

But strict custody oriented facilities may benefit from treatment programming. Most who go into prison will get out (Petersilia 2003) – and most correctional officers subscribe to the idea that “exposing offenders to life-enhancing, skills-imparting programs is likely to help keep at least *some* of them on the straight and narrow” (DiIulio 1991:107, italics added). More importantly, it may be in the officer’s best custodial interest to provide such services:

“Most prison and jail administrators view correctional programs from what I have dubbed an *institutional* perspective. They evaluate programs not mainly in terms of what they do to reduce the likelihood of recidivism or otherwise affect inmates’ post-release behavior but as institutional management tools” (DiIulio 1991a: 114).

Rehabilitation helps manage confined populations. Programming provides “incentives for good inmate behavior” (DiIulio 1991a: 118). Programming keeps prisoners

¹² See also Feeley and Simon (1992).

busy, improves communication between staff and charges, improves prisoner assimilation to prison life, and improves officer perception of the utility and importance of their own work (DiIulio 1991a: 114-123; see also Cullen et al 1989; Cullen et al 1993).

Main Inferences:

- Treatment oriented institutions increase commitment levels.
- Treatment oriented institutions improve inmate management.
- Institutions with stronger custodial orientations harden prison workers.

Although custody may be the primary goal of prison work, correctional officers call themselves *correctional* officers rather than guards. It is not clear if this term is perceived to be more professional or more accurate but it appears likely that prison officers are privately concerned with treatment (Cullen et al 1989; Toch and Klofas 1982). Since officers tend to believe co-workers are custody oriented, this individual perception may conflict with their public perception of peers (Cullen et al 1989; see also Toch and Klofas 1982). The resulting culture may be one that is largely custody oriented due to an unwillingness to divulge personal opinion for fear that it may draw ridicule (Cullen et al 1989). The authentic composition of correctional officer attitude therefore could be masked by a perceived cultural ideology. This is one indicator that prison itself drives culture above and beyond individual differences. This culture would fashion the officer in behavior but not necessarily in attitude.¹³

The claim that prison officers are receptive to treatment has empirical support among line staff (Cullen et al 1989; Toch and Klofas 1982) and among wardens (Cullen et al 1993).

¹³ It is further possible that older COs are more comfortable with sharing positive perspectives on treatment (that they may have always had) since they no longer feel controlled by a prison ideology that may not even exist. Of course, how long does it take for environmental pressure and exposure to actually change one's attitude (behavior then becomes reflective of attitude not cultural pressure).

Since custodial concerns remain priorities (Cullen et al 1989), programming reduces “unstructured socializing” and is likely beneficial to order maintenance. This could create complexity. If human service orientations encourage informal relationships with inmates – even friendliness and personal interactions – and security orientations encourage relationship avoidance and formal interactions with inmates (Hepburn and Knepper 1993) then dual adoption ostensibly calls for the employment of conflicting strategies. If exposure to such a nuanced environment untangles discrepancies then age, seniority, and more time on the job all should be aligned with more preferable attitudes toward rehabilitation orientations among correctional officers – even among correctional settings that promote custodial and punitive ideologies (see Farkas 1999).¹⁴ Older and longer tenured officers are more treatment oriented and report greater efficacy in working with inmates.

The above complexity wanes if it is considered that “officers view rehabilitation as more of an inmate management strategy than as a rehabilitative tool” (Farkas 1999:503).¹⁵ Since most officers are not required to provide treatment programming, it is generally not necessary for them to adopt perspectives amenable to change. This angle could help alleviate role conflict: simply escort inmates to programming (or permit attendance) so as to reduce idleness and the potential for incidence due to unstructured interactions. But this solution is unlikely to be administratively supported (i.e. promoting the treatment of inmates as “commodities” is not preferable) and may not reflect the satisfaction derived from prison work. Job satisfaction appears to be higher among treatment oriented, or human services

¹⁴ Minority officers, particularly black officers, may be less punitive than counterparts (Jackson and Ammen 1996). Jurik (1985) finds minority officers to possess more favorable opinions toward inmates. Whitehead and Lindquist (1989) however do not find more negative attitudes toward prisoners among white officers. Cullen et al (1989) and Paboojian et al (1997) find that minority officers’ possess more favorable attitude toward treatment.

¹⁵ Even wardens who were supportive of rehabilitative measures only believed that about one quarter of inmates could be, or would be, rehabilitated (Cullen et al 1993).

oriented, officers than among their custody-oriented counterparts (Hepburn and Knepper 1993; see also Toch 1978; Lombardo 1989). Yet, this may be a spurious and inappropriate inference. There are many conditions exogenous to inmate interaction that may drive job satisfaction.¹⁶

Treatment oriented prison workers appear to hold more favorable opinions of inmates (Jurik and Musheno 1986; Jackson and Ammen 1996). The reason for this favorability bias is unclear. Increases in education, by itself, do not appear to improve attitudes toward treatment or inmates (Jurik and Musheno 1986). Officers of color (Jackson and Ammen 1996 Jurik 1985) appear to hold more favorable opinions of inmates and of treatment. But this may only be relevant for black officers (Jackson and Ammen 1996) and does not appear to indicate a perception of proximity in social class. Importantly, organizational structure and barriers to reform appear to be highly relevant in the construction of workers' orientations (Jurik and Musheno 1986). This may illustrate the ability of institutions to shape ideology. Whitehead and Lindquist (1989) note: "the organizational whole is greater than the sum of its parts; organizational structure goals, and climate are the critical influences on individual employees' orientation" (83). It seems plausible that organizational factors are more salient to officer attitude and perception and that over time officers become more like one another regardless of race and gender differences. Research suggesting diverging perceptions due specifically to race and to gender does exist (Britton 1997). But the overall

¹⁶ Farkas (1999) insists that correctional officers derive the most satisfaction from areas that have little to do with working directly with inmates. Most satisfaction derived from pay, benefits, and job security. Perhaps, the author notes, support for rehabilitation is merely support for better techniques at managing populations. I submit that it is unclear whether this is actually detrimental since COs largely are not providing treatment.

evidence is inconclusive. Close analysis and continued scrutiny of differences among groups is warranted.¹⁷

Main Inference:

- Treatment oriented institutions reduce emotional hardening of staff.

From a management perspective, it is difficult to sufficiently detail appropriate responses to a variety of situations that arise during an officer's tour. But role conflict derived from unclear or complex institutional purpose may cause headaches. Hepburn and Albonetti (1980) insist that the goals of custody and treatment compete with and contradict one another – rare is the prison that is able to promote only one of these practices. This leads to role conflict for the providers and is much more prevalent within lower security prisons and much more prevalent among treatment staff (Hepburn and Albonetti 1980). Formal controls increase dramatically as prisons increase in security and it is expected that officers would better understand their purpose in higher security settings. Of course, officers themselves may also be the issue. Security level alone may not be sufficient to dissolve the conflict. Selectively recruiting officers that have “a sense of calling to the field” (Poole and Regoli 1980) apparently increases commitment and reduces alienation and role conflict. Acknowledging that officers must be selected from applicant pools that may be far from ideal, administrators can also attempt to alter outcomes by improving training tracks, raising wages and assessing and fixing poor work conditions (Poole and Regoli 1980: 61).¹⁸

We ask a lot from keepers. We demand forfeit of natural liberty for those who have failed to cede even the least of their natural freedom in order to abide the general will that all

¹⁷ These categories (race, age, and gender) are important to consider in interaction (e.g. long-tenured black males, middle-tenured white women, etc) and independent of one another.

¹⁸ The driving purpose is to improve the rewards reaped as an officer – both during the daily grind (e.g. finding inherent meaning in inmate watching) and in overall status (e.g. increased pay = increased social standing).

have the equal right to pursue happiness (Beccaria 1963 [1764]). But in order to monitor those who deviate we ask those who freely cede this natural liberty to the social contract to watch those who have refused. Prisons are necessary – necessary in that they uphold this social contract and promote justice. But it may be remiss to assume that any other employee is asked to do as much as the correctional officer. We ask prison officers to dedicate their entire employment to the welfare of those who have failed to consider the welfare of their neighbor. To add to this, we apparently (at least theoretically) ask that the officer also swallow a great deal of nuance and complexity in the completion of their daily work.

Correctional “Bases of Power”

Deprived of personal liberty, the prisoner is technically at the mercy of the correctional institution. But the power that the managers and line-staff hold over their charges may vary dramatically depending on the approach and the resources of the officer. It is admitted that the correctional facility has ultimate “power” to act its will on its members – but the effectiveness and usefulness of this ultimate “power” may not be uniform. Specifically, Hepburn (1985) highlights five “bases of power” that influence the effectiveness of correctional management. Depending on the adopted choice, the correctional officer may perceive and receive greater or less resistance to his command and this may impact his subsequent ability to maintain order during his tour. The central proposition in this study is that prison workers adopt power strategies that are implicitly and explicitly promoted by prison hierarchy. Implicit power strategies may differ from institution to institution but are not randomly employed. Prison worker perception of supervisor needs and requirements will largely dictate perception of appropriate power deployment. Research to date has not examined the derivation of power adoption among

federal prison workers. This section briefly details Hepburn's (1985) five bases of power and resulting research hypotheses.

LEGITIMATE POWER

The law, and the threat of punishment, may not be equally appreciated across individuals. Acute conformists and incorrigibles (see Pogarsky 2002) arguably are deterred or undeterred respectively without the risk of formal sanctions. Perspectives on and respect for moral authority – and the right thereof for that authority to discipline free citizens – could logically be based on positive or negative experiences with law enforcement illustrated by perceived bias or fairness of process and outcomes (see Tyler 1990). According to Tyler (1990), this perception of fairness influences the legitimacy individuals grant moral authorities such as law enforcement. It is likely that this perspective on fairness also permeates detention centers.

Hepburn (1985) argues: “legitimate power exists only to the extent that prisoners view the guards as having a legitimate right to give order *and be obeyed*” (146). But what power, given that the correctional officer is a variety of moral authority (as an agent of the state financed to properly supervise inmate populations), do inmates bestow upon their guardians? The comparison between police and correctional officers as moral authorities here begins to split. Portions of the general population are acute conformists – unwilling to stray from lawful behavior perhaps due to strict socialization. The natural conditions of policing permit exposure to citizens with favorable orientations toward the police. The natural work environment of correctional officers consists of populations who have refused to conform (in one manner or another). These populations are less likely to defer to the

demands of this “moral” authority (Hepburn 1985).¹⁹ But it does not automatically follow, even given these environmental differences, that legitimacy cannot be obtained and maintained in the prison setting. Fair and consistent application of sanctions – administered with respect and with objective reason (deserved, substantively just) – should increase the legitimacy of the guardian.

Generally this proposition would promote correctional officer legitimacy through a “fairness proxy” such as just infraction application. Correctional officers who appeared to support fairness and consistency in the application of infractions would garner greater respect, and therefore greater *legitimate* power, from the inmate population. This reflects Defiance Theory (Sherman 1993) hypotheses. Increases in legitimate power should result in decreases in workplace stress due to decreased inmate formal and informal grievances.

Increases in formal service provision may also result in decreased connection with the detained population and a strict emphasis solely on rule adherence – thus, potentially further removing the officer from emotional connection with his work environment.²⁰ Moreover, and perhaps ironically, legitimate power may increase with less than complete official sanctioning:

“If guards attempt to enforce all the rules, they risk being evaluated as rigid or punitive. Conversely, if they are discovered exercising undue discretion or overlooking infractions, they risk being accused of incompetence or corruption” (Poole and Regoli 1980: 217).

¹⁹ Legitimacy in terms of prison populations differs from legal cynicism within free populations. Prisons detain men and women who have violated codified law – the state holds them against their will. Legal cynicism prevents free populations from utilizing State resources to solve and prevent local crime problems. This cynical citizen chooses *not* to involve police or the courts. Relative to the state guardian (or the correctional institution), the prisoner does not have the same type of choice. His life is dictated by formal control.

²⁰ Notably, if officers do not feel supported by supervisors this could diminish their perception of the value of legitimate power. Legitimate power would only be effective if official actions by officers were reinforced and promoted by administrators. Poole and Regoli (1980) write: “a major complaint of guards is that administrators are unwilling to support their authority” (216).

Complete rule enforcement may be impossible, ineffective, and unpopular with prisoners and for prison administrators (Sykes 1956). But incomplete rule enforcement creates ambiguity. Formal rule enforcement is seemingly replaced, at least in part, by informal rule enforcement. In ostensible contradiction, an officer is required to adopt an unofficial “blind-eye” in order to maintain heightened respect, legitimacy, and order. From the inmate perspective, consistent and unbiased rule enforcement is perhaps more likely to be perceived as legitimate. It may be irrelevant as to the formality or informality of that enforcement if it is consistently enforced.

This does not uncover the nature of legitimate power as perceived by the prison worker. From the worker perspective, legitimate power is rooted in the just authority of the prison institution. Does the prison worker perceive the prison to be a legitimate institution? One central goal of prison work is inmate management. If legitimate power is culturally reinforced then belief in the legitimacy of the institution should increase the perceived ability to manage inmates. Official oversight defined by supervision and training should also increase perceived effectiveness in inmate management. The ability to manage, in this instance, is derived from official, or legitimate, sources. Those prison workers who employ legitimate power derive their sense of power from official channels – supervisors, core values, and institutional procedures.

Main Inferences:

- Legitimate power improves institutional commitment for the prison worker

- Legitimate power will have greater influence on commitment in high-security prisons.²¹
- Legitimate power improves the prison worker's ability to manage prisoner populations.
- Legitimate power will have greater influence on inmate management in high security prisons.²²

COERCIVE POWER

Unjust employment of power could understandably result in negative detainee response. The *right* to employ power does differ from the simple *ability* to employ power. Although ostensibly similar, coercive and legitimate powers diverge in that “coercive power is based on the prisoners’ perception that guards have the ability to punish disobedience” (Hepburn 1985: 147). Coercive power is not limited to the perception of unjust application. Presumably, a correctional officer concerned by legitimate power would invest more in the just authority of his actions whereby that same officer consumed by coercive authority would merely entertain the possibility of applying punishment on the detained population. This distinction is important in that responses to these two varying types of power application could be dramatically different. In line with Sherman (1993), perceived unfair sanctions result in *defiance* – a behavioral response that refuses to acknowledge the authority of the sanctioning agent. The prison environment – with continual searches, punitive segregation units, and access to physical and even lethal force – lends itself to the possibility of compromise and abuse of power. The mere ability to search cells does not warrant the search

²¹ Security level is selected as a proxy for “dangerousness of inmates” (Camp, Saylor, and Harer 1997: 749). Prison workers will be more likely to believe in the right of the prison to incarcerate with high-security prisoners.

²² Prison workers will have to rely on their belief in the prison institution in order to effectively manage potentially difficult prisoners (see above note).

– especially from the perspective of the inmate (but arguably, from the perspective of most trained correctional officers as well).

Coercive power appears to offer little reward to prison managers – and instead may only increase the likelihood of revolt or deviance (Hepburn 1987:147). Beyond its opposition to the “keeper philosophy,” it is not clear that common misuse of power serves a real purpose in prisons since “many prisoners feel that the punishments which can be imposed on a daily basis do not materially differ from the level of punishment they endure by being incarcerated” (Hepburn 1985: 147). Coercion, in this subtler form, would not increase compliance.²³ It could be argued that coercive power is merely the officer voicing her ability to punish – not necessarily an acknowledgement of abuse. This assertion would suggest that the officer is able to “penalize those who do not cooperate” (Hepburn 1987: 151). The variation applied here implies the mere *ability* – which may or may not be in line with authority and objective fairness.

At its logical extreme, coercive power implies (mis)use of force. And there is empirical support for the idea of inappropriate use of force in prison settings. In the mid 1980s in Texas, Marquart (1986) observes: “Guards’ use of force was a socially structured tactic of prisoner control that was well entrenched in the guard culture” (348). Subculture development and value transmission of appropriate coercive behavioral responses was key to what could most aptly be described as misuse of power (guards systematically and overzealously employed physical violence against inmates). Marquart (1986) highlights the lack of a strong central authority and proper administrative oversight as complacent in the

²³ With suitable Prison oversight, rampant and excessive abuses of power should be minimized and therefore coercive power would be relegated to minor instances (Marquart 1986; DiIulio 1987) – which, it is argued here, would not increase compliance. This is not to suggest that physical torture, excessive deprivation, etc (instances that are not formally permitted) would not be effective at increasing compliance – however inhumane they may be.

development and continued existence of such informal control mechanisms (see also DiIulio 1987). Coercion in this environment benefited the correctional officer individually in that it aided in promotions (as it reflected “culturally positive” qualities in the officer) and collectively in that it garnered officer “solidarity” and maintained order within the prison (Marquart 1986). The use of force, although encouraged, was strictly managed, apparently in an effort to evade formal detection and official rebuke. By unofficial code, for example, officers were not to engage in physical violence in the presence of multiple witnesses, such as in the dining hall.²⁴ These latter observations are of particular interest in this study in that they reflect the possibility of culturally prescribed normative behaviors within correctional settings. Prison workers derive coercive power strategies from co-workers, especially supervisors. Coercive power is based simply on the ability to punish.

The BOP has had a strong central authority since its founding in the 1930s. Prior to 1930, federal prisons did suffer from abuse and scandal without such oversight (DiIulio 1991a). As Marquart (1986) notes: “prison organizations based on centralization and formalization (with little autonomy and discretion), such as the California system or the Federal Bureau of Prisons, will not support an inmate control system predicated on coercion and fear” (362). Chronic employment of coercive force in federal prisons is highly unlikely. But mistrust of superiors by officers could create a more complex environment in which the line-staff perceive the administration to be unfairly and erratically meting out punishment of staff: the correctional officer “resents many of the actions of his superiors – the reprimands, the lack of ready appreciation, the incomprehensible order – and in the inmates he finds willing sympathizers: they too claim to suffer from the unreasonable caprice of power”

²⁴ Behavior encouraged by a set of proscriptions and prescriptions.

(Sykes 1956: 260). This scenario creates an environment in which coercive power from administration creates solidarity between inmates and line-staff.

Main Inferences:

- Coercive power reduces institutional commitment
- Coercive power aggravates perceived effectiveness of prisoner management

REWARD POWER

Consistent with the learning perspective that positive reinforcement of behavior X will increase incidence of behavior X (see Akers 1973), reward power implicitly adopts the perspective that correctional officers must engage in exchange for effective supervision. Appropriately, “this power base is sustained by the creation of a system of informal rewards” (Hepburn 1985: 147). Although often cloaked in an altruistic disguise, reward power is little more than quid pro quo. The correctional officer understands the burden of oversight – potentially greatly outnumbered – and is likely without administrative support. The officer’s drive toward bargaining, as it were, may be driven by benevolent intentions – but likely devolves into a prisoner hierarchy whereby select inmates are given preferential treatment, perhaps even allowed supervision of other inmates (see Cloward 1968; Marquart and Roebuck 1985). This transfer of power has met with unquestionably brutal outcomes in the past (Useem and Kimball 1989). Prisons are not intended to be democracies nor are inmates proven to be willing to accept entrance into mutual behavioral contracts while incarcerated.

While it is conceded that reward power may provide correctional officers with needed informal rewards to encourage behavioral sanity, especially on housing units, it is not clear how this type of power would increase the authority of the prison administration and improve the overall order of not just the prison but the effectiveness of other correctional officers who

must also monitor the housing units and the halls and whose perspectives toward bargaining may not only differ from their colleagues but may also place them in danger due to their potential divergence. But this may be an inaccurate inference. Reward power may be a consequence of organizational inadequacy. Hepburn (1985) insists, “deficiencies of legitimate power, coercive power, and formal rewards compel guards to establish an informal norm of reciprocity with prisoners by which resources are exchanged” (147). Reward power may emerge due to extant conditions, rather than create those conditions. Increasing legitimate power may undermine the necessity of such an informal and unregulated version of power. But in order to increase line-staff legitimacy, prison administrations may need to specifically reinforce and laud officer performance. Even selective (or rare) use of infractions is undermined if officially labeled as excessive or met without formal punitive response. Prison administrators, consequently, increase line-staff legitimacy and perceived discretion by honoring and upholding inmate infractions (without clear evidence of bias or corruption).²⁵ Trust in administrators, in turn, may be a key indicator in adoption of legitimate power techniques. Consequently, mistrust in prison administrators or in direct supervisors, may indicate the need to employ informal methods of population management.

Perhaps the more relevant point is that without official support officers may be amenable to inappropriate exchange with inmates but this exchange is largely insignificant. Hepburn (1987) defines reward power as: “I can give special help and benefits to those who cooperate with me” (151). As such, the adequate definition of reward power may simply be the likelihood that correctional officers will attempt to curry favor among the detained population in order to increase the boredom of their tours (a positive outcome). It does not

²⁵ Upholding written infractions in prison court signifies management’s support of the officer. This is only one example in which prison administrators can improve legitimate power.

appear that devolving into an inmate hierarchy is a prerequisite for utilization of reward power. Instead, as individuals continually operate in exchange so may correctional officers engage in common – even simple – exchanges during their tours. This exchange could be as simple as trading kitchen cleanup for longer hours in the day room – an exchange that does not provide the inmate recipient with peer supervision or undue guardianship over other, potentially vulnerable, populations. Taking reward power to its logical extremes draws a horrific illustration, reflective of “building-tenders” and “turn-keys” (Marquart and Roebuck 1985). But for daily operations, and on an extremely small scale, reward power may be necessary, instrumental, and harmless.

This does not address the issue of prison worker perception of reward power and the derivation of this perception. For the prison worker, reward power is reflective of special treatment due to performance. From this perspective, improved job performance yields favorable placements and pay increases. Compliance with formal institutional procedures and individual instruction improves the likelihood of reaping benefits from an informal reward system (i.e. not specifically outlined in bureau or institutional policy). Subscription to this tenet partly undermines the legitimacy understood in bureau and institutional commitment since that commitment is a product of informal and inappropriately perceived exchange.

Main Inferences:

- Reward power reduces institutional commitment
- Reward power will have greater influence on commitment in minimum-security prisons.²⁶
- Reward power aggravates perceived effectiveness of prisoner management

²⁶ See Hepburn and Albonetti (1991)

- Reward power will have greater influence on inmate management in jails and minimum-security institutions.

EXPERT POWER

Given the confrontational nature of the prison environment – specifically, the reasons for and consequences of forced confinement – correctional officers may find it difficult to garner respect from inmates due to special knowledge or advanced skill. As Hepburn (1985:148) writes: “prisoners are loathe to acknowledge competence among guards.” The utility of expert power is probably best demonstrated in the relationship between medical doctor and patient – a relationship that depends dearly on the acute awareness and perceptibility of a reasonably trained professional. It is not clear that correctional officers provide services in high demand. Medical doctors assess patient viability and recommend treatments that reflect the best possibility for the organism to thrive and survive. The utility of expert power for the correctional officer appears to pale in respect to the other bases of power, especially legitimate power. The trust the patient places in the medical doctor is trust in diagnosis based in years of training. The trust the inmate potentially places in the correctional officer is trust in fairness and consistency (a precarious and easily undone trust, of course). The value of specialized skill from a management perspective – beyond the ability to maintain order and supervise adequately (critical components to a highly professional occupation) – arguably counters the mission of custody and control. Hepburn (1985) admits that, “expert power is undermined by bureaucratic administrative procedures” (148-149). Uniformity and predictability trump correctional officer independence. These observations do not preclude the possibility that expert power permeates detention centers

but rather question how useful this expertise is to the overall goal of prison administration and order maintenance.

Expert power requires that “prisoners perceive that guards have some special skill, knowledge, or expertise” (Hepburn 1985:148). Special skill and knowledge reflect the ability to improve the conditions of the mental and physical world of the detained population. Nuanced comprehension of the institution (and of correctional practices) and the ability to navigate that institution reflects specific utility of expert power.²⁷ But the correctional officer must acquire special skills that elevate him to a unique provider of care. This suggests that Hepburn’s (1985) definition of expert power is incomplete.²⁸ Mere ability to resolve conflicts runs awkwardly close to coercive and legitimate power bases. The prisoner perception of expert power emphasizes the unique and realized ability of the prison worker due to circumstances beyond status. Hepburn (1985) observes: “guards are likely to believe that their expertise in resolving conflicts and determining the appropriate course of prisoner behavior warrants the compliance of prisoners” (148). But a more appropriate perspective may propose that prison workers perceive greater effectiveness in population management through increased emphasis in training and skill obtainment.

Prison organizations demand uniformity in administering punishment and oversight and this uniformity potentially zaps the independence of the individual correctional officer in making decisions outside procedural norms. This conclusion would be dramatically undermined if correctional officer rulebooks specifically failed to comment on correct

²⁷ If power is something that may be employed then one may assert that expert power could arise due to experience navigating the conflicting goals of treatment and custody. Experience may actually increase the ease with solving inmate grievances or concerns. Thorough knowledge of the work, in short, makes for a more effective worker. Power, here, derives from expertise in the workings of the prison – not expertise in psychotherapy, drug addiction, counseling etc.

²⁸ Hepburn defines expert power as: “I have the competence and good judgment about things to know what is best” (Hepburn 1985:151)

procedure following common and even uncommon detention center occurrences (since expert power suggests autonomy in decision making for each officer). Otherwise, the statement – “I have the competence and good judgment about things to know what is best” – merely suggests that the officer is able to follow the rules. But irrespective of actual autonomy constraints, prison workers *perception* of expertise – as manifested through discretion – may still empower and directly impact perception of inmate management. Prison workers who believe they are able to shape events also believe that (1) they have greater expertise and (2) they are more effective at their jobs.²⁹

Main Inferences

- Expert power improves institutional commitment for the prison worker
- Expert power improves the prison worker’s ability to manage prisoner populations
- Expert power will have greater influence on inmate management in high security

²⁹ Notably, discretion and role definitions may have changed throughout the mid to late twentieth century. Lombardo (1989) found that correctional officer philosophy and practice in the 1970s promoted, to a certain degree, a “helper” mentality that created a series of potentially concerning realities. This environmental posture ostensibly prevented the escalation of minor issues and may have increased the civility of the work place (see Lombardo 1989: 80) but may also have damaged the effectiveness of overall administrative control and legitimacy. Heading off potential problem escalation (and interceding adequately) required offering “free” advice or obtaining intimate knowledge of inmate lives. But effective intervention due to the correctional officer’s intimate knowledge of inmate emotion and predicament often results in the precarious development of solidarity between officer and inmate (see Lombardo 1989: 86). Perceived inadequacy of the bureaucratic administration – by both officer and inmate – likely engenders this arrangement. While the 1980s appeared to witness a turn toward procedural and directive adherence (reflective of the earlier propositions regarding expert power), Lombardo’s (1989) illustration of the 1970s draws *expert* power as emblematic of personal and intimate knowledge of inmate discourse and activity, often at the expense of the hierarchy. In this instance, expert power derived its strength by individual mandate rather than organizational or role mandate. The medical doctor derives her expert power by way of medicine – objective comprehension of anatomy; the correctional officer appears to derive expert power by living in a shared environment: “the walls of the prison emphasize divisions between guards and inmates while they also draw the two groups together as people sharing a common environment” (Lombardo 1989: 86). Undeniably, these are human environments with individuals as captors and captives. This daily interaction may harmlessly benefit the inmate in that seasoned correctional officers understand the inner workings of the prison; this daily interaction may also harm the effectiveness of order maintenance and directives in that inmate dilemmas are not handled consistently across units and across staff.

REFERENT POWER

The most ambiguous of the power bases is referent power. Hepburn (1985) contends: “a guard will have power over prisoners to the extent that prisoners respect and admire the guard.” 149). Ostensibly, this perspective highlights the importance of fair treatment and consistency – clear emblems of legitimate power. But the notion of *respect* is deeply embedded in criminological literature, specifically in reference to urban, alienated populations (see Anderson 1999). In harmlessly defining *referent* power in the following statement – “Because of the way I get along with inmates, they want to do what will get my respect and admiration” (Hepburn 1985: 151) – Hepburn potentially overlooks the self-governing and aggressive connotation attached to this ideal. As he insists: “Guards who are fair and evenhanded in their relations with prisoners, who display a degree of respect to the prisoners, who fulfill their promises to prisoners, and who exercise their coercive power with impartiality and without malice gain respect among prisoners” (Hepburn 1985:149). If this is the condition under which respect is gained, then this type of power would be better understood as a variant of legitimate power – fairness and consistency create a level of respect for the correctional institution and the correctional officer. Among populations that may harbor a deep mistrust of formal authority – perhaps due to perceived biases by formal agents of the criminal justice system – gaining respect may be either a foolhardy goal or a sign of abuse and mismanagement. This is not a debate regarding the value of respect. Instead, this notes the potential convergence of the intended meaning of *referent* with the actual meaning of *legitimate*. These two terms merge in practice and in self-report. Respecting correctional officers – as intended by referent power – is actually a variant of legitimate power. Referent power, as *unintended* by Hepburn (1985), is still a critical area of interest as it potentially

uncovers divergence toward acquiescence to prisoner normative behavior. This variant of *referent* power would most likely be linked to a darker side of *reward* power.

Referent power may also have blossomed, in earlier decades, due to the intentional attempt on behalf of the correctional officer to reduce the likelihood that minor inmate issues became major inmate issues (see Lombardo 1989). Some officers in Auburn prison in the 1970s went so far as to “*take affirmative steps to discover* if particular inmates in particular circumstances are having difficulties. This strategy requires the officer not only to be reactive, but to be the initiator of interactions involving “human services” intervention” (Lombardo 1989:82, italics in original). While concerns for protocol and even possible manipulation trumped many human service intercessions in the 1980s, during the 1970s, correctional officers who willfully aided inmates with personal or logistical dilemmas may have gained greater respect and greater referent power: “when helping inmates with problems, guards do so in face of perceived peer and administrative condemnation. Not being *paid* to counsel makes guard assistance real” (Lombardo 1989: 86, italics in original). But even in this 1970s, the accrument of referent power still appeared to be at the cost of the overall prison authority. Inmates perceived the correctional officer as operating outside of his duties – against the order of the prison – and therefore respected his counsel. This may be as simple as respecting the counsel as arriving by way of an individual, another human actor (as opposed to by way of an official institutional perspective), but it is undeniable that this respect is connected to, and arrives by way of, a sort of rebellion on behalf of the correctional officer.

Unlike the above nascence of reverent power through confrontation and mild rebellion, institutional employment of reverential power engenders empowerment and unity.

Empowerment increases the likelihood that prison workers will perceive their work and their own usefulness as integral to the success of the institution. From this perspective, referent power could most aptly be defined as the respect prison workers feel that they receive from their supervisors. The effective use of referent power by prison management may improve prison worker morale. Prison workers that perceive systematic and individual encouragement and respect will perform more professionally and more effectively. Notably, institutions have the ability to control the level of applied referent power by way of adequate supervision.

Main Inferences:

- Referent power improves institutional commitment for the prison worker
- Referent power has greater influence on commitment in minimum-security prisons.
- Referent power improves the prison worker's ability to manage prisoner populations
- Referent power has greater influence on inmate management in jails and minimum-security institutions.

Alienation

Emotional dissociation may act as a protective factor for correctional officers. Prisons house individuals who have been unable or unwilling to accept membership into collective society. Although widely overused and misused in the past few decades (especially regarding nonviolent drug offenders), forced confinement is ostensibly intended to house populations with irrepressible antisocial tendencies. But this confinement comes with an obligation – morally, on behalf of the imprisoning society – to oversee and care for

an uncontrollable collection of men and women. It would be unquestionably reckless to openly support further inhumane treatment beyond confinement. More importantly, the *keeper* philosophy strictly endorses this perspective that loss of liberty is adequate punishment. It is conceded that the widespread adoption of such a position may vary dramatically (and may even be somewhat elusive or imaginary). But its mere existence suggests awareness of the potentially intrusive and punitive nature of the prison.

The eventual conclusion, therefore, reflects the difficult balancing act of correctional employees. As DiIulio (1987) observes: “if prison workers were upset or became angry every time they passed by a convicted murderer or rapist they would be unable to perform their duties properly” (170). Their role, indeed their duty, is not to stand in judgment of their charges. Instead, entrance into prison becomes time zero: “a prisoner should be treated humanely and in accordance with how he behaves inside the institution. Even the most heinous offender is to be treated with respect and given privileges if he behaves well once behind the walls” (DiIulio 1987: 167). Irrespective of guilt or prior behaviors, the correctional officer is expected to suspend emotional connection, in effect suspend judgment, in order to create a safe and humane prison environment. In theory, thereby, increased professionalism increases the effectiveness of prison management and may increase the *legitimate* authority of the correctional officer. But it also arguably distances the correctional officer from his charges, perhaps even from his immediate environment. Seasoned professionalism may appear to be “callous” or “unfeeling” behavior (DiIulio 1987: 170) because this variety of professionalism is intended to be unfeeling and, in essence, survives and effectively manages because it is dissociated. Ultimately, the presented social self – the self witnessed by the prison population – is encouraged to be static, unemotional, objectively

fair, and consistent.³⁰ This costume, while potentially harboring great utility, may have a variety of consequences.

Prison appears to be a suitable environment to generate employee alienation. But alienation is an ambiguous idea often derived from factory analogy – suggesting the reclassification and transformation of abstract human worth into mechanical means, reflective of burgeoning industrialization. While complicated in these origins, several notable clarifications have been able to transfer these early abstractions into clear academic categories (Seeman 1959; Aiken and Hage 1966; Dean 1961). Specifically, Seeman (1959) defines alienation through five general areas: powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation, and self-estrangement. This favorable arrangement – favorable due to its precision and sophistication – is adopted here.³¹

POWERLESSNESS

The central goal of prison management arguably promotes powerlessness of employees. Security is the central goal: “Security-conscious prison management will yield more in the way of prison order, amenity, and service than less dedicated, more lax prison management; in short, prison management matters” (DiIulio 1987:256). A strict security focus endorses central command, strict rule adherence, and environmental control. Independent actions dilute the efficiency of the chain of command and provide for unpredictable outcomes. The likelihood of independent decision-making in prisons is perhaps unlikely (or at least minimized). As Poole and Regoli (1981) contend:

³⁰ See Lombardo (1989) for a description of correctional officer role perception change from the 1970s to the 1980s as directives and rule adherence became much more critical in order maintenance.

³¹ Notably, Poole and Regoli (1981) similarly adopted Seeman’s (1959) approach in assessment of alienation among correctional officers in a Maximum Security Prison in the Midwest. Findings indicated a strong sense of alienation within correctional officer ranks. Impact of that alienation was not directly addressed.

“the work behavior of the guard is, to a great extent, a function of the decisions and actions of others occupying subordinate, as well as superordinate positions in the correctional institution. For these reasons powerlessness would appear to be a fundamental feature of the guard’s work experience” (256).

Lombardo (1989) illustrates a form of powerlessness that revolves around minimal institutional support (145). Not only do guards often feel unsupported by the hierarchy, but this lack of support translates into lack of trust or effectiveness at role fulfillment: “officers are also concerned that they lack the responsibility and decision-making power necessary to contribute effectively to their work environment” (Lombardo 1989: 145). Although on the front lines of prison management, line-staff at Auburn prison in the 1970s voiced an inability to shape, modify, and adjust standard practices even though possessing requisite and uniquely germane experiences (Lombardo 1989).

It is not clear that autonomy is without merits in the detention center. Barring emergencies, discretion and autonomy may play a critical role in efficient and productive prison management. Discretion does not require mayhem. Strong centralized authority may still provide adequate leadership and input from subordinate officers and create an environment that embraces autonomy – while also enforcing uniformity. In their discussion of alienation, Aiken and Hage (1966) illustrate two varieties of centralization:

“First, organizations vary in the extent to which members are assigned tasks and then provided with the freedom to implement them without interruption from superiors...A second, and equally important, aspect of the distribution of power is the degree to which staff members participate in setting the goals and policies of the entire organization” (498).

There is sufficient room for correctional agencies to maintain security-focused order and allow for officer autonomy (which may improve morale). It is not necessary for officers to make decisions that depart from the mission of the prison, nor act outside the prescriptions of central command. The reduction of alienation requires communication and

acknowledgement of communication between management and line-staff. Relative to the alienation spectrum, powerlessness stands in opposition to empowerment.³² The ability to structure the environment and the mission of the correctional facility may empower the correctional officer and reduce the sense of powerlessness. Superior training may increase the effectiveness of correctional line-staff; thereby, improving the trust by management in their efficacy of order maintenance and rule enforcement.

MEANINGLESSNESS

Optimism may trump practice in DiIulio's (1987) model:

“Prison workers can simultaneously share a sense of mission, identify with each other, care about the inmates, and perform well a vital service to the people of the law-abiding and tax-paying community” (DiIulio 1987:256).

In practice, this “paramilitary prison bureaucracy” may not resemble the efficiency and the intimacy of the strict military model. In order to accurately compare the two work forces, the day-to-day supervision of inmates would need to reflect the altruistic sense of importance and duty that the military provides (cultural perceptions of military personnel would also need to mirror cultural perceptions of correctional officers). It is admitted that security concerns are vital to successful prison management – as they are to successful military operations. But, unlike military personnel, it is less clear that conflict events such as prison riots would automatically increase sympathies for correctional officers (instead, these events may increase sympathies for the inmate population). A strict hierarchical order will not automatically inject meaning into prison work – meaning of purpose, and of importance. The removal of antisocial actors is critical to social order (and in this way meaningful), but

³² This use of powerlessness reflects Seeman's (1959) definition: “*the expectancy or probability held by the individual that his own behavior cannot determine the occurrence of the outcomes, or reinforcements, he seeks*” (784, italics in original).

the care of those who have failed to care for others, and cultural perspectives of and requirements for that care, are more nuanced.

By the mere fact of its continued existence and frequent employment in the administering of punishment, forced confinement is a reasonable management solution for antisocial populations.³³ The removal of the incorrigibles is publically approved – and warrants public approval. But adequate concern for those who oversee those incorrigibles is less sympathetic. It appears to be possible to favor the use of prison and simultaneously hijack meaning from those who supervise prisoners: “[f]eeling that they are abused by inmates, unappreciated by superiors, unsupported by colleagues, guards tend to think they are fighting a lost cause” (Poole and Regoli 1981: 258).

Meaninglessness is greater than simply the belief that automatons could perform the tasks of line-staff. Seeman (1959) insists: “one might operationalize [meaninglessness] by focusing upon the fact that it is characterized by *low expectancy that satisfactory predictions about future outcomes of behavior can be made*” (786, italics in original). This definition illustrates meaninglessness in an absolute sense – in which the actor becomes removed from the fundamental shaping of events. Acute appreciation and comprehension of the world may actually detail helplessness. This sensitive actor understands the futility in preventing and igniting specific courses of action. Insofar as this nature of meaninglessness suggests lack of control - “fighting a lost cause” – the application to prison workers is appropriate. Greater knowledge and investment in the work of corrections may simply mirror and increase the unimportant role the officer plays. The doors continue to revolve, offenders that resemble one another continue to enter the system. Regardless of effort, little may be done to affect change. Added to this helplessness is the potential for a lack of appreciation from the

³³ Reasonable suggests that the larger community and citizenry willfully accept the use of prison.

environment charges and management. These processes may work in tandem, especially in the prison milieu, to create a grand sense of meaninglessness in the profession of inmate watching.

NORMLESSNESS

Durkheim (1897 [1951]) champions the notion that only human society may restrain, or limit, human appetite. Animal appetites are naturally limited and restrained by sustenance. A tired and full animal is without desire. Natural limits cannot restrain the reflective power of the human animal. Unrestrained wants imagined through reflection breed unhappiness. Accordingly, since the individual would never accept an unjust rule over her – rule that could be manipulated to individual wills – she will only accept society to regulate her wants. This acceptance allows the individual to know where she fits, what is appropriate for her to want, and what should be considered unreasonable. This acceptance also permits society's morality to gain hold of the individual. As Durkheim insists, society makes the individual moral. Breaks in the hold of society lead to deviance as the individual no longer understands where she fits and may no longer be able to satisfy her customary needs. The realized comfort and happiness in the individual – according to the normlessness, or anomic, argument – rests in the individual knowing where she fits and what is reasonable to desire. This is her acquired normative behavior. According to the individual, violation of this behavior should result in punishment and breaks in her bonds to society will confuse what this normative behavior actually is.

Relevant to the correctional facility, understanding institutional norms allow correctional officers to appreciate their role and to administer punishment reflective of the management. In practice, this may erode as the role of prison becomes more varied.

Although DiIulio (1987) insists that only prison can simultaneously fulfill all four goals of punishment, the result of the implementation of ostensibly conflicting goals may confuse appropriate responses to inmate behaviors (Poole and Regoli 1981).³⁴ It may be reasonable to presume that correctional officers perceive security as the chief concern while differing in their beliefs on what types of behavior threaten the secure fabric of the correctional setting. The administering of oversight may require a balancing act – but may also involve a devaluation in normative rules:

“[i]f guards were to enforce the rules by formally reporting all inmate infractions, the relatively high frequency of disciplinary response would likely be viewed by superiors as evidence of poor work performance or an inability to handle inmates. Conversely, if they were discovered exercising undue discretion or overlooking infractions, guards would be subject themselves to disciplinary sanctions” (Poole and Regoli 1981: 257).

Even though the balancing act may be achieved through experience, there may not exist normative responses to specific incidents. It may then be perceived by the actor that the outcome, irrespective of the process, will result in favorable or unfavorable management review. Adopting Merton,³⁵ Seeman (1959) assumes a similar position. Normlessness, or anomie, occurs when “there is a high expectancy that socially unapproved behaviors are required to achieve given goals” (Seeman 1959: 788). But this definition will not suffice. It is possible that this limitation precludes the possibility that normlessness merely frees the actor to engage in *any* behavior that will result in a favorable outcome. The behavior need not be actively unapproved. The behavior only needs to be unregulated. This allows the possibility that the officer, irrespective of management, may pursue acceptable or unacceptable rule enforcement –whichever is more readily available in any given situation.

³⁴ See also above section on custodial versus treatment orientation

³⁵ Merton (1942) defined innovation as the rejection of appropriate means to pursue cultural goals. The actor pursues the cultural goal of the American Dream but rejects the socially appropriate, or legal, means to achieve that goal.

This variety of normlessness devalues process – a process potentially invested in the *keeper* model – in favor of the outcome (thus eliminating the communal sense of societal purpose of forced confinement). This type of alienation will distance the correctional officer from the governing body and loosen his grasp of appropriate care for prisoners. Tragically, it is not possible to disregard the management of prisoners and fully embrace the purpose of prison (according to the social contract and justice). Hence, alienation of this sort may have a dramatic impact on the life and work ethic of the correctional officer. The officer no longer knows where he fits, what behavior is appropriate, and the alienation allows for deviation from socially appropriate behaviors.

ISOLATION

Durkheim (1897 [1951]) argued that reduced social integration increased individual self-interest, weakened communal restraint, and allowed for deviance.³⁶ The detachment from society created an inability to regulate oneself. Similar to the above discussion of anomie, the isolated individual is an unhappy and deviant individual for society is unable to limit her wants. Employing similar arguments, Faris and Dunham (1939) argued that weak social integration increased social isolation by reducing effective communal interaction. Shaw and McKay (1942) claimed a similar phenomenon: neighborhood structural factors such as low income, population heterogeneity, and residential turnover, could weaken informal social controls and subsequently increase health epidemics and crime rates. The failure of the community to integrate the individual frees her from its moral grasp and permits deviance. Isolation from the community – physically or emotionally – will increase individual purpose and decrease the collective, or altruistic, drive. In one sense, normlessness leads to isolation: “In attempting to minimize their own personal risk and

³⁶ Deviance defined here as suicide, namely egoistic suicide.

trouble, guards come to define their roles in a highly individualized manner, essentially detached from the overall institutional concerns” (Poole and Regoli 1981: 258). And this isolation results in a breakdown in communal control:

“the individualization of the guard’s role serves to isolate the guards from one another so they cannot depend on the help or cooperation of colleagues. Unable to rely on fellow officers, guards make their own accommodations on the tiers to ensure their own safety and security. In short, guards maintain a defensive posture in the social organization of the prison, working neither for the administrators nor for the inmates but for themselves” (Poole and Regoli 1981: 258-259).

Social isolation permits the correctional officer to deviate from culturally appropriate norms – norms that the prison administrators promote. This isolation further alienates the officer from communal connection, from responsibility outside her own immediate tasks, and renders the fabric of the correctional employee community fractured.

SELF-ESTRANGEMENT

The reduction of the value of labor in and of itself – that the work completed provides little satisfaction beyond its completion – increases the possibility of self-estrangement (Seeman 1959). This variety of alienation, the removal of “intrinsically rewarding experiences” (Poole and Regoli 1981: 259), breeds actors that are largely uninterested in the overall function of the host, endeavor little to produce a more effective work place, and desire little but uneventful tours. As Poole and Regoli (1981) contend:

“[The correctional officer] feels little pride in his work since the public imbues the job with such negative attributes. He feels his work is underappreciated by his superiors since they seem to show greater concern for the interests of the inmates. And since his immediate associates cannot be counted on, he enjoys no spirit of teamwork. These conditions create few incentives for the infusion of the worker’s self in his work and consequently results in self-estrangement” (259).

This self-estranged correctional officer is arguably a liability for the facility. His

disinterest in the well-being of his host potentially dismantles, or at least disrupts, the cohesion of proper management. The isolation from the community combines with little sense of value on the labor and dissolves investment in what is essentially team-oriented labor. It is conceded that the factory laborer who is easily replaced and finds minimal merit in the factory employ costs factory owners only the rate of his productivity – his true self-estrangement burdens only himself and his pursuit of happiness. To avoid being fired, however, he arguably works reasonably efficiently without garnering any sense of value from the process. But human services – especially those charged with the management of unruly and unpredictable populations – require an injection of trust in the atmosphere in order to temper aggressive emergencies. The question is whether self-estrangement is an inevitable outcome of prison management – and if so, what impact would this self-estrangement have on effective inmate oversight. Seeman (1959) defines self-estrangement as: “the degree of dependence of the given behavior upon anticipated future rewards” (790). It is not clear that a strict focus on anticipated future rewards reduces productivity or security in prison environments. If the salary is valued adequately then even the most estranged will strive for safe tours – no matter their emotional connection to the prison environment. This variety of alienation assumes negative impacts on the perception of inmates and fellow officers – begging the inquiry not only into the validity of this claim but also into the potential population variation in susceptibility to this phenomena.

Main Inferences:

- Alienation reduces prison worker ability to manage prisoners.
- The alienation impact on inmate management will be greatest in high security prisons

- Alienation hardens prison workers.
- Alienation in high security prisons will enhance hardening of prison workers.

Alienation in minimum-security prisons will decrease hardening.

A Comment on Emotion

Population specific human service environments arguably expose workers to moderate or even severe levels of uniformity in the presentation of client needs. Due to this potential consistency, perspectives toward objectively extreme conditions may be subjectively mollified by excessive exposure. Human service environments, especially those that serve at-risk men and women, increase the risk of deleterious effects on tenured staff, perhaps even without worker acknowledgement (see Maslach 1978; Maslach and Jackson 1981). Often labeled “burnout,”³⁷ this impact may increase substance use, depression, or even simple emotional dissonance (Maslach, Schaufeli, and Leiter 2001). Burnout may play a direct role in correctional officer perception of his work environment and his charges. Specifically, the Maslach and Jackson (1981) perspective illustrates the value of exhaustion, depersonalization, and inefficacy.

Perhaps more vital to professional occupations that supply direct emotional support to at-risk populations, the inclusion of burnout into this theoretical discussion is generally considered merited as correctional officers are unable to evade continual contact with a potentially manipulative and certainly needy population of men and women and these same officers often are required to provide, at the minimum, some level of personal care (see Lombardo 1989). Burnout illustrates the personal suffering of human service workers and their respective responses to stress and adversity. It may be conceded that “burnout” is better

³⁷ For a complete description on the development of the conceptual idea of burnout see Maslach and Schaufeli (1993) and Maslach, Schaufeli, and Leiter (2001).

considered under the above discussion of alienation. “Depersonalization”³⁸ and “inefficacy”³⁹ are directly related to alienation from work. Their collective inclusion in a single measure may be misguided. This is not to suggest that burnout is unimportant but rather it may be better conceptualized in its parts.⁴⁰ Depersonalization, as defined by Maslach and Jackson (1981), might actually increase the effectiveness of the correctional officer, specifically in the employment of legitimate power and perceived objective fairness. But this is arguably the cornerstone of the measure – and a decidedly negative component. It may be better to analyze what type of officer prisons make rather than assuming that prisons should make certain types of officers. Prisons forcibly detain men and women that society ostensibly fears. First contact, and even continual contact, with inmates might be unsettling:

“when correctional workers begin taking responsibility for their actions, they usually become emotionally involved in maintaining respect for their position. But inmates provide a direct challenge to their authority and because of the official rules and regulations governing correctional workers’ conduct toward inmates, the workers find themselves in a position where they must become psychologically immune from the batter of verbal assaults they receive ... new correctional officers soon come to see that their lot is with fellow workers, and they define others as enemies” (Regoli, Poole, and Schrink 1979: 185).

There is arguably no environment like the prison. It is likely that prisoners neither appreciate correctional officers nor appreciate prison; and it is not productive nor is it possible to sanction “verbal assaults” or other harmless yet unsettling and frequent behaviors.⁴¹ No set of standards will reduce unfavorable verbal assaults. But persistent

³⁸ Depersonalization: “An attempt to put distance between oneself and service recipients by actively ignoring the qualities that make them unique and engaging people” (Maslach et al 2001: 403)

³⁹ Inefficacy: “reduced personal accomplishment” (Maslach et al 2001: 403).

⁴⁰ It is important to note that this is largely a discussion of the Maslach (1981) burnout inventory – the most widely used burnout measure (and the only continually tested measure in correctional officer literature).

⁴¹ It is important to note that research has evaluated the effect of aggressive behavior within other professional occupations. The most promising comparison with the present work assesses violence against nurses in hospitals (e.g. Jackson, Clare, and Mannix 2002; Camerino et al 2007). It is conceded that workplace violence may impact “recruitment and retention” (Jackson, Clare, and Mannix 2002). But this research does not address alienation and power adoptions of nurses and their impact on efficacy or commitment. In addition, it is not

mockery can affect attitude. In order to successfully navigate such a system, a certain level of “thick skin” may be necessary. This is not tactical support for “dehumanization” but rather an attempt to logically assess genuine environmental factors that could shape the experience for correctional officers. Regardless of connotation, depersonalization may be essential to prison operations and effective population management. Of course, overlooking conditions that could inflict painful outcomes would undermine the keeper philosophy. Prison itself is punishment and perhaps it does not need to provide a greater, and unjustified, source of anguish. But what measureable quality is counter to “depersonalization” and appropriate for prison officers’ conduct?

The theoretical construct “burnout” is an insufficient measure for the prison environment. The above discussion of alienation reasonably subsumes and far exceeds the main tenets of burnout. Questions posed by the burnout literature are better addressed by alienation hypotheses.⁴²

Statement of Central Questions

This inquiry draws on federal prison worker data – across 115 prisons of varying security levels. Acknowledging the fact that prison workers are nested in prisons, multilevel

clear that nurses select into the field with the knowledge that their employment deals with violent populations. The same case cannot be made for prison workers. Ultimately, although research in burnout has evaluated numerous populations (Maslach et al 2001), research in alienation (as detailed above) has not. Prison populations are not like other populations and those who volunteer to serve in prisons are aware of this difference. Comparisons across security level may be more valuable in that minimum security prisons often do not even have fences (USDOJ 2011) – and inmates are often permitted work release – whereas high security prisons control movement and have towers and steep perimeter fences. Rather than attempting to force two populations together that are unlike (for selection and environmental reasons), it is preferable to assess differences within and across institutions that share the same “label” but might operate very differently internally.

⁴² See ethnographic work by Tracy (2008; 2004) and Tracy and Scott (2006). The qualitative design is unable to operationalize and test critical variables but does highlight the importance of “powerlessness,” lack of appreciation by general public (and within law enforcement), and emotional exhaustion. I propose that the selected measures of alienation in this study provide a more complete, and theoretically justifiable, assessment of the complicated and oft underappreciated role of the correctional officer. Importantly, Tracy’s (2008) ethnographical work indicates that alienation measures are appropriate (but the specifics of the proposed framework is contested here).

models are adopted to account for bias due to clustering, address group level variability and analyze cross-level interactions. Three specific questions empirically address key aspects of the prison ecosystem:

- (1) How do prison workers perceive institutional power derivation?
- (2) Do power adoptions impact prison worker perception of effectiveness in inmate management?
- (3) Does alienation harden prison workers and reduce their ability to effectively manage inmate populations?

Self-reported perceptions of power, as derived specifically from the prison institution, have not been formally tested. Instead of relying on inmate reports (or on prison worker perception of their own power), this inquiry targets prison worker perception of the power of the institution and of their direct and indirect supervisors. By proxy, this perception of power illustrates how the prison worker considers his environment and how he understands his role in his environment. It is further suggested that this perspective, along with the level of intimacy he shares with his employer, will influence his ability to manage inmate populations. One implicit argument proposes that prison workers with strong institutional and bureau commitment will be more apt to perceive legitimate power as appropriate. It is further suggested that security level will impact the effect of power adoptions and alienation. Specific context will enhance or diminish the effects of alienation and power on the prison worker.

Combined Statement of Hypotheses

1.
 - a. Legitimate, referent, and expert power improve institutional commitment for the prison worker. Coercive and reward power reduce institutional commitment.
 - b. Well supervised, treatment oriented institutions increase commitment levels. Fearful institutions decrease commitment.
 - c. Legitimate power has greater influence on commitment in high-security prisons. Reward and referent power have greater influence on commitment in minimum-security prisons.
2.
 - a. Legitimate, referent, and expert power improve prison worker ability to manage prisoner populations. Coercive and reward power aggravate perceived effectiveness of prisoner management.
 - b. Well supervised, treatment oriented institutions improve inmate management. Fearful institutions aggravate inmate management.
 - c. Legitimate and expert powers have greater influence on inmate management in high security. Referent and reward power have greater influence on inmate management in jails and minimum-security institutions.
3.
 - a. Alienation reduces prison worker ability to manage prisoners.
 - b. Well supervised, treatment oriented institutions will improve inmate management. Fearful institutions will aggravate inmate management.⁴³
 - c. The alienation impact on inmate management is greatest in high security prisons.
4.
 - a. Alienation hardens prison workers.
 - b. Institutions with lower perception of supervision, with stronger custodial orientations, and with greater fear of inmate populations harden prison workers.

⁴³ This is the same proposition as hypothesis (1b). The outcome measure is the same and the effect of this level-2 variable is hypothesized to be the same in both models.

- c. Alienation in high security prisons enhances hardening of prison workers.
Alienation in minimum-security prisons will decrease hardening.

3: Methods

The research hypotheses are analyzed using the data and methods provided in this section. Detailed information regarding the selected sample and general descriptive information about variables of particular interest (as well as the precise strategy of variable construction) are outlined below. The specific analytical strategy is also detailed in this section.

Sample

This study employs data from the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) yearly Prison Social Climate Survey (PSCS). The BOP utilizes a stratified proportional probability sample design and selects survey participants from each BOP correctional institution in the United States (Saylor 2006). Proportional probability ensures that staff at each facility is represented in proportion to sex, race, occupational specialty, and supervisory status (Saylor 2006).

Responses to the survey for calendar years 2006-2010 are as follows:

Year 2006: 9,021 (70.9% response rate)

Year 2007: 9,298 (71.3% response rate)

Year 2008: 7,997 (65.3% response rate)

Year 2009: 9,596 (59.9% response rate)

Year 2010: 10,058 (59.8% response rate)

Institutions with fewer than 120 staff members are fully sampled. Larger facilities, those with staff exceeding 400, are 30% sampled. Institutions that fall in-between 120 and 400 staff members are sampled at their percentage relative to 120 as the marker for fully

sampled (Saylor 2006).⁴⁴ Participants for the PSCS are selected from those institutions that have been operating for at least six months. Survey questions largely require correctional workers to consider conditions over the past six months. According to BOP: “all employees are ‘correctional workers first.’ This means everyone is responsible for the security and good order of the institution” (USDOJ 2011: 4). It is therefore appropriate to include all prison workers in this inquiry. Supervisory position and specific occupational role within the prison will be considered in model construction. The inclusion of all workers improves the sample size and variance of outcomes. More importantly, if all workers are trained as correctional officers first there is little theoretical reason for omitting certain types of officers.

Four versions of the PSCS exist and are randomly assigned to the sampled populations within institutions. This permits a broader range of pursuits for the comprehension of organizational climate (Saylor 1984). All respondents answer general demographic and occupational questions relating to work assignments, inmate contact, and BOP tenure. Due to random assignment, aggregations of certain measures that do not appear across all four versions of surveys (likely appearing in only two of the four) are used as markers of institutional level averages. This allows one to control for differences in institutional average attitudes (e.g. toward supervision or training) across institutions. Since the selection of sampled populations is random within selected demographics and the selection of version for that sampled respondent is also random this is not problematic. Due to this sampling design, it is also possible to infer institutional demographic percentages by populations sampled. Since PSCS is a stratified sample by gender and race, it can be inferred that percentages of female respondents by institution reflects that institution’s percentage of female staff members. Notably, every operating prison in the BOP is sampled each year in

⁴⁴ Institutions with 200 full time staff sampled at 60%. $120/200 = 0.6$

the PSCS. This provides for a full population of prisons for the purpose of level-2 analysis for each surveyed year.

Primary Dependent Variables

One primary outcome of interest is efficacy in inmate management. This is a self-report measure that averages 7-point Likert response to four survey questions. Answers range from “never” to “all the time.” Prior research has not employed this measure to test power and alienation hypotheses.

EFFICACY⁴⁵

GOODEAL: An ability to deal very effectively with the problems of inmates.

POSINFL: A feeling that you are positively influencing other people’s lives through your work

FEELEXHL: A feeling of accomplishment after working closely with inmates.

EZEASE: A feeling that you can easily create a relaxed atmosphere with inmates.

Cronbach alpha scores by year for above instrument:

0.7542 (2006)

0.7400 (2007)

0.7451 (2008)

0.7434 (2009)

0.7327 (2010)

Items load sufficiently onto a single factor.⁴⁶ Reported factor loadings for correlation with latent variable (year 2007):

⁴⁵ Developed by Saylor (1984)

⁴⁶ Items that sufficiently load onto single factors have only a single Eigenvalues over 1. Most often this value is close to or above a value of 2. Correlation of individual variables to factor and percentage of total observed

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
GOODEAL	0.6859	0.5295
POSINFL	0.8493	0.2788
FEELEXHL	0.8227	0.3232
EZEASE	0.6321	0.6004

The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) across prisons for EFFICACY, by year, is as follows:

0.0376 (2006)*

0.0274 (2007)*

0.04279 (2008)*

0.03807 (2009)*

0.01962 (2010)*

** Significant variation found for level-2 variance $p < 0.0001$ (not shown)*

The ICC identifies the variance of dependent variable that is explained by differences between prisons. The ICC is computed by dividing the level-2 variance by the sum of the level-1 and level-2 variance. Reduction in variance (level-1 and level-2) from initial unconditional model to later specified models can also serve to provide an estimate for the amount of variance explained due to included predictors. This is similar to the r-squared in ordinary least squares regression. Proportion of explained variance in specified models, compared to unconditional models, is noted.

The above measure implies that effectiveness in inmate management also includes personal accomplishment. The work brings rewards. Otherwise it could be argued that the prison worker is ineffective at working with prisoners since it brings no feelings of

variance explained by factor also addressed (not shown). See also Saylor, Gilman, and Camp (1996) for additional reliability and validity discussion on this EFFICACY measure.

accomplishment or positive influence (i.e. his work has not improved his condition).⁴⁷

Indices generated through factor analysis and through variable construction by simple summation yield similar correlations with independent variables. Formal analysis adopts the predicted factor score for this constructed variable.

A second outcome measure of interest is prison worker's sense of emotional hardening. This is also a self-report measure that averages 7-point Likert responses to three survey questions. Answer categories range from "never" to "all the time."

HARDENING:

GROWHARD: A feeling that you have become harsh toward people since you took this job

DRAINED: A feeling of being emotionally drained at the end of the workday.

TREATIT: A feeling that you treat some inmates as if they were impersonal objects.

Cronbach alpha scores by year for above instrument:

0.6874 (2006)

0.6927 (2007)

0.6918 (2008)

0.6969 (2009)

0.6855 (2010)

⁴⁷ It is important to note that the EFFICACY measure reflects satisfaction with current employment through inmate contact *or* (implicit in POSINFL) through contact with other workers. Surveys are self-reports of perceptions and not necessarily objective measures. Effectiveness in working with prisoners is bolstered by attention to overall perception of the importance of the work in general. Prison workers who report low scores on POSINFL arguably fail to find value in prisoner management itself. Prisoner management entails more than prisoner interaction. Perception of a positive influence on others reflects belief in effectiveness. The inclusion of this item is therefore warranted. And it is a suitable outcome variable for alienation and power tests. In addition, it is not possible to construct an objective measure of efficacy. Perceptual measures will all suffer from the same inadequacies. It cannot be overstated, however, that the role of the prison worker is to oversee prisoners. Assuming that POSINFL somehow excludes prisoners is unsubstantiated. High scores in POSINFL will still result in an improved perceived role within the prison.

Items load sufficiently onto a single factor. Reported factor loadings for correlation with latent variable (year 2007):

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
GROWHARD	0.8437	0.2881
DRAINED	0.7466	0.4427
TREATIT	0.7702	0.4068

The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) across prisons for HARDENING, by year, is as follows:

0.02113 (2006)*

0.03010 (2007)*

0.02524 (2008)*

0.03263 (2009)*

0.03603 (2010)*

* *Significant variation $p < 0.0001$*

The above measure HARDENING captures early signs of “dehumanizing” factors potentially present in prison workers. Due to the self-report nature of PSCS, these measures implicitly suggest some awareness of this emotional hardening. Prison workers admit that they are treating inmates impersonally or admit that they are exhausted emotionally following their tour. This construct reflects perception of hardening and is therefore an appropriate proxy for dehumanization by prison workers in prison settings.⁴⁸ For clarity and accuracy purposes, however, this construct will be referred to as hardening throughout the analysis.

⁴⁸ An alternative outcome using GROWHARD and TREATIT is also constructed but obtains similar correlations with independent variables.

The final outcome measure is commitment to the institution. This is also a self-report measure that averages 7-point Likert responses to three survey questions. Answer categories range from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Prior research has not used this measure to test power and alienation hypotheses.⁴⁹

INSTCOMM

INBETTER: This facility is the best in the whole BOP.

INONLY: I would rather be stationed at this facility than any other I know about.

INWORK: I would like to continue to work at this facility.

Cronbach alpha scores by year for above instrument:

0.8196 (2006)

0.8221 (2007)

0.8224 (2008)

0.8036 (2009)

0.8139 (2010)

Items load sufficiently onto a single factor. Reported factor loadings for correlation with latent variable (year 2007):

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
INBETTER	0.8099	0.3441
INONLY	0.8974	0.1947
INWORK	0.8730	0.2379

The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) across prisons for INSTCOMM, by year, is as follows:

0.12651 (2006)*

0.14865 (2007)*

⁴⁹ See Saylor (1984) for full discussion on instrument development.

0.14956 (2008)*

0.11957 (2009)*

0.12863 (2010)*

** Significant variation $p < 0.0001$*

The measure INSTCOMM captures unique attachment to direct institution of employment. Regardless of centralization of authority, numerous environmental factors may diminish or increase commitment to a particular institution, irrespective of bureau commitment. Additionally, indices generated through factor analysis and through variable construction by simple summation yield similar results (predicted factor scores are used for formal analysis). Notably, institutional commitment is an appropriate proxy for what types of power are employed within the confinement institution. For example, if coercive and reward power increase institutional commitment then this suggests that the institution promotes, presumably informally, coercion and mistrust.

Primary Predictors

POWER

Five varieties of power are employed for this study: legitimate power, coercive power, reward power, expert power, and referent power. This inquiry proposes that different types of power adoptions will have different impacts on effective ability to deal with inmates and on commitment to institution. Proxies are developed for each variety of power in order to test this proposal. Research to date has not used this power adoption to test prison workers in the federal system and has not tested the role of institution or institutional leadership in developing worker perception of power.

Legitimacy

Commitment to the BOP is used as one proxy for legitimate power. BOP officially sanctions humane treatment of inmates. Commitment to the BOP suggests commitment to this philosophy and commitment to official standards of treatment.

BOPCOMM⁵⁰

BOPGOOD = I have a good opinion of the BOP most of the time.

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

BOPRUN = Most of the time BOP is run very well.

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

BOPSAT = I am usually satisfied with the BOP.

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

BOPBETER = The BOP is better than any of the other correctional agencies (e.g. State)

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

BOPONLY = If I remain in corrections, I would prefer to remain with the BOP.

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

Items load sufficiently onto a single factor. Reported factor loadings for correlation with latent variable (year 2007):

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
BOPGOOD	0.8838	0.2189
BOPRUN	0.8785	0.2283
BOPSAT	0.8982	0.1932
BOPBETER	0.7903	0.3754
BOPONLY	0.7530	0.4330

⁵⁰ Scale developed by Saylor (1984)

It is important to note that indices generated through factor analysis and through variable construction by simple summation yield similar correlations with dependent variables.

An additional way to conceive of legitimacy is via fairness. Since one purpose of this inquiry is to ascertain prison workers perception of power through their institution of employment, the perception of fairness will increase the sense of legitimacy in the system and in the prison itself (Sherman 1993). Legitimacy is also considered through this constructed instrument labeled fairness:

FAIRNESS

FAIRSTAN = Standards used to evaluate me are fair.

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

FAIREVAL = Performance rating was fair.

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

BACKPATS = Supervisor gives feedback for good work.

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

Cronbach alpha scores by year for above instrument:

0.8214 (2006)

0.8168 (2007)

0.8336 (2008)

0.8115 (2009)

0.8262 (2010)

Items load sufficiently onto a single factor. Reported factor loadings for correlation with latent variable (year 2007):

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
FAIRSTAN	0.8844	0.2179
FAIREVAL	0.8456	0.2850
BACKPATS	0.8382	0.2974

For the above instrument FAIRNESS, indices generated through factor analysis and through variable construction by simple summation yield similar correlations with dependent variables.

Coercion

Supervisors that intimidate staff members draw on coercive power strategies. Intimidation reflects the mere ability to employ power rather than the appropriate employment of that power. By definition intimidating characteristics are not legitimate. This power variety yields low commitment to the institution and increases hardening of prison workers. Key measure:

SPINTMDT = supervisor intimidates me

(Scaled seven points from “never” to “all the time”)

Reward

In prison environments, reward power is generally defined as an informal and reciprocal relationship with prisoners that permits and promotes the exchange of services. Hepburn (1985) considers reward power to be: “I can give special help and benefits to those who cooperate with me.” In this context, prison workers believe that if they perform well they will get special rewards. The present focus argues that power derivations often arrive through institutional channels. Key measure:

WORKPAYS = I will get a cash award or unscheduled pay increase if I perform especially well.

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

Expertise

Increase in the prison worker’s perception of the effectiveness of training will increase the sense of ability to manage inmates. Expert power, reflective of special knowledge or advanced skill, arrives through the institution and improves the prison worker’s perception of his employment abilities. Key measure:

TRAINING⁵¹

_TRANBMR = The BOP training program does not prepare me or help me deal with situations that arise on the job.

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

(This item is reverse coded prior to construction of the TRAINING scale)

TRANIMPR = Training at this facility has improved my job skills.

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

TRANEFF = My BOP training has helped me to work effectively with inmates.

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

Items load sufficiently onto a single factor. Reported factor loadings for correlation with latent variable (year 2007):

VARIABLE	FACTOR1	UNIQUENESS
_TRANBMR	0.7280	0.4700
TRANIMPR	0.8474	0.2819
TRANEFF	0.8867	0.2137

For the above instrument TRAINING, indices generated through factor analysis and through variable construction by simple summation yield similar correlations with dependent variables.

⁵¹ Scale developed by Saylor (1984)

Reverence

Generally, reverent power in prison environments is reflective of the extent that prisoners respect and admire the guard or prison officer. In this context, reverent power refers to the respect prison workers feel that they receive from supervisors and from their work in general. An increase in the sense that ideas are respect will result in greater ability to manage inmate populations and increase commitment to the institution.

Key measures:

RESPECTED

IDEAVALU = My ideas and opinions are valued.

(Scaled seven points from “Never” to “All the time”)

BOSSHHELP = Boss encourages my ideas about job (engages me in the planning process).

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

BOSSASKS = Boss asks my opinion about work problems.

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

Cronbach alpha scores by year for above instrument:

0.7817(2006)

0.7783 (2007)

0.7767 (2008)

0.8204 (2009)

0.7962 (2010)

Items load sufficiently onto a single factor. Reported factor loadings for correlation with latent variable (year 2007):

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
IDEAVALU	0.7284	0.4694
BOSSHELP	0.8735	0.2370
BOSSASKS	0.8879	0.2116

For the instrument RESPECTED, indices generated through factor analysis and through variable construction by simple summation yield similar correlations with dependent variables.

ALIENATION

The alienation instruments reflect conditions detailed by Seeman (1959) and later tested in a mid-western maximum-security prison by Poole and Regoli (1981). Prior research has not employed PSCS to conduct alienation research. Five alienation measures were constructed: normlessness, powerless, meaningless, isolation, self-estrangement.

Normlessness is a self-report measure that averages 7-point Likert responses to four survey questions.

NORMLESSNESS

UNCLEAR = Formal authority is not clear

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

_COMUNEFF = I get information that helps me do my job better

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

_COMMWORK = I communicate effectively with coworkers (never/all the time)

(Scaled seven points from “never” to “all the time”)

_IKNOW = I know what my supervisor expects of me

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

COMUNEFF, COMMWORK, and IKNOW are reverse coded when the scale is constructed. Cronbach alpha scores by year for above instrument:

0.6432 (2006)

0.6119 (2007)

0.6360 (2008)

0.6476 (2009)

0.6299 (2010)

Items load sufficiently onto a single factor. Reported factor loadings for correlation with latent variable (year 2007):

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
UNCLEAR	0.6093	0.6288
_COMUNEF	0.7706	0.4061
_COMWORK	0.6028	0.6366
_IKNOW	0.7551	0.4298

For the above instrument NORMLESSNESS, indices generated through factor analysis and through variable construction by simple summation yield similar results.

The powerless construct is a self-report measure that averages 7-point Likert responses to three survey questions.

POWERLESS

_ITALK = I have lots of say so over my job

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

NOCHANGE = Change is not possible here

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

NOINFLUN = No influence on what goes on in BOP

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

IKNOW is reverse coded for scale construction. Cronbach alpha scores by year for the above instrument:

0.6451 (2006)

0.6538 (2007)

0.6423 (2008)

0.6770 (2009)

0.6819 (2010)

Items load sufficiently onto a single factor. Reported factor loadings for correlation with the latent variable (year 2007):

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
_ITALK	0.6534	0.5731
NOCHANGE	0.8235	0.3219
NOINFLUN	0.8271	0.3158

For the instrument POWERLESS, indices generated through factor analysis and through variable construction by simple summation yield similar correlations with dependent variables.

The meaningless construct is also a self-report measure that averages 7-point Likert responses to four survey questions.

MEANINGLESS

PROMBUMS = Promotions and performance are unrelated

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

_DELEGATD = Authority is clearly delegated

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

_JOBINT = My job is interesting to me.

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

_HARDWORK = My hard work will be recognized.

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

JOBINT, DELEGATD and HARDWORK are reverse coded prior to scale construction. Cronbach alpha scores by year for above instrument:

0.6341 (2006)

0.6411 (2007)

0.6422 (2008)

0.6538 (2009)

0.6701 (2010)

Items load sufficiently onto a single factor. Reported factor loadings for correlation with the latent variable (year 2007):

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
PROMBUMS	0.6908	0.5227
_DELGATD	0.6239	0.6108
_JOBINT	0.6650	0.5578
_HARDWRK	0.7892	0.3772

Indices generated through factor analysis and through variable construction by simple summation yield similar correlations with dependent variables (for MEANINGLESS).

Isolation merges the averages of three 7-point Likert responses to survey questions.

ISOLATION

_IDEAVALU = My ideas and opinions are valued.

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

_WORKWELL = I feel that I work well with others.

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

_COMMWORK = I communicate effectively with coworkers.

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

Items load onto a single factor (not shown). All three above measures are reverse coded prior to scale construction. Cronbach alpha scores by year for above instrument:

0.7749 (2006)

0.7541 (2007)

0.7631 (2008)

0.7891 (2009)

0.7997 (2010)

Items load sufficiently onto a single factor. Reported factor loadings for the correlation with latent variable (year 2007):

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
_IDEVALU	0.7304	0.4666
_WRKWELL	0.8782	0.2287
_COMWORK	0.8751	0.2343

Indices generated through factor analysis and through variable construction by simple summation yield similar results.

SELF-ESTRANGEMENT

_JOBWORTH = My BOP job suits me very well.

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

(This item is reverse coded prior to construction of the SELF_ESTRAN scale)

_JOBSUIT = My BOP jobs is usually worthwhile

(Scaled seven points from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)

(This item is reverse coded prior to construction of the SELF ESTRAN scale)

Alpha scores by year for above instrument:

0.8677 (2006)

0.8715 (2007)

0.8696 (2008)

0.8794 (2009)

0.8785 (2010)

Items load sufficiently onto a single factor. Reported factor loadings for correlation with latent variable (year 2007):

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
_JOBWRTH	0.9416	0.1133
_JOBSUIT	0.9416	0.1133

Indices generated through factor analysis and through variable construction by simple summation yield similar correlations with dependent variables.

Descriptive Statistics (Outcomes and Primary Predictors)

Descriptive statistics for the key predictors and outcomes by year are listed below. These constructed instruments have been standardized to allow for meaningful interpretation. The below descriptive statistics represent the actual number of observations per variable. Due to missing data (a result of unanswered portions of the questionnaire) certain variables have fewer observations. To maximize observations per outcome separate files were created to run analyses for each outcome.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for primary predictors and outcomes (2007)

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>Dependent Variables</i>				
Institutional Commitment (n=4522)	0.00	1.00	-2.55	1.57
Efficacy (n=4464)	0.00	1.00	-3.35	2.04
Hardening (n=4455)	0.00	1.00	-1.80	2.88
<i>Independent Predictors</i>				
Alienation (n=4281)	0.0	1.00	-2.26	4.12
Normlessness (n=4406)	0.0	1.00	-1.78	3.93
Powerlessness (n=4495)	0.0	1.00	-2.20	2.09
Meaninglessness (4469)	0.0	1.00	-2.07	2.94
Isolation (n=4458)	0.0	1.00	-1.68	4.40
Estrangement (n=4544)	0.0	1.00	-1.24	3.06
Legitimate Power (n=4468)	0.0	1.00	-2.94	1.50
Referent Power (n=4424)	0.0	1.00	-2.38	1.69
Expert Power (n=4499)	0.0	1.00	-2.93	1.62
Reward Power (n=4528)	0.0	1.00	-1.22	1.74
Coercive Power (n=4497)	0.0	1.00	-0.72	2.89

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for primary predictors and outcomes (2008)

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>Dependent Variables</i>				
Institutional Commitment (n=3796)	0.00	1.00	-2.57	1.57
Efficacy (n=3729)	0.00	1.00	-3.35	2.05
Hardening (n=3714)	0.00	1.00	-1.81	2.92
<i>Independent Predictors</i>				
Alienation (n=2352)	0.0	1.00	-1.99	1.67
Normlessness (n=3332)	0.0	1.00	-1.70	4.06
Powerlessness (n=3768)	0.0	1.00	-2.21	2.06
Meaninglessness (n=3748)	0.0	1.00	-2.03	2.98
Isolation (n=2471)	0.0	1.00	-1.34	4.81
Estrangement (n=3826)	0.0	1.00	-1.26	3.11
Legitimate Power (n=3729)	0.0	1.00	-2.83	1.48
Referent Power (n=3715)	0.0	1.00	-2.37	1.70
Expert Power (n=3786)	0.0	1.00	-2.86	1.62
Reward Power (n=3787)	0.0	1.00	-1.29	1.67
Coercive Power (n=3763)	0.0	1.00	-0.74	2.83

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for primary predictors and outcomes (2009)

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>Dependent Variables</i>				
Institutional Commitment (n=4410)	0.00	1.00	-2.56	1.56
Efficacy (n=4353)	0.00	1.00	-3.46	1.96
Hardening (n=4383)	0.00	1.00	-1.80	3.01
<i>Independent Predictors</i>				
Alienation (n=2995)	0.0	1.00	-2.12	4.12
Normlessness (n=3089)	0.0	1.00	-1.68	3.82
Powerlessness (n=4436)	0.0	1.00	-2.01	2.18
Meaninglessness (n=3151)	0.0	1.00	-1.96	3.04
Isolation (n=3115)	0.0	1.00	-1.54	4.25
Estrangement (n=4454)	0.0	1.00	-1.17	3.28
Legitimate Power	0.0	1.00	-2.94	1.50
Referent Power	0.0	1.00	-2.38	1.69
Expert Power	0.0	1.00	-2.93	1.62
Reward Power	0.0	1.00	-1.22	1.74
Coercive Power	0.0	1.00	-0.72	2.89

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for primary predictors and outcomes (2010)

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>Dependent Variables</i>				
Institutional Commitment (n=4619)	0.00	1.00	-2.64	1.50
Efficacy (n=4503)	0.00	1.00	-3.65	1.93
Hardening (n=4502)	0.00	1.00	-1.77	3.01
<i>Independent Predictors</i>				
Alienation (n=4317)	0.0	1.00	-2.04	4.26
Normlessness (n=4571)	0.0	1.00	-1.68	4.04
Powerlessness (n=4656)	0.0	1.00	-1.97	2.23
Meaninglessness (n=4623)	0.0	1.00	-1.84	3.15
Isolation (n=4665)	0.0	1.00	-1.56	4.04
Estrangement (n=4654)	0.0	1.00	-1.13	3.42
Legitimate Power (n=4598)	0.0	1.00	-3.34	1.34
Referent Power (n=4615)	0.0	1.00	-2.54	1.56
Expert Power (n=4681)	0.0	1.00	-3.20	1.40
Reward Power (n=4713)	0.0	1.00	-1.47	1.52
Coercive Power (n=4664)	0.0	1.00	-0.67	2.83

Primary Control Variables

DEMOGRAPHICS

The prison worker literature is unclear about the relationship between demographics and attitudes toward inmates. Whitehead and Lindquist (1989) suggest that organizational factors largely dictate orientation tendencies but evidence of race and gender divergence in attitudes does exist (Britton 1997; Cullen et al 1989; Jackson and Ammen 1996; Jurik 1985). Race and gender are warranted for inclusion in the level-1 prediction. It is also proposed that age is less valuable for this investigation next to years working in the Bureau of Prisons. Years of experience should be a better indicator than age and should not underestimate the impact of the aging individual since the variable YRSBOP_3 delineates that workers have at least 20 years of experience at the Bureau. The variable YRSBOP_2 delineates that workers have between 5 and 20 years of experience. These splits are selected because alienation

factors tend to see a decline in longer tenured officers after a peak in mid-tenured officers (Toch and Klofas 1982). These splits are employed throughout the analysis in order to maintain consistency. Key control variables for level-1 analysis are: race (Black), gender (1=female), high school or less, line-staff correctional officer, and years working for Bureau of Prisons. Weekly contact with inmates is also included as a binary variable in efficacy and hardening models (but is not listed below). Sums by year are as follows:

Table 5. Summary of individual level control variables

2007						
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	
RACE_BLK	9298	.181652	.3855782	0	1	
GENDER	9153	.2781602	.4481172	0	1	
LINESTAF	9166	.3886101	.487461	0	1	
YRSBOP_3	9298	.2561841	.4365482	0	1	
HIGH_SCH	9298	.184558	.3879577	0	1	
2008						
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	
RACE_BLK	7997	.1984494	.3988573	0	1	
GENDER	7863	.2955615	.4563238	0	1	
LINESTAF	7883	.3898262	.4877416	0	1	
YRSBOP_3	7997	.2807303	.4493841	0	1	
HIGH_SCH	7997	.1749406	.37994	0	1	
2009						
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	
RACE_BLK	9596	.1851813	.3884648	0	1	
GENDER	9238	.2947608	.4559598	0	1	
LINESTAF	9393	.3098052	.4624378	0	1	
YRSBOP_3	9596	.3240934	.4680595	0	1	
HIGH_SCH	9564	.157674	.3644547	0	1	
2010						
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	
RACE_BLK	10058	.1897992	.3921616	0	1	
GENDER	9709	.3119786	.463325	0	1	
LINESTAF	9843	.3146398	.4643959	0	1	
YRSBOP_3	10058	.3344601	.4718284	0	1	

The above tables show that between 18-20% of the sampled prison worker staff reports race as Black over the years 2007-2010. Therefore, stratified proportional probability assumes that over these four years about 19% of the actual prison worker population is Black. The Bureau of Prisons lists prison worker population as 21% Black as of 2012. The tables also show that between 28-31% of the sampled prison worker staff reported female for gender. BOP lists female staff at 27% as of 2012.

Institutional Level Variables

Variables at the institutional level (level-2) allow for the analysis of the impact of aggregate measures on specific individual outcomes. Specific racial composition or general institutional sense of the quality of supervision (as examples) may impact individual perceived effectiveness of inmate supervision. In this regard, it is likely that environmental factors – aggregate measures as well as unique institutional identifiers (prison age, security level) – influence prison worker perception of power and of efficacy. Specific climate measures are critical components of prison ecosystem analysis.

Included variables at level-2 reflect theoretical arguments concerning alienation and power as well as empirical research regarding perception toward treatment or toward custody. Race Black appears to play a positive role in the individual perception of treatment and is therefore likely to have a greater impact on institutional perception of treatment when percentages of Race Black are higher. Race Black and gender are included in the model to control for the percentage of population that is female and percentage that is Black by institution. (For clarity, it is proposed thereby that larger female populations – as a percentage – may also impact commitment, efficacy, and hardening.)

Alienation is implicitly considered through the lens of environmental relationships. Relationships with charges, with peers, and with supervisors are important in this regard (Poole and Regoli 1981). To approximate these relationships, three specific measures are aggregated and included at level-2. Aggregate fear of inmates captures an overall institutional level measure of the relationship between prison workers and prisoners. Aggregate attitude towards supervisors captures the overall and general relationship between prison workers and their supervisors. Aggregate treatment orientation captures the general ideology of the individual prison – a factor best suited to measure the relationship promoted by prison workers within each institution and therefore an indicator of how that staff perceives the role of imprisonment at that institution. Aggregate treatment orientation might not necessarily be reflective of individual values but may reflect the assumed and thriving culture (Cullen et al 1989; Toch and Klofas 1982). In addition, the aggregate level of commitment to treatment is warranted since treatment oriented prisons may also differ in attitudes toward inmates (Jurik and Musheno 1986; Jackson and Ammen 1996). These three aggregate measures capture key relationships within the institution of confinement (see Poole and Regoli 1981) and are included as level-2 variables. Although aggregate treatment orientation is specific to efficacy and alienation, it is included in commitment models as treatment orientation might impact power adoption, which may also impact one's commitment to the facility. These three specific factors are aggregations reported by workers within each institution sampled in the PSCS.

Additional environmental factors to consider for level-2 analysis include prison age, prison security level, and prison location. The age of the prison is controlled for on level-2 as a measure of the physical environment and “as a rough control for working conditions”

(Camp, Saylor, and Harer 1997:749). Security-level is an appropriate proxy for the “dangerousness of inmates” housed in a specified institution (Camp, Saylor, and Harer 1997: 749). Security-level progresses from low-danger at a minimum-security facility to highest danger at a maximum-security prison. Prison location is included in the model in order to control for unobservable factors that pertain to geographical differences. Local conditions may impact commitment to particular institutions. It is admitted that this control is specific only to a general geographic area and does not account for proximity to urban centers or variation within specified geographical area. Sums of institutional level measures are as follows:

Table 6. Summary of select institutional level variables

2006:					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
SUPERVIS	114	3.600112	.3224507	2.857895	4.731429
ORIENTTN	114	2.170411	.2268636	1.614035	2.847826
FEAR	114	2.101904	.6120802	.1923077	4
PRISON_AGE	114	24.35088	24.34159	1	111
2007					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
SUPERVIS	116	3.629086	.3143231	2.705556	4.270588
ORIENTTN	116	2.148059	.2379586	1.453125	2.818182
FEAR	116	2.077463	.6753352	.5833333	3.875
PRISON_AGE	116	24.2931	23.94778	1	112
2008					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
SUPERVIS	116	3.673378	.3690876	2.657143	4.684
ORIENTTN	116	2.139868	.2463567	1.285714	2.8
FEAR	116	2.20517	.7381687	.4285714	3.888889
PRISON_AGE	116	25.96552	24.31959	2	113
2009					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
SUPERVIS	115	3.762542	.3433269	2.976508	4.501852
ORIENTTN	115	2.122817	.2092979	1.578947	2.717949
FEAR	115	1.958187	.737311	.1111111	4.019022
PRISON_AGE	115	27.16522	24.39152	0	114

*Analytic Strategy*⁵²

I estimate a series of Hierarchical Linear Models (HLM) for the three dependent measures: efficacy, institutional commitment, and hardening. Hierarchical modeling is particularly useful in the context of prisons since it tackles potential bias due to the clustered nature of the observations. HLM is also able to address important group level variability. Differences in group means is likely to influence primary outcomes. In addition, HLM allows for analysis of cross-level interaction (the interaction of security-level with key predictors is of particular interest). The level-1 unconditional model for prison workers is understood by the following equation:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + r_{ij}$$

Where, β_{0j} is the mean and r_{ij} is the individual observational distance from the mean.

At level-2 of the unconditional model, this equation is adopted:

$$\beta_{0j} = y_{00} + u_{0j}$$

Where, β_{0j} is equal to the grand mean (y_{00}) plus a random error term (u_{0j}) that captures un-modeled variability between prisons (the observational distance between individual prisons and the grand mean of all prisons). The full equation with substitution is:

$$Y_{ij} = y_{00} + u_{0j} + r_{ij}$$

This model offers insight into the proportion of the outcome variable that can be explained by differences between prisons, or the intra-class correlation coefficient, and whether variation between prisons is significant. Intra-class correlations reported above

⁵² Analytic Strategy draws on Raudenbush and Byrk (2002)

indicate that key dependent variables (EFFICACY, INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT, and HARDENING) vary significantly across prisons and therefore warrant the employment of multilevel models.

Using the HLM statistical package to verify these findings unconditional models are first estimated. Results show significant variation across prisons by dependent variable:

2007:

EFFICACY: $\tau_{00} = 0.02619, p < 0.001$
INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT: $\tau_{00} = 0.15019, p < 0.001$
HARDENING: $\tau_{00} = 0.02998, p < 0.001$

2008:

EFFICACY: $\tau_{00} = 0.03947, p < 0.001$
INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT: $\tau_{00} = 0.14325, p < 0.001$
HARDENING: $\tau_{00} = 0.02536, p < 0.001$

2009:

EFFICACY: $\tau_{00} = 0.04031, p < 0.001$
INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT: $\tau_{00} = 0.12142, p < 0.001$
HARDENING: $\tau_{00} = 0.03365, p < 0.001$

2010:

EFFICACY: $\tau_{00} = 0.01996, p < 0.001$
INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT: $\tau_{00} = 0.12358, p < 0.001$
HARDENING: $\tau_{00} = 0.03571, p < 0.001$

After the initial empty model, further specified models estimate the impact of individual level measures without institutional level variables in order to ascertain continued relevance of multilevel models when the model is fully specified at level-1 (random intercept models with only level-1 predictors).⁵³ Primary predictors are next modeled against outcome variables and tested for slope variation across institutions. Hypothesis testing is employed to assess improved model fit of the fixed versus the random slope model.

⁵³ Model 1 (see detailed explanation below)

Controlling for the before listed individual (level-1) and prison level measures (level-2), fully specified models next estimate the impact of primary predictors on primary dependent variables. Random intercept models are specified as follows:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}X_{ij} + r_{ij}$$

$$\beta_{0j} = y_{00} + y_{01}Z + u_{0j}$$

$$\beta_{1j} = y_{10}$$

$$\rightarrow Y_{ij} = y_{00} + y_{10}X_{ij} + y_{01}Z + u_{0j} + r_{ij}$$

Where, X's represent individual level variables (level-1), Z's represent institutional level variables (level-2) and variance is explained at the individual and at the prison level. In order to specify random coefficient models – where level-1 variables are permitted to vary across prisons – an additional random effect is specified: $\beta_{1j} = y_{10} + u_{1j}$. If, for example, legitimate power is permitted to vary across institutions, u_{1j} would capture this variation.

Within the fully specified models, the first models estimate the role of the bases of power on institutional commitment and the role of the bases of power on efficacy. Cross-level interactions between bases of power and security level are also considered. Subsequent models estimate the impact of alienation measures on efficacy and the role of alienation on hardening (including the constructed overall alienation factor measure as well as the individually constructed alienation factor measures). Again, these sets of models also consider cross-level interactions.

It is proposed that security level, in particular, will have a varying impact on alienation and power measures in their prediction of primary dependent variables. Aggregate measures assessed on institutional level are reflective of prison workers perception of the environment as a collective and serve to improve the understanding of prison worker climate

as perceived by prison workers. Individual perception and operation as well as collective perception and operation are fundamental to the investigation of prison ecosystems.

Specifics of Model⁵⁴ Construction

MODEL 1: WITHIN INSTITUTION

The fully unconditional models provide evidence that dependent variables vary significantly across prisons and warrant the use of multilevel models. Subsequent analysis addresses variation across prisons after the introduction of primary level-1 predictors and control variables (Model 1). These random-intercept models do not include level-2 variables. All continuous variables, including primary predictors and outcomes, are standardized to facilitate improved interpretation. Primary investigation targets the impact of power and alienation on the primary outcomes and therefore control variables are fixed – slopes of these variables are not allowed to vary across prisons.⁵⁵ Prior literature suggests that Gender Female and Race Black may influence treatment of inmates and may alter the perspective of the organization (Britton 1997; Cullen et al 1989; Jackson and Ammen 1996). These controls are necessary for accurate model construction. Longer tenured officers are also assumed to be more committed to the institution and to BOP practices as well as exhibit markedly different levels of alienation than their counterparts (Toch and Klofas 1982). One primary aim is the investigation of supervision. It is of particular interest to note the impact of less education (presumably less sophistication and less socialization) on key outcomes. Line-staff have direct contact with inmates and are correctional officers. Inclusion of

⁵⁴ All models utilize restricted maximum likelihood (REML) with robust standard errors in HLM. This strategy is employed due to lower reliabilities (Wooldredge, Griffin, and Pratt 2001) and correction for bias in standard errors.

⁵⁵ It is important to note that hypothesis testing indicates that race and gender effects do not vary consistently (and are not consistently significant) across institutions and across years. Due to this inconsistency and lack of central importance to the current investigation it is further confirmed as appropriate to fix these variables.

demographics is further warranted in that it provides for a cursory investigation into the salience of selection versus organization in predicting selected outcomes (i.e. Whitehead and Lindquist 1989). In certain instances it may be possible, regardless of selection limitations, to improve prisoner treatment and officer commitment solely through organizational changes.

Prior to full model construction, each primary predictor is modeled against each outcome variable and tested for slope variation across institutions. Hypotheses testing of fixed versus random-slope models are employed to verify the improved status of the more complex model. In addition to verification of improved fit through hypothesis testing, the slopes of primary predictors are allowed to vary under the following conditions: significant variation across prisons ($p < 0.05$)⁵⁶, reliability above 0.05, tau correlations with other random predictors below 0.70. The intercept is always set to vary randomly between prisons in order to facilitate the examination of group differences in means. All variables are centered on their grand mean (subtraction of overall mean from observed value). This provides more meaningful interpretation of coefficients and outcomes across years. Significance is noted by asterisk for p-values below 0.05. The HLM outputs record p-values for coefficients from two-tail tests. Notably, hypotheses predict the direction of certain variables and therefore warrant one-tailed analysis for those variables. P-values between 0.05 and 0.10 are noted by table footnote.

MODEL 2: FULL MODEL

Initial level-2 analyses assess the relationship between prison-level controls and outcome variables (not shown). Geographical region remains in final models only if it is

⁵⁶ It is important to note that p values that exceed 0.05 but are below 0.1 are also included but table footnote denotes actual p-value.

significant within the fully constructed model. Due to theoretical importance, variables pertaining to relational aspects of the institution (fear of inmates, perception of supervision, perception of peers through treatment orientation of facility) remain regardless of significance. Again, due to their central importance in the analysis, security levels also remain in the final models regardless of their significance. The full model includes level-2 and level-1 variables. When applicable (given the above conditions), level-1 primary predictors are permitted to vary. Subsequent models include cross-level interactions.

The following chapter details the results of this study. Prior research has not addressed the potential for a varying impact of security level on the specific outcomes selected. Therefore, additional consideration is paid to cross-level interactions of the primary predictors with each level of security in order to uncover potentially hidden relationships. Central focus, however, remains on stated hypotheses.

4: Results

Results from HLM analyses are reported in this section. Results are reported by hypothesis. Detailed tables follow the summary of results for each hypothesis. At the end of this section, Table 63 and Table 64 summarize the findings as they relate to the hypotheses.

*Correlations*⁵⁷

A few issues concerning correlation needed to be addressed prior to analysis. Regarding primary outcomes and primary predictors, alienation measures are highly correlated. Therefore, separate analyses are run for each measure.⁵⁸ In addition, referent power is highly correlated with fairness (a proxy for legitimate power). Therefore, fairness is excluded from analysis. Commitment to the Bureau of Prisons is adopted as the appropriate measure of legitimate power. In general, the correlation among institutional level variables was not a concern. Moderately high correlations do exist between the level-2 variables low security and medium security (and this relationship appears to hold across years). This relationship never exceeds 0.50. The inclusion of both security levels is warranted due to theoretical considerations regarding the impact of security level on outcome variables. An analysis of the correlation between demographics and primary outcomes and primary predictors was also conducted (not shown). Correlations between these variables are not a concern and do not rise above the 0.20 level. Similarly, analysis of the relationship between

⁵⁷ See Appendix for correlation tables.

⁵⁸ Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) across all four years confirm that alienation measures are highly related to one another and warrant separation. Alienation models are run separately for each alienation measure and for the factor score of an overall alienation measure, constructed by principle component factor analysis after individual construction of measures.

security level and primary predictors and outcomes confirms a low correlation between these measures. The following sections detail the results by hypothesis.

Results: By Hypothesis

Hypothesis 1 Findings⁵⁹

Hypothesis (1a) posits that legitimate, referent, and expert power positively and significantly predict institutional commitment. Across all four years this position is supported (Tables 7-10). This consistent and robust finding across years suggests that federal institutions implicitly promote formal and constructive types of power within their facilities. Official power strategies are reflected in mission statements. Unofficially adopted power strategies are by definition informal expressions. By selecting institutional commitment as a suitable proxy for the individual institution's power adoption, it is possible to uncover these informal expressions of power. This outcome is also able to provide insight into what improves morale. Results indicate that prison workers are more committed to institutions that they believe are legitimate and that provide them with adequate training to fulfill job requirements. Prison workers are also more committed to institutions that respect them. Said differently, federal institutions appear to adopt power strategies that empower workers through respect, training, and transparency. It is important to note that the power strategies that improve commitment are also important to adopt in order to improve communication and morale among staff. Critically, communication, commitment, and transparency may enable prison managers to successfully innovate in prisoner management (see Rogers 2003).

⁵⁹ Results indicate that significant variance still exists across prisons after the introduction of level-1 variables (Model 1).

Counter to hypothesis (1a), reward power is positively related to institutional commitment across all four years and reaches significance in 2010 (Table 10). The strength of this variable appears to be weak.⁶⁰ But this result indicates that the perception of unofficial rewards improves commitment to the institution (at least at one point in time). It is plausible that prison workers merely perceive performance to be related to pay – either formally or informally. But the exact implication of a reward power effect is unclear and therefore concerning. Enhanced performance that is not officially recognized as a contributor to promotion is still perceived by prison workers to increase the likelihood of financial gain. This could be interpreted as unofficial and therefore a negative management tool. But it could also be considered as an inevitable result of human services employment. Intangible qualities – exemplified by strong performance – improve the likelihood of raises. While strictly speaking, informal “quid pro quo” is not a productive management tool, it may be that workers perceive their own performance on the job to be directly related to improved pay (formally or informally). Under this interpretation, this is not problematic.⁶¹ The remaining power, coercive power, as measured through supervision intimidation, is not significantly related to institutional commitment but maintains a negative relationship across all four years. Institutions do not appear to promote intimidation as a suitable power strategy for supervisors. Intimidation does not improve or significantly aggravate the institutional commitment of the prison worker.

The proposition of Hypothesis (1b) finds less support. Fearful institutions, as assessed on the aggregate, are negatively and significantly related to institutional

⁶⁰ It is important to note that weakness in this context implies significance level and consistency of significance level across years.

⁶¹ Note that reward power is complemented by legitimate, expert, and referent powers (all three of which have a much more robust relationship with institutional commitment). Therefore, the above speculation may not be unlikely.

commitment (Tables 7-9). Institutions that have a higher number of fearful prison workers reduce the institutional commitment of the individual prison worker. It is not surprising that fearful institutions negatively impact the commitment of the individual worker. Fear is a suitable proxy for perceived safety. Institutions that score higher on aggregate levels of fear presumably are less adequate at protecting prison workers from harm. This inability – or insufficiency – reduces individual commitment levels since the institution is not appearing to provide a base level of care for its employees: freedom from harm.

Well-supervised, treatment oriented prisons appear to have no effect on institutional commitment across all four years (counter to Hypothesis 1b). Given that significance and variation across prisons still exists after the introduction of level-1 variables, it is possible that the selected level-2 variables are insufficient. This analysis suggests that individual level perceptions of the work environment are more salient than institutional level perceptions. Institutions that report higher satisfaction with supervision do not see improved commitment to that institution by the individual worker. Treatment oriented prisons similarly do not appear to improve the individual's commitment (nor do custody oriented prisons). The proposition of Hypothesis (1b) argued that treatment oriented prisons would engender greater meaning in the work and this would increase the individual's commitment to the prison. This does not appear to be the case.

Hypothesis (1c) implies that higher security prisons will rely more on formal (socially approved and officially mandated) types of power while lower security prisons rely on informal and less socially favorable types of power (namely reward and coercive power). Informal types of power are not found to be related to security level. Hypothesis (1c) is not supported. However, the impact of legitimate power on institutional commitment is reduced

in jails. This relationship holds across three years (Tables 8-10). This result indicates that the specific nature of the jail environment is able to buffer the impact of legitimacy on institutional commitment. The jail environment provides much less distraction for prisoners (e.g. less programming). It is possible that institutional commitment is reduced due to the fact that prison workers are less able to control populations through programming, an institutional provision. Notably, analysis from year 2007 (Table 7) finds that the impact of referent power on institutional commitment is increased in jail institutions. This relationship is not maintained across years of analysis. Nevertheless, due to the unique nature of jails – specifically, limited programming and excessive inactivity – it may be necessary for supervisors to increase their use of referent power strategies to improve employee morale. Analysis from year 2007 (Table 7) also finds that the impact of legitimate power on institutional commitment is decreased in medium security prisons. Medium security prisons may buffer the impact of legitimacy due to these institutions’ inability to handle populations that are given mid-range sentences.⁶²

It is also important to note that demographics are not consistently significant across years when power adoptions of the institution are considered. Race black is not significant in 2007 or 2009 (Tables 7 and 9). Race Black is significant in 2008 and 2010 (Tables 8 and 10). Gender female is not significant across all four years. Time at institution and position (line staff) appear to be relevant across all four years when considering institutional commitment. Organizational factors – including tenure and position – appear to be more salient than demographic factors.⁶³

⁶² Given the large percentage of drug offenders in federal custody, it is plausible that medium security prisons see an unusual number of addicts and have an especially difficult time addressing specific population needs. This might reduce their commitment to their overall employer (BOP) and to their specific institution.

⁶³ It is conceded that demographics may impact time at institution and position (rank) at institution.

Individual level processes predict institutional commitment and largely support the proposition of hypothesis (1a). Institutional level processes are less powerful (and less consistently significant across years) and partly support the proposition of hypothesis (1b). Cross-level interactions are not found to work in the direction or in the institutions promoted by hypothesis (1c). In light of these results, commitment to the institution appears to be largely determined by individual processes. Individual perception (by the prison workers) of the power wielded by supervisors directly impacts institutional commitment in the predicted direction. Institutional level processes play a much weaker role. Due to the fact that much less of the overall variance is explained at the institutional level, this is not surprising.

Table 7. Institutional Commitment regressed on Power Adoptions (2007), n=4179

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)
<i>Institutional Level</i>				
Intercept	-0.010 (0.029)	-0.012 (0.021)	-0.012 (0.021)	-0.012 (0.021)
Supervision	-	-0.010 (0.072)	-0.011 (0.070)	-0.013 (0.070)
Orientation	-	0.143 (0.088)	0.044 (0.089)	0.060 (0.088)
Fear	-	-0.260*** (0.038)	-0.261*** (0.038)	-0.251*** (0.036)
Prison Age	-	0.004*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)
Gender	-	-0.523 (0.288)	-0.503 (0.288)	-0.544 (0.299)
Race	-	-0.413** (0.136)	-0.424 (0.135)	-0.473** (0.152)
High Security	-	-0.125 (0.096)	-0.114 (0.095)	-0.155 (0.094)
Medium Security	-	-0.075 (0.061)	-0.064 (0.060)	-0.899 (0.064)
Low Security	-	-0.228*** (0.058)	-0.219*** (0.057)	-0.235*** (0.059)
Min Security	-	-0.069 (0.132)	-0.062 (0.132)	-0.101 (0.125)
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Legitimate Power	0.440*** (0.021)	0.436*** (0.020)	0.435*** (0.020)	0.437*** (0.020)
Coercive Power	-0.022 (0.015)	-0.022 (0.015)	-0.022 (0.015)	-0.022 (0.015)
Reward Power	0.024 (0.014)	0.023 (0.014)	0.024 (0.014)	0.024 (0.014)
Expert Power	0.094*** (0.016)	0.093*** (0.016)	0.093*** (0.016)	0.093*** (0.016)
Referent Power	0.084*** (0.018)	0.086*** (0.017)	0.087*** (0.017)	0.086*** (0.018)
Race Black	-0.049 (0.042)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.033 (0.043)	-0.034 (0.043)
Female	0.015 (0.026)	0.011 (0.027)	0.010 (0.027)	0.014 (0.027)
20+ Years at BOP	0.140*** (0.043)	0.129** (0.043)	0.130** (0.043)	0.132** (0.043)
College	-0.036 (0.027)	-0.038 (0.027)	-0.038 (0.027)	-0.039 (0.027)
Line Staff	0.015 (0.026)	0.052 (0.029)	0.051 (0.029)	0.053 (0.029)

Table 7. (Cont.) n=4179

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>				
Referent Power * Jail	-	-	0.089** (0.034)	-
Legitimate Power * Medium Security	-	-	-	-0.071* (0.033)
<i>Variance Components</i>	χ^2	χ^2	χ^2	χ^2
U ₀	587.623***	323.930***	317.827***	318.091***
U _{Legitimate}	183.684***	182.977***	183.466***	176.305***
U _{Expert}	139.718*	140.320*	139.720*	139.711*
U _{Referent}	146.092*	146.382*	140.121*	146.169*

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Geographical region not significant

Table 8. Institutional Commitment regressed on Power Adoptions (2008), n=3483

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)
<i>Institutional Level</i>			
Intercept	-0.004 (0.028)	-0.006 (0.022)	-0.006 (0.022)
Supervision	-	0.108 (0.081)	0.107 (0.081)
Orientation	-	-0.082 (0.091)	-0.084 (0.091)
Fear	-	-0.115* (0.045)	-0.114* (0.045)
Prison Age	-	0.003*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)
Gender	-	-0.044 (0.298)	-0.051 (0.295)
Race	-	-0.446** (0.134)	-0.443** (0.134)
High Security	-	-0.137 (0.104)	-0.140 (0.104)
Medium Security	-	0.004 (0.064)	-0.001 (0.001)
Low Security	-	-0.064 (0.063)	-0.067 (0.063)
Min Security	-	0.142 (0.045)	-0.138 (0.093)
<i>Individual Level</i>			
Legitimate Power	0.444*** (0.020)	0.442*** (0.020)	0.441*** (0.020)
Coercive Power	-0.025* (0.013)	-0.025* (0.013)	-0.024* (0.012)
Reward Power	0.026 (0.016)	0.028 (0.016)	0.029 (0.016)
Expert Power	0.106*** (0.017)	0.102*** (0.017)	0.103*** (0.017)
Referent Power	0.111*** (0.016)	0.111*** (0.016)	0.112*** (0.016)
Race Black	-0.127** (0.038)	-0.095* (0.038)	-0.098* (0.039)
Female	0.020 (0.025)	0.017 (0.025)	0.17 (0.025)
20+ Years at BOP	-0.002 (0.035)	-0.013 (0.036)	-0.013 (0.036)
College	-0.075** (0.025)	-0.079** (0.025)	-0.079** (0.025)
Line Staff	0.129*** (0.027)	0.115*** (0.028)	0.115*** (0.029)

Table 8 (Cont.)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>			
Legitimate Power * Jail	-	-	-0.077* (0.040)
<i>Variance Components</i>	$\frac{2}{x}$	$\frac{2}{x}$	$\frac{2}{x}$
U ₀	573.613***	351.342***	351.397***
U _{Legitimate}	145.110*	145.659*	144.850*
U _{Referent}	139.868 ¹	140.254 ²	140.242 ³

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Geographical regions not significant

(1) p=0.057

(2) p=0.055

(3) p=0.055

Table 9. Institutional Commitment regressed on Power Adoptions (2009), n=2897

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)
<i>Institutional Level</i>			
Intercept	0.049 (0.029)	0.052* (0.025)	0.052* (0.025)
Supervision	-	0.039 (0.077)	0.038 (0.078)
Orientation	-	-0.021 (0.106)	-0.024 (0.109)
Fear	-	-0.153* (0.062)	-0.147* (0.062)
Prison Age	-	0.001* (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)
Gender	-	-0.210 (0.254)	-0.200 (0.259)
Race Black	-	-0.436** (0.131)	-0.435* (0.132)
High Security	-	-0.098 (0.120)	-0.091 (0.123)
Medium Security	-	-0.099 (0.080)	-0.088 (0.085)
Low Security	-	-0.189* (0.079)	-0.177* (0.084)
Min Security	-	-0.116 (0.146)	-0.100 (0.150)
<i>Individual Level</i>			
Legitimate Power	0.426*** (0.025)	0.426*** (0.024)	0.422*** (0.024)
Coercive Power	-0.012 (0.018)	-0.010 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.019)
Reward Power	0.004 (0.018)	0.003 (0.018)	0.003 (0.018)
Expert Power	0.074*** (0.211)	0.072*** ³ (0.021)	0.073*** ³ (0.020)
Referent Power	0.134*** (0.024)	0.134*** (0.024)	0.134*** (0.024)
Race Black	-0.041 (0.048)	-0.021 (0.050)	-0.023 (0.050)
Female	-0.013 (0.037)	-0.014 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.037)
20+ Years at BOP	0.077 (0.045)	0.056 (0.044)	0.060 (0.044)
College	-0.039 (0.037)	-0.042 (0.037)	-0.043 (0.037)
Line Staff	0.136*** (0.034)	0.134*** (0.034)	0.133*** (0.034)

Table 9 (Cont.)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>			
Legitimate Power * Jail	-	-	-0.136* (0.060)
<i>Variance Components</i>	$\frac{2}{x}$	$\frac{2}{x}$	$\frac{2}{x}$
U ₀	413.302***	312.291***	312.169***
U _{Legitimate}	166.818** ¹	166.391** ³	158.430** ⁵
U _{Referent}	157.198** ²	157.175** ⁴	157.255** ⁶

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Geographical regions not significant

(1) p = 0.001

(2) p = 0.004

(3) p = 0.001

(4) p = 0.004

(5) p = 0.003

(6) p = 0.004

Table 10. Institutional Commitment regressed on Power Adoptions (2010), n=4137

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)
<i>Institutional Level</i>			
Intercept	0.007 (0.028)	0.007 (0.025)	0.007 (0.025)
Supervision	-	-0.000 (0.086)	-0.000 (0.087)
Orientation	-	0.056 (0.143)	0.052 (0.144)
Fear	-	-0.149* (0.062)	-0.148* (0.063)
Prison Age	-	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)
Gender	-	-0.037 (0.372)	-0.045 (0.374)
Race	-	-0.511** (0.169)	-0.506** (0.170)
High Security	-	-0.043 (0.137)	-0.043 (0.136)
Medium Security	-	-0.079 (0.081)	-0.079 (0.081)
Low Security	-	-0.131 (0.093)	-0.130 (0.093)
Min Security	-	-0.054 (0.142)	-0.059 (0.144)
<i>Individual Level</i>			
Legitimate Power	0.436*** (0.018)	0.434*** (0.018)	0.434*** (0.018)
Coercive Power	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.013)
Reward Power	0.041** (0.014)	0.041** (0.014)	0.041** (0.014)
Expert Power	0.0638*** (0.015)	0.063*** (0.015)	0.063*** (0.015)
Referent Power	0.106*** (0.017)	0.108*** (0.016)	0.108*** (0.016)
Race Black	-0.113** (0.037)	-0.098* ¹ (0.037)	-0.098* ¹ (0.037)
Female	-0.027 (0.026)	-0.028 (0.026)	0.028 (0.026)
20+ Years at BOP	0.014 (0.038)	0.004 (0.038)	0.003 (0.038)
College	-0.034 (0.023)	-0.036 (0.023)	-0.035 (0.023)
Line Staff	0.173*** (0.031)	0.172*** (0.031)	0.173*** (0.031)

Table 10 (Cont.)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>			
Legitimate Power * Jail	-	-	-0.098* (0.044)
<i>Variance Components</i>			
	χ^2	χ^2	χ^2
U ₀	693.881***	531.534***	531.278***
U _{Legitimate}	181.216***	180.949***	177.261***

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Geographical regions not significant

(1)p=0.010

*Hypothesis 2 Findings*⁶⁴

Hypothesis (2a) predicts that legitimate, referent, and expert power improve prison worker ability to manage prisoner populations. Across all four years of analysis, these three types of power significantly and positively influence prison worker efficacy (Tables 11-14). These results indicate that skill provision, transparency, and respect empower prison workers and improve their perception of effective prisoner management.⁶⁵ This suggests that it is possible to empower effective prisoner management. The BOP is able to effectively improve prisoner management through organizational manipulation.

Counter to Hypotheses (2a) coercive power does not aggravate the perception of effectiveness of prisoner management. Perceived intimidation by supervisors improves the perception of efficacy. It is likely that this is less problematic than it appears. Prisons and jails house antisocial populations that are frequently aggressive and impulsive. Effective intimidation by a superior may serve to remind a prison worker of the seriousness of the occupation. Mistakes or oversight may result in serious injury. Intimidation may improve attention to detail and strict oversight – an acceptable version of fear. This strict oversight then improves the ability for the prison worker to effectively manage prisoners.⁶⁶ Consistent with Hypothesis (2a), reward power is negatively related to efficacy across all four years.

⁶⁴ Results indicate that significant variance still exists across prisons after the introduction of level-1 variables (Model 1).

⁶⁵ Notably, the outcome efficacy is intended to detail successful prisoner management as a complete undertaking – that includes perception of direct inmate management and perception of contribution to the overall environment. It is not possible to disconnect prison workers from prison institutions. The goal of prison work is to manage prisoners but prison workers also must engage one another. Therefore, the inclusion of POSINFL is critical to effective management diagnosis. And as the results indicate individual prison workers who perceive that they are respected and are given adequate training to handle job responsibilities are more likely to report high levels of efficacy.

⁶⁶ Potentially, intimidation increases the likelihood that strict protocol will be followed, which improves the effect of legitimacy on efficacy. It cannot be assumed, however, that coercive power and intimidation work in such a productive manner. Due to the salience of legitimate, referent, and expert powers it is speculated that coercive power is a complement not an antagonist.

But this relationship maintains significance only in year 2009 (Table 13). Reward power implies an informal relationship between the prison worker and his supervisor. This informal perception may aggravate the effectiveness of prisoner management. In terms of inmate management, reward power arguably counters legitimate power. Importantly, however, the effect of reward power fails to consistently reach significance.

Demographics play a much larger role in the outcome efficacy (than in institutional commitment). Race black is positively and significantly related to efficacy across two years (Table 11 and 13). Black prison workers appear to report an enhanced ability to manage prisoners. Gender female is negatively and significantly related to efficacy across all four years. Female prison workers appear to report a diminished ability to manage prisoners. Line-staff are negatively related to perception of effective inmate management across all four years of analysis. It is possible that line staff are somewhat restricted by their ability to shape events and to employ discretion. High school graduates exhibit a negative and significant (across two years) effect on efficacy (Tables 9 and 12). Inmate contact increases efficacy across all four years.

Certain populations appear to be better adept at handling inmates. But supervisors also play a substantial role in individual reports of efficacy. Organizational factors are still more powerful and consistent predictors of efficacy than demographics. Manipulating supervision techniques – empowerment through respect and skill acquisition – improves perceived efficacy. Inmate contact also dramatically improves efficacy. Encouragingly, working closely with the prisoner populations increases perception of efficacy.

Hypothesis (2b) predicts that aggregate levels of satisfaction with supervision and of treatment orientation will positively impact individual efficacy. As the above outputs detail,

institutional perspectives on supervision and treatment do not appear to have a significant effect on efficacy. Collective opinion of supervision does not appear to impact individual perception of inmate management. Furthermore, treatment orientations (defined as such by the collective) do not appear to significantly improve the prison worker's perception of inmate management.⁶⁷ Also counter to hypotheses (2b), fearful institutions do not appear to contribute to prison worker efficacy. Prisons with increased fear levels do not see efficacy diminish. Hypothesis (2b) proposes that institutional relationships will impact efficacy.⁶⁸ Results do not support these claims.

Hypothesis (2c) predicts that legitimate power and expert power will have greater influence on efficacy in high security. Results indicate that this hypothesis is partly supported. The impact of legitimate power on efficacy is increased in high security institutions across two years (Tables 12a, 13a). High security prisons house the most dangerous and aggressive prisoners. In isolation, these prisons diminish the ability for prison workers to effectively manage prisoners. But legitimate power in high security prisons – presumably, belief in the use of prisons as prescribed by the BOP – appears to counter their natural negative impact. It is beneficial to believe in the role of prison and in the overall goals and purpose of the BOP when working in a high security prison. Indeed, this belief

⁶⁷ Notably, orientation does have a negative relationship with efficacy across three years (significant at 0.07, in 2007). This suggests, modestly, that custody oriented prisons exhibit a somewhat aggravating effect on the perception of efficacy.

⁶⁸ Interpretation of additional model components provides potential insight into security and demographic effects. High security is negatively related to efficacy across all four years. This relationship is significant in 2010 (Table 14) and significant at a 0.061 level in 2009 (Table 13). But it is worth noting that the coefficient for High-Security in 2008 is very small. High security prison populations are more dangerous and therefore the ability to manage these populations is likely much more difficult, irrespective of supervision and skill provision. Percent gender female is positively related to efficacy but only significant (at 0.05 level) in 2009 (Table 13). Although percent gender female is significant at $p=0.07$ in 2010. While being female is negatively related to inmate management, prisons with higher percentages of females appear to enhance individual perception of prisoner management. Prison workers report higher levels of effective management with a greater percentage of female co-workers. It is plausible that women workers reduce the aggressive nature of prisoners and of male prison workers and increase the ability to oversee housing units and conduct daily routines.

appears to improve one's perception of prisoner management. No significant finding for the relationship between expert power and high security is found. Skill provision does not appear to especially improve efficacy in high security prisons. But the effect of expert power on efficacy is reduced in medium security prisons for at least one year of analysis (2009, Table 13a). As suggested earlier, the needs of the medium security prison population might be insufficiently met by BOP training. Therefore, prison workers feel ill equipped to manage inmates in these settings. In addition, the effect of referent power is enhanced in minimum security for at least one year of analysis (2008, Table 12a). Minimum-security prisons are likely to require greater prison worker discretion as perimeter fencing is limited and off-site work may be possible. This framework may increase ambiguity. Referent supervisors may counter this ambiguity by re-assuring prison workers of their importance. This result, however, does not appear to reach significance across years.

Individual perception of efficacy appears to be largely reflective of individual processes. Institutional level factors meet directional criteria but fail to reach meaningful significance across years. The propositions of Hypothesis (2b) are rejected. With the exception of coercive power, the propositions of Hypothesis (2a) are confirmed. Rationale for the positive significance of coercive power is stated above and might accurately reflect the nuanced role of supervision in prison environments. In terms of effective management, legitimacy appears to be significantly impacted by high security prisons. This is directly in line with Hypothesis (2c). Level-2 variance also continues to be significant across prisons. Selected institutional level variables do not entirely explain that variance. Institutional perspectives on peers, charges, and supervisors do not appear to drive individual perceptions

of inmate management. Notably, variance due to institutional difference accounts for much smaller proportion of total variance than individual differences.

Table 11. Efficacy regressed on power adoptions (2007), n=4163

	Model 1	Model 2
	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)
<i>Institutional Level</i>		
Intercept	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.015)
Supervision	-	-0.027 (0.041)
Orientation	-	-0.115* (0.063)
Fear	-	-0.041 (0.246)
Prison Age	-	0.000 (0.000)
Gender	-	0.113 (0.190)
Race	-	0.114 (0.106)
High Security	-	-0.074 (0.072)
Medium Security	-	-0.008 (0.049)
Low Security	-	0.079 (0.056)
Min Security	-	0.058 (0.111)
<i>Individual Level</i>		
Legitimate Power	0.183*** (0.018)	0.176*** (0.018)
Coercive Power	0.083*** (0.016)	0.081*** (0.015)
Reward Power	-0.026 (0.015)	-0.024 (0.015)
Expert Power	0.162*** (0.020)	0.160*** (0.020)
Referent Power	0.234*** (0.020)	0.237*** (0.020)
Race Black	0.149*** (0.035)	0.123*** (0.038)
Female	-0.107** (0.036)	-0.117*** (0.034)
20+ Years at BOP	0.240*** (0.049)	0.227*** (0.049)

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 11. (Cont.) Efficacy regressed on power adoptions (2007)

	Model 1	Model 2
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Inmate Contact	0.781*** (0.068)	0.769*** (0.066)
High School	-0.114** (0.041)	-0.110** (0.040)
Line Staff	-0.066* (0.030)	-0.059 ³ (0.034)
<i>Variance Components</i>		
	X^2	X^2
U ₀	186.849***	149/654**
U _{Expert}	160.153**	160.491**
U _{Referent}	137.689 ¹	138.690 ²

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Geographical region not significant

- (1) p = 0.057
- (2) p = 0.051
- (3) p = 0.052
- (4) p = 0.001

Table 12. Efficacy regressed on power adoptions (2008), n=3455

	Model 1	Model 2
	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)
<i>Institutional Level</i>		
Intercept	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.018 (0.018)
Supervision	-	-0.013 (0.080)
Orientation	-	-0.105 (0.075)
Fear	-	-0.052 (0.051)
Prison Age	-	-0.000 (0.000)
Gender	-	0.217 (0.255)
Race	-	0.091 (0.146)
High Security	-	-0.000 (0.079)
Medium Security	-	0.067 (0.059)
Low Security	-	0.174* (0.072)
Min Security	-	0.110 (0.100)
Region Midwest	-	-0.132** (0.047)
<i>Individual Level</i>		
Legitimate Power	0.247*** (0.021)	0.243*** (0.021)
Coercive Power	0.053** (0.019)	0.053** (0.019)
Reward Power	-0.006 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.018)
Expert Power	0.148*** (0.020)	0.145*** (0.020)
Referent Power	0.189*** (0.021)	0.190*** (0.021)
Race Black	0.078 (0.045)	0.064 (0.048)
Female	-0.115** ¹ (0.034)	-0.125** ¹ (0.034)
20+ Years at BOP	0.056 (0.034)	0.052 (0.035)

Table 12. (Cont.) Efficacy regressed on power adoptions (2008)

	Model 1	Model 2
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Inmate Contact	0.706*** (0.068)	0.698*** (0.068)
High School	0.005 (0.041)	0.009 (0.041)
Line Staff	-0.048 (0.045)	-0.048 (0.039)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2
U_0	262.253***	199.478***
$U_{\text{Legitimate}}$	151.613*	151.528*
U_{Referent}	139.911 ²	139.865 ²

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

(1) p = 0.001

(2) p = 0.057

Table 13. Efficacy regressed on power adoptions (2009), n=2895

	Model 1	Model 2
	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)
<i>Institutional Level</i>		
Intercept	0.017 (0.021)	0.019 (0.017)
Supervision	-	0.079 (0.056)
Orientation	-	-0.108 (0.082)
Fear	-	0.011 (0.045)
Prison Age	-	-0.000 (0.000)
Gender	-	0.507* (0.226)
Race	-	0.253** (0.092)
High Security	-	-0.167 ⁵ (0.088)
Medium Security	-	-0.043 (0.062)
Low Security	-	0.084 (0.063)
Min Security	-	-0.028 (0.124)
<i>Individual Level</i>		
Legitimate Power	0.195*** (0.028)	0.188*** (0.027)
Coercive Power	0.088*** (0.021)	0.085*** (0.021)
Reward Power	-0.051** (0.017)	-0.047** (0.017)
Expert Power	0.169*** (0.024)	0.169*** (0.024)
Referent Power	0.244*** (0.025)	0.244*** (0.025)
Race Black	0.106** (0.040)	0.057 (0.044)
Female	-0.105** (0.036)	-0.124** (0.036)
20+ Years at BOP	0.077 (0.059)	0.074 (0.059)

Table 13. (Cont.) Efficacy regressed on power adoptions (2009)

	Model 1	Model 2
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Inmate Contact	0.792*** (0.077)	0.783*** (0.077)
High School	-0.029 (0.043)	-0.024 (0.041)
Line Staff	-0.081* (0.039)	-0.080* (0.038)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2
U ₀	160.172** ¹	118.962
U _{Legitimate}	152.728** ²	152.306** ²
U _{Expert}	158.863** ³	159.245** ¹
U _{Coercive}	148.778* ⁴	149.185* ⁴

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

No geographical region is significant

(1) p = 0.002

(2) p = 0.007

(3) p = 0.003

(4) p = 0.011

(5) p = 0.061

Table 14. Efficacy regressed on power adoptions (2010), n=4078

	Model 1	Model 2
	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)
<i>Institutional Level</i>		
Intercept	-0.000 (0.017)	0.001 (0.014)
Supervision	-	0.013 (0.049)
Orientation	-	0.035 (0.065)
Fear	-	0.004 (0.032)
Prison Age	-	0.001 ¹ (0.000)
Gender	-	0.386 ² (0.211)
Race	-	-0.118 (0.100)
High Security	-	-0.219** (0.076)
Medium Security	-	-0.098* (0.047)
Low Security	-	-0.056 (0.052)
Min Security	-	-0.098 (0.090)
Region Midwest	-	-0.140*** (0.035)
<i>Individual Level</i>		
Legitimate Power	0.190*** (0.024)	0.187*** (0.024)
Coercive Power	0.109*** (0.015)	0.109*** (0.015)
Reward Power	-0.005 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.017)
Expert Power	0.207*** (0.020)	0.206*** (0.019)
Referent Power	0.180*** (0.022)	0.180*** (0.021)
Race Black	0.176*** (0.036)	0.165*** (0.037)
Female	-0.062* (0.030)	-0.071* (0.030)
20+ Years at BOP	0.083* (0.035)	0.071* (0.035)

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 14 (Cont.) Efficacy regressed on power adoptions (2010)

	Model 1	Model 2
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Inmate Contact	0.690*** (0.069)	0.689*** (0.070)
High School	-0.121** (0.038)	-0.120** (0.038)
Line Staff	-0.107** (0.032)	-0.107** (0.032)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2
U_0	177.878***	132.149*
$U_{\text{Legitimate}}$	183.280***	183.136***

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.050

(2) p = 0.070

CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS (BY YEAR)

Table 12a. Efficacy regressed on power adoptions (2008):

Cross-Level Interactions

	Model 3	Model 4
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>		
Referent Power * Minimum Security	0.155** (0.047)	-
Legitimate Power * High Security	-	0.094** (0.031)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2
U_0	199.065***	199.495***
$U_{\text{Legitimate}}$	151.441*	148.648*
U_{Referent}	137.444 ¹	139.828 ²

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

(1) p = 0.067

(2) p = 0.057

Cross-level interactions added in full model. No change in significance of variables in full model (not shown).

Table 13a. Efficacy regressed on power adoptions (2009):
Cross-Level Interactions

	Model 3	Model 4 ⁶	Model 5
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>			
Expert Power * Medium Security	-0.104** (0.034)	-	-
Legitimate Power * High Security	-	0.170*** (0.043)	-
Legitimate Power * Minimum Security	-	-	-0.197* ⁸ (0.099)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2	X^2
U ₀	118.511	119.387	119.277
U _{Legitimate}	152.854**	140.696*	150.714**
U _{Expert}	156.391**	159.762** ¹	159.408**
U _{Referent}	149.510* ⁷	149.630* ⁷	149.168*

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.002

(6) High-Security Institutions significant: p<0.05

(7) p= 0.01

(8) Legitimate power coefficient (se): 0.185*** (0.027)

Table 14a. Efficacy regressed on power adoptions (2010):
Cross-Level Interactions

	Model 3
	Coef (s.e.)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>	
Legitimate Power * Minimum Security	0.075* (0.034)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2
U ₀	132.523*
U _{Legitimate}	174.325***

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.050

(2) p = 0.070

*Hypothesis 3 Findings*⁶⁹

Hypothesis (3a) predicts that alienation reduces prison workers' ability to manage prisoners. Across all four years, alienation significantly and negatively relates to efficacy. The strength of the effect of alienation on efficacy, evidenced by significant variation in its slope across institutions and across four years, also varies by institution.⁷⁰ Likewise, powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation, and self-estrangement all exhibit strong negative and significant effects on efficacy. The effects of all individual measures of alienation on efficacy do not vary across prisons. The slope of powerlessness only varies (at $p < 0.05$) significantly in year 2007 (Table 19). The slope of meaninglessness varies significantly across institutions for years 2007, 2008, and 2009 (Tables 23, 24, 25).⁷¹ Normlessness slope varies in 2008 (Table 26) and 2010 (Table 30) but not in 2007 (Table 27) and 2009 (Table 29). The slope of isolation varies in 2008 (Table 32) and 2009 (Table 33) but does not vary significantly in 2007 (Table 31) and 2010 (Table 34). Self-estrangement varies significantly across institutions for all four years. Continued significance in level-1 slope variation (as noted in tables) suggests that level-2 predictors have not explained institutional variance of the slope.

The modern philosophy of prison management – a bridge between the keeper philosophy and strict order maintenance to ensure safety of inmates and workers – alienates prison workers in order to meet security goals and provide appropriate treatment of prisoners (DiIulio 1987; Lombardo 1989). As the results indicate, alienated prison workers are less effective at prisoner management. It is conceded that the prison management shift in

⁶⁹ Results indicate that significant variance still exists across prisons after the introduction of level-1 variables (Model 1).

⁷⁰ Significant at $p = 0.054$ in 2010 (Table 18)

⁷¹ Although for year 2008, significance falls to $p = 0.064$ with included cross-level interaction

emphasis to control and custody was warranted. But the effects of increased formality (reduced discretion and informality) diminish the perceived efficacy of prison workers. Reducing the ability for prison workers to dictate outcomes and connect with their work environment has harmful effects on prisoner management.

Counter to Hypothesis (3b), the current specified models are not able to fully explain the significant variation across institutions. Hypothesis (3b) posits that well supervised and treatment oriented facilities will improve individual efficacy. These institutional level variables do not prove to be significant across four years of analysis. Aggregate levels of satisfaction with supervision and treatment-oriented prisons do not significantly impact efficacy. Alienation specifically diagrams the importance of social relationships within institutions (in this case, relationships with other prison workers, with supervisors, and with inmates). At the institutional level, mean levels of these aggregated relationship variables do not impact individual efficacy (with one exception⁷²). Fearful institutions do appear to contribute negatively to efficacy in year 2007 (Table 15). But this finding does not hold up across all four years. Even fully specified models continue to show significant variation at the institutional level.⁷³ Selected level-2 variables are not able to explain entire variation. Hypothesis (3b) is not supported by these results.

⁷² The aggregation of orientation, where high scores indicate custodial perspective towards corrections, is significantly and negatively related to efficacy in year 2007 (Table 15). In line with hypothesis (3b) this suggests that in one analysis custody oriented correctional institutions negatively impact individual perceptions of inmate management. This finding does not hold up across years.

⁷³ Fully specified models also consider demographics (at the institutional level), geographical region, and security level. Year 2007 (Table 15) finds no support for institutional security level impact on efficacy in alienation models. 2008 (Table 16) suggests that low security prisons exhibit a strong and positive impact on efficacy (this finding only appears in year 2008). For years 2009 and 2010 (Tables 17 and 18), high security prisons significantly and negatively impact efficacy. 2009 (Table 17) finds positive and significant percent Race Black and percent Gender Female effects on efficacy. These results are not supported in other years. It is unclear, therefore, if race and gender on the institutional level play a role in perception of effectiveness of inmate management on the individual level.

Hypothesis (3c) predicts that the impact of alienation on efficacy will be most pronounced in high security prisons. Composition of the prisoner population, ratio of workers to inmates, and physical layouts characterize the key differences between security levels. Results indicate that high security prisons do significantly increase the negative impact that alienation has on efficacy, at least for year 2008 (Table 16) and year 2009 (Table 17).⁷⁴ This result appears to be salient across individual measures of alienation. Feeling powerless in a high security facility is apparently more damaging to effective prisoner management than it is in other institutions.⁷⁵ Meaninglessness in high security prisons has an enhanced negative effect on efficacy in one year of analysis (Table 24).⁷⁶ Normlessness also appears to be more detrimental to efficacy in high security prisons (at least for year 2009, Table 29). Similarly, high security prisons appear to increase the negative impact of isolation on efficacy. Lastly, high security prisons across three years (2007-2009) aggravate the negative impact of self-estrangement on efficacy (Tables 35-37).⁷⁷ High security prisons likely house more aggressive and antisocial populations and these populations likely exacerbate the negative impact of alienation on efficacy. Moreover, routines in high security facilities arguably follow strict protocol that minimizes informal and spontaneous interaction and activity. Therefore, the level of alienation is potentially higher and the subsequent impact of that alienation is also more substantial in high security institutions. Hypothesis (3c) is supported by these results.

In addition, findings suggest that minimum and medium security prisons may also have an impact on the effect of alienation measures (this was not strictly proposed by

⁷⁴ It is important to note that these results are not duplicated in 2010 and 2007 (Table 18 and 15).

⁷⁵ This finding is substantial in 2008 and 2009 (Tables 18 and 19) but does not gain significance in 2007 and 2010 (actual p-values reported in Tables 19 and 22)

⁷⁶ But fails to reach significance in interaction in remaining three years.

⁷⁷ This relationship does not reach significance across all years.

Hypothesis 3c). Results in 2008 and 2010 suggest that minimum-security prisons increase the negative effect of isolation on efficacy (Tables 32 and 34). Institutions with the fewest physical restrictions – that house less aggressive and less dangerous men and women – appear to further aggravate isolated individuals ability to manage prisoners.⁷⁸ Medium security prisons in 2009 mitigate the negative impact of normlessness on efficacy (Table 29). Results from 2009 (Table 33) also suggest medium security prisons soften the negative impact of isolation on efficacy. The environment of medium security prisons, therefore, appears to buffer negative effects of alienation on efficacy.

Results indicate that alienation negatively impacts the ability for prison workers to manage inmate populations. This finding supports Hypothesis (3a). Individual level processes appear to be more salient than institutional level processes (due to consistent significance across years). Hypothesis (3b) is not supported by this analysis. Unconditional models verify that institutional level variation is modest. But significant variation at the institutional level exists and continues to exist in fully specified models. Individual level variables do not fully explain variation at the institutional level (Model 1). But institutional level variables are not consistently found to be related to effectiveness in prisoner management (counter to Hypothesis 3b). Aligned with Hypothesis (3c), high security prisons are found to aggravate alienation’s impact on efficacy. Medium security and minimum-security prisons also appear to impact alienation’s impact on efficacy. These results indicate that the institutional environment – potentially the composition of prisoners and the physical layout – influences the effect of alienation on prisoner management.

⁷⁸ Results regarding minimum-security prisons and self-estrangement are unclear due to the changing sign of self-estrangement between 2007/2008 and 2010.

ALIENATION

Table 15. Efficacy regressed on Alienation (2007), n=4178

	Model 1	Model 2
	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)
<i>Institutional Level</i>		
Intercept	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.014)
Supervision	-	-0.034 (0.038)
Orientation	-	-0.180** (0.065)
Fear	-	-0.078* (0.032)
Prison Age	-	0.000 (0.000)
Gender	-	-0.180 (0.065)
Race	-	0.069 (0.092)
High Security	-	-0.103 (0.061)
Medium Security	-	-0.016 (0.047)
Low Security	-	0.063 (0.053)
Min Security	-	0.096 (0.093)
<i>Individual Level</i>		
Alienation	-0.450*** (0.014)	-0.447*** (0.014)
Race Black	0.109** ¹ (0.032)	0.090** (0.033)
Female	-0.122** ¹ (0.035)	-0.134*** (0.033)
20+ Years at BOP	0.253*** (0.048)	0.239*** (0.049)
Inmate Contact	0.769*** (0.070)	0.751*** (0.068)
High School	-0.097* (0.041)	-0.096* (0.040)
Line Staff	-0.105** ¹ (0.028)	-0.099** (0.031)
<i>Variance Components</i>		
U_0	202.961***	133.774*
$U_{\text{Alienation}}$	140.800*	141.051*

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1)p=0.001

Table 16. Efficacy regressed on Alienation (2008), n=2272

	Model 1	Model 2
	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)
<i>Institutional Level</i>		
Intercept	0.130*** (0.021)	0.126*** (0.019)
Supervision	-	-0.005 (0.086)
Orientation	-	-0.075 (0.086)
Fear	-	-0.070 (0.059)
Prison Age	-	-0.000 (0.000)
Gender	-	0.550 ¹ (0.295)
Race	-	0.035 (0.151)
High Security	-	0.099 (0.088)
Medium Security	-	0.106 (0.066)
Low Security	-	0.171* (0.076)
Min Security	-	0.095 (0.099)
<i>Individual Level</i>		
Alienation	-0.525*** (0.021)	-0.521*** (0.022)
Race Black	0.087 (0.049)	0.078 (0.051)
Female	-0.131** (0.044)	-0.149** (0.045)
20+ Years at BOP	0.062 (0.041)	0.063 (0.042)
Inmate Contact	0.819*** (0.092)	0.812*** (0.092)
High School	-0.030 (0.049)	-0.021 (0.048)
Line Staff	-0.059 (0.045)	-0.052 (0.045)
<i>Variance Components</i>		
	χ^2	χ^2
U ₀	182.912***	146.282**
U _{Alienation}	158.282**	158.175**

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.065

Table 16 (Cont.) Efficacy regressed on Alienation (2008)

	Model 3
	Coef (s.e.)
Alienation	-0.526*** (0.021)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>	
Alienation * High Security	-0.127* (0.059)
<i>Variance Components</i>	
U_0	145.962**
$U_{\text{Alienation}}$	153.180**

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

No geographical regions significant.

Table 17. Efficacy regressed on Alienation (2009), n=2897

	Model 1	Model 2
	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)
<i>Institutional Level</i>		
Intercept	0.015 (0.020)	0.015 (0.014)
Supervision	-	0.035 (0.046)
Orientation	-	-0.045 (0.075)
Fear	-	-0.005 (0.038)
Prison Age	-	0.000 (0.000)
Gender	-	0.596** (0.216)
Race	-	0.259** (0.891)
High Security	-	-0.215** (0.078)
Medium Security	-	-0.028 (0.051)
Low Security	-	0.078 (0.050)
Min Security	-	0.059 (0.099)
Region West		0.113* (0.050)
<i>Individual Level</i>		
Alienation	-0.462*** (0.018)	-0.460*** (0.018)
Race Black	0.099* (0.043)	0.041 (0.047)
Female	-0.103* (0.040)	-0.128** (0.040)
20+ Years at BOP	0.067 (0.055)	0.058 (0.054)
Inmate Contact	0.763*** (0.076)	0.751*** (0.075)
High School	-0.059 (0.039)	-0.050 (0.038)
Line Staff	-0.127 (0.038)	-0.132 (0.038)
<i>Variance Components</i>		
	X^2	X^2
U ₀	178.802***	100.468
U _{Alienation}	149.143*	149.171*

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 17 (Cont) Efficacy regressed on Alienation (2009)

	Model 3	Model 4
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Alienation	-0.461*** (0.017)	-0.460*** (0.018)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>		
Alienation * High Security	-0.185*** (0.042)	-
Alienation * Medium Security	-	0.096 (0.034)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2
U ₀	100.560	100.534
U _{Alienation}	135.823 ¹	138.498*

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
(1) p = 0.062

Table 18. Efficacy regressed on Alienation (2010), n=4074

	Model 1	Model 2
	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)
<i>Institutional Level</i>		
Intercept	0.004 (0.017)	0.006 (0.014)
Supervision	-	0.041 (0.051)
Orientation	-	0.049 (0.067)
Fear	-	0.033 (0.036)
Prison Age	-	0.001 (0.000)
Gender	-	0.199 (0.202)
Race	-	0.048 (0.093)
High Security	-	-0.278** (0.086)
Medium Security	-	-0.115* (0.055)
Low Security	-	-0.013 (0.053)
Min Security	-	-0.019 (0.099)
<i>Individual Level</i>		
Alienation	-0.470*** (0.015)	-0.471*** (0.015)
Race Black	0.144*** (0.037)	0.131** ¹ (0.038)
Female	-0.059 (0.031)	-0.063* (0.031)
20+ Years at BOP	0.059 (0.036)	0.050 (0.036)
Inmate Contact	0.703*** (0.067)	0.702*** (0.067)
High School	-0.080* (0.039)	-0.076 ⁴ (0.039)
Line Staff	-0.101** ¹ (0.030)	-0.100** ¹ (0.030)
<i>Variance Components</i>		
U ₀	193.865***	142.709**
U _{Alienation}	139.481 ²	139.273 ³

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.001

(2) p = 0.053

(3) p = 0.054

(4) p = 0.051

POWERLESS

Table 19. Efficacy regressed on Powerlessness (2007), n= 4301

	Model 3	Model 4
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Powerlessness	-0.294*** (0.015)	-0.295*** (0.015)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>		
Powerlessness * High Security	-	-0.072 ² (0.044)
<i>Variance Components</i>		
U ₀	120.979 ¹	121.638 ³
U _{Powerless}	149.157*	146.587*

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Institutional Level: Orientation and Fear still significant and in same direction
All individual level variables unchanged in sign and significance.

(1) p=0.109

(2) p=0.111

(3) p=0.102

Table 20. Efficacy regressed on Powerlessness (2008), n= 3588

	Model 4	Model 5
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Powerlessness	-0.322 (0.017)	-0.327*** (0.016)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>		
Powerlessness * High Security	-	-0.119** (0.037)
<i>Variance Components</i>		
U ₀	168.783***	168.787***
U _{Powerless}	137.879 ¹	133.170 ²

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.072

(2) p = 0.106

Table 21. Efficacy regressed on Powerlessness (2009), n=4184

	Model 5	Model 6
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Powerlessness	-0.282*** (0.015)	-0.282*** (0.014)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>		
Powerless * High Security	-	-0.141** ¹ (0.042)
<i>Variance Components</i>		
U ₀	116.530	116.607
U _{Powerless}	123.591	115.364

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.002

Table 22. Efficacy regressed on Powerlessness (2010), n=4306

	Model 3	Model 4
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Powerlessness	-0.311*** (0.015)	-0.311*** (0.015)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>		
Powerlessness * High Security	-	-0.058 ² (0.015)
	-	-
<i>Variance Components</i>		
U_0	127.092 ¹	126.804 ³
$U_{\text{Powerless}}$	126.574	124.051

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.061

(2) p = 0.132

(3) p = 0.064

MEANINGLESSNESS

Table 23. Efficacy regressed on Meaninglessness (2007), n=4301

	Model 5	Model 6
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)
Meaninglessness	-0.355*** (0.016)	-0.356*** (0.016)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>		
Meaninglessness * High Security	-	-0.078 ² (0.052)
<i>Variance Components</i>		
U_0	124.143 ¹	125.507 ³
$U_{\text{Meaningless}}$	174.181***	171.268***

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Institutional Level: Orientation and Fear still significant and in same direction

All individual level variables unchanged in sign and significance.

(1) p = 0.077

(2) p = 0.139

(3) p = 0.065

Table 24. Efficacy regressed on Meaninglessness (2008), n= 3580

	Model 6	Model 7
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Meaninglessness	-0.405*** (0.017)	0.410*** (0.017)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>		
Meaninglessness * High Security	-	-0.134** (0.045)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2
U_0	175.944***	175.755***
$U_{\text{Meaningless}}$	144.358*	137.787 ¹

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Only Low Security significant at the institutional level.

(1) p = 0.064

Table 25. Efficacy regressed on Meaninglessness (2009), n=2996

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Meaninglessness	-0.379 (0.018)	-0.380*** (0.017)	-0.378*** (0.018)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>			
Meaninglessness * High Security	-	-0.162 (0.038)	
Meaninglessness * Medium Security	-	-	0.068 ² (0.036)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2	X^2
U_0	131.218*	131.241*	131.363*
$U_{\text{Meaningless}}$	145.124*	135.369 ¹	139.656*

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.066

(1) p = 0.063

Meaninglessness * Security Medium = b: 0.068.632 / 0.036 (p = 0.063)

Table 26. Efficacy regressed on Meaninglessness (2010), n=4287

	Model 5
	Coef (s.e.)
Meaninglessness	-0.387 (0.015)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2
U_0	135.051*
$U_{\text{Meaningless}}$	129.908

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

NORMLESSNESS

Table 27. Efficacy regressed on Normlessness (2007), n=4283

	Model 7
	Coef (s.e.)
Normlessness	-0.331*** (0.015)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2
U_0	127.352 ¹
U_{Normless}	135.465 ²

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Institutional Level: Orientation and Fear still significant and in same direction
All individual level variables unchanged in sign and significance.

(1) p = 0.052

(2) p = 0.074

Table 28. Efficacy regressed on Normlessness (2008), n= 3222

	Model 8
	Coef (s.e.)
Normlessness	-0.354*** (0.019)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2
U_0	161.628***
U_{Normless}	165.590**

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Only Low Security significant at the institutional level.

Table 29. Efficacy regressed on Normlessness (2009), n=2980

	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Normlessness	-0.380*** (0.018)	-0.381*** (0.017)	-0.380*** (0.017)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>			
Normlessness * High Security	-	-0.168*** (0.040)	
Normlessness * Medium Security	-	-	0.071* (0.032)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2	X^2
U_0	108.353	108.296	108.335
U_{Normless}	132.513 ¹	122.507	128.664

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.101

Table 30. Efficacy regressed on Normlessness (2010), n=4284

	Model 6
	Coef (s.e.)
Normlessness	-0.370*** (0.016)
<i>Variance Components</i>	χ^2
U ₀	153.674** ¹
U _{Normless}	155.862**

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.001

ISOLATION

Table 31. Efficacy regressed on Isolation (2007), n=4343

	Model 8
	Coef (s.e.)
Isolation	-0.375*** (0.014)
<i>Variance Components</i>	χ^2
U ₀	134.123*
U _{Isolation}	127.487

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Institutional Level: Orientation and Fear still significant and in same direction
All individual level variables unchanged in sign and significance.

Table 32. Efficacy regressed on Isolation (2008), n=2384

	Model 9	Model 10
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)
Isolation	-0.392*** (0.027)	-0.396*** (0.026)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>		
Isolation * Minimum Security		-0.166 ¹ (0.094)
<i>Variance Components</i>	χ^2	
U ₀	139.527*	139.420*
U _{Isolation}	203.420***	200.720***

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Only Low Security significant at the institutional level.

(1) p = 0.080

Table 33. Efficacy regressed on Isolation (2009), n=3005

	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Isolation	-0.399*** (0.019)	-0.400*** (0.019)	-0.398*** (0.018)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>			
Isolation * High Security	-	-0.127* (0.053)	
Isolation * Medium Security	-	-	0.098* (0.037)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2	X^2
U_0	93.624	93.532	93.566
$U_{\text{Isolation}}$	160.156**	153.571**	149.165**

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Institutional Level: Prison Age high significant (small effect)

Institutional Level: Supervision (p = 0.054) b: 0.092(0.047)

Table 34. Efficacy regressed on Isolation (2010), n=4344

	Model 7	Model 8
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Isolation	-0.412*** (0.014)	-0.412*** (0.013)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>		
Isolation * Minimum Security	-	-0.082 ² (0.049)
	-	-
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2
U_0	157.738** ¹	157.731** ¹
$U_{\text{Isolation}}$	125.771	122.859

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.001

(2) p = 0.099

SELF-ESTRANGEMENT

Table 35. Efficacy regressed on Self-Estrangement (2007), n=4362

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Self-Estrangement	-0.403*** (0.016)	-0.403*** (0.016)	-0.401 (0.016)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>			
Estrangement * High Security	-	-0.071 ² (0.049)	-
Estrangement * Minimum Security	-	-	0.101 ⁴ (0.060)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2	X^2
U ₀	122.874 ¹	124.152 ³	124.005 ⁵
U _{Self-Estrangement}	178.139***	176.497***	176.569***

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Institutional Level: Orientation and Fear still significant and in same direction

All individual level variables unchanged in sign and significance.

(1) p = 0.089

(2) p = 0.156

(3) p = 0.076

(4) p = 0.095

(5) p = 0.078

*Self-Estrangement * Security Minimum: b = 0.103 (p=0.091)*

Table 36. Efficacy regressed on Self-Estrangement (2008), n=3644

	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)	
Self-Estrangement	-0.432*** (0.016)	-0.435*** (0.016)	-0.434*** (0.016)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>			
Estrangement * High Security	-	-0.097 ¹ (0.055)	-
Estrangement * Minimum Security	-	-	-0.128 ² (0.066)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2	X^2
U ₀	175.744***	175.488***	175.403***
U _{Self-Estrangement}	149.568*	145.187*	146.816*

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Only Low Security significant at the institutional level.

(1) p = 0.080

(2) p = 0.054

Table 37. Efficacy regressed on Self-Estrangement (2009), n=4203

	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Self-Estrangement	-0.382*** (0.017)	-0.382*** (0.017)	-0.383*** (0.017)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>			
Estrangement * High Security	-	-0.098** (0.035)	
Estrangement * Medium Security	-	-	0.064* (0.031)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2	X^2
U ₀	102.676	102.740	102.534
U _{Self-Estrangement}	153.124**	147.060*	147.465*

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 38. Efficacy regressed on Self-Estrangement (2010), n=4307

	Model 9	Model 10
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Self-Estrangement	-0.413*** (0.018)	-0.414*** (0.018)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>		
Estrangement * Minimum Security	-	-0.165* (0.079)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2
U ₀	145.828**	145.360**
U _{Self-Estrangement}	184.282***	178.709***

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*Hypothesis 4 Findings*⁷⁹

Hypothesis (4a) predicts that alienation will emotionally harden prison workers. Results indicate that alienation is significantly and positively associated with emotional hardening across all four years of alienation (Tables 39-42). This finding is replicated by individual measures of alienation as well as by the overall measure of alienation developed through principle component factor analysis. Years 2008-2010 also find that the effect of alienation varies across institutions – as indicated by significant variation in slope estimates across institutions (Tables 40-42). Alienation (and its individual measures entered into individual models) increases mean levels of emotional hardening across institutions and the slope effect largely varies by institution. After considering only individual level variables, significant variation still exists across prisons and warrants additional multi-level analysis (Model 1, Tables 39-42). Modern prison management promotes environments that alienate in order to better protect workers and prisoners. Results indicate that alienation hardens prison workers. The Keeper Philosophy lauds a perspective that demands: “the prisoner is not to suffer pains beyond the deprivation of liberty” (DiIulio 1987: 167). It may appear difficult to reconcile these results with this philosophy. Institutions that emotionally harden staff – and increase the perception that inmates are objects – remove the humanity implied by the keeper philosophy. However, if security is the primary focus then emotional hardening might benefit prison management and promote impartial, albeit cold, treatment.

On the individual level, Race Black has a consistently significant and negative effect on emotional hardening. This relationship is maintained across all four years. Gender female (on the individual level) does not reach significance and flips signs through the years,

⁷⁹ Results indicate that significant variance still exists across prisons after the introduction of level-1 variables (Model 1).

providing little insight as to the impact of being female on emotional hardening. Prison workers with 20+ years of experience are more likely to be emotionally hardened. This relationship is significant for two years (2008 and 2010, Tables 40 and 42) and is positively associated across all four years. High school education appears to protect against emotional hardening as it consistently exhibits a negative relationship (although this only reaches significance for year 2007, Table 39). Line staff also appears to protect against emotional hardening and this significant finding is maintained across all four years and is rather robust. Taken together, prolonged exposure to prison environments appears to aggravate emotional hardening. However, lower education, race black, and line staff appear to counter the impacts of emotional hardening.⁸⁰

Results also indicate that institutional level variables of interest (hypothesis 4b) – specifically, aggregations of perception of supervision and custodial orientation – do not have an effect on emotional hardening on the individual level. Due to changing signs of orientation and supervision across years, meaningful conclusions cannot be drawn about the direction of these level-2 variables in relation to emotional hardening. Institutional fear is positively associated with emotional hardening and reaches significance in year 2010 (Table 42); but fails to reach significance in other years. Primary institutional level variables are not significant in this analysis. Support is not found for Hypothesis (4b).⁸¹

Hypothesis (4c) posits that alienation in high security prisons will enhance emotional hardening of prison workers and alienation in minimum-security prisons will diminish

⁸⁰ Interactions between these demographics (age/race/gender) were not tested but should be addressed in future research.

⁸¹ On the institutional level increases in percent Black and percent female appear to protect individuals from emotional hardening but these fail to gain significance except for the year 2007 and only for race black (Table 39). High security prisons appear to aggravate emotional hardening. Again this only reaches significance for one year (2010, Table 42). Low security prisons also maintain a consistently negative relationship with emotional hardening and gain significance in 2007 (Table 39).

emotional hardening. Results indicate that neither position is supported for the overall alienation measure. However minimum-security prisons appear to operate as a protective factor in 2007 and 2008 (Tables 47 and 48), particularly for those who rank high in the measure of meaninglessness (this is not confirmed by results in 2009 and 2010). Mixed results appear regarding isolation and minimum security. In 2007 (Table 55), minimum-security facilities appear to act as an aggravator and in 2008 (Table 56) they appear to act as a protective factor. 2009 and 2010 do not confirm either of these findings (Tables 57 and 58). For prison workers who are particularly self-estranged, jail appears to lessen the impact this estrangement has on emotional hardening. This result is found in 2007 and in 2010 (Table 59 and 62). Depending on the type of alienation, security level may either buffer or aggravate the negative effect alienation has on emotional hardening. In certain years, the negative impact of specific measures of alienation appears to be buffered by security level. This suggests that prisoner composition and physical layout may mitigate (or aggravate) alienation effects. Hypothesis (4c) is partly supported if alienation as meaninglessness is considered.

Taken together, alienation positively and significantly impacts emotional hardening. This result is robust and significance is reached across all four years of analysis. This supports Hypothesis (4a). In the case of emotional hardening, individual level processes appear to be more salient than institutional level processes (due to consistent significance across years). Hypothesis (4b) is not supported by analysis. Institutional level variables exhibit minimal impact on individual outcome of emotional hardening. But significant variation at the institutional level exists and continues to exist in specified models. Individual level variables do not fully explain variation at the institutional level (Model 1).

Only equivocal conclusions may be drawn about cross-level interactions. Current analysis finds partial support for Hypothesis (4c) – but only if meaninglessness is adopted as the alienation measure. Emotional hardening may be best understood as an individual process that is not dependent on security level but is highly related to level of alienation.

Table 39. Hardening regressed on Alienation (2007), n=4165

	Model 1	Model 2
	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)
<i>Institutional Level</i>		
Intercept	-0.000 (0.017)	0.000 (0.014)
Supervision	-	-0.080 (0.058)
Orientation	-	0.046 (0.077)
Fear	-	0.026 (0.044)
Prison Age	-	0.000 (0.000)
Gender	-	-0.014 (0.246)
Race	-	-0.358** ¹ (0.105)
High Security	-	0.085 (0.062)
Medium Security	-	-0.037 (0.051)
Low Security	-	-0.121** (0.062)
Min Security	-	-0.090 (0.112)
Region Mid-Atl		0.122* ² (0.046)
Region Southwest		0.137** (0.051)
Region Southeast		0.122** (0.043)
<i>Individual Level</i>		
Alienation	0.430*** (0.014)	0.429*** (0.013)
Race Black	-0.421*** (0.039)	-0.390*** (0.045)
Female	-0.029 (0.026)	-0.019 (0.026)
20+ Years at BOP	0.101 (0.066)	0.105 (0.065)
Inmate Contact	0.139* (0.061)	0.146* (0.060)
High School	-0.085* (0.039)	-0.089* (0.039)
Line Staff	-0.223*** (0.026)	-0.226*** (0.028)

Table 39. (Cont.) Hardening Regressed on Alienation

	Model 2
	Coef (s.e.)
Alienation	0.429*** (0.013)
<i>Variance Components</i>	χ^2
U_0	136.375**
$U_{\text{Alienation}}$	107.334

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.001

(2) p = 0.0

Table 40. Hardening regressed on Alienation (2008), n=2262

	Model 1	Model 2
	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)
<i>Institutional Level</i>		
Intercept	-0.123*** (0.021)	-0.115*** (0.020)
Supervision	-	-0.042 (0.599)
Orientation	-	0.016 (0.087)
Fear	-	0.009 (0.039)
Prison Age	-	-0.001* (0.000)
Gender	-	0.163 (0.305)
Race	-	-0.108 (0.123)
High Security	-	0.106 (0.092)
Medium Security	-	0.034 (0.050)
Low Security	-	-0.036 (0.053)
Min Security	-	-0.056 (0.090)
<i>Individual Level</i>		
Alienation	0.455*** (0.022)	0.448*** (0.022)
Race Black	-0.392*** (0.047)	-0.388*** (0.052)
Female	0.043 (0.041)	0.048 (0.041)
20+ Years at BOP	0.146*** (0.038)	0.163*** (0.038)
Inmate Contact	0.184* (0.077)	0.195* (0.077)
High School	-0.076 (0.054)	-0.080 (0.054)
Line Staff	-0.148** ¹ (0.042)	-0.146** ¹ (0.041)
<i>Variance Components</i>		
U ₀	142.156*	124.989 ²
U _{Alienation}	150.252*	150.270*

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p= 0.001

(2) p = 0.089

Table 41. Hardening regressed on Alienation (2009), n=2913

	Model 1	Model 2
	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)
<i>Institutional Level</i>		
Intercept	0.010 (0.018)	0.011 (0.015)
Supervision	-	0.002 (0.066)
Orientation	-	-0.003 (0.073)
Fear	-	0.058 (0.040)
Prison Age	-	-0.001 (0.000)
Gender	-	-0.289 (0.232)
Race	-	-0.083 (0.099)
High Security	-	0.113 (0.073)
Medium Security	-	0.003 (0.041)
Low Security	-	-0.025 (0.050)
Min Security	-	0.053 (0.109)
<i>Individual Level</i>		
Alienation	0.433*** (0.019)	0.432*** (0.019)
Race Black	-0.438*** (0.040)	-0.406*** (0.044)
Female	0.041 (0.039)	-0.029 (0.039)
20+ Years at BOP	0.071 (0.047)	0.089 (0.047)
Inmate Contact	0.160* (0.072)	0.178* (0.071)
High School	-0.066 (0.047)	-0.075 (0.047)
Line Staff	-0.202*** (0.043)	-0.207*** (0.044)
<i>Variance Components</i>		
U_0	133.448 ¹	106.126
$U_{\text{Alienation}}$	140.228*	140.233*

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.092

Table 42. Hardening regressed on Alienation (2010), n=4072

	Model 1	Model 2
	Coef. (s.e.)	Coef. (s.e.)
<i>Institutional Level</i>		
Intercept	0.002 (0.020)	-0.001 (0.015)
Supervision	-	-0.017 (0.045)
Orientation	-	-0.097 (0.094)
Fear	-	0.100* (0.042)
Prison Age	-	0.000 (0.000)
Gender	-	-0.301 (0.230)
Race	-	-0.061 (0.104)
High Security	-	0.203* (0.092)
Medium Security	-	-0.001 (0.041)
Low Security	-	-0.029 (0.051)
Min Security	-	0.038 (0.087)
Region Southwest		0.092* (0.040)
<i>Individual Level</i>		
Alienation	0.432*** (0.016)	0.433*** (0.016)
Race Black	-0.329*** (0.039)	-0.315*** (0.042)
Female	-0.046 (0.029)	-0.035 (0.029)
20+ Years at BOP	0.158*** (0.039)	0.172*** (0.038)
Inmate Contact	0.094 (0.060)	0.103 (0.059)
High School	-0.010 (0.042)	-0.015 (0.042)
Line Staff	-0.198*** (0.031)	-0.202*** (0.031)
<i>Variance Components</i>		
	X^2	X^2
U_0	258.732***	154.829** ¹
$U_{\text{Alienation}}$	155.080**	154.717**

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.001

Table 42 (Cont.) Hardening regressed on Alienation (2010):
Cross-Level Interactions

	Model 3
	Coef (s.e.)
Alienation	0.433*** (0.016)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>	
Alienation * Jail	-0.107* (0.044)
<i>Variance Components</i>	
U_0	155.032** ¹
$U_{\text{Alienation}}$	148.603*

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.001

POWERLESS

Table 43. Hardening regressed on Powerlessness (2007), n=4300

	Model 3
	Coef (s.e.)
Powerlessness	0.325*** (0.014)
<i>Variance Components</i>	
U_0	137.285**
$U_{\text{Powerless}}$	119.275

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 44. Hardening regressed on Powerlessness (2008), n=3574

	Model 3
	Coef (s.e.)
Powerlessness	0.359*** (0.016)
<i>Variance Components</i>	
U_0	149.741**
$U_{\text{Powerless}}$	147.686*

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Institutional Level: High Security becomes significant (p=0.010)

Table 45. Hardening regressed on Powerlessness (2009), n=4207

	Model 3
	Coef (s.e.)
Powerlessness	0.354*** (0.014)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2
U_0	125.573 ¹
$U_{\text{Powerless}}$	115.900

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Institutional level: Gender becomes significant (negatively related at p=0.026)

Institutional level: Race Black becomes significant (negatively related at p=0.035)

Institutional level: Security High becomes significant (positively related at p=0.040)

(1) p = 0.065

Table 46. Hardening regressed on Powerlessness (2010), n=3686

	Model 4
	Coef (s.e.)
Powerlessness	0.352*** (0.015)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2
U_0	143.241**
$U_{\text{Powerless}}$	128.609

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Same institutional level variables significant.

MEANINGLESSNESS

Table 47. Hardening regressed on Meaninglessness (2007), n=4289

	Model 4	Model 5
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Meaninglessness	0.371*** (0.012)	0.371*** (0.012)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>		
Meaninglessness * Minimum Security	-	-0.094*** (0.024)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2
U_0	139.836**	139.597**
$U_{\text{Meaningless}}$	95.954	93.595

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 48. Hardening regressed on Meaninglessness (2008), n=3211

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Meaninglessness	0.373 (0.017)	0.371 (0.017)	0.377 (0.018)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>			
Meaninglessness* Minimum Security	-	-0.139 ¹ (0.087)	-
Meaninglessness* High Security	-	-	0.118 ³ (0.066)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2	X^2
U ₀	139.883*	140.008*	139.856*
U _{Meaningless}	155.205**	151.576**	151.886* ²

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p=0.111

(2) p = 0.010

(3) p = 0.078

Institutional Level: High Security becomes significant (p=0.010)

Table 49. Hardening regressed on Meaninglessness (2009), n=3013

	Model 4
	Coef (s.e.)
Meaninglessness	0.360*** (0.018)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2
U ₀	107.360
U _{Meaningless}	115.585

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

No institutional level variables are significant.

Table 50. Hardening regressed on Meaninglessness (2010), n=4286

	Model 5	Model 6
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Meaninglessness	0.356*** (0.016)	0.356*** (0.016)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>		
Meaninglessness * Jail	-	-0.122** (0.043)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2
U ₀	150.033**	150.163**
U _{Meaningless}	156.145**	149.066*

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Same institutional level variables significant.

NORMLESSNESS

Table 51. Hardening regressed on Normlessness (2007), n=4277

	Model 6	Model 7
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Normlessness	0.360*** (0.149)	0.360*** (0.147)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>		
Normlessness * Medium Security	-	-0.052 ¹ (0.030)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2
U ₀	139.788**	139.805**
U _{Normless}	126.424	122.539

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.082

Table 52. Hardening regressed on Normlessness (2008), n=3258

	Model 7
	Coef (s.e.)
Normlessness	0.371*** (0.019)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2
U ₀	138.969*
U _{Normless}	162.862**

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 53. Hardening regressed on Normlessness (2009), n=2998

	Model 5
	Coef (s.e.)
Normlessness	0.359*** (0.019)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2
U ₀	103.467
U _{Normless}	149.180*

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Only Prison Age is significant on institutional level.

Table 54. Hardening regressed on Normlessness (2010), n=4279

	Model 7
	Coef (s.e.)
Normlessness	0.359*** (0.016)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2
U ₀	152.818** ¹
U _{Normless}	138.938 ²

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.001

(2) p = 0.056

Same institutional level variables significant except High Security not significant (p=0.093)

ISOLATION

Table 55. Hardening regressed on Isolation (2007), n=4332

	Model 8	Model 9
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Isolation	0.291*** (0.015)	0.293*** (0.014)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>		
Isolation * Minimum Security	-	0.192*** (0.049)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2
U ₀	137.502**	137.464**
U _{Isolation}	136.365 ¹	129.479

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.066

Table 56. Hardening regressed on Isolation (2008), n=2373

	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Isolation	0.267*** (0.022)	0.261*** (0.022)	0.264*** (0.022)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>			
Isolation * Minimum Security	-	-0.195 ² (0.108)	
Isolation * Jail	-		-0.118 ³ (0.069)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2	X^2
U ₀	126.175 ¹	126.282	126.382 ⁴
U _{Isolation}	146.966*	144.429*	144.257*

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.078 (2) p = 0.073

(3) p = 0.092

(4) p = 0.076

Institutional Level: Race Black becomes significant (p=0.043); Supervision significant at p=0.056. High security not significant

Table 57. Hardening regressed on Isolation (2009), n=3023

	Model 6
	Coef (s.e.)
Isolation	0.290*** (0.020)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2
U_0	111.086
$U_{\text{Isolation}}$	148.851*

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Only Prison Age is significant on institutional level.

Table 58. Hardening regressed on Isolation (2010), n=4346

	Model 8
	Coef (s.e.)
Isolation	0.295*** (0.016)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2
U_0	170.358***
$U_{\text{Isolation}}$	154.607**

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Institutional Level changes: High Security not significant (p=0.139). Fear and SW still highly significant and positively related to outcome.

SELF-ESTRANGEMENT

Table 59. Hardening regressed on Self-Estrangement (2007), n=4351

	Model 10	Model 11
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Self-Estrangement	0.301*** (0.016)	0.301*** (0.016)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>		
Estranged * Jail	-	-0.095* (0.047)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2
U_0	137.999**	138.010**
$U_{\text{Self-Estrangement}}$	134.039 ¹	128.707

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

(1) p = 0.086

Table 60. Hardening regressed on Self-Estrangement (2008), n=3631

	Model 11	Model 12
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Self-Estrangement	0.323*** (0.018)	0.327*** (0.018)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>		
Estrangement * High Security	-	0.127 ¹ (0.075)
	-	-
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2
U ₀	131.092*	131.006*
U _{Self-Estrangement}	160.491**	156.233**

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Institutional Level: High Security becomes significant (p=0.022)

(1) p = 0.095

Table 61. Hardening regressed on Self-Estrangement (2009), n=4230

	Model 7
	Coef (s.e.)
Self-Estrangement	0.320*** (0.019)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2
U ₀	130.301*
U _{Self-Estrangement}	186.501***

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Institutional level: Race Black becomes significant (negatively related at p=0.078)

Institutional level: Fear becomes significant (positively related at p=0.037)

Estranged*Security High, positively related (p=0.166)

Table 62. Hardening regressed on Self-Estrangement (2010), n=3686

	Model 9	Model 10
	Coef (s.e.)	Coef (s.e.)
Self-Estrangement	0.298*** (0.016)	0.297*** (0.015)
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>		
Estrangement* Jail	-	-0.142** ¹ (0.043)
<i>Variance Components</i>	X^2	X^2
U ₀	177.019***	177.552***
U _{Self-Estrangement}	145.048*	134.177 ²

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Institutional Level changes: High Security not significant (p=0.139). Fear and SW still highly significant and positively related to outcome.

(1) p = 0.002

(2) p = 0.085

Summary of Results by Hypothesis

The following tables summarize results by hypothesis and report variance explained by each fully constructed model (MODEL 2). Individual level factors are highly significant across all four years and explain a substantial amount of variance across those years. As is shown in Table 63, all three positive and constructive power adoptions are significant in the predicted direction across all four years for the outcomes institutional commitment and efficacy. At the institutional level, fear plays an important role in predicting commitment. It is also clear that cross-level interactions do not reach significance across all four years (but legitimacy in high security prisons does reach significance in two years). Notably, coercive power works counter to hypotheses and improves inmate management across all four years of analysis. Table 64 highlights the significant and negative role that alienation plays on prisoner management and the significant and positive role that alienation plays on emotional hardening. These relationships gain significance across all four years. Importantly, institutional level factors fail to reach significance in the alienation models. However, the cross level interaction of alienation in high security prisons appears to be salient across two years (2008 and 2009).

The variance explained by the fully constructed models is also substantial. Not only do key predictors appear to have a robust relationship with the dependent variables (a relationship that holds across years) but they also appear to be vital to the explanation of the total variance. Fully constructed power adoption models explain between 35-40% of the variance of institutional commitment (Table 65) and between 25-27% of the variance of efficacy (Table 66). Alienation models explain between 24-27% of the variance of efficacy (Table 67) and 20-23% of the variance of emotional hardening (Table 68).

Since level-1 variables may explain level-2 variance, it is beneficial to compare institutional level variance explained in Model 1 with institutional variance explained in Model 2. This serves to isolate purely contextual effects (rather than compositional and contextual effects). Comparing Model 1 (without level-2 variables but with level-1 variables) and Model 2 (fully realized models) addresses these contextual effects. Although institutional level factors are responsible for only a moderate amount of the total unexplained variance of the dependent variables, fully constructed models suggest that selected variables are fairly successful at explaining the remaining institutional level variation (which is often minimal). Between 18-48% of the level-2 variance of institutional commitment is explained by fully constructed models (Table 65). 35-64% of the level-2 variance of efficacy is explained in power models and between 39-69% is explained in alienation models (across four years, Table 67). Lastly, between 3 and 71% of level-2 variance of hardening is explained by the alienation models (Table 68). But due to the inconsistency in significance of key level-2 variables across years, these findings do not appear to aid in highlighting the importance of specific institutional level variables. It is worth noting, however, that unexplained variance – after the introduction of level-1 variables – is quite small at the institutional level.⁸² Further discussion of the meaning of these specific findings occurs in chapter 5.

⁸² Analysis of compositional effects on variance indicates that institutional variance is reduced considerably by introduction of only level-1 variables to the models (not shown). With only level-1 predictors, unexplained level-2 variance is reduced by one half for power predicting commitment, between 30-50% for power predicting efficacy, between 25-60% for alienation predicting efficacy, and between 20-76% for alienation predicting emotional hardening (not shown).

SUMMARY TABLES

Table 63. Results summarized for hypotheses 1 and 2

	2007	2008	2009	2010
<i>HYPOTHESIS 1:</i>				
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Legitimate (+)	✓	✓	✓	✓
Referent (+)	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expert (+)	✓	✓	✓	✓
Coercive (-)	--	✓	--	--
Reward (-)	--	--	--	x
<i>Institutional Level</i>				
Well-Super (+)	--	--	--	--
Treatment (+)	--	--	--	--
Fear (-)	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Interactions</i>				
Legit*High (+)	--	--	--	--
Rewrd*Min(+)	--	--	--	--
Refmnt*Min (+)	--	--	--	--
<i>HYPOTHESIS 2:</i>				
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Legitimate (+)	✓	✓	✓	✓
Referent (+)	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expert (+)	✓	✓	✓	✓
Coercive (-)	x	x	x	x
Reward (-)	--	--	✓	--
<i>Institutional Level</i>				
Well-Super (+)	--	--	--	--
Treatment (+)	✓	--	--	--
Fear (-)	--	--	--	--
<i>Interactions</i>				
Legit*High (+)	--	✓	✓	--
Exprt*High (+)	--	--	--	--
Rewrd*Min (+)	--	--	--	--
Refmnt *Min (+)	--	✓	--	--

✓ = Supported; -- = Unsupported x = Significant in opposite direction as hypothesized

Table 64. Results summarized for hypotheses 3 and 4

	2007	2008	2009	2010
<i>HYPOTHESIS 3:</i>				
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Alienation (-)	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Institutional Level</i>				
Well-Super (+)	--	--	--	--
Treatment (+)	✓	--	--	--
Fear (-)	✓	--	--	--
<i>Interactions</i>				
Alienation *				
High Sec (-)	--	✓	✓	--
<i>HYPOTHESIS 4:</i>				
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Alienation (+)	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Institutional Level</i>				
Well-Super (-)	--	--	--	--
Treatment (-)	--	--	--	--
Fear (+)	--	--	--	✓
<i>Interactions</i>				
Alienation *	--	--	--	--
High Sec (+)				
Alienation *	--	--	--	--
Min Sec (-)				
✓ = Supported; -- = Unsupported				

VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY MODEL

Table 65. *Institutional Commitment regressed on power adoptions*

Year	2007	2008	2009	2010
<i>Variance Explained $R^2_{Level 1}$</i>	37.5%	40.8%	38.1%	35.4%

Year (level-2)	2007	2008	2009	2010
<i>Variance Explained $R^2_{Level 2}$</i>	48.9%	41.5%	26.7%	18.9%

Table 66. *Efficacy regressed on power adoptions*

Year	2007	2008	2009	2010
<i>Variance Explained $R^2_{Level 1}$</i>	25.5%	27.5%	27.4%	26.2%

Year (level-2)	2007	2008	2009	2010
<i>Variance Explained $R^2_{Level 2}$</i>	53.1%	35.4%	64.9%	37.8%

Table 67. *Efficacy regressed on Alienation*

Year	2007	2008	2009	2010
<i>Variance Explained $R^2_{Level 1}$</i>	25.0%	27.9%	24.9%	27.5%

Year (level-2)	2007	2008	2009	2010
<i>Variance Explained $R^2_{Level 2}$</i>	69.8%	39.5%	69.3%	48.6%

Table 68. *Emotional hardening regressed on Alienation*

Year	2007	2008	2009	2010
<i>Variance Explained $R^2_{Level 1}$</i>	20.5%	23.9%	20.0%	21.0%

Year (level-2)	2007	2008	2009	2010
<i>Variance Explained $R^2_{Level 2}$</i>	41.8%	3.6%	71.9%	63.4%

5: Discussion

Failed policies largely generated by the New Penology doctrine (DiIulio 1991; Marquart and Roebuck 1985) – combined with assumptions in the ineffectiveness of rehabilitation and escalating crime rates (MacKenzie 2006) – transformed prison management. In the 1980s, security became the primary focus. The new evolution of management increased professionalism and formality (see Lombardo 1989). This approach, lauded by DiIulio (1987), promoted a strong central authority and strict adherence to officially sanctioned power strategies that targeted order maintenance. Riots and prison violence were blamed on inadequate, informal, and even careless management oversight (Useem and Kimball 1991) – not on the nature of imprisonment. New management strategies sought to correct these management failures and inadequacies. It is conceded that the physical protection of prison workers and of prisoners is critical. But research has not addressed actual power assumptions of prison workers as perceived through their institution of employment.⁸³ Beyond official decree, do prison workers sense that prisons promote formal and constructive⁸⁴ power strategies?

Security dominated perspectives are not without consequences. Official decrees begin to trump informal relationships and accountability to management begins to revolve around adherence to these official decrees (Lombardo 1989). Evading blame for security lapses becomes vital and reduces commitment to peers. Enhanced emotional separation of the prison worker from his peers, from his supervisors, and from prisoners may be inevitable

⁸³ A strict security focus does not necessarily require adherence to the keeper philosophy. It may simply promote employment of whatever tactic secures the facility.

⁸⁴ “Constructive” power adoptions largely compliment official power strategies. These types of power do not contradict or nullify official power strategies. “Destructive” power adoptions challenge and often contradict the efforts of official strategies to manage inmate populations.

(see Lombardo 1989). Concern about prisoner manipulation challenges informal worker-inmate relationships. Ultimately, this management approach arguably endorses alienation. To date, research has not explicitly evaluated the effects of alienation on prisoner management. With these particulars in consideration, this study specifically targets power and alienation among prison workers.

Research Questions

Using data from the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) yearly Prison Social Climate Survey (PSCS), I asked three specific questions:

- (1) How do prison workers perceive institutional power derivation?
- (2) Do power adoptions impact prison worker perception of effectiveness in inmate management?
- (3) Does alienation harden prison workers and reduce their ability to effectively manage inmate populations?

Key Findings

Results from this analysis reveal the following significant findings in federal prisons:

1. Formal and constructive power adoptions improve institutional commitment. Elevated levels of institutional fear reduce commitment. The effect of legitimate power on commitment is reduced in jails.
2. Formal and constructive power adoptions improve prison management.⁸⁵ Coercive power also improves prison management. The effect of legitimate power on efficacy is increased in high security institutions.

⁸⁵ It should be noted that the measure of effective inmate management is reflective of workers who believe that they are effective inmate managers *and* who find a degree of personal fulfillment in prisoner management.

3. Alienation harms effective prisoner management. High security prisons increase the negative impact that alienation has on efficacy.
4. Alienation emotionally hardens prison workers.

Consistent and significant results across four years suggest that individual level processes are vital to institutional and prisoner management. Comparison with unconditional models suggests that specified models explain a substantial proportion of the variances of the dependent variables. In addition, the introduction of only level-1 variables (Model 1) reduces the institutional level variances by a substantial amount. This further suggests that individual level variables are particularly salient in the prediction of the key outcomes. Discussion and further interpretation of the complete results follows.

Discussion of Findings

Results from HLM analysis of survey data from the BOP suggest that legitimate⁸⁶, referent, and expert power positively and significantly impact institutional commitment. This positive association implies that commitment to prison institutions is increased by dedication, empowerment, and skill provision. Importantly, supervision appears to directly influence this commitment. Strong supervisors can improve the sense of meaning in prison work (*legitimize*), improve the sense of importance of the prison worker (*empower*), and provide adequate tools to help their employees complete daily tasks (*train*). I have further proposed that institutional commitment is an adequate proxy for the prediction of institutional power. Power that has a significant effect on institutional commitment is presumably (and informally) reflective of actual power promoted by the institution.

⁸⁶ Legitimate power is best understood as officially sanctioned BOP policy and generally reflects officially sanctioned treatment of prisoners. Due to collinearity, legitimacy as reflective of perception fair treatment was not tested.

Institutions in the BOP, therefore, appear to promote legitimate, referent, and expert power strategies.

The BOP officially sanctions humane treatment of prisoners and promotes security of staff and prisoners alike. Formal channels, realized through training and alignment with the Bureau of Prisons' philosophy and ideology, appear to affect individual institutional commitment levels. This is not to suggest that informal power strategies are not employed. It is to suggest that formal power strategies appear to be aligned with overall individual institutional management philosophies – and this seems to be reflected by Bureau employees.⁸⁷ It should be noted that since the interpretation of power is perceived by prison workers through the actions of supervisors and of the hierarchy in general,⁸⁸ these findings indicate that management *can* – through adequate skill provision and attentive supervision – manipulate commitment levels. Moreover, results from four years suggest that organizational factors are more salient in predicting commitment than demographic factors. In the BOP, thereby, management *does* manipulate commitment levels.

From an institutional level, results indicate that prison managers should be concerned with aggregate fear levels of employees. Fearful institutions significantly and negatively impact institutional commitment. It is not surprising that aggregate levels of fear could produce this outcome. Fear of crime generates personal and collective vulnerability, partly due to resultant reduced geographical surveillance (Wilson and Kelling 1982). In practice,

⁸⁷ These results also suggest that the “keeper philosophy” – championed by DiIulio (1987) and reinforced in the BOP manual – applies to the federal prison system (prison workers who subscribe to the belief that loss of liberty is adequate punishment also appear to be more committed to their institution).

⁸⁸ As a notable aside, commitment to an institution implies commitment to the philosophy of that institution but does not deny the possibility of structural transformation of that institution. If institutional commitment is largely a product of transparency, training, and respect then strict advancements in programming or daily inmate management practices and ideology should not disrupt that commitment. Transparency and respect empowers. It could be inferred – especially regarding referent power – that empowerment may also improve willingness to acquiesce to innovation.

elevated institutional fear may reduce the likelihood of cell searches, may reduce necessary contact with prisoners, and may reduce rule enforcement. The outcome of these types of negligence ostensibly shift prisoner management to prisoners and cede valuable oversight away from the prison itself. Beyond the reduction in oversight, it is also likely that institutional fear is environmentally and socially addictive. Moderate levels of fear may serve to protect prison workers on the individual level. Elevated levels of institutional fear may serve to undermine adequate management and serve to overestimate risk by prison workers. In the context of this study, fear is considered to be an appropriate proxy for the institutional perspective toward prisoners.⁸⁹

Results also suggest that significant slope and intercept variation still exists across institutions after the introduction of institutional measures. It is plausible, therefore, that selected level-2 variables are inadequate and unable to capture that variation.⁹⁰ Institutions may contain a variety of factions that are shielded by institutional averages – especially when assessing general relations within institutions. It is worth mentioning that jail does appear to reduce the positive benefit of legitimate power on institutional commitment. Minimal programming and increased inmate inactivity may increase the prison workers' perception that jails are improperly run. In addition, the composition of jails is often quite varied and includes high and low risk offenders. The combination of this rather diverse offending population could complicate management strategies and create seemingly unnecessary restrictions on low risk offenders in order to maintain uniformity and consistency across

⁸⁹ Although outside the scope of this inquiry, it is not necessarily the case that high security prisons are more fearful. Strict protocol and procedures – often witnessed in high security prisons – may reduce fear levels as workers know how to respond to aggressive and compromising situations and are highly vigilant in maintaining strict oversight (locking gates, etc).

⁹⁰ The unexplained variance in these instances is minimal.

management. The confusion on how to appropriately handle a diverse population of offenders may reduce the impact of legitimacy on commitment.

I also proposed that power adoptions impact efficacy. My proposal is that formal and constructive forms of power – legitimate, expert, and referent – exhibit positive effects on efficacy. Informal and negative types of power aggravate efficacy. These proposals are largely supported by the analysis. Across four years of analysis, formal and constructive types of power improve prison worker ability to manage prisoner populations.

Empowerment through transparency and respect – bestowed after adequate skill provision – improves prison workers’ perception of efficacy. It cannot be understated that effective prisoner management includes ability to work within an environment of other prison workers. Therefore the perception that one is a positive influence on that community is wedded to this conceptual arrangement.

Counter to my initial proposal, results indicate that coercive power is not detrimental to efficacy. Perceived intimidation actually improves prison workers’ perception of efficacy. This finding reaches significance across all four years. Prisons can be dangerous environments, filled with (potentially) zealously aggressive men and women. Individual fear is not necessarily a liability and intimidation may serve to increase accountability, formality, and rule adherence.⁹¹ Effective intimidation may merely encourage prison workers to follow protocol and may discourage informal relationship generation. Although ostensibly in opposition to legitimate power, coercive power in this lens may actually permit the unfettered flow of decrees from central command. Coercive power may simply adopt institutional norms to regulate behavior. If those institutional norms are largely antisocial – as may be

⁹¹ It is plausible and not contradictory to suggest that the influence of fear is complex. Fear alerts individuals to danger but also overestimates risk and danger (which ironically may increase likelihood of victimization). In addition, fear of a supervisor is arguably quite different than fear of an inmate.

witnessed within prisoner subcultures – then those antisocial norms will dictate behavior. But if the institutional norms are reflective of legitimacy – which appears to be the case in the federal prison system – then coercive power may simply improve legitimacy. Here, it seems preferable to label coercive as “neutral” rather than “negative.”

Institutional level variables appear to complicate the analysis of efficacy. On the individual level, organizational factors⁹² (largely relational in nature) predict perception of efficacy. Results suggest that the manipulation of supervision techniques could potentially improve efficacy. But institutional level relational variables – specifically, aggregates of satisfaction with supervision and treatment orientation (also largely relational variables) – do not appear to impact perception of efficacy. It is possible that institutional means are not reflective of within institutional variation and that aggregations are perhaps not sufficient. Even fearful institutions do not diminish the individual’s perception of efficacy. Organizational factors (on the individual level) are powerful predictors of efficacy and relationships⁹³ improve inmate management. But individual perception of those relationships is far more salient than institutional perception. Moreover, certain populations of prison workers appear to be particularly adept at working with prisoner populations (e.g. Race Black). But inclusion of these control measures does not reduce the effect of power on efficacy. In management settings that appear to encourage individual accountability and minimize collective accountability (e.g. evade blame for unfavorable management outcomes), it is not surprising that individual perceptions are so pertinent.

Notably, cross-level interactions with security suggest that environment may influence the impact of power adoptions on efficacy. The impact of legitimate power on

⁹² Prison worker perception of power (as exhibited by supervisors).

⁹³ Particularly: empowerment.

efficacy appears to increase in importance in high security institutions. Prisoner composition is presumably the most antisocial in these institutions and environmental restrictions are the greatest. Although high security prisons (at level-2) negatively impact the perception of efficacy, an analysis of cross-level interactions suggests that the effect of legitimacy on efficacy is increased in these same settings. This indicates that prison workers are particularly effective at prisoner management in high security prisons when they believe in the just authority of the prison institution. The composition of inmates in high security prisons may aggravate prison workers due to the incessant display of problematic behavior. Taken in isolation, this appears to diminish the worker's perceived ability at managing inmates. But a belief in the prison institution – a belief that prison is the one body that can handle these populations – may actually generate a sense of order and reason in high security prison work.⁹⁴

Results indicate that efficacy is also influenced by alienation. Prison workers who report advanced levels of alienation perceive less ability to manage inmate populations. Institutional level variables – that specifically capture affairs between workers, supervisors, and prisoners – do not appear to be consistently salient in this relationship. Modern approaches to prison management are naturally designed to alienate workers. This alienation harms prison oversight in multiple ways. Not only does alienation directly impact effectiveness in management but it also hardens prison workers. Findings suggest that both outcomes are avoidable and unnecessary.

All five types of alienation are robust predictors of efficacy and emotional hardening. Indeed, alienation is particularly powerful in explaining the variation across both of these

⁹⁴ The worker subscribes to the notion that high security inmates need to be in prisons with severe restrictions. High security prisons also have stricter protocols. In order to effectively manage prison populations he simply needs to follow those protocols. Perception of efficacy is thereby increased through subscription to protocol.

dependent variables. By definition, alienation is an individual's perception of the social climate. It is not contradictory or problematic to propose that individual perception may be felt uniquely – or in isolation – by a large collection of individuals and that this collective perception is detrimental to prison management. In this instance, however, collective perception does not have a unifying factor that publicly connects the population of individuals (that would extinguish the perception of alienation). Nevertheless, singular processes appear to drive the alienation of individual members. This study divides alienation into five categories: powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation, and self-estrangement. Each of these five categories is particularly salient in the prediction of efficacy and emotional hardening. Reductions in these categories are likely to improve outcomes in prisoner management and are much easier to grasp from a practical or policy perspective.

Increasing discretion and injecting meaning and collectivity into prison work may help to alleviate alienation and may be a logical place to begin. Without external respect and acknowledgment that prison workers assume roles that the public demands, prison workers may have difficulty finding meaning in their work (accolades from prisoners are unlikely). It may be possible to increase discretion by including line staff in decision-making processes – no matter how insignificant (Aiken and Hage 1966). It may also be possible to generate communal norms by increasing solidarity among workers and by promoting policies that reflect collective responsibility over self-survival. It is perhaps unsurprising that high security prisons appear to increase the negative impact of alienation on efficacy (this relationship reaches significance across two years). Strict protocols and rigid population oversight is probably not negotiable in high security settings.

It is important to stress that alienation increases the emotional hardening of the prison worker. Alienation increases the likelihood that prison workers perceive their charges as objects and increases prison worker irritability and emotional exhaustion. The eventual release of over 90% of all prisoners (Petersilia 2003) – coupled with a 67% recidivism rate (Langan and Levin 2002) – suggests that what happens in prison is not helping prisoners.⁹⁵ Institutions that harden workers are likely to negatively impact charges.

Coupled with reduced efficacy, it appears that alienation is responsible for unfavorable outcomes within the prison environment. The dual impact of alienation on prison workers could dramatically reduce the effectiveness of programming implementation of innovative strategies that aim to reduce recidivism rates. It is an overlooked reality that re-entry needs to begin in prisons and that prison workers must subscribe to rehabilitation programming in order for these programs to find success. Prison workers who believe that they are able to handle inmates and who see those inmates as people are arguably more advantageous to treatment.

Main Limitations

Perhaps the most significant limitation to this study is its inability to consistently predict outcomes at the institutional level. Institutional level hypotheses are largely unsupported by the results. Aggregations on the institutional level are assumed to capture relationships within the institutions. But these aggregations are simply institutional level averages and they may not capture actual internal dynamics. Aggregations of subjective reports may differ from an objective sense of that same reality.⁹⁶ Proxies for relationships

⁹⁵ This does not suggest that prison is criminogenic.

⁹⁶ For example, research suggests that many prison workers have a favorable opinion of treatment but view their peers as having a strong custody approach (Cullen et al 1989). Aggregations of individual perspectives will

with peers (custody-treatment orientation) and with prisoners (fear of inmates) may not adequately address the overall relational aspects of the prison environment and for this reason they may not maintain significance across years. In addition, data for prisoner classification and infractions by prison (two level-2 variables of particular interest) were not available and are likely quite critical in the prediction of institutional commitment, efficacy, and hardening. Prisons with more aggressive populations probably increase the stress level of the prison workers. And it would be inappropriate to assume (for example) that all high security prisons have identical populations. It is also important to note that the ICC across years for key outcome variables of hardening and efficacy is fairly small. Much of the variance of these two variables is explained at the individual level.⁹⁷

Survey participation also fluctuates across years and certain years find participants less likely to answer questions presumably deemed to be sensitive or intrusive. It was necessary, therefore to construct a number of HLM files in order to maximize the number of observations per model. For example, the isolation measure in 2008 (Table 56) has only 2373. This is a sizeable reduction from the number of observations in normlessness for the

suggest the institution is largely treatment oriented when the objective and “false” sense of peer orientation may drive the institutional practice.

⁹⁷ In order to disentangle compositional and contextual effects, analyses shown (Tables 65-68) evaluated the variance change between Model 1 and Model 2. But further analysis suggests that a significant reduction in level-2 variation exists with the exclusive introduction of level-1 variables. This reduction is as much as 75% for emotional hardening in 2009 (not shown) and as little as 25% for efficacy in 2010 (not shown). Coupled with the fact that level-2 variables do not appear to be consistently related to outcomes across years, there are two potential conclusions to be drawn. The first, which appears highly likely, is that individual level factors are particularly important. The second claim is more speculative and suggests that institutional level factors may be masked by limitations of current identifiers. It is possible that even within security-level the composition of inmates varies (Camp et al 2003). The effect of inmates is largely evaluated on the institutional security level and this may hide differences within prisons of the same security level. Since key variables gain significance at the institutional level across all years but these variables fail to consistently reach significance (with the exception of fear in the prediction of commitment), this may be due to an inability to adequately account for inmate composition. Camp et al (2003) argue convincingly for use of custody scores rather than security levels for inmate composition. Future studies should address the possibility of varying composition possibilities (beyond security level). But it cannot be overstated that the unexplained variance at the institutional level – after inclusion of individual level measures – is rather small.

same year (Table 48). Since four versions of the PSCS are administered it is only possible to construct measures of interest with half the total available number of observations.⁹⁸ This may be less of an issue since analyses were conducted over four years.

It could be proposed that this study aims to understand objective power and management processes and yet employs survey data that is subjective interpretation. A prison workers' perception of effective prisoner management is not necessarily equivalent to his actual effectiveness in prisoner management and there is no way to confirm effectiveness through evaluations or through supervisor interview. It is conceded that behavioral measures would be preferable but these are not available.

Primary outcomes and predictor variables were constructed by alpha scores and by principle component factor analysis. Prior to these analyses, selection of components was based on compliance with theoretical structures. Final variable constructs do not necessarily represent the only possible configuration and may not – strictly speaking – fully represent the label they are given. In addition, alienation variables are highly correlated with one another and therefore single models were not run with full inclusion. This prevents a comparison across alienation variables in order to ascertain which measure is most salient a predictor of efficacy and of hardening.

Theoretical Implications

Ostensibly, prisons and jails have absolute “power” to act their will on detained men and women. But power is not uniform in kind. And the *ability* to employ power does not imply the *right* to employ power. Sykes (1956) assumed that prison subcultures organize rationally and inevitably demand representation and voice. This unavoidable compact with

⁹⁸ The questionnaire repeats each subject section in two of the four versions and repeats general information in all four of the versions.

prisoners – essentially sharing power – proved to be overstated and detrimental to humane and effective prison management (DiIulio 1991b; Marquart and Roebuck 1985). Due in part to this failure, the most recent modern age of prison management has targeted order maintenance (DiIulio 1991a). This approach arguably alienates prison workers (Lombardo 1989).⁹⁹ Although results indicate that formal and constructive power strategies are generally adopted and improve prison management, alienation harms prison management and hardens prison workers. The theoretical implications, and ostensible contradiction, of these findings are discussed here.

The results from this study appear to engender a few complications that warrant theoretical discussion. At first glance, the results appear to illustrate an ironic contradiction in effective prison management. It is clear that federal correctional facilities promote constructive and formal power strategies. It is also clear that legitimate power adoptions improve institutional commitment and increase the perception of effective inmate management. Belief in the just authority of the prison (of the BOP) improves the prison workers' perception of prisoner management (fostering progressive belief in prison work may be a critical next step for effective prison management). But it also appears that alienation strongly reduces effective inmate management.¹⁰⁰ If legitimate power interprets the institutional mission as a function of the keeper philosophy (and strict order maintenance) then alienated workers *theoretically* benefit prison management. Herein lies a dilemma in prison management. It is conceded that security is a reasonable primary focus for coercive institutions. But if a strict security focus promotes alienation, and alienated prison workers

⁹⁹ Although he does not label it “alienation,” the change in officer behavior in Auburn prison from the 1970s to the 1980s is reflective of the alienation premises promoted in this study.

¹⁰⁰ It should be noted that analyses were conducted that removed POSINFL (and both POSINFL and FEELEXHL) from the efficacy measure but this did not alter outcomes (not shown)

do not appear to benefit prisoners, then management may engender a strategy that has minimal net gain (particularly for the prisoner).¹⁰¹

Fortunately, within the federal system, it appears that official channels of communication and constructive types of power affect prison workers. The results suggest that there is little evidence that the prison worker opts out of official decrees (and instead relies on informal and destructive types of prisoner management). This is not to suggest that prison workers in federal prisons do not employ coercive power techniques. But rather institutions do not appear to informally endorse those techniques. Moreover, endorsed techniques – formal and constructive power strategies – improve the perception of inmate management. Since it is unlikely that reductions in alienation of prison workers necessarily result in compromised security, it is counterproductive to pursue policies that effectively alienate workers. This study promotes a perspective on coercive institutions that suggests malleability even within a rigid environment.

Pliability of management may be particularly useful in terms of alienation reduction. Dividing alienation measures into its components and running models separately admittedly precludes comparison across measures. And although meaningful claims cannot be made regarding the most salient alienation predictor of emotional hardening and efficacy, reasonable conclusions can be drawn about the value of each independent alienation measure and its impact within the prison environment. All five individual measures (as well as the overall generated variable) are strong predictors of efficacy and of emotional hardening. It is proposed here that emotional hardening indicates early signs of dehumanization. The officer perceives that he is emotionally exhausted, he is growing irritable, and he is beginning to

¹⁰¹ Results indicate that prison workers perceive their prison institutions to be legitimate and this sense of legitimacy improves perception in inmate management. But if legitimate power is defined solely by security measures then this actually undermines effective inmate management. Hence, a potential net gain of zero.

treat inmates like objects. It could be inferred that the authentically dehumanized worker objectively treats inmates like objects and is not concerned by nor impacted by this cold treatment. Pursuing this logic of progression, these results specifically identify key processes that aggravate effective treatment for the susceptible but not necessarily consumed prison workers. Emotionally hardened prison workers are experiencing early signs of desensitization. Due to consistently robust and significant results, reductions in individual level measures of alienation counter this progression.¹⁰² Solutions to alienation are vague (especially in reference to a specific cure). But its individual measures are far less opaque. Progressive and clever prison managers would be able to directly reduce each specific alienation measure even within the confines of a strict security philosophy. Ultimately, improving the independent alienation measures not only improves the perception of effective inmate management but also reduces emotional hardening (and the potential physical and mental complications that arise from it).

Beyond speculative outcomes of the prison management strategies proposed by DiIulio (1987), ethnographic (Tracy 2008; Tracy and Scott 2006) and empirical work (Poole and Regoli 1981) suggest that alienation is prevalent within prison worker populations and potentially a cause for concern. Results from this study suggest that alienation has specific negative outcomes on prison management. Combined with the above conclusions about power adoptions in coercive institutions, I propose the advancement of a theoretical framework that specifically focuses on the nature of confinement. Kraska (2006) writes: “understanding the why of criminal justice behavior is crucial for the effective development and implementation of policy and reforms” (171). I propose that modern prisons informally

¹⁰² It is further possible that those prison workers who have already become fully “dehumanized” could benefit from reductions in alienation. It is unlikely that “dehumanization” is a state without return.

and formally promote alienation practices – due in large part to a strict focus on order maintenance and security – and that these practices reduce the effectiveness of prison management and dehumanize prison workers. Unlike criminological theories that propose reasons for crime commission, this criminal justice theory proposes an inevitable impact of modern coercive institutions on prison workers and on prisoners.

Policy (and practical) Implications

The security-first prison model was a rational response to a chaotic, disordered, and violent US prison environment (DiIulio 1991b). I concede that management positions that would compromise security for other ends are ill informed and careless. Superior care begins with security. Uniform and systematic population management strategies are critical. But uniformity implies a strong central authority – a rigid hierarchy – and may unnecessarily remove power from the line officer.¹⁰³ In practice, uniformity is also undermined by informal pressure for incomplete rule enforcement (Poole and Regoli 1980: 217). Clear and *genuinely* uniform guidelines would reduce this normlessness. Ultimately, a series of simple adoptions could dramatically reduce the overall alienation of prison workers: collective accountability, further recognition of service, etc. It is not apparent that specific reductions in alienation will result in less secure facilities.

Prison workers do not work in a theoretical environment. Even though the keeper philosophy condemns acts of violence within the institutional setting because victimization would be added punishment for detained men and women, correctional officers are human actors, seasoned by a complex and often difficult and needy population. It is perhaps undeniable that inside prison walls there are those who frequently strive to employ violence

¹⁰³ Moderate increases in flexibility may alleviate this sense of powerlessness. For example: allowing prison workers to decide how to solve a problem within the mission framework.

and manipulation to achieve desired ends. While it may be convenient to casually demand superior levels of care in our prisons, we generally ask others to provide this care and we may overlook the complexity with providing appropriate care to those whose freedoms must be restricted. Our lack of interest only helps to exacerbate this internally isolating condition: “[f]eeling that they are abused by inmates, unappreciated by superiors, unsupported by colleagues, guards tend to think they are fighting a lost cause” (Poole and Regoli 1981:258). This situation engenders meaninglessness in the work. Public support and recognition for prison work would begin to undermine this meaninglessness. Public support may also empower prison workers to continue to adhere to the keeper philosophy even when aggravated by persistent manipulation, intimidation, or even verbal and physical assault.

Prisons may no longer be protected institutions. Recent debates have pondered the size of the prison population and the subsequent cost.¹⁰⁴ Rational early release (Aos and Drake 2010) and redirection of certain classes of offenders (Kleinman et al 2007) already occur in certain jurisdictions. The Bureau of Prisons promotes innovation in effective prisoner programming. But recidivism rates suggest inadequacies in prison programming and/or in released offenders. Selection effects make it difficult to assess the effects of the prison environment on ex-prisoners (Useem and Piehl 2008). But unless prison workers perceive their work to be meaningful – and for their investment of time and effort to be worthwhile – then implementation of effective programming into prisons is unlikely. Indeed, alienation of prison workers may directly hamper effective innovation implementation, which may prevent adequate drops in prison populations in the coming years. Injecting meaning, purpose, and communal responsibility into prison work may be possible without

¹⁰⁴ Over 2.3 million men and women are in prisons and jails (Carson and Sabol 2012; Minton 2012), costing an estimated \$60 billion annually. Notably, Texas is closing prisons (Ward 2013).

compromising safety. The results here suggest that skill provision and respect dramatically improve institutional commitment and efficacy. Efforts should therefore be made to maximize this effect and minimize the negative effects of alienation on prison workers.

It is possible that future success of prisons may be based on their ability to “fix” offenders. With recidivism rates as high as they are – with 4 in 10 returning to state prisons within three years (Pew Center on the States 2011) – it is not clear that the public will not begin to demand more from the price of institutionalization. Research may identify effective programming for current offenders. But if prisons are not held accountable for successful implementation then there is no incentive to implement those programs and to ensure that implementation is successful. If most who go in eventually get out then it is in our interest to ensure that one main goal of prison management is the reduction in recidivism. This study suggests that empowerment, transparency, and skill provision dramatically improve institutional commitment and efficacy in inmate management.¹⁰⁵ These improvements may make prison environments fertile grounds for program innovation. In addition, empowerment may improve humane treatment of prisoners, which may increase the public’s opinion of the prison worker (subsequently improving the meaning in the work).

Prison should work for the prisoner *and* for the prison worker. Increasing the perception that he is of value and contributes substantially to the success of the prison likely will improve the possibility that advanced programming can be introduced not as an undue “advantage” to the inmate but rather as a tool to further the prison worker’s own personal success, his unit’s success, and his institution’s success at actually making the world less dangerous.

¹⁰⁵ Importantly, the efficacy measure implicitly includes personal investment in the work for the prison worker. Increasing personal investment will increase concern over outcomes in success and failure of day-to-day operations.

Implications for the Bureau of Prisons

This study assessed the often-overlooked population of prison workers. It should not be assumed that all prison workers uniformly perceive their environment and their role in their environment. But certain perspectives appear to increase the perception of efficacy, institutional commitment, and emotional hardening. Increases in commitment will make workers more effective team players and better contributors to prison management and to the Bureau of Prisons as a whole. Similarly, increases in perceived efficacy will potentially create more valuable employees as it increases confidence and injects meaning into a difficult job. The strict keeper philosophy may also be bolstered by decreases in alienation. Although security should not be undermined, solidarity may be increased – and hence alienation reduced – by establishing institutional goals that generate a sense of a collective.¹⁰⁶

Prisoner management is the primary goal of prison. Two helpful conclusions regarding direct prisoner management can be drawn from these results: (1) constructive power improves perception of efficacy; and (2) alienation aggravates perception of efficacy. Notably, solutions to improve management techniques do not necessarily require dramatic shifts in policy or practice. Prison workers respond favorably to respect and to official training. Supervisory training should ensure that prison workers are empowered and provided adequate skills to complete daily tasks. Supervisors should be selected based partly on their ability to employ referent power and their belief in the goals of the Bureau of Prisons. Empowerment through reverence improves overall management. Results also indicate that expert power – obtained through BOP training – is beneficial. It is reasonable to postulate that increasing trainings (and ensuring that they are directly applicable to job completion) will further improve commitment and efficacy among prison workers.

¹⁰⁶ For example, generating a prison with the lowest recidivism rate may become a point of pride.

In addition, limiting discretion, increasing rule ambiguity and isolating officers effectively undermines management pursuits. This alienation of prison workers directly harms prisoner management. Supervisors will benefit from including line staff in decision-making strategies and allowing them to articulate specific methods for problem solving. The hierarchy will also benefit from establishing clear and transparent rules for inmates and workers alike. Understanding appropriate and inappropriate behaviors – clearly marked – improve workers' perception of efficacy. The prison hierarchy can also reinforce the purpose and value of prison work and acknowledge exemplary performances through pay increase and formal ceremonies. Injecting meaning into the employment is complicated but it serves to improve prisoner management.

The prison worker has chosen to work in a difficult and stressful environment. His charges may be violent and antisocial men and women. Acknowledging this reality, giving him the tools for success, and clarifying the rules will greatly improve his perception of success (and will most likely improve his overall mental, physical, and emotional health). The belief that the work is meaningful and that one is successful at the work may increase job tenure and reduce turnover and absenteeism. Ultimately, I propose here that communication and solidarity among prison workers improves the efficiency of the prison. The public wants humane and safe prisons (DiIulio 1987). It is conceded that the exploitation of inmates garners greater sympathy – since they are detained by force – than the exploitation of Correctional Officers – since they are in prison by choice. Mistreatment of detained populations may lead to aggressive campaigns that undermine the necessity and value of detention centers. By definition, prison factors that harm Correctional Officers are unintended and perhaps overlooked. But it would be unfortunate to assume that we cannot

do anything to improve the work environment for the prison worker *and* increase the effectiveness of the prison. Targeted improvement in supervision tactics – specifically recognizing hard work, clearly defining expectations, and valuing individual opinions – will improve overall prisoner management.

The results of this study also indicate that certain adjustments to the Prison Social Climate Survey may improve future research endeavors. The PSCS is only able to address the perception of organizational climate and of work performance. But it may be beneficial to match worker perception of efficacy with a supervisor's evaluation of worker efficacy. This would provide an objective measurement, and an additional tool, for assessing worker performance (and, subsequently, predictors of worker performance). It would also help to see if perception is indeed positively correlated with performance. In addition, the measures for this study had to be generated from a reduced sample due to the fact that four questionnaires are administered to prison workers. It may be beneficial to administer one questionnaire and therefore increase sample size. Lastly, I would suggest that any adopted questionnaire in the future uses a criminal justice theory of prisons as its basis. As I have proposed here, I believe that alienation and power are an appropriate way to consider prison management and that questions that draw on these processes will greatly improve the effectiveness of prisoner oversight.

Future Research

This study assessed prison workers in the highly centralized federal system. These findings should be replicated and applied to state facilities. In particular, research should evaluate (1) the generation, perception, and employment of power within facilities and (2) the impact of alienation and power adoptions on efficacy and emotional hardening. Further

attempts should also be made to understand what specifically reduces prison workers perception of innovations within facilities. This is not a question of belief in programming or in treatment per se, but rather an inquiry into whether workers will accept novel approaches to actual prisoner management. Future research should also assess differences in inmate populations across similar security levels and ascertain those effects on prison worker commitment and efficacy. Research in corrections should also target differences across prisons and begin to undress uniformity. All prison institutions are not homogenous. Research should begin to assess divergence, specifically evaluating whether prisons vary in recidivism rates of released offenders.

Closing Remarks

There is no comparable institution to that of the prison. Prisons forcibly confine ostensibly *rational* populations that are neither satisfied nor comforted by their detainment. In addition, prison management in the US has followed a unique trajectory that calls for unique assessment. Solutions to reduce prisoner violence have been effective but with 2.3 million men and women in prisons and jails in the US (Carson and Sabol 2012; Minton 2012) and recidivism rates as high as 67% (Langan and Levin 2002), research must begin to assess how to implement effective programming within this distinct institution. This study begins to address the factors that help to empower prison workers and improve their perception of their own institutions and of prisoner management. Management strategies and prisoner programming will not succeed without prison worker acceptance (see Rogers 2003). That which empowers workers and improves their perceptions of inmate management will also facilitate implementation of innovation.

Appendix

Correlation Tables

Table 1. Correlation among Power adoptions and outcomes (2007)

	INSTCOM	EFFICACY	LEGIT_1	LEGIT_2	EXPERT	COERCVE	REFRENT	REWARD
INSTCOM	1.0000							
EFFICACY	0.2867	1.0000						
LEGIT_1	0.5865	0.3786	1.0000					
LEGIT_2	0.3741	0.2464	0.5166	1.0000				
EXPERT	0.4283	0.3441	0.5822	0.4395	1.0000			
COERCVE	-0.2124	-0.1024	-0.2881	-0.3957	-0.2736	1.0000		
REFRENT	0.3887	0.3719	0.5426	0.7027	0.4695	-0.4144	1.0000	
REWARD	0.2888	0.1828	0.4344	0.5460	0.3186	-0.2098	0.4391	1.0000

Table 2. Correlation among alienation measures and outcomes (2007)

	EFFICACY	HARDENED	ALIENTED	MENGLSS	POWRLESS	NORMLSS	ISOLTED	ESTRNGED
EFFICACY	1.0000							
HARDENED	-0.2161	1.0000						
ALIENTED	-0.4576	0.4175	1.0000					
MENGLSS	-0.3668	0.3671	0.8638	1.0000				
POWRLESS	-0.3174	0.3451	0.7857	0.6586	1.0000			
NORMLSS	-0.3458	0.3641	0.8685	0.6727	0.6133	1.0000		
ISOLTED	-0.3836	0.2888	0.7131	0.4402	0.3833	0.6523	1.0000	
ESTRNGED	-0.4176	0.2843	0.7267	0.6122	0.4374	0.4720	0.3971	1.0000

Correlations between alienation and power measures and demographics all lower than 0.2. Not shown.

Table 3. Correlation among Power adoptions and outcomes (2008)

	INSTCOM	EFFICACY	LEGIT_1	LEGIT_2	EXPERT	COERCVE	REFRENT	REWARD
INSTCOM	1.0000							
EFFICACY	0.3036	1.0000						
LEGIT_1	0.6099	0.4250	1.0000					
LEGIT_2	0.4184	0.2637	0.5121	1.0000				
EXPERT	0.4702	0.3733	0.6082	0.4742	1.0000			
COERCVE	-0.2634	-0.1361	-0.3026	-0.4219	-0.2958	1.0000		
REFRENT	0.4419	0.3773	0.5442	0.7016	0.5005	-0.4219	1.0000	
REWARD	0.3068	0.2122	0.4079	0.5392	0.3258	-0.2208	0.4396	1.0000

Table 4. Correlation among alienation measures and outcomes (2008)

	EFFICACY	HARDENED	ALIENTED	MENGLSS	POWRLESS	NORMLSS	ISOLTED	ESTRNGED
EFFICACY	1.0000							
HARDENED	-0.2233	1.0000						
ALIENTED	-0.5155	0.4364	1.0000					
MENGLSS	-0.4440	0.3820	0.8812	1.0000				
POWRLESS	-0.3640	0.3885	0.7851	0.6725	1.0000			
NORMLSS	-0.3989	0.3922	0.8772	0.7038	0.6319	1.0000		
ISOLTED	-0.3888	0.2558	0.6803	0.4259	0.3451	0.6250	1.0000	
ESTRNGED	-0.4644	0.3031	0.7377	0.6459	0.4364	0.4895	0.3813	1.0000

Correlations between alienation and power measures and demographics all lower than 0.3. Not shown.

Table 5. Correlation among Power adoptions and outcomes (2009)

	INSTCOM	EFFICACY	LEGIT_1	LEGIT_2	EXPERT	COERCVE	REFRENT	REWARD
INSTCOM	1.0000							
EFFICACY	0.2556	1.0000						
LEGIT_1	0.5697	0.3916	1.0000					
LEGIT_2	0.3870	0.2439	0.5160	1.0000				
EXPERT	0.4072	0.3602	0.5872	0.4203	1.0000			
COERCVE	-0.2056	-0.1086	-0.2699	-0.4046	-0.2830	1.0000		
REFRENT	0.4101	0.3783	0.5519	0.7053	0.4713	-0.4113	1.0000	
REWARD	0.2845	0.1824	0.4385	0.5430	0.3378	-0.2237	0.4403	1.0000

Table 6. Correlation among alienation measures and outcomes (2009)

	EFFICACY	HARDENED	ALIENTED	MENGLSS	POWRLESS	NORMLSS	ISOLTED	ESTRNGED
EFFICACY	1.0000							
HARDENED	-0.2177	1.0000						
ALIENTED	-0.4764	0.4195	1.0000					
MENGLSS	-0.3964	0.3551	0.8755	1.0000				
POWRLESS	-0.2885	0.3570	0.7697	0.6445	1.0000			
NORMLSS	-0.3973	0.3636	0.8784	0.6949	0.6150	1.0000		
ISOLTED	-0.4137	0.2820	0.7010	0.4451	0.3472	0.6584	1.0000	
ESTRNGED	-0.4026	0.3007	0.7266	0.6384	0.4216	0.4744	0.3741	1.0000

Table 7. Correlation among Power adoptions and outcomes (2010)

	INSTCOM	EFFICACY	LEGIT_1	LEGIT_2	EXPERT	COERCIVE	REFRENT	REWARD
INSTCOM	1.0000							
EFFICACY	0.2556	1.0000						
LEGIT_1	0.5628	0.3880	1.0000					
LEGIT_2	0.3984	0.2587	0.5436	1.0000				
EXPERT	0.3935	0.3832	0.5896	0.4619	1.0000			
COERCIVE	-0.2000	-0.0718	-0.2802	-0.4022	-0.2688	1.0000		
REFRENT	0.4007	0.3635	0.5746	0.7073	0.5009	-0.3946	1.0000	
REWARD	0.3155	0.2210	0.4466	0.5582	0.3589	-0.2186	0.4899	1.0000

Table 8. Correlation among alienation measures and outcomes (2010)

	EFFICACY	HARDENED	ALIENTD	MENGLSS	POWRLESS	NORMLSS	ISOLTED	ESTRNGED
EFFICACY	1.0000							
HARDENED	-0.2407	1.0000						
ALIENTD	-0.4815	0.4151	1.0000					
MENGLSS	-0.3955	0.3586	0.8742	1.0000				
POWRLESS	-0.3356	0.3419	0.7969	0.6664	1.0000			
NORMLSS	-0.3819	0.3770	0.8813	0.6990	0.6484	1.0000		
ISOLTED	-0.4326	0.2955	0.7231	0.4632	0.4199	0.6656	1.0000	
ESTRNGED	-0.4046	0.2898	0.7360	0.6469	0.4473	0.4958	0.4002	1.0000

Table 9. Correlation between institutional level variables (2006)

	SUPERVIS	ORIENTTN	FEAR	PRSN_AGE	GENDER	RACE_BLK	ADMSTR	SEC_HGH
SUPERVIS	1.0000							
ORIENTTN	-0.0432	1.0000						
FEAR	-0.2005	0.1842	1.0000					
PRSN_AGE	0.0611	-0.0595	-0.1468	1.0000				
GENDER	0.3012	-0.2152	-0.3655	-0.0865	1.0000			
RACE_BLK	-0.1125	-0.1193	-0.0666	-0.0320	0.2620	1.0000		
ADMSTR	0.1100	0.0803	0.0138	-0.1145	0.1699	0.1832	1.0000	
SEC_HGH	0.0503	0.0297	0.4850	-0.2033	-0.2784	-0.1469	-0.1554	1.0000
SEC_OMED	-0.2111	0.0257	0.1619	-0.0635	-0.1620	-0.0300	-0.3433	-0.2844
SEC_OLOW	-0.0405	-0.1568	-0.3406	0.2393	0.0631	0.0381	-0.2646	-0.2193
SEC_OMIN	0.2882	-0.0324	-0.3881	0.1471	0.3514	-0.0606	-0.1108	-0.0918
RGN_MDA	-0.0099	-0.0905	-0.0670	-0.0152	0.1045	-0.0326	-0.1215	0.0717
RGN_MW	0.1347	0.1514	0.0888	0.2091	-0.0470	-0.2903	-0.0000	-0.0123
RGN_NE	-0.1094	0.1020	0.0472	-0.0599	-0.1217	-0.1493	0.0764	-0.0040
RGN_SE	0.0364	-0.0749	-0.0202	-0.0601	0.0425	0.4625	-0.0196	-0.0281
RGN_SW	-0.0677	-0.1206	-0.0130	0.0034	0.1134	0.0892	0.0425	-0.0281
RGN_W	0.0152	0.0425	-0.0366	-0.0802	-0.1028	-0.1105	0.0213	0.0048

	SEC_MED	SEC_LOW	SEC_MIN	RGN_MDA	RGN_MW	RGN_NE	RGN_SE	RGN_SW
SEC_MED	1.0000							
SEC_LOW	-0.4845	1.0000						
SEC_MIN	-0.2028	-0.1563	1.0000					
RGN_MDA	0.0520	-0.0484	0.0897	1.0000				
RGN_MW	0.0322	-0.1146	0.0817	-0.1936	1.0000			
RGN_NE	0.0026	0.0057	-0.1108	-0.1875	-0.1936	1.0000		
RGN_SE	0.0881	-0.0870	0.0670	-0.2058	-0.2125	-0.2058	1.0000	
RGN_SW	-0.1908	0.2181	-0.0273	-0.2058	-0.2125	-0.2058	-0.2258	1.0000
RGN_W	0.0222	0.0209	-0.1071	-0.1813	-0.1872	-0.1813	-0.1989	-0.1989

Table 10. Correlation between institutional level variables (2007)

	SUPERVIS	ORIENTTN	FEAR	PRSN_AGE	GENDER	RACE_BLK	ADMSTR	SEC_HGH
SUPERVIS	1.0000							
ORIENTTN	-0.2292	1.0000						
FEAR	-0.3009	0.2645	1.0000					
PRSN_AGE	-0.0976	-0.0689	-0.3198	1.0000				
GENDER	0.1489	-0.2152	-0.3169	-0.0246	1.0000			
RACE_BLK	-0.1253	0.0313	0.0257	0.0554	0.3061	1.0000		
ADMSTR	0.0947	-0.1261	-0.0311	-0.0951	0.1412	0.1333	1.0000	
SEC_HGH	-0.0270	0.2222	0.4938	-0.2256	-0.2172	-0.1861	-0.1652	1.0000
SEC_MED	0.0085	0.0307	0.1765	-0.0893	-0.2503	0.0191	-0.3350	-0.3013
SEC_LOW	-0.1390	-0.0346	-0.3191	0.2704	0.1191	0.0427	-0.2588	-0.2327
SEC_MIN	0.2043	-0.2049	-0.4291	0.1593	0.3978	-0.0356	-0.1086	-0.0977
RGN_MDA	0.2412	-0.0707	0.0515	-0.0191	0.0183	0.0118	-0.1253	0.1071
RGN_MW	-0.1005	0.0196	-0.1034	0.1411	-0.0913	-0.3009	0.0033	-0.0317
RGN_NE	0.0238	0.0554	-0.0299	-0.0372	-0.1228	-0.1644	0.0794	-0.0232
RGN_SE	-0.1209	0.0878	0.0901	-0.0386	0.0958	0.4445	-0.0160	-0.0477
RGN_SW	-0.0546	-0.1078	0.0159	0.0243	0.1191	0.0939	0.0458	-0.0477
RGN_W	0.0190	0.0181	-0.0298	-0.0722	-0.0311	-0.1127	0.0136	0.0477

	SEC_MED	SEC_LOW	SEC_MIN	RGN_MDA	RGN_MW	RGN_NE	RGN_SE	RGN_SW
SEC_MED	1.0000							
SEC_LOW	-0.4721	1.0000						
SEC_MIN	-0.1981	-0.1530	1.0000					
RGN_MDA	0.0381	-0.0567	0.0835	1.0000				
RGN_MW	0.0381	-0.1094	0.0835	-0.1959	1.0000			
RGN_NE	0.0085	0.0102	-0.1086	-0.1897	-0.1897	1.0000		
RGN_SE	0.0939	-0.0816	0.0689	-0.2081	-0.2081	-0.2015	1.0000	
RGN_SW	-0.1830	0.2220	-0.0251	-0.2081	-0.2081	-0.2015	-0.2211	1.0000
RGN_W	0.0085	0.0102	-0.1086	-0.1897	-0.1897	-0.1837	-0.2015	-0.2015

Table 11. Correlation between institutional level variables (2008)

	SUPERVIS	ORIENTTN	FEAR	PRSN_AGE	GENDER	RACE_BLK	ADMSTR	SEC_OHGH
SUPERVIS	1.0000							
ORIENTTN	-0.0671	1.0000						
FEAR	-0.4339	0.3534	1.0000					
PRSN_AGE	0.1916	-0.1525	-0.2800	1.0000				
GENDER	0.0994	-0.1982	-0.2957	-0.1103	1.0000			
RACE_BLK	-0.1913	0.0489	-0.0613	-0.0511	0.2313	1.0000		
SEC_OADM	0.0382	-0.0111	-0.0262	-0.1066	0.1166	0.1812	1.0000	
SEC_OHGH	-0.0673	0.3634	0.5427	-0.2403	-0.1552	-0.2161	-0.1652	1.0000
SEC_OMED	-0.1591	0.0115	-0.1923	-0.0778	-0.1960	0.0447	-0.3289	-0.2958
SEC_OLOW	0.0798	-0.0965	-0.3254	0.2805	0.0368	0.0236	-0.2645	-0.2379
SEC_OMIN	0.2419	-0.4047	-0.5241	0.1499	0.3937	-0.0776	-0.1086	-0.0977
RGN_MDA	-0.0099	-0.0818	-0.0135	-0.0311	0.0760	-0.0179	-0.1253	0.1071
RGN_MW	0.1934	-0.0001	-0.0044	0.2142	-0.0461	-0.2923	0.0033	-0.0317
RGN_NE	-0.0097	0.0877	0.0457	-0.0486	-0.1270	-0.1420	0.0794	0.0477
RGN_SE	-0.0290	0.0684	-0.1200	-0.0520	0.1231	0.4479	-0.0160	-0.0477
RGN_SW	-0.0815	-0.0354	-0.0070	0.0108	-0.0605	0.1271	0.0458	-0.1145
RGN_W	-0.0604	-0.0390	0.1075	-0.0948	0.0299	-0.1524	0.0136	0.0477
	SEC_OMED	SEC_OLOW	SEC_OMIN	RGN_MDA	RGN_MW	RGN_NE	RGN_SE	RGN_SW
SEC_OMED	1.0000							
SEC_OLOW	-0.4737	1.0000						
SEC_OMIN	-0.1945	-0.1564	1.0000					
RGN_MDA	0.0461	-0.0647	0.0835	1.0000				
RGN_MW	-0.0021	-0.0647	0.0835	-0.1959	1.0000			
RGN_NE	-0.0331	0.0018	-0.1086	-0.1897	-0.1897	1.0000		
RGN_SE	0.1027	-0.0898	0.0689	-0.2081	-0.2081	-0.2015	1.0000	
RGN_SW	-0.1291	0.2107	-0.0251	-0.2081	-0.2081	-0.2015	-0.2211	1.0000
RGN_W	0.0161	0.0018	-0.1086	-0.1897	-0.1897	-0.1837	-0.2015	-0.2015

Table 12. Correlation between institutional level variables (2009)

	SUPERVIS	ORIENTTN	FEAR	PRSN_AGE	GENDER	RACE_BLK	ADMSTR	SEC_HIGH
SUPERVIS	1.0000							
ORIENTTN	0.0487	1.0000						
FEAR	-0.3564	0.2850	1.0000					
PRSN_AGE	0.1260	-0.0237	-0.2534	1.0000				
GENDER	0.2203	-0.3732	-0.3989	-0.0360	1.0000			
RACE_BLK	-0.1029	-0.0592	-0.1005	0.0040	0.4050	1.0000		
SEC_ADM	0.0561	0.1174	-0.0242	-0.0452	0.1048	0.1738	1.0000	
SEC_HIGH	-0.0538	0.3073	0.6352	-0.2450	-0.3108	-0.2349	-0.1500	1.0000
SEC_MED	-0.1215	-0.0894	0.1361	-0.0783	-0.1409	0.0406	-0.3049	-0.3049
SEC_LOW	-0.0592	-0.1565	-0.3763	0.2355	0.1116	0.0457	-0.2457	-0.2457
SEC_MIN	0.3627	-0.1535	-0.4344	0.1405	0.3964	-0.0643	-0.0986	-0.0986
RGN_MDA	0.0341	-0.0797	-0.0818	-0.0213	0.0959	-0.0029	-0.1028	0.1058
RGN_MW	0.1259	0.0175	-0.0268	0.2110	-0.1540	-0.2777	0.0363	-0.0333
RGN_NE	0.0210	0.1123	0.0871	-0.0414	-0.1863	-0.1727	0.0463	0.0463
RGN_SE	-0.1895	-0.0352	0.0013	-0.0362	0.1125	0.4638	-0.0415	-0.0415
RGN_SW	-0.0196	0.0540	-0.0925	-0.0310	0.0919	0.1266	0.0174	-0.1162
RGN_W	0.0340	-0.0694	0.1209	-0.0818	0.0307	-0.1589	0.0463	0.0463
	SEC_MED	SEC_LOW	SEC_MIN	RGN_MDA	RGN_MW	RGN_NE	RGN_SE	RGN_SW
SEC_MED	1.0000							
SEC_LOW	-0.4994	1.0000						
SEC_MIN	-0.2004	-0.1615	1.0000					
RGN_MDA	0.0352	-0.0752	0.0826	1.0000				
RGN_MW	-0.0130	-0.0752	0.0826	-0.1979	1.0000			
RGN_NE	-0.0437	0.0442	-0.1097	-0.1916	-0.1916	1.0000		
RGN_SE	0.1108	-0.0882	0.0751	-0.2041	-0.2041	-0.1977	1.0000	
RGN_SW	-0.0942	0.1977	-0.0262	-0.2103	-0.2103	-0.2036	-0.2169	1.0000
RGN_W	0.0056	-0.0087	-0.1097	-0.1916	-0.1916	-0.1856	-0.1977	-0.2036

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