ABSTRACT

The current study investigated pre-adolescents’ and adolescents’ attitudes about social exclusion based on cultural membership, specifically exclusion of individuals from Arab descent. Developmental intergroup research on the Arab cultural identity is sparse, and given this is a group that is highly associated with negative emotionally charged stereotypes in adults, it is important to understand the developmental origins of such attitudes. Questions about the role of stereotypes, cultural identity, shared interest in activities (e.g., hobbies), exclusive and inclusive group norms, and intergroup attributions of emotions in exclusion contexts were addressed. To answer these questions non-Arab American 12- and 16-year-olds ($N = 199$) evaluated situations in which their own group and an Arab American group of peers made decisions about inclusion and exclusion. These decisions were about a cultural ingroup target with different interests in activities or a cultural outgroup target with the same interests in activities.

Findings indicated that participants expected the Arab American group would make inclusion decisions based on the cultural identity of the target (a preference for
cultural identity over shared interests) in contrast to their own non-Arab American
group, which they expected would make decisions based on shared interest in
activities (a preference for shared activities over cultural identity). This finding was
perpetuated in groups that had exclusive group norms. Sixteen year-olds were less
inclusive toward an outgroup member than 12-year-olds and participants who
reported stereotypes about Arabs were also less inclusive toward an outgroup target.
Different emotions were attributed to an Arab American group that excluded a target
compared with an American group, evidencing more empathic attributions to
participants’ ingroup (American group). Findings from this study inform intergroup
developmental research on the role of stereotypes, and the interplay of cognition and
emotions in pre-adolescents’ and adolescents’ social decision-making in cross-
cultural interactions. Results of this study have implications for developing
interventions that foster positive intergroup peer relationships.
SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN CULTURAL CONTEXT: GROUP NORMS, FAIRNESS, AND STEREOTYPES

By

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Dedication

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my mother, Zahia and father, Antoine.

Both have been beacons of love, guidance, and support throughout my life.
Acknowledgements

The completion of this dissertation would not have been possible without the support of my family, friends, mentors, and colleagues. First, I want to thank my parents Antoine Hitti and Zahia Abboud for their unwavering support, which has been pivotal for my perseverance in my academic and scholarly endeavors. Their love and nurturance motivated me to achieve and pursue my passions. I would also like to thank my siblings, Ghassan, Wassim, Eveline, and my brother-in-law Jad Melki for all their patience, advice and encouragement throughout these years. Their support has been crucial to the completion of my doctoral program. I want to acknowledge my nieces Emesa and Eana, and nephew Naram for the inspiration they have given me in pursuing this research track and the many moments of comic relief in the midst of stressful data collection.

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Table of Contents

Dedication .......................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... iii
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... vi
List of Tables ...................................................................................................................... viii
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... ix

Chapter 1: Theoretical Rationale ..................................................................................... 1
  Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1
  Group Norms and Stereotypes ....................................................................................... 4
  Theoretical Framework .................................................................................................... 7
    Social Domain theory ..................................................................................................... 7
    Social Identity theory .................................................................................................... 9
  Overview of the Rationale for the Study ........................................................................ 10
Current Study Design ........................................................................................................ 16
  Design .............................................................................................................................. 17
  Measures .......................................................................................................................... 19
  Hypotheses ........................................................................................................................ 24
Expected Contributions to the Field .................................................................................. 28

Chapter 2: Literature Review ........................................................................................... 30
  Key Concepts and Terminology ..................................................................................... 31
  Arab American Experiences in the United States ......................................................... 33
  Group Identity and Group Norms in Exclusion Research ............................................... 38
  Theoretical Framework for Studying Exclusion .............................................................. 41
    Social Domain theory and exclusion from peer groups ............................................... 41
    Social Identity theory and children’s prejudice ............................................................. 54
  An Integrative Social Reasoning Perspective ................................................................ 63
  Stereotype Awareness ..................................................................................................... 65
  Attributions of Emotions and Exclusion ........................................................................ 68
  Present Study ................................................................................................................... 70

Chapter 3: Methodology .................................................................................................... 72
  Participants ....................................................................................................................... 72
  Procedure ........................................................................................................................ 72
  Design .............................................................................................................................. 73
  Measures .......................................................................................................................... 77
    Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes measure ....................................................... 77
    Attributions of Emotions measure ............................................................................... 78
    Force-choice condition ................................................................................................. 79
    Cultural Knowledge Task ............................................................................................. 79
    Contact with Individuals of Arab Descent measure .................................................... 81
    Demographics ............................................................................................................... 82
  Reasoning and Coding Reliability ................................................................................ 83
  Plan of Analyses .............................................................................................................. 85
Chapter 4: Results .............................................................. 87  
Cultural Knowledge Task .................................................. 88  
Knowledge about who Arabs are ......................................... 88  
Stereotypic associations made about Arab people .................. 89  
Confounding Arab and Muslim identities .............................. 89  
Contact with Individuals of Arab Descent ............................ 91  
Judgments and Reasoning about Group Inclusion .................... 91  
Group inclusion judgments ............................................... 91  
Reasoning about individual inclusion .................................. 94  
Reasoning about group inclusion ....................................... 97  
Stereotypes and Group Inclusion ........................................ 103  
Individual Inclusion Versus Group Inclusion: American Group ... 105  
Stereotypes and individual inclusion .................................... 106  
Reasoning about individual inclusion judgments ..................... 108  
Forced-choice Group Inclusion .......................................... 110  
Reasoning about forced-choice group inclusion ...................... 111  
Evaluation of the Deviant Act ............................................ 115  
Reasoning about evaluations of the exclusive group deviant ..... 116  
Attributions of Group Emotions ......................................... 119  
Reasoning about attributions of emotions ............................. 124  

Chapter 5: Discussion ......................................................... 129  
Inclusion Judgments: The Group, the Individual, and Forced-choice Decisions . 129  
Age and gender findings .................................................. 132  
Individual inclusion likelihood versus group inclusion likelihood . 135  
Forced decisions about inclusion into peer groups ................... 137  
The Role of Stereotypes on Inclusion Judgments ....................... 139  
Group Dynamics and Deviance from Groups ........................ 142  
Attributing Emotions to Groups that Exclude: Cultural Identity, Group Norms, and  
Reasoning ........................................................................ 145  
Conclusions and Future Directions ...................................... 152  

Tables .................................................................................. 156  
Figures ................................................................................ 174  
Appendices .......................................................................... 189  
Appendix A: Initial IRB Approval ......................................... 189  
Appendix B: Parent Consent Form ........................................ 191  
Appendix C: Culture, Stereotypes, and Peer Group Inclusion Survey .... 194  
References .......................................................................... 214
List of Tables

Table 1. Main Hypotheses Related to Cultural Identity

Table 2: Coding Categories for Cultural Knowledge Task and Frequency of Usage

Table 3: Coding Categories for Justifications used in *Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes* and *Attribution of Emotions* assessments

Table 4: Knowledge about Arab People and Stereotypic Associations by Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Religion and Ethnic Composition of Friendships

Table 5: Knowledge and Stereotypes by Arab/Muslim Confound

Table 6: Proportion of Reasoning Used to Justify Inclusive and Exclusive Judgments

Table 7: Individual Inclusion Reasoning about an Outgroup Target with Similar Interests

Table 8: Proportion of Reasoning Used to Judge the Acceptability of an Exclusive or Inclusive Group Deviant When the Target is an Outgroup Member with Similar Interests

Table 9: Proportions of Emotions Attributed to Each Group for Exclude an Ingroup and Outgroup Target

Table 10: Proportion of Guilty and Ashamed Emotions Attributed to an Arab American group by Gender, Group norm and Target of Exclusion

Table 11: Correlations Between Emotions Attributed and Group Inclusion Judgments
List of Figures

Figure 1. Culture and Group Dynamics Study: Conceptual Map
Figure 2. Design for Culture, Stereotypes, and Peer Group Inclusion Survey
Figure 3: Group Inclusion Judgments for Both Targets by Cultural Group Identity and Group Norm
Figure 4: Group Inclusion Judgments about an Outgroup Target with Similar Interests by Age and Gender
Figure 5: Proportion of Reasoning Used to Judge Inclusion of Both Targets into an Exclusive Group
Figure 6: Role of Stereotypic Associations on the American Group’s Inclusion Judgments about Outgroup and Ingroup targets
Figure 7: Group Inclusion: The Role of Group Norms on Those Who Make Stereotypic Associations
Figure 8: Forced-choice Group Inclusion: Choosing an Ingroup Target Over an Outgroup Target
Figure 9: Differences in Reasoning about Forced-choice Group Inclusion Based on the Cultural Identity of the Group
Figure 10: Reasoning about Choosing to Invite an Ingroup Target with Different Interests into an Exclusive and Inclusive American Group
Figure 11: Group Versus Individual Inclusion in an American Group
Figure 12: The Role of Stereotypic Associations on Individual Inclusion Judgments for Each Target
Figure 13: Evaluation of an Inclusion or Exclusive Arab American and American Deviant for Each Target

Figure 14: Reasoning about the Acceptability of a Deviant Group Member who Wants to Exclude an Outgroup Target

Figure 15: Proportion of Moral and Group Dynamics Reasoning Used Based on Negative or Positive Attributions of Emotions
Chapter 1: Theoretical Rationale

Introduction

Social exclusion in childhood is complex and research has been focused on understanding its origins, sources, and developmental trajectories (Killen & Rutland, 2011). Researchers have investigated an array of manifestations of exclusion such as peer rejection, focusing on individual traits that contribute to an individual being excluded (e.g., wariness or fearfulness; see Rubin et al., 2006), as well as intergroup attitudes, which have revealed how stereotypic expectations about other ethnic groups can contribute to social exclusion (Brenick, Henning, Killen, O'Connor, & Collins, 2007). At times, when children exclude someone who happens to be shy, their reason for excluding may not be related to the individual’s shyness but related to their cultural identity (Killen, Mulvey, & Hitti, 2012). For children who are members of a cultural minority, and who may already feel like outsiders, exclusion may impede healthy adjustment to school environments. The current study examined how intergroup attitudes, particularly regarding cultural identity, group norms, and stereotypic expectations, are related to exclusion of cultural minority children, specifically children of Arab descent living in the United States.

Arab as a cultural outgroup category is important to consider given that Arabs have been stigmatized because of associations with terrorism and negative portrayals in the media and due to the fact that it is an understudied outgroup in developmental research. While researchers have studied exclusion in groups based on gender, race and ethnicity over the past decade (Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Killen, 2007), less child development research in the United States has been conducted about groups based on
nationality, cultural heritage and religion (Hitti, Mulvey, & Killen, 2011). Children’s intergroup attitudes regarding nationality, cultural heritage and religion in the United States are not well understood, and studies with adults indicate that these identities can be and often are confounded with each other in the public arena (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh & Qasmiyeh, 2010; Guenther, Pendaz, & Makene, 2011). Given that cultural minority groups are associated with multiple intersecting categories, this makes them prone to being associated with stereotypes linked to each category.

Investigating attitudes held by those who are not of Arab descent about their Arab American peers presents a unique opportunity to explore the intersecting and often overlapping categories of culture, religion, and nationality. This is due, in part, to confusions that exist in a majority of the American population who are unfamiliar with Arab culture, regarding whether Arabs are identified by their religion, cultural heritage or nation of origin (Ibish, 2003; Naber, 2000). While Christian Arab families migrated to the United States beginning in the late 1880s, more recently, both Christian and Muslim Arab families have embarked on this migration trek. Post 9/11 created a new set of concerns for Arab Americans due to the frequently voiced negative stereotypes portrayed by the media and politicians in association with terrorism (Shaheen, 2003; Trevino, Kanso, & Nelson, 2010). Contrary to pervasive conceptions in the United States, Arab Americans are a highly diverse group in terms of nationality and religion, with ancestry in many Arabic-speaking countries, and religions varying from Muslim, Christian and Druze, among other religious denominations.
With the influx of Arabs fleeing conflict in the Middle East and migrating to Western countries, more Americans are coming in contact with people of Arab descent. Thus, many children in schools are meeting children of Arab descent for the first time without much information about where they came from. Non-Arab children who encounter peers of Arab descent are required to coordinate information about cultural identities, cultural expectations, and stereotypes associated with Arab people. An understanding of culture identity in this context may be related to knowledge about customs and traditions regarding dress, food and music, or cultural practices related to parental upbringing practices (e.g., how to interact with friends or adults). This study was not designed to measure values and beliefs that children may live by due to their cultural surroundings (e.g., psychological factors that determine individualistic and collectivistic orientations or the value they assign to adhering to or challenging social or cultural norms), but rather to capture preliminary data of what knowledge children had about people of Arab backgrounds. It was not known what information American children had about their peers of Arab descent. In addition whether non-Arab children conceive of their Arab peers as culturally different and expect them to behave in different ways is an open question. To a large extent, the focus of this study was on how children and adolescents evaluate exclusion of a cultural group that has experienced stigmatization and exclusion.

Recent research has shown that children and individuals of Arab descent are at times treated differently and are associated with negative traits. Research has documented examples of misconceptions and stereotypes about Arab Americans as well as a high rate of prejudice and discrimination aimed at this group (Flanagan,
Syvertsen, Gill, Gallay, & Cumsille, 2009; Ibish, 2001, 2003). It has also been found that among adults, stereotypes about Arab groups are emotionally charged due to their association with the 9/11 attacks (Dasgupta, DeSteno, Williams, & Hunsinger, 2009). What has not been examined is how children and adolescents coordinate what they know about these groups into their social decision-making and whether their social experiences, in the form of contact with Arabs, inform these decisions. Evaluating these dimensions in the context of peer exclusion scenarios provides an opportunity to assess children’s and adolescents’ moral considerations regarding the welfare of those being excluded and the fairness involved in being inclusive.

Group Norms and Stereotypes

One way to developmentally investigate intergroup attitudes toward cultural minority groups is to explore the role of group norms in children’s and adolescents’ exclusion or inclusion decisions. When making the decision to include others into one’s own cultural group, several factors may be at play, three of which are noteworthy in cross-cultural intergroup contexts. One factor would be children’s developing knowledge of how groups work (i.e., group dynamics). Understanding group dynamics reflects an effort to enhance one’s own group by ensuring group goals are met and group functioning is maintained (Abrams, Hogg, & Marques, 2005). If a cultural minority group is associated with negative stereotypes, including a member of this group into one’s own group might deflect from the goal of positive ingroup identity and ingroup cohesion. In addition, stereotypic expectations about the norms of a cultural outgroup (e.g., “that group doesn’t like foreigners”) may deter individuals from interacting with members of that group.
Given the pervasiveness of homophily in children’s friendship choices (Rubin, Fredstrom, & Bowker, 2008), the second factor is the extent to which members of a cultural minority are viewed as similar to members of the majority group. Thus, the choice of friendship or inclusion of peers into one’s social group may be based on similar cultural identity or based on shared interests, values, and beliefs (Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 2006). How children define “similarity” in a cross-cultural context is an open question, especially when variables other than cultural identity, such as similar interests in activities, are made salient. Stereotypic associations made about an outgroup culture may interfere with the extent to which a member of the host society might view individuals from that outgroup as similar. In addition, cultural expectations about conforming to group norms to establish common grounds for interaction can either help or hinder cross-cultural friendships. If a cultural minority is viewed as non-conforming to a cultural majority’s conventions, such as dress codes or activity-based interests, he or she might be seen as too different.

A third factor influencing children’s inclusion choices within a cross-cultural context has to do with prescriptive norms of how to treat others (Killen & Brenick, 2011). If cultural majority peers celebrate diversity, mutual respect and fair treatment of others, they would be more inclined to include someone from a different culture into their group. Alternatively, majority children who expect their own cultural group to be prejudiced or treat a cultural minority unfairly, may not be inclusive out of concern for the minority peer’s welfare. Therefore, children must coordinate between their moral understanding about how to treat others and conventional norms that serve to promote positive group identity, functioning and interests. A central goal of this
study would be to test which factors are given priority in a cultural majority/minority intergroup peer encounter.

Investigating non-Arab children’s and adolescents’ attitudes towards Arab Americans, a group associated with negative stereotypes in the United States can illuminate the extent to which stereotypic expectations interfere with the emergence of social decision-making within an intergroup context. A developmental perspective provides a unique window into the acquisition of these concepts. This is particularly the case at this point in cultural history, given that negative expectations about individuals of Arab descent have recently increased within the past decade (Ibish, 2008). Thus, studying this phenomenon provides a contrast to race (which has the history of slavery in the United States for 200 years) and recent immigrants such as Latinos (which is highly charged due to immigration policies and the dramatic increase in the proportional representation in regions of the United States such as the Southwest and West Coast). Including Arab Americans as the focus of a developmental intergroup study provides a unique opportunity to study the emergence of the role of stereotypes and social experience on judgments and evaluations in an exclusionary context. Measures of emotional attributions in an intergroup exclusionary context that is clouded with emotionally charged stereotypic associations, furthers an understanding of the interplay between emotions and judgments (Turiel & Killen, 2010) in intergroup relations. In the current study, children’s judgments about group norms endorsing inclusion and exclusion of others, and their criteria for inclusion reflecting common interests in activities, as well as common group identity, were investigated in the context of Arab American and non-
Arab American peer groups. Judgments about group members who deviate from
group norms and challenge norms related to inclusivity and exclusivity were also
assessed to provide further insight into developing knowledge of group processes and
morality.

**Theoretical Framework**

To carry out the present investigation, a social reasoning theoretical
perspective was adopted (Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010). This perspective reflects
an integration of a developmental theory about children’s social-cognitive
development, Social Domain theory (Turiel, 1983) and a theory predominantly used
to guide intergroup relations research in adulthood, Social Identity theory (SIT: Tajfel
& Turner, 1979). These two theories coupled with developmental offshoots of SIT
(Social Identity Developmental theory (Nesdale & Fless,er, 2001) and Developmental
Subjective Group Dynamics (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003)) were used to
inform expectations related to group norms and group identity, but also expectations
about children’s moral and social-conventional reasoning about social judgments in
an intergroup context.

**Social Domain theory.** Extensive research has shown that children reason
about their social interactions using three domains of social knowledge. These
domains include: (a) the moral domain, which pertains to issues related to a
prescriptive understanding of fair and just inter-individual treatment; (b) the societal
domain, which reflects issues related to authority dependent conventions, customs
and rules that can be altered; and (c) the psychological domain, which reflect personal
choices related to one’s autonomy and individual preferences (Nucci, 1981; Smetana,
Children are able to differentiate between these domains by considering rules and norms associated with them and judging how generalizable and alterable they are and how punishable violations of such rules are. For example, morally relevant rules or norms tend to be viewed as universal, unalterable, and violations are considered punishable; but, societal rules or norms are not considered to be generalizable to other cultures and countries, but can be altered by authorities and violations and are less punishable than violations of moral rules.

Intergroup exclusion is considered to be a multifaceted interaction to the extent that children consider both moral and social-conventional norms when making such decisions (Killen, Margie, & Sinno, 2006). Deciding to exclude someone from a peer group involves many conflicting concerns. On the one hand, excluding a person can cause that person harm and reflect a violation of one’s (or a group’s) moral code to be inclusive, yet, on the other hand, including someone who affiliates with a cultural minority might be disruptive to group functioning and to maintaining a positive group identity. How children resolve this conflict or expect their peer groups to resolve this conflict is central to understanding their attitudes toward Arab peers and other cultural minorities in the United States. One way to explore children’s conflict resolution approaches in an intergroup context is to adopt methods used by Social Domain theorists and acquire children’s justification for judgments about inclusion or exclusion.

Intergroup research from a Social Domain theory approach has shown that children and adolescents often reject race-based exclusion because of moral concerns about fairness and the harm it causes to the excluded, but sometimes they find
exclusion to be acceptable. The reasons they cite for the acceptability of exclusion reflect concerns for group functioning; concerns for maintaining group identity; stereotypes about racial outgroups; and personal preferences. Social Identity theory can be useful in further explaining why an individual’s social identity (e.g., racial, ethnic, cultural membership) might be perceived to hinder group functioning, or is used to make personal preference judgments that lead to exclusion.

**Social Identity theory.** SIT contends that individuals seek to enhance their ingroup’s positivity and, to this end, carry out social comparisons with other groups thus increasing distinctions between their ingroup and an outgroup. In adults, this often leads to prejudice toward outgroup members. Developmental perspectives of Social Identity theory (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Nesdale & Flesser, 2001) build on the theory by identifying the conditions under which children’s ingroup preference and outgroup negativity develop. Research from a Social Identity Developmental theory (Nesdale & Flesser, 2001) perspective has shown that prejudice along ethnic lines develops under conditions of heightened levels of group identification, perceived outgroup threat and the existence of an ingroup norm to be exclusive. While young children (between 5 and 7 years) do exhibit preferences for racial and ethnic ingroup members, with age, children begin to incorporate combinations of the latter factors into their judgments about outgroup members, whereas younger children might make judgments relying on only one (Nesdale, Durkin, Maass, & Griffiths, 2005; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011; Nesdale, Maass, Durkin, & Griffiths, 2005).
Researchers working from a Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics approach (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003) assert that when making judgments about both ingroup and outgroup members, group norms as well as group membership are taken into consideration. Children coordinate their knowledge about ingroup norms with what they know about outgroup norms and make both intragroup and intergroup decisions based on this knowledge, with the goal to enhance ingroup identity. Research from this perspective found that with age and growing knowledge about groups, children focus heavily on group norms and are not favorable to ingroup members who violate them, but are more accepting of outgroup members who support their ingroup norms. Thus, as children get older, judgments are made based on group norms more so than group identity. This signifies the sophisticated social cognitive processes that children undergo in their social decision-making, as they incorporate information about group identity, group norms and group dynamics. However, little is known about the priority children and adolescents give to different types of group norms (for exception see Killen, Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey, & Hitti, 2012). In an intergroup context, are prescriptive norms related to fair treatment of others and inclusivity (moral norms), more important than group norms related to optimal group functioning (social-conventional norms)?

**Overview of the Rationale for the Study**

The general goal of this project was to examine how children and adolescents evaluated inclusion and exclusion in peer groups. The focus was on how children internally negotiated and reasoned about including or excluding a peer representing an Arab cultural minority. What social cognitive knowledge did children draw on
when making such decisions? When thinking about including an Arab cultural minority that is associated with negative stereotypes, did they focus on stereotypic associations, their understanding about group processes, or a moral inclination to treat others fairly?

To answer these questions, participants were asked to evaluate same-gender peer groups that differ along two dimensions: (a) *cultural identity* (Arab American and non-Arab American); (b) *group norms* (inclusive and exclusive); and were making decisions to include or exclude a *target of inclusion* who’s characteristics varied based on group identity and an interest in activities. The target was either a cultural outgroup target who shared the group’s interest in activity, or a cultural ingroup target with different interests in activity. It is important to disentangle shared group identity from other group conventions related to group practices (e.g., having similar interests in activities), as it provides an understanding of the underlying reasons behind prejudicial judgments.

Often children may choose to exclude a racial minority from a racial majority group on the bases of making the group work well (Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002). What is not known from a child’s perspective is whether groups work well based on maintaining common group identity or maintaining other common group conventions. Which commonalities or similarities are given more weight, and whether there are developmental differences in how children and adolescents think about ‘similarity’ when using it to justify efficient group functioning was investigated in the current study. While both maintaining common group identity and having shared interests with members of a group serve to improve
group functioning, the former can be a proxy for negative outgroup biases that are based on stereotypic assumptions (Killen & Brenick, 2011). Focusing on a highly stereotypic cultural minority, such as Arab Americans, helps identify the situations in which children give priority to cultural identity or shared interest. Imposing group norms of inclusivity (e.g., “We invite kids who are different from us.”) and exclusivity (e.g., “We only invite kids who are similar to us.”) serves to identify children’s understanding of similarities or differences when it comes to cross-cultural encounters. The current study incorporated both group norms and a cultural identity associated with emotionally charged negative stereotypes to disentangle shared group practices (e.g., reasons to maintain group functioning) from cultural group identity. Thus when children choose to prioritize shared interests in activities over cultural group identity they exhibit cross-cultural inclusivity, but when they choose to focus on cultural identity at the cost of shared interests in activities this reflects cross-cultural exclusivity (see Figure 1). Those who held stereotypes about Arab people were expected to rely on cultural membership to make inclusion decisions, especially when their own group had an exclusive norm.

Developmental intergroup research yielded findings addressing the significant yet nuanced role that group norms play in children’s and adolescents’ intergroup attitudes. For example, research by Nesdale and colleagues (Nesdale, 2008) has shown that group norms of being inclusive or exclusive influence how favorable children (7- and 10-year-olds) are toward an ethnic outgroup member (i.e., if your group has an exclusion norm you would favor an outgroup member less). These norms, however, influenced older participants more than younger ones. Therefore,
when peer groups have exclusive group norms, children are required to identify the characteristics that would best define the criterion used for entry into a group, in the current study these are either cultural identity or interests in activities.

Older children are also attuned to group norms when evaluating ingroup members who violate them. In contexts where an ingroup member displays disloyalty to a group by cheering for an opposing soccer team, specifically an English child cheering for a German team, Abrams and Rutland (Abrams & Rutland, 2008) found that in a sample of 6- to 9-year-olds, older children favored a loyal outgroup member (German child) over a disloyal ingroup member (English child). Therefore, in this context, the defining characteristic for inclusion would be loyalty to the ingroup’s soccer team rather than nationality of a child.

In other contexts, the determining characteristics for inclusion were more nuanced and had to do with whether a group member espoused positive generic norms (e.g., norms not specific to a group but are endorsed by the wider society) as opposed to gender identity and group-specific norms (Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012). In this study, Killen and colleagues investigated both moral (i.e., equal distribution of resources) and conventional (i.e., wearing a club shirt) group norms and found that 9- and 13-year-olds differentiated between different types of norms. For example, using gender-based groups, both children and adolescents preferred members of the opposite gender who supported an ingroup’s norm of distributing money equally (or wearing the club shirt) over ingroup members who advocated for more money for their own group (or did not wear the club shirt). In addition, both children and adolescents favored ingroup deviants less when they advocated for unequal
distribution of resources than when they advocated for not wearing the club shirt, suggesting group norms that violate prescriptive norms of fairness are more salient than norms that violate group traditions related clothing customs. These findings show that violations of moral norms by an ingroup member are viewed more negatively than violations of conventional norms, which bears on the current study.

The stereotypes that are associated with an Arab social category are related to aggression and terrorism (Shaheen, 2003); therefore, the salience and moral relevance of such stereotypes may sway children into using cultural identity as a determining feature for inclusion as opposed to shared interests in activities. For this reason, group identity (Arab versus non-Arab) in the current study may play a bigger role, even though in the previous study described gender identity did not.

However, evidence from another study, which assessed cross-race interactions, showed that shared interest in a sport activity played a more central role in a context where racial stereotypes have the potential of impacting children’s friendship judgments. McGlothlin and colleagues (McGlothlin & Killen, 2005; McGlothlin, Killen, & Edmonds, 2005) investigated the role of shared interest in children’s evaluations of cross-race friendships, showing that for children from heterogeneous schools, race played a secondary role in their evaluations of potential friendships between the dyads presented. Shared interest in sport was more salient than racial membership when making judgments about friendships. But, the findings were different for children from homogeneous environments. In this case, participants’ underlying biases or conceptions about different racial groups may have conflicted with a friendship convention of having shared interests. Having shared
interests in activities is a form of convention that makes groups work well (i.e., we all like the same activity, so we will all get along), while having the same social identity as members of a peer group can also enhance the group, as social identity establishes common ground in traditions, customs and history (i.e., we are all American so we all celebrate the Fourth of July).

The former studies demonstrated that differentiating between racial identity and shared interest depends on children’s social experiences (heterogeneous versus homogenous environments). Social experience and contact with outgroup members can influence stereotypic knowledge about that outgroup. While these studies did not directly disentangle the effects of stereotypes on participants’ evaluations of friendships based on racial identity, the current study directly assessed this relationship in a cross-cultural context by capturing participants’ stereotypic knowledge through direct measurement as well as by asking them to justify their inclusion choices.

Given that stereotypes associated with Arabs are emotionally charged (Dasgupta et al., 2009), it is also important to test the role of emotional attributions in an Arab/non-Arab American exclusion encounter. Most research exploring the role of emotions on intergroup attitudes is conducted with adults (Amodio & Mendoza, 2010; Mackie, Smith, & Ray, 2008; Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1991). Research that addresses the question of how emotions are used in intergroup encounters throughout development is sparse (Turiel & Killen, 2010). One recent study directly investigated emotional evaluations and attributions within a cultural minority/majority intergroup context (Malti, Killen, & Gasser, 2012). Findings showed that in this context
minority pre-adolescents and adolescents (Serbian) attributed more positive emotions (e.g., higher ratings of feeling good) to Swiss (majority) individuals who exclude Serbian peers, and both Swiss and Serbian participants attributed pride to excluders when the target of the exclusion was Serbian. Therefore, pre-adolescents and adolescents attribute different emotions to an excluder depending on the status of the excluder’s social group. How these findings might translate into an Arab versus non-Arab American peer scenario, which has the potential to be clouded with emotionally charged negative stereotypes, is not known. In addition, how group norms related to inclusion and exclusion might impact children’s attributions of emotions in an intergroup context has not yet been empirically tested. The current study embarked on both these investigations to inform the intergroup literature on the developing relationship between emotions and reasoning in cross-cultural encounters.

**Current Study Design**

Of the research studies described above, none have provided a contrast between inclusive and exclusive group norms and how they impact children’s criteria for inclusion of other peers into their groups. The peer characteristics examined in this study were those related to a highly stereotyped cultural identity, and to interests in activity in the context of Arab and non-Arab American peer encounters. Therefore, the current study aimed to address these gaps and answer questions related to the emergence of prejudice and use of stereotypes in peer group exclusion situations where the Arab culture was the focus.

Two age groups were used to test for age-related differences in children’s and adolescents’ intergroup attitudes and development of group dynamics. Most
developmental social identity research investigated the development of intergroup attitudes in children ages 6 through 10 (Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Nesdale, 2008). In these samples, it was found that older children were more attuned to group norms than younger children. In order to capture developmental trends and extend previous findings in group dynamics, the younger age group in the current study was a sample of pre-adolescents (11- and 12-year-olds, or 6th graders). Through extensive pilot testing, we were also able to conclude that non-Arab American pre-adolescents have variable knowledge about the Arab culture and thus sampling this age group helps capture emergence of stereotypic associations made with Arab groups. However, it is during adolescence that group identity becomes salient (Horn, 2003; Verkuyten & Brug, 2001). For this reason, middle adolescents (15- and 16-year-olds, or 10th graders) were sampled for the older age group in the study. Concerns for optimal group functioning and stereotype awareness becomes more salient in adolescence and play less of a role in younger children; therefore, a comparison of these two age groups would capture developmental differences in the role of group identity and stereotypes in intergroup judgments. Fifteen- and 16-year-olds would also have had ample experience with groups and a more complex knowledge about group processes than 11- and 12-year-olds, and therefore more nuanced effects of group norms could be captured with an adolescent sample.

**Design.** To test the effect of inclusive and exclusive group norms, pre-adolescents and adolescents were introduced to two peer groups, one Arab American and one non-Arab American, that adhere to one of these norms (see Figure 2 for the complete study design). In line with previous research on exclusive group norms
(Nesdale & Lawson, 2011; Nesdale, Maass, et al., 2005) the norms for each group were established describing one group as usually inviting others who are similar to them (exclusive) and the other group as usually inviting others who are different from them (inclusive). There were two versions of the survey such that, in one version, the Arab American group had a norm to be exclusive and the American group had a norm to be inclusive, while in the other version, the norms were reversed. To explore whether more weight is given to cultural identity or shared interest in activity, similar to research conducted on cross-race friendships (McGlothlin & Killen, 2005), the targets of inclusion had characteristics that either matched the group’s cultural identity but differed in interest, or did not match the group’s identity but had similar interests.

For the purposes of simplifying descriptions of the targets’ characteristics, targets who match the group identity but have different interests in activity were called the *ingroup target; different interest*, while targets who do not match the group’s identity but have similar interests in activities were called *outgroup target; similar interests*, see Figure 2. Therefore, participants read two stories, one in which an Arab American group of peers made decisions about an Arab American target that has different interests in activity than the group (*ingroup target; different interest*) and an American target who has similar interests in activities to the group (*outgroup target; similar interests*), who both would like to join the group. In contrast, the second story included an American group of peers who made decisions about an American target with different interests in activities (*ingroup target; different interest*)
interest) and an Arab American target with similar interests in activity (outgroup target; similar interests), who both would like to join the group.

Based on these stories participants responded to several assessments that captured their intergroup inclusion attitudes, intragroup judgments, emotional attributions and social cognitive reasoning which represented outcomes that reflect children social decision making in an inter-cultural context. Following these assessments, participants filled out a Cultural Knowledge Task, completed a Contact with Individuals of Arab Descent measure, and demographic information related to ethnicity, race, religion and ethnic composition of friendships. The latter served as possible predictors of children’s attitudes, judgments, and emotional attributions.

**Measures.** There were 8 measures of group dynamics and inclusion attitudes, 2 measures of group emotional attribution, 3 measures of cultural knowledge, 5 measures of contact with Arab peers and 5 demographic measures. All together they made up the Culture, Stereotypes, and Peer Group Inclusion Survey (Appendix C).

**Group dynamics and inclusion attitudes.** The following assessments reflect intergroup as well intragroup evaluations. The assessments can be grouped as reflecting evaluations of inclusion of a target from a group or individual perspective (and reasoning), evaluations of a deviant act by a group member, and forced choice inclusion from a group perspective (and reasoning), as described below.

**Group and Individual Inclusion.** A Group Inclusion assessment measured participants’ perceptions of the likelihood that a group would include the target into their group. This was a novel approach to measuring inclusion judgments as previous research on social exclusion often asks children to judge the acceptability of
excluding someone from a group (e.g., How okay or not okay is it to exclude X?) (Killen, Sinno, & Margie, 2007), as opposed to the current assessment that provides a measure of whether children expect inclusive or exclusive group behaviors. While previous research addressed the evaluative moral dimension of exclusion, the current measure required that children make predictions about the likelihood that a group would include (or exclude if the likelihood is low) a target, thus it addressed the group processes dimension of exclusion. In addition, it provided a measure of intergroup attitudes that reflects children’s expectations about how peer groups would act in intergroup contexts. Participants were also asked to justify their judgments about group inclusion, in line with methods used to analyze social cognitive reasoning from a Social Domain theory perspective (Smetana, 2006).

To provide a conceptually important contrast to the group inclusion assessments, participants were asked to make their own Individual Inclusion predictions. It was of theoretical interest to know a participant’s own individual opinion about including the target in contrast to what they expect the group would do. Research has shown that as children get older and acquire more experience with groups, they are able to better differentiate their own opinions and preferences from the groups that they belong to, while simultaneously recognizing the importance of certain dynamics to make groups work well (Abrams, Rutland, Pelletier, & Ferrell, 2009; Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012). The individual inclusion assessment allowed for a comparison between what the participants are likely to do versus what the group will do (with reasoning).
Evaluation of the Deviant Act and Reasoning. In stories where the group was inclusive, participants were introduced to a member of the group who expressed exclusive desires (e.g., likes kids who are only similar to him/her and does not want to invite X) toward each target. In stories where the group was exclusive, participants were introduced to an inclusive member who expressed the desire to invite the target. Using an Evaluation of the Deviant Act assessment, which asks participants to judge the acceptability of each deviant member’s opinion (e.g., How okay or not okay was it for Y to tell the group they should invite/not invite X?), further differentiated evaluations of inclusive and exclusive group norms. This provided a measure of the cost associated with having inclusive or exclusive beliefs that go against a group’s norm. Reasoning was also assessed to determine whether participants use moral, social-conventional, or psychological (e.g., autonomy) reasons to justify their evaluations.

Forced-choice Group Inclusion. Participants’ predictions about the likelihood of group and individual inclusion provided a measure of expectations for inclusion for each target (ingroup target; different interest and outgroup target; similar interest). However, a Forced-choice Group Inclusion assessment forced participants to make a choice between one target and the other. By providing participants with information about logistical constraints (e.g., there’s only room for one person), this item represented a measure of active social decision-making as opposed to expectations about inclusion. This assessment was adopted from several studies on social exclusion and has been found to be very informative in extracting information about actual inclusive or exclusive decision-making (Killen & Stangor, 2001). These
studies have also shown that a *Forced-choice Group Inclusion Reasoning* assessment provides further clarification as to why children make these forced-choice inclusion decisions. Given that context in which group norms of inclusion and exclusion are imposed on norms about cultural group identity and shared interest, it is especially important to learn the reasons behind children’s inclusion choices. This is because, if a child chooses to include an American peer with different interests from his/her own group of American peers who are inclusive (like people who are different), they could be making that decision based on ingroup biases or based on the premise that the group likes others who are different. Children’s justifications for their forced-choice responses clarified this.

**Attributions of Emotions.** To assess whether participants attribute differential emotions to Arab American groups versus American groups and whether that differed based on the group’s norm, they were asked to respond to an *Attributions of Group Emotions* assessment. This assessment asked children to attribute emotions to the groups of peers in each story after they have hypothetically excluded each of the targets (*ingroup target; different interest and outgroup target; similar interest*). Four positive, one neutral and four negative emotions were drawn from the attribution of emotions research, specifically those dealing with intergroup exclusion (Malti et al., 2012). This assessment served to inform how emotional attributions take form in an intergroup context where moral and conventional norms are pitted against one another. Relating this assessment to participants’ stereotypic knowledge about Arab people provided insight into the role of stereotypes on children emotional evaluations. Given that emotions can be used as evaluative information in social interactions
(Turiel & Killen, 2010), knowing whether children focus on inclusive or exclusive group norms, cultural identity or shared interest when attributing emotions to a group informs intergroup research on the salient factors driving emotional information in such contexts. Therefore, an *Attributions of Group Emotions Reasoning* assessment was given to capture that information.

**Cultural Knowledge Task.** The Cultural Knowledge Task was adopted from assessments used to identify stereotype knowledge in research with Israeli and Arab preschool children (Cole et al., 2003). After carrying out age-appropriate word modifications and extensive pilot testing, the task was reduced to three measures. Participants were asked to provide information about their knowledge of Arab people on three measures: (a) *Knowledge about Arab People*; (b) *Trait and Characteristic Associations with Arab People*; and (c) *Arab/Muslim confound*. The first two measures were answered in an open-ended format. The third measure was included in this task to assess the phenomenon, found in adults, of confounding Muslims with Arabs. Through the three measures, this task was used to gauge participants’ knowledge and awareness about Arab culture, and provided opportunity to capture any spontaneous references to stereotypic expectations made in association with Arab people. It helped provide predictions for the role of stereotypes in children’s inclusion judgments and attributions of emotions.

**Contact with Individuals of Arab Descent.** Given that social experiences and contact with outgroup peers has been shown to play a role in how children judge cross-race friendships and intergroup relations (McGlothlin & Killen, 2010; Tropp & Prenovost, 2008), five measures of contact with Arab peers or Arab culture were
included. Modified from a previous measure assessing cross-race contact (McGlothlin & Killen, 2005), this assessment was used to gauge participants exposure to peers of Arab descent and as a possible predictor of participants inclusion judgments. The five measures include varying levels of contact with Arab peers: (a) *Neighborhood*; (b) *Friends*; (c) *Conversations*; (d) *Time Spent*, and (e) *Attendance of Arab Cultural Events*.

**Demographics.** Demographic information about participants’ *Age, Gender, Ethnicity/race, Religion*, and *Ethnic Composition of Friendship Groups* were also collected. Hypotheses only pertain to age-related differences; however, gender was included to control for any differences that might arise from this demographic variable. All other variables were used to describe the study sample to learn more about who was in our sample. No information about socioeconomic status was collected since sampling focused on public schools in low middle to middle-income districts.

**Hypotheses.** The main thesis of this study was that pre-adolescents and adolescents would judge and evaluate scenarios involving Arab American peers differently than scenarios that involve American peers (see Figure 1 for conceptual map). The level of stereotypic knowledge about people of Arab descent and the level of contact they have had with Arab peers would inform their judgments.

Several broad hypotheses are described here and more specific hypotheses pertaining to each measure and relevant to culturally based expectations can be found in Table 1. The first hypothesis is based on SIT’s assertion that individuals seek to enhance their ingroup’s positivity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In line with this assertion,
it was expected that participants would view their own group (non-Arab American) as more inclusive than an Arab American group. Inclusive and exclusive group norms would prime participants to be either inclusive or exclusive (Nesdale, Maass, et al., 2005) when it comes to evaluating their own ingroup but they may expect the outgroup to exhibit bias based on cultural identity irrespective of the group’s norms (see Figure 1). It was also expected that participants would differentiate between their expectations about how inclusive the group would be and their own individual inclusion judgments (Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012). In addition those who have had high levels of contact with peers of Arab descent would be more positive about intergroup interactions (i.e., inclusion of an outgroup target) than those with little contact (Tropp & Prenovost, 2008).

The second hypothesis represents age-related expectations. Research has shown that group identity based on categories such as shared interests (Horn, 2003) and cultural membership (Verkuyten & Brug, 2001) become salient in adolescence. Research on the simultaneous consideration of group membership and norms showed that these considerations become differentiated during early adolescence, and remain challenging for children when outgroup threat is high (Abrams et al., 2009; Nesdale, Maass, et al., 2005; Rutland et al., 2010). Therefore, it was unclear whether adolescents would focus on cultural identity or shared interest when making inclusion decisions, but would heavily be influenced by group norms. Based on research on perceptions of similarities between cross-race dyads (McGlothlin & Killen, 2005), in which elementary school aged participants placed a heavy emphasis on shared interest it was expected that 12-year-olds would define cultural similarity as involving
shared interests (without disentangling these factors). It was expected that this focus on shared interest in younger children would bear on inclusion decisions.

The third hypothesis was related to expectations that are relevant to stereotypes about Arabs. Due to adolescent use of media as a socialization tool (Arnett, 1995) and the primary role of media, specifically those coming out of Hollywood, in reinforcing stereotypes about Arabs (Shaheen, 2003), it was expected that adolescents would have higher levels of stereotypes than younger participants and these would interfere with adolescents’ judgments. Thus, those with high levels of stereotypes would focus more on cultural identity than on shared interest (Cole et al., 2003).

A fourth hypothesis was relevant for evaluations of deviant group members. Based on previous findings in the literature about evaluations of members who deviate from group norms, it was expected that a deviant member who challenges a group norm of inclusivity by being exclusive would be judged more negatively than a deviant who goes against a group by being inclusive (Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012). In addition, deviance from one’s ingroup would be evaluated differently than deviance from an outgroup (Abrams & Rutland, 2008).

The fifth hypothesis pertains to participants’ social reasoning about inclusion or exclusion within the cross-cultural encounters. When it comes to reasoning about social judgments in an intergroup context, researchers working from the Social Domain perspective found that references to group functioning and dynamics increase with age (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002). Therefore it was expected that references to group functioning would increase with age. In addition given the increase in
autonomy during adolescence (Daddis, 2011) it was expected that adolescents would reason about their inclusion judgments using references to autonomy and personal preferences more so than younger participants. Participants’ reasoning will also differ based on their inclusion judgments (Killen & Stangor, 2001).

Finally, the sixth hypothesis regarded predictions about participants’ attributions of emotions. Based on findings from research on emotional attributions in an intergroup exclusion context, differential emotions will be attributed depending on the cultural identity of the group and the target of exclusion (Malti et al., 2012). Thus, previous research would predict that higher proportions of positive emotions are expected for exclusion of an outgroup target than for exclusion of an ingroup target. Although not tested prior to the current study, it was expected that a group with a norm of inclusion will be attributed with more negative emotions for excluding either target than a group with an exclusive norm. This is due to the fact that a group that espouses inclusivity and excludes someone is violating its own norm, and therefore, it will feel bad about doing so. In addition, although not tested before in exclusion contexts, when attributing positive emotions to a group that excludes, children will reason about them referencing the group’s concerns for group conventions and functioning, while those who attribute negative emotions to the group after excluding a target will reference moral reasoning. This is assuming that positive emotions are attributed to a group that children think is likely to exclude the target, while negative emotions are attributed to a group that children think is likely to include the target.
Expected Contributions to the Field

In this era of globalization, exposure to people from diverse backgrounds has increased, and children’s experiences in schools have changed dramatically over the past two decades due to heterogeneous learning environments. Students, teachers, parents, and educators are learning how to navigate through social interactions in the context of diverse cultural, ethnic, and religious backgrounds (Qingwen, 2007; Stephan, 1999). This has proved to be a challenging task, given that prejudice and discrimination towards individuals from different cultural, national and religious groups is pervasive throughout society. Studying social exclusion from peer groups during childhood and adolescence in school contexts provides a vehicle for understanding developmental origins of group processes that often promote intergroup prejudice and tension in adulthood (Hitti et al., 2011; Killen, Richardson, & Kelly, 2010).

Altogether, the findings acquired from this research shed light on children’s cognitive and affective understanding of group dynamics with respect to an understudied group in the United States that has experienced discrimination. This contributes to the existing developmental intergroup attitudes literature by providing data on the interplay between children’s reasoning and emotions when assessing exclusion or inclusion of a group highly associated with negative stereotypes. In addition, findings provide a deeper understanding of how children resolve conflicting concerns about moral and social-conventional norms—specifically, cultural identity, shared interest and exclusive group norms. Age-related differences on the assessments described fill in gaps in the research related to social cognitive
development in cross-cultural intergroup contexts. The stereotype awareness and intergroup contact components of the study can help inform the design of school-based intervention projects, geared to increasing tolerance and reducing prejudice. Findings will have a broader impact on fostering positive social relationships and intergroup attitudes in childhood and school environments, which will inevitably help to improve adult relationships.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

This literature review will focus on the theoretical framework driving the design of the current study to clarify the complexities of studying attitudes toward a highly stereotyped group like Arab Americans. First, some necessary key concepts for investigating intergroup attitudes by means of exclusion from peer groups will be reviewed. This will be followed by an analysis of the Arab American condition and how children of Arab descent living in America are affected by this experience. Then, an overview of the theories that have been used to study exclusion and prejudice in children will be presented. This will entail a review of the research on children’s reasoning about exclusion from a Social Domain theory perspective (Smetana, 2006) and a review of the developmental prejudice research stemming from Social Identity theory (SIT), which includes both Social Identity Development theory (SIDT) and Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics (DSGD) theoretical perspectives (Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, & Marques, 2003; Nesdale, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). A discussion of the benefits of an integrated theoretical approach will follow with a review of research that has assessed the factors that may influence children’s evaluations of exclusion, such as perceived outgroup threat, the role of stereotypes, and the ability to attribute emotions to others involved in a transgression. This review of current research will be discussed from the vantage point of how the theories and methodologies could be applied to the topic of children’s and adolescents’ intergroup attitudes regarding Arab Americans.
Key Concepts and Terminology

Social psychologists have studied intergroup attitudes for over half a century, investigating the role of stereotypes in perpetuating prejudice and documenting how it might manifest in discrimination against others (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001). From this body of research, key terms can be gleaned to frame the current discourse. Prejudice is defined as negative attitudes or affective expressions, which are based on faulty generalizations and are directed toward a whole group or members of a group. These erroneous generalizations are often stereotypes. Stereotypes are labels attributed to groups without recognition of intragroup variation (Stangor, 2009). Discrimination is a form of acting out prejudice by excluding a group or its members from partaking in certain social privileges (e.g., employment, residence in a certain area, quality education). For children and adolescents, discrimination may come in the form of exclusion from peer groups (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002).

In their review of the social psychology literature on social exclusion, Abrams et al. (2005) identified two types of exclusion that are also relevant to developmental investigations of social exclusion: intergroup and intragroup. More recently, these forms have been studied in childhood (Abrams & Rutland, 2008). Intergroup exclusion is exclusion from a peer group based solely on group memberships (e.g., a girl being excluded from a boys group solely because she is a girl) or as a result of the boundaries between groups defined by social categories such as gender, ethnicity, nationality, religion, or race. Intragroup exclusion is exclusion that occurs from within a peer group based on the perception that a member has deviated from the
markers and norms with which the group identifies. Therefore, in the current study, when children are making inclusion judgments about an outgroup target, they are evaluating *intergroup* exclusion, whereas when they are making judgments about an ingroup target, then they are judging *intragroup* exclusion.

Exclusion from peer groups may occur when two conditions are met: 1) the members of a group perceive their group’s boundaries as rigid and inflexible and 2) they perceive that a target of exclusion is challenging these boundaries (Leets & Sunwolf, 2005; Sunwolf & Leets, 2004). These boundaries could be physical biological markers (e.g., skin color, gender), outward appearances (e.g., clothing choices), established beliefs (e.g., religious beliefs), customs or norms (e.g., celebrating specific holidays, eating certain foods) and expressed ideologies (e.g., liberal or conservative viewpoints) that play a role in defining a group. Other boundaries could be psychological and based on stereotypic assumptions made about an outgroup member’s beliefs, norms, and personality traits. For example, assuming that girls will not enjoy playing with trucks as much as boys or that African Americans desire to play basketball more than European Americans, both reflect psychological barriers that rely on stereotypes. Examining the developmental origins of prejudice and how stereotypes bear on children’s prejudicial attitudes toward Arab Americans in a peer group exclusion context can shed some light on the salience and meaning of group boundaries to individuals and groups.

Nationality (nation of origin), cultural heritage or religion, are social categories that individuals incorporate into their identities at different levels of importance. Therefore, examining exclusion based on Arab American identity will
clarify those boundaries that come into play when faced with an individual who is Arab American, who may be simultaneously perceived as similar to the majority group on some dimensions (e.g., Christian faith if they are Arab American Christian or similar interest in activities) but different on others (e.g., cultural customs such as food and language). Giving priority to one identity or the other or a combination of each also depends on the context of a particular intergroup situation. Thus, when non-Arab American children make decisions about Arab American peers, he or she weighs information about their own identities and norms against information about their Arab American peers. Disentangling what dimensions of group membership children use to make these judgments will help researchers understand group processes and exclusion in a peer group context.

**Arab American Experiences in the United States**

According to the 2000 U.S. Census (U.S. Census Bureau, 2003, 2005) approximately 46% of those who identified themselves as Arab were born in the United States. They are an affluent group with the median Arab family income reported in 1999 as $52,300, which was higher than the national median, and about 40% had a bachelor’s degree or more, which was also higher than the 24% reported by the entire American population. In addition, the 2000 Census reported that a quarter of Arab Americans were under the age of 18. According to Naber (2000), who extensively discussed the paradoxes of the Arab American identity, the first wave of Arab immigrants in the late 1800s was of Christian faith and had an easy time assimilating into the ‘White’ Christian American majority. More recent Arab immigrants ascribe to the Muslim faith, a religion perceived to culturally, and
religiously conflict with mainstream ‘American’ culture. Given these religious distinctions between early and more recent immigrants, some Arab Americans can be viewed as members of the American ingroup while others can be viewed as belonging to an outgroup.

In her review of the plight of Arabs in America, Naber (2000) discussed the social and political exclusion experienced by Arab American adults in the context of the United States alliance with Israel since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, which led to the political, social, and cultural marginalization of Arabs. Discrimination against Arab Americans, ranged from physical and psychological attacks to denial of services pre-September 11, while post-September 11 reports documented increases in discriminatory immigration policies, profiling of airline passengers and other civil liberty concerns (Ibish, 2001, 2003). Arab as a social category elicits many stereotypes. An examination of 900 Hollywood films found that the main stereotypes associated with Arabs are aggression and religious fanaticism (Shaheen, 2003). In a study on hiring discrimination, respondents from both the United States and the Netherlands were less likely to choose resume’s of candidates with an Arab name or affiliations to Arab professional societies than they were of those with ‘White’ or European names (Derous, Nguyen, & Ryan, 2009). In one study, 25% of Arab American adult respondents (N=1,016) reported that either a household member or themselves experienced abuse or discrimination related to their race, ethnicity, or religion post-September 11 (Padela & Heisler, 2010). Of those who perceived experiencing discrimination, more were Muslims than Christians. In addition, perceptions of discrimination were related to health measures reported by
respondents. Thus, among those who have experienced direct or indirect discrimination, levels of psychological distress were high and levels of reported happiness were low.

Children have not been left unaffected by this climate. Bullying, threats against Arab American children, in addition to textbook and teacher biases, have also been reported by Arab American parents (Ibish, 2001, 2003). A study by DeRosier (2004) of ethnic differences in peer relations after 9/11 showed negative effects for children of Middle Eastern backgrounds. Peer reports were acquired from 11-year-olds attending public schools in a mid-Atlantic State in October 2001 and in April 2002. Participants were ethnically diverse with 64% being European American, and the remaining 36% were ethnic minorities, which included those of Middle-Eastern and Southeast Asian backgrounds (3% of the total sample). Findings showed a significant drop in likability of peers from Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian backgrounds and a rise in reported victimization (e.g., getting picked on or being called names a lot) of these peers. One limitation to this study was that it grouped children from Middle Eastern backgrounds with children from Southeast Asian backgrounds into one category, thus not allowing for differentiations by cultural heritage or religion. However, decreases in favorability and increases in observed victimization of these peers is indicative of the prejudices that might exist in young children based on their perceptions of who can be categorized into these groups.

Arab American adolescents have also been affected by the anti-Arab climate, as documented by their reported experiences with discrimination in a study conducted by Flanagan, Syvertsen, Gill, Gallay, and Cumsille (2009). Self-reports about ethnic
awareness, experience with prejudice, parental admonitions about prejudice and belief in the tenets of the American promise were collected from African, Latino, Arab and European Americans 11- to 18-year-olds. One notable finding from this study was that when asked to report about experiences with prejudice and the basis for the prejudicial message, Arab Americans reported language and religion as reasons for experiencing prejudice more often than all the other groups. In fact, European Americans were the only other group that reported religion as a basis for discrimination (1.2% of European Americans reported religion as a reason for the prejudicial message versus 7.3% of Arab Americans). Although not a large percentage, these findings indicate the importance of language and religion in the Arab American intergroup experience relative to other groups.

Other findings from Flanagan et al. (2009) showed that greater ethnic awareness was related to greater reports of experiences with prejudice in African and Arab Americans. Arab and European American adolescents reported less parental discussions about prejudice related to their own ethnic identity than did African and Latino Americans. In general, those who reported more instances of prejudice believed less in the American promise of equal opportunity. No differences between ethnic groups were reported in adolescents’ willingness to serve the country and help society (patriotism). European Americans (who had low ethnic awareness) were less likely than the other groups (who had higher ethnic awareness scores), however, to support equal rights for ethnic groups and intergroup tolerance.

This study was unique in that it captured relations between ethnic awareness and adolescents’ beliefs about the American social contract in four ethnic groups.
Specifically, it acquired an Arab American sample from a densely populated Midwestern community, thus providing data on ethnic awareness and experiences with prejudice for this group. This study was, however, conducted prior to September 11, 2001; and given the malleability of ethnic identity and awareness as a function of experiences, today’s Arab American and majority adolescents might respond differently to the measures assessed.

Although no studies that we know of, systematically investigated sources of perceived discrimination by Arab American children and adolescents post 9/11, what is clear is the detrimental effect that perceived discrimination has on Arab American adolescents’ well-being. This was also shown in a study conducted with Arab American 13- to 18-year-olds, investigating the relation between sociocultural adversity and psychological distress (Ahmed, Kia-Keating, & Tsai, 2011). Strong significant positive correlations were found between adolescents’ perceived racism and depression, anxiety, internalizing, and externalizing behavior. While we know that Arab American youth are experiencing some forms of discrimination, it still remains to be understood, given the pervasiveness of negative images of Arabs and Muslims in the media, how non-Arab American adolescents have processed these images and applied them to their social interactions with peers they might perceive as either Arab or Muslim.

In summary, these studies indicated that children and adolescents from Arab or Middle Eastern backgrounds experience prejudice and discrimination. Religion and language in addition to race, and group stereotypes are salient factors associated with instances of prejudice for these groups. Therefore, it is important to study these
variables in the context of social exclusion from peer groups to understand better children’s and adolescents’ judgments and reasoning about Arab American peers.

Whether an Arab American is viewed as an ingroup or an outgroup member has not been systematically investigated. If a peer group has a member who dresses like them, speaks the same way as they do and has the same interests, but is Arab American, does having an Arab cultural identity warrant differential treatment? Whether it does or not may depend on the extent to which the decision-makers perceive the target’s Arab identity as a challenge to their ingroup identity. It may also depend on which dimensions of their ingroup identity are most salient to them, such as group norms and conventions, or social category. Therefore, given that adherence to group norms might impact how majority children perceive their peers (e.g., as similar to and belonging to the ingroup or not), it is important at this point to discuss what is meant by group identity and group norms and how they have been measured in research assessing children’s prejudices and ideas about exclusion.

**Group Identity and Group Norms in Exclusion Research**

The concept of one’s group identity, the extent to which children identify with a group, plays a pivotal role in understanding intergroup and intragroup exclusion. Research has shown that individuals define aspects of their personal identity in terms of affiliation with a group, and groups can be based on gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and culture as well as other categories (Bennett & Sani, 2011). These affiliations are multiple and can coexist at any point in time but the psychological salience of each social category varies depending on the context (Phinney, 2008). For example, being the only girl in a study group of boys might heighten the saliency of
gender affiliation for the on girl member in the study group, as well as the boy members.

Children as young as 5 years old have been found to identify with novel and minimal groups (Bigler, Brown, & Markell, 2001; Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011; Nesdale, 2008). At such a young age, they are able to express minimal forms of identification, simulated by a “minimal group paradigm” (MGP with adolescents: Tajfel, 1970) in which children are arbitrarily assigned to a group with which they have had no prior experiences. This minimal level of identification with an arbitrary group has been found to influence children’s expression of ingroup favorability and outgroup prejudice (Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2008; Bigler et al., 2001; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Specifically, higher identification with an assigned ingroup results in higher levels of ingroup favorability and lower levels of outgroup favorability.

While minimal affiliations with an arbitrary or a novel group have produced robust findings on differential evaluations of ingroup and outgroup members, this method lacks context. When addressing prejudice related to cultural, national or religious identity, many factors might be at play, including status hierarchies within a society, history of conflict or tension, cultural norms, and beliefs. For this reason, a variation of the minimal group paradigm, which assigns children to a novel group with a cultural identity (e.g., a group of non-Arab ‘American’ peers), was used in the current study. This allowed children to affiliate with the peer groups presented in the study as well as to provide an ‘American’ identity versus ‘Arab American’ identity contrast, thus highlighting the cultural majority versus minority distinction.
In late childhood and early adolescence, it has been found that children begin to internalize group identity in terms of beliefs, status and stereotypic expectations associated with the social category they belong to (Sani & Bennett, 2004). Therefore, an important aspect of group identification is ascribing to group norms, customs, and traditions and taking them on as one’s own norms and behaviors. For Arab Americans who have lived among majority American peers, identifying with American culture might mean the extent to which one begins adopting ideas such the American social commitment to equal opportunity or even appearance and activity norms, such as similar styles (e.g., fashion), food preferences, or extracurricular interests (e.g., going to a baseball game). If non-Arab Americans view these norms as salient markers for group identification, then they may perceive an Arab American who ascribes to them as a member of their ingroup, placing less emphasis on cultural background.

It is also important to distinguish between the types of norms to which people ascribe because some are viewed as universal crossing cultural boundaries, while others are viewed as culture specific. According to Social Domain theory (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983), children can organize their knowledge about their social world into multiple domains. Thus, children are able to think about social interactions in moral terms related to the welfare, justice, and rights of others (i.e., universal norms); in societal terms related to socially contextual and conventional norms and traditions put in place by authorities and societies to organize social interactions (i.e., culture specific); and in personal terms related to their own individual preferences. Based on this taxonomy, a group norm of being inclusive can be perceived as a morally
relevant norm when representing inclusion of others from a different culture, race, ethnicity, religion, or nationality. In contrast, a group norm of being exclusive can be perceived as a societal norm when it defines criteria for exclusion that maintain optimal group functioning, or it may be viewed as morally relevant if exclusion criteria are based solely of social categories and labels.

The priority children give to different types of norms might change from one context to the next. In a complex social interaction such as exclusion, children might use their knowledge about social-conventional norms to justify exclusion from a group or may give priority to a moral norm that considers the welfare of the excluded and speaks out against it (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002). Children as young as 2½ years old have developed concepts of fairness and equality (Smetana, 1985) and can attribute negative emotions to a victim of a transgression (Eisenberg, 2000). However, little is known about how children incorporate these concepts into their reasoning about group processes (between- and within- group interactions), and more specifically how they do so about groups with different national, cultural, and religious identities. To understand how children weigh their moral and emotional understandings against their knowledge about Arab Americans, research from a Social Identity theory perspective and a Social Domain theory was used to inform this investigation.

**Theoretical Framework for Studying Exclusion**

*Social Domain theory and exclusion from peer groups.* Decisions about social exclusion or inclusion demand that children rely on their social knowledge. Researchers interested in the development of children’s social cognition have
identified a domain-specific model to assess how children think about their social world. Within this model three main distinct domains of social knowledge were found to coexist in children as young as 3 and 4 (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 2006). As briefly addressed in the previous chapter, these domains reflect the concerns and rules that children tend to use when reasoning about judgments they make regarding social interactions. Children reason either using moral, social-conventional or personal concerns and sometimes use them simultaneously, depending on the social context. Rules or norms that fall in the moral domain are acts that are considered to be generalizable to other people, cultures, and countries, cannot be changed and do not rely on authority sanctioning for validity. These rules have to do with welfare, justice, and fairness for others. While social-conventional rules are contextually relative and can be changed and are contingent on authority sanctioning (e.g., eating with your hands), personal rules pertain to personal autonomy over issues related to one’s own body, privacy, and individual preferences in social activities.

Not all events and interactions can be categorized into just one domain; some events are multifaceted in that they reflect issues of morality, social conventions, and personal domain, simultaneously. It has been proposed that social exclusion is multifaceted because empirical research has shown that children can draw on all three domains when thinking about exclusion in different contexts. In order to understand how children evaluate social exclusion and which issues they focus on, researchers have adopted the use of hypothetical scenarios in which children must weigh conflicting concerns (Killen et al., 2006).
Developmental scientists working from a Social Domain theory (SDT: Killen et al., 2006; Smetana, 2006) perspective have focused on methods that measure children’s reasoning about exclusion scenarios. This approach has been helpful in distinguishing which concerns children attend to when presented with a situation in which exclusion occurs. Exclusion from a peer group could raise concerns about moral issues (e.g., fairness and empathy toward excluded), social-conventional issues (e.g., traditions and social norms set by institutions and groups to make them function well) and personal issues (e.g., autonomy, individual preferences related to friendships), and these can coexist, depending on the context in which the exclusion occurs. In intergroup as well as intragroup contexts, children need to draw on knowledge and attitudes related to their own social identities, other social categories, the social norms associated with these categories as well as moral norms to make judgments about social exclusion.

*Stereotypic expectations.* In some instances, children can challenge stereotypic expectations but, in others, they do not. Killen and colleagues have documented this when assessing children’s judgments and multifaceted reasoning about inclusion and exclusion situations (Killen, Pisacane, Lee-Kim, & Ardila-Rey, 2001; Killen et al., 2007; Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001). One study, Killen and Stangor (2001), asked 7-, 10-, and 13-year-old European American participants to judge gender-stereotypic activity-based exclusion scenarios (e.g., boy excluded from joining a ballet class and girl excluded from joining a baseball team) as well as, race-stereotypic activity-based exclusion scenarios (e.g., White student joining a basketball team and Black student joining a math club). In these instances, children and
adolescents based their judgments more on concerns for justice and fairness and rejected exclusion of non-stereotypic targets from these groups.

However, when new information was provided about the target’s ability and participants were told that the stereotype-consistent child was more qualified at participating in the activity (e.g., “The girl is better at ballet than the boy is.”), findings indicated that both 1st and 7th graders favored inclusion of the stereotypical child, but 4th graders did not. Adolescents in this study justified their responses using concerns for group functioning more than moral reasoning and did so more than any other age group. What was noteworthy was that participants’ judgments did not change based on whether the target of exclusion was a member of their gender or racial ingroup. This is contrary to what has been found in previous research on intergroup prejudice, where children have reported ingroup favoritism (Aboud, 1988). In addition, despite the fact that the scenarios were highly stereotypic, participants did not rely on stereotypes to make their decisions, although their reliance on concerns for maintaining social conventions did increase with age.

Based on these findings, one might speculate that excluding an Arab American peer from a peer group might be viewed as unacceptable by children of all ages. However, the more the target is viewed as disruptive to group functioning, the more likely older children might be willing to justify exclusion, and therefore exclusion of an Arab American peer who is viewed as not conforming to cultural norms might be perceived as legitimate. Stereotypes associated with Arab Americans may play a role more so with older children because they are more likely to be aware of them. It would be expected that younger children would judge exclusion of an
Arab American peer as wrong and unfair. While the study by Killen and Stangor (2001) did not capture participants’ reliance on stereotypes to make exclusion judgments, another study with adolescents by Horn (2003) documented explicit stereotypes about social cliques.

Using ambiguous scenarios that reflected excluding someone based on membership in a social reference group (e.g., cheerleaders, jocks, Goths, preppies), Horn (2003) found that in the absence of information beyond group membership, adolescents resorted to stereotypes associated with social reference groups. In this study, 15- and 17-year-old European Americans made decisions about scenarios involving exclusion and distributions of resources that provided only information about group membership. In these scenarios, participants either mostly relied on moral concerns about fairness and justice to justify their responses or on stereotypic associations about the social reference group the target belonged to. These ambiguous scenarios (i.e., no information about the target was given except their group membership) were contrasted with scenarios where information about individual merit was given in which less stereotypic justifications were used. Findings showed that ambiguous scenarios force adolescents to rely on whatever information they have to make judgments; thus, in such situations stereotypes serve as a source of information.

The research reviewed thus far showed that although the majority of children evaluated straightforward exclusion based on group identity as wrong using moral reasons, other reasons such as group conventions and stereotypes were brought to bear on evaluations of multifaceted exclusion scenario. When forced to decide
between including and excluding another peer, conventional considerations were frequently used to justify including someone who fits the stereotypic expectations of the group, and this was driven more so by adolescents than by younger children (Killen & Stangor, 2001). When given an ambiguous scenario that provided only information about group membership, adolescents based their decisions on existing generalizations associated with the group identity in focus, thus relying on stereotypes as justifications (Horn, 2003). Children might also find reasons for exclusion of peers who do not fit stereotypic expectations. Thus, individuals exhibiting behaviors and traits that deviate from or are non-conforming to expectations related to their group identity might be more prone to exclusion than peers who conform to identity expectations as indicated in findings from a study by Horn (2007).

In an economically and ethnically diverse sample of 10th and 12th graders (~16- and ~18-year-olds), Horn (2007) showed that conformity to gender norms is an important concern for middle- and late-adolescents. Differences were found in how adolescents evaluated the acceptability of same-sex peers identified as either heterosexual or homosexual, and either gender conforming or gender non-conforming based on appearance and activity. Although older adolescents were in general more accepting of all targets presented in each scenario, overall participants rated a homosexual peer who was gender conforming (e.g., a boy played basketball) as more acceptable than a heterosexual peer who was gender non-conforming (e.g., a boy practiced ballet).

These findings highlight the importance of conforming to gender-based conventions in how adolescents judge the acceptability of their peers. Although this
study did not directly assess acceptability of exclusion of someone who is gender conforming or gender non-conforming, it emphasized the importance of conformity to a specific identity as described by norms and appearance in adolescents judgments about these individuals. Thus, non-Arab American adolescents may view cultural non-conformity of an Arab American as unacceptable. Likewise they may view an ingroup American peer who does not share the same interests in activities as an unlikely candidate for inclusion. Along the same lines, if asking Arab Americans to judge another Arab American peer who is conforming to American culture, such conformity might be viewed as a deviance from the Arab identity. Although this is an interesting question to pursue in the future, it is beyond the scope of this review because the current focus is on non-Arab American’s reactions to exclusion of Arab Americans.

**Culture, individual traits, and context.** Personality and individual traits also can be interpreted as unacceptable and provide a basis for exclusion. These variables were investigated in a series of two studies that assessed how children and adolescents evaluated exclusion across different cultures (Killen, Crystal, & Watanabe, 2002; Park, Killen, Crystal, & Watanabe, 2003). Killen, Crystal, and Watanabe (2002) and Park, Killen, Crystal & Watanabe (2003) surveyed 10-, 13- and 15-year-old participants who were American, Japanese, and Korean, about hypothetical scenarios in which exclusion occurred based on six specific traits: aggressiveness, unconventional appearance, poor athleticism, cross-gender identity, sad personality, and social disruptiveness. Measures included participants’ evaluation of exclusion, prescription to conformity (e.g., “Should the excluded member change
to fit the group?”) and self-perceived differences (e.g., “How similar or different are you from the excluded member?”). Findings showed that culture as defined by participants’ nationality was not a strong predictor of participants’ judgments; however, type of trait (i.e., context) and gender did influence participants’ responses to a greater extent.

Contrary to expectations that cultural differences between Japanese and American participants would influence participants’ evaluations of exclusion, on the bases that Japanese are collectivistic and Americans are individualistic, the majority of all children evaluated exclusion as wrong (Killen, Crystal, et al., 2002). Both Japanese and American adolescents were more likely to exclude an aggressive child and a slow runner, citing concerns about group functioning, while most Korean students found the disruptive behavior of acting like a clown just as concerning as acting aggressively (Park et al., 2003). In addition, Japanese and American participants showed a similar gender pattern: females were less accepting of exclusion and were less willing to conform than males. This gender difference, however, was greater for Americans. No gender differences were found among Korean participants. Koreans, overall, had higher ratings of conformity than Japanese and American participants. Conformity ratings for all participants decreased with age, emphasizing importance of autonomy judgments in adolescents across the cultures and nationalities represented in this sample.

These studies showed that although culture and nationality does predict to some extent children’s and adolescents’ evaluations about exclusion, conformity, and tolerance, context and gender play a bigger role in their considerations. It would be
interesting to see whether gender differences might emerge in children’s judgments about Arab American peers who may be viewed as culturally non-conforming, but share the same interests in activities as an American group. For example, two questions are: Would boys find exclusion of an Arab American peer more acceptable than girls? To what extent do stereotypes about Arab Americans bear on these judgments?

Context was also shown to play a role in exclusion based on gender and race in a study by Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, and Stangor (2002) with an ethnically diverse American sample of 10-, 13-, and 16-year-olds (4th, 7th and 10th graders). Participants were asked to judge whether they thought exclusion of a female or African American peer from a friendship context (e.g., new neighbor), peer group context (e.g., music club that traded records), and an institution context (e.g., school), was acceptable. A test of external influence was also conducted by suggesting to participants that either a social consensus (friends and peers) existed judging exclusion differently then the participants, or that authority figures such as parents or governments had a differing view point from the participant.

Participants found it less legitimate to exclude someone from a school than to exclude someone from a friendship or a peer group. They also found exclusion of a girl from a friendship or a peer group context as more acceptable than exclusion of an African American peer. Exclusion from a peer group was found to be more acceptable by older participants (7th and 10th graders). This could be due to older children’s more extensive experience with groups and clubs. Older participants also tended to use more non-moral justifications, such as group functioning and personal
choice to justify exclusion, particularly in the case of excluding a girl from a friendship with a boy or from an all-boys peer group.

Authority influences such as parents and government were less likely to influence participants’ judgments than friends and peers. Social consensus tended to have a positive influence, such that those who originally judged exclusion as acceptable, changed their judgments when faced with differing opinions from peers. Authority influence played a role in the peer group context when the target was a girl; thus, participants became more inclusive to girls when they heard parents wanted them to be more inclusive. Authority influence had a stronger effect for the African American target of exclusion, with participants changing their judgments positively in all three contexts when faced with the information that parents or governments suggested more inclusion.

Given that gender- or race-based exclusion in friendship and peer group contexts was rated more variably by children and adolescents than exclusion in a school context, it would be expected that exclusion of an Arab American in these contexts would also be rated variably. Therefore, some children and adolescents might find exclusion of an Arab American from a friendship or peer group as legitimate based on disruptions to group functioning and personal preferences. This may be more the case among adolescents than younger children. Furthermore, this study suggests that peer consensus about either inclusion or exclusion of an Arab American in a peer group context would influence children’s and adolescents’ decisions, with more participants conforming to a social consensus or possibly a group norm of either inclusion or exclusion. Yet, how would children and
adolescents react to such norms if they perceive an outgroup member as similar to them based on other dimensions such as shared interest or clothing styles?

**Perceptions of similarity.** McGlothlin and colleagues (Margie, Killen, Sinno, & McGlothlin, 2005; McGlothlin et al., 2005) assessed the role of perceptual cues (e.g., skin color) as well as shared interests (e.g., both like to play soccer) on perceptions of intergroup and intragroup similarities and intergroup attitudes. In these studies, both minority and majority 1st and 4th graders were administered an interracial ambiguous situation task in which a White or Black child was depicted as a potential transgressor. Participants’ interpretation of the cross race interaction served as a measure for their implicit intergroup biases. A perception of similarity task was also administered, which not only varied the race of the pairs of peers represented but also the shared interest (e.g., they either like the same sport activity or not). McGlothlin et al. (2005) reported that European Americans did hold intergroup biases when it came to judgments about cross-race friendships, but not when interpreting the ambiguous behavior represented in the task administered. In addition, when rating similarity between same-race and different-race dyads, both shared interest and race influenced children’s similarity judgments. When cross-race dyads with shared interest were compared with those with different interests, those with shared interest were perceived as more similar than those with different interests. However, cross-race dyads with shared interests in activities were rated as less similar than same-race dyads with shared interests in activities. Participants evaluated a Black peer dyad that did not have similar interests as more similar than a White peer dyad with different interests in activities. Although effect sizes for shared versus
different interests were larger than cross- versus same-race peer dyads, the findings show support for the outgroup homogeneity effect, suggesting individuals view outgroup members as being similar to one another but ingroup members being more heterogeneous (Ryan, Judd, & Park, 1996). Overall, race played a secondary role in their evaluations of potential friendships between the pairs of children presented. Shared interest in sport was more salient when making judgments about friendships.

Minority children’s responses to the same measures differed slightly. Margie et al. (2005) reported that minority children showed slight bias in attributing negative intentions to White protagonists in the ambiguous situation task but showed no biases in making judgments about potential friendships. In addition, no evidence was found for the outgroup homogeneity effect in this sample of minority children. Similar to the European American sample in the previous study, minority children focused on shared interest more so than on race or other physical cues when judging both similarity and potential for friendship between different-race and similar-race dyads.

In a separate analysis (McGlothlin & Killen, 2005), looking at children’s social experience as a function of whether they attended a racially homogenous or heterogeneous school, results reflected that when making judgments about friendships social experiences mattered. Thus, European American children from homogeneous schools were less likely to see potential for friendships between different-race dyads than same-race dyads, while children who attended heterogeneous schools saw similar potentials for friendships between both cross-race and same-race dyads. What these studies highlight is the importance of shared interest in making judgment about potential friendships over racial cues. They also emphasize the multi-dimensionality
of prejudice and intergroup biases and the complex ways in which children think about their social group interactions.

Findings from a Social Domain theory perspective show that children are sensitive to the context of exclusion and pay attention to different variables when judging or evaluating exclusion. These variables include social categories, the stereotypes associated with them, children’s qualifications as defined by prior experience with an activity, personality, and behavioral traits that might be disruptive for group functioning, conformity to conventions as defined by group identity or social consensus and shared interest. In the absence of information, stereotypes can be used to justify exclusion of a member of an outgroup. One’s personality traits and whether he/she conforms to socially accepted behaviors related to identity also provide further criteria for social acceptance and inclusion by peers. As children get older, they become more attuned to issues of group functioning and conventions and weigh them in congruence with issues of fairness and morality. Children’s social experiences in terms of contact with Arab Americans would be relevant to their friendship choices or inclusion judgments. In addition, their perceptions of similarity can be influenced by both cultural identity and shared interest, although shared interests should outweigh cultural identity. How that plays out in a situation in which a group has a norm of being exclusive or inclusive based on similarities or differences has not yet been investigated. How concepts of similarities affect pre-adolescents and adolescents also remains to be explored. Other social cognitive abilities such as the ability to attribute emotions have also not been assessed within these contexts specifically with respect to Arab Americans. Social Identity theory research can help
inform why children and adolescents may attend to group functioning or personal preferences when justifying exclusion based on group membership.

**Social Identity theory and children’s prejudice.** Research guided by Social Identity Developmental theory (SIDT: Nesdale, 1999) and Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics theory (DSGD: Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003) has adopted experimental manipulations of group identity, group norms, and outgroup threat to measure children’s prejudice toward members of other groups. Working from assumptions outlined by social psychologists in Social Identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), both developmental theories place an emphasis on the salience of group identity for children and the notion that children seek to maintain or enhance a positive social identity in comparison to other groups. Both lines of research use developmentally appropriate variants of the minimal group paradigm, where children are assigned to novel groups (Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Nesdale, 2008). While Nesdale and colleagues (SIDT) have focused more on the circumstances under which prejudice to outgroups emerges, Abrams, Rutland and colleagues have worked from the developmental subjective group dynamics approach, focusing on group norms and how intragroup processes (how your group works) might inform intergroup attitudes. Both these models have mainly measured evaluative judgments about members of an outgroup in relation to judgments about ingroup members, but little has been done to assess children’s reasoning behind their favorability judgments in specific situations.

**Social Identity Developmental Theory and children’s intergroup prejudice.**

Nesdale (1999, 2004) proposed SIDT, based on SIT and Self-categorization Theory (SCT), to account for age-related changes in ethnic prejudice. To further elaborate,
according to SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), in their need to maintain a positive self-concept, individuals seek to identify with groups of superior status and groups that are associated with positive traits. To maintain ingroup positivity, people partake in social comparisons with other groups, thus developing prejudice toward members of the outgroup. SCT (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) extends this concept of social identification on the basis of cognitive grouping. Thus, people place themselves in a group that they view most similar to themselves based on some classification label, which is cognitively contrasted with another classification. Such self-categorization emphasizes positive similarities between individuals of the ingroup, thus promoting ingroup bias, while also focusing on the negative differences of the outgroup, which may lead to outgroup prejudice.

In an attempt to identify how and when children acquire outgroup prejudice, Nesdale outlined four phases that children sequentially go through that creates ethnic prejudice: undifferentiated, ethnic awareness, ethnic preference, and, finally, ethnic prejudice. Focusing on the transition from ethnic preference to ethnic prejudice (Nesdale, 2008), SIDT proposes that the development of outgroup derogation is dependent on several factors. These factors are the level of identification that a child has with her or his ingroup, the extent to which prejudice is an ingroup norm and the extent to which the ingroup members perceive the members of the outgroup as a threat. These variables have been manipulated and tested in a series of experiments that use a variant of the minimal group paradigm in which children are placed in teams involved in an art competition.
In one study, Nesdale, Maass, Durkin, and Griffiths (2005) examined the effects of exclusive group norms on children’s outgroup attitudes. To investigate this, 7- to 9-year-old Anglo-Australian children were assigned to groups said to have either a norm of being exclusive or a norm of being inclusive (e.g., “Children in this group like/don’t like to play with children from other groups”). Outgroup threat was manipulated by informing some of the participants that the members of the outgroup questioned the art competition judges’ decision, thus threatening the ingroup’s status as better drawers. Outgroup ethnicity was varied to be either Anglo-Australian or Pacific Islander.

The study showed that what drove ingroup biases or outgroup prejudice was the type of group norm and the level of outgroup threat but not the outgroup’s ethnic identity. Children did, however, factor in ethnic identity in decisions to leave their own group and join the outgroup. Low favorability of an outgroup member was associated with conditions in which outgroup threat was high and the ingroup had a norm of exclusion. Interestingly the age-related differences that were found showed, 7-year-olds’ attitudes were influence by high outgroup threat while 9-year-olds’ attitudes were influenced by both high outgroup threat and an ingroup norm of exclusion. This indicates that older children in this sample were becoming more attuned to group norms and were weighing them into their evaluations of outgroup members.

Given that children may associate Arab Americans with the ‘war on terrorism,’ and are depicted as such through the media, they may be perceived as a threat to a group composed of non-Arab Americans. In the world of children, this
threat can be viewed in terms of a tendency for being aggressive, or being affiliated with a group perceived to have immoral norms of aggression because of its association with the 9/11 attacks. While, on the one hand, children might not express negative attitudes toward Arab Americans’ peers solely based on cultural differences, they may do so based on the threat perceived to be associated with members of this group. Recent findings with 4- to 7-year-olds from an SIDT perspective provide evidence that threatening representations of outgroups through the media instigates negative attitudes towards the outgroup irrespective of ethnic background (Durkin, Nesdale, Dempsey, & McLean, 2012). Older children, on the other hand, might be more favorable to an outgroup (Arab American) who conforms to their own culture (American) norms than younger children, because younger children focus more on outgroup threat and less on group norms. Yet, how older children prioritize their concerns when weighing information about an ingroup norm of exclusion with stereotypic information about Arab Americans and knowledge that an Arab American peer adheres to an American group’s norm about activities by sharing their interests, needs further investigation.

In another study, Nesdale and Lawson (2011) assessed if a larger school norm of inclusivity can moderately effect exclusive group norms on children’s intergroup attitudes. In this study, group membership was not based on ethnicity but rather on school (e.g., participants’ school versus another school). Children (7- and 10-year-olds) were placed in groups described as being inclusive, exclusive, and exclusive plus aggressive (e.g., being mean and actively leaving them out of games and activities). Findings indicated that irrespective of age, a school norm of inclusivity
positively influenced children’s ratings of the outgroup and not the ingroup. In addition what was especially noteworthy in this study was that 10-year-olds in both exclusive group norm conditions (exclusive and exclusive plus aggressive), rated their ingroup less positively than the outgroup. This was not found in 7-year-olds, as the younger participants consistently rated the ingroup more positively than the outgroup across all conditions. Thus, it may be the case that 10-year-olds are paying closer attention to whether group norms are in accordance with their own individual beliefs and values, suggesting that distinguishing between one’s own beliefs and ingroup beliefs emerges at around this age.

Most SIDT research has been conducted with children ranging from 6 to 12 years old (Nesdale, 2008; Nesdale, Durkin, Maass, & Griffiths, 2004). Limiting SIDT research to elementary school aged children provides little insight into the development of prejudice in adolescents. Given that SIDT attributes prejudice acquisition to variables such as social identification, ingroup norms, and outgroup threat, which are salient to adolescents (Baumeister, 1995), it is important to explore such variations in older children. In addition, the important findings from this line of research that show a nuanced role for peer group norms and larger societal norms that changes with age, means that a more in-depth investigation is necessary to understand the underlying reasons for these differences. One way to do this is by gaining insights into children’s reasoning about their evaluations in such intergroup contexts. Another way to gauge how important group norms are for maintaining positive group identity is to understand how children think about a group member who might threaten this group identity by deviating from group norms. Developmental
Subjective Group Dynamics (DSGD) is a theoretical model that tries to answer that question.

**Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics and children’s intragroup prejudice.** Focusing on intragroup attitudes and contrasting them against intergroup attitudes is the approach taken by researchers working from a DSGD perspective. DSGD contends that with age children begin to make judgments about ingroup members in relation to what they know about other groups (i.e., in comparison to identities and norms other than their own). Thus, they coordinate their preferences for an ingroup and outgroup with what they know about the individuals in either group. This has been shown in several studies conducted by Abrams, Rutland, and colleagues (Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, & Ferrell, 2007; Abrams et al., 2008; Abrams et al., 2009).

In a recent study, Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, and Pelletier (2008) used a minimal group paradigm to explain intragroup and intergroup attitudes in two age groups of English children (5- to 6-year-olds and 10- to 11-year-olds). In previous research in which they used actual groups defined by nationality and summer school groups, they found that, with age, children favor an outgroup member who follows their ingroup’s norms more than an ingroup member who deviates from group norms (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Abrams et al., 2007). Abrams et al. (2008) replicated these findings using a minimal group paradigm and measured participants’ attitudes toward ingroup and outgroup members who had varying morally relevant behaviors. To measure intragroup and intergroup attitudes, four peer members were described with varying behaviors (moral ingroup, moral outgroup, immoral ingroup,
and immoral outgroup members). Participants were asked to evaluate how they felt about each member, how they thought each group felt about each of the members, and were then asked to allocate rewards to their ingroup and outgroup as well as to each of the four peers.

Findings showed that when judging ingroup and outgroup members based on their levels of moral behavior, participants focused more on the moral nature of the behavior rather than group membership. Even though exclusion was not directly assessed, this finding might suggest that, on the one hand, if children were aware of Arab stereotypes (e.g., the association with immoral behaviors related to aggression and terrorism), they might be more inclined to justify exclusion, or have negative evaluations of an Arab American peer. While, on the other hand, if children’s ingroup had a moral inclusive norm, this might moderate the effects of stereotypic information about Arab Americans. Therefore, it would be informative to acquire children’s reasoning in these multifaceted contexts, given that conflicting considerations need to be assessed to make decisions about exclusion and group processes.

Abrams et al. (2008) also found that within this minimal group context children continue to demonstrate intergroup bias, favoring their own ingroup over the outgroup. They also showed group-based bias; thus, participants reported that groups would evaluate members of their ingroup more favorably than members of their outgroup. No age- or gender-related differences were found. Even though 10- and 11-year-olds might have more experiences with groups than 5- and 6-year-olds, their responses to how groups would evaluate each of four peers did not differ.
In another study, Abrams et al. (2009) directly assessed children’s awareness of how groups work and how that bears on their evaluations of intergroup and intragroup behaviors. To do this, they measured 5- to 11-year-old English children’s social perspective taking skills (ToSM: Theory of Social Mind), their understanding of group norms (i.e., how they think other groups would evaluate deviance from a group norm), children’s real-life experience with other groups (i.e., the number of groups children reported they belonged to), as well as their multiple classification skills. This study defined ToSM as the ability to understand another person’s perspective and emotions in a social interaction.

Children responded to hypothetical scenarios about different ingroups and outgroups, either defined by nationality (e.g., soccer fans) or by the color of the team (e.g., red or green). They were asked to evaluate how much they liked each group (intergroup bias), how much they individually would like a group member who expressed loyalty or deviance from a group by either ascribing to or deviating from a conventional group norm (e.g., expression of loyalty to group goals) and how much they thought the group would like a loyal or deviant group member. Findings showed that higher social perspective taking ability (ToSM) meant that children showed greater distinction between deviant versus loyal members and justified their responses using more references to group characteristics and group loyalty than those who did not evaluate the two members distinctly. In addition having greater multiple classification skills was related to decreased intergroup bias. Children who had greater exposure to groups (i.e., reported a larger number of groups they have been members of) showed greater understanding of group norms.
Multiple classification skills and ToSM abilities increased with age. Therefore, even though older children had a greater understanding of how groups work and were more positively attuned to peers that adhere to group norms, they showed less intergroup bias. Although exclusion was not assessed directly in this study, these findings suggest that further work should be done to evaluate how understanding of group functioning impacts exclusion decisions, particularly with age. In addition, the method of contrasting an individual’s own opinion about ingroup and outgroup members with how he or she thinks a group would behave can provide insight into the age-related differences in children’s and adolescents’ understanding of group processes. Measuring children’s developing social cognitive reasoning in these contexts would also provide a more in-depth assessment of how these social cognitive abilities are developing. Social Domain theory offers a taxonomy that children use when reasoning about intergroup encounters. Neither SIDT research nor DSGD research investigate children’s evaluations of Muslim- or Arab- loyal or deviant peers, but they do highlight the importance of social cognitive abilities (e.g., understanding of group norms), group identity, type of group norms and outgroup threat in both an intergroup and intragroup context. While morally relevant norms (e.g., inclusion and moral behavior) were examined from both perspectives, indicating that they do matter in children’s assessments about group members, what is not known is how they are weighed in actual social group decisions about inclusion and exclusion. Social Domain theory research on social exclusion can shed some more light on these considerations, thus an integration of these theoretical perspectives in addressing questions about prejudice is helpful.
An Integrative Social Reasoning Perspective

Recent research has revealed new ways of examining prejudice in childhood, focusing on a combination of group norms, group identity, and morality (Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010). This model attempts to parse out children’s judgments about group relations by manipulating group norms and group identity in experimental vignettes and focusing on children’s reasoning about intergroup and intragroup behaviors based on these group dimensions. This integrative model has not yet been applied to groups defined by nationality, cultural heritage, or religion. It is a fitting framework for research with these groups, given that they are often stigmatized for their customs and norms. For example, if individuals carry the label of being Arab and are associated with negative stereotypes, members of their host country might perceive them as a threat to maintaining group conventions. In addition, how members of majority host societies perceive differences and similarities between minority groups based on nationality, cultural heritage, and religion, and themselves has not yet been investigated. How these perceptions play out in an intragroup context has also not been assessed. Specifically, this new framework will help us understand how children and adolescents judge the exclusion of someone who conforms to their ingroup norms, such as having the same interests in activities, but does not have the same national, cultural, or religious identity.

Rutland, Killen, and Abrams (2010) have proposed this new social reasoning perspective, which integrates the findings from the three lines of research outlined above, recognizing children’s sensitivity to contextual information when making judgments and evaluations about ingroup and outgroup members. Social Domain
theory complements findings from an SIT perspective as it provides insight into how children reason and rationalize about group processes in moral, social-conventional and personal terms. In addition, SIT approaches such as SIDT and DSGD, contribute to our understandings of the role of group identity and how children weigh concerns about maintaining positive group identities in their evaluations of both inter- and intragroup relations. The new social reasoning perspective proposed by Rutland et al. (2010) contends that under specific conditions and in various contexts children may give different levels of priority to either group identity, morality, or social conventions. The authors proposed that the factors that would influence children’s judgments include whether a group has a norm to be exclusive, whether there has been opportunity for quality intergroup contact (i.e., interaction with or exposure to members of the another social group), and whether the ingroup perceives an outgroup as a threat.

A recent study by Killen, Abrams, Rutland, Mulvey, and Hitti (2012) has, in fact, shown that children and adolescents do give priority to group norms when making decisions about excluding an ingroup member who deviates from a group norm, or including an outgroup member who conforms to another group’s norms. This study also shows that when responding to exclusion scenarios, the type of norm that members are deviating from or conforming to (e.g., moral or social-conventional norms), was more a more salient factor than group identity (based on gender). For instance, overall participants thought it was more acceptable to exclude deviant group members who wanted to distribute money unequally between their own group and another group (more money for the ingroup) than group members who deviated by
wanting to distribute money *equally* among all groups. The present study is an 
extension of the Killen et al. (2012) study but contrasts Arab American identity with 
non-Arab American identity and evaluates deviance from exclusive and inclusive 
group norms, as opposed to those relevant to resource distributions.

Based on some of the research reviewed, a focus on specific individual 
psychological constructs is necessary. These would include an awareness of 
stereotypes associated with specific groups and the ability to attribute emotions to 
actors within a social interaction such as exclusion, given that this ability can 
influence how children make judgments about moral or conventional transgressions 
(Arsenio & Ford, 1985). These individual level differences might bear on children’s 
judgments about intergroup and intragroup exclusion.

**Stereotype Awareness**

Children’s awareness about gender and racial categories begins at a very early 
age. Gender stereotype knowledge emerges at around three years of age (Ruble & 
Martin, 1998) but spontaneous referencing to racial stereotyping has been found in 
children as young as six and this increases with age (McKown & Weinstein, 2003). 
McKown and Weinstein (2003) also found that children from stigmatized groups are 
more aware of racial stereotypes than children from non-stigmatized groups.

Assigning a trait to members of a social category represents a stereotypic 
assumption about that group. Much research on intergroup bias in racial and national 
contexts relied on trait assignments for ingroups and outgroups and measured 
intergroup bias based on effects of asymmetry in how children attributed positive and 
negative traits to each group (Aboud, 1988; Barrett, Wilson, & Lyons, 2003; Bennett
et al., 2004; Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Rutland et al., 2007). Some of the traits that were used in these assessments included: ‘clean,’ ‘dirty,’ ‘happy,’ ‘sad,’ ‘peaceful,’ ‘aggressive,’ ‘clever,’ ‘stupid,’ ‘hardworking,’ ‘lazy,’ ‘friendly,’ ‘unfriendly,’ ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ ‘nice,’ and ‘not nice,’ and were for the most part based on children’s spontaneous descriptions of the social categories (Barrett et al., 2003). These studies have shown that in general children (as young as 4 years and as old as 12 years) assign more positive traits to their ingroup than they do an outgroup, but that the difference between positive and negative traits assigned which favors the ingroup and is unfavorable to the outgroup peaks at around 7 years of age and then drops in pre-adolescence. The social categories used in these studies were related to race and European national identities.

Less is known about developmental patterns in children’s awareness about stereotypes related to Arabs and Muslims or trait assignments to these social categories. The ability to categorize individuals into social groups and knowledge about stereotypes that are associated with these categories are constructs that develop simultaneously, with each construct informing the other (Brown & Bigler, 2005). Once aware of stereotypes, children and adolescents do resort to them, using them as possible sources of information in certain contexts to make judgment about exclusion (Mulvey, Hitti, & Killen, 2010). While Arabs and Muslims are portrayed negatively in movies, the news, and popular culture (Shaheen, 2000, 2003), it is not known how non-Arab or non-Muslim children and adolescents interpret these social cues.

There is evidence that children as young as 4 years old who live in intractable conflict with an outgroup reported perceiving the source of their outgroup stereotypes
to be mainly from television, and reliance on mass media for stereotypic information persists through pre-adolescence (Coutant, Worchel, Bar-Tal, & van Raalten, 2011). However, by early and late adolescence, youth assert their own autonomy and report the source of their stereotypic information was their own personal impressions of outgroup members they met. In the former study, the stereotypes being made were by Israeli youth about Arab people, and their context is unique from non-Arab Americans in that they are constantly reminded of their conflict with an Arab outgroup. However, given the pervasiveness of negative representation of Arabs and Muslims in American media, it is possible that non-Arab American children and adolescents have formed negative stereotypes about the Arab identity. Do these negative images help children become more apt at identifying Arab or Muslim peers? To what extent will children and adolescents use these social cues to make judgments about exclusion?

Evidence from a study with White young adults in Australia showed that participants’ negative stereotype rating predicted negative attitudes toward Arab Australians (Islam & Jahjah, 2001). In this study, the best predictor of attitudes toward Arabs was perceived threat, followed by stereotype ratings and last negative affect, suggesting that perceived threat and stereotypes play a more prominent role in influencing attitudes toward Arabs than affect does. However, another study with adults found that negative emotions of anger exacerbates implicit biases against Arabs because they are associated with stereotypes related to Arab people (e.g., aggression and religious fanaticism) (Dasgupta et al., 2009). Thus, it would be expected that non-Arab American children and adolescents who are aware of
stereotypic information related to Arabs, would report more negative attitudes toward Arab Americans, and might find exclusion of an Arab American peer as more acceptable than those who are not aware of the stereotypes. Whether stereotype awareness would interfere with children’s ability to attribute emotions to those involved in an exclusion scenario is also an area that has not been investigated and yet is very relevant to the study of judgments about Arab American peers.

**Attributions of Emotions and Exclusion**

Awareness of the stereotypes associated with Arabs may bring about negative feelings of fear or anxiety when interacting with an unfamiliar individual of Arab heritage. As found in the study with White Australian adults, these emotions to some extent do predict negative attitudes toward Arabs (Islam & Jahjah, 2001). Prejudice research with adults assessing the dehumanization (or infrahumanization) of an outgroup has shown that adults make differential emotional attributions between ingroups and outgroups. In particular, they attribute ingroup members would feel uniquely human emotions (e.g., pride, hope, remorse, shame) more than outgroup members, while outgroup members are attributed to feel more non-uniquely human emotions such as excitement and fear than ingroup members (Paladino et al., 2002; Vaes, Castelli, Paladino, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003). Recently, a study was conducted with a very small sample of 9-year-olds that shows a similar trend in the infrahumanization of an immigrant outgroup (Vezzali, Capozza, Stathi, & Giovannini, 2012).

Research with children, however, has found that children express feelings of care, and empathy toward others, showing concerns for other’s well being (Eisenberg,
Spinard, & Sadovsky, 2006). Within intergroup exclusion contexts, children and adolescents who reject exclusion sometimes justify their responses by referencing the psychological harm it causes the individual being excluded (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002). Therefore, there is evidence that the emotions of an excluded individual can be used as an evaluative appraisal in children’s judgments about an exclusion scenario (Turiel & Killen, 2010). How children attribute emotions to all characters in an exclusion scenario based on national identity was recently investigated by Malti, Killen, and Gasser (2012).

In this study 12 and 15-year-old Swiss and non-Swiss participants responded to hypothetical exclusion scenarios in which a Serbian peer was excluded from attending an activity with a group of Swiss peers. Serbians are recent same-race immigrants to Switzerland and have experienced tense relations with the Swiss majority. Participants were asked to judge the acceptability of exclusion and to attribute emotions to both the excluder and the excluded. Findings showed that non-Swiss minority participants attributed more positive emotions to the excluder (i.e., Swiss) than Swiss majority participants (i.e., the Swiss excluder felt positively about excluding a non-Swiss peer). Differences between the type of emotion attributed to the excluder and excluded also emerged, revealing that overall participants attributed feelings of pride, happiness, guilt, shame, and empathy to the excluder, but attributed feelings of sadness and anger to the excluded. Moreover, positive correlations were found between participants’ judgments about exclusion and attribution of emotions. This showed that positive evaluations of exclusion were related to positive emotion attributions to both the excluder and the excluded, indicating that differences in how
children attribute emotions to the characters in the exclusion context are associated with how they evaluate exclusion. No age-related differences were reported.

Although no measure of perspective-taking ability was assessed in this study to better understand the association between individuals’ ability to attribute certain emotions and their evaluations of exclusion, this study had several strengths. It was the first of its kind to use measures of attribution of emotions in a peer exclusion context and specifically between groups that differ by nationality and immigrant status. These findings showed that status (e.g., Swiss majority versus non-Swiss minority) influences how children attribute emotions to the target of exclusion or the excluders, which in turn bears on their judgments about exclusion. To what extent do stereotypes interfere with children and adolescents’ ability to attribute certain emotions to an excluder and excluded is not known. It is expected that because the stereotypes associated with Arabs paint them as villains, that children might attribute more positive emotions to both a non-Arab American group that excludes an Arab American, and Arab American group that excludes a non-Arab American. On the other hand, adolescents’ more extensive experience with groups and their ability to take the perspective of other individuals as well as groups might come into conflict with their stereotypic knowledge about Arabs. What issues (e.g., stereotypes, emotions of the excluded, fairness, or group functioning) they focus on could be acquired by assessing their reasoning about such exclusion scenarios.

**Present Study**

A social reasoning perspective about researching children’s and adolescents’ judgments about Arab American peers was applied in the present study to gain a
better understanding of the role of group norms, stereotypes, and emotional attributions in children’s intergroup decision-making. This is especially true for attitudes about Arab Americans, given that much confusion about religious affiliations and norms are associated with this group. Understanding how these confusions and negative stereotypes associated with Arab Americans play out in children’s and adolescents’ reasoning about exclusion, offers researchers and educators insight into children’s social cognition about group processes. How stereotypes might interfere with children’s ability to attribute specific emotions to the actors involved in an exclusion scenario is an area that has not been explored and worth pursuing.

Another gap in the literature that has been highlighted throughout this review is the lack of developmental research conducted about Arab groups. Given the heterogeneity of Arab immigrants around the world and the tensions that have developed due to the negative information that exist in mass media form, it is important to understand the effects of these media practices on children’s interactions with Arab peers. This research will in turn inform interventions on tolerance and stereotype reduction. Such interventions will help children navigate the complexities of their social world, in the hopes of reducing prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behavior brought on by negative stereotypes.
Chapter 3: Methodology

Participants

Participants included 199 non-Arab American 6th and 10th graders who attended public middle and high schools in a school district serving a low middle- to middle-income population. The sample represented 6th and 10th grade students in the Maryland suburbs of Washington, D.C. The student population of the schools recruited for the study was on average 60% European American, which reflected the demographics of the school district. Parental consent forms were distributed with an average of 65% return rate and all students who had consent participated. The sample consisted of two age groups evenly divided by gender: 102 pre-adolescent 12-year-olds (52% female, $M = 12.08$ years, $SD = 0.49$) and 97 adolescents 16-year-olds (53% female, $M = 16.16$, $SD = 0.82$). The sample was ethnically diverse and included 48% European Americans, 17% African Americans, 8% Asian Americans, 7% Latin American, 15% biracial; and 5% other races or ethnicities. Participants were also asked to report their religion and 63% reported being Christian, 12% were Jewish, 2% were Muslim, and 23% reported other religions and beliefs (e.g., Agnostic, Atheist, Hindu). Two 6th graders and one 10th grader reported being of Arab descent, given the design of the study, these participants were removed from the sample for analyses (i.e., not included in the 199 used for analyses).

Procedure

Approval from the schools to administer the survey was first attained, and then copies of parental consent forms and a letter describing the study were sent to parents. At the appointed time of the survey administration (as designated by
teachers and school administrators), a brief introduction about the study was given to students who had returned the signed, parental consent form. The verbal introduction given to participants did not include mention of culture as a focus of the study, so as not to prime students about cultural identity beyond the information presented in the consent forms. The topics of inclusion and exclusion from peer groups were described in broad terms. The survey took 30-40 minutes to complete.

**Design**

The survey was designed to measure intergroup inclusion judgments based on three factors, each with two levels: (a) *group cultural identity* (Arab American and American), (b) *group norm* (exclusive and inclusive), and (c) *target of inclusion* (outgroup target with similar interests, ingroup target with different interests). Age (12-year-olds and 16-year-olds), gender (female and male), and stereotypic associations (stereotypes versus no stereotypes) were also included as independent variables of interest. Due to participants’ very low levels of contact with Arab peers (on average 80% reported low contact), information about level of contact with Arab peers was included as descriptive data but not included in analyses. Similarly participants’ ethnic minority/majority status was analyzed as an independent factor but findings were not conclusive due to the small sample size of each ethnic/racial group represented.

Two versions of the survey were randomly administered (for the full design, see Figure 2). Version 1 included a story about an exclusive Arab American group and an inclusive American group, while the group norms were reversed in version 2 (Version 1: 49.7 %, n = 99; Version 2: 50.3 %, n = 100, evenly divided by age and
gender). Female participants received stories about female characters, and male participants responded to stories about male characters.

All participants assessed two hypothetical stories; each about a group of friends, roughly the same age as the participant, depicted visually using professional illustrations. One group was identified as a group of Arab American friends and the other group was identified as the participant’s ingroup, a group of American friends (non-Arab). Depending on the version of the survey, each group was described as either having a norm of being exclusive (e.g., ‘they like only those who were similar to them’), or inclusive (e.g., ‘they like those who were different from them.’).

For each story, there were three conditions: 1) **Ingroup target, different interests**: social decision made about a target who was of the same cultural identity as the group but with interests in activities that were different from the group; 2) **Outgroup target, similar interests**: social decision made about a target who had a different cultural identity from the group but had similar interests in activities as the group; and 3) **Forced-choice**: a condition that included both targets together and participants were required to respond to a situation in which the group (one with participants’ ingroup and one with the outgroup) had to decide to include either one or the other target. Two additional tasks included a **Cultural Knowledge Task**, and a **Contact with Individuals of Arab Descent** assessment. Using a repeated measures design, each task was administered to all participants. The data were used as individual level participant variables for cultural awareness, stereotypic associations, and level of intergroup contact. Participant’s age, gender, ethnicity/race, religion, and ethnic composition of friendship groups were also collected.
Pilot testing \((N = 72)\) was conducted to assess the clarity, readability, and appropriateness of the measures. Items were removed or revised, based on feedback through pilot testing, to ensure that the scenarios were ecologically valid and relevant to the participants and to ensure that all items were effectively presented. The final research survey protocol is titled the *Culture, Stereotypes, and Peer Group Inclusion Survey* (see Appendix C for full version of the survey).

Participants first provided some initial demographic information related to age, gender, and school. A warm-up measure was administered to familiarize participants with the 6-point Likert scale used for different questions (1 = *very bad*, 6 = *very good*). This was followed by an introduction to the two hypothetical peer groups (\text{"These are groups of friends that hang out after school."}), in the form of professional illustrations of groups of children.

As an introduction to the stories, participants completed a *Group Identification Task* in which they were told that they belonged to an American group of peers (\text{"This is your group:"}) in the form of an illustration of four same gendered peers with non-Arab American names (for survey protocol see Appendix C). The *Group Identification Task* was modified from Nesdale and Flesser (2001). Participants were asked to give their group a name, choose an end-of-year activity they would like the group to do, and pick a symbol for the group. This was done to create an identification with the American peer group (Nesdale & Flesser, 2001). This method has been previously validated in developmental intergroup research, which adopts the minimal group paradigm and novel groups to investigate intergroup
attitudes (Dunham et al., 2011). In the form of three illustrations, participants were introduced to three types of activities that their group liked to do.

Next, the Arab American group of friends was introduced (“This is the other group:”), through an illustration of four same-gendered ‘Arab’ peers. To identify the Arab American group as Arab, each member of the group was given an Arabic name written phonetically using the English alphabet, and was depicted to have darker features such as hair and eyes, but had varying skin tones. The depiction of the Arab American group of friends was intended to represent ingroup heterogeneity as Arab Americans can come from numerous regions around the world. The group of Arab American peers was depicted as having similar clothing styles as the American group, so as not to have clothing customs impact children’s judgments about each group. A statement written in Arabic, which translates to “Arab group of friends”, was shown above the picture of the group. The three activities that the Arab American group liked to do were also indicated through depiction. On the following page, the participants read about the norm of each group. Depending on the version the participant received (see Figure 2), one group would have an exclusive norm and the other group would have an inclusive norm. The norms were established as follows:

Exclusive group condition:

“In the past when your/this group of American/Arab American friends, who are your age, invited others into their group, they would invite only those who were similar to them.”

Inclusive group condition:
“In the past when your/this group of American/Arab American friends, who are your age, invited others into their group, they would invite those who were different from them.”

After the norms were identified, participants read the stories about each group and answered the questions asked about each target. Each story was set up such that participants were reminded about the norm of the group in the story and were introduced to either an outgroup peer with similar interests or an ingroup peer with different interests, each seeking entry into the group. In order to standardize the survey, the outgroup story (i.e., Arab American group) was always presented first. In addition, a set order for presenting the targets was established to avoid sample sizes beyond those necessary for the main variables under investigation, (see Figure 2).

**Measures**

For each target presented, participants responded to six measures reflecting their Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes, and two measures representing an Attribution of Emotions in an exclusion context assessment.

**Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes measure.** This assessment had 6 items: (1) Group Inclusion (“The group has to decide what to do. How likely would it be that the group decides to invite Zeina/Julie to join the group?” *Likert; 1=Really not likely, to 6 = Really likely)*; (2) Group Inclusion Reasoning (“Why”); (3) Individual Inclusion (“In your own opinion, how likely would it be that you would invite Zeina/Julie to the group?” *Likert; 1=Really not likely, to 6 = Really likely); (4) Individual Inclusion Reasoning (“Why?”); (5) Evaluation of the Deviant (“How okay was it for Ayah to tell the group that they should not invite/invite Zeina/Julie?”)
Likert; 1=Really not okay to 6 = Really okay); and (6) Evaluation of the Deviant Reasoning (“Why?”). Prior to the latter two measures, participants read a short description of an ingroup member (relevant to the group they were reading about) who went against the norm of the group and told the group to either invite or not invite the target. For example, if the group has an inclusive norm the deviant member is described as follows:

“Ayah is a member of this group, but she is the one member of this group who likes kids who are similar to her and because of this she tells the group they should not invite Zeina/Julie to the group.”

Attributions of Emotions measure. This assessment required participants to respond to a probe about the emotions a group would feel after excluding a target and was administered along with the Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes. The survey stated: “Let’s say the group decides not to invite X because he/she is different. How do you think the group would feel about excluding X?” The choice of feelings were derived from previous research on emotional attribution (Malti et al., 2012) and adjusted after pilot testing. The two items were: (1) Attribution of Group Emotions (“How do you think the group would feel about not inviting Zeina/Julie? Please check all that apply.”) proud, glad, sad, angry, anxious, guilty, feelings not changed, ashamed, and caring, 1 = checked, 0 = unchecked); and (2) Attribution of Group Emotions Reasoning (“Why?”).

Analyses were conducted using the emotions that were attributed by at least 10% of the sample. Given this criterion, analyses for attributions that the group was anxious or caring were not conducted. Thus, the emotions that were attributed most
frequently and analyzed were pride, gladness, sadness, anger, guilt, apathy (lack of emotions), and shame.

**Force-choice condition.** After responding to the *Group Inclusion, Individual Inclusion, Evaluations of Deviant Act,* and *Attribution of Emotions* measures for each of the target conditions (ingroup, different interests and outgroup, similar interests), participants were introduced to the *forced-choice* condition, which described a situation in which the group had to decide between choosing one of the two targets to join the group.

“This/your group of Arab American/American friends is going to a music concert/the movies, and they have room for one more person to invite. Remember that this/your group likes to have kids who are different from/similar to them join the group.”

The items were: (a) *Forced-choice Group Inclusion* (“If both Zeina and Julie like to go to music concerts/movies, who do you think the group will invite? Choose only one.” 1 = ingroup target with different interests, 0 = outgroup target with similar interests); (b) *Forced-choice Group Inclusion Reasoning* (“Why?”).

**Cultural Knowledge Task.** This task, administered at the end of the session, included two open-ended questions and one 3-point categorical measure: (1) *Knowledge about Arab People* (“Please define who is an Arab.”); (2) *Trait and Characteristic Associations with Arab People* (“What characteristics if any, do you think of when you think of an Arab?”); and 3) *Arab/Muslim Confound,* (“Are all Arabs Muslim?”; “yes,” “no,” or “not sure”). The former two measures were coded to capture knowledge of Arab people and stereotypic associations.
Based on the responses generated by the participants, three broad categories emerged with subcategories for further differentiation (see Table 2 for definitions and example of categories coded): (1) Knowledge level, which included codeable responses that represented factual knowledge, general imprecise knowledge, non-factual knowledge, no knowledge; (2) Stereotypic associations, which included generalizations about physical markers, cultural customs, religion, negative associations, geography and language, as well as claims about general differences compared to American culture; and (3) Positive and neutral descriptions, which included positive adjectives, claims to similarities to others, and ambiguous unclear responses. Responses for the Knowledge about Arab People assessment could have a maximum of two codes (11% of the sample used two codes); thus, responses were coded as 1 = full use of the category, .5 = partial use, 0 = no use of the category. Responses for the Trait and Characteristic Associations with Arab People assessment could have a maximum of three codes (23% of the sample used two codes, 4% used three codes); thus, responses were coded as 1 = full use of the category, .5 = partial use with two codes, .33 = partial use with three codes, 0 = no use of the category. Because participants could use all, partial, or none of the cultural knowledge codes, concerns about the interdependence of the data were not an issue (the data were independent for coding purposes). Three coders conducted the coding. On the basis of 25% of the interviews (n = 50), at least 88% agreement was achieved for coding responses into the categories identified, with Cohen’s $\kappa = .86$ for interrater reliability.

A dichotomous knowledge variable was created from the responses to the
Knowledge about Arab People assessment, which divided the sample into those who had factual knowledge about Arab people and those who did not (i.e., all other response categories) (1 = Factual Knowledge, 0 = Non-Factual Knowledge). A stereotypic associations variable was created from participants’ coded responses to the Trait and Characteristic Associations with Arab People assessment. This variable was a dichotomous variable and represents presence or absence (1 = presence, 0 = absence) of stereotypic associations (generalizations about physical markers, cultural customs, religion, negative associations, geography and language, general differences) made in response to the question “What characteristics, if any, do you think of when you think of an Arab?”. In addition, high values on the Arab/Muslim Confound represented a confounding of the two identities, while low values represented no such confound (1 = yes response, 0.5 = not sure responses, 0 = no responses).

Contact with Individuals of Arab Descent measure. Participant's’ level of contact with peers of Arab descent was measured using the Contact with Individual of Arab Descent assessment. This included five items reflecting varying levels of contact, these were: (a) Neighborhood (“How many kids in your neighborhood are Arab?” Likert; 1 = None, 2 = A few, 3 = Half, 4 = Most, and 5 = All); (b) Friends (“How many friends do you have who are Arab?” Likert; 1 = None, 2 = A few, 3 = Half, 4 = Most, and 5 = All); (c) Conversations (“How often do you have conversations with Arab kids?” Likert; 1 = Never, 2 = A little, 3 = Sometimes, 4 = Often, 5 = Always) (d) Time Spent (“How often do you hang out with people who are Arab?” Likert; 1 = Never, 2 = A little, 3 = Sometimes, 4 = Often, 5 = Always); and
(e) Attendance of Arab Cultural Events (“How often do you attend social events or cultural specific events that are sponsored by Arab groups?” Likert; 1 = Never, 2 = A little, 3 = Sometimes, 4 = Often, 5 = Always). Factor analysis was conducted on all five items, showing that they load on one factor explaining 50.1% of variance in all five variables. This factor was used as a covariate in analyses of variance.

Demographics. Additionally, participant demographics were collected at the end of the survey. These included: (a) Ethnicity (“What is your race/ethnicity?” 1 = African American, 2 = Arab American, 3 = Asian American, 4 = Hispanic/Latino, 5 = Jewish American, 6 = European American (White), 7 = Biracial/Mixed race, 8 = other and specify); (b) Religion (“What is your religion?” 1 = Christian, 2 = Jewish, 3 = Muslim, 4 = other and specify); and (c) Ethnic/racial Composition of Friendships (“How many of your friends are the same ethnicity/race as you?” Likert; 1 = None, 2 = A few, 3 = Half, 4 = Most, and 5 = All).

A new variable was created out of the Ethnicity item to capture ethnic majority and minority status differences. To create this new Status variable, Jewish Americans were collapsed into the European American ethnic category and were assigned to the “ethnic majority” category, and all other ethnicities, including “biracial” and “other,” were assigned to the “ethnic minority” category. In addition, a new Friendship Composition variable was created to assess differences on the Cultural Knowledge Task between those who had more than half their friends of the same ethnicity or race (responses on the Ethnic/racial Composition of Friendships assessment = 4 or 5) and those who had half or less friends of the same ethnicity or race (responses on the Ethnic/racial Composition of Friendships assessment = 1, 2 or
3). The split, made to create the *Friendship Composition* variable, was based on the median value of 3 for responses on the *Ethnic/racial Composition of Friendships* assessment.

**Reasoning and Coding Reliability**

Participants’ justifications were coded using a coding system comprised of categories drawn from the Social Domain theory (Smetana, 2006), as well as based on the results of pilot testing. The coding system comprised of nine subcategories that fall under three general codes: *Moral, Social-Conventional* and *Psychological* (see Table 3). The moral codes were (a) Social Justice/Inclusivity (e.g., “You should not be prejudiced” or “They did not invite him just because of his race”), (b) Psychological Harm/Empathy (e.g., “It will hurt his feelings” or “Friends should be nice to one another”); the social-conventional codes were (c) Group Functioning (e.g., “He won’t fit in because he’s different” or “It doesn’t affect the group”), (d) Activity Preferences (e.g., “She likes to do different activities” or “He likes tennis just like them”), (e) Cultural Identity (e.g., “He’s American which is different from them” or “She’s Arab American, they would like her”), (f) Stereotypes (e.g., “Arabs will be uncomfortable, because Henry does not meet their racial preferences” or “They might not speak the same language”), (g) Group Diversity (e.g., “Its good to have different opinions” or “She could teach the group new things”; the psychological codes were (h) Autonomy (e.g., “He said his opinion” or “She can say what she wants, its up to her”), and (i) Personal Preference/Personality (e.g., “I like tennis so I would like Julie” or “I would see what his personality is like first”).

For the justifications of the inclusion assessments (*Group Inclusion*,
Individual Inclusion, Forced-choice Group Inclusion, and Evaluation of the Deviant Act and the Attributions of Emotions assessment, analyses were conducted using the three most frequently used justifications, which were all used by more than 10% of the sample. Justification responses for the inclusion assessments could have a maximum of two codes, thus responses were coded as $1 = \text{full use of the category}$, $.5 = \text{partial use}$, $0 = \text{no use of the category}$. Given that in excluding a target some groups were violating their group norm it was theoretically important to differentiate between use of moral reasoning and use of social-conventional/group dynamics reasoning when reasoning about the emotions that a group would feel. For this reason the subcategory justifications of the Attribution of Emotions assessment were collapsed into their broader moral categories and social-conventional/group dynamics category. Thus, moral subcategories were collapsed into one ‘moral’ code and social-conventional subcategories were collapsed into one ‘social-conventional/group dynamics’ code. A maximum of three codes (subcategories) were possible for these responses, $1 = \text{full use of the category}$, $.5 = \text{partial use with two codes}$, $.33 = \text{partial use with three codes}$, $0 = \text{no use of the category}$ (3.5 % of sample used three codes). On the basis of 25% of the interviews ($n = 50$), at least 89% agreement was achieved with Cohen’s $\kappa = .88$ for inter-rater reliability. The least-reported percent agreement among the three coders for double versus singles codes was 90%, and a Cohen’s $\kappa = .71$. Double coding was conducted on 21% of the total number of responses.
Plan of Analyses

Descriptive analyses regarding participants’ responses to the Cultural Knowledge Task and the Contact with Individual of Arab Descent assessment were first conducted using Age, Gender, Status (ethnic minority or majority), Religion and Ethnic Composition of Friendships as independent factors in order to gain a better understanding of the study samples’ awareness and knowledge about Arab cultural identity and their levels of contact with Arab peers. Level of Contact was used as a covariate in ANCOVA analyses, however, since contact was low in the sample, it showed low correlations with the dependent measures and significant findings based on the factors of interest Group Cultural Identity, Group Norm, Target of Inclusion, Age and Gender existed above and beyond Level of Contact, it was therefore removed as a covariate from final analyses. In addition, given that 52% of the participants were racial/ethnic minorities, and research has shown that racial/ethnic minority children have differential responses to exclusion than majority status children (Margie et al., 2005), analyses were also conducted with Status as a factor. Findings were, however, sparse showing small effect sizes and no consistent patterns, thus no generalizing conclusions about minority status could be drawn. In particular, because of the diversity of the minority sample with each ethnicity having a small sample size no specific conclusions could be made, therefore to preserve statistical power this factor was removed from final analyses.

Hypotheses were tested using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), correlational analysis, independent- and paired-sample t-tests, and Chi-squared tests. Planned comparisons were conducted to test expected differences between factors and
Bonferroni comparisons were conducted as follow-up tests on the ANOVA to control for Type I errors. The primary variables of interest for this study were *Group Cultural Identity* (Arab American, American), *Group Norm* (inclusive, exclusive) and the *Target of Inclusion* (outgroup with similar interests, ingroup with different interests) as independent factors, while *Age*, and *Stereotypic Associations* were predictor variables. Although no hypotheses were proposed for gender, *Gender* was included as a factor for analyses of variance tests. Given that past research has shown differential judgments based on gender (Killen & Stangor, 2001) due to social status differences, *Gender* was maintained in the analyses to address the issue of status (e.g., females are a lower status group than males). Dependent measures were *Group Inclusion, Individual Inclusion, Forced-choice Group Inclusion, Evaluation of the Deviant Act,* and *Attributions of Emotions.*

Differences between the proportions of the top three types of reasoning used for each measure were assessed by *Group Cultural Identity, Group Norm, Target of Inclusion, Age, Gender, Evaluations,* and *Judgments* using repeated measures ANOVA. ANOVAs were used to analyze proportions due to repeated measures designs, which are not appropriate for logistic regressions (see footnote 4 in Wainryb, Shaw, Laupa, & Smith, 2001).
Chapter 4: Results

First descriptive statistics regarding participants’ responses to the Cultural Knowledge Task and the Contact with Individuals of Arab Descent assessment are presented to gain a better understanding of the study sample’s awareness of Arab cultural identity and their experiences with people of Arab backgrounds. Second, results focus on testing hypotheses related to the Group Inclusion judgment, reasoning, and the effects of stereotypic associations on participants’ Group Inclusion judgments. Then, analyses and results for participants’ Individual Inclusion judgments compared with their own Group’s Inclusion judgments (American group story only) are presented followed by reports of the effects of stereotypic associations and findings for the reasoning used to justify one’s own inclusion judgments. This is followed by results of participants’ Forced-choice Group Inclusion decision and reasoning. Results for participants’ Evaluations of the Deviant Act and their reasoning about their evaluations are then presented. Finally, tests of hypotheses and findings related to participants’ responses to the Attribution of Group Emotions and reasoning about it are presented. Please note that all mentions of the “American group”, refer to a non-Arab American cultural identity and all mentions of the “Arab American group” refer to a cultural identity of Arab descent.

When reasoning data was assessed, the top three categories of reasoning used by participants were analyzed for each inclusion judgment, forced-choice, and evaluation of the deviant group member. Although it was expected that participants would use stereotypes to justify their responses for exclusive expectations, participants used stereotype reasoning in very low frequencies (less than 3%), thus
this type of reasoning was not included in any reasoning analyses. Similarly, it was expected that social justice and inclusivity reasoning would be used to justify participants’ group inclusion and individual inclusion judgments. Although participants used social justice reasoning more to justify individual inclusion than group inclusion, the frequency of use was not greater than 8%. Therefore, references to group functioning, activity preferences, and cultural identity were used to analyze reasoning for group inclusion and forced-choice assessments. Group functioning, activity preferences, and personal preferences/personality were used to analyze individual inclusion judgments. When analyzing reasoning for evaluations of the deviant group member social justice/inclusivity, group functioning, and autonomy reasoning were used. When analyzing reasoning about attributions of emotions, subcategories in the moral domain were collapsed to represent moral forms of reasoning and reasoning using subcategories in the societal domain were collapsed to represent reasoning in terms of group dynamics. Analyses of reasoning for inclusion judgments and evaluation of the deviant act were conducted with two goals in mind; (1) to test hypotheses related to reasoning used as a function of judgments (likely to include and not likely to include) and evaluation (okay and not okay); and (2) to gain in-depth understanding of patterns found in Likert inclusion judgments and evaluations.

Cultural Knowledge Task

**Knowledge about who Arabs are.** Thirty-three percent of the participants (n = 64) who responded to the assessment “Please define who is an Arab,” reported factual knowledge about Arab people (e.g. “Someone from the Middle East” or “They
speak Arabic and are from an Arab country”), while 51% reported imprecise, non-factual, or no knowledge about Arab people \((n = 99)\), 10% used stereotypic associations \((n = 20)\), and 6% responded with ambiguities and references to similarities with other people \((n = 11)\). Further analyses were conducted using a dichotomous variable that represents those with factual knowledge \((33\%, \text{Knowledge} = 1)\) and those without \((67\%, \text{No Knowledge} = 0)\). A large effect size for age was found showing older participants had more knowledge about Arab people than younger participants, \(t(168) = -5.89, p < .001, \text{Cohen's } d = -0.86\). Knowledge did not vary by Gender, participant’s Ethnic Majority/Minority Status, Religion, and Ethnic Composition of Friendships (see Table 4).

**Stereotypic associations made about Arab people.** Forty-seven percent \((n = 88)\) of participants did not report stereotypic associations with Arab people, while 53% did \((n = 99)\). Older participants reported more stereotypic associations than younger participants, revealing a moderate effect size, \(t(185) = -4.90, p < .001, \text{Cohen's } d = -0.73\). Similar to Knowledge about Arab People, stereotypic associations did not vary by Gender, participant’s Ethnic Majority/Minority Status, Religion, and Ethnic Composition of Friendships (see Table 4). Participants’ stereotypic associations did not significantly differ based on their knowledge of Arab people, although those with knowledge were trending toward making more stereotypic associations \(M_{\text{No Knowledge}} = 0.48, SD_{\text{No Knowledge}} = 0.50; M_{\text{Knowledge}} = 0.62, SD_{\text{Knowledge}} = 0.49\).

**Confounding Arab and Muslim identities.** Seven percent \((n = 13)\) of participants did confound Arabs with Muslims, 51% did not \((n = 100)\), but 42% were
not sure \((n = 83)\). Correlational analyses were used to test the association between the
*Arab/Muslim Confound* and *Age, Gender, participant’s Ethnic Majority/Minority Status, Religion, and Ethnic Composition of Friendships*. Age was significantly
egatively correlated with the *Arab/Muslim Confound* \((r = -.205, p < .01)\), such that
older participants were less likely to confound the two identities than were younger participants.

To test whether responses to this measure were related to participants’
*Knowledge about Arab People* and *Stereotypic Associations with Arab People*,
univariate ANOVAs were conducted with *Knowledge about Arab People* and
*Stereotypic Associations with Arab People* as dependent variables and the
*Arab/Muslim Confound* as a fixed factor. Findings showed a significant effect for the
*Arab/Muslim Confound* for both knowledge \((F(2, 188) = 9.69, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.09)\)
and stereotypic association \((F(2, 182) = 4.37, p < 0.05, \eta_p^2 = 0.04)\). Pair-wise
comparisons showed that participants who did not confound Arabs with Muslims had
more knowledge about Arab people than those who were not sure \((p < .001)\) or
confounded the two identities \((p < .05)\). In addition those who did not confound
Arabs with Muslims made statistically significantly less stereotypic associations
about Arab people \((p < .05)\) than those who were not sure (see Table 5).

In sum a majority of participants did not have factual knowledge about Arab
people and half of the sample readily made stereotypic associations with people of
Arab descent. This varied as a function of age, such that older participants had more
factual knowledge about Arab people but made more stereotypic associations than
younger participants. In addition older participants were less likely to confound Arab
identity with Muslim identity. Those who were not sure whether all Arabs were Muslim however, were more likely to make stereotypic associations than those who did not confound the two identities.

**Contact with Individuals of Arab Descent**

Contact with individuals of Arab decent was low for this sample. A majority of participants reported having few or no Arabs in their neighborhoods (97%), few or no Arab friends (96%), little or no conversation with Arab peers (58%), rarely or never hung out with Arab peers (67%), and rarely or never attended events sponsored by Arab groups (84%). Thus an average score for all five measures which all range from 1 = no contact, to 5 = a lot of contact, had M = 1.88, and SD = 0.58. Given that contact was very low, ANCOVA analyses with Level of Contact as a covariate and the Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes measures as dependent variables showed similar effects as ANOVA analyses without contact as covariate. Therefore, subsequent analyses of dependent inclusion measures and attribution of emotions measures do not include Level of Contact as a covariate or a predictor. As for contact with peers not of the same ethnic or racial background, 40% reported having more than half their friends of a similar race, thus the majority of participants had ethnically or racially diverse friendships.

**Judgments and Reasoning about Group Inclusion**

**Group inclusion judgments.** To test the expectation that participants would view their own American group to be more inclusive than the Arab American group, two separate 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) × 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) × 2 (Gender: female, male) × 2 (Group Cultural Identity: Arab American,
American) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted on the Group Inclusion measures for an outgroup target with similar interests and for an ingroup target with different interests. Expectations were confirmed for an outgroup target. Findings showed that participants perceived their own group to be more inclusive toward an Arab American (outgroup target) with similar interests ($M_{\text{American Group}} = 4.36, SD_{\text{American Group}} = 1.52$) than an Arab American group would be toward an American with similar interests as the group ($M_{\text{Arab American Group}} = 3.68, SD_{\text{Arab American Group}} = 1.53$); $F(1,188) = 14.64, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .07$. However, when it came to judging inclusivity toward an ingroup target with different interests, no differences were found based on the cultural identity of the group, both groups were viewed to be inclusive toward a cultural ingroup target with different interests (American Group: $M_{\text{American Group}} = 4.24, SD_{\text{American Group}} = 1.58$; Arab American Group: $M_{\text{Arab American Group}} = 4.37, SD_{\text{Arab American Group}} = 1.35$).

A Group Cultural Identity × Group Norm interaction effect was found for both targets; an outgroup with similar interests, $F(1,188) = 6.19, p < .04, \eta^2_p = .03$, and an ingroup with different interests: $F(1,188) = 51.97, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .21$. These effects indicated that perceptions of similarity varied by cultural group, specifically when the group had an exclusive norm (“we like kids who are similar”). In the exclusive norm condition, the Arab American group was viewed to be less inclusive toward someone with a different cultural identity, whereas the American group was viewed to be less inclusive toward someone with different interests in activities (see Figure 3). Pairwise comparisons showed that, for judgments about groups with exclusive norms, the Arab American group was judged to be less inclusive toward an
American (outgroup target) with similar interests than an American group was toward an Arab American with similar interests, $p < .001$, and more inclusive towards an Arab American (ingroup target) with different interests than the American group was toward an American ingroup member with different interests, $p < .01$ (see Figure 3). However, when the groups had inclusive norms (“we like kids who are different”), statistically significant differences between each cultural group were only found for inclusion of an ingroup target but not an outgroup target. Thus, the American group was judged to be more inclusive than the Arab American group toward a cultural ingroup target, $p < .05$. These findings suggest that the Arab American group was viewed to judge similarity based on cultural identity, while the American group was viewed to judge similarity based on shared interests in activities.

One-sample $t$-tests were conducted to assess whether participants’ inclusion judgments in each condition differed from the 3.5 midpoint (neutral rating), which indicated a 50-50 likelihood of including the target into the group. Significant differences from a 50% likelihood of including the target were found for all conditions at $p < .001$, except for two. These included the conditions for the likelihood that an exclusive Arab American group would include an outgroup target with similar interests, and the likelihood that an exclusive American group would include an ingroup target with similar interests. Thus, in all other conditions participants expected groups to be significantly inclusive with more than 50% likelihood of inclusion (see Figure 3 for test statistics).

**Age and gender differences.** When participants were judging inclusion of an outgroup target with similar interests, a main effect for Age $F(1,188) = 4.08$, $p < .05$,
\( \eta^2_p = .02 \), was found showing that older participants perceived both cultural groups to be less inclusive toward an outgroup target than younger participants (12-year-olds: \( M = 4.16, SD = 0.87 \); 16-year-olds: \( M = 3.89, SD = 0.87 \)). A \textit{Gender} \times \textit{Age} interaction effect, \( F(1,188) = 7.50, p < .01, \eta^2_p = .03 \), indicated that this age difference was driven by older males (see Figure 4). Pairwise comparisons showed that older males perceived both groups to be significantly less inclusive toward an outgroup target than younger males, \( p < .001 \). Younger males were also more inclusive than younger females, \( p < .05 \). No interaction effects were found with \textit{Age} and \textit{Group Norm}, thus disconfirming expectations that older participants will perceive an exclusive group to be less inclusive than younger participants. In fact both older and younger participants viewed exclusive groups to be less inclusive than inclusive groups, except when judging the inclusion of an outgroup target by their own group (pairwise comparisons between an exclusive group and an inclusive group: Arab American group including outgroup target, \( p < .001 \), Arab American group including ingroup target, \( p < .01 \), American group including ingroup target, \( p < .001 \), see Figure 3). Thus, participants viewed their own group would be likely to include an Arab American, irrespective of their group’s norm.

**Differences by target of inclusion.** Given that children focus on shared interests (McGlothlin & Killen, 2005), it was expected that participants would judge groups to be more inclusive towards an outgroup member with similar interests than an ingroup member with different interest, except in the case when the group had an inclusive norm. To test this hypothesis, two separate \( 2 \) (\textit{Age Group}: 12 years, 16 years) \( \times 2 \) (\textit{Group Norm}: inclusive, exclusive) \( \times 2 \) (\textit{Gender}: female, male) \( \times 2 \) (\textit{Target
of Inclusion: outgroup member with similar interests, ingroup member with different interests) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted on the Group Inclusion judgments about the Arab American group and the American Group.

Findings for the Arab American group disconfirmed expectations that participants would view the group to give priority to shared interests and be more inclusive toward an outgroup target who shares the same interests as the group. In fact, a main effect for Target of Inclusion, $F(1,187) = 18.38, p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .09$, was found indicating the opposite in the case of an Arab American group. Participants perceived that the Arab American group would be less inclusive toward an American target than an Arab American target (Outgroup, similar interests: $M = 3.67, SD = 1.53$; Ingroup, different interests: $M = 4.36, SD = 1.33$).

One-sample $t$-tests were conducted to test whether inclusion judgments differed from 3.5 midpoint likelihood rating. Results showed that participants expected the Arab American group to be inclusive toward another Arab American ingroup target, $t(197) = 9.05, p < .001$, Cohen’s $d = 0.65$, but were uncertain about the group inviting an American target, showing no significant difference from the midpoint judgment of 3.5. A main effect for Group Norm was also found indicating that, irrespective of the target’s identity, inclusion judgments matched the group’s norm, $F(1,187) = 30.97, p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .14$ (Exclusive Norm: $M = 3.68, SD = 0.86$; Inclusive Norm: $M = 4.36, SD = 0.86$). One-sample $t$-tests investigating whether inclusion judgments for the group in each norm condition differed from the 3.5 midpoint likelihood rating were conducted and both were statistically significant,
In contrast to expectations about the Arab American group, findings for the American group did not show a main effect for Target of Inclusion but showed a Target of Inclusion × Group Norm interaction effect, $F(1,189) = 18.27, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .08$. This interaction effect is evidence of participants’ sensitivity to their own group’s norms, but only when including an ingroup target with different interests in activity, $p < .001$ (Exclusive Norm: $M = 3.51, SD = 1.56$; Inclusive Norm: $M = 4.95, SD = 1.27$). No statistical significance was found when judging inclusion of an outgroup target with similar interests (Exclusive Norm: $M = 4.32, SD = 1.53$; Inclusive Norm: $M = 4.37, SD = 1.54$). Participants expected their own group to be more inclusive toward an outgroup target when the group had an exclusive norm than it was to an ingroup target, $p = .001$, thus confirming the hypothesis that they would focus on shared interest in activities.

**Age and gender differences specific to the American group.** A Target of Inclusion × Age × Gender interaction effect was found for the American group only, $F(1,189) = 4.82, p < .05, \eta^2_p = .02$, showing that Age and Gender effects were present when judging inclusion of an outgroup target and not when judging inclusion of an ingroup target. Thus, when judging the likelihood that their own group would include an Arab American with similar interests 16-year-old males were the least inclusive. They were less inclusive than 12-year-old males, $p = .001$, and less inclusive than 16-year-olds females, $p < .01$ (12-year-old males: $M = 4.75, SD = 1.39$; 16-year-old males: $M = 3.74, SD = 1.61$; 12-year-old females: $M = 4.26, SD = 1.55$; 16-year-old
females: $M = 4.59$, $SD = 1.41$). A main effect for Group Norm was also found for the American group showing an exclusive group norm influenced participants overall inclusion judgments, $F(1,189) = 33.43$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .15$ (Exclusive Norm: $M = 3.91$, $SD = 0.91$; Inclusive Norm: $M = 4.66$, $SD = 0.91$).

**Reasoning about group inclusion.** Analyses of reasoning were conducted to accomplish two goals. The first was to explain the pattern found in group inclusion judgments, whereby exclusivity or similarity was judged based on cultural identity for the Arab American group but judged based on shared interest in activities for the American group. The second goal was to investigate the reasoning used by participants who judged a group to be exclusive compared with those who judged the group to be inclusive. The top three categories of reasoning used for group inclusion judgments were group functioning, activity preferences, and cultural identity.

**Explaining group inclusion when groups have exclusive norms.** To accomplish the first goal, two separate 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) $\times$ 2 (Gender: female, male) $\times$ 2 (Group Cultural Identity: Arab American, American) $\times$ 3 (Reasoning: group functioning, activity preferences, cultural identity) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted using proportion of reasoning for inclusion of an outgroup target (first ANOVA) and inclusion of an ingroup target (second ANOVA). Only the conditions in which both groups had an exclusive group norm (e.g., “we invite kids who are similar”) were analyzed. When judging the inclusion of an outgroup target with similar interests into a group with an exclusive norm a main effect for the type of reasoning used was found, $F(2,378) = 4.76$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2_p = .02$. This finding showed that participants reasoned about group decisions
regarding inclusion of an outgroup target who has the same interests in activities using references to activity preferences more so than references to cultural identity, $p < .01$ (Group functioning: $M = .32, SD = .44$; Activity Preferences: $M = .36, SD = .41$; Cultural Identity: $M = .21, SD = .35$). A $Reasoning \times Group Cultural Identity$ interaction effect was also found, $F(2,378) = 4.05, p < .05, \eta^2_p = .02$, showing that participants used more references to cultural identity when judging likelihood of inclusion by the Arab American group than when judging likelihood of inclusion by the American group, $p < .01$ (see Figure 5). In addition, only when judging their own American group’s decision to include an outgroup target did participants use more group functioning and activity preference reasoning than cultural identity, $ps < .001$. Thus, when making inclusion judgments about an outgroup target with similar interests participants attended to cultural identity when thinking about the Arab American group and attended to group functioning and activity preferences when thinking about their own group.

When the group had an exclusive norm, reasoning about decisions to include an ingroup target with different interests also differed based on the cultural identity of the group. A $Reasoning \times Group Cultural Identity$ interaction effect was found, $F(2,374) = 8.89, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .04$, providing evidence that ‘similarity’ for an Arab American group is perceived to be based on cultural identity while for an American group it is based on concerns for group functioning and a shared interest in activities. Thus, participants reasoned based on group functioning and activity preferences more so than cultural identity when judging inclusion of an ingroup target into their own group (American), both $ps < .01$ (see Figure 5). They referenced cultural identity
more than group functioning when reasoning about inclusion of an Arab American target into the Arab American group, \( p < .01 \). Significantly more references for group functioning, \( p < .01 \), but less references to cultural identity, \( p < .001 \), were made when reasoning about inclusion into an American group compared to reasoning about inclusion into an Arab American group (see Figure 5).

In addition, a \( Reasoning \times Age \times Gender \) effect, \( F(2,374) = 5.53, p < .01, \eta_p^2 = .03 \), was found, which partially confirmed expectations that older participants focused on cultural identity while younger participants focused on shared interests in activities. An unexpected gender difference was found, showing that this hypothesis only held for the male sample (not the female sample). The interaction effect showed that when reasoning about inclusion of an ingroup target with different interests, young females referenced cultural identity more than young males, \( p < .001 \), and more than older females, \( p = .001 \), but older males used cultural identity in their reasoning more than younger males, \( p < .05 \) (12-year-olds females: \( M = .43, SD = .44 \); 16-year-old females: \( M = .18, SD = .33 \); 12-year-old males: \( M = .14, SD = .32 \); 16-year-old males: \( M = .32, SD = .43 \)). Younger males were also more likely to reference activity preferences than older males, \( p < .05 \) (12-year-old males: \( M = .42, SD = .46 \); 16-year-old males: \( M = .24, SD = .40 \)).

These findings provide further supporting evidence that participants perceive the Arab American group to be more concerned with similarities based on cultural identity than those based on shared interests. The opposite is the case for the American group, which is perceived to be more likely to make inclusion decisions based on shared interests in activities as opposed to shared cultural identity. In
addition, the age by gender findings provided insight into how reasoning using
cultural identity in exclusion contexts may develop from pre-adolescence to
adolescence with younger females and older males finding this category salient for
making decision about including ingroup targets with different interests in activities.

**Reasoning about exclusive and inclusive expectations.** The second goal of
analyses for reasoning about group inclusion, which sought to identify the reasoning
used to justify exclusive versus inclusive judgments about the group, was achieved by
conducting four $2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2$ (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) × 2 (Group Norm: inclusive,
exclusive) × 2 (Gender: female, male) × 2 (Judgment: exclusive, inclusive) × 3
(Reasoning: group functioning, activity preferences, cultural identity) ANOVAs with
repeated measures on the last factor. These were conducted as a function of whether
participants rated the group as likely to include the target (inclusive) or not likely to
include the target (exclusive). Inclusive or exclusive judgments were based on a
midpoint split of 3.5 for responses to a Likert scale ranging from 1 = *really not likely*
to 6 = *really likely*. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons for each significant reasoning by
judgment interaction effect were also conducted.

The four ANOVAs represented the following conditions: (a) Arab American
group including an outgroup target with similar interests; (b) American group
including an outgroup target with similar interests; (c) Arab American group
including an ingroup target with different interests; and (d) American group including
an ingroup target with different interests. It was expected that, in the case of the
outgroup target with similar interests, participants who expected the group to include
the target would focus on activity preferences or group functioning, while participants
who expected the group to exclude the target would focus on cultural identity. Reverse patterns were expected for reasoning about inclusion and exclusion of an ingroup target with different interests. Only effects for judgments by reasoning will be reported, as this was the main theoretical concern for this study.

A Reasoning × Judgment interaction effect was found for the all conditions except for the American group including an ingroup target (Arab American Group, Outgroup Target: $F(2,358) = 5.49, p < .01, \eta^2_p = .03$, American Group, Outgroup Target: $F(2,360) = 4.90, p < .01, \eta^2_p = .02$, Arab American Group Ingroup Target: $F(2,356) = 11.25, p < .01, \eta^2_p = .05$, American Group Ingroup Target: Not significant). As expected, participants who judged the Arab American group likely to include an American with similar interests referenced activity preferences significantly more than those who judged the group to exclude an American peer, $p < .01$ (see Table 6). While those who thought the group was more likely to exclude this target reasoned about it by referencing the differences in cultural identity between the group and target more so than those who thought the group would include an outgroup target, $p < .05$. In addition, those who made inclusive judgments reasoned about them based on group functioning and activity preferences more so than cultural identity, $p < .05$ and $p < .001$, respectively.

Similarly, when reasoning about their own American group, participants who thought his or her own group was likely to include an Arab American (with similar interests in activities) referenced activity preferences more so than those who thought the group would exclude an Arab American, $p < .01$. Participants who perceived their group be inclusive referenced activity preferences and group functioning more than
cultural identity, $ps < .001$ (see Table 6). It was noteworthy, however, that those who perceived their own group to exclude an Arab American with similar interests reasoned using group functioning (e.g., “He won’t fit in,” or “She’s different”) more than activity preferences and cultural identity, $p < .05$ and $p = .001$, respectively. Variability in participants’ reasoning about their own group’s decision to include or exclude an Arab American target with similar interests indicates that exclusion decisions based on reasons that have to do with how groups work could in this case have been based on implicit rather than explicit stereotypic expectations.

Those who thought an Arab American group was likely to include an ingroup target with different interest did so based on similarities in identity as opposed to activity preferences, $p < .01$, but they used group functioning as the main reason to include someone of the same identity, more so than activity preferences and cultural identity, $p < .001$ and $p < .01$, respectively (see Table 6). Cultural identity was used to justify inclusive judgments of an ingroup target with different interests into an Arab American group more so than to justify exclusive judgments, $p < .01$. However, those who justified exclusive judgments did so using more references to group functioning and differences in activity preferences than they did using cultural identity, $p < .01$ and $p < .001$, respectively.

In summary, participants used group functioning reasoning, alluding to lack of fit between a target and a group, or lack of similarities, or lack of differences in the case the group had an inclusive group norm, when justifying why they thought a group would exclude a target. References to cultural identity were only prevalent when making judgments about an Arab American group, such that cultural identity
was used to justify the group’s exclusion of an American target because they are not the same cultural identity but also to justify inclusion of an Arab American target because they are of the same culture. Preferences for similar activities were used to justify inclusion of an outgroup member with similar interests for both groups, thus providing further evidence that shared interests continue to serve as a salient factor which pre-adolescents and adolescents think of when making inclusion decisions.

**Stereotypes and Group Inclusion**

To test hypotheses related to stereotypes and judgments about group inclusion the **Stereotypic Associations** variable was used as a fixed factor in repeated measures ANOVAs, along with **Age** and **Group Norm**. Gender was not included in these analyses because there were no hypotheses pertaining to gender and stereotypic associations and the number of stereotypic associations made did not differ by gender. Only effects related to stereotypic associations will be reported in this section. The first expectation was that participants who reported stereotypic associations with Arab people would judge a group to be less inclusive toward outgroup targets than those who do not report stereotypic associations, specifically, participants with higher levels of stereotypes would be less inclusive toward an Arab American target joining an American group.

A 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) × 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) × 2 (Stereotypic Association: presence, absence) × 2 (Group Cultural Identity: Arab American and American) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted, with planned comparison for **Stereotypic Association × Group Cultural Identity** to test expectations about the American group’s inclusion of an Arab
American. A main effect for Stereotypic Associations was found \( F(1,177)=9.48, p < .01, \eta_p^2=.05 \), confirming the hypothesis that those who reported stereotypic associations judged groups to be less inclusive toward an outgroup member \((M_{\text{Stereotypes}} = 3.82, SD_{\text{Stereotypes}} = 0.91; M_{\text{No Stereotypes}} = 4.24, SD_{\text{No Stereotypes}} = 0.93)\). In addition, planned comparison findings indicated less inclusivity toward an outgroup target on behalf of the American group between those who reported stereotypic associations and those who did not, \( F(1,177) = 4.68, p < .05, \eta_p^2=.02 \) \((M_{\text{Stereotypes}} = 4.09, SD_{\text{Stereotypes}} = 1.66 ; M_{\text{No Stereotypes}} = 4.63, SD_{\text{No Stereotypes}} = 1.34)\). Stereotypic associations, however, were not related to how participants judged inclusivity of an Arab American group toward an American target.

This finding was further supported when two separate ANOVAs for each group were conducted to address the question about whether or not participants with stereotypes judged inclusivity differentially based on the target of inclusion. Two 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) \( \times \) 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) \( \times \) 2 (Stereotypic Association: presence, absence) \( \times \) 2 (Target of Inclusion: outgroup member with similar interests, ingroup member with different interests) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted on the Group Inclusion judgments for the Arab American group and the American Group. Disconfirming expectations, no effects for Stereotypic Associations were found when judging inclusivity of the Arab American group toward either target, indicating that stereotypic associations were not influential when making inclusion expectations about a cultural outgroup. However, a Target of Inclusion \( \times \) Stereotypic Association interaction effect was found for the American group, \( F(1,178) = 6.79, p = .01, \eta_p^2 \)
This finding showed that inclusion judgments for those with stereotypes differed from those without stereotypes when deciding to include an outgroup member into their own group, \( p < .05 \). In addition, inclusion judgments for those who did not hold stereotypic associations were made based on shared interest in activity because this sample of participants was more inclusive toward an Arab American who shared the same interest in activities than it was toward an American target who did not share the same interests as the group, \( p < .05 \) (see Figure 6).

To test hypotheses pertaining to the role of group norms and how they may influence those who hold stereotypes. Four independent-sample \( t \)-tests with stereotypic associations as the independent factor were conducted on inclusion assessments for the American group for both targets when the group had an exclusive norm and when it had an inclusive group norm. Stereotypic associations proved to play a statistically significant role for participants judging inclusion of an Arab American into their own American group when the group had an exclusive norm, \( t(86) = 2.52, p < .05, \text{Cohen's } d = .53 \) (see Figure 7), but not when the group had an inclusive norm. These findings indicate that participants who held stereotypic knowledge about Arab people used these stereotypes to make inclusion decisions about an Arab American into their own group. Specifically, stereotypes were most influential in the condition where the American group had an exclusive norm but did not play a significant role when the group had an inclusive norm.

**Individual Inclusion Versus Group Inclusion: American Group**

To assess whether participants’ own individual inclusion judgments differed from how they perceived their own group’s inclusion judgments (American group)
two separate 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) × 2 (Gender: females, males) × 2
(Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) × 2 (Inclusion Judgment: group, individual)
ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted for judgments
about including an outgroup target with similar interests and an ingroup target with
different interests. When judging inclusion of an outgroup target, participants’ own
individual inclusion differed from how they perceived their group’s inclusion of the
outgroup target, $F(1,189)= 12.35, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .06$, such that they were more
inclusive than they perceived their group to be inclusive (see Figure 8). This was also
the case for judging inclusion of an ingroup target with different interests, $F(1,188)=
8.17, p < .01, \eta^2_p = .04$.

Unlike judgments about an outgroup target when judging an ingroup target an
_Inclusion Judgment × Group Norm_ effect was found, $F(1, 188) = 6.52, p < .05, \eta^2_p
=.03$, showing that participants’ own judgments about including an ingroup member
differed from how likely they perceived their group to include an ingroup member
only when their group had an exclusive norm, $p < .001$ (Exclusive Norm: $M_{Group} =
3.50, SD_{Group} = 1.57, M_{Individual} = 4.05, SD_{Individual} = 1.56$; Inclusive Norm: $M_{Group} =
4.95, SD_{Group} = 1.27, M_{Individual} = 4.98, SD_{Individual} = 1.45$). No age-related differences
were found, disconfirming expectations that older participants will differentiate
between individual judgments and group judgments more than younger participants.

**Stereotypes and individual inclusion.** While participants were more
inclusive than they viewed their group to be, their own individual judgments also
differed based on their stereotypic associations. To test hypotheses related to whether
or not participants who held stereotypes about Arab people used them in their own
individual judgments a 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) × 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) × 2 (Stereotypic Association: presence, absence) × 2 (Target of Inclusion: outgroup member with similar interests, ingroup member with different interests) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted on participants individual inclusion judgments. As in the case of group inclusion judgments a Target of Inclusion × Stereotypic Association interaction effect was found, $F(1, 176) = 4.36, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .02$, showing that in their own inclusion judgments about an outgroup target, participants who reported stereotypic associations were less likely to include an outgroup target than participants who did not, $p < .05$. In addition, participants who did not make stereotypic associations were more inclusive toward an outgroup target than an ingroup target, providing further evidence that participants who did not have stereotypes about Arab people made their decisions based on shared interests in activities more so than cultural identity, $p < .05$ (see Figure 9).

Independent-sample $t$-tests were conducted to test effects of stereotypic associations on individual inclusion judgments about an outgroup target separately for when the group had an exclusive norm and for when the group had an inclusive norm. Although a similar pattern was found as that in the group inclusion assessment such that the difference between those who made stereotypic associations and those who did not was greater when the group was exclusive than when the group was inclusive, the $t$-test for the exclusive group was not significant but trending toward significance at $p = .058$. 
Reasoning about individual inclusion judgments. How did participants reason about their own individual rating of how likely they were to include either target? Contrary to their group inclusion judgment, participants rarely used cultural identity to justify their own inclusion ratings. Instead they used references to personal preferences/personality, thus citing concerns about their own preferences matching or not matching that of the target or focusing on the target’s personality (e.g., “She could be a nice person”). Two 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) × 2 (Gender: females, males) × 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) × 2 (Judgment: exclusive, inclusive) × 3 (Reasoning: group functioning, activity preferences, personal preference/personality) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted on reasoning about each target (ingroup target and outgroup target). These were conducted as a function of whether participants judged whether they were likely to include the target (inclusive) or not likely to include the target (exclusive). Inclusive or exclusive judgments were based on a midpoint split of 3.5 for responses to a Likert scale ranging from 1 = really not likely to 6 = really likely. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons for each significant Reasoning × Judgment effect were also conducted. No statistically significant differences were found for reasoning about an ingroup target with different interests. Participants used approximately the same amount of each type of reasoning to justify their own inclusion ratings of an ingroup target with different interests (M_{Group function} = .27, SD_{Group function} = .43; M_{Activity} = .22, SD_{Activity} = .40; M_{Personal} = .28, SD_{Personal} = .44).

When participants reasoned about inclusion of an outgroup target with similar interests into their own group a Reasoning × Age × Gender interaction effect was
found, $F(2, 360) = 3.47, p < .05, \eta^2_p = .01$, in addition to a $Reasoning \times Age \times Judgment$ interaction effect $F(2, 360) = 4.53, p < .05, \eta^2_p = .02$ (see Table 7). The differences in reasoning by age and gender showed that, irrespective of the group norm, younger females focused on group functioning concerns more so than older females, $p < .01$, while older females reasoned using personal preferences and personality traits more so than younger females, $p < .05$. Older females were focused on personal preferences and personality traits and used them more so than group functioning concerns, $p < .01$. Younger males were concerned with activity preferences statistically significantly more than group functioning, $p < .05$.

In addition, differences in reasoning by $Age$ and $Judgment$ showed older participants who were likely to exclude an outgroup target reasoned about it using personal preferences and personality traits more than older participants who were likely to include the outgroup target, $p < .01$, (see Table 7). While older participants who were inclusive toward the outgroup target focused on shared interest in activities more than those who were exclusive, $p < .01$. Older participants who were likely to exclude used personal preferences more than younger exclusive participants, $p < .05$, and they used this type of reasoning more than any other form of reasoning, $ps < .05$. Older participants who were likely to include, however, used activity preferences more than younger inclusive participants, $p < .05$, and used it more than any other form of reasoning, $ps < .01$. Thus, adolescents used individual personal preferences and personality traits (e.g., “It depends on his personality, he may not be cool.”) to justify exclusive evaluations and activity preferences (e.g., “She likes to do the same things as us.”) to justify inclusive evaluations of an outgroup target with similar
interests. While gender differences were not expected, the age-related differences demonstrating that adolescents focus on individual traits and personal preferences are consistent with expectations.

**Forced-choice Group Inclusion**

When groups were forced to choose only one target (an outgroup target with the same interests in activities as the group or an ingroup target with different interests), it was expected that participants would make differential choices based on the cultural identity of the group, and that their own group would be expected to focus on shared interests in activities when making a forced choice. $\chi^2$-tests were carried out using the *Forced-choice Group Inclusion* assessment to test whether the proportion of participants who chose the ingroup target was significantly different from chance for each group. Findings confirmed this hypothesis, showing that participants perceived the American group to be less likely to choose an ingroup target over an outgroup target (significantly less than chance), $\chi^2(1) = 12.44, p < .001$ ($M_{American \ group} = 0.34, SD_{American \ group} = 0.49$), and perceived the Arab American group would choose the ingroup target over the outgroup target significantly more than chance $\chi^2(1) = 15.26, p < .001$ ($M_{Arab \ American \ Group} = 0.63, SD_{Arab \ American \ Group} = 0.49$).

To test hypotheses regarding the effects of group norms on each group a 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) × 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) × 2 (Gender: females, males) × 2 (Group Cultural Identity: Arab American, American) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted. Findings showed a main effect for *Group Cultural Identity*, $F(1,183) = 21.07, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .10$, indicating that the participants thought the Arab American group would choose the ingroup target
more often than the they thought their own group would (means and standard deviations same as above). Whether the group had an inclusive norm or exclusive norm only mattered for forced judgments about the American group and not for the Arab American group. Thus a Group Cultural Identity × Group Norm interaction was found, $F(1,183) = 3.88, p = .05, \eta_p^2 = .02$, with pairwise comparisons showing that when an American group had an exclusive norm participants thought it was significantly less likely for their own group to choose an ingroup member with different interests than when it had inclusive norm, $p = .001$ (see Figure 10). The patterns observed in the group inclusion assessment, whereby similarity was defined by cultural identity for the Arab American group and defined by shared interest for the American group, were also observed in the forced-choice group inclusion assessment. When both groups had an exclusive norm participants judged that the Arab American group would choose the ingroup target significantly more than they perceived the American group would choose the ingroup target, $p < .001$ (see Figure 10).

To test expectations related to participants’ stereotypic associations and their forced-choice group inclusion assessment, two 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) × 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) × 2 (Stereotypic Association: presence, absence) univariate ANOVAs were conducted for each cultural group. No statistically significant differences were found in participants’ forced-choice responses based on whether they reported stereotypic associations with Arab people or not.

**Reasoning about forced-choice group inclusion.** Analyses for reasoning about Forced-choice Group Inclusion assessment, were conducted to achieve two
goals. The first was to understand why children thought the Arab American group was more likely to choose an ingroup target over an outgroup target. The second goal was to explain participants’ choices of an ingroup target into their own American group and how the participants interpreted their group’s norm (exclusive or inclusive) in their forced-choice judgments. The top three categories of reasoning used for forced-choice group inclusion judgments were group functioning, activity preferences, and cultural identity.

*Reasoning about the Arab American group’s choices.* To accomplish the first goal three paired-sample t-test comparisons were conducted on the proportion of group functioning, activity preferences, and cultural identity reasoning used for inclusion choices made for the Arab American group compared with the American group. It was found that cultural identity was used significantly more when reasoning about choices in the Arab American group than when reasoning about choices in the American group, $t(188) = 2.42, p < .05, \text{Cohen's } d = 0.18$ (see Figure 11). No significant differences were found for the use of group functioning reasoning and activity preference reasoning between each cultural group.

*Reasoning about the American group’s choices of an ingroup target.* To achieve the second goal of explaining participants’ choices of an ingroup member into their own American group and to understand the role of an exclusive or inclusive group norm on their choices, only reasoning for those who chose the ingroup target was assessed as the dependent variable. Thus a $2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 3$ (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) $\times$ (Gender: females, males) $\times$ (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) $\times$ (Reasoning: group functioning, activity preferences, cultural identity) ANOVA with repeated
measures on the last factor was conducted for only those participants who chose the ingroup target (n = 70). A main effect for *Reasoning* was found, $F(2, 124) = 4.97, p < .01, \eta^2_p = .07$, showing that participants overall reasoned about including an ingroup target with different interests using group functioning reasoning statistically significantly more than activity preferences, $p < .01$, but not significantly more than cultural identity (Group functioning: $M = .46, SD = .48$; Activity Preferences: $M = .21, SD = .40$; Cultural Identity: $M = .26, SD = .43$).

A *Reasoning × Group Norm* interaction effect was found, $F(2, 124) = 5.26, p < .01, \eta^2_p = .07$, indicating that if their group had an inclusive norm of inviting kids who were different, participants reasoned about including an ingroup target who had different interest using group functioning and activity preferences more so than cultural identity, but only statistically significantly more for group functioning, $p < .01$ (see Figure 12). When the group had an exclusive norm of only inviting similar peers, they reasoned about including the American target using group functioning and cultural identity significantly more than activity preferences, $p < .05$ and $p < .01$ respectively. In addition, when their group had an exclusive norm, participants reasoned about including an ingroup target based on cultural identity (e.g., “She is American just like the group”) more so than when the group had an inclusive norm, $p < .01$, and used activity preferences more so when the group was inclusive than when the group was exclusive, $p < .05$.

There was also a *Reasoning × Group Norm × Age* effect, $F(2, 124) = 5.00, p < .01, \eta^2_p = .07$. This showed that the difference in reasoning about choosing an ingroup target to join an exclusive versus inclusive group was driven by different age
groups. For instance, the use of activity preferences when the group was inclusive was driven by adolescents, \( p < .001 \) (Activity Preference Reasoning: \( M_{12\text{-year-olds}} = .09, SD_{12\text{-year-olds}} = .29; M_{16\text{-year-olds}} = .50, SD_{16\text{-year-olds}} = .50 \)), while the use of group functioning reasoning in the same inclusive condition was driven by pre-adolescents, \( p < .01 \) (Group Functioning Reasoning: \( M_{12\text{-year-olds}} = .65, SD_{12\text{-year-olds}} = .47; M_{16\text{-year-olds}} = .28, SD_{16\text{-year-olds}} = .45 \)). Thus indicating that adolescents were explicit about the fact that the ingroup target had different interests and this matched the group’s norm of liking people who were different. While younger participants may have realized this, they were not very explicit about it and referenced group functioning (e.g., “He’s what the group wants”) reasoning more so than older participants and did so more than activity preferences \( p < .001 \), when the group was inclusive. In addition, in the inclusive group norm condition both younger and older participants used minimal references to cultural identity in their reasoning. Thus cultural identity was used less than group functioning (12-year-olds) and activity preferences (16-year-olds), \( p = .001 \) and \( p < .05 \), respectively (Cultural Identity Reasoning; \( M_{12\text{-year-olds}} = .13, SD_{12\text{-year-olds}} = .34; M_{16\text{-year-olds}} = .17, SD_{16\text{-year-olds}} = .36 \)).

When choosing to include an ingroup member with different interests, cultural identity was referenced more by both younger and older participants when the group was exclusive than when it was inclusive (Cultural Identity Reasoning; Younger: \( M_{\text{Exclusive Norm}} = .54, SD_{\text{Exclusive Norm}} = .50, M_{\text{Inclusive Norm}} = .13, SD_{\text{Inclusive Norm}} = .34 \); Older: \( M_{\text{Exclusive Norm}} = .40, SD_{\text{Exclusive Norm}} = .52, M_{\text{Inclusive Norm}} = .17, SD_{\text{Inclusive Norm}} = .36 \)). This difference in use of cultural identity based on the group norm was significant for the younger participants, \( p < .001 \). An exclusive group norm drove younger
participants to use cultural identity significantly more than activity preferences, $p < .01$ ($M_{\text{Cultural Identity}} = .54$, $SD_{\text{Cultural Identity}} = .50$, $M_{\text{Activity Preferences}} = .09$, $SD_{\text{Activity Preferences}} = .29$) and drove older participants to use group functioning significantly more than activity preferences, $p < .05$ ($M_{\text{Group functioning}} = .55$, $SD_{\text{Group functioning}} = .50$, $M_{\text{Activity Preferences}} = .05$, $SD_{\text{Activity Preferences}} = .16$). Thus younger children, who chose to include an ingroup target over an outgroup target, were explicit about the cultural similarities. Although in the same condition older participants used both cultural identity and group functioning, they used higher proportions of group functioning, evidencing a more implicit form of cultural ingroup preference.

**Evaluation of the Deviant Act**

Participants were asked to evaluate group members who deviated from an inclusive or exclusive group norms by wanted to not invite or invite a target (both ingroup and outgroup targets), respectively. Is deviance from an Arab American group viewed similarly as deviance from an American group? Was deviance from an inclusive group viewed similarly as deviance from an exclusive group? It was expected that deviating from a group with an exclusive norm by being inclusive would be evaluated positively while deviating from a group with an inclusive norm by being exclusive would be evaluated negatively. To test these expectations two $2 \times 2 \times 2$ \textit{ANOVAs} with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted for each target type (outgroup target, similar interests; ingroup target, different interests).
An interaction between Group Cultural Identity and Group Norm was found for how okay or not okay a deviant was for going against a group’s inclusive or exclusive norm for both targets (Outgroup target: $F(1, 188) = 194.26, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .50$; Ingroup target: $F(1, 187) = 218.34, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .53$). As expected, pairwise comparisons showed that for both cultural groups it was more okay to deviate from a group’s exclusive norm and invite the target than it was to deviate from a group’s inclusive norm and not invite the target, all four $ps < .001$ (for both targets, see Figure 13). Further, pairwise comparisons showed that when evaluating a deviant who did not want to invite an outgroup target with similar interests, participants evaluated the Arab American group deviant more negatively than the American group deviants, $p < .001$. No other differences were found based on cultural group. Thus, participants’ evaluations of deviance from an inclusive Arab American (outgroup) were quite differently than evaluations of deviance from an inclusive American (ingroup), suggesting divergent expectations about the ingroup and outgroup.

**Reasoning about evaluations of the exclusive group deviant.** Reasoning analyses were conducted to understand why participants evaluated an exclusive Arab American deviant more negatively than their own group’s exclusive deviant when they each advocated excluding an outgroup target. Thus three $2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) \times 2 (Gender: females, males) \times 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) \times 2 (Group Cultural Identity: Arab American, American)$ ANOVAs were conducted using the top three types of reasoning used to justify evaluations of a deviant group member in the case when they were challenging their group with respect to inviting or not inviting an outgroup target with similar interests. The top three reasoning
categories used were references to social justice/inclusivity, group functioning, and autonomy. Of the three ANOVAs only the one analyzing autonomy produced a significant Group Cultural Identity × Group Norm effect, $F(1,185) = 4.23, p < .05$, $\eta^2_p = .02$, showing that use of autonomy reasoning varied by whether the group was Arab American or American and by group norm. Pairwise comparisons showed that only in the case when the group was inclusive (and when participants were evaluating a deviant group member who was being exclusive) did participants attribute more autonomy to the American deviant than the Arab American deviant, $p < .05$ (see Figure 14).

Further analyses testing hypotheses related to participants’ reasoning as a function of their evaluations (not okay or okay) were also conducted, only on evaluation of deviants when the target was an outgroup member, to investigate if differences existed based on the valence of evaluations and between each type of reasoning used. Two 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) × 2 (Gender: females, males) × 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) × 2 (Evaluation: not okay, okay) × 3 (Reasoning: social justice, group functioning, autonomy) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted, one for evaluations of the Arab American deviant and one for evaluations of an American deviant. Okay or not okay evaluations were based on a midpoint split of 3.5 for responses to a Likert scale ranging from 1 = really not okay to 6 = really okay. This analysis only focused on Group Norm × Evaluation × Reasoning effects with planned comparisons to investigate group norm, evaluation and reasoning differences because of hypotheses.
related to differences based on evaluation of deviance from exclusive and inclusive group norms.

A Group Norm × Evaluation × Reasoning interaction effect was found only for reasoning about the Arab American deviant, $F(2, 362) = 7.07, p = .001, \eta^2_p = .03$, and not the American deviant. Planned comparisons showed that in the condition where an Arab American was deviating from his or her group’s inclusive norm (by not wanting to invite an American target), participants who evaluated this deviant act as “not okay” did so by referring to social justice and inclusivity reasoning more so than participants who found the act to be “okay”, $p < .05$ (see Table 8). Additionally, these participants referenced social justice and group functioning more than autonomy, $p < .001$. Those who thought the deviant’s act was “okay”, however, justified their responses using group functioning more than any other type of reasoning, $p < .05$. Thus, an exclusive deviant was justified based on concerns for group functioning. On the other hand, in the condition where the Arab American deviant went against the group’s exclusive norm (by wanting to invite an American target), participants who thought it was “not okay” did so because including the outgroup target may threaten group functioning more so than any other type of reason, $p < .001$. They also used group functioning more than participants who said an inclusive deviant was being “okay”, $p < .01$. Lastly, participants who said it was acceptable for the Arab American deviant to be inclusive, justified it by referencing the deviant’s autonomy, $p < .05$.

Although there was a non-significant Group Norm × Evaluation × Reasoning interaction effect for reasoning about the American deviant, planned comparisons
showed that unlike reasoning about the Arab American deviant, participants who evaluated the exclusive act of an American deviant to be okay when the target was Arab American did so by voicing both concerns about group functioning and the deviant’s autonomy more so than social justice/inclusivity reasoning, $p < .01$ (see Table 8). In addition, those who thought the American exclusive deviant was okay used autonomy reasoning more than those who evaluated the act as not okay, $p < .001$. Thus, showing that autonomy was used to justify exclusive opinions on behalf of an American ingroup member but not used for justifying exclusive opinions of an Arab American outgroup member.

**Attributions of Group Emotions**

Analyses for *Attributions of Group Emotions* in an exclusion context were conducted to answer four questions: (a) Do stereotypes effect how participants attribute emotions; (b) do participants attribute different emotions to their own group than an Arab American group when each group excludes a peer; (c) do participants attribute different emotions to a group when it excludes an ingroup target versus when it excludes an outgroup target; and (d) do group norms (exclusive and inclusive), age, and gender play a role in how participants differentially attribute emotions to a group in an exclusion context? To answer the first question, correlational analyses were conducted to test whether stereotypic associations were related to any type of emotion attributed in an exclusion context. No statistically significant correlations were found between what emotions participants attributed to each group for excluding both target and the stereotypic associations they made about Arab people. In fact, the correlations were all weak and did not exceed $r = .144$,
disconfirming expectations that stereotypic associations about a culturally different
group would be related to how participants attribute emotions to that group when it
carries out an exclusion, or when participants’ own group excluded someone from the
culturally different outgroup.

**Differences based on cultural groups.** To answer the second question,
paired-sample t-tests were conducted comparing proportions of each emotion (pride,
gladness, sadness, anger, guilt, apathy, shame) attributed to an Arab American group
excluding an outgroup/ingroup target, respectively, with emotions attributed to an
American group excluding an outgroup/ingroup target, respectively. It was expected
that more positive emotions would be attributed to an Arab American group for
excluding an outgroup target with similar interests than an American group. For
exclusion of an outgroup target, findings showed that participants attributed more
sadness, \( t(195) = -2.04, p < .05 \), Cohen’s \( d = -0.18 \), and guilt, \( t(195) = -2.49, p = .01 \),
Cohen’s \( d = -0.22 \) to their own group compared with the Arab American group for,
but attributed more apathy to the Arab American group than their own group, \( t(195) =
3.28, p = .001 \), Cohen’s \( d = 0.27 \) (see Table 9). However, when excluding an ingroup
target participants attributed more sadness, \( t(191) = -2.54, p < .01 \), Cohen’s \( d = -0.24 \),
and anger, \( t(191) = -2.29, p < .05 \), Cohen’s \( d = -0.19 \), to their own American group
than they did to the Arab American group.

**Differences based on the target of exclusion.** To answer the third question,
paired-sample t-tests were conducted to test whether more positive emotions were
attributed to a group excluding an outgroup target compared with excluding an
ingroup target. No differences were found between attributions of group emotions for
excluding an ingroup target versus an outgroup target when the group was American. When an Arab American group was carrying out the exclusion, however, attributions of emotions differed by the target being excluded. More pride, $t(193) = 2.26, p < .05$, Cohen’s $d = 0.19$, and gladness, $t(193) = 2.54, p = .01$, Cohen’s $d = 0.20$, were attributed to the group when excluding an outgroup target than when excluding an ingroup target. Whereas more guilt, $t(193) = -2.78, p = .01$, Cohen’s $d = -0.24$, and shame, $t(193) = -2.39, p < .05$, Cohen’s $d = -0.18$, was attributed to group after it excluded their ingroup member versus excluding an outgroup target (see Table 9). Overall, variance in the proportion of these emotions used across conditions suggests that participants use cultural identity to inform the types of emotions they attribute to groups that exclude others.

**Effects of group norms, age, and gender.** The next question was related to whether group norms, age, and gender played a role in how participants attributed emotions differentially based on the cultural identity of the group and the target of exclusion. To answer this question the emotions that participants saw to differ based on the group’s cultural identity and the target’s cultural identity were used. Therefore, when attributing emotions to a group that excluded the outgroup target three 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) × 2 (Gender: females, males) × 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) × 2 (Group Cultural Identity: Arab American, American) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted on the proportions of feelings of sadness, guilt, and apathy attributed to each group. For the ingroup target conditions two similar repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for attributions of sadness and anger. Given a main effect for cultural identity was
already reported and found in the t-tests above only effects of group norms, age, and gender will be reported next.

For the outgroup target conditions a Group Cultural Identity × Group Norm interaction effect was found for attributions of sadness, $F(1, 188) = 10.74, p = .01, \eta^2_p = .05$, and apathy, $F(1, 188) = 11.75, p = .001, \eta^2_p = .05$, but no effects of group norms were found for attributions of guilt. Thus, when attributing sad emotions to a group that excludes an outgroup target, participants attribute the least sadness to an Arab American group with an exclusive norm, less than an American group with an exclusive norm, and less than an Arab American group with an inclusive norm, $ps < .001$ (Arab American Group: $M_{Exclusive} = .06$, $SD_{Exclusive} = .24$; $M_{Inclusive} = .37$, $SD_{Inclusive} = .49$; American Group: $M_{Exclusive} = .33$, $SD_{Exclusive} = .47$; $M_{Inclusive} = .26$, $SD_{Inclusive} = .44$). On the other hand they attribute more apathy to an exclusive Arab American group than an exclusive American group or inclusive Arab American group, $ps < .001$ (Arab American Group: $M_{Exclusive} = .60$, $SD_{Exclusive} = .50$; $M_{Inclusive} = .28$, $SD_{Inclusive} = .45$; American Group: $M_{Exclusive} = .28$, $SD_{Exclusive} = .45$; $M_{Inclusive} = .33$, $SD_{Inclusive} = .47$).

Although group norms did not effect how participants attributed guilt to each group for excluding an outgroup target, there was a main gender effect, $F(1, 188) = 17.16, p < .001, \eta^2 = .08$, showing that females overall attributed more guilt in these conditions than males did ($M_{Females} = .63$, $SD_{Females} = .40$; $M_{Males} = .41$, $SD_{Males} = .39$).

In the case when exclusion of an ingroup target was taking place, no effects for group norm, age, or gender were found for how participants attributed sadness and anger to each cultural group. Thus exclusive group norms as well as cultural group identity
affected the way participants attributed emotions of sadness and apathy when the
group excluded an outgroup target.

To assess the effects of group norm, age, and gender on differential attribution
of emotions to an Arab American group based on the target’s identity, four 2 (Age
Group: 12 years, 16 years) × 2 (Gender: females, males) × 2 (Group Norm: inclusive,
exclusive) × 2 (Target of Exclusion: outgroup member with similar interests, ingroup
member with different interests) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor
were conducted on attributions of pride, gladness, guilt, and shame. A Target of
Exclusion × Group Norm interaction effect was found for attributions of pride,
\( F(1,186) = 7.54, p < .01, \eta^2_p = .03 \), and gladness, \( F(1,186) = 4.88, p < .05, \eta^2_p = .02 \), but
not for guilt and shame. These effects indicated that more pride was attributed to the
Arab American group when it excluded an outgroup target compared to when it
excluded an ingroup target, but only when the group had an exclusive norm, \( p < .001 \)
(Outgroup target: \( M_{\text{Exclusive}} = .15, SD_{\text{Exclusive}} = .36; M_{\text{Inclusive}} = .06, SD_{\text{Inclusive}} = .24 \);
Ingroup target: \( M_{\text{Exclusive}} = .03, SD_{\text{Exclusive}} = .18; M_{\text{Inclusive}} = .07, SD_{\text{Inclusive}} = .26 \).
Similarly, only when the group had an exclusive norm, more gladness was attributed
to the group when it excluded an outgroup target versus an ingroup target (Outgroup
target: \( M_{\text{Exclusive}} = .23, SD_{\text{Exclusive}} = .42; M_{\text{Inclusive}} = .13, SD_{\text{Inclusive}} = .34 \); Ingroup target:
\( M_{\text{Exclusive}} = .11, SD_{\text{Exclusive}} = .31; M_{\text{Inclusive}} = .12, SD_{\text{Inclusive}} = .33 \)). Consequently,
exclusive group norms held by the Arab American group drove participants to
attribute more positive emotions of pride and gladness to the group when it excluded
an outgroup target compared to when it excluded an ingroup target.
A Target of Exclusion × Gender effect was found for both attributions of guilt and shame (Guilt: $F(1,186)= 4.80, p < .05, \eta^2_p =.02$, Shame: $F(1,186)= 7.80, p < .01, \eta^2_p =.04$). These showed that females attributed more guilt and shame than males did to an Arab American group when it excluded an outgroup target, $ps < .001$ for both emotions. Males, however, attributed more guilt and shame when the Arab American group excluded an ingroup target than when it excluded an outgroup target, $ps < .001$ for both emotions (see Table 10).

In addition a main effect for Gender was found for attributions of both guilt and shame to an Arab American group, (Guilt: $F(1,186)= 6.54, p < .05, \eta^2_p =.03$, Shame: $F(1,186)= 8.07, p < .01, \eta^2_p =.04$) as well as a Gender × Group Norm interaction effect (Guilt: $F(1,186)= 4.67, p < .05, \eta^2_p =.02$, Shame: $F(1,186)= 4.16, p < .05, \eta^2_p =.02$). These effects showed that females attributed more guilt and shame to the group than males did, but did so more when the group was inclusive than when it was exclusive, $ps < .001$ (see Table 10). Thus showing that in this instance girls were more attuned to the Arab American group’s inclusive norm than boys were.

Gender findings related to females attributing more feelings of guilt in exclusion contexts are consistent with previous research (Malti et al., 2012).

**Reasoning about attributions of emotions.** Hypotheses about justifications for emotions attributed to a group that excludes were based on whether participants attributed positive or negative emotions to the group. It was expected that those who attributed negative emotions would reason about it using concerns for social justice, fairness, inclusivity, and empathy toward the target of exclusion, but those who attributed positive emotions to a group that excludes would do so referencing group
dynamics, conventions, and functioning. In order to test these hypotheses it was necessary to understand how individual types of emotions attributed (e.g., pride, gladness, sadness, anger, guilt, apathy, and shame) would be related to how inclusive participants viewed the group to be in each condition.

First, a correlational analysis between each type of emotion and participants’ group inclusion judgments was conducted. This provided a data-driven and theoretically sound grouping of emotions to analyze participants’ reasoning. Findings from the correlational analyses showed that negative emotions, such as sadness, anger, guilt, and shame were positively related to participants’ group inclusion judgments, suggesting that those who attributed these emotions to a group after it excluded a target initially rated the group to be more inclusive toward the target (see Table 11). However, when pre-adolescents and adolescents attributed pride, gladness, and apathy, these were negatively related to group inclusion ratings, suggesting that participants who attributed these emotions to the group after it excluded the target had perceived the group to be less inclusive toward the target. Although statistical significance of the correlation varied by condition, the direction of the correlation was consistent.

Given the findings from the correlational analysis, a new variable was created to capture differences between participants’ reasoning about either positive/neutral emotions (pride, gladness and apathy) attributed to the group for excluding a target or negative emotions attributed (sadness, anger, guilt and shame) but not both. Based on this criteria a Valence of Emotions attributed variable was created for each condition: (a) Arab American group excludes an outgroup target ($N = 159$, 53% negative, 47%
positive/neutral); (b) American group excludes an outgroup target \((N = 168, 67\% \text{ negative}, 33\% \text{ positive/neutral})\); (c) Arab American group excludes an ingroup target \((N = 161, 65\% \text{ negative}, 35\% \text{ positive/neutral})\); and (d) American group excludes an ingroup target \((N = 161, 68\% \text{ negative}, 32\% \text{ positive/neutral})\). Reasoning in a morally relevant way versus reasoning in terms of group dynamics or a socially conventional way were the theoretical reasoning categories under consideration for the *Attribution of Emotions* assessment. Therefore, two reasoning categories were created, by collapsing the subcategories for reasoning in the moral domain (collapsed social justice/inclusivity and psychological harm/empathy), and reasoning in the societal domain (group dynamics reasoning collapsed subcategories of group functioning, activities, cultural identity, stereotypes, and group diversity).

To test hypotheses related to valence of emotions and reasoning used when attributing emotions to a group that excludes, four 2 (Age Group: 12 years, 16 years) \times 2 (Gender: females, males) \times 2 (Group Norm: inclusive, exclusive) \times 2 (Valence of Emotion: negative, positive) \times 2 (Reasoning: moral, group dynamics) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted for each condition: (a) Arab American group excludes an outgroup target; (b) American group excludes an outgroup target; (c) Arab American group excludes an ingroup target; and (d) American group excludes an ingroup target. A main effect for domain of reasoning was found for each condition (Condition a: \(F(1, 143) = 18.88, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .11\); Condition b: \(F(1, 145) = 53.47, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .2\); Condition c: \(F(1, 145) = 43.75, p < \) .001, \(\eta_p^2 = .23\); Condition d: \(F(1, 143) = 25.49, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .15\)). This showed that group dynamics reasoning (e.g., “It’s what the group wants” or “she is different and
doesn’t like to do the same things”) was used statistically significantly more than moral reasoning (e.g., “They excluded a perfectly good person” or “They made her feel left out.”) in all conditions (Condition a: $M_{Moral} = .38, SD_{Moral} = .49; M_{Group Dynamics} = .66, SD_{Group Dynamics} = .48$; Condition b: $M_{Moral} = .29, SD_{Moral} = .45; M_{Group Dynamics} = .70, SD_{Group Dynamics} = .46$; Condition c: $M_{Moral} = .44, SD_{Moral} = .50; M_{Group Dynamics} = .68, SD_{Group Dynamics} = .47$; Condition d: $M_{Moral} = .33, SD_{Moral} = .47; M_{Group Dynamics} = .65, SD_{Group Dynamics} = .48$).

In addition a Reasoning × Valence of Emotions interaction effect was found for all conditions (Condition a: $F(1,143)= 26.82, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .15$; Condition b: $F(1,145)= 13.67, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .08$; Condition c: $F(1,145)= 46.75, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .24$; Condition d: $F(1,143)= 13.48, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .08$). These findings confirmed expectations that when attributing positive/neutral emotions to a group after it excludes a target, participants justified their attributions using significantly more group dynamics reasoning than moral reasoning, all $ps < .001$ (see Figure 15). However, when attributing negative emotions, such as sadness and guilt to a group that excludes, participants used group dynamics reasoning as much as moral reasoning except in the case of the American group excluding an outgroup target. In this condition, group dynamics were referenced more than moral concerns when justifying why the group would feel sad, guilty, angry, or ashamed about excluding an outgroup member with similar interests, $p < .001$, perhaps because the Arab American that was being excluded shared an interest in activities with the American group and participants recognized that this shared interest would help the outgroup
target fit into the group. Thus, the group would feel bad for excluding an outgroup

target because that target liked the same things as the group.

Pairwise comparisons also showed that participants used statistically

significantly more moral reasoning when they attributed negative emotions than when
they attributed positive emotions, all ps < .001 for each condition (see Figure 15).

References to group dynamics, however, were used significantly more when
attributing positive emotions than when attributing negative emotions, with ps < .001
for the Arab American group conditions and ps < .05 for the American group
conditions. A Reasoning × Age interaction effect was found for when the Arab

American group excluded an ingroup target with different interests, F(1,145) = 11.14,
p = .001, η² = .07. This effect showed that younger participants referenced moral
reasoning more than older participants, p < .05, (Younger: M_Moral = .55, SD_Moral = .50;
M_Group_Dynamics = .56, SD_Group_Dynamics = .50; Older: M_Moral = .32, SD_Moral = .47; M_Group
Dynamics = .81, SD_Group_Dynamics = .39). Older participants, however, used more group
dynamics reasoning than younger participants when justifying the emotions they
attributed to an Arab American group who excluded an ingroup target, p < .01. While
younger participants reasoned using similar proportions of each type of reasoning,
older participants used group dynamics reasoning significantly more than moral
reasoning, p < .001, thus showing how salient group dynamics concerns are to
adolescents when thinking about how an outgroup would feel about excluding a
member of their own group who does not share the same interests.
Chapter 5: Discussion

Inclusion Judgments: The Group, the Individual, and Forced-choice Decisions

Past research on social exclusion has shown that children and adolescents most often reject gender- and race-based exclusion (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002). Less is known about the conditions under which children expect peer groups to exclude others, and particularly in cross-cultural encounters. The findings from this study addressed this gap by assessing pre-adolescents’ and adolescents’ expectations regarding groups’ cross-cultural inclusion decisions. Consistent with previous assessments revealing that children and adolescents find exclusion to be unacceptable, pre-adolescents and adolescents in the current study were generally optimistic and expected that peer groups would be inclusive toward both cultural ingroup and outgroup targets. There were, however, specific conditions under which non-Arab participants, expressed uncertainty in their expectations in the context of Arab American and American (non-Arab) peer groups.

A novel finding from this study identified these conditions to be: (1) when an Arab American group was making a decision to include an American outgroup target that had similar interests in activities, particularly in the condition in which the group had an exclusive norm; and (2) when an exclusive American group was making a decision to include an ingroup member who had different interests in activities than the group. In essence, when groups had norms to invite others who were ‘similar’ to them, both pre-adolescents and adolescents were less certain that an Arab American outgroup would be inclined to invite an American into their group despite having shared interests in activities, or that their own American group would invite another
American with different interests despite having the same cultural identity. In addition, irrespective of the group norm, participants expected Arab American peers to be more inclusive of members of their own cultural group than members of a cultural outgroup (American).

These findings together suggest that non-Arab American participants perceived Arab American peers to be less cross-culturally inclusive than they perceived their own American peers. Thus, participants attributed a more positive trait of inclusivity to their own group than they did to the Arab American outgroup. This finding is in line with the Social Identity theory assumption that individuals seek to enhance their ingroup’s positivity to maintain positive self-concepts (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, in this particular case in which the outgroup was associated with a cultural outgroup (Arab descent), and the ingroup was American, ingroup ‘positivity’ was in reference to inclusive behavior. According to Turner’s (1978) Social Categorization theory, such need to enhance ingroup positivity motivates individuals to create further distinctions with outgroups. Therefore, although children’s group inclusion responses reflected uncertainty about the Arab American group inviting an American peer, further distinctions between an Arab American outgroup and an American ingroup might lead to the expectation that Arab peers are exclusive. These expectations may impede possibilities for peers from either cultural group to become friends or interact in positive ways that lead to less intergroup bias (Tropp & Prenovost, 2008).

Interestingly, this study revealed that when primed with an exclusive group norm based on the idea that a group likes to invite those who are ‘similar,’ both pre-
adolescents and adolescents assumed the Arab American group would conceptualize ‘similarity’ based on a shared cultural identity, but ‘similarity’ for the American ingroup was conceptualized in terms of a shared interest in activities. This finding supported expectations drawn from a study by McGlothlin and Killen (2005) that measured perceived similarity between Black and White same-race dyads with different interests in activities, and found that European American children (6- and 9-years-old) viewed a same-race Black dyad with different interests in activities to be more similar than a White dyad that had different interests in activities. Their findings reflected a phenomenon known as the outgroup homogeneity effect that has been found in adults (Ryan et al., 1996) and children in other countries (Barrett et al., 2003; Nesdale, Maass, Griffiths, & Durkin, 2003). An outgroup homogeneity effect is found when individuals perceive outgroup members to be more similar to one another than ingroup members and thus, they perceive more diversity within their own group than an outgroup.

In the current study, the effect manifests in a unique way, and represents expectations or a perception regarding how each cultural group defines similarity. Thus, while in McGlothlin and Killen (2005) children perceived outgroup same-race dyads that did not share the same interests as similar (based on their race), in the current study pre-adolescents and adolescents perceived that an outgroup would judge similarity based on matching cultural identity. Conversely, whereas children in the McGlothlin and Killen (2005) study perceived ingroup same-race dyads with different interests as different (based on differences in activity preferences), in the current study they expected their exclusive ingroup to be less inclusive toward an
ingroup member who did not share the same interests in activities (e.g., “He’s more different because he likes to do other things”). Thus pre-adolescents’ and adolescents’ manifestation of the outgroup homogeneity effect in the current study shows a form of social cognitive sophistication as it reflects judgments about concepts of similarities held by groups. This is evidence of a form of Theory of Social Mind (Abrams et al., 2009), in which participants use their knowledge about groups having different values and beliefs to make predictions about how groups might behave.

These differential attributions of “similarity” based on cultural group identity were robust, as they mapped onto how participants reasoned about group inclusion judgments and their forced-choice assessments. Pre-adolescents’ and adolescents’ justifications for their inclusion judgments when both groups had exclusive norms focused on cultural identity (e.g., “She’s Arab like them”) when reasoning about the Arab American group and on group functioning (e.g., “They’ll get along better”) or activity preferences (e.g., “He likes the same things as the group”) when reasoning about the American group. These findings extend findings reported in McGlothlin and Killen (2005), in that given an older sample such as the one in the current study; cultural identity justifications were captured with much greater frequency than with the younger sample (6- and 9-year-olds) in McGlothlin and Killen (2005). This high frequency of cultural identity justifications allowed for analyses of age-related differences.

**Age and gender findings.** Notably, age and gender differences were found in the use of cultural identity when reasoning about an ingroup target’s likelihood of
entry into an exclusive group. Particularly, when justifying the likelihood of inclusion of an ingroup target with different interests, pre-adolescent girls showed the highest frequency of references to cultural identity, followed by adolescent boys. This finding evidences the salience of cultural identity for young females and older males in a context where a cultural ingroup member with different interests seeks entry into an exclusive group. It is possible that the motivation for using cultural identity is different for each group (pre-adolescent girls and adolescent boys).

Females judge intergroup exclusion as more wrong than do males in several studies with ethnic majority American children, possibly because of having more experiences with exclusion, such as in the area of sports and math (Killen & Stangor, 2001; Leman, Ahmed, & Ozarow, 2005). References to cultural identity may reflect an appeal to the similar characteristics that may get an ingroup target invited instead of excluded, however; why that might change from pre-adolescence to adolescence for girls is not clear. In contrast, adolescent males have been found to focus on group identity when considering intergroup relations, such that they are less favorable in their attitudes about outgroup members (Ajdukovic & Biruski, 2008; Leman, Keller, Takezawa, & Gummerum, 2009) but more favorable toward ingroup members. Therefore they may be making decisions based on mere identity affiliation. However to fully understand these patterns, further research should investigate the motivations for gender differences in inclusion decisions based on cultural identity.

As documented in previous research regarding acceptability of race-based exclusion (Brenick et al., 2007; Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002), participants in this study used group functioning to justify their expectations that American groups will
be likely to exclude an Arab American outgroup target. Group functioning reasoning can be used as a proxy for stereotypes and outgroup prejudice, suggesting implicit expressions of intergroup bias (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002). For example, when justifying why an American group would not include an Arab American target, the participants who used group functioning, stating, “they won’t get along” could be attending to cultural differences as a barrier for group functionality. What was noteworthy in this study and has not been documented before was that unlike reasoning about an American group, group functioning was not the dominant type of reasoning when justifying exclusive expectations on behalf of the Arab American group. In those instances, participants used cultural identity, evidencing that participants differentiate between justifications for exclusive behavior by their own group and a culturally different outgroup.

Compatible with how participants’ reasoned about including an ingroup target, important developmental and gender differences appeared when judging the likelihood that a group would include an outgroup target. These findings showed that 16-year-olds expected both groups to be less inclusive toward outgroup targets despite sharing an interest in activities, and mainly 16-year-old boys drove this finding. Although this pattern existed for both cultural groups, it was stronger for inclusion expectations in the American group. Thus, 16-year-old boys were not as certain that their own group would be as inclusive toward an Arab American as it would be toward an ingroup American target. Research on social exclusion has found that although both children and adolescents reject exclusion, children (9 to 11-years-old), females, and ethnic minorities reject it more than adolescents, males, and ethnic
majorities (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002). Other research has also shown that adolescent males display more outgroup prejudice (Ajdukovic & Biruski, 2008) and are less generous in intergroup resource allocation than females are (Leman et al., 2009). Thus, the finding from the current study extends past research to evidence that in contexts of Arab American and American groups, adolescent boys who represent both ethnic minorities and majorities place much emphasis on group identities and expect groups to make inclusion judgments based on cultural identity.

**Individual inclusion likelihood versus group inclusion likelihood.** It is important to note that in line with previous research (Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012), children’s own individual judgments differed from how they expected their American group would behave. Both pre-adolescents and adolescents displayed more inclusivity irrespective of the target’s cultural identity. In addition, their reasoning reflected a focus on personal preferences and the target’s personality as opposed to cultural identity. The discrepancy between their own inclusivity and what they expected of the group was strongest in the condition when their own group had an exclusive norm and was judging inclusion of an ingroup target with different interests.

Recent research has shown children and adolescents distinguish between their own preferences and what decisions they expect groups would make, especially in instances when a group holds a norm that goes against moral values or socially acceptable conventional norms (Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012). Findings from this previous research indicated that adolescents (13-year-olds) preferred ingroup members who violated moral and traditional group norms more than they expected
the group would, but children (9-year-olds) did not make this distinction. Such developmental differences between expectations about groups and individual preferences were not found in the current study perhaps because the youngest age group was 12-year-olds, and by this age, children have acquired the cognitive ability to differentiate their own point of view from the group’s point of view in the context of Arab and non-Arab American groups. This ability is equivalent to acquiring Theory of Social Mind which has been shown to increase with age in children 6 to 11-years-old (Abrams et al., 2009). In this current study’s cross-cultural context such differentiation between individual opinion and group opinion was shown to extend into middle adolescence.

When expressing individual preferences about an outgroup target, pre-adolescents and adolescents rarely used cultural identity but instead referenced personal preferences and the target’s personality. This type of reasoning was used mostly by adolescents to justify the likelihood that they would exclude the outgroup target more so than pre-adolescents and more so than when justifying inclusivity likelihood. This is consistent with previous research that shows personal choice reasoning for judgments about exclusion are used more by middle adolescents than early adolescents or younger children (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002), but it extends such research to show that it is mainly used to justify exclusive judgments and not inclusive judgments. When adolescents justified individual inclusive judgments, they referenced activity preferences more so than personal preferences or personality considerations.

Additionally the current study documented for the first time an age-related
shift in how girls reason about inclusivity of outgroup members, showing that pre-adolescent girls focused on group functioning (e.g., “She could be a good fit”) more than older girls, while adolescent girls focused on personal preferences and personality issues (e.g., “I like meeting different people” or “We might not get along if we have different personalities”). Younger boys were more concerned with activity preferences and focused on the fact that the outgroup target shares the same interests as their own group, more so than any other reasons. These findings provide new insights into the factors that pre-adolescents and adolescents consider when giving their own opinion about the likelihood that they would include a cultural outgroup into their peer group.

**Forced decisions about inclusion into peer groups.** How did pre-adolescents and adolescents respond to a forced choice between inviting an ingroup or outgroup target? This assessment is conceptually different from asking participants to assess the likelihood of inclusion. By explicitly stating practical constraints to inclusivity (e.g., “There is room to invite only one more person.”), it challenges participants to select one target over the other. The consequence of this decision is that one target is, in essence, excluded. Therefore, the assessment helps identify what factors pre-adolescents and adolescence give priority to when including members into peer groups at the expense of excluding someone else.

In the current study, participants overwhelmingly expected the Arab American group to choose an ingroup target with different interests irrespective of the group’s norm. When choosing to invite someone into their own American group, however, they expected the group would choose an outgroup target with similar interests and
particularly so when the group had an exclusive norm. Thus, participants were more sensitive to group norms when assessing their own group than when assessing an outgroup. Previous research has shown that children’s intergroup attitudes are affected by their ingroup norms (Nesdale, Maass, et al., 2005), and adolescents are attuned to both ingroup and outgroup norms when making group decisions (Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012). The current study captures a unique extension to previous research by documenting the effects of group norms on pre-adolescents’ and adolescents’ inclusion decisions concerning their own group, but also documenting the lack of such effects when judging forced inclusion decisions of another cultural outgroup. This may reflect difficulty in taking the perspective of a cultural outgroup, perhaps because other factors, such as attributions of cultural exclusivity are interfering in participants’ forced judgments about the Arab American group.

In addition, participants’ forced-choice group inclusion findings provide strong evidence that shared interests are salient in making inclusion decisions into one’s peer group in this sample of non-Arab American ethnically diverse pre-adolescents and adolescents. This also means that individuals who have (or are perceived of having) different interests in activities are prone to exclusion irrespective of their cultural or ethnic background. It is often the case in the peer relations literature that individual characteristics are confounded with group membership (Killen, Mulvey, et al., 2012); therefore, it is not known if peers are rejected based on individual characteristics or assumptions made about their cultural/ethnic group. The former finding provides evidence that when making friends, having shared interests in activities transcends cultural boundaries. However, it continues to be the case, as
discussed in the following section, that stereotypic assumptions about cultures influence how willing someone is to interact with an outgroup.

Given that having shared interests is very salient when making inclusion decisions, especially if your group has an exclusive norm, then what motivated participants to choose an ingroup target who did not share the same interests as the group over an outgroup target who did? Analyses of participants’ justifications demonstrated that participants made this decision citing cultural identity and group functioning more so than activity preferences. The use of cultural identity references was predominant in pre-adolescents, while the use of group functioning was found mostly in adolescents, thus showing a developmental shift in reasoning about inclusion of ingroup members. Explicit use of cultural identity as a reason to include a member of one's cultural ingroup wanes in adolescence, providing support that group functioning reasoning in adolescence could be evidence of an implicit bias.

**The Role of Stereotypes on Inclusion Judgments**

Two forms of stereotypes were captured and found to influence decision-making in peer group contexts that include Arab American and American groups. The first was discussed to some extent in the previous section and is in reference to pre-adolescents and adolescents’ perceptions that Arab American groups would make inclusion decisions based on cultural identity as opposed to shared interests in activities. Thus, participants expected that groups composed of peers of Arab descent would behave in exclusive ways toward non-Arab peers. When compared with expectations that their own American group would make decisions based on shared interests, this tendency represents an intergroup attribution error, whereby a
misattribution is being made based on a social category (Hewstone, 1990). However, this stereotype was held by an ethnically diverse sample of 12- and 16-year-olds irrespective of age, only 33% of which presented factual knowledge about how to define an Arab, and only 21% had a vague general concept about the Arab identity (e.g., "From a county in Asia, next to Pakistan"). Although those who had knowledge about who Arabs were, also reported a higher percentages of stereotypic associations than those who did not have factual knowledge, further research must be conducted to assess whether the stereotype about cultural exclusivity is specific to the social category ‘Arab’ or is generalizable to any other cultural outgroup (e.g., Latin American, Asian American).

The second form of stereotypes measured in the current study was spontaneous trait attributions of someone who was Arab. Surprisingly, a minority of responses referenced negative stereotypes related to aggression and terrorism, despite the plethora of media messages that associate Arabs with terrorism or aggressive behavior (Shaheen, 2003). The largest proportion of spontaneous attributions were related to physical markers, such as skin tone, hair, and eyes, and these were followed by generalizations about an Arab person’s faith or religious affiliations, and then by generalizations about cultural customs, such as food and clothing. Given that past research has captured spontaneous stereotypic reasoning responses in children’s and adolescents’ reasoning about race and gender exclusion (Brenick et al., 2007; Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002), and no research to date assessed the direct relation between stereotypic associations made with a social category and inclusion or exclusion judgments, a central goal of this study was to address this gap. Therefore, for the first
time, it was found that pre-adolescents and adolescents who readily made stereotypic associations perceived groups to be less inclusive to cultural outgroup targets despite them sharing the same interest in activities as the groups. Those who did not make stereotypic associations (47%) were more inclusive toward cultural outgroup targets. This trend was strongest when reporting expectations about one’s own American group. Therefore, participants who made stereotypic associations about Arab people expected their own group to be less inclusive toward an outgroup target than those who did not make stereotypic associations. This finding went beyond expectations about how their group would behave, also appearing in their own individual judgments about how likely they were personally to include an Arab American into their own American group.

An important finding was that the effects of stereotypic associations on expectations about how an American group makes inclusion decisions were strongest when the group had an exclusive norm and non-existent when it had an inclusive norm. This finding is important because it has implications for stereotype and prejudice reduction interventions. It implies that inclusive group norms can mitigate the effects of stereotypes on children’s inclusion decisions. The positive effects of inclusive group or school norms have also been found in studies assessing children’s (7 to 10-years-old) favorability of ingroup and outgroup members (Nesdale & Lawson, 2011; Nesdale, Maass, et al., 2005). The current study extends this research in two ways: first, by assessing inclusive and exclusive norms in the context of intergroup decisions to include others rather than favorability judgments about outgroups and second, by using older age groups. Thus, the findings are novel in that
they provide evidence that inclusive group norms moderate the effects of stereotypes on inclusion judgment. Pre-adolescents and adolescents who hold stereotypes about an outgroup avoid relying on these stereotypes when their group has an inclusive norm. Therefore, promoting inclusive group norms of ‘inviting other’s who are different’ encourages children and adolescents to suppress stereotypic associations that they have formed and emboldens them to be more inclusive and have interactions with peers from a different culture.

There were no age-related patterns in how stereotypes affected inclusion judgments. However, in contrast to only 36% of the 12-year-olds, 70% of the 16-year-olds reported stereotypic associations. Moreover, 16-year-olds were less inclusive toward outgroup targets than were the 12-year-olds; perhaps because the stereotypic associations contributed to their exclusive orientations. Findings from research on social identity development show that in late childhood through adolescence, concepts about group identities are based on beliefs, values, status differences, and stereotypes (Bennett, 2011). While the current study sheds light on these age-related shifts, a direct connection between stereotypic expectations and exclusion judgments in adolescents remains to be further investigated.

**Group Dynamics and Deviance from Groups**

According to the Developmental Subjective Group Dynamics model, children make decisions about outgroup members in congruence with what they know about group norms adopted by both their ingroup and their outgroup. Research from this perspective showed that by 12 years children focus less on group identity to evaluate group members, but place much emphasis on whether they adhere to or violate group
norms (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003). Recent findings show that children and adolescents are more accepting of deviant group members who challenge norms that violate moral values, such as distributing money unequally irrespective of the deviant’s identity (i.e., both ingroup deviants and outgroup deviants) than deviants who challenge moral norms (Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012). Extending previous findings that addressed deviance from norms about resource distribution, the findings from this study show a similar pattern for deviance from norms about being exclusive or inclusive. Thus, irrespective of age and the cultural identity of the group or target, pre-adolescents and adolescents were more positive toward a group member who challenged his or her exclusive group norm by espousing inclusivity than they were toward a deviant member who challenged an inclusive norm. This overwhelming approval of inclusive deviant group members is further evidence that inclusivity is viewed as a positive generic norm within this sample and deviance from such a norm is not accepted.

Ingroup bias was demonstrated in the present study by the findings regarding evaluations of deviants who challenged inclusive group norms by being exclusive, specifically toward an outgroup target. It was found that both pre-adolescents and adolescents showed less acceptance of an Arab American deviant who advocated exclusion of an American target than an American deviant who advocated exclusion of an Arab American target. This suggests that exclusion of outgroup members may be tolerated when it comes to one’s own group and less so when it is being suggested by a cultural outgroup. In fact, participants who said it was not okay for an Arab American to be exclusive toward an American did so based on social justice and
inclusivity concerns as well as group functioning concerns given that the outgroup target had similar interests in activities as the group. The few who said it was okay did so because they thought that the target would not be a good fit for the Arab American group. On the other hand, when evaluating an American deviant who advocated exclusion of an Arab American, those who thought it was okay to exclude the Arab American target did so by referencing group functioning and the deviants right to his or her opinion within the group. Thus, recognizing that members of one’s own group could have their own opinion and be autonomous; however when it comes to deviant members of an outgroup less autonomy is attributed, especially when voicing exclusive sentiment toward outgroup targets.

This is consistent with findings that documented the outgroup homogeneity effect (McGlothlin & Killen, 2005; Nesdale, Griffiths, Durkin, & Maass, 2007), but the current finding reflected recognition of heterogeneity of opinion within one’s own group and not within an outgroup. This is a manifestation of the outgroup homogeneity effect in the context of deviance from Arab American and American peer groups when members were advocating exclusion of outgroup targets, thus representing differential understandings of group dynamics based on the cultural identity of the group (e.g., “In my culture groups work this way, but in other cultures groups work differently”).

Developmental differences were expected based on previous findings that adolescents would be more accepting of deviance from groups because of their focus on autonomy (Killen, Rutland, et al., 2012), but none were found as it appears in this context both age groups were overwhelmingly concerned with cultural identity and
group norm considerations. Thus, participants’ understanding of group processes differed based on the cultural identity of the group. This is related to previous findings that showed children’s evaluations about outgroups, defined by arbitrary group assignment or nationality, differed from their evaluations about their ingroup (Abrams, 2011; Abrams et al., 2009) with respect to how much they would like deviant members who challenged group norms about loyalty. The current study extends previous research by finding that expectations about inclusion and evaluations of group members who challenge inclusive norms differ based on the cultural identity of the group in question. Similarly, in the following section, differential attributions of emotions to groups based on cultural identity will also be discussed.

Attributing Emotions to Groups that Exclude: Cultural Identity, Group Norms, and Reasoning

In previous research assessing attributions of emotions in intergroup exclusion contexts, adolescents were asked to attribute emotions to an individual excluder (Malti et al., 2012), however, in the current study, emotions were attributed to a group of excluders. Other research that measures differential attributions of uniquely human and non-uniquely human emotions to ingroups and outgroups (Paladino et al., 2002; Vaes et al., 2003; Vezzali et al., 2012) has shown that children attribute uniquely human emotions (e.g., happiness and guilt) more to ingroup members than non-uniquely human emotions (e.g., excitement and anger) (Vezzali et al., 2012). The current study showed somewhat congruent patterns in that participants were able
to attribute more empathic emotions (e.g., sadness and guilt) to their own group for excluding a target than they did to the Arab American group.

What was novel in the current study was that group norms were experimentally manipulated with a design that allowed for the assessment of effects of both inclusive and exclusive group norms on children’s interpretations of how a group reacts to excluding someone. For example, groups with inclusive norms that choose to exclude a target are violating their group norm, and it was of interest to learn what children attended to in such instances when attributing emotion (i.e., the violation of a group norm or the injustice to the target caused by the exclusion). It was found that group norms did influence how pre-adolescents and adolescents attributed emotions, but stereotypic associations did not.

Children and adolescents judge exclusion to be unacceptable under certain conditions because it causes psychological harm to the excluder or is carried out for unfair reasons (Killen, Rutland, & Jampol, 2008). Because of the negative consequences of exclusion, it was expected that individuals would perceive a group to feel bad (negatively) after excluding someone. In attributing emotions to others or to groups, much perspective-taking must be employed (Harwood & Farrar, 2006), especially in intergroup exclusion contexts where group norms and cultural identity are salient. Identification with one’s group has also been shown to moderate emotional reactions about group members who undergo bullying behavior (Jones, Bombieri, Livingstone, & Manstead, 2012). Therefore, if one’s own group had a group norm to be exclusive, a member may feel good about excluding someone because they are adhering to their norm. Meanwhile because individuals recognize
the harm in exclusion and can more easily take their own group’s perspective, they might think that their own group would feel worse about excluding someone than an outgroup. The findings in the current study provided clarity on how pre-adolescents and adolescents attribute emotions to groups in an intergroup exclusion context.

Confirming expectations, the cultural identity of the group, the group’s norm, and the cultural identity of the target of exclusion all factored into how pre-adolescents and adolescents attributed emotions in an exclusion context. More negative emotions (sadness and guilt) were attributed to one’s own American group for excluding an outgroup target with similar interests, but more apathy was attributed to an Arab American group for excluding the same target. Attributions of sadness and apathy were related to whether the group had an exclusive norm or not and therefore, an exclusive Arab American group was attributed the least frequency of sadness but the most frequency of apathy when it excluded an outgroup target than an inclusive group or an exclusive American group. Pre-adolescents and adolescents reported that their own group would feel sadder and angrier for excluding an ingroup target than an Arab American group would, but group norms did not bear on attributions in this context.

Surprisingly, when comparing attributions of emotions for excluding an ingroup target versus an outgroup target for each group, no differences by target of exclusion were found for the American group, thus indicating that participants did not discriminate between how their group would feel about excluding either target. Thus, they indicated their group would feel sad, guilty, ashamed and sometimes apathetic about excluding either target. In the case of an Arab American group, however,
participants did differentiate in how they attributed emotions for exclusion of either target. In this case, they expected that the Arab American group would feel more pride and gladness for excluding an outgroup target compared with excluding an ingroup target but would feel more guilt and shame for excluding an ingroup target. This is in line with how children and adolescents expected the group would make inclusion decisions (i.e., those that favor inclusion of ingroup target over an outgroup target will feel bad about excluding an ingroup target and good about excluding an outgroup target). Group norms factored into how proud and glad the group would feel, with the most pride and gladness attributed to the exclusive Arab American group for excluding the outgroup target.

More positive emotions and less negative emotions were attributed to an Arab American group for excluding an American, but these were contingent on whether the group had an exclusive norm or not. These findings extend recent research on bullying indicating that having competitive norms elicits more pride in an ingroup bully than in conditions in which cooperative norms are emphasized (Jones et al., 2012). Given that the ability to accurately attribute emotions helps children judge whether a moral transgression has occurred or not (Turiel & Killen, 2010), this ability may help reduce intergroup prejudice, by reducing misattributions of negative intentions in intergroup interactions (Killen, Kelly, Richardson, & Jampol, 2010). The current study’s findings indicate that exclusive social norms might encourage individuals to misattribute emotions in intergroup exclusion contexts and deter them from experiencing positive intergroup interactions. Inclusive social norms, on the
other hand, can help individuals avoid misattributions of emotions and thus improve cross-cultural peer interactions.

Consistent with previous research (Malti et al., 2012) gender differences were found revealing that females attributed more guilt and shame to an Arab American group for excluding an outgroup target than males did. However, extending previous research and providing the other half of the story, it was found that boys attributed more guilt and shame than girls did when the Arab American group excluded an ingroup member. This finding reemphasizes that boys are attuned to group identity (Ajdukovic & Biruski, 2008; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Leman et al., 2009) and expect groups to base decisions on group identity; therefore, according to the findings in this study, boys think an Arab American group would feel better about excluding an outgroup target than an ingroup target. Also extending findings from the Malti, Killen & Gasser (2012) study, females attributed more guilt and shame than males did, but did so more in contexts when the group was violating its inclusive norm. Thus females displayed a higher sensitivity to inclusive group norms than boys did specifically when attributing emotions to an inclusive outgroup (Arab American group) that excludes someone based on culture.

Further extending findings from Malti et al. (2011) that found significant correlations between exclusion judgments and emotions attributed to individual excluders, the current study shows similar patterns for emotions attributed to a group that excludes. Thus, if participants expected the group to be inclusive toward an ingroup target then they attributed more negative emotions to the group when it
excluded. Similarly, if they expected the group to be exclusive, they attributed more positive or neutral (apathy) emotions to the group when it carried out exclusion.

Extending past research (Malti et al., 2012), concerns for violations of group norms when excluding someone who might have been perceived as a good match were also expressed in pre-adolescents’ and adolescents’ reasoning. Assessing participants’ reasoning about how they attributed emotions provided an opportunity to investigate the interplay of cognition and emotions. For the first time, participants’ reasoning about the emotions attributed in an exclusion context were linked to the valence of the emotion attributed. For example, positive attributions of emotions were justified overwhelmingly using references to group dynamics. Contrary to expectations that moral reasoning would be predominantly used when attributing negative emotions, pre-adolescent and adolescents used both group dynamics reasoning and moral reasoning. Therefore, they were justifying negative emotions attributed to a group by referencing concerns for social justice and harm inflicted onto the target as well as concerns for going against group interests in carrying out such an exclusion. However, in the condition in which their own group was excluding an Arab American with similar interests, participants attributed negative emotions to their group more so because of group dynamics considerations than for moral reasons, citing their concerns that the target had similar interests and would have been a good fit. Use of moral reasoning in this context was accompanied by use of group dynamics reasoning in an effort to balance salient contextual factors such as empathy toward the target, violations of group norms and target characteristics, which are often considered in exclusion contexts (Park & Killen, 2010). In the current study,
the multidimensionality of exclusion (i.e., both moral and societal considerations are incorporated) was translated into the way emotions are attributed to groups that exclude.

A novel developmental finding shows that in the context of an Arab American group excluding an ingroup target with different interests, pre-adolescents maintained the dual use of moral and group dynamics reasoning when attributing emotions, whereas adolescents used less moral reasoning and overwhelmingly more group dynamics reasoning. This is contrary to previous research that assessed judgments about exclusion and found that, although adolescents reference group functioning matters more than younger children, they continued to maintain moral concerns about exclusion (Killen et al., 2006). However, in the current study, when attributions of emotions were assessed instead of judgments about exclusion, adolescents overwhelmingly relied on concerns about group dynamics to justify either positive or negative emotions attributed to an Arab American group excluding an ingroup target. Adolescents in the current sample did report more stereotypes than pre-adolescents, so it is possible that this may be influencing their reasoning about the outgroup. Further investigations must be conducted linking emotional attributions based on social categories and the stereotypes associated with them.

In contrast, the stereotypic associations made in this study were not related to participants’ emotional attributions. This disconfirmed expectations that there would be a significant relation because stereotypes associated with Arab people are emotionally charged (Dasgupta et al., 2009). One possible explanation is that few participants in the current sample spontaneously referenced negative stereotypes that
could be emotionally salient, which was not enough to influence emotional attributions. Data collected from the pilot for the current study showed a higher proportion of negative stereotypes in a slightly higher socioeconomic status population. Therefore, further research exploring the connection between the role of negative stereotypes and how children attribute emotions in intergroup exclusion contexts must be conducted in different populations. Although no explicit stereotypic associations were found to influence participants’ attribution of emotions to a group in an exclusion context, participants did make differential attributions based on the group’s cultural identity and the identity of the target of exclusion. These differences provide support for the implicit role played by stereotypic assumptions (McGlothlin & Killen, 2005) about a cultural outgroup on the ability for an individual to take an outgroup’s perspective.

**Conclusions and Future Directions**

Understanding attitudes about peers of Arab descent is important in the context of increasing migration of Arab families into the United States due to conflict and civil war in the Arab world. As non-Arab American children begin to interact with Arab peers, the findings in this study provide teachers, counselors, and administrators with some guidance on how to best facilitate positive inter-cultural relationships. Authority figures in both the school settings and at home can help mitigate false perceptions about cultural outgroups, by providing children with accurate information and opportunities for positive interactions (Killen, Rutland, & Ruck, 2011).
Given the little knowledge about who Arabs are and the infrequent contact with peers of Arab descent found in the current sample of pre-adolescents and adolescents, it was not clear what sources of information participants were relying on to establish a pre-conceived notion that Arab American groups are exclusive and use cultural identity as the main criteria for inclusion into their groups. Further, because participants reported little contact with Arab peers, this did not allow for testing of expectations related to social experience. Future research should address these issues by investigating children’s and adolescents’ reliance on different forms of media to acquire information about cultural outgroups as well as whether having more contact and friendships with a cultural outgroup could reduce the effects of stereotypes acquired from the media. In addition, research with other cultural, ethnic, or religious categories, such as ‘Latin American’ and ‘Muslim American’ ought to be explored to further investigate the role of such identities on peer group inclusion judgments. Studies about other cultural groups can also clarify if current findings are specific to the Arab social category or are generalizable to other cultural outgroups.

What was clear, however, was that when thinking about inclusion of outgroup targets into their own group independently, both adolescent males and participants who reported stereotypic associations were the least inclusive. The effects of stereotypic associations were moderated by inclusive group norms, evidencing that schools, classrooms, or groups that foster inclusivity by embracing differences (e.g., cultural and those based on interests in activities) and cultural openness can combat the influence of stereotypes on children’s and adolescents’ social decision-making in exclusion contexts. This finding supports research assessing the effects of
multicultural education on pre-adolescents’ intergroup favorability evaluations (Verkuyten, 2008).

A one-dimensional stereotype assessment was used in this study, mainly because little was known about the content of the stereotypic associations children made with people of Arab descent. While most stereotypic associations represented neutral generalizations rather than negative ones, further research must be carried out with different samples to capture negative stereotypes and test their effects on inclusion judgments and emotional attributions in exclusion contexts. Future research on stereotypes related to people of Arab descent would benefit from adopting a multidimensional approach to measuring stereotypes (i.e., measures of saliency of stereotypes or how generalizable stereotypes are to all members of an outgroup (Coutant et al., 2011)) to capture the specific components that contribute to exclusive attitudes. In addition, peer relationships are not one-sided, and while this study reported on non-Arab American attitudes, future studies should adopt the current paradigm with samples of Arab American pre-adolescents and adolescents. Comparing these two samples can help identify how misconceptions by both groups can be resolved and addressed.

Despite the misconceptions that existed about an Arab American outgroup, 12- and 16-year-olds from ethnically diverse backgrounds overall expressed inclusive expectations about peer groups in an intercultural context. The findings extend previous developmental research on social exclusion, by identifying misconceptions that exist in pre-adolescents and adolescents about expectations that groups would exclude based on cultural identity, shared interests, and group norms and how
stereotypes influence their judgments. Findings extend developmental group
dynamics and social identity theories by identifying the factors children consider
when making expectations about inclusion of ingroup members as well as evaluations
of ingroup members who challenge group norms. Extensions to research on
attributions of emotions in intergroup contexts include differential attributions made
based on cultural identity and group norms as well as reasoning about negative
attributions of emotions in terms of concerns for optimizing group dynamics.
Overall, the findings from the current study reveal the complex ways in which pre-
adolescents and adolescents reason about intergroup exclusion encounters, providing
further insight into the development of intergroup attitudes. Most important, this
information can be used to inform intervention-based research to promote inclusivity
by reducing prejudice and the use of stereotypes in social decision-making.
Main Hypotheses Related to Cultural Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Group Inclusion</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Participants will judge their ingroup (American group) to be more inclusive than the Arab American group, irrespective of the group norm.</td>
<td>2. Participants will judge groups to be more inclusive towards an outgroup target than an ingroup target, except in the case when the group has an inclusive norm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Participants will judge groups to be more inclusive towards an outgroup target than an ingroup target, except in the case when the group has an inclusive norm.</td>
<td>3. Adolescents will judge an exclusive group to be less inclusive to either target than pre-adolescents would and pre-adolescents will focus on shared interests in activities when making group inclusion judgments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Adolescents will judge an exclusive group to be less inclusive to either target than pre-adolescents would and pre-adolescents will focus on shared interests in activities when making group inclusion judgments.</td>
<td>4. Participants who make stereotypic associations with Arab people will be less inclusive towards an Arab American target joining an American group but their judgments may be affected by the type of norm the group has.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Participants who make stereotypic associations with Arab people will be less inclusive towards an Arab American target joining an American group but their judgments may be affected by the type of norm the group has.</td>
<td>5. Participants who make stereotypic associations with Arab people will judge an Arab American group to be less inclusive towards an outgroup target with similar interests than an ingroup target with different interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Participants who make stereotypic associations with Arab people will judge an Arab American group to be less inclusive towards an outgroup target with similar interests than an ingroup target with different interests.</td>
<td>6. Participants who report high contact with peers of Arab descent will be more inclusive toward an Arab American target than those who report low contact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Participants who report high contact with peers of Arab descent will be more inclusive toward an Arab American target than those who report low contact.</td>
<td><strong>Group Inclusion Reasoning</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Reasoning about the likelihood that a group would include an outgroup target with similar interests will focus on cultural identity when the judgment is exclusive and activity preferences or group functioning when the judgment is inclusive.</td>
<td>8. Reasoning about the likelihood that a group would include an ingroup target with different interests will focus on cultural identity when the judgment is inclusive and activity preferences or group functioning when the judgment is exclusive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Reasoning about the likelihood that a group would include an ingroup target with different interests will focus on cultural identity when the judgment is inclusive and activity preferences or group functioning when the judgment is exclusive.</td>
<td>9. Older participants will make more explicit references to cultural identity, while younger children will focus on shared interests in activities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 1. Continued

Main Hypotheses Related to Cultural Identity

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Forced-choice Group Inclusion</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. It was expected that participants judgments about their own group will be based on shared interests in activities and thus will choose to invite an <em>outgroup target with similar interests</em> more often than an <em>ingroup target with different interests</em>. However this will change when the group has an inclusive norm and differential patterns will emerge for judgments about whom the Arab American group will include.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Participants who make stereotypic associations with Arab people will judge that an American group will choose an <em>ingroup target with different interests</em> more often than an <em>outgroup target with similar interest</em>, irrespective of the group norm.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Forced-choice Group Inclusion Reasoning</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Participants who choose an ingroup target with different interests will focus on cultural identity when the group is exclusive, and focus on group functioning and shared interest, when the group is inclusive.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Inclusion</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Participants will rate themselves to be more inclusive than their own group would be.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Adolescents will be able to differentiate more between their own inclusivity and a group’s inclusivity than younger participants would.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Participants who make stereotype associations with Arab people will be less inclusive towards an Arab American target joining an American group (<em>outgroup target with similar interest</em>).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Inclusion Reasoning</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Higher proportions of personal preference will appear in participants’ individual inclusive judgments than in their justifications for group inclusion judgments.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Adolescents will use higher proportions of references to personal preference than children would.</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 1. Continued

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes</strong></td>
<td>18. Those who are inclusive towards Arab American targets will use higher proportions of activity preference reasoning than those who are less inclusive towards Arab American targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation of the Deviant Act</strong></td>
<td>19. Participants will rate deviance from an Arab American group differently from deviance from their group (American group).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20. Deviance from an exclusive group norm (inclusive deviant) will be evaluated more positively than deviance from an inclusive group norm (exclusive deviant).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation of the Deviant Act Reasoning</strong></td>
<td>21. Across both exclusive and inclusive group norm conditions, higher proportions of autonomy would be used to justify positive evaluations of deviant acts, while positive evaluations of an inclusive deviant will also be reasoned with using references to social justice and inclusivity, and positive evaluations of an exclusive deviant will also be reasoned with using group functioning and autonomy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22. Adolescents will make more references to the autonomy of the deviant than pre-adolescents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attributions of Emotions measures</strong></td>
<td>23. More positive emotions will be attributed to an American or Arab American group excluding an outgroup target with similar interests than an ingroup target with different interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attributions of Group Emotions</strong></td>
<td>24. Participants who make stereotypes associations with Arab people will attribute more positive emotions to an Arab American group when it excludes a target.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25. Participants will attribute emotions based on group norms, thus attributing more negative emotions to an inclusive group that excludes than an exclusive group that excludes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 1. Continued

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<tr>
<td>Attributions of Emotions measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Attributions of Group Emotions Reasoning</em></td>
<td>26. Those who attribute negative emotions to a group that excludes will reason using fairness, harm caused to the target, and appeals to diversity, while those who attribute positive emotions will reference group functioning and dynamics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Adolescents will have more stereotypic knowledge than younger participants.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2

*Coding Categories for Cultural Knowledge Task and Frequency of Usage*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definitions and Examples</th>
<th>Knowledge about Arab People (N=193)</th>
<th>Trait Associations with Arab People (N=187)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factual Knowledge</td>
<td>Accurate statements that describe Arab as a person from the Middle East, or from an Arab country or speaks Arabic.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Someone who is from an Arab Country.&quot;</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Comes from an Arab family and has Arab parents.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Someone who speaks Arabic.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General imprecise knowledge</td>
<td>Knows that Arabs are of a different culture country but is unable to accurately specify which country.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;From a different country.&quot;</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Is a different culture.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;From a county in Asia, next to Pakistan.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Factual Knowledge</td>
<td>Inaccurate and incorrect definitions of Arab people</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;They are from India.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;I think of African American.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;From Iran and Pakistan.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Knowledge</td>
<td>State that they do not have any knowledge about Arab people</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;I do not know.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Not sure.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypic Associations</td>
<td>Generalization about Arabs as a whole group.</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Markers</td>
<td>References to skin tone, and hair and eye color</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Dark hair, darker skin, brown eyes.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Tan skin and thick black hair, has a beard&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Continued

Coding Categories for Cultural Knowledge Task and Frequency of Usage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definitions and Examples</th>
<th>Knowledge about Arab People (N=193)</th>
<th>Trait Associations with Arab People (N=187)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Customs</td>
<td>Clothing traditions, music and eating customs: references to what they wear or what they eat&lt;br&gt;&quot;They wear long gowns and have headcover&quot;&lt;br&gt;&quot;Listens to Arabic music.&quot;&lt;br&gt;&quot;Eats certain foods.&quot;</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Generalizations about religion and beliefs about god.&lt;br&gt;&quot;Is Muslim or from a Muslim country.&quot;&lt;br&gt;&quot;Believes in Allah.&quot;&lt;br&gt;&quot;Are very spiritual.&quot;</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative associations</td>
<td>Negative descriptions or adjectives&lt;br&gt;&quot;I think of a terrorist.&quot;&lt;br&gt;&quot;Osama Bin Laden.&quot;&lt;br&gt;&quot;Poor.&quot;</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography and Language</td>
<td>Generalizations related to geographic region and language&lt;br&gt;&quot;Has an accent.&quot;&lt;br&gt;&quot;Lives in a desert.&quot;&lt;br&gt;&quot;Loves hot weather.&quot;</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General differences</td>
<td>Generalizations about broad differences and behavioral differences&lt;br&gt;&quot;Different from American.&quot;&lt;br&gt;&quot;They are strict, more conservative, keep to themselves&quot;</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Continued

Coding Categories for Cultural Knowledge Task and Frequency of Usage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definitions and Examples</th>
<th>Knowledge about Arab People (N=193)</th>
<th>Trait Associations with Arab People (N=187)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive and Neutral descriptions</td>
<td>Attributing positive adjectives, statements about similarities to others and ambiguous unclear references.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive generalizations</td>
<td>Positive descriptions and adjectives</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Shy and quiet.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Respectful, friendly.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Rich culture.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similarities</td>
<td>References to Arabs being just like anyone else</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Just like anyone else.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;No different from you and me.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Normal people.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>References to descriptions in the stories</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;They like people who are different so they seem nice.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;They like music and arts.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Frequencies add up to more than 100% because the count includes references to categories in double and triple codes and frequencies represents the percent of the sample that used that category. Total number of codeable responses for the knowledge assessment were 235 and for the Trait association assessment 246.
Table 3

_Coding Categories for Justifications Used in Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes and Attribution of Emotions Assessments_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition and examples</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moral Domain</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Justice/Inclusivity</td>
<td>References to prejudice and wrongfulness of group exclusion as well as positive statements about inclusivity.</td>
<td>“I don’t like to exclude people.” “They just let someone down because of their ethnicity.” “It is not fair not to invite him because of his race.” “That’s racist.” “You should not be prejudice.” “They are leaving someone out.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Psychological Harm/Empathy</strong></td>
<td>References to negative intentions towards others (teasing or being mean) or appeals to thinking about how other people would feel. Could also include references to missed friendships and prosocial behavior and references to protecting the target, focusing on the targets feelings and preferences.</td>
<td>“It will hurt his feelings.” “If he kicked me out I would be upset.” “Hanna has nobody around.” “It is mean not to invite someone.” “Friends should be nice to one another.” “Julie would not have fun in the group anyway.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Societal Domain (Group Dynamics)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Functioning</td>
<td>Conventions of the group designed to promote the group or encourage effective group functioning. Statements about how groups work and desire to conform to group norms.</td>
<td>“He won’t fit in.”, “That’s what the group likes.” “They can talk things over.” “He betrayed his friends, went against what they like.” “They will get along together.” “They would not care because it does not affect the group.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Continued

Coding Categories for Justifications Used in Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes and Attribution of Emotions Assessments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition and examples</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activity Preferences</td>
<td>Explicit references to activity preferences of the group or target.</td>
<td>“Hani likes music.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“They like tennis.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“She likes to do different things.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“The group likes different activities.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“They like similar things as the group.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“He likes tennis just like them.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Identity</td>
<td>Explicit references to the target’s or group’s cultural identity or being ‘American’ or ‘Arab-American’ or ‘Arab’.</td>
<td>“He’s American.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“She’s not the same race.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“He’s American which is different from them.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“They are from a different culture.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“She’s Arab American and they would like her.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“They are American and so is he.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypes</td>
<td>References to stereotypic judgments about Arab Americans or Americans, even references to generalized judgments about groups based on their norms or based on physical features or cultural generalization.</td>
<td>“Sally will physically stand out and it’s hard to get past that.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“No matter how different they like people they are all Arab and will mostly likely pick the Arab kid.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Arabs will be uncomfortable, because Henry does not meet their racial preferences.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“They might not speak the same language.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Continued

**Coding Categories for Justifications Used in Group Dynamics and Inclusion Attitudes and Attribution of Emotions Assessments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition and examples</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Diversity</strong></td>
<td>Diverse perspectives within a group: Appeals to having diversity and different perspectives within the group whether culturally related or related to diversity in interests. Alludes to heterogeneity within a group.</td>
<td>“Diversity doesn’t hurt.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Its good to have different opinions.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Could teach the group new things.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Each person will feel differently.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Psychological Domain</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Individuality and personal choice.</td>
<td>“She has a right to her own opinion.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“She can say what she wants, its up to her.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“He said his opinion.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Preference/</td>
<td>Appeals to personal preferences about activities or meeting others as well as a focus</td>
<td>“I like tennis so I would like Julie.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality</td>
<td>on target’s personality.</td>
<td>“I like different things so I would not get along with him.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“I like meeting new people.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“I like to try new things.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“She seems nice to me.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“I don’t know what her personality will be like.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“I would see what his personality is like first.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4

Knowledge about Arab People and Stereotypic Associations by Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Religion and Ethnic Composition of Friendships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Knowledge about Arab People</th>
<th>Stereotypes about Arab People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-year-olds</td>
<td>0.15 (0.36) (^a)</td>
<td>0.36 (0.48) (^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-year-olds</td>
<td>0.52 (0.50) (^a)</td>
<td>0.70 (0.46) (^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.30 (0.46)</td>
<td>0.57 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.37 (0.49)</td>
<td>0.49 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>0.34 (0.48)</td>
<td>0.54 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>0.34 (0.48)</td>
<td>0.52 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;= Half Same</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>0.37 (0.49)</td>
<td>0.55 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Half Same</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>0.28 (0.45)</td>
<td>0.49 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>0.30 (0.46)</td>
<td>0.54 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>0.45(0.51)</td>
<td>0.47 (0.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.33 (0.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.39 (0.49)</td>
<td>0.52 (0.51)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Age differences for knowledge about Arab people
\(^b\) Age differences for stereotypes about Arab people

Note: Knowledge about Arab people 0 = No Knowledge and 1 = Knowledge; Stereotypes about Arab people, 0 = No stereotypes and 1 = Stereotypes
Table 5

Knowledge and Stereotypes by Arab/Muslim Confound

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arab/Muslim Confound</th>
<th>Knowledge about Arab People</th>
<th>Stereotypes about Arab People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>Mean (SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Arabs are Muslim</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.08 (0.29) b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0.21 (0.41) a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not all Arabs are Muslim</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0.47 (0.50) ab</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[^a\text{ post-hoc Bonferroni pairwise comparison } p < 0.001\]
\[^b\text{ post-hoc Bonferroni pairwise comparison } p < 0.05\]
\[^c\text{ post-hoc Bonferroni pairwise comparison } p < 0.05\]
Table 6

Proportion of Reasoning Used to Justify Inclusive and Exclusive Judgments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Reasoning</th>
<th>Likelihood Group is Exclusive</th>
<th>Likelihood Group is Inclusive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab American group;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target: Outgroup, Similar Interests</td>
<td>$n = 100$</td>
<td>$n = 95$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Functioning</td>
<td>0.38 (.45)</td>
<td>0.32 (.41)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity Preferences</td>
<td>0.27 (.36)</td>
<td>0.45 (.40)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Identity</td>
<td>0.28 (.39)</td>
<td>0.15 (.28)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American group;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target: Outgroup, Similar Interests</td>
<td>$n = 58$</td>
<td>$n = 138$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Functioning</td>
<td>0.47 (.48)</td>
<td>0.35 (.44)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity Preferences</td>
<td>0.23 (.38)</td>
<td>0.42 (.43)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Identity</td>
<td>0.18 (.35)</td>
<td>0.10 (.26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab American group;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target: Ingroup, Different Interests</td>
<td>$n = 51$</td>
<td>$n = 143$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Functioning</td>
<td>0.30 (.43)</td>
<td>0.45 (.48)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity Preferences</td>
<td>0.49 (.43)</td>
<td>0.16 (.31)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Identity</td>
<td>0.14 (.27)</td>
<td>0.29 (.42)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American group;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target: Ingroup, Different Interests</td>
<td>$n = 60$</td>
<td>$n = 133$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Functioning</td>
<td>0.48 (.50)</td>
<td>0.41 (.47)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity Preferences</td>
<td>0.43 (.48)</td>
<td>0.25 (.40)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Identity</td>
<td>0.02 (.09)</td>
<td>0.14 (.30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>12-year-olds</th>
<th>16-year-olds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Functioning</td>
<td>.29 (.41)</td>
<td>.12 (.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity Preferences</td>
<td>.25 (.37)</td>
<td>.33 (.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Preferences/Personality</td>
<td>.24 (.41)</td>
<td>.35 (.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Functioning</td>
<td>.24 (.40)</td>
<td>.26 (.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity Preferences</td>
<td>.33 (.43)</td>
<td>.39 (.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Preferences/Personality</td>
<td>.19 (.38)</td>
<td>.20 (.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood they would exclude target</td>
<td>n = 15</td>
<td>n = 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Functioning</td>
<td>.33 (.45)</td>
<td>.24 (.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity Preferences</td>
<td>.30 (.41)</td>
<td>.08 (.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Preferences/Personality</td>
<td>.20 (.41)</td>
<td>.47 (.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood they would include target</td>
<td>n = 86</td>
<td>n = 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Functioning</td>
<td>.26 (.40)</td>
<td>.17 (.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity Preferences</td>
<td>.29 (.40)</td>
<td>.43 (.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Preferences/Personality</td>
<td>.22 (.40)</td>
<td>.23 (.41)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: small sample size for those who exclude*
Table 8
Proportion of Reasoning Used to Judge the Acceptability of an Exclusive or Inclusive Group Deviant When the Target is an Outgroup Member with Similar Interests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Group Exclusive, Deviant Inclusive</th>
<th>Group Inclusive, Deviant Exclusive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deviant Not Okay</td>
<td>Deviant Okay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab American Group</td>
<td>$n = 18$</td>
<td>$n = 80$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Justice</td>
<td>.06 (.24)</td>
<td>.12 (.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Functioning</td>
<td>.53 (.47)</td>
<td>.26 (.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>.06 (.16)</td>
<td>.23 (.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Group</td>
<td>$n = 22$</td>
<td>$n = 75$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Justice</td>
<td>0.18 (.36)</td>
<td>0.19 (.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Functioning</td>
<td>0.43 (.47)</td>
<td>0.19 (.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>0.09 (.29)</td>
<td>0.13 (.34)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9

*Proportions of Emotions Attributed to Each Group for Excluding an Ingroup and Outgroup Target*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotions Attributed</th>
<th>Target: Outgroup, Same Interests</th>
<th>Target: Ingroup, Different Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arab American Group</td>
<td>American Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride</td>
<td>0.10 (.30)</td>
<td>0.08 (.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>0.18 (.38)</td>
<td>0.13 (.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadness</td>
<td>0.22 (.41)</td>
<td>0.30 (.46) ^a^ *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>0.11 (.32)</td>
<td>0.14 (.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td>0.47 (.50)</td>
<td>0.58 (.49) ^a^ **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apathy</td>
<td>0.44 (.50)</td>
<td>0.31 (.46) ^a^ ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>0.35 (.48)</td>
<td>0.40 (.49)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^a^ Comparing emotions attributed to Arab American group and American group after excluding an *outgroup target*

^b^ Comparing emotions attributed to Arab American group and American group after excluding an *ingroup target*

^c^ Comparing emotions attributed to Arab American group after excluding an *outgroup target* and an *ingroup target*

*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Table 10

*Proportion of Guilty and Ashamed Emotions Attributed to an Arab American Group by Gender, Group Norm and Target of Exclusion*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Guilt</th>
<th>Shame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Females</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target: Outgroup, Same Interests</td>
<td>.58 (.50)</td>
<td>.47 (.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target: Ingroup, Different Interests</td>
<td>.61 (.49)</td>
<td>.46 (.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive Norm</td>
<td>.49 (.61)</td>
<td>.29 (.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive Norm</td>
<td>.69 (.50)</td>
<td>.64 (.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Males</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target: Outgroup, Same Interests</td>
<td>.34 (.47)</td>
<td>.21 (.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target: Ingroup, Different Interests</td>
<td>.55 (.50)</td>
<td>.42 (.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive Norm</td>
<td>.47 (.58)</td>
<td>.25 (.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive Norm</td>
<td>.43 (.58)</td>
<td>.38 (.48)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 11

*Correlations Between Emotions Attributed and Group Inclusion Judgments*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Arab American Group</th>
<th>American Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outgroup</td>
<td>Ingroup Target, Target, Similar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride</td>
<td>-.219**</td>
<td>-.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>-.166*</td>
<td>-.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadness</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>.235**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>.143*</td>
<td>.167*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.229**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apathy</td>
<td>-.155*</td>
<td>-.281**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>.142*</td>
<td>.182*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05, ** p < .01
Figures

Figure 1. Culture and Group Dynamics Study: Conceptual Map

Note: Given that prejudice drives children to make inclusion decision based on cultural membership an inclusive judgment is defined by arrows to an outgroup target with similar interests in activities and an exclusive judgment is defined by arrows to an ingroup target with similar interests in activities. Dashed arrows represent possible pathways for those who hold stereotypes about a cultural outgroup.
## Figure 2. Design for Culture, Stereotypes, and Peer Group Inclusion Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Story</th>
<th>Group Norm</th>
<th>Deviant</th>
<th>Target characteristic</th>
<th>Forced choice Inclusion:</th>
<th>Group Norm</th>
<th>Deviant</th>
<th>Target characteristic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Story 1A</strong></td>
<td>Arab American Group</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
<td>Different cultural identity, similar interests</td>
<td>1) Different cultural identity, similar interests (Outgroup, similar interests) 2) Same cultural identity, different interests (Ingroup, different interests)</td>
<td>Arab American Group</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Same cultural identity, different interests (Ingroup, different interests)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Story 1B</strong></td>
<td>Arab American Group</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
<td>Same cultural identity, different interests</td>
<td>1) Same cultural identity, different interests (Ingroup, different interests) 2) Different cultural identity, similar interests (Outgroup, similar interests)</td>
<td>Arab American Group</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Different cultural identity, similar interests (Outgroup, similar interests)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Story 1C</strong></td>
<td>Arab American Group</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
<td>Same cultural identity, different interests</td>
<td>1) Different cultural identity, similar interests (Outgroup, similar interests) 2) Same cultural identity, different interests (Ingroup, different interests)</td>
<td>Arab American Group</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Different cultural identity, similar interests (Outgroup, similar interests)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Story</th>
<th>Group Norm</th>
<th>Deviant</th>
<th>Target characteristic</th>
<th>Forced choice Inclusion:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Story 2A</strong></td>
<td>American Group</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Same cultural identity, different interests</td>
<td>1) Same cultural identity, different interests (Ingroup, different interests) 2) Different cultural identity, similar interests (Outgroup, similar interests)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Story 2B</strong></td>
<td>American Group</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Different cultural identity, similar interests</td>
<td>1) Different cultural identity, similar interests (Outgroup, similar interests) 2) Same cultural identity, different interests (Ingroup, different interests)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Story 2C</strong></td>
<td>American Group</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Different cultural identity, similar interests</td>
<td>1) Different cultural identity, similar interests (Outgroup, similar interests) 2) Same cultural identity, different interests (Ingroup, different interests)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3. Group Inclusion Judgments for Both Targets by Cultural Group Identity and Group Norm

Note: Inclusion judgments were made on a Likert scale 1=Really not likely, to 6 = Really likely. Error bars represent standard deviations.

a n.s. compared with 3.5 midpoint inclusion judgment

b $t(99) = 5.47, p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 0.55$

c $t(97) = 4.19, p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 0.42$

d n.s. compared with 3.5 midpoint inclusion judgment

e $t(97) = 3.60, p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 0.36$

f $t(98) = 5.57, p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 0.56$

g $t(99) = 9.20, p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 0.92$

h $t(97) = 11.31, p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 1.14$
Figure 4. Group Inclusion Judgments about an Outgroup Target with Similar Interests by Age and Gender

Note: Inclusion judgments were made on a Likert scale 1=Really not likely, to 6 = Really likely. Error bars represent standard deviations.
Figure 5. Proportion of Reasoning Used to Judge Inclusion of Both Targets Into an Exclusive Group

Note: Error bars represent standard deviations.
Figure 6. Role of Stereotypic Associations on the American Group’s Inclusion Judgments about Outgroup and Ingroup Targets

![American Group Diagram]

Note: Inclusion judgments were made on a Likert scale 1=Really not likely, to 6 = Really likely. Error bars represent standard deviations.
Figure 7. Group Inclusion: The Role of Group Norms on Those Who Make Stereotypic Associations

American Group
Target: Arab American with similar interests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exclusive Norm</th>
<th>Inclusive Norm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No stereotypes</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>4.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypes</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>4.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Inclusion judgments were made on a Likert scale 1=Really not likely, to 6 = Really likely. Error bars represent standard deviations.
Figure 8. Group Versus Individual Inclusion in an American Group

Note: Both inclusion judgments were made on a Likert scale 1=Really not likely, to 6 = Really likely. Error bars represent standard deviations.
Figure 9. The Role of Stereotypic Associations on Individual Inclusion Judgments for Each Target

American Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target: Arab American, similar interests</th>
<th>Target: American, different interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Stereotypes</td>
<td>Stereotypes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Inclusion Judgement</td>
<td>Individual Inclusion Judgement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>4.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>4.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Inclusion judgments were made on a Likert scale 1=Really not likely, to 6 = Really likely. Error bars represent standard deviations.
Figure 10. Forced-choice Group Inclusion: Choosing an Ingroup Target Over an Outgroup Target

Note: 1 = choosing the ingroup target with different interests, 0 = choosing the outgroup target with similar interests. Error bars represent standard deviations.
Figure 11. Differences in Reasoning about Forced-choice Group Inclusion Based on the Cultural Identity of the Group

Note: Error bars represent standard deviations.
Figure 12. Reasoning about Choosing to Invite an Ingroup Target with Different Interests into an Exclusive and Inclusive American Group

Note: Error bars represent standard deviations.
Figure 13. Evaluation of an Inclusive or Exclusive Arab American and American Deviant for Each Target

Note: Evaluations of the deviant act were made on a Likert scale 1 = Really not Okay, to 6 = Really Okay. Error bars represent standard deviations.
Figure 14. Reasoning about the Acceptability of a Deviant Group Member who Wants to Exclude and Outgroup Target

**Target: Outgroup, Similar Interests**

![Bar Chart]

**Note:** Error bars represent standard deviations.
Figure 15. Proportion of Moral and Group Dynamics Reasoning Used Based on Negative or Positive Attributions of Emotions

![Bar chart showing proportion of moral and group dynamics reasoning used based on negative or positive attributions of emotions.](image)

*Note: Error bars represent standard deviations.*
Appendices

Appendix A: Initial IRB Approval

The University of Maryland, College Park Institutional Review Board (IRB) Office approved your Initial IRB Application. This transaction was approved in accordance with the University's IRB policies and procedures and 45 CFR 46, the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects. Please reference the above-cited IRB Protocol number in any future communications with our office regarding this research.

Recruitment/Consent: For research requiring written informed consent, the IRB-approved and stamped informed consent document will be sent via mail. The IRB approval expiration date has been stamped on the informed consent document. Please note that research participants must sign a stamped version of the informed consent form and receive a copy.

Continuing Reviews: If you intend to continue to collect data from human subjects or to analyze private, identifiable data collected from human subjects, beyond the expiration date of this protocol, you must submit a Renewal Application (http://www.urmresearch.umd.edu/IRB/renewal.html) to the IRB Office 45 days prior to the expiration date. If IRB Approval of your protocol expires, all human subject research activities including enrollment of new subjects, data collection and analysis of identifiable, private information must cease until the Renewal Application is approved. If work on the human subject portion of your project is complete and you wish to close the protocol, please submit a Closure Report (http://www.urmresearch.umd.edu/IRB/closure.html) to irb@umd.edu.

Modifications: Any changes to the approved protocol must be approved by the IRB before the change is implemented, except when a change is necessary to eliminate an apparent immediate hazard to the subjects. If you would like to modify an approved protocol, please submit an Addendum request (http://www.urmresearch.umd.edu/IRB/addendum.html) to the IRB Office.
Unanticipated Problems Involving Risks: You must promptly report any unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects or others to the IRB Manager at 301-405-0678 or jsmith@ummresearch.umd.edu

Additional Information: Please contact the IRB Office at 301-405-4212 if you have any IRB-related questions or concerns. Email: irb@umd.edu

The UMCP IRB is organized and operated according to guidelines of the United States Office for Human Research Protections and the United States Code of Federal Regulations and operates under Federal Wide Assurance No. FWA00005856.

1204 Marie Mount Hall
College Park, MD 20742-5125
TEL 301.405.4212
FAX 301.314.1475
irb@umd.edu
http://www.ummresearch.umd.edu/IRB
Dear Parents and Guardians,

We are conducting a project on how children and adolescents make decisions about inclusion in peer groups. We would like your permission to survey your child for this project because they are in grades 6 through 10. We are interested in studying how children and adolescents judge peer groups who include group members based on different reasons. We will tell participants short stories about friendship groups that have to decide whether to include peers from a different culture into the group. We are specifically interested in how expectations about other cultures and understandings about how groups function influence decisions about group dynamics. These issues are central to how children and adolescents evaluate peer relationships and group processes.

Surveys will be administered by trained research assistants from the University of Maryland to students who provide assent to participate. The survey will take about 25 minutes to complete. Students will be asked to evaluate scenarios in which individuals are asked to make choices regarding peer inclusion. All information is confidential. Please look over the assent form that will be distributed on the reverse side of this letter. If you are not willing to have your child participate in the project, please contact us (see contact information on assent form).

The information obtained from this study will help teachers, policy makers, counselors and school administrators design curriculum and interventions to promote tolerance and mutual respect among children and adolescents. This research has been approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Maryland.

We thank you, in advance, for reading this letter, and for your willingness to allow your daughter/son to participate. We have found that students enjoy the opportunity to express their opinions about their peer relations.

Thank you,

Melanie Killen, Ph.D. and Aline Hitti
(email questions to ahitti@umd.edu or mkillen@umd.edu)
**Project Title**  
Peer relationships, culture, and social groups

**Purpose of the Study**  
This research is being conducted by Dr. Melanie Killen at the University of Maryland, College Park. We are inviting you to participate in this research project because your child is in 6th through 10th grade. The purpose of this research project is to better understand how children and adolescents think about how peer groups make inclusion and exclusion decisions about peers with different cultural characteristics.

**Procedures**  
The procedure involves a 25 minute Survey. The survey will be conducted in your child’s classroom or a specially designated area identified by the school. Trained research assistants from the University of Maryland, College Park, will conduct the Survey and will be available to answer any questions. Your child will be told hypothetical stories about children faced with decisions to include and exclude peers that have different cultural characteristics. Participants will evaluate whether they think these decisions are okay or not okay and why they think so.

**Potential Risks and Discomforts**  
There are no known risks associated with participating in this research project.

**Potential Benefits**  
This research is not designed to help your child personally. Instead, research is obtained about age-related patterns regarding friendship and peer inclusion and exclusion. The results will help us learn more about what kids and teenagers think about social relationships. Educators, counselors, and school professionals will incorporate the findings into their curriculum and guidance programs through reports made available by us to the participating school districts.

**Confidentiality**  
We will do our best to keep your personal information confidential. To help protect confidentiality, your child’s name will not be attached to the Survey. S/he will be given an ID number. We will not share his/her answers with anyone, including his/her teachers, principal, or parents. If we write a report or article about this research project, your identity will be protected to the maximum extent possible. Your information may be shared with representatives of the University of Maryland, College Park or governmental authorities if you or someone else is in danger or if we are required to do so by law.

**Right to Withdraw and Questions**  
Your child’s participation is strictly voluntary. You can ask any questions at any time, or withdraw your child from participation at any time. Your child may decide to stop participating at any time and will not be penalized or lose any benefits. Participation is not a school or class requirement. Participation will not affect your child’s grades or performance evaluation. If you decide to withdraw your child’s participation in the study, if you have questions, concerns, or complaints related to the research, please contact the investigator, Dr. Melanie Killen at: Department of Human Development, 3304 Benjamin Building, College Park, MD 20742-1131; (telephone) 301-405-3176, e-mail: mkillen@umd.edu or student investigator: Aline Hitti, telephone 301-405-1200, e-mail: ahitti@umd.edu.

**Participant Rights**  
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or wish to report a research-related injury, please contact:

University of Maryland College Park  
Institutional Review Board Office  
1204 Marie Mount  
College Park, Maryland, 20742  
E-mail: irb@umd.edu  
Telephone: 301-405-0678

This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects.
**Statement of Consent**

Your signature indicates that you are at least 18 years of age; you have read this consent form or have had it read to you; your questions have been answered to your satisfaction and you allow your child to participate in this research study. You will receive a copy of this signed consent form.

If you agree to allow your child to participate, please sign your name below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signature and Date</th>
<th>PARTICIPANT NAME [Please Print]</th>
<th>PARENT SIGNATURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TEACHER: __________________________________________

[IRB APPROVED EXPRESSES ON JUL 22 2012]

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND COLLEGE PARK
Appendix C: Culture, Stereotypes, and Peer Group Inclusion Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant ID #</th>
<th>Entered into Participant List</th>
<th>Coded</th>
<th>Likert Entered</th>
<th>Reasoning Entered</th>
<th>DD Likert Entered</th>
<th>DD reasoning Entered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

University of Maryland SURVEY

This is a survey designed by the Social Development Research Group at the University of Maryland. This survey helps us to find out what students think about peer groups and friendships. There are no right or wrong answers and this is not a test. We will not tell anyone your answers and if you do not want to finish the survey please let us know.

For permission and further instructions on the use of this survey please contact: Aline Hitti alinehitti@gmail.com

All illustration in this survey have copyright: © 2011 Joan M.K. Tycko, Illustrator
Please fill in the information on this page and then turn the page.

If you have any questions, please raise your hand and ask!

Today’s date: ________________________________
Your initials (e.g., Mark Smith is MS): ________________

Birthday: Please write the day, month, and year you were born (e.g., July 12, 1999): __________________________
Your age in years (e.g., 10): __________________________

Gender (CIRCLE ONE): Male Female

SCHOOL NAME: ________________________________
SCHOOL Teacher/Counselor: __________________________

INTRODUCTION:
You are going to see pictures of some kids and read a little bit about them. Then you will answer some questions about these kids. We are interested in finding out what children your age think about things kids do. There are no right or wrong answers. This is not a test. No one will see your answers, and we do not put anyone’s name on any reports. We only record your age and whether you are a girl or boy.

When you see this type of line on the form:

1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Bad Very Good

...this means that you will be asked to circle the number that matches your answer to the question.

For example: If someone feels kind of bad about getting a low grade they would circle a 3.

1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Bad Very Good

So just tell us what you think about the stories by filling out this form!

THANK YOU!
Let’s get started!
These are groups of friends that hang out after school.

This is your group:
American group of friends

Diana  Sandra  Katie  Angela

1. Select a name for your group (Example: Superstars):

Now let’s hear some stories about each group!

Your group likes these activities:

Pizza Party  Ice Cream Party

2. At the end of the school year your group has an event. Circle the event you would like your group to have.

This is the other group:

“Arab American group of friends”

Samya  Jeenan  Diyala  Reema

3. Circle the symbol that you would like for your group:
In the past when your group of American friends, who are your age, invited others into their group, they would invite those who were different from them.

American group of friends

Diana  Sandra  Katie  Angela

“We like kids who are different from us.”

In the past when this group of Arab American friends, who are your age, invited others into their group, they would invite only those who were similar to them.

Arab American group of friends

Samya  Jeenan  Diyala  Reema

“We like kids who are similar to us.”
**Story 1A**

Remember this group of Arab American friends likes to have kids who are similar to them join their group.

**Q1.** The group has to decide what to do. How likely would it be that the group decides to invite Hannah to join the group?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Really Not Likely</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Really Likely</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q2. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)

Q3. In your own opinion, how likely would it be that you would invite Hannah to the group?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Really Not Likely</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Really Likely</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q4. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)

---

**Hannah, who is American, wants to join the group and she likes these activities:**

American

---

**“We like kids who are similar to us.”**
Tala is another member of this group, but she is the one member of her group who likes kids who are different from her, and because of this she tells the group they should invite Hannah to the group.

Q5. How okay was it for Tala to tell the group that they should invite Hannah to join the group?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Really  Not Okay  Really Okay

Q6. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Q7. Let’s say the group decides not to invite Hannah because she is different. How do you think the group would feel about not inviting Hannah? (Please check all the feelings that apply.)

- [ ] Proud
- [ ] Glad
- [ ] Sad
- [ ] Angry
- [ ] Anxious
- [ ] Guilty
- [ ] Feelings not changed
- [ ] Ashamed
- [ ] Caring

Q8. Why would they feel that way? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________
Story 1B

Now there is a new decision to make. Remember that this group of Arab American friends likes to have kids who are similar to them join their group.

Ranya, who is Arab American, wants to join the group and she likes these activities:

Q1. The group has to decide what to do. How likely would it be that the group decides to invite Ranya to join the group?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Really Not Likely</td>
<td>Really Likely</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q2. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)

Q3. In your own opinion, how likely would it be that you would invite Ranya to the group?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Really Not Likely</td>
<td>Really Likely</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q4. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Again Tala is the one member of this group who likes kids who are different from her and because of this she tells the group they should invite Ranya to the group.

Q5. How okay was it for Tala to tell the group that they should invite Ranya to join the group?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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Q6. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)

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Q7. Let’s say the group decides not to invite Ranya because she is different. How do you think the group would feel about not inviting Ranya? (Please check all the feelings that apply.)

- [ ] Proud
- [ ] Glad
- [ ] Sad
- [ ] Angry
- [ ] Anxious
- [ ] Guilty
- [ ] Feelings not changed
- [ ] Ashamed
- [ ] Caring

Q8. Why would they feel that way? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)

________________________________________________________________________
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This group of Arab American friends is going to a music concert and they have room for one more person to invite. Remember that this group likes to have kids who are similar to them join the group.

Q1. If both Hannah and Ranya like to go to music concerts, who do you think the group will invite? (Choose one only)

Hannah  Ranya

Q2. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)

__________________________________________________________________________
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Q3. Who do you prefer to invite? (Choose one only)

Hannah  Ranya

Q4. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)

__________________________________________________________________________
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“Arab American group of friends”

“We like kids who are similar to us.”
**Story 2A**

Remember your group of American friends likes to have kids who are different from them join their group.

American group of friends

Your Group:

Diana  Sandra  Katie  Angela

“We like kids who are different from us.”

Kristen, who is American, wants to join the group and she likes these activities:

American

---

Q1. The group has to decide what to do. How likely would it be that your group decides to invite Kristen to join the group?

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Really Not Likely

Q2. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)

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Q3. In your own opinion, how likely would it be that you would invite Kristen to the group?

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Really Not Likely

Q4. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)

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</table>
Brenda is another member of your group but she is the one member of the group who likes kids who are similar to her and because of this, she tells the group they should **not** invite Kristen to the group.

Q5. How okay was it for Brenda to tell the group that they should **not** invite Kristen to join the group?

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Q6. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)

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Story 2A

American group of friends

Your Group:________

“We like kids who are different from us.”

Q7. Let’s say the group decides not to invite Kristen because she is different. How do you think the group would feel about not inviting Kristen? (Please check all the feelings that apply.)

- Proud
- Angry
- Feelings not changed
- Glad
- Anxious
- Ashamed
- Sad
- Guilty
- Caring

Q8. Why would they feel that way? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)

_________________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________________
**Story 2B**

Now there is a new decision to make. Remember that your group of American friends likes to have kids who are different from them join their group.

American group of friends

Your Group: ____________

Diana  Sandra  Katie  Angela

“We like kids who are different from us.”

Layla, who is Arab American, wants to join the group and she likes these activities:

Arab American

Layla

Q1. The group has to decide what to do. How likely would it be that your group decides to invite Layla to join the group?

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<td>Really Likely</td>
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Q2. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)

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Q3. In your own opinion, how likely would it be that you would invite Layla to the group?

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Q4. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)

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________________________________________________________________________
Again Brenda is the one member of the group who likes kids who are similar to her and because of this, she tells the group they should not invite Layla to the group.

Q5. How okay was it for Brenda to tell the group that they should not invite Layla to join the group?

1 2 3 4 5 6
Really Not Okay Really Okay

Q6. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)

__________________________________________________________

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__________________________________________________________
Story 2B

American group of friends

Your Group:__________

“We like kids who are different from us.”

Arab American

Layla

Q7. Let’s say the group decides not to invite Layla because she is different. How do you think the group would feel about not inviting Layla? (Please check all the feelings that apply.)

- [ ] Proud
- [ ] Glad
- [ ] Sad
- [ ] Angry
- [ ] Anxious
- [ ] Guilty
- [ ] Feelings not changed
- [ ] Ashamed
- [ ] Caring

Q8. Why would they feel that way? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)

________________________________________________________________________

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________________________________________________________________________
Your group of friends is going to a movie and they have room for one more person to invite. Remember that your group likes to have kids who are different from them join the group.

Q1. If both Kristen and Layla like to go to a movie, who do you think the group will invite? (Choose one only)

Kristen  Layla

Q2. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

Q3. Who do you prefer to invite? (Choose one only)

Kristen  Layla

Q4. Why? (Please fill out the lines with your answer.)
__________________________________________________________________________
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__________________________________________________________________________
The stories you have read involved Arab American kids so we would like you to tell us what you know about Arab people.

Please answer the following questions:

1. Please define who is an Arab:

2. What characteristics if any, do you think of when you think of an Arab?

3. Are all Arabs Muslim? (circle one)
   - Yes
   - No
   - Not Sure

4. How many kids in your neighborhood are Arab? (circle one)
   - None
   - A few
   - Half
   - Most
   - All

5. How many friends do you have who are Arab? (circle one)
   - None
   - A few
   - Half
   - Most
   - All

6. How often do you have conversations with Arab kids? (circle one)
   - Never
   - A little
   - Sometimes
   - Often
   - Always

7. How often do you hang out with people who are Arab? (circle one)
   - Never
   - A little
   - Sometimes
   - Often
   - Always

8. How often do you attend social events or cultural specific events that are sponsored by Arab groups (e.g., dances, parties, educational lectures, holiday celebrations)? (circle one)
   - Never
   - A little
   - Sometimes
   - Often
   - Always
Now, please tell us a little about yourself. (Check all that apply)

1. What is your race/ethnicity? (circle the one that best describes you)

- [ ] African-American
- [ ] Arab-American (Specify country: ______________________________)
- [ ] Asian-American (Specify country: ______________________________)
- [ ] Hispanic-Latino (Specify country: ______________________________)
- [ ] Jewish-American
- [ ] European-American (White)
- [ ] Biracial/Mixed Race (please list all groups that apply) ________________
- [ ] Other (please specify) ______________________________

2. What is your religion? (circle the one that best describes you)

- [ ] Christian    - [ ] Jewish   - [ ] Muslim    - [ ] Other (please specify) ______________________________

3. How many of your friends are the same ethnicity/race as you? (Circle one)

- None    - A few    - Half    - Most    - All
References


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230

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