ABSTRACT


Stephen Michael Underhill, PhD, 2012

Directed By: Professor Shawn J. Parry-Giles, Department of Communication

This project examines J. Edgar Hoover’s rhetorical leadership of the Federal Bureau of Investigation during the Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S Truman administrations (1933-1953). Hoover launched and sustained a concerted domestic propaganda program that helped enhance his own political power and invented the FBI as a central force in domestic and international matters. In the process, he re-envisioned conceptions of U.S. citizenship by promoting notions of idealized citizenship. Hoover entered law enforcement and U.S. politics during the early decades of the twentieth century—a time of increased use of public campaigns sponsored by the U.S. government and presidential administrations to alter public opinion on important policy matters. This period witnessed, for example, the country’s experimentation with domestic propaganda during World War I.

While the Soviet Union and Germany used disease, vermin, parasite, and body metaphors to organize their own domestic propaganda campaigns in the following
decades, Hoover used these same metaphors to advance the need to purify America and exterminate its social pariah. Through his public campaigns against vermin (1933-1939), the Fifth Column (1939-1945), and Red Fascism (1945-1953), Hoover constructed a reality in which corruption and subversion were immutable elements of democratic life. Increasingly, Hoover’s tactics of threat and intimidation began to mimic the tactics of threat practiced by America’s enemies, moving the country closer to what many at the time called a police state. Hoover’s coupling of propaganda and coercive tactics ultimately helped him to rapidly expand the FBI and undermine his superiors and counterparts in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Whereas Roosevelt benefited politically from building up a secret police force, Truman inherited a cunning FBI director eager to use his power to expand and exploit the rhetorical presidency during the Red Scare.

By

Stephen Michael Underhill.

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2012

Advisory Committee:
Professor Shawn J. Parry-Giles, Chair
Professor Trevor Parry-Giles
Professor James F. Klumpp
Professor Kathleen E. Kendall
Associate Professor David Freund
Acknowledgements

I thank my faculty support at the University of Maryland for their help in envisioning and executing this project. I am forever grateful to my advisor, Shawn J. Parry-Giles, and to my committee members, David Freund, Trevor Parry-Giles, James F. Klumpp, and Kathleen E. Kendall, for all of their encouragement and direction. I thank Charles Wright and his Interlibrary Loan staff in McKeldin Library for tracking down and retrieving hundreds of propaganda texts for this and future projects. Also in McKeldin Library, I am very grateful for the assistance that I received from Michael Fry and his staff in the U.S. Government Information, Maps, and GIS Services department. I also thank my professional support at the National Archives in College Park for teaching me about the federal government’s history through its primary documents. Elizabeth Gray, Tim Nenninger, Richard Peuser, David Langbart, Tab Lewis, David Pfeiffer, Joe Schwartz, Christine Jones, Gene Morris, and Amy Reytar of the reference division trained me to think like an archivist when researching. I thank Julie D. Cornelius for her administrative assistance. I thank my wife, Jill, for her continued support of this never-ending project. Lastly, thank you friends, family, classmates, and God for all of your help and kindness.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: The Evolution of Justice</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: The War on Crime</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: Fighting the Axis Powers:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Americanism” Versus the Fifth Column</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: Red Fascism: The Masquerade and the Menace</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afterword</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

J. Edgar Hoover formalized a counter-intelligence apparatus to neutralize the communist threat as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) years before Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R-WI) first warned of a domestic communist conspiracy in 1950. The communist problem of Russian spy cells operating in Washington, D.C. from the 1920s through the 1940s became the communist “menace” once the problem was strategically politicized following the Truman Doctrine address in March 1947. Regardless of the veracity of its claims, anti-communism had blossomed into a powerful ideological movement that disrupted the New Deal political era and beyond.

Despite common conceptions, Senator McCarthy was not the father of “McCarthyism.” His brand of anti-communism, rather, was visible in hearings conducted by Americanist committees in Congress during the late 1930s. Scholars of international relations and members of the U.S. Congress, the intelligence establishment, and the business community alike were bolstered by an anti-communist coalition propped up by Director Hoover and many others at the time. And, although these parties sought different ends, they contributed to a campaign that targeted the Kremlin and New Deal policies.

These anti-communist opinion leaders expressed the ideological commitments of political realism, which assumed that the international arena was governed by anarchy. National stability, therefore, necessitated perpetual preparedness against international threats, especially manifestations of espionage, sabotage, and propaganda in U.S. territories. Realism constitutionally complicated the presidential
relationship with the FBI—a civilian agency that was charged with protecting the nation from a vast array of threats. For example, Tom Wicker wrote in an April 1971 Life magazine article that Director Hoover and any “president” were “almost inevitably . . . linked” more “directly” because “no attorney general [could] interpose himself between them, if they do not want him to.” Wicker enumerated that “[w]iretapping and bugging, leaking derogatory information, planting or destroying evidence and testimony, unwarranted surveillance, and undercover penetration of organizations—these [were] only a few of the weapons an FBI director who wanted to use them could deploy on his own, or on a president’s behalf.”

Presidents from both parties had questionable relationships with Hoover’s FBI. Even though President Harry S Truman referred to the FBI as a “Gestapo,” he also accepted political intelligence from the Bureau about his rivals in the Democratic Party.

Though the FBI was created under the supervision of the attorney general in 1908, Director Hoover ultimately expanded the power of the position in ways that helped him circumvent constitutional checks and allowed him to report directly to presidents. Such actions extended presidential influence and his own political stature. Hoover thus made available such questionable political tools to the eight presidents that he served from 1924 until his death in 1972. During this time, he helped enhance the scope and authority of the FBI. Under his leadership, the Bureau’s annual appropriations grew from $2.2 million to $336.1 million. This growth was continuous during the Great Depression, and accelerated during World War II and the Cold War.

This project explores the rhetorical imagination that Hoover utilized to militarize the FBI and expand his own influence through his campaigns against
gangsters (1933-1939), German and Soviet espionage (1939-1945), and communist penetration of the national security apparatus (1945-1953). These movements established Hoover’s rhetorical and political trajectory. In his December 1969 New York Times review of Hoover’s career, Wicker concluded that Hoover possibly wielded “more power longer than any other man in American history.” The director’s rhetorical campaigns were key components of his nefarious triumph. Utilizing the international relations perspectives of political idealism and political realism, this study examines the public campaigns and the behind-the-scenes rhetorical maneuvering that helped give rise to Hoover’s own public image and political influence. This study also examines the normalization of an omnipotent and militarized FBI. Before discussing the specific scope of this project, a history of the FBI and J. Edgar Hoover will first be offered, followed by a discussion of the rhetorical presidency, domestic propaganda, and international relations paradigms.

The Historical Rise of the FBI and Director Hoover

The early twentieth century represented a pivotal era for federal law enforcement. The Department of Justice (DOJ) was still in its formative years during the Theodore Roosevelt Presidency (1901-1909) when it developed an investigative agency that would become the FBI. From 1933 to 1953, the Bureau experienced an unprecedented expansion under the leadership of the director. The FBI’s public relations department—the Crime Records Division (CRD)—promoted Hoover’s leadership as a means for expanding the agency. The FBI was understood in many ways as being an extension of Hoover; he inherited a discredited and largely
unknown federal agency and helped develop it into a major political and legal force in U.S. political culture.

*Expanding the FBI, 1933-1953*

The succession of presidential administrations following Theodore Roosevelt brought with them the issuance of new executive orders, directives, and legislation that expanded the FBI’s jurisdiction, and consequently, its annual appropriations. The Bureau was born in a spirit of progressive reform, but was wielded at times as a tool of social control.\(^{11}\) From its inception in 1908 to the Harry S Truman administration and beyond, the FBI was frequently an undemocratic arm of the executive. The FBI developed rhetorical processes that adapted the agency’s public reputation to changing rhetorical contexts.

Attorney General S. Homer Cummings declared a War on Crime in 1933 that targeted Depression era gangsters. In 1934, Congress passed a series of legislation known as the Omnibus Crime Bill. Among many other powers, this legislation gave Bureau agents the jurisdiction to serve warrants and subpoenas, to make seizures and arrests, and to carry firearms.\(^{12}\) This legislation gave the Bureau jurisdiction over interstate crime, which began its rapid expansion of power. The War on Crime established the modern Federal Bureau of Investigation.\(^{13}\) The Bureau’s appropriations expanded from $2.77 million for 1933 to $6.57 million for 1939.\(^{14}\) Though molded to fight gangsters in the early 1930s, the FBI soon became a weapon for fighting fascists and communists in the middle and later part of the decade.

The FDR administration built up the FBI through a series of directives, orders, legislation, and appropriations issued to combat various social, political, economic,
and cultural crises. Hoover began cutting back and concealing his intelligence gathering activities in 1924 after Attorney General Harlan F. Stone forbade the newly appointed FBI Director from engaging in such work. Though it had certainly never fully halted its activities, the Bureau’s intelligence operations reemerged and began expanding again in the mid-1930s. After making smaller—and sometimes political—requests, President Roosevelt ordered Hoover to trace-out a “broad picture” of the “general movement” of “Communists” and “Fascism” in “the country as a whole” in August 1936. The president circumvented congressional oversight by having Secretary of State Cordell Hull issue this request for him during that same month. Roosevelt believed that the secretary had such authority under a World War I era statute that was designed to give the State Department a quick response to German espionage. It was through this secret directive that the Bureau had jurisdiction to engage in domestic intelligence gathering for the next four decades. Yet, as Richard Gid Power observes, “that authorization was considerably augmented by additional presidential directives over the next few years.” For example, Roosevelt issued a directive on June 26, 1939, that centralized “all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters” between the FBI, the Office of Military Intelligence (OMI), and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). This increased the Bureau’s jurisdiction and appropriations as World War II and the subsequent Cold War commenced.

The Bureau’s anti-communist mission treated social cleavages as evidence of an international conspiracy that was designed to pull apart the American fabric, pitting classes, races, and religious perspectives against each other. Communism was
suspected where instabilities were most visible, which created political implications for civil liberties, civil rights, organized labor, and anti-war activism. In 1941, the president expanded the Bureau’s operations to secure the entire Western hemisphere from fascist influences during the Second World War. This move militarized the agency and offered it an international focus for the Cold War era and beyond.

Congress participated in increasing the FBI’s power as well. The legislature passed a series of wartime legislation to protect against military invasion and the possible development of Fifth Columns in the homeland. The term Fifth Column was coined during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) to discuss the movement of Nationalist forces. In this metaphor, external troop regiments represented “four columns” while secret subversive cells hiding inside society represented the “fifth column.” The sinister nature of Fifth Column subversion was accented by their secret coordination with external military forces. Accordingly, anti-subversive legislation called for the registration of foreign agents, forbade federal employees from participating in “any political organization which advocate[d] the overthrow of our constitutional form of government,” outlawed advocating the overthrow of “the Government of the United States” by “force or violence,” and instituted a wartime draft. In addition to protecting the government from Nazi and communist infiltration and preparing it for war, Congress also authorized the seizure of industries threatened by strikes, and forbade labor unions from contributing to political campaigns for federal office. These laws, orders, and directives expanded the FBI’s jurisdiction. Its appropriations increased from $6.57 million for 1939 to $44.19 million for 1945.
Remarkably, this growth represented a small fraction of the Bureau’s development under Hoover’s tenure.

The FBI expanded at an even faster rate in the post-war era. Because communist infiltration was believed to thrive in places that exhibited un-American tendencies, government planners sought to seal the American perimeter from such outside threats. And, because social change and protest were often perceived as unpatriotic, the FBI was charged with controlling, dissolving, or containing counter-cultural ideologies and reform movements. For this task, the FBI was offered wide jurisdiction over American life and received appropriations to match.

America’s prime perception of international threat transitioned from fascism to international communism, or “red fascism,” in the post-war years. Fears of subversion that were previously associated with academia, religion, labor, the media, the federal government, and the defense establishment transferred from the fascist Fifth Column to its communist successor after the commencement of World War II. Labor unions operating in defense plants were especially suspected of harboring foreign loyalties, which aligned anti-communists in government and in industry. This view assumed that organized labor was a powerful Fifth Column that was sometimes controlled by either Berlin or Moscow, and other times controlled by both. Anti-communists, therefore, feared that foreign propagandists were “duping” Americans into leaving the nation vulnerable to military invasion.  

Increased perceptions of threat were accompanied by legislation that further directed the FBI to contain domestic communism. The predominant fear in the late 1940s was Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb. Congress passed legislation that
commissioned the FBI to investigate all military contractors involved in atomic intelligence, and the president ordered a “loyalty investigation of every person entering the civilian employment of any department or agency of the executive branch of the federal government.” Union leaders were required by law to file affidavits declaring that they were not communists; unions were also prohibited from engaging in strikes that affected commerce; this legislation also authorized government strikebreaking. Concurrently, the federal government issued policies to promote U.S. interests worldwide through force and diplomacy, including the containment of international Soviet expansionism. Federal planners established the National Security Council (NSC) in 1947, which included an advisory role for the DOJ and the FBI by 1949.

Furthermore, the government weakened constitutional commitments to civil liberties and civil rights. It mandated registration of communist organizations and commissioned government investigations of un-American activities; its scope also included the investigations of alleged homosexuality among government workers. Passed months after the country’s entrance into the Korean conflict, the Internal Security Act (ISA) of September 23, 1950, amalgamated “scores of anti-communist bills . . . [and] gave the government unprecedented authority to restrict civil liberties, including the authority to round up people and detain them in camps in a national emergency,” observes Albert Fried.

The Emergency Detention Act was a component part of the ISA, which authorized the apprehension and detention of communists in event of an “Internal Security Emergency.” The act authorized the president to round up citizens and aliens
who “probably [would] conspire with others to engage in . . . acts of espionage or of sabotage.” A president could do so in the event of an invasion by a foreign entity, declaration of war by the U.S. Congress, or insurrection “within the United States in aid of a foreign enemy.” The act also relieved the government from having to reveal the “identity or evidence of Government agents” in proceedings against “detainees.”39 This latitude, of course, followed the pattern of round-ups and internment that was characteristic of both world wars.

The legislative context of the early 1950s represented the zenith of the FBI’s statute authority under Director Hoover. The Bureau’s annual appropriation expanded from $44.19 million for 1945 to $84.40 million for 1953.40 Additionally, the FBI’s public support was near its twentieth-century peak as the country’s attention centered on international communism, domestic subversion, and nuclear war.

The scope of this project centers on Director Hoover’s service under Presidents Roosevelt and Truman from 1933 to 1953. The role of the FBI during these two presidencies offers a striking contrast. Hoover enhanced FDR’s public support, but challenged the credibility and patriotism of Truman and his administration. The ever-expanding role of the FBI was linked to the evolution of Hoover’s own career as the country’s chief law enforcement agent.

*The Director*

J. Edgar Hoover nurtured relationships with the press. Such support represented an integral strategy in the rise of the FBI after Hoover was its appointed director in 1924. He negotiated a mutually beneficial arrangement with Washington Star reporter, Rex Collier, as “friendly” journalists gained access to information and
the Bureau gained positive press coverage in return. These relationships prepared the director for the 1930s, when the modern FBI began its operation. Hoover used the press to champion his role in combating what he called a “crime army” that composed the “underworld.”

Attorney General Cummings’s War on Crime offered Hoover a pretext for expanding the FBI’s information system. The Publications Section was created in 1935. It gave Assistant Director Clyde Tolson his own assistant who would focus primarily upon the FBI’s mass media coordination. This section quickly expanded. It originally included correspondence, library, publications, and publicity units when it was combined with the Research Division in July 1936; the section then gained control of the crime statistics unit. This entity officially became the Crime Records Division (CRD) in September 1938. This infrastructure accelerated a domestic propaganda operation that began in 1930.

The director appointed Assistant Director Louis B. Nichols to head the division in 1936; it was his job to transform the FBI’s law enforcement movements into a series of interconnected rhetorical campaigns that celebrated Hoover’s leadership. Nichols promoted the Bureau and its director through networking with journalists, public relations counselors, and press agents. The FBI relentlessly coordinated with mass media representatives to help in the production of films, radio and television programs, and books as well as newspaper, magazine, and scholarly journal articles and more. The CRD ghost wrote articles that carried Hoover's signature, leaked material to the press, and granted Bureau access to privileged members of the press. The earliest media items promoted the War on Crime, and
then publicized Hoover’s subsequent campaigns. These texts were approved by Hoover and sought to champion his leadership, law enforcement activities, and his own political views.

While Hoover would use the CRD to promote his professional stature, he also used radio personality and columnist Walter Winchell to invent and circulate a heterosexual identity for him in the mid-1930s. Because Hoover lacked a known romantic relationship (with a woman) and lived with his mother, rumors circulated that he was homosexual. Winchell helped Hoover and Clyde Tolson, his Assistant Director (1930-1936), Assistant to the Director (1936-1947), and Associate Director (1947-1972), who was speculated to be his partner, pass as straight by presenting them as committed bachelors in the 1930s. On this stage, Winchell hinted at romantic liaisons with starlets they met and with whom they were photographed. The director bolstered this heterosexual image by declaring a campaign against homosexuals or “sex-fiends,” which “placed him in the spotlight, but, ironically, and strategically, beyond the pale of speculation,” observes Charles E. Morris. Hoover’s relationship with Tolson was only one of his many secret arrangements.

President Roosevelt welcomed Hoover into his inner sanctum in the mid-1930s when he first invited Hoover to collect political intelligence for the administration. FDR requested information on American Nazis in 1934, on his critics in 1935, and on subversive movements more generally in 1936. In 1940, Hoover instituted the Custodial Detention Program, which was a system for rounding-up and detaining Americans who were allegedly subversive in the event of an emergency. In 1943, Attorney General Francis Biddle ordered Hoover to terminate the Custodial
Index; rather than canceling the list, the director renamed it the “Internal Security Index.” The existence of the Index would remain illegal until the passage of the Emergency Detention Act in 1950, which legalized the warrantless apprehension and detention of communists in event of a security crisis. FDR drastically expanded the power of Hoover and the FBI through secret directives that were unmonitored by Congress. This power was further complemented by the director’s public promotion of his wartime agency.

The Crime Record Division publicized the FBI’s role in the Roosevelt administration as combating the Axis powers at home. Powers suggests that the director’s “primary goal during the war was to prevent the kind of mass hysteria that had blighted the home front during World War I.” Beyond this more narrow mission, Hoover used this opportunity to advertise his militaristic leadership in wartime. He strategically targeted his audiences with messages through various channels of communication in which he celebrated the Bureau’s triumphs.

In addition to building public support through propaganda, he also built budgetary support for the Bureau through an illegal relationship with his congressional overseers. In 1943, for example, Representative Clarence Cannon (D-MS), the Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations, requested that Hoover lend FBI agents to the committee to investigate the needs of departments requesting appropriations. Though President Roosevelt and Attorney General Francis Biddle forbade this relationship, Hoover and Cannon established an operational interdependence between the Bureau and one of its few oversight committees. In the mid-1940s, the chair of the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, Carl Hayden (D-
AZ), followed Cannon’s lead and also began borrowing agents from Hoover to investigate other departments.  

This practice would last at least until the end of Hoover’s career in 1972. The director developed friendly relations with members of Congress at a time when his relationship with President Truman was deteriorating.  

Hoover had to operate under a president who rejected the democratic legitimacy of the FBI following the death of President Roosevelt in April 1945. In the early years of the Cold War, and during a series of high profile Soviet spy investigations that revealed government penetration and theft of atomic secrets, the Bureau assumed that armed (and possibly nuclear) conflict with the Soviet Union was inevitable.  

President Truman, however, calculated threat levels differently and largely ignored the Bureau’s many warnings of espionage and sabotage in the defense industry and the State Department.  

The director responded to this slight by transferring his support from the president to HUAC, and fueled an anti-communist coalition in Washington that included members of the Democratic and Republican parties, business community, and the military establishment who were inside and outside of the administration.  

Though they sought different ends, they worked together to usher in a post-war anti-communist worldview in Washington.  

The split between Truman and Hoover was symbolic of the growing ideological division between idealists and realists, as some academics, minority groups, and New Dealers championed civil liberties, civil rights, and the redistribution of wealth as ends in themselves.  

Hoover’s coalition paid dividends as anti-communists in government successfully wielded public support against the
president and prioritized security measures over civil liberties. Under the advice of Navy Secretary James Forrestal and National War College Lecturer George F. Kennan, and under pressure from Congress and the FBI, the president’s administration formulated the Truman Doctrine and initiated the Loyalty Program. These policies signaled a clear position on international communism which ultimately weakened Truman’s control over domestic security planning. Truman’s own policy decisions helped build public opinion against his former commitment to idealism in foreign affairs strategizing and undermined his movement against Hoover’s coercive tactics.

The director’s long list of formidable political opponents illustrates not just his power, but also his adeptness at rhetorical adaptation. During the War on Crime, Hoover focused his rhetorical strategizing against Sanford Bates, Director of the Bureau of Prisons. Hoover used the vermin metaphor—which had already been popularized by pulp fiction writers—to discredit Bates and other opponents. While maintaining rhetorical continuity between his campaigns, the director continuously evolved his emphases and adapted to various situations. Hoover, Tolson, and Nichols strategically packaged the FBI for a number of Washington elites, including members of the U.S. Congress and the executive, who in turn used the FBI to strengthen their own rhetorical standing. The FBI’s planning reinforced FDR’s rhetorical presidency during the Depression and World War II. In the post-war era, however, Truman’s rhetorical leadership was complicated by the FBI’s efforts to help create an impression of communism in the executive branch.
Many of Hoover’s contemporaries identified his belief system as a form of American fascism. Prominent civil liberties activist Alan Barth, for example, coined the term “Americanist” in 1951 to identify members of a “group” that was “guilty” of the “gravest and most dangerous form of disloyalty to the United States.” According to Barth, Americanists were “disloyal to the principles and purposes” that composed the “genius of the American society.” He suggested that their “disloyalty” impaired “national security more seriously than the comparable disloyalty of the Communists.” He feared that their vision of Americanism was “more deeply subversive” and struck “more injuriously at the real roots of loyalty and of American strength.” He warned that the Americanists “would meet the threat of communism” by substituting the “Communist techniques for the techniques of freedom” in America. Barth concluded that the “Americanists,” intentionally or otherwise, aimed at “overthrowing the essential values which that government was instituted to secure.” The term implied that Hoover’s militant strand of super-patriotism became subversive when it turned against democratic values—strategies with deep roots in the history of U.S. propaganda. The ideological threat posed by Americanists was compounded by the Americanists’ combinations of rhetorical and institutional strategizing.

**Domestic Propaganda and International Relations**

President Woodrow Wilson refashioned the rhetorical presidency beyond the scope set by President Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt’s practice of the rhetorical presidency would also be an extension of an earlier project launched by President William McKinley at the dawn of mass media strategizing. As a former president of
Princeton University, Wilson invited his academic colleagues to prepare the nation for battle and design a post-war international environment that moved America beyond its isolationist traditions. As a leading intellectual during the progressive era, Wilson recognized the rhetorical opportunities made available through the spread of mass media and the growing field of public relations, which aligned theoretical research with the communication strategies of the U.S. government. Public opinion scholarship helped develop tactics for governments, democratic and otherwise, to build and maintain consensus through what Walter Lippmann labeled “the manufacture of consent,” more controversially known as propaganda. President Wilson’s pursuit of internationalism also pushed the academy to examine international relations (IR), which established further connections between government planners and academicians.

Though IR was born in a progressive spirit, it would ultimately become a domain of thought that attacked progressivism as a communist plot. Hoover and the FBI benefited from both the growth of public relations and international relations strategizing. The FBI director developed expertise in public relations and opinion formation, learning how to package the FBI as a solution to international threats. This bolstered the influence of the director and his institution in an era of propaganda development and research.

*Domestic Propaganda*

The post-World War I era witnessed a boom in the sophistication of propaganda techniques that elevated the role of the political science discipline in the U.S. government’s public opinion efforts and introduced public relations to the
academic community. Writing in the wake of the Red Scare and the Committee on Public Information (CPI), intellectuals rethought the contours of government and industry in a political environment susceptible to organized persuasion.\textsuperscript{63}

Walter Lippmann helped lead the discussion with his writing on the nature of propaganda and democracy. He argued that leaders had learned to manipulate symbols to deliberately misrepresent the social world through mass communication, which placed a “premium upon the manufacture of what is usually called consent.” He first discussed the failure of the press to protect the nation from government propaganda during the war, noting that this failure was a part of the executive’s expansion of power. In an early reflection upon the enhanced power of the presidency, he stated that “decisions in the modern state tend to be made by the interaction, not of Congress and the executive, but of public opinion and the executive . . . Government tends to operate by the impact of controlled opinion upon [policy] administration.”\textsuperscript{64} His contributions to social psychology in terms of crowd opinion formation, however, were more far reaching.

Lippmann articulated a theoretical design by which government planners could manipulate public opinion based on censorship and propaganda.\textsuperscript{65} While censorship blocked the transmission of undesirable meaning by oppositional forces, propaganda was designed to infuse publics with beliefs, attitudes, and emotions helpful to political agendas. Lippmann’s assumptions were grounded in a hierarchical understanding of public influence, as he believed “symbols” were “planted in people’s minds by another human being whom we recognize as authoritative.”\textsuperscript{66} He noted that such brute rhetorical force was endemic during times of war and
revolution. Lippmann’s theoretical discussion was expanded by the father of public relations, Edward L Bernays, who was interested in formalizing systems of public opinion management.

Bernays was a former press agent and veteran of the CPI’s Foreign Press Bureau. Sigmund Freud was his uncle. The nephew applied Freud’s work to shape mass opinion. Bernays was an anti-communist committed to serving business interests and was troubled by social reformers who demanded accountability from business and government. As an atheist who believed the nation was turning from its religious heritage, he feared societal collapse and chaos. Therefore, he saw the role of public relations counsels as “creating man-made gods who could assert subtle social control and prevent disaster,” observes Marvin N. Olasky. He advocated consolidating the existing power of those who already held leadership positions in business and politics through covertly manipulating the perceptions of publics without their consent.

Writing from this unabashed perspective, Bernays’ major works became resources for leaders interested in maintaining and expanding their power. He explained that in an age of greater heterogeneity, public relations counsels were necessary for building agreement among dissimilar groups. Bernays suggested that those who manipulated opinions in a democratic society represented “an invisible government which [was] the true ruling power of our country . . . It [was] they who pull the wires which control the public mind, who harness old social forces and contrive new ways to bind and guide the world.” He advised and organized front groups to support the presidential campaigns of Calvin Coolidge in 1924 and Herbert
Hoover in 1932; his work would become a resource for J. Edgar Hoover’s own FBI campaigns. Similar perspectives were championed by Bernays’ contemporaries who shared his commitments to rhetorics of social control.

The assistance of public relations counselors was obviously valued by presidential administrations throughout the 1920s and 1930s. President Hoover instituted the Office of White House Press Secretary in 1929. Will Irwin, former CPI member turned public relations counselor turned propaganda analyst, observed in 1936 that FDR established press offices in each of his executive agencies. These offices propelled New Deal federal expansionism by advertising FDR’s leadership to targeted audiences. Henry Suydam, another CPI veteran, and Irwin were hired to promote the DOJ.

President Roosevelt’s move to publicize the executive branch created further dilemmas for the democratic nation. Suydam would become both an ally and competitor of Assistant Director Louis Nichols as Hoover vied with the attorney general over credit for the War on Crime. Roosevelt’s interest in securing consent for his expanding federal Bureaucracy led James L. McCamy to warn in 1939 that publicity seeking offered political leaders the opportunity to enhance and secure their prestige as they proclaimed their own virtue and concealed their mistakes from public view. McCamy charged that such covert practices would enslave the citizenry to petty bureaucrats who would control their own media coverage, helping them to secure the consent of the U.S. people on both domestic and international issues. In this era of public opinion formation, the proliferation of international relations paradigms also took form as the FBI came of age.
Idealism and the International Community

In addition to his experimentation with public opinion management, President Wilson’s ties to academia also helped infuse America’s earliest internationalist policies with progressive ideals. Shortly after he led the nation in the “war to end all wars,” the president commissioned a group of leading intellectuals known as the “Inquiry” to explore how lasting peace might be achieved. Wilson valued them as his personal staff of international advisors. This esteemed group helped lay the foundation for his Fourteen Points, which became the blueprint for the idealist consensus.

The Inquiry’s prestige was perhaps most noticeable at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Group members assisted in drafting the Treaty of Versailles and in formulating the League of Nations. In the wake of communist revolutions across Eastern Europe, it was then charged with highlighting international democracy as a preferred alternative to Vladimir Lenin’s international communism. The necessities of the international popularity contest pressed the Inquiry to envision a perspective that was far more embracing of cultural pluralism than was America writ large. Additionally, the Inquiry weakened the control of industrialists when it pressed for the creation of the International Labor Organization (ILO) to protect workers. Among other initiatives, the ILO outlawed child labor and established the eight hour work day. The organization’s mission faced resistance, however, because such regulations were viewed as state (rather than federal) issues. Government connections with unions were feared to serve as gateways to socialism, and labor protections and business regulations were viewed as a means to impugn profits.
After the U.S. Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, influential idealist coalitions rallied to build public opinion in favor of the League while working to discredit isolationist commitments. Wealthy peace organizations globally championed the cause. They published books, articles, bulletins, and magazines (e.g., *Foreign Affairs*) that discussed issues of war and peace.

The organizations also used academia. They created universities, academic departments, centers, and clubs devoted to the exploration of IR based on international law. Academics, however, gave little attention to “whatever scant theoretical work [that] may have appeared, nor to what may be called disciplinary development. The object was to educate the business, financial, and legal elites, not academics,” observes William C. Olson and A.J.R. Groom. Ultimately, their goal was to build public opinion in favor of the League of Nations, the World Court, the arbitration of international disputes, free trade, peace treaties, and collective security.

Specific strands of progressive thought permeated idealism. William T.R. Fox explains that progressives associated peace with government and war with power politics. They also believed that an “underlying harmony of interest” between nations could be established through education and good will. Michael Joseph Smith explains that intellectual activists like Idealist IR scholar James T. Shotwell assumed “that the danger facing the world required scholars to take the lead in applying sound academic and scientific principles to recurring problems of national and international society.” Progress through science and education was believed to be a path to peace.
International public opinion making was supposed to prevent further outbreaks of war.

Idealists inside and out of government pushed for American involvement in non-aggression pacts. This outlawry of war reinforced an international “covenant” between nations that was championed by President Wilson and realized by the League of Nations. In 1926, Secretary of State Frank Billings Kellogg accepted an invitation to participate in the League Council’s Preparatory Commission to discuss international disarmament; Congress appropriated $50,000 for the commission and President Coolidge appointed Allen W. Dulles to head the delegation. Further, in 1928, the Secretary of State signed the Pact of Paris, which renounced war as an instrument of national policy. The Senate ratified the Pact in January 1929, which was widely popular at the time. And, on July 25, President Hoover activated the Pact. That same day, the American and British navies announced the slowdown of war-vessel production. The New York Times called this turn of events “the most embracing world agreement to abolish war.”

Idealism rested upon progressive assumptions that borrowed from nineteenth-century liberal political theory. As an enlightenment project, idealism had faith in the rationality and basic goodness of peoples, the existence of an underlying harmony of interests operating between nations, and that of an absolute form of justice. These ideas comprised the cornerstone of IR during the interwar period, and they invited conclusions that called for unifying communities on domestic and international levels.
Idealism’s faith in human rationality and fundamental goodness placed a premium on public opinion and democracy. It suggested that proper authority depended on the informed consent of the governed. Educated citizens of the world were seen as using reason to define their local community’s interests in accord with the world community’s common interests. This belief, then, viewed informed public opinion as a power that could direct foreign policies and actions of nation-states that existed in an otherwise anarchic global arena. Idealism equated the spread of democracy with the spread of peace, because informed citizens were thought to elect leaders who prioritized peacekeeping.

Idealism sought to make government more accessible to the citizenry so that rationality and public opinion could influence nation-states at the domestic and international levels. The ideology’s insistence on democracy influenced the internal order of nation-states themselves. Idealism called for “democratic domestic institutions” that would be responsive to public opinion, explains Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf.

Idealism was undergirded by eighteenth century presuppositions. E.H. Carr, for example, suggested that this perspective rested upon “the doctrine of the harmony of interests.” Idealism conceptualized the harmony in morality terms, and claimed that cooperative society was more secure than competitive society. Such harmony was also envisioned by idealism as a means to promote the interest of good and rational peoples in peace. Believing that there were no major conflicts of interest between states or within domestic society, idealism understood the harmony of interests as a “natural moral order” that was “discoverable by reason.” Through this
lens, all peoples were seen as having a rational and common interest that formed a peaceful community and which could “be established under the proper conditions.”

This made criminal justice philosophy an interest of idealism, which would soon thereafter also be a concern for realism as the course of IR developed.

Searching for these conditions intertwined notions of democracy and idealism’s faith in justice, as the local and global communities were to become inclusive of all. According to Trevor Taylor, idealism accepted morality as “not something bound by culture or time but [was] thought to be absolute and universal.” This implied “breaking down distinctions between in-groups and out-groups,” and creating relationships based on reciprocal obligations, mutual self-interest, loyalty, and moral obligation, explains Ken Booth. Under this principle, the CPUSA had gained sixty-six thousand registered members and possible more than half a million sympathizers by 1939.

The underlying value of idealism was progress, which was the enlightenment’s faith in “advancing civilization” through reason. Advancement was defined in terms of peace and was thought to come about through the goodness of human nature and the scientific study of war and peace. Idealism sought to refashion values and relationships between the citizen and the state as well as between the state and the international community. Shotwell observed in 1929 that political idealism sought to “substitute for ruthless competition some measure of cooperation, so that each member of the community of nations may have a larger share in an increasing common good.” The Wilsonian political vision included a democratic world order, open diplomacy, free trade, labor protections, disarmament,
the re-conceptualization of geo-political borders to coincide with nationalities, and
the formation of a “general association of nations” to draw “covenants for the purpose
of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to
great and small states alike.” His vision, however, did not emphasize enforcement
mechanisms for ensuring international stability.

The rise of fascism eclipsed that of idealism. After the League found Japan
guilty of aggression for invading Manchuria in 1933, the Japanese government
withdrew from the League rather than agreeing to arbitration. Shotwell described this
movement as “the twilight of the long day that began with the Paris Peace
Conference. It was also the ominous foreshadowing of World War II.” Germany
withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and the League seven months later; Italy
openly moved toward war with Ethiopia. Instead of engaging in collective security,
the U.S. Congress strengthened neutrality laws and Great Britain supplied Italy with
resources for war. Such isolationism and appeasement would later be blamed for
the rise of the Axis powers. A new international relations paradigm was sought after
to better capture the “reality” of foreign affairs.

Realism and the International Threat

The general failure of the League and international law to maintain order
raised skepticism about the feasibility of idealism. The philosophy was shunned by
many because of its inability to subdue the early rise of the Axis powers. E.H. Carr
suggested that in the idealist vision of IR, “wishing prevailed over thinking” and that
the outbreak of war “revealed the inadequacy of pure aspiration” as the foundation of
politics and scholarship. Instead, he argued that IR should analyze “political reality”
to correct the “wish-dreams of [its] initial stage.” As an alternative, he explained that realism emphasized the “irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies,” and insisted on the adaptation of oneself to “those forces and their tendencies.” In short, Carr encouraged a “realist” philosophy of IR that engaged the existing international environment on its own terms, rather than trying to improve upon it. In contrast to idealism, realism posited that “power politics” was “rooted in the lust for power which [was] common to all men” and was therefore “inseparable from social life itself,” observed Hans J. Morgenthau. This placed the accumulation and maintenance of power at the center of international politics and government affairs, trumping even constitutional order when necessary.

The progression of realism from an IR perspective to an academic paradigm that dominated U.S. foreign policy following World War II was in large measure a response to the international Soviet challenge to capitalism. In February 1946, a virtually unknown State Department employee stationed in Moscow named George F. Kennan delivered an interpretive essay on Joseph Stalin’s “February Election Speech.” The premier’s address hailed the superiority of the socialist system to that of the capitalist, and predicted the eventual victory of socialism over capitalism. Known as the Long Telegram, Kennan’s report was excitedly received by officials in Washington.

President Truman took office during the Soviet Union’s hostile acquisition of Eastern Europe, and at a time of nuclear espionage in the United States. In this context, explains Paul A. Chilton, the Truman administration sought to “construct a consensual concept of what was happening, a concept that would guide foreign policy
planning.” The administration’s thinking was guided by the presumed failure of appeasement, and was thus predisposed to promote an appearance of toughness and a desire for international trade.115 Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko conclude that the “United States’ ultimate objective at the end of World War II was both to sustain and reform world capitalism.” A part of the reconstruction effort was to make trading partnerships throughout the global community and thereby prevent another worldwide depression. Somewhat idealistically, the administration believed that a strong international economy would make for a more peaceful world order.116

Kennan’s report gained prominence and momentum as it circulated through a communication network that sought to define the post-war national and international orders. The diplomat’s response to Stalin “called for an open declaration of separate spheres of influence,” suggests Walter L. Hixson.117 In this containment logic, capitalism and socialism would dominate their respective spheres, rather than having to compete within a single economic system. Kennan’s justification created a new rhetorical vision of international life based upon a Nazi-Soviet analogy. Keith L. Shimko explains that a “Munich analogy was invoked” by many “policymakers” because of a “belief that Stalin’s Russia and Hitler’s Germany shared some basic characteristics—such as an undemocratic domestic political structure, an anti-liberal ideology, a desire to expand their influence, and substantial military power.”118 Facing a threat as terrifying as Hitler, again, justified militarizing U.S. foreign policy in peacetime. This rational was manifest in the growing Washington worldview.

Twentieth century notions of realism rested upon assumptions of state power and state identity. Robert O. Keohane asserts that realism assumed that nation-states
sought “power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends,” and they were seen as “the key units of action.” These assumptions had lasting ramifications for domestic law enforcement.

Realism was predominantly concerned with the role of power in international relations, which was considered the “national interest.” This focus underscored an agreement with idealism that the international scene was marked by anarchy; at the same time, however, it concluded that order could only be maintained through balancing international powers. Contrasting the belief that human nature was ultimately good, realism assumed human nature to be evil or self-destructive, thus in need of control. Maintaining domestic and international order through restraint was sought through military preparedness.

The national interest, then, was defined in terms of national security, which was secured through force. Political realist Hans J. Morgenthau suggested that the protection of the nation-state’s interior and exterior was considered “the last word in world politics,” and was thus the paramount objective of national policy. Power was used to promote the national interest in the “face of possible usurpation” from “ethnic and economic” citizen groups, by spies and traitors working on behalf of foreign governments, and by “religious bodies and international organizations.” The FBI was responsible for monitoring these groups to ensure their loyalty and to contain potentially disloyal influences over the system.

Order was thus preserved by maximizing military capabilities and efficiency. Realism integrated notions of security, preparedness, and peace. The perspective assumed that the international status quo would be preserved by the threat
of retaliation, thus centralizing deterrence as the central component of national security policy. Maximizing military strength then became the duty of the commander-in-chief.\textsuperscript{125} In this militarization of domestic life, all government agencies at all levels were expected to help maintain law and order.\textsuperscript{126} For the FBI, this meant consensus making and social control.

Preventing the world from falling into chaos was seen as the highest moral purpose of power by realists.\textsuperscript{127} Order depended on force, which made the application of force more of an amoral phenomenon. That is, the morality of coercion then depended on the intent behind the force.\textsuperscript{128} Realists viewed moral rules as culturally bound. This meant that morality was not a universally definable or applicable concept in IR; consequently, a nation’s moral structure could be refashioned as conditions warranted.\textsuperscript{129} According to the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, these ideas led the post-war FBI to maintain what Assistant Director William C. Sullivan called a “‘war psychology’” that discounted questions of legality, lawfulness, or ethics during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{130}

Power in policy formation was actualized in terms of access and influence. Realists concurred with Harold D. Lasswell’s 1930 assessment that members of the general public were “poor judges of their own interests” and, therefore, needed to be governed by an elite governing class.\textsuperscript{131} The citizenry was conceptualized as, in Walter Lippmann’s terminology, a “bewildered herd” that ought to be treated as “spectators” rather than “actors” in public affairs.\textsuperscript{132} Because the “average man” was marked by “stupidity,” elites had to use their “rationality” to maintain the “necessary
illusion” that the state was democratically controlled, posited Reinhold Niebuhr.\(^{133}\) The state presumably best understood the nexus of military and economic interests, and made decisions based on expanding both. Such assumptions minimized the role of the citizen in governing and further marginalized the potential of dissent.

Realism’s state-centrism transformed the role of justice to the maintenance of order. Unlike idealism, realism understood justice as subjectively constructed, and thus impossible to obtain absolutely in a heterogeneous society or in an international environment. Thus, it valued order instead, which was a tangible goal for government institutions that also reinforced the primacy of the state.\(^{134}\) Realism held that the role of the criminal justice system, then, was ultimately to preserve the state’s political institutions, which placed law enforcement institutions above the very code of law they were entrusted to enforce.

The state, therefore, was expected to promote its interests by abandoning values (e.g., civil liberties) that constrained its power. Herz observed, for example, that realism frequently found “itself unable to advocate over-all principles that [were] applicable everywhere, but [had to] modify its policies according to concrete situations.” Realists recognized that the national interest may sometimes have to take precedence over the established rule of law, as strict observance could allow for “corrupt purposes or to further the aims of political groups.”\(^{135}\) Under this assumption, American liberals and progressives lacked sufficient representation as most Democrats and Republicans alike abandoned commitments to constitutional guarantees during the early Cold War years. Members of the executive and legislature
overlooked covert FBI programs that engaged in illegal bugging, wiretapping, mail opening, and surreptitious entry.  

Unlike idealism’s faith in criminal rehabilitation, realism recognized law enforcement institutions as a means to neutralize oppositional groups. It was thus “inclined to advocate the readoption of the ‘classical’ system of dealing with the criminal by way of repression, utilizing punishment as a means of general deterrence,” explained Herz.  

In this manner, “political groups” were expected to be silenced by state institutions through the use of force as necessary. This mission was evident in the FBI’s consistent position against probation, parole, and pardon. Instead, the FBI championed modes of containment, including imprisonment, blacklisting, torture, and execution.  

Post-war realism thus viewed the world as a bipolar struggle between super powers. Both blocs, realism suggested, sought to expand their power to maximize their security. As such, they organized the nation-state to make offensive and defensive measures more efficient. This arrangement promoted institutions and values to keep the domestic sphere safe from internal and external infiltration.  

The post-war international economy planned by Roosevelt and Truman assumed new implications in the Cold War context. Specifically, both the economy and the military needed to be as strong as possible to maintain or expand the Western bloc’s perimeter. If the exterior failed, the Eastern bloc could spread into the West, which could limit economic and military potential. This raised doubt about various market regulations and labor reforms introduced during the New Deal.
Americanists in government worked to break labor union strength, cut New Deal social programs (including public infrastructure initiatives), and subsidized both military and industry instead. To accomplish this feat, government planners coordinated with business leaders to build public support for more realistic international strategizing. This commodification of foreign policy brought the role of media, propaganda, and censorship to the forefront of the Cold War. Noam Chomsky suggests that the FBI served as a “national political police” force that suppressed “independent politics and free speech, on the principle that the state [was] entitled to prevent improper thought and its expression.” Hoover coupled censorship strategizing with propaganda programs that mimicked totalitarian rhetoric. Tricia Starks observes that Lenin (1870-1924) relied on disease, vermin, parasite, and body metaphors to articulate the importance of purging capitalism and religion from Russian society for the purpose of purification. Additionally, German and “American elites” shortly thereafter “reified entire groups as cancers, vermin, or parasites,” Starks argues. Hoover’s rhetorical strategizing relied heavily upon this metaphorical blueprint to frame issues of citizenship and to promote political realism and anti-communism.

The rhetorical presidency and public opinion management, therefore, represented an important combination of forces that popularized the competing international relations perspectives. Over time, idealism’s theory of an informed and engaged citizenry was balanced by realism’s theory of the “spectator” citizenry by Washington and Wall Street elites. J. Edgar Hoover came to power in this volatile context in which the competing perspectives evolved in an age of enhanced public
opinion management. In such an explosive political environment, he worked within his institution to rhetorically adapt the FBI to keep it centered in the changing rhetorical contexts of the New Deal, World War II, and the Cold War.

The Rhetorical Rise of Hoover’s FBI

This project examines the rhetorical adaptation of Hoover and the FBI during this turbulent time at home and abroad, featuring the FBI’s public campaigns against crime (1933-1939), the axis powers (1939-1945), and communism (1945-1953). The War on Crime is contextualized within the progressive era, which included idealist notions of scientific progress that sought the rehabilitation of criminals and the curtailment of criminal activity through proactive social programming. The domestic campaign against the Fifth Column is situated in World War II, when idealists and realists competed over the direction of U.S. foreign policy. And, the movement against Red Fascism is located in the postwar period, which promoted the prioritization of the nation’s security over the civil rights of its citizens.

This project functions as a public address study that places the FBI’s public campaigns from 1933-1953 in their complex domestic and international contexts. This post-realist study examines the rhetorical rise of J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI. Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman observe that the post-realism perspective begins “with the investigation of realism as a language and end[s] with judgments in terms of any of the ideological, ethical, or other considerations that the realist would rule out.”143 Accordingly, the study concludes with such judgments about Hoover’s rise to power and the significance of his rhetorical legacy.
More specifically, the project seeks to answer two research questions regarding Hoover’s elevation through his use of public campaigns. First, the study will examine how the IR paradigms of idealism and realism were manifest in Hoover’s and the FBI’s public campaigns from 1933 to 1953, with a focus on the role of language, power, and public opinion management in the pursuit of rhetorical adaptation and control. Second, this project seeks to understand how Hoover used the FBI to at once bolster one presidential administration’s rhetorical presidency (Franklin D. Roosevelt’s) through the War on Crime and the wartime campaign against Fifth Columns, while manipulating the rhetorical presidency of another (Harry Truman) by inhibiting its commitment to civil liberties and by pressuring the administration to strengthen its anti-communist sentiments.

To address these questions, primary source material from a variety of archives was examined. This research assessed the behind-the-scenes strategies that accompanied the public discourse of Director Hoover and Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. Such private papers help to offer a broader understanding of the motives and collusions of power that were instrumental to the public campaigns involving Hoover’s FBI. Ronald H. Carpenter suggests that such archival research helps “explain what happened as a prelude to [public] discourse,” and it grounds “probable claims about rhetorical strategies and tactics . . . in more certain evidences,” observes Davis W. Houck. In surveying the archival documents, this project examines correspondence between FBI leadership and Roosevelt and Truman, their attorneys general, and their press secretaries. More specifically, correspondences between the White House, Congress, the FBI, and various Americanist organizations are
examined in conjunction with their more public statements. The project focuses on Hoover’s speeches before Congress and the press, as well as key presidential speeches from Roosevelt, Truman, and their predecessors that contributed to the rhetorical contexts in which Hoover operated. These contexts inform Hoover’s rhetorical selections as well as his meanings.

This study utilizes metaphor and narrative theories to study the rhetoric of Hoover's public campaigns. In the process, the study recognizes discourse as a constitutive force of politics and political ideas, and examines the rhetorical strategies at work in the evolution of political meaning and political change. The study of discourse asks questions about “intent (understood as the rhetor’s motive for speaking or writing in a particular way), or strategy (understood as the match between the rhetor’s intent and the artistry displayed in the speech or message),” observes Martin J. Medhurst. It asks questions about “style (understood more as an aspect of argument than as a literary device; metaphors argue, they do not merely adorn), or argument,” which is understood as “inventional resources.” This discursive view acknowledges that “the ability to use symbols carries with it the power both to build and destroy.” In assuming such a perspective, the study examines the manner in which symbols are deployed by government leaders to help shape the political landscape as it analyzes notions of language, ideology, and power.

Propaganda scholarship also provides a framework for interpreting the FBI’s public campaigns. In his review of rhetorical studies on domestic propaganda, James J. Kimble identifies a “rough consensus” that accepts propaganda as possessing “three contextual characteristics,” including “institutionality”—or, that which “emerges
from an institutional source”—“mass distribution, and multiple iteration.” Kimble couples these features with an observation that the “primary animating force in domestic propaganda” is the portrayal of an “agonistic struggle” that pits an “an internal protagonist” against “an external antagonist” which creates an “antithetical view of the world.” These characteristics prescribe mindsets, norms, and behaviors that venerate national symbols and dehumanize alleged enemies as “some form of a threatening entity.” Kimble concludes that these “two tasks of domestic propaganda” work together to invite national audiences to “become part of the protagonist’s image and simultaneously” invites them to “repudiate the antagonist’s image.” The generative power of such symbolic arrangements compels the use of force in armed conflict because isolationism, neutrality, or appeasement is then considered a betrayal of the hero’s identity.

Presidents, of course, typically possess unmatched power in the political decision making process—power that was enhanced with the rise of the rhetorical presidency. The historical rise of the rhetorical presidency was originally understood as a new doctrine of presidential leadership born in the early twentieth century, and credited to Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Whereas Roosevelt was recognized for manipulating the national press to build public support for his initiatives, Wilson was celebrated for his use of oratory to create and maintain public opinion to pressure Congress into supporting his programs. Speaking directly to voting publics was a move away from the typical nineteenth-century practice of limiting presidential rhetoric to the governmental sphere and commissioning surrogates to campaign on behalf of presidential candidates. Richard J. Ellis
explains that nineteenth-century presidents did not seek or decline the office, and
seldom “went public to mobilize public opinion in the manner we have come to
expect of presidents.”

Scholars disagree about the origins of the rhetorical presidency. Some argue
that the presidency has always been rhetorical, and others suggest that President
William McKinley was a pioneer of this rhetorical move to target the American
people as a strategy of electoral politics and policy promotion. Further, current
scholarship tends to focus on the public messages of presidents and fails to recognize
the role of covert rhetorical practices by presidents and the U.S. media. This trend
simultaneously celebrates the more democratic mode of direct appeal and ignores the
less democratic means of propaganda. Shawn J. Parry-Giles suggests that “America’s
commitment to a government-sponsored propaganda program not surprisingly
parallels the rise of the rhetorical presidency,” both of which, she observes, “are
traceable to the Wilson presidency.” Parry-Giles calls for expanding the traditional
notions of the rhetorical presidency to include covert “discourse controlled by the
executive branch” and disseminated by surrogates. She ultimately concludes that
divorcing “covert messages from the rhetorical presidency is naïve and misreads the
practice of presidential communication in this ‘age of secondary orality.’”

Also lacking in such scholarship is how the rhetorical presidency can be
influenced and/or manipulated by subordinate government officials. Typically
ignored are the behind-the-scenes political wrangling that help produce the public
messages of the country's presidents. Presidents, thus, can be pressured by hostile
congressional leaders and subordinate political officials (like Hoover) into making
public pronouncements that are counter to the president’s own political agenda. Such force carries the potential of wielding presidential authority against itself, as a president may be pressured to build public opinion against his own objectives.

Assumptions of the rhetorical presidency, thus, will help guide the examination of Hoover’s campaigns against crime and the axis powers, which ultimately reinforced Roosevelt’s handling of international relations during a period of heightened idealism and its subsequent decline. Conversely, understandings of the rhetorical presidency will help explore the ways in which Hoover worked publicly and privately to undermine the Truman administration’s handling of foreign affairs in the post-war years. Hoover then pressured the presidency to promulgate more hard-line Americanist policies. The importance of foreign affairs to such domestic policy planning, however, necessitates the expansion of the critical lens beyond the rhetorical presidency to include prevalent paradigms of IR thought. Thus, this study also assumes a post-realist perspective as a means for understanding the U.S. government’s historical and competing commitments to idealism and realism.

**Précis of Chapters**

J. Edgar Hoover launched and sustained a concerted domestic propaganda program that helped enhance his own political power and that adapted the FBI to changing domestic and international matters in a manner that mirrored the transitioning of U.S. foreign policy from idealism to realism. In the process, he promoted idealized conceptions of U.S. citizenship. Hoover grounded his rhetoric of Americanism in the values of Christian fundamentalism, which associated rugged
individualism, militarism, industrial capitalism, religious orthodoxy, and white
supremacy with patriotism. Conversely, Hoover associated the New Deal’s emphasis
on cooperation and progressivism with Un-Americanism, encouraging Americanists
to view New Deal proponents as enemies of democracy.

Hoover entered law enforcement and U.S. politics during the early decades of
the twentieth century—a time of increased use of public campaigns sponsored by the
U.S. government and presidential administrations to alter public opinion on important
policy matters. This period witnessed, for example, the country’s experimentation
with domestic propaganda during World War I. Like Lenin before and Hitler
concurrently, Hoover’s use of metaphor was predicated on a conspiratorial outlook
that constructed the nation’s enemies as vermin, parasites, cancers, and termites to
advance the need for their extermination and the homeland’s purification. Through
his public campaigns, Hoover constructed a reality in which corruption and
subversion were immutable elements of democratic life. Increasingly, Hoover’s
tactics of threat and intimidation began to mimic the tactics of threat practiced by
America’s enemies, moving the country closer to what many at the time conceived of
as a police state. Hoover’s coupling of propaganda and coercive tactics ultimately
helped him to rapidly expand the FBI and undermine his superiors and counterparts in
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.

Hoover’s public campaigns and the language that he employed reveal a long-
term movement to militarize American culture that ultimately helped to normalize the
use of increased totalitarian methods of control during times of international crisis in
particular.
Hoover’s use of domestic propaganda, forms of censorship, and coercion coupled public persuasion campaigns with behind-the-scenes strategizing to associate his political opposition with the alleged enemy from inside and outside of the nation’s borders. He accomplished such ends by establishing a cooperative network between law enforcement and mass communication industries, especially film, radio, and the press. In addition, he developed persuasive strategies for gaining acceptance of a federal law enforcement apparatus that used what many viewed, then as now, as unlawful methods to contain the spread of allegedly corrupt and subversive ideas. And, when necessary, Hoover would resort to censuring those who espoused what he viewed as incendiary ideas. In practice, this meant defining liberals, progressives, and political rivals as gangsters, Nazis, and communists in order to discredit and blacklist them and their ideas in very public ways.

In the process, Hoover mimicked and ultimately usurped the power of the bully pulpit during a period when the importance of propaganda and the role of public persuasion took on heightened importance. He aligned his own leadership of the FBI with President Roosevelt’s and President Truman’s public messages on crime control and domestic security. Hoover’s tactics were supported by Roosevelt and helped equip the presidency with a carefully orchestrated system for discrediting its opposition with accusations of public corruption and treason. While FDR benefited politically from building-up a secret police force that could discredit his administration’s opposition, Truman inherited a seasoned and cunning FBI director eager to use his entrenched power as head of the nation’s top law enforcement agency to expand, co-opt, and exploit the rhetorical presidency during the second Red Scare.
Hoover exploited the rise of political propaganda in WWI and its coupling with the expansiveness of the rhetorical presidency. He seemed to mimic both as he debuted his rhetorical strategies during the War on Crime, which also drew on a Nazi theme of extermination.

The long-term impact of Hoover’s protracted propaganda campaigns can be understood on multiple levels. First, his campaigns contributed to the balancing of realism for idealism as a key undercurrent of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. Hoover used the rhetorical context of the changing IR perspectives to build support for law and order as well as to present the FBI as the foremost cure for domestic crime, subversion, and social protest in the United States. Second, Hoover’s public campaigns built upon the framework established by President Woodrow Wilson for undermining the civil liberties of dissenting groups and extended such practices, at least, until the Nixon presidency. Finally, Hoover’s use of public campaigns and behind-the-scenes coercive actions helped cement his power as the FBI Director until his death in May 1972.

Chapter One first situates Hoover’s directorship within the context of the various statutes and directives that established the Office of the Attorney General at the nation’s founding, the creation of the Department of Justice in the Reconstruction era, and the formation of Bureau of Investigation in Progressive era. Throughout U.S. history, federal law enforcement had been charged with enforcing the boundaries of social protest as well as the nation’s racial composition. The DOJ’s authority to act in such regard emanated from specific pieces of federal legislation. This chapter also emphasizes the advent of public opinion management in law enforcement as an
outgrowth of the movement toward scientific management in the federal government. Following World War I, propaganda would become a key tool utilized by Hoover and the DOJ to instigate Red Scares and to generate support for repressive tactics.

Chapter Two focuses on the formative stages of the FBI’s “propaganda” arm, the Crime Records Division, which was responsible for coordinating the Bureau’s rhetorical strategizing during the New Deal and for the remainder of Hoover’s career. Hoover staffed this office with journalists like Rex Collier and pulp fiction writers like Courtney Ryley Cooper. He also appointed an Assistant Director to administer the public campaign operations during the War on Crime. While American audiences were introduced to media-hyped outlaws, the CRD worked behind-the-scenes to associate Hoover’s opposition inside the DOJ with the high profile criminals that the department pursued. Specifically, the FBI used the vermin metaphor to envision a vast political-criminal conspiracy that maligned Bureau of Prisons Director Sanford Bates and his idealistic vision for criminal rehabilitation. Hoover’s domestic propaganda campaign helped coerce the DOJ to elevate the FBI over the Prison Bureau and to privilege militarism over more rehabilitative means of crime control.

Within this campaign, Hoover mimicked FDR’s rhetorical presidency, in part, by aligning his realist vision with the president’s own discourses on crime control. The CRD framed Hoover’s leadership style during the New Deal in terms of scientific management. In the backdrop of the Great Depression, the value of efficient public administration in the federal government was sometimes elevated above constitutional norms of governing. FDR provided Hoover with a rhetorical model to advance such reasoning. In his May 1934 signing statement for a “Bill to Help the
Federal Government Wage War on Crime and Gangsters,” for example, the president directed the DOJ to develop the necessary “public opinion” to make “gangster extermination” more “effective” and to make the corruption of “public officers” a more serious offense. Hoover used the vermin metaphor and the president’s own language to advance his realist vision over Bates’ more idealistic worldview. The metaphor helped Hoover to interpret and execute the president’s order in a more literal and militant manner, and to align prison reformers with the problem of public corruption. Hoover accented the vermin metaphor with the contagion metaphor. The practice of using notions of disease to inform more commonly used metaphors worked to maintain rhetorical continuity between Hoover’s public campaigns throughout his long career. Ultimately, the War on Crime functioned as Hoover’s first major domestic propaganda program that he would subsequently remodel and perfect as the United States became embroiled in what would become the country’s battle against fascism during the Second World War and against communism in the Cold War.

Chapter Three focuses on Hoover’s increased militarization of the FBI during World War II. His domestic propaganda campaign during this war experienced drastic reformation. Hoover largely abandoned the War on Crime’s theme of scientific administration, and adopted, instead, a religious emphasis. Specifically, he used the metaphor of Americanism to re-envision the nation’s religious landscape by traversing the boundary between civil religion and the Judeo-Christian tradition. Hoover divided conservative members of Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism against their liberal counterparts, constructing the former as “American” and the latter
as “un-American.” His strategizing largely replicated the divisions that emerged in American Protestantism during the 1920s between Fundamentalists and Modernists. Hoover revived a culture war that was first waged by Christian Fundamentalists to pursue control of America’s public and private institutions, as well as to more narrowly define the meaning of Christianity. Hoover helped to resuscitate and redirect the conflict so that it would then be fought over the meaning of U.S. citizenship. Ultimately, Hoover’s wartime domestic propaganda campaign helped place pressure on the executive branch to identify Roosevelt’s supporters among the many groups that constituted the Fifth Column threat.

The CRD, once again, mimicked Roosevelt’s rhetorical presidency to neutralize the president’s anti-interventionist opposition and, more importantly, Hoover’s political rivals. FDR proclaimed in July 1940 that “national unity” was “essential” for the “preservation of democratic rights” and represented the “test” of “Americanism.” Such cohesion was allegedly necessary for combating the enemies within America’s borders, which he labeled the “Fifth Columns.” The president used the ambiguity of this metaphor to conflate his foreign policy critics with Nazis. Hoover’s wartime domestic propaganda campaign replicated the president’s juxtaposition between Americanism and the Fifth Column, but did so in a manner that encouraged more conservative—and anti-New Deal—meanings of American unity. Hoover wrote in an August 1940 issue of the Los Angeles Times, for example, that “America’s machinery for defeating the Fifth Column within our gates” required the mobilization of “Americans to fight for Americanism.” Such combat required a “marshaling of patriotic spirit directed toward the single goal of repelling every force
inimical to the welfare of the land” and the “industries” that “supply” the “materials of national defense.” Hoover’s plan to protect industry, however, aligned labor, civil rights, and civil liberties organizations, as well as their liberal Christian and Jewish supporters, with Nazi and Soviet espionage networks. In this manner, Hoover used the president’s own linguistic framework to discredit key constituencies of the New Deal. Hoover elaborated upon the Fifth Column metaphor with contagion metaphors, and presented the FBI as a bulwark to prevent the spread of subversive peoples and ideas (i.e., New Dealers and idealism) inside the nation’s borders.

Chapter Four examines Hoover’s more overt movement away from serving the presidency to aiding the administration’s political opposition in the legislative branch during the early years of the Cold War. While Hoover continued to militarize the FBI, and further develop a program for organized thought control, he formalized the FBI’s domestic propaganda strategizing with a campaign to associate New Deal policies and ideals with clandestine Soviet operations in America. This plan, ultimately, discredited labor organizers, civil rights activists, and civil liberties proponents by helping to instigate the second Red Scare. The hysteria began in 1947 and provided the dominant rhetorical context of Truman’s presidency. The scare pressed the executive branch to intermix its foreign and domestic policy planning to resist communism. This kept public life militarized in peacetime. The FBI conflated the presence of reformers in government, religion, the media, and higher education with a wide-scale Russian conspiracy to overthrow the federal government with revolutionary force and violence. Hoover worked behind the scenes with members of the legislative branch to use such heightened concerns over Soviet intrigue to pressure
President Truman into establishing his loyalty program. This infrastructure was then used to censure liberals, blacklist them from public employment, and promote his Americanist worldview in the federal government.

Hoover’s rhetorical framing of this era was marked by the Red Fascism analogy. Four months after he first used the analogy in a September 1946 speech to the American Legion, the New York Times reported on the circulation of a “Munich analogy.” According to the Times, this analogy reasoned that the “only way to tame Hitler was by rearmament and collective security. The Second World War was not averted by appeasement but merely prolonged. Russia, like Nazi Germany, [was] a totalitarian state.” Therefore, the “lesson of Munich” should be learned and a “collective security system” should be established to curb Joseph Stalin’s expansionism. The president adopted such reasoning after he delivered the Truman Doctrine address in March 1947. Hoover first helped the president to arrive at this international perspective, and then used this rhetorical context to suggest that America’s internal security was again threatened by traitors who actively coordinated with external military forces. Hoover used notions of communist Fifth Columns to exploit the rhetorical presidency in the area of domestic security. As Truman drew analogies between communism and fascism, he further empowered Hoover’s worldview and the solutions that it encouraged.

The FBI director established rhetorical continuity between the vermin, Fifth Column, and Red Fascism campaigns through his perennial use of contagion metaphors to illustrate the national and international menaces that the FBI policed. Though Truman sought to downsize the FBI, the never-ending and rhetorically
interconnected threats envisioned by Hoover adapted the FBI to a post-war rhetorical context that was in many ways encouraged by Hoover’s propaganda strategizing and which limited Truman’s ability to constrain his FBI director.

In the process, Hoover mimicked many of the rhetorical strategies and police power tactics of the Nazis and the communists not only for the Red Fascism campaign, but also the previous Fifth Column movement as well. With the commencement of WWII, Hoover’s propaganda strategies took on more of an appearance of the Nazi propaganda machine as he worked to militarize the FBI. The metaphors he used reflected such militarization in the wartime and post-war eras. Hoover denounced the enemy (Nazis and communists) through metaphors that delegitimized them. Simultaneously, he also mimicked their totalitarian rhetorical strategizing and use of police power tactics. These strategies emboldened the FBI and Hoover’s own political power. Obviously, he didn’t exterminate large groups of people or engage in widespread genocide. But, he did practice other coercive acts that were justified through a rhetoric of crisis that relied on militarized metaphors targeting American citizens. In so doing, he reconstituted notions of Americanism and helped reconstitute U.S. foreign policy according to his own realist vision. This study, therefore, examines the rhetorical and coercive means of Hoover’s domestic propaganda programs that were bolstered by one American president in ways that undercut the bully pulpit of another.

Overall, this project aims to deepen our understanding of the rhetorical strategies exercised by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover as he helped expand the power of the FBI during a period of significant transition in U.S. foreign policy thought and
during a period of heightened advancements in public opinion management. In the process, Hoover's FBI intervened into presidential politics, facilitating and manipulating the power of the rhetorical presidency. *Time* magazine anonymously suggested after Hoover’s death that “the fact” that Hoover “could acquire and keep that kind of power raises disturbing questions not merely about the role of a national police in a democracy, but also about the political system that tolerated him for so long.”¹⁵⁹ This study grapples with such complexities of this powerful figure’s public campaigns and the influential role that the FBI came to serve within domestic and international politics.
Notes


3 Clifford R. Durr praised Alan Barth for coining the term “Americanists” in March of 1951. Durr paraphrased this term as meaning the “American variety” of “Fascists” and “Communists.” Both groups were totalitarian and relied upon forceful police power tactics. In popular usage, the term connoted American fascism and not American communism (aside for its coerciveness). Countersubversive anti-communists like J. Edgar Hoover, Richard M. Nixon, and Joseph R. McCarthy described themselves as belonging to a group that they labeled “American,” and demarcated the boundaries of this group with the tag of “un-American.” This language strategy suggested that other perspectives were unpatriotic, disloyal, and subversive. Because the label “American” conflates the group with the nation writ large, the term “Americanist” is used in this project for clarity. Clifford R. Durr, “The ‘Americanists,” *The New Republic*, March 12, 1951: 18; M.J. Heale, *McCarthy’s Americans* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), xi; Lawrence N. Strout, *Covering McCarthyism* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 1; Joel Kovel, *Red Hunting in the Promised Land: Anticommunism and the Making of America* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 113.


6 Tom Wicker, “Nobody Dares to Pick His Successor,” Life, April 9, 1971: 45.

7 Harold D. Smith diary entry, May 4, 1945, page 2, Box 4, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

8 The Bureau of Investigation was founded in 1908 and became the Division of Investigation in 1933; it was renamed Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1935.


The Crime Bill included the following legislation passed in 1934, and was extended by the following legislation passed in 1935 and 1936. This list comes from: Recent Federal Crime Bills, *FBI and Hoover Reference Materials: (Publications)*, 1925-1972, Record Group 65, Entry 51: A1, Box 14, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park (hereafter cited as NARA—CP). *An Act to Provide Punishment for Killing or Assaulting Federal Officers*, Public Law 230, 73d Cong., 2d sess., May 18, 1934; *An Act Applying the Powers of the Federal Government, Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, to Extortion by Means of Telephone, Telegraph, Radio, Oral Message, or Otherwise*, Public Law 231, 73d Cong., 2d sess., May 18, 1934; *An Act to Amend the Act Forbidding the Transportation of Kidnapped Persons in Interstate Commerce*, Public Law 232, 73d Cong., 2d sess., May 18, 1934; *An Act Making it Unlawful for Any Person to Flee from One State to Another for the Purpose of Avoiding Prosecution or the Giving of Testimony in Certain Cases*, Public Law 233, 73d Cong., 2d sess., May 18, 1934; *An Act to Define Certain Crimes Against the United States in Connection with the Administration of the Federal Penal and Correctional Institution and to Fix the Punishment Therefore*, Public Law 234, 73d Cong., 2d sess., May 18, 1934; *An Act to Provide for Certain Offenses Committed Against Banks Organized or Operating Under Laws of the United States or Any Member of the Federal Reserve System*, Public Law 235, 73d Cong., 2d sess., May 18, 1934; *An Act to Extend the Provisions of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act to Other Stolen Property*, Public Law 246, 73d Cong, 2d sess., May 22, 1934; *An Act to Authorize an Appropriation for Money to Facilitate the Apprehension of Certain Persons Charged with Crime*, Public Law 295, 73d Cong, 2d sess., June 6,
The Federal Bureau of Investigation was originally created as a “Special Force” under the DOJ in 1908. It was formalized into the Bureau of Investigation (BI) in 1909. The BI and other Justice Department Agencies were consolidated into the Division of Investigation (DI) on July 1, 1933. The DI was renamed Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on July 1, 1935.


Confidential Memorandum, August 24, 1936, *J. Edgar Hoover’s Official and Confidential Files*, Record Group 65, Entry 14: UD-05D, File# 136, Box 22, NARA—CP.


Presidential Directive, June 26, 1939, Record Group 65, Entry 14: UD-05D, File# 60, Box 15, NARA—CP.

Concurrently, the Bureau’s expanded jurisdiction suspiciously overlooked the growth of the American mafia. The FBI was so adverse to investigating organized crime that its official position until November of 1957 was that the American mafia
did not exist. Moving against organized crime was certainly aligned with the
Bureau’s mission, but the FBI did not begin to target such activities until its
jurisdiction was challenged by the Senate Rackets Commission. A number of reasons
have been offered for the FBI’s reluctance, including: fear of undercover agents being
corrupted, political volatility when powerful politicians or their constituents were
implicated with criminal activity, and collusion between FBI leadership and crime
bosses. Sanford J. Ungar, *FBI: An Uncensored Look Behind the Walls* (Boston: Little,
Thirty Years in Hoover’s FBI* (New York, W.W. Norton and Company, 1979), 117;
Richard Gid Power, *Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover* (New York:
Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, (New York: Basicbooks, 1989), 107-108, 182;
James Q. Wilson, *The Investigators: Managing FBI and Narcotics Agents* (New
the FBI* (New York, St. Martin’s Paperbacks, 2003), 132; Burton Hersh, *Bobby and J.
Edgar* (New York, Carroll and Graf, 2007), 42-49; Ovid Demaris, *The Director: An
231-232; Hank Messick, *John Edgar Hoover : An Inquiry into the Life and Times of
John Edgar Hoover, and his Relationship to the Continuing Partnership of Crime,
22 J. Edgar Hoover to Francis Biddle, December 22, 1941, Record Group 65, Entry 38-B: A1, Box 16, File# 64-HQ-4104, Section 2; Serials 51-146X1, NARA—CP.

23 Powers, Secrecy and Power, 251-257.

24 William P. Carney, “Madris Rounds Up Suspected Rebels; 2,000 Are Seized in Homes as Result of Mola's Boast of Aid From Within the Capital,” The New York Times, October 17, 1936: 2; “Premier Commands All Madrid Forces; 'Commissioner for War' Named to Control and Harmonize Militia and Army; Gas Service is Shut Off; City Is Also Without Water at Night -- Capital Prepares Grimly for Ordeal,” The New York Times, October 17, 1936: 9; Edward L. Bernays, Fighting the Fifth Column in the Americas (Charlottesville, Virginia: Institute of Public Affairs, 1940), 4.

25 Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, Public Law 603, 75th Cong., 3d sess., June 8, 1938. FARA required foreign agents acting in a political capacity to publicly disclose their official duties and purpose for entering the United States. The FBI was charged with investigating such representatives, which included gathering intelligence on their activities in the United States and abroad. It was amended in 1942 to require the disclosure and registration of persons or organizations operating on behalf of a “foreign principal.” FARA thus expanded the bureau’s focus beyond American borders. Similarly, the Voohis Act of 1940 mandated the registration of organizations conducting “civilian military activity” to “overthrow the government of the United States” that were “subject to foreign control” by “an international political organization.” Anti-Propaganda Act of 1940 (Voohis Act), Public Law 870, 76th

26 *Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities of 1939* (Hatch Act), Public Law 252, 76th Cong., 1st sess, August 2, 1939, 1148.


J. Edgar Hoover, “Problems in Modern Law Enforcement,” April 14, 1937 (Penn Athletic Club), Record Group 65, Entry 51: A1, Box 6, page 3, NARA—CP.


51 “Internal Security Index, 1930-1979,” Record Group 60, Entry 1011, A1, NARA—CP; Scholars commonly refer to it as simply the “Security Index.” Frank J.


Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).


63 On April 13, 1917, President Wilson signed Executive Order 2594, which established the CPI based on the exact recommendations of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. The Committee was “charged with encouraging and then consolidating the revolution of opinion which changed the United States from anti-militaristic democracy to an organized war machine.” James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, *Words that Won the War* (Princeton University Press, 1939), 51, 14.


65 Ibid., 28.


69 Olasky, *Corporate Public Relations*, 81.


The internationalist coalition included the World Peace Foundation, the Foreign Policy Association, the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, the Council on
Foreign Relations, the League of Nations Non-Partisan Foundation, and the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace (which Alger Hiss would preside over from 1946 
to 1949), the Church Peace Union, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ, the 
National Council for the Prevention of War, the American Branch of the Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom (which was headed by Jane Addams), 
the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation, the War Resisters League, the Committee on Militarism in Education, 
the Parliament of Peace and Universal Brotherhood, the Peace Heroes Memorial 
Society, and the Women’s Peace Association.

84 William C. Olson and A.J.R. Groom, International Relations Then and Now 
(London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991), 70, 62; For example, see Philip Marshal 
Brown, International Society: Its Nature and Interests (New York: Macmillan, 1923); 
Kenneth Colegrove, Militarism in Japan (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1936); G. 
Lowes Dickinson, Causes of International War (New York, Garland, 1972, originally 
published 1920); London Frederick S. Dunn, Peaceful Change: A Study of 
International Procedures (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1937); Charles 
G. Fenwick, Cases on International Law (Chicago: Callghan and Company, 1935); 
James Garner, American Foreign Policies: An Examination and Evaluation of 
Certain Traditional and Recent International Policies of the United States (New 
York: New York University Press, 1928); Amos Hershey, The Essentials of 
International Public Law and Organization (New York: Macmillan, 1927); Charles 
P. Howland, Survey of American Foreign Relations 1928-1931: Published for the 
Council on Foreign Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931); Charles


89 The Pact of Paris is also known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact.


94 Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939*, 47.


97 Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939*, 56, 94.


Idealism also reconceptualized notions of political crime as non-criminal acts. Political realist John Herz explained, for example, that it demanded “the abolition of punishment” for political offenders who were “motivated by idealistic reasons and whom no penalty could ‘reform.’” This satisfied the “desires of oppressed groups in their fight against those in power” as idealism rejected the idea of realizing the “values and desirabilities” for one group at the expense of another. In short, idealism understood prison as a means to reform the criminal, and viewed oppositional ideology and its corresponding activities as removed from the criminal justice system. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, 162, 37, 32.

Taylor, “Utopianism,” 94.


The study of international relations as a twentieth-century academic discipline is often divided between idealist and realist paradigms. Roger Spegele explains that IR embraces a “deep commitment to a monistic metaphysics to the effect that there is one world and only one conception of it that can be true.” This belief in a single world has pushed the discipline to value consensus, which has manifested a “sort of ‘acceptance-rejection’ personality, embracing and rejecting paradigms with more or less equal degrees of ardent,” observes Robert M. A. Crawford. However, foundational assumptions regarding the international environment also transcend the paradigms. Such modes of thought are significant for their influence of national political culture. Roger Spegele, *Political Realism in International Theory* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 49; Crawford, *Idealism and Realism in International Relations*, 6.


110 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 11, 13, 14.


112 Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 9.


114 Paterson, Meeting the Communist Threat, 115.


Realism was state-centered, which influenced the formulation and implementation of domestic policy. Realism located power in government institutions. This valued the state ahead of the individual, and order before notions of justice. The alignment of state power with order, then, made domestic social control a matter of international relations. Order was conceptualized as a means of sustaining harmony rather than as an act of coercion.

Church Committee, *Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, Book 3, 968-69.


135 Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, 166-167.


137 Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, 163.


Clifford R. Durr praised Alan Barth for coining the term “Americanists” in March of 1951. Durr paraphrased this term as meaning the “American variety” of “Fascists” and “Communists.” Both groups were totalitarian and relied upon forceful police power tactics. In popular usage, the term connoted American fascism and not American communism (aside for its coerciveness). Countersubversive anti-communists like J. Edgar Hoover, Richard M. Nixon, and Joseph R. McCarthy described themselves as belonging to a group that they labeled “American,” and demarcated the boundaries of this group with the tag of “un-American.” This language strategy suggested that other perspectives were unpatriotic, disloyal, and subversive. Because the label “American” conflates the group with the nation writ large, the term “Americanist” is used in this project for clarity.

Metaphor is a rhetorical function in which a tenor from a topic of discussion is paired with a vehicle from a different class of experience to draw a comparison between persons, places, and things. The narrative form is marked by conflict between protagonists and antagonists, setting, plot, and theme. Thomas R. Burkholder and David Henry, “Criticism of Metaphor,” in *Rhetorical Criticism*, edited by Jim A. Kuypers (Lantham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), 98; Robert Rowland, “The Narrative Perspective,” in ibid., 120.

Constitutive rhetoric is defined here as “the stock of fundamental political concepts that shapes [a] culture’s understanding of political existence.” James Jasinsky, “A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography,” in *Doing Rhetorical History: Concepts and Cases*, 75.


Chapter 1: The Evolution of Justice

The Pan-American Exposition was hosted by Buffalo, New York in September 1901. Eric Rauchway observes that the Expo “paid tribute to the international reach of American power” following the annexations of Cuba, Guam, and the Philippines during the Spanish-American War (1898). President William McKinley was among its many visitors and he used the event to champion his administration’s expansion of the Monroe Doctrine. Because “modern inventions ha[d] brought into close relation widely separated peoples and made them better acquainted,” he proclaimed, “isolation [was] no longer possible or desirable.” The president suggested that “geographic and political divisions [would] continue to exist,” however, he also pointed out that the “world’s products” were then being “exchanged” quicker than ever before. McKinley further observed that the advent of “rapid transit” and “telegraphy” strengthened America’s military. Accordingly, this made “the expansion” of America’s “trade and commerce” a more “pressing problem” than staying out of foreign entanglements. Scientific advancement was changing U.S. political culture and was adapting public life to international capitalism. McKinley’s statement, however, represented the final words of his public career.

The president addressed a general audience of visitors to the Expo from near and far. H. Wayne Morgan describes his venue as “flag draped platform” from which McKinley spoke on a Tuesday afternoon “for perhaps the most important speech of his career.” A natural born American named Leon Czolgosz was among his listeners, and he stood only a few feet away with a .32 caliber revolver. Unbeknownst to
McKinley or the Secret Service agents guarding him, an assassin was stalking the president. In the crowd, Czolgosz was pushed around by a current of bodies which obstructed his ability to aim. The next day, however, there would be no such obstacle.

The president was scheduled to appear at the Exposition’s Temple of Music on September 6th around 4:00 p.m. to greet visitors in a receiving line. Czolgosz used this moment to commit America’s third presidential assassination. He lined up outside of the Temple a few hours before the president’s arrival to ensure his opportunity to approach McKinley. Having concealed his pistol under a bandage wrapped around his right hand, he neared the president fifteen minutes after doors opened. When McKinley greeted the assassin, Czolgosz shot his victim twice in the torso from a distance of two feet. The killer was immediately tackled by a U.S. Coast Artilleryman, who was soon assisted by Secret Service agents. Though doctors were initially optimistic about the president’s recovery, he died eight days later from a gangrene infection.

The assassin’s motive was possibly more troubling to the nation than the murder itself. In a jail-cell confession hours after the shooting, Czolgosz calmly claimed to be carrying out his duty. He described himself as an enthusiastic anarchist, inspired by the writings and lectures of Emma Goldman. The New York Times reported that she influenced him “to decide that the present form of government in this country was all wrong, and he thought the best way to end it was by the killing of the President.” Goldman had argued that while the “rich increase their wealth year by year, battering on the toil of the people by an organized system of wholesale theft, blood-shed, and robbery,” the “great mass of the people [was]
sinking year by year, lower and lower into poverty and distress." She concluded, therefore, that the government and capitalist orders should be dissolved by force and violence to better perfect society.  

Goldman’s incendiary rhetoric was perceived as alien to the United States, brought over from the old world. Her audience predominantly included eastern European immigrants who filled urban centers in record numbers. They worked under harsh industrial conditions for meager wages, and were blamed for importing subversive ideologies that sought change in the class structure. Frightening to many of their natural born counterparts, these newly naturalized citizens joined political parties and labor unions. The majority of their agitation was protected by the U.S. Constitution, which further helped them to challenge the American ideal of private property.

Although Anarchism and its commitment to violence were not new to the nation, never before had its members engaged in such a high-profile crime in the United States. The shooting of McKinley was similar to the assassinations of a Spanish prime minister, a French president, a Hapsburg empress, and an Italian King by anarchists in the previous ten years. While the American president led the nation away from its nineteenth century commitments to isolationism, his death illustrated the dangers of internationalism and the radical forms of citizenship that it engendered.

Though most of the country discussed the assassination as a tragedy, many radicals publicly celebrated the terrorist act. Anarchist groups denied knowing the assassin, but commended his deed. In the aftermath of the presidential assassination,
news stories circulated in the press of anarchists “rejoicing” with “happiness” and wishing Czolgosz a “long life and more power.” Anarchists gathered in public meeting places, where speeches celebrating the shooting were delivered in German to the cheers of immigrant audiences. Such news left some to question the government’s resolve in protecting the nation.

Existing federal law was seen by many as too weak to deal with the new international challenges facing America. The Department of Justice (DOJ) lacked an investigative force and the assassination of public officials was beyond any federal jurisdiction. Minutes before the state of New York executed Czolgosz in October 1901, the Times quoted him as saying “I killed the President because he was an enemy of the good people—of the working people . . . I am not sorry for my crime.” Czolgosz’s murder of President McKinley and the federal government’s failure to sufficiently respond to it alarmed many Americans who supported industrial-capitalism and the broader economic order that it established. The government’s law enforcement and judicial powers, they suggested, would need further expansion in order to control what President Theodore Roosevelt dubbed “undesirable citizens.”

From America’s beginning, the idea of hostile outsiders plotting a bloody revolt against U.S. institutions was imbedded in the nation’s political thought. This fear invited enhanced measures of control that ensured greater stability. The rise of American radicalism included the use of force to obtain its objectives. Its campaigns more often targeted property, and its members often included native-born citizens. Their stories were included, among others, in the labor movement, which pitted
workers against industrialists and government. Labor’s momentum was often curbed by new federal policies that were advanced by industrialists and attorneys general. Federal law enforcement officials and business leaders often used propaganda to perpetuate the idea that union activity represented an insurgent conspiracy. The institutions, ideologies, and strategizing that created such dynamics are examined below.

This chapter outlines the expansion of federal law enforcement. It first examines the Office of the Attorney General (OAG, 1789-1870), tracing its development from an institutionally limited and part-time office to a role in preserving the union during the Civil War. The second phase of federal law enforcement (1870-1908) is marked by the establishment of the DOJ. The Department represented an extension of the president’s institutional authority and an apparatus for securing his constituencies’ interests. The final period under review (1908-1933) studies the rise of the Bureau of Investigation (BI) and the entrance of J. Edgar Hoover into law enforcement. He gained experience in propaganda as a means of control during the Great War, which would assist his leadership of the Bureau once he became director in 1924. Hoover’s arrival in the DOJ is then situated in the historical backdrop of a fundamentalist-modernist culture war that informed the ideologies of the federal government. Relying on the principles of scientific management to demonstrate his professionalism, Hoover mastered techniques of self-promotion that would enhance his own stature as well as the reputation of the FBI.
The Expansion of Federal Law Enforcement

The succession of presidential administrations brought with them the issuance of new executive orders, directives, and legislation expanding the DOJ, its jurisdiction, and consequently, its annual appropriations. Though the OAG did not begin its rapid expansion until after the Civil War, precedent for dealing with immigrant dissent was established during the earliest years of the republic. The growth of American federal law enforcement occurred in spurts. Control was exercised when internal pressures destabilized the political and economic order. Definitions of citizenship were often at the center of such forays. Leaders of religion, industry, and government vehemently defended the status quo to promote the interests of their constituencies, while marginalized members vocalized dissent to expand the political and economic franchises. Of course, the issue of control represented a tool of partisanship and xenophobia at times, rather than a reaction to political activism.

Federal law enforcement power was rooted in the nation’s founding documents. The U.S. Constitution charged the president to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” Accordingly, the Judiciary Act of 1789 called for an “attorney-general” to “prosecute” suits and “give his advice and opinion upon questions of the law when required” by the “President” or “by the heads of any of the departments, touching any matters that may concern their departments.” According to the DOJ, the attorney general’s duties and powers “were few and vaguely defined and reflected the legislators’ concern lest the office become a center of federal power that would infringe upon the prerogatives of the state.” Congress intended a “legal counselor for the government—an official to interpret and expound the law—than of an official
whose long arm would reach out to punish those who transgressed the law.”

Cornell W. Clayton observes that the office’s “conventional inclusion in the cabinet institutionalized its role as a political advisor.”

Nevertheless, the prosecution of federal crimes became a function of the presidency and the broader executive branch, which quickly became embroiled in controversy.

President George Washington warned against the divisive influence of political parties in his 1796 Farewell Address. Such division was evident in shouts of treason just two years later. On the verge of war with revolutionary France, the empowered Federalist Party passed legislation in the name of security, but often used the acts to help obstruct Democratic-Republicans. According to John C. Miller, Federalists accused Republicans of conspiring with the French Executive Directory to overthrow the republic. The “purpose of the opposition party was made to appear to be the advancement not of American interests but of those of France; it became axiomatic that no Republican could be a true American.”

This particular conspiratorial vision of traitors coordinating with external military forces foreshadowed similar spy scares during the world wars.

Government leaders attempted to maintain power by wielding authority against their opposition. Because French and Irish immigrants were drawn to the Republican Party, Federalists delayed the naturalization process to prevent enfranchisement. Furthermore, the Department of State was given authority to fine, imprison, and deport those who expressed dissent through the Alien and Sedition Acts. The Alien Friends Act (1798) authorized the president to deport resident aliens considered “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States” or for
being involved in “any treasonable or secret machinations against the government.”

The Alien Enemies Act (1798) authorized him to apprehend and deport resident aliens if their home countries were at war with the United States. Lastly, the Sedition Act (1798) criminalized “writing, printing, uttering or publishing any false, scandalous and malicious” statements against “the government” or to bring officials “into contempt or disrepute.” There is no record of enforcement for the Alien Acts. Miller notes, however, that the Sedition Act was used by Federalists to arrest “approximately twenty-five well known Republicans . . . Fifteen of these arrests led to indictments. Ten cases went to trial, all resulting in convictions.” Although most of this legislation expired or was repealed by 1802, the Alien Enemies Act became permanent law.

The first half of the nineteenth century was relatively quiet for the attorney general, mainly because of institutional design. Clayton explains that the position earned less than half of that which was “received by heads of the executive departments.” The post was conceived of as a “part-time position” and the “low pay was interpreted as authorization for the occupant to maintain private practice.” The attorney general was expected to “pay his own rent, buy his own stamps and stationary, and furnish his own heat and light,” observes Luther A. Huston, Arthur Selwyn Miller, Samuel Krislov, and Robert G. Dixon. The DOJ further notes that the Judiciary Act “perpetuated the colonial system of county attorneys and deputy attorneys general.” This meant “the real law enforcement power rested in lesser officials whom the attorney general, in theory the government’s top lawyer, had virtually no control” over.
The office witnessed its first expansion under the leadership of Attorney General William Wirt, who remarkably held the post throughout the presidencies of James Monroe and John Quincy Adams (1817-1829). According to Huston et al., Congress only “reluctantly agreed” to provide Wirt in 1819 with “office space (in the Treasury Department), a $1,000-a-year clerk and a contingent fund of $500 a year to pay for stationery, stamps, fuel and a ‘boy to attend to menial duties.’” This marked the beginning of an expansion that would continue indefinitely.

President Andrew Jackson would soon begin negotiations on what would become the Department of Justice. In his First Annual Message of December 1829, he recommended to Congress that the “superintendence and management of legal proceedings” be “transferred” from the Treasury Department to the “Attorney-General.” The president suggested that “this officer be placed on the same footing in all respects as the heads of the other Departments, receiving like compensation and having such subordinate officers provided for his Department as may be requisite for the discharge of these additional duties.” Senator Daniel Webster (Anti-Jacksonian Party-MA)—a member of the Judiciary Committee—however, reflected “earlier fears of a strong law enforcement agency” and he created instead a “solicitor of the Treasury who would advise with the Attorney General, but who would instruct the district attorneys, marshals, and clerks of the lower courts in all matters,” explains the DOJ. In 1831, Congress did increase the attorney general’s salary, and appropriated funds for his own office and for law books.

Attorney General Caleb Cushing (1853-1857) was responsible for the office’s next major expansion. According to Clayton, Cushing “was the most outstanding
member of President Franklin Pierce’s cabinet. He transformed the Attorney General’s office into a full-time position, and he condemned any admixture of public office and private practice.” The attorney general “increased the office’s political power and linked it more firmly to the President’s administration.” He took responsibility for “advising the President on pardons” and judicial nominations were “transferred from the State Department. The Interior Department surrendered the duty of handling accounts for the federal courts. Routine legal correspondence, formerly handled by lawyers scattered throughout the executive departments, became centralized in the Attorney General’s office.” This expansion was further accelerated by the Civil War.

*Combating Southern Radicalism*

Attorney General Edward Bates (1861-1864) played a key role in preserving the union. President Abraham Lincoln asked him to find legal justifications for wartime policies. Bates defended the president’s suspension of habeas corpus without congressional authorization through a “curious opinion.” According to Clayton, the attorney general argued that the president could suspend the writ “by refusing to release those held for rebellious acts.” In other words, the president could not prevent the Supreme Court from ordering the release of untried prisoners, but the “executive could lawfully refuse to obey.” This maneuver marked a new reach of executive authority.

The post-war years witnessed a rapid expansion of federal law enforcement. The passage of constitutional amendments following the Civil War represented competition between federal authority and states’ rights. The Thirteenth Amendment
made “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” illegal, the Fourteenth Amendment made former male slaves full citizens of the United States, and the Fifteenth Amendment forbade federal, state, and local government from restricting the right to vote for reasons of “race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” In response to this assertion of federal power, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) organized a campaign of terror against freed blacks and others who sought to change the South. Radical Republicans in Congress countered with the Enforcement Act (1870) to provide punishment for those who would obstruct the right to vote. Thus began a political and controversial tradition that justified the use of force by federal agents to protect the rights of specified citizen groups from violent extremists. Though this perspective was formulated by Radical Republicans to control white-supremacists, it would soon become one of the most powerful tools wielded by racial elites and other power brokers who sought to control various minority groups. For the Reconstruction era (1865–1877), however, federal law enforcement would remain an instrument of liberal reform.

Rebuilding the union and expanding the franchise was a huge endeavor. Attorney General Homer S. Cummings and Special Assistant to the Attorney General Carl McFarland observed in Federal Justice: Chapters in the History of Justice and the Federal Executive (1937) that the Civil War brought “political, economic, and social change” to the government and country. In a move to improve efficiency and decrease cost in the federal government, the Department of Justice Act was passed on June 22, 1870, to better coordinate a backlog of “legal business.” Cummings and McFarland noted that the Act required the attorney general and “his assistants to
render all services requiring the skills of persons learned in the law necessary to enable the President, departments, and bureaus to discharge their respective duties.” As head of the DOJ, the attorney general was given supervision over the “district attorneys and all other law officers in the government.” Among many other duties, the Justice Department then oversaw criminal law and civil regulations, immigration and naturalization, and “the enforcement and protection of the rights and property of the United States.” Also, the attorney general was to report annually to Congress on the affairs of the Department, which constitutionally connected the officer to all three branches of government.

Combating southern radicals in the Klan became the Justice Department’s first major campaign. The Ku Klux Act (1871) amended the Enforcement Act. According to Cummings and McFarland, the act “created civil and criminal liability for violence against individuals. It authorized the President both to employ the army and navy for the suppression of disturbances and to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.” Two months later, Congress appropriated funds to the DOJ for the “detection and prosecution of crimes against the United States.” Instead of creating its own investigative division, however, the attorney general began the practice of outsourcing detective work to Secret Service agents borrowed from the Treasury Department and contracted from the Pinkerton Detective Agency. These investigators were used to infiltrate and prosecute the Klan. The ideological perspectives advanced by Radical Republicans called the DOJ into existence and equipped it with enforcement power. Their departure from government and
replacement by Republican industrialists, however, refocused the institution’s ideological mission.

The attorneys general grew disinterested with Reconstruction along with many other government leaders by the mid 1870s. The DOJ was compromised by partisan politics as Republicans then used the Department in various ways to win elections. 55 Perhaps even more damaging to Reconstruction was a series of Supreme Court rulings that weakened the power of the Enforcement Acts. In U.S. v. Reese (1875), the Court held that the sections of the Enforcement Act of 1870, which protected voting rights, were worded too broadly to be constitutional. 56 This ruling would make future disenfranchisement possible with the advent of literacy, character, and other forms of citizenship tests. In U.S. v. Cruikshank (1875), the Court decided the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution pertained to government restrictions and did not protect citizens from repressive actions committed by individuals; thus they could not be used to prosecute the Klan. 57 Southern Democrats used this ruling to create further voting restrictions at the state level. Cummings and McFarland observed that “the colored race did not lose everything sought for it by the federal government. The theoretical right of suffrage remained, even though limited by extra-legal techniques in each locality; and the right to serve on juries was enforced in some cases.” 58 As the DOJ slowed its pursuit of the Klan in the South, it located a new breed of radicals to pursue in northern cities.

Combating Labor Radicalism

Beyond the social disruption associated with Reconstruction, a series of economic depressions and red scares began in the 1870s, which pitted labor against
management in industrial settings. Immigrants were hardest hit, forced to endure “degradation and misery” in the “slums,” observes John Higham, while the “upper classes” continued to enjoy opulent lifestyles. After the Paris Commune of 1871, red scares emerged every decade in the United States until the 1920s. These scares paralleled times of economic crisis, during which Marxist parties and unions first emerged and then subsequently flourished. They organized immigrants and laborers to make demands on government regulators and property owners. These anarchists, communists, nihilists, and socialists sometimes operated by legal means, but they also lobbied with illegal strikes, sabotage, force, and violence. Though management killed and maimed to a far greater degree than did labor activists, the government’s response consistently favored industrialists. This was, in part, because of conflicting interests. A number of attorneys general were employed by industry following their full-time stints in public office in the post-Reconstruction era. Attorney General Richard Olney (1893-1895) went the furthest in disregarding perceptions of impropriety. He served President Grover Cleveland while under retainer by the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad Company. This raised concerns about his impartiality. The power of the attorney general was vastly expanded by federal legislation in this time, mostly for the purpose of centralizing power in the hands of industry.

The government attempted to control labor unrest by regulating immigration, passing legislation that outlawed unions as illegal organizations, and treating strikes as illegal forms of assembly. M.J. Heale explains that “acts of collective resistance by workers were almost routinely condemned as forms of insurrection . . . [and as]
assaults on the law, private property, and social order. Because the unskilled workforce was dominated by immigrants, issues of labor radicalism and immigration were treated almost synonymously; the U.S. government passed legislation aimed at calming labor agitation by keeping immigrants out.

The earliest labor legislation was marked by xenophobia and conceived of immigrants as the cause of labor’s unrest. Cummings and McFarland observed that after Chinese laborers “toiled at building railroads” and “performed other menial labor at low rates of pay,” their “effective competition in the labor market brought upon them the hostility of white laborers.” In 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act suspended “the coming of Chinese laborers” for ten years in an attempt to keep wages for white laborers up. Similarly, the Immigration Act of 1882 excluded any “convict, lunatic, idiot, or any other person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge” from naturalization. Robert Justin Goldstein observes that this law was passed to “combat the pernicious influences of communism and labor radicalism.”

The federal government soon complicated naturalization further. In addition to the previously excluded groups, the Immigration Act of 1891 precluded polygamists, “persons suffering from a loathsome or a dangerous contagious disease,” and “any person whose ticket or passage [for cross-Atlantic voyage] was paid for with the money of another” or was otherwise assisted. Beyond barring poor Europeans from citizenship, this act placed a Bureau of Immigration in the Treasury Department and granted it jurisdiction over most immigration laws. Equally important, notes Higham, the act mandated that boat companies return rejected immigrants to their home ports.
at the company’s expense, this law “contained the first effective provision for 
deporting aliens already in the United States.” The animus of xenophobic legislation was only beginning.

The assassination of President McKinley by the anarchist and natural born Leon Czolgosz ignited a wrath against outsiders. The Immigration Act of 1903 (or the Anarchist Exclusion Act) made the “unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer . . . of the Government of the United States” a federal crime. It excluded from naturalization any person “who disbelieves in or who [was] opposed to all organized government, or who [was] a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief.” William Preston suggests that the act “created a criterion of thought and conduct” for aliens and naturalized citizens “that was unknown to native-born Americans.” The anarchist law ended America’s history as an asylum for all peoples, regardless of their beliefs, and began federal law enforcement along a path of concerted thought surveillance. Concurrently, the actions of natural-born citizens were also regulated.

The federal government began intervening in the affairs of business to lend industrialists powerful backing in the 1880s. Though anti-trust legislation was passed by Congress to provide some protections to consumers, the courts purposefully interpreted various laws as a strategy for breaking strikes and outlawing labor organizing. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was passed to implement a “reasonable and just” charge for “services rendered” in the “transportation of passengers or property.” However, the courts used this legislation to issue labor injunctions against striking railroad personnel when they interrupted interstate
Likewise, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 outlawed “every contract, combination, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states.” Cummings and McFarland noted, however, that the law was “applied broadly to include combinations of labor as well as of capital. Workingmen were astounded to learn that the Sherman Act was to be applied to them when it had not yet been enforced against industrial organizations.”

Eugene V. Debs was used as a test case by Attorney General Olney in 1895. In *In re Debs*, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction of the socialist leader of the American Railway Union for violating a strike injunction under the Sherman and Interstate Commerce Acts. Goldstein observes that the Court placed “the stamp of the nation’s highest legal authority upon the doctrine that labor unions were illegal and enjoinable conspiracies” in certain circumstances. He explains that through this application of justice, “labor faced arrests, jailings, and frequent beatings and shootings at the hands of the courts, the police and federal and state troops” when it struck or boycotted industry.

Though the DOJ played a key role in the prosecution of labor laws, it was still without its own investigative force at the turn of the century. The practice of outsourcing work to the Pinkerton Detective Agency that began after the Civil War was outlawed in 1893 when Pinkerton men were hired to break the Homestead strike and “gunned down striking workers,” observes Joan M. Jensen. Complicating matters further, Congress outlawed the transfer of Secret Service agents to the Justice Department in 1908, leaving the attorney general with no investigative abilities.
President Theodore Roosevelt’s response to this restriction of power extensively expanded federal law enforcement and reshaped the Department.

**The Force of Special Agents**

The development of the DOJ’s own investigative force offered it a mechanism for much more than the detection and prosecution of crime. The training of agents who worked in federal districts and at local levels across the country allowed for specialized relationships with various publics. Advancements in technology helped agents monitor and undermine suspicious groups and hostile congressmen alike. They could coordinate nationwide dragnets and roundups, and cultivate friendly relationships with members of the local and national press. Indeed, the advent of rapid transportation and mass media also ushered in the rise of technocratic control. Whereas brute coercion sometimes led to unfavorable court decisions and public outcry, the use of public opinion management turned sympathies toward federal control.

President Roosevelt expanded the power of the executive as he used the DOJ to investigate anti-trust issues implicating members of the legislature. This inspection was a part of a broader movement that would ultimately help tip the balance of power in Washington toward the presidency. In 1906, he appointed Charles J. Bonaparte as attorney general, and directed him to lobby Congress for an investigative force. Suspicious congressmen resisted the request, and suggested that Roosevelt was defying constitutional limits placed upon his office by attempting to locate spies in the government. However, the president soon learned that such authority was not
dependent upon Congress, and Bonaparte ordered the formation of a “force of special agents” in July 1908. Bonaparte’s successor in the Taft administration, Attorney General George W. Wickersham, formally established the force in March 1909, with the issuance of an order that recognized it as the Bureau of Investigation.

President Roosevelt’s reform effort through the DOJ would be short lived. Richard Gid Powers suggests that the creation of the BI reflected a “progressive spirit of idealism and reform” that began with the “Reconstruction-era crusade for the civil rights of freed slaves.” The Bureau’s mission would shortly thereafter reorient “from the investigation of high-level crime by the politically powerful and well connected, to the punishment of high-profile offenses by politically powerless outcasts who challenged American values.”

This reorientation was partially caused by the politics and pragmatics of law enforcement.

The BI was a part of the federal bureaucracy and was likewise subject to bureaucratic order. As laws requiring federal enforcement were established, specific government agencies were given jurisdiction for investigation and prosecution. Once jurisdiction was established, an agency’s appropriation was adjusted to fund operating costs. As long as a particular law required enforcement, the chosen agency’s appropriation would annually renew itself if Congress, the president, and cabinet heads were satisfied with an agency’s performance. This design pitted agencies in competition with one another as their budgets and livelihoods depended upon jurisdictional authority. It also encouraged agency directors to find new ways to demonstrate positive results of their efforts.
The Bureau would illustrate its effectiveness by quantifying its operations. That is, the Bureau reported to House and Senate appropriations committees the number of cases it investigated in a given year. This method placed a premium on volume, which created a tension with the Bureau’s mission. Low-level crimes were easier and politically safer to investigate than high-level crimes, which could implicate captains of industry and government. The latter cases, however, were exactly the ones that President Roosevelt and Attorney General Bonaparte envisioned for the Bureau.88 The next sixty years would be marked by voluminous caseloads of low-level crime that offered a pass to high-level offenders. Bureau statistics were used by chiefs and directors to demonstrate their success at law enforcement.89 Of course, these claims consequently bolstered arguments for expanded budgets.

The Bureau’s rapid growth was supported by its expansion of jurisdictional authority and annual appropriations. In its first decade of operations, DOJ leadership discovered that it could expand the Department by publicizing the BI’s campaigns against domestic threats. Accordingly, leadership also learned that it could accelerate its rate of expansion by targeting foreign threats to American nationalism and ideology.90

The Bureau was first charged to enforce the White Slave Traffic Act (1910) and the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act (1914). The former outlawed “interstate and foreign commerce” of white “women and girls . . . for immoral purposes.”91 The latter taxed the recreational opiate trade.92 Together, these acts raised the BI’s annual appropriation from $30,000 for fiscal year 1910 to $500,000 for fiscal year 1915.93
Among other duties, the Bureau would soon also engage in systematic propaganda and censorship to build support for America’s entry into World War I.

**Public Opinion Management**

Preparations for U.S. intervention in the Great War further expanded the military. The Bureau was responsible for enforcing the Selective Service Act (1917), which authorized President Woodrow Wilson to raise a draft and imprison draft dodgers or “ slackers.” Understaffed and in competition with the Secret Service for jurisdiction of federal law enforcement statutes, Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory ordered BI Chief Bruce Bielaski to deputize members of a volunteer spy hunting organization called the American Protective League (APL).

The League was originally created to work undercover in industries and public facilities to keep aliens under surveillance. It was subsidized by industrialists who appointed trusted employees to spy on labor organizations. Industrialists feared that unions harbored German spies and saboteurs who sought to disrupt the U.S. war effort. Factory owners, however, manipulated this arrangement and called upon the DOJ and federal troops to break strikes as a means of labor control.

Together, the BI and APL enforced conscription through the Slacker Raids. Dressed in plain clothes, they arrested seventy-five thousand suspects around “ saloons, pool halls, bus stops, dance halls, and street corners” for failing to produce draft cards or birth certificates to prove they were not draft-dodgers. Jensen explains that some went “without food or working toilets for days or weeks. Many were youngsters below the draft age; one was a seventy-five-year-old man on crutches. In
the end, less than 1 in 200 was an actual slacker.” With the APL’s help, the BI became a powerful national secret police force.

The Bureau enlisted the vigilante organization to enforce other wartime legislation—especially acts that sought to suppress labor and dissent. The Espionage Act (1917) authorized the BI to target “subversives” and “radicals” guilty of “obtaining information for injury to the United States.” Similarly, the Immigration Act of 1918 stated that “anarchists” or other “aliens who are members of or affiliated with any organization that entertains a belief in, teaches, or advocates the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States” shall be “taken into custody and deported” to their home country. This authority was given to the Department of Labor, which then controlled the Bureau of Immigration. By authority of the president and his attorney general, the BI and the Labor Department relied chiefly upon the services of the APL and its two hundred and fifty thousand members to carry out these orders against immigrants, anarchists, and members of labor alike.

Along with this coercive power, the Bureau was offered a key role in wartime censorship and propaganda. It arrested Americans who uttered “disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language” about the United States government, flag, or the armed forces during war under the Sedition Act of 1918. Supreme Court challenges to the arrests of vocal radicals under this law limited the First Amendment. In *U.S. v. Schenck* (1919), political speech that created a “clear and present danger” of “substantive evils” was declared unprotected. Accordingly, that same Court decided in *U.S. v. Abrams* (1919) that speech criticizing the federal government or its
leadership during wartime represented a criminal offense. Harvard law professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr. criticized this ruling in the Harvard Law Review (1919). J. Edgar Hoover then opened a dossier on Chaffee for “Harvard’s Board of Overseers to determine if he was fit to continue teaching,” notes Michael Linfield. This movement against speech was not an isolated restriction.

President Wilson ordered the federal government and the military to monitor dissent. On April 13, 1917, he established the Committee on Public Information (CPI) based upon recommendations made by his Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. The Committee was “charged with encouraging and then consolidating the revolution of opinion which changed the United States from an anti-militaristic democracy to an organized war machine,” observes James R. Mock and Cedric Larson. According to its chairman, newspaperman George Creel, “there was no part of the great war machinery that we did not touch, no medium of appeal that we did not employ.” In addition to paid advertisements, the CPI produced pamphlets, posters, speakers, educational films, and news columns. It influenced scholarship, commercial films, novels, public and private school curriculums, church sermons, and newspaper reporting. Though some materials were marked as originating from the CPI, its influence over other materials was hidden, thus masking its strategic purposes.

Of course, Creel also was granted the power to censor. He forged relationships with the DOJ and the Military Intelligence Division (MID) through the Censorship Board. Creel used these institutions to investigate various individuals and publications that were possibly in violation of the Espionage and Sedition Acts. According to correspondences between these agencies, the chairman worked
personally with BI Chief Bruce Bielaski, who in turn directed APL leadership to investigate the loyalty of writers, editors, publishers, and producers. They blocked the release of books, movies, and news reports. Creel and Bielaski even monitored popular music and foreign language periodicals for German sympathies. Among their many concerns, they feared that the writings of Leon Trotsky would trigger an “anarchist” revolution in America, akin to the Russian Revolution, at a time when the military was preoccupied with Germany. Again, fears of revolutionary forces emerged in wartime. This was an early indicator of the first major Red Scare of the twentieth century.

Chairman Creel also worked closely with Attorney General Gregory to build support for the war. In a series of correspondences, the attorney general proposed the use of “educational propaganda” to stimulate “loyalty among foreign-born workmen in industrial plants doing government work, and [to block] enemy intrigue.” Gregory also used the CPI to capture “the widest possible publicity” for the government’s position on war-related matters concerning the Justice Department. The CPI, DOJ, and BI were thus instruments of the Wilson administration's attempts to round up dissidents and to issue official statements regarding the nature of their work. In this sense, the BI helped censor the president’s opponents and propagated the executive branch’s political agenda. This arrangement led to allegations that the CPI served the president’s own political interests. It was in this context of politics and propaganda that J. Edgar Hoover was socialized in both the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Investigation.
The Director’s Early Years

Hoover’s diligence in the war effort was rewarded with a rapid expansion of responsibility and quick promotion. According to the DOJ’s Appointment Letter Books, he abbreviated his name and was appointed to the dual titles of “Special Employee” and “clerk” of the DOJ in July 1917; both of these positions were “payable from the appropriation for ‘National Security & Defense.’” Reporting to the Department’s War Emergency Division, he was assigned to work with the Department of Labor and Bureau of Immigration. This duty involved Hoover with enforcement of the Espionage, Sedition, and Immigration Acts during and after the war, which introduced him to the task of combating American radicalism. His work soon included silencing dissent and championing coercive methods of law enforcement.

Together, jurisdiction over these laws increased the Bureau’s appropriation to $2.27 million by 1919. These acts militarized the DOJ and coordinated it with the Office of Military Intelligence (OMI) to protect industry from labor. More specifically, these federal agencies moved against the 3,600 strikes that occurred between 1919 and 1920 for their interference with defense planning and for their challenge to private property. In such capacities, the distinction of the BI as a military or civilian agency—or as a public or private security agency—frequently blurred; the Bureau found support in military and business communities as it broke demobilizing and costly strikes.
The Red Scare and the Palmer Raids

The CPI and APL were dissolved after the armistice was signed in November, 1918. Shortly thereafter, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer found a new application for their methods. More than thirty bombs were mailed by anarchists to the homes and offices of business and government leaders in the spring of 1919, which sparked the first major Red Scare (1919-1921) of the twentieth century. The attorney general “declared war on the radicals, [and] warned of an eminent revolutionary uprising” after his house was bombed on June 2nd, observes Regit Schmidt. Palmer added the General Intelligence Division (GID) to the Department of Justice, which Hoover was selected to direct as the attorney general’s “Special Assistant” in July.

Hoover reported to Congress on the work of the GID. He asserted that its activities were “at first confined solely to the investigations of the ultraradical movement,” but he expanded it to include “the study of matters of an international nature, as well as economic and industrial disturbances incident thereto.” Hoover’s GID was thus an early precursor to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which conceived of organized labor as a conflation of subversion and international threats. Kenneth D. Ackerman asserts that as head of the GID, Hoover answered to the “Bureau of Investigation Chief Bill Flynn. And as special assistant to the attorney general, Edgar [reported] directly to Mitchell Palmer, Flynn’s boss.” Wearing both hats placed Hoover in the BI and the OAG.

The GID began a widespread surveillance system. According to Ronald Kessler, it amassed index cards through “scanning six hundred twenty five...
newspapers for information on the radical movement, indiscriminately entering on each card a mix of hearsay, rumor, and fact.”

Powers notes that by November 1919, the GID “had completed a classification of over 60,000 ‘radically inclined’ individuals in the ‘ultraradical movement’ . . . Hoover had turned himself into the government’s first resident authority on communism, a reputation he jealously guarded for the rest of his long life.”

Unsure of where the anarchists’ bombs came from, the Justice Department turned its attention to American communists. In January 1919, Vladimir Lenin called for an American working-class uprising. The organizational activities of American communists would further heighten anxieties across the nation. In August of that year, Socialists were divided over forming a communist party in line with the international call. This division caused the formation of two separate U.S. communist parties—the Communist Party and Communist Labor Party—before Moscow demanded that they unite into a single Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA). However, as Albert Fried explains, this period marked the time when “the red scare went into its most virulent stage.” He notes that this scare was “marked by thousands of Gestapo-like arrests and detainments and expulsions from the country, as well as the establishment of police apparatuses at federal, state, and local levels charged with investigating, identifying, and punishing radicals, no matter what their persuasion.”

Together, Hoover and Palmer created an atmosphere that was toxic to reformers. The Interchurch World Movement and the Federal Trade Commission both concluded, in 1920 and 1934 respectively, that collusion occurred between
industry and the DOJ. They also surmised that the scare was manufactured, at least in part, to break strikes and discredit proponents of labor and business regulation.\textsuperscript{132} Though state power was used in this capacity before, this time the undesirable citizens were exiled.

The Palmer Raids targeted immigrant and labor organizations in November 1919 and January 1920.\textsuperscript{133} The first raids rounded up at least 465 alleged “radicals” by November 14. The attorney general directed Hoover to prepare these cases for trial. Three hundred of these detainees were deported to Russia on December 21, 1920, including Emma Goldman and her anarchist comrade, Alexander Berkman.\textsuperscript{134} The speed of the government in deciding these cases was a testament to the momentum against immigrants and communists in America following the war.

The second roundup commenced shortly thereafter and was accompanied by DOJ propaganda. On December 31, 1919, the attorney general announced that Bolsheviks were “‘composed chiefly of criminal, mistaken idealists, social bigots, and many unfortunate men and women suffering with varying forms of hyperesthesia.’”\textsuperscript{135} Two days later, the Department of Justice coordinated the seizure of another 2,600 suspected communists.\textsuperscript{136} In a January 27, 1920, interview with the New York Times, Hoover boasted that 3,000 of 3,600 radicals taken into custody that month were “‘perfect’” deportation cases.\textsuperscript{137} According to Claire Bond Potter, however, “Hoover's first celebrity career as a red hunter came to a crashing halt . . . when many of the deportation cases were reversed on appeal and the methods of the Palmer raids condemned as illegal.”\textsuperscript{138}
Stories circulated of civil liberties violations and inhumane treatment of suspects in the spring of 1920, which implicated the GID and brought attention to the attorney general’s methods. The Justice Department argued that Communist Party membership was a deportable offense according to the recent Immigration Act; consequently, it rounded up suspected communists wherever and however it could find them—in party rallies, on party rolls, and in newspaper accounts. Assistant Secretary of Labor Louis Post, who was charged with reviewing the deportation cases, as well as many leaders of the legal community, challenged the Justice Department’s evidence and procedure. The National Popular Government League emphasized its disapproval of “propaganda by the Department of Justice,” and claimed that Palmer worked with “magazines and editors throughout the country” to “affect public opinion in advance of court decisions and prepared in the manner of an advertising campaign in favor of repression.” Cultivating public opinion to ensure favorable court decisions would later become the cornerstone of Hoover’s power and the FBI’s stature.

Bureau leadership discovered that intelligence work and roundups were politically safer during times of war and hysteria. Labor Department officials and federal judges reversed thousands of Justice Department deportation rulings soon after the war. And, Congress took action against the executive branch as both the House of Representatives and the Senate investigated the Justice Department for misconduct, ruling that the Bureau did not have the constitutional authority to engage in intelligence work without congressional approval. This countermovement
revealed the power of civil liberties claims as well as the constitutional challenges that surrounded domestic intelligence gathering.

Palmer responded to his opposition by claiming that they were communist sympathizers and “‘liars’” who were deliberately assisting the impending communist revolution.\(^\text{145}\) Palmer’s red-baiting tactics failed when the Federal Court ruled on June 23, 1920, that the attorney general’s procedures violated civil liberties statutes and that Communist Party membership alone did not qualify aliens for deportation.\(^\text{146}\) The revolution never materialized and the attorney general spent the rest of his term under congressional investigation.\(^\text{147}\)

The Palmer Raids taught Hoover a lesson about state power and control. A nation that feared attack supported stricter law enforcement measures against marginal groups when the enforcers were reputable. Therefore, a threat could be used to generate and maintain enhanced power for law enforcement officials as long as the perception of threat persisted and the sense of scandal did not become a major public issue. This formula included silencing civil liberties proponents who brought attention to constitutional violations. A role for public opinion management was thus crystallized in the field of law enforcement.

As the Bureau became embroiled in even more scandal following the Palmer era, its appropriations and jurisdiction continued to diminish along with its reputation. Aside for the Dyer Act (1919), which outlawed the transportation of stolen motor vehicles across state lines, the Bureau’s utility as a law enforcement apparatus waned.\(^\text{148}\) Instead of keeping the BI out of trouble, however, Rhodri Jeffery-Jones suggests that “the lack of enabling legislation was an open invitation to undertake irregular
activities.” Under the leadership of Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty (1921-1924), the DOJ once again became entangled in partisan conflicts. Labor wars erupted as the nation settled into a peacetime economy. Coal mine and railroad owners rolled their workers’ wages back to pre-war levels, leading to bloody strikes as union members clashed with strike breakers. President Warren G. Harding addressed Congress on this matter in August 1922. He declared that he was committed to using “the power of government to maintain transportation and sustain the right of men to work.” Daugherty did his part, the New York Times reported, by obtaining a federal injunction that prohibited strikers from “interfering in any way with the operations of the railroads of the nation.” Using the Bureau to enforce this ruling, the attorney general effectively ended the strike on management’s terms.

However, Daugherty was less successful in managing the Teapot Dome Scandal. He attempted to use his power to protect the Interior Secretary from an investigation led by Democratic Senators Burton K. Wheeler and Thomas J. Walsh of Montana. Instead of investigating the Interior Department for accepting illegal gifts from oil companies, the Bureau tapped the senators’ phones, “opened their mail, and broke into their offices and homes. They even attempted to lure Wheeler into a compromising sexual liaison,” Athan G. Theoharis claims. Senator Wheeler was indicted by a grand jury, but won acquittal as witnesses admitted perjuring their testimony; the Justice Department also was caught manufacturing evidence to discredit the senator. The Teapot Dome Scandal was possibly more offensive than others because it occurred during a time of government reform and the attorney general was counted as a reformer. The post-war era was rife with cultural warriors
like Hoover, Palmer, and Daughtery who first emerged during the wartime and Red
Scare eras. Conflict in federal institutions was preceded by growing cleavages in
American religion and Americanism. Protestant churches across the country were
embroiled in an embittered battle over the future of the faith and, with it, the nation’s
public institutions.

“Americanism” and the Federal Government

Notions of “Americanism” have spanned the nation’s history. Robert
Shalhope explains that this concept was narrowly defined in the late eighteenth
century as an “allegiance to the nation-state rather than a pervasive loyalty to a
distinctive set of ideological principles.”¹⁵⁴ The symbol branched-off in the mid-
nineteenth century to represent two separate ideological currents running through the
Republican Party. “Americanism” was adopted by exiled German revolutionary Carl
Schurz (R-WI) whose activism pressed the Republican Party against slavery in the
buildup to war. It was thereafter claimed by the Party’s industrialists to advance
corporate interests.

First, President Lincoln provided an outlet to immigrants who advocated an
ideology of republicanism. Elliott Shore, Ken Fones-Wolf, and James Philip Danky
explain that the failed German revolution (1848–49) was a liberal uprising for artisan
republicanism—an ideology that promoted the welfare of independent workers—and
for “free thought” against clericalism.¹⁵⁵ Many revolutionaries like Schurz fled to
America to avoid reprisal for their participation in the rebellion. John Higham
explains that these newcomers included the founders of American Marxism and that
this group writ large agitated against slavery and joined the radical Republicans.\textsuperscript{156} German-American activists joined the Party to make abolition its central focus.

Schurz delivered his “True Americanism” address (1859) as a member of the Lincoln campaign.\textsuperscript{157} Republicans were anxious to calm tensions in the Party between German-Americans and the Know-Nothings who sought to restrict the voting rights of foreign-born citizens.\textsuperscript{158} Higham explains that anti-radicalism, anti-Catholicism, and Anglo-Saxonism led more established Protestant Americans to suspect internal minorities of subversion for their allegedly “foreign (i.e., ‘un-American’) connections.”\textsuperscript{159} Schurz’s brand of Americanism rebuffed this impulse with values evident in the German revolution. At a time when anti-abolitionists argued that slaves were dangerously unprepared for democratic participation, he described “true Americanism” as the belief that “liberty” was the “best school for liberty, and that self-government” could not be “learned but by practicing it.” This perspective encouraged “toleration,” rather than religious “fanaticism,” and “freedom of inquiry” to “engender . . . mutual respect of true convictions,” which made “inquiry earnest, and discussion fair.” Accordingly, he surmised that the American “Revolutionary Fathers derived their claim to independence” from the “principle” that “‘all men are created free and equal, and are endowed with certain inalienable rights’” in the promotion of universal freedoms.\textsuperscript{160} Such logic captures the principles that future liberals would ascribe to “Americanism.” This tradition, however, competed for ascendancy against the Republican Party’s other commitments to nationalism, individualism, and free enterprise within the second current of Americanism.\textsuperscript{161}
Americanism, Militarism, and Industrialism

President McKinley promoted Henry Clay’s “American system” as he advanced the interest of industrial-capitalists. Quentin R. Skrabec, Jr. explains that Clay spent his long career in public life (1806-1852) advocating a strong central bank to “assure capital for investment” and protectionism via tariffs to develop American industries. The role of government under this system was to “promote, monitor, and maintain industrial growth.” This was consistent with Alexander Hamilton’s “Report on Manufacturers” (1791), which recommended “leaving Industry to its own direction” but also encouraged the “incitement and patronage of government.”

McKinley’s era was accented by monopolies and court rulings that offered more civil rights to corporations than to women, African Americans, or marginal immigrant groups. Correspondingly, the president announced in his first Inaugural Address (1897) that “Congress” should give “ample protection and encouragement” to “industries” because “[n]o portion of our population” was more “entitled” to the federal government’s “wide and liberal care” than the owners of industry. In his successful attempt to further subsidize corporations, McKinley concluded that “Friendly legislation” to “producers” in the “American name” was “beneficial to all.” The president, thus, derived the nation’s identity from the welfare of elite economic interests. This belief was further refined by his vice president.

Theodore Roosevelt bolstered notions of Americanism through Christian benevolence and militarism with his “Strenuous Life” address (1899). As Governor of New York, he suggested that which was “most American in the American character” was a “life of toil and effort, of labor and strife” whereby the “highest form
of success” went to “the man who [did] not shrink from danger.” He encouraged “every self-respecting American” who was “manly and adventurous” to engage in wars for wealth in “Hawaii, Cuba, Porto Rico (sic), and the Philippines.” Pointing to religious differences, he advocated belligerence against “warlike Moslems, and wild pagans” who were “utterly unfit for self-government” and who showed “no signs of becoming fit.”

Roosevelt’s Americanism, thus, used issues of race and religion to discern which types of people were intellectually equipped or ill-suited for democratic governance. His internationalism elevated the spread of Christianity above liberalism. He suggested, for example, that real “men” were disinterested in notions of “‘liberty and the ‘consent of the governed’” if Christian “salvation” could be achieved through force. Statements like these articulated the conservative vision of “Americanism,” which also encouraged the expansion of U.S. security and economic interests well beyond the Americas. Roosevelt’s extensive articulation of “Americanism” was influential in shaping political culture.

Some of his ideas were further championed by Woodrow Wilson. Having articulated various pronouncements of Americanism since at least 1894, Roosevelt popularized “100% Americanism” to denounce “‘hyphenated’” Americans (e.g., German-Americans) during his 1916 bid for the Republican nomination. John F. McClymer explains that Wilson then embraced “100% Americanism” upon reelection to the presidency in 1916 as a part of his program of intervention into World War I. This made the “Americanization” of immigrants a nationwide effort sponsored by the federal government. The American “flag” was a symbol of conformity, suggested Wilson, and was an “emblem” of “our unity, our power, our thought and purpose as a
nation.“¹⁷² Such cohesion was a goal of his administration while it built support for a monolithic perspective that worked to drown out dissenting views.

The Wilson administration’s campaign for unity coerced immigrant groups into accepting Clay’s system. Wilson worked with industrialists to build public opinion in favor of the war effort, which allegedly defined a singular national interest. McClymer explains that the Bureau of Education launched an Americanization program that was financed by the National Americanization Committee (NAC) from 1914 until the private subsidization of government programs was outlawed in 1919. The NAC was a “business group” that viewed “Americanization” as an effort to Americanize the immigrant workforce for “American industry” during an era punctuated by labor radicalism. Its leadership “overlapped almost completely with the Immigration Committee, formed in 1917, of the United States Chamber of Commerce.” The Education Bureau, explains McClymer, “became a subsidiary” of the NAC which “coordinated all the manifold Americanization programs in the country.” The committee transformed from a business lobby into a federal agency as it “effectively became the War Work Extension of the Bureau of Education.”¹⁷³

The NAC developed curriculum to teach the “‘American Way’” for the Treasury, War, and Navy Departments, the Bureaus of Education and Naturalization, the Committee on Public Information (CPI), and the Council of National Defense, as well as for education, business, publishing, and labor organizations. According to McClymer, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, the DOJ, and the Bureau of Investigation used this momentum to press for “Congressional authorization to deal with the question of the alien’s ‘hyphenated’ loyalties” as Congress debated and
ultimately passed the Espionage and Sedition Acts in 1917 and 1918 respectively. The Americanization campaign consummately heightened tensions in a period marked by the Red Scare (1919-1921). Numerous civic associations formed their own Americanism campaigns during the interwar period.\textsuperscript{174}

\textit{Americanism and Christian Fundamentalism}

In the 1920s, one-hundred percent Americanism was espoused by such organizations as the Ku Klux Klan, National Security League, Freemasons, and American Legion, among others as a moral code.\textsuperscript{175} This movement, John Kane asserts, was an “ultraconservative brand of isolationism” that rejected “any foreign influence whatsoever on American life, most especially any that might affect economic liberty or racial purity.”\textsuperscript{176} Martin E. Marty explains that it attracted many “self-described original-stock Protestant Americans” who celebrated both Anglo-Saxon and Puritan traditions.\textsuperscript{177} Anglo-Saxonism was expanded at this time to imply, more generally, that Northern and Western European immigrants embodied superior lineages, which according to Higham, reinforced a more homogenized white supremacy as the “American Way.”\textsuperscript{178} Marty suggests that more hard-lined conservatives were “conscious of a covenant that gave them a privileged relationship with God,” based partially on their Anglo-Saxon heritage and spiritual devotion to an allegedly God-given “economic system.” He explains that the potency of the Red Scare, Yellow Peril, and KKK all evidenced a power struggle in America “over the soul and mission of the nation.”\textsuperscript{179} Conservative notions of Americanism, thus, became increasingly steeped in Protestant themes.\textsuperscript{180}
The conservative tendencies of Americanism were further strengthened by the wider circulation of millenarianist beliefs in the early twentieth century. Religious revivalists turned to mass media to promote premillennial dispensationalism. This led to the publication of an influential series of pamphlets titled *The Fundamentals* (1910-1915). These short essays expounded upon five fundamental beliefs that were allegedly necessary for Christian adherence, and which amplified the supernatural mythos of Jesus Christ rather than the values that he prescribed.\(^{181}\) Undergirded by America’s traditional commitment to isolationism, the eschatology was intended to counter allegedly foreign influences—especially scientific and other intellectual advancements proffered by Darwinism, progressivism, and Marxism—and to help the nation remain homogenous, or ideologically pure. It held that Jesus would literally return in human form to lead Protestant armies in a war against those of the anti-christ before ushering in one thousand years, or a millennium, of harmony. Though largely anti-Semitic, fundamentalists were also passionately Zionist as they awaited the prophesized emergence of a New Israel from which Christ would re-in. Because only this redeemer could end corruption in an otherwise imminently unsalvageable world, fundamentalists opposed peace-making “between nations, management and labor, men and women, or religious groups” as a waste of energy. These conservative Protestants opposed social services and economic reform, championing instead law and order, private sector commercialism, white supremacy, and a structure of smaller government.\(^{182}\) Such a perspective aligned laissez faire industrial-capitalism with godliness and any attempts to regulate industry with sinfulness.\(^{183}\) The principles of
fundamentalism were infused into Americanism and were done so with a reactionary zeal against the CPUSA.

Civic groups enacted fundamentalist religious principles in public policy through law enforcement ventures. Volunteer organizations like the American Legion cooperated with J. Edgar Hoover’s General Intelligence Division (GID)—before it was dismantled in 1924—to promote what Powers calls “countersubversive anticommunism.” This perspective was prone to conspiracy theories and conflated attempts made by Moscow to co-opt American reform movements through the CPUSA as evidence of actual Soviet control. Accordingly, it perceived Soviet involvement wherever and whenever fundamentalism was challenged, implicating “labor organizations, pacifist groups, the universities, the women’s clubs, the churches, and the schools” in such subversive activities; some quarters of the American Legion even blamed radicalism writ large on Catholicism and Judaism. Powers concludes that Hoover and the other Americanists of this era “chased chimerical conspiracies though paranoid labyrinths” not recognizing their own misperceptions of American political activity. Some of the very groups that they denounced included the most outspoken anti-communists.

Whereas Americanists habitually mistook the American left more generally as instruments of Moscow, many Catholics, Jews, civil rights and labor activists, as well as members of the American Socialist Party provided a far more credible renunciation of the Communist Party. Rome’s anti-communist policy was established by Pope Pius IX’s *Qui Pluribus* (1846), which condemned the threat to “laws, government, property, and even of human society itself” by “Communism.” Catholic scholars in
America documented the brutal religious oppression that accompanied the Bolshevik Revolution and used their research to discourage the official recognition of the Soviet Union. While the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and B’nai B’rith’s Anti-Defamation League (ADL) promoted anti-communism in response to religious persecution in the Soviet Union as well, more atheistic Jews in the Socialist Party turned to anti-communism to protest the Bolshevik’s gross violations of human rights more generally. Similarly, many black Socialists like A. Philip Randolph—then editor of the *Messenger*—advocated anti-communism on the grounds that the Party’s interests diverged from their own and resented its attacks on black churches and civil rights organizations. Catholic labor unions were obviously anti-communist, and Socialist labor organizations like the Harlem Labor Committee shared the perspective that white communists would abandon black unionists if necessary to promote Soviet foreign policy. These perspectives clashed with each other at numerous points, but were also allowed to compete in American thought because of the very intellectual tolerance that was advocated by Carl Schurz.

Strong tensions between the two visions of Americanism ultimately evolved into a complex matrix of ideological polarization. The post-war world combined religion and politics in ways that heightened political divisions within Protestantism. The editor of the Baptist *Watchman-Examiner* coined the term “Fundamentalist” in 1920 to represent an organized religious movement that cut across Protestant denominations and consequently established “permanent party lines” against a more liberal grouping that was called “Modernist.” These were two poles in an ideological spectrum that competed for the “machinery of the Northern Baptist Convention, the
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., and other Protestant denominations.” The Fundamentalists were a hard-line faction of conservatives who mobilized to promote their beliefs. They were particularly drawn to the KKK, which was influential in organizing lawyers, judges, and civil officials with business groups like the Chamber of Commerce to undercut liberal reformers. Next were non-Fundamentalist conservatives who disagreed with the extremist nature of Fundamentalism, but also shared many of its beliefs about Christianity and U.S. civics. To their left were moderates—the largest group—who were viewed as occupying the central position of Christianity. They, in turn, were followed by liberals who leaned more toward Social Gospel Theology. To their left was a faction of liberals called Modernists; only some of whom self-identified with the term. Fundamentalists used the term “Modernism” to represent inflammatory departures from traditional Protestantism, and lumped together their opposition under its banner. This labeling sometimes even included conservative Protestants who worked in coalition with more moderate Christians. Modernists rejected dogmatism and challenged the supernatural mythos of Christianity. They encouraged, instead, the intellectual advancement of Darwinism and Marxism. Modernists privileged reason, progress, rationalism, and intellectual experimentation. Specifically, Modernists and Social Gospel Christians campaigned to build greater political and economic harmony among nations through rational discourse. Some of these idealists even strove to establish friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. by reforming capitalism with socialistic programming, outlawing war, and establishing international government. Ultimately, they sought to reify specific
values encouraged by Jesus in his Sermon on the Mount through institution building.\textsuperscript{188}

Americanists worked in coalition to address the crisis posed by such liberalism to Fundamentalism. Reactionaries such as Blair Coan published books like \textit{The Red Web} (1925) to assert the existence of covert Soviet intrigue behind the activities of these reformers.\textsuperscript{189} R.M. Whitney thanked “Mr. John Edgar Hoover” of the “Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice” for his “advice and friendly criticism” of \textit{Reds in America} (1924), a book that Whitney dedicated to abiding “loyalty to American institutions” amidst the “trackless sea of ‘liberalism’ as now defined.”\textsuperscript{190} This fear mongering began a longer tradition of professional anti-communist conspiracy theorizing that informed the World War II and Cold War era debates about communist subversion.

A violent feud over the direction of Americanism emanated from Protestant churches throughout the 1920s that foreshadowed Hoover’s later anti-communist containment program. Fundamentalists blamed their Modernist counterparts for being too hospitable to Catholicism, Judaism, communism, secularism, and radicalism, which represented apostasy for many. Conservatives attempted to remove liberals from common denominational ventures, including foreign missions, higher education, and religious institutions. This pressure mounted while intellectuals introduced concepts like “cultural pluralism” to rebuff Americanization programming. Philip Gleason explains that the concept was coined in 1924 to encourage tolerance. Pluralism promoted a more “democratic system of government,” respect for “equality before the law,” recognition of the “rights of minorities,” and support for universal
First Amendment guarantees.\textsuperscript{191} Fundamentalists, however, believed that the “Protestant spirit,” and not civil liberties, “produced the moral and political character of the country,” explains Marty. Accordingly, the exclusion of pluralists from institutional participation was encouraged in order to protect American purity and strength from subversive threats.\textsuperscript{192} In an era of anti-communism that associated minority groups with the CPUSA, removing Modernists from positions of authority served both the religious and patriotic functions of Fundamentalism.

Allegations of Soviet penetration of America’s public institutions complemented the Fundamentalist campaign against Modernism, and even helped Fundamentalists to strike against more secular and atheistic Modernists. In \textit{The War on Modern Science: A Short History of the Fundamentalist Attacks on Evolution and Modernism} (1927), Maynard Shipley, President of the Science League of America, warned that “Fundamentalists” sought to “debar the teaching of evolution from all educational institutions supported in whole or in part by public funds.” He observed that “governors, state superintendents of public instruction, text-book commissioners, [and] city boards of education” of “many” states had begun restricting certain areas of teaching and learning. Specifically, he noted that such groups had taken “arbitrary action” against “many teachers” who had “either lost their positions” or had been “so intimidated by the general attitude of the local community” that they “voluntarily forfeited their supposed right of freedom in teaching.” Shipley concluded that scientists were in the “midst of a war on the method of science as a whole, though more particularly on the method of science as applied in geology, biology,
psychology, anthropology, sociology, and history.” Religious, government, and civic intuitions became battlegrounds for control over the nation’s future.

The religious divisions caused by the Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy formed two rival camps that punctuated American political culture. Promoting the rights of labor forged alliances between Catholics and Social Gospel Protestants who were more generally strong supporters of political idealism in foreign and domestic policy planning. This coalition clashed with business lobbies like the National Association of Manufacturers which charged that the Catholic Church’s social justice programming was, in fact, a form of radical unionism. Industrialists were joined by more conservative Protestants who equated the regulation of industry with communism. Conservative Christians were also more prone to isolationism because idealism, in their perspective, subordinated the American Christian nation to a secular world government. Instead, they preferred militarism to enforce their values on the world stage. Markku Ruotsila explains that many conservative Christians feared the alignment of America with non-Christian nations because it would, they presumed, incur God’s wrath for abandoning America’s exceptional stature among nations. Whereas Social Gospel theology rallied more liberal Catholics and Protestants together, anti-communism united religious conservatives and industrialists.

The movements identified by the Watchman-Examiner as “Fundamentalist” and “Modernist” lost their momentum by the 1930s. Thereafter, the terms “fundamentalism” and “modernism” were used to describe the extreme ends of Christianity. Their clash, however, would have major religious, cultural, and political implications for decades to come. J. Robert Nash observes that “Fundamentalism
was at the core” of J. Edgar Hoover’s long-held “religious beliefs” and that it was “still so rock hard in Hoover” as of 1972 that he considered “any modernization of traditional church teachings tantamount to treason against the American people.”

The director proudly identified as a Fundamentalist at the end of his career. That said, when secularism dominated the federal government under the presidencies of Calvin Coolidge (1923-1929) and Herbert Hoover (1929-1933), as well as during the first two terms of Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1941), Hoover portrayed himself as a scientific expert who was trained in criminology and disinterested in religion.

Scientific Management and Organizational Reform in the DOJ

The rise of scientific administration in the federal government after World War I further shaped the Department of Justice and its Bureau of Investigation. Whereas departmental funds were appropriated with little oversight before the 1920s, post-war politics demanded greater accountability from executive officers. This policy shift encouraged the adoption of the same scientific professional standards that had already been widely accepted by industry. Social scientific perspectives set new standards of professionalism in public administration and reduced factionalism in the federal government. While Fundamentalists grumbled about atheistic communism in the homeland, officials in Washington embraced more secular approaches to governing.

The Harding administration pushed to decrease waste in the executive branch. The Budget and Accounting Act (1921) established the Bureau of the Budget to assist the president in “securing greater economy and efficiency in the conduct of the public
service,” especially in regards to the appropriations, services, “organization, activities, and methods of business” employed by “executive departments.” The legislation also created the General Accounting Office (GAO), which was given authority over all executive departments’ bookkeeping and balances. The Office was given further charge to investigate “all matters relating to the receipt of, disbursement, and application of public funds” and to “make recommendations looking to greater economy or efficiency in public expenditures.”

By Executive Order, the president commissioned the budget director to decrease “the estimates of the appropriations” by locating and eliminating “unnecessary activities.” The president instructed bureau chiefs to work with the director on this mission, which was aimed at the “reorganization” of the federal government.

This downsizing was felt by the DOJ. According to the Justice Department’s Administrative Orders, Circulars, and Memorandums, the Bureau of Efficiency developed a rating system to ascertain the Justice Department’s and the Bureau of Investigation’s productivity and wastefulness. It also systematized their appropriations requests by making them account for past appropriations and the manner in which future appropriations would be spent. Justice Department officials limited telegraphs, telephones, and other office equipment to official use only. Much of this movement for greater economy and efficiency was rooted in the broader adoption of scientific management operations by professional communities.

Frederick Winslow Taylor advocated a rhetoric of science to industrialists as a rubric for increasing efficiency, economy, productivity, and profitability. Taylor’s perspective privileged institutions over individuals, stating “in the past the man has
been first; in the future the system must be first.” He suggested that the “best management” was a “true science.” Managers should “gather together” traditional knowledge of “workmen” and then classify, tabulate, and reduce it to “rules, laws, and formulae.” Once “a science for each element of a man’s work” was developed, managers were encouraged to “scientifically select” and then “train, teach, and develop the workman.”

This approach thus emphasized training workforces to adopt a systematic approach to task management. Of course, its implications stretched beyond the industrial setting.

Scientific management melded with the progressive idealism of the post-war years. It “took form in the United States” and spread across Europe and the Soviet Union while the study of International Relations spread throughout the academy, observes Judith A. Merkle. Taylor suggested that his principles were applicable to “governmental departments,” which contributed to the field of public administration. Progressive reformers envisioned “impartial administrative systems” that could be managed scientifically and apart from “politics” and “special interests.” In this proposition, “the idea of public efficiency became the core of a political program” that sought to remove sectarianism from government institutions. Scientific management encouraged the application of a method to the political problems of public administration, thus safeguarding democratic institutions from corruption, religious-political factions, and waste.

The movement to scientifically administer government operations occurred in a broader institutional context of secular reform. Christian Smith observes that the expansion of social scientific perspectives in this era coincided with the “historical
secularization of the institutions of American public life.” This movement largely spanned from 1870 to 1930 and represented a “struggle between contending groups with conflicting interests seeking to control social knowledge and institutions.” This trend balanced a previous movement to infuse Protestantism into American life. The Revolutionary era was “rather religiously derelict” and fostered an undercurrent of secular Enlightenment culture. Mass religious revivalism in the nineteenth century, however, helped Protestantism to rebound and to institutionalize Christian morality in social, cultural, and even legal codes of conduct. Specifically, mainline Protestantism praised “Christian virtue, free market capitalism, and civic republicanism” for advancing American civilization.208

The FBI Director and Secular-Scientific Law Enforcement

J. Edgar Hoover downplayed his adherence to these values following the Palmer era, but he certainly continued to advance their cause. In particular, he highlighted the value of rugged individualism. To Hoover, these values represented the only authentic vision of American citizenship, which he erroneously suggested was monolithically shared by the nation’s founders. However, Hoover first recast himself as a scientific reformer in the mid-1920s. Smith observes that the decade represented a tipping point in the history of the secular transformation of America’s “core public institutions.” He concludes that the “old Protestant establishment moralizers and pastoral opinion makers were mostly swept aside in the 1920s by new cultural authorities in the social sciences, journalism, advertising and Hollywood” who regarded their predecessors as more sectarian.209
The rhetorics of science and secularism were not inherently hostile to Protestantism. Some members of the religious community welcomed the elevation of science in U.S. culture as well as the “secular” spaces that it helped to create. For example, Professor of Religious Education at Northwestern University, Norman E. Richardson, reported to the International Sunday School Convention in 1922 that the “Protestant religious educator” should accept the “findings of the devout scientist . . . without embarrassment” because there was “no conflict between science and religion.” Paraphrasing another educator, Richardson observed that “scientists and theologians who neither know nor stick to their own respective fields engage in frequent though harmless skirmishes.” He could dismiss the rivalry between these realms of belief because he foresaw no “basic cleavage between religious and secular education.” This envisioned unity was allegedly possible, according to Richardson, because not “all scientists” were “irreligious” and not “all religious leaders” were “unscientific.” Indicative of the secularization movement, he proclaimed that the “religious educator” who attacked the “scientific method” belonged to a “former age.” This statement identified the passing of an era in which Protestantism dominated U.S. culture.

Many members of the religious and theological fields disagreed with Richardson’s optimism about such harmony. However, a common linguistic framework was established between these communities by the 1920s that associated notions of the “scientific” with those of the “secular.” This framework also disassociated such ideas from more religious notions. Because the Protestant domination of government institutions was linked to factionalism and public
corruption by political idealists, secularism and the scientific perspectives that it encouraged were viewed by such reformers as a virtue of honest government.

The effort to eliminate sectarianism in government institutions was reified in the DOJ through a series of reform measures. The Administrative Orders, Circulars, and Memorandums of the DOJ reveal that the attorneys general took specific steps to reform and repair the reputations of the Department and the Bureau. Though Daugherty himself would be indicted for corruption, he ordered executive officers in a 1922 memorandum to refrain from displaying “such obtrusive partisanship as to cause public scandal.” Attorney General Harlan F. Stone limited Bureau investigations “exclusively to violations of the Federal Laws” and ordered the discontinuance of “unnecessary investigations” in a 1924 memorandum. And, Attorney General John G. Sargent stipulated that “all publicity” pertaining to “cases pending in this Department or to the ordinary administrative business of the Department” must be “authorized and given to the press through the Office of the Attorney General only, and not otherwise” in a 1925 memorandum. He prohibited the “imperting of confidential information to newspaper representatives and others outside the Department” by penalty of “disciplinary action.” He further forbade executive officers from using their “official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the result thereof” in a 1926 memorandum.

According to the Appointment Letter Books, it was during this context of reform that J. Edgar Hoover was promoted from “Statutory Attorney” in the OAG to “Assistant Director of the Bureau of Investigation” in May 1924; he would be appointed “Director” in December. Attorney General Stone ordered Hoover to
dismantle the GID and reduce the size of the Bureau. Hoover carried out his orders as his agency’s appropriation dropped to $2.15 million for fiscal year 1927.

According to the Bureau’s Classification 61 (Treason) - Index to Headquarters Case Files, 1921-1936, however, it quietly continued to monitor American communists and other alleged subversives who challenged Protestant traditions. Its appropriations would not begin to steadily increase again until the early 1930s. The middle and late 1920s were relatively quiet years for the Bureau, yet foundational for Hoover’s agency.

He spent this time structuring the Bureau’s culture. Under President Hoover, who was known as the “Great Engineer” for his expertise in organizational administration, the director gained a model of professionalism. This included turning “to research for solutions to the problems of social waste and inefficiency,” explains Powers. J. Edgar Hoover joined the ranks of scientific managers who studied public opinion management, used scientific strategies to solve problems, and relied on statistics to demonstrate results. Every year the director reported record accomplishments to the House Appropriations Committee, which far more often than not recommended that Hoover receive his full appropriation. The director pressured Special Agents in Charge of field offices (SACs) to annually increase their caseloads and then used those numbers as evidence of his successful leadership. This pushed agents to pursue “quantity” over “quality” cases and to misreport their work.

The Bureau also returned to the Justice Department’s progressive origins during the 1920s by targeting its efforts against the KKK. By authority of Reconstruction era civil rights acts, Jeffreys-Jones explains that the BI targeted the
Klan which was “bullying and murdering its way across not just the South, but the nation as a whole, targeting blacks, political opponents, women accused of loose behavior, bootleggers, Catholics, and others who offended its [Protestant] moral and ethnic precepts.”

Though this illegal movement was well within the BI’s jurisdiction, such work was not celebrated or awarded in terms of appropriations. Southern radicals were a far less popular target than their labor counterparts.

Perhaps more rewarding, the young director established a number of relationships that would influence the Bureau’s development. Clyde Tolson joined the agency in 1928 and quickly climbed the ranks. Hoover delegated him with the responsibility of maintaining internal order of the Bureau’s operations and personnel. Another notable relationship developed with Washington Star reporter, Rex Collier. In 1929, the reporter negotiated with Hoover a mutually beneficial arrangement as “friendly” reporters gained access to information and the Bureau gained positive press coverage. Indeed, Sargent’s prohibition of propaganda was soon dismissed.

Hoover systematized press relations by creating his own public relations department, which was closely related to his own approach to scientific management. The War on Crime of the 1930s was foreshadowed through Hoover’s relationship with the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). The IACP’s Committee on Uniform Crime Records successfully lobbied Congress for a Division of Identification and Information to be operated by the Bureau of Investigation in 1924. Hoover suggested the following year that the Division was a “development of science” and “universal cooperation” that combined various fingerprint collections
to “centralize and crystallize” the work of the “chieftains of the army of law enforcement” in their “endless war against crime.” This effort expanded the Bureau’s international focus and established a linguistic framework for the DOJ’s later campaign.

The director used his jurisdiction over the Division of Identification and Information to begin a campaign for authorization to compile and disperse data on crime trends. After five years of lobbying the House Appropriations Committee to fund this project, Congress commissioned the Bureau to collect crime statistics in 1930. According to Powers, crime reporting offered the director “an excuse to put together a staff of researchers and writers that gave the Bureau a potential public relations capability.” Pulp crime writer and circus promoter Courtney Ryley Cooper joined Washington Evening Star reporter Rex Collier to assist the CRD in 1933. Powers suggests that Cooper “convinced Hoover that public relations” was “the bureau’s most important job” and used “Crime Records” as the director’s “face to the world.” Ultimately, the CRD was a vehicle for disseminating the content of the FBI’s records in the press and popular entertainment. Its channels included newspapers, popular press books and elementary school textbooks, law reviews, academic journals, comic strips, speeches, news radio programs, radio dramas, newsreels, government and commercial films, and government, academic, civic, religious and business newsletters, reports, and bulletins. The Bureau’s receipt of cooperative media and the pursuit, capture, and killing of outlaws invited dramatic retellings of events that advantaged the director’s interests.
Tolson originally managed the FBI’s propaganda work. The assistant director was responsible for operating a propaganda mill that produced, according to Claire Bond Potter, “an unrelenting national lobbying campaign throughout 1933” that supported Hoover’s leadership.\(^{229}\) FBI propaganda responsibilities formalized with the establishment of the “Publications Division” (1935), which was subsumed by the “Research Division” (1936), and again by the “Crime Records Division” (1938).\(^{230}\) Assistant Director Louis B. Nichols was hired on the recommendation of Rex Collier as a special agent in 1934.\(^{231}\) He joined the CRD in 1935 and was promoted to its lead position in 1937, after being evaluated as a “Bureau salesman.”\(^{232}\) He explained in an April 1936 memo that he segmented the director’s publics by demographics (i.e., sex, age, and religious affiliation) and spheres of influence. He targeted “civic organizations,” business groups, “police training classes,” “church groups,” “educational groups,” “teacher groups,” “high school [and] grammar school students,” “peace officers,” “accountants,” “college faculty,” and many others.\(^{233}\) Upon his arrival, the CRD’s most pressing function was to research parole and probation systems to locate evidence of their failure to maintain order.\(^{234}\) This duty, along with scientific police work, crime prevention, foreign police systems, federal-local police cooperation, political corruption, juvenile delinquency, sex crime (or homosexual predatory crime), and the organized crime menace all became major themes of its work in this era.\(^{235}\)

The CRD’s first publications included *Uniform Crime Reports* and the *Law Enforcement Bulletin*. Paid for by the appropriation for collecting crime statistics in 1930, the *Bulletin* showcased criminals wanted by the FBI, their fingerprints, and
other identification information. It also included “articles” that, according to 
Hoover, were “of special interest to law-enforcement officials which would usually 
not otherwise be available to them.” The pieces included messages from the 
director and various articles reflecting the CRD’s emphasized themes, especially the 
advancements made by science in federal police work and the new professional 
standards that it set. The Bulletin was mailed to subscribers for free and circulated 
widely around the nation. The director explained in the 1937 Annual Report of the 
Attorney General that the “circulation of the bulletin [was] approximately 14,000 and 
[was] sent monthly to more than 10,400 law-enforcement agencies in the United 
States and 81 foreign countries and territorial possessions.” Members of the press 
and popular entertainment received much of the remaining copies. By 1938, the 
CRD’s publications also included an annual “pamphlet entitled ‘The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation,’” and another “annual publication” that was “entitled ‘Criminal 
Identification and the Functions of the Identification Division.’”

Beyond writing its own material, the CRD was also responsible for cultivating 
relationships with members of local and national media. Assistant Director William 
C. Sullivan observed in 1979 that the “real job” of special agents in charge of each 
field office “was public relations. The SAC was out of the office a lot, visiting the 
‘right’ people, those who molded public opinion in his territory: newspaper publishers 
and editors, owners and managers of radio and television stations, corporate 
executives, and church officials, to name a few.” SACs were expected to plug “the 
bureau line” at “police headquarters, City Hall, Masonic Lodge meetings, Jaycee 
luncheons, even at the local college or university.”
Such promotional efforts encouraged friendly coverage and allowed for the disbursement of camouflaged material that masked its origin and strategic purposes. William Beverly notes that Hoover’s “working relationship” with Collier and Cooper included twenty-four articles in nationally syndicated magazines, four movies, three books, and a nationally syndicated radio program and comic strip. These were all commercial ventures; the CRD, however, closely shaped their storylines and those of many other commercial storylines in an attempt to enhance the Bureau’s crafted image.

The director’s behind-the-scenes relationships with members of the print media created mutually beneficial arrangements. The CRD traded access to Bureau files in return for secret information and favorable coverage from journalists, columnists, editors, and cartoonists. Because the War on Crime generated stories that increased readership in newspapers, magazines, books, and journals, access to Bureau files was a commercially desirable commodity. Likewise, the blacklisting of individuals and publications from Bureau information was a detriment. This system allowed the CRD to cultivate a pool of friendly public opinion leaders, while insulating the FBI from those who were less cooperative. The former were added to the “special correspondents list,” which, according to Natalie Robins, included individuals that “could be counted on for a favor or two”; the latter, “whose attitudes ranged from ambivalent to hostile” were relegated to the “do not contact list.”

Many newspaper reporters eventually became FBI surrogates. Sullivan observed that the “network of field offices” allowed Hoover to “place ‘news’ stories— invented and written in the bureau, really nothing more than press releases,
puff pieces for the FBI—in newspapers around the country.” He explained that the CRD’s strength “was in the small dailies and weeklies; and with hundreds of these papers behind him, Hoover didn’t give a damn about papers like the New York Times or the Washington Post.” However, Sullivan noted that “scores of Washington-based reporters printed stories [the CRD] gave them too, and they usually printed them under their own bylines. Some of them lived off us. It was an easy way to make a living. They were our press prostitutes.”244 The press was lured into a compromising relationship with the FBI in the early 1930s.

The Great Depression invited new expectations for the federal government. Beyond economic failure, Herbert Hoover’s administration was “ridiculed” for its “procedural,” rather than “retributive” response to organized crime; this was accentuated by Al Capone’s 1931 conviction for income tax evasion. Powers observes that the press taught “the public to see crime as a test of the government’s ability to meet violent challenges with violent force.” Instead of action, “President Hoover gave the country lectures about cooperation, states’ rights, and constitutional limits on federal jurisdiction.”245 The perceived crime threat facing the nation made such idealism seem unsatisfying.

The 1932 kidnapping of Charles Lindbergh, Jr. generated a groundswell of support for a national police force capable of curbing interstate gang activity. The two-and-a-half year manhunt for the infant kidnapper and murderer, Bruno Richard Hauptmann, was treated as a “national melodrama” by the press.246 According to a March 1932 story in the New York Herald Tribune, President Hoover’s administration reluctantly mobilized every agency at its “command in the Eastern part of the United
States” to search for the child and his kidnapper. Director Hoover kept close contact with the press, which brought him and his agency nation-wide attention. He used this opportunity to encourage the passage of a federal kidnapping law that would grant his agency jurisdiction over interstate crime. Hoover soon received the authority that he requested with the passage of the Federal Kidnapping Act. This law outlawed the transportation across national borders or state lines any person “unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, or carried away . . . and held for ransom or reward.”

The federal response to interstate problems was conceptualized in militarized language. The New York Herald Tribune suggested, for example, that an “army of desperate criminals” was “winning its battle against society.” It concluded that “the nation should resolve that the armies of lawlessness must be fought down and beaten.” This was an early instance of the “crime-army” metaphor that would capture front page headlines during President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first and second terms in office. The federal government was about to declare its first war on a domestic problem widened the scope of federal law enforcement.

Cultural Pluralism and the Principles of Reform

The movement to expand the DOJ into areas that had been previously governed by the states was a manifestation of a broader campaign to promote idealist programming in federal law enforcement. President Herbert Hoover appointed the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (chaired by former Attorney General Wickersham) and established the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The president used his State of the Union Address to invite the commission “to make the
widest inquiry into the shortcomings of the administration of justice and into the
causes and remedies for them.” President Hoover noted that improved law
enforcement would require “a spirit in our people in support of law” because “the
lawbreaker” was “the enemy of society.” The commission released a fourteen
volume report in 1931 that championed the greater inclusion of marginalized groups
and blamed American culture for its failings during the prohibition era.

The Wickersham Commission located the root of crime in societal factors and
institutional corruption, especially in law enforcement. The commission wrote that
the “social, political, and economic development of the country” was chiefly
responsible for the “criminal situation.” Specifically, it noted that an “apparent
inefficiency of democratic government to cope with modern problems, a long
tradition of lawlessness, [and] a long history of violence” had created conditions
where alliances between “politics” and “organized criminal activities” could
flourish. The problem of public corruption, according to the report, was coupled
with “demoralizing social influences” and “demoralizing institutional experiences,”
which contributed to the “creation of the adult professional criminal.”

The failure of institutions and society to protect marginalized groups was a
central theme of the commission’s reports on juvenile delinquency. It suggested that
“any program for the prevention of crime must begin with the proper treatment of the
child offender.” Large caseloads of juvenile crime had accumulated from “the
prohibition acts, the immigration acts, the motor vehicle theft act, the antinarcotic act,
the white slave act, and the postal laws;” however, they “were in no way more serious
than the average run of juvenile cases.” This was, in part, the reward of Hoover’s
efforts. The commission blamed delinquency on the “invasion” of “industry or commerce” into “residential areas,” which created “slum ‘areas.” This criticism of U.S. culture reproached Henry Clay’s American system of government-subsidized lassie faire capitalism. The report recommended that the “Attorney General” should give “instructions” to “agents of the Bureau of Investigation” and other law enforcement officials “to investigate children’s cases by means of Federal probation officers or local juvenile courts.”254 This would diminish the appropriations and jurisdiction of the Bureau.

The Wickersham Commission blamed Americanists for similar failings in the treatment of immigrants. It argued that for over a “century” there was “continuously in this country a clamorous group” who emphasized “only the difficulties connected with immigration” and “lost sight of all its beneficial effects.” It suggested that a “reason” for this “repetition” included the “easy theory that our social difficulties are not to be charged to our own mistakes and failures. It is easy to shift the responsibly for what is wrong by charging it upon the nationals of other countries.”255 The Wickersham Commission then “exonerated” the “foreign born” from the “charge” of causing a “disproportionate share of the crime current in the country.” The commission also reported that immigrants were apprehensive and suspicious of unjust and invisible deportation laws. It suggested that such procedures were an inexcusable use of force because they violated “guaranties to ‘persons,’” enumerated in the “Bill of Rights,” thus “making them rights of men and not privileges of citizenship.”256

With many allies in the American Bar Association (ABA) to implement its
recommendations, the Wickersham Commission became a liberal vehicle of reform.257

President Hoover also used his State of the Union Address to expand the prison system and to promote prisoner rehabilitation over containment—a core principle of idealism.258 He proclaimed that the country needed “new federal prisons and a reorganization of our probation and parole systems” to “prepare [prisoners] for return to duties of citizenship.” He suggested that there “should be established in the Department of Justice a Bureau of Prisons with a sufficient force to deal adequately with the growing activities of our prison institutions.” The president recommended that “authorization for improvements should be given speedily, with initial appropriations to allow the construction of the new institutions to be undertaken at once.”259 The Wickersham Commission estimated that by 1931 the “annual cost of administering” federal and state prisons was “nearly $30,000,000, and the actual investment in buildings, land and equipment [was] probably near $100,000,000.”260 For 1933 alone, the BOP’s annual appropriation was $12.3 million, which was more than a quarter of the DOJ’s total appropriation and more than quadruple the Bureau of Investigation’s appropriation.261 In short, the nascent BOP overshadowed the twenty-five-year-old investigation bureau.

The origin of the BOP was rooted in the Hoover administration; however, other legislation passed years earlier was also responsible for the Prison Bureau’s sizable appropriations. The Act to Reorganize the Administration of Federal Prisons was passed in May 1930, which “established in the Department of Justice a Bureau of Prisons, to be in charge of a director who . . . shall be appointed by and serve directly
under the Attorney General.” This act charged the BOP director with “the
management and regulation of all Federal penal and correctional institutions” and the
responsibility for the “safe-keeping, care, protection, instruction, and discipline” of all
prisoners. In the event of overcrowding, the attorney general was given authority to
build more institutions by submitting requests to Congress.\footnote{262} The BOP had nineteen
operating institutions by January 1934, excluding Alcatraz, which had not yet opened.
These included penitentiaries, federal jails, reformatories for men, women, and
juveniles, a drug addiction center, a hospital for “defective delinquents,” and
reformatory, correctional, and prison work camps.\footnote{263} These facilities were marked by
decorative architecture, expansive libraries, quality furniture and food, sanitary living
conditions, landscaped grounds, and staffs of social workers.\footnote{264}

Beyond establishing the Prison Bureau, Congress passed a number of laws
reflecting the idealist spirit that drove up the cost of prison operations and expanded
its jurisdiction. It created the Federal Parole Board, granted the Public Health Service
access to federal prisoners, commissioned building projects, diversified prison
employment to expand prisoner “training and schooling in trades and occupation,”
and amended the \textit{Probation Act of 1925} to enlarge the probation system.\footnote{265} Persons
subject to probation remained in the custody of the court; though not confined, they
were required to report to probation officers.\footnote{266} These investigators would be assigned
to counsel the many juvenile offenders, which challenged the FBI’s jurisdiction.

Amending the parole system was highly controversial. The \textit{Good Conduct Act}
of 1932 established a uniform clock for term deductions, which started “with the day
on which a sentence commence[d] to run.”\footnote{267} The Wickersham Commission defined
parole as “a method by which prisoners who have served a portion of their sentences [were] released from penal institutions under the continued custody” of authorities.268 The parole system was first established by the Good Conduct Act of 1902, which was amended by the Parole Act of 1910. The latter act set release at “one-third of the total of the term” for which the prisoner was sentenced if the parole board ruled that release was compatible “with the welfare of society.”269 Preparing citizens for society represented a far different ideological vision for federal law enforcement than Hoover proposed.

Idealist fervor in the DOJ threatened the FBI’s potential for growth. In an era marked by political division over expanding government programs, Hoover spent the 1930s and beyond coordinating with the press and popular media to package stories of an official War on Crime that excited Republicans and Democrats alike. Because the targets were seemingly of epic proportion and seemingly non-ideological, and because the Bureau had an accepted code of professionalism grounded in scientific management, its expansion was widely welcomed and publicized. Federal law enforcement had grown into something far different than Webster and other critics of centralized power had envisioned.

The Expanding Executive

The history of the Justice Department highlights some contours of the presidency’s expansion. The first Congress built institutional limitations to maintain the primacy of states’ rights. Federal law, however, eventually superseded regional law and was centralized under the president’s close supervision. One major step away
from the constitutional framers’ vision came during the Civil War when President Lincoln commissioned his attorney general to undermine Congress and the Court; soon afterward the attorney general was given his own Department to enforce federal law. Establishing the Bureau of Investigation was another step, which President Theodore Roosevelt took to detect and prosecute high level crimes committed by captains of government and industry, especially members of Congress.

Institutionalized law enforcement power bolstered the presidency in two distinct ways. First, the ability to investigate, arrest, prosecute, imprison, and deport targets offered the president a means to neutralize dissidents. This was especially evident in legislation ranging from the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 to the Espionage and Immigration Acts of World War I. And second, the advent of rapid transit and mass media ushered in a form of technocratic control that could manipulate public opinion through systematized censorship and propaganda. The president used these tools to help manufacture support for his policies, thus maintaining the appearance of democracy while undermining some notions of democratic legitimacy. Hoover helped develop such methods during the Great War and Red Scare as an apprentice to the attorneys general.

Hoover learned early on of strategies for social control through coalition building against political activists. Law enforcement, military, religious, and business communities had their own harmony of interests that encouraged secret and sometimes illegal collaborations of force. The president’s various duties made this combination of power almost inevitable. That is, because the executive’s roles blurred between constitutional defender, commander-in-chief, and political candidate, its
constituencies also blurred. This was especially notable when laborers disrupted order, military planning, and industrial profits. By curbing the labor movement, the president could simultaneously serve multiple interests.

Collusions of power still needed public backing. Palmer’s career demonstrated a potential for public opinion management in law enforcement. Before his prediction of a communist revolution in America was discredited, the Justice Department enjoyed wide latitude in its treatment of labor activists, Communist Party members, and immigrants. When the revolt failed to materialize, however, Congress and the courts turned its attention to the DOJ’s illegal practices. These constitutional checks were too powerful for the attorney general’s coalition to overcome.

Working with established interests to curtail what was widely perceived as a foreign threat to America’s internal security was a logical application of the Bureau’s resources. Combating labor radicalism played to popular sentiments long established in American culture against internationalism and minority groups. Targeting the Ku Klux Klan, however, was far less enticing to many because its ideals were more aligned with mainstream values, especially white supremacy, Protestantism, and isolationism. Campaigns against popular targets were more rewarding in terms of public support, which translated into expanded appropriations and jurisdiction.

The presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt further expanded the powers of the executive branch. Scientific management was imported into the public sector by progressives during the Harding administration and beyond. Republicans and Democrats both agreed with a movement toward greater economy and efficiency in government that borrowed from industrial designs. The New Deal created an
environment where notions of scientific government administration flourished even further. Dir. Hoover bolstered the Roosevelt administration by demonstrating the cultural neutrality and effectiveness of the New Deal’s law enforcement program. The director first built up the notoriety of celebrity criminals, and turned their arrests into high profile media events. Such publicity and power offered Hoover an opportunity to avoid some of the ideological battles fought during the New Deal, while reaping the rewards of expanded institutional authority. By scientifically targeting gangsters, Hoover simultaneously appealed to Republicans, Democrats, liberals, and conservatives who were all eager to protest violent crime.
Notes


2 William McKinley, “President McKinley’s Last Public Utterance to the People, Buffalo, N.Y., September 5th, 1901,” in *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Volume XIII*, edited by the Joint Committee on Printing, of the House and Senate (New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1917), 6619-21.


4 Morgan, *William McKinley and His America*, 520.


8 Morgan, *William McKinley and His America*, 524.

9 “Czolgosz Guilty”: 1.


14 Ibid., 31.


24 *Constitution of the United States of America*, Article 2, Section 3, March 4, 1789.

25 *An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States (Judiciary Act of 1789)*, 1st Cong., 1st sess., 1 Stat. 73, sec. 35, September 24, 1789.


30 An Act Supplementary to Amend the Act, Entitled “An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization; and to Repeal the Act heretofore Passed on that Subject” (Naturalization Act of 1798), 5th Cong., 2d sess., 1 stat 566, June 18, 1798.

31 Miller, Crisis in Freedom, 47, 87.

32 An Act Concerning Aliens (Alien Friends Act), 5th Cong., 2d sess., 1 stat 570, June 25, 1798.


43 This opinion is considered “curious” by historians because through it the attorney general rationalized why and how the president could disregard constitutional checks on his office.


45 *Constitution of the United States of America*, Amendment XIII, December 18, 1865; Amendment XIV, July 9, 1868; Amendment XV, February 3, 1870.

An Act to Enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to Vote in the Several States of this Union, and for Other Purposes (Enforcement Act of 1870), Forty First Cong., 2d sess., 16 stat 140, May 31 1870.

Cummings and McFarland, Federal Justice, 226.

Act to Establish the Department of Justice, 41st Cong., 2d sess., 16 Stat. 162, June 22, 1870; Cummings and McFarland, Federal Justice, 224, 220-226.


An Act to Amend an Act Approved May Thirty-One, Eighteen Hundred and Seventy, Entitled “An Act to Enforce the Rights of Citizens of the United States to Vote in the Several States of this Union, and for Other Purposes” (Ku Klux Act), Forty First Cong., 3d sess., 16 stat 433, February 28, 1871.

Cummings and McFarland, Federal Justice, 231.

House Committee on Appropriations, Appropriations, New Offices, Etc., 42d Cong., 1st sess., April 20, 1871, 3.

Cummings and McFarland, Federal Justice, 373.

Attorney General George H. Williams (1871-1875) refused to hire any Democratic lawyers as special counsel in the DOJ, thus filling the department with Republicans in an era of partisan controversy. The attorney general also decided the contested 1872 Louisiana gubernatorial election for the Republican candidate and promised “all necessary assistance” to maintain control of the state. William Pitt Kellogg, “the Republican candidate for governor, together with a legislature sympathetic with his party, was placed in office; and thus the administration at
Washington saddled itself with embarrassment and the state of Louisiana with more chaos by sponsoring a weak and unpopular state government.” Ibid., 233-34, 240-41.

56 United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).

57 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).

58 Cummings and McFarland, Federal Justice, 247.


60 The Paris Commune was a revolutionary socialist government that overthrew the Third Republic of France on March 18, 1871. Assisted by the international communist movement and supported by Parisian workers, the National Guard took control of the capital and called “for a federation of communes, abrogation of rents, confiscation of property, reorganization of credit, the establishment of workshops, and the guarantee of rights, freedom and security for all.” It pursued these ends through “a policy of destructive and violent” action against persons and property. George L. Cherry, “American Metropolitan Press Reaction to the Paris Commune of 1871,” Mid-America: An Historical Review, 32, no. 1 (1950): 3-4; Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, 24-66, 76-79, 144-158.


63 Heale, American Anticommunism, 38.

64 Cummings and McFarland, Federal Justice, 433.


67 Goldstein, Political Repression, 33.


69 Higham, Strangers in the Land, 99-100.


72 Goldstein, Political Repression, 69.


74 Goldstein, Political Repression, 44; Cummings and McFarland, Federal Justice, 293, 442.

75 An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies (Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890), Fifty First Cong., 1st sess., July 2, 1890.

76 Cummings and McFarland, Federal Justice, 438, 441-442.

77 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).

78 Goldstein, Political Repression, 56, 8.

Sundry Civil Appropriation Bill, Congressional Record, 60th cong., 1st sess, May, 1908, 5554.

Charles Bonaparte was a Maryland lawyer and a grand nephew of French emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte. Powers, *Broken*, 48.


Charles J. Bonaparte, “Order,” July 26, 1908, Record Group 60, Entry 121: A1, *Administrative Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda, 1856-1977*, box 1, National Archives and Records Administration—College Park (cited as NARA—CP); Incidentally, some of President Roosevelt’s most vocal detractors in congress would be implicated in antitrust and land-fraud conflicts of interests, including Senator Joseph B. Foraker (R-OH), Representative Walter Smith (R-IA), and Senator Benjamin Tillman (D-SC).

George W. Wickersham, “Order Establishing Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice,” March 16, 1909, Record Group 60, Entry 121, A1, box 1—NARA, CP.


88 Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, 162.


92 *Harrison Narcotics Tax Act*, Public Law No. 223, 63d Cong. 2d sess., December 17, 1914.


95 Jensen, *The Price of Vigilance*, 40-44.

96 Ibid., 25-26, 33-34.

97 Ibid., 45; Kenneth D. Ackerman, *Young J. Edgar* (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2007), 19.


112 These missions were gleaned from a series of correspondences in “General Correspondence of George Creel, Chairman, July 1917-Mar 1919,” Record Group 63, Entry 1, NC-7, box 2, folder 44: “Bielaski, Bruce,” NARA—CP.

113 Winton G. Clabaugh to Bruce Bielaski, January 15, 1918, “General Correspondence of George Creel, Chairman, July 1917-Mar 1919,” Record Group 63, Entry 1, NC-17, box 2, folder 44: “Bielaski, Bruce,” NARA—CP.

114 Thomas W. Gregory to George Creel, December 26, 1917, “General Correspondence of George Creel, Chairman, July 1917-Mar 1919,” Record Group 63, Entry 1, NC-7, box 10, folder 265: “Gregory, Thomas W.” —NARA, CP; Thomas W. Gregory to Newton D. Baker, December 26, 1917, “General Correspondence of
George Creel, Chairman, July 1917-Mar 1919,” Record Group 63, Entry 1, NC-7, box 10, folder 265: “Gregory, Thomas W.” —NARA, CP.

George Creel to Thomas W. Gregory, January 23, 1918, “General Correspondence of George Creel, Chairman, July 1917-Mar 1919,” Record Group 63, Entry 1, NC-7, box 10, folder 265: “Gregory, Thomas W.” —NARA, CP.

Mock and Larson, *Words that Won the War*, 47.

Ackerman, *Young J. Edgar*, 44.

Coincidentally, a “John E. Hoover” began work in the Office of the Attorney General on August 2, 1916. Notably, J. Edgar Hoover’s first appointment letter of July 20, 1917, was addressed to “J.E.H. Hoover.” And, his second appointment letter of the same date was addressed to “John Edgar Hoover” along with the following note: “Not J.E.H. Hoover as previously reported.” This may reflect confusion caused by having two men named John E. Hoover working in the DOJ and also suggests why J. Edgar Hoover abbreviated his name. Thomas W. Gregory to John E. Hoover, August 2, 1916, Record Group 60, Entry 312, A1, Volume 125, page 160—NARA, CP; Thomas W. Gregory to J. E. H. Hoover, July 20, 1917, Record Group 60, Entry 312, A1, Volume 127, page 256—NARA, CP; Sam J. Graham to John Edgar Hoover, July 20, 1917, Record Group 60, Entry 312, A1, Volume 127, page 256-57—NARA, CP.

Ackerman, *Young J. Edgar*, 58; See the following file for more on the War Emergency Division: Record Group 60, Entry 112-B, A1, boxes 2818 through 2824, file# 190470.

Frank Burke to T. Dec. Ruth, July 25, 1919, Record Group 165, Entry 68, NM-84, box 4057, file PF 26737, NARA—CP.


The GID was originally named the “Radical Division.” Its name was changed in 1920. A. Mitchell Palmer to J. Edgar Hoover, July 01, 1919, Record Group 60, Entry 312, Volume 134, page 678—NARA, CP; Cummings and McFarland, *Federal Justice*, 429n.


Ackerman, *Young J. Edgar*, 416.


Ibid., 18.


140 Ronald Kessler, *The Bureau*, 82-83.
Known as the Committee of Twelve, this group of esteemed legal minds included Zechariah Chaffee Jr., Professor of Law at Harvard Law School; Felix Frankfurter, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School; Roscoe Pound, Dean of Harvard Law School; Alfred S. Niles, former judge and Professor of Law at Maryland University Law School; Ernst Freund, Professor of Law at University of Chicago Law School; Tyrrel Williams, Dean of Washington University Law School in St. Louis; Francis Fisher Kane, former United States Attorney from Philadelphia; R.G. Brown, attorney from Memphis, Tennessee; Swinburne Hale, attorney from New York City; Jackson H. Ralston, attorney from Washington, D.C.; David Wallerstein, attorney from Philadelphia; and Frank P. Walsh, attorney from New York and Kansas City.


Powers, Not Without Honor, 31.

House Committee on Rules, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer on Charges Made Against Department of Justice by Louis F. Post and Others. Senate Judiciary Committee, Charges of Illegal Practices of the Department of Justice.


Jeffery-Jones, The FBI, 79.


158 The Know Nothing movement began with the “American Party,” Hans L. Trefousse, Carl Schurz (Konxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1982), 73-74

159 Higham, Strangers in the Land, 4-6, 8, 10-11.


166 For more on Theodore Roosevelt’s treatment of Americanism, see Leroy G. Dorsey, We are All Americans, Pure and Simple: Theodore Roosevelt and the Myth of Americanism (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2007).

167 Theodore Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life (New York, Century, 1901), 1, 6, 7.


170 As president, Roosevelt would further develop these themes in his Corollary (1904) to the Monroe Doctrine. This established the criteria for preemptive invasion and colonization of countries in the Western Hemisphere in the name of “international relations” and in the form of “international police” to protect against the “powers of evil.” Theodore Roosevelt, “Fourth Annual Message to Congress,” in
A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents (New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1917), 6922-6924.


William F. Wu defines the Yellow Peril as “the threat to the United States that some white” Americans “believed was posed by the peoples of East Asia.” Its common themes included “military invasion from Asia, perceived competition to the white labor force from Asian workers, the alleged moral degeneracy of Asian people, and the potential genetic mixing of Anglo-Saxons with Asians, who were considered a biologically inferior race.” In *The Yellow Peril: Chinese Americans in American Fiction, 1850-1940* (Hamden: Archon Book, 1982), 1.


Mary Todd explains that Christian fundamentalism attempted to maintain “historical continuity” at its inception in America to “recapture” and restore a
“glorified past.” Ultimately, it was a coping strategy to deal with the “stresses of change” and from which to base its “opposition to change.” Fundamentalists, thus, used “Americanism” to rearticulate themes common to nineteenth century political thought, including isolationism, industrialism, sexual spheres, militant Christianity, Anglo-Saxonism, anti-radicalism, and anti-Catholicism. Authority Vested: A Story of Identity and Change in the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod (Grand Rapids, Wm. B Eerdmans, 2000), 146.


In addition to other values inherent to his discipleship, Jesus used the Sermon on the Mount to encourage mercifulness, peacemaking, forgiveness, charity, and humility as well as to discourage the idolization of wealth and the condemnation of others. Mt 5:3-7:21.


The *Bishops' Program of Social Reconstruction* (1919) used Pope Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* (1891)—a pillar of social justice movement—to form a guide for remodeling American politics, society, and economy. Ibid., 82, 73.


201 Committee on Efficiency Ratings to Solicitor General, May 18, 1922, Record Group 60, Entry 121-A, A1, box 40, Circular 1299, NARA—CP.

202 Daugherty to Officers of the Department of Justice, August 3, 1922, Record Group 60, Entry 121-A, A1, box 41, Order 1330, NARA—CP.

203 Rush L. Holland to Officials of the Department of Justice, July 5, 1923, Record Group 60, Entry 121-A, A1, box 40, Circular 1436, NARA—CP; George E. Strong to All U.S. Officials in the Department in Washington and in the Field Service, April 30, 1924, Record Group 60, Entry 121-A, A1, box 41, Circular 1509, NARA—CP.


Ibid., 27.


Harry M. Daugherty to All Officers and Employes (sic), October 1, 1922, Record Group 60, Entry 121-A, A1, box 41, Circular 1348, NARA—CP.

Harland F. Stone to All United States Attorneys, United States Marshals, and Officers of the Bureau of Investigation, June 11, 1924, Record Group 60, Entry 121-A, A1, box 41, Circular 1521, NARA—CP.

John G. Sargent to the Department of Justice, March 20, 1925, Record Group 60, Entry 121-A, A1, box 41, Circular 1601, NARA—CP; This was in line with previous rules on press relations, see George Wickersham to Heads of Departments and Bureau Chiefs, undated, Record Group 60, Entry 325, A1, box 1, Circular 77, NARA—CP.

John G. Sargent to All Officers and Employees of the Department of Justice, September 1, 1926, Record Group 60, Entry 121-A, A1, box 42, Circular 1748, NARA—CP


218 Record group 65, entry 37-A: A1, “Classification 61 (Treason) - Index to Headquarters Case Files, 1921-1936” —NARA, CP.

219 Powers, Secrecy and Power, 145.


222 Ungar, FBI, 253.

223 Potter, War on Crime, 128.

J. Edgar Hoover, “32nd Annual Conference,” July 14, 1925 (International Association of Chiefs of Police), Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 6, Pages 1-2, 4, 8, NARA—CP.


Powers, G-Men: Hoover’s FBI in American Popular Culture, 111.


Memorandum from Clyde Tolson to J. Edgar Hoover, May 8, 1934, File# 67-9524 Sec. 1, Record Group 65, Entry 13 Box 1, NARA—CP.

Memorandum from R.E. Joseph to Clyde Tolson, December 5, 1935, File# 67-9524 Sec. 1, Record Group 65, Entry 13, Box 1, NARA—CP; Memorandum for J. Edgar Hoover, August 21, 1937, File# 67-9524 Sec. 2, Record Group 65, Entry 13 Box 1, NARA—CP; Memorandum from T.D. Quinn J. Edgar Hoover, May 15, 1937, File# 67-9524 Sec. 2, Record Group 65, Entry 13, Box 1, NARA—CP.

Memorandum to J. Edgar Hoover, April 13, 1936, File# 67-9524 Sec. 1, Record Group 65, Entry 13, Box 1, NARA—CP.

Memorandum from R.E. Joseph to Clyde Tolson, December 5, 1935.

For example, M.L. Ramsay “U.S. To Pattern Kidnap Unit on Scotland Yard,” Washington Herald, July 27, 1933, Group 65, Entry 49, Box 3, NARA—CP;


239 To view all recipients, see finding aid for Record Group 65, Classification 94 (Research Matters) in Room 2000 at NARA—CP. This finding aid reflects all CRD contacts.

240 J. Edgar Hoover to R.G. Conover, January 14, 1938, Record Group 60, Entry 140, Box 9, File: VII: The FBI, NARA—CP.


Sullivan and Brown, _The Bureau: My Thirty Years on Hoover’s FBI_, 83.

Ibid., 174.

Ibid., 175.

“Lindberghs Hope for Baby’s Safe Return Today; Still Lack Directions for Meeting Ransom Demand; President Puts All Federal Police Agents on Search,” _New York Herald Tribune_, March 3, 1932: 1, 8.


The National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, chaired by former Attorney General George W. Wickersham, represented one of idealism’s more focused attempts to reform domestic political culture. Wickersham was appointed to this post for his widely respected legal stature. Beyond serving as attorney general under President Taft (1909-1913), he also was appointed to the War Trade Board by President Wilson, and was elected President of the American Bar Association’s American Law Institute (1923-1936). And, he would go on to serve as President of the Council on Foreign Relations (1933-1936), which published _Foreign Affairs_. He died while in office, thus ending his leadership of these organizations.


257 For example, the Dean of Duke’s Law School, Justin Miller, noted in a 1933 letter to the President of the American Bar Association that his organization was “coming to play an increasingly important part in the life of this country, and that” they all had “tremendous responsibilities to measure up to in providing leadership for
the further guidance of those who are charged with the duties of government and the administration of justice.” Justin Miller to Clarence E. Martin, September 11, 1933, Record Group 60, Entry 139, Box 1, File: American Bar Association. Dean Justin Miller would become the Special Executive Assistant to the Attorney General in 1934.


259 Herbert Hoover, “State of the Union,” December 3, 1929, in Public Papers of the President of the United States, 295.


262 An Act to Reorganize the Administration of Federal Prisons; to Authorize the Attorney General to Contract for the Care of United States Prisoners; to Establish Federal Jails, and for Other Purposes, Public Law 218, Sec. 1, 2, 4, 71st Cong., 2d sess., May 14, 1930, 325-326.


An Act to Fix the Date when Sentence of Imprisonment shall Begin to Run, Providing when the Allowances to a Prisoner of Time for Good Conduct shall begin to Run, and Further to Extend the Provisions of the Parole Laws, Public Law 219, 72d Cong., 1st sess., June 29, 1932, 381.


Chapter 2: The War on Crime

On the morning of June 17th, 1933, a phalanx of law enforcement officers escorted gangster Frank “Jelly” Nash through the terminal of Kansas City’s Union Station toward the parking lot.¹ The outlaw was an escaped prisoner from the federal penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas. The officers included three Bureau of Investigation (BI) special agents and policemen from Oklahoma City and Kansas City, Missouri.² Some travelers noticed the wedge of men and concluded that “Pretty Boy” Floyd had been captured because “the morning papers carried the news that Floyd had arrived in town the night before; it was all anyone was talking about,” observes Bryan Burrough.³

As the group began piling into their automobiles, Floyd appeared with a machine gun in front of Nash’s car and ordered everyone to raise their hands. A policeman sitting behind Nash fired at the gunman, which triggered a “fusillade of machine gun bullets” that raked the car. The historian suggests that the two police officers in the back seat “jerked like marionettes, splashes of blood erupting across their chests and faces; both men were dead before they hit the ground. In the front seat Frank Nash’s head exploded.” Outside of the car, Special Agent Raymond Caffrey “was blown against the hood and crumpled to the pavement in a heap.”⁴ The unidentified murderer and his accomplices escaped by car, sustaining minor injuries; the wanted men subsequently went into hiding. Special Agent R.E. Vetterli “placed a call within minutes to J. Edgar Hoover informing him of the events in Kansas City,” which expanded the director’s movement against banditry.⁵ He soon ordered his agents to bring the culprits to justice dead or alive.⁶
Attorney General Homer Stille Cummings interpreted the Kansas City Massacre as a test to federal authority. According to a June 1933 New York Times article, he “answered the challenge with an order to set the entire department on the trail of the killers,” thus escalating a War on Crime that he had previously envisioned. Just one week earlier, Cummings spoke of a New Deal “campaign” against “the racketeers of high finance and the racketeers of violence and bloodshed,” which would be an “unrelenting and persistent effort continued over a long period of time.” Of course, J. Edgar Hoover’s BI had limited jurisdiction to lead such a charge, even lacking jurisdiction to investigate the events in Kansas City. Though the attorney general acknowledged that his Department of Justice (DOJ) and its bureaus operated with restricted budgets and limited appropriations, he committed his office to pressing “forward with confidence, faith and good will” in the area of crime prevention. A nationwide anti-crime drive was about to commence that symbolized and publicized the effectiveness of the New Deal’s centralization of power in the federal government in order to meet the national crisis. Indeed, the massacre “generated a shock wave felt all the way to Franklin Roosevelt’s desk in the Oval Office.”

New Dealers recognized the War on Crime as symptomatic of a shrinking world that called for greater coordination across government agencies to maximize efficiency. Special Assistant to the Attorney General Joseph B. Keenan wrote in an August 1933 New York Times article that “vast changes have taken place in the vital affairs of life,” including the advent of automobiles, airplanes, telephones, and radio, which sped up “travel” and “communication.” These inventions, he suggested, gave
rise to “immense problems in law enforcement as well as economics.” Because state borders demarcated the limitations of local jurisdictions in the “various states” and prevented the prosecution of interstate crime, he recommended expanding the jurisdiction and appropriations of J. Edgar Hoover’s Division of Investigation (DI) to serve all “citizens of the United States.” The Division of Investigation was the official title of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) until July 1935. The DI (and the FBI) represented the consolidation of the Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Identification, and the Bureau of Prohibition.¹³ The reorganization expanded Hoover’s jurisdiction to include federal prohibition through the Volstead Act.¹⁴ Of course, Keenan’s sentiment to expand the DI was a part of a larger movement that recognized the New Deal as a function of juristic activism inspired by a philosophy of political idealism.¹⁵

FDR used his first State of the Union address to compare the questionable practices of bankers with racketeers and kidnappers. He stated that the nation was “shocked by the many notorious examples of injuries done our citizens” by “high officials of banks” and “organized banditry.” These “violations of ethics and these violations of law,” he suggested, called “on the strong arm of the government for their immediate suppression; they also call[ed] on the country for an aroused public opinion.”¹⁶ The support offered to Attorney General Cummings by President Franklin D. Roosevelt would arguably best serve Director Hoover, who would use the Crime Records Division (CRD) to locate himself at the center of the New Deal’s War on Crime.
The DOJ, however, was not unified in its anti-crime drive. The establishment of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the Federal Parole Board under the direction of Sanford Bates marked an ideological divide in the DOJ. The Justice Department began to examine crime as a social product, rather than as an individual defect, thus curable by reformative programming. Director Bates championed a more humane approach to criminal justice programming that sought the rehabilitation of deviant social members. His arrival in 1929 came with expansive appropriations and jurisdiction which dwarfed Hoover’s agency.

The ensuing rivalry between the two directors represents J. Edgar Hoover’s first full scale public opinion management campaign, an effort so successful it would remain Hoover’s primary tool for consolidating power and expanding operations throughout his long career. He proposed to the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) in October 1937 that together they “must carry on a never-ending campaign of information” by which they could “make partners of the public.” This suggestion was made well after the fact, as he had already begun secretly strategizing the campaign on behalf of his own political interests.

J. Edgar Hoover used the press and popular entertainment to begin a longer process of militarizing the FBI. During the War on Crime this movement was predicated on notions of scientific management and efficiency. This campaign unraveled constitutional safeguards and destabilized a coalition of prison reformers in the BOP, the DOJ, and the American Bar Association (ABA). Hoover’s Americanist conspiracy theories propagated notions of a criminal conspiracy that linked low-level criminals to his idealist opposition in the DOJ. He discredited rehabilitation
advocates who challenged his containment strategies by associating gangsters with reformers through a vermin metaphor. Hoover further enhanced and expanded the vermin metaphor with ancillary contagion and parasite metaphors. The juxtaposition between a scientific-expert and a “rat” conspirator ultimately elevated the FBI and undermined the BOP. Hoover circulated spectacular narratives and militant metaphors through the press that aligned his leadership of the FBI with the urban-crime genre. In this realm, order was created by violence which was also a presumption of political realism.

This chapter begins with an examination of the War on Crime as a historical movement against gangsters, surveying the FBI’s major busts and political opposition. It then examines the infusion of liberal principles and programs into the DOJ, which challenged Hoover’s law enforcement philosophy and authority. Finally, the chapter explicates the director’s rhetorical styling to construct himself, the FBI, and its agents in terms of militant and scientific action detective heroes. It also examines the manner in which his political opposition and gangsters alike were constructed as component parts of a conspiracy through the vermin metaphor. This argument privileged deterrence strategies and the realist worldview over rehabilitation and its idealist principles. The chapter analyzes the public campaign that helped establish a mutually beneficial relationship between the director and the president, which simultaneously championed the New Deal and the FBI; both were ultimately bolstered by the War on Crime.
Crime and Politics

The anti-crime movement targeted notorious interstate gangsters, which offered the Federal Bureau of Investigation a nation-wide stage to demonstrate its necessity and efficiency. However, in an age of public distrust and distaste for politicians and bankers, some crime reporters sympathized and glamorized press savvy outlaws, like John Dillinger, which threatened the support of the DOJ’s campaign. Beyond this obstacle, detractors in the executive branch, Congress, and the press attacked J. Edgar Hoover’s policing methods and self-promotional activities, thus challenging his leadership and presence in the Roosevelt administration.

The public campaign against banditry was an early test of the New Deal’s emphasis on cooperation between federal and local governments. The hallmarks of the Bureau’s gangster era were bookmarked between the apprehensions of bank robber George “Machine Gun” Kelly in September 1933 and racketeer Louis “Lepke” Buchalter in August 1939. Though the FBI announced the completion of its campaign against gangsters in 1938, the Buchalter arrest represented the Bureau’s first strike against the Italian-American mafia and was publicized like other major busts. Hoover often took sole credit for the G-men’s accomplishments even though his agents worked closely with local police departments in the location, apprehension, and killing of “public enemies.” This term was coined by the Chicago Crime Commission and promoted in popular entertainment like the blockbuster film The Public Enemy (1931).

The director’s success was measured by the containment of high profile criminals and by the expansion of the Bureau’s jurisdiction and appropriations.
Alcatraz Federal Penitentiary was then considered the only “super prison” capable of holding alleged “super criminals,” and evidenced the extraordinary ability of G-men at bringing public enemies to justice. The president and Congress assisted the DOJ by passing the Omnibus Crime Bill in May 1934, which made robbing national banks and those insured by the Federal Reserve System a federal crime. According to Curt Gentry, the crime bill also regulated the following activities with federal law:

- the transportation of stolen property,
- the transmission of threats,
- racketeering in interstate commerce,
- and the flight of a felon or witness across state lines to avoid prosecution or giving testimony. The Lindbergh Law was amended to add the death penalty and to create a presumption of interstate transportation of the victim after seven days, thus allowing the Bureau to enter the case.

Perhaps even more telling of the director’s success at promoting his agency was the expansion of its appropriations during the Great Depression. The Bureau grew from $2.75 million for fiscal year 1933 to $6.6 million for fiscal year 1939. This expansion, according to Hoover’s testimony in the Annual Report of the Attorney General, included developing the “training school for appointees,” creating a “system of uniform crime reporting based on police records,” opening the “technical-research laboratory and the single-fingerprint section” in 1933, and launching the Bureau’s National Police Academy in 1935. The Bureau “initiated an international exchange of criminal identification data” with “practically every important nation” in 1932, thus further expanding its international focus. The agency’s growth in jurisdiction and appropriations, and its militarization through an emphasis on scientific police administration, were encouraged by Hoover’s bureaucratic leadership. The director’s
rhetorical style emphasized his professionalism and competence in an age of
disrepute for most other police agencies.

The FBI’s rapid expansion throughout the War on Crime was also related to
New Deal programming that recognized crime control as symbolic of federal
efficiency. FDR announced at the December 1934 Attorney General’s Conference on
Crime that the “constant struggle to safeguard ourselves against the attacks of the
lawless and the criminal elements” was a “component part” of his “large objective” to
release and direct the “vital forces that make for a healthy national life.” Therefore,
the president concluded, “law enforcement officers” were to be remedied of
“inadequate organization, unscientific administration and lack of public support and
understanding.”25 These statements expanded upon his May 1934 “Statement on
Signing Bill to Help the Federal Government Wage War on Crime and Gangsters” in
which he proclaimed that spreading “fear in the underworld” was an “event of the
first importance.” He then suggested that “[l]aw enforcement and gangster
extermination” could not become “completely effective so long” as the “public
look[ed] with tolerance upon known criminals, permits public officers to become
corrupted” or “applauds efforts to romanticize crime.” The president’s rhetorical
selection of “extermination” highlights the linguistic framework in which Hoover
emphasized the vermin metaphor. Roosevelt sought to arouse “public opinion” by
equipping the FBI with “new facilities, men and funds” to make it as “effective an
instrumentality of crime detection and punishment as any of the similar agencies of
the world.”26 Such reasoning conflated notions of authority, efficiency, and force
through a symbolic relationship between crime and punishment; the FBI director would adroitly expand upon this arrangement.

Hoover’s victories in the War on Crime began with a series of arrests and killings between 1933 and 1934 that framed the Bureau as a militaristic agency. The arrest of “Machine Gun” Kelly in September 1933 came a month after the arrest of Harvey Bailey, but was far more significant. Burrough suggests that the Kelly “arrest marked a turning point in Bureau history” because he “was the first nationally known fugitive the FBI had ever captured.” In addition to the arrest coining the term “G-men,” it “furthered the notion that there existed a realm of larger-than-life supervillains loose in the land, popularized the idea that the nation was actually at war with these criminals, and catapulted the Bureau into the public consciousness as the nation’s proxy in that war.” The War on Crime narrative constituted the Bureau in a militant style and helped Hoover to fashion a reality that existed more in dime novels. Pulp fiction and true crime magazines transformed mystery into conspiracy and criminals into powerful villains with evil motivations and political connections. Hoover used notorious outlaws like “Machine Gun” Kelly to reify such storylines. The director cast himself, the FBI, and its agents as protagonists, while criminals, as well as his political opposition, represented the antagonists. This juxtaposition advocated his militant law enforcement philosophy. In this manner, a frightening world and an ideologically appropriate worldview were hoisted upon the citizenry through the Crime Record Division’s public relations material.

The public was captivated again in January 1934, when Kate “Ma” Barker and her son, Fred, were killed in a shootout against Bureau agents before the G-men had
authorization to carry firearms. Bonnie and Clyde met a similar fate that May as they drove into an ambush. Perhaps most prominent was the July killing of John Dillinger when leaving a Chicago movie theater by Special Agent in Charge, Melvin Purvis. Dillinger was treated by the press as an “all-American anti-hero,” which made him more popular by some estimates than President Roosevelt or Charles Lindbergh.  

His killing was also treated with much fanfare. Two months later, the Bureau arrested Bruno Hauptman for the kidnap and murder of Charles Lindbergh Jr.  

In October, Melvin Purvis returned to the headlines for hunting down and killing “Pretty Boy” Floyd. And, “Baby Face” Nelson and Special Agent Samuel Cowley killed each other in a November shootout.  

Purvis obviously gained prominence for his successes, which arguably detracted from Hoover’s publicity. The director’s jealousy was provoked. According to Richard Gid Powers, Purvis was “forced to resign from the Bureau” for this after months of “harassment” from Hoover on July 10, 1935.  

The quantity of major busts against high profile offenders would decrease after Nelson; the director’s involvement, however, would notably increase. Known as “Director’s Cases,” Hoover was credited for the final four major arrests in the War on Crime: Alvin “Old Creepy” Karpis and Harry Campbell in May 1936, Harry Brunette in December of that same year, and Louis “Lepke” Buchalter in August 1939.  

Buchalter was the leader of a notorious mafia organization known as Murder Inc.—which included such notables as Benjamin “Bugsy” Siegel and Meyer Lansky—and his arrest was arranged by columnist and radio personality Walter Winchell, who used the opportunity to promote himself and Hoover. Buchalter was the only Mafioso arrested by the Bureau in the 1930s and, despite Hoover’s accusations
against his political rivals, the only one with political connections. His mediated arrest showcased the same press strategizing as the previous busts and was the last gangster era Director’s Case. In sum, the campaign captured five outlaws and killed eleven others. Five of those killed were wanted for non-capital offenses, especially bank robbery, and one was not wanted at all.

The media’s coverage of these outlaws posed its own challenge to the Department of Justice. The widespread distrust of bankers and government officials encouraged some writers to sympathize more with the major criminal personalities. William Beverly notes that John Dillinger “understood public relations” and enjoyed “popular media representations that aestheticized him and repressed the danger he posed” so much that “he briefly became more popular than his G-man pursuers.”

For example, *Time* magazine exclaimed in May 1934 that “to be plentifully loved and diligently hunted [was] the lot of desperadoes.” *Time* also referred to Dillinger as “Robin Hood”— a metaphor that equated Hoover with the villainous Sheriff of Nottingham. Such framing obviously threatened the director’s stature, which in turn jeopardized the Bureau’s jurisdiction and appropriations.

While Hoover publicly campaigned to build his and the Bureau’s national reputations, he also fought political opponents behind the scenes to maintain control of his agency and his status. The director quarreled with Democratic Party boss and Postmaster General James Farley, who sought to remove Hoover from office when the Roosevelt administration came to power. This contributed to an uncooperative relationship between Bureau agents and postal inspectors. Relations with the Treasury Department’s Secret Service also remained competitive. The director
officially changed the name of the Division of Investigation to the “Federal Bureau of Investigation” on July 1, 1935. According to Gentry, the rebranding was “protested” by the “Treasury Department’s chief law enforcement officer. The new name implied that Hoover’s was the only federal bureau of investigation” even though “there were at least a dozen others, including Treasury’s own Secret Service.”

Hoover also fought against detractors in Congress and the press. Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Kenneth D. McKellar (D-TN) sympathized with Farley’s campaign against the director. The Bureau had ransacked the senator’s office when the DOJ was controlled by the Herbert Hoover administration. In addition, the director refused to comply with the senator’s request that Hoover hire some of his constituents as special agents, and even fired three Tennessee agents when McKellar complained to the attorney general. Sentiment against Hoover could also be found in the press.

Ray Tucker wrote in a 1933 *Collier’s* article that Hoover had turned the Bureau into a “secret federal police” that operated as a “personal and political machine,” that the director never “did any field investigating himself,” and that his “appetite for publicity [was] the talk of the Capital.” He also alluded to an effeminate demeanor. For example, Tucker observed that Hoover “walk[ed] with mincing step” and “dresse[d] fastidiously, with Eleanor blue as the favorite color for the matched shades of tie, handkerchief and socks.” The reporter noted that Hoover was averse to “liberals and advanced thinkers,” and warned members of the press that if they “write or speak criticism” of Hoover, Bureau agents would “investigate your wife, your friends, even your ancestors.” The administration of federal police work was, thus,
politically charged and vulnerable to the same accusations that characterized local police administrations in their enforcement of prohibition laws. The director’s past strikes against Democrats were heretofore protected by the former attorney general and appreciated by President Hoover. The FBI director, however, now needed to reinvent himself for the New Deal or find himself replaced by a Roosevelt loyalist.

_Institutions and Ideologies_

The War on Crime was waged during an era of uncertainty for law enforcement ideals. The DOJ encountered ideological divisions between its bureau directors who pushed the department in opposite directions. President Hoover established the Federal Bureau of Prisons in 1930 under the leadership of Director Sanford Bates. Like the FBI director, the BOP director reported directly to the attorney general, making the position horizontal to the FBI director. The arrival of Sanford Bates represented a challenge to J. Edgar Hoover’s organizational potential, as the former enjoyed the privileges of ideological alignment with the legal community. This opposition presented Director Hoover with an ideological challenge to his realist worldview and limited his ability to curb crime through deterrence strategies.

Like Hoover, Director Bates managed a statistical unit. According to Bates’ appropriations testimony before Congress, that division compiled data on “the number and character of penitentiary and jail prisoners.” And, like the FBI’s CRD, this data created an opportunity for the BOP to publicize its work. The statistical bureau published the annual publication, _Federal Offenders_, and distributed it to “institutions,” judges, district attorneys, probation officers, and “to those interested in
parole.” The publication interposed articles written by the director and other rehabilitation advocates between statistical reports, thus serving as a liberal vestige. Federal Offenders, coupled with a book on American prisons, a report on juvenile delinquents in the Soviet Union, and a few newspaper articles and speeches, represented Bates’ limited media reach. His expertise focused on juveniles, which Hoover would refute with his own ideas on the topic.

Bates promoted the intellectual underpinnings of the BOP’s rehabilitative operations. He wrote in an August 1938 Forum Magazine article that the “problem of the discharged prisoner ha[d] always been a difficult one. Society ha[d] not yet learned how to punish a man and reform him at the same time.” He noted that many men “leave prison with a resolve to go straight,” but noted that this often broke down when the released prisoner attempted “to confront a hostile or unsympathetic society single-handedly.” To ease the transition, “a period of supervision” was “added to the end of a man’s prison term.” He contended that the “good parole system” made possible the adjustment of the release date “to a time when employment can be obtained.” It also provided an “incentive for good behavior,” assisted a “well-intentioned prisoner to rehabilitate himself,” retuned a “violator” to prison “without trial,” and enabled “the authorities to keep a check on the man’s conduct and whereabouts.”

Director Bates championed his own scientific leadership in the rehabilitation effort. He boasted that “in good parole systems, such as that of the federal government, not more than ten percent of discharged prisoners violate regulations during the period of their parole.” He used the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports as
evidence that “less than 1 per cent” of “all men now being arrested for crime” were “found to be on parole at the time of arrest.” Therefore, Bates suggested, the “wiser and more careful the system of parole which [was] devised, the more protection will be.” In using the FBI’s data to build his own argument, Bates challenged Hoover’s control of information and philosophy of law enforcement.

The rivalry posed by Sanford Bates to J. Edgar Hoover was significant for a number of reasons. Being the only other DOJ bureau director, Bates served as Hoover’s foremost competitor for appropriations. This juxtaposition created clashes at points of overlapping jurisdiction. Controlling his own statistical division, Bates was in a position to check Hoover’s expertise with his own. Both men used aggregated data as evidence for claims on reality. Whereas Hoover recommended that “society [should] preserve itself” from the frightening criminal threat with the “Machine Gun School of Criminology,” Bates recommended protecting society through rehabilitating prisoners as recommended by the widely popular Wickersham Commission. In Bates’ vision, most prisoners were persons who would better themselves if they had such opportunity; the militarized law enforcement apparatus that Hoover would spend his career building was therefore not justified.

The FBI and BOP were linked through criminals in custody. As the FBI arrested more and more individuals for violating the various laws under its jurisdiction, its suspects would eventually transfer to the Prison Bureau’s custody. This inflated the BOP at an accelerated rate, which threatened Hoover’s appropriations and room for institutional growth. Bates explained to the House Appropriations Committee in 1936 that the prison population was ballooning at an
unforeseen rate, in part, because of the “general increased activity of the Department of Justice in the old lines of crime.” Of course, he also wrote in the *New York Times* that America had “more crime” than other nations because it had “more crimes. We have attempted to lift people to a higher standard of morality” by the “doubtful method of punishing them into conformity.” Such statements challenged Americanism and its enforcers.

Ideological differences between bureau directors created conflict. The *Washington Herald* reported in October 1935 that a “feud long standing in the Department of Justice” had surfaced “between Hoover and Sanford Bates, director of the Bureau of Prisons and Paroles.” The newspaper explained that “Hoover’s outspoken attack on parole abuses furthered the strife” and that the assistant attorneys general “sided with Bates.” Central to DOJ infighting was the core disagreement between realism and idealism regarding the humanity of criminals and how they ought to be treated. More money for criminal rehabilitation meant less for detection and apprehension. Beyond organizing the FBI to combat crime, Hoover also mobilized it to combat alternative political positions. For this reason, he built the FBI on the twin foundations of domestic propaganda and censorship long before challenges were posed by the Axis powers or the Soviet Union.

Director Hoover looked to public opinion management for his faceoff with Sanford Bates. He invited Courtney Ryley Cooper to advertise the FBI through print, radio, and film. Cooper turned the G-men into a national sensation by reframing the federal officers as action detective heroes, which played to various national undercurrents that supported militarism. In this manner, crime news was reported as
entertainment while the Bureau’s movements became a part of popular culture. In the
process, Hoover became both a law enforcement expert and a celebrity.

Rhetorical Strategizing in the War on Crime

The CRD’s process of invention pulled from various American historical and
cultural facets. Powers explains that Hoover, Cooper, and the CRD developed an
“FBI formula” for law enforcement propaganda. It unified “all aspects of the FBI’s
operations into one coherent image” and it “became the model for all future
publicity.” The formula relied on standards established by scientific managers, as
well as realist assumptions of force, to present the Bureau as a professional corrective
to solve the nation’s lawlessness. Cooper borrowed concepts from an immensely
popular action detective genre in constructing the director’s political leadership
within the DOJ. Cooper then used this identity to link the problem of gangsters to that
of public corruption. Cooper’s material emphasized the vermin metaphor, which
lumped criminals, lawyers, politicians, and idealists together in a grand conspiracy. In
the process, Hoover’s worldview and interpretations were pitted against the
leadership and ideology of Sanford Bates; the latter were implicated with corruption.

This section uses newspapers, speeches, departmental orders, government
reports, letters, and FBI files to reconstruct an environment that had bearing on the
rhetorical invention of Hoover’s ideas. According to Ronald H. Carpenter,
historiographical research helps “explain what happened as a prelude to discourse”
and the “choices” made in “creative processes.” In so doing, this case study
highlights certain economic and ideological pressures that Hoover’s information
campaign sought to intersect. As Steven Goldzwig explains, archival material enables
rhetorical historians to illustrate motives, methods, and values of “political actors as they wrestle to shape public philosophy and implement public policy.” The War on Crime is examined here as an ideological campaign to maintain social control through public opinion management. This study examines how discourse was used to build legitimacy for deterrence strategies. It focuses on Hoover’s presentation of realism as an ideological alternative to the more dominant idealist worldview that occupied the halls of power in the early years of the Roosevelt administration.

Militarism and the Rhetoric of Science, Realism, and Action Detective Heroism

The FBI formula used the urban-crime genre as a vehicle for demonstrating scientific management and for privileging realism. Using professional norms widely accepted by business leaders and public administrators, the CRD emphasized efficiency and profitability through scientific methodology and training. Focusing on process and procedure stripped FBI agents of their individual identities, leaving Hoover alone to accept accolades for the successes of his agents. Hoover’s discourses celebrated the procedural mechanization of criminal detection and apprehension. His speeches and stories praised technocratic control through technocratic power and reaffirmed the constant danger posed by super-villains through a familiar style of realm located in dime novels. This locus displaced constitutional protections with notions of militant efficiency, and influenced cultural understandings of realism during the 1930s and beyond.

Realism’s central concept of the power principle was defined in terms of technocratic control which militarized the Bureau’s operations. Power was demonstrated through the use of modern transportation, communication, weaponry,
and laboratory equipment, all components of militarized strength. More than crime-fighting equipment, these became rhetorical tools for expanding Hoover’s jurisdiction and appropriations based on arguments of efficiency and professionalism. In the industrial era, science, technology, and power were melded together, lending police administration a scientific and militarized identity. These ideas were packaged in popular detective story conventions.

The dime novel urban-crime genre provided a framework suitable for advancing realist notions of a world steeped in chaos and verging on collapse, and, therefore in need of state control. Detective stories in pulp fiction and true crime magazines unseated the dominance of the western genre in the late nineteenth century, which marked shifting population trends toward urban society caused by immigration and the industrial revolution. Storylines reinforced isolationism and xenophobia through glorifying heroic, muscular, white Anglo-Saxon men motivated to do good for the sake of justice. Antagonists were motivated by evil to threaten cultural values and social stability. Wilbur R. Miller notes that protagonists held pessimistic views of city life and perpetually revealed “underworld” criminal “conspiracies” as “upper-class villains” hired street hoodlums to commit crimes against society. He adds that the genre “expressed the fears and values” of middle-class American society toward a new and uncertain city life, filled with strange peoples and ideas.

Hollywood further circulated urban-crime storylines in the 1920s and 1930s through gangster and detective films. Thomas Shatz explains that popular story formulas in the genre maintained “coherent, value-laden narrative systems”
celebrating ideological precepts that affirmed American values. Specially, these films reified cultural threats in the form of antagonists who were irrationally brutal and were hostile to measures of law and order. Gangsters represented the “perverse alter ego of the ambitious, profit-minded American male” in an alienated urban environment with class distinctions. Because antagonists were denied legitimate routes to power and success, they turned to depersonalizing “technology—guns, cars, phones, etc.” Conflict was “translated into violence” and resolved through the elimination of the character.  

The use of deadly force by antagonists justified its use by protagonists, which allowed the urban-crime genre to treat the punishment of cultural offenders in a hardboiled, unsentimental manner. Force was its ultimate currency.

The urban-crime genre interplayed realist notions of power and technocratic control. George Orwell wrote in 1939 that detective stories oriented readers to identify with an “all-powerful character who dominates everyone” through the threat of violence. The protagonist is a “superman” whose power emanates from “physical strength” and whose usual “method” for problem solving was a “sock on the jaw.” Force, therefore, was considered a method for problem solving. According to Ron Gaulart, heroes could “box, fence, swim, and operate whatever new mechanism came along—automobile, airplane, etc.” Poetic justice was privileged before law. Villains were routinely punished by death in gun battles, mob lynching, and suicide; courts were nonexistent. Similarly, the public enemies, were rarely imprisoned or executed by the state. In this manner, notions of law and justice were squarely separated.
Therefore, according to the genre, militarism—not rehabilitation—was the natural response to criminals who challenged American value sets.

*Scientific Power and the Action Detective Hero*

In his writings, Cooper celebrated Hoover’s scientific professionalism and constructed agents as singularly nondescript, but collectively composing an elite workforce. The CRD used urban-crime narratives to promote Hoover’s leadership, the Bureau’s facilities, its agents, and the realist worldview. Efficiency was privileged as the Bureau’s highest principle, which elevated militarism above constitutionality. In the process, realist assumptions of how the state ought to engage the citizenry were reified in speeches, articles, radio programs, and films.

Like pulp fiction action detectives, Hoover was constructed as an intellectually, physically, and socially elite scientific detective superhero. Cooper wrote in an August 1933 syndicated article that Hoover was ruggedly individualistic as he was a “master detective who simply [did] not conform to any picture of the average crime chaser.” Having studied French, English, and Canadian law enforcement methods, the director was allegedly accepted as an “expert all over the country” and knew “all the scientific short cuts devised for the unraveling of crime.”

Cooper added in another article that same month that Hoover’s leadership was egalitarian. He noted that Hoover “was Boss merely because he was the best of the gang.” In the introduction to *Person in Hiding* (1938), the public relations counselor described Hoover in super-human and militant terms. He suggested that the director had “machine-gun” speech delivery, with a “sixth sense” for finding a “flaw in seeming perfection,” and “fanatical” energy and strength. Hoover’s identity was
aligned with the character profile of an action detective hero. For example, *Newsweek* printed in August 1933 that Hoover’s “build resemble[d] a light heavy-weight’s” and the *New York Herald Tribune* commended him in February 1934 for being “one of the world’s great criminologists” and for his “faultless breeding.” Hoover’s leadership was also showcased by film. As Hollywood producers worked to gain access to Bureau files in their pursuit of evolving the gangster genre into that of the G-man, they wrote scripts to ingratiate the director. The Motion Pictures Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA) guaranteed to “portray upon the screen the best in law enforcement,” shaping films to “direct the sympathy of the audience against the crime and the criminal and toward the forces of law and order.” The film industry submitted scripts to the CRD for revisions and approval, which sought to further placate Hoover’s appetite for self-promotion. These films reinforced the theme of Hoover as action-detective-hero, thus serving the director and his realist ideology. For example, *G-Men* (1935) reenacted the Kansas City Massacre, but credited the War on Crime to the FBI director, rather than the attorney general. In the film, the dramatized and militant director stands before a group of congressmen and proclaims:

Gentlemen, give us national laws with teeth in them, covering the whole field of interstate crime . . . Arm governmental agents, and not just with revolvers.
If these gangsters want to use machine guns—give the special agents machine guns, shotguns, tear gas, and everything else! This is war! In reality, the 1934 Omnibus Crime Bill was passed through the politicking of Cummings, not Hoover. *G-Men* essentially wrote Attorney General Cummings out of
the public record. Powers explains that “Hollywood had done something Hoover
would not have dared, something that Cummings could not prevent—it had turned the
top G-Man into a star and it had demoted the director’s boss to an off-screen
nonentity.”69 This film, and many others like it, portrayed the director and his G-men
as militarized and powerful action heroes.

Hoover’s leadership identity was firmly connected to the FBI, which was
militantly described in terms of science, machinery, and power. Cooper credited
Hoover in August 1933 for creating “the nucleus of America’s first real national
police force.” Hoover was praised for turning a “nondescript organization” into one
of the “most powerful crime deterrents in the world and made it as much feared by
the underworld as England’s Scotland Yard.”70 This new organization, according to
Cooper’s introduction to Persons in Hiding, was “superhuman” and a “miracle” in
action.71 The New York Herald Tribune explained in February 1934 that headquarters
acquainted agents with the “machinery of Federal law,” who were then “taught
fingerprinting and other sciences.”72 The New York Post applauded Hoover’s training
of “gum-shoe tactics” in August of 1933, which according to the newspaper, pointed
to “real achievement.”73 The ideas of realism were implicated through glamorizing
the role of power in protecting the nation from cultural and economic outsiders; such
pariahs were portrayed as enemies within America’s borders.

Power in scientific detection was showcased as a function of an elite
workforce and its scientific training. G-men were constructed as action detective
heroes, which reflected the culture’s class and racial hierarchy. According to the New
York Herald Tribune, the agents supposedly had no “distinguishing insignia” or
identity as they simply looked “precisely” like other well “reared” individuals. They were presented as a conglomerate of college educated men, further rarified by their professional police training. In a series of articles appearing in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology on “Police Science,” Hoover wrote in 1933 that “all special agents coming within the jurisdiction of this Bureau must either be lawyers or graduate accountants with experience in investigative work.” This established a social filter that privileged those who could attend college and enter the force, namely middle and upper-class white males. Among this subset of the workforce, Hoover privileged graduates from more conservative Christian universities, thereby further ensuring that the FBI’s personnel shared his Americanist value structure. These captains of race, class, and ideology were further trained in science to militantly battle crime.

The FBI sought to turn the social elites into law enforcement experts by training them in the mysteries of scientific power. Hoover told the ABA in August 1934 that his agents received “intensive training courses in the training school of the Division at Washington,” which, according to Hoover, was “the only one of its kind.” He explained in an April 1933 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology article that “all reports” were then “carefully scrutinized in order to insure the employment of the latest, most scientifically comprehensive methods.” According to a November 1938 article published in Review of Scientific Instruments, these included microscopic inspections, “chemical analytical methods,” and “spectrographic examination[s]” by the “Bureau’s Technical Laboratory.” Such an image of scientific management suggested that Hoover was politically neutral and
had departed from the ideological investigations that marked the Bureau’s activities
during previous administrations. The FBI then had an alleged monopoly on
professionalism in law enforcement through its elite workforce and its unique
possession of scientific facilities and instruments.

Special agents were equally trained and powerful in the militant methods and
machinery of criminal apprehension. Busting criminals was a mainstay of Bureau
publicity, as such narratives played into sensational action stories. In a June 1936
speech before the Kiwanis International, for example, Hoover boasted that with
“meticulous” training, FBI agents had been “taught how to arrest bandits in a
speeding motor car, or under conditions of flight.” All agents were said to be an
“expert marksman or better in the use of the pistol, the shotgun, the machine gun, and
the high powered rifle.”79 The director’s imagery was further heightened in true crime
articles.

Hoover wrote stories with Cooper in The American Magazine that
sensationalized FBI operations through tales of militant danger and technocratic
power. For example, they wrote in an August 1936 article of lights glowing “upon the
switchboard in the Communications Room of headquarters” and “airplanes” rushing
G-men “from city to city.” Agents in the field maintained “constant telephonic
connection.”80 And, when special agents did catch up to the criminal, they were
prepared for war. In a shootout appearing in the June 1936 edition, Hoover and
Cooper wrote that while “outbursts of flame spat” from a criminal’s rifle, special
agents “stepped up” their “swift government machine” to “its fullest power,”
returning “fire.”81 Such constitutive discourse built a relationship between militaristic
mechanization and professionalism, which was allegedly necessary to combat supervillain criminals. These narratives of heroic force became Americanist political expression. The urban-crime genre thematically criticized law enforcement and public policy more generally, so its popularity only made it more political in nature.

Hoover heralded technocratic administration for its efficiency. He consistently used statistics compiled by the CRD to suggest before appropriations committees and other audiences that the FBI was an economic investment for the federal government. Speaking before the House Appropriations Committee in February 1936, for example, Hoover compared the Bureau’s funding for fiscal year 1935 with the “fines, recoveries, and savings” generated by the FBI; he concluded that “for every dollar expended, there was a savings of about $8 effected.” Using the same ratio, he told Westminster College in June 1937 that the FBI’s “efficiency” made it the “best paying investment” for “any community” as it offered “the cheapest form of insurance [and] the greatest profit maker” at no “cost to them.”

Perennial statistics, though allegedly fabricated in many ways, reinforced the director’s stature as a scientific expert and justified the expansion of his appropriation and jurisdiction while undermining civil liberties. In this manner, efficiency was treated as the standard of professionalism, while the subject of constitutionality was largely ignored.

The rhetorical convergence of science and realism through action detective heroism presented a number of constitutive dynamics. Hoover was constructed as a strong, rugged individual with Anglo-Saxon heritage who understood the true danger of criminals and knew how to defeat them on their own terms—specifically, with
force. The FBI was built as an omnipresent organization between headquarters in Washington, DC and its various field offices. Militarism was privileged as a form of scientific professionalism through its laboratory, training courses, equipment, and methods. Lastly, its agents were the yield of Hoover’s leadership and the Bureau’s facilities. They were constructed as a group of robust faceless white middle-class and upper-class college educated men who defended societal values and its institutions from their privileged positions. “G-men” were obviously a cultural product. These identities served to legitimate the director’s coercive operations as an inevitable conclusion based on cultural and technological trends. In the process, the FBI was militarized to fight outlaws like it was to fight the central powers during World War I.

**Americanists and the Vermin Metaphor**

The FBI’s information campaign built arguments to win greater support for Director Hoover and detract from Director Sanford Bates and his BOP. The investigation director associated criminals, idealists, and corrupt politicians with each other through the use of the vermin metaphor. This was bolstered by the “Director’s Cases,” which functioned as public relations opportunities for the director. He used the press to publicly take personal credit for arrests made by his agents, which offered him staged and broad platforms from which to speak. As the CRD portrayed Hoover in an action detective frame, it also constructed Bates and idealism as outmoded and corrupt. Hoover’s discourse masked the CRD’s behind-the-scenes strategizing, and instead presented, the director’s official FBI leadership as a brand of pulp fiction evidenced by Bureau files. Creating this alternative reality was made possible by the availability of cooperative public opinion leaders like Fulton Oursler of McFadden
Publications, who committed his support to the DOJ through calling for “a new Committee on Public Information.”\textsuperscript{87} The CRD worked closely with members of print, radio, and film media; all stood to profit by sensationalizing Hoover’s leadership.

True crime storylines bridged the world of pulp fiction into the allegedly real world by sensationalizing crime news stories that offered Hoover a coherent narrative for discrediting his opposition. According to Ron Goulart, content for pulp fiction characters like ace detective Nick Carter was largely drawn from “newspaper crime reporting and other contemporary accounts,” allowing comic strip detectives to travel to “real locales” and challenge “the real criminals of the day.”\textsuperscript{88} Conversely, a mediated Hoover existed in true crime magazines with superhuman, crime-fighting powers. Fictitious characters could then travel to allegedly real locals, while celebrity crime fighters like Hoover could combat fictitious villains. The press largely adopted the CRD’s generic framings of persons and events, allowing the director to traverse these interconnected worlds. Publishers celebrated the rise of J. Edgar Hoover and his G-man as a new breed of action detective heroes.\textsuperscript{89} This genre was well suited for Hoover to convey and demonstrate his leadership and interpretations of the War on Crime.

Hoover used Courtney Ryley Cooper’s formula and the dime novel’s reality-making machine to frame his campaigns against criminals and political enemies alike, including John Dillinger, Sanford Bates, and idealism more generally. The CRD constituted Hoover’s feud with Director Bates as a part of the true crime universe. In this world, the vermin metaphor associated liberals and criminals through an
underworld conspiracy. The CRD’s various constructions in fiction and non-fiction formats pushed forward a symmetrical realist logic that interconnected the logics of political culture and popular entertainment. Both fiction and non-fiction texts drew from the same types of evidence, relied on the same types of assumptions, and offered the same types of conclusions. This symmetry promoted Hoover’s philosophy and leadership over those ideas promoted by Bates. The following section further outlines a movement that valued force as a form of political expression.

The CRD constituted a vermin identity for Hoover’s various targets. This metaphor lumped Hoover’s oversight, bureaucratic competition, and ideological opposition together with the sensational criminals that the public was told to fear. The rhetorical maneuver was largely predicated on Cooper’s generic suggestions for crime stories that seeped into the director’s discourse and broader information campaign. The conspiracy theory added to the director’s leadership persona, which was a composite of his technocratic expertise and his alleged challenge to the political-criminal underworld. And through the Director’s Cases, the boundaries of pulp fiction began to blur as Hoover became a superhuman character in true crime magazines and in major news outlets.

The rat metaphor offered strategic rhetorical advantages. Erin Steuter and Deborah Wills explain that vermin metaphors are common to war propaganda as rodents are abhorrent to the collective conscious. The vermin metaphor served as a vehicle for communicating Hoover’s conspiracy theory and privileged his realist worldview. The scholars suggest that rats are symbolically repulsive because they are “characterized by plurality,” where the existence of one indicates that of thousands.
Rats invisibly coexist with humans in cities through secretly “penetrating” and thus “corrupting the places we imagined safe.” Because they are loathed, constructing humans as rats invites containment logic, wherein traps are expected to be lethal. These ideas helped articulate the existence of a vast political-criminal conspiracy that corrupted public office, and encouraged deterrence strategies that sought to kill and contain public enemies.  

Cooper sought to frame the Prison Bureau and idealism as a part of the criminal conspiracy and ultimately turn public opinion toward the FBI and realism. In November 1933, Cooper proposed that he write a story “on the matter of prisons, and how they [were] being turned into country clubs.” He suggested that this would “arouse the country to such a point that something could be done about it” if the story indicted “the SYSTEM and the people of the United States who [had] permitted convict coddlers to get the upper hand.” Cooper’s editor wanted to focus on the manner in which “various convict organizations” were behind the prison reform program, and how they accomplished it by threat, force, and bribery. In portraying prison improvement as a conspiracy orchestrated by criminals, prison reformers were then aligned with underworld mechanics. Hoover, however, was presented as a faithful public servant battling corruption in the political system. This contrast presented deterrence strategies as an obvious solution to a constructed problem. Hoover emphasized Cooper’s social problems and realist solutions in speeches, films, books, and articles.

The publicist borrowed conventions from dime novel detective storylines to juxtapose the director’s leadership against a vast political-criminal conspiracy.
According to a memorandum written by Hoover in September 1934, Cooper wanted to “prove” that a “set-up” existed in “practically every town” whereby the “gangster” had “naturally assumed the place whereby he [could] control bonds, paroles, etc.” through “political affiliations, etc.,” and to “‘lick’ the crime problem all this must be uprooted.” Hoover told Cooper that this generic underworld conspiracy “theory” was “absolutely sound.” The director encouraged Cooper to write a “story” on the alleged existence of “political affiliations in gangster activities” even though no evidence of such connections were located after the CRD conducted a “survey” of “information along these lines.”

Cooper’s stories borrowed from and distorted the Wickersham Commission’s review of police corruption. In Report on Police (1931), the commission observed that the “general failure of the police to detect and arrest criminals guilty of the many murders, spectacular bank, pay-roll, and other hold-ups, and sensational robberies with guns . . . caused a loss of public confidence in the police of our country.” The investigators noted that the collapse of public trust was largely caused by the “well-known and oft proven alliances between criminals and corrupt politicians which control[ed] . . . the police” forces around the country. Rather than praising idealists for identifying the problem of public corruption in law enforcement, Cooper’s stories blamed prison reformers for creating conspiratorial networks. His ideas pitted the scientific detective administrator against an evil underworld, and were circulated throughout Hoover’s political discourse.

Cooper’s storylines and crime theories are evident in Hoover’s construction of the political-criminal underworld, which relied heavily on various vermin metaphors.
The director enumerated the enemies of law enforcement before the IACP in July 1935 as the “‘human rat’” who stood “with a gun in his hand and murder in his heart.” The street criminal was assisted by “legal vermin” who “orate[d] loudly” on the “preservation” of “constitutional rights” and “politicians” who associated with “gutter scum.” The director warned the Catholic Holy Names Society in September 1936 that this conspiracy included “many forces” which had combined “under cloaks of respectability” to “make crime an easy and paying business.” This conspiracy theory was extended to include all of Hoover’s opposition.

Cooper sought to portray the director as protecting the nation from idealism, which was unwittingly playing into the hands of criminals. He suggested that his storylines should tell of “meddling women” and “how they [had] freed guilty man after guilty man.” According to his memorandum, he wanted to warn the public of an “insidious creeping process which [had] been put over” by the “convicts themselves and persons who perhaps meant well but who [had] brought about a serious condition in this country.” These ideas would turn into arguments against acts of parole, probation, and pardon in which Hoover complained of emotionally-blinded liberals who stopped the hand of justice as they sought to release dangerous convicts.

According to Assistant Director W.H.D. Lester of the CRD, a part of this campaign made “considerable criticism, directly and by innuendo, of local police departments as well as of the Bureau of Prisons of the Department of Justice.” The Bureau adopted a strategy of attack by implication to protect it from potential objections made by the “Bureau of Prisons” against Hoover for using his “position in the Department” to make sensitive information “available” to the press.
generic themes from urban-crime storylines recast the New Deal’s value set as a threat to the nation’s safety.

Hoover used the vermin metaphor to construct idealists and liberal politicians, especially parole advocates, as part of a vast network of evil doers with sinister motivations. The director told the Daughters of the American Revolution in April 1936 that corrupt politicians and racketeers “scuttle out from the shadows” to assist the “sneering vermin of gangdom.” They were allegedly assisted by “theorist, pseudo-criminologists, hypersentimentalists, criminal coddlers, convict lovers, and fiddle-faced reformers” who surged forward to fill their own “pocketbooks.”

The rodent family clearly included the director’s ideological opposites who viewed rehabilitation as a legitimate means for correcting the crime problem. His attack on liberals championed the hardboiled perspective of pulp fiction, elevating realism above idealism.

Hoover informed the vermin metaphor with an ancillary contagion metaphor. For example, he told the Association of Life Insurance Presidents in December 1937 that he mourned the passing of “several . . . associates” who were “shot down by the guns of members of the underworld.” This latter group, according to Hoover, had been the “recipients of clemency” and included “such rats as ‘Baby Face’ Nelson, who was three times paroled” as well as other “vermin.” Hoover began building long-term rhetorical continuity between his propaganda campaigns with this speech. He told the life insurance presidents that “crime” was as “malignant as any cancer, and it [was] as distinct a subject of health as tuberculosis.” The contagion metaphor was the only trope to circulate between the vermin, Fifth Column, and Red Fascism.
campaigns. The metaphor was helpful, in part, because of its versatility. For example, Hoover encouraged the insurance executives to “take more interest in many of our jails and some of our reformatories and penitentiaries.” According to Hoover, it was “a distinct matter of public health to know” whether prisoners were “forced to remain in the same cells with other prisoners suffering from contagious diseases . . . and whether unfit persons [were] being released to again prey upon the public.” The contagion metaphor dynamically operated between fields of meaning. This statement started a broader tradition in Hoover’s rhetoric that conceptualized domestic threats to internal stability as a spreading disease. Metaphorically, the contagion could either be contained by isolating invasive cells by quarantine or it could be deterred by forcibly removing such suspicious outsiders from the national body.

Hoover also informed the vermin metaphor with an ancillary parasite metaphor. The director described the enemies of the republic to the IACP in July 1935 as constituting a network of corrupt operatives who exploited democratic systems to corrupt them. For example, he derided the “legal shyster” who turned “bar associations and legislatures” against the “law-enforcement officer.” He suggested that the “shyster who passe[d] laws for the good of the criminal [was] no better than his professional brother who [hid] that criminal” because the “politician who stuff[ed] his parasitical being upon the fruits of underworld votes [was] as much a type of vermin as the scum which casts its ballots according to his dictation.” The parasite metaphor, thus, warned that democracy was susceptible to corruption and was suffering from it. President Roosevelt and Hoover would later amplify this argument to discredit their ant-war critics as the nation built-up to war.
These metaphors advanced a logic of ethnic and cultural purification. Carl Zimmer observes that people had been “referred to as parasites before the late 1800s,” but evolutionary biologists then gave the parasite metaphor a new “precision” and “transparency” that helped Adolph Hitler to formulate his own tirades against minority groups. Zimmer suggests that “Hitler probed every hidden turn of the parasite metaphor. He charted the course of the Jewish ‘infestation,’ as it spread to labor unions, the stock exchange, the economy, and cultural life.” Furthermore, Hitler’s usages of the parasite metaphor followed Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin who used it to construct the “bourgeoisie and the bureaucrats.” Zimmer concludes that “Hitler imagined the Jew and other ‘degenerate’ races” as “parasites” and thus a “threat to the health of their host, the Aryan race. It was a function of a nation to preserve the evolutionary health of its race,” argued Hitler, and “so it had to rid the parasite from its host.”

Hoover expanded upon communist and Nazi rhetorical precedents with the contagion, parasite, and vermin metaphors, all of which suggested that a growing movement of invisibly coordinated subversives was destabilizing the nation. This theme permeated Hoover’s subsequent campaigns and thereby established rhetorical continuity between his metaphorical clusters. Hoover’s patterns of terminology during the War on Crime offered a starting point for shaping future metaphorical arrangements. The next three decades were marked with metaphors that portrayed liberalism as a subversive threat to the nation.

The vermin metaphor, for example, portrayed idealism as political and moral corruption. Hoover described idealists and other liberal prison reformers to the Boys’
Clubs of America in May 1936 as “scuttling rats in the ship of politics, gnawing at its timbers, besmirching its ideals, and doing their utmost to wreck our system of government.” ¹⁰⁴ He told the American Hotel Association of the United States and Canada in November 1937 that prison reformers contributed to the practice of “unwarranted parole,” which allowed “vermin” to “go out and steal babies, lure them away, defile them, and leave them shapeless masses of broken pathetic humanity, dead at the hands of degenerate parolees.” ¹⁰⁵ The director concluded before the IACP in July 1935 that they were all “enemies to our cause and enemies to society.” ¹⁰⁶ In this manner, Hoover provided an ideological alternative to Bates’ leadership as he interpreted the crime problem as including the Prison Bureau and its worldview. The media was persuaded to adopt his storylines.

Hoover worked to ensure that his metaphorical framing was circulated by the press and to prevent the circulation of uncooperative material. He told the American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA) in April 1937 that he “preferred the term ‘public rat,’ rather than ‘public enemy’” because it better captured the “craven stealthiness” of criminals. Hoover suggested that “John Dillinger” should have been framed as the “filthy type of vermin that he was, crawling through the holes of our law enforcement” rather than a “Robin Hood.” ¹⁰⁷ He wrote thank you letters to the press when they complied. He revealed to the editor of Literary Digest in August 1936 that he was “particularly pleased” that an article in his magazine referred to a criminal as “Public Rat No. 1” rather than “Public Enemy No. 1.” ¹⁰⁸ The director also asked the ANPA to not run stories regarding some administrative affairs including an alleged “lack of cooperation between police agencies” because that served “as an aid
and comfort to the criminal.” Furthermore, in an August 1938 article appearing in *Collier’s*, the director complained of “constant surveillance set up by reporters and camera men at the field offices of the F.B.I.” and asked the publishers to “impose a voluntary restraint upon themselves.” Such self-censorship concealed Bureau embarrassments and complaints that Hoover allegedly hoarded publicity and utilized unsafe operational methods. Simultaneously, his metaphors and framings emphasized his leadership against the dangerous political-criminal rat conspiracy.

Cooper worked to develop radio programs that circulated Hoover’s metaphors and narratives. The director requested from the attorney general “authority to prepare material for presentation on the radio.” He argued that the “request . . . should be granted because of its possible value to the Department of Justice, in that it will bring before a large portion of the public some of the work performed by the Agents of the Department.” Hoover suggested that the broadcast should begin with the announcement “that the facts in the cases have been authenticated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the United States Department of Justice,” indicating that the dramatizations were consistent with the Bureau’s official record.

Though the radio program was supposed to promote the DOJ as a whole, internal memoranda suggest that the producer, Phillips H. Lord, sought to focus his attention on the FBI. He proposed to title the program “G Men” and emphasize “the scientific angle in which the Department attacks crime” to demonstrate that the “criminal” had an “impossible chance of escaping the long arm of the law.” Such framing advantaged Hoover’s ideological predisposition over Bates, as detection and apprehension were emphasized over rehabilitation in waging the War on Crime. He
promised that no unapproved “information would be given out,” but if Hoover “had a message or something” that he “wished to put over to the public,” Lord guaranteed to “see that it was worked in.” Lord offered to “work in close harmony” with the Bureau and to “have the scripts checked by some member of the Department.” Cooper and Rex Collier would fill this role. Because the scripts were reportedly taken directly from Bureau files, an element of authenticity was added.

The Dillinger script emphasized Hoover’s action-detective leadership in catching Dillinger and constructed the outlaw through the vermin metaphor. The gangster was allegedly a criminal genius that was far too advanced for local authorities to apprehend. Hoover reportedly ordered Special Agent Samuel Cowley to “leave for Chicago immediately—spare no expense—get all the men you need and get John Dillinger. He’s clever—he’s a killer. Get him alive, if you can; but GET HIM!” The script has Agent Cowley’s wife fearing for his safety. She warns, “I wish it weren’t Dillinger. Sam – I’m game – if you were going to war to face men I could stand it – but he’s a rat. He’ll shoot behind your back.” These sequences centered the Bureau’s action in Washington, D.C. and elevated Dillinger’s danger to proportions beyond those of war by turning the outlaw into a dehumanized Other with base instincts. Ultimately, he was transformed into a social monster which legitimized his militant killing.

The episode emphasized a number of themes evident in Hoover’s arguments against Bates, the prison system, and local law enforcement, while championing the Bureau’s efficiency. In the script, some members of the Dillinger gang smuggle guns “inside the gates of the State Prison, Michigan City.” They used the weapons to
escape from their prison and to siege the “Indiana State Prison,” where Dillinger was held captive. After they arrive undercover as prison officials, they announced that Dillinger was “on parole from our prison.” Following a brief overview of his ensuing crimes and capture during “the next four months,” the script highlighted his next escape from “the County Jail, at Crown Point, Indiana.” On the lam, Dillinger sought plastic surgery to conceal his identity because “the G-Men” were “hot” on him. He lamented that he could not sleep because FBI agents were “everywhere,” so he may “as well croak” if he could not “get them off [his] trail.” A gang member responded, “You’re right, boss. When them guys get started, they don’t stop.” The mediated Bureau’s alleged omnipresence reinforced its claim to always get its men.

The radio program portrayed events in a manner that privileged Hoover’s interests by rewriting the public record. Before the dramatized Dillinger is killed, FBI agents take precautions to protect the public’s safety in case a gun fight should occur, and there was no mention of civilian injuries. However, according to the New York Times, when Dillinger was slain in Chicago, “two women spectators were wounded when caught in the fire from the federal men’s revolvers.” Whereas the script emphasized that Dillinger was scientifically identified by his unalterable demarcations, like eye color and gate, local police told journalists that the FBI was tipped off—a method associated with old school law enforcement. And, whereas the script had Dillinger opening fire on FBI agents, historians report that Dillinger was killed while running for an alley and still reaching for a gun. One newspaper printed at the time that Dillinger’s killing made “one wonder if such informal executions could be conducted, as a regular thing, without possibilities of error.”
And, federal judge Robert Cowie called the Dillinger killing “lawless” before the Wisconsin Bar Association, warning that with “the support of a misguided public, the government was building up a secret police comparable only to its counterparts in Germany, Russia and Italy.” This statement underscored secretive institutional collaboration and strategizing that was, in fact, about to occur between the FBI, the Gestapo, and Italian political police forces. The *G-Men* radio broadcast of a safe and scientific killing of a criminal rat is an example of Hoover framing and narrating history in a manner that was consistent with his own ideology and interests; he concealed evidence against his operation and its potential embarrassments. His opportunism would go on to implicate the BOP for its alleged role in the political-criminal conspiracy.

Hoover attacked Director Bates by implication, raising concerns over the programs and appropriations for which he was responsible. He told the Kiwanis International in June 1936 that each year, “3,200 persons convicted of murder” were released from “penal institutions” and that more than half of those were the “result of pardon or parole.” He called on local organizations to “examine” the “political appointment of unfit men as deputies or wardens of penitentiaries, or directors of reformatories, or of guards of penal institutions” to ensure the legitimacy of the “parole system” in their communities. Hoover suggested that resources were better spent in containing and killing criminals, rather than in their rehabilitation. He remarked before the IACP in July 1935 that the “people of America” were annually taxed “millions upon millions of dollars” for “police, State constabularies, Federal enforcement bureaus, courts, [and] penal institutions,” of which the Federal Bureau of
Prisons received the largest single share. This money, according to Hoover, was “squandered because of ill-considered, ignorant, or politically controlled parole and clemency actions which release[d] dangerous men and women to prey upon society.”\(^1\) He also attached the danger of parole to kidnapping. Hoover charged in August 1933 that in “practically every instance” of “kidnapping,” the criminal was a former “recipient of a pardon, parole or probation which [had] permitted him to again pursue his criminal activities against the social structure of our nation.”\(^2\) The director went still further in discretely connecting the BOP to mismanagement and corruption.

Hoover drew a disingenuous distinction between the effectiveness of public and private organizations in rehabilitating delinquents, thus attacking the BOP’s idealistic mission. He told the Boys’ Clubs of America in May 1936 that private organizations did much to reform juvenile delinquents “with limited funds.” Conversely, he blamed “community” institutions with “heavy appropriations, full-time employees, large buildings, and expansive grounds” of turning child offenders into criminals. According to Hoover, “private institutions” were better equipped for “rehabilitation and accomplishment” than “community institutions” because the latter had “fallen into the grasping hands of the renegades of our political system.” He described this type of politician as a “barrier to law enforcement” who constantly undermined “the finer ideals of our political system” by sneaking “into our reformatories, into our probation system, into our prisons” for “personal gain at the expense of the common wealth.”\(^3\) Notably, when speaking about the Police Athletic Club of New York City in August, he praised such “organizations” as a “tremendous
financial investment” for offering youth a “substitute for temptation” and
recommended to the IACP the following month that this effort by law enforcement
should be “vastly extended.” Obviously, Hoover was not opposed to all public
spending on juveniles.

The director also attacked specific arguments made by Bates and labeled them
propaganda. He told the American Hotel Association in November 1937 that “paid
professional propagandists” who sought to “aid the criminal by pulling the death
mask of misinformation over the mind of the American citizen should be made to
reveal their selfish motive for doing so.” According to Hoover, these “moo-cow
sentimentalists” claimed that “less than one per cent of all arrests made in the United
States [were] of persons on parole.” This proposition, according to Hoover, was a
“deliberate and reprehensible dissemination of misinformation about the status of
crime.” Such claims implied a dark and ulterior motive for rehabilitation held by
idealists, who he also considered overly emotional. Of course, Hoover failed to
mention his own information campaign or that he ordered agents to have ever
increasing caseloads, which obfuscated his own statistics. Hoover’s control of
information, therefore, played a vital role in the broader construction of the
hardboiled super-villain realm, wherein action detectives needed deterrence methods
to protect a community and to promote its values. In this manner, Hoover promoted
realism with misinformation, claiming that information which contradicted his own
was suspect. The control of information was at the center of Hoover’s attempted
control of reality.
Assistant Director Clyde Tolson masterminded a system to better regulate the Bureau’s official record. After Melvin Purvis captured the spotlight for slaying John Dillinger and “Pretty Boy” Floyd, Hoover forbade Henry Suydam from supplying further information to the press regarding his agents. He claimed that when “publicity” was “given to one man as being the so-called ‘hero’ of a situation, it [was] likely to engender jealousies which would be harmful to the morale and espirit de corps of this Division.”

Beyond censoring information, Tolson recommended in an April 1936 memorandum that Hoover fly to cities on days of major arrests to furnish “information to the press.” Tolson suggested “that such a plan would be received enthusiastically by the American public as a further indication of the efficiency of the bureau in dealing with the crime situation.” Of course, Hoover would also be portrayed as the arresting officer and, in Hoover’s words, the hero of the situation. Arrests were turned into platforms from which the director could demonstrate his superhuman leadership and attack his political and ideological opposition. This offensive borrowed the worldview previously established in the detective genre by juxtaposing the admirable scientific action detective hero image with a human rat-image, thus emphasizing Hoover as a noble and venerated political leader. The public was invited to join his conspiracy-wrought reality.

The director constructed his political leadership against his opposition through various spectacles in a manner that drew from the urban-crime genre. Historians Sanford J. Ungar, Bryan Burrough, and Anthony Summers challenge the authenticity of Hoover’s claim to have personally captured Alvin Karpis in May 1936. Ungar explains that Hoover “staged a dramatic trip to New Orleans and supposedly led the
raiding party to capture a member of the ‘Barker gang,’ Alvin Karpis.” Allegedly, however, Hoover only entered the scene “after all danger was past and that he had played a purely symbolic role.” Burrough substantiates such suspicions, charging that “Hoover’s story of the arrest, as told to reporters the next day, was flat wrong in several details.” Staged “though it was,” Summers adds, “the arrest worked wonders for Edgar’s image.” Hoover used such stunts to become an action detective hero, thus reifying the pulp fiction genre in the political world.

The press immediately helped Hoover promulgate his narrated spectacle by disseminating information as the director released it. Journalists failed to explore the meaning of Hoover’s travel to New Orleans. On May 2, 1936, the New York Times flashed the front page headline, “Karpis Captured in New Orleans by Hoover Himself,” and the Washington Post boasted on its front page, “Hoover Leads 20 Agents in Arresting Nation’s No.1 Outlaw.” The Nashville Tennessean titled its story, “U.S. Men Take Public Enemy Without Shot” and the Saint Paul Pioneer Press ran on its headline “G-Men Capture Karpis Without Firing a Shot in Raid Led by J. Edgar Hoover.” These storylines came just weeks after Senator Kenneth McKellar (D-TN) scoffed at Hoover for never making an arrest and argued at an appropriations hearing that he doubted “very much” whether Hoover “ought to have a law” that permitted him “to go around the country armed as an army would, and shoot down all the people” that the director suspected “of being criminals.” Newspapers across the country would emphasize the meaning that Hoover sought to convey. For example, on May 2, the Washington Post ran a story titled, “Karpis Made ‘Name’ for Self After Parole by Kindly Judge” and the New York Times titled another story on May 4, “J.E.
Hoover Brands as Enemy No. 1 Politics that Hampers Justice.” Such headlines focused public attention on parole failure and alleged political interference in law enforcement, which served Hoover’s interests. Many reporters unquestioningly accepted the narrative offered by the only G-man authorized to talk to the press—the same G-man who was solely allowed to receive credit for the FBI’s successes.  

Hoover’s expert status permitted him to craft the story of the Karpis arrest in a manner that reinforced his perspectives. Though no journalist was present at the event, reporters substituted witnessing the arrest with the director’s cultural authority to fashion the public record. News reports celebrated Hoover’s action leadership; one account even included Hoover leveling a “submachine gun at Karpis.” A May 3rd front page New York Times story heavily quoted the director, simply repeating his narrative to readers: “‘Karpis said he would never be taken alive,’ Mr. Hoover said, ‘but we took him without firing a shot. That marked him as a dirty, yellow rat.’” The director’s use of the vermin metaphor reflected language that was familiar and meaningful to his national audience. For example, Inspector Ben Guarino tells the villain in Scarface (1932), “I told you you’d show up this way. Get you in a jam without a gun and you squeal like a yellow rat.” The film’s antagonist was a homicidal maniac and the “Detective Chief” complained of gangsters being freed from police custody by “the red tape, the crooked lawyers” and corrupt “politicians.” In one scene, the publisher of the local newspaper told a group of concerned citizens: “don’t blame the police.” Rather, they should push the government to “pass a federal law that puts guns in the same class as drugs and white slavery. Put teeth in the deportation act. These gangsters don’t belong in our country; half of them aren’t even
Hoover’s construction of criminals through a genre that denied their citizenship and encouraged their deportation highlights James J. Kimble’s observation that domestic propaganda contrasts “an internal protagonist” against “an external antagonist.” The logic of Scarface was symmetrical with that expressed by Hoover. Its rationale reinforced the propaganda mission envisioned by Hoover and fashioned by Cooper.

Scarface presented an image of American city life engulfed by organized crime and decried limitations on law enforcement that prevented it from punishing gangster activity with militant force. This arrangement of problem and solution complimented Hoover’s worldview and challenged that which was advocated by the Wickersham Commission. In Hollywood’s vision of city life, undocumented immigrants were the core cause of crime, and police were victims of criminal conspiracies. This was a land where antagonists were simply motivated by evil, and justice was hampered by a lack of enforcement mechanisms. Realism was more appropriate for this reality, according to Hoover’s logic, than the one presented by former Attorney General Wickersham, where crime was created by American institutions and ideology, and where marginalized groups were the most victimized. And, similar to Scarface, newspapers played a key role in purveying the environment and the allegedly logical ideology.

Beyond failing to scrutinize Hoover’s narratives, the press promoted the vermin metaphor in its headlines following the arrest. The Milwaukee Journal, for example, ran the headline “‘Respectable’ Citizens who Shield ‘Rats’ the Real Public Enemies.” The News and Observer of Raleigh, North Carolina titled one of its articles
“Call ‘Em Rats.” An article appearing in Phoenix, Arizona’s *Evening Gazette* included the subtitle “No. 1 Public Enemy Stricken with Terror After Capture in New Orleans; Described as ‘Dirty Rat.’” The *Times-Picayune* of New Orleans subtitled one of its articles “GANGSTER ‘YELLOW RAT,’ Says Hoover.” And the Pittsburgh *Sun-Telegraph* featured a headline: “Karpis Quit ‘Like Rat,’ Says Chief of G-Men.”

Indeed, the press coverage reflected the strategizing of both Hoover and Cooper.

Furthermore, the CRD supplied cooperative journalists with the director’s speeches, Bureau publications, and ghost-written stories, which were then printed in full or used as the basis for nationally and internationally syndicated articles. Reporters were vetted by the Bureau and, if determined to be “friendly,” were put on the Bureau’s “mailing list” to maintain a regular information flow. These journalists were also tapped for inside information on Congress and other organizations of interest, and used to gain access to affluent places beyond the Bureau’s reach. For example, according to a FBI file, one *Washington Times* writer received “information” that was to be used “in a series of articles” for William Randolph Hearst’s International News Service. The file indicated that the CRD had furnished the journalist with a “story” that was “widely printed throughout the country.” And, the Bureau courted another reporter in August 1936 who was “affiliated with Congressional Intelligence” as a “means of entry to someone in the Senate.” These processes were repeated thousands of times over.

The Hearst chain helped build public opinion for the Bureau. One of its representatives wrote to Hoover in December 1934 that the “Hearst newspapers have
underway a nationwide campaign to procure for the Division of Investigation additional men and to have Congress strengthen the Federal law-enforcement as much as possible.” Tolson attributed the Bureau’s “additional appropriation” in 1935 to the “crystallization of public opinion through the campaign of the Hearst newspapers,” which was supplemented with CRD material. The press thus circulated Hoover’s issues, frames, metaphors, and narratives around the nation, helping to privilege his worldview and political leadership over Bates’ philosophies. The vermin metaphor introduced both threat and solution.

Because the presence of rats invites a lethal response, the metaphor played into Hoover’s realist worldview and arguments for deterrence methods. He told the General Federation of Women’s Clubs in May 1938 that there must be “certain punishment” for “crimes committed.” This punishment, according to Hoover, “should serve not only as a deterrent to potential criminals, but should be a means of rehabilitation.” Hoover suggested before the Attorney General’s Crime Conference in December 1935 that “adequate detection and sure apprehension plus swift, certain and just punishment are the time-proven deterrents of crime.” He elaborated that the “only one way to make a law breaker obey the statutes of our country” was to “to make him fear punishment . . . A criminal obeys the law because he [was] forced to it.” Force, again, surfaced as a form of political expression in Hoover’s public arguments. He suggested that the “long road to internal peace and security [had] no short cuts. Civilization’s recourse is remorseless pursuit, complete punishment, and if necessary and adequately provoked, elimination of the criminal individual.”
Through this framework, the ambush and extermination of public enemies could be referred to simply as a “trap.”\textsuperscript{151}

Director Bates responded to the CRD’s assault against his authority both privately and publicly. He complained directly to the FBI for their releasing of restricted information to the press.\textsuperscript{152} According to a memorandum written by Hoover in March 1935, Bates regularly complained to the “Attorney General” in regards to “remarks” by Hoover “made from time to time concerning the granting of paroles.” The memo indicated that an especially “long controversy” erupted between the two “following” Hoover’s “speech” to the ABA, an organization which Cooper thought needed to “clean house.”\textsuperscript{153} In a May 1936 memorandum to the attorney general, Bates complained of “adverse publicity” that was inspired by the “Bureau of Investigation.” He noted that it “was discouraging to feel” that “public opinion” was “being built up in a way which [was] not justified by the facts and which [was] damaging to some of the ideals which [they] were trying to establish.”\textsuperscript{154} Bates also wrote a letter to Cooper in March 1935 lamenting that the writer had fallen “into the too prevailing habit” of “exaggerating the figures of crime” as he portrayed “intrigue, and conniving, and corruption in prison” as a common occurrence.\textsuperscript{155} Bates’ public appeal consisted of a July 1935 \textit{New York Times} article titled, “The Parole System Strongly Defended: The Federal Prison Director Replies to Critics who have Condemned It,” which appeared in the back section of the paper.\textsuperscript{156}

The Office of the Attorney General made some attempts to control the director. In August 1937, Attorney General Cummings issued an order to DOJ employees requiring that “all publicity” must be “authorized and given to the press
through the office of the Attorney General and not otherwise. Any matter arising in any Bureau or Division of the Department” that deserved “publicity” must “be submitted to the office of the Attorney General for such action as may be deemed appropriate.” The order stated that this policy was meant to prevent an “imparting of information” to press members that could lead to “charges of favoritism from press representatives. In addition, the failure to clear press information through the office of the Attorney General results occasionally in confusion as to what the policy of the Department may be on a particular matter.”157 Hoover’s information campaign against Bates obviously led to some confusion over the DOJ’s position on its own programs.

Some members of the press identified Hoover’s strategy to undermine oversight mechanisms. Press cooperation and networking through field offices and syndicated periodicals gave Hoover national and international reach, thus making him more resistant to congressional or any other form of oversight. His power was made evident in a 1937 Saturday Evening Post exposé, which exclaimed:

Sheer envy of Hoover’s genius for marshalling public opinion causes many a government official to hate him. Congress, fearful of appearing to be prodigal with the tax payers’ money, is stingy in doling out appropriations. For the FBI, however, the purse string is loosened, because it is risky for a legislator to appear to be hamstringing the G-men. The voters back home won’t stand for it.158
His power was indeed as much, if not more, rhetorical as it was institutional. Newspaper and magazine surrogates played a key role in building public opinion in favor of the Bureau, and accordingly, the director’s leadership and power.

Hoover thus used his cultural authority to mold narratives that portrayed him as the essential figure in the War on Crime. Powers explains that “one of J. Edgar Hoover's cultural roles after 1935 was to be the ‘great detective’ of his day, the official narrator of action detective stories to the American public.” Hollywood and radio producers disseminated these narratives, which featured the director as a militarized leader, centered him in Washington, D.C., coordinating the campaign, but also made him available to travel to the dangerous events at any time when his involvement was necessitated. His service in both capacities was depicted as a heroic response to a criminal army attacking the nation. The director’s leadership was unique, though, because he possessed a mythic power to confront a frightening enemy powerful enough to defeat most other law enforcement agents and agencies, including his own G-Men. In short, he was featured as the top G-Man. He was the strongest member of America's response to the nation's nefarious underworld, and, by virtue of being a member of the executive branch, he was a powerful member of FDR’s war against the destabilizing forces of the economic depression.

At the War on Crime’s end, the recently instituted Gallop Poll revealed that the director’s campaign inside and outside the DOJ was successful by at least some measures. Whereas eighty-one percent of respondents reported that Hoover had done an “excellent” or “good” job as “head of the G Men” in 1939, only two percent reported that he had done a “poor” job, and eleven percent had “No opinion.” This
contrasted with the thirty-seven percent of respondents who reported that “Attorney General Cummings” had done a “good” job in his “office,” thirteen percent who reported that he had done a “poor” job, and fifty percent who had “No opinion” in 1938, his final year in office.¹⁶¹ Hoover was by then the nation’s top authority on law enforcement and would remain so for the rest of his career.

The director’s self-promotional success was also evident in the amount of appropriations allocated by Congress. Whereas the FBI’s appropriations increased from $2.75 million for fiscal year 1933 to $6.6 million for fiscal year 1939, the Bureau of Prisons appropriations decreased from $12.35 million for fiscal year 1933 to $11.8 million for fiscal 1939.¹⁶² By the end of the following decade, the FBI’s appropriations would more than double those received by the BOP.¹⁶³ Hoover’s arguments that law enforcement belonged to the realm of superheroes and supervillains, and that realist strategies were vital to control crime, were seemingly accepted by the American citizenry. By then, Bates had retired from the DOJ and the War on Crime was widely believed to have been won by militarizing federal law enforcement that overpowered criminals with force.¹⁶⁴

The prison director’s ability to interpret the crime problem and propose more idealistic solutions was largely undermined by the quantity and quality of Hoover’s discourse. Quality was not measured by accuracy, but by its ability to present a seemingly authentic and familiar reality to his various publics through true crime storylines featuring action detective heroes. Such narratives praised realism and constructed idealism as an empty vessel of corrupt motivations that actively sought to dupe the citizenry. Americanists framed liberalism in terms of a political-criminal
conspiracy that threatened the nation’s security. Or, as one writer explained, Hoover’s campaign showed that “hell breaks over the underworld” when “G-men take to the trail of relentless justice,” which marked “a red welt of fear on every criminal in the land.” Indeed, Hoover’s power was as mighty as his image was sensational.

Concluding the War on Crime: Forecasting a Realist Future

The CRD’s promotional material during the War on Crime has a number of significant dimensions worthy of consideration. First, it demonstrates the ideological work performed by some quarters of popular entertainment in the Depression era, which privileged realism over idealism. Second, the War on Crime illustrates a role played by the American intelligence community in shaping political and popular culture. And third, it highlights Hoover’s adaptation to the secular-scientific linguistic framework that then dominated public institutions. Hoover’s rhetoric of science began an ongoing process that would eventually militarize the FBI. As the director’s prominence rose, so too did his philosophy.

The urban-crime genre performed important ideological work for J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI on a number of levels. The New Deal represented a moment of intense polarity between members of the Department of Justice at a time of great uncertainty for many Americans, especially concerning the realities of city life. The War on Crime provided moments of action where Hoover’s political discourse borrowed from a century of stories that promulgated themes of force that were common to political realism. By adopting the genre’s logic and conventions, the CRD used popular entertainment to build legitimacy for deterrence methods, while Bates
attempted to expand equality by reforming undesirable citizens. Hoover’s hardboiled interpretations of events ultimately built public support that favored the FBI and its militancy.

The director’s definitions and proposed solutions constructed a familiar world to insecure Americans that reflected his realist philosophies. Hoover’s rhetorical invention made Bates’ idealistic vision appear outmoded by presenting marginalized citizens as menacing super-villains. Hoover simultaneously constructed his FBI as a super-heroic response to this menace, thereby crafting a juxtaposition that ridiculed idealism. Therefore, Hoover did not need to attack Bates in every utterance; rather, he just needed his narratives and metaphors to promote a logic that countered Bates’ philosophy. Such reasoning infiltrated multiple forms of information outlets, which increased its persuasiveness.

The FBI’s reality-making mechanism in the CRD utilized both propaganda and censorship. Beyond muzzling some major members of the press by their own commission, the director reinforced his action hero reality by blocking competing literary genres. Claire A. Culleton notes that the FBI actively censored modern literature in the 1930s and afterward precisely because the genre prioritized internationalism and a “free exchange of ideas,” which sometimes favored liberalism, progressivism, and socialism. This made literature an important means of international opinion formation as well as a source of propaganda. Modern literature challenged Hoover’s Americanist vision of citizenship as it probed such topics as legitimacy, democracy, the citizen, and the state in an international world. Hoover censored various projects through his vast network of contacts in the intelligence and
The FBI was then serving as both propagandist and thought police. These duties were justified through Hoover’s metaphorical selections. He would perpetuate rhetorical continuity between the War on Crime and Fifth Column campaigns by recycling the contagion and parasitic ancillary metaphors. He continued to imagine new conspiracies in various terms that emphasized an always spreading and always invisible threat, which always required more containment programming. The rhetorical perpetuation of this singular threat indefinitely justified the same types of realist solutions described by George Orwell in his review of the urban-crime genre. Force had become a popular form of political expression, and it advanced more realist perspectives.

The rise of the G-man action hero paralleled the rise of twentieth century Christian realist treaties, including Reinhold Niebuhr’s *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (1932) and Walter Marshall Horton’s *Realistic Theology* (1934). While writing about Cooper’s FBI formula, Powers explains that “public interest later shifted from gangsters to Nazi spies and then to Communist subversion.” Though the Bureau’s public campaigns would evolve, its core realist principles of anarchy, power, and monolithic state identity would transcend time and genre, and were echoed by realist writers. That is, the vermin menace turned into the Fifth Column threat, which in turn, evolved into the crisis of Red Fascism. These menaces were related in a number of ways, including their implications of liberalism with subversion, presumptions that threats were somehow of alien or foreign extraction, and prescriptions for a militarized FBI.
The rhetoric of science played a central role in promoting a logic that undermined constitutional boundaries. Whereas the Constitution was supposed to establish and maintain the country’s highest legal ideals, science came to represent efficiency in the Depression era when liberals and conservatives jointly abandoned certain “constitutional barriers” that prevented the federal government from intervening in the crime problem.\textsuperscript{168} The CRD’s metaphors privileged technocratic control, which translated to paramilitary force and equipment. Science was thus equated with militarism. And, because science represented efficiency, it also came to represent state power and professionalism, a conceptual organization better fitted for fascism than democracy. This reconceptualization of state authority helped the president to further militarize the FBI during the wartime era when idealism was increasingly displaced by realism.
Notes


4 Ibid., 447, 49.


8 Homer S. Cummings, “The Department of Justice and the New Deal,” June 11, 1933 (Radio Address), page 6, Record Group 60, Entry 132, Box 2, File: Speeches, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park (cited as NARA—CP).

9 This lack of jurisdiction to investigate the Kansas City Massacre was overlooked with few, if any, exceptions. Burrough, *Public Enemies*, N53.

10 Homer S. Cummings, “Address of Homer S. Cummings,” April 24, 1933 (Radio Address), page 2, Record Group 60, Entry 132, Box 2, File: Speeches, NARA—CP.


13 Joseph B. Keenan, “Uncle Sam Presses His New War on Crime: Joseph B. Keenan, Who Heads the Government's Nation-Wide Drive Against Racketeers and
Kidnappers, Tells of the Federal Aims, The Need for New Laws, and the Forming of a Sound Plan for Widening the Campaign to Relieve Gang-Ridden Communities,” *The New York Times*, August 20, 1933: 1; The Federal Bureau of Investigation was originally called the Bureau of Investigation (BI). The BI, the Bureau of Identification, and the Bureau of Prohibition were consolidated into the Division of Investigation (DI) on June 10, 1933, by Executive Order 6166 (“Organization of Executive Agencies”), which consolidated and abolished certain federal agencies. J. Edgar Hoover was appointed director of the DI on July 29, 1933, by Attorney General Homer S. Cummings. The DI was officially renamed Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on July 1, 1935.

14 *An Act to Prohibit Intoxicating Beverages, and to Regulate the Manufacture, Production, Use and sale of High-Proof Spirit for Other than Beverage Purposes, and to Insure an Ample Supply of Alcohol and Promote its use in Scientific Research and in the Development of Fuel, Dye, and Other Lawful Industries*, Public Law 66, 66th Cong., 1st sess., October 28, 1919.

15 For example, Attorney General Cummings remarked to the ABA that “conditions and public opinion change from one era to another; and so does judicial interpretation.” He suggested that “rugged individualism . . . no longer appeared to be adapted to a highly relational society,” and pointed to a “steady drift from the competitive to the co-operative ideal.” Homer S. Cummings, “Modern Tendencies and the Law,” *American Bar Association Journal* 19, no. 10 (1933): 578, 577.

17 J. Edgar Hoover, “Present-Day Police Problems,” October 4, 1937 (IACP), page 5, Record Group 60, Entry 132, Box 12, File: “Mr. Hoover’s Speeches,” NARA—CP.


26 —“Statement on Signing Bill to Help the Federal Government Wage War on Crime and Gangsters. May 18, 1934,” in ibid., 242- 244.


28 Ibid., 359, 505-07, 344-45.


37 Burrough, Public Enemies, 529-32.


39 Ibid., 182.

40 Ray Tucker, “Hist! Who’s That?” Collier’s, August 19, 1933: 15, 49.


42 House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1938: Testimony of Sanford Bates (Dir, Bur of Prisons), 75th Cong., 2d sess., 140.

43 Federal Offenders, Record Group 287, Decimal J16.1: 931-938, Box 833, NARA—CP.


46 Ibid., 69-70.


56 Miller, “From Old Cap to Nick Carter,” 202, 204.


58 The term “hardboiled” refers to a narrative style common to pulp fiction and film noir that portrays crime and violent punishment in an unsentimental manner.


61 Miller, “From Old Cap to Nick Carter,” 209.

62 Courtney Ryley Cooper, “J. Edgar Hoover has Formed Nucleus of Powerful Federal Police Force,” *The Kansas City Star*, August 7, 1933, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 3, NARA—CP.

63 Courtney Ryley Cooper, “Getting the Jump on Crime,” *The American Magazine*, August 1933, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 3, NARA—CP.


65 “Hoover: The One Who is in the Department of Justice,” *Newsweek*, August 12, 1933, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 3, NARA—CP; Era Connolly, “Uncle

The CRD worked closely with film studios to make products that would benefit both. According to a memorandum written by the President of the MPPDA’s assistant, J. Edgar Hoover agreed to offer “every form of cooperation in the making of motion pictures based on the work of the department provided the pictures [were] constructive.” Hoover’s terms of support included that the CRD maintain creative control of commercial filmmaking as “scenarios” were to be “submitted and subjected to revisions by the Department of Justice.” The director requested that the films engage “a competent writer, an able director,” and “wanted to know who the members of the cast[s] [would] be.” He also warned producers of “political feelings and jealousies between police departments and the Department of Justice” which could present “difficulties” that were to the “detriment of all concerned or depicted.” In another memorandum between executives, it was noted that the “Department in Washington recommended” that Courtney Ryley Cooper write the studio’s screenplay. The memo’s writer also explained that he wanted the “Department to approve” his film so the DOJ would lend a “technical advisor” and also allow the studio to “use the caption ‘Picture produced with the official cooperation of the Department of Justice.’” Memorandum by Anthony Muto, February 28, 1935, Will
Hays Collection, Indiana State Library, Manuscript Collection, Box 48, File:
February 16-28, 1935; Fred Meyer to Julius Klein, March 8, 1935, Will Hays
Collection, Indiana State Library, Manuscript Collection, Box 48, File: March 1-10, 1935.


70 Cooper, “J. Edgar Hoover has Formed Nucleus of Powerful Federal Police Force,” The Kansas City Star, August 7, 1933.
71 Hoover, Persons in Hiding, x.
72 Connolly, “Uncle Sam’s ‘400.’”
73 Kenneth Campbell, “U.S. Crime Bureau on Par with Scotland Yard,” New York Post, August 17, 1933, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 3, NARA—CP.
74 Connolly, “Uncle Sam’s ‘400.’”
76 J. Edgar Hoover, “Detection and Apprehension,” August 30, 1934 (American Bar Association), page 7, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 6, NARA—CP.
77 —— “Police Science: Organized Protection Against Organized Predatory Crimes, Bankruptcy Frauds” (April, 1933): 1074.


79 —— “Crime and the Citizen,” June 24, 1936 (Kiwanis International), page 15, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.


82 Notably, the Bureau was simultaneously losing fights in the Supreme Court to expand its jurisdiction to include electronic surveillance tools like wire taps, which were forbidden by the Federal Communication Act of 1934. See Nardone v. U.S., 302 S. Ct 378 (1937); Nardone v. U.S., 308 S. Ct 338 (1939).

83 House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1937: Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover, February 11, 1936, 74th Cong., 2d sess., 95.

84 J. Edgar Hoover, “Pioneering in Law Enforcement,” June 1, 1937 (Westminster College), page 9, Record Group 60, Entry 132, Box 12, File: “Mr. Hoover’s Speeches,” NARA—CP.

86 Kessler, The Bureau, 49.


88 Goulart, The Dime Detectives, 9.

89 Orwell, “Boys’ Weeklies,” 476.

90 Erin Steuter and Deborah Wills, At War with Metaphor: Media, Propaganda, and Racism in the War on Terror (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 48, 76, 72, 78.

91 Courtney Ryley Cooper to J. Edgar Hoover, October 31, 1933, FBI File# 94-3-4-20 Sec 1, Record Group 65, Entry UD-09D 8, Box 105, NARA—CP.

92 Courtney Ryley Cooper to J. Edgar Hoover, September 19, 1934, FBI File# 94-3-4-20 Sec 2, Record Group 65, Entry UD-09D 8, Box 105, NARA—CP.

93 J. Edgar Hoover to Courtney Ryley Cooper, October 11, 1934, FBI File# 94-3-4-20 Sec 2, Record Group 65, Entry UD-09D 8, Box 105, NARA—CP.


95 J. Edgar Hoover, “Modern Problems of Law Enforcement,” July 9, 1935 (IACP), pages 1-2, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

96 J. Edgar Hoover, “True Costs of Crime,” September 19, 1936 (Holy Name Societies), page 5, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

97 Courtney Ryley Cooper to J. Edgar Hoover, October 31, 1933, FBI File# 94-3-4-20 Sec 1, Record Group 65, Entry UD-09D 8, Box 105, NARA—CP.
98 W.H.D. Lester to Clyde Tolson, January 10, 1935, FBI File# 94-3-4-20 Sec 4, Record Group 65, Entry UD-09D 8, Box 106, NARA—CP.

99 J. Edgar Hoover to Courtney Ryley Cooper, November 7, 1933, FBI File# 94-3-4-20 Sec 1, Record Group 65, Entry UD-09D 8, Box 105, NARA—CP.

100 —“Patriotism and the War Against Crime,” April 23, 1936 (Daughters of the American Revolution), pages 3-4,6, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

101 —“Public Duty in Law Enforcement” December 3, 1937 (Association of Life Insurance Presidents), page 3, 7, Record Group 65, Entry 51, box 2, NARA—CP.

102 —“Modern Problems of Law Enforcement,” July 9, 1935 (IACP), 2-3.


104 J. Edgar Hoover, “The Youth Problem in Crime,” May 20, 1936 (Boys’ Clubs of America), page 7, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

105 —“Crime’s Challenge to America,” November 9, 1937 (American Hotel Association of the United States and Canada), page 6, 3, 5, and 7, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

106 —“Modern Problems of Law Enforcement,” July 9, 1935 (IACP), 3.

107 —“Law Enforcement and the Publisher,” April 22, 1937 (ANPA), pages 2-3,5, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

108 J. Edgar Hoover to Arthur S. Draper, August 7, 1936, FBI File# 94-3-4-2, Record Group 65, Entry UD-09D 11, Box 97, NARA—CP.
109 Hoover, “Law Enforcement and the Publisher,” April 22, 1937 (ANPA), 5.


111 J. Edgar Hoover to Homer S. Cummings, April 29, 1935, FBI File# 94-3-4-20 Sec 6, Record Group 65, Entry UD-09D 8, Box 106, NARA—CP.

112 Phillips H. Lord to J. Edgar Hoover, June 10, 1935, Record Group 60, Entry 132, Box 61, File: Lord (Seth Parker), NARA—CP.


115 Ibid., 4-5, 7, 10.

116 Ibid., 18-19.


119 “Dillinger Case Criticized,” *The Herald Post*, July 30, 1934, Group 65, Entry 49, Box 4, NARA—CP.

120 “G-Men as Lawless in Methods As Gang, Judge Cowie Charges,” *Milwaukee Sentinel*, June 29, 1935, Group 65, Entry 49, Box 11, NARA—CP.
121 Hoover, “Crime and the Citizen,” June 24, 1936 (Kiwanis International), 4, 9.


123 — “Uncle Sam and the Kidnapper,” August 2, 1933 (Location Unknown), page 2, Record Group 60, Entry 132, Box 2, File: “Crime Speeches,” NARA—CP.


125 — “Remarks,” August 7, 1936 (NBC Station, Washington, D.C.), page 5, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP; J. Edgar Hoover, “Police Problems of Today,” September 22, 1936 (International Association of Chiefs of Police), page 6, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.


127 J. Edgar Hoover to Henry Suydam, November 23, 1934, Record Group 60, Entry 132, Box 64, File: Unmarked—NARA, CP.

128 Clyde Tolson to J. Edgar Hoover, April 27, 1936, File# 67-9524 Sec. 2, Record Group 65, Entry 13 Box 1, NARA—CP.


130 Burrough, Public Enemies, 540.


1.

141 “Scarface,” The Caddo Company, 1932.


144 L.C. Schilder to Clyde Tolson, December 3, 1934, FBI File# 94-8 Sub 66, Record Group 65, Entry UD-09D 11, Box 247, NARA—CP; Lester to Tolson, February 12, 1934, FBI File# 94-8 Sub 66, Record Group 65, Entry UD-09D 11, Box 247, NARA—CP.

145 Robert S. Thornburgh to J. Edgar Hoover, September 30, 1933, FBI File# 94-8 Sub 66, Record Group 65, Entry UD-09D 11, Box 247, NARA—CP.

146 E.A. Tamm to J. Edgar Hoover, August 21, 1936, FBI File# 94-3-4-2, Record Group 65, Entry UD-09D 11, Box 97, NARA—CP.
147 Jerome J. Karpf to J. Edgar Hoover, December 4, 1934, Record Group 60, Entry 132, Box 53, File: Hoover Correspondence, NARA—CP.

148 Clyde Tolson to J. Edgar Hoover, February 13, 1935, FBI File# 94-8 Sub 66, Record Group 65, Entry UD-09D 11, Box 247, NARA—CP; John J. Edwards to Clyde Tolson, February 27, 1934, FBI File# 94-8 Sub 66, Record Group 65, Entry UD-09D 11, Box 247, NARA—CP.

149 J. Edgar Hoover, “Crime and Your Home,” May 17, 1938 (Triennial Convention of the General Federation of Women’s Clubs), pages 10 and 13, Record Group 60, Entry 132, Box 12, File: “Mr. Hoover’s Speeches,” NARA—CP.


152 E.A. Tamm to J. Edgar Hoover, March 8, 1935, FBI File# 94-3-4-20 Sec 6, Record Group 65, Entry UD-09D 8, Box 106, NARA—CP.

153 J. Edgar Hoover to William Stanley, March 9, 1935, FBI File# 94-3-4-20 Sec 6, Record Group 65, Entry UD-09D 8, Box 106, NARA—CP; Courtney Ryley Cooper to J. Edgar Hoover, September 5, 1935, FBI File# 94-3-4-20 Sec 6, Record Group 65, Entry UD-09D 8, Box 106, NARA—CP

154 Sanford Bates to Homer Cummings, May 16, 1936, Record Group 60, Entry 132, Box 3, File “Prisons.”

155 Sanford Bates to Courtney Ryley Cooper, March 15, 1935, FBI File# 94-3-4-20 Sec 6, Record Group 65, Entry UD-09D 8, Box 106, NARA—CP.

Order 3019, August 28, 1937, Record Group 60, Entry 132, Box 26, File: Departmental Publications, NARA—CP; This order repeated almost verbatim the preceding orders on press matters issued March 1925, March 1933, and September 1933.


Whereas the FBI was appropriated $48.58 million for fiscal year 1949, the BOP was appropriated $22.9 million. Bureau of the Budget, *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1950* (Washington DC:}

164 Sanford Bates retired from the DOJ in January, 1937 to become the Executive Director of Boys’ Club of America. Sanford Bates to Homer S. Cummings, January 18, 1937, Record Group 60, Entry 132, Box 46, File: “Resignations,” NARA—CP.

165 “‘G’ Marks the Spot Where Hoover X’s Them Out,” *Major Bowes Amateur Magazine*, June 1936, no page number, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 26, NARA—CP.


Chapter 3: Fighting the Axis Powers: “Americanism” Versus the Fifth Column

On January 17, 1938, British intelligence officers discovered a Nazi plot to ambush and kill a high-ranking U.S. military officer in New York City, with the ultimate aim to obtain information on Atlantic coast defense operations. Through secretly screening the mail of a German agent living in Scotland, MI6 learned of a plot involving an American citizen named Guenther Gustave Maria Rumrich. After the American military attaché in London was briefed of the affair, the War Department requested FBI assistance to monitor the threat. They discovered that Rumrich was already in police custody for impersonating Secretary of State Cordell Hull in his attempt to obtain American passports for the German government. He was transferred to FBI custody on February 19 from the New York Police Department.¹

Rumrich’s arrest was ultimately not significant to military and law enforcement agencies because the plot had been abandoned. It was important, however, for the volume of information the spy proffered on Nazi operations. Rumrich revealed a transportation mechanism that utilized transatlantic steamship lines operated by German companies to carry spies between North America and Europe. Employees on these vessels were secretly assigned to transfer materials from agents to German high command. Ship captains were ordered to lend all assistance to maintain security and achieve German strategic goals. At its peak, Rumrich’s spy ring included military personnel, steamship crews, and military-industrial engineers working in private plants. According to Raymond J. Batvinis, Germany successfully collected blueprints for military aircraft and new Navy destroyers, military communication devices, classified Army maps, reports on tactical military exercises,
confidential ship-to-shore communication codes, and “contingency plans for the installation of aircraft weapons in the New York metropolitan area.”

Fears of the Fifth Column were realized.

Reports of the plot’s revelation produced expressions of surprise and concern. The Washington Post described the Rumrich discovery in a front-page story as “one of the biggest spy cases in American history.”

Fears of high-profile spies and foreign agents on American soil coordinating with external military forces emerged again before another world war. Following the exposure, Hoover’s perceived ability to neutralize this threat paled in comparison to his reputation against gangsters. Of the eighteen defendants named in three indictments issued by U.S. Attorney Lamar Hardy, only four were arrested and they received a combined sentence of fourteen years in federal prison. The rest remained in Germany or had escaped as stowaways aboard steamships.

The Rumrich case ultimately played a major role in the Roosevelt administration’s battle against its anti-interventionist opposition. The story reinforced other press reports during the buildup to war of a wide-scale Fifth Column conspiracy—a network of covert revolutionary cells—that was actively engaged in sabotage, espionage, and propaganda activities. Although associated with external threats, the growing fear was that the enemy existed within the United States and involved some of the country’s top political leaders seeking to thwart the Roosevelt administration’s foreign policies. In response, Richard W. Steele explains, “FDR led an education campaign that portrayed his domestic critics” as part of this alleged “Nazi conspiracy” even though J. Edgar Hoover would confidentially minimize the
concern shortly after war was declared. Francis MacDonnell notes that the president “played a more influential role in shaping popular attitudes towards the Fifth Column than did any other single individual.” FDR's intelligence operatives were instrumental in this administrative campaign, Steele maintains, working with “British Intelligence” to produce “hundreds of books, articles, and movies” that “authoritatively informed the American public that Hitler’s success could be explained” by the “susceptibility” of democracy to “internal subversion.” Within the build-up of such a domestic propaganda campaign, notions of “free speech,” removed from government encroachment, became a wartime casualty reminiscent of such government-sponsored information activities of the previous world war.

Roosevelt’s anti-neutrality campaign was met with considerable opposition, and his critics spanned the political spectrum. He was flanked on the far right by foreign propagandists and American media sources that were sympathetic to the military actions of Germany. These groups were joined by anti-interventionist organizations and publishers as well as conservative and liberal members of Congress who sought to deter intervention. The information campaigns launched by these groups were bolstered by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) which, according to Albert Fried, was simultaneously “isolationist and radical” in its support for neutrality. Such opposition was reinforced by the African American press, which alleged discriminatory practices in the war effort. Civil rights and labor advocates were further supported by liberal academics and jurists who attempted to preserve freedom of speech during the war. Strengthening the resistance offered by these groups, communists and socialists pledged their support to neutrality.
These groups were politically divergent. The president, however, treated them all as un-American subversives that were conspiring to undermine U.S. foreign policy. MacDonnell explains that “FDR lumped together actual spies in the employ of Hitler with his isolationist critics” and thus failed to recognize a “distinction between legitimate opposition and treason.”\textsuperscript{10} Roosevelt reasoned that patriotism during wartime was expressed through unified political support, which necessitated that all political factions rally around the war effort.\textsuperscript{11} Given the severity of the national security crisis, any attempt to thwart the president’s foreign policy goals represented a threat to the nation's safety, Roosevelt's reasoning suggested; all other issues, including the protection of civil liberties associated with free speech and civil rights, had to be subordinated to a singular national interest.

J. Edgar Hoover played a central role in tainting Roosevelt’s views of the administration’s critics. The FBI director forwarded information to the president that labeled anti-interventionists, idealists, as well as labor, civil rights, and civil liberties activists as anti-American—groups that would metaphorically make up the Fifth Column threat in the United States. Conversely, interventionists and anti-communists represented patriotic citizens who championed an idealized sense of Americanism that would preserve the nation’s security against the Fifth Column threats.\textsuperscript{12} Such rhetorical constructions of the “enemy,” both domestic and foreign, limited the role of dissent in U.S. political culture, paving the way for the Roosevelt administration to move forward with its own foreign policy agenda.

Accordingly, the FBI developed an Americanization program that promulgated FDR’s and especially Hoover’s political vision while discrediting the
view and policies of detractors. As will be discussed in this chapter, Hoover and other Americanists interlaced the tenets of Christian fundamentalism with Reinhold Niebuhr’s Christian realism. Ultimately, the director’s strategies cemented and expanded the FBI’s role in foreign policy by reshaping the American political and religious landscapes. Within this chapter, Hoover’s juxtaposition between Americanism and anti-Americanism is examined through a metaphorical constellation that promoted the containment of the Fifth Column. The Fifth Column metaphor typically targeted internal groups that secretly coordinated with external militant enemies. Hoover and FDR, however, would tactically use it against critics of the administration’s foreign policies, helping to intensify the significance of the threat and warrant more extreme measures of retribution. The Fifth Column metaphor was informed by ancillary contagion, parasite, and termite metaphors. Such threats imposed a containment logic, which pushed forward Americanism as a means to maintain national security through cultural purification. This campaign identified FDR’s opposition as a conspiratorial network of subversives that exploited constitutional guarantees in their alleged attempts to overthrow the government. In the process, the FBI was constructed as a militarized bulwark that protected the homeland from such threats, and the director ultimately used “Americanism” to replace liberal values with those of militant Christianity. This chapter begins with a brief history of Americanism that also traces its intersections with realism before moving into the analysis of speeches, articles, and films created by Assistant Director Louis B. Nichols and his Crime Records Division between 1939 and 1945 as part of J. Edgar Hoover's campaign against the Fifth Column.
Fundamentalism and Christian Realism

The culture wars that J. Edgar Hoover helped to stoke during the 1920s became moot as secularism increasingly prohibited religious speech in public institutions. Fundamentalists spent the 1930s in the cultural margins of public life and many liberal Christians grew disillusioned with political idealism. Christian realism emerged during this period of political and cultural change. Reinhold Niebuhr was a recent convert from both Marxism and idealism. The theologian promoted a perspective that elevated neo-orthodoxy, which he viewed as more “real,” and subordinated cultural pluralism, which he viewed as more “illusory.” Larry L. Rasmussen observes that Niebuhr’s “neo-orthodoxy” attempted to locate a “positive relationship between Christianity and culture,” which represented “the ‘neo’ of ‘neo-orthodoxy.’” Rasmussen adds that in “Niebuhr’s social ethic, neo-orthodoxy [was] reflected in his understanding of the need for coercion in the interests of justice” and that he placed “issues of power at the center of ethics.”

Though he identified himself as a liberal and supported civil rights and labor activism, he also renounced liberalism by dismissing its presumptions and commitments to human rationality. Niebuhr believed that liberalism shared this faith in reason with communism. He attacked them both for supporting secularism.

Christian realism undermined idealism, liberal Christianity, and political liberalism in the 1930s. Walter Marshall Horton suggested in 1934 that Christian realism was based in “objective reality,” allegedly differentiating it from idealism, which he described as a body of “romantic illusions.” Idealists grew disenchanted by the failure of the League of Nations to maintain peace. Realists took advantage of
this failure and promoted instead the tenets of realism and its neo-orthodoxical presumptions about coercion and power.\textsuperscript{16} Niebuhr rose to prominence with this movement. Beginning with the publication of \textit{Moral Man and Immoral Society} (1932), his theology outlined a more authoritarian perspective that conservatives used to undermine liberalism.

Niebuhr was indisputably the most influential twentieth century Christian realist philosopher. Martin E. Marty explains that of the realists, Niebuhr held the “ear of politicians” and introduced the movement to the public as he became “the century’s most influential native-born American theologian.”\textsuperscript{17} Reinforcing Marty’s position, William D. Dean notes that “Hans Morgenthau called him ‘the greatest living political philosopher of America;’ George Kennan called Niebuhr ‘the father of us all;’ and Vice-President Hubert Humphrey said of Niebuhr, ‘No American has made a greater contribution to political wisdom and moral responsibility.’”\textsuperscript{18} Ultimately, Niebuhr’s realism offered moral legitimacy to policy planners who sought to dismantle constitutional guarantees.

Niebuhr routinely lamented that liberals were guilty of placing too much emphasis on reason and sharing too many ideas with communists. He challenged the idealistic assumption that all peoples had the same appreciation and capacity for rational thinking.\textsuperscript{19} Accordingly, the theologian posited that “liberal culture was dying” from its “rationalistic” and “optimistic illusions” in “both the religious and the political.”\textsuperscript{20} He wrote in 1933 that “Political realists” were growing “cynical about moral and religious idealism in politics” because “confused liberals” had overestimated “human nature.”\textsuperscript{21} He dismissed the potential for achieving intergroup
tolerance through “rational capacity.” He traced such misplaced faith to Thomas Jefferson and the Age of Reason.

Christian realism rejected liberalism for its displacement of Protestant domination in American culture; specifically, Niebuhr rejected the tolerance encouraged by liberalism as a compromise of principle. He defined the “final sin” in national life as the spread of atheism, secularism, or other ideologies that did not recognize the primacy of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Niebuhr suggested that the “modern fascist nations” had “achieved a daemonic form of national self-assertion” that was “more dangerous” than that of the “ancient religious empires” because it was expressed against “Christian culture.” His argument was predicated on the premise that ancient Israel fell because it broke its covenant with God. Thus, the theologian located a point of unity for Catholics, Protestants, and Jews who shared a common contempt for the atheism inherent in communism.

Fundamentalists had traditionally resorted to force as a method of social control to curb socialist radicalism, a strategy advocated by Niebuhr. For example, Vice President Thomas R. Marshall declared in 1920 that “Americanism” meant that “America belonged” to only those citizens who comported themselves in “orderly and constitutional ways” and that all others “should be taught, peacefully” if possible and “forcibly” if necessary that “our country” was “not an international boarding house nor an anarchist cafe.” Similarly, Niebuhr wrote in 1932 that “violence” was a legitimate means to effect change if its “terror” had the “tempo of a surgeon’s skill.” He subsequently observed in 1940 that Western democracies should “destroy or suppress” the “allegiance” of its “citizens” to the “Russian” cause of a “classless
Fundamentalists and industrialists were thus granted a theological rationale for using violence to subvert adherents of Marxist ideologies and their sympathizers.

Niebuhr’s criticism of inherent rationality in human nature, and his support of violence to maintain order, harbored obvious implications for international relations, democracy, and capitalism. Michael Cox observes that the theologian strongly influenced the watershed moment of twentieth century political realism—the publication of E.H. Carr’s *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939* (1939). Following Niebuhr’s prognosis that human nature was tragically self-interested and self-destructive, Carr suggested that the “harmony of interests” between individuals and nations presupposed by Jefferson and Adam Smith was delusional. Order, thus, replaced harmony, and was thought to stabilize the interests of majority parties by controlling the intellectual pursuits of minorities with force. Limiting the freedom of inquiry—an ideal championed by Carl Schurz’s more liberal tradition of Americanism—was advocated by many fundamentalists. The threat was associated with Marxist speech that could lead to anti-Christian, anti-capitalist, and even racial revolution. As suspicions of internal subversion grew, realists became increasingly skeptical about of the patriotism of protest. They began to view democracy as a system of government in which the majority needed to operate with less regard for minority rights. Hoover articulated such conceptions of majority rule as he worked to organize a new coalition around the Americanist vision of America.
Director Hoover used the existing antithesis between Americanism and un-Americanism to divide and realign group loyalties. Metaphorically, the Fifth Column constituted a conspiratorial network of anti-interventionists, intellectuals, civil liberties advocates, labor unionists, and civil rights activists. These groups were defined as un-American because of their opposition to the Roosevelt administration, as well as their advocacy for cultural pluralism. Conversely, the FBI director pressed fundamentalists, interventionists, anti-communists, realists, and those who supported law and order to align with him under his banner of Americanism. The director specifically courted Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish groups. He encouraged their conservative members to turn against their more liberal counterparts and to join his coalition of Americanists, thereby ensuring the preservation and institutionalization of his ideals in the federal government and in public life.

Such coalition building stemmed from Roosevelt’s wish for a unified war effort. Eric L. Goldstein explains that fears in the pre-war era of “fascist propaganda” sowing racial discord led the administration to launch its own “propaganda campaign.” Speech that encouraged disunity among the white races was denounced by FDR as “un-American,” which reduced support for Anglo-Saxonism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Catholicism. The scholar further observes that Jews and Catholics benefitted from this new white racial unity that also undermined some of their previous commitments to cultural pluralism. Entering the mainstream required the newly accepted groups to abandon such high idealism.
This section examines films, speeches, government reports, newspaper articles, letters, and FBI files to show the ways in which Hoover used the Fifth Column metaphor to portray the administration’s critics in a manner that bolstered Hoover’s behind-the-scenes collaboration with President Roosevelt. Roosevelt turned to Hoover for political intelligence on his critics. The director in turn framed the president’s opposition as members of an underground revolutionary movement. Specifically, he used the Fifth Column metaphor to starkly juxtapose Americanism— informed by Christian realism, Christian fundamentalism, and their commitments to neo-orthodoxy— against un-Americanism. Ultimately, the alleged risk of anti-American sentiment was made to appear as necessitating the containment of any adversarial elements, which justified the violation of widespread civil liberties. Notions of un-Americanism also helped constitute a secretive religious-political culture in which Hoover functioned more like a dictator and the FBI more like his secret police.

The analysis begins with an examination of Hoover’s juxtaposition between “Americanism” and “un-Americanism.” The former helped Hoover further militarize the FBI’s identity as the country’s protector; the latter symbolized any perceived threats to conservative religion and the nation’s safekeeping. This chapter then ends with an examination of Hoover’s containment logic, which sought to protect and preserve his vision of Americanism and undermine the New Deal.

*Americanism and Religion*

Hoover’s Americanism campaign encouraged a conservative revolution in American religion. He used the national unity of wartime to encourage a new strand
of Christian fundamentalism that was more welcoming of anti-communist Jews and Catholics. The director used the militancy of Christian realism and Christian fundamentalism to establish a more robust Americanist coalition. This grouping was hospitable to those industrialists who promoted a free enterprise economic model. Similar to Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer’s military-industrial base of support, Hoover co-opted local law enforcement agencies as extensions of Hoover’s campaign to maintain law and order. The director’s discourses on Americanism are first examined, followed by an analysis of his militarized vision for national law enforcement. Both conceptions were predicated on a broader religious alliance of groups that followed the Judeo-Christian tradition.

The Jewish-American community was at the forefront of promoting tolerance during the wartime era. Various organizations led a movement—based on the principles of cultural pluralism—to encourage tolerance and to combat bigoted ideologies. Beyond anti-communism, B’nai B’rith’s Anti-Defamation League and the American Jewish Committee also worked in an intergroup collaborative effort with more liberal Catholic and Protestant councils as well as with labor unions, educational associations, and civil rights agencies to encourage tolerance. According to Stuart Svonkin, these organizations launched a large scale social-scientific public education campaign that depicted “Nazism as atheistic, antidemocratic, and un-American” and “anti-Semitism” as the “opening gambit in a Nazi scheme to ‘divide and conquer’ the United States.” The historian further notes that the Jewish community was helped by the “ideological battle against totalitarianism.” The Roosevelt administration defined “Americanism” in terms of a “religiosity” that
included “Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism on equal footing.” The administration treated the Jewish tradition as a foundational component of American civil religion and, thus, U.S. political culture. The FBI played a key role in the evolution of this perspective.

Hoover grounded notions of Americanism in FDR’s attempt to build national cohesion and also in the liberal Jewish-Christian campaign for tolerance. For example, he proclaimed to B’nai B’rith in May 1940 that “Our Nation was formed upon the foundation of TOLERANCE.” Accordingly, he lauded its “Americanism Program” for curbing “intolerance against” the nation’s “essential tenets,” and specifically warned that “Communism” could “kill everything that is American.” Highlighting B’nai B’rith’s commitment to anti-communism, Hoover directed its members to equate unity among the white races, as well as religious devotion, with patriotism. He asserted that the “Republic should stand fast as a sanctuary, where the voices of religious and racial bigotry [were] absent, where all [were] dedicated to faith in and service to God and human freedom.” Unification on these terms required religious Jews to renounce ideologies that challenged the Judeo-Christian tradition—including ethnic Jews in the Socialist Party or those who were sympathetic with communism. Hoover echoed B’nai B’rith’s disdain for the relationship between communism and atheism. In the process, he warned the organization in February 1941 that the “Godless forces of totalitarianism” pretended to “aid the less fortunate and the oppressed” in their promotion of “revolutionary activities.” Statements like this underscored realism’s critique of communism and liberalism.
The FBI’s interest in the Jewish community further accelerated after the dissolution of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (August 1939-June 1941), which pledged neutrality between Germany and the Soviet Union. An FBI informant reported in November 1941, for example, that influential “Jewish Capitalists in this country” were “leaning toward the Communists” and were “becoming friendly with them” even though “Mr. Hoover” was “dead [set] against the Communists” and, therefore, was a “stumbling block in their way.” The Jewish capitalists allegedly sought to use their political connections with Attorney General “Biddle to gradually make strong enough inroads to ‘upset the boss.’”

Dividing the Jewish community with notions of Americanism served to undermine such adversaries. Fears of totalitarian revolution abroad raised concerns about such issues domestically. The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) created challenges for the coalition of Catholics and liberal Protestants in America. Pope Pius XI’s endorsement of Francisco Franco’s military coup against the Spanish Government—a coalition of liberals, socialists, and communists—signaled the beginning of a worldwide Catholic anti-communist campaign. This new focus displaced the Catholic Church’s social justice commitments and its alignment with Social Gospel Protestants, perhaps most notably its commitment to the labor movement. Whereas ideas belonging to the social justice and Social Gospel movements underscored notions of cultural pluralism, Americanists insisted upon order to prevent violence, to protect property, and to preempt atheism. This change in emphasis provided an opportunity for broadening the Americanist coalition and for undermining the more liberal Social Gospel movement.
Hoover expanded Americanism to welcome into his network those Catholics who associated neo-orthodoxy with U.S. democracy. For example, he told Notre Dame University in May 1942 that “American patriotism” was “inseparable from religion; [was] strengthened by fervent religious expressions and devotions.” Accordingly, Hoover reasoned, “Americans should be more and more religious – reverently and ardently and sincerely religious.” The director’s Americanism built unity between Catholics and Protestants by rejecting the atheistic, rather than the economic, element of communism. He told the school that by “placing our faith” in “God” and by “rising as one in righteous wrath . . . democracy” would “vanquish” the “godless forces of dictators.”

The Americanization of the Catholic Church required that it refocus its commitments away from social justice. In November 1942, he told the Holland Society of New York—an exclusive organization of descendents from the New Netherland colony—that if “more emphasis were placed on the Gospel of Salvation,” which was associated with fundamentalism, and “less on social justice, the latter would become a greater reality.”

Hoover elevated fundamentalism and subordinated social justice while the Church struggled to Americanize its stature. Hoover’s doctrinal preferences were directly related to his national security mission. The director explained to Holy Cross College—a Catholic institution—in June 1944, for example, that the “fundamentals” of “Liberty” required “America” to “make her people moral” through “religion” because “Religion” was a “necessary factor” in a “well-ordered society.” The values of Christian fundamentalism, thus, were elevated over social justice. Hoover used Americanism as a vehicle to communicate his
fundamentalist precepts to Catholics and Jews. He further elaborated upon his political philosophy when speaking to more traditional anti-communist communities.

The director’s Americanism valued federal power over the universal rights that it was seemingly designed to protect. In October 1939, for example, he told the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) that “true Americanism” was “abiding adherence” to the “principles” of the “Declaration of Independence,” the “Bill of Rights and the Constitution,” which constituted American “Democracy.”

Rather than celebrating their guarantee of civil rights as many liberals did, though, the director instead accentuated the Constitution’s creation of law and order. He told the National Fifty Years in Business Club in May 1939 that the “major task of society” was to “insure that law and order” would continue to “reign supreme.” When speaking to such mainstream groups, Hoover defined “liberty” as “Obedience to the law.”

The director had long sympathized with industrialists who shared his disdain for agitation. He informed the White House in October 1940 that the FBI maintained a “friendly relationship over a period of many years with many banking establishments” and in return received “excellent cooperation” from “financial institutions” in a “monitoring program” to detect “espionage, sabotage and similar activities.” He also pledged that “[e]xtraordinary care” was “exercised at all times” to avoid the “so-called ‘labor spying’” that was often accused of interfering with “employer-employee relationships.”

Such reassurances, however, belied his surveillance organized labor which he formalized that year with help from the American Legion.
Many well-established Americans agreed that the social order needed protection from the destabilizing influences of labor and civil rights activism. He told the Holland Society that “without order, democracy” was an “empty, meaningless symbolism.”\textsuperscript{50} He reiterated this sentiment in August 1943 to the IACP, stating that “law and order – the corner-stone of civilization” was the “keystone of democracy.”\textsuperscript{51} Hoover subordinated liberty to order when addressing distinguished members of law enforcement, industry, and cultural groups.

Hoover conveyed Americanism throughout the war as an anti-communist ideology that welcomed those Jews and Catholics who appropriately Americanized—those who elevated their allegiance to anti-communism above their previous commitments to cultural pluralism. The director promulgated this perspective during a time of infighting among Protestants. Marty observes that the “Fundamentalist-Modernist controversies” of the 1920s led establishment Protestants to view what was then the conservative fringe as harboring an anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic, anti-intellectual, anti-communist, militaristic, and free-enterprise ideology for “hillbillies” and “rednecks” up through the early years of the war. Interpreting the Bible literally, they waited for the anti-christ and his forces to be revealed in the human world. By the war’s conclusion, however, fundamentalism was quickly becoming a mainstream Protestant perspective.\textsuperscript{52} The director spent the interim promoting fundamentalism’s principles and its fears through Americanist discourses, while also demanding Judeo-Christian unity. This challenged traditional racial and ideological boundary lines inherent to fundamentalism and also encouraged the formation of a new anti-communist coalition.
Hoover’s perspective appealed to conservative Protestants who believed that America needed militant religious fervor to protect the free-market economic order, which represented to them the core of democracy. Such Americanism privileged capitalism over pluralism and social justice on religious grounds. The ideology also commissioned government officials to use all means available to maintain the preeminence of Protestantism and capitalism. Correspondingly, Hoover’s Americanism appealed to the values of Christian realism and Christian fundamentalism. It also championed the militarization of law enforcement to protect “Americans” from those groups who held different, and sometimes atheistic, values. Such a rhetorical strategy was implemented as the president expanded Hoover’s jurisdiction and appropriations.

*Americanism and Militarism*

Roosevelt used the Rumrich exposure to centralize police power in the FBI, under the auspice of battling Fifth Column subversion. The FBI’s annual appropriations moved from $6.5 million in 1939 to $44.2 million in 1945; staffing of special agents increased six-fold during that same period. Additionally, Hoover was appointed as chair of FDR’s Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), which made the FBI the sole civilian agency with jurisdiction over counterespionage investigations within the United States and its territories. The IIC established the Special Intelligence Service, which covertly expanded the FBI’s jurisdiction to “conduct overseas espionage and counterintelligence activities,” observes Batvinis. In December 1941, Roosevelt ordered the “heads of all Government Departments and Agencies concerned to clear directly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in
connection with any intelligence work within . . . Mexico, Central America, South America, the Caribbean, and Canada." Additionally, FBI agents had already been placed in East Asia, Eastern and Western Europe, and the South Pacific.

Hoover developed the FBI’s national policing methods in conjunction with foreign police departments that were also anti-communist and interested in maintaining racial, religious, and ideological boundaries. He networked with the German Gestapo and members of the Waffen-SS through the International Criminal Police Commission from May 13, 1935 until December 4, 1941, just three days before the attack on Pearl Harbor. In this time, the FBI collaborated with Heinrich Himmler and Chief of German Police and Holocaust architect, Reinhard Heydrich. Hoover also accepted a medal from Benito Mussolini of Italy in this era for his police work through the International Association of Chiefs of Police. According to FBI memoranda, the Bureau and ICPC shared an interest in efficient and “new scientific developments” in law enforcement, particularly pertaining to “repressive and preventative measures against actions preparatory to crime and other dangerous conduct showing criminal intentions.” Methods of propaganda were also exchanged as the FBI reprinted its speeches in ICPC publications. Whereas the FBI used the vermin metaphor to represent criminals and prison reformers, the Gestapo used the metaphor to represent Jews; both of these usages followed Lenin’s references to capitalists and clergy as vermin.

The FBI expanded in a manner that resembled the more centralized policing models implemented in England, Germany, and Italy. The president ordered all local police departments to cooperate with the FBI in war-related matters in September
1939, which the director used to assume control over such work. Roosevelt also made Hoover the Director of the Office of Censorship in December 1941, where he gained more formal authority over domestic and foreign media. The FBI used this latitude to develop its controversial Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO), which largely replicated policing methods developed by British authorities.

According to Batvinis, Roosevelt secretly created an intelligence community that had jurisdiction over the entire federal government and its constituencies, but was only responsible to the president. Kenneth O’Reilly explains that in addition to chasing spies, FDR used this new European-styled policing apparatus to “occasionally exploit the bureau’s intelligence functions for partisan purposes, thereby sometimes demonstrating an ambivalent commitment to civil liberties.” Various requests for “political information” allowed “FBI officials” to ingratiate themselves with the “president” and to pursue “independent political objectives.” Frank J. Donner suggests that such expansion of “civilian anti-subversive surveillance” institutionally militarized the FBI and allowed the president to circumvent the “austere language of the Constitution limiting the Army’s role in civilian affairs.” This development demonstrates Douglas M. Charles’ observation that a domestic security state (1939-1945) preceded the Cold War era national security state, and did so with a hidden agenda to manipulate public deliberation.

Roosevelt’s centralization of authority in the FBI was encouraged by Hoover, who eagerly wrested authority away from the State Department and the Army. In turn, an unfriendly rivalry emerged, pitting the FBI Director against Secretary of War Henry Stimson. Batvinis explains that Stimson resented Hoover’s access to the
president and feared that he had unfairly biased Roosevelt’s perspective to win interagency battles. Though Hoover had a contentious relationship with intelligence leaders behind-the-scenes, the FBI’s militarization of American law enforcement was facilitated by its public portrayal of cooperation between civilian and military agencies.

Hoover used Americanism to suggest that the U.S. armed forces needed insulation from communism. He explained to Notre Dame University in May 1942 that “Red-blooded Americanism” bound “[a]l law enforcement bodies” together in a “united front” to safeguard the “armed and naval forces” as well as “the “country’s soldiers, sailors and marines” from the “enemy within” who would otherwise disintegrate their “strength.” Like Niebuhr, he warned that godlessness threatened America’s national security. For example, he told the Daughters of the American Revolution—an elite organization of Anglo-Saxon Protestant women—in April 1940 that the FBI was the “first line of defense” in preventing the “Communist Party” from permeating the “Army and Navy” with the “exponents” of “atheism” to promote “revolution.” Hoover, thus, constructed the FBI as a proxy to the U.S. military that prevented the spread of subversive beliefs. This new role required federal authorities to assume control over more local jurisdictions.

The militarization of the Bureau reconstituted policing agencies across the country as extensions of Hoover’s centralized and vastly expanded power. He used Americanism to communicate the president’s authority over local departments and their obligation to the national war effort. For example, Hoover told the FBI National Police Academy in September 1939 that “American law enforcement” must follow
the “request” of the “President” for its “coordination and centralization.”74 His use of
“American” did more than express the president’s national jurisdiction; it also
asserted that the centralization of policing power was constitutionally legitimate.
Hoover, for example, told the Federal-State Conference on Law Enforcement
Problems of National Defense in August 1940 that the “Chief Executive” entrusted
“constituted law enforcement” to prevent the “blackout of justice” by making the
“FBI” the “clearing house” for “subversive activities” in a manner that was “typically
American” and met “democratic standards.”75 Roosevelt expanded upon his law
enforcement directive in January 1943 to encourage “all patriotic organizations and
individuals” to “report” all war-related matters to the FBI so that it could conduct a
“comprehensive” correlation of “information” that avoided “confusion and
irresponsibility.”76 The president’s interest in coordinating law enforcement against
subversion, thus, laid the foundation for Hoover to operate without a check on, or
counterweight to, his power.

Because Hoover valued the Constitution for the power that it generated, rather
than the rights that it protected, the Americanization of law enforcement detached it
from constitutional restraints. He told the IACP in September 1940, for example, that
“Freedom of the press, of speech, and of thought, conceived by the founders of this
nation” was not intended for “crooks or dictators, spies or traitors, Communists or
[German-American] Bundsmen.”77 Hoover, thus, asserted that the founders intended
for groups that harbored Americanist values to wield militant power against those
who destabilized the social order. Beyond his own speeches on the matter, Hoover
also turned to popular entertainment for help in shaping favorable perceptions of expanded federal authority.

The militarization of a civilian agency was strategically communicated through major motion pictures. Assistant Director Hugh H. Clegg recommended to Hoover in 1942 that the FBI approach “motion picture producers” and suggested that “some ‘A’ grade pictures” be produced that portrayed the “Special Agent in at least as favorable a light as those who are in the armed forces.” Such films were supposed to emphasize that the “Special Agent” served America “unselfishly without the glamour of uniforms and military-sounding titles.”78 Assistant Director and propaganda chief Louis Nichols helped coordinate the Twentieth Century Fox production of *The House on 92nd Street* (1945). He summarized the script to Clyde Tolson, who was then Assistant to the Director, as opening with “alien round-ups, showing Germans and Japs being taken into custody – utilizing FBI Agents, Police, ONI, M.P.’s – giving credit to the entire group.” Nichols noted that the narrator should state that the FBI worked “in complete cooperation with all branches of the Armed Services.” He also wrote to Hoover that the film would include “two full-dress conferences consisting of admirals, captains, generals, colonels, along with [a special agent] and FBI executives.”79 The film celebrated the FBI’s militarization and asserted that it operated at the highest levels of national defense.

*The House on 92nd Street* misinformed audiences about the Bureau’s official role in the war effort. The film was released just six weeks after atomic bombs were dropped on Japan, making it the “first post-Hiroshima bomb film.”80 The only other Assistant to the Director, Edward A. Tamm, reported to Hoover shortly before the
production’s release that the Head of the Army Pictorial Review Section raised concerns “upon the question of jurisdiction” because the film falsely claimed that the FBI was authorized to guard the atomic bomb. In spite of such reservations, however, he ultimately approved its release. According to the film’s publicist, audiences were invited to view the movie as sticking “as closely to the truth as any non-fiction book or magazine article,” thereby obscuring the FBI’s duties in civil defense.

Constructing the FBI as the premier guardian of the world’s most dangerous military secrets and of American power increased the Bureau’s cultural prestige. Such a large expansion of power, however, resulted in more informed members of the intelligence community growing weary of Hoover’s power grab.

Americanism served as a vehicle for communicating a form of anti-communism that favored the interests of conservative Catholics, Jews, and Protestants as well as industrialists. Hoover’s Americanism also encouraged a process of thought that replaced the New Deal’s more idealist philosophy with the presumptions of Christian realism and Christian fundamentalism. It also extended ideological support to his burgeoning militarized law enforcement empire. He used un-Americanism, conversely, to inform his construction of the administration’s adversaries. Such perspectives were welcomed by the White House.

*Un-Americanism and the Fifth Column*

Hoover exploited the president’s interest in political intelligence. O’Reilly explains that Roosevelt requested political information from the director on American fascists in 1934, his critics in 1935, and communism and fascism in 1936. These requests began an on-going process throughout the remainder of Roosevelt’s
presidency whereby Hoover forwarded solicited and unsolicited reports to the White House. FDR would repeatedly express his gratitude for Hoover’s due diligence. For example, the president ordered his secretary in June 1940 to “prepare a nice letter to Edgar Hoover thanking him for all the reports on investigations he has made and tell him I appreciate the fine job he is doing.” The outgoing letter celebrated Hoover for having done “a wonderful job” in the “fast moving situation,” resulting in Roosevelt’s “gratification and appreciation.” By utilizing Hoover’s expertise in political intelligence gathering, Roosevelt came to trust the director as a confidant during the New Deal.

In the process of elevating Hoover’s administrative role, Roosevelt also appeared increasingly suspicious of the administration’s critics. Charles observes that FBI officials “played to President Roosevelt’s political interests” by forwarding “intelligence to the administration that suggested its critics were, indeed, ‘subversive.’” Specifically, Hoover more eagerly shared intelligence summaries that portrayed FDR’s opposition as treasonous. Such reports were based largely on the anonymous speculations of the American Legion—and as the director admitted—were “not susceptible to being verified.” The Legion had remained committed to one-hundred percent Americanism since its formation in 1919. Athan G. Theoharis observes that the FBI’s dependence on the American Legion Contact Program (ALCP) from 1940 to 1945 resembled its relationship with the American Protective League during the Great War; both programs were manifestations of Americanism campaigns. Once again, the Bureau employed “conservative activists to monitor dissent and insure internal order.” This time, however, Hoover’s planning expanded
the FBI’s domestic surveillance capabilities on a more permanent basis. The Legion would become a key power broker in American culture during the early Cold War. Hoover’s manipulation of national security intelligence embittered the president’s debate with anti-interventionists in the legislative branch and other wartime adversaries. For example, FDR wrote in a May 1942 memorandum to the attorney general that “Senators and members of the Congress” were “protected” only in a “sense” by the “Constitution” and that such a boundary “must be strictly construed” so as to allow the “F.B.I.” to investigate “suspected subversive activities on their part.” It was with such a mindset that Roosevelt accepted information from the FBI on a menagerie of anti-interventionist critics.

Intermixed in this broader perspective, Hoover implicated his own political opposition through the metaphor of an American Fifth Column. The term was coined during the Spanish Civil War to discuss the movement of General Franco’s military coup. The metaphor asserted a framework in which “four columns” of fascist “troops” coordinated externally against Madrid and with the assistance of an internal “fifth column.” This surreptitious group was perceived to have the power to infiltrate and undermine military and governmental agencies. Hoover’s reports to the president encouraged this view of the administration’s adversaries. The director reserved his own uses of the Fifth Column metaphor to emphasize the allegedly un-American activities of those who criticized the FBI’s wartime methods. Arguments for restraint in law enforcement were then dubbed as disloyal speech that intentionally sought to weaken America’s defenses. This section begins with
Hoover’s broader denouncement of un-American philosophies and then turns to his embodiment of such ideas through the Fifth Column metaphor.

Fears of foreign—or un-American—intrigue had circulated throughout Congress since at least the early 1930s, manifesting itself in un-American activities committees. The Special Committee to Investigate Communist Activities in the United States (1930-1931) was formed to examine allegations of Soviet conspiracies. The panel was succeeded by the Special Committee to Investigate Nazi and Other Propaganda (1934-1937), which also heavily focused on charges of Soviet activities in America. Furthermore, the Special Committee on Un-American Activities (1938-1944) defined Americanism in a manner that aligned un-Americanism more with communism than with ideologies associated with the Axis powers. Chairman Martin Dies (D-TX) wrote in January 1939, for example, that “Americanism” was the recognition that “fundamental rights” were derived from “God” and included the freedoms of worship and “property rights.” Richard Gid Powers observes that the Dies Committee was more interested in using the information that it had gained on the CPUSA as “ammunition for red-smearing attacks on unpopular opinions and associations.” Some members of Congress thus used un-Americanism to articulate the conspiracy theories that reflected the reasoning of fundamentalism. Such obtuse conservative politicking was met by liberal polemic partisanship.

Roosevelt defensively dismissed all charges of communist infiltration as anti-New Deal conservative politics. Perhaps most notably, he ignored Whitaker Chambers’ confidential September 1939 admission of guilt to the State Department
when he acknowledged his service as a Soviet spy; FDR also dismissed Chambers’
revelation of widespread Soviet penetration of the executive branch.\textsuperscript{93} Once Joseph
Stalin allied with the United States in 1941, the administration rebutted anti-
communist attacks with accusations that Dies and other critics were actually Nazi
sympathizers who were attempting to obstruct the war effort. Roosevelt even directed
Hoover to not investigate Soviet espionage in order to maintain Stalin’s trust.\textsuperscript{94} The
order did not stop the director from using allegations of communist “un-
Americanism” to discredit the administration’s detractors. This rhetorical move
simultaneously served the foreign policy goals of the president and distanced the FBI
from the administration on the issue.

Hoover, like Roosevelt, portrayed those who disrupted national unity in the
war effort as un-American and linked these individuals to hostile foreign powers. He
told the Annual \textit{New York Herald-Tribune} Forum in October 1939, for example, that
the nation “must unite to resist the insidious propaganda designed to foment unrest”
by those whose “allegiance” was “pledged abroad.” The “good citizen,” he suggested,
needed to “guard against subversion in all its forms. Call it Communism, Fascism, or
what you will – it [was] un-American.”\textsuperscript{95} He focused his meanings of un-
Americanism more on communism than fascism as the war progressed. The director
told the Boys’ Clubs of America in May 1944, for example, that “alien-minded and
un-America forces” sought to “destroy the American way of life” by corrupting
“Democracy” and injecting the “Communist virus” into the “veins of our American
youth.”\textsuperscript{96} Hoover, thus, relied upon un-Americanism to portray American communists
as subversive, and to reproach those who destabilized national unity. The virus
metaphor described a threat that could allegedly spread uncontrollably throughout the population.

The director used un-Americanism largely to imply that those groups and ideas that were rejected by fundamentalism were of foreign origin; he made, however, exceptions for Catholics and Jews who were willing to Americanize. The perspective, in general, even marked liberal commitments as embodiments of foreign ideas. Svonkin explains that by wartime, Jewish “intergroup professionals” began distancing themselves from the term “cultural pluralism”—a phrase coined by a Jewish American—because it had developed “distinctively European (and thus inherently un-American)” connotations. This context informed the Fifth Column metaphor. Hoover conflated pluralism, communism, Nazism, fascism, and criticism of the administration under a common trope. This recast anti-war, civil rights, and civil liberties agitation as well as anti-interventionism and cultural pluralism as elements of menacing foreign ideologies. This perspective advanced the principles of Hoover’s Americanism, which centralized power in the nation-state to combat atheism.

The Fifth Column metaphor was broadly used by members of the federal government to conceptualize notions of threat and to promote social control. The Dies Committee used it to describe domestic groups that were sympathetic with, or loyal to, the Soviet Union or Germany. A June 1940 Washington Post article, for example, explained that the committee used “the ‘fifth column’” to link the CPUSA with the “Communist International in Moscow,” and the “German-American Bund” with the “Third Reich of Germany” even though Germany had formally disavowed the Bund. The attorney general, however, attempted to give the metaphor a more specific
meaning. The Post printed that Robert H. “Jackson defined the ‘fifth column’ as
“[s]aboteurs” of “national defense,” as “[s]pies seeking either military or industrial
secrets,” and as “[r]epresentatives” of “‘foreign governments’” that attempted to
“influence American policy on behalf of foreign governments.” Measured against
this more technical description, the article portrayed the FBI as the organization
singularly prepared to neutralize the secretive threat. The article asserted that the FBI
knew “who the ‘fifth columnists’” were and that “[g]overnment leaders” had “thrown
the power of the G-Men against the potential menace from within.” The Post further
suggested that because “the most dangerous ‘fifth column’” allegedly stayed “under
cover,” only the FBI and “their chosen police aids” were “equipped to deal with it.”

Hoover, thus, did not singularly invent or promote notions of the Fifth Column, but
worked in conjunction with other national security leaders to inform its meanings.

The director used the metaphor to further articulate Roosevelt’s assertion that
democracy was prone to subversion, an assertion previously made by Hoover with the
parasite metaphor during the War on Crime. Hoover reiterated arguments made
during the Fundamentalist-Modernist Controversy in an August 1940 Washington
Star article. He wrote that the “real danger to democratic institutions” was “always
within a country’s own borders – and this danger lies in a possible breakdown of
moral fiber among its citizens.” He specifically blamed the “Fifth Column” for
disrespecting the “processes of law and order upon which the well-being of any
community [was] founded.” Hoover explained this menace in terms of Christian
realism and Christian fundamentalism. Like Niebuhr’s and Vice President Marshall’s
justifications of force, the director suggested that the “cause of the downfall of
nations” in “[h]istory” was due to the “growing weakness of the rulers” and their “consequent inability to enforce their laws.” Accordingly, he condemned the “Fifth Column” for its “total lack of decency, of patriotism, love of country or any interest in the public good” and the subsequent “moral corruption” that it caused. Such decay eroded respect for the law which endangered national security. Therefore, as Hoover warned: “the enemy that infiltrates through our gates and into our current life” to “poison our democratic idealism at its source,” and who also threatened America’s “moral stamina and patriotic idealism,” did so to subvert “democratic institutions” and ultimately defuse American power. Therefore, the Fifth Column, according to Hoover, threatened America by attempting to turn the citizenry against the strict enforcement of moral norms, which ultimately weakened the nation-state in the international arena.

*The America First Committee and the Fifth Column*

Hoover’s conspiratorial outlook envisioned a vast network of ideologically disparate individuals working in concert to surrender the U.S. government to foreign powers. Hoover proclaimed before the Daughters of the American Revolution in April 1940 that it made “little difference from what foreign ism” American subversives emanated because “recent unions of allegedly opposing factions” had “ended much necessity to differentiate,” making them of the “same stripe.” Similarly, he told the New York State Association of Chiefs of Police in July 1940 that “Fascism and Nazism did not come into being until the wickedly winding way was paved by Communism.” The director introduced this schema even before hostilities erupted in Europe or before the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact. Hoover
told the American Legion in September 1938, for example, that “Fascism ha[d] always grown in the slimy wastes of communism” and warned that the “Nation” could not “exist half American and half alien in spirit.” He sought to maintain a conceptual link between Nazism and communism, seemingly blaming communism for the rise of fascism. He used the complexity of this threat to suggest that the Fifth Column had penetrated Congress, the media, organized religion, academia, as well as the civil rights and labor movements. The America First Committee (AFC) was an appropriate representation of Hoover’s fascist-communist conspiracy theory.

The president’s interest in political intelligence presented an opportunity for Hoover to suggest that an ideologically diverse group of critics was acting in concert to undermine the nation’s sovereignty. Charles observes that the AFC represented the hub of Roosevelt’s most influential opposition and the greatest challenge to his wartime planning. The process of sending reports to the White House on the president’s critics formalized in February 1941 when the president ordered Hoover to investigate the committee’s funding. The historian further explains that this opened a floodgate of misinformation in which Hoover forwarded “political intelligence to either sustain or create the impression” that AFC members had links to “subversive” individuals who held foreign loyalties. Hoover specifically associated prominent anti-interventionists in the legislative branch as well as in the publishing, labor, civil rights, and academic communities with “groups or interests such as the Nazis, Communists, Fascists,” and other “forces essentially foreign.” Their criticism of the lend-lease program, for example, was portrayed as a strategy to foment disunity in America to assist Hitler’s campaign against Britain.
The FBI’s portrait of the AFC as a widespread subversive organization was predicated, in part, on reports that the committee had deeply penetrated the legislative branch to promote an insurgent campaign. The Washington, D.C. field office suggested in May 1942, for example, that the AFC was the “spearhead” of a larger “totalitarian movement” of “Nazis” and “Fascists” who sought to use the “war and its aftermath as an opportunity for totalitarian-democratic revolution.” This review relayed that the AFC claimed over fifteen million members and included “more than one hundred representatives and thirty-one senators” who were “known to be in sympathy openly or clandestinely with the America First movement.”

The imagined Fifth Column was expansive; alleged traitors included Committee on Naval Affairs Chairman David I. Walsh (D-MA), Senate Foreign Relations Committee member Gerald P. Nye (R-ND), former Chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate Communist Activities in the United States Hamilton S. Fish (R-NY), and Interstate Commerce Committee Chairman Burton K. Wheeler (D-MT).

Notably, the Commerce Chair was also accused of communist subversion eighteen years earlier while leading the charge against the DOJ for its involvement in the Teapot Dome Scandal. This effort ultimately dismantled Hoover’s GID and made Wheeler a lifelong nemesis.

The director identified the Fifth Column in the legislative branch as those politicians who attempted to control law enforcement. Hoover told Father Flanagan’s Boys’ Town in June 1941, for example, that “Corrupt politicians” had reached “high” into “governmental bodies” and “legislatures” to “seize control” of “law enforcement agencies” to promote “subversive isms.”

The director accentuated Roosevelt’s
observation that democracy was susceptible to foreign infiltration and intrigue—an idea reinforced to Roosevelt by Hoover. He suggested at Drake University in June 1940—when it was still affiliated with establishment Protestantism—that the “Communist and the Bundsmen” relied upon “‘Fifth Column’ methods” to burrow “deeper and deeper into our system of democracy” where they could obstruct the “national necessity” of “preparedness.” Specifically, he claimed that the Fifth Column had penetrated government, in part, to dismantle his agency through diminishing its reputation. He insisted before the IACP in September 1940, for example, that “persons” in “high places,” who he described as the “high-handed political dictator of the upper world,” worked with a “‘Fifth Column’” of “Communists” to launch a “‘smear campaign’” against the “FBI” and “wreck public confidence in its mission.” The director linked the administration’s war planning to his agency’s expansion and called into question the loyalty of those who challenged his methods. For example, he warned the New York State Association of Chiefs of Police in July 1943 that the “‘Fifth Column’” repeated from “high places” the “Communistic charges” that the FBI functioned in “violation of Civil Liberties” to obstruct “preparedness.” Hoover, thus, aligned democracy’s alleged vulnerability with legislative leaders who challenged his power and his rhetorical framings of the Bureau’s wartime activities. Such allegations came at a time of pointed criticism.

FDR and Hoover shared Wheeler as a political adversary. According to the AFC’s FBI file, the chairman was actively involved in the committee at its September 1940 founding. The director warned the president in March 1941 that Wheeler was working with the AFC to have “Senators” and “Congressmen” travel “throughout the
United States” to oppose “any plans that the President might have” to bring the “country into war.” The FBI’s close monitoring of the chairman followed his allegations that Hoover had built a political police force that served industrialists. Wheeler proclaimed in March 1940, for example, that Hoover’s technocratic “‘spy systems,’” especially the use of “wire tapping and dictographing,” increased the “power of law-enforcement agencies to oppress factory employes (sic)” who were under investigation “‘only by reason of their views and activities in regard to labor unions and other economic movements.’” Such allegations against the FBI were destabilized by Hoover’s own charges of Fifth Column penetration into high government offices, which also impinged non-AFC members of Congress.

Many of the president’s congressional critics suggested that Hoover was manufacturing a panic surrounding the war effort by using German-style propaganda and police tactics—sentiments that were further linked to the Fifth Column metaphor. Representative Vito Marcantonio (American Labor Party from New York) suggested that the FBI had built a “system of terror by index cards” that reflected “Himmler’s super secret service in Germany.” The congressman warned that “Mr. Hoover and other people in power” had created a surveillance system that constituted a “real serious menace to civil liberties” and laid the “foundation” for “Palmer raids, for a Palmer system, and for a Gestapo system in the United States.” Marcantonio also suggested that Hoover’s “language” in support of the renewed GID generated “war hysteria.” Members of the citizenry echoed such complaints with linkages between hysteria and the metaphor. A July 1940 Washington Post article subtitled, “Fifth Column Panic Recalls War of 1898,” for example, acknowledged that “[t]hings and
people go on that only our own Army Intelligence and Brother Hoover’s boys know” about. According to the writer, however, that did not excuse the “hapless hysteria” that made any individual with a “faintly Teutonic name” seem to be a “fifth column suspect.” The director’s use of the Fifth Column metaphor, thus, created anxiety about subversion, but was also challenged by some members of the public. His core methods were even criticized by the president’s congressional friends.

Roosevelt’s political ally, Senator George W. Norris (Independent from Nebraska), went the furthest in enumerating charges against Hoover. After Norris indicated that he “worried” about the FBI’s “activities” and suggested that it had no legitimate right to its $10 million emergency supplemental appropriation in February 1940, Norris listed the various reasons for which the FBI “ought to be curbed.” The senator proclaimed that the FBI had developed a “formula” for arresting communists in which agents “put handcuffs on before they find out even whether or not they have got the right man. They handcuff him, make him helpless, scare him, arrest him in bed at night,” torture him “all day, and deprive him even of the opportunity of saying good-bye” to family members. Norris argued that the Bureau’s “procedure must be outlawed and prohibited,” especially wiretapping. Support of the president’s leadership, therefore, did not translate into support for his confidants.

Roosevelt’s wartime expansion of the FBI occurred in tension with the idealistic value-set that he used to support the New Deal. According to a memorandum from December 1940, Norris had prepared “material for a blast at the Bureau” that was going to target “defense appropriations for the FBI, appropriations for reward and other special appropriations.” Norris was assisted by Max
Lowenthal, who shortly thereafter served on Wheeler’s Interstate Commerce Committee. The assistant symbolized the DOJ’s era of idealistic reform. Tamm, for example, reminded Hoover that “Max Lowenthal” had closely “worked with the Wickersham Committee,” which examined a Bureau case that had been “reversed by an appellate court because of ‘third degree’ [i.e., torture] or other improper treatment of defendants.” The assistant to the director concluded that Lowenthal “was behind much” of the alleged “smear campaign” against Hoover. The alleged obstruction of wartime mobilization, therefore, was associated with the expectations and limitations placed by idealists on law enforcement.

Hoover, however, used the Fifth Column metaphor to reframe public deliberations on expanded law enforcement appropriations in more supportive manner. A September 1940 Milwaukee Journal article subtitled “Fifth Column is Painted in Lurid Tints by J. Edgar Hoover in Talk at Parley,” relayed Hoover’s remarks that “America” was “so menaced” by “‘fifth columnists’” that “every police force in the country should be enlarged at once and given the utmost in equipment.” Hoover also complained that “nowhere in the nation “was there a “law enforcement agency” that had not “felt the ax of ‘false economy’ at one time or another.” Such arguments challenged Norris’ objections to the domestic security state.

The director thus collapsed administrative critics with all other Fifth Column forces, suggesting any attack on the FBI would be met with charges of anti-Americanism. The perspectives of anti-interventionists, as well as civil liberties advocates in Congress and the Senate, were summarily dismissed as un-American. Opposing Hoover was politically dangerous. Norris would lose reelection in 1943.
after serving for thirty years in the Senate. Wheeler would also lose in 1947 after serving for twenty-six years. Marcantonio would continue to serve in Congress until 1951.

Yet, the legislative branch represented only one target of Hoover’s Americanization campaign. Roosevelt and the director also shared a common mission in controlling the media—especially those news organizations with AFC sympathies and ties. In response to the president’s request for information on the AFC’s financiers in February 1941, Hoover reported that the conservative-isolationist press was financing the committee, specifically mentioning the *New York Daily News* and the *Chicago Tribune*.\(^{125}\) Along with the *New York Journal American*, Theoharis contends that Hoover began monitoring the “personal conduct and political beliefs” of journalists writing for these papers in 1939. Such press outlets represented a major hurdle to the administration’s information control. Senator Wheeler leaked top-secret military planning information to the *Tribune* just days before the attack on Pearl Harbor.\(^{126}\) His strategy was to evidence the president’s secret war preparations and thereby undercut public support for his interventionist foreign policy goals. FDR wrote to Hoover the following month that intervention gave them “a good chance to clean up a number” of “vile publications” that came “pretty close to being seditious.”\(^{127}\) The director used such encouragement to censure his own detractors in the press and elsewhere.

*The American Gestapo and Cultural Pluralism*

Hoover charged that outspoken members of the press were members of the Fifth Column who exploited constitutional safeguards to incite revolution. The
president focused his effort to silence allegedly seditious and anti-war presses from 1942 to 1944.\textsuperscript{128} In tow with Roosevelt, Hoover told the IACP and radio audiences in August 1943 that “psychopathic canard purveyors” in the “American daily press” disgraced the “good name of journalism” when they sought to “undermine public confidence in law enforcement agencies” because they ultimately assisted the nation’s enemies.\textsuperscript{129} However, he first suggested that some press members were engaged in Fifth Column activities before America intervened into the war. A May 1940 \textit{Boston Post} article titled “Says ‘Fifth Column’ in Nation Now,” relayed Hoover’s speech to B’nai B’rith. Departing from his prepared text, the director warned: “‘Under the shielding cloak of the American Constitution, traveling salesmen of foreign isms [had] formed a strong, vicious ‘fifth column’ in this country and seek to mold the democratic design to that of foreign totalitarianism.’” Hoover placed accusations against the FBI at the center of the Fifth Column’s propaganda program. The article observed that Hoover “lashed out at the un-American activities of the ‘fifth column;’ their ‘smear campaign against the [FBI] and the foul propaganda which [had] emanated from the banner carriers of foreign isms—hard at work in a vicious campaign of chicanery, falsehood and the spreading of misinformation.”\textsuperscript{130}

Condemning dissent to his leadership became a focal point of Hoover’s wartime campaign. He warned the Daughters of the American Revolution in April 1940 that any “accusations” against the FBI suggesting that it was “an OGPU”—predecessor to the KGB—a “Gestapo,” or a “national police” emanated from “certain anti-American bodies” to “discredit” the Bureau and thus “disrupt the entire United States.”\textsuperscript{131}

Assistant Director Clegg claimed that the ability to make such accusations
highlighted strategic vulnerabilities in the U.S. Constitution. In a speech presented on Hoover’s behalf, he told the Michigan Bankers Association in June 1940, for example, that the “Communist-controlled press” contributed to the “‘Fifth Column’ of destruction” as it hid behind “statutes” and “Constitutionalities.” Clegg claimed that the Fifth Column attempted to “‘smear’” Hoover for violating “civil liberties” because the director only defended “true Americans!” Such permissiveness of the press allegedly threatened Americanists. Hoover warned the New York Federation of Women’s Clubs in May 1940 that the “Communist charge” of an FBI “Ogpu” or “Gestapo” was a “‘smear’ campaign” to “undermine public confidence in the law enforcement bodies of America, and thus weaken the defenses of our internal security.” The domestic security state was, thus, allegedly vulnerable to the Fifth Column’s exploitation of speech guarantees. Hoover’s attack of constitutional safeguards was, in part, a response to widespread unease to his methods.

The country was reintroduced to anti-communist raids in the spring of 1940—a tactic that was reminiscent of Attorney General Palmer, and that would become a mainstay of Hoover’s power. The rhetoric of force that Hoover pioneered during the War on Crime was amplified during the wartime era. In the early hours of February 6, Hoover coordinated raids against the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, a communist volunteer organization that had fought in the Spanish Civil War. The FBI rounded-up twelve veterans who were booked in field offices, handcuffed and chained together, and then “paraded in front of photographers” for violating the Neutrality Act of 1937, observes Powers. Similarly, the FBI allegedly relied upon military tactics to intimidate the CIO in May. According to the Southern News Almanac, union
representatives complained that federal agents had used “Hitler’s ‘secret police’ methods” to break their strike. These tactics included false charges to justify arrests, and involved the herding of twenty “strikers into a private concentration camp” where they were “‘held for six days, questioned and threatened’” until some members signed “‘confessions’” under “the use of force.”\(^{135}\) The \textit{People’s Voice of Helena}, Montana, further reported that FBI agents had “doped” and “tortured” these strikers to “extort confessions” by making “threats against the men’s families, alternate freezing and roasting treatment, and forcing victims to sit straight for hours on high stools.”\(^{136}\) News sources widely reported upon what many saw as an abuse of power.

Prominent publications drew parallels between the FBI and foreign police systems, warning of Hoover’s use of force and propaganda. The \textit{New Republic}, for example, observed various similarities in February 1940 between the “Russian OGPU” and “German Gestapo” when discussing the FBI’s raids upon the Brigade. The magazine encouraged an investigation of “the lawlessness of Hoover’s bureau, and also the wide scale salesmanship by which Hoover” had made “himself much too powerful to be easily curbed by a superior.”\(^{137}\) And, in April, it specifically called for a “congressional investigation” of the FBI’s “publicity squad” to reveal its hidden connections with supposedly independent media outlets.\(^{138}\) Similarly, the \textit{Nation} referred to Hoover as an “American Himmler” in March and emphasized that the Hearst press boosted Hoover to push forward an ideological agenda.\(^{139}\) The press, thus, reverberated some of the same charges made by members of the legislature against Hoover’s power grab. These allegations repeated Circuit Judge Robert Cowie’s June 1935 response to the Dillinger shooting. He then warned that the
“government was building up a secret police comparable only to its counterparts in Germany, Russia and Italy.”¹⁴⁰ Such charges would increasingly accelerate throughout many other quarters of public life.

Hoover’s illegal methods were again exposed in the summer of 1941. The FBI placed CIO leader and covert CPUSA member Harry Bridges under surveillance while the DOJ built its unsuccessful case to have the Australian immigrant deported.¹⁴¹ Bridges detected his watchmen in August 1941 and invited reporters to spy with him on two agents who had checked into an adjoining room at the Edison Hotel in New York where he was staying. Curt Gentry explains that Bridges also let the press “examine the microphone he’d removed from his telephone box, as well as the notarized statement of a young woman the agents had invited up to listen to the tap.”¹⁴² The story circulated widely in the press and led the Senate Judiciary Committee—according to the New York Daily News—to demand a “grand jury investigation of first-hand evidence gathered by PM in the Harry Bridges wire-tapping case.” His “Citizen’s Commission” soon thereafter organized a petition that was signed by authors, educators, performers of “stage, music, and screen,” clergymen, and lawyers to condemn FBI methods as being “‘Devious AND Unusual.’”¹⁴³ Hoover’s rhetorical strategizing aimed to diffuse such oppositional forces.

Charging his critics in the federal government and the press with Fifth Column subversion helped the director overcome formal checks upon his authority. This strategy was predicated on realist and fundamentalist presuppositions that the nation needed to suspend the civil liberties of communists in order to promote its own
welfare. Hoover advanced this claim by accusing members of religious groups and academia of engaging in subversive activities as well. He told the graduates of Notre Dame University in May 1942, for example, that they ought to expose the “motives” of “Fifth Columnists” who preached a “foreign ‘ism’” from “some pulpits, some lecture halls, some radios, some presses and even on some screens” rather than “good old-fashioned Americanism.” Hoover’s conspiratorial outlook challenged many vestiges of cultural pluralism, especially those that campaigned in mass media.

The director suspected that the religious campaign for cultural pluralism was ultimately a front for subversive activities. Svonkin explains that intergroup professionals from the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and the American Jewish Committee (AJC) launched an educational campaign to teach tolerance and fight prejudice through the “mass media and the school system” throughout the 1940s. This program popularized the results of research conducted by Professor Franz Boas, who was Chair of the Department of Anthropology, and his distinguished colleagues also at Columbia University—Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead. Boas’ revulsion of anti-Semitism promoted a more general cultural pluralism. More religious and conservative Jews, however, relied on the principles of cultural pluralism to more narrowly argue against anti-Semitism. These two different approaches to curbing discrimination were evident in the AJC and ADL. The former more broadly and academically advocated tolerance and inclusion—and accordingly was suspected of subversion by Hoover—while the latter worked closely with the FBI to more singularly root out anti-Semitic groups. For example, Assistant Director Louis Nichols privately praised the leadership of B’nai B’rith—the ADL’s parent
organization—in 1942 for supporting the “Bureau one hundred percent” and doing “anything” the FBI requested. This loyalty included dismissing its own members who challenged Hoover and severing “all connections with the American Jewish Committee.” This triumph was commemorated in the propaganda chief’s personnel file.\textsuperscript{147} The FBI worked to embrace the ADL while raising suspicions about the AJC.

Hoover incorporated an Orwellian twist of logic as he conflated tolerance with tyranny and totalitarianism through Fifth Column subversion. He warned B’nai B’rith that wide commitments to tolerance came dangerously close to subverting American culture and its institutions. Hoover explained in February 1941 that the “‘fifth column’” operated fascist and communist “front organizations” with “high-sounding names” to promote ideologies of “tolerance” and ultimately foster “intolerance” by obstructing the FBI’s attempt to “hamper” their “revolutionary activities.”\textsuperscript{148} The director specifically targeted educators with this message. He told Rutgers University in May 1943 that though “[t]olerance was a “virtue,” the “greatest crime” of the “age” was the “toleration of wrong.”\textsuperscript{149} Specifically, he linked such toleration to the rise of fascism at home and abroad. He suggested before the Daughters of the American Revolution in April 1944 that “misguided world tolerance and stupid apathy” had permitted the “world menace” of Nazism to spread. Similarly, a “false spirit of toleration” allegedly allowed the KKK and other anti-Semitic groups to promote “racism, hate, greed, and injustice.”\textsuperscript{150} Hoover, thus, concluded that tolerance had its limits in U.S. culture and that its advocates included Fifth Columnists and other subversive groups. This disparagement of cultural pluralism
was only one aspect of his contempt for academia that reflected the Fundamentalist-Modernist culture war.

The director extensively campaigned against public intellectuals who challenged his control of information and ideology. Historian of sociology Mike Forrest Keen explains that Hoover “held a special disdain for sociologists and ‘criminologists.’”\(^{151}\) Similar to his rivalry with Prison Bureau Director Sanford Bates, social scientists who studied crime problems like AFC member and Columbia University Professor Harry Elmer Barnes, University of Washington Professor Norman Hayner, and University of Chicago Professor Ernest W. Burgess were placed under wartime surveillance after challenging the director. Barnes—a criminologist and a sociologist—claimed in 1936 that “the Attorney General and J. Edger Hoover” had “hoodwinked the public with a lot of cheap publicity in the tracking down of a few criminals.”\(^{152}\) The FBI accelerated its ongoing investigation of him after he wrote that “Roosevelt” was “attempting to set up a dictatorship in this country, with himself as the dictator” and defined “Americanism” as the “right to hold any opinion, however conservative or radical” in a 1942 textbook.\(^ {153}\) These accusations followed his signing of the *Humanist Manifesto* (1933), an anti-Fundamentalist declaration that was endorsed by prominent members of the academic community. The proclamation denied the existence of supernatural power, attacked capitalism, and called for the secular “transformation” of “religious institutions” to promote a more “free and universal society.”\(^ {154}\) Not only was Barnes offensive to Roosevelt, his atheistic secularism and his universal commitment to free speech was also an affront to Americanists. Hoover marked Hayner and his graduate students as “‘Soviet lovers’”
in 1940 after they reportedly delivered a “‘scathing denunciation’” of Hoover’s “‘machine-gun school of criminology.’” And, Burgess was placed on the FBI’s secret Security Index for emergency round-ups in 1944 for allegedly belonging to such groups as the Teachers Committee of the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Hoover’s suspicion was not isolated to these scholars.

Some liberals in the academy advocated a civil liberties perspective that provided the legal underpinnings for cultural pluralism. Prominent First Amendment scholar and Harvard Law Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr. attempted to prevent the DOJ and the FBI from reverting to the Wilson administration’s unconstitutional strategies, marked by censorship and propaganda. He wrote idealistically in *Free Speech in the United States* (1941) that political expression in “war time” should be “unrestricted” by “censorship or by punishment, unless it [was] clearly liable to cause direct and dangerous interference with the conduct of war.” This titled echoed his 1919 *Harvard Law Review* article, “Freedom of Speech in Wartime,” which had prompted Hoover to open an FBI file on the scholar.

According to FBI documents, Franz Boas presented a speech to the American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom in mid-April of 1940 titled, “The Menace of the F.B.I.” He proclaimed in it that “J. Edgar Hoover” and his “Bureau” were “dangerously overstepping the bounds of legality,” which “raised problems of the gravest kind for all Americans who believe in the maintenance of orderly and constitutional government.” Specifically, he charged that the FBI targeted any person “connected with liberal, progressive, labor, and radical movements” for their “cultural activities” with “no stated crime.” Later that same month, Boas worked with the
Conference on Civil Rights to draft resolutions that supported anti-trust prosecutions as well as greater protections for racial and political minority groups. The conference also included CPUSA General Secretary Earl Browder and CPUSA member and American Civil Liberties Union founder Elizabeth Gurley Flynn. Together, they supported and commended “Senators Norris and Wheeler for exposing the dangers of the F.B.I.’s conduct” and condemned “Mr. Hoover’s attempts to smear his critics by charactering them with communists.” The purpose of Boas’ meetings, explains Gary Bullert, was to pressure Roosevelt into firing Hoover for the Brigade roundups. Hoover’s warnings of the Fifth Column in academia gave his audiences reasons to be suspicious of more liberal scholars from a variety of fields.

While Roosevelt struggled to balance war planning and civil liberties, the FBI used the Fifth Column to suggest that idealistic commitments espoused often within the nation’s colleges and universities left the country more vulnerable during wartime. A November 1940 *New York Times* article titled, “Hoover’s Aide Sees Fifth Column as Menace to Nation’s Colleges,” relayed a speech delivered by Assistant Director Nichols to the National Interfraternity Conference. Hoover’s “administrative assistant” asked the group to “help the government combat fifth-column activities in colleges and universities in the ‘American way.’” Reminiscent of Blair Coan’s red web conspiracy theories of the 1920s, Nichols suggested that the FBI wanted to prevent “‘foreign agents’” from weaving “‘their web of alien philosophies to ensnare America in darkness and scuttle and destroy our national defenses.’” College students were consequently asked to report the “‘possible activities’” of “‘subversives’” on campus. Cultural pluralism was seemingly the alien philosophy and cause of
concern. Hoover complained to the Holland Society that “misguided souls” attempted to apply “peacetime conceptions of civil rights” to a “wartime situation.” For Hoover, during times of national emergency in particular, national security unquestionably trumped civil liberties in the hierarchy of American values. The director lamented, however, that the liberal “segment” of “American life” sought the “maintenance of civil liberties” but failed to “distinguish between” America’s “traditional safeguards” to protect the “legitimate rights” of “Americans” and their exploitation by “enemy agents” to “undermine America.”

Hoover hinted at the plurality of more liberal ideas that challenged his perspective. He told Notre Dame University, for example, that the “Nazi threat” facing the “American people from within” was compounded by an “insidious injection of several European ‘isms’” from the “Fifth Column,” which flourished in “the Republic under the false guise of Democracy.” More liberal ideas that promoted cultural pluralism were, thus, broadly rejected as ignorant and subversive.

Academics were particularly vulnerable to Hoover’s wartime red-baiting because of the defenses provided by some scholars during the 1930s to Stalinism. Powers suggests that in defending intellectual freedom, they also supported a foreign regime that abolished liberty—an argument also made by Hoover about tolerance. This paradox was at the core of realism’s insistence that only by restricting the liberty of agitators could liberty be maintained more generally. If agitation unexpectedly accelerated into revolution, the communist persecutions could be expected in America. Notions of the Fifth Column in academia, religion, and elsewhere linked the alleged threat of cultural pluralism and its constitutional rationale to foreign
belligerents. Hoover warned the FBI National Police Academy in October 1940, for example, that the “Fifth Column” had “penetrated” our “schools, our churches and our civic organizations.” According to Hoover, “[e]missaries from totalitarian governments” had “joined reform organizations and civil liberties groups” to “undermine our national integrity.” The “Fifth Column” was allowed to “contaminate” the nation because “too many” American “citizens” had allegedly pledged themselves to “apathy.”\textsuperscript{168} This was a trait, of course, that he also equated with tolerance. The director used this rhetoric of crisis to challenge the loyalty of those who campaigned for labor unionism or against white supremacy.

Furthering the assault on what Hoover depicted as anti-American sentiment, he informed the Roosevelt administration of various groups at work that threatened the nation's security; such coalitions were construed in terms of economic and racial alignments. Organizations like the CIO and W.E.B. Du Bois’ National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) were perceived as revolutionary threats for their large memberships of cultural outsiders and various communist affiliations.\textsuperscript{169} Du Bois—an accomplished sociologist—challenged Hoover’s Americanism at a number of locations as he suggested that capitalism, militarism, and racism were interconnected belief systems. Such intellectualism made him a target for perpetual FBI surveillance and harassment.\textsuperscript{170} The director warned the White House in September 1943 that the “Communist Party” was advancing its “revolutionary program” through a “boring-from-within’ technique” of the civil rights movement. Its “agitational program” allegedly targeted the NAACP, A. Philip Randolph’s 1940 “March on Washington” committee, the “Negro press,” and those “Negro churches”
that “branched” into fields beyond “religious activities.” Hoover informed White House aide Harry Hopkins the previous month that the “Communist Party” sought to unite the “Negro and the Labor Movement,” in part, to address “racial problems” in law enforcement. He observed in a June 1943 letter about the “Negro Freedom Rally” that “Congressman Vito Marcantonio” delivered a speech promoting an “Anti-Poll Tax Bill” following another “Communist Party” speech that attacked “Jim Crow in the Armed Forces.” At other times, Hoover blamed the “Axis Powers” for creating “disunity” by fostering “racial agitation” among “negroes.” Such conspiratorial forces allegedly worked to make African Americans sympathetic to the “Japanese” because they were also of “the colored race,” thereby conceiving of World War II as a “race war.” Issues of race and labor were thus at the forefront of Hoover’s wartime concerns.

Many union activists vocally protested against intervention and the FBI’s inequitable police work, which likewise attracted negative attention to the Roosevelt administration. John L. Lewis—anti-communist, AFC member, CIO President (1938-1940), and President of the United Mine Workers of America (1920-1960)—denounced FDR’s war planning. According to Albert Fried, the extensively press-covered labor leader publicly argued in 1940 that America’s entrance into war would undermine labor and civil rights reform, ultimately hurting the poor, the unemployed, blacks, the working class, soldiers, and their families. The Daily Worker reported in April that Lewis called for “full and unrestricted rights of citizenship” for the “Negro people” and “urged that Negro America unite with labor for the ‘common welfare’ of both great groups.” And, the Daily Worker reported in June that Lewis
challenged Hoover to “‘turn his face’ to see “where American people” were “being lashed by white-robed riders” and to “‘seek the dark night trails of lynching parties.’” Roosevelt directed Hoover to open an investigation on the labor leader for his unsupportive views, which Lewis discovered and made public. The director portrayed such criticisms of the administration as domestic subversion.

Hoover charged that persons with foreign loyalties sought to create racial and economic discord through exploiting the nation’s cleavages. He construed criticisms of the administration’s war planning, and the social order more generally, as evidence of subversion. Accordingly, the director warned the IACP in August 1943 that a “subversive group” sought to “seize upon racial differences, economic stresses and political difficulties” to attack the “fair play” that characterized “America.”

Marginalized and mainstream groups, suggested Hoover, were susceptible to foreign ideologies. He told the Daughters of the American Revolution in April 1940 that “ism advocates” exploited the “working man, the colored races, the farmer, the renter, and the white collar class” with “claims” that only looked “enticing” to the “unthinking person.” Hoover’s statements, among other things, recast civil rights and labor agitation as subversive activities bent on undermining Americanism, thus conflating American sovereignty with the commitments of his Americanist vision.

The Fifth Column metaphor associated the labor movement with foreign aggression. While the CIO organized strikes in defense plants to address local grievances, Assistant Director Clegg told the Michigan Bankers Association in June 1940 that “agents of foreign ideologies” had incited “chaotic conditions in American industry” to promote “alien ways of living.” He proclaimed that such
“subversive forces” included the “saboteur” and the “propagandist” who attempted to “retard our preparedness program” through “un-American activities.” Clegg concluded that the interests of industrialists were paramount while they battled against labor unions and civil rights organizations. Similar to McKinley before him, the FBI speaker charged that the “call of Americanism” demanded that “[e]very assistance must be given to the industrial world” against the “‘Fifth Column’ of destruction” that allegedly sought to “hinder or harm it.”

Reminiscent of the DOJ’s treatment of organized labor while the attorney general was under retainer by the railroad industry, Hoover directed law enforcement to regard strikers as communist agents. For example, he warned the Federal-State Conference on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense in August 1940 that “Communist-controlled labor” groups were composed of “‘Fifth Columnists’” who attempted to instigate strikes in factories to “weaken our means of national defense.” The director charged that subversives, not loyal Americans, were the source of social agitation. He insisted that “the spy, the saboteur or the destroyer” attempted to sap “national strength” by “fomenting unrest in the community, the school, the factory, and the mill.”

The Fifth Column, therefore, not only threatened to undermine national security but also the economic bedrock of Americanism—its industrial basis.

The Fifth Column metaphor allowed Hoover to revive the Americanist conspiracy theorizing that first appeared during the Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy. Hoover used cultural cleavages to signify Nazi and Soviet intrigue, and then expanded upon this base to implicate social reformers who defended civil liberties, civil rights, and cultural pluralism—all in the name of protecting the
president and his foreign policy planning. The metaphor was central to establishing a
guilt-by-association framework that discredited the administration’s critics, and more
importantly, adversaries of Hoover’s Americanist commitments. The Fifth Column,
thus, transformed perceptions of political dissent into evidence of disloyalty. The
severity of intergroup conflict that ran along numerous American cleavages made the
Fifth Column appear tremendously dangerous. The metaphor constituted a threat that
justified and further encouraged the FBI’s rapid expansion.

*Containment Strategizing and Thought Control*

Hoover used the Fifth Column portrait of a Soviet conspiracy to advance a
containment corrective as the solution to anti-American expressions and actions.
Consequently, this metaphorical construction justified the containment of any activity
that threatened Hoover’s conception of Americanism. His perspective was said to
limit the spaces in which communists operated; in practice, however, the rhetoric of
containment established intellectual barriers that restrained cultural pluralism and the
movements that it fostered. Whereas idealism attempted to universally manifest the
principles enumerated in the Bill of Rights, Hoover’s Americanism limited the
protections offered by the Constitution to only those who shared his racial, religious,
and ideological precepts. The director reconciled this particular vision with American
political tradition by elevating commitments to security above the Constitution’s
stated principles. Like Theodore Roosevelt, Thomas R. Marshall, and Reinhold
Niebuhr before him, Hoover privileged the defense of Christianity before that of
democracy.
James Madison had provided sturdy foundations for cultural pluralism in U.S. culture. Madison wrote in Federalist 10 (1787) that the “regulation” of a “landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, [and] a moneyed interest” formed the “principal task of modern legislation” to prevent an “overbearing majority” from abusing the “rights of the minor party” with “schemes of oppression.” Therefore, he recommended a “government” of “representation” as a “cure” that would “Extend” the “sphere” to “take in a greater variety of parties and interests” and “encourage” a “diversity of opinions.” Madison redoubled this philosophy in Federalist 51 (1787), suggesting that because mankind was not composed of “angels,” it was “necessary” to impose “external” and “internal controls on government.” He reminded the framers that public accountability was, “no doubt, the primary control on the government.” He located democratic legitimacy in the ability of the governed “to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers” and to prevent a “majority” from becoming “united by a common interest” and thereby threatening the “rights of the minority.” Such fears of majority tyranny played a central role in establishing civil liberties in U.S. political culture and in developing American liberalism. Specifically, the founders insisted upon a system of checks and balances to prevent an organized majority from using government machinery to advance factionalism. The Bill of Rights, then, placed considerable limits on the power of federal government office holders.

Hoover, conversely, suggested that any perceived exploitation of the U.S. Constitution threatened Americanism, particularly those acts he deemed more radical in nature that seemingly sought cover from the Constitution. The director warned the
Daughters of the American Revolution in April 1944, for example, that “Native-born agitators” who were not “American” had “[c]loaked” themselves with the “guarantees” of the “Constitution” to represent the “FBI as a menace to civil liberties” and advocate their own “philosophies.” The existing legal structure was allegedly too weak to preserve Americanism because these “malicious forces” were “cunning enough to keep within the strict letter of the law.”188 Hoover raised suspicions of civil liberties advocates in general. He told the New York Federation of Women’s Clubs in May 1940 that those who undermined “liberty” shouted “most loudly for the protection of the Constitution” while they sought to “destroy” its “sacred guarantees.” The director targeted such groups for challenging his Americanist calls for Judeo-Christian supremacy. He complained that subversive groups promoted “false notions of liberty” and failed to recognize that there was “no such thing as liberty unless” it was “liberty under law.”189 Their manipulations of the Constitution were allegedly a moot point because the Bill of Rights, according to Hoover, fostered a political culture that was only intended for those who agreed with him. Clegg told the Michigan Bankers Association in June 1940 that American civil liberties were “conceived by the founders of this Nation” strictly for “honest persons” seeking “liberty” and not for “Communists or Bundsmen.”190 Whereas Madison promoted pluralism to curtail industrial-based tyranny in the federal government, the FBI asserted that civil liberties only extended to Americanists. He craftily articulated this departure in principle through presenting the FBI as a bulwark against external forces.
Hoover informed the Fifth Column metaphor with ancillary termite metaphors to further conceptualize how America was susceptible to subversion. For example, Kirby Farrell explains that the termite metaphor projects invisible threats for which our “everyday senses and reason are helpless until the damage is already done, and relief from which can only be found in extermination.” Accordingly, the director suggested that his cultural adversaries and their more liberal beliefs threatened the nation’s democracy and purity. He told the Annual *New York Herald-Tribune* Forum in October of 1939, for example, that the “foes within our gates, like termites,” had “betrayed America by chiseling at the foundations of this great edifice of freedom.” He blamed them for inculcating their “alien ideas into our social order,” which disturbed the “cradle of liberty.” These enemies were especially dangerous to America’s democracy because they had already penetrated the civic strata with Nazi-like force. He warned Notre Dame in May 1942 that “termites” had “bored deep into our social structure with a brazenness that was as daring as the blitzes of Hitler’s blood-crazed forces.” Hoover encouraged remodeling the nation to protect it from further infestation. He told Drake University in June 1940 that since “termites” had already weakened the “internal structure of America,” it was imperative to “put” the nation’s “houses” back “in order.” The termite metaphor was so rhetorically valued by Hoover that he continued its use into the Cold War era. He used it to suggest that the foundation of the American civic structure had been destabilized by alien peoples and ideas.

The FBI encouraged barricading the nation’s enemies through use of a wall metaphor. Clegg told the Michigan Bankers Association, for example, that every
“American has a distinct duty in the erection of a national wall which will encircle Americanism” and prevent “anti-American propagandists” from swaying “our settled decisions.” For the FBI, it was important to keep the foundations of Americanism—and not those of civil liberties—secure. Clegg further explained that the “wall of patriotism must be so sturdy that no foreign ism can penetrate it and weaken Americanism, which guarantee[d] to all, Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.” These statements legitimized citizenship for only those individuals who harbored the racial, religious, and ideological precepts of Americanism. Hoover’s conceptual fortress not only kept foreign ideologies outside of protected spaces, it also perpetually sequestered un-American ideas, which allegedly hid in academia. He told the National Police Academy in September of 1939, for example, that his “walls of civic pride” would “forever protect” the country from the “theoretical blatherskites” and “academic theorists” who had “wandered from the protective cloisters of the classroom.” Hoover’s barricade, thus, established intellectual boundaries that isolated more liberal ideas and insulated the government from them.

Hoover nominated the FBI to implement a national political quarantine. The director’s containment philosophy required the citizenry to voluntarily cooperate with federal authorities. In his October 1939 remarks at the Annual New York Herald Tribune Forum, he explained that “American law enforcement” and “every loyal American citizen” had to work with the FBI to “erect defensive walls to protect” the “body politic from the insidious and malignant germs of foreign isms.” In Paul A. Chilton's discussion of Cold War contagion logic, he explains that “if communism is
an invasive organism, contagious sickness, or malignant growth, it may follow that the body politic should be sanitized, or that the disease should be stopped, or the cancer excised." Accordingly, isolation, removal, and execution composed a three-part containment strategy for sequestering pluralism away from Americanism. Hoover told the IACP that same month, for example, that the “way to cure a plague” was by “quarantine, by ferreting out the carriers of disease and either eradicating them, or placing them where they cannot infect the populace.” Similarly, the director told the National Police Academy in September that the “social disease” must be “treated” like a “cancerous growth,” it must be “cut out or burned out of the body politic.” Such separation logic—in which purity was maintained by segregation and removal—injected principles of isolationism into internationalism, and thereby encouraged containment philosophy. Instead of protecting American sovereignty by isolating the nation away from the world, Hoover provided a blueprint for protecting the nation by isolating and removing what he viewed as alien and atheistic worldliness away from America. With his agents already operating around the world, America’s presence was global and, accordingly, so was Hoover’s vision for Americanism. This reoriented American internationalism and the means by which the federal government maintained stability.

The director built rhetorical continuity between the vermin and Fifth Column campaigns by recycling his ancillary metaphors. Beyond his continued use of the contagion metaphor, Hoover also circulated parasite metaphors, both of which extended from the War on Crime. For example, Hoover told the Holland Society in November 1942 that the FBI made “America more secure for Americans and more
insecure for parasites, termites, subverters, and the forces of lawlessness.” While the parasite metaphor connected the vermin and Fifth Column campaigns, the termite metaphor would go on to associate the Fifth Column and Red Fascism campaigns. The parasite metaphor enhanced the vividness of the Fifth Column. For example, Hoover told the FBI National Police Academy in October, 1942 that anti-interventionists acted like “parasites” in their attempt to “eat away at our preparedness program” to make America “an easy victim for the Axis machines of war.” By constructing wartime threats in terms of the War on Crime, Hoover extended and expanded upon his program already in place to elevate the FBI’s stature as well as his own power.

Hoover’s perspective asserted that militant force was necessary for maintaining his quarantine. He told the IACP in September of 1940, for example, that “superior manpower, superior equipment and superior training” was the necessary “formula” for neutralizing the “‘Fifth Column.’” According to, America needed to “build up the forces of law enforcement” to the “maximum quota” to “meet every emergency” and “assist the FBI in dealing with ‘Fifth Column’ activities.” In practice, this meant the public’s blind support of the FBI’s COINTELPRO methods, including the use of secret informants, illegal mail opening, breaking-and-entering, bugging, wire-tapping, and propagating derogatory information. These were not methods that Hoover could rally public support behind, so instead the implications of militarization were shrouded in the language of government secrecy. He told the Federal-State Conference on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense in August of 1940, for example, that the wartime situation required police to “work”
with “the utmost secrecy” because the “spy” was “not a person” who could “be arrested and prosecuted like a gangster.” Allegedly, relying on democratic processes would only “allow his comrades to outwit” the government’s “further efforts.” Instead, law enforcement had to “combat him in ways and means which [had] been evolved from long experiences.” He reassured his subordinates that the “public” would be “fully advised of all the facts in every matter” when the FBI was “ready for presentation in a court of justice.”

He even warned officers against revealing information about his secret methods. Hoover told the New York State Association of Chiefs of Police in July of 1940, for example, that there was “no place in our ranks for men who unwittingly or otherwise encourage[d] the forces of subversion” with any “stab-in-the-back activities” of the “‘Fifth Column’” that could “‘smear’” the FBI or otherwise “break down its efficiency.” Thus, the director militarized law enforcement through a rhetoric of secrecy that denounced whistle-blowing as an act of disloyalty. Whereas Hoover relied on rationales inherent to the domestic security state when speaking before law enforcement officials, he more overtly appealed to Christian realism and Christian fundamentalism when addressing religious organizations.

Militant FBI tactics were portrayed as a religious test of force against the rising power of evil. Niebuhr wrote in *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (1941) that “evil” arose from “freedom” as a “force” from the “devil” that preceded “human action.” Hoover appealed to such reasoning when describing the nature of FBI power. He told the Knights of Columbus in March 1942, for example, that the “world” was “bruised and bleeding because the forces of the anti-Christ” had
ascended “over the forces of decency.” In Hoover’s framework, evil forces could only be balanced by more righteous power. He asserted to St. John’s University Law School in June of 1942, for example, that the “Axis forces and the pagan evil” could “only” be met by a “superior force of spiritual development.” Notions of force and counterforce were also used to conceptualize intergroup relations. After race riots erupted across the country in the summer of 1943, he directed the IACP in August to use “superior strength” in a clash of “force” against “force” to control any “outbursts” that may pit “race against race, creed against creed.” While the intergroup church movement attempted to build racial and religious tolerance to prevent such outbursts, Hoover argued that the root of intergroup hatred was godlessness. He suggested to Holy Cross College in June of 1944, for example, that the “conflicts between groups in our large cities” were not “truly religious” in nature because they were drawn along “racial” lines and existed between communities where “God” had “not entered.” The militarization of law enforcement was facilitated by national security and religious discourses that targeted racial minority groups.

The FBI’s wartime mission to organize a religiously-based majority against various minority groups reshaped the political-religious landscape. Fundamentalists had previously accused Catholics of radicalism for their commitments to social justice and cultural pluralism. Hoover’s juxtaposition between Americanism and the Fifth Column redirected many Catholics toward accepting his fundamentalist precepts. For example, the Dean of the Faculties at the University of San Francisco relayed to Hoover in July 1944 that his Jesuit community—which previously provided leadership to labor union activists—had begun substituting the director’s
speeches for the customary “spiritual book read at one of the meals each day.” The dean further informed Hoover that his own “primary interest” was in “Communism” and that the FBI had the “best informed man” on the subject who was also the “best analyst of international strategy.” The Church, thus, had begun reorienting its more measured anti-communist perspective, which was previously counterbalanced with labor advocacy. Instead, many Catholics then began adopting the tenets of Hoover’s Americanism, which suspected organized labor of subversion. The director commemorated this accomplishment in the personnel file of his propaganda chief. Indeed, a perspective that recast the nation’s political system through the rhetoric of Americanism was quickly accelerating.

Hoover’s antithesis between Americanism and the Fifth Column recast the nation’s political culture in terms of a totalitarianism that demanded ideological conformity. The director proclaimed to Holy Cross College, for example, that for “true Americans,” there could be “no unity with the enemy within and no compromise with those who would destroy all that we fight for” and “believe in.” He further proclaimed, “America cannot exist half democratic and half Communist or Fascist.” He explicitly contradicted the spirit of Federalist 10 and the history of American civil liberties. Specifically, Hoover defined democracy as majority rule without minority rights. For example, he told the Daughter of the American Revolution in April 1944 that “loyal Americans” composed a “majority” that needed to defend “America” and “neutralize the woeful will” of the “minority.” He arrived at this conclusion even before America intervened into the war. Hoover encouraged the National Fifty Years in Business Club, for example, to lend its “collective”
strength to him in May 1939 and organize a “dictatorship of the people, for the people, and by the people” to preserve “Democracy” and “Justice” in their “purest form.” Emphasizing both his scientific expertise and his Christian militancy, he concluded that this “dictatorship of the collective conscience” was a “crusade for America” in which “true Americanism must prevail.” Hoover, thus, relied upon the modes of loyalty and patriotism inherent to realism and fundamentalism to help destabilize ideas and groups that promoted cultural pluralism. In so doing, he adopted a rhetoric of totalitarianism.

**Fading American Idealism and the Usurpation of Dissent**

J. Edgar Hoover manipulated changing currents in American religious philosophy. He undermined the idealistic principles of the New Deal and encouraged a covenantal logic that legitimated the rise of an invasive national secret police force. The director’s rhetorical schema relied heavily upon the Fifth Column metaphor as well as ancillary cancer, parasite, and termite metaphors. These tropes shaded the Fifth Column with conceptions of movement and growth. The Fifth Column was coined during the Spanish Civil War to describe a coordinated movement of subversives in Madrid who conspired against their system of government by assisting external military forces. The metaphor, however, was also uniquely American. The Fifth Column’s emphases on internal subversion and foreign loyalties resuscitated suspicions that traced back to the early republic.

Informing the Fifth Column metaphor with the contagion and parasite metaphors helped Hoover to transfer his audiences’ beliefs about the FBI’s activities
during the War on Crime to its pursuit of Fifth Columns. This recycling of metaphors extended rhetorical continuity into the world war crisis, which amplified the previously established urban-crime reality. In this world, the rhetoric of force continued to be a popular form of dissent against political liberalism and liberal Christianity. Hoover played on the fears of Catholic and Jewish religious leaders who sought to prevent the spread of religious persecutions. These metaphors served as vehicles for importing the values of Christian realism and Christian fundamentalism into more mainstream quarters, which refashioned religious value hierarchies. Whereas Catholic leaders had previously valued social justice above protecting the interests of industrialists, order became privileged over agitation. This reorientation would cause the Church to remove itself from the labor movement. Similarly, many Jewish leaders had once worked in coalition with more liberal Catholics and Protestant councils as well as with labor unions, educational associations, and civil rights agencies to promote notions of tolerance that were steeped in cultural pluralism. Such inclusiveness, however, was curbed as the director equated tolerance with subversion. Hoover then located Americanism at the center of American religious thought, and used it to forge alliances between anti-communist Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. His use of metaphor, thus, influenced religious value structures which, in turn, reoriented American political culture to value order above civil liberties. The well-ordered society, according to Hoover, was pure of malefactors and, therefore, protected by God.

Hoover’s Americanist vision of militarized public life was articulated through his totalitarian rhetoric. Comparing liberals, agitators, and anti-interventionists to a
Hoover was at the head of this empire, which he likened to the U.S. armed forces and used to assume centralized control over local police departments. This expansion of federal law enforcement power into the states was predicated on extermination and quarantine logics that elevated force above constitutional safeguards and framed dissent to unconstitutional police work as an act of subversion. Discouraging criticism of the federal government broadly contrasted former idealistic efforts, especially the Wickersham Commission’s attempt to reform police corruption. The interplay between idealism and realism, thus, represented a seismic shift in federal culture from the harmony of its constituents to their control. The FBI largely accomplished this change through exploiting the president’s fears. Roosevelt erected the domestic security state while accepting anonymous and unsubstantiated FBI reports that showcased a need for centralized control of political dissent.

Hoover ultimately mimicked the Gestapo institutionally, ideologically, and rhetorically. The International Criminal Police Commission and the International Association of Chiefs of Police offered Hoover a mechanism for studying and networking with fascist police forces in Italy and Germany. Together, they devised methods for technocratic law enforcement programming. Hoover synced well with Himmler and Heydrich because Americanism and Nazism both sought to maintain ethnic and ideological purity through containment and extermination logics. Rhetorically, this directed propagandists like Hoover, Nichols, Hitler, and Joseph
Goebbels to conceptualize the enemy with vermin, contagion, and parasite metaphors. More than just fascism, this rhetoric of totalitarianism expanded upon rhetorical precedents that were established by Lenin.

FDR colluded with Hoover by elevating him in his administration and encouraging his illegal assistance. Hoover was Roosevelt’s rogue cop who used vested unconstitutional powers to counteract the spirit of the New Deal. After Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, the director used this power to curb momentum for the president’s commitments to expanded economic liberties. Hoover next put Harry S Truman’s Fair Deal and his domestic security agenda in the FBI’s crosshairs.
Notes


2 Ibid., 11-14.


5 Douglas M. Charles observes that “[c]ontemporaries and historians have popularly dubbed Roosevelt’s foreign policy critics during the wartime era ‘isolationists.’” The historian contends, however, that the “word ‘isolationist’ is too narrow a descriptor to be applied to Roosevelt’s foreign policy critics who did not advocate isolation from foreign affairs, but unilateralism in American foreign relations.” The anti-interventionists themselves more sparingly used the term “isolationist,” preferring instead “anti-interventionist” or “noninterventionist.” Charles suggests that it was “Roosevelt’s interventionist allies who propagated—successfully—the derogatory and inaccurate term ‘isolationist.’” Douglas M. Charles, *J. Edgar Hoover and the Anti-Interventionists: FBI Political Surveillance*


8 Steele, “Franklin D. Roosevelt and His Foreign Policy Critics,” 19-20.


10 MacDonnell, Insidious Foes, 139.

11 The dilemma of political factions had long troubled American presidents. George Washington, for example, warned in his Farewell Address of September 17, 1796 that “different parties” may “serve to organize faction” and ultimately “subvert the power of the people” by exploiting the “the regular deliberation and action of the constituted authorities.” Such “unprincipled men,” he foreshadowed, could “usurp for themselves the reins of government, destroying afterwards the very engines which [had] lifted them to unjust dominion.” In A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents (New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1917), 209-10.

12 The wartime coalition of interventionists and anti-communists was distinct from the post-war movement of liberal anti-communists. The wartime group combined idealists and realists because idealists supported the war against Germany and fascism. After the war, liberalism was fractured between idealism and liberal anti-communism (See Chapter Four).


Ibid., 321.


—“After Capitalism, What?” *The World Tomorrow*, March 1, 1933: 204-05.


25 The Deuteronomic Covenant instructed the ancient Jews to destroy all religious symbols belonging to pagans, prohibited inter-marriage with gentiles, and condemned to death those Jews who turned to gentile gods; the covenant’s purpose was explicitly to maintain homogeneity. Variations of these rules were engrained into American political culture by the Puritans. Dt 5: 1-33; Dt 1:7; Dt 2:34-35; Dt 3:3-7; Dt 7:1-7; Dt 13:7-13; Dt 15: 12-14; Dt 22:5; Jer 23: 13-14; Jer 25: 1-14; Betty Wood, *The Origins of American Slavery: Freedom and Bondage in the English Colonies* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997), 104; Mark A. Noll, Nathan O. Hatch, George M. Marsden, *The Search for Christian America* (New York Helmers & Howard, 1989), 34-35.


27 — Moral Man and Immoral Society, 220.

28 Reinhold Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1940), 110-11.

29 E.H. Carr’s authorship of The Twenty Years’ Crisis launched the realist attack against idealism, which helped usher in the post-war realist consensus. Carr is counted among Hans Morgenthau, George F. Kennan, Dean G. Acheson, John Herz, and Henry Kissinger as the preeminent twentieth century political realist philosophers. Niebuhr would influence their work as well.


32 Horace M. Kallen wrote in Culture and Democracy in the United States (1924) that “Cultural Pluralism” was “possible only in a democratic society whose institutions encourage individuality in groups, in persons, in temperaments, whose program liberates these individualities and guides them into a fellowship of freedom
and coöperation.” He warned that the “alternative before Americans” was the “Kulture Klux Klan” and its “Americanism” or “Cultural Pluralism.” Horace M. Kallen and Stephen J. Whitfield, *Culture and Democracy in the United States* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 35.


35 J. Edgar Hoover, “A National Ideal,” May 12, 1940 (B’nai B’rith), pages 1, 4 , 8, 11, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD (hereafter cited as NARA—CP).

36 —“Address,” transcription of address delivered February, 1941 (B’nai B’rith), page 1, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.


38 Joseph Stalin’s international propaganda surreptitiously worked to portray the rebellion as “democracy versus fascism” ultimately to conceal his brutal machinations in the Spanish government and against the Church. Stanley G. Payne, *The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 290.


41 J. Edgar Hoover, “Our Future,” May 10, 1942 (Notre Dame University), page 2, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

42 New Netherland was a seventeenth century (1614–1674) Dutch colonial province that stretched from the Delmarva Peninsula to Cape Cod. It was relinquished to the British Crown under the Treaty of Westminster ending the Third Anglo-Dutch War.

43 George M. Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture* (Oxford University Press, 2006), 162.

44 J. Edgar Hoover, “An American’s Privilege,” November 19, 1942 (Holland Society of New York), page 4, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

45 —“A Graduate’s Responsibility,” June 29, 1944 (Holy Cross College), pages 2-3, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

46 —“Problems of Law Enforcement,” October 10, 1939 (International Association of Chiefs of Police), page 8, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

47 —“Fifty Years of Crime in America,” May 20, 1939 (National Fifty Years in Business Club), page 7-8, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

reports-numerical series, no. 408, Official File 10-B, Franklin Delano Roosevelt
Library (hereafter cited as FDRL).


51 J. Edgar Hoover, “The Battle on the Home Front,” August 9, 1943 (International Association of Chiefs of Police), page 2, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.


55 M.H. McIntyre to the Attorney General, December 23, 1941, Record Group 65, Entry UD-05D 14, File#60, Box 15, NARA—CP.


59 “Diplomats and Police Chiefs Honor Italians,” Washington Star, September 24, 1934, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 5, NARA—CP; “Medal Presented to Mr. Hoover by Premier Mussolini’s Touring University Students on their Visit to Washington,” September 24, 1934, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 5, NARA—CP.

60 Al Belmont to Mr. Glavin, February 17, 1939, FBI File# 94-1-2061-155, FBI Electronic Reading Room, File: Interpol, Part 2a,

61 For example, Charles Patterson observes that in the “Nazi propaganda film Der Ewige Jude (‘The Eternal Jew’), which opens with footage of a mass swarming of rats, the narrator explains, ‘Just as the rat is the lowest of animals, the Jew is the lowest of human beings.’” Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust (New York: Lantern Books, 2002), 46. See also, Randall L. Bytwerk, Julius Streicher: Nazi Editor of the Notorious Anti-Semitic Newspaper Der Stürmer (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2001), 35, 168, 181.


63 J. Edgar Hoover to All Law Enforcement Officials, September 6, 1939, File# 60, Record Group 65, Entry 14, Box 15, NARA—CP.

64 Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Secretary of War, Navy, State, Treasury, Postmaster General, Federal Communications Commission, December 8, 1941, “Censorship,” The Louis Nichols Official and Confidential File and the Clyde Tolson Personal File, Reel 3; For more on J. Edgar Hoover’s role as Director of the Office of Censorship, see Record Group 216, Entry 4: PI-54, Boxes 1-3, NARA—CP.


J. Edgar Hoover, “The Test of Citizenship,” April 18, 1940 (Daughters of the American Revolution), pages 4-5, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

—“Problems in Law Enforcement,” October 10, 1939 (International Association of Chiefs of Police), page 2, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

—“Protect America!” August 5, 1940 (Federal-State Conference on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense), pages 2-3, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Police Cooperation,” January 8, 1943, Record Group 65, Entry 14, Box 15, NARA—CP.

The German-American Bund was an American Nazi organization dedicated to promoting a favorable view of Nazi Germany and Adolph Hitler. Its organizing proved to be more of an embarrassment to the German government, which officially distanced itself from the Bund in 1938. J. Edgar Hoover, “The Present Task of Law Enforcement,” September 9, 1940 (International Association of Chiefs of Police), page 6, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

Hugh H. Clegg to J. Edgar Hoover, June 1, 1942, page 2, Record Group 65, Entry 38, B, Box 1, File: Miscellaneous# 3, NARA—CP.

Louis B. Nichols to Clyde Tolson, March 5, 1945, pages 1, 4-5, File# 94-34071, sec 1, Record Group 65, Entry 11, Box 339, NARA—CP.


Edward Tamm to J. Edgar Hoover, August 18, 1945, File# 94-34071, sec 3, Record Group 65, Entry 11, Box 339, NARA—CP.

Hugh Lester, Promotional Material, page 1, FBI File# 94-34071-62, Record Group 65, Entry 11, Box 339, NARA—CP.

O’Reilly, “A New Deal for the FBI”: 646, 648, 639, 656.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Edwin Watson, June 12, 1940, FBI 1940-1941 Folder, FDRL; Franklin Delano Roosevelt to J. Edgar Hoover, June 14, 1940, ibid.


Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the Attorney General, May 11 1942, Congress 1942 Folder, Official File 419, FDRL.


Whitaker Chambers confessed to being a Soviet spy to Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle in September of 1939, and disclosed the identities of eighteen current and former government employees as spies or communist sympathizers, including Alger Hiss. Berle forwarded the information to FDR, who dismissed it. Berle then forwarded the information to the FBI in March of 1940, which also dismissed it. Berle pressed the FBI on the matter again in February of 1941, but it was dismissed again. The FBI did interview Chambers in May of 1942 and June of 1945, but took no further action.

Powers, Not Without Honor, 170-73.


—“Our Duty to Youth,” May 4, 1944 (Boys’ Clubs of America), page 6, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

Emphasis in original. Svonkin, Jews Against Prejudice, 22.

99 J. Edgar Hoover, “Spies and the Underworld,” *Washington Star’s This Week Magazine*, August 4, 1940, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 79, NARA—CP.

100 —“The Test of Citizenship,” April 18, 1940 (Daughters of the American Revolution), 4.

101 —“Cooperation in Law Enforcement,” July 23, 1940 (New York State Association of Chiefs of Police), page 4, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

102 —“Soldiers – In Peacetime,” September 19, 1938 (American Legion), page 13, Record Group 60, Entry 132, Box 12, NARA—CP. This speech highlights a transitional period in which the rhetoric of the War on Crime began to overlap Hoover’s wartime rhetoric.

103 Charles, *J. Edgar Hoover and the Anti-Interventionists*, 60.

104 Stephen Early to J. Edgar Hoover, February 21, 1941, File# 100-4712-18, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Winchester, VA (hereafter cited as FBI—VA).

105 Charles, *J. Edgar Hoover and the Anti-Interventionists*, 68.

106 J. Edgar Hoover to Edwin Watson, February 13, 1942, page 7, Personal and Confidential Letter, Official File 10-B, FDRL; R.B. Hood to J. Edgar Hoover, February 8, 1941, 100-4712-7X, FBI—VA; J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 100-4712-14, FBI—VA; Blind Memorandum, March 3, 1941, 100-4712-17X, FBI—VA.

107 Chicago Field Office to Headquarters, May 26, 1942, File# 100-4712-384, page 3, FBI—VA.


J. Edgar Hoover, “The Challenge to Youth,” June 1, 1941 (Boys Town), page 5, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

—“An Adventure in Public Service,” June 3, 1940 (Drake University), pages 2-4, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

—“The Present Task of Law Enforcement,” September 9, 1940 (International Association of Chiefs of Police), 2.

—“Cooperation in Law Enforcement,” July 23, 1940 (New York State Association of Chiefs of Police), page 4.

J.B. O’Leary to Edward Tamm, January 29, 1941, File# 100-4712-6, page 2, FBI—VA.

J. Edgar Hoover to the Edwin M. Watson, March 19, 1941, FBI Reports-Numerical Series, no. 690, Official File 10-B, FDRL. This report was also sent to the attorney general: Attorney General, March 19, 1941, File# 100-4712-20, FBI—VA.

“Wheeler Committee Joins Demand for Probe of FBI,” *Great Falls Tribune*, March 13, 1940, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 75, NARA—CP.

Statement by Representative Vito Marcantonio, Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3d sess., January 11, 1940, 292; *Department of Justice Appropriation Bill*
for 1941: Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover (Dir, FBI), 76th Cong., 3d sess., January 5, 1940, 153.


120 Statement by Senator George W. Norris, Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3d sess, February 26, 1940, 303; —Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3d sess, May 7, 1940, 8700, 8709, 8719.


122 Memorandum for the Director, December 30, 1940, in ibid.; Memorandum for the Director, February 13, 1942, in ibid.

123 Memorandum for the Director, May 5, 1940, in ibid.


127 Franklin Delano Roosevelt to J. Edgar Hoover, January 21, 1942, Justice Department—J. Edgar Hoover Folder, President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.


130 “Says ‘Fifth Column in Nation Now,’” *The Boston Post*, May 13, 1940, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 76, NARA—CP; see also prepared comments: Hoover, “A National Ideal,” May 12, 1940 (B’nai B’rith).

131 Hoover, “The Test of Citizenship,” April 18, 1940 (Daughters of the American Revolution), 5, 7.


133 — “America’s Duty to the Future,” May 3, 1940 (New York Federation of Women’s Clubs), page 4, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.


135 “Mine Workers Accuse G-men of Nazi Tactics,” Birmingham, Alabama *Southern News Almanac*, May 16, 1940, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 77, NARA—CP.
“FBI Doped Prisoners to Get Confessions, Robinson Charges, Helena, Montana, *People’s Voice*, May 29, 1940, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 77, NARA—CP.

“Untitled,” *The New Republic*, February 19, 1940, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 76, NARA—CP.

“Mr. Jackson and the FBI,” *The New Republic*, April 8, 1940, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 76, NARA—CP.

“Our Lawless G-Men,” *The Nation*, March 2, 1940, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 76, NARA—CP.

“G-Men as Lawless in Methods As Gang, Judge Cowie Charges,” *Milwaukee Sentinel*, June 29, 1935, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 11, NARA—CP.


Louis Nichols to Clyde Tolson, November 26, 1942, pages 1-2, file# 67-39021 sec 2, Record Group 65, Entry 13, Box 1, NARA—CP.

Hoover, “Address,” February, 1941 (B’nai B’rith), 2.

—“Your Call to Duty,” May 23, 1943 (Rutgers University), page 3, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

—“The Internal Defense of America,” April 17, 1944 (Daughters of the American Revolution), page 4, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.


Louis Nichols to Mr. Joseph, December 9, 1936, FBI file# 100-6715-X2, Record Group 60, Entry 146, Box 103, NARA—CP.


Hoover informed Roosevelt of the index in October of 1940, explaining that the FBI maintained “extensive suspect lists” of “individuals located” in the U.S. and its “territories whose nationalistic tendencies and activities” were “considered potentially inimical to the welfare of the United States.” These records were arranged “according to the nationality of the individuals” and were maintained for the “event of a greater emergency or the enactment of additional legislation when it might become necessary to take such individuals into custody or intern them.” Hoover detailed that individual “lists” were “maintained upon German groups and sympathizers, Communist groups and sympathizers, Fascist groups and sympathizers, Japanese and others.” Attorney General Jackson approved Hoover’s compilation of the “Custodial Detention Index” in June of 1940. Attorney General Francis Biddle, however, directed Hoover to dismantle the Index in July of 1943. Instead, Hoover ordered FBI officials to rename it the “Security Index” and kept it operational and secretive. Keen, *Stalking the Sociological Imagination*, 39-40, 194, 89; Present Status of Espionage and Counterespionage Operations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 24, 1940, page 7, FBI reports-numerical series, no. 408, Official File 10-B, FDRL; Theoharis, “A Brief History of the FBI’s Role and Powers,” 21.


Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *Free Speech in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941), 35. 206-218,


159 Flynn was ousted from the ACLU Board the following month for her party membership. Janet Lee, *Comrades and Partners: The Shared Lives of Grace Hutchins and Anna Rochester* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 280.


162 “Hoover’s Aide Sees Fifth Column as Menace to Nation’s Colleges” *The New York Times*, November 30, 1940: 8


165 The Kirov assassination (1934), the Terror-Famine (1932-1933), the Purge Trials (1936-1938), John Dewey’s Trotsky Inquiry (1937), the Nazi-Soviet Pact
(1939-1941), and the invasion of Finland (1939) disillusioned many idealists about the Soviet Union and even turned some into anticommunists.


168 J. Edgar Hoover “Address,” October 5, 1940 (Graduation Exercises, Fifteenth Session, National Police Academy), pages 1-3, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.


171 Robert A. Hill explains that with one hundred and fifty-five African American newspapers in the United States, the black press was one of the “most effective and important forces attracting the attention of the colored race.” The
*Pittsburgh Courier*, for example, promoted civil rights as a key attribute of America's war effort. It organized the Committee on Participation of Negroes in the National Defense Program, which worked in conjunction with the March on Washington Movement. Hill maintains that the CPNNDP effectively “forced President Roosevelt to issue his famous Executive Order 8802 banning discrimination in defense industries and establishing the Fair Employment Practices Committee.” In *The FBI’s RACON: Racial Conditions in the United States During World War II* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1995), 4-5, 31, 406-14, 419, 31.

172 J. Edgar Hoover to Harry Hopkins, July 1, 1943, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Report # 2354A, President Roosevelt’s Papers, Official File, 10-b, Box 18, Justice Department, FDRL.

173 J. Edgar Hoover to General Edwin M. Watson, June 11, 1943, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Report # 2235, President Roosevelt’s Papers, Official File, 10-b, Box 18, Justice Department, FDRL.


175 Fried, *FDR and His Enemies*, 163.

176 “Lewis Demands Full Negro Rights; Lashes Warmakers, Denounces FBI,” *Daily Worker*, April 27, 1940, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 77, NARA—CP.

177 “Body of Negro Leader Found in River Bears Witness Against FDR’s Stab-in-the Back of Anti-Lynch Bill,” *Daily Worker*, June 27, 1940, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 77, NARA—CP.


180 —“The Test of Citizenship,” April 18, 1940 (Daughters of the American Revolution), pages 3-4.


183 Cummings and McFarland, Federal Justice, 321-22, 327.


188 Hoover, “The Internal Defense of America,” April 17, 1944 (Daughters of the American Revolution), page 3.


193 —“Our Future,” May 10, 1942 (Notre Dame University), 2.

194 —“An Adventure in Public Service,” June 3, 1940 (Drake University), 3.


196 —“Address,” September 30, 1939 (FBI National Police Academy), pages 2-4, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.


199 Hoover, “Problems of Law Enforcement” (October 10, 1939), 7.


202 —“Address,” October 31, 1942 (FBI National Police Academy), page 2, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

203 —“The Present Task of Law Enforcement,” September 9, 1940 (International Association of Chiefs of Police), pages 5-6.


206 —“Cooperation in Law Enforcement,” July 23, 1940 (New York State Association of Chiefs of Police), 3.


208 —“Our Nation’s Strength,” March 22, 1942 (Knights of Columbus), page 3, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

209 —“A Nation’s Call to Duty,” June 11, 1942 (St. John’s University), page 1, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.
210 —“The Battle on the Home Front, August 9, 1943 (International Association of Chiefs of Police), 3.

211 —“A Graduate’s Responsibility,” June 29, 1944 (Holy Cross College), 5.

212 Raymond T. Feely, S.J. to J. Edgar Hoover, July 5, 1944, File# 67-39021, sec. 2, Record Group 65, Entry 13, Box 1, NARA—CP.


214 —“The Internal Defense of America,” April 17, 1944 (Daughters of the American Revolution), 2.

215 —“Fifty Years of Crime in America,” May 20, 1939 (National Fifty Years in Business Club), 8.
Chapter 4: Red Fascism: The Masquerade and the Menace

Growing international tension between the United States and the Soviet Union in the post-war era realigned America’s peacetime domestic and foreign policy planning. While State Department officials were suspicious of Joseph Stalin’s actions by June 1945, opinion in the Harry S Truman administration more broadly mobilized against the Soviet Union in early 1946.¹ George F. Kennan triggered a watershed moment in February when he recommended a more hard-line stance against the Soviets. Administration officials then began to accept that harmony between nations was impossible because the Russian political vision was predicated on an economic system that was hostile to capitalism. Kennan wrote in his “Long Telegram” that the “U.S.S.R.” perceived itself inside of an “antagonistic ‘capitalist encirclement’ with which there [could] be no permanent peaceful coexistence.” Rather than being open to diplomacy, he suggested that the Soviets seemed more responsive to threats of force and coercion. Kennan concluded that “Soviet power” was “(i)mperious to logic of reason” and was “highly sensitive to logic of force.”²

Many of Kennan’s warnings reflected J. Edgar Hoover’s anti-communist arguments from the wartime era. Like the FBI Director, the diplomat viewed Moscow as the head of an international Fifth Column. Kennan suggested, for example, that Soviet planners sought to instigate “revolutionary upheavals” in “capitalistic countries” through nefarious infiltration techniques. He warned that a “wide variety of national associations or bodies” were susceptible to “such penetration,” highlighting those organizations that attracted racial, religious, and economic minority groups. And, also like Hoover, Kennan predicted that such destabilization
would take the form of “economic or racial” protesting. Moscow’s ultimate clandestine objective, according to Kennan, was to weaken the military defenses of capitalist nations in preparation of forthcoming military invasions. Indeed, he, like the Americanists, feared that Stalin was engaged in post-war Fifth Column strategizing.

Hoover’s rhetoric typically excited more conservative Americans who wanted to protect the nation’s economic, ethnic, and cultural traditions at home from allegedly alien influences. Kennan’s more liberal perspective conversely focused upon Soviet expansionism in a more global context. Anti-communism was divided between first, an Americanist tradition that targeted “un-Americanism” and those perceived as cultural “outsiders” living within the United States, and second, a liberal internationalist tradition that sought to expand America’s presence on the world stage (hereafter called liberal anti-communism). Americanists prioritized domestic containment by routing out communists in government and throughout the entire country. Liberal anti-communists conversely prioritized international containment by focusing on limiting the military expansion of the U.S.S.R. These perspectives were strengthened by fears of military movements abroad and reports of Soviet espionage at home. The exigency for such domestic and international containment resulted from the growing force of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow and rumors of communism’s Fifth Columns that resembled the fascist threats Hoover identified during World War II.

The director used this context to further exploit the stature that he had built up under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. By the time of his death on April 12, 1945,
the president had helped Hoover expand the director’s authority to rival that of the presidency. Truman, conversely, attempted to constrain the FBI and even communicated a basic distrust of the director. Budget Director Harold Smith wrote in a September 1945 diary entry that Truman “thought the FBI should be cut back as soon as possible to at least the prewar level; that he proposed to confine the FBI to the United States; and that he had in mind a quite different plan for intelligence” than Hoover. This came after Smith recorded in May that the “President” did “not want to set up a gestapo.” Smith further observed that Truman did “not approve of some of” the FBI’s work. He recorded in July that Truman questioned if “having the FBI in South America” compromised FDR’s idealistic “good neighbor relations.”

Following these exchanges, Truman successfully cut FBI appropriations from $44.2 million in 1945 to $34.9 million in 1947. Furthermore, Truman nominated Harry Dexter White to be the first American executive director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in January 1946 even though the FBI had warned that White was a Soviet agent. Such actions signaled Truman’s proclivity to downsize the FBI and to dismiss its credibility.

In response to the larger Cold War landscape and the attempts by the Truman administration to check Hoover’s power, the FBI organized a domestic propaganda campaign that symbolically broadened the international crisis into the domestic sphere. Five days after Kennan sent his widely circulated telegram in February 1946, the Bureau decided to encourage the citizenry to view the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) as an arm of the CPSU’s military strategizing.
Hoover’s campaign would ultimately couple persuasion and coercion as a means for enhancing the FBI’s power and for undermining idealism and its proponents. With the commencement of WWII, Hoover’s propaganda strategies had further militarized the FBI, increasingly resembling the tactics of the Nazi propaganda machine. In so doing, he integrated the Red Fascism analogy with the Fifth Column metaphor. This analogy was coined by Henry Chamberlin when he observed in the September 1935 issue of the *Atlantic Monthly* that while “Bolshevism” had been “rapidly shedding its international revolutionary skin and evolving into something that might reasonably be called Red Fascism, it [was] conceivable . . . Germany will go through a reverse process.” While Truman used Nazi-Soviet analogies to condemn Soviet expansionism, Hoover exploited such analogical reasoning to establish rhetorical continuity between the wartime and post-war eras. Ultimately, he conceptualized the rhetorical exigencies in ways that made the president’s own liberal anti-communist arguments a threat to U.S. national security, substantiating the crisis imagined by Americanists. More specifically, the director used the Red Fascism analogy and the Fifth Column metaphors, along with their ancillary termite, Trojan horse, and fellow traveler metaphors to contaminate cultural pluralism even during peacetime. In the process, Hoover aligned the New Deal, the Fair Deal, liberal Christianity, political liberalism, and secularism with communism. He used this opportunity to bolster the FBI and Americanism.

This chapter begins with a contextualization of early Cold War history (1945-1953), which helps explain the development of both the foreign and domestic containment strategy. Then, the interrelationship between the Red Fascism analogy
and the Fifth Column metaphor and other ancillary metaphors (e.g., termites, Trojan horses, and fellow travelers) are examined. The pattern of terminology highlights the dominant ideas and ideologies that ultimately prevailed in the 1946 election cycle, as well as the debate about Truman’s Federal Employee Loyalty Program (1947-1953). The analysis subsequently examines how the FBI helped generate the Red Scare with the help of Americanists in Congress and the American Legion. This latter section also explores Hoover’s use of militaristic and contagion metaphors to justify what many of his contemporary critics defined as a form of propaganda and thought control. Together, this material highlights the ways in which Hoover’s strategizing worked to co-opt the rhetorical presidency, to elevate Americanism, and to discredit the New Deal and the Fair Deal. The analysis pulls extensively from speeches as well as newspaper, magazine, and scholarly journal articles written or influenced by the FBI during the years of the Truman administration.

**Christian Realism and International Relations**

Containment strategy in the early Cold War era developed in response to international and domestic pressures. Christian realism provided a response to idealism that ultimately gave rise to political realism and post-war anti-communism. These perspectives helped to build a coalition, in part, between former idealists, who became liberal anti-communists, and Americanists, who conflated the New Deal with communism. Realism encouraged liberals and conservatives to share a common value set that privileged individualism over idealism’s spirit of cooperation in domestic politics. Christian realism and anti-communism mutually reinforced each
other, and were combined in different ways by the liberal anti-communists and the Americanists. Liberal anti-communists sought to contain communism abroad; Americanists sought to contain communism at home. Promoting individualism worked against the notion of community and collectivism valued under the New Deal and permitted the federal government to transfer its resources toward domestic and international containment strategies. In the process, the movement undermined the CPUSA and other allegedly communist influences in American public life.

The Truman administration’s actions during and immediately following World War II helped shape the early Cold War era. In August 1945, the president directed the use of atomic force against Japan. He sought to quickly accomplish an unconditional surrender, as well as to give the United States and Great Britain a power advantage over the U.S.S.R. in the post-war world. Robert J. Donovan observes that, in part, the decision to drop the atomic bomb “pertained to the diplomatic import of possession of an atomic bomb and consideration of how this might affect power alignment in the world, especially between the United States and Great Britain . . . on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other.”

Liberal anti-communists devised their attempt to contain communism internationally through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Truman issued his Doctrine in March 1947 and pledged economic and military support for Greece and Turkey to help prevent civil wars that would make them more vulnerable to Soviet imperialism. This strategizing was reinforced in June 1947 with the announcement of the Marshall Plan. The large-scale U.S. effort to rebuild Western
European economies in the post-war era was designed, in part, to also curb Soviet expansionism by providing economic support to the war-torn regions.

Capitalist domination of the international landscape, however, became increasingly difficult. In October 1945, the United States, the Soviet Union, the Republic of China, Great Britain, and France ratified the United Nations Charter. This Security Council makeup helped create an impression of Western supremacy in global affairs. However, a series of events then followed that destabilized the balance of international power. The Soviet Union imposed the Berlin Blockade in June 1948, which obstructed the ground transportation of supplies to those sectors of Berlin that were under Western control. The Truman administration responded to this challenge with the Berlin Airlift (June 1948-September 1949), which shipped in supplies with cargo planes.\textsuperscript{14} Tensions with international communism grew increasingly hostile when the Communist Party of China overthrew the Nationalist government in 1949. Such tensions enhanced the presence of communism globally, and more evenly balanced the membership of the U.N. Security Council between capitalist and communist states. It also represented a major defeat to U.S. foreign policy because FDR and Truman had propped up China’s Nationalist regime. The loss of Chinese allies was shortly followed by the Korean War (June 1950-July 1953). In this conflict, the Soviet Union and China backed North Korea while the Western sphere supported South Korea. North Korea invaded its neighbor in June 1950, which led Truman to direct American military forces to intervene and attempt to contain the spread of communism with force. Because the Soviets had detonated their first atomic bomb in August 1949, fears intensified over the growing threat of a nuclear world war.\textsuperscript{15}
Troubling news of communist belligerence abroad was compounded by sensational front-page headlines that informed the nation of successful Soviet efforts to undermine U.S. national security. For example, the *Chicago Daily Tribune* flashed in February 1946, “A-Bomb Secrets Stolen!: Canada Holds 22 for Inquiry on Atom Leak” when Soviet cipher clerk Igor Gouzenko defected to the West. The *New York Times* reported in August 1948 that Whittaker Chambers of *Time* magazine had also told the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) that prominent New Dealer Alger Hiss was a Soviet agent in a story titled, “Red ‘Underground’ in Federal Posts Alleged by Editor.” The early Cold War era was rich with such news stories that aligned international tensions with stories of Soviet infiltration of America’s security apparatus by Americans.

Truman responded to the growing crisis by building up the national security state, through post-war national security legislation and international treaties. Passed in July 1947, the National Security Act created the Department of the Air Force and merged the Departments of War and Navy into the National Military Establishment, which was located under the Secretary of Defense. This agency was renamed the Department of Defense when the Act was amended in 1949 to subordinate and coordinate all military branches under the secretary. The Act also created the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). These federal departments offered continuity to clandestine operations after the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was abolished by Truman in October 1945. Furthermore, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in April 1949. It created a collective-defensive structure between North American and
Western European nations. The treaty was specifically drafted to help its members defend themselves from military invasion or covert infiltration by the Soviet Union.\(^{21}\)

The emergence of the national security state occurred in conjunction with the elevation of Reinhold Niebuhr and his Christian realist perspective. The theologian operated at the pinnacle of liberal anti-communism while serving in a number of official capacities.\(^{22}\) He advised George Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff (PPS) in the State Department from 1949-1950 where, according to Eyal J. Naveh, he was known as the “‘intellectual father’ of US containment policy.”\(^{23}\) Under Niebuhr’s advisement, the PPS promoted building up national defense and foreign aid programs by cutting spending on domestic social programs.\(^{24}\) Niebuhr even influenced the work of his colleague in Americans for Democratic Action, Arthur J. Schlesinger.\(^{25}\)

Schlesinger helped to translate Niebuhr’s religious philosophy of Christian realism into a more secular perspective of political realism. He located liberal anti-communists between idealists on the far left and Americanists on the far right in *The Vital Center* (1949). His ideological vision fragmented the liberal community and abandoned idealists. He observed that an “activist capacity . . . tended to split the left between those . . . who regard[ed] liberalism as a practical program to be put into effect” and “progressives, who use[d] liberalism as an outlet for private grievances and frustrations.” According to Schlesinger, liberal anti-communists comprised the center of American politics by accepting the imperfections of the “real world.” Conversely, he described idealism as a utopian “accomplice of Communism” because it refused to accept that human nature was belligerent. Schlesinger resolved this conflict by calling liberals to reform their value structures. Specifically, he envisioned
a new form of “individualism” that still valued the New Deal’s emphases on “community” and cooperation in a manner that, unlike communism, did not “suffocate the individual.” The values advanced by Niebuhr and Schlesinger helped to realign balances between the individual, the nation, and the world.

Realism, therefore, was an ideology that sought to build consensus by restructuring the values of those on the left and the right. While the prospect of atomic warfare destabilized the future of Western civilization, liberals and conservatives were pushed to reconsider existing relationships between the individual and the nation-state, as well as the nation-state and the world. Whereas liberals were instructed to accept the supremacy of individualism in domestic affairs, conservatives were directed to abandon their impulse toward more traditional forms of militarism. The Cold War, argued Niebuhr, was to be waged through propaganda for the sympathies of unaligned nations. Niebuhr was far more concerned about the spread of the Soviet Union into Europe than the infiltration of the CPUSA into American institutions. Nonetheless, Americanists in the post-war world used these ideological realignments to resurrect the Fifth Column metaphor in a post-World War II, Cold War context. Debating the nature of the most significant communist threat as either Soviet expansionism (as liberal anti-communists presumed), or as a problem compounded by the president’s demilitarization of domestic security (as the Americanists charged), paved the way for the next major Red Scare.
Red Fascism and Containing the Enemy Within

The Truman Doctrine inadvertently opened the door for the president’s rivals in the FBI, HUAC, and in the U.S. Senate to expand the philosophy and programming of containment into the domestic political arena. Americanists used the administration’s public warnings of political subterfuge abroad to help reify the alleged Fifth Column at home; both were said to be manifestations of the CPSU’s influence. The Doctrine announced a shift in American foreign policy away from idealism’s commitments to peace through education, good will, and disarmament, toward realism’s maintenance of order through military and economic strategizing. Hoover and the American Legion supported the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, but argued that more needed to be done to contain the communist threat at home. They agreed with the liberal anti-communists that international cooperation was the ideal method for combating communism abroad and also agreed that rugged individualism, and not collectivism, was the preferred value for guiding federal policy domestically. This agreement turned the cultural battle between the New Deal’s spirit of cooperation and Americanist preferences for individualism into a partisan contest, and molded domestic containment strategies to neutralize New Dealers and Fair Dealers. Truman’s critics transformed his Doctrine into a treatise for usurping presidential power.

The Truman Doctrine address of March 12, 1947, marked an official turning point in the White House toward political realism. The president waited nearly two years to inform Americans of deteriorating international relations with the Soviet Union. Martin J. Medhurst notes that the president was reticent and even laudatory
toward the Soviets in the interim as he struggled to select between two competing visions of U.S. foreign policy planning.\textsuperscript{30} Denise M. Bostdorff observes that Truman attempted in that time to balance his own entrenched commitments to political idealism with the apparent necessity of adopting more realistic interpretations of Soviet actions. She contends that the administration’s perceptions were constrained by a “rhetoric of the past—and the reality that it generated” as the White House sought support for aiding Greece and Turkey.\textsuperscript{31} By imagining the future in terms of the past, liberal anti-communists inside and outside of the White House argued that military-industrial power was the ultimate currency in international life. This perspective empowered American militarism and industrialism, which had been promoted by Hoover and other Americanists since before World War II.

Truman’s period of presidential reticence (April 1945-March 1947) coincides rhetorically with Hoover’s adoption of the Red Fascism analogy in September 1946. Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson blame the analogy, which conflated communism and Nazism, for making peaceful relations with the Soviet Union impossible between 1945 and 1946.\textsuperscript{32} For example, the \textit{Hartford Courant} questioned as early as March 1945 if “America” rescued “millions of Europeans from under the heel of German Nazism only to plunge them back into the slavery of Red fascism?” in a letter to the editor that was pointedly titled “Another Munich?”\textsuperscript{33} Winston Churchill warned one year later that “fifth columns” threatened “Christian civilization” in his “Sinews of Peace” address at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri.\textsuperscript{34} In March 1947, Truman signaled his acceptance of the rhetoric of the past and the anti-communist reality that it created. He warned Americans of “such
subterfuges as political infiltration” practiced by “totalitarian regimes” in foreign lands.\textsuperscript{35} Truman encouraged his audiences to conceptualize Soviet Russia as Nazi Germany in order to build support for containing Stalin’s expansionism.\textsuperscript{36} When the president broke his silence, he did so in a manner that extended analogies between communism and fascism, promoted realism, and consequently emphasized a vision of the past that privileged military-industrial power.

The director used the Red Fascism analogy to attempt a rhetorical coup against the president. Hoover worked to infuse the president’s liberal anti-communist vision with his own Americanist perspective. This campaign to shape the exigencies of the Cold War was couched in a broader movement that established the FBI as an unimpeachable and autonomous force in American political and religious culture. In the process, the Bureau was disloyal to the commander-in-chief as it directed public opinion against his domestic agenda. Hoover used the communist menace to further militarize and insulate the FBI. In the aftermath of FDR’s death, the Bureau gained greater autonomy from the White House and showed a growing hostility toward Truman's policies and the presidency as a whole. Hoover’s appropriations would rebound to $84.4 million in 1953, as his jurisdiction became even more unbounded and secretive.\textsuperscript{37} The sections that follow first examine the analogical function of Red Fascism and its reliance on a rhetoric of the past before turning to explore Hoover’s perpetuation of the Fifth Column, termite, Trojan horse, and fellow traveler metaphors into the post-war era. The analysis then explores how the analogy was further used in Hoover’s constructions of the labor and civil rights movements as a means to discredit the New Deal and the Fair Deal.
Metaphors and Analogies in the Rhetoric of the Past

The cultural division between Americanists and liberal anti-communists provided grounds for drastically reorganizing U.S. public life. Political intrigue and the politics of anti-communism imposed the realist worldview upon liberals and conservatives, which suffocated idealism and discredited liberalism. Anti-communists generally sought to build their consensus through a rhetoric of the past; both liberal anti-communists and Americanists turned to Red Fascism analogies. Whereas liberal anti-communists used the analogy to draw conclusions about international planning, Americanists associated the analogy with various metaphors (e.g., Fifth Column, termite, Trojan Horse), which diverted containment planning into domestic spaces.\textsuperscript{38} Americanists thus drew upon analogies and metaphors directed toward the Soviet Union to define the enemies at home.

President Truman relied on the Nazi-Soviet analogy to promote his liberal anti-communist perspective when seeking to sell the Truman Doctrine at home. He told the Association of Radio News Analysts in May 1947, for example, that there “isn’t any difference in totalitarian states. I don’t care what you call them— you call them Nazi, Communist or Fascist, or Franco, or anything else—they are all alike.”\textsuperscript{39} His analogy emphasized that both systems were totalitarian by highlighting their coercive tactics. Furthermore, Truman stated in a March 1950 press conference that there “isn’t any difference between the totalitarian Russian government and the Hitler government and the Franco government in Sprain (sic). They are alike. They are police governments—police state governments.”\textsuperscript{40} The analogy helped give rise to the Munich syndrome (or Munich analogy). This perspective suggested that because
Neville Chamberlain’s 1938 appeasement with Hitler helped the Nazis to overtake other parts of Europe, appeasing Stalin would only expedite his communist expansion.\textsuperscript{41}

This analogy stemmed from notions of Red Fascism. Former Moscow correspondent for the \textit{Christian Science Monitor} Henry Chamberlin observed in a January 1935 \textit{New York Times} article that there existed a “distinct analogy, in cause and in method, between Stalin’s method of meeting a political crisis and the method which Hitler employed.”\textsuperscript{42} Furthermore, he then wrote in the \textit{Atlantic Monthly} that “similarities [were] most vivid and most obvious in such matters as political technique, administrative practice, and ruling class psychology.” He added that “[o]ne of the most important points of similarity [was] that both Russia and Germany [were] ruled by dictatorial parties, which avowedly tolerate[d] no other political organizations.”\textsuperscript{43} Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson observe that the analogy reemerged in the early post-war era and was used by “Americans” who “casually and deliberately articulated distorted similarities between Nazi and Communist ideologies, German and Soviet foreign policies, authoritarian controls, and trade practices, and Hitler and Stalin. This popular analogy was a potent and pervasive notion that significantly shaped American perception of world events in the cold war.”\textsuperscript{44}

While liberal anti-communists used notions of Red Fascism to help construct the Soviet identity, Americanists used this identity to imagine Fifth Column strategizing at home. According to California State Senator Jack B. Tenney’s (R) 1947 book on the subject, for example, “\textit{Red-Fascism}” properly underscored that
“Fascism and Communism” were both “totalitarian” systems of “[m]ilitarism and imperialism” that operated “brutal secret police” forces.\textsuperscript{45} Similarly, Representative Everett Dirksen (R-IL) proclaimed in January that the “greatest menacing force to freedom in the world” was “red fascism.” He suggested that this was a “more impressive and accurate . . . term for Communism.” Dirksen specifically warned of communist infiltration into government, the film industry, labor unions, and “educational systems.”\textsuperscript{46} In these regards, the alleged communist threat resembled the threat that Hoover reified during the wartime era with the Fifth Column metaphor.\textsuperscript{47} Liberal anti-communists used the analogy to highlight similarities in the relationships between Hitler, Stalin, and their international strategizing. Concurrently, Americanists framed these relationships through the Fifth Column metaphor and inferred that America was, in fact, inflicted by a clandestine community of foreign loyalists. Pairing the Fifth Column metaphor with the Red Fascism analogy suggested that these subversives coordinated with foreign military leadership in ways resembling Guenther Rumrich’s coordination with German high command in 1938. As in the past, espionage was presumed to precipitate war.

The Red Fascism analogy helped Americanists weaken the resolve of the Democrat’s commitment to idealism by creating a perceptual need for more realistic foreign policy strategizing. This change of perspective was evident shortly after Hoover adopted the post-war Red Fascism analogy in his September 1946 speech to the American Legion.\textsuperscript{48} Ray Tucker of the \textit{Brooklyn Eagle} wrote that the “Republican Speaker’s Bureau” regarded Hoover as its “best unpaid spellbinder” because no one better “dramatized” the “issue of the Red menace more vividly.”\textsuperscript{49} Hoover’s address
followed two other speeches delivered by members of the Truman administration that month. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes declared in early September that America would use its military “power and resources” to protect nations in the Western sphere from being forced into totalitarian control (“Restatement of Policy on Germany”).

Reporting from Europe, Reinhold Niebuhr announced in *Life* magazine that this speech “won the support of everyone except the Communists.” Byrnes’ realist perspective was allegedly regarded by “Europeans” as the sole “guarantee of security against Soviet expansion” and “war.” This story broke while news of nuclear espionage and subversion in the federal government continued to flood the headlines.

Anti-communism crossed party lines and challenged Truman’s rhetorical presidency and complicated his penchant for civil rights. Commerce Secretary Henry A. Wallace proclaimed one week later in his speech, “The Way to Peace,” that he had presidential approval to promote “peace with Russia” through “cooperation” via the “United Nations.” He called upon Christians to enact their “moral principles” by addressing “social and economic justice.” This ideal included reducing the military and surrendering its nuclear arsenal to the U.N. Moreover, Wallace asked Christians to “eliminate racism from our unions, our business organizations, our educational institutions, and our employment practices.” These principles resonated with Truman’s domestic policy planning. For example, the *New York Times* reported in late July that Truman had ordered the DOJ to investigate “lynching” and “other crimes of oppression” in the South; this marked the beginning of his movement toward civil rights programming. Wallace’s address was aligned with the values of the New Deal and it expanded upon the idealism of Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor
policy.\textsuperscript{54} The secretary failed, however, to offer the hardboiled protections that Byrnes’ realist perspective promoted. Niebuhr lamented that the “Wallace speech” symbolized “confusion in American liberalism” and that the speech “must be regarded as catastrophic in the light of the European realities.”\textsuperscript{55} The president was at an ideological crossroad, and his reticence signaled ambivalence in deciding the future of American foreign policy.

Whereas Byrnes’ realist vision was welcomed by liberal anti-communists and Americanists, Wallace’s worldview represented a continuation and amplification of Roosevelt’s more idealistic principles. World events made realism the more attractive alternative for many. Tucker reported that the “Grand Old Party’s strategists” considered the Commerce Secretary’s speech to be an “oratorical asset,” and he sarcastically described Wallace’s “apology for Russia” as one of the “most effective speeches of the current Congressional campaign.” Tucker concluded that if the “sudden pre-election shift” signified the “death of the New Deal,” then the “assassins” included Hoover and Wallace.\textsuperscript{56} Red Fascism was about to consolidate anti-communism and further discredit idealism. The analogy was supported by a constellation of ancillary metaphors that helped to transfer beliefs about fascism to communism—beliefs that were especially framed in terms of the Fifth Column.

\textit{Red Fascism and the Fifth Column}

Hoover established rhetorical continuity between the wartime and post-war eras, in part, by restructuring the international situation in the terms of a trope used by the Roosevelt administration to discredit its critics. The Fifth Column metaphor associated the wartime espionage threat to the post-war discovery of atomic spy rings.
This continuity bolstered the Red Fascism analogy by echoing the same reality that governed the wartime era, a reality that grew out of the urban-crime genre. This reality was articulated through a rhetoric of force, and then with the help of Americanism, the rhetoric of totalitarianism. Hoover again used the Fifth Column metaphor to construct more liberal groups as constituent members of a subversive international conspiracy. Their very presence evidenced the Americanist argument that the Red Fascism analogy should be further extended from the international scene into daily public life. The threat of communist Fifth Columns was perpetuated from wartime into the post-war era and continued to associate liberal organizations with subversion.

Hoover used the Fifth Column metaphor to align liberal reformers with Soviet espionage, which informed the analogy with more Americanist meanings. He proclaimed before HUAC in March 1947, for example, that the “Communist Party” was a “fifth column” and called this new post-war crisis the “menace of Red Fascism.” The analogy combined the fears of liberal anti-communism and Americanism. Hoover observed, for example, that the “mad march of Red Fascism” was observable in the “Canadian spy trials,” which allegedly “revealed” that all domestic “Communists and sympathizers” were disloyal. Hoover used the Red Fascism analogy to correlate the president’s own strategizing in the international crisis with these spies. He claimed that communists mobilized to “exert pressure on Congress” after “President Truman called for aid to Greece and Turkey.” The analogy linked the international Soviet threat that Byrnes alluded to with idealistic reformers who advocated social justice policies. Hoover warned, for example, that he
feared for the “liberal and progressive” who had been “hoodwinked and duped into joining hands with the Communists.” Informing the Red Fascism analogy with the Fifth Column metaphor, therefore, helped Hoover to resume his assault upon idealism.

Anti-communists of all stripes were encouraged to view the Soviet Union as the head of an international Fifth Column conspiracy that was already engaging in the same types of subterfuge in America that Hitler had imposed across Europe. The Russian Fifth Column metaphor ultimately elevated Americanism in foreign policy planning by fracturing the liberal community between idealism and anti-communism. Such discord curbed the expansion of the New Deal and the Fair Deal while Truman abandoned his idealism for realism. The metaphor also slandered labor organizers, as well as civil liberties and civil rights advocates, with suspicions of disloyalty.

The post-war logic replicated the anti-New Deal strategizing encouraged by the Fifth Column metaphor during war. For example, the New York Times reported in a March 1946 story that an “enormous affinity” existed “between communism and fascism.” The “Communists,” it paraphrased from Hoover, were attempting to build a “united front” so that a few leaders could “influence” a “broad area of American affairs.” Hoover used the Fifth Column metaphor to malign organized labor as well as civil rights and civil liberties proponents. The Times reported that “Russian fifth columnists” allegedly appealed to “workers, to Negroes, to veterans, to young peoples, and to ‘progressives’ of every persuasion.” These groups were united by the Fair Deal and also overlapped with the types of groups that Hoover charged with communist subversion during the war. For example, Truman pledged his support in
September 1945 to continuing FDR’s “economic bill of rights” and to expanding the New Deal in terms of health, housing, education, employment, and catastrophic protections. Hoover aligned Truman’s agenda with the Communist Party line. He told HUAC in March 1947 that “Communists” promoted “old-age security, houses for the veterans, child assistance, and a host” of other programs to “conceal their true aims and entrap gullible followers.” Such constructions perpetuated the realities of the Fifth Column metaphor, advantaging Republicans who campaigned against the New Deal’s tolerance of what they viewed as radical philosophies (e.g., cultural pluralism, social justice, collectivism) and their adherents. Ellen Schrecker observes that Hoover’s anti-communist network rose in response to this alleged menace. It enlisted the support of religious leaders, labor organizers, journalists, ex-communists, bureaucrats, and super-patriotic civic organizations to spread the Americanist vision.

Hoover coupled persuasion with coercion as he circulated his ideas while seeking to censor his opponents. His program mimicked both the rhetoric of Hitler and Lenin. He pioneered his own systems for purging his opposition from government and public life by promoting their "extermination." The director further informed the Red Fascism analogy with more Americanist meanings by recycling his wartime ancillary metaphors.

Termites, Trojan Horses, and Fellow Travelers

As he did during the war, Hoover used a termite metaphor to construct totalitarian and un-American ideologies. Lachlan Strahan observes that the "metaphor" of “Red Fascist Termites” uses the nature of swarms to create meaning
by “amalgamating the themes of numerosity and dehumanizing dictatorship.”

Communists and termites were both thought to burrow deep “into a structure, cloaked by darkness and invisible to the eye.” Termites “riddled a building with rottenness until it simply disintegrated. Like termites, communists were tireless in their furtive destruction of society from within.” This metaphor once again helped Hoover to brand idealistic reformers and their beliefs as subversive. He further used the metaphor to warrant removing idealists from government employment and censuring them in public life.

For example, the director used the termite metaphor to amplify the scope of the communist threat. Hoover wrote in a February 1947 American Magazine article titled, “Red Fascism in the United States Today,” that the “Red scourge of Communism in America [was] boring its way through our land like a termite.” As in wartime, the termite metaphor implied that the nation needed to fear unseen threats that were undetectable. Hoover suggested that the “American Communist” was “cloaked in stealth and intrigue,” and operated “behind the protection of false fronts” to accomplish a “sinister and vicious program, intent on swindling and robbing Americans of their heritage of freedom.” The metaphor organized disparate social justice movements into a more monolithic threat of un-Americanism. Hoover told the Freemasons in May 1950, for example, that a “half million . . . sympathizers ready to do the Communist bidding” stood “behind” a “force of traitorous Communists” who were “gnawing away like termites at the very foundations of American society.” The metaphor enabled Hoover to continue aligning civil liberties and civil rights advocates with subversion. Hoover charged that these “individuals, though not
identified as Communists, [were] extremely dangerous to the internal security of this Nation, because as hypocrites and moral swindlers they [sought] the protection of the freedoms which they constantly seek to destroy.” The termite metaphor, thus, created the impression of a prolific, invisible network of registered communists and their unregistered allies working to undermine society and its sovereignty.

Whereas the termite metaphor extended a larger rhetorical project that Hoover began during the war, the increased use of the Trojan horse metaphor amplified a trope that Hoover had used more sparingly during the war. The Legend of Troy tells of a wooden horse deceptively offered in truce to the Trojans. A battalion of Greek soldiers hid inside of the presumed gift. These stealthy warriors went on to sack the city after the horse was brought inside of Troy’s protective city walls. Hoover once used the Trojan horse metaphor in the wartime era to imagine communist strategizing. For example, he told the New York Federation of Women’s Clubs in May 1940 that “Communists” were engaged in “Trojan Horse’ activities” to shackle the FBI so they could “proceed without interference as they go their boring, undermining way to overthrow our Government.” Even then, the Trojan horse had the properties of termites. Writing about the State Department’s response to the Kremlin’s South American presence in the 1950s, Jutta Weldes explains that the “Trojan horse metaphor implies” that “reform movements are not, in fact, indigenous movements, grounded” in the “pursuit of legitimate local aspirations” or “spontaneous indigenous responses to structures of oppression.” Instead, the “Trojan horse metaphor” constructs reform movements as “weapons wielded by an external, alien enemy secretly and deceitfully to infiltrate the Western Hemisphere.”
Trojan horse and termite metaphors, therefore, worked together to discredit social reformers, to amplify the scope of the problem. They also suggested the need to reject reform.

The director also used the Trojan horse metaphor to distinguish liberal anti-communism from idealism through a dissociative process that classified the former as real and latter as somehow less real or illegitimate. He told the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Association in October 1949, for example, that the “Trojan Horses” viewed “real liberals” as their “sworn enemies” because they sought to “corrupt liberalism.” The metaphor implied that an illegitimate and alien value set was being secretly forced upon the republic. Hoover suggested that communists wanted to erode America’s “treasured liberties of freedom of speech and religion, habeas corpus, [and] trial by jury” by placing the “state above God and men above principles.” The metaphor also aligned idealism more generally with communism. Hoover relayed in the August 1950 edition of *U.S. New & World Report*, for example, that the “Trojan horse of disloyalty” might “mouth sweet words of ‘peace,’ ‘democracy,’ ‘equality,’ and flourish gay slogans of ‘international solidarity’ and ‘brotherhood of men,’” but wherever the “Trojan horse of Communist fifth columns . . . walked, the indelible footprints of Russian imperialism remain[ed] behind.” Political idealism was depicted as illusory compared to the realism of liberal anti-communism. Hoover’s public arguments, therefore, helped him to attack those individuals most associated with idealist principles.

Hoover, furthermore, used the Trojan horse metaphor to align secularism with communism. For example, he told a Conference of Methodist ministers in
November 1947 that “secularism” was a “Trojan Horse strategy” to destroy “religion” and to establish a “godless, atheistic society.” He traced the source of this strategy to liberal Protestantism. For example, he lamented that “secularism” made its “advances” because the “social gospel” was espoused “too frequently without the Christian Gospel’s coming first.” Similar to its ability to dissociate perspectives of liberalism, the Trojan horse metaphor also allowed the dissociation of correct from allegedly incorrect traditions of Christianity. He suggested that self-proclaimed “Christians” had “too much freedom and too little discipline” because they failed to realize the “inevitable consequences of perdition.” The Trojan horse metaphor, therefore, preferred the values of Christian fundamentalism to social justice, implying that the latter was subversive and illegitimate. Hoover professed to the ministers that communists disingenuously supported “idealist” programs for “equal rights, for better working conditions, for the abatement of poverty, for the equitable division of the products of industry and for the rights of racial groups and political minorities.” According to the director, however, such positions were merely a “cover to conceal their real aims of undermining democracy.”

The Trojan horse metaphor thus supported the Red Fascism analogy by asserting that communists in the post-war era were engaged in the same types of Fifth Column strategizing that they had allegedly been conducting during the war. Between World War II and the Cold War, the metaphor implied, communists had used the New Deal and the Fair Deal to subvert democracy.

The Trojan horse metaphor, therefore, cast suspicion on reformers by suggesting that their proclaimed motivations, in practice, masked ulterior ideological
commitments. In promoting tolerance, Hoover argued, they left America vulnerable to attack. Following the speeches delivered by Byrnes and Wallace in September 1946 Hoover told the American Legion, for example, that “[d]uring the past five years, American Communists [had] made their deepest inroads upon our national life. In our vaunted tolerance for all peoples the Communists [had] found our ‘Achilles’ heel.” Of course, this was another metaphor from the Legend of Troy. Hoover framed commitments to tolerance as a proven national weakness to Soviet strategizing by perpetuating themes associated with the Fifth Column metaphor. Five weeks before the November election, he described “Red Fascism” as a cycle in which “Communism . . . bred Fascism and Fascism spawn[ed] Communism.”73 This helped to further discredit idealism and to elevate realism by interlocking notions of communism and fascism. Hoover’s use of the termite and Trojan horse metaphors thus established the properties of the alleged traitors of past and present in government.

Hoover also used the fellow traveler metaphor to maintain rhetorical continuity between his campaigns. Soviet writers used the metaphor to describe those individuals who were sympathetic to the communist revolution, but whose commitment was still a matter of question.74 Hoover, however, used the metaphor during the wartime era to suggest that idealists were actively conspiring against their own countrymen to deliver America into Soviet hands. For example, Hoover told the Annual New York Herald-Tribune Forum in October 1939 that there was “no place in our land for the pinkish ‘fellow traveler,’” who was “steeped in the bloody handed egotism of gangster conquest.” This statement also established continuity between the
War on Crime and World War II. Similarly, he complained to the International Association of Chiefs of Police in September 1940 of a “‘smear campaign’” that was “planned by a group” of “fellow travelers” and “communist termites” to “discredit the FBI and wreck public confidence in its mission.” Like the Trojan Horse, the fellow traveler metaphor was also conceptually related to the termite metaphor, and was also extended from the wartime era.

The director borrowed the Soviet metaphor to proclaim that social justice advocacy and political idealism were treasonous. He told the Roosevelt Memorial Association in October 1949, for example, that the “Communist, his sympathizers, fellow-travelers, and pseudo-liberals must be recognized for what they are—a ‘fifth column,’ if there ever was one, awaiting the Quisling call to arms.” This speech represents yet another manifestation of the Red Fascism analogy; the term “Quisling” referred to wartime traitors who assisted in the occupation of their own Allied nations, such as those from the Vichy movement in France. Hoover assigned this Fifth Column identity to social reformers in his Cold War vision.

The fellow traveler metaphor suggested that individuals who shared any common ground with communists were untrustworthy and unfit for government employment. Hoover told HUAC in March 1947, for example, that the “recent Canadian spy trials revealed the necessity” of “keeping Communists and sympathizers out of government services,” referring to the latter as “fellow travelers.” Hoover asserted that any communist presence in government warranted the loyalty program. He wrote in a June 1947 issue of Newsweek magazine, for example, that “[o]ne disloyal local, county, state or Federal employe (sic) can do
irreparable harm by acts of disloyalty or by indoctrinating others with a Marxian philosophy” as ““fellow travelers.”” The metaphor suggested that such individuals were dangerous because of their alleged material support of communism. Hoover wrote in the May 1950 issue of *U.S. News & World Report*, for example, that “fellow travelers” represented to the “Communist movement, a source of wealth: financial resources; the creation of valuable contacts; levers of social, economic and political pressures; [and] recruiting grounds for espionage information and agents.” The metaphor suggested that social justice advocates represented national security threats. The news magazine quoted Hoover in its March 1951 edition as estimating that the “most important single menace to our internal security” was the “Communist Party, U.S.A., its members, fellow travelers and sympathizers.” The fellow traveler metaphor thus provided grounds for suspecting liberal members of the federal government of disloyalty, while idealism generally was constructed as an intolerable and subversive worldview.

The Fifth Column and its ancillary termite, Trojan horse, and fellow traveler metaphors collectively buttressed the Red Fascism analogy. Americanists asserted that liberal Christianity and political liberalism were rhetorical tools wielded by foreign propaganda agents to undermine more realistic perspectives of American politics and religion. Truman’s loyalty program was established in response to such fears. Accusations that the communist Fifth Column was continuing to infiltrate government sectors were accompanied by an institutional movement to monitor and regulate the beliefs and actions of federal employees.
Instituting the National Security State

Metaphorical extensions of the Red Fascism analogy provided a foundation for monitoring and regulating the beliefs of the federal workforce and for purging its more liberal members from governmental employment. The numerous spy stories that dominated the mediascape during Truman’s presidency raised concerns about the loyalty of federal employees. The president’s Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty (TCEL) and his administration’s planning for emergency roundups were outlined in response to the Gouzenko defection. Canada’s Royal Commission concluded that “‘membership in Communist organizations or sympathies toward Communist ideologies was the primary force which caused’” Canadian citizens to assist the Soviet Union as “‘agents.’” The commission concluded that “‘questions of thought and of attitudes took on new importance as factors of safety in the eyes of all those concerned with national security.’”82 This cast suspicions upon many social reformers in America.

In response, Hoover thoroughly involved the FBI in the administration’s countersubversive programming. The House Civil Service Committee recommended that the president form a committee to investigate espionage matters in the United States and address the concerns that were raised in the Canadian report. Following his attorney general’s advice, Truman signed Executive Order 9806 in November 1946 and established the TCEL.83 Truman then made Gus Vanech, a Hoover loyalist from the DOJ, its chairman on the recommendation of Attorney General Tom Clark. According to Tim Weiner, Clark was a “professional oil lobbyist from Texas who had joined the Justice Department as an antitrust lawyer and worked his way up to chief"
of the Criminal Division.” The attorney general informally delegated the responsibility for drafting the DOJ’s response to domestic communism to Hoover and did not object to the director’s ideological excesses. For example, Hoover clarified to the attorney general in September 1946 that he included “‘every convinced and dependable member of the Communist Party’” as well as other individuals “‘who regard the Soviet Union as the exponent and champion of a superior way of life’” as being suspicious persons. Hoover warned of prominent members of government showing “‘sympathy for Communist objectives’” and who therefore “‘might possibly serve the Communist Party and/or the Soviet Union should war break out.’” This proclamation came after Hoover alerted the White House in May 1946 that the “political views” of Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the views of Henry Wallace were both “pro-Russia in nature.” Overall, the attorney general accepted Hoover’s questionable standards for reasonable suspicion.

The FBI and the attorney general manipulated the Truman administration’s review of the communists-in-government issue to amplify the scope of the problem. In January 1947, Ladd reported to TCEL that there was a “‘substantial number of disloyal persons’” in government service. The director then recommended to the commission that the government should monitor the associations of employees on the premise that the Soviet Union was using social reform organizations as front groups to manipulate U.S. policy. Clark added in February that any Soviet presence at all represented a “‘serious threat’” to national security. The attorney general’s statement was bold because Soviet espionage had been present in the United States since the 1920s. At its inception, the problem of Soviet interference with American
public life was to the chagrin of liberal and conservative Catholics, Jews, and Protestants, as well as to civil rights and labor activists. Clark approved of Hoover’s Americanist movement, which considered many of these anti-communists to be suspicious. Kenneth O’Reilly observes that Clark sought to “indoctrinate Americans” with a countersubversive brand of anti-communism, and that his “efforts intersected with President Truman’s efforts to ‘sell’ his containment policies and the FBI’s self-described educational program.”

Anti-communists in the Truman administration, therefore, worked to establish a more Americanist national security state than the president had previously supported. This new apparatus purged employees from government service on the grounds of their split loyalties or memberships in reform movements.

The method for determining employee loyalty was based, in part, on membership in organizations listed by the attorney general as being subversive. The FBI furnished Clark with his list of subversive organizations, which Hoover had been secretly organizing since before former Attorney General Francis Biddle ordered its discontinuance in 1943. This list was first unveiled in October 1947 and included, in part, civil rights, civil liberties, pacifist, anti-fascist, student, academic, international relations, consumer, press, film, juridical, labor, international publishing, anti-lynching, and religious organizations. Even the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) was briefly considered for inclusion but was ultimately cleared. This list implicated the core supporters of the New Deal with subversion. Historians debate whether or not Truman was briefed on the DOJ’s or the FBI’s emergency planning. Clark was obviously outmaneuvered by Hoover’s use of Americanism to undermine the
president. Truman would later tell Merle Miller that Clark was his “biggest mistake.” Truman elaborated that Clark was not a “bad man” but was “a dumb son of a bitch.” His empowerment of Hoover and failure to protect the president from Hoover’s insubordination informed Truman’s reflection that Clark “was no damn good as Attorney General.” The president, consequently, was rendered institutionally vulnerable by the failure of the DOJ to control the FBI.

*The Federal Employee Loyalty Program and Congress*

Hoover ultimately prevailed at institutionalizing his vision of internal security. Truman reluctantly signed Executive Order 9835 on March 21, 1947, and established the Federal Employee Loyalty Program (FELP). This program was established just nine days after the Truman Doctrine address was delivered and five days before Hoover spoke to HUAC. Truman advised the Loyalty Review Board to limit the role of the FBI in an attempt to prevent witch-hunting. The FBI, however, engaged in an unfriendly competition with the Civil Service Commission over jurisdiction for loyalty investigations. George Elsey, Assistant to Clark Clifford, the Special Counsel to the President, noted in May 1947 that Truman felt “very strongly anti-FBI and side[d] positively” with the Civil Service Commissioners. He added that Truman wanted to “be sure to hold” the “F.B.I. down” because he was “afraid” of building-up a “‘Gestapo.’” Truman confirmed this view and acknowledged that he feared the Americanist excesses of anti-communism. Clifford wrote weeks later to the president that Gus Vanech was making “mountains out of molehills” in his successful attempt to make the FBI “fully responsible for all investigations in every case in which there [was] a suspicion of disloyalty in an applicant for Federal employment.” Truman
wrote in the margin of this memo that “J. Edgar will in all probability get this backward looking Congress to give him what he wants. It’s dangerous.”\textsuperscript{98} The president was correct. Hoover’s allies in Congress reversed Truman’s planning. According to the Church Committee’s 1976 report on Hoover’s strategizing, the “administration’s budget request of $16 million for Civil Service and $8.7 million for the FBI to conduct loyalty investigations was revised in Congress to allocate $7.4 million to the FBI and only $3 million to the Civil Service Commission.”\textsuperscript{99} This funding was used to practically double the FBI from 3,559 agents in 1946 to 7,029 agents by 1952.\textsuperscript{100}

The FBI was prone to abusing secret Americanist connections with Congress. Though FELP was established in response to well founded concerns that the Soviet Union was using the CPUSA to recruit espionage agents, the Church Committee suggests that it soon stretched beyond this threat to include more “speculative preventative intelligence objectives.” Hoover ultimately co-opted the program and used it to insulate and expunge the federal government of New Dealers and their idealism. Because Soviet intelligence abandoned the recruitment processes that sparked the employee loyalty program shortly thereafter, it became “almost entirely a means for monitoring the political background of prospective federal employees.”\textsuperscript{101} Hoover, therefore, coupled strategies of propaganda with threats of coercion to shade perceptions of the communist threat and to neutralize his opposition’s ability to rebut his assertions.

The Truman administration’s inability to prevent the FBI from passing restricted information to Congress was an issue of major concern to both the White
House and the attorney general. Assistant Press Secretary Eben A. Ayers observed in an August 1948 diary entry that Truman “refused” as a “matter of principle” to “give the Congress or legislative branch, confidential material from the executive departments.” He noted in the same entry that the “President” did not trust Hoover’s loyalty. Specifically, he recorded that the “President said that the trouble” with “Hoover” was that he was “concerned with his own future.” Truman suggested that the “election in November” made it impossible to trust him not to reveal “secret and confidential information in the executive department files.”

The previous month, Clark sent a memorandum to Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd threatening to fire any member of the FBI caught furnishing the legislative branch with restricted information. O’Reilly quotes the attorney general as saying “‘Any S.O.B. that gives Congressman (Karl) Mundt (R-SD) any information gets his ass kicked out of this building. . . I want you to get the word around that anyone giving information to the Committee is out—O-U-T.’”

Syndicated columnist Drew Pearson revealed the FBI/DOJ rift in January 1949 on his radio program. According to an FBI memo, Pearson told his listeners that there was to be a “showdown between the Attorney General and the FBI” because its employees were acting insubordinately. Assistant Director Louis B. Nichols relayed that Pearson’s suggestion that the “Bureau” had “violated regulations” had “something to do” with the FBI’s “relations with the Un-American Activities Committee and went back before the election.” Nichols advised Tolson that the Bureau should treat the “leak of information from the Department to Drew Pearson” delicately because the FBI might otherwise play into the “Department’s hands.”
Hoover’s alliance with Americanists in Congress represented an unauthorized transfer of power from the executive to the legislative branch.

The Red Fascism analogy was instrumental in curbing the New Deal. Ray Though hyperbolic, Tucker was somewhat correct when he charged Hoover with killing Roosevelt’s signature domestic program.107 Hoover played a leading role in creating a rhetorical context in which the Wallace speech seemed to ignore international realities and the Truman Doctrine address could, against the president’s own wishes, evidence subversive activities within the New Deal and the Fair Deal. Truman’s adoption of Nazi-Soviet analogies reinforced the presumed reality of Red Fascism, which Hoover tempered with the Fifth Column and its ancillary metaphors. The director successfully co-opted the rhetorical presidency by pushing his own Americanist agenda on Truman, undermining Truman's foreign policy vision. FBI propaganda helped Americanists to more easily slow the growth of idealistic domestic programming.

**Mimicking the Rhetorical Presidency**

The Cold War context provided Hoover with the grounds for adopting Americanist standards in determining issues of loyalty. The fundamentalist-modernist culture war manifested itself in the same conspiratorial paranoia that marked the first Red Scare and its tumultuous aftermath. The director combined masquerade, phalanx, spotlight, exposure, contagion, and quarantine metaphors in a militarized cluster to imagine secret, large, and numerous movements of American citizens working in combination with the Soviet military. The director’s propaganda program challenged
the president’s rhetorical power. It played a leading role in gaining public support for expanding the FBI according to antiquated cultural norms and was assisted by the president’s own confidants in implementing such ends. Hoover, in many ways, built his own bully pulpit to mimic the rhetorical presidency—using it to rival Truman and the presidency more generally. Hoover was emboldened by the fact that FDR allowed him to assume such political power—a move that ultimately undercut his successor. Truman rhetorically stumbled when he concurred with a reporter who characterized allegations against Alger Hiss as a “‘red herring,’” which was used as a means “to divert public attention from inflation” in August 1948. His statement created a rhetorical opportunity. By proving that Hiss was, in fact, guilty, Americanists simultaneously legitimized themselves while also discrediting organized labor, liberal anti-communism, idealism, and the Truman administration. This rhetorical victory occurred through use of the Red Fascism analogy and its ancillary metaphors. Therefore, when Hiss was found guilty on two perjury counts in January 1950, a rhetorical coup was implemented against the president by Americanists serving in the FBI, the American Legion, and Congress. This maneuver was an ideational overthrow that instructed the nation to fear and reject liberal approaches to U.S. foreign and domestic policies generally.

The rhetorical presidency was co-opted by an insubordinate member of the administration who helped manufacture public opinion to further and continuously expand his own power. The FBI’s mission was to purge the government of those with political views contrary to the director’s own political positions—people who would also seek to undermine his power. Hoover helped shape the new political landscape
by undermining liberal ideas and promoting Americanism in their place. The director helped to maintain the militarized status of U.S. political culture and further militarized the FBI by experimenting with thought control on a more massive scale. Hoover’s mimicking of totalitarian police state tactics was attacked by New Dealers, but they too were rendered powerless against Hoover's propaganda strategies that were strengthened by threats of coercion.

Americanists perceived currents of social reform, especially secularism, to be evidence of a communist takeover. Idealism was framed as a Soviet plot to weaken America’s internal defenses, as both Hoover and George Kennan had warned. Individualism, instead, was celebrated for allegedly being the paramount American value. FBI Loyalty Program investigations and congressional loyalty review boards presumed that perspectives promoting cooperation were subversive; they also provided a pretext for disseminating compromising information about prominent liberals.

Hoover’s image of communism was carefully crafted by the Crime Records Division to undermine organized labor and liberal Christianity. In February 1946—just days after Kennan sent his telegram—the FBI Executives Conference suggested that “‘educational material’” should be “‘released through available channels’” to develop an “‘informed public opinion’” about the “‘basically Russian nature of the Communist Party in this country.’” Learning from Attorney General Palmer’s experience during the previous Red Scare, the goal of this program was to circumvent a “‘flood of propaganda from Leftists and so-called Liberal sources’” in the “‘event of extensive arrests of Communists.’” Specifically, the FBI sought to establish that
the Party was “the most reactionary, intolerant and bigoted force in existence.” This message was supposed to undermine the support of communism “from ‘Liberal’ sources and from its connections in labor unions” as well as from “persons prominent in religious circles.”  

The Executives Conference’s plan was initially implemented on an informal basis, but was formalized and expanded upon during the 1950s. For example, Hoover established the Responsibilities Program in February 1951, Athan G. Theoharis explains, which secretly “coordinated with state governors,” civic officials, “members of police departments,” prominent Republicans, and at least twelve different congressional committees. The historian observes that trusted surrogates covertly circulated information from FBI reports about alleged “subversives employed in state agencies, in public or private colleges, or as elementary or high school teachers.”

According to a memorandum written by Associate Director Tolson in October 1949, the FBI’s “dissemination” program spread “derogatory information” about its political and cultural opposition that was not “confirmed or verified.” This material was largely collected through the American Legion Contact Program (ALCP).

The Bureau attempted to use this propaganda strategizing to take control of the nation’s thinking about communism. Hoover also used it to enhance the FBI’s stature. In an April 1951 letter, Tolson seemed excited, for example, that members of local governments could then safely “remove public school teachers based on information furnished by the FBI” without having to fear that such a purge “could be twisted by the Communist Party and its sympathizers into an endeavor by the FBI to control the thinking in the education field.” His confidence stemmed from the fact
that the “public” was then “educated to the dangers of Communism and that public opinion” would then “back up the dissemination of such information by the FBI.”

Hoover’s public opinion management strategizing was intricately coordinated with his national security programming. Fears of communist Fifth Columns helped Hoover to institutionally militarize the FBI and to undermine unions. According to FBI memoranda, Hoover reinstated the “Plant Informant Program” (1940-1945; 1950-1966) because of a 1949 “Delimitation Agreement” with the “intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.” This compromise required the FBI to warn these agencies of threats to “vital facilities, vital utilities and critical points of communication and transportation.” The FBI needed to expand its pool of confidential informants to properly manage this mission as well as the Loyalty Program. The ALCP was an auxiliary plan to the Plant Informant Program, and was used in wartime for populating the FBI’s informant pool. This program was also central to shading Roosevelt’s views against his anti-interventionist critics. Hoover suspended the Plant Informant and the Legion programs together in 1945, while instructing his agents to “retain the continued support” of the “American Legion” by maintaining their already activated contacts. Once the ALCP was reinstated in July 1950, the director pressured his agents to always be expanding their Legion contacts because, as he reminded, the “American Legion” had “almost three million members” with “varied nationality backgrounds” who were “employed in practically every type of industrial, communications, transportation, and utilities facilities.” Ladd observed that the Legion was uniquely qualified to dominate the informant pool because it was a “very militant organization and quite security conscious” in its
mission to “combat Communism and subversive activities.” Theoharis suggests that that the FBI valued the American Legion’s support immensely because of an “ideological affinity between Legion officers and FBI officials” that was marked by “extremely conservative political views.” The FBI also used other organizations to populate its informant pool as well, but to a remarkably lesser extent.

Americanists in the American Legion and the FBI rallied to undermine organized labor. In August 1950, Hoover directed that “members of the Legion” should be “selected” as confidential informants for their “employment in important national defense facilities.” The FBI coordinated this operation through the Legion’s Americanism Commission. The Legion had already been condemning the “slave system” of “Soviet dictatorship.” The commission blamed communism for American “labor trouble” and charged that the CPUSA was an “agency of Moscow.” It warned that “Russia” would “eventually attack the United States” and advocated building-up a strong “national defense program.” The commission also launched an information campaign in April 1948, according to Roscoe Baker, to “bolster faith in American ideals and institutions against the inroads of Communism.” The American Legion’s program combined the fears of Americanists and liberal anti-communists by making labor disruptions appear to be the result of Soviet Fifth Column strategizing. The platform directed both groups to support Americanism in national security planning.

Hoover’s program helped him poison the well of strategic information with Americanism, and thereby drew a wedge between the FBI and the Truman administration and its commitment to liberal anti-communism. Legionnaires were
especially helpful as confidential informants, suggests Theoharis, because they reliably supported a “particular conservative ideology” and supplied Hoover with “political espionage” to undermine what Hoover called the “‘kicking’” of “‘labor organizations.’” The plan was kept secret from the Office of the Attorney General (OAG), the president, and Congress, which contributed to the “permanent growth of the role and independence of the FBI,” observes Theoharis.127 The Bureau’s files swelled with what executives termed “considerable derogatory information” that was “not the subject of verification” and could never be confirmed.128 Theoharis explains that the material had little value for law enforcement or national security because the informers failed to discover any “information that could legitimately be described as national security intelligence or involving statutory violations.” Nonetheless, this material was secretly furnished to a variety of Americanists in Congress, especially those serving in HUAC and the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security (SIS) as well as to Joseph R. McCarthy (R-WI).129 The ALCP, thus, ensured that the FBI could continually furnish congressional channels with confidential information that reliably supported Americanism.

The FBI strategically circulated unconfirmed and derogatory information to Americanists serving in local government offices. Assistant Director Allan H. Belmont successfully argued in February 1951 that the FBI had a “responsibility” to share its files with those “responsible” for protecting vital “facilities.” He noted that the FBI’s “responsibility” was to “the people” which could allegedly best be served by confidentially furnishing information to the “state or local government or police department representing them.” Belmont recommended that field offices should
carefully select the “channel utilized” to ensure that only FBI-friendly and discreet members of local governments received the derogatory information.\textsuperscript{130} Hoover then proclaimed to his field agents that “information should be furnished to responsible local authorities” regarding “subversive activities in public utilities.”\textsuperscript{131} Such targeting lent Hoover justification for monitoring members of organized labor.

Beyond the industrial sectors, the FBI also focused its circulation of material against educators. The FBI Executives Conference observed in April 1950 that the “educational field” was “considered a prime target by the Communist Party” because it reached the “youth of our nation.” It warned that the “daily contact of teachers with pupils form[ed] close association and enable[d] the teachers to effectively control the thinking of the pupils and thus insidiously instill into the minds of children the Communist Party line.” Therefore, the FBI allegedly had a “responsibility to advise local officials of the identities of Communists in the schools.” The conference, however, also encouraged restraint because the “educational field” was one of the “most controversial and independent fields in existence.” It warned that “any attempt to remove public school teachers based on information furnished by the FBI” could serve as evidence that the FBI sought to “control the thinking in the educational field.” The Executives Conference ultimately encouraged Hoover to make a “calculated risk” by minimizing potential “flare-backs” through “careful selection of the responsible officials to whom this information would be given on a confidential basis.”\textsuperscript{132}

The FBI established an additional safeguard to protect its planning. Belmont successfully proposed in June 1950 that agents first request “Bureau authority . . .
before contacting any employee, professor, or student of a university with a view to developing him as an informant.” Furthermore, he insisted that “[c]ontacts with these individuals who [were] located on the actual campuses of colleges or universities should be held to an absolute minimum.”  

By then, Hoover had already ordered his agents to “furnish information concerning teachers and employees of public schools to the proper authorities” as well as to “consider furnishing information to State Governors concerning subversive individuals” who were “connected with state-operated colleges and universities.” Ellen Schrecker observes that “over a hundred college teachers lost their jobs and were barred from new ones” because of this programming. The FBI, thus, secretly established liaisons in local government offices through which it disseminated unverified, derogatory, and confidential information about organized labor, public employees, and academics. This program was an invisible and coercive extension of the Loyalty Program and its mission to contain communism domestically.

Accusations circulated in the press that Hoover had co-opted the Loyalty Program to advance an Americanist agenda. Former Interior Secretary Harold Ickes adroitly observed in the July 1949 issue of the *New Republic*, for example, that Hoover’s definition of “improprieties” had “not been regarded as such since the Victorian age” (1837-1901). Identifying the FBI director with nineteenth-century norms set him squarely at odds with the New Deal and the Fair Deal. The *New Republic* charged in December 1947, for example, that Hoover was a “politically and ideologically unsophisticated cop” who sought to enforce his vision of “Americanism” through collecting “anti-labor, anti-Roosevelt, anti-Russian pap”
from wealthy and conservative citizens. His Cold War propaganda strategizing and manipulation of the rhetorical presidency had helped move the nation to fear and reject liberal philosophies. The *New Republic* observed in May 1948, for example, that Hoover’s belief that “all liberals [were] radicals, that all radicals [were] Communists, that all Communists [were] bomb throwers and should be deported or jailed—ha[d] taken root.” Accordingly, the news magazine suggested that the domestic implications of the Truman Doctrine had come to mean the rejection of all that was not “orthodox and generally accepted.” The writer warned that this “subtle change in thought” was taking “place throughout the country.” This issue of neo-orthodoxy was at the core of his plans to create an anti-communist consensus. The *Yale Law Journal* charged in December 1948, for example, that the “readiness by the chief of the FBI to identify (what [was] to him) unorthodox views with Communist views” revealed the “atmosphere” in which the FBI operated. Former Federal Communications Commissioner (1941-1948) and National Lawyers Guild (NLG) President Clifford R. Durr (1949-1950) described this worldview in the *Chicago Law Review* as one that tended to “force all political, economic, and social thinking into orthodox patterns” by creating an “atmosphere hostile to reason, an atmosphere in which” the nation could be “dangerously misled into rejecting information of vital importance solely because it appears to conflict with accepted beliefs of what is so.” The FBI’s critics, thus, charged that the Soviet threat was being used as an excuse to move American public opinion toward the values of Christian fundamentalism.
The Loyalty Program even raised concerns among some liberals that the FBI was moving into the realm of thought control by policing ideas. Eleanor Roosevelt wrote in a March 1947 issue of the *Washington Daily News*, for example, that she feared that the Loyalty Program made it “possible to declare” any group “subversive” that opposed the “thinking of certain powerful groups.”¹⁴¹ The FBI was accused of being too prone to adopting the methods of the Axis powers and of undermining the nation’s political traditions. Syndicated columnist Marquis Childs speculated in a November 1947 issue of the *Washington Post*, for example, that the program could “destroy” America’s “heritage of free thought,” and that the FBI’s attempt to do so signified that it was becoming a “‘thought police’” in the tradition of “Japanese war lords.”¹⁴² Observers were quick to identify Hoover’s own Americanist worldview as the standard by which all others were being judged. The director of the Jefferson School of Sciences warned in December 1947, for example, that the DOJ was becoming a “‘thought police’” that “‘labeled’” all “‘ideological heresies’” that challenged the “‘beliefs of J. Edgar Hoover’” as “‘subversive.’”¹⁴³ The FBI’s critics warned their audiences that democracy could not be preserved by undemocratic methods. Durr sarcastically observed in a January 1948 speech to the American Political Science Association (APSA), for example, that the administration was attempting to “‘to safeguard our liberties by giving our secret police the power of surveillance over the speech, writings, affiliations, and even the social life of our citizens.’”¹⁴⁴ The FBI’s critics rightfully informed their audiences that the practice of thought policing was spreading beyond the Loyalty Program to include all quarters of public life shortly after the Responsibilities Program was inaugurated in February
Prominent civil liberties activist Alan Barth warned the American Association of University Professors the following month, for example, that Hoover’s “inquisition” had “permeated our schools and our institutions of higher learning” as well as “State governments” and “professional associations and even into private industry” as a form of “thought control” that was predicated on “political belief and affiliation.” Hoover’s critics, therefore, recognized his association of idealism with the communist penetration of U.S. institutions to promote a realist approach to U.S. foreign policy.

Prominent liberals objected to the FBI’s Cold War era strategizing on religious grounds. A group of Episcopal bishops proclaimed in November 1947, for example, that the Loyalty Program encouraged an “offense against God’s commandment, ‘Thou shall not bear false witness against thy neighbor’” by offering immunity to confidential informants. Liberal Christians especially found the use of confidential informants to be a violation of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Durr observed in his January 1948 speech to APSA that the Loyalty Program celebrated “informers, stool pigeons, and gossips, a class which since the days of Leviticus we have been taught to regard with suspicion and scorn.” He further observed in the winter of 1949 issue of the Chicago Law Review that the program defied “basic religious teachings by giving protection and power to a group against which we are repeatedly warned in both the Old and New Testaments.” This occurred, he suggested, through the FBI’s insistence that it had the privilege to deny the due process of law by concealing the identities of its informants. Liberal resistance to Hoover’s accumulation of gossip and hearsay was further emboldened in June 1949
when a federal judge ordered the FBI to enter various confidential files into the court record which revealed its extensive and illegal reliance upon wiretapping. This, too, was opposed on religious grounds by New Dealers. Former Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission James L. Fly (1939-1944) wrote in the February 1950 issue of the New Republic, for example, that FBI wire-tappers violated “every sacred relation established by God and protected by law: husband and wife; parent and child; minister and parishioner; doctor and patient; lawyer and client.”

The liberal Christian foundation for civil liberties challenged Hoover’s crusade. He would publicly target such voices to censor them to mold American religion according to his planning.

Some socialists and liberals identified Hoover as a fascist and called his anti-communism a repressive campaign against liberalism and organized labor. For example, the Morning Freiheit—a New York daily Marxist newspaper—compared the “red-baiting activities” of Hoover to those of Joseph “Goebbels” in January 1947. It observed that the director and “Hitler” both waged an “incitement campaign” against liberals, and in so doing, formed alliances with “reactionaries” and “monopolists” to undermine organized labor. The national security state was described as a subtle form of totalitarianism and Hoover was cast as its leading tyrant.

The New Republic printed in December 1947 that although America’s resemblance to “Nazi Germany” as a “police state” was negligible, it did allow this “super-cop” to “seriously harm almost anyone” irrespective of due process. Hoover’s critics complained that the Loyalty Program had become a source of coercive power that gave the director broad control over the executive branch more generally. Durr wrote
in the *Chicago Law Review*, for instance, that the program disempowered agency heads in selecting their personnel and gave the FBI a “dictatorial power over government employment policies.”

Hoover’s vision of Americanism was identified as a brand of fascism. Henry Steele Commager observed in the September 1947 issue of *Harper’s Magazine*, for example, that a new “definition of Americanism” was being advanced that insisted upon “conformity” and “acceptance” of America’s traditional hierarchies.

Durr complimented Alan Barth in the March 1951 issue of the *New Republic* for recently coining the term “‘Americanists’” to describe this new ideological menace. Hoover’s Americanism, therefore, had successfully constituted Cold War political and social realities by 1951. This new world order was structured around a key constellation of militant metaphors.

The director responded to his vast array of critics with a variety of metaphors, including the masquerade trope. Mira Morgenstern observes that “masquerade” serves metaphorically to represent “intrigue” through the act of “pretending to be what one is not . . . culminating in disguise.” Hoover used the metaphor to punctuate a dissociation between reality and appearance by accusing the advocates of political liberalism and liberal Christianity with subversive strategizing. Hoover wrote in the May 1950 issue of the *Educational Forum*, for example, that the “Communist masquerader” deceitfully promoted “the victory of reason over prejudice, the supremacy of free thought, the freeing of the individual from restraints of the state.” According to Hoover, liberal perspectives were actually communism in disguise. The communists allegedly compounded this deceit by “masquerading” behind the values of “‘truth,’ ‘justice’ and ‘mercy’” to confuse the “historical principles of liberalism”
with “Marxist-Leninist philosophy.” Whereas the first two concepts belonged to the civic realm, all three were encouraged by Jesus in his Sermon on the Mount. Therefore, according to Hoover, communists disingenuously presented values that were appealing to political liberals and liberal Christians to secretly promote communist dogma.

Hoover claimed that educators mistook the nature of the communist threat and failed to grasp its significance. He further lamented in the *Educational Forum*, for example, that “befuddled intellectuals” asserted that “Communism” was “not a danger” by arguing that it “really [did] not exist” or by claiming that it was an “abstract economic and philosophical theory.” Belittling the intellectual community, he suggested that this signified an “intellectual blindness” in “contemporary American thought.” Hoover constructed communism in terms of its totalitarian tactics, which resembled many of the developing themes of his own organization. For example, he wrote that the “Communists,” in practice, were attempting to “create a totalitarian man, a man whose fawning servility would be matched only by his intellectual imbecility,” which threatened the “very existence of democratic education.” This counterargument deflected charges of thought control by resorting to the same allegation against the FBI’s critics. The masquerade metaphor helped Hoover to countercharge New Dealers with accusations of communist thought control and intellectual dishonesty, which balanced their own criticisms of the FBI. Additionally, the metaphor provided grounds for discrediting the liberal value of free inquiry, and the more liberal perspectives that it generated, as a ploy to advance subversive ideas. Such tactics earned the director a more militant identity.
Hoover’s critics accused him of forming a militarized and secret police force, just as they had complained of him doing during the war. The *Yale Law Journal* described Hoover’s loyalty procedures in December 1948 as a “militant investigation” that qualified the “collection of gossip, rumor, and data on private affairs” as “tangible results.” It warned that the FBI was operating on a “completely independent basis” that acknowledged “little or no responsibility to anyone outside of its own organization.” This “secret police” force, it argued, would inevitably adopt “militant police methods” and become a “grave and ruthless menace to democratic processes.” The journal acknowledged that Hoover’s operation was “moving dangerously in this direction.” Indeed, the FBI did work secretly to undermine the oversight of its operation. For example, one FBI official insisted in an October 1949 memo to field agents that “no mention must be made in any investigative report relating to the classifications of top functionaries or key figures, nor the Detcom or Comsab Programs, nor the Security Index or the Communist Index.” These “investigative procedures and administrative aids” were considered “confidential” and were “not to be known to any outside agency.” While the attorney general was familiar with the Security Index and relied upon it for the Loyalty Program, he was kept in the dark about a program for prioritizing the detentions of high-value targets in the event of war (Detcom), a program that targeted Americans who were considered potential saboteurs (Comsab), and a program to detain Americans for whom the FBI did not have, in its own words, “sufficient disloyal information” (Communist Index). All of these suspects were added to the Security Index and thus considered disloyal by the attorney general. Therefore, reports that Hoover enjoyed
operational independence—and that he used such latitude to further militarize domestic policing in peacetime—were well founded.

Hoover used militant metaphors to identify how the labor and religious communities should comport themselves toward public life. John P. Crank observes that gun metaphors are infused in “police mythology” and that they “evoke a heroic cop image, a lone actor on the metaphorical street, protecting citizens and stopping bad guys.”

Hoover used such imagery to encourage labor to identify itself as being a militant defender of America’s heritage. He wrote in the September 1951 issue of the *American Federationalist*, for example, that it was the “job” of every “labor union member” to “keep the fortress well guarded” by focusing their “gunsights” on communists and, thereby, defending the “traditions of our forefathers.”

Hoover combined offensive and defensive tactics. Intellectual homogeneity through militant drilling was his endgame. Rebecca Ard Boone explains that the phalanx metaphor conveys a sense of collectivity in which risk is equally shared, thus inspiring meanings of “social cohesion.”

Hoover relied on this metaphor to encourage the religious community to expel and discredit less orthodox perspectives and ultimately establish a more Americanist society. He told the Methodist ministers in November 1947, for example, that clergy members and national security planners should begin “tightening up the ranks” so they could “present a solid phalanx through which secularism [could] not penetrate.”

Hoover thus militarized the very locations in which the FBI feared liberal obstructionism, turning some of its weaknesses into strengths.
Hoover constructed the FBI as a militarized policing organization and encouraged the militarization of public life in peacetime. He used the conflation of communism and Nazism with liberalism to suggest that all three were militant threats, and used this vision as a blueprint for remodeling American religious, civic, and political life. He constructed communism as an armed and militant revolutionary movement inside the United States. Hoover told HUAC in March 1947, for example, that American communists were “planning” a “revolution” in which they would receive “[m]ilitary aid and assistance” as well as “[p]lenty of guns and ammunition.” They would use these resources, he suggested, to exterminate the “police” and to seize control of communication and transportation channels.167 This notion of foreign military coordination comprised the core fear of Fifth Column strategizing. When fascist general Emilio Mola prepared for his invasion of Madrid in October 1936, the New York Times paraphrased him as saying in a radio broadcast that he “was counting on four columns of troops outside Madrid and another column of persons hiding within the city who would join the invaders as soon as they entered the capital.”168 The Times then reported that “[s]everal hundred thousand adults in Madrid” who voted for the “Right in the last election” represented the “potential . . . ‘fifth column’” threat.169 Hoover used this fear of internal political dissidents coordinating with external military forces to justify militant Americanism.

Focusing on the relationship between secularism and liberalism, the director proclaimed that liberalism was an anti-religious and dangerous ideology that required a militant response. He told the Methodist ministers in November 1947, for example, that the “secularists” had become “militant” and that the “ministers of this nation”
also needed to be “organized and militant” to stand against such “forces which threaten the security of America.”\textsuperscript{170} Hoover encouraged the religious community to launch a militant and evangelical crusade against liberals. He wrote in the February 1949 issue of \textit{Redbook}, for example, that just as the “zeal of early Christians stamped out paganism in Rome,” the “churches of America” then needed to “recapture the militant spirit of Paul” to “convert godless Communism.”\textsuperscript{171} Hoover discredited labor by claiming that militant communists remained in organized labor after it claimed to have purged communists from its ranks in 1949-1950. Hoover wrote in the September 1951 issue of the \textit{American Federationalist}, for example, that the “strength” of communism was its “militant” nature and that people who suffered from “little faith, lack of knowledge or evil intentions” advanced a “philosophy” of “‘[l]ive and let live’” to assist the “Communist gauleiter.” The gauleiter was a Nazi political operative; Hoover’s statement, thus, further reinforced the Red Fascism analogy by presenting industrial agitation as militant and radical.\textsuperscript{172} Hoover did so with the use of the spotlight, exposure, contagion, and quarantine metaphors.

Hoover used the spotlight metaphor to incite fear of people and organizations that disagreed with his worldview. Dorian Wiszniewski and Richard Coyne observe that the spotlight metaphor “operates through the relationship between the background field of darkness and the roving concentration of illumination.”\textsuperscript{173} It suggests that a preexistent truth awaits revelation by the movement of attention to the object of interest. Hoover reinforced his rhetorical continuity with the wartime era with this metaphor. For example, he first told the IACP in August 1943 that the “spotlight of public attention” should focus upon “subversive groups—those termites
of discontent and discord, always alert to seize upon racial differences, economic stresses and political difficulties to advance their selfish and vile purposes.”

Extending the spotlight metaphor into the post-war era helped him to encourage the containment tactics that he introduced during the war. For example, Hoover wrote in the December 1946 issue of *Washington News Digest* that “[a]ll” those who stood for the “American way of life” must focus the “spotlight of public opinion” upon “Red Fascism in America” to build up “barriers” through which it could not “penetrate.”

He also used the metaphor to charge liberal organizations with subversion. Hoover told HUAC in March 1947, for example, that the “spotlight of truth” would leave the “deceit, the trickery, and the lies of the American Communists . . . exposed” for public scrutiny. The metaphor suggested that all groups that did not support his vision of Americanism were disloyal. He told the committee, for example, that it should begin “spotlighting existing front organizations” that supported the “cause of Soviet Russia” rather than the “cause of Americanism.” The metaphor aligned liberal anti-communism with loyalty and political idealism with disloyalty.

Hoover directed HUAC to focus its “spotlight” on any “organization” that espoused “liberal progressive causes” while denouncing “well-known honest patriotic liberals,” especially if the organization did not “have a consistent record of supporting the American viewpoint over the years.”

The metaphor, thus, aligned his worldview with truth and its challengers with deceit, and thereby encouraged the censuring of more idealist groups and his critics. Accordingly, HUAC incorrectly identified Durr’s National Lawyers Guild as an official Soviet organ in September 1950.
Communist hunting in domestic spaces was encouraged through a rhetoric of exposure. Hoover used the metaphor as an entailment of the spotlight metaphor. That which was identified by a spotlight was then also exposed for public scrutiny. Hoover used the metaphor to suggest that alleged American traitors harbored secrets against the nation’s safety that required public examination. This allegation was used to justify the Loyalty Program’s investigation into the ideas of federal employees, as well as the investigations launched by HUAC, McCarthy, and a host of other Americanists in Congress.

Hoover used the exposure metaphor to re-imagine the relationship between the citizen and the state in mainstream anti-communist political culture. The metaphor relied upon an appearance-reality dissociation to invent divisions between liberal anti-communism and idealism. Hoover wrote in the June 1947 issue of Newsweek, for example, that the “first step in the fight to preserve the American way of life [was] the exposure of the true aims of Communism and then a contrast of them with our American way of life.” The exposure metaphor’s dissociation between real and unreal forms of liberalism encouraged conflict between liberal anti-communists and idealists. Hoover told HUAC in March 1947, for example, that the “sincere liberal” was “anxious” to “drive out of the ranks . . . . Communists who ha[d] infiltrated” “liberal organizations.” This even cast suspicions on liberal anti-communists who supported social justice efforts like Reinhold Niebuhr. The metaphor’s dualism asserted that Americanists had the authority to appraise the legitimacy of their cultural opposition. Hoover further observed in Newsweek three months later, for example, that the “committee fulfils its obligation of public disclosure of facts”
through the “exposure of Un-American forces” and was thus “worthy of the support of loyal, patriotic Americans.” The metaphor helped Hoover to perpetuate his institutional arrangements with the American Legion into peacetime. The director launched the FBI’s Red Fascism campaign following the speeches from Byrnes and Wallace in September 1946. He then proposed to the Legion that it should continue to work in conjunction with the FBI to achieve the “exposure and denunciation of every force which weakens America.” The metaphor suggested that communist witch-hunting was a democratically legitimate activity. He proclaimed to the Roosevelt Memorial Association in October 1949, for example, that “[w]e must meet and expose Communism for what it actually is on all levels, educational, political, economic, social, religious and when necessary in the field of law enforcement,” which would allegedly “make our democracy more effective.” The exposure metaphor, thus, implied that the ideological differences among liberals proved that some liberal ideology was illegitimate. Once suspects were exposed, they then needed to be contained.

Hoover returned to his longtime use of the contagion metaphor and its entailments to advance the containment strategies of political realism. Such rhetorical continuity suggested that as America’s security threats continued to grow, so too did the nation’s need to expand the FBI. Paul A. Chilton observes that if “communism is viewed as a cancer or some other disease, it follows metaphorically that its spread needs to be ‘contained.’” The director constructed communism as a contagion that sought to contaminate the body politic. He wrote in the November 1950 issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association, for example, that “germs of an alien
ideology” called “Communism” were “attempting to infect the blood stream of American life.” The contagion metaphor insisted upon the need for detection. He wrote that the “physicians of America” should render their services in this “ideological fight” because “[m]edical science” was “interested” in “detection of specific symptoms and the prescribing of cures which will eliminate the cause of the malady.” Hoover relied on the contagion metaphor to justify hardboiled Americanist containment strategizing. His discourse, again, mimicked both Hitler and Lenin and their emphasis on strength by purity. He wrote, for example, that it was then “America’s task” to “kill these Communist germs and to increase the strength and vigor of American resistance.” The communist threat of un-Americanism, thus, was supposed to be met with the American solution of deadly force.

Hoover rolled over his use of the quarantine metaphor from the wartime era to remind his audiences how such power could be applied. Halford Ryan observes that “‘quarantine’ denotes action toward isolating a sick person for the community’s benefit.” Hoover relied upon the metaphor to encourage vigilantism. He wrote in the June 1947 issue of Newsweek, for example, that once the nation worked to “[u]ncover” and “expose” communist “activities,” the “American people will do the rest—quarantine them from effectively weakening our country.” These Americans were a part of a secret and nationwide Americanist movement that operated through the nation’s civic institutions to remove liberals from public employment and thereby end the New Deal. Indeed, it looked very much like the Fifth Column threat that was supposedly attacking the nation. Hoover told HUAC in March 1947 that “once communists [were] identified and exposed,” the “public” would “take the first step of
quarantining them so they [could] do no harm.” This was allegedly necessary, according to Hoover, because “Communism” was “akin to disease that spreads like an epidemic and like an epidemic a quarantine [was] necessary to keep it from infecting the Nation.” The contagion metaphor thus suggested that communism was communicable like a disease, and that its adherents, therefore, deserved to be publicly scrutinized, shamed, and discredited. Preferred members of the citizenry could then prevent the further spread of the alleged infection.

Hoover’s ideological containment strategizing elevated the value of individualism in American political and religious culture. He traced the paramount importance of individualism to the founding moment of the nation. The director wrote in the November 1952 issue of The Rotarian, for example, that the “builders of the American republic had indomitable faith” and “believed in the individual.” Accordingly, Hoover suggested, “they projected a concept of government based upon individual responsibility” in the “Constitution.” Additionally, he used such rhetoric to trace the value of individualism to the founding moment of Christianity. Hoover encouraged his readers to “not minimize spiritual values,” but to recognize that the “Founding Fathers” laid the nation’s “foundation in a philosophy set forth almost 2,000 years ago” that “granted the individual a dignity never before accorded to mankind.” Hoover used notions of individualism to set liberty against communism. He wrote in the September 1951 issue of the American Federationalist, for example, that “[e]very patriotic American” who was “dedicated to the advancement of liberty, justice and the happiness of the individual, must fight” against “Communism.” The nature of this fight was illustrated through his militant selection of metaphors.
Hoover’s rhetorical commitment to individualism, therefore, elevated Americanism over idealism, political liberalism, and liberal Christianity.

The anti-communist political discourses of exposure and containment helped to further substitute realism for idealism. O’Reilly observes that by 1950 a movement of prominent “Cold War liberals” that included Schlesinger, Niebuhr, and the leadership of the American Civil Liberties Union, the NAACP, and the CIO, among others, had “rejected” the “traditional tenets” of idealism, especially its “belief in progress, popular democracy, and man’s inherent goodness and perfectibility.” Instead, they then accepted a more Christian fundamentalist “creed that stressed man’s corruptibility, the inevitability of conflict among nations, and the dangers of democratic rule.” The historian notes that liberal, social justice, and idealist values eroded, in part, because many liberals believed that Hoover was aligned with the “responsible anticommunism of the Truman administration.” These liberals rejected Americanism in Congress. They, however, mistakenly supported Americanism in the FBI as they presumed that Hoover was loyal to Truman. In so doing, many liberal anti-communists failed to recognize that they were ultimately supporting McCarthyism and the Red Scare.

The damage done to liberal values was evident in Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s response to Alger Hiss’s five-year prison sentence for perjury. The New York Times reported that Acheson pledged to continue his unflinching support of Hiss at a January 1950 press conference. The secretary of state was then being “criticized by various members of Congress for his past associations and comments about Hiss.” Acheson rebutted that the “‘standards’” and “‘principles’” that he used to judge
Hiss’s guilt were “‘stated on the Mount of Olives’” and could be found in the “‘Twenty-fifth Chapter of the Gospel according to St. Matthew, beginning at Verse 34.’”\textsuperscript{191} In this passage, Jesus identified just action as feeding the hungry, comforting those in need, sheltering immigrants, clothing the naked, tending to the infirmed, nurturing the imprisoned, and declared “[i]n as much as ye have done [it] unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done [it] unto me.”\textsuperscript{192} Whereas these social justice principles undergirded the New Deal and political idealism, the rhetorical constraints placed on the presidency by FBI propaganda favored fundamentalism and its Americanist agenda. This influenced the American value structure, the reality that it constructed, and the corresponding roles that it placed upon federal institutions.

The rhetorical dimensions of J. Edgar Hoover’s national security programming advanced his Americanist agenda and challenged presidential control over the executive branch. Durr wrote to Truman in June 1949 and again in January 1950 as President of the NLG. He complained that “FBI employees” exhibited “intellectual limitations” that were manifest in their “investigations of the social, economic and political views and associations of private citizens.” Such thought policing, Durr charged, occurred in “almost complete secrecy and obscurity.” He suggested that Hoover used this power to investigate “Americans suspected of no criminal activity,” which marked a “dangerous tendency toward a police state.” Accordingly, the lawyer called upon the “executive branch of government” to examine the “extent to which the FBI” had become a “dangerous political secret police.”\textsuperscript{193} Durr’s attempt to use presidential power to curb Hoover, however, failed to recognize that the director had already destabilized the presidency. Nichols wrote a
memo to Tolson in July 1949 summarizing Hoover’s power grab of the presidency. The public relations specialist relayed a private conversation between Truman and one of his advisors about the emerging police state. He wrote that the “President had made up his mind to let the Director go” but the advisor encouraged Truman to “face certain facts, namely the Director [was] tremendously popular throughout the country and that if the President did anything which would cause the Director to leave, it would reflect adversely on the elections in 1950 and 1952.” Truman admitted that he knew “this was so” and decided not to act. Hoover built his thought police force by pressuring the president into silence, thus forcing Truman to tacitly endorse Hoover’s leadership in the field of domestic security. The president’s failure to control the FBI enabled Hoover, HUAC, McCarthy, and other Americanists to purge traces of idealism from the government and public life more generally. This intellectual purge was also the function and the purpose of McCarthyism. In this way, the rhetorical presidency was exploited by a subordinate through his institutional connection to the nation’s highest office.

Hoover was not the only Cold Warrior to battle against Truman, and the president certainly was not without his own political agency. Yet, Hoover did dominate Truman in the realm of domestic security. President Truman launched his own overt and covert propaganda programs in 1948 and 1950, respectively, to advance his liberal anti-communist “foreign policy agenda.” Shawn J. Parry-Giles observes that Truman’s use of propaganda signified an “appreciation for the power of persuasion,” bolstered the power of his office, targeted “larger publics,” and lessened “congressional involvement in foreign policy matters especially.” His “rhetoric of
“crisis” also raised concerns about communism among national and international audiences, which further emboldened Americanist accusations that the New and Fair Deals were manifestations of communism. By associating the CPUSA and the CPSU, many arguments invented by the administration to justify containing foreign communist leaders (the mission of liberal anti-communism) evidenced the importance of containing their domestic counterparts (the Americanist vision). Richard Gid Powers observes that once “Hoover had broken with the administration over the loyalty issue” when he appeared before HUAC in March 1947, “the popular press looked to him for authoritative official statements on the Communist menace. Truman could still use the presidency to define the foreign threat, but he lost the ability to control the domestic security agenda.”

**Public Opinion, Propaganda, and the Rhetorical Presidency**

Freshman Congressman Richard M. Nixon (R-CA) attended Hoover’s speech to HUAC in March 1947; he was a committee member and would soon become an FBI surrogate. In the question and answer session, Nixon asserted that “a considerable amount of opposition” had “arisen to the President’s” recent “order” regarding “Communists in the Government service.” He suggested that criticisms of the Loyalty Program were based “on the grounds that proper safeguards for persons who [were] accused of being disloyal [were] not set up in the order.” Nixon reminded Hoover that the FBI had a “great deal to do with furnishing the information,” which critics opposed because the “accused” then did not “have the opportunity to be confronted with the witnesses against him” and did “not have the right to a jury trial.”
Hoover responded by arguing that his information program was a “matter affecting the security of the country. Obviously we would not . . . disclose the identity of a confidant . . . because it would prevent usefulness in the future, and might endanger his life.” However, these concerns were not worthy of consideration anyway, suggested Hoover, because they had been raised only to “force a disclosure of sources of information by elements that [were] particularly un-American who still may be in the Government service.” Hoover added that he suspected that such “shouts and screams” were from that “source particularly.”

Truman’s and Hoover’s speeches and the executive order combined to legitimize the concerns of Americanists. Truman warned of “such subterfuges as political infiltration” on March 12, and then nine days later he ordered the FBI to investigate the loyalty of federal employees. The boundaries of Americanism and liberal anti-communism began to blur. Many liberals began supporting Hoover because they presumed that he was aligned with Truman. In a nationally broadcasted speech, Hoover essentially told the president’s opposition in Congress that civil liberties advocacy was a communist plot that should be ignored and discredited. Truman’s rhetorical power was virtually hijacked. The president complained to Miller in the latter years of his life that Hoover “was, still is inclined to take on, to try to take on more than his job was, and he made quite a few too many speeches to my mind, and he very often spoke of things that, strictly speaking, weren’t any of his business.”

Truman’s reflection highlights Hoover’s on-going expansionist tendencies as director of the FBI and his propaganda programming to accomplish such ends.
In the midst of Hoover’s rhetorical coup, fear of communist subversion overcame objections to his illegal methods. Nixon could “express complete confidence” in Hoover’s “service” on behalf of the “House of Representatives” in June 1949 when the FBI’s ideological strategizing had recently been revealed. Similarly, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX) reassured one of his constituents in February 1950 that Hoover would not “encounter any loss of confidence either from the general public or the Congress” regardless of what his critics might say about him. The anti-communist consensus that Hoover sought to establish simultaneously cemented his premier status in American political culture. McCarthy made this evident when he sycophantically gushed in a July 1952 letter to the director that the “FBI” stood as a “monument” to “J. Edgar Hoover” and that this would “always be” so. Public opinion polling backed this perspective. The Gallup Poll recorded in January 1950, for example, that 82 percent of respondents felt that Hoover had “done a good job as head of the F.B.I.” while only 2 percent reported that he had done a “poor job.”

Hoover’s discourse thus fostered a political climate that was more receptive to an expanded and militarized FBI in peacetime. Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson credit the “Red-fascist image” (or the “Nazi-Soviet analogy”) for helping to reshape the “reasoning” of U.S. policy planners when “possibilities for accommodation” with the Soviet Union were still tangible in 1945-1946. Hoover’s propaganda activities at home expedited the crystallization of the anti-communist consensus, promoted his Americanist containment program, and elevated Americanism in national security planning.
FDR emboldened Hoover and gave him the latitude to engage in coercive strategies that ultimately helped the director to build up the FBI. This power also set up Hoover to undermine Truman and assume control of the public pulpit for his own political gain. His propaganda strategies were empowered by his coercive acts that ranged from censorship, intimidation, job termination, and alienation in public life to jailing, torturing, and expulsion from the country. For example, Max Lowenthal—former member of the Wickersham Commission, former assistant to Senators Burton K. Wheeler (D-MT) and George W. Norris (Independent from Nebraska), member of the NLG, and close friend of Harry S Truman—reminded his readers that Hoover had long relied on torture as a law enforcement tactic. He wrote in *The Federal Bureau of Investigation* (1950) that “FBI practices” in this area were “summed up in March 1940 by a Senate Committee” report. According to Lowenthal, Senator Harry S Truman (D-MS) and other committee members concluded that the “FBI had, in 1939 and 1940, engaged in many illegalities suggestive of the years 1919 to 1924.” These criminal activities included “‘degrading and ‘third degree’ treatment.’” The Wickersham Commission defined the “third-degree” nine years earlier as a “secret and illegal practice” that employed “methods which inflict[ed] suffering, physical or mental, upon a person, in order to obtain from that person information about a crime.” Combined with his other tactics, these actions were Hoover’s equivalent to the roundups, purges, political denunciations, book-burnings, and other programs for thought control, physical imprisonment, and abuse that had taken place in Germany and the U.S.S.R. To that end, just as Hoover repudiated the twin enemies of fascism and communism, he simultaneously mimicked many of their rhetorical strategies and
police power tactics to expand the FBI and his own political power. FDR’s experiment with coercion and persuasion, therefore, allowed Hoover to build up the domestic side of the national security state in a manner that undercut the New Deal and the Fair Deal.

Within the totalitarian paradigm, Hoover contributed to a broader Americanist movement that mimicked the rhetorical framework of Nazism. Kenneth Burke observed in “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle” (1939) that the dictator offered a “trinity of government” that interlocked “popularity of the leader, force to back the popularity, and popularity and force maintained together long enough to become backed by a tradition.” He further noted that “Hitler appeal[ed]” to his audiences “by relying upon a bastardization of fundamentally religious patterns of thought.” He suggested that “religion” did not require a “fascist state,” but that “much in religion” could be “misused” to create “a fascist state.” Burke concluded that “politicians of his kind” were also “in America” and that such “corruptors of religion” constituted a “major menace to the world” because they gave the “profound patterns of religious thought a crude and sinister distortion.” Hoover’s information campaign mimicked Hitler’s rhetorical strategizing in terms of the Americanist tradition that he continuously and metaphorically extended throughout his public campaigns. The director combined such tactics with his manipulation of American religion. This strategy established and promoted a worldview that was appropriated from the urban-crime genre. The ideology celebrated force and violence as forms of political expression, tactics also practiced by Hitler. The rhetoric of Americanism thus resembled a rhetoric of fascism.
The FBI helped to create a context in which any rhetorical choices made by the liberal, anti-communist president came to increasingly reflect the Americanist worldview. While idealistic remarks about the Soviet Union or other efforts to create international peace like those made by Wallace could be framed as disloyal or too friendly towards communism, more realist remarks like the Truman Doctrine speech were treated as proof of domestic subversion. Rhetorical scholars have repeatedly found disfavor with Truman’s address, sometimes blaming it for precipitating the rise of McCarthyism and the Red Scare.\textsuperscript{210} Truman stumbled when he invoked the Nazi-Soviet analogy to justify his policy decisions in May 1947 and March 1950. However, Denise Bostdorff observes that the rhetoric of the past—and therefore the Munich and Red Fascism analogies—was rhetorically prominent at the time the White House began drafting the address in March 1947. This timing was already more than a year after the FBI decided to disburse its “‘educational material.’”\textsuperscript{211} The FBI’s information campaign dovetailed with Kennan’s private and public messages about the international communist threat. Combined, their discourses contributed to the intellectual and ideological contexts in which Truman spoke, and led most interpretations of his speech away from the liberal anti-communist worldview and towards Hoover’s Americanism.
Notes


2 Telegram, George Kennan to James Byrnes [“Long Telegram”], February 22, 1946, pages 1, 3, 16-17, Elsey Papers, Harry S Truman Library (hereafter cited as HSTL)

3 Ibid., pages 3, 11-15.

4 The term “liberal anti-communist” is used to identify former idealists whose perspectives on international relations move toward political realism in the post-war era.

5 Ibid., September 5, 1945, page 1, Box 1.

6 Harold D. Smith diary entry, May 11, 1945, pages 1-2, Box 1, Harry S Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri (HSTL).

7 Ibid., July 6, 1945, page 1, Box 1.


“‘A-Bomb Secrets Stolen!: Canada Holds 22 for Inquiry on Atom Leak; Russia Reported to Be Involved,’” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 16, 1946: 1.


20 The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) preceded the Central Intelligence Agency (June, 1942-September, 1945) as the federal government’s dominant


24 “A Report to the National Security Council - NSC 68,” April 12, 1950. President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers, page 57, HSTL.


27 Niebuhr drew a tension between the values of individualism and cooperation to encourage post-war thinkers to fortify American culture for the Cold
War. Because Niebuhr believed that “Communism” had to “be contained,” balancing the value of individualism in domestic politics with the value of cooperation in international affairs was of paramount importance to his worldview. He encouraged liberals and conservatives to “engage in vast collective ventures” to build-up a robust anti-communist international community through the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine. America, accordingly, was responsible for creating bonds of trust between the Western allies. Niebuhr’s realism called upon liberals and conservatives to abandon the New Deal and traditional militarism. Instead, he encouraged liberals to recognize the primacy of individualism in domestic affairs. And, the theologian prompted conservatives to abandon their “apocalyptic” quest for nuclear war by substituting expansive foreign aid programs for their militaristic strategizing. Niebuhr envisioned a political reality in which the “Anglo-Saxon world” was protected by centralized governments that curbed the spread of Soviet expansionism and that attracted unaligned nations into the Western sphere. Niebuhr called upon liberals and conservatives to adopt some common values related to individualism and international relations. Accordingly, he celebrated the influence of Puritanism in American political culture. Niebuhr suggested that the nation’s historic commitment to isolationism was a part of its self-image as “God’s American Israel,” thereby aligning isolationism, Puritanism, and American exceptionalism. This perspective, he suggested, held that the American promised-land had been separated from the world following the Protestant Reformation so that the American church and its individual members could be perfected. He even agreed with America’s “Calvinist” and “Jeffersonian ancestors” that “individual liberty” was rightfully the “final value of
life,” and encouraged his readers to prefer “death” to the “annulment” of such “cherished values.” Rugged individualism, thus, was a Protestant value to be protected. Niebuhr, however, also focused upon James Madison’s insistence on a strong central government to maintain the national community. This balanced the value of individualism in domestic politics with the need for a strong and centralized federal government that could maintain stability at home and abroad. *The Irony of American History* (New York: Scribner, 1952), 24-5, 97-8, 7,10, 79, 134; —“A Protest Against a Dilemma's Two Horns,” *World Politics* 2, no. 3 (April 1950): 343-344; —*The Irony of American History*, 10; —The Marshall Plan,” *Christianity and Crisis*, October 13, 1947: 2;—“Two Forms of Tyranny,” *Christianity and Crisis*, February 2, 1948: 4; —“The Fight for Germany,” *Life Magazine*, October 21, 1946: 66;—“American Conservatism and the World Crisis: I. A Study in Vacillation,” *The Yale Review* 40 (March 1951): 388, 391.

27 —“European Impressions,” *Christianity and Crisis*, May 12, 1947: 3; —“A Protest Against a Dilemma's Two Horns,” 343-344.


29 HUAC became a standing committee in 1945 when Edward J. Hart (D-NJ) replaced Martin Dies as its Chairman (January, 1945 - January, 1947).


31 Denise M. Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms* (College Station, Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 36-37, 134, 60.
32 Adler and Paterson, “Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia”: 1060.


36 Bostdorff, Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine, 121.


40 Harry S Truman, “The President’s Press and Radio Conference,” March 30, 1950, page 2, David D. Lloyd Files, Box 5, HSTL.


43 William H. Chamberlin, “Russia and Germany—Parallels and Contrasts,” Atlantic Monthly (September, 1935): 359, 368; Chaim Perelman and Lucy Olbrechts-Tyteca explain that an analogy compares a “resemblance of relationship” in which “A is to B as C is to D.” The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, translated by John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 372-73.


45 Emphasis in original. This work extensively cites Hoover and the FBI. Jack B. Tenney, Red Fascism: Boring from Within; By the Subversive Forces of Communism (Los Angeles: Federal Printing Company, 1947), 639.


47 Hoover ordered the Los Angeles field office to report on “Communist Infiltration of the Motion Picture Industry” in August, 1942. Daniel J. Leab, “Introduction,” page v, Federal Bureau of Investigation Confidential Files:


49 Ray Tucker, “Ray Tucker’s Letter,” The Brooklyn Eagle, October 22, 1946, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 94, NARA—CP.


53 The president regularly addressed the civil rights movement in his public policy statements, and enacted major reform through a series of executive orders. Truman issued EO 9808 in December, 1946 and established the President’s Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR). Moreover, the president issued two landmark executive orders in July of 1948. EO 9980 commissioned an investigation into discriminatory practices within the federal government, including the DOJ and the FBI. And, EO 9981 created the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, which was charged with integrating the Army. This began a movement that effectively desegregated the armed services and spearheaded the broader desegregation and integration campaign across the country.

54 FDR proclaimed in his First Inaugural address that in “the field of world policy” he sought to “dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor, the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others, the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.” In practice, this meant respecting the sovereignty of South American nations and comporting U.S. strategizing to non-interventionist norms. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Inaugural Address, March 4, 1933,” in *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Year of Crisis, 1933* (New York: Random House, 1950), 14; Bryce Wood, *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 47.

56 Tucker, “Ray Tucker’s Letter.”

57 —“Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,” March 26, 1947 (Committee on Un-American Activities), pages 11-12, 4-5, 9, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.


59 In general, Hoover targeted popular front organizations and individuals whom he could associate with them. Joseph Stalin ordered international Communist parties to form “popular fronts” in 1934, which were broad alliances of anti-fascists who advanced more liberal agendas. This directive offered Hoover a warrant to investigate New Dealers.


62 Schrecker, Many are the Crimes, 42-43.

63 Lachlan Strahan, Australia’s China: Changing Perceptions from the 1930s to the 1990s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 151.

Later that month, Roosevelt used the Trojan Horse and Fifth Column metaphors to align anti-interventionism with subversion. He warned in a May, 1940 Fireside Chat, for example, that the “Trojan Horse” and the “Fifth Column” were composed of “[s]pies, saboteurs and traitors” who disseminated “discord” through instigating “sectional” and “racial” groups to “create confusion of counsel, public indecision, political paralysis and, eventually, a state of panic.” Roosevelt complained that “[s]ound national policies” were then “viewed with a new and unreasoning skepticism” through “the clever schemes of foreign agents.” Roosevelt used the fear of foreign alliances to discredit anti-interventionism. He described the “dividing forces” that had invaded America as being an “undiluted poison” that sought to “spread in the New World as they have in the Old.” Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Fireside Chat on National Defense, May 26, 1940,” in The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1940 (New York: Macmillan, 1941), 237-238; Hoover, “America’s Duty to the Future,” May 3, 1940 (New York Federation of Women’s Clubs), page 4, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 140.

Chaim Perelman observes that reasoning by “dissociation is characterized from the start by the opposition of appearance and reality. This dissociation can be applied to any idea, as soon as one makes use of the adjectives ‘apparent’ or ‘illusory’
on the one hand, and ‘real or ‘true’ on the other.” *The Realm of Rhetoric*, translated by William Kluback (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press), 134.


71 A series of Supreme Court Decisions throughout the 1940s established secularism as the official federal, state, and local position on religious expression. The Court decreed in *Cantwell v. Connecticut* (1940) that First Amendment religious protections applied to the states. It shortly thereafter decided a number of cases that affirmed the rights of unpopular religious groups to express their perspectives and forbade public officials from compelling religious expressions, especially in public schools. These earlier rulings in the wartime era set a precedent for a post-war ruling that would quickly become entwined in Cold War politics. The Court ruled in *Everson v. Board of Education* (1947) that government bodies serving at any level or in any capacity may not suggest religious preference, or encourage or discourage religious expressions of belief or disbelief. Justice Hugo Black wrote that “[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and *vice versa.*” Citing Thomas Jefferson’s “Letter to the Danbury Baptists” (1802), the justice famously suggested that “the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and State.’” Writing explicitly about the “public school,” Justice Robert Jackson recognized that the ruling challenged the prestige of
“Protestantism” in U.S. culture because public institutions were “more consistent with it than with the Catholic culture and scheme of values.” Secularism was further entrenched in American political culture by *McCollum v. Board of Education* (1948), which prohibited public schools from assisting in religious instruction. The judicial branch, therefore, significantly curtailed the advantages historically enjoyed by Protestantism in U.S. culture by prohibiting government institutions from supporting religious interests. The momentum of these rulings subsided in the 1950s when the Court began to relax such restrictions and “God” was added to the Pledge of Allegiance and to U.S. currency. *Cantwell v. Connecticut*, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); *Minersville School District v. Gobitis*, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); *Jones v. City of Opelika*, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); *Murdoch v. Pennsylvania*, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); *Martin v. Struthers*, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); *Everson v. Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947); for Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptists, see http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html.

72 J. Edgar Hoover, “Secularism—A Breeder of Crime,” November 26, 1947 (Conference of Methodist Ministers), pages 5 and 7, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

73 J. Edgar Hoover, “Remarks of J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,” September 30, 1946 (Annual Convention of the American Legion), pages 1-2, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.


82 U.S. Senate, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book III: *Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, 431.


85 Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book III: *Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, 431, 437-438.

86 J. Edgar Hoover to George E. Allen, May 29, 1946, President’s Secretary’s File, File: FBI-Atomic Bomb, Box146, HSTL.

87 Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book III: *Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, 432-433


92 According to John A. Salmond, the NLG was formed in 1939 by “leftist lawyers” who sympathized with the New Deal and promoted “civil liberties, minority


97 George Elsey, May 2, 1947, Elsey Papers Box 69, File: Internal Security, FELP Executive Order 9835, HSTL.

98 Clark Clifford to Harry S Truman, May 23, 1947, Box 69, File: Internal Security, FELP Executive Order 9835, HSTL.

99 Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book III: *Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, 434.

Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book III: *Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, 431, 435.

Diary Entry, August 31, 1948, Eben A. Ayers Papers, Box 20, HSTL.


Louis Nichols to Clyde Tolson, January 24, 1949, in ibid.

Louis Nichols to Clyde Tolson, January 26, 1949, in ibid.


D. Milton Ladd to J. Edgar Hoover, February 27 1946, *Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operation* , Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, 429-30.
Ladd to Hoover, February 27, 1946.


The Executives Conference to the Director, October 3, 1949, in Federal Bureau of Investigation Confidential Files: McCarthy Era Blacklisting of School Teachers, College Professors, and Other Public Employees; The FBI Responsibilities Program File and the Dissemination of Information Policy File (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1989), reel 8, frame 787.

Clyde Tolson to J. Edgar Hoover, April 30, 1951, in Federal Bureau of Investigation Confidential Files: McCarthy Era Blacklisting of School Teachers, College Professors, and Other Public Employees; The FBI Responsibilities Program File and the Dissemination of Information Policy File, reel 1, frame 645-46.

Executive Conference to Director, November 1, 1945, in FBI, American Legion Contact Program (Wilmington, DL: Scholarly Resources, 1984).
117 D. Milton Ladd to Alan H. Belmont, October, 2, 1952, in ibid.

118 Alan H. Belmont to D. Milton Ladd, June 26, 1951, in ibid.

119 Executive Conference to Director, November 1, 1945, in ibid.

120 Hoover to All Investigative Employees, August 1, 1950, in ibid.

121 Belmont to Ladd, June 26, 1951, in ibid.


124 Hoover to Agents, August 1, 1950, in ibid.


128 The Executives Conference to the Director, October 3, 1949, in Federal Bureau of Investigation Confidential Files: McCarthy Era Blacklisting of School Teachers, College Professors, and Other Public Employees; The FBI Responsibilities Program File and the Dissemination of Information Policy File (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America 1989), reel 8, frame 787.


131 J. Edgar Hoover to All SACs, February 17, 1951, in ibid., reel 1, frames 221-222.

132 The Executives Conference to the Director, April 30, 1951, in ibid., reel 1 frames 645-646.

133 Belmont to Ladd, June 26, 1951.

134 J. Edgar Hoover to All SACs, May 12, 1951, in Federal Bureau of Investigation Confidential Files: McCarthy Era Blacklisting of School Teachers, College Professors, and Other Public Employees; The FBI Responsibilities Program File and the Dissemination of Information Policy File, reel 1, frame 693.

135 Schrecker, Many are the Crimes, 404.


“‘Hoover’s List is Subversive,’ Not Jefferson School, Says Head,” *PM Daily*, December 5, 1947, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 98, NARA—CP.


Alan Barth was a civil liberties advocate, author, and editorial writer at *The Washington Post*. “The Loyalty of Free Men” (March 16-17, 1951), reprinted in the *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors* 37, no. 1 (Spring, 1951): 9-10.


N. Wagner, “Red Baiter Number 1,” Morning Freiheit, January 28, 1947, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 96, NARA—CP.


Durr, “The Loyalty Order’s to the Constitution”: 301.


159 Mt 25:34-40.

160 Hoover, “Unmasking the Communist Masquerader”: 399-401.


162 SAC Letter No. 97, Series 1949, 10/19/1949 in *Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operation*, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, 440-41.


434


171 —“God or Chaos?,” *Redbook Magazine* (February 1949): 64.

172 —“Communism—Enemy of American Labor”: 32.


174 J. Edgar Hoover, “The Battle on the Home Front,” August, 9, 1943 (International Association of Chiefs of Police), page 4, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.


— “Remarks,” September 30, 1946 (Annual Convention of the American Legion Convention), page 2, Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.


— “Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,” March 26, 1947 (Committee on Un-American Activities), 12.


Mt 25:34-40.

Clifford J. Durr to Harry S Truman, June 20, 1949, and January 19, 1950, President’s Official File, Loyalty Program, Box 102, HSTL.

Louis Nichols to Clyde Tolson, July 13, 1949, in Louis Nichols Official and Confidential File and the Clyde Tolson Personal File, Reel 4, “Director: Political Support.”


Lyndon B. Johnson to Fred Edwards, February 13, 1950, FBI file# 94-41273-261, Record Group 65, Entry 11, Box 346—NARA, CP.
Joseph R. McCarthy to J. Edgar Hoover, July 30, 1952, FBI file# 94-37708-71X1, Record Group 65, Entry 11, Box 346—NARA, CP.


Adolph Hitler’s Mein Kampf was originally published in a two volume series. The first of which was published in 1925 and the second was published in 1926.


211 D. Milton Ladd to J. Edgar Hoover, February 27 1946, *Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operation*, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, 429-30.
Afterword

Hoover’s public campaigns from 1933 to 1953 borrowed from political idealism and political realism, but exploited the rhetoric of the former to promote the values of the latter. Hoover used such combinations to embolden and manipulate Franklin D. Roosevelt’s rhetorical reach and to challenge and undermine Harry S Truman’s rhetorical power. The FBI director adapted his rhetorical strategies to the idealistic and secular norms of Frederick Taylor’s scientific management technique during the War on Crime. Hoover’s rhetoric was increasingly steeped in the values of Christian realism and Christian fundamentalism by wartime. And this realist framework shaded the Cold War era with many of fundamentalism’s more neo-orthodox presumptions.

The War on Crime (1933-1939) offered Hoover a foundation that grounded his realist conjectures in more idealistic language. FDR began rebuilding the Bureau in this era as he reclaimed the rhetorical power of propaganda that was pioneered by presidents like Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Hoover had been rehearsing such rhetorical practices since 1925 when he imagined an “endless war against crime” that combined police cooperation and scientific management. Attorney General Homer S. Cummings promoted this mixture of idealism and realism when he announced the War on Crime in 1933. The idealistic value of science was in turn used as a basis to strengthen Hoover’s rhetorical power. Hoover combined a rhetoric of science and a rhetoric of war in his construction of law enforcement. The vermin metaphor helped the director to frame his militant vision in terms of the urban-crime genre, wherein the power of law enforcement was enhanced.
When promulgating the War on Crime through popular entertainment, Hoover promoted his Machine Gun School of Criminology by circulating spectacular stories and metaphors that invoked his scientific expertise. In this urban-crime drama, violence was a well established method for solving political problems. The realist themes of anarchy and power sprouted from pulp fiction texts and grew into a larger system of political thought.

The popularization of Christian realism made the rhetoric of power politics even more available to the director. The rise of Adolph Hitler and fascist belligerence abroad provided the director with grounds for discussing totalitarianism more broadly (1939-1945). Hoover orchestrated the vermin and Fifth Column campaigns with FDR’s backing and consent. The director’s ancillary contagion, termite, parasite, Trojan horse, and fellow traveler metaphors all promoted notions of stealthy intruders who infiltrated the nation’s institutions and necessitated an even more expanded law enforcement apparatus to exterminate the threats.

In the process, Hoover used the presidency as a key dimension of his rhetorical movements to strengthen his own power and the force of the FBI. Roosevelt empowered Hoover to police his administration’s critics as well as the director’s own political opposition. Moreover, Roosevelt called for the “extermination” of criminals and he used the Fifth Column and Trojan horse metaphors to undermine his adversaries. Hoover betrayed President Roosevelt and used this framework to conceal the implicit anti-New Deal partisanship that would become foundational to Hoover's anti-communist rhetoric. Roosevelt initially benefitted from his support of Hoover’s power politicking, but the director ultimately
undermined FDR’s domestic agenda, especially during President Truman’s administration.

The early Cold War era (1945-1953) was marked by an amplification of political realism in the executive branch. Hoover helped to build a post-war rhetorical context that perpetuated the cold war exigencies and its realist presumptions. With this paradigm, Hoover undermined President Truman’s support for a liberal anti-communist approach in U.S. foreign policy and promoted his own Americanist vision in the process.

Hoover’s ability to seamlessly transition from a secular-scientific crime chaser to a militant Christian activist illustrated his ability to adapt to and exploit the political world he inhabited. Courtney Ryley Cooper and Reinhold Niebuhr provided Hoover with a bridge between the realms of science and religion. Hoover combined Cooper’s urban-crime ideology with Niebuhr’s theology to merge the worlds of pulp fiction and international relations. Niebuhr’s support of violence to accomplish moral ends lent Hoover’s crackdowns against alleged criminals and communists intellectual support. The director’s promotion of neo-orthodoxy helped him to bring together realists and fundamentalists. His Americanist discourses outlined his parameters of American citizenship, which strongly favored whites, conservatives, and the rich.

Hoover’s realist planning during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations resembled Hitler’s strategy for building-up the Nazi infrastructure in Germany. Both Hitler and Hoover concurrently relied upon vermin, parasite, and contagion metaphors to convey threats to internal security. They both politicized state-sponsored violence through elaborate propaganda departments. Hitler’s and Hoover’s
propaganda campaigns announced the existence of invisible threats to the nation that required a more centralized and militant response by the nation's militaries and the nation's law enforcement agencies. And, they both relied on the advancements of science in their administration of law enforcement. Their rhetorics of contamination justified displays of power that boldly as well as surreptitiously chilled dissent.

The Rhetorical Trajectory of Hoover’s Federal Justice

Hoover relied heavily on metaphors to construct the lurking public threats facing the nation. Such metaphors in turn helped build support for the federal expansion of law enforcement and justified his strategies of coercion. The director was also able to exert militant force against his opposition by creating an aura of fear associated with his metaphorical references to vermin, the Fifth Column, and Red Fascism. Such fear gave him enhanced latitude to engage in acts of secrecy that helped exploit democratic processes and conceal his coercive tactics. In the end, the director’s propaganda campaigns camouflaged his subversion of the very institutions (e.g., the presidency) that he claimed to serve and protect.

The director continued his reliance on metaphorical frameworks throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s. For example, Hoover told the American Legion while John F. Kennedy was president that “‘[c]rime [was] a parasite, feeding upon public disinterest and moral lethargy.’”² He described “[o]rganized crime” as a “cancer in our society” when he was a member of the Lyndon B. Johnson administration.³ Similarly, he identified members of “organized crime” as “parasites” during the Richard M. Nixon administration.⁴ He also called “extremism” a spreading “disease”
that allegedly afflicted “America.” The rhetorical framework first constituted by President Roosevelt and FBI Director Hoover remained in effect for the next three decades.

What began as a strategy for FDR to defend his own policies against the policies of his opponents, ended with an FBI director using the power of the presidency to promote his own rhetorical clout and political agenda. Such a strategy would embolden one president and undermine the next. As the power of the rhetorical presidency expanded, the bully pulpit became a platform for other political leaders like Hoover to exploit for their own political gain. Students of the rhetorical presidency typically focus upon the biography of the president and the rhetorical power of the Oval Office. However, the authority of the rhetorical presidency cascades from the White House down to cabinet officers and flows to various department heads and bureau directors and their assistants. Many of these individuals are charged with speaking publicly on the president’s behalf and with the president’s consent. This study demonstrates how a president can lose control over such subordinates who engage in acts of rhetorical subterfuge. The presidency does not have the power to fully control what is said by such presidential surrogates. Even more problematic, presidents cannot be certain that members of the various executive agencies will be more loyal to the presidency than to their own ideological presumptions. The ideologies of executive leaders, therefore, can influence the meanings and complexities of the rhetorical presidency. This substratum of presidential meaning includes unwanted rhetorical surrogacy that ranges from political gaffes to insubordination. What is said in the name of the presidency can
constrain, obscure, or even hijack the future rhetorical actions made by the commander-in-chief. Hoover demonstrated how presidents, therefore, would have to guard against rhetorical poachers embedded in the executive offices of the federal government, who relied upon institutional authority to appropriate and at times exploit the presidency’s rhetorical power.
Notes

1 J. Edgar Hoover, “32nd Annual Conference,” July 14, 1925 (International Association of Chiefs of Police), Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 6, Pages 1-2, 4, 8, NARA—CP.


Bibliography


An Act to Amend an Act to Establish a Hospital for Defective Delinquents. Public Law 201. 71st Cong. 2d sess. May 13, 1930.


An Act to Authorize the Public Health Service to Provide Medical Service in the Federal Prisons. Public Law 203. 71st Cong. 2d sess. May 13, 1930.
An Act to Establish Two United States Narcotic Farms for the Confinement and Treatment of Persons Addicted to the Use of Habit-Forming Narcotic Drugs who Have been Convicted of Offenses Against the United States, and for Other Purposes. Public Law 672. 70th Cong. 2d sess. January 19, 1929.


An Act to Fix the Date when Sentence of Imprisonment shall Begin to Run, Providing when the Allowances to a Prisoner of Time for Good Conduct shall begin to Run, and Further to Extend the Provisions of the Parole Laws. Public Law 219. 72d Cong. 1st sess. June 29, 1932.


An Act to Reorganize the Administration of Federal Prisons; to Authorize the Attorney General to Contract for the Care of United States Prisoners; to
Establish Federal Jails, and for Other Purposes. Public Law 218. Sec. 1, 2, 4. 71st Cong. 2d sess. May 14, 1930.


—-*Fighting the Fifth Column in the Americas*. Charlottesville, Virginia: Institute of Public Affairs, 1940.


Bostdorff, Denise M. *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms* College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008.


Civil Rights Act of 1866. 39th Cong. 1st sess. 14 Stat. 27. April 9, 1866.


Civil Rights Act of 1875. 43rd Cong. 2d sess. 18 Stat. 335. February 1, 1875.


Cooper, Courtney Ryley. “J. Edgar Hoover has Formed Nucleus of Powerful Federal Police Force.” *The Kansas City Star*, August 7, 1933, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 3, NARA—CP.

Cooper, Courtney Ryley. “Getting the Jump on Crime.” *The American Magazine*. August 1933, Record Group 65, Entry 49, Box 3, NARA—CP.


—“The Department of Justice and the New Deal,” June 11, 1933 (Radio Address).
   Record Group 60, Entry 132, Box 2, File: Speeches, National Archives and
   Records Administration, College Park (hereafter cited as NARA—CP.

—“Address of Homer S. Cummings,” April 24, 1933 (Radio Address). Record Group
   60, Entry 132, Box 2, File: Speeches, NARA—CP.

— “Modern Tendencies and the Law.” *American Bar Association Journal* 19, no. 10
   (1933): 577-78.

Cutlip, Scott M. *The Unseen Power: Public Relations, A History*. Hillsdale, New

Davis, James Kirkpatrick. *Spying on America: The FBI’s Domestic

Dean, William D. “Niebuhr and Negative Theology.” In *Reinhold Niebuhr Revisited:
   Engagements with an American Original*, edited by Daniel F. Rice and


Denning, Michael. *Mechanic Accents: Dime Novels and Working-Class Culture in

Denslow, William R. and Harry S. Truman. *10,000 Famous Freemasons from K to Z.

*Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1941: Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover
   (Dir, FBI).* 76th Cong. 3d sess. January 5, 1940.


Dt 1:7. Bible.

Dt 2:34-35. Bible.

Dt 3:3-7. Bible

Dt 7:1-7. Bible


Dt 22:5. Bible.


Everson v. Board of Education. 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).


Executive Order 9835. *Prescribing Procedures for the Administration of an Employees Loyalty Program in the Executive Branch of the Government.*


Executive Order 9808. *Establishing the President’s Committee on Civil Rights.*


*FBI, American Legion Contact Program.* Wilmington, DL. Scholarly Resources, 1984.
Federal Bureau of Investigation Confidential Files: Communist Activity in the

Federal Bureau of Investigation Confidential Files: McCarthy Era Blacklisting of
School Teachers, College Professors, and Other Public Employees; The FBI
Responsibilities Program File and the Dissemination of Information Policy

Federal Kidnapping Act of 1932 (Lindbergh Law). Public Law 189. 72d Cong. 1st

Federal Trade Commission. Utility Corporations: Efforts by Associations and
Agencies of Electric and Gas Utilities to Influence Public Opinion. 70th
Printing Office, 1934.

Felber, Ron. The Privacy War: One Congressman, J. Edgar Hoover, and the Fight
for the Fourth Amendment. Montvale, New Jersey: Croce Publishing Group,
2003.

Fenwick, Charles G. Cases on International Law. Chicago: Callghan and Company,
1935.


Ferrell, Robert H. “The Peace Movement.” In Isolation and Security, edited by


House Committee on Appropriations. *Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1938: Testimony of Sanford Bates (Dir, Bur of Prisons)*. 75th Cong. 2d sess.

House Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1937: Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover*. February 11, 1936. 74th Cong. 2d sess.

House Committee on Appropriations. Sundry Civil Bill, 1915: Testimony of Bruce A. Bielaski, Chief, Div of Investigation, Justice Department. 63d Cong. 2d sess. 1914.

House Committee on Appropriations. Sundry Civil Appropriation Bill for 1911: Testimony of S.W. Finch, Chief Examiner, Justice Dept. 61st Cong., 2d sess. 1911.

House Committee on Rules, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer on Charges Made Against Department of Justice by Louis F. Post and Others. Part 1. 66th Cong. 2d sess., June 1, 1920.


— “God or Chaos?” *Redbook Magazine* (February 1949): 64.


—“Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.” March 26, 1947 (House Committee on Un-American Activities). Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.


— “Remarks of J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.” September 30, 1946 (Annual Convention of the American Legion). Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

—“A Graduate’s Responsibility.” June 29, 1944 (Holy Cross College). Record Group 65. Entry 51. Box 2. NARA—CP.

—“Our Duty to Youth.” May 4, 1944 (Boys’ Clubs of America). Record Group 65. Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

—“The Internal Defense of America.” April 17, 1944 (Daughters of the American Revolution). Record Group 65. Entry 51. Box 2. NARA—CP.


—“Your Call to Duty.” May 23, 1943 (Rutgers University). Record Group 65. Entry 51. Box 2. NARA—CP.


—“A Nation’s Call to Duty.” June 11, 1942 (St. John’s University). Record Group 65. Entry 51. Box 2. NARA—CP.
— “Our Future.” May 10, 1942 (Notre Dame University). Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 2, NARA—CP.

— “Address,” February 1941 (B’nai B’rith). Record Group 65. Entry 51. Box 2. NARA—CP.


— “The Test of Citizenship.” April 18, 1940 (Daughters of the American Revolution). Record Group 65. Entry 51. Box 2. NARA—CP.


— “A National Ideal.” May 12, 1940 (B’nai B’rith). Record Group 65. Entry 51. Box 2. NARA—CP.


— “Our Nation’s Strength.” March 22, 1942 (Knights of Columbus). Record Group 65. Entry 51. Box 2. NARA—CP.
— “The Challenge to Youth.” June 1, 1941 (Boys Town). Record Group 65. Entry 51. Box 2. NARA—CP.

— “Address.” October 5, 1940 (Graduation Exercises, Fifteenth Session, National Police Academy). Record Group 65. Entry 51. Box 2. NARA—CP.


— “Spies and the Underworld.” Washington Star’s This Week Magazine. August 4, 1940. Record Group 65. Entry 49. Box 79. NARA—CP.


—“An Adventure in Public Service.” June 3, 1940 (Drake University). Record Group 65. Entry 51. Box 2. NARA—CP.

—“America’s Duty to the Future.” May 3, 1940 (New York Federation of Women’s Clubs). Record Group 65. Entry 51. Box 2. NARA—CP.


—“Problems of Law Enforcement.” October 10, 1939 (International Association of Chiefs of Police). Record Group 65. Entry 51. Box 2. NARA—CP.

—“Address.” September 30, 1939 (FBI National Police Academy). Record Group 65. Entry 51. Box 2, NARA—CP.
—“Fifty Years of Crime in America.” May 20, 1939 (National Fifty Years in Business Club). Record Group 65. Entry 51. Box 2, NARA—CP.


— “Soldiers – In Peacetime.” September 19, 1938 (American Legion). Record Group 60, Entry 132, Box 12, NARA—CP.


NARA—CP.

— “Present-Day Police Problems,” October 4, 1937 (IACP). Record Group 60, Entry 132, Box 12, File: “Mr. Hoover’s Speeches,” NARA—CP.

— “Law Enforcement and the Publisher.” April 22, 1937 (ANPA). Record Group 65, Entry 51. Box 2. NARA—CP.

— “Problems in Modern Law Enforcement,” April 14, 1937 (Penn Athletic Club), Record Group 65, Entry 51: A1, Box 6, NARA—CP.


— “Crime and the Citizen,” June 24, 1936 (Kiwanis International). Record Group 65. Entry 51. Box 2. NARA—CP.


— “Patriotism and the War Against Crime.” April 23, 1936 (Daughters of the American Revolution). Record Group 65. Entry 51. Box 2. NARA—CP.

— “Detection and Apprehension.” August 30, 1934 (American Bar Association)
  Record Group 65, Entry 51, Box 6, NARA—CP.
— “Uncle Sam and the Kidnapper.” August 2, 1933 (Location Unknown). Record
— “Police Science: Organized Protection Against Organized Predatory Crimes,
  Bankruptcy Frauds.” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 23, no. 6
  (April 1933): 1070-1084.
—“32nd Annual Conference,” July 14, 1925. International Association of Chiefs of
  Police. Record Group 65. Entry 51. Box 6. NARA—CP.
Hughes, Alice. “A Woman’s New York; Fifth Column Panic Recalls War of 1898;
  Matrimony Knocks Off Airline Stewardesses.” The Washington Post, July 13,
  1940: 9.
Immigration Act of 1918 (Alien Act). Public Law 221. 65th Cong. 1st sess. October
  16, 1918.
Irons, Peter H. “American Business and the Origins of McCarthyism: The Cold War
  Crusade of the United States Chamber of Commerce.” In The Specter:
  Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism, edited by
  Robert Griffith and Athan G. Theoharis. 70-90. New York: New Viewpoints,
  1974.


Louis Nichols Official and Confidential File and the Clyde Tolson Personal File.


Mt 25:34-40. Bible.

Mt 25:34-40. Bible.


—“Two Forms of Tyranny.” *Christianity and Crisis*. February 2, 1948: 4


—“European Impressions.” *Christianity and Crisis*, May 12, 1947: 3


—*The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness*. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944.


—*Christianity and Power Politics*. New York: Scribner’s, 1941.


—“After Capitalism, What?” *The World Tomorrow*. March 1, 1933: 204-05.


Norris, George W. “Statement.” Congressional Record. 76th Cong. 3d sess. May 7, 1940.

Norris, George W. “Statement.” Congressional Record. 76th Cong. 3d sess. February 26, 1940.


“Premier Commands All Madrid Forces; 'Commissioner for War' Named to Control and Harmonize Militia and Army; Gas Service is Shut Off; City Is Also Without Water at Night -- Capital Prepares Grimly for Ordeal.” *The New York Times* (October 17, 1936): 9.


Steele, Richard W. “Franklin D. Roosevelt and His Foreign Policy Critics.” *Political Science Quarterly* 94, no. 1 (Spring 1979): 1-20.


Attorney General


— “The President’s Press and Radio Conference.” March 30, 1950. David D. Lloyd Files, Box 5, HSTL.


Wright, Quincy. The Existing Legal Situation as it Relates to the Conflict in the Far East. New York, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1939.


Zimmern, Alfred E. America Europe and Other Essays. New York, Oxford University Press, 1929.
