This dissertation poses two basic questions: (1) Under what conditions are leaders more or less likely to publicly acknowledge cooperative security negotiations or to pursue talks secretly? (2) What impact does this decision have on leaders' subsequent bargaining behavior and their overall prospects of achieving cooperation? To answer these questions, I develop a realist-inspired theoretical framework that advances two main arguments about leaders' management of national security information. First, international audiences — namely, third-party states — rather than domestic audiences often constitute the principal targets of official secrecy and public acknowledgement. Second, leaders' control of information is shaped primarily by the international strategic context and the scope of their states' national security interests rather than domestic political incentives and institutions. My central claim and finding is that
states’ power positions in the international system fundamentally influence not only the way that leaders control information during cooperative security negotiations but also the impact that information management has on leaders’ subsequent willingness to make concessions during talks and their likelihood of reaching an agreement.

I evaluate these arguments empirically by studying leaders’ control of information during negotiations for foreign military base rights. Based on extensive archival research, I have constructed an original comprehensive dataset of 218 negotiation rounds and 59 agreements for U.S. overseas base rights during 1939–1971. I use this dataset to test seven novel hypotheses through rigorous statistical analyses that produce strong support for my argument about international power position and strategic context while systematically controlling for the effects of important domestic political factors. Additional support comes from rich historical examples and comparative case studies based primarily on declassified government records that illustrate the causal processes underlying each of the main quantitative findings.
THE SOUND OF SILENCE:
POWER, SECRECY, AND INTERNATIONAL
AUDIENCES IN U.S. OVERSEAS MILITARY BASING NEGOTIATIONS

by

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For Beth and Jack
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Columbus, Ohio
20 July 2012
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFHRA...........Air Force Historical Research Agency (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL)
CCS.................................................................Combined Chiefs of Staff
CDC.................................................................Caribbean Defense Command
CDF........................................................................Central Decimal File
CF........................................................................Confidential File
CMH.............U.S. Army Center for Military History (Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.)
EAS..............................................................Executive Agreement Series
FDRL.......................Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library (Hyde Park, NY)
FRUS..............................................Foreign Relations of the United States Series
GF.................................................................Geographic File
HMF.............................................................Historical Manuscript File
JCS.................................................................U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
LF........................................................................Lot File
NARA........................National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD)
NATO..............................North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PCD...............................................................Panama Canal Department
PSF.................................................................President’s File
RG.........................................................Record Group
SAC...............................................................Strategic Air Command
SF........................................................................Subject File
SHAPE.................................Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SNF.................................................................Subject-Numeric File
TIAS.........................................................Treaties and International Acts Series
WPD.........................................................War Plans Division

LIST OF MAIN RECORD GROUPS ACCESSED AT NARA

RG 38..............................Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
RG 59..............................General Records of the Department of State
RG 84..............................Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State
RG 218..............................Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
RG 497......Records of the African-Middle East Theater of Operations (WWII Army)
CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION

Henry Kissinger once remarked that *the way* negotiations are carried out is almost as important as *what* is negotiated.\(^1\) One prominent way in which the conduct of international negotiations varies is the level of transparency to outside audiences. Whether distinguished in terms of front-versus back-channel communication, open-versus closed-door bargaining, or public versus private diplomacy, leaders must decide whether to directly invoke the attention of outside audiences by publicly acknowledging the occurrence of negotiations (if not the content) or to pursue talks secretly. Building on Kissinger's insight, this dissertation addresses two sets of questions regarding leaders' management of information during cooperative security negotiations. First, what role does secrecy play in leaders' pursuit of security cooperation? More specifically, under what conditions are leaders more or less likely to withhold or disclose information about cooperative security negotiations? Second, does the way cooperative security negotiations are carried out (i.e., publicly or privately) affect what is negotiated (i.e., bargaining behavior) and how the negotiations end (i.e., the prospects of cooperation)? More specifically, does public

acknowledgment of the negotiations affect leaders’ willingness to make concessions during talks and their likelihood of reaching an agreement?

Consider, for instance, the United States’ negotiations with the United Kingdom for military base rights in various North Atlantic and Caribbean territories. Perhaps the most famous early case of U.S. basing abroad, the so-called Destroyers-Bases Deal of 1941 granted the United States rights to construct air and naval bases on eight British transatlantic possessions in exchange for fifty overage destroyer warships. American and British officials publicly acknowledged both rounds of negotiations prior to their commencement in August–September 1940 and January–March 1941.\(^2\) A little known fact, however, is that these negotiations were preceded by highly secretive talks during June–August 1939 regarding naval base rights in Trinidad, Bermuda, and St. Lucia. So secretive were these early negotiations that upon their completion nearly all of the official records were burned at the urging of U.S. Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles.\(^3\) In fact, these negotiations and the resulting arrangements were not publicly acknowledged until March 1946.\(^4\) Why did American and British officials pursue highly secretive basing negotiations in June–August 1939 but openly acknowledge their negotiations in August 1940–March 1941?

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\(^3\) F. A. Baptiste, "The British Grant of Air and Naval Facilities to the United States in Trinidad, St. Lucia, and Bermuda in 1939 (June–December)," *Caribbean Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (July 1976), pp. 5-43.

Similarly, the recent leak of hundreds of thousands of classified U.S. government documents by the whistle-blower website WikiLeaks shed light on the full extent of U.S. military activities in Yemen, which American and Yemeni officials had publicly denied and disguised as Yemeni operations since late 2009.\(^5\) This leak raises one of the critical puzzles examined in this dissertation: Why does the United States pursue military cooperation secretly with some countries, such as Yemen, but publicly with others, such as Djibouti, where officials have openly acknowledged U.S. military bases and operations since 2002?\(^6\)

Alternatively, consider the United States’ bilateral basing negotiations with Denmark and Norway during 1951–1953. Why did Danish authorities launch a publicity campaign to draw attention to their talks with the United States, while Norwegian officials insisted on maintaining a high degree of secrecy in their negotiations? To what extent do these choices explain the divergent outcomes across these two cases—i.e., the stalemate and breakdown of the negotiations with Denmark and the successful conclusion of the talks with Norway, despite the United States’ greater willingness to make concessions in the former compared to the latter?

To answer these questions, I develop a realist-inspired theoretical framework that advances two main arguments about leaders’ management of information during


negotiations for overseas military basing rights. First, international audiences – namely, third-party states rather than domestic audiences often constitute the principal targets of official secrecy and public acknowledgement during cooperative security negotiations. Second, leaders’ control of information is shaped primarily by the international strategic context and the scope of their states’ national security interests rather than domestic political institutions. My central claim and finding is that states’ power positions in the international system fundamentally influence not only the way that leaders control information during basing negotiations but also the impact that information management has on leaders’ subsequent bargaining behavior and the outcome of talks.

In the remainder of this chapter, I identify this project’s primary theoretical, empirical, and historical contributions by reviewing and critiquing relevant scholarship on secrecy, audience costs, bargaining, and security cooperation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the importance of this study and an outline of the dissertation’s remaining chapters.

**Secrecy and the Pursuit of Security Cooperation**

Existing scholarship suggests that leaders engaged in bilateral security negotiations employ official secrecy to withhold sensitive information from each other or domestic audiences. Rationalist accounts of dyadic bargaining suggest that leaders use secrecy to keep the other side guessing about their exact reservation point or level of military
capabilities or when invoking the attention of domestic audiences threatens to significantly decrease the prospects of cooperation, escalate the risk of costly fighting, or increase the political fallout from a foreign policy failure. Realist scholars similarly argue that leaders resort to secrecy or deception when they anticipate domestic opposition to unpopular foreign policies ranging from the use of force abroad to the terms of postwar settlements. Thus, whereas David Gibbs once suggested that the desire to withhold information from potential foreign rivals is, by far, the most widely accepted explanation for government information policy, John Mearsheimer’s recent survey of lying in world politics concludes that leaders rarely attempt to deceive one another, focusing instead on misleading their citizens.

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Liberal theorists, such as Charles Lipson, also share this view that leaders maintain secrecy mainly for domestic reasons.¹²

This prevailing focus on the efforts of negotiating parties either to mislead each other or to circumvent domestic constraints neglects the fact that public disclosure of pending cooperation also invokes the attention of other state leaders who are not participants in the negotiations. With few exceptions, existing scholarship gives scant treatment to third-party states as targets of official secrecy.¹³ In this dissertation, I argue that third-party states often constitute the principal targets of information control during cooperative security negotiations. In making this argument, I do not suggest that dyadic bargaining dynamics and domestic audiences are unimportant. Rather, the purpose of this project


is to rectify the relative neglect of international audiences as targets of official secrecy in previous scholarship.

A corollary of this neglect is the literature's failure to capture how a state's place in the international system—namely, whether it is a great power—affects its leader's management of national security information.\textsuperscript{14} Consistent with the prevailing focus on domestic audiences, most existing scholarship examines either the effects of regime type on leaders' control of information, where the conventional wisdom is that autocratic leaders are more prone to secrecy,\textsuperscript{15} or the effects of secrecy on democratic leaders' accountability for national security policy.\textsuperscript{16} Without discounting the important role played by domestic political factors, I argue that leaders' use of secrecy is shaped principally by the international strategic context and the scope of their states' national security interests. Specifically, a state's power

\begin{itemize}
  \item[14] One exception is Robert Jervis, who notes generally that "Throughout history, and especially for the great powers, states have often cared about specific issues less for their intrinsic value than for the conclusions they felt others would draw from the way they dealt with them." See Robert Jervis, \textit{The Logic of Images in International Relations} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 7.
  \item[15] See, for instance, Lipson, \textit{Reliable Partners}, pp. 87-93.
\end{itemize}
position in the international system shapes its leaders' management of national security information by affecting the size and attentiveness of international audiences, the types of assets it brings to the negotiating table, and the benefits it seeks to realize through military cooperation. In these ways, this dissertation makes novel theoretical contributions by extending the analysis of secrecy beyond purely dyadic and domestic political incentives and impediments.

Reconsider the two cases of U.S–U.K. basing negotiations in the British North Atlantic and Caribbean territories during 1939–1941. These cases pose an empirical puzzle for the prevailing perspective on leaders' management of national security information, given that the domestic political situations facing American and British officials were not dramatically different across the two cases. The theory developed in this dissertation suggests instead that this puzzle can be explained by changes in the international strategic context after September 1939 that altered both states' incentives to signal strength to adversaries—rather than avoid provoking them, which was the case prior to that point—and offered the United States an opportunity to demand highly favorable terms of agreement that could be used as precedents for future basing negotiations with other potential cooperative partners in Central and South America.

Public Acknowledgement, Bargaining Constraints, and the Prospects of Security Cooperation

Bargaining theorists highlight a dilemma arising from actors' efforts to manipulate constraints that simultaneously enhance their bargaining leverage but decrease the
overall probability of cooperation. As Thomas Schelling notes, the power of a negotiator often rests on a manifest inability to make concessions and to meet demands. Negotiators who pursue a strategy of constraints, however, run the risk of establishing an immovable position that goes beyond the ability of the other to concede, and thereby provoke the likelihood of stalemate or breakdown. Public acknowledgement is one strategy of constraints that formal theorists have linked via domestic political institutions to variation in the process and outcome of international negotiations. Specifically, democratic leaders can use public statements about acceptable terms of agreement to create political costs for making concessions by invoking the attention of domestic audiences that can punish them for poor performance. While this constraint may improve such leaders' bargaining position, it often does so at the cost of shrinking the set of terms that both negotiating parties can openly accept by inducing them to adopt uncompromising demands.


Reconsider, however, Danish and Norwegian basing negotiations with the United States during 1951–1953. Despite having nearly identical domestic political systems and situations, Danish authorities publicly acknowledged their talks with the United States while Norwegian officials shrouded their negotiations in secrecy. Though the United States proved more willing to make concessions to Denmark, those talks stalemated and broke down while the negotiations with Norway ended successfully in an agreement. These decisions and outcomes pose a puzzle for the conventional perspective, for they cannot be explained by domestic political factors. Specifically, as diplomatic historians Thorsten Olesen and Poul Villaume note, “there was no obvious internal party, parliamentary, or electoral pressure for a ‘no’ on the [Danish] Social Democratic leadership.”

This dissertation expands on the general proposition linking public acknowledgement and bargaining constraints by moving the analysis beyond domestic political institutions and incentives to examine instead the effects international strategic factors and audiences. I argue that states’ power positions in the international system shape the distribution of constraints in cooperative security relationships by affecting the balance of vulnerability between the negotiating parties to abandonment and entanglement. Public acknowledgement, in turn, enhances the

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weaker or more vulnerable partner’s bargaining position by invoking the attention of third-party states, whose opposition to the pending relationship generates scrutiny costs that the weaker partner can use as leverage during the negotiations.\textsuperscript{20} While the attendant scrutiny costs of transparency put pressure on the stronger, less vulnerable partner to make concessions, these costs also can motivate the weaker, more constrained partner to adopt uncompromising demands. Ultimately, then, public acknowledgment of cooperative security negotiations produces a short-term bargaining advantage for the weaker, more vulnerable side but has the long-term effect of reducing the overall likelihood that the two sides will reach an agreement.

By emphasizing international power position rather than domestic political institutions, this dissertation thus generates different expectations about which states’ bargaining positions benefit from public acknowledgement than previous scholarship on audience costs. Furthermore, my argument differs from other realist theories, which suggest generally that the bargaining advantage during security cooperation rests with the less vulnerable and less constrained state.\textsuperscript{21}

This argument also helps to explain the divergent outcomes in the cases of Denmark and Norway. Through public disclosure of their basing negotiations with the United States, Danish authorities invoked international scrutiny costs by providing grist for Soviet propaganda and diplomatic protests and by inviting

\textsuperscript{20} On scrutiny costs, see Thompson, \textit{Coercion Through IOs}, pp. 10-11.

unnecessary pressure from the governments of Sweden and Finland to reject the bases, lest these two countries be negatively affected by Russian countermeasures. While this external opposition served to strengthen Denmark’s bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States, it effectively foreclosed any chance of reaching an agreement by forcing Danish authorities to adopt an uncompromising position that went beyond the United States’ ability to make concessions. Thus, the negative feedback from Denmark’s acknowledgement of the pending basing relationship undercut its original objective of achieving cooperation on terms that improved its security relative to the Soviet Union by establishing a hard-line bargaining stance that provoked stalemate with the United States. Alternatively, by not acknowledging their negotiations with the United States, the Norwegians deprived the Soviets of an important peg on which to base propaganda and diplomatic protests. Though this approach may have weakened Norway’s bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States, it enabled the Norwegians to accept a level of military cooperation deemed highly important by their Defense Ministry but considered otherwise impossible to attain in light of that country’s public no-bases policy and renewed Soviet threats of retaliation and strained relations.

Security Cooperation and Foreign Military Basing

I evaluate these general arguments about secrecy, public acknowledgement, and security cooperation by studying leaders’ control of information during negotiations for foreign military base rights. I chose this substantive domain for two reasons. First,
foreign basing is among the most controversial and therefore secretive forms of security cooperation, often perceived internationally as an instrument of aggression or a blight on sovereignty. Yet leaders particularly in host states regularly invoke public attention to basing negotiations, thus posing an interesting puzzle. Second, whereas most previous work on secrecy, deception, and public acknowledgment focuses on conflict scenarios between adversaries, the study of basing negotiations permits an analysis of information control in cooperative security relationships during wartime and peacetime.

Foreign military basing is a prominent type of cooperative security relationship, where the sending state is granted privileges to station its military personnel at naval, air, or ground-force installations on the host state’s territory. It is regularly implicated in the study of grand strategy, extended deterrence, alliance


politics, international trade, foreign direct investment, the provision of economic aid, arms transfers, and host-state defense expenditures, economic growth, and democratization. Yet outside of historical and policy studies of specific access relationships and issues, foreign basing has received scant theoretical analysis or


rigorous empirical testing as a topic unto itself. This dissertation addresses three areas of scholarship in which further work is essential.

Traditional basing scholarship focuses largely on the sending state’s interests and power, assuming implicitly that these constitute the determinants of basing politics, while an emergent revisionist literature shifts the explanatory focus to political and social dynamics within host states. These literatures talk past one another, generating partial answers and non-cumulative findings. To address this limitation, this dissertation carefully theorizes both states’ interests and influence simultaneously, shifting analytical attention back to international strategic as opposed to domestic political factors.

A second area of scholarship in which further work is needed concerns the causal pathways associated with the development of basing relationships. All cooperative security relationships evolve over a series of sequential stages, from entering into negotiations to reaching an agreement and from cooperating under that agreement to negotiating a change in its terms. Since the advancement of cases from


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earlier to later stages is a nonrandom process, a rigorous analysis must carefully model these stages.\textsuperscript{37} Current basing scholarship fails to do this, focusing almost exclusively on later stages of cooperation: namely, the renegotiation of basing agreements.\textsuperscript{38} This failure to systematically model the evolution of cases through each stage and to account for possible selection dynamics leaves our understanding of basing relationships incomplete, at best, and potentially biased, at worst. This dissertation project takes a first step toward addressing this limitation by examining the early stages of basing relationships— that is, the decisions to enter into talks, make concessions during negotiations, and reach an agreement.

A final area of concern is the scope of empirical analyses. Historically, the origins and basic contours of most U.S. basing relationships were set immediately prior to or during wartime and often with host states that were not formal allies. Existing literature, however, focuses almost exclusively on peacetime basing relationships between the United States and major allies in Western Europe and East Asia, thus leaving the history of most access relationships unexamined in any significant detail. The majority of recent U.S. basing relationships similarly have emerged and taken shape in active conflict zones and outside the context of formal alliances. This pattern is likely to continue as the U.S. basing system expands into unstable regions where it previously had little or no presence. Methodologically,


current scholarship is limited to qualitative analyses of a small number of cases. While these studies have usefully illustrated the way in which specific theoretical arguments play out in particular cases, the literature as a whole has yet to conduct rigorous statistical tests on a sufficiently large sample of cases to produce generalizable findings. Based on extensive archival research, this dissertation addresses these limitations by constructing an original, comprehensive dataset on U.S. basing proposals, negotiations, and agreements during 1939 ï 1971. I then use this dataset to test seven novel hypotheses about leaders' management of information during each stage of cooperation through statistical analyses that produce strong support for my theoretical argument about power position and strategic context while systematically controlling for the effects of important domestic political factors. In this way, the project also advances the empirical study of international cooperation more broadly, since most existing datasets code the final terms of formal agreements but collect no data on prior stages of cooperation or on cases of negotiations that stalemate and therefore never result in a cooperative relationship.39

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Why is this Study Important?

Why should we care about leaders’ management of information during foreign military basing negotiations? There are at least two general reasons.

First, as the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy noted in 1997, “information is power, and it is no mystery to government officials that power can be increased through controls on the flow of information.” For this reason, concludes Kenneth Mayer, “the availability of information and the [reasons] for restricting the distribution of that information are central issues of government power, national security, and political legitimacy.” Whereas previous scholarship has focused primarily on the dyadic and domestic political reasons for leaders’ control of information, this dissertation shows that leaders’ use of secrecy also is motivated often principally by international strategic pressures related to power position and third-party states.

Second, the Overseas Basing Commission recently concluded that “the basing posture of the United States, particularly its overseas basing, is the skeleton of national security upon which flesh and muscle will be molded to enable us to protect our national interests and the interests of our allies.” Yet, as Paul Huth notes, “the timely projection of military power with forward deployments of ground troops can

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be undercut by domestic and regional political constraints that preclude extensive military preparations early in a crisis, when they are most critical.\textsuperscript{43} This dissertation explores and demonstrates the central role that both sending- and host-state leaders attribute to information management in their often difficult pursuit of vital military cooperation. In these ways, this dissertation provides new insights and evidence on the potential national security implications of the current \textit{war on government secrecy}.\textsuperscript{44}

**Overview of the Dissertation**

In chapter 2, I first present my definition of a foreign military basing relationship and discuss explicitly what types of cases are included in and excluded from my analysis. I then identify and broadly describe the population of U.S. basing proposals, negotiations, and agreements during 1939–1971. I conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of the sources used to construct the dataset.

In chapter 3, I first outline the three general dilemmas that leaders face when choosing to withhold or disclose information about pending military cooperation. I then develop my theory of how states’ power positions in the international system shape leaders’ decisions to go public or private during basing negotiations and the effects of those decisions on their bargaining behavior and the prospects of

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\textsuperscript{43} Huth, \textit{Deterrence and International Conflict}, p. 36.

cooperation. This theory generates seven novel hypotheses, which are then tested empirically in chapters 4–5.

In chapter 4, I present the empirical analysis of sending- and host-state leaders' decisions to go public or private during basing negotiations. This analysis consists primarily of statistical tests of the first five hypotheses developed in chapter 3. This quantitative analysis, however, is then supplemented with historical examples that illustrate the causal processes underlying each of the main findings.

In chapter 5, I present the empirical analysis of sending- and host-state leaders' decisions to make concessions and to reach an agreement during basing negotiations, with a particular focus on the effects of host-state leaders' decisions to publicly acknowledge the pending relationship. I first conduct statistical tests of the remaining two hypotheses presented in chapter 3. To illustrate the causal processes underlying these quantitative findings, I then present comparative case studies of Danish and Norwegian basing negotiations with the United States during 1951–1953.

In chapter 6, I begin with an overview of the theoretical argument and empirical findings. I then examine the project's relevance to the study of overseas basing and leaders' management of national security information in the twenty-first century. I close with a discussion of several directions for future research.
CHAPTER 2:  
U.S. OVERSEAS MILITARY BASING DATASET, 1939 – 1971

In the first section of this chapter, I present my definition of a foreign military basing relationship and discuss explicitly what types of cases are included in and excluded from my analysis. In the second section, I identify and broadly describe the population of U.S. basing proposals, negotiations, and agreements during 1939 – 1971. I conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of the sources used to construct the dataset.

Conceptualizing Foreign Military Basing

Foreign military basing is a prominent type of cooperative security relationship, where the sending state is granted privileges to station its military personnel at naval, air, or ground-force installations on the host state's territory during wartime or peacetime. Foreign military installations, in turn, are defined as any real-property entity at a fixed land location used to launch or support military activities by foreign forces deployed on a permanent or rotating basis.¹

To avoid practical problems of data collection and cross-case comparability, several types of cases are excluded from my analysis. First, various lesser elements of foreign military presence, if found by themselves or solely in combination with one another, are not included in the dataset: namely, privileges of military overflight, air transit, en route access, ad hoc staging, or technical stop; naval port calls; use of offshore anchorages within sovereign maritime limits; military missions (i.e., small groups of military advisors); pre-positioned materiel, fuel depots, or pipelines; weapons systems (i.e., missiles); and training exercises, maneuvers, or weapons testing. Though these constitute important and often quite secretive types of military cooperation, the access privileges encompassed by such policies are qualitatively and quantitatively different from those related to the deployment and hosting of foreign troops at fixed installations.

The Swedish government’s consent in the 1950s to the United States’ utilization of a secret flight path over the southwestern part of Sweden, for example, does not qualify for inclusion in the dataset because the United States sought only to

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use Swedish airspace. U.S. negotiations with Norway, however, do qualify for inclusion because the United States sought to deploy its troops and aircraft at Norwegian airfields. Thus, what matters for purposes of inclusion in the dataset is that the United States specifically requests rights to station its military personnel at fixed installations on the host state’s territory.

Also excluded are instances where bases develop organically during the course of fighting a war rather than as a result of a specific proposal to enter into a basing relationship. As Bernard Brodie notes, many combat operations are undertaken for the purpose of capturing places already functioning as air or naval bases, or which might be made to serve as such. The intention may be to use such a base for oneself, or to deprive the enemy of its use, or both. For example, as American forces pushed northward toward the Japanese-occupied Gilbert Islands in September 1943, bases were constructed on Nanomea in the British-held Ellice Islands as a part of military operations without specific undertakings regarding them. Such cases may eventually make their way into the dataset, but only when a

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5 Letter from Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal to Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle, 3 June 1944, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 811.245/62, Box 3765; and Memorandum from the Navy Department (Colclough) to the State Department (Hickerson), 11 July 1944, Subject: Abandonment of airfield on Nanomea Island (Ellice Islands), NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, Confidential File (250/34/17/5), 811.234546M/7-1144, Box C82. Also see John B. Lundstrom, Nanomea, Ellice Islands, U.S. Naval Advance Base, 1943-1944, in Paolo E. Coletta and K. Jack Bauer, eds., United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), p. 219.
specific proposal for base rights is made. Thus, the Ellice Islands entered the dataset in November 1945, when American officials approached their British counterparts with a proposal to open negotiations for permanent base rights in the island group.6

Alternatively, cases where a proposal is made and an agreement is reached but bases are never actually built or garrisoned do qualify for inclusion in the dataset. In late 1944, for instance, the United States opened negotiations with Yugoslavia for the construction and use of an airbase at Zara. While an agreement was signed on 18 January 1945, construction of the base was delayed initially by adverse weather and then indefinitely on 18 May following the cessation of hostilities in Europe.7 As the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff note in this regard:

There is a distinction between ‘rights’ desired which can be exercised when necessary, and the actual establishment, garrisoning, and maintenance of bases. Whether or not the United States intends to take advantage of rights at any particular site will depend on a number of factors, such as current strategic concept, the international situation, new weapons of war, and the material and manpower resources available to the armed forces of the United States.8

Thus, what ultimately matters for purposes of inclusion in the dataset is that the United States specifically proposes to open negotiations for base rights — and, then,


7 Combined Chiefs of Staff, ‘Establishment of Air Bases in Yugoslavia,’ NARA, RG 218 (190/1/16/1), Geographic File 1942-45, JCS 356 1-20-45, Box 221.

whether the host state accepts or declines the proposal rather than the actual construction or use of bases.

Finally, renegotiations of existing agreements are not included in the analysis for theoretical and practical reasons. On the one hand, renegotiations are subject to different dynamics and are therefore not strictly comparable to talks for the original agreement. On the other hand, the data collection effort for the initial negotiations proved more time consuming than expected, thus making further research on renegotiations impractical at this point.


Table 1, which is posted at the end of this chapter, provides a comprehensive list of U.S. proposals, host state acceptances/rejections, negotiations, and agreements for base rights on foreign territory where the United States did not already legally possess such privileges during 1939 – 1971. I chose this time period because the United States began to expand its foreign basing network in 1939 and official records after 1971 are not widely accessible due to the minimum 30-year closure period for classified national security documents. During this period, the United States issued 90 proposals to open basing negotiations, of which 82 were accepted by the potential host states.

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host state. These acceptances led to 218 rounds of bilateral talks and resulted in 59 agreements. For each case in the table, I list the host territory/state, the month and year of the United States proposal to open talks, the month and year of the host state acceptance or rejection of the proposal, the negotiation time period, the total number of negotiation rounds, and the month and year of any agreement that was reached. Appendix A presents a summary description of each case.

The observational referents for U.S. proposals, host state acceptances or rejections, and final agreements are relatively intuitive and straightforward: namely, identifying verbal requests and responses for negotiations by state officials and then the existence and text of a signed document. Rounds of talks, however, are more difficult to classify. In fact, though the process of international negotiations is widely characterized as a protracted "rebounding of rounds," scholars have yet to provide a clear conceptualization of a negotiation round, instead using the term loosely in at least four ways. The first option is to treat each meeting as a round of talks. This conceptualization is problematic for two reasons. First, it offers too fine of a measurement for studying a large number of cases, which is why datasets capturing daily events must be aggregated in a substantively meaningful way for statistical analysis. Second, as any given case of basing negotiations can involve hundreds of individual meetings, this conceptualization risks inflating the number of observations.


in the dataset. The second option is to group meetings covering individual issues as separate rounds. The problem with this conceptualization is that basing negotiations do not unfold in a set, predictable, or neat fashion, with each issue being raised, discussed, and resolved before moving onto the next issue. As most meetings can encompass multiple issues at a time, each of which may be tabled, withdrawn, or reopened at any point, the use of this conceptualization would raise concerns about the independence of observations in the dataset. The third option is to treat each iteration of the proposal/counterproposal process as a round of talks. As any given meeting can involve multiple proposals and counterproposals on individual issues, this option raises all of the aforementioned concerns. The final option is to separate negotiation rounds according to identifiable beginning and end points or periods of inactivity/impasse that last at least one month. I used this option to construct my dataset because it offers the most operationally feasible and substantively meaningful conceptualization of a negotiation round for studying a large number of basing relationships.

The United States’ basing negotiations with Norway during 1951–1952 provide an example of a case where all of the rounds are easily separated by identifiable beginning and end points. Specifically, the first round of talks began on 27 August 1951, as a telegram from the American Embassy in Oslo to the State Department indicated that the first meeting regarding military operating rights [was]
held this morning.\(^{13}\) After twelve meetings, this round ended on 20 December 1951 with the signing of a memorandum of conversation that indicated that we have, so far, terminated the negotiations on our agreement\(^{14}\) and then summarized the trajectory of the talks up to that point.\(^{14}\)

On 4 July 1952, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvard Lange, informed the American Ambassador in Oslo, Charles Bay, that his government would be ready [to] resume discussions by the middle of the month.\(^{15}\) Accordingly, the second round of talks began on 24 July 1952, when Norwegian negotiators handed their American counterparts a new draft of the proposed agreement.\(^{16}\) After nine meetings, this round ended with the signing first of an Aide Memoire by Foreign Minister Lange and Ambassador Bay on 17 October 1952 and then of a military-level agreement the following day by the Chief of the Norwegian Air Force, Lieutenant General Finn Lambrechts, and the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, General Hoyt Vandenberg.\(^{17}\)

The United States' negotiations with the United Kingdom for airbase rights on Ascension Island during 1941–1946 provide an example of a case where some of the

\(^{13}\) NOREP 1 from Oslo to Washington, 27 August 1951, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.

\(^{14}\) NOREP 27 from Oslo to Washington, 20 December 1951, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.

\(^{15}\) Telegram 19 from Oslo to Washington, 5 July 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.

\(^{16}\) Telegrams 77 and 78 from Oslo to Washington, 24-25 July 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.

\(^{17}\) NOREP 11 from Oslo to Washington, 20 October 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.
rounds can be separated according to identifiable beginning and end points while other rounds are separated by periods of inactivity/impasse lasting at least one month. On 27 January 1941, the American Ambassador in London, John Winant, and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, commenced the first round of talks regarding the establishment of a U.S. Army air base on Ascension Island in the South Atlantic. Four days later, British officials indicated their general acceptance of the project. This round ended on 7 February 1941, when Secretary Eden presented a formal note that expressed his government’s willingness to agree to this [project] being started immediately, leaving [further] discussions to be undertaken as soon as is mutually convenient.\(^{18}\)

The second round of talks began on 11 March 1942, when American officials tabled a draft agreement at a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). This text was under consideration and subject to regular revision by the CCS until American and British military officials reached an impasse on formalizing the existing working arrangements and suggested, on 25 December 1942, that as this document is predominantly of a political nature, and on the assumption that it will eventually be agreed as between the U.S. Government and His Majesty’s Government, negotiations on the final draft of this agreement should be undertaken.

by the State Department and Foreign Office. U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull never acted on this recommendation, however, for the following reason: “As the operation of the base was proceeding smoothly under the informal arrangement in effect with the British Government, it seemed advisable not to disturb the situation, given the material differences between the British and the United States drafts of the proposed agreement.”

As a result, a period of inactivity ensued for thirty-four months until 6 November 1945, when U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes approached British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ernest Bevin with a proposal to reach a formal exchange of notes establishing long-term U.S. base rights on Ascension. British officials agreed to hold a third round of talks, which commenced on 13 March 1946 and continued until Secretary Bevin officially turned down the proposal in May of that year.

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20 Memorandum of Conversation, 24 April 1945, Subject: “Air Base on Ascension Island,” NARA, RG 59, CDF 1945-49, 811.24549F/4-2745, Box 4655.


A Comment on Sources

I identified this population of cases primarily through extensive archival research at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD) and the U.S. Center for Military History (Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.). This archival research, which resulted in digital scans of more than 17,000 pages of formerly-classified records from the State, War, and Defense Departments, was supplemented with further research in official published document collections: namely, the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, the *Treaties and Other International Acts Series*, the *Executive Agreement Series*, the *Public Papers of the Presidents* series, the *Department of State Bulletin*, and the *Declassified Documents Reference System*. I also consulted relevant secondary historical sources on diplomatic and military history for the United States and each host state. Appendix A presents a full list of the sources consulted for each case.

The fact that the vast majority of my primary source materials comes from U.S. archives and document collections leaves this study open to a charge commonly leveled against American diplomatic historians: namely, that the work only captures the "view from Washington." In other words, by failing to consult relevant foreign archives, this dissertation is not fully capable of weighing important differences in the perceptions and impressions of situations across American and host-state officials.  

My response to this critique is threefold.

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First, it is not problematic to rely primarily on American documents to identify and determine the basic population and general contours of cases—that is, the United States’ proposals to open negotiations, the host states’ acceptances or rejections of those proposals, the beginning and end points of negotiation rounds, and the signing of agreements. The dates associated with these events are not likely to vary dramatically if at all in the official accounts kept by host states.

Second, even the coding of more substantive details such as demands or concessions made during negotiations can be accomplished with a reasonable degree of accuracy based largely on American primary sources. After all, U.S. archives often contain documents and materials for instance, position papers and draft agreements written and presented by host state officials during the negotiations. American records also capture the give-and-take between sides during each meeting, which helps to provide at least superficial insight into host state perspectives, concerns, and bargaining positions.

Third, for more nuanced information on the internal dynamics shaping host state decisions, I rely on the work of historians often host-state nationals who have researched these cases using foreign archives. I have read extensively in relevant secondary historical scholarship, much of which provides rich accounts of the host state’s side of the story. For example, approximately one-third of María Emilia Paz’s excellent book *Strategy, Security, and Spies* is devoted to the United States’ efforts to

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secure air and naval base rights in Mexico during World War II. She presents a parallel, comparative account of the various basing negotiations using primary source materials from the U.S. State and War Departments, which I also have accessed, and from Mexico’s Archivo Histórico, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores and the Archivo de la Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional. Similarly, the Danish Institute for International Studies recently produced a four-volume white book on Denmark’s national security policy during the Cold War. One chapter is devoted entirely to the United States’ failed efforts to secure air base rights in Jutland during 1951–1953. This account is written almost exclusively from declassified documents from the archives of the Danish Foreign and Defense Ministries.

With regard to the use of secondary historical sources, I am certainly sympathetic to Ian Lusticks’ argument that the work of historians is not understood by historians to be, and cannot legitimately be treated by others as, an unproblematic background narrative from which theoretically neutral data can be elicited for the framing of problems and the testing of theories. At the same time, though, this is


precisely why I do not rely exclusively on secondary sources but instead employ a combination of such materials with primary sources gathered through original research at American archives. The juxtaposition of secondary sources and original primary research enables me to carefully judge between competing claims and to recognize incomplete accounts presented by historians and thus to produce a more balanced, fine-grained analysis of each case.\textsuperscript{27}

A final issue to address is the empirical scope of this project. All large data gathering efforts are susceptible to the question: How can we be sure that all cases have been identified? A study of secrecy is especially likely to raise this concern. The short answer is simply that we will never know definitively if the full universe of cases has been identified. In some respects, then, this is a cheap critique, for the reader must entertain at least a basic level of trust in the researcher’s thoroughness and diligence. At the same time, I welcome and encourage anyone who feels that a case is missing to contact me directly and recommend it for inclusion.

That being said, state officials certainly can attempt to destroy, distort, or otherwise contaminate contemporaneous records.\textsuperscript{28} As discussed in the previous chapter, for instance, nearly all of the official American records on the highly secretive talks during June–August 1939 between the United States and the United


\textsuperscript{28} For a brief discussion of this issue, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, \textit{We All Lost the Cold War} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 9-14.
Kingdom regarding naval base rights in Trinidad, Bermuda, and St. Lucia were burned at the urging of U.S. Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles. As Fitzroy Baptiste’s superb historical research on this case demonstrates, though, foreign policy decisions—even the most secretive—tend to leave a paper trail, despite some officials’ deliberate efforts to conceal it. Accordingly, the two years of careful and exhaustive historical research that went into constructing my dataset on U.S. basing negotiations should go at least some distance toward satisfying those who are skeptical of the feasibility of large data gathering projects.

**Conclusion**

This chapter presents my definition of foreign military basing and identifies the population of cases for my analyses. The next chapter develops a realist-inspired theoretical framework for thinking about leaders’ management of information during basing negotiations. This framework generates seven hypotheses that are then tested empirically in chapters 4 and 5 using the dataset discussed above.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host Territory/State</th>
<th>U.S. Proposal Date</th>
<th>Host State Response: Date</th>
<th>Negotiation Time Period</th>
<th>Number of Rounds</th>
<th>Agreement: Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda, St. Lucia, &amp; Trinidad/</td>
<td></td>
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<td>7/1940 ÷ 1/1943</td>
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<td>10/1939</td>
<td>A: 10/1939</td>
<td>11/1939 ÷ 3/1947</td>
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<td>5/1940</td>
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<td>8/1940 ÷ 12/1941</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Y: 12/1941</td>
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<td>Haiti</td>
<td>5/1940</td>
<td>A: 5/1940</td>
<td>8/1940 ÷ 12/1941</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Y: 12/1941</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>5/1940</td>
<td>A: 6/1940</td>
<td>8/1940 ÷ 9/1940</td>
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<td>5/1940</td>
<td>D: 10/1940</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>8/1940</td>
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<td>8/1940 ÷ 2/1944</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>8/1940</td>
<td>A: 8/1940</td>
<td>8/1940-9/1940</td>
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<td>8/1940</td>
<td>A: 8/1940</td>
<td>9/1940 ÷ 4/1942</td>
<td>2</td>
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Table 1 (Continued): The Population of U.S. Basing Proposals, Negotiations, and Agreements, 1939 – 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host Territory/State</th>
<th>U.S. Proposal Date</th>
<th>Host State Response: Date</th>
<th>Negotiation Time Period</th>
<th>Number of Rounds</th>
<th>Agreement: Date</th>
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<td>10/1941</td>
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<td>10/1941 ÷ 4/1947</td>
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<tr>
<td>Line Islands/United Kingdom</td>
<td>10/1941</td>
<td>A: 10/1941</td>
<td>10/1941 ÷ 4/1947</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands/United Kingdom</td>
<td>10/1941</td>
<td>A: 10/1941</td>
<td>10/1941 ÷ 5/1946</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Antilles/Netherlands</td>
<td>12/1941</td>
<td>A: 12/1941</td>
<td>12/1941 ÷ 1/1942</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Y: 1/1942</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Siberia/Soviet Union</td>
<td>7/1942</td>
<td>D: 1/1943</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
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Table 1 (Continued): The Population of U.S. Basing Proposals, Negotiations, and Agreements, 1939 – 1971

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<th>Host State Response: Date</th>
<th>Negotiation Time Period</th>
<th>Number of Rounds</th>
<th>Agreement: Date</th>
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<td>7/1944</td>
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<td>D: 8/1945</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3/1948</td>
<td>D: 3/1948</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1/1949</td>
<td>D: 9/1949</td>
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<tr>
<td>Host Territory/State</td>
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<td>Negotiation Time Period</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12/1965</td>
<td>D: 12/1965</td>
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<tr>
<td>Onn Kyunt Island/Bangladesh</td>
<td>3/1971</td>
<td>D: 3/1971</td>
<td>NA</td>
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NOTE: A = Accept; D = Decline; NA = Not Applicable; Y = Yes; N = No. Dates are presented as month/year.
In this chapter, I develop a theory of how states’ power positions in the international system shape (1) leaders’ decisions to go public or private during military basing negotiations and (2) the effects of those decisions on leaders’ bargaining behavior and the prospects of cooperation. This theory abstracts from purely dyadic and domestic political factors, holding constant any influence they may exert on leaders’ use of secrecy in pursuit of security cooperation. In doing so, I am not suggesting that these are unimportant, for leaders engaged in negotiations clearly have incentives to withhold information from each other and domestic audiences. Rather, the purpose of this theory is to rectify the relative neglect of international audiences — namely, third-party states — as targets of information control in previous scholarship.

In the first part of this chapter, I outline the three general dilemmas that leaders face when choosing to disclose or withhold information about pending military cooperation. In the second part, I argue that a state’s power position in the international system is a primary causal factor influencing the way leaders handle these dilemmas.
Dilemmas of Information Disclosure in Cooperative Security Negotiations

Leaders engaged in cooperative security negotiations must decide whether to directly invoke the attention of outside audiences (going public) or to pursue talks secretly without their knowledge (going private). For the purposes of this study, then, the concept of secrecy or going private captures leaders’ concealment of the occurrence as well as the content of negotiations rather than simply the latter. Leaders face three general dilemmas when choosing to disclose or withhold information about pending military cooperation. In confronting these dilemmas, leaders are assumed to act rationally, choosing the most efficient means for the attainment of identified ends, and strategically, calculating options based on expectations of other actors’ behavior.

Constraints, Bargaining Leverage, and the Prospects of Cooperation

The first dilemma arises from leaders’ efforts to manipulate constraints that simultaneously enhance their bargaining leverage but decrease the overall probability of cooperation. As Thomas Schelling notes, often in bargaining situations we must maneuver into a position where we no longer have much choice left. This is the old business of burning bridges of maneuvering into a position where one clearly cannot yield. In strategy the advantage goes often to the one who arranges the

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1 This point is similar to Dean Pruitt’s distinction between back-channel communication, which is completely unknown to outside audiences, and front-channel communication, which is known but not necessarily witnessed by outside audiences. See Dean G. Pruitt, Back-channel Communication in the Settlement of Conflict, International Negotiation, Vol. 13, No. 1 (April 2008), pp. 37-54. Similarly, David Pozen distinguishes between deep secrets, where leaders conceal from outside audiences the fact that they are concealing information, and shallow secrets, where audiences understand that they are being denied certain items of information. See David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 62, No. 2 (January 2010), pp. 257-340.
status quo in his favor and thus relinquishes to the other side the initiative to concede.\(^2\) Going public is one prominent strategy of constraints, where leaders invoke the attention of outside audiences to generate opposition as a tactic for signaling their resolve to stand firm in negotiations or for enhancing their bargaining leverage by creating additional costs for accepting less favorable terms of agreement. As Duncan Black observes, however, in light of the obstinacy attendant to such a strategy, it is quite possible that no agreement will be reached, for a nation may refuse to move from its more-preferred solutions, in the hope that it may thereby force the others to make the concessions.\(^3\) Thus, formal theorists have shown that when public acknowledgement generates a higher level of constraints for one of the negotiating parties, that leader’s bargaining position often improves, though at the cost of shrinking the set of terms that both negotiating parties can openly accept by inducing them to posture and adopt uncompromising demands. This bargaining inefficiency creates an incentive for leaders to pursue talks secretly.\(^4\)


For instance, when the United States approached Greece in April 1953 with a request for base rights, Prime Minister Alexandros Papagos agreed to hold talks but desired to release a press statement shortly before the negotiations commenced in late August. In a telegram to the American Embassy in Athens, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles gave the following reasons for the United States’ opposition to invoking public attention: (1) ‘Greece constitutes [a] sensitive peripheral area and it would constitute useful grist [for] Soviet propaganda’; (2) ‘Certain arrangements are politically sensitive…We are attempting [to] avoid public speculation and discussion’; and (3) ‘We fear [the] inference that [the] Greeks might use [the] grant [of] base rights as leverage [to] obtain concessions. Public announcement would strengthen [the] Greek hand [in] this respect.’ Not wishing to jeopardize the negotiations, Papagos ultimately decided to withhold the announcement. Similarly, when approached by American officials in June 1940 to discuss the construction and use of air and naval bases, Uruguayan Foreign Minister Alberto Guani agreed to hold


6 Telegram 725 from Washington to Athens, 28 August 1953, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-1954, 711.56381/8-1453, Box 3198.

7 Telegram 668 from Athens to Washington, 1 September 1953, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-1954, 711.56381/9-153, Box 3198.
talks but, anticipating opposition from Argentina, insisted that any actual agreement to use the bases by the United States might be the subject of a secret agreement.  

**Precedents: The Benefits of Success and the Costs of Failure**

The second dilemma is that the attentiveness of outside audiences to leaders’ foreign policy behavior simultaneously increases the benefits of success and the costs of failure. In particular, leaders manage information to accrue (or avoid) the precedent-setting benefits (or costs) of concessions. As Paul Anderson notes, Governments care about the expectations other governments infer from their behavior because expectations make a difference. Unlike public diplomacy, secret foreign policy actions will be relatively unconstrained by the influence of precedents on expectations. Thus, leaders may go public to set favorable precedents for future negotiations with third-party states – namely, other potential cooperative partners – or pursue talks privately to minimize the precedent-setting nature of their concessions.

For instance, when the United States sought to release a public statement regarding its

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8 Despatches 999, 7 June 1940, and 1003, 10 June 1940, from Montevideo to Washington, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-1944, Confidential File (250/34/16/3-4), 810.20 Defense/864 and 871, Box C19.


basing negotiations with Ethiopia in 1952, Foreign Minister Ato Aklilou demanded that the negotiations remain secret, fearing otherwise that "many European bees will want an equal right to sip the Ethiopian honey."\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{Deterrence, Provocation, and Surprise}

The final dilemma confronting leaders engaged in cooperative security negotiations is the potential trade-off between the deterrent or coercive benefits from publicly signaling strength to an adversary and the risk of diminishing the military effectiveness of the relationship by unnecessarily provoking an opponent to take preventive measures or sacrificing the tactical advantages of surprise.\textsuperscript{13} Returning to the case of Greece, for instance, Prime Minister Papagos sought to release a press statement prior to the negotiations partially in an effort to deter a possible Bulgarian attack.\textsuperscript{14} Alternatively, when asked at an October 1943 news conference whether the United States would approach Russia for airbase rights in Siberia for bombing raids against the Japanese home islands, President Franklin Roosevelt dismissed the


\textsuperscript{14} Hatzivassiliou, \textit{Greece and the Cold War}, p. 33.
question by responding rhetorically, "What do you think Japan would do? Try and stop it!" Yes. The Japanese would start invading Siberia. The Russians would, of course, resist. But suppose Russia wasn’t prepared to fight a two-front war; suppose she had all she could do to fight the Germans.\(^\text{15}\) Shortly thereafter, however, in a private meeting with Marshal Joseph Stalin, President Roosevelt requested rights to construct airbases and station one thousand American heavy bombers in Siberia, emphasizing that the project must be accomplished with the utmost secrecy.\(^\text{16}\)

In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that the international strategic context and the scope of states’ national security interests are primary causal factors influencing the way leaders handle these three dilemmas.

A Theory of Power, Secrecy, and International Audiences in Basing Negotiations

I develop a theory of how states’ power positions in the international system shape leaders’ decisions to go public or private during military basing negotiations and the effects of those decisions on leaders’ bargaining behavior and the prospects of cooperation. The basic logic of the theory is rooted in two general propositions traditionally associated with a realist perspective on international politics. First, given the lack of a supranational authority with the power to protect states’ independence,


leaders are on their own to promote their state’s national interests. Accordingly, ensuring the security of their state from external threat and preserving the autonomy of their foreign policy from external influence constitute basic goals. Second, the full scope of a state’s national interests and efforts to advance them is driven principally by its power position in the international system. In particular, the security interests, goals, and concerns of great powers are more complex and multidimensional than those of weaker states. Whereas small powers focus primarily on preserving the security and independence of their national territory, great powers seek to advance myriad military, political, and economic interests that implicate the security of their homeland and various extended territories.

In the first subsection below, I argue that a state’s power position also shapes its leaders’ management of national security information by affecting the size and attentiveness of international audiences, the types of assets it brings to the negotiating table, and the benefits it seeks to realize through military cooperation. This argument generates five novel hypotheses about leaders’ decisions to go public or private during military basing negotiations. In the second subsection, I extend this argument to show how states’ power positions and leaders’ management of national security

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information affect their bargaining behavior and the prospects of cooperation, generating two novel hypotheses about the effects of public acknowledgement on leaders' willingness to make concessions during basing negotiations and their likelihood of reaching an agreement.

*Power, Secrecy, and the Pursuit of Security Cooperation*

A state's power position in the international system shapes its leaders' management of information and thus the decision to go public or private during military basing negotiations in three ways: by affecting the size and attentiveness of international audiences, the types of assets it brings to the negotiating table, and the benefits it seeks to realize through military cooperation.

**The Size and Attentiveness of International Audiences.** The first way a state's power position shapes its leaders' management of national security information is by affecting the size and attentiveness of international audiences. Put simply, a great power's foreign policy choices are likely to receive more attention from a wider international audience, including allies and adversaries, because its behavior affects a broader range of actors and interests. Consequently, a great power's pursuit of a controversial foreign policy, such as a military basing relationship, is likely to generate a higher level of international attention and thus possibly increased opposition. For the same reason, the precedent-setting effects of concessions whether positive or negative are also likely to be more expansive for great powers, given the scope of their other international relationships.
Most basing relationships are characterized by a dramatic asymmetry of capabilities between the sending and host states. The sending state is invariably a great power and often enjoys a preponderance of material capabilities relative to the receiving state.\(^{19}\) Some hosts, however, are also great powers, accounting for 41 (or 18.8\%) of the 218 rounds of U.S. negotiations during 1939–1971.\(^{20}\) The argument above implies that leaders should be less inclined to disclose information during basing negotiations when both sending and host states are great powers for two reasons. First, military cooperation between two great powers holds significant international implications simply by virtue of their potential aggregate capabilities. Consequently, public acknowledgement of pending great-power cooperation will attract the attention of a wider international audience and thus invite enhanced opposition, particularly from adversaries. Second, the decision by one great power to host another great power’s military forces on its territory may be perceived by international audiences as a signal of the former’s diminishing status as a major player. Given that they must rely upon their own power for the protection of their existence and power position, [great powers] can hardly neglect the effect that

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\(^{19}\) Specifically, the mean ratio of aggregate power for the United States and the host states was 0.92 for the 218 rounds of basing negotiations during 1939-1971. This captures the average of the ratios of the sending and host states’ total population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military manpower, and military expenditures, translated to a continuous scale ranging from 0 to 1. Values near 0.5 indicate approximate parity, while values above 0.5 indicate a power advantage for the sending state. The primary source of data is the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset. See J. David. Singer, *Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on National Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985*, *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer 1987), pp. 115-132.

The loss of prestige will have upon their power position on the international scene.\(^{21}\)

This suggests the first hypothesis.

\[ H1: \text{Sending- and host-state leaders are less likely to go public when both states are great powers.} \]

ASSETS, COERCION, AND BARGAINING LEVERAGE. The second way a state’s power position shapes its leaders’ management of national security information is by affecting the types of assets it brings to the negotiating table. The assets states bring to a cooperative security relationship vary in their specificity, ranging from aggregate resources that are “highly flexible and easily transferred from one application to another” to issue-specific assets that are “highly specialized and difficult to redirect.”\(^{22}\) When security cooperation is symmetrical in terms of assets, both parties bring primarily aggregate or issue-specific resources to the negotiating table. In asymmetrical relationships, one party possesses primarily aggregate and the other issue-specific assets. Whereas great powers exert influence by virtue of their aggregate economic and military capabilities, weaker states gain bargaining leverage by manipulating relationship-specific assets needed by the stronger state.\(^{23}\) Basing relationships are characterized by this type of asymmetry of assets, for each host state enjoys an advantage in issue-specific power by virtue of its sovereign control over...

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\(^{21}\) Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 91.


site-specific resources. In particular, a weak state that controls access to strategically-located territory can use the threat of territorial denial to effectively reduce the overall leverage that the superior sending state can wield during the negotiations. Consequently, the sending state’s material predominance does not necessarily translate into a clear bargaining advantage, except in cases where its capabilities carry an explicit threat of coercion. For instance, some basing agreements are outgrowths of colonial relationships (e.g., the Philippines in 1947) or military occupations imposed on vanquished enemies (e.g., Germany and Japan in 1952). In such cases of imposed cooperation, the host-state leader’s contractive capacity is sufficiently impaired that she has little choice but to make any desired concessions.

24 The general point being made here is that the nature of basing relationships is such that the host state always enjoys an advantage in issue-specific power relative to the sending state because it controls access to the fixed asset of strategically-located territory. Of course, the specificity of any particular base or host state does vary depending on numerous contextual factors. As Alexander Cooley and Hendrik Spruyt note, the particular asset specificity of each overseas U.S. military installation will depend on a number of factors, including the importance of an installation to a major theater of operation, its functional importance within a particular operational or logistics network, and/or its positional importance to a regional command. In addition, the value and specificity of a base might be subject to particular doctrinal or institutional innovations that may alter the relative strategic value of that installation. Technological innovations may render certain assets and installations obsolete or increase the value of others. A final factor determining the specificity of certain bases to the overall U.S. network is the periodic consolidation and reorganization of redundant sites. See Alexander Cooley and Hendrik Spruyt, Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). Consequently, one host state may possess more issue-specific power relative to another host state due to any one of these or other factors. The theoretical argument developed here, however, does not attempt to assess or capture the specificity of one host state compared to another. Instead, it focuses on the broader point about host states’ general advantage in issue-specific power relative to the sending state.


and to do so publicly. All else equal, I argue that sending-state leaders can attempt to use such unequal agreements to set favorable precedents for future negotiations with other states. This suggests a second hypothesis.

**H2**: Sending- and host-state leaders are more likely to go public when the host state was recently subjugated by the sending state.

**The Benefits of Security Cooperation.** The third way a state's power position shapes its leaders' management of information is by affecting the benefits it seeks to realize through security cooperation. In general, a military relationship can advance a state's security (i.e., its ability to preserve a desired status quo) or autonomy (i.e., its ability to pursue desired changes in the status quo). When military cooperation is symmetrical, both parties receive either security or autonomy benefits. In asymmetrical relationships, one party receives security and the other autonomy. Basing relationships, by definition, involve the host state offering concessions (i.e., access privileges) that increase the sending state's freedom of action by extending its ability to project power abroad. In return, the host state can receive a variety of quid pro quo, though most enter into basing relationships primarily for the security benefits implicit in hosting a foreign military. This asymmetry of benefits, with the sending state receiving autonomy and the host state security, shapes leaders' decisions.

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management of information during basing negotiations by affecting how they assess the dilemma between deterring and provoking adversaries in light of the international strategic context.

A state’s ability to quickly project power declines with distance, while the threat posed by an adversary increases with proximity. A primary purpose of foreign military basing is to enhance the sending state’s ability to overcome the time-distance problem inherent to power projection by establishing a forward presence near potential theaters of operation ahead of time. Foreign basing relationships are perceived as security-enhancing by host states and provocative by adversaries, in turn, precisely because they bring the sending state’s military capabilities into closer proximity to both. As a great power seeking to enhance its autonomy by expanding its forward presence abroad, the sending state will be more inclined to pursue a basing relationship secretly when it expects an adversary to have heightened incentive and ability to forcefully oppose particular negotiations. The argument above suggests that this is especially likely in two situations. The first is when the potential host territory is located on the immediate periphery of the sending state’s adversary, for a proximate threat is more likely to prompt the enemy to forcefully oppose the negotiations. The second is when the sending state’s ability to deter or compel an

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adversary is undermined by an overextension of its military capabilities. Specifically, taking on simultaneous military commitments in multiple disputes increases the risk of spreading the sending state’s forces too thin.\(^3\) Thus, when the sending state is already engaged in a war, it will be more likely to pursue basing negotiations secretly for fear of triggering a response by the enemy against the host or some other territory where it may not be prepared to resist. In both situations, the host-state leader also is likely to prefer secret negotiations to avoid prematurely provoking military retaliation against her homeland from the sending state’s enemy. This suggests the third hypothesis.

\(H3: \text{Sending- and host-state leaders are less likely to go public when} \)
\( (a) \text{ the potential host territory shares a border with an adversary of the sending state or} \)
\( (b) \text{ the sending state is involved in an interstate war.} \)

As a weaker state seeking to enhance its security by hosting a foreign military, however, the receiving state will be more inclined to pursue a basing relationship publicly when it faces an immediate external threat. In this case, the host-state leader has incentives to use a public basing relationship to signal strength to her adversary, for any perceived increase in the host state’s capabilities that is attendant to engaging in military cooperation with the sending state may serve to deter the host state’s enemy or compel it to seek an early negotiated settlement if fighting occurs. In light of the host state’s need for immediate support, the sending-state leader will be more likely to accept public negotiations in this situation, anticipating enhanced bargaining.

leverage and thus more favorable agreement terms. This is especially likely when the host state is already engaged in active conflict, for the fear of prematurely provoking its adversary is no longer operative. This suggests the fourth hypothesis.

*H4:* Sending- and host-state leaders are more likely to go public when the host state is involved in an interstate war.

Alternatively, a state may seek to ensure its security or autonomy by pursuing a policy of neutrality whereby it agrees to remain impartial in ongoing conflicts, specifically preventing other states from using its territory for military purposes in return for their agreeing not to violate its territorial integrity. Yet neutral states often are approached for base rights, accounting for 63 (or 28.9%) of the 218 rounds of U.S. negotiations during 1939–1971. Moreover, the United States itself as the sending state was committed to a neutralist policy for 48 (or 22%) of the rounds. The arguments above imply that leaders will be more likely to pursue basing negotiations secretly when either is publicly committed to neutrality for three reasons. First, from the sending state’s perspective as a great power, publicly pursuing base rights on neutral territory may set an unfavorable precedent that motivates adversaries to seek their own footholds in neutral states. Second, when the sending state itself is neutral, it may pursue basing negotiations secretly as a strategy for discreetly building up its forward presence and preserving the advantages of surprise in anticipation of future conflict. Third, from the host’s perspective as a weaker state, neutrality can be a

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matter of existence. Thus, for a small neutral state, publicly granting base rights to a great power may be dangerous, as it invites opposition from the sending state’s adversaries. This suggests the fifth hypothesis.

\textit{H5: Sending- and host-state leaders are less likely to go public when either state is publicly committed to a policy of neutrality in an ongoing conflict.}

\textit{Public Acknowledgement, Bargaining, and the Prospects of Security Cooperation}

In this subsection, I extend the argument above in two ways to show how states’ power positions and leaders’ management of national security information affect their bargaining behavior and the prospects of cooperation. First, I argue that power position shapes the distribution of constraints in cooperative security relationships by affecting the balance of vulnerability between the negotiating parties to abandonment and entanglement. Second, I argue that public acknowledgement can enhance the more vulnerable or constrained partner’s bargaining position by invoking the attention of third-party states, whose opposition to the pending relationship generates scrutiny costs that affect the negotiating parties’ willingness to make concessions and the overall likelihood of reaching an agreement.

\textit{Power Asymmetries and the Balance of Vulnerability.} As suggested above, cooperative security relationships vary broadly across two dimensions: the benefits each partner seeks to realize (i.e., security or autonomy) and the assets each partner brings to the negotiating table (i.e., issue-specific or aggregate). These two


dimensions tend to co-vary, since each partner can offer and receive different benefits in light of the complementary assets each brings to the relationship.\textsuperscript{35} For this reason, cooperative security relationships often exhibit an asymmetry across both dimensions, with one side seeking autonomy and bringing primarily aggregate resources to the negotiating table and the other seeking security and offering issue-specific assets in return. Basing relationships exhibit this dual asymmetry, with the host state offering issue-specific concessions (i.e., access to strategic territory) that increase the sending state's freedom of action by extending its ability to project power abroad. In return, the host state receives the security benefits implicit in hosting a great power's military forces.

Such asymmetries shape the distribution of constraints in cooperative security relationships by affecting the balance of vulnerability between the negotiating parties to abandonment and entanglement. Abandonment refers broadly to the fear that one's partner may fail to deliver its end of the bargain.\textsuperscript{36} Entanglement, on the other hand, refers to the concern that one may be compelled to pursue costly policies (or may experience negative externalities) on account of the relationship.\textsuperscript{37} Because they are

\textsuperscript{35} See, for instance, Morrow, \textit{Alliances and Asymmetry.}


\textsuperscript{37} In place of the conventional term entrapment, Tongfil Kim proposes the broader term entanglement, of which entrapment is a subset. Entanglement is defined as \textit{the process whereby a state is compelled to aid an ally in a costly and unprofitable enterprise because of the alliance}, whereas \textit{entrapment} is a form of undesirable entanglement in which the entangling state adopts a \textit{risky or offensive} policy not specified in the alliance agreement.\textsuperscript{6} See Tongfi Kim, \textit{Why Alliances Entangle But Seldom Entrap States}, \textit{Security Studies}, Vol. 20, No. 3 (July 1 September 2011), p. 355.
more dependent on the cooperative relationship, states seeking security and possessing inflexible specific assets are generally more vulnerable to both abandonment and entanglement and thus more constrained than states seeking autonomy and possessing more flexible aggregate assets.

Basing relationships demonstrate this point. Given that the host state’s territory is simultaneously the fixed asset it seeks to secure through the relationship and the one it offers as its side of the bargain, the host is more exposed to the risk of abandonment and entanglement than the sending state, whose objectives and assets afford greater flexibility. Host states often view foreign bases as a way of cementing a great power’s defense commitment, while at the same time recognizing that the sending state possesses the ability to withdraw or redeploy its forces elsewhere if its strategic interests change.  

38 Similarly, though hosting a foreign military may

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generally increase the probability of successful extended deterrence,\textsuperscript{39} it also can place the host state ťon the target list of another power.\textsuperscript{40} While the sending state itself is certainly susceptible to abandonment and entanglement ť as reflected in the locational redundancy of the United Statesôbasing system and its preference for retaining unrestricted use rights ť the nature of the sending stateô objectives and assets helps to minimize these risks and affords it a greater ability to adjust should either arise. This imbalance of vulnerability, then, places a higher level of constraints on the host state.

In his seminal work *Alliance Politics*, Glenn Snyder suggests generally that one strategy for dealing with abandonment fears is to draw attention to them through the use of ťdiplomatic communications and public statements,ô while one way of dealing with entanglement concerns is ťthrough the exercise of bargaining power.ô\textsuperscript{41} In the next subsection, I argue that for host states, on account of their higher level of constraints, these strategies are one and the same.

**Public Acknowledgement and International Scrutiny.** Underlying the host stateô negotiating behavior, given its vulnerable position, is the desire to avoid serving as ťmere real estateô for the pursuit of the sending stateô strategic objectives


\textsuperscript{40} Handel, *Weak States*, p. 129.

\textsuperscript{41} Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, pp. 184-186.
at the expense of its own interests.\textsuperscript{42} To address this grievance, host states seek concessions across two broad agreement design features. The first is control, which concerns each actor’s ability to influence how decisions are made within the context of the relationship, thus determining each actor’s ability to block undesirable outcomes.\textsuperscript{43} Specifically, the use rights governing a basing relationship capture the choice between agreements that grant the host state prior consultation over the sending state’s use of its troops and military assets stationed within the host’s borders and agreements that grant the sending state unilateral decision-making power to deploy its military forces based in the host state outside the latter’s borders.\textsuperscript{44} The various out-of-area disputes between the United States and West European hosts are prominent examples of bargaining over use rights, where the latter sought to restrict the use of U.S. bases for missions in other regions.\textsuperscript{45} The second design feature concerns the precision with which a basing agreement specifies the behavior it requires, authorizes, or proscribes.\textsuperscript{46} In particular, host states can seek to limit the types of installations, assets, and personnel stationed within their borders and to fully


\textsuperscript{44} Alexander Cooley, \textit{Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 41-42.

\textsuperscript{45} See Geir Lundestad, \textit{The United States and Western Europe Since 1945} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 142-167.

specify the extent of the sending state’s defense commitment. Examples here include France’s refusal to allow nuclear weapons to be stationed at U.S. bases⁴⁷ and Australia’s efforts to link base rights on Manus Island to the creation of a broad U.S. security arrangement in the Pacific.⁴⁸

Public acknowledgement is one strategy that host states can use to press these demands during negotiations. As Robert Keohane notes, for a weaker state that wants political, military or economic support, it is imperative that visibility be maintained by insisting that [its stronger partner] is overlooking some of its important interests.⁴⁹ The visibility attendant to public acknowledgement can invite or intensify international opposition to the pending relationship, generating an additional constraint in the form of scrutiny costs from monitoring by third-party states which the weaker partner can use as leverage during the negotiations.⁵⁰ The logic here is that while sending the signal bears no direct costs (a situation often called ‘cheap talk’ for the host state, public acknowledgement can lead to actions by other actors that impose costs.⁵¹ Such actions include diplomatic protests, hostile propaganda


⁴⁹ Keohane, Big Influence of Small Allies, p. 168.


statements, and other forms of official objections or resistance that carry a threat of strained relations by third-party states opposed to the new precedents and provocations resulting from the pending basing relationship.\textsuperscript{52} This resistance creates an additional bargaining constraint for two reasons. First, following public acknowledgement, host-state leaders are obliged to respond to this opposition, which serves to clarify and, in the process, solidify their bargaining demands. When basing negotiations are secret, on the other hand, third-party resistance can simply be ignored or denied and thus has no constraining effects. Second, it increases the value of noncooperation for the host state relative to cooperation on unfavorable terms. By inviting resistance and the prospect of strained relations from third-party states, particularly adversaries, public acknowledgement by the weaker host does not merely communicate a vulnerability it already had but actually \textit{enhances} that vulnerability in the process. Thus, the message from the host to the sending state is: \textit{In case we were not sufficiently exposed to impress you, now we are.}\textsuperscript{53} This is an informative signal because it conveys simultaneously (1) the host state's willingness to suffer the costs of third-party reactions if the terms of cooperation meet its needs and (2) the imperative of walking away if the terms do not sufficiently compensate for the


\textsuperscript{53} The phrasing of this part of my argument draws heavily and closely from Thomas Schelling's discussion of relinquishing the initiative and the process of commitment by coupling capabilities to objectives. See Schelling, \textit{Arms and Influence}, pp. 43-45, 49-50.
increased vulnerabilities it might otherwise experience.\textsuperscript{54} By effectively maneuvering into a bargaining position where the choice is between noncooperation and cooperation on its terms, the host state has arranged the status quo in its favor and left to the sending state the decision to concede.

These scrutiny costs from public acknowledgement by the weaker, more constrained state put pressure on the stronger, less vulnerable partner to make concessions to ensure cooperation for two reasons. First, with regard to precedent setting, the sending state must balance its preference for securing the most favorable terms possible, as suggested above, with the need to reassure other potential cooperative partners that they will not be exploited. Thus, when one host state goes public to draw attention to unequal gains and liabilities in a pending basing relationship, the sending state can choose to exercise “strategic restraint” by making concessions as a means of ensuring cooperation and alleviating other partners’ fears of domination.\textsuperscript{55} As Donald Moak notes, “United States bases have regularly been the object of allied striving for ‘independence within interdependence.’ When such efforts are focused on its bases, the United States has usually accepted some limitation of base rights rather than risk an open conflict with the host.”\textsuperscript{56} Second, by invoking the attention and thus exacerbating the opposition of a rival power,

\textsuperscript{54} This latter point is similar to Judith Kelley’s concept of strategic noncooperation in asymmetrical bargaining situations. See Judith Kelley, “Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq was not Just about Iraq,” \textit{International Politics}, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2005), pp. 153-173.


\textsuperscript{56} Moak, \textit{Host Country Pressures}, p. 50.
public acknowledgement by the host state can serve to emphasize the severity of the threat posed by the common adversary, thereby blurring the distinction between the host state’s concerns and the sending state’s self-interest.57

For similar reasons, though, the scrutiny costs from public acknowledgement can motivate the weaker, more constrained state to adopt an uncompromising position that goes beyond its partner’s ability to make concessions. As argued above, once a host-state leader has acknowledged the negotiations, she is then obliged to respond to the opposition generated by the visibility. The opportunity to clarify one’s bargaining position can lead, in turn, to a hardening of that position. The result, as Dean Pruitt notes, often is speeches to the gallery—endless repetition of official positions and past grievances—which sound good when relayed to [outside audiences] but do not advance the negotiations. Alternatively, a benefit of secret negotiations is that they are usually disavowable if an outsider finds out about them. The leaders can argue that reports about these talks are faulty, that these reports concern other innocent events, or that the people engaged in these talks were not authorized to do so.58 The negative feedback from public acknowledgement can undercut the host state’s original objective of securing cooperation on favorable terms by establishing a hard-line bargaining stance that provokes stalemate.59


Ultimately, then, while public acknowledgment of cooperative security negotiations by the weaker, more vulnerable partner produces a short-term bargaining advantage for that side, it has a long-term effect of reducing the overall likelihood that the two sides will reach an agreement. This argument suggests the last two hypotheses.60

\[ H6: \text{Public acknowledgement of negotiations by the host state} \]
\[ (a) \text{increases the likelihood that the sending-state leader will make concessions but} \]
\[ (b) \text{decreases the likelihood that the host-state leader will make concessions.} \]

\[ H7: \text{Public acknowledgement of negotiations by the host state decreases the likelihood of the two parties reaching an agreement.} \]

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I develop a realist-inspired theoretical framework for thinking about (1) leaders’ control of information during military basing negotiations and (2) the impact of information disclosure on their bargaining behavior and the prospects of cooperation. This theory focuses on third-party states as the primary targets of information management and emphasizes the effects of international power position and strategic context, holding constant any influence that purely dyadic and domestic political factors may exert on leaders’ use of secrecy and public acknowledgement in pursuit of security cooperation. I derive seven hypotheses from this framework. The first five examine the conditions under which leaders are more or less likely to go public or private during negotiations. These hypotheses are evaluated empirically in

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60 The broader theoretical argument developed in the first half of this chapter also suggests several hypotheses beyond the effects of public acknowledgment that link variation in international power position and strategic context to leaders’ bargaining behavior and the prospects of cooperation. These supplementary expectations are briefly discussed in Appendix C.
the next chapter. The remaining two hypotheses focus on the effects of public acknowledgement on leaders’ willingness to make concessions and reach an agreement during negotiations. These are tested empirically in chapter 5.
CHAPTER 4:
POWER, SECRECY, AND THE PURSUIT OF SECURITY COOPERATION:
ANALYZING LEADERS’ DECISIONS TO GO PUBLIC OR PRIVATE DURING BASING NEGOTIATIONS

In this chapter, I present the empirical analyses of sending- and host-state leaders’ decisions to go public or private during basing negotiations. I first discuss the unit of analysis, variable operationalizations, and statistical model used in the quantitative tests of H1 – H5. I then report the results of the statistical analysis. I also provide several illustrative historical examples for each of the main findings.

Negotiation Rounds as the Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis is the negotiation round rather than the standard dyad-year observation for two reasons. First, more than one round of talks can take place in a single year, and any given round of talks can spill over from one year to the next. By examining the actual episodes of interest rather than yearly observations, this research design is better suited to capture patterns of activity and substantive decisions that do not necessarily unfold on an annual basis. Second, each leader faces the choice of going public or private during each negotiation round. Thus, two outcomes are coded for every round: one for the sending-state leader and one for the host-state leader.

Compared to a dyad-year analysis that aggregates both leaders’ choices into a single observation, this research design is better suited to capture the effects of different variables on each leader’s decision.²

The Dependent Variable and Statistical Model

GOING PUBLIC: The dependent variable for both the sending and host states is dichotomous, coded 1, respectively, if officials from that state publicly acknowledge a round of negotiations prior to its commencement or while it is taking place. Thus, the code of 0 captures going private. The data were gathered through archival research principally in the General Records of the Department of State (RG 59) and the Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State (RG 84) at the National Archives and through supplementary research using official published document collections, the ProQuest Historical Newspapers database, and secondary historical sources.

While both leaders separately decide whether to pursue public or private strategies in a given round of talks, their individual choices are interrelated. Given dichotomous dependent variables, a bivariate probit model is an appropriate statistical technique for capturing the interrelated decisions of two separate actors. This model estimates a separate equation for the likelihood that the sending- and host-state leaders will individually choose to go public in a round of negotiations. The model

also accounts for the interrelatedness of their choices by incorporating the correlation of the errors between the two equations, which is expressed as the parameter rho (ρ).

A statistically significant and positive rho indicates that the unmeasured factors that affect the sending state’s equation also affect the host state’s equation in a similar way. A significant and negative rho, on the other hand, indicates that the common unmeasured factors affect the two equations in an opposite manner. Thus, I estimate a bivariate probit model to examine the sending- and host-state leaders’ decisions to go public during each round of negotiations.

Since a leader’s decision to go public in any given round may be related to her decision to enter into that round in the first place, I also test for possible selection bias by estimating a Heckman or censored probit model. I found no evidence of selection effects biasing the analyses, however, and the results remained consistent. Consequently, I report only the bivariate probit results below.

**The Independent Variables**

The independent and control variables are measured on a month-specific basis to more accurately capture their effects on leaders’ decisions to go public or private. Thus, when either leader goes public, the data for the independent and control

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4 Specifically, the selection model’s estimated rho (ρ) parameter, which indicates the correlation of the disturbances across the two equations, did not approach standard levels of statistical significance. The full details and results of the selection analysis are presented in Appendix B.
variables are drawn from the month when this decision is made. Alternatively, if neither leader goes public, the data for the variables are drawn from the last month of that round of talks.

**GREAT POWER:** This indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the host state was classified as a major power by Vesna Danilovic.\(^5\) The United States was a major power during the entire coding period.

**SUBJUGATION:** This indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the host state was forcibly subjugated by the sending state in the recent past—that is, defeated in war by the United States within the past five years, formerly occupied militarily by the United States, or formerly a U.S. colony. The data were gathered from relevant secondary historical sources and the Correlates of War (COW) Wars dataset.\(^6\)

**ADVERSARY BORDER:** This indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the host territory shares a land or sea border with a third state that is engaged in a militarized dispute with or is a strategic rival of the sending state at the time of the negotiations. Data on land and sea borders come from the COW Direct Contiguity and Colonial/Dependency Contiguity datasets.\(^7\) The primary sources of data on

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disputes and rivals are the COW Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset\textsuperscript{8} and Michael Colaresi, et al.'s dataset on strategic rivalries.\textsuperscript{9}

**WARTIME:** A separate variable is coded for the sending and host states. This indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the state is engaged in an interstate war at the time of the negotiations. Data come from the COW Wars dataset.

**NEUTRALITY:** This indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the sending or host state was publicly committed to a policy of neutrality, non-belligerency, or non-alignment in an ongoing conflict. The data were gathered from relevant secondary historical sources.

### The Control Variables

**COALITION SIZE:** This variable is included as a control for domestic regime type, which previous scholarship suggests affects leaders' use of secrecy. Using Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, et al.'s five-point winning coalition scale, ranging from 0 (the smallest coalition size) to 1 (the largest coalition size), this indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the host-state leader's coalition size equals .75 or 1, thus capturing large-coalition leaders. The code of 0, in turn, captures small-coalition leaders — that is, all

\[\text{COALITION SIZE} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \text{coalition size} = .75 \text{ or } 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}\]

\[\text{WARTIME} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if engaged in war} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}\]

\[\text{NEUTRALITY} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if committed to neutrality} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}\]

\[\text{COALITION SIZE} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \text{coalition size} = .75 \text{ or } 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}\]

\[\text{WARTIME} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if engaged in war} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}\]

\[\text{NEUTRALITY} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if committed to neutrality} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}\]

---


leaders with coalition sizes equal to 0, .25, and .5.\textsuperscript{10} This variable is coded only for the host state, as the United States had a large coalition during the entire coding period. I chose this operationalization of regime type for two theoretical reasons. First, selectorate theory's argument regarding coalition size and the provision of public versus private goods is particularly relevant to explaining leaders' bargaining behavior during basing negotiations.\textsuperscript{11} Second, recent scholarship also links variation in coalition size to leaders' incentive and ability to engage in secret foreign policy behavior.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINTS:} This indicator measures the degree of institutionalized constraints on the power of the executive to determine policy. It is included as a control variable for the elements of democracy outside of the winning coalition: namely, legislative constraints.\textsuperscript{13} Previous scholarship suggests legislative branches that possess significant powers of oversight can decrease the executive's incentive and ability to withhold information about foreign policy behavior.\textsuperscript{14} This

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Alexander Cooley, \textit{Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).
\item \textsuperscript{13} James D. Morrow, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, \textit{Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects of \textit{W} from Other Elements of Democracy}, \textit{American Political Science Review}, Vol. 102, No. 3 (August 2008), pp. 393-400.
indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the EXCONST variable in the Polity IV dataset is equal to 7, which captures executive parity or subordination to a relevant accountability group such as a legislature.\textsuperscript{15} This variable is coded only for the host state, as the United States had a value of 7 for EXCONST during the entire coding period.

\textbf{ELECTION:} This variable is included as a control for cycles of political vulnerability in democratic states, as previous scholarship suggests that leaders are significantly less likely to go public just prior to elections than immediately after them.\textsuperscript{16} A separate variable is coded for the sending and host states. This indicator is coded as the number of months since the last relevant national election rather than the number of months until the next election to account for endogenous election timing in parliamentary systems.\textsuperscript{17} Information on the dates of all national elections comes from the Archigos dataset.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{PRESS COVERAGE:} This variable is included as a control for the effects of the media on leaders' incentives and ability to engage in secret foreign policy


\textsuperscript{17} Huth and Allee, \textit{Democratic Peace}, p. 96.

behaviors. This indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the national press in either the sending or host state printed news stories reporting prospective U.S. military basing in the potential host territory within at least three months prior to the negotiation round. Data for the United States were coded from press coverage in *The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Chicago Tribune*, based primarily on research using the *ProQuest Historical Newspapers* database. Data for the potential host territory were coded from press coverage in national newspapers in each potential host state as comprehensively tracked by the U.S. Department of State in RG 59 and RG 84 at the National Archives.

**TECHNICAL ROUND:** This indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the negotiation round is devoted primarily to technical military details about the force structure deployed in the host state. Given that the disclosure of such information to an enemy could undermine established war plans or sacrifice the immediate tactical advantages of surprise, negotiation rounds devoted primarily to technical military details are more likely to be shrouded in secrecy. The data were gathered from archival sources.

**PREVIOUS PUBLIC ROUND:** This indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the previous negotiation round was public, as a control for past history.

---


20 It is important to recognize that this coding scheme introduces a small amount of bias in favor of 0, as this value is assigned to instances of first negotiation rounds — that is, observations for which there were no prior rounds to acknowledge. As the only alternative would be to drop the first negotiation round for each case from the dataset, the present coding scheme is tolerated as the lesser of two evils.
ROUND: This indicator counts the number of previous rounds, as a control for the non-independence of observations.²¹

The Results

The results of the bivariate probit analysis are presented in Table 2 and provide strong support for the hypotheses and the overall theoretical argument. Moreover, there is considerable support for the use of a bivariate probit model. The parameter rho (ρ) is positive and significant, indicating that the sending- and host-state leaders’ decisions are highly correlated and that the unmeasured factors affecting the sending state’s equation also affect the host state’s equation in a similar way.²² To aid interpretation of substantive effects, Table 3 reports the impact of changes in select significant variables on predicted probabilities for going public.²³ Table 4 provides a summary of the expected and observed relationships.

²¹ To further address concerns related to the nonindependence of observations, clustered robust standard errors are used in the analyses.

²² The extremely high ρ coefficient in this model simply reflects the fact that both decisions, while made separately, often are jointly coordinated, as suggested by the case of Greece discussed in chapter 3. Despite this high correlation, the bivariate probit is a more useful and informative model than a probit with a dyadic dependent variable because the former can capture the different effects that independent variables might have across each leader’s decision. The ability to separate the two wartime variables, for instance, demonstrates the utility of the bivariate probit, as these indicators generate more nuanced relationships that otherwise would be missed with an aggregate dyadic variable.

²³ The predicted probabilities represent the marginal probability of the sending or host state going public, regardless of whether the other state also goes public. The baseline probability was calculated by setting all variables at their mean or mode. The first difference was calculated by subtracting the baseline predicted probability from the predicted probability following a discrete change in the variable of interest from its low value to its high value, holding all other variables constant. The percentage change in probability was calculated by dividing the discrete change in the predicted probability by the baseline probability and then multiplying by 100.
The first hypothesis received strong support. As predicted, both sending- and host-state leaders are significantly less likely to go public during basing negotiations when both states are great powers. In particular, the United States is 48.1% less likely

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES</strong></th>
<th><strong>Sending State Decision</strong></th>
<th><strong>Host State Decision</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Power</td>
<td>-.676*</td>
<td>-.932**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.392)</td>
<td>(.392)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjugate</td>
<td>2.50***</td>
<td>2.29***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.673)</td>
<td>(.664)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary Border</td>
<td>-1.17***</td>
<td>-.965**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.398)</td>
<td>(.401)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime (U.S.)</td>
<td>-.930***</td>
<td>-.684**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.296)</td>
<td>(.338)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime (Host)</td>
<td>.881***</td>
<td>.660*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.322)</td>
<td>(.376)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality</td>
<td>-1.06***</td>
<td>-1.21***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.315)</td>
<td>(.380)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>DOMESTIC &amp; CONTROL VARIABLES</strong></th>
<th><strong>Sending State Decision</strong></th>
<th><strong>Host State Decision</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large Coalition Size</td>
<td>-2.61***</td>
<td>-2.54***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.608)</td>
<td>(.668)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Constraints</td>
<td>.900***</td>
<td>1.19***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.344)</td>
<td>(.436)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election (U.S.)</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>-.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.008)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election (Host)</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Coverage</td>
<td>1.57***</td>
<td>1.64***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.350)</td>
<td>(.328)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Round</td>
<td>-.762*</td>
<td>-.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.424)</td>
<td>(.510)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Public Round</td>
<td>.644**</td>
<td>.902***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.326)</td>
<td>(.325)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.093)</td>
<td>(.093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.704</td>
<td>-.738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.495)</td>
<td>(.476)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 218. Log pseudolikelihood = -90.87.
\( \hat{\rho} = .985 \). Wald test of \( \hat{\rho} \); \( p = .000 \).
Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering.

***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1
and the host state is 74.1% less likely to go public under these circumstances. In August 1939, for instance, when the United States approached France for naval base rights on Fakarava Island in the South Pacific, the following rationale was given for conducting the negotiations secretly.

The [lease] of one of the islands of the Tuamotu Archipelago and the establishment of a naval base there might be interpreted by Japan as part of an encircling movement by the only great power which is at present in a position to wage effective warfare against Japan. This strategic threat to Japan might be expected to render American-Japanese relations more difficult and more unfriendly than they are at present and to increase the likelihood of eventual war between the two countries. It could be further anticipated that in the event of indecision on the part of Japan as to whether she should join with Germany and Italy in a war against Great Britain and France, knowledge that the United States was intending to establish a naval base in the Tuamotu Islands might influence Japan into active participation in the war: Japan might conclude that it would be preferable to come to a showdown militarily with Great Britain and France prior to development of the contemplated naval base as such a base would weaken Japan's position in the Pacific in the event of war with Great Britain and France.24

Precisely for these reasons, the negotiations quickly broke down following the German invasion of Poland and France's entry into World War II in September 1939. Alternatively, British officials often expressed the concern that publicly granting base rights to the United States would be perceived internationally as bad bargains for the United Kingdom and unbecoming of a great power.25 Consistent with these


rationales for secrecy, when news broke in September 1940 that the United Kingdom had granted extensive base rights to the United States in eight British possessions in the North Atlantic and the Caribbean, officials in Germany, Italy, and Japan interpreted this agreement as a sign of both the British Empire’s eminent demise and the rise of an American-led bloc, thus motivating the formation of the Tripartite Pact two weeks later.26

The second hypothesis also received strong support. As predicted, both sending- and host-state leaders are significantly more likely to go public when the host state recently was defeated in war by the sending state, formerly occupied by the sending state, or formerly a colony of the sending state. In particular, the United States is 94.9% more likely to go public when it has forcibly subjugated the host in the recent past. The host state, in turn, is 179.7% more likely to go public. Thus, when the sending state’s superior capabilities carry an explicit threat of force, it can attempt to utilize this leverage to wrest more favorable terms of agreement that may set favorable precedents for future negotiations. For instance, the United States publicly secured highly unequal agreements with the Philippines in 1946–1947 (a recently former colony) and Japan in 1951–1952 (a recently defeated and formerly occupied enemy) by effectively making favorable base rights a necessary condition for granting

### Table 3: Impact of Changes in Variables on Predicted Probabilities for Going Public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Sending State</th>
<th>Host State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>.511</td>
<td>.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>.265</td>
<td>.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Difference</td>
<td>-.246</td>
<td>-.252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-48.1%</td>
<td>-74.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjugate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>.511</td>
<td>.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>.996</td>
<td>951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Difference</td>
<td>.485</td>
<td>.611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>94.9%</td>
<td>179.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary Border</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>.511</td>
<td>.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Difference</td>
<td>-.463</td>
<td>-.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-90.6%</td>
<td>-64.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime (U.S.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>.511</td>
<td>.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Difference</td>
<td>.231</td>
<td>-.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-45.2%</td>
<td>-61.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime (Host)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (1)</td>
<td>.511</td>
<td>.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>.812</td>
<td>595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Difference</td>
<td>.301</td>
<td>.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>58.9%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>.511</td>
<td>.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Difference</td>
<td>-.400</td>
<td>-.283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-78.3%</td>
<td>-83.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOMESTIC VARIABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Coalition Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>.511</td>
<td>.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Difference</td>
<td>-.510</td>
<td>-.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-99.8%</td>
<td>-99.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Constraints</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (0)</td>
<td>.511</td>
<td>.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (1)</td>
<td>.855</td>
<td>748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Difference</td>
<td>.344</td>
<td>.408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>67.3%</td>
<td>120%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Coverage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>.511</td>
<td>.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>.952</td>
<td>884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Difference</td>
<td>.441</td>
<td>544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>86.3%</td>
<td>160%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
both states independence. It subsequently attempted to use these agreements as a baseline during early negotiations with South Korea and Taiwan.

The third hypothesis received strong support. As suggested in H3(a), both sending- and host-state leaders are significantly less likely to go public during basing negotiations when the host territory shares a border with an adversary of the sending state. In particular, the United States is 90.6% less likely to go public and the host state is 64.1% less likely under these circumstances. U.S. negotiations with Turkey in 1953–1954 constitute an example of this, given that the latter shared a land border with the Soviet Union. Specifically, the negotiators agreed that the secrecy [of] military rights [talks was] of great importance because of known Soviet sensitivity [to] actual US military operations [in] peripheral countries and therefore necessary to avoid [a] USSR reaction causing [them] to counterbalance US operations by adjusting their own defense planning and estimates which tend [to] diminish the gains attendant [to] additional US bases.

Similarly, in 1951–1952, American and Norwegian officials pursued highly secretive basing negotiations partially for fear of provoking a Russian retaliatory move against northern Norway, which bordered the

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28 On South Korea, see NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 711.56395B, Box 3200; CDF 1955-59, 711.56395B, Box 2919. On Taiwan, see NARA, RG 59, CDF 1955-59, 711.56393, Box 2917.

29 Telegram 1405 from Washington to Ankara, 31 May 1953, NARA, RG 84 (350/56/13/4), Entry 2454-A, 430.3 i Military Bases Overseas: Turkey, Box 37.
Soviet Union, or against Norway’s Svalbard Archipelago, which was located just across the Barents Sea from the U.S.S.R.  

Moreover, as suggested in H3(b), both the sending- and host-state leaders are significantly less likely to go public when the sending state is engaged in an interstate war at the time of the negotiations. In particular, the United States is 45.2% less likely to go public and the host state is 61.2% less likely under this circumstance. For example, despite general support for a basing relationship in both countries, the United States and Ecuador maintained a high level of secrecy during negotiations for the Galapagos Islands in December 1941 – June 1942, for fear of triggering a Japanese attack against Ecuadoran territory.

The fourth hypothesis also received strong support. As predicted, both sending- and host-state leaders are significantly more likely to go public when the host state is fighting an interstate war at the time of the negotiations. Specifically, the United States is 58.9% more likely to go public and the host state is 75% more likely under this circumstance. In early January 1942, for instance, as Japanese planes extended their operating radius to within 800 miles of Australia, recently conducting two bombing raids against Australian airdromes at Rabaul in the Bismark Archipelago, it was announced that Australian and American officials were

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31 Caribbean Defense Command, Procurement, Occupation, and Use of Air Bases in the Galapagos Islands and at Salinas, Ecuador, CMH Historical Manuscript File 8-2.8 BL 1945.
conducting negotiations for naval base rights, with Prime Minister John Curtin emphasizing the "great encouragement" that Australians should feel as a result.  

Similarly, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill remarked at a meeting of the War Cabinet in August 1940 that one public benefit of the Destroyers-Bases Deal was the "immense" effect it would have on Germany, as the arrangement more closely associated the United States with the British war effort.

Finally, the fifth hypothesis received strong support. As posited, both sending- and host-state leaders are significantly less likely to go public during basing negotiations when either leader is openly committed to a neutral policy in an ongoing conflict. In particular, the United States is 78.3% less likely to go public and the host state is 83.2% less likely under these circumstances. For instance, given Portugal’s neutral status during World War II, the United States’ negotiations for air base rights on Santa Maria Island in the Azores during 1943–1945 were shrouded in secrecy for two reasons. First, Portuguese officials sought to avoid provoking German retaliation. In fact, President Antonio de Oliveira Salazar continually emphasized throughout the negotiations that "the German Minister had been after him repeatedly with all sorts of questions about the possibility of the facilities in the Azores being used by the Americans; and that German curiosity in this respect had been so keen that the question may represent the keystone of German policy with regard to Portugal." Thus

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33 Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy, pp. 116-117.
Table 4: Summary of Expected and Observed Relationships for Going Public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sending State Decision To Go Public</th>
<th>Host State Decision To Go Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expected</td>
<td>Observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power</td>
<td>í</td>
<td>í</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjugate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary Border</td>
<td>í</td>
<td>í</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime (U.S.)</td>
<td>í</td>
<td>í</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime (Host)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality</td>
<td>í</td>
<td>í</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOMESTIC &amp; CONTROL VARIABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Coalition Size</td>
<td>í</td>
<td>í</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Year (U.S.)</td>
<td>í</td>
<td>Ins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Year (Host)</td>
<td>í</td>
<td>Ins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Coverage</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Constraints</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Round</td>
<td>í</td>
<td>í</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Public Round</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** A positive sign (+) indicates a coefficient value greater than zero. A negative sign (í) indicates a coefficient value less than zero. The abbreviation “Ins.” indicates an insignificant coefficient.

he would agree to cooperate only as long as some formula were observed which would permit him to deny officially to the Germans that he had granted any special facilities to the United States in the islands. Second, American officials feared that if Portugal granted [bases in the Azores] to us as a power not allied with Portugal the Germans might cite this as a precedent for obtaining similar concessions from Spain in the Balearics.³⁴

Several of the control variables for domestic political factors also generated significant results. First, basing negotiations between two large-coalition leaders are significantly less likely to be public than negotiations between a sending-state leader

with a large coalition and a host-state leader with a small coalition. In particular, the United States is 99.8% less likely and the host state is 99.1% less likely to go public when both have large domestic coalitions. This finding is consistent with recent scholarship that suggests leaders are more likely to engage in secret negotiations when public attention generates similar levels of domestic audience costs for both parties. It also is supportive of recent work on large-coalition leaders’ enhanced incentive and ability to secretly pursue controversial foreign policies. Second, sending- and host-state leaders are significantly more likely to go public when both leaders face high levels of institutionalized constraints on their ability to determine policy and when there is press speculation about the negotiations in either state. Specifically, the United States is 67.3% more likely to go public when the host-state leader also faces a high level of executive constraints and 86.3% more likely following press speculation. Similarly, host-state leaders are 120% more likely to go public in the face of high executive constraints and 160% more likely following press speculation. These findings are consistent with conventional wisdom that institutional constraints such as legislative oversight and a free press generally enhance the transparency of leaders’ foreign policy behavior. There is no evidence, however, that cycles of domestic political vulnerability shape leaders’ decisions to draw attention to international negotiations. Specifically, leaders are neither more nor less likely to go


36 Brown and Marcum, “Avoiding Audience Costs.”
public when basing negotiations take place in close proximity to national elections. Overall, then, these additional findings indicate that domestic political institutions broadly affect both sending- and host-state leaders' management of national security information during basing negotiations.

**Conclusion**

This chapter poses a basic question: Under what conditions are leaders more or less likely to go public or private during military basing negotiations? To answer this question, I evaluate the first five hypotheses presented in chapter 3 with rigorous statistical analyses that produce strong support for my theoretical argument. Additional support comes from several historical examples that illustrate the causal processes underlying each of the main findings.

This dissertation draws on basic insights from realist theory to emphasize the effects of international power position and strategic context on leaders' management of national security information. The empirical results presented in this chapter show that great powers are more likely to employ official secrecy than other types of states and clearly indicate that leaders generally seek to withhold information about the occurrence of basing negotiations when its disclosure to international audiences may reflect poorly on their state's prestige or when it might unnecessarily provoke adversaries to oppose the talks or take preventive measures. Alternatively, leaders seek to invoke the attention of international audiences when doing so may set
favorable precedents for future negotiations with other potential cooperative partners or signal strength to present enemies.

In the next chapter, I continue this project’s empirical analyses by examining the effects of public acknowledgement on leaders’ bargaining behavior during basing negotiations and its impact on the probability of achieving formal cooperation.
CHAPTER 5: 
PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, BARGAINING, AND THE PROSPECTS OF 
SECURITY COOPERATION: ANALYZING LEADERS’ DECISIONS TO MAKE 
CONCESSIONS AND REACH AGREEMENTS DURING BASING 
NEGOTIATIONS

In this chapter, I present the empirical analyses of sending- and host-state leaders’ decisions to make concessions and to reach an agreement during basing negotiations, with a particular focus on the effects of host-state leaders’ decisions to publicly acknowledge the pending relationship. I first discuss the variable operationalizations and statistical models used in the quantitative tests of H6 and H7. As in the previous chapter, the negotiation round is the unit of analysis for these tests. I then report the results of the statistical analyses. To illustrate in greater depth the causal logic underlying these quantitative findings, I also present a qualitative analysis that compares Danish and Norwegian basing negotiations with the United States during 1951–1953.

The Dependent Variables and Statistical Models
CONCESSIONS: To test H6, the dependent variable for both the sending and host states is dichotomous, coded 1, respectively, if officials from that state make concessions during a round of negotiations. A leader makes a concession when she accepts a
proposal from the other side or explicitly forfeits one of her own proposals.¹ Concessions in basing negotiations can cover an array of issues, such as use rights, criminal jurisdiction procedures, base location, military assets, troop levels, and various political and economic quid pro quo.² Despite the diversity of demands that leaders may have across these and other issues, I code dichotomous variables that capture each side’s basic decision to offer or withhold concessions rather than ordinal variables that attempt to assess the magnitude of concessions. As Kathleen Cunningham notes:

> Treating different types of concessions as if they were a continuum of “less” to “more” is problematic. The value of the concessions depends on what the [actors] want. Moreover, specific demands can have multiple implications. Indeed, many concessions are multifaceted – addressing a number of policy areas – which makes categorizing them difficult and potentially misleading.³

The data on concessions were gathered through archival research principally in RG 59 and RG 84 at the National Archives supplemented with published document collections and relevant secondary historical sources. Given dichotomous dependent variables that capture leaders’ separate but interrelated decisions to make concessions in a given round of talks, I estimate a bivariate probit model to test H6.


AGREEMENT: For H7, the dependent variable is dichotomous, coded 1 if the negotiation round ends with the sending and host states signing an agreement. As this indicator is both binary and dyadic, I estimate a logit model.

Since the decision to make concessions or reach a final agreement in any given round may be related to the decision to enter into that round in the first place, I also test for possible selection bias by estimating a series of Heckman or censored probit models. Again, though, I found no evidence of selection effects biasing either of the analyses, and the results remained consistent. Consequently, I report only the bivariate probit and the logit results below.

The Independent Variable

PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY HOST: This variable is dichotomous, coded 1 if host-state officials publicly acknowledged a previous round of negotiations. This indicator is lagged in this way to help minimize endogeneity problems, thus essentially capturing the equivalent of a prenegotiation public commitment. The data

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4 Specifically, each selection model’s estimated rho (\(\rho\)) parameter, which indicates the correlation of the disturbances across the two equations, did not approach standard levels of statistical significance. The full details and results of the selection analyses are presented in Appendix B.

5 Again, it is important to recognize that this coding scheme introduces a small amount of bias in favor of 0, as this value is assigned to instances of first negotiation rounds that is, observations for which there were no prior rounds to acknowledge. As the only alternatives would involve either dropping the first negotiation round for each case from the dataset or allowing significant endogeneity in the model, the present coding scheme is tolerated as the least worst option.

were gathered through original archival research and supplementary research using official published document collections, the ProQuest Historical Newspapers database, and secondary historical sources.

The quantitative analyses also incorporate most of the independent and control variables for international strategic and domestic political factors featured in the previous chapter. The coding rules for these variables are largely the same, with a few minor changes that are briefly discussed in Appendix C.

The Results

The results of the bivariate probit and the logit analyses are presented in Tables 5 and 7, respectively, providing strong support for the hypotheses. To aid interpretation of substantive effects, Tables 6 and 8 report the impact of changes in select significant variables on predicted probabilities for making concessions and reaching an agreement, respectively. For the sake of clarity and focus, the discussion below is limited to the principal independent variable, as only these results bear directly on the hypotheses. A discussion of supplementary findings for the other independent and control variables can be found in Appendix C.

---

7 The predicted probabilities represent the marginal probability of the sending or host state making concessions (or of both reaching an agreement), regardless of whether the other state also makes concessions. The baseline probability was calculated by setting all variables at their mean or mode. The first difference was calculated by subtracting the baseline predicted probability from the predicted probability following a discrete change in the variable of interest from its low value to its high value, holding all other variables constant. The percentage change in probability was calculated by dividing the discrete change in the predicted probability by the baseline probability and then multiplying by 100.
Table 5: Bivariate Probit Results for Concessions in a Round of Negotiations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sending State Decision To Make Concessions</th>
<th>Host State Decision To Make Concessions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host State</td>
<td>.544**</td>
<td>-.671**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.263)</td>
<td>(.293)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power</td>
<td>.564*</td>
<td>-1.06***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.327)</td>
<td>(.255)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjugate</td>
<td>-.540</td>
<td>1.00*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.546)</td>
<td>(.579)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary Border (U.S.)</td>
<td>.653**</td>
<td>.274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.320)</td>
<td>(.386)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary Border (Host)</td>
<td>.128</td>
<td>.493**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.227)</td>
<td>(.225)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wartime (U.S.)</td>
<td>-.043</td>
<td>.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.201)</td>
<td>(.289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime (Host)</td>
<td>.168</td>
<td>.389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.324)</td>
<td>(.274)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Access</td>
<td>-.884***</td>
<td>-.699**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.248)</td>
<td>(.283)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>-.567**</td>
<td>-.174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.260)</td>
<td>(.323)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Stalemate</td>
<td>-.123</td>
<td>-.705***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.231)</td>
<td>(.220)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round</td>
<td>.157*</td>
<td>.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.084)</td>
<td>(.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOMESTIC CONTROL VARIABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Coalition Size</td>
<td>.515</td>
<td>.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.377)</td>
<td>(.352)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Constraints</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.301)</td>
<td>(.294)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election (U.S.)</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>-.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election (Host)</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Coverage</td>
<td>.301</td>
<td>-.525*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.281)</td>
<td>(.292)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.272</td>
<td>.998**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.365)</td>
<td>(.393)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 218. Log pseudolikelihood = -204.01.
\(j = .825\). Wald test of \(j\): \(p = .000\).
Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering.
**p < .01, *p < .05, *p < .1
As indicated in Table 5, the sixth hypothesis received strong support. As predicted in H6(a), the sending state is significantly more likely to make concessions during negotiations after the host state has publicly acknowledged the pending relationship. Specifically, as shown in Table 6, the United States is 37.7% more likely to make concessions. Alternatively, as suggested in H6(b), the host state is significantly less likely to make concessions after it has publicly acknowledged the negotiations. In particular, it is 18.3% less likely to adopt a flexible bargaining stance. These results are broadly consistent with my argument, first, that public acknowledgement is a strategy that host states can use to press their demands during negotiations and, second, that the visibility attendant to acknowledgement puts pressure on the stronger sending state to compromise but motivates the weaker host state to adopt a hard-line bargaining stance.

I now turn to the logit analysis of the likelihood that negotiations end with the sending and host states signing an agreement. As indicated in Table 7, the seventh hypothesis received significant support. As predicted, sending- and host-state leaders are significantly less likely to reach an agreement after the host state has publicly acknowledged the pending relationship. Specifically, as shown in Table 8, the negotiations are 53.1% less likely to end in an agreement under these circumstances. Again, this result is consistent with my argument that public acknowledgement, while

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Moreover, there is considerable support for the use of a bivariate probit model to test H6. The parameter rho (\( \rho \)) is positive and significant, indicating that the sending- and host-state leaders’ decisions are highly correlated and that the unmeasured factors affecting the sending state’s equation also affect the host state’s equation in a similar way.
producing a short-term bargaining advantage for the weaker partner, has a long-term
effect of reducing the overall likelihood that the two sides will achieve cooperation.

| Table 6: Impact of Changes in Variables on Predicted Probabilities for Concessions |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| **PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**      | Sending State                  | Host State     |
| Host State                      | No (0)                          | .512           | .891           |
|                                | Yes (1)                         | .705           | .728           |
| First Difference               | .193                            | -.163          |
| % Change                       | 37.7%                           | -18.3%         |
| **INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES**    |                                 |                |
| Great Power                    | No (0)                          | .512           | .891           |
|                                | Yes (1)                         | .745           | .557           |
| First Difference               | .233                            | -.334          |
| % Change                       | 45.5%                           | -37.5%         |
| Subjugate                      | No (0)                          | --             | .891           |
|                                | Yes (1)                         | --             | .989           |
| First Difference               | --                              | .098           |
| % Change                       | --                              | 11%            |
| Adversary Border (U.S.)        | No (0)                          | .512           | --             |
|                                | Yes (1)                         | .775           | --             |
| First Difference               | .263                            | --             |
| % Change                       | 51.4%                           | --             |
| Adversary Border (Host)        | No (0)                          | --             | .891           |
|                                | Yes (1)                         | --             | .959           |
| First Difference               | --                              | .068           |
| % Change                       | --                              | 7.6%           |
| Prior Access                   | No (0)                          | .512           | .891           |
|                                | Yes (1)                         | .197           | .685           |
| First Difference               | -.315                           | -.206          |
| % Change                       | -61.5%                          | -23.1%         |
| Ally                           | No (0)                          | .512           | --             |
|                                | Yes (1)                         | .283           | --             |
| First Difference               | -.229                           | --             |
| % Change                       | -44.7%                          | --             |
| **DOMESTIC VARIABLES**         |                                 |                |
| Press Coverage                 | No (0)                          | --             | .891           |
|                                | Yes (1)                         | --             | .739           |
| First Difference               | --                              | -.152          |
| % Change                       | --                              | -17.1%         |
Table 7: Logit Results for Reaching an Agreement in a Round of Negotiations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Acknowledgement</th>
<th>States' Decision to Reach an Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Host State</td>
<td>-.868** (0.435)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

International Variables

| Great Power             | -1.45*** (0.443)                      |
| Subjugate               | 1.25** (0.596)                        |
| Adversary Border        | .211 (0.355)                          |
| Wartime                 | 1.72*** (0.412)                       |
| Prior Access            | .424 (0.414)                          |
| Ally                    | 1.08*** (0.380)                       |
| Previous Stalemate      | 1.01*** (0.370)                       |
| Round                   | .302* (0.160)                         |

Domestic Control Variables

| Large Coalition Size   | 1.04** (0.492)                        |
| Executive Constraints  | -.331 (0.586)                         |
| Election               | -.464 (0.406)                         |
| Press Coverage         | .116 (0.448)                          |
| Constant               | -3.95*** (0.678)                      |

N = 218. Log pseudolikelihood = -100.63
Wald Chi-square (13) = 112.29
Prob > Chi-square = .000.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering.
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1

The qualitative analysis presented in the next section illustrates how the causal mechanisms posited to underlie these statistical findings actually explain the divergent bargaining processes and outcomes in two cases where the predictions of my theory are correct.
Table 8: Impact of Changes in Variables on Predicted Probabilities for Agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</th>
<th>States Decision to Reach an Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Host State</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Difference</td>
<td>- .093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-53.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Difference</td>
<td>-.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-73.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjugate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>.427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Difference</td>
<td>.252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>144%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Difference</td>
<td>.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>386.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>.385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Difference</td>
<td>.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>120%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOMESTIC VARIABLES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Winning Coalition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>.376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Difference</td>
<td>.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>114.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Something Is Rotten In the State of Denmark”\(^9\): A Comparison of Danish and Norwegian Basing Negotiations with the United States, 1951 – 1953

I chose to examine Danish and Norwegian basing negotiations with the United States during 1951 – 1953 because these cases come very close to approximating the strict conditions for a controlled comparison – that is, the study of two or more instances

of a well-specified phenomenon that resemble each other in every respect but one.\textsuperscript{10} Denmark and Norway share similar domestic political dynamics and international strategic pressures. Moreover, their respective basing negotiations with the United States were alike in nearly all respects except for the principal explanatory and outcome variables. As such, this analysis can be thought of as employing a \textit{most-similar} case study design.\textsuperscript{11} Specifically, Danish authorities publicly acknowledged their negotiations while Norwegian officials did not. Despite the United States\textquotesingle s greater willingness to make concessions to the former compared to the latter, Danish officials developed a hard-line bargaining stance that provoked stalemate while Norwegian authorities pursued a more flexible negotiating strategy that resulted in an agreement. Furthermore, these cases clearly illustrate the different effects of, on the one hand, the international scrutiny costs that are attendant to public acknowledgement and, on the other, the deniability that is buttressed by secrecy. The first subsection briefly discusses the general strategic context in Scandinavia during the late 1940s and early 1950s. The second and third subsections explore the United States\textquotesingle s negotiations with Denmark and Norway, respectively.


Strategic Context

Physically weak, geographically exposed, and strategically important, Denmark and Norway together constitute a vital but vulnerable chokepoint in the great-power politics of northern Europe. During the early years of the Cold War, the small state of Denmark was particularly vulnerable on its southern border, given the lack of ground coverage in Schleswig-Holstein and the presence of Soviet forces stationed near Lübeck, and to its east with the home base of the Soviet Baltic Fleet in nearby Kaliningrad.\textsuperscript{12} Norway was even more difficult to defend, with a total land area of 149,273 square miles, including more than 13,000 miles of coastline. It also shared a 120-mile border with northern Russia that was a short distance from Murmansk, the home base of the Soviet Northern Fleet, which the Norwegian Defense Ministry deemed capable of mounting a three-dimensional attack on northern Norway.\textsuperscript{13}

This general sense of vulnerability was reinforced in early 1950 when Danish and Norwegian officials learned confidentially that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (JCS) coordinated war plan for Europe, codenamed \textit{Offtackle}, drew the outer defense line at


the Rhine, as American military planners estimated that Soviet forces could easily knock off both Scandinavian countries in less than three days.¹⁴

Scandinavia formed an essential strategic zone for the Soviet Union. The two most important lines of approach to the Atlantic Ocean for Soviet naval forces were from Arctic harbors around northern Norway and from Baltic outposts through the Danish straits.¹⁵ In addition to being essential access points for the Barents and Baltic Seas, the Scandinavian countries lay “astride the great circle route between North America and the strategic heart of Western Russia” and were “midway on the air route between London and Moscow.”¹⁶ As Tom Hetland notes, “Soviet strategy in Scandinavia was therefore of necessity one of ‘area denial,’ that is to say to prevent the western powers from securing a strategic foothold in the Nordic region.”¹⁷ To this effect, during January–March 1949 the Soviet Union launched a barrage of diplomatic protests and propaganda against Norway, alleging that the Western powers sought to establish military bases on Norwegian territory and seeking assurances against this eventuality. The Norwegian government formally replied that it will not join in any agreement with other states involving obligations to open bases for military forces of foreign powers on Norwegian territory as long as Norway is not


¹⁶ Riste and Tamnes, “Norway,” p. 182.

attacked or exposed to threats of attack.\textsuperscript{18} On its own accord, the Danish government
followed suit in May 1949 when Foreign Minister Gustav Rasmussen issued a
statement that he could promise with certainty that there would be no foreign bases
in Denmark.\textsuperscript{19}

The United States, at any rate, was not interested in Scandinavian bases during
the mid to late 1940s and had not approached either state about the matter. With
regard to Denmark, U.S. officials were concerned that any request for base rights
could set an unfavorable precedent that would open the door for the Soviet Union to
do the same.\textsuperscript{18} On the other hand, the development of allied bases in Norway,\textsuperscript{18}
according to the JCS, would tend to precipitate a Soviet armed invasion of
Norway.\textsuperscript{20} This position changed with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950.
Anxiety among U.S. officials that this conflict constituted a prelude to a Soviet
military thrust westward motivated decisions to formulate specific military operating
rights within the North Atlantic Treaty Area, to grant the Strategic Air Command
(SAC) control over new overseas air bases, and to deploy additional U.S. troops to
Europe.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{18} Greve, \textit{Norway and NATO}, pp. 22-31.

\textsuperscript{19} Despatch 1019 from Copenhagen to Washington, 20 May 1952, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54,
759.5/5-2052, Box 3779.

\textsuperscript{20} Geir Lundestad, \textit{America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, 1945-1949} (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1980), pp. 65-66, 247; Mats R. Berdal, \textit{The United States, Norway, and the Cold

\textsuperscript{21} Rolf Tamnes, \textit{The United States and the Cold War in the High North} (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth,
1991), p. 72; Melvin P. Leffler, \textit{A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman
Upon learning informally in October 1951 of a forthcoming request for air base rights by the United States, officials in the Danish Foreign and Defense Ministries commissioned studies to determine whether Denmark should accept or decline the approach. These analyses decisively favored the proposal for strategic reasons: namely, Denmark’s exposed position, proximity to Soviet occupied territories in Central and Eastern Europe, vulnerability to an unannounced Soviet attack, and the otherwise low probability of allied assistance during the critical early stages of a conflict, given current allied war plans. One Foreign Ministry analysis concluded specifically that “the presence of foreign forces on Danish soil will probably be the best guarantee that the country will not be written off.” These studies recommended, however, that all basing negotiations and arrangements be kept secret to avoid provoking Soviet preventive measures, arguing that the highest risk of conflict would come during the interval between the Russians gaining knowledge of the Danish acceptance and the actual arrival of U.S. forces.22

In light of these analyses, Danish Foreign Minister Ole Kraft informed U.S. Ambassador Eugenie Anderson, in a private meeting on 11 January 1952, of his belief that there will not be any serious opposition to the establishment of NATO air

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bases in Denmark. Consequently, when he met with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson the following month, Kraft expressed Denmark's interest in the proposal, emphasizing only the importance of not disclosing the negotiations to the Soviets until the deployment could be presented as a fait accompli. American officials shared this preference for maintaining secrecy in order to avoid giving Soviet propaganda an advantage. Otherwise, as Acheson wrote to Anderson on 20 March, the United States' ability to obtain proposed positions might be impaired.

It gradually became evident, during preparations for the negotiations, that American officials did not similarly share their Danish counterparts' understanding of the purpose for the bases. As Poul Villaume notes:

Right from the start, Denmark and the United States were talking about different things. The Danish decision-makers were deeply worried about the country's exposed strategic position and the apparently low priority which the alliance gave to its defense, and regarded American air units in Denmark as a much-needed reinforcement of the country's air defenses. In contrast, the State Department and the Pentagon thought in larger strategic and more offensive terms. American military planners saw Scandinavian air space as an important route for strategic bombers on their way to and from targets in the Soviet Union. Such strategic bombers needed to be escorted by fighter planes and Washington regarded the stationing of escorting aircraft, or fighter-bombers in support of the strategic air offensive, at forward bases in Jutland in peacetime as a natural and tempting prospect.

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23 Telegram 504 from Copenhagen to Washington, 15 January 1952, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 759.5/1-1552, Box 3779.

24 DIIS, Denmark during the Cold War, pp. 255-258.

25 CIRCR 777 from Washington, 12 March 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.

26 Telegram 807 from Washington to Copenhagen, 20 March 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.

Danish officials thus perceived early on that the United States likely assessed the value of the bases primarily in terms of enhancing its capacity to project power rather than to defend Danish territory. American officials nevertheless were taken by surprise when, five months prior to the start of negotiations, the Danish government launched a publicity campaign that disclosed the upcoming talks and explicitly cast the stationing of foreign forces as a concrete guarantee of Danish security.

In the spring of 1952, Foreign Minister Kraft met privately with representatives of Danish newspapers to inform them of a government campaign to publicize the country’s decision to consider hosting allied military detachments at several new air bases. This campaign commenced on 6 May when Kraft informed the Rigsdag, the Danish Parliament, that he sought to establish air bases for use by NATO forces as an important contribution to Denmark’s ability to defend herself. This announcement was followed on 15 May with a speech by Finance Minister Thorkil Kristensen, who argued that the lack of allied air forces in Denmark constitutes a serious gap in this country’s defense structure. Two days later, Kraft delivered a speech to the Foreign Press Association’s annual dinner, claiming that Denmark’s membership in NATO provides effective guarantees that in case of war she will receive outside assistance, and it is clear that the preparation of base facilities is a first requirement to assure that the assistance will come in time.

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28 Despatch 1183 from Copenhagen to Washington, 27 June 1952, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 759.5/6-2752, Box 3779.

29 Despatch 1019 from Copenhagen to Washington, 20 May 1952, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 759.5/5-2052, Box 3779.
making this argument, he explicitly dismissed as "entirely erroneous" the idea that Denmark "cannot be defended and will only be an advance base for the defense of the United States."³⁰ Kraft expressed similar points in additional speeches throughout June. These were followed on 3 July by a radio address from Defense Minister Harald Peterson, who argued that "the objective of the air base program is to make it possible to strengthen the air defense of a specially exposed country by stationing there airmen from other countries."³¹

In response to this publicity campaign, the Soviet Ambassador in Copenhagen created a working group to formulate a propaganda policy aimed at preventing or impeding Danish acceptance of U.S. bases.³² This led to the publication on 23 July of an article in Pravda entitled "Suspicious Maneuvers." This article proclaimed:

Ole Bjorn Kraft, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Thorkil Kristesen, Minister of Finance, have frequently spoke of the fact that the USA is preparing to station its armed forces on the territory of Denmark in the near future. The presence of foreign forces on Danish territory in peacetime cannot be explained by any kind of defense considerations. The aggressive, provocative [sic] nature of such measures is obvious. The Danish government cannot but see that the granting of bases to foreign armed forces and the stationing of foreign armed forces on Danish territory would be a gross violation of the assurances made by it not to participate in measures directed against the Soviet Union. It cannot but realize the serious responsibility it has undertaken by violating these assurances. Denmark is daily falling more and more under the control of the USA, and the threat of American occupation is increasingly hanging over it. The Soviet people, of

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³⁰ Despatch 1049 from Copenhagen to Washington, 27 May 1952, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 759.5/5-2752, Box 3779.

³¹ Despatch 26 from Copenhagen to Washington, 10 July 1952, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 759.5/7-1052, Box 3779.

³² DIIS, Denmark during the Cold War, p. 263.
course, cannot but pay attention to the unfriendly measures of the Danish government with regard to the Soviet Union.\footnote{Despatch 35 from Moscow to Washington, 25 July 1952, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 711.56359/7-2552, Box 3191.}

Two days later, the Danish Ambassador in Washington, Henrik Kauffmann, called on State Department officials, handing them a note from his government expressing concern about the article. The note stated specifically that any untimely representations from the Soviet Government might cause serious difficulties for a positive resolution to the problems iné a potential stationing of American forces in Denmark.\footnote{Memorandum of Conversation, 25 July 1952, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 711.56359/7-2552, Box 3191.} On 1 August, Kraft noted in a private letter to Jorgen Jorgensen, leader of the Social Liberal Party, that he regarded the article as representing only the first Soviet warning to Denmark.\footnote{DIIS, Denmark during the Cold War, p. 264.}

The Danish government proposed that the negotiations unfold in two stages, with technical matters addressed in the first stage and political matters discussed in the second.\footnote{Telegram 967 from Copenhagen to Washington, 13 June 1952, and Telegram 1045 from Copenhagen to Washington, 28 June 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/56/13/4, Entry 2454-A, 430.3 Đ Bases: NATO Countries, Box 30.} After various meetings to set the schedule for the technical talks, Ambassador Anderson reported to the State Department in late August that, contrary to Kraft's initial accommodating perspective in January, Danish officials have started to show some reluctance on the airfield issue in view of the Pravda article.\footnote{Telegram 280 from Copenhagen to Washington, 30 August 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/56/13/4, Entry 2454-A, 430.3 Đ Bases: NATO Countries, Box 30.} Shortly
thereafter, in closed meetings with key Danish ministers on 8 and 10 September, Kraft argued that Denmark could not appear to give into Soviet pressure, lest the Russians get the impression that it was possible to scare Denmark, and emphasized that Denmark should accept the stationing proposal as a means to accomplish its long sought goal of a concrete allied defense guarantee. He further remarked, however, that Denmark was now in a position to make some demands of the U.S. in the upcoming talks: (1) all aircraft stationed in Denmark must be tactical and therefore meant only to defend Danish territory, thus addressing the accusation of offensive measures; and (2) Danish nationals must be employed to construct the airfields and Denmark must retain jurisdiction over foreign forces, thus addressing the allegation of an impending American occupation. 38 During the initial round of technical talks in late September, only the second issue was raised, particularly concerning the use of Danish engineers and contractors, but U.S. officials indicated their willingness to meet this demand. 39

At the suggestion of the Soviet Ambassador in Copenhagen, Russian officials decided to increase pressure on Denmark with an official communication, which was handed to the Danish Ambassador in Moscow on 2 October by the Soviet Foreign Minister. The note declared:

38 Villaume, ÒNeither Appeasement nor Servility,Ó pp. 171-172; DIIS, Denmark during the Cold War, pp. 264-268.

39 Telegram 390 from Copenhagen to Department, 30 September 1952, and Telegram 448 from Copenhagen to Washington, 17 October 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/56/13/4, Entry 2454-A, 430.3 ï Bases: NATO Countries, Box 30.
As it will appear from statements made by members of the Danish government in July and August of this year, Denmark will be made into a base for foreign armies. The Danish Government has begun negotiations concerning this problem with the American Government. These negotiations were started in spite of the Danish Government’s former declaration that Denmark would not in peacetime place bases at the disposal of forces of any foreign power. The Soviet Government draws the attention of the Danish Government to the fact that the stationing in Denmark of foreign armed forces cannot be justified by stating that it is a matter of defense. The Soviet Government finds it necessary to draw the attention of the Danish Government to the fact that its intention of placing military bases at the disposal of foreign armed forces must be regarded as a threat against the safety of the Soviet Union and the other Baltic countries. The Soviet Government declares that the responsibility for the consequences of such a policy will rest upon the Danish Government.

Danish authorities replied simply that they would never allow Danish territory to be used to initiate an attack on any other state.

American officials reported that their Danish counterparts seemed almost elated by the Soviet note. However, while Danish Foreign Ministry officials indicated reassuringly that the note did not affect Denmark’s overall willingness to hold talks, they did express confidentially that it created difficulties and likely would hamper their ability to pursue the basing relationship entirely according to plan. This newly constrained bargaining position was further emphasized by Kraft, who informed Anderson that Danish officials also were now facing pressure from the

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40 Telegram 399 from Copenhagen to Washington, 2 October 1952, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 759.5/10-252, Box 3780.


42 Telegram 417 from Copenhagen to Washington, 4 October 1952, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 759.5/10-452, Box 3780; Telegram 427 from Copenhagen to Washington, 7 October 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/56/13/4, Entry 2454-A, 430.3 I Bases: NATO Countries, Box 30.

43 DIIS, *Denmark during the Cold War*, pp. 270-272.
governments of Sweden and Finland to reject the bases, lest these two countries be negatively affected by Soviet countermeasures.\textsuperscript{44}

As the start of the second round of negotiations approached in December 1952, Danish officials calculated that they now were in a position, given the recent external opposition, to push the Americans on the defensive character of the bases by demanding Danish command over allied detachments stationed in Jutland and prior consent rights over the use or removal of those forces for activities outside of Denmark.\textsuperscript{45} These additional demands were outgrowths of Danish officials’ concerns about entanglement and abandonment. As Carsten Holbraad notes, ‘if the aircraft were to be under U.S. command, there appeared to be a risk that Denmark might become involved in a course of action that could be deemed aggressive by the Soviet Union.’\textsuperscript{46} Moreover, absent prior consultation rights, Danish officials feared that U.S. forces might be withdrawn for use in local wars between, for instance, Bulgaria and Turkey or East and West Germany, thereby leaving Jutland unprotected and vulnerable to attack.\textsuperscript{47} Thus, when the second round of talks commenced on 8 December, Danish officials outlined four principal demands: (1) Danish prior

\textsuperscript{44} Telegram 580 from Copenhagen to Washington, 5 December 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/56/13/4, Entry 2454-A, 430.3  in Bases: NATO Countries, Box 30.

\textsuperscript{45} DIIS, Denmark during the Cold War, pp. 275-277.


consultation, (2) Danish command, (3) tactical aircraft, and (4) Danish primary jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{48}

Over the course of the second negotiation round, U.S. officials indicated their willingness to concede the third and fourth points and to compromise on the second condition by "working out a satisfactory command relationship."\textsuperscript{49} They rejected the first point, however, emphasizing foremost the need for operational flexibility. As General Alfred Gruenther, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), explained to Kraft on 19 December, "Flexibility is an important attribute of air power and the commander wants to be assured he can use it where needed. This is also a great advantage to Denmark because it provides for employment of additional air power over Denmark and other areas in case of emergency. It would be a serious error to tie air power to a territorial basis."\textsuperscript{50} U.S. negotiators also were concerned, though, that publicly committing the aircraft to Denmark alone would create a dangerous precedent that other host states could then cite in an effort to receive similar commitments.\textsuperscript{51} While Danish officials appeared gratified by the United States' willingness to make concessions on points two

\textsuperscript{48} Telegram 586 from Copenhagen to Washington, 15 December 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/56/13/4, Entry 2454-A, 430.3 V Bases: NATO Countries, Box 30.


\textsuperscript{50} Telegram 61 from Paris to Copenhagen, 26 December 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/56/13/4, Entry 2454-A, 430.3 V Bases: NATO Countries, Box 30.

through four, they maintained ņhat of these points one was an imperative sine qua non. Consequently, by mid-January 1953, Anderson reported to Washington that ņ am exceedingly pessimistic as to the chances for any change. ņProceeding further at this time is probably doomed to failure. ņSecretary of State Acheson insisted, however, that the negotiations continue ņin view [of the] importance ņof [the] project going forward this year. ņ

Less than two weeks later, the Soviet Foreign Minister handed an aide-memoire to the Danish charge d'affaires in Moscow, reiterating Soviet opposition to the basing negotiations. This communication further warned that ņBy entering the North Atlantic bloc Denmark became a part of an aggressive military group ņpreparing a world war. By accepting foreign troops in peacetime Denmark becomes a direct participant in the war now under preparation. ņThe Polish government followed suit shortly thereafter by criticizing Denmark for preparing to accept American ņwar bases ņand thereby becoming a ņspringboard ņfor Western aggression. ņ

As was the case in October 1952 with the first Soviet note, this external opposition ņserved a useful purpose in raising allied awareness of the significance of

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52 Telegram 626 from Copenhagen to Washington, 30 December 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/56/13/4, Entry 2454-A, 430.3 Ň Bases: NATO Countries, Box 30; Telegram 656 from Copenhagen to Washington, 14 January 1953, and Telegram 762 from Washington to Copenhagen, 16 January 1953, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 759.5/1-1453 and 759.5/1-1553, Box 3780.

the threat against Denmark. However, while American officials reaffirmed their willingness to meet most of Denmark's demands, they would not budge on the issue of prior consultation. A few days after the Soviet aide-memoire, Kraft, who was inclined to accept a stationing agreement on U.S. terms, held a closed meeting with key ministers to seek a possible relaxation of Danish demands. This effort was of no avail, though, as the growing political disadvantages in peacetime and the increased risk of Soviet bombing in time of war now made it impossible for Denmark to accept American forces without veto power over their use outside Jutland. The negotiations stalemated as a result, when Danish representatives indicated there was no possibility at this time of further fruitful discussions. Talks were never resumed.

Historians of Danish security policy widely agree, as Hans Mouritzen notes, that the flight stationing was rejected due to external constraints, primarily the direct Soviet connection. By publicly disclosing the basing negotiations, Danish authorities provided useful grist for Soviet propaganda and diplomatic protests. Able

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55 Ibid., pp. 247-248; DIIS, Denmark during the Cold War, p. 284.

56 Telegram 409 from Washington to Copenhagen, 11 November 1953, NARA, RG 84, 350/56/13/4, Entry 2454-A, 430.3 Bases: NATO Countries, Box 37.

57 See Telegrams 621 and 622 from Copenhagen to Washington, 4 and 9 December 1953, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 711.56359/12-453 and 711.56359/12-953, Box 3191.

58 Mouritzen, A Hundred Years of Danish Action Space, p. 133.
to then capitalize on issues that were already part of public debate in Denmark, Moscow succeeded in setting the agenda for Danish political debates on security issues. While this external pressure served to strengthen Denmark’s bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States, it effectively foreclosed any chance of reaching an agreement by forcing Danish authorities to adopt an uncompromising position that went beyond the United States’ ability to make concessions. In the end, then, as Jonathan Agger and Trine Michesen observe, although the Danish government displayed considerable resolve in the face of Soviet pressure, it nevertheless pursued a policy line that was close to the Kremlin’s demands. These apparent Danish concessions [to Moscow] led to a strengthening of the Kremlin’s conviction that Copenhagen was susceptible to influence. Thus, the negative feedback from Denmark’s acknowledgement of the pending basing relationship undercut its original objective of achieving cooperation on terms that improved its security relative to the Soviet Union by establishing a hard-line bargaining stance that provoked stalemate with the United States.

Secrecy, Deniability, and U.S.-Norway Basing Negotiations

On 7 August 1951, American Ambassador Charles Bay approached Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange with a proposal to open SAC basing negotiations. Four days later, Lange accepted this offer and suggested that the talks could start by

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59 Agger and Michelsen, How Strong was the Weakest Link, p. 259.

60 Ibid.
the end of the month.\textsuperscript{61} According to the Foreign Minister, what Norway sought in a basing relationship was "the maximum of protection with the minimum of provocation."\textsuperscript{62} From Norway's perspective, then, emphasis is not so much on what can be done but rather on how it can be done. The Norwegian Government wishes to avoid any action which would focus attention on U.S. operations in Norway.\textsuperscript{6} Any resulting arrangements consequently must appear to be consistent with the [country's] base policy.\textsuperscript{63} Specifically, Lange indicated that if queried as to whether he has made agreement with the U.S. [on base rights], he wants to be in a position to reply that neither he nor [the] Norwegian Government has done so.\textsuperscript{64} The Norwegian government thus wishes [to] keep the negotiations and conclusion of any agreement secret and would appreciate [the United States'] cooperation in seeing that there are no leaks or disclosure of any information on this subject.\textsuperscript{65}

U.S. officials shared this view. As Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote to Ambassador Bay:

> We believe it is essential that SAC base development be kept secret and be done under guise [of the] present base policy. It is our belief that the disclosure of an agreement with Norway providing for military operating


\textsuperscript{62} Letter from Snow to Raynor, 18 March 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.

\textsuperscript{63} NOREP 7 from Oslo to Washington, 14 September 1951, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.

\textsuperscript{64} NOREP 4 from Oslo to Washington, 21 September 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.

\textsuperscript{65} NOREP 42 from Oslo to Washington, 29 May 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.
requirements and facilities would be interpreted internationally as a revision of the Norwegian base policy. Such an impression, if created, would probably result in international pressure of the type which would increase unnecessary risks jeopardizing the securing of the rights and facilities we need.\footnote{Telegrams 929 and 939 from Washington to Oslo, 3 and 6 May 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.}

More specifically, according to Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews, openly acknowledging plans for the peacetime stationing of U.S. forces in Norway will serve only to afford the Soviet Government a clear opportunity to embarrass and to bring pressures of various kinds on the Norwegian Government\footnote{Letter from Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews to Acting Secretary of Defense Foster, 4 December 1951, NARA, RG 59, 250/49/3/5, European Lot File, Entry 1172, Lot 59D559, Box 1.} and give the Soviets a peg which they do not now possess on which to base their general propaganda which may result in adverse effects in Norway\footnote{Telegram 188 from Oslo to Washington, 18 August 1951, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.} with the probable result that we would end up with definitely less than might be possible.\footnote{Telephone from Washington to Oslo, 18 August 1951, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.} Thus, Bay reported to Washington on 18 August that discussed publicity with Lange and we agreed it would be better not to publicize [the] forthcoming discussions.\footnote{Telephone from Washington to Oslo, 18 August 1951, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.}

The first round of talks commenced shortly thereafter on 27 August. Secrecy and deniability aside, the Norwegian representatives raised two principal concerns. The first pertained to enhancing the security of Norway. As expressed by Defense Minister Jens Christian Hauge, the arrangements\footnote{Telephone from Washington to Oslo, 18 August 1951, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.} must not deal only with matters of U.S. interest.\footnote{Telephone from Washington to Oslo, 18 August 1951, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.} Instead, they also must take into consideration local Norwegian
defense. In particular, Norwegian officials sought to include a clause in the agreement explicitly linking the development of the facilities to the defense of Norway. U.S. negotiators opposed the inclusion of this clause on grounds that it would commit the United States to a special bilateral security guarantee for Norway that was outside of and in addition to the general defense assurances attendant to membership in NATO. The second issue concerned the Norwegian government’s desire to place a ceiling on the number of foreign troops to be stationed in Norway.

As Hauge explained at a meeting on 16 October, New U.S. personnel must be strictly limited. These limitations sprang partly from Norwegian anxiety regarding [the] world political situation and desire to avoid creating an impression on the Soviets that war was inevitable. Norway would even be willing to sacrifice some immediate military security to avoid such a provocation.

Later that evening, as if on cue, the Soviet Foreign Minister delivered a diplomatic note to the Norwegian Ambassador in Moscow, accusing the Norwegian government of agreeing to build air bases on Norwegian territory, including areas in North Norway abutting on the Soviet Union, for use by the armed forces of the

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69 NOREP 13 from Oslo to Washington, 18 October 1951, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.

70 NOREP 8 from Oslo to Washington, 21 September 1951, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.

71 REPNO 6 from Washington to Oslo, 31 August 1951; REPNO 8 from Washington to Oslo, 11 September 1951; and REPNO 11 from Washington to Oslo, 3 October 1951, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.

72 NOREP 13 from Oslo to Washington, 18 October 1951, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.
aggressive North Atlantic bloc under American command. The note asserted that this decision was in violation of the Norwegian government’s 1949 base declaration and therefore incompatible with the normal bilateral relationship between the Soviet Union and Norway as neighboring states.\textsuperscript{73} As Tom Hetland notes:

\begin{quote}
We do not know how well-informed the Russians were about internal discussions within NATO and Norway, but it is not inconceivable that they were aware that the Norwegian policy toward foreign bases was under a certain degree of pressure at this time. If the Russians entertained suspicions along these lines, it can only have reinforced the urgency of obtaining new assurances.\textsuperscript{74}
\end{quote}

In fact, there was some concern among Norwegian officials that the Soviets actually knew about the negotiations.\textsuperscript{75} Nevertheless, the Norwegian government’s reply simply denied any change in the base policy and reaffirmed the purely defensive character of NATO. Moreover, the Norwegian authorities flatly ignored a second Soviet note that followed shortly thereafter, casting Norway’s response as untrue and reiterating the general accusation that NATO’s aggressive intentions were evident in the setting up of American military bases close to the Soviet Russian border.\textsuperscript{76}

On 23 October, one week after the Soviet communication, Ambassador Bay reported to Washington that he have consciously avoided interrogating [Foreign Minister Lange] formally concerning the Russian note for fear of magnifying the

\textsuperscript{73} Greve, \textit{Norway and NATO}, pp. 23-24.

\textsuperscript{74} Hetland, \textit{Soviet View of the Nordic Countries}, pp. 172-173.

\textsuperscript{75} See, for instance, NOREP 38 from Oslo to Washington, 18 April 1952, and Telegram 938 from Washington to Olso, 3 May 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.

\textsuperscript{76} Greve, \textit{Norway and NATO}, p. 24.
note's importance in relation to the base discussions and of stimulating his thinking
toward linking the note with our current negotiations. However, two days later, in
the first negotiation meeting following the episode, the Norwegian representatives
gave no indication that the Russian note has adversely affected the negotiations.
Instead, they simply reiterated their prior two demands concerning local defense and
a personnel ceiling. Little progress was made on the first issue until 3 November,
when Defense Minister Hauge indicated he would be willing to drop this question
for [the] present as being outside [the] scope of these negotiations. With regard to
the second issue, U.S. representatives proposed on 10 December that all American
personnel could be brought into Norway under the cloak of the existing Military
Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), thereby disguising them as military advisers,
but then stationed at the air bases. This first round of talks closed ten days later,
leaving the question of a personnel ceiling unresolved. However, the round ended
with the signing of a memorandum of conversation that expressed both governments' satisfaction with the present trajectory of the negotiations and approved the

77 NOREP 16 from Oslo to Washington, 23 October 1951, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.

78 NOREP 18 from Oslo to Washington, 26 October 1951, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.

79 NOREP 20 from Oslo to Washington, 3 November 1951, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.

80 NOREP 22 from Oslo to Washington, 10 December 1951, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.
introduction of limited technical personnel, attached to MAAG, to begin developing the airfields.\textsuperscript{81}

In the interim between the first and second negotiation rounds, the \textit{New York Herald Tribune} published an article on 18 May 1952 speculating on the possible future stationing of U.S. forces in Norway and a change in that country's bases policy.\textsuperscript{82} Initially, U.S. officials feared that this leak would constitute an "adverse development which might prejudice reaching agreement with Norway."\textsuperscript{83} American and Norwegian authorities did not officially acknowledge the story, however, and it ultimately received little attention. In fact, the Norwegian Foreign Office confidentially asked the editors of local newspapers to refrain from commenting on the article.\textsuperscript{84} Furthermore, in a meeting with General Gruenther on 31 May, the new Norwegian Defense Minister Nils Langhelle indicated that "when queried regarding a change in policy, he, Lange and other Government officials will continue to take the line that there has been no change in Norway's base policy."\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{81} NOREP 27 from Oslo to Washington, 20 December 1951, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.

\textsuperscript{82} Don Cook, ÒNo Welcome Mat for U.S. Flyers,Ó\textit{New York Herald Tribune}, 18 May 1952, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{83} Telegram 1031 from Oslo to Washington, 30 May 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/56/13/4, Entry 2454-A, 430.3 "Bases: NATO Countries, Box 30.

\textsuperscript{84} Telegram 1041 from Oslo to Washington, 4 June 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.

\textsuperscript{85} Telegram 120 from Paris to Oslo, 1 June 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2. For instance, on 26 June, Foreign Minister Lange went on record as stating that "Norway has been mentioned in connection with American bases. It is discouraging that persons in certain quarters are so poorly informed that they imagine that American bases have been established in Norway. Anyone can easily ascertain that this is not the case. There are no American bases in Norway, we have no foreign troops in the country and there has been no change in Norway's policy in this field.Ó See Telegram 1275 from Oslo to Washington, 27 June 1952, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 711.56357/6-2751, Box
Amazingly, the Soviets also failed to utilize the story for propaganda purposes. As Ambassador Bay speculated, "the Norwegian reply to the Russian note on bases of last October... contained the clear indication that if the Russians wished the Norwegian base policy to remain unchanged they should leave the Norwegians alone. Conceivably the Russians are paying some attention to that thought." Either way, he continued, "it would not have surprised me at all if the [Norwegian] Government had informed us that in view of [this] business it would have to reconsider the whole position. But this has not happened." 86

The second round of talks therefore commenced on 24 July. The first matter that U.S. negotiators sought to resolve concerned the fixed troop ceiling, which the Norwegians agreed to drop at the initial meeting. 87 After making this concession, though, Norwegian officials raised two new concerns. Perhaps due to their failure in the first round of talks to secure a clause in the agreement explicitly linking the development of U.S. facilities to the defense of Norway, the Norwegians sought "to play down the bilateral aspect in favor of the NATO aspect of the arrangement, and [to] avoid any mention of SAC as such. This was done specifically to put the government in a safer position in case of [further] leakage which might force it to

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86 Letter from Bay to MacArthur, 10 June 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.
87 Telegrams 1135 and 78 from Oslo to Washington, 26 June and 25 July 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.
disclose [the] document. U.S. officials rejected this demand on grounds that, absent specific reference to the United States and SAC, any resulting agreement would be insufficient to authorize and ensure American tenure at the bases. Though the Norwegians initially refused to budge on this condition, they ultimately were forced to accept the bilateral approach.

The second issue pertained to Norwegian prior consent rights over the use of American forces stationed in Norway for activities outside of the country. According to the Norwegian negotiators:

The gist of it was that use for hostile purposes of a Norwegian base by a second country against a third country could be expected automatically to involve Norway in hostilities against the third country. This being so, Norway felt justified in reserving the right to make the initial determination as to when its bases could be used in that manner. In substance, Norway did not want to put itself in a position where another country, however friendly and reliable, could force it into hostilities against a third country.

Again, U.S. officials opposed this condition, arguing that it has long been our theory that such consent of the host government is an inherent factor in any base agreement. Moreover, they stressed that it is particularly important from a military viewpoint that use of these bases by the U.S. Air Force be possible with

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88 Telegram 78 from Oslo to Washington, 25 July 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.
89 REPNO 2 from Washington to Oslo, 1 August 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.
90 Telegram 189 from Oslo to Washington, 23 August 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2; Tamnes, *United States and the Cold War*, pp. 73, 87.
91 Telegram 129 from Oslo to Washington, 8 August 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.
92 Memorandum from Bonbright to Parsons, 29 August 1952, NARA, RG 59, 250/49/3/5, European Lot File, Entry 1172, Lot 59D559, Box 1.
minimum delay, conceivably a matter of hours.\textsuperscript{93} While these arguments were received critically,\textsuperscript{94} the Norwegians ultimately backed away from this demand.

As a result, the negotiations ended successfully with the signing first of an Aide Memoire by Foreign Minister Lange and Ambassador Bay on 17 October 1952 and then of a military-level agreement the following day by the Chief of the Norwegian Air Force, Lieutenant General Finn Lambrechts, and the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, General Hoyt Vandenberg.\textsuperscript{95} These documents granted the United States rights to utilize Norwegian airfields and allowed for the presence of U.S. military personnel in peacetime. In light of the general feeling that Soviet reaction would be based to a considerable extent on what they saw happening in Norway and not on the contents of an agreement,\textsuperscript{96} Secretary Acheson reiterated to Ambassador Bay that one had to make a critical selection of people who were to be located in Norway under the SAC agreement; the operation needed maximum cover and a thorough briefing of the personnel in advance.\textsuperscript{96} Funds for building and maintaining the airfields also were camouflaged\textsuperscript{96} by funneling the money through preexisting

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item REPO 3 from Washington to Oslo, 29 August 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.
\item NOREP 1 from Oslo to Washington, 8 September 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.
\item NOREP 11 from Oslo to Washington, 20 October 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.
\item Memorandum of Conversation, 4 December 1951, in \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States: 1951}, Vol. 4, p. 770; Tamnes, \textit{United States and the Cold War}, p. 88.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
legislation on defense construction projects. Thus, when Pravda ran several articles in November 1952 alleging U.S. military bases on Norwegian territory, Lange was able to categorically deny the claims, simply reiterating the position that "the Norwegian government has not changed its mind not to permit allied bases in Norway." In the end, the SAC basing arrangements remained secret for thirty-one years, until the Norwegian government finally acknowledged their existence in 1983.

While it is clear, as Nils Ø rvik notes, that Norway's 1949 ban on allied bases was caused by various forms of Soviet intimidation and pressure tactics, Norwegian authorities nevertheless were able to reach a basing agreement with the United States three years later, despite renewed Soviet threats of retaliation and strained relations, by simply pursuing the negotiations secretly. By not acknowledging the pending relationship, the Norwegians deprived the Soviets of an important peg on which to substantiate propaganda and diplomatic protests. Though this approach may have weakened Norway's bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States, it enabled the Norwegians to accept a level of military cooperation

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97 Telegram 78 from Oslo to Washington, 25 July 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2.


100 Ø rvik, Norway, p. 209.
considered important by their Defense Ministry but otherwise impossible to attain, thus loosening the binds of what Rolf Tamnes once referred to as "probably the knottiest problem in the American relationship."101

Conclusion

This chapter empirically tests the effects of public acknowledgement on leaders' bargaining behavior during negotiations and its impact on their willingness to reach an agreement. The statistical results, coupled with illustrative comparative case studies, support my argument's three principal claims. First, public acknowledgement is a strategy that host states can use to press their demands during negotiations. Second, the visibility attendant to acknowledgement generates international scrutiny costs that put pressure on the stronger sending state to compromise but motivate the weaker host state to adopt a hard-line bargaining stance. Third, while public acknowledgement may produce a short-term bargaining advantage for the weaker partner, it has a long-term effect of reducing the overall likelihood that the two sides will achieve cooperation.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I first present an overview of this dissertation’s theoretical argument and empirical findings. I then examine the project’s relevance to the study of overseas basing and leaders’ management of national security information in the twenty-first century. I close with a discussion of several directions for future research.

Overview of the Argument and Findings

This dissertation poses two basic questions: (1) Under what conditions are leaders more or less likely to publicly acknowledge cooperative security negotiations or to pursue talks secretly? (2) What impact does this decision have on leaders’ subsequent bargaining behavior during negotiations and the overall prospects of achieving cooperation? To answer these questions, I develop a realist-inspired theoretical framework that advances two main arguments about leaders’ management of information during negotiations for overseas military basing rights. First, international audiences – namely, third-party states – rather than domestic audiences often constitute the principal targets of official secrecy and public acknowledgement. Second, leaders’ control of information is shaped primarily by the international strategic context and the scope of their states’ national security interests rather than domestic political institutions.
My central claim and finding is that states’ power positions in the international system fundamentally influence not only the way that leaders control information during cooperative security negotiations but also the impact that information management has on leaders’ subsequent bargaining behavior and the outcome of talks. The empirical results presented in chapter 4 show that great powers are more likely to employ official secrecy than other types of states and that leaders generally seek to withhold information about the occurrence of basing negotiations when its disclosure to international audiences may reflect poorly on their state’s prestige or when it might unnecessarily provoke adversaries to oppose the talks or take preventive measures. Alternatively, leaders commonly seek to invoke the attention of international audiences when doing so may set favorable precedents for future negotiations with other potential cooperative partners or signal strength to present enemies. By emphasizing third-party states as targets of official secrecy and acknowledgement, this dissertation thus makes novel contributions to scholarship on audience costs, bargaining, and security cooperation by extending the analysis of information management beyond purely dyadic and domestic political incentives and impediments.

The empirical results in chapter 5 show that public acknowledgement is a strategy that weaker states can use to press their demands during negotiations by putting pressure on their stronger partner to make concessions. At the same time, while public acknowledgement may produce a short-term bargaining advantage for the weaker side, it can motivate that state to adopt a hard-line bargaining stance. This,
in turn, often has the long-term effect of reducing the overall likelihood that the two sides will achieve cooperation. Specifically, the quantitative and qualitative analyses indicate that, on account of attendant international scrutiny costs, public acknowledgement of basing negotiations by the host state increases the likelihood that the United States will make concessions but decreases the likelihood both that the host state will make concessions and that the negotiations will end in an agreement. By emphasizing international power position rather than domestic political institutions, this dissertation thus generates different expectations about which states' bargaining positions benefit from public acknowledgement than existing scholarship on audience costs. By highlighting the constraining effects of international scrutiny costs that arise from acknowledgment by the weaker partner, this dissertation also challenges previous realist theories that suggest the bargaining advantage during security cooperation rests with the less vulnerable and less constrained state.

**Contemporary Relevance of the Project**

As this project’s empirical evidence ends in 1971, some readers might question its contemporary relevance in light of revolutions in military and information technologies that suggest a decreased need for overseas military bases and cast doubt on the state’s ability to control information. I address both issues in turn.
Overseas Military Basing

There is no denying that technological changes that improve the performance characteristics of ships and planes (as well as missiles) certainly lessen the need for elaborate overseas basing networks comprised of numerous naval shore facilities and aerial staging points to project power over long distances.\(^1\) That being said, though, advances in military technology have far from eliminated the utility of overseas bases. Even in the twenty-first century, as Michael O’Hanlon notes, without bases from which to operate, combat units are of little inherent use unless a battle comes straight to them and they can fight on their home fields. It would typically take a couple of weeks even to deploy a few thousand troops to a distant region and a few months to deploy a large combat force to most parts of the world, much less the equipment, supplies, and support units needed for a sustained campaign. Some of this can be constructed as needed, but that is a slow process.\(^2\) Thus, in a very basic and meaningful way, an existing network of overseas bases with peacetime troop deployments continues to contribute to great powers’ abilities to deter and fight wars by allowing for extensive military preparations prior to the outbreak of crises and on-call capabilities for efficient responses during the critical early stages of conflicts. For

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these reasons alone, to echo the conclusion of a 2007 SIPRI Policy Paper, "Foreign military basing will remain an indispensable element of the force deployment plans of several of the world’s major powers and alliances for a long time to come."\(^3\)

Moreover, power projection remains susceptible to three key vulnerabilities at least one of which is made worse by advances in military technology that suggest a continued (if not increased) need for diversification and redundancy of base locations. The first vulnerability concerns logistical bottlenecks and operational limitations. Large modern airfields, for instance, can reasonably accommodate deployments of no more than 1,000 tons of equipment and supplies each day and operations involving a fighter wing of aircraft (i.e., 72 planes). Such throughput and operational limitations are more severe at smaller, less developed airfields. Consequently, absent a sufficiently large number of modern airbases within at least 500 miles of combat theaters, bottlenecks can develop that significantly clog large deployments and diminish operational effectiveness.\(^4\) The second vulnerability is in relation to enemy attacks. Fewer bases means longer supply lines, which are more easily disrupted, and renders any given location a prime target for area denial strategies by adversaries involving the use of advanced precision weapons (i.e., ballistic and cruise missiles), ground assaults, and terrorist attacks. Effectively

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countering this vulnerability requires, at a minimum, dispersing forces across a greater number of locations and developing hardened facilities capable of surviving such attacks. Both objectives are more easily accomplished ahead of time and at dedicated defense areas.\(^5\) The final vulnerability is due to the threat of access denial by cooperative partners. Specifically, potential host states can refuse to grant base rights and current hosts can deny the use of existing bases in a given crisis or war.\(^6\)

Again, this suggests the importance of acquiring access privileges across a wide range of foreign territories and maintaining sufficient backup locations to accommodate fluctuations in host-state politics.

Each of these vulnerabilities is heightened in the current strategic environment. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the geopolitical emphasis of U.S. national security strategy shifted toward the so-called ëarc of instabilityë that stretches from parts of the Caribbean and the triborder region of South America through most of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and into Central, South, and Southeast Asia. This region is populated by quasi, failing/failed, and rogue states that ëthreaten us by their weakness, not their

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strength. The unstable governance structures that characterize such states help to proliferate an array of non-state and transnational threats that include global terrorism, organized international crime, drug and human trafficking, piracy, and humanitarian crises. Given this area’s underdeveloped infrastructure, volatile politics, and panoply of new threats, a great power’s efforts to secure access in or around this region will be especially vulnerable to bottlenecks, area denial strategies, and anti-access pressures. At the same time, though, since it lies astride the major sea lanes of communication, containing many of the globe’s vital chokepoints, and is home to much of the world’s energy resources, acquiring or maintaining bases and base access on this region’s periphery from which to project forces rapidly may be of even greater importance in the future than it is today.

Reflecting these considerations, the United States announced in 2004 that it intended to restructure its overseas basing network. The resulting Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR) called for the creation of bases in new regions (i.e., Eastern Europe and Central Asia) and the downsizing or realignment of bases in older areas of activity (i.e., Western Europe and East Asia). It emphasized the need to combat new asymmetric threats and prioritized force mobility, strategic flexibility, and

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unrestricted use rights. In this regard, the GDPR represents an adjustment in U.S. strategic policy of the type and scale that one would expect naturally to follow a major change in the external threat environment. In other respects, such as its conceptualization of overseas basing, the GDPR is less transformative.

To make sense of this strategic adjustment, the United States introduced three new categories of overseas military facilities: main operating bases (MOBs), forward operating sites (FOSs), and cooperative security locations (CSLs). MOBs represent strategically enduring assets with robust infrastructure and permanently stationed combat forces. Characterized by extensive command, control, and support structures as well as force protection measures, MOBs are meant to serve as regional hubs for throughput and as anchors for U.S. engagement and commitments. FOSs constitute scalable "warm bases" with light infrastructure and a small permanently stationed U.S. support presence. These "lily pads" are meant to be rapidly expandable staging and jump-off points capable of accommodating large troop deployments as well as logistical and strategic lift in times of crisis. Finally, CSLs are host-state facilities with limited in-place infrastructure and little or no permanently stationed U.S.

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personnel. These “virtual bases” are meant to provide contingency access and to be rapidly scalable to FOSs should the need arise.\textsuperscript{11}

Though these categories certainly help to clarify important aspects of the GDPR’s on-the-ground implementation, these distinctions do not represent a transformation in the nature of foreign basing relationships. In the early 1940s, for instance, the U.S. Army and Navy employed a comparable spectrum of base types: lions, cubs, and acorns. A lion base was equipped to support major fleet and air operations and to provide force protection. It consisted of robust infrastructure, including as many as eight runways of up to 5,000 feet, and accommodated approximately 10,000 combat, repair, and construction personnel. A cub base ordinarily hosted a small group of light forces but was capable of supporting the transition process from force deployment into a theater to force employment in combat operations. An acorn, in turn, was designed for rapid construction and operation as needed.\textsuperscript{12} Similarly, in 1949, Hans Weigart classified naval and air bases into three groups:

Permanent operational bases which are fortified and garrisoned with sufficient strength to hold against a major attack; limited operational bases, which will be used chiefly for aerial reconnaissance; and emergency bases, which need not be garrisoned in normal times, but which we should be entitled to occupy should an emergency arise.\textsuperscript{13}


\textsuperscript{12} Memorandum, 15 October 1942, Subject: “Availability of Army organizations for construction, maintenance, and defense of aerodromes and bases,” NARA, RG 38, 37/10/30-31/7-1, Entry 32-A, Box 4.

Analogous to the concept of FOSs, in the early 1950s the U.S. Air Force considered establishing a series of "bargain bases" in Central, West, and East Africa that were to be maintained at austerity levels by limited U.S. personnel but serviceable in emergencies. Finally, comparable to CSLs, during the late 1960s and early 1970s the U.S. Air Force introduced the concept of collocated operating bases (COBs) for Western Europe. These were host-state facilities capable of bedding down U.S. tactical aircraft deployed at the outbreak of hostilities to augment in-place U.S. forces already stationed at MOBs in the region. Thus, from an historical perspective, as these examples illustrate, there is nothing especially novel or revolutionary about the GDPR's reconceptualization of overseas facilities.

In sum, foreign military basing remains as relevant today as it was during the period of 1939–1971. Advances in military technology certainly have decreased the sheer number of shore facilities and aerial staging points needed for power projection, though sustained overseas operations remain vulnerable to logistical bottlenecks, area denial strategies by adversaries, and anti-access pressures from hosts. In chapter 2, I made use of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s distinction between rights desired which can be exercised when necessary, and the actual establishment, garrisoning, and maintenance of bases, which depend on a number of factors, such as current strategic concept, the international situation, new weapons of war, and material and

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14 Memorandum of Conversion, 3 December 1952, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 711.56376/12-352, Box 3197.

15 Donald E. Lewis, Bruce W. Don, Robert M. Paulson, and Willis E. Ware, A Perspective on the USAFE Collocated Operating Base System (Santa Monica: RAND, 1986).
manpower resources.\textsuperscript{16} This dissertation project focuses on the former, the nature of and need for which have changed little over the past 70 years. To the extent that the United States current basing strategy is designed to leave a lighter footprint in host states, however, this will serve only to facilitate the pursuit of secret basing relationships. At the same time, a strategy that deploys fewer permanent troops and emphasizes unrestricted use rights may lead cooperative partners to question the security benefits of hosting U.S. bases, thus possibly motivating their use of public acknowledgment as a bargaining tactic to address abandonment and entanglement concerns during negotiations. In all these respects, this dissertation's arguments and findings are not only quite relevant to the study of basing relationships after 1971 but also especially timely for understanding U.S. overseas military strategy in the twenty-first century.

\textit{Secrecy and the Management of National Security Information}

The information age began in the mid to late 1970s and then picked up considerable speed in the 1980s and 1990s, with no end in sight.\textsuperscript{17} As my dataset terminates in 1971, this dissertation's empirical analyses effectively precede the information age.


Does this make the results and insights from these analyses irrelevant to contemporary times? Answering this larger question requires posing two more specific ones.

First, has the revolution in information and communications technology decreased leaders’ incentives to withhold national security information from international audiences? In chapter 3, I discussed three general motives for employing official secrecy during cooperative security negotiations: to avoid bargaining inefficiencies from unnecessary opposition and constraints; to minimize unfavorable precedents from concessions; and to preserve military effectiveness by maintaining the benefits of surprise and curtailing unnecessary provocations. There is no reason to think that these incentives are diminished in the information age. If anything, as suggested below, technological advances that broadly render state behavior more observable likely spur leaders’ impulse to withhold official information about and acknowledgement of sensitive activities, for an effective use of secrecy still carries the advantage of deniability. Moreover, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the potential for secrecy has become much greater as the scope of ‘national security’ has expanded exponentially.\(^\text{18}\)

Second, has the information revolution decreased leaders’ abilities to withhold national security information? There are at least two parts to answering this question. The first concerns the procedural aspects of the state’s production, classification, and

then subsequent declassification and release of government records. By decreasing the costs of information production, advances in communication technologies have dramatically increased the volume and diversity of government records and thus the work loads of officials tasked with reviewing those records for declassification and release. Of course, this implies that the state actually has procedures mandating the release of official records, which is not always a safe assumption. For instance, a 2006 survey of freedom of information protections in ninety-two democracies found that only 57% had any codified procedures requiring the executive to release national security records, with an average mandated lag-time of release of thirty-five years. Either way, records concerning military cooperation particularly overseas basing always have been subject to the highest levels of classification and slowest rates of release. This has not changed in the information age.

Setting aside the legal and procedural aspects of classifying and releasing official records, has the state’s ability to conceal its foreign policy behavior more generally been affected by the revolution in information and communication technologies? Absolutely. Advances in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites and sensors, for instance, clearly enhance the abilities of technologically

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proficient third-party states to identify and locate objects of military interest such as the construction and garrisoning of new defense installations in other countries. At the same time, though, such technologies are less capable of detecting secret negotiations and planning for pending and future military relationships, which constitute the primary focus of this study. Of course, today’s global broadcasting networks, twenty-four-hour news coverage, and cybercitizens armed with video-equipped smart phones help to shed light on these less easily observed activities.\(^{21}\) Secretive foreign policy behavior also is vulnerable to leaks that is, premature, unauthorized partial disclosures of insider information.\(^{22}\)

The release in November-December 2010 of hundreds of thousands of classified U.S. government documents by the whistle-blower website WikiLeaks is a prominent example of these contemporary forces working together. This leak was unprecedented in its mode and scale. Following the 9/11 attacks, there was a push to share intelligence information more widely among federal agencies to make the U.S. government more capable of detecting terrorist plots. This enabled Bradley Manning, a low-level analyst with access to the Defense Department’s classified Siprnet system, to quickly download a large number of State and Defense Department


documents and then easily share those with WikiLeaks. As Scott Shane of The New York Times notes, however, if technology enabled those disclosures, technology can also make computers more leakproof. Chastened bureaucrats already have made fixes to prevent the hemorrhage of more documents. These include blocking USB ports, disabling the recording capacity of CD and DVD drives, and installing software that disables read-write drives and detects unusual downloads of data on classified computers.23 Moreover, as Beth Simmons observes, WikiLeaks may encourage governments everywhere to escalate their internal security ratings. What was once secret in the future will more likely be elevated to top secret and become harder than ever to declassify. This could hardly have been what the techno-libertarians had intended.24

While this dissertation’s empirical scope predates the information age and thus does not directly capture the effects of these advances in communication technology, the quantitative tests in chapters 5 and 6 do take some of these factors into consideration by controlling for press speculation and leaks. These statistical analyses demonstrate in a generalizable way that such unwanted attention significantly increases both sending- and host-state leaders’ subsequent likelihood of going public, as conventional wisdom might suggest, and decreases host-state leaders’ willingness to make concessions. Moreover, though leaders often are able to


effectively manage unintended breakdowns in secrecy by lying, there is anecdotal evidence that press speculation and leaks also can decrease the probability that negotiations will end successfully in a formal agreement.

For instance, on 6 June 1940, the Chargé d'affaires at the American Legation in Montevideo, Uruguay, approached Foreign Minister Alberto Guani to discuss the construction and use of air and naval bases. Guani agreed to hold talks but, anticipating Argentine opposition, insisted that any actual agreement to use the bases by the United States might be the subject of a secret agreement. Preliminary discussions were held secretly during late June. However, on 24 August, The New York Times published a story, which subsequently was republished in the Uruguayan opposition newspaper El Diario, reporting that secret emissaries from Washington had met with Uruguayan officials to discuss the establishment of bases. The American Legation responded with a public statement that this report is entirely without foundation, which was followed by a statement from Guani that the Foreign Office denies these reports categorically and states it has never discussed any

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26 Montevideo Despatches No. 999, 7 June 1940, and No. 1003, 10 June 1940, NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File (CDF) 1940-1944, Confidential File (250/34/16/3-4), 810.20 Defense/864 and 871, Box C19.

propositions of this nature. Additional secret discussions were held in late October. However, on 10 November, *The New York Times* published a second story reporting, incorrectly, that Uruguay had agreed to host bases. The next day, Guani issued another statement that "consideration has not been given nor is it being given to permitting the establishment of such foreign bases on our territory." This was followed by a press conference from Sumner Welles, Acting U.S. Secretary of State, who announced that "the United States Government has never sought directly or indirectly to obtain the lease or cession of air and naval bases in Uruguay." In the end, though both governments were able to effectively dodge this unwanted attention before it became an international political liability, they chose not to resume the negotiations.

In sum, there is no reason to think that leaders' incentives to withhold national security information from international audiences have weakened in the information age. If anything, the global war on terrorism promises to increase states' use of secrecy in the twenty-first century. There is no denying that advances in information and communication technologies since 1971 have broadly diminished states' abilities

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to fully conceal their foreign policy activities. By controlling for press speculation and leaks, however, this dissertation’s empirical analyses systematically capture the effects of contemporaneous information diffusion. The fact that such diffusion has increased in subsequent years does not therefore limit the generalizability and relevance of this project’s findings.

**Directions for Future Research**

There are at least three directions for future research. The first is to explore the scope of the argument beyond U.S. foreign military basing. In theory, the argument should be generalizable to other sending states and their respective host partners. Testing this empirically will require systematic data gathering on the negotiation efforts of other major powers that have pursued overseas basing networks: namely, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Similarly, it should be possible to apply or expand the argument to explain leaders’ management of information in other types of cooperative security relationships, such as alliances, coalition warfare, and the provision of foreign military assistance.

A second obvious avenue for future research is to extend the empirical analysis to cover the time periods before 1939 and after 1971. The present study also is limited to U.S. negotiations and agreements for base rights on foreign territory where it did not already legally possess such privileges. Thus, additional data could be gathered on all talks and agreements related to the renegotiation or termination of
existing privileges to examine leaders’ management of information during these later stages of cooperation.

Finally, whereas this dissertation focuses on third-party states as targets of official secrecy, leaders’ control of national security information may be directed at other international audiences, such as terrorist organizations. As David Ochmanek notes, “Protecting U.S. forces and assets worldwide from terrorist attacks is always a high priority, but concern for the safety of U.S. forces increases when those forces are deployed in a region close to the home base of one or more terrorist groups.” Similar to the logic of H3(a), this suggests that sending- and host-state leaders may be more likely to pursue military cooperation secretly if the receiving state also plays host to an international terrorist organization. This argument sheds some light on the contemporary examples briefly discussed in the introduction chapter: namely, that the United States’ secret cooperation with Yemen and public cooperation with Djibouti can be explained partially by the fact that the former serves as the hub for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) while the latter is not a terrorist haven. A third avenue for future research, then, is to examine leaders’ use of official secrecy when sending and host states’ adversaries are non-state actors.

32 Ochmanek, Military Operations against Terrorist Groups Abroad, p. 15.

33 On Yemen, see Andrew W. Terrill, The Conflicts in Yemen and U.S. National Security (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011).
APPENDIX A:
CASE SUMMARIES AND SOURCES

In appendix A, I present a summary description of the 90 cases of potential basing relationships initiated by the United States between January 1939 and December 1971. Of these 90 proposals to open basing negotiations, 82 were accepted by the potential host state, leading to a total of 218 rounds of bilateral talks and 59 agreements. The summary profile for each case includes the following information:

1. The month and year when the United States first proposed to open basing negotiations for a particular host territory/state.
2. The month and year when the potential host state either accepted or declined the proposal.
3. If negotiations took place, the starting and end dates for each round of talks.
4. If an agreement was reached, the title and date of the agreement.

The full citation information for the sources consulted is provided at the end of each case summary. The cases are grouped together by geographic region and then presented in chronological order.

North, Central, and South America and the Caribbean

Brazil (1939 – 1942)

American officials approached Brazil in May 1939 to discuss military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at air and naval bases in the country.
Brazilian officials accepted the proposal that same month. Four rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (May–July 1939), round 2 (May–October 1940), round 3 (January–November 1941), and round 4 (March–May 1942). These negotiations culminated in the Political-Military Agreement between the United States of Brazil and the United States of America, signed 28 May 1942.¹

**Bermuda, St. Lucia, and Trinidad/United Kingdom (1939)**

President Franklin Roosevelt proposed the establishment of U.S. bases in Bermuda, St. Lucia, and Trinidad to King George VI and British Ambassador Ronald Lindsay in June 1939. The proposal was accepted that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (June–July 1939) and round 2 (September–November 1939). The negotiations culminated in Agreements for the Lease of Air and Naval Facilities on Bermuda, St. Lucia, and Trinidad, finalized on 28 November 1939.²

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British Caribbean and North Atlantic Territories/United Kingdom (1940 – 1941)

President Roosevelt proposed the establishment of U.S. bases in British Caribbean and North Atlantic Territories to Prime Minister Churchill in August 1940. The proposal was accepted that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August – September 1940) and round 2 (January – March 1941). The negotiations culminated in Agreement for the Leasing of Naval and Air Bases, signed 27 March 1941.3

Mexico (1939 – 1943)

President Franklin Roosevelt sent a letter to Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas, forwarded from Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to Mexican Ambassador Francisco Nájera in August 1939, requesting bases in Mexico. Nájera met with Welles in June 1940 to convey Cárdenas’ willingness to discuss the base issue. Five rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (July 1940), round 2 (November 1940), round 3 (March – July 1941), round 4 (December 1941 – April 1942), and round 5 (June 1942 – January 1943). No agreement was reached.4


4 NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, 811.24512/11B, Box 4986; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 810.20 Defense/3465, Box C21; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 811.24512, Box 3765; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 811.34512, Boxes 3782 and C80; NARA, RG 218 (190/2/24/5-7), Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission, SF 1942-1945, MDC 4960 Airbases, Boxes 5-6; FRUS, 1940, V, pp. 133-
**Galapagos Islands/Ecuador (1939 – 1947)**

American officials approached Ecuador in October 1939 to discuss the defense of the Galapagos Islands and the establishment of military bases on the islands. Ecuadoran officials accepted the proposal that same month. Nine rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (November 1939), round 2 (December 1941 ñ February 1942), round 3 (July 1942), round 4 (September ñ November 1942), round 5 (October 1943 ñ May 1944), round 6 (July ñ August 1944), round 7 (October 1944 ñ January 1945), round 8 (May 1945 ñ April 1946), and round 9 (June 1946 ñ March 1947). No agreement was reached.\(^5\)

**Panama (1939 – 1942)**

The American Ambassador to Panama approached the Panamanian Foreign Minister in November 1939 to informally indicate US interest in obtaining base rights outside of the Panama Canal Zone. The Panamanian Foreign Minister accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (July ñ August 1940) and

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round 2 (October 1940 ñ March 1942). The negotiations culminated in the Defense Sites Agreement, signed 18 May 1942.6

Venezuela (1940 – 1942)

American officials approached Venezuela in May 1940 with a proposal to open staff conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at air and naval bases in the country. Venezuelan officials accepted the proposal in June 1940. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August 1940), round 2 (January 1942), and round 3 (June ñ July 1942). No agreement was reached.7

Uruguay (1940)

American officials approached Uruguay in May 1940 with a proposal to open staff conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at air and naval bases in the country. Uruguayan officials accepted the proposal in June


1940. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (June 1940) and round 2 (October 1940). No agreement was reached.  

Peru (1940 – 1942)

American officials approached Peru in May 1940 with a proposal to open staff conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at air and naval bases in the country. Peruvian officials accepted the proposal in June 1940. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (September 1940), round 2 (December 1941 ÿ January 1942), and round 3 (April ÿ July 1942). The negotiations culminated in the Talara Air Base Agreement, initialed on 24 April 1942 and officially signed on 8 July 1942.  

Colombia (1940 – 1942)

American officials approached Colombia in May 1940 with a proposal to open staff conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at air and naval bases in the country. Colombian officials accepted the proposal in June 1940. Four rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (September 1940), round 2 (May ÿ July  


9 NARA, RG 59, 810.20 Defense/6-2942; FRUS, 1940, V, pp. 157-161; CDC, Procurement, Occupation, and Use of Peruvian Bases, CMH HMF 8-2.8 BH 1945, pp. 16-17, 25-28, 33-48; CDC, United States Missions and Bases in Peru and the Caribbean Defense Command – Period of World War II, CMH HMF 8-2.8 BH 1946, pp. 10-11, 24-30, 33-34, 42-52; Weathers, Acquisition of Air Bases in Latin America, pp. 102-110.
1941), round 3 (December 1941 ÿ May 1942), and round 4 (July ÿ September 1942).
The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for a Naval Seaplane Base at Cartagena by exchange of notes on 23/30 September 1942.10

Ecuador (1940 – 1942)
American officials approached Ecuador in May 1940 with a proposal to open staff conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at air and naval bases on the Ecuadoran mainland. Ecuadoran officials accepted the proposal in June 1940. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (September ÿ October 1940) and round 2 (December 1941 ÿ January 1942). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for a Defense Base at Salinas, signed 24 January 1942.11

Chile (1940)
American officials approached Chile in May 1940 with a proposal to open staff conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at air and naval bases in the country. Chilean officials accepted the proposal in June


11 FRUS, 1942, VI, pp. 362-368; CDC, Air Bases in the Galapagos Islands and at Salinas; PCD, Salinas – Preliminary Historical Study, CMH HMF 8-2.9 AP 1946; Weathers, Acquisition of Air Bases in Latin America, pp. 89-94.
1940. One round of talks ensued during August – September 1940. No agreement was reached.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{Argentina (1940)}

American officials approached Argentina in May 1940 with a proposal to open staff conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at air and naval bases in the country. Argentine officials declined the proposal in October 1940. No negotiations were held and no agreement was reached.\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{Cuba (1940 – 1942)}

In May 1940, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles met with the Cuban Ambassador in Washington and broached the topic of holding talks on expanded military and naval cooperation between the United States and Cuba, including the issue of base access outside of Guantanamo Bay. The Cuban Ambassador accepted the proposal that same month. Four rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August – September 1940), round 2 (December 1941 – January 1942), round 3 (April – June 1942), and round 4 (August – September 1942). The negotiations culminated in an


\textsuperscript{13} NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 810.20 Defense/7-1940, Box C21; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 811.24535/1, Box C77; \textit{FRUS}, 1940, V, pp. 16-17, 21-38; Conn, Engleman, and Fairchild, \textit{Guarding the United States and Its Outposts}, pp. 175-181; Michael J. Francis, \textit{The Limits of Hegemony: United States Relations with Argentina and Chile during World War II} (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), pp. 65-67.
Agreement between the United States and Cuba for Military and Naval Cooperation, signed 7 September 1942.¹⁴

**Dominican Republic (1940 – 1941)**

American officials approached the Dominican Republic in May 1940 with a proposal to open staff conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at air and naval bases in the country. Dominican officials accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August 1940) and round 2 (December 1941). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for a U.S. Army Air Base at Cuidad Trujillo, signed on 16 December 1941.¹⁵

**Haiti (1940 – 1941)**

American officials approached Haiti in May 1940 with a proposal to open staff conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at air and naval bases in the country. Haitian officials accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August 1940) and round 2 (December 1941).

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1941). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for a U.S. Army Air Base at Brown Field by exchange of notes on 15/16 December 1941.16

Nicaragua (1940 – 1942)

American officials approached Nicaragua in June 1940 with a proposal to open staff conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at air and naval bases in the country. Nicaraguan officials accepted the proposal that same month. Four rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August 1940), round 2 (December 1941 – January 1942), round 3 (April – June 1942), and round 4 (August – November 1942). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for a Naval Base at Corinto by exchange of notes on 14 October and 25 November 1942.17

Honduras (1940 – 1942)

American officials approached Honduras in June 1940 with a proposal to open staff conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at air and naval bases in the country. Honduran officials accepted the proposal that same month. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (September 1940), round 2 (June – July


17 NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 811.24517/4, Box 3765; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 811.34517/17 and /18, Boxes 3783 and C80; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 810.20 Defense/114 3/12, /114 7/12, and /1833, Boxes C17 and 1833; FRUS, 1940, V, pp. 145-150; CDC, Nicaragua and the War Effort, CMH HMF 8-2.8 BW 1945, pp. 2-5, 7-10, 13-17; Weathers, Acquisition of Air Bases in Latin America, pp. 112-114, 222, 225; Andrew Crawley, Somoza and Roosevelt: Good Neighbor Diplomacy in Nicaragua, 1933-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 178-179.
1942), and round 3 (September 1942). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for a Naval Base at Puerto Castillo by exchange of notes on 8/19 September 1942.\(^{18}\)

**Guatemala (1940 – 1942)**

American officials approached Guatemala in June 1940 with a proposal to open staff conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at air and naval bases in the country. Guatemalan officials accepted the proposal that same month. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (September 1940), round 2 (December 1941 ŏ February 1942), and round 3 (April ŕ November 1942). The negotiations culminated in an Air Base Agreement, signed 16 November 1942.\(^{19}\)

**El Salvador (1940)**

American officials approached El Salvador in June 1940 with a proposal to open staff conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at air and naval bases in the country. Salvadoran officials accepted the proposal that same month. One round of negotiations ensued in September 1940. No agreement was reached.\(^{20}\)

\(^{18}\) NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 810.20 Defense/3293, Box 3391; *FRUS*, 1940, V, pp. 130-133; CDC, *Honduras and the War*, CMH HMF 8-2.8 BU 1945, pp. 1-8.

\(^{19}\) NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 811.24514/8 and /10, Box 3765; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 810.20 Defense/2267 and /2970, Boxes 3387 and C20-C21; *FRUS*, 1940, V, pp. 110-122; *FRUS*, 1941, VI, pp. 56-57; *FRUS*, 1942, VI, pp. 433-451; CDC, *History of Procurement, Occupation, and Use of Air Bases in Guatemala*, CMH HMF 8-2.8 BT 1945; Weathers, *Acquisition of Air Bases in Latin America*, pp. 218-220.

\(^{20}\) NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 810.20 Defense/7-1940 and /2126, Boxes C21 and 3386; *FRUS*, 1940, V, pp. 108-111.
Costa Rica (1940 – 1942)

American officials approached Costa Rica in June 1940 with a proposal to open staff conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at air and naval bases in the country. Costa Rican officials accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August 1940) and round 2 (December 1941 ï January 1942). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for a U.S. Army Air Base at San Jose by exchange of notes on 15 December 1941 and 9 January 1942.\(^\text{21}\)

Bolivia (1940 – 1942)

American officials approached Bolivia in August 1940 with a proposal to open staff conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at air and naval bases in the country. Bolivian officials accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (September ï October 1940) and round 2 (January ï April 1942). No agreement was reached.\(^\text{22}\)


\(^{22}\) NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 810.20 Defense/222 5/9 and /535 5/7, Boxes C17-C18; FRUS, 1940, V, pp. 39-40; FRUS, 1942, V, pp. 516-517, 528-529; Weathers, Acquisition of Air Bases in Latin America, pp. 198-200.
Paraguay (1940)

American officials approached Paraguay in August 1940 with a proposal to open staff conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at air and naval bases in the country. Paraguayan officials accepted the proposal that same month. One round of talks ensued during August and September 1940. No agreement was reached.23

Canada (1940 – 1944)

President Franklin Roosevelt approached Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King in August 1940 with a proposal to establish US bases and to station US troops in Canada. Prime Minister King accepted the proposal that same month. Four rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August 1940), round 2 (September – November 1941), round 3 (July 1942 – February 1943), and round 4 (October 1943 – February 1944). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement concerning Military Facilities, initialed 26 November 1941 with an Understanding concerning the Status of US Forces Stationed in Canada by exchange of notes on 27 December 1943 and 8 February 1944.24


**Surinam/Netherlands (1941)**

American officials approached the Netherlands government in September 1941 for access to bases in Surinam. Dutch officials accepted the proposal that same month. One round of talks ensued during September Ė November 1941. The negotiations culminated in a Defense Agreement for Surinam, signed on 19 November 1941.²⁵

**Dutch Antilles/Netherlands (1941 Ė 1942)**

American officials approached the Netherlands government in December 1941 concerning the use of military facilities in the Dutch Antilles. Dutch officials accepted the proposal that same month. One round of talks ensued during December 1941 Ė January 1942. The negotiations culminated in a Defense Agreement for Curacao by exchange of notes 15 December 1941/20 January 1942.²⁶

**Ascension Island/United Kingdom (1942 Ė 1946)**

American officials approached the United Kingdom in January 1942 to open discussions regarding the construction and use of an air base on Ascension Island. British officials accepted this proposal that same month. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (January Ė February 1942), round 2 (March Ė December 1942), and


round 3 (March–May 1946). No agreement was reached. As a point of clarification, the exchange of correspondence on 27 January and 7 February 1942, which is commonly referred to as the Ascension Island Air Base Agreement, was in actuality a preliminary "agreement in principle" that approved the construction and use of the air base while negotiations were being held to determine the specific terms of use in a formal agreement. These negotiations commenced in April 1942 but ended in stalemate in December 1942. The United States sought to reopen these negotiations in November 1945, which the United Kingdom agreed to in February 1946. Negotiations resumed in March 1946, but British officials ultimately turned down the U.S. request for base rights in May 1946. Thus, no formal agreement covering Ascension Island was reached.  

_French Guiana/France (1943)_

American officials requested rights for an air base at Gallion in French Guiana in March 1943. French authorities accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (March 1943) and round 2 (May 1943). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for an Air Base at Gallion, signed 18 May 1943.

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28 NARA, RG 84 (350/55/35/2), Entry 2453-A (France; US Embassy, Paris; Classified General Records, 1944-1963), 801.44, Box 21; CDC, _French-American Military Relations in the Caribbean Theater in World War II_, CMH HMF 8-1.8 BK 1945, pp. 73-77; Weathers, _Acquisition of Air Bases in Latin America_, pp. 119-121; Baptiste, _War, Cooperation, and Conflict_, pp. 201-202, 205.
**Newfoundland/Canada (1946 – 1952)**

In October 1946, President Harry Truman approached Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King to indicate the United States’ willingness to open discussions on the status of its leased bases in Newfoundland following the eventual transfer of sovereignty over that territory from the United Kingdom to Canada. Prime Minister King accepted the proposal that same month. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (November – December 1948), round 2 (February 1949 – March 1950), and round 3 (February – March 1952). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement on Leased Bases in Newfoundland by exchange of notes on 19 March 1952.²⁹

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**Federation of the West Indies (1959 – 1961)**

In December 1959, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Federation of the West Indies agreed to enter into trilateral talks to reach a bilateral agreement on the status of U.S. bases in the Federation of the West Indies following independence. Five rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (December 1959 – June 1960), round 2 (September 1960 – October), round 3 (November 1960), round 4 (November – December 1960), and round 5 (January – February 1961). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement between the Government of the United States of

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America and the Government of the Federation of the West Indies Concerning United States Defense Areas in the Federation of the West Indies, signed 10 February 1961.  

*Guyana (1959 – 1966)*

American officials raised the issue of post-independence base rights at Atkinson Field with Guyana (British Guiana) in December 1959. Guyanese officials delayed responding to this approach until September 1965, at which point they agreed to hold discussions. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (September – November 1965) and round 2 (April – May 1966). The negotiations culminated in a Defense Agreement for United States Use of Atkinson Field, signed 26 May 1966.  

*Surinam/Netherlands (1960 – 1962)*

In April 1960, the American officials approached the Netherlands to request base access and stationing rights at Zanderij Field in Surinam. Dutch officials accepted this proposal that same month. Four rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (April 1960), round 2 (March – April 1961), round 3 (September 1961), and round 4 (January – April 1962). The negotiations culminated in a Defense Agreement for Use of Zanderij Field by the United States by exchange of notes 24 April 1962.  

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32 NARA, RG 59, CDF 1960-63, 756A.56311, Box 1836; *TIAS* 5013.
Europe

United Kingdom (1941 – 1942)

In January 1941, the United States and the United Kingdom decided to hold staff conversations on the strategic principles of joint military operations, including the establishment and stationing of troops at U.S. air and naval bases in the British Isles. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (January 1 – March 1941), round 2 (May 1 – July 1941), and round 3 (November 1941 – July 1942). The negotiations culminated in a series of informal agreements governing the establishment and use of military bases and the status of US forces stationed in the United Kingdom, reached by 27 July 1942. As a point of clarification, all of the post-war base arrangements, staring with the Spaatz-Tedder Agreement of June 1 – July 1946, are treated here as agreements for the continuation of the American military presence in the United Kingdom rather than as the initial agreements of a new case of U.S. basing, given that elements of the Eighth Air Force and the U.S. Navy were still stationed in the United Kingdom at the time these new arrangements were being negotiated.33

**Greenland/Denmark (1941)**

American officials approached Danish authorities in February 1941 concerning bases in Greenland. Danish officials accepted this proposal that same month. One round of talks ensued in April 1941. The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for the Defense of Greenland, signed 9 April 1941.\(^{34}\)

**Iceland (1941 – 1942)**

In June 1941, American officials approached Iceland via the British Minister in Reykjavik concerning the question of stationing U.S. forces in the country. Icelandic officials accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (June – July 1941) and round 2 (February – May 1942). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for the Defense of Iceland by exchange of notes on 1 July 1941, with a Supplementary Agreement concerning the Construction and Use of an Airdrome at Keflavik by exchanges of notes on 2, 5, and 18 May 1942.\(^{35}\)

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\(^{35}\) NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 811.34559A/3, Box 3803; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-1944, 811.245/37, Box 3764; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 859A.20, Box 5384; FRUS, 1941, II, pp. 776-
Ukraine/Soviet Union (1943 – 1944)

In October 1943, American officials approached the Soviet Union for air base rights in the Ukraine. Soviet officials accepted this proposal in December 1943. One round of talks ensued during February – March 1944. The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for the Establishment and Use of Air Bases at Poltava, Mirgorod, and Piryatin, reached on 22 March 1944.36

Azores/Portugal (1943 – 1945)

American officials approached Portugal in November 1943 with a proposal to open negotiations for the construction and use of an air base on Santa Maria Island in the Azores. Portuguese officials accepted the proposal that same month. Four rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (November 1943 – May 1944), round 2 (July 1944), round 3 (September – November 1944), and round 4 (January – July 1945). The negotiations

792; EAS 232; Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 78; Donald E. Nuechterlein, Iceland: Reluctant Ally (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 26-36; Conn, Engleman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, pp. 459-531; Chester, United States and Six Atlantic Outposts, pp. 128-139.

culminated in an Agreement for Air Base on Santa Maria Island by exchange of notes on 28 November 1944, with complementary accords signed on 23 July 1945.\textsuperscript{37}

\textit{Yugoslavia (1944 – 1945)}

In December 1944, the United States and the United Kingdom jointly approached Yugoslavia via the Combined Chiefs of Staff to open negotiations for rights to establish an air base and to station American and British troops at Zadar. Yugoslav officials accepted the proposal that same month. One round of talks ensued during December 1944 ñ January 1945. The negotiations culminated in an Agreement concerning the Establishment of Air Bases in Yugoslavia, signed 18 January 1945.\textsuperscript{38}

\textit{Iceland (1950 ñ 1951)}

In September 1950, American officials approached Iceland via the NATO Military Standing Group concerning the question of stationing U.S. forces at bases in the country. Icelandic officials accepted the proposal in January 1951. One round of talks ensued during February ñ May 1951. The negotiations culminated in the Defense Agreement Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty between the United States and the


\textsuperscript{38} NARA, RG 218 (190/1/16/1), GF 1942-45, JCS 356 1-20-45, Box 221; Fitzroy Maclean, \textit{Eastern Approaches} (New York: Time Inc., 1964), p. 543.
Republic of Iceland, signed 5 May 1951, with an Annex on the Status of United States Personnel and Property, signed 8 May 1951.39

Federal Republic of Germany (1950 – 1952)

Following President Truman’s decision in September 1950 to increase the strength of U.S. forces stationed in Europe and to thus change the footing of U.S. forces in the Federal Republic of Germany from occupation to containment, it was decided in December 1950 that talks would be held at Bonn with representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany on the German contribution to Western defense and a new contractual relationship to replace the Occupation Statute. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (January – June 1951), round 2 (September – November 1951), and round 3 (February – May 1952). The negotiations culminated in the Bonn Conventions on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and Their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany, signed 26 May 1952.40

39 NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 740B.5, Box 3503; FRUS, 1951, IV, pp. 480-505; TIAS 2266 and 2295; Nuechterlein, Iceland, pp. 95-113; Thor Whitehead, The Ally Who Came In From the Cold (Reykjavik: University of Iceland Press, 1998), pp. 49-54.

France (1951–1952)

American officials proposed negotiations in March 1951 to France regarding air base rights in Metropolitan France. French officials accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (April–October 1951) and round 2 (January–October 1952). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of France Regarding Certain Air Bases and Facilities in Metropolitan France Placed at the Disposal of the United States Air Force, signed 4 October 1952.41

Norway (1951–1952)

American officials approached Norway in April 1951 with a proposal to open negotiations for base rights. Norwegian officials accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August–December 1951) and round 2 (July–October 1952). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed 17 October 1952, with a Supplementary Military Arrangement for the Utilization of Certain Norwegian Facilities, signed 18 October 1952.42


42 NARA, RG 84 (350/66/2/7), Entry 3053 (Norway; US Embassy, Oslo; Top Secret Records, 1947-1952), Box 2; NARA, RG 59 (250/49/3/5), LF Europe, Entry 1172 (Records of the Office of British
Spain (1951 – 1953)

American officials approached Spain in June 1951 with a proposal to open negotiations for base rights. Spanish officials accepted the proposal that same month. Four rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (July – October 1951), round 2 (January – March 1952), round 3 (May 1952 – April 1953), and round 4 (June – September 1953). The negotiations culminated in the Defense Agreement between the United States and Spain Concerning the Use of Military Facilities in Spain, signed 26 September 1953.43

Denmark (1951 – 1953)

American officials approached Denmark in January 1952 with a proposal to open discussions concerning the stationing of U.S. troops and military aircraft at airfields in Jutland. Danish officials accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of

talks ensued: round 1 (September 1952) and round 2 (December 1952 Ė January 1953). No agreement was reached.44

Italy (1952 – 1954)

American officials approached Italy in December 1952 with a proposal to open bilateral base rights negotiations. Italian officials accepted the proposal that same month. Four rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (January Ė July 1953), round 2 (October Ė December 1953), round 3 (March Ė June 1954), and round 4 (August Ė October 1954). The negotiations culminated in a Bilateral Infrastructure Agreement, signed 20 October 1954.45


**Greece (1953)**

American officials proposed base negotiations to Greece in April 1953. Greek officials accepted the proposal that same month. One round of talks ensued during August ï October 1953. The negotiations culminated in an Agreement between the United States and Greece Concerning Military Facilities, signed 12 October 1953.46

**Netherlands (1954)**

American officials proposed base negotiations to the Netherlands in February 1954. Dutch officials accepted the proposal that same month. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (February ï March 1954), round 2 (April 1954), and round 3 (May ï August 1954). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for the Stationing of United States Armed Forces in the Netherlands, signed 13 August 1954, with a Technical Annex Concerning the Use of Soesterberg Air Base, signed 16 November 1954.47

**Africa**

**Liberia (1941 – 1942)**

American officials approached Liberia in June 1941 with a proposal to open negotiations for air base rights. Liberian officials accepted the proposal that same

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month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (June ï July 1941) and round 2 (November 1941 ï March 1942). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and Liberia Concerning the Use of Defense Areas, signed 31 March 1942.48

French Equatorial Africa/France (1942)

American officials requested rights for an air base at Pointe-Noire in French Equatorial Africa in February 1942. French authorities accepted the proposal that same month. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (February ï April 1942), round 2 (May ï June 1942), and round 3 (August ï September 1942). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for an Air Base at Pointe-Noire, signed 16 September 1942.49

French West Africa (1942)

In December 1942, American officials approached French authorities regarding access to and administration of military bases in French West Africa. French officials agreed to enter into negotiations that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (December 1942) and round 2 (January ï February 1944). The negotiations culminated in an Understanding with the Government General of French West Africa

48 NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 811.34582/7 ½, Box 3803; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 882.20/549, Box 5772; NARA, RG 59, CDF 882.7962, Box 5776; FRUS, 1941, III, pp. 532-549; FRUS, 1942, IV, pp. 355-377; EAS 275.

49 NARA, RG 59, CDF 811.24551U/31, Box 3767; FRUS, 1942, II, pp. 564-590.
relating to the Construction, Improvement, Command, and Use by the United States Army of Airdrome Facilities, signed 24 February 1944.50

*Belgian Congo/Belgium (1948)*

In March 1948, American officials approached Belgium to express interest in obtaining air base rights in the Belgian Congo. Belgian officials declined the proposal that same month. No negotiations were held and no agreement was reached.51

*Ethiopia (1948 – 1953)*

American officials approached Ethiopia in November 1948 to indicate their desire for formal base rights in Eritrea once that territory came under Ethiopian sovereignty. Ethiopian officials accepted the proposal that same month. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (March 1952), round 2 (August – December 1952), and round 3 (March – May 1953). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Imperial Ethiopian Government Concerning the Utilization of Defense Installations Within the Empire of Ethiopia, signed 22 May 1953.52


51 NARA, RG 59, CDF 1945-49, 811.24555A, Box 4655.

52 NARA, RG 59, CDF 1945-49, 811.24565D/9-249, Box 4656; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 711.56375 and 711.56375A, Box 3197; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 711.56377, Box 3198; *FRUS,*
Near East, Middle East, and North Africa

Oman (1942)

In July 1942, American officials approached Oman via British representatives in that country regarding air base rights for the U.S. Army Air Forces at Salalah, Masirah, and Ras-al-Hadd. The Sultan of Oman accepted this proposal in August 1942. One round of talks ensued during August ï November 1942. The negotiations culminated in an Agreement Concerning Use by the United States of Air Bases in Muscat and Oman, reached on 4 November 1942.53

Iran (1942 – 1945)

In October 1942, American officials approached Iran to discuss the stationing of U.S. forces and the operation of military facilities in that country. Iranian officials accepted the proposal in November 1942. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (November 1942 ï January 1953), round 2 (April ï December 1943), and round 3 (September 1944 ï March 1945). No agreement was reached.54


**French North Africa/France (1942)**

In November 1942, American officials approached French authorities regarding access to and administration of military bases in French North Africa. French officials accepted the proposal that same month. One round of talks ensued in November 1942. The negotiations culminated in the Clark-Darlan Agreement, signed 22 November 1942.\(^{55}\)

**Saudi Arabia (1944)**

In July 1944, American officials approached Saudi Arabia with a proposal to start negotiations for the construction and use of an air base at Dhahran by the U.S. Army. Saudi officials declined the proposal that same month. No negotiations were held and no agreement was reached.\(^{56}\)

**Saudi Arabia (1945)**

In May 1945, American officials again approached Saudi Arabia with a proposal to start negotiations for the construction and use of an air base at Dhahran by the U.S. Army. Saudi officials accepted the proposal that same month. One round of talks ensued during May–August 1945. The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for

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a United States Military Airbase at Dhahran by exchange of notes on 5-6 August 1945.57

Libya (1950 – 1954)

In June 1950, American officials expressed their desire for base rights at Wheelus Field to Emir Mohammed Idris el-Senussi. The Emir accepted the proposal that same month. Six rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August to December 1951), round 2 (August to October 1952), round 3 (December 1952 to January 1953), round 4 (April to May 1953), round 5 (August to October 1953), and round 6 (January to September 1954). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Libya Concerning the Use of Defense Facilities in Agreed Areas in Libya, signed 9 September 1954.58

Turkey (1952 – 1954)

In September 1952, the American Secretary for Air met with the Turkish Prime Minister to indicate that the United States would like to discuss the use of Turkish air bases. The Turkish Prime Minister accepted this proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (February to August 1953) and round 2 (October 1953


June 1954). The negotiations culminated in a Military Facilities Agreement and a Status of Forces Agreement, signed 23 June 1954.59

**Morocco (1956 – 1959)**

In June 1956, American officials proposed to Morocco the holding of tripartite negotiations between American, French, and Moroccan authorities to determine U.S. base rights in the newly independent Morocco. Moroccan officials responded in November 1956 that they would agree to hold only bilateral negotiations with the U.S. Five rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (May – July 1957), round 2 (September – November 1957), round 3 (January – May 1958), round 4 (July – September 1958), and round 5 (April – December 1959). No agreement was reached.60

**Bahrain (1971)**

American officials approach Bahrain in April 1971 regarding base rights negotiations. Bahraini officials accepted the proposal that same month. One round of talks ensued during July – December 1971. The negotiations culminated in a Military Facilities

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Agreement and an Agreement for the Deployment in Bahrain of the United States Middle East Force by exchange of notes 23 December 1971.\textsuperscript{61}

Central Asia, the Far East, and the Pacific

Fakarava Island/France (1939)

American officials approached France in August 1939 for base rights on Fakarava Island in French Polynesia. French officials accepted the proposal that same month. One round of talks ensued during August ñ November 1939. No agreement was reached.\textsuperscript{62}

Fiji/United Kingdom (1941 ñ 1942)

American officials approached the United Kingdom in October 1941 with a proposal to open discussions for the establishment of air bases in the Fiji Islands. British officials accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of negotiations ensued: round 1 (October ñ November 1941) and round 2 (July ñ August 1942). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States Regarding the Defense of Fiji, reached on 15 August 1942.\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{61} NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-73, DEF 15 BAHRAIN IS-US, DEF 15-3 BAHRAIN IS-US, and DEF 15-4 BAHRAIN IS-US, Box 1690; \textit{TIAS} 7263.

\textsuperscript{62} FDRL, PSF, Memo from Chief of Naval Operations H.R. Stark, 4 September 1939, ßSummary of Current Items as a Sort of Clearing House of the Situation to Date,ô Box 58; \textit{FRUS}, 1939, II, pp. 528-533.

\textsuperscript{63} NARA, RG 218 (190/1/11/4), CDF 1942-45, CCS 660.2 4-2-42, Box 518; \textit{FRUS}, 1941, I, pp. 573-575, 578, 580-581.
Dutch East Indies/Netherlands (1941)

American officials approached the Netherlands government in October 1941 to request air base rights in the Dutch East Indies. Dutch authorities accepted the proposal that same month. One round of talks ensued during October – November 1941. No agreement was reached.64

Phoenix Islands/United Kingdom (1941 – 1947)

American officials approached the United Kingdom in October 1941 with a proposal to open discussions for the establishment of air bases in the Phoenix Islands (in particular, Canton and Enderbury Islands). British officials accepted the proposal that same month. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (October – November 1941), round 2 (March – May 1946), and round 3 (December 1946 – April 1947). No agreement was reached.65

Australia (1941 – 1942)

In October 1941, American officials approached Australia with a request for base rights in that country, particularly at Darwin and Rockhampton. Australian officials accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (October

64 FRUS, 1941, I, pp. 573-575, 577, 581; Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces in World War II, pp. 180-181.

The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for the Planning, Operation and Provision of Personnel for Naval Bases, reached 29 May 1942.\textsuperscript{66}

*Line Islands/United Kingdom (1941 – 1947)*

American officials approached the United Kingdom in October 1941 with a proposal to open discussions for the establishment of air bases in the Line Islands (in particular, Christmas Island). British officials accepted that same month. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (October 1941 – November 1941), round 2 (March 1942 – May 1942), and round 3 (December 1946 – April 1947). No agreement was reached.\textsuperscript{67}

*Western Samoa/New Zealand (1941 – 1942)*

In October 1941, American officials approached New Zealand with a proposal to begin negotiations for air base rights on the island of Western Samoa. New Zealand


\textsuperscript{67} FRUS, 1941, I, pp. 573-575, 578, 580-581; FRUS, 1945, VI, pp. 209-211; FRUS, 1946, V, pp. 11-16, 20-26, 28-30, 35-45; McIntyre, *Background to the Anzus Pact*, pp. 75-76, 81-82.
officials accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (October – November 1941) and round 2 (March 1942).  

**Solomon Island/United Kingdom (1941 – 1946)**

American officials approached the United Kingdom in October 1941 with a proposal to open discussions for the establishment of air bases in the Solomon Islands (in particular, Guadalcanal-Tulagi). British officials accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (October – November 1941) and round 2 (March – May 1946). No agreement was reached.

**New Caledonia/France (1941 – 1942)**

American officials proposed negotiations to France in November 1941 for base rights on the Island of New Caledonia in French Melanesia. French authorities accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (December 1941) and round 2 (March 1942). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for the Use of a

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69 NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-1944, 811.245/62, Box 3765; *FRUS*, 1941, I, pp. 573-575, 578, 580-581; *FRUS*, 1945, VI, pp. 209-211; *FRUS*, 1946, V, pp. 11-16, 20-26, 28-30, 35-45; McIntyre, *Background to the Anzus Pact*, pp. 75-76.
Naval Base on the Island of New Caledonia by the United States of America, signed 7 March 1942.\textsuperscript{70}

\textit{Bora Bora/\textit{France (1941 – 1942)}}

American officials proposed negotiations to France in December 1941 for base rights on the Island of Bora Bora in French Polynesia. French authorities accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (December 1941 – January 1942) and round 2 (February 1942). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for the Use, Administration, and Operation of a Naval Base on the Island of Bora Bora by the United States of America, signed 23 February 1942.\textsuperscript{71}

\textit{New Hebrides/\textit{United Kingdom (1941 – 1946)}}

American officials approached the United Kingdom in November 1941 with a proposal to open discussions for the establishment of air and naval bases in the New Hebrides. British officials accepted the proposal that same month. Five rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (December 1941), round 2 (March 1942), round 3 (March


\textsuperscript{71} NARA, RG 38 (370/10/31/2), WPD OP-12D, Entry 32-C (Formerly Security-Classified Correspondence Relating to Naval Bases, 1941-1942), Box 1; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 811.24546, Box C77; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 811.34551M, Box C82.
1943), round 4 (April–May 1944), and round 5 (March–May 1946). No agreement was reached.\textsuperscript{72}

\textit{Tongatabu/United Kingdom (1942)}

American officials approached the United Kingdom in February 1942 regarding the establishment of a naval base on the Island of Tongatabu. British officials accepted the proposal in March 1942. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (May–June 1942) and round 2 (July–August 1942). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States Regarding the Defense of Tonga, signed 15 August 1942.\textsuperscript{73}

\textit{Eastern Siberia/Soviet Union (1943)}

In July 1942, American officials approached the Soviet Union with a proposal to open discussions on air base rights in eastern Siberia. Soviet officials declined the proposal in January 1943. No negotiations occurred and no agreement was reached.\textsuperscript{74}


\textsuperscript{73} NARA, RG 59, CDF 1945-49, 811.34546M/2-2045 and 811.34546K/2-2045, Box 4683; NARA, RG 218 (190/1114), CDF 1942-45, CCS 660.2 4-2-42, Box 518; Coletta and Bauer, \textit{United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases}, pp. 324-325.

\textsuperscript{74} Matloff and Snell, \textit{Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942}, pp. 121, 142-145, 341-346; Conversino, \textit{Fighting with the Soviets}, p. 17.
**Eastern Siberia/Soviet Union (1944 – 1945)**

In November 1943, American officials approached the Soviet Union for a second time with a proposal to open discussion on air base rights in eastern Siberia. Soviet officials accepted the proposal in February 1944. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (June ‒ July 1944), round 2 (September ‒ October 1944), and round 3 (February ‒ April 1945). No agreement was reached. 75

**Philippines (1945 – 1947)**

In April 1945, U.S. Secretary of State Stettinius raised the issue of reaching an agreement on military and naval bases with Philippine President Osmeña, who accepted the proposal that same month. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (May 1945), round 2 (May ‒ September 1946), and round 3 (October 1946 ‒ March 1947). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines Concerning Military Bases, signed 14 March 1947. 76

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75 NARA, RG 84 (350/70/10/5), Entry 3314 (USSR; US Embassy, Moscow; Top Secret General Records, 1941-1948), Box 1; NARA, RG 84 (350/70/10/6), Entry 3315 (USSR; US Embassy, Moscow; Top Secret Records from the Office of the Ambassador, 1943-1950), Box 1; Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, pp. 223-266; Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944*, pp. 500-501; Lukas, *Eagles East*, pp. 222-227.

Kurile Islands/Soviet Union (1945)

American officials approached the Soviet Union in August 1945 with a proposal to open negotiations for air base rights in the Kuril Islands. Soviet officials declined the proposal that same month. No negotiations occurred and no agreement was reached.\textsuperscript{77}

Ellice Islands/United Kingdom (1945 – 1946)

American officials approached the United Kingdom in November 1945 with a proposal to open discussions for rights to air and naval bases in the Ellice Islands (in particular, Funafuti). British officials accepted the proposal in February 1946. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (March – May 1946) and round 2 (December 1946). No agreement was reached.\textsuperscript{78}

Gilbert Islands/United Kingdom (1945 – 1946)

American officials approached the United Kingdom in November 1945 with a proposal to open discussions for rights to air and naval bases in the Gilbert Islands (in particular, Tarawa). British officials accepted the proposal in February 1946. Two


\textsuperscript{78} NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-1944, 811.34546M/7-1144, Box C82; \textit{FRUS}, 1945, VI, pp. 209-211; \textit{FRUS}, 1946, V, pp. 11-16, 20-26, 28-30, 35-45; McIntyre, \textit{Background to the Anzus Pact}, pp. 75-76, 81-82.
rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (March–May 1946) and round 2 (December 1946). No agreement was reached.\textsuperscript{79}

\textit{Admiralty Islands/Australia (1946 – 1947)}

In March 1946, American officials approached Australia with a proposal to open negotiations on base rights at Manus in the Admiralty Islands. In April 1946, Australia officials indicated their willingness to discuss U.S. base rights at Manus on the condition that such talks also encompassed the development of a regional defense arrangement. Four rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (April 1946), round 2 (June 1946), round 3 (October 1946–February 1947), and round 4 (June 1947). No agreement was reached.\textsuperscript{80}

\textit{Sri Lanka (1949)}

In January 1949, American officials approached Sri Lanka with a proposal to open discussions on access to and stationing of U.S. military personnel at naval and air

\textsuperscript{79} FRUS, 1945, VI, pp. 209-211; FRUS, 1946, V, pp. 11-16, 20-26, 28-30, 35-45; McIntyre, \textit{Background to the Anzus Pact}, pp. 75-76, 81-82.

communication facilities in that country. Sri Lankan officials declined the proposal in September 1949. No negotiations occurred and no agreement was reached.\textsuperscript{81}

\textit{Japan (1951 – 1952)}

In February 1951, the United States released a public proposal to station American forces in Japan and to open negotiations for base rights following the restoration of Japanese sovereignty, which the Japanese government accepted that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (February ï ¿ 1951) and round 2 (November 1951 ï ¿ February 1952). The negotiations culminated in the Security Treaty between the United States of American and Japan, signed 8 September 1951, with an Administrative Agreement Under Article III, signed 28 February 1952.\textsuperscript{82}

\textit{Republic of Korea (1953 – 1966)}

In August 1953, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles indicated to South Korean President Rhee that the United States intended to negotiate a formal agreement governing the status of American forces and the use of military facilities in the Republic of Korea. President Rhee accepted the proposal that same month. Seven rounds of talks ensued:

\textsuperscript{81} NARA, RG 59, CDF 1945-49, 811.34546C, Box 4683; \textit{FRUS}, 1949, I, pp. 304-306, 371.


In May 1954, the American Ambassador to Thailand approached the Prime Minister of Thailand with a proposal to open negotiations for an agreement governing the establishment of air bases and the stationing of U.S. military personnel in that country. The Thai Prime Minister accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (November 1966 – November 1967) and round 2 (February – July 1968). No agreement was reached.84

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Republic of China (1955 – 1965)


Pakistan (1955)

In December 1955, the American Ambassador to Pakistan approached Iskander Mirza with an informal proposal to open discussions for base rights in Pakistan. The proposal was declined that same month. No negotiations occurred and no agreement was reached.86


Pakistan (1957 – 1955)

In December 1957, American officials approached Pakistan with a proposal to open negotiations for the establishment and stationing of U.S. military personnel at a naval communication facility at Peshawar. Pakistani officials accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (April – July 1958) and round 2 (March – July 1959). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for the Establishment of a Naval Communications Unit by exchange of notes on 18 July 1959.  

British Indian Ocean Territories/United Kingdom (1960 – 1966)


87 NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 711.56390D, Box 2917; FRUS, 1958-60, XV, p. 615; TIAS 4281.

**Australia (1960 – 1963)**


**Onn Kyunt Island/Bangladesh (1971)**

In March 1971, American Envoy to Pakistan Joseph Farland met with Mujib Rahman and requested rights to establish a naval base on Onn Kyunt Island in the Bay of Bengal after Bangladesh achieved independence. Rahman turned down the request that same month. No negotiations occurred and no agreement was reached.90


APPENDIX B: SELECTION ANALYSES

A leader’s decision to go public, make concessions, or sign an agreement in any given round of negotiations may be related to her decision to enter into that round in the first place. As such, it is necessary to test for possible selection bias in each of the statistical analyses presented in chapters 4 and 5. I do this by estimating a series of Heckman or censored probit models, the results of which are presented in this appendix.¹

These selection analyses focus only on the United States’ decisions for two reasons. First, the United States is almost universally the initiator of basing negotiations. Second, host-state leaders rarely turn down a proposal to hold talks. Accordingly, estimates for the United States’ decisions will provide better results for assessing possible selection bias. To conduct the selection analyses, a random sample of cases of potential negotiations — that is, instances when the United States could have pursued basing negotiations with a potential host state but chose not to — was added to the original dataset of negotiations that were pursued.² To identify these


² As any foreign territory is eligible to host a U.S. military base, the sample of potential hosts that did not receive a proposal was drawn randomly from the population of foreign territories, encompassing all sovereign states, colonies, and overseas territories. The primary sources of data used to identify this population include the State Department’s Country Lists for 1939-49, 1950-59, 1960-69, and 1970-72; David Henige, Colonial Governors from the Fifteenth Century to the Present (Madison: University of
non-cases, I follow Paul Huth and Todd Allee in using a "twelve-month rule." According to this procedure, each twelve-month period in which the United States did not initiate basing negotiations with a potential host state is designated as a case in which no negotiations were sought. A random sample of such periods of inactivity was then included in the dataset as cases of potential negotiations.³

The broader theoretical argument developed in this dissertation can speak to this prior stage and generate hypotheses about the conditions under which the United States is more or less likely to propose basing negotiations with potential host states. However, the current project sets this topic aside theoretically as a fruitful avenue for future analytical and empirical work. What follows, then, is not intended to be a thorough treatment of this prior stage but rather simply a sufficient assessment of possible selection bias in the main quantitative tests.

The results for each of the analyses are presented in Table 9. As this table demonstrates, I found no evidence of selection effects biasing the analyses. Specifically, each model’s estimated rho (ρ) parameter, which indicates the correlation of the disturbances across the two equations, did not approach standard levels of statistical significance. Moreover, the primary results remained consistent.

## Table 9: Heckman Probit Results for Going Public, Concessions, and Agreements during Basing Negotiations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Variables</th>
<th>Going Public</th>
<th>Concessions</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selection</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Selection</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power</td>
<td>-.710 (.227)**</td>
<td>-.719 (.394)*</td>
<td>-.480 (.300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjugate</td>
<td>.012 (.252)</td>
<td>4.68 (.722)***</td>
<td>-.090 (.447)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary Border</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary Border (U.S.)</td>
<td>.403 (.177)**</td>
<td>-1.65 (.540)***</td>
<td>.305 (.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary Border (Host)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime (U.S.)</td>
<td>.634 (.154)**</td>
<td>-1.19 (.416)***</td>
<td>.614 (.263)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime (Host)</td>
<td>-.401 (.191)**</td>
<td>.838 (.361)***</td>
<td>-.333 (.433)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality</td>
<td>.888 (.194)***</td>
<td>-1.19 (.447)***</td>
<td>.650 (.332)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Round</td>
<td>-.551 (.199)***</td>
<td>-1.00 (.534)*</td>
<td>-.636 (.190)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Public Round</td>
<td>.499 (.231)**</td>
<td>.769 (.302)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Access</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.592 (.183)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Stalemate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.361 (.214)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>-.004 (.276)</td>
<td>-.509 (.254)**</td>
<td>.244 (.199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Presence</td>
<td>-.794 (.145)***</td>
<td>-.839 (.159)***</td>
<td>-.752 (.227)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round</td>
<td>.367 (.056)***</td>
<td>.145 (.118)</td>
<td>.479 (.082)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Coalition Size</td>
<td>.738 (.267)***</td>
<td>-2.97 (.828)***</td>
<td>.525 (.357)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Constraints</td>
<td>.115 (.257)</td>
<td>1.03 (.403)***</td>
<td>.033 (.386)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election (U.S.)</td>
<td>.016 (.04)***</td>
<td>.005 (.010)</td>
<td>.017 (.005)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election (Host)</td>
<td>.001 (.042)</td>
<td>.012 (.010)</td>
<td>.002 (.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Coverage</td>
<td>.119 (.144)</td>
<td>1.60 (.392)***</td>
<td>.680 (.136)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.58 (.221)***</td>
<td>-1.89 (.105)</td>
<td>-1.50 (.342)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \bar{\gamma} )</td>
<td>.221 (p = .634)</td>
<td>-.315 (p = .514)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-371.07</td>
<td>-419.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering.

**p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1
APPENDIX C:
SUPPLEMENTARY HYPOTHESES AND FINDINGS ON BARGAINING
BEHAVIOR AND THE PROSPECTS OF COOPERATION

The argument developed in the second half of chapter 3 focuses on the effects of public acknowledgement on leaders’ bargaining behavior and the prospects of cooperation. However, the broader theory set forth in the first half of that chapter suggests several additional hypotheses beyond the effects of public acknowledgment that link variation in international power position and strategic context to leaders’ willingness to make concessions and their likelihood of reaching an agreement. This appendix briefly explores these supplementary expectations and discusses relevant empirical findings from the statistical analyses in chapter 5.

The Expectations

Power Position

The broader theoretical argument developed in this dissertation suggests that states’ power positions in the international system should affect their willingness to make concessions during basing negotiations and the overall prospects of reaching an agreement. As argued in chapter 3, a great power’s foreign policy choices are likely to receive more attention from a wider international audience because its behavior affects a broader range of actors and interests. Consequently, the precedent-setting
effects of concessions — whether positive or negative — are likely to be more expansive for great powers, given the scope of their other international relationships. As the decision by one great power to host another great power’s military forces on its territory may be perceived by international audiences as a signal of the former’s diminishing status as a major player, great power hosts should be more likely to bargain hard over the terms of agreement. For similar reasons, though, the sending state also should pursue a hard-line bargaining stance, given that fellow great powers are peer competitors. In light of these rigid bargaining positions and the fact that each state has less to offer the other, given their general power symmetry, the overall likelihood of cooperation should be lower for two great powers than for a great power sending state and a weaker host state. This argument suggests the first supplementary hypothesis.

\[ SH1: \text{When both sending and host states are great powers,} \]
\[ (a) \text{each state is less likely to make concessions during negotiations and} \]
\[ (b) \text{the two parties are less likely to reach an agreement.} \]

**Coercion**

Most basing relationships, however, are characterized by a dramatic asymmetry of capabilities between the sending and host states, with the former often enjoying a preponderance of material capabilities relative to the latter. Given that the nature of basing relationships is such that the host state almost always has an advantage in issue-specific power by virtue of its control of site-specific resources, the sending

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state's material predominance does not necessarily translate into a clear bargaining advantage, except in cases where its capabilities carry an explicit threat of coercion. Specifically, when the host state was forcibly subjugated by the sending state at some point in the recent past, the former's contractive capacity is sufficiently impaired that she has little choice but to make any desired concessions. For the same reason, the sending state should be less inclined to make concessions. Overall, though, given the sending state's general ability to impose cooperation on its terms, negotiations under these circumstances should be more likely to end in an agreement. This argument suggests the second supplementary hypothesis.

**SH2: When the host state was recently subjugated by the sending state,**
(a) the host state is more likely to make concessions during negotiations,
(b) the sending state is less likely to make concessions during negotiations, and
(c) the two parties are more likely to reach an agreement.

**Strategic Value**
A state's ability to quickly project power declines with distance, while the threat posed by an adversary increases with proximity. A primary purpose of foreign military basing is to enhance the sending state's ability to overcome the time-distance problem inherent to power projection by establishing a forward presence near potential theaters of operation ahead of time. Foreign basing relationships are perceived as security-enhancing by host states and provocative by adversaries, in turn, precisely because they bring the sending state's military capabilities into closer proximity to both. Given that the strategic value of a basing relationship thus increases when the host territory is located on the immediate periphery of an
adversary, leaders should be more likely to make concessions and reach agreements when this is the case. This suggests the third supplementary hypothesis.

**SH3**: *When the host territory shares a border with an adversary of their state,*

(a) *the leaders of that state are more likely to make concessions during negotiations and*

(b) *the two parties are more likely to reach an agreement.*

Basing relationships also take on added strategic value during wartime. Thus, states engaged in war during the negotiations should be more likely to make concessions to ensure cooperation. Consequently, wartime negotiations also should be more likely to result in an agreement. This suggests the fourth supplementary hypothesis.

**SH4**: *When a state is engaged in war,*

(a) *the leaders of that state are more likely to make concessions during negotiations and*

(b) *the two parties are more likely to reach an agreement.*

**The Independent and Control Variables**

I start with the coding procedure for the principal independent variables and then turn to the control variables. Unless otherwise noted, the data for these variables are drawn from the last month of each round of talks. The data sources for variables featured in chapter 4 are the same and thus not provided below.

**Main Independent Variables**

**GREAT POWER**: For both the bivariate probit and the logit analyses in chapter 5, this indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the host state was a major power. The United States was a major power during the entire coding period.
SUBJUGATION: For both sets of analyses, this indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the host state forcibly was subjugated by the sending state in the recent past—that is, defeated in war by the United States within the past five years, formerly occupied militarily by the United States, or formerly a U.S. colony.

ADVERSARY BORDER: For the bivariate probit analysis of concessions, a separate dichotomous indicator is constructed for the sending and host states, coded 1 if the host territory shares a land or sea border with a third state that is engaged in a militarized dispute with or is a strategic rival of the sending or host state, respectively. For the logit analysis of agreements, an aggregate dichotomous indicator is constructed, coded 1 if the host territory shares a border with an adversary of either state.

WARTIME: For the bivariate probit analysis, a separate dichotomous indicator is constructed for the sending and host states, coded 1 if the state is engaged in an interstate war. For the logit analysis, an aggregate dichotomous indicator is constructed, coded 1 if either state is engaged in an interstate war.

Control Variables

ALLY: This indicator is included as a control for the effects of a preexisting cooperative security relationship, which previous scholarship suggests is positively associated with the likelihood of additional security cooperation.²

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analyses, this indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the sending and host states share a military alliance. The primary source of data is the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset.³

PRIOR ACCESS: For both sets of analyses, this variable is dichotomous, coded 1 if the sending state’s troops were granted access to the host state’s territory prior to the end of the negotiation round and thus prior to a formal agreement. This indicator essentially captures instances of tacit or de facto cooperation that carry the superficial appearance of agreement but not its substance.⁴ It serves as a control for the effects of such bargains on leaders’ subsequent willingness to make concessions and reach a formal agreement.⁵ The data were gathered from archival and secondary historical sources.


⁵ The United States’ negotiations with the United Kingdom for airbase rights on Ascension Island provide an example of this dynamic. When approached by American officials in early 1942, British officials expressed their willingness to agree to this project being started immediately, leaving the discussions to be undertaken as soon as is mutually convenient. See Telegram 568 from London to Washington, 7 February 1942, in Foreign Relations of the United States: 1942, Vol. 1: General; The British Commonwealth; The Far East (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 560-561. These discussions commenced following the arrival of U.S. forces but ultimately stalemated without a formal agreement for the following reason: As the operation of the base was proceeding smoothly under the informal arrangement in effect with the British Government, it seemed advisable not to disturb the situation, given the material differences between the British and the United States drafts of the proposed agreement. See Memorandum of Conversation, 24 April 1945, Subject: Air Base on Ascension Island, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1945-49, 811.24549F/4-2745, Box 4655. For the full record of the negotiations, see Combined Chiefs of Staff, Protection of Air Routes from Brazil to the
COALITION SIZE: This variable is included as a control for domestic regime type. Previous scholarship suggests that regime similarity particularly among democracies affects the probability of international cooperation. For both sets of analyses, this indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the host-state leader has a large coalition and 0 if not. This variable is coded only for the host state, as the United States had a large coalition during the entire coding period. I chose this operationalization because selectorate theory’s argument regarding coalition size and the provision of public versus private goods is particularly relevant to basing negotiations and informative of the types of concessions leaders are more or less likely to make.

EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINTS: This indicator measures the degree of institutionalized constraints on the power of the executive to determine policy. It is included as a control variable for the elements of democracy outside of the winning coalition: namely, legislative constraints. Previous scholarship suggests that high levels of such constraints affect both the probability and terms of international

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For both sets of analyses, this indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the host-state executive was in a position of parity or subordination to a relevant accountability group such as a legislature. This variable is coded only for the host state, as the United States had a value of 1 during the entire coding period.

**ELECTION**: This variable is included as a control for cycles of political vulnerability in democratic states, as previous scholarship suggests that the occurrence and proximity of elections affects leaders’ willingness to make concessions and the prospects of international cooperation. For the bivariate probit analysis, a separate variable is included for the sending and host states. This indicator is coded as the number of months since the last relevant national election. For the logit analysis, an aggregate dichotomous indicator is constructed, coded 1 if an election occurred in either state in the past twelve months.

**PRESS COVERAGE**: This variable is included as a control for press speculation and leaks. For both sets of analyses, this indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the national press in either the sending or host state printed news stories reporting prospective U.S. military basing in the potential host territory during the negotiation round that were not officially acknowledged by either side.

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PAST STALEMATE: For both sets of analyses, this variable is dichotomous, coded 1 if neither side made concessions in the previous round. This indicator controls for a history of stalemates, which numerous studies link to the development of hard-line stances during negotiations and thus possibly to a decreased likelihood of concessions and agreements in subsequent rounds.\textsuperscript{10}

ROUND: For both sets of analyses, this variable counts the number of previous rounds, as a control for the non-independence of observations.

The Results

The results of the bivariate probit and the logit analyses are presented in chapter 5 in Tables 5 and 7, respectively, providing support for most of the supplementary hypotheses. To aid interpretation of substantive effects, Tables 6 and 8 from chapter 5 report the impact of changes in select significant variables on predicted probabilities for making concessions and reaching an agreement, respectively. Tables 10 and 11 below provide a summary of the expected and observed relationships for the supplementary expectations and control variables.

The first supplementary hypothesis received mixed support. As predicted in SH1(a), when the host state is a great power, it is significantly less likely to make

Table 10: Summary of Expected and Observed Relationships for Concessions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sending State Decision To Make Concessions</th>
<th>Host State Decision To Make Concessions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expected</td>
<td>Observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host State</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power</td>
<td>Ī</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjugate</td>
<td>Ī</td>
<td>Ins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary Border (U.S.)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary Border (Host)</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>Ins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime (U.S.)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Ins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime (Host)</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>Ins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Access</td>
<td>Ī</td>
<td>Ī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Ī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Stalemate</td>
<td>Ī</td>
<td>Ins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOMESTIC VARIABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Coalition Size</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Ins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Year (U.S.)</td>
<td>Ī</td>
<td>Ins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Year (Host)</td>
<td>Ī</td>
<td>Ins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Coverage</td>
<td>Ī</td>
<td>Ins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Constraints</td>
<td>Ī</td>
<td>Ins.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: A positive sign (+) indicates a coefficient value greater than zero. A negative sign (ī) indicates a coefficient value less than zero. The abbreviation “Ins.” indicates an insignificant coefficient. The abbreviation “NP” indicates no prediction.

concessions during basing negotiations (see Table 5). Specifically, as shown in Table 6, great power hosts are 37.5% less likely to adopt a flexible bargaining position than other host states. Contrary to expectations, though, the sending state is significantly more likely to make concessions when negotiating with a great power host. Specifically, the United States is 45.5% more likely to adopt a flexible bargaining position in such talks. This suggests that the host state’s hard-line bargaining strategy may put pressure on the sending state to compromise as a means to ensure cooperation, perhaps due to the host state’s advantage in issue-specific power. Consistent with the prediction of SH1(b), however, negotiations are significantly less likely to end in an agreement when both sending and host states are great powers (see
Table 7). Specifically, as shown in Table 8, such talks are 73.1% less likely to result in formal cooperation.

### Table 11: Summary of Expected and Observed Relationships for Agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Observed</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Host State</td>
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<td>ť</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power</td>
<td>ť</td>
<td>ť</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjugate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary Border</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Ins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Access</td>
<td>ť</td>
<td>ť</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Stalemate</td>
<td>ť</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOMESTIC VARIABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Coalition Size</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Year (U.S.)</td>
<td>ť</td>
<td>Ins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Year (Host)</td>
<td>ť</td>
<td>Ins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Coverage</td>
<td>ť</td>
<td>Ins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Constraints</td>
<td>ť</td>
<td>Ins.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** A positive sign (+) indicates a coefficient value greater than zero. A negative sign (ť) indicates a coefficient value less than zero. The abbreviation "Ins." indicates an insignificant coefficient.

The second supplementary hypothesis also received mixed support. As predicted in SH2(a), host states are significantly more likely to make concessions when they were forcibly subjugated by the sending state in the recent past (see Table 5). Specifically, as shown in Table 6, the host state is 11% more likely to adopt a flexible bargaining position when it was defeated in war by the sending state, formerly occupied by the sending state, or formerly a colony of the sending state. However, SH2(b) was not supported. The coefficient for this variable is in the hypothesized direction but not statistically significant. Thus, in explicitly coercive relationships, the United States is not in general less likely to make concessions to the potential host state. Consistent with the expectations of SH2(c), though, sending- and
host-state leaders are significantly more likely to reach an agreement when the host state recently was subjugated by the sending state (see Table 7). Specifically, as shown in Table 8, coercive relationships are 144% more likely to end in formal cooperation.

The third supplementary hypothesis similarly received mixed support. As predicted in SH3(a), leaders are significantly more likely to make concessions when the host territory shares a border with an adversary of their state (see Table 5). In particular, as shown in Table 6, the United States is 51.4% more likely to make concessions and the host state is 7.6% more likely under these circumstances. However, SH3(b) was not supported. The coefficient for this variable is in the hypothesized direction but not statistically significant (see Table 7). Thus, when the host territory shares a border with an adversary of either state, the parties are not in general more likely to reach an agreement.

Finally, the fourth supplementary hypothesis also received mixed support. The bivariate probit analysis does not support SH4(a). The coefficient for the host state variable is in the hypothesized direction but not statistically significant, whereas the coefficient for the sending state is in the opposite direction but also not statistically significant. Thus, when engaged in war, neither the United States nor the host state is in general more likely to make concessions during negotiations. Consistent with the expectations of SH4(b), however, sending- and host-state leaders are significantly more likely to reach an agreement when either state is engaged in an interstate war.
(see Table 7). Specifically, as shown in Table 8, wartime negotiations are 386.1% more likely to result in a signed agreement.

Several of the control variables also generated significant results. The first set of findings concerns the effects of preexisting security cooperation. As indicated in Table 5, both sending- and host-state leaders are significantly less likely to make concessions when the sending state’s troops already have been granted access to the host state’s territory prior to the end of the negotiations and thus prior to reaching a formal agreement. Following the emergence of such tacit or de facto cooperation, the United States is 61.5% less likely to adopt a flexible bargaining position and the host state is 23.1% less likely to do so (see Table 6). However, prior access has no effect on the probability of reaching an agreement (see Table 7). Alternatively, common security ties in the form of preexisting alliance relationships significantly decrease the sending state’s willingness to make concessions during basing negotiations but have no effect on the host state’s bargaining behavior (see Table 5). Specifically, as shown in Table 6, the United States is 44.7% less likely to adopt a flexible bargaining stance in negotiations with allied host states. However, sending- and host-state leaders are significantly more likely to reach an agreement when they share alliance ties (see Table 7). In particular, as indicated in Table 8, talks between allies are 120% more likely to end successfully with formal cooperation.

A set second of findings touches broadly on the effects of domestic political factors. First, as indicated in Table 5, host states are significantly less likely to make concessions following press speculation or leaks regarding prospective U.S. military
basing. Specifically, as shown in Table 6, host-state leaders are 17.1% less likely to adopt a flexible bargaining position following such unintended attention. This finding is explicable by the simple fact that foreign military basing is one of the most controversial forms of security cooperation, often perceived internationally as a blight on host states’ sovereignty and domestically as a source of crime and pollution. However, press speculation and leaks have no effect on the sending state’s bargaining behavior or on the overall probability of cooperation. Second, though domestic coalition size does not have a statistically significant effect on bargaining behavior (see Table 5), basing negotiations between two large-coalition leaders are significantly more likely to end in an agreement than negotiations between a sending-state leader with a large coalition and a host-state leader with a small coalition (see Table 7). In particular, as shown in Table 8, such talks are 114.9% more likely to culminate in formal cooperation. This finding is consistent with the popular claim that democracies are more likely to engage in security cooperation with one another than with nondemocracies.
This appendix reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Observations</th>
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<td>Going Public (U.S.)</td>
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