ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: WHY REFUGEES REBEL: MILITARIZATION IN JORDAN AND WORLDWIDE

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Why do some refugee groups militarize while others do not? Existing literature focuses on structural explanations and neglects factors related to refugee groups themselves. While acknowledging the importance of exogenous factors in enabling militarization, I fill this gap by proposing a framework of refugee militarization including factors endogenous to refugee groups, which will help explain the motivation of refugees to militarize and the framing used to mobilize them. In this framework, four conditions are necessary and sufficient to lead to refugee militarization in a particular host country at a particular time: a collective project to redeem the homeland from a clear enemy, socioeconomic marginalization from the host state, militancy entrepreneurs and political opportunity.
This framework is applied to in-depth case studies of two refugee groups, Palestinians and Iraqis in Jordan. Why did Palestinians militarize from 1964 to 1970, but not earlier or later? Why have Iraqis not militarized despite fears that they might? What are the implications for the likelihood of militarization by either group in the near future, given the ongoing upheavals of the Arab Spring?

From 2010 to 2011 I conducted 174 interviews of Palestinian and Iraqi households and local experts in Jordan. The results of these interviews reveal that from 1948 to 1963 there was a collective project among Palestinians in Jordan, but most refugees were waiting for powerful states to redeem the homeland on their behalf. From 1964 to 1970 all four conditions were met. From 1971 to 2011 militarization has not occurred mainly due to lack of political opportunity. This suggests that Palestinians would likely militarize again if political opportunity arose. Among ordinary Iraqis, however, there is little collective project, despite the presence of militancy entrepreneurs, so it is unlikely that they would militarize even if given the opportunity.

To extend the global applicability of this framework, I apply it also to cases of Rwandans and Afghans, using secondary literature. I conclude with suggestions for future research, a projection of refugee militarization in the context of the new Middle East, and recommendations to reduce the risk of militarization.
Why Refugees Rebel: 
Militarization in Jordan and Worldwide

by
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Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the 
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Preface

This project has gone through many evolutions, but the core concepts – refugees, the Middle East and ethnonationalist projects – came from three sources. The first was my long-standing interest in the Levant. At fourteen years old I somehow managed to convince my parents that I was mature enough to travel there alone and visit my older brother, who was studying abroad. This was my first foray out of North America, and it was a powerful experience. The ancient history and modern political struggles dazzled my teenage brain.

The second formative experience was my work for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Macedonia and Kosovo in 1999 and 2000. For a reason which shall forever remain a mystery to me, IOM agreed to allow a random American college student help supervise the logistics of refugee departures and returns, then allowed him to come back the following summer in a position with even more authority. Kosovo was my first post-conflict zone, and my first time interacting with refugees on a daily basis. It disturbed me that refugees seemed to be stripped of agency and funneled into the position of dependent supplicants. This concern as well as other aspects of the refugee experience continued to trouble me long after I left the Balkans.

The third source of inspiration came from a discussion several years ago with my wife, Munita, who is from the Fiji Islands. She is part of the population, constituting over one-third of the population\(^1\), whose ancestors immigrated from India under a British

\(^1\) Weiner states that the Indo-Fijian proportion of the population was much higher before the 1987 coup and subsequent anti-Indian riots in Fiji – in fact, slightly greater than the indigenous Fijian population, 48.6% to 46.2% – but the instability and targeting of Indo-Fijians led to substantial
scheme over a century ago (now referred to as “Indo-Fijians”). Although most Indo-Fijians retained their religion and dominant social customs from India, they also integrated into Fiji over the generations. Nowadays, few Indo-Fijians have family ties to India or feel any particular attachment to it.

Fiji has experienced its own ethnic conflict, including four coups since 1987. Three of these coups aimed to decrease the rights and political influence of the Indo-Fijians in favor of indigenous Fijians. Following one such coup in 2000, Munita and her family left Fiji, as did thousands of other Indo-Fijians. Yet, after three anti-Indo-Fijian coups, persecution, discrimination and civil unrest, Indo-Fijian refugees and emigrants have never taken up arms against their indigenous Fijian co-nationals. Even the single coup supporting Indo-Fijian rights, in 2006, was led by indigenous Fijian Commodore Frank Bainimarama, not an Indo-Fijian. When I asked Munita why Indo-Fijians had not organized to defend themselves and attack Fijians in response, she replied that Indo-Fijians would rather focus on moving to places with better economic opportunities, such as Australia and New Zealand, than fighting for Fiji. “Isn’t Fiji your home?” I asked. After all, she had grown up in Fiji, as had her ancestors dating back at least four generations. She pondered and then replied, “Home? No, I don’t think so.”

The confluence of interests in refugees, the Middle East, ethnonationalism and conflict coalesced into the present study of refugee militarization with a focus on the two major refugee populations in the Middle East region, Palestinians and Iraqis. I was surprised to find that no one had yet written on the critical role of a collective project in

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emigration afterward. (1992/93, fn. 28; see also Williams 2003; Clad & Keith-Reid/Far Eastern Economic Review, June 1990)

2 This is a striking contrast from a case study of Fiji published in 1942: “Though linked to India by sentiment, religion, and tradition, [the Indo-Fijians] look upon Fiji as their only home and are almost as indigenous as the Fijians themselves.” (Coulter 1942, p. 3)
distinguishing those refugee groups who orient politically toward their country of origin, and even take up arms to fight and die for it, from those who orient instead toward a new life in their host country and third-party resettlement states. I was even more surprised to find that, despite token references to Palestinians in the literature on refugee militarization, no one had yet conducted a detailed study on them in direct comparison to other cases worldwide. Why Refugees Rebel – borrowing titular inspiration from Ted Gurr’s (1970) famous Why Men Rebel and Mohammed Hafez’s (2003) Why Muslims Rebel – was born.

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I wish to express my sincere thanks to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the David L. Boren Fellowship for supporting my year of research in Jordan. It is an honor and a privilege to be part of the USIP family; and the staff of the Institute of International Education (IIE), which administers the Boren Fellowship, were amazingly accommodating of all my unusual requests and super helpful in facilitating the post-Ph.D. job search.

I am deeply indebted to the hundreds of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees and local experts who took time out of their day to sit down with an unknown American graduate student and answer intrusive, personal and politically sensitive questions. For many of them, it wasn’t easy to dredge up memories of their homeland, their losses and the horrific events that forced them or their ancestors to leave. Sometimes they wept. It wasn’t easy to talk about their ongoing struggles and pain – emotional, political and physical – and their hope, or lack thereof, for the future. It wasn’t easy to trust a stranger, when their statements could attract unwanted attention from the authorities. Despite all
of that, they opened up to me, they shared with me, and I am honored and grateful. I hope they find that this project faithfully represents the wide diversity of experiences, knowledge and opinions that they shared with me.

Gratitude for supporting and facilitating this project are due to my dissertation advisor at the University of Maryland College Park, Shibley Telhami, whom I also consider a friend. He has not only given me solid advice guiding the development of theoretical aspects of this project, but indispensable assistance in practical aspects of field research in the Middle East. He also has written so many letters of recommendation for my fellowship applications that he probably has a template letter memorized.

James Milner, one of the world’s most prolific experts on the topic of refugee militarization, has found the time to review my work repeatedly and give me detailed, constructive feedback. He also drew from many years of field research experience worldwide to offer a wealth of helpful suggestions for my year in Jordan. For that assistance, as well as leaving the Middle East region largely untouched for me throughout a decade of writing about refugee militarization, I am extremely grateful.

Next, sincere thanks are owed to the other members of my dissertation committee, Paul Huth, Johanna Birnir, Kanisha Bond and Meyer Kestnbaum, each of whom approached my work from a different perspective and offered uniquely insightful – and, I thought, exciting – improvements to its development. Extra thanks are due to Professor Huth for writing endless letters of recommendation for my fellowship applications.

I also want to express my gratitude to those who have helped develop my inchoate ideas and hypotheses into the nearly respectable work that it is today. Any brilliant flashes of insight and clarity which shine through in this project are probably theirs; the
rest is entirely mine. In addition to the worthy scholars already mentioned, they include Howard Adelman, Gary Goertz, Joshua Goldstein, Virginia Haufler, Mark Lichbach, Sarah Lischer, Idean Salehyan, Jillian Schwedler, my fellow students in the Government & Politics program at the University of Maryland and at the Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University, and my fellow USIP Peace Scholars.

Next there is the long list of individuals who provided critical assistance during my work in Jordan. First are my two interpreters/assistants, Ahmad and Aseel, whom I relied on not only to be my ears and voice during hundreds of hours of interviews, but also to help me navigate cultural and local customs as smoothly as the unmarked roads of cities, villages and refugee camps. During some weeks they spent more time with me than with their own families. Both of them explained to me hidden aspects of Jordanian, Palestinian and Islamic society which I probably would never have known or understood otherwise. I owe them both a debt of gratitude.

There are many people and organizations in Jordan who facilitated my work in ways large and small, including: Nawaf Tell and the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan; Mater Saqer, Lex Takkenberg and UNRWA; Jamal Arafat and UNHCR; the Jordan River Foundation; the International Organization for Migration; Seth Wikas and the American Embassy; the Department of Palestinian Affairs for permission to visit the refugee camps; Mohammed Amer; Fusayo Irikura and Wisam Alkhafaji; and the fountains of wisdom on all things Palestinian in Jordan, Jalal Al Husseini, and all things Iraqi in Jordan, Géraldine Chatelard. There are so many other people in Jordan to
whom I owe thanks that I cannot list them all here, and I apologize for that, but please know that I am grateful for your help.

On the home front, I wish to express gratitude to my parents for helping us take care of our domestic affairs back home each time we went traipsing off to the Middle East for a summer or a year. They made our travels logistically possible by dealing with all sorts of unforeseen circumstances on our behalf, allowing us to complete our trips in the Middle East as planned.

Finally, none of this would have been possible without the support of my loving wife, Munita. I have been in graduate school for seven years, the entirety of our married life to date. She has allowed me to retreat into my cave for countless hours to read, research, plan lessons, grade exams and write fellowship proposals, papers and this dissertation – and also reminded me when it’s time to come out to eat dinner or spend time with the family. She joined me on trips to academic conferences all over the United States, and even let me abandon her one Thanksgiving to attend a conference in Switzerland. She came with me to Egypt and Israel for a summer of Arabic study, and to Jordan for a year of research. She suspended her own Master’s degree studies to take care of our children while I wrote my dissertation. That kind of sacrifice and support can only be found in true love.
For Munita,

Amit, Gavriel and Jake
Note on Anonymity of Interviewees

Most of the expert interviews for this project were conducted from October, 2010, to January, 2011, and the refugee interviews were conducted from January to May, 2011. The latter period coincided almost exactly with beginning of the turbulence in the Middle East which has come to be known as the Arab Spring, including weekly protests in Jordan. While I did not ask questions in my interviews directly related to the popular uprisings, many interviewees perceived my work in the context of those historic events. Given the long-standing pervasiveness and fear of the domestic intelligence services (*mukhabarat*) in Jordan, the unpredictability of the Arab Spring, and the sudden appearance of a foreigner asking politically sensitive questions, it is not surprising that many declined to be interviewed, and even some of those who did agree were afraid to speak openly. This is not an uncommon problem in research on refugees. (Gerdes 2006; Mestheneos 2006) On the other hand, most refugees who agreed to be interviewed did seem eager to share their personal and family history and opinions, which is also a common finding by researchers. (e.g., Harrell-Bond 1986)

One step I took to try to put interviewees at ease was explaining at the beginning of every interview the extensive precautions I was taking to ensure their anonymity, and promising that they will in no way be personally identifiable in anything that I write. Therefore, quotes from most refugee interviewees identify only their age and sex. Quotes from non-refugee experts are also anonymized, except when the interviewee gave me explicit permission to use his/her name.
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**Acronyms and Arabic Terms**

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<td>Arab shepherds/nomads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoO</td>
<td>Country of origin</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Rwandan Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Palestinian National Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fedayeen</td>
<td>Palestinian guerrilla fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felaheen</td>
<td>Traditional Palestinian farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Islamic Action Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inshallah</td>
<td>Hopefully (lit., “If Allah wills it”)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intifada</td>
<td>Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iqama</td>
<td>Residency permit</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laaji’in</td>
<td>Palestinian refugees who fled their homes in 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makramah</td>
<td>University admission slots reserved for children of veterans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mujahideen</td>
<td>Islamist rebels fighting in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mukhabarat</td>
<td>Domestic intelligence service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naazihiin</td>
<td>Palestinian refugees who fled their homes in the West Bank for the first time in 1967</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nakba</td>
<td>1948 War (lit., “catastrophe”)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Army</td>
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<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<td>ULIMO</td>
<td>United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNRWA</td>
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Map 1. Jordan (showing Palestinian refugee camps)

Source: Dept. of Palestinian Affairs, 60 Years Serving Refugee Camps (2008), p. 21
CHAPTER 1: Why Refugee Militarization Matters

Since the beginning of 2011, the Middle East and North Africa have been roiled by popular protests and revolutions, following decades-long dictatorships. Inspired and emboldened by the popular uprisings, Palestinian refugees\(^3\) in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Gaza and the West Bank marched to their respective borders with Israel in May and June to mark their 1948 and 1967 exoduses and attempted to breach the barriers to their country of origin (CoO). In the ensuing clashes, Israel killed six Palestinians on the Lebanese border, one at the Gaza border and twenty-three on the Syrian border.\(^4\) At the border with Jordan, six thousand Palestinian refugees protested:

“We have been waiting in Jordan, in Lebanon, in Syria, in Iraq,” said Abdullah Abu Jared, a 22-year-old resident of Baqaa, the Hashemite Kingdom’s largest refugee camp. “After watching what happened in Egypt and throughout the Arab world, we are no longer willing to wait.” (CNN, “Amid talk of intifada, Jordan’s Palestinians demand right of return”, 5/13/11)

Meanwhile, despite the abundance of available weapons, the vast majority of Iraqi refugees seem wholly uninterested in the idea of mobilizing to fight their persecutors in Iraq. What is the relevance of the Arab Spring to political mobilization and militarization by the two major refugee populations in the region, Palestinians and Iraqis? As I will discuss in Chapter 10, this research project suggests that a chaotic transition period may provide an opportunity for militarization by both groups, but only Palestinians are likely to take advantage of that opportunity.

Most scholars theorizing that refugees can pose a security threat to their host

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\(^3\) The label “refugee” is fraught with confusion and even contention. I will explore and define the term “refugee” as I use it in this project in Chapter 2.

states include early in their work a disclaimer emphasizing that the vast majority of refugees are peaceful and desperately in need of humanitarian assistance; and they strongly recommend that those in the policy world should not interpret their research as a reason to refuse or limit asylum to refugees.\textsuperscript{5} While echoing those reminders, I would also add that although endogenous characteristics may increase the likelihood of conflict, selectively refusing entry to refugees on the basis of those characteristics would constitute a human rights violation with potentially devastating consequences. Policymakers could view such characteristics as an increased risk factor in the aggregate rather than deterministic on an individual basis – warranting proactive policies and increased attention rather than discrimination or exclusion.

Why do some refugee groups militarize while others do not, or at some periods of their exile but not others? I propose a framework to improve our understanding of the circumstances under which refugees militarize against their CoO. This framework integrates: the presence of a collective project to redeem the homeland; militancy entrepreneurs; political opportunity; and conflict resources. I will apply this framework to in-depth case studies of Palestinians and Iraqis in Jordan, exploring why Palestinians militarized from the mid-1960s until 1970, but not before or since; and why Iraqis in the country have not militarized despite fears that they might do so\textsuperscript{6}. Interviews I conducted in Jordan from 2010-11 with hundreds of refugees and local experts revealed that the resources are available for both groups to militarize, but political opportunity is

\textsuperscript{5} This concern may even lead scholars to avoid the topic “because it could encourage restrictive humanitarian practices by governments concerned at refugee flows. Rather than avoiding the links between refugees and security, the problem... should be explored precisely in order to offer viable policy options that attempt to reconcile human rights concerns with legitimate state interests.” (Derouen & Barutciski 2007, p. 222)

\textsuperscript{6} For example, see Leenders (2009).
(currently) available to neither. There are many willing Palestinian militancy entrepreneurs present in Jordan and one such group of Iraqi leaders. However, the main difference between the groups is the presence or absence of a collective project to redeem the homeland from a clear enemy: There is little such collective project among ordinary Iraqi refugees, while the collective project among Palestinian refugees in Jordan has mostly continued unabated since their period of militarization four decades ago; and the Arab Spring breathed new life into Palestinian militancy entrepreneurs’ hope for a resumption of “resistance”.

**Why does it matter? Practical concerns**

Militarization by a refugee group can have problematic outcomes beyond the security threat it poses to the CoO. First, even if it occurs with the support of the host state, the militarization nevertheless constitutes a challenge to its sovereignty. The armed group is a non-state militant organization exercising political will more or less independently, possibly securing funding and weapons outside the control of the host government, and engaging in its own international relations with every attack on the CoO and every irregular movement of weapons, money and fighters across borders. In the most dramatic cases, like those of the Palestinians in Jordan and Lebanon, the militarized refugee organization can take over territory in the host state, including levying taxes and providing social services, effectively becoming a state within a state.

Militarization can also undermine the stability of the host state in a variety of ways. Raids on the CoO by the militant group often bring retaliatory raids onto host state territory, even when the host state and CoO are not in a state of conflict. For example, Turkey has repeatedly entered northern Iraq to attack Kurdish camps which they accuse
of supporting or harboring militants of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Soviet-controlled Afghanistan attacked targets over the border in Pakistan, where militarized refugees were launching deadly raids on the Communists. Other examples include attacks by South Africa on refugee camps in Angola, Botswana, Zambia and Lesotho; the Vietnamese military attacking Cambodian refugee camps in Thailand; Guatemalan attacks on refugee camps in Mexico; Ethiopian attacks on refugee camps in Sudan; and Angolan attacks on refugees in Zambia and Zaire. (Loescher 1992; Lischer 2005; Salehyan 2009; Gerdes 2006; Mogire 2011; Weiner & Munz 1997; Tavernise & Arsu/New York Times, 2/22/08; Reuters, “Kurdish rebel supporters seek a way back to Turkey”, 9/9/09; Yavuz/Today’s Zaman, 12/24/09) Such conflict can draw the host state directly into a (transnational) civil conflict, effectively widening the conflict to neighboring states; or it can lead to armed conflict between the host state and refugee group, as happened in 1970 in Jordan.

Third, militarization by a refugee group can perpetuate the conflict in the CoO and obstruct international efforts to resolve it. Diaspora constituencies often hold more extreme positions regarding a conflict in their ethnic homeland. (Carmet, James & Taydas 2009; cf. Sayigh 1977) Thus, even a peace agreement which is signed by all parties in a civil conflict may fail if a refugee militant group refuses to recognize it, as has occurred in West Africa, the Great Lakes region, Afghanistan/Pakistan and Nicaragua/Honduras (Betts & Loescher 2011; Loescher 1992) Likewise, there is a difference between the opinions of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and those in the diaspora in regard to negotiations with Israel, with those in the diaspora generally more in favor of armed conflict and opposed to negotiations than those in the Palestinian
territories. As one of my Palestinian interviewees in Jordan stated:

The Jews don’t deserve to live in Palestine, they have to go. And the only way for them to go is… because they use weapons on us, we have to use weapons on them. But [Palestinians] in Palestine will disagree with me because they want to live in peace. Maybe because I don’t live there, so I don’t feel the need for peace… All the time [we] watch the news and see the killings, and we just want the Jews to go. (Female, 22)

Finally, from the perspective of international organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and international humanitarian NGOs, militarization prolongs a refugee situation and complicates the provision of humanitarian assistance to needy populations. It presents a legal obstacle to the efforts of UNHCR, which is prohibited from registering active combatants as refugees, and makes the international effort to find durable solutions more difficult (Zolberg, Suhrke & Aguayo 1989); UNHCR will even be unable to find resettlement opportunities for the families of combatants and former combatants, as resettlement countries fear the future immigration of a combatant on family reunification grounds.7 (Interview, senior UNHCR official, 11/14/10) Militarization also presents an ethical quandary for organizations whose mission is to protect victims of conflict, by raising questions of participation and guilt, as occurred most famously in the case of Rwandan refugees in the mid-1990s.

Given the above concerns, should refugee militarization always be discouraged? To put the issue in layman’s terms, refugees who take up arms are not always the bad guys. For example, opponents of communism may say that the militarization of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and support for anti-leftist refugee militant groups in Honduras and Thailand was the correct course of action. Adelman (1998) offers an answer to this normative question:

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7 This may be more of a concern in some cases than others. In the case of Burmese refugee combatants in Thailand, Loescher & Milner (2008) report that some family members have been resettled while their combatant/ex-combatant relative remains in Thailand.
Different warrior communities are evaluated [normatively] in different ways by different groups. But refugee warriors always come into conflict with those whose priority is the peaceful resolution of conflict, regional stability, and the provision of humanitarian aid exclusively to [non-combatant] refugees.

**Why does it matter? Conceptual issues**

In addition to the practical difficulties presented by refugee militarization, the phenomenon poses several conceptual challenges in the study of international relations and comparative politics. First, as suggested above, it provides a route for the expansion of civil war into neighboring states. This offers a bridge between the study of civil and international war, crossing a conceptual line which has become increasingly blurred in the post-World War II period. So far-reaching are the effects of refugee militarization that civil war should no longer be studied as domestic affairs when it occurs. The relationship between the host and CoO states becomes a central factor affecting the fate of the militarization. Does the host state support attacks against their neighbor? Are they opposed but too weak to prevent it? Can the CoO use diplomacy or coercion on the host state to affect their tolerance/support of militant activity? Or will the CoO use the attacks as a justification to take control of a “buffer zone”, as Israel did in southern Lebanon in 1982? Furthermore, as noted above, even peace agreements become more complicated: States hosting armed (or formerly armed) refugee groups may adopt an important role in erstwhile bilateral negotiations, as Jordan has in the case of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. More actors can mean more veto players, and more opportunities for the failure of negotiations or their implementation.

Second, there are important implications of refugee militarization to the study of armed conflict, challenging concepts of sovereignty, international law and domestic law. What is the bearing of refugee militarization to our understanding of borders and
sovereignty? What is the difference between shooting at an enemy standing one meter east or west of an international border? What are the legal implications when the border is not a clearly demarcated line but a “border zone”, and what if the border is nominally demilitarized? Is it necessary to reconceptualize the border itself? Some academic works have attempted to open the “black box” of the international border, investigating the meaning and implications of the border frontier, particularly in reference to refugees. (For example: Lang 2002; Rajaram & Grundy-Warr 2007)

Third, violence perpetrated by those who have fled persecution constitutes a challenge to the academic study of refugees. In international legal standing, the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees excludes active combatants; yet in cases of militarization, which are often only semi-formal organizations, it becomes difficult to establish who is a combatant, who is involved in a militant organization but not an active combatant, who is benefitting from or supporting combatant activity but not directly involved, and who is completely uninvolved. What does this mean for the international refugee regime, which is built around the concepts of protection and durable solutions?

Finally, refugee militarization bears upon the study of ethnic relations, diasporas and transnationalism. Relations between ethnic groups can have an important effect on transnational rebel activity. For example, the minority Albanian population in Macedonia supported the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during its conflict with Serbian forces; and links with the KLA even helped establish the Macedonian Albanians’ own rebel group, the National Liberation Army (NLA) in 2001. (Salehyan 2009)

Concerns about ethnic balance and irredentist claims for a greater Pashtunistan led in part to the decision by Pakistan’s government to support a refugee-based low intensity war
against Soviet-controlled Afghanistan. (Grare 2003) A co-ethnic population in the host state is a likely source of material support for refugee militant organizations; while the relationship between the global diaspora and a refugee community adjacent to the CoO may differ in material ways from their relationship with co-ethnics in the CoO itself. For instance, a hardline refugee militant group may be seen by the diaspora as the “real” or “pure” resistance to the enemy in the CoO, in contrast to a co-ethnic rebel group engaging in negotiations inside the CoO. Scenarios such as these differ from the standard conceptualizations of transnational ethnic groups, in which the CoO is situated at the center of a diaspora web.

In order to help place the in-depth case studies of Palestinians and Iraqis detailed in this project into a global context, in this chapter I will briefly summarize several cases of refugee militarization worldwide, followed by an overview of the puzzle and gap in the existing literature which my framework addresses. Finally, I will offer an outline of the remaining chapters.

**Refugee militarization worldwide**

The Palestinians famously militarized in Jordan, but refugee militarization is not a uniquely Palestinian phenomenon, nor one limited to the Middle East. While it is important to note that the vast majority of refugee groups around the world do not take up arms, engage in conflict or otherwise pose an explicit security challenge to their host state\(^8\), studies have provided qualitative and quantitative evidence that refugees can increase the chance of engagement in conflict by the host state (e.g., Loescher &

\[^8\] Salehyan & Gleditsch (2006) estimate that 90% of country-year cases in which countries host refugees from neighboring states have been peaceful. Yet the presence of refugees does evidently increase the likelihood of conflict by a modest but significant degree: almost all country-years (97%) in their dataset in which refugees were not hosted from neighboring states were peaceful.
Monahan 1989; Loescher & Milner 2005; Muggah & Mogire 2006; Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006), and have found that political violence involving refugees occurs in about 15% of states hosting refugee populations of 2,000 or more.9

Some of the most recent examples include recruiting and attacks by the Taliban from refugee camps in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan (Parker 2008; US News & World Report, “Taliban finds fertile recruiting ground in Pakistan’s tribal refugee camps”, 2/9/09), and by the Somali government from refugee camps in Kenya (Lischer 2010; Houreld/AP, 11/16/09). As of this writing, similar activity is taking place on the Turkish-Syrian border, where Turkey is hosting and guarding a refugee camp containing a rebel organization fighting the forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the Free Syrian Army, which uses the camp as a base from which to conduct raids on targets inside Syria (Stack/New York Times, 10/27/11); while the newly Shi’ite-led regime of Iraq is trying to strengthen its ties with Iran by closing a refugee camp which has housed the armed Iranian opposition militant group People’s Mujahedeen Organization of Iran since the era of Saddam Hussein. (Washington Post, “Iraq extends deadline for Iranian exiles to leave refugee camp”, 12/21/11)

In the following pages I will summarize four cases of militarization outside of Jordan, including three outside the Middle East, to demonstrate the global scope of this phenomenon. Two of the most famous cases of refugee militarization outside the Middle East, Afghans in Pakistan and Rwandans in Zaire, will be covered in Chapter 9.

In Chapters 2 and 3, I will make the argument that a collective project to redeem the homeland is a necessary prerequisite of militarization. As I will demonstrate, in each

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9 Lischer (2000) found that, on average, there was political violence involving refugees in 11 states hosting refugees each year during the period 1987-1998, out of an average of 82 states hosting 2,000 or more refugees per year.
of the following cases, a collective project was present on the part of the refugees.

**West Africa: Sierra Leoneans and Liberians in Guinea**

The first case in this introductory survey concerns exiles from Sierra Leone and Liberia in Guinea in the 1990s, stemming from the civil wars which began in Liberia in 1989 and Sierra Leone in 1991. At its peak during that decade, Guinea hosted 670,000 refugees from those two states, which was equivalent to a nearly 9% increase in Guinea’s population. The refugees took up residence in camps, co-ethnic border settlements and cities, including the Guinean capital. (Loescher & Milner 2005; Milner & Christoffersen-Deb 2006)

By the late 1990s, asylum had become a highly politicized aspect of the conflicts, when two parties, the Sierra Leonean pro-government Kamajors and Liberian anti-government United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), “assisted Guinea’s military to patrol its borders and screen those seeking asylum in Guinea and assistance intended for refugees was allegedly diverted to support Kamajor and ULIMO campaigns in Sierra Leone and Liberia” (Loescher & Milner 2005, p. 52), resulting in the militarization of the camps. Many fighters in ULIMO were either refugees themselves or had close relatives in the refugee communities. Contrary to the typical portrayal of refugee militarization, in which camps are loci of mobilization while urban refugees, if acknowledged at all, are bystanders, ULIMO was drawing refugee recruits from the cities of N’Zérékoré and Macenta as well. (Milner & Christoffersen-Deb 2006)

Attacks on refugee camps occurred in September 1998, when RUF fighters crossed into Guinea to attack two camps housing militants, killing seven refugees and three others. In the summer of 2000, incursions and attacks on refugee camps in Guinea
by Sierra Leonean rebels forced UNHCR to relocate the Sierra Leonean refugee camps farther from the border with their CoO.\textsuperscript{10} (Andrews 2003; Loescher & Milner 2008a) Meanwhile, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), a militant group which emerged from ULIMO, had established itself with the support of the Guinean government in the town of Macenta and the Kouankan refugee camp, where fighters “used the camp as a base for their families, as a destination for rest and relaxation, and as a source for supplies, especially food and medicine.” (Milner 2005, p. 152) The Liberian refugee camps had in fact been suspected of hosting militants opposed to the Liberian government since the beginning of the civil war. (Gerdes 2006) LURD conducted strikes on Liberia from Guinea, leading the Liberian military and pro-government paramilitaries to retaliate in September 2000, attacking multiple border towns in Guinean territory and killing at least 80 Guinean nationals. In response, the Guinean army mobilized ULIMO, including its constituent Liberian refugees, to counterattack. The violence continued until April 2001, with devastating impacts on both Guineans and the refugee settlements. (Loescher & Milner 2005) Even after the conflict ended, LURD militants roamed freely in the refugee camps that remained. (Milner & Christoffersen-Deb 2006)

In both cases, there was a collective project on the part of the refugee group to redeem the homeland from a clear enemy. In the case of the Liberians, it was mostly ethnic Krahn refugees, sympathetic to the overthrown government of President Samuel Doe, who formed ULIMO in opposition to the government of Charles Taylor, who was supported by the Gio and Mano tribes. Among the Sierra Leoneans, the Kamajors were

\textsuperscript{10} UNHCR has likewise moved camps away from borders in other cases due to incursions by armed groups from the CoO, such as the camps in Kenya near Somalia. (Agier 2008)
formed by ethnic Mendes, who supported the government, in opposition to the rebel RUF controlling most of the country’s territory.

**LATIN AMERICA: NICARAGUANS IN HONDURAS**

Following the Sandinistas revolution in Nicaragua, various groups opposing the revolution, collectively called the *contras*, took up arms in a low-intensity conflict beginning in the early 1980s. As in the case of Afghanistan during the same period, the war in Nicaragua between the Sandinistas and the contras became a proxy battlefield between American and Soviet clients. (Salehyan 2009) The contras operated in part from Honduras, where 14,000 Nicaraguan refugees (primarily indigenous Miskitus) had fled by 1983, and at least 25,000 (including non-Miskitus) by 1988. (Ferris 1985; Hammond 1993) However, unlike the Honduran government’s restrictive approach to Salvadoran refugees, who were treated with suspicion as sympathizers of the enemy Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), subject to *refoulement* and even massacred in at least one incident (Hartigan 1992), the Nicaraguan refugees were treated as allies, allowed gainful employment and freedom of movement. The contras were able to use the Nicaraguans’ refugee camps for sanctuary, supply and recruitment (Salehyan 2009), although the level of political mobilization, broadly defined, among Nicaraguan refugees was lower than among Salvadorans in similar camps.\(^\text{11}\) (Hammond 1993) The presence of 7,000 contras operating from Honduras led to retaliatory strikes by the Nicaraguan military on Honduran territory, sometimes killing Honduran soldiers and leading to tense relations and occasional border skirmishes between the two states. (Salehyan 2009)

The United States gave substantial – and controversial – aid to the contras in their

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\(^\text{11}\) Hammond (1993) explains that this was partly due to prior experience in self-mobilization by the Salvadorans prior to fleeing their CoO, which had not taken place among the Nicaraguans; and partly due to ongoing perception of threat by the Salvadorans.
fight against the socialist Sandinistas, as did the right-wing governments of Argentina and Honduras itself. (Salehyan 2009) Likewise, the refugees, who largely supported the contras, were labeled “freedom fighters” by the American government, “and as such [were] encouraged to wage a war of resistance in Nicaragua.” (Loescher 1989, p. 14; see also Ferris 1985) Support for militarization of the refugees also arrived from conservative non-governmental organizations with ties to fundamentalist church groups, who provided aid “along the Honduras-Nicaragua border, in areas dominated by rebel activity, [drawing] some refugees out of the relative protection of the UNHCR camps and [making] it possible for them to join the military forces of the contras.” (Ferris 1989, p. 162, emphasis in original; see also Zolberg et al. 1989)

In this case, the refugees strongly supported the contras’ collective project to redeem their homeland from the socialist Sandinistas who had taken power in a 1979 revolution.

**SOUTHEAST ASIA: BURMESE IN THAILAND**

Refugees from Burma (Myanmar) did not arrive to Thailand as a large wave due to a single high-intensity conflict, but more gradually over time. The conflict dates back to the independence of the country in 1948, after which multiple ethnic minorities along the border with Thailand began a low-intensity conflict for autonomy. (Brees 2008) From less than 10,000 registered camp residents in Thailand along the border in 1984, the number grew to over 92,000 by 1995, and over 150,000 by 2008. The Burmese refugees comprised multiple ethnic groups, including Karens, Karennis, Mons and Shans, among others. In addition to those in Thai border camps, there were also at least 300,000

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12 There were also periods of repatriation, including a large-scale return of Mons in 1995, some of whom later fled to Thailand again.
outside the camps, most of them ethnically Shan. (Loescher & Milner 2008a) Finally, thousands of Burmese “students” migrated to urban areas in Thailand, primarily Bangkok, after the military junta in Burma nullified the 1990 elections and began persecuting members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi. (Loescher & Milner 2005; Loescher & Milner 2008a; Lang 2002)

The Burmese ethnic minority refugees in Thailand have posed security threats to their CoO. The students have in the past hijacked airplanes (1989 and 1990) and seized the embassy of Myanmar in Bangkok (1999), while ethnic Karen militants held civilians hostage in a Thai hospital (2000). (Loescher & Milner 2005) The ethnic minorities have used the refugee camps – which were de facto exempted from Thai law – for supply, diversion of humanitarian aid, sanctuary, a source of recruitment, and bases for militant rebels, leading to retaliatory attacks on Thai soil by Myanmar’s military and its proxy militias. (Loescher & Milner 2008a; “Bringing the law to Burmese refugee camps”, IRIN, 4/23/09) Starting in 1995, the military began to target refugee camps to not only “destroy potential sources of supply and bases for insurgent forces but also [as] a means of obtaining forced labor for their military operations.” (Loescher & Milner 2005, pp. 58-59) The Thai government was not a bystander in this conflict but took advantage of the militants and refugees to contain Myanmar and create a de facto buffer zone along the border, including covertly supplying weapons to the rebels and allowing the rebel ethnic groups to administer some territory. These conditions even led to border skirmishes between the militaries of Thailand and Myanmar in 1995 and 2001. (Lang 2002; Loescher & Milner 2008a)

In 1997, Thai policy regarding the refugees and the militant groups they
supported changed significantly in an effort to improve relations with the Myanmar government. The Thais consolidated some two dozen rural camps into nine securitized and fortified locations, enforcing strict limitations on the free movement and employment of over 100,000 refugees who lived there. After 2001 the Thai government took further steps when it began pressuring the Burmese rebel groups, their former clients, to reach ceasefire agreements with the Myanmar government. In 2002, due to politically-related security concerns as well as other economic and security issues, Thailand began instituting stricter border controls and started moving refugees, including the students, from the cities back to camps near the border; some students were forcibly repatriated to Burma. (Loescher & Milner 2008a; Loescher & Milner 2005; Lang 2002) In November 2005 the Thai government suspended new refugee registrations. (Brees 2008)

In the case of Burmese in Thailand, there is a clear collective project on the part of several refugee ethnic groups to gain autonomy from the military-led government.

**MIDDLE EAST: PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON**

Palestinian civilians fled their CoO in two major waves, as a result of the wars in 1948 and 1967. According to the roster of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the UN agency responsible for the welfare of Palestinian refugees, 127,600 Palestinians had entered Lebanon by 1950. (Schiff 1995, p. 7) In the early years, there was little political activism among the refugees, and the Maronite-dominated Lebanese government kept close tabs on them through the military intelligence service, the “second bureau”. (ICG 2009) Their early lack of political activity contrasts sharply with their later

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13 The Thai government began to loosen restrictions on movement and employment again in 2007 in response to pressure from UNHCR and NGOs to improve living conditions for the refugees. (Loescher & Milner 2008)
14 Hudson (1997) cites a figure of 104,000.
militarization: “Initially impoverished, fragmented, dispirited and without adequate leadership to address their concerns, the Palestinian refugee community [in Lebanon] was quiescent until the mid-1960s.” (Haddad 2003, p. 30) At that time, according to Hudson, they were “uniquely situated to energize the emerging Palestinian resistance movement: they possessed discontented, youthful ‘masses’ ready to be mobilized, and a sophisticated middle-class political elite ready to lead.” (1997, p. 249) In 1964, sixteen years after their initial exodus, the refugees began to militarize, led by the Fatah movement, which had begun its political operations in the region in 1959. Starting in 1965, Fatah repeatedly crossed the border from Lebanon to strike at targets inside Israel, leading to retaliatory strikes which contributed to the destabilization of Lebanon. (Gerdes 2006; ICG 2009)

The 1967 War not only led to another influx of 100,000 Palestinians into Lebanon, it also marked a turning point for the political mobilization of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and throughout the Levant, as they realized that they could no longer hope for an Arab-led campaign to recover their homeland. The heady days of Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser trumpeting the Palestinian cause as the rallying cry of Pan-Arabism were over. Palestinian militant groups themselves took up the banner with fervor, with attacks conducted not only by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which had regionally recognized authority over the Palestinians in Lebanon as a result of the 1969 Cairo Agreement, but also independently by other Palestinian militant organizations, such as Marxist groups (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, PFLP; Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; PFLP-General Command) and those sponsored by the Ba’ath parties in Syria and Iraq (Saiqa and Arab Liberation Front,
respectively). (Haddad 2003; Hudson 1997) The Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM) fulfilled basic state functions for the refugees, including “civil, economic, political, administrative, and military institutions…. [and] development of factories (producing clothing, furniture, leather goods, ironwork, some arms, and handicrafts), printing and publishing, filmmaking, and other industries…. all in an effort to provide jobs” for Palestinian refugees. (Farsoun & Aruri 2006, p. 137) In 1968-69 Lebanon “gradually became a de facto confrontation state with Israel, though by default and not by a decision made by the Lebanese government.” (El Khazen 1997, p. 277)

Following the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1970-71, the militant organization moved its headquarters and base of operations, including tens of thousands of militants15, to Lebanon under the leadership of Yasser Arafat. (Hudson 1997) Especially after the cessation of active hostilities between Israel and its other neighbors following the 1973 War, Lebanon became the next active arena on which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict played out. (El Khazen 1997) Unlike Jordan, Lebanon was unable to control or crush the Palestinian militant groups due to its weak central authority (Dumper 2008), the state’s democratic restrictions and heterogeneous society, which meant that it “could not resort to those instruments of control that are at the disposal of the authoritarian state system.” (El Khazen 1997, p. 278; Hudson 1997) As a result, the PLO was able to become a quasi-state within a state in southern Lebanon (Dumper 2008), and it constituted one of the largest armed groups in the morass of Lebanon’s civil war beginning in 1975, surpassing even the Lebanese army (El Khazen 1997, p. 284). By the late 1970s they were appropriating UNRWA resources, such as vocational training

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15 Haddad (2003, p. 31) refers to “several hundred thousand Palestinians” entering Lebanon from Jordan as a result of Black September, though that estimate could not be corroborated elsewhere.
centers, for recruitment, training, weapons repair and storage, and communications. 

(Schiff 1995) Their cross-border attacks led to Israel seizing a buffer zone inside southern Lebanon in 1982, expelling the PLO from the country, and maintaining the buffer zone for the next eighteen years. The Palestinians remaining in Lebanon after 1982, numbering over a quarter million, “were reduced to a dazed, defeated, and unprotected minority in besieged camps.” (Farsoun & Aruri 2006, p. 138)

A key characteristic of the Palestinian militarization in Lebanon which distinguishes it from that in Jordan is the relationship of the refugee group to the sectarian composition of the host state. Whereas East Bank Jordanians and Palestinians are both Sunni with only a tiny percentage of minority sects, in Lebanon a delicate balance – or imbalance – is maintained between Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims and Shi’ite Muslims. According to the terms of Lebanon’s 1943 National Pact, Maronites held the greater share of power, including 55% of seats in Parliament. Therefore, the influx of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, and especially the militarization of that group, was perceived as a serious threat by the Maronite Christians. In the late 1960s, prior to the Cairo Agreement, the Lebanese army attempted to reign in the Palestinian militias, but it was opposed in this effort by the Lebanese Muslim political leadership:

[The] PLO gained political and military power in Lebanon, and it increasingly touched off a resonance of sympathy from Sunni Muslims, who among all Lebanese confessions were the most enthusiastic about the existence of Palestinian resistance on Lebanese soil. Sunni Muslim support was a consequence of the inadequacy of their own recruitment into the Lebanese political system…. [Right-wing Christians] resented the Palestinians as a new community of Muslims and especially their “state within a state,” which threatened to overthrow the Maronite-dominated political system. The Maronites reacted by establishing and training their own militias to counter the Palestinians. (Haddad 2003, p. 31; see also Hudson 1997)

Although the PLO was forced out of the country following Israel’s 1982 invasion,
and despite the withdrawal of most Palestinian militants into the refugee camps and their surrendering of heavy and medium weaponry following the end of the civil war (Haddad 2003), Palestinian militants still retained a dozen outposts and bases outside of the refugee camps nearly a quarter century after the PLO’s departure. (Blanford/Christian Science Monitor, 10/20/05) The Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon are still militarized today, and still constitute a lingering dilemma for the state. The International Crisis Group writes:

Marginalised, deprived of basic political and economic rights, trapped in the camps, bereft of realistic prospects, heavily armed and standing atop multiple fault lines – inter-Lebanese, inter-Palestinian and inter-Arab – the refugee population constitutes a time bomb… The notion of armed struggle in particular remains sacrosanct and is used as a reason for the existence of multiple paramilitary groups. In the wake of the civil war, manifestation of this right to armed resistance increasingly has lost its meaning: Palestinians can bear arms, but only in their camps and on a few training grounds; these in turn become zones of lawlessness that Lebanese authorities cannot enter; and their weapons are aimed not at Israel, the purported rationale for continued armed status, but inward. (ICG 2009, p. ii)

The refugee camps in Lebanon also became bases for some jihadist groups operating outside the country, particularly in Iraq. (ibid.)

As in the previous cases, this case of refugee militarization stemmed from the

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16 For example, in 2007 a conflict between the militant group Fatah al-Islam, which had established itself in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp, and the Lebanese army led to a three-month siege in which more than 400 people died, including 168 soldiers, and 95% of buildings and infrastructure were damaged beyond repair. Plans in 2009 to rebuild the camp and place it under Lebanese government control for the first time were resisted by Palestinians. In addition, following the Fatah-Hamas conflict in Gaza and the West Bank that year, the Lebanese refugee camps became an arena for clashes between supporters of the two groups, including the public display in the Ain al-Hilweh camp of nearly 400 Fatah fighters carrying automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades, as well as larger weapons such as anti-aircraft guns for the first time since the end of the Lebanese civil war. Some Palestinian militant groups still operate outside the camps, such as the PFLP-General Command, which has bases in the eastern Bekaa Valley and possesses Katyusha rockets and light weapons. (“Armed groups operating in South Lebanon”, Reuters, 1/8/09; “Fatah stages show of force in Lebanon refugee camp”, AFP, 11/9/08; “Lebanon refugees bitter over camp rebuilding plans”, AFP, 2/9/09; Cook 2008; UNRWA 2011) In Ain al-Hilweh, the largest refugee camp in Lebanon, “gunmen hanging out on street corners keep an eye on their faction's turf — some openly clutching guns, some with pistols tucked to their waists, others sporting Islamic fundamentalist beards. Wall graffiti and pictures of 'martyrs' also give evidence of which territory is whose.” (Ghattas/AP, 2/7/09)
collective project held by Palestinian refugees to redeem their homeland from a clear enemy, Israel.

The above cases, in addition to those which will be covered in Chapter 9, are only a sampling of refugee militarization worldwide. There are many others, such as: the refugee camps of Turkish Kurds, which served as bases for rebels of the PKK; Western Sahara refugee camps in Algeria operated by the Polisario resistance; Algerian refugee militants in Tunisia and Morocco in the 1950s opposed to the French colonial occupation; Namibian refugees who supported the South-West African People’s Organization militants in Angola; South African refugees who were recruited by the African National Congress (ANC) in states bordering South Africa; Rhodesian refugees in Zambia and Mozambique who supported rebels from the ZANU and ZAPU militant groups; refugees from Chad who mingled with militants in Libya; Libyan refugees who were trained by the CIA to fight the Qaddafi government; Mauritanian refugees who were recruited for the anti-Mauritanian government group FLAM in Senegal; Darfuri Sudanese refugees in Chad who supported militant groups fighting in their CoO; Ugandan refugees who allied with the government of Tanzania to invade Uganda and depose Idi Amin in 1979; Somali refugee camps in Kenya which acted as a sanctuary for some of the militant groups fighting in Somalia in the early 1990s; possibly Somali refugees who are vulnerable to radicalization by agents of al-Shabab or al-Qaeda in Yemen today; refugees from the Tigray region of Ethiopia in Sudan, who were loyal to the militant Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF); refugees from Burundi who attacked their CoO from Tanzania; East Pakistani (Bangladeshi) refugees in India, who received support, training and
equipment to fight Pakistan in 1971; ethnic Nepalese refugees stripped of their citizenship and expelled from Bhutan to Nepal in 1991; Sri Lankan Tamil refugees, who received military assistance from their host state, India, in their fight against their CoO; Tibetan refugees, who were trained by the CIA to engage in guerrilla warfare against China; Laotian and Cambodian refugees in Thailand, who received training from the Chinese (for the Khmer Rouge) and the CIA to fight their respective home governments; Papuan refugee camps in Indonesia, which occasionally served as a sanctuary for Free Papua Movement fighters; East Timorese refugees in West Timor, whose camps sheltered Indonesian militants; Cuban refugees who were trained by the US to invade Cuba at the infamous Bay of Pigs; and Nicaraguan refugees in Costa Rica, in addition to the example of Nicaraguans in Honduras described above. (Terry 2002; Lischer 2005; Mtango 1989; Adelman 1998; Mogire 2011; Salehyan 2009; Salehyan 2007; Gerdes 2006; Helsing 2004; Loescher & Milner 2008c; Loescher 1992; Weiner 1992/93; Hammond 2004; Joly 1996; Pini 2007; Duncan/San Francisco Chronicle, 4/19/09; Raghavan/Washington Post, 1/12/10).¹⁷ There were also Jewish refugees who joined the partisans fighting in Europe during World War II.

**The Missing Piece of the Puzzle**

Most refugees do not participate in violent political activity. For instance, Rohingya Burmese refugees in Bangladesh have not militarized despite severely

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¹⁷ Gerdes (2006, fn. 7) refers to an additional, rare case in which refugees attacked their CoO from a non-bordering state: In 1970 Portugal led an invasion of Guinea by Guinean refugees based in France. In addition, Adelman (1998) makes a compelling case to stretch the definition of “refugee warriors” to encompass Jewish refugees from Europe who took up arms in Palestine post-World War II, even though they were not fighting to regain the country that they or their parents or grandparents had fled. Adelman writes: “First, they were recruited as warriors from outside the country, many from refugee camps in Europe. Second, they used violence to attempt to gain, and eventually actually to gain, control over what they regarded as their homeland.”
impoverished living conditions\textsuperscript{18} (Loescher & Milner 2008a); Palestinians in Syria have not organized militarily within Syria, with some rare exceptions; and in the 1980s millions of Afghans hosted in Iran and almost a million Mozambicans in Malawi did not take up arms (Lischer, 2005; Salehyan 2009). There are currently estimated to be over 11 million refugees worldwide living in host states bordering their CoO\textsuperscript{19}, and the vast majority of them have never engaged in any category of militarization.

The positive cases discussed in the previous section, while demonstrating the importance of studying the phenomenon of refugee militarization and its global relevance, do not explain why it happens, nor do they explain the majority of cases around the world which are negative. The puzzle which this dissertation addresses is: *Why do some refugee groups militarize while others with seemingly similar characteristics do not, or during some periods of their exile but not others?* As I will discuss in the next chapter, the relatively few studies of refugee militarization which have been conducted to date have offered some clues, but none have yet proposed a clear and parsimonious hypothesis to explain this puzzle.\textsuperscript{20}

Existing literature has focused almost exclusively on structural factors, those outside the purview of refugee groups themselves, while neglecting their collective projects to redeem the homeland and their economic orientations. While acknowledging

\textsuperscript{18} In Thailand, however, the status of Burmese Rohingya refugees is somewhat murkier. At the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009 revelations of abuse by the Thai military, including towing them back out to international waters, stemmed from accusations that the ethnic Rohingya refugees, who are Muslim, are linked to insurgent Muslim separatists in Thailand’s south. (Montlake/Christian Science Monitor, 1/23/09) However, this may have merely been an excuse for the appalling treatment of the refugees by Thai authorities.

\textsuperscript{19} Calculated from population statistics taken from the websites of UNHCR (2011) and UNRWA (2011)

\textsuperscript{20} Lawrence & Chenoweth (2010) challenge theories of ethnic and nationalist violence to explain temporal variation: Why, given the relative stability over time of explanatory variables such as grievances, ethnic heterogeneity and regime type, does violence occur only at certain times?
the importance of structural factors such as political opportunity and available resources in facilitating the possibility of militarization, I aim to fill this gap by proposing a framework to approach refugee militarization which will help explain the motivation of some refugee groups to militarize, and the framing used by militancy entrepreneurs to mobilize them. This project seeks to build on existing literature by asking not only how refugees militarize, but why.

The proposed framework attempts to explain why refugee militarization may occur in a particular host country at a particular time by considering the following variables:

1) **Collective project** – Some refugee groups maintain a collective project to redeem their homeland, while others maintain no such collective project and seek individual, rather than group, solutions;

2) **Socioeconomic integration to the host state** – Some refugee groups, and some refugees within a given group, experience higher levels of socioeconomic integration to the host state, which makes them less likely to personally take up arms even though they may hold equally militant attitudes as those who are more socioeconomically marginalized;

3) **Militancy entrepreneurs** – Among the refugees, there may be present individuals and organization(s) who are willing and capable of organizing, mobilizing and leading militant activity against the CoO; and

4) **Political opportunity** – Refugees do not constitute a sovereign entity, so there must be a structure of political opportunities, including political space, which permits the militarization to occur. This primarily, but not exclusively, depends
on policies of the host state. If political opportunities are available, militancy entrepreneurs will be able to obtain necessary conflict resources, including weapons, financing, training grounds, bases, etc.

**Overview**

This introductory chapter has demonstrated the scope, necessity and urgency of improving our understanding of refugee militarization. In Chapter 2 I will review the existing literature on refugee militarization, and the lessons on this topic which can be drawn from scholarly works on ethnic conflict, contentious politics and the sociology of group violence. The third chapter will set forth a new framework to approach the study of refugee militarization, as outlined above. Chapter 4 will explain the methodology for my field research case studies of Palestinians and Iraqis in Jordan. In Chapters 5 to 7 I will use the results of that research to explore why Palestinians did not militarize in Jordan from 1948 to 1963, the changes which led to their militarization from 1964 to 1970, and why Palestinians have not taken up arms in Jordan since 1971, respectively. In Chapter 8 I will turn to the Iraqis in Jordan, who have not militarized despite fears that they may do so. Next, in order to begin extending the generalizability of the proposed framework outside the Middle East, Chapter 9 will apply it to two additional matched pairs of case studies, in which large-scale militarization occurred in one case but not the other: Rwandans in Zaire vs. Rwandans in Tanzania; and Afghans in Pakistan vs. Afghans in Iran. Finally, Chapter 10 will conclude with a discussion of prospects for Palestinian and Iraqi militarization in the new Middle East, recommendations to policymakers on reducing the risk of militarization, and directions for future research.
CHAPTER 2: Literature Review

This chapter begins with discussions and working definitions of key terms used in this project. Next I discuss the shortcomings of the sparse refugee militarization literature, and turn to related fields of study, including ethnic conflict and the sociology of group violence, to draw theoretical lessons from those fields. Finally, I review the literature on contentious politics and social movements to discuss the core concepts of grievance and opportunity, which will form the nucleus of the framework to be outlined in Chapter 3.

Definitions

As Harry Eckstein noted, even concepts which are widely used in political science are not uniformly understood, so the reader “must therefore bear with me for a while as I clarify some basic terminology.” (1975, pp. 80-81)

REFUGEE

First, it is necessary to define the contentious term “refugee”, which is popularly used to refer to people in a wide variety of circumstances who have fled their home, including those who have not crossed an international border. While refugees have existed as long as humans have engaged in war, and the word “refugee” is recorded as far back as 1573 in Europe (Zolberg et al. 1989), an internationally recognized official definition and its accorded legal status is relatively recent. Some scholars argue for a subjectivist interpretation of the term\textsuperscript{21}, but most scholars prefer to use objective criteria in defining refugees, and practitioners must have measurable criteria. For the past sixty years

\textsuperscript{21} For example, Joly states that the “actual self-perception of the move is crucial for an adequate definition of refugee and in no way can the objective circumstances deemed to cause flight be sufficient….” (2002, p. 6)
years, granting or withholding the label has held potentially life-or-death consequences for individuals in need of protection and assistance.

The relatively narrow definition set forth by the United Nations, as outlined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the corresponding 1967 Protocol, is:

A person who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of persecution because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution. (Article I, section A(2))

This definition excludes large groups with similar characteristics, such as those who have fled their homes due to political persecution but not crossed an international border (internally displaced persons, IDPs) and those who left their country for non-political reasons, such as natural disasters or economic opportunity. Of course, many people who are experiencing political persecution which may not be severe enough to force them to leave might nonetheless choose to leave if they also face a second pressure, such as economic hardship. This is called mixed migration, in which it is often difficult to disentangle the multiple reasons for flight. (Salehyan 2007; Lischer 2007) In addition, the definition does not explicitly state that it is applicable to the descendants of refugees nor those fleeing general violent conflict in which they are not persecuted on the basis of a particular group membership, but UNHCR has operationalized it to apply to

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22 Lischer (2007) argues that refugees and IDPs should be studied under the same rubric of “conflict-induced displacement”, but most scholars and practitioners draw a practical and analytical separation between the two groups, in large part because refugees are subject to the international legal standing and protection offered by the 1951 Convention.

23 The definition offered by the Organization of African Unity in their Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969) repeats the 1951 Convention definition above, then adds the following expansion: “The term ‘refugee’ shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing
dependents of a refugee head of household and those fleeing due to a well-founded fear of general violent conflict.

More directly, the Convention explicitly excludes those who are eligible for assistance from another UN agency, whether or not they choose to accept it, as well as those who hold the citizenship of a host country or a third-party country, who could therefore avail themselves of the protection of that state. For the first reason, the UNHCR definition does not apply to Palestinians in the Levant, and for the second reason, it does not apply to Palestinians in Jordan in particular, most of whom hold Jordanian citizenship. Finally, the definition excludes active combatants, certain high-ranking military officials and those responsible for war crimes and other gross violations of human rights, despite the fact that enforcement of this distinction is minimal. (Adelman 1998; Gerdes 2006; Mogire 2011) Nonetheless, this exclusion makes the topic of this project, refugee militarization – or any related terms, such as “refugee warrior”, which was popular in the academic literature through the 1990s – an oxymoron.

It is clear that a definition which excludes one of the largest and longest-standing refugee groups in the world, and which constitutes an archetypal example of refugee militarization, will not work for the purposes of this project. Therefore, the definition of “refugee” used herein is: A person, including his/her dependents and future public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.” (Article I, para. 2) This additional allowance explicitly encompasses those fleeing general conflict without having been persecuted on the basis of some group membership.

24 The text of the treaty states, “This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.” (Article I, section D) In 1948, the Palestinians were the first non-European group to be afforded assistance by the United Nations via the UN Relief and Works Agency (Zolberg et al. 1989), which is still responsible for their welfare today.
descendants, who left and/or is unable to return to his/her country of origin primarily due to a well-founded fear of political violence, drawing from the broader definitions utilized by Zolberg et al. (1989), Mtango (1989), Ager (1999) and Gerdes (2006). This is a wider definition than that used by UNHCR, since it includes Palestinians, combatants and those with dual citizenship, and it more explicitly allows for refuge based on fear of general violence rather than only based on persecution. However, it still requires crossing an international border and excludes emigrants who left and refuse to return for non-political reasons.

REFUGEE MILITARIZATION

Next, what is “refugee militarization”? Muggah & Mogire (2006, pp. 7-8) distinguish this term from refugee camp militarization, but their two definitions overlap to a significant degree; furthermore, not only do many refugees live in urban areas, and militant activities undertaken in camps can also be accomplished in urban and other non-camp areas (Harpviken 2008, p. 8), but a sharp distinction between camp and self-settled (usually urban) refugees may be misleading as a starting point, since “[in] many situations, refugees move out of their camps periodically to visit their homeland or to take advantage of wage-earning, trading or farming opportunities that exist in their

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25 Zolberg et al. define refugees as “persons whose presence abroad is attributable to a well-founded fear of violence, as might be established by impartial experts with adequate information. In cases of persecution covered by the statutory definition, the violence is initiated by some recognizable internal agent, such as the government, and directed against dissenters or a specified target group. But flight-inducing violence may also be an incidental consequence of external or internal conflict, or some combination of both, and affect groups that are not even parties to that conflict. Violence may also be inflicted indirectly, through imposed conditions that make normal life impossible.” (1989, p. 33) Mtango includes “not only those refugees covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, but also those covered by the 1969 OAU Convention, Palestinian refugees, and any refugee recognized as such under relevant international instruments or under the national legislation of the state of refuge or state of residence.” (1989, p. 91) Ager defines refugees as “all classes of forced migrants (i.e., excluding economic and other ‘voluntary’ migrants”).” (1999, p. 2) Finally, Gerdes defines refugees as “those who have crossed an international border because of real threats to their physical integrity.” (2006, p. 11)
country of asylum. In this respect the crude distinction… should itself be subjected to greater scrutiny.” (Crisp & Jacobsen 1998, p. 28; see also Jacobsen 2000, p. 18)

Therefore, it is unnecessary to separate the two terms, and I combine them as follows: Refugee militarization is the **involvement of groups of refugees in militaristic activities, including political violence, armed resistance, military training, explicit support for combatants, storage and diffusion of weapons, and/or military recruitment**.\(^{26}\) Non-political violence such as criminal activity involving refugees is excluded from the definition. (Lischer 2005) Furthermore, this study is specifically investigating cases in which the militarized refugees live in states bordering their CoO and their primary aim to is undermine and/or overthrow an enemy in the CoO, who is usually but not necessarily the government in power, following the lead of Adelman (1998) and Gerdes (2006).\(^{27}\)

Under this definition, refugee militarization can occur in three ways, listed here in order of increasing proximity to the actual militant activity: 1) refugees can provide material support for a non-refugee militant group, including food, clothing, money, care for militants’ dependents, intelligence and other non-weapon materials; 2) they can serve...
as a source of recruitment for a militant group, such that recruits leave the refugee camp or community to fight for the militants; and 3) the camps or communities themselves can militarize, such that they serve as a base for militants, maintain arms caches, and/or the refugees themselves take up arms or initiate an active militant group within the camps or communities, directed against the CoO.

How much of such activity is enough to conclude that militarization has occurred? It is impossible to set a quantitative threshold – for example, “x quantities of food, clothing or money contributed to militants”, “x recruits provided to a militant group” or “x percent of camps serving as bases for a militant group”; and the number of cross-border attacks would be an operationalization with poor construct validity because ordinary refugees may hold only supporting roles for a militant organization, particularly a pre-existing one, yet still be militarized under the broad definition provided above. However, following the lead of Lischer (2000), I am referring to instances of refugee militancy which are “persistent” (occurring over consecutive years) and/or “intense” (based on narrative descriptions).

**Ethnicity, Nation and Ethnonationalism**

Finally, a definition is needed for the term “ethnonationalism”, which I will later propose as a potentially significant factor leading to a collective project for redemption of the homeland by refugee groups. The concept of *nation* is challenging to define, ranging from the objective – possessing discrete shared features such as language, culture, history and homeland – to subjective, as in Anderson’s (1991) imagined communities, which are based primarily on affect and belief. I distinguish between *nation* and *ethnicity* using the definitions offered by Anthony Smith, as follows: A nation is “a named human
community residing in a perceived homeland, and having common myths and a
shared history, a distinct public culture, and common laws and customs for all
members.” (2010, p. 13) This definition does not presuppose any claim to an ancestral
bond. By contrast, ethnicities (or as ethnicity scholars call it, ethnie) are “relatively
large, culturally distinctive groupings in which membership is conferred by birth in
a group claiming a common origin.” (Williams 2003, p. 17) Ethnic identities are not
rational, conscious beliefs but “intuitive convictions of the ancientness and purity of [the]
group’s existence.” (Connor 2004, p. 31) Ethnicities themselves, however, may be
constructed and their “origins may be mythical, but they can nevertheless attract powerful
loyalties and commitments as political elites mobilize ethnic kin for action.” (Lake &
Rothchild 1998, p. 4; see also Brubaker 2004) Furthermore, membership in ethnic
groups is almost always based on descent (Williams 2003; Fearon & Laitin 2000),
whereas a nation may or may not allow voluntary membership (see discussion of
“illiberal nationalism” below).

An ethnicity includes myths of common ancestry and various elements of a shared
culture, such as a shared language, religion or customs (see also: Williams 1994;
Williams 2003; Lee et al. 2004; Eller 1999; Verkuyten 2005; Spickard & Burroughs
2000), among people not necessarily living in their claimed homeland, but who may have
a symbolic connection to a homeland, as opposed to a more clearly standardized common

28 Confusingly, in the literature on ethnic groups and ethnic conflict, the term “ethnic” is often
conflated with groups that seek political autonomy or independence on an ethnic basis, who are
better classified as “ethnonationalist”, as defined below. For example, De Vos (2006) muddles an
attempt to disentangle “ethnicity” from “nation”, and Helbling (1997) uses the term “national”
interchangeably with “ethnonational”.
29 Since the relevant characteristics of group differentiation differ from case to case (for example,
race in South Africa, language in Canada and religion in Bosnia), ethnicity is used here as “an
umbrella term that includes race, religion, language… as the case may be.” (Bookman 2002, p.
23; see also Eller 1999)

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national history and shared public culture among the *nation*, which usually is located in its claimed homeland. The constitution of the ethnic group is based on primordial claims, whereas the nation is not necessarily so.

Having established working definitions of *nation* and *ethnicity*, let us turn to *nationalism*. Nationalist partisans make the argument that their nationalism actually predates industrialism and is primordial, but most scholars disagree: Nationalism “*is not* the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it does indeed present itself.” (Gellner 1983, p. 48, emphasis in original) Ancient Biblical “nations”, for example, bear little resemblance to state-aspiring nationalist movements of today. Nevertheless, the nation is often “ethno-symbolic” in that nationalist movements often make use of earlier ethnic histories, myths and symbols. (Smith 2001) Those scholars who espouse a primordial basis of the nation are usually referring to its ethnic variant, as will be discussed shortly.

According to Smith’s definition of “nation” given above, self-determination, or even autonomy, is not a necessary condition of nationhood.\(^{30}\) That is one reason why nationalism is important. Nationalism as it is known now is a political animal\(^ {31}\) inextricably intertwined with the idea of territory and the state. (Lawrence 2010) Nationalism is the movement which corresponds to the nation’s (or its elites’) aspirations for autonomy: As Smith defines it, an “*ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its*"
members deem to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’.” (2010, p. 9)

Having defined these three terms, it is possible at last to combine “ethnicity” and “nationalism” to offer a definition of “ethnonationalism” as a nationalist movement for attainment or recovery of a homeland based on claimed ethnic bonds of common ancestry and culture. There are only about 200 states in the world today and thousands of ethnic groups, many of which maintain an ethnonationalist project for autonomous control over a homeland of their own. (Stavenhagen 1996) Ethnonationalism has also been called illiberal nationalism. (For discussion see, for example: Brown 1999; Williams 1994; Williams 2003; Clark 2011)

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32 Gurr (2000) defines ethnonationalists as “Regionally concentrated peoples with a history of organized political autonomy with their own state, traditional ruler, or regional government who have supported political movements for autonomy at some time since 1945.” Gurr’s definition is not used in this project because it is apparently tautological – a group is not ethnonationalist unless it has been ethnonationalist in the past (a history of autonomy) – and because of its chronological restriction to the post-World War II period.

33 The terms liberal and illiberal are used in the academic literature synonymously with a division between civic and cultural nationalisms, respectively. Yet as Brown (1999) rightly points out, this dichotomy is not necessarily so. In almost all real-life cases of nationalism both ideal-types are found; and sometimes “cultural” national identities, supposedly ascribed and primordial, can change. Brown proposes an alternative explanation for the rise of liberal and illiberal variants of nationalism, based on feelings of security and insecurity – by elites, a class, and masses, in regard to an external other.

34 There are a number of important assumptions implied by the modern, liberal formulation: first, that societies were divided, possibly tribal or clannish, prior to the rise of integrating forces of national identity; second, that nationalism is intimately and positively related to state capacity; third, that nationalism is based on an identity which resonates and endures but can be voluntarily acquired; and fourth, that nationalism, like modernity, is an inevitable process given forces of political globalization and the spread of global norms such as democracy, human rights and liberal individualism. Partisans of the illiberal variant would agree with the first assumption, prior division, but would not necessarily claim an association with state capacity; they believe that national identity is ascribed, denying the possibility of voluntary membership; and they usually reject association with most Western liberal political values. Some scholars, such as Connor (2004), state that ethnonationalism is not technically different from nationalism since the nation is based on a claimed ethnic bond, but this is inaccurate. There are examples of loyalty to a nation which are not based on ethnic identity, most famously the American nation, which is based on common ideals rather than a shared blood-bond of ethnicity. Connor (2004) disregards American nationhood as a “misnomer” since it does not appeal to a common ancestry, but he does not offer an alternative description for the shared American identity.
COLLECTIVE PROJECT FOR REDEMPTION OF THE HOMELAND

The significant lacuna in the literature which I aim to address concerns a refugee group’s collective project to redeem the homeland from a clear enemy, which I will propose is a necessary (but not sufficient) variable leading to militarization. As will be discussed in the following sections, significant attention has been devoted to structural conditions which establish the parameters for action by refugee groups; yet little attention has been paid to the question of their motivations.

There are many examples of the exercise of a collective project by refugees which are outside the scope of this study. For instance, refugees can persist in teaching their children of their heritage, and celebrating it with their expatriate community. They can lobby the host state to change a policy regarding relations with the CoO. They can engage in protests, strikes and a variety of other nonviolent forms of political activity, if allowed by the host state. This study, however, is limited to militarization, the most high-profile and dangerous means by which a collective project can be expressed, and the one which seeks most directly to achieve the goals of the project by reversing the circumstances which led to their exile in the first place.

The refugee militarization literature

Despite the fact that refugee warriors have existed at least since the Burmese ethnic minority groups and Palestinians took up arms, awareness among scholars of the politically active and potentially militant role played by refugees is relatively recent. Ferris noted in 1985 that failure to integrate and assimilate refugees into the host state, in situations in which return to the CoO is not available, has led to instances of refugees engaging in militant activity, citing the examples of Afghans in Pakistan, Khmers in
Thailand, and Miskitu Indians from Nicaragua in Honduras. In 1986 and 1989 Zolberg et al. were the first refer to such groups as “refugee-warrior communities”, while Loescher noted that “refugees often live on, or very near, disputed borders; they either reside among combatants in an ongoing conflict, or are perceived to be materially assisting guerrilla forces attempting to overthrow the government from which they have fled.”

(1989, p. 3) Nonetheless, academic interest in the topic was not strongly stimulated until after the realization that international humanitarian relief actually supported the perpetrators of the Rwanda genocide in the 1990s. (Harpviken 2008; Mogire 2011; Stedman 2003)

Most scholars seeking to explain refugee militarization have focused on structural and environmental variables exogenous to the refugees. This is curious given that some of these same scholars challenge the traditional portrayal of refugees as passive, decrying “the striking absence of political ‘voice’ or agency on the part of refugees,” (Nyers 2006, p. xiv). It appears that a template for explanations of refugee militarization has developed whereby scholars broadly suggest that militarization constitutes a demonstration of refugees’ agency, then slide inexorably back to explanations which are predominantly exogenous. Adelman (1998), for instance, writes that “refugee warriors do indeed attempt to take history in their own hands, and are not simply tools used by neighbouring states in their antagonistic relationship” with the CoO. Yet he goes on to reject the argument that refugees militarize due to the experiences which led to their flight. In other words, the refugees’ political motivation is not an explanatory factor. Instead, Adelman focuses on states and the international system, and proposes a structural explanation centered on “failures – sometimes deliberate – in the management of
conflicts and, more specifically, the management of the plight of the refugees themselves, whatever the original causes.”

A number of scholars subsume explanation for refugee militarization under a rubric of manipulation by militants, host states or great power states. One of the earliest attempts to address the issue in depth is presented by Myron Weiner (1992/93), who incorporates refugee militarization into a broader theoretical framework on the migration-security nexus, offered as an alternative to the standard economic analyses of mass migrations. Like later scholars, he implies political motivation with a tangential remark: “A diaspora made up primarily of refugees is, of course, likely to be hostile to the regime of the country from which they fled.” (p. 107) But he, too, sees refugee militarization primarily as a “potential tool in inter-state conflict” (p. 107), listing examples where refugee militants received support and assistance from their host or other state sponsor(s), rather than as independent actors in their own right.

In a similar vein, Stedman & Tanner (2003) constructed their entire edited volume, including its title, around “refugee manipulation”, which by definition is a condition of passivity. They first acknowledge an endogenous element by referring to refugees militarizing in camps as “disaffected individuals, who – with the assistance of overseas diasporas, host governments, and interested states – equip themselves for battle to retrieve an idealized, mythical lost community.” (p. 3) However, this perspective is quickly minimized as they turn to their main thesis, in which refugees are utilized as an objectified resource and militarization is a tactic used by states and rebel groups to take advantage of refugees and their attendant aid.

While on the topic of manipulation, it is important to recognize the fact that, as
Morris & Stedman (2008) briefly note, refugee militarization is sometimes less than voluntary, as they are coerced or forced to support or participate in violent political activity by militancy entrepreneurs. However, this does not mean that their interests, orientation and perceptions are irrelevant, nor that they are ignored as framing devices by militancy entrepreneurs; rather that the relative weight of those dimensions in affecting their militarization may be diminished in such cases.

A few works have put forth explanations of refugee militarization which include consideration of refugees as independent political actors. One example is that of Salehyan (2009), whose study of transnational rebels includes a discussion of refugees as a vector for the spread of civil war. Salehyan’s broader theoretical framework acknowledges the importance of a collective project, briefly summarizing grievance and greed, but minimizes such explanations by stating that there will always be some subset of any population which is disgruntled enough to take up arms and some resource available to be plundered; therefore he privileges explanatory factors based on opportunity. In regard to refugees specifically, Salehyan recognizes that they are more likely to bear personal and group grievances against the ruling regime in the CoO than an ordinary transnational rebel group not based in refugees, since in most cases traumatic experiences are precisely what led to their exodus in the first place. He adds that destitute living conditions lower their opportunity costs for participating in militant activity (see also Salehyan 2007), whereas access to employment and economic integration can raise their opportunity costs. But rather than theorizing this motivation to explain in part the phenomenon of refugee militarization, he focuses on the transnational rebel group as the primary actor, with refugee militarization just one of many resources.
potentially available to it.

Another one of the few scholars to discuss the importance of a refugee group’s collective project, including ethnicity and nationalism, in affecting refugees’ engagement in conflict is Milica Bookman (2002). Her focus is on the political-economic factors which lead to nationalism in relation to interethnic competition and conflict between refugees and the CoO as well as the host state. These factors include competition for resources, economic niches and power. However, her study is limited to protracted refugee situations35, placing them within regime-differentiated economic frameworks of their host states and the globalized international arena. Conflict is only tangential to that broader focus, and includes more analysis of criminal activity than political violence directed toward the CoO. She does not seek to explain conflict catalyzed by refugees nor the spread of civil war across borders.

Joly (2002) comes close to addressing the importance of refugees’ collective political project in her ideal-type dichotomy of refugee experiences in the land of exile. According to Joly, refugees belong to either an Odyssean or a Rubicon typology. Odyssean refugees are those who “were positively committed to the political struggle and to a project of society in their homeland; they also brought this project with them into exile… Return is their objective with the aim of continuing the project.” (p. 9) At the other extreme, Rubicon refugees maintain “no collective project of society…. Return for

35 UNHCR defines protracted refugee situations as those involving populations of at least 25,000 refugees living in a developing country for at least five years. Most refugees in the world today live in such situations. (Loescher & Milner 2008c; Derouen & Barutciski 2007) But these cut-off points are admittedly arbitrary. The US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants uses a cut-off of ten-years to define a “warehoused” refugee situation. (Smith 2004) Bookman offers a different approach, defining “permanent encampments” as situations in which the refugees’ basic needs are met, employment is sought and found, adults in the camp have never lived elsewhere (which implies a minimum passage of 18 years from the date of exile), and funding sources for the camp have changed. (2002, p. 20)
the purpose of settling back home is not envisaged within the framework of options for the future and exile is perceived as definitive.” (p. 16) There are important differences in the way the two ideal-types integrate into host countries, including their patterns of social organization and sources of meaning. However, her work is targeted toward explication of refugee experiences in developed third-country resettlement states rather than states of first refuge. The vast majority (three-fourths) of refugees are hosted in a state bordering their CoO, and 80% are located in the developing world. (UNHCR 2011) This research project focuses on the processes at work in countries of first refuge which share a land border with the CoO, and where opportunities for engagement in direct militarized conflict with the CoO are far more likely. (Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006)

Like Joly, an ethnographic study by Malkki (1995) on Burundian Hutu refugees investigated different constructions of identity, meaning and symbology among those residing in a camp and those in an urban setting in Tanzania. Her study revealed stark differences between the two groups: camp residents held more militant and polarized attitudes constructed around displacement, had adopted the refugee label, and identified themselves as Hutu first; while those in the urban setting had mostly assimilated into Tanzanian society, rejected the refugee label, and identified first as Burundian (a national identity) or even Tanzanian (the host state identity) rather than as Hutu (an ethnic identity). While her work is an important contribution to understanding identity construction among refugees, it is mostly descriptive rather than theoretical, focusing primarily on the camp/urban distinction with little explanation for the differences, and it does not address political violence or militarization explicitly. Nonetheless, it does highlight an intersection between endogenous and exogenous factors not addressed by the
literature on refugee militarization: the relationship between residential environment and identity construction. On the other hand, inferring causality from this relationship may be subject to an endogeneity problem, as the urban refugees in Malkki’s study were self-settled, suggesting that those inclined toward “cosmopolitan” perceptions may have self-selected to move to the urban setting.

Harpviken’s (2008) study of “refugee warriors” in the context of return to the CoO offers three important points regarding refugees’ collective project: First, an ideology and narrative of exile and resistance can polarize and even calcify in refugee settings, particularly protracted situations. Second, both the act of fleeing and residence in exile are often carried out in groups, with the result that refugee camps and communities are often “composed of numerous tightly knit groups. Flight collectives may be based on groups that were already politically mobilized and became subject to government countermeasures,” or may only militarize after taking up residence in the host state. (p. 9) Third, positions of community leadership are often affected by refugee status in camps, as “influence over aid distribution is key, and… young, educated, English-speaking men fare much better than the traditional notables.” (p. 10) I will return to the role of leadership and humanitarian aid in the next chapter.

MOGIRE’S VICTIMS AS SECURITY THREATS

The most recent acknowledgment of the importance of a collective project in the literature on refugee militarization comes in a discussion of the agency-structure debate by Mogire (2011). He refers to the social and economic value presented by militarization to refugees, offering the example of Burundian refugees in western Tanzania. First, Mogire states that the cause of flight is an important variable affecting refugees’
motivation: those who were expelled or persecuted on the basis of their identity, or subject to ethnic cleansing, are more likely to militarize, especially as they may fear continuing attacks from the CoO and therefore see militarization as a necessary defense; as are those whose CoO prevents return, and those languishing in protracted refugee situations, leading to their turn toward force as a last resort. Although he does not discuss the rational cognitive implications of the “force as a last resort” option, it is a worthy avenue for exploration.36 Mogire is also one of the very few scholars to mention the interplay between refugees’ motivations and the framing used by militancy entrepreneurs: “[In] many instances refugee or rebel leaders draw on the experience of persecution – and often exaggerate it – in order to rally support for military activity.” (p. 42) The last motivation that he mentions is poor living conditions in the context of a protracted refugee situation; by itself this is an unlikely explanation, however, since there are far more refugees worldwide who live in conditions of poverty than those who militarize.

Mogire discusses structural factors as well, including the host state’s willingness and capability to demilitarize and securitize refugee camps. In Tanzania and Kenya, for example, the host governments, both of which had the capacity to enforce demilitarization, chose instead to allow and even facilitate militarization of their refugee populations due to those host governments’ political alliances and sympathies; while the international community refused to attempt to separate combatants from civilians. His review of these cases also suggests that proximity of camps to the border with the CoO, a structural factor commonly cited especially in policy circles, is less predictive of militarization than the extent of government control over that territory. Likewise, the size

36 Hafez (2003) also explains militant activity in part by the absence or closing off of nonviolent avenues of contention.
of refugee camps is less important than the overall magnitude of the refugee population in the host state. Finally, drawing on the work of Lischer (2005), Mogire rejects the “bored young men” hypothesis proposed by policymakers and some scholars (for example, Harrington 1976) because it does not take into account political motivations.

**GERDES’ FORCED MIGRATION AND ARMED CONFLICT**

One of the most serious attempts to tackle the topic of refugee militarization with theoretical rigor is a monograph by Felix Gerdes (2006). He asks, “Which of these factors, i.e. refugee motivations, humanitarian aid, and the host country, is the most important [in explaining militarization]?” (p. 2) Gerdes explains that a conflict begins in the CoO when a particular subset of the population is excluded from security, a newly privatized public good. Violence sharpens the contradiction between those included and excluded from the polity; the subsequent migration by those excluded across an international border in search of safety can be described as a physical expression of the political exclusion which had already occurred.

However, upon arriving in the host state (Gerdes’ work is limited to host states neighboring the CoO in the developing world), the refugees discover that the contradiction of their exclusion is not resolved by their flight but for the most part recreated and repeated. Although they may recover benefit of the public good of security, they usually remain marginalized and excluded politically, economically and socially from the host state. The refugees then come to decide that militarization is the most rational course of action to maximize their utility:

In essence, the refugee status represents a substantial demotion compared to habitual life as far as access to patronage, political authorities and participation in (local) decision-making are concerned. Refugees will try to improve their social position in the host country. The more social ascendancy is blocked, the more expectations remain centred on return to the home country and the resumption of habitual life. This often seems to
depend on political change in the country of origin, change which is already pursued by violent means [by militant groups]. Refugees may therefore consider supporting one of the warring parties an appropriate response to their situation. (2006, p. 20)

Of the scholarly works reviewed so far, this is the first to offer a deeper consideration of refugees’ motivations to militarize. The logic can be summarized as follows: Refugees make a rational (economic, but not only financial) assessment of their access to patronage and authority in the host state compared to such access in the CoO prior to the crisis. They conclude that they were better off in the CoO – or at least, could have a better situation there if the cause of their departure (i.e., the CoO government, occupying military or other enemy) were nullified. As a result, they choose to support a pre-existing armed group which is already fighting their enemy in the CoO.

Another contributing motivation which develops in refugee situations is a shared identity. Gerdes applies Anderson’s (1991) famous “imagined communities” theory of nationalism to the development of a common identity within a refugee group, which is facilitated by the nature of camps and the class-leveling circumstances of exile:

People… are then propelled into refugee camps assembling thousands and often tens of thousands of individuals from different regions and social backgrounds. Many of them had to flee or were expelled because of their group identity, and contacts and communication in refugee camps makes them experience that they indeed do have a common fate. Flight and its circumstances become symbols through which the community is imagined…. Flight has the effect of levelling traditional stratifications: strongly differentiated people become refugees, have to deal with the same problems and tend to adopt similar strategies of survival, while the importance of the traditional social standing is diminished. Accordingly, the vertical social mobility associated with flight is primarily downward social mobility. It can nevertheless be as effective as upward mobility [in Anderson’s theory] in creating a common identity…. Under these circumstances, a “refugee” identity often symbolises a degree of upward social mobility and becomes part of the wider group identity…. (2006, pp. 32-33)

Gerdes adds that this common identity must be spread by leaders, who are generally middle- and upper-class elites. He does not discuss these leaders in depth except to indicate that they are often associated with either the civilian or military wing of a rebel
group, and they take advantage of the camp situation to reach, communicate with and control masses of refugees lacking social mobility, a process which is much more difficult in situations of rural and urban self-settlement.

Finally, Gerdes considers structural factors, foremost of which is the relationship with the host state. The host state usually has the means to enforce demilitarization of refugee communities, should it choose to do so. To forestall this possibility, the refugees attempt to cultivate a symbiotic relationship with the host government: They need a powerful patron, and the most powerful one available is usually the host government; while the ruler of the host state may see the refugees as valuable clients whose loyalty to him, should he empower them with the resources and authority to use violence, is more reliable than that offered by host state nationals because the refugees’ outsider status makes them more vulnerable and thus more dependent on his patronage.

The second cluster of structural factors which Gerdes describes in leading to militarization, though he does not use the term specifically, is conflict resources. He focuses on the resources which are facilitated by the presence of refugee camps, namely organizational capacity, ease of recruitment, diversion of humanitarian aid, and (stretching the definition of a conflict resource) increased legitimacy. He does not address the acquisition of more specific military resources such as weaponry and equipment, but presumably those were obtained prior to the refugees’ militarization since he theorizes that refugees join a pre-existing militant organization rather than creating one of their own. He also refers, as discussed above, to the possibility of inclusion in the security forces of the host government, which could provide a source of materiel.

Gerdes’ analysis is the closest approximation in the literature to a comprehensive
framework of refugee militarization. It includes consideration of refugees’ motivation, leadership, political opportunity and conflict resources. Nonetheless, his exploration of these constructs is incomplete. First, the motivation that Gerdes describes seems to be primarily a microeconomic one, based on relative deprivation, and he does not discuss a political project except for the development of a common refugee identity. Epistemologically, Gerdes’ framework falls short in its failure to clearly explain negative cases as well as positive ones.

**Lischer’s Dangerous Sanctuaries**

The study which laid the methodological foundation for this project is Sarah Lischer’s (2005) *Dangerous Sanctuaries*. The most important scholarly contribution made by her study is a rigorous scientific approach to refugee militarization in both theory and methodology, utilizing a Most Similar Systems (Mill 1843) qualitative research design to compare the presence and absence of militarization by refugees in seemingly similar situations. Her study maintains strong internal and construct validity, and incorporates some advantages of the experimental design by investigating these natural field experiments. She offers solid evidence of broader generalizability by investigating three very different regions: the Indian subcontinent, Balkans and sub-Saharan Africa. However, her hypothesis does not extend to protracted refugee situations. (Eichensehr 2005)

Lischer theorizes that the likelihood of war diffusion across borders through refugees is most affected by: 1) circumstances surrounding the origins of the refugee crisis – whether from war and chaos, group persecution, or defeat in civil war; 2) the capability and will of the host state to provide security and demilitarize refugee camps;
and 3) the presence of undifferentiated international humanitarian aid, which could be used to assist and support rebel movements. She rejects earlier dominant socioeconomic explanations which suggested that the risk of political violence increases when: camps are large; camps are located near the border with the CoO; there are a lot of bored young men; and living conditions are poor. The first of these three factors is only one to consider refugees’ political motivations.

Lessons from the study of contentious politics

It is surprising that the literature on refugee militarization has not yet drawn explicitly from the analytical toolbox offered by the field of contentious politics, considering that refugee militarization would logically fall under its rubric. Even though most works in the study of contentious politics works refer to activity that is wholly or mostly domestic, there is no reason that it cannot be extended to transnational militant activity. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly define contentious politics as: “episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.” (2001, p. 5) This is applicable to the phenomenon of refugee militarization, assuming that the CoO government is the target of the militants, as is usually the case. Collective action is not

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37 Contentious politics offers common analytical tools, vocabularies and models to explain the span of “revolutions, social movements, industrial conflict, war, interest group politics, nationalism, democratization”, etc. (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001, p. 6)

38 For example, writing from a contentious politics approach, Schock (2005) explains the rise in popularity of nonviolent tactics by opposition social movements in recent decades in part by noting that increasingly monopolistic control over new technologies of repression and violence, and the extensiveness of state control over territory, makes violent tactics unlikely, as rebel militants “need sanctuaries for bases of operation, rest from combat, the provision of food, rearmament, and military training.” (2005, p. 17) This analysis is valid as far as it goes, but it does not consider the increased potential for militant activity presented by rebel bases and supporting populations located outside the territory in question.
necessarily contentious; it becomes contentious when “it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities.” (Tarrow 1998, p. 3) Again, there is clear relevance to refugees who take up arms to challenge an opponent, usually the ruling regime, in the CoO.

One organized expression of contentious politics is a social movement, which Tarrow & Tilly define as “a sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of public displays of that population’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment.”39 (2007, p. 442) The exception here in extending applicability to refugee situations is, of course, that refugees by definition are no longer under the jurisdiction of the CoO opponents whom they are challenging.40 Nonetheless, given the unique circumstances of refugee situations in regard to the issue of jurisdiction – namely, that they were forced from their homes in the CoO; they generally lay claim to, and are expected by others to return to, their CoO; and refugee camps, like border zones, are often “zones of exception” in regard to sovereignty (Agamben 2004; Rajaram & Grundy-Warr 2007) – I propose that lessons drawn from scholarship on social movements are relevant as well.

The most significant contributions which can be applied to refugee militarization from the study of contentious politics stem from the field’s explanations of the factors

39 Tarrow defines it more broadly, and without the requirement of territorial jurisdiction of the target of contention: “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities.” (1998, p. 4)
40 There certainly are many examples of social movements by refugees challenging the host state, but the scope of this project is limited to refugee militarization targeting the CoO. Also, Tarrow (1998) devotes a chapter of his monograph exploring “transnational social movements”, but these are organizations that aggregate and integrate collective action by groups across multiple countries, such as Amnesty International, in contrast to the phenomenon of refugee militarization in which militants act across borders but there is no expectation of colleagues based in the CoO.
which lead to growth and maintenance of social movements. These variables include: motivating factors such as common interests or claims among the mass of participants, as well as feelings of solidarity and identity based on ethnicity and nationality; structural factors such as political opportunities and availability of resources which make such action possible; political entrepreneurs who are able to make use of discursive interpretations and culturally relevant symbols to frame their arguments in ways which resonate with the target public; and the participation of non-elite masses, in addition to leaders, in opposing structures of authority. Although social movements can and do sometimes work through existing institutions, they are more characteristically defined by means outside of the system due to lack of inside-track resources such as access to the state.\(^{41}\) (Tarrow 1998) Likewise, refugee militarization clearly works from outside of normal institutionalized forms of opposition.

Williams (2003) refers to two types of political opportunity specific to mobilization and violence directed toward ethnic conflicts. The first is unilateral foreign aid inbound to the ethnopolitical opposition (see also Hanlon 2009), which I will discuss in Chapter 3 as an example of available conflict resources rather than political opportunity. The second type of political opportunity, which is highly relevant to the question posed at the beginning of this work regarding the Arab Spring, is “periods of rapid sociopolitical transitions. In such periods, violent collective insurgency will be favored by state weakness and vacillating policies in the context of a high level of collective grievances felt by solidarity ethnies….” (pp. 178-179; see also Ryan 2007)

In regard to conflict resources, militancy entrepreneurs who would seek to not

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\(^{41}\) cf. McAdam Tarrow & Tilly’s (2001) “transgressive contention”, in which at least some of the involved claimants are new political actors, and their expressions of collective action are either new or illegal in the existing regime.
only instigate sporadic acts of violence but sustain a low-intensity conflict against a well-armed state opponent must secure reliable sources of ammunition, weapons, spare parts and technical expertise in guerrilla warfare. The most reliable and common source for these conflict resources in ethnopoli
c
tical conflicts remain state suppliers, but groups in conflict can also draw from the black market, including transnational links with other non-state rebel groups around the world, arms dealers and criminal enterprises. (Hanlon 2009; see also Chenoweth & Stephan 2010) State suppliers operate through legal transfers or the “grey market”. The grey market, which originates from the sending state but does not go directly to the government of the receiving state, is the most relevant source of arms for non-state militant groups like those of interest in this project. (Bourne 2007)

The next major hurdle is financing, which can come from co-ethnic diasporas, exploitation of natural resources such as diamond mining, criminal activity, supporting states or a combination thereof. (Hanlon 2009) In addition, the ethnonationalist militancy entrepreneurs must establish reliable training grounds, diplomatic support and a steady supply of recruits.

Hafez’s (2003) Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World attempts to explain Islamist militant action in the context of contentious politics, but minimizes the importance of actual grievances, focusing instead on the political process by which organizations adapt to exclusion and repression, their exclusive mobilization tactics, and the antisystem ideological frames used by Islamist entrepreneurs.

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42 For example, Hizbollah, the PLO and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, or Tamil Tigers) are alleged to have had links in training and expertise. (Bhattacharji 2009)
43 Fearon (2004) found that civil conflicts in which a rebel group has financing from a natural resource such as precious gems, coca or opium tend to be longer than those with other types of financing.
to motivate collective action and violence. I propose that grievances are not a constant and therefore empty of explanatory power, as he implies, but rather a necessary variable; in fact, political exclusion, which he portrays as a structural constraint forcing Islamists to turn to militant activity as a last resort, can also contribute to development of a collective project. (Ryan 1995) This is especially true in regard to refugees, whose common identity is, by definition, based on exclusion.

**Framing**

The contentious politics literature highlights the process by which political entrepreneurs frame events in a conflict rhetorically and symbolically for their constituents. (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001; McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 1997; Tarrow 1998; Brysk 1995; Tarrow 1992; Hafez 2003) Snow & Benford define a frame as “an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment.” (1992, p. 137) Frames are often constructed around arguments of injustice, and deliberately draw on familiar symbols, including those of religion and nation, to evoke emotions such as love, loyalty and anger. (Tarrow 1998) Some might argue that this is evidence of manipulation by elites. I suggest that it should be viewed instead as persuasion of the potential to achieve their collective project through direct action: “For the oppressed to engage in collective action, there must first be… a diminution of fatalism coupled with a perception that conditions are unjust, yet subject to change through collective action….” (Schock 2005, p. 27; see also Toft 2003)

Violence is an instrument utilized toward specific goals; a means in need of
justification. (Arendt 1969, p. 51; Gude 1971 [1967]; Dodd 2009) When militancy entrepreneurs seek to frame arguments in a way which will not only mobilize constituents to collective action but motivate and justify violence, they must first dehumanize the opponent and demonstrate their threat to the in-group, depicting the other as “terrorists, bandits, thugs, rapists, arsonists, murderers, demons, beasts; they are rats, lice, cockroaches, pigs, snakes – in all, not human and fearfully menacing.” (Williams 2003, pp. 186-187; cf. Neal 1976) They are sometimes described as a disease, such as lepers, a cancer, or a plague. (Ryan 2007, p. 71) Second, militancy entrepreneurs are likely to use antisystem ideological frames:

Antisystem ideological frames… are polarizing. They represent the relationship between the movement and its opponents as a conflict between two antithetical opposites – us versus them, just versus unjust, faithful versus impious. The sharp dividing lines drawn by such frames depict the opponent as a monolithic entity that is incapable of adjustment due to intrinsic characteristics that preclude reform; the opponent must be displaced. (Hafez 2003, pp. 156-157, emphasis in original; cf. Ryan 2007)

Hafez explains that the rebel organizations rationalize violent acts through ethical explanation of its necessity and/or justice, comparison with the enemy whose actions are portrayed as much worse, and displacing responsibility for the violence onto the enemy or victims. This kind of justification is likely to be easily accomplished in refugee situations.

**Lessons from the study of groups, ethnic conflict and violence**

Before proceeding, it is necessary first to recognize that mobilization is led, and in most cases acts of violence are actually committed, by organized entities (claiming that they are) acting on behalf of a particular civilian group. (Gude 1971 [1967]) These

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44 Such framing is apparently effective. For example, perpetrators of ethnic riots usually show no remorse, stating that “they had it coming”. (Kaufman 2011)
organizing entities can be states, militaries, paramilitaries, terrorists, political parties\textsuperscript{45}, ethnic associations, etc. The more organized and spectacular the act, the more likely it was actually committed by an organization rather than an unaffiliated member of the larger group on whose behalf such organizations claim to act. At the other extreme, the type of violent activity which is least organized and over which an organization has the least control is mass riots. (Brubaker 2004) The link between civilians and militancy entrepreneurs may be more appropriately characterized as an invitation than detachment or coercion:

[If] communities feel themselves under attack, and especially when [they] feel they cannot rely on state agencies to protect them, they will turn to groups who can offer them security and can exact revenge on the other side for the harm inflicted…. For many who live in situations of extreme insecurity where inter-communal violence has already broken out, the militarization of the state and/or communities might appear to be both sensible and comforting…. Often the demand for protection – for militarization – will come from within a community under threat and so it would be quite wrong to see militarists as people who impose themselves on a community against its wishes. (Ryan 2007, pp. 61-62)

Thus, in some instances the militant organization can be best described as an agent of the people. Therefore, to those critics who argue that acts of violence and mass participation are unrelated phenomena, and militancy entrepreneurs and ordinary civilians are completely distinct actors, I would reply that they are not mutually exclusive; in fact, the successful revolutions in the twentieth century which were violent also included mass participation. (Chenoweth & Stephan 2010)

GROUPS AND VIOLENCE

Although most sociological studies of dynamics of group engagement in

\textsuperscript{45} Political parties are one of the most common sources of ethnopolitical mobilization: “When the major constituency of a political party is a specific ethnic population, then political competition can easily become ethnic confrontation.” (Stavenhagen 1996, p. 63)
aggression and violence refer primarily to non-political variants such as crime, hooliganism and “legitimate” aggression like sports (for example, Harrington 1976; Shupilov 1981), it can also offer important insights to the study of refugee militarization. First, a group is most likely to become a “conflict group”, one ideologically oriented toward and able to engage in organized conflict, when it achieves conflict solidarity – that is, “members not only recognize that their goals are incompatible with those of their opponents, but also have many grievances against them and are frustrated” – in addition to sufficient conflict resources. (Bartos & Wehr 2001, p. 81) In other words, there exists the motivation and resources for violence (see Figure 1). Both of those conditions could be met in refugee camps and communities in host states bordering the CoO. Next, identities are fluid, multiple and constructed (Goff & Dunn 2004; Brubaker 2004; Schlee 2008; Schlee 2002), and camps and communities full of refugees who were expelled due to persecution or participation in a civil war – circumstances in which a single common identity was an important element in the conflict – also facilitate other conditions for transformation of a group to a conflict group: increased interactions, similarity of culture and shared identity (Bartos & Wehr 2001), and collective memory of conflict (Cairns & Roe 2003), which are further reified and made more salient by the presence of a threatening external enemy (Woehrle & Coy 2000; Cuhadar & Dayton 2011; cf. Harrington 1976).

Sociological study of political violence has also produced relevant theorizing on

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46 Hobsbawm (1959) offers an intriguing perspective on group violence which was “pre-political” or “primitively” political, such as banditry of the Robin Hood type, and Mafia.
47 Gude 1971 [1967] defines violence as follows: “a physical act carried out by an individual or individuals against another individual or individuals and/or property with the intent to cause injury or death to persons and/or damage or destruction to property. For violence to be political, there must also be the intent of affecting the political process.” (1971 [1967], p. 261) Note that
Figure 1. Conflict Theory: A sociological approach to explaining group conflict (reproduced from Bartos & Wehr 2001, p. 81)

typologies and causes of violence in civil conflicts. Violence is relatively rare across the span of human political conflict, it is costly, and it poses formidable barriers to mass participation (Chenoweth & Stephan 2010), so why does it occur? As I will address in the discussion of instrumental and expressive functions of violence below, Lawrence (2010) challenges the widespread assumption that violence escalates naturally out of nonviolent conflict which is unresolved (see, for example, Gude 1971 [1967]), proposing instead that violence is a specific set of tactics adopted for specific reasons, such as: it is seen as more effective than nonviolent means; in response to repression (i.e., violence by the state); because its morality is increasingly seen as justified in response to the actions

the identity of the perpetrator, state or non-state, and the perception of the act by the target(s) and observers are not relevant to the definition. (cf. Campbell 1976, Galtung 1981; Stewart & Strathern 2002) Honderich adds that an act must be illegal to qualify as political violence, and the goal is “a change in the policies, personnel, or system of government.” (1974, p. 102) Classifying an act as political violence or not depending on its legality seems unsound, and that requirement is not used here. (See also Tutt 1976) There is a broader conceptualization of violence which subsumes “structural violence” (for example: Jacoby 2008; Joxe 1981), but that is outside the scope of this project.
of the enemy; or because of boiling emotions. Pearlman (2010), in the same edited volume, suggests that the answer may lie in unpacking the group to reveal elites, aspirants (political entrepreneurs) and masses. Similarly, Harrington (1976, p. 186), writes that in a mass of people, or mob, there are three categories of people: the leader, an active minority and a passive majority. Those who constitute the “masses” who participate in violent activity can be further unpacked:

…when a society supposedly reaches the boiling point, it is not the society as a whole that does so, but a minority who because of atypical circumstances are free to react with vigor to sensed injustice, since vigorous reaction is less likely to harm these individuals in their home, property, or income. The majority of the society may sympathize with or after the deed support the rebellious minority, but it will not itself man the barricades or shout ‘Down with the King.’ It is not alone the existence of intolerable social circumstances which makes people rise in protest. It is perhaps at least as much the existence of individual, private circumstances that make it possible not to tolerate the intolerable. (Wada & Davies 1957, p. 874)

This early sociological observation demonstrates the importance of understanding the varying economic motivations faced by subsets of a group. I will incorporate this consideration into the proposed framework in the next chapter when discussing who among the refugee group is likely to take up arms and who is likely to support militarization but not take up arms themselves.

A groundbreaking work on political violence is Kalyvas’ (2006) The Logic of Violence in Civil War. He unpacks the black box of violence, demonstrating that there are many categories of political violence in war, utilized in different circumstances, toward varying ends, including local and private interests. (See also: Wilkinson 2004; 48 See discussion on framing, above. 49 Lawrence acknowledges the many difficulties with theorizing emotions and frustration as a cause, especially the fact that such feelings are far more prevalent worldwide than instances violence. She proposes that these emotions may constitute a base of motivations from which other factors operate. 50 Gude (1971 [1967]) adds that violence can be an effective form of political communication when nonviolent avenues are not available.)
Lischer (2007) adapts Kalyvas’ work to the causes of conflict-induced displacement, suggesting that difference in the type of violence, including the intent of its perpetrator – whether to (continue to) govern the population targeted for violence or not – can affect not only characteristics of its commission but also the later development of a collective project on the part of the refugees. I will incorporate this observation into my discussion of a “war of exclusion”, in Chapter 3.

Besides sociology, the disciplines of psychology and anthropology have made worthy contributions to the understanding of violence. For instance, studies of memories of violence, and their intergenerational transmission, have shown that individual and collective memories of manmade trauma can be quite divergent. Individual memories are often fragmentary, emotionally detached or even suppressed, and often have substantial variations and discrepancies, but collective memories of injury tend to be evocative and tell a coherent, intact narrative. (Argenti & Schramm 2010) Individual memories of violence may or may not be conveyed explicitly to the next generation (Filippucci 2010), but collective memories of violence are deliberately transmitted, including through performances and reenactments. (Kidron 2010) While individual memories are (mis)constructed by a single (fallible) recall and subject to retrospective interpretation, collective memories are formed by the intersubjective construction of meaning – and sometimes used as justification for action by political entrepreneurs. (Lindgren 2005; Argenti & Schramm 2010)

ETHNIC CONFLICTS, ETHNONATIONALISM AND VIOLENCE

In the decades of the post-World War II era, ethnic conflicts – mostly civil and anti-colonial conflicts rather than inter-state wars – have emerged as the most frequent
form of political armed violence, claiming between 11-20 million lives worldwide, with a spike of ethnic conflicts at the beginning of the post-Cold War period in the early 1990s.\(^{51}\) (Wimmer 2004; Eller 1999; Williams 1994; Stavenhagen 1996; Ryan 1995; Lobell & Mauceri 2004; Toft 2003; Fearon & Laitin 2011; Hewitt, Wilkenfeld & Gurr 2012) These conflicts dividing populations on the basis of their ascribed identities “have the appearance of unusual ferocity and resistance to termination” (Williams 2003, p. 5; see also Ross 2007), and many explanations for this bloody history have been proposed.\(^{52}\)

Drawing a connection between nationalist movements – with or without the “ethno” prefix – and violent conflict is not a novel idea.\(^{53}\) (See, for example: Brown et al. 2001; Williams 2003; Varshney 2003; Varshney 2002; Brubaker & Laitin 1998; Harff &

\(^{51}\) Fearon & Laitin (2011), for example, find that 57% of the civil wars from 1945-2008 were ethnically based, and another 17% were ambiguously based on ethnicity.

\(^{52}\) According to one hypothesis, without the power balance and security imposed by colonial powers, ethnic group identities became increasingly salient as a function of information failures and credible commitment problems in upholding intergroup agreements. (Fearon 1998; Lake & Rothchild 1996; Wimmer 2004; Fearon & Laitin 2011) Cordell & Wolff (2009) subsume this sort of explanation under a broader category of rational choice theories to explain ethnic conflicts, which also include security dilemma-style threats as well as explanations based on “greed” or economic gain. (For example: Collier & Hoeffler 1998; Collier & Hoeffler 2004; see also Jacoby 2008, Ch. 8) Alternatively, political economy explanations focus on challenges to ethnic inequalities, disproportionate access to resources, and racially ordered systems, as could be brought about by modernization and globalization. (Bookman 2002; Olzak 2006; Wimmer 2004; Stavenhagen 1996) Still others have explained the rise of ethnic conflict as a function of: the refusal of multiethnic states to recognize their plurality (Stavenhagen 1996); incompatibility of culture and identity (Ross 2007); the “loosening of cold war ideological straitjackets [which] has given greater salience to ethnic factors in many political conflicts” (Stavenhagen 1996, p. 13); neighborhood effects and the wave of democratization that spread across Eastern Europe; “alienation from increasingly impersonal, bureaucratic, and centralized states; [the] declining importance of class-based political parties and movements” (Danforth 1995, p. 11; see also Wimmer 2004); the concept of the nation-state itself (Otterbein 2009); “improvements in mass communication [which] have enabled states to impose dominant national cultures and symbols more effectively on the private lives of members of minority groups” (Danforth 1995, p. 11); and a combination of human nature, state-level and systemic variables (Hanlon 2009). Finally, Huntington’s (1993) famous clash of civilizations hypothesis suggests that ethnonationalist conflicts are drawn along the fault lines of nine global “civilizations”. (Wimmer 2004)

\(^{53}\) Williams classifies such conflict into three categories: “(i) turmoil (strikes, demonstrations, mutinies…, protests, sabotage, communal rioting, and terrorism); (ii) internal war (coups d’état, secessionist rebellions, civil wars and revolutions); (iii) genocide.” (1994, p. 54)
Gurr 2004; Lake & Rothchild 1998; Bookman 2002; Williams 1994; Danforth 1995) In the following pages I will first discuss scholarly work which has linked ethnicity to mobilization and group violence. Next I will turn to ethnonationalism in particular to observe the additional factors which can stimulate those movements to violence. In the next chapter I will suggest that ethnonationalism can provide a source of political attachment to land in the CoO, contributing to a collective project for its redemption by a refugee group.

Studies of ethnic conflict have demonstrated that mobilizing a group to support and engage in violence is a multi-step process, in which political entrepreneurs first reify the in-group, establish and sharpen boundaries from the out-group, squelch other identities in the in-group, and clarify collective grievances; next, violence is committed due to its specific instrumental and expressive functions.

Reification of the in-group / Distinction from the out-group

The first step in the construction of any social group is the reification of the group itself. This means, before any mobilization can begin, defining membership rules which establish an in-group (“us”) and out-group (“not us”) and demarcate the borders of identity.54 The second step is establishing the content of that group, in other words, “sets of characteristics (such as beliefs, desires, moral commitments, and physical attributes).

54 The field of social psychology has done considerable research on the construction of in-group bias, relating it to the maintenance of self-esteem by degrading perceptions of out-groups. (Cuhadar & Dayton 2011; see also Verkuyten 2005; Harrington 1976) Williams (2003) outlines eight factors leading to salient ethnic identification, including: “An ethnie preceded the territorial state into which it has been incorporated, and the basis of incorporation emphasized ethnicity; There are only a few large ethnies within the claimed jurisdiction of the state; The population of the ethny is geographically concentrated; The ethny’s members are concentrated in a few salient occupations; There is a history of recent ethnic conflict; There are many cultural differences with other nearby ethnies; Social closure, including in-group marriages, is strong; Discrimination is prevalent.” (pp. 14-15)
thought to be typical of members of the category, or behaviors expected or obliged of members in certain situations (roles),” as well as “the social valuation of members of this category relative to others (contestation over which is often called ‘identity politics’).” (Fearon & Laitin 2000, p. 848)

A number of scholars have noted that nationalism is defined in large part by distinction from the “other” and competition with the out-group(s) for power and resources (for example: Lake & Rothchild 1998; Bookman 2002), and the same is true of ethnonationalism – perhaps even more so, since the claims of “us” and “them” are based on supposedly unbreakable ancestral lineage. One mechanism by which this can lead to violence is as a result of the discursive reification of the group itself. Salient identification into “us” and “them” is usually founded in part on perception (or construction) of threat from “them” (Fearon & Laitin 2000; Williams 2003; Ross 2007; Helbling 1997; Cuhadar & Dayton 2011; Kaufman 2011), whether the threat is physical, economic, political, moral, national or some combination thereof. Since the alleged blood bonds of ethnicity confer immortality to the individual through deindividuation and installation into a tree of ancestors, successors and distant cousins dating back to the primordial ooze, the disappearance of the group would be “a form of killing inflicted on one’s progenitors, including one’s parents, who still ‘live’ as long as some symbols of their culture are carried forth in into the present and future, out of the past.” (de Vos 2006, p. 12)

Thus, by binding the individual to the group, the construction of threat to one’s ethnic identity taps into nature’s most powerful instinct, that of survival.

As Connor writes, “convictions concerning one’s ethnic identity are predicated not upon chronological or factual history but upon sentient or felt history. And because its roots lie in the subconscious, rather than in reason, … [rational awareness of evidence
to the contrary] need not alter the subconscious conviction that one’s nation has been ethnically hermetical.” (2004, p. 30) The reification of the group is an entirely social enterprise led by “ethnopolitical entrepreneurs” who seek to utilize the group in order to achieve political ends. “Their categories are for doing – designed to stir, summon, justify, kindle, and energize.” (Brubaker 2004, p. 37, emphasis in original) However, a reified identity does not mean that it is an illusory or an empty one. Indeed, it is precisely the reification which leads to real and powerful political activity by a group on the basis of that identity. (Brubaker 2004; Williams 1994)

Furthermore, once an ethnonational identity has been successfully reified, most members of that group see and believe it to be as real and important, or perhaps more so, than any other identity. It becomes part of everyday discourse and is recreated in private and public social practice. Countless “common people”, non-elites, have voluntarily\textsuperscript{55} put their lives on the line, and died, in defense of their ethnonational identity. They believed they would be martyrs, and their community discursively interpreted their act of violence as heroism in defense of the ethnic nation\textsuperscript{56}. (See, for example, Fuglerud 2011; Stewart & Strathern 2002; cf. Tutt 1976) They believe the group exists, regardless of its constructed genesis and ethnopolitically entrepreneurial advocates, and therefore their actions represent not passive manipulation but active attempts to achieve their collective project.

\textsuperscript{55} Of course, it is also necessary to recognize that there are also those who have fought and died in the name of an ethnopolitical project who were not participating voluntarily, but were forced to do so, such as child soldiers in Africa and southeast Asia.

\textsuperscript{56} See Hanlon (2009) for a discussion of ethnic violence as defense against a threat to group survival.
Suppressing other identities among the in-group

The second step is to make the reified identity the most salient identity, replacing other possible loyalties such as class, tribe or state. In other words, besides establishing membership boundaries of the ethnic nation, the movement must promote solidarity within the group, suppressing other identities. This can lead to intra-group conflict and violence, such as monitoring and sanctioning processes (Laitin 1995 [in Brubaker 2004]), violence by non-elites to prevent blurring of group boundaries (Fearon & Laitin 2000), or at the very least indoctrination, to elevate the common identity above other cross-cutting identities (Williams 2003).^57^ The Zionist movement in Palestine/Israel offers an instructive example.^58^

Grievance

Next, there must be a perceived serious grievance. A variant of grievance was the central variable posited in Gurr’s (1970) famous text *Why Men Rebel*, namely, that

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^57^ See also Williams (2003) for discussion of intra-group conflict especially as regards relations between the ethnonationalist group and the state.

^58^ The Jews in pre-1948 Palestine were from a variety of countries, mostly spanning Europe and the Middle East. Zionism as an ethnonationalist ideology rejects cultural, linguistic and ethnic differences among Jews, claiming that immigrants’ countries of “origin” were in fact temporary (one- or two-millennia) residences while Palestine/Israel is the true origin. “The continuing distinctiveness of ethnicity among Jews in Israel is perceived, therefore, as temporary…. Zionist ideology constructs the obvious evidence of Jewish ethnic differences in Israel as… largely irrelevant to the longer term goals of national Jewish integration and nation-building.” (Goldscheider 2006, p. 4; see also Mitchell 2000) Since 1948, differences among Jews have successfully been minimized, though not eliminated, through a project of assimilation which all new immigrants must complete. This process includes learning Hebrew, Israeli culture, and introduction to civic and political life in Israel. Mandatory participation in national institutions, school for children and the military for adults, are strong reinforcements to Israeli identity. Because the project of Jewish nationalism is an example of ethnonationalism (Greenfeld & Eastwood 2007), the assimilation process has been more formal and intrusive than immigration into other countries which accept large numbers of newcomers but maintain civic nationalism, such as Australia and the United States.
relative deprivation leads to frustration, which in turn leads to aggression. Although it was an important step toward understanding that perception matters – and therefore social construction matters – in ethnic conflicts, the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard et al. 1939; cf. Harrington 1976; Klineberg 1981) has been largely debunked since its publication. Variables frequently associated with minority status, such as oppression, discrimination and limited opportunity, have been shown to be ubiquitous and therefore unconvincing as standalone explanations of violence. In fact, some scholars disregard the grievance variable altogether. (See, for instance, the discussion of Hafez’s (2003) work, above.) However, other scholars of ethnic conflict disagree, and take this requirement seriously as a sine qua non of mobilization. For example, Williams writes that

> genuine grievances… are not merely deprivations or dissatisfactions. Rather, they always involve some sense of violation of norms, some wrongfulness, some illegitimacy, some breach of rules of proper conduct, some essential injustice. Indeed, many people over long periods endure deprivations and frustrations without protest; some substantial level of chronic discontent probably can be expected in any collective arrangement. What is crucial is that poverty or inequality or social exclusion come to be seen by a whole collectivity as wrong, and that a shared ideology develops in which the wrongfulness is seen as being categorically imposed. Violent ethnic conflicts occur when a cohesive grouping infused with such a systematic view encounters resistance that seems to preclude peaceful resolution. Protesters and rebels in these circumstances believe that they are fighting for things that they deserve. (2003, pp. 184-185, emphasis in original)

Grievances based particularly on collective feelings of injustice are crucial for mobilization toward violent conflict, and this feeling is relatively easy to access when refugees have been expelled from their CoO on the basis of their shared identity, as is generally the case (Bookman 2002).

The instrumental use of violence and its framing

Once boundaries between the in-group and out-group have been established and serious grievances exist, there are several mechanisms leading to violence. One such

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59 For an in-depth discussion of theories of violence that are predominantly grievance-based, see Jacoby (2008, Ch. 7)
mechanism is that violence can be a tactic deliberately selected for its instrumentality to achieve a specific end (Marković 1974; Klineberg 1981), as von Clausewitz famously suggested nearly two centuries ago. For instance, violence is sometimes used as a highly effective *cause* leading to the establishment and sharpening of group membership boundaries, rather than only an effect of it. (Wilkinson 2004; see also Lawrence & Chenoweth 2010; Jacoby 2008; Ryan 2007; Gude 1971 [1967]; Harrington 1976)

Brubaker (2004) refers to the example of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which increased attacks on Serb targets in 1998 in order to draw massive reprisals by the Serb authorities targeting Kosovo Albanian civilians, leading to deeper division between Kosovo’s Albanians and Serbs. This in turn led to increased funding, recruitment and legitimacy for the KLA among the Albanian population in Kosovo and the diaspora.\footnote{The KLA is also reported to have used violence against moderates within the Kosovar-Albanian leadership who advocated a reformist agenda with Serbia rather than a violent approach. (Ryan 2007)}

Besides being used to sharpen in-group/out-group identities, violence may also be used instrumentally to gain attention to grievances and bring them into the public domain (Arendt 1969; Chenoweth & Stephan 2010) and to empower, stimulate and mobilize the masses\footnote{For a summary of Marxist perspectives on the utility of violence, see Khan (1981).} (Fanon 1963).

But a given act of violence is not inherently political or ethnopolitical. In order for the violence to be linked to a collective project, and therefore become effective in sharpening the divide between (reified) groups, it must be framed in the context of that conflict *ex post facto*. This framing is done by the perpetrator(s), victims, observers, politicians, reporters, academics, etc. Whether an act of violence is coded in the public
discourse as ethnopolitically motivated, crime, terrorism, or some other attribute is often subject to fierce rhetorical framing contests. (Brubaker 2004; see also Richards 2005)

Framing an ambiguous act of violence in the context of a collective project, which political actors may have private incentives to do, can in turn have violent repercussions. (Fearon & Laitin 2000)

The expressive use of violence and self-perpetuation

Finally, violence can have an expressive, emotional or cathartic function, such as fulfilling a desire for revenge which is perceived by the recent victim as legitimate. (Stewart & Strathern 2002) In this sense violence can become self-perpetuating, both because a rising toll of “martyrs” increases individual and collective pain, and demands that their deaths should not be in vain (Toft 2003; Hanlon 2009) and because violence increases cohesion and emotional bonds among in-group perpetrators (Arendt 1969).

Violence can also become self-perpetuating as it instigates or catalyzes a security dilemma with the enemy. (Ryan 2007)

Ethnonationalism: Territory and “sons of the soil”

Movements that are ethnonationalist, like “sons of the soil” movements, are particularly prone to violence. (Stewart & Strathern 2002) This is due in large part to the additional motivation presented by the perception of victimization and loss of territory:

The special intensity so evident in many ethnic conflicts frequently arises from a sense of victimization… arising from loss of autonomy, loss of historically claimed territory, infringement of prior rights, or generally treatment thought to be unfairly

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62 The same mechanism operates when states go to war and face mounting casualties. Ryan (2007) refers to this as “entrapment” and offers the text of the Gettysburg Address as an example.

63 Derouen & Barutciski describe “sons of the soil” movements as “a peripheral ethnic group that is fighting for autonomy or secession on the basis that the territory they occupy is inextricably tied to the group. Tensions mount if there is a valuable resource in the territory (e.g., oil in Cabinda or Sudan) and if the government adopts a policy of transmigration into the territory.” (2007, p. 221; see also Weiner 1978; Fearon & Laitin 2011; Toft 2003)
discriminatory…. The more nearly indivisible the goods and the less the access of the ‘disadvantaged,’ the greater is the resentment and the more likely is ethnic mobilization, followed by overt conflict…. (Williams 1994, p. 59, emphasis added; see also Williams 2003)

In other words, violence is especially likely when the putative group has lost an indivisible good that it once possessed. (See also: Gurr 1993) Obviously, this is highly relevant to the situation of refugees with a collective project, who have lost not only their homes and land (possibly recompensable) but their homeland (irreplaceable and indivisible).

As discussed earlier, the reification of a sharp us/them divide is the first step leading toward ethnic mobilization. In Chapter 3 I will explore the link to territory in reference to refugees specifically, but indigenousness to the territory is usually one of the central points of distinction from “them” in ethnonationalist conflicts, especially when “they” are settlers or colonizers, or viewed as such by the in-group – even though “they” may perceive themselves as the legitimate natives rather than part of a foreign colonization project, as in Palestine/Israel and Northern Ireland. (Mitchell 2000; see also Fanon 1963; Lawrence 2010)

Since territory is one of the most common sources of contention leading to armed conflicts worldwide (Huth & Allee 2002; see also Stavenhagen 1996), it should not be a surprise that it is a common element in ethnonationalist constructions of threat. Fearon &

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64 Cordell & Wolff (2009) categorize theories of ethnic conflict like this one as social-psychological approaches. This category sees ethnic conflict arising as a function of unmet expectations of entitlement or the threat of loss of existing privileges.

65 Allen & Turton (1996) contest this characterization as reflecting European-centric notions of nationalism, in which “the world is naturally made up of clearly bounded politico-territorial entities – sovereign states.” (p. 11) They give examples to support their assertion that not all ethnic groups lay claim to the territory of the CoO, even when they are indigenous to it. (See also De Vos 2006) In response, I would suggest that refugee ethnic groups like those they describe dovetail well with my proposed framework, as examples of refugees without a collective project, who are unlikely to be motivated to militarize.
Laitin found that groups claiming to be sons of the soil are more likely to rebel than those who do not claim indigenousness, which they suggest could be a function of “more severe grievances”, among other possibilities. (2011, p. 201; see also Fearon 2004) The seeming intractability of ethnonationalist conflicts (Hanlon 2009) could be explained in part by this extra severity of grievances.

A homeland can be attributed far more value in symbolic terms than its material value, becoming “not an object to be exchanged but an indivisible component of a group’s identity.” (Toft 2003, p. 1; see also Williams 2003) Ethnonationalist movements are linked rhetorically to the territory of the ethnic group’s ancestry and identity, using familiar symbology and discursive constructions to frame the modern movement in the language of primordial kinship bonds. Given the familial basis of ethnic nationalism, “their” threat to the motherland/fatherland (cf. Williams 1994; Ryan 1995; Verkuyten 2005) is described in the ethnonationalist construction as an insufferable travesty of family honor. In such framing, is not uncommon to hear the threat of, or actual, occupation and control of the homeland by the “other” portrayed in the incendiary language of rape. For example, the Tamil Tigers’ ideology and songs anthropomorphized the Tamliltay (“motherland”) as a married woman or mother in danger of sexual violation. (Fuglerud 2011)

It must also be noted that there are practical reasons, too, that ethnonationalists see the homeland as necessary for the survival and perpetuation of the group:

Homeland ownership means that groups can enact language and education policies to ensure that future generations continue to identify themselves as members of the group. It also protects place names and historic sites and secures land ownership such that land can be passed or sold [only] to members of the group. Finally, homeland ownership ensures

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66 Toft (2003) suggests that ethnic groups who do not see the territory as indivisible are more often those groups who are geographically dispersed and urban.
that the ethnic group will retain its link to the homeland even if the group declines in size relative to ethnic strangers. Homeland ownership guards against the erosion of group identity and protects the existence of the group. (Hanlon 2009, p. 14)

Thus, contention over a homeland is likely to lead to violence (Arendt 1969) for both symbolic and practical reasons.

INTEGRATING EXOGENOUS AND ENDOGENOUS FACTORS

The study of ethnic conflict, much further developed than that of refugee militarization, has tended toward explanations which incorporate both structural variables and factors endogenous to the group. For example, in the founding text on ethnic conflict, Horowitz’s Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985), the author acknowledges explanations based primarily on broader structural factors such as modernization theory but finds them lacking; instead he focuses on attributes of the groups themselves, including their affiliation, organization, and centralization, in the context of institutions of governance. Likewise, Williams (1994) draws extensively on discussions of grievances and fears as well as political structures, political opportunities and class relations. Gurr (2000) outlines four criteria leading to ethnic mobilization and violent conflict, including:

1. The salience of ethnocultural identity for members and leaders of the group.
2. The extent to which the group has collective incentives for political action.
3. The extent of the group’s capacities for collective action.
4. The availability of opportunities in the group’s political environment that increase its chances of attaining group objectives through political action.

(2000, pp. 65-66, emphasis in original)

Other studies of ethnic conflict have emphasized the importance of elites’ and masses’ perspectives on “comparative group worth and legitimacy” based on traditions, symbols and historical experiences, while also acknowledging structural causes such as the security dilemma, and the catalyzing presence of “political entrepreneurs” to take advantage of ripe circumstances. (Wolff 2006) The scholars whose theoretical
framework integrates endogenous and exogenous variables most succinctly, and who seek to explain both positive and negative cases, are Cordell & Wolff (2009):

The first conceptual element of our framework is the set of motives that drive people to opt for conflict. Motive alone, however, is insufficient to account for the occurrence of ethnic conflict… [Participants] need to have both the means and the opportunity…. Importantly, if our framework is to be viable, these relationships need to be able to explain both the occurrence of conflict and its absence. (2009, pp. 44-45)

As demonstrated here, scholarly attention to ethnic conflict and group violence – and the literature on contentious politics and social movements, as shown earlier – has included significant consideration of factors endogenous to the groups involved, such as nationalism, ethnicity, identity, and economic interests, in addition to structural factors such as political opportunities and available resources. Yet, surprisingly, such integrative approaches have not yet been applied to the study of refugee militarization. This is likely due to three factors: the focus in the refugee literature on the victimization and humanitarian needs of refugees (Morris & Stedman 2008; Derouen & Barutciski 2007); the tendency in the field of conflict studies, and the discipline of international relations more broadly, to privilege security perspectives and state actors (ibid.); and the institutionalization of the refugee regime since the adoption of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951. All three of these factors prejudice scholarly focus toward structural and environmental explanations rather than grievance-based collective projects, and none of them expect refugees to take important independent action.

**Conclusion: Back to the future with Zolberg et al.**

This chapter concludes with a return, ironically, to the earliest attempt in the literature to explain refugee militarization, offered in a brief paragraph by Zolberg et al., which resembles the framework described in the next chapter.
Individuals in exile find that the most socially meaningful and economically rewarding activity is to join the warriors, and consequently move from the category of mere displaced persons into that of the politically active and conscious. [The refugee situation] also offers a new set of resources in a new situation which can be used by innovative political entrepreneurs to establish themselves. (1986:166)

Several variables here are noteworthy. First, the authors do not elaborate on what makes militarization “socially meaningful”, but it is related to a collective project; second, there is an economic calculation; third, there are militancy entrepreneurs who facilitate bridging the gap between motivation and action; and fourth, there is a new and unique set of resources available to be mobilized toward militant ends. The only major element of contentious political activity added in this paper to this insightful summary by Zolberg et al. is the existence of political opportunities for militant activity. I will explore each of these factors in detail in Chapter 3.
CHAPTER 3: A New Framework to Approach Refugee Militarization

In this chapter I will begin with brief discussions of: the original theoretical contribution offered by this project; levels of analysis; and challenges in applying the contentious politics toolbox to refugee situations. Next I will draw on the bodies of knowledge reviewed in the previous chapter to propose a new framework to approaching the question: Why do some refugee groups militarize while others do not, or during some periods of their exile but not others?

The value added

The original contribution which this framework makes to the existing body of knowledge about refugee militarization is four-fold: 1) It gives a collective project to redeem the homeland the theoretical weight which it is due, and which is mostly missing from the literature; 2) It accounts both for cases which are positive and those which are negative in the dependent variable, and offers alternative outcomes if only some conditions are met; 3) It begins to unpack the “refugee group”; and 4) It offers a truly multi-disciplinary approach to the topic. Although many scholars have noted that the very category of refugees blurs conceptual divides, none have yet proposed an explanation for this phenomenon which likewise bridges such divides. My framework applies a multi-disciplinary approach, drawing from studies of contentious politics, rational choice and constructivist approaches, civil and international war, domestic and international law, economic and forced migration, and more broadly, the disciplines of political science, sociology, geography and economics. It borrows from all three major categories of explanations for group violence: group identity; psychological theories based on relative deprivation; and structural theories. (Homer-Dixon 1999)
A brief note on levels of analysis

The unit of analysis in this framework is the refugee group in a given host state in a given period of time. A large body of sociological and political science literature has established that groups are real entities, more than the sum of their constituent individuals; and group dynamics matter in the political arena, particularly in conflict situations. In the previous chapter I summarized the sociological literature on group dynamics relating to violent conflict. Here I will offer a framework to connect the relationships between the refugee group and external actors – including the host state, CoO, superpowers, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and international NGOs – with political dynamics within the refugee group, such as the evolution of leadership in exile; and between refugee civilians and refugee militants. I will also suggest who within the group is likely to actually take up arms and who is likely to support militarization but not take up arms.

However, this group (meso level) focus is not exclusive. The individual is the common denominator to all decision-making, and some argue that the sum of refugees’ individual psychologies create group sentiment\(^67\), which in turn raises issues of individual and group rationality\(^68\). Most scholarly literature on the collective action problem, including game theoretic approaches, argues that individual rational calculations lead to individual participation or non-participation in a group, but more recent works have

\(^{67}\) For example, Ferris (1985) writes that “[although] the refugee is initially appreciative of all those who aided and supported him or her, in time the refugee becomes hostile as the aid is never sufficient to make up for the suffering experienced. In the end, the refugee emerges from the experience as a more aggressive person and one more prone to physical violence.” (18) Her claim is strangely deterministic, and it is unclear whether she is referring to political or non-political (i.e., familial or criminal) violence.

\(^{68}\) Hechter (2004), for instance, rejects claims that ethnonationalist partisans are irrational; see also the work of Schlee (2008) for a rationalist treatment of ethnic conflict.
introduced less strictly rational factors, such as interpersonal trust. (Ostrom 2007) In this project, rationalist (micro level) and structural (macros level) explanations are also incorporated, as will be demonstrated below.

**Challenges in applying lessons from contentious politics**

Refugee militarization is a type of contentious politics but not technically a social movement, though the study of both topics offer valuable insights. There are several important distinctions of refugee militarization from social movements: First, social movements are usually domestic phenomena while refugee situations are inherently transnational and international; second, refugee militarization involves violence or the threat of violence by the disenfranchised, while most of the literature on social movements does not; and third, for those seeking to militarize refugees, there is no need for active politicization prior to mobilization and militarization since the acts of war, expulsion and exile are inherently politicizing. By seeking asylum in a foreign country, individuals and groups are engaging in political acts and become political entities, even if they do not have a collective project to redeem the homeland. However, this does not suggest that all refugees seek to engage in militarization; as we have already seen, most refugee groups do not militarize, and most probably do not seek to do so.

As stated above, most literature on contentious politics studies domestic conflict. What makes the study of refugee militarization distinct from the study of domestic group conflicts? There are two important differences: first, conflicts involving refugees always include territory as an important point of contention, whereas domestic conflicts may or may not concern territory. The very concept of “refugee” necessitates consideration of territory as an issue of conflict, as it is only by fleeing homes, land and property and
crossing an international border that the dispossessed become refugees. As shown in the previous chapter, contention over territory increases the risk of armed conflict, and such conflicts may be more intractable and “ferocious” than other types of violent conflict.

Secondly, international factors, which are often only tangentially involved in a domestic conflict, are of central importance in a refugee situation. One such set of international factors includes those which relate to the host state, including policies on accommodation, assimilation and securitization; economic variables relating to the host; minority-state relations; and the relationship between the host state and CoO. The second important set of international factors which becomes salient in refugee situations is the UN-centered refugee regime, including protections afforded by international law (for example, if the host is a signatory to the 1951 Convention and follow-up 1967 Protocol), the use of international humanitarian aid to support a war economy, and the typical humanitarian conceptualization of refugees as passive, needy objects. Refugees can also engage in political activity which blurs the domestic/international divide, such as pressuring the government which is sovereign over the area where they reside (domestic activity) to change a policy regarding a neighboring state (international activity) with the intent to affect their home territory (transnational activity).

Do the international and transnational dimensions of refugee situations undermine the applicability of a contentious politics approach? I argue that it does not. The categories of factors borrowed from that approach – grievances, political/militancy entrepreneurs, political opportunity and conflict resources – are relevant particularly to non-state actors, whether within or outside the jurisdiction of the target of their claims.

69 This can be a sort of two-level game (Putnam 1988), depending on the political dynamics within the host state, including its ethnic constituencies.
Proposed framework

The framework proposed in this project is summarized in Figure 2. I will discuss each of these factors in turn: a war of exclusion; an economic or political attachment to land in the CoO; the degree of socioeconomic integration or marginalization in the host state; militancy entrepreneurs; hope of resolution by external actors; permissive political opportunities; and conflict resources (not shown in Figure 2, as I will explain shortly).

Following the suggestions of George & Bennett (2005) for developing typological theories, I propose likely alternative outcomes if only some of the following conditions are met.

The first variables I will discuss below are those affecting the presence or absence of a collective project to redeem the homeland by the refugee group. It is not an overgeneralization to state that every refugee group desires to end its condition of displacement and transience. Refugees typically “reject their marginalization as stateless and homeless citizens” and they “desire to return to their homelands or find a permanent home elsewhere.” (Bookman 2002, p. 184) But who seeks the homeland and who aims to move elsewhere? Of those who wish to return, do they seek to do so as individuals or as part of a collective project of redemption? Of those who do not wish to personally return, do they see themselves as part of a collective project or seek to start a new life?

To borrow Hirschman’s (1970) famous terminology, the refugees’ option of loyalty to the authorities in the CoO has been nullified by expulsion; the only choices remaining are

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70 They define a typological theory as one which “provides not only hypotheses on how [the independent] variables operate individually, but also contingent generalizations on how and under what conditions they behave in specified conjunctions or configurations to produce effects on specified dependent variables.” (p. 235)
exit – psychosocially rather than geographically this time, as they effectively abandon claims to membership and property left behind in the CoO, and seek integration to the

Figure 2. Proposed framework of refugee militarization

host state or resettlement\(^ {71} \) – or voice, which represents indefinite perpetuation of the

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\(^ {71} \) It is important to note at this point that options for resettlement are usually far beyond the political agency available to refugee groups. Those who choose resettlement may be quickly
collective project of return through diplomatic channels, violent means, or both. (cf. Salehyan 2009, p. 35) While loyalty and exit are passive options (take it or leave it, respectively), voice indicates an active attempt to change the status quo.

1. COLLECTIVE PROJECT TO REDEEM THE HOMELAND?

Bariagaber (2006, p. 9) refers to theoretical incorporation of all stages of the refugee experience and their path-dependence as an “holistic approach”, which is critical to understanding later refugee actions. I propose that two factors relating to the CoO affect whether or not there is a collective project on the part of the refugees to redeem the homeland. The first is a war of exclusion with a clear enemy, and the second is an economic or political attachment to land in the CoO. Both factors provide the basis for grievances around which militancy entrepreneurs will later be able to frame mobilizing arguments and shape reality for potential supporters. In particular, in such refugee situations it is easy to frame arguments around injustice and identity, while militarization offers hope of agency – in this case, defeating their oppressors in the CoO, redeeming the homeland and reclaiming their homes and property.

War of exclusion with a clear enemy

The reason for flight may be an important factor affecting refugees’ later perception of the conflict in the CoO. Lischer (2005) specifies this variable with three possible values: situational, persecution or state-in-exile. The difficulty with Lischer’s categorization scheme is that her definition of situational refugees – the only ones not expected to militarize – is distinguished from the other categories primarily by their lack resettled or they may languish in camps for years while political considerations prevent both their onward migration and their permanent settlement in the country of first refuge.

72 Gamson (1995) discusses these three critical collective action frames in motivating social movement followers.
of political interest and involvement. Lischer does not explain how these refugees differ from the other categories except by their political activity, which creates a tautological problem since Lischer’s dependent variable, refugee militarization, is also a type of political activity.

I use the terminology employed by Morris and Stedman (2008, pp. 74-75) to ask whether the conditions under which civilians fled the CoO were a “war of exclusion”. Like Morris and Stedman, I believe that a two-category scheme is more clear as it isolates the war itself as a distinct variable. Was one central purpose of the war to displace a population, as in cases of ethnic cleansing? If so, then the effect may be that refugees are more likely to develop a collective project to redeem the homeland. Contrast this with Lischer’s trichotomous variable, which is measurable not by objective accounts of the war but rather by the refugees’ active politicization and the circumstances under which they are willing to return.

In order for a war of exclusion to lead to a collective project, however, there must also be a clear enemy who is responsible (or perceived to be responsible) for the violence and exile. As discussed in the previous chapter, a group identity usually develops in contrast to a threatening “other”. When the vast majority of a refugee group can attribute their personal exile to a direct or indirect threat from an enemy “other”, it is much easier to develop a group identity in opposition to them.

**Economically or politically attached to land in CoO**

The second variable concerns whether the group is economically or politically attached to land in the CoO. I will discuss three ways in which the group could be attached: an ethnonationalist project; an agricultural economic base; or a rent-producing
resource such as oil or diamonds. The first is a political attachment, while the second and third are economic attachments. I propose that any one of these three can be sufficient to establish an attachment to land in the CoO. However, while these are the most common types of attachment, they are not the only types. Other types of attachment are relevant as well, as in the case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, which will be discussed in Chapter 9.

*Ethnonationalist movement*

An ethnonationalist movement can be pre-existing or it can develop in exile. The reason that an ethnonationalist movement can generate a collective project to redeem the homeland is that acquisition of an independent state is “used to complete the process of constructing the nation.” (Danforth 1995, p. 17) Refugees who see themselves as relatively recent immigrants to the CoO are less likely to take up arms in an effort to return there; while those with the ethnonationalist connection, who see themselves as “sons of the soil” torn from their ancestral homeland, are more likely to militarize.

In Malkki’s (1995) study, the militant camp-dwelling refugees strongly identified not only as refugees but as Hutu, their ethnic identity, first. Adopting the refugee label is important because it emphasizes the group’s status as temporary, dispossessed, and belonging to another place; but the ethnonationalist movement is a powerful motivating factor for refugees. A politicized ethnic group which has constructed an historical narrative and symbology of nationhood connected to their territory of (prior) residence has already established the foundations for nationalist aspirations toward self-

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73 What “relatively recent” means is, of course, open to subjective interpretation. For example, a fifth-generation American could feel that the US is their homeland as strongly as a Native American; whereas a fifth-generation Indo-Fijian may feel that they will never be “native” to Fiji.
sovereignty. The acts of persecution and expulsion which resulted in them becoming refugees then serve to solidify processes of intergroup conflict and intragroup unity which further consolidate their national identity. Like other conflict-generated diasporas, such refugees maintain and perpetuate identities centered around “a very specific, symbolically [rather than instrumentally] important, and territorially defined ‘homeland’”. (Lyons 2006, p. 115) Groups maintaining such movements map onto Joly’s (2002) Odyssean refugees, a category which includes “territorially based national and ethnic groups.” (Joly 1996, p. 155)

Thus, as described in the previous chapter, a CoO lacking a tangible incentive such as a rent-producing resource but which is identified as a national homeland can become equally precious in the eyes of exiles – and equally worth fighting for – as a non-homeland CoO possessing such resources. At the core of this distinction is the concept of a land’s replacement value: substitute land or sources of revenue might be found elsewhere, bitter though the change may be, but the emotional attachment of a national homeland can never be substituted. The dominant group in the CoO is often well aware of this dynamic. They see refugees’ intent to return as a potential source of conflict and future instability:

In most cases of involuntary migration, cleansing the country of target minorities (i.e., ethnic cleansing) was an explicit or implicit goal of the authorities. Involuntary displacement was usually followed by the state-sanctioned destruction of homes and villages in order to eliminate the economic or emotional pull they might exert on the migrants (this formula was applied to the Kurds in Turkey, they Mayan peasants in Guatemala, and the Karen in Myanmar, among others). Needless to say, such displacement and concomitant destruction fosters anger and frustration coupled with a sense of injustice and a desire for revenge. When properly harnessed by ethnic political leaders, these feelings are a potent source of nationalistic sentiment that can be used to develop a cadre of refugee-warriors. (Bookman 2002, pp. 186-87)
Why do I refer to an *ethnonationalist* project specifically, rather than a non-ethnic nationalist one? Because the ethnonationalist project lays claim to a homeland *on the basis of primordial ties*, an (allegedly) ancient link with the homeland. As discussed in Chapter 2, a nationalist movement does not necessarily lay claim to primordial connections, whereas an ethnonationalist movement does. This connection generates a collective project to redeem the homeland due to the nature of the refugee experience and identity, in which ethnic claims and contestation over territory are usually the basis around which the trauma of “refugeeness” revolves. Discursive and symbolic constructions of refugees’ ethnic attachment to their homeland create or reinforce the ethnonationalist project.

*Agricultural economic base*

The refugees’ former economic base in the CoO can also affect their attachment to the land and assessment of its value relative to their current situation in the host state. For a variety of reasons, rural areas tend to be more prone to initiating civil wars than urban areas (Kalyvas 2007), and some of those reasons are applicable to the situation of erstwhile rural residents dislocated to a neighboring state. Groups whose property and skills are easily transferable have less binding them to the CoO and consequently less to fight for; whereas refugee groups whose property and skills are less transferable, like those in the agriculture sector and especially small farmers, are more likely to maintain a collective project to redeem their land. In many cases, this factor intertwines with – providing further justification and basis for – an ethnonationalist movement.

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74 I am referring here to refugees who were expelled from their homeland on the basis of a particular identity, rather than Lischer’s (2005) “situational refugees”, who fled a general fear of violence and war.
Another factor which must be considered in a discussion of refugees’ economic attachment to the CoO is the “greed” motivation: If the CoO, and especially the region from which the refugees fled, relies on an economic base of a rent-producing natural resource such as oil, diamonds or minerals, refugees may have greater cause to fight for their home country. Collier & Hoeffler (2004) make the case that economic arguments such as these are the most persuasive predictors of civil war, and the same logic could apply to the motivations of refugees, who in many cases are a product of civil war.

Above I discussed one political factor and two economic factors which can lead a refugee group to maintain a collective project to redeem the homeland. However, some refugee groups (during some periods of their exile) have no ethnonationalist movement and no such economic attachments. In such cases, even if they were expelled on the basis of a shared identity by a clear enemy, individual households assess the situation and make the most rational decision possible to maximize their own security, stability, employment and perhaps education. This could be accomplished by returning to the CoO once safety is assured; integrating and assimilating to the host state; or seeking resettlement in a third country. Regardless of whether they seek to return or not, they do not see themselves as part of a cohesive refugee group, they do not adopt a refugee identity, and they maintain no collective project to redeem the homeland. Such cases map onto Joly’s Rubicon refugees. Examples of these dynamics can be found in the cases of Palestinian refugees – well known for their militant activities directed at Israel – expelled from their long-time residences in Kuwait in 1990-91 and Iraq since 2003. In
neither of the latter cases did they militarize in exile. (Lebson 2009) Other examples can be seen in the cases of ethnic Indians who fled Fiji following the anti-Indian coups there and those who were expelled from Uganda under Idi Amin.

2. Socioeconomic Integration or Marginalization?

Those groups who have experienced a war of exclusion with a clear enemy and are politically or economically attached to land in the CoO have a collective project to redeem the homeland. I propose that whether or not they seek to achieve that project with force, however, depends on whether they are more or less socioeconomically marginalized in the host state.

Until now, I have discussed the refugee group as a coherent unit. At this point, however, the group may be disaggregated, as it is possible that some (especially urban) refugees are more integrated, while others (especially camp) refugees are more marginalized. Both segments may support, even strongly support, the collective project in their attitudes. However, socioeconomically integrated refugees, who have more to lose in the host state, will be less likely to personally take up arms, even though they may actively support their militarized brethren with money, arms and supplies. In the event that the homeland is actually redeemed in the future, and practical return becomes a viable option, they are likely to personally choose to stay in the host state even while they support the idea and right of return by the group. On the other hand, the segment which is socioeconomically marginalized has less to lose in the host state. They are more focused on practical return in the event that the CoO is redeemed, and are more likely to personally take up arms.

What factors affect whether an individual household is socioeconomically
integrated or marginalized? I will discuss three factors: rights, employment opportunities and ethnic consanguinity. As in the discussion of economic or political attachment, above, this is not an exhaustive list, although I suggest that these are the three most important factors affecting refugees’ socioeconomic integration.

Rights

Looking at the host state, refugees consider whether they are able to lead a “normal” existence: Do they have legal access to courts, citizenship, free movement and residence? Do they have legal access to employment? Such policies may be affected by whether the host state is a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and follow-up 1967 Protocol. Increased rights, and especially citizenship in the host state, are likely to increase integration in the host state, including making long-term business and personal investments such as land and property. (Bookman 2002) Refugees who are able to move freely – and, very importantly, self-settle – might also be better able to integrate and assimilate into the host state, and are less likely to be concentrated in camps which reinforce group identity and collective consciousness on the basis of expulsion from, and conflict with, the CoO.75

On the other hand, exclusion and repression are factors known to increase motivation for militancy domestically (Hafez 2003)76, and the same logic could apply to refugees if socioeconomic integration is not available in the host state. However, in a twist to the usual mechanism, under such circumstances, they will not target the host

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75 Bookman (2002, pp. 134-141) discusses reasons why host states are often reluctant to offer substantial rights to refugees, including rights of movement, residence and citizenship. She acknowledges two significant exceptions, Jordan (which granted citizenship to Palestinian refugees) and India (which granted it to Tibetan refugees). Bookman also notes that some states, like Tanzania and Botswana, offer citizenship as a reward for becoming self-sufficient.

76 See also Lemarchand (2004) regarding intertwined aspects of exclusion, including political, economic and social dimensions, as applied to refugees in the Great Lakes region of Africa.
government but rather the CoO government because they will not perceive the host state as a potential home, and therefore remain focused on practical return. A number of host states, including Lebanon, have used this logic rhetorically to justify highly restrictive policies toward refugees.

Finally, if the refugees have access to political institutions of the host state, they may feel more integrated. The freedom to publicly and peacefully articulate grievances, and demand their resolution by the state without fear of repression, is a strength of the democratic process. However, most countries of first asylum are not democracies; even those that are often exclude refugees from the polity through lack of citizenship, at least in the initial years. But such institutions for expression of grievance need not be formal, such as voting and legislative representation. Even informal avenues, such as protests, media appearances, petitioning governmental bodies, and other forms of nonviolent political activity outside of the mainstream political system, which are usually not restricted on the basis of citizenship, can be effective avenues of expression. Such informal mechanisms are less certain in non-democratic regimes. Regardless of the regime type, however, if formal and/or informal institutions are available to the refugees to address grievances, they may experience more integration to the host state.

Employment opportunities

Besides rights, refugees also consider whether employment opportunities are available in the host state. If opportunities are not available, or if there are barriers to employment based on education and certification – which is more likely when the economic base of the CoO is agricultural while the host is not – the refugees may remain socioeconomically marginalized despite having rights. Such obstacles to employment are
more likely in the first generation, as later generations who have rights to education will gain the necessary education and certifications. Even if there are no such barriers, however, a refugee group with rights may remain socioeconomically marginalized if there are few employment opportunities for anyone in the host state, national or refugee.

Without employment opportunities, refugees are likely to compare their situation to that in the CoO, or more precisely, to conditions in the CoO as they are remembered – and in protracted refugee situations, to the memories which are transmitted down the generations. Clearly, this is highly subjective, especially when a refugee tries to compare current conditions with ancestors’ romanticized recollections of the CoO. If employment opportunities are believed to be significantly better in the CoO than in the host – or were and could be again – the group will orient economically toward the CoO. In situations which are not protracted, it is not unusual for refugee families to send a member back to the CoO periodically to check on security, living conditions and the status of their property, when travel to the CoO is possible, or to inquire as to circumstances among relatives still living in the CoO.

**Ethnic consanguinity**

Besides economic and legal standing in the host state, ethnic consanguinity can affect refugees’ social integration to the host state. In bordering countries there are often ethnic linkages across borders, so it is not uncommon for an ethnic group in the host state to sympathize with either the refugee group or the persecuting group in the CoO. When the refugee group is ethnically similar to the dominant ethnic group in the host state, refugees are more likely to be accepted and integrated in the host state (Milner 2011; Loescher & Milner 2005) and have denser social network ties.

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77 Jordan director, NGO for Iraqi refugees, personal interview, 1/4/11
As stated earlier, the items listed above are not an exhaustive list of factors which can affect socioeconomic integration or marginalization in the host state, but they are some of the most important factors. Since this assessment is made by individual households, there is no standard formula by which to calculate the relative importance of these factors to determine whether the household is socioeconomically integrated or marginalized; each household may approach that question differently. It should be viewed as a continuum rather than a dichotomous question. Therefore, rather than an objective “yes or no” as portrayed in Figure 2, these factors can be viewed as increasing *or decreasing the likelihood* that an individual (household) would consider themselves integrated or marginalized.

In sum, if a refugee household is socioeconomically integrated to the host state, they are unlikely to personally take up arms, even if they actively support the collective project to redeem the homeland, including the provision of aid and supplies to those who do take up arms. In the American context, an analogy could be made to Jewish American Zionists, who strongly support the collective project of Zionism, but very few of whom seek to personally move to Israel and join the Israeli military. Refugee examples of this scenario include: Tibetans in India; Afghans in Iran from 1979-1989; and wealthy, urban Palestinians in Jordan from 1948 until today.

3. MILITANCY ENTREPRENEURS?

At this point, we are referring to a (sub)set of refugees who have a collective project to redeem the homeland, are more likely to seek practical return, and are open to using force to attempt to achieve their project because they have less attachments and
socioeconomic integration to the host state.

There is often some small vanguard of the refugee group which sees the potential to mobilize refugees to support or physically engage in militant activity. These could be a pre-existing rebel organization which retreated with the refugees from the CoO, or leaders who emerge later in exile. (In some exceptional cases pre-existing leaders and organizations may arrive later in exile, as in the case of Palestinians in Lebanon, which received the PLO after it was expelled from Jordan in 1970-71.) I refer to such leaders and organizers as “militancy entrepreneurs”. Militancy entrepreneurs are often able to make use of collective action frames based on the perceived injustice faced by refugees due to their persecution and exile, their right to land in the CoO as justified by their ethnonationalist historical narrative, and the potential to gain agency and reclaim what they perceive is rightfully theirs through militarization. It is necessary to remain cognizant, as mentioned earlier, that the relationship between militancy entrepreneurs and ordinary refugees could be one of coercion, consensus or a combination thereof; yet even in cases of coercion, militancy entrepreneurs utilize discursive framing on the bases described above to justify their actions, motivate their “constituency”, and foreclose internal opposition.

Pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs

If a militant organization which [claimed to have] acted on behalf of the refugee group prior to expulsion retreats into the host state along with ordinary refugees, they are already organized and mobilized toward initiating militant activity against the enemy in the CoO with the intent of achieving the collective project. It is highly likely that they will seek to continue their efforts in exile, and at that point their ability to do so will
depend primarily on political opportunities. On the other hand, it is conceivable, but highly unlikely, that a group of pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs would abandon their militant efforts in the hopes that a powerful actor will take up the banner on their behalf. In most cases, if there is such a powerful actor, pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs would seek to ally with them rather than adopt a wait-and-see approach.

**Emerging in exile**

If there are few or no pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs, then such leaders could emerge from the refugees masses during their exile. This is more likely to occur in protracted refugee situations than new situations not only because building such an organization takes time, but because in the initial months and years most refugee populations have hope that powerful international actors – whether the host state, regional power, superpower or the United Nations – will right the wrongs which they perceive were committed against them, punish their enemy in the CoO and redeem the homeland on their behalf. As long as this expectation holds, they are likely to be content to wait for those external actors to achieve their (perceived) redemption and justice, and it is unlikely that militancy entrepreneurs will emerge from the refugee masses.

In protracted refugee situations, the group is neither repatriated to the CoO nor assimilated into the host state or a third-party resettlement state. The direct causes of protracted refugee situations are political: the persistence of persecution and/or government policies in the CoO which led to their exile and preclude their return; resistance of the host state to integrating and assimilating them; reluctance of third-party resettlement countries to accept large numbers of refugees; and in some cases, threats by
external militant groups who derive legitimacy from the continuing refugee presence (Morris & Stedman 2008; Loescher & Milner 2008c).

Over time, the situation becomes the status quo rather than an urgent one demanding political and international attention. Especially as a new generation is raised knowing only life as a refugee, a subset of the group may realize that hope for a resolution facilitated by regional and international actors has faded, and they must take action on their own behalf – if not in hopes of victory over the CoO government then at least to restore the urgency of the conflict on the international agenda and within the refugee community itself. In protracted refugee situations, in which refugees are in a state of perpetual limbo and/or constitute a recurring and unresolved condition, they are more likely to militarize, provide a source of rebel soldier recruitment, create tension with locals in the host state, and contribute to regional instability. (Loescher & Milner 2005) The reasons are partly related to identity construction, as “the longer a conflict goes unresolved the more likely identity-related issues will emerge, since the conflict becomes part of disputant self-understanding and part of how they are viewed by other parties.” (Woehrle & Coy 2000, p. 6) A prime example of these processes can be found in the case of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, who did not militarize until sixteen years after they fled their CoO, as I will discuss in Chapters 5 and 6.

4. Political Opportunities?

The last two factors, political opportunities and conflict resources – I did not list conflict resources as an separate variable in Figure 2 for a reason which I will explain below – are well known to students of social movements (e.g., Tarrow 1998; McAdam, McCarthy & Zald 1996), rebellions and insurgencies. The first is the degree of
permissiveness of political opportunities, which is affected by factors primarily in the host state but also in the international domain. Lemarchand refers to the receptivity of the host state to the goals and political organization of refugees as “the single most important conditioning factor” in determining the success or failure of a refugee group’s political mobilization. (2004, p. 68; see also Joly 1996, pp. 28-30) Of the factors affecting the opening or closing of political opportunity which are listed below, I propose that only the first two, lack of securitization and political space to organize, are necessary for militarization to occur. The remaining factors listed below can serve to increase or decrease the likelihood of political opportunity, but are not necessary factors.

Securitization

There are two important host state policies which are not mentioned in the 1951 Convention, but which must be included here: physical protection and camp demilitarization. First, when refugees are physically protected from attack, such as raids by military or paramilitary forces from the CoO, they have less political opportunity (understood loosely in this instance as opportunity for justification by militants) to organize their own self-defense. Likewise, host states which proactively securitize and demilitarize the refugee camps and border areas, as Lischer (2005) emphasized, decrease the opportunity for organized armed activity as well as voluntary or involuntary provision of goods to external militants. As discussed in the previous chapter, however, securitization and demilitarization by the host state presupposes both the will among host state policymakers as well as their capacity to do so.

Space to organize and mobilize

Other host state decisions which can affect political opportunities for
militarization include policies on allowance for political space for refugees and refugee organizations to freely move, communicate, organize and assemble within and between camps or communities. Freedom of movement and assembly, through which refugees have opportunities to organize political activity, are necessary to conduct militant actions related to the CoO. Note, however, that freedom of movement was discussed earlier as a factor increasing socioeconomic integration in the host state and consequently decreasing the likelihood of actual militarization. Thus, policies providing for freedom of movement can serve to decrease (for those who are integrated) and increase (for those who are marginalized) the likelihood of militarization.

Whether or not a host state allows such physical and political space can be affected by its regime type. Democracies are usually more restricted in their capacity for repression and internal security, limiting their ability to squelch opportunities for militarization or provision of material support for cross-border militants; while authoritarian states are not bound by liberal ideals and restrictions and therefore have more capacity to enforce security, reducing opportunities for militarization.

Tolerance by humanitarian organizations

Next, UNHCR and NGOs on the ground in refugee camps can create permissive political opportunities by ignoring evidence of militant recruitment, training, and diversion of humanitarian aid toward militant purposes, as they struggle to maintain missions of humanitarianism and neutrality. This dynamic was famously demonstrated in the case of Rwandan refugees. Because of the direct connection to western donor governments, this has been one of the factors most disturbing to western scholars and policymakers, and the one which has attracted the most attention. The alternative course
of action, which helps prevent political opportunity, is when humanitarian aid organizations actively oppose politicization of their activities, refusing to continue operating as long as they perceive that their assistance is being diverted toward militancy or supporting a war economy.

**Minority-majority ethnic relations in the host state**

Another factor potentially affecting political opportunity is ethnic relations within the host state. When the refugee group is ethnically similar to a minority group in the host state, they are more likely to be perceived by the dominant ethnic group as a threat, especially if the refugee population is large enough to upset a delicate ethnic composition in the host state (Loescher & Milner 2005), as has occurred in Lebanon and Macedonia, among other places. This threat perception may make the host state vigilant in suppressing any attempts at political organization by the refugees, resulting in decreased opportunity for violent political activity.

**CoO defense capability**

So far the political opportunities discussed have all been located in the host state. However, factors in the CoO can also create or prevent political opportunities for guerrilla-style attacks. These factors are related to the capacity of the CoO government to defend against cross-border raids. As Salehyan writes, “conditions such as rough terrain, regime transitions, and poor infrastructure, which reduce the state’s ability to repress challengers effectively, provide strategic opportunities for insurgent groups to emerge.” (2009, p. 36) Additional factors can be added to this list, including the porousness of the border, strength of border defenses, and whether a conflict in the CoO, such as a civil war, is still ongoing. Indirectly, defensive capabilities may be affected by
whether the CoO government receives military support from a powerful patron.

Host-CoO relations

An international factor which could potentially affect political opportunities is the relationship between the host state and CoO. If their political relationship is one of opposition then the host will be unlikely to repress refugee militarization, creating a more permissive opportunity environment. On the other hand, if the host and CoO are significant allies and trade partners, the host will be less likely to support, and more likely to repress, violent actions by refugee groups which could disrupt the host’s close relationship with the CoO.

International engagement

Finally, if international actors, including the UN and regional IGOs such as the Arab League or the African Union, are actively engaged in working toward resolution of a conflict, they could apply political, economic and diplomatic tools to facilitate conflict management, decreasing political opportunities for militarization, although in some cases only temporarily as peace agreements break down. In many refugee situations, however, particularly protracted ones, there is a distinct lack of political will and engagement by international actors, increasing political opportunity for refugee militarization.

5. Conflict resources

The last element in this framework is the potential to mobilize conflict resources, which is a necessary component of any contentious, and particularly violent, political action. I do not refer to this as a “variable”, and did not include it in Figure 2, because I propose that it is in fact a constant. That is, conflict resources are always available somewhere; where there’s a will and a political opportunity, there’s a way. *Acquisition of*
conflict resources depends on permissive political opportunities. In the following paragraphs I will describe some likely suppliers of conflict resources.

Host state

The most likely, and easiest, source of conflict resources is the host state itself. If the host state has an interest in funding militancy by refugees as a proxy against its neighbor, it is likely to supply them. Gerdes (2006) finds this latter factor to be the most important in predicting whether a host state will allow (political opportunity) and facilitate (conflict resources) the presence of refugee warriors.

International actors

Internationally, do other powerful states in the region or the world have an interest in supporting militant action by refugees? If a regional great power or a superpower has aggressive or deterrent security interests related to the CoO and/or host state, it may support the refugees in waging an active militant campaign. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 9, an example of this dynamic can be found in the case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, who were materially supported by the United States and other countries in their fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan; and in the case of Bosnian refugees in Croatia, who were supported in militarizing during their first exile by “the receiving ‘state’, the Republic of Serb Krajina, [which] was hostile to the sending state and had the means to arm the refugees”, but not during their second exile the following year. (Lischer 1999, p. 20)

Although it is less common and usually on a much small scale than military assistance provided by states, conflict resources could also be forthcoming from a co-ethnic diaspora population supporting militant action, both in the host state and around
the world. The most likely conflict resources they could provide would be money, humanitarian supplies and political lobbying in their own states rather than weapons and military hardware. This type of support from a co-ethnic population occurred in Macedonia in 1999-2001, when there were leadership and material links between minority ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, Kosovar Albanian refugees in Macedonia, and the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army.

**Humanitarian aid**

As noted above, another international factor affecting the capacity for resource mobilization is whether international humanitarian aid to the group is differentiated and closely monitored. If not (i.e., the political opportunity is permissive), it can constitute an important conflict resource. International aid intended to meet the humanitarian needs of refugees could be diverted to support militants – by providing them with food, relieving them of responsibility for their dependents and supporters, supporting their war economy or legitimizing their presence (Lischer 2005), or by adopting quasi-state functions\(^78\). This has occurred in the Rwandan camps in Zaire and western Tanzania, Sudanese camps in Kenya and Uganda, Burundian camps in Tanzania, Salvadoran refugee camps in Honduras and Cambodian camps in Thailand, among other places. (Muggah & Mogire 2006; Stedman & Tanner 2003; Terry 2002)

**Conclusion**

In the preceding pages I have outlined a new framework to explain when militarization is likely to occur among refugees – and, beginning to unpack the refugee group, I have suggested who within the group is likely to actually take up arms, who is

\(^78\) Regarding UNHCR as a quasi-state, see Slaughter & Crisp (2009); regarding UNRWA, see Al Husseini & Bocco (2008).
likely to organize and lead militarization, and who is likely to support the collective project, even with material donations, but not actually militarize themselves. The framework described in this chapter contributes to the existing scholarly literature by bringing together a diverse set of explanations from the study of contentious politics, ethnic politics, sociology and economics to explain the politically important phenomenon of refugee militarization. In sum: *A refugee group maintaining a collective project to redeem the CoO from the enemy which displaced it is likely to be led by militancy entrepreneurs – a pre-existing organization or one which emerges in exile after the group has lost hope of redemption by powerful external actors – who mobilize the refugees to take advantage of existing political opportunities and available conflict resources to militarize against their CoO.*

It is worth noting that, as defined in the previous chapter, the dependent variable being studied in this project is militarization by a refugee group, not by a small militant organization of refugees lacking mass support. An alternative scenario like this is possible if a small militant group of refugees is isolated from the larger population and independently supported, freeing them from dependence on the refugee community and its associated resources. Al-Qaeda-linked cells fit such a profile. While this sort of scenario is possible, it is easily distinguishable from the popular militant organizations with widespread support from, and integration into, refugee camps and communities which are the focus of this research project and the refugee militarization literature at large.

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79 For example, the Islamist militant group at the Nahr al-Bared camp for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon numbered only about 200 and were alleged to have links to al-Qaeda. (BBC, “Profile: Fatah al-Islam”, 8/15/10) The Abu Nidal Organization, numbering only a few hundred members, also fits this description. (“Abu Nidal Organization…”, Council on Foreign Relations, 5/27/09; “Country Reports on Terrorism 2004”, US Department of State, April 2005, p. 93)
CHAPTER 4: Case Study and Interview Methodology

In the following chapters I will apply the framework described in the previous chapter to case studies of Palestinians in Jordan from 1948-1963, 1964-1970, and 1971 to 2011\textsuperscript{80}, and Iraqis in Jordan from 2003 to the present, drawing from extensive interviews I conducted there with hundreds of refugees and local experts. In Chapter 9 I will apply the framework to two additional pairs of case studies in Africa and Asia to begin to expand its generalizability outside the Middle East context. Before embarking on those case studies, however, I will address in this chapter the methodological advantages and drawbacks of my selected approach, why I selected Jordan for in-depth field research, and how I addressed issues such as trust-building with such a large and diverse sample of interviewees.

Why case studies?

Case studies are the most appropriate method for this research project for a number of reasons. First, the question posed in this project seeks to understand how (capacities, opportunities, resources) and why (collective projects, economic considerations, framing, leadership) refugee militarization is likely to occur. These questions are best addressed with case studies. Second, rather than simply frequencies or incidence of militarization, I seek to trace the process of its evolution, including how evolving political factors affected the emergence (or non-emergence) of militarization over time. Third, refugee militarization is a relatively contemporary phenomenon – the\textsuperscript{80} This chronological segmentation is the same as that used by Dina Matar (2011) in her work on narratives of Palestinian identity. However, she breaks down the post-1970 segment further, with a dividing point in 1987. I chose not to do that because the major regional event of that year, the first Intifada, only indirectly affected Palestinian refugees in Jordan, unlike the events of 1948 and 1964-70.

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concept of refugee was only formalized after World War II, codified in the 1951 UN Convention – and the oldest case of refugee militarization dates back only to Burmese Kareni refugees in Thailand in 1949. Case studies, including interviews of former militants and actual refugees, are therefore more valuable than archival analysis. Fourth, they can provide direct observation by the researcher of ongoing processes rather than second-hand accounts. Fifth, case studies encompass a wide variety of evidence, including interviews, observations and documents, which can help triangulate and support narratives. Sixth, it is difficult to distinguish the phenomenon of interest, militarization, from the surrounding context. Such distinctions, which are central to the framework in this project, are best achieved from in-depth observation and study. Finally, and related to the latter point, I seek to model and assess complex causal relations, including issues of identity, economic orientations and broader structural factors, which can only be discerned with confidence from case studies. (Yin 2009; see also Devine 1995)

STRUCTURED AND FOCUSED CASE STUDIES

More specifically, the following chapters will offer “structured and focused case studies”, which can provide empirically supported evidence of causal inference. (George & Bennett 2005; King, Keohane & Verba 1994) Such case studies systematically investigate the same variables across all observations. In this project I will apply the framework proposed in the previous chapter by investigating, for each observation, the variables which I proposed are necessary and sufficient to lead to refugee militarization. Comparative case studies cannot establish that an independent variable(s) is either necessary or sufficient to lead to the dependent variable due to the small-n problem.
(George & Bennett 2005) Therefore, results of the case studies in the following chapters will be qualified as “consistent with the expectations” of the proposed framework.

**Matched-case comparative design**

I follow the advice of King, Keohane and Verba (1994) to maximize the number of observations from a limited number of cases by disaggregating the Palestinian case into three observations of their tenure in Jordan: before, during and after the period 1964-1970. Most research on refugee militarization refers (briefly) to Palestinians in Jordan as a positive case, even an archetypal one, of refugee militarization, without considering why they did not militarize earlier than 1964 or later than 1970. Therefore, it is important to investigate this single case as three distinct observations.

The validity of my study is increased by using a matched-case comparative design. I chose these cases using the method recommended by King, Keohane and Verba of selecting cases with distinct variance in the dependent variable, without regard to the values of the independent variable. (1994, pp. 141-142; see also Van Evera 1997, pp. 46-47) First, the case of Palestinians in Jordan is compared over distinct time periods, one of which led to militarization (Chapter 6) and two which did not (Chapters 5 and 7). This is not a perfect comparison, of course – developments and changes over time could introduce an omitted variable into the analysis – but it is generally a closer match than a contemporaneous cross-group comparison.

Next, to increase external validity, I compare the Palestinians with an in-depth study of the Iraqi case (Chapter 8), still within the same host state, which likewise provides for increased control over untheorized variables. The presence in one country of two significant refugee populations creates ideal conditions for a comparative study.
Finally, I will expand the external validity still further by applying it to two pairs of additional cases in Africa and Central Asia (Chapter 9). All of these case study comparisons use the matched-case comparative design, also called controlled comparison (George & Bennett 2005; Van Evera 1997; Mackie & Marsh 1995) or Most Similar Systems (Mill 1843), in which two similar cases, or two observations in the same case, resulted in different outcomes on the dependent variable: Palestinians in Jordan militarized from 1964-1970 but not earlier or later, nor did Iraqis in Jordan; Rwandans militarized in Zaire but much less in Tanzania; and Afghans militarized in Pakistan but not Iran. Matched-case comparative design is particularly well suited to investigating necessary and sufficient causes. (Mahoney & Villegas 2007)

UNIVERSE OF POTENTIAL CASES

Nomothetically inclined scholars state that good case study research clearly specifies the universe of cases from which the sample is drawn and to which it is alleged to be generalizable (George & Bennett 2005), and that the very purpose of the case study is “understanding a larger class of cases (a population).” (Gerring 2007, p. 95) For this project, the universe from which the samples were drawn are instances in which political violence was perpetrated in one state, leading to a mass outflow of refugees to a neighboring state. This excludes cases in which refugees live in host states not bordering their CoO (whether they flew there directly from the CoO or were resettled later).

I do not specify a minimum number of refugees to constitute a “mass outflow”, but it is reasonable to suggest that the theorized mechanisms would be substantially different, if not altogether irrelevant, in situations of less than 5,000 refugees. On the other hand, situations with more than 100,000 refugees which fit the criteria above are
certainly included. An exact minimum threshold between those two parameters would be arbitrary.

**Criticisms of case study methodology**

As with all methodologies, small-n comparative case studies have disadvantages. Foremost among these is the limited generalizability of case studies in contrast to the strong correlations potentially available from large-n statistical analysis. Although – unlike the *sui generis* approach with which many Middle East scholars view the Palestinian refugee issue – I attempt to buffer this shortcoming by including matched cases from other regions of the world, the grand total of eight observations which I review in this project is insufficiently large to conclude with confidence that the mechanisms I propose are consistently predictive of the presence and absence of militarization worldwide. In the final chapter of this text I will make recommendations on conducting a quantitative study to further assess the generalizability of the proposed framework.

The second significant shortcoming of small-n case studies is the possibility of equifinality, or multiple causal pathways to the same outcome. (George & Bennett 2005) In this project equifinality would mean that militarization can occur from an alternative pathway to the one I proposed. For example, if refugees spontaneously took up arms and attacked their CoO without apparent leadership, mobilizing rhetoric or organization – like a mass riot – then we might say that militarization occurred without militancy entrepreneurs. This may occur domestically, but it is hard to imagine refugees “spontaneously” crossing an international border to attack. A more likely scenario is if refugees are subjected to forced recruitment and/or forced material support of a militant
organization attacking the CoO despite their lack of motive to do so, then we might say that militarization occurred without a collective project. Forced recruitment and support has occurred in some refugee situations. Whereas voluntary recruitment and support clearly stems from motivation, the difficulty in cases of forced recruitment and support will be in distinguishing the motivations of the group, whether supporting the collective project or not, separately from their actions.

Third, all research, both qualitative and quantitative, must beware of the threat of endogeneity to empirical inference. (Franzese 2007) I suggest that this is not a problem in the Palestinian case because the only observation in which one might argue that endogeneity occurred was the third period, beginning 1971, in which there was decreased political opportunity (an independent variable) as a response to the militarization (dependent variable) which occurred in the prior observation (1964-1970). However, dividing the Palestinian case into three distinct observations resolves this problem because the alleged endogeneity occurred across observations rather than within one.

**Why the Middle East?**

I selected case studies in the Middle East for in-depth field research, and Palestinians and Iraqis in particular, for several reasons. First, as of 2009, these two groups combined accounted for three-quarters of all refugees in the Middle East and North Africa region (Palestinians, 52%; Iraqis, 23%), and sixty percent of all refugees around the world residing in a country bordering their CoO (Palestinians, 42%; Iraqis, 18%).\(^8\) Secondly, the refugee militarization literature addresses many cases in Africa, Asia and a scattering of other cases around the world, but almost none have studied the

\(^8\) Data compiled from UNHCR, UNRWA and U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI).
Middle East, and the Palestinians and Iraqis in particular. As Leenders writes, “No serious researcher posing the question ‘under what conditions do refugee crises lead to the spread of civil war across borders?’ can afford to ignore this part of the world.” (2009, p. 353) The Palestinian case is often considered sui generis, but putting it in comparative perspective to other refugee situations can be valuable. (Dumper 2003; Chatty & Hundt 2005) Lischer (2005) referred to the Palestinians as an archetypal case of refugee militarization, but did not include them as one of her in-depth case studies.

Third, both populations are overwhelmingly urban, and there is a dearth of scholarly literature on urban refugee populations (Pavanello, Elhawary & Pantuliano 2010; Sommers 2001; Jacobsen & Landau 2003), especially in the topic of refugee militarization. Finally, issues of conflict and stability in the Middle East are very important for American and other Western policymakers, and will likely continue to be central foreign policy issues in the decades to come. Therefore, greater understanding of the dynamics of refugee politics and militarization in the Middle East is of significant policy value.

On a personal note, the Middle East was a logical choice for me because it is my regional specialization and I speak Arabic. While I did not gain sufficient fluency in the Palestinian and Iraqi dialects to conduct in-depth interviews in Arabic, it was nonetheless a significant advantage during fieldwork.

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82 I refer to the “traditional” Middle East, extending east only as far as Iran. There have, of course, been studies of refugee militarization in the extended Middle East which encompasses Afghanistan and Pakistan.

83 There is a substantial historical literature about the Palestinians refugees and their militarization in Jordan in the 1960s and in Lebanon during the civil war, but very few of these works consider refugee militarization as a standalone phenomenon, nor attempt to study the Palestinians in comparison to other cases worldwide. Gerdes (2006) is a notable exception.

84 Leenders (2009) is a valuable exception.
Why Jordan?

Palestinian and Iraqi refugees are also present in significant numbers in Syria, and Palestinians in Lebanon, so why Jordan? I selected Jordan for a combination of methodological and practical reasons. Methodologically, there has never been significant militarization by refugees in Syria like there has been in Jordan and Lebanon, so a comparative study there would have been a study solely of non-militarization, with little variation on the dependent variable. A study in Lebanon would have excluded Iraqis, or attempted to compare Palestinians in Lebanon with Iraqis in another country, which reduces control over host-state variables.

Practically, conducting research in Syria, and politically sensitive research in particular, is more challenging than in Jordan. Even before the murderous events of the Arab Spring began in Syria, the domestic intelligence services there were far more intrusive than the Jordanian domestic intelligence, and much more likely to interfere in academic research. Such interference could have included trailing or even accompanying the researcher to interviews, which would have drastically reduced the willingness of interviewees to talk, compromised their anonymity, and possibly led to serious negative repercussions for those who chose to speak openly. Even acquiring official permission to conduct research in the country may have been a challenge.

In Jordan, by contrast, I had very little interaction with the government and domestic intelligence services. There was no special permission required to conduct research in the country except in the Palestinian refugee camps, which I obtained

85 Thousands of Palestinians from Syria fought with the fedayeen (Palestinian resistance) movements in Jordan and Lebanon from the 1960s to the 1980s. (Chatty & Hundt 2005)

86 According to UNHCR, there are only about 7,000 Iraqi refugees in Lebanon; and the scope of this study is limited to countries of first asylum sharing a border with the CoO.
relatively easily. To the best of my knowledge I was not followed, the anonymity of my interviews was not breached, and there have been no negative repercussions for any of my interviewees as a result of speaking with me. Whereas academic freedom is heavily restricted in Syria, it is generally respected in Jordan. (Freedom House 2011)

Why interviews?

The data collected from Jordan were overwhelmingly drawn from interviews with hundreds of Iraqi refugees, Palestinian refugees and local experts. I chose to focus my limited time and resources on semi-structured interviews because macro-historical information about most structural factors in my framework, such as conflict resources and political opportunities, as well as details of the headline-grabbing dependent variable, militarization, are readily available from an extensive literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict and some relatively new literature on Iraqi refugees. What is minimally available in existing secondary sources is information about the factor most neglected in studies on refugee militarization, motivation among ordinary refugees, including their perceptions, worldviews, political attitudes, economic orientations and feelings of integration or exclusion from the Jordanian state and society, which are precisely the sort of data for which intensive interviews are well suited (Devine 1995; see also Wood 2007).

This factor, motivation, is highly subjective and open to personal interpretation. Most public opinion polls which have been conducted on Palestinian refugees in Jordan only scratch the surface of these issues with narrow questions; and the in-depth case studies of Palestinian refugees that have been conducted are usually ethnographic studies limited to one or two refugee camps (Chatty & Hundt 2005), and do not attempt to describe the diversity of views present among Palestinians in Jordan (more than 80% of
the Palestinian refugee population in Jordan does not live in camps). The lack of existing
literature on the motivation factor, and the collective project in particular, might also be
due in part to the fact that it is one of the most politically sensitive topics in Jordan, and
unofficially taboo; a senior American diplomat there referred to my research topic as “the
third rail of Jordanian politics”. Finally, a body of psychological and political science
literature has demonstrated that attitudes and actions are not well correlated. This makes
field research and interviews valuable, in order to clarify relationships between
motivation and action or inaction. (Wood 2007)

Another category of data which is available in Jordan is information about
government repression. Besides summary references to the Jordanian government’s
extensive and highly effective domestic intelligence service, these data are very difficult
to find in existing literature. For example, it is common knowledge that the Palestinians
have not militarized in Jordan since 1970, but it is critical to this project to know if
refugees tried to militarize but were stopped by Jordanian security forces, or if they
abandoned their collective project and have not tried at all since 1970. That kind of
information is not readily available in existing literature – nor from the Jordanian
government – but Palestinians in Jordan could address that question, and some were
willing to share that knowledge with me.

INTERVIEW STRUCTURE AND QUESTION TYPES

Semi-structured interviews

My semi-structured interviews included open-ended questions, close-ended
questions, and multiple-choice questions. For the most part, I asked the same questions
of all refugee interviewees. But since these were semi-formal interviews rather than tightly scripted questionnaires, I used my discretion to modify or skip some open-ended questions, for example, if the interviewee was short on time, misunderstood the question, stonewalled or declined to answer on a particular topic, or had already answered a question in the course of addressing a previous question. I also added follow-up probes when elaboration was warranted. (Devine 1995) The results drawn from these interview questions will be exhibited in a mixed-methods format, including both qualitative and quantitative data from the interviews, reflecting the different types of questions. (Yin 2009)

**Focus groups**

In addition to personal or household interviews, at the beginning of my research on Iraqi refugees I conducted three focus groups: one of women, one of men and one of out-of-school youth (male and female). While it was a useful starting point, I did not repeat this exercise for several reasons: First, because of the loss of diversity of responses due to social pressure between participants, which led to converging responses and one-upsmanship, rather than independent perspectives and privately held opinions which may be less socially acceptable among Iraqis; secondly, because of the local custom of not contradicting an elder, which stifled opposing viewpoints; and third, because my time

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87 There are some exceptions, such as a question on identity ranking, which I only added to the question set after two-thirds of the Palestinian interviews were already completed. (I ended up discarding those results for Palestinians due to the small sample size.)

88 For example, some interviewees answered repeatedly “I don’t know” to questions about details of their ancestors’ departure from Palestine and arrival in Jordan. After several such answers, or if the interviewee was exhibiting increasing frustration with questions that they could not answer, I would skip the remaining questions in that section.

89 For example, many Iraqis confided privately that they don’t associate with other Iraqis because they don’t trust them and want nothing to do with them. This would be difficult to reveal in a room full of Iraqis.
with the group was limited and I was only able to ask a few questions, each of which stimulated lengthy discussion, rather than my full set of in-depth and survey questions which generate richer data.

**A TYPICAL REFUGEE INTERVIEW FROM SOUP TO NUTS**

Initial contact with 88% of Palestinian interviewee households and 77% of Iraqi interviewee households was made by telephone. My interpreter explained who I am, briefly explained my research and asked if we could interview him/her; if s/he was not personally available, we asked to interview another person in the household. If the respondent agreed, we set a date and time within one week, and allowed him/her to choose the location. The day before the interview we called again to confirm. On the day of the appointment, I drove with the interpreter to the agreed meeting place and we called again to announce our presence. Most of the interviews (72% of Palestinians; 88% of Iraqis) were conducted in their home. The remainder were conducted at their workplace, a public location or another place. Interviews began as early as 8:00 AM and as late as 8:00 PM.

We sat down on a sofa or floor mats, and our hosts invariably brought coffee, tea or juice (sometimes all three). I began in Arabic by thanking them for participating in my research, and introducing myself and the interpreter. Then, in English (with translation), I summarized my research, the types of questions I would ask, and the steps I would take to protect their privacy. I asked if it would be okay to type notes on my laptop (all

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90 Initial contact was made through email for 3% of Palestinians and 10% of Iraqis, and in person for 9% of Palestinians and 13% of Iraqis.

91 The meeting place was usually a local landmark, and once we arrived we asked for turn-by-turn directions from that point, since most people in Jordan don’t know the road names and many buildings are unnumbered. Sometimes the interviewee sent a child to meet us there, or met us there him/herself.
interviewees agreed). I began with demographic questions, then their family history prior
to leaving the CoO, the circumstances of their departure, their journey and transition to
Jordan, the effect of major historical events in Jordan and the CoO on their family, and
finally, their opinions about the present and future of themselves and of their refugee
group. When we finished the interview I thanked them for their time and we left. If I
had their email address, I sent a follow-up note within a few days, thanking them again
for their participation.

I conducted between one to five interviews per day. Most interviews lasted 45 to
90 minutes; the longest lasted 3½ hours. I did my best to type every word they said when
it was relevant to my research. Sometimes, at the end of the interview, they would
request something from me, such as assistance with UNRWA, UNHCR, resettlement (in
the case of Iraqis) or employment. This occurred in 9% of Palestinian interviews and
25% of Iraqi interviews. I did my best to assist when I could, but in most cases it was
impossible.

Most of the interviews were conducted in Arabic (86% of Palestinian interviews,
79% of Iraqi interviews), and the remainder in English. The male interpreter translated
31% of the Palestinian interviews. The female interpreter translated 55% of the
Palestinian interviews and 81% of the Iraqi interviews. She was also present at another
3% of Palestinian interviews and 6% of Iraqi interviews, which were conducted in
English. Another 9% of Palestinian interviews and 13% of Iraqi interviews were
conducted in English without an interpreter present.92

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92 I went alone if I knew beforehand that the interviewee is comfortable speaking English.
CRITICISMS OF INTERVIEW DATA

Sampling bias

A frequent methodological criticism leveled at interviews is that the sample of interviewees is selected in a non-random, non-representative way, raising concerns about the generalizability of results. (Devine 1995) I attempted to overcome this objection by conducting nearly 80% of the Palestinian interviews with households drawn randomly from the register of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which I used as a sampling frame. UNRWA’s list of registered refugees in Jordan totaled 1,999,466 individuals in 2011. No reliable statistics are available on the percentage of Palestinians in Jordan who are not registered\(^93\), nor on the percentage of the entire population of Jordan who are Palestinian\(^94\), which makes assessment of generalizability to the wider Palestinian population in Jordan more challenging (Wood 2007, p. 124). However, most estimates refer to the Palestinian population as “at least half” of the total population\(^95\). A range of 51-60% of the population would place the estimate of the entire Palestinian population at between 3,064,218 – 3,604,962 people.\(^96\) Using these figures, it is reasonable to estimate that registered refugees constitute between 55-65% of all

\(^93\) Dumper (2008, p. 195) summarizes why UNRWA’s register is not a record of all Palestinian refugees.

\(^94\) Refusing to collect or publish statistics on this elephant-in-the-room demographic characteristic of their population is the overt policy of the Jordanian government (Chatty & Hundt 2005; Abu-Odeh 1999), although in 2002, Prime Minister Ali Abu al-Ragheb stated that Palestinians constitute 43% of the population (Al-Quds Center 2009). As I will discuss in Chapter 7, the government sees division between Palestinians and Jordanians as one of the biggest threats to the state, and which has made extensive public campaigns such as “One Jordan” and “Jordan First” since the early 2000s to promote a state-national identity over East Bank/West Bank division (Al Husseini & Bocco 2009).

\(^95\) See, for example: “Assessment for Palestinians in Jordan”, Minorities at Risk, 12/31/06; Chatty & Hundt (2005)

\(^96\) The CIA World Factbook estimates the population of Jordan in 2011 at 6,508,271, but this includes an estimate of 500,000 Iraqi refugees, who I removed from the calculation.
Palestinians in Jordan, and 33% of the entire population of Jordan.\footnote{This is consistent with the estimate of the Jordanian population who are registered mentioned by Chatty \& Hundt (2005); but it contrasts with the estimate by UNRWA that “maybe 5% of refugees in Jordan are not registered.” (Mater Saqer, UNRWA spokesman, personal interview, 10/25/10)}

The remaining interviewees were selected through the snowball technique and interception (Gomm 2009, p. 354) in order to balance out the sample with underrepresented demographics, namely \textit{naazihiin} (lit., “displaced people”, those who fled their homes in the West Bank for the first time in 1967), and wealthy Palestinians. Naazihiin are not eligible for inclusion in the UNRWA register (Chatty \& Hundt 2005; Dumper 2008), but it is unclear why few wealthy individuals were successfully contacted through the UNRWA register. There are two possible explanations: either they are less likely to be on the register or less likely to agree to an interview.

The first reason is plausible because UNRWA is primarily a social services organization, so wealthy people would have no economic need for it. The wealthy also were not eligible to register with UNRWA until a change in the rules in 1993 which opened it to anyone whose father or grandfather was born in Palestine.\footnote{Judith van Raalten, personal interview, 11/30/10} On the other hand, many Palestinians see inclusion in UNRWA’s register as an identity statement: Even if you are not using UNRWA’s social services, you must remain on the register to be part of the Palestinian refugees.\footnote{The perception of UNRWA primarily as proof of refugee status rather than provider of humanitarian services is more common in Jordan than any of the other host states. (Al Husseini \& Bocco 2009)} (Al Husseini \& Bocco 2009) For example, one interviewee stated, “My father was really sick and dying. Some people wanted to buy his UNRWA refugee paper for 6,000 JD (US$8,475) but he refused to sell it, because it proves he’s a refugee.” (Female, 47) It is also commonly rumored that UNRWA’s
register will be the basis for claims to compensation once the refugee issue is resolved with Israel:

Until now they are telling us that they are going to give us money to make it up to us, but nothing happens…. If you have a card from 1948, then UNRWA and the Jordanian government is planning to offer money to give up Palestine. That’s what we heard. (Male, 27)

So, if wealthy people are on the register, and the sample from the register was random, then they were contacted but declined to participate more frequently than the lower and middle classes. This raises a theoretically pertinent question: Do wealthy Palestinians feel less inclined to agree to an interview because they are more integrated into Jordanian society and less interested in issues related to Palestinian refugees? This seems unlikely, if they deliberately chose to remain on the register as a political statement. Are they simply more busy? Or perhaps they are more reluctant to meddle in political issues, since they have more (economically) to lose? It is impossible to answer these questions, but I attempted to correct for the selection bias by using other means, as mentioned above, to find wealthy interviewees as well as naaizihiin.

There is no comparable register of Iraqi refugees in Jordan. Whereas Palestinians are likely to remain registered with UNRWA even if they do not utilize its social services, the register maintained by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) lists only about 30,000 Iraqis who have sought their assistance with living expenses and/or resettlement. Therefore, I was forced to locate Iraqi interviewees primarily through networking and the snowball technique (88%), but also other venues such as social media.

The total sample size is shown in Table 1. Within each refugee household there

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100 It is possible that a parent registered a child when s/he was young, but when the child grows up s/he feels detached from Palestinian issues or identity.
was sometimes more than one person actively participating, so the number of households and total participants are shown separately.\footnote{Not included in Table 1 are one Palestinian interview which was discarded because of strong evidence that the family was not actually Palestinian, and one Iraqi interview which was discarded because the family did not meet the definition of refugee used in this project.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Palestinians</th>
<th>Iraqis</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugee households</td>
<td>96*</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual participants</td>
<td>134*</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes two Palestinian scholars (experts)

Table 1. Sample size (n) for refugee and expert interviews in Jordan

The experts included employees of UNRWA, UNHCR and NGOs, clergy, media, the Jordanian government and foreign diplomats.

Response rate

From the sample drawn randomly from the UNRWA register, I attempted to contact 371 households using their associated phone numbers. Of these, I could not reach 144. Out of the 227 whom I was able to contact, 87 (38%) refused to be interviewed, and 27 (12%) gave a socially gentle refusal such as neglecting to call back or asking me to call again another time. Another 20 (9%) made an appointment to be interviewed, but either cancelled, did not answer their phone on the day of the interview, or did not come to the agreed meeting place. I declined to interview another 18 (8%) because of their location far from Amman or another characteristic which disqualified them from the sample. I successfully interviewed 75 households (33%) from the UNRWA sample.

Because it is impossible to ask demographic questions of people who refuse to be interviewed, it is unclear whether there is any non-random variable(s) associated with unsuccessful attempts to interview households from the list. The limited information...
included in the list itself did not suggest any such pattern. Of the 87 who clearly refused to be interviewed, 34 (39%) indicated that it was due to lack of time, while 10 (11%) implied that it was due to an identity issue. For example, some denied that they are refugees or even Palestinian; others acknowledged that they are refugees but also Jordanian (i.e., loyal and integrated to Jordan). Two (2%) refused because they “don’t know much about the subject”. Three (3%) refused because no monetary compensation was available, and the remaining 42 (44%) either gave an excuse (e.g., “I’m traveling now”, or “My job doesn’t allow me to do interviews without permission”) or refused without a reason (e.g., “I’m not interested”, “I can’t”, or “It’s difficult”).

Out of these refusals, only the 10 who gave an excuse related to identity suggest a reason to suspect selection bias: Those who are completely integrated into Jordanian society and detached from a Palestinian identity, or so afraid of the mukhabarat (domestic intelligence forces) that they pretend to be so, were more likely to refuse an interview. Of course, it is likely that the number who actually refused for these reasons is higher; i.e., that a portion of the other types of refusals, even the culturally gentle ones, were in fact for the same reason of identity and/or fear. What does this mean for the generalizability of results? It suggests that they may reflect the opinions only of those who still maintain a Palestinian identity and have not wholly assimilated into the host state, and also are not excessively afraid of the mukhabarat.

The Iraqi interviewees were sampled almost exclusively through networking and the snowball technique rather than a sampling frame, so it is not possible to calculate a response rate.

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102 One woman insisted, “We are Jordanian, there is nothing to ask, we are satisfied with everything.” Another said, “I won’t be useful because I was born here. I have a Jordanian passport. I don’t know anything.”
Camp/non-camp residence

- Among Palestinians, I interviewed 33 refugee households (34%) across seven of the thirteen refugee camps in the country. Another 13 households (14%) were located outside camps but their members’ lives are centered in, or attached to, a camp. Finally, 49 households (51%) were neither in a camp nor camp-centered. I deliberately over-sampled from refugee camps (only 18% of registered refugees in Jordan live in camps, but camp residents constitute 34% of my sample) due to the strong emphasis in the literature on the relevance of refugee camps to factors leading to militarization, and the more militant views held by its members (Malkki 1995).

When summarizing results for the entire sample of Palestinians in the following chapters, I will weight the percentages by camp/non-camp residence.

- There are no refugee camps for Iraqis.

Urban/rural residence

- There are no data available on the percentage of Palestinians in Jordan who live in urban or rural settings, but it is generally acknowledged that Palestinians are more clustered in urban and suburban areas, while East Banker (non-Palestinian)

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103 For example, they recently moved out of the camp, live near it, work in it, visit it frequently, and/or their family and friends live there. As an elderly Palestinian refugee stated, “I live on the outskirts of the camp now, but I imagine myself still in the camp. I shall never forget my camp years. In fact, look, this is my signature: mukhayam al-Hussein [‘Hussein Camp’]. I can never forget.” (Abu Ma’an, in Matar 2011, p. 69) A report by the Al-Quds Center noted that “a growing number of refugees have moved out of camps… [but] generally remain attached to the camps’ community.” (2009, p. 8)

104 The largest contingent of camp and camp-centered households came from Wihdat Camp in Amman (19 / 41%); followed by Husn Camp, 80 kilometers (50 miles) north of Amman (7 / 15%); Jerash Camp (5 / 11%); Baqa’a (4 / 9%); Talbiyah (3 / 7%); Irbid (2 / 4%); Hussein (2 / 4%); Prince Hasan (2 / 4%); Zarqa (1 / 2%) and Madaba (1 / 2%). The households in Irbid, Zarqa and Madaba were camp-centered. This sampling distribution over-represents Wihdat Camp, but the specific camp is not as theoretically important as the camp/non-camp distinction, and therefore I will not weight statistics to reflect the actual camp populations when reporting results in the following chapters.
Jordanians are more frequently rural. In my Palestinian sample, 52 (54%) of interviewed households were in urban areas, 35 (36%) in suburban areas, and 7 (7%) in rural areas. There is no reason to believe that this distribution differs significantly from the wider Palestinian population in Jordan.

- Iraqis in Jordan are known to be almost entirely urban and suburban, and this was reflected in my sample: 38 (79%) of households were urban, 8 (17%) were suburban, and only 2 (4%) were rural.

**Demographics**

The complete demographic variables are reported in Appendix I for the single participant who dominated the conversation (talked most) in each refugee interview – who was usually, but not always, the head of household – as well as all participants within each refugee group (including the dominant speakers). A person was coded as a “participant” if they volunteered substantive additional information during the interview, or an alternate opinion, rather than simply echoing the elder’s response as is the local custom. I will summarize the demographic variables here.

- **SEX**: Palestinian males interviewees outnumbered females, 2:1. Iraqi males also outnumbered females but not as drastically, 6:5. Even when an interview had been arranged with a female, her husband or father, if available, was often the one who answered the questions. I allowed each household to decide for themselves who would be interviewed. However, I was able to increase female participation, and

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105 These figures do not add up to the total number of Palestinian households interviewed (96) because two Palestinian scholars were interviewed in public locations using the question set for experts, which did not include all the demographic questions, such as place of residence.
conduct interviews even when a female was alone in her house\textsuperscript{106}, by using a female interpreter.

- **AGE**: The mean age for both Palestinians and Iraqis was similar (Palestinians, 39; Iraqis, 42).

- **MARITAL STATUS**: Palestinian interviewees were more likely to be married (76%, including those with two or more wives) than Iraqis (58%), while Iraqis in the sample were more likely to be separated or divorced (17%) than Palestinians (2%). Also, it is possible that the “random” selection of refugees from UNRWA’s register was actually skewed toward recently updated registrations: Significantly more Palestinians (18%)\textsuperscript{107} than Iraqis (4%) had been married two years or less.

- **CHILDREN**: Among those who are married or previously married, Palestinian interviewees had a higher mean number of children (4.4) than Iraqis (3.1).

- **ARAB/KURD**: All Palestinian interviewees and 95% of Iraqis were Arab; 5% of Iraqis interviewed were Kurd. Few Iraqi Kurds fled to Jordan, but it is unknown whether this percentage was typical of the broader Iraqi refugee population in Jordan.

- **RELIGION**: Almost all (98%) of the Palestinian interviewees were Sunni Muslim, which is similar to the Palestinian population at large. Half of Iraqis were Sunni, 24% Shi’ite, 13% Christian, 5% Sabean (Mandeans), and 7% inter-faith. Again, there are no data available on the religious makeup of the broader Iraqi refugee population in Jordan, but it is generally believed that mostly Sunnis came to Jordan.

- **EDUCATION**: Iraqi refugees were generally more educated. Three-fifths of Iraqis

\textsuperscript{106} Jordan is a very conservative society, and it would be socially taboo to allow one or two males into a house when only one female (who is not their relative) is home.

\textsuperscript{107} The actual percentage may be even higher, since this number does not include households in which the register sample listed a young person’s name but I met with his/her parent instead, which was common.
had completed at least some university education, compared to only 35% of Palestinians.

- **EMPLOYMENT:** Nearly half of Palestinian interviewees were employed outside the home, but only 31% of Iraqis were. Among males, 67% of Palestinians and 38% of Iraqis were employed.

- **HOUSEHOLD INCOME:** Despite a lower rate of employment, the Iraqis have nearly double the mean monthly income (JD 1,095 / US$1,547) of Palestinians (JD 597 / US$843). I will discuss Iraqis’ multiple sources of income in Chapter 8.

- **OWN/RENT:** The right to own land and property is a politically loaded issue in Jordan. Palestinians, most of whom are citizens, are far more likely to own their residence (54%) than Iraqi refugees (11%).

- **INTERNET ACCESS:** Palestinians (38%) and Iraqis (37%) were about equally likely to say that they have access to the internet at home or elsewhere.

- **ENGLISH:** Two-thirds of Iraqis said that they speak at least some English, and slightly fewer Palestinians (58%).

- **HOUSEHOLD SIZE:** Not surprisingly, given the higher number of children, Palestinians’ mean household size was greater (5.2) than Iraqis’ (3.8).

- **HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS EMPLOYED:** A higher mean percentage of Palestinian household members were employed (29%) than in Iraqi households (20%).

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108 Property inside refugee camps holds a complicated and ambiguous status regarding ownership: “The camps were built on property either owned or leased by the government to UNRWA to build shelter units for those displaced after the wars of 1948 and 1967. Over time residents have come to regard the units as their property, adding floors, renting, or even selling. Both the government and UNRWA turn a blind eye to such practices, although it is known that the original residents do not own these properties.” (Al-Quds Center 2009, p. 29)
• CITY/AREA OF ORIGIN\textsuperscript{109}: The families of most Palestinian interviewees came from the environs of Ramle (16\%), Jaffa (15\%), Jerusalem (14\%), Beer Seba (9\%), Tulkarm (8\%), Khalil (7\%), Lydda (7\%), and Haifa (6\%), among other places. Slightly over one-third of the Palestinian interviewees reported that their family were second-time (double) refugees, i.e., they fled to the West Bank or Gaza in 1948, then again to Jordan in 1967. The vast majority of Iraqi refugees came from Baghdad (76\%), and a few from Mosul (7\%), among other places.

• IRAQIS’ YEAR OF DEPARTURE: The majority of Iraqis interviewed arrived in 2005 or later (61\%); only 17\% left Iraq in 2003 or 2004. I also interviewed 12 Iraqis (22\%) who had left Iraq between 1992-2002, for comparison purposes. Because of their very different circumstances – fleeing individual persecution or economic hardship, rather than war – those who left Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s rule are not included in the statistics on Iraqis cited in Chapter 8.

• JOB IN CoO: Nearly two-thirds of Palestinians reported that their ancestors in Palestine were farmers (\textit{felaheen}) pre-1948. Of the remainder, 10\% were shepherds (\textit{bedouin}), and others were merchants, professionals or manual laborers. Among Iraqis, by contrast, nearly half held professional jobs in Iraq, 20\% were merchants, and only 6\% were farmers.

• RESIDENCY STATUS: Ninety percent of Palestinian interviewees held Jordanian citizenship, and 10\% were Gazans, a special category of residence reserved for Palestinians who fled from Gaza to Jordan, usually as second-time refugees, in 1967.

\textsuperscript{109} “City/area of origin” refers to a Palestinian family’s origin pre-1948 (or pre-1967, for naazihin). Unless there is a common English name for a city, such as Jerusalem, I am using here the Arabic names of the cities as they were used by the interviewees, such as Beer Seba.
There are almost 140,000 Gazans in Jordan (UNRWA 2011), constituting 7% of the registered refugee population, and 4-5% of the entire Palestinian population in Jordan. Gazans were slightly oversampled because of their unique circumstances, in which they enjoy distinctly less rights than non-Gazans, and are less integrated into the Jordanian economy, society and polity. In all other relevant ways – their family histories and experiences in the CoO, host state variables – they are identical to non-Gazan Palestinians, which makes a comparison between the two groups a rare natural field experiment, as I will discuss in Chapter 6. Among Iraqis, nearly one-third had no legal residency status, 30% held refugee status, 19% had residency (iqama) through an investor visa\textsuperscript{110}, 9% had iqama on different grounds\textsuperscript{111}, and 6% held a three-month visitor visa.

Verbal reports

Verbal reports of all varieties are subject to particular shortcomings, including interviewee bias, faulty recall and the desire to give socially acceptable answers. (Yin 2009; Devine 1995) Therefore, whenever possible, the case studies in the following chapters do not rely solely on interview and focus group data, but triangulate evidence with data from secondary literature as well. I will discuss memory and intergenerational transmission of family narratives further in Chapter 5 (see “A note of caution”).

Reactivity

The presence of the researcher him/herself can also affect the interview in a way that good quantitative data collection, such as a survey, is designed to prevent. In qualitative research such as semi-structured interviews reactivity is inherent to the

\textsuperscript{110} The investor visa is a one-year renewable residence permit, including the right to work, upon investment of a large sum in a Jordanian bank.
\textsuperscript{111} Usually through marriage to a Jordanian citizen.
method, and therefore it is better to acknowledge and discuss its impact rather than attempt to minimize it. (Devine 1995; Jacobsen & Landau 2003) In this project interviewees were affected by the presence of an American male graduate student in his early 30s and one of two Palestinian-Jordanian interpreters, male or female, who was a college student in his/her early 20s.

The researcher

The presence of an American may have led some interviewees to attempt to shape their responses in a way that they would like an American, or western, audience to hear, such as expressing anger at US support for Israel; on the other hand, most interviewees actually seemed to deliberately avoid offering negative opinions about the US out of respect for their interlocutor, which is another result of reactivity. In fact, Palestinians in particular were likely to express gratitude to me as an American who came to Jordan in order to hear the Palestinian perspective. Respect for me as an American was prevalent among Iraqi interviewees as well, who, given the circumstances, expressed surprisingly little anger at the US. Most of those who did express blame or resentment prefaced it with a request to me not to take offense.

Being interviewed by relatively young people may have made interviewees more willing to talk, as they felt less intimidated or restricted than they would have in the presence of an elder, given social norms in Jordan and Iraq. On the other hand, mukhabarat field agents are usually males in their 20s-40s, so my age and gender may have added to suspicion that I am an undercover agent (see section on trust, below).

The interpreter

Although I conducted training and practice interviews for the two interpreters to
improve the reliability and neutrality of both their verbal and non-verbal communication during interviews, both are themselves part of the Palestinian refugee community in Jordan, which invariably affected the interviewees. (cf. Jacobsen & Landau 2003) For example, it may have caused some Palestinian interviewees to modify their responses to match the dominant narrative of the Palestinian cause which is socially acceptable within Palestinian milieux. Sometimes interviewees addressed the interpreter directly to ask about his/her family background, neighborhood or opinions; sometimes they made a statement and asked him/her not to share it with me. In general, the fact that the interpreters are themselves Palestinian seemed to help put most Palestinian interviewees at ease. The interpreters come from educated middle and upper-middle class backgrounds, however, so occasionally geographic/class differences were assumed by interviewees with lower socioeconomic status, particularly in camps. It is possible that this led some to emphasize their interwoven Palestinian camp identities and criticize wealthy urbanite Palestinians as having less Palestinian refugee identity.\footnote{Both interpreters expressed to me privately, after leaving such interviews, that they resent and reject such assumptions and insinuations by camp residents.}

The Palestinian female interpreter was used for the Iraqi interviews, on the advice of prior researchers who suggested that there is such little trust between Iraqi refugees that they would be more comfortable and speak more openly with a non-Iraqi interpreter present than an Iraqi one. The fact that the interpreter was visibly Muslim, however, and Palestinian (and therefore Sunni), may have caused Christian, Sabean and Shi’ite interviewees to be reluctant to express any negative opinion about Muslims or Sunnis.

The interpreters were also personally affected by their experiences of participating in many interviews with Palestinian and Iraqi refugees from a wide variety of
backgrounds and circumstances. Each interpreter told me on his/her own initiative the lessons they had learned about their own community, and the ways in which they had grown as a result of this work.\textsuperscript{113}

**Trust**

In any situation it is a challenge to quickly gain the trust of a stranger. This is even more true in refugee situations, where “pervasive distrust… hangs like cloud over all relationships.” (Harrell-Bond 1986, p. 378, emphasis in original; cf. Omidian 1994, El-Abed 2009, Jacobsen & Landau 2003) When the refugees reside in a host state where there is widespread fear of the domestic intelligence services and few guarantees of personal liberty, and where the community is rife with conspiracy theories large and small, it can seem like a nearly impossible task to convince a refugee to talk openly with a stranger about politically sensitive topics. There was an initial assumption among some Palestinian interviewees that I was an undercover agent for the CIA, Jordanian mukhabarat, or another intelligence agency.\textsuperscript{114} Likewise, an unknown number of Iraqi refugees assumed that I was an undercover agent of UNHCR or the American Embassy sent to assess their living conditions and/or suitability for resettlement. Overcoming issues of trust and authenticity is an advantage which ethnographic research has over efforts like those in this project to obtain a representative and mostly random (for the Palestinians) sample. Nonetheless, the majority of refugees who agreed to be interviewed

\textsuperscript{113} Mestheneos (2006) and Harrell-Bond (1986) reported similar effects on refugees conducting interviews of other refugees.

\textsuperscript{114} Compare the work of Harrell-Bond, whose study of Ugandan refugees in the Sudan led her to write that some refugees believed “that I was a ‘spy’ either for the British, Obote, or both!” (1986, p. 378)
exhibited at least a medium degree of trust.\textsuperscript{115}

I took steps to increase the comfort level of my interviewees and allay their fears and suspicions. First, I used a Palestinian interpreter for both the Palestinian and Iraqi interviews (see discussion of reactivity, above), which lent credibility to my presence. Second, I built a strong relationship, rapport and open communication with each interpreter, such that our mutual trust would set a positive example by a fellow Palestinian/Arab during the interview. Third, I gave a truthful introduction of myself and a very broad summary of my research, explaining that there is a stereotype of refugees as passive and helpless, and that I believe refugees have opinions and voices which need to be heard; but, like other field research on refugee militarization (for example, Gerdes 2006), I did not directly refer to militancy or militarization, nor did the informed consent form which I used.\textsuperscript{116} (The informed consent form had been translated into Arabic and back-translated into English to test for linguistic equivalency. In the few cases where the interviewee was illiterate, the interpreter offered to read it aloud.) Fourth, at the beginning of the interview I asked many questions about their family history and life in the CoO, some of which were not directly relevant to my research, to demonstrate understanding of their family’s plight and “warm up” the interviewee. Finally, I asked sensitive questions in a sympathetic and culturally appropriate circuitous way, allowing them to avoid the question if they so chose. For example, rather than asking, “Do you support militarization by Palestinian refugees against Israel?”, I asked related questions, such as, “What do you believe is the best way for the Palestinian people to achieve the

\textsuperscript{115} There was probably a selection bias, as those with the lowest levels of trust refused to be interviewed.

\textsuperscript{116} Likewise, Harrell-Bond (1986), in her research on refugees, introduced her research topic very broadly without explaining that she was studying the impact of aid on refugee settlements.
rights that they lost by being forced to leave their homeland?”, and “Who do you believe will best help the Palestinians achieve those rights?”

I did not attempt to explain or justify the policy of any government unless I was specifically asked to do so. When asked what was the benefit to the refugees for participating in my interview, I explained that, while there is no direct economic benefit, I hope that the research will benefit the community as a whole by sharing their voices and showing the diversity of their opinions.

When coding the interviews, I included a measure of the interviewee’s level of trust, based on their responses and my subjective impression. The interviews included questions on some of the most politically sensitive issues, such as a Palestinian family’s involvement in the 1970 War between fedayeen (Palestinian guerrillas) and the Jordanian military, a taboo topic, to assess their degree of trust. Sensitive issues which I did not directly raise, but which helped me measure their level of trust if the interviewee raised or avoided it, included discrimination, Gazans’ rights, lack of legal status and illegal employment (for Iraqis), attempts at militarization, and the weekly Arab Spring protests in Jordan.

I coded each participant as having low, medium or high trust, as summarized in Table 2, below. Only 20 Palestinian interviewees (16%) and 3 Iraqis (5%) exhibited low levels of trust, while the overwhelming majority (84% of Palestinians; 94% of Iraqis) exhibited medium or high levels of trust.

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117 One question that was very puzzling to many interviewees, and which I was asked repeatedly, was why the US supports Israel so much.
### Table 2. Degree of trust exhibited by interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PALESTINIANS</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>20 (16%)</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>70 (55%)</td>
<td>37 (67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>37 (29%)</td>
<td>15 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>127 (100%)</td>
<td>55 (100%)</td>
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<td>Data missing</td>
<td>7 (5%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
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Table 2. Degree of trust exhibited by interviewees
CHAPTER 5: Palestinians in Jordan, 1948 to 1963

This chapter will apply the framework developed in Chapter 3 to the first of three periods of the Palestinians’ stay in Jordan, from 1948 to 1963. The following chapters will apply it to the periods 1964-1970 and 1971-2011. During only one of these periods, 1964-1970, was there substantial militarization among the Palestinian refugee community. During the first and third periods there was almost no militarization, although for different reasons. In each chapter I will apply the proposed framework of refugee militarization to explain the outcome which occurred.

An extensive literature exists on the history of the Israeli-Arab conflict, including the Palestinian refugee issue, and that history will not be repeated here except in brief summary. Jewish and Arab populations had coexisted in Palestine under the Ottoman Empire, which ended after World War I. In the late 19th century a new political movement, Zionism, began among European Jews calling for the “restoration” of Jews to Palestine. According to the dominant Zionist discourse, the existing population in the territory was neither to be expelled nor treated as equals, but rather were not considered at all; a popular motto of the movement was “A land without a people for a people without a land”. (Matar 2011) Around the same time, Arab nationalism was on the rise, as a function of a spreading global norm of self-determination and the gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire¹¹⁸, but a more specific Palestinian Arab nationalism was also developing in response to the perceived growing threat of Zionism. (Brand 1988) In the interwar period Palestinian national political organizations began to cohere, holding the

¹¹⁸ Brand (1988) pinpoints the beginning of Arab nationalism as a response to the Turkification project of the Young Turks after 1909.
first All-Palestine Congress in 1919 (Hassassian 1990), although Palestinian nationalism was still intertwined at that time with growing pan-Arab nationalism and pan-Islamism (Khalidi 1997, ch. 7). The first official organization claiming to represent the Palestinian nation, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), did not emerge until nearly a half-century later.

In the 1920s and 1930s there were violent uprisings by Palestinian Arabs against Jews, further reifying the narrative of a native “us” in opposition to a foreign “them”. The two nationalist movements clashed in Palestine due to a complex interplay of factors, including: waves of Jewish immigration and increasing purchases of land by Jews, which local Palestinian leaders saw as a threat; intra-Palestinian contests for leadership; increasing consensus among Zionist leaders on the need to gain an independent state, especially during and after the Holocaust; and the actions of the British, which had a mandate for Palestine from the League of Nations post-World War I, including its conflicting promises to each side (Sicker 1989). The Arab revolt in Palestine of 1936-39 targeting two foreign enemies, the British and the Jews, was a turning point for Palestinian/Arab nationalism. (Abu-Odeh 1999) Seeing the futility of further administering the territory, and facing increasing pressure at home to withdraw, Britain returned the mandate for Palestine to the newly constituted United Nations. In 1947 the UN put forward a plan to partition the territory into two states, one for the Jews and one for the Palestinian Arabs.

The Zionist leadership accepted the UN plan but the Arab states and the Palestinian Higher Arab Committee, against the wishes of moderate Palestinians and King Abdullah I, rejected it. (Abu-Odeh 1999) They declared war against the Jews, who
declared independence as the State of Israel in May 1948. The precise mechanisms by which the war led to the Palestinian exile are contested, but centrist historians, making use of newly released documents from that era, are beginning to converge on a narrative in which there were some local expulsions by Israeli military commanders, some Palestinians fled due to general fear, and some left following calls by Arab leaders for the Arab population to take a temporary absence from their homes in order for the Arab militaries to more easily crush the enemy. My interviews reflected these multiple causes:

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We heard the news that there are Arab armies, and of course we have to evacuate the houses… Some well-known people said that Arab armies are coming for three months. After three months they will kick the Jews out. And the cannon does not distinguish between Arabs and Jews…. There were fights, Jews were attacking villages and killing people. Because of that we left…. Some people on the shore wanted all the Arabs on the shore to leave, so all the [Arab armies] could attack and make the Jews from outside leave because they were attacking Palestinian people…. They were killing people at night…. They were saying that the Haganah (Jewish militant group) came and didn’t distinguish between anyone. They killed women, children, they didn’t care. This is what made them leave…. (Male, 72)
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The new Israelis won the war, and the refugees were stranded in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan\(^ {119}\), waiting expectantly for the Arab militaries to bring them home in victory.

I will demonstrate in the following sections that the Palestinian refugees in Jordan during this period maintained a collective project to redeem their homeland as a result of the war of exclusion they had experienced and their economic attachments to land in the CoO. However, despite the presence of a permissive political opportunity structure, this project did not result in militarization due to their high degree of socioeconomic integration to Jordan (wealthy, urban Palestinians) and their expectation that powerful

\(^ {119}\) By June 30, 1950, the newly displaced Palestinians registered with UNRWA in Transjordan (the combined West and East Banks) numbered 506,200; Lebanon 127,600; Syria 82,194; and the Gaza Strip 198,227. (UNRWA 2009) This brought the total Palestinian population under Jordanian control, including non-refugees living in the West Bank, to 800,000-900,000, double that of East Bank Jordanians. (Abu-Odeh 1999; Alon 2007)
regional actors would redeem the homeland on their behalf.

**A note of caution**

As discussed in Chapter 2, memories and narratives, especially when they are passed down orally from generation to generation, are notoriously subject to embellishment, re-interpretation, and fabrication to fill in the missing pieces. Historians are careful to record the word of original participants as a memory of an event rather than an actual event when collecting oral testimony years later; they are even more wary when recording testimony second- or third-hand. In the case of Palestinians relating their ancestors’ experiences in 1948 and 1967, it is very likely that their knowledge of those events has been influenced not only by the changes, omissions and embellishments inherent in transmission of any oral history across the generations, but also by the public narrative of the Palestinians’ exodus, including songs, poetry, media portrayals and reenactments. (Matar 2011; Chatty 2010) As Randa Farah writes in her study of Palestinians in Jordan:

> Palestinians learned their histories and trajectories at home, in [neighborhoods], at school (through Palestinian teachers who believed it their duty to teach them their history and beyond what the curricula required), in political organisations and social and cultural centres. As adults narrated, children listened, imbibing the stories and reminiscences of their elders, drawing images of villages, lands, or agricultural cycles, imagining heroes and victims and in turn reproducing these images in their own creative ways. (2005, p. 95)

Relatively few original 1948 refugees are still alive today, so younger Palestinians have only heard stories second-hand.\(^{120}\) Several interviewees referred me to a popular television dramatization of the *nakba* (lit. “catastrophe”, the Arabic term for the 1948 War), especially when they seemed embarrassed to admit their own limited knowledge of

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\(^{120}\) See Farah (2005) for a discussion of the inter-generational gap regarding the Palestinian national project among Palestinians in Jordan.
their family’s experiences in these seminal events. Does that mean that testimony of later
generations of refugees is worthless? Not at all. It is as important to know what later
generations believe occurred – which is the basis for the collective project and the
rhetoric used to mobilize refugees – as the actual historical record. However, as stated in
the previous chapter, I will also draw on the secondary literature of the Arab-Israeli
conflict to triangulate data.

**Collective project**

**WAR OF EXCLUSION WITH A CLEAR ENEMY**

Regardless of whether historians expose evidence of a coherent plan for ethnic
cleansing by the Jews/Israelis in 1947-49, the Palestinians perceived that the war which
led to the their exodus was a war of exclusion, and they had a clear enemy: “Thinking of
it now, they must have planned it for a while, because they wanted to make the area
predominantly Jewish.” (Khalil Jindawi, in Matar 2011, p. 71) It was a domestic conflict
in which the two sides were identified and fought according to their ethnicity, Jewish or
Arab, and the war was fought for territorial control along those ethnic lines. There were
few reliable sources of information available to Palestinian civilians during the war, and
most civilians relied on word-of-mouth in their decision-making process:

> They did not have a good education at that time, and there were no media, not like we
> have nowadays. Now if anything happens around the world we can see it immediately.
> Then it was just [word of mouth].... (Male, 42)

The reasons for departure were coded as “direct threat” if they (the interviewee or his/her
ancestors), their home or their village were attacked, for example:

> They came and killed people in the village in 1948 and people left. My father and
> grandfather said the [Jewish] gangs came to the village and killed everybody. (Male, 57)

> They were there and they were hit by missiles from planes, so that’s why they ran away.
> (Male, 32)
A Jew came and wanted to survey our land and he kicked my father and grandfather and said, “This is my land.” My father and grandfather said, “No, this is our land, it belongs to our ancestors.” [Was the Jew/Israeli armed?] No, he came without a weapon. After one week the Israeli soldiers attacked the camels belonging to my family and relatives. They killed 100 camels. This was their source of income. So that’s why they left Beer Seba and went to Gaza.\(^{121}\) (Male, 53)

Word of the massacre of Palestinians by Jewish militants in the village of Deir Yassin near Jerusalem, and other attacks against civilians, spread quickly. (Glubb 1954)

They were taken as a warning to Palestinian villagers to depart or risk becoming the next victims. The reason for departure was coded as “indirect threat” if they left upon hearing of attacks on people or nearby villages like their own, but did not personally experience an attack by enemy soldiers:

From what I heard from my fathers, there were massacres, Deir Yassin was the reason. Killing people inside their houses. And shooting people inside their rooms. (Male, 47)

The Jewish gangs, they let some people from a massacred village live, in order to announce to others… (Male, 26)

They were looking at the neighboring village. The Israeli Stern Gang came to that village and killed women, old people, and this made them afraid. All the people, when they see the neighbors killed, the women and old people and children, they moved to the [east] side of the Green Line, four kilometers from our land, stayed there for a few months to wait and see if they can return back to their home or not. (Male, 42)

The vast majority of Palestinian households\(^ {122}\) (83\%) who fled in 1948 reported that they left due to direct and/or indirect threats. The fact that so many of the refugee households perceived a threat to their personal safety from the Jewish/Israeli soldiers is evidence that the conflict, in their perception, was a war of exclusion with a clear enemy.

The widespread sense of injustice and catastrophe (al-nakbah) of the Palestinian exile, and the consequent shared experiences and refugee identity, helped to catalyze the

\(^{121}\) Glubb (1954) reported that evictions of Arab tribes from the Beer Seba area were conducted in the two years after the end of the 1948 War, not through direct military attacks but through harassment and imposition of economic hardship.

\(^{122}\) When I calculate a proportion of “households”, I am referring to the interviewees who dominated the conversation. When I refer to a proportion of “interviewees”, I am calculating from the entire sample of Palestinians.
development of Palestinian identity, and later Palestinian nationalism, in Jordan.

ETHNATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Palestinian nationalism was still in its formative stages at the time of the 1948 War and throughout the 1950s. In contrast to the Jordanians, elite Palestinians had more experience in oppositional politics as a result of their experiences with the British and Zionists/Israelis. They were “more urban, more educated, more experienced in political participation, and more exposed to the mass media….”\(^{123}\) (Bacik 2008, p. 147; see also Brand 1988; Aruri 1972) But the Palestinian national identity was more established among the urban elites than the general refugee population.\(^{124}\) The non-elite masses were still mostly incohesive as a nation; in Palestine pre-1948, identities had mostly been local rather than national (Pederson 1997), and Palestinian leadership had been divided between two prominent families, the Nashashibi in Nablus and the Husseini in Jerusalem (Haddad 2001). Furthermore, “because of Palestine’s recent dismemberment and the resulting scattering and degradation of its people, some Palestinians felt ashamed of their identity… [and] found it easier or more natural to identify themselves as Jordanians.”\(^{125}\) (Brand 1988, p. 165)

During this period, overt efforts were made to “develop further and extend the sense of loyalty based on identity by mobilizing more members of the various communities and by asserting exclusivity of allegiance through expanding existing popular organizations,” similar to the process of nation-building going on in many Arab states at that time – but without the advantage of an independent territory or indeed even

\(^{123}\) As such, they constituted a challenge to the incomplete nation-building project ongoing at that time in Jordan, including concepts of citizenship and national identity formation. (Bacik 2008)

\(^{124}\) Jordanian scholar, personal interview, 8/19/10

\(^{125}\) This was also suggested by Palestinian scholar Riad al Khouri. (Personal interview, 4/27/11)
a single territory within which to operate (Brand 1988, p. 4); and furthermore forced to compete on the international stage with another successful nationalist project, Zionism, for the claim of indigenousness to a piece of territory. Palestinian nationalism was therefore buffeted by the idiosyncrasies and developments not only within each host state, but of wider regional events and interactions involving their respective host states. (Brand 1988)

All over the Arab world, state nationalisms (al-wataniyya) were in competition with Arab nationalist (al-qawmiyya) and pan-Islamic movements which had been developing since the nineteenth and earlier in the twentieth centuries. This was the case among Palestinians as well, and most Palestinians in the late 1940s and 1950s had less loyalty to a Palestinian nation than an Arab nation. (Brand 1988; Alon 2007; see also Matar 2011, p. 37) In fact, there were no political parties based on Palestinian nationalism anywhere in the region. This was reinforced by the pan-Arab movement, particularly under the leadership of Gamal Abd al-Nasser, who took control of Egypt in a 1952 coup, and whose powerful radio-transmitted oratory inspired millions across the Arab world. Especially after his “victory” in the 1956 Suez Crisis against Britain, France and Israel, Nasser’s speeches resonated with the Palestinian refugees, whose cause he championed and for whom he demanded redemption. (Abu-Odeh 1999) As a result, the pan-Arab movement, which was ideologically opposed to state nationalist movements – including Palestinian nationalism – was strongly supported by most Palestinians.

In addition, the Hashemite monarchy was viewed during this period as the protector of the West Bank and a buffer against Israeli aggression, even though the

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126 By contrast, in most colonial states, such as those in Africa, the label “indigenous” or “native” was clearly assigned by the former colonizing power and endured following independence. (Mamdani 2001)
Palestinians widely blamed Jordan for losing Lydda and Ramleh during the war. The official discourse of the state, even including the language of the Unity Resolution which merged the East and West Banks under the Hashemite monarchy, was perceived as continuing to seek redemption of the Palestinian homeland; and since the Palestinians in Jordan – unlike those in Gaza – already had citizenship in a state, they had less incentive to challenge it by pursuing an alternative nation. (Abu-Odeh 1999)

While there was, as I will describe shortly, strong attachment to the land among the Palestinian refugees, this did not equate to an extant ethnonationalist movement. Rather, it was the foundation on which a strong Palestinian ethnonationalist movement could take root. In fact, it would likely have emerged earlier if not for the competing “isms” which drew Palestinians’ national attachments to supranational identities. Palestinian nationalism started to gain prominence among the general refugee population with the decline of pan-Arabism, which received its first major setback when the flagship United Arab Republic, the merging of Egypt and Syria, disintegrated in 1961.

Attachment to a Palestinian identity grew gradually over the course of the 1950s. Although referring to his experiences in Lebanon, a famous quote from author Fawaz Turki gives an indication of the formation of nationalism-in-exile which was occurring throughout the region:

If I was not a Palestinian when I left Haifa as a child, I am one now. Living in Beirut as a stateless person for most of my growing up years, many of them in a refugee camp, I did not feel I was living among my ‘Arab brothers’. I did not feel I was an Arab…. I was a Palestinian. And that meant I was an outsider, an alien, a refugee, burden. To be that, for us, for my generation, meant to look inward, to draw closer, to be part of a minority that has its own way of doing and seeing and feeling and reacting. (Turki 1972 [in Schulz 2003, p. 113])

**AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC BASE**

As is common in refugee situations, the classes of Palestinians migrated at
different times: First came the wealthy, those with the most economic and migration options at their disposal, from November 1947 to March 1948; next came the educated, but not necessarily wealthy, urbanites, from March to May 1948; and finally the peasants, the vast majority of the refugees, who were dependent on the land regardless of whether they owned it or not.\textsuperscript{127}

Most Palestinian households’ ancestors (62\%) were \textit{felaheen}\textsuperscript{128}, small farmers, in Palestine prior to 1948. Jordan is mostly desert, and in 1948 most East Bank Jordanians were nomadic and semi-nomadic. The area of arable land in the East Bank was far exceeded by the number of immigrant felaheen (Aruri 1972), some of whom had owned hundreds or even thousands of dunams of land in Palestine. Therefore, when the Palestinians came to the East Bank, there were few opportunities to engage in farming; and due to the imminent expectation of return, few refugees were interested in buying land anyway. For most refugees in the early years, therefore, there was a significant economic dislocation from an agriculture-based economy in their CoO to what would eventually become a manufacturing, construction and mercantile-based economy in their host. In addition, whereas a traditional agricultural lifestyle did not require much formal education, the new economy would. This wholesale change was a difficult adjustment for many Palestinian families:

Palestine was better, of course, because they were living in their own lands. They had their own business, they didn’t work for anybody else. When you are working for other people, compared to what you had, it’s an insult…. It’s like an insult for them to leave their lands behind. My father was very wealthy, and when he came here to Jordan he was working in construction, housecleaning, things that take physical effort. It’s like an insult

\textsuperscript{127} Palestinian-Jordanian researcher, personal interview, 12/5/10; Former PLO legal advisor, personal interview, 12/26/10

\textsuperscript{128} This figure is consistent with those mentioned by Aruri, who says that only 34\% of Palestinians lived in cities pre-1948 (1972, p. 33), and Schiff, who writes that around two-thirds of the 1948 refugees were “villagers, farmers, and shepherds”. (1995, p. 7)
When interviewees were asked to describe their family’s life in Palestine prior to 1948, 45% of households gave answers which were vague and glorified the rustic lifestyle:

Their life was very normal and happy and peaceful, and their financial situation was very good. (Female, 22)

It’s like a paradise, there were farms, they had their own land, it’s on the shore of the Mediterranean. (Male, 65)

They were farmers, they didn’t buy anything because they had food and drink from their own lands. They had cattle, they did simple things, but their life was excellent. From what I hear from my grandfather and grandmother, the conditions were very, very good. (Male, 24)

A few interviewees (4%) gave detailed descriptions of the felaheen lifestyle:

They were living in their own lands, they woke up for dawn prayer, there was just one mosque in the village. They had lands, they were farmers, they worked in their own lands, olive trees… They planted different crops. They had camels and sheep… They milked the cows. And the coast is near their village, so they would go fishing. Children went to school, there was just one school in the village, teaching Islam. Women cooked all the fish and food and they go to have lunch in the farm, outside the house. They spent the whole day in the farm, and returned home in the evening. There was a big field in the village and they gathered in the evening. They hosted people from other villages. There was a moonless night, a black day, the Jews came and took everything, the land, even their air. (Male, 36)

Still others (29%) referred to the felaheen lifestyle as a simple life, but did not glorify it:

The life was simple at that time. They had some cows, chickens… and this supported them. (Male, 26)

We had farms, we were planting olives and vegetables there, and we had cattle and sheep. (Male, 45)

Ordinary, primitive life. My father was not educated and my mother is not educated too, and they had sheep, and they didn’t work, didn’t have much money. (Female, 47)

With a few exceptions, detailed knowledge of actual conditions in Palestine prior to 1948 appeared to be limited, and awareness of the hardships of rural life were minimized in favor of (in most cases) a romanticized ideal of the felaheen lifestyle. This romanticization did not begin with exile, though exile increased it. The life of the felaheen had begun to be transformed “into a symbolic representative of the cultural and
historical continuity of the Palestinian people” with the Arab Revolt of 1936-39, in which thousands of felaheen were mobilized against the British and Zionists. (Matar 2011, p. 22) This idealized vision of the felaheen, which is also the dominant Palestinian narrative of life pre-1948 (Farah 2005), became the basis against which the hardships of refugee life in Jordan were compared in the public discourse.

When asked what their ancestors brought with them to Jordan, almost all refugee households who fled in 1948 indicated that they had brought only minimal items, and no significant assets\(^\text{129}\):

They didn’t take anything, they left everything behind…. And even the new clothes, my grandmother took all the clothes, and the Jews were attacking us, she left the clothes in a cave with my cousin so we can go back, but we left the cave and weren’t able to go back. (Male, 65)

He lost his land and his source of living, and in that journey he lost his goats and sheep, lost everything. (Male, 42)

My mother told me that we left everything behind, clothes, jewelry…. They were like beggars when they came here. They were barefoot. (Female, 47)

In addition, the overwhelming majority (86%) of households who fled in 1948 indicated that they had abandoned their land and house, which were no longer under their family’s control:

Everything they owned they left behind. They didn’t take anything with them. The sheep, money, nothing. My father and uncle had 100 dunams [25 acres] there. They didn’t take anything. (Male, 57)

When asked what their family’s primary concerns were at the time of departure, the most common responses were family and children (35%), survival (32%) and their

\(^{129}\) One household indicated that they had brought liquid assets: “My grandmother had jewelry, so she put it in her belt, this is the only thing she took with her, but she left other things behind. And… their gold they didn’t hide in the house, they took it with them… hidden in their belts. And also her money, she had her money with her…. If it weren’t for this money and jewelry, we wouldn’t have this life [today].” (Male, 25)
land and property (41%)\textsuperscript{130}, which was often tied to their occupation as farmers:

Their houses, their lands, their work. Especially their land. They were farmers, and I’m proud that we were farmers. (Male, 27)

The land. It’s the most important thing because if their land is lost, they are lost. The situation shouldn’t be like this, because if we had stayed in our land, it would have been better. We’re not used to living in crowded places, we’re not used to this life. (Male, 37)

My family had many lands and many houses and they lost everything…. The figs and vegetables are still there, until now. The houses were torn down but the trees are still the same. (Female, 48)

They were concerned about the lands, because they loved the lands more than they loved their own sons…. Our land is as precious as our souls. (Male, 46)

The idea of the family’s land was often intertwined with the idea of the country. Both were highly valued because they of their irreplaceability:

The land itself. For example, the crops we can plant again…. Even if they tore [houses] down, we can build them again. If the cattle were killed, we can buy them again. (Male, 24)

Their land…. Because you can have more than one child, but you cannot have more than one land. Land is irreplaceable. (Male, 26)

Their lands. It’s our most valuable asset. There’s a song, if you [lose] someone you love, you can bear it; if you lose your money, you can bear it; but if you lose your country, it’s unbearable. (Male, 63)

Others went further, de-emphasizing the importance of their personal family’s land in favor of the country as a whole:

It’s not just our house, it’s all Palestine. (Female, 21)

They just wanted to return to their own country… They didn’t care about their house or land – just wanted their own country… Land was cheap – when they return, they can buy new land…. (Male, 38)

As I will show in Chapter 8, this attachment to the land represents a stark difference from the Iraqi refugees, none of whom mentioned concern over land or property as a primary concern when departing Iraq.

\textsuperscript{130} This was an open-ended question, and interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one response.
On the whole, given most Palestinian refugees’ attachment to the land, the economic dislocation imposed by moving to a country where they would need to acquire new skills and alter their economic base, and the lack of economic development in Jordan, it is not surprising that the overwhelming majority of households (83%) stated that the living conditions were better in Palestine before 1948 than after their arrival in Jordan. When asked why Palestine was better, 70% indicated that it was because they had easy access to a livelihood, farming or employment opportunities.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, in refugee situations in which the border to the CoO is open, it is not uncommon for families to send a member back periodically to check whether conditions are conducive to return. This allows them to update their assessment of the comparison of living conditions between the CoO and host. In the case of Palestinian refugees in the 1950s, the borders were closed, and communications between refugees and their relatives (if any) remaining in the CoO were limited. As a result, for most people, their memories of the CoO prior to departure were the sole basis for comparison. Over time these memories grew further and further removed from contemporaneous reality, and evolved into the romanticized rural portrayal which is the dominant Palestinian narrative today.

GREED

There were no significant rent-producing resources available in Palestine such as diamonds or oil, so this factor is not relevant.

In sum, from 1948-1963 there was a definite collective project on the part of the Palestinian refugees to redeem their homeland following their perceived expulsion by the

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131 Jalal Al Husseini, personal interview, 12/6/10
Jewish/Israeli enemy. Their attachment to the land was strongly rooted in a mostly agricultural economic base in the CoO, which became the dominant narrative of life in Palestine pre-1948.

**Socioeconomic integration and marginalization**

**RIGHTS IN THE HOST STATE**

Unlike in Lebanon and Syria, Palestinians in Jordan were quickly offered nearly equal rights with Jordanians. In 1950 King Abdullah I annexed the West Bank and, overriding the opposition of his government and the Arab League\(^{132}\), offered citizenship (codified into law in 1954) to all Palestinians living there, including the refugees who had fled to the West and East Banks during the war. He did this due to his Hashemite pan-Arab territorial aspirations for a Greater Syria and because he saw in the Palestinians potential for the economic development of his country, including the guarantee of foreign aid. (Abu-Odeh 1999) However, the government also enshrined the right of return; this contradiction created a “‘temporary-citizen’ formally endowed with citizenship rights and duties pending the day when they would be given the right to choose to return to Palestine or to stay in Jordan as permanent citizens.” (Al Husseini & Bocco 2009, p. 263; cf. Al-Quds Center 2009)

Palestinians were integrated into the government – albeit as a minority to East Bank Jordanians – and gradually into the military (Abu-Odeh 1999), and grew to dominate the private sector. Jordan was largely rural at that time, and Amman more of a town than a city; many Palestinians take pride and credit for building Amman and Jordan up to the level of development seen today:

\(^{132}\) Jalal Al Husseini, personal interview, 12/6/10; Former PLO legal advisor, personal interview, 12/26/10
Before 1948 the Jordanians themselves were going to Palestine to work, because there was nothing here in Jordan. Jordan was like a desert, but when Palestinians came… they improved Jordan a lot. (Male, 46)

There was a high level of economic integration in Jordan. However, when asked whether obtaining Jordanian citizenship changed their ancestors’ identity, only 25% of households said “yes”, while 56% said “no”. Those who said “no” explained that their ancestors accepted the citizenship for its functional use rather than as an identity:

No [it didn't change], no, the opposite, we just use it as something practical, as a tool. (Male, 40)

We felt that we are Palestinians having the Jordanian citizenship. Like we have rights, and freedom, like if we want to travel or get educated, it's helpful to have the citizenship. (Male, 60)

When we obtained the Jordanian citizenship we were more relaxed because we can work and have jobs…. We took the Jordanian passports and identities and settled officially in Jordan, but we will never forget Palestine, it’s our origin. (Male, 65)

Those who answered “yes” usually reported that it caused their ancestors to feel more Jordanian:

Yes, a lot. At the beginning they were in Palestine, then they left for the Jordanian Kingdom, so their life has been changed. They had Palestinian citizenship, but now they have the Jordanian citizenship and ID. They were Palestinian, now they are Jordanian. (Female, 65)

Of course…. Taking Jordanian citizenship… they were able to get rights here in Jordan… People lost the feeling that they are Palestinian because they have this…. (Female, 22)

One interviewee reported that the Jordanian citizenship increased, not decreased, her

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133 Al Abed concludes that Palestinians’ economic integration was achieved through three factors: First, “the legal and citizenship status that Jordan had privileged the Palestinians without which they could have not been able to secure a 'stable' living condition. Secondly, the type of education that they have chosen which enabled them to jump over the limitations that the system, the traditions or the market have created. Thirdly, the type of work concentrating on dynamism and capability to compete with the new entering forces to the market.” (1999, p. 43)

134 The remaining 19% said they don’t know, refused to answer or gave an irrelevant answer.

135 This may be a post-1970 revision of post-1948 history. See Haddad (2001, p. 156).
family’s attachment to Palestine:

They felt more Palestinian… because they were far away from Palestine, and they were afraid that this would make them forget Palestine, so they did the opposite and attached themselves more to Palestine. (Female, 23)

Some reported that gaining the citizenship led to a dual identity, a dichotomy between their external/public identity as Jordanian and their internal/private identity as Palestinian:

Internally, no. But outside they felt Jordanian. They agreed that they are Jordanian now, but inside their hearts they were Palestinian. (Male, 29)

As with building a house and buying land, however (which I will discuss shortly), accepting Jordanian citizenship was a politically loaded act in the 1950s. There was an undercurrent of fear that it would undermine their claim to return to Palestine, which led to opposition among Palestinians:

It was very easy for them to get the Jordanian citizenship. But some people didn’t want [it]. They were very stubborn because they thought… I don’t know for how many years after the nakba, but they didn’t want the Jordanian citizenship. (Male, 24)

As of 1987, there were still some 250,000 refugees living in camps who refused Jordanian citizenship. (Samha 1987) For most Palestinians, however, acquisition of citizenship and rights in their host state facilitated their socioeconomic integration even if they rejected the notion that it infringed on their collective project.

Institutions to address grievances through the host state

The Jordanian state in the early 1950s was an authoritarian monarchy, and offered no guarantee of rights to protest, assembly and speech, with the exception of the constitutional reforms promulgated under King Talal’s brief rule and implemented in the first years of King Hussein’s reign. It swung away from the democratic reforms and into

136 Jalal Al Huseini, personal interview, 12/6/10; Lex Takkenberg, personal interview, 11/10/10
137 Nazek Saleh, personal interview, 12/14/10
martial law after King Hussein preemptively squelched a leftist coup in 1957, including the imprisonment or expulsion of some leftist Palestinian political figures, ending an experiment with liberal multi-party politics. (Robins 2004)

However, there were some institutions providing an outlet for expression of political grievances: Locally, there were mukhtars (traditional notables) who “become quasi governmental employees in the Ministry of Interior. Camp dwellers can apply for this job and then the DPA conducts an investigation among the camp dwellers to ensure that the applicant is acceptable to the population they will represent.” (Hanafi 2010, p. 18) Nationally, from the first parliamentary election in 1950, Palestinian candidates ran for office:

The Palestinian contenders thought it would be better for their cause if they participated actively in the political life of Jordan. They hoped to influence the decision-making process through the established Jordanian institutions. Their first and most salient slogan for their intended political action was stated during the election campaign: “Yes to the union, no to the peace with Israel.” This platform, on which the Palestinian activists predicated their political partnership, eventually constrained King Abdullah’s plan to reach a separate peace agreement with Israel, a fact that defined Jordanian-Israeli relations for almost half a century to come. (Abu-Odeh 1999, p. 51)

Thus, the regime of their host state did effectively provide an institutionalized route through which to voice their concerns and influence policy – not directly, by electing representatives with the power to change policy, but indirectly, through their representatives’ political platform.

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

As discussed earlier, felaheen found the transition to Jordan economically difficult, particularly the lack of employment opportunities which compounded their dislocation from the land in the CoO. Non-felaheen refugees had less economic attachment to the land, and their economic lives in Jordan were not necessarily
dramatically different from the way they lived in Palestine. Even merchants who lost all
their assets had to start from scratch, but they were able to do so within the same
economic sector, unlike the felahee:

My grandfather… used to work in the junk business, he was one of the people who
bought the British camps when they were leaving, their tents and utensils and chairs, and
put them all in this huge warehouse, then the Israelis came and he left, he had to leave
without any cash because all his assets were in inventory. He came here and my
grandmother used to cook these little sweet things and he would go out and try to sell
them. From somebody who owned his own business to… a street vendor. Then he
developed himself…. He started his own business… (Male, 43)

However, even for non-felahee refugees, Jordan was less economically developed and
offered significantly fewer economic advantages than Palestine:

[Before 1948] Palestinians had factories, major farms, a big coast with the Mediterranean
Sea, and Jaffa was a main port not just for Palestine but for many countries. And Haifa
was a big port for petrol. They had ships coming from all around the world. And in Gaza
they had weaving factories…. But after [1948]... Jordan was poorer than Palestine, and it
was a Bedouin society. [The Palestinian influx] started the kingdom. And everything
that starts, it’s not easy. [Hundreds of thousands] of people came in one year to a poor
society, with no ports, factories, [or] big farms; no economy. (Male, 42)

Twelve percent of households indicated their ancestors were shepherds (bedouin), whose
nomadic lifestyle also sometimes afforded them pre-existing connections in Jordan:

They didn’t necessarily leave as a group. My grandfather had a good relation with Karak
village so he went there. [My relative]’s father had a good relation with Hebron village
so he went there. (Male, 42)

My grandfather was a shepherd. He used to give milk to Jordanians and Palestinians. [He
had the] same job after migration. (Male, 25)

Jordan in 1948 and throughout the 1950s was a poor country with limited
infrastructure and resources. Many refugees lived in UNRWA-provided tent
encampments upon arrival or after quickly exhausting their savings (in 1955-56 the tents
were upgraded to tin-roof shacks, and finally concrete structures). (Brand 1988)

Interviewees related that their family faced significant hardships in the early years,
surviving on meager assistance from UNRWA:
So now we were living with the help of UNRWA, taking supplies, rice and sugar, that’s it. They used to distribute an omelet and a glass of milk at the UNRWA school. (Male, 70)

On the other hand, without a means to support themselves, many of the poorer class of refugees turned to education, primarily through UNRWA schools, as “the best opportunity for upward mobility and increasing economic security in a situation where political security was virtually unachievable.” (Brand 1988, p. 13; see also Ramzouni 2001)

Financially they were really weak. But [my father] went to vocational college… cheaper than university. After that he got a job and also studied in Beirut…. He opened a library. He did a Master’s, then a Ph.D. (Male, 38)

This focus on education as an asset – and even a weapon – has had far-reaching effects down the generations:

We do have this hidden sense of insecurity, of not having your country and your need for something to hold on to, and education is like your weapon… to provide for yourself and your family anywhere you went. I guess that was at the back of our minds…. Education is something that nobody can never take away from you. They can take your house, your [property]… it’s more of survival, not a luxury… This is like your shield, no matter [what happens]. (Male, 43)

All Palestinian families focused on education…. It was the only investment possible. [They had] no ownership, no land…. As Palestinians [who] live in Jordan, our only weapon is education. I wanted to be educated and to go to university because I want to build myself, to prove to everyone that Palestinians are able to do something even though their circumstances are bad. So the things that we aren’t able to do with our hands, we can do with our education. (Female, 21)

Interviewees described with pride the way that their family and community pulled themselves up out of misery and poverty to become educated, economically productive and successful over the years and generations (cf. Farah 2005):

My father, he was smart, once he came to Jordan he made a supermarket in his tent in the camp. Then this tent converted to a big store…. By their hands, they changed [their living situation]… nobody helped them, they depended on themselves. (Male, 50)

[My grandmothers] lived in Wast al-Balad [downtown Amman]. They didn’t have any work so their father opened a workshop and their mother was a seamstress. My grandmother… worked from age 10 or 12. At 18 they started to work as teachers.... They
[didn’t want] to ask for any money. Then they bought a new house, and they felt relieved after a while. Some of them went to the Gulf to work. They sacrificed a lot. (Female, 20)

My father was practical, he worked in a place [which] employed refugees, he was working in construction with them. His wage was 5 qirsh (US$0.07) [per day], he didn’t want to take the assistance from UNRWA, he wanted to work and support his family, us. (Male, 64)

The Palestinian economic activity was needed and encouraged by the Jordanian government, which was one reason why Jordan offered citizenship to the refugees.138 The Palestinian refugees who fled to Jordan were upwardly mobile not only in Jordan, but hundreds of thousands moved to the Gulf states, beginning in the 1950s, for labor. (Brand 1988; Abu-Odeh 1999) Most of them sent home remittances which eventually grew to constitute a substantial portion of the Jordanian GDP.139

The refugees’ early political passivity – waiting for the Arab armies to bring them home in victory – stands in contrast, at least in the popular narrative, with their economic agency. Rather than remain in poverty and live off the aid and social services provided by UNRWA while waiting for the redemption of their homeland, many Palestinian households chose to make the difficult adjustment of adapting economically and contributing productively to their host state. While some aspects of this economic orientation, such as buying a land and building a house, as will be described shortly, were politically controversial for decades, in other ways an economic orientation toward the host state was far more socially acceptable, even laudable, than a comparable political orientation (i.e., abandoning claims to Palestine). Of course, some refugees (Joly’s “Rubicon refugees”) saw the two as intertwined: As Palestinians gradually became convinced that they will not be able to return to their CoO, they thought, “We need to

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138 Brand 1988; Former PLO legal advisor, personal interview, 12/26/10
139 Jalal Al Husseini, personal interview, 12/6/10
build up this country, start over, build up our education.” This contradiction was, and still is, a tension in the Palestinian community in Jordan: How to integrate to Jordan while maintaining the collective project to redeem the homeland? 

ETHNIC CONSANGUINITY

The ethnic similarity to East Bank Jordanians did help ease the transition to life in the host state. East Bank Jordanians are Arab and Sunni Muslim, like the Palestinians, and certainly were more sympathetic to them than to their enemy in the CoO. The East Bankers identified strongly by their tribes, however, which were mostly different from the Palestinian tribes; and they were mostly bedouin, so in lifestyle they were different from the largely felaheen, and some urban, Palestinians.

Thus, from the beginning of their stay in Jordan, there was an economic segmentation within the Palestinian refugee community. Wealthy, urban, non-felaheen refugees established businesses, became involved in Jordanian politics and government, and adapted relatively quickly to their host state. Some poorer felaheen also managed to build themselves up through hard work in various low-level jobs, although it took many more years – sometimes even the next generations’ higher levels of education and access to professional jobs – to approach the degree of socioeconomic integration enjoyed by wealthy elites from the beginning. Finally, there were poorer refugees, particularly those who remained in camps. Despite legal rights, they had fewer and lower-paying employment opportunities, and were significantly less socioeconomically integrated to Jordan.

140 Nazek Saleh, personal interview, 12/14/10
141 Jalal Al Husseini, personal interview, 12/6/10
Militancy entrepreneurs

FEW PRE-EXISTING

There were poorly trained and equipped Palestinian irregulars who fought in the 1948 War, such as the Army of the Holy War (Abu-Odeh 1999), but interviewees contradicted each other on whether armed Palestinians fought against the Jews/Israelis before fleeing to Jordan. According to some refugees, the fighting in 1947-49 was primarily between the Arab states and the Jewish/Israeli military, while the Palestinian civilians were unarmed:

They had to leave their country... They didn’t have weapons or anything. The best thing they could do was to run away. (Male, 25)

In 1948, the Jews... had so many weapons, they attacked the villages and killed the civilians there. So when the Bedouins in Beer Seba heard that, they were afraid and ran away. They didn’t have any weapons, they were civilians, but the Jews had so many weapons, so when they attacked [a] village they killed people there – old women, children, they didn’t care. The civilians just wanted to save their own lives, so they ran away. (Male, 51)

Others stated that the Palestinians in villages were armed prior to 1948:

They attacked the town and took weapons from us…. They were just hiding their gold, jewelry, weapons, underground, [with the intent] that they will come back soon and take it. (Female, 65)

The Jews were sabotaging and killing and terrifying people... The young people, they had weapons, they bought it with their own money, to defend their country. (Male, 64)

Even if there were armed individuals and groups in Palestine, it is clear that there were no organized Palestinian militant groups which withdrew across the border into Jordan as a result of the war, a pre-existing faction which could have acted as militancy entrepreneurs in the early years.

WAITING FOR POWERFUL STATES: FEW DEVELOPING IN EXILE

Likewise, while there were surely individuals who could and would have volunteered to take on such roles, few such militant leaders emerged in exile during the
1950s. Those who had an inclination to fight against the enemy in the CoO joined the Jordanian military or another Arab army, or operated at the direction of Arab governments. The community was relying on Arab states during this early period to resolve the issue on behalf of the refugees:

They thought that the Arab armies will help them. The Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi armies will help them. Maximum, many months, and then they will win and return to their homes. (Male, 45)

They were relying on the Arab governments and the leaders. They were relying on the leaders to give them their lands back. Because we were scattered, homeless, we didn’t have any weapons. (Male, 51)

They just wanted to go back. They were expecting to hear on the news that everything was back to normal so they could go back. (Male, 24)

Three-quarters of interviewee households which left in 1948 reported that in the early years, their families were not aware of political organizations representing the interests and rights of Palestinian refugees.

In the early months and years of their exile, by definition, the refugees’ stay was not yet protracted. Most maintained expectation of imminent return. Just over 70% of households stated that their family believed they would return home in less than a month (36%) or less than a year (35%). (cf. Samha 1987) This expectation gradually evolved into an absolute faith in return despite evidence to the contrary. This became a sacred tenet of the Palestinian narrative even while the practical reality of a new life in Jordan sank in over the years and decades.

They were hoping, just hoping…. [Now] they have died without ever going back to Palestine. When they turned 80 or 85, they had no chance to go back. It was like Satan’s dream of going to heaven. (Male, 53)

They are still hoping to go back…. My father says that the end is near and the Jews are going to leave Palestine, so they are still hoping. (Female, 21)

Actually at the beginning they didn’t want to buy or own anything. They had this idea because of the promises they were told. So regardless [whether the promise was] from
As in the latter household, even though they had the right to buy land or build property in Jordan, and land was cheap, many Palestinians refused to do so on principle. They equated purchasing land and property in Jordan as setting down roots and abandoning the collective project to return to Palestine, just as many saw King Abdullah’s policies on resettling the refugees in Jordan, and the American-led push for UNRWA to develop economic integration projects, as directed at protection of Israel through elimination of Palestinian rights (Abu-Odeh 1999). Nearly a quarter of households voluntarily mentioned their ancestors’ refusal to put down economic roots:

We used to ask our dad to buy a land and settle. He refused because he said we are coming back to our land, according to the promises that we used to hear in the news. (Female, 54)

They thought, everybody thought that it’s going to be short-lived, a few months, they'll be back to their houses, their homes… I heard so many stories about other people telling them to buy property here in Jordan, and they said, “Why should we? We’re going back to Palestine.” (Male, 43)

My grandfather was offered to buy this land in Jordan for one cow… but he refused because he thought he would go back. (Male, 25)

Some younger Palestinians today resent what they see as their parents’ and grandparents’ stubborn standing on principle to the detriment of their long-term economic welfare. In retrospect, they see such decisions as “living in a dream”. Some who still don’t own property in Jordan blame their ancestors for the poor conditions in which they live today:

From the 1970s they decided that there was no return. They woke up and bought land and built houses. (Male, 50)

Lands here were very cheap, but they didn’t buy any land…. But they haven’t gotten back to Palestine, so we were affected, because if they had bought lands, our situation would have been better…. Other areas in Jordan [were] desert…. People used to think that those who bought lands in Shmeisani or Derekh Barr [now the wealthy neighborhoods of Amman] are crazy…. (Male, 26)
A minority of households contradicted the standard narrative, however, stating that their family had no qualms putting down roots in Jordan:

For me, because my salary was good and I was able to support my family and have a new house for me and my family. So we accepted the reality. (Male, 68)

I built this house in 1979 or 1980 because I have to settle down…. I don’t want my children to live in camps, this is the reason that I built this house…. This is considered as our country, we had to settle… (Male, 64)

As noted in the previous section, this may have been more common among wealthy refugees, including those with the means to meet the property ownership requirement for citizenship in Jordan soon after arrival (Brand 1988):

Really, to tell you the truth, when they first left, a big part of them, people from the village who had money bought lands here… and started to build their houses here. And they thought that they’re not going back ever. (Male, 57)

But to resolve the contradiction, or deny apostasy against the Palestinian narrative, as it were, they needed to reconcile the contradiction to themselves and the community. For example, a woman in her 40s related that her mother finally convinced her father that “it’s good to believe, but there’s no harm in building in Jordan. We can come back [to Jordan] in the summers.” Interviewees were often quick to add that they still believe in return:

If I have the money I can buy the house but that does not mean I lost hope. I still will tell my son. I will write a book about the land. We are still speaking at occasions about the past. (Male, 42)

If you’re talking about the family ID book or national number, is that against the right to go back? If I build a house here and live in dignity, does that mean I give up the right to go back? If I wear good clothes, does that mean I cannot go back to Palestine? Haifa, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Tulkarm, all the cities of Palestine are in our hearts from generation to generation. (Palestinian activist, male, 30)

With no local face of Western government on whom to target their demands for sustained urgency, many Palestinians projected those demands and fears on the closest available alternative, UNRWA. The aid agency was suspected of being an invention of
the West to keep Palestinians quiescent\textsuperscript{142}, which was not far from the original American-led objective and financing. (Schiff 1995) Therefore, ironically, beginning in the 1950s, every significant attempt by UNRWA to improve living conditions in the camps by providing more permanent structures and development projects faced resistance from Palestinians, and have sometimes been prevented by their opposition\textsuperscript{143} – even as Palestinian refugees became dependent on the aid provided by UNRWA\textsuperscript{144} – because the improvement programs were feared to represent a nail in the coffin of the Palestinian right of return, further reducing the urgency of their cause.\textsuperscript{145} (Buehrig 1971; Schiff 1995; Al Husseini & Bocco 2009) This suspicion could also be related to the lack of rights among refugees, which may explain why the hostility to UNRWA was less severe in Jordan, where they enjoy more rights, than in Lebanon:

Because they have no access to the West, they believe sometimes psychologically that UNRWA is the West…. It represents a microcosm of the West, which is responsible for their tragedy. When we introduced the human rights program, they were very skeptical, [saying,] “It will damage our traditions and our culture,” [but] later on with some clarification of the benefits of the program, things began to settle. In Lebanon in particular, there is the most critical community of UNRWA. And sometimes in the West Bank and Gaza. These are the most difficult hubs for suffering of the Palestinians. They cannot fight Israel, they can't fight the occupiers, so.... There has not been any violence against UNRWA, but they are skeptical of anything that UNRWA does…. There is nothing taken in good faith, but [they assume] there must be a political [agenda]: “The

\begin{itemize}
\item Brand 1988; Jalal Al Husseini, personal interview, 12/6/10
\item Former PLO legal advisor, personal interview, 12/26/10
\item Palestinian activist, female, 20s
\item “The Americans decided to make a sort of Marshall Plan for the Middle East… and created UNRWA with this dual mandate to, on the one hand, to provide direct relief and on the other hand to carry out public works…. That second part of UNRWA’s mission was met with a lot of suspicion by the refugees [and] the host countries… [They saw it as an attempt] to settle them…. [The] US is still one of the principle donors of UNRWA… so it’s still seen as in league with US foreign policy agendas… in which the US’s strong support for Israel is a well-known fact. Then, there has been over the years always, that sort of concern about how different UNRWA programs and activities would be seen in light of the right of refugees to return home eventually…. These debates have come up when UNRWA replaced tents in the late 1950s with mud-brick or cement-brick sheds… again when they were replacing the sub-standard housing units for better shelters with a concrete roof; and it came up again when we were involved in a lot of camp reconstruction and development programs. It’s come [up] whenever we’ve had more of a development orientation in our work…. ” (Lex Takkenberg, personal interview, 11/10/10)
\end{itemize}
Westerners do not want to give us anything useful, [so] there must be something behind this.” I think this is most noticed in Lebanon. Even this has its own explanation [lack of rights].

These feelings were also expressed in interviews with some refugees:

We don’t believe in the UN. UNRWA was created to keep Israel alive, keep them safe…. Since that time, they are the keepers of Israel. (Palestinian activist, male, 36)

One interviewee even expressed a sentiment that the services provided by UNRWA were suspiciously too good for refugees:

The only one who stood with us was UNRWA. I believe that this was a creation of the Jews to make us patient and make us forget Palestine. I remember the sweet taste of the bread and the kashkawane cheese…. They opened a restaurant for us to eat every day and schools for us…. They opened a theater for us, for refugees! (Male, 65)

The relative newness of the refugee situation, the swirling rumors and promises of imminent return, the Nasser-led ideology calling for Arab unity to bring the Palestinians home in victory and glory, and the ongoing state of conflict and occasional skirmishes (and the Suez War) between the Arab states and Israel throughout the 1950s led to a feeling among the refugees that their plight is only temporary, an aberration, and powerful actors were soon going to restore normality – a feeling which was codified by the pledge of the Arab League in 1948 to liberate Palestine. (Abu-Odeh 1999) There was little feeling that their residence in Jordan was the status quo, or that they needed to refresh the tree of hope (of the collective project to redeem Palestine) with their own independent action. This sense of anticipation, of waiting for something to happen outside of their own initiative, lasted for years. Although it receded at different times for different people, by the early 1960s it was being replaced by a cynicism of Arab governments and a growing belief in their own efficacy, as I will discuss in the next

146 Mohammed Tarakhan, personal interview, 1/26/11
chapter.

**Political opportunities**

East Bank Jordanians began to view Palestinians with wariness and suspect loyalty after a Palestinian assassinated King Abdullah I in 1951. In addition, the government declared martial law in 1957, and the mukhabarat intensified their operations in Amman, Irbid and the West Bank. (Abu-Odeh 1999) Nonetheless, there was substantial political opportunity for militarization during this first period of the Palestinians’ exile in Jordan. The refugee camps and communities were not securitized by the host state, and the Jordanian internal state security apparatus was still relatively weak. The refugees had freedom of movement and assembly, and ample political space to organize, if they so chose, except for a brief period from 1957-58, when some Palestinian leaders were imprisoned and political organizations shut down as part of the monarchy’s crackdown following an alleged foiled coup. In addition, despite overtures by the Jordanian monarchy in the late 1940s and 1950s to make a separate peace with Israel (Abu-Odeh 1999), the host state and CoO remained officially in a state of war. Israel’s border defenses in the early years were still weak and porous – even an “open frontier” (Sicker 1989, p. 110) – especially given that they were drawn artificially along a land border without a natural geographic divide such as the Jordan River, as would occur in 1967; and international engagement was directed at peacemaking between state governments, not non-state groups such as the Palestinians.

The only explanation policymakers and scholars usually mention (often with

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147 Jordanian scholar, personal interview, 8/19/10
148 Palestinian ex-guerrilla, personal interview, 12/8/10
149 Aruri (1972) states that evidence of the coup was never demonstrated by the Jordanian authorities, but was a convenient justification for shutting down the leftist opposition and instituting martial law.
condescension) to explain the lack of militarization among Palestinians since 1971 is Black September, i.e., lack of opportunity. Yet this one-dimensional explanation fails to explain why Palestinians did not militarize from 1948 to 1963, when political opportunity was mostly available.

Conflict resources

It is impossible to answer a counterfactual question – if they had attempted to militarize, would they have found available conflict resources? – but some indicators are available. First, some of the sources of military equipment which would later supply the Palestinian guerrillas in the late 1960s, including many neighboring Arab states, were also present in the 1950s, though in different form. It was not until 1963 that both Syria and Iraq experienced Ba’athist coups; but throughout the 1950s they were antagonistic to Israel, and both had fought Israel in the 1948 War; they may have been willing to provide military supplies to Palestinians. It is unknown whether Nasser, who sought to project Egypt as the champion of the Palestinian cause, would have supported a non-state actor in Jordan to undertake a role which he saw as his own; on the other hand, relations were strained between Jordan and Egypt, so it is quite possible that a Palestinian client in Jordan would have suited Nasser well. The Soviet Union began supporting Arab states in the 1950s, and it too may have been willing to send arms and supplies to Palestinians.

Although they may not have had the capability to prevent militarization in the 1950s, it is doubtful that the Jordanian government itself would have actively supported a Palestinian militant organization in that period, when King Abdullah, and later King Hussein, were making clandestine efforts to smooth relations and some speculate even broker a peace treaty with Israel. The monarchy saw itself as the leader of the Palestinian
people, so it is unlikely they would have abetted militarization.

Finally, humanitarian aid was available through UNRWA, which could have relieved militants of caring for their dependents; militants also could probably have diverted at least some of UNRWA’s resources, including food, medicines and organizational supplies, to their purposes. On the other hand, this may not have been as easy as it sounds, since UNRWA’s western donors were wary even in those early years of their aid being diverted for non-humanitarian purposes and used against Israel; the agency was bound “by its UN status not to participate in or contribute to any military activities.” (Schiff 1995, p. 103)

**Little militarization**

During the 1950s there were scattered, uncoordinated border raids from Jordan (the West Bank) into Israel (Glubb 1954), but they were “for the most part unstable and ineffective.” (Sicker 1989, p. 111) There was a distinct impression among Palestinian interviewees that their elders were politically naïve and passive when they left Palestine. Some added a normative dimension to this observation, blaming elders for their cowardice and naiveté, and declared that they would have made better decisions if they had been in that situation:

If I had been in Jerusalem [with my family] I would have fought until I died. (Male, 68)

As a young generation, we blame our grandparents’ generation, that they shouldn’t have left, they should have stayed there. But they say, “If you had been there, you would have done the same.” That… the Israeli gangs, they used to kill and rape women, and to destroy lands and shoot people there in Palestine…. (Palestinian activist, male, 30)

The best way [for my grandparents to achieve their rights]? The best way was that they didn’t leave in the first place. (Female, 22)

More interviewees mentioned the passivity, ignorance and naivety of their elders, but did not go so far as to blame them:
When the Jews came to Palestine, people were very simple, so they didn’t know what to do. Even after that, to talk about politics, they didn’t know how to do that, or who to represent them, they didn’t know. (Male, 27)

My father and grandfather were uneducated. There was ignorance, but now, in this time, the Palestinians are the most educated people in the world. So if we were educated, we wouldn't have left. (Male, 72)

They didn’t [even] know that they had lost something in Palestine. They were just waiting to go back…. (Male, 26)

The ignorance and passivity of the older generation, and – as seen through the eyes of later generations – the lack of attachment to Palestine which is suggested by their perceived meek departure, is seen as a stain which must be counterbalanced by fervent attachment to Palestine now.\(^{150}\) This sometimes leads to contradictions even within one family:

(Husband:) They were illiterate, uneducated.
(Wife:) They had a hope that one day they would be able to go back to their country. And maybe some of the other countries could help them do that.
(Husband:) They didn’t know anything about politics.
(Wife:) They told their children about their country, that’s why [the later generations] love it.
(Husband:) My son doesn’t know anything about Palestine, except a few stories I told him.
(Wife:) So the children love it, even though they haven’t seen it…. My young sons... have objectives to go back to Palestine, see Palestine…
(Male, 53; Female, 47)

The refugees’ top priority in the early years was to return to the land through reliance on Arab leaders, with less regard for how it was achieved, i.e., through war or negotiations. When asked, as an open-ended question, to describe what their ancestors believed at that time was the best way to address their grievances and achieve their rights, only 28% said they believed that fighting was the best way. One-third said simply to

\(^{150}\) Turner (2010) found similar perceptions of elders’ naïveté among Burundian Hutu refugees in Tanzania, leading to their massacre and expulsion from Burundi in 1972, and their subsequent “awakening” and politicization. Likewise, Sayigh (1977) found that, despite objective evidence to the contrary, Palestinians in Lebanon claimed that their parents and ancestors, and they themselves in Palestine, were not politically conscious (bela wa’ee), perhaps reflecting the feeling of each generation that they are more politically savvy and aware than those that came earlier.
return home, and 23% said it was impossible to address their grievances.\footnote{This was an open-ended question, and interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one response.} Even among those who said “fight”, they appeared to be referring to war by the Arab states, not necessarily the refugees themselves. Overall, there was a feeling of political passivity:

- They were just waiting for the governments or organizations to help them go back to their country in negotiations. (Male, 29)
- They had no power, what could they do? They couldn’t do anything. (Female, 60)
- There was a big hope to come back because it’s their country, their homeland. The media… were telling lies about being able to return. The radio stations were telling lies. The UN sent mediators to tell us we are coming back. It’s like anesthesia. (Male, 65)
- They were very sad but they were still hoping to return to Palestine after 1 month or maximum 1 year. They believed and had big hope in the Arab army, their “saviors”. But the Arabs are the ones who let the Palestinians down. If Palestinians had depended on themselves, the Zionists would not have won…. (Male, 53)

Within Jordan, there was little intent to militarize; the focus was on return under the banner of the victorious Arab armies:

- I just wanted to go back. There was no resistance, nothing. Now the resistance is something new. Before that, there was no resistance. They used to distract us with the supplies and the clothes, so we were just hoping to go back. (Male, 70)

**Conclusion**

During the first fifteen years of the Palestinians’ exile in Jordan, there was almost no militarization by the refugees. As summarized in Figure 3 below, the refugees had a collective project to redeem the homeland, but some of the refugees were socioeconomically integrated to Jordan and therefore less inclined to actually militarize; while even those who were less integrated did not militarize because there were few militancy entrepreneurs: no pre-existing group withdrew into exile together with civilians, and few such entrepreneurs emerged in exile due to the fact that most Palestinians were waiting expectantly for the Arab states to bring them home in victory.
Therefore, it was irrelevant that political opportunities (as well as conflict resources) were available for militarization.

Figure 3. Summary: Palestinians in Jordan, 1948-63

The Palestinian refugees in Jordan began militarizing in 1964 and gained significant momentum following the 1967 War, culminating in the civil war and Black September in 1970, and the expulsion of the Palestinian militants from Jordan in 1970-71. There also was a fresh influx of Palestinian refugees to Jordan in 1967 from the West Bank and Gaza, part of them having experienced their second expulsion. In this chapter I will demonstrate that all variables in the proposed framework were present during this period, although their attachment to land in the CoO, which had been mostly economic in the earlier period, shifted toward a political attachment with the rise of Palestinian nationalism.

Collective project

War of exclusion with a clear enemy

Those who arrived in 1967 or shortly thereafter, either as first-time or second-time refugees (n = 39 households), were again fleeing a war of exclusion from the same clearly defined enemy. They related stories of threat similar to those told of the 1948 War, fleeing both from direct threats…

[In 1948] we left Jaffa and went to Qalqilya, they followed us there, they were attacking Qalqilya, too, and they tore half of it down in 1967… because they wanted people to leave…. I remember, the battle of 1967 started… they were attacking us with cannon, so the people ran away to the mountains near Qalqilya, and there were trees there, we stayed for two to three weeks in the mountains. (Male, 65)

Of course, they were attacked and their house was torn down, and they were hiding in holes underground, and after that they came to Jordan. (Female, 20)

and indirect threats…

They were just afraid, there were a lot of rumors that they’re going to kill [us]. (Female, 22)
The Israeli occupation expanded to Gaza, Golan, Sinai…. The terror that had happened in 1948 stayed in people’s minds, so they were very afraid that it will happen again, so they left and went to Amman. We heard that the Jews were coming to Gaza. (Male, 65)

and like the wealthy in 1947-48, some left due to a general fear of the impending conflict:

They didn’t leave because of force, when the situation was really bad; no, [they left] when they felt that the situation was going to get bad… as normal travel. (Female, 21)

When we were leaving we didn’t know anything, we thought we were going on a picnic. But after that we began to understand what happened to us. We were going on a picnic with sheep and with our friends. As a [thirteen-year-old] kid, this is what I thought. (Male, 57)

They felt that Jericho won’t be safe because of the war, so that’s why they left to Jordan. (Male, 32)

Like those who had arrived in 1948, 81%\textsuperscript{152} of those who arrived in 1967 or shortly thereafter reported that they fled due to a direct or indirect threat. Almost all blamed Israel for their exile and suffering, but, as in 1948, some also blamed their elders for their passivity and naïveté:

People were very passive, they didn’t know the Jews were coming and would take our country. In 1948 and 1967, it’s the same tragedy repeating itself. (Female, 38)

Among the refugees who arrived in 1948, the 1967 War and the new influx of refugees eastward across the Jordan River rekindled memories of suffering during their own exodus, which was perceived to be on the basis of their shared group identity, refreshing their shared sense of injustice and the collective project.

**ETHNONATIONALIST MOVEMENT**

The Palestinian national movement gained traction throughout the 1960s, as the pan-Arabist movement was declining in momentum and popularity, starting with the

\textsuperscript{152} Double refugees were included in both the statistics in the previous chapter and this chapter, since they were subjected to forced migration in both observations.
founding of Fatah by Palestinians (ex Gaza) in Kuwait in 1959. The first Palestinian National Congress, a creation of Nasser’s, led to the founding of the PLO in 1964. This followed a crucial formative period of national identity development in exile in the 1950s (Brand 1988), as discussed in the previous chapter. In Jordan, the establishment of the PLO “confused” those who were already sentimentally attached to the Hashemite regime, and prevented the development of identity-based attachment to the Jordanian state in others. (Abu-Odeh 1999, p. 112) Palestinian nationalism received a further boost from the Arab League’s 1965 passage of the Casablanca Protocol, which offered (nominally) equal rights for Palestinians in Arab states while maintaining Palestinian national identity.154

The spectacular failure of the Arab militaries in the 1967 War, including Jordan’s, led to not only a feeling of ethnonationalist self-help, as I will discuss below, but a strong feeling of Palestinian identity which spread among the refugees, coinciding with a decrease in Jordanian identity:

There were fedayeen here in this camp. [My family] was helping them. Because back in Palestine they weren’t able to do anything to defend their lands, so here they wanted to help the fedayeen…. They were thinking that they’re Palestinians, not Jordanians, and they wanted to help Palestinians so they could go back to Palestine. During the war they just wanted to help by any means, so they can get back to Palestine because this is not their country. (Male, 32)

This was the case even among Palestinians who had migrated out of the region: Those in the upper and upper-middle classes who had migrated to wealthy western countries after 1948 had squelched their Palestinian origins, then experienced a surge of identity and

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153 Brand (1988) suggests that, across the region, “the earliest widespread sense of strong Palestinian identity [occurred in Gaza] after 1948,” whereas it did not appear openly in Jordan until the mid-1960s. (p. 165)
154 Former PLO legal advisor, personal interview, 12/26/10
political activism following the 1967 War.\textsuperscript{155}

**AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC BASE**

Those who arrived to Jordan in 1967 and were living in camps experienced a marked decrease in their standard of living from where they had been living prior to the 1967 War. Like those who arrived in 1948, almost two-thirds of the refugees who came to Jordan in 1967 were felaheen before their first expulsion. Naazihiin who had stayed on their land and continued to work as felaheen after the 1948 War experienced the same dislocation from an agricultural economic base to a non-agricultural base (cf. Samha 1987) as had those who arrived in 1948:

Because they were felaheen, they had their own land and business. Maybe some people were working in the security or army, but very few. I think they didn’t work as employees in companies or government [in Palestine] because most of them had land and they worked in the land. So now we [became] employees, we have jobs. (Female, 21)

They told me that they were very poor, deprived…. They were felaheen. When they came to Jordan they worked in construction – quarry. (Female, 38)

Also like those who arrived in 1948, 44\% of households who arrived to the East Bank in 1967 gave descriptions of life in Palestine prior to departure which were vague and glorified the felaheen lifestyle. Another 3\% were likewise glorified but detailed, and 33\% described it as a simple agricultural life, without glorification. Also like their brethren who crossed the Jordan River nearly two decades earlier, the new arrivals brought little or nothing with them (90\%), and about the same proportion reported that their family abandoned their land and house in the CoO. Approximately the same proportion also cited land and property as their family’s primary concern at the time of departure.

Gazans have unique considerations when comparing their living conditions to

\textsuperscript{155} Riad al Khouri, personal interview, 4/27/11; Said 1999
Palestine, as they can contrast not only their life in Jordan with that in pre-1948 Palestine and pre-1967 Gaza\textsuperscript{156}…

Living conditions were better in Gaza – because Gaza is in southern Palestine. It’s better because it’s on the shore, there is trade, fishing, and there is good agriculture, and there are food and vegetables everywhere. There was trade between Gaza and Egypt. But here it’s like – surrounded by mountains and the resources are limited. It was a very good life in Gaza, we had a very good life. (Male, 65)

… but even their life in Jordan relative to a certain non-Gazan Palestinian neighbor with their life in Palestine relative to the same neighbor:

In Gaza, it’s normal, you’re a citizen there, you can work, be a policeman, engineer, teacher, lawyer, whatever you want…. I see the Jordanian citizens [of Palestinian origin] living in their own lands… and they have money and can work, and I don’t have anything compared to them. In Palestine I used to be more rich than him: He has 20 or 30 dunams (5-7 acres) and in Palestine I used to have 200 dunams (49 acres). (Male, 63)

For the refugees who arrived to the East Bank in 1948, however, who continued to constitute the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian population even after 1967, the practical importance of the agricultural economic base in the CoO had begun to fade in the 15-20 years since they arrived. Most had adjusted to the new economic situation, and the second generation had been educated in Jordan. For the families who arrived in 1948, therefore, their attachment to the land of Palestine had begun to shift from a practical economic one to a political one. Along with the marked increase in Palestinian identity and nationalism after the 1967 War, as discussed in the previous section, the portrayals of the felaheen lifestyle in Palestine pre-1948 became even more romanticized:

This is a joke among the Palestinians: An old person is talking to a young person in a refugee camp. He says, “Back in Palestine I was [in such a good condition] and now I’m [in such a poor condition]…” The young person asks, “Was that cat a tiger in Palestine?” After '67 this [romanticization] really took off. (Riad al Khouri, personal interview, 4/27/11)

\textsuperscript{156} One Gazan interviewee related that the economic situations in Gaza pre-1967 and Jordan post-1967 were not very different at all: “They were very similar. At that time there was poverty in Gaza and in Jordan. I remember the salary in Jordan was not more than 20 JD (US$28) [per month].” (Male, 53)
This variable did not change from the 1948-1963 period.

In sum, during this second period of the Palestinians’ exile in Jordan, there was still a widespread collective project to redeem the homeland. However, unlike in the first period, the refugees’ attachment to the land of the CoO had begun to shift from a primarily economic attachment to a political one (except for naazihiin, who were newly displaced from their land after 1967). The political attachment was reflected in the rise of Palestinian nationalism and collapse of pan-Arabism, especially after the dismal failure by the armies of Jordan, Egypt and Syria in the 1967 War.

**Socioeconomic integration and marginalization**

**Rights in the host state**

The rights and citizenship status of those refugees who arrived in 1948 remained unchanged in the 1964-1970 period, leading to most Palestinians’ growing integration into the Jordanian economy and polity. In fact, by the late 1960s, some Palestinians had risen to high ranks in the Jordanian military. (Abu-Odeh 1999) The 265,000\textsuperscript{157} naazihiin and double refugees who fled from the West Bank to the East Bank in 1967 and shortly thereafter continued to enjoy the rights and citizenship which they had obtained while the West Bank was under Jordanian control. However, in the broader picture, the project of socioeconomic integration was put on hold with the emergence of the PLO in 1964, which led to a period of confusion regarding representation of the Palestinian people. (Al-

\textsuperscript{157} Figure from Brand (1988, p. 170); Samha (1987) offers an estimate of 250,000 naazihiin who fled to the East Bank, and 175,000 double refugees, of which an unspecified number went to the East Bank. Schiff (1995) cites a figure of 100,000 naazihiin and 100,000 double refugees.
Quds Center 2009)

Gazans

The significant exception to the increasing integration was the Gazans, those Palestinians who had fled to Gaza in 1948, while it was under Egyptian control, then to Jordan in 1967 or soon thereafter. The number of Gazans who arrived in 1967 is unknown, but they (including the children of Gazan males) are currently estimated at 120,000 - 200,000. Due to the resistance of East Bank tribes to granting citizenship to more Palestinians, and the interest of the PLO in preventing integration of refugees to host states, the Gazans were placed into a special residence regime in which they received “temporary” passports (now two years’ duration) without citizenship. The Gazans had limited rights after they arrived in 1967, but at least maintained parity with non-Gazan refugees in terms of social services, including competitive access to tertiary education, until Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank in 1988. (Al-Quds Center 2009)

Like other foreigners in Jordan, Gazans are not eligible for nationals’ tuition rates at public universities – which are half the rate charged to foreigners – nor national health insurance. They cannot own real property, and are officially limited to owning one private and two business vehicles; if they wish to buy a house or more vehicles, it must be registered in the name of a waqil, a trusted friend or relative who has Jordanian citizenship. They cannot open a bank account in their own name. They are barred from government employment. They are not allowed to work in a number of professional capacities such as doctors, lawyers, accountants and pharmacists, and even some menial

Samha (1987) cites a figure of 45,000 who left Gaza, “most of whom were admitted by Jordan to the East Bank….” (p. 186)
occupations like drivers. As one Gazan stated in a 2007 focus group, “Ironically, the Gazan, with his temporary passport can apply and work abroad as a Jordanian but cannot enjoy this luxury in Jordan itself!” (Quoted in Al-Quds Center 2009, p. 55) Even as of 2011, the main camp for Gazans, Jerash Camp, lacked a sewage system, and many houses in the camp still had a tin roof rather than concrete. Internet was connected to the camp for the first time in 2011. For males, these policies can make it difficult to find a bride\textsuperscript{159}, since, due to the patrilineal system in Jordan, Gazan females can acquire citizenship through their husband but not vice versa.

Gazans don’t have any rights, they can’t work, can’t own anything. But with Jordanian citizenship, it’s different…. I’m telling the truth, people from Gaza… don’t have any rights. For example, [my wife’s] sister is married to a Gazan guy. He doesn’t have anything. But if he wants to buy anything, it’s under my sister’s name. The car, house, everything. Even the electricity bill. (Male, 53)

We are not allowed to work in government offices, hotels, tourism institutions, municipalities… accounting… even as a nurse…. We cannot study in public universities…. I studied in Iraq…. My sister’s average is 99.7% and she couldn’t study anything [in a university] here…. The people who have cancer can’t be treated for free at the cancer center. As I said, we can’t own anything. That’s why I’m renting. I can’t have anything in my name…. They just want to put more restrictions on us. It affects people psychologically…. There are no services here in the camp. No sewage, no hospital; we [only] have the UNRWA clinic. There’s not enough medicine for everyone…. It has affected education. From 7 to 17 years old, the school dropout rate is 6.5% in Amman, but 14% here…. We just want the simplest rights…. We want to be treated as other Jordanians, as other citizens. We wish that we will be able to have rights like other people. (Male, 36)

When a Gazan publicly engages in political activity in Jordan, they are subject to even more restrictions:

None of my children have a [Jordanian] ID, and the reason is that I have political attachment. This is their “crime”. When they went to the Ministry of Interior, they asked to see me and said, “The difficulty for your children is you.”…. Yes, [my family has even] less rights than other Gazans. People from Gaza have a temporary passport for 2 years, but anyone who has political attachment is not allowed to have this passport. When I went for an interview they told me that I am a guest here and can’t have political attachments in this country because “you’re a guest”. Even though it’s the right of anyone in the world to have political attachments in any country, this is a human right.

\textsuperscript{159} Nazek Saleh, personal interview, 12/14/10
What political attachment do you have? To the Muslim Brotherhood. (Male, 53)

There is little evidence available for the impact of these restrictions in the first few years of the Gazans’ residence in Jordan, but in the next chapter I will discuss their impact on Gazans’ current attitudes.

Institutions to address grievances through the host state

The degree of democracy or authoritarianism in the Jordanian regime did not change in any meaningful way during the period 1964-1970. (Marshall & Jaggers 2011) Even though they maintained the ability to elect representatives to Parliament, the Palestinians continued to have no means to achieve policy change except in accordance with the monarchy’s will. Theoretically, this could lead to increased motivation for self-help, and perhaps it did. However, even if Jordan had been democratic, it is doubtful that the refugees would have sought representation of their cause through the Jordanian state, following the humiliation of Jordan in the 1967 War, which had led to the loss of the last Palestinian territory to their enemy, including the holy city of Jerusalem.

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

For most of the Palestinian refugees, their employment opportunities and standard of living continued to gradually improve over the 1960s. The 1948 refugees, particularly those not living in camps, were less directly affected by the 1967 War:

We didn’t have anything [left in Palestine] to be affected by the war… They had left everything behind, they didn’t have anything [there]. (Male, 26)

However, like the refugees who lived in tents in 1948, those who arrived to camps in 1967 experienced many of the same hardships.\(^\text{160}\):

\(^{160}\) Also like those who arrived in 1948, a few refugees had liquid assets which they were able to use to start a new life in Jordan: “My grandmother sold her jewelry and they bought a house, so they didn’t live in a camp.” (Female, 20)
This camp, we were kids, we were living in tents. There were dirt [floors]. And in the winter there were muddy areas because of the rain. You had to wear boots, and shared bathrooms, and there was no [running] water. My mother would carry water three kilometers. (Male, 48)

The suffering…. To live in a tent, and having many kids and only one person who works. When we lived in the tents, the snow was around us. (Female, 70)

Of course, the Gazans experienced even fewer employment opportunities as a result of the unique restrictions of their residency regime.

Not only the new arrivals were economically affected by the war, but also those who had arrived in 1948 and were still living in camps. They suddenly found their camps and schools overcrowded and overwhelmed:

We were affected, we suffered…. We saw how the camps were full again of tents, and… when I was in school, they stopped school, and the school was full of people. I was in a school next to my house and we used to give them food and our own clothes, water, and when we went and saw how messy was the situation, we were really disappointed. (Female, 54)

Really, it affected us a lot because it was a big burden on us…. So many people left Palestine to come here to Jordan, so we had to split everything again, even the bread. (Male, 57)

Resources were stretched thin, and employment opportunities in the East Bank became more scarce after the war, as hundreds of thousands of new residents sought employment.

In the aggregate, however, Jordan was more developed in the late 1960s than it had been in 1948, and there were more, and more varied, employment opportunities available to Palestinians, including industrial and professional positions, especially for the younger generation who were achieving higher levels of education than their parents.

**ETHNIC CONSANGUINITY**

This variable did not change from the 1948-63 period.

The economic segmentation of the refugee group continued, with many of those
arriving during and after 1967 refreshing the ranks of the socioeconomically marginalized in camps. A significant minority of them, the Gazans, were subjected to a different residency regime with substantially less rights. Hundreds of thousands of refugees, including both those who had arrived in 1948 and 1967, were living in camps by the end of the 1960s, although as Amman grew it began to subsume the two largest suburban camps, Hussein and Wihdat – inhabited primarily by those who had arrived in 1948 – and slowly transforming them from standalone refugee camps into urban slums. Most of the camps built from 1967-1969 were intentionally placed farther away from city centers, which further reinforced the socioeconomic marginalization of the 1967 arrivals.

On the other hand, many of the Palestinians who arrived in 1948 had experienced a degree of upward social mobility over the prior two decades, as continued rights and citizenship had facilitated their economic development, transition and integration into the Jordanian economy and polity. For those living outside of camps, political objections to buying land and building a house in Jordan had mostly subsided. Recollections of life in Palestine pre-1948 grew even more romanticized while a practical hope of return was pushed farther out of reach by Israel’s sweeping victory in 1967.

**Militancy entrepreneurs**

**PRE-EXISTING**

It is not quite accurate to call the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) a “pre-existing” militancy organization, since it was founded in Jerusalem at a meeting of Arab states under Nasser’s leadership with the agreement of King Hussein¹⁶¹ in 1964 – long

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¹⁶¹ Brand (1988, pp. 168-69) discusses the reasons and criteria for Hussein’s agreement to the establishment of a nationalist Palestinian organization on his territory, despite the monarchy’s long-standing claim to represent the Palestinian people.
after the arrival of Palestinians in Jordan. Nonetheless, that leadership did enter Jordan as an external group, separate from the masses of civilians, so it is more reasonable to classify them in the “pre-existing” category than as one emerging in exile.

Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) were the two largest groups within the PLO umbrella, but the PLO’s original conservative leadership never imagined guerrilla activity, independent of the Arab states, as its primary means; the most active military role they expected was as a Palestinian army fighting alongside, and under the leadership of, Arab armies. (Brand 1988; cf. Sicker 1989) Increasingly disillusioned by the failure of Arab states to fulfill their promise of redeeming the Palestinian homeland, and especially following the humiliating defeat of Arab armies by Israel in 1967, Fatah became emboldened in taking resistance against Israel into its own hands. It gained status and legitimacy following their claimed victory162 against an Israeli incursion into Jordan in the 1968 Karameh War, and recruitment in Jordan soared (Brand 1988; Lischer 2005; Al Abed 2004; Dumper 2008) “as the Palestinians recognized that the Arab states would not solve their problems for them.” (Schiff 1995, p. 69) Yasser Arafat said after the battle:

What we have done is to make the world... realize that the Palestinian is no longer refugee number so and so, but the member of a people who hold the reins of their own destiny and are in a position to determine their own future…. Now that they carry rifles the situation has changed. (Quoted in Hirst 2003, p. 428)

Their alleged success at Karameh helped them gain control over the PLO in 1969, under the leadership of Arafat, freeing the PLO of control by Arab governments. As a result, from 1967 to 1987, the center of gravity of Palestinian resistance was outside the CoO. (Sayigh 1997)

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162 King Abdullah II (2011) claims that it was actually the Jordanian military who inflicted heavy casualties on Israeli forces, not the fedayeen.
The dominant Palestinian parties in Jordan in the 1960s and 1970s, including Fatah and PFLP, were secular, leftist and even Marxist-Leninist, and they mobilized at the grassroots level. The Fatah leadership, many of whom had lower-middle class and camp backgrounds themselves, used ideological frames to reject the legitimacy of their enemy in the CoO and mobilize the refugees by using language which tapped into their feelings of injustice, identity and longing for the homeland. They promoted the idea that the Palestinians could no longer rely on Arab states to provide their redemption, but must rely only on themselves. (Matar 2011) These were powerful and effective devices which “provided a vicarious release for the frustration of the masses in face of the disaster they were led into by the Arab governments.” (Sicker 1989, p. 128) I will demonstrate the use of these frames with the PLO’s 1964 Charter. First of all, it defines (and constructs) the Palestinian people:

The Palestinians are those Arab citizens who were living normally in Palestine up to 1947, whether they remained or were expelled. Every child who was born to a Palestinian Arab father after this date, whether in Palestine or outside, is a Palestinian.

Next, it binds the Palestinian people to the disputed territory using ethnosymbology to stake their primordial claim to it:

We, the Palestinian Arab people, who waged fierce and continuous battles to safeguard its homeland, to defend its dignity and honor, and who offered all through the years continuous caravans of immortal martyrs…. has the legitimate right to its homeland…. It promotes in-group unity by espousing a dominant ethnonationalist identity and rejecting sub-national identities…

Article 8: Bringing up Palestinian youth in an Arab and nationalist manner is a fundamental national duty. All means of guidance, education and enlightenment should be utilized to introduce the youth to its homeland in a deep spiritual way that will constantly and firmly bind them together.

163 Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10
164 The succeeding quotes are taken from the website of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations.
Article 9: Ideological doctrines, whether political, social, or economic, shall not distract the people of Palestine from the primary duty of liberating their homeland. All Palestinian[s] constitute one national front and work with all their feelings and material potentialities to free their homeland.

… and supra-national identities:

Article 11: The Palestinian people firmly believe in Arab unity, and in order to play its role in realizing this goal, it must, at this stage of its struggle, preserve its Palestinian personality and all its constituents. It must strengthen the consciousness of its existence and stance and stand against any attempt or plan that may weaken or disintegrate its personality.

It identifies, delegitimizes and demonizes the enemy “other” against whom the

Palestinian people are locked in struggle:

We, the Palestinian Arab people, who faced the forces of evil, injustice and aggression, against whom the forces of international Zionism and colonialism conspire and worked to displace it, dispossess it from its homeland and property, abused what is holy in it and who in spite of all this refused to weaken or submit.

…

Article 18: The Balfour Declaration, the Palestine Mandate System, and all that has been based on them are considered null and void. The claims of historic and spiritual ties between Jews and Palestine are not in agreement with the facts of history or with the true basis of sound statehood. Judaism, because it is a divine religion, is not a nationality with independent existence. Furthermore, the Jews are not one people with an independent personality because they are citizens to their states.

Article 19: Zionism is a colonialist movement in its inception, aggressive and expansionist in its goal, racist in its configurations, and fascist in its means and aims….

It argues that the Palestinian national cause is grounded in justice:

We, the Palestinian Arab people, based on our right of self-defense and the complete restoration of our lost homeland – a right that has been recognized by international covenants and common practices including the Charter of the United Nations – and in implementation of the principles of human rights….

Finally, it offers Palestinians the chance to claim agency and redeem their homeland through militarization:

We, the Palestinian Arab people, who believe in its Arabism and in its right to regain its homeland, to realize its freedom and dignity, and who have determined to amass its forces and mobilize its efforts and capabilities in order to continue its struggle and to move forward on the path of holy war (al-jihad) until complete and final victory has been attained….
However, since the Charter was drawn up under the auspices of Arab states, led by Nasser and his pan-Arabist ideology – and since, in 1964, most Palestinians still maintained some hope that the Arab states would help them redeem their homeland, which was at that time a more logical idea than expecting to accomplish it alone – references to “Arabism” and the “Arab nation”, rather than only Palestinians, were included. Article 14 offered an explicit appeal for external assistance, with “the Palestinian peoples being in the forefront”, from the broader Arab nation:

The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national duty. Its responsibilities fall upon the entire Arab nation, governments and peoples, the Palestinian peoples being in the forefront. For this purpose, the Arab nation must mobilize its military, spiritual and material potentialities; specifically, it must give to the Palestinian Arab people all possible support and backing and place at its disposal all opportunities and means to enable them to perform their role in liberating their homeland.

When the official discourse of the PLO was combined with their first militant strikes against Israel in 1965, the refugees in Jordan gradually began to see the PLO as their agent and representative. The PLO achieved the right to speak at the United Nations in 1965, though it did not receive formal recognition as the representative of the Palestinian people by Arab states and the UN until nearly a decade later. Nonetheless, in the late 1960s and the 1970s, the fedayeen became a symbol of the Palestinian nation and identity, “the centre of a constructed heroic national narrative of steadfastness, struggle and resistance. Armed struggle became the central element of the ‘imagined community’ of the Palestinians.” (Matar 2011, p. 94)

The PLO deliberately chose not to interfere in the internal politics of Jordan – in fact, it explicitly stated in Article 26 of its 1964 Charter that it will not interfere in the internal politics of any Arab state – and as a result did not attempt to form linkages with

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165 Nazek Saleh, personal interview, 12/14/10
East Bank Jordanian political forces. While this may have helped the PLO avoid accusations of overstepping its bounds, it also “made it easier for the King's army to defeat them” in 1970. (Hudson 1997, p. 253) However, there were some individual East Bank Jordanians who joined the PLO.\(^\text{166}\)

In addition to the PLO leadership, some Palestinian combatant refugees arrived from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967:

My father came here to Jordan two weeks before us. He escaped from the [Israeli] soldiers…. [He was fighting in Gaza and came] here with the Fatah party…. (Palestinian activist, male, 49)

**NO LONGER WAITING FOR POWERFUL STATES**

After the 1967 War, the sentiment regarding the Palestinian refugees throughout the Arab world, including among the refugees themselves, underwent a dramatic reorientation. The Arab states “gradually accepted Israel and began to search for ways of disengaging from the conflict” (Abu-Odeh 1999, p. 152), while the idea quickly took hold that the Palestinian people are responsible for their own redemption:

They stayed here in the camps and after the Arab armies lost the war… those refugees started to make some resistance. In order to defend [themselves] and fight Israel…. The Palestinians felt disappointed, so they started to do something for themselves…. (Female, 21)

The dismal performance of the Arab states in the war, including Jordan, sparked anger and indignation among the refugees, who felt betrayed:

The Arab governments and armies gave up in six hours, not six days…. It’s treason, the Arab armies are traitors, they didn’t fight in 1967, the Arab leaders gave it to Israel without even fighting. (Male, 65)

Jordan’s loss of control over the West Bank also opened up for discussion the question of Palestinian secession from the East Bank, which was vigorously opposed by Jordan. (Abu-Odeh 1999) This was one element of the conscious politicization of the refugee

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\(^{166}\) Former PLO legal advisor, personal interview, 12/26/10
public after the war:

[Because of] the ’67 War we became politically educated, my parents and uncles, from a really young age they started to analyze politics, and they knew about the peace process, so they were really older than their age when it comes to these matters, so I think it gave them a better education when it comes to politics. (Female, 21)

In contrast to the spectacular failure of the Arab states in the 1967 War, which was the final blow to the hopes that had been pinned on state-led pan-Arabism, the fedayeen offered renewed hope of redemption, even of a pan-Arabist cooperation, this time under the leadership of Palestinians:

Fedayeen gave us hope, ninety-five percent certainty that we’re going to liberate Palestine… The 1970 War made us disappointed. [Before 1970] there were so many fighters: Syrians, Jordanians, Lebanese, Egyptians. They gave us hope that Arabs are all united…. Yes, even Jordanians were helping the fedayeen… against Israel. (Male, 63)

For naazihiin, of course, the duration of their refugee situation was new, and many experienced the same early expectations of quick return as had those who arrived in 1948:

We got married before 1967 and lived in Nablus. When the war started, we fled to the mountains, then when things got easier we went to Amman. We left everything in Nablus, thinking we’ll be back soon…. (Female, 60)

For the laaji’in (those who fled their homes in 1948), who were the vast majority of the Palestinian population, by 1964 the duration of stay in Jordan had become a protracted situation. The second generation had already grown to teenagers in exile. There was an increasing perception that their cause had dropped off the international agenda, and was no longer seen as an urgent issue demanding resolution: In fact, the years of 1948-64 later became known as the “lost years” because “Palestine seemed to have disappeared from the regional political map and from international public discourse, as an independent actor and as a people….“ (Matar 2011, p. 59) This was compounded by the failures of the Arab states in the 1967 War and the widespread feeling of self-help,
as discussed above.

The 1967 War led many refugees to conclude that they would not be able to return to Palestine in the foreseeable future, which marked a significant shift from the practical hope that had been maintained throughout the 1950s and early 1960s:

It was a great disaster. It affected us more than what happened in 1948. Before that, I had hoped to go back 70%, but after that it went down to 5%. (Male, 70)

They stopped dreaming of going back – it was really hard [to think of] going back. Before 1967 they could go to the West Bank and buy stuff, but afterwards they couldn’t. (Male, 37)

They were more depressed and more hopeless. It’s like saying, “You will never go back.” (Female, 20)

The loss of practical hope of return among the 1948 refugees, combined with the arrival of the PLO, the wholesale failure of the Arab states in the 1967 War, and the alleged success of the fedayeen in the 1968 Karameh War, led to a profound shift in the attitudes of Palestinians in Jordan. In short, they largely turned away from reliance on powerful Arab states to redeem the homeland on their behalf, and instead adopted a widespread belief in self-help, the necessity of taking their own independent action to achieve their collective project.

**Political opportunities**

As in the first period of their exile, the political opportunities for militarization were mostly still present from 1964 to 1970. There was little securitization of refugee camps and communities. UNRWA’s immunity from host state laws regarding labor organizations made it a source of political space for organization. (Brand 1988) Militant organizations such as Fatah and the PFLP were able to train, organize, move, communicate, and store weapons, particularly after 1967. The only exception was a
period from summer 1966 to just before the 1967 War, when the government shut down the PLO’s offices in response to their escalating attacks on Israel, which were attracting damaging reprisals from the Israeli military, but the government was unable to stop cross-border attacks by Fatah. (Brand 1988; Sicker 1989) Earlier, King Hussein had also vetoed a PLO plan to establish bases along the border with Israel and levy taxes on refugees in camps; but he allowed attacks by Fatah, which he saw at that time as a counterweight to the Nasser-supported PLO. (Sicker 1989)

The 1967 War had a devastating impact on Jordan’s military and economy, which severely weakened the government’s coercive capacity, and it also severely damaged the perceived legitimacy of such methods. (Brand 1988) As one ex-guerrilla interviewee stated, after 1967, there were no police, no mukhabarat and no border control. Fedayeen, loaded with weapons, were able to travel easily between countries, barely even bothering to conceal the weapons they were smuggling into Jordan.\(^{167}\) Whether for lack of will or capacity, Jordan did not interfere with the militarization of the fedayeen after the war. (Abu-Odeh 1999; Sicker 1989)

In the late 1960s, East Bank Jordanians were still more supportive of the fedayeen than Israel (some even joined the fedayeen); Israel and Jordan were still officially in a state of war; and the international community remained focused on state actors rather than non-state actors like the PLO. The only political opportunity which decreased from the earlier period was the defense capability of their CoO. By gaining control over the West Bank in the 1967 War, Israel improved its defensive capacities, as the Jordan River, including nearby high ground and a shortened defensive perimeter, is easier to monitor and defend than an arbitrary line. (Schiff 1995)

\(^{167}\) Palestinian ex-guerrilla, personal interview, 12/8/10; cf. Abu-Odeh 1999
Conflict resources

There was not much change in the availability of conflict resources from the earlier period. The Palestinian militant organizations were able to obtain supplies of money, arms and support from the revolutionary states of Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Algeria, as well as China and the USSR, and money from the wealthy Gulf states. (Sayigh 1997; Abu-Odeh 1999; Brand 1988; Bourne 2007) Humanitarian aid and care for dependents from UNRWA continued to be available. However, donor states continued to watch UNRWA’s activities carefully, and the US “strongly protested suspected provision of food to the Palestinian army and the Congress passed legislation forbidding contribution to agencies supporting terrorist groups.” (Schiff 1995, p. 103)

Jordan opposed the PLO’s activities, and in 1965 had supplied weapons to towns and villages in the West Bank bordering Israel in order to counter the influence of the PLO. Jordan, which was part of a conservative regional coalition facing a revolutionary alliance of Egypt, Syria and the PLO, certainly did not supply the PLO, except for some assistance and sympathy they received from local Jordanian army officers along the Jordan River. However, whether the government of Jordan wanted to or not, it provided the training grounds, staging grounds and safe havens for them. (Abu-Odeh 1999)

Militarization

The new wave of refugees in 1967 were more inclined toward militancy than had been those who arrived in 1948 upon their arrival. They “gravitated toward the Palestine Liberation Organization as an outlet for their political frustrations. They created enclaves in the Jordan Valley and in the Amman area in which they sought to create authority independent of the Jordanian government.” (Schiff 1995, p. 69) When households who
arrived in 1967 were asked what they or their ancestors believed at that time was the best way to address their grievances, 38% said armed conflict.\textsuperscript{168} Only 5% of households arriving in 1967 replied that they believed it was impossible to address their grievances, which is significantly less than the 23% of households which had said that in regard to their family’s arrival in 1948 (p < 0.1). Just under a quarter of refugees, 1948 and 1967 combined, mentioned that a relative was involved with the fedayeen; this is probably an underestimate of the actual proportion, due to the political sensitivity of the admission.

Fatah and the PFLP began conducting border raids on Israel in 1965 without authorization by the Jordanian leadership\textsuperscript{169}, and attacks escalated sharply after the 1967 War. The fedayeen were based in, and recruited from, the refugee camps, especially Wihdat and Baqa’a camps\textsuperscript{170}:

They lived in a refugee camp, the area and the period of the fedayeen. If there were problems or troubles, the fedayeen solved all the problems of the people in the refugee camp, in the 1960s, before the 1970 war. (Male, 28)

[I lived in ____ Camp] until university. It is the origin of the Palestinian revolution…. I consider it a part of Palestine. (laughing)…. It was the place of political parties through the 1960s and 70s and 80s…. I have been brought up with the fedayeen – the Fatah party called [us] “the flowers of the fedayeen”. I was a kid, seven or eight years old, and I was playing with guns…. I did not know my childhood actually…. Our teachers were fedayeen also, so I was brought up with these ideas, so… that’s why I have this mentality now, I cannot leave it at all. I don’t know [my family’s village in Palestine] at all but I have to go back to [it]. I will die… still fighting for these ideas. I will put it in my kids… I cannot abandon the idea. (Palestinian activist, male, 49)

This sometimes drew attacks on the camps from Israeli forces:

So of course the Jews were coming to Jordan at night and going back in the morning, looking for armed people. One year, when I was living in ____ Camp, the hill east of the camp, there were planes, the [Israeli] soldiers came and searched people for weapons and went back. Some people were fedayeen, attacking Israelis and coming back. They

\textsuperscript{168} Only 29% of households had indicated that in regard to their attitudes in 1948 (p < .05) – and, as described in the previous chapter, in 1948 they had mostly been referring to armed conflict by the Arab states, not militarized Palestinian refugees.

\textsuperscript{169} Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006

\textsuperscript{170} Due to the highly sensitive nature of this topic, names of camps have been redacted from the individual quotes to further ensure their anonymity.
Not everybody in the camp welcomed the guerrillas, and not all recruitment was voluntary:

[We] were in ____ [Camp]… Even the fedayeen [did not help] Palestinians [much]. It was unfair. Like after 8:00 PM nobody could leave the house. And the kids were taken from school and forced to train as soldiers. And forced them to register as Fatah. And parents were refusing…. [We] resented fedayeen dominance in the camp. (Male, 50)

My dad was born in 1957, so he was young. The fedayeen took him with them, they trained him, taught him how to fight, but once my grandmother was able to catch him she just hid him in the house. He wasn’t involved in the fighting, he was young. (Male, 27)

By 1970 the Palestinians had established a state within a state, based in the refugee camps but recruiting heavily in the cities, moving freely about Jordan while armed, and challenging the domestic sovereignty and security of their host government.

Fatah had a troop strength of about 7,000 fedayeen and could draw on a reserve of many thousands more supporters and trainees; PFLP and other militant groups fielded an additional 2,000-3,000 fedayeen. (CIA 1970) The Palestinians had their own external sources of revenue, which they used to purchase weaponry independently of Jordanian control. Fedayeen controlled the public areas in Amman, including most streets and hotels, and even manned their own border checkpoints. (Abu-Odeh 1999; Sicker 1989; Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006; Bacik 2008; Sayigh 1997) However, the goal of the PLO at this time was not the East Bank Jordanians’ nightmare scenario of al-watan al-badil, or an alternative homeland for the Palestinians, but rather “to replace the regime with a government more accommodating to Palestinian demands in order to secure for itself a base from which to launch military operations against Israeli targets without Jordanian government interference.” (Brand 1988, p. 11)

Events climaxed in September 1970, now memorialized by Palestinians as Black September. Following the landing of hijacked airliners by Palestinians in Jordan, weeks
of sporadic clashes with the fedayeen, an assassination attempt against King Hussein (Sicker 1989) and an order by Yasser Arafat to overthrow King Hussein’s “Fascist government” (BBC, 9/17/70 [2009]), the Jordanian king decided to shut down PLO operations in his country. For ten days the Jordanian army unleashed relentless force against the Palestinians, not bothering to differentiate between militants and civilians as they bombed the Amman refugee camps and hounded guerrillas throughout the country, while the fedayeen fought back. The number of deaths is unknown but is estimated in the tens of thousands. (Farsoun & Aruri 2006)

Interviewees related some of the ways in which they were directly affected. Not surprisingly, households which still live in camps or are camp-centered were more affected than non-camp households. Camp and camp-centered households stated three times more frequently (28%) than non-camp households (9%) (p < .05) that the Jordanian military attacked their camp or neighborhood, including the use of rape as a torture tactic:

Every person used to kill each other, we didn’t know if this was a Palestinian or Jordanian. It was a civil war…. There were a lot of bombs, just like rain. I didn’t know any member of my family who was involved in this, but my friend was feda’ee, he brought a gun for me, but I refused…. More than forty years ago and I still remember this…. Nobody was secure. The majority of houses were destroyed. A lot of people died, were shot…. And all that I built in ten years was destroyed in one second…. (Male, 75)

In the camp there were no men, just women, and they used to rape the women here to find out where the men are…. They were in underground caves near here. (Male, 36)

[The military] would knock on the door and ask where are the men, and if they don’t answer they take them and rape them to find out where the men are. (Female, 45)

They told me that they were searching houses, and any house in which they found weapons, they took all the men living in that house. (Male, 29)

Nearly one-fifth of camp and camp-centered households stated that the military searched or attacked their home:

They entered our house, they were looking for guns everywhere, even in furniture. Even
toy guns, they used to think it was real, they used to take it and say, “We don’t need any kids with guns.” They destroyed the furniture and the doors and looked under the beds, and if they found anything you don’t know what’s going to happen with [that person]. I saw this with my own eyes. (Female, 47)

There was a missile that hit our house. It made a hole in the roof. My uncle was a feda’ee. They were living in caves, underground, to hide from the fighting. My family and all my neighbors…. (Male, 28)

I was arrested with [many] other civilians and stayed ten days in jail…. They said, “All fedayeen come with us, we will take you to Syria.” I started to stand up, [even though] I was not fedayeen, but my neighbor just told me, “Sit down!” The fedayeen were taken to… the worst jail in Jordan, in the desert, where they were [tortured], beaten, killed, and after one month were [buried]…. (Male, 65)

Camp and camp-centered households were also more than twice as likely to state that they fled their home and hid or lived in underground caves (23%) than non-camp households (9%) (p < 0.1).¹⁷¹

They killed a lot of us. Yes, we were sad, it was war. Our houses were destroyed and we ran away for 14 days… to our relatives’ house. Because here our mosque was a base [for the fedayeen]. (Male, 49)

The fedayeen war. We were here in the camp. It was a very difficult situation for us…. They dug holes in the ground to hide when there was an attack. We were kids, but I remember. They hid us in these holes and the older people stayed above…. Many people were killed and injured. (Female, unknown age)

Non-camp households were more likely to report that they experienced a general sense of fear (23%) than camp households (5%) (p < 0.01). Overall, 17% of households reported that a relative was hurt or killed as a result of the war:

My brother was killed…. He was a civilian, not a feda’ee nor in the army…. He was killed in front of the door of the house. It was unbelievable for us. How the Jordanians and Palestinians… how this could happen between them. It’s unbelievable. In our neighborhood, at the beginning of it there was a Fatah office. And we used to see the militants, and we were dealing with them as brothers…. I was 13 years old. There was no water. So [my brother] took a vessel to go to the building near us to fill it from the tanks… because we were really thirsty, but unfortunately they killed him…. We were in [____ Camp] at that time. (Female, 54)

¹⁷¹ This was an open-ended question, and interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one response. These statistics probably underestimate actual incidence due to the highly sensitive nature of the 1970 War in Palestinian-Jordanian relations, which likely caused some interviewees to deny that their family was affected, or claim ignorance.
Two [of my] brothers died. I saw them when they were killed. One was named ____, they shot him. My two-year-old brother, they shot him through the eye and the bullet went through my arm. There was shooting everywhere and it was like we were between two fires, the fedayeen and Jordanians. So I don’t know who killed them, the Jordanians or Palestinians. (Male, 68)

My uncle was killed in this. He was a leader in Fatah at that time…. They had weapons and everything… My older uncle was in the Jordanian army, and opposite him was my younger uncle… (Male, 25)

As a result of the civil war, the PLO signed an agreement in which they recognized the Jordanian king’s sovereignty over all the state’s territory, and moved their organization and operations to southern Lebanon. However, intermittent clashes of lower intensity between Palestinians and the Jordanian military continued for years after the departure of the PLO. (Bacik 2008, p. 156)

Conclusion

The second period of the Palestinians’ stay in Jordan, from 1964 to 1970, was a tumultuous one. As summarized in Figure 4 below, a collective project to redeem the homeland was present as the Palestinian ethnonationalist project rose quickly in popularity, while pan-Arabism lost influence. Organized militancy entrepreneurs framed their arguments in the language of injustice and primordial ties to the land of Palestine, mobilizing refugees with the chance to utilize their own efforts to redeem the homeland through militarization – a claim which would have been unlikely a decade earlier, but was plausible after the Arab states’ humiliating defeat in the 1967 War and the claimed victory by fedayeen in 1968. Political opportunities and conflict resources remained available since the 1948-1963 period, and even increased after the 1967 War. As a result, mass engagement in militarization occurred among the refugees, with camps utilized as bases and sources of support and recruitment for the fedayeen. While some recruitment in urban areas did occur, those Palestinians who were more socioeconomically integrated
were less likely to personally take up arms, even though many did support the fedayeen both in attitude and in material support.

**Figure 4. Summary: Palestinians in Jordan, 1964-70**

- Experienced war of exclusion with clear enemy?  
  - Yes  
  - Economically or politically attached to land in CoO?  
    - Yes  
    - Socioeconomically marginalized in host state?  
      - Yes  
      - Pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs?  
        - Yes  
        - Little hope of redemption by powerful patron(s)?  
          - Yes  
          - Political opportunities?  
            - Yes  
            - **Mass Militarization**
          - No  
        - No  
      - No  
    - No  
  - No  

Collective project, may support others, but little militarization themselves
CHAPTER 7: Palestinians in Jordan, 1971 to 2011

The 1970 War led to some significant changes in Jordan, with implications particularly for Palestinians’ political opportunities for militarization. In this chapter I will demonstrate that, even with the passage of time and the rise of two new generations, the group’s collective project has not abated. There are still militancy entrepreneurs who are willing and able to take the reins of organizing armed activity, and conflict resources are available. In this period, the only factor which is clearly preventing militarization is the lack of political opportunity.

**Collective project**

The collective project has been passed down to the third and fourth generations, as even young people today continue to express support for armed conflict against Israel in hopes of redeeming the homeland.

**War of Exclusion with a Clear Enemy**

It is clear that both the 1948 and 1967 Wars remain categorized as a war of exclusion in the perception of the vast majority of the Palestinian refugee community. Memories of the expulsions in 1948 and 1967 merged into a dominant community narrative in which Israel (‘the Jews’ pre-1948) engaged in an active policy of ethnic cleansing against Palestinians for the purpose of controlling and expanding the territory of the Jewish state. The enemy remained clear: Israel and Zionists, and sometimes Jews more broadly, became the boogeyman of Palestinian politics, the covert culprit responsible for every major negative event, including the 1970 War. The exclusion is continuously reproduced by the fact that Israel has never allowed the refugees to
Even without the presence of the PLO in Jordan, the Palestinian ethnonationalist movement has grown and strengthened since 1971. The 1970 War itself led to a “stronger, though hushed, sense of Palestinian nationalism,” as the Palestinians in Jordan felt both guilt for the actions of the fedayeen and resentment of the Jordanian government. (Abu-Odeh 1999, p. 190) Combined with the rise of East Bank Jordanian nationalism, which sought to politically exclude Palestinians from the Jordanian state, over the next three decades, this led to their affective estrangement from the state and increased political orientation toward the ethnonational project – regionally led in the 1970s and 1980s by the PLO.

Salience in time of crisis

The Palestinian identity and ethnonationalist project become especially salient in times of crisis and violence in Israeli-Palestinian relations. For instance, when asked how the first Intifada affected them and their family, 23% of interviewees said that it revived their hopes in the Palestinian cause and/or the redemption of their homeland:

We were very happy because the resistance in Palestine started to move. The countries all around the world were reminded of the Palestinian cause. (Male, 57)

It’s like a revived hope [for] the Palestinian people… like a dead tree which came back to life. The new generation did not forget about their lands. So the occupied Palestine does not belong to the Jews, they are just colonizers. And we hope that the Intifada continues all the time…. (Male, 48)

The first Intifada represented the first challenge from the Palestinian people to the Zionist forces. Even children threw stones at the tanks. People were not afraid of the “invincible” Israeli army any more. So all the world saw that these people who are

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172 Israel’s policy of refusing return by Palestinian refugees “turns the principle of non-refoulement on its head. The issue is not whether the conditions are safe for repatriation, as in many other refugee cases, but whether they will ever be allowed to return.” (Dumper 2008, p. 190)
defending themselves using stones, if they have enough weapons they would have won and defeated their enemy. (Male, 53)

A few interviewees indicated that it raised their political awareness:

We started to know more information about Palestine because of the Intifada. Our parents had just told us their stories. But after the Intifada we started to read books, know more about it, know about the massacres, why our parents left Palestine, how many Palestinians are in different countries. We started to study it, we started to be more connected to Palestine…. It was like, we started to think that we can have another future. (Palestinian activist, male, 36)

However, many participants, particularly those in their 20s and early 30s, did not remember the first Intifada well; more than a quarter of interviewees said they don’t know.

In regard to the second Intifada, however, almost everyone described how it affected them. Camp refugees (including those who are camp-centered) reported being more affected, and more active in response to the events, than non-camp refugees: 22% of those with a camp attachment said it revived their hopes\(^\text{173}\); and 20% of non-camp refugees, but only 4% of camp refugees, said they were not affected (\(p < .05\)). Most interesting for the purposes of this project, however, is that just over one-third of refugees overall\(^\text{174}\) stated, in response to this open-ended question, that the second Intifada raised their political awareness, mobilized them to protests…

All the camp was affected…. They were doing broadcasts and stuff. Even King Abdullah brought the family of Mohammad al-Durra [boy whose death by Israeli fire was captured on video] to Jordan to be part of the broadcasting. And [the main street in the camp] was very small, so they just widened it to serve all the volume of protests. (Male, 23)

When the Israeli prime minister… came to the Aqsa mosque and killed the people who were praying there, this is a criminal act and this what Israelis do to the people in Palestine. This makes us responsible to do many things. We have to learn the lesson: No negotiations, no peace; the fight with Jews is the fight for survival. They have to know, the Palestinian leadership, they have to know who will survive, that it’s not a fight for borders. So if you have a poll here in the camp, the Palestinian leadership with

\(^{173}\) This was an open-ended question, and interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one response.

\(^{174}\) The proportions of camp and non-camp refugees mentioning this response were similar.
Mahmoud Abbas should know that the negotiations with Israel are worthless and do not represent the Palestinian people. (Palestinian activist, male, 30)

In 2000, I remember this. It affected us a lot, in school we always discussed the situation and we felt injustice, and for the first time, as a student, I felt the injustice and suffering of the Palestinian people, because we saw many things on TV. I hadn’t seen anything like that before because I didn’t experience war. When we saw these things I started asking questions, like, “Why is this happening?” And since that time we started to really understand the situation in Palestine. (Female, 22)

… or that they would even have gone to Palestine to participate if possible (cf. Farah 2005):

It has affected us psychologically, especially my children…. People wanted to go back to resist, but we can’t. Because we miss our land and want to go to fight with them. (Female, 45)

This is the one that affected us, because we lived it. We were in seventh grade. We were very sad and depressed. We wanted to go back to Palestine and defend Palestine. We were sad because we were watching the news and weren’t able to do anything to defend Palestine. (Female, 21)

Camps

As noted throughout this text, camp and non-camp refugees often hold divergent attitudes about aspects of the conflict with the CoO and their life in Jordan. The Palestinian camps are mostly crowded slums, but there is a pervasive sentiment that the camp is intertwined with the meaning of being a Palestinian refugee. The historical connection, suffering and concentration of Palestinians in a small area reminds Palestinians, both those who live inside and outside the camps, of the injustice of their exile and the Palestinian national identity:

[The thing I am most satisfied about is] that I live in a camp. Because it’s a traditional life, surrounded by refugees, we all have hope of… return. We still have hope. (Male, 30)

The people in the camp are very good, helpful, they live in harmony, are very close to each other. If someone dies in the camp, all the mosques will call that this person died, and everybody should go to the funeral. We help each other. We are like one big family.…. I’ve been living here for 40 years, so all the people in the camp know me. So they will say salaamu aleikum to me if I go outside. But if I go to another place, they won’t know me. This is the difference between the camps and the cities…. It’s like the
villages in Palestine, everybody knows each other. (Male, 60)

This camp reminds me of Palestine…. It is divided into two different neighborhoods, [each] from a different [part of Palestine], Rafah and Beer Seba…. (Male, 53)

Here is the best life. There’s no racism – such as I’m from this part and you’re from that part. We are all one people and feel for each other. And our atmosphere is different, we help each other. Outside the camp there’s nothing like this. (Female, 22)

Some interviewees drew a direct connection from living conditions inside and outside the camp to political attitudes:

If you met my [two-year-old] girl, she would tell you that she is Palestinian and that is her land. And all people who are in the camp feel the same. Outside the camp… I don’t deal with those outside, but I guess [they don’t feel the same]. Others, in the cities, have a good situation, their own businesses, education is very good for them, but here we do not [have such a good situation]. (Male, 40)

[There is more political activism in the camps] because they still have the suffering…. Yes, [it makes them more active,] 100% Palestinian. If you see Gaza [Jerash] Camp, it’s a very bad situation. Most of them don’t know about Palestine, but we have non-stop activities [there]. (Palestinian activist, male, 49)

While most camp residents left the camp as they acquired the means to do so (Ramzoun 2001; Hanssen-Bauer & Jacobsen 2007), a few households with the means to leave have chosen to remain there as a political statement:

Even if I were a millionaire, I wouldn’t leave the camp…. I feel that this camp is my country. I feel that when my father came here, he brought a piece of Palestine with him and established it here in Jordan. When I go outside of the camp, I feel like I’m crossing the border from one country to another. When I go out, I feel homesick for this “country”, the camp. If I had money I would build a house here, establish a playground and swimming pool, all the things that children are deprived of here in the camp, I would establish here for them. (Palestinian activist, male, 36)

[The camp] is a sign that we are Palestinian…. Some people in the camp don’t believe that we can go out of the camp and start a new life. Either stay in the camp or go back to Palestine. [Why do they feel that way?] Because they have dreams and hopes to go back to Palestine. They think that if they leave the camp, they won’t be able to go back to Palestine…. They are living in the past…. The older generation had a good mentality and worked to live outside the camp, but the new generation is really bad. They were born in the camp and their roots are in it. The older generation believed in the right to return [and didn’t need the camp to remind them of it]. (Multiple household members)

We had many opportunities [to buy land], but our parents were strict about it. Because [the camp] is the address of the refugees. I told you, ignorance was just controlling them. They didn’t know the future. They thought the camp was the title of coming back. They
were really rich, they had many opportunities. But they thought the best way to go back to Palestine is to stay in the camp.... (Male, 40)

AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC BASE

Since there was no major exodus of Palestinians from the CoO to Jordan between 1971-2011, there is nothing new to add regarding the transferability of property and skills. Second and later generations of refugees have grown up in the Jordanian educational system and have not endured the difficult adjustment from an agricultural to non-agricultural economic base. Even adults who arrived in 1967 are now in their 60s and older, generally past the age when people stop working, or they have passed away. Very few Palestinians today continue to suffer because of economic dislocation from an agricultural base, although this has been a very gradual change.

Some refugee households, particularly those who arrived in 1967, are in contact with relatives in the West Bank or Gaza, who can update them regularly on the economic situation there, but most refugee households in Jordan are not. Relatively few (27%) have ever visited west of the Jordan River, and even fewer (9%) have crossed to the Israeli side of the Green Line, where the 1948 refugees’ property and land are located. Interestingly, however, a few innovative refugees have started using technology such as Google Earth to check on the status of their family’s village and property:

I saw the village on the internet and it was surrounded by wires and nobody is allowed to go there. In the surrounding areas the Jews live there, but the village itself is empty. (Male, 29)

They wrote on the sign of this village, “Property of the absent”. So Jews have not built anything there…. The village they [my family was] living in, nobody was left there. Israel destroyed the whole village…. The house is still there. We can see it on the internet, a picture of it. My grandfather told me, “This is our house.” (Male, 57)

175 UNRWA, for those Palestinians who attend its schools, uses the Jordanian educational curriculum. (Mohammed Tarakhan, personal interview, 1/26/11)
Greed

This variable did not change from the earlier periods.

In sum, over the course of the past forty years, the Palestinian collective project has been thriving in Jordan. The project is no longer founded on a practical economic attachment to land in the CoO, but rather on a strong ethnonationalist movement which has a special relationship to the camps. The dominant narrative of the collective project is based on the wars of 1948 and 1967, perceived to be wars of exclusion perpetuated by a clear enemy.

Socioeconomic integration and marginalization

Rights in the Host State & Employment Opportunities

Over the last four decades, non-Gazan Palestinians have continued to enjoy the citizenship and most of the rights and extensive economic integration which they had begun to develop in the first two decades of their stay in Jordan. Whereas East Bank Jordanians have a seemingly guaranteed public sector job and pension, Palestinians grew to dominate the private sector, to the extent that low-skill jobs in Amman which used to be filled by poor Palestinians, such as construction and street sweeping, are now usually filled by imported laborers. Some Palestinians have risen to become very wealthy. As one foreign diplomat stated, “The East Bankers’ government jobs don’t pay well…. The Palestinians are very entrepreneurial, economic [elites]…. Who are my neighbors in Derekh Bar [a wealthy neighborhood of Amman]? Mostly Palestinians.” (Personal interview, 5/4/11)

Citizenship, rights and integration to the Jordanian economy have led to economic
orientation toward their host state rather than the CoO for most Palestinians. But Jordan is still a developing country, and most Palestinians remain in the lower-middle class. The median household income of Palestinians in my sample was just under JD 4,000 (US$5,650) per annum. When asked what they personally would most like to change about their life in Jordan\(^{176}\), very few gave political answers related to their CoO or ethnonationalist project. The majority (54%) said they would like to improve their economic situation. Even when answering the question, “What does it mean to you now to be Palestinian?”\(^{177}\), more than a quarter referred to a transnational Palestinian-Jordanian identity instead:

My mother and father had Jordanian citizenship and used to live in Palestine. But for me, we were born here and have Jordanian citizenship, so we just care about Palestine from the Jordanian side. (Male, 49)

Palestine stays in my mind because it’s our house and home…. We are Jordanian, the reality is to Jordan because we are living in Jordan, born in Jordan, everything in Jordan…. I served in the army…. Just remember, we are Jordanian. but we will die dreaming of Palestine. Even if I was the President of America I would just love Palestine. (Male, 42)

When they ask me what nationality you are, I say, “Um… Palestinian”, but for something formal, I say “Jordanian”. When it comes to work, university, something [where] I need to show ID, I say “Jordanian”, but informal situations, with my friends, [I say] “Palestinian”. (Female, 21)

Some linked this feeling of transnationalism to their high level of economic integration in Jordan:

To be honest, in Jordan we are living in a very good situation here. Jordan is our country but Palestine is our home. (Male, 40)

I am in Jordan but in my heart I am Palestinian. I will never change my roots…. I am really proud of being Jordanian, too, because the government feeds us and heals our sick people…. I love Jordan more than Palestine. My husband is sick, but the government pays everything for him, so without the government and Allah, how could I live?

\(^{176}\) This was an open-ended question, and interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one response.

\(^{177}\) This was an open-ended question, and interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one response.
For most Palestinians, their absolute standard of living, including social mobility, has continued to rise over the course of their family’s stay in Jordan. Two-thirds of interviewees stated that their family’s living standard had improved from the time they first arrived in Jordan to today:

My father spent all his life here in Jordan. The same thing for me here in Jordan. I studied in Jordan, I’m working in Jordan, I will die in Jordan. We cannot compare between our grandfathers’ generation and now, because everything has changed. Until I was twelve years old, we had no electricity in our houses. But now we have internet, satellite dishes, everything. (Male, 42)

At first it was very bad and after that it got better. The Palestinians are just survivors, they just want to live, get on with their lives, they won’t give up. My grandfather went to Saudi Arabia and Oman to work there. Two of my uncles were working… in construction or something like that. If they didn’t get a scholarship they wouldn’t have been able to get an education, so the only way was to study hard and get a scholarship. So I think everyone was trying to adapt to the life [here]. But now it is very good. One of my uncles is very wealthy, one is in Australia. Everything is good now, it’s getting better now. (Female, 22)

Only 7% of interviewees said their family’s living standard has gotten worse since first arriving in Jordan. Not surprisingly, the improvement has been less marked for camp refugees, of whom only 58% said that it had improved, compared to 70% of non-camp refugees (p < .10).

Nonetheless, the effect of their unresolved political status regarding Palestine and its political evolution – including the 1974 declarations by the Arab League and UN that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, Jordan’s 1988 disengagement from the West Bank and its 1994 peace treaty with Israel178 – has complicated their host state’s approach to integrating them, leading to an uneasy feeling...

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178 Hanafi (2009) notes that the terms of the 1994 treaty led Jordan to more actively integrate the refugee camps in socioeconomic programs: “This agreement has played a significant role within the camps and has contributed to the change in Jordanian policies toward the camps and their dwellers. Many urban planning initiatives have targeted refugee camps, especially in the area surrounding Amman, which has raised the issue of resettlement of Palestinians in Jordan.” (p. 13)
of long-term uncertainty among Palestinians.\(^{179}\) (Hanafi 2010; Farah 2005) Furthermore, discrimination in employment and educational opportunities, and social prejudice against Palestinians, increased sharply after 1970; while Gazans’ lack of rights and economic integration has made them a very unique subset of the Palestinian refugees in Jordan.

**Discrimination**

As a result of the 1970 War and the 1974 declarations, there was a contraction of Palestinians’ rights in Jordan as the monarchy, wary of the Palestinians’ loyalty, shifted alliances from Palestinian urban elites to East Bank tribes.\(^ {180}\) Immediately after the civil war, the government purged fedayeen supporters – primarily Palestinians but also some East Bank Jordanians – from the military, intelligence services, and civil service. This gradually evolved into a “de-Palestinianization process”, which, partly due to the Palestinian refugees’ sense of guilt for the role of the fedayeen in instigating the civil war, and partly due to the availability of jobs in the private sector and the Gulf, did not arouse protests from Palestinians.\(^ {181}\) (Abu-Odeh 1999, p. 190; Al-Quds Center 2009)

Due to the *makramat malakiya* (lit., “privileges of the King”) system in which admission quotas at universities are reserved primarily for the children of soldiers, they also found it difficult to gain entrance to public universities.\(^ {182}\) Nearly half of interviewees stated that

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\(^{179}\) A report on Palestinians in Jordan by the Al-Quds Center notes that there is “an identity dilemma… between a sentiment of belonging to Jordan (where many of them were born and raised) and their longing for Palestine. Successive Jordanian governments and the nascent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza have both pondered the desirable degree of integration… in Jordan. They have both asked whether it is in their long-term interests to make a reality of the right of return. These dilemmas have nurtured amongst [Palestinians in Jordan] a feeling of precariousness….“ (2009, p. 13)

\(^{180}\) Former PLO legal advisor, personal interview, 12/26/10; Al-Quds Center 2009

\(^{181}\) Mandatory military service for males was instituted in 1976, which led to an increase of Palestinian participation in the military, but only at low levels, while the higher ranks were reserved for East Bank Jordanians. (Brand 1988)

\(^{182}\) Lex Takkenberg, personal interview, 11/10/10
their rights decreased after 1970, and this is probably an underestimate due to the sensitivity of the issue. For example:

Because of the war, there was a lot of prejudice…. There used to be Palestinians in high positions of the Jordanian army, but after the war they were kicked out of these positions because they didn’t trust them. (Male, 37)

[Since the war] there is discrimination… not only in job offices, but in the police, for example if the police pull you over and looks at your last name and sees you are Palestinian, the treatment is different. Even in prisons, the treatment is different. (Male, 28)

In the army, there are no job opportunities – or in civil defense, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or mukhabarat…. There was difficulty for Palestinians to obtain good jobs, even until now. (Male, 66)

The decrease in rights led to worsening economic conditions for Palestinians:

The work was not [available] like before the war. Living conditions were affected, we didn’t have money like we used to, and it stayed like that… for years. (Female, 46)

The problem of employment was especially acute for the thousands of ex-fedayeen who stayed or returned to Jordan, but were banned from all government and military service:

My uncle went to Syria and came back, so he can’t work in the government. And of course those who were fedayeen don’t have jobs in the government. So people from my generation weren’t… there were no jobs for people like me in the government. People who left Jordan and then came back, their names are recorded in the government, so they cannot be employed in the government. (Male, 48)

In camps, however, almost one-fifth of interviewees stated in response to this question that they received more assistance from the Jordanian government than they had before 1970, which may have been an attempt by the government to subdue anger among the camp population after the war.

Despite the official discourse of “One Jordan” and attempts to erase the distinction between Palestinians and Jordanians, the discrimination, and rumors of it, are rife even today. Although I did not ask a question about it, more than half (76 out of 134) of the Palestinian interviewees voluntarily raised the topic. Of those 76 interviewees, 65% stated that there is discrimination and/or prejudice:
[My wife] applied for a vacancy in an UNRWA school…. She was declined and the job was given to a [East Bank] Jordanian…. There’s a guy who wanted to be in Parliament and he got 14,000 votes – all the Palestinians voted for him – but the government said he got only 3,000 votes…. Someone who is Jordanian got the seat. (Male, 25)

Applying for the military or public sector jobs here, they ask, “Where are you from?” I said, “Dubai.” Then, “Your father?” I said, “He was born in Wadi Seer, here in Amman.” Then, “Your grandfather?” I said, “He is from Jerusalem.” Then, “Aaahhh, Palestinian.” And (makes gesture of writing something down dismissively). No opportunities in the public sector. (Male, 32)

On the other hand, many other interviewees praised Jordan for its excellent treatment of the Palestinian refugees, claiming that they have equal rights with East Bank Jordanians, including the ability to serve in the military and government employment.

When asked what they are most satisfied with about their life in Jordan\textsuperscript{183}, 22\% of interviewees said, “Equal rights with Jordanians”. There are two noteworthy points about this result: First, only about a quarter as many camp refugees (6\%) as non-camp refugees (25\%) mentioned this satisfaction with equal treatment (p < .01). Second, part of these responses should be discounted because they were probably given as the perceived “correct answer” due to fear of the mukhabarat. Nonetheless, others are genuine in appreciation for what they perceive as equality\textsuperscript{184}:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Jordanian and Palestinian people are the same. They host us and open the doors for us, and were very hospitable in schools, factories and jobs. We have the same rights as Jordanians; there are no differences between us and Jordanians. (Male, 65)
  \item We have health insurance, our children [serve in] the Jordanian military…. My father and uncles were serving in the Jordanian army. And we study in the university with the makramah. There is no discrimination between Jordanians and Palestinians. (Female, 41)
  \item We are considered as being Jordanians, so we have Jordanian [ID] cards and national ID numbers, so we have the same rights, except for the people from Gaza. We have established our lives here, so we don’t feel like strangers. (Female, 21)
\end{itemize}

This seemingly irreconcilable contradiction from the opinions of most

\textsuperscript{183} This was an open-ended question, and interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one response.

\textsuperscript{184} It is difficult to distinguish the latter from the former.
Palestinians is probably due in part to whether the individual is comparing their rights to East Bank Jordanians (glass half empty), or to Palestinians in other Arab states or the low expectations they have of rights for refugees in general (glass half full):

Personally I appreciate Jordanian citizenship very much, because I [was able to get] educated in government schools and universities, like a Jordanian citizen. I have loyalty to Jordan, because when I see Lebanon….. There is no security, [no social services]…. So I appreciate and am proud to have this citizenship…. I have met many Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. We have a different mentality now. In Lebanon, they say “We are Palestinian only, we have no loyalty to Lebanon, and that’s it.” But here, we have citizenship here, studied here, we have many Jordanian friends. I have loyalty to this country and to Palestine…. (Male, 25)

For Palestinian people, all the rights can be taken from the Jordanian government, when you compare it to other countries. I was in Saudi Arabia and Libya and Egypt, so I know how the conditions are for Palestinians. In Jordan you can take all the rights but it’s a little bit less than Jordanians. (Male, 27)

Camp refugees

As in the previous periods, there remains an economic segmentation even today between urban refugees, who are generally more socioeconomically integrated, and camp refugees, who are generally less integrated. As one interviewee stated, “Education, health, marriage, rights – we cannot take them 100% because we are in the camps. The Palestinian takes his rights if he is outside the camp.” (Male, 40) Despite the increased political attachment to the camp described by some camp residents, as discussed earlier, most camp refugees (61%) said that they would leave if they had the means to do so:

I would, of course, why would I not leave? I am thinking of leaving now, even without the money. If we’re talking about the old generation, my parents, they will stay here – they had many opportunities to leave, but they didn’t. But as for me, if I had an opportunity to leave today, I will. (Male, 32)

The camp is like one house [where] everyone is crowded, so we want to be able to breathe outside the camp. I love the camp, I was born here, I respect everyone here…. This is our refuge, the place that provides us protection, the place that I grew up…. The camp is a very narrow [area], everybody knows each other, there are troubles that happen between us, a few people are very bad…. We want to establish a good life for our children, better than this life. So I respect the people in the camp, I won’t forget it, but it’s very necessary for everyone to develop. For example, we are able to hear our neighbors through the wall because it’s very crowded. I love the camp, the camp is very
good, but it’s necessary for us to move on, to improve. (Male, 24)

To try to reconcile the political pull toward the camp and the economic push away from it, those who do leave sometimes plan to maintain a tangible link with the camp:

There is a chance, we are planning to leave…. So if we leave the camp we will not sell our house here in the camp, so wherever we live, this stays in our hearts. But if we want to improve our situation, we will develop, this is a natural thing…. And our children, this is the same thing, we will tell them about the camp. (Male, 37)

My father wanted to move out of the camp but we refused. Since last year I started to change my mind. We should have a base here in the camp, a family house, but we can live in other places. Maybe one day if I live in New York, I would come here to visit ____ Camp, I wouldn’t forget it. (Palestinian activist, female, 29)

For those who live in camps, their prolonged residence there “keeps the Palestinian community in confined spaces and reinforces the clear group boundaries. It makes the Palestinians, at least those in the camps, identifiable as an alien minority to themselves as well as to the host society.” (Hammer 2005, p. 17)

Gazans

As a result of their extremely limited rights in Jordan, comparison of Gazans with non-Gazan Palestinians in Jordan offers a rare natural field experiment in terms of attitudes and behaviors. Interviews with Gazans and local experts suggest that their lack of economic integration to Jordan has led to less economic and political orientation toward their host state and a stronger, practical intent to return:

Either they give us official citizenship… and a national ID number, or [it is better to] go to our village [in Palestine]…. We, the refugees who have no citizenship, even if… we go to the West Bank or Gaza, we would just go to another camp. So either to our [original] village, or nothing. (Male, 51)

I feel like I’m an injury, or a bomb that will explode at any moment…. Here in Jordan, we die here every day because of the pain and suffering. But in Palestine, even if they are killed or tortured or are unemployed, they live a good life just because they are living in their own land. (Palestinian activist, male, 36)

I think the Gazans want to return to Palestine more than other Palestinians in Jordan because their conditions are so bad here. They have nothing here. They’ll live in hell[ish conditions] here or in Gaza, better to live in hell in your own country. (Female, 22)
When asked what they expect will happen in their future personally, Gazans were more likely (33%) than non-Gazan Palestinians (12%) to state that they expect to return to Palestine (p < .05), even by infiltration:

(Young man:) If you had Palestinian citizenship, you would go to Gaza?  
(Activist:) Yes, immediately. They will allow me to go through Egypt to Gaza, through the tunnels, when I turn forty, inshallah in five years…. If Egypt allows us to go to Gaza we can go through the tunnels, it’s easy. Old women are allowed to go. They do this.  
(Young man:) I want to go back to Gaza. Even if I stay here for five or ten years, after that I will go back.  
(Activist:) We can go all together to Gaza.  
(Male, 19; Palestinian activist, male, 36)

In addition, their orientation toward the CoO seems to lead some Gazan refugees to identify more closely with Palestinian politics, and seek involvement in it, than Jordanian politics:

We hope that we will get more freedom after the [recent] reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, and to have representation in the PLO in refugee camps, and people will respect us, especially when it comes to expressing our own opinions…. I hope that we will have a representative from all the camps here in Jordan in the Palestinian National Council and the Palestinian Legislative Council. (Male, 53)

However, a stronger practical intent to return to the CoO among Gazans must be understood separately from political attitudes – as I will demonstrate later in this chapter, Gazans appear to hold attitudes which are no more militant than those of non-Gazans and non-camp refugees. Yet there seems to be more willingness among Gazans, as well as camp refugees more generally, to actually militarize:

When the Lebanon war happened in 1982, many people from [this camp] ran away and crossed the borders illegally to go to Beirut [and fight]. And during the Intifada also, the people who got visas to go to Palestine participated in the Intifada. (Male, 53)

Overall, there is substantial evidence that the Gazans’ severe restrictions and the failure to integrate them to the Jordanian economy has led to a significantly stronger

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185 This was an open-ended question, and interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one response.
practical orientation toward the CoO and willingness to militarize. The government of Jordan knows that the Gazans’ lack of rights constitutes a security risk, and is probably willing to give them citizenship, but it is hamstrung by the lobby of East Bank Jordanians, which opposes permanent resettlement of Palestinians in Jordan, and which sees policies on Gazans as an acid test of the monarchy’s intentions for all Palestinians.  

Institutions to address grievances through the host state

Jordan remained authoritarian throughout the 1970s and most of the 1980s. In the 1970s the Muslim Brotherhood was supported by the Jordanian government as a counterweight to leftist opposition, and it provided social services which the government was not able to provide. Following the departure of the leftist movements in 1971, the Muslim Brotherhood gradually began to fill the political vacuum of the opposition.

In 1989 and 1992, King Hussein instituted political reforms, including the ending of martial law and legalizing of political parties. (Marshall & Jaggers 2011) At the same time, with the fall of communism in Europe and Russia, leftist movements were losing credibility worldwide, including among Palestinians. Combined with Hamas’ debut performance in the West Bank and Gaza during the first Intifada in 1987, the support of Palestinians in Jordan shifted from Marxist movements to the Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF).

To Palestinians, the ideology of the movement did not matter as much as the final goal: achieving the aims of their collective project by reversing the situation in Palestine, creating a Palestinian state and implementing the right of return.  

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186 Jalal Al Husseini, personal interview, 12/6/10
187 Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10; Jordanian scholar, personal interview, 8/19/10
188 Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10
1990s the IAF, which is led and largely comprised of Palestinians, came to represent the Palestinian cause. (Al-Quds Center 2009)\textsuperscript{189} It was an avenue for Palestinians “to express their political aspirations as opposition to the status quo.”\textsuperscript{190} Similarly, Islamic activism came to be seen by Palestinians as a substitute for expression of Palestinian identity\textsuperscript{191}, which was politically sensitive and was even banned by royal decree in 1950 (Al Husseini & Bocco 2009). Throughout the last decade, however, the Jordanian government has curtailed the representation of the IAF in parliament, primarily through manipulations of electoral design. (Marshall & Jaggers 2011)

In sum, the Palestinians’ ability to express their political demands through the democratic process increased at the beginning of the 1990s, but it has waned again in recent years. As one interviewee stated, “It’s easier for people from the [East Bank] Jordanian tribes to talk with the government.” (Male, 57)

ETHNIC CONSANGUINITY & SOCIAL INTEGRATION

Although the high degree of ethnic consanguinity did not change from the previous periods, social prejudice from East Bank Jordanians increased after the 1970 War:

Here, when a Palestinian-Jordanian marries a Jordanian-Jordanian… it’s difficult because they always have in the back of their mind that you are [second class]. They are raised in this situation, it’s not their fault. I won’t blame him because his family raised him like that. Men especially are raised to make a separation.... That’s why I prefer not to interact with Jordanian-Jordanian males. (Female, 20)

There are people here in Jordan who are a little bit racist, like [asking], “Are you Palestinian or Jordanian?” Not everyone. When I hear it from a Palestinian, it’s ok for me. But when I hear it from someone who is not Palestinian, it is insulting to me, like he hates me. (Male, 25)

[My mother’s] neighbors in Ghor used to say, “If my finger were Palestinian, I would cut

\textsuperscript{189} Foreign diplomat, personal interview, 5/4/11
\textsuperscript{190} Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10
\textsuperscript{191} Formal legal advisor to PLO, personal interview, 12/26/10
it off.” The women were really tough…. They said, “Why are you here occupying our country?” But even despite that, we were proud of being Palestinian. (Female, 47)

Those few Palestinians who do have government jobs are careful to draw a distinction between official discrimination and social prejudice:

I am Palestinian and work in the government. There are no differences between Palestinians and Jordanians in the government. But the people are prejudiced, and always ask where I’m from. But His Majesty makes no distinctions; if you have the citizenship [then you are equal].…. If anyone told you that Palestinians can’t work in the government, don’t believe him. We can all work [in the government]…. I’m Palestinian and I’ve been working in the government for nineteen years. But the [Jordanian] people are [racist]. (Male, 49)

The discrimination and prejudice directed at Palestinians since 1970 has decreased their socioeconomic integration and led some refugees to identify more strongly as Palestinian (Farah 2005):

Even though I was born here and live here, Palestine is our country. I’ve never felt like a Jordanian citizen. Because the discrimination is obvious to everyone. (Male, 29)

Even the racism from Jordanians just makes us feel more strongly Palestinian. (Female, unknown age)

The distress that interviewees expressed at economic and social rejection in Jordan stands in sharp contrast to the distress that their ancestors expressed at integration. (Abu-Odeh 1999) This is evidence that the economic orientation of Palestinian refugees in Jordan has swung substantially toward their host state.

**INTENT TO RETURN**

With a few exceptions, most Palestinians do not know the status of their family’s land and property, and what the economic conditions might be if they were to actually return. When addressing the *practical* question of return today, they do not use romanticized notions of the felaheen lifestyle as a basis for comparison to their current economic situation. In fact, rather than eagerly anticipating actual return, many – especially those who are more economically integrated – fear that a peace agreement will
compel them against their will to leave their homes and livelihoods in Jordan and return to Palestine. Thus, they distinguish between an *adamant right of return* de jure and *fear of physical return* de facto. Most Palestinians are settled in their “new” life and economically oriented to Jordan:

> There is nothing tempting us to go back. We don’t have lands, don’t have sheep [or other assets there]... (Male, 24)

> We don’t have any goals in the West Bank. All our ambitions and dreams are centered here [in Jordan]. So *inshallah* it will be here in this country. Because we left in 1948 and after that we’re not going back, ever. (Male, 57)

(*Mother:) I, for example, I won’t go back to Palestine. If they can give us monetary compensation [as part of a peace settlement] to buy a house and live here, it’s fine. (*Son:) We don’t have anything left in Palestine. (*Mother:) Even if we went back, we don’t know where our land is. (*Son:) Because all the elder people died, and they knew Palestine, but we don’t. We have nothing left in Palestine. The life there is very difficult, you [would] have to start from scratch. (*Mother:) We are comfortable here, and we are working, it’s fine, our life is good. (Female, 67; Male, 30)

Two-thirds of interviewees indicated that they or their family do not have a practical expectation of returning, even if they maintain a hope of, and adamantly insist on the right of, return. In fact, when asked what they would most like to change about their life in Jordan, only 9% said that they wish to return to Palestine.

However, the collective project of the Palestinian refugee community, which is the dominant discourse, states that all Palestinians will return to their family’s ancestral homes in Palestine when the refugee issue is finally resolved. This has led to a psychological dissonance between the socially constructed “correct” answer and what most individuals themselves would do:

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192 Senior UNRWA official, personal interview, 10/25/10
193 When asked at what point they lost hope of return, 2% said it was before 1950; 10% in the 1950s; 14% after the 1967 War; 10% in the 1970s; and 31% at some other time.
194 This was an open-ended question, and interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one response.
We will try to do the impossible and go back, but life here is good. (Male, 32)

I think if they’re satisfied with what they have right now – in Jordan – with their financial situation, and if they don’t have any problem with any Jordanian tribe or anything, they would just deal with it, and stay here. As for the people who really wish to go back to Palestine, I think they will have a chance to go back…. As for me, I don’t see myself in Palestine, to be honest with you. I see myself working here or in the States, or the Gulf. I’m loyal to my country, of course. Maybe I’m not as ambitious as my father is. I would stick to Jordan. (Female, 20)

As has been noted in studies of Palestinians in the past (Al Husseini & Bocco 2009), the number of refugees who would actually prefer to move to Israel, or even the new state of Palestine, in the event of a peace agreement is relatively small, and far less than the total population; those in Jordan are even less inclined to actually return, while those in Lebanon are the most inclined. This was reinforced by interviewees’ complex descriptions of the intent to return, and the conflicting political and practical considerations affecting it:

[Among non-Gazans.] I think the old people… the ones who actually left Palestine… really want to return, until they die. Among the younger generation, they grew up here, they don’t have anything in Palestine, they aren’t as [eager] to return…. If given the opportunity, many won’t return. (Female, 22)

Look, there’s a difference between people from ’48 and those from ’67…. The ’67 refugees have more hope for return than those from ’48…. We are settled here. But people who are from 1967, [I give my best wishes] to go back to their country…. I was born here, married here, my friends and relatives are here, my children were born here. (Female, 54)

(Young man:) To be honest, Palestine is not on the plan.
(Brother:) It's a complicated issue.
(Young man:) It’s not a matter of one person, it’s a whole nation.
(Sister-in-law:) It’s different from family to family. I think my family [would have] a problem with that [statement]. They connect more with the Palestinian issue…
(Young man:) I mean, we can’t go to Palestine….
(Brother:) Personally, I will not lose hope… because it’s mentioned in the Qur’an.
(Male, 26; Male, 25; Female, 22)

A few interviewees (7%) speculated that, if return to the CoO became a

\[195\] In a fascinating comparison, the militarized refugee community of Bhutanese in Nepal were mostly resettled to western countries beginning in 2007, leading to bitter divisions and even violence within the community regarding their political project and economic welfare. (Osberg/Al Jazeera, 5/6/09; Cozens/AFP, 10/19/09)
possibility, they would like to maintain a transnational existence between Jordan and Palestine:

Ideally, I would like to be able to travel back and forth easily between Jordan and Palestine, [without border control]. But I would not move back there. Everything is here, my family, friends, assets. I don’t have anything left there. I also speak with a Jordanian accent. (Male, 32)

As for Palestine, if there is unity between Palestine and Jordan in the future, they will become like one people. They want [something] like a federal unity. (Male, 72)

When asked what they expect for the future of the Palestinian refugees, almost half of interviewees said that they expect that there will be no change, and only 28% said that the group will return to Palestine. However, camp refugees seem more pessimistic than non-camp residents about the future of the refugees: Almost twice as many non-camp refugees (30%) as camp refugees (16%) expect the refugees will return to Palestine (p < .05). Similarly, among those over 50, non-camp refugees stated much more frequently (38%) than camp refugees (7%) that they personally are too old to return, but they have hope for future generations (p < .05). The younger generations (36 and under) were less likely to predict the group will return to Palestine (17%) than the older generations (31%) (p < .05).

When asked what they expect will happen in their own future, however, an interesting contradiction arises among non-camp refugees: Whereas 30% had expected the refugees as a group will return to Palestine, only 7% expect to personally return. In contrast, 19% of camp refugees stated that they personally expect to return to Palestine (p < .05), which is similar to the proportion who expected the refugees as a group to

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196 Both questions about expectations of the future were open-ended, and interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one response.
197 Of the 16 interviewees who said that the group will return, only 1 said that they will personally return.
Clearly, there are significant differences between camp and non-camp refugees in their expectations and practical hope of return both for the refugee group as a whole and themselves personally. Those who are not attached to a camp maintain a greater expectation that the group will return, but few of them expect to personally return, even if the group does.

Interviewees were asked the following question:\textsuperscript{199}

If there is a peace deal with Israel in the future, and all options are possible to Palestinian refugees, which of the following do you believe is the best course of action for them?

a. Go back to their original homes, but live with Israelis in Israel
b. Move to an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza
c. Stay permanently in Jordan
d. Move to other countries

Nearly equal proportions of interviewees chose an independent Palestinian state (30\%) and staying permanently in Jordan (27\%). Only 16\% chose the option which would place personal and economic interests above group and political interests, returning to their original homes but living with Israelis in Israel.\textsuperscript{(cf. Haddad 2001)} Some (14\%) rejected all of these options and offered their own alternative, to return to their original homes without an Israeli state and Israeli neighbors. These results are nearly identical to those of a poll of Palestinians in Jordan by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, directed by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, conducted in 2003.\textsuperscript{200}

On this question, there were no significant differences between camp and non-camp interviewees, except that camp refugees chose the option of returning to their original home (with Israelis, in Israel) more frequently (26\%) than non-camp refugees

\textsuperscript{198} Of the 9 interviewees who said that the group will return, 4 said they will personally return.
\textsuperscript{199} Interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one choice.
\textsuperscript{200} In that poll, 15\% of Palestinian refugees in Jordan chose to move to Israel, 27\% chose an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, 33\% chose to stay permanently in Jordan, and 16\% rejected all the options. (PCPSR 2003)
Likewise, Gazans chose this option more frequently (38%) than non-Gazans (17%) (p < .05). This result deserves elaboration:

The fear of an influx of millions of Palestinian refugees to Israel, forcing the Jewish democracy to choose between being Jewish and democratic, is the main reason why Israel has never agreed to acknowledge a Palestinian right of return. (Dumper 2008) Pro-Israel critics will say that the above result is a strategic calculation on the part of the camp and Gazan refugees to achieve precisely that outcome, which demonstrates that they are hold stronger political attitudes, as the conventional wisdom goes, to seek Israel’s destruction. This perspective is based on a misunderstanding of the perception of Israel among Palestinians in Jordan. It assumes, as Israel’s supporters inherently believe, that in such a scenario, the Palestinians would immediately gain the electoral advantage and thereby eliminate the Jewish state through the democratic process. However, the vast majority of Palestinians in Jordan have no such faith in Israeli democracy. They do not trust Israel to keep its promises and never imagine that, in such a scenario, the regime would willingly dismantle itself as a result of free and fair elections. In fact, those holding the most militant opinions against Israel vehemently refused the option to “live with Israelis in Israel”. When asked the reason for their choice, only 1 of the 23 interviewees who did choose it offered the strategic reason regarding democracy. Most of the others gave answers which reflected precisely the opposite trend, namely that they are more personally or economically motivated than politically motivated. They place higher priority on living on their ancestral land than the collective political project:

There’s no other option, because it’s my land…. (Male, 46)

The first choice, for me personally…. Old people, because it's my country, I want to die there in my land. (Male, 72)
My dad used to tell me [he knew] Israelis, and they were really good people. Even if we lived together... we believed my dad, they used to hang out together. (Male, 25)

It’s not a problem to live with Israelis, but Israelis should comply with... not oppressing Palestinians, and should be honest with the people, not to delay. (Male, 46)

Despite a degree of discrimination and social prejudice affecting Palestinians regardless of camp/non-camp status, the segmentation between those who are more socioeconomically integrated to Jordan (mostly urban refugees) and those less integrated (mostly camp and Gazan refugees) has important differences on Palestinians’ practical intent to return and even their willingness to militarize, despite similarity in the militancy of their attitudes, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter. Most refugees weigh complex political and economic considerations when considering whether they would actually return to Palestine, if given the opportunity; but camp and Gazan refugees are more likely to prioritize personal and economic considerations in that decision over group and political ones.

**Militancy entrepreneurs**

Even after the departure of pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs – fedayeen and the PLO leadership – in 1971, there have been present in Jordan individuals who would be willing to take up the mantle of leading militancy against Israel if given the opportunity, as well as some efforts at starting clandestine militant organizations. For example:

I was a leader in the university at that time and was... inviting people to participate, celebrating the Intifada. I was arrested... at that time, in 1987, because of our political duties.... We were underground revolutionary parties at that time... making leaflets, painting slogans on the walls, songs supporting Intifada.... I was in Jordan, so I couldn’t do anything else.... My idea is only all [of] Palestine, my historical right, one day, maybe by force, I will take it. Now we don’t have the power, the weapons, but PFLP is one of the most “terrorist” organizations.... My party is totally different now, [it has moderated,] but I still believe in the old [militant] ideas.... What has been taken by force must be returned by force, this is Nasser’s saying.... (Palestinian activist, male, 49)
Jordan signed a peace treaty with the Jews. And they don’t want anyone to join the resistance, even if they just want to talk about resistance. I wanted to gather people here to go [fight in Palestine] but the Jordanian government prevented me. \[When was that?\] According to the events; the last [time] was during the [2008-09] Gaza War. But I did some things behind the government’s back…. My hip here broke. That’s why I’m not trying to do anything now, because I’m sick and don’t want to go to jail. The people in the camp trust me and listen to me, but not [to] other people. (Palestinian activist, male, 75)

They interrogated me in the intelligence, and I was beaten there to prevent me from doing this again…. Even if I help them [in Palestine by sending assistance], that doesn’t prevent me from carrying a weapon and going to the border and dying. There are many projects to revive the occasions which happened in Palestine…. the killing of leaders in Palestine…. So we try to revive these occasions. This is for us not to forget, for the next generation not to forget there is a country occupied by the Jews. And when the day comes, we can confront them and get our lands back. (Palestinian activist, male, 30)

Interviewees were asked the following question\(^{201}\):

The Palestinians in Jordan have not joined the resistance against Israel for many years. In your opinion, why is that?

- a. They have lost hope in the Palestinian national movement
- b. They are focused on building their lives in Jordan
- c. There are no resistance organizations in Jordan
- d. People would join the resistance but the government of Jordan prevents it
- e. Another reason

Considering the failure of any militant organization to publicly organize and operate in Jordan, and the high-profile expulsion of the PLO and fedayeen in 1971, it is surprising that only 27% of interviewees stated that one reason was the lack of resistance organizations in Jordan. (I will discuss their answers to this question further in the section on “militant attitudes”, below.) This may suggest that most people are aware of, or at least have heard of, the presence of militancy entrepreneurs in Jordan.

NO LONGER WAITING FOR POWERFUL STATES

By the late 1970s, even those who had arrived in 1967 had entered into a protracted refugee situation. The tent camps erected following the 1967 War were replaced with semi-permanent shelters by 1974. (Schiff 1995) By 2011, the great-

\(^{201}\) Interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one choice.
grandchildren of those who arrived in 1948 were already adults. As in the previous period, this extended duration has led to a feeling that their cause has long since become the status quo on the international agenda, and independent action by the refugees is the only likely impetus which will refresh its urgency. The feeling of self-efficacy is stronger now than it was forty years ago:

We are suffering more than our parents when they first came here [after the 1967 War] because they didn’t have many choices, they just wanted to find work and protect their sons and daughters. We have many options now, we want so many things and we want to implement them. We want to achieve many things because our time is different from their time. (Palestinian activist, male, 36)

The evolving pragmatic approach by Arab states to Israel also helped reify the shared Palestinian identity. After the 1973 War, every major historical event in the Arab-Israeli conflict over the next four decades reinforced the idea that the Arab states no longer accept responsibility for the Palestinian issue, and the Palestinians are on their own in the conflict against Israel. First, the Arab states implicitly abandoned the Palestinian issue by formally recognizing the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in 1974, negotiating separate peace treaties in 1978/79 (Egypt) and 1994 (Jordan), and abdicating claims to the West Bank in 1988 (Jordan). Second, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, many of whom had lived in the Gulf their whole lives, were expelled from Kuwait in 1991 and Iraq since 2003. Third, the 1993 signing by the PLO of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) with Israel “shattered the hope of return for Palestinian refugees…. After the DOP, Palestinian-Jordanians realized that their case was no longer on the PLO agenda; they would have to present and defend it themselves.” (Abu-Odeh 1999, p. 235) Whereas the PLO had represented the “unifying nationalist umbrella” until that point, afterward the refugees felt that they had been forgotten (Farah 2005), sacrificed on the altar of the West Bank and Gaza.
The only group which has demonstrated success in putting the Palestinian issue back on the international agenda were the Palestinians themselves, in the West Bank and Gaza beginning in 1987 and 2000, and the Gaza War between Hamas and Israel in 2008-09.

Oslo Accords

In the early 1990s the regional Palestinian leadership under Yasser Arafat was persuaded to moderate its strategy toward engaging in negotiations and adopting the two-state solution. At first this led to hope of a long-delayed resolution for the Palestinian refugees, but eventually, as the failure of the Oslo Accords became apparent by the late 1990s, most refugees in Jordan grew cynical and pessimistic about the prospects for a peace accord. Since Israel was perceived by most Palestinians as having failed to uphold its obligations under the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority (PA) – a Fatah-controlled institution which grew out of the Oslo Accords to establish provisional Palestinian control in the West Bank and Gaza – came to be seen as evidence of collaboration with the enemy; while expanding Israeli occupation and endemic corruption in Fatah and the PA undermined the perceived legitimacy of Fatah’s leadership:

As for the PA, I don’t believe in it at all. I think they are just a bunch of thieves. They aren’t trying to help us at all. (Female, 22)

The PA are spies for Israel, they are protecting Israel, so there is no such thing as peace with Israel…. Abbas doesn’t defend Palestine…. He’s a traitor and he protects the interests of Israel and the US, and he doesn’t deserve the leadership of the Palestinian people. The Palestinian people should lead themselves, not Abbas. (Male, 65)

I used to be with Fatah. When it was first established, I was supporting Fatah. But after that, when they started to negotiate with the Israelis, I didn’t support it anymore. (Male, 64)

The release of the so-called Palestine Papers in January 2011 represented, for many refugees, yet another resounding blow to Fatah’s legitimacy:
Abbas and [the other Fatah leaders] are thieves and traitors.... They don’t think about the Palestinian people.... For example, we saw the documents revealed by Al-Jazeera, they all knew Gaza was going to be attacked but they were with the Israelis. (Male, 48)

It’s important that... I won’t see [the Palestinian leader] on the internet sitting and having fun with the Jews, kissing each other on the cheek as though he’s their brother or cousin. Al-Jazeera revealed everything. And based on that, Saeb Erekat resigned. He denied everything at first and after that he resigned. (Male, 48)

When these factors – corruption and perceived collaboration with an intransigent enemy – were viewed in contrast to apparent honest stewardship and resistance bona fides by Hamas, support for Fatah and its foray into moderation shifted to support of Hamas:

Hamas is strong…. Their position is fixed, it's permanent…. And Israel didn't want to relinquish anything, they wanted more land, to expand. And the PA, of course, there are three treaties and agreements, but Israelis do not abide by these treaties. (Male, 72)

[Hamas] will not compromise the Palestinian issue, while Fatah compromises too much. They have compromised and are still compromising. They have direct negotiations, they are ignoring many rights of the Palestinian refugees, [and] there is so much corruption, especially financial corruption. They are looting the donations…. [With] Hamas, we don’t hear about this. (Female, 22)

In short, strong international engagement in the early 1990s temporarily decreased hope of redemption through intervention by powerful actors, but ultimately backfired as it led to damaging the legitimacy of its own cultivated partner and boosting that of its hardline rival.

Fatah-Hamas rivalry

Even the Fatah-Hamas split is viewed through the lens of the Palestinian national project, leading some refugees to condemn the divide and hope for Palestinian unity:

Fatah and Hamas have an internal conflict between them, so they don’t have an agreement…. They are supposed to be united to defend Palestine together. (Male, 51)

They just want the position itself, not to help the people. Because if they have the best interests of the Palestinians in their hearts, they would have united – Fatah and Hamas – like in Algeria. (Male, 68)

Others see the shortcomings of both of these two main contenders for the title of

Palestinian leadership as further evidence that the Palestinian refugees are on their own:
There is no [Palestinian] authority in Palestine…. There is fighting between us and we can’t decide which one to pick. Fatah is supported by Israel and Hamas is supported by the Shi’ites in Iran. There is no authority for the Palestinian people except the people themselves. (Male, 27)

In Palestine, not Fatah, not even Hamas, they made many mistakes…. [Perhaps] we follow Hamas because we follow the religion, but as a sole representative of the Palestinian people, there is no representative. Because people who are interested in keeping their positions can kill their own people to support their positions. So they only represent themselves, not the people…. The Palestinian people are so powerful, they can handle anything. (Male, 48)

When asked, “Which group or organization do you feel best represents the interests of the Palestinian refugees?” only 19% mentioned Hamas and 10% mentioned Fatah. Just under a quarter said that UNRWA represents their interests, while 37% said no organization represents them, and the only representative of the Palestinian refugees is the Palestinian people themselves.

Political opportunity

Unlike in the 1948-63 period, the main reason that Palestinian refugees have not militarized in Jordan since 1971 is lack of political opportunity. Of the independent variables in this project, this was the only one which changed dramatically following the civil war in 1970.

Securitization of Camps and Communities

The agreement which the PLO signed to end the civil war in Jordan in 1970 required that they depart for Lebanon, leading to the exit of tens of thousands of fedayeen. The military, civil defense and domestic intelligence services were purged of Palestinians. Police clamped down on protests. The mukhabarat became proactive in preventing and stopping political activism among Palestinians, including efforts to

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202 This was an open-ended question, and interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one response.
203 This may be an underestimate due to the sensitivity of the question.
organize militarization, thwarting several attempts in the early 1970s. (Abu-Odeh 1999) They cultivated informants in refugee camps, universities and high schools, and exercised broad powers of surveillance and detention. Imams at mosques were forbidden to give sermons not sanctioned by the government. The Jordanian military and border police began intercepting and shooting anyone attempting to cross westward illegally. As a result, organization, communication, mobilization, storage of weapons and cross-border strikes became extremely difficult without interception by the host state authorities.

In the question mentioned previously, why the Palestinians in Jordan have not engaged in “resistance” activities, 56% of interviewees chose the fourth option, that people would join the resistance but the government of Jordan prevents it:

If they have participated in the resistance, they will be captured by the Jordanian government…. If they were in Palestine they would have participated in the Intifada. (Female, 45)

We, now, here, cannot join the resistance. This is a country [with] its own government, its own constitution…. If the king asked us to go, we would have gone. But we cannot go by ourselves. If the king said, yes, we’re going to help the Palestinians, we would go. (Male, 51)

The mukhabarat terrified them. They wanted to participate, all of them, but they were afraid…. Unfortunately, anyone who wants to say, “I am from Hamas, I want to join the resistance,” was arrested. (Male, 64)

Many mentioned that the border is closed and guarded by the Jordanian military:

Because of the treaties, it’s not allowed. The Palestinians, to go and cross the border to Israel, it’s not allowed in the treaty. But all of us hope to go and fight and die there, to go and set Palestine free. (Male, 48)

If they opened the border, many people would have gone there. There were soldiers and police along the border, even now. Every two kilometers there is a checkpoint. (Male, 32)

As a result, protests were held in lieu of militarization by those who wished to cross the border:

Imagine that someone has taken your land, your money, everything. If you had a chance to fight, would you fight? But of course, the Jordanian government prevented us. We
were only capable of holding demonstrations. (Male, 48)

However, during the two Intifadas and the Gaza War, even protests were sometimes repressed by the authorities:

This was the street where there were protests during the second Intifada. You see [the streets are so narrow] and we were suffering because there were so many police around, and they fired tear gas. (Male, 27)

I was really happy when my sister told me that they were going out in demonstrations…. This was great…. When I went out in demonstrations, they used the water cannons. (Male, 26)

The mukhabarat are especially vigilant in the camp for Gazan refugees:

The mukhabarat are here all the time. They asked me now [when I stepped out of the interview with you] what the American wants. I said, “I don’t know, I don’t speak English.” (Female, 40)

Those whose families arrived to the East Bank in 1967 were even more likely to cite government intervention (69%) than those whose families arrived in 1948 (52%) (p < .05). As noted previously, only 27% of interviewees said that there has not been militarization because there are no such organizations in Jordan; an equal proportion said that it is because people are focused on building their lives in Jordan; and relatively few (14%) said that the people have lost hope in the Palestinian national movement. There were no significant differences between camp and non-camp refugees, but no Gazans – not surprisingly – cited building their lives in Jordan as a reason, whereas 28% of non-Gazan refugees mentioned it (p < .05).

COO DEFENSE CAPABILITY

In the past 40 years, Israel’s military and defense capabilities have grown exponentially with their technological superiority, including along its borders. It has installed multiple layers of obstacles at its borders, surveillance systems and tracking mechanisms to prevent infiltration. In addition, as noted in the previous section, the
Jordan River is more easily defensible than an arbitrary line.

**HOST-CO-O RELATIONS**

From 1971 to 1994 Jordan and Israel were officially in a state of war, but the Hashemite Kingdom was very reluctant to initiate or support any conflict against its western neighbor. They did not participate in the 1973 War against Israel by Syria and Egypt, except to send some forces to Syria after coming under intense political pressure from Arab states. After Jordan and Israel signed the peace treaty in 1994, the Jordanian government’s incentive to allow militant activity against Israel from their territory decreased even further.

**INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT**

In 1974 the UN officially recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, but it was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that the first Intifada caused international attention to evolve from a mostly state-centric consideration of the “Israeli-Arab conflict” to an “Israeli-Palestinian conflict”. This may have temporarily reduced legitimacy for militancy entrepreneurs to operate in Jordan, reflecting the increased hope of redemption through the efforts of others, as described above. However, that strong international engagement by the West is now widely perceived as worse than useless – many interviewees observed that twenty years of negotiations have produced nothing for them, while Israel continues to expand settlements in a perceived attempt to create new realities on the ground.

**Conflict resources**

Without political opportunities for militarization, it is impossible to know for certain whether conflict resources would be available. However, some parallels can
provide insight. Syria intervened in Jordan on behalf of the fedayeen in 1970. (Schiff 1995; Sicker 1989) Iran and Syria currently support two armed militant groups fighting Israel, Hizbollah and Hamas\textsuperscript{204}, so it is not a stretch to imagine that they would be willing to supply another group based in Jordan. Jordan also shares a long border with Iraq, the home of al-Qaeda and other Sunni militant groups who might seek to extend their influence by supplying Palestinian (Sunni) guerrillas in Jordan. Clearly, the Jordanian government itself would not be a likely supplier.

Diversion of humanitarian aid is unlikely. UNRWA stopped distributing food and other in-kind supplies decades ago; their assistance now is limited to social services, primarily schools and health clinics. As in the previous periods, UNRWA is also extremely sensitive to accusations by donor countries of supplying militants. However, UNRWA support in refugee camps could remain a source of care for militants’ dependents.

\textsuperscript{204} As of early 2012, Hamas appears to be cutting its ties with Syria and Iran as a result of the bloody repression by the Syrian government against “Arab Spring” protesters. Its leadership recently moved from Syria to Qatar.
Little militarization

MILITANT ATTITUDES

There has been almost no militarization in Jordan since 1971, but it is not for lack of intent. For instance, interviewees were asked the following question:

During the second Intifada, which of the following best describes how you felt?

a. Everyone must join the resistance
b. The resistance should be maintained within Palestine, while those outside Palestine should send assistance
c. All we can do is follow events closely in the news
d. I did not follow what was happening in Palestine

Interviewees were about equally likely to choose the first and second options (40-42%), with no significant differences between camp and non-campus refugees. The most direct question I posed regarding current attitudes toward militancy was the following:

What do you believe now is the best way to address the historical grievances and achieve the rights of the Palestinian people regarding Palestine?

a. Peace settlement with an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and monetary compensation to Palestinian refugees
b. Using international law and international courts to achieve the rights
c. Nonviolent resistance like that of Gandhi in India, or the protests in Tunisia and Egypt
d. Armed resistance

One-third of interviewees chose “armed resistance”, which is about the same percentage (36%) that chose the two-state solution. Some chose both:

The first and last choices are good. We can’t reach the first choice unless we go through the last. Because Israel is selfish. (Male, 45)

India is different… [And] the second choice, forget about it, nobody will help. International law is for the strong… The veto [in the UN Security Council] canceled all the other [resolutions]. There are two choices… Possibly the first choice, or armed resistance. (Male, 48)

Maybe armed resistance, but nobody will give us weapons… The first choice. So they will have the Palestinian government. But people should elect who is going to rule them. (Female, 21)

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205 Interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one choice.
206 Interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one choice.
International legal remedies (18%) and non-violent resistance (14%) were less frequently chosen. Interestingly, there were no significant differences between camp and non-camp refugees on the second, third or fourth options, but camp residents were less likely (21%) to choose the two-state solution than non-camp refugees (39%) (p < .05). However, younger camp residents (36 and under) were far more likely (32%) to choose the international legal route than older camp residents (1%) (p < .01), and they were less likely (4%) to reject all the options, and say that the Palestinian grievances are impossible to address, than older camp residents (17%) (p < .10). Likewise, Gazans were more likely to choose the international legal option (38%) than non-Gazans (16%) (p < .05)

As noted in the previous chapter, those who arrived in 1967 held more militant attitudes than those who arrived in 1948. This distinction seems to have persisted more than forty years later: Refugees whose families crossed to the East Bank in 1967 were more than twice as likely (52%) to choose “armed resistance” as those who arrived in 1948 (24%) (p < .01), and less likely to choose nonviolent resistance (6%) than those whose families had arrived earlier (19%) (p < .05).

Finally, interviewees were asked the following question to assess their feeling of group efficacy in achieving the collective project:

Do you believe the rights of the Palestinian people regarding Palestine can be best achieved through the efforts of the…

a. international community led by the United Nations
b. international community led by the United States
c. Arab governments
d. Palestinian people themselves

The most popular choice was “the Palestinian people themselves” (55%); the other choices each received about 20%. On this question there was significant variation

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207 Interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one choice.
by age: Younger interviewees (36 and under) were less likely to choose the leadership of the US (8%) and Arab governments (13%) than older interviewees (21% and 28%, respectively) (p < .05), and they were more likely to choose the Palestinian people themselves (63%) than older respondents (47%) (p < .10). This may reflect a remnant of the Palestinians’ political beliefs of the 1950s and early 1960s, when they saw only two routes for redemption: a political resolution through the United Nations, or all-out war by the Arab states. (Abu-Odeh 1999) There were no significant differences for Gazans or camp refugees in this question. Those who arrived in 1967 were less likely to choose the UN (12%) than those who arrived in 1948 (27%) (p < .05). Out of the interviewees who chose “the Palestinian people themselves”, just over a quarter mentioned that it is because the Palestinians have tried the other options, and all have failed.

One militant quote which seems to permeate the refugee community is borrowed from Gamal Abd al-Nasser. After Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip in 1967, he said, “What was taken by force must be restored by force.” (Morris 1999, p. 347) This quote was voluntarily mentioned by nearly one-fifth of all interviewees, and it was more frequently stated by non-camp refugees (22%) than camp refugees (9%) (p < .05); and more frequently by those whose families arrived in 1967 (22%) than 1948 (12%) (p < .10).

The above results indicate that there is a significant support among the population for militarization in support of the Palestinian national project. As in the discussion of intent to return above, the results also refute the conventional wisdom\textsuperscript{208} that camp

\textsuperscript{208} For example, Brand writes that camp residents “remain the most disgruntled and, at least potentially, militant of the Palestinians residing in Jordan.” (1988, pp. 180-81) Similarly, political analyst Rami Khouri writes: “Anger, frustration and depression are fuelling two parallel trends: more and more people say they just want to leave [Gaza] in order to provide their children

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refugees, Gazans and young people hold more militant attitudes than non-camp refugees, non-Gazans and older people. It seems that all of those demographic groups are about equally likely to hold militant attitudes. However, refugees whose families arrived to the East Bank in 1967 hold significantly more militant attitudes than those who arrived in 1948. This may be due to the fact that the overwhelming majority of those households were double refugees, but they are also more educated: Those who arrived in 1967 were twice as likely (49%) to have had at least some university-level education as those whose families arrived in 1948 (24%) (p < .01). With that high degree of correlation between these two variables, arrival year and education level, it is not possible to infer causality. However, whether higher education, arriving in 1967 or being a double refugee, or some combination thereof, is the cause of the increased militancy, it is certainly a question worthy of greater investigation.

**ATTEMPTS TO MILITARIZE**

In the early 1970s the mukhabarat thwarted several attempts at militarization, especially as the PLO then saw the Jordanian regime as an enemy. Over the past 40 years, there have been further attempts by Palestinians in Jordan to infiltrate their CoO or to fight their CoO enemy on other fronts, such as during the 1982 Israeli invasion of

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209 Mean household income is comparable between the two groups, and they are about equally likely to live in camps.
southern Lebanon: “So great was the turnout [of volunteers at the PLO office in Amman] that there were not enough buses for all who wanted to go…. At the border the Syrians… turned back the buses, saying the fighters were not wanted in Lebanon.” (Brand 1988, pp. 181-82) Most recently, in January 2010 a roadside bomb was detonated as a convoy of Israeli diplomats passed by. (Bright/Christian Science Monitor, 1/15/10) Over the years, some of the efforts were successful, most were intercepted by Jordanian border guards, and others were killed by the Israeli military:

Some of my friends last year – they are youths, not old – they went to Gaza. We told them that there is a war and a bad situation, but they said that it’s enough to die in Palestinian land. (Male, 45)

A few years ago, some young people from the camp were trying to cross the border to fight in Gaza, but they were killed on the border. (Male, 19)

[In the second Intifada] there was a gang here in [the camp] who wanted to take a bus and go fight Israel. But unfortunately the Jordanian army started shooting them…. [Thankfully] they ran away and are ok. Can you imagine the Jordanian army, which is Arab, how they deal with the Palestinians? (Male, 16)

They tried to go to Palestine and join the resistance, but the Jordanian government was afraid the Jews would kill them, so that’s why they closed the border, because it would be a massacre if they crossed the border…. Even if they wanted to make nonviolent resistance, [the Israelis] would have killed them…. The Jordanian government just wanted to protect them…. This is how I see the perspective of the Jordanian government. (Male, 68)

People tried, they went to the borders, but the Jordanian army arrested some of them, and the rest left. If it was allowed, all the Palestinians here in Jordan would have gone to Palestine. (Male, 46)

Many people, young people, were trying to reach Palestine. We went to Ghor next to the borders, and we confronted the Israeli army, but we weren’t able to cross the borders to Palestine. And some of us went to Egypt to cross into Palestine from Gaza. And they were arrested in Egypt. (Male, 28)

In the second Intifada… eight guys from this camp went to the West Bank and Gaza and were killed…. People here understand that it’s impossible for them to go to Palestine because there’s a peace treaty. We tried to go there and eight guys were killed…. So people know that they cannot cross the border. They will be killed or arrested. We can’t even visit. (Palestinian activist, female, 29)

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210 This boy was not a participant in the research project, and this quote was unsolicited. He voluntarily spoke up during an interview with his mother, who was a participant.
Stifled attempts at militarization have sometimes been sublimated into other forms of action:

They used to have [protests] to support making war against Israel seven years ago. But [the protesters] just destroyed the camp. They were trying to show people that they care, but it was for nothing. They suppressed the feeling because they want to fight, but the borders and the community itself doesn’t allow them to go, so they just express it here by destroying and making fires. (Female, 47)

Even weapons – if we send weapons, the Arab governments confiscate them. People were trying to do that. They actually sent weapons and were caught on the border, and they confiscated their weapons…. Even for a visit we can’t go, so how can we help them with weapons? (Male, 65)

Some interviewees vowed that they will militarize as soon as the political opportunity is available:

The refugees who are in Jordan are not trained to use weapons…. But trust me, if the Palestinian refugees, whether trained to use weapons or not, if he had the chance to go, he would go. (Male, 28)

Maybe [armed resistance] is hard nowadays, but we are thinking of that. We are talking about political actions, we are not going to stop it, we are not stopping our political activities. But if we have the chance [for armed resistance], we’ll grab it. I’m sure, what gives the Palestinians a good image is doing armed resistance… Maybe it was from 1968 to the 1980s, doing these armed activities… but we have to go back to it. It’s not easy…. For sure, I’m against any civilian attacks, any terrorism…. If you follow our [policy on] armed resistance, we abandoned these things. It’s clear, my idea, who’s against me: a soldier or [a person] carrying a weapon against me, for sure I will fight him. (Palestinian activist, male, 49)

In sum, while militarization has not occurred in Jordan, there have been repeated attempts, particularly during times of crisis and violence in Israeli-Palestinian relations, such as the Intifadas and the Gaza War.

**Symbolic actions and education**

Since political opportunities for militarization are not available, many refugees engage in symbolic and educational acts to perpetuate and defend the Palestinian identity and collective national project. For example, most Palestinian homes have wall decorations referring to Palestine, such as maps, souvenirs, posters of Jerusalem, etc.
One household proudly displayed a framed certificate which states:

The Eternal Promise / I will keep the Aqsa Mosque and all Palestine in my heart and serve it… even though the Jews are trying to make us forget Palestine and the holy places in Palestine; and I will not deal with those who support the Zionists, for all eternity; and I will pass on this promise to my children and grandchildren….

Palestinian activists resent actions by the Jordanian government which they perceive as attempts to erase the Palestinian identity in Jordan, such as moving away from the term “refugee camp” to a more ambiguous term, removing any suggestion of differences between Palestinians and Jordanians in the educational system\textsuperscript{211} (Farah 2005), banning display of the Palestinian flag except in certain circumstances, withholding permission for Palestinian workshops and campaigns in camps, refusing to allow Palestinians in Jordan to vote in Palestinian elections, and the ubiquitous displays of “One Jordan” and “Jordan First” slogans. In contrast, political entrepreneurs actively seek to perpetuate the Palestinian identity through educational and symbolic actions (cf. Farah 2005); a few interviewees mentioned that they see education as a weapon in the conflict against Israel.

Everything about the right of return… has been removed from textbooks after the 1994 peace treaty…. Now we have sessions [to teach] on the right of return to Palestine…. There is coordination between us and the human rights center, with EU support. We try to educate people, women, men and children, about the Palestinian cause, and about the right of return to Palestine, how we can achieve this right…. We were surprised during these sessions, we expected that children have forgotten…. We were shocked to find that they love Palestine and are attached to Palestine. They have bracelets and pins with the Palestinian flag. In every house there is a Palestinian flag. There are photos of martyrs. When people are killed in Palestine, there are funerals here…. If they have a happy occasion there, we celebrate here. (Palestinian activist, male, 36)

On Facebook, I speak with my family, how to resist the Jews, I try to encourage them, to tell them you have to have patience. To support them in Gaza. How I can resist, if I talk with you and other people, about the situations and the Palestinian cause – I can resist the

\textsuperscript{211} The public education curriculum in Jordan essentially denies any distinction between the two groups, and does not teach students about the 1970 civil war. As a result, many young East Banker Jordanians are not even aware that there are two groups. Some informed me that when they were younger they did not even know that the famous rivalry between the Wihdat and Fasali soccer teams represents a Palestinian/Jordanian rivalry.
Jews [like this]. And if we can [make cases in the] courts.... The blind support for Israel in the US and all over the world, we can try to make them look at the Palestinian cause from a different point of view, from our perspective.... So [I do] what I’m capable of: I am a volunteer here [in this aid office]. I help school dropouts try to find something useful to do. I wanted to help you [with] your research, but I wanted to give you the real image of the Palestinian refugees, not a stereotype.... [By] answering your questions, I am helping my community. (Palestinian activist, female, 29)

It’s really important for me, being Palestinian, I’m really proud…. I refuse to put up any picture that has nothing to do with Palestine.... My parents, because of the [1970 War], they [tell] us, just don’t get involved in politics.... [But] I refused the way that my parents raised me, that when it comes to politics, don’t interfere, don’t talk about politics.... I wanted to be a journalist and get into politics, [and] they refused that, but I am planning inshallah to raise my children to just get involved, don’t just be silent and do nothing. (Female, 21)

The internet has opened up new avenues for political activism and educational activities to perpetuate the Palestinian national identity:

My children are feeling that they are Palestinian more than us, because of the media and especially the internet. (Male, 48)

Now we have Facebook and the internet, good media [outlets], so we have a good idea, better than before.... So we are trying to say objectively what’s going on in our minds. (Palestinian activist, male, 49)

The group is making the most logical choice they can in order to achieve their collective project. Whereas there was a credible option for attainment of the refugees’ political objectives in the first period (pan-Arabism) and the second (Fatah/PLO), since 1971 there has been no such credible option. Therefore, in this case, the most logical choice is to strongly maintain their collective project through educational and symbolic actions, impressing hardline attitudes on the younger generations and occasional attempts to militarize, in the hopes that political opportunity will become available and enable them to achieve their political goals in the future.

**Conclusion**

Results of the case of Palestinians in Jordan from 1971-2011 revealed a contradiction of the conventional wisdom regarding refugee camps, in which camp
refugees are more politically extreme in their attitudes against the CoO. In this study, those who were less socioeconomically integrated, camp residents and Gazans, expressed greater intent to personally return, and were more likely to select an option which privileges their personal and economic interests over the collective project, even though they were equally likely to hold militant attitudes regarding Israel. These results provide evidence that decreased rights and less economic integration to the host state increases orientation toward the CoO and desire to return, but not necessarily a militant attitude. Camp refugees, and particularly older camp refugees, are more pessimistic about the future of the Palestinian refugee situation; and young people feel more political self-efficacy but are less likely to expect to personally return. In general, the segmentation between those who are more or less socioeconomically integrated has persisted, despite general upward mobility (for non-Gazan refugees) from 1948 until today.

In both the first (1948-1963) and third (1971-2011) periods of the Palestinians’ stay in Jordan there was a collective project to redeem the homeland, but militarization did not occur. The main difference between these periods is that there was political opportunity in the first, but few militancy entrepreneurs primarily due to faith in a supranational alternative, pan-Arabism; whereas in the third period, the community has turned from faith in outside powers to a belief in self-help, and militancy entrepreneurs are present, but there is no political opportunity. The case of Palestinians from 1971-2011 is summarized in Figure 5, below. I will discuss the Arab Spring and the likely future of militarization by Palestinians in Jordan in Chapter 10.
Figure 5. Summary: Palestinians in Jordan, 1971-2011
CHAPTER 8: Iraqis in Jordan, 2003 to 2011

The preceding three chapters have applied the proposed framework to three observations of the case of Palestinian refugees in Jordan. In this chapter I will expand the generalizability of the framework by extending it to the case of Iraqis in Jordan since 2003. Leenders summarizes well the failure of existing militarization literature, particularly Lischer (2005), when applied to this case:

[The] generalizing prerequisites [Lischer] mentions for refugee violence to occur appear to be by and large in place when assessing the Iraqi refugee crisis…. [There] appears to be a medium to high probability of Iraqi refugees transforming into warriors and triggering a spill-over of the violence in Iraq…. [Yet there] is no sign of combat activity involving Iraqi refugees; no massive recruitment of refugee warriors; and no spill-over of the political violence in Iraq via refugees carrying out their presumed role as ‘carriers of conflict’. (2009, p. 350)

I will demonstrate that Iraqi refugees have had little sense of group identity and collective project to redeem the homeland, even though there have been present militancy entrepreneurs, and conflict resources would be available if a political opportunity allowed it. As a result, there has been no militarization by Iraqis in Jordan.

The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 was expected to produce a mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of refugees, leading UNHCR to prepare tent encampments across the border in neighboring countries, including Jordan. However, this foresight ended up being an embarrassment for UNHCR when relatively few refugees arrived (Loughry 2010; Hodson 2007); in fact, there was actually an inflow of some 300,000-500,000 to Iraq, mostly from Iran, by those who had earlier fled the regime of Saddam Hussein (Jones 2010; Chatelard & Misconi 2009):

In 2003, just days after the collapse of the Saddam Hussein, some relatives who have been in the US since the 1980s called us and asked, “What’s the situation? Are there
opportunities?” They wanted to come back. People thought it will be like Germany and Japan after World War II. Most of the Baghdad hotels were filled with Iraqi businessmen who had been living outside. (Male, 43)

The first wave of departures from Iraq were ex-Ba’athists and their families, who fled following de-Ba’athification, demobilization of the Iraqi military and closing of state-owned industries in Iraq. (de Bel-Air 2009) Departures from 2003-2005 were mostly middle-class technocrats, intelligentsia and professionals who began to be targeted by militias. (Human Rights Watch 2006) However, most refugees departed during the years of the worst civil violence, from 2005-2008, when Sunni and Shi’ite militias were attacking civilians daily, and especially following the 2006 bombing of the Shi’ite mosque in Samarra. (Fagen 2007; Sassoon 2009; Al-Tikriti 2010; Loughry 2010; Jones 2010)

Most Iraqi refugees entered their host countries, primarily Jordan and Syria, legally. At first, Jordan was generous in allowing Iraqis to enter and stay for up to six months without a prior visa, and then renew their legal status by exiting the country and re-entering at any border crossing or the international airport. However, an attack on hotels in Jordan by Iraqi terrorists in November 2005 led authorities to begin refusing entry to single Iraqi males 17-35 years old, and Shi’ites; next, Jordanian border authorities started requiring presentation of a new Iraqi passport which was difficult to obtain; then a surge in refugees led Jordan to mostly close the border in 2007 (Fagen 2007; Chatelard 2010; Sassoon 2009; Loughry 2010; Hodson 2007), the same year that UNHCR declared those from southern and central Iraq prima facie refugees.212 Likewise, those already in Jordan began to find it difficult to renew their legal status by exiting and re-entering the country, particularly religious men:

212 Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/2/10; Fagen 2007
Before 2006 I used to go back and forth between Iraq and Jordan because I hadn’t applied to UNHCR to be a refugee, so we had a temporary visa and had to renew it; we had to go back to Baghdad to renew our visa. But after 2006, we couldn’t. Jordan wouldn’t allow us to come back, especially people [like me] with beards. (Male, 37)

Jordan opened the border again in 2009, after the violence had decreased.

It is unknown precisely how many Iraqis are in Jordan. The Jordanian Government compels international organizations, including UNHCR and FAFO, a Norwegian research institute, to report the official estimate of 450,000-500,000 Iraqis.\(^{213}\) (Seeley 2010; de Bel-Air 2009) FAFO’s 2007 report actually cites an estimate of 161,000, while qualifying that number with methodological rationale to explain why it is lower than the official estimate. The report estimated that almost a quarter arrived before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, some of whom have been in Jordan for decades. The Iraqi embassy in Amman publically estimated during the 2010 parliamentary elections that there were 150,000-180,000 Iraqis of voting age in Jordan. (Luck/Jordan Times, 3/7/10) According to a foreign diplomat (not Iraqi) speaking on condition of anonymity, the Iraqi Embassy privately believes that there are about 70,000 Iraqis in Jordan in addition to the 30,000-plus registered by UNHCR, for a total of around 100,000.\(^{214}\)

**No collective project**

**Some war of exclusion, but no clear enemy**

There have been four main groups of political/military actors in Iraq, each of which has perpetrated violence which led to refugee outflows since 2003. First, the US military’s initial invasion led some refugees to flee due to a general fear of violence, and also to the departure of high-ranking Ba’ath party members and their families, who were

\(^{213}\) See Schmeidl & Jenkins (2003) for a discussion of similar difficulties in obtaining reliable estimates of refugee populations.

\(^{214}\) Seeley (2010) suggests a figure of 125,000.
fired from their jobs, suspected of ties to insurgent groups, interrogated and searched repeatedly. Second, the Shi’ite-led Iraqi government has detained and tortured civilians, and is suspected by many Iraqi refugees of being a puppet of Iran (this was voluntarily mentioned by nearly one-quarter of interviewed households) and supporting Shi’ite militias. Third, the Sunni militant groups, especially Al Qaeda’s Iraq affiliate, have killed and terrorized thousands of Iraqi civilians, particularly targeting Shi’ites and those who were employed by the American military and other international (western) organizations. Finally, the Shi’ite militant groups, especially the Mahdi Army, supported by Iran, have also conducted campaigns of terror, murder and mayhem against primarily Sunni civilian targets and those they accuse of collaborating with western states and organizations.

Therefore, the Iraqis who arrived since 2003 can be generally classified into three categories. The first is that of wealthy transnational businessmen, whose families stay in a home in Amman while they continue operating their businesses via the internet, telecommunications and occasional trips to Iraq:

I think [my] dad had the plan to keep us here in Amman [even before we came]…. We had come to Jordan as tourists in 2005, [then] my dad said it’s too dangerous to go back to Iraq because of bombings and kidnappings…. Ethnic targeting, and I’m Sunni…. Around 2006 it was too dangerous even for my dad to go back home, so we went to Beirut for a little bit and then came back [to Jordan]. (Male, 21)

The second group consists of political figures from post-2003 Iraqi governments, who keep themselves and their families safe in Amman while they engage in politics in Iraq – and sometimes hold meetings in Amman for reasons of safety and/or convenience (Hodson 2007) – as well as political figures from the deposed Ba’ath Party215:

215 Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10; One interviewee stated, “I know people in the Iraqi government, living here…. Their work is in Iraq but they’re
It was really terrible…. We were living in fear…. Because I am from Tikrit and was working with Saddam Hussein, I had a high rank in the army, and I am Sunni. And you know… the militias from Iran, some people in the [Iraqi] government support these militias…. They came to our house many times [looking for me, but I wasn’t there]. They damaged everything, the furniture, and stole everything…. Some of them were from Mahdi Army, from Iran, some from the Badr organization, also trained in Iran. The most terrible militias. Predators. (Former general under Saddam Hussein, male, 70)

When [the American army] came to my house they were very powerful, with airplanes and sound bombs, a huge army, and tanks. They broke into my house and locked my children in a room. They even took a French textbook that belongs to my daughter. And two laptops. One they broke and the other they took. They stole all the jewelry. And the money in the house. They stole five bottles of scotch whiskey. And they drank one of them. I have a video that proves what I said…. [This] was, I think, December 2003. (Former minister under Saddam Hussein, Male, 55)

A family member was abducted and we had to pay a ransom to release him. My father was negotiating a ransom… When he tried to negotiate, they threatened us, they knew all the [details] about us. So we traveled to Jordan and my father [continued] negotiating the ransom. It boiled down to US$60,000, and they had already stolen US$40,000 from the office….. They claimed to be a Shi’ite militia, I don’t know which one…. They said “Your father worked for Saddam Hussein.” My father was a surgeon and he did surgeries once a week for the [gendarmerie] and he was also one of Saddam Hussein’s physicians. So the [militia] called him an intelligence officer and a torturer… All the [physicians] like him were on a hit list. (Female, 32)

The wealthy ex-Ba’ath political figures and their families who fled to Jordan were dubbed “the Mercedes refugees” in diplomatic circles and the press. (Sassoon 2009, p. 36)

The third group consists of the general population of Iraqi refugees who fled as a result of direct or indirect threats to their personal safety. Some of the businessmen and political figures maintaining residences in Amman had left (or partially left) Iraq as a result of direct or indirect threats, but most did so from a general fear of conflict. Of the entire Iraqi sample, 78% of the households indicated that they left due to a direct or living here. They call this the hidden class…. They are officials in the Iraqi government, one is a member of Iraqi parliament. They settled here in Jordan, their villas are here, their money is here, but their work is in Iraq…” (Male, 38)

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indirect threat. General fear of conflict was the reason cited by 17% of households.\textsuperscript{216}

Among households reporting a direct threat, one-third stated that the most serious threat they received was a verbal or written threat, one-third mentioned kidnapping or attempted kidnapping of themselves or a relative, 20% mentioned murder or attempted murder, and 7% mentioned imprisonment.

Those who fled from the American military or post-2003 Iraqi governments were not subjected to a war of exclusion on the basis of their ethnic identity:

The Iraqi government arrested me. People said that I did something, so that’s why. I was arrested and they…. It was for ransom. My daughters paid the ransom and they released me. But after I was released I came here. (Female, 65)

[I left] one day before the war, in 2003…. When they told Saddam Hussein, “You have 48 hours to leave,” when I heard that, I left…. I am afraid of air raids, I faint…. [I traveled] directly to Amman, and when things calmed down I went back to Iraq. When I went there I saw everyone killing each other, so I had to come back. (Female, 74)

On the other hand, most of those who had experienced attacks by one or another of the militant groups usually were victims of a war of exclusion; but with the multitude of armed groups, and the fact that most spoke with the same Iraqi accent, many victims did not even know what organization their attackers represented, or if they were simply criminals posing as a militia. Of households which identified the source of the threat, only 16% stated that it was a Shi’ite militia…

Badr Forces… threw a paper in the house, a threat, and after that [my family] left Karbala…. My father went back with my brother to take the stuff from there. [The militants] saw him, so they said, “We told you not to come back,” and they shot him once in the chest and once in the head, and my brother [is] paralyzed now. (Male, 34)

I was threatened [by the] Mahdi Army. I told you, I was a police officer, in Fallujah…. They thought we were traitors and spies…. They were threatening me to [make me] quit my job. They tried to kidnap my wife. So I captured one of them and arrested him and sent him to prison, and after that all hell broke loose. (Male, 35)

\textsuperscript{216} As mentioned in Chapter 4, due to the lack of reliable population statistics on Iraqis in Jordan, and the fact that participants were not chosen randomly, the sample of Iraqis in this study cannot be claimed to be representative of the wider Iraqi population in Jordan.
… 7% cited a Sunni militia…

[My brother] left my mother’s house, carrying his son…. They were in the car and leaving [when] they were stopped by armed men, and they told him to step outside. He was carrying his son and [his wife] was standing with the other two [kids]. The armed men asked him, “Are you Sunni or Shi’ite?” He told them, “I am Shi’ite,” [and] they shot him four times. Even his son, whom he was holding, was shot in the shoulder. He doesn’t speak now, doesn’t go to school, doesn’t even understand when people talk to him.… (Female, 38)

… and one household accused both:

In July 2007 my cousin was hanged, and her family. Four people. They left the bodies in the street…. The area they lived in was under the control of al-Qaeda…. [After] they hanged them they called us and threatened us. They knew everything about us, the color of our clothes, where we live, and I was living in terror because I thought they were going to kill me at any moment. After this, in August, I told my mother, “If I am killed or kidnapped, where would my children go?”…. I went to my house and found this letter (shows copy of letter) thrown through the window on September 9, 2007. It says: “To the filthy policewoman and stray dogs: You have to quit your work with the Jews within two days or else your fate will be like those before you.” It’s signed [by] the Mahdi Army. So we were threatened by al-Qaeda by phone and Mahdi Army by letter…. (Female, 35)

Unlike the ethnic wars in the Balkans and the Great Lakes region of Africa, in which neighbors attacked neighbors and there were massacres and mass rapes of whole villages, attacks in Iraq were more anonymous and less personal.217 Many households (38%) received anonymous threatening letters or were not able to identify their attackers at all:

[My husband went] missing in 2008. He was just going to visit his mother, every [two] weeks or a month. His last visit was in July 2008. He didn’t come back. (crying) He didn’t even call. We searched for him in every area in Iraq, in [other] governorates, everywhere. We couldn’t find him…. One day we found a note on the door, a death threat, with a bullet, saying that we had just seven days to leave. (Female, 45)

There is no security, there is much bloodshed, theft, vandalism. My brother [walked out of] the house, just 100 meters, and he was killed in the street. And we don’t know who killed him…. [We] received a threatening letter telling us to leave, so we left. (Male, 51)

(Son:) My brother and I left our house to buy lands.
(Father:) A gang came, masked, and had guns, and they took US$17,500, and four gold rings.
(Son:) … They called my father from my phone and asked him for a ransom of US$50,000.

217 Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/14/10
(Father:) Or they will kill him. So of course I paid the ransom. I sold everything we owned there. We had so many properties and we sold everything to pay the ransom.
(Son:) … They kidnapped me, first because I am Sabean, and second because I am a jeweler…. I was beaten, they were telling us, “You are non-Muslims, you will not go to heaven when you die, we have to save Islam from your evil.” They didn’t give us any food or drink, and they were always insulting us.
(Male, 77; male, 30)

As in the last example, even if they didn’t know what group their attackers represented, minority religious groups in Iraq such as Christians and Sabeans were more certain that they were being targeted for their religious identity.

Several interviewees were attacked not because of their sectarian identity but because they worked for a western organization or the Iraqi government, or were engaged in a type of employment deemed unacceptable by fundamentalist religious interpretations (Fagen 2007):

I worked on a [program] about children’s rights and solving conflict…. So when they knew that I worked with UNICEF, they threatened me. I didn’t care that they threatened me, [I thought they’re not serious,] because we got used to this, fed up with this. So I didn’t imagine they’re going to kidnap [my husband]…. The kidnappers were from my area. Al-Qaeda infiltrated our area and took the youth from my area to work with them. So they know I’ve been living in the area for 27 years, I’m not a stranger…. They kidnapped him for two days, tortured him, no food, and kicked him from the back of his head to his lower back. So now he speaks with a stutter and has pain in his legs…. So when I negotiated with them, they told me that you have to swear on the Qur’an that you will not work with UNICEF [any more], and then they released him. I had to kiss their feet. (Female, 39)

It was July 31, 2007…. There had been threats. I don’t know the source, but it was a letter. The letter came to my [salon], and after a while people with weapons came…. And at that time I was injured. They threw acid [on my face]…. Before ours was attacked, the owner of another salon next to us was attacked. I had refused to close the salon because this was my livelihood. (Female, 29)

In that period from 2004-06 I was working in a specialized institute as a lecturer. People’s mentality in Iraq now, anyone who tries to offer what he has, information, knowledge, will be killed. So I was threatened, again and again. (Male, 53)

Unlike in the Palestinian case, among Iraqi refugees in Jordan there is no single
clearly identifiable enemy who can be blamed for their suffering. The wide diversity of threatening experiences and groups precludes a clear “other” against whom the refugees can coalesce in a shared experience. Assignment of blame for Iraq’s security troubles follows a similar pattern, as summarized in Table 3, below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blamed actor</th>
<th>Households (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>20 (42%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi political leaders</td>
<td>16 (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Militias”</td>
<td>15 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign fighters</td>
<td>6 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>6 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Qaeda</td>
<td>6 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahdi Army</td>
<td>6 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi’ites</td>
<td>4 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saddam Hussein government</td>
<td>3 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews/Israel</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Assignment of blame for the internal violence in Iraq. (n = 48)

Even the most frequently blamed actor, Iran, was cited by only 42% of households. As in the source of threat, this proportion is too low to facilitate consolidation of the refugee population against a clearly identifiable “other”. Similarly, when asked, “Who is the enemy of the Iraqi refugees?”, there was no consistent answer: 17% of households said there is none; 15% mentioned Iran; 9% said the Iraqi government or political leaders; and 6% said “militias”. “Time”, or waiting in a liminal existence, was cited by 11% of households.

Finally, whereas Palestinians’ exclusion is continuously recreated by their inability to return to the CoO, Iraqis are allowed to return or visit Iraq whenever they choose: Almost 40% of households who left since 2003 stated that they or a family

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218 Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/2/10
219 Interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one answer.
220 This was an open-ended question.
221 Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/2/10; IOM official, personal interview, 12/22/10
member has visited Iraq at least once since they left, either for business or a family reason. Visiting Iraq can also help provide closure to some refugees, and decrease glorification of the CoO:

There is a difference between being forced out and choosing to leave. When we left in 2005, we were forced out by an Islamic militia…. I was angry…. When you are forced to leave, you feel nostalgic and you start to [glorify] things. It was dangerous to go back in 2008, but I guess I needed closure. I said goodbye to my girlfriends…. I saw how lucky I am to be one of the refugees in Jordan. I saw that Baghdad is not the rosy picture that I [had created]…. I do want to go back to Iraq eventually, but [for now], I’ve definitely gotten it out of my system. (Female, 32)

In sum, while Sunni and Shi’ite militias in Iraq have engaged in acts of violence with the intention to “cleanse” territory of other sectarian and religious groups, the causes of violence and threat against civilians have been too diverse, and perceived attribution of responsibility for Iraq’s internal violence too scattered, to be classified as a clear war of exclusion. As a group, Iraqi refugees don’t know who their enemy is, or if they even have one; and their ability to enter and leave Iraq at will decreases perception of a war of exclusion even further.

ETHNONATIONALIST MOVEMENT

In contrast to the dominant portrayal of the violence in Iraq in western media, most interviewees vehemently denied the existence of any ethnonationalist project. The only exception is the ex-Ba’athists, whom I will discuss separately, below.

In the dominant discourse among Iraqis, their society is multicultural, united by their Iraqi identity. For example, while Iraqi parents in a focus group bemoaned their children’s loss of Iraqi identity after living for years in Jordan, no one attached that sentiment to an ethnic identity. The only ethnic variation of Iraqi nationalism is Kurdish
nationalism, but there are very few Iraqi Kurds in Jordan (only 5% of the sample in this project). The lack of an ethnonationalist movement is due in part to the strongly secular Ba’athist version of Iraqi nationalism which was instilled in Iraqis from the time of the Ba’ath takeover in 1963 until its fall in 2003.

Interviewees were asked the following question:

In your opinion, which of the following would be the best future for Iraq?
   a. Rule by [your sect]
   b. Democratic power-sharing agreement between all the groups
   c. A federal system in which each group mostly lives in separate areas and has some autonomy
   d. Breakup of Iraq into independent Sunni, Shi’ite and Kurdish countries
   e. Rule by one leader, like Saddam Hussein

Only two interviewees (5%) preferred rule by their own sect. Half chose democracy, 13% preferred a strong dictator, and 8% said “anybody who puts their Iraqi identity first”.

When asked how they feel about the other sect, more than half of interviewees explicitly rejected ethnic/sectarian divisions, and another 19% indicated that they feel neutral about the other major group or that they have no problem with them. Many interviewees referred to inter-sectarian marriages within their family as evidence of the lack of importance Iraqis attribute to sectarian identity:

When my parents got married, they didn’t even know they were Sunni and Shi’ite. I have friends, Christians, etc., we go to their house…. Here they think it’s weird if we go to church, but in Iraq it’s normal. (Female, 42)

This discrimination that happens between Sunnis and Shi’ites [was instigated by] people who came [to Iraq] from outside. Here in Jordan, we are friends with Sunnis…. If we go to take a course [at an NGO], we are all Iraqis together…. We don’t have this difference between Sunnis and Shi’ites. (Female, 38)

My brother was killed by a Shi’ite militia but I don’t hate my Shi’ite colleagues or friends

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222 Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10
223 An official for IOM related that they expected to have problems in their waiting room between Sunni, Shi’ite and Christian resettlement applicants. Not only have they not had any such problems, but having now conducted over 80,000 interviews since they started operations in Jordan, only 20 applicants have requested a different translator due to sectarian difference. (Personal interview, 12/22/10)
or neighbors… They are not guilty. (Female, 38)

Less than a quarter of interviewees expressed a negative attitude about the other group.

This was usually directed at Shi’ites:

All Iraq now are Shi’ites. We can’t go there, they will kill us…. [Shi’ite Iraqis and Iranians] are the same. They pray on stones. (Female, 39)

There are Shi’ites also who are refugees here… and [the West] helps them resettle in Europe. I think this is dangerous… Sunnis are nonviolent people, they don’t do bombings. I’m not biased, I’m telling the truth…. I think in the future they will kick [the Shi’ite refugees] out because there are so many problems between them and other people because they want to feel in charge, or in control all the time. They try to convert people to their religion…. (Male, 72)

To more directly assess the construct of identity, interviewees were asked the following question:

There are various aspects to one’s sense of self or identity. Some are more important than others. When you think about yourself, which of the following is your most important identity?

a. Muslim/Christian/Sabean
b. (If Muslim) Sunni/Shi’ite
c. Arab/Kurdish
d. Iraqi
e. Your tribe or clan

More interviewees chose “Iraqi” (42%) than any other choice, and the second most common answer was “Muslim” (29%). Not only did no one state that being Sunni or Shi’ite was their most important identity, but many expressed discomfort when I asked whether they are Sunni or Shi’ite; a few interviewees even took umbrage, complaining that “this is a racist question.” Likewise, some interviewees objected to a question on “the civil war in Iraq” on the grounds that the perpetrators were mostly foreigners and it was not a civil war (harb ahleea):

I did not consider it a civil war…. There were ethnic killings, [but when] you hear “civil war”, it’s [as though] all Iraq has been split into two or three [parts]… But to me, it was just violence… killings… those working for foreign [entities] were threatened, that had nothing to do with ethnic violence…. It feels alien to me to call it a civil war…. And I

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224 This question was adapted from Telhami (2011).
most certainly don’t support any extremists from any group. There’s simply no war to fight, for me. (Female, 32)

In contrast to a Palestinian national identity, which can be classified as ethnonational because it is defined largely on an ethnic basis, in contrast to an “other” of a different ethnicity, Iraqi national identity – at least in the dominant discourse – does not have an ethnic basis:

According to the American concept based on this, the sect started to be considered as a political identity…. I am an Iraqi citizen. When I’m an Iraqi, there are Kurds, and Sabeans, and Christians, and Sunnis, and Shi’ites, but if all of these groups are Iraqis, other sects and religions just melt away. Do you understand? Iraqis used to be one people, but after [the Americans] came…. (Male, 64)

The sensitivity of the topic of sectarian tension may be due in part to the fact that a Sunni/Shi’a divide was perceived, especially by Sunnis, as nonexistent in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Therefore, its current presence represents an un-Iraqi construction\textsuperscript{225} – especially in the eyes of Sunnis who have lost power, position and wealth – which is partly responsible for their tragedy.

Furthermore, among Iraqi exiles there seems to be less fervent attachment to the state and the homeland, and less political orientation toward the CoO, than among Palestinians. When asked, “What does it means to you now to be Iraqi?”\textsuperscript{226} as an open-ended question, 23% said that they feel proud of their national identity, and only 17% expressed longing for their homeland. (Among Palestinians, the percentages were 35% and 30%, respectively.) One out of six interviewees (17%) indicated that being Iraqi is just an ascribed fact of their existence or they feel little attachment to the label. Nearly two-thirds of interviewees said that they don’t know what it means to them or refused to answer.

\textsuperscript{225} Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/14/10
\textsuperscript{226} Interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one response.
Unlike Palestinians, who can idealize a vision of statehood which has never been realized, Iraqi nationalism faces a failure of nation-building which dates back even earlier than 2003.\footnote{Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10} The concept of a national political movement based on land and territory has competed throughout Iraq’s history with both supranational (\textit{al-qawmiyya}, Arab nationalist) movements as well as sub-national (tribal, clan) identities\footnote{IOM official, personal interview, 12/22/10; Al-Tikriti 2010}. Some refugees blame the lack of a unifying Iraqi nationalist identity on Saddam Hussein:

\begin{quote}
Iraq failed to spread the concept of nationalism. I don’t hate Saddam Hussein that much…. But I hate him for erasing the entire idea of nationalism just so he can still be in charge in the country. The idea of nationalism is sacred, at least I think [so]…. What I hate about Iraqi leaders is they didn’t implement nationalism as the most important thing…. Then we wouldn’t be seeing the problems we’re seeing today. (Male, 21)
\end{quote}

Furthermore, whereas the 1948 War actually improved the cohesion of the Palestinian community and ended most major intra-group rivalries, the 2003 war led to decreased cohesion among Iraqis.\footnote{Program manager for an NGO, personal interview, 1/6/11} Ironically, Iraq’s nationalist project has arguably never been as successful as Palestinians’ stateless nationalism since the 1960s.

The lack of political orientation to Iraq also seems to translate into political apathy: For example, in the 2005 Iraqi parliamentary elections, only about 30,000 Iraqis in Jordan at that time cast ballots (Luck/Jordan Times, 3/5/10), which may have represented only 10-20\% of eligible voters. Iraqi authorities declined to publish the number of votes cast in Jordan in the 2010 elections.

One reason that there may be little nationalist sentiment is that the Iraqi “community” in Jordan, among those without \textit{iqama} (one-year renewable residency

\footnote{Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10}
permit), is not socially cohesive.\textsuperscript{230} First, despite clustering in some neighborhoods, such as Hashmi Shmali in Amman, their pattern of emigration was scattered over time and space.\textsuperscript{231} Unlike the Palestinians, most of whom left their CoO in two major waves and often traveled in large groups, Iraqis left more gradually over time, and usually traveled in small nuclear family units. Rather than the iconic picture of masses of weary villagers trudging through the wilderness, an Iraqi family typically hired a private taxi to take them to the border alone, or went on a bus with strangers. Whereas 42\% of Palestinian households stated that their family settled with their neighbors from the CoO upon initial arrival in Jordan (cf. Farah 2005, p. 93), only 6\% of Iraqi households did. More than half of Iraqi households voluntarily mentioned that their family has been scattered to different places as a result of the violence, for example:

\begin{quote}
Because of all the things I’ve been though, no, I won’t go back. Even my aunts, some are in Syria, Greece, Australia. Even within Iraq, they left Baghdad to go to other governorates. (Female, 20)
\end{quote}

In contrast, only 37\% of Palestinian households (28\% of those in camps) mentioned such scattering. However, there may be some loose self-segregation of Iraqis by sect into different neighborhoods of Amman\textsuperscript{232}, and Iraqi Christians appear to be more cohesive within their religious group, but in general most Iraqis self-settled by class and income rather than sect. (Chatelard 2010)

Another reason that the community is not cohesive is that decades of dictatorship under Saddam Hussein, during which it was dangerous even to mention his name for fear

\textsuperscript{230} Jordan director, NGO for Iraqi refugees, personal interview, 1/4/11; Iraqi Christian clergyman, personal interview, 1/6/11; Chatelard 2010; de Bel-Air 2009. For a discussion of “bonding” (within-group) and “bridging” (with host nationals) social capital among Iraqi refugees in Jordan, see Calhoun (2010).

\textsuperscript{231} Jalal Al Husseini, personal interview, 12/6/10; Jones 2010

\textsuperscript{232} Iraqi reporter, personal interview, 1/27/11; This was contradicted by other interviewees, who stated that there is no such segregation.
of denouncement by one’s neighbors or even family, has left Iraqis highly suspicious of each other (Jones 2010; Sassoon 2009):

In the time of Saddam Hussein, we didn’t have telephones, satellite TV…. We were even afraid to speak in our own house because we were afraid there would be spies among our neighbors. That’s why he stayed as a leader for 35 years, because we were living in fear of him. (Male, 36)

Distrust of fellow Iraqis is experienced even by former Ba’ath members, who may fear being recognized by the family of a victim in Jordan.\(^\text{233}\) Many interviewees mentioned that they try to avoid interacting with Iraqis in Jordan:

We don’t like to [interact with others] because everybody has their own situation and circumstances. Especially Iraqis, we don’t like to deal with Iraqis because we are afraid that something will happen. (Female, 45)

There are so many Iraqis here but I don’t have any relationship with them because we are really scared, because Iraqis are troublemakers. I don’t mix with them at all. When I [see] people, just “hi” and “goodbye”. (Female, 39)

Some even expressed hope of being resettled in a remote corner of a western country where they will never have to meet another Iraqi. However, in the last few years this fear may have started to abate.\(^\text{234}\)

In conclusion, it is safe to say that there is no ethnonationalist movement among ordinary Iraqi refugees in Jordan.

Ex-Ba’athists

The subset of Iraqi refugees who may feel a stronger patriotic attachment are those who worked for the Ba’ath party for many years. These are the only subset of Iraqi refugees whose discourse veers toward an ethnonationalist project – i.e., Iraq should be led by Sunnis, who are naturally the most qualified leaders to restore its Iraqi national glory – even while they vehemently deny any suggestion of social sectarian division.

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\(^{233}\) Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/14/10

\(^{234}\) Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10
This reflects the political reality in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, when, despite extensive social mixing between the groups, political power in the government and military was held by Sunnis, who also received disparate shares of oil wealth and water resources:

The rights that my family thought they had in Iraq were based on ethnicity. We are Sunni, from the Sunni quarter of town…. We were trusted in positions in the army or intelligence… and there is no way to regain those privileges. I didn’t really feel those privileges but my father did…. My father feels nostalgic for those days…. I don’t like it when people say there’s no difference between Sunni and Shi’ite, because there is [an economic and political difference]. The majority of privileged Iraqis were Sunni, and it’s not just under Saddam Hussein, it [started long] before him. (Female, 32)

Sunni political dominance in the region of Iraq actually dates back to the fifteenth century, even before the modern use of the term “Sunni” to denote an ethnic grouping.

Many Sunnis themselves see it as more analogous to being “white” in the United States, including its long historical associations of privilege and dominance, than a sect or ethnicity. (Al-Tikriti 2010)

NO AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC BASE

Unlike the majority of Palestinians who arrived in 1948 and 1967, most Iraqis were already urban, educated, professional and middle-class when they arrived. Of those who arrived since 2003, almost half indicated that the head of their household held a professional position in Iraq prior to departure, and another 19% said they were a merchant or small business owner. Only two interviewees (6%) said that they were farmers prior to leaving Iraq. More than 60% have completed at least some university education.

Upon arriving in Jordan, all but one interviewee household settled in

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235 Nazek Saleh, personal interview, 12/14/10
236 The proportion with at least a Bachelor’s degree in this sample was 40%, which is nearly identical with the proportion among UNHCR’s registered refugees (Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/2/10).
Amman or its suburbs.²³⁷

Unlike the Palestinians, no Iraqis mentioned an attachment to the land, farming, or even the familiarity of their homeland as a reason why life was better in their CoO. Similarly, whereas 77% of Palestinians had offered romanticized and/or agricultural descriptions of life in their CoO prior to the war, only 27% of Iraqis gave idealized portrayals of life in Iraq pre-2003 – but none of those descriptions were agricultural. The lack of glorification may be due in part to the decades of suffering through war and international sanctions which Iraqis experienced almost continuously for nearly a quarter-century prior to 2003.²³⁸ Other Iraqi interviewees (22%) focused on the security which was provided by the Saddam Hussein regime, even if it came at the cost of freedom:

Before 2003, there was security. But there was no freedom. You were subject to arrest for any reason, for the least criticism, for the least mistake you made in your report or in your life. But on the level of the family, there was security: If you leave the house, you will come back safe. Security without freedom. After 2003, freedom without [security]. In my opinion, security without freedom is better than freedom without security, at least for the family, for the girls. (Male, 43)

Others (14%) described economic difficulties, while still others (14%) described a comfortable upper-middle class lifestyle; finally, 24% described it as an ordinary, middle-class, urban life.

The Iraqis’ economic attachments to their CoO are also substantially different than Palestinians’. Since almost all were urban before leaving Iraq, very few owned land; their only major assets were an apartment or house and vehicle(s). Only 35% of households arriving since 2003 stated that they had abandoned their house (in contrast, 86% of Palestinian households had abandoned their land). Nearly the same proportion

²³⁷ There were some small refugee camps for Iraqis near the Jordan-Iraq border, but they closed years ago.
²³⁸ Former PLO legal advisor, personal interview, 12/26/10
either sold their house, are renting it out, or left it in the care of relatives or friends. One-quarter had not owned real property in Iraq at all. When asked what their primary concern was at the time of leaving Iraq, no one mentioned property or land.\textsuperscript{239}

Furthermore, in contrast to Palestinians, of whom very few had brought assets from the CoO, one-third of Iraqis stated that they were able to bring significant assets such as vehicles, jewelry and cash to Jordan.

**GREED**

Unlike Palestine, Iraq has a very large natural reserve of a rent-producing resource, oil. Oil rents heavily subsidize public services in Iraq, including free education from primary school through the doctoral level, and free medical care. In Jordan, by contrast, university education and medical care can be relatively expensive. In that sense, oil as a rent-producing resource could stimulate an economic attachment to land in the CoO.

However, no interviewees claimed that they were expelled in order that an enemy could take over oil fields. If refugees had been expelled from their homes in oil-rich areas which were taken over by an enemy group, it is possible that greed could be an economic motivating factor for refugee militarization. But most refugees in Jordan came from Baghdad, which is not an oil-rich region of the country.

In short, there is no collective project to redeem the homeland among ordinary Iraqi refugees. Even if they were expelled on the basis of their sectarian identity, they don’t know who their enemy is; and they have little economic or political attachment to land in the CoO. The only exception is ex-Ba’athists, and possibly Sunni elites more

\textsuperscript{239} The most commonly cited answers were family and children (38\%) and survival (35\%).

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broadly, many of whom long for their lost power and privilege.

**Socioeconomic integration and marginalization**

**Rights in the Host State**

Iraqis in Jordan experience a much more liminal condition than Palestinians. Like most states in the Levant and Gulf, Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention, and due to the large number of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, the government is reluctant to officially classify the mass of Iraqis as “refugees” because they fear it will be a first step toward permanent resettlement in Jordan. According to the terms of a 1998 memorandum of understanding between the government and UNHCR, every non-citizen accorded refugee status in Jordan is obligated to be resettled within six months, subject to renewal by the Jordanian authorities. (Sassoon 2009) As a result, although they may have refugee status with UNHCR, Iraqis are not granted official refugee status from the Jordanian government until their case has been forwarded to the resettlement department of UNHCR.\(^240\)

The Jordanian government sees Iraqis through the lens of Palestinian refugees, including their rocky history of integration to Jordan. As a result, the general approach to Iraqis in Jordan by the government is that they are “guests”, an inherently temporary status, and therefore not eligible for the rights accorded to nationals. (Fagen 2007; Sassoon 2009; de Bel-Air 2009) Those without iqama have no right to employment except for some menial labor jobs\(^241\); and, like Gazans, they must pay foreigners’ rates for higher education and medical care. They were not allowed to enroll their children in public primary or secondary schools until intervention by King Abdullah in 2007.

\(^240\) Director, NGO for Iraqi refugees, personal interview, 1/12/11

\(^241\) Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/14/10
changed the policy. (Fagen 2007) Those with iqama are able to use the public health care system and enroll in schools like Jordanians. In the sample in this study, only 30% of interviewees stated that they have refugee status (many of those were not sure whether that was with UNHCR or the Jordanian government); 19% had iqama through an investor visa; 9% had iqama through another means, such as marrying a Jordanian citizen; 6% held a visitor visa; and 32% had no legal status.

Therefore, with the exception of the wealthy who are able to invest US$70,000-$150,000 in a Jordanian bank and receive iqama through an investor visa, most Iraqis have no stable right of residence. However, until 2005, it was relatively easy to exit the country at any border crossing to renew a visitor visa every 3-6 months. After the bombings in Jordan by Iraqi terrorists in 2005, it became much more difficult to renew visitor visas, and the number of Iraqis in Jordan without legal status increased dramatically. (Fagen 2007; Hodson 2007; de Bel-Air 2009)

For the most part, those with iqama are able to lead relatively normal lives in Jordan, and – despite some resentment by Jordanians against the spike in prices of food and real estate which they blamed on the influx of wealthy Iraqis in the early years (Fagen 2007; Sassoon 2009; Loughry 2010; Hodson 2007; de Bel-Air 2009) – enjoy economic and social integration. Many do not consider themselves refugees (Chatelard 2010) – a term often reserved in the Middle East for Palestinians – even if they meet the criteria defined in this project:

Us as refugees? We never felt that we’re refugees here. We’re treated like Jordanians, especially that we speak the Jordanian slang. Some people don’t even know that we’re Iraqi, so we’re not treated as refugees. Probably because we left Iraq early, we didn’t… feel forced to leave Iraq [or] lose our rights…. We chose to leave, we chose the place to

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242 Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/2/10
243 Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/2/10
live in… so we’ve never been treated as refugees. We didn’t even feel inside that we’re refugees…. Some people actually feel it, they got kidnapped or a relative was kidnapped, or the way they traveled was very dramatic, but we never felt that…. We have always lived well. (Female, 24)

I don’t really consider myself a refugee…. In the reason of displacement, yes, I am…. I do need legal protection because there is no guarantee that my residency will be renewed. But in terms of salary and living standard, I am way better off [even] than most Jordanians…. It just feels unethical to consider myself a refugee…. If I knew of another way to apply to the US or UK, I would. But my understanding is that these governments are funding UNHCR to do their paperwork… So the only way to [do] it is through UNHCR. (Female, 32)

The second generation, children who have spent the last 5-8 years in Jordan, are generally well integrated and oriented to their host state. Their attachment to Iraq is mostly cultural, they speak Arabic with a Jordanian accent, and they don’t project themselves into any activity toward Iraq\(^\text{244}\):

Two days ago there was a [soccer] match between Syria and Jordan, and we asked the kids who’s playing. The kids said, “Us and Syria”. I said, “Us Iraqis?” They said, “No, it’s Jordan.” They speak the Jordanian dialect better than the Iraqi dialect. (Male, unknown age)

I expect my parents to go back to Iraq, but I expect myself to stay here for a few years, at least until finishing university, then go to a foreign country and get a Master’s degree…. For me, even if that happens, I wouldn’t really want to go back. Life here is better, and I imagine life in the western countries is even better. (Male, 18)

On the other hand, lack of attachment to Iraq may be due in part to the fact that Iraqi children are often bullied and marginalized:

My son is in the tenth grade. Everybody hits him because he is Iraqi. They tell him, “Go back to Iraq.” (Male, unknown age)

This type of bullying has led children to try to hide their Iraqi identity, and some even dropped out of school.\(^\text{245}\)

Those without iqama expressed serious anxiety about their circumstances in

\(^{244}\) Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10; Iraqi Christian clergyman, personal interview, 1/6/11

\(^{245}\) IOM official, personal interview, 12/14/10; Program manager for an NGO, personal interview, 1/6/11
Jordan, including fear of deportation. In fact, lack of legal status and fear of deportation led many Iraqis to avoid registering with UNHCR, with the idea of staying off the radar of all official authorities. (Sassoon 2009) After the terrorist attack in 2005, and again when Jordan tightened border restrictions in 2007, officials kept up the threat of detention and deportation of Iraqis lacking legal status:

> After the bombing in Jordan our lives were really difficult…. Because the Jordanian authorities were… deporting Iraqis when they arrested them, and they did not treat us in a good way. After that they did not give us residency here…. Even people with investments here, they refused to give them residency. Some people I know, Iraqi men married to Jordanian women, they were married and living here even before the war, and have children, and the Jordanian government came and told them, take your children and go back to Iraq. Things were really bad. (Male, 35)

In 2009, however, Jordan relieved the Iraqi community by stating that they would no longer detain and deport Iraqis lacking legal status; by 2011 there were almost no deportations. This eased the situation for Iraqis without iqama, and made them more comfortable to approach UNHCR.

> Nevertheless, for most Iraqis without iqama, their lack of permanent residence and right of employment in Jordan, as well as the months and years most refugees are waiting for resettlement to western countries, has led to little economic integration in Jordan, and a feeling of perpetual liminality:

> We are like birds who are still flying; we cannot settle here. If [we] want to settle in our nests permanently, it depends on [UNHCR]…. I consider this a slow death…. We don’t know what will happen in the future…. So there is no future, no dreams. (Male, 47)

When asked, “How much control do you feel you have over your own life and your own future now?” 55% said “none” or “little”, and only 10% said “a lot”. Another 16% said that they will have control over their lives only after resettlement. Of those who felt

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246 Program manager for an NGO, personal interview, 1/6/11; Iraqi Christian clergyman, personal interview, 1/6/11
247 Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/2/10
248 This was an open-ended question.
little or no control over their life, 57% said that this is due to a feeling of liminality, and 17% said it is because they are stuck in Jordan, unable either to return to Iraq or to be resettled. When asked, “What would you most like to change about your life in Jordan?”

answers were mixed: about equal percentages cited their economic situation and resettlement (26-28%); and 13% mentioned rights, especially the right to work. Only one interviewee mentioned returning to Iraq. As one UNHCR official stated, “Life is not comfortable in Jordan, it’s not easy…. They don’t want to return [to Iraq] because that’s how scared they are….” (Personal interview, 11/2/10) However, even Iraqis who do have iqama are not entirely at ease with their situation. In answer to the latter question, nearly a quarter of those with iqama stated that they would like a longer residency period, since they have to renew it every year. They fear that a policy change will prevent renewal, as happened for some Iraqis after the 2005 bombings.

Institutions to address grievances through the host state

As noted in the previous chapters, whereas the Jordanian regime does maintain some democratic characteristics, there are no guarantees of freedoms of assembly, protest and speech. And unlike the Palestinians, Iraqis – very few of whom have Jordanian citizenship – have no means of addressing their grievances through the formal institutions of government. Given the lack of collective project regarding Iraq among ordinary Iraqis, however, it is unlikely that they would take advantage of such opportunities even if they were available. I found no evidence of mass political assembly, with the exception of campaign visits by political candidates from Iraq during election season.

The situation is different in Syria, where a larger, poorer and more homogenous

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249 This was an open-ended question, and interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one answer.
250 Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10
population of Iraqis may constitute a critical mass, potentially making them an important domestic actor.\textsuperscript{251}

**EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES**

Despite legal and economic restrictions, particularly on those without iqama, one-third of households still stated that life in Jordan was better than in Iraq (compared to only 6\% of Palestinians). By far the most frequently cited reason for preferring Jordan was safety and security. Among the two-thirds of households who stated that life in Iraq was better, commonly cited reasons were that they had lost a high position and wealth, they had better employment opportunities, and a better financial situation. Whereas two-thirds of Palestinians stated that their living standard had improved since their ancestors first arrived in Jordan, only 28\% of Iraqis said that it had improved; half said it has gotten worse. Not surprisingly, there was a large difference between those who had iqama, of whom 64\% said their situation has improved, and those without, of whom the same proportion said it has gotten worse since arrival.

**Without iqama**

One official at the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which handles the logistics of transporting refugees who have been accepted for resettlement, compared his interactions with Iraqis to what could be expected if Americans became refugees: They are a technologically savvy, demanding population with complicated affairs and high expectations of customer service. For instance, sometimes they ask to postpone a resettlement flight because they won’t be able to liquidate assets in less than a month. Some refugees check the price of flights on the internet, and challenge why their IOM

\textsuperscript{251} Jalal Al Husseini, personal interview, 12/6/10
promissory notes will require them to repay more than market value.\textsuperscript{252}

When this population arrived to Jordan and most (without iqama) discovered that they would be legally allowed to work only in menial labor positions, it was a serious obstacle to economic orientation toward Jordan. Most found the prospect of low-wage physical labor demeaning\textsuperscript{253}, and preferred to simply wait for a solution – either resettlement or a change in conditions allowing return to Iraq. Those in this position usually did not realize that the resettlement process could take years.\textsuperscript{254} Others chose to seek employment illegally:

I used to work in a restaurant [here in Jordan] and every week the mukhabarat came to the restaurant, and every time I used to escape through the window. (Male, unknown age)

Informal work also lacks the protection of labor laws, and several interviewees reported abuses by employers, including refusing to pay for months of work\textsuperscript{255}; and rumors swirl of Jordanian authorities deporting Iraqis who work without authorization:

Iraqis are not allowed to work here. My nephew was working here in a restaurant, and when the government found out, they deported him, and now he is [persona non grata]. That was five years ago. All his family is here and he is in Iraq. (Female, 31)

Especially for women, there is social stigma attached to manual labor:

To be honest, I work at wedding parties, serving. When I get the chance to do that, I go. When they call me and tell me that they need servers, I go, because we need money…. If my brothers knew that I’m working as a waitress, they will…. (Female, 38)

These obstacles have had several ramifications, including dwindling cash reserves (Fagen 2007; Tavernise/New York Times, 8/10/07), voluntarily mentioned by 17% of households:

I brought money with me…. When I came to Jordan I had a lot of money, but now this money is almost gone. I wonder, when my money is gone, will Jordan still love me?

\textsuperscript{252} IOM requires that refugees repay the cost of their flight, but are given years to do so.
\textsuperscript{253} Jordan director, NGO for Iraqi refugees, personal interview, 1/4/11
\textsuperscript{254} Jordan director, NGO for Iraqi refugees, personal interview, 1/4/11
\textsuperscript{255} Reporter for a western news agency, personal interview, 12/20/11
UNHCR gives registered refugees in need a cash stipend which is sufficient only to cover rent for a small apartment in a lower class neighborhood. Those in the middle and upper-middle classes in Iraq, with a large house and one or more cars, have experienced declining socioeconomic status without iqama, becoming lower-middle class in Jordan, where they may live in a small apartment with one bathroom:

I was working in Iraq. I had an excellent situation…. We had a house, car, a great situation, a classy life…. When we came here, the situation was very bad…. I have 29 years of work experience…. Rent and other expenses make living here very hard.

In some cases, lack of income leads to upsetting traditional gender roles, as men stay home while their wife gets involved with community-based development NGOs, and is able to bring home a little cash from the transportation allowance given to attendees.

Some refugees are able to receive assistance from relatives overseas or even in Jordan, but may find it shameful to ask for it.

Due to UNHCR’s adoption of Jordan’s patriarchal rules of descent, the children of an Iraqi woman married to a Jordanian man are ineligible for assistance from UNHCR – and they are often rejected from Jordanian charities and public assistance because the applicant (their mother) is Iraqi – which leads to poverty and tragic circumstances when her Jordanian husband refuses to support them.

As cash reserves are depleted while they await resettlement, some downsize to a more affordable apartment (Loughry 2010), particularly in the low-rent Hashmi Shmali neighborhood of Amman. As mentioned earlier, there are no refugee camps for Iraqis.

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256 Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10; Program manager for an NGO, personal interview, 1/6/11; Sassoon 2009
257 Program manager for an NGO, personal interview, 1/6/11
258 Jordan director, NGO for Iraqi refugees, personal interview, 1/4/11
Since nearly all Iraqis live in Amman or its suburbs, they have access to basic services, including electricity, running water, indoor plumbing and television. Urban residence also offers social advantages to ease the living situations of Iraqis: It has “allowed large numbers of Iraqis to take advantage of their support networks, access social and financial resources that may be found only in the cities…, participate actively in professional and art spheres in Amman and more generally, work [legally or illegally]. Not easily found in camp settings, such elements are crucial to pursuing… livelihood potentials.” (ICMC 2009, p. 26) These are important factors which could potentially affect refugees’ socioeconomic integration, but they pale in comparison to the right of employment.

One response by UNHCR to the urban environment of Iraqi refugees has been to establish community centers “where Iraqis, other refugees and members of the local population can come together, access services, information and counseling, participate in recreational activities and enjoy each other’s company.” (Crisp, Janz & Riera 2009, p. 31) It is unclear what effect these community centers may have on the orientations and motivations of Iraqis who use them. In theory, they may encourage local integration; or they may reinforce a ‘refugee’ identity by concentrating an otherwise diffuse and fragmented refugee community; or they are not widely known, widely utilized or widely available to the geographically dispersed Iraqi refugee population in Amman and therefore have no effect. Regardless, they are clearly far less integrative and cohesive institutions than refugee camps, since they bring limited numbers of refugees together voluntarily, and only for limited periods of time.

**With iqama**

Even elites with iqama enjoy a lower degree of luxury than they did in Iraq. As
one interviewee stated, “My house in Baghdad was 1000 square meters [10,700 square feet]; this house is 300 square meters [3,200 square feet]. So you can see the difference.” (Male, 55) Nonetheless, those with iqama often reported that current living conditions now are better in Jordan than Iraq, including reliable water and electricity supplies and the fact that “everything is available” in Jordan if a person has the ability to pay for it. Many continue to benefit from the income they receive from rental properties, pensions, investments and business interests in Iraq, even while they reside in Jordan, through multinational banks. They have support networks and social and financial resources available. For the most part, they find life in Jordan sustainable, and are content to stay as long as necessary. They may seek resettlement to the US or Europe – most prefer the EU because of the generous provision of social services, which is similar to what they were accustomed to in Iraq259 – but many see resettlement more as a strategy to gain the safety net of American or European citizenship, which will provide them and their children the freedom to come and go between Iraq, Jordan and the west as conditions evolve in the future260:

I think… a lot of Iraqis think [it’s best to] emigrate, get another passport, and you can always return later. And when the Middle East erupts again, as it always will, you have an exit strategy…. For those outside Iraq, you definitely want a more permanent legal status. If Jordan gave my family a more permanent residency, we wouldn’t think of leaving. (Female, 32)

ETNIC CONSANGUINITY

Most Iraqi refugees who came to Jordan are Sunni Arab (54% of households who left since 2003 in this study261), which describes nearly all Jordanians, both those from

259 Official working in refugee issues in the Middle East, personal interview, 12/20/10
260 IOM official, personal interview, 12/14/10
261 Sunni Kurds constituted 3% of households in this sample who arrived since 2003; Shi’ites 11%; Christians 19%; Sabeans 5%; and inter-faith 8%.
Palestine and the East Bank. However, Sunnis, including former Ba’athists, also preferred Jordan because the Jordanian population was sympathetic to Saddam Hussein and his Sunni-dominated regime.262 Iraq under Saddam Hussein had provided oil to Jordan at heavily subsidized prices, and the Jordanian government worked hard to maintain good relations with its wealthy neighbor.263 As a result, Jordan did not participate in either the 1991 war against Iraq (much to the consternation of its Gulf neighbors) nor the 2003 war.264 It would be difficult to disaggregate ethnic similarity from political alliance as the attractive factor.

In terms of ethnic consanguinity affecting socioeconomic integration, it may have helped the Sunni elites – those with iqama – feel more comfortable in Jordan, and orient economically more toward their host state than CoO:

> Jordan is near Iraq, and I have friends here, and there are similarities in culture and social traditions. (Male, 55)

> The refugees have not come from far, they haven’t come into an alien culture, they haven’t come to an alien value system. They speak the same language, so in that sense, both [Palestinian and Iraqi] refugees have not experienced their environment with the eyes of total strangers…. (Lex Takkenberg, personal interview, 11/10/10)

On the other hand, as described earlier, Sunnis especially were reluctant to contemplate social sectarian differences, so this may be a spurious connection. In fact, class – which largely overlapped with sect in Iraq – may have been more of a consideration in selecting a host state than sectarian similarity, since those who came to Jordan were generally wealthier, more educated and more professional than those who went to Syria.265

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262 Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/2/10
263 Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10
264 However, Jordan did provide logistical support to the coalition forces. (Fattah & Slackman/New York Times, 11/10/05)
265 Official working in refugee issues in the Middle East, personal interview, 12/20/10; Tavernise/New York Times, 8/10/07
As for Shi’ite refugees, most fled to Syria, especially after 2005.\textsuperscript{266} (Fagen 2007; Chatelard 2010) The lack of ethnic consanguinity with locals has led those who came to Jordan to often hide their sectarian identity from Jordanians, who are less welcoming to Shi’ites (Sassoon 2009; de Bel-Air 2009), even though they may be open about their sectarian identity with other Iraqis.\textsuperscript{267} Rumors circulate of Shi’ites who proselytize to youth and build mosques in Jordan.\textsuperscript{268} Consider, for example, this exchange between a Jordanian worker in a government office for development with her Iraqi Sunni colleague:

\begin{quote}
(Jordanian woman:) Sunnis are more compassionate than Shi’ites. They are afraid of Allah more. Shi’ites are cruel. Right?
(Iraqi man:) Right.
(Jordanian woman:) You see them on TV, they hit themselves. You know Shi’ites don’t care, they could kill children, but Sunnis are not like that. Because they love Allah and the Prophet Mohammad.
\end{quote}

(Personal interview, 5/2/11)

Christians and Sabeans have expressed similar reluctance to reveal their identity to Jordanians.\textsuperscript{269} It is clear that they feel uncomfortable and harassed in Jordan, decreasing their social integration in their host state.

In sum, there is a clear socioeconomic segmentation among Iraqi refugees in Jordan, even sharper than among Palestinians, between those socioeconomically integrated (almost all of whom are Sunni elites with iqama) and those generally marginalized (from all sects, without iqama). Most Iraqis in Jordan have few economic ties binding them to Iraq, such as property, and no economic attachments to the land; relatively few glorify their pre-2003 life in Iraq. Those without iqama have few rights in

\textsuperscript{266} A news article by Oweis (Reuters, 2/12/09) contradicts this, stating that 60% of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR in Syria are Sunni.
\textsuperscript{267} Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10
\textsuperscript{268} Nazek Saleh, personal interview, 12/14/10; Hodson (2007) cites one instance in which the Jordanian government refused authorization to build a Shi’ite mosque.
\textsuperscript{269} Program manager for an NGO, personal interview, 1/6/11
Jordan, and as a result, do not see any reason to orient economically to their host state, either. Even those with iqama are uneasy about their long-term future in Jordan, but they do often maintain transnational business ties between their host state and CoO, and are more likely to feel comfortable in a Jordanian social environment supportive of the Sunni Arab elite which dominated Iraq under Saddam Hussein. In general, however, is not surprising that most Iraqi refugees who arrived since 2003, and especially those without iqama, are economically oriented toward resettlement in a third country where they expect to receive full rights and eventually citizenship. They are trying to make the best economic decision they can, including consideration of where they will obtain legal status and employment rights as well as job opportunities.

**Militancy entrepreneurs**

**PRE-EXISTING**

There are two pre-existing groups of potential militancy entrepreneurs residing in Jordan. The potential leadership are the deposed Ba’athists, who are deeply resentful of their lost positions, power and wealth, and especially of the de-Ba’athification process instituted by occupation administrator Paul Bremmer in 2003-04. They seek to recover what they lost in Iraq, framing their arguments around claims of injustice and “natural” ethnic privilege:

> The bastard Bremmer passed a law, a very bad law, really awful, dreadful, all the people who were Ba’ath were kicked out. Even professors at the universities, doctors, engineers. They were exiled…. The American government came to Iraq with a bunch of animals and strange faces. Iranian-made. Civilized humans can’t deal with these people…. The

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270 Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/2/10; Program manager for an NGO, personal interview, 1/6/11; Unfortunately, many refugees anticipating resettlement to the US have highly inflated expectations of the degree of social services and safety net they can expect to receive there, similar to the lifestyle they enjoyed in Iraq. (Official working in refugee issues in the Middle East, personal interview, 12/20/10)

271 IOM official, personal interview, 12/22/10
big hope is that I want the people who rule Iraq to be really Iraqis, so that when I carry
the flag on my left side…. Now I have no flag…. I feel that my country is stolen, taken
away…. (What’s the best way to get it back?) Using the American power, if they were
honest, they should protect Iraq from its historical enemy, the Persians…. America
should blow the wind at these people [the Shi’ite-led government of Nouri al-Maliki] to
remove them and bring civilized, educated people, who have real certificates, people who
use religion to educate people, and worship [in] the right way, not to use religion for
political and financial objectives. When you bring these kinds of people, they would be
able to rule the country. (Former minister under Saddam Hussein, male, 55)

I’ve had the opportunity to meet with a number of senior former Iraqi regime elements in
Amman, many of whom are now in their 60s and 70s. Their consistent message to me
was a disappointment in and even hatred of [Ambassador Paul] Bremmer’s tenure and, in
particular, the de-Ba’athification measures he instituted. But then they would
acknowledge that they made a mistake in 2003: “We should have known that linking with
[the United States] would have been better for us. Instead, many of us opposed [the US]
and therefore found ourselves on the same side as al-Qaeda. This is what opened the
door to Iran. Now we see the error of our ways, and we want [the US] to empower us to
go back and fight the Iranians.” By that, they meant not to invade Iran, but to oppose
Iraqi Prime Minister [Nouri al-]Maliki, who, to their reckoning, was Iran’s representative
to Iraq. They are demilitarized here but wouldn’t mind being militarized. (Foreign
diplomat, personal interview, 5/4/11)

The ex-Ba’athists were heavily involved in meetings with post-2003 political
figures in Amman, for example at the Al-Quds Center for Political Study, as they tried to
regain their positions in Iraq. They have now largely lost hope in the institutional route
to regaining power in Iraq following the disappointing outcome for Ayad Allawi, who
had intended to re-integrate the former Ba’athists, in the 2010 parliamentary elections.272

The second group, who could potentially constitute the foot soldiers of a militant
organization, are the young, single males in Jordan, mostly neglected by the humanitarian
NGOs due to their age and sex, who were low-level members of the Ba’ath party,
mukhabarat, military and/or special forces under Saddam Hussein. Because of their
former activities, they are nearly impossible to resettle; and like those in the first group,
who are “probably pretty realistic about what would happen to them if they were to go

272 Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10
back” to Iraq\textsuperscript{273}, they cannot return to Iraq as civilians because they are targeted by anti-Ba’ath militias such as those supported by the Shi’ite Dawa party; and they cannot work legally in Jordan:

They hope to go back, but know that they cannot. Their families are in Iraq…. Many people want revenge…. They came from a poor area, poor background, [little] education…. Those that are still here, more than five years, these are my concern. (Director, NGO for Iraqi refugees, personal interview, 1/12/11)

As former members of the Ba’ath party, they may maintain a collective project to redeem the homeland, like the exiled ex-Ba’ath leadership, while they remain socioeconomically marginalized in Jordan by their lack of iqama. They are in a state of perpetual limbo, with little hope of resolution for their situation. As such, they may be particularly susceptible to the appeal of militarization. It is unknown how many Iraqis fall in this category, but if married males with dependents are included, this description may apply to the heads of household of as much as half of UNHCR’s register of 30,000-plus Iraqi refugees\textsuperscript{274}.

It is important to note, however, that these two groups who are stuck in Jordan, unable to return to Iraq or be resettled\textsuperscript{275}, are mostly disconnected from ordinary Iraqi refugees, who are more transient: some return permanently to Iraq; others return, then come back to Jordan again; some are resettled\textsuperscript{276}; and new refugees arrive. When asked, “Which group(s) or organization(s) do you feel best represents the interests of the Iraqi

\textsuperscript{273} Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/14/10
\textsuperscript{274} Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/2/10; UNHCR does exclude high-ranking political and military figures who are responsible for war crimes, but the standards for exclusion are high – as of 2010, only about 40 applicants had been excluded. (Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/14/10)
\textsuperscript{275} Official in a Jordanian government office for development, personal interview, 5/2/11; Reporter for western news agency, personal interview, 12/20/10
\textsuperscript{276} IOM’s office in Jordan has been processing decreasing numbers of resettlement applications over the past several years, from about 10,000 individuals in 2008 to about 6,000 in 2010. (IOM official, personal interview, 12/14/10)
refugees?277, half mentioned the UN (usually UNHCR) and 15% mentioned another humanitarian organization, while 21% said that there is no organization. None mentioned the former Ba’ath party. Unlike in Syria, where the Mahdi Army operates and recruits openly, and in Lebanon, where “it’s an open market for any [organization] who wants to operate”, there are no organizations recruiting in Jordan278, nor even loose political associations279 (Chatelard 2010; Sassoon 2009):

There isn’t a strong Iraqi civil society abroad, and… I don’t think the Jordanian government would welcome it. There is no strong presence like a strong tribe, or a charity or organization… there’s no core. Because the Jordanian government doesn’t want there to be something that could eventually become political… and there is no basis for it [from Iraq] because there were no NGOs under Saddam Hussein. (Female, 32)

WAITING FOR INDIVIDUAL, NOT GROUP, RESOLUTION

Of those who have left Iraq since 2003, as of the time of interview, one-third had been outside their CoO for 6-8 years, 28% had been outside for 3-5 years, and 39% had left Iraq within the previous 2 years. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the minimum threshold of a protracted stay as defined by UNHCR is five years, but in this case, even among those who have been in Jordan for more than five years, the situation has not yet reached the point at which they have lost hope for an individual resolution to their situation.

Whereas nearly half of Palestinians said that they expect no change in the future of the refugees, only 16% of Iraqis said that; and while more than one-quarter of Palestinians said they expect the status quo to continue in their own future, only 11% of Iraqis hold that view.

Unlike Palestinians, Iraqi refugees had less expectation of imminent return when

277 This was an open-ended question, and interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one answer.
278 Official speaking on condition of anonymity
279 Reporter for western news agency, personal interview, 12/20/10
they arrived: 43% said they expected to never return, and 13% said they had expected to return “someday”. Only 13% of interviewees stated that they had expected to return within less than a year from departure, and all of those had left Iraq in the early years, from 2003-2006. Of course, whereas Palestinians distinguish between a right of return and actual return, Iraqis do not; as noted earlier, they are physically and legally capable of returning whenever they choose, which makes the idea of return less tantalizing than for Palestinians.

When asked their current expectations of return, most households stated that they are waiting for resettlement through UNHCR, which is at some stage of processing; half said they will never return to Iraq after resettling, even if there is security in the country:

I want to go to another country…. Khalas, it’s enough, everything we have seen, and our [traumatic] memories, we just want to forget them. This is my personal opinion. (Male, 38)

When the car crossed the border into Jordan, I can’t forget, I looked to the right and felt that I had been in hell and now I am in heaven. I forget Iraq, I don’t care, I don’t think about Iraq, I don’t want to go back…. I will never go back. (Female, unknown age)

This Rubicon-type sentiment may be more common among those who experienced more violence and trauma and those with relatives in a western country, who can be role models and/or a support system. In the 2007 FAFO study, 40% of Iraqi refugees stated that they will return to Iraq once the security situation improves, but in the sample in this study, only 19% of those who had left since 2003 said they expect to return in the distant future, if there is security in Iraq. This large difference may be due in part to the fact that those who were inclined to return in 2007 have already done so, as well as those who

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280 Reporter for western news agency, personal interview, 12/20/10
281 Former PLO legal advisor, personal interview, 12/26/10; Iraqi Christian clergyman, personal interview, 1/6/11; Senior official, Department of Palestinian Affairs, personal interview, 5/4/11
282 Reporter for a western news agency, personal interview, 12/20/10
283 Iraqi reporter, personal interview, 1/27/11; Jordan director, NGO for Iraqi refugees, personal interview, 1/4/11
found the cost of living in Jordan prohibitive\textsuperscript{284}; also, the FAFO study substantially over-sampled wealthy Iraqis, who were more willing to be surveyed. (Sassoon 2009) In addition, whereas 40\% of the FAFO sample intended to stay in Jordan, none in the present study stated that they see their long-term future in Jordan.

Just as the Palestinians had been asked their opinion on the best way to achieve their rights now, Iraqis were asked the following question:

What do you believe now is the best way for people like you to address their grievances and achieve their rights?\textsuperscript{285}

a. Monetary assistance to refugees to assist in returning home to Iraq
b. Assistance in resettling to other countries
c. Non-violent resistance like that of Gandhi in India, or the protests in Tunisia and Egypt
d. Armed resistance

The vast majority (81\%) cited assistance in resettlement; only 7\% chose assistance in returning to Iraq. (I will discuss the other two options in the section on militant attitudes, below.)

The reasons for this pessimism regarding return may be related to the fact that the exodus was not compressed over a short period of time, like the Palestinians, but was relatively spread out. By the time most of the current refugees had left Iraq, they knew relatives and friends who had already been out for several years. Also, the fact that the US was not seen as the cause of the ongoing violence meant that the eventual departure of US troops could not be expected bring an improvement in the situation.

Most ordinary Iraqi refugees, who do not have a collective project to redeem the homeland, are seeking individual solutions to their refugee situation: mostly resettlement

\textsuperscript{284} Jordan director, NGO for Iraqi refugees, personal interview, 1/4/11; IOM official, personal interview, 12/14/10
\textsuperscript{285} Interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one choice.
for those without iqama, with a possibility for return in the distant future; and either resettlement or integration to Jordan for those with iqama. The only group who could potentially act as militancy entrepreneurs against the new Iraq are the ex-Ba’athists, perhaps with support from Iraqi Sunni elites; while the only group whom those leaders could potentially mobilize as foot soldiers are the low-level former security personnel of the Ba’ath regime. Both of these sub-groups are stuck in Jordan, unable either to return to Iraq or be resettled due to their former roles; and the low-level former security personnel, most of whom do not have iqama, remain significantly socioeconomically marginalized in Jordan.

**Political opportunity**

As described in Chapter 7, since 1971 the Jordanian government and security forces have been successful at infiltrating and repressing any attempt at militant activity by non-state actors. Data on activities of the mukhabarat are, of course, inaccessible, but the Jordanian government is very aware of being “the stable one in an unstable environment” and is very keen to preserve that reputation.\(^{286}\) In January 2007, King Abdullah II stated, “We will never allow Jordan to be used as a staging post to foment any problems against Iraq.” (Hodson 2007, p. 4) The mukhabarat have paid especially close attention to the activities of ex-Ba’ath political figures\(^ {287}\), and the government “dreads Sunni militants targeting US allies and westernized countries in the region.” (de Bel-Air 2009, p. 13)

The mukhabarat have been proactive in foreclosing opportunities for militarization, including identifying and dismantling terrorist groups with Iraqi ties.

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\(^{286}\) Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/14/10

\(^{287}\) Nazek Saleh, personal interview, 12/14/10
After the 2005 bombing, the state – as well as the Jordanian people – began to see Iraqis through the lens of national security. Surveillance of Iraqis increased dramatically, to the extent that it was even a strain on their capacity.

Iraqis were aware of the increased attention – as one young Iraqi mentioned, “In 2006 and 2007 there were a lot of mukhabarat in cafes [frequented by Iraqis in Jordan] to keep an eye on [us]” (Male, 21) – and their reaction was to try to stay quiet and off the radar of the mukhabarat, a feeling which still persists today. The increased attention by domestic intelligence forces on Iraqis also strained relations with UNHCR, with which they had an agreement to provide notification of the detention and deportation of registered refugees. Since the bombings, deportations in the name of national security have occurred without informing UNHCR.

Even though there are no refugee camps on which to concentrate instruments of repression, since 2006 the mukhabarat have been effective at intercepting and preventing movement, communication, organization and storage of weapons by any would-be Iraqi militants. In 2005, despite extensive penetration of Jordanian society by the mukhabarat, little attention to Iraqis in the country allowed an Iraqi terrorist cell to conduct an attack.

It is unclear whether humanitarian NGOs would contribute to a war economy by ignoring evidence of militarization among their clients if it occurred, but the mukhabarat do work with UNHCR to help ensure that ex-militants and current militants stay off their

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288 Jalal Al Husseini, personal interview, 12/6/10; Iraqi Christian clergyman, personal interview, 1/6/11; de Bel-Air 2009
289 Reporter for western news agency, personal interview, 12/20/10; IOM official, personal interview, 12/22/10; Jordan director, NGO for Iraqi refugees, personal interview, 1/4/11
290 Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/2/10
register\textsuperscript{291}. However, other aspects of political opportunity are present: First, assuming that the would-be perpetrators of militarization are Sunni Arabs, ethnic relations in the host state are strong. Unlike the experience of Dawa, a militant Iraqi Shi’ite party which found no opportunity to base itself in Jordan before 2003\textsuperscript{292}, Jordanians would probably be sympathetic to efforts to dislodge the Shi’ite-dominated government of Iraq.

Secondly, Iraq’s ability to defend itself from cross-border attacks originating in Jordan is probably limited, given the long, porous border through barren desert, and the even longer desert border that both Jordan and Iraq share with Syria.

However, relations between the governments of Jordan and Iraq have mostly been strong since the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s (Terrill 2010), including in the post-2003 period, and it is highly unlikely that the government of Jordan would turn a blind eye to efforts by its putative guests to destabilize its neighbor. In addition, appeals for military support by exiled ex-Ba’athists to the United States government notwithstanding, the US government has a strong national interest in a stable and secure Iraq, especially now that US combat troops have withdrawn. The US would be likely to apply significant pressure to oppose and shut down any serious attempt at militarization by Iraqi refugees.

Overall, despite a few elements which appear to be present, political opportunity for militarization by Iraqi refugees is not available in the current circumstances.

**Conflict resources**

As discussed in the previous chapter, it is impossible to know with certainty whether conflict resources would be available for militarization by refugees in Jordan, but in the Iraqi case it is highly likely. Iraq continues to suffer terrorist attacks by Sunni

\textsuperscript{291} Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/14/10
\textsuperscript{292} Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10
and Shi’ite militias, though attacks have declined since 2005-07, and the central
government continues to have difficulty maintaining security. It is quite feasible that
some of those militias, particularly al-Qaeda’s affiliate, would be capable and interested
in funding and supplying militarization based in Jordan. As of this writing, similar
provision to Syrian rebels by Iraqi Sunni groups, including al-Qaeda, is occurring.
(Arango & Adnan/New York Times, 2/12/12) In fact, after the 2005 bombings in Jordan,
which followed similar attacks elsewhere in the region, there was increasing awareness
that Iraq was becoming not only a hub of terrorist attacks but a regional exporter of them
as well. (Schuster/CNN, 11/12/05; Fagen 2007) Amman and Baghdad are extensively
integrated through transportation, migration, trade and a web of business and social
networks, including via refugees\footnote{Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10}, so quiet movement of weapons and other conflict
supplies to Jordan would not necessarily raise suspicion. Jordan is already used as a
place to launder money for Iraqi militias:

> People here who want to support Iraqis in Iraq, they are doing money laundering to help
the militias in Iraq…. These things happen mostly in Syria. Here there is scrutiny [on
wire transfers]…. Everything is normal after war. Because the Iranian government has
interfered. They used many people, sent many people here to invest money and support
the militias. So they buy things [above] market value and after that [sell it]… if they
have US$1 million and lose $300,000, it’s fine…. They say that this is legal trade but it’s
money laundering. \[Where do they invest it?\] The stock market, real estate, everything;
[even] a company for electronic devices or furniture…. They’ll buy a TV for $200 and
then sell it for $150, and it’s fine…. Yes, (laughing) if you go to Iraq, you’ll see
wonders. (Male, 35)

In addition, there have been some instances of resettled Iraqi refugees attempting to send
weapons and money to militant groups in Iraq. (Schmidt & Schmitt/New York Times,
11/5/11)

Besides non-state actors in Iraq, wealthy Sunni states in the region, such as Saudi
Arabia, seeking to counter Iran’s rising profile by supporting a Sunni proxy group based
in Jordan against the Shi’ite government of Iraq, could conceivably be another potential source for weapons and funding. There are also extensive connections between Iraqis in Jordan and those in Syria, where many Iraqi militants are present, and where more high-ranking Ba’ath political figures fled soon after the American invasion (Fagen 2007):

The Iraqi community in Syria is militarized. The Sunnis, foreign fighters, the ones going back and forth across the borders…. Old networks don’t die. [Potential militancy entrepreneurs in Jordan] are very much in contact with the ones in Syria…. They can pick up the phone and [call them]…. (Foreign diplomat, personal interview, 5/4/11)

Iranian militias, al-Qaeda, Moqtada al-Sadr…. Syria has all of these. People who want to destroy Iraq, and those who want to free Iraq, are both in Syria. I saw them there myself, people working with the Ba’ath party, they are really strong there…. They are all in one area, Said al-Zaynab. (Male, 38)

Domestically, some of the Iraqi Sunni elites in Jordan, including ex-Ba’athists, are very wealthy and have substantial resources available. However, the millionaires among them, some of whom moved to Jordan in the 1990s to avoid the sanctions regime imposed on Iraq, are businessmen rather than political figures294; and they generally see distance from politics as the price to pay for maintaining their transnational business295. Nonetheless, they could potentially be a source of funding and resources, as could radicalized individuals and groups in Jordan, such as the Salafists based in the cities of Zarqa and Salt (ICG 2005), who could be convinced to support an anti-Shi’ite organization. For example, one Palestinian interviewee informed me that he had gone to Iraq after the American invasion to fight against the Shi’ites. Of course, the most powerful domestic actor in Jordan capable of supplying conflict resources is the Jordanian government itself, but that would be nearly unthinkable under current political circumstances.

Regarding acquisition of resources from humanitarian aid organizations, without

294 Foreign diplomat, personal interview, 5/4/11
295 Geraldine Chatelard, social anthropologist, personal interview, 12/9/10
camps it would be substantially more difficult to collect those resources. The only exception might be UNHCR’s assistance programs, which have changed from in-kind assistance to ATM cards, obviously a very fungible resource, for a variety of logistical and practical reasons related to the urban environment. (UNHCR, “Protecting refugees…”, 12/4/09) However, relatively few Iraqi refugees even receive this assistance – less than half of the 30,000-plus registered with UNHCR.

In sum, it is very probable that conflict resources would be available from both regional and domestic actors, if political opportunities were available.

**No militarization**

**FEW MILITANT ATTITUDES**

When asked what they felt was the best way to address their grievances and achieve their rights at the time they arrived in Jordan, only 6% mentioned fighting for it. The most common response was that their grievances were impossible to address at that time (41%), followed by resettlement (21%). As mentioned above, interviewees were also asked a multiple-choice question concerning the best way to address their grievances now, to which only two interviewees (7%) chose “armed resistance”.

Interviewees were also asked the following question, similar to the one asked to Palestinians regarding the second Intifada:

During the civil war in Iraq (2005-08), which of the following best describes how you felt?

a. Everyone must join an organization fighting to free Iraq
b. Those outside Iraq should send assistance to organizations fighting in Iraq, but they should not join the organizations themselves
c. The war should end immediately

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296 Senior UNHCR official, personal interview, 11/2/10
297 This was an open-ended question, and interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one answer.
298 Interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one choice.
d. I did not follow what was happening in Iraq

Three-fifths of interviewees who arrived since 2003 chose “The war should end immediately”, and only two interviewees (6%) said “Everyone must join an organization fighting to free Iraq”. As one interviewee explained, he can’t fight an unknown enemy:

I don’t believe in resistance because you’re resisting what, exactly? The Americans? The [Iraqi] government? The twenty or thirty parties? Or against who, your neighbors? You have to identify your enemy first. (Male, 26)

Similar results were found when interviewees were asked the following question:

After leaving Iraq, the vast majority of Iraqis in Jordan have not joined any organization participating in the fighting in Iraq. In your opinion, why is that?299

a. They have lost hope in the Iraqi political situation
b. They are focused on building their lives in Jordan or another country
c. There are no such organizations in Jordan
d. People would join these organizations but the Government of Jordan prevents it

The most frequently cited answer was “They have lost hope in the Iraqi political situation” (45%), followed by “They are focused on building their lives in Jordan or another country” (30%). Only 8% said it is because there are no organizations in Jordan, and an equally low proportion said that Iraqis would but the Jordanian government prevents it (for comparison, 55% of Palestinians had chosen the last option). A quarter of interviewees offered an additional explanation, that the refugees were escaping violence and would not want to perpetuate more.300

However, as one official, speaking on condition of anonymity, stated, “The sentiment is there – against Shi’ites, against Shi’ite organizations in Iraq.” As noted earlier, nearly a quarter of interviewees expressed negative attitudes or hatred toward the other group, which was almost always directed at Shi’ites, and many expressed negative attitudes toward the Shi’ite-led government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. But

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299 Interviewees were allowed to indicate more than one choice.
300 As a senior UNHCR official stated, “Those who fled are those who want nothing to do with [sectarian tensions].” (Personal interview, 11/2/10)
prejudice toward a group and accusations of politicians does not equate to militant attitudes. Only one interviewee expressed an overtly militant attitude against Shi’ites:

The Shi’ites didn’t like Saddam Hussein, so they wanted to kill anyone [they could]. I don’t want [Iraq] to be destroyed or damaged. I don’t want to be a troublemaker…. I’m not capable of anything. I won’t be able to achieve anything. If I had enough… if I had the power I would kill all Shi’ites. (Male, 23)

NO ATTEMPTS TO MILITARIZE

The 2005 attack by an Iraqi terrorist cell does not fit the scope of refugee militarization in this project because the attackers were not refugees – they entered Jordan just days earlier (Murphy & Dabu/Christian Science Monitor, 11/14/05; Leenders 2009), apparently for the purpose of the attack – and because they targeted Jordan rather than their CoO. Therefore, it can be said there has been no militarization among Iraqi refugees in Jordan.

Conclusion

The presence of potential militancy entrepreneurs, availability of conflict resources and lack of political opportunities are the same between Palestinians and Iraqis in the current period, and the outcome (lack of militarization) is the same, but the major difference is in the presence or absence of a collective project to redeem the homeland among ordinary Iraqis. Even if the ex-Ba’athists do seek to militarize, it would more likely be in the manner of an isolated and self-contained terrorist group, like Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon or the Abu Nidal organization, than an entity with mass appeal and support among a refugee constituency, like Fatah/PLO.

The case of Iraqis in Jordan from 2003-2011 is summarized in Figure 6, below. I will discuss the impact of the Arab Spring and the likely future of militarization by Iraqis in Jordan in Chapter 10.
Figure 6. Summary: Iraqis in Jordan, 2003-2011
CHAPTER 9: Relevance to Cases in Africa and Asia

The previous four chapters presented results of field research in Jordan on Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. In this chapter I will begin to demonstrate the relevance of the framework outside the Middle East by using secondary-source literature to apply it to two famous cases of refugee militarization, and comparing them to contemporaneous matched cases in which militarization occurred to a much lesser degree, following the example set by Sarah Lischer (2005): Rwandans in Zaire and Tanzania; and Afghans in Pakistan and Iran. Both pairs of cases were examined by Lischer.

Rwandans in Zaire

Probably the most famous case of refugee militarization – the “mental template” for discussions of refugee militarization (Lischer 2010, p. 1) – is that of the Rwandan Hutus, numbering over one million, who fled to Zaire in 1994 fearing retribution following the genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda. This case actually stems from an earlier case of refugee militarization: Tutsi Rwandan refugees and their descendants who had lived in Uganda since fleeing their CoO between 1959-1962 – with additional recruitment from Tutsi Rwandan refugees in Tanzania – formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which invaded Rwanda in 1990. Violence continued for the next three years, ending with the Arusha Accords in 1993. The following year was a period of regrouping and preparation for the next stage of war, which began in April 1994 with the assassination of Rwandan President Habyarimana. Over the course of three months, around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were slaughtered in Rwanda, while the RPF battled Rwandan government forces, eventually capturing Kigali in July. (Lischer 2005; Milner 2011; Terry 2002; Loescher & Milner 2008c; Bakwesegha 2004; Salehyan 2009;
Rwandan Hutus fled the country in two waves. The first went to Tanzania, as will be discussed shortly. The second wave consisted of about one million refugees, including the Rwandan government, who fled to Zaire in July and August at the urging of their leaders. (Lischer 2005; Salehyan 2009; Adelman 1998; Adelman 2003)

**COLLECTIVE PROJECT**

**War of exclusion with a clear enemy**

Counterintuitively, the departure of Hutus from Rwanda into Zaire can be called a war of exclusion, despite the fact that they were mostly rounded up by their own government and herded into exile, even by shooting into the air to compel the civilians to flee. The government’s propaganda machine instructed Hutus to flee or face certain death at the hands of the victorious RPF. (Adelman 2003; Lischer 2005; Mogire 2011)

The information was not entirely fictitious, as many Hutu civilians had been killed by the RPF since 1990. (Prunier 1995) As a result, even though the direct cause of expulsion was not committed by an enemy force, most refugees believed that they faced an imminent ethnic cleansing operation by the enemy, and were saved from death only by the quick action of their leaders. They perceived an indirect threat and fled, which is not very different from the indirect threats perceived by Palestinians and Iraqis to their physical security which caused them to flee. Even if the RPF was not actually engaged in ethnic cleansing during their march to Kigali, the refugees perceived it as such.

**Ethnonationalist movement**

Rwanda is “bicommunal”, referring to a society in which only two groups constitute the vast majority of the population. Bicommunal societies are more prone to
ethnic radicalization than homogenous societies or those with three or more major
groups. (Quinn 2004) As a result of this demographic constitution and a colonial
arrangement in the 1950s in which Tutsis and Hutus competed for authority along ethnic
cleavages, there was a pre-existing, strongly institutionalized Rwandan Hutu
ethnonationalist movement.301 This movement claimed the country for Hutus, who were
the overwhelming majority of the population. The northwestern provinces of Rwanda,
where most of the refugees fled across the border to Goma, were a “bastion of Hutu
extremism”. (Adelman 2003, p. 101) By the end of 1994, local authority structures from
the CoO had been recreated in exile, and the Goma camps had been organized according
to the refugees’ préfecture, commune and section of origin in Rwanda, each led by its
former bourgmestre (Lischer 2005; Prunier 1995), further impressing and maintaining the
ethnonationalist project.

Agricultural economic base

The population of Rwanda in the early 1990s was far more rural, and arable
territory far more densely populated, than average in sub-Saharan Africa. Its rural
population, mostly small farmers, constituted between 90-95% of the entire population,
and most lived on less than two dollars per day. (Quinn 2004) The competition for arable
land as a resource leading to ethnic conflict was underlined by the refusal of the Hutu
government to allow the return of exiled Tutsis on the basis that there was a land
shortage. (Mogire 2011) However, an agricultural base in the CoO may have been less
attractive than usual in this case because the price of coffee, which was a major export of
Rwandan farmers, crashed on the world market in the early 1990s, dropping from an

301 Prior to 1958, the situation was very different: Hutu politicians, seeking appointments by
Belgian colonizers who gave preferential treatment to Tutsis, espoused an historical narrative of a
single origin with Tutsis. (Stewart & Strathern 2002)
average annual price of US$0.74 per pound in Rwanda in 1990 to just $0.45 per pound in 1993 (International Coffee Organization 2012), impoverishing many Hutu farmers. (Adelman 1998)

SOME SOCioECONOMIC INTEGRATION

In exile, refugees enjoyed a decent standard of living and some local integration in eastern Zaire, besides the obstructions of militants in the camps and the “tolls” requested at Zairian military checkpoints in the region. After an initially high morbidity and mortality rate during the summer of their arrival due to a cholera epidemic, health and nutrition were relatively well maintained in the camps. Refugees were able to move more or less freely in the local area, as long as they were able to pay the “tolls” and did not try to repatriate to Rwanda against the wishes of the militants. They came to be seen as a source of cheap labor for local employers. (Lischer 2005) The area was mostly populated by ethnic Hutus, but there were also some Tutsi enclaves.

Militancy Entrepreneurs

Upon arriving in Zaire, Hutu commanders and officials acted as pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs to recruit and mobilize the Hutu refugees into a militant organization to retake control of Rwanda. By the fall of 1994, they had formed a complete government-in-exile, including a prime minister and defense minister charged with “liberating” Rwanda. (Lischer 2005) By early 1995 they claimed to have grown their army to 50,000 troops throughout the camps. They framed their arguments around themes of injustice and rightful control by Hutus over Rwanda, offering an opportunity to achieve the refugees’ collective project through militarization. Their propaganda in the camps presented Hutus as the victims of a history of Tutsi oppression, blamed the Tutsi
RPF for the war and suffering, and called on the refugees to “liberate” their CoO. Following on the heels of a genocide in Rwanda during which Hutu propaganda dehumanized Tutsis, calling for the inyenzi (cockroaches) to be exterminated, political speeches demonized the RPF and sought to frighten the refugee masses by declaring that the Tutsi army would slaughter any returning Hutus. (Adelman 2003)

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY

The government of Zaire under President Mobutu had been allied with the Hutu government of Rwanda since the 1980s, and was not inclined to securitize the camps or borders, or to separate militants from civilians. For example, the Zairian military collected weapons at the Goma border crossing in July 1994 in the presence of international press, but later allowed the refugees to reclaim the weapons. When the refugees crossed in August at Bukavu, the international press were not observing, and weapons were not collected at all. However, even if Mobutu had possessed the will to securitize the refugee-populated border region, the state did not even have the capacity to do so. (Lischer 2005; Quinn 2004) After signing an agreement with UNHCR to provide security at the camps in January 1995, the Zairian government sent 1,000 soldiers to the camps at Goma and Bukavu, but this contingent, under the leadership of a host government which was allied and sympathetic to the militarized refugees, became a back-up force for the ex-FAR and militants rather than an obstacle to them. (Adelman 2003; Adelman 1998)

The conflict centered in Zaire and Rwanda drew even more international attention because of the role played by international NGOs and donors, who were faced with the quandary of assisting, feeding and sheltering both refugee combatants and civilians,
including tens of thousands of genocidaires, or neither. Most international donors – Medecins Sans Frontieres excepted302 (Prunier 1995; Turner 2010) – created a permissive political environment by supporting aid agencies in choosing to stay. They did so in the name of humanitarianism and political neutrality, and from 1994 to 1996 donors “spent billions of dollars to sustain that population. These same donors refused to fund efforts to disarm the militants or to send peacekeeping troops to do so.” (Lischer 2005, p. 2) They maintained a presence only during the day, and were encouraged by camp leadership to leave before military training began in the evening. UN arms embargoes were not enforced. An international outcry against supporting genocidaires later led to changes in the policies of aid organizations, including UNHCR. (Leenders 2009; Lischer 2005; Lischer 2003; Mthembu-Salter 2006; Hammerstad 2011; Milner 2011; Adelman 2003; Stedman 2003; Gerdes 2006; Roberts 2011)

Consolidation of power over territory and establishing strong border defenses takes time, and the post-war RPF Rwandan government was still new in the latter half of 1994 and 1995, with relatively weak border defenses. Furthermore, the largest refugee camps were within walking distance of the border at Goma. Lischer (2005) disregards this as an explanatory variable by comparing it to Tanzania, where camps were also near the border but little militarization occurred. However, her reasoning is flawed: Maintaining camps near the border contributes to a permissive political opportunity structure, but this factor alone is not sufficient to lead to militarization.

CONFLICT RESOURCES

The strongest and most overt supporter of the Rwandan Hutu militants and ex-

302 See Terry (2002) for a detailed description of the decision by Medecins Sans Frontieres to withdraw from Zaire for these reasons.
FAR was the government of Zaire. Under Mobutu’s leadership, the government bought and delivered arms to the Rwandan militants, shared warehouses with them for the storage of weapons and goods, laundered money for them, and provided them with diplomatic cover. (Adelman 2003; Mthembu-Salter 2006; Prunier 1995) In addition, a number of foreign states contributed conflict resources to the militant refugees. These included France, which had long supported the Hutu government of Rwandan president Habyarimana:

Under the guise of humanitarianism, France provided aid to the genocidal Hutu regime during and after the genocide…. In the most egregious example of the partisan stance of French forces, the French allowed former military and government officials to escape to Zaire after the RPF victory. The French forces disarmed the departing genocidaires, but turned the weapons over to the Zairian army rather than to the UN peacekeepers. Once the extremists had established themselves in the camps, the French reportedly facilitated meetings of key leaders…. (Lischer 2005, pp. 87-88; see also Snyder 2011; Quinn 2004)

The government of France saw it as their national interest to keep Rwanda as a Francophone state by supporting its French-speaking Hutu majority, in contrast to the Anglophone RPF. (Adelman 2003; Quinn 2004)

The refugee camps in Zaire were used as a critical source of support for militant action, including taxing, recruitment and diversion of humanitarian resources. (Adelman 2003; Salehyan 2009) In 1994 alone, humanitarian aid agencies supported by international donors spent $1.4 billion in the Goma area of Zaire, a sum which “provided a windfall for the militants, who used it to support their planned invasion of Rwanda,” through food for militants, care for their supporters, diversion of aid, and more broadly, legitimation of their leadership role in the camps. (Lischer 2005, p. 90)

Finally, it is also worth noting that the Hutu government-in-exile brought virtually every portable resource of the Rwandan state with it into Zaire, including everything from helicopters, tanks, artillery, gasoline and hard currency to doorknobs, window
frames and coffee. (Lischer 2005; Adelman 2003; Quinn 2004; Prunier 1995)

**MILITARIZATION**

In the early months, Hutu militias battled each other for control of the camps. Observers noted the ubiquity of uniformed, armed militants throughout the camps, and militants set up roadblocks and patrols to further control the refugee population. After consolidating control, camps were used as training grounds, for storage of weapons, and as a base for launching attacks on Rwanda. Raids on the CoO began by targeting local officials and infrastructure on the opposite side of the border, but gradually moved eastward, even striking Kigali in November 1995; then they shifted to civilian targets, including nearby civilian Tutsi populations in Zaire, after the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the post-war Rwandan military, developed effective counterinsurgency techniques. (Lischer 2005; Adelman 2003; Mthembu-Salter 2006; Quinn 2004)

These attacks drew interventions by the CoO, and the ex-FAR and Hutu militants lost control of the camps to the RPA and ADFL, a Rwandan-supported Zairian rebel group which continued on to take over Zaire, in 1996. The conflict widened with the participation of several other countries in the region, and ultimately the militarization of the Rwandan refugees led to a decade of instability and international conflict, despite the return of 200,000 Hutu refugees in 1994 – before the militants consolidated control over the camps and prevented further returns – and 640,000 refugees in 1996, after the Hutu militants were defeated again. An estimated three million people died as a result of the wider conflict, primarily from preventable diseases and malnutrition, and violent repercussions persisted even as late as 2009. (Salehyan 2009; Lischer 2005; Adelman 2003; Quinn 2004; Milner 2009; Gerdes 2006; Stedman & Tanner 2003;
Most literature on Rwandan refugee crisis in Zaire focuses on the motivations and actions of the militants, with hardly any mention of attitudes among civilian refugees. Some critics may question the importance of a collective project if the civilians were merely pawns herded and manipulated by the militants, and would have repatriated at the first available opportunity if the militants had allowed them. To this critique I would respond with five observations: First, the refugees perceived that they had been subjected to a war of exclusion, even if objective evidence of such a war is doubtful. Second, support for Rwandan Hutu nationalism was strong among the civilian population, especially in the northwestern part of the country, from which most refugees had fled to Zaire. Third, evidence is unclear on whether the civilian refugees in Zaire actually wished to return to their CoO or continue to follow their militant leaders in exile. Fourth, the militants grew their ranks by tens of thousands through recruiting from the civilian refugee population, which suggests high levels of support for the militants’ goals (assuming recruitment was voluntary; it is unknown how many of those who joined were subjected to forced recruitment). Fifth, even if a critic finds all the prior points unconvincing, this case was unique in that the number of pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs, including the former government, ex-FAR, and militant groups such as the interahamwe, was so high – in the tens of thousands – that, given the broad definition of “refugee” used in this project, one could argue they constituted a refugee group unto themselves, even without the civilians. The only apparent direct effect which a lack of civilians would have made in the case is that, presumably, international humanitarian aid
would not have been available to be diverted into conflict resources, and the militants would not have been able to increase their ranks with such relative ease.\(^{303}\)

Although they remained isolated in camps from the host society, the refugees enjoyed a decent standard of living, supported by a massive infusion of international aid and the possibility of local employment – despite a poor economy and hyper-inflation in Zaire – which was possibly even better than the devastated economic condition of their CoO at that time. Militancy entrepreneurs dominated the camps, framing their arguments in the language of injustice and the ethnonationalist project, demonizing the “other” and promising redemption through militarization. Political opportunities were abundant in Zaire, and conflict resources were readily available from both state actors and international humanitarian aid. The combination of these factors led to one of the most famous cases of refugee militarization worldwide.

**Rwandans in Tanzania**

The first major wave of refugees to leave Rwanda in 1994 was on April 29, when a quarter million Rwandan Hutus fled into Tanzania at the behest of some 70,000 Hutu military and militiamen, including genocidaires, who also joined them in exile. Most crossed over the Rusumo bridge into Tanzania over a period of just thirty hours. Within less than a year, some 700,000 Rwandans\(^{304}\) had arrived in Tanzania. There are many similarities with the case of those who fled to Zaire, but the degree of militarization in Tanzania was much lower. (Lischer 2005; Milner 2011)

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\(^{303}\) The militants also would have enjoyed less international legitimacy, but that bears only an indirect effect on the likelihood of militarization.

\(^{304}\) Prunier (1995) cites a figure of 300,000 at the end of April, and 577,000 total; Landau (2006, p. 268) cites “nearly 600,000” by early 1995.
COLLECTIVE PROJECT

In general, the pre-departure factors were mostly the same as in the case of those who fled to Zaire: It was perceived to be a war of exclusion, and there was a strong pre-existing Hutu ethnonational project. As in Zaire, refugees resided according to their commune in Rwanda, and social structures and political leadership from the CoO were recreated in exile. (Prunier 1995) CoO variables affecting the economic orientation of the refugees who fled to Tanzania were mostly the same as well: Most refugees were poor, small farmers in the CoO, and their livelihood depended on Rwandan land. Many were coffee growers who were economically devastated by the plummet in coffee prices worldwide in the early 1990s.

It appears that the civilian refugees, even if influenced by the propaganda of the militants, voluntarily supported the collective project espoused by their leaders:

As in Zaire, the refugees in Tanzania refused to repatriate to Rwanda despite extensive recruitment campaigns by international agencies and the Rwandan and Tanzanian governments. By refusing to return, the refugees provided support for the militant leaders, who could then claim that they ruled a state in exile. (Lischer 2005, p. 102)

SOME SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Overall, living conditions were relatively good, as in Zaire. Lischer (2005) notes that mortality and nutrition rates were better than in nearby Tanzanian villages, and camp residents enjoyed adequate shelter, food and health care. Unlike Zaire, however, Tanzania had a long tradition of generous policies toward refugees, having allowed employment and even citizenship to waves of Burundian and Rwandan refugees fleeing their CoO from the 1960s to early 1980s. (Mogire 2011; Mogire 2006; Turner 2010) Although policies became more restrictive in the early 1990s and had largely switched to an exclusion approach by 1995-96 (Milner 2011), and despite the fact that rights to
employment and movement were restricted de jure, in practice the refugees were able to engage in productive economic activity by trading with local host communities, leading some UNHCR officials to suspect that refugees’ resistance to repatriation was based in the fact that economic conditions in the host state were better than the CoO: “Like the camps in Zaire, the Tanzanian camps resembled small towns with markets, shops, bars, and other businesses…. [More than] 10,000 hectares of land had been cultivated by refugees as of 1996. Rwandan refugees also provided cheap labor for the local peasants.” (Lischer 2005, p. 110) In addition, they exploited the local environment, including crop, forest and property destruction, for example, using doors and window frames from schools as firewood (Milner 2011), improving their economic security while demonstrating a disregard for rules which earned them a reputation for assertiveness and brazenness among the “shyer” Burundian Hutu refugees who were also in Tanzania (Turner 2010).

In an attempt to stimulate voluntary return in 1996, the Tanzanian government and NGOs decreased provision of social services, including secondary education, and UNHCR cut food rations, but there was no noticeable effect on refugees’ desire to return. Lischer (2005) points to both the good living conditions and the refusal to return regardless of decreased assistance as evidence of the lack of importance of economic factors in explaining refugee militarization:

In Tanzania, the relatively good living conditions did not blunt the political goals of the refugees. Despite the existence of informal employment, markets, agricultural land, and social interaction, refugees continued to attempt military organization. Statements and actions of refugees and their leaders indicated a desire to engage in violence, regardless of the material opportunities in exile. (p. 110)

While the results of my research suggest that her overall point is correct, viz. that a collective project is important in explaining militarization, her conclusion is flawed: First,
as discussed above, the refugees were relatively well integrated to the local economy, so the humanitarian organizations were not the only source – and for some refugees, may not even have been the primary source – of food and social services. As Lischer herself notes, the decrease in UNHCR rations was supplemented with sources of food elsewhere. Secondly, even the contractions which were implemented may not have been sufficient to swing their orientation toward the CoO, when considered in the context of their broader assessment of economic orientation. Third, even if it was sufficient to change their economic orientation, they would still resist repatriation if they believed that their lives would be threatened upon return. Therefore, Lischer’s conclusion, that the refugees’ lack of response to decreased economic benefits eliminates economic variables as an explanatory factor for militarization, is spurious. This is one reason why it is necessary to differentiate, as demonstrated especially in the chapters on Palestinians in this work, between the right or idea of return (political) and the practical intent to return (economic).

Finally, there was also a degree of ethnic consanguinity between Hutus and Tanzanian ethnic groups in the western part of the country, where the camps were located, leading to greater sympathy for the Hutus from the local population. (Lischer 2005)

**Militancy Entrepreneurs**

As noted earlier, some 70,000 Hutu militants and military joined the refugees in Tanzania, mixing freely with the civilian refugees, and had the same goals as those in Zaire of recovering control of the Rwandan government from the Tutsi RPF. They were
mostly politicians and militias, however, rather than ex-FAR\textsuperscript{305}. Militant leaders quickly organized and gained control over the camps with the blessing of UNHCR, which was completely overwhelmed by the massive influx. (Lischer 2005)

Like the militancy entrepreneurs in Zaire, their propaganda described an altered version of older and more recent history\textsuperscript{306} to frame their arguments around themes of injustice, victimhood and ethnonational right, while offering the opportunity to redeem the homeland through militarization. They were also the primary source of news and information in the camps, which made their propaganda more persuasive. (Lischer 2005; Milner 2011)

**POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY**

The factor which differs most from the case of Rwandans in Zaire is political opportunity. Unlike Mobutu’s Zaire, the government of Tanzania considered itself neutral in the Hutu-Tutsi conflict. Despite supporting anti-colonial armed movements and actively militarizing refugees in the past (Mogire 2006; Salehyan 2009), and despite initial tensions between the Tanzanian government and RPF in the first half of 1994 (Mogire 2011), the government and most voting Tanzanians were not sympathetic to the Hutu militants. The government exercised its power to securitize the refugee-populated areas (to an extent) and prevent cross-border raids. In March 1995, the government deployed the army and closed the border with Burundi to prevent entry by some 70,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees, a large portion of whom were likely militants, arriving from Zaire. (Lischer 2005) The Tanzanian government’s lack of support for militarization by the Rwandan refugees, and the decision to expel them at the end of 1996, were partly an

\textsuperscript{305} Mogire (2011) states that ex-FAR were present in Tanzania. (See also Mogire 2006)

\textsuperscript{306} Turner (2010) and Malkki (1995) both discuss alternative histories created by Burundian Hutu nationalists in Tanzania, making for an interesting comparison with the Rwandans.
effort to maintain good relations with the new government of Rwanda and “partly in response to threats by Rwanda… that they would attack the camps to stop them from being used as bases for armed subversion.” (Mogire 2011, p. 41)

However, in other ways political opportunities were available: The host authorities were not successful in separating militancy entrepreneurs from civilians, though they made a token effort to do so; a degree of sympathy by local Tanzanian authorities led them to confiscate only part of the weapons in the camp; and they arrested only fourteen known genocide leaders upon arrival in Tanzania, releasing even those few without charge a few months later – an outcome resulting from the fact that Tanzanian law had no basis for arresting and prosecuting refugee militants. The host government also had insufficient policing capacity to adequately address the large refugee population, and insufficient coercive resources to enable them to fully demilitarize the camps. (Lischer 2005; Mogire 2011; Mogire 2006)

As in Zaire, UNHCR and humanitarian NGOs were intimidated by militants but continued to provide aid and services. In most of the camps, UNHCR also reinforced the power of the genocidaires and militants by allowing them to organize and represent the camps, and effectively implementing a don’t-ask-don’t-tell policy regarding militarization. In addition, as in Zaire, the largest camps were located within walking distance of the border with their CoO (Lischer 2005), in remote areas which obstructed securitization and facilitated militant activity (Mogire 2011). Rwanda’s eastern border, like its western border, is long and porous, and was poorly defended by the new government.
CONFLICT RESOURCES

The Hutu militancy entrepreneurs in Tanzania were in regular contact with, and coordinated with, their ex-FAR counterparts in Zaire, many of whom entered Tanzania via Burundi for the alleged purpose of finding relatives (until March 1995, as described above). These militancy entrepreneurs could have brought in weapons while coordinating activities, and probably did; as noted previously, ample conflict resources were available to the militancy entrepreneurs in Zaire, especially from the Mobutu government. Light weapons had also been brought in from Rwanda at the time of departure. Through control over the camps and representation to international humanitarian aid workers, militants were also able to divert large quantities of food aid by inflating population numbers and selling the excess. (Lischer 2005)

SOME MILITARIZATION

Militants in the camps stored light weapons out of view. Heavy weapons, which are larger and difficult to conceal, were not allowed in the camps; and Tanzanian authorities confiscated some light weapons and ammunition from the camp in 1994 and 1995. Despite these efforts, recruitment and regular military training were held, and some raids across the border to Rwanda took place, straining relations between Rwanda and Tanzania, but they were minimal compared to the events in Zaire. (Lischer 2005; Mogire 2011; Mogire 2006)

Overall, most factors in Tanzania were similar to Zaire: The Rwandan Hutu refugees had a collective project to redeem the homeland based on a perceived war of exclusion perpetrated by a clear enemy, their ethnonationalist project and an agricultural

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economic base in their CoO; there were pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs who joined them in exile; and conflict resources were available. The main difference was that there was much less political opportunity for militarization in Tanzania than in Zaire. The window of opportunity was mostly shut, so to speak, resulting in a lower degree of militarization.

**Afghan Refugees in Pakistan**

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 came after six years of instability, including unpopular communist rule, following the coup which deposed King Zahir Shah. Fearing the collapse of a weak communist government on its periphery, the Soviet Union invaded and installed another Afghan communist leader. By that time, the various resistance groups had already loosely coalesced into the mujahideen, or Islamic warriors, with a base in Peshawar, Pakistan, located some twenty miles from the border. At its peak, the USSR had a troop strength of about 150,000-200,000 in Afghanistan; and at their peak strength, the mujahideen fielded about the same number of fighters, most located in Afghanistan. By the time the Soviets departed a decade later, 1.25 million Afghans had died out of a prewar population of 16 million, in addition to 15,000 Soviet troops. The conflict led to an exodus of over three million Afghans into Pakistan – including the nearly 400,000 who were already there prior to December 1979 – and over two million to Iran. Most of the refugees did not return after the USSR withdrew. (Lischer 2005; Mayotte 1992) The number of refugees over the next two decades fluctuated, but due to the instability in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, the fundamentalist Taliban regime which took over in 1996, UN sanctions in 1999, the American invasion in 2001 and the ongoing insurgency and violence for the most recent decade, as of 2010
there were still nearly two million refugees in Pakistan and over one million in Iran\textsuperscript{307}. In this section I will discuss those in Pakistan, where extensive militarization took place, and in the following section I will turn to those in Iran, where it did not.

**COLLECTIVE PROJECT**

Most refugees fled due to a brutal counterinsurgency campaign intended to “drain the sea” in which guerrilla fish lived, characterized by civilian-punishing techniques such as fragmentation bombs, small mines and booby-trapped toys. (Grare 2003; Mayotte 1992) In a survey conducted in Peshawar, two-thirds of refugees left due to a direct or indirect threat, including an attack on their village, imprisonment, harassment, or impending conscription to the communist army. (Connor 1987 [cited in Lischer 2005]) Many also left due to the imposition of highly unpopular policies regarding land and the family, which they saw as undermining the pillars of rural Afghan society. (Wood 1989) The conflict which led to the refugees’ departure was perceived to be a war of exclusion, but its basis was partly ideological and partly religious (Nyers 2006; Marsden 2006):

The refugees fled Afghanistan due to their anti-communism, their resentment of foreign rule, the widespread cruelty practiced by the regime, and their adherence to Islam. The Soviets and their Afghan allies committed numerous massacres in villages as a warning against supporting the rebels. The demonstration effect of these massacres caused thousands to flee. The Soviet forces also conducted massive aerial bombing campaigns…. Islam provided an additional reason to flee the country…. [The] Islamic concept of *hijrah* encourages Muslims to leave territory that has been occupied by infidels. (Lischer 2005, p. 48)

Likewise, the political project which helped unify and motivate the refugees was part religious, based on Islam, anti-atheism and Islamic/traditional values relating to women (Mayotte 1992); and part ideological, based on anti-communism. The Afghan population consists of multiple ethnic groups, but the mujahideen, especially the seven

\textsuperscript{307} Data from the UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database (accessed 2/7/12)
Sunni Islamist parties which were recognized and supported by the Pakistani government, made no such divisions. It cannot be said that there was an Afghan nationalist project\textsuperscript{308}; in fact, lack of development of a national Afghan identity, in deference to ethnic and tribal identities, has been a failure of successive governments in the country since the turn of the twentieth century. (Hoodfar 2010)

Most of the Afghan population willingly supported the resistance, which they considered legitimate, and opposed the Soviet occupation. They refused to return to their CoO unless their political demands – namely the withdrawal of the communists – were met. (Lischer 2005; Grare 2003) Camp life indoctrinated the second generation to support the mujahideen, with children as young as nine or ten years old beginning training. (Mayotte 1992; Stevens/New York Times, 10/3/82) Also, as in the Rwandan cases, the refugees recreated patterns of social authority from the CoO in their settlements in Pakistan; but traditional tribal authority declined over the course of the 1980s with the rise of Islamist authority via the resistance parties. The refugees saw themselves not as individuals in need of protection, as the international aid agencies saw them, but as a group with a collective political grievance. (Grare 2003; Macleod 2008; Wood 1989)

Afghans were (and still are) among the most rural populations in the world, and most refugees were small farmers or sharecroppers, with a smaller proportion nomadic, in their CoO. The refugees were able to cross the border in both directions with relative ease, and often visited their CoO to protect their property and tend their farms. (Macleod 2008; Marsden 2006; Lischer 2005; Mayotte 1992; Wood 1989)

\textsuperscript{308} For a discussion of differences in recruitment to religious versus ethnonationalist militant groups, see Cunningham et al. (2011).
SOME SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Despite the fact that Pakistan was not a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention and had no legislation to recognize refugees (Parker 2008), the Afghans had freedom of movement and residence – some small groups self-settled in Pakistani cities – and were encouraged to work by the government, which granted them exemptions from the Foreigners Act. (Marsden 2006; Lischer 2005; Grare 2003; Wood 1989) They became economically productive through a variety of means: Some (illegally) planted crops in Pakistan (Mayotte 1992), and they “were active in the transportation industry and the arms trade, and also smuggled goods, including drugs. Further, the refugees brought three million livestock with them into Pakistan.” (Lischer 2005, p. 56) Refugees also sold relief food on local markets and were employed on internationally funded infrastructure development projects. Some engaged in unskilled construction or seasonal agricultural labor, or migrated to the cities in search of work. (Macleod 2008; Grare 2003; Mayotte 1992; Wood 1989)

However, with the exception of the latter example, these economic activities involved the CoO, subsistence or serving the refugee communities, or were funded – intentionally or not – by international agencies attracted to the region by the refugees. There were few opportunities for participation in the host state economy which did not somehow involve the refugee communities themselves. The Afghans were offered neither integration to Pakistan nor resettlement as a durable solution to their situation.

Although life in refugee camps was far from luxurious, it was well-provisioned and sustainable from the refugees’ point of view, and – especially considering the
Soviets’ destruction of crops, farms and irrigation in Afghanistan—economically better than life in the CoO. Rates of nutrition and disease were better than in Afghanistan. Tents were replaced with mud-brick huts, and settlement patterns in refugee “villages” were similar to those of local Pakistani villages. (Lischer 2005; Marsden 2006; Wood 1989)

Although Pakistan was not a democracy, the refugees were able to express their political grievances through the mujahideen groups, which were technically political parties. This even led to calls among local Pakistanis for the right to form opposition political parties. (Lischer 2005) However, the mujahideen groups were Afghan parties, not Pakistani parties, and they mostly stayed out of the Pakistani political process.

Finally, ethnic consanguinity between the Afghan refugees, 80% of whom were Pashtun, and Pakistanis in the Northwest Frontier Province (Grare 2003; Lischer 2005; Macleod 2008) generated sympathy among the locals.

Militancy Entrepreneurs

The mujahideen mostly developed in exile, but some degree of organization existed prior to departure. Two of the resistance parties first established a presence in Pakistan in 1975. (Grare 2003) However, as of 1979, the pre-existing resistance organizations were loose, weak and lacked military capacity. With a clear foreign common enemy following the Soviet invasion, however, the wide array of resistance groups which had risen over the late 1970s were able to unite in defense of Islam and Afghan traditions—a unity which was always tenuous, however, and lasted only as long as the Soviet occupation. (Lischer 2005)

The militants used discursive framing to portray their cause to civilian refugees.

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309 More than 15,000 villages were damaged or destroyed out of a total of 22,000. (Wood 1989)
using themes of injustice, collective right based on religion, and militarization as a means to redeem the homeland:

“The atheist forces invaded our country, destroyed our mosques, killed our children and started teaching communism in the schools,” a square-bearded leader shouted in a speech at the sprawling, 140,000-person Barakai refugee camp…. “For the sake of our religion we migrated. We now swear that we will fight until we eliminate the very germ of communism from our country.” (Stevens/New York Times, 10/3/82)

Religious fundamentalism had not been common in the public sphere in Afghanistan prior to 1979. As Sarah Lischer writes, the rebel leaders’ “control over millions of refugees provided a legitimacy to the Mujahideen parties, which might otherwise have been viewed as peripheral to the conflict inside Afghanistan.” (2005, p. 51) It was the arming of the mujahideen which led to their extraordinary empowerment in the refugee community and, later, the supplanting of tribal authority in Afghanistan by religious fundamentalist authority. (Macleod 2008)

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY

The host government in Pakistan supported the efforts of the mujahideen, and did not securitize the refugee camps. This decision was due in part to their ethnic ties with the Afghans – both populations are dominantly Sunni Muslim, the border areas have long traditions of ethnic and cultural ties, and President Zia al-Huq himself had justified his 1977 military takeover of Pakistan partly on religious grounds – but more importantly for geostrategic reasons, as increased influence in the south-central Asia region and the Muslim world more broadly, as well as American weapons and technology, would help Pakistan balance against India. In addition, Pakistan feared irredentist claims by Afghan Pashtuns over the Pashtun-populated border area of the (deliberately non-eponymous) Northwest Frontier Province. Pakistan had quarreled with the Afghan central government

310 Also quoted by Lischer (2005)
prior to 1979 over Afghan Pashtuns’ ethnonationalist program, and throughout the 1980s the two states were antagonistic to each other. (Grare 2003; Lischer 2005)

On the other hand, the government tried to maintain rebel activity below a threshold which would trigger a large-scale invasion from the Soviet Union or become a potentially independent force in Pakistani politics. President Zia al-Huq had been a military advisor in Jordan in 1970 and personally observed the potentially destabilizing effect of a large, militarized refugee population. For these two reasons, he ensured that the Pakistani intelligence service, ISI, controlled the flow of arms, limiting the number and type of weapons, and kept supply covert. Pakistan also controlled public political activities, such as meetings and press conferences, held by the mujahideen parties. When pressure from the Soviet Union grew too great in 1984, the government compelled the resistance parties to move their headquarters out of Peshawar. (Lischer 2005; Grare 2003)

Not only did the international community not seek peaceful durable solutions for the refugee situation, but the mujahideen were actively supported by western countries, who were on the same side as the Afghan rebels in the context of the Cold War, as well as Muslim states, especially Saudi Arabia, and China. The UN overwhelmingly condemned the occupation in the General Assembly. Perhaps due to this widespread political support for the rebels’ cause, as well as the broad support for militarization among the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan, the ambiguous ends of international humanitarian aid drew little condemnation or ethical concern from aid organizations, academics311 or the media, even years later, unlike the case of Rwandans in Zaire. (Terry 2002; Grare 2003; Lischer 2005)

Finally, camps in Pakistan were located relatively near the border with

311 Notable exceptions include Baitenmann (1990) and Fielden (1998).
Afghanistan, though not necessarily walking distance. The rugged, mountainous border terrain was very porous, and nearly impossible to defend against infiltration. (Lischer 2005; Marsden 2006)

**CONFLICT RESOURCES**

One of the most salient characteristics of this case of refugee militarization is the billions of dollars’ worth of support which the mujahideen received from American, Pakistani, Chinese and Saudi intelligence agencies, beginning soon after the Soviet invasion. (Weiner 1992/93; Lischer 2005; Mayotte 1992) In the interest of containing and rolling back the spread the communism, the US supplied Pakistan and the mujahideen with substantial military aid, including not only small arms but rockets, surface-to-surface and anti-aircraft missiles, and communications equipment, valued altogether at about $670 million annually; in addition to up to $150 million ($400 million from all international sources combined by the late 1980s) annually in humanitarian aid. (Bourne 2007; Lischer 2005) The refugees in Pakistan were seen by the American government not as humanitarian cases first, but as a potent, and ultimately successful, political resource in the global war against Communism – especially since access to those in Iran was not available as a result of the anti-western Iranian revolution in 1979. In addition, Pakistan selected seven of the more fundamentalist Islamist groups – those without Pashtun nationalist ties – to support with military assistance. (Lischer 2005; Grare 2003)

Meanwhile, the humanitarian aid sent by Pakistan, the United States and other international donors was delivered via the resistance parties controlling the camps, allowing the militants to inflate population numbers, control distribution and divert aid.
The aid acted as the infrastructure of the Afghan resistance and relieved the mujahideen of providing for their dependents and supporters, in addition to providing direct assistance to the mujahideen in the form of food, shelter and medical supplies. (Lischer 2005; Stedman & Tanner 2003; Nyers 2006) The militants were able to use the refugee camps in Pakistan as “both sanctuary and logistical back up”. (Macleod 2008, p. 342)

**Militarization**

By 1987, the mujahideen had developed seven training camps in Pakistan and had trained some 80,000 fighters over the prior four years, although training was forbidden in the refugee camps themselves. (Grare 2003; Lischer 2005) There are conflicting reports of the extent to which combatant and non-combatant refugees mingled in the case of the Afghans in Pakistan, with convergence on the fact that women, children and the elderly were not involved while the vast majority of younger men in the same families participated in fighting against the CoO. The camps served as centers of recruitment, including of newly arriving refugees who had never before encountered the resistance parties. They would register for humanitarian assistance and join one of the seven dominant mujahideen parties, which controlled the camps, at the same time. Combatants and non-combatants “mixed freely…. Nearly all refugee men spent time with one or another of the resistance parties fighting in Afghanistan.” (Lischer 2005, p. 53) On the other hand, one of the first groups of scholars to discuss the “refugee warrior” phenomenon wrote: “Most commonly, there are separate physical facilities for the armed wing and for the refugees…. The same obtains in Pakistan, where the Afghan *mujahedin* are training and operating from their own bases, and the old men, women and children are concentrated in other camps supported by the UNHCR.” (Zolberg et al. 1989, p. 276,
emphasis in original; see also Nyers 2006, p. 115) Grare agreed that the camps in Pakistan were “a key source of recruitment of anti-Soviet fighters, [but] this did not lead to extensive militarization of the camps…. [Fighting] was only a part time occupation. A man could spend three or four months in the field and the remainder in a refugee camp and eventually be replaced by a relative.” (2003, p. 58-71) Thus, even if the refugee camps were not directly militarized, they provided recruitment, support, supply and safe haven for the mujahideen.

The refugee fighters made cross-border raids into Afghanistan, striking government targets not only on the opposite side of the border, but even in the interior of the country. They also served as sources of resupply to mujahideen forces within the CoO. The Soviet-backed Afghan government responded by shelling refugee-populated areas, including UNHCR-run refugee camps, killing 700 civilians in 1987 alone. They conducted hundreds of attacks on Pakistani territory, but, thanks in part to careful management by the Pakistani government, the conflict did not widen into an international war. (Lischer 2005; Wood 1989) The activities of the Afghan refugees who, with the support of powerful patrons, militarized against the Soviets transformed this conflict into one of the most important – and last – proxy battles of the Cold War, and ultimately the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from a poor and weak central Asian country.

In conclusion, there was widespread support among civilian Afghan refugees in Pakistan for a collective project to redeem their homeland from a clear enemy, even though the project was based more on a religious than nationalist or ethnonationalist basis; and they were mostly small farmers tied to their land. They experienced some
socioeconomic integration to the host state, especially as living conditions in western-supported camps were better than in their CoO, access to employment was available, and their hosts were ethnically consanguineous. Pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs were present in Pakistan, and they quickly organized, mobilized and led the refugees to militarize. The host state and many other powerful states worldwide, who were opposed to the refugees’ enemy in the CoO, supported the militarization, and humanitarian organizations did not object to it. Large amounts of military resources were available from those same powerful states, including the host state, and humanitarian aid was especially helpful in supporting the militants’ dependents.

**Afghans in Iran**

A pre-existing Afghan community, most of whom were economic migrants rather than refugees, was present in Iran prior to 1979. Estimates put the population at 600,000, mostly located in urban areas. In the months and years after the Soviet invasion, over two million more Afghans joined them in Iran. (Lischer 2005)

**COLLECTIVE PROJECT**

For the most part, CoO factors relating to the collective project of Afghans who fled to Iran are the same as those who went to Pakistan. They experienced a war of exclusion on a religious and ideological basis, and they sought the departure of the Soviets and Afghan communist government before they would return. (Lischer 2005) It is unclear whether the degree of violence perpetrated on those who fled westward was less than those who moved to Pakistan: Homa Hoodfar (2010), for example, cites compulsory education for girls and a new marriage law – which contradicted religious and traditional mores – as the main reason that most Afghans in Iran fled their CoO.
Ironically, many refugees’ attitudes reversed completely due to their experiences in Iran, where Islamic teachings emphasized the importance of education. In fact, many of those who returned to Afghanistan in the early 1990s later moved back to Iran after the Taliban took over, primarily because of lack of educational opportunities for their daughters. (Hoodfar 2010) If one of the refugees’ primary grievances against the communist government in their CoO was the imposition of girls’ education, a growing belief in the value of that education may have decreased their collective project against the CoO over time. On the other hand, the Soviets and the Afghan communist government were still not Islamic, so a change in attitude on the single issue of girls’ education may not have changed their overall political motivation, especially since the education which they began to value in Iran was specifically based in Islamic teachings.

Like those in Pakistan, their collective project was primarily based on religious, rather than national, grounds. On the other hand, like Palestinians in Jordan, the shared experience of exile in Iran gradually led the refugees to develop a group identity as Afghans over time:

Most Afghan refugees before coming to Iran thought of themselves as Hazara, Tajic, Pashtune, etc. Few identified themselves as Afghan and had little knowledge of other ethnic groups. However once in Iran they were referred to as Afghan regardless of their ethnicity. This helped to develop a sense of collective Afghan supra-identity and a corresponding Afghan nationalism which was rare in the identity matrix of fragmented and diverse Afghan society. (Hoodfar 2010, p. 147)

But this national identity did not begin to develop until relatively late in their stay, especially since the government emphasized shared Islamic identity until the end of the Iran-Iraq war led to changes in their policies toward Afghan refugees. (Hoodfar 2010)

Like their compatriots in Pakistan, the population of refugees in Iran were rural in their CoO, mostly small farmers, and most were illiterate. While their land was, of
course, not transferable, urban residence in Iran made their agricultural skills and lack of formal education even less well-suited to the host state environment than in Pakistan, except for those few who sought agricultural labor. As a result, even adults began to seek literacy and education while in Iran, which was strongly encouraged by the new theocratic government. (Hoodfar 2010; Marsden 2006; Macleod 2008; Wood 1989)

MORE SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Given the large population of Afghan economic migrants in Iran prior to 1979, and their connections with the refugees who arrived after 1979, it seems that those who fled westward may have been more economically motivated in general, and more oriented to their host state in particular, than those who moved to Pakistan. This is consistent with their settlement patterns (urban), general attitude toward Persian society (seeking integration) and their shock and dismay in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Iranian policies regarding them shifted from an integration approach to one strongly pressuring return. (Hoodfar 2010)

Overall, the standard of living for refugees in Iran was at least as good, if not better, than in Afghanistan. This was particularly the case for Hazaras, who were a minority historically oppressed and persecuted in their CoO. The Iranian government, which is a signatory to the 1951 Convention, provided adequate food and shelter, and the refugees utilized the same medical services and schools as local Iranians. Most Afghans in Iran settled in urban areas where they could find work and become self-sufficient, rather than border camps. Half of the refugees moved out of the border region altogether. By the late 1980s, only 75,000 refugees (3% of the refugee population) resided in government-run camps. The Afghans encouraged their children to adjust to Persian
society, and Afghan-Persian intermarriages were not uncommon. The workforce in Iran had a labor shortage due to the war with Iraq, leading the refugees to be absorbed into the host state economy, albeit mostly in unskilled labor positions; and they were not allowed to open their own business except via an Iranian partner. The refugees had freedom of movement and residence until 1986, when the government began directing them toward places in need of labor, and requiring permits for domestic travel. (Lischer 2005; Hoodfar 2010; Marsden 2006; Macleod 2008; Strand, Suhrke & Harpviken 2004)

The refugees, most of whom came from western parts of Afghanistan, already spoke Farsi; and the majority were from the Hazara ethnic group, who follow Shi’a Islam. Their hosts sympathized with the refugees due to their shared religious, cultural and ethnic ties, but their sympathy was not as deep as in Pakistan. Despite the government’s emphasis on shared Islamic identity through the 1980s and a warm reception by their host communities (Hoodfar 2010; Macleod 2008), there was an undercurrent of distrust of Afghans which pre-dated the refugee crisis, and the refugees were widely perceived as damaging the Iranian economy and depleting local resources, which led to attacks and protests in Tehran against Afghan refugees in 1983. (Lischer 2005)

Finally, although Iran was not democratic, in some cases the state provided institutionalized avenues for the Afghan refugees to address their grievances. For example, the government “established Afghan refugee councils in urban areas with heavy Afghan populations as forums to discuss refugee issues.” (Lischer 2005, p. 70)

**Militancy entrepreneurs**

There were few leaders among the refugees in Iran who emerged to take up the
mantle of resistance against Afghanistan. Those militancy entrepreneurs who were present were poorly organized, consisting only of “a fractured group of Shi’a resistance parties” and some mujahideen fighters based in Afghanistan who would move temporarily to Iran for work, then return to fight in Afghanistan. (Lischer 2005, p. 65) It is quite possible, however, that many more militancy entrepreneurs did exist but did not act on their intentions due to lack of political opportunity; or that they did not emerge because they maintained a reasonable hope of resolution by outside actors, namely their mujahideen compatriots in Afghanistan and Pakistan with assistance from powerful patron states.

**POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY**

The strongest obstacle to militarization by the Afghan refugees in Iran was the lack of political opportunity. In 1979 the Islamic Revolution threw the state into a tumult, and during the following decade Iran was bogged down in a war with Iraq. Although it opposed the Soviet invasion of an Islamic state, it had little interest in getting involved in another war, especially when they were vulnerable to Soviet attack not only via Afghanistan but also along their northern border. Furthermore, Iran needed Soviet economic assistance and trade, especially since the western states had imposed a trade embargo. Domestically, it feared setting an example of non-state actors rebelling against their home government, which could be adopted by nationalistic minority groups such as the Baluchis who were pushing for more autonomy within Iran. Additionally, the ideology of the Islamic Revolution was founded in large part on rejection of western interference and western values, particularly those of the United States, and adamant demands for “pure” national sovereignty. (Lischer 2005; Marsden 2006)
As a result, the new government refused the introduction of weapons, humanitarian aid and organizations from outside, especially from American sources, which were the primary direct and indirect supporters of the mujahideen in Pakistan. The Iranian state also prevented militarization among the refugees by closely monitoring their movements and activities, confiscating weapons and securitizing the border. The government refused to allow its territory to be used as a conduit to transport weapons into Afghanistan from the parties based in Pakistan. (Lischer 2005; Grare 2003; Marsden 2006)

Finally, Afghanistan’s western border is significantly shorter, less mountainous and less rugged than its eastern border, making it easier to monitor and defend. In order to prevent Afghan rebel activity from Iran, which would have forced the Soviet Union to face two active fronts, the Soviet army built up forces along the border, establishing a buffer zone, and on a few occasions demonstrated its willingness to attack Iranian border posts if Afghan militants were present. (Lischer 2005)

CONFLICT RESOURCES

Even though Iran provided some limited support to rebel groups fighting in Afghanistan, including to the Sunni group Hizb-i-Islami in Pakistan at the beginning of the 1980s, and to Shi’ite groups such as Hazara Nasr, it did not provide such resources to Afghan refugees seeking to attack their CoO from Iranian territory. Furthermore, humanitarian aid from outside Iran, which could have potentially been diverted to support militarization, was non-existent until 1983, when the government allowed UNHCR to establish a small operation. This operation grew gradually over the next few years, but never made a dramatic contribution to the welfare of the refugees, as it did in Pakistan.
(Lischer 2005) Nonetheless, considering the abundance of imported arms, hardware and other conflict resources delivered to Afghans in Pakistan in their fight against Soviets, it is very reasonable to expect that the same would have been available to the refugees in Iran – opening a second front in the war – if militancy entrepreneurs had sought it and their host state had allowed it.

**LITTLE MILITARIZATION**

There were some claims early in the exile that refugees in Iran were making hit-and-run raids on Afghan government targets in the CoO, and some refugees donated money to the mujahideen parties. In one instance, they occupied the Soviet embassy in Tehran, but Iranian authorities quickly removed them. (Lischer 2005) Near the end of the war, there may have been an uptick in cross-border resistance against the CoO (Macleod 2008), but evidence is scant. Either way, militarization of the refugees was minimal throughout their stay in Iran.

In sum, the refugees in Iran maintained a collective project for redemption of the CoO from a clear enemy which was mostly the same as that held by their brethren in Pakistan, but they were more socioeconomically integrated to their host state. Few militancy entrepreneurs made themselves known; however, given the circumstances, it is possible that more would-be leaders were present among the refugees but chose not, or were not able, to act on their political inclinations; or they were waiting for external actors to achieve their collective project. For a variety of foreign policy and domestic reasons, the host state foreclosed any possibility of political opportunity for militarization, and strong defenses in the CoO reinforced it. Finally, conflict resources
would probably have been readily available to the refugees in Iran, as they were available in Pakistan, had the Iranian government allowed it. As a result of these factors, militarization of the refugees in Iran did not occur.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, the proposed framework of refugee militarization which was seen to explain well the presence and absence of militarization in Jordan was applied to two pairs of cases outside the region, in order to begin to investigate its relevance worldwide. Whereas Rwandans in Zaire militarized, those in Tanzania did so to a much lesser degree; and whereas Afghans in Pakistan militarized, those in Iran did not. Existing literature on refugee militarization suggests that the main reason for these differences is the presence or absence of political opportunity, namely the will and capability of the host state to prevent it. However, the case of Afghans in Iran, where they were mostly socioeconomically integrated to the host state, suggests that even if political opportunity had been present, the majority of refugees may have been ambivalent at most about engaging in militarization. Figure 7, below, summarizes the four external cases reviewed in this chapter.
Figure 7. Summary: Rwandans, 1994-96, and Afghans, 1979-1989.

Note: Due to the fact that these four cases were reviewed using secondary-source literature rather than in-depth case studies, the indications above are only preliminary categorizations. For example, as discussed in this chapter, although Afghan refugees were relatively well socioeconomically integrated to Iran, they may also have been waiting for resolution through the efforts of powerful patrons. In-depth studies are needed to draw more nuanced conclusions in these cases.
CHAPTER 10: Lessons from the Past and Directions for the Future

The previous chapters in this work have: established the necessity and urgency of understanding refugee militarization; revealed the lacuna in the academic literature which fails to give adequate consideration to collective projects and socioeconomic integration, in the context of structural factors, leading to militarization; proposed a framework outlining conditions which are necessary and sufficient to cause refugees to take up arms; justified the use of case studies and interviews in field research in the Middle East as initial applications of the framework; demonstrated the value of the framework to increasing understanding of four in-depth observations of Palestinian and Iraqi refugee situations in Jordan; and began to demonstrate its relevance outside the Middle East by applying it to four additional cases of refugee situations in Africa and central Asia.

In this concluding chapter I will: summarize the results of those case studies; offer suggestions for future research on refugee militarization and related fields; apply the proposed framework to forecast the likely future of refugee militarization in Jordan in the context of the new Middle East; and conclude with policy recommendations to host states, international humanitarian organizations and donor states for reducing the likelihood of militarization.

**Summary of results**

The eight observations are summarized in Figure 8, below. The three cases which resulted in large-scale militarization – Palestinians in Jordan from 1964-70, Rwandans in
Zaire, and Afghans in Pakistan\textsuperscript{312} had the same values on all independent variables: a (perceived) war of exclusion with a clear enemy, socioeconomic marginalization (at least among the part of the refugee group who were mostly responsible for actual

\textsuperscript{312} As noted in Chapter 9, some Afghans migrated to urban areas in Pakistan for work. Despite their greater socioeconomic integration, they are not listed separately in this summary due to their relatively small number.
militarization), the presence of militancy entrepreneurs, and a permissive political opportunity structure which allowed acquisition of conflict resources. In the cases which resulted in little or no militarization, values on the independent variables varied: lack of political opportunity was the main obstacle to militarization by Palestinians from 1971-2011, Rwandans in Tanzania and probably ex-Ba’ath Iraqis in Jordan; while Palestinians in Jordan from 1948-1963 were waiting for powerful external actors to redeem the homeland on their behalf; socioeconomic integration dissuaded actual attempts at militarization by wealthy, urban Palestinians since 1948 and Afghans in Iran; and ordinary (non-ex-Ba’ath) Iraqis in Jordan since 2003 have had little collective project. With the exception of the latter case, all of the others maintained a collective project toward redemption of the homeland.

In only one observation besides those which actually resulted in militarization was political opportunity available: Palestinians in Jordan from 1948-63. Despite the opportunity to militarize, few militancy entrepreneurs emerged, due to most Palestinians’ belief at that time in an alternative route to redemption. This framework suggests counterfactuals regarding the other selected cases. For instance, among Iraqis in Jordan and Afghans in Iran, mass militarization probably would not have occurred even if a permissive political opportunity structure had been available: in the first case because of a lack of collective project, and in the second due to their relatively high level of socioeconomic integration. Finally, in two cases (plus one subset of a case, ex-Ba’ath Iraqis), mass militarization probably would have occurred if political opportunities were available: Palestinians in Jordan since 1971 and Rwandans in Tanzania.

In the aggregate, these eight observations/cases are all consistent with the
necessity and sufficiency of the proposed independent variables in leading to mass
mobilization and militarization by refugees: a collective project, socioeconomic
marginalization (for at least a significant portion of the group, if not the whole group),
militancy entrepreneurs and political opportunity. *In no case in which these variables
were present did militarization fail to occur; and in no case in which at least one
independent variable was absent did militarization occur.*

**CAMPS, SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND MILITANCY**

The conventional wisdom is that refugee camps are hotbeds of political
extremism and militant attitudes while urban refugee populations are economically
motivated and detached from the political cause. This perception is widespread among
both scholars and practitioners, and even among Palestinians themselves. By contrast,
the results of this study revealed a more complex picture. First, it showed that camps are
seen, both by Palestinians who live in the camps and those who do not, as a tangible
symbol and locus of the Palestinian identity. Some even compared the camp to Palestine
itself. However, there were *no measurable differences in their attitudes regarding
militancy.*

But there were other differences: Camp residents are more pessimistic that the
group will return, but have higher expectation of actual return personally; and camp
residents and Gazans are more likely to place higher priority on private economic
interests than collective political interests, as demonstrated by the fact that they are more
willing to live side-by-side with Israelis in an Israeli state as long as they can return to
their ancestral homes – an option flatly refused by most interviewees. In short, less
economic integration to the host state increases economic orientation toward the CoO and
intent to actually return, but not necessarily attachment to the collective project or militant attitudes.

If camp residents are not more extreme or militant in their attitudes regarding the CoO than non-camp residents, how can we explain the fact that the camps have been centers for actual militarization (1965-1970) and attempts to militarize (1971-2011)? The explanation appears to be related not to differences in attitude but differences in economic orientation. First, those who are less integrated to the host state have fewer and shallower economic and affective ties to the host state, so they are more free to act on the political attitudes which they share with their non-camp or non-Gazan compatriots. As one Palestinian ex-guerrilla stated, “They had nothing to lose but their tents.” (Personal interview, 12/8/10) This is an exaggeration, but the basic idea has merit.

Second, decreased socioeconomic integration in the host state means that they remain more economically oriented toward the CoO, which explains both the increased willingness to live with Israelis in Israel, and the higher levels of actual militarization. In other words, those who are less economically integrated to the host state are more likely to seek practical return to their ancestral homes, and are more willing to achieve it either peacefully or violently. Finally, camps are logical places for militancy entrepreneurs to base their operations because they are less integrated to the host state – they are, even more so in Lebanon than Jordan, a “zone of exception” – and the residents are nearly all Palestinian. When combined with the fact that these Palestinians are themselves more willing to actually militarize, even though their attitudes are no more militant than their urban brethren, it is not surprising that militant groups would base their operations there.

313 Note, however, that this does not mean that camp residents are more willing to accept a peaceful diplomatic route such as the two-state solution. In fact, they were less likely than non-camp residents to choose that option.
**PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATION**

As discussed in Chapter 2, significant attention has been paid in the literature on refugee militarization to protracted refugee situations. Among the three cases in this study which did result in large-scale militarization, a protracted refugee situation was present in the case of Palestinians, but not those of Rwandans in Zaire or Afghans in Pakistan. Among Palestinians, the protracted duration of their refugee situation by 1964 contributed to their belief that they could no longer expect powerful external actors such as Arab states or the UN to address their grievances and bring them home; they could rely only on themselves. From this point, a Palestinian identity and ethnonationalist project began to become widespread and popular, and the number of fedayeen started to increase rapidly – especially after their alleged success against Israel in 1968 – from the civilian refugee population. In the other two cases, militancy entrepreneurs and a collective project were present prior to departure, and they grew their ranks and continued their efforts in exile. These results suggest that a protracted refugee situation may be necessary for the development of militancy entrepreneurs in exile, but it is not a necessary condition when pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs are present.

**MILITANCY ENTREPRENEURS AND THE COLLECTIVE PROJECT**

Some critics may argue that the causality in the proposed framework is reversed, i.e., that political and militancy entrepreneurs can stimulate and generate political motivation where it did not exist previously. However, this line of reasoning grants too much power to the persuasiveness of such leaders. It is far less plausible that a powerful orator will be able to mobilize a population by framing an argument around grievances which have little relation to their own experiences and perceptions, ex nihilo, than
political grievances which resonate with the audience because they draw from experiences and symbols which are already familiar and widespread.

**Directions for future research**

**COLLECTIVE PROJECT BASED ON ECONOMIC ATTACHMENT TO CoO**

One area which calls for further investigation is construction of the collective project on the basis of economic attachment to the CoO. In the three cases reviewed in this project in which militarization occurred, a strong political attachment was present – ethnonationalist projects in two cases and a religious/traditional project in the third – which appeared to overshadow the economic attachment, even though two (and all three, if naazihiin are included) also had a practical economic attachment to the CoO due to their agricultural base. This raises the question of whether economic attachment as a basis for a collective project is a sufficiently strong motivator to lead to militarization.

One way to begin investigating the latter possibility is to find cases in which there was relatively little political attachment to the CoO but economic attachment was strong, while the rest of the variables were present. An illustrative case would be one in which refugees were expelled due to a conflict over arable land or rent-producing resources, but there is little nationalism or ethnonationalism among the refugees. An in-depth study of refugees from Sierra Leone – where diamonds were an important element in the civil war – may be a relevant case to begin investigating this question further.

**A CALL FOR MORE CASE STUDIES AND QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT**

Future research on the topic should conduct additional case studies across diverse geographies and groups to extend further its global relevance. Some possibilities, using the same matched-case comparative design as that used in this project, are: Burmese
(Keren) refugees in Thailand from 1970 to the present vs. Burmese (Rohingya) refugees in Bangladesh from 1991 to the present; both Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea from 1999-2002 vs. the same refugees from 2003 to the present; Burundians in Tanzania in the mid-1990s vs. Rwandans in Tanzania from 1994-96; and Iraqis in Syria since 2003 vs. Iraqis in Jordan since 2003. These are just some initial suggestions; there are many other potentially valuable comparisons. In fact, it would be particularly useful to compare every case that has resulted in militarization in specific years with the same case during years in which those refugees did not take up arms.

While case studies have certain strengths, including strong internal validity, a global database of all situations worldwide (above a certain population threshold) in which refugees resided in a host state bordering their CoO, could be used to assess quantitatively the framework proposed in this project. This would provide a more convincing assessment of the framework’s global generalizability. Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) tested quantitatively the contribution of refugees to engagement in war by the host state, so their data might be utilized as a starting point.

EXPANDING THE SCOPE

This project has provided strong initial empirical evidence for a new approach to the study of refugee militarization which incorporates a collective project and socioeconomic integration among the group with structural factors. It has shown – while acknowledging that humanitarian needs are real, legitimate and worthy of urgent humanitarian action – that refugees can be important political actors, and their political attitudes matter.

The first logical extension would be to internally displaced persons (IDPs), those

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The first case listed in each pair resulted in militarization, while the second did not.
who have fled their homes but not crossed an international border, but the proposed framework also has potentially important implications for a variety of related research areas. For example, with the exception of studies of the classic peasant revolutions, those scholars who attempt to study agency among the severely disenfranchised have often done so in the context of Scott’s (1985) “everyday forms of peasant resistance”, behavior that is passive-aggressive in improving the living conditions of the poor while avoiding punishment by the authorities. By contrast, this project suggests that further attention to the political will of marginalized groups is warranted. Demonstrating the importance of studying collective projects among those who have been excluded not only from the polity but even further, from the physical state, suggests the necessity of studying such projects among all groups who have been severely disenfranchised.

Furthermore, this work can be fruitfully applied to the study of armed rebellion by populations who have not migrated. Although some of the factors discussed in this study are unique to refugee situations, the main elements of the proposed framework, which are drawn primarily from the study of contentious politics, may be just as applicable to mobilization and militarization by a non-refugee population. Scholars studying civil war, for example, may find the framework a parsimonious way to integrate a rebel group, its population constituency, and structural constraints.

Finally, the project has the potential to help illuminate processes at work in other situations of group conflict. For instance, it could help scholars studying ethnic and ethnonationalist violence better understand group political projects and social construction of attachment to a homeland.

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315 For example, see Bayat’s (1997) study of strategies by the Iranian urban poor in the 1970s-1980s.
Palestinian and Iraqi refugees in the new Middle East

As of this writing in March 2012, the events of the “Arab Spring” which began fifteen months ago with the self-immolation of a Tunisian street vendor have now led to the toppling of three Arab dictatorships (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya), with the fates of at least two more still uncertain (Yemen, Syria). Jordan experienced weekly protests in the first half of 2011, some attracting thousands of participants and at least one, at Dakhliyya Circle, turning violent. There are several reasons for the decline of protests later in the year, most notably quick action and promises of future reform by King Abdullah, and the fear of chaos and civil war which could result from an uncertain transition period. That fear is prevalent among both Palestinians and East Bank Jordanians, who see the Hashemite monarchy – which has neither Palestinian nor East Bank tribal provenance – as the lynchpin which holds the country together.

Nonetheless, turmoil in the region continues to churn and there are still occasional protests in Jordan, most recently in the East Bank tribal town of Karak. (Farrell/New York Times, 2/9/12) What would happen with regard to refugee militarization if the Jordanian regime were to enter a chaotic transition period like those seen elsewhere in the region? What is the likelihood that either Palestinians or Iraqis would militarize?

Palestinians

Although I did not ask questions specifically about the Arab Spring, during the course of the interviews nearly a quarter of Palestinian interviewees voluntarily referred to it or strongly implied a reference to it. The events of the Arab Spring breathed new life into the hopes of Palestinian political and militancy entrepreneurs, both through the advent of democratic Arab governments more supportive of the Palestinian cause and
expectations of a Palestinian Arab Spring:

The revolutions that happened in other Arab countries, they were able to achieve and take their freedom back. So we hope that this will happen [for the Palestinians]. The Palestinians have to suffer two things: the Palestinian Authority and the enemy [Israel]…. The destiny of every young man here is unknown. As I said, we are motivated and provoked by anything… not just what happens in Palestine, but in Libya, Tunisia…. Young people have energy and are more active, they have more power to do something. You know, because of Facebook and the internet, there are more connections between people around the world. (Male, 30)

It’s good for my heart nowadays, what happened in Egypt, [it offers us] a new future…. From 1991 to 2011 we were disappointed with what’s going on in the Arab world. Lebanon, Gaza…. It was a black picture. But this year, what’s going on in the Arab world, the Arab Spring…. These young people gave us [older leaders] some good lessons. We are not the leaders now giving the youth the opportunity. Even the Facebook guys, they are good guys, we are following them nowadays. (Male, 49)

I believe that if there is democracy in all Arab countries, the Palestinians [will be] allowed to go back to Palestine with the support of all Arabs with nonviolent resistance, like demonstrations, to go to Palestine together, with nonviolent demonstrations. I believe in the next five years all the refugees will go back to Palestine in peace. Five million in Tahrir Square made Hosni Mubarak leave. Now five million Palestinians in addition to five million Egyptians, if they cross the borders to Palestine -- I don’t think anyone will be able to stop them if they are not using any weapons. (Male, 53)

These sentiments were expressed by political and militancy entrepreneurs even into May (when I completed the field research). Among ordinary refugees, the initial days and weeks after the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak brought similar optimism concerning the implications of the Arab Spring for the Palestinian cause:

What happened in Tunisia and Egypt recently…. The new governments will help [the Palestinians] achieve their rights. The Arab governments had made [the Palestinian] people suffer. [For example] Hosni Mubarak stopped aid from reaching Gaza. (Male, 28, 2/17/11)

We want a revolution like what’s happened in Tunisia and Egypt so we can get our land back. (Female, 41, 3/2/11)

Now we put our faith in a people’s revolution to get Palestine back, so the Jews will leave like Mubarak and like [Ben Ali in] Tunisia. Inshallah we can get rid of Israel in that way. (Male, 64, 3/8/11)

Maybe the situation is going to be better, maybe the revolutions in the Arab world are going to be very effective and do something about Palestine. Maybe new governments are going to do something…. What’s happened in Egypt, I immediately link it with Palestine, so if the situation in Egypt is going to be better, then the situation in Palestine
is going to be better because of Gaza…. (Female, 21, 3/16/11)

However, in the following months, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, Syria and other states experienced turmoil and upheaval, experiencing severe repression and even war, while Jordan had been experiencing weekly protests. The extended repression of protesters throughout the region and the long drought of good news, after the euphoric reaction and soaring hopes which had followed the resignation of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on February 11 – as well as the growing divide between East Bank Jordanians, who mostly supported the Jordanian regime, and Palestinians, who were widely perceived as the instigators of the protests in Jordan – led to a growing feeling of pessimism and discontent with life in Jordan, and the protests in particular:

We don’t want to participate in the resistance. They won’t change anything, even if they joined the resistance, nothing will change. I think all the demonstrations are a mistake. (In Jordan?) In any place, I think it’s wrong. They only make the situation worse if they do that. They won’t be able to liberate Palestine if they do that. (Female, 47, 5/5/11)

When asked, “When you think about your life in Jordan, what aspects are you most satisfied with?”, interviewees in later interviews became less likely to say “equal rights with East Bank Jordanians” (p < .05), after controlling for demographic and other relevant variables. In response to the question I posed regarding options for refugees following a peace deal, they became less likely to choose “stay permanently in Jordan” (p < .05). And when asked what they expect of the future of the Palestinian refugees, they became more likely to say that there will be no change (p < .05), which from the perspective of most Palestinians is a pessimistic answer, and less likely to say that the refugees’ economic situation will improve (p < .001), which were the primary demands of the protests in Jordan.

316 See Appendix II.
The Arab Spring also appeared to increase Palestinians’ allegiance to affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood. When asked, “Which group(s) or organization(s) do you feel best represents the interests of the Palestinian refugees?”, participants became less likely over time to say “No organization” (p < .05) and more likely to mention Hamas (p < .05). This result may be related to – or even a veiled reference to – the leading role of the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the Jordanian political party of the Muslim Brotherhood which is dominated by Palestinians, in organizing protests in Jordan. In other words, among Palestinians in Jordan, the events of the Arab Spring appear to have increased support for affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestinian territories, which may reflect an increase in support for the Brotherhood’s affiliate in Jordan.

However, the increased pessimism over those four months also led to decreasing faith in their own self-efficacy: When given choices on who will best help them achieve their rights, they became less likely to choose “the Palestinian people themselves” (p < .05). There was no measurable effect of the Arab Spring on the questions relating to militant attitudes.³¹⁷

As noted in Chapter 7, the only variable in the proposed framework which is known to be absent in the case of Palestinians in Jordan today is political opportunity. The Jordanian security forces, especially the mukhabarat, are proactive and effective in repressing occasional efforts at militarization by Palestinian refugees. If the regime were to fall or enter a transitional phase, it is likely that the organization and repressive capacity of the security forces would likewise falter. Since those forces are almost entirely comprised of East Bank Jordanians, the tribes’ political allegiances, rather than

³¹⁷ Logistic regression was conducted on each of these dichotomously coded questions, while holding demographic and all other relevant variables constant. See Appendix II for details.
the will of the Hashemite-led state, would become a crucial factor affecting the degree of political opportunity for militarization by Palestinians. There are three possible paths at that point:

1) The East Bank tribes allow and support Palestinian militarization, as it reinforces their nationalist claim that Jordan is for the tribes while Palestine is for Palestinians.

2) The East Bank tribes, wary of Palestinians as they recall 1970, largely maintain the integrity of the security forces. The tribes cooperate with each other to continue and even increase their surveillance and repression of Palestinians, and their securitization of the borders, to ensure that the refugees do not arm during this period, regardless of the Palestinians’ intended target.

3) Jordan dissolves into civil war along national and tribal lines, pitting the various tribes against Palestinians and each other. In this scenario, there is essentially no state authority, or only a powerless interim government. The tribes arm primarily from the stores of the Jordanian government, as well as other states, while Palestinians arm primarily from outside the country – the West Bank, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Iran and Iraq are all possible sources, if the East Bank tribes are unable to cooperate with each other to secure the borders. In this scenario it is again likely that Palestinians would militarize against Israel, a project which would be seen as more legitimate among Palestinians themselves, and in the region, than fighting East Bankers. Attacks on Israel, which would attract violent reprisals, would constitute a powerful tactic for stimulating recruitment, fundraising and arms acquisition to the Palestinian militant groups.

In the first and third scenarios above, political opportunity would be available,
either with or without the support of the East Bankers, and militarization by Palestinians would occur. In the second scenario, political opportunity would continue to remain unavailable, and militarization would not occur.

IRAQIS

As shown in Chapter 8, the masses of Iraqi refugees have little collective project to redeem their CoO, even though it is highly likely that conflict resources would be available. However, ex-Ba’athists, both former leaders and low-level potential foot soldiers, do constitute a group of highly motivated pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs. Without political motivation among the larger group, the militancy entrepreneurs could still engage in attacks on the CoO, though they would be more akin to an isolated terrorist group than large-scale refugee militarization.

Until now, the main obstacle preventing them from conducting such attacks has been lack of political opportunity. If the Jordanian regime were to enter an uncertain transition period, it is possible that political opportunity would become available. This is especially the case if Jordan were to fall into civil war, as in the third outcome described in the Palestinian section, above. In such a scenario, there would be an abundance of unsecured arms in the country and decreased repressive capacity. Neither the East Bank Jordanians nor Palestinians would have an inherent stake in the ex-Ba’athists’ political project, but they would surely become party to the conflict as alliances evolved over time. Therefore, with political opportunity, it is likely that the ex-Ba’athists would obtain the capacity to conduct terrorist strikes on the Shi’ite-led government of Iraq from Jordan, but not large-scale refugee militarization.

318 Very few Iraqi refugees referred to regional or local events relating to the Arab Spring. Also, I did not begin interviews with Iraqi refugees until mid-March, which was already more than a month after the fall of Mubarak.
Turkey in the New Middle East

The new and evolving constellation of power and alliances in the Middle East, including the growing Sunni/Shi’ite political polarization, has changed the calculus for powerful regional players. In particular, Turkey’s turn eastward in the past several years has raised its profile among Sunni populations, especially in its frosty relations with Israel and recent opposition to the Iranian-supported Assad regime in Syria. Turkey harbors and supports the Free Syrian Army, a group of army defectors in refugee camps on the Syrian border who seek to overthrow the Syrian regime. Turkey’s recent international activity gives it a stake in both the Palestinian and Iraqi conflicts, on the side of the refugees in both cases.

Although Turkey and Israel still officially maintain diplomatic relations and military ties, they have cooled considerably since the Gaza War of 2008-09. Turkey is still allied with the West and a longstanding member of NATO, so it is unlikely to directly attack Israel. If inclined to support Palestinian militants, it is far more likely that Turkey would supply covert military assistance and diplomatic cover to the Palestinian rebels. On the Iraqi front, given that Iraq’s government is Shi’ite-led and also supported by Iran, it is entirely conceivable that Turkey would likewise be willing to covertly support and arm the aggrieved Sunni ex-Ba’athists.

In 2004, King Abdullah of Jordan expressed fear of a rising “Shi’ite crescent”\(^{319}\), but is firmly committed, as noted in Chapter 8, to maintaining security and stability in his country. Therefore, Jordan under the current regime would probably attempt to prevent such provision of conflict resources, despite a degree of convergent interests.

\(^{319}\) Wright & Baker/Washington Post, 12/8/04
Reducing the risk of refugee militarization

I began this work by explaining the dangers of refugee militarization and the urgency of gaining greater understanding of the phenomenon. In this section of the concluding chapter, I will apply the lessons learned to make policy recommendations for stakeholders, including host states, international humanitarian organizations and donor states. Applying the theoretical framework developed in this project to better understand the factors leading to refugee militarization could help practitioners and policymakers decrease the risk of engagement in conflict by refugee groups.

First, while it is certainly legitimate for host states to seek security and sovereign control over their borders, they must not refuse entry or asylum to groups of refugees due to a fear that they will militarize, which would be discriminatory and a violation of their human rights as well as international law, and could result in refugees’ injury or death in a situation of ongoing conflict. As I will emphasize below, they must also take care to honor the human rights of refugees. With that said, host states, aid organizations and interested third-party states, such as donors, may be able to reduce the risk that a refugee group will militarize by taking certain actions, including the following:

COLLECTIVE PROJECT

The war has already occurred; if it was (perceived to be) a war of exclusion, no action can change that ex post facto. The best action that can be taken to avoid this factor is to proactively intervene early in a crisis to prevent violence against civilians. After the fact, it may be possible to reduce motivation for violent reprisal by offering culturally sensitive counseling to refugees, including children, who have experienced trauma in the CoO or in the course of their expulsion.
Likewise, there is little that a host state or external actor can do to suppress an ethnonationalist movement relating to the CoO. Normatively, it is also questionable whether it is even appropriate to try to thwart such a movement; clearly, it depends on the individual case. That is a question which will be answered by political leaders on the basis of political calculations. In some cases, such as the Rwandans, a project existed prior to departure; in others, like the Palestinians, it develops in exile. Either way, there is little that outsiders can do to avoid that powerful motivating factor. Sometimes, as in the case of Palestinians from 1948-1963, a nascent ethnonational project can be averted by an alternate ideology, such as pan-Arabism, which credibly offers redemption. However, that was a unique set of circumstances and it is unlikely that a host state could intentionally create a competing ideological movement for the purpose of thwarting an ethnonationalist project.

It would be all but impossible to address the “greed” variable. Either rent-producing natural resources in the CoO were a basis for the conflict, or they were not. The best recommendation that can be made to reduce this economic motivation is, again, to be assertive and proactive in politically intervening in the crisis in the CoO.

Socioeconomic Integration in the Host State

It would be more feasible for a host state and other stakeholders to reduce the likelihood of militarization by increasing refugees’ rights and socioeconomic integration to the host state. First, this can be accomplished by improving their living conditions, employment and educational opportunities and legal rights to meet the terms of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, regardless of whether the host state is a signatory. Secondly, both host states and international agencies can improve both the
relative and absolute standard of living of refugees by: accommodating them in urban settings – for example, giving them vouchers for apartment rental, which landlords can redeem for cash, rather than in camps; offering skill training, especially when the economic bases of the CoO and host are substantially different (this is especially relevant for refugees with an agricultural base in the CoO); and decreasing barriers to employment, for example by accepting professional certifications and work experience from the CoO to allow refugees to engage in the same professions in the host state.

Unfortunately, whether or not these recommendations – as well as even greater integration, such as citizenship – are implemented will depend in large part on domestic political calculations by the host state, but humanitarian aid organizations and international donor states could take steps to ease the economic and political pain which a host state government could face from their domestic constituencies as a result of such policies.

Secondly, host states can create formal and informal avenues for refugees to address their political grievances through the host state. Examples of formal avenues include Iran’s refugee councils for Afghans and Jordan’s allowance for Palestinians to vote in parliamentary elections. Informal avenues include allowing refugees freedom of speech, press and assembly. For example, they can establish alternative routes for expression of grievances such as town hall forums in camps and communities, engagement in media outlets, polling, civil society groups, ethnic/national cultural centers, and other traditional forms of political engagement unique to each group. Host states can allow peaceful protests. Such opportunities could constitute not only an outlet

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320 Compare the recommendations for addressing protracted refugee situations in Kuhlman (2002).
for political engagement and expression, but valuable skill training and additional employment opportunities as well. In practice, such allowances will depend on the regime type and political interests of the host state.

Finally, in most cases ethnic consanguinity will be impossible to address, unless there are two areas in the host state where a refugee population could be housed with equal ease, one of which contains a co-ethnic host population while the other does not – in which case the refugees would probably feel more welcome and integrate better with the co-ethnic population. However, even when refugees and host nationals are of different ethnic groups, stakeholders could make efforts to reduce social estrangement through public awareness campaigns and bridge-building efforts such as those of UNHCR-supported community centers in Amman, which primarily serve Iraqi refugees but are also open to Jordanians.

**DETERRING MILITANCY ENTREPRENEURS**

Host states can deter pre-existing militancy entrepreneurs by separating them from civilians at the border – to the extent possible in what is often chaos – or as soon as possible after arrival, and extraditing any who are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity to the International Criminal Court. Host states also have the right, under the terms of the 1951 Convention, to refuse asylum to active combatants. Host states’ implementation of such recommendations will depend on both their capacity and political will to do so.

Deterring the emergence of militancy entrepreneurs in exile from a civilian population without violating their human rights is more difficult, but the recommendations above for addressing the collective project and increasing
socioeconomic integration may help. Since a protracted stay appears to be necessary for the emergence of militancy entrepreneurs in exile, interested states can reduce the duration of stay of refugees by quickly and actively engaging in the political conflict in the CoO to reach a lasting peace agreement which will enable refugees to return home. Once the situation has become protracted and the second generation has grown up in exile, it may become more difficult and complicated to convince a refugee group to accept a political compromise.

PREVENTING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES

The presence or absence of political opportunities for militarization, including acquisition of conflict resources, is the factor which is most directly controllable by host states. Like the other factors, it will depend in large part on the political will and capacity of the host state, including the nature of its relationship with the CoO. However, a government which seeks to prevent militarization must tread a fine line in order not to violate the refugees’ human rights. With that in mind, the following steps can be taken: First, the government can train and employ refugees themselves as police and intelligence forces to maintain security, and to identify and report the presence of small arms and light weapons within their camps and communities. Second, the government can confiscate small arms and light weapons through a process of search and seizure which is consistent with international legal standards. Third, it can monitor and minimize political space in refugee camps and communities for militant organizations to organize, train, recruit and operate; while continuing to allow nonviolent avenues for political expression, as described above. Finally, the host government can increase border

321 See Mandal (2003) for detailed international legal guidance on the actions a host state must not do, may do and must do, regarding refugees’ political activities relating to the CoO.
security to prevent uncontrolled cross-border activity.

International humanitarian organizations, including the two UN refugee agencies, can reduce political opportunity by withdrawing their assistance to militarized camps and communities, or making it contingent on a clear separation of civilians from militants. When there is serious concern about diversion of aid, they can choose to provide that aid only in person, for example by giving antibiotics – a potential conflict resource – one dose at a time, in a clinic. (Since the Zaire case, UNHCR and many other international organizations have adopted such policy changes to prevent a repeat of their complicity in future refugee situations.)

Finally, host states and interested third-party states can reduce political opportunity by using diplomatic tools to attempt to shut down international sources of funding, weapons and other conflict resources to the militant group(s).

THE BIGGER PICTURE

While humanitarian concerns must continue to be met, the implications of this framework for understanding refugee groups’ collective projects, in the context of structural factors, could help raise awareness among policymakers of the multifaceted roles held by those who qualify for refugee status. It can help build capacity among refugees by leading decision-makers to acknowledge and address their personal and group aspirations, which has often been lacking. That lacuna has constituted a blind spot which, in some cases, militancy entrepreneurs have been able to exploit for mobilization and militarization. By acknowledging and expecting that refugees are important actors who take independent political action, practitioners and policymakers might reconsider policies which seek to deter all political activity by refugees, and offer access to
nonviolent formal and informal institutions of political engagement, as described above.

This work has proposed a new analytical framework to explain refugee militarization which accords the collective project its due weight in motivating the actions of refugee groups. Refugee militarization is a global phenomenon which warrants greater understanding among scholars, policymakers and humanitarian practitioners, especially as it continues around the world today, and is likely to emerge in new locations in the future. I hope that this scholarly effort will contribute in a small way to improving the chances for peace and security for all affected people; and durable solutions for refugees, especially those whose situations are protracted, in order that they might be able to end their condition of permanent temporariness.
APPENDIX I. Demographic Characteristics of Refugee Samples

Table I-1. Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
<th>TALKED MOST</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PALESTINIANS</td>
<td></td>
<td>PALESTINIANS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>1%*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In one early interview the respondent changed repeatedly: First a young man spoke, then he left and his mother took his place, then she left and his brother took her place, etc. In later interviews I handled this problem by recording each speaker as a separate individual in the household, but I did not do that the first time.

Table I-2. Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
<th>TALKED MOST</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PALESTINIANS</td>
<td></td>
<td>PALESTINIANS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;64</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

335
Table I-3. Marital status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MARITAL STATUS</th>
<th>ALL PALESTINIANS</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
<th>TALKED MOST PALESTINIANS</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>21 16%</td>
<td>9 17%</td>
<td>11 12%</td>
<td>9 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>96 74%</td>
<td>31 58%</td>
<td>71 76%</td>
<td>27 59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated/Divorced</td>
<td>2 2%</td>
<td>9 17%</td>
<td>2 2%</td>
<td>7 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>8 6%</td>
<td>4 8%</td>
<td>7 8%</td>
<td>3 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 or more wives</td>
<td>2 2%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>2 2%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>129 100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>53 100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>93 100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>46 100%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>5 4%</td>
<td>2 4%</td>
<td>3 3%</td>
<td>2 4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I-4. Number of children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHILDREN (if married or previously married*)</th>
<th>ALL PALESTINIANS</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
<th>TALKED MOST PALESTINIANS</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* No interviewee who was single had a child

Table I-5. Arab or Kurd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARAB/KURD</th>
<th>ALL PALESTINIANS</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
<th>TALKED MOST PALESTINIANS</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>134 100%</td>
<td>52 95%</td>
<td>96 100%</td>
<td>45 94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurd</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>3 5%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>3 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>134 100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>55 100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>96 100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>48 100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table I-6. Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELIGION</th>
<th>ALL PALESTINIANS</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
<th>TALKED MOST PALESTINIANS</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>130 98%</td>
<td>28 51%</td>
<td>92 97%</td>
<td>27 56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi'ite</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>13 24%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>9 19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>2 2%</td>
<td>7 13%</td>
<td>2 2%</td>
<td>7 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asabiyya</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>3 5%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>2 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-faith</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>4 7%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>3 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>133 100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>55 100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>95 100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>48 100%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I-7. Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
<th>ALL PALESTINIANS</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
<th>TALKED MOST PALESTINIANS</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 6th</td>
<td>10 8%</td>
<td>3 6%</td>
<td>4 4%</td>
<td>3 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed 6-9</td>
<td>28 21%</td>
<td>10 19%</td>
<td>27 28%</td>
<td>8 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed 10-12</td>
<td>35 27%</td>
<td>7 13%</td>
<td>19 20%</td>
<td>6 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>12 9%</td>
<td>1 2%</td>
<td>8 8%</td>
<td>1 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some univ</td>
<td>19 15%</td>
<td>11 21%</td>
<td>15 16%</td>
<td>10 22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Bach</td>
<td>22 17%</td>
<td>17 33%</td>
<td>17 18%</td>
<td>15 33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some grad</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adv. Degree</td>
<td>4 3%</td>
<td>3 6%</td>
<td>4 4%</td>
<td>3 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>131 100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>52 100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>95 100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>46 100%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>3 2%</td>
<td>3 5%</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>2 4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table I-8. Employment status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th></th>
<th>TALKED MOST</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PALESTINIANS</td>
<td>IRAQIS</td>
<td>PALESTINIANS</td>
<td>IRAQIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EMPLOYED</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>130</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EMPLOYED</strong> (males only)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>86</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data missing 4 3% 1 2% 2 2%
Table I-9. Household income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOUSEHOLD INCOME (JD per month)</th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>TALKED MOST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PALESTINIANS</td>
<td>IRAQIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-200</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201-400</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401-600</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601-800</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>801-1000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001-10000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;10000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>127</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>n</strong></td>
<td>127</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data missing</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>597</td>
<td>1095</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I-10. Home ownership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OWN/RENT</th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>TALKED MOST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PALESTINIANS</td>
<td>IRAQIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>130</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data missing</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table I-11. Internet access

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
<th>TALKED MOST</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PALESTINIANS</td>
<td>IRAQIS</td>
<td>PALESTINIANS</td>
<td>IRAQIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNET</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>69 53%</td>
<td>30 55%</td>
<td>49 52%</td>
<td>25 52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, recently or soon</td>
<td>12 9%</td>
<td>5 9%</td>
<td>8 8%</td>
<td>5 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, use it elsewhere</td>
<td>8 6%</td>
<td>1 2%</td>
<td>7 7%</td>
<td>1 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>42 32%</td>
<td>19 35%</td>
<td>31 33%</td>
<td>17 35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>131 100%</td>
<td>55 100%</td>
<td>95 100%</td>
<td>48 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>3 2%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I-12. Foreign languages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
<th>TALKED MOST</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PALESTINIANS</td>
<td>IRAQIS</td>
<td>PALESTINIANS</td>
<td>IRAQIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPEAKS ENGLISH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>56 42%</td>
<td>18 34%</td>
<td>43 45%</td>
<td>16 34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>52 39%</td>
<td>23 43%</td>
<td>34 35%</td>
<td>19 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>24 18%</td>
<td>12 23%</td>
<td>19 20%</td>
<td>12 26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>132 100%</td>
<td>53 100%</td>
<td>96 100%</td>
<td>47 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>2 1%</td>
<td>2 4%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>1 2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPEAKS ANOTHER LANGUAGE</th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
<th>TALKED MOST</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>109 83%</td>
<td>47 89%</td>
<td>77 81%</td>
<td>41 87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>14 11%</td>
<td>2 4%</td>
<td>11 12%</td>
<td>2 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8 6%</td>
<td>4 8%</td>
<td>7 7%</td>
<td>4 9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>131 100%</td>
<td>53 100%</td>
<td>95 100%</td>
<td>47 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>3 2%</td>
<td>2 4%</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>1 2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table I-13. Household size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOUSEHOLD SIZE</th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
<th>TALKED MOST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PALESTINIANS</td>
<td>IRAQIS</td>
<td>PALESTINIANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>22 18%</td>
<td>12 22%</td>
<td>15 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>31 26%</td>
<td>19 35%</td>
<td>20 23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>35 29%</td>
<td>19 35%</td>
<td>28 32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-8</td>
<td>16 13%</td>
<td>4 7%</td>
<td>12 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;8</td>
<td>15 13%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>12 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>119 100%</td>
<td>54 100%</td>
<td>87 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>15 11%</td>
<td>1 2%</td>
<td>9 9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table I-14. Percentage of household members employed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS EMPLOYED (% of household size)</th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
<th>TALKED MOST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PALESTINIANS</td>
<td>IRAQIS</td>
<td>PALESTINIANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>16 12%</td>
<td>2 4%</td>
<td>9 9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table I-15. City of origin (Palestinians)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PALESTINIANS: ORIGIN CITY</th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>TALKED MOST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalil</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer Seba</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lid</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bisan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near Gaza</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulbas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falujah</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalqilya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK / refused</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table I-16. Double refugee (Palestinians)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>TALKED MOST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PALESTINIANS: DOUBLE REFUGEE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table I-17. City of origin (Iraqis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>TALKED MOST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IRAQIS: ORIGIN CITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosul</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basra</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karbala</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meisan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simawa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasriyya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadasiyya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data missing: 1 2%
### Table I-18. Year departed Iraq (Iraqis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IRAQIS: YEAR DEPARTED IRAQ</th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>TALKED MOST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992-2002</td>
<td>12 22%</td>
<td>11 23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-04</td>
<td>9 17%</td>
<td>7 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-06</td>
<td>11 20%</td>
<td>10 21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-09</td>
<td>8 15%</td>
<td>7 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>14 26%</td>
<td>12 26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>54 100%</td>
<td>47 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>1 2%</td>
<td>1 2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table I-19. Job in country of origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JOB IN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN</th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>IRAQIS</th>
<th>TALKED MOST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PALESTINIANS</td>
<td>IRAQIS</td>
<td>PALESTINIANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>69 64%</td>
<td>2 6%</td>
<td>52 64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shepherd (Bedouin)</td>
<td>11 10%</td>
<td>1 3%</td>
<td>8 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchant/Small business owner</td>
<td>8 7%</td>
<td>7 20%</td>
<td>6 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>4 4%</td>
<td>16 46%</td>
<td>3 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>2 2%</td>
<td>5 14%</td>
<td>2 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6 6%</td>
<td>4 11%</td>
<td>4 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK / refused</td>
<td>8 7%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>6 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>108 100%</td>
<td>35 100%</td>
<td>81 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>26 19%</td>
<td>20 36%</td>
<td>15 16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table I-20. Residency status in Jordan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESIDENCY STATUS</th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>TALKED MOST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PALESTINANS</td>
<td>IRAQIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>120 90%</td>
<td>1 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazan</td>
<td>13 10%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>14 30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>9 19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iqama - other</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>4 9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visitor</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>3 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None/Illegal</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>15 32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1 1%</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answer irrelevant</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>1 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>134 100%</td>
<td>47 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
<td>8 15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX II. Effect of the Arab Spring on Palestinian Interviews

In order to assess the impact of the Arab Spring on Palestinian interviewees’ responses (see Chapter 10), logistic regression was run on each of the following dichotomously coded questions while holding demographic and all other relevant variables constant.

Table II-1. Question: “When you think about your life in Jordan, what aspects are you most satisfied with?” (open-ended) Answer: “Equal rights with East Bank Jordanians”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>z value</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interview date</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-2.13</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp/non-camp</td>
<td>-3.15</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>-2.95</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-2.12</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>0.552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet access</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double refugee</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust level</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>-1.92</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>578.8</td>
<td>271.5</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 91
Log likelihood = -30.86
Pseduo-$R^2$ = 0.296
Table II-2. Question: “If there is a peace deal with Israel in the future, and all options are possible to Palestinian refugees, which of the following do you believe is the best course of action for them?” (choices given) Answer: “Stay permanently in Jordan”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>z value</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interview date</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-2.15</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>z value</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp/non-camp</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-1.61</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>-0.80</td>
<td>0.425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>0.551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>-0.89</td>
<td>0.372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet access</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>0.575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double refugee</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazan</td>
<td>-1.02</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>-1.01</td>
<td>0.314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust level</td>
<td>-1.06</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>-2.74</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Constant: 402.4  185.4  2.17  0.030

N = 113
Log likelihood = -55.44
Pseduo-R² = 0.188

Table II-3. Question: “What do you think is the future of the Palestinian refugees?” (open-ended) Answer: “No change”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>z value</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interview date</td>
<td>0.0201056</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control Variables

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>z value</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp/non-camp</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>0.607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-1.14</td>
<td>0.252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td>0.518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet access</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double refugee</td>
<td>-1.22</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>-2.13</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazan</td>
<td>-0.99</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>-1.15</td>
<td>0.248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust level</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>0.654</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Constant: -377.1  166.4  -2.27  0.023

N = 102
Log likelihood = -60.74
Pseduo-R² = 0.140
Table II- 4. Question: “What do you think is the future of the Palestinian refugees?” (open-ended) Answer: “Their economic situation will improve”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>z value</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interview date</td>
<td>-1.95</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-34.50</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Control Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>z value</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp/non-camp</td>
<td>131.81</td>
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<td>Household income</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.928</td>
</tr>
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<td>Region</td>
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<td>-0.24</td>
<td>0.813</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>168.31</td>
<td>658.55</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>20.72</td>
<td>492.19</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>257.88</td>
<td>1038.79</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet access</td>
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<td>1084.48</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.884</td>
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<td>Double refugee</td>
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<td>0.877</td>
</tr>
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<td>Gazan</td>
<td>295.33</td>
<td>952.33</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.756</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust level</td>
<td>48.40</td>
<td>455.86</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
<td>36026.9</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

N = 102
Log likelihood = -1.57
Psuedo-R² = 0.944

Table II- 5. Question: “Which group(s) or organization(s) do you feel best represents the interests of the Palestinian refugees?” (open-ended) Answer: “No organization”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>z value</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interview date</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-2.11</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Control Variables**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>z value</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp/non-camp</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>0.689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.247</td>
</tr>
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<td>Region</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>0.114</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.540</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sex</td>
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<td>0.56</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>0.585</td>
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<td>Marital status</td>
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<td>0.46</td>
<td>-2.03</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>-1.16</td>
<td>0.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet access</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.58</td>
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<td>0.218</td>
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<td>Double refugee</td>
<td>-1.62</td>
<td>0.64</td>
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<td>Gazan</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>0.87</td>
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<td>0.040</td>
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<td>Trust level</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.937</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>167.9</td>
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<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
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N = 108
Log likelihood = -60.07
Psuedo-R² = 0.156
Table II-6. Question: “Which group(s) or organization(s) do you feel best represents the interests of the Palestinian refugees?” (open-ended) Answer: “Hamas”

<table>
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<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>z value</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interview date</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.040</td>
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Control Variables

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<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>z value</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Camp/non-camp</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
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<td>-1.01</td>
<td>0.313</td>
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<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
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<td>Sex</td>
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<td>0.220</td>
</tr>
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<td>Marital status</td>
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<td>-0.40</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Education</td>
<td>1.69</td>
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<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet access</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Double refugee</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
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<td>Gazan</td>
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<td>-1.84</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust level</td>
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<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.766</td>
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</table>

Constant

-418.6  203.2  -2.06  0.039

N = 108
Log likelihood = -42.77
Pseudo-R² = 0.196

Table II-7. Question: “Do you believe the rights of the Palestinian people regarding Palestine can be best achieved through the efforts of the…?” (choices given) Answer: “Palestinian people themselves”

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>z value</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>-2.08</td>
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</table>

Control Variables

<table>
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<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>z value</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp/non-camp</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>0.526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
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<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.91</td>
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<td>Sex</td>
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<td>-0.19</td>
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<td>Marital status</td>
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<td>Education</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>0.120</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internet access</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double refugee</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazan</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust level</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.722</td>
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</table>

Constant

347.8  168.0  2.07  0.038

N = 95
Log likelihood = -55.25
Pseudo-R² = 0.155


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