ABSTRACT

Title of Document: RE-MEDIATING IDENTITIES IN THE IMAGINED HOMELAND: TAIWANESE MIGRANTS IN CHINA
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Directed By: Professor Linda Steiner
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This dissertation analyzes the identity formation and transformation of Taiwanese migrants to China in light of globalization. Combining migrant studies and media studies, it explores how the identities of Taiwanese migrants are shaped and reshaped through the ongoing interactions of mediated communication and lived experience in the place of adoption. Against the linear model of assimilation, three discourses on transnationalism argue for the pluralization and deterritorialization of identities among contemporary migrants, including continuous home-country loyalty, diasporic hybrid identities, and cosmopolitan consciousness. However, this case study also encounters historical particularities, such as the opposition of Taiwanese and Chinese identities in Taiwan, Taiwanese migration to their imagined homeland, and China’s authoritarian media system. While attending to these issues, I analyze the migration patterns of Taiwanese migrants, their use of the media in China, and the relations between mediation and identity.

Primarily based on in-depth interviews with 68 Taiwanese migrants conducted in
2008, I found that Taiwanese migrants’ spatial and upward mobility upon migration contributes to their class distinction and outsider mentality in China. Moreover, despite different settlement plans, migrants tend to see their migration as sojourning. Mental isolation from Chinese society, along with distrust of the Chinese news media, makes migrants heavily dependent on Taiwanese news media for information. They also utilize such communication tools as SMS and the Internet to forge and maintain Taiwanese-only social networks and interpersonal communications. As for entertainment media, migrants prefer foreign and Taiwanese media products to Chinese ones. Much of their transnational communication is sustained through the use of illegal means, such as satellite TV and pirated videos. Everyday experiences—lived or mediated, local or transnational—enable migrants to renegotiate their own similarities with and differences from the Chinese. A kind of Taiwanese consciousness based on pride develops among migrants. Nevertheless, as far as national identity is concerned, Taiwanese migrants remain divided, although they have also become less nationalistic and more realistic.
RE-MEDIATING IDENTITIES IN THE IMAGINED HOMELAND:
TAIWANESE MIGRANTS IN CHINA

By

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This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, who passed away in 1998.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

On May 12, 2008, a devastating earthquake struck Southern China so violently that people in Bangkok about 2,000 miles away could feel the tremors. One Taiwanese businessman close to the epicenter told a Taipei newspaper in a telephone interview that the disaster put local television out of service; but he kept updated about the news via Taiwanese satellite channels. This man was quoted as saying, “it’s strange that I have to watch Taiwan’s TV for information about the earthquake on the mainland” (Hu et al, 2008). He might not be alone. Months later, I happened to be seated next to a Taiwanese expatriate family in a Shenzhen restaurant when conducting field research. Noticing the little boy’s Taiwanese accent of Mandarin Chinese, I asked whether they came from Taiwan. The mother confirmed and added that her son learned the accent from Taiwanese TV programs. These two episodes reveal the great presence of Taiwanese in China, their transnational connections with the home country, and the intertwined relations between mediated communication and lived experiences.

The affinity between mediation and cultural identity has been well articulated in media studies. Mediated communications serve as an important avenue through which the shared meaning of culture is produced, apprehended, and utilized (Carey, 1989), the sense
of belonging to a community is represented and imagined (Anderson, 1983/2006; Hall, 1992), and collective memory is constructed (Morley & Robin, 1995; Zelizer, 1995). However, globalization brings about what Appadurai (1996) calls *irregularities* in the work of the imagination, as neither images nor viewers are confined to local or national spaces as a result of mass migration and electronic mediation.

Since the late 1980s, a great number of Taiwanese people have followed the relocation of Taiwanese businesses to China, a magnet of global and regional capital. Migration across national borders has profound cultural meanings for displaced groups as well as for their countries of entry and exit, particularly with regard to the issue of identity. The case of Taiwanese in China is further complicated by historical relevance and political rivalry across the Taiwan Strait. In this globalized world, how do the mobility of human beings and the flow of symbolic forms through the media reconfigure people’s imagery and identity? How much does such identity formation remain contingent on national boundaries and historical specificity?

**Theoretical Background**

This dissertation is about migration, communication, and identity in the wake of globalization. More specifically, it is about how mediated communication interacts with
lived experience of contemporary migrants and shapes their identities in the host country, at a time when national borders seem more porous than before. Social theorists have characterized social transformation at the turn of the 21st century as late capitalism, late modernity, postmodernity, globalization, and so forth. Globalization stands as a multidimensional, all-inclusive, yet contested concept that draws a variety of definitions. The term, as Ritzer synthesizes the literature on it, refers to “an accelerating set of processes involving flows that encompass ever-greater numbers of the world’s space and that lead to increasing integration and interconnectivity among those spaces” (2007, p. 1). Therefore, mobility and connectivity mark two key concepts in the theory of globalization. With the compression and uncoupling of space and time, social relations increasingly become disembedded from physical settings and connected to remote parts of the globe (Castells, 2000; Giddens, 1990; Harvey, 1989; Thompson, 1995; Tomlinson, 1999). Many modern subjects are constantly on the move, either by travel or through mediated communication (Bauman, 1998; Clifford, 1992). The process has altered the context of our meaning construction and loosened the associations of state, nation, culture, citizenry, people, territory, etc. Consequently, cosmopolitan consciousness and hybrid identities are increasingly replacing fixed, place-based identity (Beck, 2003; Featherstone, 1990; Hannerz, 1996; Pieterse, 2004; Rosenau, 2004; Scholte, 2005). It is against this
theoretical backdrop that discourse on transnationalism emerges, challenging so-called methodological nationalism in social science that naturalizes geographic boundaries of the nation-state (Beck, 2007; McGrew, 2007; Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2003).

Two strands of transnational studies have burgeoned since the 1990s in response to the changing reality of migration and communication. Scholarly literature documents the emergence of transnational communities that allow people to engage simultaneously in two or more worlds across national borders. First, migration research, particularly in anthropology, finds that many contemporary international migrants maintain multiple linkages with their countries of origin and form transnational social fields that connect home and host communities (Foner et al., 2000; Gold, 1997; Levitt, 2000, 2001; Levitt & Glick Schiller, 2007; Morawska, 2003; Portes, 2003; Rivera-Salgado, 2000; Glick Schiller et al., 1995; Smith, 2006). The economic reconstructing of globalization encourages a great number of people to seek investments or employments abroad. New transportation and communication technologies enable them to sustain a dense and dynamic cross-border exchange (Portes & DeWind, 2007). Instead of being uprooted subjects forced to convert their allegiance to the host countries, transnational migrants continue to hold a meaningful stake in domestic affairs at home. As a result, they live a life of bifocality—or orientations concurrently toward both here and there (Rouse, 1995;
Vertovec, 2007).

The transnational perspective on migration demonstrates the blurring boundaries between seemingly dichotomous categories, such as sending/receiving countries, sojourners/settlers, and citizens/non-citizens (Robinson, 2007). It also challenges the conventional linear assimilation thesis of immigration. Because of their embeddedness in more than one society, migrants no longer assume a master identity rooted in a single place, but manage to live with “several fluid, sometimes conflicting identities” (Levitt, 2001, p.202). However, transnational migration research is criticized for its limited applications to some distinctive immigrant minorities in the United States, whose long-distance attachments are particularistic rather than transnational (Waldigner & Fitzgerald, 2004; Waldigner, 2008).

Second, scholars of cultural studies find transnational communities in old diaspora fostered by the new conjuncture of physical mobility and symbolic communication (Appadurai, 1996; Athique, 2006; Georgiou, 2006; Hall, 1990, 1992; Morley, 2000; Ong, 1999, 2003; Ong & Nonini, 1997). While migration studies focus on new patterns of migration and migrant networks across space, recent diasporic studies place the emphasis on the role of mediated communications in forging deterritorialized identities. As Tololyan argues, diasporas have become “the exemplary communities of the transnational
moment” (2008, p.232). Since the 1990s, Anderson’s (1983/2006) concept of imagined community has inspired the analysis of the media and diasporic identities in a transnational context. The application of new communication technologies, such as DVDs, global ethnic narrow broadcasting, and the Internet, facilitates a transnational imagination for diasporic subjects. Appadurai (1996) argues that nowadays ethnicity is no longer contained in locality but can evoke translocal loyalties because of the global flows of images, news, and opinions. Given the global spread of overseas Chinese, narratives of transnational Chinese communities also prevail. A wealth of literature explores the emergent global Chinese media sphere shaped by the cross-border circulation of popular culture or news (Harding, 1993; Huat, 2006; Ip, 2006; Sinclair et al., 2000; Sun, 2006; Yang, 1997).

However, migrant transnationalism is criticized for promoting deterritorialized nationalism (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2003) and giving the impression of an ethnic, national, or religious unity (Dufoix, 2008). Diaspora studies, despite its appeal to subvert national cultural homogeneity, may instead contribute to cultural reification (Dirlik, 2004). The transnational paradigm of migration studies focuses on a particular kind of state affiliation rather than universal transnationalism (Amit-Talai, 1998; Waldinger & Fitzgerald, 2004). A true transnational, or post-national, perspective is discourse on
cosmopolitanism, which argues for the formation of identity that transcends national boundaries.

Cosmopolitan discourses emphasize the willingness to engage with cultural others and the openness to cultural distinction and diversity (Hannerze, 1996; Lash and Urry, 1994; Tomlinson, 1999). Not all migrants are cosmopolitans; likewise, not all cosmopolitans are migrants. With their transnational mobility, nevertheless, migrants have a great potential for developing cosmopolitan consciousness (Beck, 2006; Hannerz, 2006). Moreover, the transnational flows of communications enhance the sense of the world as a whole (Held et al., 1999; Robertson, 1992). Beck (2003) regards cosmopolitanization as the blurring of the foundations of nationhood through migration, telecommunications, and transport. However, some scholars see cosmopolitanism as the privilege of the global mobile elite, whose lack of state loyalty may reflect class interests and consciousness (Bauman, 1998; Calhoun, 2006; Cheah, 2006; Sklair, 1991). The flexible citizens portrayed by Ong (1999) are exemplary of capitalist transnational migrants who seek to maximize their benefits from different state regimes. For these global nomads, cosmopolitanism seems pitted against locals rather than entails the appreciation of diversity (Calhoun, 2006).
The Case of Taiwanese Migrants in China

These transnational theories and studies envision various pictures of identity formation and transformation among contemporary migrants, but generally they point out a tendency toward pluralization and hybridization of identities. This dissertation uses Taiwanese migrants in China to examine these theoretical theses. According to estimates, one million citizens of Taiwan now live in China, a remarkable number, given Taiwan’s population of 23 millions. This group is an intriguing case to examine transnational theories, not only for its great scale but also for other reasons.

First, Taiwanese in China situate in the intersections between two transnational discourses—home-host country connections and diasporic networks. China is the original homeland of the Chinese diaspora. As a large receiver of immigrants from the Chinese mainland over the past four centuries, Taiwan used to play a special role in this diaspora (Williams, 2003). The migration of Chinese descendants to China is perceived by Chinese nationals as the return to the motherland (zuguo).¹ Unlike overseas Chinese (hwaquio), Taiwanese people, along with residents of Hong Kong and Macao, are categorized by the Chinese government as compatriots (tongbao) (Johnson, 2007). Unlike the two special administrative regions of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter PRC), Taiwan has its own statehood by the name of Republic of China (hereafter ROC). China

¹
claims the island as an inalienable part of its territory, while Taiwan remains inflicted by split national identities (Chinese/Taiwanese) and has not produced a consensus about its future.

Smith (2008) categorizes two routes to nationhood: civic-territorial and ethnic-genealogical. For some Taiwanese, the civil nationhood (Taiwan) is in conflict with the ethnic nationhood (Chinese nation). Moving to the mainland thus entails a renegotiation of national identifications, diasporic identity, and home-county loyalty. That helps explain why the transfer of Taiwanese capital and businesses to the mainland stirs fears beyond the economic hollowing-out effect. There are also great concerns in Taiwan that Taiwanese migrants will become the hostage or a lobby for China to strike its political agenda (Bush, 2005; Geng & Lin, 2005).

Second, despite Taiwanese migrants’ transnational practices connecting home and host societies, their migration pattern has evolved over time and may change in accordance with external conditions. Economic migration associated with the relocation and expansion of Taiwanese businesses to China constitutes the main movement. In a sense, these people are expatriates, who maintain Taiwanese citizenship for political, economic, and social rights. However, many people are also in a situation between immigrants and temporary migrants (Deng, 2005) or a status of permanent temporality,
retaining legal status as transits for a long period of time (Tseng, 2005). Besides, although Taiwanese migrants hardly belong to the same class, they have moved from a more developed country to a developing country and thus enjoy a higher economic status in China. Therefore, clarifying and detailing their migration pattern and class relations in the host society will enrich existing discussions on transnational migration.

Third, China’s political and media environments can play a tricky role in Taiwanese migrants’ diasporic and home imaginations. Studies on the Chinese media sphere often focus on the experiences of overseas Chinese and on the area of popular culture. How Taiwanese use media in China, one of the key producers of Chinese-language cultural products, serves as a litmus test for the thesis. The centripetal forces that draw Taiwanese migrants to use Chinese media for news and entertainment include linguistic and cultural similarities, Taiwanese influences on the Chinese media culture (Chan, 1996; Gold, 1993), and China’s restrictions on information and cultural inflows. However, the government control of the Chinese media may also drive them away. Whether and how the media environments of individual countries affect migrants’ transnational communication is worth exploring.

Research Questions
Drawing on the theory of globalization, particularly discourse on transnationalism about migration and communication, this dissertation seeks to understand how Taiwanese migrants negotiate their identities through the interactions of their lived experience and mediated communication in China. More specifically, it explores the following research questions:

RQ1: How should the migration pattern(s) of Taiwanese to China be defined? What kinds of relationships do Taiwanese migrants maintain with their countries of exit and entry, respectively? How do these relationships affect their use of the media—in particular for news?

Most Taiwanese migrants retain citizenship of Taiwan and appear to be expatriates “who have chosen to live abroad for some period, and who know when they are there that they can go home when it suits them” (Hannerz, 1996, p.106). However, such a definition neglects external constraints on migrants’ choices of stay, return, or transfer. Transnational theories emphasize disjuncture between citizenship and economic/cultural memberships. Does that mean that Taiwanese migrants fit into the category of transmigrants? If so, how do they engage in political, economic, and cultural activities of the sending and receiving countries? How do their migration pattern influence their
media use behaviors?

RQ2: How do Taiwanese migrants use media for information, entertainment, or participation in China, and how do their applications of mediated communication entail the process of identity renegotiation?

Transnational media theories focus on home-host or diasporic interconnectedness enabled by transnational communication, ignoring place-based media consumption and participation. This dissertation seeks to understand how Taiwanese migrants sustain transnational media connections under China’s control over cultural and informational inflows. In addition, it also explores how migrants use Chinese mainstream media, as well as how they utilize mediated personal communication via such tools as mobile phones and the Internet to share information. Furthermore, it asks whether and in what ways these transnational and place-based mediated communications reshape migrants’ identities.

RQ3: Do Taiwanese migrants sustain, reinforce, or change their self-identifications as they encounter Chinese culture after migration? Do they develop plural or hybrid identities as transnational theories anticipate?
Transnational theories argued for the increase in plural or hybrid identities due to human mobility and cultural connectivity. However, China is simultaneous the imagined homeland and a political adversary in the Taiwanese imagery. Cultural identities in Taiwan are fractured in terms of Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity. Migration to China thus complicates the issue of identity. This dissertation will use Taiwanese migrants' self-narratives to illustrate the complex process of identity renegotiation.

I adopt qualitative methods to answer these questions. The main data is based on the author’s in-depth interviewing with Taiwanese migrants in China between October and December in 2008. The field research took place in the greater Shanghai area (including Suzhou) and the greater Shenzhen area (including Dongguan) of China. A total of 68 interviewees were recruited for this research, which inquired into their backgrounds, migration history, media use, and identity negotiation. Four administrators of Taiwanese community websites and organizations were included. Other supplemental data cover document research on government policy, statistics, and media reports from China and Taiwan. The methodology and research methods will be detailed in Chapter 2.

In this introductory chapter, I will first explain the context of my dissertation. This includes the formation of national identities in Taiwan, the background of Taiwanese
mass migration to the mainland, and the Chinese media environment. These bodies of information are crucial to the understanding of Taiwanese migrants’ media use and identity renegotiations in China.

Fractured Identities and Double Consciousness in Taiwan

The question of identity is complex, and many Taiwanese cannot easily answer it. Taiwan’s complicated history and political relations with China further perplex this issue. The ethnic Han Chinese currently constitute the majority of Taiwan’s population, due to waves of emigration from China over the past four centuries. During which, however, the island has been ruled by various regimes, including the Dutch (1624-1662), rebellious Cheng Cheng-kung’s army (1662-1683), China’s Manchu government (Qing Dynasty, 1683-1895), the Japanese (1895-1945), and the ROC (1945-present). As Jenkins (1996/2008) argues, identity involves the comparisons of both similarity and difference. The meaning of Taiwanese has been constantly made sense of in relation to the appearances of the Other, and hence subject to change over the historical trajectory.

According to Tu (1996), the term Taiwanren (Taiwanese) first appeared in Taiwan around 1920s, after the island was colonized by Japan. During that period, the elite-led
Taiwanese nationalist movement also emerged (Ching, 2001). Therefore, the concept of Taiwanese was conceived as oppositional to the colonial rulers. In the Taiwanese folk society, however, *Taiwanren* was labeled in terms of ethnicity. It conventionally referred to the majority *Hoklo* people, whose ancestors emigrated from southern Fujian province (generally called Minnan) of China. The term in daily use thus excluded other minority groups on the island—the indigenous Austronesians of various tribes and the *Hakka* people from China’s Guangdong province.

After the Communists seized China in 1949, the defeated Nationalist government (Kuomintang, hereafter KMT) took refuge in Taiwan and brought a legion of bureaucrats, soldiers, and followers. These new settlers were called Mainlanders (*weishenren*, literally people of other provinces), as opposed to native Taiwanese (*benshenren*), now including *Hoklo* and *Hakka*. Under KMT’s *internal colonialism* based on hierarchical ethnic politics, minority mainland elites dominated the center of power (Lee, 2003). The *weishenren* consciousness was shaped by the over-representation of Mainlanders in civil and military authorities, a residential separation called *juncun* (the villages of military families), and the system of *jiguan* that categorized people by provincial origins (Corcuff, 2002).

Despite the significance of ethnic politics, the current societal contradiction in
Taiwan consists in an identity crisis that results from competing projects of nation-building. Hall summarizes how national identity is constructed by the discourse of national culture based on five elements: the narrative of the nation, the timelessness of national character, the invention of tradition, a foundational myth, and a pure people. The narrative of the nation is told in “a set of stories, images, landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national symbols and rituals which stand for, or represent, the shared experiences, sorrows, and triumphs and disasters which give meaning to the nation” (1992, p.293). In Taiwan, national identities so far have been constructed by two sets of national narratives that respectively engineer the Chineseness and Taiwaneseness of its subjects. One is the history of the ROC, starting from 1912 on the mainland but tracing its root back to the five millennial civilization of the Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo, China). The other records a Taiwan (and Han)-centered history that emphasizes diverse cultural influences on the island for the past four hundred years. Ironically, China is the key reference in each national narrative.

Shih (2007) sees Taiwan’s “overwhelming obsession with China” as an unnatural consequence of the KMT’s Cold War ideology. During the last decade of the Japanese rule, Taiwan had undergone intense Japanization (kominka), designed to erase colonial identity and to cultivate imperial subjects through such campaigns as speaking Japanese
and changing to Japanese names (Ching, 2001). After taking refuge in Taiwan, the KMT émigré regime built its political legitimacy upon the claim to sole representative of China. Various institutions in Taiwan were mobilized to serve the purpose of building a Chinese nation in diaspora. As Clifford argues, diaspora culture mediates the experience of “living here and remembering/desiring another place” (1994, p. 311). The grand Chinese narrative constructed mainland China as the eternal homeland. The concept of Huaxia was used to create a nationalist consciousness that linked to sacred origins and the myth of a continuous history from Xia Dynasty of China (Chun, 1994). People on the island, including the aborigines, were honored as “Heirs of the Dragon,” or true Chinese offspring destined to return (Jacobs, 2005). Mandarin Chinese was promoted as the national language (guoyu), while local Taiwanese dialects, spoken by the majority of people, were restrained from use (Chen, 1998; Rawnsley, 2003). In 1966, in reaction to the Cultural Revolution in mainland China, the Cultural Renaissance Movements were launched to inculcate traditional Chinese culture and Confucian teachings through myriad sectors of the culture industry (Chun, ibid). Taiwan became tantamount to Free China bestowed upon the mission of “restoring China.” The mass media—controlled and disciplined by the triple alliance of party organs, state machinery, and military apparatuses (Lee, 2003)—became a carrier of this China-centered dominant ideology.
The state-engineered Chinese nationalism in Taiwan peaked in the early 1970s, when the sovereignty controversy with Japan over the Senkaku Islands took place and Taiwan lost its seat in the United Nations to the PRC (Hsiau, 2005). However, consecutive diplomatic setbacks thereafter had endangered the ROC legitimacy. Meanwhile, societal discontents with the deprivation of constitutional rights accumulated to the extent that political opposition movements began to emerge. From the late 1970s on, people voiced their aspiration for democracy and free speech through the use of various alternative media, such as political magazines, underground radio, and illegal cable television (Feng, 1995; Ke, 2000; Kuan & Liu, 2000; Lee, 1993, 2003; Rawnsley, 2004). Accompanying the appeal for democracy was the discourse on Taiwanese consciousness and the campaign for Taiwan independence.

As mentioned earlier, Taiwanese self-consciousness emerged from the Japanese colonialism. Chinese nationalism was once the impetus for colonial emancipation, but later became the source of resentment under the Nationalist rule (Ching, 2001). Some scholars regard the Kaohsiung Incident (1979) as the watershed that Taiwanese nationalism came to the fore in democratic movements (Chen, 2004; Hsu 2001; Wu, 2000). After the KMT government cracked down on this Human Rights Day rally, some political activists turned to advocate the principle of majority (native Taiwanese) rule and
the idea of self-rule. Exile historian Shih Min stated in an opposition magazine that
Taiwanese nationalism would be the “motor of a democratic and social revolution” (1980, p.6). The notion that “Taiwan’s future should be determined by all Taiwanese residents” was formally declared by opposition leaders in 1982 and then written into the platform of the newly-established Democratic Progressive Party (hereafter DPP) in 1986 (Liu, 2001). Therefore, the fight for democracy in Taiwan was laced with “a defensive nativism” that raised the consciousness of being Taiwanese (Buruma, 1996). The so-called Taiwanization (bentuhwa) movement launched a comprehensive counter-narrative against Chinese nationalism (Jacobs, 2005). Once-suppressed Taiwanese folklores, religions, dialects, and traditions were rediscovered. Taiwan studies won legitimacy in academia. The heritage of aboriginal cultures and Japanese legacy were incorporated to the construction of an exclusive Taiwanese culture (Brown, 2004).

Since the late 1980s, democratization led to the reorganization of political power, evidenced in the selection of Lee Teng-hui (KMT, 1996) and Chen Shui-bian (DPP, 2000/2004), both native Taiwanese, as the first democratically elected ROC Presidents. During their presidencies, Taiwanization was institutionalized and de-Sinicization gained momentum. One prominent example was the introduction of Understanding Taiwan (Renshi Taiwan) textbooks to schools. The books characterized Taiwan history as
multiculturalism, internationalism, trade, and “a courageous and enterprising people.”

This people was defined by President Lee as New Taiwanese, composed of four ethnic
groups—Hoklo, Hakka, Mainlanders, and the aboriginal. He further called on all
Taiwanese to participate in “the destiny of their nation” (Lee, 1995).

The discourse on people’s common fate under Taiwan sovereignty was, ironically,
amplified by China’s military threats and diplomatic containment. Taiwanese people
desired international recognition at a time when globalization intensified their
interactions with the outside world (Fang & Sun, 1999; Wang, 2000). China as the PRC
hence symbolized a menacing external power and embodied the Other in the construction
of new Taiwanese subjectivity. However, the shift in political power and historical
narrative also made Mainlanders feel unwelcome, marginalized, and threatened in Taiwan.
They lost first the cause for restoring China and then the anchor of being at home. Ethnic
division, entangled with unsolved questions about national identity, concerns Taiwan’s
democracy (Lee, 2003).

National identity in Taiwan is now assessed by a multiple-choice question. Opinion
polls constantly ask people “who they are” in terms of Taiwanese, Chinese, or both.
According to a longitudinal survey (Election Study Center, NCCU, 2009), Taiwanese
identity rose from 17.3% in 1992 to 50.8% in 2008, while Chinese identity dropped from
26.2% to 4.7% over the same period. Meanwhile, people who identified themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese continued to account for 40-50% of the sample. The ascendance of Taiwanese identity is not equal to the surge in Taiwanese nationalism nonetheless. First, identity is a more complicated issue than the simplified question. The same choices in the survey may mean different things to the respondents. *Taiwanese* can imply ethnic, geographical, or national identity, and *Chinese* connotes cultural or national meanings (Wu, 2008). Second, dual identity remains significant over the past two decades, indicating that Taiwanese identity did not replace Chinese identity (Chu, 2004).

Third, a hybrid Taiwanese identity may have emerged from common experience after 1949. Lo (2002) argues that Taiwan have formed a Taiwan-centered, hybrid nationhood while sustaining “double homeland complex.” Other studies (Rigger, 2006) confirm that younger Taiwanese, who reached adulthood during and after Taiwan’s democratization, are more pragmatic and more likely to discard the Taiwan/China dualism. Furthermore, despite the fact that identity in Taiwan is associated with ethnicity—that is, Mainlanders lean to Chinese identity and native Taiwanese tend to have Taiwanese identity—this connection has become less salient in recent years (Dittmer, 2005).

The transformation of national narrative and national consciousness in Taiwan
demonstrates the fluid, relational, and constructed characteristics of identity (Kuo, 2002). Moreover, the “China factor” persists in the Taiwanese quest for identity. As more and more Taiwanese people seek to make fortunes on the mainland, the interactions between China and Taiwan have intensified. For China-bound expatriates, China no longer exists in imagination but becomes an everyday reality.

Going Westward to the “Big Land”

Due to the Cold War antagonism, the PRC and the ROC closed borders against each other for almost four decades. Taiwanese people were only allowed to visit China after 1987. Since then, cross-Taiwan Strait relations had undergone the dual process of economic convergence and political divergence. During the tenures of President Lee and Chen (1988-2008), Taiwan pursued international recognition of its sovereignty via so-called pragmatic diplomacy. The official dialogue between the two sides began in 1992 but was soon interrupted upon Lee’s visit to the United States in 1995, to which China responded by testing missiles in the vicinity of Taiwan. Lee later defined the status between Taiwan and China as “special state-to-state relationship” and Chen further proposed the “one country on each side” formula. Cross-strait relations froze when China
adopted Anti-secession Law in 2005 that threatened with the use of military measures against the island. At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP) started unofficial forums with the KMT, then the opposition party. Since President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT took office in May, 2008, both sides have signaled rapprochement, starting direct flights across the Strait and beginning to negotiate bilateral pacts, including a free-trade agreement.

Regardless of Taiwan’s regulations on China-bound investment, economic integration between China and Taiwan has only intensified at a rapid pace. The “westward” (xijin, denoting China-bound) investment rush is parallel to the territorial dispersion of manufacturing (Sassen, 1991) and the growth of offshore production (Sklair, 1991) elsewhere as a result of the reorganization of global economic activities. By and large, Taiwanese businesses relocate or expand to China in order to accommodate to new transnational production networks, prominently in footwear and IT industries (Cheng, 1999; Hsing, 1998; Leng, 2002, 2004; Naughton, 2004). Consequently, they usually move collectively as an industrial cluster composed of the vertical and horizontal production chains (Wu 2001; Zhang, 2007). That greatly amplifies Taiwanese investment to China.

Between 1991 and 2008, Taiwan approved 37,181 investment projects to China,
which added up to $75 billions, or 57.13% of the outward investment amount (Mainland Affairs Council, 2009b). The share would be much higher if indirect investment via Hong Kong and some tax havens, like the British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands, were counted. In fact, Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation, a private intermediary body in charge of cross-Strait matters, estimated that Taiwanese businesses had invested 77,000 projects and over $150 billions in China (SEF, 2009). The gigantic gaps between official statistics and unofficial estimates only highlight the Taiwan state’s incapability to constrain business interests. In addition to investment, China also replaced the United States as Taiwan’s largest trade partner, accounting for 28.94% of Taiwan’s export in 2008 (Mainland Affairs Council, 2009d). These numbers show that Taiwan has increasingly relied on China for its economic prosperity.

Taiwan’s increasing economic dependence on China is evidenced not only by investment amount but also by industrial change. Over the past two decades, Taiwanese manufacturing in China has shifted from labor-intensive enterprises (1987-1992) to capital-intensive heavy industries (1993-1997), and finally to leading high-tech companies (1998-present) (Geng, 2006). By 2005, 79.5% of the information hardware made by Taiwanese firms had been produced on the mainland; meanwhile, over 60% of the companies listed in Taiwan’s stock market had a stake in China (Kao & Tsai, 2007).
Besides, service, retail, and agriculture sectors also have increased their presence on the mainland. Taiwanese investment to China is concentrated in Jiangsu province (33.26%), Guangdong province (24.01%), and Shanghai (14.86%), but has extended to Fujian, Zhejiang, and other parts of the mainland (Mainland Affairs Council, 2009b).

The Taiwanese mass migration to China is closely associated with those waves of investment. Most of the early migrants (1980s-1990s) were male owners and expatriate managers of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This pattern has changed since the late 1990s, when more professionals, females, family members, and others join the migratory crowd, particularly to the great Shanghai area. This recent China fever is facilitated by China’s preferential terms of entering, residing, working, and studying for Taiwanese (Tseng, 2008). It is manifested in the proliferation of publications in Taiwan about Shanghai—jobs, investments, travel, literature, and so on (Hsu, 2002; Wang, 2009). Among them, business magazines are big promoters of the Shanghai fever. In 2001, Business Weekly selected “leaving for Shanghai” as product of the year, even though it was not literally a product. Common Wealth (August, 2001) published a special issue on “A Tale of Two Cities,” comparing various index of Shanghai and Taipei. “Shanghai is hot, and Taipei is cold,” a Newide (July, 2007) article titled. Bestsellers in Taiwan represent the Shanghai-Taipei connection in terms of the imagination of global urban
networks (Huang, 2007). Going to Shanghai is thus a pursuit not only for economic opportunities but also for a cosmopolitan lifestyle.

Under the generic term *taishang* (Taiwanese businessmen), the Taiwanese population in China has grown heterogeneous. Business owners and expatriates assigned to China remain the prime components of this population. Following these lead migrants are their family members. Some Taiwanese are employed by foreign and, recently, Chinese companies. Other groups such as students, teachers, entertainers, and artists are increasingly present on the mainland. A small portion of China-born Mainlanders have also returned to their roots. However, several factors contribute to the difficulty in counting the Taiwanese population in China. First, no clear criteria are suitable to define them. Aside from people residing in China on the daily basis, the term *taishang* actually includes business visitors who shuttle back and forth across the Taiwan Strait. The boundaries between migrants and non-migrants are also obscured by the phenomena of circular migration (Tseng, 2008) and cross-border life experiences (Deng, 2005). In 2008, about 4.3 million Taiwanese traveled to China (Mainland Affairs Council, 2009a), revealing the busy traffic across the Strait.

Second, Taiwan allows dual citizenship, but those seeking PRC citizenship will have their ROC citizenship revoked. Most Taiwanese migrants prefer maintaining Taiwanese
citizenship and hold *Taiwanese Compatriot Passes* (Pass for Taiwanese Residents Traveling to the Mainland, *taibaozheng*), travel documents designed for Taiwanese by China, when entering the mainland. Since the pass holders also include tourists, they do not represent the migrant population. Third, China requires Taiwanese to register temporary residency with Chinese authorities for their stays. Many Taiwanese fail to do so, making it difficult to identify their number, much less demographic characteristics (Hu, 2006).

Despite the lack of statistics, the enormous presence of Taiwanese in China is greatly felt in Taiwan. According to the 2005 Taiwan Social Change Survey, 7.3% of the Taiwanese had migrated at some point to the mainland for work, 9.4% had close family members working in China, and 61.1% knew someone of Taiwanese nationals living in China, Hong Kong, or Macao (Chang & Fu, 2006). Consequently, economic integration across the Taiwan Strait has altered Taiwan’s imagination of China and aroused deep anxiety in the Taiwanese psyche. The *China factor* now presents in the form of the economic reality more than the yearned homeland or a military threat.

Still, China remains a source of attraction and an object of repulsion (Bush, 2005). The theme of China simultaneously as economic gold mine and a risky country recurred in business magazines. On one hand, China is represented as the pivotal business
battleground for Taiwan to preempt its global position and avoid being marginalized. Distancing Taiwan from China is equal to closing the gateway to the world. On the other hand, the mainland (dalu, the big land) is described as an immense frontier full of unknown risks. Taiwanese businesspeople and expatriates are hence portrayed as pioneers, economic nomads, and modern representatives of the great conquer Genghis Khan, a ruler of the Mongol Empire. Contrary to the image of brave explorers is the accusation about self-interested merchants who fawn on China or even betray Taiwan. Scholars (Dittmer, 2005; Kahler & Kastner, 2006) predict that Taiwan’s politics will turn to China’s favor if this Taiwanese constituency in China continues to grow. Therefore, Taiwanese migrants symbolize Taiwan’s love-hate affair with China and uncomfortable intersections with globalization.

Chinese Media System: Reforms within the Party Line

To understand how Taiwanese use media in China requires knowing the media environment in which they situated. In the past, the Chinese party-state monopolized all media avenues, including newspapers, magazines, books, radio and television stations, film productions, and so on. The media, as the instrument of ideological control and mass
mobilization, enjoyed government subsidies and other economic privileges for survival.

Since the open door policy of economic reforms after 1978, China’s media has undergone gradual transformation. Current Chinese media system is characterized by state-market duality, anti-foreignness, and Internet activism.

State-market Duality

Media marketization is one consequence of China’s shift to “socialist market economy.” The Chinese government allowed media to accept advertising after 1979 and reduced or terminated subsidies since the late 1980s. Around the turn of the century, “bigger and stronger” conglomerates were formed to preempt foreign competition upon China’s entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Lee, He & Huang, 2006). The reliance on advertising to generate revenues has led to rapid commercialization of the Chinese media, which now assume a dual role—being commodities in the market as well as ideological apparatuses of the state (Ma, 2000; Zhang et al., 2006). A dual-track system is developed to accomplish these twin goals. In the press conglomerates, newspapers are divided into the main party organs that serve the state and mass-appeal subsidiaries that cater to the market, such as evening tabloids, weekend editions, and metropolitan dailies. In the broadcast groups, specialty channels focusing on business,
entertainment, and lifestyle thrive (Y. Zhao, 2008). All in all, these market-oriented media outlets are driven towards tabloidization, feeding people with apolitical, sensational, and light entertainment contents.

Parallel to the trend toward commercialization is the persistent state control of the media via proliferating party-state agencies and multiplying laws and regulations. The CCP’s Propaganda Department has the responsibility of setting propaganda guidelines and a nationwide network of bureaus to monitor every media outlet. Multilayered and diverse government agencies are established and charged with the regulations of media contents and structures. For example, the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) and the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) maintain annual reviews of the licenses for the press, broadcast, and film and television program production. They have permanent staff at the local and central levels for systematically censoring newspapers and television programming (Y. Zhao, 2008). In 2004 alone, the SARFT promulgated more than 20 regulations on the broadcasting industry (Zhang, 2006). The Ministry of Information Industry (MII) has the authority to review, approve, and grant operation license to Internet service providers. Internet censorship involves twelve state-party agencies (J. Zhao, 2008). Between 1994 and 2005, twenty rules and regulations that covered Internet censorship, operations, and users took
effect (Zheng, 2007). Despite sporadic tolerances of media revolts, such as the aftermath of the SARS crisis in 2003, the government has maintained a tight grip on the media of all sorts. To what extent have market forces undermined the omnipotent power of the Chinese regime is debatable.

According to some scholars, the Chinese state has unleashed the power of the market to articulate with neoliberal globalization, while reinforcing coercive and discursive disciplinary powers. This has been achieved by the use of a more sophisticated means of censorship, propaganda, and media management (Y. Zhao, 2008). The second view is that, to cope with commercial competition, China had lessened totalitarian control and adopted a less repressive approach toward media. Chinese authorities use more legal and administrative means than coercive apparatuses to entertain, educate, and inform the audience (Ma, 2000). Official organs have been transformed from propaganda instruments into “Party Publicity Inc.” that delivers softened publicity messages to the public (Lee, 2001a; Lee, He & Huang, 2006). Accordingly, the Chinese media has moved from having no freedom to having some freedom in non-political arenas (Lee, 2001b).

The third perspective holds that the change of the media has empowered other players—local party cadres and bureaucratic officials, media entrepreneurs and managers, as well as private and foreign investors—to negotiate with central policy makers
(Akhavan-Majid, 2004; Huang, 2007a). The market socialism model has been replaced by a new “state-controlled capitalist corporation model,” under which the Chinese state becomes the majority shareholder of the media (Huang, 2007b). Despite these different evaluations of political control on the media, the consensus holds that the Chinese state has transformed itself and perfected its propaganda machine in accordance with changing media and social environments.

*Anti-foreignness*

The sentiment of anti-foreignness in China is rooted in the “one hundred years of shame and humiliation” by foreign invasions (Yahuda, 2000). Political discourse on the idea of a China constantly subjected to external threats has been central to the building of a modern Chinese state (Renwick & Cao, 2003). The anti-foreigner and anti-Western emotions have significant implications for the Chinese media. First, the state-controlled media utilize such emotions to mobilize the general public. After the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989, the CCP’s legitimacy was jeopardized amidst international sanctions and the collapse of communism in Russia and East Europe. Guided by a “patriotic education campaign,” the Chinese media conformed to the party line by shaping news frames that recalled previous imperialism and stirred nationalism against American
hegemony (Huang & Lee, 2003). This state-led, media-manufactured nationalism combines critique of external threats with narratives of self-pride. Later on, the nationalist discourse became increasingly prevalent in cyberspace, where the Internet-savvy “angry young” devoted their passions to hate-mongering (McCurry & Watts, 2004).

Second, anti-foreignness legitimizes cultural protectionism. In Mao’s China, foreign television programs not originating from socialist nations were prohibited. After economic reform, imported programs are permitted to broadcast on Chinese television, provided that they obtain political clearance from the SARFT (Chan, 1996). Commercial distribution of foreign films is solely controlled by the Chinese Film Corporation and subject to quota restrictions (Wang & Zhu, 2004). Foreign television channels are basically held at bay. The government approves a handful of foreign channels to be broadcast in China via satellite on the yearly basis, but limits access to upscale hotels and residential compounds reserved for foreigners (see Appendix C for the list in 2008). All channels must be encrypted and transmitted by China International Television Corporation—a subsidiary of CCTV. Only residents in partial areas of Guangdong have the privilege to enjoy foreign channels through cable services, which serves as an experiment and a showcase of openness. Since the approved landing of the Phoenix Chinese Channel in 2001, nine foreign channels have been available in cable in this
region. Besides MTV of Viacom, these foreign channels are either based in Hong Kong or Macau and usually involve Chinese capital. However, this means Taiwanese migrants in the Shenzhen-Dongguan area of Guangdong have more choices in terms of foreign channels than their counterparts in the great Shanghai area.

In addition to the restrictions on foreign broadcasts, foreigners are prohibited from setting up press and publication entities in China. The import of overseas audiovisual products and the sale of foreign newspapers and magazines are monopolized by state-run China National Publications Import & Export Corporation (CNPIEC), an affiliation of the GAPP. Non-news foreign magazines, such as Elle and Cosmopolitan, are allowed to partner with local companies to publish Chinese versions. The Internet regulations require that the flow of information into China be made through state-run public communication networks, which serves as a filter (McGreary, 2001). Foreign news reports are forbidden from directly posting on any Chinese websites, except for those distributed through Xinhwa, the state-owned news agency. Any Internet services with foreign capital are prohibited from providing news on the Internet (J. Zhao, 2008). Overseas websites deemed threatening are blocked from access by China’s cyberspace censorship system, dubbed Great Firewall, particularly during politically sensitive periods, such as days around the memorial of the Tiananmen Incident. A large force of
Internet police—alleged about 40,000—is recruited to monitor users’ online activities (Coonan, 2005).

Despite China’s promotion of cultural protectionism, this does not shield the country from outside influences. In fact, it is the strict control over foreign media that engenders widespread illegal media practices in China. Evidence shows that foreign media products have made inroads to China through satellite transmission, signal spillover, piracy, and so forth (Chan, 1996). For example, the SARFT repeatedly issues warnings on cable providers’ broadcast of foreign channels and announces crackdowns on satellite dishes. These actions underscore the fact that foreign television programs are not as difficult to access as imagined.

A more noticeable phenomenon is commercial piracy, which is justified by the Chinese as an expression of anti-imperialism (Renwick and Cao, 2003) and receives more lenient treatments by the government. The rampant networks of pirated CDs, VCDs, and DVDs provide newly-released albums, films, TV episodes from the U.S., Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and beyond at a cheap price. Recently, popular video-sharing websites also supply a variety of free and up-to-date foreign media products. As of 2008, China was estimated to have 400 video-broadcasting websites—mostly with foreign venture capital funds—and 180 million regular viewers (China Telecommunications
Newswire, 2009; Ng, 2008). The two leading video-sharing websites—Youku.com and Tudou.com—respectively attracted more than 100 million video views a day (Madden, 2008). The huge market of free on-demand entertainment has become a new haven of media piracy.

*Internet Activism*

Despite continuous political control over the media in China, popular voices have been increasingly represented in traditional media as well as the fast-growing cyberspace. The Internet opens a new space for information circulation and collective actions. More importantly, providing certain conduits for public opinions seems tacitly approved by the central leadership, as Chinese society is currently torn with many discontents, such as uneven distribution of wealth, dislocation, corruption, and crime. Over time, the Chinese media have developed unique ways of carrying the voices of the people that have been described as “liberalization without democratization” (Yang, 2009; Zheng, 2007). A breed of Chinese investigative journalism has emerged to expose business wrongdoing, government corruption, social injustice, and sensational crime stories (Lee, 2001b; Tong & Sparks, 2009; Zeng, 2006). The trend was initiated by the CCTV’s current affairs show, *Focal Interviews (Jaodian fantan)*, and energized by the more liberal newspaper,
Southern Weekly. Investigative journalism thrived in a more tolerant political atmosphere in the 1990s but has showed sign of decline into the new century, due to various political and economic pressures. However, the advent of the Internet, as important sources of news leads, offer new opportunities for this journalistic practice (Tong & Sparks, 2009).

Since the Internet opened to the public in 1995, China’s cyber population has grown exponentially. By the end of 2008, the number of Internet users reached 298 million, the world’s No.1 (CINIC, 2009). The thriving Bulletin Board Services (BBSs), online chat rooms, and blogs provide platforms not only for alternative information but also for a new form of association. Under intense censorship and regulations, the sophisticated Chinese netizens have learned to use SMS (Short Message System), tricky passwords, and overseas servers to engage in “guerrilla warfare” against state control (Zheng, 2007). They also developed a creative Internet culture that is full of humor, play, and irreverence. The various forms of online parodies manifest a cultural revolution in which “the ordinary people assume an unprecedented role as agent of change” (Yang, 2009, p.213).

Like Chinese citizens, Taiwanese migrants’ choices of media are greatly influenced by these aforementioned transformations, including new forms of state control and censorship, the proliferations of commercial media outlets, nationalism represented by the news media and voiced on the Internet, restrictions on foreign news and cultural
inflows, prevalent piracy, illegal use of the media, Chinese investigative journalism, and the popularity of interpersonal communication via cell phones and computers. In particular, the absence of ethnic media and the restrictions on the inflows of news from Taiwan, due to China’s regulations, should have some impacts on their use of the media.

Organization of the Dissertation

The movements of Taiwanese capital, businesses, people, and cultural influences to China manifest the increase in transnational flows. Taiwanese investment to China has multiplied under the constraints by the Taiwan state. Growths of Taiwanese businesses and expatriates on the mainland largely result from the reorganization of global capital. Taiwanese migrants forge cross-border life experiences through frequent travel across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwanese popular culture is well received in China, as proof of intense cultural linkages among Chinese-speaking communities. However, these global forces also meet specific conditions in localities, particularly in regard to identity. In the case of Taiwanese in China, such local contexts—fractured national identities in Taiwan, migration to a country that is the source of divided identities, and the regimented media environment in China—greatly condition their identity negotiations. The following
chapters will unfold the tensions between global and local forces, and between transnationalism and nationalism.

Chapter 2 includes the sections of literature review and methodology. First, it reviews the literature on globalization theory, particularly focusing on transnationalism. This issue is researched in the areas of transnational immigrant studies, diaspora studies, and cosmopolitan theory. Discourses on the Chinese transnational community, such as cultural China, Greater China, and pop culture China, are surveyed. This chapter also examines studies on identity regarding migrants of Chinese descent from various countries to China, including Taiwan. Second, this chapter summarizes a method of audience research that derives from Stuart Hall’s “encoding/decoding model” of communication but has since evolved to emphasize the social context in which media experiences are shaped. I will detail two qualitative methods used in this study, including in-depth interviewing and document review, and how I apply them to examine the relations between migration, communication, and identity.

Chapter 3 explores Taiwanese migrants’ motivations for migration. In addition, I will provide background information about migrants’ everyday life in China, including the arrangements of residence, children’s education, patterns of consumption, and social networks. Of interest is how migrants’ dual mobility—spatial mobility and upward
mobility—shape their work, life, and lifestyle in China. I also stress how they develop a sojourning mentality as a result of a disjuncture between their career and life, even though their sojourns may seem permanent.

Chapter 4 analyzes Taiwanese migrants’ pattern of media consumption. I will explain why Chinese mainstream media have played a relatively insignificant role in their everyday practices. Instead, migrants generally rely on Taiwanese media for news, while consuming cultural products from diverse sources, including the global, the regional, the diasporic, and the local.

Chapter 5 examines Taiwanese migrants’ reception of Chinese news about three events that occurred in 2008—the Sichuan earthquake, the Beijing Olympics, and the controversy regarding the tainted-milk products made in China. I will show how news reception entails the receivers’ meaning construction in ways that accommodate their cultural schemata and lived experiences. With some exceptions, migrants confirm their Taiwanese identity through a negotiating process but they also develop a sense of in-betweenness.

Chapter 6 explores Taiwanese migrants’ social groupings and information exchange, particularly enhanced by mediated interpersonal communication. I will use two migrant community websites—*Taima Club* and *Taike Life*—and three social groupings as
instances. Specifically, I focus on how trust relationships are realized by migrants’ motto of mutual help.

Chapter 7 analyzes Taiwanese migrants’ two-layered identity transformation in China through the examination of their own narratives. On the one hand, the perceived cultural differences between Taiwanese and Chinese reinforce their Taiwanese consciousness. On the other hand, migrants’ sense of identity involves their interpretations of cross-Strait politics, and thus remains fractured. Nevertheless, there is a trend toward convergence, as both Chinese and Taiwanese nationalisms are weakened after migration.

Finally, in the conclusion, I will reflect on the applications and limitations of transnational theories to this research. Transnational migration and communication allow migrants to sustain their attachment to their country of origin and to develop deterritorialized identities. However, identity is shaped and reshaped by an amalgam of conditions, and such transnational practice is only one source of identity. Cultural identity based on the boundaries of the nation state remains predominant.

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1 Except for some widely accepted usages, this dissertation uses the Hanyu Pinyin Romanization system for standard Mandarin Chinese. Additional, the pseudonyms assigned to the interviewees are based on Wade-Giles Romanization conventionally used in Taiwan.

2 The KMT followers arrived in Taiwan proximately between 1945 and 1955, with estimated numbers of 908,500 to over 2 millions. As of 1989, the Hoklo people accounted
for 73.3% of the Taiwan population, *Hakka* for 12%, Mainlanders for 13%, and the Austronesians 1.7% (Corcuff, 2002).

3 President Lee Teng-hui set the guideline of “No Haste, Be Patient” (*jeji yongren*) that constrained mainland-bound investment in terms of industries and amount. His successor, Chen Shui-bian, adopted the so-called “Positive Openness with Effective Management” (*jijikaifang youxiaoguanli*) policy, slightly loosening investment to China.

4 Newspaper conglomerate in China began with the Guangzhou Daily Group in 1996. In 2003, 677 papers were ordered to stop publishing in the name of “press reform” (Zhang, 2006). These moves were seen by some scholars as China’s attempt to control chaotic competition and limit the proliferation of minor papers that defied state orders (Lee, He & Huang, 2006; Ma, 2000). As for the broadcasting industry, the mandate mergers were written into the 10th Five-Year Plan for the National Economy and Social Development (2001-2005). The reorganizations of television stations at national and provincial took places around 2000-2001 (Liu, 2004).

5 According to Measures for the Administration of the Landing of Overseas Satellite Television Channels issued by the SARFT in June 2004 (SARFT Order No. 22), foreign satellite television channels may broadcast to stipulated areas such as, three-star hotels (or above) catering to foreign guests, residential use by expatriates, and within other specially designated locations.

6 The nine foreign channels available in Guangdong include not only satellite channels but also networks. These nine channels are Hong Kong-based Phoenix Chinese Channel, CETV, Xing Kong (STAR Chinese Channel China), TVB Jade Channel, TVB Pearl Channel, ATV, ATV World, Macau-based MASTV, and MTV (China). Among them, MTV (China), permitted to broadcast in Guangdong since 2003, is the only channel operated by real foreign companies. Xing Kong is a joint venture of News Corporation’s STAR TV and Phoenix Chinese Channel.
Chapter 2: Mediated Communication and Migrant Identities

This dissertation draws on theories of cultural globalization and cultural reception to articulate the relation between mediated communication and migrant identity. In this chapter, I review theoretical perspectives on communication, culture, and identity, as well as their conceptual transformation in light of globalization. Then I outline three major arguments of transnationalism regarding migrant identities: home-country allegiance, diasporic hybrid identities, and cosmopolitan consciousness. Based on transnational theories, I categorize three discourses on Chinese transnationalism that are associated with return migrants of Chinese descent. The following section deals with cultural reception research that has increasingly emphasized social context. Finally, I explain how this dissertation project was conducted.

Communication, Identity, and Globalization

Identity is the human capacity to know who’s who, and is thus a matter of meaning (Jenkins 2008). Making sense of self is a process of being and becoming, in accordance with the criteria of similarity and difference. Our sense of belong to, and the boundary of,
a community depends on “the capacity of symbols to encompass and condense a range of, not necessarily harmonious or congruent, meanings” (ibid, p.136). Therefore, communication, understood as “the construction, apprehension, and utilization of symbolic forms” (Carey, 1989), plays a significant role in the formation and transformation of identity. The most powerful and seemingly natural identity is cultural identity. Cultural identities, as Hall defines in the plural form, are “aspects of our identities which arise from our ‘belonging’ to distinctive ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious and above all, national cultures” (1992, p.274).

Both Hall and Carey emphasize the importance of representation in producing shared belief and cementing cultural unity. Carey highlights the crucial importance of communication, not as information dissemination, but as “the sacred ceremony that draws persons together in fellowship and commonality” (1989, p.18). Accordingly, “it is through communication, through the intergraded relations of symbols and social structure, that societies, or at least those with which we are most familiar, are created, maintained, and transformed” (ibid, p.110). In Carey’s view, communication produces not only citizens who assume a relation in space to their contemporaries, but also patriots who assume a relation in time to the tradition of national culture. Similarly, Hall argues that “national identities are not things we are born with, but are formed and transformed
within and in relation to representation” (1992, p. 292). For Hall, the formation of a nation requires the production of a system of cultural representation so that its citizens are able to “participate in the idea of the nation as represented in its national culture” (ibid, p. 292).

Smith (2000) argues that, although people continue to have multiple identities, national identity has become a preponderant one, with the coincidence of the nation, the nation-state, and nationalism. Nationalism, in his view, is not primordial or perennial; nor does it reflect merely a modern ideology. Scholars like Habsbawn (1983) and Anderson (1983/2006) have attributed the rise of nationalism to the use of symbolic forms—invented tradition or the print media. Recently, mediated mass communications are considered a significant factor to consolidate the nation as a sovereign territory and the people as a collectivity. Collective memory, viewed as the reconstruction of the past for the present (Halbwachs, 1992), is increasingly restored and mediated by the mass media (Zelizer, 1995). National cinema and television helps shape the imagination of a nation (Morley & Robins, 1995). However, Smith (1991) contends that the concept of the nation is not completely constructed; instead, it blends two sets of dimensions: civic and territorial on one hand, and ethnic and genealogical on the other. His approach of “historical ethno-symbolism” recognizes both the importance of historical clusters and
symbols and the role of ethnicities in the formation of nations.

The advent of globalization, however, has challenged the isomorphism between people, culture, sovereignty, and citizenry (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2003). Despite the fact that the nation state arrived in tandem with modernity, the development of modernity may diminish the state power and national identity as the overriding identity. Giddens argues that “modernity is inherently globalizing” (1990, p. 63). Modernity is premised upon time-space distanciation, under which time and space are organized so as to connect presence and absence. This distanciation results in disembedding, or lifting social relations out of local contexts and stretching social systems across indefinite spans of time-space. From a Marxist perspective, Harvey argues that, under the pressure of capital accumulation, modernity entails time-space compression, or the shrinking of space and time. This process involves the conquest of space, the tearing down of all spatial barriers, and the ultimate “annihilation of space through time” (1989, p. 205). In Harvey’s view, flexible accumulation since the 1970s, accompanied with the facility of transportation and communication, results in our current overwhelming sense of compression. For Thompson, the development of communication media has been an integral part of modernity. In particular, the advent of telecommunication has fostered “the uncoupling of space and time” and “despatialized simultaneity” (1995, p.32).
The compressed and distantiated time-space relation of the late twentieth century is broadly analyzed as globalization, chiefly characterized by mobility and interconnectivity. Flows of capital, people, goods, images, information, etc. across national borders and the increase in global interconnectedness have dramatically transformed not only organizations of social life but also human consciousness. First, mobility is a crucial concept of cultural globalization, albeit not understood merely in a physical sense. Bauman (1998) argues that in the globalized world, most people are on the move—by changing places, switching TV channels, or even being consumers. Therefore, contemporary subjects are all *travelers or nomads*, including those who are physically immobile. Lash and Urry also use the metaphor of *tourists* to capture the mobility of modern societies, in which people are either literally mobile or experience “simulated mobility” through the fluid signs and images (1994, p.259). Mobility—of human beings, trade, information, images, and so fort—transforms the meaning of culture, or the way we view culture. For example, Pieterse (2004) argues that we should treat culture as translocal, fluid, and outward looking rather than territorial, static, and inward looking. This perspective on culture, in her view, is particularly pertinent in this period of accelerated globalization and cultural mixing. In a similar vein, Clifford suggests that we see culture, along with tradition and identity, in terms of *travel*—“practices of crossing
and interaction that troubled the localism of many common assumptions about culture” (1997, p.3). Because of the restless movements of people and things, culture should be studied in circuits, not in a single place.

Second, in addition to mobility, global interconnectivity also destabilizes the territorial concept of culture and community by altering our sense of proximity and immediacy. In particular, electronic mediation—through interpersonal or mass communication—greatly enhances such interconnectivity. In the nascent stage of television, McLuhan (1964) foretold how this medium would act as a technological simulation of human consciousness. Based on McLuhan’s thinking, Meyrowitz argues that electronic media break down the distinctions between “here and there, live and mediated, and personal and public” (1985, p.309) to the extent that physical presence is no longer significant and mediated experience can become social reality. Giddens also likens mediated experience to an “intrusion of distant events into everyday consciousness.” It produces feelings of reality inversion, as “the real object and event, when encountered, seem to have a less concrete existence than their media representation” (1991, p.27).

Tomlinson (1999) argues that intimacy delivered by mediated communication is a different order from the face-to-face experience of physical proximity within a locality.
However, the use of electronic media and communication technologies deterritorializes our cultural and existential connections to a larger world—a process called “telemediatization of culture” (Tomlinson, 2007, p. 361). Although our sense of culture is felt within particular localities, the geographical location of a culture is eroding. For Hannerz, the increasing global interconnectedness urges us to think of culture as “a pool of culture” (1996, p.49) and discard the assumption that a culture belongs to a people. This single large inventory of culture at the global scale allows individuals or collectivities to assemble particular repertoires. Consequently, people’s “habitats of meanings” become malleable and may stretch out wherever they may.

As the conception of culture changes, so does the construction of meaning and identity. Scholars argue, from different perspectives, that increasing global mobility and interconnectivity has ended the monopoly of national identity. Some emphasize the resurgence of traditional communal identities based on ethnicity, religion, or civilization, which may dwell within or above the nation state (Barber, 2001; Huntington, 1996). Others see the increase of plural identities, drawing not only from various levels of cultures, but also from diverse aspirations, such as class, gender, and humanity (Castells, 1997, 2000; Scholte, 2005). Hall argues: “The more social life becomes mediated by the global marketing of styles, places and images, by international travel, and by globally
networked media images and communications systems, the more identities become
detached-disembedded—from specific times, place, histories, and traditions, and appear

Thompson (1995) reconciles the two images of identity—primordial and
free-floating—arguing that identity can be uprooted, reworked, and re-moored to new
kinds of territorial units. He argues that this process is particularly important to migrant
or displaced groups. They renew their traditions through ritualized story-telling and
increasingly, by way of symbolic forms through communication media. Appadurai
regards electronic mediation and mass migration as two interconnected forces that seem
to alter “the work of the imagination as a constitutive feature of modern subjectivity”
(1996, p.3, italics in original):

The story of mass migrations (voluntary and forced) is hardly a new feature of
human history. But when it is juxtaposed with the rapid flow of mass-mediated
images, scripts, and sensations, we have a new order of instability in the production
of modern subjectivities. As Turkish guest workers in Germany watch Turkish films
in their German flats, as Koreans in Philadelphia watch the 1988 Olympics in Seoul
through satellite feeds from Korea, and as Pakistani cabdrivers in Chicago listen to
cassettes of sermons recorded in mosques in Pakistan or Iran, we see moving images meet deterritorialized viewers. These create diasporic public spheres phenomena that confound theories that depend on the continued salience of the nation-state as the key arbiter of important social change. (ibid, p.4, italics added)

As Appadurai sees it, both human mobility and media flow evidence a state of transnationality. In fact, recent years have seen a rich literature devoted to the studies of transnationalism in migration and/or communication.

Mediation and Migrant Identities

Although mass migration has recurred in history, according to Massey, only after postindustrial migration emerged during the 1960s did immigration become a “truly global phenomenon” (1991, p.34). Held and his colleagues (Held et al., 1999) argue that contemporary migration patterns are different from historical forms in extensity, intensity, velocity, as well as its impact on host and home states. Much literature has attributed recent mass migration to the restructuring of the global economy and the consequent new international division of labor. First, the shift from Fordism to flexible production in
advanced industrial societies results in a segmented labor market structure: highly-skilled professionals on the one hand, and low-paid casual laborers on the other (Sassen, 1991; Sklair, 1991). Foreign workers—skilled or unskilled, and legal or illegal—are drawn into the polarized job markets in advanced societies chiefly because of wage differential between countries. Some scholars argue that the global dispersion of information and lifestyle also makes such migration more attractive (Guhathakurta et al, 2007; Massey, 1999). Currently migration from less developed countries to postindustrial countries, or from the East to the West and from the South to the North, constitutes the largest movement of people (Iredale, 2001).

Second, the dispersion of manufacturing from core capitalist countries to the peripheries and the global expansion of multinational corporations (MNCs) facilitate skilled migration from capital-rich to capital-poor countries. Besides giant MNCs, recently increasing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) also internationalize their operations and demand human capital on offshore sites (Morley, Heraty & Collings, 2006). In these foreign invested enterprises, top managers, technicians, and professionals tend to be expatriates (Sklair, 1991). These skilled persons often move on relatively short-term assignments, hence defined as skilled transients. Sometimes they have become indistinguishable from business visitors (Iredale, 2001). Although this is not the case with
economic migrants, many refugees, asylum seekers, exiles leave their countries involuntarily. Artists, students and academics also may choose to live abroad for a while. Madison (2006) highlights the emergence of *existential migrants*—people who migrate in order to enjoy becoming “strangers in a strange land” rather than to pursue economic benefits or a better standard of living.

The scale, intensity, and fluidity of international migration, along with other forms of mobility and connectivity across the globe, have given rise to the field of transnational studies. Khagram & Levitt claim: “By transnational, we propose an optic or gaze that begins with a world without border” (2008, p.5). Beck (2003) argues that transnationality implies a “revolution in loyalties” to nationality and has made the latter a “zombie category.” Therefore, transnational studies suggest the growing of deterritorialized identities among contemporary subjects in general and migrants in particular. Basically, three distinct, but sometimes overlapped, discourses related to migrants’ transnational identity have emerged: home-country allegiance, diasporic hybrid identities, and cosmopolitan consciousness. These discourses, more or less, include the role of mediated communication in forging transnational identities.

*Home-country Allegiance*
The first perspective argues that contemporary migrants maintain multi-layered transnational ties to their countries of origin, and thus sustain substantial attachment, commitment, and loyalty to their homeland. However, given their cross-border practices, migrants no longer assume a master identity rooted in a single place. Rather, they are prone to develop a sense of *bifocality* (Rouse, 1995) or “several fluid, sometimes conflicting identities” (Levitt, 2001, p.202). This line of literature on transnationalism is concentrated on, but not limited to, empirical immigrant studies in the United States, presenting a shift in academic focus from assimilation to immigrant identities and ethnicity. Transnational migration, as defined by Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc, is “the process by which immigrants forge and sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (1995, p. 48). Therefore, transnational migrants are not well represented by the conventional image of immigrants “who uproot themselves, leave behind home and country, and face the painful process of incorporation into a different society and culture” (*ibid*, p. 48). Meanwhile, they are also different from sojourners, whose displacement is temporary.

Whether transnational migration constitutes a new historical phenomenon or normative pattern is contestable. Nevertheless, a proliferation of studies in the past two decades document recent migrants’ intense and dynamic relationships with their home
societies—familial, religious, economic, political, social, and cultural. These transnational linkages are made through ceaseless back-and-forth movements, political engagements, remittances and investments, interpersonal social networks, voluntary organizations, lifestyles, ideologies, and so forth. These connections greatly benefit from the change in transportation and communication technologies. Migrants’ simultaneous embeddedness in host and home countries creates a space of social practices that span national borders, labeled by such terms as transnational village (Levitt, 2001), transnational life (Smith, 2006), transnational social field (Levitt & Glick Schiller, 2007), transnational space (Glick Schiller et al., 1995), transnational habitus (Guarnizo, 1998), translocal space (Morawska, 2003), and so forth. These transnational practices transform not only the lives of migrants and non-migrants who stay behind, but also the concepts of community and identity.

The transnational paradigm of migration studies challenges the assumption of either-or unitary identity based on the national boundaries. As Kearney argues, transnationalized identities are constituted in social spaces defined by the logic of both-and-and, in which “the subject shares partial, overlapping identities with other similarly constituted decentered subjects that inhabit reticular social forms” (1995, p. 558). Transnational social fields comprise multiple cultural repertoires, by which
migrants use to construct identities (Levitt, 2005). Vertovec (2001) explains the relations between transnational social practices and identity:

[T]he multi-local life-world presents a wider, even more complex set of conditions that affect the construction, negotiation and reproduction of social identities. These identities play out and position individuals in the course of their everyday lives within and across each of their places of attachment or perceived belonging.

(Vertovec, 2001, p.578)

However, Levitt and Glick Schiller (2007) argue that migrants’ ways of belonging does not necessarily correspond with their ways of being. That is, although engagements in bi- or multi-localities enrich resources for the reconfiguration of identity, such identity formation is contingent on the active choices of the subjects. In other words, migrants can “use their identities symbolically or instrumentally, tailoring them to fit particular settings” (Levitt, 2001, p. 4). Therefore, transnational migration studies suggest the decoupling of citizenship and membership, of nationality and political loyalty. Transnationalism, as Portes and DeWind (2007) contend, enables migrants to “sustain a presence in two societies and cultures and to exploit the economic and political
opportunities created by such dual lives” (p.9). Presence in a country and the act of naturalization do not ensure a shift in loyalty; rather, citizenship can be used for expedient purposes, such as making travel easier (Foner, Rumbaut & Gold, 2000).

On the contrary, people who are absent from their home country may continue to regard themselves as legitimate members of that country. Accordingly, transnational migrants disturb the built-in analytical triad of “identities-borders-orders” by compounding identities, ignoring borders, and overruling orders (Vertovec, 2007). Their homeland allegiance is furthered by the competition between nation states, as more and more countries provide dual citizenship and political representation to their expatriates in exchange for their loyalty and economic contribution (Guarnizo, Portes & Haller, 2003). Increasingly, states incorporate overseas populations into the project of nation-building, regarding them as strategic transnational constituencies. This results in the emergence of “deterritorialized nation-states” that are defined socially rather than geographically (Basch, Glick Schiller & Szanton Blanc, 1994).

Discourse on transnationalism and identity sometimes involves the moral dimension of identity politics, as many studies research on migrants from countries in the peripheries to the core, advanced societies, particularly to the United States. Immigrant or ethnic identities are thus seen as a response to unjust racial relations and a resistance to
the linear model of assimilation. However, Wimmer and Glick Schiller connect home
country nationalism to the hegemony of the nation-building project. They warn that
transnationalism studies “reproduce the standard image of a world divided into nations”
(2003, p.598). Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004), instead, argue that exit of emigrants
weakens the home state’s ability to discipline its population and gives migrants
new-found leverage to effect domestic politics at home. No matters whether the home
state or transnational migrants benefit more in the process, their ongoing relationships are
changing the politics in both countries of exit and entry.

Diaspora and Hybrid Identities

The second perspective emphasizes migrants’ hybrid identities, particularly in the
literature of burgeoning diasporic media studies in recent years. According to Safran
(1991), the Diaspora originally referred to the exile and dispersion of the Jews from their
homeland, thus implying oppression and moral degradation. Nowadays the concept of
diaspora is applied to various expatriate minority communities, which share the
characteristics of dispersion from a center to peripheral regions, collective memory about
origin, alienation from the host society, a desire to return, the commitment to the
maintenance of the homeland, and ethno-communal consciousness in relation to that
For Safran, the existence of a homeland myth is crucial to solidify dispersed populations. Cultural and postcolonial studies, in contrast, shift the focus of diaspora from *roots to routes*. Hall, for instance, argues that the diaspora experience is defined “not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of ‘identity’ which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by *hybridity*” (1990, p.235, italics in original). Diasporic identities are formed through the process of *translation* rather than defined by *tradition*. In the process, diaspora subjects must learn to “inhabit at least two identities, to speak two cultural languages, to translate and negotiate between them” (Hall, 1992, p.310).

Gilroy argues for the necessary link between roots and routes, identifying diaspora as “a relational network, characteristically produced by forced dispersal and reluctant scattering” (1994, p.207). He argues that diaspora should be apprehended as live memory, as “the changing same,” and as “mutable itinerant culture” that is creolized, syncretized, and hybridized. Clifford, following Gilroy, emphasizes the practices of “decentered, lateral connections” of diaspora that are constituted in specific maps and histories. Diaspora cultures mediate “the experiences of separation and entanglement, of living here and remembering/desiring another places” (1994, p. 306, p.331). In Clifford’s view, the
renewed, painful yearning for the homeland and persistent double consciousness distinguish diaspora from immigrant communities.

Since the 1980s, however, the usage of diaspora has been relieved from its burden of misery and tended to replace immigration/emigration (Dufoix, 2008). Ang (1993), for example, argues that diaspora can be formed either by force or by choice. As Nonini and Ong say, diaspora subjects “can play with different cultural fragments in way that allows them to segue from one discourse to another, experiment with alternative forms of identification, shrugs in and out of identities, or evade imposed forms of identifications” (1997, p.26). Shih (2007) argues that the overthrow of victimization and the celebration of flexible subjects in diasporic narratives mark a theoretical revolution.

Discarding the homeland myth and forced dispersal, recent diasporic studies emphasize the role of mediated communications in solidifying dispersed populations of diaspora across the globe. Appadurai’s “theory of rupture” serves as a significant aspiration. He argues that electronic media and mass migration work together to create the present world of irregularities, in which both viewers and images are in “simultaneous circulation”—they “meet unpredictably, outside the certainties of home and the cordon sanitaire of local and national media effects” (1996, p.4). This process fosters the emergence of imagined communities in a global context—labeled as diasporic
As mass mediation becomes increasingly dominated by electronic media (and thus delinked from the capacity to read and write), and as such media increasingly link producers and audiences across national boundaries, and as these audience themselves start new conversations between those who move and those who stay, we find a growing number of diasporic public spheres. (*ibid*, p. 22)

For Appadurai, diasporic public spheres disrupt the union between nation and state. As a result, “the nationalist genie, never perfectly contained in the bottle of the territorial state, is now itself diasporic” (*ibid*, pp. 160-161). Such trans-local loyalties are increasingly mediated by electronic media and communication technologies. Morley and Robin (1995) argue that in the global age, the “spaces of transmission” defined by satellite footprints provide the crucial boundaries between cultures. In their view, broadcasting in the current context of fragmentation caters to various forms of nostalgia and supplies a sense of identity. In the growing field of diasporic media studies, global narrowcasting that targets ethnic niche markets (satellite television or DVDs) is considered an important factor that maintains diasporic identities (e.g. Sinclair &
Despite diasporic media’s market-orientation, their presence destabilizes the dominant forms of cultural representation in host societies and opens up new possibilities for self-expression and identity negotiations among migrants (Bailey, Georgiou & Haridranath, 2007). In addition, the use of “small media” such as electronic mail and videos, along with physical mobility, also sustain communication networks that link diasporic narratives of identity (Morley, 2000).

However, empirical studies show that the relation between diasporic media and migrant identity is not so straightforward, or even positive. For example, Gillespie’s study (1995) finds that young Punjabi Londoners redefine their ethnicity through a range of transnational and diasporic media available to them. Some media representations evoke a cosmopolitan stance, while others engender an awareness of cultural differences and reinforce ethnic identity. In contrast, Kevin and Aksoy (2006) describe Turkish television in London as an “agent of cultural de-mythologisation,” in that it bring the banal reality of Turkish life to migrants and undercut the romantic imagination about the homeland.

Based on her ethnographic research, Georgiou highlights several factors that affect the articulation of mediation and identity: various lived experiences, diverse ideologies in diasporic communities, human agency of meaning construction, generational difference,
etc. She argues that diasporic subjects can playfully shift between media and between identities. Therefore, diasporic community belonging is “conditional and partial, as its members live and belong to other local, urban, transnational communities—all at the same time” (2006, p.156). Similarly, Athique (2006) argues that a diasporic audience is not always overlapped with a diaspora. The specificities of the environments where migrants reside and the plurality of diasporic audiences should be taken into account.

**Cosmopolitan Consciousness**

The third perspective holds that, because of intensified cultural interactions, more and more people in the world are developing a specifically cosmopolitan transnational identity. The mobility of people and the interconnectivity of communication, among others, greatly contribute to the formation of this identity, which transcends national and territorial boundaries. Held et al. (1999) contend that an incipient cosmopolitanism has emerged from huge transnational flows of information, people, and imagery, which provide real-time cultural link across the globe. Likewise, Robertson argues that the improved means of travel and communications spreads consciousness of “the world as a whole” and of “an increasingly singular, but not unified conception of humankind” (1992, p.59).
Therefore, the cosmopolitan perspective indicates a moral imperative. As human beings, we share common risks and responsibilities; at the same time, we appreciate cultural differences. Tomlinson thinks of cosmopolitanism as *ethical glocalism* to articulate the relations between the global and the local: on the one hand, a cosmopolitan needs to experience a *distanciated identity* in a world where “there are no others”; on the other hand, this person needs “an awareness of the world as one of many cultural *others*” (1999, p.194). In this sense, cosmopolitanism is not understood as universalism and homogeneity that denies local particularities. Hannerz defines cosmopolitanism as “an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other,” which entails “an intellectual and esthetic openness toward divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrasts rather than uniformity” (1996, p.103). In addition, cosmopolitanism also demands a competence to master different structures of meanings. This definition is similar to what Lash and Urry (1994/2002) call *aesthetic cosmopolitanism*—a stance of openness to other and the ability to judge tastes and distinctions about different cultures. This raises the question of who are capable of being cosmopolitans.

Beck argues that *cosmopolitanization*—“the blurring, through migration, telecommunications and transport, of the foundations of nationhood”—has become an everyday feature of the human condition (2003, p. 21). This forced mixing of culture
creates *banal cosmopolitanism* that is often unaware of, since one’s life and individual existence have become “part of another world, of foreign cultures, religions, histories and global interdependences” (Beck, 2006, p.19). For Beck, people who live cross-border polygamous forms of life, including illegal immigrants, are inclined to develop a cosmopolitan outlook. However, some theorists criticize cosmopolitanism as elite-biased. For example, Bauman (1998) contends that the cosmopolitan, extraterritorial world belongs only to global businessmen, culture managers, or academics. The language of cosmopolitan chatter, in Bauman’s view, presents the privilege of those who are freely on the move (*tourists*), as opposed to the *localized* people and forced movers (*vagabonds*).

In his early work, Hannerz (1996) also distinguishes cosmopolitans from locals. He argues that not all mobile persons are cosmopolitans. People with *decontextualized cultural capital*, like the expatriates, are more readily to become cosmopolitans than exiles and labor migrants are. Later on, Hannerz (2006) admits that the social bases of cosmopolitanism are expanding, while insisting that transnational mobility is not a sufficient condition for cosmopolitan attitudes. He coins the term *instrumental cosmopolitanism*, referring to the skills in managing heterogeneous, alien environments.

We can include Ong’s concept of *flexible citizenship* to this instrumental cosmopolitanism. Ong portrays a group of mobile entrepreneurs and professionals who
utilizes multiple citizenships to circumvent and benefit from different nation-state regimes. For these people, citizenship has less to do with loyalty than a strategy to “evade, deflect, and take advantage of political and economic conditions in different parts of the world” (1999, p.113). This flexibility may extend from citizenship to identity. Rosenau (2004) argues that mobile transnational elites are prone to juggle multiple identities that derive from non-territorial ties, in accordance with the changing circumstances. However, the cosmopolitanism of transnational migrants, as Cheah (2006) argues, is more likely to be driven by upward class mobility than the normative imperative. In particular,

[the] cosmopolitanism of corporate workers is essentially the cosmopolitanism of a new technocratic professional class whose primary aims in life are making a profit and conspicuous consumption. The only feelings of solidarity manifest here are to the global firms as a terrain for professional self-interest and advancement. This type of attachment is gradually disseminated throughout the world through the global outsourcing of white-collar jobs, which in turn establishes more bridges for higher-end South-North migration. (Cheah, 2006, p.492)

This technocratic professional class of transnational migrants is part of what Sklair
(1991) calls the transnational capitalist class, composed of the entrepreneurial elite, managers of transnational firms, state functionaries, and politicians, etc. For these transnationals, class interests override, if not competing against, national interests.

Calhoun (2006) argues that today’s cosmopolitanism reflects the class consciousness of frequent travelers who carry visa-friendly passports. Cosmopolitans, prominently top managers of multi-national corporations (MNCs), regard themselves as multi-culturally modern and thus different from locals—rooted in mono-cultural traditions that limit their perspectives. Therefore, instrumental cosmopolitanism implies the superiority of the cosmopolitan over the local: “One is rich, the other poor. One is transient and mobile. The other is rooted and fixed. One enjoys limitless options. The other opts for the limits of locality” (Ong, 2009, p.456).

The mentality that Calhoun sees in contemporary capitalist cosmopolitans is similar to what Watson (1960, 1964) observed among managerial spiralists assigned by large firms to industrial towns in mid-twentieth century England. The spiralists achieve career upward mobility through occupational experience in different local communities. Accordingly, they developed a generic culture with “international standards of value” that kept them apart from the locals of all classes: “The young business executive in Wigan is likely to have more interests and friends in Manchester and London, or even in New York,
than he has in Wigan” (Watson, 1960, p.417). Like Watson’s spiralists, contemporary
time business expatriates of MNCs tend to live in self-contained communities, which separate
them from the local cultural setting (Lauring & Selmer, 2009). They may develop what
Leggett (2005) calls expat identity, marked not only by nationality, but also class, status,
attitude, and lifestyle.

To sum up, theoretical perspectives relevant to migrants identities—home-country
affiliation, diasporic identities, and cosmopolitan consciousness—suggest the formation
of deterritorialized, plural cultural identities. However, these perspectives may reflect
only particular subjects in their contexts. For example, transnational migration research
chiefly studies migrants from less developed countries to developed societies, especially
to the U.S. In this setting, as Waldinger (2008) argues, transnational migrants represent
only one set of actors (Waldinger, 2008). Therefore, even the proponents of transnational
studies recognize that transnational actions are socially bounded and territorially specific
(Guarnizo, Portes & Haller, 2003; Portes, 2003). Meanwhile, diaspora studies focus on
postcolonial migration. The two strands of research tend to see the persistence of
ethnicity as an expression of identity politics against racial discrimination. This stance
may unintentionally result in cultural reification (Dirlik, 2004). Discussions on
cosmopolitanism, instead, are highly theoretical. Whether there is a truly post-national
culture or identity based on cosmopolitanism or class consciousness remains empirically unelaborated.

Friedman (2004) suggests a holistic analysis that articulates the relation between migration and state structures in particular historical conjunctures. In this framework, the identification process of migrants with the host countries is understood in terms of a continuum of variation from assimilation to enclavization, depending on the ways of group practice. Dirlik (2004) also argues for a place-based analysis that focuses on the “historicity of identity” and the consciousness of place. Therefore, the question of identification needs to be analyzed in the context of historical specificities rather than in abstract forms. Identifying the characteristics of research subjects and particular social contexts in which they are situated is crucial.

Chinese Transnationalism and its Divergence

Since the 1990s, different variants of Chinese transnationalism have emerged to review the relations between overseas Chinese and their original homeland—mainland China. They can be categorized into three concepts: Greater China, Cultural China, and the Chinese media sphere. To start with, the term Greater China (dazhonghwa) is defined
by Harding as “the rapid increasing interaction among Chinese societies around the world as the political and administrative barriers to their intercourse fall” (1993, p. 660). This broad definition encompasses a transnational Chinese economy, a global Chinese culture, and a reunified Chinese state (see also Wang, 1993). Shambaugh argues that Greater China comprises “various actors, dimensions and processes” and lack institutionalization, but together it poses a potential challenge to the regional and international order (1993, p.653). This term, however, usually emphasizes the economic aspect, referring to a “unifying ethno-economic space” including China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and other sites in Southeast Asia (Ong, 2004).

In this economic space, transnational Chinese businesses networks are facilitated by some interrelated aspects of “Chinese distinctiveness” (Lever-Tracy, Constance & Ip, 1996). Among them, guanxi (interpersonal connections)—built upon familism, kinship, fraternal solidarity, and linguistic-cultural commonality—is singled out as representative of so-called Chinese capitalism, particularly in the practices of small businesses. Recently academic interests have shifted to production networks in the high-tech sector that primarily consists of large corporations in Silicon Valley, Taiwan, and China. While no longer emphasizing the guanxi factor, scholars continue to attribute such business networks to ethnic connections (Naughton, 2004; Leng, 2002, 2004; Zhang, 2007). Some
scholars contest the idea of Chinese uniqueness, arguing that the use of Chineseness by business people is simply an adaptive and expedient strategy of capital accumulation (Hsing, 1998; Ong, 1999; Wu, 2001).

The idea of Chinese distinctiveness also ignites a debate over the notion of Cultural China. In a famous essay, Tu argues that Chinese culture, based on Confucian humanism, constitutes “a unique form of life.” He identifies overseas Chinese as a unity of people with “a common ancestry and a shared cultural background, hoping to build a transnational network for understanding the meaning of being Chinese within a global context” (1991, p.22). This account presumes constancy and consistency of Chineseness and bestows a moral obligation on people of Chinese descent for China’s modernization. Some scholars criticize Tu’s essentialist perspective and China-centered discourse on Chineseness. Wang, for instance, contends that “there has never been one single Chinese community abroad” (1993, p.939). The concrete experience of being Chinese, based on place and practice rather than origin, has oriented Chinese overseas to different directions (Wang, 1999). Wang specifically uses the term Chinese overseas (haiwai hwaren), as foreign nationals who are ethnic Chinese, to replace overseas Chinese (hwagiao), which implies a continued political link with mainland China.

Similarly, Ma (2003) argues that Chinese overseas are diverse in terms of place of
origin, settlement patterns, and socioeconomic characteristics. Consequently, mainland 
China is no longer the sole homeland and Chineseness means different things to the 
Chinese at various locations. Ang agrees on the polysemy of Chineseness, viewing it as 
“an open signifier which acquires its peculiar form and content in dialectical junction 
with the diverse local conditions in which ethnic Chinese people…construct new, hybrid 
identities and communities” (1993, p, 13). Chineseness involves not only abstract 
qualities recognized by other people, but also self-identification (Wang, 1999). In other 
words, being Chinese is defined both by descent and by consent. To be or not to be 
Chinese is often a matter of politics (Ang, 1993).

In addition to Greater China and Cultural China, a growing number of recent studies 
have focused on a new kind of Chinese transnationalism fostered by the electronic media. 
This body of literature is part of the broader trend of diasporic studies of media. 
According to Liu (2004), the concept of “Chinese-language media market” is not new. 
However, only in the 1990s did media industries of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore become truly transnationalized, owing largely to government promotion. The 
penetrations of media industries—film, television, music, newspapers, etc.—in these 
societies to each other and overseas niche markets give rise to the speculation of a 
deterritorialized Chinese media sphere. Furthermore, the Internet also reinforces the
interconnectedness of various Chinese communities. In these discourses, the Chinese across the globe share a media culture, as consumers of pop cultural products from different Chinese societies, as audiences of news concerning worldwide Chinese communities, or as a public emerging from the cyberspace. This global Chinese imagination is dubbed as “the worldwide diasporic communities of Chinese” (Sinclair et al., 2000), “a transnational Chinese global media public” (Yang, 1997), “a Chinese television global village” (Harding, 1993), “a global diasporic Chinese mediasphere” (Sun, 2006), “Pop Culture China” (Huat, 2006), “Sinophone Community” (Shih, 2007), “the Huaren cyberpublic” (Ong, 2003), and so on.

The way of being Chinese in the global context thus acquires a new dimension: mediation. Sun, a China-born scholar in Australia, describes such a mediated experience: “One everyday practice of being Chinese […] besides eating Chinese foods and speaking a Chinese language or dialect, is the consumption of a multiplicity of readily available and accessible Chinese-language media and cultural products” (2006, p.2). However, whether the global circulation of Chinese-language media products promotes Chinese identity is contested. First, there is a disagreement concerning the existence of transnational Chinese community or identity. Some expect or argue for the formation of such a transnational imagination (Huat, 2006; Yang, 1997), while others see little
evidence of it (Chu, 1998; Carsten, 2003). Second, studies on migrants’ local media practices also produce divergent conclusions. For instance, Ip (2006) observes that Chinese-language media in New Zealand cement ethnic cohesion among migrants of Chinese descent from different countries. In contrast, Sinclair et al. (2000) find that the daily ritual of television news reception provides the Australian Chinese a strong sense of connection with home, be it China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong.

Narratives of Chinese transnationalism interpret Chinese cultures differently, as guanxi networks, “a unique form of life,” or a shared media culture. The way to be Chinese in the global context, hence, is built upon instrumental purposes, primordial ties, or constructed imagination. The concepts of cultural China and pop culture China are based on the experience of ethnic Chinese in diaspora. The perspective on guanxi networks, instead, mainly applies to return migrants of Chinese descent to mainland China. A number of studies reveal how Chineseness is utilized by overseas Chinese, Hong Kongers, and Taiwanese to advance businesses in China (Deng, 2002; Hsing, 1998; Ong, 1999; Shen, 2005; Smart & Smart, 1998; Wu, 2004). Rather than truly identifying their ancient homeland, these businesspeople manipulate Chinese identity for instrumental purposes.

Scholars analyze why Taiwanese, Hong Kongers, and Singaporeans usually
reinforce their allegiance to countries/places of origin after migration to China in terms of (1) societal and political differences between China and other Chinese societies, (2) long-term social isolation of the mainland, (3) and class distinction (Hsing, 1998; Kong, 1999; Shen, 2005; Smart & Smart, 1998). For Taiwanese, the political hostility across the Taiwan Strait also increases their suspicion of Chinese nationals. There is also a widespread attitude among these migrants of Chinese descent that they are culturally superior to the PRC Chinese.

Ong (1999) argues that Chinese kinship rituals and cultural values represented in ethnic mass media is a key source of translocal Chinese identity. However, other studies show that overseas Chinese often experience a process of disillusion of their ideal homeland upon “return” to China. Smart and Smart (1998) observe that Hong Kong migrants and business travelers tend to see themselves as more developed and rational, as opposed to incivility of Chinese. Singaporean expatriates in China, portrayed by Yeoh and Willis (2005), seek “return-to-roots” experience but instead feel strong cultural differences. Similarly, Taiwanese migrants develop a sense of superiority, considering themselves economically and culturally better off than Chinese (Hu, 2006; Lin, 2006; Wang, 2007).

However, other studies report ambivalence in identity transformation among
migrants of Chinese descent. For example, Kong (1999) finds that Singaporeans reinforce their allegiance to Singapore as a nation. At the same time, they also develop stronger ethnic attachments to Chineseness. Mathews, Ma and Lui observe that Hong Kongers’ northbound experience to southern China has been breaching the wall against Chineseness. Experiencing a huge national territory and diverse people allow denationalized Hong Kongers to learn to “belong to a nation” (2008, p.146). Likewise, some scholars argue that Taiwanese migrants will assume a Chinese identity in the long run. First, the pattern of Taiwanese migration to China has changed over time. Recent migrants—composed of the younger generation and professionals—tend to identity with China because of their long-term settlement plans (Geng, 2006; Leng; 2002). Second, the longer Taiwanese migrants stay in China, the more likely they are assimilated to the Chinese society (Fang, 2003).

In sum, Chinese transnationalism consists of economic, cultural, and political dimensions. For China-bound migrants of Chinese descent, economic transnationalism has been a reality. However, how their identities are sustained or transformed upon migration is highly contested. Particularly, research on Taiwanese migrants has produced divergent answers: Taiwanese identity, Chinese identity, and in-betweenness. This incoherence demonstrates the complexity of identity among the Taiwanese. Most studies
have analyzed Taiwanese migrants’ identifications through the perspectives of primordial
ties or cultural encounters. This dissertation focuses on how the use of media enables
migrants to renegotiate their identities, but also attends to the factors of ethnicity and
lived experience.

In doing so, I am not arguing for a casual relation between mediated communication
and identity formation. Rather, this dissertation is designed to unveil the process of
identity negotiation through the intersections between mediation and lived experience.
Theories of cultural globalization and transnationalism have outlined new possibilities of
migrants’ identity construction—in additional to the conventional view of assimilation.
These theoretical discussions include home-country allegiance, diasporic hybrid identities,
and cosmopolitan consciousness. While more or less emphasizing the role of media and
communication technologies in forging such identities, each perspective has its own
theoretical context. Therefore, it is important to specify research subjects, social contexts,
and historical conjunctions.

Contextualizing Reception Research

This dissertation adopts the methods of reception research in cultural studies to
elaborate upon how Taiwanese migrants use media for meaning construction and participation, and how these processes enact their identity negotiation. Reception research challenges the positivist, behaviorist paradigm of media studies, which emphasizes media effects by the measure of the audience’s attitude and behavior change. Williams argues that communication is not only transmission, but also “reception and response” (1958/1990, p.313). This statement repudiates the perspective that sees the audience as the mass or cultural dupes. Carey proposed instead a ritual view of communication that emphasizes “the actual social processes wherein significant symbolic forms are created, apprehended, and used” (1989, p.30). Hall (1980, 1982) integrates this culturalist perspective with concepts of hegemony and semiotics to develop his critical paradigm in media studies. His encoding-decoding model of communication highlights both ideology of media text and the audience’s active role in reception.

For Hall (1993), mass communication is articulated by four connected yet distinctive practices—production, circulation, distribution/consumption, and reproduction. Of importance in this exchange is the discursive form of the message, realized in the moments of encoding and decoding. On one hand, discourse of the media represents a dominant cultural order shaped by power and ideology. On the other hand, discourse is polysemic and, hence, allows “relative autonomy” of entry and exit of the message. The
audience may adopt three hypothetical positions in the process of decoding: dominant-hegemonic (or preferred readings), negotiated, or oppositional. Hall’s approach analyzes meaning structures in the processes of encoding and decoding, as well as social structures that constrain such processes, including the frameworks of knowledge, the relations of production, and material culture (Nightingale, 2003). However, based on Hall’s model, a generation of reception research thriving in the 1980s and 1990s highlighted audience agency, resistance, and pleasures (Murphy, 2005). Such an approach erases the material conditions of social life and fails to locate specific cultural practices within their contexts (Grossberg, 1994).

Recent scholarship of reception research has paid more attention to social context. Bird (2003) argues that separating text/audience from the culture in which they are embedded is problematic. Media researchers need to study not only specific text-audience relationship, but also everyday experiences. Murphy proposes a perspective of cultural ecology that focuses on “the embodied, existential field experience of how media narratives and aesthetic surface and resonate in the everyday life of active, reflexive social agents” (2005, p.176). This approach brings together media practices and real-life social relations, replacing a media-centric understanding of collectivity, such as fandom. In a similar regard, Nightingale outlines a relational approach that points to broader
cultural continuities beyond the time-space of viewing/reading. She contends: “people are not audiences by nature but by culture...We learn to act and to think of ourselves as audiences in certain contexts and situations—these always possess a textual dimension which eclipses the mechanical or operational functions of the medium” (1996, p.147). Therefore, audience is both context- and text-bound.

In addition to social context, scholars also argue for a more comprehensive understanding of the meaning structure in the process of decoding. Morley suggests that we deal more with the issue of relevance/irrelevance than the acceptance/rejection of particular propositions in media texts—that is, to ask the question of how a viewer “thinks and feels about living her/his social situations” (1986, p.43). Fiske argues that preferred reading is a textual concept, while relevance is a social one. The relevance position states that a text can only be activated into a meaningful moment “by the social allegiances of the person engaged in it” (1988a, p.248). Kraidy extends Fiske’s concept of relevance to social relevance, emphasizing “the communal aspects of media consumption in its socio-politico-economic context” (2005, p. 142). For Kraidy, the notion of social relevance provides a dynamic understanding of the links between media texts and collective identities.

Georgiou (2006) proposes a more radical position that reverses the relations between
text and context. She argues that viewing media culture as context allows a better understanding of the relation between mediation and identities:

Identities are shaped within the context of media culture. Thus, their multiplicity cannot but be informed by, and their commonality constructed around the shared media consumption. In the cultural process of media consumption, audiences participate in the construction of meaning. What does this mean? The relation between media and identities is dialectical and homologous, especially as it unravels in the context of everyday life. The functions and values of the two meet dynamically in everyday life and although, or perhaps because, conflicts and inconsistencies exist, they reach a level of constant, dialectic compatibility.

(Georgiou, 2006, p.163)

Therefore, research of media reception is not limited to the correspondence between a text and an audience that is usually artificially arranged. Instead, we can ask how the subjects choose media texts available or relevant to them, and how they construct meaning from media texts socially relevant or irrelevant to them, how such meaning construction interacts with their lived experience, and how these processes enact their
identity negotiation.

Research Subjects and Methods

Cultural studies research asks questions about “meaning and the significance of the cultural at every level of the social and cultural processes”—why people invest in particular texts and practices, what meanings these texts and practices have for them, and how they account for this engagement (Gray, 2003, p.17). Small-scale intensive qualitative studies enable researchers to explore these questions in detail about the construction of cultural identity and subjectivity (ibid). To better understand how Taiwanese migrants use media in China and how they negotiate meanings and identity through such use of the media, this dissertation applies qualitative methods.

Qualitative research, as Denzin and Lincoln argue, involves an “interpretive, naturalistic approach” to the world. In other words, researchers “study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them” (2003, p.5). The focus of qualitative research is “how social experience is created and given meaning” rather than the measurement and analysis of causal relationships between variables (ibid, p.13, italic in original).
According to Creswell (2003), qualitative research (1) takes place in the natural setting, (2) uses multiple methods that are interactive and humanistic, (3) is emergent rather than tightly prefigured, (4) and fundamentally interpretive. Meanwhile, the qualitative researcher (1) views social phenomena holistically, (2) systematically reflects on who he or she is in the inquiry, (3) uses complex reasoning that is multifaceted, interactive, and simultaneous, (4) and adopts one or more strategies of inquiry as a guide for the procedures.

This dissertation project aims to understand the “how” rather than the “why” questions. It inquires into people’s lived and mediated experiences in natural settings, and takes their own words seriously—that is, how people interpret their everyday practices and how they negotiate meanings through these practices. Moreover, as explained earlier, this case study is highly contextualized. The identity negotiation of Taiwanese migrants is conditioned by a complicated historical process and the ambiguous political relations between China and Taiwan. Migrants also experience a very sophisticated, continuously evolving media system in China. Quantitative surveys and experiments, emphasizing fixed research design and numerical values, would not suffice the purpose of this research. Small-scale qualitative research allows the “thick description” (Geertz, 1973) of cultural meanings and hence is a preferable research methodology.
Marshall and Rossman (1999) list four primary methods in qualitative research: participation, observation, in-depth interviewing, and the review of documents. Open-ended interviewing and participant observation allow researchers to obtain empirical data “collected in the form of people’s own words, gestures, and behavior” (Fortner & Christians, 2003, p.351). Moreover, secondary materials help achieve a more complete and accurate account of the subject matter. My research uses all of these above-mentioned methods to reach triangulation. I mainly adopt in-depth interviewing to understand my research subjects’ narratives, but also use participation and observation to complement the data. Besides, document research is utilized to contextualize questions to be answered.

*In-depth Interviewing*

In-depth interviewing—which by its very nature requires talking to smaller numbers of people—is crucial to cultural studies work because it provides detailed information as to why specific answers are given and allows for observation of respondent’s non-verbal response (Wimmer and Dominick, 1994). This method is used to explore a few general topics to help uncover the participants’ views, but otherwise it respects that “the subjective view is what matters” (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p.108). However,
Silverman (2003) argues that both the research participants’ constructed narratives and real experiences demand analysis. Besides, interviewing often comes hand in hand with participant observation (Fontana & Frey, 2003). Therefore, I primarily adopted semi-structured interviewing in the field, but occasionally used participant observation when I visited company compounds and schools.

Locating research subjects.

My research subjects are Taiwanese migrants in China. Due to the lack of official statistics, the number, demographic characteristics, and locations of these migrants remain unclear. There is no directory of Taiwanese migrants in China, or other methods for determining the universe of this population. Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) estimated that in 2008, a total of more than 800,000 Taiwanese people were working and/or living in China. Other figures that appear in the press are much higher, but one million is frequently cited by scholarly literature. Currently the Taiwanese mass migration to China is closely associated with the relocation of Taiwanese businesses. The main components of the migrant population include businesspeople, skilled workers, and their family members (Tseng, 2008). According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Taiwan government approved 37,181 cases of China-bound investment
between 1991 and 2008, which amounted to $75,560 millions. Jiangsu province (33.2%),
Guangdong province (24.01%), and Shanghai (14.86%) attracted the largest amounts of
investments (Mainland Affairs Council, 2009b). It is reasonable to assume that the
Taiwanese population in China is also concentrated in these areas. Therefore this is where
I conducted my research.

Selecting the sites.

I chose two key sites for my field research—the greater Shanghai area on central
east coast of China and the greater Shenzhen area in southeast China. The former
includes Shanghai city and nearby Suzhou city, the industrial hub of Jiangsu Province.
The latter includes Shenzhen city and nearby Dongguan city of Guangdong, which
clusters lots of Taiwanese companies. These two areas should have large numbers of
Taiwanese migrants. In addition, both areas encompass urban districts and satellite
cities/townships where numerous industrial parks are located. This allows the comparison
between urban life and compound life, and the comparison of regional differences. In
particular, the media environments are slightly different in these two areas. Some foreign
television channels, chiefly from Hong Kong and Macau, are accessible via cable in
Shenzhen and Dongguan, but not in Shanghai and Suzhou (see Chapter 1).
**Snowball sampling.**

Theoretically, social research requires probability sampling designs to ensure that the sample selected is representative of things in the population at large. Practically, random sampling is not feasible in most cases (Knight, 2002). This is particularly true when the units of a population are not known. The problem of obtaining a list of the population, called coverage error, is common among immigrant studies (Corbetta, 2003). In such circumstance, snowball sampling provides a means of accessing difficult to reach or hidden populations. This technique consists of “identifying respondents who are then used to refer researchers on to other respondents” (Atkinson & Flint, 2003, p.1).

In my dissertation research, I used snowball sampling to recruit 68 interviewees, including 32 respondents in the greater Shanghai area and 36 in the greater Shenzhen area (see Appendix A). I located potential research subjects in China through informants in my personal networks. After the interviews with my respondents, I asked them to refer me to Taiwanese migrants with whom they had weak ties and whose demographic characteristics were different from those of themselves. That is, I took every measure possible to avoid drawing too many subjects from a particular social network and to diversify the groups I studied. As a result, I diversified my research subjects in terms of
gender, age, ethnicity, employment, education, and years of residence in China (see table 2.1). Most interviewees were migrants who had lived in China at least a half year, but this sample also included one returnee and five business travelers whose main residences were in Taiwan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Frequencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>male (37), female (31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>under 30 (5), 30s (29), 40s (30), over 50 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Hoklo (43), Hakka (6), Mainlander (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>business owners and spouses (17), expatriate employees (30), the second generation (5), housewives (11), others (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>high school and below (4), college* (45), post-graduate (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of residence in China</td>
<td>4 years and under (31), 5-9 years (30), 10 years and over (7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Two-year colleges are included.

Data collecting.

My field research took place in China between October and December in 2008. The interviews were conducted in my research subjects’ homes, companies, or cafes. I visited more than ten company compounds in industrial areas, which allowed me to observe work and life of Taiwanese expatriates. I also visited schools with large numbers of
Taiwanese students—one Taiwanese school with K-12 education and one Chinese bilingual primary and middle school. In the Taiwanese school, I toured the campus, interviewed school teachers, and observed students. In the Chinese school, I attended a festival, observed the interactions among Taiwanese parents, and conducted interviews.

I adopted semi-structured face-to-face interviewing. Most interviews were conducted in the one-on-one format, although some cases involved two or more participants. My questions encompassed respondents’ background, migration history, media use, and self-described identity (see Appendix B). While following the outline of the prepared semi-structured topics, I also asked questions specific to particular interviewees and changed topics according to my respondents’ answers. On average the interviews took 90 to 120 minutes, but some lasted as long as three hours. All interviews, with the permission of my research subjects, were digitally recorded. After leaving the scenes, I took notes about my observation and unrecorded conversations with my respondents. Each interview record was transcribed in Chinese. Only those sentences being quoted in the dissertation were translated into English. I was responsible for the transcriptions and translations.

In addition to the general research subjects, I also interviewed three administrators of Taiwanese community websites (*Taima Club* and *Taike Life*) and one organizer of a
Taiwanese social group (*Shanghai Rice Ball*). The purpose was to understand Taiwanese migrants’ online and offline social networking. There are numerous community websites in China operated by Taiwanese migrants to share information. *Taima Club* and *Taike Life* were chosen for analysis because they had the largest numbers of participants, approximately 6,000 to 30,000 at the time of my field research. *Shanghai Rice Ball* is an informal social group that has lasted for years. The interview questions to these administrators were centered on how they operated their websites or organizations. The details will be analyzed in Chapter 6.

*Research criteria.*

Qualitative research tends to draw conclusions from smaller samples. From the perspective of traditional canons in social sciences, qualitative research is weak in generalizability—or external validity. The issue of generalizability occurs at two levels—generalizing the findings about a particular sample to the population and applying the findings about a population of interest to the second population (Gray, 2003; Marshall & Rossman, 1999). Aside from the small scale, samples acquired by snowballing tend to be biased, due to the researcher’s subjective choices of the respondents and the inclusion of individuals with interrelationships. Therefore, snowball
samples are criticized for the lack of representativeness (Atkinson & Flint, 2003).

However, these deficiencies do not mean that qualitative studies drawing from small-scale, snowball samples are not valuable. Atkinson and Flint (2003) argue that snowball sampling has the advantage of locating respondents who are otherwise inaccessible by survey. The technique also allows researchers to obtain more comprehensive data on a particular research. The issue of generalization can be addressed through the use of larger samples and by the replication of results. Knight (2002) contends that whether one sampling strategy is better than another depends on the inquiries. In his view, random sampling methods applied in positivist social research projects regard one person in the sample as substitutable for another. Small-scale research, in contrast, emphasizes contingency, complexity, subjectivity, and multiple meanings, which make it scrupulous, meaningful, significant, and generalizable.

Other scholars treat the claim of generalizability differently. Corbetta (2003), for example, argues that generalization in qualitative research is based on classifications and typologies rather than correlations, which are emphasized by quantitative research. For Gray (2003), generalization in small-scale qualitative studies is theoretical rather than statistical. These studies employ reflexive and innovative methods appropriate to the research questions, and produce valuable insights transferable to different contexts.
Similarly, Lincoln and Guba contend that qualitative research should be accessed by the criterion of *transferability* instead of generalizability—that is, whether the findings will be useful to other researchers in similar situations, with similar research questions (cited in Lincoln, 1995). Marshall and Rossman (1999) suggest researchers elaborating on how data collection and analysis is guided by theoretical frameworks to counter the challenge of generalization.

This dissertation does not claim its generalizability to the whole Taiwanese population in China or to other migrant groups in China and beyond. However, I followed some procedures to make my sample more representative. I expanded the scale of the sample to 68 respondents, recruited research subjects with diverse backgrounds, and chose two different sites for my field research. In addition, as Marshall and Rossman (1999) suggest, my interview questions are guided by the research problematic and theoretical concepts. Gray argues that validity of qualitative research consists in “the accuracy of the picture presented of the subject and context of study” (2003, p.71). In my data analysis, I emphasize historical factors and social context. I also truthfully report the accounts of my research subjects and use classifications and typologies to present research findings. These measures increase the credibility and validity of this case study.
Document Research

The review of documents or archival records, both public, such as newspapers and official reports, and private, such as diaries and letters, linking to the conceptual framework of the study, supplements other qualitative methods (Creswell, 2003; Marshall & Rossman, 1999). In the course of my research, I collected documents about law and regulations, statistics, official reports issued by the Taiwanese and Chinese governments. I also read books, media reporting, and online postings regarding Taiwanese migrants in China.

The key government and semi-government websites I accessed included, for China: The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, The State Administration of Radio Film and Television, General Administration of Press and Publication, Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, China Internet Network Information Center, and China National Publication Import & Export Corporation Shanghai Branch. For Taiwan these were: Mainland Affair Council, Straits Exchange Foundation, National Statistics, and Government Information Offices. These websites provide a range of regulations, policies, statistics, and reports about trade, human movements, and media, etc. Some secondary materials were collected from Taiwan Social Survey, Report on Development of China’s Radio, Film and Television (2008),
Report on Development of China’s Media Industry (2009), and others.

I prepared for my field research, in part, by reading lots of trade books written by Taiwanese migrants about their business operations and everyday lives in China. I also downloaded articles of Commonwealth, a Taiwanese news magazine, relevant to Taiwanese migrants. I enrolled in several Taiwanese community websites, such as Taima Club and Taike Life, and constantly read Taiwanese migrants’ online postings on these websites. I also watched videos of such television show as Stories of Taiwanese Businesspersons (Taishanggushi, CCTV of China) and Discovering China and Taiwan (Zoujinliangan, ETV of Taiwan), which featured Taiwanese businesspeople in China. These materials provided rich information about migrants’ lived experiences and ways of thinking.

I read news coverage of major news events in 2008 about China and cross-Taiwan Strait relations—including the Sichuan earthquake, the Tibet riot, the Beijing Olympics, the tainted milk scandal, and the visits of two Chinese envoys to Taiwan. News reports of the United Daily News (Taiwan) served as the main source because this newspaper and its website were the most-used news outlets by Taiwanese migrants. I also accessed other news sources, such as The New York Times (US), Xinhwa (China), the China Times (Taiwan), and the Liberty Times (Taiwan). I did not aim for textual analysis; rather,
reading news coverage of these events helped me better understand my research subjects’ narratives; and it helped me to formulate more relevant and productive questions of my subjects.
Chapter 3: Forming a Cosmopolitan Class? Career, Life, and Lifestyle

“I feel as if my family are living in a fish bowl. The only difference is that this fish bowl has relocated to mainland China. Our lives remain the same. We have never swum out of this container. I know little about local things, people, and surroundings.” (Hsiao-hui Tien—housewife, 6 year residence in China)

The “fish bowl” metaphor cited above was used by a Taiwanese housewife to portray her life in Shanghai. By the time of my interview, she had moved to Shanghai twice because of her husband’s job assignments, and had lived there for a total of nearly six years. Both of her parents were born in China, so she had always thought of herself as Chinese and of mainland China as her homeland. However, she lived like a stranger there. Not every Taiwanese lives within an invisible fish bowl in China. Nevertheless, there is a widespread outsider mentality and willful resistance to assimilation among migrants of all sorts. Previous studies have attributed the Taiwanese sense of cultural strangeness in China to several factors—the long-time political hostility and social separation between Taiwan and China (Shen, 2005; Wu, 2001), differences in local dialects (Lin, 2006), and
Taiwanese socioeconomic superiority (Hsing, 1998; Wang, 2007).

These narratives were also frequently heard in my interviewees and should be taken into account. This chapter analyzes why Taiwanese migrants insist on maintaining a “Taiwanese way of life” in China. The term refers not so much to the transplanting of Taiwanese culture to China as to migrants’ making distinctions from the host society. I argue that Taiwanese migrants’ notion of living a Taiwanese way of life is affected by their migration patterns. I focus on the mechanism of mobility—that is, how migrants’ transnational spatial mobility enables their upward mobility and creates a mobile culture that makes them intentionally isolated from the locals. The first section provides background information about my research subjects. The later sections discuss Taiwanese migrants’ dual mobility, virtual segregation and lifestyle, and the sojourner mentality in China.

Who Are Taiwanese Migrants in China?

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the mass migration of Taiwanese to China has been largely associated with the relocation and expansion of Taiwanese businesses. The first wave of economic migration started in the late 1980s, and was chiefly composed of male
owners and managers of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). These early migrants were generally called *Taiwanese businessmen (taishang)* by their compatriots in Taiwan. Since the late 1990s, larger Taiwanese firms have also expanded their operations to China and brought a great number of expatriates to their local subsidiaries. Since most Taiwanese assigned to the mainland hold managerial jobs, they are called *Taiwanese cadres/executives (taigan)*. In recent years, however, such terms as *Taiwanese moms (taima), sisters (taijie), and students (taisheng)* have also emerged in China to specify new components of this migrant group, including family members, female expatriates, and students. These proliferations of the *tai*-prefix phrases indicate the growing diversity of the Taiwanese population in China. Aside from Taiwanese business-associated migrants, my sample also includes people working for foreign or Chinese companies, school teachers, academics, students, freelancers, and so on. In addition to these migrants, partly for purposes of comparison, I also include returnees and business travelers in my analysis.

This section uses some personal stories to illustrate who these Taiwanese migrants are. I roughly categorize migrants into three groups according to their employment statuses: business owners and spouses (including the self-employed), expatriate employees, and family members. I further divide family members into housewives and
the second generation. Such categorization is not all-inclusive, but it offers a sketch of the Taiwanese migrant population.

*Business Owners (taishang)*

Taiwanese investments in China include the relocation of companies, the extension of Taiwan’s businesses, and joint ventures. Among business owners, the actual migrants are those who have transferred their companies’ key operations to China. In many cases, the spouses of businessmen, called “boss’s wife” (*toujianiang*), may not have a formal title, but they are de facto in charge of many tasks in the companies and households.

Contrarily to these business owners and spouses who live in China on a daily basis, the heads of large enterprises or businesspeople with joint ventures usually visit China only on business trips, albeit frequently.

Yu-Sheng Wang is a typical Taiwanese SME businessman who owns an electronics company in Dongguan. Since the 1980s, his small factory in Taiwan had manufactured low-end plastics exports, but in the mid-1990s, a shortage of low-waged labor and stricter environmental regulations drove his factory out of the island. Meanwhile, the local government in Guangdong was offering investment incentives such as tax holidays and inexpensive lands. Wang relocated his company as well as his family to Dongguan. In a
few years, he began to manufacture electronic gadgets and set up a distribution arm in the Untied States. His wife has since taken care of the U.S. business and their children, who attend schools there. As a high school graduate, Wang hopes that American education will equip his children with English skills and an “international outlook” (guojiguan), which he thinks is crucial to future entrepreneurs. The children and his wife have all obtained U.S. citizenships and regularly travel back and forth across the Pacific.

Wang’s company in Dongguan employs about 600 workers, but all senior managerial positions are held by Taiwanese only, including family members and three other expatriates. He explained that Chinese employees’ loyalty and ethics were questionable. Taiwanese reside on higher floors of one dormitory building, segregated from the Chinese staff’s residence on lower floors. They have a housemaid who takes care of their meals, laundry, and other chores. They dine together and, after lunch and dinner, watch Taiwanese satellite news channels—illegally received—in the living room. Chinese staffers share a restaurant with shop-floor workers, who live in a separate building. Wang bought a mansion outside the company compound but has never really moved in. He feels more comfortable living close to his factory, in case something happens. After doing business in Dongguan for over a decade, Wang has built good relations with local officials. His guanxi networks enabled him to downplay a fire
incident at his factory days before my visit. However, his close friends, with whom he haunts karaoke bars in the evenings or plays golf on weekends, remain Taiwanese. He hopes to return to Taiwan with his wife once his son takes over his business, but the timing seems indefinite.

Unlike Wang, Chi-Ming Shih has large investments in China but maintains his furniture company’s core sectors in Taipei, on the grounds that Taiwan still has the comparative advantage in design. He said that the Guangdong province of China had become an “international hub” of trade in furniture. He had no choice but to build his business there. Three years ago, Shih set up two exhibition centers in Dongguan and invested in another two-dozen stores across China’s east coast via joint venture. He thought it was the right decision because of his frequent encounters with foreigners of diverse origins—from Dubai, India, Australia, Russia, and so on—in his stores in China. Despite the rapid expansion of his business, Shih emphasized that he had no plan to migrate to China. Instead, he hired Taiwanese managers to supervise his Chinese business. On average, he stays in Taiwan for two weeks and then travels to China for one week. During his stay, he visits his stores and meets his Chinese friends, including furniture suppliers and business partners. Shih said that he is usually sleepless at night in Dongguan, fearing that his safety might be compromised. Only when he returns to
Expatriate Employees

Taiwanese expatriates usually enter the Chinese job market through one of three tracks: job assignments by Taiwanese employers, recruitment through headhunters, and personal connections. According to my interview data, being assigned by Taiwanese parent companies to Chinese subsidiaries was the most common avenue. However, those who had work experiences in China would transfer jobs to other companies through personal networks if they saw better opportunities. A job assignment to China may or may not be a free choice; the boundaries are not clear-cut. For example, Eric Chen and Ellen Sun, both in their late twenties, took jobs in China from different routes and lived divergent lives there. However, they share similar economic motivations for migration.

After losing his first job in Taiwan because of company downsizing, Eric worked with a Taiwanese OEM (original equipment manufacturer) that produced athletic footwear. Between 1976 and 1987, Taiwan was the world’s largest exporter of footwear (Hsing, 1998). In the 1990s, most Taiwanese contractors of American footwear companies moved their operations to China and maintained only value-added activities in Taiwan, forming what has been called triangle manufacturing (Cheng, 1999). In the
2000s, however, those value-added activities were also transferred to China and Southeast Asia. Five years ago, Eric was asked by his company to either accept a new assignment to Shenzhen or take severance. He had just proposed to his girlfriend and was reluctant to leave Taiwan. But his employer promised to pay him double and provide eight round-trip flight tickets a year. He considered it a good offer. Three days after his wedding, Eric flew to Shenzhen alone, while his wife stayed in Taiwan. They have lived separately since then.

Eric’s company employs around 20,000 Chinese and fifty Taiwanese in the Shenzhen factories. The campus is so gigantic that it includes a soccer court, a bank, and a clinic in addition to factories and dormitories. Taiwanese expatriates reside in a modern building with such facilities as gyms, entertainment rooms, and a restaurant. Only Taiwanese employees are permitted to use these facilities. When I visited on a Saturday at noon, about a dozen younger Taiwanese took out their meals to the main entertaining room and watched Taiwanese variety shows on a big TV screen. Someone told me that the television set was turned on all day long on weekends. Eric works 7:30am-9:30pm on weekdays and is on duty on Saturdays at times. When he is free, he either watches videos in his own room or hangs out with other young expatriates. He phones his wife and mother in Taiwan every day, but his Taiwanese coworkers are more like his family
members—they work, dine, live, chat, and have fun together. At the time of my visit, Eric was worried about massive job cuts in the coming year. Should it happen, he might return to Taiwan.

While Eric stays in the company compound most of the time, Ellen Sun enjoys life in Shanghai city. She works at the Shanghai subsidiary of a Taiwanese high-tech corporation, one of the top service ODMs (original design manufacturers) in the world. Holding an MBA degree from the United States, she had searched for jobs in Taiwan that could keep her connected with “foreigners.” She found that the electronics industry was the best choice, but most of the positions she pursued moved to China. Through an executive recruiter, she landed her current job where her responsibility is to coordinate with American clients to develop electronic products. Ellen said that most expatriates took jobs in China because of “money.” She is satisfied with her salary as well as her life in Shanghai. She lives in the city and takes a shuttle to her office in the industrial district on work days. As a result, she is able to have a metropolitan lifestyle—shopping in modern malls and frequenting restaurants, KTVs, lounges, and disco pubs. As a single woman, Ellen feels lucky to stay in an “internationalized” city but is open to working anywhere, as long as a job brings a better pay package.
While, in China, the wife and adult children of a business owner often hold important positions in family enterprises, the spouse of a male expatriate employee tends to be a housewife. On the one hand, it is difficult for these wives to find satisfying jobs in the places where their husbands work. On the other hand, a sense of economic security, owing to their husbands’ higher incomes, persuades them to stay home. Many of the housewives I interviewed used to be career women in Taiwan. They chose to quit jobs and move to China for the sake of family unity. Besides, widespread stories about Taiwanese men’s causal sexual encounters with Chinese women or the phenomenon of “bao ernai (keeping mistress)” (Shen, 2005) also encouraged them to migrate with their husbands. Many Taiwanese households in China hired full-time or part-time housemaids for domestic chores. Accordingly, housewives usually had leisure to build a more active life outside the family, if they established their own social networks.

Hsiao-hui Tien came to Shanghai five years ago with her husband, who was promoted to a high-ranking position in a Taiwanese retail chain. She said that the opportunity was too desirable to be passed by. She reached an agreement with her husband that they should move together to avoid “family problems.” After a scrutiny of schools, she found that the “international division” of an elite public school in Shanghai
taught in English and would provide a good education for their son. However, migration turned out to be more difficult than Tien had expected. Her husband was too busy in his new job to take care of the family. Although they hired a full time housemaid, Tien was helpless in the beginning. She was not familiar with the environment and often felt cheated by locals. Her life, she said, was devoid of meaning, as she stayed home all day long without much to do. The only person she could talk to was her housemaid. She said that she almost cried every day until she became acquainted with other Taiwanese housewives via a Taiwanese community website (details in Chapter 7).

Tien’s family bought a decent house in a gated community close to the city center, and she got a car to drive around. By the time I met her, she had developed a hectic schedule—eating out with friends, playing mahjong, working out, shopping, and going for spa treatments and massages. She is content with her new life in Shanghai but has never felt a sense of belonging. She emphasized that her family’s migration to Shanghai was temporary because her husband might repatriate to Taiwan or lose his job.

The Second Generation

Currently, most adult children of Taiwanese migrants are not exactly the second generation. Taiwanese investments to China started in the late 1980s, but early migrants
were overwhelmingly lone males. Therefore, the China-bom second-generation migrants are mostly in their childhood. However, many Taiwan-born children did move to China, before or after coming of age, in great part because of family businesses. They are better described as the 1.25, 1.5 or 1.75 generation coined by Rumbaut (1997).³

Vichy Kao migrated to Dongguan at fourteen, six years after her father moved there to establish a new arm for his electronic company. Before the family was reunited in China, she stayed behind with her siblings and mother, who took charge of the family’s factory in Taiwan. During her adolescent years in China, she was sent to a Hong Kong boarding school in nearby Shenzhen. Then she attended college in Japan to enhance her capacity for doing business with Japanese clients. Since graduation, Vichy has worked at the family business as her father planned, and resides upstairs from her office. On weekends, she either plays video games or watches DVDs in the dormitory, hobbies that she grew up with. She told me that her parents had been too busy at work, so she had learned to entertain herself.

A young woman in her mid-twenties, Vichy said that she had been used to the life at factories, either in China or in Taiwan. Her family also maintains a very Taiwanese way of life. They have shrines in the company, at which they worship every day as they did in Taiwan. At my visit on a traditional Taiwanese festival day, the family prepared an
abundant feast in honor of gods and ancestors—rituals that were wiped out in China due to the Cultural Revolution. Vichy is adept at practicing complex rituals that fewer and fewer of today's Taiwanese comprehend. As the oldest child, she feels responsible for helping the family business, which she expects will be inherited by her younger brother someday. Vichy emphasized that she could go anywhere if she left the company. After all, she had been “floating” all her life.

Unlike Vichy, Yuen-Kai Lee moved to China as an adult. While his parents left for China for investments in the early 1990s, he stayed in Taiwan to finish his higher education. Eight years ago, he was asked to help his family’s real estate business in Suzhou. Lee initially regarded his stay in China as a short journey because of his aversion to the Chinese regime. Unexpectedly, he got stuck there. The real estate company, his father’s joint venture, promoted him to the rank of senior manager. Besides, he met a Chinese woman whom he has since married. Following his parents’ retirement to Taiwan, Lee has found himself increasingly involved in his wife’s family business in Beijing, where he has begun to establish a Chinese network. Lee said that he sees a brighter career vision in China, so he has no desire to move back to Taiwan in the near future.

Spatial Mobility and Upward Mobility
Taiwanese migrants in China consist of people of various education levels, incomes or wealth, and cultural capital. However, the vignettes shown in the last section demonstrate that generally these migrants enjoy a high socioeconomic status in the local society. Recent migration studies (Foner, Rumbaut & Gold, 2000; Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2003) note that contemporary migrants represent polarized demographic characteristics: manual laborers and low-wage service workers on the one hand and highly-educated, highly-skilled professionals, technicians, and managers on the other. It is true that most Taiwanese migrants hold managerial jobs—in SMEs or large corporations—but not all of them are highly-skilled workers. Besides, the threshold of migration to China is relatively low, due to China’s proximity to Taiwan—geographically and culturally—and its looser policy on visas and work permits towards Taiwanese.4

Despite the fact that Taiwanese migrants do not all belong to the same economic class, they indeed form a distinctive social group in China, based not only on nationality but also on social status. Two factors contribute to their economic privileges: the difference of living standards between China and Taiwan, and Taiwanese migrants’ spatial and upward mobility. First, Taiwanese take the advantage of migrating from a more advanced society to a developing country. In 2007, Taiwan’s GPI per capita was
$17,950, sharply in contrast to China’s $2,370 (The World Bank, 2007). That means the average Taiwanese family can live the life of an upper-middle class family in China, if they wish. As a result, they often feel a sense of superiority, owing not only to their higher incomes but also to a more “progressive” place of origin. This class distinction is most obvious in industrial districts, where Taiwanese managers encounter Chinese migrant workers (dagongzai) from poorer inland provinces.

Second, migrating to China, for the Taiwanese, accompanies the ascendance of economic and occupational statuses. Watson (1960, 1964) observed that the expansion of national corporations in mid-century England brought a legion of managerial spiralists to industrial towns. These professionals’ upward mobility was combined with their spatial mobility. Despite sharing similar economic standards with local businessmen, the spiralists developed a more generic culture, one with international standards of value that kept them apart from the locals. Spiralism—the combination of mobility in residence, career, and social standing (Watson, 1960, p.416)—is evident among Taiwanese migrants, albeit in a transnational context. Expatriate job assignments to China often, if not always, bring pay raises and career promotions. Business people, if they succeed, are able to extend the scale and influences of their enterprises.

By and large, expatriate employees can skip some rungs on the career ladder when
taking jobs in China. Their occupational upward mobility is evidenced by better salaries, higher job positions, greater scopes of management, and possibly, more impressive resumes. In Taiwanese firms, expatriates—newly hired and existing employees alike—are paid much higher salaries than Chinese in the same positions. This is because the wages of Taiwanese workers are measured by their ranks in Taiwan’s parent companies, while the pay of Chinese workers is based on local levels. On average, my interviewees had 50% to 100% pay raises immediately after transferring to China. The pay packages might also include flight tickets, homecoming vacations, allowances, bonuses, stock options, and so on.\(^7\) A young engineer (SH20A) working for a Taiwanese electronic company told me that his starting salary in China was roughly equal to ¥18,000 ($2570) per month, a 50% pay raise. He also became a division head supervising a team of 80 people. On the contrary, Chinese employees in his position were paid between ¥6,000 ($850) and ¥9,000 ($1285), half of his salary. An operative on the shop floor was paid only the minimum wage—about ¥750 ($107) per month at that time. The pay differentials are sharpened by the fact that Taiwanese usually hold higher positions in Taiwanese firms. This has created a distance between the Taiwanese and Chinese in terms of class relations.

Investments in China can also mean upward mobility for business people, as they
usually expand the scale of their enterprises. A manager (SH02) who owned a share of a printing house in Kunshan said that he hired thirty employees in China. Their payroll was equal to that of only five workers in Taiwan. Because of the larger workforce, he could showcase the plant to his clients and feel like he was running a “real company” rather than a workshop. It was precisely this achievement of being a “boss” that made a businesswoman (SH26) feel like “Empress Dowager Cixi,” a woman who held supreme authority for nearly half a century in China’s Qing Dynasty. When I walked with her around her business center in Shanghai, I saw that she received salutes from a herd of compliant security guards. Taiwanese expatriates’ dual mobility—spatial and upward mobility as one package at the time of migration—and the gap in the standards of living between China and Taiwan provide huge economic incentives for people to invest or work in China. They also greatly influenced migrants’ lifestyles and mentality in places of adoption.

Being Global Nomads and Adventurers

As Gold (1997) argues, post-migration reconstructions of reasons for exit can be distorted by current experiences or selective memory. When asked why they had moved
to China, my subjects often showed an ambiguous attitude. On one hand, they felt compelled to “follow the business trend”—meaning “moving westward” (xijin) to China. Some people said that migration was not their previous life plan. They just seized the opportunities. Such narratives of passivity were more apparent among expatriate employees, who often moved to China because of job assignments. Only few acknowledged that they had actively looked for jobs in China. On the other hand, even these passive migrants would say that China had abundant economic opportunities, which only occurred during a radical societal change. Accordingly, they were anxious to “seize the moment.” Business people were particularly keen to become a shareholder of “China Inc.” upon its initial public stock offering (IPO). They saw China as the world factory, as an emergent gigantic consumer market, and as an international hub of trade (see table 3.1). Whatever they were aiming for—cheap labor, the big market, or trade—Taiwanese investors felt urgent to act.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common factors</th>
<th>Push factors of Taiwan</th>
<th>Pull factors of China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business People</td>
<td>Higher labor cost</td>
<td>Cheap labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small market</td>
<td>Investment incentives and government efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political infighting and uncertainty</td>
<td>The same language and culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Expecting) economic slump</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3.1 Most-mentioned reasons for investment or working in China*
A getaway to the global market
Huge domestic market

| Expatriate workers | Difficult to land (appealing) jobs | Higher salaries
|                   | Small scale of companies          | Preempting good positions
|                   |                                  | Having the “China experience” for better career development

The anxiety not to be kept out of China’s economic prosperity also haunts some wage earners. My interviewees often mentioned the importance of having the “China experience,” particularly when one is young. “China experience is inevitable,” a housewife (SZ19) explained why she gave up her job in Taiwan and came to Shenzhen with her husband, who became a senior manager with a Fortune 500 Taiwanese company. “Only in China could my husband oversee large orders for high-end consumer electronics from around the world,” she added. Such reasoning was not limited to managerial elites in multinational corporations. Ping Liu, a middle-aged single mother with a high-school degree, cherishes her job as finance manager in a lumber company in Dongguan. She said proudly that when her boss is away, she is de facto in charge of the whole plant with about 1000 employees. On the contrary, she would never have been able to get a senior managerial job in Taiwan. In fact, a 2008 survey on Taiwanese wage-earners revealed that the main attraction of working in China was that “the China experience facilitated career advancement” (Peng, 2008). Even a Western-educated academic (SH27) turned down a
job offer from a prestigious university in Taipei and chose to work at a higher-education institution in Shanghai. Besides economic incentives, he told me that he wanted to have the China experience: “I don’t want to be an onlooker in Taiwan and fail to witness the rise of China.”

Although China’s economic development lagged behind Taiwan's, the nation is incomparably larger than Taiwan, and increasingly, becoming a powerhouse of the world economy. It is precisely the two faces of China—as an industrial latecomer and as a rising giant—that motivate Taiwanese to invest and work in China. Migration from a small island to the vast, “uncultivated” mainland feels like a great adventure. For businessmen, it is a realization of *entrepreneurship*. For expatriate employees, it becomes a *rite of passage* that one should experience at least once for the sake of career development. As a result, my subjects often reasoned their presence in China with the logic of “nomads” or “adventurers.”

First, there is a widespread nomadic mentality among Taiwanese migrants that “one should graze cattle on pastures when they are lush and green.” Business people argue that an opportune timing for entry to China will be short-lived. If they fail to hitch on the “China-fever” bandwagon early, they may miss the window of opportunity. One interviewee (SH11) asked her previous employer for a job in Suzhou in order to help her
husband set up restaurant business there. She said that China was a “goldmine” but one had to dig into it early. “We don’t want to be trailblazers, but we don’t want to be left behind, either,” she emphasized. Similarly, Li-ling Chang, a CFO with a leading Taiwanese high-tech corporation, said that she met a group of Chinese graduates from elite universities in the late 1990s and started feeling insecure about her career. She decided to preempt a position in a big Taiwanese firm in China and eventually got promoted as she had planned. The necessity of seizing the moment was also expressed in such notions as “Shanghai is the next New York and Tokyo,” emphasized by my research subjects. Therefore, there was a need to “catch up the last train” to China’s prosperity.

Second, migrating to China was somewhat adventurous. Migrants feel that the vast land of China is a “frontier”—full of opportunities and dangers at the same time. On one hand, it is easier to start a business or find high-salary jobs in China. On the other hand, one has to tolerate China’s living standards, particularly when the business or job opportunities are located outside modern cities. When Feng-yi Pang came to Shanghai in the mid-1990s, what he saw was a status of “chaos.” He sensed that there were a lot of chances to make a profit because Taiwan had experienced the same process before. Besides, compared with vast China, Taiwan was like a small “cage” that would restrain his business potential. “I liked adventure and challenge, so that I decided to move to
here,” Pang recalled. The comparison between small Taiwan and big China was frequently heard during my field trip. One businessman (SH26) emphasized: “A market to businessmen is like a stage to actors. China is such a big stage to play. But one has to be aware of numerous traps.” Even a housewife (SZ13) said that when she arrived in China, the image of *Wagon Train*, an American western movie, appeared in her mind. She felt as if her family had been heading to an unexplored land.

Of course, not every adventure leads to success. Some of my interviewees had been jobless at some point. An expatriate (SH16) who had stayed in China for ten years lamented that he had had a lot of ups and downs there. He once had a monthly income of ¥60,000 ($8500) when making a fortune from business investment, but he also once lived on a salary tantamount to that of a Chinese migrant worker. This man emphasized that economically, he was not successful in China. However, the idea of moving back to Taiwan made him feel unfulfilled, so he had decided to hang on. Some migrants joke that currently there are a lot of “Taiwanese vagabonds” (*tailiǔ*) in China—people who are jobless but refuse to return home. Betty Lee, an expatriate employee turned businesswoman, said that she was once unemployed for one year but felt ashamed to go back to Taiwan.

Migrants like Betty might not be the great conqueror Genghis Khan, as portrayed by
the Taiwanese media (see Chapter 1), but they do see themselves as global nomads and adventurers who have come to the mainland to pursue their China dreams. Their mobility has helped them develop a self-perception of having a more “cosmopolitan” vision, compared not only with the Chinese locals but also with their “insular” countrymen in Taiwan. The vastness of China and this country’s rising global influence make migrants feel more “internationalized”—a buzzword repeatedly raised by my interviewees. In this way, they are simultaneously engaged in Taiwan and China, or even other countries, and they also develop a consciousness of being the transnational class separated from the immobile people in any of those places.

**Distinction and Virtual Segregation**

Despite the fact that many expatriates work for Taiwanese firms and do business with Taiwanese companies, they do not actually live in ethnic enclaves in China. Instead, they are constantly in contact with Chinese people at work and in pleasure. However, interviewed migrants often indicated that they continued to live a “Taiwanese way of life” after migration. A sales manager (SH06A) likened the Taiwanese in Shanghai to Jews in the Diaspora: “We form a small circle of Taiwanese in which we continue to see
Taiwanese doctors, eat Taiwanese foods, and watch Taiwanese TV.” He joked that migrants in nearby industrial districts were virtually living in Taiwan. A visit to Shanghai city once in a while was, ironically, like “going abroad” for them. Literally, this was an overstatement and at best, a metaphor. Nevertheless, Taiwanese migrants often said that they felt like they were still living in Taiwan and made little effort to adapt to the local life. Taiwan’s linguistic and cultural affinity with China might create such an illusion, allowing them to maintain their original lives without much change. However, many migrants do intend to keep their distance from the locals. Their isolationist mentality is related to their higher class status and their self-perception of having a more cosmopolitan outlook, which presents itself in their residences, children’s education, consumption patterns, and social lives, and so forth.

Residence

Previous studies (Deng, 2002; Wang, 2007) show that Taiwanese migrants usually reside in gated communities in China, such as company-provided dormitories and luxurious residential complexes, which makes them spatially segregated from the outside world. However, these company compounds and residential communities are not exclusive to Taiwanese residents. Neither do all migrants confine their activities to these
isolated settings. Their degree of spatial mobility is contingent on the locations they live in. In modern cities such as Shanghai and Shenzhen, Taiwanese feel comfortable traveling around. In industrial districts, particularly in less developed areas in Southern China, migrants tend not to inhabit local neighborhoods because of safety concerns.

Most Taiwanese companies in China provide meals and accommodations for expatriates, without or with a minimal charge. In industrial districts, Taiwanese employees and business owners usually reside within or close to company compounds consisting of factories, warehouses, offices, restaurants, and dormitories. In a sense, such compounds are self-sufficient oases. Expatriates’ basic demands and daily chores are well taken care of by service laborers so that they can concentrate on their work. In the Shenzhen-Dongguan area, working from 8 am to 9 pm, six days a week, is normal. Sometimes night shifts are not made official, but expatriates feel obligated to work late. A female asset manager (SZ07) emphasized that her job is based on “responsibility” rather than working hours. As long as the shop floor is in operation, she has to stay on the alert. On Sunday, she is either on duty or too exhausted to go out.

In addition to long working hours, business owners and expatriates in Shenzhen and Dongguan expressed a concern about safety in their surroundings. They argued that crime rates were high and that Taiwanese—deemed richer than locals—were easy targets.
Business owners often have personal drivers for transport. Some expatriate employees rarely leave company compounds, especially during weekdays. When they need to do so, they hire acquainted drivers and band together. Some of my interviewees reminded me not to take public transportation or stop a taxi on the streets to avoid robberies or something worse. Although these compounds are equipped with tight security, some cautious businessmen still feel unsafe. A general manager (SZ25) arranged for his family to live in the city and spends two hours daily commuting to his factory in the outskirts of Shenzhen. He insists on driving himself so that company chauffeurs will not know his family’s residence.

Expatriate employees living in well-planned industrial districts are less constrained. In Suzhou, for instance, more migrants drive, and those who don’t are less fearful of crimes. A senior manager (SH09) emphasized that Suzhou was safer than Taipei because the streets are patrolled by the armed police. However, a more subtle segregation, along an ethnic line, remains in factory settings everywhere. Taiwanese expatriates, whatever their positions are, usually reside and dine separately from their Chinese coworkers. In smaller firms, the boundaries between the boss and the Taiwanese subordinates are blurred, while the division between Chinese and Taiwanese is salient. Eric Chen, who worked for a Taiwanese footwear firm, said that his company accommodated Chinese
staffers only outside the compound based on a fear that they would steal business secrets.

The spatial separation furthers not only mutual suspicions but also class distinction between the Taiwanese and Chinese. The dormitories and restaurants for the Taiwanese are usually better than those for the Chinese. A female expatriate (SH20B) said that the restaurant for the Chinese workers was closer to her dormitory, but she seldom dined there for the sake of her health.

 Those migrants who have families around are more likely to live away from the factories and reside in gated residential communities. For example, in a huge residential complex in the Shenzhen suburb concentrate hundreds of Taiwanese, most of whom are employees or family members of a big Taiwanese corporation. Shu-Min Lu’s family lives in a community within this complex, protected by two security checkpoints and numerous patrolling guards. Visitors are only allowed entry with IDs and confirmed invitations. As a housewife, Lu said that she seldom goes outside the complex unless she is with her family or other Taiwanese housewives. She feels that the neighborhood is dangerous because it is situated outside the gateways of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ) *(guanwai)*. On the contrary, migrants who live in Shanghai or Shenzhen *(guanne)* (inside the zone) feel safe to idle in the city by car, taxi, or subway. The main reason given for living in those security-guarded residences is that they are newer and
have better housing units. While these gated communities do not actually segregate Taiwanese migrants from their neighborhoods, they do serve to distinguish them as people of the higher class in the Chinese society.

*Children’s Education*

Compared to company compounds, the campuses of Taiwanese schools are even more isolated. The rapid increase of Taiwanese families in China has created a great demand for educational institutions suitable for Taiwanese children. Since 2000, there have been three Taiwanese schools set up in China that provide K-12 education.9 These schools hire instructors from Taiwan to teach core subjects, such as Mandarin, mathematics, and science. Students study the traditional Chinese characters used in Taiwan. They also adopt Taiwanese textbooks so that they can take the entry exams for Taiwan’s universities.10 Most students—including kindergarteners—and teachers live on campus and have various activities together day and night. These private schools are partially subsidized by the Taiwanese government, and their tuition is middle-of-the-road in China (see table 3.2 for a comparison of various school types). An administrator of Taiwan Businessmen’s Dongguan School (SZ23) said that he never considered himself to be in the land of China because the campus was a “little Taiwan.” In fact, many
Taiwanese children are sent to this school to avoid mixing with local children.

Table 3.2 Tuition of schools with large numbers of Taiwanese students

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School types</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Tuition (semester)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International School</td>
<td>Shanghai Singapore International School(K-12)</td>
<td>¥72,000-136,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese School</td>
<td>Hwa Dong Businessman’s School(K-12)</td>
<td>¥15,000-19,300**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private School</td>
<td>SMIC Private School(K-12)</td>
<td>¥12,000-16,000 (Chinese track)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>¥30,000-37,000 (English track)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charter School</td>
<td>Shenzhen Nanshan Bilingual School(1-12)</td>
<td>¥4,400-6,000 (ordinary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>¥10,000-11,600 (experimental)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public School International division</td>
<td>Shanghai High School International Division</td>
<td>¥38,800-42,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Tuition is based on the 2009-2010 school year. Other fees are not included.
** Total expense, including the fees of dormitory and meals.
Sources: school websites.

However, attending Taiwanese schools is not the sole option for Taiwanese migrants' children. On the surface, the number of students at these schools seems to grow annually. However, they have been increasingly losing the edge in student recruitments. In 2006, the three Taiwanese schools had about 2,500 students. In Shanghai alone, however, there were 4,300 Taiwanese children of age to attend grades K-12 (The Ministry of Education, Taiwan, 2007). My interviewees often complained that Taiwanese schools were boarding schools far away from homes. Some migrants feel that their children should receive more
“internationalized” or “localized” education instead of staying in Taiwanese enclaves. In Shanghai and Shenzhen, there are a variety of schools to choose from—international schools, international divisions of public schools, private schools, charter schools, and various ranks of public schools.

Without a doubt, only well-heeled families can afford the expensive tuition of international schools. For example, Shanghai Singapore International School asks as much as ¥272,000 ($40,000) a year for tuition alone. Min-yi Chang arranged for her son to attend this school, hoping that he could learn English earlier in a more “internationalized environment.” She plans for her son to study in a Western country for higher education. For those families with less disposable incomes, the budding private schools in China deliver an alternative. Their tuitions are usually moderate—similar to Taiwanese schools. They also offer English-track education in addition to Chinese courses. Some parents say that studying Chinese is also important for their children because they might have to work or do business in China in the future. The same reason propels more and more parents to send their children to public schools, preparing them to compete with Chinese students from the start. After a survey showed that some Taiwanese students wished to pursue higher education in China, Taiwan Businessmen’s Dongguan School negotiated a special channel for their graduates to apply to Chinese
universities.  

Attending public schools may be a step toward “going native,” but such localization is highly selective. Public schools in China are tuition-free but explicitly hierarchical, ranking from elite schools through schools for locals to schools for migrants. Even elite schools are graded on several levels. Taiwanese parents often target the better ones, if not the best ones. Pei-ying Chu sent her children to local public schools upon migration, with the thinking that “China is the linkage to the international society.” She only realized afterwards that the student body of this school was comprised of the children of migrant workers, and she then immediately transferred her children to an elite public school. Also, not every public school is “free” for all. Many jurisdictions in China ask a local household registration (*huko*) or payment for students to attend public schools. It is an open secret that a certain “sponsor fee” is required by elite schools.

Feng-yi Pang, a veteran migrant whose daughter is enrolled in a top public elementary school in Shanghai, emphasized that even money did not guarantee admission to this school. “You need to have better guanxi than others,” he noted, adding that the child of a high-profile district official had been rejected. Therefore, while the walls of Taiwanese schools segregate Taiwanese children from the outside world, the barriers to entering better schools in China prevent them from contact with certain components of
the Chinese society. Vichy Kao, a housewife, admitted that schools of higher tuition or fees functioned as the mechanism of “sifting” some students from others. The reasons for sending children to these different kinds of schools may look different—staying Taiwanese, becoming internationalized, or going native. However, underneath these various reasons exists the common intention of making a distinction.

Consumption

Consumption is a significant symbol of class status. Because of their higher income in relation to average Chinese households, Taiwanese expatriates enjoy a more luxurious lifestyle in China. When asked whether they were indigenized to the local society, Taiwanese respondents often used consumption as a key index. Such examples include: “I usually buy foods of higher quality, but I’m not afraid of eating disgusting street foods at times” (SH05); “Unlike other Taiwanese people, I ride on subway for work instead of taking taxi” (SH13); “I’m okay with eating a ¥5 lunch box, like most of my Chinese coworkers do” (SH19). In Shenzhen, every housewife I interviewed said she buys groceries at Sam’s Club at least once a week, saying that the quality of products is better than that of those in traditional markets and local supermarkets. Some frequent Hong Kong to search for products not “made in China.” Since many migrants are concerned
about food safety and product quality in China, they are willing to spend more money to keep a higher living standard.

However, it should be noted that few Taiwanese live a life of “conspicuous consumption” as described by Veblen (1899/1994). First, not every migrant can afford to keep up with the Joneses. As Mei-li Wu stressed, income differences among migrants were too great to ignore, but Taiwanese still lived with an expectation that they were richer than locals. For instance, it can be difficult for Taiwanese to make satisfactory bargains with Chinese merchants. In fact, it was a common complaint among my subjects that they were asked a much higher price for the same product and treated like “daibao” (Taiwanese simpletons). As a result, they have tried to learn Chinese accents and usages to avoid exposing their Taiwanese identities. Second, richer migrants have another reason to remain low-profile in China. They are self-restrained in lifestyle to prevent possible crimes or unnecessary controversies.

Avoiding conspicuous consumption, Taiwanese mark class distinction in a more subtle way—the difference of taste. Some migrants joke that only a few years ago, Shanghainese would wander around the streets or shop at department stores in pajamas, indicating their lack of decency. Despite the fact that nowadays few Shanghainese really do so, “pajamas parties” become cool events among young Taiwanese migrants. They
may have transformed the meaning of wearing pajamas in public from vulgarity to avant-garde, but the sense of belittling remains. A school teacher (SZ24) emphasized that he would rather wear counterfeit brand-name casual attire than Chinese suits. He said that his wife was Chinese, but he didn’t want to “look like Chinese” from the countryside.

Taiwanese migrants’ criticism of Chinese low taste includes those nouveau riches, who, in migrants’ view, like to parade their wealth. A businessman (SZ01) analyzed different consumption patterns between the Taiwanese and Chinese: “When we have disposable money, we use it to expand the factory or buy equipments. On the contrary, Chinese would spend on luxurious goods, cars and houses. They focus more on their appearances.” In a similar regard, a restaurant manager (SH19) observed: “Taiwanese are clinging to every dollar, while Chinese like extravagant restaurant experiences. They need not work hard as we did to get their ‘first barrel of gold.’” Therefore, some Taiwanese migrants admit that they live a better life than the average Chinese, but they are also moderate on spending. What distinguishes them from affluent locals, they believe, is a higher standard in taste.

Social Life and Marriages

Outside of work, Taiwanese migrants usually have a limited social life in China.
Visiting massage parlors is a favorite activity outside the home. When seeking out companions, they haunt restaurants or karaoke bars. Those who live with family may buy groceries at international supermarket chains on the weekend. Some have “healthier” hobbies, such as playing softball or golf, cycling, and travel, albeit mostly with other Taiwanese. A few are more socially active, but many of my interviewees said that their lives are simple and somewhat boring in China. Expatriate employees living in company dormitories often described themselves as a zhainan (family man) or zhainu (family woman) who enjoyed staying at home. Even those living in Shanghai said that it was difficult to find satisfactory entertainment. A manager (SH05) explained that China was a “materialistic society,” in which only rich people could afford better services—highways, theme parks, and high-end restaurants. Therefore, he would rather spend his time at home on weekends.

As for social networks, those who stay longer in China may have more Chinese acquaintances in the business community or at local bureaucracies. Some have kinship relationships with the Chinese, by blood or by marrying Chinese women. These people are more likely to say that they have Chinese friends. Nevertheless, they still maintain a Taiwanese-only intimate circle. The majority of my interviewees hang out only with other Taiwanese at leisure. On one hand, staying in the Taiwanese social network is an
intentional act of “self-protection.” Many migrants complained that they had been defrauded by Chinese business partners or employees, so they distrusted Chinese people in general. Contrastingly, they thought of their fellow Taiwanese as more loyal and trustworthy.

The suspicion towards the Chinese also comes from political antagonism between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Some migrants said that they had good relations with Chinese but felt tired of their nationalistic unification campaign (tongzhan)—arguing that Taiwan was part of China and criticizing Taiwan independence. A businessman (SZ04) who regularly visited China on business trips recalled that he once had dinner in China with some Chinese officials. At that occasion, he was reminded that one should not forget where his ancestors came from—meaning mainland China. The next morning he found himself forcibly “escorted” to visit his ancestral town hundreds of miles away.

On the other hand, the formation of Taiwanese social networks is also a consequence of class differences. In office or factory settings, Taiwanese tend to occupy higher positions. It is not appropriate or desirable for them to make friends with their subordinates. Sometimes the two reasons—mutual distrust and class difference—overlap. After an eight-year stay China, one expatriate manager (SZ05) has developed personal networks primarily composed of Chinese people. However, he said in a definite tone that
Taiwanese people are more reliable. “You have to be cautious of making Chinese friends because the economic inequality in China is so great that you never know why people approach you.” Therefore, many Taiwanese migrants are too afraid of being taken advantage of by Chinese to associate with them too closely.

Despite the prevalent intermarriages between Taiwanese men and Chinese women, my interviewees who married Chinese wives seldom make Chinese friends through their wives. In addition, Taiwanese women rarely marry Chinese men. Here class distinction and gender hierarchy work together to create the perception that it is appropriate for Taiwanese men to marry Chinese women, but not for Taiwanese women to marry Chinese men. Every single Taiwanese woman I met in China told me that she would never marry a Chinese man. They often cited “cultural difference” as the reason, but the sense was that they did not want to “marry down.” One of my female interviewees (SZ15), a single woman, made fun of Taiwanese women in China—they were either single, divorced, or if lucky, getting married before migration. Accordingly, single Taiwanese women often see their stays in China as temporary, unless they want to remain single. They also sense their disadvantage in competing with Chinese women for Taiwanese men. They have thus developed a somewhat hostile attitude towards Chinese women, who they see as “unrestrained” in sexuality. This hard feeling is also shared by Taiwanese married women,
who fear that their husbands will be seduced by Chinese mistresses.

On the contrary, Taiwanese men find themselves popular in China. For example, Feng-yi Pang told me that he was pursued by his Chinese wife, a physician in Shanghai. He reiterated a saying: “The most beautiful women sail across the Strait, while the less beautiful ones stay in Shanghai”—meaning that Shanghai women were crazy about Taiwanese men. The gender and ethnic differences in the marriage market in China explain why female migrants are more detached from Chinese society, viewing it as a temporary stop. In addition, since male is considered the dominant sex, Taiwanese men who marry Chinese women are less inclined to be incorporated into their wives’ personal connections. As a result, Taiwanese migrants often maintain a Taiwanese-dominant social network in China.

The examination of Taiwanese migrants’ life experiences—residences, children’s education, consumption habits, and social networks—show that they intend to live a “Taiwanese way of life” and keep a distance from the host society. The “Taiwanese way of life” indicates the making of distinction, not only in terms of socioeconomic class, but also in terms of lifestyle.

Work-life Disjuncture and Home Connections
Waldinger (2008) categorized contemporary international migrants into three groups—*immigrants* who plan to settle down in a new place, *transmigrants* who maintain here-there ties, and *sojourners* whose displacement is experienced as temporary and who never put down roots. My interview data suggest that it is not appropriate to place all Taiwanese migrants in China into the same category. The issue of categorization is further complicated by historical and political relations between China and Taiwan. A few of my interviewees were extremely resistant to the term *immigrants* (*yimin*) in Chinese, for different reasons. Some argued that migrating to China was different from migrating to other foreign countries; therefore, immigration sounded wrong to them. Conversely, some said that labeling them as immigrants suggested a betrayal to Taiwan, a stain they tried to avoid. Those who planned to stay in China for a long while suggested *settlers* (*yijuzhe*) as a more neutral and acceptable term, despite its indication of a status of immigration.

From the perspective of citizenship, Taiwanese migrants are *expatriates*—foreigners who decide to live abroad for a while. My interviewees said that they had never heard of any Taiwanese changing citizenship to the PRC. At present, Taiwanese passports make border crossing easier, greatly enhancing the spatial mobility of the Taiwanese. Some hold, or intend to obtain, passports of Western countries, while at the same time retaining
their Taiwanese citizenship. Other reasons for continuing their membership with their home country include Taiwan’s better medical services and welfare system, China’s undemocratic political environment, and migrants’ allegiance to Taiwan.

Maintaining Taiwanese citizenship allows migrants to “keep feet in both worlds” (levitt, 2000), as transnational migrants do. However, their engagements with the countries of exit and entry are highly selective. Mostly Taiwanese migrants are economically embedded in China but are rarely involved in other types of activities. China’s political system and sensitive cross-Strait relations in particular make them politically silent in China. In contrast, many migrants remain concerned about Taiwan’s domestic politics. A community website administrator told me that his website mobilized thousands of migrants—by helping them to book airline tickets—to return to Taiwan for casting votes on Taiwan’s presidential election in 2008. He estimated that eight out of ten migrants in China were Blue Camp voters (KMT supporters) so the mobilization should help KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou, who spoke in favor of reconciliatory cross-Strait relations, get elected. Some migrants said that they did not go to the poll but gathered with friends in China to watch the televised vote-counting via Taiwanese satellite channels.

Economic involvements also keep Taiwanese migrants’ transnational connections
with their home country alive. Many business people still have investments at home and have to take care of them once in a while. The pay of expatriate employees at Taiwanese firms is usually split between Taiwan and China, but sometimes involves a “third place” with which their companies register, like Hong Kong. Such distributions of salaries lower expatriates’ income taxes, especially in China, which has higher tax rates. Accordingly, migrants usually have direct deposit bank accounts in Taiwan. Some expatriates are offered share options in Taiwan’s parent companies. These economic considerations make migrants keep a watchful eye on Taiwan’s economic and political change. In this sense, they are better described as a large transnational constituency of Taiwan.

Kinship linkages matter a lot in migrants’ transnational activities. Some expatriates are single and others leave their spouses and children behind in Taiwan. Even family migration rarely includes migrants’ elderly parents. Therefore, most Taiwanese firms provide several round-trip flight tickets a year for expatriates, making them frequent flyers across the Taiwan Strait. Mediated personal communication, such as the use of MSN and Skype, helps migrants to sustain their social networks in Taiwan—although some interviewees said that such virtual relationships waned over time. A married finance manager (SZ26) migrated to Shenzhen alone. At night, he usually keeps his Skype connected with his home in Taiwan for hours. Through video-conferencing, he said that
he is able to monitor his children’s homework and tutor them. “I can live anywhere as long as I have access to the wireless and the Internet,” a businesswoman (SZ11) emphasized. These examples demonstrate that telecommunications do shorten the sense of distance. However, virtual presence remains different from physical presence. One expatriate (SZ16) works in Shenzhen, while his wife lives in Dongguan, and their child stays with his parents in Taiwan. He said that no technologies would be able to ease his anguish over the family separation.

A more profound factor that sustains migrants’ relations with Taiwan is their life in China. Many migrants said that they moved to China for work or business rather than the pursuit of a new life or a desire to return to the “motherland.” Because of their heavy workload and China’s lower living standard, they rarely enjoy life or feel relaxed in the places to which they have migrated. Betty Lee, a businesswoman who is single, said that going back to Taiwan once in a while is the only way she can recharge her energy. Sometimes the inconsistency between career and life can tear apart a soul, particularly when the person moved to China alone. James Wang, a manager with a foreign bank in Shanghai, has lived away from his wife—a successful career woman in Taiwan—for five years. Despite visiting Taiwan five times a year, he suffers from his self-interested decision to pursue his own career in China:
I feel a conflict all the time. For the sake of my career, I should stay here (China).

Have you heard of the TV documentary *The Rise of the Great Nations*? China is the next rising great nation and Shanghai will soon reclaim its status as the center of Asia. In the past, I often lamented that I was not born in a great epoch. Now I have the opportunity to witness the opening of a new era and become part of the history. Shouldn’t I stay here?[......]But I also tell myself that life is more than work. My migration to China is temporary and I will return to Taiwan anytime soon. However, it’s like running against the current of the times. (James Wang, junior manager/banking).

The work-life disjunction in China increases migrants’ homesickness, but few said that they planed to return to Taiwan at the years to come. Alex Ho, a businessman, told me that several years ago he was shocked when hearing his friend’s decision to stay in China for good. Only after he came to own his business in China did he realize the dilemma: “since you have had your hair wetted, you can’t stop in the middle of hair-washing.” Generally speaking, businesspeople have greater motivation to immigrate than expatriate employees do. However, the principle does not always hold true. Some
business owners have more than one passport and are thinking of moving to Western countries or returning to Taiwan after their retirement. Some managers insist on working in China to advance their careers or to establish their businesses in the future.

I listed seven terms used by Taiwanese media to describe the Taiwanese in China and asked my subjects which one best matched their migration status (See table 3.3). The first group include “returnees,” “immigrants,” and “settlers,” which implies a plan of permanent stay and the feeling of getting settled. Those who choose these terms can be seen as self-described immigrants. The second group contains “nomads,” “sojourners,” and “strangers,” and epitomizes a transient mentality and a disassociation from the local society. People of this group are better described as sojourners. Those who choose “migratory bird” may be caught in between.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration mentality</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Returnee (guixiangren)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Retuning to parents’ hometown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant (yimin)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Getting settled or planning to settle down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settler (luohu)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Planning to stay for a long while Being living with family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migratory bird (honiao)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Flying back and forth Being able to live either in Taiwan or China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomad (youmuminzu)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>A temporary stop for work</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The majority of my interviewees fall into the category of *sojourners* (including nomads, sojourners, and strangers). They see China as only a stop for work and think that they will return to Taiwan or move to other countries, although the timing for that proposed move is not clear. Others consider themselves returnees, immigrants, or settlers. These people are more likely to be married males who live with their families in China and who consider themselves Chinese. However, there is a gap between reality and desire. For example, Wei-chi Hsu has a successful family business, a highly-educated Chinese wife, and a luxurious home in Shenzhen. He categorizes himself as an immigrant but he also has a strong desire to return to Taiwan: “I don’t like here. I just get used to it and try to accept it. My home is in Taiwan. Strolling on any streets in Taipei makes me happier than shopping in any fancy malls here.”

Such ambiguity and uncertainty about the status of migration are best described by Betty Lee, who said that she is “physically a settler but mentally a sojourner” because she
can not identify with the place of adoption. As a result of similar feelings, this multi-choice question often led interviewees to a kind of self-pity. A businessman (SH26), in his fifties, likened himself to a “Taiwanese ox”—a symbol of the Taiwanese spirit of hard work—fated to toil and live a vagabond life. He moved to Indonesia alone in the past and has worked in China for years without his family around. This man said that being a wanderer (liulang) was the destiny of Taiwanese people, evidenced in Taiwan’s history.

In sum, the interviewed group of Taiwanese migrants consists of people with diverse migration patterns. The majority of migrants categorize themselves as sojourners, but their sojourns might look as long as permanent residence. A few migrants plan to get settled in China, without altering their citizenship. Self-described immigrants and sojourners share similar translocal lives, economically engaged in China and politically and culturally involved in Taiwan. No matter which category they chose, they maintain a transient and outsider mentality on the mainland, which prevents them from assimilating to the local life.

Conclusion
This chapter shows a disharmony between migrants’ career choices and life plans, reinforced by the structural difference between Taiwan and China. First, moving to China often helps migrants climb up on the career ladder. In this sense, Taiwanese migrants are *transnational spiralists* whose occupational upward mobility is combined with geographical mobility. Second, China’s living standard is much lower than Taiwan’s. As a result, migrants enjoy a higher socioeconomic status in the places of adoption, as seen in their choices of residence, children’s education, consumption habits, social networks, and so on.

On the one hand, the *dual mobility* of Taiwanese migrants makes them a group of its own kind in Chinese society, not only distinguished by their nationality and socioeconomic status, but also characterized by their culture of *transnational standards of values and lifestyle*. Migrating to China—a rising global giant—makes them feel they have a more international and cosmopolitan outlook than both the Chinese locals and their Taiwanese compatriots at home. However, this sense of connecting to the global nomad culture also prevents them from adapting to the local life.

On the other hand, life in China is not as satisfying as in Taiwan or elsewhere for many migrants. They often feel tormented by the decoupling of work and life. Consequently, they insist on living a “Taiwanese way of life” in China, which
demonstrates their expat lifestyle more than a transplantation of Taiwanese culture. Their sojourner or outsider mentality is an intentional resistance to assimilation. As the next chapter will argue, Taiwanese migrants’ detachment from Chinese society deeply shapes their behaviors of media use in China.

1 One of my male interviewees moved to China with his fiancée and virtually became a househusband. However, this is not a typical migration pattern among Taiwanese.

2 “Boss’s wife” is a crucial role in Taiwan’s family businesses. According to Lu’s (2001) study, a wife of a small business owner usually lacks a title in the company. However, she is often in charge of the company’s internal affairs and able to establish bargaining power in decision making.

3 Rumbaut coined the term, “the 1.5 generation,” to describe those foreign-born youths who immigrated before age 12 and came of age in the country of destination. He later developed the concepts of “1.25ers” (who entered at ages between 13 and 18) and “1.75ers” (who entered at age under 5) (Rumbaut, 1997).

4 The Chinese visa is a tricky issue for Taiwanese. On one hand, under the Chinese government’s “One China Policy,” Taiwanese can only enter China by holding the “Pass for Taiwanese Residents Traveling to the Mainland” (taibaozheng), on which the visas are stamped, instead of Taiwanese passports. On the other hand, China has increasingly given the Taiwanese more privileges of entering, residing, and working than other nationals. Taiwanese are allowed to apply for multiply entrance visas effective for one year and since 2005, Taiwanese can work anywhere in any sector if they meet certain conditions. In fact, currently Taiwanese can renew their visas in cities such as Shanghai and Shenzhen for fees as low as ¥100 ($14).

5 Wang’s (2007) study finds that Taiwanese expatriates’ sense of superiority in relation to local Chinese is based on their economic affluence and being “culturally better-off.” Such feelings are reproduced by the segregation of their social networks and educational systems from those of the local people. The “sense of superiority” was also an oft-mentioned term by my interviewees.


7 Some companies offer a handsome amount of allowances and stock options to attract talent. One housewife (SZ20) whose husband worked for a high-tech corporation said daily allowances for expatriates ranged from $400 (HK) to $500(HK). However, the most attractive incentives were stock options, which generated tremendous profits in the bull market.

8 The modern and urban part of Shenzhen, meaning inside the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, lies in stark contrast to its industrial districts on the skirts. A housewife
living in the Shenzhen city told me that she visited Hong Kong once a week but, out of safety concerns, she seldom went to neighboring areas outside the zone.

The three Taiwanese schools are Taiwan Businessmen’s Dongguan School (Dongguan, Guangdong Province), Hwa Dong Businessman’s School (Kunshan, Jiangsu Province), and Shanghai Taiwanese Children’s School (Shanghai), respectively established in 2000, 2001, and 2005.

Those textbooks are censored by China’s education authorities before distribution to students. In early 2000s, students returning to Taiwan for the entry exams often complained that their textbooks were a mess—missing pages or having been written all over. An administrator (SZ23) of Taiwan Businessmen’s Dongguan School told me that textbook censorship still remained. The school faculty had to spend two days collecting the content of textbooks in accordance to the requirements of Chinese authorities. Now they have learned to use stickers to cover forbidden words, such as “Republic of China,” to expedite the process.

According to one administrator of Taiwan Businessmen’s Dongguan School (SZ23), in 2008, 85% of their high school graduates went to Taiwan’s universities, 10% to Chinese universities, and 5% to other, Western countries.

For example, a Taiwanese woman recorded her experiences of attending a “Shanghai vulgar pajama party” on her blog posted on June 21, 2009 (http://babe0827.pixnet.net/blog/post/25316045), describing how a group of Taiwanese youngsters visited a restaurant and a karaoke bar in pajamas.

The terms zhainan and zhainu derive from Japanese otaku, referring to people with obsessive interests in such pastimes as cartoons or video games. They have negative denotations in Taiwan, used to describe people not only enjoying being at home but also becoming socially stunted.

Taiwanese voters are principally divided into the Blue Camp, which supports the KMT, and the Green Camp, which supports the DPP. The KMT is inclined toward unification with the PRC, while the DPP is inclined toward Taiwan’s de jure independence. Many of my interviewees said that the majority of migrants in China were Blue Camp voters and the minority Green Camp voters were reticent about their political stand. Before the 2004 presidential election, Chinese officials warned Taiwan entrepreneurs not to campaign for the DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian. After that election, those labeled green businesses—whose owners supported the DDP—were threatened to be closed down in China.
Chapter 4: Media Reception—Local Communications, Transnational

Contents

This chapter examines Taiwanese migrants’ reception of news and entertainment media and explores its implication for their identity. Transnational migration studies point out how home-host connections and diasporic imaginations are enabled and reinforced by electronic communication technologies. Studies of media globalization often attribute cultural proximity to increasing cultural flows among geo-cultural regions. Given China’s role as the imagined homeland for many Taiwanese and cultural affinity between China and Taiwan, how do Taiwanese migrants use media for information and entertainment in China? In what ways does the media environment in China constrain or facilitate such behaviors of media use?

According to my interview data, Chinese mainstream media play an insignificant role in Taiwanese migrants’ media consumption. Migrants seek Taiwanese media for news and receive media products from diverse sources—the global, the regional, home-country, and the local—for entertainment. Because of China’s regulations on informational and cultural inflows, migrants often utilize various underground communication tools, illegal but widely available in China, to keep their transnational
connections alive. This chapter explains why, and in what ways, Taiwanese migrant adopt localized communication tools to sustain transnational connections, particularly with their home country. The following sections analyze media resources in China available to Taiwanese migrants, their use of communication tools and reception of media content, and the implications of their media consumption for identity.

Media Overload or Media Scarcity?

China’s unique media environment greatly influences Taiwanese migrants’ behaviors of media use. On the one hand, rapid commercialization of the media has made abundant domestic entertainment and news sources available to them. On the other hand, overseas media products and news information, including those from Taiwan, are both restrictive and expensive through legal avenues. Accordingly, the attractiveness of the Chinese media to Taiwanese migrants determines whether they follow the mainstream or go underground for their media consumption.

To quote the words of an IT manager (SH24), “the media in China have made inroads into every space of people’s lives.” What he referred to was not just newsstands that sprawled in many streets corners. In Shanghai and Shenzhen, multimedia devices
may appear on the buses, cabs, and subway cars, or even in the elevator banks of commercial or residential buildings. These devices forcibly expose passengers or passersby to news sound bites, entertainment information, and more importantly, advertisements. The number of mainstream media outlets in China has also been exploding, especially in big markets. In 2008, China had a total of 1943 newspapers, including 224 national publications. Any of the four markets under my investigation—Shanghai, Suzhou, Shenzhen, and Dongguan—has at least two municipal newspapers (see Appendix D for the list of major newspapers and television channels in the four regions). Shanghai alone has more than one hundred registered dailies or weeklies devoted to regional news or specialized issues, such as sports, entertainment, and fashion. In addition to the local press, newsstands also sell papers circulated nationally, such as Southern Weekly, Reference News (Cankao Xiaoxi), People’s Daily, and Global Times. The retail price of a daily is around ¥0.6-1.5 ($0.1-0.2). Subway riders in Shanghai can get Metro Express which is distributed for free on weekday mornings.

Although compulsory subscription is not formally enforced, some Taiwanese companies reluctantly subscribe to Chinese publications for the sake of avoiding trouble or in exchange for bureaucratic favor. According to my interviewees, organ papers (jiguan bao)—especially those published at local levels, such as Dongguan Daily, or by
government departments, such as *China Taxation News*—are often promoted by village leaders or directly delivered to Taiwanese companies. Few companies refuse to pay the subscription fees. From a passive point of view, subscribing to those publications is like buying a “talisman” (*pingan fu*), as one finance manager (Ping Liu) argued. A businessman (Yu-Sheng Wang) said that he spent about ¥30,000 ($4,300) a year on newspapers and government documents from salesmen who claimed to represent government units. He doubted their identity but still paid the money in fear of offending any officials. From an active perspective, newspaper subscription was also part of public relations. Another finance manager (SZ17) emphasized that subscribing to newspapers promoted by local officials was a gesture of being “cooperative,” which would pay off when the company got into troubles. As a result, most Taiwanese companies I visited subscribed one or more Chinese newspapers. However, only very few of my interviewees said that they read those subscribed publications.

Besides the press, broadcasting is fast-growing in China, too. According to official statistics, China had 2,324 television stations as of December 2007, many of which carried multiple channels. Cable service reached 153 million homes nationwide. The four cities of my fieldwork have been well covered by cable television—cable penetration rates are 99.94% in Shanghai, 84.40% in Shenzhen, 62.40% in Jiangsu Province (where
Suzhou is located), and 62.26% in Guangdong Province (where Dongguan is located) (SARFT, 2008). Cable providers in these four cities carry 55 to 75 basic channels with monthly rates of less than ¥30 (under $5). The program menus are usually composed of 13 CCTV channels, 30-plus provincial satellite channels, and several channels operated by local stations. In Shenzhen and Dongguan, nine foreign channels sanctioned by the Chinese government are also included in basic cable packages. With the development of digital television, more channels—including unauthorized overseas channels—are available with additional fees.

These four coastal cities are also well connected to the Internet. In 2008, the Internet penetration rates in Shanghai and Guangdong—59.7% and 48.2% respectively—were much higher than the national average (21.9%). It should be noted that 90.6% of Chinese Internet users had broadband access, mostly provided by cable. Besides, 117.6 million or 39.58% of Internet users went online via mobile phones (CNNIC, 2009). The better telecommunication infrastructure in coastal cities and the application of mobile phones create a beneficial environment for online information circulation and media consumption. In sum, my research subjects have easy access to the Internet. A verity of Chinese print publications and television channels are also available to them at low price.

Contrary to the thriving domestic media market, legal foreign media products are
extremely scarce in China. On the website of the CIPIEC, the exclusive importer of the print press, virtually major Taiwanese newspapers and magazines are open to subscription, including the pro-independent *Liberty Times*. However, my interviewees concluded that only five Taiwanese publications are legally circulated in China—*The China Times, The Commercial Times, The United Daily News, The Economic Daily News,* and *Business Weekly* magazine. These titles belong to three media organizations deemed friendly to China. In addition to regulations on media imports, economic measures also restrain the spread of foreign publications. The CIPIEC asks ¥4,970 ($710) of annual subscription fees for each of the four dailies and ¥3,650 ($520) for the weekly, about five times of their prices in Taiwan. Due to the cost, these publications are chiefly supplied to Taiwanese-owned restaurants or companies instead of ordinary households. Only one of my interviewees (SH17) had home delivery of Taiwanese newspapers. Since 2008, *The United Daily News* has secretly distributed papers in China via its own agents and thus greatly reduced its price.

A tricky fact is that this newspaper’s website (*udn.com*) has been one of the few Taiwanese online news outlets unblocked in China. Under normal conditions, Taiwanese websites administrated by government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and news institutions are fully or partially barred from access. The blocking list may change
frequently in accordance with political climates, special timings, or the attitude of particular media. During the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008, for example, the control of inbound information was loosened for a brief time. Afterwards, the Chinese government swiftly resumed its grip on the Internet and re-blocked some foreign media websites, including *The New York Times* (Tran, 2008). Major Taiwanese news portals—such as *Yahoo! (Taiwan)*, *PC Home*, and *MSN (Taiwan)*—were also among the casualties.¹

Because of China’s media regulations, Taiwanese migrants find it difficult to receive home-country media through lawful channels. Meanwhile, the Chinese media is full of representations of Taiwan. On television, Taiwan-related productions range from news talk shows, entertainment programs to TV dramas. Since the broadcast of *Strait Express (Haixiaxinganxian)* on Fujian TV’s Southeast Satellite Channel in 2004, there have been eight news programs devoted to Taiwanese affairs on Chinese television. The list includes CCTV4’s *Across the Taiwan Strait* that has been on air since January 2008. Two foreign stations—Phoenix of Hong Kong and MASTV of Macau—also have several similar shows available in Guangdong via cable. These programs often obtain news footage from Taiwanese media and frequently live broadcast with Taiwanese reporters and pundits, making them an alternative source of Taiwanese news.

Asides from news programs, Chinese television stations scrambled to broadcast or
adapt Taiwanese variety shows and TV dramas in the 1990s (Gold, 1993; Sun, 2003). The import of Taiwanese programs only reduced after 2000, due to SARFT’s restrictions on Hong Kong and Taiwanese dramas (Liu, 2004). In 2008, 191 foreign TV dramas and films were approved for broadcast on Chinese television. Taiwanese programs accounted only for 15%.\(^2\) However, the Chinese government has encouraged cross-Strait co-productions to facilitate cultural exchange. Since January 2008, Taiwanese co-productions have been granted the same privileges as domestic programs (China News, 2007). Accordingly, five out of seven approved co-produced dramas in 2008 involved Taiwanese companies.\(^3\) It should be noted that even without co-productions, a great number of Taiwanese talents and production staff has worked with Chinese stations for years.

In addition, Taiwanese news often hits the headlines in Chinese newspapers. Because of the lack of Chinese correspondents in Taiwan, mostly the Chinese press picks up stories from Taiwanese media and re-edits them to suit their publications. Chang (2006) finds that People’s Daily, the Communist Party organ, adopts nine news frames to cover Taiwanese news, such as one-China policy, anti-independence discourse, facilitation of unification, the appeal of ancestral and cultural origin, and so on. In recent years, this newspaper has learned to make its coverage more convincing by citing
Taiwanese media to emphasize negative news about Taiwan.

In addition to legal imports and Chinese media, Taiwanese migrants also can resort to illegal tools for Taiwan’s information and media products. Satellites television is an expensive but convenient way. Since 1998, two Taiwanese satellite companies have operated in China—C-Sky-Net of CSTV (Chinese Satellite Communication Group) and D-Sky. Other operators, such as Pacific Satellite TV of Hong Kong and Dream Satellite TV of Philippine, also provide a few Taiwanese channels. Depending on dealers and packages, each new customer pays about ¥2,600-4,500 ($370-640) for equipments, installations, and subscription fees. From the second year on, subscribers pay about ¥1,500-1,800 ($215-255) annually to renew their smart cards.

According to my interviewees, flyers that advertised satellite TV installations are widely distributed. The real risk of installing satellite dishes is not the government crackdown; rather, people fear mostly of commercial scams by unauthorized dealers, who might sell pirated smart cards that work only a few days or weeks. Some companies also descramble the encrypted satellite signal and deliver it to customers via cable. This technique reduces the price to less than ¥2,000 ($285) for the installation. Users only pay additional ¥100 ($14) annually but risk receiving unstable and unclear signals. China’s control over foreign media hence creates a black market of foreign satellite TV that
allows swindlers to sell unauthorized products with dubious quality. However, Taiwanese satellite TV remains a vital news source for many migrants, including those who have lived in China for years.

News Media: Transnational Connections with Home

As discussed, media outlets available to Taiwanese migrants are plentiful, especially in Shanghai and Shenzhen. TV channels are mostly broadcast in Mandarin Chinese, which is official language in Taiwan. Newspapers and magazines are printed in the simplified Chinese characters, slightly different from the traditional Chinese characters used in Taiwan but not difficult for Taiwanese to understand. Despite linguistic similarities, my interview data show that the mainstream Chinese media play a relatively insignificant role in migrants’ reception of news and entertainment. Receiving Taiwanese news from Taiwanese media remains a common practice for almost every interviewee. A few migrants routinely access Chinese media for information about China. The degrees to which they engage in Chinese media, however, vary.

I asked my research subjects what kind of news concerned them most and then surveyed which news media outlets they accessed frequently. According to their answers,
I categorize migrants into three groups: home orientation (primarily receiving Taiwanese news from Taiwanese media, 59%), balanced reception (access to Taiwanese media and Chinese media equally, 29%), and host orientation (primarily receiving Chinese news from Chinese media, 6%). Of course, some migrants also obtain Chinese news from Taiwanese media, since many Taiwanese news outlets report “mainland news.” Conversely, some acquire Taiwanese news from Chinese media, particularly when they have no access to the Taiwanese media. These behaviors show that to some extent the Chinese and Taiwanese media sources are exchangeable for certain people.

*Home-oriented Reception*

The majority of my interviewees—regardless of their demographic characteristics—said that they pay more attention to Taiwanese news than Chinese. Satellite TV and the Internet are two primary media tools. More than a half of my subjects have access to Taiwanese satellite TV, either in the public areas of their companies or in private spaces, such as their dormitories or homes. In Taiwanese companies, satellite TV is usually installed in restaurants or recreation rooms, and is set on 24-hour news channels, such as TVBS-N, CtiTV News, or ETTV News. As a result, watching Taiwanese news became a collective ritual among expatriates. Some private
rooms also have satellite access, either paid for by employers or by users themselves.

The choices of media tools for those living at home are often determined by their ages and family circles. Middle-aged expatriates living with families are more likely to subscribe to Taiwanese satellite TV. They are able to afford this than younger migrants, more dependent on traditional media, and spend more time at home. On the contrary, singles or youngsters rely more on the Internet to receive Taiwanese news. Some use proxy technologies—as many Chinese do—to access the blocked Taiwanese news portals and websites. However, proxy software often slows down their computers and thus become impractical. Therefore, China’s control of inbound information does not prevent migrants from obtaining Taiwanese news via the Internet. Instead, it directs the traffic to the few unblocked websites, such as udn.com, the United Daily News’ online outlet. In addition, some Taiwanese companies or restaurants also supply Taiwanese newspapers.

Migrants’ persistence in receiving home-country media is heavily influenced by their relations with Chinese society and their opinions on the Chinese media. When asked why they were attentive to Taiwanese news instead Chinese news, basically interviewees cited three reasons: deep connections with Taiwan, an outsider mentality in China, and the dislike of the Chinese media.

First, the consumption of domestic news from countries of origin serves to satisfy
the longing for home (Sinclair et al., 2000). Very often my interviewees said that it is “natural” that they care about news in Taiwan. Some people are interested in Taiwanese news because they have savings, stock shares, or companies in Taiwan. For most migrants, Taiwan represents their “roots,” “homes,” or “motherland” to which they may or may not return, but have maintained emotional attachment. Several migrants who lived in other countries in the past said that they maintained the habits of receiving Taiwanese news abroad. By and large, the reception of Taiwanese news results from homesickness, but it also shows migrants’ concern of Taiwan’s political future.

The enthusiasm for Taiwan’s domestic politics is most apparent among middle-aged men, many of whom watch Taiwanese news talk shows everyday. One businessman (SZ14) admitted that he started the subscription to the United Daily News because he was too concerned with the 2008 presidential election. When I visit Shanghai in late 2008, many migrants were preoccupied with the news about the detention of former President Chen Shui-bian of the DPP, who was under investigation of corruption after leaving office. One KMT supporter (SH15) said that he stayed up to 2 a.m. watching live broadcast of the news. Unlike Chinese narrow broadcasting in diaspora whose news is reedited by local stations, Taiwanese satellite TV delivers Taiwanese news in real time and in the original form. It allows migrants to sustain their routine news consumption and
reinforces the sense of synchronicity. Yu-Sheng Wang, a business owner, emphasized that watching Taiwanese TV keeps him connected with Taiwan after living in China for more than one decade. Some migrants said that it is important to remain updated of Taiwanese news so that they can chat with other migrants or their acquaintances back in Taiwan.

Second, Taiwanese migrants’ distance from the host society, as analyzed in last chapter, reduces their interest in Chinese news. Some migrants live in segregated environments and rarely feel the need to understand their surroundings or the country they have migrated to. Interviewees would said that “I feel like living in a factory rather than in Suzhou so that I don’t care things outside the factory” (SH20A) or “I have a chauffeur for transportation so that I don’t need to know local news” (SH14). More often than not, the indifference to Chinese news presents a sojourn mentality beyond practical considerations. A businessman (SH15) told me that sometimes he was bothered by his ignorance of local issues, such as gas prices. He suspected that local people had “particular channels” to get information but he said he would not make great efforts to figure these out. A few migrants refuse Chinese news due to political reasons. “I don’t identify with this place and feel like an outsider;” the wife of a business owner (SZ10) explained, “therefore, I’m not so motivated to keep updated of Chinese news.” The feeling of living in a rivalry country is best portrayed by a housewife’s (Shu-Min Lu)
citation of the Chinese proverb: “I am forced to stay with the camp to which I swear no loyalty” (shen zai cao ying xin zai han).

Because of their feeling of closeness to Taiwan and remoteness from the Chinese society, home-oriented migrants are interested more in Taiwanese news than in Chinese news. As Rosenau (2003) argues, distant proximities are subject appraisals of what is remote or close-at-hand. A young female expatriate’s (SZ15) statement illustrates a sense of “distant proximity” to Taiwanese news and the feeling of “near remoteness” from Chinese news: “Taiwan is such a small island that you care about any trivial news there […] China is just too huge. Not long ago a fire in Shenzhen killed more than forty people, but I didn’t pay too much attention to it. It’s true that Shenzhen is closer than Taiwan to our factory, yet it’s like an alien world to me.” Her statement demonstrates that mediated communication to some extent alters people’s perception of distance.

The sense of remoteness from Chinese news is further reinforced by migrants’ negative perception of the Chinese news media. A former media executive (Alex Ho) reminded me of Journalism 101 that people cared most about news proximate to them. When I questioned that he lived in China but cared little about Chinese news, he emphasized that China was an exception to the principle: “Because of propaganda, you can’t get what you want to know from the Chinese media.” Mostly, interviewees
criticized Chinese media’s features of propaganda, censorship, government control, corruption, incredibility, nationalism, cliché, and boredom. Such criticisms are particularly concentrated on, but not limited to, organ papers and CCTV’s National News Broadcasting (Xinwen Lianbo) aired by most national and provincial stations at 7 p.m. every night.

The issue regarding news credibility was cited by migrants as the main reason preventing them from using Chinese media for news. A real estate manager (Yuen-Kai Lee) said that he had tried to read Chinese newspapers but found them too one-sided and biased. Very often, migrants who hold deep suspicions on the Chinese regime assume that Chinese media deliver little more than “lies.” Vichy Kao, who migrated to China in her early teens, said that she had accustomed to Chinese media’s dishonesty and cover-up so that she never bothered to access them. Besides trustworthiness, migrants also complained about formalism (bagu) of the Chinese media. “The delivery of Chinese news media is like the lecture a teacher gives to students,” a finance manager (SH11) said.

As a result, home-oriented migrants rely heavily on Taiwanese media for Chinese news. Some said that Taiwanese media covered most significant issues about China, which were sufficient for them. Specifically, they were more interested in knowing news
about the Taiwanese community in China. Some contended that Taiwanese media would reveal negative news unseen in Chinese media. More importantly, migrants said that they needed a “Taiwanese perspective” to compliment their understanding of China. That was especially true when they were confused by the chaos of information during some controversial events, such as the Tibet riot in 2008. Many migrants looked to Taiwanese or even Western media for uncovering the truth. Despite their physical presence in China, these home-oriented migrants virtually live in a Taiwanese news media sphere.

However, some migrants emphasized that they had some avenues to get information and were not that ignorant about Chinese news. Businesspeople and high-ranking managers said that they relied on government announcements and news briefs submitted by Chinese subordinates. Expatriate employees said that they were often informed of local affairs through word-of-mouth communication or email messages from Chinese coworkers. A few people subscribed to wireless services for the update of weather and other information. Some said that they got to know Chinese news randomly: reading free papers in subway, viewing mobile television on bus, browsing magazines in restaurants, watching Chinese television at massage parlors, glancing over community billboards in residential complexes, and so on. These random information avenues show the limited role of Chinese mainstream media in the lives of home-oriented migrants—the majority
of Taiwanese migrants in China.

Balanced Reception and Host-oriented Reception

Receiving Chinese news, especially from Chinese media, is indicative of migrants’ willingness to “go native.” Less than one third of my interviewees said that they received Taiwanese news and Chinese news equally. Only four interviewees paid more attention to Chinese news than Taiwanese news. These two groups of people are emotionally more receptive to China than home-oriented news recipients. Particularly, those marrying to Chinese spouses are more inclined to frequently access Chinese news media at home.

Various reasons encourage migrants to use Chinese media for news. First, Chinese media can be a substitute of news sources, especially when migrants have no access to Taiwanese satellite TV. Some people cut off Taiwanese satellite TV on purpose. They criticized Taiwanese electronic news media—several 24-hour channels on the air—as too annoying, repetitive, shallow, and sensational. One businesswoman (Betty Lee) said that she felt peaceful without the noise of Taiwanese TV at home. She joked that one of her friend had become emotionally disturbed for watching too much Taiwanese news. In most cases, however, migrants cited external constraints on satellite TV subscription—high prices, commercial scams, technological problems, government
crackdowns, and tight work schedules, etc. Sometimes they merely wanted to prevent themselves from indulging in TV watching.

The Chinese media as the secondary choice is demonstrated by the fact that many migrants rarely tuned in Chinese channels when they had Taiwanese or foreign satellite TV. When migrants seek substitutable media, usually they access those resembling Taiwanese TV. Most watched Chinese channels include CCTV4 (Chinese International Channel of the CCTV), business news channels such as CCTV-2 and CBN (Shanghai), and local channels with on-the-spot live news broadcasting like SZTV’s City Channel (Shenzhen). These channels are thought of less clichéd and similar to Taiwanese television in style. In Shenzhen and Dongguan, foreign channels from Hong Kong and Macao—such as Phoenix and MASTV—are much more welcome than Chinese TV. Migrants consider these channels more reliable than the state-controlled Chinese media. Besides, several programs on these channels cover Taiwanese news, some of which are even hosted by Taiwanese.

Media substitutability also explains the popularity of current affairs shows on Chinese TV that deliver Taiwanese news. A businessman (SH18) emphasized that watching twenty minutes of Taiwanese news on CCTV4’s Across the Strait and Fujian TV’s Strait Express was enough information for him. Otherwise he would read the United
Daily News at Taiwanese teahouses once a week for detail. Since these shows often present news footage, reporters, and pundits from Taiwan, they provide the Taiwanese audience a sense of familiarity. However, some migrants complained that these programs are biased against Taiwan. A housewife recalled how she ended up watching Taiwanese news on the Chinese TV:

I planed to subscribe to Taiwanese satellite TV, but it was unreasonably expensive. Then I figured out I didn’t have to watch Taiwanese TV. Watching bad news repeatedly aired on those channels kept me in bad mood. Since I lived in China, why would I torture myself by watching Taiwanese TV? Therefore, I started to watch Xinwen Lianbo (CCTV), which only broadcast good news and official news. I was bored. Then I found the show First Scene on Shenzhen TV’s City Channel. Its muckraking style was close to Taiwanese TV. But this program only cared about local news, as if nothing had happened in the world. I started to watch Greater China Live on Shenzhen TV because it covered Taiwanese news. It’s strange, though, that this program often focuses on trivial news that put Taiwan in negative light […] I still watch this program, though. I have no other choices. (Men-jung Tu, housewife)
The second reason to access the Chinese media is the need to understand the Chinese society. Those active Chinese-news seekers are more likely to read Chinese newspapers, which are unattractive to most migrants. In total, only three interviewees have home delivery of Chinese newspapers and several others frequently read them at office. Two areas of Chinese news are of interest to them. The first category encompasses economic and financial issues, especially when government policy is involved. Businesspeople and investors would access Chinese mainstream news media for official announcements. Yu-Sheng Wang, owner of an electronic company, said that he read the “A” section of Dongguan Daily everyday in order to keep an eye on government policy, which changed frequently. The second area of Chinese news reception is concentrated on security issues, in particular food safety and crime. A housewife (Shih-ying Hong) said that she did not cared so much about Chinese news, but she would watch First Scene (Diyi Xianchang) on Shenzhen’s City Channel. This live show offers muckraking-type news not available on other Chinese TV; it has covered issues such as tainted food and avian flu.

Some migrants receive Chinese news out of pragmatic purposes. However, they hope to equip themselves at least with a rudimentary understanding of the society they
have migrated to. A second-generation businessman (SZ03) compared his reception of Chinese news media to his father’s dependence on guanxi for information:

My father has been in China for 16 years and has made some “local friends.” When our company gets into troubles, he is used to looking to his friends for help. That’s his style. He relies very much on personal connections to scout insider. I’m different. I spend less time on socializing and pay more attention to local newspapers to familiarize myself with business-related policies. Honestly, I had a parochial mentality in my early days of migration. Basically we Taiwanese businessmen stay in our own circle and watch only Taiwanese TV. We have few contacts and care little about outside communities. I felt ignorant of this society and started to subscribe to the Guanzhou Daily in our factories…I pay a lot of attention to labor issues. Our employees read newspapers. It’s important that we know what they know. (SZ03, manager/plastics)

For a few migrants, reading Chinese newspapers or watching Chinese television have further implications beyond their superficial messages. Receiving Chinese news media is not as incompatible with guanxi building. Rather, becoming more
knowledgeable about Chinese society help migrants extend local social networks. One sales representative of a software company (SH06A) said that he received Chinese news occasionally in order to keep up conversations with his Chinese clients. As a senior manager (Min-yi Chang) argued, “the more topics for conversations you have, the more friends you make.” She was recently assigned to cultivate government relations and had home delivery of major newspapers in Shanghai.

More importantly, some migrants regard Chinese media as a significant barometer of politics in China, which should be watched carefully. A self-claimed “mainland expert” (dalutong) (SH18) explained the importance of reading untold messages in Chinese media: “Most Taiwanese are bored by routine news on Xinwen Lianbo. They don’t realize that even the sequence of political figures’ presences on this news program reveals something important about politics in China.” These political messages are conveyed not only through news but also through entertainment programs. Some interviewees observed that there were less and less dramas about civil war between the KMT troops and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on Chinese TV, indicating a more cordial relationship between the two formal rivals. These evaluations, not matter whether they are correct or not, show that migrants maintain high political sensitivity in China. Chinese media transmit not only plain and simple information but also implicit messages to them.
Negotiating Between Two (Undesired) Media Systems

Taiwanese migrants’ news reception reflects their relationships with the countries of exit and entry. In addition, they also need to negotiate between the two diverse media systems in Taiwan and China. As aforementioned, the Chinese media have experienced rapid commercialization but remain tightly controlled by the CCP. In Taiwan, people’s constitutional rights of “freedom of speech, lecture, writing and publication” had been denied under the authoritarian KMT regime after 1949 (Rampal, 1994). The liberalization and deregulation of the media only took place since the late 1980s, accompanied with political democratization. Nevertheless, present Taiwanese media are criticized as “liberalization without full democratization” because of their tabloidization on the one hand, and partisan rifts about national identity on the other (Lee, 2003). Under the circumstances, neither Chinese media nor Taiwanese media are considered reliable news sources by interviewed migrants. They point out that Chinese and Taiwanese media systems present polar opposites: eulogist versus naysayers, cover-up versus demagoguery, and control versus anarchy, etc.

On the one hand, most interviewees consider Chinese media to be the mouthpiece of
the CCP and thus lack objectivity (See table 4.1). They recognized that in China, “good news is news.” Several “news-savvy” interviewees reminded me that the CPP still frequently gave orders to news organizations, that exposures of bad news were determined by the government; they reminded me also about the Golden Shield Project (jindun gongcheng) that involved the Chinese government sophisticated control over the Internet. Therefore, getting complete information from the Chinese media, they thought, was impossible. Some migrants also said that they were annoyed by Chinese media’s nationalistic tones and narratives on Taiwan—for example, the usages of such derogatory terms as “leader of the Taiwan area” (Taiwandequ lingdaoren, referring to Taiwan President) and “people of the island” (daomin, referring to Taiwanese people).4 Global Times and Reference News—the solely Chinese newspapers allowed to reprint foreign coverage—were signaled out as hostile publications that often covered untrue and provocative stories. Even a self-described “Chinese nationalist” (SH27) told me that he was offended by such news.

On the other hand, most interviewees also held very negative views on Taiwanese news media. They complained that Taiwanese media focused on trivialities instead of substantial issues, carried partisan opinions rather than news, and indulged in uncorroborated expose. In their views, all these factors made Taiwanese media fraught
with bad news. One interviewee (SH06A) lamented: “Every time I watch Taiwanese TV, I feel like Taiwan is going to sink into the Pacific Ocean.” A senior manager (Li-ling Chang) said that she felt shamed of watching Taiwanese TV with Chinese coworkers because the news contents were too shallow. Discontent with Taiwanese news media, several migrants emphasized that they appreciated the depth and scope of Chinese news, particular in the coverage of foreign affairs. They argued that Taiwanese media’s focus on inter-party fights was proof of “insular mentality” (daomin xintai), as opposed to China’s great power attitude.

Table 5.1 Taiwanese migrants’ views on Chinese and Taiwanese news media

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<th>Positive evaluations</th>
<th>Negative evaluations</th>
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<tr>
<td>Chinese media</td>
<td>Quality international news: more non-Western news</td>
<td>Propaganda: good news only, government mouthpiece, lack of objectivity and fairness,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professionalism: informative news, substantial issues</td>
<td>pre-packaged news, model news</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vibrant Internet culture: rich information, the fifth</td>
<td>State control: cover-up, information regulations, censorship, single perspective,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>estate</td>
<td>lacking foreign sources</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cliché (<em>bagu</em>): routines, formality, flatness,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nationalism: anti-foreignness, hostility toward Taiwan, emotionality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taiwanese media</td>
<td>Diversity: various perspectives, transparency, media</td>
<td>Yellow journalism: sensationalism, trivialization, shallowness,</td>
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While criticizing Taiwanese news media, most migrants continue to access them. They legitimize their behaviors by treating Taiwanese news coverage as “TV dramas,” “jokes,” “entertainment shows,” “farces,” “fictions,” or “gossip” (*bagua*) that needed not to be taken seriously. In contrast, news in Chinese media is like the “model plays” (*yangbanxi*)—politicized Chinese revolutionary dramas with routine scenes and standardized contexts. In general, migrants prefer the sauciness of melodramas in the Taiwanese media to the monotonous model plays. Besides, they also find *pleasure* (Ang, 1982; Radway, 1984) watching Taiwanese news, while distastings for the content.

Taiwanese migrants’ negative evaluations of both Taiwanese and Chinese news media lead to their distrust of journalism in general. By and large, my interviewees said that Taiwanese and Western media are more credible than Chinese media, but some also added that no media source is truly reliable. Accordingly, they often emphasized the importance of “media literacy” and “judgment.” A senior manager (Chung-Hsing Kao) said that news can be manufactured anywhere: “We should believe in our own wisdom
rather than any media. It’s terrible that news has become an instrument for some people’s agenda. I think everyone knows the trick.” The best strategy to deal with such media environments is to “read news at a distance,” another interviewee (SH23) suggested.

Like many Chinese citizens, some migrants said that they had become accustomed to searching information online. “I have changed my ways of getting information,” said Lucy Tang, a freelance writer. She emphasized that after migrating to China, she learned from her Chinese friends that the Internet provided abundant information unavailable in mainstream media. An in-house attorney said (Rei-yi Deng) that she was surprised to see a message about a large-scale “right-defense” (weiquan) protest on Chinese websites, although such information disappeared soon. She added that the Internet was also a primary news source for her Chinese coworkers. The vibrant Chinese Internet culture often make migrants believe that the government have somewhat lost media control and trust information whatever they see online.

Migrants’ experiences with two divergent media systems also result in polarized views on the role of journalism in society. First, some interviewees justified China’s media control as a means of social control. They argued that China is a huge country with numerous illiterate peasants and workers. “If Chinese media work like Taiwanese media, the society is going to collapse,” an interviewee contended (SH16). One manager (Li-ling
Chang) explained: “Present Chinese media are just like past Taiwanese media under the martial law. To tell the truth, I don’t think that’s bad…Sometimes it’s necessary to blind the people. Is it so important to tell the truth? I prefer the media here. At least they give people the hope.” These statements reveal a conservative perspective reinforced by migrants’ class status in China. Like the Chinese political elite, the Taiwanese business community counts on a stable Chinese society for their prosperity. Besides, when migrants said that they supported media control, they had alternative channels to get information.

Second, some migrants feel aversion to the Chinese media system because of information control and indoctrination. A graduate student (SH25) was shocked that when she ordered the Internet service, her computer was being examined and labeled a “permit.” “I feel like living in the Iron Curtain,” she emphasized. Several housewives complained that they felt personally insulted for not being able to get such simple information as recipes and train schedules from Taiwanese websites. In addition, some interviewees stressed that the Chinese media had indoctrinated their people, who became extremely nationalistic. The negative view on Chinese media often deepens migrants’ dislike of China. Therefore, the isolation of Taiwanese migrants in China reduces their motivations to use Chinese media for information; nevertheless, the resistance to access
Chinese media, for some migrants, also furthers their alienation from Chinese society.

On the contrary, Taiwanese media play a complicated role in migrants’ relationship with Taiwan. On the one hand, migrants’ attachment to Taiwanese media keeps them connected with their home-country. On the other hand, receiving Taiwanese news often Reinforces their resentments against domestic politics. A housewife (Mei-li Wu) lamented: “Taiwan is my homeland, but every time I see those partisan fights on television, I don’t feel like going back to Taiwan.” Therefore, the reception of Taiwanese news is not always positive to migrants’ bonds with Taiwan. Robin and Aksoy (2006) find that transnational Turkish television brings banal reality of Turkish life to the migrants in London, which de-mythologizes their nostalgic dreams and fantasies about the homeland. For Taiwanese migrants, what they experience from Taiwanese satellite news channels is hyperreality (Baudrillard, 1981/2006) of Taiwanese life, which reinforces their negative view on their home country.

Entertainment Media: Multiple Sources

Access to entertainment media is a significant practice in migrants’ everyday lives.

They watch TV dramas, movies, variety shows, or documentaries from Chinese cable TV,
Taiwanese satellite TV, DVDs, or online videos. Their media experiences involve the local, the regional, the diasporic, and the global. Underground media enormously contribute to such diverse patterns of consumption.

Illegal DVDs and unauthorized online videos are the primary sources of entertainment for migrants. While TV watching is often a collective ritual either at households or in factories, playing DVDs or online videos on personal computers delivers the pleasure in private space. This reflects a universal trend toward fragmentation of the audience and individualization of media consumption. Choosing channels on a shared TV is often a process of negotiation accompanied with compromises. DVDs and online videos supply a variety of choices on demand anytime for anyone. Most interviewees living in companies’ dormitories said that they enjoyed staying at their rooms at night or on the weekends because they needed some space of their own.

In addition, migrants’ isolated way of life increases their media consumption at leisure. “Killing time” was the most cited reason of frequent video watching, as explained by a finance manager (SZ08) who lived in the company compound in Dongguan: “When I was in Taiwan, I would hang out with my family, dine with friends, see a movie, or just walk around. I had a lot of options for leisure activities on the weekend. But I don’t know what to do here. Besides, I feel exhausted after six workdays. The neighboring public
space only makes me nervous rather than relaxed.” This manager’s statement illustrates why video watching is so prevalent in expatriates’ dormitories. Nevertheless, those living with families in cities are also crazy about DVDs and online video, only to less extent.

Finally, the media environment in China encourages migrants to go underground for entertainment. With few exceptions, dramas and entertainment programs on Chinese TV are deemed unattractive by interviewed migrants. Chinese dramas—often set in rural or revolutionary contexts—hardly resonate with migrants. Foreign dramas aired on Chinese TV are said to be outdated and weirdly dubbed in Mandarin. As for cinema, very few interviewees have ever gone to movies in China. They complained that films were extremely limited and theaters were shabby—like Taiwan’s cinemas thirty years ago. Of course, the rampant piracy culture in China is the most important factor. Several migrants said that they rarely accessed pirated media products and felt shamed of buying unauthorized DVDs in the beginning; however, they got used to it soon.

First of all, it is difficult to find copyrighted DVDs, especially those popular movies and dramas. Secondly, it seems less morally questionable if most people do the same thing. A law student (SH25) said that she was asked to bring back the DVD of a Chinese epic drama to Taiwan. She felt embarrassed to ask her classmates where to buy it because most of them were justices or attorneys. Then she got a surprising answer from them:
“Who still buy DVDs? It’s all free online.” She emphasized that media piracy was legitimized and advocated as a weapon against “evil American imperialism” by Chinese intellectuals. Many migrants know that Chinese authorities are halfhearted about anti-piracy measures. A regular DVD-buyer (SZ07) said that one street in nearby downtown concentrated many video shops. “Every storeowner knows when the police is coming and will hide recent Hollywood movies to their warehouses in advance,” she observed.

Some interviewees feel it natural to access pirated media products. Taiwan had also been an empire of piracy in the past and up to recently, the Hong Kong-Taiwan link remains the bedrock of Chinese-subtitled pirated Japanese TV dramas (Hu, 2004). The real contention about piracy, for interviewed migrants, is whether DVDs or online videos provide more satisfying media experiences. Some said that DVDs saved time on online searching or downloading and had better special effects. Other argued that online videos were free and could be done without leaving one’s own room. Which video shops had most recent DVDs with best quality was a common chatting topic.

My interviewees’ passion for pirated media is beyond imagination. A young female manager (SH20B) said she had watched over three hundred episodes of One Piece, a Japanese cartoon, from a video-sharing site. A housewife (Yu-Sheng Wang), in her fifties,
said that on average she finished a Korean drama series from rented DVDs per week. These videos are usually subtitled in Chinese, produced by the privacy networks or fans. Several interviewees admitted that they often stayed up watching videos until dawn on the weekends. Among them, an expatriate (Eric Chen) who resided in his company’s dormitory, revealed that he could watch DVDs for 12 hours without a break. As a result, he had damaged two DVD players within two years.

The most popular videos come from diverse sources. Gender is an important determinant of video-viewing behaviors. In general, male interviewees tended to enjoy Hollywood movies, Japanese cartoons, and Chinese epic dramas. Women preferred Asian dramas, including those from Japan, Korean, Hong Kong, Taiwan, or China. American series were extremely popular among migrants of different ages and genders. Many interviewees had collections of recent seasons of *Prison Break*, *CSI*, or *Grey’s Anatomy*, reproduced with Chinese subtitles. Therefore, China’s regulations created a huge underground economy that featured foreign media products and satisfied Taiwanese migrants’ appetite for global, regional, diasporic, and local productions. Because pirated DVDs and online videos were so accessible, many interviewees said that they become impatient of waiting for TV broadcasting. If they found some programs attractive on television, they tried to watch them immediately from DVDs or the Internet.
Unlike Taiwanese news, Taiwanese entertainment media play a less important role in migrants’ everyday lives. The most attractive programs are variety shows, such as *Kangxi laile* (a celebrity show) and *Quanmin Dammenguo* (a satire show famous for imitating and mocking politicians). Since these two shows are also popular among Chinese netizens, migrants without satellite TV can watch them on many video-sharing websites, such as Tudou.com or PPStream. They said that these hilarious Taiwanese shows helped them relax because they could easily understand the punch lines. Another popular category of Taiwanese programs is the talent show, notably *Super Star (Chaoji Xingguang Dadao)*. Two middle-aged men living with families (SH15, SH24) emphasized that watching *Super Star* was an important “family time.” Some interviewees said that they would watch the program online hours after the original broadcast.

One single woman (SZ09) said that she wanted to watch what she used to watch in Taiwan so that she felt closer to home. The same reason explained that several interviewees frequently watched the so-called *Taiwanese local dramas (bentuju)* broadcast in *Hoklo* dialect, although they might not be so interested in their contents per se. A female manager (SZ29) said that at night, most male Taiwanese coworkers were having fun outside the company compound. She usually watched Taiwanese local dramas in the dormitory alone, which made her feel like having someone familiar talk to her.
Therefore, Taiwanese entertainment media provided not only viewing pleasures but also cultural connections with Taiwan.

Sometimes watching Taiwanese programs is a deliberate collective ritual for migrants. My interviewees said that they got together with fellow Taiwanese migrants to watch televised vote-counting of elections in Taiwan, the games of Taiwanese sports teams, or popular movies produced by Taiwan. In 2008, *Cape No. 7 (Haijiao Qi Hao)*, a Taiwanese romance film, was well acclaimed in Taiwan and broadly celebrated as a harbinger for the revival of the Taiwanese cinema. I found that many of my subjects excited about the movie and had watched it via the pirated DVD, since the copyrighted DVD had not yet been released. Some told me that they saw the movie with Taiwanese friends and tried to keep up current hot topics in Taiwan.

Some Chinese television programs and movies also offer migrants a sense of cultural proximity. In general, Taiwanese migrants are not attracted to Chinese entertainment media. However, Chinese epic dramas and historical documentaries are well received among interviewed migrants. In fact, epic drama has been the only genre among Chinese TV programs that have sporadic successes in Taiwan—such as *Yongcheng Dynasty (Yongchen wanchao)*, *The Family (Dazhaimen)*, and *Qiao's Grand Courtyard (Qiaojia dayuan)*—all of which are big productions by the CCTV. Some
interviewees said that those epic dramas were exquisite art works. Besides, they were fascinated with Chinese historic sagas. In addition to epic dramas, CCTV10 (Science and Education Channel) is most watched Chinese non-news channels. This channel features such programs as Exploring (documentaries mostly on Chinese history) and Masters’ Forum (Baijiajiangtan, lectures about Chinese culture). Some migrants—often above certain age—said that watching these programs reminded them of history they had learned from textbooks in Taiwan. The popularity of Chinese epic dramas and historical documentaries among older migrants demonstrates that the instillation of China-centered historical narratives through cultural institutions in Taiwan has had profound influences on Taiwanese. In particular, migrants having a Chinese identity are very fond of these genres. On the contrary, films and TV dramas that portray the Chinese society after 1949, especially about the Communist revolution, barely find their audience among Taiwanese migrants.

In sum, Taiwanese migrants’ viewing experiences of entertaining programs shows their appropriations of diverse media sources—the global, the regional, the local, and the diasporic. However, the global (American films and series) and the regional (Japanese and Korean TV dramas) are dominant forces, even though these cultural products are rarely legally accessible in China. Receiving Taiwanese or Chinese entertaining media is
based on cultural affinity—cultural representations that Taiwanese migrants have been familiar with. Certain Chinese media products provide migrants a sense of cultural affinity with the historical China rather than the contemporary China. Taiwanese entertainment media satisfy migrants’ longing for home and maintain their feelings of belonging to Taiwan.

Conclusion

This chapter shows that despite the thriving of Chinese media and linguistic commonality between China and Taiwan, the Chinese mainstream media has played an insignificant role in Taiwanese migrants’ everyday lives. That does not mean that migrants’ habits of media consumption are entirely at odds with the Chinese mainstream. Instead, migrants localize their use of media tools—such as illegal satellite TV, pirated DVDs, and online videos—to circumvent government control and regulations and to keep their transnational connections alive. They enjoy pirated DVDs and online videos from various sources, as many Chinese do. However, such viewing behaviors also show the domination of the global and regional media forces.

Additionally, Taiwanese migrants also seek alternative or underground media
channels—such as the Internet and satellite TV—for information otherwise unavailable in the Chinese mainstream media. In particular, they rely heavily on the Taiwanese media not only for hometown news but also for local knowledge. Such patterns of media consumption contradict the assertion of the transnational Chinese media imagination.

Although the performance of Taiwanese news media has conflicting influences on migrants’ perception about their home country, Taiwanese news reception keeps migrants connected with Taiwan. On the contrary, except for some active Chinese-news seekers, the majority of Taiwanese migrants hold a suspicious attitude toward the Chinese media. That furthers their sense of being outsiders in China. The next chapter will use the examples of some events to illustrate migrants’ news reception and their relationships with the host and home countries.

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1 I tried to access major Taiwanese news websites during my stays in hotel rooms in China. Most Taiwanese news websites were not blocked from access in Shanghai between October and November in 2008. In December when I visited Shenzhen, however, many of those websites were again fully or partially prevented from access.

2 The figures are based on SARFT’s seasonal announcements of “Approved Foreign Television Dramas and Films” in 2008. These approved foreign shows cannot be aired in the prime time and on more than four channels in the same periods.

3 The figures are base on SARFT’s seasonal announcements of “Approved Co-produced Television Dramas” in 2008.

4 According to “Opinions on Correct Propaganda Usages about Taiwan,” a mandate issued by the CCP’s Propaganda Department in 2002, the names of all Taiwanese government institutions and titles of officials at national level should be altered in accordance to the guidance.
Chapter 5: Re-negotiating Taiwanese Identity through Chinese News

“In 2008, China faced Olympian challenges, of which the Olympics was but one,” one China scholar said, referring to, among others, the enforcement of a new Labor Contract Law, a severe winter storm, riots in Tibet and consequent protests along the Olympic torch relay overseas, the Sichuan earthquake, the Beijing Olympic Games, the tainted milk scandal, and the global financial crisis (Belcher, 2009, p.74). Some of these events made news internationally, inviting myriad media representations that expressed diverse concerns, interests, and perspectives. Visiting China toward in the year’s end, I wanted to understand how Taiwanese migrants received information and judged facts from competing media narratives. Unexpectedly, I found that their reconstructions of Chinese news events involved a deeper reflection of situational self. Through news reception, migrants confirmed, confronted, or redefined their different and sometimes conflicting identification marks—ethnic Chinese, citizens of the ROC, and Taiwanese migrants in China. The search for the meanings of news thus entailed a quest of identity.

Based on interviewees’ accounts of Chinese news, this chapter explores the relationships between news reception and identity negotiation. That is, “how people
represent themselves in relation to media narratives, exposing in the process instances of appropriation and conflict” (Murphy, 2005, p.176). Moreover, the subjects are treated as “socially and historically situated people,” not merely news receivers (Fiske, 1987, p.63).

Three significant news events are chosen for analysis: the Sichuan earthquake, the Beijing Olympics, and the tainted milk scandal. They are most mentioned Chinese news of 2008 by interviewed migrants. They also stand for divergent news categories: a natural disaster, a festive sports event, and a man-made mishap. I will analyze how the reception of various news events converges in an isomorphic process of boundary-drawing, as migrants make sense of self, collective community, or national identity.

Reading News: Information, Meaning, and Identity

Before formally analyzing the three cases, I shall point out that identity negotiation, despite its significance to Taiwanese migrants, is only one aspect of news reception. The act of reading news may contain three levels of involvements. First, it is simply a process of getting information, desired or unwanted—for example, the brands of milk products contaminated by toxic chemical or the death tolls of a disastrous earthquake. The journalistic practice, based on the norms of objectivity and fairness, assumes that a fact
can be collected by news producers and then disseminated to receivers. However, even a plain message can be framed by newsmakers via the principles of selection and salience, or “making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences” (Entman, 1994, p. 295). Interviewed migrants’ notion that one needs to be news-savvy (see Chapter 4) indicates their awareness that news can be biased and manipulated by journalists or news institutions.

The second level of news reception engages meaning constructions by way of decoding news messages. A salient news message is not always meaningful to receivers, or the meaning structure of text does not always correspond to that of receivers. Entman (ibid) attributes the gaps to the difference of frames or schemata between a text and its receiver. For Hall (1993), the key issue regarding text is not the selection question but dominant ideology represented in the discursive form. Despite hegemonic discourse of a text, the viewer may read its meaning with a preferred (affirmative), a negotiated, or an oppositional position. Morley (1994) argues that any hegemonic discourse is insecure and incomplete, but scholars should not be over optimistic about semiotic democracy. As I will discuss later, consistent with Hall and Morley, my subjects articulated diverse interpretations of the same news events, even when they did not misunderstand the denoted or connoted meanings of media messages. However, their news reading is also
constrained by their assumptions about the Chinese media.

While news reception involves information transmission and meaning construction, this chapter will focus on the third level—that is, identity negotiation. For Taiwanese migrants, the issue of national identity and/or cultural identity often assumes high priority in their self-identifications, as they frequently encounter conflicts concerning their special status as “compatriots” in China. Hall (1992) points out that “national identities are not things we are born with, but are formed and transformed within and in relation to representation.” A nation is “a system of cultural representation” that produces meanings and generates a sense of identity and allegiance (p.292). In Taiwan, national identities are highly politicized and divided, precisely because of a profound rupture in the system of cultural representation. Migrants bear different national/cultural identities to China and constantly re-negotiate their allegiances through both lived and media experiences. Therefore, news reception is not merely a segment of information transmission in which a receiver interact with media text. Rather, the process involves both social context and cultural relevance.

Carey proposes a ritual view of communication that treats news more as drama and less as information. He argues that news “invites our participation on the basis of our assuming, often vicariously, social role within it” (1989, p.21). News reading, in this
ritual view, is like “attending a mass, a situation in which nothing new is learned but in which a particular view of the world is portrayed and confirmed” (ibid, p.20).

Communication cannot be treated as a phenomenon isolated from lived experience. Real life and media, using Meyrowitz’s (1985) term, constitutes “the structure of social situations” in which many once-distinct social spheres become blurred and overlapped. Consequently, people think of their social role in terms of physical settings as well as informational settings created by the media:

For media, like physical places, include and exclude participants. Media, like walls and window, can hide and they can reveal. Media can create a sense of sharing and belonging or a feeling of exclusion and isolation. Media can reinforce a “them vs. us” feeling or they can undermine it. (Meyrowitz, 1985, p.7)

What Meyrowitz describes is that media, like places, create social situations in which our role-playing is activated. Mediated situations can change our perception of physical situations, and vice versa. Media enable people to adjust social roles in face-to-face interactions, while real life experiences provide a frame of references at the contact point of news reception. Media can create a sense of sharing or isolation, but the
same media text may enact a person’s feeling of belonging or isolation in various physical settings. Therefore, Taiwanese migrants’ reception of Chinese news may be different that of their counterparts in Taiwan. The following sections analyze how Taiwanese migrants re-negotiate their identities through three significant news events of China in 2008, given their physical presence in China.

The Sichuan Earthquake: Undesired Media Effects

On May 12th, 2008, a devastating earthquake—8.0 magnitude on the Richter scale—struck Sichuan Province of southern China. It killed 80,000 people, and left 368,500 more injured, and 15 million homeless (Blecher, 2008). The Chinese government swiftly responded to the tragedy, as Premier Wen Jiabao rushed to the damaged areas to direct the relief operation. A total of 130,000 military service members and police officers were deployed to the earthquake zones (Wong, 2008). Instead of blocking bad news as in the past, Chinese authorities held press conferences on an almost daily basis and granted foreign reporters access to the scenes (Chen, 2009). China’s adoption of more open and timely media management won praises from a range of foreign media.

The extensive coverage of the earthquake news in Chinese media was also
unprecedented. Xinhua, the official news agency, publicized the earthquake within 18 minutes of the tremor. Four minutes later, the CCTV, the state-owned national broadcaster, delivered the breaking news. Television channels across the country for the first time replaced regular programming with around-the-clock news coverage. They devoted a total of 1,397 hours to the earthquake newscasts in the first week of the disaster. In particular, CCTV’s marathon broadcast lasted for as long as 294 hours (Gao, 2008; Hu et al. 2008; Jiang, 2008).

The earthquake also caused a media frenzy for days in Taiwan. Major news organizations sent reporters for on-spot reporting. Several TV channels acquired footage from Chinese Television stations and held cross-Strait charity events with them. News about damages of the disaster, safety of Taiwanese tourists and expatriates, and relief efforts from Taiwan, dominated newspaper pages and television airtimes. For example, the earthquake made headlines in the pro-unification United Daily News’s front pages for six days, during which related stories spread across the first seven pages. The pro-independence Liberty Times was less frantic about the earthquake news, but it also covered the event on page three for five days.

As Renwick and Cao argue, Chinese political discourse formation is characterized by consensus building (gongshi), a drive for unity (tuanjie), and a need for propagation of
this consensus through education (*jiao*yo*u*) (2003, p.72). The Chinese media coverage of the Sichuan earthquake was credited with unifying the country faced with a critical crisis. Premier Wen set the tone of “putting people first” for the earthquake relief. Li Changchun, the de facto propaganda chief of the CCP, ordered media to focus on positive news and “uphold unity and encourage stability” (Dickie et al, 2008). Such instillation of positive thinking included the promotion of heroes—notably the braveness of the People’s Liberation Army, the leadership of the CCP cadres, and the generous donation of overseas Chinese (Chen, 2009).¹

While the Chinese media highlighted China’s national unity, the Taiwanese media often focused on Taiwan’s compassionate response to the disaster, such as donations by ordinary people and relief efforts by Taiwanese rescue, medical, and charity groups. At a news conference, Wang Yi, the head of China’s Taiwan affairs, appreciated Taiwanese people’s fraternity as proof that “blood is thicker than water” (*China Review News*, 2008). The theme of blood ties and compatriot love was echoed by *United Daily News*’s May 16th editorial, “Humanitarianism and Human Nature: Earthquake Opened the Door for Cross-Strait Dialogues.” This article analyzed why Taiwanese treated the tragedies of the Sichuan earthquake and a cyclone disaster in Burma that also claimed tens of thousands of lives differently: “It is natural to be so, and it ought to be so. Moreover, no one can
prevent it from being so.”

Chung-Hsing Kao, a middle-aged senior manager, said that he felt emotionally connected with “fellow Chinese” when receiving the earthquake news from the Chinese and Taiwanese media. He was touched that “all Chinese across the globe worked hard together” for the earthquake relief. This man resonated with the tone of “blood is thicker than water.” For him, the earthquake confirmed his Chinese identity and symbolized a unified Chinese nation in the future. In most cases, however, my subjects read the theme of unity represented by Chinese media with a negotiated or even oppositional position. They often expressed a humanitarian concern rather than comradeship with Chinese.

Betty Lee, a businesswoman in Shanghai, watched the earthquake news mostly from Chinese television. She decoded the Chinese media messages with lay wisdom, while being emotionally affected by the storylines. Her narrative presented a negotiated process through which she constructed the meanings of the news:

Chinese news media had become much more transparent than before, but still only positive news was allowed. The media tried to promote heroes. People’s Liberation Army was great, the Chinese Communist Party placed people in priority, and the earthquake victims had full support from the government. The message was clear:
Every cloud had a silver lining. Wow, it’s amazing that a disaster solidified a nation…But I still wept over those touching stories. (Betty Lee, businesswoman)

Betty simultaneously ridiculed and praised Chinese media’s instilling of positive thinking and national unity. Her analysis actually echoed her dissatisfactions with the partisan media and political infighting in Taiwan, a subject she raised frequently during our conversations. She argued that “whether Taiwan is on the right track does not matter so much to our everyday lives here, but it affects our feeling of belonging (guishugan).” Therefore, the national unity she saw from the Chinese media reminded her of a divided Taiwan. She said that Taiwan was her “root” to which she desired to return, but the politics on the island concerned her very much. While the earthquake news affirmed Betty’s Taiwanese identity, it also refreshed her memory about the shaky foundation of such identity and reinforced her sense of rootlessness.

Like Betty, other interviewees also often mentioned Chinese media’s overemphasis on positive stories, heroism, and national unity. Mostly, they adopted an oppositional reading, complaining about too much propaganda in the earthquake news. A study revealed that nationwide, the Chinese television viewership rate slightly reduced in the first month of the earthquake (May 12th-June 12th), due to the interrupt of regular
programming (Hu et al., 2009). It was not clear whether the Chinese audience became
tired of the earthquake news framed by the Chinese media. However, my interviewees
complained a lot about the repetitive coverage of similar stories in Chinese media.

One severe earthquake that struck Taiwan in 1999 and killed more than 2,000 people
served as a frame of references to migrants. They emphasized that, compared to
Taiwanese media’s coverage of that tragedy, Chinese media’s reporting of the Sichuan
earthquake ignored the voice of the survivors, lacked the criticism of the government, and
looked more like propaganda than news. A female expatriate (SH20B) said that she
glanced at news programs on Chinese TV after the earthquake but could not stay tuned
for long: “You could see only positive news on television. No one criticized the
government. Maybe those negative stories were censored and cut out.” Some migrants
said that the Chinese media coverage of the earthquake lasted a long time and out of
proportion. Alex Ho, a businessman in Kunshan, said that he decided to subscribe to
Taiwanese satellite TV after the Sichuan earthquake:

After May 12th, the whole country was laden with grief. Every time you turned on
TV, you saw news about how catastrophic the earthquake was, how well the
government responded to the disaster and took care of its people…etc. For as long
as one week, all of the fifty-plus channels on my cable TV broadcast the same news stories. Nothing else was on the air. Yes, the earthquake was a huge matter, but the news was so ubiquitous that I couldn’t take it anymore. (Alex Ho, businessman)

As Gans (1994) argued, the intentions of the audience can limit media effects because people may tune out much undesired content. In addition to opting out of the Chinese media because of information overload, some Taiwanese migrants also expressed their dislike of official propaganda, particularly media-constructed patriotism. A real estate manager (Yuen-Kai Lee) said that “the Chinese media tried to use the earthquake to make the case of national unity; that was really overdone.” A Taiwanese student (SH25) complained: “The Chinese television was full of stories about the great government and people’s patriotic behaviors. For example, a kid was rescued alive, thanked to national anthem sung by his classmates to encourage him. Afterwards, these students were showcased on TV, singing patriotic songs together and eulogizing the CCP leadership.”

Migrants’ discursive practices on the earthquake news suggest their apathy towards the themes of unity and compatriotic love represented in the media. Fiske argues that the meanings of a text is activated by relevance—the bridge between text and receiver at a “concrete, contextualized moments of semiosis” (1988, p.250). Kraidy extends Fiske’s
notion of relevance to the concept of *social relevance*, seeing it as the link between media text and “the communal aspects of media consumption” (2005, p.143). That means that news reception—even when it takes place in an individual—involves cultural meanings shared collectively. The same text that encourages Chinese national morale thus becomes a source of discomfort to some interviewed migrants. Low social relevance helps explain why, in a *moment of semiosis*, few migrants activate the meaning of Chinese patriotism—despite the fact that they understand the messages in the Chinese media. Instead, the reception of the earthquake news is a process that affirms their self-consciousness of being Taiwanese, or outsiders, in China.

The Beijing Olympics: Belonging, Exclusion, and Outsiders

The theme of 2008 for China was supposed to be “One World One Dream,” as the slogan of the Beijing Olympics announced. From January on, however, internal ethnic conflicts surfaced—including the unrests in Xinjiang and Tibet, where minority Uighurs and Tibetans were discontent with the majority Han Chinese rule. The most serious clashes took place in Lahsa, capital of Tibet, on March 14th. After a wave of riots by Tibetans, China deployed thousands of troops into the region to restore order and barred
foreign journalists from entries. Most Western media expressed concern over China’s military crackdown on Tibetans (Blecher, 2008), while Chinese media reported the killings of Han Chinese and blamed Dalai Lama for masterminding a plot to embarrass China during the Olympic year (Latham, 2009). The drama continued as pro-Tibet protesters and pro-China crowds brawled along the Olympic torch relay route across the Atlantic. A threatened boycott of the Olympic opening ceremony by France caused anti-French rallies across China.

The media war between China and the West only cooled down after the disastrous Sichuan earthquake. As Beijing was counting down to the Olympics, issues about human rights, media regulations, air pollution, qualifications of Chinese athletes, etc. reemerged in Western media. On August 8th, China showcased a stunning performance in the opening ceremony of the Beijing Games, one that surpassed all expectations (Brady, 2009). The two-week sports event proved to be a huge success for China, not only as the host of the Games but also as the champion of gold medals. However, some negative news began to spread—for example, the fireworks shown to television viewers were enhanced by computer graphics, a female leading dancer became a paraplegic after falling during a rehearsal, a cute little girl singing solo in the ceremony turned out to mime another girl’s voice.
The media coverage of those controversies also invited academic criticism from different angles. A study (Ono & Jiao, 2008) of the *New York Times* coverage of Tibet, the Olympics, and the 2008 earthquake harshly criticized its “Sinophobic discourse” and “yellow peril motif.” In contrast, another study (Brady, 2009) showed how the Chinese government tutored domestic media to collaborate on the Olympics propaganda campaign to promote patriotism and distract people’s discontents (Brady, 2009). As Latham argued, the Olympic coverage was the site of competing representations of real China: While foreign journalists strived to debunk China’s “state propaganda” and “official deception of the public,” Chinese media tried to correct “biased, outdated and even malicious representations” of their country (2009, p. 26).

In Taiwan, anything relevant to China can be politicized. Tibet unexpectedly became a focal issue in the last days of Taiwan’s presidential election in March. Whether Taiwan would be “Tibetized” and whether Taiwan should boycott the Beijing Olympics were heatedly debated. Before the Games, the name of the Taiwanese Olympic delegation again made news. China’s official media initially referred to Taiwan’s delegation as *Zhongguo* Taipei (China Taipei)—instead of *Zhonghwa* Taipei (Chinese Taipei), conventionally used in the Olympics. This implied that Taiwan is part of China. Later on, China resumed the use of Chinese Taipei as a gesture of goodwill to Taiwan’s recently
elected President Ma Ying-jeou, who adopted a conciliatory approach to his China policy.

Diverse media narratives surrounding the Beijing Olympics make it difficult to understand the reality. Interviewed migrants often felt better informed because they received Western perspectives through Taiwanese media; meanwhile, they also noticed the limitations and prejudices of some foreign news sources. Despite information confusions, migrants seemed more interested in understanding the meanings of media representations than discovering the truths behind the news. More specifically, in their reception of the news about Tibet, Taiwanese migrants found their ambiguous role—both as ethnic Han Chinese and citizens of a nation whose sovereignty is denied by the host country.

Some people stuck to their ethnic identity but struggled over the issue of human rights. Pei-ying Chu, a housewife who strongly identified herself as Chinese, said that she doubted the Chinese media’s one-sided reportage about Tibet. Yet she was not motivated to figure out the truth. Other migrants disliked nationalism and Han Chinese chauvinism expressed by the Chinese media and the general public. For example, a freelancer (SH23) said that he happened to be traveling with a group of Chinese in Europe when the Olympic relay was protested: “I kept quiet in the course of the trip because Chinese people discussed the issue everyday with angry emotions. It wasn’t fun.” Generally
speaking, migrants said that they were confused by various media reportages, but they
did connect Tibet’s situation to Taiwan’s future. Through Tibet, they confirmed their view
that China is determined to defend territorial integrity at any price. Feng-yi Pang, having
migrated to China for 13 years, expressed his knowledge of China:

While Western media focuses on human rights, Chinese authorities insisted on
sovereignty and would never let go of Tibet. That’s why China stations so many
troops in Tibet and Xinjiang. Had Tibetans succeeded in the uprising, Xinjiang
would revolt. Had Xinjiang revolted, there would be a chain reaction in the East
Coast (meaning Taiwan). (Feng-yi Pang, senior manager)

Compared with their rational analysis of the Tibet controversies, Taiwanese migrants
seemed to involve themselves deeply in the drama of the celebrated Beijing Olympics.
Their responses were often associated with self-identification—or the social role they
held in such an extraordinary moment for China. I first noticed the symbolism of the
Olympics to some Taiwanese when I met with a migrant in Taiwan months before my
fieldtrip to China. At that time, he was returning home to cast his vote for the President of
Taiwan. With political enthusiasm, he asked me whether I would support China or the
United States during the Olympic competitions. His rationale for asking was that one’s answer to this question revealed one’s political stance and voting behavior. I asked him why “supporting Taiwan” was not an option, since, after all, Taiwan was fielding its own separate teams. I was told that the Olympics would be a showdown between Chinese and Americans.

During my field research in China after the Beijing Games, I did find the Olympics an indelible and emotional experience for some interviewed migrants. However, their sentiments were more complicated than what that informant had implied. Chung-Hsing Kao, the man who was touched by Chinese unity for the earthquake relief, echoed the theme of China’s victory over the U.S. He emphasized that the Beijing Olympics honored all Chinese people across the globe, “showing off China’s prowess to Western countries.” It was understandable that migrants with strong Chinese identity shared the sentiments of foreign humiliations in modern Chinese history. They felt resonated with the Olympic triumphalism that permeated in Chinese media and people.

Some were ready to see a strong Chinese nation ascending on the world stage, albeit in the name of PRC rather than the ROC, which now represented Taiwan. Kao’s personal experience helped him to accept the transition. He said that Taiwanese people of his age grew up studying Chinese history and geography. He was content with his six-year job
assignment in Japan, but had never fitted into Japanese society. After returning from Japan to Taiwan, he said that he was annoyed by the soaring Taiwanese nationalism on the island and did not feel at home. Instead, he found his comfort in China: “What I see here is totally the same with the portrayal of the textbooks I read in the past.” Similarly, Min-yi Chang, a female manager in her early forties, also said that her studying in Japan a decade ago made her disillusioned with the ROC. “I was asked by a foreign student ‘where Taiwan is’ and felt extremely insulted,” she recalled. She resumed her dignity because of China’s hosting of the Olympics—only after a negotiating process:

The hot tears welled up in my eyes when I watched Li Ning (a Chinese gymnast) lit the Olympic cauldron in the air in the opening ceremony. I don’t know how to explain my feelings. At least Li Ning is Chinese, not Japanese, isn’t he? He is one of us! When will Taiwan get the opportunity to host the Olympic Games? It’s time to wake up! I’m proud to be Chinese who was born in Taiwan…Taiwan has no leverage over the United States, but China can say no to Americans. (Min-yi Chang, senior manager)

There was no surprise that the Beijing Olympic opening ceremony aroused Min-yi’s
emotions. The fifty-minute show boiled down 5,000 years of glorious Chinese history and civilization—Chinese characters, arts, technological innovations, philosophy, etc.

The spectacle was achieved by modern technology and astonishing synchronized actions of around 14,000 performers. Chinese official media exclaimed that the media event had been longed for a hundred years and was “giving millions of reasons to Chinese to have a sleepless night” (Xinhwa, 2008).

On the other hand, Yu-Sheng Wang, a housewife and a former school teacher who had taught Chinese in Taiwan, was sleepless for another reason. Her reception of the Olympic opening ceremony proved to be a painful experience. She used the term “loneliness” to describe her feeling:

Wang: I was shocked by Chinese people’s passions for the Olympics. I didn’t have that and felt left out.

Researcher: How come?

Wang: You know, even the beauty salon I usually visited was closed during the opening ceremony of the Olympics. All employees gathered in the shop to watch the show and celebrate its success. They were so proud that the whole world was watching the Games hosted by their zuguo (motherland). Despite some controversies, they
supported their country wholeheartedly. Taiwanese are more aloof. We don’t have

the concept of zuguo in mind.

Researcher: Can you elaborate on your point more specifically?

Wang: It’s strange. Is our country Taiwan or the Republic of China? We claim to be the

Republic of China, but few countries recognize us. We’re lost. We can say that we

are Chinese also and be proud of the Olympics. To tell the truth, I don’t have such

a strong feeling.

Researcher: Didn’t you say earlier that you considered yourself Chinese?

Wang: But people here don’t treat you as Chinese. I almost burst into tears when

watching the opening ceremony. Yet when China hosted the Games, what did we

do for it? Nothing! I felt like floating here and there without an anchor.

The theme and performance of the Olympic opening ceremony evoked Wang’s

historical memory, one that had defined her Chinese identity all her life. Yet her

enthusiasm was dampened by her nonchalant media experience, which was in sharp

contrast with Chinese people’s passionate reception. She lacked the feeling of

participation and pondered over the question of exclusion. She was confused of her

identity as historical memory, media reception, and life experience clashed. As
Meyrowitz argued, “while we tend to think of our group affiliations simply in terms of ‘who’ we are, our sense of identity is also shaped by where we are and who is ‘with’ us. A change in the structure of situations—as a result of changes in media or other factors—will change people’s sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’” (1985, p.55). Therefore, Wang might not be aware of her outsider status if she had never lived in China and had watched the opening ceremony in Taiwan.

Chung-Hsing Kao, Min-yi Chang, and Yu-Sheng Wang exemplify Taiwanese who have a strong Chinese identity. They were emotionally aroused by the Beijing Olympics, as they strongly felt the sense of belonging and exclusion. In sharp contrast, some interviewed migrants situated themselves as outsiders from the beginning. Instead of feeling excluded, they begged to be left alone by Chinese media’s extensive coverage and Chinese people’s patriotic behavior. When talking about the Olympics, several migrants described their media experiences as *Terror bombing (pilao hongzha)*—a military terminology originally referring to periodical air raids aimed at exhausting patience of the enemy. In Chinese, this term is applied to an intolerable status of information overload. Yuen-Kai Lee, coming from a family that had supported Taiwan independence, explained his distaste for the Olympic fanaticism portrayed by the Chinese media:
The Olympics was a huge gala for China. All Chinese media eulogized the glory of China—how the Games was well held, how foreigners praised its success, and how many medals China had won. I was bombarded by these similar news messages everyday and really felt fatigued of it. (Yuen-Kai Lee, senior manager)

Tracy Cheng, a second-generation Mainlander, used stronger and more malicious words to illustrate her unpleasant viewing experience of the Beijing Olympics:

Chinese media’s coverage of the Olympics tried to convince people how great China had become and how communism worked for the country. If I were Chinese, I might appreciate the achievement of the motherland. But I’m Taiwanese! I just found the news laughable [...] It’s disgusting. We all know that this is a totalitarian regime, but its people are unaware of it. What they see on TV is a caring government. News is just a performance here. (Tracy Cheng, housewife)

Tracy said that her Chinese identity had been gradually diluted after she moved to Shanghai with her husband, a Westerner, years ago. She constantly noticed her difference from the Chinese. Her media experiences in China—particularly with such a big event as
the Olympics—often consolidated her Taiwanese identity. She said that she was expelled by media manipulation of patriotism and desired to shun away from that. Some migrants rarely used Chinese media but also sensed the soaring patriotism among the Chinese public. An asset manager (SZ07) was asked by her Chinese subordinates to give the Olympic opening day off. She thought the request “nonsensical” and wondered why the Games aroused so much enthusiasm among Chinese. Chi-Ming Shih, a businessman who regularly traveled to China, felt the same way: “Even a salesman would boast about China’s gold medals.” For certain migrants, the Olympic experience—via media representations and real life encounters—was a practice of drawing boundaries between “us” and “them.” They reaffirmed their Taiwanese identity and reinforced their outsider mentality in the places they lived.

Still for other migrants, the boundary-drawing was the rediscovery of the difference between self and other rather than an expression of hostility. They said that during the Olympics, they only paid attention to baseball games, Taiwan’s national sport. At work, they viewed the games via online text-cast and discussed with Taiwanese coworkers. They also watched television broadcast with Taiwanese at private homes or public spaces. For example, one interviewee (SH13) said that he attended a “Go Chinese Taipei” event at a restaurant in Shanghai when Taiwan played Japan. That event attracted more than
one hundred Taiwanese. The collective experience of watching baseball games was a confirmation of the Taiwanese social bond, both from physical settings and from media settings.

The Beijing Olympics was a glorious moment for China, at which Taiwanese migrants often found their ambiguous role. Some thought of the question of belonging and exclusion, in their struggles to make sense of self. Others just maintained an outsider mentality, either feeling indifferent or aversive to the media constructed heroism and triumphalism. Whatever their reactions were, migrant’s reception of the Olympic news evidenced a process in which they confirmed, confronted, or transformed their identities.

Tainted-milk Incident: Class and Identity

On September 11, 2008, a report in *Dongfang Zao Bao (Oriental Morning Post)* of Shanghai disclosed that dozens of infants in Gansu and other provinces had been diagnosed with kidney stones. This report connected the illnesses to milk powder products of Sanlu Group, one of the leading Chinese infant formula providers. Chinese authorities then acknowledged that Sanlu’s products contained chemical melamine, which was added to boost the reading of protein in milk. A nationwide inspection found that 22
of China’s 109 infant formulas were contaminated, including some of the most trusted brands. About 53,000 infants were sickened by tainted dairy products, of which 13,000 needed to be hospitalized (Yardley, 2009). The scandal soon developed to an international storm, as various doses of the toxic industrial additive was found in Chinese-made products of some of the world’s top food brands.

Taiwan was one of the countries heavily stricken by the melamine storm. Before the government was able to take action, the melamine-tainted milk powders imported from China had been distributed to numerous food providers in Taiwan. A variety of other packaged foods contaminated with the toxic chemical, such as instant coffee and canned beverage, had been sold to consumers. A melamine scare grew in Taiwan as bakeries and bubble-tea shops lost businesses or even closed down. A Health Minister was forced to resign among the public outcry about government’s indecisive actions in response to the incident. A mass protest under the banner of “Opposing toxic products and defending sovereignty” attracted a half-million people to the street.

The melamine storm also aroused discontents among Chinese. Journalists posted stories in the Internet about how the Sanlu Group and local authorities covered up the news for weeks or months. A Nanfang Daily editor revealed that the paper postponed its investigation because of the Olympics. Chinese authorities had denied the accusations.
However, the delayed exposure of the tainted milk scandal furthered Taiwanese migrants’
suspicions on Chinese media and products.

When asked of their impressions on China from the Taiwanese media, migrants
painted a polarized picture. On one hand, China was described as an economic gold mine
and a nation with spectacular natural landscapes. On the other hand, it was felt as a third
world country fraught with crimes and hazards. In fact, these impressions to some extent
matched conflicting media narratives of China in Taiwan over the past two decades. In
the 1990s, popular travel programs on Taiwanese television depicted the pastoral and
underdeveloped parts of China, which denied coevalness between China and Taiwan
(Shih, 2007). Since the 2000s, proliferating discourses in various Taiwanese media
promote a China fever that focuses on economic opportunities. However, the assertion
that Taiwan is more civilized than China persists in Taiwanese media about China-made
heixin (literally black-hearted in Chinese) products—unsafe goods produced unethically
and hazardous to human health.

Although many countries, Taiwan included, more or less manufacture unsafe
products, the phrase heixin is usually reserved for China by Taiwanese, thanks to local
media’s interest in picking up sensational exposés from Chinese media. Those bizarre
stories about heixin products include “fake” eggs, “hairs-made” soy source, “goat
urine-immersed” duck meat, and DTT-added buns. A study (Chang, 2009) shows that major Taiwanese newspapers, regardless of their political positions, tend to apply such terms as “counterfeit,” “poisonous,” “low-priced,” and “poor quality” to Chinese commodities, under the generic term of heixin. Consequently, it is not only that the meaning of heixin is monopolized by China, but also that all Chinese goods are generalized as unsafe, low-quality products.

The tainted-milk scandal revived Taiwanese migrants’ memories of unsafe Chinese-made products, putting them on the alert for possible contamination. Their fear was amplified by their mistrust of the Chinese mainstream media. Betty Lee, a businesswoman, attributed this incident to the lack of transparency in Chinese political and media systems: “The news actually appeared on the Internet months before it became public. But it had been blocked for a while, thanks to the Olympics. You see, how terrible it was that mainland China suppressed the news for such a long time.” An IT manager (SH24) echoed: “News here was tailored by the state apparatus. That’s why the news [of the tainted milk scandal] was only released after the Olympics. Human life could be so sacrificed for a big national event.” Migrants were not only critical of Chinese government’s initial cover-up of the news but also suspicious of the trustworthiness of media coverage in the aftermath. One expatriate (SH05) working for a software company
said that he frequently browsed Chinese websites for news. He contended: “In China, dissident voices might be heard for a short term, but they would be silenced eventually…Now we’re told that milk products produced after a certain date were safe. Do you believe it?”

Migrants’ fear of contamination connotes physical and metaphorical meanings. Unsafe products in China are not only seen as an issue of hygiene but also as a sign of moral decay. The tainted-milk scandal only reminded migrants of their migration to an “uncivilized” place and confirmed their difference from locals, in term of the capacity of “telling right from wrong.” For example:

I feel it difficult to fit into local society…The moral standard is very low here. Take poisonous milk for example, I was shocked by the news, but most local people were blind to it. (Amy Dai, housewife)

The news about melamine was really big… My husband said that it’s okay to ingest minimal of it. But he also emphasized that “in China, anything could happen.” (Shu-Min Lu, housewife)

These statements revealed that the reception of the news about tainted milk scandal
reinforced migrants’ sense of moral superiority and seemingly legitimized their resistance
to assimilation to the Chinese society. At the same time, migrants also stressed their
difference from Taiwan’s public in general, and certain components in particular, through
the news event. As they saw it, both Taiwanese media and Taiwanese people overacted to
the incident because of prejudice against China. At worst, the melamine panic in Taiwan
was exploited to spread China-phobia. Betty, who criticized China’s information control
over the tainted-milk scandal, was also discontent with Taiwanese media’s performance:
“News in Taiwan is overdone. It’s a shame that Taiwanese media politicize everything.
They favor politics over justice and ignore the moral distinction between right and
wrong.” A school teacher (SZ24) also felt that Taiwanese media tended to exaggerate the
dark side of China. “China has more than one billion people and most of them were not
poisoned by tainted milk,” he emphasized.

Migrants used the tainted milk scandal as an ideal example to prove their point on
Chinese media’s subjection to state control and Taiwanese media’s tendency toward
sensationalism and partisanship (see Chapter 4). Meanwhile, their opinions also involved
a reflection of situational self. First of all, they felt a sense of in-betweenness—as being
Taiwanese in China. That explained why, despite their caution on Chinese goods,
migrants felt obligated to correct unfair accusations against China. Lucy Tang, a
freelancer, illustrated such a struggle. She said that her Chinese-Canadian boyfriend often received forwarded e-mails from his Canadian friends. More often than not, those emails contained stories about China that she called “biased, and sometimes untruth.” She concluded that “Western media often gloat over China’s mistakes and enjoy disclosing problematic Chinese products.” However, Lucy is also sensitive to food safety in China. Once she suspected that the grapes she bought were artificially colored. “I threw them out right away, based on my knowledge about Chinese heixin foods,” she said.

Many interviewed migrants shared such ambivalence. They felt insulted when Taiwanese criticized China. A more profound and subtle feeling was the fear of being ostracized by their compatriots in Taiwan. They regularly received e-mail or instant message alerts from Taiwan about unsafe made-in-China items. When they returned to Taiwan, the topic of heixin products was often raised by friends or relatives. “In Taiwan, any Chinese imports are considered problematic,” a female manager (SH20B) recalled her uneasiness during the milk episode. Similarly, another female manger (SZ07) disliked some of her Taiwanese friends’ hostility against China: “They teased me that the mainland is full of heixin foods, and I would give them a chilly response, saying that Taiwan also had a lot of [unsafe products].” For migrants, speaking up for China was a self-vindication by which they fanned away doubts of themselves—Taiwanese who chose
to live in China over Taiwan.

Second, although the news about the tainted milk scandal catches many migrants in limbo between China and Taiwan, it is clearly a reaffirmation of their class identity. Curiously, such class identity is often associated with their being Taiwanese. Migrants felt it unnecessary to panic over tainted milk in part because they had been well prepared for unsafe products in their everyday lives. They brought crucial daily supplies from Taiwan, changed their diet so as to avoid processed foods, and shopped in decent supermarkets. Some migrants said that they rarely bought cheap stuff in China, especially as far as food was considered. After the tainted-milk scandal, some set up a stricter standard—refusing all made-in-China products, including those foreign brands. Therefore, consumption became an expression of identity for many migrants, with an emphasis on brands and product origins. One businessman’s (Alex Ho) comment epitomized such identity construction: “In China, Taiwanese commodities have been distinguished from local products. So have Taiwanese people become distinctive from locals.” Therefore, migrants confirmed their distinctiveness through a discriminative process of othering, which assured them of not being contaminated.

Conclusion
Taiwanese migrants’ reception of Chinese news about these three episodes shows that news reception involves not only the process of information transmission but also meaning construction. Moreover, the meaning of news constructed by human subjects is not always correspondent to the meaning of media text. First of all, people read news differently because of social contexts where they are situated and because of social relevance of the news to them. Taiwanese migrants make sense of Chinese news with reference to their real life experiences. They also react to news in accordance with their cultural frames. It demonstrates that, just as Morley and Hall would predict, not merely other forms of popular culture, but also news stories are polysemic texts. Even news readers will exploit the *leakiness* of the news text.

Secondly, news reception enacts different levels of meaning construction, including the process of identity negotiation. For Taiwanese migrants, the reception of Chinese news often invites a reflection of situational self, reminding them of being “Taiwanese migrants of Chinese descent.” Three various news events in the host country—a natural tragedy, a national gala, and a man-made disaster—all activate migrants’ identity negotiations. Some confirm their Chinese identity, but mostly migrants strengthen their feeling of being outsiders and reinforce their Taiwanese consciousness. However, the
process is not straightforward. Sometimes migrants also develop a sense of in-betweenness that they are distant from both the sending and receiving countries. In fact, it is the Taiwanese migrant community in China that bestows them with the feeling of sharing and belonging. Next chapter will analyze how migrants’ information exchange with fellow Taiwanese helps reinforce their sense of Taiwanese solidarity.

1 What viewers saw on Chinese television after the disaster, as a Chinese scholar described it, included the footage of “Premier Wen’s speech when flying to the scene and his gravity upon arrival, Chen Jien’s last appearance that deeply moved every Chinese, a student’s backpack dug out from the ruins, the tears of survivors who lost their families, the rescue effort by our generous and respectful soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army, great passion of volunteers who rushed to help, and the national spirit presented by the Chinese people’s unity under the relief effort” (Jiang, 2008, p.5). Chen Jian was a victim of the Sichuan earthquake who died shortly after being pulled out of the rubble that trapped him for three days. During the rescue process, Chen showed tremendous courage as he expressed his strong will to survive and reunion with his family. His voice was heard by the nationwide audience through a telephone interview by a Chinese TV station.

2 City officials of Shijazhuang, Hebei Province, admitted in a news conference that the Sanlu group knew the contamination in its baby formula weeks before alerted the city authorities on August 2nd (Quek, 2008). However, the affair only became public after the expose of an Oriental Morning Post report on September 11th. The reporter, Guangzhou Jian, posted an online article, saying that he was not the first journalist to report the story but only the first one to name the name of Sanlu. Fujian Feng, an editor of Nanfang Daily, also posted an article revealing that his news organization was tipped the story in July but did not start the investigation because of “a reason that everyone knows,” indicating the Olympics.
Chapter 6: Trust—Social Networking and Information Exchange

Trust, as defined by Giddens (1990), is “confidence in the reliability of a person or a system, regarding a given set of outcomes or event, where that confidence expresses a faith in the probity or love of another, or in the correctness of abstract principle” (p. 34). In Giddens’ account, trust is vital to social existence because it reduces or minimizes the sense of risk and insecurity. Modernity marks a transformation in which the foci of trust relations shift from localized contexts, such as the local community, to abstract systems, especially expert systems. Meanwhile, modernity also changes our feeling of intimacy in that personal trust becomes one that needs to be worked at and to be earned (ibid).

Trust is a crucial concept for Taiwanese migrants. It affects how migrants organize social relations as well as how they obtain information. Previous studies have shown that building trusting interpersonal relationships (guanxi) with local Chinese bureaucrats is a substantial component of doing business in China among overseas Chinese, including Taiwanese (Hsing, 1997; Lever-Tracy and Ip, 1996; Ong, 1999). My research also confirms that such guanxi connections help Taiwanese migrants scout insider information and ask for favors (see Chapter 4). The relationships between Taiwanese businesspeople and Chinese officials are instrumental in character: there are explicit objects of social
exchanges. On the other hand, migrants also develop Taiwanese-only networks for social support and information exchange that they see as altruistic, based on their belief in mutual help. These social networks among migrants retribalize interpersonal relationships to the primary level, although they are not necessarily built upon localized contexts. Migrants’ networks become a significant medium through which information is initiated, relayed, and received.

This should not be surprising since seminal communication research has rediscovered that, given the prevalence of mass media, *primary groups*—informal groupings of families and friends or formal groupings of clubs and organizations—remain important to news distribution and personal decision-making (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). Early immigrant studies have also showed that the exchange of reportage, gossip, and news hold together the networks of immigrant peer groups composed of kin, friends, and neighbors (Gans, 1962). With the development of electronic communication technologies, interpersonal communication among migrants is no longer limited to face-to-face conversations. Rather, it can be carried out by “mediated interactions” (Thompson, 1995), such as telephone and the Internet.

Mediated interactions have twofold implications for migrants. First, interpersonal communication transcends the limitations of time and space (Cathcart & Gumpert, 1983).
Therefore, the concept of community is transformed from physical space to cyberspace, as well as from groups to networks (Wellman, 2001). Migrant networks become well connected beyond physical constraints and across group boundaries. People are able to establish new ties, retain old ties, and rediscover lost ties in the cyberspace that links to wherever they reside (Hiller & Franz, 2004). Second, compared to the one-way transmission of ethnic media, migrants also can contribute to information flow within their networks. Deuze (2006) argues that the worldwide emergence of online ethnic community media reflects a trend of participatory culture, owing to people’s growing dissatisfaction with mainstream news media.

In fact, ethnic communication networks—interpersonal communication and ethnic media alike—not only help cement tradition and facilitate assimilation (Jeffres, 2000), but also substitute for mass media’s function of surveillance of the environment (Lasswell, 1964). Since immigrant groups are vulnerable to discrimination in host countries, ethnic media work as community sentinels, acting as both radar and early warning system against external threats (Viswanath & Arora, 2000). Digital technologies virtually allow everyone in the networks of communication to play the role of gatekeeper. Additionally, the new cyberspace provides marginalized immigrants a discursive comfort zone in which they can articulate their identity narratives (Mitra, 2005).
Taiwanese migrants are not marginalized in China, at least in terms of class. They enjoy economic privilege and cultural affinity. Nonetheless, they do face political hostility or at least opposition. Studies have shown that high economic status (Hu, 2006; Wang, 2007) and political rivalry across the Taiwan Strait (Shen, 2005) heighten Taiwanese migrants’ sense of insecurity and anxiety. At the core of their consciousness is a trust crisis—disbelief in Chinese expert systems and in Chinese people. Because of their isolation from the adopted society (see Chapter 3) and suspicion toward Chinese mainstream media (see Chapter 4), migrants seek interpersonal or community networks for social support and vital information, screening out external hazards and reducing their sense of insecurity. As one of my interviewees (Feng-yi Pang) argues, a sublime principle of being Taiwanese in China is “keeping watch together in mutual defense and helping out one another (shou wang xiang zhu).” This Chinese proverb highlights a return to solidarity in the local community, although the meaning of community has changed.

Previous chapters have demonstrated Taiwanese migrants’ use of mass media. This chapter focuses on community websites and interpersonal communication, exploring how trust relations influence migrants’ modes of communication and associations—that is, informal information exchange and interpersonal social support. First, I will discuss institutional factors that contribute to the proliferation of interpersonal communication
and social groupings. Second, I will examine the role of community websites in distributing information regarding migrants’ everyday lives and in facilitating their social groupings. Finally, using the examples of three Taiwanese groups/networks, I will analyze how Taiwanese migrants utilize communication technologies to keep themselves informed and to cement solidarity.

Information Ambiguity, Social Alienation, and Interpersonal Communication

As analyzed in previous chapters, many Taiwanese migrants insist on living a “Taiwanese way of life” and pay little attention to Chinese news. Their lifestyle and news reception greatly influence their dependence on Taiwanese migrant networks for what they think as “reliable” information. Of course, the practice of interpersonal communication is not limited to Taiwanese networks. First, some migrants also recognize Chinese people such as local officials, business partners, office coworkers, house helpers, or personal chauffeurs as their news sources. Even the taxi drivers and massage therapists they meet occasionally provide local news. Businesspeople and high-ranking managers usually ask their Chinese subordinates for news briefs related to business operations.

Second, communication by word of mouth is also prevalent among the Chinese, due
to China’s special media environments. Allport and Postman (1946-1947) argue that “rumor travels when events have *importance* in the lives of individuals and when news received about them is either *lacking* or *subjectively ambiguous*” (italic original) (p.502).

In China, it is often the lack of information in mass media that make interpersonal communication prevail. For example, many Chinese citizens utilized alternative platforms of information exchange—word of mouth, cell phone SMS (Short Message Service) and the Internet—to cross-verify rumors about the SARS outbreak in 2003, at a time when official information control created a high level of ambiguity and uncertainty (Tai & Sun, 2007). In fact, SMS is broadly used by the Chinese for information production and dissemination in everyday life. As of the end of 2008, 39.5% of Internet users in China receive online content through SMS (CNNIC, 2009). This affordable, movable, and interactive communication device is dubbed “the fifth mass media” in China, where newspapers, broadcasting, television, and the Internet are controlled by authorities (Li, 2009). He (2008) argues that SMS has emerged as a quasi-mass communication channel through which a deviant discourse universe is carried out against the official discourse.

Taiwanese migrants also resort to interpersonal communication for news and sometimes utilize such tools as SMS to expedite and expand information flow. Compared
to Chinese citizens, however, migrants even rely more on informal news sources because they receive news less from Chinese media, and Taiwanese media offer only a sketch of Chinese news. More importantly, a deep distrust of Chinese society and people furthers their dependence on information exchange within Taiwanese-only social networks. As analyzed in Chapter 3, migrants intentionally keep their distance from the local society. Social isolation has contradictory implications for migrants’ reception of news. On one hand, they become apathetic toward local affairs and are concerned little about Chinese news. On the other hand, their ignorance about the outside world makes migrants feel insecure, so they demand reliable information to ease the sense of uncertainty.

Many of my interviewees saw China as a high-risk society fraught with unknown dangers. They were worried about the social ills emerging from China’s societal change, such as social inequality, crimes, food safety, environmental hazards, and so on. Furthermore, doubts about China’s expert system, including political, economic, and social institutions, made them feel like being in a jungle in which they had to struggle for survival. The distrust of Chinese society was expressed by a notion often mentioned by my interviewees, that “China is a society governed by humans rather than cast by the rule of law.” Businesspeople were wary of frequent policy changes and rent-seeking by Chinese officials. For example, businessman Wei-chi Hsu described his sense of
insecurity about “information asymmetry” in China: “Chinese society is still groping its way. One thing may be right at the moment but then become wrong at a different time. You need to figure out when to do the right thing.” Because of a sense of uncertainty, migrants utilize interpersonal communication to make sure they have sufficient information.

Aside from distrusting Chinese expert systems, Taiwanese migrants also distrust Chinese people. “Untrustworthiness” (buchengxin) and “disloyalty” (buzhongcheng) were common perceptions of the Chinese voiced by my interviewees, who cited their personal experiences to defend this prejudice. An accountant manager’s statement was representative of a common view among migrants:

I have learned to protect myself from being taken advantage of … To tell the truth, it’s not easy to survive here. You get hurt if you’re not skillful enough … We wish to stay in our own [Taiwanese] circle. I used to treat some local people as good friends but didn’t realize what they were up to. Taiwanese culture is different. We make friends with sincerity and are willing to help one another. (SH11, finance manger)

This statement indicates that trust among Taiwanese has a twofold meaning: First,
migrants think that other Taiwanese are more trustworthy than the Chinese, even though they know also stories about betrayals among their own kind. Second, they have a strong belief that the Taiwanese they meet will give them a helping hand. Based on mutual trust, migrants often band together, not only for information but also for social support. A freelance writer (SH01) explained how she felt more secure in Shanghai than in other parts of China: “There are many Taiwanese in Shanghai. It makes you feel that whatever happens, you always have people from your home country on your side. It’s a kind of comfort.” Despite the fact that this writer made few Taiwanese friends in Shanghai, the presence of Taiwanese alone eased her anxiety about the external environment. It was precisely these trustful relationships among Taiwanese migrants that furthered their reliance on community websites and Taiwanese groups and networks for information and social support.

Community Websites: Online Sharing and Offline Networks

Ethnic media are generally thought to produce geo-ethnic stories that provide culturally relevant and locally vital information to immigrants in their places of residence (Lin & Song, 2006). In China, government regulations make it impossible to launch
media under sole foreign ownership. However, various publications that cater to the Taiwanese business community still thrive in China, such as Strait Bridge (Taishang) and China Taiwan Businessman (Zhongguo Taishang), monthly magazines sold both on the mainland and Taiwan. Regional Taiwanese business associations also have their internal publications delivered to their members. In Shanghai, such magazines as Emigrate to Shanghai (Yiju Shanghai) provide myriad kinds of information, including health care, education, advertisements for goods and services, and so forth. Most of my interviewees said that they had heard of these publications but rarely paid attention to them. Generally, they thought that these publications failed to provide useful information.

A newer format of ethnic media is the group of Taiwanese community websites that have burgeoned in China over the past years. The absence of viable ethnic presses may contribute to the popularity of websites that exclusively cater to the migrant community. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the web supplies immediateness, interactivity, and intimacy for migrants. Besides, the long list of Taiwanese websites blocked from access in China also diverts online traffic to community websites. Wellman (2001) defines community as “networks of interpersonal ties that provide sociability, support, information, a sense of belonging and social identity” (p. 228). Taiwanese community websites serve as an avenue that satisfies these functions. Among them, Taima Club
(Taishang Taitai Xintiendi) and Taike Life (Taike Shenghuowang) are the two largest sites in terms of membership.

_Taima Club: Supporting Networks for Housewives_

_Taima Club_ was launched in 2005 by three Taiwanese migrants and was initially designated as an online platform for information exchange for Taiwanese housewives in Shanghai. As the time of my fieldwork in the end of 2008, this site had reached 30 thousand members, making it the most prominent Taiwanese community website in China.¹ It had also extended membership in other parts of China, Taiwan, and even foreign countries—as its previous users re-migrated to other places—and had recruited many male participants. Su Wu (an online alias), the chief administrator and one of the founders of _Taima Club_, explained that he was motivated to inaugurate this website out of his own frustrations with getting useful information after he migrated to Shanghai. He rarely used Chinese mass media and was unfamiliar with Chinese websites. The Taiwanese community website he had formerly been using had set up many restrictions in fear of censorship by Chinese authorities. However, his online interactions with other participants made him realize that Taiwanese housewives were responsible for the well-being of their family and thus most needed information to conduct their lives in
Shanghai. Besides, they also had more time to spend online than other migrants did. Therefore, Su Wu and the other co-founders decided to adopt a bulletin board system (BBS) for Taima Club so that Taiwanese housewives could exchange information with one another.

According to Su Wu and Jason’s Ma (online alias), an active participant of Taima Club, the website became well known to Taiwanese housewives because of its forum on education. With more and more expatriates moving to China with families, locating a suitable school was a big concern for many housewives. The website awarded prizes, such as online prestige, virtual money, and even actual trophies, to encourage participants to get involved in discussions and to answer questions. The back-and-forth exchange not only enriched the content of the website, but also reinforced interpersonal interactions. Those messages increasingly touched on a wealth of topics related to migrants’ everyday lives—for example, where to shop and eat, how to apply for visas and driver’s licenses, whom to ask for the installation of Taiwanese satellite TV, etc. Sometimes the topics would become very personal. The Wing of Desire (Yuwangziyi) was one of the hottest forums: in it, housewives would discuss their husbands’ infidelities.

As a result, active and seasoned members of Taima Club became acquainted with one another beyond the Internet. The website began to hold offline activities, such as
lectures, classes, and informal gatherings. Jason’s Ma was the chief organizer of lunch meetings on the weekdays. She said that the gatherings in Shanghai usually attracted more than one hundred housewives, who had had deep interactions with some online friends and were eager to know each other in person. Therefore, Taima Club is not only a platform of information exchange and social support in cyberspace, but is also a medium that helps Taiwanese housewives build new ties in a place where they have lost most of their old ties.

Taike Life: Sociability for Young Professionals

In contrast to Taima Club’s focus on housewives, Taike Life targets younger, working Taiwanese expatriates in the greater Shanghai area. It was founded in 2007 for commercial purposes by a Taiwanese-invested IT firm and has been maintained by a team of full-time employees. Although its website resembles Taima Club, Taike Life emphasizes topics related to consumption, such as shopping, dining, and travel, to cater to the interests of youngsters. From the onset, it has utilized offline interactions to cement its online community. With an aim toward profit, the Taike team hosts a variety of indoor and outdoor leisure activities—bowling, Christmas parties, and group trips. The website also allows participants to invite other Taiwanese young people to join their small group
activities.

The site’s administrator (at the time of my field research), nicknamed James Pond, told me that as a latecomer in the arena of community websites, Taike Life initially emphasized members’ face-to-face interactions to create a sense of belonging to the online community. In addition, to publicize itself via Taiwanese mass media, the site also relied on existing members’ personal networks to recruit new blood. Within one and a half years, Taike Life already had more than 6,000 registered members. According to James Pond, most of Taike Life’s offline participants are salaried men and women in their twenties and thirties, whose demographic characteristic are different from Taima Club’s. These people want to meet new friends, lovers, and potential working partners. Therefore, sociability is emphasized by the website. The Personal Network sub-page allows members to find their lost ties, such as classmates and hometown friends. Offline social activities help members to build new connections. If Taima Club fosters small groups via its online community, Taike Life hopes to connect scattered groups into an expanded and interwoven migrant network.

Authentication, Distinction, and Solidarity
Trust relations among migrants play an important role in the maintenance of such Taiwanese community websites as Taima Club and Taike Life. Because of trust and the belief in mutual help, information exchange and social support among strangers are made possible through online conversations and offline interactions. Being Taiwanese is the fundamental criterion of being trusted. The following is an analysis of how trust works in the three mechanisms of authentication, social distinction, and solidarity.

Authentication

Despite Internet anonymity, the administrators of both Taima Club and Taike Life emphasized that their websites maintained a composition of at least 90 percent “effective members,” by which they meant that these members not only provided truthful profiles but also actually came from Taiwan. Some measures were taken to ensure participants’ Taiwanese identity. First, website administrators would verify whether a newly registered member provided a real e-mail address, msn account, and telephone number. Then they would monitor online postings to judge whether this person was Taiwanese. Second, on both websites, only registered members were permitted to post new messages and respond to others’ questions. When participants expressed their opinions, the websites would show their personal profiles, including the information about their hometowns in
Taiwan. Third, based on their involvement, online participants were assigned various ranks. Certain sensitive messages or forums were open only to privileged members who had been actively involved in online sharing for a long while—meaning that their authenticity had been well tested by other participants. Finally, offline activities were the ultimate verification procedure, allowing participants to reveal their real identities to one another.

Given the volume of information exchanged and the number of participants involved, the effectiveness of these mechanisms to screen out non-Taiwanese is probably overstated. However, their very existence shows how much website administrators are concerned with maintaining a Taiwanese-only online environment. Su Wu emphasized that he did not intend to make a distinction between Taiwanese and Chinese members, but he had to appease Taiwanese users’ “sense of insecurity” about sharing information and exchanging thoughts with strangers online. He argued that the presence of Chinese users on Taima Club’s forums often incurred unnecessary quarrels between Taiwanese and Chinese participants, particularly when political issues were involved. James Bond, whose wife was Chinese, also emphasized that Taiwanese people, including himself, preferred hanging out with fellow Taiwanese because of cultural “commonality.” Therefore, Taike Life hoped to keep a Taiwanese-only community.
The desire for sharing among Taiwanese, either online or offline, was reinforced by migrants’ life experiences. Many of my interviewees mentioned that it was important to maintain a low-key lifestyle in China. Unless absolutely necessary, they would not expose their Taiwanese identities to Chinese people. Being Taiwanese made them an easy target for swindling and forced them to declare their respect for China as the motherland. Because of this forced and intentional reticence in everyday life, migrants found Taiwanese community websites a shelter and “discursive comfort zone” in which they could articulate a “silenced identity narrative” (Mitra, 2005). Mei-li Wu, a senior member of Taima Club, explained why she appreciated this haven of discussions shared by Taiwanese. She said that she used to visit Chinese websites related to her interests but learned to keep silent because “Taiwanese often became targets of attacks.” If she wanted to ask questions, she would pretend to be Chinese by typing in the simplified Chinese characters used in China and used as few words as possible. “It’s a kind of self-protection not to reveal we’re Taiwanese on Chinese websites,” she emphasized. Only after the establishment of Taima Club did Wu feel secure to freely share information online without disguising herself.

China’s online censorship also made community website administrators and participants cautious of the presence of non-Taiwanese people on the forums. Most
Taiwanese community websites set up in China reminded members of the ten taboo topics stipulated by the State Council’s *Telecommunications Regulations* (September, 2000), including the prohibition on spreading information to “undermine national unification.” Website administrators also frequently warned users not to discuss political issues and disparage the Chinese. “We need to follow [China’s] rules of game; after all, we live on its turf,” James Pond argued. He said that he exercised self-censorship by deleting some messages on the website that might cross the red line; he also cut out some sensitive keywords, such as “Taiwan independence” or “Democratic Progressive Party,” a group in Taiwan which was hostile to the PRC. In fact, *Taima Club* was once shut down for a month because participants posted inappropriate content. Su Wu said that he received phone calls about twice a month from the police, asking him to delete certain postings. To maintain the website’s operation, he had no choice but to comply with the orders. With the growth of the website, *Taima Club* has added 25 volunteer (in 2008) assistant administrators to monitor its voluminous content. The practice of self-censorship has also expanded to ordinary members, who regularly notify administrators of suspicious or unsafe messages. Jason’s Ma, one of the assistant administrators of *Taima Club*, emphasized that she had gradually begun spending less time “patrolling” her forums because of members’ reports. Devoted members become sentinels to protect the
sustainability of the online community. Preventing the involvement of non-Taiwanese participants assumed priority as a means to shelter this discursive sanctuary from external threats.

**Distinction: a “Taiwanese Perspective”**

Some migrants continued to cling to Taiwanese media for information in part because they were hungry for news from home. In addition, my interviewees often mentioned that they wanted a “Taiwanese perspective” from the Taiwanese media so they could understand China, although the meaning of this term was not clearly defined.

Administrators and participants of community websites also emphasized the demand for a public platform that allowed migrants to trade information from a Taiwanese perspective. Su Wu illustrated what constituted a Taiwanese perspective by giving me an example of online sharing about a trip to the Great Wall. He argued that what made a pleasant travel experience for Chinese visitors might be a nightmare to Taiwanese because of different concerns about safety, noise, cleanness, and so on. That made travelogues shared among Taiwanese important and distinctive: “If you read a piece of information posted by other nationals, you may have doubts about its truthfulness; but if the story is told by fellow Taiwanese, you tend to trust it.”
This account demonstrated that the sense of reliability about information on the web was built upon trust relationships among Taiwanese, particularly when participants were strangers to one another. What made the Taiwanese perspective distinctive was the mutual trust in Taiwanese people’s sincerity, shared values, and willingness to help one another. In fact, Su Wu specifically stressed that Taiwanese housewives’ kindheartedness and sincerity contributed to the success of Taima Club. Alex Ho, an occasional visitor of Taike Life and TWGOCN (a Taiwanese community website focusing on business), also explained why he felt information on Taiwanese sites more truthful: “Taiwanese are sincere about sharing knowledge online. Chinese disregard copyrights and tend to copy postings from other websites.” Ho emphasized that he preferred visiting Taiwanese websites to look for local information that involved a “Taiwanese angle.”

Trust among Taiwanese online participants was also expressed via language distinctions. For a start, most Taiwanese typed messages in traditional Chinese characters that were different from the simplified Chinese characters used in China. It seems that over time, messages typed in the simplified form have increased, indicating a trend toward localization. However, the Chinese characters used by online participants remains an apparent index of nationality. A more subtle way to demonstrate one’s being Taiwanese is the adoption of Taiwanese-style Chinese. Some idioms and usages are only
used by Taiwanese. For example, participants would type “JJMM” as a codeword for “sisters” in the online community. Some Chinese terms used by Taiwanese users were meaningless to Chinese readers because they were transformed from Taiwanese-tongued Mandarin or the Taiwanese Hoklo dialect. A mixture of Chinese characters and phonetic symbols (zuyin), adopted only in Taiwan, is often seen in online postings, too. Jason’s Ma argued that using Taiwanese-style Mandarin on Taima Club was an intentional gesture to express one’s Taiwanese identity: “We have a common language and share the same thinking. That’s why people appreciate this online community.” Linguistic distinction not only testifies to one’s nationality but also offers a cordial and intimate environment for conversations in which people feel acquainted to one another and demonstrate their solidarity.

**Solidarity: Social Support**

Community websites serve as a platform of information exchange. They are also a source of social support through participants’ online interactions and offline activities. At the informational level, online participants believe in mutual help and play the role of community sentinels to watch out for each other. People constantly update news stories related to the migrant community. They also alarm others if they detect anything unusual
in their surroundings. Ellen Sun, a product manager in Shanghai, said that she cared little about Chinese news but regularly visited such sites as Taike Life and Taiwanese on Mainland (Taiwanren Zaidalu) to keep informed of local information, in particular about crimes. “Many people are willing to search for information and then share it with others; that’s enough information for me,” she explained.

One recent college graduate elaborated on the point of mutual help in online communities: “Because of anonymity, it’s difficult to evaluate the validity of online messages. You need others’ help to verify the information. It’s like Wikipedia. Many people will correct false information for you.” This young man said that he basically depended on the Work in China forum of PTT, the largest BBS site in Taiwan, for Chinese news. Hsiao-hui Tien, a housewife and a Taima Club participant, valued the information provided by community websites: “We [Taiwanese] are a minority here so we buy things at a higher price and are often fooled by taxi drivers.” She thought that most Taiwanese migrants had similar experiences, so that online information exchange was a collective effort to share strategies for survival in China.

Online communities also provide emotional aid and companionship for participants. As the proverb goes, “birds of a feather flock together.” People with similar characters also tend to associate together and share personal experiences. On Taiwanese community
websites, such as Men’s Talk (of Taima Club) and Expatriate Zone (of Taike Life) create a space in which expatriate employees trade complaints about jobs, salaries, and job-related issues. However, emotional support was most evident among housewives, who have often sacrificed their own careers and relocated to China for the sake of family unity. In the place of adoption, they lose not only careers but also social networks and self-esteem. Throughout my interviews, many housewives told personal stories about their lack of confidence, feelings of loneliness, worries about spouses’ infidelity, and sense of helplessness after moving to China. Personal narratives revealed how they reset their anchors in life with the support of other women in similar situations. Mei-li Wu emphasized how much such websites as Taima Club meant to her:

[Taima Club] is a place for killing time and talking with people about what’s bothering me now. For example, I’ve been in a bad mood recently because my husband’s job is shaky. I can’t show my worries in front of him, but I can share secrets with other sisters on the website. They would come to comfort me. It makes you feel that you have someone to count on. For me, Taima Club is like my natal home. (Mei-li Wu, housewife)
The emotional aid and companionship among participants can be strengthened by offline interactions, through which some weak ties are transformed to strong ties.

Hsiao-hui Tien said that she rebuilt her social networks in China after attending *Taima Club*’s workshops. However, she gradually faded out from online communities because she found like-minded friends from the workshop to spend time with offline. Some website participants, like Tien, build their own groups or networks for various kinds of support.

Social Grouping and Networking

Despite the impressive scale of some community websites, their frequent visitors only constitute a small portion of the Taiwanese population in China. Many interviewed migrants instead formed various social groupings and networks for information exchange, making interpersonal communication prevalent in the migrant community. But because of China’s political climate, some migrants said that they were cautious of getting involved in formal organizations and associations. The most visible Taiwanese organizations in China are the chambers of commerce of different regions, called *Taiwanese Business Associations* (*Taishang Xiehui*). These organizations are sanctioned by Chinese
authorities and composed of Taiwanese companies located in the same townships.

Various local associations are then incorporated into larger business associations at municipal, provincial, and national levels. They hold regular meetings, publish pamphlets, and work as intermediaries between Taiwanese companies and Chinese governments.

According to my interviews with businesspeople and senior managers, views on Taiwanese business associations were polarized. Some business owners were deeply involved in those associations, confirming the functions of information exchange among different companies and of guanxi-building with local officials. Others, on the contrary, considered these associations nothing more than rubber stamps or decorative organizations that benefited their businesses little. Some senior managers of big corporations even told me that, given their companies’ clout in local politics, joining business associations was only a gesture of doing a favor to other smaller Taiwanese firms.

In addition to business associations, a variety of Taiwanese groupings also have been burgeoning in China, such as religious groups, professional clubs, and amateur sports teams. Some are formal groups, and others are merely loose interpersonal connections. During my field research in China, I was impressed by how much migrants relied on these Taiwanese groups and networks for “reliable” information and social support and
believed in the spirit of “watching out for each other.” In the following section I list three examples: senior managers in Suzhou, housewives in Shenzhen, and an informal Taiwanese gathering called *Shanghai Rice Ball* (*Shanghai Fantuan*).

*Senior Managers in Suzhou*

In an industrial township in Suzhou, a “study group,” composed of 22 top-level Taiwanese managers of different firms, is formed to share information about how to do business in China. Named *Finance Manager Fellowship* (*Caiwuzhang Liangyihui*), the group includes executives in charge of finance, public relations, customs, and personnel management. According to Feng-yi Pang, a key figure in this group, only senior managers whose companies are listed in Taiwan’s stock market are eligible for membership. The monthly meeting is hosted by the company in rotation. Participants discuss issues related to government policies, Chinese bureaucratic culture, labor relations, and so forth. For example, they further their understanding of China’s major economic policies by reading *red-head* (official) documents frequently. However, given the fact that local bureaucracies in different jurisdictions might have diverse interpretations of central policies, members also share information they have scouts from officials. Sometimes they also exchange experiences of dealing with Chinese
employees, especially since China tightened its labor law in 2008. Pang concluded that this study group realized the principle of “keeping watch together in mutual defense.”

Cheng-wu Yu, a member of this group, said that he benefited more from the informal gatherings with other Taiwanese executives than formal meetings at business associations. As an assistant general manager with a Taiwanese electronic firm, Yu is concerned with issues relating to taxes, customs, safety regulations, environmental standards, and so on. Information exchange among group members makes him better informed of these topics. More importantly, he can consult other managers about “the right person” and “the best way” to solve problems if his company gets into trouble. What Yu means is the ability to get things done behind the scene, possibly involving red envelope (bribes). Pang, and others like him, can contribute on these issues because he is a counselor to several local government agencies and maintains good relationships with officials. For these managers, “social practice” (termed by Pang) provides them with more valuable information than the media can offer, as they distrust the “public scripts” of Chinese officialdom and feel insecure about frequent policy changes in China.

*Networks of Housewives in Shenzhen*

In China, many Taiwanese housewives have housekeepers to help with daily chores,
but they remain the persons that keep their households running. In Shenzhen, I found that some Taiwanese housewives had developed interconnected social networks through several primary groups—religious gatherings, residential communities, children’s schools, and so on. They would inform one another about news crucial to their everyday lives, such as crime, food safety, and shopping information. Each grouping was essentially formed by weak ties and inter-group interactions were loosely connected by some key persons. However, when asked about their news sources, every interviewee involved in the networks pointed out the importance of interpersonal communication among group members. Moreover, new communication technologies, such as listservs and SMS, were applied to enable efficient information sharing.

Every Tuesday morning, a Bible study session is held in a house within a gated residential complex in a Shenzhen suburb. This residential complex attracted many Taiwanese families because of its geographical proximity to an industrial park in which a large Taiwanese corporation was headquartered. The Bible group includes Chinese housewives, but its core members are mostly Taiwanese. In this huge residential community, another Taiwanese housewife group consists of members of the Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation, a major Buddhist organization in Taiwan. Regardless of religious differences, Christians and Buddhists become “sisters” with one
another and join efforts to do such things as donate resources to the Sichuan Earthquake survivors. In addition, almost every Taiwanese housewife in this community has her email address on a common mailing list managed by an active volunteer. The listserv is usually used for group purchases, including buying goods from Taiwan. Sometimes members also share personal experiences, such as avoiding certain bad landlords and recommending a good house helper. Shu-Min Lu, a housewife, emphasized that this neighborhood group provided her vital information as well as discounts she could not get by shopping alone. Ping Liu, also a housewife, urged newcomers of the residential community to sign up for the mailing list, or “they would be left out and know nothing about the locality.”

I accompanied Amy Dai, a member of the Bible group, to her children’s bilingual school in Shenzhen city when a Christmas performance was held. It turned out that many Taiwanese children attended this school and most Taiwanese parents knew one another. Shih-ying Hong, one of the parents, was considered an opinion leader by Taiwanese housewives of this school community. She had diverse social networks aside from this school, such as her own Taiwanese neighbors and people she knew from Sunflower, a club composed of Taiwanese housewives in Shenzhen. Hong said that she watched a Hong Kong-style tabloid news program on a local channel every morning and became
more knowledgeable about local affairs than other housewives. Therefore, she frequently
sent out text messages to people in her network. However, information exchange among
this network that involved dozens of housewives was multi-directional and interactive;
Hong played a crucial role, but did not act alone. Every day several messages were
transmitted among the networks, including news, personal experiences, or group
activities.

*Shanghai Rice Ball (Shanghai Fantuan)*

Shanghai Rice Ball was launched by Milan (a nickname) in 2001, designated as a
group meeting for casual dinners that allowed Taiwanese migrants to socialize with one
another. Milan emphasized in her interview that back in the early 2000s, there were not
so many Taiwanese in Shanghai as today. She used to get excited when she overheard
someone speaking in the Taiwanese *Hoklo* dialect. She decided to organize Taiwanese
gatherings after finding out that one of her Taiwanese friends faced some career
difficulties because he lacked connections in China. Since its first test-run, the group’s
parties have been thrown sporadically and now attract one hundred more participants on
average. Milan said that she saw about half new faces appearing at the meetings every
time. Over the past seven years she had collected more than two thousand phone numbers
Milan argued that *Shanghai Rice Ball* was a very loose network and she had no intentions of making it a formal organization. She “notifies” people in her network about activities by sending cell phone text messages and by publicizing the date and location on her MSN account. Sometimes the event is co-hosted by other Taiwanese groups and makes the news in Taiwanese media. At the gathering, people show up for fun and exchange business cards. Those who want to further business or personal relationships then keep contact amongst themselves. “Because it’s a Taiwanese gathering, people get to know one another in a very natural situation,” she emphasized. Three of my interviewees said that they had attended *Shanghai Rice Ball*’s activities before, hoping to extend personal networks. They told me that the gathering could become commercialized, as people scrambled to promote commodities by giving samples and direct mails. Some party goers also sought job opportunities on these occasions. However, they did not anticipate immediate benefits for attending such events, but only hoped to get to know more Taiwanese.

Watching Out for Each Other and Mutual Help
The three examples above demonstrate a sampling of the diverse social groups and networks organized by Taiwanese migrants. In Shanghai, where the largest Taiwanese population is concentrated and where urban facilities make socializing easier, a myriad of Taiwanese organizations prevail, such as 1881 Taiwanese Professional Women’s Society, Taichum Gentlemen and Ladies Club, and Wine and Gourmet Club. Fennie Tseng, who considered herself a socialite, emphasized that many members of these organizations overlapped because they were active in the Shanghai Taiwanese circle. Asides from those formal organizations, many migrants joined only unnamed groups, such as golf teams, cycling teams, and even KTV or travel pals. As one businessman (SZ04) argued, “it’s too sensitive to get involved in formal organizations in China.” Under such circumstances, informal social grouping and network building served as a trading zone in which migrants shared information and social support.

Sense of Being Taiwanese

The Taiwanese community in China is a loose concept rather than a tightly-knit network. Social groups are not necessarily composed of people with close relationships and strong-ties, either. In fact, I observed that some of the small group members did not really know each other well. Nevertheless, many interviewed migrants shared a
commitment that Taiwanese should and would help one another. Based on this belief, the membership of groups or networks was highly extendable, as long as the new recruits were Taiwanese. Milan explained why such loose gatherings as *Shanghai Rice Ball* would attract friends and strangers alike: “Taiwanese social networks are important here. Taiwanese are willing to give a hand to our compatriots. We all strive to make a living in an alien place. People often admire that Taiwanese are united here!”

Mei-feng Luo, a housewife in Shenzhen, recalled how she learned the norm of mutual help in the Taiwanese migrant community. The second day after Luo’s arrival in China, a Taiwanese woman on the street recognized her Taiwanese accent and said hello to her. After a short conversation, this woman gave out her contact information in case Luo, then a newcomer, needed help. “Her offer didn’t involve personal interests,” Luo claimed. Similar experiences repeated in her life in Shenzhen and made her strongly believe in the sincerity and goodwill of Taiwanese people. She noticed that Taiwanese usually kept their guard up in China but became less self-defensive when associating with people of their kind, even though they were strangers to each other. Li-ling Chang, a high-ranking manager, confirmed the openness of social groupings and networks among migrants. She frequently traveled around China with a group of Taiwanese whose members had constantly changed because of many expatriates’ transient stays in China.
She argued that migrants in China had to cope with constantly “losing old friends” by opening their hearts to make new ones:

Taiwanese have a peculiar pattern of sociability on the mainland. When I met college friends in Taiwan, I’d never bring my colleagues with me. But this happens all the time here. Since we’re in an alien place, we don’t care so much about [Taiwanese] strangers. We’re really much more open-minded here than in Taiwan.

(Li-ling Chang, CFO)

Therefore, my research shows that trust relationships and faith in mutual help among migrants are grounded more in membership in the Taiwanese community than in the strong ties of primary groups, although such trust and faith are still activated and reinforced by interpersonal interactions—face-to-face and mediated. Social grouping and networking among migrants satisfies their need for leisure, information, and sociability, with the companionship of fellow Taiwanese.

“Watch Out for Each Other”: the Role of the Community Sentinel

Many migrants described their lives in China as constrained to a “fish bowl,”
“fortress,” or “small circle” that segregated them from outside communities, physically or psychologically. Consequently, their information exchanges concentrated in two areas: surveillance of the environment and internal integration. First, a strong sense of insecurity drove migrants to scout out information about their surroundings for one another. One migrant (SH24) labeled his communication network in China as “feelers” (chuxiu) that served as an organ of reconnaissance and “bodyguards” (hufa) who protected him from external threats. Interpersonal communication among Taiwanese migrants thus plays the role of a sentinel or watchdog for immigrant communities. In the case of finance managers in Suzhou, information exchange concentrates on Chinese bureaucratic practices that otherwise seem opaque and whimsical to them. Group members also share experiences concerning management of the labor force, chiefly composed of Chinese migrant workers, whom Taiwanese executives regarded as unruly and dangerous. Similarly, Shenzhen housewives also warn one another through their listserv or SMS communication against hazards and dangers in China, such as crimes and product safety. They also send information about “group purchase programs,” with the assumption that Taiwanese will be easily cheated by local merchants. In sum, the Taiwanese migrants treat information sharing as a means of minimizing the external risks they face and reducing their sense of insecurity.
It should be noted that messages traded by migrants include news and personal experience, as well as misinformation, gossip, and rumors. Shih-ying Hong, an opinion leader among housewives, said that she once received a text message about the contamination of HIV in meat sold at barbeque stands on Shenzhen streets. Based on trust in and mutual help among her fellow Taiwanese, she immediately forwarded it to other housewives in her cell phone network: “I believe the story was true because it was sent from my friend.” Another network member (SZ28B) confirmed: “Alternative communication networks shape our understanding of local environments. We don’t trust mass media here, [but] we trust the veracity of text messages sent by our friends.”

This logic is flawed because much information traded by the housewife network originates from Chinese media. It is personal trust in sincerity and common judgment among the Taiwanese that endorses this sense of news authenticity. The alternative communication network among migrants cements group identity but also furthers their distrust of and isolation from their host society.

“Mutual Help”: Sociability and Bounded Solidarity

The second type of information shared by migrants involves internal integration, including messages general to the Taiwanese migrant community, such as issues
concerning visas, schools, and, company benefits. Updates regarding Taiwanese investments and job opportunities are also circulated through interpersonal communication. By and large, migrants regard their guanxi with Chinese officials and business partners as instrumental. For example, a businessman (SZ04) emphasized that he frequently gave gifts to local bureaucrats even while he cautiously maintained an appropriate distance from them. Gift giving is an explicit signal of social exchange in the expectation of the repayment of political favors. On the other hand, migrants tend to see their social groupings and networking with other migrants as altruistic, although they do not exclude instrumental purposes.

The sociability among Taiwanese migrants is similar to what Bourdieu (1986) calls social capital—“the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to passion of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition—or in other word, to membership in a group” (p.248). Bourdieu regards profit as the basis of the solidarity accrued from social capital, but he also argues that an investment in sociability is not necessarily a calculated pursuit of gain. Rather, an investment can be emotional and indebtedness can be transformed to gratitude. Disinterested and altruistic investment can be motivated by bounded solidarity, or identification with one’s own group, sect, or community (Portes, 1998).
One of my interviewees (Fennie Tseng) called the Taiwanese sociability in China a form of “resource pooling” (ziyuan zhenghe), in that migrants lack sufficient disposable resources—which they could have enjoyed in Taiwan. People who participated in Taiwanese groups and networks—golf teams, softball teams, KTV gatherings, etc.—admitted that through this participation they got access to some privileged information and cultivated good relationships that might help in their future. At the same time, they also denied specific instrumental motivations to join these groups and networks. A manager (Yuen-Kai Lee) who planed to move from Suzhou to Beijing began attending the activities of a so-called Taiwan Rice Ball group there, hoping to build new social networks. He emphasized: “We’re not classmates or neighbors. People join these events with some purpose, but it’s not always for profit.” A businesswoman (Betty Lee) disclosed her ups and downs in China, emphasizing that “it’s important to have someone pull you up from the abyss.” For migrants, this “someone” is more likely to be Taiwanese.

Interpersonal information exchange and (potential) social support among migrants enables a bounded solidarity in the Taiwanese community. One housewife (Men-jung Tu) in the aforementioned Shenzhen suburb complex described how Taiwanese neighbors took care of one another—for example, looking after Taiwanese children whose parents
needed to return temporarily to Taiwan because of an emergency. She argued: “Local people are not as united as we are… in this neighborhood, you can easily single out who is Taiwanese.” Because of this sense of solidarity, she enjoyed her life more in the Taiwanese circle of China than in Taiwan. Therefore, such solidarity was specifically bounded to the Taiwanese community in China. This feeling of comradeship in the place of adoption was also reinforced by the severe social division and political partisanship at home. Another housewife (Mei-feng Luo) lamented: “Taiwanese are united here but divided in Taiwan; [people in Taiwan] can’t see our differences from other peoples.” The construction of community identity thus was also based in a nostalgia for lost unity in the home country.

Conclusion

China’s control of mass media and its rapid development of communication technologies make mediated interpersonal communication through the use of such tools as SMS and e-mail popular among ordinary people. Like Chinese citizens, Taiwanese migrants also rely on personal networks for certain information. Such interpersonal information exchange in China is even more important to the Taiwanese, given their
status as foreign citizens. With the absence of viable ethnic media and the demand for immediate and interactive ways of communication, Taiwanese community websites become a platform of social exchange among migrants, not only for information but also for other types of support. Migrants actively involve themselves in groups and build social networks exclusively for Taiwanese migrants, in which they produce, relay, and receive information through word-of-mouth communication.

Ethnic communication networks’ function of the surveillance of the environment has been documented by previous research. However, these studies often focus on economically disadvantaged immigrant groups who depend on internal networks for resources. Taiwanese migrants enjoy economic privilege in China but feel politically discriminated against by Chinese people and censored by Chinese authorities. This particular situation nurtures their sense of insecurity in the host society. Interview data show that trust plays a pivotal role in the Taiwanese networks of interpersonal communication. With deep suspicion in their surrounding environments, migrants band together for information and support. They believe in the notion of “keeping watch together in mutual defense and helping out one another.” This communal spirit solidifies the Taiwanese community through the mechanism of identity authentication, circulation of Taiwanese perspectives, and trust in mutual help. However, it also sustains migrants’
intentional distinction from the local society and reinforces mutual distrust between
Taiwanese and Chinese people.

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1 As of December 2009, Taima Club’s membership had grown to over 50,000.
2 According to Telecommunications Regulations of PRC, information is prohibited: 1) that goes against the basic principles set out in the State constitution; 2) that endangers national security, divulges state secrets, subverts the government, or undermines national unification; 3) that is detrimental to the honor and interests of the state; 4) that instigates ethnic hatred or ethnic discrimination or that undermines national unity; 5) that undermines the state’s superstitious beliefs; 6) that disseminates rumors, disturbs social order, or undermines social stability; 7) that disseminates pornography and other salacious materials; 8) that promotes gambling, violence, homicide, and terror or that instigates the commission of crimes; 9) that insults or slanders other people or that infringes upon other people’s legitimate rights and interests; and 10) other information prohibited by the law or administrative regulations (cited from Zheng, 2007, p.60)
3 Most Chinese left after the Bible study session, which gathered about thirty people. After lunch, less than ten people stayed to discuss a holiday activity. It was evident that the core members of this group mostly consisted of Taiwanese women, but my interviewees explained that the Chinese housewives had errands to run so they left earlier.
4 My field research in China was benefited greatly from Taiwanese migrants’ trust in me—as Taiwanese—and their belief in mutual help. After we ended the interview, this housewife, whom I had met only occasionally, volunteered her contact information.
Chapter 7: Growing Taiwanese Consciousness, Fractured Identities

In the previous chapters, I have shown how Taiwanese migrants construct we-group sameness and consolidate Taiwanese consciousness through a range of transnational and local practices. This chapter focuses on their perception of cultural difference and the consequent distinction of “we” from “they.” This intentional cultural othering reinforces migrants’ pride in being Taiwanese. Nevertheless, as I will also discuss, their self-narratives of identity usually involve politics. This sense of being Taiwanese, as distinguished from the PRC Chinese, sometimes contradicts with their existing identities or perspectives on Taiwan’s political future. In the following sections, I will unravel Taiwanese migrants’ ambiguous, and sometimes conflicting, self-identifications.

Identity of Difference

In *The Global and the Local*, Hall (1997) describes a peculiar kind of identity emerging from the cultural encounters of difference in the history of English imperialism:

To be English is to know yourself in relation to the French, and the hot-blooded
Mediterraneans, and the passionate, traumatized Russian soul. You go round the entire globe: when you know what everybody else is, then you are what they are not. Identity is always, in that sense, a structured representation which only achieves its positive through the narrow eye of the negative. It has to go through the eye of the needle of the other before it can construct itself. (Hall, 1997, p.21)

Cultural othering is a way of identity formation through which the sense of “we” is clarified by being distinguished from the “they.” What happens, then, when the search for “we” turns out to be the encounters of otherness? Wessendorf (2007) finds that, driven by nostalgia, second-generation Italians in Switzerland return to their parents’ hometowns in Italy. These “roots migrants” constantly deal with the discrepancies between the imaged and real homelands. What follows are shocking and uprooting experiences:

In Italy, roots migrants become aware of their idealised images of the homeland and struggle to integrate into a society and a culture which they had until then perceived as their own. This shock is caused by existential fears of economic and social insecurity, and by the cultural expectations of the communities in which they settle. (Wessendorf, 2007, p.1098)
Such experiences of culture shock amplified by “cultural expectations” also happen to some “return” migrants of overseas Chinese. Yeoh and Willis (2005) find that Singaporean expatriates in China have more difficulties in negotiating cultural difference than their British counterparts do, because they have expected to rejuvenate their lost Chineseness with their journey to the motherland. The notion of encountering China as a “return-to-roots” experience, however, is soon replaced by the assertion of Singaporean identity, which is distanced from PRC Chineseness. They quote a housewife’s narrative of how Singaporeans rediscover their Singaporeanness in Beijing:

And the culture shock at first was quite (tremendous) for we thought we were all Chinese, but their attitude towards life, their attitudes towards hygiene, their mannerisms are all totally different from us as Chinese…My son told me, “Mommy, I hate the Chinese.” I said, “Don’t say that, you are Chinese.” He said, “No, I’m Singaporean. I can’t stand them.” (quoted in Yeoh & Willis, 2005, p.227)

Yeoh and Willis argue that Singaporean expatriates in China mostly belong to the elite strata—highly educated professionals and managers or business entrepreneurs. With
their superior economic resources and geographical mobility, they manage culture shock by constructing physical and psychological boundaries between themselves and local Chinese. Smart and Smart likewise observe that Hong Kong investors’ negotiation of identity inclusions and exclusions in China involves negative assessments of mainland Chinese—a kind of colonial mentality. Hong Kongers tend to see themselves as “much more developed and rational than their benighted counterparts who have been degraded and decultured by the socialist experience” (1998, pp. 116-7). Studies on Taiwanese migrants also show that Taiwanese develop a sense of superiority (yoyuegan) in China, feeling that they are culturally more progressive than the PRC Chinese (Hsing, 1997; Lin, 2006; Wang, 2007, 2008). Moreover, the awareness of cultural difference is also furthered by exposure to the Chinese people’s discipline of the “one-China discourse”: that Taiwan is part of China (Shen, 2005). Wang (2008) argues that different economic and political systems and histories on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have led to dissimilar lifestyles, which strengthens migrants’ Taiwanese identity.

During my field research, I also found that cultural difference (wenhwa chayi) was the key concept in the minds of Taiwanese migrants when drawing boundaries between themselves and the Chinese. At the same time, Taiwanese migrants were also aware of their cultural affinity with China. The majority of Taiwanese are descendants of Han
Chinese immigrants. As I reviewed in Chapter 1, Taiwanese who grew up before the 1990s were educated in school as Chinese. They were taught to appreciate Chinese cultural heritage such as Confucianism. As a result, Taiwanese migrants develop mixed feelings of similarities and differences in the place of adoption, which became constitutive of their identity renegotiation in China.

Encountering Cultural Similarities and Differences

Cultural Similarities

Generally speaking, my research subjects pointed out three aspects of how they felt culturally connected to mainland China—daily life, tradition, and business. Although these cultural similarities were less emphasized than cultural differences, they were important reference points when migrants talked about their identities. First, most migrants said that they accommodated themselves to local lives without too much effort, at least when compared, as they saw it, to foreigners in China or their own experiences in other foreign countries. Shanghai foods, despite their saltiness and greasiness, remained the Chinese dishes they preferred, rather than Western foods like hamburgers. Local dialects like Cantonese were difficult to learn, but Mandarin was the common language
that allowed them to speak with locals. Secondly, the natural landscape and cultural heritage on the mainland often reminded migrants of the Chinese history, literature, and geography they had studied in school. Some of my interviewees described the excitement of witnessing the scenery in China that they had learned about from textbooks. To them, touring the old towns in Suzhou and seeing architecture described by ancient Chinese poets was like revisiting familiar places.

The third aspect of cultural similarity was emphasized by businesspeople, who said that Taiwanese had the advantage of understanding the “grey areas” of Chinese society—particularly the red-envelope (bribe) culture. They argued that Hong Kongers and Singaporeans had become too Westernized to grasp the subtleties of doing business in China. In this sense, migrants asserted their Chineseness—in an instrumental way. However, this Chineseness implies a negation of the Chinese culture presented by the PRC nationals. When asked how the factor of “the same language/culture and the same ancestral stock” (tongwentongzhong) conditioned their relationships with local Chinese, Taiwanese migrants tended to deny that part of their “cultural sameness.”

_Cultural Differences_

As Hall (1997) argues, identity in its positive sense is achieved through the eye of
the negative. The consciousness of being Taiwanese in China, for migrants, was reinforced by their negative evaluations of Chinese people, ranging from the superficial “uncivil behaviors” they observed to profound “moral corruptions” they asserted. Migrants often complained about the ways the Chinese acted in public—spitting, littering, clamoring, not queuing, etc. They said that they were annoyed by the bad demeanor and rudeness of local Chinese. In the workplace, business owners and managers accused Chinese employees of being disloyal, irresponsible, untrustworthy, opportunistic, and inclined to steal company properties or secrets. They argued that these “bad behaviors” reflected the backwardness of Chinese society in terms of social norms, moral values, and ethics. Therefore, cultural difference, in the usage of Taiwanese migrants, connoted cultural discriminations against the Chinese. My interviewees usually had unpleasant personal stories at hand to illustrate their strong feelings of cultural difference. A Christian described her disappointment at the “uncivilness” of Chinese people after a religious gathering:

We had a Christmas event a few days ago. When the Santa was giving out the presents, he was almost toppled down by a swarm of (Chinese) people who wrestled to grab the gifts. After the party, all the decorations on the wall were gone. We still
needed those decorations and didn’t know what to do. We felt so upset. […] They have become rich now, but they have remained uncivil. (Men-jung Tu, housewife and former school teacher)

Tu said that, for her whole life, she had adamantly regarded herself as Chinese. She was excited when leaving Taiwan for China because those who “advocated Taiwan independence”—meaning the DPP—were in power. After living in China for four years, as she saw it, her Chinese identity was diminished by the everyday experiences of cultural difference.

Migrants’ assertion of Chinese “incivility” was not limited to how Chinese people behaved but also how they thought. A business owner (SZ04) contended that the reasoning of the Chinese was different from that of the Taiwanese:

I can’t imagine their ways of thinking. Some of my (Chinese) friends are used to littering drinking bottles about. I asked them why they did that, and they would answer that someone was going to clean it up anyway. They thought that they paid the taxes and thus had the right to litter. I didn’t know how to contest this argument. But their ways of thinking were different from ours. (SZ04, businessman)
Like this businessman, many migrants emphasized that they did not know how to communicate with the Chinese. Their statements centered on impressions of a lack of ethical standards and moral values on the part of Chinese. Sometimes migrants might essentialize these to being differences of human nature. Rei-yi Deng, an in-house attorney, explained why she remained distant from Chinese people:

I can’t believe in their sincerity. I used to work in an office with a dozen more Chinese coworkers. It really opened my eyes to see how they attacked others for their own survival. For example, when someone took a day off, they collectively badmouthed this person in the office. I felt it was terrible. I was shocked. That’s against our nature. (Rei-yi Deng, in-house attorney)

Although a few Taiwanese migrants moved to China in search of their roots, their everyday cultural encounters in China became a challenge to this sought-after Chineseness. For those who had adored Chinese culture, the gaps between reality and imagination were unbearable. These migrants tended to blame the Communist regime for uprooting the virtue of “traditional Chinese culture.” They argued that the Cultural
Revolution, the one-child policy, and the pursuit of economic growth had led to current “moral degradation” in China. Instead of completely disavowing their Chineseness, these migrants thought that Taiwan had preserved traditional Chinese culture and regarded themselves as “more Chinese” than PRC Chinese. A returnee (Jerry Chen) who had previously owned a cafe in Shanghai said that he ended his business there and returned to Taiwan because of his frustrations with the Chinese. He argued: “they (Chinese nationals) don’t have the traditional virtue of the Chinese, but I do. I have been cultivated by Confucianism.”

Other migrants interpreted cultural difference with an evolutionary perspective that China was in the initial stage of modernization and therefore was less civilized. A businessman (Wei-chi Hsu) said that cultural differences between the Taiwanese and Chinese were understandable because Taiwan and China are in different stages of development. China lags behind Taiwan for twenty years, so do its people [...] I think that human beings are shaped by the environments in which they situate. We should think of individuals and collectives in this way. Taiwan also had the problem of PCB pollution in the past. Was it different from the current melamine incident in China? It’s ideological to think of things in
terms of the differences between Taiwanese and Chinese. (Wei-chi Hsu, general manager)

Like Hsu, some migrants believe that the Chinese society will continue to become more “civilized” in accordance with its modernization. In fact, those veteran migrants report observations of reduced “incivility” in the Chinese over the past decade. However, these two views of PRC Chinese as either de-Sinicized or uncultivated subjects supported migrants’ sense of superiority and resistance to assimilation, at least at present. Taiwanese subjectivity is, therefore, shaped by the distance from PRC Chineseness. Interviewed migrants considered fellow Taiwanese “honest,” “sincere,” “modest,” “responsible,” “polite,” “moral,” “hard-working,” and so on—all of which had emerged from their antonyms designated to the others. This Taiwanese consciousness, despite rising from an opposition to the Chinese, was no longer the victimized identity developed in Taiwan’s democratic movements against the KMT Chinese discourse and China’s military threats (Buruma, 1996; Jacobs, 2005; Lo, 2002) (see Chapter 1). Rather, it was built upon the glory of being Taiwanese in relation to the PRC Chinese.

Assimilation as Undesirable
When asked whether they had become localized in China, Taiwanese migrants expressed their resistance to adapting to Chinese society. Assimilation, implying cultural degrading for the migrants, was not only unattainable but also undesirable. On one hand, many said that localization was an important survival strategy in China. It was a common complaint among migrants that they were taken advantage of by the Chinese because they lacked sufficient local knowledge. On the other hand, going native, in migrants’ view, meant violating their own ethics and values. A housewife acknowledged that she behaved differently in China and in Taiwan. She defended her double standards:

You can’t help but have double standards. For example, when you dine out here, you shout at the waiters to get served. Why do you do this? Because based on your past experiences, they ignore your requests if you’re being polite to them […] I don’t like that, but I have to. This behavior contradicts my own principles. But it’s the real life in China. (Mei-feng Luo, housewife and former HR manager)

In addition to behavior changes, some migrants said that localization was an issue of altering mentality—in a bad direction. A finance manager (SH11), who also owned a small business with her husband, illustrated what assimilation meant to her:
The way of life here is totally different from that in Taiwan. I can’t tolerate lots of things, but I try to de-emphasize them. Now I don’t have strong emotions about their (Chinese) bad behaviors. I think I have been assimilated […] We need to accommodate to their ways of thinking. I have become less honest and sincere.

That’s the way to get things done here. It’s not that I’m mendacious. I just learned to protect myself. (SH11, finance manager)

For most migrants, assimilation was a negative thing to do. They said that they just got used to rather than adapted to the local life. Integration into and identification with the Chinese society were out of question. A student (Wendy Pei) described how she managed to get used to the life in China by de-emphasizing Chineseness: “If you’re a foreigner, you don’t care so much. The situation here is that you speak Chinese, but you can’t communicate with them. It makes you feel a strong cultural difference. What shocks me is this […] So I try to think of myself as a foreigner, who’s temporarily experiencing an exotic place. That makes you feel better.” Similarly, a sales manager (SZ12) argued: “Some foreign missionaries went to Taiwan at a young age but devoted their lives there. That made me think why I can’t love here more, given that I will stay here for a while.”
By thinking of themselves as foreigners, migrants were able to ease the “cultural shock” that challenged their Chineseness.

Continuous Fractured Identities

My research subjects usually spoke of themselves as Taiwanese and frequently emphasized “we Taiwanese” in the course of the interviews. In the end, when I asked how they defined themselves, some began to alter their utterances. This sense of “we Taiwanese” was in relation to the PRC Chinese, but not necessarily in conflict with their Chinese identity. Migrants tended to insist on their existing identities; nevertheless, they might experience a trying process of renegotiation and become less certain about their identities. I find it difficult to answer whether Taiwanese migrants sustain, reinforce, or change identities after migration because of the many divergent possibilities that appear. I analyze their identity renegotiation in three categories: Taiwanese identity, Chinese identity, and flexible identities. This reduction helps clarify their processes of re-identification.

_Taiwanese Identity: Reaffirmed but Pragmatic_
Migrants who thought of themselves as Taiwanese before migration tend to sustain or reinforce their Taiwanese identity in China. The majority of these migrants are ethnic Hoklo or Hakka, whose ancestors immigrated to Taiwan a long time ago. They regard Taiwan as their homeland and the site of their ancient roots. Moving to China, like moving to any other country, was a process of rediscovering their affectionate connections with their homeland. These migrants usually regarded China as a place for work rather than a motherland. A businesswoman described her mentality of migration:

Both of my parents are (Hoklo) Taiwanese. I don’t feel déjà vu in China. I still define myself as Taiwanese. Citizens of the world… I don’t think I have such a big vision. It’s okay to see myself as a member of the global village, though […] Mainlanders have blood relations with Chinese and may feel that their roots are in here. I don’t feel that. I’m just a Taiwanese who works in China—an extension of my career. Nothing else. (Betty Lee, businesswoman)

For these migrants, leaving their own country only made clear where their roots were. A housewife (SZ28B) had followed her husband’s job assignments to different countries and was in the process of applying for foreign citizenship at the time of the
interview. She said that her family does not plan to return to Taiwan. Nonetheless, “experiencing the world” reinforces her Taiwanese consciousness, strengthening her feeling that she is Taiwanese. On one hand, migrants tended to romanticize Taiwan—the cozy ambiance, the cordial people, the vibrant culture, etc.—because of nostalgia. On the other hand, they said that the trademark of Taiwan had increasingly become a powerful symbol that they could be proud of. A boss’s wife (SZ30B) illustrated how she strengthened her sense of being Taiwanese:

I attended a language school in Canada before. When my classmates passionately talked about their countries, I didn’t know how to introduce my country to them. It seemed to me that Taiwan had nothing characteristic or to be proud of. But now I feel good about Taiwan. I have received many nice comments about Taiwan from my friends of different nationals. When I saw the movie Cape No.7, I felt that Taiwanese culture was kind of vulgar, but it’s so sincere and lovable. (SZ30B, boss’s wife)

Her husband explained this kind of transition of attitude by saying that the longer he and his wife had been away from Taiwan, “the better we appreciated the merits and even
the drawbacks of our own culture.”

This sense of identification with Taiwan, for some migrants, was reinforced by their experiences in China, and specifically by the experience of being told by Chinese people that Taiwan was part of China and Taiwanese were Chinese. Migrants who identified with Taiwan disliked the feeling that they had to hide their homeland loyalty. Shih-ying Hong, a housewife, expressed her resentment at the imposition of political views by Chinese nationals: “The Chinese like to say that Taiwan is theirs. They reject any disagreements. In my view, people have freedom to express different perspectives. As far as politics is involved, it’s just impossible to communicate with Chinese.”

Despite these migrants’ persistent Taiwanese identity, witnessing the rise of China also made them more pragmatic and less nationalistic. Identification with Taiwan, nevertheless, should not be confused with a specific political stance on independence or a specific party preference. Some migrants said that they identified themselves solely as Taiwanese, but also explicitly or implicitly revealed that they were in the Blue Camp, supporters of the KMT. In Taiwan, the KMT adopts a conciliatory China policy and has promoted cross-Strait integrations on various fronts. In contrast, the DPP (Green Camp) is inclined towards political independence. Generally speaking, Taiwanese migrants supported Taiwan’s further integrations with China, at least economically. Some DPP
supporters told me that they had adjusted their political views on China after migration. A
real estate manager, who had lived in China for eight years and whose wife was Chinese,
explained that he still hoped for Taiwan’s de jure independence, but he had also become
more realistic:

I still think that I’m in the Green Camp, but I’m a different type of Green now. We
need to take China into account when thinking about Taiwan’s relations with the
world […] Doing business here makes me see through to the reality. We can’t resist
the (political) trends and neglect (economic) interests…If China becomes more
progressive and democratic, I probably will change my mind (about independence).
People are subject to change, and time can change many things. I don’t have to
adhere to a principle forever. (Yuen-Kai Lee, real estate manager)

Lee’s statement showed that while retaining Taiwanese identity, he no longer
assumed the priority of Taiwanese nationalism. Likewise, Rei-yi Deng, a former DPP
local politician, told me about an episode that had made her rethink her political beliefs.
She visited a Taiwanese home in Suzhou and saw the Taiwanese children writing with the
simplified Chinese used in China and speaking Chinese-accent Mandarin. “Is this the
vision of unification?” she asked herself, pondering that perhaps unification would not be bad.

*Chinese Identity: Shaky but Persistent*

Very few of my research subjects developed or strengthened their Chinese identity after migration to China. These migrants who did tended to love Chinese culture and to have attained Chinese identity by education. Witnessing the rise of China was solidifying their conviction that the twenty-first century would be the *Chinese Century*. They had become emotionally detached from Taiwan because of what they saw as the rise of separatism on the island. When I asked a senior manager (Li-ling Chang) about her identity at the end of her interview, she seemed annoyed. She said “we were all educated as Chinese, weren’t we?” She asked me: “since when did we become Taiwanese?” In her opinion, identity was a pseudo issue contrived by pro-independence politicians, and she was glad that she had stayed in China when the DPP was in power, between 2000 and 2008.

Some migrants with a strong Chinese identity held similar views, but they had also begun to question their Chineseness after moving to China. This group of migrants showed similarities to Wessendorf’s (2007) concept of “roots migrants” — the second
generation who migrate to their parents’ homeland in search of their roots. Unlike roots migrants, interviewed Taiwanese had generally moved to China because of economic motivations. However, those second-generation Mainlanders did find it difficult to settle the disjunctures between the homeland in their imagination and the homeland in reality. As a result, their self-narratives of identity became ambiguous and somewhat conflicting. On the one hand, they felt culturally and genealogically close to the mainland, and had hoped for the unification of China—by the Republic of China. They had rarely questioned their identity as zhongguoren (Chinese nationals) before migration. On the other hand, they had resisted Communism for their whole lives. Migrating to China only made them discover their differences from zhongguoren on the mainland. Some had a double consciousness: that they were also Taiwanese, but their Chinese identity assumed priority, especially when politics was involved. In Taiwan, they were aware of their identity as weishengren (Mainlanders, people of other provinces). In China or elsewhere, the concept of zhongguoren was usurped by the PRC nationals. Therefore, they experienced a more challenging process of re-identification than other migrants did. One Mainlander described his difficulties in defining himself this way:

I really don’t know how to define my identity. If you want me to choose, I’d say I’m
Taiwanese. But if broadly defined, I'm Chinese [...] From the standpoint of my father (born in China) and from what we’ve learned, I think I’m Chinese—in terms of blood. But the experience of living here for years makes me realize that we Taiwanese are culturally different from them. I can’t identify myself with them.

(SZ06, technician)

Unlike this technician, some second-generation Mainlanders used “Chinese” in English to express the ambiguity of their identities. The English term “Chinese” denoted two meanings: zhongguoren (Chinese nationals) and hwaren (Chinese descendents). However, neither of these two terms seemed to fully fit their self-defined identities now:

Psychologically I feel that I’m Chinese (in English). If narrowly defined, I’m Taiwanese. But I don’t have strong Taiwanese consciousness [...] I just don’t think that I can completely belong to China. That’s for sure. But you can call me Chinese (in English). (Lucy Tang, freelance writer)

I felt like a stranger (in Shanghai), totally…Anyway, I’m from a different country [...] As a weishengren, I had a very positive view on the mainland in the past. I had
assumed its people were nice. But now I don’t admit I’m *zhongguoren*. I would say
I’m *Chinese, I’m from Taiwan* (in English) (Researcher: what do you mean by
Chinese, *hwaren*?) *Hwaren*, or you can say *zhongguoren*. But I don’t belong to this
place […] *It’s a shame to be* (in English). (Tracy Cheng, housewife and freelancer)

Tracy’s use of English to describe this complicated situation indicated, it seemed to
me, that she was confused about who she was. Before we entered the part of the
discussion about identity, Tracy had explicitly identified herself as Taiwanese, as
distinguished from mainland Chinese. Then she became elusive about her Chinese
identity—she was Chinese, but not Chinese of PRC. Therefore, she was *zhongguoren*, but
in the latter sense, she was not *zhongguoren*. Jerry Chen, the aforementioned returnee,
avoided this ambiguity by asserting his authenticity of Chineseness: “We’re different
from them. We’re pure Chinese. We’re genuine.” For second-generation Mainlanders in
China, Chinese identity was persistent, but Chinese nationalism was diminishing. Like
Taiwanese nationalists, Chinese nationalists also became more realistic after migration to
China. My conversations with Chung-feng Ko, a sales manager, revealed such a
transition of mentality:
Ko: I feel I’m zhongguoren. Yes, zhongguoren of the Republic of China.

Researcher: Did you develop a stronger sense of being zhongguoren after moving here?

Ko: No, I don’t think this place is better than Taiwan. Zhongguoren seems to refer to the people of China, but I don’t feel that I belong to China. I’m…true Chinese. I don’t know how to explain.

Researcher: Do you mean that you’re culturally zhongguoren?

Ko: Yes, because I can’t say that I’m Taiwanese. After all, I’m a second-generation weishengren. I’m not pure (Taiwanese)…

Researcher: Would you identify with China if it were ruled by the ROC?

Ko: Yes, I grew up supporting unification (with China). But after I came here, I felt that it’s not my real business—I mean, unification or not unification. It’s more important to figure out how to feed my family. I have become less enthusiastic about politics now. I don’t care so much about identity. But the sense of being zhongguoren has been bred in my bones.

Some Mainlanders, like Ko, said that they felt like weishenren in Taiwan and Taiwanese in China. In either case, the distinction in each society represented a sense of superiority; at the same time, it also fed migrants' feelings of marginality, of
homelessness: that they were outsiders everywhere. One IT manager (SH24) concluded my interview with him by referring to *The Rootless Orchid*, an article written by Chinese author Chen Tse-fan about his sense of displacement after the Communists came to power in China: “One without a country is like the grass without roots. It withers without from the damage of rain and wind.” For these migrants, everywhere is home, but nowhere is home. They are diaspora subjects in their own homeland(s), because their ideal homeland is gone.

**Flexible Identities**

According to a longitudinal survey conducted in Taiwan, about forty to fifty percent of Taiwanese identify themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese. This percentage has fluctuated only a little over the past two decades (Election Study Center, NCCU, 2009). What this double identification means is subject to different interpretations (see Chapter 1). My interview data with Taiwanese migrants in China showed that Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity remain two key, and sometimes conflicting, references of identity. Those who seemed to have double consciousness mostly interpret their double or multiple identities as hierarchical rather than hybrid. They have a master identity, which is highly relevant to their political views. However, some migrants also demonstrated an
ability to change their identities to fit specific situations. Such flexibility might reflect instrumental use of identity, relativity of identities, or in very few cases, cosmopolitanization.

First, like the *flexible citizens* portrayed by Ong (1999), some Taiwanese migrants instrumentally utilize their Chinese identity for business purposes. In China, they tend to publicly declared that they are Chinese—in order to take advantage of this ethnicity or just to avoid arguments with Chinese. One senior manager (Feng-yi Pang) argued that one cardinal principle of doing business was flexibility. For him, “the sky is blue, the ground is green, and the blood and heart are red”—meaning that he did not want to offend any powerful people in the camps of the KMT (blue), the DPP (green), or the CCP (red). Since he was doing business in China, he considered himself the “descendant of the dragon” who made friends with his (red) “heart.” Very few Taiwanese migrants I met were that opportunistic. However, it was common among migrants to express their Chinese identity in front of Chinese people, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. One sales manager (SH06A) emphasized that Taiwanese needed to have “split personality” to survive in China’s business environments.

For some migrants, speaking of identity is a declaration of political positions, and cautious businesspeople tried to avoid discussing the issue. One businessman (SH26)
argued: “Identity is all about politics. It does not matter where we belong to. It’s the problem of the governments.” After I finished the interview and stopped recording, he told me that “Taiwanese identity must have high priority” for most migrants. However, this did not mean that migrants’ Chinese identity was pretend. It could be a constitutive part of their identities. A university professor (SH27) said that he usually told foreigners that he was Taiwanese. In China, he was willing to identify himself as Chinese, as long as he was not being pressured by Chinese people.

This type of instrumentalism was not limited to situational adjustments of identity to fit various occasions. Some migrants anticipated Taiwan’s eventual political unification with China, whether they liked it or not. That meant that they were flexible about their identities in accordance with the political change. One finance manager (SH11) expressed this view: “Of course I insist on Taiwanese identity. But it is possible that Taiwan and China will become one country in the future. Now the interactions (across the Strait) already are intensive. Therefore, I usually tell people I’m Chinese.” One bank manager (James Wang) said that, at present, he identifies himself as Taiwanese and Chinese. Nevertheless, he is ready to assume a solely Chinese identity because “political unification is inevitable.” These migrants are instrumentally adjusting themselves to embrace Chinese identity to accommodate to what they think is the political reality.
Secondly, flexible identities were also presented by migrants who had multi-layered identities. They might highlight one kind of identity in relation to others. For example:

—“When I visit restaurants crowded with foreigners, I feel I’m hwaren. But with mainland Chinese around, I feel I’m Taiwanese because I’m different.” (Ellen Sun, product manager)

—“I’m Chinese in China. When I’m back in Taiwan, I’m Taiwanese. Because of my Hakka ascent, I usually tell people that I’m Hakka. (SZ23, school administrator)

—“I define myself as Taiwanese in China and Chinese in Taiwan.” (SZ14, businessman, consulting firm)

These migrants did not insist on the Taiwanese/Chinese opposition and felt free to change identities. Their multiple identities are hybrid rather than hierarchical, but Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity remain key references. There were also people who argued that national boundaries no longer mattered. Wei-chi Hsu, a businessman whose wife was Chinese, planned to send his child to a boarding school in Hong Kong. He asked: “how should this child define herself?” He said that he had traveled around the world and felt it unnecessary to identify with a specific nation. Amy Dai, a Taiwanese
housewife who had lived in the United States for years and had attained a U.S.
citizenship, was now staying in Shenzhen with her family. She said that she did not know
how to define herself: “When I visited Hong Kong, I was asked by someone about my
origin. Did he mean where I was born, what my nationality was, or where I lived now? I
didn’t know how to answer.” In the end, Amy decided to speak in English so that she was
not mistaken as mainland Chinese, and thus avoid being discriminated against.

As Calhoun argues about cosmopolitans: “Their passports bear the stamps of many
countries, but they are still passports, and good cosmopolitans knew which ones would
get them past the inspectors at borders and airports” (2002, p.103). Cosmopolitan
consciousness may be reinforced by multiple passports and various visa stamps. In the
case of Taiwanese migrants, it is also present in the privilege of the mobile few.

Conclusion

This chapter shows that, for Taiwanese migrants, encountering cultural others is a
way by which they make sense of self and their own collectivity. This knowing of “who
we are” derives from the negation of the PRC Chinese and the Chinese culture they
represent. Taiwanese consciousness has developed in relation to Chinese and has taken
on a sense of cultural superiority. Nevertheless, the negation of the PRC Chinese also
implies a negation of their own Chineseness. For some interviewed migrants, this
negation was a painful process to go through.

Despite the consolidation of Taiwanese consciousness, Taiwanese migrants remain
divided about their identities, in terms of Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity. My
interview data demonstrates the persistence of identity among Taiwanese migrants.
However, the daily realities in China have also made migrants become more flexible
about their identities, either because of their perceived cultural differences or their
optimistic view about China’s progression. This resilience is evident among people who
have a double consciousness or multiple identities. How China develops in the
future—economically, politically, and culturally—may influence the identity
transformation of Taiwanese migrants.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

This dissertation analyzes the identity formation and transformation of Taiwanese migrants to China in light of globalization. Combining migrant studies and media studies, it explores how the identities of Taiwanese migrants are shaped and reshaped through the ongoing interactions of mediated communication and lived experience in the places of adoption. I draw on three discourses on transnationalism that address possible identity formations of contemporary migrants in accordance with the changing realities of migration and communication: the transnational paradigm of migration studies, diasporic studies, and cosmopolitanism. These discourses argue that, instead of reflecting a linear assimilation to the host country, the identities of contemporary migrants become plural and deterritorialized, assuming such models as continuous home-country loyalty, diasporic hybrid identities, or cosmopolitan consciousness.

While I draw on theories of globalization for my analysis, I also recognize the historical particularities that may condition Taiwanese migrants’ identity negotiation. First, Taiwan’s national identity is fractured, split between Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity. Second, this rift in identity is complicated by the Taiwanese mass migration to China—the homeland with various meanings within migrants' imaginations.
Third, China’s authoritarian media system and its control over media imports counter the free-flow image of communication. These variations demonstrate that Taiwanese migrants encounter a specific political, cultural, and media environment upon migration.

In this chapter, I first synthesize my findings in response to the research questions outlined in Chapter 1: (1) How should the migration patterns of Taiwanese people to China be defined, and how do these patterns affect both their relationships with their countries of exit and entry and their use of the media? (2) How do Taiwanese migrants use media for information, entertainment, and participation in China, and how do their applications of mediated communication entail the process of identity renegotiation? (3) Do Taiwanese migrants sustain, reinforce, or change their self-identifications as they encounter Chinese culture after migration? Following these questions, I unfold the dialogues between my findings and general theoretical premises, and, finally, I point out the limitations of this dissertation and reflect on my own standpoints as a researcher.

Dual Mobility, Transient Mentality, and No Sense of Place

Two patterns of Taiwanese migration to China—the direction of movement and the planned length of stay—greatly influence the relationships of Taiwanese migrants with
the countries of origin and settlement and, hence, their media use behaviors, as I showed in chapter 3. First, the Taiwanese are migrating from a more advanced society to a less developed country and hence enjoy a higher socioeconomic status. This results in their expat identity and isolation from Chinese society. Second, although whether and when to return to Taiwan are indefinite questions for many migrants, they tend to see their stays in China as sojourns. Because of their social segregation and transient mentality, Taiwanese migrants retain their habits of receiving Taiwanese news and seem less concerned with Chinese news. As a result, transnational communications from their home country play a significant role in their daily media use.

To start with, discourses on migrant transnationalism have primarily been developed in the Euro-American context. In particular, transnational migration studies and diasporic studies tend to focus on immigrants and their posterity from postcolonial or developing countries to Western advanced societies. Such movements of people are different from the movement of Taiwanese migrants to China—as capital-induced migration from a newly-industrialized country (NIC) to a less developed society. Despite individual differences, Taiwanese migrants by and large enjoy upward class mobility, resulting not only from the increase of their income but also from the huge gap of living standards between Taiwan and China.
However, when moving to China, migrants encounter a second difference between the two societies: China is a rising economic giant with an immense territory, while Taiwan is a tiny island. Moving from Taiwan to the “big mainland” (dalu) strengthens migrants’ sense of geographical mobility. The vastness of China presents a great business frontier to realize interests in entrepreneurship or career advancement for the Taiwanese migrants. Additionally, China’s economic globalization was strongly felt by migrants through their jobs and everyday lives—particularly those who worked in large multinational corporations or lived in metropolitan Shanghai. Such experiences as developing products for global brands or regularly encountering foreigners at work and in leisure made interviewed migrants feel that they had a more “international outlook” (guojiguan) than before. The “China experience,” a term frequently mentioned by my research subjects, connoted limitless possibilities for careers. They saw going to China as a rite of passage that one could not afford to miss.

The sense of dual mobility—upward class mobility and geographical mobility—was decisive in determining the interviewed migrants’ attitude towards the places of adoption. They often explicitly contrasted the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, as if they were polar opposites: China was big, and Taiwan was small. China was fraught with opportunities, and Taiwan was losing its edge. Meanwhile, China was backward, and Taiwan was more
civilized. Therefore, China was a place for work, and Taiwan was home where the heart was. Migrants continually experienced conflicts between economic opportunities and life quality. As a compromise, they insisted on living a “Taiwanese way of life”—meaning eating Taiwanese foods, haunting Taiwanese restaurants, making Taiwanese friends, speaking Taiwanese dialects, watching Taiwanese television, etc. On one hand, these behaviors eased their homesickness and made them feel at home. On the other hand, this so-called “Taiwanese way of life” might not be completely Taiwanese. For many, it also was an expression of a lifestyle quality that was different from locals', especially from the lower classes. Migrants’ class distinction showed in their choices about residences (gated communities), children’s schools (Taiwanese or elite Chinese schools), consumption (better taste), social networks (Taiwanese-only circles), and so on.

However, the class distinction was usually uttered by interviewed migrants in terms of “cultural difference,” as I showed in Chapter 7. Encountering Chinese nationals made these migrants reconsider the notion that they shared with Chinese “the same language/culture and the same ancestral stock” (tongwentongzhong). While negotiating their similarities with and differences from real Chinese, migrants tended to emphasize the contrasts. They regarded the Chinese of the PRC as uncivil, insincere, disloyal, nationalistic, and narrow-minded. In this sense, they intentionally resisted assimilation to
Chinese society. Although the interviewed migrants said that they become more cosmopolitan as a result of their dual mobility, for them, such cosmopolitanism meant their proximity to the global culture and norms. Localization was, in migrants’ view, antithetical to internationalization. Thus they desired to remain outsiders in China.

Taiwanese migrants’ settlement plans also influence their relationships with the host and home societies. In most cases, interviewed migrants recognized their migration as a result of economic calculations. Even second-generation Mainlanders rarely saw their move as an act of returning to the roots. Migrants usually thought of themselves as Taiwanese expatriates and their stays in China as non-permanent. Managers and technicians assigned by their mother companies to the mainland, in particular, were unsure of their job security on the mainland. Nevertheless, many were caught in a dilemma of stay or return. Those who desired to move back to Taiwan were unsure of the timing when such a move might take place. Some planned to settle in China or migrate to other foreign countries later on. No matter what kinds of migration plans they had in mind, migrants retained Taiwanese citizenship and maintained multiple relations with Taiwan. They tended to see themselves as sojourners, nomads, or strangers in China—lacking a feeling of belonging. They rarely put down roots in China, or were at least refraining for the moment. This transient mentality, along with an outsider attitude,
isolated interviewed migrants from the host country. Many of these migrants had little sense of the places to which they had migrated. They were indifferent to Chinese news, and continued to rely on Taiwanese media for news information, even after years of migration.

Media Use: the Taiwanese Media Sphere

Mass media of a host country is a significant means of acculturation by which newcomers adapt to the majority culture. Because of the Taiwanese migrants’ outsider mentality, they showed little interest in “going native” and furthering their local knowledge. China’s authoritarian media system also pushed them away from using Chinese news media. According to most media diasporic studies (Gillespie, 1995; Georgiou, 2006), migrants consume diverse media products available to them, which shape their hybrid identifications. In China, however, mass media are principally controlled by the state and the inflows of foreign media are strictly regulated. As I demonstrated in Chapter 4, Taiwanese migrants, like Chinese citizens, have adopted a range of media tools to bypass state censorship and sustain their transnational and interpersonal communications. Their use of media included illegal satellite TV, pirated
videos, proxy software, SMS, Internet forums, and so forth. Chinese mass media, instead, were only rarely used for news, information, or entertainment.

News reception for Taiwanese migrants is highly home-oriented. Even veteran migrants remain interested in news events in Taiwan—whether because of investment, personal interests, or homesickness. Taiwanese satellite channels and news websites are the main sources of Taiwanese news, although some migrants also watch news programs regarding Taiwan's affairs on Chinese, Hong Kong, or Macao channels. Generally speaking, migrants depend heavily on Taiwanese media for all sorts of information—despite the fact that Taiwanese satellite TV is illegal, newspapers are expensive, and news websites are mostly blocked from access in China. Some interviewed migrants only paid attention to the Chinese news that appeared in the Taiwanese media. There were individual differences, however. Those who had long-term plans in China were more likely to be attentive to Chinese news. They used Chinese news media not only for information but also for better understanding of local cultures—especially when business was involved. This showed that the use of Chinese mass media was closely associated with migrants’ relationship with the Chinese society.

A salient phenomenon of communication among the interviewed Taiwanese migrants was their reliance on personal networks for local information, as I showed in
Chapter 5. Businesspeople tended to scout insider information from local officials with whom they had built good guanxi. In most circumstances, however, migrants formed Taiwanese-only social networks and exchanged information with one another within those networks. Such sharing might occur in businessmen’s associations, voluntary organizations, community websites, or informal social groupings in which SMS and the Internet were utilized. The prevalence of interpersonal communications among Taiwanese migrants can be explained not only by the absence of vital ethnic media. Also, and more importantly, the interviewed migrants emphasized trust relations, seeing information circulated through the Taiwanese circles as more trustworthy and reliable. Therefore, the resistance to Chinese news media and dependence on Taiwanese news sources also furthers migrant’s isolation from the host country.

Despite the fact that foreign media products are restricted in China, they play a significant role in Taiwanese migrants’ everyday lives. Many people—particularly those living in company compounds—have limited leisure activities in China and spend lots of time watching videos. They use satellite television, pirated DVDs, and online videos for entertainment. The menu of their media consumption includes American movies and series, Japanese cartoons and dramas, Korean dramas, Taiwanese variety shows, and Chinese epic dramas and documentaries. The list involves media products from the global,
the regional, the local, and the home-country sources. But in general, the Taiwanese media sphere overwhelmed the Chinese one in studied instances.

Growing Taiwanese Consciousness, Conflicting Identities

Because of the double-homeland complex (Lo, 2002), identity is a puzzling issue for many Taiwanese. Moving to China entails a complex, and often difficult, identity renegotiation, evidenced by migrants’ ambiguous narratives of self-identification. On the one hand, migrants seem to develop a strong “we-group” sense of being Taiwanese in China, and easily distinguish themselves from Chinese nationals. On the other hand, the notion of being “Taiwanese” might mean different things to different people: a local identity, a national identity, or the identification with a territory of a split nation. As far as national identity was concerned, some interviewed migrants’ self-categorizations became slippery and somewhat conflicting.

First, regardless of their political positions on unification, the status quo, or independence, Taiwanese migrants generally developed an awareness of being Taiwanese in China. Such Taiwanese consciousness was different from that of the “defensive nativism” (Buruma, 1996) emerging from the Taiwanization movements on the island, as
I reviewed in Chapter 1. The concept of being Taiwanese, for migrants, exists in relation to PRC citizens, but is not exactly "against" Chinese identity. Moreover, the Taiwanese consciousness advocated by political activists in Taiwan during the 1980s and the 1990s appealed to a sense of victimhood for native Taiwanese. This Taiwanese consciousness, in the view of some migrants, was used to promote Taiwan’s independence, and thus was undesirable. However, what interviewed migrants perceived as Taiwanese solidarity in China was based on a sense of superiority. Such consciousness of being Taiwanese was reinforced by daily negotiations of sameness and differences, by the dialectical relation between mediated communication and lived experience, and by the intersection of transnational and local practices.

*Sameness*: transnational studies tend to emphasize migrants’ trans-local social relations and neglect place-based activities. For the interviewed Taiwanese migrants, Taiwanese consciousness was fostered by their local and transnational practices. At the local level, migrants participated in Taiwanese-only social networks and presumed a trust relation among Taiwanese. These networks were embodied in a thriving community of websites, voluntary organizations, and primary groups based on neighborhood, religion, business, friendship, and so forth. Mediated communications, such as SMS and the Internet, were utilized to share information and support. There was also a prevalent
mantra that Taiwanese should abide by, shown in this Chinese saying cited by one of my interviewees: “keeping watch together in mutual defense and helping out one another.” For the Taiwanese, of course, this refers to other Taiwanese migrants. Migrants’ belief in mutual help reinforces their social bond and the sense of being Taiwanese in China.

At the transnational level, the reception of Taiwanese news remains a significant daily ritual for migrants. Despite being abroad, migrants continue to keep themselves updated about Taiwanese news and are concerned with Taiwan’s domestic affairs. This allows migrants to sustain attachments to their country of origin. News reception thus becomes a “sacred ceremony” (Carey, 1989) that draws migrants and their compatriots at home together in fellowship. Besides, watching Taiwanese television programs also strengthens the feelings of being close to “home.” The Taiwanese accent, the punch lines, and the scenes presented in Taiwanese TV shows provide a sense of familiarity. However, Taiwanese news also refreshes, or even amplifies, migrants’ unpleasant memories about Taiwan’s political infighting. The division in Taiwan is in sharp contrast with migrants’ in-group solidarity in China. For some, the political division seen on the Taiwanese TV undermines their determination to return.

*Difference:* Encountering Chinese people and “Chinese culture” on the mainland enacts the negotiation of similarity and difference for Taiwanese migrants. More often
than not, interviewed migrants emphasized differences between Taiwan and China regarding culture, as marked in etiquette, ways of thinking, moral values and norms, cultivation, democratic disposition, etc. Migrants tended to think that the genuine Chinese culture had been destroyed by the Communist regime, particularly in the Cultural Revolution. When watching Chinese television, they preferred the genres of epic dramas and historical documentaries, which they considered to represent the essence of Chinese culture. Otherwise, they found few similarities that resonated with their cultural frameworks. Migrants’ reception of news about the Sichuan earthquake, the Beijing Olympics, and the tainted-milk scandal enacted their negotiations of sameness and difference, and of inclusion and exclusion. In most cases, migrants confirmed their outsider status through these mediated experiences.

Second, the growth of Taiwanese consciousness among migrants does not directly translate to national identity. The question of whether Taiwanese migrants sustain, reinforce, or change their identities is difficult to answer. Migrants came to China with various identities. Some expressed nationalistic sentiment and others did not. Interviewees' self-narratives of identity usually involved not only their daily practices of being Taiwanese but also their thinking about Taiwan’s political future. Sometimes the two layers of identification were in conflict. When talking about their identities, some
migrants seemed ambiguous, or even ambivalent. Generally speaking, those who had identified themselves as Taiwanese before migration tended to maintain or reinforce their Taiwanese identity. These people’s self-identifications were more explicit than those of other migrants. Those who had a Chinese identity before migration rarely discarded such identity, but their narratives usually became less affirmative. These two groups of people showed the persistence of their original identities. On the contrary, those who had hybrid identities prior to migrating demonstrated a kind of flexibility and openness to various political possibilities. Moreover, the experience of migration seemed likely to diminish migrants’ nationalistic emotion—be it a Chinese or Taiwanese one.

Re-examining Migrant Transnationalism

Media studies demonstrate that mediated communication, as an important symbolic form of representation, is appropriated to construct cultural unity and cement solidarity. In modern societies, the nation state has assumed a dominant role in shaping cultural identity. Theories of cultural globalization nevertheless portray an image of the world on the move, in which the scope, velocity, and intensity of human mobility and communication flows are destabilizing the concepts of territorialized culture and identity.
Against this theoretical backdrop, discourses on migrant transnationalism emerged in the 1990s, arguing that contemporary migrants no longer assume a master identity based on a territorial boundary.

American-led immigrant research has begun to unravel the social space forged by migrants’ simultaneous, multi-stranded relations linking their home and host societies. These studies contend that the transnational social space allows migrants to sustain their loyalty to their country of origin, although such allegiance is but one source of identity. Meanwhile, the so-called media diasporic studies that have thrived in recent years renew diasporic discourse in the context of transnational communication. This line of research focuses on the role of electronic mediation in shaping migrants’ diasporic identities—which are hybrid and constantly reconstructed. While these two strands of scholarship emphasize the trans-national identities of contemporary migrants, discourse on cosmopolitanism envisions a post-national identity based on humanity. Some scholars argue that cosmopolitanism entails openness to difference and diverse cultures; nevertheless, others regard it as the privilege of the mobile elite, or worse, a reflection of snobbish class consciousness. Are these transnational theories applicable to the Taiwanese migrants in China, and, if so, in what aspects? What kinds of contextual factors need to be considered?
First, this dissertation confirms that Taiwanese migrants sustain their attachments to Taiwan, in part enabled by new patterns of transnational migration and communication in light of globalization. Migrants simultaneously engage in two or more societies and sustain multilayered relations with their home country. Transnational communication, particularly via satellite television and the Internet, plays an important role in maintaining their home connections. Nevertheless, it should be noted that place-based practices remain dominant in their everyday lives. Transnational migration studies emphasize the “transnational space” that links places of origin and settlement. In their lived experience, interviewed Taiwanese migrants largely participate in activities in the local places rather than this transnational space. Their media use behaviors, such as dependence on Taiwanese media for news information and entertainment and their adoption of communication tools for in-group networking, are highly relevant to their lives in China. In particular, migrants’ mental isolation in China prevents them from deep engagement in Chinese society and reinforces their home attachments.

The Nation State as the Key Reference of Identity
Second, identity based on the boundaries of the nation state remains the dominant form of cultural identity, despite the fact that transnationalism allows Taiwanese migrants to sustain deterritorialized identities. Some scholars argue that what migration studies call transnationalism actually represents bi-state affiliation (Amit-Talai, 1998; Waldinger & Fitzgerald, 2004). The tricky situation for Taiwanese migrants is that they already had the dual concept of identity in mind before migration. The fractured national identities in Taiwan—in terms of Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity—continue to shape migrants’ bi-state imaginations. On one hand, a Taiwan-centered subjectivity apparently has currency in migrants’ self-consciousness and is reinforced by their daily practices in China. On the other hand, such Taiwanese consciousness can be equated to a local identity, which is not in conflict with a unified Chinese nation. Migration to China rarely increases migrants’ Chinese consciousness; rather, a rooted Chinese identity is still persistent after migration. The nation state—be it a Taiwanese or Chinese one—is still the predominant framework of reference for cultural identity.

Cosmopolitanism and transnational diasporic communities are too broad a cultural category for Taiwanese migrants to identify with. Despite rapid movements of people and communications, it is too early to announce the emergence of either a borderless world or a post-national consciousness. For Taiwanese migrants, a cosmopolitan outlook means
proximity to the global culture—usually a Western lifestyle, values, and norms. It becomes a cultural distinction, pitting them against the “parochial” locals. Likewise, the concept of Chinese diaspora rarely exists in Taiwanese migrants. Some identify with the homeland (mainland China), but they do not have a transnational diasporic consciousness (hwaren). For others, Taiwan’s nationhood provides a mooring that diminishes the sense of the Chinese diaspora.

*Instrumentalism and Free-floating Identities*

Third, despite the fixed opposition between Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity, there is a space for flexible and fluid identities. Such flexibility is expressed in two very different senses: deliberately instrumental or more passive and free floating. Scholars (Levitt, 2001; Ong, 1999; Portes & DeWind, 2007) have analyzed how migrants—skilled or unskilled—instrumentally use their identities to maximize economic or political benefits in particular settings. Some Taiwanese migrants, businesspeople in particular, demonstrate an ability to switch identities to fit specific situations. In China, they tend to publicly identify themselves as Chinese and avoid asserting their Taiwanese identity. This is not to say that such self-identification is artificial or insincere. Chinese identity may constitute a legitimate part of these migrants' subjectivity. However, identity is not that
expedient and manageable for everyone. Others experience—and express—a more
free-floating sense of identity proximate to that of postmodern displaced subjects (Hall,
1992). They desire “home” but cannot find a place to put down the roots. This mentality
is particularly evident among second-generation Mainlanders, who often find themselves
strangers in their parents’ homeland.

Some migrants express their flexibility of identity and openness to various political
possibilities. They tend to watch the political, economic, and cultural development in
China closely to “decide” their identities. Although this research shows Taiwanese
migrants’ persistent Taiwanese or Chinese identity, it does not assert the fixity of identity.
I have argued in Chapter 1 that both Taiwanese and Chinese identities are formed and
transformed in particular historical and social contexts. I recognize that my study is set in
the initial stage of Taiwanese migration to China. There may be a different picture that
emerges in the long run.

**Contextualizing Mediation**

Last but not least, this dissertation shows that the analysis of mediation and identity
needs to be contextualized, not only in terms of the settings of reception but also in terms
of specific historical conjunctures. Media disaporic studies tend to emphasize the
transnational imagination of diasporic communities or of homeland affiliations enabled by the globalization of ethnic media, such as satellite television, videos, and websites. Less recognized is how the presence of ethnic media and the audiences’ use of media are constrained by structural conditions. China’s media environments, the migration patterns of Taiwanese migrants, and their relationships with host and home societies greatly influence how they use media for news, entertainment, and participation. The media consumption of Taiwanese migrants poses a challenge to assumptions of a transnational Chinese media sphere and an emergent global Chinese community. Even while situated in the imagined homeland, with linguistic-cultural commonalities, Taiwanese migrants find Chinese media play a relatively insignificant role in their lives. Their news reception is highly home-oriented, and their consumption of entertainment media is multilayered. Therefore, media availability should not be confused with media use, which is highly specific and intentional.

More importantly, access to the same media content does not necessarily enact a sense of commonality. More attention needs to be paid to how people interact with media content. For Taiwanese migrants, the reception of Taiwanese news draws them closer to home; at the same time, the partisan media of Taiwan also furthers their aversion to Taiwan’s domestic politics. The reception of Chinese news is often a process of
rediscovering difference rather than sameness, and exclusion rather than inclusion. This results from gaps between the meaning structure of encoding and the meaning structure of decoding. Despite there being no linguistic barriers, migrants find that Chinese news media lack social relevance to them, in part because of different cultural frameworks and in part because of their social isolation in Chinese society. This means that the analysis of mediated experiences should take into account lived experiences. As far as identity is concerned, such factors as historical memory, political situation, socioeconomic conditions, and everyday lives in the place of adoption are converged to shape particular mediated experiences. Transnational, deterritorialized mediation cannot be isolated from place-based lived experiences.

Conclusion and suggestions

This dissertation unravels Taiwanese migrants’ identity formation and transformation shaped by the conjunction of mediated and lived experiences in China. As a case study in a very specific context, it does not seek to generalize its findings to other migrant communities. Rather, it provides an empirical examination of theoretical assumptions in the growing popular discourses of transnationalism that derive from
globalization theories. My research confirms that the mobility of migrants and their communications enable the maintenance of deterritorialized identity. However, such deterritorialized identity remains framed in the image of the nation state. There is little evidence of post-national cosmopolitanism and transnational diasporic identity based on ethnicity. Even ethnicity is defined by cultural rather than genealogical terms. The sense of cosmopolitanism paradoxically entails cultural othering, disturbing migrants’ imagination about their original homeland. Meanwhile, the experience of migration does discount the power of nationalism, despite the continuous dominance of the nation state in shaping identity.

Case studies allow in-depth and holistic probing. Nonetheless, researchers need to be cautious about external validity—that is, whether the sample is representative (Fortner & Christians, 2003). Since specifying the demographic characteristics of the Taiwanese population in China is difficult, this study seeks to diversify research subjects in terms of gender, age, employee status, occupation, and region. Besides this, it also avoids over-recruiting interviewees from the same social networks. Still, I recognize that this sample is slanted toward the better-educated and toward people in the electronic industry. China-born returnees and Taiwanese aboriginal migrants are not included simply because of the problem of access. The China-born second-generation Taiwanese are intentionally
excluded because most of them are minors. Future researchers might consider expanding the sample base to include any or all of these groups. Additionally, in order to sort out the patterns of findings from voluminous interview data, individual differences may be under-emphasized in this dissertation.

Throughout the course of this dissertation, I have constantly kept in mind the reflexivity of being a researcher and my relations with my research subjects. In the field, I tried to be an objective observer and a compassionate but cautious listener. When writing my dissertation, I thought a lot about ethnic and moral issues. However, I also recognize that being Taiwanese and interviewing only Taiwanese subjects to some extent constrains such reflexivity.

I understand that this research deals with a complex historical context, a sophisticated media system, and a peculiar migration. To avoid oversimplifying the relations between mediation and identity, I draw on a great deal of background information to contextualize this case study, which may obscure the central arguments. However, I believe that these secondary data are necessary for the triangulation of qualitative research. This research also incorporates a range of theoretical perspectives that may not directly match its own problematic. These theories, nevertheless, offer a more holistic picture regarding the conditions of contemporary migrants.
Identity is a fascinating topic to analyze for a dissertation. The complexity of Taiwanese identity formation and transformation in Taiwan and—following migrants’ footprints—in China makes this an intriguing case to study. The opinion polls in Taiwan, and studies based on these statistics, tend to simplify identities and categorize them into certain categories. While I adopt these categories as a basic framework, my interview data show a much more complicated identification process and a more diverse picture of identity among Taiwanese. Studies of media and identity sometimes assume the direct relations between the two. To some extent this assumption resembles the media effect formula. Media diasporic studies, in particular, may amplify mediated imagination in the transnational context. But Taiwanese migrants’ narratives demonstrate that their encounters with media contents enact various identity renegotiations. This requires us, as media scholars, to avoid a solely media-centered approach and attend instead to the interactions between mediation and other social conditions.
## Appendix A: Interviewee List

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Years in China</th>
<th>Occupation/Job position</th>
<th>Region</th>
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<td>M</td>
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<td>SZ26</td>
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<td>D</td>
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<td>SZ30B</td>
<td>30s F</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>molding/business owner's wife+</td>
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</table>

Notes:
1 Pseudonyms are given only to the interviewees whose words are frequently quoted.
2 M=married, S=single, D=divorced, W=widowed, #=Chinese spouse.
3 *=repeated migrant, **=business traveler.
4 +=family business.
Appendix B: In-depth Interviewing Questions

A. Basic Information
1. Gender
2. Birth year
3. Birth place/residence in Taiwan
4. Father’s/mother’s ethnicity (Hoklo/Hakka/Mainlander)
5. Education
6. Marital status/residence
7. Occupation/job position

B. Migration History
1. Can you outline your past work experiences in Taiwan?
2. Had you been a resident in any foreign countries before moving to China? If so, please indicate the names of these countries, your staying periods, and your main purposes of stay.
3. How long have you lived in China? What motivated you to come here? How did you get your first and current job in China?
4. Can you describe in detail your current job? For example, your position, work routines, duty, and the persons you often meet at work.
5. Are any of your close friends or family members living in China? If so, where do they live? Does that influence your decision to come or stay here?
6. What do you do for leisure and with whom do you hang out on the weekends?
7. Have you joined any Taiwanese groups or organizations in China? If so, what are these groups or organizations? Are you an active member? What are the major activities you involved in? Do you join them for business or personal purposes?
8. How often do you come back to Taiwan? Does your company reimburse your spending? How long do you stay each time? What do you do during your stay in Taiwan?
9. Are you a house owner in China? If so, do you plan to stay here for a long run? If your company arranges your accommodation, please describe the living conditions.

C. Media Use
1. What had been your impressions on China before you came here? How did you get these impressions? Did they affect your decision to move to China?
2. Where did you get information concerning life and work in China before your departure?

3. What kinds of news are you concerned with? What are the media you use for news?
   a. Have you ever subscribed to Taiwanese satellite TV? If so, do you watch Taiwanese news on a daily basis?
   b. Have you ever subscribed to any Taiwanese or Chinese newspapers? How often do you purchase Chinese newspapers on newsstands?
   c. What news websites do you visit frequently? Have you ever attempted to use Taiwanese or foreign news websites that are blocked from access in China?
   d. What other news media do you use very often?
   e. Does your company subscribe to any Chinese publications? Are the subscriptions mandatory? Do you read these publications?

4. How do you evaluate the news from the following sources: foreign news outlets, the Taiwanese media, and the Chinese media?

5. Can you list three major news events this year regarding mainland China and cross-Strait relations? Did you follow the news with alternative sources? Can you compare the differences of their content?

6. Do you pay attention to news reports or programs relevant to Taiwan in the Chinese media? How do you think of their perspectives?

7. Do you know any Taiwanese community media based in China? Do you think they provide useful information? If you visited some community websites before, did you participate in any interactive activities?

8. What kinds of entertainment media do you often use—for example, TV, movies, newspapers, magazines, books, DVDs, music, and KTV?

9. How important is it for you to keep informed of the news events in Taiwan?

10. Do you have personal blog(s)?

11. How often do you contact your family members and friends in Taiwan? What kinds of communication tools do you use? If you use instant messengers such as MSN and Skype, please indicate the persons on your contact list.

D. Identity

1. Do you think that your migration to China is part of a larger trend, such as globalization, regionalization or the emergence of Greater China?
   a. Is “going native” important to you? How do you adapt to the host society?
   b. Some said that it is easy for Taiwanese to adapt to Chinese society because of “the same language and the same ancestral stock.” Do you agree or disagree on it, based
on your own experience?
2. How do you think of the media representations of Taiwanese migrants in China?
3. Which of the following terms best describe your migration status—immigrants, sojourners, strangers, returnees, migratory birds, nomads, and settlers?
4. Which of the following terms best describe your identity—Taiwanese, Chinese as zhongguoren (Chinese citizens), Chinese as hwaren (people of Chinese descent), and cosmopolitans? Is your identity changed after migration?
Appendix C: Approved Foreign Satellite Channels in China (2008)

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<th>Satellite TV channel</th>
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<td>Home Box Office (H B O)</td>
<td>Time Warner</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<td>C I N E M A X</td>
<td>Time Warner</td>
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<tr>
<td>C E T V</td>
<td>Time Warner/Tom group</td>
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<td>NBC-General Electric (GE)</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTV Mandarin (China)</td>
<td>Viacom</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Geographic Channel</td>
<td>News Corporation</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<td>News Corporation</td>
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<td>Channel V</td>
<td>News Corporation</td>
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<td>Xing Kong Wei Shi</td>
<td>News Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESPN Asia</td>
<td>ABC/News Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>STAR Sports</td>
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<td>A X N</td>
<td>Sony Pictures Entertainment</td>
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<td>Discovery Asia</td>
<td>Discovery Communications</td>
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<td>Hallmark</td>
<td>NBC-General Electronic (GE)</td>
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<td>Bloomberg</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>NHK World Premium</td>
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<td>Phoenix Chinese Channel</td>
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<td>Phoenix Infornews Channel</td>
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<td>Korea</td>
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Note: These channels are permitted to legally broadcast only in three-star or above hotels, residential complexes reserved for expatriates, and some other stipulated locations.
### Appendix D: Major Newspapers and TV Channels in Four Cities

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Major newspapers</th>
<th>Local television channels</th>
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<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td><strong>Wenhui-Xinmin United Press Group:</strong> <em>Oriental Morning Post, Xinmin Evening News, Wenhui Daily</em>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Jiefang Daily Group:</strong> <em>Jiafang Daily, Shanghai Evening Post, Shanghai Evening Post, The Shanghai Times</em> (weekly), <em>Metro Express</em> (free)&lt;br&gt;<strong>Others:</strong> <em>News Times</em> (<em>Tenten Xinbao</em>), <em>Shanghai Radio and TV Weekly, Youth Daily, Shanghai Weekly</em></td>
<td><strong>SMG Group</strong> (13 channels):&lt;br&gt;<em>Dragon TV, STV, CBN</em>(<em>business</em>), <em>Channel Young, Dongfang TV</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Drama, Great Sports, Documentary Channel, News Entertainment, Arts, ICS</em> (<em>international</em>), <em>Drama, Toonmax TV</em> (<em>cartoon</em>), <em>Children</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Suzhou</td>
<td><strong>Provincial:</strong> <em>Jiangsu Xin Hwa Daily Press Group</em> <em>Xin Hwa Daily, Yangtse Evening Post</em>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Municipal:</strong> <em>Suzhou Daily Press Group</em> <em>Suzhou Daily, Gusu Evening Post, City Business News</em>&lt;br&gt;<strong>County:</strong> e.g. <em>Wujiang Daily, Kunshan Daily</em></td>
<td><strong>Provincial:</strong> <em>Jiangsu Broadcasting Corporation</em> (<em>JSBC</em>) (8 channels)&lt;br&gt;<em>Jiangsu Satellite Channel, Variety Show, Film and TV, Public Service, Channel Win, Children, Business, Channel Win</em>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Municipal:</strong> <em>Suzhou Broadcasting System</em> (5 channels)&lt;br&gt;<em>Integrated News Channel, Socioeconomic Situation Channel, Cultural and Life, Film and Entertainment, Life and Information</em>&lt;br&gt;<strong>County:</strong> e.g. <em>Wujiang CATV, Kunshan TV 1-3</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
<td><strong>Provincial:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Overseas</strong> (9 channels):</td>
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<td>A. Guangzhou</td>
<td>Nanfang Daily Press Group &lt;br&gt; <em>Southern Weekly, Nanfang Metropolis Daily</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guangzhou Daily Press Group &lt;br&gt; <em>Guangzhou Daily, Guangzhou Times</em></td>
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<td>Shenzhen Press Group &lt;br&gt; <em>Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, Shenzhen Commercial Daily, Shenzhen Evening Daily, Sunshine Daily (Jing Bao)</em></td>
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<td>Shanghai Press Group &lt;br&gt; <em>Shanghai Commercial Daily, Shanghai Evening Daily</em></td>
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<td>Beijing Press Group &lt;br&gt; <em>Beijing Daily, Beijing Times</em></td>
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<td>Provincial: &lt;br&gt; <em>Phoenix Chinese Channel, CETV, Xing Kong, TVB Jade Channel, TVB Pearl Channel, ATV, ATV World, MASTV, MTV (China)</em></td>
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<td>Municipal: &lt;br&gt; <em>Guangdong Television Group (GDTV) (6 channels):</em> <em>Guangdong Satellite Channel, Zhujiang, Sports, Public Service, News, Cartoon</em></td>
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<td>Southern Television Guangdong (TVS) (6 channels): <em>Metropolis (satellite), Economy, Entertainment, Movie &amp; Drama, Children</em></td>
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<td>Overseas (9 channels): <em>Phoenix Chinese Channel, CETV, Xing Kong, TVB Jade Channel, TVB Pearl Channel, ATV, ATV World, MASTV, MTV (China)</em></td>
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<td>Southern Television Guangdong <em>Metropolis (satellite), Economy, Entertainment, Movie &amp; Drama, Children</em></td>
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