

## ABSTRACT

Title of Document: THE GOAL OF LOW SELF-MONITORS: TO  
THINE OWN SELF BE TRUE?

Rachel Amanda Freidus, Phd, 2010

Directed By: Dr. Harold Sigall, Department of Psychology

Traditionally, low self-monitors have been viewed as individuals who are less likely than high self-monitors to monitor their expressive behavior and to present themselves a certain way for the sake of desired public appearances. However, recent research suggests that low self-monitors may have self-presentational concerns, which seem to relate to low self-monitors' desire to *appear* to be sincere. In order to examine low self-monitors' goal, a study was conducted in which the participants were placed in a situation where they had to choose between being sincere and only appearing to be sincere. Participants revealed their attitudes to another participant, whose attitudes were known to them, and who would be forming an impression of them based on their attitudes. Results of this experiment demonstrated that low self-monitors chose to conform to the attitudes of the other participant, and did not choose either to be sincere or to appear to be sincere. Although the hypothesis was not supported, the experiment revealed that low self-monitors do actively present themselves. Results and implications are discussed in terms of understanding the goals of low self-monitors by distinguishing between the ability and motivational components of the construct of self-monitoring.

THE GOAL OF LOW SELF-MONITORS: TO THINE OWN SELF BE TRUE?

By

Rachel Amanda Freidus

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Advisory Committee:  
Dr. Harold Sigall, Chair  
Dr. Charles Stangor  
Dr. Mark Johnson  
Dr. Monique Turner  
Dr. Seppo Iso-Ahola

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## Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my wonderful, low self-monitoring family. I am very lucky to have you.

I would like to dedicate this to my parents, Alice and Gene Freidus, who worked very hard to make sure that I get a great education and that I always let “my reach exceed my grasp.” Thank you mom and dad, for all of your love, patience and support (of all kinds) during this long, long journey. Now that it’s over, I’m very happy that you didn’t let me quit 😊.

I would also like to dedicate this to Grandma Reba and Grandpa Ted (Z”L). Thank you grandma and grandpa (Z”L) for loving me so much, for letting me know it, and for making it clear how special I always was to you. I told you I would make you proud!

Finally, I would like to dedicate this to my brother Josh and to Butters. Thank you Josh and Butters for your love and entertainment. Josh, thank you for making me laugh, especially when I am stressed. Butters, thank you for putting a huge smile on my face every time I see you and think of you.

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## **Chapter 1: Introduction**

### General Introduction

*“All the world's a stage,  
And all the men and women merely players”*

(Shakespeare, 1974, p.381)

As if fleshing out Shakespeare’s view, Goffman’s (1959) formulation is that “life itself is a dramatically enacted thing” (p.72) and that “ordinary social intercourse is itself put together as a scene is put together...” (p.72). Goffman implied that all individuals constantly try to control the impressions that they create. According to Snyder’s theory of self-monitoring (1974, 1979, 1987), particular people are more likely to control the impressions they create than are others. Those people are known as *high self-monitors*.

The theory of self-monitoring, introduced over thirty five years ago, proposed that people differ in the way they can and do engage in expressive control (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). These differences affect the degree to which people value, create, develop and project public appearances (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). The construct of self-monitoring, measured with the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986), distinguishes two different types of people: high self-monitors and low self-monitors. Snyder’s theory implies that “the world as a stage” metaphor applies to some more than others, and not equally to “all the men and women”.

Traditionally, high self-monitors, as compared to low self-monitors, are defined as those who monitor their expressive behavior and present themselves in a certain manner for the sake of desired public appearances (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). High self-monitors’ behavior is more likely to be guided by the situation at hand, and as a

result they are highly sensitive to social and interpersonal cues (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000; Snyder, 1987). High self-monitors are more likely to view themselves as adaptive individuals (Snyder, 1987), who are both willing and able to project images that cater to others (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). They endorse a pragmatic “conception of self”, and define their identities based on the role or appearance they project in each social situation (Snyder, 1987).

According to traditional self-monitoring theory, *low self-monitors*, as compared to high self-monitors, are defined as those whose expressive behavior tends to reflect their own inner attitudes, emotions and dispositions, and does not change out of a concern for situational appropriateness (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). Low self-monitors are known to endorse “images of themselves as rather principled beings who value congruence between ‘who they think they are’ and ‘what they try to do’ ”(Snyder, 1987, p. 50). They endorse a principled conception of self, and define their identities based on their inner characteristics and traits, which are said to be more stable than those of high self-monitors (Snyder, 1987). In addition, they are more likely to say that their behavior is based on internal motivation than are high self-monitors (Brockner & Eckenrode, 1978; Furnham, 1981; Gutkin & Suls, 1979; Schneiderman, Webb, Davis, & Thomas, 1981; Snyder, 1976; Snyder & Tanke, 1976). Lows are traditionally viewed as less willing and less able to construct what they perceive to be a false image of themselves (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000).

My research examines whether the traditional definition of what a low self-monitor is, can be upheld: are they those who follow the philosophy of, “*This above all: to thine own self be true,*” (Shakespeare, 1974, p.1147), or are they those who attempt to

*appear to be true* to others? If low self-monitors are motivated to *appear to be true*, it would suggest that Shakespeare's metaphor of the world as a stage does apply to "all men and women," including those who score higher and lower on the self-monitoring scale. It would suggest that lower self-monitors are putting on a performance just as the higher self-monitors are; only they are following a different script.

*What is already known about the motivations behind high and low self-monitoring?*

By definition, high self-monitors care about their self-presentation (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000; Snyder, 1974, 1979, 1987, 1995). High self-monitors are motivated to use social and interpersonal cues to guide their presentations, to monitor, and adjust their behavior during social interactions (Snyder, 1987). This motivation seems to stem from their goal of appearing to be situationally appropriate (Snyder, 1987; Snyder, 1995).

In Snyder and Monson's (1975) experiment, high and low self-monitors were asked to participate in discussion groups. Half of the discussion groups had a private social norm, and half had a public social norm. In the public groups, the participants were in rooms with one way mirrors, video cameras, a microphone, a videotape monitor, a table and chairs. In the private groups, the participants were in a room with only a table and chairs. Participants in the public group also signed a release form allowing their conversations to be taped and shown to other students in their class. The experimenters expected that the cameras, and the explicit consent would emphasize "the public nature of group members' behavior and would make salient membership in the larger reference group of undergraduate students with its norms concerning social conformity and autonomy in response to social pressure" (Snyder & Monson, 1975, p. 639). In the private groups, the salient norms and cues were provided by the group members

themselves. Because of the private situation, where there was no larger reference group apparent, conforming to the smaller group and having consensus within the group would be more appropriate for the situation.

Results demonstrated that high self-monitors were acutely sensitive to the differences between the contexts in which the discussion groups took place: they conformed in the private discussions when conformity was more situationally appropriate, and did not conform in the public discussions where autonomy was more situationally appropriate. Low self-monitors' behavior did not vary based on whether they engaged in private or public discussions. However, it is important to note that high self-monitors did not merely conform. High self-monitors only conformed when it was situationally appropriate to do so. When the social norm was autonomy, high self-monitors could act in an independent, non-conforming manner (Snyder, 1987).

The motivation of high self-monitors is clear, but the motivation of low self-monitors is not clear. Traditionally, low self-monitors have been viewed as individuals who are simply not high self-monitors, meaning that relatively, low self-monitors lack the motivation and ability to monitor their behavior as compared to high self-monitors (Snyder, 1974, 1979).

The self-monitoring construct is highly correlated with acting ability (Snyder, 1974), as high self-monitors are likely to be better at expressing emotions on cue (Snyder, 1974), and at role playing (Lippa, 1976) than are low self-monitors. High self-monitors are also more likely to employ "technique" when engaging in social interactions than are low self-monitors. High self-monitors are more likely to talk about their conversation partner instead of themselves when engaged in conversation than are low self-monitors

(Ickes & Barnes, 1977). They are more likely to give off more intimate greetings (Riggio, Friedman, & DiMatteo, 1981), to reciprocate intimacy and emotionality (Shaffer, Smith, & Tomarelli, 1982), to be humorous (Turner, 1980), to pace conversations (Dabbs, Evans, Hopper, & Purvis, 1980), and to have knowledge of social rules than are low self-monitors (Riggio & Friedman, 1982). All of these behavior differences have been attributed to a relative absence of both ability and motivation by low self-monitors. However, later on, Snyder (1987) modified the idea that low self-monitors are simply not high self-monitors by suggesting that low self-monitors may have their own motivations. According to Snyder (1987, p. 57),

“Much as it may seem at an intuitive level, that there is something automatic, unreflective, and unconscious about expressing one’s attitudes and ‘just being oneself,’ it really may be that these features of the low self-monitoring orientation demand as much deliberate, intentional, and motivational planning as the impression-managing activities of the high self-monitoring orientation....Typically, the social behavior of low self-monitors is highly responsive to dispositional influences and only minimally responsive to situational considerations. Nevertheless, the fact that they actively structure their social situations suggests that low self-monitors are not totally unconcerned with situational considerations. Rather, they are attentive to those situational considerations that permit them to size up the potential of social

situations to allow them to ‘be themselves.’ Once in the situations, they then respond to their own dispositions.”

Snyder’s statement suggests that low self-monitors are, indeed, motivated individuals, and that their social-interaction motivations stem from trying to be themselves.

Another motivation suggested, is that low self-monitors are motivated to “*appear*” to be sincere individuals just as high self-monitors *appear* to be situationally appropriate (Arkin, Gabrenya, Appelman & Cochran, 1979; Kim, 2005; Ratner & Kahn, 2002; Sigall & Doherty, unpublished document; Snyder & Tanke, 1976). This hypothesis has been examined (Kim, 2005) but has not been supported thus far.

What evidence is there to suggest that low self-monitors may have social-interaction motivations, and that they are not merely those who are less motivated to monitor their behavior than high self-monitors? Next, evidence will be presented suggesting that low self-monitors have social interaction motivations by examining the lifestyle choices that both high and low self-monitors make, and based on situations showing that low self-monitors react to public versus private manipulations. This evidence, which will be discussed, demonstrates that thinking of low self-monitors as individuals who act without motivation, simply because they are not high self-monitors, is implausible. Just because they do not attempt to monitor their behavior in the same way that the high self-monitors do, does not mean that they have no social interaction motivations of their own.

*The chosen lifestyles and social situations of high and low self-monitors*

In discussing the different lifestyles of high and low self-monitors, Snyder (1987) pointed out that both the high and low self-monitors *actively* construct their social worlds. High and low self-monitors differ in the way that they approach their friendships and relationships (Leone & Hawkins, 2006). For example, high self-monitors are more likely to like those with similar activity preferences, whereas low self-monitors are more likely to like those with similar attitudes (Jamieson, Lydon, & Zanna, 1987). When it comes to choosing people to spend time with, high self-monitors are more likely to choose those who are “skilled” at a particular activity, whereas low self-monitors are more likely to choose to spend time with those whom they like (Snyder, Gangestad & Simpson, 1983). High self-monitors’ social lives involve “partitioning, differentiation, and segmentation” (Snyder, 1987, p. 64), allowing them to play different roles with different people. Although it is unclear as to why high self-monitors prefer a partitioned social life, and low self-monitors do not, these behaviors typically accompany the high versus low self-monitoring lifestyles.

The dating worlds of high and low self-monitors are different as well, with high and low self-monitors valuing different attributes in their dating partners, and differing in level of commitment towards their dating partners. High self-monitors value physical attractiveness (Buchanan, 2000; Glick, 1985; Jones, 1993; Snyder, Berscheid, & Glick, 1985), sex appeal, social status, and financial resources (Jones, 1993) in their romantic partners, whereas low self-monitors value attributes such as similarity of values and beliefs, and honesty (Jones, 1993) in their romantic partners.



High self-monitors remain relatively “uncommitted” and low self-monitors remain relatively “committed” to their partners (Leone & Hawkins, 2006; Snyder, 1987; Snyder & Simpson, 1984; Rowatt, Cunningham & Druen, 1998), as high self-monitors say they are willing to engage in social activities with other dating partners (Snyder & Simpson, 1984). When given the chance to end their current relationship in favor of another partner, high self-monitors are willing to do that as well (Snyder & Simpson, 1984). When initiating dating relationships, high self-monitors are more likely to use deception with their dating partners (Rowatt, Cunningham & Druen, 1998), and in Snyder and Simpson’s (1984) study, high self-monitors reported dating a greater number of partners in the preceding year than low self-monitors, though low self-monitors reported experiencing longer relationships than high self-monitors (Snyder & Simpson, 1984).

Furthermore, evidence suggests that high self-monitors construct worlds where it is easy for them to act appropriately, and low self-monitors construct worlds where it is easy for them to act in accord with their attitudes, feelings and dispositions (Snyder, 1987, p. 52). Both high and low self-monitors use strategies that involve choosing situations, surroundings, and circumstances. According to Snyder (1987), people choose social situations that are favorable to their self-monitoring propensities.

Evidence for this can be seen by examining the choices that people make when faced with competing social situations. Snyder and Harkness (1984) conducted an experiment in which participants were given the “partygoer’s dilemma.” There were two conversations taking place at the party, one of which had a high clarity of definition (the people were similar to each other), and the other of which had a low clarity of definition

(the people were not similar to each other). When the participants had to choose a conversation to join, the high self-monitors were more likely to be drawn to the conversation with high clarity of definition, while the low self-monitors were more likely to be drawn to the conversation where there was an individual with whom they identified. For high self-monitors, the similar interests that the other group members had with each other provided a clear definition of the situation and made it clear to them how they should act. For low self-monitors, finding someone with whom they identified made it easy for them to act upon their own attitudes and feelings (Snyder, 1987).

Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) also highlighted the importance of choices made by high and low self-monitors. In their study, participants joined groups where they discussed issues of concern. Low self-monitors chose groups discussing topics that were in line with their attitudes, whereas high self-monitors chose groups based on the perceived role appropriateness of their membership in the groups.

Snyder (1987) pointed out that “the consequences of people’s choices of situations may be considerable and profound” (p. 55). High self-monitors choose situations where they can be their pragmatic selves, and low self-monitors choose situations where they can express their attitudes and personalities. According to Snyder (1987, p. 56),

“...it appears that people of both types are actively engaged in choosing their situations. What is different is the motivation behind these strategic activities.

What this means is that although the behavior of low self-monitors typically reflects their personal attributes, they are not

amotivational. To the contrary, the consistency between their attitudes and actions seems to be as much the product of motivated activities as is the high self-monitoring orientation. Indeed, just as it may take a considerable amount of “stage work” to convey just the right image, it may take a considerable amount of careful choosing of situations to display true inner beliefs and feelings” (p. 56).

Snyder suggested that choosing situations where low self-monitors can display their “inner beliefs and feelings” may take as much “work” as it takes high self-monitors to convey the right image.

*Low self-monitor’s motivations: public versus private situations*

Further support for the idea that low self-monitors are motivated individuals, comes from a number of studies in which low self-monitors were affected by a publicity manipulation, meaning the low self-monitors responded differently when they knew their responses would be publicly evaluated (Arkin, Gabrenya, Appelman & Cochran, 1979; Ratner & Kahn, 2002; Sigall & Doherty, unpublished document; Snyder & Tanke, 1976).

Arkin, Gabrenya, Appelman, and Cochran (1979) ran a study to see if self-monitoring predicted self-serving bias, meaning that individuals make self-attributions for positive outcomes and situational attributions for negative outcomes. Results showed that high self-monitors assumed significantly more responsibility for success than for failure when they thought they were being evaluated, and only slightly more responsibility for success than failure when they did not think they were being evaluated. Low self-monitors who were not evaluated assumed greater responsibility for success than failure, whereas low self-monitors who were evaluated took no more responsibility

for success than for failure. Arkin et al. (1979) expected, based on the traditional view of low self-monitors, that they would not assume different levels of responsibility as a function of whether they were evaluated.

Arkin et al. (1979) commented on the results saying, “An intriguing possibility is that low self-monitors’ attributions were actually self-presentational in nature...the data reported in this experiment at least question the cross-situational consistency of low self-monitors and suggest the fruitfulness of further investigating the critical antecedent conditions for when cross-situational consistency can and cannot be expected” (p. 75-76). The low self-monitors were attempting to appear a certain way when their results were public.

Snyder and Tanke (1976) examined differences in attitude change between high and low self-monitors who were placed in a forced compliance situation. Results demonstrated that low self-monitors asked to write counterattitudinal essays, who did so with freedom of choice, exhibited greater attitude change in support of the essay than did high self-monitors with freedom of choice to write counterattitudinal essays. Low self-monitors seemed to experience greater cognitive dissonance than did high self-monitors. Tetlock and Manstead (1985) commented on low self-monitors exhibiting such greater attitude change: “It is possible that high and low self-monitors differ not so much in their concern for impression management, but in the types of impressions they seek to create on others. Low scorers may be much more concerned than are high scorers with projecting an honest and principled image” (p. 70). When attitude change takes place in a forced compliance situation in support of the counterattitudinal idea, some view this change as impression management in an effort to maintain a consistent appearance

(Tedeschi, Schlenker & Bonoma, 1971). This idea would further support the possibility that low self-monitors feel the need to present themselves a certain way.

Ratner and Kahn (2002) conducted three studies demonstrating that people incorporate variety into their consumption decisions when behavior is subject to public scrutiny. They found that high self-monitors incorporated variety in public, when they thought they were being evaluated on how interesting their decision was, more so than when their decision was private. Low self-monitors did not differ in their public or private decision when told they were being evaluated for making an interesting decision. However, low self-monitors incorporated variety in public, when they thought they were being evaluated on how rational their decision was, more so than when their decision was private. The high self-monitors did not differ in their public or private decision when they told they were being evaluated for making a rational decision.

Ratner and Kahn (2002) believed that low self-monitors cared more about appearing rational than interesting. They pointed out that their results (showing that low self-monitors are more rational in public) are consistent with the idea that some types of impression management concerns may influence low self-monitors (p. 252). Ratner and Kahn (2002) believed that high self-monitors would be more concerned about appearing interesting and creative in public than low self-monitors would, because high self-monitors are more likely to “put on a show to impress and entertain others,” which they viewed as consistent with modifying behavior to appear interesting. Ratner and Kahn (2002) believed that low self-monitors would be more concerned about appearing rational in public than high self-monitors would, because they perceived low self-monitors to be principle-based individuals who are concerned about maintaining their image as

principled people (p. 252). They suggested that the desire to appear rational may be a type of concern that is consistent with low self-monitor's image as principled.

Sigall and Doherty (unpublished manuscript) had high and low self-monitors complete the Self-Monitoring Scale, either publicly (where the participants would have to discuss their responses with the group) or privately (where their responses would be completely anonymous). Participants were told that the Self-Monitoring Scale was a measure of interpersonal morality, social skillfulness, or interpersonal style. Results demonstrated that low self-monitors in the interpersonal morality condition who thought their scale would be viewed publicly, lowered their self-monitoring scores significantly more than those who thought their scale would be private, suggesting that the low self-monitors were trying to appear to be even lower self-monitors than they were.

The research on low self-monitors' reaction to a public versus private manipulation, suggests that they are attempting to *present* themselves as principled individuals who are honest, rational and sincere. However, there has been little research directly addressing whether low self-monitors have the goal of appearing to be principled individuals. Kim (2005) has been the only other researcher I have found to directly examine this topic. Although Kim's (2005) hypothesis that low self-monitors are motivated to appear to be sincere, was not supported, he believed that the lack of support resulted from the methodology used (p.38).

Kim (2005) conducted two experiments in which he attempted to examine whether low self-monitors would misrepresent their attitudes in situations where sincerity was made salient to participants. Both studies were 2(Self-Monitoring: High/Low) x 2(Similarity: Similar/Dissimilar) x 2(Sincerity Salient: Yes/No) between subjects

designs. In both studies the participant's attitudes were collected prior to the experiment and participants found out if their attitudes were similar to or dissimilar from a confederate's. The dependent variable was participant's attitude shift from the first time they completed the attitude questionnaire prior to the experiment, to the second, during the experiment. In the first experiment, the salience of sincerity was manipulated by having the confederate tell the participants in the sincerity salient condition that her friend had just participated in the study and told her that she could get through the study quickly by agreeing with whomever the other participant was. The confederate told the participants that she would do the same. The confederate did not say anything to those in the sincerity non-salient condition. In the second experiment, sincerity was manipulated by telling participants that another participant had formed an impression of them, and the impression was either that they were sincere, or sociable individuals.

Results of both experiments revealed that the low self-monitors' attitude change did not differ from the high self-monitors' attitude change. All participants conformed to the confederate's attitudes regardless of self-monitoring level. Kim (2005) suspected that the manipulations of sincerity did not have the intended effects. Because there were no manipulation checks included, it is unclear whether participants noticed the manipulations or not. Kim (2005) also suggested that participants reacted the way they did because they had expected to meet the confederate and were anticipating having to discuss their attitudes with the confederate. Kim (2005) believed that had these methodological issues been corrected, results may have been different.

### Being Sincere versus Appearing Sincere

Gangestad and Snyder (2000) stated, "...as much as high self-monitors are concerned with constructing social images, low self-monitors may be equally motivated to establish and protect reputations of being earnest and sincere, with no desire (or perhaps even ability) to construct what they perceive as false images of themselves. Only by fostering such reputations can low self-monitors effectively inhabit social worlds in which the public faces that they and their partners display authentically represent inner reality" (p. 533).

Gangestad and Snyder (2000), in their most recent review of the self-monitoring research, suggested that low self-monitors' motivations may relate to being sincere, as they have "no desire (or perhaps even ability) to construct what they perceive as false images of themselves," and their motivations may relate to being perceived as "earnest and sincere" as well. As Gangestad and Snyder (2000) pointed out, being sincere and wanting to be perceived as sincere, are not mutually exclusive goals. However, when referring to the motivation of *appearing* to be sincere, I am not referring to wanting to be perceived as sincere, when being sincere. I am referring to *constructed* images, like those displayed by low self-monitors as a result of the public versus private manipulations. Low self-monitors' reaction to public versus private evaluation provides evidence that low self-monitors do not merely want others to perceive them as sincere because they are indeed sincere. The public versus private manipulation research suggests that low self-monitors are motivated to appear sincere, and will do so by *constructing* images of themselves as principled individuals, much like the high self-monitors construct social images, but, perhaps with different contents.



For this reason, the present study distinguished between the goals of being sincere, and appearing to be sincere as a false constructed image. Low self-monitors had to choose between being perceived as sincere, even if that required being insincere, OR being sincere, even if that required being perceived as insincere; that way the two goals could not be achieved simultaneously.

By having low self-monitors choose one way or the other, the importance of appearing sincere to the low self-monitor was isolated. My research attempted to answer the question that the experimenters of the public/private manipulation studies asked. Are low self-monitors, like highs, motivated to appear a certain way? Did they forego being sincere in order to appear to be sincere?

The main study and the pilot study were 2 (Self-Monitoring: High/Low) x 2 (Similarity: Similar/Dissimilar) x 2 (Goal Condition: Sincere/Compatible) between subject designs. In both studies, participants believed that they would be partaking in an impression formation situation with an attractive opposite sex participant whom they found out had similar or dissimilar opinions from them. All participants were given an idea of how they could make a favorable impression on this attractive opposite sex participant. For half of the participants, the attractive opposite sex participant expressed a preference for meeting people who were sincere, but believed that people were not being sincere when in acquaintanceship situations they expressed similar attitudes to him/her. Therefore to make a favorable impression, the truly similar participants would have had to *appear* as sincere by *appearing not* to be as similar to the other participant as they actually were. For the other half of the participants, the attractive opposite sex participant expressed a preference for meeting people who were compatible with, or had similar

attitudes to him/her. Therefore, to appear as compatible to this other participant, participants must appear to have similar attitudes to him/her.

It was predicted that whereas high self-monitors would be more likely to conform to the other's preferences in both the compatible and the sincere conditions, low self-monitors would be likely to do so only in the sincere conditions (see Table 1 for predictions). Specifically, if low self-monitors are concerned about appearing sincere, they would be likely to shift their attitudes in the sincere condition when their attitudes are similar to the other participants'.

Table 1

*Predictions of Shift in Attitudes as a Function of Self-Monitoring, Goal Condition and Similarity Level in Accordance with the Hypothesis that Low Self-Monitors want to Appear to be Sincere*

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	Low Self-Monitors		High Self-Monitors	
	Sincere	Compatible	Sincere	Compatible
Similar	Away from J	No Change	Away from J	No Change
Dissimilar	No Change	No Change	No Change	Towards J

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*Note:* This table displays shifts in the participants' attitudes from the first completion of the opinion questionnaire to the second, and the direction of the shifts in relation to the other participant's attitudes.

## **Chapter 2: Pilot Study**

The goal of the pilot study was to make sure that the goal condition manipulation was being noticed by participants, that the other participant was perceived to be a likeable and attractive person, and that the procedure was running smoothly.

### Method

*Participants.* The participants were all students from the University of Maryland, College Park who were participating in the psychology subject pool. They received course credit for their participation. There were 39 participants, 8 males and 31 females, ranging in age from 18-29, with an average age of 19.62. Participants were racially diverse: 23 were white and 16 were non-white, 19 were in a relationship while 20 were not, and 35 of the 39 participants identified as heterosexual.

High self-monitors (those with scores of 13 and above on the Self-Monitoring Scale) and low self-monitors (those with scores of 7 and below on the Self-Monitoring Scale) were pre-selected and were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions created by the similarity and goal condition variables.

*Materials.* Self-Monitoring Scale- Snyder and Gangestad's (1986), 18-item Self-Monitoring Scale was used. Participants must respond True or False to each item (see Appendix A-1).

Personality Profiles- The personality profile (see Appendix A-2 and 3) was the form on which the other participant revealed information about him/herself. The experimenter completed this form in a manner intended to make the other participant seem likeable and attractive. The form was also used to manipulate the goal condition variable. In the "comfort level in social situations" section, the other participant indicated liking for

someone who was either compatible or sincere. There were two separate profiles: one for a female other participant and one for a male other participant.

Opinion Questionnaire- An opinion questionnaire was created based on Kim's (2005) opinion questionnaire. There were 10 items, all of which were answered using a 10-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (10) (see Appendix A-4).

Commitment Questionnaire- This questionnaire was a follow-up to the opinion questionnaire, and asked participants how committed they were to their position on each individual item from the opinion questionnaire (see Appendix A-5). Each question was answered using a 10-point Likert scale ranging from not at all (1) to extremely (10). This questionnaire allowed participants to express agreement or disagreement with the other participant in a more subtle way than the opinion questionnaire did.

Impression Formation Questionnaire- This questionnaire was used to check on the goal condition manipulation, to see if the other participant was perceived to be likeable and attractive, and to collect demographic information from the participants (see Appendix A-6).

*Procedure.* At the beginning of the semester, participants completed the 18-item Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) and the opinion questionnaire. These questionnaires were completed in a different setting, with no apparent connection to the experimental session, and took place anywhere from two weeks to three months prior to that session.

When the participants arrived at the lab, the experimenter delivered the cover story, telling participants that they and an opposite sex participant would be forming

impressions of each other; they would each receive information about the other. It was made very clear that there would be no opportunity for a face-to-face interaction (for detailed cover story/instruction sheet see Appendix A-7). The experimenter told participants that they would be asked to evaluate each other based on the other's attitudes on certain issues, though one of the participants would also receive personal information about the other. They were told that who would learn the personal information about the other would be decided based on a lottery. The lottery was rigged and participants always ended up being the one who would get the personal information about the other.

Thus, the experimenter told them, the other participant, who was allegedly in the room next door, would be asked to complete the personality profile. The experimenter came back about five minutes later and gave participants the other's personality profile.

On this profile, the other participant was described as a fun, attractive, likeable, single female named Sarah or male named Jason (see personality profiles in Appendix A-2 and 3). Aside from describing the other participant's appearance and personality, the personality profile manipulated the goal condition variable. In the "comfort level in social situations" section, the other participant indicated liking for someone who was either compatible or sincere. For those in the sincere condition, the other participants wrote that they are comfortable in social situations, though they tend to get along better with people whose views and interests are different from theirs. They said that they like when people speak their minds, even when they see things differently. For those in the compatible condition, the other participants wrote that they are comfortable in social situations, though they tend to get along better with people whose views and interests are similar to theirs. They said that they like it when they have a lot in common with people.

The experimenter gave the participant a few minutes to look over the other participant's personality profile, and then came back to the room with the other participant's already completed opinion questionnaire. Participants were told that while they were reviewing the personality profile, the other participant already completed the opinion questionnaire, and that they would be completing their responses on the same sheet as the other's responses so that they could compare opinions before forming impressions of each other. They were told that when they were done, the other participant would see their responses.

Sarah/Jason's responses to the opinion questionnaire, for those in the similar condition, were exactly the same responses as those that the participants had given on the opinion questionnaire the first time they completed it, prior to the experimental session. Sarah/Jason's responses, for those in the dissimilar condition, were 5 scale points away from the participants' opinion given on the opinion questionnaire the first time they completed it, prior to the experimental session.

After participants completed the opinion questionnaire, the experimenter copied their responses from the opinion questionnaire onto the commitment questionnaire, which asked participants to rate how committed they were to their position on each item (see Appendix A-5). After they completed this questionnaire, participants received the impression formation questionnaire (see Appendix A-6). The experimenter made it clear to participants that the other participant would not be seeing their responses to either the commitment questionnaire or the impression formation questionnaire. The participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation (see Appendix A-8).

## Results and Discussion

*Changes made as a result of conducting the pilot study.* As a result of conducting the pilot study, the following changes were made: information was added to the cover story to make it more believable to the participants; real confederates were used as the “other participant”; only females were used as participants; the information conveyed on the personality profile, including the manipulation, was changed; adjectives used to rate the other participant were modified; the opinion questionnaire was modified from 10 items to 5 items and from a 10-point Likert scale to a dichotomous scale. The reasons for these changes are described below.

*Cover story and confederates.* I learned from the pilot study that information needed to be added to the cover story and that confederates needed to be used in order to make the cover story more believable to participants. Before debriefing the participants, a suspicion check was run, and the majority of the participants guessed that there really was no other participant. The majority of the participants did say that they responded “as if” there really were another participant, though they did not fully believe that another person was there. It was necessary to make changes in order to convince participants that there was another participant present (see Appendix B-5 for modified instruction sheet and cover story).

*Female participants.* Only 8 out of the 39 participants in the pilot study were male. The imbalance present in the pilot study reflects an overall imbalance present in the subject pool. I had no reason to believe that the proportions would have been any different during the experiment. Because of the disproportion it would have been impractical to collect enough data to allow for a comparison between males and females.



In addition, separate personality profiles were necessary for male and female participants, as the other participant was supposed to be someone of the opposite sex. Because separate profiles were created it is possible that different perceptions of the other participant by the male versus female participants could have been created. Any possible differences in perception would have been difficult to interpret, as they could have been due to the stimulus material or to differences in perception by males versus females in general.

*The personality profile and the manipulation.* As only females were going to be participants in the experiment, the male profile (Jason) was kept and modified. Instead of writing that he was a psychology major I changed it to a psychology and business major. I chose to make him a business major as well because business is perceived to be a more masculine major than psychology (Beyer, 1999) and I believed this would increase the perception of his intelligence (intelligence from pilot study:  $M=6.74$ ,  $SD= 1.31$ ). In addition, from an evolutionary perspective, women prefer men with higher income (Buunk, Dukstra, Fetchenhauser, & Kenrick, 2002) and I believed that business as a major would be associated with wealth and would make Jason seem more desirable. Instead of writing that Jason was “fun and outgoing” I changed it to “kind and outgoing”, to increase the perception of his kindness (kindness from pilot study:  $M= 6.36$ ,  $SD= 1.77$ ). Instead of writing that he was “unattached at the moment” I changed it to “single”, as some participants expressed that they did not believe the phrasing to come from a college student.

The goal manipulations needed to be modified as well. On the impression formation questionnaire, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which certain

qualities were important to Sarah/Jason when she/he forms personal relationships with others. I examined whether sincerity was perceived to be more important to Sarah/Jason by those in the sincere condition than those in the compatible condition, and whether the compatibility was perceived to be more important to Sarah/Jason by those in the compatible condition than those in the sincere condition. I also checked within each goal condition to see if participants perceived that the goal provided to them was more important to Sarah/Jason than the goal provided in the other goal condition.

I conducted a 2(Self-Monitoring: High/Low) x 2 (Goal Condition: Sincere/Compatible) x 2 (Similarity: Similar/Dissimilar) x 2 (Trait: Sincerity/Compatibility) repeated-measures ANOVA. All post hoc tests were employed using Sidak adjustments. There was a significant Goal Condition x Trait interaction,  $F(1, 31) = 39.64, p < .01$ , indicating that those in the different goal conditions perceived the importance of sincerity to Sarah/Jason to be different than the importance of compatibility to Sarah/Jason.

When comparing means, it became clear that there was no significant difference in the perception of importance of sincerity to Sarah/Jason between those who were in the sincere condition ( $M = 7.43, SE = .40$ ) and those who were in the compatible condition ( $M = 6.88, SE = .36$ ),  $F(1, 31) = 1.04, p = .32$ . Those within the sincere condition perceived that sincerity ( $M = 7.43, SE = .40$ ) was significantly more important to Sarah/Jason than compatibility ( $M = 4.30, SE = .46$ ),  $F(1, 31) = 24.79, p < .01$ , however, because the perception of importance of sincerity to Sarah/Jason did not differ based on goal condition, the sincerity manipulation had to be strengthened (see Table 2 for summary of means).

There was a significant difference in the perception of importance of compatibility to Sarah/Jason between those who were in the compatible condition ( $M=9.03, SE=.41$ ) and those who were in the sincere condition ( $M=4.30, SE=.46$ ),  $F(1, 31)=58.57, p<.01$ . Those within the compatible condition perceived that compatibility ( $M=9.03, SE=.41$ ) was significantly more important to Sarah/Jason than sincerity ( $M=6.88, SE=.36$ ). Although the compatibility manipulation was effective, the sincerity manipulation was not (see Table 2 for summary of means).

Table 2

*Pilot Study: Summary of Means for the Goal Condition Manipulation*

	Sincerity		Compatibility	
	Mean	Standard Error	Mean	Standard Error
Sincere Goal Condition	7.43	.40	4.30	.46
Compatible Goal Condition	6.88	.36	9.03	.41

In addition, there was a Self-Monitoring x Trait interaction,  $F(1, 31)=7.51, p=.01$ , indicating that those with different self-monitoring levels perceived the importance of sincerity to Sarah/Jason to be different than the importance of compatibility to Sarah/Jason. There were significant differences in the perceived importance of sincerity between high and low self-monitors,  $F(1, 31)=7.23, p=.011$ , with the ratings of sincerity being significantly higher for high self-monitors ( $M=7.88, SE=.33$ ) than for low self-

monitors ( $M= 6.43, SE= .42$ ). There were no significant differences in the ratings of compatibility,  $p= .18$ . High self-monitors reported that sincerity was more important than did low self-monitors. High self-monitors reported that sincerity was significantly more important than compatibility,  $F(1, 31)= 9.97, p< .01$ , whereas low self-monitors did not report a significant difference between the two,  $p=.32$ . These results were not expected, and, again, indicated that the manipulations for both sincerity and compatibility had to be strengthened.

I modified the wording on the personality profile to make the goal stand out and be clearer to each participant. In addition, I provided an explanation of how Jason is able to perceive whether someone possesses the trait of sincerity or compatibility. On the new personality profile (see Appendix B-1) I added the question, “When you meet someone new, what is the most important quality to you in this person you are becoming acquainted with?” Those in the sincere condition respond: “For them to be sincere,” and those in the compatible condition respond: “For them to be compatible.” This way the goal is made very clear to the participant. Jason then explains how he knows whether someone possesses those characteristics. For sincere it says, “I can tell that people are being sincere when they tell me what they believe even if they don’t think I’ll agree with them, and may debate them on it. If someone agrees with me too much I get suspicious.” For compatible it says, “I can tell that people are compatible with me if they have similar interests and opinions to me, and if we just have a lot in common.”

*Impression formation questionnaire.* I slightly modified the impression formation questionnaire. During the pilot study participants were asked to rate the other participant’s physical attractiveness, friendliness, intelligence and kindness. The modified

version added in likeability. The purpose of the personality profile was to convey how likeable the other participant was, and it was important to know whether the participants perceived him to be a likeable person.

*Opinion questionnaire.* The final modification that resulted from conducting the pilot study was that of the dependent measure. The opinion questionnaire included 10 items, each with a 10- point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (10). After conducting the pilot study, the dependent measure was modified to a five item questionnaire, each item utilizing a dichotomous (agree/disagree) scale.

When receiving feedback from participants, those in the similar condition made it clear that they thought it was strange that the other participant had similar attitudes to them on all of the items. In addition, there were difficulties associated with computing the dependent variable.

When designing the pilot study, my intention was for the dependent variable to measure the average of the absolute value of shift of attitudes from the first time participants completed the opinion questionnaire (pre-experimental session) to the second (during the session). The goal was to compare differences in attitude shift based on Self-Monitoring (High/Low) x Goal Condition (Sincere/Compatible) x Similarity (Similar/Dissimilar), believing that, according to my predictions, any shifts for those in the similar condition would be away from Sarah/Jason's responses and any shifts for those in the dissimilar condition would be towards Sarah/Jason's responses. There was no conceptual reason to believe that shifts other than those predicted, would take place. However, those in the similar condition could *only* shift away from Sarah/Jason's attitudes (as Sarah/Jason's attitudes were the same as the participant's original

responses), whereas those in the dissimilar condition had the option of shifting even further away from Sarah/Jason's attitudes, or shifting beyond Sarah/Jason's attitudes, depending on their original responses (as Sarah/Jason's attitudes were 5 scale points away from the participant's original responses). When reviewing participants' opinion questionnaires it became clear that there were more than a few responses that were in unexpected directions. As a result, looking at the absolute value of shift of attitudes was not possible, and an improved dependent measure was required.

By switching to a dichotomous scale, participants either kept their attitude or they changed their attitude on each item, allowing for a more simple comparison of participants' responses. Any shifts of attitude for those in the similar condition would be away from the other participant, whereas any shifts of attitude for those in the dissimilar condition would be towards the other participant. Half of the items were also eliminated from the questionnaire in order to decrease suspicion in participants. Having the same five attitudes as another participant on a dichotomous scale seems more plausible and less suspicious than having exactly the same attitudes as another individual on ten items each on a 10-point Likert scale.

*Commitment questionnaire.* I conducted a 2(Self-Monitoring: High/Low) x 2 (Goal Condition: Sincere/Compatible) x 2 (Similarity: Similar/Dissimilar) between subjects ANOVA, with the dependent variable being the average of the participant's commitment to his/her responses to the ten items from the opinion questionnaire. All post hoc tests were employed using Sidak adjustments. Though there were no interactions, there was a marginal main effect of similarity, with those in the similar condition ( $M=7.80$ ,  $SD=.33$ ) being marginally more committed to their responses than those in the

dissimilar condition ( $M= 6.89$ ,  $SD= .37$ ),  $F (1, 31)= 3.38$ ,  $p= .08$ . No changes were made to the commitment questionnaire, and this trend was further examined during the experiment.

## Chapter 3: Experiment

### Method

*Participants.* The participants were all female students from the University of Maryland, College Park who were participating in the psychology subject pool. They received course credit for their participation. There were 183 participants. Data from two participants had to be dropped because they did not complete all of the responses on the opinion questionnaire. Data from four others had to be dropped because they guessed that there was no other participant, and had questioned the experimenters about it during the experimental session. The one participant who identified as gay was also dropped from the experiment, as participants were in an impression formation situation with someone of the opposite sex, and it seemed plausible that sexual orientation might affect liking for the other participant. There were 176 females, ranging in age from 18-22, with an average age of 19.28. Participants were racially diverse: 120 were white and 54 were non-white (2 chose not to report their race), 62 participants were in a relationship while 114 were not, and 167 of the 176 participants identified as heterosexual. Two participants identified as bisexual, two identified as unsure, and two chose not to report their sexual orientation.

High self-monitors (those with scores of 12 and above on the Self-Monitoring Scale) and low self-monitors (those with scores of 8 and below on the Self-Monitoring Scale) were pre-selected and were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions created by the similarity and goal condition variables.

Originally I had selected those with scores of 13 and above, and 7 and below. This was based on Snyder's criteria for *extreme* high and low self-monitors (1986, p.



181). However, because of the difficulty of recruiting participants, and because of Snyder's (1986) belief that "a split (for high and low self-monitors) between scores of 10 and 11 would be a reasonable guideline for research using North American college students," (p. 181) I extended the pre-selection to include the scores of 12 and 8. Of the female subject pool from which participants were selected, 39.4% scored an eight and below, and 27.4% scored a 12 and above.

*Materials.* Self-Monitoring Scale- Snyder and Gangestad's (1986), 18-item Self-Monitoring Scale was used. Participants must respond True or False to each item (see Appendix A-1).

Personality Profile- The personality profile (see Appendix B-1) was the form on which the other participant revealed information about himself. The experimenter completed this form in a manner intended to make the other participant seem likeable and attractive. The form was also used to manipulate the goal condition variable. The other participant directly states that the most important quality in someone he is becoming acquainted with is either "For them to be sincere" or "For them to be compatible," and indicates how he knows whether someone possesses that quality.

Opinion Questionnaire- An opinion questionnaire was created based on Kim's (2005) opinion questionnaire. There were five items, all of which were answered using a dichotomous agree/disagree scale (see Appendix B-2).

Commitment Questionnaire- This questionnaire was a follow-up to the opinion questionnaire, and asked participants how committed they were to their position on each individual item from the opinion questionnaire (see Appendix B-3). Each question was answered using a 10-point Likert scale ranging from not at all (1) to extremely (10). This

questionnaire allowed participants to express agreement or disagreement with the other participant in a more subtle way than the opinion questionnaire did.

Impression Formation Questionnaire- This questionnaire was used to check on the goal condition manipulation, to see if the other participant was perceived to be likeable and attractive, and to collect demographic information from the participants (see Appendix B-4).

*Procedure.* At the beginning of the semester, participants completed the 18-item Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) and the opinion questionnaire. These questionnaires were completed in a different setting, with no apparent connection to the experimental session, and took place anywhere from two weeks to three months prior to that session.

When the participants arrived at the lab, the experimenter told them that once the other participant would show up, the experiment could start. While the experimenter was giving the participant a consent form, the male confederate (who was supposedly the other participant, Jason) knocked on the door. The experimenter opened the door a crack so that the participant could see that there was a male at the door, but could not see what he looked like. The confederate said, “Hey, I’m here for the experiment,” and the experimenter responded with “Ok have a seat in the hallway and I’ll be right with you.” The experimenter then turned to the participant and said “Now that he’s here I can get you both started. I’ll be right back.”

The experimenter delivered the cover story, telling participants that they and an opposite sex participant would be forming impressions of each other; they would each receive information about the other. It was made very clear that there would be no

opportunity for a face-to-face interaction (for detailed cover story/instruction sheet see Appendix B-5). The experimenter told participants that they would be asked to evaluate each other based on the other's attitudes on certain issues, and that one of the participants would also receive personal information about the other. They were told that who would learn the personal information about the other would be decided based on a lottery. The lottery was rigged and participants always ended up being the person who would get the personal information about the other.

Thus, the experimenter told them, the other participant, who was allegedly in the room next door, would be asked to complete the personality profile. The experimenter came back about five minutes later and gave participants the other's personality profile.

On this profile, the other participant was described as an attractive, likeable and single male named Jason (see personality profile in Appendix B- 1). Aside from describing the other participant's appearance and personality, the personality profile manipulated the goal condition variable. The other participant had been asked on the personality profile, "When you meet someone new, what is the most important quality to you in this person you are becoming acquainted with?" For those in the sincere condition his response was "For them to be sincere," and explained that he knows when someone is being sincere "when they tell me what they believe even if they don't think I'll agree with them, and may debate them on it. If someone agrees with me too much I get suspicious." For those in the compatible condition his response was "For them to be compatible," and explained that he knows when someone is compatible with him "if they have similar interests and opinions to me, and if we just have a lot in common."

The experimenter gave the participant a few minutes to look over Jason's personality profile, and then came back to the room with Jason's already completed opinion questionnaire. Participants were told that while they were reviewing the personality profile, Jason already completed the opinion questionnaire, and that they would be completing their responses on the same sheet as his responses so that they could compare opinions before forming impressions of each other. They were told that when they were done, Jason would see their responses.

Jason's responses to the opinion questionnaire, for those in the similar condition, were the five same responses as those that the participants had given on the opinion questionnaire the first time they completed it, prior to the experimental session. Jason's responses, for those in the dissimilar condition, on the same five items, were opposite to the responses that the participants had given on the opinion questionnaire the first time they completed it, prior to the experimental session.

After participants completed the opinion questionnaire, the experimenter copied their responses from the opinion questionnaire onto the commitment questionnaire, which asked participants to rate how committed they were to their position on each item (see Appendix B-3). After they completed this questionnaire, participants received the impression formation questionnaire (see Appendix B- 4). The experimenter made it clear to participants that the other participant would not be seeing their responses to either the commitment questionnaire or the impression formation questionnaire. The participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation (see Appendix A-8).

## Results

*Manipulation check.* On the impression formation questionnaire, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which certain qualities were important to Jason when he forms personal relationships with others. I examined whether sincerity was perceived to be more important to Jason by those in the sincere condition than those in the compatible condition, and whether the compatibility was perceived to be more important to Jason by those in the compatible condition than those in the sincere condition. In addition, within each goal condition I tested whether participants perceived that the goal provided to them was more important to Jason than the goal provided in the other goal condition.

I conducted a 2(Self-Monitoring: High/Low) x 2 (Goal Condition: Sincere/Compatible) x 2 (Similarity: Similar/Dissimilar) x 2 (Trait: Sincerity/Compatibility) repeated-measures ANOVA. All post hoc tests were employed using Sidak adjustments. There was a significant Goal Condition (Sincere/Compatible) x Trait (Sincerity/Compatibility) interaction,  $F(1, 168)=336.95$ ,  $p < .01$ , indicating that those in the different goal conditions perceived the importance of sincerity to Jason to be different than the importance of compatibility to Jason.

Those in the sincere condition ( $M= 9.76$ ,  $SE= .12$ ) perceived that sincerity was significantly more important to Jason than did those in the compatible condition ( $M= 7.65$ ,  $SE= .12$ ),  $F(1, 168)= 154.90$ ,  $p < .01$ . Those within the sincere condition also perceived that sincerity ( $M=9.76$ ,  $SE= .12$ ) was significantly more important to Jason than compatibility ( $M= 6.17$ ,  $SE= .17$ ),  $F(1, 168)= 296.1$ ,  $p < .01$ . Those in the compatible condition ( $M=9.46$ ,  $SE=.17$ ) perceived that compatibility was significantly more important to Jason than did those in the sincere condition ( $M= 6.17$ ,  $SE=.17$ ),  $F(1,$

168)=193.59 ,  $p < .01$ . Those within the compatible condition also perceived that compatibility ( $M=9.46$ ,  $SE=.17$ ) was significantly more important to Jason than sincerity ( $M= 7.65$ ,  $SE= .12$ ),  $F(1, 168)=76.29$  ,  $p < .01$ . The manipulations of sincerity and compatibility were clearly effective (see Table 3 for summary of means; see Tables 4 and 5 for ratings of each quality by goal condition).

Table 3

*Experimental Study: Summary of Means for the Goal Condition Manipulation*

	Sincerity		Compatibility	
	Mean	Standard Error	Mean	Standard Error
Sincere Goal Condition	9.76	.12	6.17	.17
Compatible Goal Condition	7.65	.12	9.46	.17

Table 4

*Trait Ratings: Sincere Goal Condition*

Trait	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Sincerity	87	6	10	9.76	.66
Compatibility	87	1	10	6.18	2.02
Humor	87	3	10	6.81	1.36
Intelligence	87	4	10	7.33	1.33
Extraversion	87	4	10	7.43	1.44

Table 5

*Trait Ratings: Compatible Goal Condition*

Trait	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Compatibility	89	5	10	9.46	.94
Sincerity	89	4	10	7.64	1.42
Humor	89	2	10	7.24	1.51
Intelligence	89	3	10	7.11	1.46
Extraversion	89	4	10	7.93	1.28

However, there was also a significant Self-Monitoring x Similarity x Trait interaction,  $F(1, 168) = 5.55, p = .02$ . Low self-monitors in both the similar,  $F(1, 168) = 5.30, p = .02$ , and dissimilar conditions,  $F(1, 168) = 16.14, p < .01$ , rated sincerity as significantly more important than compatibility. High self-monitors in the similar condition rated sincerity as significantly more important than compatibility,  $F(1, 168) = 18.47, p < .01$ , whereas those in the dissimilar condition did not significantly differ,  $p = .15$ . Overall, sincerity was perceived by all to be more important than compatibility, with the exception being high self-monitors in the dissimilar condition who did not perceive a difference in importance between the two. Conceptually, it is not clear why this took place. As this interaction did not involve the goal condition variable, this interaction does not provide information regarding how the manipulation worked. The sincerity and compatibility manipulations were still clearly effective, as participants responded to the manipulation in the intended manner.

*Perception of the other participant (Jason).* On the impression formation questionnaire, participants were asked to rate Jason on a list of traits. Participants gave their perception of Jason's physical attractiveness, likeability, friendliness, intelligence and kindness. A principle components analysis with a varimax rotation showed that the traits loaded into one factor which accounted for 58% of the variance. Likeability loaded the strongest at .90, followed by kindness (.84), intelligence (.79), friendliness (.74) and attractiveness (.48), therefore the five traits were averaged into one factor called total likeability. In addition, a reliability analysis showed that the trait ratings correlated highly with each other,  $\alpha = .81$ . Participants reported Jason's total likeability to be  $M = 7.70, SD = 1.09$ . For separate ratings of each trait see Table 6.



Table 6

*Perceptions of the Other Participant*

Trait	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard deviation
Attractive	176	1	10	7.00	1.42
Likeable	176	2	10	7.97	1.43
Friendly	176	5	10	8.26	1.18
Intelligent	176	2	10	7.48	1.58
Kind	176	2	10	7.80	1.63
Total Likeability	176	3.8	10	7.70	1.09

Because all of the participants were in an impression formation situation with someone of the opposite sex, it seemed plausible that participants' dating status could have affected their liking for Jason, therefore, I examined the main effect and first order interactions for dating status. I also examined the main effect and first order interactions for the race of the participants, as race may have affected the perception of Jason.

A 2(Self-Monitoring: High/Low) x 2 (Goal Condition: Sincere/Compatible) x 2 (Similarity: Similar/Dissimilar) between subjects ANOVA with total likeability as the dependent variable was conducted. All post hoc tests were employed using Sidak adjustments. Race and dating status, as main effects, as well as the first order interactions

for race and dating status were included in a preliminary analysis to see if they influenced the liking of Jason.

There was a main effect of race, with non-white participants ( $M= 7.99, SE= .16$ ) liking Jason significantly more than white participants did ( $M=7.48, SE= .11$ ),  $F(1, 158)= 6.79, p= .01$ . Conceptually, it is not clear why non-white participants liked Jason more, as Jason's race and any facial features indicating race were not included on the personality profile. In addition, confederates were told to speak quickly and using a deep voice, which was done in order to prevent participants from being able to guess the confederate's race from the voice. Even though there was a main effect associated with race, there were no interactions between race and the main independent variables, and this main effect did not influence how low self-monitors or high self-monitors were affected by the similarity level condition or the goal condition that they were in. This main effect had no bearing on the possible theoretical explanations for the predictions.

There was a significant interaction between Self-Monitoring (High/Low) x Dating (Single/Not single),  $F(1, 158)= 8.10, p<.01$ . Low self-monitors did not significantly differ in their liking for Jason based on their dating status,  $p=.36$ , whereas high self-monitors did. High self-monitors who were single ( $M= 8.10, SE= .17$ ) liked Jason significantly more than those who were not single ( $M= 7.26, SE=.25$ ),  $F(1, 158)=8.50, p<.01$ . It is possible that high self-monitors picked up on the cue that this first impression situation, where an attractive, likeable, single, opposite sex participant would be forming an impression of them, could mimic that of a potential dating scenario, and perceived Jason to be a possible romantic interest. Therefore the single participants may have liked him more because he was single and available to them. His positive qualities may not

have mattered as much to non-single participants, as he was not a potential romantic interest for them. The low self-monitors may not have differed in their liking for Jason based on dating status because they may not have picked up on the potential cue.

Race and dating status were removed from the analysis, as these variables did not lead to theoretically relevant results and were not part of the hypothesis. The liking for Jason was tested using the 2(Self-Monitoring: High/Low) x 2 (Goal Condition: Sincere/Compatible) x 2 (Similarity: Similar/Dissimilar) between subjects ANOVA. The perception of Jason did not vary by main independent variables of self-monitoring, similarity, or goal condition, as there were no main effects or interactions involving those variables.

*Dependent Measure.* The dependent measure was calculated by finding the sum of the absolute value of shift of attitudes from the first time participants completed the opinion questionnaire (pre-experimental session) to the second (during the session). When movement took place in the similar condition, any movement had to be away from Jason's attitudes. When movement took place in the dissimilar condition, any movement had to be towards Jason's attitudes.

It was predicted that whereas high self-monitors would be more likely to conform to the other's preferences in both the compatible and the sincere conditions, low self-monitors would be likely to do so only in the sincere conditions (see Table 1 for predictions). If low self-monitors were concerned about appearing sincere, they would be likely to shift their attitudes in the sincere condition when their attitudes were similar to Jason's. There were no predicted shifts for low self-monitors who were in the sincere condition and dissimilar from Jason, or for low self-monitors who were in the compatible

condition. High self-monitors in the compatible condition were predicted to conform to Jason's preferences by shifting towards Jason's attitudes when their attitudes were dissimilar from his, though not shifting attitudes when their attitudes were similar to his. High self-monitors in the sincere condition were predicted to conform to Jason's preferences by shifting away from Jason's attitudes when their attitudes were similar to his, though not shifting attitudes when their attitudes were dissimilar from his.

A 2(Self-Monitoring: High/Low) x 2 (Goal Condition: Sincere/Compatible) x 2 (Similarity: Similar/Dissimilar) between subjects ANOVA was conducted (see Table 7). The mean of the attitude shifts was  $M= 1.65$ ,  $SD= 1.27$ , and the distribution of the attitude shifts approximated normality. All post hoc tests were employed using Sidak adjustments. The main effects and first order interactions for race and dating status were included in a preliminary analysis, to see if they influenced attitude shifts as well.

There was a significant main effect of race,  $F(1, 158)= 4.41$ ,  $p=.04$ , with non-white participants ( $M=1.91$ ,  $SE= .14$ ) shifting their attitudes significantly more than white participants ( $M= 1.58$ ,  $SE= .09$ ). Even though there was a main effect associated with race, there were no interactions between race and the main independent variables, and this main effect did not influence how low self-monitors or high self-monitors were affected by the similarity level condition or the goal condition that they were in. There was also a significant Similarity (Similar/Dissimilar) x Dating (Single/Not single) interaction,  $F(1, 158)= 6.54$ ,  $p=.01$ . Those in the similar condition shifted their attitudes significantly more when they were not single ( $M= 1.14$ ,  $SE= .19$ ) than when they were single ( $M= .63$ ,  $SE= .12$ ),  $F(1, 158)= 5.24$ ,  $p=.02$ . In the dissimilar condition, non-significant trends suggested that those who were single ( $M=2.73$ ,  $SE=.14$ ) shifted more

than those who were not single ( $M=2.48, SE=.17$ ). Those who were single were more hesitant to shift their attitudes away from Jason's than those who were not. These results for race and dating status are not relevant to the theoretical ideas under consideration.

Race and dating status were removed from the analysis, as these variables did not lead to theoretically relevant results and were not part of the hypothesis. The predictions were tested using the 2(Self-Monitoring: High/Low) x 2 (Goal Condition: Sincere/Compatible) x 2 (Similarity: Similar/Dissimilar) between subjects ANOVA.

The hypothesized three way interaction was not significant,  $F(1, 168)=.19, p=.66$ , meaning that high and low self-monitors' Similarity x Goal Condition interactions displayed similar patterns, and did not differ significantly from each other (see Table 7).

Table 7

*Shift in Attitudes as a Function of Self-Monitoring, Goal Condition and Similarity Level*

	Low Self-Monitors				High Self-Monitors			
	Sincere		Compatible		Sincere		Compatible	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Similar	.87	.76	.71	.75	1.05	.94	.42	.61
Dissimilar	2.27	1.08	2.73	1.19	2.36	.95	2.60	.88

*Note:* Higher values reflect greater attitude shifts.

There was a significant main effect of similarity level,  $F(1, 168)=153.67, p<.01, \eta^2=.48$ , with those in the dissimilar condition ( $M=2.49, SE=.10$ ) shifting their attitudes

significantly more than those in the similar condition ( $M = .76, SE = .10$ ). There was also a significant Similarity (Similar/Dissimilar) x Goal Condition (Sincere/ Compatible) interaction,  $F(1, 168) = 7.07, p = .01, \eta^2 = .04$ , with those in the similar condition shifting significantly more when the goal was to be sincere ( $M = .96, SE = .14$ ) than when the goal was to be compatible ( $M = .57, SE = .14$ ),  $F(1, 168) = 3.92, p < .05$ , whereas those in the dissimilar condition shifted marginally more when the goal was to be compatible ( $M = 2.67, SE = .14$ ) than when the goal was to be sincere ( $M = 2.32, SE = .14$ ),  $F(1, 168) = 3.17, p = .08$ . It is important to note, that when conducting the same three-way interaction on extremely high and low self-monitors (14 and above, and 6 and below) the results remained the same.

Even though the three-way interaction was not significant, because I was interested in examining low self-monitors' self-presentation behaviors, I examined the simple Similarity (Similar/Dissimilar) x Goal Condition (Sincere/Compatible) interaction at each level of self-monitoring. When examining low self-monitors only, the interaction was not significant,  $F(1, 168) = 2.68, p > .05$ , though there was a significant main effect of similarity,  $F(1, 168) = 81.66, p < .01$ , with those in the dissimilar condition ( $M = 2.50, SE = .13$ ) shifting significantly more than those in the similar condition ( $M = .79, SE = .13$ ). In addition, low self-monitors in the dissimilar condition shifted marginally more towards Jason when in the compatible goal condition ( $M = 2.73, SE = .18$ ) than when in the sincere goal condition ( $M = 2.27, SE = .20$ ),  $F(1, 168) = 2.95, p < .10$  (see Figure 1).

When examining high self-monitors only, the Similarity (Similar/Dissimilar) x Goal Condition (Sincere/Compatible) interaction was significant,  $F(1, 168) = 4.45, p < .05$ . High self-monitors in the similar condition shifted significantly more when the goal

was to be sincere ( $M=1.05$ ,  $SE=.21$ ) than when the goal was to be compatible ( $M=.42$ ,  $SE=.21$ ),  $F(1, 168)= 4.52$ ,  $p<.05$  (see Figure 2), whereas those in the dissimilar condition shifted more when the goal was to be compatible ( $M=2.60$ ,  $SE=.21$ ) than when the goal was to be sincere ( $M=2.36$ ,  $SE=.20$ ), though this difference was not significant,  $p> .10$ . Although the low self-monitors' attitude shifts were in the same direction as those of the high self-monitors, the high self-monitors had a significant goal condition x similarity interaction, whereas the low self-monitors did not (see Figures 1 and 2). This is consistent with the idea that high self-monitors are better at self-presentation than are low self-monitors.



*Figure 1.* The interaction of Similarity (Similar/Dissimilar) x Goal Condition (Sincere/Compatible) for Low Self-Monitors.



Figure 2. The interaction of Similarity (Similar/Dissimilar) x Goal Condition (Sincere/Compatible) for High Self-Monitors.

*Commitment level.* The commitment questionnaire was given as an extension of the dependent measure, and the predictions for this questionnaire paralleled those for the dependent measure. Participants were aware that this questionnaire was private, and this allowed them to further express agreement or disagreement with their attitudes, that were either similar to or dissimilar from Jason's.

I ran a 2(Self-Monitoring: High/Low) x 2 (Goal Condition: Sincere/Compatible) x 2 (Similarity: Similar/Dissimilar) between subjects ANOVA, with the dependent variable being the average of the participant's commitment to her responses for the five items from the opinion questionnaire. The average commitment level was  $M= 7.37$ ,  $SD= 1.07$ . All post hoc tests were employed using Sidak adjustments. As with the dependent variable, race and dating status, as main effects, as well as first order interactions for race



and dating status were included in a preliminary analysis to see if they influenced participants' commitment level to their attitudes.

There was a main effect of race,  $F(1, 158) = 5.38, p = .02$ , with non-white participants ( $M = 7.64, SE = .15$ ) committing to their attitudes significantly more than did white participants ( $M = 7.22, SE = .10$ ). Even though there was a main effect associated with race, there were no interactions between race and the main independent variables, and this main effect did not influence how low self-monitors or high self-monitors were affected by the similarity level condition or the goal condition that they were in. There was also a significant interaction of Similarity (Similar/Dissimilar) x Dating (Single/Not single),  $F(1, 158) = 5.38, p = .02$ . Those in the dissimilar condition who were not single ( $M = 7.31, SE = .19$ ) committed to their attitudes marginally more than those who were single ( $M = 6.90, SE = .16$ ),  $F(1, 158) = 3.15, p = .08$ . In the similar condition, non significant trends suggested that those who were single ( $M = 7.93, SE = .14$ ) committed to their attitudes more than those who were not single ( $M = 7.57, SE = .21$ ). These results for race and dating status are not relevant to the theoretical ideas under consideration.

Race and dating status were removed from the analysis, as these variables did not lead to theoretically relevant results and were not part of the hypothesis. Commitment level was tested using the 2(Self-Monitoring: High/Low) x 2 (Goal Condition: Sincere/Compatible) x 2 (Similarity: Similar/Dissimilar) between subjects ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of similarity level,  $F(1, 168) = 21.88, p < .01$ , with those in the similar condition ( $M = 7.73, SE = .11$ ) committing to their attitudes significantly more than those in the dissimilar condition ( $M = 7.01, SE = .11$ ).

Additionally, because the commitment questionnaire was given as an extension of the dependent measure, I correlated participant's attitude shifts with their commitment level. There was a significant negative correlation,  $r(174) = -.29, p < .01$ , between the two, demonstrating that the more participants shifted their attitudes, the less committed they were to their attitudes. This significant negative correlation was present for both high self-monitors,  $r(81) = -.32, p = .00$ , and low self-monitors,  $r(95) = -.28, p = .01$ .

### Discussion

The cover story and manipulation utilized during the experiment were successful: the sincere/compatible manipulation was effective in conveying to participants which goal condition they were in, participants believed that there was another participant in the room next door (those who did not were dropped), and Jason, the other participant, was perceived to be a likeable person. Ratings of Jason's attractiveness, likeability, friendliness, kindness and intelligence were all 7 and above on a 10-point Likert scale.

The hypothesis that high self-monitors would be likely to conform to Jason's demands in both the compatible and the sincere conditions, whereas low self-monitors would be likely to conform only in the sincere conditions was not supported. Even though the hypothesis was not supported, the findings are helpful in understanding the goal of low self-monitors.

There was evidence of self-presentation by both high and low self-monitors. There was a large main effect of similarity, accounting for 48% of the variance, demonstrating that both low and high self-monitors, regardless of goal condition, shifted their attitudes more when Jason's attitudes were different from theirs, than when their attitudes were the same. Though the great impact of the similarity variable was

unexpected, one can speculate, in light of the well known findings that similarity, especially similarity of attitudes, breeds liking in impression formation situations (Byrne, 1961; Byrne & Nelson, 1965; Byrne, 1971), that participants would want to shift towards Jason's attitudes in order to create a positive first impression, despite having been told that he likes sincere people who speak their minds.

Participants in the similar condition were also more committed to their attitudes than were those in the dissimilar condition. It is possible that those in the similar condition were more committed to their attitudes because they had their attitudes confirmed by Jason and may have therefore been more confident in their decisions, whereas those in the dissimilar condition did not have their attitudes confirmed by Jason and may have therefore been less confident in their decisions (which is consistent with Festinger's (1954) social comparison theory).

The negative correlation between commitment to attitudes and amount of attitude shift also demonstrates self-presentation by both high and low self-monitors. This correlation shows that those who shifted more may have attempted to discount their "new" attitudes by remaining less committed to them. This may indicate that those who shifted did not have a true attitude change: they may only have shifted their attitudes for the sake of creating a positive impression.

The effect of the similarity variable was moderated by the goal condition variable. There was a significant interaction between similarity level and goal condition. Both low and high self-monitors in the similar condition shifted attitudes more when the goal was to be sincere than when the goal was to be compatible, whereas low and high self-

monitors in the dissimilar condition shifted attitudes more when the goal was to be compatible than when the goal was to be sincere.

When examining the similarity x goal condition interaction separately for low and high self-monitors (see Table 7), it became clear that the interaction was significant for high self-monitors, but not for low self-monitors (see Figures 1 and 2). Although high self-monitors did not shift as predicted (see Table 1), the significant similarity x goal condition interaction shows that high self-monitors did attempt to meet the desires of Jason. This is consistent with the idea that high self-monitors are better at self-presentation than are low self-monitors. High self-monitors utilized the cue from the other participant to appear as either sincere or compatible, though they did so while still attempting to show the other participant that they were similar to him. High self-monitors in the sincere/similar condition shifted their attitudes in a way that would still allow them to maintain similarity to Jason, while attempting to appear sincere as well. Those in the compatible/similar condition knew not to shift their attitudes away from Jason.

The low self-monitors also did not shift as predicted. Like the high self-monitors, the similarity variable highly affected their attitude shifts. Unlike the high self-monitors, the similarity x goal condition interaction was not significant. The low self-monitors did not utilize the sincerity cue, though it was predicted that they would (see Table 1). Low self-monitors in the similar/sincere condition shifted their attitudes away from Jason no differently than those who were in the similar/compatible condition. Although those in the dissimilar condition did shift slightly more towards Jason when in the compatible condition than when in the sincere condition, the difference was marginal.

The effect of the similarity variable on low self-monitors was unexpected. The low self-monitors did not respond as either individuals who are motivated to appear as principled, sincere individuals, or as individuals who are motivated to be principled, sincere individuals. Although the low self-monitors did not react as expected, their responses do provide evidence that they actively present themselves (their attitude shift in the dissimilar versus similar condition), and that they are motivated to appear a certain way during interactions with others.

Kim's (2005) experiments also revealed that low self-monitors shifted their attitudes towards another participant's attitudes. In understanding why low self-monitors shifted towards the attitudes of another participant in these experiments, and in understanding why low self-monitors did not utilize the sincere/compatible manipulation cues to the degree that the high self-monitors did, it is necessary to examine the procedures of the present experiment and of Kim's (2005) experiments.

In these experiments, it was clear to participants that they were in impression formation situations, in which a likeable individual would be forming an impression of them based on their attitudes. Participants were always aware of the attitudes of the individual who would be forming an impression of them and then had to convey their attitudes to this individual by completing a questionnaire. As mentioned, the power of similarity during first impression situations may be so well-established in people's minds, that low self-monitors in the dissimilar condition were aware of the necessity to convey similarity in such situations, and knew how to do so. However, in the similar condition, when participants were given the cue to appear sincere, the high self-monitors were *able* to figure out how to strike a balance between remaining similar to Jason while still

finding a way to appear to be sincere. When given the cue to appear compatible, the high self-monitors were *able* to figure out that they should not shift their attitudes as much as those in the sincere condition. Low self-monitors in the similar/sincere condition shifted their attitudes away from Jason no differently than those who were in the similar/compatible condition. They may not have been *able* to pick up on the cue that they should not shift as much when in the compatible condition as in the sincere condition. Similarly, when low self-monitors did not conform to the social norm of the discussion groups in Snyder and Monson's (1975) study, as mentioned earlier, it is possible that this took place because low self-monitors may have been unaware of the social norm in this particular situation, and may have been *unable* to act in a similar manner to the high self-monitors.

Traditionally, low self-monitors have been viewed as individuals who are simply not high self-monitors, meaning that lows lack the motivation and ability to monitor their behavior (Snyder, 1974, 1979). However, the behavior differences between the low self-monitors and high self-monitors seem to be highly ability-based: they differ in acting ability, with high self-monitors being more likely to be better at expressing emotions on cue than low self-monitors (Snyder, 1974); they differ in "technique" when engaging in social interactions, with high self-monitors being more likely to be better than low self-monitors at focusing a conversation on their partner instead of themselves (Ickes & Barnes, 1977). High self-monitors are more likely to give off intimate greetings (Riggio, Friedman, & DiMatteo, 1981), to reciprocate intimacy and emotionality (Shaffer, Smith, & Tomarelli, 1982), to be humorous (Turner, 1980), to pace conversations (Dabbs,

Evans, Hopper, & Purvis, 1980), and to have knowledge of social rules than are low self-monitors (Riggio & Friedman, 1982).

Snyder (1987, p. 135) admits that ability precedes motivation to self-monitor (see quote below). However, the items on the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) are not meant to distinguish between the ability and motivation of an individual.

“If motivation and ability go hand in hand, then there should not be any people with motivation who lack ability. Yet, such people clearly do exist, such as those with a high need for social approval (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964)...Taken together...the person with the extraverted disposition (who may possess some high self-monitoring abilities but lack high self-monitoring motivations) and the person with the high need for social approval (who may be motivated to engage in self-monitoring but lack the self-presentational abilities to do so) suggest that, with respect to self-monitoring, ability precedes motivation.”

Even though the items on the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) are not meant to distinguish between the ability and motivation of an individual, if one closely examines the scale's items, the majority of the items seem to relate to individuals' abilities more so than their motivations: e.g., “I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people”; “I can only argue for ideas which I already believe”; “I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information”; “I would probably make a good actor”; “I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting”; “I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations”; “I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face

(if for a right end)” etc. It is highly possible that those who receive lower scores on the Self-Monitoring Scale (i.e., the low self-monitors) are more likely to be those who lack ability than those who lack motivation.

It seems that low self-monitors in the similar condition were less able to utilize the cues provided, than the high self-monitors were. However, low self-monitors in the similar condition were able to pick up on the cue that the present study was an impression formation situation, and that similarity is a positive thing when in such a situation. The low self-monitors seemed motivated to act upon this knowledge by making themselves appear to be similar to Jason. It is possible that low self-monitors did not appear to be sincere in the present study because the power of similarity during impression formation situations may have overpowered their need to appear to be sincere. It is possible that appearing sincere may be one goal that low self-monitors have, though it may not be their primary goal.

Low self-monitors’ shift of attitudes in the present study and in Kim’s (2005) studies demonstrates that they are motivated individuals, along with the studies demonstrating that they appear to be sincere (Arkin et al.,1979; Ratner & Kahn, 2002; Sigall & Doherty, unpublished document; Snyder & Tanke, 1976), and the research demonstrating that they actively construct their social worlds (Snyder, 1987; Snyder & Harkness, 1984; Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982). Low self-monitors have displayed various self-presentational motivations throughout the literature, including appearing to be sincere and appearing to be compatible. However, low self-monitors’ primary goal has yet to be established. Low self-monitors, like high self-monitors, do seem motivated to create a positive impression. It is possible that both low self-monitors and high self-



monitors attempt to create positive impressions in social interaction situations, though because their abilities differ they accomplish this in different ways: one method that low self-monitors may utilize is to appear to be sincere, though this appears not to be their only method. Low self-monitors may be just as concerned as high self-monitors are about appearing to be situationally appropriate, yet their methods of addressing this concern may differ from those of high self-monitors. It is possible that low self-monitors may not differ in motivation from high self-monitors; they may differ in ability.

Though this may be a possibility, understanding the goals of low self-monitors may not be possible without distinguishing between the ability and motivational components of the construct of self-monitoring. Future research must compare the attitude shifts of low self-monitors in situations where abilities may be less necessary (a less difficult impression formation situation) with their attitude shifts in situations where abilities may be more necessary (a more difficult impression formation situation). If low self-monitors respond in a manner that is similar to high self-monitors in a “less difficult” situation, but respond differently in a “more difficult” situation, this would support the idea that low self-monitors may have similar goals to high self-monitors, though their abilities may prevent them from attaining the goals in the same manner as high self-monitors. This research would allow the ability of the participants to be a manipulated variable, allowing researchers to focus on the motivation that would result when ability is manipulated. This is an important next step in examining the goal of low self-monitors, as it may be impossible to understand the motivations of low self-monitors without separating their motivations from their abilities.

Additionally, conceptualizing self-monitoring as a construct that is comprised of two separate dimensions, ability and motivation, would be helpful in clarifying the goals of low self-monitors, as researchers have not done so thus far. Referring back to Snyder's (1987, p. 135) quote on how ability precedes motivation, he points out that there are individuals who are motivated but lack ability (those high in social approval), and that there are individuals who have ability but may lack the motivation (extraverts). If there are individuals who are motivated but lack ability, and others who possess ability but lack motivation, then the concepts of motivation and ability should be distinguishable from one another. In distinguishing between motivation and ability, it may be beneficial for researchers to find ways to identify and differentiate between the four types of individuals: those who display high levels of motivation and ability, those who display high levels of motivation and low levels of ability, those who display low levels of motivation and high levels of ability, and those who display low levels of motivation and ability. Identifying these individuals may aid in distinguishing between the motivational and ability components of the construct of self-monitoring.

It is possible, however, that the Self-Monitoring Scale may need to be modified, in order to fully understand the goals of low self-monitors. While the Self-Monitoring Scale has been factor analyzed (Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980; Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980; Sparacino, Ronchi, Bagley, Flesch, & Kuhn, 1983), the factors that emerged did not distinguish between motivation and ability. The most common and reliable breakdown (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985) of the original 25-item Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974) has been the three factor solution of Acting ("I would probably make a good actor"), Extraversion ("In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention") and

Other-Directedness (“I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain other people”) (Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980). Snyder and Gangestad (1986), nevertheless, suggested that the three factors tap into one common latent variable, and proposed the shorter 18-item Self-Monitoring Scale being used in the present study. The shorter scale, which taps into the latent variable better than the original scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) has also never been factor analyzed in a way that distinguishes between motivation and ability. It is possible that the scale has never been factor analyzed in this way because, as mentioned above, the majority of the items seem to relate to individuals’ abilities more so than their motivations: e.g. “I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people”; “I can only argue for ideas which I already believe”; “I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information”; “I would probably make a good actor”; “I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting”; “I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations”; “I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end)” etc. The motivation to self-monitor may not be explicitly examined with the current Self-Monitoring Scale. Future researchers may consider adding items to the scale that focus solely on motivation.

Although my hypothesis was not confirmed, and I was not able to determine whether low self-monitors’ goal is to appear sincere or to be sincere, the present experiment does give insight into a possible goal of low self-monitors. Low self-monitors do demonstrate that they are motivated individuals who actively present themselves in order to be liked. They will do so by appearing to be sincere *and* by appearing to be compatible, which shows that low self-monitors are not trying to be true to themselves.

This changes our perception of what low self-monitors are. The theory of self-monitoring should be modified to incorporate the idea that low self-monitors are motivated people who also have self-presentational concerns. Although they may differ in ability to monitor their behavior, low self-monitors can not be thought of as those who do not monitor their behavior. Rather, they can be thought of as those who may be less successful at monitoring their behavior. “All the world” may indeed be a stage: higher self-monitors may be putting on a more skilled performance for their audience than the lower self-monitors are, but the lower self-monitors are still performing.

## Appendix A-1

### Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986)

Please circle True or False next to each statement. There are no right or wrong answers. Please try to answer as honestly as you can.

1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people. **True / False**
2. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like.  
**True / False**
3. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe. **True / False**
4. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information.  
**True / False**
5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others. **True / False**
6. I would probably make a good actor. **True / False**
7. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention. **True / False**
8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons.  
**True / False**
9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me. **True / False**
10. I'm not always the person I appear to be. **True / False**
11. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or win their favor. **True / False**
12. I have considered being an entertainer. **True / False**
13. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting. **True / False**
14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.  
**True / False**
15. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going. **True / False**

16. I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should. **True / False**
17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end). **True / False**
18. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them. **True / False**

## Appendix A-2: Personality Profile (Pilot)

Demographic Information:

First name: \_\_\_\_\_Jason\_\_\_\_\_

Age: \_\_\_\_\_19\_\_\_\_\_

Gender: \_\_\_\_\_Male\_\_\_\_\_

Height: \_\_\_\_\_5'10\_\_\_\_\_

Major: \_\_\_\_\_Psychology\_\_\_\_\_

Aside from being a student, do you have a job? If yes, what is your job?

\_\_\_\_\_Waiter on weekends, part-time personal trainer\_\_\_\_\_

Are you an in-state or out-of-state student? \_\_\_\_\_in-state\_\_\_\_\_

What is your relationship status? \_\_\_\_\_unattached at the moment\_\_\_\_\_

Please describe yourself briefly:

\_\_\_\_Fun, outgoing, like to go out with friends on weekends, family-oriented. I spend a lot of free time being outdoors, playing sports and going to the gym.

How comfortable are you in social situations?

**Sincere:** Usually pretty comfortable. Tend to get along better with people whose views and interests are different from mine. I like when people speak their minds, even when they see things differently than I do.

**Compatible:** Usually pretty comfortable. Tend to get along better with people whose views and interests are similar to mine. I like it when I have a lot in common with people.

### Appendix A-3: Personality Profile (Pilot)

Demographic Information:

First name: \_\_\_Sarah\_\_\_\_\_

Age: \_\_\_\_\_19\_\_\_\_\_

Gender: \_\_\_Female\_\_\_\_\_

Height: \_\_\_\_\_5'6\_\_\_\_\_

Major: \_\_\_\_\_Psychology\_\_\_\_\_

Aside from being a student, do you have a job? If yes, what is your job?

\_\_\_Waitress on weekends, part-time model\_\_\_\_\_

Are you an in-state or out-of-state student? \_\_\_\_\_in-state\_\_\_\_\_

What is your relationship status? \_\_\_\_\_unattached at the

moment\_\_\_\_\_

Please describe yourself briefly:

\_\_\_Fun, outgoing, like to go out with friends on weekends, family-oriented. I spend a lot of free time taking dance classes and going to the gym.

How comfortable are you in social situations?

\_\_\_**Sincere**: Usually pretty comfortable. Tend to get along better with people whose views and interests are different from mine. I like when people speak their minds, even when they see things differently than I do.

**Compatible**: Usually pretty comfortable. Tend to get along better with people whose views and interests are similar to mine. I like it when I have a lot in common with people.



**Appendix A-4: Opinion Questionnaire (Pilot)**

Code # 1: \_\_\_\_\_ Code # 2: \_\_\_\_\_

For each of the following items, please indicate your opinion by circling one number.

There are no right or wrong answers.

**1. The United States spends more than necessary on defense.**

*Participant 1:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

*Participant 2:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

**2. The Maryland drinking age should be lowered to 18.**

*Participant 1:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

*Participant 2:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

**3. In general, the best policy is to keep tuition rates constant despite the rising cost of living.**

*Participant 1:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

*Participant 2:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

**4. A student exchange plan between U.S. and Arab countries would be a good idea.**

*Participant 1:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

*Participant 2:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

**5. The University of Maryland should eliminate the mandatory athletic fee, because students should not be required to pay for athletic programs.**

*Participant 1:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

*Participant 2:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

**6. The death penalty has no place in a civilized society.**

*Participant 1:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

*Participant 2:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

**7. Marijuana should be legalized.**

*Participant 1:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

*Participant 2:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

**8. We must accept limits on civil liberties to decrease vulnerability to terrorism.**

*Participant 1:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

*Participant 2:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

**9. Hidden “red light cameras” are a good way to encourage safe driving.**

*Participant 1:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

*Participant 2:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

**10. It should be illegal in Maryland to use a hand-held cellular phone while driving.**

*Participant 1:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

*Participant 2:*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

## Appendix A-5: Commitment Questionnaire (Pilot)

Code #: \_\_\_\_\_

Below are the items you responded to in the previous questionnaire, as well as your responses to those items. We are trying to understand how strong your opinion is for each item from the previous questionnaire, therefore you will be asked to indicate how committed you are to your response on each item. The scale ranges from 1(Not at all committed) to 10 (Extremely committed). Please respond as honestly as possible. Your answers are completely confidential.

1. How committed are you to your position on the item below?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not at all									Extremely

**The United States spends more than necessary on defense.**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

2. How committed are you to your position on the item below?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not at all									Extremely

**The Maryland drinking age should be lowered to 18.**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

3. How committed are you to your position on the item below?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Not at all

Extremely

**In general, the best policy is to keep tuition rates constant despite the rising cost of living.**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Strongly

Strongly

Disagree

Agree

4. How committed are you to your position on the item below?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Not at all

Extremely

**A student exchange plan between U.S. and Arab countries would be a good idea.**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Strongly

Strongly

Disagree

Agree

5. How committed are you to your position on the item below?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Not at all

Extremely

**The University of Maryland should eliminate the mandatory athletic fee, because students should not be required to pay for athletic programs.**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Strongly

Strongly

Disagree

Agree

6. How committed are you to your position on the item below?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Not at all

Extremely

**The death penalty has no place in a civilized society.**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Strongly

Strongly

Disagree

Agree

7. How committed are you to your position on the item below?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Not at all

Extremely

**Marijuana should be legalized.**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Strongly

Strongly

Disagree

Agree

8. How committed are you to your position on the item below?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Not at all

Extremely

**We must accept limits on civil liberties to decrease vulnerability to terrorism.**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Strongly

Strongly

Disagree

Agree



9. How committed are you to your position on the item below?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Not at all

Extremely

**Hidden “red light cameras” are a good way to encourage safe driving.**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Strongly

Strongly

Disagree

Agree

10. How committed are you to your position on the item below?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Not at all

Extremely

**It should be illegal in Maryland to use a hand-held cellular phone while driving.**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Strongly

Strongly

Disagree

Agree

## Appendix A-6: Impression Formation Questionnaire (Pilot)

Code #: \_\_\_\_\_

1. We are interested in your impression of the other participant. Based on what you learned about the other participant, please rate him/her on the following traits:

The other participant is:

a)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	Unfriendly								Friendly	

b)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	Physically Unattractive								Physically Attractive	

c)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	Unintelligent								Intelligent	

d)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	Unkind								Kind	

2. Please indicate the extent to which you think the following qualities are important to him/her when he/she forms personal relationships with others:

a) Sense of Humor

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	Extremely Unimportant								Extremely Important	

b) Sincerity

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	Extremely Unimportant								Extremely Important	

c) Compatibility/Similarity

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	Extremely Unimportant								Extremely Important	

d) Kindness

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Extremely Unimportant Extremely Important

e) Extraversion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Extremely Unimportant Extremely Important

3. Demographic Questions:

What is your...

Race: \_\_\_\_\_

Age: \_\_\_\_\_

Gender (circle one): Male Female

Dating Status (circle one):

Married In a relationship Single but casually dating someone

Single and interested in dating Single and not interested in dating

Sexual Orientation (circle one): Heterosexual Gay Bisexual Unsure

### Appendix A-7: Instructions for Study

- ➔ Have a list of the participants names from the sign up website:  
umpsychology.sona-systems.com. I will have already pre-selected certain students who are allowed to participate.
  
- ➔ Before running the participants, you should have their responses to the **opinion questionnaire** from mass testing. Depending on what condition they will be in (Similar, or Dissimilar) you will prepare the opinion questionnaire before they arrive. For those in the SIMILAR conditions you will give “participant #1” the same exact responses that the participant you are running gave during mass testing. For those in the DISSIMILAR conditions you will give “participant # 1” responses that are all 5- likert scale points away from the participant that you are running’s responses- so that the responses will be on the other side of the midpoint of the scale.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly									Strongly
Disagree									Agree

- If the original response is 1, the new response would be 6. 1 → 6
  
- 2 → 7
  
- 3 → 8
  
- 4 → 9

- 5 → 10
- 6 → 1
- 7 → 2
- 8 → 3
- 9 → 4
- 10 → 5

➔ The consent form and the sign-up sheet should be with you in the room you are running the subjects in. Down the hall in another room (or next door, or wherever) is where the personality profile sheet, the opinion questionnaire, the commitment questionnaires, and the impression formation questionnaires should be kept (the participants should not be able to see those). But you should have all of the necessary forms prepared before you run each subject so that you are ready to hand the questionnaires to them.

➔ Bring participants in one at a time. These participants should be randomly assigned to one of the four conditions: similar/sincere (A), similar/compatible (B), dissimilar/sincere (C), dissimilar/compatible (D). (A,B,C,D in a hat for blocked random assignment) After you have recorded the participants' name and UID number on the sign up sheet, then write which condition they are in by assigning a letter. When they arrive just confirm their name and UID#, which you should have already written on the sign-up sheet. Assign them a code number- put their

code number on the sign up sheet and give them an index card with their code number on it.

→ Give Participants the consent form. Collect it.

Read to them: **You will be identifying yourself throughout this experiment using the number on this index card. This will be your code number and will be placed on each questionnaire that you complete. Please do not write your name on the questionnaires, as I want to ensure your anonymity.**

**The purpose of this experiment is to learn about how different kinds of information conveyed about people in various settings and situations will influence first impressions. For example, we want to see if information conveyed in person will influence impressions differently from information conveyed on paper or via internet, or if the impressions formed are influenced by whether or not the person is someone of the same or of the opposite sex. The condition you happen to be in, is one in which you will be forming an impression of an opposite sex person, and one in which the information you learn about the other participant will be conveyed on paper, without an actual face-to-face interaction. You and the other participant will form impressions of each other using on-paper information only, which is similar to how people get acquainted when they meet over the internet, and there is no opportunity to meet each other first in person.**

**The impressions you form of each other will be based on information you receive about each other's opinions on certain issues. One of you will also learn personal information about the other, though one of you will not. This will be decided based**

**on a lottery, and you get to choose first. If you pick the “one” the other participant will complete a personality profile for you to see. If you pick the “two” you will be asked to complete a personality profile for the other participant to see.**

- ➔ Take out a hat with two numbers in it. {Both numbers will be ones so participants will always get a “one.”}

Read to them: **Ok, I’m going to give the other participant the personality profile. I’ll be right back. Please wait patiently.**

- ➔ When you are down the hall (or next door) go get the “**personality profile**” for either Sarah or Jason. Half of the profiles will be for the SINCERE conditions and the other half will be for the COMPATIBLE conditions. Make sure to take the right one! Wait a few minutes before giving it to them. {I will have my RA’s complete the profile’s prior to the experiment- we will work on exactly what to write for the profile’s before the experiment starts}

- ➔ Go back into the room and give them the other participant’s profile.

Read to them: **Please look over the other participant’s profile. This should help you form a more clear first impression of him (her). I’ll be back in a few minutes.**

- ➔ Go get the **opinion questionnaire** from the other room, which should be already completed prior to the experiment (see instructions above). Wait about 5 minutes before going back in.

Read to them: **While you were reviewing the other participant’s profile he (she)**

**already completed this questionnaire, which you will be completing on the same sheet. (give the participants the questionnaire). He (she) completed his (her) responses next to participant # 1, so you should just complete yours next to participant # 2. The reason you guys are completing the questionnaire on the same sheet is so you can compare responses in order to help you form an impression. When you're done I will be giving the questionnaire back to the other participant so that he (she) can compare responses as well. Please take your time and respond to each question.**

➔ Leave the room and wait a few minutes. When they are done, go back in, collect the questionnaire and copy their responses (NOT the other participant's responses) onto the "**commitment questionnaire,**" (while in the room with them) and then give them the commitment questionnaire.

Read to them: **I just copied your responses from the previous questionnaire onto this one. Please take your time and respond to each question. Your responses to this questionnaire are completely confidential.**

➔ Leave the room and wait a few minutes. When they are done, go back in, collect the questionnaire, and give them the "**Impression formation questionnaire.**"

Read to them: **This is the final questionnaire on which you will provide us with your impression of the other participant. Please take your time and respond to each question. Your responses to this questionnaire are completely confidential.**



→ Leave the room and wait a few minutes. When they are done, go back in, collect the questionnaire, and debrief.

## **Appendix A-8: Suspicion Check & Debriefing (Pilot & Experiment)**

### **Debriefing and Suspicion check (you can read straight from the paper)**

Do you have any questions about anything? (give them time to respond to the questions)

Was everything clear to you?

Did you understand the purpose of this study?

If I were to tell you that there is more to the purpose of the study do you know what it could be? **{if they guess that there is no real other participant, put a star next to their name}**

Let me tell you more about the experiment. We are interested in examining how people present themselves to others in first impression situations. More specifically, the participants in this experiment, like yourself, were given an indication of what another person likes when he meets someone. For some participants the other person indicated a preference for people who agree with him; for other participants the other person expressed a preference for people who do not agree with him. Whether you received one preference or the other was determined completely at random. In fact, the “other person” doesn’t really exist. We could not tell you that until now because we are interested in how people present themselves under conditions that they believe are real; if you knew that there wasn’t really another person, or that the preferences expressed were randomly chosen, your responses would not be interpretable.

Another thing that was of interest to us is whether people who, in general, are concerned with responding appropriately in social situations, react differently to the expectations of others than do people who are less concerned about the appropriateness of their responses. There is a psychological characteristic, called self-monitoring, that

indicates the degree of concern. Your self-monitoring level was measured earlier in the semester when you completed the large packet of surveys on sona-systems. We want to see if high self-monitors will respond differently than low self-monitors. We expect high self-monitors to agree with the other when the other indicates that agreement is preferred, and to disagree with the other when disagreement is preferred. We are less confident about how low self-monitors will respond, but we hypothesize that lows are more likely to ignore the guidance provided by the other.

Earlier in the semester we also measured your attitudes. So now we can see if you changed your attitudes to meet the other's expectations. Again, if we had told you about this in advance we would be unable to interpret your responses.

It is important to me that you understand why we could not reveal everything in advance, why we had to pretend that there was another participant, and that you realize that had we disclosed fully what we were interested in, you may not have responded spontaneously.

Is that clear to you? Do you understand?

Do you have any comments or questions?

Please do not discuss the purpose of this study with anyone because if other students know the details of this study, it will make the results invalid. Can you promise that you will not discuss the study with others?

Thank you very much for your participation. Have a nice day.

{ If they ask any questions that you can't answer, give them this email address and tell them to contact me [rfreidus@psyc.umd.edu](mailto:rfreidus@psyc.umd.edu) }

## Appendix B-1: Personality Profile

Demographic Information:

First name: Jason

Age: 19

Gender: Male

Height: 5'10

Major: Psychology & Business

Aside from being a student, do you have a job? If yes, what is your job?

Waiter on weekends, part-time personal trainer

Are you an in-state or out-of-state student? in-state

What is your relationship status? single

Please describe yourself briefly:

Kind, outgoing, like to go out with friends on weekends, family-oriented. I spend a lot of free time being outdoors, playing sports and going to the gym.

How comfortable are you in social situations?

Usually pretty comfortable. I like being around people, am always happy to meet new ones.

When you meet someone new, what is the most important quality to you in this person you are becoming acquainted with? **Sincere:** For them to be sincere.

**Compatible:** For them to be compatible with me.

When getting acquainted, how can you tell that another person possesses that quality?

**Sincere:** I can tell that people are being sincere when they tell me what they believe even if they don't think I'll agree with them, and may debate them on it. If someone agrees with me too much I get suspicious.

**Compatible:** I can tell that people are compatible with me if they have similar interests and opinions to me, and if we just have a lot in common.

## Appendix B-2: Opinion Questionnaire

Code # 1: \_\_\_\_\_ Code # 2: \_\_\_\_\_

For each of the following items, please indicate your opinion by circling one number.

There are no right or wrong answers.

- 1. In general, the best policy is to keep tuition rates constant despite the rising cost of living.**

*Participant 1:*

1	2
Disagree	Agree

*Participant 2:*

1	2
Disagree	Agree

- 2. The University of Maryland should eliminate the mandatory athletic fee, because students should not be required to pay for athletic programs.**

*Participant 1:*

1	2
Disagree	Agree

*Participant 2:*

1	2
Disagree	Agree

**3. The death penalty has no place in a civilized society.**

*Participant 1:*

1	2
Disagree	Agree

*Participant 2:*

1	2
Disagree	Agree

**4. Hidden “red light cameras” are a good way to encourage safe driving.**

*Participant 1:*

1	2
Disagree	Agree

*Participant 2:*

1	2
Disagree	Agree

**5. It should be illegal in Maryland to use a hand-held cellular phone while driving.**

*Participant 1:*

1	2
Disagree	Agree

*Participant 2:*

1	2
Disagree	Agree



3. How committed are you to your position on the item below?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Not at all

Extremely

**The death penalty has no place in a civilized society.**

1 2

Disagree

Agree

4. How committed are you to your position on the item below?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Not at all

Extremely

**Hidden “red light cameras” are a good way to encourage safe driving.**

1 2

Disagree

Agree

5. How committed are you to your position on the item below?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Not at all

Extremely

**It should be illegal in Maryland to use a hand-held cellular phone while driving.**

1 2

Disagree

Agree



## Appendix B-4: Impression Formation Questionnaire

Code # : \_\_\_\_\_

1. We are interested in your impression of the other participant. Based on what you learned about the other participant, please rate him/her on the following traits:

The other participant is:

- |    |                         |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |                       |
|----|-------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|
| a) | 1                       | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10                    |
|    | Unfriendly              |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | Friendly              |
| b) | 1                       | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10                    |
|    | Physically Unattractive |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | Physically Attractive |
| c) | 1                       | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10                    |
|    | Unlikeable              |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | Likeable              |
| d) | 1                       | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10                    |
|    | Unintelligent           |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | Intelligent           |
| e) | 1                       | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10                    |
|    | Unkind                  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | Kind                  |

2. Please indicate the extent to which you think the following qualities are important to him/her when he/she forms personal relationships with others:

a) Sense of Humor

- |  |                       |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |                     |
|--|-----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---------------------|
|  | 1                     | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10                  |
|  | Extremely Unimportant |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | Extremely Important |

b) Sincerity

- |  |                       |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |                     |
|--|-----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---------------------|
|  | 1                     | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10                  |
|  | Extremely Unimportant |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | Extremely Important |

c) Compatibility/ Similarity

- |  |                       |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |                     |
|--|-----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---------------------|
|  | 1                     | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10                  |
|  | Extremely Unimportant |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | Extremely Important |

d) Intelligence

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Extremely Unimportant Extremely Important

e) Extraversion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Extremely Unimportant Extremely Important

Demographic Questions:

What is your...

Race: \_\_\_\_\_

Age: \_\_\_\_\_

Gender (circle one): Male Female

Dating Status (circle one):

Married In a relationship Single but casually dating someone  
Single and interested in dating Single and not interested in dating

Sexual Orientation (circle one): Heterosexual Gay Bisexual Unsure

## Appendix B- 5: Instruction Sheet

Instructions for Study:

1) To do at **HOME** the night before:

➔ Have a **list of the participant's names** from the sign up website:

umpsychology.sona-systems.com. I will have already pre-selected certain students who are allowed to participate.

The sign up is rfreidus and the password is 14455811. Click on “My Studies”, click on “Impression Formation”, click on “View time slots” to see your times for the week.

➔ I will be emailing you an **Excel file with the names of participants**, their information, and their scores from the OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE and the SELF-MONITORING questionnaire from the mass testing surveys. I will keep sending you updated ones every few weeks (Use the most recent one that I send you, and delete the old ones). The students who sign up to participate during your time will all come from this data file. **Find their names and fill out the appropriate information on the Prepsheet.**

➔ The night before you run you should fill out the Prepsheet. You can write in the information by hand or type it in. If you write it, do so neatly! From the data file you can find their name, UID #, and other information needed for parts of the table. You will give them their code number the next day.

- Their Self-Monitoring scores will be in the file I send you as well. 12 and up is considered high (2) and 8 and below is considered low (1).
- The condition they are in: used blocked random assignment to randomly assign them to one of the 4 conditions (try to remember which conditions you have assigned on previous weeks...maybe write it down for yourself):

**A=1= Similar(1)/Sincere(1);**

**B=2= Similar (1)/Compatible (2) ;**

**C=3= Dissimilar (2)/ Sincere (1);**

**D=4=Dissimilar (2)/ Compatible(2)**

Look at the top of the Prepsheet- each condition has an associated similarity level (similar or dissimilar); and personality goal (sincere or compatible).

- How to figure out the O 1-5 (The O stands for “other” meaning the other participant):

If they are in the similar conditions (A or B), the O 1-5 will be exactly the same responses as their RevQ 1-5.

If they are in the dissimilar conditions (C or D), the O 1-5 will be the exact OPPOSITE as their RevQ 1-5 responses.

2) **The day of, before they arrive** (Come in about 10 minutes before you are supposed to run, to set up)

- ➔ When you come in to run, add their names to the **chart on the clipboard** (the chart asks for their name, code #, UID, your initials, and the psych class they are

currently in). **Add their code # to your Prepform.** If they don't show up just cross their name off both. That code # can be given to the next person.

- ➔ All of the forms are down the hall in room **3124A**. The forms are numbered in the order they will be given to the participant.
- ➔ Participants must show up on time. If they show up more than 10 minutes late, tell them they can not participate. If they don't show up at all, give them penalty. If they show up more than 10 minutes late, don't give them penalty but still mark as no show.
- ➔ Make sure you know which condition each person is in, and you are aware of which forms to use. Use the Prepform to help you!!
- ➔ Sit in room 3128 waiting. Bring a laptop if you have one.

### 3) **Once the participant shows up:**

**Some small but important tips:** always have a blue pen with you (and make sure there is a black liquidy pen in 3124), always close the door to 3128 once the participant is in there- never leave it open even when you come in to give a qnaire, read/ speak slowly, have a watch of some sort so you can time things, write neatly on the Prepsheet, when you are reading from this sheet hold the clipboard upright so the participants can't see this what you're reading, keep reading this instruction sheet over and over until you are comfortable and familiar with the study!

NOTE: I am going to distinguish between the things you should memorize and things you

can read straight from the paper.

For things you must memorize: **The font is this, and will be highlighted in yellow.**

For things you can/should read from the paper: The font is this and will not be highlighted.

→ Once participants arrive, say

**“Come on in and have a seat in the \*blue chair\* at the head of the table. I’ll be right back with your consent form.”**

Get their consent form. Bring it to them and say

**“Please sign this (ask if they have a pen), and I can get you started once the \*other participant\* shows up. It may be a few minutes.”**

While you’re in there, the **confederate** will knock on the door (Confederates- count to a slow 5 once they enter the room to give the consent form). The experimenter will open the door only a crack so that the participant can’t see the confederate (only the tip of a cap should be showing).

The confederate will say **“Hey, I’m here for the experiment.”**

The experimenter will say **“Ok have a seat in the hallway and ill be right with you”**

- Collect the consent form and say **“Now that he’s here I can get you both started. Ill be right back.”**
  
- Put the consent form in the basket on the side in 3124. Gather their **\*code #\*** and **\*cup with the 2 papers\*** in it. You should be carrying around a **blue pen** with you at all times.
  
- Go into the room, first **confirm their name & UID # using the chart on the clipboard**. Ask what psych class they are in write it down.
  
- Give them their **code #** and read to them: (Note: read slowly and take your time. Even though you can read straight from the paper, try to make eye contact and look up every once in a while to make sure they are paying attention and not in outer space)

**This is your code number and should be placed on each questionnaire that you complete. Please do not write your name on the questionnaires, as I want to make sure that everything stays \*anonymous.\***

**The purpose of this experiment is to learn about how different kinds of information conveyed about people in various settings and situations will influence the creation of positive first impressions. Certain settings and situations may be more conducive to this than others. For example, we want to see if information conveyed in**

**person will influence impressions differently from information conveyed on paper or via internet.**

**The condition you happen to be in, is one in which the information you learn about the other person will be conveyed on paper, without an actual face-to-face interaction. You and the other participant will form impressions of each other using on-paper information only, which is similar to how people get acquainted when they meet over the internet, and there is no opportunity to meet each other first in person.**

**One of you will form an impression of the other based only upon knowing the other's opinions on certain issues, while one of you will form an impression of the other based on knowing the other's opinions as well as personal information about the other. We plan on comparing the type of impression that is created based on opinions only, with the type of impression that is created based on opinions combined with personal information.**



**Who gets to learn the personal information about who will be decided based on a lottery, and you get to pick. If you pick the “one” the other participant will complete a personality profile for you to see. If you pick the “two” you will be asked to complete a personality profile for the other participant to see.**

→ Take out a cup with two numbers in it. {Both numbers will be ones so participants will always get a “one.”} Let them choose, and have them show you their paper. If they don’t, just ask them what they got. Once you’ve seen the paper,

Say to them: **Ok, so that means I have to give him the profile to fill out and then I’ll bring it back to you when he’s done. It’s going to take a few minutes.**

→ Start timing about **5-7 minutes**.

→ When you are down the hall go get the “**personality profile**” for Jason. Half of the profiles will be for the **SINCERE** conditions and the other half will be for the **COMPATIBLE** conditions. Make sure to take the right one! Use the **Prepsheet** to help you. Wait about 5-7 minutes before giving it to them.

→ Go back into the room and give them the other participant’s profile. (Make sure to close the door behind you when entering the room) Say: **Here’s the other**

**participant's profile. This should help you form a more clear first impression. Please look it over and I'll be back in a few minutes.**

- Go get the **opinion questionnaire** from the other room. Fill out the “Participant One” responses on the **opinion questionnaire**, and put the “other participant’s” code # next to “Code # 1”. His code # should be the code # **AFTER** the current participant’s number. The “participant one” responses should be exactly the same as the **O 1-5 responses on your Prepsheet** (The “participant two” responses are for the real participant). Use the same color and type of pen that was used on the profile sheet—**usually the black liquidy pen**. Wait about 3-5 minutes before going back in. You can have the confederate fill this out if your handwriting is not manly enough 😊, just make sure they are filling out the correct info from the Prepsheet.

Read to them: **While you were reviewing the other participant's profile he already completed this questionnaire, which you will be completing on the same sheet.** (give the participants the questionnaire).  
**He completed his responses next to participant # 1, so you'll be completing yours next to participant # 2.**

The reason you guys are completing the questionnaire on the same sheet is so you can compare responses in order to help you form an

**impression. When you're done I will be giving the questionnaire back to the other participant so that he can compare responses as well. Please take your time and respond to each question. There are no right or wrong answers.**

➔ Leave the room and wait about 2 minutes. When they are done, go back in, collect the **opinion questionnaire.**

➔ Leave the room. Copy *\*their responses\** from the opinion questionnaire (NOT the other participant's responses) onto the "**commitment questionnaire**" using the *blue pen* and then give them the commitment questionnaire.

Read to them: **I just copied your responses from the previous questionnaire onto this one, which should make it easier for you to respond. Please read the instructions. There are no right or wrong answers. \*Your responses to this questionnaire are completely confidential- he will not be seeing your responses this time\*.**

➔ Leave the room and wait a few minutes. When they are done, go back in, collect the questionnaire, and give them the "**Impression formation questionnaire.**"

Read to them: **This is the last questionnaire on which you will give us your**

**impression of the other participant. There are no right or wrong answers. \*Again, your responses to this questionnaire are completely confidential- he will not be seeing your responses this time\*.**

➔ Leave the room and wait a few minutes. When they are done, go back in, collect the questionnaire, and **debrief**. There is a copy of the debriefing sheet on the clipboard. If people **guess that there is no other participant**, put a little star next to their name on the Prepsheet. Or if you think the participant is odd- trying to mess with things, put 2 stars next to their name on the Prepsheet.

4) After the experiment is done:

➔ Assign credit to them on Sona systems.

➔ Collect all of their data together with a paper clip and leave it face down in the unentered pile.

➔ **Give me your Prepsheet- either give it to me via email, or after you're done for the week put it in my mailbox. Try to get it to me as soon as possible every week.**

**If you are writing and not typing, do it neatly!!**

➔ Each week you will start a new Prepsheet.

➔ **Thank you for all of your hard work!! 😊 I very much appreciate it.**

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