AMERICANS ON TERRORISM: 
TWO YEARS AFTER 9/11

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Knowledge NETWORKS
A polling, social science, and market research firm based in Menlo Park, California
The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) is a joint program of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland and the Center on Policy Attitudes. PIPA undertakes research on American attitudes in both the public and in the policymaking community toward a variety of international and foreign policy issues. It seeks to disseminate its findings to members of government, the press, and the public as well as academia.

Knowledge Networks is a polling, social science, and market research firm based in Menlo Park, California. Knowledge Networks uses a large-scale nationwide research panel which is randomly selected from the national population of households having telephones and is subsequently provided internet access for the completion of surveys (and thus is not limited to those who already have internet access).

The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), at the University of Maryland’s School for Public Affairs, pursues policy-oriented scholarship on major issues facing the United States in the global arena. Using its research, forums, and publications, CISSM links the University and the policy community to improve communication between scholars and practitioners.

The Center on Policy Attitudes (COPA) is an independent non-profit organization of social science researchers devoted to increasing understanding of public and elite attitudes shaping contemporary public policy. Using innovative research methods, COPA seeks not only to examine overt policy opinions or positions, but to reveal the underlying values, assumptions, and feelings that sustain opinions.

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INTRODUCTION

As the second anniversary of the September 11th attacks arrives, the greater distance provided by two years’ passing seems to make it a time for examination, as well as for the recollection of grief and trauma. Many key questions arise.

Over the past two years President Bush has made the war on terrorism a centerpiece of his administration, and it has been a dominant rationale for a range of key undertakings, from the Iraq war to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. So do Americans now feel safer from the threat of terrorism?

The American public has been widely regarded as an unfailing reservoir of support for efforts of every type against terrorism. But is this true without qualification? When Americans are asked to think about the full range of methods to deal with the problem of terrorism, what priorities do they set—and do these resemble current government priorities?

Controversies over the Bush administration’s foreign policy efforts to deal with the threat of terrorism have often revolved around its choices of emphasis: assertiveness versus cooperation; military methods versus diplomatic and economic methods; unilateralism versus multilateralism. How do Americans view the Bush administration’s foreign policy efforts on terrorism in these dimensions? Do they agree with its emphasis?

The nature and importance of public opinion in the countries of the Islamic world has been a major topic for discussion since the September 11 attacks. Some argue that because Islamic countries are generally not democratic, public opinion in the Islamic world is not a significant factor for US foreign policy; and that, in any case, the resolve shown through using military force impresses the publics in those countries. Others say that the US needs to be viewed positively by publics in Islamic countries, because this could make it harder for terrorist groups to recruit, while making it easier for their governments to cooperate with the US on terrorism issues. Where does the American public come down in this debate?

How do Americans perceive the attitudes of most people in the Islamic world? Do they believe that there is an inevitable clash of cultures that results in conflict? Do they think the US should, or even could, make efforts to improve relations with the Islamic world? If so, what strategic choices would they prefer to see the US make? Over the long term, would Americans like to see the US increase or decrease its profile in the Middle East?

In important policy speeches both before and since the Iraq war, the president and major figures in the administration have proposed an extended project of transformation for the Middle East as a region, invoking the model of the Marshall Plan and Germany after the Second World War. But how does the public feel about this proposal?

The USA Patriot Act, passed rapidly by Congress not long after the September 11 attacks, has become a subject of renewed controversy, with Congress acting to annul one of its provisions. How do Americans view the USA Patriot Act? How many feel concern over the government powers granted under some of its provisions? Do they feel it has gone too far, or has not gone far enough, in giving the government greater power to pursue terrorists? How many feel that they have some understanding of the Act—and what is their perception of how it relates to the rights of US citizens?

How do Americans feel about various domestic approaches to security, such as increasing airport security and stepped-up surveillance of individuals and goods entering the US? Do they feel that enough has been done and that these measures now have a sufficiently high priority? How do their priorities for domestic approaches to security—essentially defensive in nature—stack up against military approaches that put America on the offensive?

In order to probe deeper into Americans’ attitudes on these and other questions, the
Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks conducted a nationwide survey with a sample of 1,217 respondents over August 26-September 3. The margin of error was plus or minus 3-4%, depending on whether the question was administered to the whole sample, three-quarters, or half of the sample.

The poll was fielded by Knowledge Networks using its nationwide panel, which is randomly selected from the entire adult population and subsequently provided internet access. For more information about this methodology, go to www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp.

Funding for this research was provided by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the Ford Foundation.

FINDINGS

Assessment of War on Terrorism
Despite the high-profile efforts of the war on terrorism since September 11, 2001, the majority of Americans have not come to feel any safer from the threat of terrorism. President Bush’s handling of the problem of terrorism, though, is a modest plus for his reelection prospects.

Despite the efforts made by the Bush administration over the last two years, as well as the sheer passage of time since the September 11 attacks, the majority of Americans have not come to feel safer from the threat of terrorism.

When asked directly, “in terms of the threat of terrorist attacks, over the last two years how they “have come to feel,” only 24% said they have come to feel safer. Approximately the same percentage—28%—said they have come to feel less safe, and another 48% said they feel “neither safer nor less safe.” Thus a total of 76% say that they do not feel safer.

A trend line question asked repeatedly over the last two years finds that there has been essentially no movement in the level of concern for terrorist attacks. The question, “How concerned are you about the possibility there will be more major terrorist attacks in the United States?” has been asked repeatedly since October 2001 by ABC/Washington Post. One month after the 9/11 attacks, 81% said they were very or somewhat concerned. After the initial shock of the attacks had receded a little, this number dropped slightly to 70% in December—and has remained in the 70s ever since. The course of the Afghanistan war, and then the Iraq war, apparently has had little effect either way on the level of concern about terrorist attacks in the US. PIPA/KN asked this question in the current poll and found 73% very or somewhat concerned. When ABC asked the same question September 3-7, 2003, 71% said they were very or somewhat concerned.
When a separate sample was asked to think specifically “about the various efforts the Bush administration has made over the past two years that it has said were aimed at reducing the risk of terrorist attacks,” a somewhat larger minority—46%—said that these efforts have made them feel safer. But still, a majority of 53% said these efforts had made them feel “neither safer nor less safe” (45%) or “less safe” (8%).

This modest net plus, when given a fine-grained set of response options, is a bit less positive than poll results that give only the two options of saying that they approve or disapprove of Bush’s performance on terrorism. For instance, this year Newsweek has frequently asked: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bush is handling policies to prevent and minimize terrorism at home?” In July 2003 68% approved and 26% disapproved (down from 78% approval in April). In a September 3-7 2003 ABC News poll, 67% approved.

There may be a reluctance to express direct disapproval of the President due in part to a ‘rally-round-the-President’ effect, as would be expected given that Americans continue to feel that the US is effectively at war with terrorists. This may also help explain why approval ratings are high, even when, as will be discussed below, there is substantial criticism of and disagreement with many specific features of the Bush administration’s foreign policy, as well as widespread discomfort with the USA Patriot Act.

Assessment of Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy
In the effort to fight terrorism, and in general since September 11, a majority feels the Bush administration’s foreign policy has put too much emphasis on being assertive and should put more emphasis on cooperation, nonmilitary methods, and multilateral action. This view is consistent with a strong general preference for emphasizing multilateral and
When asked to characterize the Bush administration foreign policy since September 11, a majority said the administration has been too assertive. Respondents were asked: “Thinking about how the Bush administration has been acting in relation to other countries over the last two years, overall, would you say that the Bush administration has tended to be too assertive, too cooperative, or has the balance just right?” (Respondents were able to describe the administration as a little, somewhat, or much too assertive or cooperative.) A 54% majority said the administration was too assertive. Just 14% thought the administration was too cooperative, and 28% said the administration had the balance just right.

A different half-sample was simply asked: “In its relations with other countries, do you think the Bush administration should or should not be more cooperative?” A very strong majority—66%—said it should be more cooperative.

When Americans are asked their preferences on how the fight against terrorism should be conducted, a majority wants to see a different emphasis. Asked whether “In the effort to fight terrorism, do you think that in the future, compared with what it has been doing, the Bush administration should put more emphasis on military methods or should put more emphasis on diplomatic and economic methods?” 58% said the administration should put more emphasis on diplomatic and economic methods; only 35% thought there should be more emphasis on military methods.

A near-unanimous 91% said it is important “for the war on terrorism to be seen by the world as an effort of many countries working together, not just a US effort.” This consensus belief is essentially unchanged from when PIPA asked this question in November 2001 (95% said it was important), though the percentage saying that it is very important has eroded from 82% to 67%.

Asked “What do you think is the more important lesson of September 11?” an overwhelming majority—81%—said it was that “the US needs to
work more closely with other countries to fight terrorism,” while just 16% said the most important lesson is that “the US needs to act on its own more to fight terrorism.” This support for a multilateral approach is up from when the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations asked the same question in June 2002 and found 61% favoring more emphasis on a multilateral approach—perhaps an outgrowth of frustration with the costs of the Iraq war and its aftermath.

In the current poll PIPA/KN offered a wide range of different approaches to the problem of terrorism and asked respondents to rate whether each approach should have a higher or lower priority, compared to the priority it has currently (see pp. 12-13 for full list). The three approaches that were most explicitly multilateral were among the ones that scored highest. An overwhelming 73% wanted to see a higher priority for “working through the UN to strengthen international laws against terrorism and to make sure UN members cooperate in enforcing them.” Seventy-nine percent wanted a higher priority for “setting up an international system to cut off funding for terrorism,” as did 76% for the idea of “setting up a UN database of terrorists to which all countries would contribute.”

Other foreign policy approaches that emphasized a non-military approach also did quite well. An overwhelming 75% wanted to put a high priority on “reducing US dependence on oil,” 75% wanted to put a higher priority on “putting more pressure on the Saudi government to shut down funding and other support for terrorist groups,” and 60% supported “putting greater pressure on both Israel and the Palestinians to reduce their level of conflict.” There was more moderate support for other diplomatic approaches, though in each case those favoring putting greater priority outweighed those favoring putting less priority—“making a stronger effort to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan” (higher 42%, lower 22%), “initiatives to help fight global HIV/AIDS and help poor countries develop their economies” (higher 52%, lower 20%), and “Promoting and helping fund public education in Muslim countries as alternatives to Islamic fundamentalist schools” (higher 36%, lower 29%).

On the other hand, approaches that involved new uses of military force were quite unpopular. Only 30% wanted to see a higher priority on “overthrowing the government of Iran” and just 21% wanted this for the idea of “overthrowing the government of Syria.” (Please see “Approaches to the Problem of Terrorism,” pp. 12-13)

Views of Islamic Public’s Response to US Foreign Policy
A majority perceives that the general public in the Islamic world is critical of US foreign policy, that these feelings have been growing more negative, and that while most people in the Islamic world reject al-Qaeda’s methods they sympathize with its feelings toward the US. An overwhelming majority of Americans believes that these negative feelings toward US foreign policy create a more favorable climate for breeding terrorism. At the same time, a majority rejects the idea that there is a fundamental clash of civilizations between the Islamic world.

A majority of respondents perceived the general public in the Islamic world as quite critical of US foreign policy. Respondents were asked: “Thinking now about the people in the Islamic world, on average, how do you think they would rate how they feel about US policies in the Middle East? Please answer on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being very bad and 10 being very good.” A 52% majority thought that people in the Islamic world would give US policies a
negative rating (0-4); 28% thought the rating would be neutral (5); and only 17% thought the rating would be positive (6-10). Sixty percent thought “a majority of people in the Islamic world think US policies in the Middle East make the region less stable”; only 35% believed that a majority in the Islamic world thinks US policies make the Middle East more stable.

A large majority perceives that since September 11 feelings toward US foreign policy have grown more negative. Asked, their perception of feelings throughout the Islamic world toward US foreign policy over the last two years, only 27% felt they had gotten better, while 65% said they had gotten worse.

Perhaps most striking, a strong majority of respondents assume that the majority of people in the Islamic world share many if its feelings toward the US, though an equally strong majority assumes that the majority of the Islamic public oppose al-Qaeda’s terrorist methods. Respondents were asked, “How do you think a majority of people in the Islamic world feel toward Osama bin Laden’s terrorist group al Qaeda?” and given three options. A majority of respondents (57%) thought that a majority in the Islamic world are “opposed to al-Qaeda’s terrorist methods but share many of its feelings toward the US.” Another 16% thought a majority in the Islamic world were both supportive of al-Qaeda’s methods and shared its feelings, while 21% thought a majority opposed al-Qaeda’s methods and did not share its feelings toward the US. Thus 73% of American respondents assumed that the Islamic majority shared al-Qaeda’s feelings toward the US, even while 78% assumed that the Islamic majority opposed al-Qaeda’s terrorist methods.

Strong majorities assume that the majority of people in the Middle East want the US to lower its profile there. Two-thirds (66%) thought that “in regard to the US role in the Middle East…most of the people in the Middle East want the US to play a less prominent and influential role.” Only 30% thought most of the people in the Middle East want the US “to continue to play as prominent and influential a role as it has.” An even stronger majority of 68% thought that “most people in the Middle East want US military presence [there] reduced.”

On some questions, though, Americans show a bit more optimism than may be warranted. Asked, “Do you think a majority of people in the Islamic world favor or oppose US-led efforts to fight terrorism?” the response was divided: 48% said “favor” and 46% said “oppose.” Polling in the Islamic world shows a clear majority opposed in most Islamic countries (see Appendix, pp. 15-17).

Similarly, there was a mixed or neutral response when PIPA/KN asked whether “the fact that the US overthrew the government of Saddam Hussein has made people in the Islamic world more or less likely to support ‘US efforts to deal with the problem of terrorism,’” or has made no difference either way. While more said that it made them more likely (35%) than less likely (22%), the plurality (39%) said that it made no difference either way.
Negative Attitudes Seen as Breeding Terrorism

It is sometimes argued that because Islamic countries are generally not democratic, public opinion in the Islamic world is not a significant factor for US foreign policy. The American public, however, overwhelmingly believes that negative public attitudes toward the US can create a breeding ground for terrorism. Asked what the effects might be “when there are widespread negative feelings in the Islamic world toward US foreign policy,” an overwhelming 77% said that “this creates a climate in which it is easier for terrorist groups to recruit new members and raise funds,” while just 16% said “this does not have much effect on the ability of terrorist groups” to do these things.

This does not have much effect on the ability of terrorist groups to recruit new members and raise funds

77%

This creates a climate in which it is easier for terrorist groups to recruit new members and raise funds

16%

Also, when there are widespread negative feelings in the Islamic world toward US foreign policy, 68% said this “makes it less likely that people there will want their governments to cooperate with US efforts to deal with the problem of terrorism”; only 26% thought “this does not have much effect.” Also, a plurality of 48% in a September 2003 ABC News poll said that they thought that the US going to war increases the risk of further terrorism – up from 29% when asked this question in April.

Rejection of Clash of Civilizations

Despite the widespread view that there is substantial criticism of US foreign policy and that this helps create a climate that breeds terrorism, a majority, nonetheless, rejects the view that tensions between the West and the Islamic world are inevitable due to a clash of cultures. Offered two statements, only 36% chose: “Because Islamic religious and social traditions are intolerant and fundamentally incompatible with Western culture, violent conflict is bound to keep happening.” A strong majority (60%) instead chose the other statement: “Though there are some fanatics in the Islamic world, most people there have needs and wants like those of people everywhere, so it is possible for us to find common ground.”

This question was asked before in November 2001, when the second statement got 68%; in June 2002 CCFR asked a slightly altered version and the second statement got 66% agreement. It is perhaps surprising that the experiences of the Afghanistan war, the Iraq war and the ongoing “afterwar,” and a recent attack against an American hotel in Indonesia, have brought so little attrition to the majority’s view that it is possible to find common ground.

Please tell me which of the following statements is closer to your own view:

Because Islamic religious and social traditions are intolerant and fundamentally incompatible with Western culture, violent conflict is bound to keep happening.

36%

Though there are some fanatics in the Islamic world most people have needs and wants like those of people everywhere, so it is possible for us to find common ground.

60% 66%

Improving US Relations With Islamic World

Large majorities think the US should make greater efforts to improve relations with people in the Islamic world and should play a less dominant role in the Middle East. A majority believes US military presence in the Middle East increases rather than decreases the likelihood of terrorist attacks and that the US should decrease its military presence over the next 5-10 years. A plurality does not believe that the Bush administration is ready
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to commit the resources necessary to transform the Middle East region, and the public is divided about whether it should.

An overwhelming majority—78%—thinks the US should “make greater efforts to improve relations with people in the Islamic world.” As discussed above, strong majorities assume that the majority of people in the Middle East want the US to lower its profile there, with 66% believing that “most of the people in the Middle East want the US to play a less prominent and influential role.” Perhaps more significant, when asked what the US should do “if the majority of the people in the Middle East want the US to play a less prominent and influential role there,” 63% said that in that case the US should play a less prominent role (should not: 31%).

Even without the condition of Islamic public opposition, Americans seem to favor a lower profile in the Middle East. Fifty-eight percent agreed with the statement that “the US is playing the role of world policeman in the Middle East more than it should be.”

Some of this sentiment appears to arise from the belief that US military presence increases the risk of terrorist attacks—though arguably it reduces the risk by providing a base from which to attack terrorist groups. Asked, “Do you think that US military presence in the Middle East increases or decreases the likelihood of terrorist attacks against the US?” 64% thought it increases the likelihood, while just 32% thought it decreases it.

Reducing US Military Presence in the Middle East

Consistent with this view, a majority of the public favors reducing US military presence in the Middle East over the long term. Asked to think “about the next 5-10 years in the Middle East,” respondents were asked whether the US should increase or decrease its military presence there. By a two-to-one margin, the majority (64%) said the US should decrease its military presence. Only 31% thought it should be increased in the Middle East.

US Military Presence in the Middle East

Thinking about the next 5-10 years, in the Middle East, do you think the US should:

- Increase its military presence: 31%
- Decrease its military presence: 64%

Effect of US Military Presence on Terrorism

Do you think that the US military presence in the Middle East increases or decreases the likelihood of terrorist attacks against the US?

- Increases likelihood of attacks: 64%
- Decreases likelihood of attacks: 32%

Some of the sentiment is also a response to the perceived opposition to US military presence among the Islamic public. As mentioned, 68% believed that most people in the Middle East want US military presence there reduced. Asked, “If most people in the Middle East want the US to reduce its military presence in the Middle East, do you think that it should or should not do
so?” 51% said that it should, while 45% said that it should not.

Proposal to Transform the Middle East

In important policy speeches both before and since the Iraq war, the president and major figures in the administration have proposed an extended project of transformation for the Middle East as a region, invoking the model of the Marshall Plan and Germany after the Second World War. However, a plurality of Americans does not believe that the Bush administration is ready to commit the resources necessary to transform the Middle East region, and less than half think it should. Asked whether they think “President Bush is ready to commit the resources necessary to transform the Middle East region the way that the US committed resources to transforming Germany after World War II,” a 50% plurality said President Bush was not, while just 39% said he was.

 Asked then whether they thought the US should in fact commit the resources to do this, the response was evenly divided, with 45% saying that it should and 45% saying that it should not.

USA Patriot Act

A modest majority thinks that the USA Patriot Act has gone too far in compromising constitutional rights, while a large majority expresses concern. Support for further removing limits on US government power to monitor and detain individuals in extremely low. A large majority thinks that American citizens detained under suspicion of being part of a terrorist group should have the right to meet with a lawyer and is not aware that this is not the case.

Respondents were asked to consider the ongoing controversy about the USA Patriot Act by hearing a description of the debate. Asked to put themselves into the controversy in this way, 52% said that the removal of limitations on the government has already gone too far, while 38% said it has not gone far enough.

When presented with the concerns raised by some about the USA Patriot Act, a large majority said it shares these concerns at least somewhat. Asked: “How concerned are you that removing limitations on the government’s ability to monitor and detain individuals may, in some cases, lead the government to go too far?” 66% said they were very (27%) or somewhat (39%) concerned by this. Thirty-one percent said they were not very (23%) or not at all (8%) concerned.

Respondents showed little support for further removing limits on the US government’s power to monitor and detain individuals. In the section of the poll that offered 17 approaches to dealing with the problem of terrorism, only 28% had a favorable view of “Removing more limits on the government’s power to read e-mails and listen in on telephone conversations.” (For the full list, see pages 12-13).

A large majority thinks that American citizens detained under suspicion of being part of a terrorist group should have the right to meet with a lawyer and is not aware that this can be denied to the detainee as a result of the USA Patriot Act. Three-quarters of the respondents (75%) knew that, in fact, American citizens have been detained by the US under suspicion of being involved with a terrorist group. But when asked “If American citizens are detained by the US under suspicion of being involved with a terrorist group, is it your impression that they do or do not have the right to meet with a lawyer in their defense?” 74% mistakenly said that American citizens do have this right. Only 23%
correctly replied that in this case, there is no right to a meeting with a lawyer. Perhaps most significant, asked whether, in this circumstance, American citizens “should or should not have the right to meet with a lawyer in their defense,” an overwhelming 80% said that they should.

Respondents were presented six approaches for dealing with the problem of terrorism that focused on domestic measures, as well as a number of foreign policy options, and asked to evaluate whether they should receive a higher or lower priority than they do now (see pp. 12-13 for full list).

The option that received the highest level of support was “more extensive checks on people entering the US,” with an overwhelming 79% saying that this effort should receive a higher priority than it has now.

However, there does not appear to be majority support for an across-the-board reduction in visas, at least when respondents are presented alternatives. Respondents were told that “currently there is some debate about whether the US should reduce the number of visas for entrance into the US as a way of trying to prevent terrorists from entering the US,” and were presented with three arguments. The argument that supported across-the-board reduction in visas was supported by 43%. Only 13% chose the second argument, which simply opposed across-the-board reduction. Thirty-nine percent chose the third argument, which proposed a more selective screening process.

Other domestic approaches also received high levels of support. A very large 75% wanted a higher priority for “increasing the monitoring of goods entering the US.” About two-thirds also wanted a higher priority for “increasing airport security” (70%) and “increasing security at
buildings and locations that have political, economic and cultural importance” (66%).

However, other measures, which seemed to suggest an expansion of government bureaucracy or, as discussed above, the removal of limitations on government, were met with very low enthusiasm. The idea of “putting more government functions under the Department of Homeland Security,” found only 37% wanting this to have a higher priority. “Removing more limits on the government’s power to read e-mails and listen in on telephone conversations,” was endorsed by only 28%.
APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM

To give respondents a chance to outline how they would like to see the US tackle the problem of international terrorism, PIPA/KN offered 17 approaches, divided into:

- a list of nine current policies (shown in regular type)
- and a second list of eight policies that have been proposed (shown in italic type).

The approaches fell into six broad areas:

- overthrowing governments tied to groups that use terrorism
- protective security measures at home
- government powers
- diplomatic and economic measures in the Middle East
- developing goodwill and support through aid
- broad multilateral initiatives

Each approach was scored from -5 to +5. A -5 meant that a current policy should get a much lower priority than it is presently being given, and that a proposed policy should definitely not be tried. A +5 meant that a current policy should get a much higher priority than it is presently being given, and that trying a proposed policy should be given a very high priority. A 0 meant that a current policy should be given the same priority it has now, and that a proposed policy should just continue to be considered.

The chart shows all 17 approaches, rank-ordered by number who gave a positive score. Fourteen of the 17 received at least a mildly positive mean score, suggesting public openness to a multi-sided strategy. The three items that got a negative mean score all fell into the areas of government powers and overthrowing governments tied to groups that use terrorism.

Among the six areas, the broad multilateral initiatives did very well, with over 7 in 10 wanting to give them a higher priority. (These were all tested in slightly different PIPA questions in November 2001 and received very similar levels of support.)

Protective security measures at home and diplomatic and economic measures in the Middle East, between them, dominated all the rest of the top half of the rankings. The desire for more emphasis on protective security measures strongly suggests that, in the controversy over the amount of federal funding for these measures, a majority would prefer to see an increase. Where diplomatic and economic measures in the Middle East are concerned, 60-75% wanted higher priorities given. A combination of reducing US dependence on oil, putting more pressure on the Saudi government, and putting greater pressure on Israel and the Palestinians would alter the US profile in the Middle East significantly.

Aid-based approaches (rebuilding Afghanistan, assistance for HIV/AIDS and development, and promoting public education in Islamic countries) received mild positive ratings, with those wanting a higher priority outweighing those wanting a lower priority. The much higher support for multilateral initiatives suggests that aid-based approaches would gain greater support if they were organized as efforts by the international community, including the US.

The two lowest-ranked areas were government powers and overthrowing governments tied to groups that use terrorism. These two areas between them received all the negative mean scores given by respondents.
## Americans on Terrorism

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>-5 to -1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>+1 to +5</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More extensive checks on people entering the US</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>+3.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting up an international system to cut off funding for terrorism</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>+2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting up a UN database of terrorists to which all countries would contribute</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>+2.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putting more pressure on the Saudi government to shut down funding and other support for terrorist groups</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>+2.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing US dependence on oil</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>+2.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing the monitoring of goods entering the US</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>+2.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working through the UN to strengthen international laws against terrorism and to make sure UN members cooperate in enforcing them</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>+2.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing airport security</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>+2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing security at buildings and locations that have political, economic and cultural importance</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>+1.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putting greater pressure on both Israel and the Palestinians to reduce their level of conflict</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>+1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiatives to help fight global HIV/AIDS and help poor countries develop their economies</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>+0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making a stronger effort to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>+0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putting more government functions under the Department of Homeland Security</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>+0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting and helping fund public education in Muslim countries as alternatives to Islamic fundamentalist schools</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>+0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overthrowing the government of Iran</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removing more limits on the government's power to read e-mails and listen in on telephone conversations</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overthrowing the government of Syria</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
METHODOLOGY

The poll was fielded by Knowledge Networks, a polling, social science, and market research firm in Menlo Park, California, with a randomly selected sample of its large-scale nationwide research panel. This panel is itself randomly selected from the national population of households having telephones and subsequently provided internet access for the completion of surveys (and thus is not limited to those who already have internet access). The distribution of the sample in the web-enabled panel closely tracks the distribution of United States Census counts for the US population on age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, geographical region, employment status, income, education, etc.

The panel is recruited using stratified random-digit-dial (RDD) telephone sampling. RDD provides a non-zero probability of selection for every US household having a telephone. Households that agree to participate in the panel are provided with free Web access and an Internet appliance, which uses a telephone line to connect to the Internet and uses the television as a monitor. In return, panel members participate in surveys three to four times a month. Survey responses are confidential, with identifying information never revealed without respondent approval. When a survey is fielded to a panel member, he or she receives an e-mail indicating that the survey is available for completion. Surveys are self-administered.

For more information about the methodology, please go to:
www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp.
APPENDIX

Public Opinion in Islamic World: Are We Perceiving Correctly?

Throughout this study Americans were asked for their perceptions of attitudes among publics in the Islamic world. Thanks to the Pew Global Attitudes Study—a major, multi-part international poll that has repeatedly surveyed the publics of many countries around the world—it is possible to compare the perceptions of the US public with survey data collected in seven largely Islamic countries—Morocco, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Indonesia—and the Palestinian Authority. This comparison shows that the majority of Americans do have a broadly correct assessment of attitudes in the Islamic world.

Perception in the US: The general public in the Islamic world is quite critical of US foreign policy.

In nearly all Islamic countries polled in May 2003, the majority expressed a negative view of the US—only in Kuwait did a majority say it had a favorable opinion of the United States. Percentages giving a negative view of the US ranged from 66% to 99%.

In each country, respondents with unfavorable opinions of the US were asked whether this was “mostly because of President George W. Bush or is it a more general problem with America?” In Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, Lebanon and Morocco, majorities (51%-69%) of those with unfavorable opinions of the US said this was “mostly because of President George W. Bush.” In Jordan, Kuwait, and the Palestinian Authority, responses from this group were divided.

Respondents in Islamic countries were asked: “In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the United States takes into account the interests of countries like [name of survey country]?” Majorities saying “not too much” or “not at all” were overwhelming in Turkey, Indonesia, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority (62-92%). In Morocco a 63% majority thought so; in Pakistan, 62%. Kuwait was the exception, with only 35% thinking that countries like Kuwait were not taken much into account by the US.

Perception in the US: Throughout the Islamic world feelings of people toward US policy have gotten worse over the last two years.

The Pew study provides figures from Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Pakistan and Indonesia for both summer 2002 and May 2003. During this period in all five countries there were sharp increases in unfavorable opinion of the United States: from an increase of 12 percentage points in Lebanon up to 47 percentage points in Indonesia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Very + somewhat unfavorable, summer 2002</th>
<th>Very + somewhat unfavorable, May 2003</th>
<th>Shift</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>28% more negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between summer 2002 and May 2003, in all five countries, the sentiment that the US does not take the interests of countries like the respondent’s country into account grew at least somewhat: by 4% in Lebanon up to 26% in Pakistan.
Perception in the US: A majority of people in the Islamic world think US policies in the Middle East make the region less stable.

PIPA/KN’s question was derived from a question asked by the Pew Global Attitudes survey in May 2003: “Do you think US policies in the Middle East make the region more stable or less stable?” Out of the eight Islamic countries polled, majorities in six said that US policies in the Middle East make the region less stable. These majorities ranged from 56% in Lebanon to 91% in Jordan. In Pakistan, 43% said US policies make the Middle East less stable, but another 43% said US policies either “made no difference” (12%) or that they did not know (31%). In Kuwait a 48% plurality said US policies made the Middle East more stable.

Do you think U.S. policies in the Middle East make the region more stable or less stable?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>More stable</th>
<th>Less stable</th>
<th>No difference</th>
<th>DK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perception in the US: Americans are divided as to whether a majority of people in the Islamic world favor or oppose US-led efforts to fight terrorism.

PIPA/KN’s question was derived from a question asked by the Pew Global Attitudes survey in summer 2002 and May 2003: “Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view? I favor the US-led efforts to fight terrorism, or I oppose the US-led efforts to fight terrorism.” In all countries polled with the exception of Kuwait, only minorities said they favored “US-led efforts to fight terrorism.” In May 2003, minorities who said they were opposed to US efforts ranged from 67% in Lebanon to 97% in Jordan. In the five countries where polls were conducted a year apart, in all cases the minority favoring US-led efforts shrank.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Favor US led efforts to fight terrorism</th>
<th>Oppose US led efforts to fight terrorism</th>
<th>DK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Summer 2002</td>
<td>Summer 2002</td>
<td>Summer 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>