

**DECLINING APPROVAL FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES: DOES IT MAKE
IT MORE DIFFICULT TO FIGHT AL-QAEDA?**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

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MAY 17, 2007
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CONTENTS

	Page
WITNESS	
Steven Kull, Ph.D., Director, Program on International Policy Attitudes	4
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING	
The Honorable Bill Delahunt, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight: Memorandum to Members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs dated May 16, 2007	2
Steven Kull, Ph.D.: Prepared statement	10

DECLINING APPROVAL FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES: DOES IT MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO FIGHT AL-QAEDA?

THURSDAY, MAY 17, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:30 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Delahunt (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. DELAHUNT. This hearing on the Subcommittee on International Organization, Human Rights, and Oversight will come to order. A bit late, I might note.

Please let me extend my apologies to Dr. Kull. This hearing was to commence at 2:00, but I believe that his testimony is of such significance that we requested him to stay so that we can memorialize it and listen to what I know will be interesting data.

As you know, Dr. Kull, this subcommittee has held a series of hearings on the implementation for our national security as well as a wide array of our national interests about the recent decline in foreign support for our American policies and leadership. We have heard from a large number of polling organizations, specialists on Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Europe, from the Government Accountability Office and even the Travel Business Roundtable, as well as colleagues from the European Parliament.

In fact, we have been so diligent in showing a decent respect for the opinions of mankind, as our Declaration of Independence puts it, that my good friend and ranking member, who I am sure will join us shortly, Mr. Rohrabacher, asked last week if we were going to sample the opinion in Antarctica and bring in some penguins.

Well, I want to note for the record that we tried, but the penguin that we asked to come before us was busy visiting the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Murtha. I am not kidding. Mr. Murtha took the penguin, whose name is Simon, to waddle around the halls of the Rayburn building to publicize the Pittsburgh Aviary. Maybe we can get him next year.

In any event, in our series we have heard about the impact of foreign opinion about the United States and our policies. There is a long list. I will submit that into the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT

MEMORANDUM
MAY 16, 2007

TO: Members, Committee on Foreign Affairs

FROM: Bill Delahunt, Chairman
Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight

SUBJECT: Hearing on “Declining Approval for American Foreign Policy in Muslim Countries: Does It Make It More Difficult to Fight al Qaeda?”

There appears to be a consensus among pollsters and analysts, from Pew Research to the Government Accountability Office, that there has been a sharp decline in recent years in foreign approval ratings for the United States, and that these lower levels of approval make it harder for the U.S. to promote its national interests. The Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight (IOHRO) has been conducting a series of hearings to see if this consensus is correct, and whether it relates to a general sense of the American role in the world, and to American values and people, or just to specific policies of our government, whose change could then improve our standing in the world.

The hearings aim to establish a baseline of facts about foreign opinion about American policies, values, and people, and provide some preliminary analysis of the reasons behind these opinions. The IOHRO Subcommittee, often in collaboration with other subcommittees, has heard from a series of top pollsters.

- On March 6, the first hearing provided a global overview. Dr. Steven Kull, long-time director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), presented poll results from recent years, and placed them in a historical context by comparing them to results from previous decades.
- On March 8, in a joint hearing with the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, John Zogby, President of Zogby International, presented poll results from the general population and from business elites in Latin America.
- On March 14, Andrew Kohut, President of the Pew Research Center, presented testimony on additional global polling data.
- On March 22, in a joint hearing with the Europe Subcommittee, Dr. John Glenn, Foreign Policy Director of the German Marshall Fund, and Kelly Conway of the Polling Company, reviewed polling data on European approval ratings for American leadership.
- On March 28, in a joint hearing with the Africa and Global Health Subcommittee, Dr. Devra Moehler of Harvard and Cornell Universities presented a statistical analysis of background characteristics that correlate with Africans’ attitudes about the United States.
- On April 17, in a joint hearing with the Europe Subcommittee, three members of the Parliament of the European Union, Jonathan Evans, Baroness Sarah Ludford, and Claudio Fava; former CIA officer Michael Scheuer; and Julianne Smith of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, discussed the impact of renditions, and of the indictment in Italy of 26 Americans for a rendition to Egypt, on European attitudes towards America.
- On Thursday, April 26, Jess Ford, Director of the Government Accountability Office’s International Affairs and Trade Team and Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation testified on the potential impact of declining foreign opinion on U.S. national interests, and on U.S. Government efforts to arrest the decline through “public diplomacy.”
- On May 3, Dr. James Zogby, of Zogby International, and Dr. David Pollock, of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, testified on Arab opinion of the United States and its policies.

On May 17, the series of hearings will conclude with a hearing on the possible link in Muslim countries between anti-American sentiment and support for violence against Americans. Dr. Steven Kull, Director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), will be the sole witness. Dr. Kull is the principal investigator for a study released by PIPA on April 24, 2007, entitled, “Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda.”

Mr. DELAHUNT. But I do want to point to one observation that was made by other witnesses, and that is the perception that we act inconsistently with our stated values, speaking loudly on the one hand about democracy and human rights, while arming or supporting dictators, as we heard last week in our hearing on Ethiopia and Equatorial Guinea.

On this point, let me stress that witness after witness has testified that, contrary to the conventional belief that they hate us because of our freedoms and our values, foreigners in general are more aptly described as being disappointed because the United States in their perception does not live up to its values, which they tend to support.

Today, in the 10th and—I am sure some will be glad to hear this—the final hearing of the series, we move to the business end of the equation by asking—by not asking, rather, what do they think of us but rather asking what effect does what they think of us have on our national interest?

In a GAO report that I have repeatedly quoted, four areas were identified. First was an increased foreign public support for terrorism directed at Americans; secondly, increased cost and decreased effectiveness of military operations; third, a weakened ability to align with other nations in pursuit of common policy objectives; and, lastly, dampened enthusiasm for U.S. business services and products.

Today's witness, Dr. Steven Kull, will address that first possible area, foreign support for terrorism directed at Americans. He has just released a poll from four Muslim countries that asks the question: Does declining approval for American foreign policy make it more difficult to fight al-Qaeda? This is clearly a crucial question for our national security.

We are aware that the two primary planners of the 9/11 attacks, the Saudi Osama bin Laden and the Egyptian al-Zaqarwi, claim to have been motivated by American support for the dictatorships that rule in their country. But is their particular case—can it be generalized? That is, does opposition to American policies in Muslim countries create an environment where membership in al-Qaeda and similar organizations is tolerated and perhaps supported more than it would be if the United States was perceived by the average citizen as a partner rather than as an opponent?

This is a very complex question with important implications, and we are very pleased that Dr. Kull has returned to help us sort it out. He has been introduced on previous occasions by myself. Just let it be said that he is a most impressive witness with an impeccable litany of accomplishments in the area of polling and surveying, as well as a prolific author and someone who has expertise in a number of fields.

Welcome back, Dr. Kull. It is my understanding that we are going to run up against some votes, but it is only a single vote on the floor. So I would ask my friend and colleague, the gentleman from New Jersey, if he cares to make any observations.

Mr. PAYNE. I yield my time so we can hear the witness. Thank you very much.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Great.

Again, Dr. Kull, my profuse apologizes. But would you proceed, and maybe we will be able to conclude your testimony. Then, if you will excuse us once more if the bell rings, we shall go and return. I think we will have adequate time, because that is the beginning of a 15-minute vote.

Dr. Kull.

**STATEMENT OF STEVEN KULL, PH.D., DIRECTOR, PROGRAM
ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES**

Mr. KULL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to speak today. I would like to ask that my testimony be entered into the record.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Without objection.

Mr. KULL. As I discussed the last time I testified to this committee, in the world as a whole, views toward the U.S. have turned sharply negative in the recent years. A key factor seems to be that the U.S. is perceived as unconstrained in its use of military force by the system of international rules and institutions that the U.S. itself took the lead in establishing in the post-war period.

Today, I am going to focus on the attitudes in the Muslim world. Clearly, the Muslim world is of particular interest to us. It is a major source of violence against the U.S. As you have heard already in previous testimony, it is an area of the world with particularly negative attitudes toward the U.S.

Now the question I want to address today is whether this is important. It is not self-evident that it is important. Popularity isn't intrinsically good. Particularly, I want to address the question of whether negative feelings toward the U.S. have an important impact on the U.S. effort to deal with al-Qaeda and its related groups.

In this context, some people have argued what is important is not that the people in the region like the U.S. but that they fear it. When forced to make a choice between the U.S. and al-Qaeda, this fuel increases the likelihood that the people will choose the U.S.

Others have argued that negative feelings toward the U.S. drive people into the arms of al-Qaeda, that people in Muslim countries are so angry at the U.S. that this leads them to actively support al-Qaeda in its fight against America.

Well, according to our research, neither of these views are, actually, exactly correct. But I am going to say from the beginning that our research does show that anti-American feelings do make it easier for al-Qaeda to operate and to grow in the Muslim world.

This conclusion is based primarily on an in-depth study that we conducted in Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan and Indonesia we conducted earlier this year in conjunction with the START Center at the University of Maryland. START is a center of excellence funded by the Department of Homeland Security and stands for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism, thus START. The study included focus groups which I conducted in all four countries as well as in-depth surveys.

Not surprisingly, we did find negative views toward the U.S. Government. As you can see on this graph here, asked how people feel about the U.S. Government, overall, three-quarters said they

had an unfavorable view; in Morocco, it was 76 percent; Egypt, 93 percent; Pakistan, 67 percent; and Indonesia, 66 percent.

These numbers, while they are disturbing, I don't think they capture what I think is the most important dynamic in the Muslim world today. For decades, polls and statements of Muslims leaders have shown a variety of resentments toward the U.S. and about U.S. policies. Muslims share the world view that we discussed earlier that the U.S. doesn't live up to its ideals of international law and democracy. There have also been some very specific complaints from the region that the United States favors Israel over the Palestinians and the Arab world as a whole, that the U.S. is not even-handed, that the United States exploits the Middle East for its oil, and that it hypocritically supports nondemocratic governments that accommodate U.S. interests.

Now all these attitudes were there before, and they are still there, but it seems that now there is also a new feeling that has emerged in the wake of 9/11. This isn't so much an intensification of negative feelings toward the U.S. as much as a new perception of American intentions. There now seems to be a perception that the U.S. has entered into a war against Islam itself.

I think perhaps the most significant finding of our study is that, across the four countries, 8 in 10 believe the U.S. seeks to weaken and divide the Islamic world, as you can see in this slide. On average, 79 percent agree with the statement that this is a U.S. goal, to weaken and divide the Islamic world; and large majorities in all four countries, getting as high as 92 percent in Egypt, agree with this position.

Also, overall, 7 in 10 agree that it is America's goal "to weaken Islam as a religion so that it will not grow and challenge the western way of life."

Now we don't have good trend line data to demonstrate clearly that this is something new, but in the focus groups people said that they perceive this as arising recently from American anger about 9/11. America is perceived as believing that it was attacked by Islam and thus having declared war on Islam. People repeatedly brought up the fact that President Bush used this term "crusade" and see that as evidence that this is a war targeted at Islam.

So, in this context, it is not surprising that three out of four respondents favor the goal of getting the U.S. to withdraw its military forces from all Islamic countries. Overall, 74 percent have this view; and, as you can see, it is a large majority, 72 percent in Morocco, 92 percent in Egypt, 71 percent in Pakistan and 64 percent in Indonesia.

More disturbing is that there is widespread support for attacks on U.S. troops. Now not quite as strong as the desire for troops to get out, but, overall, you can see that 53 percent approve of attacks on United States troops in Iraq, getting as high as 91 percent in Egypt, not so high in Indonesia. Also, significant numbers have mixed feelings about it; and not all that many disapprove, except in Indonesia.

Now it is not just the situation in Iraq. Even though there are troops based in the Persian Gulf, overall, 46 percent approve of attacks on United States troops there, 11 percent with mixed feel-

ings, and this gets as high as 83 percent in Egypt. Again, not so strong, though, in Indonesia.

In the focus groups, some respondents said that the sense of Islam as being under siege has enhanced peoples' identification with Islam, that it has made them pull into this identity. And, indeed, polling that has been done by the Anwar Sadat Chair at the University of Maryland in Arab countries over the last few years has found a dramatic increase in the number of people saying that their primary identity is as a Muslim.

Also, in our poll, 7 in 10 approved of the goal of requiring a strict application of Sharia law in every Islamic country.

Mr. DELAHUNT. What was that number?

Mr. KULL. Seven in 10, on average, approve of the goal of requiring a strict application of Sharia law in every Islamic country.

So does this mean that all these negative feelings toward America have driven Muslims into the arms of al-Qaeda? Well, it does appear that Muslims are embracing the type of religiously based interpretation of the conflict with the U.S. that is associated with al-Qaeda and that al-Qaeda promotes, but in fact al-Qaeda itself is not popular. Across the four countries, only about 3 in 10 expressed positive feelings toward Osama bin Laden; and only 1 in 7 say they both share al-Qaeda's views of the U.S. and approve of its methods.

Now perhaps most significant, very large majorities reject attacks on civilians, in general, and on American civilians, in particular. You can see that over here on this graph here.

We asked, how justified are attacks on civilians that are carried out in order to achieve political goals? And the dark area on the right shows those who say that they are not justified at all. On average, three quarters take that position; and another 10 percent say that they are weakly justified. That is quite constant across the whole spectrum. Most take the position that attacks on civilians are contrary to Islam, and people say that very spontaneously and passionately in the focus groups.

So does that mean that the Muslim public has basically aligned itself with America against al-Qaeda? Well, the answer again is no. While al-Qaeda may not be popular, large majorities say they perceive al-Qaeda as seeking to "stand up to America and affirm the dignity of the Islamic people, and equally large majorities agree with this as an effort."

Though al-Qaeda and America are both seen as illegitimate, America is seen as more powerful and more threatening. You can think of it as like Muslims are living in a neighborhood and there are two warlords operating in this neighborhood or region. They don't like either one, but one is much more powerful. As long as the weaker one is standing up to the stronger one, it makes sense for them to play down their dislike for the weaker one. And in the focus groups—

Mr. DELAHUNT. The David-Goliath syndrome.

Mr. KULL. That is a way of putting it. Rooting for that underdog as long as he is fighting the giant.

Mr. DELAHUNT. The Yankees versus the Red Sox.

Mr. KULL. There you go.

And in the focus groups, when we brought up al-Qaeda, people strongly resisted criticizing al-Qaeda even though they said, Well,

we don't approve of attacks on civilians. And I would bring up, well, what about 9/11? And they got very uncomfortable, quite defensive; and they strongly insisted that there was no proof that al-Qaeda was behind the 9/11 attacks.

This pattern was present in the survey as well when we asked respondents—

Mr. DELAHUNT. I am going to ask you to suspend. I don't want to hurry you, because it is just too good. I sense the data there is very informative.

Myself and Mr. Payne will go. We will vote. I shall return as soon as I can.

Mr. KULL. Fine.

[Recess.]

Mr. DELAHUNT. We are back.

Dr. Kull, please proceed.

Mr. KULL. All right.

So I was talking about this resistance to recognizing that al-Qaeda was behind the 9/11 attacks, the people getting very defensive and saying, we don't know, there is no proof, and so on. So we asked this question in the survey as well, and in no country did more than 35 percent say that al-Qaeda was behind 9/11. And in Pakistan just 2 percent said that al-Qaeda—

Mr. DELAHUNT. In Pakistan.

Mr. KULL. In Pakistan, just 2 percent. And in the focus groups they were the most definitive about no, no, even denying it flatly.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You know, since it is just the two of us at this point in time—

Mr. KULL. Sure.

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. As you make a particularly thought-provoking observation, I am going to take the liberty of interrupting.

In the focus groups, did anyone provide a rationale—maybe that is not the right term—for this obviously firmly held belief that al-Qaeda was not responsible?

Mr. KULL. Well, remember that you don't have a clear majority saying one way—any particular scenario; and the strongest position is, we don't know, no one knows, there is no proof, and things like that.

There is a fairly substantial number who say that it was the United States who did it, and the motivation was to create a pretext to go to war in Iraq. There are some who say that Israel did it for that same reason. But, mostly, it is just a kind of blocking, it is a denial, it is an "I don't want to think about it, let's not go there."

And I would try at times to actually push them on this, saying, "Well, have you seen the videos where al-Qaeda leaders brag about the 9/11 attacks?" And the common response heard over and over, "Oh, Hollywood can do anything. They can make up these videos that show anything."

You know, it sounds very strange, but I think we should remember that, you know, this is something that people do a lot. They avoid paying attention to facts that are inconvenient. During World War II—

Mr. DELAHUNT. I noted that since I have been in Congress, Dr. Kull.

Mr. KULL. Yeah, okay. During Soviet Union, when—pardon me, World War II, when the Soviet Union was our ally, we probably didn't pay too much attention, we didn't think that much about the gulags during that period. We just sort of pushed that out of our mind. And in the '80s, when the Mujahedin were fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan with CIA, we probably didn't pay too much attention to the ideology that has since become a real problem for us. So it is like enemies of one's enemies aren't necessarily one's friends, but you probably—you are not prone to pay attention to their faults or to be too critical of them.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I note that on a rather regular basis as we review the Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights.

Mr. KULL. Mm-hmm, yes, of course.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And what I find interesting is there is a degree of integrity—I want to note that for the record—in the Human Rights Reports. But what one hears—and I am not laying the responsibility on any party or even on the administration, but there is a constant repetitive theme about those countries with whom we do not have a particularly warm relationship, in fact, a strained relationship; and yet when compared to some of those nations that we consider allies, there is silence.

Mr. KULL. Mm-hmm.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Or—

Mr. KULL. Selective inattention.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Selective inattention. Thank you. Proceed.

You would be interested. We are doing a series of hearings, and the one that we might be able to do before we break is Iran, their human rights record, Kazakhstan, and Saudi Arabia. The human rights records of all three clearly leave something to be desired, and yet we hear on a daily basis Iran. However, the other two nations are not part of the incessant condemnation in terms of human rights records, as they in my judgment should be. Proceed.

Mr. KULL. Right. So this brings us back to the question that we started with. What are the consequences of anti-American feelings toward the U.S. or anti-American feelings in the Muslim world?

Our studies found that anti-American feeling is by itself not enough to lead one to actively support al-Qaeda. To approve of attacks on civilians, one must have views, I am pleased to report this, that are actually quite unusual in the Muslim world, such as the belief that Islam endorses such attacks in some cases.

But anti-American feeling can lead Muslims to suppress their moral doubts about al-Qaeda, and that makes it politically more difficult for governments to take strong action against al-Qaeda. It makes publics more likely to passively accept al-Qaeda, and it creates a larger pool of individuals who may cross over that threshold into actively supporting al-Qaeda. In other words, it gives al-Qaeda more room to maneuver.

So, in closing, I am not going to go so far as to make policy recommendations, but I would like to point out a few of the policy implications of what we are finding here.

When the U.S. decides to expand its military presence, clearly there are many factors that need to be taken into account; and the

impact on public opinion is only one. But the impact on public opinion can have significant consequences, as we have seen in Iraq today.

When the U.S. acts on its own initiative, without multilateral approval or critical participation, these public feelings are also apt to be highly focused on the U.S. itself; and it is not easy to judge in advance what those public reactions will be.

When the U.S. expanded its presence in the Muslim world after 9/11, some assumed that this expansion would not intimidate the general population, that people would perceive it as targeted against something highly circumscribed, terrorists, something that didn't include them. But the population does not perceive the target of the U.S. military as separate from them.

Mr. DELAHUNT. We are talking past each other then, aren't we, Dr. Kull, in a collective way?

Mr. KULL. Yes. We say we are after those people, not you; and yet they feel they are in the crosshairs. This makes them afraid, and that makes them pull away from the U.S. They see that they are what is the target.

The other people assume that this expansion of U.S. presence and power would—there is another view—would induce a kind of awe in the general population, and that would draw people closer to the U.S. and away from America's enemies. Well, the Muslim people are clearly awed by American power. It is really quite extraordinary how powerful they perceive America to be. But this awe turns quickly to fear, and that fear leads people to pull away from the U.S. and to take a more accommodating view of al-Qaeda or anybody else who defies America.

Now, I think there may be some steps that America can take at this point to mitigate these unintended consequences. But I think, above all, the challenge is to provide reassurance through credible evidence that the U.S. has not targeted Islam itself. I think there may be some symbolic steps that could have some moderating effects, and I think addressing immigration issues may be helpful. That is an example of an area where they see that Muslims are discriminated against, and this is pulled into that same framework that the U.S. is against Islam. In the focus groups, people very spontaneously brought up these restrictions on immigrations and visas as evidence of this hostility toward Islam.

But what is most important is how the U.S. comports its military force and how it communicates its long-term intentions. I think it is very important in the long run we learn from this experience and that we have a clear-eyed view of the likely side-effects when the U.S. uses or projects its military force into a region. And I think these effects are likely to be more powerful, more intense when the U.S. acts without the legitimizing and defusing effect that comes when the U.S. is part of a multilateral process or a multilateral action. Without that, it is very focused on the U.S. There are a lot of projections onto the U.S. as an actor with certain intentions, and the problems are also likely to be stronger and the effects are stronger in a region where relations to the U.S. have become laced with the intensity of religious convictions.

Now, we might decide in the end that the costs are worth a strategic objective. But we shouldn't assume that the costs will not be high, and—as it appears they have been in these last few years. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kull follows:]

Testimony of Dr. Steven Kull

**Director, Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA),
University of Maryland
Editor, WorldPublicOpinion.org**

May 17, 2007 – 2:00 PM

**House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations,
Human Rights, and Oversight**

As I discussed the last time I testified to this subcommittee, in the world as a whole negative views of the United States have increased sharply in recent years. A key factor contributing to these feelings is that the United States is perceived as unconstrained in its use of military force by the system of international rules and institutions that the US itself took the lead in establishing in the post war period.

Today I will focus on attitudes in the Muslim world. Clearly the Muslim world is of particular interest as it is a major source of violence against the US. As you have already heard it is also an area of the world with particularly negative feelings toward the United States.

The question I wish to address today is whether this is important. It is not self-evident that it is. Popularity is not intrinsically good.

In particular I want to address the question of whether negative feelings toward the US have an important impact on the US effort to deal with al Qaeda and its related groups.


In this context some have argued that what is important is not that people in the region like the US, but that they fear it. When forced to make a choice between the US and al Qaeda, it is surmised, this fear will increase the likelihood that people in the region will choose the US.

Others have argued that negative feelings toward the US drive Muslims into the arms of al Qaeda; that people in Muslim countries are so angry at the US that this leads them to actively support al Qaeda in its fight against America.

According to our research, neither of these views is quite correct. However, I will say from the beginning that our research does show that anti-American feelings do make it easier for al Qaeda to operate and to grow in the Muslim world.

This conclusion is based on a review of publicly available surveys from the Islamic world as well as the in-depth study of Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and Indonesia that we conducted this year in conjunction with the START Center at the University of Maryland. START is a center of excellence funded by the Department of Homeland Security and stands for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism. The study included focus groups which I conducted in all four countries as well as in-depth surveys. Detailed data from these studies can be found at our web site www.WorldPublicOpinion.org.

Not surprisingly we did indeed find negative views toward the US government even though the governments of the countries surveyed, by and large, have a positive relationship with the US government. Most negative were the Egyptians—93% expressed an unfavorable view with 86% very unfavorable. In Morocco, 76% had an unfavorable view with 49% very unfavorable. In Pakistan, 67% had an unfavorable view with 49% very unfavorable. The most moderate responses were in Indonesia where 66% did have an unfavorable view but a more modest 16% had a very unfavorable view.




However these numbers do not capture what I think is the most important dynamic in the Muslim world today.

For decades, polls in the Muslim world and the statements of Muslim leaders have shown a variety of resentments about US policies. Muslims share the worldwide view that the US does not live up to its own ideals of international law and democracy. There have also been specific complaints that the US favors Israel over the Palestinians and the Arab world as a whole, that the US exploits the Middle East for its oil and that it hypocritically supports non-democratic governments that accommodate its interests. These attitudes persist.

But now there is also a new feeling about the US that has emerged in the wake of 9-11. This is not so much an intensification of negative feelings toward the US as much as a new perception of American intentions. There now seems to be a perception that the US has entered into a war against Islam itself.

I think perhaps the most significant finding of our study is that across the four countries, 8 in 10 believe that the US seeks to “weaken and divide the Islamic world.”

We do not have trendline data to demonstrate that this is something new. But in the focus groups this was described as something that has arisen recently from American





anger about 9-11. America is perceived as believing that it was attacked by Islam itself and as having declared war on Islam. People repeatedly brought up the fact that President Bush's used the term "crusade" and cited this as evidence of these underlying intentions.

In this context it is not surprising that three out of four respondents favor the goal of getting the US to withdraw its military forces troops from all Islamic countries.

Most disturbing there is widespread support for attacks on US troops. Overall about half of all the Muslims polled approve of attacks on US troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf. Support reaches as high as nine in 10 in Egypt. It appears that American troops stationed throughout the region are widely perceived as occupiers.

In the focus groups, some respondents said that this sense of Islam as being under siege has enhanced people's identification with Islam. Polling done by the Anwar Sadat Chair at the University of Maryland in Arab countries over the last few years has found a dramatic increase in the number citing their Muslim identity as primary. In our poll seven in 10 approved of the goal of requiring "a strict application of sharia law in every Islamic country."


So does this mean that all these negative feelings toward America have driven Muslims into the arms of al Qaeda? It does appear that Muslims are embracing the type of religiously-based interpretation of the conflict with the US that is consonant with vies that al Qaeda has also long promoted.



But in fact al Qaeda is not popular. Across the four countries only about 3 in 10 express positive feelings toward Osama bin Laden and only 1 in 7 say they both share al Qaeda's views of the US and approve of its methods.

Perhaps most significant, very large majorities reject attacks on civilians. Overwhelming majorities in all countries also specifically reject attacks on civilians including attacks on US civilians in the United States and US civilians working in Islamic countries. Most agree that such attacks are contrary to Islam.

So does that mean then that the Muslim public is basically with America against al Qaeda? The answer is no. While al Qaeda may not be popular, large majorities said that they perceive al Qaeda as seeking to "stand up to America and affirm the dignity of the Islamic people" and equally large majorities agreed with this goal.



Though al Qaeda and America are both seen as largely illegitimate, America is seen as the greater threat. It is as if Muslims are living in a neighborhood where there are two warlords operating. They do not like either one, but one is much more powerful. As long as the weaker one is standing up to the stronger one, it makes sense that they are inclined to play down their dislike for the weaker one.

And in the focus groups people clearly resisted criticizing al Qaeda. Having rejected attacks on civilians as wrong they became uncomfortable and somewhat defensive when asked about 9-11. They strongly insisted that there was no proof that al Qaeda was behind the 9-11 attacks.

This pattern was present in the survey as well. When we asked respondents who they thought was behind 9-11, in no country did more than one in three identify al Qaeda as the culprit and in Pakistan the number was a mere 2 percent. Some respondents blamed the US itself, some blamed Israel, and many refused to even make a guess.

In the focus groups when I brought up the fact that there are videos in which al Qaeda leaders brag about the 9-11 attacks a common answer was: "Hollywood can create anything."

While this may sound very strange, we should remember that it is not unusual for people to ignore evidence that is, shall we say, 'inconvenient.' During World War II when the Soviet Union was America's ally against Hitler, Americans probably stopped paying attention to

Stalin's gulags. In the 1980s when the mujahideen were fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan with CIA aid, we probably did not pay too much attention to their ideology.

Enemies of one's enemies are not necessarily one's friends. But it is pretty normal to not spend a lot of time scrutinizing their faults.

This brings us back to the question we started with: What are the consequences of anti-American feelings in the Muslim world?

Our study has found that anti-American feeling is by itself not enough to lead one to actively support al Qaeda. To approve of attacks on civilians one must have views that—I am pleased to report—are quite unusual in the Muslim world.

However, anti-American feeling can lead Muslims to suppress their moral doubts about al Qaeda. This makes it politically more difficult for governments to take strong action against al Qaeda, it makes general publics more likely to passively accept al Qaeda and it creates an environment where it is more likely that individuals will cross the threshold into actively supporting al Qaeda. In other words it gives al Qaeda more room to maneuver.

In closing, I will not go so far as to make policy recommendations, but I would like to point out a few of the policy implications of what we have found. When the US decides whether to expand its military presence in a region clearly there are many factors that need to be taken into account. The impact on public opinion is only one. But the impact on public opinion can have significant consequences on the ground as we are seeing vividly in Iraq today. When the US acts on its own initiative, without multilateral approval, these public feelings are also apt to be highly focused at the US itself.

It is also not easy to judge in advance what those public reactions will be, though it is easy to formulate what sound like plausible assumptions. When, the US greatly expanded its military footprint in the Muslim world after 9-11, some assumed that this expansion would not intimidate the general population, that people would perceive it as targeted against a highly circumscribed enemy that did not include them. But the population does not perceive the target of US military presence as separate from them. Rather the target is widely seen as the religion with which they deeply identify.

Others assumed that this dramatic expansion would induce a kind of awe in the general population that would draw people closer to the US and away from America's enemies. The Muslim people are indeed awed by American power, but it appears that this awe quickly turned to fear leading people to pull away from the US and to take a more accommodating view of those, like al Qaeda, who defy America.

There may be some steps that America can take at this point to mitigate these unintended consequences. Above all the challenge now is to provide reassurance through credible evidence that the US has not targeted Islam itself. There may well be symbolic steps that could have some moderating effects. What is most important, however, is how the US comports its military force and how it communicates its long-term intentions.

Equally important, though, is for America to learn from its experience. We will no doubt face challenges in the future and it is critical that we have a clear-eyed view of the likely side effects for the United States when it uses military force. These side effects are likely to be more pronounced when the US acts without the legitimizing and diffusing effect that comes from a multilateral process. And they are likely to be stronger in a region where relations with the US have become laced with the intensity of religious convictions. We may well decide that the costs are worth the strategic objective, but we should not assume that the costs will not be high.

Thank you for your attention.

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Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda

April 24, 2007

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR
STEVEN KULL

RESEARCH STAFF
CLAY RAMSAY
STEPHEN WEBER
EVAN LEWIS
EBRAHIM MOHSENI
MARY SPECK
MELANIE CIOLEK
MELINDA BROUWER

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INTRODUCTION

Since the United States was attacked on September 11, 2001, there have been many studies of Islamic groups, such as al Qaeda, which oppose the United States and use violence against civilians. However there has been relatively little research into how these groups are viewed by the larger Muslim society from which they arise.

The attitudes of this larger society are important for a variety of reasons. At the broadest level, they tell us whether these groups are considered legitimate in terms of their goals as well as their methods. They also tell us how much support such groups are likely to get from the larger society, both directly and indirectly.

To understand the public's feelings about these groups, it is also critical to understand the prevailing narratives in the societies they come from. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has undertaken a "war on terrorism," introducing large numbers of troops into Islamic countries, particularly Afghanistan and Iraq. How do people in the Islamic world understand the purpose of these US efforts? Are their interpretations consonant with the interpretations offered by al Qaeda and related groups? Do Muslims perceive that US forces are a stabilizing force or a threatening one?

Al Qaeda and other groups have not emerged simply in reaction to US policies. They have a broad ideological agenda that includes transforming Islamic countries. How much do these goals resonate with the larger society? Do they favor living in an Islamic state? Do they seek the kind of isolation from Western influences that al Qaeda calls for?

The use of violence against civilians for political purposes has figured prominently in debates about al Qaeda and related groups. Do Muslims believe that it is consistent with Islam? Do they think the current situation warrants such acts?

To answer these and other questions WorldPublicOpinion.org conducted an in-depth study of public opinion in Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and Indonesia. The research was primarily supported by the START Consortium at the University of Maryland. Other scholars of the START Consortium participated in the development of the questionnaire.

Focus groups and surveys were conducted in all four countries. Focus groups were used to identify arguments made spontaneously by people in the region. These arguments were subsequently adapted into survey questions.

The surveys were conducted between December 9, 2006, and February 9, 2007, using in-home interviews based upon multi-stage probability samples. In Morocco (1,000 interviews), Indonesia (1,141 interviews), and Pakistan (1,243 interviews) national probability samples were conducted covering both urban and rural areas. However, the Pakistan findings discussed in this report are based only upon urban respondents (611 interviews); rural respondents were unfamiliar with many of the issues in the survey (full data is available in the questionnaire). In Egypt, the sample (1,000 interviews) was an urban sample drawn probabilistically from seven governorates. Sample sizes of 1,000 – 1,141 have confidence intervals of +/- 3 percentage points; a sample size of 611 has a confidence interval of +/-4 percentage points.

This report focuses on the general distribution of attitudes in the four countries and is limited to policy-related questions. The entire study also includes questions on a wide-range of variables that may be related to the support for such anti-American groups. Analyses of these variables will be released at a future date.

The key findings of the analysis of the general distribution of attitudes are:

VIEWS OF US FOREIGN POLICY

1. Views of the US Government

In all countries large majorities have a negative view of the US government. The United States is perceived as having an extraordinary degree of influence over world events, with majorities in all countries saying that the United States controls most or nearly all of what happens in the world.4

2. Perceptions of US Foreign Policy Goals Related to the Islamic World

Very large majorities believe the United States seeks to undermine Islam and large majorities even believe it wants to spread Christianity in the region. About the same numbers think a key US goal is to maintain access to oil. While majorities perceive the United States as seeking to prevent terrorist attacks, this is not seen as the primary purpose of the war on terror.5

3. Getting the US Military Out of the Muslim World

Majorities in all countries endorse the goal of getting the United States to remove its military bases and its forces from all Islamic countries. Consistent with this goal, support for attacks on US troops in the Muslim world is quite high in Egypt and Morocco. But Pakistanis are divided about such attacks and Indonesians are opposed to them.7

4. US Support for Israel

Majorities in all countries see United States as seeking to expand Israel’s territory. In no country does a majority believe that the US genuinely seeks to create an independent and viable Palestinian state. Majorities in all counties agree with the goal of pushing the United States to stop favoring Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians.8

5. US Support for Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan

Views are mixed on US support for the governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Indonesians support the goal of getting the US to stop providing such support, Moroccans and Pakistanis lean toward supporting it, while Egyptians are divided.....9

VIEWS OF ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS

6. Attacks on Civilians in General

Large majorities in all countries opposes attacks against civilians for political purposes and see them as contrary to Islam. Attacks on civilians are seen as hardly ever effective. Politically motivated attacks against civilian infrastructure are also rejected as not justified.9

7. Attacks on American and European Civilians

Consistent with the opposition to attacks on civilians in principle, and in contrast to the significant support for attacks on US troops, majorities in all countries disapprove of attacks on civilians in the United States as well as civilians in Europe. Nearly as many disapprove of attacks on Americans working for US companies in Islamic countries. In all cases the Egyptians are the most opposed, while the Pakistanis are the least.12

VIEWS OF AL QAEDA AND ITS GOALS

8. Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden

Consistent with their rejection of attacks on civilians, majorities or pluralities say they oppose al Qaeda's attacks on Americans. But many say they share some of al Qaeda's attitudes toward the US and substantial majorities endorse many of al Qaeda's goals. Views of Osama bin Laden are quite divided, with many expressing uncertainty. Views of al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden may be complicated by the widespread disbelief that al Qaeda committed the September 11 attacks..... 13

9. Groups that Attack Americans

In regard to groups that attack Americans in general, Indonesians and Moroccans are fairly negative, Pakistanis lean negative while Egyptians lean positive. Only small numbers in all countries say they would consider donating money to such groups or would approve if a family member were to join such a group..... 18

10. Perceptions of Others' Support

People tend to believe that others share their feelings toward Osama bin Laden and groups that attack Americans. However those who have a favorable attitude are considerably more likely to project their attitudes than those who have negative attitudes. Those with neutral attitudes are more likely to skew in the direction of believing that others have a positive attitude. 20

11. Views on Islamization and Western Cultural Influences

Most respondents express strong support for expanding the role of Islam in their countries—consistent with the goals of al Qaeda---but also express an openness to outside cultural influences. Large majorities in most countries support the goals of requiring a strict application of sharia, keeping out Western values, and even unifying all Islamic countries into a single Islamic state. On the other hand, majorities in all countries regard the increasing interconnection of the world through trade and communication as positive and strongly support democracy and religious freedom. Majorities or pluralities also reject the idea that violent conflict between Muslim and Western culture is inevitable and say that it is possible to find common ground. 21


FINDINGS

VIEWES OF US FOREIGN POLICY


I. Views of the US Government

In all countries large majorities have a negative view of the US government. The United States is perceived as having an extraordinary degree of influence over world events, with majorities in all countries saying that the United States controls most or nearly all of what happens in the world.

Negative views of the United States government are widespread. An overwhelming majority of Egyptians (93%) expressed unfavorable attitudes toward the current US government, with most (86%) saying their opinion was “very unfavorable.” Large majorities also had unfavorable views in Morocco (76%), Pakistan (67%), and Indonesia (66%). About half of the respondents in both Morocco and Pakistan said their opinion was very unfavorable (49%) and 16 percent said this in Indonesia.



The United States is perceived as having an extraordinary amount of control over events in the world. Respondents were asked, “How much of what happens in the world today would you say is controlled by the US?” Majorities in all four countries said “most” or “nearly all” of what happened was controlled by the United States. Eighty-nine percent in Egypt said this (57% “nearly all”), as did significant majorities in Pakistan (64%), Morocco (63%), and Indonesia (60%).



Responses were mixed when presented arguments that made the case that the United States has at time been helpful to others or compared favorably to other great powers in history. Presented the argument, “There have been times in American history where it has helped to promote the welfare of others.” A majority in Egypt (58%) and a plurality in Morocco (42%) disagreed. Pakistanis were quite divided, with 36 percent disagreeing and 33 percent agreeing, while more than a third (31%) declined to offer an opinion. A plurality of Indonesians (46%) agreed that the US had been helpful (27% disagreed).

Similar responses were elicited by the argument, "There is a lot wrong with America, but at least America has done more to promote economic development in the Middle East than past great powers like the British." A majority of Egyptians (59%) and a plurality of Pakistanis (37% to 28%) disagreed. Moroccans were divided (39% agree, 38% disagree) and a plurality of Indonesians (44%) agreed that the United States had promoted development. Indonesia received substantial and very obvious US help following the December 2004 tsunami, which may explain the large numbers of Indonesians who agree that the United States has at least promoted development.



2. Perceptions of US Foreign Policy Goals Related to the Islamic World

Very large majorities believe the United States seeks to undermine Islam and large majorities even believe it wants to spread Christianity in the region. About the same numbers think a key US goal is to maintain access to oil. While majorities perceive the United States as seeking to prevent terrorist attacks, this is not seen as the primary purpose of the war on terror.

Respondents were presented a series of possible foreign policy goals related to the Islamic world and asked to evaluate whether each was a goal of the United States. Large majorities across all four countries believe that a goal of US foreign policy is to "weaken and divide the Islamic world." On average 79 percent said they believed this was a US goal, including a very large majority in Egypt (92%) and large majorities in Morocco (78%), Indonesia (73%) and Pakistan (73%).

Respondents believe that the United States wants to weaken Islam out of a feeling of being threatened by Islam. In a separate series of questions, large majorities agreed with the statement, "It is America's goal to weaken Islam so that it will not grow and challenge the Western way of life." This attitude was most widespread in Egypt, where 87 percent agreed followed by Morocco (69%) and Pakistan (62%). Although Indonesians were more skeptical about whether the United States sought to weaken Islam, an overall majority (57%) agreed that it did.

US leaders are seen as having a pro-Christian agenda. Large majorities (average 64%) said they believed that the United States wanted "to spread Christianity in the Middle East," including two-thirds in Morocco (67%) and significant majorities in Pakistan (64%) and Indonesia (61%). Egyptians were not asked this question.



Equally large majorities think the United States pursues the more traditional strategic goal of protecting its access to oil. An overwhelming majority in Egypt (93%) said that maintaining “control over the oil resources of the Middle East” was a goal of the United States (84% definitely), as well as strong majorities in Morocco (82%), Indonesia (74%) and Pakistan (68%). On average 79 percent had this perception.

Respondents also endorsed an argument that framed US efforts to gain access to Middle Eastern oil as illegitimate and exploitive. In all four countries, most respondents agreed that “America pretends to be helpful to Muslim countries, but in fact everything it does is really part of a scheme to take advantage of people in the Middle East and steal their oil.” On average across all four countries, two thirds of respondents (67%) thought this was the case. Egyptians (87%), Moroccans (62%), Indonesians (61%), and Pakistanis (56%) agreed with this. These majorities were a bit smaller than those believing the United States wanted to maintain control over Midcast oil, however, perhaps because some felt that saying the US sought to “steal” Middle Eastern oil overstated the case.

The stated US goal of preventing “more attacks such as those on the World Trade Center in September 2001” was seen as a genuine objective by more modest numbers (average 58 percent). Seventy-one percent of Moroccans and 68 percent of Indonesians said this was a US goal. Only 58 percent of Egyptians said this was a US goal and 39 percent said it was not. Pakistanis were even more uncertain: just 48 percent said the US wanted to prevent such attacks and 29 percent disagreed, while 33 percent did not answer.


Only minorities said that the US sought to ensure that their country “does not fall into the hands of extremist groups” (average 35%). The highest percentage was in Indonesia (41%) followed by Morocco (38%) and Pakistan (38%). Just 24 percent of Egyptians concurred.

Primary Goal of the War on Terrorism

Respondents were also asked what they thought “the primary goal” of the US war on terrorism was. They were given three possible responses: 1) “to protect itself from terrorist attacks;” 2) “to achieve political and military domination to control Middle East resources;” and, 3) “to weaken and divide the Islamic religion and its people.”

The US government’s stated goal—to protect the United States from terrorist attacks—received short shrift. On average, just 16 percent saw this reason as primary, ranging from 9 percent in Egypt to 23 percent in Indonesia.

Roughly equal numbers thought the other two possibilities were the United States’ primary goals. Over all four countries, 36 percent selected achieving political and military domination, while 34 percent chose weakening and dividing the Islamic religion and its people. Achieving political and military domination was highest in Egypt (55%) and Morocco (39%), while weakening and dividing Islam was highest in Pakistan (42%) and Indonesia (29%).





3. Getting the US Military Out of the Muslim World

Majorities in all countries endorse the goal of getting the United States to remove its military bases and its forces from all Islamic countries. Consistent with this goal, support for attacks on US troops in the Muslim world is quite high in Egypt and Morocco. But Pakistanis are divided about such attacks and Indonesians are opposed to them.

Large majorities in all countries agreed with the goal of getting “the US to remove its bases and its military forces from all Islamic countries”—on average 74 percent. In Morocco, 72 percent agreed (37% strongly). In Egypt, agreement was 92 percent (82% strongly). In Pakistan, 71 percent agreed that the US should be pushed to remove its bases from Islamic countries (48% strongly); only 9 percent disagreed. Indonesians, too, agreed with this goal by 64 percent to 16 percent.

Consistent with their support for the goal of driving US military forces out of Islamic countries, respondents express significant—but not universal—approval of attacks on US troops in Islamic countries, including both those that are fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan and those that are based in the Persian Gulf. On average, for each area, approximately half favored such attacks, with three in ten opposed, but there were substantial variations between countries. Very large majorities in Egypt said they supported such attacks, as did robust majorities in Morocco. Pakistanis tended to be divided and Indonesians were mostly opposed.

Majorities in Egypt and Morocco expressed approval for attacks on US troops in Muslim countries. Egyptians were those most likely to support such actions. Nine out of ten Egyptians approved of attacks on US military troops in Iraq (91%) and in Afghanistan (91%). Four out of five Egyptians (83%) said they supported attacks on US forces based in Persian Gulf states. Substantial majorities of Moroccans were also in favor of attacks on US troops in Iraq (68%), in Afghanistan



(61%) and slightly smaller majorities supported attacks on those based in Persian Gulf states (52%).

Pakistanis were divided about attacks on US troops, though only a third expressed outright disapproval. A third (35%) of respondents in Pakistan approved of attacks on US troops in Iraq and another 13 percent expressed mixed feelings. A third (35%) disapproved. About the same percentages endorse attacking US forces in neighboring Afghanistan: 34 percent approve and 14 percent are ambivalent. One third (33%) disapproves. In the Persian Gulf, about a third (32%) approved of attacks on US forces while 14 percent had mixed feelings and 27 percent disapproved.


Indonesians stand out for their opposition to such attacks. Sixty-one percent disapproved of attacks on US troops fighting in Iraq and nearly as many (59%) disapproved of attacks on US forces in Afghanistan. Fifty-seven percent rejected attacks on US military troops based in the Persian Gulf states. Fewer than one in five said they were in favor of attacking US forces in any of the three locations.

4. US Support for Israel

Majorities in all countries see United States as seeking to expand Israel's territory. In no country does a majority believe that the US genuinely seeks to create an independent and viable Palestinian state. Majorities in all countries agree with the goal of pushing the United States to stop favoring Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians.

Consistent with the view that the United States does not respect Islamic interests, majorities in all four countries believe that the United States supports the expansion of Israel's borders. More than nine in 10 Egyptians (91%) and roughly three in five in Morocco (64%), Pakistan (62%), and Indonesia (58%) said they believed this was a US goal.

In no country did a majority or plurality believe that "the creation of an independent and economically viable Palestinian state" was a goal of the United States. The numbers asserting this was not a US goal varied considerably among the countries polled, however. Egyptians took the strongest position: 91 percent said that this was not a US goal. A majority of Moroccans (64%) agreed. Pakistanis tended to agree: 36 percent said the US did not want this and 29 percent said it did. Indonesians were divided, with 38 percent (the largest number) saying that US wanted a Palestinian state and 40 percent saying it did not.




Two-thirds or more of those polled in all four countries said that they supported the goal of trying "to push the United States to stop favoring Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians." In Egypt, an overwhelming 95 percent agreed and in Morocco, 75 percent did. In both Pakistan and Indonesia, 65 percent agreed, though Pakistanis were more emphatic (42% believed strongly) than Indonesians (29% strongly).

5. US Support for Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan

Views are mixed on US support for the governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Indonesians support the goal of getting the US to stop providing such support, Moroccans and Pakistanis lean toward supporting it, while Egyptians are divided.

In contrast to the strong support shown overall for pushing US military forces out of Islamic countries, views were much more mixed about whether it was a good idea to try "to push the United States to stop providing support to such governments as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan."

Indonesia is the only country where a majority expressed support for this idea (55%). It is also the country that is the most distant—both geographically and culturally—from the Arab countries named. In Morocco, respondents tended to agree, but by a narrow margin of 42 percent to 36 percent. Although their government is also a major recipient of US aid, Pakistanis tended to agree that such aid should be stopped by 40 percent to 27 percent. The question asked of Egyptians was worded slightly differently in that Egypt was not named. Egyptian respondents were divided: 44 percent agreed but 46 percent disagreed. Egypt is the largest recipient of US bilateral aid after Israel.




VIEWS OF ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS

6. Attacks on Civilians in General

Large majorities in all countries oppose attacks against civilians for political purposes and see them as contrary to Islam. Attacks on civilians are seen as hardly ever effective. Politically motivated attacks against civilian infrastructure are also rejected as not justified.

Most respondents in all four countries believe that politically-motivated attacks on civilians, such as bombings or assassinations, cannot be justified. Respondents were given four options for evaluating such attacks: "strongly justified," "justified," "weakly justified," and "not justified at all." In all countries a majority—in most cases an overwhelming majority—took the strongest position, saying




April 24, 2007 Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda

that such attacks could not be justified at all. More than four out of five Indonesians (84%), Pakistanis (81%), and Egyptians (77%) said such attacks were completely inexcusable, as well as 57 percent of Moroccans (an additional 19 percent of Moroccans said they could only be “weakly justified”). On average 75 percent said that such attacks could not be justified at all.

Most believe that attacks on civilians are contrary to Islam. Respondents were asked about the “position of Islam regarding attacks against civilians,” and asked whether it supports or opposes such attacks. They were offered the additional options of saying that it “certainly” supports or opposes such attacks. Most took the strongest position of saying that Islam “certainly” opposes targeting civilians. On average, 63 percent took this position including 83 percent of Egyptians, 72 percent of Pakistanis, and 61 percent of Moroccans. A more modest 37 percent of Indonesians said that Islam certainly opposes such attacks, though an additional 38 percent said simply that Islam opposes them.

Respondents were also asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement, “Groups that use violence against civilians, such as al Qaeda, are violating the principles of Islam. Islam opposes the use of such violence.” Large majorities agreed in Egypt (88%), Indonesia (65%) and Morocco (66%).

Pakistanis, however, were much more equivocal on this question. Only 30 percent said they agreed that such attacks violated Islam and 35 percent disagreed (35 percent did not answer). This appears to contradict the majority view in Pakistan, discussed earlier, that attacks on civilians could never be justified and that Islam certainly opposes such attacks. It may be that some Pakistani respondents are reacting negatively to the assertion that al Qaeda uses violence against civilians. As discussed below, Pakistanis are particularly likely to reject the idea that al Qaeda had a role in the September 11th attacks.



Three of the publics polled see targeting civilians as not only morally unacceptable but also largely ineffective. Respondents were asked to judge whether attacking civilians was an effective tactic “often,” “only sometimes,” or “hardly ever.” A majority of Moroccans (55%) and Pakistanis (53%) considered such attacks hardly ever effective, while 17 percent of both publics said they were only sometimes effective. A plurality in Indonesia (42%) also said they were hardly ever effective, while 19 percent called them only sometimes effective. Just eight percent called them often effective, while 31 percent did not answer.

Egyptians, however, took quite a different view. While 37 percent said such attacks were hardly ever effective, a majority of 58 percent said they were at least sometimes effective. It should be noted, however, that Egyptians show greater opposition to the use of such attacks than other publics.

Attacks on Civilian Infrastructure


Majorities in all four countries also think that attacks on civilian infrastructure—even if no civilians are killed—are completely unjustifiable. Respondents were asked about “politically motivated

attacks” that do not inflict casualties, such as “destroying a pipeline or bombing a radio transmitting tower.” On average 69 percent said that such attacks could never be justified, including 80 percent of Indonesians, 77 percent of Pakistanis, 62 percent of Egyptians and 56 percent of Moroccans. On average another 12 percent said such attacks could only be weakly justified, while just 10 percent said they could be justified.

Suicide Attacks

Attitudes about suicide attacks are more complex. It should be noted that suicide attacks do not necessarily target civilians; many are directed against military targets. Nonetheless, majorities in three of the four countries said that suicide attacks were rarely or never justified. Egyptians, on the other hand, tended to believe they were justified sometimes or often.

Respondents were asked what they thought when they heard or read about “an attack in which a Muslim blows himself up while attacking an enemy.” In two countries majorities said such suicide bombings were “never justified:” Indonesia (68%) and Pakistan (62%). An additional 13 percent of Indonesians and 11 percent of Pakistanis said suicide bombings were rarely justified. Moroccans also tended to think such attacks were unjustified, though less emphatically: 34 percent said they were never justified and 19 percent said rarely.



Three in five Egyptians (60%), however, considered suicide bombings to be “often” (41%) or “sometimes” (19%) justified. About a quarter (28%) said they were never justified and 8 percent called such actions rarely justified. The fact that Egyptian respondents also said they were strongly opposed to attacks on civilians suggests that Egyptians may tend to think of suicide attacks as being against non civilian targets.

Terrorism

In three of the four countries polled, most respondents indicate that they consider terrorism a serious challenge. They were asked to choose whether they viewed “terrorism” as a “very big problem,” a “moderate problem,” a “small problem” or “not a problem.” Very large majorities said they saw terrorism as a problem, and large majorities saw it as a very big one.

The highest level of concern was in Pakistan where 83 percent saw terrorism as a very big problem and an additional 10 percent saw it as a moderate problem. Two-thirds of Indonesians (67%) also said terrorism was a big problem and an additional 21 percent called it a moderate problem. Among Egyptians, 62 percent said it was a very big problem, plus eight percent saw it as a moderate one.

Morocco diverges dramatically. More than four fifths (84%) said terrorism was either only a “small problem” (78%) or “not a problem” (6%). Only 13 percent of Moroccans called it either a very big problem (1%) or a moderate problem (12%).


All four countries have suffered major terrorist attacks in recent years, though Morocco has suffered fewer casualties than the other countries polled. Pakistan—the country where respondents were most likely to consider terrorism a significant problem—has lost about 35 people in two suicide bombing attacks so far this year and Islamic militants trained there are blamed for suicide attacks in neighboring Afghanistan. In Indonesia, more than 200 people died in the 2002 suicide bombings at nightclubs in Bali, Indonesia, and since then about 40 more people have died in attacks on foreign targets. Bombings in the Egyptian resort cities of Dahab in 2006 and Sharm el Sheikh in 2005 killed more than a hundred people. In Morocco, suicide bombings carried out in Casablanca in 2003 killed 45 people.

7. Attacks on American and European Civilians

Consistent with the opposition to attacks on civilians in principle, and in contrast to the significant support for attacks on US troops, majorities in all countries disapprove of attacks on civilians in the United States as well as civilians in Europe. Nearly as many disapprove of attacks on Americans working for US companies in Islamic countries. In all cases the Egyptians are the most opposed, while the Pakistanis are the least.

Large majorities in all countries reject violence that targets civilians in the United States or in Europe, with large majorities in three of the countries rejecting them strongly. On average 78 percent said they disapprove of attacks on American civilians (60% strongly), while 79 percent disapproved of attacks on European civilians (62% strongly). Just 4-5 percent approved of such attacks while 7-8 percent had mixed feelings.

Egyptians were the most strongly opposed. Nine out of ten disapproved of attacks on both Americans (91%) and Europeans (93%) and most of them disapproved strongly (79% for Americans, 84% for European). Eight out of ten Moroccans (78%) opposed attacks on Americans (57% strongly) and slightly more (82%) opposed attacks on Europeans (61% strongly). Indonesian responses were similar. Three-quarters (75%) disapproved of attacks on Americans (57% strongly) and 78 percent rejected attacks on Europeans (60% strongly). Because of the large number of non responses in Pakistan, percentages there were smaller: 67 percent opposed attacks on Americans (46% strongly) and 63 percent opposed attacks on Europeans (44% strongly).



Exceedingly small numbers in all countries—ranging from 3 percent to 7 percent—expressed approval for attacks on either American or European civilians. Respondents were also offered the option of saying they had mixed feelings about such attacks, though relatively small numbers chose it: 2 percent to 8 percent in three of the countries and 13-14 percent in Pakistan for Europeans and Americans. The minorities who approved of or had mixed feelings about such attacks were also largest in Pakistan: 18 percent said they either approved (5%) or had mixed feelings (13%) about attacks on Americans and 20 percent either approved (6%) or had mixed feelings (14%) about attacks on Europeans. In Morocco, this number reached 15 percent for attacks against Americans (7% approve, 8% mixed), and 13 percent for Europeans (6% approve, 7% mixed). Those approving in Indonesia and Egypt were even fewer.

Most respondents also opposed attacks on US civilians working for US companies in Muslim countries. In Egypt, nine out of ten disapproved, including 78 percent who chose “strongly disapprove.” Three out of four Indonesians (76%) disapproved, 57 percent strongly, as did three out of four Moroccans (73%), 49 percent strongly. A majority of Pakistanis also rejected attacks on such workers (58%), though only 39 percent did so strongly.

The percentage expressing approval or “mixed feelings” about attacks on US civilians working for US companies in the Muslim world was highest in Pakistan (23%) and Morocco (20%). One tenth or less expressed either ambivalence or approval in Indonesia (10%) and Egypt (8%).


VIEWS OF AL QAEDA AND ITS GOALS

8. Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden

Consistent with their rejection of attacks on civilians, majorities or pluralities say they oppose al Qaeda’s attacks on Americans. But many say they share some of al Qaeda’s attitudes toward the US and substantial majorities endorse many of al Qaeda’s goals. Views of Osama bin Laden are quite divided, with many expressing uncertainty. Views of al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden may be complicated by the widespread disbelief that al Qaeda committed the September 11 attacks.

Views of al Qaeda are not simply positive or negative. Just as respondents reject attacks on civilians, most reject al Qaeda’s attacks on Americans. Nonetheless, they agree with some of its views of the United States and sympathize with many of its goals.

To differentiate between their views about al Qaeda’s attacks on Americans and their views about al Qaeda’s attitudes toward the United States, respondents were offered three statements: 1) “I support al Qaeda’s attacks on Americans and share its attitudes toward the US;” 2) “I oppose al Qaeda’s attacks on Americans but share many of its attitudes toward the US;” and, 3) “I oppose al Qaeda’s attacks on Americans and do not share its attitudes toward the US.”




April 24, 2007 Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda

Respondents confirmed once again their opposition to attacks on civilians (discussed above). No more than one in four endorsed al Qaeda's attacks on Americans. However, majorities or pluralities in all countries said they shared al Qaeda's attitudes toward the United States. Remarkably high numbers declined to take a position in all countries except Egypt, however.

The highest percentage saying that they supported al Qaeda's attacks and also shared its attitudes toward the United States was found in Egypt, though even there it reached only 25 percent. Lower levels of support were found in Indonesia (15%), Morocco (9%), and Pakistan (9%).

Relatively high percentages fully rejected both al Qaeda's attacks and its views of the United States. This was the most common position in Indonesia (29%) and Pakistan (17%), one of the highest in Egypt (31%), and the second highest in Morocco (26%).

The mixed position—rejecting the al Qaeda's attacks, but sharing its views of the United States—was the most common in Morocco (31%), one of the highest in Egypt (31%), the second highest in Indonesia (24%), but the lowest in Pakistan (7%).



In summary, every country except Pakistan (where two out of three declined to answer) had substantial majorities who rejected al Qaeda's attacks on Americans (Egypt 62%, Indonesia 53%, Morocco 57%) though majorities or pluralities also expressed agreement with al Qaeda's attitudes toward the United States (Egypt 56%, Indonesia 39%, Morocco 40%).

Al Qaeda's Goals

Perhaps most significantly, large majorities endorsed goals that they also perceived to be the objectives of groups such as al Qaeda. Respondents were presented a series of seven goals and asked whether they were the goals of "groups such as al Qaeda and groups inspired by al Qaeda that have conducted attacks on American and European civilians." Respondents could say whether they thought each one was definitely or probably a goal, or definitely or probably not a goal. In a second series of questions, they were presented the same series of seven goals and asked whether they personally agreed with each one.

Large majorities in all countries personally agreed with six of the seven goals and believed, correctly, that they were objectives of al Qaeda and similar groups. The one goal majorities neither perceived as being one of al Qaeda's objectives nor supported themselves was "to push the US to stop providing support to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan."

Majorities in all four countries expressed very strong support for keeping "Western values out of Islamic countries:" Egypt (91%), Indonesia (78%), Pakistan (67%) and Morocco (64%). Majorities—ranging from 56 percent in Pakistan to 75 percent in Egypt—also rightly perceived that this was one of al Qaeda's goals.


Similar majorities also endorsed the goal “to push the US to remove its bases and its military forces from all Islamic countries:” Egypt (92%), Pakistan (71%), Morocco (72%) and Indonesia (64%). Again, large majorities also correctly believed that this was an al Qaeda goal, ranging from 59 percent in Pakistan to 81 percent in Egypt.

Majorities said they considered pushing the United States “to stop favoring Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians” to be one of al Qaeda’s goals and also said it was a goal they supported. In Egypt, 81 percent thought al Qaeda was striving to accomplish this and an overwhelming 95 percent said they agreed with this objective. In Morocco, 76 percent believed this was an al Qaeda objective and 75 percent supported it themselves. In Indonesia, 65 percent said it was an al Qaeda goal and the same percentage said they agreed with it personally. In Pakistan, a slim majority said it was an al Qaeda goal (51%) and a larger one (65%) said they shared the goal.

Majorities in all countries said they believed al Qaeda tries “to stand up to America and affirm the dignity of the Islamic people.” This was also the goal most widely shared overall by respondents across all countries. Three-quarters or more said this was al Qaeda’s goal in Egypt (78%), Indonesia (76%) and Morocco (75%) as did a majority in Pakistan (57%). Large majorities across all four countries said they personally agreed with this goal: 90 percent in Egypt (80% strongly), 72 percent in Indonesia (38% strongly), 69 percent in Morocco (40% strongly) and 65% in Pakistan (41% strongly).

Majorities in all four countries—though smaller ones—said that al Qaeda sought “to require a strict application of Shari’a law in every Islamic country.” Seventy-four percent of Moroccans said this was an al Qaeda objective and 65 percent of Indonesians and 62 percent of both Egyptians and Pakistanis agreed. This goal was strongly supported by respondents themselves in every country except Indonesia. Three-quarters or more personally supported the application of Islamic law in Pakistan (79%), Morocco (76%) and Egypt (74%). A narrow majority of Indonesians (53%) also expressed support for this goal, though 40 percent said they disagreed with it. About one in five disagreed in Egypt (22%) and Morocco (19%). Less than one in ten disagreed in Pakistan (8%). (It should be noted that there is no Islamic equivalent to the Roman Catholic papacy. No single religious leader or institution in the Islamic world has the authority to define sharia).

The two remaining goals represent potential threats to governments in the Islamic world. The first is “to unify all Islamic countries into a single Islamic state or caliphate.” Majorities in all countries polled perceived correctly that al Qaeda wanted to achieve this: 67 percent in Morocco, 61 percent in



April 24, 2007 Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda

Indonesia, 60 percent in Egypt and 52 percent in Pakistan. Majorities in three countries also agreed with this objective themselves: Pakistan (74%), Morocco (71%), and Egypt (67%). Indonesia was the exception: only 49 percent agreed that Islamic countries should be united into a caliphate.


The second goal that might threaten existing regimes is to push the United States to “stop providing support to such governments as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.” (The Egyptian government was not named when this question was asked in Egypt). Although al Qaeda leaders have expressed this goal, majorities in only two of the four countries said it was one of al Qaeda’s objectives: Indonesia (54%) and Morocco (51%). The Egyptian public was divided: 41 percent agreed that it was an al Qaeda goal and 43 percent disagreed. In Pakistan, only 35 percent saw the withdrawal of US support for certain governments as an al Qaeda goal.

Respondents’ personal views about this objective are mixed. Only in Indonesia did a majority express support (55%). Of the four countries polled, Indonesia is the most distant—both geographically and culturally—from the Arab countries named. In Morocco, respondents agreed by only a narrow margin of 42 percent to 36 percent. Although their government is another major recipient of US aid, Pakistanis tended to agree by 40 percent to 27 percent. In Egypt, respondents were divided: 44 percent agreed but 46 percent disagreed. Egypt, one of the countries named in the question, is the largest recipient of US bilateral aid after Israel.

Osama bin Laden

Views of Osama bin Laden are roughly balanced in all four countries, though they tilt positive in three countries. Respondents were offered the option of saying whether their feelings were positive, negative, or mixed. On average 30 percent were positive, 19 percent negative, 29 percent mixed and 23 percent declined to answer. No more than 40 percent endorsed any one of these categories in any country. Once again in all countries except Egypt, very large numbers declined to answer.

Egyptians had the most positive opinion of bin Laden: 40 percent said their feelings were positive, 20 percent negative and 34 percent mixed. Moroccans were slightly more positive (27%) than negative (21%), though 26 percent had mixed feelings and 25 percent did not answer. Pakistanis also tended to be more positive (27%) than negative (15%), though 24 percent expressed mixed feelings and 35 percent did not answer. Indonesians were the most uncertain of the four publics polled: 21 percent said their feelings toward bin Laden were positive, 19 percent negative, 32 percent mixed. Twenty-six percent of Indonesian respondents would not answer.



Beliefs about the September 11th Attacks

Views of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden may be complicated by the high levels of uncertainty about whether al Qaeda carried out the September 11th attacks. This could explain the large numbers who would not answer (up to 66%) questions about al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.



When asked how confident they were that they knew who was behind the September 11th attacks, majorities in all four countries either said they were "not at all confident" or declined to answer. In Egypt, 44 percent were not at all confident and an additional 11 percent had no opinion. In Morocco, 31 percent were not at all confident and 21 percent had no opinion. In Indonesia, 23 percent were not at all confident and 41 percent expressed no opinion. Pakistan had the lowest percentage saying they were not at all confident (15%) but a majority (56%) would not answer.

All respondents were then asked to either name who they thought was responsible for the 9/11 attacks or to make their best guess. The largest percentages, but still much less than a majority, identified al Qaeda as responsible. This included 35 percent of Moroccans, 28 percent of Egyptians and 26 percent of Indonesians.

Pakistan is a special case. Only 2 percent of Pakistanis named al Qaeda, while 27 percent said the US government was behind the attacks. A very large 63 percent would not answer.

The US government was considered responsible for the attacks by 16 percent of Moroccans, 9 percent of Egyptians, and 17 percent of Indonesians. Israel was also mentioned as responsible, especially in the two Arab countries: 15 percent of Moroccans and more than a quarter of Egyptians (29%) said Israel was behind the attacks (Egyptians cited Israel more often than the United States). Only 7 percent of Pakistanis and 3 percent of Indonesians said they believed Israel was responsible for 9/11.


No other state or organization garnered more than 2 percent of responses in any of the four countries. Given Osama bin Laden's public disclosure that al Qaeda was behind the attacks on New York and



April 24, 2007 Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda

Washington, it is striking that more than five years later, majorities do not identify al Qaeda as the perpetrator.


In all countries, the most common view is that the September 11th attacks “have been negative for the people of the Islamic world.” Majorities in Morocco (62%), Egypt (70%), and Indonesia (56%), and a plurality in Pakistan (50%) said the attacks had had a negative effect. Large numbers went further and said their effect had been “very negative:” 53 percent in Egypt, 39 percent in Morocco, 31 percent in Pakistan and 22 percent in Indonesia. The largest minority calling the attacks positive was in Egypt (23%), followed by Indonesia (19%), Morocco (12%) and Pakistan (8%).



9. Groups that Attack Americans

In regard to groups that attack Americans in general, Indonesians and Moroccans are fairly negative, Pakistanis lean negative while Egyptians lean positive. Only small numbers in all countries say they would consider donating money to such groups or would approve if a family member were to join such a group.

Respondents in most countries tend to have more negative than positive views of groups that attack Americans in general, with the exception of Egypt. Respondents were asked to rate “groups in the Muslim world that attack Americans” on a 0-10 scale with “with 0 meaning they do not feel at all supportive and 10 meaning they feel very supportive.” In three countries the mean score is below the midpoint: Morocco 3.4, Indonesia 4.5 and Pakistan 4.6. Egypt is the exception with a mean score of 5.1, just a hair above the midpoint.



Respondents were also given the opportunity to differentiate between various “groups in the Muslim world that attack Americans.” In this context significant numbers expressed support for at least some such groups. Respondents were given three possible responses: “disapprove of all of these groups,” “approve of some but disapprove of others,” and “approve of all or most of these groups.” A majority of Indonesians (52%) said they disapproved of all such groups while a quarter (24%) approved of at least some of them (6% most) and another quarter declined to answer. In Morocco, 44 percent



expressed blanket disapproval while 38 percent approved of some (3% most). About a fifth of Moroccan respondents (19%) did not answer. In Pakistan, 43 percent completely rejected such groups while 15 percent approved of some (5% most). However, 42 percent of respondents in Pakistan declined to answer.

In contrast, two-thirds of Egyptians (66%) said they approved of at least some of these groups. This included 51 percent who said they endorsed some and rejected others and 15 percent who said they approved of all or most groups that attack Americans.

Those who said they approved of at least some groups that attack Americans or would not answer, were also asked a number of questions to gauge their support for such groups, such as whether they would speak favorably about them with family or friends and whether they would consider giving money to them or encouraging others to do so.

Fairly small minorities said they would sometimes speak favorably about groups that attack Americans to family or friends (all percentages are of the full sample). Egypt had the largest numbers (24%) saying they would do so, though it also had the largest numbers refusing to express such opinions (41%). Indonesia was next with 16 percent saying they would speak favorably (21% no answer) followed by Morocco with 12 percent and Pakistan with 6 percent.

Respondents in three countries (excluding Egypt) were asked whether they "would ever consider" contributing money to "an organization that may send some of its funds to a group that attacks Americans." Very small numbers said they would do so, but substantial numbers would not answer, which may mean that respondents felt



April 24, 2007 Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda

uncomfortable answering such a question. In Pakistan, 7 percent said they would consider contributing money (27% no answer), as did 8 percent in Indonesia (19% no answer) and 5 percent in Morocco (11% no answer).

Respondents in three countries were asked (again excluding Egypt) whether they would approve if a family member were to join a group that attacks Americans. In every case the most common response was that they would disapprove, and only small minorities said they would approve of such a decision.

However, large numbers—those who approve plus those who express mixed feelings or refuse to answer—did not say they would disapprove of a relative's decision to join a violently anti-American group. Among Indonesians, these answers total 19 percent. Among Moroccans, those unwilling to disapprove add up to 24 percent and among Pakistanis to 33 percent.

10. Perceptions of Others' Support

People tend to believe that others share their feelings toward Osama bin Laden and groups that attack Americans. However those who have a favorable attitude are considerably more likely to project their attitudes than those who have negative attitudes. Those with neutral attitudes are more likely to skew in the direction of believing that others have a positive attitude.

Respondents were asked to assess the attitudes of others in their country toward groups that attack Americans and Osama bin Laden. Because these questions followed the same format as questions about themselves, it is possible to compare respondents' perceptions of themselves to their perceptions of others. Overall there is a strong tendency of respondents to believe that most others agree with them, but this tendency is generally stronger among those who approve of groups that attack Americans, of Bin Laden and of suicide bombing than among those who disapprove.

Respondents were asked to rate both themselves and the average person in terms of support for groups that attack Americans on a 0-10 scale, where 0 means not at all supportive and 10 very supportive. In Indonesia, 70 percent of those indicating that they felt relatively little support for such groups (scores of 0-4) also assumed that the average person in their country felt relatively little support. However, of those who indicated relatively high support (scores of 6-10) a much higher 86 percent assumed that others agreed with them. This tendency was even stronger in Egypt where 63 percent of those with 0-4 ratings assumed that the average Egyptian agreed with them, while 87 percent of those with 6-10 ratings assumed agreement. Pakistan followed a similar pattern: 74 percent of those indicating they felt lower support for such groups thought their feelings were shared but 80 percent of those showing higher support thought so. In Morocco, the results were similar though the differences are barely significant.

In all countries majorities or pluralities of those who rated their own feelings at the scale's midpoint (5), assumed others felt equally neutral about groups that attack Americans. But they were far more likely to assume that the average person in their country would feel relatively positively toward such groups (scores of 6-10) than negatively (0-4). Thus even in this neutral group, perceptions were skewed toward believing others favor groups that attack Americans.

Responses to questions about Osama bin Laden followed the same pattern. Respondents tended to project their views on others, especially those with positive views of bin Laden. In Egypt, overwhelming majorities of those with a positive view of bin Laden projected these views (82%) while less than half (47%) of those with negative views assumed their opinions were shared. The


same contrast is found in Morocco (74% to 49%) and Pakistan (72% to 47%). In Indonesia, however, equal numbers of those with positive and negative views assumed their feelings were shared by the average Indonesian (66%).

This tendency to assume that others have positive views of the groups that attack Americans and bin Laden is not derived from a correct perception. In fact, there is no majority position on either question in any country. Views of Osama bin Laden tilt slightly to the positive (though it is a minority position in each case) while views of groups that attack Americans tilt to the negative.


II. Views on Islamization and Western Cultural Influences

Most respondents express strong support for expanding the role of Islam in their countries—consistent with the goals of al Qaeda—but also express an openness to outside cultural influences. Large majorities in most countries support the goals of requiring a strict application of sharia, keeping out Western values, and even unifying all Islamic countries into a single Islamic state. On the other hand, majorities in all countries regard the increasing interconnection of the world through trade and communication as positive and strongly support democracy and religious freedom. Majorities or pluralities also reject the idea that violent conflict between Muslim and Western culture is inevitable and say that it is possible to find common ground.

Most respondents express strong support for expanding the role of Islam in their societies, a view that is consistent with the goals of al Qaeda. Large majorities in most countries—an average of 71 percent (39% strongly)—agree with the goal of requiring “strict application of Shari’a law in every Islamic country.” Pakistanis were the most enthusiastic with 79 percent agreeing. About three in four Moroccans (76%) and Egyptians (74%) also agreed. Indonesians showed the lowest support: 53 percent agreed and 40 percent disagreed.



Closely related to the goal of expanding the role of Islam is the aim “to keep Western values out of Islamic countries.” This objective, too, got wide support (overall average 76%). In Egypt, an overwhelming 91 percent agree (80% strongly). Nearly four out of five (78%) also agreed with this objective in Indonesia as did two out three Pakistanis (67%) and Moroccans (64%).




Majorities in three of the four countries—Indonesia (79%), Pakistan (66%) and Egypt (55%)—also expressed an unfavorable view of American culture. A majority of Moroccans, however, expressed a favorable view (64%).

Majorities even agree with the ambitious goal “to unify all Islamic countries into a single Islamic state or caliphate” (overall average 65%). Seventy-four percent of Pakistanis agreed with this goal, as did 71 percent of Moroccans and 67 percent of Egyptians. However, in Indonesia only 49 percent agreed while 40 percent disagreed.


Openness to Western Influences: Globalization, Democracy and Human Rights

While respondents said they wanted to keep Western values out of Islamic countries, they also expressed a surprising degree of openness to some Western influences, suggesting their opposition to Western culture may be limited to certain intensely felt issues.

Asked how they felt about “the world becoming more connected through greater economic trade and faster communication,” an average of 75 percent considered this positive. Ninety-two percent of Egyptians, 80 percent of Indonesians, 65 percent of Pakistanis and 62 percent of Moroccans said they thought that this was either a “very good” or a “somewhat good” thing for their country. Only marginal numbers called globalization a “somewhat bad” or a “very bad thing.” Morocco had the highest percentage of respondents expressing negative attitudes toward globalization (23%).



In all four countries polled, strong majorities (67% overall) said they considered “a democratic political system” to be a good way of governing their country. Support for democracy was highest in Egypt, where an overwhelming 82 percent saw it as good and a 52 percent majority called it “very good.” In Indonesia, democracy was endorsed by 65 percent, though with less intensity (only 14 percent said very good). In Morocco, 61 percent called democracy a good way of governing their country (28% very good). In Pakistan, 61 percent called democracy a good way to govern (20% very good).




Support for human rights appears to be strong, even extending to the freedom to practice any religion. Respondents were asked whether in their own country, “people of any religion should be free to worship according to their own beliefs.” On average 82 percent said they should (63% strongly). Indonesians were the most emphatic supporters of freedom of religion: 93 percent supported it (82% strongly). In Egypt almost nine out of ten (88%) agreed, including 78 percent who agreed strongly. Pakistanis also strongly affirmed freedom of worship: 84 percent agreed (64% strongly). The only country that did not express overwhelming support for this principle is Morocco, though a robust 63 percent majority of Moroccans agree (29% strongly).

However, views are mixed about whether it is acceptable to try to convince others to change their religion. Respondents were asked whether they agreed that in their own country, “people of any religion should be free to try to convert members of other religions to join theirs.” In Morocco, 60 percent rejected this right (30% strongly), while 23 percent favored it. In Indonesia, 85 percent rejected the freedom to proselytize (65 percent strongly). However in Pakistan, three in five accepted such a freedom (35% strongly), though 31 percent did not. (This question was not asked in Egypt.)

Even when human rights issues are associated with the United States some Muslims express support. Asked their opinions about “the laws permitting freedom of expression in the US” majorities in Egypt (57%) and Morocco (68%) had favorable views. However a majority in Indonesia (74%) and a plurality in Pakistan (49%) had unfavorable views.

Clash of Civilizations?

The idea that a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West is inevitable receives little support in the four countries polled, though it is clearly rejected in only two of them. Asked whether "violent conflict is inevitable" between Muslim and Western cultures or whether "it is possible to find common ground," majorities in Indonesia (66%) and Morocco (54%) chose the latter. Only 13 percent of Indonesians and 28 percent of Moroccans felt that conflict was inevitable, however about 20 percent of each public would not answer the question.



Egyptians and Pakistanis also tended to reject the idea that conflict was inevitable, though less emphatically. Pluralities of Egyptian (49%) and Pakistani (43%) respondents said they believed common ground could be found between Western and Muslim cultures. A relatively large minority of Egyptians (45%) thought that conflict was inevitable, however. In Pakistan, 21 percent predict conflict, though larger numbers (36%) would not answer.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Dr. Kull.

How long do we have before—how long do we have to impact public opinion in the Islamic world in a positive way—

Mr. KULL. Right.

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. Before it becomes intractable, or at least of such a duration that we are talking decades to recover?

Mr. KULL. Mm-hmm. Well, things got worse pretty fast. And I think probably things could get better. You do have the problem of young people just moving into adulthood with that crystallizing, and that is harder to undo. But I don't think that it is irreversible.

I think there are a lot of underlying values that we do share with people in the region. Majorities don't think that this is an intractable problem, the tension between Islam and the West, that it is possible to find common ground. They don't reject relations with the West. They don't reject globalization, for the most part. So there are—I think that there is a looking for positive signs. I don't see that the majority of people have just closed the door and said, That is it. That is my view of the U.S., and that is permanent.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I daresay that would be very dangerous.

Mr. KULL. That would be a very bad sign. That would be very problematic. And in the focus groups they expressed those views, too.

For example, I asked how they felt about Presidents in the past, and President Clinton has definitely gotten a—has been fully rehabilitated. Not that it was a negative image in the first place. But he is now seen as—oh, he gets great reviews now. So that is—and I think that is a desire on their part to communicate that, yes, we are capable of liking Americans.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You know what I find interesting is their sense that it is a war against Islam.

Mr. KULL. Yeah.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And that the distinctions between Islam and extremists that will do violence has seemed to have morphed. So often our own rhetoric does not match our deeds.

What would be—if you have some ideas—some actions that the government could take to demonstrate that we as a people, the American people, are tolerant of diversity, respect and embrace diversity, and clearly our view—our collective view of Islam is one of respect? How do we disabuse the Islamic world of that? How do we go about it?

Mr. KULL. I can't say that I have the solution to that problem.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Believe me, you probably have a much better grasp.

Mr. KULL. I think there are some symbolic steps that can be taken with the President visiting a mosque and things like that.

I think addressing the problems related to immigration is key. In the focus groups, that was really very much on the top of their mind, that they see that they are discriminated against. I think that there is a certain language that we use.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Maybe if we inform them there are many groups that share that same feeling.

Mr. KULL. But they see that there has been a sharp change after 9/11. Suddenly, they perceive it was very hard to get visas, very hard to come and work here, that they were being held up in air-

ports. Everybody knows somebody who had some experience of being harassed, and so they feel that is a real, palpable way that they experience this.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But, you know, when I made that comment just now, I wasn't just being entirely facetious. Because I hear that same comment from, you know, non-Muslims, people from all parts of the world. It is clear that it is a worldwide perception that we are not a warm and welcoming country, which I think really is inaccurate and untrue. But that is the perception. We have had hearings on that in this subcommittee.

Mr. KULL. Sure.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And I think probably the best evidence is we have experienced from overseas a decline of some 17% as far as visitors from overseas. It has impacted the tourist industry significantly and our national economy. In 1 year, we lost \$43 billion what we would have anticipated because of our market share. So this goes to that other—

Mr. KULL. Right.

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. Note in the GAO report about anti-Americanism having a deleterious consequence in terms of our national economy.

Mr. KULL. Right.

Mr. DELAHUNT. \$43 billion is a lot of jobs.

Mr. KULL. And there is a cost in terms of America's relation to the outer world, and particularly to the Muslim world.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right.

Mr. KULL. I can't say what our immigration policy should be, but I think we should be aware that these policies have costs, and they have costs in terms of the message that is projected.

Another area that comes up is the treatment of terrorism suspects, which have—obviously, there is an Islamic face on that; and there is definitely a perception that people have in that part of the world that they are not being given the same kind of treatment that others would be given. So it is looking at these different areas where they see discrimination.

There is also a kind of religious language that they hear.

Mr. DELAHUNT. The crusade, for example.

Mr. KULL. The crusade statements that General Boykin made and things like that. I heard a lot about those in the focus groups. Any sign, any minor indication—and if you say, oh, well, this term crusade is just a matter of speech, they don't—

Mr. DELAHUNT. They don't accept that.

Mr. KULL [continuing]. They don't believe that at all. They think that reveals the underlying intention. So being very attentive to that kind of language is I think very important.

But, ultimately, I think the question of the use of force is critical. There is a perception that the U.S. presence there is not something that they have chosen, that we are not there for their benefit and that we would not leave if asked to leave. And that is another—

Mr. DELAHUNT. Just to interrupt you, what I found fascinating in one of the Hill—newspapers, might have been *The Hill* or *Roll Call*, I don't know who to credit it to—but there was statements by several of the more conservative Members of the House that

they would change their opinion about our presence there if the Iraqi Parliament, you know, voted to ask us to leave.

Mr. KULL. Right.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You know, as I muse on these particular issues, I wonder if we, as parliamentarians, Members of Congress ought somehow to communicate—and I have met with individual Iraqi parliamentarians and asked them, take a vote. Let's put it out there, you know, for debate in Baghdad, and let's hear the debate. Let's see what the vote says.

VOICE. They did vote about 2 weeks ago in the news.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Please.

Mr. KULL. The Iraqi public, interestingly, do not want the United States to pull out immediately. What they do want is a timeline, and what's important about the timeline is communication that the U.S. does intend to ultimately leave. The perception, held by about three-quarters, is the U.S. plans to stay permanently; and that is related to their support for attacks on U.S. troops, to put pressure on the U.S. to ultimately withdraw.

If the United States is there without that support, then it really becomes—it becomes perceived as an occupation; and that very much applies to Iraq and to the region as a whole.

After 9/11, the U.S. greatly expanded its military footprint in the region, and there was certainly not the perception that this was done in response to an acceptance of this on the part of the people in the region. That produces a very strong impact. It is humiliating, and it is scary. Because, all of a sudden, there is all this military power around that is ultimately targeted at something that they feel closely associated with.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You know, there has been a lot of discussion here in the Congress regarding the issue of permanent bases. Would an unequivocal statement from the administration or simply a sense of Congress resolution that there ought not to be or it is not the intention of the United States Government taken as a whole to have a permanent base in Iraq, would that have—

Mr. KULL. I think any kind of statement is helpful; and, therefore, there are different ways it can be done for it to be more emphatic. If it comes from the President, that is probably stronger. A statement from Congress is helpful as well.

Obviously, there is uncertainty about what the intent is, no matter what the statement. But some statement to the effect that they would be responsive to the views of the Parliament.

Tommy Thompson has recommended this idea of having a vote in Parliament and making a U.S. decision accordingly. For the President to make a clear statement that if the Parliament asks us to leave we will leave would be very powerful.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Dr. Kull, did you say Tommy Thompson or—

Mr. KULL. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. General Franks?

Mr. KULL. No, Tommy Thompson. Did I—

Mr. DELAHUNT. No, I—

Mr. KULL. The Presidential candidate.

Mr. DELAHUNT. All right. That is kind of an interesting position.

We had a hearing here on extraordinary renditions, which was quite controversial and provoked a—you know, provoked some in-

teresting statements from one witness in particular. And this was a Michael Scheuer, who is an author, *Imperial Hubris*, and was the former head of the Osama bin Laden CIA unit. He and I had a serious disagreement over the use of extraordinary renditions and that entire program.

But what I found really interesting, as I am listening to your testimony—and I just grabbed some statements that he has made about the war and about the perception of Muslims regarding the United States. He continued to emphasize that it wasn't our values, it was our policies, or maybe the interpretation of our policies that were hurting us in terms of our relationship with the Islamic world at large and specifically in the Middle East; and this is his comment. Now this is someone whom I am sure on most issues I would have profound disagreement, but he went on to say this:

“And we don't want to be in a position I think where 1.3 billion Muslims hate Americans just because they are Americans and not hate American foreign policy just because it is policy. It's a big difference, and it's a staggeringly dangerous thing to play with.”

Any comment on that?

Mr. KULL. Yeah, our research finds that as well, that, for the most part, it is an issue of policy. It is not values, that there is not a real clash of values. That is not 100 percent the case. If you look at people who do support attacks on civilians, who do approve of al-Qaeda and bin Laden, there you do find a difference in the realm of values. But that is a rather small group of people; and they are seen by others as being unusual, let's say. And they don't identify with it, and they see it as a problem. But—

Mr. DELAHUNT. Scheuer reaches the same exact conclusion that your polling data has identified.

I mean, here is another comment of him in his book called *Imperial Hubris*:

“U.S. forces and policies are completing the radicalization of the Islamic world, something bin Laden has been trying to do with substantial but incomplete success since the early '90s. As a result, I think it is fair to conclude that the United States remains Osama bin Laden's only indispensable ally.”

I admit he has quite a flair, I should say, but there is much truth in what he says. At least—this is listening to you and then, you know, having read your testimony and then reading his comments:

“We must cease acts that fuel the hatred. Such conduct is entirely self-defeating and counterproductive. America's bipartisan leaders fail to accept that we are at war with militant Islamists, terrorists if you prefer, because of our policies in the Muslim world, not because of what we think or believe.”

Mr. KULL. I just disagree that the Islamic world as a whole has become radicalized.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right.

Mr. KULL. That is what we were trying to find out. How deep is this? We know that there are negative attitudes toward the U.S. throughout the region. We know that large majorities want U.S. troops removed. We know that about half overall approve of attacks

on U.S. troops. But only small minorities approve of attacks on U.S. civilians. Only small minorities approve of al-Qaeda's methods, as well as its views of the U.S.

And it is not that anti-Americanism, if you just intensify it long enough or if it goes high enough, people will certainly become radicalized. It is something else that drives them over that threshold. Because they really become deviants in their society when they support that kind of thing. So I think that is—

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think that is an important message for Americans to understand, too.

Mr. KULL. Right. People then generally still turn a blind eye to the activities—even though they don't approve, they turn a blind eye to it and don't think about what they disapprove of; and that creates a condition where those radical groups can operate more effectively.

Mr. DELAHUNT. How do people in the Islamic world view the values, in your judgment, of what we call human rights and democracy? Are the words—do they have a different significance?

Mr. KULL. Well, that is something that there is some efforts to understand. But, clearly, majorities endorse democracy, endorse the idea of human rights, endorse the idea of freedom of religion.

There are limits. They don't support the right to try to convert somebody else. But they do support people's right to practice their religion, whatever it might be.

They do—globalization is seen in a positive light. So they don't think that there is a sharp discontinuity between themselves and the western world. They see that there are differences, but it is more of a magnitude rather than something fundamental or central. They do think it is possible to find common ground, that violent conflict is not inevitable.

Mr. DELAHUNT. What about our support for authoritarian—I will use that word, it is little kinder than dictatorship—but authoritarian regimes in the Middle East?

Mr. KULL. We asked about support for Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and so on; and that was not—there is a very modest majority that says that they are opposed to it, but it is certainly not overwhelming. It is—in some cases, some countries, it is just a plurality. There is not an intense desire for the U.S. to stop that. You might say it is primarily negative, but then we kind of like the support, too. So it is not a clear-throated, stop doing that, stop supporting those governments. That doesn't mean those governments are popular, but it is not held against the U.S. so much that it provides that support.

They do point out that it is hypocritical, because we say democracy and yet those are not democratic. But the fact that we send aid is not seen as a clearly negative phenomenon. And the fact that we send aid to Pakistan and Indonesia has—there are indications that that has mitigated the negative feeling toward the U.S.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, particularly in Indonesia in the aftermath of the tsunami.

Mr. KULL. Right.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Why Egypt? Why are we doing so badly in Egypt? I mean, that 93 percent is just a—

Mr. KULL. Yeah, it is quite virulent.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I mean, that distinguishes Egypt from other Islamic countries.

Mr. KULL. It seems that the closer—

Mr. DELAHUNT. I am looking at 91 percent versus the average.

Mr. KULL. Right.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I mean, Egypt is bringing up the average considerably. Yet Egypt is such a significant force, you know, within the Arab world. And as we talk about aid, you know, we are sending in the neighborhood of \$2 billion a year of aid. I presume it is mostly military, which I think is a huge mistake. If we are going to send aid we should be, you know, making it—maybe we could call it something like democracy promotion or, you know, economic development aid. But that is just my observation. But why Egypt?

Mr. KULL. I think some of it is connected to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, which is something we haven't talked that much about. But this is a big factor in the negative feelings toward the U.S., the perception—

Mr. DELAHUNT. That we are not an honest broker.

Mr. KULL [continuing]. That we are not evenhanded.

There is also a perception that we are not genuinely trying to create an independent and viable Palestinian state; and there is even a majority perception that the United States supports Israel expanding its boundaries, becoming larger, getting new territory. So there is this in general, but particularly in Egypt, this view of the United States as intervening in the region and in favor of Israel and in an expansionistic way relative to Israel, which is quite dramatic. That is a sensitive issue and a symbolic issue throughout the region.

I think the Palestinians identify—pardon me, Muslims identify with the Palestinians, and so when there is this unevenness, this unfairness in the way the United States deals with that situation, Muslims identify with that, and they feel mistreated. This theme of unfairness when you have such a strong power—and the U.S. is seen as tremendously powerful—and that power is being unfair, that evokes a very powerful, almost primal feeling.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Fear and anger?

Mr. KULL. Yes, and a sense—

Mr. DELAHUNT. Which is reflected in the 93 percent.

Mr. KULL. A sense of injustice, right.

Mr. DELAHUNT. What is somewhat ironic, too, is it was Egypt that first signed a peace treaty with Israel.

Are you aware of any polling data about Egyptian attitudes vis-à-vis Israel at this moment in time or within the last year?

Mr. KULL. In the last year, I am not aware of anything specific, no. I mean, there are some questions in here that are related to it, but—

Mr. DELAHUNT. Because I am just—I think that former Secretary of State Baker and a former colleague that was the chair of this committee, the full committee, Lee Hamilton, clearly prioritized the Israeli-Palestinian issue in their report to, you know, to the President regarding a new strategy, if you will. And your data seems to support that this is a cause for friction, if nothing else.

Mr. KULL. I think that if the United States took a strong position in support of something like the Saudi peace plan, that could have

a positive effect. This is something that we are aspiring to study more, to find out more how people in the region feel about that prospect.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But the Bush administration gets no credit for the two-state proposal, it would seem.

Mr. KULL. That has not come through. The perception is that that is—that the intention is not—

Mr. DELAHUNT. Genuine.

Mr. KULL [continuing]. Really there. Yeah, not enough to make it happen.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yet we could do it because we are so powerful.

Mr. KULL. That is really key.

I was saying earlier that the U.S. is seen as so powerful. There is almost this tautological logic that says if something is a certain way it is that way because America wants it to be that way. Because, if they didn't, they could change it. If we haven't caught bin Laden, it is because we don't want to catch bin Laden. Because, of course we could, if we wanted to. We could have stopped 9/11, because we are omniscient; and, therefore, we wanted 9/11 to happen. That kind of reasoning.

We asked, of all the things that happened in the world, how much are caused by the U.S.? And majorities in all four countries said most or all, most or nearly all are caused by the U.S. It is hard to get this across, how powerful they perceive the U.S. to be. So if things aren't happening, well, then the U.S. doesn't really care or they want it to be the way it is.

Mr. DELAHUNT. How do you change it, though?

Getting back—and I understand it is important to do, obviously, after a thorough and full debate in which the American people are engaged, as well as Congress and the executive branch in terms of policy, and I understand. And what I am hearing from you, from those as I spoke to earlier about the comments by Dr. Scheuer, it seems that it is going to be extremely difficult to change that perception without some reconfiguration of our policy; and we, I think, have to do that.

I think we better start the debate in terms of how we do it and what new policies, what new strategy, if you will, would be conducive to changing that sentiment so that our national security risks are diminished and that we are in better shape in terms of our relationships across the globe. But, in the meantime, as you well know, debate here is slow, a slow and painful process. As Churchill said, it is still the best we have figured out, but things don't happen quickly in a democracy such as ours.

In the areas of public diplomacy, there was an interesting hearing chaired by Mr. Ackerman on the Middle East Subcommittee just this past week about the American-taxpayer-funded Middle East. You know, I think it is called al-Hurra. And there was debate within the committee about allowing those who disagree with us, sometimes vehemently, any airtime at all.

By doing that, do we demonstrate, in your opinion—and maybe this is just a guess for you, too—do we demonstrate what the democracy is about? Though when we allow even those that, you know, are at least vehemently opposed to American policies, giving

them the time to express that, does it make a difference? What do we do in terms of public diplomacy?

Mr. KULL. I think that everything helps. Nothing is the magic bullet—

Mr. DELAHUNT. There is no silver bullet.

Mr. KULL [continuing]. That is going to turn this thing around. But it is possible.

I don't want to be sounding partisan here, but in the focus groups when I said, you know, is there anything that the United States has ever done that is good, or in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian process, people did bring up the efforts that President Clinton made and put it in a positive light. They didn't, you know, take all positive efforts and somehow dismiss it all. There is a responsiveness to perceived efforts.

So there is—you know, there are a lot of little things that can be done to establish American credibility; and I think an effort at this point to get the peace plan back on track would be important. What is always critical, though, is whether the United States is perceived as ready to put pressure on Israel.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right.

Mr. KULL. Because the perception is that is the only way it is going to happen. And if not, you know, then they say, well, then you are just talking, and so on. But even just starting to talk about it is something that makes some difference with some people on those numbers. The needle can move a little bit. So I don't think we should think of it as an all or nothing kind of thing. It is not.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Cumulative.

Mr. KULL. Yes. And it can be reversed. People do perceive that there are positive things about America. It is not that they have crystallized a completely negative image. It is not—I mean, there are people who do have this image, but they are quite small.

Mr. DELAHUNT. That, at least, is reassuring.

Mr. KULL. Right.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think we make a mistake by saying they hate us because of our values—

Mr. KULL. Right. Right.

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. And our embrace for democracy.

Mr. KULL. Now there are a small number of people that do.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I understand that, too, but those are people we should be focused on in terms of our national security. I think sometimes what occurs is, when we say it in broad strokes, the fear that they are being targeted envelops a larger portion of the population in these countries.

Mr. KULL. Right.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. KULL. That is very much a fair statement, and it leads people to conclusions that make it more possible for those who are more radical to operate.

Mr. DELAHUNT. My counsel here just said Israel, yes, but United States troops in Iraq and the rest of the region is the biggest problem?

Mr. KULL. It is hard to pinpoint. It is part of a total impression that the U.S.—after 9/11, the U.S. moved into the region, greatly expanded its military footprint in the region and is in conflict with

many people in the Islamic world and has no intention of leaving. That is the impression, and anything that mitigates that is going to help. Anything that involves us being receptive to the will of the people in the region is going to help. Anything that moves forward the peace process that is perceived as evenhanded is going to help. Anything where we show respect for the Islamic people, for Islamic governments and so on.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And Islam itself.

Mr. KULL. And Islam itself is all going to mitigate this. There is all of these different factors come together in this total gestalt of America driven by this desire to undermine, overwhelm and eliminate Islam, which goes all the way down to, you know, we are trying to get women to stop wearing head scarves. You know, it is a global image. But anything you do that diminishes it—

Mr. DELAHUNT. You probably don't even—I don't know if you have an opinion, but let me put it out. I mean, I wonder if we are missing opportunities by not utilizing Muslim-Americans—

Mr. KULL. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. In terms of our communication with the Islamic world. I mean, hopefully—I can remember the night of 9/11. This is my own going to the floor, along with a number of other Members of Congress, both Republicans and Democrats, and speaking to the issue of the need for America to remind itself that, you know, there can be no discrimination. There can be no reaction toward Americans of the Islamic faith. Because that would be betraying our values.

It was a very, very powerful moment for me personally. I thought at that moment in time that Congress really was echoing what is best about American “values.” And yet maybe we need a strategy to utilize that segment of the American community to demonstrate to the Islamic world that this is not Christianity, you know, versus Islam. It just simply isn't. And the need for them to understand us.

I will tell you what I find disturbing is the decline in students matriculating in the United States. You know, not that I begrudge other nations and other democracies the benefit of increased enrollment from foreign lands. But maybe we ought to consider a strategy in terms of how we re-energize the welcome to people of different—maybe a special focus on the Islamic world to come here, know us, study here, learn about the United States.

It was to me really remarkable, because I have been doing some research, and the funding available, public funds available to attract students from other countries is just at such a level it is absurd. And I mean that in a negative way. Maybe we have to really design a strategy that goes to the Muslim world and says, come here; study. Because these are the people that are going to be the future generations from now.

Mr. KULL. This is very much in people's minds. In the focus groups they brought this up quite a lot, and some of them were very emotional and very frustrated about it. Almost everybody in the focus groups knew somebody who had had some problem when they came to visit the U.S. or coming to work here or to come and study here. They perceived that some door shut.

So it is not just that we could do more. It is if we just returned to how things were in the past that would go a long way. They per-

ceive a big “go away, we don’t like you anymore because you are Muslims, you are all terrorists, and we don’t trust any of you.” That is the way they portrayed the message.

So, yes, opening that door and receiving—expressing interest, all that would have a big impact. I really want to emphasize how much for some people that was much more important than anything else. You know, that was the core issue.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Respect is—I mean, I think of the \$2 billion that we send to Egypt in terms of, I am sure, primarily military assistance; and then I look at those numbers, 91 percent. It seems like it was a—if we funded the Fulbright program and put \$2 billion into that on an annual basis, would that be a better bang for our buck so to speak?

With that, I will give my ranking member as much time as he wants.

Thank you, Dr. Kull. You have been very, very—

Mr. KULL. It has been a pleasure.

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. Informative.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will have to admit that I have gone to about four meetings since our hearing began, and I apologize.

Let me just ask this question, and I am sure that you have answered it already, but why is it important for us to care about what other people care about us? Shouldn’t we just basically be trying to determine what is the policy that is going to work in the long run and not put our wet fingers in the air and just go for that? Because in the long run, if it works, people are going to be on our side; and if our policies don’t, they are going to be against us.

Go right ahead.

Mr. KULL. What we have found in this study is that when people have negative feelings toward the U.S., it makes them more accommodating of al-Qaeda. They don’t like al-Qaeda to start with, but when they feel threatened by the U.S., they see al-Qaeda as a force that stands up to America. And when that happens, they stop paying attention to those things about al-Qaeda they don’t like. They will resist accepting that they had anything to do with 9/11, and that gives al-Qaeda more room to maneuver, makes it more difficult politically to stand up to al-Qaeda, for governments to go after it.

Then it also creates a larger pool of people who may cross over and become radicalized. It doesn’t—the negative feelings by the U.S. doesn’t radicalize people, other things have to happen. It is related to their beliefs about Islam and so on.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me give you an example: Turkey. Did you do any polling in Turkey?

Mr. KULL. Not as part of this.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. But I can’t help but notice the people of Turkey are Muslims, by and large, and they actually—we saw a demonstration in the streets of Turkey a few days ago against the type of Islamic government that al-Qaeda—certainly that al-Qaeda represents. This in sort of millions of people sort of flies in the face of the idea that, because we are making a stand in Iraq right next door, that in some way we are alienating all these people in Turkey and pushing them toward the direction that you just indicated.

Mr. KULL. It doesn't push people into radicalization. There is support for many aspects of an Islamic seat, there is support throughout the region for Islamic law or Sharia, and so these ideas resonate. There is definitely conflict within those societies between those who are more secular and those who are more religious. But those who are religious and support Sharia don't necessarily support al-Qaeda. So we need to think of three categories here: The secular, the general pro-Islamic public, and then the radicalized public.

Negative feelings toward the U.S. cause people to become more likely to not make a clear distinction between themselves and al-Qaeda. More accepting, but not the same as. It doesn't make them go over there, but that creates a political condition that ultimately we can—those who might otherwise be more aligned with us.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But we have seen this also in other polls that we have had presented to us here. Over the last couple of months, we have really taken a look at public opinion, how public opinion perceives America throughout the world, and it just—it would seem by the pollsters' results that America is really on the outs with people all over the world because of this and because we have made stands since 9/11 that have alienated people, especially in Iraq.

Yet we end up having polls—the real polls that count in Germany, where we now have a pro-America leader in Germany, or at least a leader that is much more pro-American than the one she replaced, and in France, where there was a clear choice between an anti-American candidate versus someone who aligned himself with the United States—the French people voted just not by a little bit but by a significant majority to go with that candidate. Yet the polls that we have been seeing would have suggested to us just the opposite.

Mr. KULL. There are a lot of things that determine the outcomes of elections.

In France, for example, foreign policy in the United States didn't even come up in debates and discussions and so on. So I don't think that we should assume that this is necessarily the driver in those elections. But it is not so overpowering that it drove it, drove the outcome, yes, that is true.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would my friend yield for a moment?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Because I was quoting Dr. Scheuer who, as I remember, was your witness, wasn't he?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I was reading to Dr. Kull a series of statements, and the reason I was doing this is because Dr. Kull's data reflected exactly what Dr. Scheuer was saying. And you know that Dr. Scheuer and I had some profound disagreements on the issue of renditions. But, again—I mean, this is the minority's witness in a previous hearing that says:

“U.S. forces and policies are completing the radicalization of the Islamic world, something bin Laden has been trying to do with substantial but incomplete success since the early '90s. As a result, I think it is fair to conclude that the U.S. remains bin Laden's only indispensable ally.”

In other words, you are right when you say we should never look at polls to determine policy. But, at the same time polls, can be a helpful guidepost as to perceptions and understandings of the United States; and then we can have a full and vigorous, at times contentious, debate over what those policies should be.

I mean what is encouraging is while they hold a substantial—particularly in these countries, look at Egypt at 92 percent—negative opinion of the United States, they don't like al-Qaeda either. So how do we get ahead, what kind of strategy can we craft so that they don't view us as the enemy but al-Qaeda as the enemy? And then we can address the extremism that tragically exists and is a threat not just to the United States but the rest of us.

I am sorry, Dana, go ahead.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You know, it is often the dichotomy has not really been, I don't think, explored. Maybe you can tell me if maybe this is true, but I understand that when we ask people, for example, in this region, but in just about every region, but this one in particular in the Middle East, that I say what do you think about the United States, and they will come back with negative reactions. But at the same time when you say, would you like to immigrate to the United States, that the answer is overwhelmingly yes. Is there that kind of dichotomy?

Mr. KULL. Is there what?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. A dichotomy like that that exists.

Mr. KULL. Yes. If you ask about the American people, you get a much softer response. And people make this distinction very much in the focus groups that we did, that they liked the American people, the people who lived there, lived in the U.S., expressed positive feelings about being here; one woman who said she wore the head scarf while she was here in the U.S. and that she was well treated, and expressed that to other people in the group. So there are distinctions within the U.S. among Americans about U.S. policies, pro and con, and so—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me suggest that what the real thing is, is that—take Abu Ghraib, which was a disgusting example of Americans who were not trained to do their job and didn't have the proper leadership. They not only permitted things to happen, they engaged in things that are embarrassing. But they did not murder their prisoners, they did not mutilate their prisoners. They, yes, humiliated them in a very bad way, and it is horrible that they did that, but had they been prisoners of any of these other countries, these people would have been butchered. If it would have been the prisoners of al-Qaeda or the prisoners of the Syrian regime, which we talked about, or to Iran or any of these other regimes, these men who were humiliated would have not been humiliated, they would have been murdered.

Now, I think down deep that people who see these things actually know that as a true fact, and that is why they would rather move to the United States, even though they may be mad at the United States for having American soldiers that should have known better—and were punished for this, I might add—do these things that humiliated their captives.

So I just have to believe that down deep they know that Americans have a different standard over here, and that that standard is actually better than the one they live under.

Mr. KULL. The difference is that the United States is seen as so much more powerful than any of these other countries. And if the U.S. is perceived as lowering its standards, even if those standards are still higher than any of these other countries', that is very unnerving to people; because what the U.S. might do in an unconstrained situation could have much more impact than what these other countries could do.

We asked about how much influence the U.S. has over key world events, and the majority in all countries said that it controls most of the events, key events that happen in the world. And that comes through in the focus groups too, that anything that happens, happened because, well, America wanted it to happen. Because America is seen as so powerful, it takes on kind of a mythical quality. This term the "Great Satan" has a real meaning. It is almost a cosmic principle at times, this view of the U.S.

So when this big powerful force starts modifying its standards and is less constrained, that is scary.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. There are many countries that believe that the CIA has enormous influence on their countries. Then when you go to check, and you find out there is one nerdy analyst in some cubicle over there in the CIA, and that is all they have got to tell you what is going on in the country, and he happens to be able to read the newspapers there, but the people of the country have CIA operating in their country.

Mr. KULL. That is what the CIA wants you to think.

Mr. DELAHUNT. If the gentleman would yield for a moment.

Just to go back to Dr. Scheuer. I mean, the response by Dr. Kull echoes this statement by—and you are right, there is a dichotomy—and this is your witness at that previous hearing saying this. "The real danger of that"—he is referring to Gitmo—Abu Ghraib—"is that the Muslim world begins to hate Americans because they are Americans. The one great saving grace of everything we know in terms of polling data in the Muslim world is that huge majorities oppose American foreign policy. They view it as a threat."

And this is what Dr. Kull been saying to Islam and to Muslims, but at the same time they admire Americans. In the same nation, large majorities admire the basic equity of American society.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I would—

Mr. DELAHUNT. How do we take advantage of that? How do we communicate that? We don't have to go like that, but we have got to be aware of it and demonstrate our strengths and have policies where we maintain our standards, because we are and ought to be, you know, the gold standard for human values.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would suggest this; that the United States needs to be the champion of human rights and democracy throughout the world, and whether it is policy in Ethiopia—which now we have allied ourselves with a clique there that is actually eliminating the democratic government rather than promoting democracy in that country, and it is very sad because that is a country that never had a chance for democracy. And there are countries

like that throughout the world that we have made some wrong decisions in some of those countries.

Let me just suggest that in this particular moment in history, I believe and I think the differences that are coming out here are basically based on a different perception as to whether or not we are at war with a force in this world that would slaughter thousands or millions of people, had they had the chance, and I believe that in wartime conditions that you have to make decisions that are, even in the short term, you know, not consistent with your beliefs.

We allied with Joseph Stalin in order to defeat Hitler, and Joseph Stalin certainly murdered as many people as Hitler did. And sometimes there are some compromises you have to make in that particular battle plan to succeed to thwart an enemy that would do you great harm. I think that is where we are right now, and some people do not believe that we are in that kind of peril and thus when decisions that are made that are compromises with basic principle, there obviously is a moral outrage and a justified moral outrage if you do not believe that we are in a moment of great peril.

I would suggest that is the basis of much disagreement because, of course, the chairman and I think we share a lot more goals than what people thought we share, but it may be just that perception. So whether or not the people overseas see that, I certainly know a bunch of us here see it, and I believe that to be the case.

So, unfortunately, again, if it does mean that there will not be another 9/11, if Disneyland which was on the target list of Ramsey Yusef's target list, Disneyland is 15 miles from where I live, I took my children there 6 months ago, I have three kids—had the terrorists had their way, my wife and my babies, my three children would have been murdered along with tens of thousands of other people. They would like to have done that. That was on their list. We know it. I believe it has been thwarted because we have taken proactive actions that may be unpopular with people in the Arab world because some of their people are involved with these very same groups.

That is why I don't have apologies, that is my perception of it. Other people have other perceptions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. KULL. What we found is that people feel that in our effort to target those who have these virulent attitudes, they feel that they have been caught in the cross-hairs as well. That we are targeting Islam as a whole. And that becomes a problem because, like we were in regard to Stalin, they are now in regard to al-Qaeda. They don't approve of al-Qaeda, but if al-Qaeda is standing up to America and they feel America is coming after them, then that makes them want to turn a blind eye to what they don't like about al-Qaeda.

So we have to get much better at targeting what we are trying to target and not impacting, not harming, not alienating those others, because in that environment where the society as a whole is passively accepting of al-Qaeda, that is a much more difficult situation for us to work in. And that is a consequence—and it is not a question of wanting to be popular—this is just an objective con-

sequence if people in that part of the world are having these perceptions.

Mr. DELAHUNT. We want them as allies and support us against those who would do us harm.

Dr. Kull, thank you again so much. You are a great witness and we appreciate it.

Dana, thank you.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Might I apologize again for being late. It was one of those days.

Mr. DELAHUNT. We have all had them. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 5:16 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

