ABSTRACT

Partition has been proposed as a way to (i) end ethnic civil wars and to (ii) build a lasting peace after ethnic civil wars end. This dissertation builds on partition theory and the ethnic security dilemma in three ways, demonstrating empirical support for a novel theory of why violence recurs following the end of ethnic civil wars and how partition can be used to prevent such violence. The dissertation begins by introducing the puzzle of ethnic group concentration: the social sciences have demonstrated that concentrated ethnic groups produce both peace and violence. The first case study discredits the notion that ethnic group concentration produced during ethnic civil wars will produce an end to ethnic civil wars. I conducted detailed field research, producing a longitudinal study of ethnic migration and violence in the Georgia-Abkhaz civil war (1992-1993), which acts as a crucial case. I conclude that partitioning groups does not end ethnic war. This is the first accurate empirical test of the ethnic security dilemma. Next, the dissertation looks at partition’s ability to build
peace by concentrating ethnic groups in new homeland states, and I argue that post-
partition violence is caused by weak states and the triadic political space
dependently created by partitions that do not separate ethnic groups completely. I
call this the Third Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma, building on previous ethnic
security dilemma research. I test this empirically by introducing an index measuring
the degree to which partitions separate ethnic groups, and I compare all ethnic civil
war terminations between 1945 and 2004, demonstrating that partitions which
completely separate ethnic groups provide a better chance for peace. Third, I selected
two cases (Moldova and Georgia) to examine the causal processes of post-war
recurring violence. Georgia, which experienced post-partition violence, and
Moldova, which did not, act as a structured case comparison. I conclude that mixed
ethnic demography interacts with state-building to cause or avert renewed violence.
PARTITION AS A SOLUTION TO ETHNIC CIVIL WAR: STATEHOOD, DEMOGRAPHY, AND THE ROLE OF POST-WAR BALANCE OF POWER FOR PEACE

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1. Political Science Moves to Iraq:
   o Theory, Methodology, and the Puzzle of Ethnic Demography
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1 Political Science in Iraq: Exposing the Puzzle of Ethnic Demography

During 2006 and 2007, Iraq’s civil war reached its apex, with hundreds of civilians being killed on a daily basis, highly organized militias controlling huge swaths of territory throughout the country, and the national army unable to secure control of Baghdad itself. The civil war had taken on a decidedly ethnic nature, with civilians being targeted for death or displacement based on their ascriptive religious or ethnic affiliations. The U.S. government, independent political analysts, and other regional actors all sought a realistic strategy to end the internecine bloodshed. Social science scholarship was source of policy advice.

The Iraqi civil war occurred, coincidentally, at the peak of civil war research in the social sciences. Beginning in the 1990s, when the quantity of civil wars around the world reached its highest level of the 20th century, research programs sprung up in the fields of International Relations, Comparative Politics, Sociology, Psychology, and beyond. To be sure, the focus on civil violence had long been a staple in Comparative Politics, but this specific attention to “civil wars” as a unique category
of internal, contentious politics, was new and attracted intense interest, especially in U.S. academic circles following the wars of collapsing Yugoslavia.

Research on civil wars has developed in stages, both thematically and methodologically. While there has been a consistent and substantial amount of case-study research on civil wars throughout the post-WWII period, the systematic study of civil war accelerated in the post-Cold War era (Bradley 1975; Brovkin 1994; Eckstein 1964; Heilbrunn 1962; Pye 1956; Vlavianos 1992). The initial phase of research in the post-Cold War era was dominated methodologically by large-n cross-national studies and theoretical pieces thematically focused on civil war onset (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Posen 1993: 1; Toft 2003; Walter and Snyder 1999). Thematically, this research agenda shifted to civil war dynamics, explaining phenomena such as the extent of and forms of violence, rebel objectives, and duration (Azam and Hoeffler 2002; Buhaug 2006; Derouen and Sobek 2004; Fearon 2004; Valentino, Huth, and Balach-Lindsay 2004). Finally, civil war research shifted to how civil wars end (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2007; Licklider 1995; Walter 2002). This dissertation contributes to the literature on civil war termination.

What did this research tell us, and how could it assist the U.S. government trying to end the violence in Iraq? Research demonstrated that, since the early 1950s, civil wars have been longer lasting and more frequent than international wars, producing high levels of death and disability (Collier et al. 2003; Derouen and Sobek 2004; Elbadawi, Hegre, and Milante 2008; Fearon 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003; Licklider 1995).¹ Ethnic wars, of the type seen in

¹ Fearon and Laitin (2003, p.75) write, “Between 1945 and 1999, about 3.33 million battle deaths occurred in the 25 interstate wars that killed at least 1,000 and had at least 100 dead on each side.
Iraq, have been especially common, comprising anywhere from 55 percent (70) to 72 percent (91) of all civil wars between 1945 and 1999 (Fearon 2004). Moreover, cross-national evidence suggests that ethnic wars last longer than nonethnic wars (Fearon 2004; Licklider 1995). These numbers are even more troubling given that, during the 1990s, more than 200 ethnic minorities and subordinate majorities throughout the world were contesting their political status, suggesting that the potential for future violence is grave (Gurr 1993; McGarry and O'Leary 1993).

While most research has focused on civil war onset, a significant research agenda has focused on how to end civil wars. However, in addition to the challenge of ending the such wars, one of the vexing and under-explored problems of civil wars has been their high recidivism rate, with postconflict countries facing over a 50 percent chance of experiencing renewed deadly conflict within the first five years of establishing peace (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2001; Collier and Sambanis 2002; Horowitz, Weisiger, and Johnson 2009; Johnson 2008; Walter 2004). Despite empirical evidence demonstrating both the high recidivism rate, and that ethnic wars are particularly susceptible, little work has been done differentiating war onset from

These wars involved just 25 states that suffered casualties of at least 1,000 and had a median duration of not quite 3 months. In contrast, in the same period there were roughly 127 civil wars that killed at least 1,000, 25 of which were ongoing in 1999. A conservative estimate of the total dead as a direct result of these conflicts is 16.2 million, five times the interstate toll. These civil wars occurred in 73 states—more than a third of the United Nations system—and had a median duration of roughly six years.” The number of ongoing civil wars has declined since its peak in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but it remains high (ranging between 20 and 30 wars over the past 15 years), and recent data show a second upward trend beginning in 2004. See Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr, Peace and Conflict, 2008 (Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm, 2007).

2 Fearon codes his cases as “ethnic,” “nonethnic,” and “ambiguous.” Ethnic wars made 55 percent of all civil wars between 1945 and 1999, and ambiguous wars 17 percent.


4 Johnson (2008) shows ethnic civil war recidivism at 60%. “Deadly conflict recurrence” is defined as violence exceeding 25 deaths in a given year.
war recurrence, or explaining ethnic civil war recurrence in particular (Derouen and Sobek 2004).

1.1 How to End Ethnic Civil Wars

As we will see in the first theory chapters (Chapter Two), several theories have been put forward for successful ways to end ethnic civil wars. One dominant strategy is a realpolitik focus on military victory. Increasing military ability and better military strategy have been a central approach to winning wars from time immemorial (Sun Tzu 1910). This was the approach ultimately chosen by the Bush administration in 2007 to deal with Iraq, and the choice made by the U.S. and Soviet Union for most civil wars during the Cold War (Fearon and Laitin 2007; Regan 2000), and was achieved by increased external support for the central Iraqi government.

The dangers of this approach, especially for ethnic civil wars, are twofold. First, ethnic civil wars tend to last a long time and intervention has not been demonstrated to bring a swift end to violence. Some evidence suggests that interventions actually prolong civil war violence (Regan 2002). Second, such military victories achieved by one party in an ethnic war, in contrast to a negotiated solution by all parties to the conflict, are often accompanied by large-scale ethnic massacres (Licklider 1995). Thus from a humanitarian point of view, neither strategy achieves its goal as they tend to bring great human suffering. Just as relevant, with U.S. forces already heavily invested in Iraq at the start of 2007, it was far from clear whether the U.S. government could find the political will to increase military support further (Biddle 2006).
A second approach has focused on the need for third-party security guarantees to overcome the problem of credible commitment (Fearon 1998; Walter 2002). Under this understanding of civil war violence, wars do not end because weaker parties fear the post-settlement environment in which they need to decommission their weapons, leaving them vulnerable if the stronger party reneges on commitments. By creating third-party guarantees, warring parties would more easily reach agreements, ending wars without the need for military victory. For the case of Iraq, this approach was also unlikely to succeed given that the presence of a third-party (the U.S.) was unable to enforce agreements or even bring warring parties to the negotiating table.

Since the mid-1990s, one solution to ending ethnic civil wars that has gained international policy and scholarly attention has been partition (Downes 2001; Downes 2004; Galbraith 2006; Kaufmann 1996; Kaufmann 1998; Kaufmann 2006; McGarry and O’Leary 1993; Mearsheimer 2000; Mearsheimer and Van Evera 1995). The debate surrounding partition emerged at the end of the Cold War as ethnic conflicts came to the forefront of Western policymakers’ attention and international boundaries were once again open to large-scale change. Still, Western governments have demonstrated ambivalence toward partition, opposing the recognition of several de facto partitions, such as Nagorno Karabakh in Azerbaijan, recognizing others, such as Kosovo’s separation from Serbia, and further promoting the incorporation of partitions into peace plans that ended civil wars in Sudan, Papua New Guinea, and

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5 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary present a taxonomy of macro-political forms of ethnic conflict regulation identifying partition as one of eight.
Indonesia. The negotiations that surrounded Kosovo’s final status further reflected ambivalence, with proposals to separate Kosovo from Serbia being fiercely contested within the European Union. Moreover, there is still the possibility of a further partition of Kosovo into majority Albanian and Serbian regions.

As Iraq’s civil war heightened, partition became a central consideration in the debate over Iraq’s future and how best to minimize the humanitarian disaster unfolding as a result of the ethnically-based killing and displacement that was occurring in the country (Galbraith 2006; Gelb 2006; Kaufmann 2006).

Debates over partition traditionally focused on the normative goal of self-determination as a general tool for regulating ethnic conflict (Kumar 1997; Mansergh 1978; McGarry and O’Leary 1993; Schaeffer 1990; Tullberg and Tullberg 1997). Yet

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7 The Dutch foreign minister, Maxime Verhagen, became the first European foreign minister to state that partition of Kosovo into majority Albanian and Serb political territories would be an acceptable outcome on August 28, 2007. This was followed by a similar comment by Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, on August 31, 2007. See Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Dutch Minister Says Partition of Kosovo Acceptable” RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 11, No. 160, Pt.2, August 29, 2007; and, “Russia Rules Out Crossing ‘Red Line’ on Kosovo, but Would Accept Partition” RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 11, No. 163, Pt. 2, September 4, 2007. As far as I am aware, no state has actively lobbied for a further partition of Kosovo, though some have suggested that such an outcome would be acceptable if Kosovo and Serbian leaders accepted this compromise. For discussion of the debate within the European Union over recognition of Kosovo independence, see “The Waiting Game,” Economist, September 27, 2007, p.33. Russia’s opposition to recognition and the United States’ support are well known.

this policy was also intricately linked to resolving ethnic conflict. As Donald Horowitz (1985: 589) stated over twenty years ago: “separating the antagonists – partition – is an option increasingly recommended for consideration where groups are territorially concentrated.” Nevertheless, partition was largely abandoned as a policy-goal after several perceived failures following World War Two, including India-Pakistan and Israel-Palestine.

In the 1990s, at the height of civil war violence globally, partition re-emerged as a solution specific to ethnic civil wars. As Nicholas Sambanis (2000, p.438) noted, “its intuitive appeal…has been shaping scholarly and policy opinion on how to end ethnic civil wars.” Academics such as John Mearsheimer, Stephen Van Evera, and Chaim Kaufmann concentrated on partition as a humanitarian tool, as a means of minimizing deaths and reducing human suffering once ethnic civil wars had begun. Partition, in this latest guise, was proposed as means to end ethnic civil wars.

According to this body of research, the cause of violence during ethnic civil wars is driven by the ethnic security dilemma (Posen 1993). While the first generation ethnic security dilemma theory was designed to explain ethnic civil war onset, the second generation sought to explain the dynamics of violence and migration during ethnic civil war. Fearful of ethnic massacres, ethnic militias have an incentive to “save” ethnic kin located within territory controlled by enemy ethnic kin groups. Similarly, those same ethnic militias have an incentive to preemptively “kill or drive out enemy populations before the enemy does the same to it, as well as to create homogeneous enclaves more practical to defend” (Kaufmann 1996, p.150).
This creates a vicious cycle of violence that cannot end until the populations are separated.

As a result of the ethnic security dilemma, multi-ethnic regions of intermingled populations face the greatest likelihood of violence and ethnic targeting. This dynamic, which is a hallmark of ethnic civil wars, leads to increasingly homogenous territories and cycle of violence that cannot end until ethnic groups are separated and the ethnic security dilemma comes to an end. Once ethnically homogenous territorial units are created, ethnic militias are less murderous because their territories have defensive value only.

This creates a policy prescription that both ends wars and prevents human suffering. Under these conditions, partitioning groups into defensible enclaves where they can protect themselves militarily, provides the best chance for ending ethnic wars and establishing an enduring peace. Deaths and suffering are reduced by establishing humanitarian corridors during the war to allow “trapped” populations to move to territories controlled by their ethnic groups. This “unmixing” of populations would occur anyway during ethnic war, but by organizing it “humanely” via third-parties, there should be less human suffering because separation would not be executed by enemy ethnic groups intent on ethnic cleansing at all costs. As John Mearsheimer (1993) asked during the Bosnian ethnic civil war, “Wouldn't it make better sense to move populations peacefully rather than at the end of a rifle barrel?” Indeed, when scholars and policymakers have proposed partition, it has been as a last resort, not to achieve self-determination, but to end ethnic wars when widespread ethnically based massacres are already occurring.
Based on a decade of theoretical and empirical research, many proposed the partition of Iraq as the only realistic solution to its civil war. Several unique aspects of Iraq’s ethnic civil war lent themselves to partition. The accelerating speed with which religious targeting and displacement occurred between 2005 and 2007 strongly suggested the emergence of an ethnic security dilemma between the Shiite and Sunni communities, where families whose homes were in the “wrong” area were threatened with death if they did not leave (Cockburn 2006; Kaufmann 2006; Ridolfo 2006).9

In fact, the separation of ethnic groups reached such levels that, by 2006, Peter Galbraith (2006) stated, “The case for the partition of Iraq is straightforward: It has already happened.” The question for the US government, according to advocates of partition, was whether to assist the remaining trapped minorities to move to regions controlled by their own militias or to allow the civil war to do this on its own, with disastrous humanitarian consequences.

1.2 The Puzzle of Ethnic Demography

Partitioning groups as a means to end violence presents a puzzle in the literature. Concentrating ethnic groups into homogenous territories, argues the ethnic security dilemma, decreases the likelihood of violence. Yet decades of research has demonstrated that concentrated ethnic groups increase the likelihood of inter-ethnic violence (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gurr 1993; Gurr 2000; Laitin 2004; Toft 2003; Walter 2003). Empirically, the role of concentrated groups being correlated with an increased likelihood of ethnic rebellion against the state is powerful. Fearon and Laitin (1999, p.16), for example, found that “regional concentration of minority group

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9 See also special edition of Forced Migration Review, “Iraq’s Displacement Crisis: The Search for Solutions,” June 2007
was a] powerful and robust factor. . . far more likely to see large-scale ethnic violence than urban or widely dispersed minorities.” Similarly, the “group concentration” variable from the Minorities at Risk dataset (MAR) is routinely statistically significant as an independent variable in any regression model where “ethnic rebellion” is the dependent variable.

The theoretical relationship between regional concentration and violence is still disputed. Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that concentration acts as a proxy for a “regional base” that increases a group’s ability to wage war against the center. Regional concentration, they argue, provides ethnic militias with distinct advantages over the state’s armed forces, such as unique knowledge of the territory and the ability to hide amongst ethnic kin.

Monica Toft (2003), on the other hand, argues that a regional homeland acts as “issue indivisibility” between the host state and the ethnic group, decreasing the likelihood for compromise and increasing the likelihood for violence:

Majorities and groups concentrated in a region of a state, especially if that region is a homeland, are more likely to regard control over territory as indivisible than are groups that are minorities, dispersed, or urbanized…if [both state and ethnic group] represent their interests over the disputed territory as indivisible, then violence is likely.

The positions of these scholars present a clear puzzle when juxtaposed with the position of partition advocates: how can group concentration both lead to an increased likelihood of peace and violence? David Laitin (2004, p.357), in his critique of Kaufmann’s ethnic security dilemma, points to this puzzle as “an intuitively
perplexing position, since it would be difficult to explain why group concentration has such a violent effect on groups that have not yet been at war, but a peaceful effect on groups that have ended a war….it merits scrutiny.”

2 My Dissertation’s Contributions

How can ethnic group concentration lead to both long-term peace and violence? My dissertation addresses this puzzle and presents a convincing explanation of how and under which conditions, partitioning ethnic groups can increase the likelihood peace. I achieve this through theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions. In this dissertation, I also identify and address three specific gaps in the partition literature, and I use a nested research design to build theory, identify causal mechanisms, and empirically test theoretical arguments.

2.1 Theoretical Contribution

Theoretically, I focus attention on the need for de facto statehood in addition to demographic separation. Demographic concentration alone, I argue, will increase the likelihood of violence by increasing the capability of the group to wage war against the center; but group concentration with statehood decreases the motivation to fight the center. Almost all ethnic civil wars are separatist by nature, and providing statehood to these ethnic militias will reduce the need for further rebellion. Further, statehood also permits standard practices of deterrence between states, with each building up its military and alliances in a bid to avoid future conflict. These factors are evident whether statehood is de jure (Bangladesh in 1972) or de facto (Northern Cyprus after 1974). Finally, partitions into separate states overcome the problem of
credible commitment by permitting the smaller party to retain its military when it establishes a separate homeland state.

While I stress the importance of statehood, I also distance myself from previous pro-partition scholars by arguing that demographic separation and statehood will not end ongoing ethnic civil wars. The causes of violence during civil wars, I argue, are too complicated to reduce to demographic intermingling, as the 2G ESD assumes, and therefore violence is likely to continue even if groups unmix into separate, defensible enclaves or independent states. In Chapter Three, I conduct an empirical test of this assertion.

Building on the ethnic security dilemma tradition, I argue that several of its theoretical insights can, however, be applied to post-war conflict recurrence. I call this the Third Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma (3G ESD). This Third Generation is similar to the first two generations in that it also emphasizes the key components of demographic intermingling and anarchy as key predictors of violence. While partition will create peace in a war zone, I argue that partitioning ethnic groups will help facilitate long-term peace-building once an initial cessation of violence has been established via other means. Such partitions need to include both statehood (de facto or de jure) and demographic separation.

Yet, where the 2G ESD focuses on ethnic intransigence as the microfoundation of continued violence within intermingled groups, I focus on the triadic political space endogenously created by partition as the cause of renewed conflict. The triadic political space consists of three actors: (i) the host state, (ii) the stay-behind minority located in the host state, and (iii) the homeland state, ruled by the
same ethnic group as the stay-behind minority. For reasons outlined in the theory chapter, I argue that the homeland state poses the greatest danger to conflict renewal, taking advantage of opportunities to re-assert control over territories with its kin group members. The key factor for conflict renewal, if a stay-behind minority is present, is the balance of power between the post-partition states. If one side gains an advantage in the initial post-war period, conflict is likely to re-erupt.

In a direct challenge to the 2G ESD, I argue that the stay-behind minority can peacefully co-exist with enemy ethnic groups even after a devastating ethnic war involving large-scale ethnically-based massacres. The 2G ESD argues that stay-behind minorities will inevitably clash with the host state and its members due to fears and anger created during the ethnic civil war. I argue that enemy ethnic groups can and do collaborate with each other even after brutal ethnic wars, provided there are appropriate incentives created by the state. To accomplish domestic peace, I emphasize the role of anarchy as a central component in the ethnic security dilemma, arguing that exiting anarchy through strong state-building is an important parallel mechanism for peacebuilding.

Exiting anarchy plays two roles. First, state-building allows the government to establish incentives that induce collaboration (e.g., through physical punishment or material gain). Ethnic group preferences and ethnic group behavior need not coincide as long as the state is strong enough to induce collaboration (Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas 2008). Even if members of a stay-behind minority prefer to be ruled by their ethnic kin, they can still collaborate peacefully with a regime run by the enemy ethnic group as long as they see the incentives of collaboration. Second, state-building is
important because it reduces the host state’s external vulnerability and hence reduces the opportunity for irredentist action by the neighboring homeland state.

The bottom line for post-partition states, therefore, is not the presence of stay-behind ethnic minorities, per se. Rather the bottom-line is strengthening the state (i) to induce minority collaboration and (ii) to reduce the state’s vulnerability to external attack by the minority’s homeland and maintain a balance of power with it. This is easier said than done since post-war states in general are extremely weak, and post-partition states have the additional burden of state-building and guarding a new, previously non-existent border. Since state-building is problematic, stay-behind minorities are likely to increase the risk of violence.

In sum, while partitions are helpful to reduce the risks of violence, they create problems if they leave stay-behind minorities. To increase the likelihood of long-term peace, partitions should demographically separate ethnic groups.

2.2 Conceptual Contribution

This brings me to the conceptual contribution of this dissertation. Political science has focused on “civil war termination,” conflating two distinct and qualitatively different forms of termination: (i) the initial cessation of violence and (ii) the establishment of long-term peace. This conflation has been dealt with recently by some IR scholars, but the problem has remained in partition scholarship (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Page Fortna 2008). Given the high recidivism rate of civil wars, ending the initial violence is therefore only part of the solution. My dissertation disaggregates “civil war termination” and evaluates partition’s ability to both end
ongoing violence (Chapters Two and Three) as well as partition’s ability to build long-term peace.

2.3 Methodological and Empirical Contributions

My methodological and empirical contributions in this dissertation are threefold. First, methodologically, my research design enables me to test, for the first time, the 2G ESD. I argue that the 2G ESD (often labeled “partition theory”) has never been properly tested empirically. Looking through the literature on partition, I count at least 15 articles that offer specific empirical tests based on the 2G ESD (e.g., Bloom and Licklider 2007; Downes 2001; Downes 2004; Fearon 2004; Johnson 2008; Kaufmann 1996; Kaufmann 1998; Kaufmann 2006; Kaufmann 2007; Laitin 2004; Lindley 2007; Sambanis 2000). Each of these, however, suffers from an inappropriate research design that does not permit testing of whether partition ends the violence of ethnic civil war. No scholar to date has structured a research design to test whether separation into defensible enclaves will lead to an end of ethnic civil war, including both partition’s leading proponent (Chiam Kaufmann) and its leading critic (Nicholas Sambanis), although both claim to have concluded empirical tests. Without an accurate empirical test, both sides of the debate remain at the level of theoretical conjecture.

This gap in the literature is all the more alarming when we consider that this theory has been promoted as a policy prescription, most recently during the height of Iraq’s civil war. If humanitarian corridors had been established to separate ethnic groups as partition advocates proposed, would this have ended the war? The answer is that we do not know, since the theory has never been appropriately tested.
**Conceptual Flaw in Dependent Variable**

The level of data required for such a test is highly demanding, requiring detailed information about migration patterns and violence during an ethnic civil war. Instead of conducting such research, IR scholars wedded to this theme have chosen convenient short-cuts as proxies to test partition theory. The fatal methodological flaw in each of these designs is a conceptual focus on the wrong dependent variable. To test whether separation into defensible enclaves (independent variable) leads to an end of violence (dependent variable), one needs to draw from a universe of cases that includes all *ongoing* ethnic civil wars. However, scholars have instead drawn from a universe of cases that includes *all civil war terminations* and tested whether the civil war recurs. Such research designs permit us to test whether partition prevents civil war recurrence, but do not test whether partition ends ongoing violence, the key claim made by partition advocates and the claim used by policy-makers to justify the use of partition in Iraq and elsewhere.

To address this research flaw, I present a “crucial case” (Eckstein 1975) based on the Georgian ethnic civil war with the Abkhaz (1992-1993). Drawing on primary research collected during field trips conducting in 2008, I use a combination of interviews, archival material, and secondary sources to track levels of violence and migration patterns that occurred during the ongoing war. I demonstrate that separation did occur during the ethnic civil war, as the 2G ESD would predict, but that the war carried on, and even escalated, refuting the key claim made by partition advocates that separation will lead to the war’s termination.
Empirically, I also contribute to the field by testing my 3G ESD through a large-n empirical test of all ethnic civil war terminations between 1945 and 2004. While there have been other cross-national tests of partition’s ability to prevent conflict recurrence, these have not included the key variable of demographic separation (Chapman and Roeder 2007; Sambanis 2000). I construct an original index that captures ethno-demographic separation resulting from ethnic civil war, and I gather data on all relevant wars from this period. I find strong, supportive evidence that ethnic civil wars ending in separate ethnic homeland states with high degrees of ethno-demographic separation are less likely to experience conflict recurrence than other forms of ethnic civil war termination.

My methodology is a nested design, joining a growing number of scholars that combine methodological techniques (Laitin 2002; Tarrow 1995). Such a mixed-methods methodological approach combines the advantages each method can bring individually as well the “synergistic” value provided by a combined approach (Lieberman 2005). This approach allows us to understand general relationships as well as to find specific causes of events (Lieberman 2005, p.436). In my dissertation, I am interested in the general relationships between ethnic minorities and civil war violence as well as the specific causes of post-partition peace and violence in Georgia-Abkhazia and Moldova-Pridnestrovie.

By using case studies, I am also able to more accurately trace the micromechanisms of my theory and compare it to the leading alternatives. In fact, there has also been a clear methodological trend in the civil war literature, moving from large-n cross-national research to systematic case study evidence (Tarrow 2007).
and my dissertation, methodologically, contributes to this trend. While cross-national studies have been extremely insightful, productive, and have established much of the civil war research agenda, there has also been a growing awareness of their limitations in theory testing and theory building, largely due to their aggregate, macro-level variables. This realization was epitomized by the efforts of leading large-n scholars to encourage greater case study research (Collier and Sambanis 2003; Sambanis 2004), as well as recent efforts by Fearon and Laitin (2007) to introduce “random narratives” as an alternative research method. To date, case-study research has focused on violence during war, recruitment patterns, motivations of violence, and others (Arjona and Kalyvas 2006; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Kalyvas 2006; Oyefusi 2008; Weinstein 2007; Wood 2003). My dissertation concentrates on both the end of ongoing violence and on conflict recurrence, which is relatively new to this field of study.

And, by focusing on civil war termination and exiting the trap of repeated violence onset, I contribute to one of the key topics emerging now in the literature. As Sydney Tarrow (2007, pp.596-597) stated in a recent review of the literature, “There is, finally, the question of how countries get out of insurgencies….What are the factors and the mechanisms that are likely to produce postwar civil peace?...In this era of intractable civil wars, this may well be the next phase in civil war studies.”

Finally, as all of my cases come from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet region, my cases make empirical contributions to their respective area studies literature. While much literature has focused on the causes of ethnic wars in Georgia and Moldova (Cornell 2002; Goltz 1993; Jones 1994; Kaufman 1996; Sverev 1996),
there has been no Western scholarly work detailing (i) the dynamics of violence during the wars in Georgia and Moldova, (ii) the cause of conflict recurrence in Abkhazia in 1998, and (iii) and a credible explanation for the absence of ethnic violence in Moldova despite the presence of large stay-behind minorities on both sides of the partitioned country after 1992.

3 Data

The data for my dissertation comes from several sources. First, the three case studies of my dissertation were built primarily on nine months of field research in the partitioned territories of Moldova-Transnistria and Georgia-Abkhazia during 2008. I made two trips to each Georgia-Abkhazia and Moldova-Transnistria, which each lasted approximately two months. I conducted over 150 interviews during this period, concentrating on civilians displaced during the war as well as members of the government and armies at the time of the conflict. Second, I use archival material, which proved indispensable to understand the migration and violence occurring during and after the civil conflicts, especially in Georgia-Abkhazia. Third, I use news articles from the time of the conflict to help triangulate data from interviews, and I also draw on expert opinion and other secondary sources. I detail this further in the individual case study chapters.

My large-n, cross national study was built using two sources. First, I drew on an extant database of civil war and partition constructed by the World Bank (Sambanis 2000). I built on this by (i) extending the database temporally and (ii) adding an

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10 Having lived in Moldova between 2001-2003 as a Civic Education Project Fellow, I also draw on data collected during that period as well.
original variable to capture ethno-demographic separation, which I constructed using secondary sources of ethnic civil wars around the world between 1945 and 2004.

4 Concepts

4.1 Civil Wars

The term civil war is used to distinguish one type of large-scale political violence from inter-state wars and other forms of intra-state collective violence, such as riots, pogroms, and brawls (Brass 1996; Horowitz 2001; Sidel 2006; Tilly 2003; Varshney 2002). Much of the sociology and political science literature of the past 50 years has used a variety of labels for processes that could be subsumed in a definition of civil war, such as revolutions, insurgencies, rebellions and some forms of ethnic conflict (Gurr 1970; Parsa 1989; Tilly 1978). While there is no single definition of what constitutes a civil war in the social science or policy-related literature, there are general components to a civil war with which most definitions concur. A generally accepted definition includes criteria such as (i) armed conflict involving representatives of the state as one actor and at least one other domestic actor as a competitor; (ii) conflict over a contested political issue; and (iii) conflict resulting in a certain number of deaths and/or casualties exceeding a certain threshold for each party (Baev 2007; Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Gates 2004; Small and Singer 1982).

The first authoritative definition in the political science literature came from the Correlates of War project (COW), which began including civil wars in its dataset in 1982. The COW definition includes the abovementioned, and its death threshold is
set at 1,000 battle-related deaths, including civilians, during the duration of the conflict (Sarkees 2000; Singer and Small 1994; Small and Singer 1982).\textsuperscript{11}

Other scholars have built on this definition, using slight variations, particularly related to the death count threshold over time (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gleditsch et al. 2002; Licklider 1995; Sambanis 2004). Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) dataset, for example, includes a minimum of 1,000 deaths (including civilians) but add two specific qualifiers: a yearly average of at least 100 deaths, and at least 100 killed on each side of the conflict; Sambanis (2004: 829-830) probably has the most comprehensive definition for cross-national, quantitative studies, generally following the trend begun by COW but with a more specific criteria to capture start and end dates. Gleditsch et al. (2002) move beyond civil war by including any “armed conflict” in their dataset; an armed conflict has at least 25 battle-related deaths. Other scholars, not troubled by the construction of cross-national datasets, choose broader definitions. Kalyvas (2006: 17), for example, defines a civil war as “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities,” although he also appears to accept the necessity of a death threshold.\textsuperscript{12}

My dissertation relies on both cross-national and case-study data. As I build on a previous data collection effort used by Sambanis (2000) for my cross-national test of

\textsuperscript{11} The body-count aspect of the definition has changed over time, originally requiring 1,000 battle deaths for each year, which was changed in 1992 to include only a total of 1,000 deaths during the duration and including civilian deaths. Sambanis (2004: 822) raises questions about the degree to which civilians are included in the death count.

\textsuperscript{12} Kalyvas states, “Civil wars are distinguished from coups when a certain fatality threshold is crossed, entailing significant military operations.” See Kalyvas (2006) page 19, footnote 4. Although see Fearon (2004) who identifies “coup-related” civil wars.
partition, I adopt his definition, which is virtually identical to that used by COW.\textsuperscript{13} My case studies fit the definitions of civil war identified by each author presented above. I describe the specific details of the ethnic civil wars in their respective chapters.

\section*{4.2 Civil War Termination}

Ideally, we would mark the end of a civil war occurs when the violence itself ends. Deciding when, precisely, a civil war ends, however, is almost always a difficult task. In ideal-type cases, the civil war would end with either (i) a complete military victory that coincides with an end of military fighting, or (ii) a signed peace agreement that coincides with the end of military fighting. Part of the problem is the absence of reliable data on deaths for monthly or even annual periods. As Fearon (2004: 279) notes, “Given this lack [of annual data], it seems that the standard civil war lists often rely implicitly on the presence of a formal peace agreement or truce to indicate the end year of many conflicts. That is, a formal agreement or truce followed by a significant reduction in killing that lasts for some period of time.”

Probably the most difficult problem is deciding whether a resumption of violence is war recurrence or whether the war never, in fact, ended. Given that a death threshold is deemed critical to virtually all definitions of civil war, and given that we are normatively interested in ending the killing of civil wars, I view this as the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{13} Sambanis (2000: 444) defines a civil war as, “A civil war is defined as an armed conflict that has (1) caused more than one thousand deaths; (2) challenged the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; (3) occurred within the recognized boundaries of that state; (4) involved the state as one of the principal combatants; (5) included rebels with the ability to mount an organized opposition; and (6) involved parties concerned with the prospect of living together in the same political unit after the end of the war.” More on this in Chapter 4.
\end{footnotesize}
most important indicator, with war termination achieved when battle-deaths drop below 25 for at least one year.\textsuperscript{14}

\subsection*{4.3 Ethnic Civil Wars}

In the social science literature, “ethnic conflict” refers to conflicts involving ascriptive group identities, identities that are both in some sense “visible,” very difficult, if not impossible, to change, and that are often based on an individual’s descent, such as language, religion, or race (Chandra 2006; Horowitz 1985; Varshney 2002).\textsuperscript{15} Identities are difficult to change primarily because of their visibility, but also because of local knowledge and in-group policing. In the social science literature, these are also called communal, identity, or sectarian conflicts, and are often distinguished from socially-based conflicts, such as class (Hechter 2004). I use the term “ethnic” because it is more common, and therefore familiar, in the literature.

The concept of ethnic conflict does not assume primordial identity in the sense that groups are fixed and unchanging, nor does it require fixed individual identities.\textsuperscript{16} Advocates of the ethnic conflict category need only accept that ethnic identity \textit{becomes given} under certain conditions. In fact, the concept of an “ethnic war” is still compatible with mainstream constructivist understandings of individuals sharing multiple, overlapping identities, some of which become more salient than others depending on the context (Barth 1969; Brubaker 2004; Wimmer 2008).\textsuperscript{17} In

\textsuperscript{14}There several other definitions; for example, Fearon (2004: 279): “War ends are coded by observation of either military victory, wholesale demobilization, or truce or peace agreement followed by at least two years of peace.”

\textsuperscript{15}Horowitz (1985, p.53), for example, defines ethnicity as ascriptive identities that include “color, appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of common origin, or some combination thereof.”

\textsuperscript{16}Some scholars do not agree. Kaufmann (1996: 140), for example, states that “ethnic identities are fixed at birth.”

\textsuperscript{17}Rogers Brubaker (2004) has long challenged his colleagues to move beyond “constructivist clichés” that characterize identities as multiple, unstable, contingent, etc., and to examine the ways in which the
precolonial Rwanda and Burundi, for example, Hutu and Tutsi identities were flexible, but this was certainly not the case during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when some Hutus targeted all Tutsis because of their ethnic identity (Hintjens 1999). In the words of one individual caught up in the Bosnian ethnic civil war, “I am a Croat....I was Yugoslavian, and now I am a Croat. I always knew that I am a Croat, but I didn’t feel it so much. Now, you have to be Croat, Serb, Muslim, Jewish or whatever....For me personally, these identities didn’t interest me at all: my being a Croat wasn’t important. But now, you have to be” (Fahy and Mogul 1995). Another Bosnian stated it even more succinctly, “Before this crisis I didn't even know if I was a Serb or a Croat” (McGeough 1991).

It is the specific use of violence in civil wars that mark some as “ethnic.” More often than not, it is violence that targets specific categories of people; it is not the “ethnic identity” that causes the violence, in other words, but rather the violence that creates the relevant ethnic identity during war (Tilly 2003). There are several mechanisms involved in the activation of this identity which can be drawn from the dynamics of contention literature; these are primarily part of a process of polarization (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). The most important are either “category formation” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 143), if identities are invented anew, or “boundary activation” (Tilly 2003: 75-76), when a shared identity exists but
violence is used to activate or reinforce it in opposition to others. Several other mechanisms may also be at work.18

It is this component of an ascriptive identity, and the politicization of that identity through violence, that distinguishes ethnic civil war from other forms of large scale political violence, such as revolutionary wars, coup-related wars, or resource-based wars (Aspinall 2007; Besancon 2005; Fearon 2004).19 The ascriptive component can lead militant organizations to identify entire ethnic groups as loyal or disloyal within a country’s population—regardless of how one may self-identify—in a way that ideological conflicts cannot. In fact, ethnic group members have gone to great lengths to find out who is a member of an “enemy” group, including the use of census data in Nazi Germany, electoral lists in Sri Lanka, and identity cards in Rwanda (Hintjens 1999; Kaufmann 1996; Seltzer 1998). As a result, members of one ethnic group are far less likely to fight for the opposing side, dividing communities and potentially making postwar reconciliation in an intermingled state very difficult.20

In ideological wars, by contrast, loyalties are more fluid both during and after combat.21

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18 For example “convergence,” where contradictions at one end of the political spectrum drive actors of one identity into a closer alliance, and “attribution of threat,” which distinguishes between the presence of a threat and the recognition of the threat by the group.

19 There may be an interaction effect between resource and identity conflict; see Aspinall (2007)

20 This is not to say that cross-ethnic appeals are not possible. As other scholars have pointed out, even during ethnic wars it is possible to find individuals from the rebellious ethnic group working for the government. Kaufmann argues this may occur when there is “extreme power imbalance,” which would be consistent with Kalyvas’s (2006; 2008) argument that civilians will provide support to whichever actor has military dominance locally, although most of his cases come from colonial wars. This may explain how the Russian government was able to co-opt local rebel leaders and their followers (e.g., Akhmad Kadyrov and the so-called Kadyrovtsy) only after taking territorial control of most of Chechnya’s urban centers.

21 Ideological conflicts may sometimes display fixed or inflexible identities. For example, during the Russian civil war of 1917-21, members of certain classes (e.g., “kulaks”) were targeted for deportation or death. For evidence of the extreme class-based nature of the early Soviet state, see Nicolas Werth, *Istoria Sovetskogo Gosudarstva* [History of the Soviet State] (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Ves Mir, 2003), pp.
Numerous definitions of ethnic civil war exist, but typically they combine the definitions of civil war and ethnic conflict discussed above (Esty et al. 1995; Sambanis 2006). Ethnic civil wars are typically coded when one party to the conflict is an ethnic group seeking changes in their status or government policies toward them, whether that be an end to repression, increased power at the center, or secession (Sambanis 2001). More recently, scholars have begun disaggregating “ethnic civil wars” into sub-categories, differentiating ethno-secessionist from other forms of ethnic war (Chapman and Roeder 2007).

In political science, scholars continue to debate whether and to what degree ethnic civil wars are different from other civil wars, but there is significant theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest that, at least in some areas, they should be seen as qualitatively different (Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Fearon 2005; Licklider 1995; Sambanis 2001; Sambanis 2006). Scholars have identified the “uniqueness” of ethnic civil wars as they relate to onset (DeFigueiredo and Weingast 1999; Huntington 1996; Jenne 2007; Kaufman 1996; Kaufman 1996; Kaufman 2001; Posen 1993; Snyder 2000; Toft 2003), dynamics (Downes 2008; Kaufmann 1996; Sambanis 2006), and termination (Bloom and Licklider 2007; Kaufman 2006; Licklider 1995; Sambanis 2000; Svensson 2007). The concept of ethnic conflict and ethnic war is not without its critics (Chandra 2006; Crawford and Lipschutz 1998; Gilley 2004; Mueller 2000). These criticisms, however, primarily concern what definition should
be used and the scope conditions for its use, rather than abandoning the concept altogether.

4.4 Partition: Statehood and Demography

In the past, partitions were understood as a ‘fresh division’ of some territory, usually executed by a sovereign (often great) power occurring at the time of decolonization (Schaeffer 1990). Meanwhile, debates over partition focused on the normative goal of self-determination (Kumar 1997; Tullberg and Tullberg 1997). This changed in the mid-1990s when academics such as Van Evera, Mearsheimer, and Kaufmann concentrated on partition as a mechanism to end ethnic civil wars, as humanitarian tool to minimize deaths and reduce human suffering once war had begun.

Under this humanitarian variant, the word “partition” has been presented as either (i) the demographic separation of warring ethnic groups into defensible enclaves (Kaufmann 1996; Kaufmann 1998) or (ii) the demographic separation of warring ethnic groups into separate, sovereign states (Downes 2004; Mearsheimer 1993). The latter variant has come to dominate the pro-partition argument, in recognition of the difficulties posed by reintegrating ethnic groups under a single, post-war state, and the need to translate those “enclaves” into a longer-term solution (Downes 2001; Kaufmann 2007). I address both of these concerns in later chapters. I argue, for example, that reintegration is possible as long as the state is sufficiently strong to induce collaboration. I also argue that separation into defensible enclaves does not produce an end to ongoing violence and will not produce a long-term solution if the enclaves are multiple.
4.5 De Jure or De Facto Statehood

There is some debate as to whether de jure or de facto statehood is necessary to end ethnic civil wars, but these arguments are one of degree: the key component is statehood. According to Max Weber, a state is an entity that “claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory” (Gerth and Mills 1958). As Salehyan (Salehyan 2007, p.219) states,

“Internally, states have the power and authority to establish rules of the political game, regulate opposition activities, and suppress challengers to its dominance. States may also regulate which types of flows—finances, goods, people, and so on—may cross their borders. In short, international boundaries define the sovereign jurisdiction and geographic territory of modern states.”

The key component of statehood for partition, as we will see in later chapters, is the core Weberian notion of controlling force within a given territory. Partition need not be recognized internationally as two sovereign states, but the partitioned territory needs have two or more territories controlled unilaterally by separate armed forces. These territories are demarcated by boundaries that act as lines of defense (Salehyan 2007, p.220).

Both de jure and defacto statehood provide the necessary defensive capabilities to reduce the ethnic security dilemma and avoid the problem of credible commitments that would appear if the two groups attempted to reintegrate within one state (Kolsto 2006; Pegg 1998). De jure statehood might increase the likelihood for peace by improving defense capabilities (e.g., the ability to procure weapons) and diplomatic activity. There is some empirical evidence to suggest that de jure
statehood is more likely to create an enduring peace (Chapman and Roeder 2007). However, since both de facto and de jure statehood take care of the key security concerns, both are, in principle, acceptable as part of the definition for partition, when combined with complete ethno-demographic separation. Increasingly, the notion of sovereignty is questioned in IR literature, and several scholars have begun treating de facto sovereign units as separate units in the state system, subject to IR theories and explanations (e.g., Krasner 1999; e.g., Vinci 2008). As a recent review summarized, while various authors disagree on many aspects of de facto states, there is agreement that de facto states “are remarkably robust, state-like entities” (Kolsto 2006, p.727).

5 Chapter Overview

I conclude this introductory chapter with a brief overview of each chapter in this dissertation and the major findings it presents. It is hoped this will both provide a grand overview of the dissertation and permit people to identify which chapters will be of greater interest for more in-depth reading.

5.1 Chapter 2: Theories of Ending Ongoing Ethnic Civil War Violence

This is the first theory chapter and focuses on the first half of civil war termination: theories of how ongoing civil wars end. I divide theories into three sub-groups: (i) realpolitik; (ii) negotiated solutions and the problem of credible commitments; and (iii) the second generation ethnic security dilemma (2G ESD). I identify weaknesses in the first two sub-groups and concentrate on partition as a solution to the ethnic security dilemma. The partitioning of warring ethnic groups, it is argued, should end the ethnic security dilemma and bring peace. However, theoretically the 2G ESD is exposed to an external critique since it does not take into
adequate consideration alternative factors that could prolong ethnic civil war violence. Equally important, empirically, this theory has never been properly tested in the literature. This sets the stage for chapter three, which is the first empirical test of the second generation ethnic security dilemma.

5.2 Chapter 3

Chapter three uses a single, crucial case to test the ethnic security dilemma. I use an ethnic civil war with high levels of death, displacement, ethnically-based massacres, vilification of the enemy, ethnic migration into ethnically homogenous territories, and a war that ended in complete ethno-demographic separation. In short, the case matches extremely well with the type of war for which partition advocates advocate partition. As a crucial case, if I do find evidence of partition’s success, it only provides mild support for the theory, since the partition is highly likely to produce a war-end, according to the theory. Nevertheless, since no scholars have properly conducted a process tracing of this event, the research is valuable in its own right. If I cannot identify a causal impact between partition and war end, it will call into question the ethnic security dilemma as an explanation.

Using process-tracing, I track violence and migration during the Georgian-Abkhaz civil war (1992-1993) and demonstrate that separation into defensible enclaves occurred, just as the 2G ESD predict, but that the violence of war did not end. I uncover a previous, little-known partition that occurred during the war but once this partition had taken place, the war continued for several months and concluded with a major humanitarian catastrophe and a second, better-known partition. As a critical case, I argue that this poses a strong challenge to the second
generation ESD. Further, the catastrophe that followed the first ethno-demographic partition raises grave doubts about the humanitarian justification for partition. However, while wars may end for reasons other than demographic separation, I develop the 3G ESD that focuses on post-war peace endurance since the recidivism rate of ethnic civil wars is so high.

5.3 Chapter 4

This is the second theory chapter and it focuses on this second phase of “civil war termination,” examining theories of how to maintain peace once an initial cessation of violence has taken hold during ethnic civil wars. I divide the theories into three categories: (i) capacity, (ii) motivation, and (iii) trust. I build on the first and second generations of the ethnic security dilemma, developing the third generation that emphasizes post-war peace.

My theory argues that demographic separation with statehood ends the ethnic security dilemma and increases the likelihood of peace in a post-conflict environment. However, it challenges the microfoundations emphasized in the 2G ESD, arguing that intractable inter-ethnic relationships are not at the heart of conflict recurrence. Instead, the 3G ESD argues that it is a combination of the triadic political space created by incomplete partitions and the balance of power that emerges in the post-partition environment. If stay-behind minorities exist, the chances of renewed warfare depend largely on a state’s capacity to defend itself relative to its neighbor rival. Many things reduce state capacity, including infrastructure damage caused by the civil war, internal armed opposition, state-building strategies, etc., and I deal with some of those factors in the case studies.
5.4 Chapter 5

This chapter is a cross-national test of the 3G ESD. It examines all ethnic civil war terminations in between 1945 and 2004 (n=80). It introduces a new index to measure ethno-demographic separation, and the results demonstrate that ethnic civil wars that ended with a partition into separate states and complete ethno-demographic separation maintained peace for at least five years. I run a statistical test using the index and I compare the results to all other ethnic civil war terminations. This is strong evidence in support of the 3G ESD. These data are part of a nested design, and I turn to case studies Chapter Six to supplement the results of chapter five and evaluate the causal mechanisms of the theory through process tracing, which cannot be accomplished through the cross-national examination.

5.5 Chapter 6

Chapter six is a set of two case studies: post-war Abkhazia, a state that emerged following the Georgian-Abkhaz civil war, and post-war Pridnestrovie, a state that emerged following the Moldovan-Pridnestrovie civil war. Abkhazia had a large ethnic Georgian stay-behind minority and, as the 3G ESD predicts, violence ensues. However, the key difference between the 2G and 3G ESD is why and how violence ensues. Such micromechanisms could not be established using the aggregate data in the cross-national study. The 2G argues that ethnic groups cannot cooperate following intense ethnic wars. The 3G argues that they can cooperate where the state is strong. I disaggregate the Abkhaz state and demonstrate that (i) violence was caused by the triadic political space, with armed groups entering Abkhazia from Georgia and (ii) that violence occurred only in the part of the Abkhaz state where
state-building had failed, shifting the balance of power in favor of the Georgian state. Where the Abkhaz state was comparatively strong, there was no violence.

The Moldova-Pridnestrovie case study examines a “non-event”: the lack of violence in Pridnestrovie following their ethnic civil war (1992). Both Pridnestrovie and Moldova had large stay-behind minorities that, according to the 2G ESD, should have resulted in violence. The results of the case study bring into relief the importance of state-building. I demonstrate a little-known fact about the Moldovan civil war: Pridnestrovie had effectively separated from Moldova and consolidated its rule before the civil war began. When the war did occur, it was short in duration and isolated geographically, leaving both Moldovan and Pridnestrovie security apparatuses intact and (i) able to induce collaboration among the stay-behind minorities and (ii) reduce the opportunity for attack from the neighboring republics in the post-war period.

5.6 Chapter 8

This concluding chapter summarizes the results of the dissertation, suggests future areas of research, and puts forward some policy recommendations, for Iraq, Kosovo, and elsewhere.
Chapter 2: Theory: Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil War

Theory
Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil War

1 Introduction

As discussed in Chapter 1, this dissertation focuses on two elements of “resolving” ethnic civil war: (i) ending ongoing violence and (ii) building an enduring peace. These elements are conceptually distinct but frequently conflated in the literature. Ending war emphasizes mechanisms to lower heightened levels of violence and disengage combat forces, resulting in (a frequently fragile) peace. This is distinct from peace-building, which addresses the high recidivism rate of ethnic civil wars, seeking means to assist conflict-prone countries to exit the recurring cycle of violence; the emphasis is therefore on maintaining peace once it has been established. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the first meaning of war termination and Chapters 4 through 7 focus on the latter.

In this chapter I discuss various explanations for ending the ongoing violence of civil war termination that are dominant in the field of comparative politics and international relations. I narrow in on the ethnic security dilemma that has been used as a theoretical backdrop to promote the use of partitioning countries specifically to end ongoing ethnic civil war.

2 Theory: Ending Ongoing Ethnic Civil Wars
Explanations of ethnic civil war duration are dominated by three approaches, each with a specific theory of how civil wars end: (i) realpolitik and balance of power, (ii) credible commitment problems, and the (iii) ethnic security dilemma. The first two approaches affect ethnic and non-ethnic wars, although I make an original contribution below by arguing that credible commitment problems for ethnic wars are more acute. Other explanations for duration, such as regime type (Goemans 2000), prospect theory (Bauer and Rotte 1997; Levy 1996), or veto players (Cunningham 2006), are less relevant to comparisons with partition because there is little prospect for direct intervention to hasten the end of war. Since I am interested in how to end ethnic civil wars, I therefore do not address these latter theories.

3 Realpolitik: Military Victories

The most common cause of civil war termination is military victory, which is typically a function of balance of capabilities or military strategy: wars end when one side gains an upper-hand militarily to defeat its opponent, and wars continue when their balance of capabilities are equal (Fearon and Laitin 2007; Toft 2006).\(^{23}\) Realpolitik has also proven to be a powerful explanatory power in ending interstate wars (Bennett and Stam 1996).

There are a variety of ways to achieve an upper hand in civil wars, such as strategic choices on the battlefield, but strong external support for one actor is a clear mechanism (i.e., certification or brokerage) that could hasten the end of civil wars (Balach-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Regan 2000). For example, civil wars could end when a foreign power either enters or exits a conflict: US withdrawal from the

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\(^{23}\) Toft (2006: 11) calculates that 69 percent of all civil wars ended in military victory between 1940 and 2000; during the Cold War, the percentage of military victories was even higher.
Vietnam War, leading to a North Vietnamese victory, and increased US assistance to Turkey during its war against the Kurdish Workers Party in the 1990s, leading to the end of that war. The withdrawal of great power support at the end of the Cold War has been proposed as a possible explanation for the dramatic decline in the number of civil wars since its peak in 1994. Finally, not only foreign governments, but also diaspora communities can impact the balance of power. Sri Lanka’s long-running ethnic civil war experienced a dramatic shift after 9/11 when funding the Tamil Tigers from abroad became riskier when the international community began to legislate and punish funding for “terrorist organizations” more forcefully. The reduction in funding allowed the Sri Lankan government to gain the upper-hand military, leading to a dramatic decline in the fortunes of the Tigers, and a military victory for the government by spring 2009.

There are conflicting empirical results as to exactly whether and how external support ends civil war. For example, Regan’s (2002) results suggest that interventions lengthen all wars; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008) suggest that it may hasten military victory for one side but prolongs the end for negotiated solutions; and Fearon and Laitin (2007) suggest that a sudden change during the war will produce termination. While military victory is not specific to ethnic civil war termination, criticisms of the “peace through victory” approach cite an increased likelihood of ethnic massacres (e.g., genocide) following victory as one dangerous outcome specific to ethnic civil wars (Licklider 1995). A similar criticisms related to ethnic wars is that such victory may cause the spread of war through diffusion caused
by refugee flows (Forsberg 2008; Lake and Rothchild 1998; Moore and Shellman 2006).

4 Negotiated Solutions and the Problem of Credible Commitment

Despite the frequency of military victories, academic research and policy preferences on ending civil wars have largely focused on negotiated solutions, especially in the past two decades (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2008; Stedman 1997; Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002; Zartman 1985; Zartman 1995). Research has focused on getting parties to the negotiating table, and in the post-Cold War environment began focusing on implementation due to the difficulty of transforming ceasefires into peace agreements that endure (Stedman 2002).

Explanations for the inability to reach negotiated settlements in civil wars narrow-in on the key difference between resolutions for inter-state and intra-state wars: the need for one party to disarm, creating a problem of credible commitment (Fearon 1998). Agreements between governments and rebels require rebels to disarm, but by disarming, the rebels lose key leverage that brought the government to the negotiating table. If the government later reneges on its commitments, weaponless rebels have severely diminished options. Barbara Walter (2002: 21) states:

As groups send their soldiers home, hand in their weapons, and surrender occupied territory, they become increasingly vulnerable to a surprise attack; and once they surrender arms and cede control of territory, their rival can more easily seize control of the state and permanently exclude them from power.

Thus any promises the government makes in a peace agreement are not credible. Given the risks associated with negotiated solutions, rebels are less likely to pursue negotiated agreements, preferring to fight for a military victory. This may explain
why war termination involving powersharing agreements are so rare for civil wars, why military victories are so common, and why civil wars are so much longer than inter-state wars.\textsuperscript{24}

5 Problem of Credible Commitments for Ethnic Civil Wars

While it has not been addressed in the literature, the problem of credible commitment can be seen as particularly acute in ethnic civil wars; I term this an \textit{augmented and expanded problem of credible commitment}. In non-identity conflicts it is the rebel \textit{organization} that fears being a sucker if it were to disarm: disarming could lead to the arrest or destruction of the leadership and armed forces, in addition to losing gains achieved in peace agreements. However, in an ethnic civil war, when \textit{groups} have been targeted because of their ethnicity, \textit{the fear of failure suffuses all members of the group}, not just the organization. Being the sucker, and thus losing the war and the peace, could lead to massacres and genocide, a statistically significant likelihood when governments win ethnic wars. The “actor” is now the group, not the organization, and this compounds the problem.

Given \textit{group fears}, there are several reasons why negotiated solutions are less likely to be signed. Most critically, it is easier to motivate group members to carry on fighting and supporting the war against difficult odds, given the alternative is potentially genocidal. Second, there is lower likelihood that organizations will be able to bring all group members onside in the event that an agreement is reached. Even if an organization can be convinced to enter an agreement, its group members may not provide support, fearing long-term consequences. Third, it is easier for

\textsuperscript{24} Fearon and Laitin (2007: 14) estimate that 13 percent (nine of 70) of rebels seeking control of the center end in power-sharing, with three falling apart. If we include both secessionist and center-seeking rebels, civil wars ended with significant power-sharing in only 20 of 141 wars (14 percent).
splinter groups to emerge as “spoilers” since group identity can be used as a resource and be exploited by ethnic entrepreneurs seeking a base of support. In essence, there are many more individuals affected by the problem of credible commitments and therefore many more individuals that need to be satisfied by potential resolutions of the problem making it a more difficult obstacle to overcome.

6 Solutions to Credible Commitments: Third Party Guarantees

Two solutions have been proposed to overcome the problem of credible commitments and end civil wars. The most widely discussed is third-party security guarantees (Walter 2002). If states cannot commit to terms in a peace agreement on their own, then an external actor with a credible enforcement mechanism (i.e., armed force) could theoretically resolve the dilemma. Walter presents this solution with evidence demonstrating its validity. If credible enforcement mechanisms are created, rebel organizations will be more likely to implement peace deals and decommission rebel armies.

Yet there are at least three problems with this solution. First, if rebels can look ahead and see that government promises are not credible, why do they sign peace agreements without third-party enforcement mechanisms that only later break down? This occurred several times in the long-running Sri Lankan civil war. Second, how, specifically, are peacekeepers able to enforce power-sharing mechanisms? Even well-armed peacekeeping missions rarely possess the military strength and political will to directly interfere with the political process in a given country to veto decisions of the government. Yet, agreements are nevertheless implemented with weak peace enforcement mechanisms. The ending of Tajik civil war, for example, included a
power-sharing agreement between government and rebel forces. Yet, while a peacekeeping force was introduced, they were not given a detailed mandate to enforce a given number of cabinet seats. When the government removed former rebels from positions in the government, the peacekeepers could not act.

Third, peacekeepers are designed to assist only in the transitional period, yet the problem of credible commitment continues over the long-term, as governments will still have an incentive to renege on promises after third-parties depart. Why do rebels not anticipate this problem? Thus, if the problem is credible commitments, third-party enforcement mechanisms do not appear to be enough, unless they are comprehensive and permanent, which they almost never are. This suggests that other factors may be at work.

7 Solutions to Credible Commitment Problems: Partition

An alternative solution to the problem of credible commitment is partition. Partition addresses the core issue of the problem directly. By permitting the division of territory between rebel and state leaders, the problem of credible commitment is resolved by turning the intra-state conflict into an inter-state conflict, with separate armed forces. For ethno-secessionist conflicts, by far the largest percentage of ethnic civil wars, this is promising because the nature of territoriality during the war is typically missing in ideological and other forms of civil war where capture of the center is at the heart of the conflict.25 This may help explain the empirical observation that ethnic wars more frequently end in partition than non-ethnic wars (Sambanis 2000).

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25 Examining Fearon’s data (2004), we see that all secessionist civil wars since 1945 were ethnic. The numbers break down as follows: 93% (47 of 51) were purely ethnic and 8% (4 of 51) were “mixed or ambiguous”.

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Despite its resolution of credible commitment problems, leading scholars in IR have not recommended partition as a solution: Walter does not discuss this option in her work, and Fearon (2004) explicitly condemns partition as a solution, predicting greater global instability if it were to be adopted by great powers. In fact, when partition emerged as a solution to ethnic civil wars in the 1990s, problems of credible commitments were not invoked as the rationale. Instead, partition advocates introduced a unique theory for ethnic civil war dynamics: the ethnic security dilemma.

8 The Ethnic Security Dilemma during War

The security dilemma derives from the realist tradition of international relations (Glaser 1997; Jervis 1978). A security dilemma can develop when, in an anarchical system, one state’s defensive action makes other states feel less secure, prompting them to build up armaments, drawing two or more states into a potential military confrontation, even where none originally sought it. Barry Posen (1993) applied this concept to ethnic conflict, initiating an extensive research program within the social sciences that continues to this day. Examining situations of “emerging anarchy” that results from failing states, Posen likened ethnic groups to states in the international system. Given the lack of a central government to enforce the peace, distrustful ethnic groups are forced to rely on themselves, engaging in defensive actions that seem threatening to the rest, heightening tension, and possibly leading to violence.

Importantly, the demographic mixture of populations influences the intensity of the security dilemma: when islands of one group are located in the territorial
confines of another, an offensive strategy may come to dominate, to save their brethren “from a horrible fate” (Posen 1993: 32); conversely, ethnic militias have an incentive to preemptively expel members of the out-group located inside their own territory to remove the out-group’s incentive for an offensive strategy.

As a theory of ethnic war onset, however, the micro-foundations are under-specified. Most centrally, what is the process by which identities gain salience in this emerging anarchy? As discussed above, group identities do not by themselves constitute politically relevant units, but are usually “activated” via violence. Ethnic groups do not fear other groups until a threat is attributed to them, which typically occurs through collective violence, although other factors could be involved (Tilly 2003). In other words, collective violence is probably the cause of the ethnic security dilemma, not the result. The ethnic security dilemma is therefore probably a better explanation for violence and migration after ethnic war has begun.

Chaim Kaufmann (1996; 2006) has proposed the ethnic security dilemma to explain the dynamics of migration and violence during war. I call this the Second Generation (2G) Ethnic Security Dilemma because it builds on the component parts of Posen’s First Generation: demography, sovereignty, and anarchy. The 2G ethnic security dilemma is more consistent with my expectation since the violence of ethnic war has already heightened the salience of group identity and groups have attributed threats to other groups, thus completing the polarization process (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). As Downes (2004: 236) confirms, “[i]ntermingling by itself…does not cause ethnic wars in the first place; it is the effect of the war that makes intermingling dangerous.” Saideman et al. (2002) underscore this logic when they
state that “the search for security motivates groups in divided societies to seek to control the state or secede if the state’s neutrality cannot be assured” (Saideman et al. 2002: 106-107, italics added). Indeed, in an ethnic civil war the biased nature of the state has already been demonstrated, and all threatened groups must mobilize for self-defense.

Once war has begun, due to real or perceived threats, virtually all individuals become trapped by their ascriptive characteristics, forced into rigid, opposing sides, in part because they can be identified easily by the enemy. While not everyone is mobilized for war, it is rare to find members of one ethnic group fighting on the opposing side.26 As Kaufmann (1996: 139) states:

Ethnic wars…generate intense security dilemmas, both because the escalation of each side’s mobilization rhetoric presents a real threat to the other, and even more because intermingled population settlement patterns create defensive vulnerabilities and offensive opportunities…Once this occurs, the war cannot end until the security dilemma is reduced by physical separation of the rival groups.

Other scholars have identified ethnically mixed regions as particularly prone to violence during war, prolonging the war itself. In discussing the former Yugoslavia, Hurst Hannum (2004, p.280) states, “Keeping ‘trapped’ Serbs within Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (and trapped Croats within the latter) may have actually contributed to continuation of the violence, since peaceful means of redrawing

26 Kalyvas has been at the frontline of demonstrating when and where group members may defect, such as during colonial war. See: Kalyvas, Stathis. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. New York: Cambridge University Press, Kalyvas, Stathis. 2008. Ethnic Defection in Civil War. Comparative Political Studies 41 (8):1043-1068.
borders seem to have been excluded.” The incentive for violence and the uprooting of hundreds of thousands continued.

The solution is therefore separation (Kaufmann 1996, p.161-162): “Unless outsiders are willing to provide permanent security guarantees, stable resolution of an ethnic civil war requires separation of the groups into defensible regions. The critical variable is demography, not sovereignty…demographic separation dampens ethnic conflicts even without separate sovereignty.”

Critically, for this dissertation, the ethnic security dilemma is “a theory of how ethnic wars end” (Kaufmann 1996, 137). The violence of these wars takes on a logic of its own and continues until groups separate into defensible cantons (i.e., partition), after which the incentive for further violence ends. Partition advocates acknowledge that ethnic wars can also end through military victories by the state, or long-term international military commitments to enforce a truce, such as that seen in Bosnia. The problem with those solutions, as mentioned above, is that the former comes with an increased risk of genocide, and the latter is rarely forthcoming from third parties in sufficient numbers and strength (Stedman 2002). Without a complete victory or large-scale intervention, the war will not end until the warring groups are separated.

Waiting for groups to separate on their own also carries great humanitarian risks, as the driving force behind separation is the continued massacres and military actions designed to homogenize territories. Partition advocates therefore advocate that the international community intervene to less inhumanely produce separation. As one legal advisor for the International Committee for the Red Cross stated (quoted in Mooney 1995: 224):
You cannot stop ethnic cleansing as long as there is a political will to effect such a policy. [...] If it is the authorities themselves that direct the police and the municipal authorities to carry out this kind of policy, then we can make all the protests we want but succeed only in making it more humane. They will still carry out ethnic cleansing, but perhaps in a certain manner that at least preserves the lives of the victimized population.

9 Partition and the End of Ethnic Civil War

Since the ethnic security dilemma drives violence and migration, partitioning warring groups ends the war. Importantly, other factors that may have caused the war to erupt in the first place are irrelevant once the ethnic security dilemma dynamics take over. As Kaufmann (1996: 137) states boldly: “solutions to ethnic wars do not depend on their causes.” Since that statement, other empirical tests have indeed suggested that this is the case. Doyle and Sambanis (2006: 44) write that “there exist important qualitative differences between the problems of war onset and war continuation or termination. Empirical evidence to date confirms that some of the variables that influence civil war onset do not have equivalent power in explaining war duration.”

10 Critique of the Ethnic Security Dilemma and Partition

As a theory of how ethnic civil wars end, the ethnic security dilemma is extremely parsimonious, with a simple explanatory variable (separation of groups into separate cantons or states) and a powerful dependent variable (end of ethnic civil war). Yet, I present two major critiques: one theoretical and one empirical. Most centrally, the theory of partition does not adequately address alternative explanations
for civil war violence and assumes that the unique logic of the ethnic security dilemma trumps all other factors. Civil wars are complex affairs and almost certainly contain multiple motivations and dynamics, which are conveniently ignored by partition advocates, who reduce violence and migration to the ethnic security dilemma alone.

For one, the social science literature on civil wars increasingly emphasizes the importance of organizations in explanations of violence and the duration of internal wars (Collier and Hoeffler 2003; Weinstein 2007; Mueller 2000). Once these organizations of violence are established, operating with stable sources of funding, can we really expect they will cease their violence if their ethnic kin are suddenly concentrated homogenously in a new homeland? There are many reasons to question that assumption, and other scholars have identified a broad range of factors that may lead to the continuation of violence. Once a violence-generating organization has been established, there may be material incentives for its leaders to perpetuate the conflict as a means of extracting greater rents from society (King 2001).

The 2G ethnic security dilemma has helped advance the field of civil war studies in several ways. While I argue that it seems improbable that such a theory could explain the end of ethnic civil war violence, I argue that is should still be a powerful explanation of migration, violence, and group concentration during ethnic civil wars.

However, even if we assume that theoretically the ethnic security dilemma overtakes other causes of violence, and despite the theory’s widespread attention over the past 15 years, the 2G ethnic security dilemma remains untested. Sambanis (2000:
439) raised a similar concern when he stated, “However intuitive [partition theory’s] reasoning may be, it is nothing more than a series of unsubstantiated assertions. Beyond a handful of self-selected cases, partition theorists have not presented proof that partition is the only viable and credible solution to ethnic civil war.”

I go further than Sambanis, however, and argue that *partition theory has never been properly tested empirically, even through case studies*. Looking through the literature on partition, I count at least 15 articles that offer specific empirical tests based on the “Kaufmann Argument” (e.g., Bloom and Licklider 2007; Downes 2001; Downes 2004; Fearon 2004; Galbraith 2006; Galbraith 2006; Gelb 2003; Johnson 2008; Kaufmann 1996; Kaufmann 1998; Kaufmann 2006; Laitin 2004; Lindley 2007; Mearsheimer 2000; Mearsheimer and Van Evera 1995; Sambanis 2000). Each of these, however, suffers from an inappropriate research design that does not permit testing of whether partition *ends the violence of ethnic civil war*. The critical problem is a conceptual flaw with scholars focusing on the wrong dependent variable. Each piece of research, from single case studies to large-n cross national studies, includes only “war-ends” in their universe of cases. These studies then examine whether violence recurs in the proceeding years. While this is appropriate for testing whether partition builds an *enduring peace* (a topic we will return to in Chapters 4 through 7), it is highly inappropriate for testing whether partition *ends ongoing war*.

Kaufmann’s (1996: 159) seminal article on the topic in fact admits that he does not test his hypotheses appropriately: “Testing this proposition directly requires better data on the attitudes of threatened populations during and after ethnic wars than we have now. Next best is aggregate analysis of the patterns of ends of ethnic wars,
supplemented by investigation of individual cases as deeply as the data permits.” The problem is that no one has gone “deeply” enough into the data to test the theory, and no one has constructed a research design to systematically gather the necessary data. Further, in addition to the conceptual flaw, each case study used to test partition to date has relied exclusively on secondary data, which is particularly dangerous when dealing with war; Kalyvas (2006: 32-51), for example, identifies five potential biases that can occur in war-related literature which should strongly caution scholars from relying solely on secondary evidence for this topic.27

This gap in the literature is all the more alarming when we consider that this theory has been promoted as a policy prescription, most recently during the height of Iraq’s civil war in 2006-2007 (e.g., Galbraith 2006; Kaufmann 2006). If humanitarian corridors had been established to separate ethnic groups as partition advocates proposed, would this have ended the war? The answer is that we do not know, since the theory has never been appropriately tested.

This brings me to the first two hypotheses I will test in the dissertation related to migration patterns. The 2G ethnic security dilemma predicts that, during ethnic civil wars, ethnic groups should migrate to regions under the territorial control of their ethnic kin. This produces the following hypotheses:

**H1** During ethnic civil wars, territories will become increasingly ethnically homogenous.

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27 These biases can affect those writing on civil wars or the quality of information available to writers on civil wars – each of these could affect literature available to scholars relying on secondary literature. The biases are (i) taking sides in a conflict (partisan bias); (ii) political framing of civil wars (political bias); (iii) obtaining information from urban locations despite violence being fought predominantly in rural areas (urban bias); (iv) focusing on violence instead of peace (selection bias); (v) problems with data (overaggregation bias and data problems).
During ethnic civil wars, members of ethnic groups migrate to regions under the territorial control of ethnic kin members.

The third hypothesis relates to the consequences of ethnic separation. The 2G ethnic security dilemma (sometimes referred to as “partition theory”) predicts that, once populations are separated, the violence of war will end:

**H3** Complete separation of ethnic groups will lead to the termination of ethnic civil war.

Observationally, if one can identify the date when ethno-demographic separation has been achieved, the end of the ethnic civil war should follow immediately or soon thereafter. We can also create two related sub-hypotheses with observable implications. First, that greater separation should lead to lower levels of violence during war, since the incentives for violence decrease; and second, the greater the separation should lead to fewer civilian casualties during war, for the same reason.

**H3a** The higher the degree of ethno-demographic separation during ethnic civil war, the fewer the battles there will be.

**H3b** The higher the degree of ethno-demographic separation, the fewer the civilian casualties there will be.

In Chapter Three, I develop a detailed systematic test of partition’s ability to end ethnic civil war by examining migration and violence spatially and temporally during Georgia’s 1992-1993 separatist ethnic civil war. The results carry both confirmation of the 2G ethnic security dilemma and negation. While I find support that the ethnic security dilemma leads to separation and increasingly homogenous regions, the result vis-à-vis war end are decidedly negative: full separation did not lead to the war’s termination. Worse, despite separation, the war ended in a humanitarian catastrophe for civilians, exactly what partition is supposed to avoid.
Chapter 3: Partition and the End of Ongoing Ethnic Civil War: An Empirical Test of the Theoretical Literature

1 Overview

Chapter Two introduced the reader to the Second Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma (2G ESD) theory, which argues that (i) ethnic civil war leads to demographic separation and that (ii) complete demographic separation of ethnic groups leads to the end of ethnic civil war. I argued that the theory was too reductionist, that the causes of violence during war were too complex to have ethno-demographic separation lead to peace. I also argued that previous empirical tests of 2G ESD (often referred to as “partition theory”) had been methodologically flawed, not permitting an accurate evaluation of the theory. This chapter provides an empirical test of the 2G ESD through a single case study of the Georgian-Abkhazian ethnic civil war (1992-1993). I use primary sources to track patterns of migration and violence both spatially and temporally during that war to assess whether the main tenets of the 2G ESD are accurate.

2 Introduction

Several diverse options have been put forward to help bring civil wars to an end, including third-party security guarantees (Walter 2002), peacekeeping operations (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Doyle and Sambanis 2006), military aid (Herbst 1996/97; Regan 2000), and standing aside to allow warring factions to fight it out, leading to decisive military victories (Luttwak 1999).
One option that has gained significant attention since the 1990s has been the use of partition, to divide warring ethnic groups into separate homelands. Advocates of partition accept several paths to ethnic war termination but argue that separating warring ethnic groups is the best one under certain conditions. In particular, this option should be considered when ethnic war and massacres have already begun but long-term commitments of well-armed ground forces are not forthcoming from the international community. Under such conditions, partition offers a realistic policy alternative that achieves humanitarian objectives without the need for long-term troop commitments. Foreign troops need intervene only for a short period of time to establish humanitarian corridors, permitting ethnic groups to cross to “their” newly created homeland state. While population transfers are a travesty, under partition’s plan they are conducted by foreign troops, who will be more humane than enemy militias who are engaged in ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity. Partitioning warring ethnic groups has been recommended during warfare in such diverse areas as Bosnia, Rwanda, Israel-Palestine, Sudan, Serbia, and, most recently, in Iraq. Remarkably, given the gravity of such a proposal, little empirical evidence has been conducted to assess whether partition would really work to end the war.

Not only has little empirical testing has been completed, but the extant tests have suffered from a methodological flaw that has prevented reliable conclusions. While the ethnic security dilemma theory predicts that, during ethnic civil war, separation of ethnic groups into separate homelands will lead to an end of ongoing violence, scholars have only empirically tested whether partition prevents ethnic civil war recurrence. This means we do not know what led to an end of the violence. The
universe of cases selected by scholars has been restricted to ethnic civil wars that have ended, neglecting ongoing ethnic civil wars. In other words, even if partition prevents war recurrence, we do not know whether partition ends ongoing war – and ending ongoing war is the *raison d’etre* of partition as a policy tool.

In this chapter I correct that deficiency and use the Georgian ethnic civil war in Abkhazia (1992-1993), a war which ended in partition, to construct a “crucial case” research design (Eckstein 1975). I find supporting evidence of the ethnic security dilemma – the driving force behind partition theory – of ethnically targeted violence, and of homogenization of territories. As the ethnic civil war progressed, ethnic Abkhaz and ethnic Georgians indeed sought safety within territory controlled by their own ethnic kin. There was also evidence of militias targeting ethnic outgroups, encouraging them to flee, as the ethnic security dilemma would predict.

However, I find no support for the proposition that ethnic partition ends ongoing ethnic civil wars. In fact, my research uncovers a remarkable but little-known aspect of the Georgian-Abkhaz war: while the war itself does end in ethno-demographic partition, there was an earlier, separate ethno-demographic partition that occurred during the war, yet the war continued.

The warring ethnic groups separated into homeland states, as the theory would predict, but the war carried on. In fact, despite the separation, the Abkhaz side continued attempts at territorial gain, eventually succeeding, which led to a wave of humanitarian suffering through mass ethnically-based death and migration, *the exact suffering that partition is supposed to prevent in ethnic civil wars*. As a crucial case, this is a strong challenge to partition theory, and suggests that, at best, the scope
conditions for the theory are far more limited than previously imagined, and at worse, the theory is wrong.

Partition did not end the war, I argue, because other strategic objectives drove the violence long after ethnic separation had occurred. Despite the ethno-demographic separation into militarily defensible enclaves, both sides were intent on retaking lost territory it deemed to be part of its homeland, with neither side was militarily capable of defeating its opponent. Drawing on theories of realpolitik and balance of capabilities, I suggest that the war ended as a result of two other factors: (i) the Abkhaz forces took advantage of increased external support while (ii) the Georgian side both made a militarily strategic blunder (it was “the sucker” in a problem of credible commitments) and imploded internally when an intra-Georgian civil war simultaneously erupted.

2.1 Overview of Chapter

I begin with a brief overview of the relevant theory and causal mechanisms associated with partition theory. Second, I present the research design methodology used. Third, I present the empirical findings. After concluding that separation had earlier occurred without the war’s termination, I briefly discuss how the war did end, identifying several factors related to balance of capabilities – not ethno-demography – that were decisive to the war’s termination. Finally, I conclude by discussing both the importance of these results for foreign policy and how ethno-demographic partition may still be important in preventing war recurrence.

3 Theory Review
The ethnic security dilemma argues that the violence of ethnic wars trap individuals by ascriptive features and society polarizes along identity lines. Ethnicity identifies friend and foe rigidly, making cross-ethnic appeals extremely difficult. As a result, individuals can only rely on the support of militaries comprised of their own ethnic kin, and militaries can only rely on recruits from their own ethnic group. Areas of mixed-demography create offensive opportunities and defensive vulnerabilities. Offensive opportunities exist because ethnic militias can rely on the support of kin members in other regions and thus can (i) expand territorially while (ii) protecting those kin members from persecution by enemy ethnic militias. Defensive vulnerabilities exist for exactly that reason: if enemy minority members exist within one’s territory, enemy ethnic militias may try to attack to expand territory and “save” their kin members. As a result it is within the each side’s interest to act preemptively, (i) eliminating enemy ethnic out-group members within their territory (through expulsion or death) and (ii) attacking other regions where kin members are located to save them before those members are massacred or expelled.

Once this dynamic is underway, say partition advocates, the war cannot stop until at least one of three things occurs: a third party intervenes to forcefully end the conflict; one side militarily defeats the other; or ethnic groups are partitioned into separate states. The last option is called “partition” in the current generation of ethnic civil war literature. Importantly, Chaim Kaufmann (1996: 137), partition’s leading advocate, stresses its ability to end ethnic civil wars: this is, he parsimoniously argues, “a theory of how ethnic wars end.”

3.1 Hypotheses to be Tested
Based on the theory, I produced three hypotheses to be tested in the dissertation.

The first two were based on the dynamics of the ESD:

\( H_4 \) During ethnic civil wars, members of ethnic groups migrate to regions under the territorial control of ethnic kin members.

\( H_5 \) During ethnic civil wars, territories will become increasingly ethnically homogenous as the war continues.

The third hypothesis relates to the consequences of ethnic separation:

\( H_6 \) Complete separation of ethnic groups into defensible enclaves will lead to the termination of ethnic civil war.

We can also create a related sub-hypothesis. Greater separation should lead to lower levels of violence during war, since the incentives for violence decrease; for example, the greater the separation should lead to fewer civilian casualties during war. After all, as Kaufmann (1996, p.137) argues, “Separation reduces both incentives and opportunity for further combat, and largely eliminates both reasons and chances for ethnic cleansing of civilians.”

\( H_{3a} \) The higher the degree of ethno-demographic separation during ethnic civil war, the lower the level of violence.

4 Methodology

Given the micro-level empirical detail required on population migration and violence, I use a single-case research design. By focusing on an ongoing war and not the war-end, I draw my case from an appropriate universe of cases and avoid the

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28 One can think of an ideal large-n, cross-national study, but the data is simply unavailable, and it seems unlikely that the data could be realistically gathered. At a minimum, we would need to track patterns of ethno-demographic concentration at some time interval during a war (i.e., the percentage of ethnic minorities “trapped” in each other’s homeland). To collect such data relying on secondary sources appears to be impossible. The closest effort of which I am aware was attempted by the Minorities at Risk Project (MAR), which tried to collect approximate data on ethnic minority concentration levels in countries during peace time for two time points (1960 and 1992). However, the data from 1960 are largely missing since researchers hired by MAR could not find the data using secondary data.
methodological problems found in previous research. Simultaneously, I evaluate the causal claims of partition theory through process tracing, examining migration and violence (George and Bennett 2005). In fact, the civil war literature has turned sharply in favor of case study research in recent years due, in part, to the difficulties of specifying causal mechanisms and processes through large-n cross-national statistical analyses of civil war terminations, in addition to other problems such as data availability and data aggregation at the national level (Kalyvas 2006; Sambanis 2004; Tarrow 2007). Large-n scholars Collier and Sambanis (2003, p.301) remark that “[t]he difficulties associated with distinguishing between rival mechanisms on the basis of limited quantitative results are becoming clearer.” Sambanis’s solution is to confront the quantitative findings with the case study research to draw out the mechanisms with greater specificity. Further, such within-case analysis frequently develops a theory’s scope conditions and causal mechanisms further, making it a valuable exercise on its own.

4.1 Case Selection: Crucial Case

Since this is the first test of its kind for partition theory’s prediction that ethno-demographic separation will lead to the end of ethnic civil war, I have chosen a “crucial case” research design. Harry Eckstein (1975) has said the case “must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity.” Crucial cases “offer valuable tests because they are strongly expected to confirm or disconfirm prior hypotheses” (McKeown 2004, p.141). I have selected a case study in which the theory is most likely to confirm hypotheses; if the evidence fails to demonstrate support, it counts disproportionately against the theory (Eckstein 1975).
My case, the Georgian-Abkhaz civil war (1992-1993) should confirm the hypotheses for several reasons. First, this is a core ethnic civil war and is coded as such by the leading civil war datasets that include such a variable (Fearon 2004; Licklider 1995; Sambanis 2000). I use an ethnic civil war with high levels of death, displacement, ethnically-based massacres, vilification of the enemy, ethnic migration into ethnically homogenous territories, and a war that ended in complete ethno-demographic separation. In short, the case matches extremely well with the type of war for which partition advocates advocate partition. As I demonstrate below, recruitment patterns, rhetoric, and targeted killings all support the notion that ethnicity was a core aspect of this civil war, and this created an ethnic security dilemma. Further, this war ended in complete ethno-demographic separation, as the theory would predict (Dale 1997; Johnson 2008), and is considered a case of partition by both advocates and critics of partition (Chapman and Roeder 2007; Sambanis 2000). Through process tracing, the case study should therefore be able to demonstrate the causal link between partition and peace if it exists.

When I began this research, I intended to use process tracing and assess whether and how the ethno-demographic partition that occurred at the end of the war had in fact contributed to the war end. As I began to trace the process of separation and violence back in time, I discovered a very complicated picture of territorial division and ethnic migration throughout the war. I therefore changed my approach and began at the start of the conflict, examining (i) which side controlled which territory, (ii) how many “enemy” ethnic group members remained in each territory, and (iii) whether and how separation led to a cessation of violence. This approach led
to the striking observation that Abkhazia experienced complete ethno-demographic partition during the course of the war, but the violence of war did not abate.

4.2 Sources

Putting together accurate data on activity during a contentious event, such as a civil war, is riddled with problems (Davenport and Ball 2002; Kalyvas 2006). I try to deal with the inherent biases, misinformation, and incomplete information by relying on four distinct sources of information. First, I interviewed approximately 150 civilians who had been in Abkhazia during the war. I used structured and semi-structured interviews, enabling me to compare results about migration patterns during the conflict as well to remain open to other details participants may have had to offer (Arthur and Nazroo 2003); I detail that approach later in the paper. My goal was to see when and where people moved during the war. Second, I interviewed 24 military and government personnel from both sides of the conflict. These individuals included then-government ministers, aides, colonels, officers, and soldiers. I used semi-structured interviews, focusing on a list of key themes to understand what they understood to be the ethno-demographic situation during the war and how that influenced their war-time decisions (Wengraf 2001).

Third, I rely on several pieces of archival data. I used documents from a joint Abkhaz-Georgian commission that operated during the war to help civilians move to areas controlled by their own ethnic kin militias. I also have data on civilian deaths, put together by the Georgian Ombudsman’s office, as well as published material on the ethnic composition of armed forces. Fourth, I used secondary sources, including the use of (i) expert opinion from local think-tanks and NGOs, (ii) local and
international news articles from the time of the conflict, and (iii) local and foreign books published about the conflict.

4.3 Overview of Georgia, Abkhazia, and the War

Abkhazia is located in the north-west corner of the internationally recognized borders of Georgia (See Map 1).\(^{29}\) To its north sits Russia, to its west is the Black Sea, and to its south-east is the Georgian region of Samegrelo. Abkhazia has an area of 3,300 square miles (similar in size to Connecticut, Kosovo, and Cyprus), which is an eighth of Georgia’s overall territory, and roughly half its Black Sea coastline.

Map 1

![Map of Georgia and Abkhazia](source: BBC)

On the eve of the war, ethnic Abkhaz were concentrated in the eponymously titled Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Despite being the titular group, ethnic Abkhaz were only 18 percent of Abkhazia’s population (2 percent of Georgia’s

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\(^{29}\) Russia and Nicaragua have recognized Abkhazia as an independent country as of 2008.
total population) while ethnic Georgians formed a plurality of 46 percent; other significant groups included the Armenians at 15 percent, and the Russians at 14 percent (Zhorzholiani et al. 1995: 79). These demographic numbers were the result of Tsarist Russian policies of forced Abkhaz expulsion, as well as the in-migration of various ethnic groups during the Tsarist and Soviet era (Bennigsen and Broxup 1983; Blauvelt 2007; King 2008; Kvarchelia 1998; Suny 1994).

In 1991, as the Soviet Union unraveled, ethnic Georgians within Georgia voted overwhelmingly for independence while the Abkhaz (and other ethnic groups, such as Armenians and Russians) within Abkhazia overwhelmingly voted to remain within the Soviet Union (Suny 1994: 326-329). In the spring of 1991, Georgia had declared its independence; by the end of 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and by July 1992, the Abkhaz autonomous parliament had effectively declared its independence from Georgia (Cornell 2002; Sverev 1996).

On August 14, 1992, armed forces representing the Georgian government (predominantly paramilitaries) entered Abkhazia and the war began; PRIO’s Centre

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31 Abkhazia did not make a formal declaration of independence at that time, but reinstated its 1925 constitution, a year in which Abkhazia was the Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic within the Soviet Union, and independent but with special treaty ties to Georgia. Since the Soviet Union did not exist in July 1992, meaning Abkhazia was a union republic in a country that did not exist and where all other union republics had achieved independence, this can effectively be seen as a declaration of independence. Some reports also stated that the leader of Abkhazia, Vladislav Ardzinba, on a trip to Turkey, had requested diplomatic support to gain international recognition. See, for example, Turkish National News Agency report from July 27, 1992 as reported in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 07/30/92, “Abkhazia ‘Strong Enough to Fight Georgia’”.

32 In 1992 there were several paramilitary units, although the two major factions were the Mkhedrioni, controlled by Jaba Ioseliani, and Georgia’s National Guard, controlled by Kitovani. These were ostensibly under the control of the civilian government, although the degree to which Shevardnadze wielded any power vis-à-vis these forces is subject to debate. Kitovani’s National Guard forces were the first to enter the outskirts of Sukhum on August 14.
for the Study of Civil War’s dataset codes the war’s onset for this date. Despite intensely inter-mixed regions, cities, towns, villages, and families, and despite relatively peaceful relations at the individual level for decades, if not centuries, the war polarized communities along ethnic lines. Shelling, aerial bombardments, and several (generally unsuccessful) offensives continued during this period until September 1993, when the Abkhaz side launched a major offensive and successfully took complete control of Abkhazia, effectively ending the war by September 30.33

Under the United Nation’s aegis, a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ was signed December 1, 1993, and a more formal ‘Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces’ was signed in Moscow on May 14, 1994. PRIO codes the war’s end at December 1, 1993.

While exact numbers of death and disability stemming from civil war is always problematic, an approximate number of total deaths is estimated to total 8,000 with 18,000 wounded and 240,000 displaced from their homes (International Crisis Group 2006: 1; Mooney 1995: 197). Abkhazia’s population at the war’s outset was 525,000, while Abkhazia’s population is currently around 200,000.

5 Ethnic War and the Ethnic Security Dilemma

33 September 30 is the date frequently used to mark the end of the war in written sources, and the day used by Abkhazia to mark Victory Day, as this is the day Abkhaz forces reached the Inguri river, which was the pre-war administrative border between Abkhazia and Georgia. Field research among villages in upper Gali (Zone 6) suggest that Abkhaz forces did not arrive there to secure complete control of Abkhazia until October 1st and 2nd, so these dates may be more appropriate (e.g., interviews with residents from Okum, Chkhortal, Mukhuri: IG-75, IG-76, IG-77, IG-78; Jvarezi, Georgia 06/23/08). The Abkhaz did not take control Kodori at this point, a sparsely populated valley in the mountains. Abkhaz forces took control of lower-Kodori (town of Lata) in March 1994, and upper-Kodori in August 2008.

34 These are International Crisis Group Figures, and probably refers to estimates of permanently displaced; if one includes all the displaced, including many Abkhaz, Armenians, Russians, Greeks, Jews, etc. this figure would probably be over 400,000.
There is substantial evidence demonstrating the ethnic character of the war and that the 2G ESD dynamics occurred as the theory would predict. Observable implications of an ethnic security dilemma would include: ethnically-based targeting, real or perceived ethnically-based massacres and victimization, mono-ethnic patterns of recruitment and participation, perceptions of group fear of the out-group, polarization of identities, ethnically-based migration patterns, and homogenization of territories. Evidence exists for each.

In terms of ethnic targeting, there is no better summary than a Human Rights Watch Report (1995: 1) based on a detailed investigation during and after the civil war:

The combination of indiscriminate attacks and targeted terrorising of the civilian population was a feature of both sides….The practice was adopted first by the Georgian side, in the second half of 1992, and later, more effectively, by the Abkhaz side. The parties terrorised and forced the enemy ethnic population to flee, or took members of the enemy population hostage … entire villages were held hostages on the basis of the ethnicity of their population.

One scholar, Erin Mooney (1995: 198), stated that “[e]thnically-motivated acts of brutality have been committed on both sides, and with such regularity that they cannot be dismissed as sporadic, unintentional or individual incidents.” Catherine Dale (1997: 87), a scholar conducting ethnographic work on migration in Abkhazia, concluded, “Much Abkhaz migration during the war can be attributed to fear of ethnic violence…[and] [a]lmost all displaced Georgians state clearly that they left because their lives were in danger precisely because they were Georgian.”

One report by the Unrepresented Peoples Organization (Overeem and UNPO 1994: 13), widely perceived as sympathetic to the Abkhaz, nevertheless states that,
“In areas controlled by Abkhazian authorities during the war, there is evidence of anti-Georgian violence, including extra judicial killings, burning and looting of houses and of property.” Georgian forces also purposefully destroyed culturally significant but militarily insignificant targets, such as the Abkhazian national archives, and the Abkhazian Institute of Language, Literature and History (Sverev 1996; Personal Interview, Director of National Library of Abkhazia, Sukhum, 2008).

Equally important, for the ethnic security dilemma, people on each side perceived there to be ethnic-targeting during the war, and each group’s leaders framed the conflict in those terms. After all, it is not necessarily the massacres that is critical for the ethnic security dilemma, but the perception that a massacre occurred, engendering feelings of mass fear and ethnic polarization, sharpening identity salience.

Stories of ethnically-based looting, rape, beatings, and murder poured across the border into Abkhaz controlled territory during the first months of the war, which sharpened enmity and instilled fear in the Abkhaz as to what a Georgian-dominated government would bring.35 The principal, newspaper for the Abkhaz in Gudauta, their temporary homeland capital during the war, carried regular articles about Georgians targeting Abkhaz and threatening anyone who attempted to protect ethnic Abkhaz (e.g., Respublika Abkhazia 1992). One of the most infamous quotes to emerge from the war, was made by Gia Q’arq’arashvili, a colonel in the Georgian

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35 Dalila Pilya, an ethnic Abkhaz, meticulously recorded the stories of Abkhaz refugees that arrived in Gudauta, primarily from the Sukhum region. Personal Interview, Sukhum (03/03/08)
armed forces, who threatened in a television interview that he was prepared to see the entire Abkhaz population killed (Sukhumi Television 1992).36

Similarly, there was a widespread belief among ethnic Georgians that Abkhaz forces burned alive hundreds of Georgians, drank Georgian blood, and played polo using the severed head of a Georgian man, which was reported in papers at the time and in many personal interviews (e.g., Pringle 1992; e.g., Schmemann 1992; personal interviews, Tbilisi, Zugdidi 2008). It is not relevant, for the ethnic security dilemma, that reporters could find no evidence of at least some of the reported massacres (Korlov 1992), it is only relevant that they were believed during the war, causing fear and migration. Georgian leaders encouraged this perception. For example, Eduard Shevardnadze, then head of Georgia’s government, described the situation of Georgians living under Abkhaz control with the following words: “According to reliable sources reaching us from the occupied territory, mass executions of the Georgian civilian population, widespread torture, rape and other atrocities are being committed” (Narayan 1992).

Finally, there was widespread evidence of low inter-group trust. Weapons were kept within ethnic groups, and there were credible reports of mixed families from all over Abkhazia divorcing during the war itself (Personal Interview, Bendeliani, Zugdidi, 05/29/08).37 This adds to the notion of ethnicity being a short-

36 “I can guarantee the separatists that if from us 100,000 Georgians die, then all 97,000 of you who support Ardzinba will die…” This was a televised interview on August 25, 1992. Q’arq’arashvili’s reference to 97,000 was the total number of ethnic Abkhaz in Abkhazia based on the 1989 Soviet census, and Ardzinba was the Abkhaz pro-independence leader. This quote may have been taken out of context (personal interview with Q’arq’arashvili, Tbilisi, 07/03/08), although this is irrelevant for the ethnic security dilemma, where the perception of being credible is important.

37 There was an organization established in the 1990s to help such families, Union of Georgian-Abkhaz Mixed Families, as a result of cooling heads in the aftermath of the civil war, with partners seeking each other out. Interview with Rezo Bendeliani of the, 05/29/08, Zugdidi, Georgia.
cut to trust, and the war accurately portrayed as an ethnic war. This is not to say that no guns were given to Georgians – there were ethnic Georgians in the Abkhaz military, but their numbers were miniscule, as I discuss below.

Prior to the war’s onset, the Abkhaz leadership had formed a mono-ethnic National Guard and had begun a policy of removing ethnic Georgians from leadership positions within the Abkhaz regional government (Cornell 2002, 168; Sverev 1996). According to government sources on both sides of the conflict, during the war it was rare to find Abkhaz fighting on the side of the Georgians and Georgians for the Abkhaz. Identifying recruitment patterns for the armed forces is difficult, since there are no publicly available lists of soldiers who fought on either side of the war. I did find a list of those who died fighting for the Abkhaz side during the war (Pachulia 1997). I took this list and asked two Abkhaz in Abkhazia and two Georgians in Georgia to look through the list and mark whether the last name was (i) definitely Georgian; (ii) could possibly be Georgian or (iii) was definitely not Georgian. Out of approximately 1,770 names, a maximum of 61 were selected as “possibly Georgian” (3.45 percent) and an average of 19 identified as “definitely Georgian” (1.07 percent), leaving over 95 percent as definitely non-Georgian.

While relying on last names to ascertain ethnicity is a crude measure and is bound to make some mistakes, it can demonstrate trends, and the technique is used by other academics in the former Soviet space (e.g., Casu 2009). The number of Georgians identified also fits with the Abkhaz Minister of Security’s personal estimate of the army’s ethnic composition, which he claims included less than 10

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38 There is one partial list of Georgian soldiers that was apparently found by the Abkhaz at the end of the war, but there is no way to verify its legitimacy. This has been published by the Abkhaz.
percent non-ethnic Abkhaz (Personal Interview, Lakoba, Sukhum, 03/12/08).\textsuperscript{39} The remaining 10 percent, he said were primarily those arriving from regional ethnic groups to the north, such as Chechens and Adyghe, which formed the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, widely known to have sent soldiers to support the Abkhaz during the war (Billingsley 1998; Derluguian 2005: 267-273). There are other indicators, such as the Hero of Abkhazia Award, of which I found only one percent given to ethnic Georgians, but they are more open to government manipulation.\textsuperscript{40} In addition, there were numerous stories relayed to me about the lack of trust between groups over weapons (e.g., IG-103, 05/28/0, IA-118, 06/06/08).\textsuperscript{41}

6 Spatial and Temporal Changes in Abkhazia’s Ethno-Demography

What follows is a longitudinal analysis over the 14 months of war, disaggregating the state into zones of territorial control as my unit of analysis. By focusing on zones of control, I can identify the approximate ethnic make-up of each

\textsuperscript{39} There was a Russian news report from the time of the war when an Abkhaz parliamentarian, Viktor Loginov, suggested the non-Abkhaz figure was closer to 30-40 percent. There is no way to verify the claim or to know where this figure came from. TASS. 1992. Russians in Abkhazia Abandon Their Homes. ITAR-TASS, October 15.

\textsuperscript{40} This is less reliable since it is a government decision and, since the government’s master narrative is one of ethnic conflict, there is potential bias in favor of awarding some ethnic groups more awards than others. Having said that, the Abkhaz government does stress that the Georgian government waged an immoral war and that many ethnic Georgians recognized this and supported the Abkhaz cause, so this, too, is part of the government’s narrative.

\textsuperscript{41} Examples of lack of trust with weapons include one ethnic Georgian manager of a large factory in Georgian-controlled territory mentioned that he had a team of armed security guards in place as standard practice long before the war began, but once the war was underway, while many ethnic Abkhaz continued working at the factory, no Abkhaz worked as an armed guard (IG-103-05/28/0). Similarly, one ethnic Abkhaz recalled being surprised to find an ethnic Georgian in Abkhaz territory asking to fight on the Abkhaz side. Initially they refused to give him a gun: “as a Georgian, it was risky to give it to him” (IA-118-06/06/08). For sourcing of interviews, I use a format that protects the identity of those requesting anonymity. For most civilians, I did not request their name. Instead, I noted the location and date of the interview, which I keep in a database with a unique number. I note IG for those on the Georgian side and IA for those on the Abkhaz side.
zone to see whether and when zones become ethnically homogenous. Since zones of control change during the course of the war, I present “phases” of the conflict – three in total – that capture the evolution of territorial control and ethnic migration. I focus exclusively on regions within Abkhazia, instead of the whole of Georgia, since the civil war did not occur outside that region. While there were other ethnic groups affected by the war, most of whom left during the war (e.g., Russian, Greek, Jewish populations), I focus exclusively on the two main warring parties – ethnic Abkhaz and ethnic Georgians – to evaluate arguments of the 2G ESD.

6.1 Capturing Flight: Witness Testimonies

To reconstruct the process of ethno-demographic separation, I first conducted over 140 interviews with members of the civilian population who were located in the conflict zone during the war to ask about migration and ethnic separation. I covered all major cities and towns (8), and many villages (33) that comprise the six major regions of Abkhazia (Map 1 indicates places I visited to interview people during my field research). The zones indicated relate to regions of fighting and will be introduced and discussed further below.

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42 The Russian Federation evacuated ethnic Russians throughout the war; Israel sent a plane to collect most of the Jewish population, and Greece sent a ship to collect most of the Greek population. Armenians are known to have contributed more to the Abkhaz effort, including the Bagramyan Battalion, established in spring of 1993, although individuals from all ethnic groups contributed to the war effort in some degree.
Map 1: Zones of Conflict during the War and Sites of Field Research Visits
I had to spend more time in the eastern region because there was no natural border, such as rivers or mountains, delineating the “Eastern Front” of the war, so tracking the border required greater attention.

I asked ethnic Georgians, ethnic Abkhaz, and others to describe (i) if and when they left their homes, (ii) what ethnicity their neighbors were, (iii) if and when those neighbors left their homes, and, for those people that stayed in their homes for at least most of the war, I asked them (iv) whether there was some point during the war when most of the Abkhaz or Georgians had left their neighborhood or village. These interviews typically lasted 20 minutes, but sometimes lasted as long as an hour; they were conducted almost exclusively in Russian but occasionally were conducted in Georgian through a translator into Russian.

I covered these “locations” in two steps, due to the uniqueness of this war’s termination. First, I traveled to the actual locations in Abkhazia, where I interviewed individuals who live there today.43 Typically, I would arrive in a village and find people by approaching their home, introducing myself, and asking if I could learn more about migration during the conflict. Fortunately, Abkhaz and Georgian tradition is famed for its hospitality and I was rarely turned down.44 In every village, the stories were fairly uniform; given that these villages are relatively small, after a few interviews, I could get a general picture. In urban centers, such as Sukhum or

43 There are a very limited number of ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia outside the Gal region [Zone 6]. Ethnic Georgians outside Gal almost all come from “mixed families,” typically a Georgian woman married to an Abkhaz man; I spoke to some of them.
44 Occasionally, people would tell me that they simply did not want to talk about it, but this was exceptional. As one example, in the village of Merkaul, one woman, who had lost her son in the war, broke down in tears when she began to speak, and refused to continue.
Gagra, the stories are more complicated since the physical size of space is much larger, and stories were less uniform. Nevertheless, the pattern is fairly evident and supported by other sources, such as news articles, as I will present.

Second, I traveled to over 15 “collective centers” and many more private homes, which house refugees/internally displaced people (IDPs)\(^45\) throughout Georgia. Collective centers are essentially large, state-owned buildings to which displaced Georgians fled during the war; these include former resorts, hotels, kindergartens, factories, hospitals, warehouses, and dormitories. Each collective center houses anywhere from five to 50 or more families who fled Abkhazia. By visiting these collective centers, I could find ethnic Georgians who had lived in Abkhaz cities, towns, and villages during the war, even if they no longer live there now.

6.2 Potential Bias and Other Data Problems

There is, of course, a serious risk of bias in the stories relayed to me. After all, one can expect that ethnic Georgians in Georgian controlled territories during the war would downplay the number of ethnic Abkhaz who fled (to demonstrate that ethnic Abkhaz were not victimized and did not need to leave), and that ethnic Georgians in Abkhaz controlled territories would exaggerate the number of Georgians who fled (to emphasize the fear and victimization that befell ethnic Georgians). There could be other individual motivations for including, excluding or interpreting

\(^{45}\) The words refugee and internally displaced person is controversial and politically loaded in this context; I use the terms interchangeably in this paper but the meaning is someone who was forced to leave one’s home for fear of persecution. Technically, according to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee is a person who, “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of their nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail him/herself of the protection of that country.”
facts. While some interviewees gave idiosyncratic information about the degree to which ethnic groups stayed or fled, I found a high degree of consistency between the groups. There were systematic differences, but they were typically in the explanation for why people fled, not if and when. For example, an Abkhaz in the village of Kyndyg explained that he left because he was attacked and his house burned by a Georgian paramilitary (IA27, 06/11/08), while a Georgian from the same location told me that there was no violence against the Abkhaz in his village during the war (“nikto ikh ne trogal!”), but that Abkhaz nevertheless left because they either wanted to fight or feared that they would be targeted in the future (IG97, 07/01/08). Fortunately, these differences do not impact my results since the important aspect for my research is when they left, regardless of why. In addition to that bias, there are also the common problems of memory failure, and telescoping (incorrect placement of events) that are common when asking individuals to recall events in the past. (Sudman and Bradburn 1982).

I addressed these potential biases by triangulating sources: First, I relied on multiple accounts from members of the same ethnic group from each location. I also used the seasons and other indicators of time (e.g. “do you remember if there was snow on the ground when this happened?”). Second, as discussed above, I made sure to get “both sides” of the story by interviewing both Abkhaz and Georgians who had lived in a given village when the war began. Third, I corroborated the stories I heard from civilians through interviews with the military and government as well as through secondary sources, such as news articles reporting migration flows from the time of the war.
7 Three Phases of the Georgia-Abkhaz Ethnic Civil War

I now present three phases of the war, discussing both the establishment of effectively separate states controlled by Georgians and Abkhaz, as well as the degree of ethnic separation.

7.1 Phase 1: Territorial Division and Initial Civilian Flight

This period established preliminary, if uncertain, lines of territorial control for the Abkhaz and Georgian forces, and sparked an initial migratory flow. The first phase occurred between August 14th and September 28th, 1992.

7.1.1 Territory:

Each side consolidated control in regions where their ethnic kin dominated numerically in the pre-war era, as the ethnic security dilemma would predict. The Abkhaz were demographically dominant in (i) two urban centers (Gudauta and Tkvarchel), (ii) one administrative region (Gudauta Region – Zone 2 in Map 2), and (iii) the northern half of another administrative region (Ochamchira Region – Zone 5a in Map 2); the Abkhaz side gained control over each of these territories during this initial phase of the war. Meanwhile, ethnic Georgians had a plurality in every other region and urban center, and they consolidated control over these, including an amphibious landing in the Gagra region (Zone 1). Ethno-demography proved a decisive predictor of spatial control, despite the lack of territorial contiguity between these spaces.

The administrative district of Ochamchira (Zone 5) split in half during this period, with its upper region (5a) gradually coming under Abkhaz control and its
lower region, surrounding the main highway (5b), coming under Georgian control. This became known as the “Eastern Front” during the war.

Map 2: Abkhazia by Zones

Map 3: Initial Territorial Control – Phase 1
7.1.2 Migration

An initial migration began during this period which, as the ethnic security dilemma would predict, primarily involved Georgians moving to Georgian-controlled territories and Abkhaz moving to Abkhaz-controlled territories, although the migration was far from complete, as witnesses on both sides confirmed.

Abkhaz in Zones 4 and 5B, for example, began seeking shelter in Zone 5A. As one Abkhaz (IA98, 02/22/08), located in Gulripsh (Zone 4) at the start of the war stated, “Of course we left, we all left, you couldn’t stay, the Mkhedriontsy [Georgian paramilitary] were already here.”

I visited almost all villages in Ochamchira (Zone 5). Some predominantly Abkhaz villages in Lower Ochamchira (Zone 5B) and Guluripsh (Zone 4) were
vacated early in the war during Phase 1. This included Stary Kyndyg, Pshap, Atara, Adziubzha, Talmysh and Dranda, where local Abkhaz and Armenians spoke of heading north towards the mountains, where Abkhaz dominated. These were villages close to the main highway, perhaps easier to target by marauding Georgian paramilitaries. Typical of comments from Georgians I met who had lived in this region was that of a man I met in Zugdidi, Georgia: “They all left quickly, headed for the mountains, they didn’t stick around, well, maybe the odd one here and there (mu, byli, koe gde, koe gde)” (IG87, 07/01/09). Many Abkhaz males from Zone 5B spoke of hiding in forests initially, returning to their homes at night (“The Georgians controlled Tamysh by day, but we controlled it by night” IA31, 06/11/08).

Those Abkhaz and Georgians in villages north of the highway experienced less dislocation, although many villages were already ethnically homogenous and Georgian paramilitaries were not as prevalent. Georgians from Kochara, an ethnically Georgian village in Zone 5A, spoke of sending children to safety outside Abkhazia in September, but many remained (IG74, 06/23/08), and Abkhaz forces did not enter the village. Ethnic Georgians from Tkvarchal, a city in Zone 5a, also reported leaving the city in the initial weeks, although these were either children or people connected with the Georgian government (e.g., IG99-101, 05/27/08); several others reported remaining until later in the war. Ethnic Abkhaz I spoke with confirmed that some Georgians left, but claimed that they left just before the war began, not after it had begun (e.g., IA49, 06/13/08). This is an example of stories not coinciding perfectly, but where the idea that Georgians left was not questioned.
Remarkably, some mixed villages, such as Merkaul, actually divided within the village itself based on ethnic settlement patterns. In pre-war Merkaul, Georgians largely lived in the southern half of the village and Abkhaz in the upper half, although there was much inter-mixing. While both Georgians and Abkhaz spoke of inter-ethnic harmony in the pre-war period, when the war began, Abkhaz established fortifications starting in September against incoming Georgian forces, with stay-behind minorities within the divided village moving to “their side” (IA36-I40, 06/11/08). In some villages near the border of Zones 5 and 6, such as Bedia and Agubedia, ethnic Georgians in Abkhaz dominated villages appeared to remain initially, although this information comes from Abkhaz alone and I could find no ethnic Georgians from those villages specifically to confirm this. Paramilitary units did not come to these regions during this period. Zone 6 was almost entirely ethnic Georgian and there appeared to be little in the way of migration.

Migration from other Georgian controlled territories occurred, but was far from complete at this stage. Both Georgians and Abkhaz from Zone 1 referred to migration, primarily with Abkhaz moving to Zone 2. Georgians referred to most Abkhaz men “disappearing” but claimed that many Abkhaz women, children, and the elderly remained (e.g., IG-17, 07/03/08). When I interviewed Abkhaz, meanwhile, they referred to large-scale migration to the safety of Zone 2 (e.g., IA106, 06/14/08), but several remained in Gagra’s rural areas. Migration of Abkhaz from Zone 3, where the regional capital of Sukhum is located, appeared to be one of the most

46 Not every individual moved along ethnic lines; for example, I spoke to one ethnic Georgian who lives in Merkaul today, the wife of an Abkhaz. As she (IA40-06/11/08) explained to me, “pure Georgians (chistye Gruziny) went over there [to the Georgian side], most from mixed families remained.”
intense, although not complete. Both Abkhaz and Georgians described large-scale flight from Sukhum, but it was acknowledged that a limited number of Abkhaz remained, often in hiding, seeking protection from friends with Georgian names (e.g., IA-107, 06/20/08; IG-83 05/25/08). Several Georgians reported that some Abkhaz returned to Sukhum after a ceasefire was declared two weeks into the war on September 3, 1992 (IG-85-85, 05/25/08).

These personal statements describing an exodus are supported by other news reports, academic articles, and NGO reports. HRW (Human Rights Watch 1995: 6), for example, states that in Sukhum, “[m]any, mostly Abkhaz, left in those first weeks.” An academic article (Mooney 1995: 200) from the time, states that writes “The attacks [by the Georgians at the start of the war]…had the effect of driving most Abkhaz out of the regional capital of Sukhumi during the last two weeks of August.”

In sum, migration had begun, but was at a preliminary stage with much intermixing remaining.

7.2 Phase II: Fall of Gagra, Increased Migration, and Solidifying Homeland States

The second phase began October 1st, and lasted for approximately two to four weeks. This second stage in the war finalized borders for the proceeding ten months and initiated a short, intense wave of migration with Georgians and Abkhaz seeking shelter in their homeland states.

7.2.1 Territory

During this phase, Abkhaz armed forces began an assault on Zone 1 in order to gain strategic access to a key supply route via Russia (BBC 1992; Billingsley 1998;
Burke 1992; Mooney 1995: 201; Schmemann 1992; TASS 1992). Within days, they had secured victory, although large-scale migration continued for some weeks. This was one of the first major battles during the war as both sides had weeks to prepare armed forces following the start of hostilities in August. In particular, ethnic kin groups from the newly established Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus were providing soldiers to support the Abkhaz side, escalating the conflict (Derluguian 2005).

Map 4 Territorial Control for Most of the War, November 1992-September 1993

7.2.2 Migration
Migration following this battle was large-scale, from both ethnic groups, and lends weight to the ethnic security dilemma, where real or perceived massacres lead to greater fear and migration. The most immediate flight was of ethnic Georgians from Zone 1, leaving to the border with Russia (e.g., Leselidze, Gantiadi) and then on to Sochi and beyond. Several IDPs from Gagra, currently in Tbilisi, spoke of fleeing their homes when the Georgian army decided to abandon Gagra. Four of the five I spoke with did not know any Georgians that stayed behind, aside from some elderly Georgians: “We left on October 1…our Abkhaz neighbors remained. Other Georgians joined us in Leselidze. I only know one Georgian who remained, a mother with two children, she was a teacher, and her Abkhaz students protected [zashishali] her” (IG92-07/01/08). I found one woman (IG88-07/03/08) who had stayed behind with her mother until early November, who recalled seeing only one other Georgian, “all the others had left.” The Russian Black Sea fleet was also documented evacuating thousands of Georgians from Gagra (Human Rights Watch 1995: 32). Further, one Abkhaz official, Georgy Gulia, reported to the Associated Press at the time that “there were practically no Georgians” in Gagra at the time the city was captured (Shargorodsky 1992), while Georgia’s permanent representative to Moscow, Petre Chkheidze, declared that armed Abkhaz were forcing all Georgians to leave territory controlled by the Abkhaz (Interfax 1992).

Meanwhile, there was increased flight of Abkhaz from Sukhum. “We now realized this would not end soon,” was how one Abkhaz female described her flight in early October (IA19-02/26/08). As another Georgian (IG102-05/28/08) told me, “Many Abkhaz left after Gagra fell, Abkhaz feared reprisals after we heard what the
Abkhaz did to Georgians in Gagra.” Whatever the reason, flight from the city, of what remained of the small Abkhaz community, was evident and confirmed by both sides.

Finally, along the Eastern Front in Zone 5, several Abkhaz I interviewed reported leaving at the end of September and during October, mentioning that the situation had become more dangerous by then (e.g., IA30-06/11/08).

In sum, this period established borders and instigated further flight, especially Georgians from Zone 1 and Abkhaz from Zones 3-5.

7.3 **Phase III: Low-Scale, Constant Migration**

The third phase is a long period stretching from November 1992 to Summer 1993. There are minor border changes, but the central characteristic of this period is a low-level migration, often with government help, that solidifies ethnic homogenization of territories. Based on the data I gathered, I have determined that the groups were largely separated by the end of 1992 and completely by the end of spring 1993.

7.3.1 **Territory**

There were only a few small battles to act like “triggers” during this period, unlike the first two phases mentioned above. In Zone 5, along the Eastern Front at the end of November 1992, Abkhaz forces took control of the ethnic Georgian village Korchara. This is exemplary of the ethnic security dilemma. Korchara was along the Eastern Front, but inside Abkhaz controlled territory (Zone 5A). Since the village was homogenously Georgian, this posed a security threat (defensive vulnerability) for
the Abkhaz precisely because the Georgian forces could use it as a staging ground (offensive opportunity) for an attack on the regional capital, Tkvarchal.

David Pilya, commander of the Eastern Front, explained why securing Kochara was deemed necessary: “Look at where Kochara is located, if the Georgians wanted, they could cut the Eastern Front in half, severely weakening our supply routes to positions further west. We had to control Kochara.” Victory was quickly secured and, according to prior Georgian inhabitants currently outside the conflict zone (Djvarezi), the entire Georgian population fled (IG79-81-06/28/08). A visit to Kochara in 2008 revealed a ghost town.

The second significant border change did not occur until July 1993, long after each side’s territory was “unmixed.” Ethnic Georgian villages north of Sukhum, such as Shroma and Kamani, were attacked, this time as part of a new offensive strategy to take Abkhazia’s capital from the north, according to government and military personnel (personal interview Lakoba, Sukhum, 03/11/08, and Tsukhba, Sukhum, 06/13/08). The Abkhaz secured these villages, and the ethnic Georgians all left, maintaining territorial homogeneity. There were several other offensives during this period, but they did not result in significant border changes.

7.3.2 Migration

As the war dragged on, more out-group members felt increasingly insecure and vulnerable. Realizing that the war would not end soon, the remaining out-group members from both sides began seeking safe-havens in regions controlled by their own kin groups. These reports I heard echo some other eyewitness reports cited in other reports (e.g., Human Rights Watch 1995: 28).
Already by November 1992, there were few principally Georgian locales within Abkhaz territorial control. One concentration was located in and near Tkvarchel, but even these were depleted by the end of December. I spoke to two Georgians (IG100/1-05/27/08), for example, whose parents left from Tkvarchel “in November or December, when it became difficult to live there anymore.” More importantly, the Abkhaz commander of the Eastern Front, David Piliya, remarked on the unease with which Georgians lived in villages around Tkvarchel. Referring to the village of Akvasa (Zone 5A), for example, he said that by November, “Village leaders approached me and asked to leave; they were scared. We helped them to leave, created a passage for them into Gali [Zone 6] over the next couple of weeks.” Piliya described the difficulties of maintaining security given the polarized ethnic environment:

I did my best to protect them [Georgians], we established additional security, but this was a war, the population of Tkvarchel swelled from 20,000 to 60,000 and there were a lot of young Abkhaz who had seen their relatives being killed by Georgians. We tried to maintain security, but of course things happen, it wasn’t always possible to protect them. This was a war.”

On December 14 1992, a helicopter left from Tkvarchel to Gudauta as part of a regular series taking civilians to Gudauta and bringing military and humanitarian supplies back. The helicopter crashed, with Abkhaz blaming Georgians for shooting it down. Piliya emphasized that this event was a catalyst for further Georgian outflows from Tkvarchel and beyond. “By the end of December,” Piliya confirmed, “there were very few Georgians left in the region.” The lack of Georgians was further confirmed by the commander of Georgian forces, Gia Q’arq’arashvili, who was surprised when I asked him about ethnic Georgians in Tkvarchel (Personal
interview, Tbilisi, 07/03/08). To the best of his knowledge, he claimed, “there were no Georgians there in December…well, there may have been a few, but nothing significant…all the Georgians who wanted to leave had left.”

There were Georgians who spoke of Abkhaz who remained, for example in Ochamchira city (5b), but they acknowledged that most had left. In the city Tkvarchala, more Abkhaz insisted that Georgians had not fled the city at all and remained throughout the war. This was the only location where I had strongly conflicting stories: over seven separate ethnic Georgians I met from Tkvarchala claimed they had left by December 1992 and claimed that all their friends had left and they knew no Georgians who remained, yet eight ethnic Abkhaz and one ethnic Georgian I spoke with on a brief visit to Tkvarchala all claimed that no Georgians left during the war.47

In fact, the paucity of mixed demography by the end of 1992 was apparent all over Abkhazia, and confirmed by the Minister of Security and a colonel in the Abkhaz army (personal interview Lakoba, Sukhum, 03/11/08, and Tsukhba, Sukhum, 06/13/08). This is also consistent with other reports I found written from the time. For example, Thomas Goltz (1993) visited Sukhum in February 1993 and notes that, while some Abkhaz remained, most had left the city. A Human Rights Watch (1995: 34) site visit to Sukhum in August 1993 described Sukhum this way: “The pre-war population of Sukhumi was about 120,000; at the height of the fighting, and after the Abkhaz had been driven out, its population fell to some 50,000, mostly Georgians.”

47 Some of them said that Georgians had left before the war began. This could be a problem with memory and an understanding of when the war actually “began” since Phase 1 did not affect Tkvarchala military as much as later in the war.
One ethnic Georgian, Alu Gamakharia (Personal Interview, Kutaisi, 05/28/08), who managed a factory in Sukhum, summed up the three phases of migration this way: “I had about 200 Abkhaz working in the factory at the start of the conflict…about 50 left right away…after the Abkhaz took control of Gagra, many more left immediately…after that I don’t remember exactly when or why, but there were fewer, the situation became more difficult here…we protected them, many had to live on the factory grounds, it was difficult, so they left…in March there were maybe 30 left, I’m not sure, but there weren’t many…” I then asked about the end of August, and he replied, “By the end of August? I don’t recall any Abkhaz working with us by then.”

8 Abkhaz-Georgian Civilian Exchange Program

The absence of significant “trapped minorities” is confirmed by a joint commission established by the Abkhaz and Georgian sides to exchange civilian populations during the war.48 According the Georgian side, such an exchange was initially rejected, fearful that this would encourage the Abkhaz to mistreat Georgians, encouraging them to leave. As the war continued, however, a decision was made to pursue an exchange for humanitarian reasons.

Requests were made in the form of a written document with a list of people that wanted to leave from a certain area, such as a village or town. Requests could be as few as two names on a piece of paper, or as many as 200. I spoke to the organizers of each side of the Commission, Beslan Kolbakhia and Paata Zakareishvili, although I managed to receive archival data only from the Georgian side. I went through the

48 Committee for the Question of Hostages and Soldiers Missing in Action; the committee also dealt with prisoners of war, but they are not included in the following figures.
files and counted (i) the number of requests per month and (ii) the number of people trying to leave; I present the results in Graph 1. As one can see, the number of requests and aggregate number of people both peak in March 1993, tailing off by the end of June to 0. Zakareishvili (Personal Interview, Tbilisi, 07/02/08) stated that the process began in winter and that “all Georgians who wanted to leave were able to.” When I asked why the numbers declined in June and after, he stated that there were so few Georgians in Abkhaz territories to begin with, and that after June there were none left, or at least none that wanted to leave. Surprisingly, given the incentives the Georgian side has to vilify the Abkhaz side, Zakareishvili said he firmly believed that any Georgians who wanted to leave were given the opportunity by the Abkhaz, and he believes all who wanted to leave did.49 He did not exclude that small numbers of Georgians remained, but said they did not want to leave (e.g., they could have been part of mixed families).

Graph 1

49 Zakareishvili did mention that occasionally Georgians on the list would already be dead when they arrived on site visits to collect those who had requested to leave.
The bigger story from these numbers is that the total number of civilians exchanged from the Georgian side by June was a mere 632. There were some additional lists within the archival documents that were ambiguous, such as lists without any dates or other markings but even these only numbered 1,599. Even including the ambiguous people, at most the total was 2,231 Georgians exchanged, which lends strong weight to the aforementioned voices of civilian accounts that few “trapped minorities” were left after December 1992, and that almost none were present by the end of spring 1993. The rise of requests in October stems from Phase 4 of the war, which will be addressed below.

8.1 Out-Group Members who Remained

While most out-group members had left by the end of 1992, many witnesses I met with did report some non-Abkhaz remaining in Georgian controlled territories and Georgians in Abkhaz territory. This consisted principally of two categories of people: (i) the elderly and infirmed and (ii) those with some sort of “protection.”
Protection meant strong ties to the other ethnic group, such as being part of a “mixed” family, typically a Georgian female and Abkhaz husband (Dale 1997: 83). I recall one Abkhaz from a village in Zone 5a explaining that most Georgians had left but that a few remained, and those that were people who “had someone to watch their back [имели кого-нибудь за спиной].” (IA-06/2008). In other words, there may have been pockets of out-group members, but they were few, scattered, and appeared to stay of their own volition.

9 Existence of Separate Defensible Enclaves

To resolve the ethnic security dilemma, according to the 2G ESD, each group has to develop separate defensible enclaves or de facto states they can use to defend their ethnic kin. There is ample evidence that each group had achieved this by the end of Phase II. The existence of the Georgian state is a matter of public record, and it joined the United Nations in 1991. The Abkhaz state’s territorial boundaries have been detailed in the previous sections, and the borders are available on Map 2. The Abkhaz government itself was already in existence prior to the war’s onset as a result of Abkhazia’s regional autonomy (Bgazhba and Lakoba 2007; Cornell 2002; Suny 1994). Members of the government, including members of parliament, moved to Zone 2 in the first days of the war, providing continuity and a continuously functioning body throughout the conflict; this was reported in the press at the time and in personal interviews with members of the Abkhaz government, such as Sokrat Jinjolia (e.g., BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1992; Lakoba 2001; TASS 1992). There was a full cabinet of ministers that functioned throughout the war (Mayak Radio 1993), a defense committee with state-sponsored mobilization of Abkhaz soldiers (e.g.,
Agence France Presse 1993; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1992), there were Abkhaz government sponsored press-conferences (e.g., TASS 1992), and an official government newspaper (*Respublika Abkhazia*). Crucially, the Abkhaz received official military support from the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, as well as unofficial military, diplomatic, and financial support from Russia (Cornell 2000; Derluguian 2005; Goltz 1993). While Zone 5a was not territorially contiguous with the rest of Abkhaz controlled territory, regular shipments of weapons and soldiers were sent to the exclave, and the region never came under assault by the Georgian armed forces.  

10 The Violence Continues

Despite the absence of mixed demography, effectively by the end of December 1992, and despite the existence of separate homeland states for each group, this did not prevent further military assaults, and these assaults led to large scale deaths. This is extremely damaging to the 2G ESD, as the ethnic civil war is supposed to end.

Kutol, a Georgian village along the Eastern Front (Zone 5), for example, was captured by Abkhaz forces in early January, leading to mass displacement (Human Rights Watch 1995: 28; TASS 1993). News reports present dozens of border conflicts, shelling, and aerial bombardments in each month of 1993, at a level consistent with the autumn of 1992 when demography was more intertwined (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1993; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1993;  

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50 Officially, Tkvarchal received only humanitarian supplies, but several Abkhaz military officials confirmed weapons and troops were flown in, and this has long been asserted by Georgians (personal interviews). There was reported shelling and bombing of Tkvarchal by Georgians, but never an assault.
Most of the major offensives were being led by the Abkhaz (Billingsley 1998), and interviews with the Abkhaz war-time leadership stressed the territorial nature of their goals. In an interview with Stanislav Lakoba (Personal Interview, Sukhum, 06/09/08), Abkhazia’s Minister of Security, I asked how ethnic Abkhaz in Sukhumi helped or hindered battle strategies during 1993. Looking perplexed, he said, “that was not a consideration. Our goal was to liberate Abkhazia, we were fighting for our land.” Colonel Tsukhba (Personal Interview, Sukhum, 06/13/08) similarly stressed that, as far as he knew, there were few ethnic Abkhaz in Georgian-controlled territories in spring and summer 1993 and that they were not central to the military strategy.

10.1 Phase IV: The End of the War and Mass Georgian Migration

Perilously, for partition’s ability to end ethnic war, in September the war escalated dramatically, causing widespread civilian victimization, deaths, and a hemorrhaging of refugees, months after partition had occurred.

On September 16th 1993, Abkhaz forces launched an assault on Sukhum from the north, taking the city after an 11-day battle. When Georgia decided to abandon the city, the victory over Sukhum turned into a rout, with Georgian defenses collapsing, and Abkhaz forces reaching, on September 30th, the Inguri River, which was the pre-war border between autonomous Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia.

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51 There were credible reports of earlier attacks on September 14, 1993 in Ochamchira to cut the supply route to Sukhumi.
This final Abkhaz advance was accompanied by a mass-exodus of ethnic Georgians, in excess of 150,000. I spoke with dozens of these Georgians, virtually all of whom left between the 20th and 30th of September. The most striking aspect of Phase IV, for the purposes of this study, is that the amount of death and displacement associated with this final border change is greater than that of the previous three phases combined. Given that partition is premised on humanitarian goals, this war termination is particularly troubling.

For comparative evidence on death, I turn to information I obtained from Georgia’s Ombudsman for Abkhazia, Murman Chkhotua, who had lists of civilian deaths from the conflict. I received 354 pages of documents listing victims’ name and age, as well as date, location, and cause of death. I have entered the data into a spreadsheet to display the results graphically. As the following graph demonstrates, the worst of the civilian deaths occurred in September and October, 1993, after complete separation had occurred.

Graph 2: Ethnic Georgian Civilian Deaths by Month

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52 Those with missing data included civilians without a location or without a date of death. The Ombudsman explained that they gathered as many details as were available for each individual death. There was no reason to believe that there were any systematic reasons for missing data, although this cannot be ruled out. There are also several civilians who were recorded as having died after the war officially ended, primarily in the Gali regions during the “partisan war” which began in the war’s aftermath, and I have not included those here (see Chapter Six).
The violence also suggests that most civilian deaths occurred when there was a shift in territorial control. In regions that did not experience changes in control, deaths do not rise to the same levels. For example, if we disaggregate the above data by district, we see that most of the civilian deaths spike when Abkhaz forces take control of Georgian held territory (Map 4).

Map 4: Ethnic Georgian Civilian Deaths by Region
Zone 1, for example, spikes in October 1992 when control shifted from Georgian to Abkhaz. Meanwhile, Zones 2 and 5 A, which never changed hands, did not experience a spike in deaths. While we know that Georgians fled these regions, civilian deaths were comparatively muted. Data for the Abkhaz side is not available, but I suspect it would demonstrate the same pattern. This also fits with data from other large-scale ethnic wars. For example, the massacre at Srebrenica occurred during the initial takeover of the city (Honig and Both 1997). One conclusion to draw from this is that preventing territorial offenses may be far more humanitarian than

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working to separated multi-ethnic populations. The more important conclusion for this study is that partition does not end ongoing ethnic civil war.

11 How did the War End?

The Georgian-Abkhaz ethnic civil war’s termination can be attributed to the coalescence of three principal factors: (i) an increase in Russian military aid; (ii) strategic military blunder by the Georgians; and (iii) the onset of an intra-Georgian civil war. These factors created the conditions for an overwhelming Abkhaz military victory, securing control over all of Abkazia aside from a small mountainous territory deep in the Upper Kodori valley.

11.1 Russian Support

The Russian government was officially neutral during the Georgian-Abkhaz war, but its military, through a combination of corruption, sympathy, and geopolitical strategic maneuvering, is widely understood to have supported the Abkhaz side at an increasing rate as the war progressed. Russia’s heavy involvement is accepted by most scholars on the topic (Cornell 2000; Goltz 1993; Mooney 1995); Russian troop involvement was witnessed by Georgians soldiers (personal interviews, Senaki, 06/27/08); at least one Russian pilot was captured running bombing raids (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1993); and Georgia’s president, Eduard Shevardnadze, complained loudly about Russian support during the war itself (e.g., Burke 1993).54 This military equipment, training, and staff support gave the Abkhaz increasing capability to launch a sophisticated and well-planned assault on Georgian positions, and tipped the scales in the Abkhaz’s favor. In addition, it has been

54 It should be noted that the Russians can also be seen as supporting the Georgian side, at least initially, by honoring pre-arranged agreements to transfer Soviet military equipment to the Georgian government.
suggested that the fighters from the north Caucasus that arrived, such as Chechens and Adyghe, arrived with Russian support and training (Derluguian 2005: 267-273).

11.2 Strategic Error

The July 27, 1993 Sochi Agreement\(^5\) ostensibly aimed at a phased demilitarization of Abkhazia, the return of the “legal government to Sukhumi,” and the resurrection of a united Georgia, all with Russia as a third-party guarantor (Sverev 1996). Georgia’s armed forces withdrew most of their heavy military equipment and troops from Zones 3 and 4 by early September. At that point, on September 16\(^{th}\), Abkhaz forces, claiming that Georgia had not fulfilled its terms of agreement, began a full assault on Georgian controlled territory. Without heavy military equipment, the Georgians were at a severe military disadvantage. Russia was there to act as a guarantor to overcome the widespread problem of credible commitments, but in this case Russia acted only diplomatically, criticizing the Abkhaz assault, and did not act militarily to prevent Georgia from becoming the proverbial “sucker.”

11.3 Intra-Georgian Civil War

Importantly, an intra-Georgian civil war simultaneously re-erupted in north-west Georgia near the Abkhaz border, impeding a successful defense of the remaining Zones of control in Abkhazia, much less a forceful response (Danilov 1999; Personal Interview, Q’arq’arashvili, Tbilisi, 07/03/08; Sverev 1996).\(^6\) Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the previous Georgian president who had been expelled in early 1992 through a coup,  

\(^5\) Official title is the “Agreement on a Cease-Fire in Abkhazia and on a Mechanism to Ensure Its Observance.”

returned to western Georgia during the final Abkhaz assault to mount an anti-
Shevardnadze coalition. This fatally divided Georgia’s armed forces, with reportedly
high levels of desertions and military pandemonium affecting Abkhazia and western
Georgia (Personal Interview, Q’arq’arashvili, Tbilisi, 07/03/08; Suny 1994). The
Abkhaz forces took Sukhum (Zone 3) within 11 days, and marched to the borders of
the pre-war autonomous territory of Abkhazia (Zone 6) three days later, effectively
ending the war.

In essence, a strategic blunder by the Georgian state, followed by a complete
collapse of central Georgian authority, allowed the Abkhaz, with Russian support, to
achieve a military victory.

In fact, as the Georgian army retreated out of Abkhazia, Gamsakhurdia’s
forces, set his sights on Tbilisi. Shevardnadze, then president of Georgia and fearing
for his political life and lacking alternatives, ironically turned to Russia for protection,
the same Russia that, days earlier, had provided Abkhaz forces with the military
means to defeat Shevardnadze. Q’arq’arashvili, then Minister of Defense, summed it
up: “First of all, we had no strategy then, it was chaos. Second, civil war had begun
in western Georgia. And third, we had lost most of our military strength.”

Evidence from Georgia’s war termination supports Fearon and Laitin’s (2007:
2) conclusion that “civil wars will tend to end when there is a significant shock to the
relative power or cost tolerance of one side or the other with military victory
occasioned by a shock to one side’s relative power.” The shock was the twin impact
of removing Georgian armed forces from Abkhazia, providing Abkhazia with relative
strength, plus the shock given to Georgia’s relative power when the intra-Georgian conflict began, which shattered its capacity to wage war.

12 Conclusion

I followed four steps in presenting empirical results in this chapter to evaluate the 2G ESD. First, I demonstrated that the war is an ethnic civil war and that an ethnic security dilemma existed. I presented evidence of the existence of real and perceived massacres, ethnic targeting, and large scale migration into ethnically defensible units. I also demonstrated how atrocities – real or perceived – motivated flight and expulsion of “trapped minorities.” This provided support for Hypothesis 1.

Second, I examined the spatial and temporal patterns of territorial change and ethnic migration during the 14 months of armed combat. This demonstrated a continuous homogenization of territories, exactly as the 2G ESD would predict, confirming Hypothesis 2. In fact I demonstrated that the homogenization reached such a degree that we can safely say that the territory was completely partitioned ethno-demographically by Spring 1993 into militarily defensible enclaves.

Third, and critically, despite the separation, the Abkhaz side continued to attack the Georgian side after the Georgian controlled territory was devoid of ethnic Abkhaz. Abkhaz military leaders further explained the motivation for attack as fighting to recapture territory lost to the Georgians, even though they knew no ethnic Abkhaz lived there. In the last major battle of the war, the Abkhaz side seized on a strategic blunder committed by the Georgian side and used its military advantage to capture the rest of Georgian-controlled Abkhazia; during the process, over 150,000 ethnic Georgians fled with scores killed, wounded, and raped. In other words, despite
the ethno-demographic separation, the war did not end, and a humanitarian catastrophe ensued. While the ethnic security dilemma played a vital role in violence and migration, the end of this ethnic security dilemma did not end the war. This evidence fails to confirm Hypothesis 3. Both the Georgian and Abkhaz sides were intent on re-establishing territorial control over all of Abkhazia, supporting the alternative hypothesis presented in Chapter 2 that multiple factors influence the dynamics of violence during war and that the 2G ESD is too reductionist.

This is a strong challenge to the theory that partition is an effective strategy to end ongoing ethnic civil wars. It suggests that that separating populations will not end the war, and may not even be able to lessen the humanitarian crises posed by ethnic war’s violence. After all, despite complete ethno-demographic separation, a humanitarian catastrophe ensued when virtually all ethnic Georgians fled Abkhazia under conditions of large-scale civilian victimization, and the deaths from that catastrophe were worse than all previous military phases of the conflict combined.

In sum, there is strong support from this case for several key dynamics of the 2G ESD, but not its central case that partition will end war. While this is only one case, as a “crucial case,” it raises major questions about the theory’s validity vis-à-vis war termination.
Chapter 4: Enduring Ethnic Civil War Termination: The Role of Ethnic Minorities in Post-Partition Peace and Violence

1 Overview

Chapter Two introduced the reader to the Second Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma (2G ESD), which argued that demographic separation of ethnic groups would end ethnic civil war. Chapter Three provided the first empirical test of the 2G ESD, and, as a crucial case, raised grave doubts about partition’s ability to end ethnic civil wars. In this chapter, I shift the focus of the dependent variable from ending ongoing violence to building long-term peace. The literature on civil war termination, especially as it relates to partition, often conflates these related but separate phenomena, leading to muddled theories and empirical tests. I review different theories designed to explain peace-building following ethnic civil war, and I introduce the Third Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma (3G ESD), which explains how ethnic partition increases the likelihood of prolonged peace. I argue that, regardless of how the war ends, separating warring ethnic groups into different states facilitates peace-building, and I draw on the ethnic security dilemma to explain how. In contrast to the 2G ESD, however, my theory argues that violence is not caused by intransigent ethnic identity, but rather renewed violence is caused by weak states, a shifting balance of power, and the triadic political space created by incomplete partitions.

2 Introduction
Ending the violence of civil wars has bedeviled the international community for decades. Yet, while convincing warring factions to reach a peace agreement and come to the negotiating table is a critical step, a convincing body of evidence has emerged to demonstrate that any initial peace achieved is only part of the solution (Collier et al. 2003; Toft 2006; Walter 2002; Walter 2004). Most civil wars experience a recurrence of deadly violence within the first five years of peace, and there is evidence to suggest that ethnic civil wars in particular are more likely reerupt in violence (Horowitz, Weisiger, and Johnson 2009; Johnson 2009; Licklider 1995). It is therefore important to understand why peace fails so frequently, and what solutions are available.

In this chapter I lay out the theoretical foundations to explain how peace breaks down in the post-war environment and how complete ethnic partition can reduce the likelihood of recurring violence. My theory, which builds on the first two generations of the ethnic security dilemma, is called the Third Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma (3G ESD). The 3G ESD is similar to the first two generations in that it emphasizes the key components of demographic intermingling and anarchy as predictors of violence. Whereas the 1G ESD predicted the onset of ethnic civil war during “emerging anarchy” (Posen 1993) and the 2G ESD predicted the end of ongoing ethnic civil war (Downes 2001; Kaufmann 1996), the 3G ESD predicts the recurrence of ethnic violence in a post-partition environment. However, in contrast to the 2G ESD, which stresses ethnic intransigence as the cause of post-war violence, I argue that the core problem is the interaction of (i) the triadic political space created endogenously by partitions that fail to separate ethnic groups and (ii) weak states with
a shifting balance of power that creates opportunities for aggression between the post-partition states.

Drawing on constructivist insights, I critique the 2G ESD, arguing that even after ethnic civil war with high levels of ethnic targeting and massacres, the civilian populations can and will collaborate with a regime controlled by the enemy ethnic group as long as that regime maintains territorial control. It is not the stay-behind minority that erupts into violence. Instead it is the neighboring homeland state dominated by the minority’s kin ethnic group that causes violence, and this violence occurs when the balance of power between the post-war states grows unevenly, providing an opportunity for one state to pursue an irredentist agenda.

2.1 Why are Ethnic Civil Wars Prone to Recurring Violence?

There are three reasons why ethnic civil wars are likely to recur. The first is concentrated ethnic groups. Concentrated ethnic groups are a well established predictor of ethnic conflict, the causes of which were discussed in Chapter Two (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gurr 1993; Toft 2003). As we saw in Chapters Two and Three, ethnic civil wars create an ethnic security dilemma that lead to increasingly homogenous territories of ethnic groups (Kaufmann 1996; Kaufmann 1998). While the 2G ESD did not end the war, theory and evidence confirm that the wars do lead to increasing group concentration. Even those that question the ethnic security dilemma or the intention of ethnic cleansing, agree that ethnic war separates ethnic groups (Downes 2004; Kalyvas 2006). Therefore, one consequence of ethnic civil war is to increase one of the main predictors of war onset.
Second, weak states are also a predictor of violence, and post-war states are, almost by definition, weak (Esty et al. 1995; Herbst 1996/97); this is part of the “conflict trap” that is at the heart of explanations for continuing violence (Collier et al. 2003). In other words, weak states lead to violence, and violence leads to a further weakening of the state. Third, if peace is achieved through a negotiated settlement, a major problem is the absence of credible commitments, discussed in Chapter Two and elaborated further below. Ethnic minority militias are reluctant to disarm after establishing peace for fear that any promises made by the central government will be reneged as soon the minority does not have the ability to wage war (Fearon 1998; Walter 2002). The result is the minority will likely pursue war instead of continuing down the path to a durable peace. I argued in Chapter Two that the problem of credible commitment was even more powerful for ethnic wars than non-ethnic wars, which I labeled an “ethnically augmented” problem of credible commitment. These three factors encourage recurrence of violence (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1: How Processes Endogenous to Ethnic Civil War Increase the Likelihood of Conflict Recurrence**
2.2 **COMPLETE ETHNIC PARTITION AS A SOLUTION**

Given these difficult pressures that encourage renewed violence, partitioning groups offers one powerful solution. First, partition overcomes the ethnically augmented problem of credible commitments by permitting warring factions to retain their own defensive capabilities by constructing two separate ethnic homeland states. Second, by establishing a separate homeland state for an ethnic group, the problem of ethnic concentration decreases as the group no longer is motivated to rebel against the center. After all, the rebellion of ethnically concentrated ethnic groups is almost entirely designed to achieve independence (Gurr 1993; Gurr 2000; Walter 2006). The role of state weaknesses is not resolved by partition, and this poses a risk to peace; I address this question separately below.
However, to be effective, partition must completely separate the warring ethnic groups demographically. Leaving significant stay-behind minorities is likely to increase the risk of violence because of the post-war ethnic security dilemma. Yet, where the 2G ESD focuses on ethnic intransigence as the micro-foundation of continued violence within intermingled groups, I draw on constructivist advances that emphasize the possibility of inter-ethnic cooperation even following intense inter-ethnic warfare; this approach separates ethnic preferences from ethnic behavior. It is not intransigent inter-ethnic relations that lead to conflict in post-war environments, but rather the ethnic homeland state created by partitions that aims to “protect” its kin stay-behind minority to advance its political interests. There are three main causes of renewed violence in this context: (i) incentives for the leadership of the homeland state and (ii) actions of non-state actors. The third factor is an interaction effect: (iii) shifting balance of power. Leaders will only act when they believe they can conquer territory without a difficult war, and for that to happen one of the states must be weaker than the other. I deal with these factors further below.
2.3 Contribution

My contribution in this chapter is fourfold. First, I challenge two dominant strands within the ethnic conflict literature. I reject the 2G ESD approach, arguing that its micro-foundations based on ethnic intransigence are not compatible with recent developments in constructivist literature. Second, I also reject the scholarship that denies the relevance of ethnic identity (Mueller 2004). Ethnic identity, I argue, needs to be contextualized, and I demonstrate the conditions under which ethnic preferences are acted upon and become relevant in the political process. I introduce
the concept of “active” versus “limited” collaboration with the state, and I demonstrate the importance of ethnic preferences under conditions of weak states and shifting territorial control. Where territory shifts to control by kin groups, I argue that minorities have an incentive to actively collaborate, and this further increases the likelihood of violence.

Third, I present an alternative theory, the 3G ESD, maintaining a focus on the triadic political space, mixed-demography and shifting balance of power as the core causes of post-war recurring violence. I present a solution to this problem: complete ethno-demographic partition, which separates ethnic groups into separate homeland states. I show that separation will decrease the likelihood of violence after war. Finally, my theory also suggests why the first years of a post-ethnic civil war environment are so prone to violence. Post-partition states are weak by definition and state-building will often be variable, while ethnic identity is heightened from the war. Over time, however, the state strengthens and identity salience fades, reducing the risk of war.

2.4 Overview

This chapter begins with a brief overview of the current literature on how to maintain peace in a post-civil war environment. I identify specific gaps in the literature as they relate to partition, and I suggest an alternative theory of how violence recurs and how this can be avoided.

3 Theories of How to Keep the Peace after Ethnic Civil Wars End

Despite early statistical evidence pointing to the high recidivism rate in civil wars, scholarly research specifically focusing on post-civil war recurrence and
mechanisms to prevent it was limited until recently (Collier et al. 2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Elbadawi, Hegre, and Milante 2008; Mendeloff 2004; Walter 2004). Explanations for why peace breaks down in post-civil war environments can be divided into three categories: capacity (greed), motivation (grievance), and mistrust (security dilemma).

3.1 Capacity

Capacity arguments, a prominent approach in the social science literature today, typically focus on (i) the ability of rebels to wage war and (ii) the ability of states to prevent it (Benson and Kugler 1998; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2008; Collier and Hoeffler 2007). This follows from earlier research on civil war onset known as the “insurgency” or “greed model,” stressing the opportunity for societal groups to engage in collective violence against the state (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Post-civil war regions are typically awash with guns and armaments, have large numbers of non-state actors (the rebels) with military experience, command structures and, in the case of ethnic wars, a highly polarized society with salient identities that can be readily tapped anew. States, meanwhile, are fragile, with weakened infrastructure, collapsed economies, low revenues, high unemployment, and low levels of legitimacy, especially among minority groups at the end of ethnic wars. Weak states are unable to prevent renewed violence because they lack the coercive resources to suppress rebellion, and they lack the material resources to co-opt discontented groups and encourage collaboration.

The Democratic Republic of Congo, which officially was at war between 1998 and 2003, has seen conflict re-erupt in several regions, especially in its north-east,
leading to thousands of deaths and over 250,000 displaced in 2008 (Economist 2008). The causes were, in part, due to a weak central government that never managed to reassert territorial control, enabling rival ethnic militias, such as General Nkunda’s largely Tutsi militia, to pursue their goals.

Proposed solutions focus on eliminating the “supply side” of rebellion. One way is to ensure the war ends with a complete or decisive military victory, destroying one side’s ability to fight or convincing it of war’s futility. For example, Sri Lanka’s 26-year ethnic civil war came to an end in 2009 after the Sri Lankan armed forces decisively defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Given that decisive military victories produce long-term peace, prosperity, and perhaps democratization, several scholars have framed this as a “humanitarian” proposal (Luttwak 1999; Toft 2006; Wagner 1993). The problem with this approach is twofold. First, waiting for military victory means greater civilian suffering as the war drags on; ethnic wars in particular appear to last longer than ideological or other civil wars (Fearon 2004). Second, for ethnic civil wars, there is a statistically significant correlation between military victory and ethnic massacres (Licklider 1995); this seems to have occurred in the closing phases of Sri Lanka’s civil war as well (Economist 2009).

Others scholars have focused on post-war reconstruction, emphasizing the need to build state capacity either by improving the economy to provide jobs to potential rebel recruits or to strengthen security through police training, building the armed forces, or providing robust peacekeepers, each of which would make rebel success less likely (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2008; Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Herbst 1996/97; Oyefusi 2008). Some of the
factors related to rebel capacity, such as experienced rebel command structures and identity salience, may fade with time on their own, suggesting that the presence of peacekeepers for an initial number of years may also help overcome rebel capacity. This would be consistent with the empirical pattern that the risk of war recurrence falls with time. While this approach can be successful, the problem is that the international community and individual foreign powers are typically reluctant to engage in long-term peace-keeping and reconstruction efforts, which are extremely expensive and typically mean a long-term commitment of foreign troops (Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002). As we will see below, partition is offered as a solution where such international support is not forthcoming, where alternatives peace-building strategies are required because the alternative is a likelihood of recurring ethnic warfare and civilian suffering.

Finally, capacity arguments, as they relate to ethnic conflicts, emphasize the role of group concentration. These arguments have focused on ethnic civil war onset, but the theoretical explanations and empirical patterns remain the same (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gurr 1993; Gurr 2000; Laitin 2004; Walter 2003). The irony for central governments, as we saw in Chapters Two and Three, is that ethnic civil wars lead to increased ethnic group concentration, which further increases the risk of conflict renewal. Solutions to this are almost never addressed in the literature, despite its clear correlation with violence. Walter (2006), for example, has looked at preventative actions that states may pursue, repressing one ethnic group if it has other concentrated ethnic minorities in its territory, but this is not related to post-ethnic war environments. As I argue below, partition helps assuage this problem.
We can also look to international relations theories for war recurrence since post-partition environments create an inter-state environment. Werner (1999), for example, focuses on balance of capabilities, and particularly on the perception of balance of capabilities that becomes evident during the “bargaining” of war (Werner and Yuen 2005). If one of the post-partition states significantly increases its military strength relative to its adversary, peace duration is likely to be shorter. The solution to this problem is the maintenance of a balance of power, and this is part of what makes partition an attractive solution. As we will see below, the problem of credible commitments is precisely linked to the balance of capabilities, with the minority rebels fearful of what the state will do after they decommission their weapons. With partition each side is allowed to pursue deterrence strategies equally, seeking to build their armed forces and make alliances in a bid to avoid the recurrence of war (Huth 1999).

3.2 Motivation

Motivation arguments typically focus on the rebels, examining why rebel groups would engage in post-war collective violence – the “demand side” of civil war. This paradigm is dominant in the policy community and in journalistic accounts, and is colloquially called the “grievance” explanation of civil war, where groups rebel against real or perceived injustice (Gurr 1970; Gurr 1993).

While some of these arguments echo grievance-based models of civil war onset discussed in Chapter Two, there are distinct differences resulting from processes endogenous to the war itself, creating a different set of problems and solutions. For example, there are spoilers problems, which can reignite wars that were purportedly
settled with agreements, and there may be grievances specific to post-war environments that need to be addressed, such as sharing military power (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Kydd and Walter 2002; Stedman 1997).

Further, several accounts of ethnic conflict onset emphasize the role of the past (Bendor 1993; Kaufman 2001; Lake and Rothchild 1996; Petersen 2002). These theories suggest that conflictual histories increase the likelihood of violence because they both cause unresolved grievances and because they provide conflict narratives that elites can use to foment hostilities and violence. If groups are more likely to rebel against the state when they have conflictual histories, then post-ethnic war environments following ethnically-based massacres perpetrated by governments and militias would be particularly prone to violence.

Solutions to the motivation approach focus on addressing grievances through power-sharing, such as federalism/autonomy, and other conflict regulating mechanisms (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2008; Ghai 2000; Gurr 2000; Lapidoth 1997; Lijphart 1969; McGarry and O'Leary 1993; Paris 2004). This has been the American administration’s approach to Iraq since the onset of civil war in 2004 (Biddle 2006). These solutions appear self-explanatory and seductively simple, but they have proven very difficult to implement following ethnic civil wars. As Alexander Downes (2004, p.231) has written, “hardly any ideological wars resume after a settlement is implemented, whereas such agreements fail as often as two-thirds of the time in identity wars.” Thus, negotiated solutions to ethnic civil wars have remained largely illusive.

3.3 Mistrust and the Security Dilemma
The realist paradigm from IR has formed the base of many theories developed to look at post-civil war peacebuilding. IR scholars have suggested that the use of violence itself changes the dynamics between states, destroying trust, making actors skeptical about peace arrangements, more fearful of others’ intentions, and more likely to misperceive and overreact to minor breaches or accidents (Fortna 2004; Ikle 1971). Lacking a global sovereign that can enforce peace, states must look after themselves, and will therefore be highly sensitive in post-war environments.

The literature on civil wars, echoes that of international relations, but argues that the situation is even worse for ethnic civil wars. Downes (2004: 234) argues that post-civil war environments create nearly intractable situations because, unlike interstate wars, “combatants are not allowed to retain their military forces and retreat behind fortified frontiers.” This is similar to the problem of credible commitment, but has distinct differences. The problem of credible commitment prevents warring groups from reaching and/or implementing peace agreements, but says nothing about what happens in a post-implementation environment. The security dilemma, however, exists both during and after the implementation of peace agreements. Even after decommissioning has been completed, a highly sensitive “former” rebel group or state could turn back to violence as a strategy if it suspects the other party is preparing to break the terms of peace (Downes 2001).

Rebels, for example, could regroup if they feared an increasingly repressive state, meanwhile states could repress if they feared rebels were planning acts of violence, sparking a spiral of repression and dissent, reigniting civil war. Perceptions of mistrust are easy to imagine in a post-war environment: central governments might
strengthen their military spending or appoint known hardliners to positions within the
security apparatus aggravating extant suspicion among the ethnic minority. Collier,
Hoeffler, and Soderbom (2008: 465) point to evidence that governments typically
maintain high levels of military spending in post-war environments due to the
perceived risk of war. Following Sri Lanka’s military victory over the Tamil Tigers,
the army’s chief immediately announced plans to dramatically increase the size of the
armed forces, in an already highly militarized country (Economist 2009). Rebels,
meanwhile may maintain their capacity to fight in a post-war environment by
maintaining an equipped army (e.g., Hezbollah in Lebanon), by hiding their weapons
(e.g., the IRA during the 1990s), or decommissioning them but keeping them legally
within reach (e.g., Maoist forces in Nepal that have their weapons locked away but
maintain the keys themselves).

The IR literature on “enduring rivalries” suggests that actors may rationally
adjust their behavior based on prior interactions, and therefore groups that conflicted
in the past see a strong likelihood that they will engage in violence again in the future
(Goertz and Diehl 1993). Initial research on “enduring internal rivalries” suggest that
such dyads produce specific dynamics that differentiate themselves from other civil
wars (Derouen and Bercovitch 2008). Collier and Hoeffler (2002: 15) in fact find
prior-levels of conflict a significant predictor of civil war recurrence, but their work is
undertheorized, suggesting broadly that, “Once a conflict has occurred, it creates a
legacy of hatred, and this hatred fuels further conflict.” If ethnic groups do adjust
their behavior based on prior conflict, full decommissioning may never be complete.
While this theory is applicable to all post-civil wars environments, the increased salience of identity and territory make ethnic civil wars particularly sensitive to the security dilemma by rupturing trust between entire ethnic groups, not merely rebel organizations. Further, gains achieved through peace agreements will be linked to ethnic group members’ personal security, given the backdrop of a previous civil war. As a result, small infractions by the state are interpreted as direct threats on individual security, increasing the risk of a return to war.

Other ethnic civil war scholars focusing on problems of trust in post-ethnic war environments include Stuart J. Kaufman (Kaufman 2001; 2006), who refers to a “symbolic politics” trap: once distrust and hostility towards ethnic out-groups has been initiated, it becomes difficult to moderate, leading to renewed conflict even when that outcome is undesired by both sides. Chaim Kaufmann’s emphasis on the ethnic security dilemma is also relevant for post-war situations. Kaufmann (1998: 122) emphasizes heightened identity, mutual mistrust, and inter-group hatred that occurs as a result of ethnic civil war, stressing the dangers of inter-mixed ethnic communities even in a post-war environment, concluding: “Solutions that aim to…restore multiethnic civil politics…such as institution building, power-sharing, and identity reconstruction, cannot work…after an ethnic civil war because they do not resolve the security dilemma created by mixed demography.”

In fact, Posen’s formulation of the original ethnic security dilemma (1G ESD) to explain war onset, is far more promising as a theory for ethnic war recurrence. Examining the ethnic security in this context addresses many of the criticisms of Posen I presented earlier in Chapter Two. In a post-ethnic war environment, ethnic
identities are already established and heightened by prior collective violence; governments and rebels have demonstrated their threat and willingness to kill each other; and states remain extremely weak, verging on “anarchy,” leaving minorities to feel particularly vulnerable. In fact, for Kaufmann and others, intermingled populations are the key ingredient that sparks renewed warfare. Kaufmann (1996: 169) suggests, for example, that Rwanda today should be partitioned with forced population transfers to separate Hutus from Tutsis; if this is not done, he concludes starkly, “[t]he alternative, sooner or later, is another genocide.” Thus, after peace has been reached (by whatever means), there may still be incentives within the minority group to preemptively build or maintain defensive capabilities since they distrust the central government’s intentions. This, in turn, may cause the state to act preemptively, spiraling to violence in the post-war years.

There are two dominant solutions in the literature to mistrust and the security dilemma. First, institutional solutions are proposed, including robust peacekeeping operations and comprehensive peace agreements help groups overcome mutual suspicion, problems of credible commitment, and incentives to defect (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2003; Fortna 2004; Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). The problem with institutional solutions and peace agreements within a single state are several: (i) states are typically weak following civil wars, making implementation of agreements difficult; (ii) ethnic civil wars create group concentration, which increases the capacity of ethnic groups to wage war, increasing the likelihood of ethnic rebellion in the future; (iii) institutional solutions do not solve the problem of credible commitments (more below); and finally, perhaps for the
reasons just detailed, (iii) empirically, power-sharing agreements have a terrible track record, collapsing into conflict most of the time (Downes 2004; Licklider 1995; Toft 2006).

The second dominant solution to mistrust and the security dilemma is educational programs, re-writing history textbooks, and transitional justice programs, such as truth and reconciliation commissions. These have been proposed to overcome mistrust, and especially group hatred (Bass 2000; Hayner 1994; Kaufman 2006; Mendeloff 2004; Minow 1998; Pingel 2008). The problem with these approaches is the time required for results. Constructivist literature has demonstrated that nations and national identity are constructed and malleable, but the process of identity construction takes decades, at a minimum (Anderson 1983; Connor 1994). This is hardly a plausible solution to the problem of conflict recidivism that occurs within the first five years of establishing peace. Overcoming group hatred without reconstructing identities may also be possible, but research on this is at its infancy and also appears to take decades for such positive inter-ethnic relationships to be internalized (Dumitru and Johnson 2009).

4 Partition as an Enduring Solution

A more powerful solution to the problem of mistrust and the security dilemma is partition. Partition has been built into recent peace agreements for Sudan, Papua New Guinea, and Kosovo, and, as I argue below, separating warring parties deals with a number of the problems identified above. As Downes (2004: 236), states, “solutions to [ethnic] wars should be based on separation.” But “partition” can be both new statehood (i.e., creating a new state) and/or demography (i.e., separating populations).
I begin with the need for partitions of statehood and then move to partitions of demography; I conclude that both are necessary for durable solutions.

4.1  **Partitions of Statehood: Building Long-Term Peace After Ethnic Civil War**

Partition overcomes the post-war domestic security dilemma by permitting both sides to remain armed and build deterrent forces.\(^{57}\) Second, for similar reasons, partition also resolves the problem of credible commitment by removing the need for the minority to trust the state’s promised post-war intentions.

Third, partition helps deal with grievance-based arguments for conflict recurrence. As discussed above, ethnic civil wars are almost entirely dominated by separatist conflict, and therefore partitions that allow the minority to achieve independence satisfies this primary grievance. Finally, partition eliminates the problem of ethnic group concentration as a factor for ethnic rebellion. With concentrated groups no longer within the state, but with a separate state of their own, such conflict is no longer possible.

Such a solution can, however, create a grievance on the opposite end of the spectrum, affecting the rump state, which may be motivated to reacquire territory lost as a result of partition. Territorial conflicts are the major source of inter-state wars in the 20\(^{th}\) Century (Huth 1996). Further, Stinnet and Diehl (2001) find that territorial disputes, newly independent states, and contiguous states are all more likely to move down the path of enduring rivalry, and this is exactly what is created when partition occurs. While true, there are clear benefits to the internationalization of the conflict. First, as mentioned above, is the use of deterrence, which is now open to the minority,

\(^{57}\) Naturally, the “security dilemma” itself is not resolved, since the domestic security dilemma is transferred to the more traditional inter-state security dilemma. Nevertheless, this is qualitatively different given each side’s ability to maintain armies in an inter-state context.
allowing its new homeland state to pursue weapons-buildup and alliances to deter the rump state from aggression. Such deterrence should help avert inter-state war. Second, international diplomatic pressure is present in this environment, and such international actions have been credited, in part, with decreasing the number of inter-state wars since World War Two.

In addition, if the concept of “enduring rivals” applies to parties within a single state (e.g., Kurds in Turkey or Arabs in Israel), partition could help resolve those recurring domestic problems: Goertz and Diehl (1995), for example, identified “large political shocks,” including territorial changes, as influencing the end of enduring rivalries; the same may be true for rivalries in ethnic civil wars.

In sum, partitions that establish separate states are extremely useful, overcoming several major obstacles to long-term peace. Having said that, I argue that partition also creates problems if it leaves significant ethnic minorities from the warring ethnic group. The important question here is why and how.

4.2 Partitions of Demography

The need for demographic separation is central to my argument about partition, and this is shared with other scholars who advocate partition. As Downes (2001, p.74) confirms, “Implementing partition without separating the groups in conflict to reduce or eliminate the number of minorities left behind is sure to see them cleansed, or for conflict over the intermingled region to continue…Thus, planned population exchanges should be an integral part of partition, not left to ethnic cleansing.” Downes, however, does not theorize about the mechanisms that link the stay-behind minority to renewed violence.
Tir (2005), in his study of secessions, also confirmed that post-secession violence was significantly higher if regions included ethnic minorities. Tir’s study was extremely helpful empirically in identifying ethnicity as a factor, but his study had two limitations. First, theoretically, Tir only examines the leadership of the state as the actor in conflict renewal. I agree with Tir’s theoretical base, but argue that it needs to be expanded to include non-state actors that are often at the heart of violence in civil wars. Tir’s analysis conflicts with the 2G ESD although Tir does not address this head-on. My dissertation does, since Kaufmann’s theory is the central foil in the partition debate.

Second, empirically, Tir is interested in comparing secession outcomes, and the universe of cases is drawn from twentieth century secessions. I am interested in ethnic civil war recurrence, and therefore need to compare different outcomes of ethnic civil wars to determine which are more likely to recur; this is tackled in Chapter Five. Third, Tir includes only fully sovereign, independent states and excludes de facto independent states. For the argument at hand, internationally recognized sovereignty is not essential; to overcome the problem of credible commitment and the triadic political space, de facto independence with demographic separation is sufficient.

4.3 The Standard Explanation: Ethnic Intransigence

Most IR accounts of ethnic civil wars treat ethnic groups as unitary actors (Fearon 1998; Posen 1993). The root cause of post-war conflict, as explained by these theories, is based on ethnic intransigence. Identities become salient during war and this creates irreconcilable identities in the post-war environment (Downes 2001;
Kaufmann 1996; Kaufmann 1998). To quote Kaufmann (Kaufmann 2007, p.3): “Atrocity tales continue to circulate within all the rival groups for many years after the end of the most intense violence, providing unanswerable arguments to hard-liners on all sides and undermining individual trust that might allow refugees to return to homes in what has become ‘enemy’ territory—as well as the likelihood that the ‘enemy’ will allow such returns.” If war ends without complete demographic separation, the risk of conflict renewal remains high as these groups cannot live together after such intense inter-ethnic violence.

But what of the constructivist contributions demonstrating the malleability of ethnic group identity (Brubaker 2004; Chandra 2006)? Some IR theories, including the 2G ESD, recognize but dismiss constructivism under conditions of war, arguing that the unitary actor model is valid during and after ethnic wars. Before ethnic war, identities may be malleable, but that the process of ethnic war itself locks in identity and forces members to choose sides. There is much evidence to suggest that this is true, and we saw some of that in Chapter Three, which demonstrated that very few ethnic Abkhazians fought on the side of the Georgians and very few Georgians on the side of the Abkhaz. Mixed-ethnicity families that were united before the war divided during it.

4.4 Critique of the 2G ESD: Territorial Control and Ethnic Collaboration

However, recent evidence suggests that even under conditions of war, ethnic behavior cannot be predicted by ethnic identity (Kalyvas 2008). I draw on Kalyvas’s (2006) theory of territorial control and collaboration to explain. Kalyvas argues that regardless of preferences, individuals will behaviorally comply with a regime that
controls its territory: “the higher the level of control exercised by a political actor in an area, the higher the level of civilian collaboration with this political actor will be” (Kalyvas 2006: 111). As Kalyvas (2008, pp.1062-1063) wrote, “Control, largely predicated on the judicious use of military resources...can potentially generate collaboration, irrespective of initially adverse preferences, including the type of strong preferences associated with ethnic identities.” Positive inducements, such as finance may also play some role, although disincentives, such as repression tend to be more effective in a war environment.

Territorial control, in other words, is more important than preferences in explaining behavior because people can be coerced into altering their behavior in ways that may not be consistent with their preferences through a combination of incentives (e.g., material goods) and disincentives (e.g., repression), with the latter particularly important during times of civil war. While violence is of prime significance for translating control into collaboration, Kalyvas (2006: 124-130) lists six additional causal mechanisms that spawn collaboration.58 This fits with other rational choice explanations of dissent and control (Lichbach 1995; Wintrobe 1998). This argument can be extended from ongoing war to the immediate post-war environment without altering any assumptions.

If accurate, the theory suggests that even stay-behind minorities in post-partitioned states could be prevented from organizing self-defense groups or rebelling against the state, as long as that state has control over that territory. It is therefore not intransient identities that lead to violence, but a lack of control (anarchy) and, as

58 The six are: shielding, mechanical ascription, credibility of rule, the provision of benefits, monitoring, and self-reinforcing by-products.
I argue below, the actions of the neighboring state. This is still predicated on the fact that the initial rebel militia has disappeared from the territory, and this can be accomplished through military defeat or partition – with the militia surviving, but establishing a separate homeland state.

While Downes (2001) states that ethnic separation is required following ethnic civil war, he tacitly agrees, through one of his case studies, that separation is not always required. When discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he stresses the need for ethnic separation, but when it comes to the Israeli-Arabs he suggests that they do not need to be transferred out of Israel. The Israeli Arabs, Downes (2001, pp.110-111) argues, have been subject to a “successful system of control which impeded Arab mobilization.” This lack of mobilization means the Israeli Arabs are not a current risk for renewed violence, and this is in spite of the vicious violence that has been perpetrated by both sides of the conflict for decades.

4.5 Incomplete Partition and the Triadic Political Space

Even if ethnic minorities can remain within an enemy state and collaborate, incomplete ethnic partitions endogenously create a “Triadic Political Space,” which I argue poses a grave threat to peace (Brubaker 1996; Jenne 2007). The triadic political space consists of the (i) stay-behind minority, (ii) the host state where the minority is situated, and (iii) the homeland state, dominated by the same ethnic kin as the stay-behind minority (Figure 2). Within a context of weak states, which are virtually guaranteed by the ethnic civil war and newly created states, the opportunities for violence are high.

59 “Population transfers…In this case…means removing Jewish settlements deep inside the West Bank and Gaza while leaving the Israeli Arabs where they are” (Downes 2001, p.111).
4.5.1 Leadership Pursues War to Remain in Power

This triadic political space, I argue, is the main threat to post-war peace, and this is for three reasons. The first two reasons relate directly to actions of the homeland state. First, in a two-level game (Putnam 1998), the homeland government may calculate that fighting to include the minority will expand its domestic base of support both by (i) rallying the domestic audience behind a nationalist cause to reclaim territory and ethnic kin lost in a recent war (“rally round the flag effect”) and by (ii) physically adding new ethnic kin that would be grateful to be ruled by the homeland state (Tir 2005). Recall that the collaboration discussed above is based on behavior, not preferences; the preferences of the ethnic minority and the homeland state would still be to live together: the stay-behind minority is collaborating with the new regime only under the threat of violence, increasing the chance of perceived
repression. Even John Mueller (2000, p.56), who challenges the very concept of “ethnic war,” points out that people often face the choice of “being dominated by vicious bigots of one’s own ethnic group or by vicious bigots of another ethnic group: Given that range of alternatives, the choice was easy.”

4.5.2 Domestic Polity Presses Government to Act

Second, the homeland state acts as a lobby for and protector of the stay-behind ethnic minority. The government may find itself under pressure from its domestic audience to act internationally to save the kin minority from real or perceived repression. Such minority repression is likely in post-war, post-partition states, because weak states must rely disproportionately on security services to control populations as they lack more sophisticated means to co-opt populations (Kalyvas 2006). Further, in the initial post-war period, identity salience is high, leading to greater domestic pressure within the homeland state for its leadership to take action and “save” its neighboring kin. In post-war Kosovo, Belgrade is under enormous pressure to take action and save its Serb minority within Kosovo and indeed has taken action to defend them (International Crisis Group 2004). Could a government under these conditions fail to act while its own people were perceived to be under a grave threat? This draws on key aspects within the ethnic security dilemma tradition, but instead of looking at civil war onset in “emerging anarchy” or civil war duration during “ethnic civil wars,” my theory, the 3G ESD extends these arguments to look at the recurrence of deadly ethnic violence.

4.5.3 The Importance of Balance of Power Shifts
The triadic political space does not guarantee violence, however, it only makes it more likely, and I argue that the probability of violence increases with a shift in the balance of power between the post-war state states. If one state gains strength, leaders of the stronger state are more likely to take advantage of the opportunity. This is especially true in the initial post-partition years while borders changes are still fresh and fluid.

Each of the above factors is dependent upon a shift in the balance of power. As scholars of war have demonstrated, leaders in both democratic and autocratic regimes face an increased risk of losing office if they begin wars they lose (Bueno de Mesquita and Silverson 1995; Goemans 2000). Leaders in the post-war period will take advantage of opportunities that allow it to reclaim territories populated by its ethnic kin. Many factors could reduce a state’s capacity to defend itself relative to its neighbor, including the results of the civil war itself, internal armed opposition, state and non-state neighboring actors.

4.5.4 Non-State Militias

Third, the homeland state can be used as a safe-haven for ethnic militias that can be used to launch attacks against the neighboring state. Even if the state itself does not engage in direct intervention, safe-havens are notorious for creating and prolonging civil wars. As Saleyhan (2007, p.218) has argued, “the use of external sanctuaries is one of the most common strategies employed by rebel groups to evade state repression…. [and] provide an important opportunity for rebel mobilization.”

A homeland state may covertly permit such militias to use its territory. This is common for states that do not want to be seen internationally as directly intervening
in a neighboring state, but nevertheless want to protect or support its ethnic kin. Pakistan, for example, has long supported non-state militias in neighboring India among its Urdu-speaking Muslim kin in Kashmir. Weak states may also not be able to prevent such militias acting on its territory. In a post-war environment where territorial control is weak, government security forces may simply be unable to monopolize the use of force on its territory or be unwilling to risk its authority by taking on armed political opposition groups in the initial years. After Georgia’s civil wars ended in 1993, it took another 15 years before the state finally put an end to non-state violent groups operating openly in its territory.

This weakness approximates conditions of “anarchy” and this creates increased opportunities for violence. While it may seem obvious that territorial control will not be in doubt following the end of war, this is far from true. Frequently governments can largely “control” their territory but still have pockets of land and resistance that remain for years. For example, the ethnic civil war in Indonesia between the government and East Timor’s Fretilin was largely over by the 1980s, with the government eliminating Fretilin’s 27,000 strong forces from the 1970s, but even in 1987 it is estimated that 100 guerrillas still remained hiding in the mountains (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Similarly, the Soviet Union, which had already managed its first atomic bomb in 1949, did not manage to eliminate the last of the Ukrainian independence fighters that emerged during World War Two until 1953. Finally, one of the causes of instability in Congo and Rwanda in the late 1990s was each government’s inability to reign in militias conducting cross-border raids, and these actors eventually drew the governments into the conflict.

60 Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor)
In sum, it is not the minority itself that is causing violence, I argue, but rather the international environment caused by an incomplete ethnic partition and a shift in the balance of power between those states. This presents a paradox: partition is required to solve the problem of credible commitment, the “realist” security dilemma, and the problem of group concentration within a single state. Yet, such partitions increase the risk of violence by endogenously creating the seeds of further conflict via the triadic political space within an ethnically charged environment with weak state structures. But if partitions are complete – if they separate the warring groups then the principal justification for recurring violence – protection of ethnic kin and irredentism – is removed.

Without an ethnic minority, the state’s only justification for intervention is territorial expansion. This is certainly a possibility, and, as mentioned above, territorial conflicts have been at the heart of most interstate wars last century. My 3G ESD cannot preclude such violence, and also does not claim to be a guarantee against any deadly conflict recurrence. Rather, the 3G ESD argues that combined partitions of at least de facto statehood and demography will provide the best chance of an enduring peace in comparison to all other ethnic civil war terminations.

4.6 State Weakness and Identity Salience Over Time

While state weakness is central to my argument, the extent of the weakness is likely to be limited in time. While post-war states may remain fragile for years, the initial phase of weakness that approximates anarchy should be short-lived as governments take control of their land and population, penetrating society and eliminating vestiges of any violent opposition. Where 1G ESD was examining
“emerging anarchy,” the 3G ESD looks at conditions of “exiting anarchy” and this time limit helps explain why the initial post-war years are the most prone to violence recurrence. As states secure control of territory and consolidate new borders, it will become difficult for neighboring states or non-state militias to interfere to undermine state stability.

In addition, identity-salience will likely fade with time. While much research has concentrated on “activating” identity, very little has researched decreasing salience (Brubaker 2004). A common assumption is that the intensity of feelings decrease as the threat against the ethnic group decreases. Further, as governments assert control, they will increasingly co-opt minorities, further decreasing the likelihood of rebellion either as government threats become more real or as they become stakeholders in society. This does not prevent recurring violence – neighboring states can launch an invasion at any moment – but as the host state strengthens, opportunities decrease for interference and this decreases the likelihood for recurring deadly conflict.

5 Testable Hypotheses

Based on the above, we can draw the following testable hypotheses for the 3G ESD. First, and most centrally, the 3G ESD posits that separating warring ethnic groups into separate homeland states will increase the likelihood of a sustained peace.

H1: Complete ethnic partitions increase the likelihood of peace after ethnic civil wars.

This stands in contrast to those who focus on problems of credible commitment or the realist security dilemma, where stay-behind minorities and identity should not play a
central role. Therefore a rival hypothesis from the literature should be that partitions creating separate states alone will increase the likelihood of a sustainable peace.

**H2: Partitioning territories into separate states increase the likelihood of peace after ethnic civil wars.**

I explore both of these hypotheses in Chapter Five, through a cross-national statistical study of all ethnic civil war terminations between 1945 and 2004. I also conduct process tracing as part of a nested design through a case study in Chapter Six.

While complete separation should lead to prolonged peace, the 3G ESD also argues that the violence of stay-behind minorities is caused by an interaction effect of weak states and the triadic political space. Stay-behind minorities, by themselves, do not lead to renewed violence since they will collaborate with the ruling regime, even if it is controlled by an enemy ethnic group that committed atrocities against members of the minority during the war. This is one of the key theoretical distinctions between the 2G and 3G ESDs.

**H3: Members of the stay-behind minority are likely to collaborate with the host state controlled by the enemy ethnic group as long as it maintains territorial control.**

However, the preferences of the stay-behind minority should be visible if territorial control shifts from one regime to another, with the stay-behind minority engaging in “limited” collaboration under the control of the enemy ethnic group and “active” collaboration under the control of their own ethnic kin.

**H4: Stay-behind minorities will likely engage in “limited” collaboration when located in territory controlled by the enemy ethnic group and “active” collaboration when located in territory controlled by their kin ethnic group.**
The 3G ESD argues that violence will likely recur with stay-behind minorities, but argues that the source is the triadic political space created endogenously by incomplete partitions. I argued above that this could come from two sources. First, the homeland state’s armed forces could directly intervene to capture territory where the ethnic minority was located. Second, the homeland state could be used by non-state armed militias as a safe-haven to conduct military operations against the host state’s security forces. This creates two more hypotheses to test:

**H5: Violence recurrence is likely to be caused by the homeland state’s armed forces direct intervention in the host state’s territory.**

**H6: Violence recurrence is likely to be caused by non-state ethnic militias using the homeland state as a safe-haven to launch military operations.**

**H7: Violence is likely to occur when there is a shift in the balance of power between the two post-partition states.**

Some of these hypotheses require fine-detailed information on who is involved in violent attacks, and this information is not available at the cross-national level. It also requires information on state weakness, which at present is operationalized in datasets as including states in the immediate post-war period. Further, partitioned states and new states are also operationalized in large-n datasets as being “weak.” This prevents us from a cross-national comparison of cases of ethnic civil war termination in a large-n study. All of these cases will marked as weak. The type of evidence required necessitates detailed field research, and I explore this and other hypotheses in Chapters Six and Seven.

6 Conclusion

Partition offers a potential to resolve the problem of ethnic civil war recurrence. Up until now, however, much of the literature on partition has combined differing
theoretical frameworks generating more confusion than clarity about the effectiveness of partition. Scholars have not, for example, always untangled whether the issue is sovereignty (i.e., statehood) or demography, whether it is the realist security dilemma or the ethnic security dilemma, and whether the dependent variable should be war onset or war recurrence. These are important, because it impacts how we think about partition and how we can evaluate its effectiveness.

If the security dilemma is the driver of conflict renewal, then partitions of sovereignty alone may be sufficient to lower the risk of war renewal, without requiring population transfers once peace has already been achieved. Given that forced population transfers go against normative commitments to which the international community has committed itself, this is not just an academic question. Moreover, it could shed light on the risks of reintegration efforts the international community is working towards in places such as Bosnia, Georgia, and Angola.

If demography alone is the key variable, then separating populations within a country, relying on autonomy and internal population transfers may be enough.

If the 3G ESD is at the heart of war renewal, then both separate statehoods and ethno-demographic separation are indeed required, with separate borders and population transfers implemented, while reintegration of ethnic groups should not be a policy prescription adopted by the international community.

Disentangling statehood and demography is a priority for understanding the dynamics of ethnic war recurrence, and this creates room for both theory testing and theory building. This forms the basis of Chapters Five and Six of my dissertation. In Chapter Five, I construct a formula to capture ethnic unmixing and code this for all
ethnic civil war terminations between 1945 and 2004. Chapter Six consists of case studies in a nested research design drawn from the dataset in Chapter Five. I use process tracing through two cases of incomplete partition that result in both conflict recurrence and prolonged peace.
Chapter 5: Partition and Post-War Violence: Cross-National Evidence from 1945-2004

1 Overview

Chapter Four introduced the Third Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma (3G ESD) as a theory of post-ethnic civil war conflict recurrence and how to avoid it. Building on previous civil war and ethnic conflict research, I focused on (i) ethnic group concentration, (ii) problems of credible commitment, and (iii) the triadic political space as core issues likely to bring about recurring violence. As a solution, I argued that demographic separation alone would not prevent conflict recurrence as it both increased the ethnic group’s capacity to fight and left the ethnically augmented problem of credible commitment unresolved. Similarly, I argued that partitions into statehood alone were insufficient, because they created a triadic political space that would likely increase violence between the post-partition states. Instead, partitions with complete ethno-demographic separation of warring ethnic groups are likely to produce prolonged peace. This chapter provides a cross-national empirical test of this theory for all ethnic civil war terminations between 1945 and 2004.

2 Introduction

With the majority of ethnic civil wars experiencing conflict recurrence within the first years of establishing peace, we must understand how this occurs if we ever hope to build a sustainable peace. The 3G ESD challenged the 2G ESD by arguing the conflict recurrence came from states, not from an inability of ethnic groups to live
together after ethnic civil wars. In this chapter we test this theory through a large-n, cross-national study, comparing partitions to other ethnic civil war outcomes. I examine post-partition peace and violence in all ethnic civil wars during the post-WWII period from 1945 to 2004. This chapter serves as part of a larger nested-design and I draw two cases from the results for in-depth process-tracing in chapters five and six to complement these cross-national results.

The value of this chapter is threefold. First, previous studies contributing to the debate on partition have largely remained theoretical or focused on case studies and policy-prescriptions (Downes 2001; Galbraith 2006; Kumar 1997; Mansergh 1990; Mearsheimer 2000). Evidence has pointed to some successes, such as the 1974 partition of Cyprus, which led to decades of peace, and some failures, such as the partition of British India, which led to widespread death and subsequent war.

Second, I directly challenge both the conceptual and empirical results of the only large-n cross-national study purporting to test partition’s ability to end civil war. Nicholas Sambanis (2000) produced the first empirical study of partition using a large-
, cross-national database. Based on his results, Sambanis (2000, p.479) concluded that “partition does not significantly prevent war recurrence [which] suggests, at the very least, that separating ethnic groups does not resolve the problem of violent ethnic antagonism.”

Sambanis’s analysis helped to further scholarly understanding of partition’s relationship to ethnic civil war, but was flawed on two counts. Sambanis explicitly sets out to test the second generation ethnic security dilemma (2G ESD), yet his research design does not allow him to test whether partition ends ongoing ethnic civil
wars. Instead he assesses whether partition prevents the recurrence of ethnic civil war, which is only part of the 2G ESD. Equally important, the Sambanis analysis suffers from a methodological error because it identified new borders (i.e., de facto statehood) as the critical independent variable to represent partition, and not the demographic separation of warring ethnic groups.61 Testing the relationship between statehood and conflict recurrence does not capture – and therefore cannot refute – the position of partition advocates. This chapter, in contrast, introduces an index to calculate the amount of unmixing of ethnic groups that occurs with partition, therefore capturing partition advocates’ core argument.

When I test the 3G ESD, focusing similarly on conflict recurrence but with demography and statehood as key components of the independent variable, I find partition to be a uniformly effective tool in preventing a recurrence of war and low-level-violence. Finally, this chapter contributes to the wider debate by offering a staging point for further research through case studies. This section of the dissertation is a nested design, and the cross-national analysis allows me to select cases that fit and do not fit the 3G ESD; I examine those cases in Chapters Six and Seven.

2.1 Chapter Outline

The chapter is divided into three sections. First, I examine partition’s empirical record and raise critical questions about Sambanis’s main conclusion that partition is not particularly effective at preventing war recurrence. Second, I propose an alternative variable – the Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index – for testing whether partition is a viable solution for ending ethnic wars. Third, I demonstrate

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61 Alexander Downes notes this flaw in the Sambanis analysis in “The Holy Land Divided.”
that, where the index shows warring ethnic groups were in fact separated, neither war nor low-level violence reoccurred for at least five years, suggesting that the 3G ESD is correct. I close by highlighting two cases to explore in greater depth for subsequent chapters.

3 Cross-National Statistical Testing of Partition Theory

Sambanis (2000) compiled a dataset of all civil wars between 1945 and 1999 to compare the effectiveness of partition to other causes of war termination and peace building. Sambanis tested each of these independent variables, including partition, on three dependent variables: its ability to prevent war recurrence; its ability to reduce low-level postwar violence; and its ability to promote postwar democratization. Based on his analysis, Sambanis (2000, p.439) concluded that “although it may seem like a clean and easy solution, partition fares no better than other outcomes of ethnic civil war.” He also concluded that “the evidence does not support the assertion that partition significantly reduces the risk of war recurrence.” (2000, p.473) He went on, “I can point to only very weak evidence in support of the hypothesis that partitions help end low-level ethnic violence.…More importantly, the positive impact of partitions seems fragile and extremely dependent” (2000, p.478).

The Sambanis analysis has gone some way towards resolving the issue of whether statehood is at the heart of the partition debate, demonstrating that such partitions are not more effective than other strategies at maintaining peace. Further, I specifically coded his civil wars to identify ethno-secessionist wars (those that are more likely to be potential cases of partition) using Fearon’s coding as a guideline.

62 These variables include gross domestic product per capita, cost of the war as measured by deaths and injury, and the war’s outcome (government victory, rebel victory, etc.). See p.469.
and found partition not be a statistically significant variable in preventing war recurrence for that sub-set of cases. However, Sambanis does not include a variable for ethno-demographic separation, so his analysis cannot test the ethnic security dilemma.

3.1 Operationalization

Ethnic Civil War

Sambanis used a broad definition of ethnic civil war, which allowed him to draw on a variety of civil war related databases. He based his definition on six criteria: the war caused more than 1,000 battle deaths; it challenged the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; it occurred within the recognized boundaries of that state; it involved the state as one of the principal combatants; it included rebels with the ability to mount an organized opposition; and it involved parties concerned with the prospect of living together in the same political unit after the end of the war (Sambanis 2000, p.444). A civil war was coded as ethnic based on other datasets, using case-specific source material when discrepancies emerged Sambanis 2000, Appendix B, p.7).

Low-Level Violence

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63 For consistency, I follow Sambanis’s coding for ethnic war in as many cases as possible. He categorized such wars “with reference to as many sources as I could consult for each case. I tried to reflect majority opinion about the coding of each case, where there was disagreement between my main sources.” See p. 455. As noted below Tajikistan was recoded.
64 The definition is relatively uncontroversial except for its “1,000 deaths,” which does not require an annual death threshold, but rather “1,000 [battle] deaths for the duration of the war.” See Sambanis, “Appendix B: Data-Set Notes,” (Washington, D.C.:World Bank, 2000), p. 2. For a detailed discussion about the use of battle deaths in the quantitative, cross-national data set, see Sambanis (2004).
Sambanis’s definition for low-level violence relies largely on the Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1997) data set coding all armed conflicts causing 25 or more deaths but falling short of war.

Post-War Peace

For post-war peace, I use a two and five-year threshold since, as mentioned in the introduction, the first five years are deemed the most critical for conflict recurrence.

Partition

Sambanis (2000, p.445) defined partition as “a war outcome that involves both border adjustment and demographic changes.” This chapter follows Sambanis and includes instances of both “partition” and “secession.” Traditionally, partitions were understood as a “fresh division” of some territory, usually executed by a sovereign (often great) power occurring at the time of decolonization (Schaefer 1990). In my study, however, who imposes partition is relatively unimportant: the critical factor is whether dividing warring groups into separate entities can prevent war recurrence. 66 Further, whether it is possible to accurately distinguish between secessions and partitions is unclear: Kaufmann, for example, codes Cyprus (1974) as a “partition” but Abkhazia (1992-93) a “secession,” even though both Turkish

66 Debates regarding differences between secession and decolonization also exist, although these debates are unhelpful for the current debate on partition: to suggest that the “separation” of Nigeria and the United Kingdom is similar to the “separation” of Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh conflates two very different events and serves only to obfuscate the partition process in the current debate of ethnic civil wars. Further, current ethnic civil wars often see the language of “colonization” in a highly contested manner. For example, Chechen insurgents claim to be waging a war of liberation against the “colonizing” center of Moscow, whereas Moscow claims the uprising is a secession and sees Chechnya as an integral part of the Russian Federation. In the military campaign beginning in 1999, Russia labeled the Chechen insurgents no longer as secessionists but as bandits, criminals, or Wahhabi radicals. For purposes of analysis, many academics put partition, secession, and decolonization in the same category. McGarry and O’Leary lump “partition and/or secession (self determination)” together in their taxonomy, and include decolonization within it. See, for example, McGarry and O’Leary (1993), pp. 11-16.
Cypriots and Abkhaz were involved in separatist movements that were ultimately successful because of assistance from an external power (Turkey and Russia, respectively).\textsuperscript{67} Moreover, given that the implications of partition theory affect partitions and secessions equally in the minds of academics and policymakers, it is logical to code both.

\textbf{De Jure and De Facto Independent Statehood}

I follow Scott Pegg (1998, p.26) and others in referring to state-like entities that lack international recognition as de facto states, such as the state of South Ossetia, which is legally part of Georgia, recognized by only Nicaragua and Russia.\textsuperscript{68} For partition theory, the importance is the state-like attributes, critical for defense, not the international recognition. As Dov Lynch (Lynch 2002: 835) argues, “the key difference for the de facto state resides in its lack of recognized external sovereignty, which prevents it from enjoying membership of the exclusive and all-encompassing club of state.” As a recent review summarized, while various authors disagree on many aspects of de facto states, there is agreement that de facto states “are remarkably robust, state-like entities” (Kolsto 2006: 727; Vinci 2008).

Finally, it is relatively unimportant whether a postpartitioned entity achieves de jure sovereignty (as in the case of Bangladesh’s internationally recognized

\textsuperscript{67} See Kaufmann (1998) p. 126. The role of Turkey in enabling the de facto independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has been well documented. For the critical role of Russia in enabling Abkhazia’s de facto independence, see Toft (2003), pp. 87-106.

\textsuperscript{68} “A de facto state exists where there is an organized political leadership, which has risen to power through some degree of indigenous capacity; receives popular support; and has achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a specific territorial area, over which effective control is maintained for a significant period of time. The de facto state views itself as capable of entering into relations with other states and it seeks full constitutional independence and widespread international recognition as a sovereign state.” The classical definition of an entity that may be regarded as a sovereign state was established at the Montevideo Contention on Rights and Duties of States in 1933. The criteria: (i) permanent population; (ii) a defined territory; (iii) a government; and (iv) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
separation from Pakistan) or de facto sovereignty (as in the case of South Ossetia’s unrecognized separation from Georgia); therefore both types are included. Although some scholars have begun to include wars of decolonization in data sets of civil wars (e.g., Algeria from France and Mozambique from Portugal), this practice remains questionable conceptually. Moreover, because I am primarily interested in reevaluating Sambanis’s analysis, like him, I also exclude such wars. Using Sambanis’s data set, I was able to reproduce his estimates.

My Cases

My cases differ slightly from those used by Sambanis. First, I excluded Tajikistan because it did not undergo a recognizable partition during or after its civil war, and because most experts deemed it a regional and ideological, not ethnic, conflict. Second, I included the case of Bosnia, but where Sambanis uses the 1992 partition, I used the 1995 partition. The 1992 partition of Bosnia from Yugoslavia did not occur at the end of the war, which raged for three more years. I coded the Dayton accords as a partition of Bosnia between Serbs, on the one hand, and

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69 Some civil war databases, such as those used by Fearon (2004) include wars of decolonization. Others, such as Roy Licklider (1995) do not. The Correlates of War separates these into “internal wars” and “extrasystemic wars”. Fearon and Laitin (2003) run their analysis both with and without wars of decolonization when testing for causes of civil war onset, recognizing conceptual and theoretical problems for both inclusion and exclusion.

70 It was not clear from the Sambanis article, appendix, or coding notes in Appendix B as to why Tajikistan was coded as a partition or an ethnic civil war; Tajikistan’s separation from the Soviet Union occurs before its war begins. Sambanis recognizes Tajikistan as a coding error in, “Partition and Civil War Recurrence.” For Tajikistan as a regional and ideological conflict, see Payam Foroughi, “Tajikistan: Nationalism, Ethnicity, Conflict, and Socio-Economic Disparities—Sources and Solutions,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 1 (April 2002), pp. 39-62; and Dov Lynch, “The Tajik Civil War and Peace Process,” Civil Wars, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Winter 2001), pp. 49-72.


72 The General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was initialed in Dayton, Ohio, on November 21, 1995, and signed in Paris on December 14, 1995.
Bosniaks and Croats on the other. The territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into two de facto states in 1995, each maintaining separate armed forces that cannot enter the other’s territory. This qualifies Bosnia as a partition. As the realist scholars John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt confirmed at the time, Bosnia “produced a partition settlement….The settlement is a veiled partition but a partition nevertheless.” Third, I excluded the 1992 Croatia case because of the difficulty of categorizing it as a war end. Although there were cease-fires between the Zagreb-based Croatian authorities and the Knin-based Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK), the conflict between Yugoslavian/Serb and Croatian forces continued in many regions, including the Serb siege of Dubrovnik and the Croat siege of Bihac. In addition, serious military operations between RSK and Croatia’s army resumed soon after each cease-fire. I therefore exclude this case from the analysis. Given the ongoing violence between Yugoslavian/Serb and Croat forces between 1991 and

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73 The inclusion of Republika Srpska partition from Bosnia also means that I added the Bosniak-Croat dyad as a case of ethnic war ending without a sovereignty partition. This does not appear in Tables 1 and 2, which look only at sovereignty partitions, but does appear in the later comparison between partitions and other war outcomes.

74 The two republics are Republika Srpska and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is not a case of territorial autonomy because of the existence of separate governments with armed forces that cannot enter each other’s territory. The primary conflict was between the Serb forces, on the one hand, and the Croat and Bosnian forces on the other, although the Croat and Bosnian forces also fought each other from mid-1993 until the signing of the Washington treaty of March 18, 1994, after which they fought together against Serb forces. Other coding possibilities therefore include separate Bosniak-Serb and Croat-Serb codings for partition, but the figures for separation are virtually the same and do not affect the results, except to provide an additional “partition.” Further, given the conflict between Croat and Bosniak forces, one could include this as an ethnic war without partition as an ending. Again, these results do not affect the final results when comparing partition to nonpartition.


76 RSK had a separate government and armed forces.

77 For example, see military operations in the Lika region of RSK (Operation Medak Pocket, September 1993), and the Maslenica and Zadar regions of RSK (Operation Maslenica, January 1993). By the time of the next cease-fire, in 1994, Croatian forces were already preparing Operation Flash, which began in May 1995.
1995, it is more appropriate to consider this a Croatian “war of independence,” ending with the partition of Croatia from Yugoslavia in 1995, which is what I include in my analysis. Finally, I updated all relevant variables for all cases of ethnic civil war through mid-2004. This update includes the additional case of Kosovo, which was partitioned in 1999.

More importantly, I introduce a new independent variable for analysis. This new variable is critical because Sambanis’s definition of partition relies on the existence of any border and demographic changes but not the degree of separation between ethnic groups. The following section outlines my alternative approach.

4 The Centrality of Demography

As mentioned in the theory chapter, the 2G ESD claims that demography is the core variable that will decide the fate of ethnic civil wars and whether they end in peace or violence. Yet, as also mentioned in the introduction, several authors have identified concentrated ethnic groups within a single country as particularly at risk for rebellion, suggesting this alone would not be an effective strategy for peacebuilding (Gurr 1993; Toft 2003). In fact, Laitin (2004) addressed this topic directly as it relates to partition, although insufficient data prevent him a direct test. Moreover, Kaufmann himself stresses the need for the concentrated groups to have defense capabilities, which may be difficult to achieve within a single state. The 3G ESD

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78 The Yugoslav National Army was heavily involved in the wars for the RSK, as was Slobodan Milosevic.
79 This is, in fact, how most Croats understand the war (commonly labeled “Domovinski Rat” in Croatian) from 1991 to 1995. In Sambanis’s unpublished paper (“Partition and Civil War Recurrence”), he excluded Croatia altogether, which I find surprising given that the definition he uses for partition in this paper is “an outcome of a civil war that…leads to the formation of a new state out of a part of another state,” which is what occurred in Croatia, where war began in 1991 by conventional counts.
80 This may be possible if territorial autonomy was granted with policing powers.
argues that both statehood (de facto or de jure) and demography are critical to a successful.

Thus far, we have only had a cross-national test of statehood alone without demography. If demography is central, and if partitioned countries with new minorities increase the security threat, then demographic changes need to be captured for use as an independent variable. Social scientists have developed few demographic indicators to capture degrees of ethnic heterogeneity. Tatu Vanhanen (1999), for example, created the ethnic heterogeneity index to explore the general relationship between ethnic conflict and ethnic division. Daniel Posner (2004) has created an index based on politically relevant ethnic groups. Neither index, however, can identify which groups were at war and the degree to which they separated after the war. As a result, I created the Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index (PEHI).

4.1 Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index

In constructing the PEHI, I began with a state that contains a titular ethnic group and a minority ethnic group. The two groups engage in a civil war and, at some point, their territory is partitioned in the hopes of ending the conflict. The result is two countries, each with its own titular majority as well as a potentially “stay-behind” minority from the other ethnic group. To determine the degree to which the ethnic groups were separated, it requires knowing (1) the percentage the percentage of the minority group in the original country (recorded as OSM for original state minority); (2) the percentage of the original minority left in the rump state after partition (RSM for rump state minority); and (3) the percentage of the original titular group now found as a minority inside the new state (NSM for new state minority).
Figure 1. Components of the Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index

PRE-PARTITION

original country border

original state minority enclaves
“OSM”

POST-PARTITION

rump state border

new state border

stay-behind minority enclaves: rump state minority

stay-behind minority enclaves: new state minority
Given the theoretical focus on demography, with an understanding that leaving sizable minorities on either side of a new border could increase the chances of renewed warfare and low-level violence, this index uses both new minorities to calculate the degree to which a partition and population transfers succeeded in separating the warring groups. For countries with more than two ethnic groups at war, groups are aggregated if they fought on the same side or if they are treated as one by the opposing force,\textsuperscript{81} if there are separate warring ethnic dyads within a civil war, they can be treated as separate wars.

To calculate the PEHI, I subtracted the new minority percentages (RSM and NSM) from the original minority percentage (OSM). I then divided this percentage by the original minority percentage (OSM) and multiplied the result by 100. This simple calculation yields the percentage change in the size of ethnic minorities produced by partitioning the country, thus indicating the degree of ethnic separation:

\[
\text{PEHI} = \frac{\text{OSM} - (\text{RSM} + \text{NSM})}{\text{OSM}} \times 100.
\]

The higher the PEHI number, the greater the degree of separation achieved by partition. The maximum score a partition can receive is +100, indicating a complete

\textsuperscript{81} The Minorities at Risk Project follows a similar guideline when aggregating groups vis-à-vis the government. For example, in Darfur today, MAR codes the “Black Muslims of Darfur” as a group, even though there are three different groups: Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit. The same formula is used for the “Southerners” group in Sudan, which comprise Equatorians, Dinkas, Nuers, Akuaks, Shilluks, Latukas, Taposas, Turkans, Moru, Madi, and Azande. See Minorities at Risk Project, “Assessment for Southerners in Sudan” or “Assessment for Darfur Black Muslims in Sudan,” (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2005), http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/.
separation of the warring ethnic groups. This number falls as the size of the stay-
behind minorities grows relative to the original minority percentage.  

4.2 Coding PEHI  

Timely data on minority populations in the aftermath of ethnic civil wars proved difficult to find. For coding, I relied on a staple set of books and encyclopedias.  

The guiding principle in gathering the data was to have at least two credible sources provide the same numbers; when these numbers were close but not exact, an average was taken. Where two sources could not be found among the staple, I consulted case-specific academic publications and news reports gauging refugee flows of ethnic groups.  

Where data were unavailable for the year immediately after partition, I used the first available data.  

4.3 Results  

Table 1 presents the PEHI component figures from the 17 cases of partition that occurred after ethnic civil war between 1945 and 2004. For example, in Azerbaijan OSM – in this case, the Armenians – formed 5.8 percent of Azerbaijan’s population before the civil war. After the civil war approximately 20,000 Armenians remained in rump-Azerbaijan, creating an RSM of 0.25 percent. The number of Azeris found

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82 There are different ways to calculate the PEHI. One alternative is to look at the separation from both sides by including an indicator of the percentage of the original majority found in the minority region prior to the war (e.g., ethnic Russians in Chechnya before 1994), which I label MiM (Majority in Minority region), and then to calculate the index as: [(MiM+OSM) – (RSM+NSM)]/(MiM+OSM). I conducted a sensitivity test using this formula, and others, and found no substantive differences in the results: those cases with high degrees of unmixing scored highly on all formulas.  


84 Refugee flows were required for some conflicts, in which case prewar minority percentages were used to obtain absolute numbers of the minority, and refugee numbers were subtracted from the total to arrive at an approximation of the minority remaining in the territory. Where large refugee movements take place - many of these conflicts forced hundreds of thousands of people from their homes - exact numbers are not possible so approximations were required.
in the new state of Nagorno Karabakh after the war ended was negligible (NSM<0.01). The following equation reflects the PEHI for the case of Azerbaijan:

\[
\text{PEHI} = \frac{5.8 - (0.25+0)}{5.8} \times 100 = 95.69
\]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Original State Minority</th>
<th>Rump State Minority</th>
<th>New State Minority</th>
<th>Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan-Nagorno Karabakh (1994)</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td>95.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia (1995)</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>86.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia-Croatia (1995)</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>71.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (1963)</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>11.90</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
<td>34.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (1974)</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia-Eritrea (1991)</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td>98.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia-Abkhazia (1993)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>99.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia-South Ossetia (1994)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>98.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Pakistan (1947-48)</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>10.40</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>50.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Kashmir (1965)</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.40</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>-28.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Kashmir (1989-94)</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.40</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>-28.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel-Palestine (1948)</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td>13.80</td>
<td>58.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia-Kosovo (1999)</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>52.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova (1992)</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>24.00</td>
<td>40.50</td>
<td>-108.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan-Bangladesh (1971)</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>98.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia-Chechnya (1996)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>-366.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Somalia (1992)  27.4  25.00  28.00  -93.43

Note: Scores of <0.01 assume value 0 for calculation of the Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index.

The PEHI shows what was achieved with partition. Rather than a simple binary code indicating if de facto statehood was achieved, the PEHI captures the degree to which minorities were separated. For example, the 1963-64 partition of Cyprus, where Turks migrated into small defensive enclaves during intense interethnic war, failed to significantly divide the populations with a large number of Turks left outside the defensible enclaves. According to the PEHI, this partition homogenized the territories by a paltry 34.6 percent, reducing the security dilemma only marginally. Partition theory would expect a high likelihood of war recurrence under these conditions, which is what took place. In contrast, Azerbaijan’s partition succeeded in separating Azeris and Armenians with a PEHI of close to 100 percent. As predicted by partition theory, there has been no recurrence of war.

4.4 Examining the PEHI

The PEHI indicates whether any one partition selected from the database would be considered a “complete partition” or an “incomplete partition” by partition advocates. A complete partition is one in which the warring minorities are fully separated, leaving negligible stay-behind minorities; an incomplete partition is one in which the minorities are not separated, leaving sizable stay-behind minorities in either of the two emerging states. For this study, any partition that succeeded in separating the warring parties by a PEHI of 95 percent or more is considered a complete partition. The threshold of 95 percent is not fixed, but rather should be seen as a
guide to indicate partitions where ethnic groups have been effectively separated in their entirety, a critical demand by partition advocates.\textsuperscript{85}

Table 2 compares “complete” and “incomplete” partitions against the two main criteria established by Sambanis: recurrence of war 2 and 5 years after the end of a civil war, and recurrence of low-level violence within 2 and 5 years.\textsuperscript{86} This five-year threshold is particularly significant given World Bank data (Collier and Hoeffler 2000) and other scholarly research (\textit{e.g.}, Johnson 2009) suggesting that post-conflict countries face a 50 percent or higher risk of renewed conflict within the first five years of reaching peace.

\textsuperscript{85} This accepts the inevitability of small, residual minorities which do not alter the value of the results. The average size of the largest residual minorities found after “complete partitions” amounted to a mere 0.33 percent. Kaufmann argues, “While peace requires separation of groups into distinct regions, it does not require total ethnic purity. Rather, remaining minorities must be small enough that the host group does not fear them as either a potential military threat or a possible target for irredentist rescue operations.” Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars,” p. 163.

\textsuperscript{86} Sambanis uses postwar democratization as a third criterion and finds postpartition states associated with higher levels of democracy. This chapter does not address these results because they do not form the core of the partition theory argument. Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War,” pp. 459-464.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>PEHI</th>
<th>Complete Partition</th>
<th>War Ended for 2 Years</th>
<th>War Ended for 5 Years</th>
<th>Low-Level Violence Ended for 2 Years</th>
<th>Low-Level Violence Ended for 5 Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan-Nagorno Karabakh (1994)</td>
<td>95.69</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia (1995)</td>
<td>86.40</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia-Croatia (1995)</td>
<td>71.62</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (1963)</td>
<td>34.60</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (1974)</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia-Eritrea (1991)</td>
<td>98.13</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia-Abkhazia (1993)</td>
<td>99.83</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia-South Ossetia (1994)</td>
<td>98.33</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Pakistan (1947-48)</td>
<td>50.82</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Kashmir (1965)</td>
<td>-28.85</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Kashmir (1989-94)</td>
<td>-28.85</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel-Palestine (1948)</td>
<td>58.56</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia-Kosovo (1999)</td>
<td>52.14</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova (1992)</td>
<td>-108.06</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan-Bangladesh (1971)</td>
<td>98.91</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia-Chechnya (1996)</td>
<td>-366.67</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia (1992)</td>
<td>-93.43</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the results in Table 2 indicate, for all partitions achieving a PEHI separation score higher than 95 percent, there were no recurrences of war for at least five years, nor were there recurrences of low-level violence for five years, with the sole exception of Georgia-Abkhazia. The Georgia-Abkhazian partition, however, is an exception that proves the rule: the PEHI is a static number, indicating ethno-demographic separation only once at the end of the war, but in the case of Abkhazia post-war migration was not static. Within two years, ethnic Georgians began returning to Abkhazia, and within five years over 40,000 had returned, sparking a return to armed conflict in 1998. Therefore, while low-level violence recurred, it was because of non-separation, adding further evidence to the 3G ESD. If we rank the PEHI from highest to lowest, we find that the top 10 partitions experienced no conflict recurrence and no separation achieving a PEHI score above 70 percent experienced a recurrence of war or low-level violence, suggesting the threshold of 95 percent could even be lowered (see also Johnson 2009). For partitions with lower PEHI scores, the results are mixed, with most experiencing either war recurrence or a return of low-level violence.

These data suggest that a partition that successfully separates warring ethnic groups produces substantially different results from partitions that do not separate the groups, which is what the 3G ESD predicts. This further underscores the need to disaggregate partitions into those that separate the warring ethnic groups and those that do not. Although the number of cases is small – there have been only six cases of “complete” partition – the results are consistent and unambiguous. Given the small number, however, these results must also be treated with caution. While partition
advocates cannot be faulted for the lack of complete partitions since 1945, they can be honest about what the numbers demonstrate.

One case that stands out is the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. Although this partition meets the criteria established by Sambanis, with no recurrence of war or low-level violence between Ethiopia and Eritrea for at least five years after their partition, these countries did return to war in 1998, after a seven-year peace. Partition advocates do not claim, however, that separating warring ethnic groups will always prevent a return to war or low-level violence forever into the future; rather they claim that it is often the best option to give peace a chance. In addition, for this particular case, had more population transfers occurred at the time of partition, the tens of thousands of Eritreans remaining in Ethiopia would not have faced the horrific expulsions that occurred during the 1998-00 war (Amnesty International 1999; Tronvoll 2000).87

Further, as mentioned earlier, partition advocates argue that any future war between partitioned states will be an improvement over a return to civil war because the two sovereign states will be subjected to greater international attention and diplomatic pressure, increasing the likelihood of war ending quickly. Ethiopia and Eritrea exemplify this logic: the civil war the two sides fought lasted more than 15 years, whereas the inter-state conflict of 1998 ended within two years following heavy international pressure. Similarly, the Georgian conflict over South Ossetia in

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87 On the civilian expulsions, Minority Rights Group reported that by early 2000 more than 54,000 Ethiopians of Eritrean origin had been deported. Amnesty International (1999, p.27) that “the expulsion of people of Eritrean origin was often carried out in an inhumane manner that amounts to cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment.”
2008 lasted just six days amidst heavy international pressure, producing relatively few deaths (Johnson 2009).

A potential concern with the results of this analysis may be over the issue of endogeneity or whether a selection bias has taken place where cases of complete partition occurred in states where ethnic minorities were already compact and homogeneous, and thus relatively easy to separate after a war without “ethnic cleansing” or large population transfers. Few communities are ethnically homogeneous, however, and even those ethnic groups that are territorially concentrated typically have a significant minority in their midst. In this analysis, all of the “complete” cases involved large-scale forced population transfers during their wars, with the possible exception of Bangladesh. Militias and government armed forces displaced hundreds of thousands of people during the two ethnic wars in Georgia, during the war over Nagorno Krabakh, and during the ethnic war in Cyprus. In the other partition reaching a high PEHI – Bosnia (86.4 percent) – armed forces displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians based on their ethnic identity in what had been an ethnically intermixed territory.

4.5 Stay-Behind Minorities and Peace

There are several countries that experienced incomplete partitions – partitions that do not completely separate the warring ethnic groups – and yet also do not experience war recurrence or low-level violence within the first five years of the end

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88 The case of Bangladesh is deceiving due to the large Bengali population that was largely separate from the rest of West Pakistan. Nevertheless, Urdu-speaking Biharis were the targets of violence with tens of thousands of resulting deaths. A Pakistani white paper on the topic estimated more than 60,000 Urdu-speaking Biharis were killed during the brief conflict.
of their civil wars. This indicates that demographic separation is not the only way to prevent war recurrence.

Two dimensions to this issue are relevant to the current analysis. First, a closer look at the incomplete partitions that did not experience an initial conflict recurrence reveal troubling insights. The conflict over India-Pakistan (1947-48) did not recur in the first five years, but the “incomplete” partition, which left substantially inter-mixed populations, was followed by three wars over the proceeding half century. The “incomplete” partition between Israel and Palestine (1948) has seen low-level violence and war recurrence over subsequent decades. Moreover, it was arguably the reintroduction of significant ethnic intermingling after Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 that has led to heightened conflict. Croatia’s “war of independence” (1991-95) also ended with an “incomplete” partition. Although the degree of ethnic unmixing was not enough to be deemed a “complete” partition by the strict criteria outlined in the chapter, the final Croatian military operation of the war in 1995 forced approximately 200,000 Serbs to flee Croatian territory, reducing the percentage of Serbs in Croatia by almost two-thirds by the end of the war, and therefore substantially unmixing the populations.

Second, the 3G ESD does not stop at demographic separation. As stated in chapter four, state building – exiting anarchy – is also a significant factor that can prevent conflict recurrence despite the presence of stay-behind minorities. If some post-partition states are able to exit anarchy faster than others, thus reducing opportunities for violence, this could explain some of the peace. Capturing state-

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building for a cross-national analysis of post-war situations is almost impossible; certainly no cross-national data is currently available that would suit our purposes.\textsuperscript{90} However, this provides an ideal opportunity for case-study work. Chapter Seven addresses this issue by exploring the case of Moldova’s partition in 1992, which included large, stay-behind minorities that did not experience conflict renewal.

4.6 Statistical examination of the PEHI

I added the PEHI to set to the dataset to check for statistical significance on war recurrence. Using binary probit, the variable warend2 (no war recurrence for at least two years after the end of the civil war) was regressed on the continuous variable PEHI only for ethnic wars that experienced partition. The PEHI is affected by the prewar minority percentages; as a control, therefore, the prewar minority variable has also been included in the model. The results show a positive regression coefficient for PEHI, as one would expect based on the theory, with a $p$-value significant at the 0.1 level (see Table 3).

| Variable          | $\beta$ | $z$-value | $p>|z|$ |
|-------------------|--------|----------|-------|
| PEHI              | .01    | 1.56     | .06   |
| Prewar Minority   | -.03   | -.91     | .18   |
| Constant          | .93    | 1.35     | .09   |

NOTE: $N = 17$. $\beta$ is an unstandardized coefficient; $z$ is a $z$-test of $\beta$, and $p$ is the $p$-value for a one-tailed $z$-test.

\textsuperscript{90} Cross-national statistical studies to date that examine state strength or state weakness invariably include war as an indicator of state weakness, new statehood, or partitioned territories as an indicator of state weakness or state failure. All of these indicators would place our partitioned countries as “weak” proving no variation on the independent variable. We require more fine-grained data than is currently available. See, for example, the State Failure Task Force \textit{(1995)} or Fearon and Laitin (2003).
The results suggest that the greater the separation of warring minorities produced by a partition (i.e., the higher the PEHI), the greater the expected likelihood is of not experiencing a return to war for at least two years. Given the small-$n$ (17), however, these results are only suggestive.

### 4.7 Alternative Explanations of Partition and Peacebuilding

We must also consider alternative theories that might account for peacebuilding in these partitioned countries. Perhaps complete partitions have coincided with alternative factors that have contributed towards preventing a recurrence of violence. Sambanis compiled a series of control variables for his cross-national analysis. Unfortunately, if any of them are entered into the probit analysis, all results become insignificant; this is almost certainly due to the small $n$ ($n=17$) of the dataset. I therefore turn to a more primitive form of “control variables” by examining whether other explanations can also act as sufficient conditions for peace.

Since we are examining both (i) peace maintenance and (ii) renewal of violence after civil wars, theories explaining either of these should be considered as alternative explanations and tested against partition; further, since these post-partitioned conflicts are at the cross-roads of civil wars and inter-state wars, theories from international relations should also be considered. I draw on theories explored in the previous theory chapter to select control variables. Most prominent in peace maintenance is the role of *third parties*, such as peacekeepers, in maintaining peace. According to these theories, peacekeepers act as a deterrent to aggression, they act to enforce peace agreements, and they act as an instrument to overcome the problem of
credible commitments between parties seeking a long-term solution to conflict (Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2003; Fortna 2004; Walter 2002; Wilkenfeld and Brecher 1984). I add a modified variable for the presence of peacekeepers to my dataset. The original Sambanis variable is a 5-point scale, which I dichotomize into the presence of peacekeepers with sufficient strength to enforce any agreement.91

Other scholars have examined the role of war traits, such as costs of war, and duration (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Zartman 1985). These theories argue that the longer the war and the higher the casualties (i.e., the greater the cost of war), the less likely the war will be to recur because each side is exhausted and does not have the appetite for war renewal. These theories, however, have had mixed results in the literature, with international wars experiencing less likelihood for war renewal, but civil wars experiencing greater likelihood for renewal. For war duration, I use a dichotomized version of Sambanis’s dataset, coding wars as either greater than or less than the mean length of all civil wars between 1945 and 2004. The Sambanis average is seven years (84.6 months) for all ethnic wars, and I therefore code each conflict as short or long.92 For deaths during war, I do the same, coding high or low based on the mean death count at 171,469 (civilians and soldiers). Finally, scholars have looked at the role of war outcomes military victories as an aid to peace maintenance (Luttwak 1999; Toft 2006;

91 Sambanis’s variable is taken from Doyle and Sambanis (2000): 0 indicates no intervention; 1 indicates mediation only; 2 indicates an observer mission; 3 indicates traditional peacekeeping operations; 4 indicates peace enforcement. I code the presence of peacekeeping by combining 3 and 4, since this is conventionally used; all other variables I code as an absence of peacekeepers.

92 Of course much depends on the criteria one uses for civil war; using Fearon’s dataset (2004), the mean length of all wars is 11.5 years, but he has a stricter criteria for entry into the dataset biasing the results to longer wars.
Wagner 1993). I use the Sambanis variable of War Outcome, which differentiates between: military victory by government; military victory by rebels; truce/informal ceasefire; formal settlement/treaty.

I present the results in Table 4, permitting a comparison of the various alternative independent variables for peace-building, and the dependent variable of a Five-Year peace.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Complete Partition</th>
<th>War Duration</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Peacekeeping Operation</th>
<th>War Ended for 5 Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan-Nagorno Karabakh (1994)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Truce</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia (1995)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia-Croatia (1995)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (1963)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Truce</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (1974)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Truce</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia-Eritrea (1991)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Rebel Victory</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia-Akhazia (1993)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Truce</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia-South Ossetia (1994)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Truce</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Pakistan (1947-48)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Kashmir (1965)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Truce</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Kashmir (1989-94)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Truce</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel-Palestine (1948)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Gov’t Victory</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia-Kosovo (1999)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Rebel Victory</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova (1992)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Rebel Victory</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan-Bangladesh (1971)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Rebel Victory</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia-Chechnya (1996)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia (1992)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>Rebel Victory</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As we can see, there is no single variable that can act as a sufficient condition for peace maintenance other than Complete Partition.

4.8 Comparing Complete Partitions with the Alternative for All Ethnic Civil Wars

A comparison of countries that experienced complete partitions with those that experienced other outcomes between 1945 and 2004, including incomplete partition or no partition at all, further reveals the benefits of separating warring ethnic groups. Table 5 shows a cross-tabulation of countries whose ethnic wars ended for at least two years. Seventy-one percent of these wars did not recur. Nevertheless, in cases of complete partition, no country experienced a return to war (100 percent). The chi-square test produced a statistic of 3.92 for a probability of 0.14, although three cells have an expected count of less than five. Using the Fisher’s Exact Test, which can be used regardless of how small the expected frequency is, we find a similar statistic of 0.162.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did the War End for At Least Two Years?</th>
<th>Complete Partition</th>
<th>Incomplete Partition</th>
<th>No Partition</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square = 3.92 (df=2), P = 0.141; Fisher’s Exact: 0.162

In 68 percent of the cases, countries did not experience a recurrence of war for at least five years, while all cases of complete partition (100 percent) avoided a recurrence of civil war. The chi-square statistic is 6.07 for a probability of 0.048,
Turning now to low-level violence, an even greater contrast is evident between complete partition and the alternative of incomplete partition or no partition (see Table 6). In 60 percent of the cases, low-level violence did not end for the first two years. Strikingly, for those civil wars that ended with a complete partition, none experienced further low-level violence during that period. The chi-square value is 10.06 for a \( p \)-value of 0.007, statistically significant at the 0.01 level, although three cells have expected counts of less than five. Nevertheless, the Fisher’s Exact is also 0.007. In other words, 60 percent of ethnic civil wars experienced deadly conflict recurrence within the first two years, but complete partitions did not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did Low-level Violence End for At Least 2 Years?</th>
<th>Complete Partition</th>
<th>Incomplete Partition</th>
<th>No Partition</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6 (100%)</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>23 (37%)</td>
<td>32 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>8 (73%)</td>
<td>40 (63%)</td>
<td>48 (60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHI-SQUARE = 10.063 (df=2), \( p \) = 0.007; Fisher’s Exact = 0.007

If we turn to the dependent variable of no low-level violence for five years, our results are affected by the aforementioned Georgian-Abkhaz case, where violence occurs, but only after ethnic Georgians returned to Abkhazia. If we drop the Georgian-Abkhaz case from the dataset, the chi-square is 7.77, with a \( p \)-value of 0.021; again, three cells have expected counts of less than 5. The Fisher’s Exact is 0.024.

These figures strongly support the position of scholars who advocate partition. Complete partitions that separated warring ethnic groups prevented a return to war for at least five years. For the period under review, complete partition was a sufficient
condition. Partitions that separated warring ethnic groups have also terminated low-level violence for at least five years. This, too, was a sufficient condition. This finding is all the more significant given that a majority of post civil war countries continue to experience low-level violence, a plague that haunts civilian populations for years after combat operations formally conclude.

5 Conclusion

This chapter has examined partition as a way to prevent the recurrence of ethnic war and low-level violence. After reviewing theoretical issues involving the dynamics of ethnic war, I reexamined the first large-scale, cross-national empirical study of partition conducted by Nicholas Sambanis. Sambanis relied on the presence of a new political border as his indicator for partition, concluding that partition does not significantly prevent war recurrence and should not be promoted by the international community. To accurately test the 3G ESD, I constructed a new variable – the Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index – that captures ethnodemographic separation and partitions into separate statehood for all ethnic civil war terminations between 1945 and 2004. I found that in all cases where the PEHI showed a complete separation of warring minorities, there were no war recurrences and no occurrences of low-level violence for at least five years after the end of the ethnic civil war. These results trump the alternatives of incomplete partitions and no partitions, providing strong evidence in support of the 3G ESD.

The cross-national results, while important, are insufficient evidence to demonstrate the validity of the 3G-ESD for two reasons. First, the results demonstrate only a correlation between complete partition and peace. The low-n
further undermines confidence in the results. To strengthen this finding, I therefore subject the theory to a more rigorous test through the case study of Georgia-Abkhazia’s incomplete partition, using process tracing to evaluate the cause of violence in Chapter Six. Second, as mentioned above, the cross-national analysis did not capture state strength and balance of power between the two states. Cross-national data for state-strength in post-war and post-partition countries is not available with the level of data required. Third, there were some incidents of incomplete partition that did not experience violence. I examine this puzzling result in Chapter Seven, using Moldova-Pridnestrovie as my case study.
Chapter 6: Post-War Violence: Case Studies of Post-Partition Abkhazia and Moldova

1 Overview

Chapter Four introduced the Third Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma (3G ESD) and explained how complete partitions – partitions that ethno-demographically separate warring ethnic groups into separate states – increase the likelihood of an enduring post-war peace. Chapter Five supported this theory with a cross-national examination of all ethnic civil war terminations between 1945 and 2004. This chapter selects two ethnic civil war terminations from the cross-national analysis, and has two goals. First, it evaluates the micro-mechanisms of the 3G ESD theory to evaluate how the presence of stay-behind minorities leads to violence. I both evaluate the 3G ESD, which is based on the triadic political space, state strength, and balance of power between the post-war states, and I compare it to the rival explanation presented by the 2G ESD, which is based on ethnic intransigence and hatred caused by the ethnic civil war. Second, I choose an outlier case, a post-partition environment with significant stay-behind minorities that did not experience violence renewal, and I use it to further evaluate and hone the 3G ESD.

2 Introduction

This chapter is part of a nested research design that strengthens the results of the cross-national study presented in Chapter Five. The cross-national results were strong, suggesting that the ethnic security dilemma is a cause of renewed warfare and that ethnic partition is a solution, but the macro-level indicators could not assess the
micro-mechanisms discussed in Chapter Four and therefore could not distinguish between the Second and Third Generations of the ethnic security dilemma as rival theories for conflict renewal. This chapter fills that gap with two case studies.

I first present a case-study from the Georgian-Abkhaz post-ethnic civil war partition, conducting process-tracing to determine the causes of the “Six Day War” in 1998. As noted in Chapter Five, Abkhazia contained a large, stay-behind minority and experienced renewed deadly conflict within the first five years of peace. The purpose is to test the micro-foundations of the theory developed in Chapter Four and explore how the presence of ethnic minorities contributed to violence. As we will see below, this case provides strong supportive evidence for the 3G ESD, demonstrating the dangers posed by the triadic political space and specifically how variable weakness of state institutions in a post-war environment can lead to a shift in the balance of power leading to renewed violence.

This case also challenges standard accounts of ethnic intransigence within post-war settings by demonstrating the malleability of ethnic group behavior, indicating that intra-state inter-ethnic violence is not structurally determined by identity, but rather dependent on the ability of the state to provide credible incentives for minorities to collaborate. Minority violence in the Six Day War occurred only after territorial control shifted to ethnic kin militias, and minority preferences were only visible under those conditions. Previously, the Georgian minority population collaborated with Abkhaz-dominated state and there is strong evidence to suggest that the minority did not initially support the insurgents. Further, insurgents for the Six
Day War originated in cross-border attacks from Georgia involving both state and non-state armed forces.

Importantly, for the argument about state weakness, the insurgents did not attempt to control the entire minority region, but rather attempted to control areas where the Abkhaz state was weak and vulnerable. I disaggregate the Abkhaz state spatially and, through a case comparison of two regions within Abkhazia, am able to demonstrate that minority rebellion occurred only in those regions where the Abkhaz state was weak and territorial control shifted to kin militias; in regions where the state was comparatively strong, the stay-behind minority collaborated with the Abkhaz regime, violence was low, and deadly conflict did not recur.

Next, I present a case-study from Moldova-Pridnestrovie, an ethnic civil war that ended in partition but left substantial stay-behind minorities on both territories. Contrary to initial expectations, there was no recurrence of violence in the post-war years. This is ostensibly an outlier according to the 2G ESD, an “off-the-line” case that presents an opportunity to understand what other factors helped maintain peace. The results of my research reinforce the notion that ethnic group behavior is malleable and dependent on the ability of the state to provide credible incentives for minorities to collaborate. Further, it stresses the role of state strength in maintaining the balance of power between post-partition states, which reduces the opportunities for violence to escalate.

The separatist Pridnestrovian state had comparatively stronger post-partition state security institutions than Abkhazia for two related reasons. First, due to unique circumstances within the collapsing Soviet Union, Pridnestrovie had actually
consolidated its rule before the civil war began. Second, the civil war was both brief and geographically confined to two regions of the country, leaving the state security apparatus largely intact. With state strength relatively high, the stay-behind minority collaborated and violence did not recur. On the Moldovan side, non-state militias did not survive the war; the one attempt to infiltrate the border, initiated by Moldovan state authorities, was immediately discovered by Pridnestrovie, its members were arrested, tried, and jailed. Further attempts were not made.

2.1 Contribution

This chapter makes a contribution in four ways. First, the chapter demonstrates empirically the value of the 3G ESD laid out in Chapter Four. Second, the evidence strongly challenges the 2G ESD and other theories emphasizing ethnic intransigence. Third, it builds on the theory chapter about 3G ESD, by raising the significance of post-war balance of power, paying particular attention to state institutional strength. Fourth, it presents original data on the post-war situations in Georgia-Abkhazia and Moldova-Pridnestrovie, contributing to area studies of Eastern Europe.

2.2 Chapter Overview

This chapter is divided into four parts. First, I introduce the methodology and case selection. Second, I introduce the post-war violence in Georgia and I trace the roots of the violence. Third, I introduce the second case of Moldova and provide an explanation for why violence did not occur despite the presence of large stay-behind minorities. Finally, I conclude with lessons from the two cases.

3 Methodology
Many leading methodologists have recommended “mixed-methods” approaches, involving “nested designs” of large-n statistical analyses with structured case studies, for the advantages each method can bring as well the “synergistic” value a combined approach can provide (George and Bennett 2005; Laitin 2002; Lieberman 2005). I heed this advice, and my cases here formed part of a nested design that comprises Chapters Four through Six. My post-partition case of Abkhazia and Georgia is actually three case studies. I begin by examining post-partition Abkhazia as a whole, where renewed deadly conflict occurred on the territory where the stay-behind Georgian minority was located. Second, I disaggregate the Abkhaz state spatially, creating a focused comparison of two regions within Abkhazia that contained ethnic Georgian stay-behind minorities. One region experienced violence while the other did not. Third, the Georgian-Abkhazia case is a structured comparison with Moldova-Pridnestrovie, comparing the post-war incidents of peace and violence. My two cases help illuminate, illustrate, and develop the theory in a way that macro-level cross-national statistical analyses cannot.

3.1 Case Selection

I have used my cross-national analyses to guide my case selection in Chapter Six. Georgia-Abkhazia both had a significant stay-behind minority and it experienced violence recurrence, providing an optimal environment to use process-tracing to test the micro-mechanisms of the 3G ESD that the macro-level cross-national test of Chapter Five could not capture. As Lieberman (2005, p.435) states, “Small-N analyses can be used to assess the plausibility of observed statistical relationships between variables.” Further, given the limited number of partitions
between 1945 and 2004, a focused case study is particularly helpful to evaluate the causal mechanisms proposed in the theory. In addition, Moldova-Pridnestrovie was chosen as an “outlier” because it had large, stay-behind minorities but did not experience violence recurrence; this is perplexing to the 2G ESD but not the 3G ESD. This also provides an opportunity to develop the theory by exploring why violence did not recur despite structural conditions that increase the likelihood of violence.

Finally, Moldova’s and Georgia’s partitions hold many other factors constant, increasing the value of the comparison. Most importantly, as former Soviet republics, we are able to hold many background conditions constant, such as previous government security structures, conflict, and economic development. Second, the conditions of the civil war were very similar in Moldova and Georgia, with capital cities seeking separation from the Soviet Union while separatist regions within the country were trying to separate from their host states to remain part of the Soviet Union. Since the ethnic civil wars were separatist, it makes both cases highly representative of ethnic civil wars of the past 60 years. Third, the termination of ongoing ethnic civil war violence was similar in both cases, with Russian military intervention in support of the separatist regions, with partitioning of each country, and with the deployment of Russian-led peacekeepers to maintain fragile ceasefires.

3.2 Sources

My data comes from six sources: (i) interviews with refugees and Internally Displaced People from all four states, (ii) interviews with insurgents and ex-combatants from all four states, (iii) interviews with government officials from all states, (iv) data from both Georgian and Abkhaz governments on post-war violence,
(v) elite interviews with members of non-governmental organizations, such as think-tanks and humanitarian agencies, and (vi) press reports and other secondary material, such as locally written histories of the conflict. I made three trips each to Abkhazia, Georgia, Moldova, and Pridnestrovie for a total of nine months between January and September 2008.

4 Post-Partition Abkhazia

As described in Chapter Three, the battle between Georgian and Abkhaz forces effectively ended by the end of September 1993, and formally ended with the May 1994 Moscow Agreement, signed under UN auspices. The territory of Georgia was divided in two, with Abkhaz forces controlling almost all of Abkhazia, and Georgian forces controlling the rest of the country.93 The ethnic Georgian population was absent from Abkhaz controlled territory, and there was no significant ethnic Abkhaz presence in the rest of Georgia.

The Moscow Agreement provided for a ceasefire, a separation of forces, and the deployment of a peacekeeping force under the aegis of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a weak, Russian-dominated successor to the Soviet Union. In June 1994, the peacekeeping force was deployed to the conflict zone, with a mandate to ensure the peace. The forces were responsible for the region of Gal(i)94 (see Chapter 3, Map 1, Zone 6), which acted as a buffer zone between Abkhaz and Georgian armies. According to the agreement, Abkhazia could not bring heavy military equipment into the region and had to rely on lightly-armed security personnel.

93 There was one region, the Kodori Gorge, which remained in Georgian hands following the war.  
94 Gali is the Georgian name. Since Abkhazia controls the territory at the time of writing, I use the Abkhaz name.
to police the region. The Moscow Agreement also provided for a UN monitoring mission (UNOMIG), responsible for monitoring and verifying the observance of the ceasefire.95

4.1 Refugee Returns

While war ended with a complete ethno-demographic separation, within months refugees began returning to southern Abkhazia. The returns were overwhelmingly to the Gal region, although some returnees did venture beyond.96 The process of returns evolved over time with several Georgians from villages along the border with Georgia initially conducting reconnaissance missions, assessing the damage to their property and livestock. As one returnee (IG-109, May 28, 2008) said to me “Where else could I go? I didn’t have anywhere, this is my home, so I went back.” Others spoke of the quality of the land and their dire economic prospects were they to remain in Georgia (so-called Pull Factors in refugee literature).

The returns began with a limited number of farmers returning to their land on a daily basis, tending their fields, and leaving before night fall. Over time more began to do the same with increasing numbers establishing permanent homes there. Through informal channels of communication, Georgians learned it was relatively

95 The UNOMIG Mission had previously begun its work during an earlier ceasefire.
96 This information is confirmed by multiple sources. First, interviews with various organizations suggested this was the case: the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Danish Refugee Council, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees all suggested this was the case, and suggested that refugees began returning as early as 1994, which increased during the 1995-1998 period. Regarding returnees beyond Gali, I visited Ochigvara in 2008 and found a small settlement of former IDPs, mainly the elderly and it remained a small percentage of its pre-war size. I also heard several personal accounts from Georgians who returned to regions beyond Gali and were arrested and asked to leave (Personal Interview IG-56, Zugdidi region, Georgia, May 29, 2008). This policy of eviction was further confirmed by the deputy Abkhaz Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maxim Gvinja. Gvinja reported that if local police learn of an unauthorized return, the police will arrest and deport the individual (Personal Interview, Sukhum, Abkhazia, March, 2008)
safe to return to the Gal region, a region that was homogenously Georgian prior to the war.\textsuperscript{97} The pace of return and exact number of Georgians in Abkhazia during those initial years is a major source of dispute, but it is generally accepted that 30-40,000 Georgians had returned to the Gal region by 1998, and the UNHCR suggested the figure could have been as high as 50,000, confirmed by other sources; one Abkhaz official stated to the media that this figure was reached in 1994 (Shchegoleva 1994; The New York Times (no author) 1998).\textsuperscript{98}

5 Inter-State Conflict: The “Six Day War”

Sometime during the first two weeks of May 1998, a large-scale invasion of Abkhazia took place involving non-state guerrilla fighters coming from Georgia, including some members of the Georgian armed forces acting in an unofficial capacity.\textsuperscript{99} Despite the presence of the Russian Peacekeeping force, they did not play a role in the Six Day War. This suggests that Russia was complicit with the Georgians in the invasion, but there is no hard evidence.

\textsuperscript{97} As mentioned earlier in the dissertation, the ethnic Georgians from Gal are also ethnic Mingrelian. Depending on who’s speaking, “ethnic Mingrelian” is either an ethnic Georgian sub-group or a separate ethnic group. Inhabitants of Gal typically accept they are both Georgian and Mingrelian; their mother-tongue is usually Mingrelian and Georgian is learned.

\textsuperscript{98} In the summer of 1994, the Deputy Prime Minister, Enver Kapba, was reported in the Russian press to have stated that 45,000 refugees had returned to Gali without waiting for the quadripartite commission (Shchegoleva 1994; . While this figure is almost surely exaggerated, the United Nations special representative in Georgia, Liviu Bota, said in a telephone interview to the New York Times in 1998 that “[d]uring the last two years some 50,000 refugees had returned [to Gali].” These “returnees” include those that live part time in Gali; for example, some come to plant and to harvest; others remain for only part of the year. See also Отчет Совместной Миссии ООН По Изучению Ситуации В Гальском Районе (20-24 ноября 2000г.), глава В, раздел II, пункт 21.

\textsuperscript{99} I spoke with a General, whom I will call by his first name only, Rezo, who claims to have been given the order to fight but without uniform, which he claims to have done. He currently works for the Ministry of the Interior, and several of his colleagues claimed to have fought in Gal at that time. They gave precise details and locations of the combat operations. While there story, told over two lengthy interviews, appear credible, there is no way to corroborate. Interviews took place within Georgia in
These ethnic Georgian guerrilla fighters quickly secured control of the lower Gal region, where primarily ethnic Georgians were located, and indicated irredentist intentions, including the raising of Georgian flags in the “liberated” territory. Sukhum, faced with a challenge to its territorial integrity, broke the 1994 Moscow agreement, and sent in its armed forces, backed by tanks, to retake the territory. Large-scale violence began on May 19th between these two forces. The ensuing battle for territorial control lasted for six days. Georgia dispatched Ministry of Interior troops, but the Georgian army and Georgian heavy military equipment were never deployed, and this limited the escalation of the violence.

It did not take long for the Abkhaz, with their heavy military equipment, to rout the guerrillas, locals, and Ministry of Interior forces. As one ethnic Georgian participant commented (IG-111, Zugdidi, June 29, 2008), “Once we realized that the [Georgian] tanks were not coming, we knew we would lose. How were they planning to fight without heavy military equipment?” Without the support of the Georgian armed forces, Abkhaz forces quickly secured the upper hand. By May 25th, a peace agreement was reached in Gagra between Georgia and Abkhazia to withdraw to the pre-May borders, and the conflict drew to a close with Abkhaz forces securing territorial control in lower Gal.

Deaths from the May conflict are heavily disputed, especially since the majority of fighters on the Georgian side were unofficial volunteer guerrilla fighters, but are likely to total in the hundreds but less than 1,000. In addition to the Abkhaz government claims it lost 26 soldiers in the operation and that hundreds of Georgian fighters were killed (email correspondence with the Ministry of Defense, July 16, 2009), but these numbers are impossible to verify and Georgian officials claim the opposite ratio (Interview with Temur Gabisonia, Ministry of Reintegration, Tbilisi, Georgia, July 1, 2008).
killings, about 40,000 Georgian civilians were displaced during the conflict with thousands of homes destroyed.  

6 Evaluating the 3G ESD

The fundamental questions for this chapter are the causes of the Six Day War and whether and how the ethnic Georgian minority was relevant for the renewed violence. My 3G ESD argues that the micro-foundations established by 2G scholars and others emphasizing ethnic intransigence are wrong. The 3G ESD argues that violence comes from the homeland state, which acts to protect the minority in the host state. Further, it argues that the ethnic minority should collaborate (on a limited level) with the host government as long as the host government controls the territory. Collaboration occurs despite the low-levels of inter-group trust because members of the minority respond behaviorally to threats and inducements of the controlling power (i.e., the host state government, in this case Abkhazia).

The local minority population should rebel against the host government only if territorial control shifts from the incumbent (the host government) to the challenger (the ethnic Georgian insurgents). At this point collaboration with the guerrillas will take place behaviorally, but I also argued that the “quality of collaboration” would change. As territorial control shifts from the incumbent to the challenger, the local

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101 Most Georgian and Western sources identify this as “ethnic cleansing,” pointing to the almost complete flight of Georgian civilians from lower Gal and the mass destruction of housing. Meanwhile most Abkhaz sources describe the civilian flight as a normal product of warfare, where civilians flee when active combat is occurring. The Abkhaz side claims houses were destroyed as part of counter-insurgency tactics, moving house to house, throwing grenades inside in case there were waiting guerrillas or booby-traps. Some Abkhaz did mention emotional reasons for destruction: for example, I spoke to one Abkhaz member of parliament, who had taken part in the May 1998 Gali operations, and he told me of much resentment among the Abkhaz for international aid that was given to Georgians to reconstruct their homes after the war: “Why were they receiving aid when we weren’t? Our homes were destroyed too [during the 1992-1993 war], but we were put under an embargo, of course we were angry, and we destroyed those homes.” (IA-108, 03/05/08). To challenge claims of ethnic cleansing, the Abkhaz need only point to official statements welcoming the Georgians back to Gali soon after the conflict, and to the fact that, indeed Georgians did return in large numbers in the following years.
population’s preferences begin to matter, leading to “active collaboration,” meaning symbolic, material, and man-power support. This active collaboration can help the challenger consolidate control in its battle with the host state.

6.1 The Triadic Political Space

Confirming the 3G ESD, the impetus for violence came from the homeland. Non-state guerrilla fighters launched their raid with at least tacit support from the Georgian government. The intention was to take control of Gal and its ethnic Georgian residents and join it with Georgia. Guerrilla fighters, observers, and those government security personnel that participated in an unofficial capacity, all confirmed this goal. Some of the unofficial participants went slightly further, arguing that the government’s aim may have been to go further, but they confirmed that, at a minimum, they were to take Gal (personal interviews, Kutaisi, May 27, 2008).

While the official version from the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) is that they did not control or collaborate with the guerrillas and that MoI entered to facilitate the exit of the Georgian population (Interview, Temur Gabisonia, Tbilisi, July 1, 2008),\textsuperscript{102} all other sources of information point to the Interior Ministry troops being used to support the guerrilla movement and defend their positions. As one local said to me, “And then we saw some trucks with Georgian symbols, men with Georgian uniforms, and we knew it was real, it was really happening, we thought we were finally getting our land back!” (IG-122, July 6, 2008). The civilians I spoke with all uniformly spoke of those forces participating, along with the guerrillas and local participants, trying to prevent Abkhaz forces from penetrating lower Gal.

\textsuperscript{102} Gabisonia worked in the Ministry of Reintegration.
Whether being used to help establish territorial control over Gal or to help evacuate civilians, either way, the government sent troops across the border and helped defend the local population.

Importantly, violence did not originate from within Gal itself. In fact, in over 30 interviews with locals who lived in Gal prior to the war, they all spoke of violence originating in cross-border raids. While it is possible that these were lies being told by locals to avoid persecution from the Abkhaz government, the same stories were told by ethnic Georgians who, today, live in Gal and those that live in Georgia (i.e., those that lived in Gal in 1998 but lived in Georgia at the time of the interviews in 2008). Archival material from the Abkhaz government that details the source of violence (terroristicheski akty) during this period also showed that violence came from armed units in neighboring Georgia. The Abkhaz government representative in charge of Gal during that period, Ruslan Kishmaria, also confirmed that, while some collaboration did exist between guerrillas and local residents, the major source of violence stemmed from cross-border raids (Interview, Sukhum, June 13, 2008). Finally, the guerrilla movements themselves, as I will detail further below, spoke in frustrating terms about the lack of collaboration between locals and guerrillas during the lead-up to the war.

6.2 Balance of Power, State Weakness, and the Location of Violence: A Spatial Comparison of Upper and Lower Gal

While the invasion of Gal targeted only territory inhabited by ethnic Georgians, it curiously did not target the entire territory inhabited by ethnic Georgians, despite that territory being contiguous. With an irredentist aim, why would the guerrillas and
the Georgian state not have tried to control the entire territory? As I investigated this, it became apparent that, due to recent historical factors, the Abkhaz territory differed in terms of Abkhaz state-building. The attack on Gal occurred only where the Abkhaz regime was extremely weak. It was this shift in the balance of power, with lower Gal remaining weak while Georgia gained in relative strength, that created a strong opportunity for invasion.

In upper Gal, the Abkhaz state consolidated its control quickly in the post-war period and the local population collaborated with the state faster. In lower Gal, the state faced a constant struggle and never managed to consolidate its rule. In fact, one guerrilla fighter (IG-24 June 11, 2008), who participated in the May 1998 conflict, looked puzzled when I asked the date that he crossed into Abkhaz territory in May. He said, “We didn’t cross into Abkhaz territory, this was ours, there were no Abkhaz; we went to defend the territory from the Abkhaz to prevent them from attacking.” At first, I thought he was making a political statement, but I later realized that he thought the border with Abkhazia was elsewhere since the village where he was stationed had no Abkhaz presence when he entered. In other words, by May 1998, upper Gal had a relatively strong Abkhaz state presence, but lower Gal had an almost complete absence of the Abkhaz state.

What caused this discrepancy between upper and lower Gal? My explanation comes in two stages. First, I explain how extraordinarily weak the Abkhaz state was at the end of the war, especially in the Gal region to which ethnic Georgians returned. Second, I explain why lower Gal continued to weaken while the state in upper Gal strengthened.
6.3 Stage 1: State-Weakness in Abkhazia

For Abkhazia, weak statehood was a hallmark of its first years of independence. Much has been written about the challenges of state-building in the former Soviet region (Beissinger and Young 2002; Bermeo 1992; Carothers 2002; Way 2005). All of these immense challenges – economical, political, social – applied to Abkhazia at the end of the Soviet period, but were made immeasurably worse by the destruction of war, the absence of the territory’s international status, and a tight blockade imposed by Russia during the initial years (Croft 1996).

Abkhazia was quite literally destroyed by the conflict and its population decimated. Economically, large-scale destruction ravaged the territory’s tourism infrastructure, agricultural production, and tea industry – each of the region’s pre-war economic staples. Further, Abkhazia was placed under economic blockade by both Russia and Georgia while its undefined international status prevented it from establishing external relations with other countries or international bodies, further limited its economic recovery from the war. Demographically, the population declined by over two-thirds, a combination of death and flight, and this downward trend continued in the post-war period as locals escaped the economic collapse. Politically, the state had to start anew, constructing a new constitution, new political institutions, and new organs of power, including police and an army. The nascent Abkhaz state was thus faced with exceptionally limited administrative capacity, lack of financial and material resources, and extremely limited man-power.

State building efforts by the Abkhaz state in the 1990s were not monolithic. Within Abkhazia, the region of Gal was particularly hard hit. Gal remained under
Georgian control throughout the ethnic civil war, yet the end of the war brought the region under Abkhaz control for the first time, by which time the entire pre-war population had fled. Abkhaz state-building in Gal thus faced all the factors described above, plus it was deserted, had no administrative capacity, and contained no indigenous people upon whom the state could rely. Further, Gal fell within the demilitarization zone, as demarcated in the Moscow 1994 peace accords. This meant that the Abkhaz military was unable to enter the regions, and Abkhazia had to rely on a lightly armed police force to control the territory.

In an interview with the president’s special envoy to Gal region, Ruslan Kishmariya (Interview, Sukhum, June 2008), I learned that Abkhazia had great difficulty finding enough men to even patrol the region, much less effectively police it. Confirmation of the weak nature of the state can also be seen from scholars writing prior to 1998. For example, Catherine Dale (1996: 94) states

“…representatives of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia note that the Gali\textsuperscript{103} militia is untrained and undersupplied, and some of its members plunder villages in search of sustenance. There is no effective authority in Gali district but rather a total lack of contact between Georgian village heads of administration and the Abkhaz officials in Gali city; no monopoly on the legitimate use of violence but rather undisciplined, marauding Abkhaz militia members.”

It is within this context that displaced Georgians began returning to the Gal region almost immediately following the war’s termination.

*State-Building According to International Experience*

\textsuperscript{103} Gal is the Abkhaz name and Gali is the Georgian name.
A recent study by RAND (Dobbins et al. 2007: xxiii) stresses that “[f]irst order priorities for any nation-building mission are public security and humanitarian assistance” with priority given to peacekeeping, rule of law, law enforcement, and security sector reform. RAND estimates that a country needs 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants “to stabilize an internally divided society.” In addition, the U.N. typically deploys one police officer per 10 soldiers and that is in addition to the existing structures of local police. It is also estimated that most post-conflict societies require at least two of their own police for every 1,000 inhabitants, equaling approximately 24 members of a security force (local and external) for every 1,000 inhabitants to stabilize a post-conflict divided society.

By contrast, in Abkhazia’s Gal region according to Abkhaz state officials, there were approximately 3.5 Interior Ministry police officers for the entire Gal region per 1,000 inhabitants (150 total). This priority of security emphasized by RAND, the U.N. and other specialists on post-war situations is exactly what was missing in post-war Abkhazia. For the reasons outlined above – demographics, financial, and a lack of social capital – Abkhaz authorities faced extraordinary challenges establishing order and stabilizing the security situation in Gal.

6.4 Stage 2: Low-Level Guerilla Insurgency

The region of Gal borders Georgia, and the state weakness described above created an opportunity for guerrilla fighters, who crossed the unsecured border in an attempt to target Abkhaz security forces. The guerrilla fighters I spoke with (described in greater detail below) spoke of the ease with which they crossed the

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104 The publication treats the terms “nation-building” and “state-building” synonymously. I use state building because it is more exact and well-defined.
Inguri river into an effectively lawless no-man’s land where Abkhaz police would infrequently patrol. By targeting Abkhaz security officials, Georgian guerrilla fighters further weakened the nascent Abkhaz state-building effort by reducing the pool of Abkhaz security officers prepared to patrol there.

Ruslan Kishmaria (Interview, Sukhum, June 13, 2008) spoke of the violence and its affect on his ability to police the region: “They didn’t want to patrol Gal, of course they were scared, I lost a lot of men.” He spoke of two attempts at ending the guerrilla campaign by making clean sweeps through the region. When this failed, he increasingly did not police the region, placing the region increasingly into contested control. Ultimately, for impoverished and demographically challenged Abkhazia, this led to an almost complete abandonment of areas targeted by Georgian guerrillas.

To illustrate, I took the most comprehensive list of incidents, which came from the Abkhaz Ministry of Security. I coded the incidents by date and location (village and region) in the run-up to the May conflict. The pie chart below (Chart 1) breaks down the levels of violence by region between January 1994 and April 1998, the month before renewed warfare began. Gal is the only region which contained an ethnic Georgian stay-behind minority.

**Chart 1: Guerrilla Attacks by Region (January 1994 – April 1998)**

N=257
As is clearly visible, the overwhelming number of incidents (64 percent) occurred in Gal, with limited attacks occurring in other regions of the country. If we look at the incidents temporally, we can also see that the number of incidents increased over time in the run up to 1998, as state weakness decreased in Gal.

Chart 2: Temporal View of Guerrilla Attacks

Upper versus Lower Gal: a Comparison
The description of security in Gal outlined above was primarily that of lower Gal. If we take Gal as a whole, the region appears to be lawless and attacks increasing. However, there was a dramatic difference between lower Gal, which is the south-western portion of Gal closer to the Black Sea, and upper Gal, to the north-east. Due to geographical differences between the two territories, lower Gal was targeted by guerrillas more, while upper Gal was left largely alone, and the Abkhaz state was permitted to build-up a security presence and control of the population.

Geography is important here because during the initial post-war years, the guerrilla fighters crossed into Abkhazia using the easiest paths possible, and this was in lower-Gal. To access upper Gal, one needs to cross a large river basin created by the Inguri river hydro-electric dam, whereas in lower Gal, access is across the trickle of the Inguri river that emerges after the dam. Guerrillas were thus able to kill Abkhaz police or plant road mines and exit quickly into the safety of Georgian-controlled territory. As a result, Abkhaz soldiers feared the lowest section of Gal. The further away from this section one traveled, the safer it was for Abkhaz, and easier it became for Abkhaz to build a functioning administration, co-opting members of the local population and resisting guerrilla control.

When I visited upper Gal in 2008, the difference was striking. The local Georgian minority more readily spoke with me, were more open, and spoke more calmly about cooperation with the regime; the environment was palpably calmer. One Georgian there commented that, during the first few years after the end of the conflict, he hid a gun on his property and was prepared to fight. “Back then, we thought the war would start again at any moment, and we were prepared to help, to
take even a meter of land back. But over the years we realized this was not going to happen, we found a compromise (*obshii iazyk*) with the authorities, and it’s worked out; I no longer keep my gun” (IG-112, 06/19/08). In an interview with former Georgian State Minister, Gia Vashadze (Tbilisi, July 5, 2008), he also admitted that the Georgians in upper Gal managed to cooperate more easily with the Abkhaz than those of southern Gal (*oni nashli obshii iazyk*). Without the attacks from guerrillas, locals collaborated and the Abkhaz built state infrastructure.

In sum, it was a spiraling loss of control in lower Gal caused initially by a weak state and later by cross-border raids, encouraged by the weak state. The Abkhaz state only weakly controlled its lower border with Georgia, and this permitted ethnic Georgian guerrillas to target Abkhaz security personnel, but they did this in lower Gal only, where the terrain made and border made for easier and faster missions. Eventually, the Abkhaz virtually stopped patrolling the lower territory, creating a radical shift in the balance of power between the Abkhaz and Georgians vis-à-vis this territory. This shift permitted the Georgians to usurp power in an effectively stateless region of Abkhazia in May 1998. In upper Gal, by contrast, there was almost no residual violence in the post-war period and, despite contiguous territory that could have been captured during May 1998, it was not targeted during the Six Day War because this would have meant a direct provocation with the Abkhaz state. When the guerrillas did enter Abkhazia, it was only lower Gal, which the Abkhaz effectively did not control.105

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105 After the war in 1998, Abkhazia changed its policy. Vowing never let the situation occur again, they allowed Georgians back into the territory but under strict supervision, filtering returning members, building up the border, and augmenting security force member, maintaining strict control on the entire territory. By 1999, Abkhazia’s blockade had eased and its economy had stopped its freefall...
6.5 Ethnic Minority Collaboration in Lower Gal: Limited

Despite the declining presence of the Abkhaz security forces in Gal, the Georgian minority did not assist the Georgian guerrillas in the lead up to the 1998 conflict and, to some extent, appears to have collaborated with the Abkhaz state. This contradicts the 2G ESD theory, and stands against conventional wisdom found in the ethnic conflict literature.

I met with 10-15 of these guerrilla fighters, and the leader of one of the factions.\textsuperscript{106} I cannot claim that this is anywhere close to a representative sample, but interviews with these men were in-depth (lasting anywhere from one to four hours) and, in conjunction with other information, I believe constitutes a legitimate source. Importantly, these individuals were found via disparate channels: some spontaneous, some arranged via journalists, some via friends. Despite the random selection, the stories were almost all the same vis-à-vis the local population: the Georgian minority was not key to their mission’s success. In fact, several argued that their presence hindered operations. Rather, their alternative explanations were convincing and relatively similar across former fighters.

Based on interviews with guerrilla fighters and journalists who used to work with them, a typical operation lasted three days and consisted of crossing the border. They described their operations as originating in Georgian controlled territory, crossing into Abkhazia for 3-15 days, usually taking all necessary supplies with them, and then

\textsuperscript{106} I do not know the exact number because some who claimed to have fought may not have; at least 10, however, gave specific details about the operations that fit with others to an extent that I believe they did actually fight. Further, some of these individuals were passed to me by trusted individuals, increasing their credibility in my eyes.
returning. Some fighters would state explicitly that they would go across to kill a
certain Abkhaz or to “protect” Georgians that they knew would soon be required to
pay “taxes” to the Abkhaz authorities; others would describe their activities in more
general terms: “We would go across and do our job, and then return.” (my pereshli
Inguri, sdelali delo, i vernulis).

But the fighters described a change over time: “It was much easier at first, in the
first months, when there were no Georgians – we would go across, do our job, and
return. When Georgians started returning the situation became more difficult.” In
fact, while Georgian fighters spoke about protecting the ethnic Georgian population
by attacking the Abkhaz, they spoke of the local ethnic Georgians within Gal as an
obstacle to their mission. Ethnic Georgian guerrilla fighters found it far easier to
operate in Abkhaz territory with fewer ethnic Georgians; the guerrillas said that local
ethnic Georgians interfered (meshali) in their operations.

Evidence from guerrilla fighters, Abkhaz officials, and the local Georgian
population pointed to two main reasons why the fighters had limited contact with the
local population: (i) local Georgians were co-opted by the Abkhaz, meaning partisans
could not trust them; and (ii) reprisal attacks by Abkhaz on local Georgians meant
that partisans had to be careful about when and where they attacked Abkhaz in an
effort to minimize retaliatory actions. The result was that the guerrilla fighters relied
very little on the local population.

Four of the fifteen guerrillas said there were safe-houses if necessary, but that
these were usually avoided. A journalist, who worked with the guerrillas in the 1990s
confirmed this, saying that such homes existed and were usually those of the fighter’s families (IG-110, Tbilisi, 07/03/09).

Guerrillas spoke of not being able to trust the local population since some of them were working for the Abkhaz. Whether because they were under threat, had been bought off, or simply were against the guerrilla movement, some local Georgians would contact Abkhaz authorities when they saw Georgian guerrillas. “We didn’t know which Georgians were ours and which were theirs,” was how one fighter stated it (IG-126, Atara, 06/11/09). Another fighter explained how, after a couple of years, they began speaking only Russian amongst each other so that if locals saw them, they would not pay attention, assuming they were Abkhaz or Russians (IG-129, Zugdidi, 05/29/09). Some ethnic Georgians, in other words, were collaborating with the Abkhaz regime, at least in the role of informants, and this prevented the guerrillas from using the local population for support.

Specifically, they stated that they could not trust the local population, that “traitors” (predatel’i) were always present, and no one knew who they could trust. “We couldn’t sleep in houses there, even if we trusted the person – a neighbor might see, or someone passing by, and they could make a phone call [to the local administration].” One fighter (IG-76) recounted a story of meeting, accidentally, a local Georgian while walking through a heavily forested region of Gal. “He saw us, and I told him just to keep quiet, to say nothing, and we carried on. Just to be safe, we picked up our pace and moved in a different direction for three kilometers and waited. Within 30 minutes, Abkhaz had arrived and started a massive fire in the forest. The fucking traitor, I should have shot him.” In other words, counter-
intelligence strategies by the Abkhaz were successful enough to eliminate an obvious
advantage. Ruslan Kishmaria (Interview, Sukhum, June 13, 2008), the Abkhaz
president’s special representative for Gal spoke specifically of these strategies to co-
-opt locals. While they were losing control of the territory, they were nevertheless
able to obtain intelligence from the local population until the May 1998 events.

In addition to the lack of trust, several fighters said that locals were not used
because of retaliatory attacks. Whereas some guerrillas claimed, for example, to
initially protect the local Georgians when Abkhaz forces would come to collect taxes,
they later ceased such operations. The guerrillas learned quickly that a strike against
Abkhaz forces would lead to reprisal attacks against the village, resulting in torched
homes and sometimes killings. This was confirmed by Abkhaz government officials,
who referred “responding to provocations” and giving an “answer” (otvet) to attacks
by Georgian guerrillas. As a result, the fighters claimed to avoid contact as much as
possible with the locals. This fits with stories of other guerrillas who told me that
they would sleep in forests, not among civilian homes.

In sum, the Georgian minority in Abkhazia did not support the Georgian guerrilla
movement emanating from Georgia and, if anything, engaged in limited collaboration
with the Abkhaz authorities. Despite the widely held assumption that ethnic
Georgians in Abkhazia would support Georgian guerrilla fighters and oppose the
Abkhaz state, evidence from the local population, from the guerrilla fighters, and
from the Abkhaz authorities suggest otherwise. Fear of punishment or possibly the
lure of financial gain led some ethnic Georgians to refrain from collaborating with the
guerrilla movement and to provide limited cooperation to the Abkhaz state.
6.6 Ethnic Minority Collaboration in Lower Gal: Active

This situation changed dramatically when the guerrilla movement shifted strategies from isolated military operations to an attempted irredentist seizure of power. As claimed in the theory chapter, while preferences and behavior do not necessarily overlap, preferences do have an impact on the “quality of collaboration.” When the Georgian guerrillas seized power in May 1998, the reaction of the local population was dramatically different from that observed under Abkhaz rule. In fact, the Georgian fighters relied on the support of the local population to seize power.

Abkhaz authorities had virtually no presence in lower Gal by 1998, and the guerrilla movements decided to take full control, almost certainly with the backing and coordination of Tbilisi. From eyewitness accounts and from statements of both Abkhaz and Georgian officials, the local population indeed supported the guerrilla movement at this point in a qualitatively different way than the limited support they demonstrated under Abkhaz rule. Portraying themselves as liberators, and claiming support from Tbilisi, the guerrillas arranged meetings within each village to organize Gal’s seizure and enlist the local population’s support.

In terms of man-power, the local population assisted in digging trenches, manning posts, and preparing food for those fighting. Materially, the locals donated food and tools. Symbolically, locals erected Georgian flags and made statements in support of the Georgian state and against Abkhaz authorities. The locals I spoke with who were in Gal at the time spoke of widespread support and a change in the atmosphere. “We saw this as our chance, we thought it could really happen, that we would return to
Georgian control. You should have seen it, the mood changed, everyone was helping” (IG-122, Tbilisi, July 6 2008).

This is radically different from what was experienced under Abkhaz rule, where some Georgians collaborated but in a very limited manner. This suggests that, indeed, while behaviorally collaboration can occur under any regime, the quality of that collaboration will be different and that depends on the underlying preferences of the population.

6.7 Summary of Post-War Abkhazia

Post-war Abkhazia experienced deadly conflict renewal for two reasons. First, the incomplete partition created an ethnic homeland state for the Georgian minority located in Abkhazia. The state, and actors within it, took actions to support the minority. There were non-state actors, such as guerrilla fighters that acted on behalf of the minority to reassert Georgian territorial control. When the guerrillas invaded Abkhazia, the targeted only regions with a homogenous ethnic Georgian population, and the minority actively supported the irredentist move. The Georgian state, when conflict occurred in 1998, also participated, providing partial military support. Without those actors – the minority and the homeland state – the conflict would not have occurred.

The second cause of renewed violence was the opportunity for invasion. The invasion occurred because of a radical shift in the balance of power within one region of Abkhazia: the Georgians only invaded after the Abkhaz state security presence in lower Gal had become virtually non-existent. By contrast, in upper Gal, where the same ethnic Georgian minority exists, but where the Abkhaz state was able to build
more a state and security presence, there was no invasion. These two factors – the triadic political space and the Abkhaz state failure in lower Gal – are interlinked, and the first is highly unlikely to have occurred without the second. While the theory stressed balance of power, in this particular case, balance of power shifted because of a failure of state building in lower Gal.

7 Moldova-Pridnestrovie

I now turn to the “non-event” of Moldova, reinforcing the importance of maintaining the balance of power relative and state-strength in avoiding inter-ethnic conflict renewal. Both Pridnestrovie and Moldova were relatively strong, and this unusual situation in a post-war, post-partition state reduced the likelihood of conflict recurrence.

7.1 Historical Background of Moldova-Pridnestrovie (1500-1990)

Until 1812, Moldova and Pridnestrovia were historically separate territories, with Pridnestrovie part of the Russian empire and Moldova a semi-autonomous principality under the Ottomans. In 1812, Moldova became part of the Russian empire, and remained until the end of World War I, when Moldova joined Romania and Pridnestrovie became part of the USSR. After a series of border changes during World War II, Moldova became part of the Soviet Union with Pridnestrovie, together forming the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. This situation remained stable until the unraveling of the Soviet Union, when calls from some Moldovans to join Romania were met with calls from some Pridnestrovians to remain within the Soviet Union. The 1989 census had 65 percent of the Moldovan population as ethnic Romanians, the rest are mostly ethnic Slavic people, who speak Russian as a first or
second language and have little knowledge of Romanian. In Pridnestrovie itself, ethnic Romanians were 39.9 percent of the population and Slavs were 53.8 percent of the population.

8 Moldova and Pridnestrovie: Early State Consolidation

The case of post-partition Moldova further confirms the importance of state-building to avoid ethnic civil war recurrence. Despite large stay-behind minorities located in both rump-Moldova and the newly created Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic (Pridnestrovie), Moldova has not experienced any post-war violence since its termination in 1992. As I identify below, the Pridnestrovie authorities managed to consolidate control before the war began and its security organs were not damaged significantly by the war, allowing it to retain state strength in the post-war years. Moldova, meanwhile, did not experience violence on its territory and likewise was able to retain state strength established before the war’s onset.

8.1 The War

Moldova’s ethnic civil war broke out between the central government, dominated by ethnic Romanians, and Pridnestrovie, a separatist region on its eastern border with Ukraine between the rivers Nistru and Bug, a territory dominated by Slavic people, primarily ethnic Russians and Russified Ukrainians.107

107 The Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset codes this group as “Slavs”.

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The Correlates of War project identifies December 13, 1991 as the start date of the war. 108 On this date, Pridnestrovie authorities surrounded a police station which had pledged allegiance to Moldovan authorities in Chisinau. This led to the first major clashes of the war. 109 Soon after, Pridnestrovie security forces took steps to control the Dubossary regional government and began to secure control of territory located on the west bank of the Nistru in the city of Bendery, where Slavs were demographically dominant within regional government offices.

The two regions that remained contested at the start of 1992 were Dubossary, a city in the middle of Pridnestrovie that threatened to divide the aspiring secessionist entity in half, and Bendery, a region dominated by Slavs but located on the west bank of the Nistru river. These two areas were the core theaters of violence during the war.

Clashes in Dubossary began in March 1992 with Pridnestrovie forces attempting to secure complete control of the cities police precincts. Part of what made Dubossary contested was the geography of neighboring villages, which were close to the Moldovan side of the Nistru river, allowing Moldova authorities to more easily reinforce troops in and around the village Cocieri. By June, a ceasefire was announced with Pridnestrovie authorities in control of the Dubossary and its surroundings, although several tiny villages on a peninsula of land remained under Moldova control (and remain as such until the present day). As a ceasefire was established in Dubossary, fighting erupted in Bendery, with Moldovan and Pridnestrovie forces clashing over control of the city and its environs beginning June 19. This was the most serious and lethal phase of the war and ended only when

108 COW gives a second start date of March 29, 1992.
109 Dubossary had previously seen non-lethal violence occur when a police station refused to cede control in October 1991.
Russia’s army, which had been stationed in Pridnestrovie since the Soviet period, intervened to establish a ceasefire.

Active combat operations ran for approximately five months, killing approximately 1,000 people and displacing well over 100,000. COW codes the war as officially ending on July 21, 1992, when a peace agreement was signed between Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s president, and Mircea Snegur, Moldova’s president.

8.2 Moldova’s Civil War as Ethnic

Today, Pridnestrovie remains an unrecognized de facto independent state. Most expert opinion today view this unresolved “frozen conflict” as a political, not ethnic. However, that same expert opinion recognizes the central role of ethnicity that existed leading up and during the war. More importantly, most sources from that period clearly demonstrate a fissiparous situation that separated along ethnic lines.

Language, for example, was one of the main rallying points for each side in the lead up to the violence. Ethnic Romanian politicians, for example, attempted to strengthen the position of Romanian language in society after decades of Russification. Some of the largest protests surrounded a language law that placed Romanian as the official language for Moldova and stipulated that those communicating with customers must speak Romanian. However, it was not uncommon for ethnic Slavs to respond to a Romanian-speaker with the phrase, “Speak to me in a human language,” which meant speak to me in Russian. In the

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110 Oazu Nantoi, a policy expert on the conflict, for example, stated, “The war had ethnic overtones.” Interview, Chisinau, MD Aug. 12, 2008
111 Article 7 of the language law, August 31, 1989 passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic.
streets of Chisinau it was also not uncommon to see protest placards reading “Suitcase, Train Station, Russia,” encouraging ethnic Russians to leave the country. The International Crisis Groups estimates that, as a result of Moldovanization and De-Russification, ethnic Romanians occupied 90 percent of leadership positions within the government and state administration as the country approached independence in 1991 (International Crisis Group 2003).112

As the violence began, many people from each side of the conflict sought safety within the territorial confines of regions dominated by their ethnic kin. While no firm numbers exist to demonstrate the degree of migration, there are some indicators. For example, of the faculty members who fled the main university in the separatist region, 100 percent were ethnic Romanians: not a single Slavic member of the faculty moved to the Moldovan capital. Of all the police and refugees I spoke with, it was rare to find ethnic Slavs moving to Chisinau or ethnic Romanians moving to Tiraspol. Further, of all the displaced volunteers that did not return to Pridnestrovie after the end of the war, I did not meet or hear of a single ethnic Slav – they were all ethnic Romanians.113

Further, when it appeared as if Moldovan forces would reach the separatist capital, Tiraspol, the panic among the civilian population was largely confined to ethnic Slavs, most of whom fled to neighboring Ukraine.114 Among the dead soldiers fighting for the separatist side, fewer than 10 percent could be identified as ethnically

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112 I use ethnic Romanian instead of ethnic Moldovan, identifying Moldovan as a sub-type within Romanian ethnicity.
113 Based on conversations with seven separate refugees, including the organizer of the a pressure group representing the displaced.
114 Based on interviews with 10 former residents of Tiraspol, 7 ethnic Romanians and 3 ethnic Slavs. Expert opinion confirmed this tendency.
Romanian based on last names. In addition, no regional soviets dominated by ethnic Moldovans that voted to join the separatist Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic; all of them were dominated by ethnic Slavs. 115 Finally, during the actual fighting, support for Pridnestrovie came from Russia (both the Russian army and Cossacks), while foreign support for Moldova, to the extent it existed, came from Romania.

8.3 Stay Behind Minorities

As we saw in chapter five, Moldova’s partition was “incomplete,” scoring -108 on the PEHI. This negative score resulted from the high number of stay-behind minorities in both Pridnestrovie and Moldova. Pridnestrovie contained about 40% ethnic Romanians at the end of 1992 while Moldova contained about 30% ethnic Slavs. As we saw, however, there was no recurrence of violence during the first five years. Further, the war displaced over 100,000 people, possibly as high as 200,000, who fled mainly along ethnic lines, with ethnic Romanians fleeing to Moldova and ethnic Slavs fleeing to Pridnestrovie or beyond to Ukraine. 116 However, as soon as the war ended the vast majority of these refugees returned to their homes. Again, unlike the case of Georgia, there was no recurrence of violence.

When the war ended with the July ceasefire, there was an expectation that fighting would resume. As Time’s correspondent (Church 1992) to the region wrote

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115 Based on conversations with several historians and archivists at the State University of Pridnestrovie as well as the History of Pridnestrovie. Importantly, the narrative of the conflict emphasizes that ethnic Moldovans (read: Romanian speakers) supported Pridnestrovie and were also opposed to the rise of Romanian fascism that occurred in Chisinau at that time. It would therefore be in their interest to demonstrate Moldovan dominated regions that voted to join Pridnestrovie.

116 Based on various expert opinions in Moldova and backed by Facts on File World News Digest, September 3, 1992, “Moldova Said to Prepare For Union with Romania; Shaky Peace Imposed in Separatist Area.” The Norwegian Refugee Council reports up to 51,000 internally displaced people and 80,000 refugees. Another report stated that at least 102,000 people were displaced during the conflict. See Nantoi, Oazu. 1999. Report on the Problem of Internally Displaced Persons in the Republic of Moldova. Chisinau. However, records from a survey conducted in 1999 on the displaced have been lost or misplaced, according to UNHCR and Oazu Nantoi.
at the time, “there is serious doubt [the ceasefire] will hold.” How is it that an ethnic civil war that ends in a partition with significant stay-behind minorities does not experience any renewal of violence? As the theory chapter outlined, the 3G ESD places an emphasis on the Triadic Political Space, which would predict violence in this case. However, it also emphasized the role of state-building and opportunities for violence – the role of “exiting anarchy.” As I outline below, I argue that Moldova and Pridnestrovia avoided violence, in part, because the strength of each state was relatively high at the end of the war, decreasing the opportunity for violence.

Two factors led to Moldova’s relatively strong post-partition states. First, due to factors unique to Moldova’s situation, Pridnestrovia authorities managed to secure territorial control before the separatist war began. As I will detail below, Pridnestrovia forces were able to consolidate control in 1989-1990 during an interregnum when the Soviet forces were not active yet Moldova was not independent. Thus, most of the territory never became contested and never shifted between one force and another. Second, the state security infrastructure in both territories was not severely affected by the war, leaving it capable of maintaining territorial control in the post-war period. State strength was maintained through the war because the war itself was relatively brief and geographically concentrated in only two urban regions of the country.

8.4 Pre-war Secession

Much has been written about Moldova’s separatist war and its consequences. What is less known about this separatist struggle, however, is that the war itself was not waged by Tiraspol to gain independence, but rather waged by Chisinau to regain
lost territory. Tiraspol, in 1992, was defending its de facto independent status. International Crisis Group (2003), for example, reports that, “The 14th Army [i.e., Russia] intervened in the fighting there on 20 June. While this helped to establish a cease-fire, it also secured Transdniestria’s de facto independence.” I argue that Pridnestrovie had obtained de facto independence long before 1992.

The federal states comprising the Soviet Union began seeking increased autonomy in the late 1980s (Beissinger 2002). As Moldova gained control over its legislature in 1989, pressing for increased use of Romanian language and the possibility of joining neighboring Romania, authorities in the Slavic dominated Pridnestrovi region began uniting behind a movement to remain within the Soviet Union (King 2000).117 Regional “workers’ councils” in the eastern territory of Moldova were dominated by ethnic Slavs, who readily identified with authorities Moscow, not the increasingly nationalist authorities in Chisinau. The adoption of a language law in 1989, which promoted Romanian to the status of official language, was a focal point of protests throughout the eastern region, uniting non-Romanian speakers to resist Moldovan independence efforts. The most important of these was the Unified Council of Working Collectives (Ob’edinennye Sovet Trudovykh Kollektivov), formed August 11, 1989 from several workers collectives in the eastern region of Moldova.

When Moldova declared its sovereignty in June 1990, officials in Tiraspol responded with their declaration of independence from Moldova, forming the Pridnestrovi Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (PMSSR) as a constituent part of

117 The territory of Pridnestrovie had been an autonomous region within the Soviet Union during the inter-war period, during which the rest of Moldova had been part of Romania; thus the idea was not completely novel.
the Soviet Union on September 2 of the same year (Associated Press 1990). PMSSR parliamentary elections were organized in on November 25, 1990 and Igor Smirnov was elected president of PMSSR by parliament on November 29. By this point the separatist authorities had already formed military detachments by stealing arms from local Soviet weapons depots (King 1994). In May, 1991 a PMSSR Ministry of Interior and prosecutor’s office were formed and parliament issued an order for all policemen on PMSSR territory to obey authorities. Municipality after municipality and region after region throughout the eastern territory pledged allegiance to the new authorities in Tiraspol over the following year.118 When Moldova declared independence from the Soviet Union on August 27, 1991, PMSSR ordered all Soviet military units to obey PMSSR jurisdiction, which was largely followed. Many of the factories in that region had predominantly Russian speaking workers while management teams were subordinate to Moscow; this further encouraged the workers’ collectives to side with Tiraspol authorities rather than subordinate themselves to Chisinau.

Several regions in the center of the nascent PMSSR, however, were dominated by ethnic Romanians and refused to submit to Tiraspol’s new authorities. Those regions were coopted through a combination of intimidation and force, with several police stations, courts, and state prosecutors’ offices surrounded by militia loyal to

118 Interviews with authorities in Pridnestrovie today claim this was entirely voluntary, based on fears of Moldova uniting with Romania as well as a desire to remain within the socialist framework of the USSR. It is, of course, impossible to gauge the degree to which these municipalities joined voluntarily or were forced by an emerging militia.
Tiraspol, forcing pro-Moldovan authorities to leave the territory or switch allegiance (Socor 1992).119

In any other country, such blatantly provocative actions by separatist challengers would result in military action from central authorities to subdue them. However, Moldova was not yet independent and Chisinau therefore did not control an army or state-wide interior ministry troops. Rather, interior ministry troops and the army were controlled by Moscow, and Moldova’s police forces were controlled at the municipal and district level. As such, Chisinau did not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force had no means with which to prevent Tiraspol establishing parallel state structures. Chisinau could have appealed to Moscow to send in its forces – in fact it rejected such an offer from Moscow (New York Times 1990) – but the newly elected legislature was more concerned with its own intentions to separate from the Soviet Union and therefore was reluctant to bring additional Soviet troops on to its territory.120

This is not to suggest Moldova made no attempts prior to the war’s onset. Evidence of Pridnestrovie’s territorial control was evident already on November 2, 1990, when Chisinau dispatched Moldovan police to the town of Dubossary on the east side of the River Prut. As they attempted to cross the bridge, gun-shot fire began, resulting in at least three deaths (Carney 1990). Soon after, Pridnestrovie

119 There were reports of police stations being surrounded by PMSSR security forces, as well as the publication of names of Moldovan police who refused to pledge loyalty to PMSSR (Trudovoi Tiraspol, November 27, 1991).
began institutionalizing its own militia, the Republican Guard. Only in a few small regions was control still contested by the start of 1992, and it was in those two regions that actual violence began. Moldova began forming its own army only in spring 1992 (Creanga 1998, p.118). According to key actors involved in the events, it was only after this inchoate military began to form that more decisive military actions were taken by Chisinau against the separatist Pridnestrovie authorities (Personal Interview, Viorel Cibotaru, August 4, 2008).

The important conclusion to draw from this section, however, is that the regime itself had established control over most of Pridnestrovie before the start of the ethnic civil war. This is significant as part of the explanation for why violence did not recur despite the presence of large stay-behind minorities.

8.5 Isolated war

The second reason why we do not see a recurrence of violence is because the war itself was short and isolated, leaving the structures of government power in Pridnestrovie and Moldova almost entirely in tact. In spring 1992, the heaviest period of the conflict broke out but even this was isolated to two urban centers, Bendery and Dubossari. Fighting was fierce, but remained isolated. The damage, therefore, to the security apparatus of the state was minimal and did not impact the vast majority of the territory under Moldovan and Pridnestrovie control.

With territorial control secured as the war ended, the opportunities for shifting territorial control over to Moldova were significantly diminished. First, the Moldova state was able to monopolize the use of force on its rump territory, preventing illegal

\[121\] The army was formally established September 3 1991, but this was only a presidential declaration (ukaz). The Ministry of Defense was only established in February of the following year.
armed formations from attempting to destabilize Pridnestrovie. According the then-head of the Moldovan Secret Service, Moldova did try to destabilize Pridnestrovie, but this initial attempt failed as the men were arrested by Pridnestrovian security forces (the so-called Illiascu affair). Realizing their inability to penetrate Pridnestrovie easily, and the complicated consequences of such actions, the government discontinued such approaches (Interview, Plugaru, August 23, 2008).

Second, with a strong state, stay-behind minorities collaborated with state authorities on each side, regardless of their individual preferences. If Moldova had wanted to retake territory, it would have meant certain warfare with an inconclusive result. Both territories were relatively equal in strength and there were no “easy targets” for Moldova to reclaim. As with the case of Abkhazia-Georgia, it appears that state strength was critical in maintaining the balance of power between the two territories.

Pridnestrovie’s situation, however, also stands in stark contrast to Abkhazia, where the war itself devastated the Abkhaz state, where security force personnel were weak, and where armed insurgents interfered with Abkhaz state-building efforts, preventing them from securing effective control over lower Gal in the years proceeding the ceasefire. When Georgia finally invaded Abkhazia, it invaded a territory all but abandoned by the Abkhaz state.

9 Conclusion

Both Pridnestrovie and Abkhazia had large stay-behind minorities during their post-war, post-partition periods, but only Abkhazia experienced renewed large-scale violence. The 3G ESD emphasizes the triadic political space and the role of the homeland state being central for renewed violence, and it suggests that the 2G ESD
emphasis on intractable inter-ethnic conflict is incorrect. The first conclusion to draw from these cases is that the 2G ESD is incorrect: Pridnestrovie’s ethnic Romanian minority remained peaceful and collaborated with the state; I also disaggregated Abkhazia’s state and demonstrated that one homogenously Georgian region remained peaceful and collaborated with the Abkhaz state. Therefore, ethnic identities, despite ethnic war, do not deterministically lead to renewed conflict when minorities remain within a state controlled by the “enemy” ethnic group.

The critical factor, I argued, was the state’s ability to maintain territorial control, which allows it to induce minority collaboration, usually through threats of retaliation for non-collaboration. In addition, even in the region of Abkhazia where the minority rebelled, the minority itself had been collaborating with the Abkhaz state, at least minimally, between 1994 and 1997; it was not until the Georgian guerrillas took territorial control that the local population participated in the rebellion against the Abkhaz state.

To support the 3G ESD, I demonstrated that Abkhazia’s Six Day War emerged from the neighboring Georgian state, which was used as a launching pad for an irredentist invasion by non-state and state security personnel. Coming back to state-building, this violence was almost certainly a result of Abkhaz state weakness that left lower Gal, a territory with a homogenously ethnic Georgian population, virtually without an Abkhaz presence in 1998. The opportunity to take the territory was high, and the guerrillas took control of lower Gal without a struggle. The guerrillas did not attempt to invade a neighboring and territorially contiguous region with a similarly homogenous Georgian population but with an Abkhaz security
presence. In other words, *violence erupted only where there was a shift in the balance of power over a certain territory*, where Abkhaz state-failure occurred following the war. This case study lends great weight to the 3G ESD’s emphasis on the triadic political space, but suggests that greater weight should be given to the role of opportunity for conflict renewal. Had the Abkhaz state been able to build up its strength, protect the border, and pose a greater security threat to the invading Georgians, it is unclear that an invasion would have taken place; after all, the guerrillas did not take over all of Gali despite the minority presence; they only took the part without an Abkhaz security presence.

This emphasis on opportunities became clearer with the case of Pridnestrovie. I argued that two unique factors surrounding Pridnestrovie’s secession – (i) its state consolidation prior to the war and (ii) the limited and geographically concentrated nature of the war – allowed it emerge from the war and partition in a relatively strong position. The security apparatus and state institutions were strong, encouraging minority civilian collaboration, and making any attempts to destabilize the country militarily difficult. If Moldova had sought to reclaim territories dominated by ethnic kin Romanians, it would have meant certain warfare with Pridnestrovie and Russia; the Moldovan state was not prepared to engage in such direct military confrontation.

The results from this chapter overwhelmingly reject the 2G ESD as an explanation for post-war violence. The results are strongly supportive of the 3G ESD. The case studies provide complementary evidence to the cross-national analysis in Chapter Five.
I now turn to the concluding chapter to summarize the results of the dissertation, develop policies, and suggest areas of future research.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

1 Introduction

I began this dissertation by looking at how scholars of civil war proposed to end Iraq’s ongoing ethno-religious civil war in 2006 and 2007. In a hotly contested debate, opinions were divided as to the most effective and humanitarian approach. Most controversially, several scholars proposed partitioning Iraq and its people into three homelands, arguing this would end the violence and minimize human suffering. The proposed solution of partition was based on theoretical arguments as well as empirical evidence from ethnic civil wars during the post-WWII period. But this solution also presented a puzzle for the literature: the puzzle of ethno-demography and its relationship to violence.

My dissertation addressed this puzzle of ethno-demographic violence and presented a new theory of how partition reduces the likelihood of violence, addressing key questions in the civil war literature. These questions included: (i) Does partition end ongoing ethnic civil war violence?; (ii) Does partition prevent ethnic civil war recurrence?; (iii) How does partition prevent war recurrence?; (iv) Why do some wars ending with large stay-behind minorities not experience conflict renewal?

2 The Puzzle of Ethnic Demography

The puzzle of ethnic demography arose from the literature because both theoretical and empirical evidence demonstrated that homogenously concentrated ethnic groups were both more likely to cause violence and more likely to end violence. How is that possible? This puzzle is resolved (i) by giving the minority
statehood (de facto or de jure) and (ii) by jettisoning the second generation ethnic security dilemma (2G ESD) which incorrectly predicts the end of war via group concentration.

First, as several scholars have identified, ethnic group concentration is likely to increase the risk of ethnic violence when that group is located within a sovereign state. The literature has not successfully resolved how group concentration leads to increased violence but there is a consensus that it does lead to violence. Group concentration may be a proxy for capability, either physically providing a base from which to wage war against the central state or psychologically providing members with the will to fight. Ethnic group concentration lowers the risk of violence only when statehood is included. By separating groups into separate states, the risk of violence decreases significantly since the ethnic rebel groups achieve their main aim – statehood. Second, as I argue below, partition does not end ongoing warfare, but rather helps prevent conflict recurrence. Therefore the puzzle of group concentration is resolved with concentration not ending violence, but rather preventing the recurrence of violence; and this prevention is only successful if it includes both demographic concentration and partitions into separate states.

3 The Questions Addressed in the Dissertation

3.1 Does partition end ongoing ethnic civil war violence?

The 2G ESD argues that separating warring ethnic groups during ethnic civil wars into defensible enclaves or separate states will end the violence. I demonstrated that research designs to date had failed to empirically test the core theoretical argument. Scholars, including its lead proponent (Chaim Kaufmann) and critic
(Samabanis), had only looked at ethnic civil war terminations to test whether this correlated with demographic separation. This approach is methodologically flawed as it excludes an entire set of cases that are crucial to an empirical test. In order to test whether partition leads to civil war termination, one must select ethnic civil wars from a sample of *ongoing ethnic civil wars* to determine whether partition will bring the war to an end. Further, as other critics noted, there had not been a systematic test of partition: advocates of partition had relied on self-selected cases, raising questions about objectivity.

The only systematic empirical test of the 2G ESD, conducted by Nicholas Sambanis, failed to accurately test the theory on two counts. First, the independent variable used was statehood, not demography. The core argument of the 2G ESD is based on demographic separation and is ambivalent about statehood. This means that the Sambanis test does not capture and therefore cannot test the 2G ESD. Second, the Sambanis test, like Kaufmann’s, also suffers from a conceptual flaw focusing on the wrong dependent variable: Sambanis used a universe of cases based on wars that had already ended. Once again, the empirical test did not include ongoing wars, preventing it from testing whether partition would lead to war termination.

To correct this, I used the crucial case of the Georgia-Abkhaz ethnic civil war (1992-1993) in Chapter Three and I tracked violence and migration patterns during the ongoing war. Much as the 2G ESD would predict, the ethnic civil war led to ethno-demographic separation, with ethnic groups fleeing territory controlled by rival ethnic militias and seeking safety among ethnic kin groups. This suggests that the dynamics of the ethnic security dilemma are accurate. However, the key theoretical
prediction of the 2G ESD – that such separation would lead to war end – was not confirmed. The war continued for several months, and even escalated in spite of the separation leading to the type of humanitarian catastrophe that this solution is expressly designed to prevent. The 2G ESD has many merits, but it is reductionist in its sweeping conclusions and does not consider other theoretical explanations of violence during war. In other words, the answer to the question is no, partition does not end ongoing ethnic civil war. In the case of Georgia-Abkhazia, the main explanation of continued violence was based on realpolitik, and the war escalated due to a shift in the balance of capabilities and because of a strategic error on the part of the Georgians, permitting Abkhazia to secure a military victory over the Georgian armed forces.

3.2 How does partition prevent war recurrence?

Instead of arguing that partition ends ethnic civil wars, I argued that partition was an effective solution to prevent ethnic civil war recurrence. I drew on the three theoretical foundations to build my theory, which I called the Third Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma (3G ESD). Most fundamentally, as the name suggests, I drew on previous generations of the ethnic security dilemma that focus on anarchy, uncertainty, and inter-mixed ethnic demography. However, I corrected previous theoretical flaws. The First Generation ESD (1G ESD) was an explanation for war onset, but could not explain which groups would go to war. By focusing on post-conflict recurring violence, we already have heightened identity salience and enemy ethnic groups established based on violence and massacres perpetrated during the
ethnic civil war. The theory, therefore, fits better as an explanation for post-conflict recurring violence.

Second, the ethnic security dilemma called on groups to be separated in order to end the violence but was ambivalent about the role of statehood. The key ingredient was ethno-demographic separation that permitted self-defense for concentrated ethnic groups. Such a solution does not provide long-term stability or security for those pockets of ethnic groups within the country. I therefore bring statehood into the theory as a key component of peace maintenance. Creating two sovereign states both eliminates the need for the minority to rebel against the center and it permits each side to build up deterrent mechanisms that will prevent further conflict. While it provides no guarantee of peace, it creates the best possible environment for peace to survive. This can be achieved with de facto and de jure statehood, although some other authors have claimed that de jure sovereignty is more likely to produce long-term peace; those claims were not tested here (Chapman and Roeder 2007; Kaufmann 1998).

Moreover, another key insight to emerge from the civil war termination literature since 1998 has been the problem of credible commitment. By forcing one party to the conflict to disarm, the conflict is paradoxically likely to continue. The disarming party is probably going to look forward and see that, once disarmed, any agreement reached with the center can be reneged and the disarmed party will have no leverage. By bringing statehood into the equation, we negate the need to disarm by maintaining separate states for the warring parties with separate armed forces.
Third, as with the 1G ESD, the role of mixed-demography remains a core concern for conflict recurrence in the post-civil war environment. Once the violence of war has initially ceased, even if the territory had been divided into separate states, the presence of significant ethnic minorities within territory controlled by a warring ethnic group remains a high-potential for renewed violence. My 3G ESD, however, differs from the 2G ESD, which relies on intractable ethnic animosity as the micro-foundations of renewed violence. I argue that intractable ethnic animosity is not a credible explanation for violence and that intra-state inter-ethnic violence is unlikely to occur once a state has established territorial control. Research has shown that collaboration will occur even during ethnic war as long as sufficient incentives exist.

As we saw in the case of post-war Abkhazia and Pridnestrovie, minorities collaborated with the authorities in the post-war environment despite war-time atrocities targeting the minority groups. In the case of Abkhazia in particular, despite a low-level insurgency originating from Georgia to defend the minority, enough minority members collaborated with the Abkhaz state that guerrilla fighters did not rely on the support of their kin members inside Abkhazia: guerrillas were afraid of traitors among the Georgian minority and/or were afraid of reprisals committed against the Georgian minority by the Abkhaz state. Only when territorial control shifted to complete Georgian control in May 1998 did the minority collaborate with the ethnic Georgian armed forces.

As noted by the theory, there was a difference in the “quality of collaboration” between how the Georgian minority collaborated with the Abkhaz and the Georgians: under Abkhaz control, there was “minimal” or “limited” collaboration, but under
Georgian control there was “active” collaboration, included material, symbolic, and man-power support. This, I argued allows us to see the relevance of ethnic identity, where preferences do matter. Collaboration may occur under any regime, but the preferences of individual members affect the quality of that collaboration.

Rather than intransigent ethnic identities being responsible for conflict, the 3G ESD focuses on the triadic political space created by incomplete partitions and a shift in the balance of power between those states that creates an opportunity to reclaim territory populated by ethnic kin.

Neighboring homeland states pose a danger for violence on two fronts. First, non-state militias can use the homeland as a safe-haven to launch attacks on the host state where the minority is located. Second, the homeland government can covertly or overtly support such militant activities, producing a boost in capabilities for violent action. We saw evidence of both: guerrilla fighters and state security personnel in official and unofficial capacities entered Abkhazia in an attempt to retake control parts of Abkhazia containing ethnic Georgian populations.

The leadership of the homeland state may get involved for a variety of reasons related to its desire to maintain power, including its desire to expand its domestic base of support through acquiring new land with a loyal population, or due to pressure from its domestic audience to protect ethnic kin facing real or perceived repression. Especially in the initial post-war period when identity salience is high, the risk of involvement form the homeland is significant. My case study could not identify the reasons for the Georgian state to be involved – evidence for this was simply not available and is left to speculation that is not elaborated here.
The triadic political space alone, however, is not a guaranteed recipe for violence. Since the leadership of the homeland state is interested in maintaining power, it is unlikely to launch an irredentist war unless it is reasonably sure it can win. Therefore there needs to be a shift in the balance of power that increases the likelihood of victory for the homeland state. In the two cases of partition I presented, it was the success and failure of post-war state-building that led to the absence and presence of violence, respectively. The ability of the host state, where the minority is located, to conduct post-war state-building was critical to avoiding conflict.

In Abkhazia, not only was the war itself extremely destructive in terms of infrastructure damage and loss of human life, the region of Gal in particular, where the stay-behind minority was located, was left in ruin. These challenges to Abkhaz state-building were compounded by (i) the lack of security personnel working for the Abkhaz state, (ii) the cease fire agreement which established a buffer zone near the border with Georgia preventing the Abkhaz from using heavy military equipment in its southern district, (iii) the stringent economic blockade against Abkhazia imposed by Russia and Georgia in the initial post-war environment, and (iv) the cross-border raids by Georgian guerrillas that killed Abkhaz security personnel and created an atmosphere of fear and intimidation.

I also disaggregated the Abkhaz state to focus attention on the role of state building in creating or eliminating opportunities for violence. As we saw in Abkhazia, the Georgian attack on Abkhazia during the Six Day War in May 1998 did not include all areas of the ethnic Georgian minority, despite this being a contiguous territory. Instead, Georgian guerrillas and the state security officials invaded
Abkhazia only in those areas where Abkhaz state-building efforts had failed and the territory – lower Gal – was almost completely devoid of an Abkhaz presence. An opportunity for retaking territory had presented itself to the Georgians, and they took it.

By contrast, the Abkhaz state had slowly managed to build up state institutions in upper Gal, which was also populated by ethnic Georgians. In 1998, the opportunity for attack there was significantly reduced because the Abkhaz security presence well established. The 1998 invasion never attempted to enter upper Gal, but confined itself to regions virtually abandoned by Abkhaz security personnel.

The ability to establish strong states in a new state following a civil war are extremely challenging. As a result, violence will be far less likely to emerge in states that are both partitioned and demographically partitioned, removing stay-behind minorities. I called this type of partition “complete partition” indicating that ethnic groups were completely separated. Partitions that leave behind significant stay-behind minorities were labeled “incomplete partitions.” While it is possible to have incomplete partitions and maintain peace, the chances of success without a large security presence are minimal.

3.3 Does complete partition prevent conflict recurrence empirically?

Empirically, complete partition, as the 3G ESD predicts, does prevent recurring deadly post-war violence. I gathered data on all ethnic civil wars that ended in partitions separating territory into separate states to assess the degree to which ethnic groups were separated. Using this novel variable, I demonstrated that every single ethnic civil war between 1945 and 2004 that ended with a complete partition (i.e., a
partition that completely separated the warring ethnic groups) violence did not recur for at least five years. This stands in stark contrast to the 60 percent of all ethnic civil war terminations that experienced deadly conflict renewal within the first five years of achieving peace. There was one civil war – Georgia-Abkhazia – that experienced conflict renewal, but this occurred only after ethnic minorities returned to the territory, demonstrating the danger of “stay-behind” minorities.

I followed the cross-national study with a case study of post-war Georgia-Abkhazia to use process-tracing and understand the causes of conflict renewal. At first glance, the patterns of violence appeared to support the 2G ESD, with violence occurring exactly in the same geographical region as the returning minority. However, a closer examination of the violence revealed that the attack originated from armed groups in Georgia and that the Georgian minority in Abkhazia only began collaboration after territorial control shifted to the Georgian side. Further, it was only in regions with extreme state failure, where the balance of power between the Abkhaz and Georgian states shifted, that Georgia attempted to conquer territory.

3.4 Why do some wars ending with large stay-behind minorities not experience conflict renewal?

The results of the cross-national test revealed strong support for complete partition, but also revealed some initially perplexing results. There were several ethnic civil wars that ended in incomplete partitions yet did not experience conflict renewal. According to the 2G ESD, this is not possible. An incomplete partition must lead to renewed violence because of the intransigent ethnic animosity created by the ethnic civil war. According to the 3G ESD theory, however, this is possible if anarchy ends in the two territories.
As mentioned above, Abkhazia also had regions containing stay-behind Georgian minorities that did not experience conflict renewal, even when an armed uprising that challenged Abkhaz territorial integrity occurred in a contiguous territory. I argued that effective state-building had deterred Georgian aggression and reduced the opportunity for violence in those regions.

Similarly, using Moldova as a case study, I discovered that an incomplete partition and state-building had been achieved before the ethnic civil war began. I demonstrated that Pridnestrovie, due to unique circumstances that surrounded the collapsing Soviet Union, had actually seceded and established its nascent statehood presence before war onset in 1992. The armed secessionist movement against Moldova gathered strength in 1989 while Moldova was still a Union Republic in the Soviet Union. Where most countries would counteract a secessionist movement with force, Moldova did not have an army of its own and refused the support of the Soviet Army at the time, fearful that its presence would be used as a pretext to prevent its own secession from the USSR. By the time Moldova gained independence at the end of August 1991, Pridnestrovie was already effectively independent with its own security organs. Moldova’s army was established in late 1991 but was not a functioning institution until 1992, when the war began.

With a short war that was geographically confined, Pridnestrovien and Moldovan statehood was comparatively strong in the post-war period. This ensured that (i) the minority collaborated with the state, (ii) there were fewer opportunities to achieve irredentist ambitions without provoking an all-out war from Moldova’s side, and (iii) there were fewer non-state actors to conduct cross-border raids since both
post-war states maintained a monopoly on the use of force within their respective territories.

With the security apparatus in place, the borders were effectively guarded and the ethnic-Moldovan population continued to collaborate with Pridnestrovien authorities. On the Moldovan side, while the country was not a paragon of state strength, order was in place and independent guerrilla formations were not permitted to develop. In short, the balance of power between the two sides remained relatively equal and opportunities for violence were heavily curtailed.

4 Summary

In sum, my dissertation came to three key conclusions. First, ethnic separation during war does not end ethnic civil wars. The 2G ESD was weak theoretically and a crucial case study (Georgia-Abkhazia) demonstrated its faults empirically. Instead, extant theories in the literature, especially realpolitik, did a better job of explaining the end of ongoing warfare for my case study. Second, I stressed the need to conceptually disaggregate the term civil war termination, differentiating between an end of ongoing violence and the recurrence of violence since recidivism is such a central problem for ethnic civil wars. The 2G ESD also claims to explain conflict renewal, but I also argued that it fails as an explanatory framework for conflict renewal. Theoretically, the 2G ESD cannot explain how ethnic minorities collaborate peacefully within post-partition states dominated by enemy ethnic groups. The theory fails to differentiate preferences from behavior and assumes that incompatible preferences will lead to violence. Building on other constructivist work in the field that demonstrates behavioral collaboration based on incentives, I argue that stay-
behind minorities will collaborate as long as states are significantly strong. My two case studies (Abkhazia and Pridnestrovie) demonstrated this pattern empirically.

Third, partitions that separated territory into distinct states help resolve some key problems that bedevil peacebuilding but are unlikely to produce long-term peace unless they (i) separate the warring ethnic groups demographically and (ii) maintain a balance of power between the post-war states. My case studies identified the difficulties of post-war state building as areas of particularly concern, where balance of power could shift. This is part of the 3G ESD, which focuses on conflict renewal amidst weak states and a triadic political space. Conflicts are likely to recur where (i) a homeland state (or elements within) seeks to “protect” its kin minority in a neighboring state and where (ii) states are weak creating several opportunities for violence to erupt. Since incomplete partitions endogenously create both triadic political spaces and weak states, the likelihood of violence is high. By contrast, partitions that include ethno-demographic separation are likely to produce peace that lasts beyond the critical first five years. Indeed, cross-national evidence from the post-World War Two period suggested this to be the case with no complete partition experiencing recurring violence within the first five years of establishing peace. While complete partitions are no guarantee against renewed warfare, they reduce the chances of conflict significantly.

5 Policy Implications

There are four policy conclusions that come into clear relief from this dissertation. First, and most obviously, pursuing partition as a solution to ongoing inter-ethnic civil war is unlikely to end the conflict and offers no promise of a
humanitarian solution. Despite the results in Chapters Five and Six that complete partitions prevent deadly ethnic conflict recurrence, the results from Chapter Three clearly demonstrated that partition during ongoing violence was not a sufficient condition to end the conflict.

In terms of Iraq, the accelerating speed with which religious targeting and displacement occurred between 2005 and 2007 strongly suggested the emergence of a security dilemma between the Shi’ite and Sunni communities, where families whose homes were in the “wrong” area were threatened with death if they did not leave.122 Partition advocates painted a stark picture in their calls for US involvement in implementing partition. The question faced by the US, they said, was whether they want to permit this separation to be organized by unregulated communal militias under conditions of large-scale violence, or whether they want to facilitate this process under less inhumane conditions through organized population transfers. However, without the promise of peace, partition should not be considered as a policy option.

While partition may not end ethnic civil wars, Chapters Four through Six suggest that a policy of partition in a post-war environment does provide the best chance for long-term peace, and this forms the second policy implication from the dissertation. Once the violence of ethnic civil wars has subsided, implementing partition may be a durable solution to prevent conflict recurrence. For example, as of mid-2009, the Iraqi ethnic civil war had de-escalated significantly, although this was still an ethnic

civil war by any social science measure. If the trend continues, however, partition may be an option to consider in the future. Moreover, by not partitioning Iraq, the chances of renewed violence may remain high. The ethnic security dilemma during the Iraqi civil war did lead to large-scale ethnic unmixing, increasing ethnic group concentration throughout the country. As mentioned in the introduction, much evidence in the political science literature suggests that group concentration increases the long-term risk of ethnic rebellion, and this means that the risk of violence in Iraq remains high unless the territory is partitioned. Should the U.S. then pursue partition if the violence of war ends?

Such considerations raise a second question rarely discussed in the literature: how does an international actor implement a partition strategy? Most importantly, Iraq is not divided into homogeneous regions, despite claims to the contrary.\textsuperscript{123} There are large geographical regions of the country that are relatively homogeneous, but there are nevertheless several densely populated, multi-ethnic regions in the center of the country that would need to be demographically separated under any partition plan, not to mention multiethnic flash-point cities elsewhere in the country, such as Kirkuk.\textsuperscript{124} How to accomplish that in a way that protects civilian lives is a major challenge.


\textsuperscript{124} The Iraqi Red Crescent and the International Organization on Migration show a complicated picture. As journalists James Glazer and Alissa J. Rubin stated in September 2007 after reading those organizations’ reports, “displacement in the most populous and mixed areas is surprisingly complex, suggesting that partitioning the country into semiautonomous Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish enclaves would not be easy.” Glanz and Rubin, “Future Look of Iraq Complicated by Internal Migration,” \textit{New York Times}, September 19, 2007. On Kirkuk, see, for example, “Iraq and the Kurds: Resolving the
Any announcement of a decision to partition the country would almost certainly lead to a large increase in the number of families in mixed regions seeking refuge in “their” new states, emboldening local militias that are pressing for separation. While the U.S. and Iraqi forces could attempt to minimize the violence that such a mass migration might encounter, the ability of the military to ensure the safety of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis on the move, given the difficulty in providing even basic security, is highly questionable. In this case, the decision to partition could make the situation considerably worse for civilians, thus taking away the humanitarian rationale of partition advocates.

Because partition without the separation of ethnic groups does not significantly increase the likelihood of securing peace, two options are available: redrawing borders or transferring populations. Population transfers pose at least two problems. First, the implementation of such transfers may sound procedural, but the reality would be far from it. Let us imagine, for example, that considerable numbers of minority group members refuse to move to their new home state. Would the U.S. or Iraqi military be prepared to use force to deport those civilians, the very civilians that partition is supposed to protect? Unmixing populations can require great force, as the twentieth century has demonstrated. One solution to that problem is to keep transfers “voluntary,” where civilians are given the choice to move to “their” new state or remain a minority within the other group’s new state. Given the uncertainty of life under a new state dominated by an enemy group following intense warfare, most members of the minority group would likely move. If such “voluntary” transfer

Kirkuk Crisis,” International Crisis Group, Middle East Report, No. 64 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 19, 2007).
transfers do not materialize, however, then U.S. military force against civilians would become necessary. If the U.S. is not prepared to use deliberate force against Iraqi civilians then partition should not be considered.

What about redrawing borders? Given the risk of violence associated with incomplete partitions and the benefits associated with complete partitions, the international community should give serious consideration to redrawing borders if that would produce a complete partitions. Since the ethnic security dilemma during war leads to ethnic group concentration, this may not be as difficult to achieve as it might initially appear.

The saliency of this point is evident in debates over Kosovo’s final status. Post-1999 Kosovo is an example of an incomplete partition and, based on the results here, a final status agreement that does not transfer Serb-controlled regions (or Serbs themselves) back to Serbia will not provide the much desired peace dividend offered by complete partition.125 Indeed, in spite of the presence of international peacekeepers, clashes in 2004 led to large-scale interethnic violence and the ethnic cleansing of Serb villages.126 The international community should therefore give serious consideration to the further partitioning of Kosovo into homogeneous Serb and Albanian regions before withdrawal.127 The resulting Serb region would almost certainly join Serbia, while Kosovo would become independent. These results should

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125 Because the objective is to minimize human suffering, population transfers should be kept to a minimum, which would suggest redrawing borders around the concentrated Serb populations.
also be noted for the partitions of Sudan and Papua New Guinea, where referenda on independence are being established for the near future. Drawing borders to correspond with ethnic group concentration is highly likely to facilitate long-term peace.

Finally, one other alternative to population transfers exist for incomplete partitions: building up strong state institutions in the post-partitioned states. Given that this encourages minority collaboration, reduces the opportunities for violence, and does not require the morally dubious practice of population transfers, it is an admirable approach. For Iraq, given the strong financial and institutional support it receives from the U.S. and others in the international community, this has a good chance of succeeding. In Bosnia, another case of incomplete partition, a commitment by the international community to establish strong state institutions has meant that a reversal in ethnic cleansing has begun to take hold without any associated conflict renewal.

The fourth and final policy implication emerges from the theoretical and empirical results of Chapters Two and Three. These should be strong cautionary tales for any policy-maker drawing on social science research. Despite a decade of research on partition, with much evidence demonstrating support, an appropriate methodological test had not in fact been conducted. Proxy variables and convenient short-cuts were used for an empirical test, and this led to superficial results that incorrectly provided support to partition as a means to end ethnic civil wars. Before policy makers draw on social science research, they must carefully evaluate the
evidence to decide whether, indeed, the evidence provides legitimate support for the theories at hand.

6 Areas for Future Research

I conclude with some promising areas for future research. First, the PEHI index could be extended to incorporate not only the presence of minorities, but their location and territorial concentration after partition. Several scholars have identified group concentration as a powerful predictor of rebellion, and Barry Posen has argued that the location of minorities may increase the security dilemma risk.\footnote{See, for example, Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence; and Gurr, Minorities at Risk.} For example, minorities living near a state's borders might increase the likelihood of renewed violence. Another empirical test that would help clarify the ethnic security dilemma and the role of demography is to track the size of minorities within states that experience ethnic civil war but do not end in partition. If a minority is eliminated (e.g., through death or expulsion), this should eliminate the ethnic security dilemma. Similarly, the theory would hypothesize that the smaller the minority after ethnic civil war, the less the chance of ethnic war recurring. This would allow a large-n test with robust statistical results.

Second, the frequency of militarized interstate disputes among postpartitioned states could be compared to that of all other states to see if these new dyads are more or less at risk of interstate warfare. This would involve extending the initial five year time horizon chosen for this study to examine the long-term impact of partition.

Third an examination of ethnic reintegration after ethnic war could be made to evaluate the timing of and the degree to which returning populations risk reigniting violence. While all wars produce high levels of displacement, the degree to which
displaced populations return, even after ethnic cleansing, is surprisingly variable both across cases and temporally in the years following the end of ethnic wars. Many in the international community are normatively committed to the idea of multiethnic societies and yet are confounded by the realities of protracted refugee problems and intransigent postwar communities long after the war has ended. Does lack of reintegration stem from a top-down process led by political elites, or a bottom-up process led by local communities? Do returns increase or decrease the risk of war and violence? Answers to these questions are of great theoretical interest for questions of conflict, war, and identity salience, as well as of extreme practical value.

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