ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: ETHNIC IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS AMONG POST-SOVIET YOUTH

Erjan Kurbanov, Doctor of Philosophy, 1998

Dissertation directed by: Professor John P. Robinson
Department of Sociology

This research examines theoretical concepts of ethnic identity using survey data from probability samples of about 13,000 youth from 11 countries of the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Russia, and Ukraine). The focus is on the combined impact of different micro and macro factors on ethnic attitudes and perceptions during a period of rapid social change.

The dependent variable is ethnic distinctiveness, which describes a group member's distancing of themselves from other ethnic groups, an important consequence of ethnic identity. The variable was measured through evaluations of six personal characteristics of ethnic majority and minority groups in each country. The continuous nature of this variable allows detailed study of how ethnic micro factors (self-identification, parents' ethnic identity, ethnic language, level of interaction with outsiders), macro factors (ethnic conflict and level of ethnic homogeneity at the national, sub-national, and micro levels), and other social factors (parents' education, religious strength, gender, and family income) affect ethnic distinctiveness. Due to the nested nature of the data, the analysis was

conducted on three levels--individual, sub-national, and national--using different techniques for each level.

The results show that at the individual level, ethnic self-identification is the strongest predictor of ethnic distancing, followed by parents' ethnic identification and ethnic language; out-group interaction has only a weak effect. At the second level, the micro-level (school) ethnic homogeneity has the strongest effect, while the regional homogeneity effect is not significant. Both national-level variables (national conflict and homogeneity on the societal level) have strong effects on the dependent variable, while class variables (parents' education and family income) have no effect on ethnic distinctiveness (possibly a legacy of the egalitarian Soviet system).

The original model which presumes that ethnic distancing is a product of the strength of ethnic identity, family ethnic background, and out-group interaction thus seems applicable mostly to societies (1) in which the majority and minority are significantly differentiated from each other, (2) where the minority is significantly large, and (3) where both groups are involved in a major ethno-social process. Thus, the study confirms that the individual ethnic processes of ethnic boundary formation are quite susceptible to the pervasive social dynamics of the larger society.

ETHNIC IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS AMONG POST-SOVIET YOUTH

by

Erjan Kurbanov

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
1998

Advisory Committee:

Professor John Robinson, Chair/Advisor
Professor Ted Gurr
Professor Jerald Hage
Professor V. Lee Hamilton
Professor Barbara Meeker

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND

Research Goals

This dissertation examines the process and consequences of ethnic identification using data on ethnic relations gathered from high school students in the former Soviet Union. The research is based on secondary analysis of survey data from probability samples of about 13,000 youth in the eleven countries of the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belorus, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Russia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine).

The dependent variable is ethnic distinctiveness, which describes the group members' distancing of themselves from other ethnic groups, one of the most important consequences of ethnic identity. Such distancing of an ethnic group from others on a social continuum is a crucial element in social identity. Indeed, the greater the distance, the more ethnic group members feel different from others and the more ethnicity becomes salient. From this perspective, the difference among ethnic identifiers becomes rather continuous, unlike its dichotomous treatment in most other ethnic studies (e.g., "Whites" vs. "Blacks").

There is an important difference between this concept and the more commonly used concept of ethnic self-identification. Both describe ethnic identity and its different components, but while ethnic self-identification is the personally reported strength of ethnic identity (which emphasizes the "we" part of ethnic identity--belonging to a particular group), ethnic distinctiveness relates to the distance of "we" from "them." This methodological distinction is an important element in this research.

Exploration of the connections between macro factors and the micro-level of individual psychological processes related to ethnic identity is the main focus of this research. Social identity theory and the contact hypothesis approach are complemented by adding macro-level variables that increase the salience of ethnic

identity, making an initial ethnic "label" a crucial determinant of group status in ethnically structured societies where ethnicity is a central component of social identity.

Ethnic Relations in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet States

The former Soviet Union is a convenient region for the study of ethnic relations. After the sudden and unexpected disintegration of the Soviet Union in September 1991, all 15 Soviet republics became independent countries. Since the Soviet Union had been administratively divided into republics according to ethnic principles, the new successor states soon turned into ethnically based societies. Major ethnic groups suddenly became dominant ones, while Russians, who had been seen as a ruling nationality, became a subordinate minority. This provided something of a natural experiment, with various countries having a common economic and social system now experiencing different levels of ethnic tensions.

The Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917, which at first sight completely destroyed the Tsarist regime, in fact continued many legacies of imperial authoritarianism.[1] However, among the new forms of social control introduced after the revolution was the ethnically structured system of territorial administration. Following various ideological and political motives, the communist government eventually divided its territory into 15 ethnically-defined Soviet republics. Inside the union republics, autonomous regions were created for smaller ethnic groups. Borders were drawn in a way that only vaguely reflected the borders of the previous state entities (if such ever existed) and often did not coincide with the ethnic population distribution. The majority group in each republic was the titular group (e.g., Ukrainians in Ukraine, Latvians in Latvia). Usually this group was a majority, though its proportion in the population differed.

While prior to the emergence of the Soviet Union in 1922, several new union republics had a history of statehood at some point in history, others were not part of larger nation-state and were completely new political creations,[2] as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Ethnic Distribution in the Union Republics of the USSR, 1989

Union Republic	Entered USSR	Population in ml.	Titular Ethnic Group	Two Largest Minority Groups
Russia	1922	183.0	82%	Tatars 6% Ukrainian 3%
Azerbaijan	1922	7.02	83%	Armenians 6% Russian 6%
Armenia	1922	3.30	94%	Azeris 3% Russians 2%
Georgia	1922	5.40	70%	Armenians 8% Azeris 6%
Kyrgyzstan	1922	4.26	52%	Russians 22% Uzbeks 13%
Tajikistan	1922	5.09	62%	Uzbeks 24% Russians 8%
Lithuania	1940	3.67	80%	Russians 9% Poles 7%
Estonia	1940	1.57	62%	Russians 30% Ukrainians 3%
Latvia	1940	2.7	52%	Russians 34% Ukrainians 3%
Moldova	1939	4.3	64%	Ukrainians 14% Russians 13%
Ukraine	1922	51.45	73%	Russians 22% Belorusians 1%
Belarus	1922	10.15	76%	Russians 13% Poles 4%
Uzbekistan	1922	19.81	71%	Russians 8% Tajiks 5%
Turkmenistan	1922	3.51	72%	Russians 10% Uzbeks 9%
Kazakstan	1922	16.46	40%	Russians 38% Ukrainians 5%

Sources: 1989 Soviet Census; Rywkin (1994).

An important element in these arrangements was the definition of autonomy in ethnic terms. Each ethnic group with autonomous status was assigned a defined area of land; it had its own party and administrative structures which exercised some sovereignty within borders defined by the Center. Even in cases of initial artificiality, distinct political communities soon emerged within these republics, each with its own bureaucracy. New ethnic identities were formed, especially in Central Asia. For example, Atkin (1993) argues that though Tajik national identity was in some sense imposed on the Soviet Republic of Tajikistan created in 1924, this identity began to play an increasingly important role in social processes.

The overwhelmingly Russian component in the power structure was slowly decreasing, replaced by the locals using a policy of "korenizatsiya" (appointing of local nationalities into administrative and party organs). As a result of these transformations, the Soviet state became dual in nature: it had a federal structure with nominal power sharing between different ethnic groups, within the dominant structure of the communist party (controlled overwhelmingly by Russians) that had the real power.

Nevertheless, "korenizatsiya" helped to create a local political elite within the party organs. With the leader of the republic (the first secretary of the communist party of that republic), as a rule an individual belonging to the titular ethnic group, the impression was that that group was in fact in control of its autonomous territory (which, incidentally, gave Soviets excellent propaganda vehicles). However, the key appointments to party and power positions were Moscow's decisions, and the non-Russians' perception that Russians were in control of the country was quite common throughout the Soviet Union.[3]

Tight control from Moscow over non-Russian republics further weakened after the Khrushchev period: demographic trends significantly decreased the proportion of the Russian population in the non-Russian union republics. Such changes increased control of the republican leadership over local developments.[4] Local party leaders readily used the rise of liberalization and demands by dissident groups as a way to

press Moscow to give them more power. As a result, the ethnic nationalism of the late 1980s came from the party leadership of the republic and from grassroots movements as well. Many Western scholars and politicians ignored this very important phenomenon because they saw the demise of the USSR mostly as the result of purely anti-communist uprisings by dissident forces.[5]

Meanwhile, most Western explanations for the sudden eruption of ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s reflected the influence of political scientists, economists, and historians who represented the overwhelming majority in 'Soviet studies,' rather than that of experts in ethnic relations.[6] Many interpreted ethnic relations in terms of Soviet federal structure and initially did not pay much attention to the genuine ethnic content in these processes. Therefore, the surge of ethno-nationalism in the USSR was quite unexpected and no effective explanations were suggested. The common interpretation was liberalization--protest against the Center's political or economic oppression or the consequences of economic deprivation and cultural differences, inequalities (e.g., Motyl, 1992; Vetik, 1993) and suppressed historical memories and political inequalities (Gurr, 1994). However, empirical data do not always support claims about the importance of economic inequalities, which presumably produced anti-Russian or 'anti-other ethnic group' moods.[7] The poorest republics as a rule did not press for independence.[8]

When central Soviet authority collapsed following the aborted anti-Gorbachev coup attempt of August 1991, union republics became independent from Moscow de jure, while de facto, many already achieved control of their own affairs. The internal administrative borders of the former Soviet Union republics became international borders overnight, and ethnic identity (which in some cases was created by purely political decisions) became a strong political factor in the newly independent states.

These developments sent a shock wave among millions of ethnic Russians living outside of Russia in non-Russian republics. Overnight, they ceased to be a powerful majority of the Soviet superpower and became minorities, often with no guarantees of their status. During Soviet times Moscow's interference equalized the

demands from ethnic groups within republics toward each other on behalf of one or another side. The sudden disappearance of an independent "judge" created overwhelming advantages for the titular-majority group. Lack of institutional mechanisms for power-sharing, which in Soviet times were arbitrary, and the overwhelming concentration of power within the executive branch created few opportunities for minority groups to realize their demands. The titular ethnic groups' perception was that now they "finally" were in control of their fate, while minorities (especially ethnic Russians) felt they were not part of the political process (Tishkov, 1995).[9]

Indeed, the language, citizenship, elections, and other laws adopted in many Newly Independent States (NIS) even before the de facto disintegration of the USSR, might have effectively "squeezed-out" many competitors (members of non-titular ethnic groups) from important positions. Language laws severely reduced employment opportunities for those who did not speak the titular language well enough. Since Russian was widely used in the Soviet Union as a language of inter-ethnic communication, many non-titulars had neither the need, desire, nor simple opportunity to study the titular language. Any of these could cause them to lose their positions to competitors from the titular ethnic group.

Table 2 provides approximate rankings of the levels of conflict between majority ethnic groups and the Russian ethnic minority (except Russia, where Tatars are the minority under consideration) as determined through published accounts, such as, Atkin (1993), Bremmer (1994), Fane (1993), Kaiser (1995), Solonar and Bruter (1994), Urban and Zaprudnik (1993), the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports (1997), Wixman (1993).

The most severe ethnic conflict between titular majority and ethnic Russians in the post-Soviet territory took place in Moldova. Solonar and Bruter (1994) argue, for example, that after the nationalists gained power in Moldova and made top appointments on an ethnic basis, the result was outright ethnic war. In September 1991, the government leadership was made 92% Moldovan. These authors believe

Table 2: Extent of Ethnic Conflicts in the Former Soviet Union

(Based on Atkin (1993), Bremmer (1994), Solonar and Bruter (1994), Fane (1993), Kaiser (1995), Urban and Zaprudnik (1993), U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports (1997), Wixman (1993).

Country	Groups (majority vs. minority)	Extent of Conflict
Moldova	Moldovans vs. Russians	3 (severe)
Latvia	Latvians vs. Russians	2 (intermediate)
Tajikistan	Tajiks vs. Russians	2 (intermediate)
Kazakstan	Kazaks vs. Russians	2 (intermediate)
Ukraine	Ukrainians vs. Russians	1 (low)
Kyrgyzstan	Kyrgyzis vs. Russians	1 (low)
Russia	Russians vs. Tatars	1 (low)
Georgia	Georgians vs. Russians	0 (none)
Armenia	Armenians vs. Russians	0 (none)
Azerbaijan	Azeris vs. Russians	0 (none)
Belorus	Belorusians vs. Russians	0 (none)

that "...the interethnic conflict first turned into a territorial and then an interstate conflict,which later assumed the form of military confrontation"(pp. 84, 88). This outright military conflict (similar to the Yugoslavian scenario) eventually divided the country into two ethnic parts-Moldovan and Russian (Fane, 1993, pp.139-141). Thus, the Moldovan case is rated 3, indicating the highest level of ethnic confrontation.

While Latvia managed to escape military conflict over the same issues, the situation with ethnic Russians remained quite tense. This confrontation, which started with a forceful introduction of Latvian language requirements in the early 1990s, is ongoing and has led to numerous protests. Importantly, citizenship laws have left many ethnic Russian residents of Latvia without Latvian citizenship; as a result, they do not participate fully in civic life (U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports for Latvia,1997). Kaiser (1995) argues that, "in Latvia ... restrictive citizenship laws are used to restrict non-titular access to jobs" (p.104) and "in the Baltic states, where

nationalist elites were successful in gaining political power during the late 1980s, they have used this power to pass language laws that undermine the competitive position of Russians in favor of the titular nations" (p.105). Thus, the Latvian case is rated 2, indicating the strong level of ethnic confrontation, still short of actual military conflict, however.

Among the countries of Central Asia, the Russian minority is experiencing the strongest pressures in Kazakstan and Tajikistan. In the first case, the introduction of the Kazak language and the policy of parachuting Kazak administrators into Russian-populated areas of Northern Kazakstan brought wide resentment and some protests. Bremmer (1994) argues that while "there is general agreement between Kazaks and Russians that before the fall of the Soviet Union ethnic tensions were generally unknown to northern Kazakstan. . .":

> . . . a fundamental part of the process of enlarging Kazak presence [in majority Russian regions] has been cadre replacement, with the objective of creating small but powerful local elites politically loyal to the center . . . This has been particularly evident at the top levels, where substantial numbers of non-Kazaks in key positions have been removed . . . In 1992 alone, Russians holding five of the most important positions in the oblast administration of Eastern Kazakstan were replaced by Kazaks directly accountable to the central government in Alma-Ata (p. 621).

As the U.S. Department of State has recently reported, the Kazakstan government continued to discriminate in favor of ethnic Kazaks in government employment, where ethnic Kazaks predominate, as well as in education, housing, and other areas. However, it reports that the Kazak government has continued to back away from its "Kazakification" campaign of the first year of independence (U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports for Kazakstan,1997).

The Kazakstan case is close to the Latvian one and is rated 2, indicating the strong level of ethnic confrontation, again short of actual military conflict.

In Tajikistan, violent military conflicts between rival Tajik clans forced most Russians to flee a disintegrating country. (Atkin, 1993, pp. 368-369). The U.S. State Department reports that while the government has repeatedly expressed its desire for the ethnic Russian and Slavic populations to remain, economic conditions provide little incentive for them to do so, and some local Russians and other Slavs perceive an increase in negative social attitudes toward them (U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports for Tajikistan, 1997). The Tajikistan case is different in many instances from the others since conflict there took place within the majority group itself. However, because of the military conflict in the society and economic discrimination against ethnic Russians, this case is rated 2.

Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan adopted a relatively soft policy of accommodating Russians in the new society, and language requirements there are not so stringent. The U.S. State Department reports that while minorities complain of alleged discrimination and argue that the government favors ethnic Kyrgyz due to government efforts, Russian emigration has significantly declined, with some ethnic Russians returning (U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports for Kyrgyzstan, 1997). Thus, the Kyrgyz case is rated 1, indicating a moderate level of ethnic confrontation.

The Russian minority in Ukraine experienced the discomfort of becoming a minority and many experts see the possibility of strong separatist movements in the Russian-populated areas under certain circumstances. Kaiser (1995) argues that if in the Ukraine " . . . formal Ukrainization of the workforce and society is able to dominate the political agenda, a Russian separatism similar to that in Moldova is likely"(p. 109). The U.S. State Department reports that ethnic relations in Ukraine are quite positive, with only isolated cases of ethnic discrimination in Ukraine. There are, however, two important exceptions: in some parts of western Ukraine and in Crimea, local ethnic communities credibly complain of discrimination (U.S. Department of State Ukraine Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 1997). So, the Ukrainian case is rated 1, indicating a moderate level of ethnic confrontation.

Initially, strong separatist tendencies in the regions of Russia populated by Tatars quickly subsided after federal arrangements were negotiated between Moscow and the regional government. Still, separatist movements exist among some Tatar nationalists (Wixman, 1993, pp. 430-432, 442). Thus, the Russian case is rated 1, indicating a moderate level of ethnic confrontation.

In the other Slavic country of Belarus, there is no indication of majority-minority conflict at all, with a high level of intermarriage and overall cultural closeness (Urban and Zaprudnik, 1993, p.114-115). The rating for the Belarusian case is 0, which means no ethnic conflict between the native majority and the ethnic Russian minority.

The countries of the South Caucasus region (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia) have relatively small Russian minorities in their populations. Nationalist movements in these countries were rarely directed against local Russians and virtually all existing ethnic conflicts involve other local ethnic groups (e.g., Armenian-Azeri conflict, Georgian-Abkhaz conflict). Thus, the ratings for these countries are 0, since no significant confrontations between majority groups and ethnic Russians are noted there.

Overall, the decrease in minority participation in the political and social processes of the NIS and the break-up of implicit power-sharing agreements maintained in Soviet times have led to a drastic rise in the minority perception of the country government as an agent of the titular ethnic group. Thus, the remnants of the Soviet period in that sense represent an "invitation" for ethnic conflicts, and most of the social conflicts have ethnic overtones. The political changes in the former Soviet Union have had an important impact on population's ethnic attitudes, with the rise of the salience of ethnic identity being the most crucial factor. Increased conflict among ethnic groups is largely responsible for the rise of this salience.

Theoretical Background

Ethnic identity and the factors influencing its strength and direction are relatively little-studied topics in social psychology. In most studies, after individuals are identified as belonging to a particular group, the analytic focus is mostly on inter-group comparison and the impact of different intervening variables (especially class and education) on ethnic prejudice and stereotyping. Most researchers interested in ethnic relations are involved in the analyses of ethnic prejudice, with ethnic identity serving as a constant ("Whites," "Blacks," etc.) criterion for inter-group comparison. While researchers as a rule acknowledge the complicated nature of ethnic identity and its fluidity and change, few undertake empirical studies or suggest theoretical concepts that would describe the dynamics of different dimensions of ethnic identity and establish the factors and conditions influencing the nature and strength of ethnic identity or their effect on ethnic perceptions. The present study will examine these factors and their impact on ethnic identity, while adding micro and macro variables into the analysis. This research will combine the several theoretical approaches in social psychology related to ethnic identity, especially social identity theory and the contact hypothesis, each of which has received considerable empirical support.

Sociological research on inter-group relations dates to the beginning of this century and has focused largely on out-group prejudice and stereotyping, paying little attention to ethnic identity. Overall, research is concentrated on the idea of inter-group attitude comparisons initially developed by Bogardus (1926).[10] (See endnote 11 for an overview of related research.)

During the mid-1960s, however, interest in the study of ethnic relations decreased in American sociology, since in the context of modernization, the prevailing understanding of ethnic relations was that ethnicity was becoming less important. It was thought that ethnic differences were disappearing because minorities, by joining the majority culture, would eventually assimilate and ethnic identity would lessen considerably. Although the growth in ethnic-related movements and confrontations from the 1970s onward increased interest in this subject among social scientists, that

interest was in many instances still limited to inter-group comparisons and to studies of stereotypes and prejudice, rather than to ethnic identity issues.

The current research underlines the growing importance of ethnic boundaries even in traditionally assimilationist societies (such as the U.S.). Research pointed out at the end of the Cold War as a main reason for ethnic revival, since it freed numerous Third World ethnic movements from their ideological component. Another important factor was the worldwide decline in religiosity. As a result, ethnicity came to play a more important functional role in society, giving individuals a stronger sense of belonging.

While research on such a powerful social factor as ethnic identity would seem to be of significant interest to social psychologists, growing fragmentation within the social sciences has prevented unification of different theoretical approaches to ethnic relations into a more integrated theory. One of the major factors that has hindered the development of an integrative theory of ethnic relations is the presence of "research enclaves," which are relatively independent and rarely interact (Brewer, 1997). As a result, no serious attempts have been attempted to date.

Brewer (1997) suggests a classification of approaches to social sciences research on inter-group relations (Table 3). Brewer argues that research in each of the six categories (as shown in the table) has been highly encapsulated, with little interaction with others; the biggest gap probably lies between research on the individual and group levels. Even though ethnic identity is a product of micro and macro processes, studies of ethnic identity by social psychologists are rather rare. This research attempts to fill one of these gaps by bringing together elements of macro and micro approaches in research on ethnic identity.

Ethnic Identity in Sociological Perspective

Ethnic identity can be defined in a variety of ways, most often as a sense of belonging to a particular social group with particular cultural differences. Some extend

Table 3: Classification of the Research Traditions in the Study of Inter-group Relations

	Level of Analysis	
	Individual/Interpersonal Processes	Group Processes
Cognition	– Stereotyping (Bogardus, 1926)	– Social Categorization – Social Identity (Tajfel and Turner,1979)
Affect Attitudes	– Prejudice/Racism (group norms (Sherif and Sherif, 1953) – Unconscious evaluation (authoritarian personality; Adorno, et al., 1950)	– Inter-group contact (Allport, 1954)
Behavior Discrimination	– In-Group favoritism – Aversive racism	– Institutional racism – Collective action – Grievances against discrimination (Gurr, 1994)

(Adapted from Brewer, 1997.)

this feeling of continuity with a real or imagined past (which is the most important part of any definition) to the "sense of affiliative survival" (De Vos, 1995, p. 25).

Since ethnic identity is one of the sources of general social identity, the theoretical approaches to social identity are quite helpful in considerations of the ethnicity paradigm. Indeed, many social factors influencing social identity have an important impact in formation and development of ethnic identity, and are important elements in the processes used by people to develop perceptions of others.

In the sociological perspective, individual "identity" would mean a specific position or location of the individual on a social continuum. Identification is always a relative and complex phenomenon. Higher identification of the individual with a particular social element (e.g., nation) means higher salience of this element, which may occur for a variety of reasons. Still other components of personal identity are not ignored and continue to be present, although their importance may be less significant.

While personal identity is comprised of a complex set of attributes unique to the individual, social identity is a complex of attributes unique to the members of the group, which may be defined in a variety of meaningful ways. It is commonly defined as a position of one social group in relation to other social groups in a social continuum. This position defines the salience of the different components of social identity (Berger, 1966; Berger and Luckman, 1967).

One argument for the importance of social identity compared with personal identity in inter-group relations was presented by Smith (1993), who argues that:

> . . . attitudes and behaviors relevant to inter-group relations are driven by feelings and cognitions that reference the perceiver's social rather than individual or personal identity. . . And fraternal relative deprivation [feelings that one's group is not faring as well as it deserves or as well as a comparison group] clearly implicates feelings of resentment or inequity felt on behalf of one's social identity as a group member (p. 308).

Social identity, meanwhile, is closely connected with personal identity, since it becomes a part of it. Indeed, as Ross and Ross (1995) argue,

> To be subjectively genuine, changes in identity must start sufficiently early to make the assumption of a particular behavior feel internally natural to the individual. A sense of identity is, by definition and by implication, a conscious part of the self rather that the operation of unperceived automatic mechanisms. It is a conscious awareness of what and who one is in relation to a social group. An ethnic identity is developed through time and takes on various meanings in the course of one's life experience, as one contrasts one's social group in some measure against the dominant culture and against other groups within it (p.367).

A widely held approach (and one actively exploited in politics) largely presupposes that ethnicity is a primordial phenomenon held from ancient times. In this perspective,

ethnic identity is considered a mystic bond that connects generations of people, gives them a common past and suggests a common destiny. Ethnic identity then is considered an unchangeable defining element of the personality, attached to individuals for as long as they live. As Smith (1991) argues, "identification with the 'nation' in a secular era is the surest way to surmount the finality of death and ensure a measure of personal immortality. Even the Party cannot make so unequivocal a promise; it too must ultimately fall back on the nation" (pp.160-161).

Most social scientists view biological determinism in ethnic identity with skepticism, and instead beleiving ethnic identity to be a socially constructed situational and changing phenomenon. Since ethnicity often depends on stable social, cultural, and economic structures in society, some scholars believe that once constructed, ethnicity changes only slowly (Eriksen,1993).

An important characteristic in the process of ethnic identity formation is the division between "we" and "they." Indeed, if individuals identify themselves with a particular social group within the social system, they would perceive the distinctions between this group and other groups. The higher level of identification would lead to the further distancing of "we" from "them," who will be perceived as more different. As Salamone (1986) argues, "there is no "us" without "them" (p. 61). Meanwhile, the "them" element in social identity is often ignored in research, while the "we" part of ethnic identity is overemphasized.

Reflecting this perspective, Nagel (1994) argues that,

> As the individual (or group) moves through daily life, ethnicity can change according to variation in the situations and audiences encountered. Ethnic identity, then, is a dialectical process, as well as the individual's self identification and outsiders' ethnic designations - i.e. what you think your ethnicity is, versus what they think your ethnicity is. Since ethnicity changes situationally, the individual carries a portfolio of ethnic identities that are more or less salient in various situations and vis-à-vis various audiences

(p.155).

Indeed, the same person may be identified as "White" in the US, "Turk" in Germany, "Moslem" in Israel, "European" in China, and "Anatolian" in Turkey.

Each of these definitions brings a whole "package" of expectations and behavioral scripts that could force a person to behave within limits imposed by such definitions. Tajfel (1978) described the experience of West Indian students in Britain who were perceived by Britons as "Blacks," with no attention paid to their self-perceptions. After this environmental reaction, the students did develop "Black consciousness," which they had not previously had (pp.6-7).

One of the important features of current ethnic identity research is that while many studies pay lip service to the fluidity and complexity of identity, they nevertheless focus overwhelmingly on ethnic boundary characteristics and their historical background. Overall, the ethnic boundaries and specific characteristics that underlie ethnic distinctions have become a favorite area of research in the field of ethnic relations. Often, researchers literally vilify the objective insignificance of these characteristics for the outside observer.

Thus, according to M. Seeman (1990):

> Because any observable difference (of speech, dress, appearance, behavior, and so forth) between people can become the basis for such categorical discrimination (that is, differential treatment based upon irrelevant categorical features), it is in some degree an "accident" of history that ethnic, religious, and natural categories have constituted the classic minorities (p. 379).

In a similar way, De Vos (1995) argues that

> . . . group identity can even be maintained by minor differences in linguistic patterns and by styles of gestures. There are many ways in which language patterning fluency or lack of fluency in a second language is related to identity maintenance. (p. 23) . . . An origin

> myth can be created to justify a contemporary political loyalty or new sense of contrasting status enhancing identity (p. 24).

Nagel (1994) cites many examples of the creation of ethnic attributes, from initially "artificial" constructs to important factors of real-life society: these include the distinct Highlanders' culture of Scotland, American-Indian cultural forms and the invention of the Kwanzaa holiday in the US African-American community (pp. 164-165).

However, Allahar (1994) argues that while socially constructed ethnic identity may or may not be primordial or based on wrong cultural/historical assumptions the uncertainty will not prevent people from believing their ethnic attachments are primordial. This primoridiality indeed becomes real in its consequences. When an ethnic identity becomes a part of one's self-concept—attached to the subjective belief that the self belongs to a group with which it shares a common fate--attitudes toward in- and out-group members will then be derived from that ethnic self-concept, even if based on incorrect historical/cultural assumptions.

While non-sociologists may see the process of creating a social identity on the basis of "artificial" criteria as an amusing and strange phenomenon, it is a well-established argument in social psychology. In fact, the theoretical importance of even trivial criteria for group boundary formation is one of the issues that has dominated studies of identity in social psychology since the late 1960s, especially as developed in the social identity theory of Tajfel and Turner (1979). This approach is probably the best developed (theoretically and empirically) and tested theory on identity in a field mostly concerned with interpersonal processes and boundary emergence in groups.

One of the major findings of the research conducted within this paradigm is that people understand their social world in categories; therefore, the categorization of people into groups is an inevitable result of human comprehension of social reality. Social identity was defined "as that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). Social identity (and therefore ethnic identity) in this perspective is closely connected

with memberships in different groups and thus has direct consequences for inter-group behavior. The major premise of social identity theory, then, is that outside groups will always be considered more negatively than one's own groups.[12]

Since individuals will tend to have positive self-concepts and will try to maintain their self-esteem, and since part of their self-concept is defined in terms of group affiliation, an individual will tend to view in-groups favorably in comparison with out-groups. Subsequently, according to this theory, people derive their identity from group membership, such that the members of ethnic groups would tend to carry negative attitudes toward all other ethnic out-groups.

Tajfel (1978) argues that as social relations become "group relations," they first will be "to a large extent independent of individual differences, either in the in-group or in the out-group. Second, it will be, to a large extent, independent of the personal relationships which may exist in other situations between individual members of the two groups" (p. 44). Tajfel further argues that, "some social situations will force most individuals involved, however weak and unimportant to them may their initial group identification have been, to act in terms of their group membership...and enhance for many people the significance to them of the initially weak forms of their group membership" (p. 39).

Tajfel's classic experiments (Tajfel, 1978) have demonstrated how easily group boundary formation can occur, even in the case of insignificant or trivial criteria for group formation. He assumes that after this "differentiator" started to work, "... the subjects structured the situation for themselves as one involving relations between groups, and that they behaved in ways similar to those habitual to them in situations of this kind" (p. 36).

However, since group boundary formation is Tajfel's main interest, the "external differentiator" (or social element) rule has been trivial (for example, color preferences). Also, as a rule only one element has been used for the role of differentiator. While this oversimplification of social reality is indeed important to the "cleanliness" of the experiment, the inevitable consequence is that only one dimension

of the subject's identity is considered. Other limitations include the fact that differences between strong and weak identifiers are ignored, and that no comparison of the effect of different components of identities on out-groups' attitudes is conducted. It remains unclear whether out-group perception varies among strong and weak identifiers and what elements of identity have the strongest effect on out-group perception.

Another relevant approach is the "contact hypothesis," which states that the consequence of inter-group contacts will be favorable when participants are of the same social status and are seeking collective goals. It was developed by Allport (1954), who based his theory on individual motivation, stating that "one of the frequent sources, perhaps the most frequent source, of prejudice lies in the needs and habits that reflect the influence of in-group memberships upon the development of the individual personality"(p. 84).

The contact hypothesis was one of the most notable ideas developed by social psychologists. It was presented as an argument against racial segregation during the US Supreme Court's consideration of the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka case in 1954. Strongly supported by empirical data, the contact hypothesis, combined with some of the elements of social identity theory, has been elaborated into an integrative theory of inter-group prejudice and conflict (Miller and Brewer, 1984).

The basic postulates of this approaches are that:

1. assimilation occurs within category boundaries and contrast between categories, such that all members of the in-group are perceived to be more similar to the self than members of the out-group (the inter-group accentuation principle);
2. positive affect (trust, liking) is selectively generalized to fellow in-group members but not out-group members (the in-group favoritism principle); and

3. inter-group social comparison is associated with perceived negative interdependence between in-group and out-group (the social competition principle) (Brewer, 1997).

Overall, this theoretical approach predicts that in interethnic relations, in-group members will be treated more positively and less trust will be given to out-group members.

While the contact hypothesis was eventually curtailed by necessary qualifications (equal status, positive affect, etc.), it remains the most theoretically and methodologically strong approach to inter-group relations. However, its major weakness (as with other individualistic theories of ethnicity) is its concentration more on personal identity or role identity, ignoring the social origins of ethnic attitudes and ethnic identity.

In their turn, macro-level theories do not pay much attention to individualistic processes. However, macro-level sociologist James Coleman (1957) initially underlined the importance of different levels of strength of social identity, arguing that the process of social identification leads persons

> . . . to identify with groups of which they are members. . . If the strength of this identification is great, it leads the individual to take the organization's position, to accept its reasons and use them as his own. . . All individuals are equipped with a multitude of ties, any of which may be sufficient to pull him into a controversy. If these ties all go to persons and groups on one side, they will all pull in the same direction, and bring him quickly into the controversy; if they opposite one another, he may be 'cross-pressured,' and perhaps withdraw from the controversy (p.18).

By contrast, researchers working at the macro-level (behavior/collective action) have paid most attention to economic and political inequalities at the institutional level, and to historic memories of lost autonomy and repression, as the most important factors in ethnic relations (Gurr, 1993). There are few arguments

against the importance of these structural factors, even if some of the macro-level models, which consider economic or political inequality a general major driving force for ethnic conflicts can be challenged. As Gurr (1993) maintains, among thirty-two politicized minorities of Eastern Europe and the USSR prior to the demise of communism, very few "experienced deliberate economic discrimination or political discrimination" (p. 61). This region currently experiences a number of ethnic conflicts.

An important theoretical approach at the macrolevel is the human needs model of Azar (1990) and Burton and Dukes (1990), which asserts that the basis for ethnic conflict is the shortage of "basic human needs" for members of a particular ethnic group. According to this model, ethnicity is always coherent, the struggle for identity is permanent, and such conflicts inevitably become ethnic in nature and are often protracted.

In an approach that emphasizes situational factors, Gurr and Harff (1994) argue that:

> . . . when people with a shared ethnic identity are discriminated against, they are likely to be resentful and angry . . . A major determinant of the occurrence of ethno-political conflict is the cohesion of the challenging ethnic group (p. 84).

In macro-level theories of ethnic relations, conflict is commonly viewed as an important consequence of highly salient ethnic identity or even as a direct result of it. Here lies the famous "historical memories" approach to ethnic conflict, which explains most of the current such conflicts as a result of century-old feuds between rival groups. However, researchers have found contradictory empirical evidence for this claim.

Indeed, ethnic relations between currently warring groups have often been quite tolerant prior to the start of the hostilities. Moreover, these groups' ethnic identity may not have been very salient before open conflict began (Hudson, Sekulic and Massey, 1994; Yamskov, 1991). Thus, in pre-war Yugoslavia, as Gilliland (1995) argues,

> . . . other dimensions of personal and group identities took precedence over ethno-nationality, at least in some parts of the south Slav regions. Ethno-nationality, as one dimension of identity, did not disappear, but for some, perhaps many southern Slavs, it ceased to make sense to define oneself or others primarily in such terms. In the current war, political leaders and other elites have used ethnic nationality to gain backing for political agendas that may not have been primarily motivated by nationalism itself (p. 212).

Initially, clashes in Uzbekistan's Andizhan region between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyzs have little ethnic content at all. Gleason (1993) pointed out that members of these two ethnic groups are not "physically distinguishable from one another and spoke languages that were closely related, [so] many of the rioting youths donned red or black armbands to distinguish their side from the others side" (p. 333).

Often, only one party to the conflict has a strong ethnic identity, while its ethnicity has not been salient prior to confrontation. For example, Saroyan (1997) argues that the conflict with Armenia and Armenian nationalism strengthened Azeri ethnic identity in late 1980s. He quotes an Azeri journalist who said that:

> We had a weak sense of solidarity in the past and minded our own business. The developments [of the conflict] have helped to unite us. A national feeling and state of awareness have emerged in the community for the first time. We had not observed it in the past. I can say that Azerbaijan has changed. It is as if the Armenian attitude has awakened the people and moved them to safeguard their rights (p. 181).

Importantly, some researchers have concluded that latent ethnic boundaries always existed, and under conditions of conflict ethnic divisions would inevitably resurface even in seemingly tolerant societies and in a relatively short time (Enoch, 1994).

The importance of conflict in strengthening ethnic identity may be confirmed by another example from Yugoslavia's break-up. As Sukic (1996) argues, "....because the language spoken in Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina was a single one, the new nation-states had to enforce language fragmentation along ethnic lines by promoting new language identities" (p. 10). Bosnian Serbs tried to cleanse their language of Turkish and "Croatian" words, Bosnian Moslems introduced Arabic words, while Croats followed suit by enforcing Latin script.

Thus, the mechanisms of ethnic conflict can be quite different from classic "historic memories." What later becomes a serious protracted ethnic conflict may start as a rather political/economic/communal confrontation, with little ethnic content on either side. Conflict itself produces ethnic overtones and finally creates strong ethnic identity, even if initially a trivial factor. Moreover, whatever the initial conditions, the conflict may lead to a situation in which communities of peoples (even with rather blurred borders) may become separate ethnicities with different languages.

The importance of macro-level factors for individual-level psychological processes also may be considered from a different angle, by looking at the effects of population distribution. Blau (1994) underlined the importance of heterogeneity for social processes, arguing that structural conditions make some sort of inter-group relations simply impossible. As Blau argues, "...the greater the heterogeneity, the greater are the chances that fortuitous encounters involve members of different groups" (p. 31).

The result of these encounters may differ, thus making heterogeneity a contradictory factor. On the one hand, the physical absence of an out-group makes inter-group conflict impossible, while a minority's presence creates a structural possibility of conflict. Indeed, the absence of Jews in a particular country makes anti-Semitism impossible, since there is no target for attacks. On the other hand, structural conditions can create an environment for positive inter-group relations--the presence of a minority group may make interracial marriage and friendship possible. (A White person cannot have a Black friend, if there are no Blacks in the community.)

While one of Blau's (1994, p. 40) original theses is that heterogeneity increases the rate of inter-group conflict (since conflict requires a direct contact), another states that heterogeneity promotes inter-group relations (p. 36). The outcome of the particular level of heterogeneity on inter-group relations is, then, the product of intervening variables (such as mobility and inequality in the Blau's model). Still, Blau argues that the different levels of heterogeneity have different effects on inter-group relations. Basing his argument on a major empirical study, he stipulates that for positive ethnic relations micro-heterogeneity is more important than macro-heterogeneity. His proposition that "...ethnic heterogeneity raises the rate of interethnic friendships substantially more if it penetrates into classrooms than if it is confined to the higher level of the school system" (Blau, 1994, p.77) is very relevant for the present research, and in fact will be confirmed in the analysis in chapter 3.

While ethnic self-identification has been widely used in sociological research, it has some serious limitations because it describes only one part of ethnic identity. For example, an otherwise strong ethnic identifier (say, Russian) may not indicate a high level of prejudice toward a group for which a significant distance is not felt (such as Ukrainians). This situation would confuse researchers working in the "standard" paradigm, who might expect strong ethnic identifiers would have negative feelings toward all out-groups in accordance with social identity theory. Indeed, the latter postulates that social identification always presupposes boundary formation. This research treats social identification as a distancing in relation to different groups on different levels, with borderlines sometimes being rather blurred or sometimes extremely salient.

Ethnic distinctiveness is thus considered a result of several micro-factors: self-identification, parents' identification, language, ethnic heterogeneity at the school level; one can look as well to macro-factors--ethnic heterogeneity at the regional and country levels, and the intensity of ethnic conflict in society.

The line of argument behind this research is as follows. Since ethnic identity has not been a major factor in social processes in the USSR prior to Gorbachev

reforms, ethnic boundaries blurred and ethnicity was not salient. The ethnic structuring of the Soviet Union by the communist authorities can be considered the real-world counterpart of the "external differentiator" in Tajfel's experiments. When post-Soviet societies became fully independent and more ethnically-structured countries, social tensions often were perceived as ethnic ones; therefore, some social and political events (government actions, media reports, etc.) became interpreted by individuals as a threat to the welfare of their ethnic group.

These processes have led to a rise in the salience of ethnic identity, with an increasing formation of boundaries. While in general the processes have been quite similar among all post-Soviet societies, the occurrence of an open ethnic conflict in some of them has caused an made especially pronounced distancing from the opposite groups, acting as a an intervening factor. Another important factor here is ethnic heterogeneity, which plays a somewhat different role on different societal levels: while on the micro-level its effects on inter-ethnic relations have been positive, on the macro-level it has either been negative or positive, since it has involved different mechanisms and created structural conditions for conflict interactions.

Thus, analysis of the effects of ethnic conflict and the population's ethnic homogeneity on ethnic identity is important feature in this research. It allows an analysis and comparison of the little-studied effect of the social system on ethnic identity processes. The continuous nature of the ethnic distinctiveness variable allows detailed study of the effect of the different components and the factors influencing students' ethnic identity, including conflict, ethnic self-identification, parents' ethnic identity, ethnic language, level of interaction with outsiders, level of ethnic homogeneity at both the macro- and micro-levels, parents' education, religious strength, gender, and family income.

In this research, the following questions are addressed, with specific research hypotheses elaborated later (see p. 39):

- What impact does the ethnic homogeneity of the population have on ethnic identity?

- How does inter-group conflict influence perceptions of being different from other ethnic groups?
- What is the relative strength of one element of ethnic identity versus others?
- What role does parents' ethnic identification play in ethnic self-identification?
- How do the different elements of ethnic identity influence perceptions of being different from other ethnic groups?
- In which countries does the suggested model work better than others and what intervening variables may influence it?

This study is purposely limited in scope to analyses of the direct effect of the above- mentioned variables on ethnic distinctiveness, leaving more complex combined and interaction effects to be examined in future research.

CHAPTER 2

METHODS, CONCEPTS, AND MEASUREMENT

The data for this analysis were collected from students in their final years of high school in the former USSR, using probability sampling procedures. Data were collected in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Belorus, Russia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan from May 1993 to May 1995. The surveys were mainly conducted through the Institute of Comparative Social Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Sociology Department, Moscow State University, and its Survey Research Center. Both collected complete listings of high schools in the countries. Schools were selected at random from official records of the numbers of schools.

The probability samples in each country consisted of students in both the 9th and 11th (graduating) years of secondary school. All students in the 9th and 11th grades in the selected schools were included in the sample. Exact context or time of administration (e.g., in social studies classes, after school) was determined on site as appropriate to the school. Native university students were hired to explain, conduct, and monitor the surveys. All schools were enumerated in each of five selected regions within respective countries; eight schools were chosen using systematic random sampling procedures.[13]

The interviewers in each selected region started at the first school and then went to the second and so on until 200 questionnaires had been completed. However, once a school has been selected, all students in the 9th and 11th grades in that school completed questionnaires. Thus, the exact number of respondents in each country varies slightly. In Russia and Ukraine, the sample sites were doubled to 2,000 to take into account the larger populations in these countries.

Since the samples represent only one age group (14 to17-year-old high-school students), the generalizability of the results is limited to that age group and not to the entire population. At the same time, this method of sampling has many advantages.

First, there was a common population group in each republic to compare. Thus, the factor of age is in a sense "controlled." Second, this age group is relatively pristine in the sense that it is least likely to have been subject to historical events and life experiences that can differentially affect the perceptions being studied here. Third, this group will comprise the next generation of adults in these states, as well as the group that will be primarily called on to defend or act on behalf of that state should armed forces be necessary.

It is further the case that this method of sampling (i.e., through the schools) provides a sampling frame that comprises a solid, scientific base for ensuring that all students have an equal or known chance of selection. This is far more difficult to achieve through household samples because of the incomplete and often obsolete lists of people in the former Soviet Union, the problem of respondent selection in communal housing situations, and the difficulties in achieving uniform interviewing procedures. Moreover, because of the willing cooperation and clear hierarchy among school officials, it became possible to achieve quite a high response rate (well above 90%) among those students selected in the samples, with the main source of non-response being the non-inclusion of students who did not happen to attend school on the day the surveys were conducted (no advanced warning was given to the students, so having to complete the surveys was not a reason for not being in school that day).

Nonetheless, some proportion of that age cohort was left out of the sample: potential respondents who were sick or absent from school on the date of data collection, and dropouts. However, no significant difference was found after a comparison of sample distribution by demographic and ethnic composition with census data. This probably means that the dropout rate is low or random with respect to ethnicity. It indirectly reflects the representativiness of the sample procedures used in this research.

A further advantage of this sampling method is that it achieves a high degree of uniformity of survey administration across schools and republics. Usually in each school, all students in the 9th and 11th grades were simply included and asked to fill

out the questionnaires in their classrooms. A trained survey administrator gave an introduction to the survey and how it was to be filled out (deliberately not mentioning that it was part of a U.S. venture, to avoid biasing responses set among the participating students).

Students were then asked to complete the survey in the privacy of their own desk with the administrator present to answer questions. Written uniform instructions also were provided on the cover page of the questionnaire; these further indicated the anonymity and confidentiality of the students' responses.

In each republic, the survey questions were translated and back translated into the native language. The survey administrators were of the same nationality as most of the students to whom they administered the questionnaire. If Russian students in that republic were selected into the sample, administrators gave a form in Russian to them. During the collection of the original data, the survey administrators used anonymous questionnaires, making it impossible to identify respondents. When students in the room had completed the forms, they put them face down on the desk of the survey administrator (much as they would in a written test) in order to maintain anonymity.

Such data collection method utilized in a group-setting environment also can be questioned on the basis of its ability to eventually distort responses toward more socially desirable ones. In order to prevent this from happening, a neutral administrator was present, supervising the procedure and preventing discussion of questions. Unfortunately, the original data set did not include social desirability scales, which could help control for any distortions.

To enhance generalizability and scientific confidence in such data collections, the 1991-1992 Russian surveys were designed around a methodological experiment to test whether two different research organizations, using independent national probability samples, would arrive at consistent estimates and conclusions. One Russian sample was interviewed by the Institute of Social and Political Research at the Russian Academy of Sciences in December and January 1991-1992 (n=4,213 students in their graduating year of secondary school), and the other by the Department of

Sociology at Moscow State University in February and March 1992 (n=1,950 such students). The results from the two surveys were within sampling error of each other for about 150 of the 170 common items. Differences for some of the remaining 20 items could be attributed to different translations. These results help establish this sampling approach in the (former) Soviet Union as a model for standard probability sample data collection among school-age youth.

While survey methods can be used in effective evaluation of ethnic relations in a society since they describe the attitudes of the general population, few researchers have used survey data in ethnic studies in non-Western countries and most studies are based on theoretical assumptions rather than on statistical data. This is especially true for studies in countries of the former communist bloc. Moreover, of those public opinion samples conducted in the former Soviet Union, few have been based on a solid probability basis. In the past, both Soviet researchers and interviewers were more comfortable with quota selection procedures that had introduced arbitrary selection criteria for respondents that had made such procedures suspect in the West. Even now, those administering household surveys of adults encounter sampling difficulties in terms of complete lists, area coverage on a true probability basis, interviewer training, and field quality control.

Unlike those studies, the universe of school-age children can be well covered because these youth are in school, there are complete lists of schools, and school officials have been almost universally cooperative in providing access to students in their schools. The opportunity to administer questionnaires to groups of students simultanously in the school setting means considerable cost savings over individual interviews, and ensures standardized administration of questions. Previous research in the region (Robinson et al., 1992, 1993) indicates that interviewing was easily done in the school setting when a trained and neutral administrator was present, and that school officials were interested in participating and helpful (with less than 5% overall refusal or non-response).

The results in Table 4 show the actual sample distribution in each country, with the majority being the titular nation (Ukranians in Ukraine, etc.) and minority being ethnic Russians in all countries, except Russia, where Tatars are the main minority. The sample ethnic distribution is close to the census data in Table 2. The differences are probably due to the population shifts, especially the emigration of ethnic Russians from Central Asia.

Conceptualization

The key theoretical concepts in the proposed research are Ethnic Identification, Ethnic Distinctiveness, Parent's Ethnic Identification, Extent of Out-group Contact, Level of Interactions with Ethnic Groups, Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Homogeneity, Parents' Education, Language, Religion, Gender, and Income.

The two largest ethnic groups in each former Soviet republic are selected as a majority and a minority. The majority group is sometimes called "a titular group"(i.e. Ukrainians in Ukraine), while the minority is usually Russians. In each country, the opposite group means the majority from the point of view of the minority and vice versa. Exact measurement details are shown in the Appendix.

Table 4: Sample Ethnic Distribution

Country	Respondent ethnicity						Total
	Majority		Minority		Others		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Russia 1993	1,993	87	135	6	150	7	2,278
Ukraine 1995	1,731	85	273	13	4	2	2,008
Belorus 1993	836	84	116	12	4	5	956
Moldova 1994	660	66	135	14	200	20	995
Georgia 1995	849	83	4	5	126	12	979
Armenia 1995	1,012	100	0	0	1	0	1,013
Azerbaijan 1995	943	98	15	2	1	0	959
Latvia 1996	293	58	163	33	4	9	460
Kazakstan 1995	550	56	297	30	135	14	982
Tajikistan 1995	705	71	2	2	266	27	973
Kyrgyzstan 1995	607	64	154	16	186	20	947
Total	10,179	80	1,294	11	1,077	10	12,550

Dependent Variable

The main dependent variable for this research is ethnic distinctiveness--the perceived difference in personal characteristics between one's own ethnic group and an out-group, usually a minority. As discussed in more detail below and in the Appendix, this variable describes the extent to which majority respondents see their own ethnic group as different from the ethnic minority. A larger difference reflects a larger distance of "we" from "them" along a social continuum. The lack of a difference would suggest an absence of boundaries. Pilot studies indicate that the direction of the difference is almost always positive (i.e., one's own group is perceived as having more positive characteristic). Still, a negative difference would mean a lower evaluation of own group, perhaps reflecting self-hatred.

Independent Variables

The following variables were used to predict differences in ethnic distinctiveness.

Ethnic identification is a subjective perception of having a common fate with members of a specific group; thus, being "Russian" means that respondents consider themselves as part of the community of people defined as "Russians," have emotional attachments with the historical facts and figures associated with Russian ethnicity, see the future of the community as their own, and so on. Of course, the strength of these attachments differs across Russian identifiers--they may be exceptionally strong among some people and quite weak among others. This reflects the extent to which a person values one's ethnicity. The importance of ethnic identity varies across society, being stronger among some groups in the population and almost disappearing among others. This definition is continuous: different persons can view the importance of ethnicity at different levels.

Parents' ethnic identification is the ethnic identification of the student's parents. If one parent is from the majority ethnic group and the other is from other (not largest minority) group, it would mean a higher association with the majority

group and not with the largest minority group. For example, a person with a Ukrainian mother and an Armenian father in Ukraine would feel stronger associations with Ukrainians than with Russians, even though his father is a member of a minority group and Russians are the largest minority. So, since parents may be of different ethnicities, this variable represents the combination of ethnic messages received by the respondent.

Language is the language usually spoken by the respondent. Use of the titular language would probably reflect higher ethnic identification with the titular group and vice versa.

Ethnic homogeneity is the proportion of members of the titular ethnic groups in the respondent's proximity, such as classroom or school (first level), within the larger region (second level) or within society (third level). A high level of ethnic homogeneity presupposes infrequent and indirect contact between the respondent and representatives of different ethnic groups.

Extent of out-group contact indicates the reported level of interaction with members of an ethnic group outside one's own.

Conflict reflects the intensity of ethnic confrontations between majority and minority groups, which may involve armed conflict, demonstrations, etc., as described in chapter 1, pp. 12-16.

Control Variables

The following four variables were used as control variables in many of the multivariate analyses.

Family income is a subjective assessment of income available in the respondents' family. A higher level of income is associated with higher tolerance to the out-group and therefore with lower ethnic distinctiveness.

Religious strength is the reported strength of the respondent's religious beliefs. A higher level of religious strength is associated with higher ethnic self-identification and therefore with lower ethnic distinctiveness.

Parents' education is the reported highest level of education achieved by the respondents' parents.

Gender is the self-reported gender of the respondent.

Processes

The unit of analysis in the proposed research is the individual. The processes described below relate to the individual's social-psychological processes. These processes will be considered for all countries in the sample and for each country separately.

Figure 1 shows a conceptual model of ethnic distinctiveness resulting from combined effects of micro and macro factors, such as conflict, ethnic identification, ethnic homogeneity, and other ethnic variables. Ethnic conflict and homogeneity in a society play the roles of moderator variables in increasing the level of ethnic distinctiveness.

According to social identity theory, a perceived threat to ethnic group welfare increases ethnocentrism and perceived group differences (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Indeed, perceived threat exacerbates in-group/out-group differences such that out-group members overestimate the prevalence of negative attributes and underestimate the prevalence of positive attributes of the opposite group; conversely, in-group members overestimate the prevalence of positive attributes and underestimate the prevalence of negative attributes.

Strong ethnic identifiers with the majority group perceive greater distance from the out-groups and vice versa (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Respondents with parents whose ethnic identification is closer to the majority ethnic group also should develop a higher level of out-group distancing. Closer experience with a member of an out-group should help in resisting negative stereotyping, so that a higher level of ethnic



Figure 1: Model of Processes

heterogeneity should be associated with lower national distinctiveness. At the same time, those respondents with low social status associated with low parental education and low income should develop a higher level of out-group prejudice (Adorno et al. 1950).

Homogeneity should have certain impacts on respondents. For example, a low level of homogeneity on the micro-level should allow close personal contacts between groups, since members of both groups belong to the same social and age group. According to the contact hypothesis, these factors would lead to a lower level of distancing from the outside ethnic group. Indeed, students located in the same high school as a rule come from the same neighborhood, and presumably from the same social class. They have common goals, there is minimal competition between groups,

and contact is sanctioned by the school administration (including the variety of extracurricular activities). According to the contact theory, these conditions should reduce ethnic divisions (Allport, 1954). At the macro-level, heterogeneity may have positive as well as negative effects (Blau, 1994).

Operationalization

The measure of ethnic distinctiveness (independent variable) as described in the Appendix was developed from six rating scales covering different personal characteristics of own ethnic group as opposed to those for the contrasting ethnic group ("friendly-unfriendly," "hard working-lazy," "peace loving-aggressive," "open-shy," "willing to help others-care only about themselves," "trustworthy-untrustworthy"). Perception of the ethnic group as friendly or trustworthy was considered to be a product of personal behavioral experience--not necessarily implying direct contacts with members of such a group, since such perceptions could result from the mass media or peer group information. For the measure of distancing respondents were asked to evaluate different characteristics of both the nationality group and the contrast group on six 5-point scales, covering relative levels of friendliness, trustworthiness, openness, hardworking, and willingness to help others. Where necessary, these variables were recoded to assign larger values to the positive evaluations [(1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1)]. Factor analysis of these variables (conducted for the whole sample, both for the contrasting group only and for the majority group separately) yielded a single factor.

Two new variables were created--one by summing the values of variables that evaluated the personal characteristics of majority group, and another by summing the values of variables that referred to the same characteristic of the minority group. These new variables are indicators of positive evaluations of each nationality group. The larger the value of the new variable, the larger the positive perception of this ethnic group.

The difference between these two variables (the first one minus the second one) is the overall level of ethnic distinctiveness between opposite ethnic groups. A high level of

distinctiveness from the minority for the ethnic majority respondent would then yield a high value on this variable. Zero would mean no difference, and therefore no ethnic distinction between groups. If a minority respondent's responses produce a high positive score on the ethnic distinctiveness variable, the respondent sees the majority nationality as having more positive characteristics than the minority. Such a result probably can be interpreted as a recognition of the dominant status of the titular nation.

Example. For an ethnic Ukrainian respondent in Ukraine who rates Ukrainians as very friendly (coded as 5), in large part peace-loving (4), very hardworking (5), in large part trustworthy (4), very much willing to help others (5), and very open (5), the sum of these scales produces a combined score of 28. At the same time, if his evaluations of ethnic Russians are 3, 4, 2, 4, 3, and 2, correspondingly, this produces a combined score of 18. In this example, the ethnic Ukrainian student evaluates his in-group more favorably than ethnic Russians. He sees them as less friendly and less open, while at the same time exhibiting the same "peace-loving" quality. The difference in the combined evaluation of the ethnic Ukrainians vs. ethnic Russians is thus 10 (28 - 18). The larger this score, the more distance Ukrainian respondents place between their in-group and the Russian out-group. However, if this score would equal 0, for example, then the Ukrainian respondent sees no distance between the in-group and out-group. In this case, these groups are seen as one group without categorical borders. If this score is negative, then it means this Ukrainian respondent perceives his own ethnic group as somewhat inferior to ethnic Russians.

Overall, this measure shows the absolute value of the gap between perceptions of own vs. out-group. It avoids asking a direct question such as, "How do you like this ethnic group," which may create difficulties for respondents who may be reluctant to provide negative evaluations. On the other hand, this measure works much better than the Bogardus social distance scale: our pilot studies show that students had difficulty understanding Bogardus scale items.

Ethnic identification was measured using a combination of two variables: self-identification and importance of ethnic identity (see Appendix). Self-identification was measured by asking an open-ended question "What is your ethnicity?" In the current

case, a denotative definition is used based on how a person is defined via of Census Bureau categories. Though some people have difficulty in defining themselves, the Soviet system defined their ethnicity quite categorically at the age of 16 (which is the age group covered in the sample). If a respondent's parents were of same ethnicity, the child would acquire that ethnicity. If parents were from two different ethnic groups, the child would choose between these two ethnicities at the age of 16. The self-reported ethnicity was recoded into three categories: 0=minority, 1=others, 2= titular.

Importance of ethnic identity was measured by asking respondents to describe whether their ethnic identity was (1) very important, (2) somewhat important, or (3) not important to them. These two variables were combined with strong ethnic identifiers--the titular group was coded as 7 (the highest score) and strong ethnic identifiers of the minority group were coded as 0 (the lowest score). The scale goes from strong ethnic identifiers of the titular group to the weaker identifiers of the titular group, then to the identifiers of the other ethnic groups, to weak minority identifiers and then to the strong minority identifiers (see Appendix).

Parental ethnicity was measured by recoding the open-ended questions, "What is your mother's ethnicity?" and "What is your father's ethnicity?" into a single variable in the following order: if both parents were of the titular ethnic group, the variable code was 7; if the father was titular and mother was not titular and not minority, then the code was 6; if mother was titular and father was not titular and not minority, the code was 5; if the father was titular and the mother was minority, then the code was 4, if the mother was a titular and father was a minority, the code was 3; if the mother was a minority and the father was not a minority and not titular, the code was 2; if the father was a minority and the mother was not a minority and not titular, the code was 1; and if both parents were minority, the code was 0. All other combinations were recoded as 4 (middle of the scale)(see Appendix).

Language was measured by asking respondents what language they use in everyday life. This was recoded into (0) Minority (1) Other, and (2) Titular. Missing data were recoded into the middle of the scale (1).

Extent of out-group contact indicates the general level of interaction with members of an ethnic group outside one's own. Respondents were asked to choose one of five possible responses: (1) "I interact only within my own ethnic group," (2) "I interact mostly within my own ethnic group," (3) "I interact equally with my own and other ethnic groups," (4) "I interact mostly with other ethnic groups," and (5) "I interact only with other ethnic groups." These responses were treated as equally spaced points on a continuous scale, with response (1) reflecting the lowest level of out-group openness and response (5) reflecting the maximum level of openness to out-groups. 'No answers' were recoded into the middle of the scale (3).

Ethnic homogeneity on the micro-level was measured at the level of the high school. The number of titular students in a particular school was divided by the total number of respondents in this school. The resulting variable was recoded into 10 intervals. A high level of ethnic homogeneity at the micro-level is associated with high values for this variable and vice versa.

Ethnic homogeneity on the regional level was measured at the regional level. The number of members of the titular group in a particular region was divided by the total population in that region. For larger countries, regions were identified through administrative units called oblasts (the equivalent of states in the US). The resulting variable was recoded into 10 intervals. A high level of ethnic homogeneity at the region level is presumably associated with the high values of this variable and vice versa.

Ethnic homogeneity at the country level was measured at the country level, using census data.

Conflict was measured on the basis of literature reviews for each country as discussed in chapter 1 (pp. 6-10). The scale goes from 0 (no conflict) to 3 (protracted military ethnic conflict).

Parents' education is based on the highest educational degree received as reported by students. The lowest point in the scale is "some secondary-school," the highest point is "graduate school degree."

Family income was reported as a subjective evaluation of a respondent's family's financial standing. The lowest point is "poverty" and the highest is "family has unlimited spending potential." While this scale does not measure the actual amount of money made by the family (of which respondent may not be aware), it does reflect a perception of relative deprivation, which is an important concern for this research.

Hypotheses

Basic Hypotheses

The following basic hypotheses were tested. The degree of ethnic distinctiveness was expected to increase as a function of:

1. Greater extent of in-group contact. A greater extent of in-group contact should produce less interaction with the outside group, according to the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954), leading to less positive attitudes toward the latter. An integrative theory of inter-group prejudice and conflict (Miller and Brewer 1984) also supports this point.
2. Stronger importance of ethnic identity. This importance leads to stronger attachments to the in-group and lower evaluations of the out-group, according to Tajfel (1978), producing higher ethnic distance between a respondent's group and the contrast group.
3. Higher level of parents' titular identification. A higher level of parents' titular identification should produce higher titular identification for the student and thus lead to greater distancing from the contrast group, following hypothesis 2.
4. Higher level of titular language identification. More frequent use of the majority language means less experience with the minority out-group and the creation of negative stereotypes. Respondents with greater identification with the majority language should be closer to the majority

ethnic group and should have a less positive out-group experience and develop a higher level of out-group distancing.

5. Higher level of homogeneity at the micro-level. A high level of ethnic homogeneity presupposes infrequent and indirect contact between the respondent and representatives of different ethnic groups. In this case, members of both groups belong to the same social and age group. According to the contact hypothesis, these factors would lead to a low level of distancing from the outside ethnic group (Allport,1954). Conversely, a higher level of ethnic homogeneity would lead to higher level of distancing. Blau (1994) also stipulates that micro-heterogeneity is more important than macro-heterogeneity for positive ethnic relations. Effects of the latter may vary from positive to negative depending on the intervening variables.

6. Lower parental education. Many studies have found that a higher educational level is associated with more tolerance for minorities. The higher educational standing of parents may mediate greater acceptance of out-groups among students. Gibson and Duch (1992) argue that education works in several ways: by increasing analytical abilities and therefore resistance to stereotypes, and by instilling values of equality and tolerance. Hamilton et al. (1995) argue that people with higher education and at the top of a stratification system hold more autonomous attitudes. These findings are consistent with most North American studies, which show that education creates individuals with less authoritarianism and more tolerant views as in Altemeyer (1988) and Kohn (1990).

7. Lower level of family income. It is expected that respondents with low social status due to low income will develop a higher level of out-group prejudice (Adorno et al., 1950).

8. Higher levels of inter-group conflict in the society. Higher levels of inter-group conflict should lead to greater salience of ethnic identity and

distancing from the other group, since they create a direct or perceived threat to ethnic group welfare. According to social identity theory, this increases ethnocentrism and perceived group differences (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). A perceived threat exacerbates in-group/out-group differences in valence inaccuracy such that out-group members overestimate the prevalence of negative attributes and underestimate the prevalence of positive attributes. In-group members overestimate the prevalence of positive attributes and underestimate the prevalence of negative attributes (Ryan, Park and Judd, 1996).

CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

Descriptive Findings on General Inter-Group Perceptions

Before proceeding to the multivariate analysis of variables in the model, some results from ethnicity-related questions will be discussed, mostly using a "like-dislike" evaluation of ethnic groups (see Appendix). As Table 5 demonstrates, there are significant differences in ethnic attitudes between ethnic minorities and titular ethnic respondents and respondents across these countries.

Titular Ethnic Respondents' Perceptions

The majority ethnic group respondents evaluate their own ethnic group at a very high level: from 97% of Azeris to 85% of Belorusians said they like or like very much their own ethnic group (see Table 5). Their attitudes towards other ethnic groups differ somewhat: while titulars generally evaluate ethnic Russians less positively than themselves, those numbers range widely--from a high of 90% in Tajikistan to a low of 49% in Azerbaijan. Among those ethnically closest to Russians, Slavic nations (Ukrainians and Belorusians), the ratings of Russians are relatively high (74% and 80%). Still, these results are not far from those for some Moslem/Turkic countries such as Kyrgyzstan (70%).

This phenomenon is interesting: the positive characteristics of Russians have little to do with titular groups' religious affiliations and/or language. As Table 5 demonstrates, while ratings of ethnic Russians vary across Christian and Moslem nationalities, they do not clearly correspond with religious affiliations. Moreover, reported attitudes of the titular respondents in general indicate higher positive attitudes towards Western/ industrialized nations than toward former Soviet "brothers." Indeed, for all countries in the sample, Americans and Italians were among the three most liked outside ethnic groups (except in Tajikistan, where Iranians were

Table 5: Ethnic Perceptions of High School Students (% "like" or "like very much")

	COUNTRY																											
	Russia		Ukraine			Belorus			Moldova			Georgia			Armenia		Azerbaijan			Kazakstan			Tajikistan			Kyrgyzstan		
	Russians	Others	Russians	Others	Titular	Russians	Others	Titular	Russians	Others	Titular	Russians	Others	Titular	Others	Titular	Russians	Others	Titular	Russians	Others	Titular	Russians	Others	Titular	Russians	Others	Titular
Russians	88	78	89	74	74	88	77	80	89	77	63	90	68	58	*	72	*	55	49	83	77	68	82	94	90	84	74	70
Ukrainians	62	61	59	75	90	53	70	57	69	75	52	75	51	43	*	33	*	33	52	60	63	39	50	35	56	64	35	32
Belorusians	57	47	49	59	57	75	80	85	56	55	36	35	44	51	*	36	*	20	33	47	39	28	50	61	50	51	34	24
Moldovans	50	44	41	42	37	33	21	32	34	43	86	29	22	28	*	30	*	25	25	31	26	21	50	37	39	47	25	22
Georgians	19	29	22	17	22	16	17	12	23	31	22	91	80	92	*	12	*	20	39	22	26	21	25	41	36	41	27	20
Armenians	17	28	22	22	19	13	14	10	15	18	17	75	40	40	*	94	*	13	1	25	19	19	38	24	35	24	32	10
Azeris	15	26	15	16	12	14	9	8	14	23	15	28	37	21	*	2	*	82	97	16	18	21	33	32	35	26	36	16
Estonians	32	38	25	39	31	28	28	26	26	32	42	13	22	16	*	10	*	*	29	29	23	22	14	42	41	32	24	17
Latvians	32	33	24	43	29	28	30	24	24	33	41	36	38	47	*	33	*	*	28	25	19	20	14	40	47	27	19	17
Lithuanians	31	35	31	41	36	33	29	30	24	30	43	48	36	46	*	34	*	33	32	26	21	20	13	37	37	24	24	18
Kazaks	25	35	20	23	19	16	19	19	29	26	21	41	62	26	*	22	*	20	43	41	45	93	38	73	35	36	57	86
Tajiks	15	23	15	25	12	8	12	9	10	14	16	21	23	13	*	5	*	25	39	13	14	30	48	63	95	28	39	20
Kyrgyz	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	43	68	50	42	52	87
Uzbeks	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	50	88	63	50	61	36
Tatars	22	62	16	22	11	9	9	10	13	12	12	6	11	12	*	4	*	*	49	28	49	32	39	37	33	44	40	20
Germans	49	52	48	55	52	54	63	52	48	70	70	63	57	64	*	65	*	17	65	68	72	47	43	33	42	69	50	51
Jews	28	35	29	36	24	19	26	15	31	41	35	41	50	48	*	44	*	25	30	35	35	32	33	45	29	37	35	35
Japanese	44	45	35	45	45	34	42	35	37	48	60	58	57	48	*	58	*	75	73	32	44	53	50	64	52	55	62	70
Chinese	33	37	29	44	35	26	26	31	26	38	49	48	44	38	*	41	*	33	46	22	16	21	50	44	52	34	37	31
Americans	73	65	64	64	72	86	78	71	69	77	86	77	80	78	*	87	*	75	80	68	69	71	89	78	76	81	77	75
Italians	67	52	60	60	67	78	68	67	69	78	83	74	84	79	*	87	*	56	64	61	62	72	*	65	71	82	81	72

the second most liked group and Americans the third). This holds even for conservative Central Asian and Moslem groups, which presumably are more Moslem-oriented.

On the other hand, there are many differences at the other end of the scale—namely, in attitudes toward the least liked groups. In most cases, these are the former Soviet groups. In Slavic countries (Russia, Ukraine, Belorus), these peoples are from the Caucasus/Central Asia (for example, Azeris, Georgians, Tajiks, and Armenians). The probable reason is these immigrants' involvement in traditionally disliked occupations (such as street trade). On the other hand, the least likable ethnic groups in Central Asian countries and Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) are not Russians, but some other ethnic groups.

For example, the least liked group among ethnic Azeris in Azerbaijan is Armenians (1%, like) and vice versa (2%), while ethnic Russians are rated much higher (49% in Azerbaijan said they like Russians, vs. 72% in Armenia). Undoubtedly, the reason for the contrast is the Armenian-Azerbaijan war. At the same time, the attitudes of Russians in Russia toward ethnic Azeris and Armenians are quite negative in each case: only 15% and 17% of Russian students, respectively, said they like them.

Thus, attitudes toward Azeris in Russia have very little to do with attitudes toward Russians in Azerbaijan since little interaction occurs between these two countries. It seems that when asked to evaluate ethnic Russians, majority group respondents evaluate local Russians (or perhaps Russian policy toward their country) and not ethnic Russians in the far away Russian Federation.

Ethnic Russian Respondents' Perceptions

Ethnic Russians in non-Russian countries rate themselves very high (between 82 and 90 percent say they "like" Russians or "like them very much"). This indicates considerable self-approval of the ethnic Russian and probably shows a high level of ethnic self-identification.

At the same time, their ranking of the majority titular group differs considerably across countries. The highest ratings given by ethnic Russians to the titular group was in Georgia (91%) and the lowest in Moldova (34%), where considerable ethnic conflict between the titular ethnic group and ethnic Russians broke out in 1991.

Table 6 provides a useful comparison of reciprocity between the attitudes of titular ethnic groups and ethnic Russians within each country. With the exception of Georgia, titular respondents give higher ratings to ethnic Russians than ethnic Russians give to them. In other words, Russians express less positive views of the majority group. One possible explanation is the Russian's overall dissatisfaction with their sudden minority status after the USSR's disintegration and possible distrust of the majority group now in control. At the same time, titular groups probably do not see Russians as a major threat to their dominant status; as a result, they view Russians mostly positively. (Georgia, the exception, may be explained by the Russian government's support of separatist movements there.)

The differences between these two ratings are the lowest in Ukraine and Belorus (the ethnically closest nations to Russia) and significantly higher in other countries where dominant groups differ in ethnic terms.

Table 6: Comparison of Reciprocal Ratings of Russian and Titular Ethnic Groups within each country (% "like" or "like very much")

	Ukraine	Belorus	Moldova	Georgia	Kazakstan	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan
Titular respondents who say they like Russians	74	80	63	58	68	70	90
Russian respondents who say they like titulars	59	75	34	91	41	42	48
Percent Difference	15	15	29	-33	27	28	42

Note: Armenia, Azerbaijan were not included in this table, due to very small numbers of ethnic Russians in the samples. Russia was excluded, since Russians are the titular group in that country

Institutional Effects on Ethnic Identity Importance

A comparison of Ukrainian sample results with data taken from earlier research by Robinson, Gurr, Kurbanov, McHale, and Slepenkov (1993) indicates that for majority and minority groups in that country, attitudinal changes were in large part the same across time, indicating overall growth in the significance of ethnicity in social life (Table 7). Indeed, while in 1992 just 4 percent of ethnic Russians in Ukraine said that ethnic identity was important to them; after three years, this number increased to 20%. Thus, ethnicity, an almost trivial social factor in 1992, is becoming more and more important to the new Russian minority generation in Ukraine.

Many of the same developments can be seen among Ukrainian youth, with a higher level of ethnic awareness: while 24% percent of ethnic Ukrainian respondents indicated in 1992 that ethnicity was very important to them, this number increased to 35% in 1995. Moreover, the proportion of ethnic Russians speaking the Ukrainian language and ethnic Ukrainians speaking the Russian language slowly decreasing. While independence brought more attention to teaching the Ukrainian language, the proportion of ethnic Russian respondents speaking only Ukrainian declined to the low

Table 7: Ethnic Concerns of Students in Ukraine (% agree/completely agree)

	Ukrainians		Russians	
	1992 n= (352)	1995 (1,723)	1992 (100)	1995 (271)
My ethnic identity is very important to me.	24	35	4	20
I speak Ukrainian all the time.	57	62	18	8
I speak Russian all the time.	45	32	81	89
I interact only/mostly with my own ethnic group.	36	34	18	21
I interact equally with my own and other ethnic groups.	62	63	77	76
I interact only/mostly with other ethnic groups.	3	4	5	3

level of 8%. At the same time, the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians speaking only Russian was down from 45% in 1995 to 32% three years later, a significant change in the importance of an ethnic language.

Surprisingly, the level of interethnic contacts remains virtually the same across the three-year period. The differences between 1992 and 1995 for both groups is 3 points or less, indicating a high level of inter-group interaction. The extent of this interaction for ethnic Russians is higher than for ethnic Ukrainians, probably because of their overall lower numbers in the population.

Thus, while Ukraine managed to avoid a much feared ethnic confrontation and is still considered tolerant, the data indicate growing ethnic concern by ethnic Russians perhaps due to their dissatisfaction with this minority status. One possible explanation for this change is the significant institutional change that strongly affected the social status of ethnic Russians. From being a powerful majority in a superpower state, they suddenly became a minority in a poor Eastern European country.

This institutional change has created a new social environment that emphasizes "Ukrainianess." For example, the high school curriculum is different and less Russian-centered. New history textbooks have been introduced that focus on the history of Ukraine and its national heroes. The history of the Soviet people and Russia are no longer considered common, but treated as separate phenomena. Historical and current events are being interpreted from a Kiev point of view, not Moscow's. State symbols are different, while a switch to the majority language is slowly taking place. Thus, a new generation of Ukrainian youth is receiving a different societal message that may lead to the increased importance of ethnic elements in their social identity. However, this message has different meaning for majority and minority ethnic groups.

Still, as Van Knippenberg (1989) argues, "...when group boundaries are permeable, the dominant strategy of social identity enhancement for low status group members is to join higher status groups" (pp. 64-65). This is exactly what happened in Ukraine, where some people who declared themselves to be ethnic Russians in Soviet times, now choose to declare themselves ethnic Ukrainian (U.S. Bureau of Census

report cited in RFE/RL Report, 9/16/97). However, this may occur only among people qualified to be so by having a parent who is an ethnic Ukrainian. For others, stronger in-group identification will be inevitable (Van Knippenberg, 1989, p. 65). Data clearly indicate a rapid growth in the numbers of ethnic Russians emphasizing the importance of their ethnic identification. As demonstrated below, these processes are further exacerbated in countries with open ethnic conflicts.

Effect of Macro and Micro Factors on Ethnic Distinctiveness

Analysis of the impact of the various predictors of ethnic distancing is conducted separately for different levels: individual, sub-national, and national.

Thus,

1. Effects of individual-level variables are evaluated by using the analysis of variance (ANOVA) multiple classification analysis (MCA) procedure in SPSS/PC, which allows effective estimation of the model for individual-level variables.
2. Effects of sub-national-level variables (e.g., homogeneity of the school or region) are estimated using the relatively new Hierarchical Linear Modeling procedure designed specifically for analysis of nested data (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992). The model is run on two levels. The first level represents the original individual-level model, and the second level describes the effects of school and regional homogeneity.
3. Effects of national-level factors (e.g., country homogeneity and ethnic conflict) are estimated using the comparative model suggested by Ragin (1987). Since the number of cases for the country-level analysis is limited (11 countries), quantitative analysis does not seem appropriate and a rather qualitative comparison is used instead; this involves analyzing effects of country homogeneity and ethnic conflict within each country on the ethnic distinctiveness model.

The following results have been identified and are discussed, using these three approaches.

Analysis Individual-Level Variables

Analysis at this level involves considerations of the impact of several individual-level variables on the ethnic distinctiveness variable. The ANOVA-MCA procedure used in this analysis allows an efficient analysis of this multiple variable data set. Overall, ANOVA performs analysis of variance testing the hypothesis that the group means of the dependent variable are equal. Multiple classification analysis creates a table that includes a list of unadjusted category effects for each factor, category effects adjusted for all factors, and eta and beta correlation values. This facilitates interpretation of each factor's role in the model.

The analysis is conducted for all countries in the sample, with the titular group as a majority reference group and ethnic Russians as the minority. In the case of Russia (where Russians are the titular group), the Tatars are a minority. As described in more detail earlier, ethnic distinctiveness is defined as the sum of the differences in the evaluation between the majority ethnic group and the minority ethnic group on six personal characteristics.

Table 8 presents the results of the ANOVA analysis of the total sample and shows the significance of the proposed research model with the explained variance value (R squared) equal to .17. All eight variables in the model are significant and have positive effects, although the level of their effects on ethnic distinctiveness is quite different.

Table 8: Individual Level ANOVA Results

	Eta	Beta Adjusted for Factors
IDENTITY *** strength of ethnic identity	.39	.22
PARETH** parents' ethnicity	.38	.17
LANGUAGE** language spoken	.29	.07
INTERACT** interaction in- and out-group	.14	.05
PAREDUC** parents' education	.04	.04
INCOME** family income	.02	.03
GENDER*	.01	.02
RELIGION** strength of religion	.09	.05

$R=.42$ $R^2=.17$

** significant at <.01 level * significant at <.05 level

Ethnic variables. The results show that respondents' personal ethnic identity has the strongest effect on national distinctiveness, with a beta coefficient of .22. Parents' ethnicity has somewhat less effect, with beta of .17, while the other ethnic variables (language spoken, interactions within in-group vs. out-group) have a considerably less effect, with betas of .07 and .05, respectively.

While the importance of one's personal ethnic identity and one's parent's ethnicity are quite predictable, the weaker effects of reported interaction with outsiders and language on ethnic distinctiveness are indeed quite surprising (though they significant). A detailed explanation for these results is provided below, where they are compared with the effects of school homogeneity which indicate that intimate interactions (such as friendship) may not be a key element in the process of ethnic distinctiveness, and that non-intimate interaction (mere observation) - a by-product of homogeneity - may have a stronger effect.

Another important finding is that the control variables (parents' education, family income, gender, and strength of religiosity) have little effect on the ethnic distinctiveness variable. Moreover, Table 9 shows that while the effect of ethnic variables on the predicted mean for the ethnic distinctiveness variable is almost linear, this is not true for most of the control variables, except for strength of religiosity.

Table 9: Individual-level MCA Results

Ethnic Dictinctiviness by		N	Predicted Mean of Ethnic Distinctiviness	
			Unadjusted	Adjusted for Factors
Ethnic self-identification	Strong minority identifiers	336	3.24	3.70
	Medium minority identifiers	533	3.51	3.95
	Weak minority identifiers	478	3.61	4.04
	Others	1,212	3.86	4.12
	Weak majority identifiers	1,706	4.40	4.38
	Medium majority identifiers	3,209	4.56	4.48
	Strong majority identifiers	5,264	4.75	4.63
Parents' ethnicity	Both minority parents	790	3.43	4.00
	Minority mother, other father	360	3.41	3.90
	Minority father, other mother	148	3.46	3.97
	Other combinations	1714	4.04	4.32
	Majority father, other mother	473	4.25	4.25
	Majority mother, other father	971	4.50	4.49
	Both majority parents	8,282	4.68	4.54
Language mostly spoken	Minority language	3,562	4.01	4.36
	Other language	782	4.02	4.25
	Majority language	8,394	4.66	4.48
Interactions with in- and out-groups	Only with others	112	3.87	3.97
	Mostly with others	427	4.23	4.39
	Mame	6,428	4.32	4.43
	Mostly with own	3,500	4.59	4.49
	Only with own	2,271	4.60	4.39
Parents' education	Lowest education	1,124	4.44	4.39
	2	2,438	4.45	4.41
	3	4,337	4.43	4.43
	4	1,337	4.32	4.37
	5	1,585	4.47	4.47
	6	1,745	4.48	4.51
	7	62	4.53	4.52
	Highest education	110	4.47	4.53
Family income	Very poor	427	4.41	4.37
	Poor	749	4.47	4.49
	Average	4,269	4.41	4.45
	With means	6,084	4.45	4.44
	Rich	1,209	4.43	4.34
Gender	Male	5,526	4.44	4.46
	Female	7,212	4.43	4.42
Strength of Religiousity	Weak	1,226	4.26	4.29
	Average	7,736	4.40	4.43
	Strong	3,776	4.57	4.49

In relation to income and education variables, such a finding may seem surprising since class variables usually are very good predictors of ethnic attitudes in the U.S. However, these findings also may confirm the argument that the remnants of egalitarian Soviet social system are still in place. This system made the incomes of different social groups quite comparable and while the collapse of communism did lead to the rapid creation of a new high-income class, that class is still very small. Moreover, the overall ethnic differences in terms of income characteristics remain trivial. This finding justifies the exclusion of the class variable from the analysis.

These results indicate the crucial role of ethnic identity in feelings of distance from other ethnic groups. Thus, strong versus weak ethnic identifiers for the same ethnic group may indicate quite different levels of appreciation of other ethnic groups. This suggests the questionable validity of directly comparing inter-ethnic attitudes if each group's identity strength is not controlled. Indeed, strong ethnic identifiers for groups A and B may produce quite extreme views in relation to ethnic items, while weak identifiers for both groups may hold similar and moderate views on ethnic issues. However, if no attention is paid to identity strength, the resulting comparison may easily indicate considerable differences between ethnic/racial groups in perceptions of ethnic issues--even if caused by the radical views of the strong identifiers on the margins.

Analysis of Sub-national-level Effects (School and Region)

The nested design of the sample provides the basis for using Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) in estimating the effect of school and regional homogeneity. Before turning to the actual HLM results, it is useful to examine the homogeneity effects in Table 10, which contains a comparison of the effects of school and regional homogeneity on the ethnic distinctiveness variable. This table indicates an important difference in the effects. Results show that an increase in the numbers of majority students in schools is related to an almost perfect linear increase in levels of ethnic distinctiveness. However, the effect of regional homogeneity is not linear at all.

Table 10: Comparison of Ethnic Distinctiviness Variable by Homogeneity Levels

	Mean of Ethnic Distinctiveness	
Homogeneity level	In school	In region
No majority	3.11	*
10% majority	3.50	3.87
20	3.63	3.71
30	3.65	3.90
40	3.78	3.87
50	4.11	3.89
60	4.23	4.50
70	4.26	4.62
80	4.55	4.63
90	4.67	4.60
100% majority	4.75	*

and an increase in ethnic homogeneity at the regional level does not produce a linear increase in ethnic distinctiveness.

Meanwhile, an analysis of the homogeneity effects cannot be done effectively without the taking the nested nature of the data into account. A simple inclusion of sub-national-level variables describing school and regional ethnic homogeneity in the ANOVA MCA procedure could lead to inflated coefficients for the homogeneity variables and probably distort results. If all higher order variables are directly disaggregated to the individual level, and school and regional characteristics are also assigned at the individual level, it is impossible to use the assumption of independence of observations underlining the classical statistical analysis (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992, p. xiv). Indeed, while there are 12,830 individual cases in the data set (and thus individual observations describing individual characteristics of the respondents and

their attitudes), there are only 245 observations of school homogeneity and 45 of regional homogeneity.

The Hierarchical Linear Modeling procedure allows this problem to be solved by assuming that the slope of the ethnic distinctiveness regression equation depends linearly on class homogeneity. This approach assumes that effects are linear on both levels, and it takes the hierarchical structure into account. Due to the very complicated nature of the data-file design for running this analysis and some software limitations, regional and school homogeneity are analyzed on the same level (while, theoretically, they also should be put on separate levels). The analysis at the individual level is limited to ethnic and personal variables due to the weak performance of three control variables--income, gender, and religion--in the individual level ANOVA analysis presented above.

Overall, the HLM analysis is performed for the two levels in the following design:

a. First-level regression: $y=b+ax_1+ax_2+ax_3+e$, where y is ethnic distinctiveness, x_i is individual-level independent variables (identity, language, parents' ethnicity, and in-group interaction); b is the intercept for this regression, which is the result of the second-level regression.

b. Second-level regression: $b=g+az_1+bz_2+e$, where z_i is school- and regional-level independent variables (school and regional homogeneity) and g is the intercept for this regression.

Thus, HLM treats values of the intercept in the first-level regression (b) as the result of another regression, with the second-level variables as independent variables.

Table 11 shows the results for the homogeneity effects in part 1, which indicate that school homogeneity has a significant positive effect on ethnic distinctiveness. At the same time, it reveals the effect of regional homogeneity not to be significant.

The second part of the table shows the effects of the individual-level variables on ethnic distinctiveness. However, these differ from the ANOVA MCA analysis

Table 11: Hiererchical Linear Analysis of the School and Regional Homogeneity Effects

1. Second-level Effects				
	Coefficient	Standard Error	T-ratio	P-value
Intercept 2	3.84	0.08	48.72	0.00
School homogeneity	0.07	0.01	7.76	0.00
Regional homogeneity	0.01	0.01	0.78	0.43

2. Individual-level Effects:				
Random Effect	Standard Deviation	Variance Component	Chi-square	P-value
Intercept 1	0.34	0.11	582.04	0.00
Identity	0.08	0.01	271.22	0.00
Language	0.10	0.01	223.17	0.01
Interaction with out-group	0.10	0.01	202.65	0.06
Parents' ethnicity	0.04	0.00	205.53	0.04
Level-1, R	0.88	0.78		

above, since HLM allows a control for the nested design. The overall results are very much the same as for the ANOVA model, with the important exception of the effect of out-group interaction on ethnic distinctiveness, which is not significant. The ANOVA results described above, meanwhile, show that while interaction is significant here its overall effect on ethnic distinctiveness is quite small (beta, .05). These findings together probably indicate that the social interaction level may not have as a strong effect on ethnic distancing as might be believed. Still, the HLM analysis indicates the strong role of identity and parental ethnicity in predicting the degree of an individual ethnic distinctiveness, while the effect of the language variable is somewhat weaker.

Thus, overall, the personal ethnic identity and school homogeneity variables are the strongest predictors of how different students rate the ethnic majority in each country in relation to the major ethnic minority. The HLM analysis thus confirms statistically that the effects of regional homogeneity on ethnic distinctiveness are not non-significant, while the impact of school homogeneity is significant and positive.

This confirms Blau's (1994) theory that homogeneity in immediate proximity to the individual is much more important than homogeneity at the higher (regional) level.

National-level Factors

The following analysis concentrates on ethnic conflicts and percentages of the minority in the population; these factors have an important effect on the psychological processes associated with ethnic distinctiveness. Due the limited number of cases related to these factors (there are only 11 countries), the analysis of their effect will be conducted not so much through direct statistical procedures, as through more indirect descriptive procedures.

First, an individual-level analysis is performed on a country-by-country basis using ANOVA MCA procedures in order to assess the model's working within each country. Second, these results are compared across all countries and contrasted with the level of conflicts and ethnic homogeneity in each country.

Russia

The results for Russia are shown in Table 12. The largest country in the post-Soviet world had managed to avoid any major ethnic conflict prior to this sample data

Table 12: ANOVA MCA Results for Russia

	Eta	Beta Adjusted for Factors
IDENTITY ** strength of ethnic identity	.28	.21
PARETH* parents' ethnicity	.25	.10
LANGUAGE language spoken	.16	.02
INTERACT interaction in-, out-group	.08	.06
PAREDUC parents' education	.05	.03
INCOME family income	.07	.05
GENDER	.01	.01
RELIGION strength of religion	.03	.03

$R=.30$ $R^2=.10$

** significant at <.01 level * significant at <.05 level

collection. Indeed, the war in Chechnya began after these data were collected. Potential conflict with the largest minority within Russia - ethnic Tatars - so far has been avoided, although some tensions remain. As a result, ethnic awareness by Russian students has not been affected significantly and the overall variance explained by the model is only .10 (R square). Identity is the strongest factor in the Russian sample (beta, .21). Parents' ethnicity is second with a beta of .10; however, this variable is only significant at the .05 level. Other variables do not have a significant effect on ethnic distinctiveness. This may be explained in terms of the low proportion of Tatars in Russia, and the low level of serious ethnic tensions between Russians and Tatars, combined with Russian respondents' low awareness of Tatars in general. Still, the impact of the identity variable is quite pronounced, and updated data collections will probably yield a much more significant predictive model for Russians as opposed to others due to the Chechnya confrontation.

Ukraine

While Russians and Ukrainians are close ethnically, the model indicates important differences between respondents in Russia and Ukraine. Indeed, as shown in Table 13, four ethnic variables and one control variable (religion) have significant impacts on ethnic distinctiveness. Moreover, R^2 for the model is much higher (.23). As with the Russian sample, the identity variable has the strongest effect with beta of .28, followed by the parent's ethnicity variable with a beta of .16. This repeats the pattern in the Russian sample. However, in the Ukrainian sample, three more variables are significant, though their effect is much weaker than that of the first variables. The language and interaction variables have betas of .08 and .07. Interestingly, while religion has a significant effect on the dependent variable, its effect is low (beta, .07). Although Ukraine had not experienced serious ethnic conflicts, the proportion of minority Russians within Ukraine is almost 22%, a potential threat to the majority. Also, the Russian minority in the Crimean peninsula has been expressing some separatist tendencies, which may explain the stronger model for the Ukrainian case.

Table 13: ANOVA-MCA Results for Ukraine

	Eta	Beta Adjusted for Factors
IDENTITY ** strength of ethnic identity	.44	.28
PARETH** parents' ethnicity	.40	.16
LANGUAGE** language spoken	.28	.08
INTERACT* interaction in-out-group	.12	.07
PAREDUC parents' education	.08	.07
INCOME family income	.09	.05
GENDER	.03	04
RELIGION** strength of religion	.17	.07

R=.48 R^2= .23

** significant at <.01 level * significant at <.05 level

Belorus

Russians and Belorusians as ethnic groups are in many instances almost inseparable, with a high level of intermarriage, the same religion, and very close languages. As Table 14 shows, this seems to make it very difficult for respondents to differentiate between Russians and Belorusians. Survey results show that only 7% of ethnic Belorusian students use the Belorus language all the time, while the rest are Russian speakers. Such closeness between two ethnic groups, in combination with the

Table 14: ANOVA-MCA Results for Belorus

	Eta	Beta Adjusted for Factors
IDENTITY ** strength of ethnic identity	.24	.19
PARETH** parents' ethnicity	.22	.16
LANGUAGE language spoken	.08	.05
INTERACT interaction in-, out-group	.08	.05
PAREDUC parents' education	.06	.06
INCOME family income	.04	.05
GENDER	.02	.02
RELIGION strength of religion	.08	.05

R=.30 R^2= .09

** significant at <.01 level * significant at <.05 level

absence of any conflicts, should produce a weak model. Indeed, R^2 is quite low - only .09. Still, ethnic identity is the strongest factor (beta, .19), followed by parents' ethnicity (beta, .16). Other factors are insignificant.

Latvia

This Baltic country with the largest Russian-speaking population (about 40%) experienced serious conflicts with its minority before and after its independence. Though conflict never reached anything close to military confrontation, the divisive issue of state language and limitations on Latvian citizenship for Russian-speaking residents led to numerous protests and deep-seated resentment. Thus, it is not surprising that the model predicted best in the Latvian sample, with a R^2 of .50 (see Table 15). All ethnic variables are significant. Moreover, language (the key issue in ethnic relations in Latvia) is the strongest factor, with a beta of .32. In second place is identity (beta, .26) followed by parents' ethnicity (.21), and interaction (.09). Here, effects of ethnic conflict and country homogeneity probably produce a combined effect: the majority is not only in conflict with the minority, but it also is threatened by its numbers.

Table 15: ANOVA-MCA Results for Latvia

	Eta	Beta Adjusted for Factors
IDENTITY ** strength of ethnic identity	.64	.26
PARETH* parents' ethnicity	.64	.21
LANGUAGE** language spoken	.64	.32
INTERACT* interaction in-, out-group	.22	.09
PAREDUC parents' education	.11	.06
INCOME family income	.10	.05
GENDER	.03	.07
RELIGION strength of religion	.04	.07

R=.70 R^2= .50

** significant at <.01 level * significant at <.05 level

Moldova

Similar confrontations caused by language laws in Moldova led to direct military conflict between the central government and Russian-speaking separatists in the Trans-Dniester region. Again, as for the Latvian sample, the model works well, with an R^2 of .44 (as shown in Table 16). Similarly to Latvia, language is the strongest factor with a beta of .31, followed by parents' ethnicity (beta, .23), identity (.16) and religion (.09).

Table 16: ANOVA-MCA Results for Moldova

	Eta	Beta Adjusted for Factors
IDENTITY ** strength of ethnic identity	.57	.16
PARETH** parents' ethnicity	.57	.23
LANGUAGE** language spoken	.60	.31
INTERACT interaction in-, out-group	.24	.07
PAREDUC parents' education	.11	.09
INCOME* family income	.09	.09
GENDER	.03	.04
RELIGION** strength of religion	.24	.09

$R=.66$ $R^2= .44$

** significant at <.01 level * significant at <.05 level

Kazakstan

In Kazakstan, whose population is almost 40% ethnic Russian and which has divisive ethnic and language problems, the model is quite strong (with an R^2 of .37) (see Table 17). As in Latvia and Moldova, the ethnic identity and language variables proved to be the strongest predictors of ethnic distinctiveness (betas, .31 and 17), followed by interaction (beta, .11).

Table 17: ANOVA-MCA Results for Kazakstan

	Eta	Beta Adjusted for Factors
IDENTITY * strength of ethnic identity	.56	.31
PARETH parents' ethnicity	.56	.15
LANGUAGE** language spoken	.49	.17
INTERACT** interaction in-, out-group	.28	.11
PAREDUC parents' education	.10	.09
INCOME family income	.17	.04
GENDER	.03	.04
RELIGION strength of religion	.19	.03

$R=.60$ $R^2= .37$

** significant at <.01 level * significant at <.05 level

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan repeats Kazakstani patterns in many instances, probably as a result of geographical closeness as well as ethnic affinity between Kazaks and Kyrgyzis and similar ethnic problems with the Russian minority. However, as shown in Table 18, the model is weaker here (R^2 =0.19) likely due to the low proportion of ethnic Russians. The strongest factor is parents' ethnicity with a beta of .23, followed by identity (.18), and language (.17). The control variables of religion and income also are significant, though their effect is much weaker.

Table 18: ANOVA-MCA Results for Kyrgyzstan

	Eta	Beta Adjusted for Factors
IDENTITY ** strength of ethnic identity	.30	.18
PARETH* parents' ethnicity	.32	.23
LANGUAGE** language spoken	.30	.17
INTERACT interaction in-, out-group	.09	.09
PAREDUC parents' education	.22	.18
INCOME* family income	.16	.10
GENDER	.01	.02
RELIGION** strength of religion	.05	.04

$R=.43$ $R^2= .19$

** significant at <.01 level * significant at <.05 level

Tajikistan

The Tajik case does not fit well with the other countries in the sample for one important reason: the country is experiencing a bloody civil war between regional clan factions, and the Russian population have largely fled. The chaos in the country has created somewhat different pictures of social reality among respondents, which may be putting less emphasis on ethnic identity and more on regional loyalties. As shown in Table 19, while the model is significant, (R squared = .13), only two factors are significant at the .05 level: language (beta of .12) and family income (.10). Ethnic identity and parent's ethnicity are not significant at all.

Table 19: ANOVA-MCA Results for Tajikistan

	Eta	Beta Adjusted for Factors
IDENTITY strength of ethnic identity	.30	.14
PARETH parents' ethnicity	.30	.15
LANGUAGE* language spoken	.29	.12
INTERACT interaction in-, out-group	.08	.08
PAREDUC parents' education	.08	.08
INCOME* family income	.15	.10
GENDER	.06	.03
RELIGION strength of religion	.11	.05

R=.37 R^2= .13

* significant at <.05 level

Georgia

When the republic of Georgia was torn by ethnic conflicts, ethnic Russians were not part of these confrontations. As a result, the model is quite weak (R^2 =.07), as shown in Table 20. There are only two significant factors: interaction (beta, .12) and religion (.14).

Table 20: ANOVA-MCA Results for Georgia

	Eta	Beta Adjusted for Factors
IDENTITY strength of ethnic identity	.12	.10
PARETH parents' ethnicity	.10	.09
LANGUAGE language spoken	.04	.06
INTERACT** interaction in-, out-group	.11	.12
PAREDUC parents' education	.04	.03
INCOME family income	.09	.09
GENDER	.03	.14
RELIGION** strength of religion	.14	.14

R=.26 R^2= .07

** significant at <.01 level * significant at <.05 level

Armenia

Armenians also have not had many problems with that country's extremely small ethnic Russian minority. Therefore, as shown in Table 21 the model is very weak (R squared = .07) and all significant variables are significant at the .05 level. The strongest predictor of ethnic distinctiveness here is parents' ethnicity (beta, .18), followed by parental education (.13) and interaction (.10). Gender has some effect (beta, .06), though it is very weak.

Table 21: ANOVA-MCA Results for Armenia

	Eta	Beta Adjusted for Factors
IDENTITY strength of ethnic identity	.31	.08
PARETH* parents' ethnicity	.34	.18
LANGUAGE language spoken	.32	.11
INTERACT* interaction in-out-group	.19	.10
PAREDUC* parents' education	.12	.13
INCOME family income	.06	.07
GENDER*	.04	.06
RELIGION strength of religion	.11	.10

R=.41 R^2= .17

* significant at <.05 level

Azerbaijan

As in Armenia and Georgia, there is no majority conflict with the small ethnic Russian minority here. As a result, the overall significance of the model is only .07 (R^2), as shown in Table 22. Only two variables--language and income--are significant at the .05 level. Income is a somewhat stronger predictor (beta, .13) than language (.08); however, the overall effect is evidently weak.

Table 22: ANOVA-MCA Results for Azerbaijan

	Eta	Beta Adjusted for Factors
IDENTITY strength of ethnic identity	.07	.07
PARETH parents' ethnicity	.08	.07
LANGUAGE* language spoken	.10	.08
INTERACT interaction in-, out-group	.17	.15
PAREDUC parents' education	.11	.11
INCOME* family income	.13	.13
GENDER	.03	.04
RELIGION strength of religion	.06	.05

$R=.27$ $R^2= .07$

* significant at <.05 level

Summary of The Within-Country Analyses

The importance of societal factors in ethnic relations is well accepted in the social sciences. However, inter-country comparison may be quite difficult, since controlling for variances in social characteristics, such as economic development, history of ethnic relations, governmental policy, etc. is not easy. Statistical comparisons become especially hard to use if the number of cases is low. However, as mentioned earlier, the similar political and economic nature of the post-Soviet states makes it somewhat easier to conduct comparisons disregarding economic and historical variables, a step that may not be justified in other cases.

Table 23 shows the number of significant individual-level ethnic variables, with an indication of their significance across countries as well as in the total sample. If the variable is significant, it is assigned a value of 1 in the table, or 0 if it is not. The value of the beta coefficients, which shows the strength of this variable in the model, is in brackets.

Table 23: Significance of Individual-level Factors Across Countries' Samples

	Ethnic Variables in the Original Model				Number of Significant Factors
	Identity (Betas)	Parents' Ethnicity (Betas)	Language (Betas)	Interaction (Betas)	
Latvia	1 (.26)	1 (.21)	1 (.32)	1 (.09)	4
Moldova	1 (.16)	1 (.23)	1 (.31)	0 (.07)	3
Kazakstan	1 (.31)	0 (.15)	1 (.17)	1 (.11)	3
Ukraine	1 (.44)	1 (.16)	1 (.08)	0 (.07)	3
Kyrgyzstan	1 (.18)	1 (.23)	1 (.17)	0 (.09)	3
Tajikistan	0 (.14)	0 (.15)	1 (.12)	0 (.08)	1
Russia	1 (.21)	1 (.10)	0 (.01)	0 (.06)	2
Belorus	1 (.19)	1 (.16)	0 (.05)	0 (.05)	2
Georgia	0 (.08)	1 (.18)	0 (.11)	1 (.10)	2
Azerbaijan	0 (.07)	0 (.07)	1 (.08)	0 (.15)	1
Armenia	0 (.10)	0 (.09)	0 (.06)	1 (.12)	1
Total sample	1 (.22)	1(.17)	1 (.07)	1 (.05)	4

These results are incorporated into Table 24, which compares the overall explanatory power of the model with individual- and societal-level factors across country samples. The results presented in this table are ranked by the variance explained by the model and compared with the initial conflict ranking for the countries. The table's layout allows a comparison of the effect of societal-level factors, such as

country homogeneity and level of ethnic conflict, with individual ethnic perception variables.

Table 24 largely confirms initial hypotheses about the importance of country homogeneity to feelings of ethnic distancing from the minority, as well as the crucial role of conflict in this process. Indeed, the proposed model for ethnic distinctiveness works best in Latvia, where the explanatory power of the model is very high (R^2 = .50). Moreover, all four factors in the model are significant. This corresponds with the highest proportion of the minority population (48%) and the high level of conflict within the Latvian society. The confrontation, which began with mandated Latvian

Table 24: Comparison of Original Model and Model Factors Significant Across Countries' Samples

	Number of Significant Factors (from Table 24)	Societal-level Factors		Model's Significance (R^2)
		Country homo-geneity (proportion of minority in %)	Initial ranking by the level of conflict (from Table 2)	
Latvia	4	48	2	.50
Moldova	3	13	3	.44
Kazakstan	3	38	2	.38
Ukraine	3	22	1	.23
Kyrgyzstan	3	22	1	.19
Tajikistan	1	8	2	.13
Russia	2	6	1	.10
Belorus	2	13	0	.09
Georgia	2	6	0	.07
Azerbaijan	1	6	0	.07
Armenia	1	2	0	.07
For the total sample	4	10 (.21)	.30	.30

language requirements in the early 1990s, is ongoing and has led to numerous diplomatic interventions from European governments. Evidently, the divisions between ethnic groups participating in this conflict have become acute and explicit. Similar conflict arose in Moldova, next in line after Latvia. This country has experienced a protracted conflict with its Russian minority, which constitutes 13% of its population.

The countries of Kazakstan and Ukraine, where ethnic minority Russians live mostly in regions bordering the Russian Federation, show the same results in many instances. The model of ethnic distinctiveness is strong for both societies, with three out of four factors present and with R^2 equal to .38 and .23, respectively. While these results are somewhat lower than in the previous two cases, if conflicts do reach a higher level, results very likely will resemble the Latvian or Moldovan patterns. Indeed, the Russian minorities in Ukraine and Kazakstan have experienced the discomfort of being a minority; many experts beleive strong separatist movements in these areas are possible under certain circumstances. However, the divisions between majority and minority are still not so acute here as in Latvia and Moldova. Following Ukraine and Kazakstan on this list is Kyrgyzstan, which borders Kazakstan and is quite close to the latter in cultural and ethnic terms. Here, minority Russians are mostly urban and so are not concentrated along the border with Russia as in the previous case. The somewhat weaker comparison with the Kazakstan model may be explained by the lower proportion of minorities (22% vs. 38%) in these countries.

The social processes in Tajikistan are very different from other post-Soviet state. This country has experienced a brutal civil war and as some observers argue it is problematic to talk about Tajik ethnicity as such, since clan warfare has increased regional loyalties at the expense of the national Tajik identity. Thus, the Tajikistan data may well be ignored in the overall analysis.

The results for the Russian Federation fit quite well in the general pattern, even though ethnic distinctiveness in the Russian sample was measured not towards ethnic Russians (as in other states), but towards the largest minority of ethnic Tatars. Still, the

low proportions of Tatars in Russia (6%) and the low levels of confrontation are consistent with the weaker model ($R^2 = .10$) with only two factors being significant.

In spite of its relatively considerable proportion of ethnic Russians (13%), the results for the Slavic country of Belarus do not indicate the strength of the model (R^2 is only .09, with two factors being significant). However, this should not be surprising, given that Belorusians and Russians are very close ethnic groups. Moreover, only 7% of majority Belorusian respondents in our sample said that they speak Belarusian; the majority speak Russian instead. Because of such ethnic closeness, the model does not work there, since there are no clear divisions between groups.

The remaining countries of the South Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) have relatively small proportions (less than 6%) of Russians in their populations. Moreover, these minorities as a rule are not involved in significant ethno-politics. Therefore, they cannot be considered a threat to the ethnic majority.

Overall, these data show that the proposed model has the strongest explanatory power in countries where the differences between majority and minority are most meaningful, where the proportion of a minority is significant, and where the conflicts between majority and minority are more intense. In cases where there is little difference between the majority and minority (as in Belarus), the suggested model does not work very well.

If the minority is very small, it cannot be part of ethno-politics. For example, in Armenia, the small ethnic Russian population can hardly become a party to ethnic confrontations. On the other hand, in societies with a significant minority population, an ethnic minority may be perceived as a potential threat to the majority. Of course, conflict does not necessarily result from such structural conditions. However, as pointed out by Blau (1994), without these conditions, conflict is simply impossible. Such structural limitations are very important because they determine the parameters of ethnic relations and the associated theoretical models.

Meanwhile, it is highly likely that if ethnic distinctiveness is measured against ethnic minorities which are part of ethno-political processes, the resulting model will

have the same patterns as in societies in the upper parts of Table 24. For example, taking into account the current conflict between Russia and Chechnya, it may be interesting to test the model using Chechens (and not Tatars) as a minority group in the Russian sample. Similar analysis may be done for Azerbaijan and Armenia, which were virtually at war with each other. However, this is a task for future research.

CHAPTER 4

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In summary, the data have confirmed some of the initial hypotheses but not others.

1. Ethnic distinctiveness was expected to increase as a function of greater in-group contact, since greater in-group contact presumably leads to less interaction with the outside group. According to the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954), this will result in less positive attitudes toward the latter. However, the data produced mixed results, showing that in-group contact as a factor in the formation of ethnic distinctiveness is weak at best, especially in comparison with the impact of ethnic identity and ethnic homogeneity variables.

2. Ethnic distinctiveness was expected to increase as a function of the greater importance of ethnic identity, since it presumably leads to stronger attachments to the in-group and lower evaluations of the out-group, according to Tajfel (1978). Indeed, the data show that stronger ethnic identifiers have higher ethnic distinctiveness, confirming this hypotheses.

3. It also was expected that a higher level of parents' titular identification would create a higher level of ethnic distinctiveness the former would produce higher titular identification for students and thus lead to greater ethnic distancing from the contrast group. This hypothesis has been confirmed as well. It seems that parents' ethnic identification is a very important factor in these students' feelings of ethnic distinctiveness, so these factors can be considered quite close, though their impact differs somewhat across countries.

4. It was hypothesized that ethnic distinctiveness is higher for those respondents using the majority language more often. It was suggested that such respondents have less experience with members of an out-group and so

develop a higher level of out-group distancing. Indeed, the data analysis generally confirms this hypothesis. Meanwhile, the strongest effect of the language variable is in the countries where language issues are an important part of the political conflict between minority and majority: in other countries, this hypothesis was not confirmed, either because of the closeness of majority/minority languages or the social irrelevance of the language issue (as when the overwhelming proportion of the population speaks only one language).

5. Another hypothesis suggested that a higher level of ethnic homogeneity (at the micro-level) leads to a higher level of ethnic distancing, presupposing infrequent and indirect contact between respondent and representatives of the different ethnic groups. Data analysis clearly supported this hypothesis. Indeed, the effect of school homogeneity is quite strong, especially in comparison to the non-significant effect of regional homogeneity. These findings partly confirm another initial suggestion: that micro-heterogeneity is more important for positive ethnic relations than macro-heterogeneity (Blau, 1994). However, homogeneity at the societal level does seem to have a significant effect. This may be due to different psychological mechanisms, which are less connected to people's interactions than to the majority group's perception of the minority group as a potential threat, and the minority's perception of the majority group as dominant.

6. It was hypothesized that less parental education would lead to higher levels of ethnic distancing, since many studies have found that higher educational level is associated with more tolerance for minorities. However, present study results indicate that parents' education is a weak predictor of ethnic distancing. It is possible that individual education may affect ethnic distancing, because it is probably associated with specific experiences. (Presumably, more years in school will lead to a lower level of distancing.)

7. Study results also indicate that family income is a weak predictor of ethnic distancing level; this may be a legacy of the Soviet egalitarian system and a weak relations with parental education.

8. Results also indicate that ethnic distancing processes tend to be much stronger in those societies with higher levels of ethnic conflict. Possibly, higher levels of conflict lead to the higher level of salience of ethnic identity and distancing from the other group, since it creates a direct or perceived threat to ethnic group welfare.

A summary of all results may be found in Table 25.

Table 25: Effects of Independent Variables on Ethnic Distinctiveness

Independent Variable	Effect		
	Individual-level (ANOVA/MCA)	Sub-national-level HLM	National-level Descriptive Comparison
Ethnic identity	Strong		
Parents' ethnic identification	Strong		
In-group contact	Weak		
Language	Moderate		
Ethnic homogeneity at school level		Strong	
Ethnic homogeneity at regional level		No effect	
National conflict			Strong
Ethnic homogeneity at societal level			Strong
Parents' education	Weak.		
Family income	Weak		

Among the most significant findings of this research is that levels of ethnic identity play the strongest role in distancing the individual from outsiders. In this regard, interactions with outsiders are less important. Another important finding is that the level of homogeneity in the immediate environment is more important than that at the larger regional level. However, societal-level homogeneity has a strong effect, while higher levels of ethnic conflict within a society correspond to more ethnic distancing.

The importance of ethnic identity in ethnic distancing underlined in this research has important theoretical and methodological implications. Among other things, it suggests that ethnic distancing is not merely a product of membership in a racial/ethnic group per se, but rather results from the salience of one's ethnic identity and the extent of identification with own ethnic group. Thus, differences may be found within any ethnic group in terms the strength of each member's feelings of closeness with their own group. It is possible that in many cases, if strength of ethnic identity is not controlled, responses of the small numbers of very strong identifiers (ethnic extremists) may considerably distort results. For example, on the basis of opinion polls, a researcher may conclude that deep divisions exist between races on some issues, while the real divisions are between ethnic extremists of two groups, with not much difference existing between the rest of the population in both races.

It also is likely that class variables play a much lower role in ethnic processes than is widely believed. This study finds that parental education and family income variables have a very weak (if any) effect on ethnic distancing in comparison with ethnic variables, especially ethnic identity. While, in this particular case the remaining elements of Soviet egalitarism may in large part be responsible for such results, the attention to indicators of ethnic identity may provide more explanatory power for other models of ethnic relations and attitudes.

That respondents attach less importance to inter-ethnic interaction is indeed quite intriguing. The first explanation that comes to mind is that respondents' reporting is biased by their levels of social interaction with outsiders. Indeed, some may interpret a question about a high level of interaction as being related to "friendship" or close

"affinity," while others may consider presence in the school or community of other ethnic groups as indicating that they have a high level of interaction with outsiders--even if no intimate interaction takes place.

However, it is quite likely that the mere observation of minority group behavior in school by majority students (assuming sufficient minority numbers) will indicate their internal diversity, even if no close personal interaction occurs. Meanwhile, the results do not show that interaction is not important--only that its impact is somewhat weaker than that of identity.

Thus, a larger proportion of outsiders in one's immediate proximity (as in class) may lead to lower feelings of distinctiveness, since majority respondents will have more chances to see differences within a minority group and may find that some minority students have many things in common with them. However, if the number of minority members in a school is small, then they will be observed as a more homogenous group and presumably as having more in common among themselves. This will strengthen the stereotyping process. Of course, these two factors are closely connected, since without minority students such interactions are not possible. Still, this research indicates that intimate interactions (such as friendship) may not be a key element in the distancing process, while non-intimate interactions (observation) seem to have stronger effects.

Another important finding is the different effects of language on ethnic distinctiveness across countries. One of the possible explanations is the difference in language closeness between majority and minority languages. For example, the Ukrainian and Belorusian languages are closer to Russian than to Moldovan or Kazak. Another factor is the social policy significance of the language issues. Indeed, the countries affected most by the language variable are Moldova and Latvia, where the forceful introduction of titular languages has been the main reason for majority-minority confrontations.

The differences in how the two levels of homogeneity influence ethnic distancing are quite interesting. Homogeneity in immediate proximity to the individual (school level) makes a difference in feelings of ethnic distancing from outsiders.

Indeed, segregation of students by ethnic criteria, even in highly heterogeneous areas, would create fewer opportunities for interactions of any kind - and according to the contact hypothesis, lower evaluations of outsiders. Thus, some manipulation of the proportion of the ethnic minority in immediate school settings may produce fewer feelings of ethnic distinctiveness: increasing the minority proportion in school may decrease perceptions of its difference.

However, regional homogeneity does not have a similar effect, since the actual proportions of minorities within the larger region do not directly correspond with that observed by individuals within their immediate surroundings. Obviously, the unit size is the critical factor here. To produce a direct psychological effect, individuals should experience particular ethnic homogeneity around themselves. Indeed, even if regional homogeneity (at about the level of a U.S. state) is very high, the ethnic distancing variable may not be directly affected because a person may live in a small but highly heterogeneous city within a homogeneous state. Overall, this study confirms Blau's argument that heterogeneity in one's immediate environment has a direct effect on social relations, while impact of the higher level heterogeneity is susceptible to the effects of intervening variables.

Another important finding is that ethnic homogeneity at the societal level has considerable effect on the ethnic distinctiveness process. However, it seems that the mechanisms by which societal homogeneity influences ethnic attitudes differ from those for regional homogeneity. Similarly, it is not the daily observations that play a role, but the knowledge of the numeric strength of the particular ethnic group. Thus, by virtue of its numbers, the minority may be perceived as a threat to majority group domination, while a very small minority may simply be ignored.

On the other hand, the minority proportion within a society is the most important base for any political movement by an ethnic minority, since in some cases the minority may be quite numerous, though scattered around the country. A mere perception of being in the minority may lead to overall negative attitudes toward the majority group, which would be considered dominant and therefore hostile. If the minority is not numerous, it may perceive majority domination as overwhelming and

assimilation would be more acceptable. On the other hand, if the minority numbers are substantial, they may feel ready for confrontation and the reciprocal reaction of the majority may be adversarial; moreover, if communal conflicts are interpreted in ethnic terms, they may further exacerbate mutual prejudice. Importantly, even if the majority seems to be firmly in control, conflict still may erupt--much as Coleman (1957) argued,"...whenever a pattern of control is so complete that the minority can see no way of moving to a position of power, either individually or as a group, there may exist sporadic and irrational outbursts, but not organized opposition" (p. 16).

Since such institutional factors as population homogeneity cannot be easily manipulated, it seems that some societies have always had a predisposition for poor ethnic relations, even if economic and educational differences are small and cultural differences are negligible. Intervening factors may simply exacerbate the existing ethnic differences. Thus, even in a tolerant country such as Ukraine, mere division of ethnically and culturally close ethnic groups (Russian and Ukrainians) across majority/minority lines leads to a somewhat negative perception of the majority by the minority. Much higher levels of ethnic salience should be expected in societies with more pronounced economic and cultural differences between groups and with a recent history of ethnic confrontation. One possible way out of this problem is to lessen the emphasis on the ethnic element of identity by ignoring ethnicity in political discourse. However, this task may be quite challenging for traditionally ethnically structured societies.

Overall, this study underlines the significance of both macro-level and micro-level factors in ethnic attitudes and relations. Of course, it is quite a challenging to take all factors into account since ethnic identity is not only a product of family upbringing, but also is highly susceptible to pervasive social dynamics within a larger society.

Still, this research demonstrates the importance of taking macro-level variables into account in ethnic perception research. Indeed, the original model's assumptions--that ethnic distancing is a product of strength of ethnic identity, family ethnic background, and out-group interaction--is applicable mainly to societies in which majority and minority ethnic groups are significantly differentiated from one another

and are involved in ethno-political process. In countries where the ethnic minority is too close to the majority in cultural terms, the use of the suggested model may not be justified.

Moreover, the study shows that a minority's proportion in a country's population also is important because the proposed model works quite well in countries with proportionally large minorities. In societies with a very small particular minority, the model has weak explanatory power. For example, in the U.S., the racial relations of Whites vs. Blacks, or Whites vs. Latinos, may be studied using this model, while research on Whites vs. Uzbeks is hardly justified due to the extremely small numbers of the latter ethnic group within the U.S. society. Such limitations (or scope conditions) suggest a useful framework for future application of the ethnic distinctiveness model in the analysis of ethnic relations.

ENDNOTES

[1] While the old regime exercised its power through a privileged class of nobility and was ruled by the Tsar's decrees, the new communist government eventually developed the use of the nomenclature class and Party Central Committee orders instead. In both societies political competition was allowed only within a privileged class (nobility, nomenclature), and the legislature was always very weak.

[2] The overall system of power in the USSR was highly hierarchical, with extremely strong executive authorities which enjoyed wide powers over the respective territory. The "party line" was established exclusively by a narrow group in the Politburo and was executed through a system of party committees, with the regional party committees being the key element of control. In the absence of any real electoral process, appointments to the power positions depended mostly on top-level decisions.

[3] This situation did not necessarily mean the existence of a colonial structure in classic terms. Local elites were not completely powerless and ethnic Russians did not get much economic benefit out of their dominant status. The reality was some balance of power inside the union republics, the center of which was slowly moving from Moscow to local elites. Starting with Khrushchev, some key positions in each republic started to be reserved for titular groups; this became an unwritten tradition.

[4] While in the late 1980s Gorbachev initially tried to break the ethnic republic bureaucracy by moving ethnic Russian appointees there, Rywkin (1994) argues, "The policy of 'parachuting in' Russian apparatchiks to break up local fiefdoms lost legitimacy in the context of Gorbachev's liberalization drive with its slogans of glasnost and democratization. Many formerly purged native officials resurfaced and alleged that they had suffered from national discrimination . . . Party leaders in the republics were forced to seek grass-roots support" (pp. 185-186).

[5] Thus, as Marshall (1993) points out, the slow disintegration of the USSR led the opposition mobilization to be "channeled into the only alternative organizational vehicles available in those systems: the networks of legal or semi-legal cultural organizations and the formal structures of nationality based regional administration"

(p.180). In this situation, local party leaders had a much stronger resource base than new democratic/cultural organizations, and control over the institutions of power was slowly transferred to them.

[6] Rywkin (1994) appropriately noted that the subjects of Kremlinology, the economics of socialism, Marxist-Leninist ideology, party structure, the military and the KGB, and literary dissent, took priority over sociological research into ethnic problems. These were viewed as secondary and virtually irrelevant to the stability of the Soviet Union.

[7] For example, Kaiser (1995) argues that in the Baltics, "A titular hegemony of the work force had been achieved prior to independence...the laws passed in the Baltic states to favor the titular nation and language are more a formalization and legitimization of previously existing informal titular favoritism" (p.109). It also is important to note that participants in ethnic clashes were as a rule people of the same economic status.

[8] On the contrary, as Rywkin (1994) argues, the most prosperous did, with a better educated workforce, as did the Baltic republics, Western Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia (p. 151). This looks like a "reverse" inequality uprising, meaning that the richer region wanted to secede from the poorer one.

[9] Tishkov (1995) found the sources of Uzbek-Kyrgyz conflict in the Osh region in Kyrgyzstan (60% Kyrgyz; 26% Uzbek) in the collapse of the power balance in Soviet republics and the distribution of higher-ranking and prestigious positions between the leading regional clans (observed for decades and to some extent reflecting former tribal distinctions as well as culturally specific groupings within Kyrgyzstan) (p. 134).

[10] In his opinion, "viewed from a social distance an individual takes on the characteristics of his group or groups. His traits are not distinguished from his group's tastes"(p. 210).

[11] Among individual-level analysis one important group of theories was derived from the authoritarian personality tradition, with its distinctive intrapsychic approach (Adorno et al., 1950). Adorno and his followers argued that unacceptable sexual/aggressive impulses among some individuals can be transformed into permanently intolerant attitudes toward outsiders or any minority (regardless of race, religion, language, etc.). According to this approach, then, internal conflict becomes externalized. Such tolerant or intolerant qualities are presumably permanent and part of one's ethnic character. The authoritarian personality approach was challenged almost immediately on methodological grounds. Altemeyer (1988) has claimed that "the psychoanalytic model has virtually no evidence to support its most distinctive feature: the importance of certain early childhood experience in a special home environment. And its array of unconscious mechanisms has proved difficult to verify and ultimately discouraging even to pursue" (p. 331).

Using the intra-psychic paradigm, Katz (Katz, 1981; Katz, Wackenhut, and Hass, 1986) explained White Americans' ambivalence in attitudes towards Black Americans by pointing out the value conflict between American values of individualism (with their emphasis on individualistic values, hard work, personal responsibility, and self-reliance) and egalitarianism (with its emphasis on compassion and humanitarianism). According to the logic of this approach, while Blacks deserve compassion on the basis on egalitarianism, their violation of individualistic norms leads to resentment and attribution of their failures to their personal traits.

Sherif and Sherif (1953) argued that formation of attitudes of prejudice "is functionally related to becoming a group member -- to adopting the group and its values (norms) as the main anchorage in regulating experience and behavior" (p. 218). Thus, according to this theory, group norms play a decisive role in individual attitude formation and change, rather than individual decisions.

The social learning theory of Bandura and Walters (1963) was applied to group relations in the form of a scape-goat hypothesis related to conditioned affective responses: "When a frustrating agent is feared, aggression will be displaced to a less-

feared scape-goat. This explains occurrence of hostility and aggression toward minorities or members of out-group that are identifiably different from the social groups to which the aggressor belongs" (p. 18).

These theories associate ethnic relations with the socioeconomic conditions in the society and maintain that the majority is tolerant in times of economic prosperity and prejudiced during crises and high unemployment. In this interpretation of ethnic/racial relations, the division of the working class along the ethnic lines reduces possibilities of social explosion (Rex, 1986). With regard to immigrant societies, once the migrants' structural location had been determined, the group's advance was largely derived from that location. Perlmann (1988), who studied ethnic groups in the U.S., found that "in virtually every comparison across groups, social class origins and family structure played an important role in creating ethnic differences in schooling and work" (p. 204).

[12] Vanman and Miller (1993) argue that "whereas the categorization itself can be considered primarily a cognitive process, its consequences (e.g., increasing the salience of a social identity) probably include emotional, motivational and other cognitive components" (p. 220).

[13] For comparative purposes, data from two Ukrainian samples (1992 and 1995) are used in the research. However, it differs somewhat from the 1995 Ukrainian sample: six regions were selected in the 1992 Ukrainian survey, while five areas were selected in 1995. Since the sample size for 1992 was 500 respondents due to cost considerations, only two schools were covered within each region in 1992.

APPENDIX

MEASUREMENT PROCEDURES

I. Actual Measures as Used in Questionnaires

1. ETHNIC DISTINCTIVENESS

Questionnaire items:

a. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS:

Please check one position on each of the following scales to reflect how you feel about that national/ethnic group.

1. Majority group:

	Very	In large part	Equally	In large part	Very		Do not know
Q1.1 Friendly	1	2	3	4	5	(Unfriendly)	8
Q1.2. Peace loving	1	2	3	4	5	(Aggressive)	8
Q1.3. Hardworking	1	2	3	4	5	(Lazy)	8
Q1.4. Trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5	(Untrustworthy)	8
Q1.5. Willing to help others	1	2	3	4	5	(Indifferent)	8
Q 1.6. Open	1	2	3	4	5	(Not open)	8

2. Minority group:

	Very	In large part	Equally	In large part	Very		Do not know
Q1.1 Friendly	1	2	3	4	5	(Unfriendly)	8
Q1.2. Peace loving	1	2	3	4	5	(Aggressive)	8
Q1.3. Hardworking	1	2	3	4	5	(Lazy)	8
Q1.4. Trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5	(Untrustworthy)	8
Q1.5. Willing to help others	1	2	3	4	5	(Indifferent)	8
Q 1.6. Open	1	2	3	4	5	(Not open)	8

The overall scores for each majority and minority evaluations were computed by summing up the scores for each characteristics. ["Do not knows" and missing data were recoded as 3 (the middle of the scale): Q1=Q1.1+Q1.2+Q1.3+Q1.4+Q1.5+Q1.6. Q2=Q2.1+Q2.2+Q2.3+Q2.4+Q2.5+Q2.6.

The ethnic distinctiveness variable was created by subtracting the first score (majority evaluation) from the second (minority evaluation). The result was divided by 6. NATDIST= (QI-Q2)/6.

2. IDENTITY

A. Questionnaire items:

1. What is your ethnicity? _____[open ended question].
2. How Important Is Your Ethnic Identity to You?
    1. Not important
    2. Somewhat important
    3. Very important

B. Variables were recoded as follows:

1. Majority identifiers were recoded as 2 (ethnic=2)
   Minority identifiers were recoded as 0. (ethnic=0)
   All other identifiers were recoded as 1. (ethnic=1)

2. Strong majority identifiers were recoded as 6, strong minority identifiers were recoded as 0, as follows:

IF (idenimp = 3 & ethnic = 2) identity = 6.
IF (idenimp = 2 & ethnic = 2) identity = 5.
IF (idenimp = 1 & ethnic = 2) identity = 4.
IF (idenimp = 3 & ethnic = 1) identity = 3.
IF (idenimp = 2 & ethnic = 1) identity = 3.
IF (idenimp = 1 & ethnic = 1) identity = 3.
IF (idenimp = 1 & ethnic = 0) identity = 2.
IF (idenimp = 2 & ethnic = 0) identity = 1.
IF (idenimp = 3 & ethnic = 0) identity = 1.

3 . PARENTS ETHNICITY

Questionnaire item :

1. What is your father's ethnicity?_____[open ended question]
2. What is your mother's ethnicity?_____[open ended question]

B. Variables were recoded.

Majority fathers recoded as 2 (fathethn=2).
Minority fathers were recoded as 0. (fathethn=0).
All other fathers recoded as 1. (fathethn=1).

Majority mothers recoded as 2. (mothethn=2).
Minority mothers were recoded as 0. (mothethn=0).
All other mothers recoded as 1. (mothethn=1).
PARENTS ETHNICITY variable was as follows:
IF (fathethn =2 & mothethn=2) parethn = 6.
IF (fathethn =2 & mothethn=1) parethn = 4.
IF (fathethn =1 & mothethn=2) parethn = 5.
IF (fathethn =1 & mothethn=1) parethn = 3.
IF (fathethn =2 & mothethn=0) parethn = 3.
IF (fathethn =0 & mothethn=2) parethn = 3.
IF (fathethn =0 & mothethn=1) parethn = 2.
IF (fathethn =1 & mothethn=0) parethn = I.

IF (fathethn =0 & mothethn=0) parethn = 0.

4. INTERACTION:

Questionnaire item: To What Extent Do you Interact with Members of Other Ethnic Groups or Your Own Group?

1. Interact only within other ethnic groups
2. Interact mostly within other ethnic groups
3. Interact equally with my own and other ethnic groups.
4. Interact mostly within my own ethnic group
5. Interact only within my own ethnic group

5. PARENTS' EDUCATION

Questionnaire item: What is the highest education your father completed?

1. Some high-school
2. High-school
3. Vocational school
4. Some college
5. College
6. Some graduate school
7. Graduate degree
8. Do not know
9. No father

Questionnaire item: What is the highest education your mother completed:

1. Some high-school
2. High-school
3. Vocational school
4. Some college
5. College
6. Some graduate school
7. Graduate degree
8. Do no know
9. No mother

These two variables were receded into PAREDUC (Parent's education) Variable:

1. Categories 8,9 and system missing for both variables were receded into the middle of the scale (4).
2. New variable was computed as a sum of the both Father Education and Mother's Education variables
3. New variable was recoded into less intervals; intervals with lower numbers of responses were combined into single one, with total number of categories equaled 8. 1 is the lowest level of Parent's education and 8 the highest.

6. FAMILY INCOME

Questionnaire item:

What is your family income?

1. Very low, poverty
2. Low, almost poverty
3. Average
4. High average, there is money for most of the expenses
5. My family has an unlimited spending potential

7. LIKE-DISLIKE SCALE

Please rate the following ethnic groups:

Name of the ethnic group	Dislike very much	Dislike	Neutral	Like	Like very much	Do not know the group well enough
Russians	1	2	3	4	5	6
Ukrainians	1	2	3	4	5	6
Belorusians	1	2	3	4	5	6
Latvians	1	2	3	4	5	6
....	1	2	3	4	5	6

REFERENCES

Adorno, T. 1950 *The Authoritarian Personality.* New York: Harper & Row.

Allahar, A. 1994. More than an oxymoron: Ethnicity and the social construction of primordial attachment. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 1994, 26, 3, 18-33.

Allport, G. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

Altemeyer, B. 1988. *Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right Wing Authoritarianism*. San-Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Atkin, M. 1993. Tajikistan: Ancient heritage, new politics. Pp. 361-383 in *Nations And Politics in The Soviet Successor States*. Ed. by I. Bremmer and R. Taras. New York NY: Cambridge University Press.

Atkin, M. 1993. Tajik national identity. *Iranian Studies* 26: 151-158.

Azar, E. 1990. *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict*. Brookfield, VT: Gower.

Bandura, A., and Walters, R. 1963. *Social Learning Theory and Personality Development.* New York: Holt, Rinchart and Winston.

Berger, P. 1966. Identity as a problem in the sociology of knowledge. *European Journal of Sociology.* 7: 105-115.

Berger, E., and Luckman, T. 1967. *The Social Construction of Reality*. New York: Doubleday.

Blau, B. 1994. *Structural Context of Opportunities*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bogardus, E. 1926. *The New Social Research*. Los Angeles: Jesse Ray Miller.

Bremmer, I. 1994. Nazarbaev and the north: State-building and ethnic relations in Kazakhstan. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17, 4.

Brewer, M. 1997. Social psychology of inter-group relations: can research inform practice? *Journal of Social Issues* 1: 197-211.

Bryk, A., Raudenbush, S. 1992. *Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis Methods*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

Chivian, Eric, Robinson, John, Tudge, Jonathan, Popov, N., and Andreenkov, V. 1988. American and soviet teenagers' concerns about nuclear war and the future. *New England Journal of Medicine* 319: 407-413.

Coleman , J. 1957. *Community Conflict*. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe.

De Vos, G. 1995. Ethnic pluralism: conflict and accommodation. In *Ethnic Identity: Creation, Conflict, and Accommodation*, ed. by L. Romanucci-Ross and G. De Vos. Walnut Creek: Altamira Press.

De Vos, G. and Romanicci Ross, L. 1995. Ethnic identity: A psychocultural perspective. *In Ethnic Identity: Creation, Conflict, and Accommodation.* Ed. by L. Romanucci-Ross and G. De Vos. Walnut Creek: Altamira Press.

Enoch, Y. 1994. The intolerance of a tolerant people: Ethnic relations in Denmark. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17-2: 282-300.

Eriksen, T. 1993. *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives.* Boulder, Colorado: Pluto Press.

Fane, D. 1993. Moldova: Breaking loose from Moscow. Pp. 121-156 in *Nations And Politics in The Soviet Successor States,* ed. by I. Bremmer and R. Taras. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hamilton, V., Sanders, J., and McKearney, S. 1995. Orientations toward authority in an authoritarian state: Moscow in 1990. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 21,4: 356-365.

Hudson R., Sekulic D., and Massey G. (1994). National tolerance in former Yugoslavia. *American Journal of Sociology* 99:1534-1558.

Gibson, J.L., and Duch R.M. 1992. Anti-semitic attitudes of the mass public: Estimates and explanations based on a survey of the Moscow oblast. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 56: 2-27.

Gilliland, M. 1995. Nationalism and ethnogenesis in the former Yugoslavia. In *Ethnic Identity: Creation, Conflict, and Accommodation,* ed. by L. Romanucci-Ross and G. De Vos. Walnut Creek: Altamira Press.

Gleason, G. 1993. Uzbekistan: From statehood to nationhood? Pp. 331 - 361 in *Nations and Politics in The Soviet Successor States,* ed. by I. Bremmer and R. Taras. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gurr, T., and Harff, B. 1994. *Ethnic Conflicts in World Politics.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Gurr, T. 1993. *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict.* Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Kaiser, R. 1995. Nationalizing the work force: Ethnic restratification in the Newly Independent States. *Post-Soviet Geography* 36,2: 87-111.

Kohn, M., and Slomczynski, K. 1990. *Social Structure and Self-Direction: A Comparative Analysis of the United States and Poland.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell.

Marshall, M.,1993. States at risk: Ethnopolitics in the multinational states of Eastern Europe. In *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict,* ed. by T. Gurr. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Masson, C., and Verkuyten, M. 1993. Prejudice, ethnic identity, contact and ethnic group preferences among Dutch young adolescents. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 23: 156-168.

Miller, N. and Brewer, M. 1984. *Groups in Contact: The Psychology of Desegregation.* New York: Academic Press.

Motyl, A. 1992. From imperial decay to imperial collapse: The fall of the Soviet empire in comparative perspective. Pp.15-43 in *Nationalism and Empire: Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union,* ed. R. Rudolph and D. Good. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Nagel, J. 1994. Constructing ethnicity: Creating and recreating ethnic identity and culture. *Social Problems.* 41, 1: 153-176.

Perlmann, J., 1988. *Ethnic Differences: Schooling and Social Structure Among the Irish, Indians, Jews and Blacks in an American City, 1880-1935.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ragin, C. 1987. *The Comparative Method : Moving Beyond Qualitative And Quantitative Strategies.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Robinson, J., Gurr, T., Kurbanov, E., McHale, S., and Slepenkov, I. 1993. Ethnonationalist and political attitudes among post-Soviet youth: The case of Russia and Ukraine. *Political Science and Politics* 24: 516-521.

Robinson, J., Andreenkov, V., Slepenkov, I., Kurbanov, E. and Davidchinkova, L. 1992. Changing perceptions of societal problems among Soviet youth. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research:* 4, 4: 335-345.

Rywkin, M. 1994. *Moscow's Lost Empire* Armolk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Salamone, F. 1986. Colonialism and the Emergence of Fulani Identity. In *Ethnic Identities and Prejudices: Perspectives from the Third World,* ed. A. Paranjpe Leden: E.J. Brill.

Saroyan, M. 1997. *Minorities, Mullahs, and Modernity: Reshaping Community in the Former Soviet Union.* Berkeley, California: University of California at Berkeley.

Schermerhorn, R. 1978. *Comparative Ethnic Relations - Framework for Theory and Research.* New York: Random House.

Seeman, M. 1990. Inter-group relations. Pp. 378-410 in *Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives,* ed. M. Rosenberg and R. Turner. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

Smith, A. 1991. *National Identity.* Reno, Nevada: University of Nevada Press.

Smith, E. 1993. Social identity and social emotions: Toward new conceptualizations of prejudice. In *Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping,* ed. D. MacKie and D. L. Hamilton. San Diego, California: Academic Press.

Sherif, M., and Sherif, C. 1953. *Groups in Harmony and Tension.* New York: Harper.

Solonar, V., and Bruter, V. 1994. Russians in Moldova. In *The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republic,* ed. V. Shlapentokh, M. Sendich and E. Pain. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Sucic, D.S. 1996. The fragmentation of Serbo-Croatian into three new languages. *Transitions.* November 1996.

Tajfel, H., and Turner, J. 1979. An integrative theory of inter-group conflict. Pp. 7-24 in *The Social Psychology of Inter-group Relations*, ed. W.G.Austin and S.Worchel. Monterey, California: Brooks-Cole.

Tajfel, H. 1978. Inter-individual behavior and inter-group behavior. Pp. 27-45 in *Differentiation between Social Groups*, ed. H. Tajfel. London: Academic Press.

Tajfel, H. 1978. *The Social Psychology of Minorities*. London: Minority Group Report.

Tishkov, V. 'Don't kill me, I'm a Kyrgyz!': An anthropological analysis of violence in the Osh ethnic conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* 32,2:133-149.

Travis R., and Velasco S. 1994. Social structure and psychological distress among Blacks and Whites in America. *The Social Science Journal:* 31, 2: 197-207.

Urban, M. and Zaprudnik, J. 1993. Belorus: a long road to nationhood. Pp. 99-120 in *Nations And Politics in the Soviet Successor States,* ed. I. Bremmer and R. Taras New York: Cambridge University Press..

U.S. Department of State. 1998. *Armenia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997.* Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State.

U.S. Department of State. 1998. *Kazakstan Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997.* Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State.

U.S. Department of State. 1998. *Kyrgyzstan Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997.* Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State

U.S. Department of State. 1998. *Latvia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997.* Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State.

U.S. Department of State. 1998. *Moldova Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997.* Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State.

U.S. Department of State. 1998. *Tajikistan Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997.* Washington, DC, U.S. Department of State.

U.S. Department of State. 1998. *Ukraine Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997.* Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State.

Van Knippenberg, A.1989. Strategies of identity management. In *Ethnic Minorities: Social Psychological Perspectives*, ed. J. Van Oudenhoven and T.M. Willemsen. Amsterdam: Swets and Zeitlinger.

Vanman, E., and Miller, N. 1993. Application of emotion theory and research to stereotyping and inter-group relations. In *Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping*, ed. D.M. MacKie and D. L. Hamilton. San Diego, California: Academic Press.

Vetik, R. 1993. Ethnic conflict and accommodation in post-Communist Estonia. *Journal of Peace Research*: 30,3: 271-280.

Wixman, R. 1993. The middle Volga: Ethnic archipelago. Pp. 421-447 in *Nations And Politics in The Soviet Successor States*, ed. I. Bremmer and R. Taras. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Yamskov, A. 1991. Ethnic conflict in the Transcaucasus: The case of Nagorno-Karabakh. *Theory and Society* 20: 631-660.