ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: VIOLENCE AND BELONGING: THE
IMPACT OF CITIZENSHIP LAW ON
VIOLENCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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Many countries in Africa are embroiled in heated debates over who belongs
where. Sometimes insider/outsider debates lead to localized skirmishes, but other times
they turn into minor conflict or even war. How do we explain this variation in violence
intensity? Deviating from traditional explanations regarding democratization, political or
economic inequality, or natural resources, I examine how nationality laws shape patterns
in violence.

Citizenship rules determine who is or is not a member of the national political
community. Nationality laws formalize these rules, thus representing the legal bond
between individuals and the state. Restrictive nationality laws increase marginalization,
which fuels competition between citizenship regime winners and losers. This competition

stokes contentious insider/outsider narratives that guide ethnic mobilization along the dual logics of threat and opportunity. Threats reduce resource levels and obstruct the exercise of rights. Opportunities provide the chance to reclaim lost resources or clarify nationality status.

Other work explains conditions necessary for insider/outsider violence to break out or escalate from the local to the national level. I show that this violence intensifies as laws become more exclusive and escalates to war once an outsider group with contested foreign origins faces denationalization. Groups have contested foreign origins where the "outsider" label conflates internal and foreign migrants. Where outsiders are primarily in-migrants, it is harder to deny the group's right to citizenship, so nationality laws do not come under threat and insider/outsider violence remains constrained to minor conflict.

Using an original dataset of Africa's nationality laws since 1989, I find that event frequency and fatality rates increase as laws become more restrictive. Through case studies, I explain when citizenship struggles should remain localized, or escalate to minor or major conflict. Next, I apply a nationality law lens to individual level conflict processes. With Afrobarometer survey data, I show that difficulty obtaining identity papers is positively correlated with the fear and use political violence. I also find that susceptibility to contentious narratives is positively associated with using violence to achieve political goals. Finally, I describe the lingering effects of a violent politics of belonging using original survey data from Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana.

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by

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Chapter 1. Citizenship Rules and the Structure of Belonging

Debates over *who* belongs *where* are a persistent feature of African politics. Mass expulsions of foreign workers in Ghana (1969), Uganda (1972), Nigeria (1983), and Gabon (1995) predate South Africa's xenophobic riots (2004, 2008). The cycles of inter-ethnic violence since Nigeria's independence, or in Kenya's Rift Valley (1991-1997, 2007-2008), are hauntingly reminiscent of ethnic cleansing in Cameroon (1966) and Rwanda (1994). Some episodes even surpassed the threshold for civil war, as happened in Senegal (1989), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (1996), Côte d'Ivoire (2002), and Sudan (2003). The minor conflict in northern Ghana (1981, 1994-1995) shows that even stable countries can experience a violent politics of belonging. Why are clashes between self-proclaimed "insiders" and alleged "outsiders" worse in some places than others? Under what conditions does insider/outsider violence escalate to civil war?

Insider/outsider disputes revolve around the question of who can claim rights and resources in the state. [1] I describe it as *violence of belonging* (VOB). VOB surfaced immediately after independence, but leaders managed to suppress widespread unrest for

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[1] There is a vast terminology to describe "insiders" and "outsiders". I use "insider" to refer to individuals who believe they are indigenous to a territory. In the literature, "insiders" are alternately called "natives", "hosts", "indigènes", "autochtons", "sons of the soil", "first-arrivers", etc. I use "outsider" to refer to individuals who are believed by insiders to have migrated to an area from elsewhere. In the literature, "outsiders" are alternate called "settlers", "strangers", "migrants", "foreigners", "allogènes", "guests", etc. I assume outsiders are internal-migrants or immigrants from another country. Some research defines outsiders strictly as internal migrants (cf. Fearon and Laitin 2011; Côté and Mitchell 2015).

many years. Democratization in the early 1990s raised the stakes of national citizenship and forced governments to define who officially belonged to the national political community—and who did not. Debates over membership criteria erupted into violence (Young 2007; Geschiere 2009; Mamdani 1996; Adejumobi 2001). Today, a "new nationalism" (Ake 1996; Kersting 2009) that equates citizenship with indigeneity is gaining ground around the world. Surging populism in Europe and the United States has striking parallels with "sons of the soil" movements in Africa and Asia. Citizenship struggles may very well define the next era of politics.

Political or economic inequality, natural resources, weak institutions, or low state capacity are well-studied factors in conflict. Contested citizenship rules, on the other hand, receive far less attention. The existing literature has explained why citizenship is such a contentious issue in African politics, and why it often leads to violence. However, it has not fully addressed the question of why some citizenship debates are more violent than others. Importantly, it does not account for the conditions under which these debates turn into civil war. I argue that the answer lies with nationality laws, which formalize citizenship criteria in a state. I find that these laws impact patterns in violence in two distinct ways. First, the codification of exclusionary citizenship rules into nationality laws increases the severity of VOB in general. Secondly, exclusionary nationality laws explain the conditions under which VOB escalates to civil war.

The effect of exclusionary nationality laws on political violence is understudied in the existing literature. Further, broadly cross-national work on the topic is lacking, even among studies about insider/outsider violence specifically. Most research examines complex processes at work in one or a handful of cases, leaving generalizable factors and

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outcomes underexplored. Moreover, the emphasis tends to fall on election violence, which leads to a selection bias towards high-intensity events driven by a narrow set of processes. In contrast, I take an explicitly cross-national perspective and examine provisions in nationality laws across the African continent. I show that variation in these laws accounts for different intensity levels across insider/outsider conflicts. Additionally, I broaden the scope to examine a wider range of events, occurring from the local to the national level as well as within and outside of election periods. This approach reveals trends that were not observable before. For example, I find that event frequency and fatality rates generally rise as laws become more exclusionary. I also find that national level VOB turns into war when nationality laws are revised to strip an outsider group of their citizenship status.

The nationality law lens deviates from existing answers for *why* insider/outsider violence escalates in a country. Following this line of argument, I put forward a new theory about the intersection of citizenship politics and violence. I conceptualize citizenship struggles as a form of redistributive conflict. The stakes are high because, as Andreas Wimmer (1997) observed, formal citizenship implies "ownership" of the state. Without formal citizenship rights individuals are prevented from participating fully in the political, economic, and social area. I theorize that competition between "winners" and "losers" of the status quo citizenship rules produces contentious narratives about where outsiders belong. When the necessary conditions are met, insider/outsider violence reaches the national level. I argue that when the outsider group has contested foreign origins, the national citizenship rules may be thrown into question. If nationality laws are then revised to denationalize outsiders, then the group has a strong incentive to rebel and the risk of war peaks. Conversely, where outsider groups do not have contested foreign origins, nationality

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laws do not come into question. Therefore, VOB remains constrained at the minor conflict level.

Politics of Belonging in the Literature

I situate this project in the literatures on citizenship politics and political violence. This approach is the road less travelled. Exclusion from power and competition over scarce resources lead to violent confrontations between groups. However, citizenship, an underlying instrument of exclusion and competition, is an understudied a causal factor in ethnic conflict. The impact of exclusive nationality laws specifically is largely ignored in ethnic conflict research. Standard explanations of ethnic conflict point to systematic economic and political inequality between groups (Birnir 2007; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Stewart 2002; 2008; Østby 2013), to the actors' economic motivations (Collier and Hoeffler 2004), or to the feasibility of launching a rebellion at all (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Other scholars focus on economic (Olzak 1992, 2011; Weiner 1978) or political (Wilkinson 2004; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Mansfield and Snyder 2005) competition between groups. Still others describe the ways in which weak or discriminatory institutions incentivize collective action (Onoma 2010; Lieberman and Singh 2012; Boone 2014).

It is widely acknowledged that contestation over exclusive citizenship rules exacerbates communal tensions, thereby leading to violence. The body of work on contentious citizenship politics in Africa draws upon major strands in the literature regarding inequality, competition, and institutions. Additionally, it points to the historical evolution of citizenship on the Continent, as well as the contemporary political setting. For instance, land, ethnicity, and citizenship were intertwined and politicized during the colonial era (Mamdani 1996, 2001), and scholars have long noted the mobilization power

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of ethnicity and its proclivity for violence (Gurr 1970; Horowitz 1985). Recent efforts to nuance ethnicity-based accounts describe various land and election mechanisms at work (Boone 2014; Gescheire 2009; Côté and Mitchell 2015, 2016; Klaus and Mitchell 2015).

Existing research explores the ways in which individuals and groups are denied their legitimate citizenship rights, and the implications of widespread marginalization. Unlike these studies, I focus on how exclusionary provisions in nationality law affect patterns in violence. Treating nationality law as an explanatory factor is a new direction for the conflict literature. Yet nationality laws are a useful lens for studying the politics of belonging because they are the link between membership and authority in a polity. Furthermore, I apply the nationality law lens in an explicitly cross-national way. I am therefore able to correct for a pervasive selection bias in the literature. Current research relies on qualitative analysis of a single or a handful of cases, typically of electoral violence. Consequently, a great deal is known about the confluence of within-country processes, but cross-national effects are underexplored. In fact, general patterns in VOB outside of election periods are not well understood. It thus remains unclear why citizenship struggles are worse in some places than others, and what specific role nationality laws play in this difference.

Studies of Africa's nationality laws are hard to find. Notable exceptions include work by Bronwen Manby (2009, 2010), who catalogues discriminatory policies and practices throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, and Geoffrey Herbst (1999), who classifies countries according to *jus soli* or *jus sanguinis* citizenship principles. The existing scholarship is valuable because it identifies processes by which contested citizenship turns violent. However, data limitations have hampered the development of systematic,

generalizable measures relevant to citizenship politics. For that reason, I created the first metric for comparing countries over time: the African Citizenship Policy Index (ACPI).[2] The ACPI is a country-year measure of formal exclusion from citizenship rights that covers 42 countries from 1989 to 2014.

The ACPI facilitates the comparative study of citizenship laws in Africa, and I use it to test new hypotheses about VOB. To my knowledge, these tests constitute the first broadly cross-national investigation into how exclusionary nationality laws impact patterns in political violence.[3] I find that *as laws become more exclusionary, insider/outsider violence in general worsens*. The number of violent events increases, as does their fatality rates. My generalist approach complements existing case study research. Not only does it reveal patterns not previously observable in small-N qualitative studies, but it also sheds new light on existing propositions. For example, the current literature is unclear on how to weight the relative influence of VOB determinants, such as ethnic discrimination, competing land claims, electoral competition, and restrictive nationality laws. The ACPI offers a way to determine the respective influence of a host of causal factors through statistical modeling. Further, it allows analysts to compare the relative *size* of effects, which was not previously possible with the available qualitative analysis. I find that exclusionary

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[2] See also Frugé (n.d.) and Frugé (n.d.)

[3] The closest study is Manby (2009), a thoughtful and detailed examination of how policies surrounding citizenship rights (including nationality laws) lead to pervasive discrimination, economic crisis, and political strife. Manby looks at cases where nationality laws were an issue in conflict, but does not build a generalizable theory about political violence. Further, she draws on qualitative evidence from many cases in Sub-Saharan Africa, but does not conduct a largescale, variable-driven analysis of law and violence severity.

laws matter above and beyond standard predictors of conflict from the literature. The ACPI has a larger effect on VOB severity than ethnic discrimination, population characteristics, development level, and land scarcity. This is a valuable contribution to the field.

The Intersection of Nationality Law and Violence

Given that citizenship politics is a high-stake game, where winners "own" the state (Wimmer 1997), we have reason to believe that these contests would be violence-prone. Citizenship rules determine who is a full member of the national political community and who is not. Nationality laws are the formal expression of these rules and thus represent the legal bond between an individual and the state. Furthermore, citizenship distinguishes between insiders and outsiders because it is an instrument of inclusion and exclusion (Herbst 2000; Brubaker 1992).

Restrictive laws limit the number of groups that can claim membership in the polity. As laws become more exclusive, they marginalize a larger swathe of the population. Citizenship laws can impose restrictions based on ascriptive criteria, such as race, religion, ethnicity, gender. They may also support discriminatory policies, weak institutions, corruption, or leadership preferences. For example, Uganda only grants citizenship by birth to members of indigenous ethnic group. The DRC and Côte d'Ivoire have, at different times, embraced similar policies. Additionally, identity cards in South Sudan are only issued in the capital Juba, which is a difficult journey for many individuals. Finally, Kenya's government stopped issuing identity cards in counties bordering Somalia in November 2014. The move was a response to attacks by al-Shabab, but it meant that those without identity cards could not travel.

I conceptualize citizenship politics as a redistributive conflict producing winners and losers. Winners receive a larger share of state resources than losers. Winner/loser status follows ethnic lines but is not fixed. In other words, winners and losers can be insiders or outsiders, depending on state policies and regime preferences. For example, the indigenous groups in Kenya's Rift Valley Province (i.e. the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, Samburu—the KAMATUSA) were citizenship regime *losers* under first-President Jomo Kenyatta, *winners* under Daniel arap Moi, and *losers* under Moi Kibaki. Groups that migrated to the Rift Valley from other parts of Kenya (such as the Kikuyu), on the other hand, were citizenship regime *winners* under Kenyatta, *losers* under Moi, and *winners* under Kibaki.

I theorize that competition between citizenship regime winners and losers drives an "ethnicity security dilemma" that leads to insider/outsider violence. Previous work does not frame insider/outsider disputes in the context of winning/losing under the status quo citizenship regime, or as an ethnic security dilemma. Winner/loser competition also produces contentious citizenship narratives questioning where outsiders belong. These narratives justify winner/loser claims to state resources through ethnic appeals, often equating national identity with ethnic identity. They also present the status quo citizenship rules as a *threat* to group resources, and propose an overhaul to prevent further loss. Others tend to use narratives to explain mobilization processes (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Klaus and Mitchell 2015) or deteriorating security conditions (Autesserre 2012). I go one step further to argue that narratives are also a conflict escalation process that turns minor conflicts into wars. Understanding the *magnitude* of violence taking place is an important new direction for the VOB field—and one that matters more broadly considering that greater magnitude implies higher costs and because variation in violence magnitude leads to distinct

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conceptual categories in conflict studies (e.g. social conflict vs. minor conflict vs. major conflict).

I do not address violence onset. Rather, I argue that exclusionary nationality laws increase the *severity* of insider/outsider violence that has already broken out. Further, I look to variation in national level conflict. Earlier studies examine electoral violence as the ultimate level of violence. I propose that a nationality law lens helps disentangle VOB episodes more completely, explaining the divergence between minor and major conflict. I argue that *after* citizenship struggles reach the national level, an outsider group is likely to rebel if threatened with denationalization. Further, I suggest that the government is more likely to denationalize a group with contested foreign origins. When the group composition of outsiders includes internal and external migrants, popular imagination conflates them with foreigners. It is thus easier for insider entrepreneurs to deny their right to citizenship. Where politicians cannot make this case because the outsider group is composed of in-migrants, VOB remains constrained at minor conflict. This is a new argument that deviates from traditional explanations of civil conflict. Previous work does not examine how the interaction between nationality laws and group composition shapes civil conflict.

Three prominent alternative explanations for VOB escalation point to ethnic competition, electoral competition, and competing land claims. Ethnic competition theses cannot explain variation in violence severity because ethnic competition exists everywhere. A more appropriate question is under what circumstances does ethnic competition lead to violence? How does ethnic competition exacerbate conflict processes set in motion? The nationality law lens helps distinguish between ethnic conflicts and shows why their conflict arcs diverge. Secondly, electoral competition theses can explain some VOB outcomes, but

not all. They do not capture the full variation in VOB severity and therefore fall short of explaining the most local or the most incendiary conflicts. Characteristics of nationality law, on the other hand, help explain why VOB is worse in some places than others both during and outside of elections. They also reveal a new causal pathway leading to civil war: denationalization. Finally, land mechanisms are powerful explanatory factors in VOB because they unify ethnic and electoral mechanisms. However, competing land claims are present in national level conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Rwanda, as well as in localized episodes in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, and Zimbabwe.[4] Therefore, competing land claims cannot fully explain the variation in VOB intensity.

A unified theory of citizenship struggle would blend these three lines of argument, Nationality laws would be an important component because they structure competition over ethnicity, elections, and land by formally "fixing" group status relative to one another. However, before the field can develop a grand theory of citizenship struggle, it is imperative to understand the foundations of citizenship. Therefore, we must construct a comprehensive theory of how nationality laws affect contentious politics. This dissertation contributes to ongoing conversations in that vein.

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[4] Minor conflict implicating the land regime occurred in Kenya (1992, 1997, 2007/8), Nigeria (1966, 1990s-2000s), and Ghana (1994-1995). Major conflict implicating the land regime occurred in Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2007), the DRC (1996-2003), and Rwanda (1959-1961, 1990-1994). Boone (2014, 84) documents localized land skirmishes in Burkina Faso (1990s), Cameroon (1960s-2000s), Ghana (1990-2000s), Mali (2000s), and Senegal (1990s). I put farm seizures in Zimbabwe (since 2000) in this category as well.

There remains the question about whether insider/outsider violence itself encourages more restrictive laws. Nationality laws, like most political institutions, may have exogenous initial conditions, but they evolve through some endogenous processes. At independence, African countries by and large adopted the laws of exiting colonial powers (Herbst 1999).[5] Over time, international pressures to liberalize have grown, forcing changes that gradually reduced discrimination based on ethnicity or gender (Manby 2009) and increased tolerance of dual nationality (Manby 2009, Whitaker 2011). As nationality laws become more exclusive, the risk of VOB increases, which in turn affects the development of later nationality laws. Following a VOB episode, these laws may become either *more* or *less* restrictive, depending on local context. For example, increased international scrutiny, heavy foreign involvement, or a strong civil society can lead to inclusionary policies after VOB (as happened in Ghana and Kenya). In the absence of these liberalizing forces, regimes may impose stricter nationality laws, thereby escalating VOB and possibly sending a country down the path to war (as seen in Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC).

Organization of the Dissertation

I develop and test my argument over the course of nine chapters. My research design combines quantitative and qualitative empirics to study how exclusionary nationality increase VOB severity from multiple angles. The testing all supports the same causal pathway: exclusive laws contribute to the intensification of insider/outsider

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[5] Only Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Sudan, Seychelles, and Zambia diverged from the laws of their colonizers (Herbst 1999, 273).

violence. I first make the case for studying the role of nationality laws in driving political

violence (Chapters Chapter 2 and

Chapter 3) and then demonstrate that exclusionary laws increase VOB severity generally (Chapter 4). Next, I describe several mechanisms linking exclusionary nationality laws and the trajectory of VOB (Chapters 5 and 6). I then turn to the effect of citizenship policy on conflict processes at the individual level (Chapter Chapter 7). Finally, I consider the implications of this project, both in terms of what a violent politics of belonging means for individual countries (Chapter Chapter 8) and what the nationality law lens can contribute to broader academic and policy goals (Chapter Chapter 9).

Chapter Chapter 2 presents the conceptual foundations of this study by defining citizenship as a   political construct and situating this project within the literatures on citizenship and political violence. I also explain why testing hypotheses about nationality laws using data from Africa produces generalizable knowledge relevant to many regions. Chapter

Chapter 3 details my theory, a new framework for understanding how nationality laws shape patterns in violence. I also lay out the hypotheses guiding my analysis.

In Chapter 4, I introduce my original dataset on Africa's nationality laws. From this dataset, I created the African Citizenship Policy Index (ACPI) to facilitate systematic, comparative analysis of Africa's nationality laws on a largescale. To my knowledge, this chapter is the first effort to explicitly model the relationship between restrictive nationality laws and conflict. I uncover relationships not observable in prior analysis. I find that exclusionary laws increase the frequency of inter-ethnic violence, and increase the fatality rates of violence over land, ethnicity, and elections. They even affect the fatality rates of violence unrelated these issue-areas.

Chapters 5 and Chapter 6 compare the arc of VOB in Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, Kenya, and Ghana. This set of cases illustrates the conditions under which citizenship rules are politicized, and the effects of restricting nationality laws. The cases of Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC explain why denationalization of an outsider group pushes minor conflict towards major conflict. Evidence from Kenya and Ghana show why some VOB remains constrained at the level of minor conflict or localized skirmishes, Kenya and Ghana, respectively.

Using survey data from 29 national surveys, Chapter Chapter 7 applies the nationality law lens to conflict processes at the individual level. I find that individuals who face difficulty obtaining national identity documents (which prove their citizenship status) are more likely to fear becoming a victim of violence, as compared to other individuals. They are also more likely to have used political violence recently. Furthermore, individuals susceptible to contentious citizenship narratives are more likely to have used political

violence, as compared to other individuals. This effect holds whether the narratives target insiders or outsiders.

Chapter Chapter 8 uses original surveys I collected in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana to explore the lingering effects of violent citizenship struggles. My surveys demonstrate that the recruitment environment for Ivoirian ethnic entrepreneurs is rife with opportunity and that mobilization there has a greater risk of turning violent, as compared to Ghana. These results speak to the divisions that persist in Côte d'Ivoire, and foreshadow cleavages of unrest in the future. Moreover, they have sobering implications for the future of Côte d'Ivoire and other post-citizenship-conflict societies. Namely, the potential for conflict relapse remains elevated even after the war has subsided.

Finally, Chapter Chapter 9 draws together results from the entire study and discusses broader implications of the research. I then make policy recommendations for the development and implementation of inclusionary citizenship policies.

Chapter 2. Legislating Nationality

This chapter grounds my research in the wider literatures on citizenship and political violence. I begin by looking at citizenship as an institution and the significance of codifying exclusionary criteria into law. I then explain the evolution of citizenship in Africa, with particular attention to the reasons why citizenship is a contentious issue on the Continent. Next, I cover standard explanations in for ethnic conflict, before moving into a discussion of insider/outsider contention specifically. I wrap up by underscoring my original contributions to both the politics of belonging and the conflict studies fields.

The Contentious Foundations of Citizenship

In the most general sense, the term "citizenship" indicates belonging to a particular national or sub-national political community (Habermas 1994). I focus on citizenship in the national political community, which represents the bond between individuals and the state. Nationality laws are the formal-legal expression of citizenship status, and therefore a vehicle individuals to obtain rights and resources from the center. Others have shown that restrictive nationality laws deny the rights and resources to which many individuals are entitled, thereby increasing marginalization. I contend that exclusionary nationality laws therefore impact the severity of civil unrest.

Engin Isin and Peter Nyers define citizenship as "an 'institution' mediating rights between the subjects of politics and the polity to which these subjects belong" (2014, 1). Citizenship rules determine who is a full member of the polity and who is not. They are embedded in a regime of policies and practices (Isin and Nyers 2014; Keller 2014). Everyday activities, such as registering a birth, enrolling in school, accessing healthcare,

finding employment or travelling freely are affected by an individual's citizenship status (Manby 2009). Importantly, Isin and Nyers refer to "political subjects" rather than "citizens" because the institution does not guarantee access those rights and resources. Although citizenship implies legitimate claim to rights within a community, it by no means guarantees those rights will be protected. As Mahmood Mamdani eloquently put it, "citizenship does not entitle you to resources, it entitles you to enter the struggle for resources" (2002, 505). For example, the Federal Character Principle in Nigeria puts the rights of indigenous groups over the rights of migrants, even if those migrants are Nigerian citizens. This leads to a hierarchical citizenship in Nigeria, where indigenes receive preferential treatment.

For decades, T.H. Marshall's (1998) model of citizenship was the standard-bearer. However, Marshall's three pillars of citizenship, comprising civic, political, and social rights, has received much criticism over the years for being an oversimplification. Critics rightly point out that inequalities in society means that citizens cannot access or exercise their rights equally. Moving away from Marshall's idealized citizenship as something "granted and fixed", and towards a flexible model of citizenship as something "embodied, enacted, or negotiated", is a conceptual improvement (Harrington 2014, 16). The shift signals refinement in theory and recognition that citizenship is constituted through struggle for "civic and political recognition" (Harrington 2014, 16; c.f. Isin and Nyers 2014; Dean 2014).

The field has moved towards conceptualizing citizenship as rights *and* performance. *Rights* span the civil, political, and social sphere. They include the right to vote, travel freely, and speak freely, as well as the right to equal treatment before the law,

dignity, and a certain standard of living. *Duties* are obligations citizens have to the state, such as taxes or civic participation. *Performance* refers to the fact that rights and duties are not passively held. Rather, it is through performance of rights and duties that "citizenship is brought into being" (Isin and Nyers 2014, 3). The terms of citizenship are renegotiated when individuals or the state seek to redefine the rights and duties of citizenship, or when non-citizens perform as citizens and thus make a claim to citizenship.

Citizenship is multi-dimensional because it refers to a host of relationships that cross-cut levels of analysis. Membership within some kind of community exists at almost every level of social organization. From kinship systems to juridical states, networks at the national and sub-national level can be described as communities that confer a type of citizenship. For my purposes, citizenship refers to the legal bond between an individual and the state. A citizen is thus a person who is officially entitled to rights and resources within the polity. Hereafter, I use the term "citizenship" to mean *national* citizenship, and I stipulate when rules of *sub-national* belonging are relevant to the discussion.

At times, citizenship status overlaps with social identity characteristics, such as ethnicity or gender. Citizenship should not, however, be conflated with social identity because it is a legal status rather than emotional or cultural belonging to a group. For the same reason, citizenship status should not be equated with national identity either. National identity is a construct of belonging meant to replace localized identities, and it can contradict an individual's citizenship status. For instance, children brought into the United States by their undocumented parents who have grown up in the country may identify as American (national identity), but they would be deported if discovered (citizenship status). National identity is different from nationality, which implies belonging to a cultural group

(Assal 2014, 2011; Bauböck 2006). Despite the minor conflation of terms, the literature uses "citizenship law" and "nationality law" interchangeably.

The institution of citizenship is integral to state-formation. The state's completeness and legitimacy is expressed through allocation of citizenship rights and obligations (Harrington 2014, 15). States face the challenge of building legal and emotional ties with the population because the modern nation-state rarely lives up to the ideal-type: an "internally homogeneous, externally bounded political, legal, social, cultural, and (sometimes) economic space (Brubaker 2010, 63)." Citizenship helps states build emotional ties with the population because it is an instrument of collective unity. Rogers Brubaker (1992) observed that a *political* understanding of citizenship means that political unity constitutes nationhood, and citizenship helps build cultural unity (i.e. France). In contrast, an *ethno-cultural* understanding of citizenship means that the population's ethno-cultural unity constitutes nationhood, and the state uses citizenship to build political unity (i.e. Germany 1913-1999/2000).

As for legal ties, nationality laws codify the criteria for membership in the polity. In other words, they formalize citizenship rules. Nationality laws can be distinguished by the extent to which they reflect *jus soli* or *jus sanguinis* principles. *Jus soli* laws, as found in the United States and India, recognize individuals born in the state's territory as citizens, regardless of their parents' nationality. In Africa, only Chad, Lesotho, and Tanzania have an absolute *jus soli* rule in which any child born in the territory is automatically granted citizenship. *Jus sanguinis* laws, on the other hand, only recognize citizenship through descent. They are appealing for nationalist projects seeking to preserve an ethno-cultural composition in the polity. Indonesia and Malaysia use *jus sanguinis* laws to limit the

influence of the wealthy Chinese minority, while Israel, Hungary, and Poland, use them to unite co-ethnics scattered through diaspora (Herbst 2000). Most countries in Africa confer citizenship based on *jus sanguinis* principles—more than 30 states grant citizenship if a child has one or more citizen parents.

States with *jus sanguinis* citizenship principles face a dilemma with individuals born to foreign parents. These individuals are not automatically granted citizenship, but they often spend their entire lives in the state's territory. For example, Germany's 1913 nationality upheld *jus sanguinis* principles. After 1990, there was a large population of new-Germans across Europe who had never visited the country. However, the law denied citizenship to thousands of Turks who knew no country other than Germany as home. Some countries, including Germany, have adopted *soli-sanguinis* hybrid solutions to address this complexity. In Uganda, individuals with non-citizen parents can become citizens "by registration" at the age of majority. This path is also available in Namibia, South Africa, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Certain states make no official provision for children who do not meet criteria for citizenship, condemning many of them to statelessness. This is the case in Botswana, Gambia, Libya, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe.

By defining membership in the political community, citizenship is often understood as a boundary mechanism, an instrument of inclusion and exclusion (Herbst 2000; Brubaker 1992). Furthermore, in distinguishing insiders from outsiders, citizenship determines "owners" of the state (Wimmer 1997). Citizens have a legitimate claim to rights in the polity, whereas outsiders do not. It is worth reiterating that just because a person is entitled to rights, it does not mean that she is able to fully exercise them. Formal nationality laws do not always reflect informal practices or popular notions of membership. After the

United States Civil War, for instance, African-Americans were *de jure* citizens that were denied their rights under *de facto* Jim Crow citizenship rules.

In her book *Struggles for Citizenship in Africa* (2009)*,* Bronwen Manby describes how capricious or despotic regimes, discriminatory institutions and practices, weak civil administration systems, and corrupt or convoluted bureaucracies directly impede an individual's free and full exercise of their rights. An individual may be denied citizenship rights based on their ethnic background, race, religion, or gender. They may also face discrimination based on non-ascriptive characteristics, such as the failure to pay a bribe or to navigate complex and costly institutional procedures. Perhaps the most common method of exclusion arises when individuals cannot obtain national identity documents that prove their citizenship status or this documentation is not recognized (even destroyed) when presented to officials. For example, South Sudanese identity cards are only issued in the capital Juba, which restricts citizenship rights for those without the time and resources to travel.

Exclusionary citizenship regimes are not unique to Africa. Historically, wealth-based or literacy-based restrictions to voting circumscribed franchise in Europe and the New World. In the 19th century, Britain, Chile, and Canada had an income and/or property restriction on voting rights. Argentina and the United States had literacy requirements into the 20th century. States may also restrict citizenship rights by gender. Women received the right to vote in federal elections in 1893 in New Zealand, 1907 in Finland, 1920 in the United States, and 1971 in Switzerland. In present-day Nepal, a woman's citizenship application must be supported by her father or husband—a restriction not imposed on men. More than 24 African countries still have laws on the books that exhibit gender

discrimination. Zambian men can pass citizenship on to their non-national wives, but Zambian women cannot pass citizenship on to their non-national husbands. According to Burundi's nationality code, citizenship is passed through men only, meaning children with foreign fathers are not granted citizenship at birth. Change is on the horizon, though. The 1992 Unity Dow ruling set a precedent for other countries to follow. The court case forced change in Botswana's citizenship law such that women could pass citizenship on to their spouses or children.

Citizenship regimes reproduce racial or ethnic discrimination both directly and indirectly. Malaysia's constitution guarantees special privileges for ethnic Malays, who are defined by law as Muslim. Bhutan's leadership pursued "one nation, one people" policies in the 1980s that made it harder for individuals who were not "pure" Bhutanese to acquire citizenship and resulted in the loss of citizenship among ethnic groups formerly considered citizens, such as the Nepali-speaking Lhotshampas. Autochthonous or racialized inclinations are present in African nationality laws too. For example, the DRC, Côte d'Ivoire, and Uganda have, at different times, embraced policies stipulating that an individual must be from an indigenous ethnic group in order to claim citizenship. Sierra Leone and Liberia go so far as to grant citizenship at birth only to individuals "of negro descent" in an effort to minimize the influence of the Lebanese community (Manby 2009). In addition, indigeneity is not formally defined in Nigeria, but the informal understanding is that indigeneity is passed through the paternal line and usually only for one generation (Manby 2009).

Even where formal institutions may guarantee citizenship, informal restrictions may still serve as a barrier to citizenship rights. So-called "Amerasians", born of Asian

mothers and American fathers during war, were ostracized in Vietnam (DeBonis 1995) and in Japan (Williams-León and Nakashima 2001). Additionally, the Indo-Pakistani heritage of the Karana community of Madagascar complicates their eligibility for citizenship and makes passports hard to acquire (Manby 2009, 2010). In Kenya, Somalis and Muslims face increasing challenges as the government struggles to fight al-Shabab. In November 2014 the government suspended the issuance of identity cards in three counties bordering Somalia as part of the fight against al-Shabab, meaning individuals living there who did not possess an identity card could not travel. In Swaziland, individuals who are not ethnically Swazi face discrimination. A 1974 law required citizens to swear allegiance to a Swazi chief (*ukukhonta*), and the 2005 constitution favors those of Swazi descent.

Previous research explores the ways in which individuals and groups are denied their legitimate citizenship rights, and what the implications of widespread marginalization are. Unlike these studies, I focus on how exclusionary provisions in nationality law affect patterns in violence. Treating nationality law as an explanatory factor in political violence is a new direction for the conflict literature, as I show later in this chapter.

The Evolution of Citizenship in Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa is a unique testing ground for arguments about how nationality laws shape patterns in violence. It is a region comprised of young states undergoing the tumultuous process of democratization. As such, citizenship rules, and by extension nationality laws, are still in the process of being defined and redefined. Settling "the citizenship question" is integral to long-term growth and stability in these states. For historic reasons, citizenship questions are linked to issues surrounding land, elections, and ethnic identity, which makes them contentious and oftentimes deadly. The problem of

contested citizenship threatens the future of many countries and yet cross-national data on nationality laws is scarce. I address this gap in the field.

It is helpful to begin a discussion of present-day debates in Africa by looking at citizenship during the colonial period. Modern citizenship, in which individuals are bound to specific and discrete polities, did not exist before colonial conquest (Herbst 1999). Colonial governance was organized according to the logic of 'decentralized despotism', to borrow a phrase from Mamdani (1996). Europeans established a system of hierarchical citizenship characterized by racial discrimination. It divided each state's population into Citizens and Subjects. Citizens occupied a domain of rights and privileges associated with civil law and liberal citizenship. Subjects occupied a domain of distorted tradition and fabricated customary law, devoid of citizenship rights. Colonized populations were only accorded citizenship status in rare circumstances.[6] Africans were further divided into tribes, which roughly mapped on to ethnic groups, but were sometimes artificially constructed by colonial ethnographers. Each ethnic group was presumed to have a "homeland" such that an individual was always a native of his or her homeland and a settler in any other territory. Massive migration schemes transplanted thousands of people outside their assigned homelands, turning them and their descendants into settlers (Mamdani 1996).

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[6] In 1848, France granted full citizenship rights to Africans living in four towns in present-day Senegal, but they could only exercise their rights within these privileged communities. Additionally, *evolués* in French colonies who adopted European culture through education or assimilation could earn full citizenship rights (Keller 2014; Manby 2009).

Through these practices, colonial-era institutions turned flexible cultural identities into rigid political identities (Idris 2012; Boone 2014; Mamdani 1996, 2001a). Moreover, the colonial state created new identities that had not previously been salient—or, in some cases, even existed. One of colonialism's most devastating legacies in Africa is the grounding conceptions of citizenship in land and ethnicity (Mamdani 1996; 2001b). In the settler-native paradox identified by Mamdani, settlers were treated preferentially, to the detriment of natives. In the early years of independence, African governments reversed the settler-native paradox such that migrants and their descendants lost rights and resources they previously enjoyed—even if they had known no other home than where they currently resided. The 1960s and 1970s saw expulsion of immigrants and refugees in Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, and elsewhere.

The legal implications of Citizen-Subject dualism were so-far reaching that they resonate today. Archetypes of governance from the colonial period flowed into post-colonial politics, bringing their contradictions and tensions with them. System-level changes of globalization, liberalization, and economic collapse have only deepened citizenship contention. Peter Geschiere (2009) argues that globalization has increased mobility, decentralization, and democratization, which feeds an "obsession with belonging".

Elections are arenas where elites and individuals compete for power and resources, which can intensify the salience of political identities (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; D. N. Posner 2005). Multi-party politics and the ensuing competition for elected office only redoubled the importance of citizenship (Young 2007; Geschiere 2009; Dorman, Hammett, and Nugent 2007; Whitaker 2005). Another wave of expulsions occurred in the 1990s in

Nigeria, Gabon, Zambia, Angola, and elsewhere. Elite competition for state resources shapes dynamics at the grassroots-level by defining the requirements to fully 'belong' at the national level. According to Dorman, Hammett, and Nugent (2007):

> Political and economic liberalization constitute the current configuration against which identity politics are played out, the interaction of local and global influences threaten the survival of a state-level national identity and gives urgency to elite attempts to retain power through the molding of citizenship (8).

Nationality laws are inherently political constructs and therefore subject to the elite machinations and changes in the international sphere. Increasingly, nationality law is used as a political tool. Revising the laws is a strategy groups use to secure access to resources, and to sideline opponents (Manby 2009; Geschiere 2009; Whitaker 2005). For example, the DRC has changed their nationality law four times since independence in response to political and economic competition between autochthons and the Banyarwanda ethnic group (Jackson 2007).[7] In addition, the governments of Zambia, Botswana, Swaziland, and Tanzania have at one time or another used denationalization to silence opponents or critics (Manby 2009). And yet existing research does not examine how variation in nationality laws affects patterns in violence. In contrast, examine how variation in laws predicts variation in VOB intensity. Further, I show how the interaction of laws and group composition helps explain VOB escalation. Specifically, I find that when an outsider group

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[7] In 1964 the nationality law granted citizenship to individuals who could trace their family origins to an ethnic group resident in the territory as of 1908. In 1971 the date changed to 1960 (the year of independence), but in 1972 the date was pushed back to 1950. In 1981 the "date of origin" became 1885, and in the current law (from 2004) the date is 1960.

with contested foreign origins (because the "outsider" label conflates internal and external migrants) is denationalized, national level VOB escalates to civil war.

Citizenship debates essentially reflect groups' efforts to secure a foothold in a mercurial club promising privileged access to state resources. Seeking to convince "authorizing officials that their claims to land are as good or better than anyone else's, many people have turned to the past, basing claims to land on narratives of origin or ancestry that are difficult, if not impossible, to refute (Berry 2009, 25)." Although it makes sense that groups would try to ground citizenship in a physical commodity like land, such efforts are problematic. Although homeland may be indivisible (Toft 2003), it is not permanent. Geschiere and Jackson (2006) notes that even proponents of autochthony, who seek to rank ethnic groups according to who arrived in a territory first, do not miss the intrinsic "nervousness" of their discourse. They are cognizant that their situation could always change if the "wrong" people get into power. Since political competition opens the space for regime turnover, the anxiety of autochthons never goes away entirely. Every time political competition intensifies, such as during election season, the anxiety returns and tensions rise.

With the realization that a great many conflicts in Africa can be traced back to citizenship debates came a flood of studies about citizenship-related violence in Africa (Geschiere 2009; Mamdani 2001b; Adejumobi 2001; Keller 2014; Kersting 2009; Bøås and Dunn 2013; Boone 2014; Nyamnjoh 2006; Crush 2001; Hayem 2013; Marshall-Fratani 2007; Jackson 2007). The prevalence of indigeneity discourse in African politics reminds us that the African experience of citizenship is inextricably linked to the production of social identities through violence. Colonialism established the native/settler divide and

liberation struggles reified this distinction. Tragically, African nationalism morphed into "ultranationalism, to chauvinism, and finally to [violent] racism (Fanon 1965, 127)."

Considering that a group's claim to state resources is legitimated by virtue of political membership (Wimmer 1997), exclusionary citizenship regimes are a ripe environment for violence. Furthermore, the current brand of identity politics can be construed as the politics of fear. It exacerbates communal tensions by turning on ethnic cleansing discourses. Moreover, a narrative of victimization takes prominence in citizenship debates such that "native" and "foreigner" become synonyms for "victim" and "aggressor", leading to retaliatory or pre-emptive attacks (Dunn 2009). For example, victimization frames were used by political entrepreneurs in Rwanda, the DRC, and Côte d'Ivoire to mobilize for collective violence (Dunn 2009; Mamdani 2001b; Turner 2013; Marshall-Fratani 2007).

Even though exclusionary nationality laws are often implicated in the cases of violence, there are no cross-national investigations into their impact on violence severity. In part, this stems from the limited availability of data on African citizenship laws. Money (2002) evaluates the restrictiveness of nationality laws around the world between 1929 and 1954 by breaking laws up into four components: naturalization procedures, gender discrimination, and how citizenship is passed to children of citizens and of foreigners. Working with more recent data, Herbst (2000) catalogues contemporary nationality laws along several dimensions, including *jus sanguinis* principles, gender discrimination, and naturalization procedures. Most of Herbst's measures are binary and thus serve as blunt instruments for analysis. Moving towards multi-category indicators, Seely et al. (2013) propose a measure for gender discrimination in current African nationality laws. However,

the gender-specific focus narrows the metric's applicability. Both Herbst and Seely provide a snapshot of nationality laws, frozen in time. In contrast, Manby (2009, 2015) draws on a wealth of historical data to catalogue African nationality laws since independence. Emphasizing risk factors in statelessness, she describes policy trends in relation to general citizenship principles, gender equality, dual nationality, ethnic and racial discrimination, naturalization procedures, and de-nationalization provisions. She does not, however, create any indicator for quantitative analysis.

The existing literature is composed of a constellation of case studies about extreme cases of insider/outsider violence (e.g. Nigeria, Kenya, the DRC, Côte d'Ivoire) or unlikely successes in stability (e.g. Tanzania, Botswana, Ghana). Although considerable advances have been made towards understanding the relationship between exclusionary citizenship rules and violence, the dominant qualitative research methods are not designed to search for generalizable patterns. Instead, they are meant to build knowledge of processes and mechanisms, generate rich theories, and confirm peculiarities about outlier cases. Since so few studies have addressed the full variation in violence severity, important questions remain unanswered. Furthermore, the generalizability of researchers' claims goes untested and existing findings are difficult to replicate. My research complements this work by developing a flexible framework that permits quantitative analysis of relationships identified in earlier studies. Importantly, the framework also opens the door for new research questions as well. This dissertation, for example, probes the distinct ways that exclusionary nationality laws impact political violence.

Although the literature would lead us to believe that exclusive nationality laws shape patterns in violence, this hypothesis has never been directly tested. I frame my study

of nationality laws around three questions: How do nationality laws shape general patterns in violence? Why do citizenship debates sometimes lead to war? How do nationality laws shape conflict processes at the individual level? Answering these questions requires an explicitly cross-national approach. In conducting a largescale examination of nationality laws over time and across geographic space, I provide a new perspective on citizenship politics in Africa. Previous work has typically examined outlier cases of extreme violence during election periods or over land rights. By relaxing the standard scope conditions, I find that restrictive nationality laws exacerbate insider/outsider violence in general, both at the group and the individual level. Furthermore, I identify a new factor in civil war: denationalization of an outsider group. In short, I demonstrate that exclusionary nationality laws have explanatory power in their own right.

Theories on Political Violence

The ethnic conflict literature offers many reasons for unrest, and yet the role of nationality laws is largely overlooked. In this section, I review prominent explanations for why identity politics so often turns violent. Leading explanations point to grievances, "greed", institutions, elections, and natural resources.

Identity Politics

Ethnic identity is a critical factor in conflict. The debate about *whether* ethnic diversity itself drives violence is ongoing (Sambanis 2001; Easterly and Levine 1997). The research into *why* is prolific. Group identity supports coalition building (Bates 1983; Posner 2004) by resolving organizational barriers to mobilization (Horowitz 1985; Collier 2009). For example, ethnic mobilization encourages the rise of political entrepreneurs (Eck 2009). Individuals are more responsive to ethnic appeals given ethnically salient political

cleavages (Posner 2005; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010), and leaders can make credible commitments of future rewards (Weinstein 2007). Ethnicity also assists in targeting recruits (Horowitz 1985) and free-riders (Hardin 1995; Olson 1971). Constructivists note that the meaning behind ethnic identity makes it a powerful mobilizing force (Lynch 2008, 2011; Geschiere 2009; Bøås and Dunn 2013).

Early identity-based accounts argued that "ancient hatreds" led ethnic groups to fight one another. Relative deprivation theorists pushed back, arguing that groups actually fought over the distribution power and resources (Gurr 1970; Horowitz 1985). The recognition that conflict stemmed from inequality between groups, rather than ethnic attachments alone, represented a significant advancement in the field. Theories making this line of argument are referred to as *grievance* accounts. According to grievance theorists, groups are socially, politically, or economically marginalized in absolute terms or relative to other groups, they are more likely to violently mobilize. For example, ethnic groups are more likely to rebel if they are denied access to the executive (Birnir 2007; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010) or if they experience systematic economic and political discrimination (Stewart 2002; 2008; Østby 2013).

Critics point out that groups the world over have grievances, yet violence is a rare event (Tilly 1978; Fearon and Laitin 2003). This observation led to a rise in so-called *greed* accounts. Greed theorists argue that actors are economically-motivated, meaning they weigh the opportunity costs of fighting and decide it is in their material interest to participate (Grossman 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Others argue that specific conditions make launching a rebellion actually feasible, and therefore more likely. For instance, Fearon and Laitin (2003) show that certain material conditions favor insurgents—

weak states, mountainous or rough terrain, large populations, and local knowledge. Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) find that economic conditions and a large proportion of young men in the population matter, whereas grievance indicators are indeterminate. A variation on the greed hypothesis points to economic competition between actors. Anti-immigrant sentiment is strong in the presence of weak economic indicators or when groups directly compete with immigrants (Weiner 1978; Olzak 1992; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006). Social crisis can also lead to scapegoating of foreigners and rising xenophobia (Whitaker 2015).

Critics of the entire greed-versus-grievance debate point out that greed and grievance are not conceptually distinct; it is therefore more productive to study their interactive effect (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). Moreover, it is increasingly clear that grievances are fundamental to the dynamics of contentious politics, yet violence happens when institutions and practices form boundaries that political entrepreneurs can exploit (Leckie and Huggins 2011). I argue that nationality laws are the ultimate boundary mechanism because they link the individual to the state and its resources. Therefore, exclusionary nationality laws should increase the severity of violence that does break out.

Institutions

Many scholars focus on how institutions structure relationships and hierarchies within society, thereby creating competition over the state's scarce resources. Weak institutions in particular create incentives to use violence, and provide space for actors to behave with impunity. For example, weak property regimes (Boone 2011; Onoma 2010), weak rule of law (Mueller 2008), or overly centralized executives (Branch and Cheeseman 2006) contribute to the normalization and diffusion of political violence.

It is clear from current research that institutionalizing identity politics is particularly

dangerous. Lieberman and Singh (2012) argue that institutionalization of ethnic difference

"generates emotional, conflict prone dynamics" (Lieberman and Singh 2012, 5) and drives

armed conflict. To others, ethnically-exclusive regimes "create a 'zero-sum' political

atmosphere where those outside of favored ethnic status are not afforded representation

based on public support, demography, or ideology" (Raleigh 2014, 101).

I build on institutionalist accounts of ethnic conflict, which do not address the

impact of nationality law. Even though institutionalized exclusion implicates the

citizenship regime, formalized citizenship rules are understudied in the conflict literature.

In contrast, I argue that exclusionary nationality laws have explanatory power in their own

right. I theorize that grievances proliferate under these laws, denying a large segment of

the population rights and resources to which they are entitled. [8] Weakly protected rights

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[8] This is not to say that inclusionary laws do not create grievances among a segment of the population as well. I restrict analysis to exclusionary laws because case evidence suggests that movement towards inclusionary provisions leads to less severe hostilities. See Chapter List of Tables

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means that the present is dangerous and the future is uncertain. Moreover, I argue that nationality laws offer a way for groups to secure resources into the future by legitimizing their claims as "owners" of the state. Restrictive citizenship criteria are appealing because they allocate a larger portion of state resources to a smaller number of groups.

Chapter 1. for a more detailed discussion.

Political Competition

Institutionalists often point to role of political competition in driving conflict processes. Without strong democratic institutions, elections are dangerous events because they "encourage mobilization into rival political camps, the airing of grievances, and competition for power (Salehyan & Linebarger 2015, 26)." Early democratization theorists believed that weak institutions condemned new democracies to violence, but assumed that development would assuage many of the problems (Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Snyder 2000; Huntington 1991; Dahl 1971). Recent work challenges this notion. For instance, Straus and Taylor (2012) find that election violence has been consistently high from 1990 to 2008.

Electoral violence is defined as any event in which electoral competition provides the motivation, target identification, and timing of violence (Salehyan and Linebarger 2015; Straus and Taylor 2012). Uncertain wins (Wilkinson 2004, Hafner-Burton et al. 2013) or fraud (Bratton 2008; Gutiérrez-Romero 2014; Norris 2014) increase election violence. Elites use intimidation or violence as a tool for staying in power (Wilkinson 2004; Bratton 2008, Klaus and Mitchell 2015). They may pray on fears in the general population to mobilize supporters for violence (Wilkinson 2004; Klaus and Mitchell 2015). They also use elections to prop up neo-patrimonial systems that distribute power and resources in exchange for political loyalty (Bratton 2008; Boone 2011; Klaus and Mitchell 2015).

Elections are notorious are tools for advancing group interests. Politicians rally support by playing the "ethnic card" (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010). Additionally, elections are seen as a vehicle for redressing grievances and resolving competing claims to

resources, such as land and power (Boone 2011, 2014; Klaus and Mitchell 2015). Sara

Berry explains the process of ethnic cohesion in the context of elections as follows:

> Rival candidates and citizens alike re-examined the question
> of who was eligible to stand for office and/or
> vote…competing claims to citizenship frequently turned on
> questions of historical precedent, giving rise to debates over
> descent, cultural heritage and territorial origin that both
> reinforced the salience of these categories as sources of
> social and political entitlement, and challenged efforts to
> clarify their significance for contemporary claims to
> property and authority (2009: 26).

This ethnic cohesion increases the risk of electoral violence (Snyder 2000; Côté

and Mitchell 2016; Collier 2009). However, I observe that citizenship struggle takes place

in and outside election periods. Furthermore, I argue that an emphasis on electoral violence

leads to a selection bias towards high-intensity episodes of VOB, meaning an electoral

competition lens is too narrow an explanation for VO in general. By relaxing the scope

conditions, I uncover trends in VOB that are not observable using an election violence lens.

Natural Resources

Some scholars argue that groups fight over natural resources in a setting of

environmental scarcity (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998; Homer-Dixon 1999; Klare 2001).

However, the evidence is stacked against resource scarcity arguments and this thesis rarely

explains direct causes of conflict (Boserup 1981; Kahl 2006; Derman, Odgaard, and

Sjaastad 2007). That said, a sizeable literature shows that land is a principal cause of

conflict in Africa.

Land conflict is defined as violence over property rights and land access.

Essentially, it concerns questions about who can claim (or reclaim) land. On the surface,

these conflicts may be understood as competition over scarce resources. This perspective assumes a certain degree of fungibility among material resources, but land is not like oil or diamonds. Tied up in ethnic attachments, land has great significance even in urban areas as a source of income, power, identity, and status (Klaus 2015). Land is life in rural Africa because "belonging to the land guarantees the rights of present as well as future generations" (Bøås 2009, 21).

Land is such a powerful force in African politics because it underlies understandings of citizenship and attachments to ethnic identity (Geschiere 2009; Boone 2011, 2014; Klaus and Mitchell 2015; Bøås and Dunn 2013). Land politics are therefore integral to discussions of political order in Africa (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boone 2014; Klaus 2015). According to Toft (2003), when land is *territory* it defines physical and political space. As a *homeland,* land defines a locus of belonging. Catherine Boone (2011, 2014) and Sara Berry (2009) understand land's inherently political nature as the tangible connection between citizens and the state.

Land mechanisms not only help explain conflict onset, but also the scope and scale of violent episodes. Boone (2014) argues that land tenure regimes define the stakes of competition, the axis of competition (outsider vs. insider), and the scale of competition (national vs. local). Others focus on the role of elite narratives and individuals beliefs regarding secure land rights (Klaus 2015; Klaus and Mitchell 2015). Still others focus on the impact of nativist movements on political violence. They demonstrate that autochthonous ideology is so violence-prone because it combines material and ideational explanations of conflict. (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Geschiere 2009; Marshall-Fratani 2007). Berry (2009) connects land politics and electoral competition by suggesting that

"competition over land and authority has given rise…to struggles over the meaning of 'citizenship' in local as well as national arenas of belonging" (40).

Land mechanisms have great explanatory power because they synthesize insights from the ethnic and electoral competition theses, but these mechanisms alone cannot adequately account for general patterns in VOB. Competing land claims are present in conflicts ranging from the local to the national level. Sometimes land disputes remain constrained, but other times they escalate into wars.[9] Clearly, land is just one among many

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[9] See Chapter List of Tables

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factors shaping VOB outcomes. I propose that exclusionary nationality laws are yet another force at work, and one that is not well understood by the literature.

Insiders and Outsiders

Although nationality laws are often overlooked in the conflict literature, citizenship struggles receive far more scholarly attention. Citizenship struggles are essentially debates over the content of citizenship, including what it means and who can claim it, making them high-stakes and violence-prone. In Africa, citizenship politics typically reflects insider/outsider cleavages given the historical evolution of citizenship on the continent. The literature on insider/outsider violence focuses on the role of land, ethnicity, elections, and political discourse in driving clashes between indigenous groups and internal or external migrants.

Chapter 1. , Note 3 for a list of land disputes at different levels of intensity.

Citizenship on the continent is historically entangled with ethnic identity and land claims (Mamdani 1996, 2001). Therefore, *violence of belonging often manifests as insider/outsider conflict.* I use the term "insider" to refer to indigenous groups, and "outsider" to refer to groups that migrated to an area from elsewhere in the country or from abroad. Most literature separates analysis of the two. The "autochthon/foreigner" dyad pits autochthons against foreign-migrants (Whitaker 2005; Nyamnjoh 2006; Landau 2010; Crush 2001). The "autochthon/settler" dyad pits autochthons against internal-migrants (Côté and Mitchell 2015, 2016; Geschiere 2009; Bøås and Dunn 2013; Boone 2014).

The existing literature tends to examine insider/outsider violence through the lens of land disputes and election violence. The general consensus is that VOB is most likely during election periods when elites politicize national citizenship rules (Côté and Mitchell 2015; Keller 2014). When the state has authority over land tenure, land becomes a source of political leverage. Given the deep connections between land and ethnicity, citizenship then becomes ethnicized (Berry 2009; Boone 2011, 2014; Klaus and Mitchell 2015).

Land mechanisms are not so far removed from electoral politics. Assertion of land rights is linked to ambitions for political power and sentiments of belonging. As such, land claims feature prominently in election time because politicians mobilize constituents through land mechanisms. As a patronage resource, land is used to reward supporters and punish opponents (Boone 2011, 2014; Klaus and Mitchell 2015). During the 1992, 1997, and 2007 elections in Kenya, land rights were alternately promised or threatened (Boone 2011; Klaus and Mitchell 2015). Further, elections represent "an opportunity to alter the distribution of land rights and other resources (Klaus and Mitchell 2015, 2)." Followers and observers alike understand that the status quo property regime hangs in the balance,

providing an incentive for violence—either to defend existing land rights or seize the opportunity to reclaim something that was allegedly lost (Klaus and Mitchell 2015). For this reason, land is inextricable from many electoral contests and ethnicity-driven violence in Africa.[10]

Throughout these studies, contentious narratives about where outsiders belong encourage violent mobilization. Narratives are stories that express beliefs about the world. They not only shape beliefs about what constitutes a problem, but also about what practices can and should be taken to remedy that problem (Autesserre 2012). For example, land grievance narratives are a signaling device elites use to send messages to their supporters and rivals (Klaus and Mitchell 2015).

Citizenship narratives help answer Weber's (2008) question, "who has citizenship but should not have it, and who should have it but does not have it" (125). Citizenship narratives reinforce identity politics by affirming insider/outsider labels. For instance, "sons of the soil" (SOS) movements claim that only "indigenous" ethnic groups, those who arrived in the territory "first", are true citizens. Ethnicity is a powerful unifier because it amplifies group cohesion and offers a powerful lens through which grievances are experienced and understood (Horowitz 1985). Furthermore, these narratives employ discourses that mix elements of the tangible (land) and the relational (claims to having been first-arrivers in a territory), which makes them very dangerous (Côté and Mitchell 2015; Bøås and Dunn 2013; Geschiere 2009). Finally, contentious narratives are the mechanism linking elite incentives and individual interests in the "joint production" of violence

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[10] See Côté and Mitchell (2015) for a critical review of the literature on SOS conflicts.

(Kalyvas 2003; see also Klaus and Mitchell 2015). Power-seeking elites incite violence by manipulating ethnic attachments through contentious narratives. Violence follows a logic of threat when rights are insecure and a logic of opportunity when competition balloons (Klaus 2015; Klaus and Mitchell 2015).

Why does insider/outsider violence break out? When does it escalate from the local to the national level? Previous work suggests that citizenship debates break out during political liberalization (Geschiere 2009), economic crisis (Geschiere 2009; Côté and Mitchell 2016), and where the balance of power favors migrants (Boone 2014; Côté and Mitchell 2016). VOB moves from the local to the national level where citizenship is politicized by elites, often as a result of severed patronage networks (Côté and Mitchell 2016; Arriola 2009; Villarreal 2002) and where the state has land tenure authority (Boone 2014). Most of these arguments highlight that mounting economic and political pressures heighten "fears of dispossession and exclusion" (Berry 2009, 25), which incentivizes violent collective action.

The general assumption has been that electoral violence constitutes national level conflict. For instance, Boone (2014) collapses episodes in Kenya, Rwanda, Côte d'Ivoire, and Eastern the DRC under the umbrella of "national scale land conflict". I find this assumption problematic given the significant differences in minor and major conflict. I show that exclusionary nationality laws affect a wider range of outcomes (regardless of election timing) than previous studies and identify a new factor in civil war. Specifically, VOB escalates to war where an outsider group with contested foreign origins faces denationalization. I propose that an outsider group composed of internal and external migrants is more likely to be labeled "foreign" in exclusionary discourse. These narratives

make it easier for political entrepreneurs to challenge the outsider group's right to citizenship.

Lastly, the generalist perspective in my research contrasts with existing work. Employing much broader scope conditions, I examine violence across multiple issue-areas (land, ethnicity, and elections). Observations in my models often fall below standard thresholds for conflict, and take place within and outside of election periods. I operationalize "intensity" as event and fatality counts rather than selecting specific VOB episodes within specific countries. I also discard the small-n research design in favor of largescale statistical analysis. Using the country-year ACPI indicator, I conduct the first cross-national analysis of how exclusionary nationality laws impact political violence. Together, these deviations from previous work shed light on generalizable trends never observable before. They also support a new framework for theorizing about contentious citizenship politics that can be applied globally.

Final Remarks

Citizenship has been described in the literature as a form of membership, a politicized status, a collection of practices, and even as performance. I focus on the legal bond between individuals and the state. Citizenship grants membership in the national political community, but does not guarantee that rights will always be respected. It only means that citizens have legitimate claim to rights and resources within the polity. Importantly, citizens are constituted through a struggle for "the right to have rights" (Arendt 1966).

I examine how the codification of exclusionary citizenship rules into nationality laws shapes patterns in insider/outsider violence. Previous work implies this relationship

should exist, but does not directly test the hypothesis. I argue that nationality laws deserve close inspection because they formalize belonging in the political community. They are the fundamental boundary mechanism determining who has access to state resources and who does not. *As laws become more restrictive, the severity of VOB increases because a larger segment of the population is excluded.* I detail my theory in the next chapter. It is situated in the wider literature on citizenship politics and ethnic conflict.

Scholarship on insider/outsider violence in Africa describes the connection between citizenship struggles and the issue-areas of land, ethnicity, and elections. Ethnicity is embedded in power structures and social identities, and assertion of land rights is linked to the political arena. Land serves as a patronage resource and "proof" of belonging in the political community. Consequently, in the theatre of contested citizenship, land often serves as the script and elections are typically the stage. It also clearly explains how these struggles escalate from localized skirmishes to the national level. However, current research does not address why citizenship struggles lead to war in some places, but not others.

Chapter 3. A Theory of Violence and Belonging

This chapter presents an original theory on the intersection of nationality laws and violence. I argue that exclusionary nationality laws affect conflict processes in two distinct ways. First, they increase the severity of insider/outsider violence in general. Second, they illuminate the conditions under which insider/outsider violence escalates to war. I begin the discussion by explaining why we would expect nationality laws to impact patterns in violence at all. Next, I detail the theory and its assumptions, address key alternative explanations, and introduce hypotheses guiding this analysis. I conclude with a recap of my theory's contributions to the citizenship politics and conflict fields.

The literature identifies specific conditions under which insider/outsider violence breaks out, and when it escalates from the local to the national level. However, it cannot explain variation in VOB severity in general. I conceptualize citizenship politics is essentially a redistributive conflict. Winners and losers of this conflict compete over scarce resources in the state. Winner/loser status tends to follow ethnic lines in Africa, which increases the likelihood of armed mobilization. Previous work does not attribute explanatory power to nationality laws, focusing instead on land and electoral mechanisms. However, nationality laws matter because they shape the distribution of resources in the polity and thus influence insider/outsider balance of power. Specifically, *exclusionary laws increase marginalization and contribute to an ethnic security dilemma, which intensifies insider/outsider violence*.

My research illuminates a new conflict process: the interaction of exclusionary nationality laws and group composition, which increases the probability that minor conflict

escalates to civil war. *I theorize that national level violence will escalate to war if an outsider group is denationalized*. Faced with the threat of losing their citizenship status, incentives are sufficiently high for that group to rebel. Further, I expect this situation to arise where an outsider group has contested foreign origins, which is most likely when an outsider group is composed of internal and external migrants. Popular imagination is then more likely to conflate outsiders and foreigners, making it easier for insiders to argue that outsiders should be excluded from the national political community.

The Citizenship-Violence Nexus

Exclusive nationality laws marginalize a large segment of the population and produce deep grievances, which can lead to widespread civil unrest (see Manby 2009). To examine the impact of exclusionary nationality laws on VOB severity, I focus on insider/outsider violence because citizenship struggles in Africa are historically tied to struggles over ethnicity and land. Although this argument is implicit in the current literature, it has not been directly tested. This oversight is notable because citizenship is the underlying mechanism of inclusion and exclusion in a state. Therefore, we have clear reason to expect that the codification of exclusive citizenship rules into nationality law would affect violence outcomes.

Why do citizenship politics and violence intersect? I conceptualize *citizenship politics as a redistributive conflict producing winners and losers*. Winners receive a larger share of state resources than losers. They are also *citizenship secure* in that they can exercise their rights without inordinate obstacles. Losers, on the other hand, face more obstacles in obtaining the rights and resources to which they are entitled, rendering them *citizenship insecure*. Formal barriers to citizenship, such as exclusive nationality laws or

property regimes, cause more insecurity than informal barriers, such as weak civil administration.

I theorize that since their claim to citizenship rights is officially recognized and generally upheld in practice, citizenship regime winners tend to have authority in the social and political spheres. They also exhibit fewer political grievances than losing groups, and can more easily access institutionalized channels of dispute resolution. Further, groups can lose out under the prevailing citizenship for a variety of factors: demographic ratios, an unfavorable balance of power, weakly enforced rights, discriminatory institutions, etc. Current literature examines how each of these factors drives violence over land, ethnicity, or elections. I synthesize these insights and argue that they are all sources of citizenship regime winner/loser competition that drives insider/outsider violence. My argument generalizes insights from the literature about how competition between land rights winners and losers drives land conflict (Boone 2014).

Importantly, I maintain that winner/loser status follows ethnic lines, but transcends insider/outsider distinctions. In other words, winners can be insiders or outsiders, depending on state policies and regime preferences. The same is true for losing groups; they can be insiders or outsiders, depending on the political environment in a state. In the DRC, for example, the Banyarwanda were *winners* during colonialism, *losers* at independence, and alternately *winners* and *losers* under Mobutu. Although Kabila defended their interests at the start of the Second Congo War, the Banyarwanda ultimately fell from favor and their citizenship status remains precarious. Under inclusionary citizenship regimes, both insiders and outsiders can be winners. For instance, Ghanaian politicians court the votes of autochthons and migrants (Whitaker 2015; Kobo 2010). By

the same token, insiders *and* outsiders can lose out under the prevailing regime. In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, property rights are poorly defined and not properly documented, making land claims in general tenuous and contradictory.

My argument also builds upon research into the "ethnic security dilemma" (Posen 1993, Saideman et al 2002). Insiders and outsiders compete for citizenship rights and resources within the state, each group fearing oppression and persecution if another group controls the state. Their competition drives a security dilemma, which leads to violence. Kenya's turbulent election history illustrates how winner/loser competition drives an ethnic security dilemma between insiders and outsiders. Rift Valley Province (RVP) has long been contested territory. The Kalenjin ethnic group claims ancestral land rights in RVP, but waves of Kikuyu settlers challenge these claims. In the 1990s, President Daniel arap Moi used the language of "cleansing" the Rift to mobilize Kalenjin supporters before elections. He freely intimated and evicted Kikuyu and other "outsiders" in competitive districts to undermine the opposition. In December 2007 Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) won re-election. Supporters of the main opposition party, the Kalenjin-dominant Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), now feared their lands would be appropriated by the government. They feared Kibaki's regime would only serve Kikuyu interests. ODM responded to their electoral loss by removing Kikuyu (PNU sympathizers) from the Rift Valley.

Previous studies do not frame insider/outsider disputes in the context of winning/losing under the status quo citizenship regime, or as an ethnic security dilemma. Furthermore, I go farther than others by suggesting that winner/loser status is a determinant of insider/outsider balance of power. My argument also lays the groundwork for why

nationality laws, an understudied factor in the literature, deserve more attention in political violence studies. Unlike prior studies, I look at how exclusionary laws, rather than land or election mechanisms, affect collective action and violence.

As a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion, I theorize that nationality laws reinforce beliefs about the extent to which status quo citizenship rules pose an existential threat. They also create a path for resolving group grievances. Although exclusionary nationality laws exacerbate the ethnic security dilemma within a polity, these laws are political constructs that can be changed. Revising laws to support group interests is seen as a way to address the group's security dilemma by securing their hold on power. Restricting citizenship criteria, for example, can "fix" each group's status to ensure a favorable balance of power. In extreme cases, insiders call to denationalize an outsider group. I return to this idea later.

I focus on winner/loser competition as the *motivation* for actors to violently contest the status quo citizenship regime. However, competition does not address the *mechanism* by which mobilization occurs. Therefore, I now turn to research on political narratives to explain the causal mechanism in my theory: contentious citizenship narratives. Recall that *narratives* are stories group members use to understand where they fit in to the political order and wider social networks. Narratives also explain what actions are legitimate or off-limits, what is to be feared, and what is to be valued. Importantly, narratives shape beliefs about what constitutes a problem and how to fix it.

I argue that citizenship regime winner/loser competition produces contentious citizenship narratives questioning where outsiders belong. I build on studies explaining that exclusionary discourse is an effective mobilization tactic, and one that it is violence

prone (Geschiere 2009; Bøås and Dunn 2013). Like autochthony discourses, citizenship narratives comprise a potent mix of the tangible (e.g. votes, jobs, and land) and the relational (e.g. individual rights and obligations vis-à-vis the state). They therefore tap into grievance and greed mechanisms of ethnic conflict. Furthermore, exclusive narratives have an inherent appeal because they advocate for ethnically-defined communities (Geschiere 2009; Lynch 2011). These narratives justify winner/loser claims to state resources by making ethnic appeals, thereby reinforcing the insider/outsider cleavage. For instance, Klaus and Mitchell (2015) show that elites mobilize followers during elections around the defense of existing land rights (pre-emptive logic) and the chance to reclaim land that was allegedly lost (opportunistic logic). Recall that land claims are inseparable from ethnic identity in African politics. Similarly, I argue that contentious citizenship narratives mobilize groups according to the dual logics of *threat* and *opportunity*. Elites frame the citizenship regime as a threat to group resources (logic of threat), and suggest that groups can improve their condition by revising the status quo citizenship rules (logic of opportunity).

Contentious citizenship narratives facilitate collective violence by stoking ethnic grievances and an ethnic security dilemma. Their specific appeals vary by country, time period, and whether the audience is composed of insiders or outsiders. However, insider-oriented narratives call for restrictive citizenship rules, while outsider-oriented narratives push for liberal rules. Insiders and outsiders try to legitimize their claims by appealing to their group's membership in the Nation. Examples of contentious citizenship narratives are provided in Table 1.

Table 1: Political Entrepreneur Narratives for Mobilization

	Insider Audience	Outsider Audience
Narrative of Threat	"Foreigners are taking the good jobs."	"The government wants to take away our citizenship."
Narrative of Opportunity	"We should take back our ancestral land."	"By amending the laws, we can guarantee our citizenship status."

To see these narratives in action, we can look to Côte d'Ivoire's recent history. Ahead of the 1995 election, Alassane Ouattara defended the rights of citizenship insecure Northerners and fought to clarify their citizenship status through inclusive nationality laws. In the same campaign, interim president Henri Konan Bédié called into question whether Northerners should be considered Ivoirian at all. Bédié presented himself as a champion of autochthonous rights, which he claimed were trampled by the migrant-friendly regime. Similar tactics have been used in Cameroon, the DRC, and Kenya (Nyamnjoh and Rowlands 1998; Jackson 2007; Klaus and Mitchell 2015).

A final note on citizenship narratives: they are disseminated through top-down *and* bottom-up processes (Geschiere and Jackson 2006). Elites manipulate citizenship rules for political expediency, but often claim these maneuvers reflect the will of the "true" people (Marshall-Fratani 2007; McGovern 2011; Bah 2010). However, elites do not have a monopoly of manipulating ethnic identity out of political expediency. Whether motivated by elites or by communalism, even grassroots movements seek to address exclusion through violence and identity politics (Vlassenroot 2002).

In summary, exclusionary and politicized citizenship policy, expressed through restrictive nationality laws, exacerbate marginalization and fuel insider/outsider

competition. Consequently, I expect nationality laws to increase the severity of VOB in general. Further, I expect these laws to impact conflict processes at the individual level.

Escalation

The second line of argument in this dissertation concerns the conditions under which insider/outsider violence leads to war. I argue that exclusionary nationality laws produce widespread marginalization, exacerbate insider/outsider tension, and thus encourage violent mobilization. A confluence of factors bring insider/outsider competition to a head; namely political and economic competition between winners and losers under the prevailing regime. The question of violence onset is beyond the scope of this study, which focuses on how exclusive nationality laws impact *escalation*, which speaks to VOB magnitude. Episode magnitude matters because as severity increases, so too do the costs of fighting (both in terms of human suffering and material losses). Moreover, the conflict studies field revolves around distinct conceptual categories, such as minor as opposed to major conflict, all premised on variation in violence magnitude.

Previous work explains why citizenship debates moves from the local to the national level, including political or economic crisis (Geschiere; Côté and Mitchell 2016) and statist land tenure regimes that grant outsiders a favorable balance of power (Boone 2014; Côté and Mitchell 2016). However, these studies assume that "national level conflict" is synonymous with electoral violence. Consequently, they do not distinguish between cases of minor conflict and war. Understanding nationality legislation, though, sheds greater light on VOB episodes, indicating when such violence likely remains minor conflict, and when it is most likely to escalate to war. In a deviation from traditional

explanations of civil conflict, I contend that *the risk of war spikes when an outsider group is faced with denationalization.*

Insiders credibly threaten outsiders with denationalization when the outsider group has contested foreign origins, which occurs when the outsider group is composed of internal and external migrants. It is then easier to make the case that outsiders are truly foreigners who should be removed from the national political community. By extension, an outsider group is unlikely to have contested foreign origins when members are principally in-migrants.[11]

Denationalization is a sufficient incentive for rebellion because its consequences are so stark. Individuals considered foreign-nationals under the law are vulnerable because the state is not under the same obligation to protect and serve them as it is to citizens. Therefore, rescinded citizenship status means groups are cut off from state resources, denied a wide range of rights, and often relegated to an alternative (and arbitrary) legal track. Also, they may not qualify for citizenship elsewhere, which leaves them stateless.

Recall too that the insider/outsider violence stems from an ethnic security dilemma. The future, then, looks particularly bleak for denationalized groups. Considering that

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[11] This pattern is reflected in the war-cases of DRC and Côte d'Ivoire, but the Rwanda case is a slight deviation. Hutus and Tutsis were not distinct ethnic groups before European colonization. The indigenous Twa were present in the territory before the Hutu arrived between the 5th and 11th centuries. The Tutsi migrated around the 14th century. Hutu Nationalism in the 1950s espoused the fiction that Tutsis were foreign invaders. The Bahutu Manifesto helped turn that fiction into a dominant narrative (Mamdani 2001b; Keller 2014). In line with my theory, the Social Revolution (1959-1962) and the Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994) reflect efforts by insiders (Hutu) to physically remove outsiders with contested foreign origins (Tutsi). I would argue that is the most extreme form of denationalization.

peaceful, institutionalized channels of dispute resolution are closed off to denationalized groups, armed organization may be the only way for groups to defend their "right to have rights" (Arendt 1966).

In summary, I expect insider/outsider clashes to remain localized where the criteria for conflict are not met. Where these criteria obtain, VOB escalates to the national level. Major conflict is likely where outsiders are threatened with denationalization, whereas minor conflict is likely where nationality laws are not at stake and outsiders are not threatened with denationalization.

Assumptions

My theory relies on assumptions about institutionalizing citizenship, the composition and incentives of actors, and characteristics of violence. Firstly, constructed, negotiable, and subject to social and political processes, I assume that citizenship rules evolve through endogenous processes that are not explained here. These rules are formalized through nationality laws, although the provisions of these laws varies across countries and over time. I understand citizenship rules as flexible criteria that are negotiated through debates over belonging. As these debates deepen, they inform policymaking at higher levels of government. Determining the conditions under which these narratives turn into policy is beyond the scope of this project.[12] Instead, I focus on how exclusionary provisions impact patterns in violence. Violence certainly impacts the development of nationality law itself, but I account for this endogeneity in my testing strategy. In Chapter

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[12] Côté and Mitchell (2015) have made inroads to that question.

4, I lag ACPI scores so that measurement of legal provisions precedes measurement of frequency and fatality rates. Most importantly, I use process-tracing in four case studies to demonstrate that violence worsened *as a consequence* of changes in nationality laws, rather than the other way around.

I emphasize rights protected by nationality laws, yet the gap between *de jure* and *de facto* rights is quite large in many countries. In fact, informal barriers to citizenship are a common form of exclusion (Manby 2009). For example, Anglophones in Cameroon were discriminated against in government appointments, development projects, and public services due to English-language dominance in the administration (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2004). Their story is familiar to migrants in Nigeria, non-Swazis in Swaziland, Somalis and Nubians in Kenya, and many other groups around the world. Informal institutions remain outside the scope of this project largely because data availability remains sparse. Oftentimes, informal barriers, such as corruption, are unobservable and stubbornly hard to quantify. In contrast, nationality laws provide an observable and systematic metric of exclusion from citizenship rights. Moreover, when individuals are denied formal citizenship, they face a more pernicious form of exclusion. I therefore measure the effect of *de jure* exclusion, and leave it to future researchers to measure the effect of *de facto* exclusion. I assume that where individuals are denied rights through nationality laws, they are also denied rights through informal institutions.

The formal criteria for citizenship change over time. Laws can be revised to expand access to citizenship, as happened after the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, or they can uphold new restrictions. One high-profile case is that of Kenneth Kaunda, former president of Zambia (1964-1991). In 1996 he was deemed ineligible to contest upcoming

presidential elections on the opposition United National Independence Party ticket after the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy party amended the constitution to require that both parents of presidential candidates had to be Zambian citizens. In 1999 the High Court of Zambia ruled Kaunda a stateless person on the grounds that he was a Malawian citizen by descent. The inherent flexibility of citizenship requirements creates uncertainty about membership in the political community, which hardens into the core of citizenship debates.

My theory of winner/loser competition locates agency at the group level. However, I assume that groups respond to a strategic environment structured by public policy. Just as exclusionary nationality laws can exacerbate communal tensions, state policies can peacefully manage ethnic relations. Early-independence presidents Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta or Kenya, and Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon achieved this goal through ethnic balancing policies. On the other hand, governments may take actions that enflame citizenship debates—even those that formerly sought national integration. For example, Cameroon's 1992 electoral code required indigenous, Anglophone candidates to be represented on the list (Fru Awasom 2004). In 1996, a provision promising state protection for autochthonous minorities was added to the constitution (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2004). These policies strengthened Anglophone identity and intensified hostilities between indigenous Anglophones and Francophone settlers. My theory addresses how nationality laws shape the strategic environment in which groups operate.

My argument is as much a story of disenfranchised, losing groups rising up against the center, as it is a story about winning groups defending their share of the national pie. For this reason, I do not make predictions about whether winners or losers will mobilize

first. For example, Mugabe's promises of land and wealth redistribution during the fast-track land reform program mobilized winners/insiders (veterans of the anti-colonial liberation war) against losers/outsiders (white farmers). In South Africa, losers/insiders (Black South Africans) mobilized through the Inkatha Freedom Party, the African National Congress, Azanian People's liberation Army, and other organizations against Afrikaners. Of course, winners/outsiders (Afrikaners) mobilized as well through the National Party, the Boer Resistance Movement, and the Afrikaner Resistance Movement. This perspective deviates from other grievance-based accounts of ethnic conflict. It allows me to go farther than many studies in exploring insider/outsider violence, which tend to privilege insider- or outsider-driven activity, rather than examining both at the same time.

It is beyond the scope of this project to predict VOB onset. At times citizenship debates turn violent, but other times they do not. For instance, the quest among Arab leaders of Sudan to make the country an Arab-Islamic state led to genocide against Southerners, Nubians, and Darfurians alike and fueled the decades-long civil war (Idris 2012). However, the denationalization of about 3,500 Galje'el Somalis in the Tana River District, Kenya has not sparked conflict (Manby 2009). Clearly violence is not a pre-determined outcome of exclusive nationality laws, so I do not put forward a deterministic formula for predicting VOB onset. Instead, I examine how nationality laws shape conflict processes, specifically with reference to magnitude (i.e. localized violence versus minor conflict versus civil war). My theory would not apply to the Galje'el Somalis case because the criteria for violence onset have not been met. After onset takes place, then my theory applies.

Any study of political violence faces the difficulty of setting appropriate scope conditions. Citizenship struggles manifest as demonstrations, xenophobic riots, ethnic

clashes, election violence, and even armed conflict. Episodes can be local, regional, or national in scale. Furthermore, citizenship debates are entangled in other issues, such as land, ethnicity, and elections. Many studies of citizenship debates focus on "sons of the soil" (SOS) conflicts, defined as clashes between indigenous ethnic groups and *internal* migrants (Côté and Mitchell 2015, 2016; Fearon and Laitin 2011). A different strand of the literature addresses anti-immigrant or xenophobic violence (Olzak 1992; Landau 2010; Nyamnjoh 2006). In contrast, I consider violence between indigenous groups and outsiders generally, whether they are internal or external migrants. I therefore leverage the full variation in insider/outsider violence. This is a new, more holistic approach to the study of VOB.

Self-determination movements are a sub-set of VOB in which a minority group demands special treatment for their ethno-cultural nation. This "treatment" can be anything from protected status for cultural practices to an independent state. Africa is no stranger to such movements, which have disrupted life in Cameroon, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and over a dozen other countries (Cunningham 2014). The theory of citizenship security applies weakly to these cases because losing groups seeking self-determination challenge the status quo by denying their place in the national political community. Therefore, my theory does not fully apply. A different theory is needed to explain conditions of violence onset and escalation in these cases.

Finally, I focus on how exclusionary nationality laws produce violence. However, there is evidence that inclusionary shifts in citizenship policy can generate pushback from hardliners. Winning groups may resent expanded citizenship rules that allocate scarce state resources among a larger number of groups. Their competition with losing groups may

intensify this resentment, prompting collective action. For instance, Afrikaner nationalist groups violently resisted liberalization in South Africa. The Confederacy also resisted liberalization in the United States. A modified version of my theory applies loosely in these cases too: winner/loser competition produced insider/outsider violence at the national level, and violence intensified when nationality laws were at stake. In my sample of Sub-Saharan African countries, though, I do not find a case where *inclusionary* shifts in nationality law led to war. As much violence as apartheid loyalists employed, VOB did not reach the level of major conflict. Perhaps a study drawing upon a global sample can more fully test this research question. That line of inquiry is beyond the scope of this dissertation. At this point, it seems that exclusionary nationality laws (and denationalization of an outsider group specifically) remain the key factor that escalates insider/outsider violence from minor conflict to war.

Alternative Explanations

How does my theory mesh with alternative explanations of conflict? The following section explains how I account for the role of ethnic competition, electoral contests, and overlapping land claims in VOB.

The first alternative explanation is that VOB is another story of ethnic insiders battling ethnic outsiders over scarce resources. However, this line of argument leaves too many open questions. Ethnic competition is everywhere, yet we observe markedly different levels of ethnic violence. Therefore, ethnic competition is an insufficient explanation in and of itself for explaining violence severity. I apply a citizenship rules lens to disentangle ethnic contests from one another and show why they follow different trajectories. Additionally, existing ethnic competition analyses tend to assume that the ethnic groups in

question are homogenous coalitions, whereas I examine multi-ethnic coalitions built around the identity of autochthony or a pan-ethnic, nationalist ideology.[13]

A more fundamental problem with ethnic competition theses is the endogeneity problem. Ethnic labels are unstable over time and disputed by groups themselves. Moreover, ethnic coalitions, not to mention ethnic groups themselves, are built for strategic purposes (Bates 1983; Posner 2005). The competition between ethnic groups can be endogenous to the origination of the respective ethnic identities. For instance, the "Bété" ethnicity in Côte d'Ivoire is a colonial-era artifact, an "agglomeration of more than seventy tribal groupings with no shared language" (Boone 2014, 134). Bété consciousness developed in reaction to losing under early-independence citizenship regime that ignored autochthonous land rights. In this regard, a strong parallel exists between the Ivoirian Bété, Kenyan Kalenjin, and Rwandan Hutu groups (Keller 2014; Klaus and Mitchell 2015; Boone 2014). A nationality law lens, with its emphasis on citizenship regime winners and losers, helps stabilize unstable ethnic categories in a way that permits wide comparison of groups across countries and over time. Through cross-national analysis, generalizable trends in insider/outsider violence become clear.

In addition to ethnic competition theses, political competition is a common thread running through literature on VOB. In line with previous work, I acknowledge that elections are often the stage on which citizenship debates play out. Although elections may trigger events, grievances drive the dynamics (c.f. Klaus and Mitchell 2015; Boone 2014;

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[13] Although autochthony is tied to ethnicity, the category refers to the date of the group's arrival in a territory.

Marshall-Fratani 2007; McGovern 2011). Furthermore, the electoral competition lens helps explain some VOB outcomes, but it cannot explain them all. I add to these accounts by capturing the full variation in VOB, and advancing new causal factors in insider/outsider violence (i.e. winner/loser competition and denationalization of outsiders).

Theories of land competition also fall short of explaining the divergence in national level conflict. Autochtonous ideology certainly matters in citizenship politics, but competing land claims cannot explain variation in VOB severity. We see autochthonous discourse featured prominently in cases of national-level conflict (Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, Kenya, Nigeria, and Rwanda), as well as in lower-level episodes (Ghana, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, South Africa, and Guinea). Theorizing about autochthonous movements is better suited for filling in the contours of citizenship narratives and explaining insider/outsider violence onset.

Of course, a full account of VOB severity blends multiple lines of argument. Conflict is multi-causal, and factors in onset and escalation are not necessarily the same. Exclusionary nationality laws are frequently overlooked as a conflict process. By evaluating the intersection of citizenship, law, and narratives in cross-national perspective, I shed new light on VOB processes and patterns.

Hypotheses

The preceding discussion generates several testable hypothesis. In Chapters 4-8, I examine these propositions empirically using a mixed-methodology approach. I theorize that the codification of exclusionary citizenship rules into nationality law shapes patterns in violence. I first address how exclusionary nationality laws impact VOB severity in general, leading to Hypothesis 1:

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H1: Exclusionary nationality laws increase the severity of collective violence.

I address Hypothesis 1 in Chapter 4 to motivate the rest of the dissertation. Employing an original dataset on Africa's nationality laws, I find that exclusionary laws increase the severity of VOB. I operationalize severity as event frequency and fatality rates, and limit testing to violence over land, ethnicity, and elections. This decision is theoretically motivated as these issue-areas are historically related to citizenship struggles in Africa.

Next, I examine how exclusionary nationality laws affect national level violence in particular, leading to Hypothesis 2:

H2a: Violence at the national level will escalate to war once nationality are revised to denationalize one or more groups in society.

H2b: Violence at the national level will fall short of war if nationality laws are not in question.

Comparative case studies in Chapters 5 and Chapter 6 show that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC deteriorated as nationality laws became more exclusive. In support of H2a, I find that VOB there turned into war because an outsider group faced denationalization. In support of H2b, I find that VOB fell short of war in Kenya and Ghana because national citizenship criteria never came into question. Through these case studies,

I also illustrate how the causal mechanism of contentious narratives propels ethnic mobilization and intensifies VOB episodes.

An important contribution of my research is that I apply the nationality law lens to conflict processes at the individual level. To my knowledge, no previous study has cross-nationally examined the impact of exclusionary nationality laws at this level of analysis. I theorize that exclusionary laws incentivize violent collective action because they make individuals feel citizenship *insecure,* leading to Hypothesis 3:

H3a: Citizenship insecurity increases the likelihood that an individual will fear becoming a victim of political violence.

H3b: Citizenship insecurity increases the likelihood that an individual will use political violence.

Citizenship insecurity refers to the ability to exercise citizenship rights. In Chapter Chapter 7, I use Afrobarometer survey data to measure of citizenship insecurity at the individual level. I find that individuals who face difficulty obtaining national identity documents (which prove their citizenship status) exhibit a greater likelihood of fearing and using political violence. Also, I find that the worst-off individuals (very insecure and discriminated against) are actually *less* likely to use political violence than the moderately worse off (somewhat insecure and discriminated against). These findings contradict most of the literature, but are in line with recent research suggesting that moderately-aggrieved groups are more likely to rebel than highly-aggrieved ones (Lacina 2014).

I then use Afrobarometer data to measure the cross-national effect of contentious narratives at the individual level. I propose that this discourse mobilizes individuals along

ethnic lines according to the logics of threat and opportunity. This argument leads to Hypothesis 4:

H4a: Contentious narratives increase the likelihood that an individual will fear becoming a victim of political violence.

H4b: Contentious narratives increase the likelihood that an individual will use political violence.

I cannot directly measure contentious narratives or their logics with available data, so I look for observable implications of an individual's *susceptibility* to those narratives instead. Since insider groups typically mobilize around narrowing citizenship criteria, I use support for restrictive citizenship criteria as a proxy for susceptibility to insider-oriented narratives. Since outsider groups typically mobilize around denial of their citizenship rights, I classify individuals who were prevented from voting in the last election as susceptible to outsider-oriented narratives. I find that susceptibility to contentious narratives increases the likelihood an individual will use, but not fear, political violence.

In Chapter Chapter 8, I explore the lingering effects of a violent politics of belonging through original survey data from Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. Citizenship is not a politicized issue in Ghana, but the issue led to war in Côte's d'Ivoire (2002 to 2007 with a relapse of fighting in 2010). In October 2015, Côte d'Ivoire's first election since the 2010 *Crise* passed off peacefully, and Alassane Ouattara began his second presidential term. With economic growth on the rise, the country seems to be rebounding, and Ivoirians outwardly express stronger support for ethnic inclusion than Ghanaians. My survey reveals

not simply that ethnic divisions persist in post-conflict Côte d'Ivoire, but that these cleavages remain potent risk factor in conflict relapse. I argue that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire illustrates the lingering effects of an exclusionary and violent politics of belonging. I capture this argument in my final hypothesis:

> *H5: A history of violence of belonging increases support for using political violence, even after conflict has ended.*

To test this hypothesis, I look for observable implications of elevated risk factors in violence in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. Ivoirians willing to mobilize around leaders are more likely to support the use of violence, but the same is not true in Ghana. Additionally, strong ethnic identification and the perception of ethnic bias in the government both predict of support for violence in Côte d'Ivoire, but not in Ghana. In fact, the only predictive measure of support for violence in Ghana is the perception that the regime favors its clients in the distribution of resources. This factor has a similar effect in Côte d'Ivoire. Taken together, Ivoirian ethnic entrepreneurs have a favorable recruitment environment, and collective action is violence-prone. The implication is that Ivorian stability, roundly cheered after the 2015 election, is precarious and that insider/outsider mobilization remains a serious threat.

Final Remarks

Citizenship struggles represent a form of redistributive conflict. Exclusionary nationality laws fuel competition between citizenship regime winners and losers. This competition encourages challenges to the prevailing citizenship rules, and insider/outsider

narratives develop. These narratives encourage ethnic mobilization around the logics of threat (depleted resources) and opportunity (improved standing). I expect that where the conditions for national level conflict are not met, localized VOB breaks out even if nationality laws are restrictive. Characteristics of nationality law reveal why episodes follow different trajectories. Where the national citizenship rules are at stake, nationality laws come into question and the risk of war increases. If the government denationalizes an outsider group, VOB escalates to war. This situation is most likely where outsiders have contested foreign origins because the group is composed of internal and external migrants. However, I expect VOB to remain at the minor conflict level where nationality laws are not in question, and debates only concern sub-national rules of belonging.

Examining nationality laws as a causal factor is a novel approach to studying ethnic conflict. Most conflict scholars do not address the role of these laws at all. Even in accounts of VOB that acknowledge how important nationality laws are, scholars tend to treat these laws as a by-product of existing institutions rather than a force with explanatory power. Moreover, the qualitative-bent in VOB research has obscured factors that explain cross-national variation in VOB severity. And yet, exclusionary nationality laws are clearly an important causal factor in political violence. They shape violence severity and contribute to pushing minor conflict towards war.

To my knowledge, I have conducted the first cross-national study into the impact of nationality laws on political violence.[14] By placing laws front and center of statistical

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[14] The closest study is Manby (2009). See Chapter List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter 1. , Note 2.

analysis, I expand the scope of testing to include all Sub-Saharan African countries, many forms of violence, and thousands of discrete events. Consequently, my work provides a much broader perspective on VOB than what has come before. It also demonstrates the conditions under which citizenship struggles are most likely to lead to war, a new direction for the literature. Finally, I have developed a generalizable framework for studying contentious citizenship politics that can be applied in or outside Africa.

Chapter 4. Nationality Laws and Violence Severity: Evidence from the African Citizenship Policy Index

Much has been written about the conceptual dimensions of citizenship in Africa, such as what citizenship means and how the institution has evolved over time. And yet the letter of citizenship law has received far less attention. Moreover, the field is built around a constellation of qualitative studies that speak to the interplay between context, mechanisms, and processes, yet are not grounded in a standard set of "measurements, criteria, and analyses" (Howard 2006, 444). Consequently, it is difficult to theorize about general patterns in citizenship policy, to understand the empirical implications of spatial and temporal variation in these laws, and to replicate findings from previous research.

In this chapter, I present the first cross-national investigation of how provisions in nationality laws shape patterns in collective violence. I introduce a new tool for analyzing the impact of citizenship policy: the African Citizenship Policy Index (ACPI). The ACPI covers laws in 42 Sub-Saharan African countries from 1989 to 2015. It is the first country-year measure of African citizenship policy, and the most comprehensive metric available. I find that more exclusionary provisions increase the frequency of inter-ethnic violence and the fatality rate of violence over land, elections, and ethnicity. Furthermore, years in which a new nationality law passes exhibit greater violence frequency, but not greater fatality rates.

A Empirical Exploration of Citizenship Policy

Contested citizenship threatens the stability of many African countries and yet cross-national data on laws are scarce. Notable exceptions include work by Geoffrey

Herbst (1999), who classifies countries according to *jus soli* or *jus sanguinis* nationality laws, and Bronwen Manby (2009, 2010, 2015), who catalogues discriminatory policies and practices throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Dual nationality provisions in particular have captured scholarly interest (Whitaker 2011; Sejersen 2008; Dahlin and Hironaka 2008), but much work remains to be done in terms of understanding the range, content, and implications of Africa's legal landscape. Moreover, existing studies do not merge their data on citizenship-related laws with conflict data. As such, the field is not equipped to interrogate the diverse effects of exclusive nationality laws on violence. Therefore, one of my primary contributions is an assessment of how the legal framework of belonging affects violence severity.

The following chapter describes the methodology used to construct the ACPI and what the indicator reveals about citizenship policy over time. I also test my first hypothesis:

H1: Exclusionary nationality laws increase the severity of collective violence.

I define severity in terms of event count and fatalities. This coding decision is in line with the conflict literature, which defines social conflict, minor conflict, and major conflict based on how many battle-related deaths the episode had. Furthermore, I examine violent events related to elections, land, and ethnicity. Citizenship struggles typically manifest in these issue-areas. Land underlies understandings of citizenship and attachments to ethnic identity (Boone 2014; Mamdani 1996; Berry 2009). Assertion of land rights is linked to ambitions for political power and sentiments of belonging. During elections, politicians mobilize constituents by using land as patronage to reward supporters and

punish opponents (Boone 2011, 2014; Klaus and Mitchell 2015). In Africa, land rights and political competition are tied to identity politics and ethnic cleavages (Raleigh 2014; Stewart 2008; Dorman 2014).

Methodology and Measurement

I created the African Citizenship Policy Index to test causal arguments about Africa's nationality laws. The ACPI describes country performance in multi-dimensional space. Indices "provide simple comparisons of countries that can be used to illustrate complex and sometimes elusive issues" (OECD 2008, 13). By summarizing complex information, indices make it easier to evaluate abstract concepts and to interpret a wide array of causes or effects, as compared to juggling many separate indicators (OECD 2008). Examples of effective indices, include the gross domestic product (GDP), the Human Development Index, Polity IV, Freedom House scores, and the Fragile States Index, among many others.

The downsides of composite indicators lie in their construction and application. Muro, Mazziotta, and Pareto (2010) consider two problems paramount: selecting the dimensions under consideration and deciding how to measure these dimensions. Of course, issues related to normalization, weighting, aggregation, and robustness should not be discounted (OECD 2008). Misinterpretation, lack of transparency, and simplistic policy prescriptions are perennial issues of composite indicators. In this section, I walk through the theoretical framework underlying the ACPI, the data selection procedures, and aggregation methods.

Conceptual Framework

To measure exclusionary citizenship rules, I first define what exclusion from citizenship means. I define it as the denial of rights and resources associated with formal citizenship status (e.g. the right to vote, own property, personal security, travel freely, etc.). National legislation is an implication of exclusion from citizenship that is measureable in an objective, systematic way. Informal barriers lead to exclusion as well, but they are not necessarily observable. Moreover, without formal citizenship rights individuals are prevented from participating fully in the political, economic, and social area. This type of marginalization is not necessarily the case when individuals lack informal recognition of their belonging. Therefore, I reserve this line of inquiry for future studies.

The ACPI index builds upon previous efforts to construct comprehensive records of nationality laws in Europe (Howard 2005), Africa (Herbst 1999; Manby 2009; Seely 2013), and elsewhere (Money 2002). My goal is to produce a metric akin to the Citizenship Policy Index (Howard 2005, 2006), an additive index evaluating nationality laws in Europe.[15]

The ACPI is a composite of six sub-indicators. I determined ACPI dimensions based upon Manby's (2009) identification of areas in citizenship policy producing exclusion: citizenship principle, gender equity, ethnicity and race, naturalization requirements and delayed political rights, and multiple nationalities. Citizenship principle

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[15] Marc Marjoré Howard's (2005, 2006) Citizenship Policy Index (CPI) has three dimensions: *jus soli* principles, residency requirements for naturalization, and dual nationality for naturalized immigrants. The CPI allocates up to 2 points for each indicator, leading to a 6-point additive scale.

refers to the fact that citizenship by descent (*jus sanguinis*) sets a higher bar for national belonging than citizenship by birth in the territory (*jus soli*). Countries that do not recognize a woman's right to pass citizenship to her foreign spouse or her children also create undue barriers to access, as do countries that show preferences for particular ethnic or racial groups. Finally, governments often set up barriers to those interested in naturalizing, such as lengthy dual nationality residency requirements and restrictions on political rights for naturalized citizens.

Components of the African Citizenship Policy Index

The master list of relevant nationality, naturalization, and constitutional laws comes primarily from Manby (2015), although it has been supplemented by additional material collected by the author. To be included in the study, a law had to pertain to one of the six dimensions of the ACPI. Data comes from constitutions, nationality laws, naturalization laws, amendments and policy notes. I obtained copies of these documents from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)'s Refworld database, academic books and journal articles, and websites of governments or non-governmental organizations.[16]

Following Howard (2005, 2006), I allocate up to 2 points for each ACPI sub-indicator. By keeping ACPI components in the same units, it is not necessary to normalize scores at the sub-indicator level. Countries are coded on whether evidence of a type of provision can be found. Where no evidence to the contrary can be found, countries are

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[16] The Refworld database is available from www.refworld.org, accessed September 2015-January 2016.

coded as if that exclusionary practice is absent. Therefore, I do not distinguish between countries that disavow an exclusionary practice from those with laws that say nothing one way or the other on the practice. In addition, the sub-indicators are not continuous measures, they are categorical. As such, I identify natural breaks and thresholds of exclusion rather than a gradation in policies and treatment of individuals. The strength of this coding procedure is that the ACPI framework is highly generalizable. Furthermore, each sub-indicator has full coverage and no missing values. Figure 1 summarizes the distribution of observations across ACPI sub-indicators.

Figure 1: Distribution of Index Components, All Years

Citizenship Principle: I distinguish nationality laws by the extent to which they are based on *jus sanguinis* or *jus soli* principles, sub-indicator values of "2" and "0"

respectively. In some cases, law allows individuals born in the country to foreign parents to acquire citizenship at the age of majority, after a residency period, or after meeting other criteria. I assign these cases of limited *jus soli* a value of "1". By and large, African states enshrine *jus sanguinis* principles fully (54%) or through limited *jus soli* laws (40.7%). Only 5.3% of country-years have pure *jus soli* laws, driven by Mozambique and Chad's generous policies.[17] On average, countries score a 1.49 on the ACPI's *Principle* dimension.

Gender Equity: Most countries allow foreign women to acquire citizenship upon marriage to a national. However, many countries, including Burundi, Ghana, and Malawi, do not allow women nationals to pass citizenship on to their foreign husbands. I assign these cases a sub-indicator value of "1". Countries that do not allow women to pass citizenship to their children on terms equal to men take a value of "2". For example, Kenya only allowed fathers to pass citizenship to children born abroad until 2010. In Sudan, individuals whose mothers are citizens and whose fathers are foreign must apply for citizenship. I assume that prohibitions against passing citizenship to children is more exclusionary than prohibitions against passing citizenship to foreign spouses. My logic is that foreign nationals (and thus foreign spouses) have historically been treated with skepticism in Africa and elsewhere. In fact, naturalization remains elusive in many African countries (Manby 2009). In contrast, the inability of a mother to pass citizenship to her child simply because the father is a non-citizen demonstrates a significant prejudice against women. The issue does not even arise for children born to non-citizen mothers. In the dataset, *Gender Discrimination* is distributed among country-years as follows: no evidence

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[17] Tanzania had *jus soli* laws until 1994.

of gender inequality at 36%, discrimination against foreign spouses at 37.5%, and against children at 26%. On average, countries score a 0.9 on the ACPI's *Gender Discrimination* dimension.

Ethnicity and Race: The index component *Ethnic/Racial Discrimination* reveals which countries require citizens to be from specific ethnic or racial backgrounds. I assign countries favoring members of particular ethnic or racial groups a sub-indicator score of "2". For instance, since 1995 Uganda has required citizens be members of an indigenous ethnic group. Liberia and Sierra Leone require citizens to be of "negro descent." When African origin is required to claim citizenship by birth (Malawi or Mali) or to naturalize (Chad, Tanzania 1962 to 1995, or Kenya 1963 to 2011), I assign the country a score of "1".[18] Without evidence of ethnic or racial discrimination, a country scores "0". Formalized ethnic discrimination is relatively low, making up 20% of observations. Countries score an average 0.32 on this ACPI component.

Multiple Nationalities: Dual nationality is permitted in 39 Sub-Saharan African countries, usually in response to pressures exerted by migration (Whitaker 2011, Manby 2009). Permitting individuals to hold multiple nationalities addresses the complex migration history in many African states, and would contradict states' efforts to deny citizenship based on foreign parentage (Manby 2015). I assign the *Dual Nationality* sub-indicator a value of "2" if the practice is entirely forbidden; that is, any individual who takes a foreign nationality loses his or her citizenship. If multiple nationalities are permitted

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[18] Historically, and in the present day, countries have debates whether "African" origin refers to racial or geographic boundaries. In coding the ACPI, I assumed it meant geography considering that there was a clear precedent among some countries of specifying racial categories.

for a limited class of persons, such as women married to foreign nationals, *Dual Nationality* takes a value of "1". Where multiple nationalities are permitted for all citizens, the value "0" is assigned. In 32.9% of country-years dual nationality is permitted across the board, with limited permission granted in 8.64% of country-years. The practice is prohibited in about 59% of country-years. The average score for the ACPI'S *Dual Nationality* component is 1.23.

Naturalization and Residency: Although procedures vary from place to place residency periods are part of the requirements for naturalization. These requirements are often waived in the case of marriage. Following Howard (2005), I divide the *Residency Requirements* sub-indicator into three categories: Countries asking for ten or more years of residency are assigned a value of "2", those asking for six to nine years take a value of "1", and those asking for five years or less take a value of "0". In 43.4% of country-years naturalization requires 5 years of residency or less, while 44.9% require 10 years or more. 11.8% of observations fall in-between at 6 to 9 years. On average, countries score a 1.01 on the ACPI's *Residency Requirements* dimensions.

Delayed Rights: Naturalized citizens are often treated differently than citizens by birth or acquisition. One area of difference is that laws may impose a delay on the political rights of naturalized citizens. It may be years (if ever) before a naturalized citizen is allowed to vote, work as a civil servant, register at the bar, hold ministerial office, or serve in the military. I assign the sub-indicator *Delayed Rights* a value of "1" if there is up to a five year delay in political rights for naturalized citizens, and a value of "2" if this waiting period is six years or more. A score of "0" indicates that there is no evidence of a delay, which is the case for 57% of observations. A delay of five years or less is imposed in

13.14% of country-years, and 29.5% have a delay of 6 years or more. On average, countries score a 0.721 on this ACPI component.

To calculate a country's ACPI score, a composite of all sub-indicator values, I deviate from Howard (2005)'s additive scale in favor of a geometric mean.[19] Geometric averages are less influenced by outlier values and account for wide variation across sub-indicator values better than additive scales do. [20] Without a strong theoretical foundation to indicate precise weighting of each dimension, I do not weight ACPI sub-indicators in the primary analysis. For robustness checks, though, I use the variables $ACPI_{2w}$ and $ACPI_{3w}$, which employ alternative weighting schemes. $ACPI_{2w}$ weights *Principle*, *Gender*, and *Ethnicity* twice as much as *Dual*, *Residency*, and *Delay* on the assumption that dimensions applying to citizens by birth have a stronger impact on outcomes than dimensions applying to naturalized citizens. The logic: naturalization is allowed by law in most African countries, but rare in practice (Manby 2009). $ACPI_{3w}$ weights *Gender*, and *Ethnicity* twice as much and *Ethnicity* three times as much as *Dual*, *Residency*, and *Delay*. $ACPI_{3w}$ follows the same logic as $ACPI_{2w}$, but assumes that ethnic discrimination is the most potent form of exclusion. The extensive literature on ethnic conflict lends confidence to this assumption. Table 2 summarizes the three weighting schemes. Higher ACPI values

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[19] To find the geometric mean, I add "1" to the raw ACPI scores, calculate the product of the 6 sub-indicator scores, and take the 6th root of the product.

[20] Assume Index I_C has sub-indicators J_{1-3}. On an additive scale, Country C_1 with sub-indicators $J_1=2$, $J_2=2$, $J_3=2$ would score a 6 and Country C_2 with sub-indicators $J_1=1$, $J_2=1$, and $J_3=6$ would score an 8. A geometric mean, on the other hand, would score C_1 as 2 and C_2 as 1.817, taking into account the even performance of C_1 and the varied performance of C_2.

indicate more exclusionary policy. Additional descriptive statistics are available in Table

6 and Table 7 in the appendix.

Table 2: Weighting the composite ACPI

Dimension	Regulates	ACPI	ACPI$_{2w}$	ACPI$_{3w}$
Principle	Citizens by birth	1x	2x	2x
Gender	Citizens by birth + Naturalization	1x	2x	2x
Ethnicity	Citizens by birth + Naturalization	1x	2x	3x
Dual	Naturalization	1x	1x	1x
Residency	Naturalization	1x	1x	1x
Delay	Naturalization	1x	1x	1x
	Dataset Average Score:	1.77	2.51	2.68

Trends in Citizenship Law According to the African Citizenship Policy Index

Citizenship policy is by no means static. To get a sense for its evolution, it is useful

to look at ACPI scores at several points in time. Figure 2 compares for all countries in 1989

(panel 1) and 2014 (panel 2). Institutions are notoriously slow to change, so ACPI scores

do not change from year to year. For example Benin, Madagascar, and Zambia, among

others, exhibit zero change in their scores for the entire period. That said, there has been

marked improvement in citizenship policy in the last 25 years or so. Rwanda's score

dropped 55% (1.12 in 2014), the DRC's score dropped 31% (1.94 in 2014), and Sierra

Leone's score also dropped 31% (2.08 in 2014). Moreover, it is rare that nationality laws

become *more* exclusionary over time. Swaziland and Mauritania are the exceptions, with a 0.11-point and 0.09-point increase, respectively.[21]

Figure 3 presents annual data for selected cases to illustrate several patterns of change observed in the dataset. Exclusion dropped off precipitously in Angola in 1991 and more gradually in Kenya and South Africa. Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire remained more exclusive for longer periods of time, while Angola and South Africa have seen low exclusion for the majority of the observation period. In summary, there is an encouraging trend in Africa's nationality laws.

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[21] Swaziland's index rose from 1.62 to 1.73 when dual nationality was prohibited in 1992. Mauritania's score went from 1.82 to 1.91 in 2010. In this year, women gained the right to pass citizenship to their children (if not their foreign spouses) on terms equal to men and dual nationality was legalized. However, naturalization residency requirements were reduced only for individuals married under Sharia law; for everyone else requirements climbed from 6 to 10 years.

Figure 2: Africa's Citizenship Policy Scores

Figure 3: Citizenship Policy Scores Over Time, Selected Cases

Patterns in Violence

I hypothesize that exclusionary nationality laws increase the severity of political violence. To test this proposition, I use two count dependent variables capturing the frequency and fatality rate of violent events. Data comes from the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) (Salehyan et al. 2012), an event-level database compiling a record of social conflict events based on reports from the Associated Press (AP) and Associated French Press (AFP).[22] Social conflict is defined as contentious political activity that falls short of war. Given the dataset's event-level nature, I use country-year counts of events and fatalities. At the time of data collection, SCAD included information for 42 Sub-Saharan African countries between 1990 and 2013.[23] Descriptive statistics of violence events are available in Table 6 and Table 7 in the appendix.

In their original form, SCAD events are categorized according to issue type and are accompanied by a description of the event and the actor involved. I compile counts of the number of events and the number of fatalities in each country-year for land, election, and inter-ethnic violence.[24] I then create the following dependent variables: *Election Frequency, Election Fatalities, Land Frequency, Land Fatalities, Inter-ethnic Frequency,* and *Inter-ethnic Fatalities*. I preserve SCAD's categorization of election and ethnic violence events. According to the SCAD codebook, an event constitutes election violence

[22] SCAD coders identified events by conducting keyword searches in Lexis-Nexis searches of the AP and AFP.

[23] At the time of this writing, SCAD covers events between 1990 and 2014 in Africa, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.

[24] SCAD fatality estimates come from source (e.g. AP, AFP) reports about the event.

if an election is the source of unrest, and inter-ethnic violence occurs when religion or ethnicity was an issue in the event. SCAD does not identify which events are related to land issues. To identify these incidents, I reviewed event descriptions to determine which events fit the land violence definition from the existing literature. I coded an event as land-related if the SCAD description stated that contested borders or land or water resources were at issue.[25] This compilation of land violence events is an added bonus of the ACPI data collection because there is not currently a dataset like this on land violence events.

Some events can be classified as several different types of violence because these issue-areas are not mutually exclusive categories. For instance, it is possible for a SCAD event to be classified as both land and ethnic violence. This fact makes sense because some confrontations are strictly single-issue events (e.g. election outcomes), but other times they reflect tensions over multiple or overlapping issues (e.g. land and immigration). For this reason, I run separate analysis for each type of violence.

In total 8,582 violent events are analyzed across 42 countries for the period 1990 to 2013. Almost 80% of the country-years in the dataset suffer from at least one violent event. Generally speaking, more than 8 events occur per year. With 246 reported events in 2012 alone, Nigeria suffered the highest number of recorded events in a given year. On average, events lead to 95 fatalities per year, although some lead to thousands. The maximum

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[25] Events related to self-determination are excluded from this analysis. See Chapter

Chapter 3, "Assumptions".

number of fatalities recorded in the dataset is the DRC with over 5,500 fatalities documented in 1993.

Figure 4 breaks down event frequency by issue area. Inter-ethnic violence is well documented in the dataset with 1,331 events total. 27.4% of country-years experienced inter-ethnic violence, with an average of 1.3 events per year. Nigeria had the highest number of ethnic events in any given year: 66 in 2011. Electoral violence arises less often with 775 events total, coming just shy of 23% of country-years. Nigeria had the highest number of election violence events too: 20 in 2011. Averaging less than one event per year, land violence is not well documented by SCAD. Only 240 land events appear in the dataset. Likely this deficit is caused by underreporting in international newspapers. Although most countries did not experience land violence, some had quite a bit. For instance, Sudan had 9 events in 2013 and South Africa had 5 in 2001.

Figure 4: Event Frequency by Issue-Area

Empirical Analysis

I run a series of regressions with robust standard errors using *Frequency* and *Fatalities* dependent variables. These count variables exhibit a right-skew and overdispersion, which necessitates the use of negative binomial regressions (NBREG).[26] Standard errors are clustered on country to account for serial correlation within countries. I do not use fixed effects because ACPI scores do not typically vary within countries over the period of observation. Therefore, I leverage variation across countries to determine the effect of exclusionary nationality laws on patterns in violence.

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[26] I use NBREG rather than Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression (ZINB) because most of the ZINB models fail to converge.

In each model, I control for forces in a country affecting the nature of law generally or citizenship policy specifically. I include population density, the size of the immigrant population, and ethnic fractionalization because I expect these demographic characteristics to shape society's understanding of belonging and where the bounds of citizenship should be. Population density and migration flows are sources of economic and political competition that drive tensions in society. Ethnicity is a powerful mobilizing force, especially in weak democracies, and intrinsically related to understandings of citizenship in Africa. For all of these reasons, ethnicity and population variables are standard factors to include in studies of political violence (cf. Fox and Hoelscher 2012). The ethnic fractionalization measure comes from the All Minorities at Risk (AMAR) dataset (Birnir et al. 2016), while population data comes from the World Bank.[27]

Regime type is added to the model given that political openness should push citizenship policy to be more inclusive as a wider segment of the population achieves political representation. Regime data comes from the Polity IV project (Polity2 variable). The models also feature political and economic controls. The size of the excluded population comes from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR).[28] The World Bank provides data for GDP per capita and unemployment. I also include dummies for a year in which citizenship law changes, election years, and the presence of minor conflict or war. These factors are likely to intensify any violence that does break out. Descriptive statistics for all controls are available in Table 6 and Table 7 in the appendix.

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[27] The World Bank estimates of total migrant stock includes the size of the refugee population.

[28] EPR data ends in 2010, but the *Excluded Population* measure very rarely varies within country. I fill in the missing four years based on the last observed value of *Excluded Population.*

The final way I control for confounding factors is by narrowing the scope to events in Sub-Saharan Africa. This region is comprised of young states on the same continent undergoing democratization and economic development in the same international context. Regimes face similar challenges and opportunities including colonial legacies, poverty, economic and educational inequality, ethnic heterogeneity, dependence on mineral wealth or cash crops, traditions of centralized leadership and autocratic rule, complex migration patterns, and brutal conflicts. At the same time, many of these states endeavor to harness the potential that lies in youth bulges, contrasts between large rural populations and surging in urban centers, vast natural resources, and strategic friendships in the international system.

In the primary analysis I use unweighted ACPI scores lagged by one year to address concerns that violence severity drives the development of nationality laws.[29] Estimates are presented as incidence rate ratios.[30] I then conduct multiple robustness checks: *Other Violence* models, which use the total number of violent events or fatalities as the dependent variable; models using weighted ACPI scores; and models in which all independent variables are lagged by one year. Finally, I test the effect of each ACPI sub-indicator on *Frequency* and *Fatalities* dependent variables to ensure that one single dimension of the ACPI is not driving the results.

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[29] The lag addresses this endogeneity concern by ensuring that policies are measured before violence outcomes are measured and it accounts for learning by actors and the time it takes for contentious politics to turn violent.

[30] When standard error bars cross "1", the coefficient estimate loses statistical significance. Values greater than one indicate a positive relationship and values less than one indicate a negative relationship.

Results

In support of Hypothesis 1, citizenship policy has a stronger effect on fatality rates than event frequency. It also affects inter-ethnic violence more than any other issue-area. Higher ACPI scores, indicating more restrictive citizenship policy, are positively correlated with the number of inter-ethnic events. For every unit increase in the ACPI, we can expect more than five times as many inter-ethnic violence events, on average, holding all else constant. Considering that inter-ethnic events average 59 fatalities each, any increase in event count is costly in human and economic terms.

The ACPI does not have a significant effect on the number of election, land, or other violence events. However, the number of election, land, and ethnic violence events jumps the year a new citizenship law comes into force. In fact, there are four times more land events in a new-law year than in other years, on average holding all else constant. This increase is substantively significant, especially considering how few land events there are in the dataset. On average, there are only 0.23 per year and the maximum in any year is nine events. A new citizenship law also increases the frequency of inter-ethnic violence (2.3 times more events) and election violence (2.5 times more events). I find that the introduction of a new citizenship law has no effect on "other" types of violence.

In terms of control variables, the size of the immigrant population has a small, negative relationship with the number of land and ethnicity-related events. Figure 5 shows these results graphically as incidence rate ratios, and Table 8 in the appendix presents the full regression results.

Figure 5: ACPI Scores and Event Frequency

Another way to operationalize violence severity is to look at the event fatality rate. Using fatality rates as a measure of episode intensity is theoretically grounded. The conflict literature often defines conflict levels based on battle-related death estimates.[31]

In support of Hypothesis 1, the ACPI has a strong effect on fatality rates across election, land, and inter-ethnic violence. The ACPI's effect is stronger in *Fatality* models than in *Frequency* ones. For every unit increase in the ACPI, there are 76 times more election fatalities (average: 10 fatalities), nearly 10 times more land fatalities (average: 11 fatalities), about 19 times more inter-ethnic fatalities (average: 59 fatalities), and about 2 times more "other" fatalities (average: 15 fatalities).[32]

The coefficient on *Law Year* loses is statistical significance in these models. The introduction of a new law may influence frequency more than fatalities because laws represent a culmination of debates over criteria and serve as focal points for mobilization. The law year itself has less effect on marginalization than exclusionary provisions themselves (captured by higher ACPI values).

Ethnic fractionalization has a positive and significant effect on fatalities from land and inter-ethnic violence. The size of the immigrant population has a significant but negative effect. Ethnic diversity has been shown to increase low-level violence (Fox and Hoelscher 2012; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). It is surprising that immigration flows would decrease the fatality rate because so much of the literature describes xenophobic

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[31] The Uppsala Conflict Database Program and Correlates of War definitions of minor and major conflict are just two examples.

[32] Recall that *Other Fatalities* models control for the number of election, land, inter-ethnic violence fatalities.

contestation. Ongoing war or minor conflict increases fatalities generally, likely because these episodes are defined by battle-related deaths. The ACPI actually has a larger effect on the severity of events than war or minor conflict does. Likely, this result arises because citizenship policy taps into localized understandings of belongings, and even national VOB has local roots (Côté and Mitchell 2016). Figure 6 shows these results graphically as incidence rate ratios, and Table 10 in the appendix presents the full regression results.

[Insert Figure 6]

Robustness checks

Although weighting individual components of the ACPI may improve the metric's efficiency, there is not a strong theoretical grounding for weight specification. Therefore, I use unweighted ACPI scores in the primary analysis. I now present robustness checks using alternative weighting schemes, $ACPI_{2w}$, and $ACPI_{3w}$. Results hold across all *Weighted* models (Tables 12, 14, 16, and 18 in the appendix), although coefficients are smaller than in the *primary* models.

In a second robustness check, I lag most control variables by one year in order to account for the progression of contentious politics over time.[33] Results hold across *Lagged* models (Tables 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19 in the appendix). Plus, *ACPI* and *Other Frequency* are now positively and significantly related (p<0.05). The coefficients in *Lagged* models tend to be smaller than in the *Primary* models.

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[33] Control variables expected to impact events in the moment, rather than over time, are not lagged: *Law Year, Election Year, Minor Conflict,* and *War.*

Figure 6: ACPI Scores and Violence Fatalities

Lastly, I investigated whether one dimension drives the ACPI's overall effect.

Table 3 summarizes the findings, indicating the direction of the relationship between ACPI sub-indicators and each outcome of interest. I also present the coefficient sign for *Law Year*. Interestingly, I find that several provisions have a significant and positive coefficient in *Frequency* models, even though the composite ACPI score has limited effect on *Frequency*. Specifically, ethnic discrimination increases the number of events across types of violence. Gender discrimination increases the number of events tied to land, ethnicity, and other issue-areas. Longer residency requirements for naturalized citizens reduces the number of election and land events in a given year. This last finding may indicate that such requirements can be a tool to lessen political competition between citizens and recent migrants from abroad. In addition, new-law years have a strong significant and positive correlation in *Frequency* as well. This relationship likely arises because laws are excellent focal points for mobilization and typically the result of bitter disputes over where to draw the lines of the political community. Thus, the coefficient estimates for *Law Year* may capture the effect of a culmination of debates over citizenship.

Certain dimensions of the ACPI increase event fatality rates as well. Gender discrimination has a positive effect in *Fatalities* models, and ethnic discrimination increases fatalities during electoral, inter-ethnic, and "other" violence. Dual nationality increases fatalities during inter-ethnic and "other" violence, while delayed political rights increases election fatalities. Again, the relationship between residency requirements and violence outcomes is negative, likely for the reason mentioned previously. In addition, *Law Year* largely loses its significance in fatality models. Where the *Law Year* coefficient does achieve significance, it affects fatalities from land and inter-ethnic violence.

Table 3: ACPI Components and Patterns in Violence

	Frequency				Fatalities			
	Elections	Land	Ethnicity	Other	Elections	Land	Ethnicity	Other
Citizenship Principle	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Law Year	+	+	+	.	.	.	+	.
Gender Discrimination	.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Law Year	+	+	+	.	.	.	.	.
Ethnic Discrimination	+	+	+	+	+	.	+	+
Law Year	+	+	+	.	-	+	.	.
Dual Nationality	.	.	.	.	.	.	+	+
Law Year	+	+	+	.	.	.	.	.
Residency Requirements	-	-	.	.	.	.	.	-
Law Year	+	+	+	+	.	.	+	.
Delayed Political Rights	.	.	.	.	+	.	.	.
Law Year	+	+	+	+	.	+	+	.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I demonstrate that citizenship policy, an area often overlooked by conflict scholars, deserves closer attention and continued research. I draw on evidence from the African Citizenship Policy Index, a metric I designed to investigate generalizable trends in nationality laws. Results show that exclusionary laws increase the severity of collective violence, particularly in terms of fatalities. I find that every unit increase in the ACPI, leads to more than five inter-ethnic violence events, about 76 times more election fatalities, 10 times more land fatalities, 19 times more inter-ethnic fatalities, and about two times more "other" fatalities, on average. I also find that new-law years see greater violence severity as well. There are four times more land events, 2.3 times more ethnic events, and 2.5 times more electoral violence events in such years. The implication is that even if policies become more inclusionary over time, violence may still occur in the year nationality laws change. Contested citizenship causes deep divisions in society. The years in which these debates reach their zenith, when the laws are in flux, are more violent than others. It is important to note that no single ACPI dimension is driving the results.

After testing three different weighting schemes I determined that results remain robust to alternate specifications. My analysis of individual sub-indicators suggests that gender and ethnic discrimination should be weighted more heavily than other dimensions, but it is unclear what the exact weighting values should be. Continued empirical work is needed to understand the best path forward. Another caveat of the ACPI is that the index is built on fine-grained information about provisions, but is constructed as a composite of categorical variables. Some details about provisions are lost in the process of aggregation. At the same time, my methodology supports my overarching goal to find a balance between

meaningful information about exclusionary practices and facilitate broad comparison across laws, countries, and time periods. I pursue this balance by supplementing the aggregated ACPI scores with detailed notes about exact provisions in the full ACPI dataset. Future researchers can thus recode ACPI scores to suit their specific research questions.

My approach maintains consistency with previous work, thereby promoting cross-national and inter-regional comparisons. However, this analysis represents several "firsts". I built the first cross-national dataset on Africa's nationality laws. I then conducted the first analysis of how exclusionary nationality laws shape patterns in violence. In addition, land disputes are increasingly common and yet there is no comprehensive land violence dataset available. I identify land violence events using SCAD and conduct a cross-national, statistical examination on their determinants. This too is a novel contribution since previous statistical analyses of land violence only consider episodes of major conflict (cf. Fearon and Laitin 2011). My findings are conservative estimates given that SCAD has limited documentation of land disputes. Future research will only broaden our understanding of land-related conflict.

Where do we go from here? The immediate next step is to address why nationality laws shape patterns in violence. Chapters 5 and 6 consider the causal pathway more carefully, and illuminate the conditions under which citizenship struggles do *or do not* escalate to war. In the longer-term, analysts can update the ACPI framework to incorporate measures of *de facto* exclusion from citizenship rights, such as the quality of civil administration systems, responsible for birth and voter registration levels. Finally, Chapters Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 apply the nationality law lens to conflict processes at the individual

level. I demonstrate how citizenship security and contentious citizenship narratives shape

political behavior, and I incorporate informal exclusion into the analysis.

Chapter 5. Nationality Laws and Civil War: Evidence from Côte d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo

This chapter illustrates how contested citizenship rules contribute to VOB, and the role nationality laws play in escalating events to the point of war. I offer a different perspective on *why* individuals mobilized during VOB in Côte d'Ivoire and the Congo. Moreover, I go beyond the standard ethnic identification arguments to make the case that exclusionary nationality laws shaped conflict processes in these countries. Essentially, I test the first part of Hypothesis 2:

> *H2a: Violence at the national level will escalate to war once nationality are revised to denationalize one or more groups in society.*

Restrictive laws increase citizenship insecurity, which fuels winner/loser competition and stokes contentious insider/outsider narratives, which guide ethnic mobilization. Although mobilization is typically elite-directed, I focus here on the joint production of violence by elites and individuals. When the conditions are met, VOB escalates from the local to the national level. At this point, VOB escalates to war once an outsider group faces denationalization. I argue that this situation is most likely where an outsider group has contested foreign origins because popular imagination conflates internal migrants and foreign nationals. However, when national citizenship rules are not at stake, national level VOB is likely to remain a minor conflict. Where an outsider group is primarily composed of in-migrants, it is harder for insiders to portray outsiders as foreigners.

As evidence, I present four case studies that span two chapters. In this chapter, I use process tracing to explain how events in Côte d'Ivoire escalated to the point of civil war (2002-2007). Next, I show that events in the DRC followed a similar trajectory (1996-2003). In both cases, citizenship regime winner/loser competition culminated in an attempt by winning insiders to denationalize a losing outsider group. In Chapter 5, I use process tracing to explain why citizenship conflict in Kenya and Ghana fell short of war. Namely, although winner/loser competition led to insider/outsider narratives and violence, there were no serious efforts by the government to denationalize outsiders.

The case selection is justifiably non-random. I examine cases with the necessary variation on the dependent and independent variables, while controlling for potentially confounding factors and addressing alternative explanations. The dependent variable under study is violence severity. Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC both succumbed to civil wars, and Kenya has experienced bouts of minor conflict. I use Ghana, which has only seen the outbreak of localized skirmishes, as the "negative" case. National citizenship rules were thrown into question and formally revised in Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC. In Kenya and Ghana, the national citizenship rules were never at stake, even though sub-national citizenship rules came under fire.

The case analysis complements existing scholarship on ethnic competition, electoral competition, and competing land claims. Land-related and inter-ethnic violence is present in all four cases. Elections triggered VOB in Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, and Kenya, but not in Ghana. Additionally, nationality law provisions vary within and across all four cases. The long time horizon of the study also allows me to control for exclusionary and inclusionary periods in each country's history. See Table 4 for a summary of the case

selection methodology. Data comes from secondary source material and original interviews I conducted with political researchers in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire and Accra, Ghana (November-December 2014).

Table 4: Case selection

Cases	Dependent Variable	Independent Variable	Control Variables

1.Côte d'Ivoire
 	
2. The DRC
	Major Conflict	Citizenship politicized at the national level
		
		Outsider group (internal and external migrants) threatened with denationalization
			• Elections triggered widespread violence
			• Insider group
			  o Lost ancestral land to outsiders
			  o Economically disadvantaged vis-à-vis outsiders
			• Outsider group
			  o Demographic majority/near-majority
			  o Favored by colonial and post-colonial state
			  o Powerful (if still "potential") electoral bloc
			• Statist land regime

Kenya	Minor Conflict	Citizenship politicized at the national level
		
		Outsider group (internal migrants) not threatened with denationalization
			• Elections triggered widespread violence
			• Insider group
			  o Lost ancestral land to outsiders
			  o Economically disadvantaged vis-à-vis outsiders
			• Outsider group
			  o Demographic majority/near-majority
			  o Favored by colonial and post-colonial state
			  o Powerful electoral bloc
			• Statist land regime

Ghana	Localized Conflict	Citizenship not politicized at the national level
		
		Outsider group (internal and external migrants) not threatened with denationalization
			• Insider group
			  o Lost ancestral land to outsiders
			  o Economically advantaged vis-à-vis outsiders
			• Outsider group
			  o Demographic minority
			  o Substantial electoral bloc
			• Customary land regime

To understand the trajectory of citizenship debates in Côte d'Ivoire, it is essential to understand the ethnogenesis of the "Dioula" ethnic group. The label is too often simplified in terms of the Muslim North/Christian South cleavage. A full explanation requires some appreciation of the demographics in the northern part of the country. It is easiest to describe the landscape of Ivoirian ethnic groups after carving the country up into figurative quadrants (cf. McGovern 2011). The northwestern quadrant has a majority Mande-speakers (the Malinke/Jula, Gouro, Toura, and Dan), who are related to the Mande-speakers of Mali, Guinea, and Liberia.[34] Mande languages in Côte d'Ivoire can be divided into the northern subgroups (Maninka/Jula and Bamana) and southern subgroups (Mano, Gouro, and Dan). The Northern Mande are generally Muslim, while Southern Mande are Christians or follow traditional religions. The northeastern quadrant has a majority Voltaic-speakers (the Senufo, Lobi, and Koulango), who are related to the Voltaic language speakers in Mali and Burkina Faso. The southern half of the country has its own set of ethnic groups, which also have historical ties to groups in Liberia and Ghana.

Over time, the terms "Northerners" and "Dioula" came to refer indiscriminately to the northern Mande and Voltaic speakers. The terms conflate groups that do not share the same language, culture, religion, or history. Their common link is only the trading language, Dioula. The terms contribute to contentious identity politics by presuming that all Dioula are Muslim. They also fail to distinguish between families that have historically

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[34] The Jula language is sometimes spelled "Dioula" or "Dyula".

lived in present-day Côte d'Ivoire and those who have emigrated from elsewhere (Mali, Guinea, or Burkina Faso) (Marshall-Fratani 2007; McGovern 2011; Manby 2009). In my discussion, I use the terms Northerners and Dioula interchangeably.

Figure 7: Map of Côte d'Ivoire [35]

Colonial Foundations

The colonial state territorialized and ethnicized political identification through "colonial ethnography, colonial government, and economic policy" (Marshall-Fratani

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[35] Map courtesy of the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection at the University of Texas at Austin. Available at: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/cote_divoire_ref04.jpg. Accessed August 26, 2016.

2007, 16; see also Mamdani 1996; Chauveau and Dozon 1987).[36] Citizenship rules during this period distinguished between citizens (Europeans) and subjects (non-whites), as well as between African "natives" and "settlers" (Mamdani 1996).[37] The colonial land tenure regime consistently favored migrants. Even after independence the state continued to allocate land "*at the expense of* aggrieved communities claiming ancestral rights to land (Boone 2014, 260, emphasis in original)." Autochthonous groups were even pressured into leasing land to outsiders through *tutorat* arrangements (Lewis 2003; Boone 2014; Berry 2009) in which an ongoing exchange of "gifts" served as a signature by both parties on the informal dotted line (Boone 2014; Manby 2009; Dozon 1985). As such, the relationship between hosts and strangers in the country more closely resembled a patron-client bond than tenancy (Berry 2009).

Cash crop revenues slumped in the 1940s. In an effort to fuel flagging production, the French administration moved thousands of people from eastern Côte d'Ivoire (e.g. the Baoulé) and the northern reaches of the colony (e.g. Iovirian Jula and Senoufo, Burkinabés, and Malians) to the southwestern frontier, home of the We, Bété, and Dan (Boone 2014). These colonial resettlement schemes spurred an ethnic consciousness for many groups (Dozon 1985). At the core of this consciousness was the ideology of autochthony, which

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[36] For instance, the sixty distinct Ivoirian societies were carved up and assigned to administrative units under the fiction that the new ethnic groupings represented primordial nations (Boone 2014, 130).

[37] In the literature, "hosts" are also referred to as natives, indigenes, and autochthons, and "strangers" are also referred to as migrants, settler, and allochthones. I use this vocabulary interchangeably.

developed "in large part in opposition to a state that was seen as the architect of this [land] dispossession" (Boone 2014, 134; Chauveau and Dozon 1987).

Within a decade, strangers outnumbered the indigenous population. [38] Insider/outsider tensions boiled over as land pressures increased throughout the 1940s and 1950s (Boone 2014; Dozon 1985; McGovern 2011; Marshall-Fratani 2007). After WWII, the political space opened up and civil society organizations stepped up to voice grievances of indigenous groups. For example, the Mouvement Socialist Africain's (MSA) platform was to fight against the "colonization" of indigenous communities by strangers (Dozon 1985, 343).[39]

In summary, the French colonial administration laid the groundwork for future citizenship debates by producing overlapping claims to land, hierarchical definitions of citizenship, and political boundaries that conflicted with localized understanding of belonging. Combined with a repressive system of government characterized by exploitation and violence, independence-era elites had a wealth of tragic history to draw upon as political capital. Additionally, land tenure became a zero-sum game in which one group's loss meant another group's gain. During colonialism, Africans were rarely granted citizenship. However, certain groups received preferential treatment. In Côte d'Ivoire, outsiders were favored and insiders lost out under the colonial regime. Winner/loser

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[38] In some places, autochthons made up less than a third of the population (McGovern 2011, 78). By 1960, half the population of the country's southwestern quadrant were strangers (Boone 2014, 129).

[39] The MSA pit themselves against the Syndicat African Africole (SAA) union, which was perceived as a vehicle of Baoulé and Dioula interests (Boone 2014; Dozon 1985).

competition produced insecurity that elites later framed in terms of threats and opportunities in order to mobilize constituents for political violence. Since the outsider group "Dioula" refers to a composite grouping of internal and external migrants, the group came to be seen as foreign.

Independence

Côte d'Ivoire became independent on 7 August 1960 under the leadership of Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the PDCI. The country remained a single-party state until 1990, and under PDCI control until 1999. As the leading producer of the cocoa in the world, Côte d'Ivoire appeared to have struck the elusive balance between cash crops and a diversified economy (Keller 2014).[40] In the open, the PDCI supported the heavy investment in development projects, while behind the scenes coffee and cocoa revenues fueled a personalistic patronage state (McGovern 2011; Woods 2003). Economic prosperity and the substantial political support of migrants bolstered Houphouët's consolidation of power. The period became known as the Ivoirian Miracle.[41]

Although Houphouët favored his group, the Baoulé, part of the Akan family (Manby 2009), "all major ethnic groups were represented in Côte d'Ivoire's main political institutions" (Langer 2005, 31). However, the fatal flaw in Côte d'Ivoire's success was that

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[40] From 1965 to 1975, GDP grew by 8 percent per year with generous spill-over into other areas of the economy (Keller 2014, 93).

[41] According to Mike McGovern, the true miracle was "that Houphouët-Boigny succeeded in sharing the wealth to a sufficient extent that he, his close associates, and many French business and political interests all became rich, while many previously poor Ivoirian families also experienced significant improvements in their lives" (2011, 140).

it was contingent on the economic productivity and political support of Dioula, and perpetuated by ill-defined citizenship criteria. For instance, Houphouët famously proclaimed that "land belongs to those who cultivate it" to encourage farmers from within and outside the country to migrate to southwestern plantations. He then upheld the colonial practice of enforcing a land tenure regime that treated migrants preferentially in order to shore up popular support (Boone 2014). To turn this loyalty into a political base, Houphouët embraced "fuzzy citizenship policies" that blurred the line between formal citizenship status and *de facto* political rights (Bah 2010; Marshall-Fratani 2007; Woods 2003). Citizenship and national identity were never precisely defined so that strangers loyal to the PDCI could vote, purchase land, and hold government office (Woods 2003). During Houphouët's tenure, outsiders were the unequivocal winners of the citizenship regime. After agriculture revenues dropped, calls to restrict citizenship rights, notably from the citizenship regime losers (e.g. the Bété and Baoulé) grew stronger (Woods 2003).[42]

The line between "Ivoirian" and "foreigner" became increasingly blurry in the political arena. Further, contradictory understandings of the place of migrants in society at the local level began to infuse national discourse. Indigenous groups perceived strangers as guests who were granted temporary access to land under the *tutorat* system. Settlers, on the other hand, buying fully into the PDCI system, understood themselves as land owners with guaranteed property rights (Keller 2014; Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005). Overlapping claims became intractable, seemingly impossible to resolve given that transactions were made according to *tutorat* rather than through official channels. Moreover, getting official

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[42] Recall that the Bété are "hosts" in the southwestern region and the Baoulé are internal migrants.

documentation to prove ownership is an expensive and burdensome task, eliminating it as an option for many people (then and now).[43]

An additional problem arose in the contradictory understandings of land ownership as a practice. One interviewee explained to me that Dioula groups are historically nomadic and therefore understand land as a commodity to be used for a period of time before it is discarded for new land. Autochthonous groups, on the other hand, come from a sedentary farming tradition in which it is inconceivable that land could be transferred outside indigenous lineages.[44] In other words, *tutorat* was not a compromise between natives and settlers. Autochthons believed that land always *had* and always *would* belong to sons of the soil; it was not possible for anyone else to legitimately claim it.

Economic crisis brought these divergent world views crashing to a head. The cocoa economy breached its structural limits right when global markets entered a significant downturn (Woods 2003). Economic volatility in the 1970s and 1980s hit Côte d'Ivoire hard, prompting heavy borrowing by the government (Keller 2014). Independence had only "accelerated the rhythm of the 'massive alienation of land to outsiders'" (Dozon 1985, 129).[45] Structural adjustment programs managed by the World Bank and IMF forced privatization reforms and brought the Ivoirian Miracle to a definitive end (Keller 2014).

With the economy in a tailspin, and in response to a presidential back to the land program, many urban residents, mostly unemployed youth, moved back to villages

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[43] Interview-Abidjan-December 1, 2014 (2)
[44] Interview-Abidjan-December 2, 2014 (3)
[45] In the mid-to-late seventies, strangers made up 64% of Divo Department and almost 50% of Gagnoa Department (Boone 2014; Hecht 1985; Dozon 1985).

(McGovern 2011; Berry 2009; Boone 2014). They arrived to find their family's land in the hands of well-off strangers and their own prospects exceedingly limited. Sara Berry's description of the consequences is worth quoting at length:

> Obliged to take menial jobs in order to survive, urban returnees seethed at their perceived dispossession at the hands of 'northerners'—both Ivoirian and foreign-born—and the PDCI regime, whose Baulé leaders were suspected of favoring members of their own ethnic group (2009, 32).

At a time of falling incomes and rising land scarcity, demographic pressures exerted their full force. Three decades of extensive migration to the southwestern regions generated "bitter conflict between indigenes and strangers over land and employment" (Crook 1997, 222). Narrowing citizenship criteria became a way for "losing" autochthons to reverse their economic and political marginalization. For "winning" Dioula, formal citizenship status was the best way to address land disputes and protect their property rights, the root of their economic and political power. After all, as one of my interviews eloquently said, "*La terre est la richesse*," land is wealth.[46]

Although contested citizenship was not yet a salient issue, land conflicts were a recurrent feature of this period (Boone 2014). The Gagnoa revolt is one example worth describing in detail. On October 26, 1970 hundreds of planters in the Gagnoa region rallied around Nragbé Kragbé and rebelled against the state. A "peasant army" raised a flag of the République d'Éburnie over government buildings and called for the return of autochthonous land and the exodus of migrants. The Ivoirian army brutally suppressed the

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[46] Interview-Abidjan-December 1, 2014 (1)

movement in a small massacre (Dozon 1985; Boone 2014; McGovern 2011). The Guébié "genocide", as the event is known among the Bété (Boone 2014), "cemented Bété feelings of exclusion and resentment against PDCI regime and the strangers it 'backed'" (McGovern 2011, 83; see also Bøås and Dunn 2013). The political identity of the Bété became synonymous with autochthony (Marshall-Fratani 2007).

In summary, winners and losers under the Ivorian citizenship regime faced off in the early years of independence. Their competition encouraged the development of contentious insider/outsider narratives. Elites strategically exploited concerns about citizenship security and mobilized co-ethnics according to the dual logics of threat and opportunity. Amidst deepening land scarcity, "losing" autochthons resented the PDCI for giving their ancestral land to immigrants. Further, they saw liberal voting laws as a thinly-veiled ploy for the PDCI to maintain their hold on power. In contrast, "winning" Dioula felt threatened by vehement calls by autochthons to reclaim land and drive settlers away. Both winners and losers saw nationality laws as a way to secure citizenship rights and state resources.

Ultimately, violence of belonging broke out. Two contributing factors to onset deserve a note. Economic decline exacerbated disputes over land ownership and belonging. Moreover, land institutions were poorly organized and managed. The population did not understand the laws on the books (which were not enforced well besides) and a *crise de confiance*, where people distrusted or outright rejected formal institutions, brought the country to its knees.[47] There was also the widespread belief that the same people who

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[47] Focus Group-Abidjan-December 3, 2014

created the institutions were also responsible for the unfolding crisis.[48] Consequently, the gap between formal laws and informal practices widened.[49] When the *de facto* contradicts the *de jure* rules, dysfunction prevails.

Multi-party era

Côte d'Ivoire entered the new decade in full-swing of an economic and political crisis. Real growth sank below one percent in 1990 and the country remained deeply in debt (Keller 2014). International organizations insisted that Allasane Ouattara, a former IMF technocrat, be installed as Prime Minister. Aside from the disastrous economic performance, PDCI policies had generated so much bad-blood over the years that Houphouët was the only glue holding together the PDCI's fragile multi-ethnic coalition. A scramble to exploit the remaining forest in the south-west compounded these problems and led to intense fighting between hosts and strangers (Woods 2003).

Succumbing to international pressure, Côte d'Ivoire held its first multi-party elections in 1990 and winners and losers under the old regime jockeyed for control of the state. Henri Konan Bédié, in a daring challenge to Houphouët's grip on the PDCI, took an anti-northerner stance. Laurent Gbagbo of the Ivoirian Popular Front (FPI) positioned himself as the anti-immigrant candidate. Gbagbo staked his ground by accusing the PDCI of systematically favoring Baoulé, northerners, and foreigners (Woods 2003; Crook 1997; Langer 2005), using them as "electoral cattle" (Marshall-Fratani 2007, 22). The FPI also began rumors that Prime Minister Ouattara was himself a foreigner because his father was

[48] Ibid
[49] Interview-Abidjan-December 1, 2014 (2), Interview-Abidjan-December 2, 2014 (1)

born in present-day Burkina Faso (Marshall-Fratani 2007). In the background "a growing northern consciousness…contributed to the escalation of ethnic tensions" (Langer 2005, 32). A Charter of the North, *Le Charte du Grand Nord*, surfaced in 1992. It called for "fuller recognition of the Muslim region…more efforts to reduce regional inequalities, greater political recognition of the north's political loyalty during the upheavals of the 1980s and (most worryingly) an end to Baoulé nepotism in recruitment to public jobs" (Crook 1997, 226).

With Houphouët's death in December 1993, the political sphere fractured. Two factions within the PDCI battled one another and the opposition FPI, carving out separate trenches for the Baoulé, the northerner/immigrant (Dioula), and the Bété ethnic blocs. In 1994 the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) put Ouattara forward as their presidential candidate. This PDCI-splinter represented the northern/immigrant/Muslim bloc, and took on a reformist tenor (Crook 1997). The old guard, new PDCI recruits, and the Baoulé threw their support behind interim President (and former President of the National Assembly) Henri Konan Bédíe of the PDCI. Bédié drew heavily on resentment of migrants to strategically out-maneuver his opponents. He was especially concerned about Ouattara, the first politician capable of mobilizing northern migrants as a coherent electoral bloc (Marshall-Fratani 2007). Without support in the *Grand Nord*, Bédié had very little chance of securing a winning coalition (Crook 1997).

In the 1990 elections, Bédié had solicited foreigners' votes to challenge Houphouët, but he sought to deny their rights all together ahead of the 1995 elections. His about-face stems from two important developments. First, Bédié saw in the RDR the collapse of the PDCI's Baoulé-northerner/immigrant coalition (Crook 1997; Bah 2010). Secondly, Baoulé

cocoa producers were suffering economically and failing to compete with migrants from Burkina Faso. They blamed their misfortunes on 'foreigners' and demanded recompense (Crook 1997). Bédié's strategy thus became to nullify, rather than to win over, the Dioula vote (McGovern 2011). He labelled the RDR "a northern regional party with a sinister 'Muslim' agenda likely to tear the country apart" (Crook 1997, 225). He then exploited rising xenophobia and, alongside other ethnic entrepreneurs, called to make autochthony a requirement for citizenship (Marshall-Fratani 2007; McGovern 2011).

Out of this nationalist frenzy, *Ivoirité* was born. The ideology turned on the claim that only "pure" Ivoirians should have citizenship. Purity meant indigeneity, and very few ethnic groups made this cut.[50] As such, Ivoirité resurrected the colonial-era bifurcated citizenship framework, distinguishing between indigenous Ivoirians and those of "mixed" heritage (Marshall-Fratani 2007; Bah 2010). Combining nativism and nationalism, elites in the movement revitalized anti-imperialist discourse through demands for "liberation" of land from strangers (McGovern 2011). Railing against immigrants and northerners, ethnic entrepreneurs lumped the disparate groups together in an effort to marginalize them both. This type of ethnic nationalism became the basis for conflict and ethnic cleansing (McGovern 2011).

Bédié moved quickly to institutionalize Ivoirité by reforming electoral rules, land tenure policies, public sector employment, and national identification programs. For example, a 1994 law required presidential and legislative candidates to prove that they and

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[50] Namely, it was Akan cultural cluster, which includes the Baoulé, Bété, and Kru sub-groups (Keller 2014; McGovern 2011).

their parents were Ivoirian by birth. This law later made its way into the 2000 Constitution as the notorious Article 35. In 1995 Bédié revised the electoral code such that presidential candidates were required to "have lived in the country for the past 5 years" and "foreigners were no longer allowed to vote in Ivoirian elections" (Langer 2005, 33). The 1994 and 1995 laws specifically targeted Ouattara, whose father was reputed to be Burkinabé, but they renounced the rights of anyone considered to be of "foreign" stock (Manby 2009; Bah 2010; Crook 1997).

Until 1999 the RDR and the FPI were united as the Front Républicain.[51] After a violent election season, Bédié declared victory; the Front Républicain immediately decried the illegality of the process (Crook 1997). Under Bédié's rule, the Dioula lost their voting and property rights (Manby 2009; Bah 2010; Crook 1997). Bédié also ended the Houphouët-era balancing policies that had provided representation to the country's diverse ethno-regional interests. In their place he implemented "Baoulisation" and filled civil and military positions with Baoulé (Langer 2005).[52]

An obsession with national identity proliferated Ivoirian society, supported by the efforts of pseudo-scientists. The Cellule Universitaire de Recherche et de Diffusion des Idées et Actions Politiques du Président Henri Konan Bédié (CURDIPHE) produced a

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[51] The irony of this political union was two-fold: Gbagbo, future supporter of Ivoirité, denounced xenophobic policy-making and Ouattara, staunch critic of ethnic politics, built an ethno-regional coalition (Crook 1997).

[52] According to Langer (2005), "Baoulé over-representation in the government as a whole increased from 1.43 in the December 1993 government to 1.86 times its relative demographic size in the August 1998 government" (Langer 2005, 41). As a comparison: 40% of the key positions in the Bédié administration were held by members of the Baoulé ethnic group, while only 3% of ministers came from the Northern Mandé group (Langer 2005, 41).

manifesto on Ivoirité in 1996 that urged Ivoirians to "affirm their sovereignty, their authority in the face of the threat of dispossession and subjection: be it a question of immigration or political and economic power" (Touré 1996, 21 as quoted in Marshall-Fratani 2007, 23).[53] As if heeding CURDIPHE's appeal, Bédié spearheaded legislation that required individuals to prove their authenticity as Ivoirians. The process required individuals to return to their ancestral village and obtain a certificate stating their nationality-qua-ethnicity. Those who could not prove Ivoirian ancestry were disenfranchised (Keller 2014; Manby 2009).

In 1998, Bédié introduced a new land law that reserved property rights for the state and autochthons. Foreigners had no legal claim to land on which they lived, and internal migrants had difficulty owning property outside their home regions. Traditional leaders wasted no time confiscating and then redistributing land "according to their own interpretation of customary law" (Keller 2014, 96; see also Englebert 2009).[54]

Understandably, Dioula felt they were "victims of state-sponsored discrimination in the application of nationality laws" (Bah 2010, 603), and did not take the denial of their citizenship rights lightly. The opposition attacked the PDCI in the press, presenting divisions in ethnic terms and coating their imagery in blood. Richard Crook (1997) offers several excerpts from *L'Ivoire*, an RDR weekly based in Abidjan. Describing life in the

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[53] According to the mythology, the "great ethnic groups" were already present in Côte d'Ivoire at the nation's birth on March 10, 1893. Their descendants were "pure" Ivoirians by virtue of their autochthony.

[54] In the ensuing land conflicts, Mossi farmers from Burkina Faso received the brunt of anti-immigrant hostility (Woods 2003).

town of Dimbokro, the 10 October 1995 edition says, "All one could hear in the streets was the Baoulé language, and where Baoulés acted as if they owned the place, doing only business with each other" (Crook 1997, 234). Regarding officers accused of a killing spree, the 20 October 1995 edition of *L'Ivoire* says:

> They are Akans. They are gendarmes, full of hate…ready to kill on the 22nd. The Toroghué battalion of around 600, 'dyed-in-the-wool' Baoulés, fully trained and ready to go, are due to serve in squads commanded by freshly promoted Baoulé officers . . .they have sworn to cement Akan power in blood (Crook 1997, 234).

This discourse translated into real actions. In Gagnoa, "Baoulé migrant farmers were set upon in their village and 18 people killed. The result was a massive exodus of Baoulé 'refugees' from the rural areas of the centre west, creating further havoc" (Crook 1997, 235).

On the heels of widespread unrest, General Robert Guei toppled Bédié in a coup on December 24, 1999. Concerns about Baoulisation and the denationalization of non-indigenous groups motivated the take-over (Langer 2005). At first, General Guei publically opposed Ivoirité. However, after promising elections in 2000 he embedded ethno-nationalist principles in the constitution and leveraged Ivoirité to garner popular support (Manby 2009; Keller 2014; Bah 2010; Akindès 2003). Combining language from 1994 and 1995 laws, the now-infamous Article 35 stated that presidential candidates:

> Must be Ivoirian by birth, born of a father and of a mother themselves Ivoirian by birth. He must never have renounced the Ivoirian nationality. He must never have had another nationality. He must have resided in Côte d'Ivoire continuously during the five years preceding the date of the elections and have totaled ten years of effective presence (Constitution July 2000).

In October 2000, the Supreme Court deemed Ouattara ineligible to run for president based on Article 35, while Bédié was disqualified on procedural grounds. This decision left Gbagbo as Guei's only formidable rival. Once Guei lost his lead in the polls, he stopped ballot counting, dismissed the electoral commission, and declared himself the winner. Gbagbo's supporters attacked the palace in anger, police and soldiers mutinied, and Bédié and RDR supporters rioted and called for new elections. The clashes forced Guei to flee the city (Manby 2009; Keller 2014; Bah 2010).

Ultimately, Gbagbo was installed as president. In contradiction to his national reconciliation efforts, Gbagbo expanded the reach of Ivoirité. For instance, he created the Office of National Identification (ONI) in 2001after the RDR did well in local elections. Charged with identifying true citizens, village councils across the country sought to ascertain who was autochthonous to the community and who was not. The ONI's logic was that if every Ivoirian has a village of origin, then issuing identity cards in these villages was the best way to identify true Ivoirians (Manby 2009; Keller 2014; Marshall-Fratani 2007; Englebert 2009). Ahead of departmental elections in 2002, only 20 percent of potential voters had received registration cards—many were given a foreign resident's card instead of a national identity card, which left them unable to vote (Manby 2009).

Gbagbo unwittingly lit the match that sparked the civil war when he initiated a demobilization program after setting up a government of national reconciliation. The program was widely understood to constitute an Ivoirité-inspired purge of northerners from the military (Bah 2010). Furthermore, accusing Gbagbo and the ONI of denying their legitimate citizenship rights, northerners and immigrants mobilized against the threat under the RDR's direction. This incident represents a critical juncture in the Ivoirian story. The

formalization of autochthony-based citizenship rules led to the first civil war. The rebels and their leaders said as much:

> We needed a war because we needed our identity cards. Without an identity card you are nothing in this country (*Forces Nouvelles* fighter as quoted in Manby 2009, 1).

> Give us our identity cards and we hand over our Kalashnikovs (Guillaume Soro, MPCI leader as quoted in Manby 2009, 90. The original quote appeared in Bouquet 2007).

In summary, ethnic entrepreneurs in the multi-party era leveraged citizenship rules as a tool for redressing grievances of losing groups. They sought to reverse the balance of power between citizenship regime winners and losers, galvanize popular support, and eliminate political opposition. Previously, citizenship rights had been stretched to accommodate strangers because they were loyal to the PDCI regime. Land pressures drove debates over the place of Dioula in society and nebulous citizenship rules. Riding a wave of xenophobia, representatives of indigenous groups came to power and capitalized on popular resentment of "invading foreigners". They revised laws to narrow citizenship criteria, thereby ensuring that autochthons "won" under the new citizenship regime.

Narratives that framed citizenship security set in motion logics of violence that escalated VOB towards civil war. Ivoirité was a response by autochthons to their losing position. Narrow citizenship criteria was a way to counteract threats posed by winning Dioula groups, and an opportunity to advance nativist ideology. Autochthons saw Dioula as invaders protected by a corrupt regime and a broken citizenship system. Restricting citizenship provided a way for autochthons to reclaim ancestral land, improve their political influence, and increase their share of state resources. Ivoirité threatened the Dioula's winning position by linking citizenship with a territorialized, ethnicized identity. Elites

representing the northerner/immigrant bloc advocated clarifying the status of strangers as legitimate citizens. Nationality law thus provided an opportunity to protect Dioula political status. Importantly, the "Dioula" label blurred the distinction between internal and external migrants. In the next section, I address how Ivoirité calls to strip "immigrants" of their citizenship led to a civil war.

The War Years

The Ivoirian civil war began in September 2002 with a mutiny: Exiled soldiers in Burkina Faso revolted after Gbagbo proposed decommissioning them. The rebel Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI) attacked the economic capital Abidjan, the second largest city in the country, Bouaké, and the main northern town, Korhogo. Although the take-over of Abidjan failed, half the country fell to rebel control within days. In short order, two additional rebel movements surfaced, the Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP) and the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirian du Grand Ouest (MPIGO), sponsored by Liberian president Charles Taylor. MJP and MPIGO echoed the MPCI's mission to bring down Gbagbo, and eventually the three rebel groups formed an alliance under the Forces Nouvelles (FN) banner. Within a month of forming, the Forces Nouvelles signed an accord with the Gbagbo government to end hostilities, but peace remained elusive. Peacekeepers from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) soon joined French soldiers in Côte d'Ivoire.

FN recruits were motivated by citizenship insecurity generally, and Gbagbo's national identification program in particular. One recruit summed up attitudes held by himself and his comrades when he said he joined the rebellion "because the Malinké had been here since the twelfth century, and soon they'll [the government] be giving us a

foreign resident's card to be able to live here" (International Crisis Group 2003, 7; see also Marshall-Fratani 2007, 26). MPCI leader Guillaume Soro claimed the rebellion was an effort to reinstate the citizenship rights of northerners and guarantee their political participation. He criticized Ivoirité as xenophobic, and said that very word "in its true sense means nothing other than: 'Côte d'Ivoire to Ivorians', which is to clearly say, according to those from the south northerners are considered foreigners in their own country" (Bah 2010, 20).

The Gbagbo regime relied on paramilitarization of civil society to achieve "political order through terror, and an ultranationalist radicalization" (Marshall-Fratani 2007, 29). Self-defense militias formed in rural areas too, quickly establishing organizational structures and linking their activities with national networks (Marshall-Fratani 2007). Reaffirming autochthonous land rights, these organizations seized property from strangers and justified land expropriation as a defense of heritage and innate rights (Marshall-Fratani 2007). Such movements were not limited to the south. Fighting between the Guéré and northern Ivoirians, Burkinabé, and Malians was "provoked a spiral of revenge and counter-revenge" (Marshall-Fratani 2007, 32). Deadly attacks near Bangolo, Guiglo, Toulépleu, and Bloléquin drove much of the indigenous population away. These attacks were labelled genocide by the government and used to "legitimate the local Guéré militias" (International Crisis Group 2003, 26).

In January 2003, international mediators helped broker the Linas-Marcoussis Accord (LMA) peace agreement. The LMA proposed a government of national unity and new laws on citizenship and land rights. However, it was ultimately ineffective because it did not adequately address the question of citizenship, instead narrowing the focus to the

distribution of power (Bah 2010). Citizenship and land tenure institutions, not to mention electoral and economic reforms, were relegated to the LMA annex. More importantly, the agreement accepted the *jus sanguinis* principles of the 1961 and 1972 nationality laws as valid, taking issue with their application rather than their content. In other words, the LMA assumed the citizenship question was a simple administrative problem. Therefore, rather than addressing root causes of the grievances, the government was asked to reform the application of these laws, and establish a new national identification program under the supervision of an independent commission.

The Gbagbo regime continued to pursue a strict definition of citizenship based on ancestry, while northerners maintained that indigeneity criteria amounted to denationalization. They staunchly opposed using any basis for citizenship other than one's place of birth Furthermore, the LMA recommendations for constitutional revisions (such as presidential candidates must have Ivoirian citizenship and at least one Ivoirian parent) neglected the fundamental contention of this war: how to define and prove Ivoirian citizenship (Bah 2010). Subsequent agreements, such as Accra II of March 2003 and Accra III of July 2004, continued to treat the issue as a struggle for power (Bah 2010). Therefore, parties to the LMA continued to fight over definitions, birth records, and nationality certificates, and peace proved exceedingly hard to keep.

Fighting continued through 2004 and by 2005 the LMA was in shambles. At this time, a tract began circulating in Abidjan. It captures the discourse autochthonous elites used to mobilize individuals to their cause and so is worth quoting at length (Marshall-Fratani 2007, 10):

People of the Greater West,

The current political situation of our country is linked to its recent history lived by the sons and daughters of our tribes. For forty years, misfortune, injustice, inequality, and crimes have been inflicted on our tribes.

For forty years the Akans and the despot Houphouët-Boigny, the greatest thief of all time, have fought our tribes without respite. Odious crimes have been ordered and executed. One of our illustrious sons, Kragbé Gnagbé, aka Opadjélé was decapitated, and with him perished nearly 4,000 of our people. A genocide such as this cannot remain unpunished.

Our lands, our most precious possession, were torn from us by force by the Akans, led by Houphouët-Boigny with the treacherous collusion of the Dioula and a handful of our own people.

The people of the Greater West must thus unite around one of their own, Laurent Gbagbo, the reincarnation of Opadjélé. It is through him we shall be saved.

The 24 December 1999, God, in giving the power to one of our sons, wanted to show us the way. Daughters and sons of the Greater West, link hands together, the hour has come for us to be heard. The hour has come to kill the Akans and chase them from our lands. The hour has come to recuperate our land. The hour has come to clean our villages and towns of the Dioulas (Mossi) and the Akans, who are objective allies.

Yes, the hour of grand vengeance has struck. We too want our cities to become capitals like Abidjan, Yamoussoukro and Daoukro.

People of the Greater West, unite, so that power will never leave us again. We must use our guns, our machetes. Get ready. Let us kill for the survival of our tribes, to prevent the confiscation of power.

Union of the Greater West (10).

Under mounting pressure to liberalize the nationality laws, Gbagbo passed conciliatory bills on nationality and naturalization, identity documents, and land ownership in 2005 (Manby 2009). As part of the new national identification program mobile courts with independent judges ran disseminated forgery-proof identification documents (Keller 2014). Drafters of the agreement took care to embed lenient procedures. Courts accepted verbal testimony and incomplete documentation, witnesses could verify the place of birth or citizenship of the claimant's parents, cases were heard in the claimant's village of birth rather than in their ancestral village, and children of unknown parentage were automatically entitled to an Ivoirian identity certificate (Keller 2014). Gbagbo also suspended Article 35, thereby allowing Ouattara to run for president in future elections.[55]

In March 2007, a breakthrough peace agreement was reached in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. The agreement's success is attributable to several factors. Ivoirians spearheaded the process, stipulations directly addressed citizenship questions, and the Gbagbo regime made important concessions (Bah 2010; Keller 2014; Manby 2009). For example, the government rescinded identity certificate legislation, created a path to naturalization for long-term immigrants, and modified the 1998 Rural Land Law. Additionally, the agreement stated that rebel forces would be demobilized and incorporated into the national army, which would have an equal proportion of northerners and southerners. Lastly, Gbagbo pledged to hold elections in early 2008 after implementing reconciliation initiatives.

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[55] Originally scheduled for September 2005, the elections were postponed through 2007. They were delayed because of the precarious security situation and voter registration problems linked to the national identification program (Keller 2014; McGovern 2011; Manby 2009).

Despite these strengths, we should not overlook the drawbacks of this agreement. First, it did not specify citizenship criteria, thereby creating space for Ivoirité sympathizers to rail against northerners fraudulently claiming citizenship. This lack of clarity angered opposition supporters as well, who accused the government of continuing to deny the rights of legitimate citizens. Secondly, the Ouagadougou Agreement did not resolve disputes over the 1998 Rural Land Law, leaving property rights controversially tied to indigeneity (Bah 2010; Manby 2009; Keller 2014).

The Ivorian civil war officially ended in 2007, but elections were postponed until 2010. Ouattara defeated Gbagbo after two rounds of voting deemed free and fair by international monitors and the United Nations. The Constitutional Council declared Gbagbo the winner anyway, and supporters on both sides resumed fighting. In April 2011, the so-called *Crise* came to a close with the arrest of Laurent Gbagbo. Violence continued until after Ouattara was installed as president. In October 2011, the International Criminal Court investigated Gbagbo for crimes against humanity committed during the 2010 post-election crisis. He became the first former head of state to be tried by ICC.

The Ivoirian civil war represents an extreme outcome of debates between citizenship regime winners and losers. Concerns about citizenship security took center stage and contentious insider/outsider narratives propelled violence forward. Dual logics of threat and opportunity guided collective action. Losing autochthons felt threatened by the growing economic and political power of Dioula in the country. Feeling colonized and marginalized, they sought to reclaim land and power through nationality law reform. They framed their struggle using the loaded terminology of emancipation, colonization, and ancestry.

The death of Houphouët-Boigny opened a Pandora's Box of trouble for the Dioula. They had been citizenship regime winners up to this point, but they were protected by regime preferences rather than positive law. Never formally integrated into Côte d'Ivoire's national political community, their ambiguous citizenship status left them vulnerable and insecure. With their lands expropriated, and their citizenship rights revoked, the tide eventually turned against the Dioula. They became citizenship regime losers under the weight of mounting political, economic, and security threats. Fighting offered an opportunity to end the erosion of their rights and security, clarify their citizenship status, and formalize their belongingness. Narratives framed the Dioula's grievances as questions of citizenship, denationalization, and justice. Insurgents fought for "a new political order…[and] the redefinition of Ivoirian citizenship and sovereignty" (International Crisis Group 2003, 4; see also McGovern 2011).

Final remarks

Citizenship insecurity characterizes the Ivoirian civil war. Since legal foundations were not well established in the early independence era, citizenship became deeply contested during democratization. Winners and losers competed with one another, but things really fell apart when elites could no longer pacify competing interests through patronage. Violence broke out as groups clambered to demand their inheritance, seeking to legitimize their claims by revising nationality laws.[56] The escalation to full-blown rebellion is largely attributed to laws that formally excluded Dioula from the polity.[57]

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[56] Interview with Joel Baroan-Abidjan-December 5, 2014
[57] Interview-Abidjan-December 2, 2014 (2)

Identity politics became the justification for acts of violence, as each group denied the humanity and "Ivorianness" of the other.[58] It was as if the entire country suffered from collective prosopagnosia and they could no longer see faces. The problems persist to this day. As Joel Baroan, a former minister in then-Prime Minister Ouattara's cabinet put during our interview, while politicians talk of the *tous* (of "everyone") there is no *tous* in Côte d'Ivoire.[59] According to another contact, the Ivoirian "Nation" is fiction.[60] Some blame this state of affairs as a consequence of colonialism.[61] Others point to "le marketing" elites used to rally supporters around them.[62] For example, RDR elites used the sentiment of "*Je suis au Nord*" to mobilize people, preying on the fear that "Because I am from the North, I am excluded".[63] At the same time, to Southerners, Ouattara represented Burkinabé (read: "foreign") domination.

The question then became how to preserve what rightfully belonged to each group.[64] Autochthonous communities perceived land scarcity and economic competition with migrants as a multi-pronged attack on their livelihoods, their heritage, and the ethnic purity of the Ivoirian Nation. They saw revising nationality laws as a means of reclaiming what once belonged to them. Ivoirité discourses helped autochthons to "make sense of that loss and to rectify it" (Bøås and Dunn 2013, 1). The discourses also legitimized political

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[58] Interview with Joel Baroan-Abidjan-December 5, 2014
[59] Interview with Joel Baroan-Abidjan-December 5, 2014
[60] Interview-Abidjan-December 1, 2014 (2)
[61] Interview with Joel Baroan-Abidjan-December 5, 2014
[62] Interview-Abidjan-December 1, 2014 (1)
[63] Interview-Abidjan-December 2, 2014 (1), Interview-Abidjan-December 2, 2014 (2)
[64] Interview-Abidjan-December 2, 2014 (1)

violence against foreigners, who were blamed for the loss. International intervention only compounded the problem, and France's role in particular casts a long shadow over the country.[65]

Political entrepreneurs manipulated nationality laws (and therefore citizenship security) as part of an explicit political strategy. For many years, the *habitude* among Ivoirian leadership has been demagoguery rather than democracy.[66] Stretching from present day to colonial times, the desire to stay in power overrides liberalization. It has been difficult to break free of the tradition of charismatic leaders given the weak civil society in Côte d'Ivoire, which is easily manipulated by powerful actors.[67]

Elites connect institutional processes of laws, policies, and formal practices to group agency. Their motivation becomes clear when one considers how citizenship *insecurity* benefits actors at many different levels of government and civil society (McGovern 2011). At the national level, President Gbagbo and the FPI cater to their autochthonous base and disqualify political opponents. Alassane Ouattara and the RDR built a coalition around claims to expanded rights and political power. Autochthon ministers demonstrate a commitment to protecting the community against invading foreigners. Moreover, by confiscating land from strangers and selling it to locals, they can use land as patronage and promote themselves as defenders of "authentic" Ivoirians. Chiefs

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[65] Interview-Abidjan-December 1, 2014 (1), Interview-Abidjan-December 2, 2014 (2)
[66] Interview-Abidjan-December 1, 2014 (2)
[67]Interview-Abidjan-December 1, 2014 (1), Interview-Abidjan-December 1, 2014 (2). Most people I spoke with in the field distrusted NGOs, assuming they were in the pocket of this-or-that political party.

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can reassert their authority in a time where swells of migrants with economic and political power have weakened their position. Militias of any stripe accumulate power, material resources, and perhaps personal fulfillment fighting for a just cause.

The Democratic Republic of Congo

What happened in Côte d'Ivoire is not in fact unique to Ivoirian politics. A 2004 study by the Open Society Justice Initiative found that nationality and nationality laws have taken a concerning turn towards exclusion in recent decades, from mass deportations of foreigners and political opponents to legal reforms. I now turn to the "Banyarwanda Question" in the DRC, a citizenship debate even more explosive than the saga in Côte d'Ivoire. The Banyarawanda live in the lush Kivu provinces of eastern Congo. Their citizenship status is so contested that it has "literally been switched on and off as expediency dictated" (Jackson 2007, 483).

Figure 8: Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo [68]

The Banyarwanda Question

The term "Banyarwanda" collectively refers to majority Hutu and minority Tutsi Kinyarwanda-speakers (Rwandaphones) in the Kivus. The variant "Banyamulenge" refers more specifically to Tutsi from South Kivu. I return to this point later. The Banyarwanda's precise arrival date is disputed, but evidence suggests Tutsi settlers resided in South Kivu before colonial conquest, and were joined later by successive waves of co-ethnic migrants. The territory that became present-day Congo was once ruled by a Rwandan king. Similar

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[68] Map courtesy of the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection at the University of Texas at Austin. Available at: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/congo_demrep_pol98.jpg. Accessed August 26, 2016.

to *tutorat* Côte d'Ivoire, a system called *ubugabire* evolved whereby Banyarwanda could use land controlled by customary leaders in exchange for tribute (Vlassenroot 2002; Court 2013). The territory came under colonial rule in the late 19th century. By 1885 all residents in the territory became citizens of the Congo Free State, presided over by King Leopold II of Belgium. In fact, an 1892 law granted citizenship to children born in Congo to Congolese parents. In 1910 parts of the Congo Free State were assumed by the Germany colony of Rwanda, only later to be returned to Belgium in 1922. During colonialism, the state owned the land and administered it indirectly through chieftancies called *chefferies*. The Banyamulenge had several *chefferies* until 1933 when these areas were subsumed into larger territorial units controlled by indigenous authorities.

To understand the Banyarwanda's contested nationality, it is helpful to start with the group's ethnogensis. Demographic shifts in Kivu province (now split into North and South Kivu) complicates and politicizes their citizenship status to this day (Manby 2009; Jackson 2006, 2007; Vlassenroot 2002; Court 2013). The self-proclaimed indigenous groups in the Kivus are the Hunde, Nande, Bashi, and Barega. In North Kivu, the Rwandophones are a mix of Tutsi pastoralists and Hutu Banyabwisha, some of whom arrived in pre-colonial times. In South Kivu, the Rwandophones are Tutsi pastoralists with origins in the territory pre-dating the Congo Free State. They call themselves the Banyamulenge (the people of "Mulenge" village) to distinguish themselves from later-arrivals (Ruhimbika 2001; Jackson 2007; Manby 2009).

Some Congolese distinguish between Hutu and Tutsi Rwandophones, reserving their greatest enmity for Banyamulenge specifically, whereas others make no such distinction (Jackson 2007). Generally speaking, Hutus that arrived as refugees of the

Rwandan genocide are "exonerated" based on their opposition to Rwanda's invasions during the Second Congo War (1998-2003) (Lemarchand 2009). For the purposes of this chapter, I use "Banyarwanda" to refer to all Rwandophones in the Congo and I specify Banyamulenge where appropriate.

Through coercive colonial migration schemes and voluntarily exit from Rwandan chiefs, a steady stream of Rwandophones settled in then-unified Kivu province throughout the colonial era. To avoid overpopulation in Rwanda and support plantation agriculture in the Congo, the Belgian government transplanted tens of thousands of Rwandans into Kivu province from the 1930s onward (Boone 2014; Jackson 2006). About 100,000 came during a UNHCR program from the early 1960s (Boone 2014). Conflict at home and in neighboring states served as another significant push-factor in Banyarwanda migration. In addition to refugees from Rwanda's Social Revolution (a Hutu uprising against a Tutsi regime formerly supported by Belgium), thousands of Rwandophones arrived in the Kivus when they fled conflict in Rwanda (early 1960s, 1973, early 1990s) and Burundi (1972, 1978, early 1990s). Hutu refugees arrived after the Hutu extremist government in Rwandan was overthrown in 1994. As successive waves of Rwandan *transplantés* arrived in the Congo, the local population grew increasingly resentful of the continued land expropriation (Boone 2014).

Important parallels exist between the Banyarwanda in the Congo and the Dioula in Côte d'Ivoire. First, the origins of both groups are deeply contested, rendering their "true" nationality a point of contention. Some Banyarwanda and Dioula families resided in the respective territories before colonialism, which implies a legitimate claim to indigeneity as vaguely defined by nativist movements. However, many more group members arrived

during waves of colonial-era migration, leading sceptics to believe the groups had foreign ethnic homelands. In popular imagination, the labels "Dioula" and "Banyarwanda" connote foreign nationality.

Secondly, local struggles over customary authority and land rights dating back to the colonial period are integral to citizenship disputes in both countries. The Banyarwanda and Dioula were winners under the colonial citizenship regime. Colonial administrators treated migrants preferentially and sidelined local workers (Jackson 2007; Boone 2014). This preference contributed to the growing migrant population, which was as large as or larger than the indigenous population in some places. From 1950 through the 1990s, for example, in-migrants represented 50% of the total population in both North Kivu and Southwestern Côte d'Ivoire (Boone 2014). In the background, the informal land tenure systems known as *tutorat* (Côte d'Ivoire) and *ubugabire* (Congo) laid the foundations for competing land claims.

A Tragic Trajectory

The trajectory of conflict follows a similar pattern in Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC. Political and economic competition intensified and intersected with external forces, which elevated issues in local politics to the national level. Nationality law became a politically expedient way for winning and losing groups to address threats to their community and to seize opportunities to claim rights and resources. Debates over nationality questions became progressively heated and framed in insider/outsider terms. Low-level violence morphed into regional conflict as the threat of Banyarwanda denationalization increased.

The Banyarawanda's contested nationality status can be traced to a legal technicality during the colonial period. They were denied a "native" administration under

Belgian rule, which hurts their claims to indigeneity today. Further, their contested nationality became "fodder for local anti-Banyamulenge campaigns" in the lead-up to independence (Court 2013, 424; Pottier 2002). However, Rwandophones served as large potential voting bloc so many leaders desired their political support, even though it was politically damaging to grant them full citizenship rights in the newly independent country (then Zaire). In the negotiations at the Brussels Round Table on the transition to independence, the parties involved agreed that only current citizens (granted citizenship through the *jus sanguinis* principles of the 1892 decree on nationality) would be allowed to vote and run for office in the 1960 election. Recently-arrived Banyarwanda were only allowed to vote (Manby 2009).

Congo achieved independence on June 30, 1960. Seemingly overnight, debates over local belonging erupted into ethnic conflict. Katanga and Kasai provinces tried to secede. Rwandophones stopped paying customary rent to Hunde chiefs and many were expelled from North Kivu, sparking the "Banyarwanda War" (1963-1965). One interview conducted by Stephen Jackson is worth quoting at length to illustrate the contested citizenship narratives that persist event today:

> It was often the administrators who alerted the people to be against the Rwandans, the immigrants…they were numerous and every time they arrived they looked for power…when they started to try to enter and share power with the others, the others would say, 'No, you are Rwandans, you have no claim on anything here…if you don't immediately quit your lands we are going to massacre you!' (2006, 101 quoting interview with "Juma," Goma, June 10, 1999)

Mobutu Sese Seko came to power in 1965 by a Belgian and United States-backed coup. He rewarded Banyamulenge for their loyalty during the Simba rebellion (1964-1965) by granting them expanded citizenship rights (i.e. education, social services, employment,

etc), much to the chagrin of autochthonous groups in South Kivu (Turner 2013; Court 2013; Vlassenroot 2002). Local politicians pointed to Rwandophone refugees who arrived in 1959 (Rwandan Tutsis) and 1972 (Burundian Hutus) to demonstrate that all Banyarwanda were foreigners. In response, Tutsi leaders in South Kivu, who could traced their origins in the Congo to pre-colonial times, changed their ethnic label to "Banyamulenge". The goal of identifying with an indigenous identity backfired. Ever since, other Congolese accuse the Banyamulenge of adopting a "counterfeit identity" (Jackson 2006, 484; see also Vlassenroot 2002, Ruhimbika 2001).

Citizenship insecurity remained high for the entire Congolese population during Mobutu's tenure. On one hand, the Banyamulenge were citizenship regime winners because they gained political and economic power under Mobutu. However, they were precariously winning because their official status remained ambiguous. Their strong influence threatened autochthons and bred widespread resentment.

During the Mobutu regime, Banyarwanda nationality became a bargaining chip, easily manipulated for political gain. The 1964 Luluabourg Constitution, written amidst an influx of refugees from Rwanda's liberation war, limited citizenship to individuals whose ancestors were members of an ethnic group in Congo before October 18, 1908.[69] The law denied citizenship to all Banyarwanda and Hunde authorities moved quickly to claim their land, property, and chieftaincies (Boone 2014, 169). However, Mobutu aimed to build a power base out of minority groups that would be unable to effectively challenge, much less

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[69] 1908 is the year when the territory transferred hands and became a formal colony of Belgium, rather than private property of King Leopold.

topple, him (Jackson 2006; Williame 1997). The Banyamulenge were thus given agricultural concessions, political appointments, and expanded access to rights and state services (Manby 2009; Vlassenroot 2002; Jackson 2007; Boone 2014). By 1967 Barthélémy Bisengimana, a Tutsi from North Kivu, had enough influence in the President's Office to restore citizenship to the Banyarwanda. He pushed through a decree in 1971 that granted citizenship to Rwandophones established in the territory since June 30, 1960. A 1972 law reinforced the 1971 decree by moving the date of arrival to January 1, 1950. This legislation elevated the nationality question from a local or regional level to a national one (Manby 2009).

Resentment towards Banyarwanda continued to grow as their economic conditions improved their citizenship status remained ambiguous. Their sprawling plantations and ranches were acquired through the expropriation of autochthons' land and their political power obtained after steamrolling customary traditions (Boone 2014). Many Congolese believed that Banyarwanda success came only by the grace of the patronage state, seeing as they were the prime beneficiaries of Mobutu's divide-and-rule strategies (Jackson 2007; Manby 2009; Boone 2014; Autesserre 2009).

Unable to ignore the popular pressure, Mobutu eventually turned on his Banyarwanda allies as he attempted to centralize power. Bisengimana was dismissed following corruption charges. A 1971 constitutional amendment and a 1973 property law brought all public land under state control. The Banyamulenge had purchased much of their land privately and so retained access to much of their property. Families relying on customary land rights, though, stood to lose everything. Absent proper enforcement of the new land law, the result was uncertain land rights and heightened volatility (Court 2013).

In response to the growing economic and political power of the Banyamulenge, and their own losing position, autochthons mobilized around the threat of "occupation of land and territory by immigrants" (Mathieu and Tsongo 1999, 45). They channeled mounting animosity into the development of armed organizations, such as the Mai-Mai (Jackson 2007; Boone 2014).[70]

In 1981 the date of eligibility for citizenship reverted to August 1, 1885, the date of the Berlin Conference that carved up Africa for European empires. A 1982 decree then annulled the nationality for anyone who acquired citizenship under the 1972 law, forcing them to apply for naturalization if they wanted to be Congolese citizens. Proof of eligibility was hard to come by even for those who met the new restrictive criteria. Many, but not all, Banyarwanda were effectively denationalized and some were expelled (Manby 2009). Further, ambiguous citizenship rules still prevailed. Banyamulenge candidates were not allowed to contest the 1982 and 1987 national elections, but they were allowed to vote in them—even though they were barred from local elections (Manby 2009; Vlassenroot 2002). Banyamuelenge boycotted the elections. In response to the 1981/1982 legislation, Banyarwanda formed the organization the Peoples of Rwandan Origin in Zaire and asked the United Nations to create an independent state in North Kivu for their safety (Jackson 2007; Williame 1997).

Under international pressure, the DRC was forced to accept a liberalization program in the early 1990s. However, Banyarwanda were largely excluded from the

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[70] Mai-Mai is an acronym in the local language for the nationalist slogan "Tutsi get out! Congolese guard your country!" (Jackson 2006, 106).

Conférence Nationale Souveraine (CNS) in 1991, which concerned the transition to multipartyism. Embracing the policy of *géopolitique* (the politics of geography), Mobutu required all CNS delegates to be indigenous to the area they represented. Politicians began to use *géopolitique* as part of campaigning and leaders at the CNS "increasingly challenged the right of Banyamulenge and other Kinyarwanda-speakers to citizenship" (Turner 2013, 94; see also Jackson 2006). For example, the North Kivu delegation denounced "the political and economic exploitation of the province by 'Rwandan foreigners'" (Jackson 2006, 105-6). National identity cards were regularly withheld from Banyarwanda by local administrators during this period (Vlassenroot 2002; Jackson 2006; Ruhimbika 2001). By virtue of their exclusion from the CNS and the withholding of their nationality cards, the Banyarwanda were treated as foreign nationals by the central government. They unequivocally lost under the prevailing citizenship regime.

A CNS sub-commission then proposed a census to identify "true" Congolese citizens ahead of elections. However, the census would only be conducted in the Kivus and two territories in Katanga bordering South Kivu. The census fed into a popular skepticism of Banyarwanda nationality, and served as an extension of the *Mission d'Identification des Zaïrois au Kivu* conducted in 1989. Ostensibly launched to determine whether Banyarwanda could in fact claim Congolese nationality, the *Mission* became a witch-hunt for "foreigners" that parroted the dominant narrative that Banyarwanda were not autochthons (Court 2013; Vlassenroot 2002).

With national and local administrators denying the Banyarwanda's right to Congolese nationality, grassroots organizations (e.g Groupe Milima and Ugeafi) lobbied to reinstate the liberal 1971/1972 nationality laws (Vlassenroot 2002). Many Banyarwanda

understood the *Mission* and CNS census as a "notice of intension for ethnic cleansing" (Jackson 2007, 488). In response to the threat, Rwandophone self-defense militias cropped up in the Kivus, matched by ethnic militias of autochthonous groups (Jackson 2007). International events only made the situation worse. In 1990, the RPF began their assault on the Hutu government in Rwanda. This conflict, along with a Tutsi-led coup in Burundi in 1993, sent refugees streaming into Congo and intensified hostility towards all Banyarwanda. As early as 1991, Banyamulenge began joining the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), driven out of South Kivu by marginalization (Williame 1997; Vlassenroot 2002).

The Masisi war broke out in North Kivu in March 1993. The cycle of attacks and counter-attacks between Banyarwanda and Mai-Mai militias led to 6,000 deaths and 250,000 displaced persons (Turner 2013, 103). The shifting coalitions meant that sometimes Tutsis allied with Hutus under the Banyarwanda umbrella, but other times the two groups fought each other (Manby 2009; Jackson 2006). The ethnic cleansing, which has continued to date, changed previously diverse areas into ethnic enclaves (Manby 2009).

In the run-up to the 1993 election, several Banyarwanda (mostly Hutu) were killed at Ntoto market by autochthonous Hunde and Nyanga youths. This seemingly isolated incident escalated to the "Inter-ethnic war" in North Kivu, and spread south into mineral-rich Katanga and Kasai provinces. What started as a clash in a market became a trigger for two civil wars in the late 1990s (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Jackson 2007). The proximate cause of the Ntoto market incident was an attempt to dislodge Rwandophones from the area to limit their political influence. The underlying cause was defense of ancestral land rights. Indigenous groups maintained their exclusive rights to land and authority in the provinces, but the Banyarwanda had long ago stopped paying tribute to local chiefs for the land they

occupied. This act of defiance supported the proliferation of sons-of-the-soil movements bent on land reclamation (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Autesserre 2009). The fragmented collection of Mai-Mai militias blame their disadvantage and the expropriation of their lands on Banyarwanda. They are motivated by a "nostalgia for a lost past that can be brought back only if certainty about people and places reestablished" (Bøås and Dunn 2013, 97). Moreover, they desire a new order in which autochthons are predominant (Bøås and Dunn 2013).

In 1994, Hutu-extremist *Interahamwe* fled Rwanda for Congo. They landed in refugee camps alongside moderate Hutus and Tutsis. The line between Congolese and Rwandan Hutu thus became even more blurred (Manby 2009). In response to the surge of refugees, the 1995 Transitional Parliament sent the Vangu Commission to investigate. The body adopted a resolution on nationality alleging that all Banyarwanda had fraudulently acquired citizenship (Jackson 2007). According to Thomas Turner,

> The commission's conclusions reflected a spirit of "ethnic cleansing"…
> It alleged that Rwanda had been attempting to acquire Congolese territory and to supplant its indigenous inhabitants for years and that the Tutsi now were preparing to create a "Hamitic Kingdom," to be known as the United States of Central Africa or the Republic of the Volcanoes (2013, 95).

Heeding the Commission's report, Banyarwanda identity cards were confiscated or destroyed. In South Kivu, the regional government expropriated Banyamulenge property, evicted Banyamulenge families, and deported many people to Rwanda or Burundi. Indigenous militias sang anthems of ethnic cleansing and brutally "cleaned" villages and

drove "Rwandans to Rwanda" (Manby 2009, 75). [71] Then, in early October 1996, Banyamulenge in South Kivu were ushered into temporary camps. By the end of the month, they, along with any other suspected Rwandan, Burundian, and Ugandan nationals, were expelled from the country.

The Banyarwanda quickly organized in response to these threats, joining other militias under the banner of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL). Their objective was to defend themselves and rebel against the government that had exorcised them from the polity. Led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the rebels received massive support from Rwanda and Uganda. Hostility against the Banyarwanda only intensified after Rwandan troops crossed the border in 1996 (Manby 2009).

In summary, parallels between the path to war in Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC continue into the independence era. Insider/outsider competition intensified in both countries as land scarcity and liberalization efforts affected the balance of power between citizenship regime winners and losers. Dioula and Banyarwanda claims to land and leadership were not seen as legitimate because the groups were widely perceived as foreign. Their landholdings were considered illegal and their political authority null. Furthermore, resentment among losing autochthons undercut Dioula and Banyarwanda economic success and political influence.

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[71] The Interahamwe alternately fought indigenous groups and allied with them to attack Banyamulenge (Manby 2009, 74-5).

In both cases, efforts to identify "true" citizens came to a head during elections, which then triggered violence leading to civil war. In the lead-up to each conflict, individuals mobilized around contentious narratives highlighting citizenship insecurity and leadership that endorsed violence. The logics of threat and opportunity were clearly active as well. Autochthons in both countries saw their land gobbled up by "foreigners" and their political power diminish as outsiders curried favor with the regime. The Banyarwanda and Dioula, on the other hand, were threatened by their ambiguous and allegedly fraudulent citizenship status. In addition, they became targets of ethnic cleansing. Nationality laws provided a compelling opportunity to address citizenship insecurity on all sides. Autochthonous movements pushed for new laws that would restrict citizenship to indigenous groups, while the Banyarwanda and Dioula sought to legitimate their nationality status through inclusionary legislation.

The 1995 resolution on nationality represents the critical juncture in which citizenship became the focal point of conflict in the Kivus. Effective denationalization through the 1981/1982 nationality laws, combined with ethnic cleansing of the 1990s, left the Banyarwanda with few options outside of armed resistance. However, the 1995 law stating that the Banyarwanda had *fraudulently* acquired citizenship prompted the group to mobilize in self-defense and to reclaim their nationality rights (Court 2013; Manby 2009; Vlassenroot 2002). Nationality law is a way to upend the balance of power between citizenship regime winners and losers, but is not a sufficient cause for conflict. Other initial conditions must be met for onset to take place. I now turn to these conditions.

War in the Congo

The first Congo War (1996-1997) toppled Mobutu. The second (1998-2003) attempted to do the same to Kabila. In 1998, the Banyarwanda still lacked official citizenship and Kabila steadily lost their support. When he expelled Rwandans and Ugandans from his army, the Banyarwanda formed a new rebel group, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma (RCD-Goma).[72] The RCD-Goma's stated mission was to advance the cause of Congolese Rwandophones, and protect the security of Tutsis in particular. The government and the Congolese population saw the RCD-Goma as Rwanda's puppet because the rebels were backed by Rwanda and refugees fled there to escape the fighting. Reacting to Rwanda's violation of Congolese sovereignty, Kabila supported Mai-Mai and Congolese Hutu militia. Hate speech by Congolese elite labelled Banyarwanda "invaders", "vermin", and Rwandan "puppets". Rwandophones were again accused of wanting to annex Kivu to create a Hamitic Kingdom. In this toxic climate, Tutsis became targets of massacres (Manby 2009; Vlassenroot 2002; Jackson 2007).

A bodyguard assassinated Laurent-Désiré Kabila in January 2001. Kabila's son Joseph took charge and began the slow process of ending the war. A Transitional Government formed in 2003 and a year later the entity returned citizenship to the Banyarwanda, although it retained ethnicity-based nationality criteria. By 2004, anyone born of an ethnic group or nationality present in the territory at independence could claim

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[72] At one point the DRC had 14 foreign armies, three rebel groups, and numerous militia groups operating within its borders. After 1999 the fighting was concentrated in the east: North Kivu, South Kivu, northern Katanga, and Ituri district (Autesserre 2009).

citizenship. [73] This date represented a formal concession to many Banyarwanda, but informal barriers continued to pervasive denial of the group's rights. For example, to prove their identity, applications for voter registration had to include statements by five witnesses who were already registered and who had been resident in the country for at least five years (Manby 2009).

The 2006 Constitution upheld the 2004 law, which is still in force today. The 2004 nationality law is intended to be the final word in Congo's citizenship debate, but the language "leaves a dangerous level of ambiguity in its interpretation" (Manby 2009, 79). First, the terms "ethnic groups" and "nationalities" are not precisely defined and therefore subject to interpretation and political manipulation. Second, authority to prove ethnic identity is left indeterminate. If this authority falls to customary leaders, Banyarwanda nationality will remain precarious. They have little chance of convincing an autochthonous chief of their legitimate claim to citizenship. In short, even when law concedes Banyarwanda citizenship, exercising their rights proves difficult, inconsistent, and arbitrary (Manby 2009; Jackson 2007).

Peace talks in 2008 could still not resolve the Banyarwanda nationality question. Since then, the Banyarwanda have suffered setbacks in their quest for citizenship. Indigenous groups remained steadfast in their claims that all Banyarwanda are immigrants, possibly even double-agents for the Rwandan government (Manby 2009). Inflammatory rhetoric and hate speech marred the 2011 federal elections; the Banyarwanda were depicted as alien exploiters of Congo and the Congolese (Human Rights Watch 2011; Jackson 2007;

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[73] The upper house of parliament did not approve this provision (Manby 2009).

Bøås and Dunn 2013). When North Kivu fell to M23, a Rwanda-backed rebel group, in late 2012, Rwandophone communities were blamed. Seen as complicit in M23 activities, Banyarwanda were repeatedly threatened and attacked (International Crisis Group 2012).[74] Then, a draft electoral law in 2014 proposed updating the voter roll through a national census. Protests ensued and the provision was dropped. The current plan is to use the 2011 voter roll without registering new voters.[75] The 2011 roll is controversial due to lack of transparency and poor verification procedures.[76] The Banyarwanda nationality question will likely gain renewed traction in the next few years. In March 2015, the government began the process of *Découpage*, a plan to divide the DRC's 11 existing provinces into 26.[77]

In summary, the politics of *Ivoirité* in Côte d'Ivoire and *Géopolitique* in the DRC are similar in many respects. A response to the balance of power between citizenship regime winners and losers, the ideologies impose broad restrictions on Dioula and Banyarwanda citizenship rights. For example, Côte d'Ivoire's 1998 land law withdrew property rights from "foreigners" and other legislation required individuals to prove their

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[74] M23 refers to peace agreement of March 23, 2009 between Kinshasa and the CNDP. By the end of 2013 Rwanda had withdrawn support for M23 and the group was defeated.

[75] "Congo: Is Democratic Change Possible?" The International Crisis Group, Africa Report no. 225, May 5 2015, pp.19. Accessed June 30, 2016 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/225-congo-is-democratic-change-possible.pdf.

[76] "Elections in the DRC (completing the 2011-2016 cycle): Status and Perspectives", SSRC/DRC Affinity Group, August 2014, pp. 5; Mission d'Observation Electorale RDC 2011, EU, pp. 32-36.

[77] "Congo: Is Democratic Change Possible?" The International Crisis Group, Africa Report no. 225, May 5 2015, pp.17. Accessed June 30, 2016 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/225-congo-is-democratic-change-possible.pdf.

authenticity as citizens through certificates of nationality. Eventually the government created the Office of National Identification to systematize the process of obtaining documents from one's from ancestral village. These measures resemble efforts by the *Mission d'Identification des Zaïrois au Kivu* and the *Conférence Nationale Souveraine* to identify "true" citizens in the Congo. Furthermore, contentious citizenship narratives in Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC used the language of past injustices and future redemption to mobilize people along insider/outsider lines. Collective violence then followed a logic of threat (decreased citizenship security) and opportunity (increased citizenship security).[78] Faced with denationalization, armed resistance by Banyarwanda escalated to war, which parallels what happened in Côte d'Ivoire.

Conclusion

It is undeniable that the conflicts in Côte d'Ivoire and eastern the DRC have many layers: land rights, elections, nationality disputes, and natural resources, among others. However, Catherine Boone's observation about land regimes applies to citizenship regimes as well. Citizenship rules "structure (or de-structure) political grievances and political action" (Boone 2011, 1315). Understanding citizenship politics as identity politics, which is the norm in the literature, is extremely useful because identity and citizenship are nearly inseparable. At the same time, by emphasizing the redistributive element of citizenship politics, we gain better purchase on the variation in violence severity. Varying levels of

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[78] The language of "past injustices" and "future redemption" comes from a discussion in Bøås and Dunn (2013, 97) regarding the motivation and objectives of autochthonous movements. The concepts apply equally well when describing how citizenship security informs contentious narratives.

competition between winners and losers drives varying levels of violence. The depth of winner/loser competition is linked to the depth of exclusion in nationality laws. At the same time, these two cases illustrate how VOB can lead to increasing restrictions in nationality laws that then fuel greater episodes of violence. Where we see this downward spiral of violence and exclusion, violence severity continues to risk and the risk of war weighs heavy on the country.

I find that contentious citizenship narratives help explain the joint production of violence by elites and individuals. These messages highlight citizenship insecurity of citizenship regime winners and losers, and emphasize the insider/outsider cleavage. Citizenship debates are more likely to implicate the national citizenship rules if the outsider group is composed of both internal and external migrants. As nationality law becomes more exclusionary, VOB escalates. War is likely when denationalization is a credible threat to outsiders. The next chapter shows that outcomes are constrained when the national citizenship rules are not at stake. Further, the "negative case" of Ghana illustrates that VOB does not break out if initial conditions are not met.

Finally, the Ivoirian and Congolese wars clearly diverge in their duration and intensity. I attribute this divergence to the depth of exclusion in the citizenship regime. Although institutions in Côte d'Ivoire narrowed citizenship criteria, Dioula exclusion was less severe and less prolonged than that of Congolese Banyarwanda. The Banyarwanda faced threats to their nationality as early as the Brussels Round Table of 1960. The Dioula, on the other hand, informally exercised important citizenship rights, such as the right to vote and own land, under Houphouet Boigny (1960-1993). The 1994 and 1995 electoral laws were the first major pieces of Ivoirité legislation, followed later by Article 35 in the

2000 Constitution. These restrictions limited who could run for presidential office, but did not revoke Dioula citizenship completely. The 1998 land law prevented Dioula from owning property, but did not deny their nationality. Even the Office of National Identification, with its unwieldly procedures for nationality documents, did not explicitly withdraw Dioula nationality; rather, it denied their citizenship in practice. The Banyarwanda, on the other hand, formally lost their citizenship multiple times: under the 1964 Constitution (restored 1971/1972) and under the 1981/1982 nationality laws. From 1981 to 2004 most Banyarwanda were not officially citizens of the DRC (Jackson 2007). In short, the Dioula were *effectively* denationalized through formal means, but the Banyarwanda were fully and *officially* deemed foreign nationals.

Chapter 6. The Wars that Never Happened: Evidence from Ghana and Kenya

The previous chapter explained why the politics of belonging led to war in Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC. This chapter addresses cases of non-escalation and minor conflict. Evidence from Ghana shows why some insider/outsider violence remains at the local level, and evidence from Kenya sheds light on processes driving episodes towards minor conflict that stops short of war. In this chapter I test the second part of Hypothesis 2:

H2b: Violence at the national level will fall short of war if nationality laws are not in question.

Ghana meets the basic criteria you would expect for VOB escalation. Foreign migrants lived and worked in the country for several generations, and growing land scarcity increased insider/outsider competition. The country's nationality laws also changed several times and became progressively more restrictive. In the midst of exclusionary reforms, the government required "foreigners" to acquire residence permits or leave the country. Furthermore, economic crisis and political liberalization meant citizenship insecurity was on the rise and intra-elite competition was fierce. Even more striking, rural areas saw land disputes turn violent, and election violence over fraud broke out. Yet the politics of belonging never led to minor conflict. Why? I argue that Ghana did not meet the necessary conditions for conflict onset.

The nature of Ghana's citizenship regime, and its network of institutions more broadly, prevented the politicization of citizenship. Furthermore, low citizenship insecurity

minimized winner/loser competition and limited the momentum of citizenship debates. Therefore, national citizenship did not become a politicized issue in Ghana. Importantly, the country's formal and informal institutions effectively managed insider/outsider tensions. A disconnect between winner/loser status and insider/outsider identity had a dampening effect on contentious narratives, which in turn prevented widespread ethnic mobilization. Additional factors suppressed widespread VOB in Ghana as well. For example, political and economic liberalization did not happen at the same time, meaning the government could manage each change before it turned into a crisis. Also, land authority rests with Ghana's chiefs so the insider/outsider axis of contention does not involve the national political community. A critic may point to the clashes between the Konkomba and the Nanumba, Dagomba, and Gonja groups in the northern regions of the country. I address this episode of minor conflict later.

In Kenya's Rift Valley, competition between citizenship regime winners and losers exacerbated insider/outsider divisions. The statist land tenure regime, the clientelization of land, the breakdown of patronage networks, and the combined force of political and economic crises elevated insider/outsider violence in Kenya to the national level. Although the nationality laws liberalized in 1986 and again in 2010, widespread violence broke out during the 1992, 1997, and 2007 elections. Inflammatory rhetoric during these campaigns amounted to calls for ethnic cleansing, reflecting the extent of elite impunity and normalization of political violence in the country. Kenya reached the brink, but did not succumb to civil war. Why?

Kenya experienced VOB at the minor conflict level because the criteria for conflict onset were met. Citizenship became a nationally politicized issue, but insider/outsider

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violence ultimately fell short of war because only sub-national belonging came under fire. Since outsiders did not have contested foreign origins, nationality laws were not come under threat. Even though citizenship insecurity peaked, war did not break out because outsiders never faced denationalization. In contrast, outsiders in Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC had strong ties, at least in popular imagination, to neighboring countries. This fact made it easier for politicians to claim that the Dioula and Banyarwanda, respectively, had no right to national citizenship. When the government moved to denationalize them, it raised the stakes sufficiently high for outsiders to rebel. A critic may point to the case of the marginalized Somali and Nubian communities in Kenya. I address these plausible outliers at the end of this section.

Data for this chapter comes from secondary source material and original interviews I conducted with political researchers in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire and Accra, Ghana (November-December 2014). See Table 4 in Chapter 5 for an overview of variables under consideration. Recall that case selection is purposive in order to harness the necessary variation on the dependent and independent variables, while also controlling for potentially confounding factors.

Ghana

Present-day Ghana is divided into 10 regions: Upper West, Upper East, Northern, Brong-Ahafo, Ashanti, Eastern, Volta, Greater Accra, Central, and Western. The largest ethnic groups are the Akan (49%), Mole-Dagbani (17%), Ewe (13%) and Ga-Dangme (8%) (Fremong 2012). These ethnic groups are highly fragmented, though. In fact, the Akan can be divided into about 20 sub-groups (Langer 2009).

"Stools" are a form of religio-political organization throughout Ghana.[79] Part of chiefly estates, stool lands are managed on behalf of the community. Chiefs have land authority, which they use to allocate plots, extract revenue and rents, and arbitrate disputes (Boone 2014; Crook 2008). Since property rights are governed by customary law in Ghana, land conflicts remain outside the national political arena. Furthermore, chiefly land authority has a dampening effect on insider/outsider cleavages. Autochthons tend to economically outperform migrants, and land is not exploited by politicians as a patronage resource. Therefore, migration is not a politically charged issue during Ghanaian elections. Even when nativist discourse does rear its head, the messages do not encourage armed organization (Boone 2014; Boni 2005; Boone and Duku 2012; Côté and Mitchell 2016; Kobo 2010).

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[79] As Hammer (1998) explains, "It is through the current occupier of the Stool that the spiritual and political power of the people is exercised…the Stool represents the centre of political gravitation" (317, Note 6). The 1979 Constitution extended the power of chiefs over "stool lands" to northern regions, where had previously had a statist land tenure system (Berry 2009).

Figure 9: Map of Ghana [80]

The structure of insider/outsider relations

Chiefs and their stool rights were the foundation of indirect, colonial rule in Ghana. Migrants entered into *abusa* (sharecropping) contracts in which they paid tribute to chiefs for access to stool lands (Fred-Mensah 1999; Addae-Mensah 1986; Boni 2006; Berry 2009; Berry 2001; Boone 2014). However, unlike in Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC, migrants in Ghana could acquire land titles that proved their ownership of a plot—even if the tribute requirement often remained in place. Furthermore, the transactions were well documented

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[80] Map courtesy of the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection at the University of Texas at Austin. Available at: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/ghana_admin_2007.jpg. Accessed August 26, 2016.

and professionally surveyed (Boone 2014; Boone and Duku 2012; Benneh 1988; Boni 2005). Lastly, the size of the in-migrant population was smaller in Ghana, as compared to places with national level land conflict. For example, Boone (2014, 82-85) notes that districts with national level land violence had in-migrant populations that made up 50 to 60% of the total district population, whereas in-migrants in Ghana represented closer to 30%. In short, even though outsiders remained at a disadvantage under customary land regime, citizenship insecurity was kept in check. Migrants had land rights, manageable population sizes, and throughout Ghana's independence period the government has taken significant steps to minimize ethnic divisions and support migrant communities.

Cocoa cultivation arrived in the eastern Volta Region just before the First World War. After WWII, migrants came to take advantage of Ghana's booming cocoa industry. They originated from other parts of the colony, Haute Volta (present-day Burkina Faso), Niger, Mali, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria. Cocoa production expanded east to west as declining yields forced migrants to search for uncultivated land. Outsiders leaving Eastern and Ashanti Regions were welcomed in Western Region because population densities were low and indigenous groups did not take a strong interest in export crop production (Boone and Duku 2012; Boni 2005; Côté and Mitchell 2016). So long as farmers could find new land to cultivate, scarcity and declining yields did not exacerbate host/migrant relations.

Eventually the spread of commercial production overwhelmed exhausted natural resources. Communities began to accuse their chiefs of betrayal for selling ancestral land to non-indigenes. Popular pressure thus forced chiefs to curb or eliminate property rights of strangers (Boone 2014; Boni 2005; Addae-Mensah 1986; Alhassan and Manuh 2005;

Benneh 1988).[81] Competition intensified and land conflict broke out. However, fighting was constrained to the local level. Even though the outsider group in Ghana was comprised of internal and foreign migrants, contention never reached the national stage because autochthons blamed their chiefs for land-related problems (Boone 2014; Mitchell 2011). Therefore, citizenship was not politicized in the national political arena. Moreover, indigenous populations in Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC competed directly with migrants for land and political power. In Ghana, though, migrants remained subservient to hosts, thereby posing less of a threat (Crook 2001; Mitchell 2011). This reduced the salience of the citizenship security cleavage and weakened winner/loser competition

The evolution of state-society relations in Ghana also contributed to non-escalation there. Essentially, the government's policies prevented citizenship regime winner/loser status from exacerbating ethnic cleavages. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention People's Party (CPP) led Ghana to independence on March 6, 1957. Although the CPP took an anti-migrant platform (Boone 2014; Mikell 1992), it supported an inclusionary citizenship regime. For example, the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1 of 1957 (later replaced by the Nationality Act 62 of 1961) upheld *jus soli* citizenship principles. In 1966, the National Liberation Council (NLC) overthrew Nkrumah.[82] The NLC curried favor among the economically-powerful immigrant community. The Nationality Decree of 1967

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[81] Strangers responded by organizing politically. For example, the Association of Stranger Farmers of Wassa Amenfi, which had goal of representing (land) interests of stranger farmers (Benneh 1988; Boone and Duku 2012).

[82] Ghana experienced eight more changes of government (four of which were military coups) by 1983.

then relaxed the criteria for acquiring citizenship for individuals born before independence (Whitaker 2015; Kobo 2010).[83]

In addition, Nkrumah and his successors engaged in ethno-regional balancing to ensure that northerners were represented in the government. They also took concrete and symbolic steps to build an inclusive national identity. For instance, under the Avoidance of Discrimination Act of 1957 (ADA), Nkrumah banned political parties formed along ethnic or regional lines. The move remains controversial for its role in undercutting political opposition, but it is widely credited with reducing the salience of ethnic identities. Subsequent regimes have upheld ADA principles by passing additional legislation to prevent ethnicity-based mobilization and to prevent any local language from being elevated to the status of national language (Langer 2009).[84]

Nkrumah and his successors openly celebrated Ghana's pluralism as well. They adopted many forms of traditional dress or invited different traditional leaders at state events, in addition to participating in important cultural festivals around the country. Furthermore, the Ghanaian boarding school system sends students to institutions outside their home region in an effort to break down regional ties and promote national integration. The same is true for civil servants, which forces them to learn the local language and assimilate (Langer 2009).[85]

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[83] The 1967 Decree upheld *jus soli* principles.
[84] The Constitutions of 1969, 1979, and 1992, the 2000 Political Parties Act, and the (non-binding) 2004 Political Parties Code of Conduct all aim to impede electoral mobilization along ethnic lines.
[85] These efforts were also stressed to me in field interviews. See Frempong Interview-Accra-December 15, 2014; Nana Interview-Accra-December 17, 2014

In summary, Ghana's state-society relations helps explain why insider/outsider violence does not escalate beyond the level of localized skirmishes there. Namely, formal and informal institutions support an inclusionary citizenship regime, which reduces citizenship insecurity and minimizes the salience of the insider/outsider cleavage. *Jus soli* nationality laws in the early years of independence supported a liberal conceptualization of national citizenship, even as indigeneity often held sway in rural areas. Efforts at national integration further reduced the salience of ethnicity and thus the likelihood of mobilization along cultural lines. Consequently, citizenship regime winner/loser status fell along party lines more than ethnic identity. Finally, the insider/outsider axis of contention implicates chieftaincies rather than the state, preventing national citizenship rules from becoming politicized. This confluence of factors helps explain why contentious citizenship narratives did not develop and VOB did not escalate to minor conflict soon after independence.

Stability in instability

In 1969, Ghana's economy went into shock, leading to massive inflation, unemployment, food shortages (Beckman 1976). Opposition to foreigners grew, especially in the business sector where they posed the greatest threat. Land scarcity also contributed to growing resentment towards migrants (Whitaker 2015; Mitchell 2011; Kobo 2010). However, the foreign-born were by now an important part of the national economy—in part because of their substantial demographic footprint (Whitaker 2015; Peil 1974).[86]

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[86] According to the 1960 census, non-Ghanaians accounted for 12% of population (Peil 1974). Moreover, 18% of cocoa farmers, 65.6% of cocoa farm workers, and 40% of all farm workers were immigrants (Boone 2014).

Within a year of passing the Nationality Law of 1967, the NLC replaced it with the Nationality (Amendment) Decree 333 of 1969. In one fell swoop, *jus soli* provisions gave way to *jus sanguinis* rules.[87] The Busia government then introduced the Aliens Compliance Order of 1969 (ACO) to enforce Nkrumah-era legislation.[88] The ACO required foreigners to get residence permits within two weeks under threat of deportation. The result was a mass expulsion of 200,000 people within 6 months. The ACO intended to target immigrants from Nigeria, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Syria in the urban retail and informal sectors (Boone 2014).[89] Many of those expelled were Ghanaian in-migrants. As is common in many parts of Africa, autochthons did not distinguish between foreign-nationals and strangers from the northern or southern areas of the country (Peil 1974).

The new laws represented a shift towards more exclusionary policies, but did not provoke violence or significant political mobilization.[90] In fact, insider/outsider tension did not even influence the 1969 election campaign (Boone 2014). These laws were not wide-reaching enough to exclude a significant portion of the population from citizenship, and

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[87] The 1969 law was reinforced by the 1969 Constitution, the Nationality Act 361 of 1971, and the Amendment Decree of 1972. The laws state: A person born in Ghana before independence is a citizen if one parent or grandparent was born in Ghana. A person born outside the country must have one parent born in Ghana. A person born in or outside of the country after independence and before the 1969 Constitution's enactment must have one parent and one grandparent or great-grandparent born in Ghana. The 1972 Amendment withdrew citizenship for those who did not qualify under the criteria of Act 361. For more information, see Manby (2015).

[88] The Aliens Acts of 1963 and 1965.

[89] The law even exempted foreign cocoa farm workers, but they still left their fields in droves—only hurting the economy more by undercutting the labor supply (Peil 1974; Mikell 1992; Boone 2014).

[90] The ripple effects of the ACO are still felt today. Discussions of citizenship issues are tempered by the long shadow cast by the ACO (Mohammed Interview-Accra-December 17, 2014).

therefore did not have a substantive impact on citizenship security or winner/loser competition. Furthermore, state-society relations that minimized ethnic divisions and protected basic rights kept citizenship insecurity in check. Most importantly, the customary land regime kept insider/outsider competition outside the national arena and prevented citizenship from becoming a nationally politicized issue. Therefore, critical factors in VOB onset remained absent. Finally, outsider fortunes changed soon enough. Starting in the 1980s, the pendulum swung the other way and outsiders saw citizenship security improve dramatically. Insiders did not lose out under the new citizenship rules, so winner/loser competition remained manageable and only localized VOB broke out.

In December 1981, Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings seized power in a coup.[91] In the midst of growing land shortages, falling commodity prices, net-positive emigration, and structural adjustment programs, migrants' fortunes changed. Rawlings and the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) "subordinated [ethnic claims] to the language of class interest" (Lentz and Nugent 2000, 22; Langer 2009).[92] The regime also encouraged registration and titling of land in an effort to support outsider property rights (Boone 2014). The new measures prompted periodic episodes of violence. In one instance, Sefwi chiefs in Western Region encouraged autochthons "to dispossess strangers" of land that had been purchased legally years earlier (Boone 2014; Boni 2005). However, the Asare

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[91] Rawlings was from the Ewe ethnic group, which had a history of secessionist tendencies. Some credit for Ghana's stability goes to the alternation of ethnic groups in power. Even groups that complained of discrimination have controlled the executive at one point in time (Frempong Interview-Accra-December 15, 2014; Frempong 2012).

[92] Nonetheless, Rawlings showed favoritism towards his Ewe ethnic group, specifically in terms of political appointments (Langer 2009; see also Boahen 1992).

Committee of 1987 tasked with investigating the clashes ultimately took the migrants' side, thus tipping the balance of power slightly in favor of outsiders (Boone and Duku 2012).

Rawlings faced growing pressure from the international community to introduce free market reforms and open the political system, as did almost all of his contemporaries. In response, he founded the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and went on to win multiparty elections in 1992 and 1996. In Côte d'Ivoire, political and economic liberalization occurred at the same time as deepening land scarcity, which severely restricted patronage flows. This "perfect storm" politicized the migration issue and when the state could not address surging grievances, violence broke out (Mitchell 2011). A similar pattern is evident in Kenya and the DRC where violence of belonging escalated to the level of minor and major conflict, respectively. However, Ghana may have been "able to 'weather the storm' of exogenous shocks" because it liberalized economically during the first Rawlings regime (1981 to 1992), before it liberalized politically (Mitchell 2011, 134). Staggering economic and political liberalization helps suppress xenophobic politicking. The government can manage the monumental transitions one at a time (Whitaker 2015) and the crisis does not rupture patronage networks. In Côte d'Ivoire, political and economic liberalization occurred at the same time as deepening land scarcity, which severely restricted patronage flows. This "perfect storm" politicized the migration issue and when the state could not address surging grievances, violence broke out (Mitchell 2011). A similar pattern is evident in Kenya and the DRC.

Citizenship insecurity remained low in Ghana for several reasons. First, Ghana deported many migrants rather than withdrawing their rights, but allowing them to stay in the country. By physically removing so many citizenship regime losers, the government

impeded collective action. The migrants' departure before the cocoa crisis meant that they could not be so easily scapegoated for the country's problems (Mitchell 2011). Therefore, contentious citizenship narratives did not gain much traction. Secondly, Ghana has experienced "stability in its instability" unlike Côte d'Ivoire which experienced "instability in its stability" (Frempong Interview-Accra-December 15, 2014). The military government in place during the cocoa crisis provided a degree of political certainty (Mitchell 2011), which improved citizenship security generally. Furthermore, Ghana's economy had diversified during the independence era and it was much less dependent on cocoa when the crisis hit (Mitchell 2011), yet another boon for citizenship security. The same cannot be said of Côte d'Ivoire.

Up to the present moment, Ghana's migrant communities have seen deterioration in land rights in rural areas, but this trend has not been accompanied by violence. For example, Wassa Amenfi (Eastern Region) became one of the first districts to pilot the Land Administration Project (LAP) in 2003. The LAP upholds the primacy of indigenous rights by confirming chiefs' land authority (Boone 2014; Alhassan and Manuh 2005). Migrants who acquired titles for land purchased 1950-1970s are effectively tenants under the new system (Boone and Duku 2012). Under the LAP, chiefs continue to force concessions from migrants, ranging from the renegotiation of titles to the repossession of land, and yet the policy has not engendered violent opposition (Boone 2014; Boone and Duku 2012; Boni 2005). Since land rights fall under chiefly authority, the axis of contention does not involve the state or the national political community. Therefore, national citizenship is not a politicized issue and VOB does not escalate.

It is also important to note that Ghana's institutions support a relatively inclusionary citizenship regime. Ghana's nationality laws are clear on citizenship criteria and courts can manage disputes effectively, which reduces citizenship insecurity. [93] For example, the government has made a conscious effort to legislate on citizenship issues and detail precisely who can be a citizen, how one may obtain or lose citizenship, etc. Improvements in the registration process and distribution of identity cards also helped reduce the use of citizenship as a political weapon. The opposite was true in Côte d'Ivoire, where a history of leaving open questions regarding citizenship criteria and discriminatory identification policies created confusion and exacerbated winner/loser tensions.

It is noteworthy that no political party has verbally (or physically) attacked foreigners since the 1990s (Côté and Mitchell 2016; Mohammed Interview 12/17/14).[94] Furthermore, rushing to defend the rights of migrants, the ruling NDC set a precedent for others to follow. In 2000, John Kufuor selected a running mate with foreign family ties, and it is believed that this move helped him win the election. Furthermore, Ghana's (effective) two-party system incentivizes politicians to try to win every single vote, meaning that politicians on all sides try to woo the *Zongo* community (Whitaker 2015; Kobo 2010; Mohammed Interview 12/17/2014).[95] Therefore, the status quo citizenship

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[93] Present-day nationality law in Ghana upholds *jus sanguinis* principles and discriminates against women with foreign spouses, but has relatively liberal provisions otherwise. It permits dual nationality and imposes low residency requirements (5 years) for naturalization. Further, there is no evidence of a probationary period before naturalized citizens can exercise their rights (Citizenship Act 591 of 2000; Dual Citizenship Regulation Act 91 of 2002).

[94] In 1996 the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) presidential candidate allegedly threatened in 1996 to deport migrants if elected.

[95] The term "Zongo" refers to migrant-dense communities in urban areas.

rules do not lead to widespread exclusion, and thus citizenship insecurity is not a threat to stability.

A second reason for Ghana's stability stems from the country's formal institutions. Strong institutions reduce elite leverage over citizenship questions, which is why the issue has not become politicized. Additionally, since respect for public institutions is rather high, elites and individuals try to work within the system rather than taking to the streets (Nana Interview 12/17/2014; Mohammed Interview 12/17/2014; Tsegah Interview 12/17/2014).[96] For instance, when NPP disputed the results of the 2012 elections, the party protested and brought their case before the Supreme Court. The judges ruled in favor of NDC candidate and incumbent president John Mahama. The NPP respected this decision rather than exiting the political process.

To be clear, ethnicity still matters in Ghanaian politics. After the NLC handed over power in 1969, the military split along ethnic lines into Ashanti/Akan and Ewe factions. The resulting tensions have repeatedly resurfaced since then. However, state strategies and policies that diminish the political salience of ethnicity also serve to reduce the salience of nationality questions (Mitchell 2011; Langer 2009; Frempong Interview-Accra-December 15, 2014). There is hope too that improvements in education will reduce the sway political entrepreneurs have over politicizing issues. Lack of education is a compounding factor in

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[96] During interviews, the role chiefs play in mediating disputes and facilitating cooperation came up in a positive light. Their moral authority is seen as a valuable dispute resolution tool. However, research by Crook, Asante, and Brobbey (2011) suggests that customary leaders are not as "congruent with popular values about fairness and just resolution of disputes" (65) as public institutions, such as state courts or the state-sponsored Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice.

violent mobilization by facilitating elite manipulation of latent resentment against foreigners among the population (Tsegah Interview-Accra-December 17, 2014).[97]

In summary, Ghana has evaded large-scale violence over citizenship questions even though nationality laws have undergone contraction.[98] I argue that Ghana's non-escalation can be attributed to factors that served to suppress the politics of belonging and violence onset more generally. First, the citizenship regime is relatively inclusive and strongly supported by formal and informal institutions that reduce winner/loser competition. Citizenship security is thus a weak political cleavage in society and ethnic mobilization is rare.

The Konkomba question

I separate the discussion of clashes in northern Ghana (1981, 1992, 1994-95) from the preceding discussion because they represent episodes of minor conflict. The central issue in these clashes is a question of political organization. Although the groups involved make competing claims to autochthony, this dispute is not the crux of the contention. Rather, it is Ghana's chieftaincy system, which privileges centralized societies by following the colonial policy of placing non-centralized (acephalous) societies under the jurisdiction of centralized neighbors (Talton 2010). Tensions between the historically acephalous

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[97] See Collier (2007) on the general relationship between low education levels and conflict.

[98] A notable exception is fighting between Konkomba migrants and indigenous Dagomba, Gonja, and Krachis in northern Ghana. Between February and March 1996, clashes killed 1,000 people and destroyed 144 villages (Fred-Mensah 1999).

Konkomba and the Dagomba, Nanumba, and Gonja ethnic groups escalated to minor conflict because the Konkomba challenged wanted a chieftaincy of their own.

Without a formal chieftaincy, the Konkomba remain marginalized politically even though they find great economic success in the commercial yam market. In 1978 General Acheampong established the Committee on Ownership of Land and Positions of Tenants in Northern and Upper Regions. The Alhassan Committee, as it was popularly known, was tasked with creating "a uniform system of land tenure for the entire nation, by determining the best process to transfer land control from the government to the region's 'original land owners' in the north" (Talton 2010, 146-7). Konkoma leaders petitioned the state to recognize their paramount chief. The official reason for denying their request was that the Dagomba allegedly conquered the Konkomba before the colonial period. However, the petition was reviewed by the very chief the Konkomba sought to replace.

The 1979 Constitution extended chiefly land authority to Northern and Upper Regions. In 1981 tensions between the Konkomba and Nanumba burst into four months of fighting that left over 1,000 people dead. In the lead-up to the confrontations, Konkomba leaders instructed their communities to stop paying tribute to non-Konkomba chiefs and to work within Konkomba traditions to resolve disputes. The central government intervened but never addressed the underlying inequalities of traditional politics, leaving grievances on both sides.

In 1991, political competition between the Nawuri and Gonja led to a conflict and the Konkomba were dragged into the fray. Again they petitioned for recognition of a Konkomba paramount chief and again their request was denied. The 1991-1992 attacks precipitated largescale violence during the 1994-1995 "Guinea Fowl War". Northern towns

of Tamale, Damango, Yendi, and Bimbilla were hit hardest and in the end as many as 3,000 people died.

The Konkomba case meets conditions for VOB escalation to minor conflict. As a historically non-centralized society, the Konkomba were citizenship insecure because they lacked land rights and, more generally, they were subordinated to non-Konkomba chiefs. As winner/loser competition heated up, it exacerbated ethnic tensions. Ethnic mobilization supported armed organization. VOB fell short of war each time, though, because national citizenship rules were not in dispute. Although *sub-national belonging* came under fire, no movement aimed to deny the Konkomba's nationality status. Therefore, events did not escalate to war.

Kenya

Present-day Kenya is divided into eight provinces: Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western, Central, Eastern, North Eastern, Nairobi, and Coast. None of Kenya's 42 ethnic groups can claim a demographic edge. The largest groups are the Kikuyu (18.3%), Luhya (14%), Kalenjin (12%), Luo (10.7%), and Kamba (10.2%).[99]

Three of Kenya's last five elections (1992, 1997, and 2007) have been violent.[100] During these campaigns, contentious citizenship narratives deployed logics of threat and opportunity that encouraged ethnic cleansing. Kenya meets the criteria for insider/outsider

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[99] The Luhya and the Kalenjin are colonial-era agglomerations of smaller groups. The label "Luhya" combines 16 groups (Bukusu, Dakho, Kabras, Khayo, Kisa, Marachi, Maragoli, Marama, Nyala, Nyole, Samia, Tachoni, Tiriki, Tsotso, and Wanga) and the label "Kalenjin" combines 11 groups (Kipsigis, Nandi, Pokot/Suk, Elgeyo, Marakwet, Keiyo, Tugen, Sabaot, Sebei, Dorobo, and Terik) (Human Rights Watch 1993, 5).
[100] Elections were peaceful in 2002 and 2013.

violence onset. The statist land tenure regime put insiders at a structural disadvantage vis-à-vis a growing population of outsiders and encouraged the clientelization of land. Then, patronage resources dried up with the transition to economic and political liberalization. Why did cycles of violence in Kenya fall short of war? I argue that nationality laws were not at stake because outsiders did not have contested foreign origins, which reduced the chances of civil war onset.

The Rift Valley Province (RVP) is the epi-center of insider/outsider violence in Kenya. This area has the most fertile farmland and is traditionally home to pastoralist groups (Kalenjin, Maasai, Samburu, and Turkana). The outsider group in RVP is predominately composed of Kenyan in-migrants (Kikuyu and Luo). Therefore, elites pushing a nativist agenda could not make a compelling case for denationalizing outsiders, which served to constrain VOB to the level of minor conflict.

In Kenya, contentious insider narratives suggested that the nationalist orientation of the status quo rules undermined the land rights of autochthons (decreased citizenship security). They argued that the rules should instead reflect sub-national (ethnic) rules of belonging (increased citizenship security). Outsiders favored the nationalist status quo, which allowed any citizen to own land in any region of Kenya (increased citizenship security). Outsiders argued that if sub-national membership took precedence, their claims to land would be subordinated to the claims of autochthons (decreased citizenship security).

Figure 10: Map of Kenya [101]

Roots in the Rift

In 1895, Kenya became part of the British East Africa Protectorate and all land came under the Crown's jurisdiction. Three million hectares of the central Rift Valley were designated part of the Scheduled Areas, which became known as the White Highlands because Europeans had exclusive rights to this land. In 1915, Kenya's forty-plus ethnic groups were forced onto Native Reserves, designated Tribal Trust Land. [102] Unlike the Scheduled Areas, Trust Land was governed by customary law, meaning that indigeneity

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[101] Map courtesy of the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection at the University of Texas at Austin. Available at: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/kenya_pol88.jpg. Accessed August 26, 2016.

[102] This law also abolished Africans' right to own land.

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became the principle way to claim land rights there. To create the Scheduled Areas, colonial administrators expropriated land from indigenous groups in RVP (Maasai and Kalenjin) and in Central Province (Kikuyu), leading to massive internal displacement that exaggerated the effects of land scarcity across all ethnic groups. As in Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC, colonial administrators also resettled thousands of people to support commercial farming. The in-migrants farmed small plots in the White Highlands as "squatters".[103] The resulting economic pressures, combined with an emergent African intellectual class demanding broader political and economic rights, culminated in the Mau Mau rebellion from 1952 to 1957 (Keller 2014).

Mau Mau fighters were primarily disenfranchised Kikuyu.[104] They sought to "break the white monopoly on best farmland, political and economic rights in the native reserves" (Boone 2014, 140-141). The colonial government came down with a heavy hand. More than 12,000 rebels and over 2,000 loyalists died in the fighting, compared to only 32 Europeans.[105] As a result of Mau Mau, Europeans reconsidered African demands for independence. They also realized that some land would need to be transferred to Africans. In 1961 a new law allowed Africans to buy and farm land in the Scheduled Areas (Keller 2014; Human Rights Watch 1993).

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[103] By the 1930s, about 150,000 Kikuyu resided in RVP (Boone 2014; Gisemba 2008). In 1939, the administration resettled an additional 4,000 Kikuyu (Keller 2014).

[104] Branch (2009) notes that Mau Mau represents a schism in the Kikuyu group where disenfranchised Kikuyu joined the rebellion while Kikuyu elite followed Kenyatta in institutionalized contestation of the colonial state.

[105] Some estimates are as high as 50,000 Africans killed (Boone 2014, 141)

Negotiations for the transition to independence took place during the Lancaster House Conference (1960-1963). Land rights in RVP were a particularly tense issue. Debates between indigenous and settler communities arose over competing claims to land there (Boone 2014; Human Rights Watch 1993). The Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU), led by Masinde Muliro, Daniel arap Moi, and Ronald Ngala, supported a regionalist federalism called *majimboism* which would protect the interests of minority ethnic groups by privileging ancestral rights in local communities. The Kenyan African National Union (KANU), on the other hand, led by Jomo Kenyatta, Oginga Odinga, and Tom Mboya, supported a constitution that preserved the state's control over land, and opened the land market to all Kenyans.[106] *Harambee*, Kenyatta's motto of "let's all pull together", came to represent a nationalist vision of Kenya's citizenship rules, whereas *majimboism* represented an ideology of regionalism. *Harambee* and *majimboism* represent competing narratives about Kenya's citizenship rules.

KANU defeated KADU and the African People's Party (APP) in the pre-independence elections of 1961. Almost immediately upon entering office in 1963, Kenyatta centralized power in the executive. Importantly, he abolished regional powers, a provision agreed to during the Lancaster Conference to appease KADU concerns about ancestral land rights. In exchange for their cooperation, KANU included KADU in a power-sharing agreement. With the dissolution of KADU and APP, Kenya became a de

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[106] An ethnic cleavage is apparent in the KANU-KADU divide: KANU drew support from RVP settlers (e.g. Kikuyu and Luo), and KADU from RVP indigenes (e.g. Maasai and Kalenjin). However, Catherine Boone (2014) argues that the cleavage is more appropriately characterized as between land-rights winners (settlers) versus losers (autochthons).

facto one-party state (Leys 1975; Klopp 2002). By 1964 *majimboism* was subordinated to *harambee*.

As in Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC, colonialism in Kenya laid the foundation for violent land disputes through policies of forced migration, land appropriation, and fabricated ethnography. Resettlement schemes in Kenya were primarily oriented towards in-migration, which was not the case in Côte d'Ivoire and the Congo. These schemes reallocated ancestral land of RVP indigenes to settlers from other parts of the country. Citizenship debates over regionalism pitted losing autochthons against winning settlers. These disputes escalated to minor conflict during the 1990s and in the 2007/2008 election crisis. However, due to the outsider group's ethnic make-up, these disputes did not reach the level of civil war. The Kikuyu did not have contested foreign origins, and there were no efforts to denationalize them.

"Nyayo": In the footsteps

The 1960s and 1970s saw a land rush in the Rift Valley. Between 1960 and 1966, the government bought up parcels in the former White Highlands, mostly from exiting European settlers. The government transferred much of this land to African farmers through settlement schemes, such as the Million Acre Scheme, and state-backed land-buying companies (Leys 1975). Kikuyu already in RVP purchased the land they worked on, and many more people escaped overcrowding in Central Province by migrating West (Keller 2014; Human Rights Watch 1993).[107]

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[107] In 1962, 43.5% of the RVP population were in-migrants and their numbers grew through the 1970s. From 1968 to 1979, the number of settlers in RVP increased six-fold from 5,350 to 34,253

To a large extent, minority elites controlled local land allocation during Kenyatta's rule (Leys 1975). As in-migration continued, though, winner/loser competition grew. The losing Kalenjin loathed the settlement schemes, which forced them to buy back their ancestral homeland—and sometimes they were outbid by outsiders. Rumors that Kikuyu went unpunished for defaulting on loans (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Anderson and Lochery 2008; Lynch 2008) and accusations of corruption (Anderson and Lochery 2008; Harbeson 1973) only deepened Kalenjin resentment of Kikuyu winners.[108]

In 1978, Jomo Kenyatta died while in office. His successor, Daniel arap Moi, continued and expanded the "Imperial Presidency". A 1982 constitutional amendment turned Kenya into a *de jure* one-party state, with KANU at the helm. The integrity of political institutions deteriorated precipitously during this period and Moi bolstered his absolutist rule with heavy repression (Onoma 2010). Under Moi, political violence became normalized and diffused (Mueller 2008; Kagwanja 2009). In addition, mounting pressures from economic crisis, declining aid flows, international scrutiny on human rights abuses, international pressure to liberalize, and structural adjustment programs hampered Moi's ability to dole out patronage. He turned to land as an alternative (Klopp 2000; Boone 2011, 2014; Southall 2005; Republic of Kenya 2004 [Ndung'u Report]).

According to the Ndung'u Commission's 2004 report, grand corruption through illegal land sales reached the level of kleptocracy under Moi. Insecure property rights

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people. In comparison, the number of settlers in the Central Province only increased 60% during the same period (Boone 2014, 146).

[108] Vast tracks of land went to Kenyatta himself and Kikuyu elites. As in Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC, the regime turned farmers into economically dependent clients of the government.

overlapped with competing land claims to create a highly volatile political situation that heightened levels of citizenship insecurity for insiders *and* outsiders For example, it was common for the government to issue multiple titles for same piece of land. Some titles were issued for property that did not even exist.[109] In addition, land registration and titling accelerated in rural areas, indicating the "growing exclusivity of land rights" (Boone 2014, 155). Land titles were not granted if an individual failed to repay their loan or was a member of a cooperative society—and membership in co-ops was "nearly universal" (Harbeson 1973; Boone 2011, 2014; Bates 1981).

Kalenjin landlessness became "acute" in the 1970s and 1980s (Bøås and Dunn 2013, 60). Unlike Kenyatta, Moi had to appropriate land from other groups to distribute it to his Kalenjin constituents, displacing Kikuyu squatters in RVP. With the presidency firmly in control of land allocation, the locus of blame for land alienation also shifted to the center and to Daniel arap Moi in particular (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Boone 2014). Winner/loser competition intensified over land disputes as losing Kalenjin felt increasingly marginalized. Sporadic violence erupted in 1980s, but the Moi regime managed to contain these episodes (Boone 2014, 263).

1986 marked a year of liberalization in nationality laws. First, the 21st amendment to the Constitution repealed Section 89 dictating *jus sanguinis* citizenship principles. Act 15 of 1986 introduced limited *jus soli* provisions instead. Individuals born in Kenya to foreign parents could now claim citizenship if at least one of their parents was also born in

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[109] Between 1962 and 2002, nearly 2,000 land titles were issued illegally (with a significant jump after 1986). The government also routinely sold land below market value to individuals and companies who then sold it far above fair market value (Southall 2005).

Kenya. Secondly, women's rights improved. Under the 1963 Constitution, women applying for naturalization needed parental or spousal consent. This provision was removed in 1986, but other discriminatory provisions remained. Kenyan women could not pass citizenship to their children born abroad or to their foreign spouses, but Kenyan men had these rights. In this year, Kenya also liberalized naturalization procedures. The government did away with the stipulation that naturalized citizens must be of African origin and reduced the residency requirements from ten to eight years continuous residence in the country.[110]

In summary, I find that Kenyatta resembled his contemporaries in Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC in important ways. He privileged national identity by not recognizing the land rights of KAMATUSA communities, the self-proclaimed indigenes of RVP. The resulting grievances created tension between citizenship regime winners and losers. During Moi's tenure, the balance of power shifted to his KAMATUSA base, thus elevating the status of sub-national membership. However, extensive land grabbing in the presence of combined economic and political liberalization exacerbated winner/loser competition. Still, nationality laws in Kenya have made steady progression towards inclusion. Despite liberal reforms made in 1986 and 2010, debates over who belonged where exploded in the multi-party era under the weight of rising citizenship insecurity. However, they did not reach the level of war because outsiders did not have contested foreign origins.

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[110] The law still permitted citizens of certain African countries, such as former Commonwealth countries, to acquire citizenship through registration.

Multi-party era

In 1992, the opposition Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), led by Kenneth Matiba (a Kikuyu) and Oginga Odinga (a Luo), contested the first-multi-party elections of the independence era. Their calls for reform were amplified by international donors, who threatened to withdraw aid if Kenya did not improve human rights and curb corruption. In spite of these pressures, Moi used the full force of the state to stay in power. He revised electoral laws and redrew electoral districts to dilute the strength of the opposition.[111] He banned opposition parties from campaigning where ethnic clashes had broken out. He also resorted to political intimidation and violence.

It is well documented that KANU encouraged ethnic violence through inflammatory rhetoric that revived chauvinist messages of *majimboism*. Government officials at every level were involved in planning and orchestrating ethnic violence from 1991 to 1998 (Human Rights Watch 1993; Republic of Kenya 1999 [Akiwumi Report]).[112] This pattern of behavior continued through the notorious 2007 election, at which point "violence and political intimidation became a regular feature of elections and relations between the ruling party and opposition parties" (Keller 2014, 118; see also Mueller 2008; CIPEV 2008; Anderson and Lochery 2008).

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[111] Under the new laws, a candidate had to win 25% of the vote in 5 of 8 provinces plus a plurality of total votes. If these margins were not met, a run-off would be held between the top two candidates (Keller 2014).

[112] KANU went so far as to fund and transport so-called Kalenjin "warriors" responsible for widespread and systematic ethnic cleansing in the Rift Valley (Human Rights Watch 1993; Republic of Kenya 1999 [Akiwumi Report]). Moi neither endorsed nor condemned his patronage bosses, allowing him to appear to be above the fray (Klopp 2002).

Violence during the 1991-1997 period targeted rural farmers in RVP that had received parcels of land through Kenyatta-era programs and triggered retaliatory attacks by non-Kalenjin.[113] Moi was attempting to transform RVP into a "KANU zone" by eliminating opposition supporters (Anderson and Lochery 2008; Human Rights Watch 1993, 2008). The result was heightened citizenship insecurity that fueled contentious insider/outsider narratives and mobilized ethnic coalitions according to the logics of threat and opportunity. For instance, Kalenjin politicians promised their followers land redistribution and called for non-KAMATUSA groups to leave the Rift Valley. Such policies would increase Kalenjin citizenship security and decrease Kikuyu citizenship security. Furthermore, there were explicit calls to "destroy" members of the opposing party who posed a threat to autochthonous groups (Klopp 2002; Human Rights Watch 1993; Republic of Kenya 1999 [Akiwumi Report]).[114] Meanwhile, Kikuyu and other "settler" politicians emphasized that all Kenyans had the right to live and work anywhere they wanted. Kikuyu citizenship rights were threatened by KANU efforts to prevent them from registering to vote or casting their ballot (Klopp 2001).

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[113] Estimates for the period 1991 to 1997, which covers 2 elections (in 1992 and 1997), put the death toll around 1,500, plus 300,000 persons displaced (Boone 2014; Human Rights Watch 1993; Klopp 2002; Republic of Kenya 1999 [Akiwumi Report]; Throup and Hornsby 1998).

[114] In April 1993, William ole Ntimama, an MP and Maasai Minister for Local Government, supported by Vice-President George Saitoti (also Maasai), deployed the logic of threat when he told an audience that the opposition "was arming itself as a plot to eliminate indigenous residents of the Rift Valley" (Human Rights Watch 1993, 20-21). He warned KAMATUSA members "to be on their guard and to spread the message so that they could defend themselves" (Human Rights Watch 1993, 20-21).

In 2002, the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) peacefully ousted Moi and KANU. The new government, headed by President Mwai Kibaki, rejected *majimboism* outright. It affirmed the primacy of national identity, proclaiming that "Kenya belongs to all Kenyans" (*The Nation,* "Kenyans are 'Free to Live Anywhere'," 1 April 2005 as quoted in Boone 2014, 268). The Kibaki regime avoided taking a firm stance on insider/outsider tensions in RVP, choosing to focus instead of fulfilling specific campaign promises. In the end, Kibaki's regime consolidated executive power along ethnic lines much like his predecessors had (Jenkins 2015; International Crisis Group 2008; Human Rights Watch 2008).

Raila Odinga formed the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) to contest the 2007 national election. ODM presented itself as the harbinger of democratic reform in Kenya. Returning to a *majimbo* platform, the party called for enhanced regional autonomy, land redistribution, and a return of ancestral land to indigenous groups (Anderson and Lochery 2008; Bøås and Dunn 2013; Keller 2014; Klopp 2000, 2001). ODM politicians led supporters to believe that Odinga supported *majimboism* (now called "Devolution") and land redistribution. Some even hinted that Odinga would support expelling settlers. ODM narratives framed national citizenship rules as a threat to autochthons rights (decreased citizenship security) and sub-national citizenship rules as an opportunity to reclaim land and political power (increased citizenship security).

People believed that with 41 tribes allied behind ODM, Odinga should win any free and fair election (Jenkins 2015). When the National Elections Commission declared Kibaki the winner by a slim three percent margin (47% to 44%), Odinga and other opposition

leaders claimed fraud and protested the results.[115] On December 30, 2007, in the middle of a recount, Kibaki took the presidential oath. Violent protests erupted across Kenya. Within two days, Kenya was "on the brink of civil war" (International Crisis Group 2008, 9).

The scale of the 2007 violence was unprecedented. Over 1,000 people were killed and hundreds of thousands were displaced.[116] The violence began as ethnically-driven, spontaneous attacks by gangs, armed groups attached to politicians, and ordinary Kenyans. It quickly turned into communal clashes directed by elites.[117] *Majimbo*-inspired violence hit urban and rural areas, with the most intense fighting in the Rift Valley—especially the capital, Nakuru. Lynch (2008) quotes one participant as saying that the violence was not so much about the disappointing election outcome, but about the opportunity to "right" historical grievances of the Kalenjin people.

As they had in the 1990s, politicians drew upon unresolved land grievances and competing land claims to stoke ethnic hatreds. Insiders and outsiders challenged each other's right to land. Citizenship rules were presented to both sides as an opportunity to remedy the imbalance in the distribution in land and power. Autochthons wanted to see revisions that would privilege indigeneity, while outsiders wanted to maintain (if not

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[115] According to the International Crisis Group (2008) all election observers agreed that the election was rigged. Results were inflated at the constituency and the national level.

[116] Human Rights Watch (2011) estimates that 1,300 were killed more than 650,000 displaced. The Waki Report (CIPEV 2008) estimates up to 700,000 displaced.

[117] The Kalenjin warriors and the Sabaot Land Defence Force returned, forming an alliance to expel settlers from KAMATUSA territory. The infamous Mungiki sect diversified their criminal activities to include targeting non-Kikuyus in and outside RVP. The police and security services played a role too, using excessive force against unarmed civilians and against peaceful protesters (International Crisis Group 2008; CIPEV 2008; Human Rights Watch 2008).

strengthen) the nationalist status quo. Narratives about historic grievances and marginalization justified violence on both sides.

Hate speech resurfaced on the campaign trail (Jenkins 2015; Anderson and Lochery 2008), and rumors played into the logics of threat by suggesting that settlers wanted to exterminate indigenes. Kalenjin evicted Kikuyu not only to defend their property rights, but also to pre-empt their own potential displacement. They shrouded their motives in the rhetoric of "cleansing" and "liberating" RVP. For their part, Kikuyu leaders spread the message that their community would be in danger under a Luo president (Klaus and Mitchell 2015; Boone 2012; Keller 2014; International Crisis Group 2008). The Mungiki gang is the Kikuyu version of the Kalenjin Warriors. Framing their actions in the context of the Mau Mau legacy, Mungiki members spun a narrative of victimization and revenge.[118] They claimed to defend poor, land-hungry Kikuyu and promised to remedy past wrongs done to the community (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Anderson and Lochery 2008; Rasmussen 2010).

In summary, the cycles of violence in Kenya are driven by a complex interplay of factors. Zero-sum neo-patrimonial politics and deliberately weak institutions support ethnic clientelist parties who will go to extreme lengths to maintain their hold on state power. Land scarcity, extensive migration, a lack of checks and balances, a personalized and centralized presidency, and a history of extra-state violence and elite impunity has only encouraged the downward spiral. Elections, fraud, and ethnic brokers trigger and facilitate

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[118] The connection to Mau Mau also carries the symbolic weight of a liberation movement that fought against colonial oppression (Anderson and Lochery 2008).

Kenya's election violence. However, the root causes of Kenya's insider/outsider violence lie in grievances over land, migration, and citizenship rights. Citizenship rules were presented to both sides as an opportunity to increase citizenship security by determining the distribution of land and power. Narratives about historic grievances and marginalization justified violence on both sides by describing ongoing threats to citizenship security. However, nationality laws never in question. As much as they may have tried to undermine outsider citizenship rights, insiders did not lobby for denationalization.

My argument is that competition between citizenship regime winners and losers in Kenya contributed to a pervasive fear of "marginalization and exclusion under the rule of another community" (Jenkins 2015, 225). Fueled by long-simmering insider/outsider animosity, contention over the jurisdiction of national and sub-national citizenship rules deepened. Contentious narratives developed, mobilizing ethnic coalitions according to the logic of threat ("our citizenship rights are under attack") and opportunity ("we must ensure the supremacy of national/sub-national citizenship rules"). I argue that Kenya's citizenship struggles have not degenerated into war because even hardliners cannot make the case to denationalize outsiders, who are Kenyan in-migrants.

Non-escalation in Kenya

To be clear, political exclusion of outsider groups with contested foreign origins does not always lead to widespread violence. Asian-, Somali-, and Nubian-Kenyans have largely escaped the conflict that characterizes the Kikuyu-KAMATUSA relationship. As is the case of non-escalation in Ghana, additional criteria for VOB onset are not met in these cases. Although the outsider group has contested foreign origins, they are not a politically salient group. Moreover, exclusion from state patrimonial networks limits

largescale mobilization. Therefore, the intermittent episodes of violence involving these groups (namely the Nubians and Somalis) has not escalated beyond the local level. [119] I now turn to the case of Nubian-Kenyans as an illustration.

Like the Dioula and the Banyarwanda, contemporary Nubians have contested foreign origins. In the 19th century various ethnic groups from across Sudan and Southern Egypt (formerly part of ancient Nubian Kingdoms) were recruited into British slave armies (Johnson 1988, 1989). In 1912 they were forcibly settled in Kibera, which became one of the densest slums in Nairobi. While the Nubians believed they were given parcels to own, the Crown considered them tenants (Balaton-Chrimes 2015). As in Côte d'Ivoire, competing understanding of land tenure laid the foundation for later tensions between settler Nubians and "indigenous" groups, such as the Luo. [120]

Nubians maintained a "fragile superiority" during colonialism, but they were marginalized after independence (Balaton-Chrimes 2015, 37). They were not granted full citizenship rights at independence because they are not indigenous to Kenya. Further, they traditionally occupy the position of "landlord", but have not been able to penetrate Kenya's patrimonial networks. Consequently, they rarely have access to development funds or state services and struggle to get identity cards. In 2009, "Kenyan" became an official

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[119] An exception to this pattern: Ethnic Somalis waged the Shifta War, a bid for secession, shortly after independence (1963 to 1967). This exception can be explained by the fact that their territory was historically part of greater Somalia and the population identified more strongly with other Somali clans than the Kenyan nation (Whitaker 2014).

[120] The British classified Nubians as "Detribalised Natives", referring to the fact that they were displaced from their ancestral "homeland".

designation on the census, which ameliorated their situation slightly (Balaton-Chrimes 2015; Manby 2015).

Nubians have largely escaped the conflict plaguing Kenya's multi-party era. A small ethnic minority concentrated in an area of Nairobi, they are considered "inconsequential" to the larger ethnic politics driving the country (Balaton-Chrimes 2015, 56).[121] Consequently, Nubians have been involved in localized skirmishes in Kibera, but nothing amounting to minor conflict.[122] Secondly, they are disconnected from the state's patronage networks, which limits the politicization of their status as well as their ability to mobilize to defend their interests. In short, we would not expect to see VOB move from the local to national level because criteria for escalation conflict onset are not met.

Conclusion

VOB in Ghana remained localized because the criteria for conflict onset were not met. Migration is not deeply politicized, and although many migrants are from neighboring countries, they represent a much smaller proportion of the total population, as compared to Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, and Kenya. Furthermore, traditional authorities hold a firm grip on land allocation and dispute resolution, and public policy has subordinated ethnic cleavages in Ghana. Lastly, without the politicization and clientelization of land relations,

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[121] In 1963, approximately three out of nine thousand Kiberans were Nubians. In the 1970s, an influx of mostly Kikuyu migrants swelled the population to 60-65,000 by 1980. Today, they number 10,000 in a total Kibera population of 350,000 (Balaton-Chrimes 2015).

[122] Their fraught tenant-landlord relationship with the Luo occasionally boils over. In 1995 four days of Nubian-Luo clashes left seven people dead. In 2001, 15 people died and 30,000 were displaced by Luo-Nubian fighting (Balaton-Chrimes 2015; Osborn 2012).These attacks have reified the ethnic nature of the tenant-landlord relationship in Kibera (Katumanga 2005).

migration has not become a national level issue in Ghana. VOB reached minor conflict levels in Kenya, but fell short of war. From 1963 to 1990, Kenya's institutions enforced the rule of law reasonably well. After 1991, though, a steady weakening of institutions subverted the rule of law and contributed to a political culture characterized by corruption, impunity, and violence (Onoma 2010). Widespread citizenship insecurity among Kenyans, combined with land grievances, fueled insider/outsider conflict that escalated to the national stage. Politicians could not make a compelling case for denationalizing the outsider group, though, because it was primarily composed of in-migrants. Lastly, in both of these cases we see that VOB does not necessarily lead to more exclusionary nationality policy. Ghana and Kenya experienced progressive liberalization of nationality law, which helped to dampen winner/loser competition, limit the politicization and citizenship, and curb the severity of VOB.

Chapter 7. Citizenship Security and Involvement in Violence: Evidence from 29 national surveys

The micro-foundations of citizenship struggles episodes are not well understood, yet a nationality law lens helps explain conflict processes at the individual level. I theorize that exclusionary nationality laws support mobilization by making individuals feel *citizenship insecure*, meaning they cannot exercise their rights freely or fully. They therefore have incentive to change the status quo, even at great personal cost. Further, I argue that when a large portion of the population feels citizenship insecure, political entrepreneurs face an easier recruitment environment. They can mobilize individuals using contentious citizenship narratives, which depict the prevailing citizenship regime as a threat to group resources. They suggest an overhaul could guarantee the group's resources into the future.

My driving question in this chapter asks how citizenship security affects an individual's role in collective violence—either as victims or as perpetrators. I test Hypotheses 3 and 4:

> *H3a: Citizenship insecurity increases the likelihood that an individual will fear becoming a victim of political violence.*

> *H3b: Citizenship insecurity increases the likelihood that an individual will use political violence.*

> *H4a: Contentious narratives increase the likelihood that an individual will fear becoming a victim of political violence.*

H4b: Contentious narratives increase the likelihood that an individual will use political violence.

Although individual level determinants of participation have received increasing attention in recent conflict studies (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008), the politics of belonging literature has been slow to leverage cross-national or survey data. Consequently, theories propose individual level factors, such as grievances or access to nationality identity documents, but it is difficult to evaluate the independent and joint effect of these factors. Furthermore, much of the literature assumes that political attitudes matter, yet competing predictions cannot be fully resolved without cross-national analysis. For example, marginalization is considered a root cause of VOB, but the effects of grievance are still debated in the wider conflict literature. No previous study has empirically tested the relative weight of individual level determinants on VOB. Finally, the question of who *participates* in violence is a relatively new topic in the conflict literature, and the question of who *fears* violence is even less well understood. In tackling both of these questions, I contribute to ongoing discussions about the micro-foundations of political violence with this chapter.

My data comes from Round 5 of the Afrobarometer, a survey of political attitudes in 34 Sub-Saharan African countries between 2011 and 2013. I operationalize citizenship security as the ability to access national identity documentation. As proof of one's citizenship status, these documents are fundamental to the exercise of citizenship rights (Manby 2009).This measure allows for citizenship security due to weak or discriminatory civil registration systems or a host of other institutional factors. Importantly, an individual can be citizenship insecure even if they are entitled to citizenship.

Measuring contentious citizenship narratives using Afrobarometer data proves more difficult because the questionnaires do not directly address this issue. However, it is possible to identify individuals most likely to be susceptible to these messages. Winner/loser competition leads to debates over the place of outsiders in the national political community. There may be calls to make the exercise of certain rights more difficult, to narrow citizenship criteria, or even to denationalize a particular group. In my analysis, individuals who support restrictive citizenship criteria proxy for insider group attitudes. Those facing effective denationalization proxy for outsider group attitudes. The measures of citizenship security and contentious narratives are not statistically correlated with each other.

Previous chapters have applied the nationality law lens at an aggregated level of analysis, either looking at group level behavior or country-year indicators. This chapter shows how that lens contributes to a better understanding of conflict processes at the individual level as well. Namely, I explain the cross-national variation in the fear of victimization and use of political violence in Africa as a function of citizenship politics. I find that insecure access to national identity documents and susceptibility to contentious narratives affect outcomes above and beyond ethnic discrimination, a standard predictor of violence in the literature. On average, insecure individuals are more likely to fear and use political violence than the citizenship secure. Interestingly, individuals who are insecure and discriminated against are not necessarily more likely to fear victimization than secure individuals treated fairly by the government. However, the insecure and discriminated-against are twice as likely to use violence as their more secure and fairly treated counterparts. In addition, susceptibility to contentious narratives makes individuals more

likely to use violence. Surprisingly, these individuals are not more likely to fear victimization, though.

To date, it has been unclear how to evaluate the relative influence of key factors in VOB. Existing work tends to focus more on the *origins* of various factors and the *processes* by which they influence outcomes. This chapter is the first to compare the effects of ethnic discrimination, access to national identity documentation, and contentious narratives on violence outcomes. My findings suggest often-downplayed factors, such as civil registration procedures, the letter of the law, and outsider-oriented narratives, merit renewed attention by conflict scholars.

My cross-national approach complements existing scholarship while still revealing new information. I find that even beyond the well-worn cases of electoral violence, citizenship insecurity and contentious narratives impact an individual's experience of violence. As such, the results help clarify the foundations of citizenship politics by demonstrating the generalizability of assumptions that have guided the field to date. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: I describe the research design, findings, and contributions of my analysis. I then suggest paths for future research.

Research Design

Afrobarometer participants are selected using a multi-stage stratified clustered area-probability sampling procedure. All participants are citizens of their respective countries so the sample does not include formally excluded individuals. However, the logical extension of the analysis is that these individuals feel the effects of citizenship insecurity and contentious narratives more strongly than anyone else.

Round 5's nationally representative sample contains between 1,200 and 2,400 respondents per country. I analyze 45,589 observations from 29 Sub-Saharan Africa countries, [123] using survey questions as dependent and independent variables. Afrobarometer questions are cited as "AQ" followed by the question number, as in AQ-26E. For a list of the original questions and full answer choices, see Table 20 in the appendix. Full descriptive statistics are available in Table 21 in the appendix.

Dependent variables: Patterns in violence

Violence can be measured in two distinct ways: how individuals *use* it and who becomes a *victim*. The first dependent variable, *Fear*, indicates whether an individual fears being a target of violence during the next election. To produce a conservative estimate, *Fear* takes a value of "1" if the respondent answers "A Lot" to AQ-54, and "0" otherwise: [124]

> **AQ-54:** During election campaigns in this country, how much do you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence?

Fearing victimization is a good approximation of an individual's perceived vulnerability. Since the questionnaire only asks about fear of electoral violence, it is impossible to observe fear about other events, such as land grabs or riots. Nonetheless, looking at the context of electoral violence is illuminating because elections render the

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[123] I drop Cape Verde so that only countries with populations greater than 1 million are included.
[124] Other possible responses were: Somewhat; A little bit; Not at all; Don't know; Refused to answer; or a missing value.

question of who can vote extremely salient, thereby intensifying the scrutiny of nationality laws and enflaming debates over citizenship criteria. Events in Zimbabwe, Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, and Kenya demonstrate this trend.

A potential criticism of *Fear* is that people have higher levels of fear in countries where elections are routinely violent. To account for this possibility, I use fixed-effects regression to hold constant a country's propensity for election violence. It bears keeping in mind that citizenship insecurity is one of many sources of vulnerability. That said, individuals living in a dangerous place likely feel even more vulnerable if they are also citizenship insecure.

Over 8,100 people, almost 18% of all respondents, said they fear victimization during the next elections. Figure 11 shows that *Fear* varies by country. Guineans and Zimbabweans have the highest levels of fear, at 44.6% and 45% of respondents, respectively.

Figure 11: Proportion of respondents who fear becoming victims of violence

Based on AQ-26E, the second dependent variable, *Use*, takes a value of "1" if the respondent acknowledges that they engaged in any kind of political violence during the past year, and "0" otherwise:[125]

> **AQ-26E:** Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Used force or violence for a political cause.

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[125] Other possible responses were: No, would never do this; No, but would do if had the chance; Don't know; Refused to answer; or a missing value.

A potential criticism of *Use* might be that social desirability bias limits the number of individuals willing to admit they have committed violent acts. This selection bias would lead to conservative estimates. If I find statistical significance despite the downward bias, then I am increasingly confident that the relationship holds.

About 1,400 respondents, or 3% of the total, acknowledge that they used force or violence for a political cause in the last year. Almost 7% of respondents said they did not use violence in the last year but would have if given the chance. Figure 12 shows that the propensity is low overall and varies by country. Uganda's 9.46% positive response rate is staggering.

Figure 12: Proportion of respondents who recently used political violence

What is interesting about the patterns of *Fear* and *Use* is that the results do not clearly map on to the severity of violence in the country. Figure 13 shows that there is only

weak correlation between *Fear* and *Use* and the number of total fatal violence events between 1990 and 2014, as reported by the Social Conflict in Africa Database. I hypothesize that citizenship security, contentious narratives, and ethnic discrimination are explanatory factors, albeit with varying degrees of impact. In the next section I describe how to operationalize these concepts for a multivariate statistical analysis.

All Violence

Electoral Violence

Figure 13: Fatal violence event count, by country

Independent variables: Insecurity and Narratives

National identity documents underlie citizenship security because they prove one's citizenship status. Lacking this documentation poses serious problems to the exercise of many citizenship rights. To operationalize citizenship security for Hypotheses 3, I use the variable *Document Access* based on AQ-67:

> **AQ-67:** Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to obtain the following services from government? Or do you never try and get these services from government: An identity document, such as a birth certificate, driver's license, passport or voter's card?

Individuals who found documents difficult to obtain are classified as citizenship insecure (*Document Access*=2), those who easily obtained documents are considered citizenship secure (*Document Access*=1). Otherwise, *Document Access* takes the value "0".[126] This coding procedure allows direct comparison between citizenship secure and insecure individuals. I hypothesize that citizenship insecurity increases the likelihood that an individual fears victimization in the near future (H3a) and has used political violence in the recent past (H3b).

A potential concern about using *Document Access* as a measure of citizenship security is that individuals may operate in informal spaces where documentation is not needed to get by, or live in areas with weak civil administration systems where a complete set of documents is a luxury. However, access to identity documentation indicates the

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[126] Other possible responses are: Never try; Don't know; Refused to answer; or a missing value.

relationship between the individual and the state, so the lack of documentation represents exclusion from political, economic, and social spheres. Specifically, without a national identity card, individuals can be denied government services and even basic human rights. In fact, Bronwen Manby argues that lacking documentation "can have consequences as permanent and damaging as…denationalization" (2009: 115).

Another concern is that *Document Access* does not go far enough to measure restrictions on citizenship rights because it does not specify who eventually received identity documents and who did not. Even if an individual is ultimately successful at obtaining their documents, costly or lengthy processes still constitute marginalization, which can be exploited by political entrepreneurs to prompt collective action. I would expect the question of whether an individual ultimately acquired documents to matter more for predicting the timing of events—specifically in terms of *when* an individual expects to become a victim or *when* they are ready to use violence.

Over half of all respondents are citizenship insecure: 14,031 people found identity documents difficult and 9,216 found them very difficult to obtain. A total of 13,956 respondents found documents easy and 4,874 found them very easy to obtain. Kenya has the highest rate of citizenship insecurity at 78.5% of the population, and Mauritius has the lowest rate of insecurity at 16.4%.[127] Figure 14 shows how these levels vary across country.

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[127] Generally, Kenya's ACPI scores are higher than those of Mauritius, indicating more exclusionary policies. Kenya scored 2.04 until 2000, then dropped to 1.82 in 2001. It has held this its present score of 1.51 since 2010. In contrast, Mauritius scored 2.18 until 1992, when the score dropped to 1.35 for 1993 to 2005. Mauritius' score has been 1.82 since 2006.

Figure 14: National identity document access by country

There are few studies on why document access varies across the continent. Formal and informal barriers limit document access: discriminatory institutions and regimes, weak civil registration systems or costly procedures, and corrupt or inefficient bureaucracies (Manby 2009; UNICEF 2013). One likely culprit for *Document Access* variation is low birth registration rates in Africa. UNICEF (2013) reports that the births of over 85 million children under the age of five in Sub-Saharan Africa have not been registered. In some countries, birth registration rates are lower than one in five children. The political effects of low birth registration rates is not a well-studied topic.

The Afrobarometer does not directly ask about attitudes towards contentious narratives. Therefore, I identify individuals most likely to respond to elite appeals. Recall that insider narratives advocate exclusionary citizenship rules whereas outsider narratives highlight the threat of lost citizenship rights. To capture the effect of insider narratives, I operationalize *Citizenship Rules* using AQ-86A, B, and E:

> **AQ-86A:** In your opinion, which of the following people have a right to be a citizen of the country? A citizen would have the right to get a passport and to vote in national elections if they are at least 18 years old: A person born in the country with one national and one non-national parent?

> **AQ-86B:** In your opinion, which of the following people have a right to be a citizen of the country? A citizen would have the right to get a passport and to vote in national elections if they are at least 18 years old: A person born in the country with two non-national parents?

> **AQ-86E:** In your opinion, which of the following people have a right to be a citizen of the country? A citizen would have the right to get a passport and to vote in national elections if they are at least 18 years

old: A person who came from another country, but who has lived and worked in the country for many years, and wishes to make the country his or her home?

Citizenship Rules takes a value of "2" if the respondent disagrees with all three questions, a value of "1" if the respondent agrees with all of them, and a value of "0" otherwise.[128] It is important to recognize that citizenship debates often revolve around these three questions. Further, *Citizenship Rules* is not statistically correlated with difficulty obtaining identity documents. Hypotheses 4a and 4b suggest that insider narratives increase the fear and use of violence.

A total of 2,840 individuals, or about 6% of all respondents, favor exclusionary citizenship criteria. Burundi, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia have the highest rates at 17-18% of respondents. For the most part, these countries are a mix of post-conflict societies (Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia) or hubs for immigrants and refugees (South Africa, Tanzania).[129] It is interesting to note that the baseline propensity for violence varies between these countries. Figure 15 shows the variation in preferences across the region.

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[128] Other possible responses are: Yes; Don't know; Refused to answer; or a missing value.
[129] ACPI scores are as follows: Tanzania 1.82, South Africa 1.35, Burundi 1.94, Sierra Leone 2.08, and Liberia 1.73.

Figure 15: Citizenship rule preferences by country

Many forces can help explain the variation in the support for exclusionary citizenship rules: winner/loser status under the citizenship regime, land tenure institutions, resource scarcity and economic crisis, etc. Figure 15 is interesting because it displays continent-wide variation that is not observable in existing studies, which rely on a small, purposive samples. The data speak to hardening attitudes towards outsiders described in so much of the literature, but attitudes towards citizenship rules clearly do not map on to largescale VOB. For instance, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia see similarly high rates of exclusionary attitudes, yet South Africa, with the spate of xenophobic riots, has seen more intense VOB than Tanzania and Zambia in the last few years. Rather, Figure 15 presents a snapshot of an important risk factor for politicized citizenship, which can fuel VOB under the right circumstances.

To capture the resonance outsider narratives, I focus on warnings of denationalization. I construct the variable *Prevented* based on AQ-27*:*

AQ-27: With regard to the most recent national election in [Year], which statement is true for you?

Prevented takes a value of "2" if the respondent was prevented from voting or did not vote because they could not find their name in the register, a value of "1" if they voted, and a value of "0" otherwise. [130] The logic is that VOB is often triggered by elections. In cases where VOB escalates, voting rights are often at stake. Further, when an outsider

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[130] Other possible responses are: Not registered to vote; Voted in the elections; Decided not to vote; Could not find the polling station; Did not have time to vote; Did not vote for some other reason; Too young to vote at the time; Don't know; Refused to answer; or a missing value.

group is denationalized, it can trigger a war. This coding procedure allows direct comparison between individuals who voted in the last election and those who were denied this basic right. *Prevented* is not statistically correlated with difficulty obtaining identity documents. Hypotheses 4a and 4b suggest that outsider narratives will increase the fear and use of violence.

Figure 16 shows that the number of individuals prevented from voting in the last election varies within countries. On the tails of the 2010 election crisis, Côte d'Ivoire has the largest proportion of citizenship insecure outsiders at almost 6% of respondents. This number is exceedingly large, considering that only 1.6% of all respondents reported the same level of difficulty.

Figure 16: Denied voting rights by country

A potential criticism of *Citizenship Rules* and *Prevented* as measures of contentious narratives is that they do not capture the incendiary language typically used. However, these variables do capture the core messages of insider/outsider narratives: citizenship should be harder to claim and fundamental rights will be taken away. Finding significance even in the presence of conservative coding decisions should strengthen confidence in the results.

Control variables

I include standard demographic controls that shape attitudes and behavior regarding violence: the respondent's age, gender, ethnicity, wealth, education, religion, residence in a rural or urban area, and neighborhood. I also control for the respondent's ethnic group (*Ethnicity*), income (*Wealth*, determined based on the roofing material of each respondent's house),[131] and census-district (*Region*).

As previously mentioned, citizenship insecurity often overlaps with ethnic discrimination. It is thus imperative to distinguish between their respective effects on patterns in violence. I measure *Group Treatment*, based on AQ-85A:

AQ-85A: How often is [Respondent's Ethnic Group] treated unfairly by the government?

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[131] I collapsed the nine original categories of roofing material to four, just as I collapsed education and religion into four categories.

Group Treatment takes a value of "2" if the respondent believes their ethnic group is treated unfairly, a value of "1" if their group is not, and a value of "0" otherwise.[132] This coding procedure allows direct comparison between individuals who feel discriminated against and those who believe their group is treated fairly. I expect that perceived group disadvantage increases the likelihood that an individual fears victimization, but I do not have expectations about the use of violence. Grievance-based arguments suggest that aggrieved groups are more likely to rebel to achieve political goals (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). However, opportunity-based arguments find the material conditions of poverty, political instability, and weak states are better predictors of conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

A total 7,252 respondents feel that their ethnic group is often or always treated unfairly and 24,613 believe their group is never treated unfairly. Nigeria and Guinea report the highest level of unfair treatment at over 30% of respondents. With response rates pushing 85%, Madagascar, Lesotho, Senegal, and Niger report the highest level of fair treatment. Figure 17 shows the distribution of these levels across country.

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[132] Other possible responses are: Sometimes treated unfairly; Don't know; Refused to answer; or a missing value. This question was not asked in Sudan. No explanation is given by Afrobarometer.

Figure 17: Group treatment by country

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In order to account for the relationship between citizenship security and ethnic discrimination identified by Manby (2009), I create an interaction term comprised of *Document Access* and *Group Treatment*. The interaction takes a total of six values, representing every possible pairing between *Document Access* and *Group Treatment*. Of particular interest are comparisons between individuals who are citizenship secure and fairly treated and those individuals who are citizenship insecure and unfairly treated. I expect the interaction term to have a positive relationship with *Fear* (H3a), and with *Use* (H3b). These individuals exhibit two important determinants of violence: grievance (unfair treatment) and material incentives (denied citizenship rights). Furthermore, the politics of belonging literature suggests that the interaction of ethnic discrimination and citizenship insecurity increases the likelihood of violence. Individuals then have more to gain by changing the status quo and more to lose by leaving it alone.

Of course, country level factors may influence estimates as well. Of particular interest are ACPI scores and the quality of a state's civil registration system. As shown in Figure 18, the average ACPI score for the Afrobarometer sample is 1.7, with a minimum of 1.26 and a maximum of 2.33.[133] Birth registration directly affects an individual's ability to obtain identity documents and levels are tracked by the World Health Organization. The time period covered by Round 5 has full birth registration coverage. Figure 19 shows that the mean birth registration level is 54.8%, with a minimum of 2.3% (Malawi) and a maximum of 91.8% (South Africa). ACPI scores and birth registration levels cannot be

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[133] In the full ACPI dataset, the minimum score is 1.12, the maximum is 3, and the mean is 1.77. The methodology behind data collection and scoring for the ACPI is covered in Chapter 4.

inserted directly into the model because they are measured at a higher level of analysis than other variables. I include country fixed effects to control for these and other country-year level factors.[134]

Figure 18: African Citizenship Policy Index scores

[134] A hierarchical model is not appropriate in this case because the sample size of countries is under 50 (N=34) and Afrobarometer's sampling procedure for countries is not random—it is biased towards stable, democratic countries. By adding fixed effects I effectively partition the analysis to remove between-country variation from the estimation process. Therefore, effects are calculated based on within-country variation alone, which means that unobserved variables at the country-level, such as ACPI score or birth registration rates, do not bias the estimates.

Figure 19: Birth registration levels

Connecting Insecurity to Behavior

I use multivariate logistic regressions with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on country to estimate the likelihood that an individual will experience or commit violence. Table 22 in the appendix presents the full regression results and Figure 20 and Figure 21 show odds ratios for key independent variables. [135] I find that citizenship insecurity increases the fear of victimization (H3a) and the use (H3b) of political violence. Elite narratives are correlated with the use (H4b), but not the fear (H4a), of violence.

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[135] Interpretation of the interaction terms must take into account the odds ratio for both component variables and the interaction term.

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According to Model 1c, citizenship insecure individuals are 25% more likely to fear victimization than secure individuals, on average, holding all else constant. Individuals from disadvantaged ethnic groups are almost two times (1.9) as likely to fear violence as individuals treated fairly. The coefficient on the interaction term fails to achieve statistical significance at conventional levels. Thus, individuals who are both citizenship insecure and treated unfairly are not more likely to fear victimization than individuals who are citizenship secure and treated fairly. Further work is needed to fully explain this counter-intuitive result.[136]

Contrary to H4a, there is no significant relationship between *Citizenship Rules* and *Fear* or between *Prevented* and *Fear*. It is possible that less-conservative or different measures of insider/outsider narratives would produce different results. For example, appeals explicitly linking citizenship rules and voting obstacles to ethnic discrimination may instill more fear of being targeted than appeals regarding citizenship law or the right to vote alone. After all, elite rhetoric during citizenship debates often turns on ethnic injustices.

Finally, the effect of discrimination on *Fear* is about 65 percentage points higher than the effect of citizenship insecurity on *Fear*. In addition, women are more likely to fear victimization, as are people with lower levels of education.

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[136] Coefficients and levels of significance for key variables of interest do not change if the assumptions for *Fear* are relaxed to include individuals who "somewhat" fear attacks during the next election, as opposed to only including individuals who fear this possibility "a lot".

Figure 20: Fear of victimization during violence

With respect to Model 2c, citizenship insecure individuals are 42% more likely to use violence than citizenship secure individuals, on average, all else equal. Ethnic disadvantage amplifies the effect of insecurity on the use of violence. When an insecure individual is treated unfairly by the government, they are two times more likely use violence as someone who is secure and treated fairly. In other words, feeling insecure and discriminated against has a roughly 160 percentage point larger effect on *Use* than the effect of feeling insecure and *not* discriminated against.

In line with Hypothesis 4b, preferences for exclusionary citizenship rules make individuals 55% more likely to use violence, as compared to individuals with inclusionary preferences. People prevented from voting in the last election are 59% more likely to report using violence, as compared to those who voted. It is worth noting that the effect of narratives on *Use* is 13 to 17 percentage points higher than the effect of insecurity.

Finally, *Female* and *Age* have a negative relationship with *Use.* Individuals treated unfairly are nearly three times (2.75) as likely to use political violence as individuals treated fairly, on average, all else equal.

Figure 21: Use of political violence

As a robustness check, I further disentangle levels of citizenship insecurity by distinguishing the effect of having a "difficult time" as opposed to a "very difficult time" accessing national identity papers. Results are robust to separating the effect of being *somewhat* citizenship insecure from being *very* insecure (Table 23 in the appendix). According to Model 1d, individuals who are *somewhat* insecure are not more likely to fear violence than the citizenship secure. However, individuals who are *very* insecure are 1.5 times more likely to fear violence than the citizenship secure. In other words, the effect of citizenship insecurity increases by 25 percentage points when the bar for insecurity is higher. The effects of ethnic discrimination, feeling insecure and discriminated against, and

susceptibility to contentious narratives are unchanged from the primary analysis (Model 1c).

With respect to Model 2d, the *somewhat* citizenship insecure are 42% and the *very* insecure are 43% more likely to use political violence than the citizenship secure. Those who are somewhat insecure and discriminated against are 2.54 times more likely to use violence than those who are citizenship secure and treated fairly. Individuals who are very insecure and discriminated against are 1.83 times more likely to use violence. The effects of ethnic discrimination, feeling insecure and discriminated against, and susceptibility to contentious narratives are unchanged from the primary analysis (Model 2c).

These models, and Model 2d in particular, make an important contribution to the literature by addressing competing predictions about the effect of grievances on collective violence. I find that the very insecure are more likely to use violence than the citizenship secure, but *less* likely to use it than the somewhat insecure. This finding supports research showing that the most marginalized groups are *less* likely to use violence than moderately marginalized groups (Lacina 2014). This counter-intuitive finding can be explained in a couple of ways. The most aggrieved groups have fewer resources at their disposable with which to contest the status quo, and they suffer greater consequences (e.g. government repression) for their actions.

Discussion

In conclusion, this chapter examines how the citizenship regime inform conflict processes at the individual level. I argue that a nationality law lens helps explain the likelihood that individuals will fear and use political violence. My theory proposes that exclusionary nationality laws support mobilization by making individuals feel citizenship

insecure. I find that citizenship insecurity and contentious narratives are positive associated with *Use*. Citizenship security also predicts *Fear*, but contentious narratives do not. Put differently, citizenship insecurity increases the likelihood that an individual will use and fear violence. The implication is that insecure individuals, regardless of whether they are insiders or outsiders, should be easier to mobilize.

But *how* do elites get people to follow them? I find that emphasizing exclusionary citizenship rules or denied political rights supports mobilization. However, these messages do not seem to raise supporters' anxiety about personal security. At least, they do not have an independent effect on this anxiety. Closer inspection of elite rhetoric should clarify whether we can better predict *Fear* by looking at alternate messages (e.g. historic ethnic discrimination, past victimization, opportunity for revenge) or an interaction of frames. It could be that some frames predict *Fear*, while others predict *Use.*

The last point to make about the results is this: Contrary to what we might expect from the literature, the effect of each factor (i.e. citizenship security, contentious citizenship narratives) is independent of an individual's experience with ethnic discrimination. Therefore, my analysis identifies new conflict process operating at the individual level, which sheds light on the micro-foundations of citizenship struggle and violent collective action more generally. This topic is underexplored in both the conflict and the politics of belonging literatures.

This study is the first to compare competing explanations for individual level determinants of VOB participation. It is also the first to measure access to national identity documents and contentious citizenship narratives either cross-nationally or with survey data. Regional or global comparative studies such as this one are important contributions

to the field because they support widely generalizable theories about citizenship politics. An immediate benefit is a better understanding of VOB outside of election periods and that falls short of the threshold for minor or major conflict. Therefore, my methodology addresses the literature's selection bias towards conflict trigged by elections. A second benefit is the production of generalizable knowledge. The testing procedure and findings presented here are broadly applicable because citizenship insecurity and problematic civil registration systems are not restricted to the African continent. Moreover, the nationality law lens is relevant for how we conceptualize the dynamics of citizenship politics in general and carries implications for policymaking and conflict prevention as well.

In addition, millions, if not tens of millions, of people are affected by the "crisis of citizenship and statelessness in Africa" (Manby 2009, 18). The concept of citizenship security makes an important theoretical contribution because it explains *how* the lack of citizenship rights create grievances that can then be transformed into something hard by ethnic entrepreneurs. Although previous work has presumed this relationship exists, it has not gone far enough to explain the causal mechanism at work. Additionally, prior studies have approached citizenship politics from a macro-perspective, inadvertently downplaying the micro-foundations. Consequently, the mechanics of elite-citizen interactions and the process by which individual preferences become group values tend to be assumed rather than tested directly. In contrast, I test key assumptions of the politics of belonging field. Importantly, I nuance previous assumptions and identify new causal factors that drive an individual's relationship to political violence—either as a victim or an aggressor.

That said, citizenship insecurity presents measurement challenges because a wide variety of obstructions can prevent individuals from exercising their citizenship rights.

There is also the near-impossible task of measuring formal and informal institutions separately. In addition, elite narratives are difficult to study through Afrobarometer questions. Needless to say, limitations in the available data forced trade-offs in the way I operationalize concepts in this paper. Future research should continue to distinguish between insiders and outsiders in search of unique factors affecting these groups. Analysts might also track specific elite narratives to see how different claims affect various forms of contention, such as protests, riots, or communal clashes. Finally, refining the measurement of citizenship security to encompass formal and informal practices would deepen our understanding of when citizenship security matters most for political outcomes.

Chapter 8. In The Days After: Evidence from Field Surveys in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana

Citizenship regimes structure the politics of belonging in a country. The nationality law lens not only helps us understand conflict processes at the individual level; it is also relevant to understanding post-conflict settings. Specifically, it can illuminate the lingering effects of a violent politics of belonging. I test Hypothesis 5 in this chapter:

H5: A history of politicized citizenship debates increases popular support for using political violence, even after conflict has ended.

To test this hypothesis, I turn to field surveys I conducted in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana in 2014. Recall that Ivorian citizenship is a politicized and contentious issue, but Ghana has historically had a stable and inclusionary citizenship regime.[137] My contention here is that Ghana serves as the counterfactual for Côte d'Ivoire; a baseline for what Ivoirians attitudes should look like had Côte d'Ivoire not suffered a VOB war. I find that risk factors in violent mobilization remain high in Côte d'Ivoire, whereas there are few predictors of support for violence in Ghana. My results demonstrate that VOB produces long-term effects on social cohesion, and that the risk of violence relapse remains elevated despite progress towards reconciliation.

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[137] See Chapters 5 and 6 for case studies of Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana.

The survey results also reveal a certain puzzle. From certain angles, it seems that Hypothesis 5 is not in fact borne out. Over the last six years, the Ivoirian government has seen progress in peace-building efforts. For instance, international audiences cheered as incumbent Alassane Ouattara won re-election in 2015 without a return to violence. Furthermore, an experiment I embedded in the 2014 questionnaires shows that support for ethnically-biased distribution is about 13 percentage points higher in Ghana than in Côte d'Ivoire. Similarly, support for ethnically-inclusive distribution is about 11 percentage points lower in Ghana.[138]

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[138] The differences in support levels are statistically significant at conventional levels with p-values of 0.00 and 0.01, respectively. See "Research Design" below for details on the survey procedures.

Figure 22: Resource distribution preferences, by country

Alongside these encouraging signs, I find that Côte d'Ivoire's path to peace remains incomplete and fragile. Popular support for using violence to achieve political goals is higher in Côte d'Ivoire, and Ivoirians willing to mobilize are more tolerant of political violence than Ghanaians. Furthermore, although Ivoirians outwardly express a stronger preference for ethnic inclusion, ethnic cleavages retain their potent link with violence in Côte d'Ivoire but not in Ghana. I contend that the stark contrast here is indicative of the lingering effects of VOB. However, the patterns I unearth say more than that violence begets violence. Indeed, they speak to the nature of divisions that persist in Ivoirian society, and therefore the types of cleavages along which future cycles of violence may erupt. It is no coincidence that ethnic cleavages, which previously catapulted debates over Ivoirian

citizenship onto the national stage and down the path to war, continue to have a strong association with support for violence. We also learn from the surveys that political entrepreneurs face a conducive recruitment environment. Ethnicity remains a salient cleavage in society and individuals willing to mobilize are also more tolerant of using violence to achieve political goals.

In the following sections I detail the methodology of my field surveys and embedded experiment, present an empirical analysis of Hypothesis 5, and discuss alternative explanations. I conclude by reflecting on what these findings mean for the future of Ivoirian peace-building and for post-VOB countries more generally.

Research design

Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana are appropriate cases for this comparison because they are similar along important structural dimensions related to geography, demographics, and development, but their divergent nation-building processes and citizenship regimes produced vastly different outcomes in terms of the politics of belonging. The conflict processes active in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana are detailed in Chapters 5 and Chapter 6, respectively, but it is worth summarizing them here as well. Côte d'Ivoire offered expansive citizenship rights under first-president Houphouët Boigny. After 1993, nationalist principles grounded citizenship in autochthony, leading to the denationalization of many northerners (collectively referred to as "Dioula"). From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, violence in Côte d'Ivoire progressed from protests to civil war in response to the codification of exclusionary citizenship rules into nationality law. Citizenship in Ghana is not politicized because formal and informal institutions are generally geared towards national integration of all ethnic groups. Ghana's pluralistic nation-building model has

weakened ethnic barriers and helped to build a unified national identity. Communal violence has remained localized through most of Ghana's history.

To study political attitudes in each country, I conducted field surveys in Abidjan and Accra from November to December 2014. The sampling procedure was not intended to produce a nationally representative sample, but, as the metropolitan centers of their respective countries, Abidjan and Accra offer diverse subject pools. Survey sites were selected using a multistage sampling procedure tailored to the specific municipal structure of the city.[139] In Abidjan, 7 communes (districts) were randomly selected, followed by 4 localities (neighborhoods) within each commune. In all, 23 neighborhoods were surveyed in Abidjan. In Accra, a sample of 21 localities were selected from a population of 103, all of which were included in the final sample. Within each locality, subjects were selected using a clustered random sample stratified by gender. Enumerators began at a focal point in each locality and used a "random walk" to select every fourth household.[140] In total, 841 surveys were completed. Survey questions are cited throughout this discussion as "FS" followed by the question number (i.e. FS-15). A list of original survey questions is available in Table 24 in the appendix.

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[139] Differences between Abidjan and Accra in terms of municipal structure and ease of mobility necessitated sampling procedures tailored to the local context. Surveys could not be completed in all the randomly-selected neighborhoods of Abidjan due to unforeseen issues that arose during the field research, including inclement weather, security concerns of the enumerators, and logistical constraints.

[140] Within each household, one respondent was interviewed. If multiple people were in the household, enumerators used randomized cards to select a participant over the age of 18.

I embedded an experiment in the questionnaire to evaluate attitudes regarding resource distribution by local officials. Surveys and experiments are common measurement tools for individual-level factors, such as support for political actors or policy (Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013; Gutiérrez-Romero 2014; Wantchekon 2003) or perception of state institutions (Gutiérrez-Romero 2014). Enumerators administered three versions of the survey, each of which had slightly different phrasing of the following prompt:

> **FS-15:** Now I'm going to give you some information about aid distribution and then I'll ask for your opinion. An aid organization has given a community leader a little money by to buy grain for families in the community. He only has enough money to buy grain for 50 households even though most families in the community need the grain.

The "Ethnic-Bias" treatment group learned that the leader distributed grain to members of his ethnic group only. The "Ethnic-Inclusion" treatment group heard that the leader distributed grain to at least one household from each ethnic group. The control group learned that the leader randomly distributed grain to households. Participants were then asked whether the method described was an acceptable way to distribute the grain.

In summary, the present analysis employs a most-similar research design. Ghana's questionnaires thus indicate what attitudes should look like in the absence of a politicized citizenship regime. In other words, Ghanaian responses are a proxy for what Ivoirian attitudes would look like today had VOB not happened. Outcomes in Côte d'Ivoire should generalize to other post-VOB settings because Ivoirian politics of belonging have followed a familiar trajectory seen elsewhere on the continent.

Table 5 presents summary statistics demonstrating that the treatment groups did not differ statistically from the control group.[141] None of the p-values reach statistical significance, suggesting that randomization effectively created balance between the groups. The treatment and control groups comprised both Ivoirians and Ghanaians. In the analysis I separate the treatment effects by country to understand how *Citizenship Regime* affects outcomes.

[Insert Table 5]

In summary, the present analysis employs a most-similar research design. Ghana's questionnaires thus indicate what attitudes should look like in the absence of a politicized citizenship regime. In other words, Ghanaian responses are a proxy for what Ivoirian attitudes would look like today had VOB not happened. Outcomes in Côte d'Ivoire should generalize to other post-VOB settings because Ivoirian politics of belonging have followed a familiar trajectory seen elsewhere on the continent.

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[141] Columns 1-3 list the mean of demographic characteristics by group, Columns 4 and 6 list the differences between the means of the treatment and control groups. Columns 5 and 7 state the p-value of the test that the difference between the respective treatment and control group is zero.

Table 5: Balance test

	1 Bias (T1)	**2** Inclusion (T2)	**3** Control (C)	**4** Difference (T1-C)	**5** P-Value (T1-C)	**6** Difference (T2-C)	**7** P-Value (T2-C)
Age	45.095	44.297	44.964	0.131	0.989	-0.666	0.938
Gender	0.498	0.491	0.837	-0.339	0.339	-0.346	0.334
Education	6.565	6.993	6.971	-0.406	0.446	0.022	0.973
Religion	2.807	4.556	3.964	-1.157	0.408	0.592	0.710
Employed	2.940	1.652	1.650	1.291	0.241	0.003	0.998
Wealth	3.758	3.975	3.466	0.292	0.569	0.509	0.344

A model for risk assessment

The following section covers variables under study in this chapter: support for political violence, ethnic cleavages, and mobilization feasibility. These indicators are operationalized through survey questions.

Dependent variable

To gauge levels of popular tolerance of political violence, the variable *Support* dichotomizes responses to FS-11. This question asks about the legitimacy of political violence. I code *Support* as "1" for individuals who agree that "it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause."[142]

This binary dependent variable paints a clear picture of attitudes, yet comes with some drawbacks. First, violence occurs in a moment and it is understandably difficult for individuals to predict what they would do in very specific circumstances. That said, Ivoirians may make better predictions given that they recently went through a conflict. Secondly, FS-11 is potentially affected by social desirability bias, which is inherent in sensitive survey questions. I attempt to address this problem by providing respondents some distance from the act of violence. For example, I do not ask participants if they committed or would commit violence. Instead, I ask them whether such an act is *ever* justified. Taking this softer approach allows the respondent to safely express opinions that may run up against social norms. I still expect the distribution of responses to this question

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[142] Other possible responses (*Support*=0) are: The use of violence is never justified in politics (, Agree with neither, Don't know, and No response.

to underestimate true preferences in the population. The fact that coefficients achieve statistical significance in spite of such bias builds confidence in the results. So too does the expectation that social desirability should affect Ghanaian responses to the same extent (possibly even more), which would level out *Support*'s downward-bias.

Overall, 20% of respondents agree that violence is justified in certain circumstances, while half believe it is never justified. Figure 23 displays the distribution across all possible responses to FS-11. I find that Ghanaians are much less supportive of political violence (13.4%) than Ivoirians (27.9%).[143] A chi-square test shows that Ivoirian levels of *Support* differ significantly (p=0.00) from those of Ghanaians.

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[143] These values correspond to those found in the Afrobarometer data, in which 12.4% of Ghanaians (2014) said violence was justified in politics and 22.1% of Ivoirians (2013) agreed.

Figure 23: Support for violence, by country

Let us turn now to the independent variables of the analysis. With the understanding that violence occurs in a moment, I evaluate risk factors shown in the literature to be capable of transforming *support* for violence into *action*. I look specifically at the role of ethnic cleavages and mobilization around political entrepreneurs, which made a deep mark on the Ivoirian civil war. I measure ethnic cleavages as the salience of ethnic identification relative to national identification (*Ethnic Salience*), and the perception that the government favors co-ethnics in resource distribution (*Ethnic Bias*). *Ethnic Salience* is a categorical variable based on FS-8:

FS-8: Let's suppose that you had to choose between being a [National Identity] and being a [Self-reported Ethnic Group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?

I code *Ethnic Salience* as "3" when an individual identifies more strongly with their nationality than with their ethnicity, and as "1" if the reverse is true.[144] I code the variable as "2" if a respondent expresses equal attachment to ethnic and national identity.

Winner/loser mobilization typically follows ethnic lines, so measuring the strength of attachment to ethnic identity is important to this study. I do not mean to suggest that strong ethnic attachments are necessarily violence-prone. Rather, they represent a potential cleavage along which individuals may mobilize. Ethnicity-based mobilization has been found in the literature to intensify outcomes (Eck 2009). An additional benefit of *Ethnic Salience* is that it allows me to interrogate attitudes towards violence held by individuals who feel greater attachment to their *national identity*. This angle is too often overlooked in the politics of belonging literature. Given that outsiders often push for a liberal citizenship emphasizing a polity unified around the national character, violence of belonging may reflect a nationalist goal. The Ivoirian case is testament to this fact.

Overall, 23% of respondents favor their ethnic identity and 30% favor their national identity. Figure 24 breaks down responses by *Ethnic Salience* categories and by country. I find that the distribution of identity salience differs significantly (p=0.00) between Ivoirians and Ghanaians, but in ways that may surprise. Ethnic and national identification is actually twice as high in Ghana (at 30% and 40%, respectively) as in Côte d'Ivoire (at 15% and 19%, respectively). Ivoirians tend to report equal attachment (60%). This result could be driven by a number of forces beyond the scope of this project: social desirability,

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[144] People who identified "more" or "only" with a particular identity were collapsed into the same category (*Ethnic Salience*=1 or 3). Other possible responses include: Don't know (*Ethnic Salience*=0) and No response (*Ethnic Salience*=0).

response to a traumatic experience pitting ethnic and national identity against one another, etc. Through multivariate analysis, I demonstrate that group identification maintains a positive relationship with tolerance of violence in Côte d'Ivoire, but not in Ghana.

Figure 24: Relative ethnic salience, by country

Based on FS-9, *Ethnic Bias* captures perceptions about resource distribution by the government.

FS-9: In your community, who receives goods and services from the government?

I code *Ethnic Bias* as "1" if a respondent perceives ethnic bias in the distribution of state resources and as "2" if he or she perceives a bias towards people who helped get the

ruling party elected (henceforth referred to as "clients").[145] In the Ivoirian Civil War, the perception of biased resource distribution by the government (particularly their favoritism towards migrants) encouraged citizenship regime "losers" to mobilize. *Ethnic Bias* speaks to the salience of this risk factor in Ivoirian politics today. It is possible that there is substantial overlap between co-ethnics of the regime and their supporters. However, given that respondents have the clear option to report ethnic bias specifically, I am confident that the two answers capture different sentiments. The distribution of responses supports this assumption.

Overall, 23% of respondents believe leaders favor their co-ethnics, but many people (43%) report no bias. Figure 25 breaks down responses by *Ethnic Bias* categories and by country. The difference in perceptions between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire is highly significant (p=0.00), likely driven by sharp differences in the *type* of perceived government bias. I find that roughly three times as many Ivoirians report *ethnic* bias as Ghanaians (36% and 11%, respectively), and that three times as many Ghanianas report *client* bias as Ivoirians (25% and 9%, respectively).

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[145] Other possible responses include: No bias, meaning no perception of patronage (*Ethnic Bias*=3), Don't know (*Ethnic Bias*=0), and No response (*Ethnic Bias*=0).

Figure 25: Biased resource distribution, by country

The last factor I investigate is mobilization feasibility, which concerns leaders' ability to rally supporters around a cause. It is based on FS-10:

FS-10: If you disagree with something the government is doing and one of the following individuals calls on you to join them and their supporters in working to solve the problem, how likely are you to agree?

Elections are so central to escalation processes during the politics of belonging that violence is often related to mobilization by politicians specifically. *Feasibility* thus takes a value of "2" if someone is "likely" or "very likely" to follow a political party leader when

protesting government policy.[146] As a robustness check, I look at other types of leadership to capture different mobilization patterns: local government officials and traditional leaders.

One strength of *Feasibility* is that the variable reflects an understanding that violence occurs in a moment. In a time of crisis or upheaval, charismatic leaders can bring latent tensions to the surface or even cultivate new preferences. Therefore, a risk assessment of violence relapse must not only consider attitudes towards violence as a political tool or the salience of ethnic cleavages, but also towards the likelihood of collective action. The next step, which I do in short order, is to determine whether mobilization will lead to communal fighting.

The inevitable caveat for *Feasibility* is that I do not mean to suggest that all collective action in Côte d'Ivoire necessarily turns violent. I also recognize that the question is framed broadly enough to capture non-violent and violent protest. For these reasons, it is important to study the relationship between *Feasibility* and other risk factors. Concern arises when individuals willing to mobilize are *also* more tolerant of violent action. I find this to be the case in Côte d'Ivoire.

Overall, 54% of respondents are willing to follow political party leaders, 52% are willing to follow local government officials, and 63% are willing to follow traditional leaders. As shown in Figure 26, Ghanaians and Ivoirians are similarly likely to follow leadership with some significance in the distribution of responses (p=0.067).

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[146] Other possible responses are: Unlikely to follow (*Feasibility*=1), Don't know (*Feasibility*=0), and No response (*Feasibility*=0).

Figure 26: Mobilization feasibility, by country

Control variables

My analysis of Afrobarometer data from Chapter Chapter 7 showed how important it is to control for the effect of political grievance. I treat grievance as a control rather than an explanatory variable because its effect on conflict onset is still debated in the literature. In addition, ethnic grievance is an alternative explanation to the factors presently identified.[147] Based on FS-6, I code *Grievance* as "1" if the respondent believes their ethnic group to be politically worse or much worse off than other groups in society.[148] In a robustness check I do not collapse the original categories of FS-6, instead allowing *Grievance* to reflect the full variation in responses.[149]

> **FS-6:** Think about the present condition of [R's Ethnic Group]. How would you rate the condition of [R's Ethnic Group] compared to other ethnic groups in the country in terms of political influence?

About 28% of all respondents feel marginalized to some extent. Interestingly, I find that only 16% of Ivoirians feel their ethnic group fares better than other groups in society, compared to 37% of Ghanaians. The level of grievance differs significantly (p=0.00) between the two countries. Figure 27 displays the distribution across all possible responses to FS-6.

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[147] See Chapter Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of the treatment of political grievance in the literature.

[148] Other possible responses are: Similar (*Grievance*=2), Better (*Grievance*=3), Much better (*Grievance*=3), Don't know (*Grievance*=0), and No response (*Grievance*=0).

[149] The categories of *Grievance* in grievance-robust models are as follows: Much better (*Grievance*=5), Better (*Grievance*=4), Similar (*Grievance*=3), Worse (*Grievance*=2), Much Worse (*Grievance*=1), Don't know (*Grievance*=0), and No response (*Grievance*=0).

Figure 27: Political grievance, by country

I include standard demographic controls of age, gender, ethnicity, employment, education, religion, and residence in a rural or urban area in all empirical models. These variables are established factors in mobilization, political grievance, and violent onset. *Ethnicity* is operationalized as the respondent's family language and *Employment* is a binary indicator for whether an individual is employed. A control for household wealth is purposively excluded given high collinearity between wealth (measured as self-reported, personal economic conditions) and *Grievance*. Models rely on unpooled data. Those using the Ivoirian sample include a control for whether the respondent lives in a stronghold of

Ouattara (RDR party) or Gbagbo (FPI party).[150] Detailed summary statistics of all control variables are available in Table 25 in the appendix.

Empirical Analysis

The previous section demonstrated that tolerance of political violence is higher in Côte d'Ivoire than in Ghana. This section takes the analysis a step further to study correlates of that tolerance. I find that ethnic cleavages and willingness to rally around leadership, two triggers of conflict processes, are positively and significantly related to *Support* in Côte d'Ivoire and not in Ghana. In fact, only client-based distribution has a consistently positive and significant relationship with *Support* among Ghanaians. The implication is that ethnicity remains a potent cleavage in Côte d'Ivoire that can be leveraged by political entrepreneurs. Further, I show that collective action under the guidance of entrepreneurs is violence-prone. A similar situation is less likely in Ghana. After presenting the results, I address several alternative explanations.

The models are a series of logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered on neighborhood (*Locality*) using unpooled survey data. I factor out categorical variables to determine the effect of each category on the outcome of interest. Figure 28 displays the effects of key variables from the main model, with estimates presented as odds ratios.[151] The full regression results, including those from feasibility-robust models (controlling for

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[150] See Chapter 4 for details about Ivoirian leadership and political party allegiances.
[151] Recall that odds ratios are the exponentiated coefficients of a logistic regression. They describe differences between two populations in terms of order of magnitude.

other leadership types) and grievance-robust models (disaggregating *Grievance*), are available in Tables 26 and 27 in the appendix.[152]

Figure 28: Correlates of support for political violence

I find that leadership has a strong and positive correlation with *Support* in Côte d'Ivoire. Individuals willing to rally behind political party leaders, government officials, and traditional leaders are more tolerant of political violence (Models 4-6e and 4-6f), as compared to their less-than-willing counterparts. Specifically, those Ivoirians willing to mobilize around a political party leader are 3.32 times more likely to support political violence than those who are not willing to mobilize. Ghanaians willing to do the same are 1.8 times more likely as their less-motivated counterparts (Model 1e). However, the

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[152] The coefficients are not exponentiated in these tables.

coefficient on *Feasibility* loses its statistical significance in Ghana's feasibility-robust models (Models 2-3e and 2-3f, respectively). Smaller coefficients and inconsistent significance indicates a weak relationship between mobilization and support for violence in Ghana.

In support of Hypothesis 5, ethnic cleavages predict *Support* in Côte d'Ivoire in spite of the reported ethnic tolerance there (Models 4-6e and 4-6f). Those who believe that government agents favor their co-ethnics are about three times more likely to support political violence than those who do not perceive a bias. Additionally, those who identify more strongly in ethnic terms are around 1.63 times more likely to support violence than those who identify equally with their ethnic and national identities. Interestingly, Ivoirians who identify more strongly in national terms are about twice as likely to support violence, reinforcing the idea that VOB can be instigated by those favoring national integration. The literature has not paid much attention to this strand of VOB so it would be a productive avenue for future research.

Furthermore, ethnic cleavages are not predictive of *Support* in Ghana (Models 1-3e and 1-3f), which is in line with my prediction. I find that ethnic bias and ethnic identification do not significantly affect tolerance of violence among Ghanaians. However, Ghanaians who perceive *client* bias in the government are three times more likely to support political violence, as compared to those who perceive no bias. In contrast, client bias has a much weaker relationship with *Support* among Ivoirians. In Côte d'Ivoire (Models 5-6e and 5-6f), the coefficient regarding client bias is half the size as in Ghana (Models 1-3e and 1-3f) and only somewhat significant.

The effect of political marginalization is hard to determine in the models. *Grievance* has a negative and somewhat significant (p<0.1) effect on *Support* in Ghana, but no significant effect in Côte d'Ivoire in the main models (Models 1-6e). In grievance-robust models (Models 1-6f), the coefficient on *Grievance* fails to achieve significance in almost every model in the Ghana sample, and has only a weak relationship with *Support* in the Côte d'Ivoire sample. The coefficients in Models 1-6f are finicky. They gain and lose significance depending on the model specification. Some of the contradictory results can be attributed to low-observation counts in the categories "much worse" (N=72) or "much better" (N=60). This fact justifies my decision to collapse *Grievance* into four categories in the primary analysis. At the same time, these results are a microcosm of the ongoing debate in the literature about how to understand the effect of grievance. Marginalization clearly has a nuanced relationship with political violence, and specifying this relationship may be beyond the scope of this present study.

Finally, I find that individuals in President Ouattara's (RDR) strongholds are less supportive of using political violence than individuals in former-President Gbagbo's (FPI) strongholds. This result likely stems from the fact that RDR supporters were the primary victims of Ivoirité and VOB preceding the war. Furthermore, they are now in power with the head of their party in the presidential office, and violence would surely threaten their position.

Alternatives

One source of potential bias stems from the pressure some respondents may feel to answer questions in a socially desirable way. This problem plagues any questionnaire broaching sensitive subjects, such as ethnic relations and political violence. I try to

minimize the effect of this bias in two ways. First, I compare two countries with strong social norms against ethnic discrimination. I expect that social desirability would affect Ghanaian responses to the same or greater extent as Ivoirian responses, thus levelling out any downward-bias caused by social desirability. Granted, norm-development evolved in different ways in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. However, the underlying process of norm-development is endogenous to the independent variable of interest here (*Citizenship Regime*). In fact, the norm-development processes are possible causal mechanisms driving differences in Ivoirian and Ghanaian attitudes. Secondly, surveys were conducted in private so that respondents could speak their minds away from friends or family members. Lastly, I designed the questionnaire such that respondents did not have to openly admit to engaging in "negative" behavior. For example, I ask whether violence is *ever justified*, rather than whether respondents *have used* violence themselves. When the questionnaire asks directly about a sensitive topic, such as ethnically-biased resource distribution, I use an experimental design. I can therefore compare responses to the sensitive question with responses to neutral (random distribution) or pro-social (ethnically-inclusive) questions. Finding statistically significant results, even if the estimates of true preferences are conservative measures, increases confidence in the results.

A second concern with the chosen testing procedure may be that Côte d'Ivoire suffered a civil war from 2002 to 2007, with a brief resumption of fighting in 2010. This recent unrest has surely impacted individual attitudes towards mobilization, leadership, grievances, and violence. However, rather than undermining my results, the Ivoirian conflict is part and parcel of the key independent variable, *Citizenship Regime.* Struggles over contested citizenship, and nativist ideology in particular, characterize politics in Côte

d'Ivoire during the multi-party era. The civil war was a response to Côte d'Ivoire's increasingly exclusionary citizenship regime. The violence further politicized citizenship debates, thereby reinforcing the contrast exploited in my testing. There is no way to disentangle the risk factors explored here from an individual's experience with the war. Instead, this chapter emphasizes what we can glean from the data, which is that exclusionary citizenship regimes increase the salience of risk factors in violence even after conflict has ended. I leave it to future research to explain how much of the results are driven by experience of past conflict.

Discussion

Many of the preceding chapters have investigated collective violence in the aggregate. Chapter 4 linked nationality law and annual events and fatalities, while Chapters 5 and 6 examined group level processes and mechanisms. To fully understand collective behavior, it is important to identify micro-level determinants and then link all levels of analysis. I use survey data in Chapters 7 and Chapter 8 to explore individual-level determinants of political violence. I aim to shed light on the foundations of VOB. The findings have implications for determining the likelihood of conflict relapse.

Ethnic entrepreneurs on both sides of the citizenship debate in Côte d'Ivoire preyed upon ethnic divisions, effectively tearing the country in two. Today, the recruitment environment for Ivoirian political entrepreneurs remains rife with opportunity and collective action is violence-prone. I find not only that ethnic cleavages are salient in in Côte d'Ivoire, but that they are strongly associated with support for political violence. Furthermore, I show that individuals willing to mobilize around leadership are more tolerant of violence, as compared to other individuals.

The consequence is that Côte d'Ivoire's path to peace, roundly cheered after the 2015 election, is incomplete and fragile. Serious threats to stability and reconciliation remain, an observation that has sobering implications for other post-citizenship-conflict societies. This is not to say that Côte d'Ivoire is on the upswing of a conflict trap. Rather, I suggest that there is still work to do. The positive steps towards peaceful elections and continued economic development are encouraging. However, if the root causes of Côte d'Ivoire's VOB are not fully resolved, they remain potent even after fighting has died down. A concern for Côte d'Ivoire moving forward is that the fundamental question of land ownership has not been settled. Lessons from Ghana on managing disputes, and de-politicizing citizenship issues in particular, may serve Côte d'Ivoire well in the long-run.

Chapter 9. A Path for Citizenship Studies

Where should the boundaries of the Nation lie? Who is an insider? Who is an outsider? These profoundly contentious questions form the core of the politics of belonging. Citizenship represents the legal bond between an individual and the state. Citizenship rules, formalized through nationality law, determine who has a claim to the most important rights in the polity: the right to vote, stand for office, own property, obtain a passport, etc. Debating who *does* or does *not* have a right to citizenship can lead to violence because citizens "own" the state.

Previous scholarship explains why citizenship debates so often turn into armed confrontations. The role of land or election mechanisms, often framed as insider/outsider competition, receive much attention from analysts. Far less energy is directed to the role of exclusive nationality laws, much less the cross-national variation in VOB intensity. And yet variation within nationality laws produces notably different levels of violence. This gap in our knowledge leads to the question, why is insider/outsider violence worse in some places than others? I argue that the answer lies in the legal framework of belonging itself. Specifically, codifying exclusionary citizenship rules into nationality law intensifies VOB. Moreover, I identify a new causal factor in civil war: the threat to denationalize an outsider group.

Starting from the premise that citizenship politics is a form of redistributive conflict producing *winners* and *losers*, I argue that exclusive nationality laws increases competition between these groups. Furthermore, the marginalization produced by exclusive laws creates incentives to challenge status quo citizenship rules. Winner/loser competition

follows ethnic lines, and thus encourages the development of contentious citizenship narratives about where outsiders belong. These narratives justify a preferred pattern of resource distribution and frame status quo citizenship rules as *threats* and *opportunities*. The ethnically-exclusive appeals inherent in these narratives build group cohesion, reinforce an ethnic security dilemma, and facilitate armed organization.

The literature is fairly clear on factors in VOB onset: political competition between insiders and outsiders, politicization of land and ethnicity, and economic or political crisis. In contrast, I focus attention on the underexplored question of variation in VOB intensity. Why is it that citizenship debates lead to localized skirmishes in some countries, but minor conflict or even war in others? Restrictive laws deepen marginalization and exacerbate insider/outsider tensions. Contentious narratives emphasize deep group cleavages, which facilitates ethnic mobilization and thus intensifies the severity of VOB outcomes. When outsiders are labelled foreigners because the group is composed of internal and external migrants, calls to strip them of citizenship rights gain traction. Once a group faces denationalization, they have few options outside of extra-institutional strategies to defend their rights. Consequently, armed confrontations are more likely to devolve into a civil war. However, events remain constrained at the level of minor conflict where outsiders do not have contested foreign origins, which happens where outsiders are primarily in-migrants.

My research makes theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature. First, the conflict studies field is intensely interested in how exclusion from power, resource competition, or ethnic rivalries drive conflict processes. And yet citizenship, the fundamental instrument of inclusion and access, is largely overlooked. I find that provisions in nationality laws have explanatory power in their own right, and not just in

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the well-worn cases of extreme violence sparked by competitive elections. While the existing literature recognizes that citizenship policy has far-reaching effects, it has not made much headway in understanding how specific provisions impact violence outcomes. Situated in the burgeoning scholarship on Africa's citizenship policies, this dissertation offers a fresh vantage point for the citizenship politics field. For instance, the African Citizenship Policy Index's (ACPI) flexible framework expands the breadth of legal provisions to be studied, and proposes a means of systematizing and coordinating overlapping research agendas. In addition, by employing violence severity as an outcome of interest, I endeavor to correct the selection bias towards extreme cases (e.g. conflict events and election violence) currently weighing on the field.

Secondly, previous work tends to assign groups to opposite ends of the insider/outsider dichotomy and study their interactions. In contrast, I conceptualize groups as aggregations of individuals that fall along a spectrum of citizenship security. This approach is novel in the way it emphasizes how *threats* to citizenship rights and *opportunities* for improved status guide violent collective action. In deviating from the traditional focus on ethnic identity and grievance, the concept of citizenship security provides a new perspective on why contentious narratives lead to VOB and how elites are able to convince supporters to follow them. Furthermore, examining the insider/outsider dichotomy as a citizenship regime winner/loser divide sheds a different light on elite-individual interactions. This approach implicates elites *and* individuals from insider *and* outsider groups in the joint production of violence. Therefore, it offers novel insight into group relations, and how group composition interacts with nationality law.

In terms of empirical contributions, I identify new factors and trends never before observed by taking a broadly comparative approach. I find that event frequency and fatality rates generally rise as laws become more exclusionary, and that laws have a larger effect on fatality rates. Looking at individual level data, which is under-utilized in existing VOB studies, I show that people who have difficulty obtaining national identity papers are more likely to fear and use political violence. Individuals susceptible to contentious citizenship narratives are more likely to use political violence, but not to fear it. Access to national identity documents and susceptibility to contentious narratives are significant factors and independent of ethnic grievance. These findings are important because the correlation between these factors and VOB is acknowledged in the literature, but not statistically modeled. Moreover, studies to date are unclear on how to evaluate their relative weight, as compared to the effect of other VOB forces.

The ACPI is one of my most important empirical contributions. Data limitations have hampered the development of generalizable metrics relevant to citizenship politics. Without indicators permitting systematic comparisons across countries and time periods, it is extremely challenging to determine the extent to which nationality laws explain geographic or temporal variation in outcomes of interest. The relationship between citizenship policy and patterns in political violence remains under-explored because existing work has not produced a comprehensive, cross-national indicator. I created the ACPI to help remedy this major constraint on research into citizenship law. Employing a country-year unit of analysis, the ACPI is the first quantitative metric for studying Africa's legal framework of belonging. Capturing the most salient policy dimensions (e.g. birthright, gender, ethnicity, naturalization, and dual nationality), the index generalizes to

almost any region of the world. The ACPI builds on dedicated efforts of other scholars and complements existing research by enlarging the scope of variation under observation. An additional benefit is that the ACPI moves the field towards developing standardized indicators to facilitate replication and consensus. Tracking ACPI scores over time yields an encouraging trendline: citizenship policies in Africa are becoming more inclusionary. At the same time, ACPI analysis demonstrates the close relationship between exclusive nationality laws and violence severity.

In summary, a comparative study of nationality laws helps explains a wider range of outcomes, from localized skirmishes to civil war, in a wide range of time periods, both during and outside of election periods than what has come before. Furthermore, close attention to the interaction of elite interests and individual motivation fills in details about how contentious narratives transform individual preferences into action at the group level. Finally, case studies demonstrate that events are more likely to escalate into war when denationalization becomes a bargaining chip in citizenship debates.

The policy implications of this project are clear: minimize exclusion through citizenship law to reduce marginalization and violence. This is not to say that nationality law is a panacea for security issues in Africa or elsewhere, but inclusionary citizenship policies are more than lofty goals to be included in human rights treaties. They must be established and enforced through constitutions and peace agreements. They are a means of strengthening state institutions and augmenting the government's legitimacy, which serve the twin goals of achieving stability and increasing development.

Historical circumstances set many countries in Africa on a trajectory of acute and often violent citizenship debates: a period of repressive colonization, weak institutions

designed for extractive purposes, complicated and extensive migration flows, deep ethnic fractures and history of conflict along group lines, forced democratization in the context of fragile political institutions and vulnerable economic structures. These conditions are not a favorable groundwork for stable or peaceful politics, much less for delicate issues surrounding belonging and identity. The evolution of citizenship law in Africa is therefore illustrative of the processes and mechanisms that transform the *politics* of belonging into *violence* of belonging.

However, African experiences are not singular events and nativism. Demonization of the Other arises in places as disparate as Asia, the Indian sub-continent, the former Soviet Bloc, and Western Europe (Geschiere 2009; Côté and Mitchell 2015). The proliferation of this obsession can be explained by the ordinariness of the conditions that propel citizenship debates towards violence. Many parts of the developing world are still recovering from their colonial past. Pressures amplified by globalization, such as massive migration flows and economic and political liberalization are not confined to a single continent or development level. Additionally, a truism of sorts is emerging in global politics: Economic and political instability at the national level generate profound existential insecurity at the individual level, which leads to scapegoating foreigners for a bounty of misfortunes. These trends may be magnified in African states, but they are still apparent almost anywhere else. Consequently, lessons from this dissertation apply beyond the Continent's boundaries. While not universal *per se*, they tell us a great deal about the meaningfulness of membership in the contemporary moment. We can draw out their implications for Nations in states and political development generally.

Similarly, dire prognoses about the future of the nation-state as an organizing principle in the international system may be overblown. Christian Lund's observation that "the *idea* of the state is, if not entirely clear, quite powerful despite the incapacity of government institutions" is apropos (2003, 589). Continued confrontations over citizenship criteria indicate that the nation-state remains a powerful, if only symbolic, organizing force. In fact, a "new nationalism" (Ake 1996; Kersting 2009) spreading around the globe espouses indigeneity as the essential criterion for membership in the political community. Further, it suggests the swelling popularity of having nation-homogenous states. Legislation should therefore be closely monitored for nativist (or proto-nativist) strands because inclusionary policies are jeopardized by such movements.

As the fundamental tool of inclusion and exclusion from rights resources in the polity, citizenship laws have the potential to consolidate or undermine democracy. I have detailed the various ways leaders in Africa have manipulated nationality laws as part of divide and rule politics. However, it would be a mistake to containerize this research as only relevant to multi-ethnic societies democratizing in the modern era. For instance, charismatic populist leaders espousing xenophobic nationalism are largely responsible for the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, the growing number of parliamentary seats in Europe held by far-right parties, and the success of Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election in the United States.[153]

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[153] On the Brexit vote, see: Goodwin and Heath (2016) and Inglehart and Norris (2016). On the rise of far-right parties in Europe, see: Norris (2005), Mudde (2007), Goodwin (2011), or Inglehart and Norris (2016). On far-right ideology in the U.S. presidential campaign of 2016, see: Philip Klinkner, "The easiest way to guess if someone supports Trump? Ask if Obama is a Muslim,"

Preferences for exclusionary citizenship rules at the local level are poised to upend inclusionary policies at the national level, paralleling the cases of Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, and Kenya. As competition between winners and losers under the prevailing regime has intensified in Western Europe, some elites have turned to exclusionary national identity discourses and contentious citizenship narratives to push for more restrictive citizenship rules. Calls to close borders in Finland, Denmark, Finland, and Norway, [154] or to build walls in Austria, Hungary, and the United States reflect ongoing citizenship debates in these countries. [155] Furthermore, legislation in the U.S. to tighten voter identification requirements and calls to eliminate *jus soli* citizenship rights represent efforts to shrink the boundaries of the national community.[156] The "long, hot" summers of "urban rebellion"

Vox.com, June 2, 2016. http://www.vox.com/2016/6/2/11833548/donald-trump-support-race-religion-economy (Accessed September 28, 2016).

[154] Finland's nationalist Finns Party wants to block immigration from non-European Union countries: Jan Sundberg, "Who are the nationalist Finns Party?" *BBC.com*, May 11, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32627013 (Accessed September 28, 2016). Denmark, Norway, and Sweden are clamping down on the number of migrants crossing their borders: WSJ. "Europe's Closing Borders," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 7, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/europes-closing-borders-1452212006 (Accessed September 28, 2016).

[155] Austria plans to build a wall on its border with Slovenia and Italy: Simon Tomlinson, "Is Austria building a fence on the border with Italy?" *DailMail.com*, April 12, 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3535936/EU-concerned-Austria-planning-build-fence-border-Italy.html (Accessed September 28, 2016). Hungary built fences on its southern border with Serbia and Croatia in 2015, then announced expansion plans in 2016: Associated Press, "Hungary's PM plans 'more massive' fence to keep out migrants," *The Guardian*, August 26, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/26/hungarys-pm-plans-more-massive-fence-to-keep-out-migrants (Accessed September 28, 2016). On the proposed U.S.-Mexico border wall, see: "Immigration Reform That Will Make America Great Again". *DonaldJTrump.com*. https://www.donaldjtrump.com/positions/immigration-reform (Accessed September 28, 2016).

[156] On voter ID laws, see: Brennan Center for Justice, "New Voting Restrictions in Place for 2016 Presidential Election," *Brennan Center*, at http://www.brennancenter.org/voting-restrictions-first-time-2016 (Accessed September 28, 2016). On ending birthright citizenship, see: Tal Kopan,

during the American civil rights movement (McLaughlin 2014), and their latest reincarnation as protests over discriminatory policing, serve as reminders that while largescale violence is unlikely, restrictive citizenship rules can be destabilizing even in strong states.

Where do we go from here? The challenge is to pursue meaningful reforms that encourage buy-in from stakeholders and avoid creating a regressive backlash that undermines the entire project. The latest return to nativism stands in stark contrast with the integrationist vision that characterizes the 20th century. From the League of Nations to organizations bent on regional unification to an embrace of Multiculturalism, the trajectory of citizenship policy, while halting at times, has generally inclined towards greater tolerance and deeper integration. Since the establishment of Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948, all international human rights treaties uphold the principle that every person has a right to a nationality. The difficulty, of course, is bringing domestic policy into line with international norms. The African Union (AU) has taken positive steps in this direction by seeking to formalize the right to a nationality, which is implied but not explicitly granted by Article 6 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. As of August 2015, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Right adopted a draft Protocol to the African Charter

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"Birthright citizenship: Can Donald Trump change the Constitution?" *CNN.com*, August 18, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/18/politics/birthright-citizenship-trump-constitution/ and Jenna Johnson, "Scott Walker: The U.S. should 'absolutely' stop granting birthright citizenship," *The Washington Post*, August 17, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/08/17/scott-walker-the-u-s-should-absolutely-stop-granting-birthright-citizenship/

on the Right to a Nationality. In July 2016, the AU allowed the draft to "enter the procedures for elaboration of legal instruments for adoption by the African Union" (CRAI 2016). If the Protocol is passed, it places additional pressure on governments to change nationality and naturalization laws to make them more inclusive.[157]

An entire overhaul of domestic nationality law is, of course, unlikely in the vast majority of cases. Instead, incremental changes are the surest way to improve citizenship policies.[158] First, there should be a pathway to citizenship for individuals born in the territory and for long-term residents. This pathway should not be narrow or characterized by discretionary judgement on the part of officials; it should fight against conditions leading to permanent exclusion. Secondly, citizenship rules should not only be widely inclusive, but also objective, specific, clear, and transparent. Otherwise, competing claims to nationality will continue to subvert social cohesion, political stability, and democratic consolidation. The position of insiders and outsiders is similarly undermined by vague or contradictory nationality laws. The adoption, implementation, and enforcement of just laws requires strong state institutions. Finally, the legitimacy of nationality laws depends upon the legitimacy of the state and its institutions; this point should not be forgotten.

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[157] More information on international and African standards for citizenship laws is available through the Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative at http://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/.
[158] Manby (2015, Chapter 15) details opportunities for reform and principles that should be respected throughout the process.

Appendices

Chapter 4

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics, ACPI Models

	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max	Count
ACPI Scores					
Unweighted	1.772	0.353	1.12	3.00	1088
2x-weighted	2.508	0.500	1.59	4.24	1088
3x-unweighted	2.682	0.535	1.70	4.54	1088
Patterns in Violence					
Elections - Frequency	0.738	2.181	0.00	20.00	1050
Elections - Fatalities	9.810	139.275	0.00	4050.00	1050
Land - Frequency	0.229	0.769	0.00	9.00	1050
Land - Fatalities	11.366	123.769	0.00	3500.00	1050
Ethnicity - Frequency	1.268	4.530	0.00	66.00	1050
Ethnicity - Fatalities	58.898	345.441	0.00	5420.00	1050
All Violence - Frequency	8.173	16.085	0.00	249.00	1050
All Violence - Fatalities	95.276	405.613	0.00	5560.00	1050
Minor Conflict - Incidence	0.178	0.382	0.00	1.00	1092
War - Incidence	0.071	0.256	0.00	1.00	1092
Additional Factors					
GDP per capita	515.954	314.620	1.00	1061.00	1092
Regime Type	0.466	5.581	-10.00	10.00	1062
Excluded Population Size	0.190	0.266	0.00	0.85	1092
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.707	0.200	0.18	0.94	1092
Population Density	70.396	107.177	1.65	621.15	1092
Immigrant Population Size	3.644	3.813	0.18	18.43	1092
Arable Land Size	13.129	12.628	0.32	48.77	1092
Law Year	0.070	0.255	0.00	1.00	1092
Election Year	0.255	0.436	0.00	1.00	1092

Table 7: Descriptive Statistics by Country, ACPI Models

	ACPI Scores (Avg)			All Violence (Avg)	
	Unweighted	2x-weighted	3x-weighted	Frequency	Fatalities
Angola	1.46	2.04	2.18	4.16	15.12
Benin	1.26	1.78	1.91	3.2	1.32
Botswana	1.62	2.04	2.18	0.64	0.04
Burkina Faso	1.51	2.14	2.29	3.12	2.72
Burundi	2.11	2.75	2.94	6.68	56.96
Cameroon	1.7	2.4	2.57	4.84	21.2
C.A.R.	1.7	2.4	2.57	10.76	40.68
Chad	1.35	1.91	2.04	2.52	42.24
Congo	2.18	3.09	3.3	1.44	0.72
Côte d'Ivoire	1.99	2.75	2.94	13.16	90.12
DRC	2.42	2.75	2.94	19.68	852.48
Eritrea	1.73	2.45	2.62	0.64	2.36
Ethiopia	1.37	2.04	2.18	4.04	64.04
Gabon	1.51	1.91	2.04	3	1.12
Gambia	1.53	2.04	2.18	0.56	0.56
Ghana	1.42	1.91	2.04	3.28	139
Guinea	1.82	2.57	2.75	5.36	31.84
Guinea-Bissau	1.64	1.91	2.04	2.6	2.4
Kenya	1.86	2.14	2.29	21.4	265.76
Lesotho	1.62	2.29	2.45	2.24	5.56
Liberia	1.73	2.45	2.62	4.84	84.04
Madagascar	1.94	2.75	2.94	3.4	16.36
Malawi	1.86	2.57	2.75	5.52	6.4
Mali	1.9	2.57	2.75	7.84	29.72
Mauritania	1.84	2.7	2.88	4.32	16.12
Mauritius	1.64	2.57	2.75	0.32	0.44
Mozambique	1.72	2.04	2.18	3.4	10
Namibia	1.4	2.29	2.45	1.16	2.76
Niger	1.95	2.57	2.75	7.84	12
Nigeria	2.33	3.3	3.53	59.12	1090.6
Rwanda	1.89	1.59	1.7	3.72	147.48
Senegal	2.14	3.09	3.3	6.92	7.16
Sierra Leone	2.68	2.94	3.15	4.2	12.48
Somalia	1.8	2.29	2.45	21.4	221.24
South Africa	1.47	1.91	2.04	40.72	300.36
Sudan	1.64	2.57	2.75	18.08	363.2
Swaziland	1.72	2.45	2.62	3.36	0.2

	Tanzania	1.85	2.57	2.75	3.88	7.12
	Togo	1.59	2.24	2.4	4.52	13.84
	Uganda	1.92	2.45	2.62	4.2	14.2
	Zambia	1.94	2.75	2.94	5.44	3.2
	Zimbabwe	1.65	2.04	2.18	15.76	6.44

Table 7 continued

	Elections Violence (Average)		Land Violence (Average)		Ethnic Violence (Average)	
	Frequency	Fatalities	Frequency	Fatalities	Frequency	Fatalities
Angola	0.12	0	0	0	0.08	0.08
Benin	0.6	0.16	0	0	0.08	0.08
Botswana	0	0	0	0	0.08	0
Burkina Faso	0.16	0	0.08	0.84	0.12	0.4
Burundi	0.28	0.64	0.04	0	0.76	19.56
Cameroon	0.4	0.28	0.36	2.6	0.36	2.24
C.A.R.	0.32	4.76	0.12	3.28	0.84	6.76
Chad	0.16	0.04	0.12	5.6	0.44	28.04
Congo	0.16	0.04	0	0	0	0
Côte d'Ivoire	2.32	19.56	0.36	3.04	0.96	36.2
DRC	1.6	48.28	0.44	226.48	4.8	655.4
Eritrea	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ethiopia	0.32	4.08	0.44	23.84	1.16	39.12
Gabon	0.72	0.36	0	0	0	0
Gambia	0.04	0.08	0	0	0.04	0
Ghana	0.64	0.8	0.04	0.12	0.6	131.76
Guinea	1.72	8.6	0.04	2.4	0.36	9.2
Guinea-Bissau	0.2	0.12	0.04	0.04	0.08	1.24
Kenya	2.56	72.88	1.12	30.32	3.76	136.96
Lesotho	0.64	1.96	0.04	0.24	0.04	1.36
Liberia	0.28	0.16	0	0	0.84	14.96
Madagascar	0.52	2.04	0.04	0	0.08	0.12
Malawi	0.88	2.08	0.08	0	0.12	0.2
Mali	0.36	0.32	0.12	1.4	1.84	6.96
Mauritania	0.44	0.28	0	0	0.96	15.04
Mauritius	0.04	0.04	0.04	0	0	0
Mozambique	0.28	3.52	0	0	0.04	0.04
Namibia	0.08	0.04	0	0	0.12	0
Niger	0.24	0	0.24	0.96	0.52	4.88

Nigeria	4.68	216.96	2.12	87.2	14.32	839.2
Rwanda	0.36	0.32	0	0	0.64	35.24
Senegal	0.8	0.52	0	0	0.72	0.96
Sierra Leone	0.64	1.12	0.04	0.04	0.08	2
Somalia	0.08	0.52	0.92	16.96	4.36	105.2
South Africa	1.84	6.84	0.68	4.68	9.04	203.6
Sudan	0.64	2.6	1.24	65.28	3.12	164.08
Swaziland	0.04	0	0.08	0	0	0
Tanzania	1.16	1.92	0.04	1.24	0.76	0.4
Togo	1	4.44	0.04	0.8	0.16	3.52
Uganda	0.56	0.64	0.08	0	0.4	8.8
Zambia	0.96	0.2	0	0	0.08	0.08
Zimbabwe	2.16	4.84	0.6	0	0.48	0.04

Table 8: Event Frequency, Unweighted ACPI Scores

	(1a) Elections	(2a) Land	(3a) Inter-ethnic	(4a) Other
ACPI Score, unweighted	0.720	0.366	1.663**	0.280
	(0.487)	(0.571)	(0.570)	(0.197)
Pop. Density, log	0.184	-0.253	-0.259	-0.200
	(0.363)	(0.410)	(0.479)	(0.165)
GDP per capita	0.000*	-0.001	-0.001	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ethnic Fractionalization	2.064**	0.450	1.113	-0.150
	(0.879)	(1.218)	(0.901)	(0.504)
Immigrant Pop., log	-0.142	-0.598**	-0.409**	-0.009
	(0.171)	(0.237)	(0.202)	(0.084)
Regime Type	0.027	0.027	0.109**	0.034*
	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.021)
Excluded Pop., log	-0.076	-0.239	0.061	0.098
	(0.126)	(0.213)	(0.205)	(0.081)
Law Year	0.933**	1.383***	0.836***	0.147
	(0.319)	(0.297)	(0.139)	(0.147)
Election Year	2.098***	-0.136	0.097	-0.282**
	(0.142)	(0.206)	(0.127)	(0.106)
Arable Land Size, log	0.105	0.566	0.229	0.200
	(0.353)	(0.466)	(0.449)	(0.149)
Minor Conflict	0.289	0.246	0.659**	0.291**
	(0.343)	(0.322)	(0.267)	(0.127)
War	-0.806	0.387	0.447	0.581***
	(0.688)	(0.335)	(0.403)	(0.142)
Inter-ethnic Violence Frequency				0.099***
				(0.026)
Land Violence Frequency				0.351***
				(0.068)
Election Violence Frequency				0.176***
				(0.025)
Observations	1020	1020	1020	1020

Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 clusters.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.

Table 9: Event Frequency, Unweighted ACPI Scores and Lags

	(1a) Elections	(2a) Land	(3a) Inter-ethnic	(4a) Other
ACPI Score, unweighted	0.719	0.462	1.634**	0.282
	(0.492)	(0.575)	(0.565)	(0.191)
Pop. Density, logged and lagged	0.123	-0.373	-0.301	-0.247
	(0.364)	(0.410)	(0.489)	(0.157)
GDP per capita, lagged	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ethnic Fractionalization, lagged	2.140**	0.382	1.196	-0.088
	(0.876)	(1.232)	(0.880)	(0.489)
Immigrant Pop., logged and lagged	-0.130	-0.618**	-0.424**	-0.016
	(0.169)	(0.234)	(0.199)	(0.076)
Regime Type, lagged	0.020	0.020	0.092**	0.020
	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.020)
Excluded Pop., logged and lagged	-0.075	-0.155	0.038	0.080
	(0.120)	(0.239)	(0.208)	(0.079)
Law Year	0.984**	1.344***	0.986***	0.157
	(0.314)	(0.284)	(0.167)	(0.135)
Election Year	2.116***	-0.086	0.221	-0.307**
	(0.136)	(0.215)	(0.136)	(0.100)
Arable Land Size, logged and lagged	0.152	0.654	0.263	0.245*
	(0.358)	(0.460)	(0.464)	(0.146)
Minor Conflict	0.304	0.302	0.647**	0.284**
	(0.345)	(0.335)	(0.271)	(0.124)
War	-0.832	0.433	0.443	0.504***
	(0.634)	(0.300)	(0.347)	(0.140)
Inter-ethnic Violence Frequency				0.103***
				(0.027)
Land Violence Frequency				0.340***
				(0.065)
Election Violence Frequency				0.180***
				(0.025)
Observations	1022	1022	1022	1022

Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 clusters.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.

Table 10: Fatality Rates, Unweighted ACPI Scores

	(1b) Elections	(2b) Land	(3b) Inter-ethnic	(4b) Other
ACPI Score, unweighted	4.331**	2.281*	2.915***	0.931*
	(1.355)	(1.269)	(0.824)	(0.498)
Pop. Density, log	0.097	-0.382	0.552	0.237
	(0.740)	(0.982)	(0.659)	(0.277)
GDP per capita	0.002*	-0.001	-0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Ethnic Fractionalization	2.631	6.747**	4.670**	1.252
	(1.727)	(3.253)	(1.574)	(0.953)
Immigrant Pop., log	-0.043	-1.470**	-0.543*	-0.107
	(0.343)	(0.525)	(0.291)	(0.166)
Regime Type	0.142*	0.036	0.058	-0.001
	(0.074)	(0.098)	(0.074)	(0.036)
Excluded Pop., log	-0.329	-0.197	0.345	0.073
	(0.297)	(0.409)	(0.350)	(0.211)
Law Year	0.232	1.029	0.085	0.243
	(0.773)	(0.734)	(0.329)	(0.264)
Election Year	2.279***	-0.229	-0.190	-0.321
	(0.478)	(0.400)	(0.321)	(0.230)
Arable Land Size, log	0.432	0.515	-0.575	-0.275
	(0.790)	(0.968)	(0.571)	(0.314)
Minor Conflict	1.439*	1.167*	1.332**	0.837**
	(0.772)	(0.687)	(0.530)	(0.280)
War	-0.975	2.453**	1.928**	1.762**
	(0.917)	(1.194)	(0.817)	(0.587)
Election Violence Fatalities				0.006
				(0.006)
Land Violence Fatalities				0.006
				(0.006)
Inter-ethnic Violence Fatalities				0.005**
				(0.002)
Observations	1020	1020	1020	1020

Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 clusters.
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.

Table 11: Fatality Rates, Unweighted ACPI Scores and Lags

	(1b) Elections	(2b) Land	(3b) Inter-ethnic	(4b) Other
ACPI Score, unweighted	4.118**	1.905*	2.510**	0.793
	(1.410)	(1.093)	(0.781)	(0.499)
Pop. Density, log	0.015	-0.230	0.464	0.190
	(0.749)	(0.787)	(0.700)	(0.280)
GDP per capita	0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Ethnic Fractionalization	2.797	7.874**	5.376***	1.245
	(1.718)	(2.939)	(1.597)	(0.994)
Immigrant Pop., log	0.035	-1.674***	-0.716**	-0.138
	(0.364)	(0.487)	(0.311)	(0.161)
Regime Type	0.122*	0.016	0.019	-0.020
	(0.074)	(0.089)	(0.070)	(0.037)
Excluded Pop., log	-0.471	0.085	0.237	-0.032
	(0.310)	(0.365)	(0.346)	(0.199)
Law Year	0.344	0.897	0.337	0.305
	(0.711)	(0.677)	(0.326)	(0.278)
Election Year	2.042***	-0.034	-0.079	-0.357
	(0.500)	(0.375)	(0.322)	(0.223)
Arable Land Size, log	0.521	0.195	-0.482	-0.230
	(0.765)	(0.844)	(0.631)	(0.327)
Minor Conflict	1.337*	1.271*	1.251**	0.840**
	(0.749)	(0.659)	(0.520)	(0.279)
War	-0.942	2.214**	1.632**	1.627**
	(0.948)	(1.012)	(0.735)	(0.554)
Election Violence Fatalities				0.006
				(0.006)
Land Violence Fatalities				0.006
				(0.006)
Inter-ethnic Violence Fatalities				0.005**
				(0.002)
Observations	1022	1022	1022	1022

Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 clusters.
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.

Table 12: Event Frequency, 2x-Weighted ACPI Scores

	(1a) Elections	(2a) Land	(3a) Inter-ethnic	(4a) Other
ACPI Score, unweighted	0.507	0.256	1.171**	0.198
	(0.343)	(0.404)	(0.404)	(0.139)
Pop. Density, log	0.183	-0.253	-0.260	-0.200
	(0.363)	(0.410)	(0.480)	(0.165)
GDP per capita	0.000*	-0.001	-0.001	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ethnic Fractionalization	2.065**	0.452	1.115	-0.149
	(0.878)	(1.218)	(0.900)	(0.503)
Immigrant Pop., log	-0.142	-0.598**	-0.410**	-0.009
	(0.171)	(0.237)	(0.202)	(0.084)
Regime Type	0.027	0.027	0.109**	0.034*
	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.021)
Excluded Pop., log	-0.076	-0.239	0.062	0.098
	(0.126)	(0.213)	(0.205)	(0.081)
Law Year	0.932**	1.383***	0.835***	0.147
	(0.319)	(0.297)	(0.139)	(0.147)
Election Year	2.098***	-0.136	0.097	-0.282**
	(0.142)	(0.206)	(0.128)	(0.106)
Arable Land Size, log	0.106	0.566	0.231	0.200
	(0.353)	(0.466)	(0.450)	(0.149)
Minor Conflict	0.288	0.246	0.659**	0.291**
	(0.343)	(0.322)	(0.268)	(0.127)
War	-0.806	0.387	0.446	0.581***
	(0.688)	(0.334)	(0.402)	(0.142)
Inter-ethnic Violence Frequency				0.099***
				(0.026)
Land Violence Frequency				0.351***
				(0.068)
Election Violence Frequency				0.176***
				(0.025)
Observations	1020	1020	1020	1020

Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 clusters.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.

Table 13: Event Frequency, 2x-Weighted ACPI Scores and Lags

	(1a) Elections	(2a) Land	(3a) Inter-ethnic	(4a) Other
ACPI Score, unweighted	0.506	0.324	1.151**	0.199
	(0.346)	(0.406)	(0.400)	(0.135)
Pop. Density, logged and lagged	0.122	-0.373	-0.303	-0.247
	(0.365)	(0.410)	(0.489)	(0.157)
GDP per capita, lagged	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ethnic Fractionalization, lagged	2.141**	0.383	1.197	-0.087
	(0.875)	(1.232)	(0.880)	(0.489)
Immigrant Pop., logged and lagged	-0.130	-0.618**	-0.424**	-0.016
	(0.169)	(0.234)	(0.199)	(0.076)
Regime Type, lagged	0.020	0.020	0.092**	0.020
	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.020)
Excluded Pop., logged and lagged	-0.075	-0.156	0.039	0.080
	(0.120)	(0.239)	(0.208)	(0.079)
Law Year	0.983**	1.344***	0.985***	0.157
	(0.314)	(0.283)	(0.167)	(0.135)
Election Year	2.116***	-0.086	0.221	-0.306**
	(0.136)	(0.215)	(0.136)	(0.100)
Arable Land Size, logged and lagged	0.153	0.655	0.265	0.245*
	(0.358)	(0.461)	(0.465)	(0.146)
Minor Conflict	0.303	0.303	0.647**	0.284**
	(0.345)	(0.335)	(0.271)	(0.124)
War	-0.833	0.433	0.443	0.504***
	(0.634)	(0.300)	(0.346)	(0.140)
Inter-ethnic Violence Frequency				0.103***
				(0.027)
Land Violence Frequency				0.340***
				(0.065)
Election Violence Frequency				0.180***
				(0.025)
Observations	1022	1022	1022	1022

Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 clusters. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.

Table 14: Event Frequency, 3x-Weighted ACPI Scores

	(1b) Elections	(2b) Land	(3b) Inter-ethnic	(4b) Other
ACPI Score, unweighted	0.475	0.241	1.098**	0.185
	(0.321)	(0.377)	(0.376)	(0.131)
Pop. Density, log	0.182	-0.253	-0.261	-0.200
	(0.363)	(0.410)	(0.479)	(0.165)
GDP per capita	0.000*	-0.001	-0.001	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ethnic Fractionalization	2.063**	0.451	1.113	-0.150
	(0.878)	(1.218)	(0.900)	(0.504)
Immigrant Pop., log	-0.142	-0.598**	-0.409**	-0.008
	(0.171)	(0.237)	(0.202)	(0.084)
Regime Type	0.027	0.027	0.109**	0.034*
	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.021)
Excluded Pop., log	-0.076	-0.239	0.062	0.098
	(0.126)	(0.213)	(0.205)	(0.081)
Law Year	0.932**	1.383***	0.834***	0.147
	(0.319)	(0.297)	(0.139)	(0.147)
Election Year	2.098***	-0.136	0.096	-0.282**
	(0.142)	(0.206)	(0.128)	(0.106)
Arable Land Size, log	0.106	0.567	0.230	0.200
	(0.353)	(0.466)	(0.449)	(0.149)
Minor Conflict	0.289	0.246	0.660**	0.291**
	(0.343)	(0.322)	(0.267)	(0.127)
War	-0.805	0.387	0.448	0.582***
	(0.688)	(0.335)	(0.403)	(0.142)
Election Violence Fatalities				0.099***
				(0.026)
Land Violence Fatalities				0.351***
				(0.068)
Inter-ethnic Violence Fatalities				0.176***
				(0.025)
Observations	1020	1020	1020	1020

Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 clusters. *$p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.001$.

Table 15: Event Frequency, 3x-Weighted ACPI Scores and Lags

	(1a) Elections	(2a) Land	(3a) Inter-ethnic	(4a) Other
ACPI Score, unweighted	0.474	0.304	1.079**	0.186
	(0.324)	(0.380)	(0.373)	(0.127)
Pop. Density, logged and lagged	0.121	-0.374	-0.303	-0.247
	(0.365)	(0.410)	(0.488)	(0.157)
GDP per capita, lagged	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ethnic Fractionalization, lagged	2.139**	0.382	1.195	-0.087
	(0.876)	(1.232)	(0.880)	(0.489)
Immigrant Pop., logged and lagged	-0.129	-0.618**	-0.424**	-0.016
	(0.169)	(0.234)	(0.199)	(0.076)
Regime Type, lagged	0.020	0.020	0.092**	0.020
	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.020)
Excluded Pop., logged and lagged	-0.074	-0.155	0.039	0.080
	(0.120)	(0.239)	(0.208)	(0.079)
Law Year	0.983**	1.343***	0.984***	0.157
	(0.314)	(0.284)	(0.166)	(0.135)
Election Year	2.116***	-0.086	0.221	-0.307**
	(0.136)	(0.215)	(0.136)	(0.100)
Arable Land Size, logged and lagged	0.153	0.655	0.264	0.245*
	(0.358)	(0.460)	(0.464)	(0.146)
Minor Conflict	0.304	0.303	0.647**	0.284**
	(0.345)	(0.335)	(0.271)	(0.124)
War	-0.832	0.433	0.446	0.505***
	(0.634)	(0.300)	(0.347)	(0.140)
Inter-ethnic Violence Frequency				0.103***
				(0.027)
Land Violence Frequency				0.340***
				(0.065)
Election Violence Frequency				0.180***
				(0.025)
Observations	1022	1022	1022	1022

Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 clusters. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.

Table 16: Fatality Rates, 2x-Weighted ACPI Scores

	(1b) Elections	(2b) Land	(3b) Inter-ethnic	(4b) Other
ACPI Score, unweighted	3.031**	1.612*	2.052***	0.654*
	(0.951)	(0.896)	(0.583)	(0.351)
Pop. Density, log	0.090	-0.390	0.552	0.237
	(0.742)	(0.985)	(0.660)	(0.277)
GDP per capita	0.002*	-0.001	-0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Ethnic Fractionalization	2.685	6.740**	4.656**	1.252
	(1.722)	(3.248)	(1.575)	(0.954)
Immigrant Pop., log	-0.050	-1.473**	-0.540*	-0.107
	(0.343)	(0.523)	(0.292)	(0.166)
Regime Type	0.140*	0.036	0.058	-0.002
	(0.074)	(0.097)	(0.074)	(0.036)
Excluded Pop., log	-0.331	-0.199	0.343	0.073
	(0.298)	(0.409)	(0.351)	(0.211)
Law Year	0.217	1.027	0.084	0.241
	(0.768)	(0.732)	(0.329)	(0.264)
Election Year	2.275***	-0.226	-0.190	-0.320
	(0.479)	(0.400)	(0.321)	(0.230)
Arable Land Size, log	0.439	0.525	-0.573	-0.273
	(0.793)	(0.973)	(0.572)	(0.314)
Minor Conflict	1.435*	1.172*	1.327**	0.837**
	(0.771)	(0.687)	(0.530)	(0.280)
War	-0.967	2.454**	1.914**	1.758**
	(0.917)	(1.191)	(0.816)	(0.586)
Election Violence Fatalities				0.006
				(0.006)
Land Violence Fatalities				0.006
				(0.006)
Inter-ethnic Violence Fatalities				0.005**
				(0.002)
Observations	1020	1020	1020	1020

Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 clusters.
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.

Table 17: Fatality Rates, 2x-Weighted ACPI Scores and Lags

	(1a) Elections	(2a) Land	(3a) Inter-ethnic	(4a) Other
ACPI Score, unweighted	2.879**	1.347*	1.765**	0.557
	(0.989)	(0.773)	(0.553)	(0.351)
Pop. Density, logged and lagged	0.008	-0.237	0.464	0.189
	(0.751)	(0.790)	(0.702)	(0.281)
GDP per capita, lagged	0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Ethnic Fractionalization, lagged	2.849*	7.863**	5.368***	1.245
	(1.718)	(2.941)	(1.599)	(0.995)
Immigrant Pop., logged and lagged	0.029	-1.675***	-0.715**	-0.138
	(0.366)	(0.486)	(0.311)	(0.161)
Regime Type, lagged	0.120	0.016	0.018	-0.021
	(0.074)	(0.089)	(0.070)	(0.037)
Excluded Pop., logged and lagged	-0.473	0.083	0.235	-0.032
	(0.312)	(0.366)	(0.347)	(0.199)
Law Year	0.329	0.896	0.336	0.304
	(0.707)	(0.676)	(0.325)	(0.278)
Election Year	2.035***	-0.031	-0.079	-0.356
	(0.501)	(0.376)	(0.322)	(0.223)
Arable Land Size, logged and lagged	0.527	0.203	-0.479	-0.229
	(0.766)	(0.850)	(0.632)	(0.327)
Minor Conflict	1.331*	1.274*	1.246**	0.841**
	(0.748)	(0.659)	(0.520)	(0.279)
War	-0.938	2.214**	1.622**	1.624**
	(0.949)	(1.011)	(0.735)	(0.553)
Inter-ethnic Violence Frequency				0.005**
				(0.002)
Land Violence Frequency				0.006
				(0.006)
Election Violence Frequency				0.006
				(0.006)
Observations	1022	1022	1022	1022

Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 clusters. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.

Table 18: Fatality Rates, 3x-Weighted ACPI Scores

	(1b) Elections	(2b) Land	(3b) Inter-ethnic	(4b) Other
ACPI Score, unweighted	2.850**	1.505*	1.918***	0.613*
	(0.890)	(0.839)	(0.542)	(0.328)
Pop. Density, log	0.090	-0.387	0.552	0.236
	(0.741)	(0.985)	(0.658)	(0.277)
GDP per capita	0.002*	-0.001	-0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Ethnic Fractionalization	2.655	6.752**	4.661**	1.250
	(1.724)	(3.251)	(1.574)	(0.953)
Immigrant Pop., log	-0.044	-1.473**	-0.542*	-0.106
	(0.343)	(0.524)	(0.292)	(0.166)
Regime Type	0.142*	0.036	0.058	-0.001
	(0.074)	(0.098)	(0.074)	(0.036)
Excluded Pop., log	-0.330	-0.198	0.344	0.074
	(0.297)	(0.409)	(0.350)	(0.211)
Law Year	0.225	1.026	0.082	0.241
	(0.770)	(0.734)	(0.329)	(0.264)
Election Year	2.275***	-0.227	-0.191	-0.320
	(0.479)	(0.401)	(0.321)	(0.230)
Arable Land Size, log	0.438	0.520	-0.575	-0.273
	(0.791)	(0.972)	(0.570)	(0.314)
Minor Conflict	1.436*	1.170*	1.332**	0.837**
	(0.772)	(0.688)	(0.530)	(0.280)
War	-0.964	2.455**	1.922**	1.761**
	(0.917)	(1.194)	(0.815)	(0.586)
Election Violence Fatalities				0.006
				(0.006)
Land Violence Fatalities				0.006
				(0.006)
Inter-ethnic Violence Fatalities				0.005**
				(0.002)
Observations	1020	1020	1020	1020

Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 clusters.
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.

Table 19: Fatality Rates, 3x-Weighted ACPI Scores and Lags

	(1a) Elections	(2a) Land	(3a) Inter-ethnic	(4a) Other
ACPI Score, unweighted	2.708**	1.258*	1.652**	0.522
	(0.927)	(0.723)	(0.514)	(0.328)
Pop. Density, logged and lagged	0.008	-0.235	0.464	0.189
	(0.750)	(0.789)	(0.700)	(0.281)
GDP per capita, lagged	0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Ethnic Fractionalization, lagged	2.818	7.875**	5.371***	1.244
	(1.718)	(2.938)	(1.598)	(0.994)
Immigrant Pop., logged and lagged	0.034	-1.675***	-0.715**	-0.137
	(0.366)	(0.487)	(0.311)	(0.161)
Regime Type, lagged	0.121*	0.016	0.018	-0.020
	(0.074)	(0.089)	(0.070)	(0.037)
Excluded Pop., logged and lagged	-0.472	0.085	0.236	-0.031
	(0.311)	(0.365)	(0.346)	(0.199)
Law Year	0.335	0.894	0.333	0.304
	(0.709)	(0.677)	(0.326)	(0.278)
Election Year	2.036***	-0.032	-0.080	-0.356
	(0.501)	(0.376)	(0.322)	(0.223)
Arable Land Size, logged and lagged	0.526	0.199	-0.481	-0.229
	(0.765)	(0.848)	(0.630)	(0.327)
Minor Conflict	1.333*	1.273*	1.250**	0.840**
	(0.749)	(0.659)	(0.520)	(0.279)
War	-0.933	2.216**	1.628**	1.626**
	(0.950)	(1.012)	(0.734)	(0.554)
Inter-ethnic Violence Frequency				0.005**
				(0.002)
Land Violence Frequency				0.006
				(0.006)
Election Violence Frequency				0.006
				(0.006)
Observations	1022	1022	1022	1022

Standard errors appear in parentheses, constant estimates are suppressed, and there are 42 clusters. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.

Table 20: Original Afrobarometer Questions

Dependent Variable Questions

AQ-26E
Question: Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Used force or violence for a political cause
Value Labels: 0=No, would never do this, 1=No, but would do if had the chance, 2=Yes, once or twice, 3=Yes, several times, 4=Yes, often, 9=Don't know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Note: Author collapsed into binary variable

AQ-54
Question: During election campaigns in this country, how much do you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence?
Value Labels: 0=A lot, 1=Somewhat, 2=A little bit, 3=Not at all, 9=Don't know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Note: Author collapsed into binary variable

Independent Variable Questions

AQ-27
Question: With regard to the most recent national election in [20xx], which statement is true for you?
Value Labels: 0=You were not registered to vote, 1=You voted in the elections, 2=You decided not to vote, 3=You could not find the polling station, 4=You were prevented from voting, 5=You did not have time to vote, 6= You did not vote because you could not find your name in the voters" register, 7=Did not vote for some other reason, 8= You were too young to vote, 9=Don't know/Can't remember, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Note: Author collapsed into 3-category variable

AQ-67A
Question: Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to obtain the following services from government? Or do you never try and get these services from government: An identity document, such as a birth certificate, driver's license, passport or voter's card?
Value Labels: 1=Very difficult, 2=Difficult, 3=Easy, 4=Very easy, 5=Never try, 9=Don't know/Haven't heard enough, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion
Note: Author collapsed into 3-category variable

AQ-85A

Question: How often is [Respondent's Ethnic Group] treated unfairly by the government?
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Sometimes, 2=Often, 3=Always, 7=Not applicable, 9=Don't know, 997=Not asked, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Note: Interviewer entered respondent "s exact response. If respondent did not identify any group on this question – that is, if they "Refused to answer" (9998), said "Don't know" (9999), or "national ID only" (9990) – then the interviewer marked "Not applicable" for questions Q85A-Q85B and continued to question 85C.
Note: Not asked in Sudan, Author collapsed into 3-category variable

AQ-86A
Question: In your opinion, which of the following people have a right to be a citizen of the country? A citizen would have the right to get a passport and to vote in national elections if they are at least 18 years old: A person born in the country with one national and one non-national parent?
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Don't know, 997=Not asked, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Note: Not asked in Sudan, Author merged with AQ-86B & E and collapsed into 3-category variable

AQ-86B
Question: In your opinion, which of the following people have a right to be a citizen of the country? A citizen would have the right to get a passport and to vote in national elections if they are at least 18 years old: A person born in the country with two non-national parents?
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Don't know, 997=Not asked, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Note: Not asked in Sudan, Author merged with AQ-86A & E and collapsed into 3-category variable

AQ-86E
Question: In your opinion, which of the following people have a right to be a citizen of the country? A citizen would have the right to get a passport and to vote in national elections if they are at least 18 years old: The wife of a national man, even if she was born outside of the country?
Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Don't know, 997=Not asked, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Note: Not asked in Sudan, Author merged with AQ-86A & B and collapsed into 3-category variable

Control Variable Questions

Interviewer's gender
Values: 1=Male, 2=Female, -1=Missing
Note: Answered by interviewer

AQ-1
Question: How old are you?

Values: 18-100, 105, 998=Refused to answer, 999=Don't know, -1=Missing

AQ-84
Question: Let us get back to talking about you. What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?
Note: See Afrobarometer R5 codebook for value labels.

AQ-105
Question: What was the roof of the respondent's home or shelter made of?
Value Labels: 1= Metal, tin or zinc, 2= Tiles, 3= Shingles, 4= Thatch or grass, 5= Plastic sheets, 6= Asbestos, 7=Multiple materials, 8=Some other material, 9=Could not tell/ could not see, 10=Concrete, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Note: Author collapsed into 5-category variable.

AQ-117
Question: Interviewer's highest level of education
Value Labels: 3=Primary school completed, 4=Some secondary/high school, 5=High school completed, 6=Post-secondary qualifications other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a polytechnic or college, 7=Some university, 8=University, completed, 9=Post graduate, -1=Missing
Note: Author collapsed into 4-category variable.

AQ-98A
Question: What is your religion, if any?
Note: Author collapsed into 5-category variable. See Afrobarometer R5 Codebook for Value Labels.

Table 21: Descriptive statistics, Afrobarometer

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Years	45,589			2011	2013
Country	45,589			1	29
Census district	45,589			1	1523
Document Access	45,589	1.190	0.891	0	2
Difficult	23,247				
Easy	7,774				
Other	14,568				
Citizenship Rule Preferences	45589	0.496	0.612	0	2
Exclusionary	2,840				
Inclusionary	16,950				
Other	25,799				
Voting Access	45,589	0.767	0.458	0	2
Prevented	716				
Voted	33,531				
Other	11,342				
Ethnic Group Treatment	45,589	0.858	0.663	0	2
Unfair	7,252				
Fair	24,613				
Other	13,724				
Fear of Violence	45,589	0.179	0.383	0	1
Used Violence	45,589	0.031	0.172	0	1
Age*	45,589	36.979	14.521	18	105
Ethnicity*	45,589	531.382	443.964	1	2760
Female	45,589	1.500	0.500	1	2
Wealth	45,589	2.594	0.894	0	4
Indeterminate	3,373				
Plastic Sheets	203				
Thatch/Grass	10,394				
Metal/Asbestos	29,216				
Tiles/Shingles	2,403				
Education	45,589	0.768	0.739	0	3
Less than Primary	17,393				
Primary to High School	22,916				
Post- High School	3,726				
University or Higher	1,554				
Religion	45,589	1.285	0.633	0	4
No response	2,601				
Christian	29,145				
Muslim	12,224				
Other Religion	1,482				

Atheist/Agnostic	137

* For these variables, I removed indeterminate, "don't know" and "no response" categories in calculating the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum. The number of observations given still includes these categories.

Table 22: Citizenship Security and Violence

	Fear	Use
	(1c)	(2c)
0.Other Document Access	-0.055	0.188
	(0.103)	(0.180)
2.Difficult Document Access	0.221*	0.350**
	(0.119)	(0.163)
0.Other Group Treatment	0.185	0.121
	(0.146)	(0.194)
2.Unfair Group Treatment	0.693***	1.044***
	(0.175)	(0.237)
0.Other Document Access x 0.Other Group Treatment	0.037	0.102
	(0.161)	(0.261)
0.Other Document Access x 2.Unfair Group Treatment	-0.246	-0.181
	(0.163)	(0.207)
2.Difficult Document Access x 0.Other Group Treatment	-0.035	-0.053
	(0.166)	(0.203)
2.Difficult Document Access x 2.Unfair Group Treatment	-0.158	-0.672**
	(0.189)	(0.250)
0.Other Citizenship Rules	-0.012	0.159
	(0.050)	(0.136)
2.Exclusionary Citizenship Rules	0.055	0.437*
	(0.106)	(0.240)
0. Other Voting Rights	0.092**	0.005
	(0.042)	(0.111)
2. Prevented Voting Rights	0.027	0.461**
	(0.102)	(0.184)
Age	-0.000	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ethnicity	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Urban/Rural Residence	-0.089	0.152
	(0.058)	(0.094)
Income Level	0.033	-0.074
	(0.034)	(0.055)
Female	0.264***	-0.288***
	(0.035)	(0.045)
Education Level	-0.093**	-0.037
	(0.030)	(0.060)
1.Christian	-0.030	0.025
	(0.082)	(0.151)
2.Muslim	0.070	0.141
	(0.162)	(0.163)

3.Other Religion	-0.140	-0.307
	(0.184)	(0.318)
4.Atheist/Agnostic	-0.528**	-0.729
	(0.259)	(0.957)
District	-0.002	-0.029
	(0.014)	(0.020)
Observations	45589	45589

Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Constant and fixed effects estimates suppressed.

Table 23: Citizenship Security and Violence, Robust Models

	Fear (1d)	Use (2d)
0.Other Document Access	-0.050	0.197
	(0.103)	(0.181)
2.Difficult Document Access	0.093	0.350*
	(0.105)	(0.179)
3.Very Difficult Document Access	0.407**	0.358**
	(0.137)	(0.181)
0.Other Group Treatment	0.198	0.133
	(0.148)	(0.201)
2.Unfair Group Treatment	0.650***	1.012***
	(0.177)	(0.246)
0.Other Document Access x 0.Other Group Treatment	0.025	0.095
	(0.162)	(0.261)
0.Other Document Access x 2.Unfair Group Treatment	-0.233	-0.172
	(0.162)	(0.210)
2.Difficult Document Access x 0.Other Group Treatment	0.047	0.021
	(0.164)	(0.290)
2.Difficult Document Access x 2.Unfair Group Treatment	-0.207	-0.516*
	(0.167)	(0.307)
3.Very Difficult Document Access x 0.Other Group Treatment	-0.159	-0.197
	(0.195)	(0.197)
3.Very Difficult Document Access x 2.Unfair Group Treatment	-0.125	-0.853***
	(0.234)	(0.244)
0.Other Citizenship Rules	-0.012	0.161
	(0.049)	(0.137)
2.Exclusionary Citizenship Rules	0.044	0.436*
	(0.103)	(0.241)
0. Other Voting Rights	0.090**	0.004
	(0.041)	(0.109)
2. Prevented Voting Rights	0.022	0.459**
	(0.101)	(0.184)
Age	-0.000	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ethnicity	0.000**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Urban/Rural Residence	-0.096*	0.158*
	(0.058)	(0.091)
Income Level	0.037	-0.069
	(0.033)	(0.057)
Female	0.266***	-0.291***
	(0.035)	(0.045)

Education Level	-0.085**	-0.034
	(0.031)	(0.059)
1.Christian	-0.026	0.025
	(0.080)	(0.150)
2.Muslim	0.065	0.139
	(0.161)	(0.160)
3.Other Religion	-0.141	-0.323
	(0.180)	(0.314)
4.Atheist/Agnostic	-0.507**	-0.728
	(0.258)	(0.958)
District	-0.002	-0.029
	(0.014)	(0.020)
Observations	45589	45589

Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Constant and fixed effects estimates suppressed.

Table 24: Original Field Survey Questions

Dependent Variable Questions

FS-11

Question: Which of the following statements is closest to your view?

Values: 3= It is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause, 2= The use of violence is never justified in politics, 1=Agree with neither, 99=Don't know, 77=Refused to answer

Note: Author collapsed into binary variable

Independent Variable Questions

FS-8

Question: Let's suppose that you had to choose between being a Ghanaian and being a [*Group from Q5*]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?

Values: 5=Only national identification, 4=More national identification, 3= Equal attachment to ethnic and national identity, 2=more ethnic identification, 1=only ethnic identification, 99=Don't know, 77=Refused to answer

Note: Author collapsed into 4-category variable

FS-9

Question: In your community, who receives goods and services from the government?

Values: 3= Everyone, 2= Only people who helped get the ruling party elected, 1= Only members of the ruling party's ethnic group, 99=Don't know, 77=Refused to answer

Note: Author collapsed into 4-category variable

FS-10

Question: If you disagree with something the government is doing and one of the following individuals [A leader of the political party that you support, Local government officials, Religious, or traditional leaders] calls on you to join them and their supporters in working to solve the problem, how likely are you to agree?

Values: 3=Very likely, 2=Likely, 1=Not at all likely, 99=Don't know, 77=Refused to answer

Note: Author collapsed into 3-category variable

Control Variable Questions

Interviewer's gender

Value Labels: 1=Male, 2=Female, -1=Missing
Note: Answered by interviewer

FS-1
Question: How old are you?
Values: 18-84, 777=Refused to answer, 999=Don't know

FS-4
Question: Which language do you speak at home? That is, the language of your group of origin.
Values: Abbey, Abidji, Aboure, Abron, Adjoukrou, Agni, Ahanta, Ahizi, Akan, Alladjan, Appolo, Attie, Avikam, Bakoue, Bambara, Baoule, Bete, Boussanga/Burkina, Bulsa, Dagaare, Dagaati, Dagbani, Dagomba, Dida, Djimini, Dogo, Ebrie, Ehotile, English, Ewe, Fafara, Fanti, Francais, Ga/Dangbe, Gagou, Gnamboua, Godie, Gonja, Gouro, Guan, Guere, Hausa, Kotokoli, Koulango, Koyaka, Krobo, Kroumen, Kusasi, Lobi, M'Batta, Malinke/Dioula, Mamprusi, Mole/Burkina, More, Mossi/Burkina, N'Gbato, Narie, Neo, Ningo, Nzema, Odienneka, Senoufo, Sisaala, Siya, Toura, Wobe, Yacouba, Yorey, Other [Specify].

FS-6
Question: Think about the present condition of [Group from Q4]. How would you rate the political influence of [Group from Q4] compared to other ethnic groups in the country?
Values: 5=Much Better, 4=Better, 3=Same, 2=Worse, 1=Much worse, 99=Don't know, 77=Refused to answer
Note: Author collapsed into 4-category variable

FS-18
Question: Interviewer's highest level of education
Value Labels: 0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling only, 2=Some primary school, 3=Primary school completed, 4=Some secondary/high school, 5=High school completed, 6=Post-secondary qualifications other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a polytechnic or college, 7=Some university, 8=University, completed, 9=Post graduate, 99=Don't know, 77=Refused to answer
Note: Author collapsed into 5-category variable

FS-19
Question: What is your religion, if any?
Values: Christianity, Islam, Traditional/ethnic religion, Atheist (don't believe in God), Agnostic (don't know if there is a God), Other (Specify), Don't know, Refused to answer
Note: Author collapsed into 5-category variable

FS-20

Question: What is your occupation? Please only specify the main one

Values: Open-ended

Note: Author collapsed into 3-category variable

Experimental Groups

FS-15

Question: Now I'm going to give you some information about aid distribution and then I'll ask for your opinion. An aid organization has given a community leader a little money by to buy grain for families in the community. He only has enough money to buy grain for 50 households even though most families in the community need the grain. [Read T1, T2, or C]. Is this an acceptable way to distribute the grain?

    T1: He decides to give grain to members of his ethnic group (family/cultural group) only.

    T2: He decides to make sure that at least one household from each ethnic group (tribe, cultural group) in the community gets some grain.

    C: He decides to give grain to 50 households at random.

Values: 1=Yes, 0=No, 99=Don't know, 77=Refused to answer

Table 25: Descriptive Statistics, Field Surveys

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Percent
Support for violence	841	0.203	0.403	0	1	
Follow political party leader	841	1.503	0.576	0	2	
Other (political party)	34					4.04
Unlikely to follow (political party)	350					41.62
Likely to follow (political party)	247					29.37
Very likely to follow (political party)††	210					24.97
Follow government official	841	1.476	0.575	0	2	
Other (government official)	34					4.04
Unlikely to follow (government official)	373					44.35
Likely to follow (government official)	249					29.61
Very likely to follow (government official)††	185					22.00
Follow traditional leader	841	1.595	0.551	0	2	
Other (follow traditional leader)	26					3.09
Unlikely to follow (traditional leader)	289					34.36
Likely to follow (traditional leader)	275					32.70
Very likely to follow (traditional leader)††	251					29.85
Group political conditions	839	7.422	18.188	1	99	
Much Worse (political conditions)††	72					8.58
Worse (political conditions)	160					19.07
Same (political conditions)	333					39.69
Better (political conditions)	166					19.79
Much Better (political conditions)††	60					7.15
Other (political conditions)	48					5.72
Resource distribution	841	1.870	1.147	0	3	
Other (resource distribution)	140					16.65
Ethnic bias	194					23.07

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	N	Mean		Min	Max	%
Client bias	142					16.88
No bias	365					43.4
Ethnic/National identification	841	1.979	0.848	0	3	
Other (identification)	39					4.64
Only ethnic (identification)[††]	63					7.49
More ethnic (identification)	53					6.30
Equal (identification)	499					59.33
More national (identification)	58					6.90
Only national (identification)[††]	143					17.00
Education	841	2.232	0.839	0	4	
Other (education)	3					0.36
Primary school or less	130					15.46
High school or less	459					54.58
Some post-H.S.	167					19.86
University or Graduate school	82					9.75
Religion	841	1.837	0.684	0	4	
Other (religion)	30					3.57
Islam	165					19.62
Christianity	579					68.85
Traditional or Other religion	46					5.47
Atheist or Agnostic	21					2.5
Employed	841	1.496	0.559	0	2	
Other (employed)	26					3.09
No	372					44.23
Yes	443					52.68
Sex	840	0.607	3.435	0	99	
Men	428					50.95
Women	411					48.93
No response (sex)	1					0.12
Age	841	44.787	105.464	1	84	

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No response (age)	10					1.19
Language	841	11.541	9.371	0	30	
Locality	841	19.794	9.539	1	32	

Notes: The symbol †† indicates that this category is collapsed into an existing category for the primary analysis

Table 26: Predicting Support for Violence, Main Model

	Ghana			Côte d'Ivoire		
	(1e)	(2e)	(3e)	(4e)	(5e)	(6e)
Unlikely to follow political party	0.000			0.000		
	(.)			(.)		
Likely to follow political party	0.597**			1.201***		
	(0.263)			(0.237)		
Other (follow political party)	0.000			0.000		
	(.)			(.)		
Unlikely to follow traditional leader		0.000			0.000	
		(.)			(.)	
Likely to follow traditional leader		0.371			0.645***	
		(0.277)			(0.191)	
Other (follow traditional leader)		-0.208			0.000	
		(1.199)			(.)	
Unlikely to follow gov't official			0.000			0.000
			(.)			(.)
Likely to follow gov't official			0.255			0.581**
			(0.285)			(0.207)
Other (follow gov't official)			0.000			-0.579
			(.)			(0.396)
Worse political conditions	-0.669**	-0.631*	-0.569*	-0.583	-0.472	-0.514
	(0.322)	(0.329)	(0.319)	(0.493)	(0.502)	(0.513)
Similar political conditions	0.124	0.105	0.170	0.356	0.401	0.347
	(0.290)	(0.287)	(0.279)	(0.393)	(0.323)	(0.358)
Better political conditions	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Other (political conditions)	0.978**	0.877**	0.850**	1.128**	0.911**	0.609
	(0.424)	(0.383)	(0.395)	(0.469)	(0.427)	(0.443)
Ethnic bias	0.658	0.580	0.579	1.177***	1.056***	1.143***

	(0.545)	(0.507)	(0.497)	(0.261)	(0.256)	(0.259)
Client bias	1.223**	1.108**	1.086**	0.491	0.567*	0.588*
	(0.431)	(0.375)	(0.402)	(0.357)	(0.313)	(0.323)
No bias	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Other (bias)	0.978**	0.877**	0.850**	1.128**	0.911**	0.609
	(0.424)	(0.383)	(0.395)	(0.469)	(0.427)	(0.443)
More/Only ethnic identification	0.600	0.488	0.513	0.487**	0.375*	0.372*
	(0.453)	(0.453)	(0.441)	(0.202)	(0.215)	(0.193)
Equal identification	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
More/Only national identification	0.228	0.210	0.199	0.733**	0.668*	0.657*
	(0.326)	(0.316)	(0.310)	(0.356)	(0.380)	(0.362)
Other (identification)	0.099	0.010	0.111	-0.819	-0.772	-0.891
	(0.843)	(0.862)	(0.812)	(0.633)	(0.652)	(0.617)
Education Level	-0.267*	-0.281**	-0.280**	-0.006	0.005	0.030
	(0.141)	(0.134)	(0.131)	(0.181)	(0.186)	(0.180)
Religion	-0.175	-0.195	-0.173	-0.112	-0.093	-0.136
	(0.239)	(0.248)	(0.243)	(0.186)	(0.161)	(0.171)
Employed	-0.113	-0.050	-0.072	0.007	0.052	0.093
	(0.318)	(0.319)	(0.318)	(0.176)	(0.156)	(0.197)
Men	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Women	0.137	0.146	0.155	-0.554**	-0.546**	-0.550**
	(0.267)	(0.271)	(0.268)	(0.253)	(0.215)	(0.212)
Age	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ethnicity	-0.005	-0.007	-0.005	0.064**	0.061**	0.065**
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
RDR stronghold				-0.714**	-0.633**	-0.619**
				(0.261)	(0.299)	(0.292)
Constant	-1.732*	-1.599*	-1.458	-2.383**	-2.145**	-2.159**

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	(1.000)	(0.938)	(0.902)	(0.958)	(0.835)	(0.959)
Observations	426	438	427	374	379	395

Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

Table 27: Predicting Support for Violence, Grievance-Robust Model

	Ghana			Côte d'Ivoire		
	(1f)	(2f)	(3f)	(4f)	(5f)	(6f)
Unlikely to follow political party	0.000			0.000		
	(.)			(.)		
Likely to follow political party	0.610**			1.214***		
	(0.266)			(0.199)		
Other response (political party)	0.000			0.000		
	(.)			(.)		
Unlikely to follow traditional leader		0.000			0.572**	
		(.)			(0.190)	
Likely to follow traditional leader		0.411			0.000	
		(0.284)			(.)	
Other response (traditional leader)		-0.241			-0.684*	
		(1.192)			(0.399)	
Unlikely to follow gov't official			0.000			0.000
			(.)			(.)
Likely to follow gov't official			0.272			0.682***
			(0.291)			(0.171)
Other response (gov't official)			0.000			0.000
			(.)			(.)
Much worse political conditions	-1.102	-1.161	-1.070	-0.871	-1.016**	-0.986**
	(0.736)	(0.730)	(0.717)	(0.532)	(0.466)	(0.472)
Worse political conditions	-0.640*	-0.587	-0.512	-1.060*	-0.937	-0.967
	(0.371)	(0.391)	(0.380)	(0.618)	(0.588)	(0.617)
Similar political conditions	0.044	0.011	0.097	-0.035	-0.061	-0.094
	(0.303)	(0.305)	(0.291)	(0.395)	(0.320)	(0.344)
Better political conditions	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Much better political conditions	-0.405	-0.458	-0.379	-1.227**	-1.473**	-1.370**

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	(0.569)	(0.562)	(0.562)	(0.599)	(0.649)	(0.636)
Don't know (political)	-0.561	-0.552	-0.564	0.366	0.102	-0.073
	(0.795)	(0.799)	(0.799)	(1.159)	(1.038)	(1.001)
No response (political)	0.000	0.000	0.000	-1.387	-1.007	-1.198
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.991)	(1.226)	(1.105)
Ethnic bias	0.658	0.581	0.576	1.243***	1.136***	1.216***
	(0.559)	(0.530)	(0.515)	(0.284)	(0.267)	(0.267)
Client bias	1.221**	1.117**	1.082**	0.531	0.619*	0.649*
	(0.432)	(0.380)	(0.402)	(0.371)	(0.349)	(0.335)
No bias	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Other response (bias)	0.965**	0.877**	0.842**	1.263**	1.067**	0.746*
	(0.419)	(0.380)	(0.389)	(0.442)	(0.363)	(0.419)
More/Only ethnic identification	0.631	0.528	0.552	0.488**	0.395*	0.376*
	(0.440)	(0.439)	(0.426)	(0.230)	(0.226)	(0.204)
Equal identification	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
More/Only national identification	0.242	0.227	0.213	0.616*	0.548	0.532
	(0.325)	(0.318)	(0.312)	(0.366)	(0.393)	(0.367)
Other response (identification)	-0.264*	-0.277*	-0.279**	0.020	0.032	0.052
	(0.146)	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.169)	(0.167)	(0.161)
Education Level	-0.182	-0.206	-0.182	-0.095	-0.085	-0.139
	(0.245)	(0.255)	(0.248)	(0.184)	(0.161)	(0.171)
Religion	-0.117	-0.061	-0.083	-0.001	0.060	0.099
	(0.320)	(0.322)	(0.322)	(0.208)	(0.188)	(0.224)
Employed	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Men	0.136	0.144	0.156	-0.532**	-0.551**	-0.557**
	(0.272)	(0.279)	(0.276)	(0.222)	(0.205)	(0.201)
Women	0.631	0.528	0.552	0.488**	0.395*	0.376*
	(0.440)	(0.439)	(0.426)	(0.230)	(0.226)	(0.204)
Age	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003	0.000	0.000	-0.000

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	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ethnicity	-0.004	-0.007	-0.006	0.070**	0.066**	0.070**
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.030)
RDR stronghold				-0.639**	-0.575**	-0.561**
				(0.257)	(0.285)	(0.275)
Constant	-1.722*	-1.602	-1.432	-2.649**	-2.412**	-2.354**
	(1.040)	(0.993)	(0.950)	(0.949)	(0.802)	(0.958)
Observations	425	437	426	372	377	393

Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

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Table 28: Africa's Nationality Laws

Country	Year	Law Name
Angola	1975	The Constitution of the People's Republic of Angola [10 November 1975]
	1984	Law No. 8/84 of 7 February
	1991	Law No. 13/1991 of 11 May 1991, Nationality Law
	2005	Law No. 1/05 of July 1 (National Assembly)
	2007	Decree No. 31/07 of 14 of May, Birth Registration [14 May 2007]
	2010	Constitution of the Republic of Angola [21 January 2010]
Benin	1965	Law No. 65-17 of 23/06/65 containing the Code of Dahomean Nationality
	1972	Decree No. 72-62 of 15 March 1972
Botswana	1966	Constitution of Botswana [30 September 1966]
	1966	The Citizenship of Botswana (Supplementary Provisions) Law, 1966 [14 September 1966]
	1969	The Citizenship 30 June Act, 1969
	1982	Citizenship Act, 1982 (Act No. 25 of 1982)
	1982	Amendment Act No. 32 of 1982.
	1984	Citizenship (Amendment), 1984 (Act No. 17 of 1984)
	1995	Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1995 (No. 14 of 1995)
	1998	Citizenship Act, 1998 (No. 8 of 1998)
	2002	Citizenship Act, 2002 (No. 9 of 2002)
	2004	Citizenship Act, 2004 (No. 1 of 2004)
Burkina Faso	1961	Law No.50-61-AN of 1 December 1961 pertaining to the adoption of a Code of Voltaic nationality
	1989	Law ANVII-13 of 16 November 1989 pertaining to the institution and application of the Code of individuals and of the family
Burundi	1971	Decree No. 1/93 of 10 August 1971 pertaining to the Nationality Code
	2000	Law No. 1-013 of 18 July 2000 pertaining to the reform of the Nationality Code
	2003	Decree No. 100/156 of 14 October 2003 pertaining to the practical methods of acquiring Burundian nationality by acquisition
	2005	Law No. 1/010 of 18 March 2005 pertaining to the promulgation of the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi
Cameroon	1959	Ordonnance No. 59-66 of 26 November 1959 pertaining to the Cameroonian Nationality Code
	1968	Law No. 1968-LF-3 of 11 June 1968 pertaining to the Cameroonian Nationality Code

	1968	Decree n° 1968 DF-478 of the 16th December 1968 to Establish Rules of Procedure Under the Nationality Code
Central African Republic	1966	Ordonnance No. 1966/64 of 30 August 1966 modifying Law No. 61-212 of 27 May 1961 pertaining to the Central African Nationality Code
	1995	1995 Constitution
Chad	1961	Law No. 31-60 of 27 February 1961 pertaining to the Chadian Nationality Code
Chad	1961	Decree No.16/PG of 28 septembre 1961 regarding the Chadian Nationality Code.
Chad	1962	Ordonnance No. 33/PG-INT of 14 August 1962 pertaining to the Chadian Nationality Code
Chad	1963	Decree No.211-PG.-INT of 6 November 1963 pertaining to the application of the Chadian Nationality Code.
Chad	2007	Birth Act of 2007, No. 148/PR/PM/MISP/SE/SG/DAPEC/2007, 30 April 2007
Republic of Congo	1961	Law No. 35-61 of 20 June 1961 pertaining to the Congolese Nationality Code\
	1961	Decree No. 61-178 of 29 July 1961 determining methods for applying the Nationality Code
	1961	Circulaire n° 747 du 31 juillet 1961, Déclarations en vue de décliner, de répudier et renoncer a répudier la nationalité congolaise par application du Code de la nationalité et du Décret n° 78 du 29 juillet 1961
	1993	Loi No. 2-93 du 30 septembre 1993 modifiant l'article 30 de la loi No. 35-61 du 20 juin 1961.
Côte d'Ivoire	1961	Loi n° 61-415 du 14 décembre 1961 portant code de la nationalité ivoirienne
	1964	Loi No.64-381 du 7 octobre 1964
	1972	Loi No.72-852 du 21 Décembre 1972.
	2000	Constitution ivoirienne du 23 juillet 2000
	2004	Loi No.2004-662 du 17 décembre 2004
	2004	Loi portant dispositions spéciales en matière de naturalisation [Côte d'Ivoire], No. 2004-663, 17 December 2004
	2005	Décision n° 2005-03/PR du 15 juillet 2005 relative au code de la nationalité [Côte d'Ivoire], 2005-03/PR, 15 July 2005
	2005	Décision n° 2005-04/PR du 15 juillet 2005, portant dispositions spéciales en matière de naturalisation [Côte d'Ivoire], 2005-04/PR, 15 July 2005
	2005	Décision n° 2005-09/PR du 29 août 2005 relative au code de la nationalité [Côte d'Ivoire], No. 2005-09/PR, 29 August 2005

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	2005	Décision n° 2005-10/PR du 29 août 2005 relative aux dispositions spéciales en matière de naturalisation [Côte d'Ivoire], N° 2005-10/PR, 29 August 2005
	2006	Communique du conseil des ministres du 31 mai 2006 [Côte d'Ivoire], 31 May 2006
	2013	Projet de loi portant dispositions particulières en matière d'acqusition de la nationalité par déclaration [Côte d'Ivoire], 6 June 2013,
	2013	Projet de loi n° du portant modification des articles 12, 13, 14 et 16 de la loi n° 61 - 415 du 14 decembre 1961 portant code de la nationalite telle que modifiee par les lois n° 72 - 852 du 21 decembre 1972 et n° 2004- 662 du 17 decembre 2004 et les decisions 2005-03/PR du 15 julillet 2005 et n° 2005-09/PR du 29 août 2005 [Côte d'Ivoire], 6 June 2013
	2013	Loi No.2013-653 du 13 septembre 2013 portant dispositions particulières en matière d'acquisition de la nationalité par déclaration
	2013	Loi No.2013-654 du 13 septembre 2013 portant modification des articles 12, 13, 14 et 16 de la Loi n°61-415 du 14 décembre 1961 portant Code de la nationalité
	2014	Côte d'Ivoire: Arrêté interministériel N° 003/ MJDHLP/MEMIS du 2014 fixant la période de souscription et de traitement des demandes d'acquistion de la nationalité ivoirienne par déclaration [Côte d'Ivoire], 27 March 2014
	2014	Côte d'Ivoire: Circulaire interministérielle no. 06 MJDHLP/MEMIS du 2014, mise en oeuvre de la Loi no. 2013-653 du 13 septembre 2013 portant dispositions particulières en matière d'acquisition de la nationalité ivoirienne par déclaration [Côte d'Ivoire], 27 March 2014
Democratic Republic of Congo	1964	Constitution of 1 August 1964
	1965	Decree-Law (décret-loi) of 18 September 1965
	1972	Loi No. 1972-002 du 5 janvier 1972 relative à la nationalité zaïroise
	1981	Loi No. 1981-002 du 29 juin 1981 relative à la nationalité zaïroise
	1994	Acte Constitutionnel de la transition du 9 Avril 1994
	1997	Décret-loi constitutionnel No. 003 du 27 mai 1997 relatif à l'organisation et l'exercice du pouvoir en République Démocratique du Congo
	1999	Décret-loi no. 197 du 29 janvier 1999
	2003	Constitution de la République Démocratique du Congo
	2004	Loi No. 04-024 du 12 novembre 2004 relative à la nationalité congolaise
	2005	The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2005

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DRC	2006	Arrêté ministériel n° 261/CAB/MIN/J/2006 du 04 juillet 2006 portant certaines mesures d'exécution de la Loi n° 04/024 du 12 novembre 2004 relative à la nationalité congolaise [Democratic Republic of the Congo], No. 261/CAB/MIN/J/2006, 4 July 2006
DRC	2011	Constitution de la République Démocratique Du Congo, 2011
Eritrea	1992	Eritrean Nationality Proclamation (No. 21/1992), 6 April 1992
	1997	Constitution of Eritrea [Eritrea], 23 May 1997
Ethiopia	1930	Ethiopian Nationality Law of 1930, 22 July 1930
	1995	Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 21 August 1995
	2002	Proclamation No. 270/2002 concerning the rights of foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin
	2003	Proclamation on Ethiopian Nationality, No. 378 of 2003 [Ethiopia], 378/2003, 23 December 2003
	2004	Directive Issued to Determine the Residence Status of Eritrean Nationals Residing in Ethiopia [], January 2004
G-Bissau	1976	Lei da nacionalidade No.1/76 de 4 de maio
	1984	Lei da nacionalidade No. 1/84 de 15 de fevereiro
	1984	Constitution of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau [Guinea-Bissau], 1984
	1992	Lei da nacionalidade No.2/92 de 6 de abril
	2010	Lei da nacionalidade No.6/2010 de 21 de junho
Gabon	1962	Décret no. 58/PR du 2 mars 1962 déterminant les modalités d'application du Code de la Nationalité Gabonaise [Gabon], 58/PR, 15 March 1962
	1998	Gabon: Loi n°37-1998, Code de la nationalité [Gabon]
Gambia	1965	Constitution of the Republic of The Gambia, 1965
	1965	Gambia Nationality and Citizenship Act, Cap 82, 18 February 1965
	1970	No. 1 of 1970 [The Gambia], 24 April, 1970
	1997	Constitution of the Republic of The Gambia, 1997 [Gambia], 16 January 1997
Ghana	1957	Ghana (Constitution) Order in Council 1957/277
	1957	Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Act 1 of 1957
	1960	Constitution (Consequential Provisions) Act (CA8).
	1961	Ghana Nationality Act 62 of 1961
	1967	Ghana Nationality Decree, NLCD 191 of 1967
	1969	Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree NLCD 333 of 1969
	1969	Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1969
	1971	Ghana Nationality Act 361 of 1971

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	1971	Ghana Nationality Act 361 of 1971
	1972	Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree 1972 NRCD
	1979	Constitution of the Third Republic of Ghana , Decree 1979 [Ghana]
	1992	Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992
	1996	Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (Amendment) Act 527 of 1996
	2000	Citizenship Act 591 of 2000
	2002	Dual Citizenship Regulation Act 91 of 2002
	2008	National Identity Register, 2008
Guinea	1960	Ordonnance No.011 du 1 mars 1960 portant code de la nationalité guinéenne
	1983	Loi 004/APN/83 du 16 février 1983, portant Code civil de Guinée
Kenya	1963	Citizenship Act Cap170, 1963
	1963	Constitution 1963
	1969	Constitution 1969
	1985	Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No.6 of 1985
	1986	Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 15 of 1986
	1997	Constitution of Kenya (Amendment), Act No 9 of 1997.
	2001	Constitution of Kenya 2001
	2001	Children's Act No.8 of 2001
	2006	Refugee Act 2006
	2010	Constitution of Kenya 2010
	2011	Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act No.12 of 2011 as amended by the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 12 of 2012
Lesotho	1966	Lesotho Citizenship Act 1967, 4 October 1966
	1971	Lesotho Citizenship Order 1971 [Lesotho], Order No. 16 of 1971
	1993	Constitution of Lesotho, 2 April 1993
	1998	Passports and Travel Documents Act No. 15 of 1998
Liberia	1956	Aliens and Nationality Law, Title 3, Liberian Code of Laws 1956
	1974	Aliens and Nationality Law (amended 1974) [Liberia], 15 May 1973
	1986	Constitution of the Republic of Liberia, 6 January 1986
Madagascar	1960	Décret no. 1960-446 relatif aux formalités qui doivent être observées dans l'instruction des déclarations de nationalité et des demandes de naturalisation ou de réintégration [Madagascar], 1960
	1960	Ordonnance no. 1960-064 portant code de la nationalité malgache [Madagascar], 30 July 1960

	1961	Loi no. 1961-052 portant modification de l'article 93 du code de la nationalité malgache, modifiant les articles 24, 58, 82 et 93 du code de la nationalité [Madagascar], 1961,
	1995	Loi n° 95-021 du 18.09.95
Malawi	1964	Constitution 1964
	1964	Malawi Citizenship Act No.2 of 1964
	1966	Malawi Citizenship Act No.28 of 1966
	1967	Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 37 of 1967.
	1968	Malawi Citizenship (Prescribed Languages Regulations) [Malawi], G.N. 222/1966 206/1968 under s. 34, 1968
	1971	Amendment Act No.5 of 1971
	1992	Citizenship Act [Malawi], 1966 (with amendments through 1992)
	1994	Constitution 1994 (Act No.20 of 1994, as amended by Acts No.31 of 1994, 6 of 1995, 7 of 1995, 1 of 1997 and 38 of 1998)
	1996	Malawi Constitutional Provision Relating to Citizenship [], 1996
Mali	1960	Ordonnance No.55 du 24 novembre 1960 relative à l'attribution de la nationalité malienne à tous les ressortissants de la République du Mali
	1962	Loi No. 62-18 AN-RM du 3 février 1962 portant Code de la nationalité malienne
	1992	Constitution, 1992
	1995	Loi No. 95-70 du 25 août 1995 portant modification du Code de la nationalité malienne
	2011	Loi n°2011–087 du 30 décembre 2011 portant Code des personnes et de la famille
	2014	Mali: Décision No. 2014-0191/MJDH-SG, Création d'un comité interministériel sur l'apatridie [Mali], 17 November 2014
Mauritania	1961	Loi No.61-112 du 12 juin 1961 portant Code de la nationalité mauritanienne tel que modifié par la Loi No.1962-157 et la Loi No.1976-207
	1991	Constitution de la République Islamique de Mauritanie [Mauritania], 20 July 1991
	2010	Loi. No.2010-023 du 11 février 2010 abrogeant et remplaçant certaines dispositions de la loi 61-112 du 12 juin 1961 portant Code de la nationalité mauritanienne
Mauritius	1968	Citizenship Act 1968 [Mauritius], RL 3/585 , 14 December 1968
	1968	Mauritius: Constitution, 12 March 1968
	1995	Mauritius: Constitution, 1995

	1995	Mauritius Citizenship Amendment Act No. 24 of 1995
Mozambique	1975	Nationality Act [Mozambique], 25 June 1975
	1975	Decree No. 3/1975 - Regulations Implementing the Nationality Act [Mozambique], 16 August 1975
	1982	Act No. 2/1982 of 6 April 1982 (Nationality Act) [Mozambique], 6 April 1982
	1987	Act No. 16/1987
	1988	Decreto Nr. 5/88: Regulamenta a Lei da Nacionalidade [Mozambique], 6 April 1988
	1990	Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique [Mozambique], 30 November 1990
	2004	Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique [Mozambique], 16 November 2004
Namibia	1990	Constitution of the Republic of Namibia (amended 1998) [Namibia], 21 March 1990
	1990	Act to Further Regulate the Acquisition or Loss of Namibian Citizenship, 30 August 1990
	1991	Regulations Under The Namibian Citizenship Act, 1990, Act No. 14 of 1990, 22 February 1991
	1999	Namibia Refugees (Recognition and Control) Act, 1999 [Namibia], 19 March 1999
	2010	Amendment Act No. 7 of 2010
Niger	1961	Loi No. 1961-26 du 12 juillet 1961, determinant la nationalite nigérienne [Niger], 31 August 1961
	1973	Loi No. 73-10 du 27 février 1973
	1984	Ordonnance n° 84-33 du 23 août 1984 portant code de la nationalité nigérienne [Niger], N° 84-33, 23 August 1984
	1988	Ordonnance no. 88-13 du 18 février 1988
	1999	Niger: Constitution du 18 juillet 1999 [Niger], 9 August 1999
	1999	Ordonnance no. 99-17 du 4 juin 1999
	2014	Loi no. 2014-60 du 2014
Nigeria	1960	Constitution 1960
	1960	Nigerian Citizenship Act 1960
	1961	Nigerian Citizenship Act 1961
	1974	Nigeria Constitution (Amendment) Decree No. 33 of 1974
	1979	Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria [Nigeria], 1979
	1985	Nigeria: Passport (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act [Nigeria], Cap P1 L.F.N. 2004, 8 August 1985
	1999	Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Act No. 24, 5 May 1999
	2010	Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Act No. 1, 16 July 2010

Rwanda	1963	Law of 28 September 1963 on the Code of Rwandan nationality, 28 September 1963
	1974	Décret-loi du 19 juillet 1974 modifiée Code de la Nationalité Rwandaise
	1977	Arrête Ministériel No. 101/06 du 25 juillet 1977 - Modalités d'exécution de l'article 31
	2003	Constitution, 2003
	2004	Loi organique n° 29/2004 du 03/12/2004 portant code de la nationalité rwandaise
	2005	Presidential Order N° 21/01 of 27/05/2009 establishing the Procedure for the application and acquisition of Rwandan Nationality [Rwanda], N° 21/01 of 27/05/2009, 27 May 2005
	2005	Ministerial Order N° 74/11 of 31/08/2005 Determining the Procedure of Acquisition and Declaration of the Rwandan Nationality [Rwanda], 74/11, 31 August 2005
	2008	Organic Law N° 30/2008 of 25/07/2008 relating to Rwandan Nationality
	2009	OG No. special of 28/05/2009.
Sierra Leone	1961	Constitution 1961
	1962	Sierra Leone Constitution (Amendment) (No.2) Act 1962
	1973	Sierra Leone Citizenship Act, No 4 of 1973
	1976	Sierra Leone Citizenship Act, No.13 of 1976
	1991	Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991, 1 October 1992
	2006	The Sierra Leone Citizenship (Amendment) Act, No. 11 of 2006, 26 October 2006
	2007	Sierra Leone: Act No. 6 of 2007, The Refugees Protection Act, 2007 [Sierra Leone], 30 August 2007
	2007	Sierra Leone: Act No. 7 of 2007, The Child Right Act, 2007 [Sierra Leone], 3 September 2007
Senegal	1961	Loi n° 61-70 du 7 mars 1961
	1961	Loi No.61-10 du 7 mars 1961
	1967	Loi No.67-17 du 28 février 1967
	1970	Loi No.70-27 du 27 juin 1970
	1970	Loi No.70-31 du 13 octobre 1970
	1979	Loi No.79-01 du 6 janvier 1979
	1984	Loi n° 84-10 du 4 Janvier 1984
	1989	Loi No.89-42 du 26 décembre 1989
	1992	Loi organique n° 92-24 du 30 mai 1992
	2013	Loi no. 2013-05 portant modification de la loi no. 61-10 du 07 mars 1961 déterminant la nationalité, modifiée

Somalia	1962	Law No.28 of 22 December 1962 on Somali Citizenship
	1963	Constitution of Somalia, 1963
	2004	Somali Transitional Federal Charter 2004
	2012	Provisional Constitution 2012
South Africa	1949	South African Citizenship Act, No. 49 of 1949
	1959	Promotion of Black Self-Government Act, 1959
	1961	South African Citizenship Amendment Act, No. 64 of 1961
	1962	Commonwealth Relations Act, No. 69 of 1962
	1964	Residence in the Republic Regulation Act, No. 23 of 1964
	1970	The National States Citizenship Act of 1970 (Act 26 of 1970)
	1973	South African Citizenship Amendment Act, No. 41 of 1973
	1978	South African Citizenship Amendment Act, No. 53 of 1978
	1980	South African Citizenship Amendment Act, No. 30 of 1980
	1981	South African Citizenship Amendment Act, No. 95 of 1981
	1984	South African Citizenship Amendment Act, No. 43 of 1984
	1986	Matters concerning Admission to and Residence in the Republic Amendment Act, No. 53 of 1986
	1990	Application of Certain Laws to Namibia Abolition Act, No. 112 of 1990
	1991	South African Citizenship Amendment Act, No. 70 of 1991.
	1993	Interim Constitution 1993
	1995	South African Citizenship Act No. 88 of 1995
	1996	Constitution 1996
	1997	South African Citizenship Amendment Act No.19 of 1997
	2004	South African Citizenship Amendment Act No.17 of 2004
	2010	South African Citizenship Amendment Act No.17 of 2010
Sudan	1948	Definition of Sudanese Ordinance 1948
	1957	Sudanese Nationality Act 1957
	1959	Sudanese Nationality Act, No. 66 of 1959
	1963	Sudanese Nationality Act, No. 40 of 1963
	1970	Sudanese Nationality Act, No. 33 of 1970
	1970	Sudanese Nationality Act, No. 55 of 1970
	1970	Sudanese Nationality Act, No. 65 of 1970
	1972	Sudanese Nationality Act, No. 47 of 1972
	1972	Sudanese Nationality Act, No. 48 of 1972
	1973	Sudanese Nationality Act, No. 11 of 1973
	1974	Sudanese Nationality Act, No. 40 of 1974
	1993	Sudan Nationality Decree No. 18 of 1993
	1994	Sudanese Nationality Act 1994
	1998	Constitution of Sudan, 1998
	2003	Nationality Act, 2003 (New Sudan), 31 December 2003

	2005	Constitution of Sudan, 2005
	2006	Miscellaneous Amendments Act No. 1, 2006
	2011	Sudanese Nationality (Amendment) Act 2011
Swaziland	1967	Constitution of Swaziland, 1967
	1967	Swaziland Citizenship Act No.17 of 1967
	1968	Constitution of Swaziland, 1968
	1974	Swaziland Citizenships Order, No.22 of 1974
	1975	The Citizenship Regulations, 1975, 12 April 1975
	1992	Swaziland Citizenship Act No.14 of 1992
	2005	Constitution of Swaziland, 2005
Tanzania	1911	Zanzibar Nationality and Naturalisation Decree 1911
	1952	Zanzibar Nationality Decree No.30 of 1952
	1958	Zanzibar Nationality Decree No.30 of 1952 (amended by Act No.16 of 1958)
	1961	Constitution of Tanzania, 1961
	1962	Citizenship (Amendment) Act No. 69 of 1962
	1963	Citizenship (Amendment) Act No. 19 of 1963
	1963	The Kenya and Zanzibar Independence Act, No. 70 of 1963
	1964	Citizenship Decree No. 5 of 1964
	1977	Constitution 1977 (as amended to 2005)
	1985	Zanzibar Act No.5 of 1985
	1995	Tanzania Citizenship Act No. 6 of 1995
	2009	Law of the Child Act No 21 of 2009
Togo	1961	Loi No. 61-18 du 25 juillet 1961 relative à la nationalité togolaise
	1978	Ordonnance 78-34 du 7 septembre 1978 portant Code de la nationalité togolaise
	1992	Constitution of Togo, 1992
Uganda	1962	Constitution of Uganda, 1962
	1967	Constitution of Uganda, 1967
	1995	Constitution of Uganda, 1995
	1999	Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Act No.3 of 1999 (Chapter 66)
	2005	Constitution (Amendment) Acts of 2005 (Act 11/2005 and Act, 21/2005)
	2006	The Refugee Act 2006, Act 21, 24 May 2006
	2009	Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control (Amendment) Act 5 of 2009
Zambia	1964	Citizenship of Zambia Ordinnance 1964
	1973	Constitution of Zambia, 1973
	1975	Citizenship of Zambia Act No.26 1975

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	1977	Citizenship of Zambia Regulations (last amended 1997) [Zambia], 56, 1977
	1977	Act of March 4 1977
	1986	Act No.17 of 1986
	1990	Act No. 10 of 1990
	1991	Zambia Constitution 1991
	1994	Act No.13 of 1994
	1996	Zambia Constitution 1996
	2009	Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 20 of 2009
Zimbabwe	1979	Zimbabwe Act 1979
	1979	Zimbabwe Constitution Order 1979 .
	1979	Constitution of Zimbabwe 1979
	1983	Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.3) Act No.1 of 1983
	1984	Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act No.23 of 1984 (Cap.4.01)
	1990	Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.11) Act No.30 of 1990
	1990	Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No.7 of 1990
	1996	Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.14) Act No.14 of 1996
	2000	Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2000
	2001	Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No.12 of 2001
	2001	Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No.22of 2001
	2001	Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No.23 of 2001
	2002	Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No.1 of 2002
	2003	1984 Nationality Act amended 12/2003
	2005	Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.17) Act No.5 of 2005
	2007	Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.18) Act No.11 of 2007.
	2007	Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Bill, 2007 [Zimbabwe], H.B. 6A, 2007, 2007
	2009	Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.19) Act No 1 of 2009
	2013	Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No.20 of 2013

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