

## ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation / Thesis: INVESTIGATION OF SELF-PRESENTATION  
AMONG LOW SELF-MONITORS

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Low self-monitors are often described as individuals who lack self-presentation concerns. They seem not to adjust their behavior in accordance with situational demands. Instead, their behavior seems to be guided by their inner attitudes, dispositions, and values, and thus their behavior is consistent across time and situations. We question the view that low self-monitors lack self-presentation concerns. In contrast, we argue that low self-monitors care about their self presentation and that their main self-presentation concern is to appear sincere to others.

The purpose of the present research was to examine whether low self-monitors are concerned about self-presentation. More specifically, we were interested in whether low self-monitors are concerned about appearing to be sincere to others. To test the specific hypothesis, we wanted to distinguish between low self-monitors' desire to "appear" to be sincere from their desire to "be" sincere.

Two studies were conducted to test the hypotheses. The results of the self-report measure in Study 1 and the results of Study 2 did not demonstrate that low self-

monitors are concerned about appearing sincere. On the other hand, the results of the behavioral measure in Study 1 suggest the need for further research into the possibility that the low self-monitors have self-presentation concerns and that those concerns may derive from a desire to appear to be sincere. Results and their implications are discussed in relation to a traditional view of low self-monitors.

INVESTIGATION OF SELF-PRESENTATION AMONG LOW SELF-MONITORS

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## **Dedication**

To my parents, Mr. Kim, Young-Bae and Mrs. Lee, Soon-Hee, for their unwavering support, love, and prayer through this long journey.

## Acknowledgements

“You are done.”

My dissertation is indeed finished, but only because of the encouragement, support, and love of many people.

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My special thanks go to those friends and family whose counsel and enthusiasm gave me the courage and determination to carry on. To Mark Carpenter: Thank you for your humor and wisdom. To Doug Hill: Thank you for your continuous support. To my brother and sisters: Thank you for your love and encouragement. To Henry Lee: Thank you for your inspiration and passion.

And, most deeply, I thank my father and mother for their love and belief in me.

“I am done. Thank you all.”

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

*The image of myself which I try to create in my own mind in order that I may love myself is very different from the image which I try to create in the minds of others in order that they may love me. (W. H. Auden, 1965, p. 104)*

Mark Snyder saw this quotation written by the British writer Auden while reading the *San Francisco Chronicle* when he was a graduate student. At that time, he was struggling to understand why some people exhibit large differences between their public appearances and their private realities, whereas other people show very little differences between the two (Snyder, 1995).

Snyder developed the self-monitoring scale to address his interests in cross-situational consistency. This self-monitoring scale measures individual differences in the extent to which individuals can and do monitor their self-presentation (Snyder, 1974). High self-monitors change and vary their behaviors across situations because they are more sensitive to social and interpersonal “cues in a situation which indicate what expression or self-presentation is appropriate and what is not” (Snyder, 1974, p. 527). Typically they ask themselves “Who does this situation want me to be and how can I be that person?” (Snyder, 1987, p. 32). They adjust their behaviors to fit the images appropriate to the situation. Therefore, high self-monitors tend to show relatively low behavioral consistency across situations.

On the other hand, low self-monitors’ behaviors tend to be consistent across situations because their expressive self-presentation is more likely to be guided by

their inner attitudes, dispositions, and values. Low self-monitors are not concerned about the “appropriateness of their self-presentation” (Snyder, 1974, p. 527). The main idea of self-monitoring is succinctly summarized by Snyder (1979):

The prototypic *high self-monitoring individual* is one who, out of a concern for the situational and interpersonal appropriateness of his or her social behavior, is particularly sensitive to the expression and self-presentation of relevant others in social situations and uses these cues as guidelines for monitoring (that is, regulating and controlling) his or her own verbal and nonverbal self-presentation. By contrast, the prototypic *low self-monitoring individual* is not so vigilant to social information about situationally appropriate self-presentation. In comparison with their high self monitoring counterparts, the self-presentation and expressive behavior of low self-monitoring individuals seem, in a functional sense, to be controlled from within by their affective states and attitudes (they express it as they feel it) rather than molded and tailored to fit the situation. (p. 89)

Snyder labeled the chameleon-like individuals as “high self-monitors” because of “the great extent to which they are engaged in *monitoring* or controlling the images of the self they project in social interaction” (Snyder, 1995, p. 37).

The traditional view of self-monitoring can be summarized as follows: High self-monitors are sensitive to social and interpersonal cues and they monitor, change, and adjust their behaviors to fit a given situation. In contrast, low self-monitors are

not sensitive to situational cues and do not seem to care about public opinion. The expressive behaviors of low self-monitors are the reflection of their dispositions rather than concerns about self-presentation, so their behaviors are congruent with their dispositions. In other words, high self-monitors' goal seems to be "to meet the demand of different social situations" and they are concerned about self-presentation, whereas low self-monitors' goal seems to be "just to go my way" and they don't seem to be concerned about self-presentation.

In contrast to this conventional view of low self-monitors, we suggest that low self-monitors do indeed care about their self-presentations, but their concerns are different from those of high self-monitors. What low self-monitors care about, across situations, is to appear *sincere* to others. Low self-monitors, in other words, behave in ways that are consistent across *time and situations*, not because they are indifferent about what others think, but because they want to appear *sincere* and they want to see themselves as projecting sincerity.

This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, we review the findings based on the traditional view of self-monitoring. In the second section we present a new perspective on low self-monitors.

### **The Traditional View of Self-Monitoring**

The scientific literature has been enriched by a large number of articles that test hypotheses generated from self-monitoring theory (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000; Snyder, 1974, 1979, 1987, 1995). Let us review some of main findings in the self-monitoring literature to see how both high and low self-monitors have been traditionally described.

Snyder (1974) found that professional stage actors, who presumably have acting ability and change their roles according to situational demands, had higher scores than non-actors on measures of self-monitoring. When ordinary college students were asked to express several emotions, such as anger, happiness, sadness, surprise, disgust, fear, and guilt with emotionally neutral sentences, high self-monitors were better at expressing these emotions than low self-monitors (Snyder, 1974). When high self-monitors were asked to act like an extraverted, friendly, and outgoing person and then suddenly to act like an introverted, withdrawn, and reserved person, high self-monitors adopted each role better than low self-monitors did (Lippa, 1976). Turner (1980) tested the relation between individual differences in self-monitoring and humor production. Participants in his study were asked to generate captions for cartoons and to perform a three-minute monologue. High self-monitors, compared to low self-monitors, generated more humorous cartoon captions and produced significantly more jokes in the monologue segment (Turner, 1980). These studies suggest that high self-monitors are more capable of controlling their different expressive performances than low self-monitors are.

High self-monitors place more value on exterior attributes than interior attributes, whereas low self-monitors place more value on interior attributes than on exterior attributes. High self-monitors' concern with projecting situationally appropriate images of themselves to others is reflected in their choice of friends, dating partners, and commercial products.

High self-monitors choose friends as activity partners for their leisure time based on the friends' skill in the specific activity as opposed to how much they like

the friends. Low self-monitors, on the other hand, choose friends as activity partners based more on how much they like the friends rather than the friends' skills (Snyder, Gangestad, & Simpson, 1983; Snyder & Smith, 1986). High self-monitors are more likely than low self-monitors to choose their partner based on the partner's physical appearance rather than the partner's personality.<sup>1</sup> High self-monitors also spend more time, compared to low self-monitors, gathering information about the partner's appearance versus information about the partner's interior personal attributes (Snyder, Berscheid, & Glick, 1985). If high self-monitors are asked to hire new female employees, they hire women who are attractive but have an unsuitable personality over unattractive women who have a suitable personality (Snyder, Berscheid, & Matwychuk, 1988). When they choose a product, high self-monitors prefer image-oriented products over quality-oriented products, whereas low self-monitors prefer quality-oriented products over the image-oriented products (Snyder & DeBono, 1985).

High and low self-monitors have also different ways of regulating their behavior in public. High self-monitors regulate their social behaviors according to situational cues, whereas low self-monitors regulate their social behaviors according to their dispositions. If high self-monitors rely on situational cues, including cues from other people, they should be relatively knowledgeable about types of individuals who are prototypical examples of various trait domains (e.g., open, confident, adventurous). Low self-monitors, who rely on their dispositions, should be relatively knowledgeable about their own characteristic attitudes, traits, and dispositions. This is

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<sup>1</sup> Dating an attractive partner enhances one's own attractiveness in the eyes of others (Sigall & Landy, 1973).

what Snyder and Cantor (1980) found. When asked to construct their own self-concepts, using various trait domains, low self-monitors provided richer descriptions of their own self-images than did high self-monitors. When asked to construct individuals who are prototypes of the same trait domains, high self-monitors provided richer descriptions of individuals fitting these prototypes than did low self-monitors.

High self-monitors' behaviors, compared to low self-monitors' behaviors, are more variable across social situations. In Snyder and Monson's (1975) study, participants engaged in a group discussion with different audiences. Different audiences could provide different cues for the situationally appropriate self-presentation. High self-monitors were sensitive to the manipulation of different audiences: They were "dissenters" when the audience was in favor of autonomy in the face of social pressure, whereas they were "conformists" when conformity was the most appropriate interpersonal orientation. Low self-monitors, however, were unaffected by the different audiences and cues for appropriate social behaviors.

High self-monitors, compared to low self-monitors, show less consistency between their attitudes and behaviors. In a simulated sex-discrimination court case, high self-monitors' verdicts on the case did not correspond with their own attitudes on affirmative action. Low self-monitors, however, had more correspondence between their personal stands on affirmative action and their verdicts (Snyder & Swann, 1976). After low self-monitors wrote a counter-attitudinal essay on a certain issue, their expressed attitude on the issue became more consistent with the position taken in the counter-attitudinal essay than the attitudes of high self-monitors did (Snyder & Tanke, 1976). Low self-monitors' behaviors, compared to high self-

monitors' behaviors, are more predictable from their attitudes and are more affected by the discrepancy between their public behavior and their personal attitude. As the above research indicates, self-monitoring is a variable<sup>2</sup> that moderates the predictive relationship between attitude and behavior.

### **A New Perspective on Low Self-Monitors**

There is a conceptual connection between sincerity and low self-monitors' consistency. Webster's New World dictionary (1994) defines *sincere* as "being the same in actual character as in outward appearance," as well as being honest, straightforward, and truthful. Self-monitoring theory says that "the behavior of people who act according to information from relevant inner sources (that is, low self-monitors) ought to possess substantial consistency across situations and over time and the correspondence between behavior and underlying personal attributes ought to be substantial" (Snyder, 1987, p. 34). Interestingly enough, Webster's definition of sincerity and the definition of low self-monitors are well matched.

The connection between sincerity and low self-monitors' consistency is also found if we examine the items on the self-monitoring scale that low self-monitors are more likely to endorse, such as "At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like" "I would not change my opinions (or the way I

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<sup>2</sup> Self-monitoring as a moderator debuted in the early of 1970s and the timing was perfect. Mischel (1968) ignited the debate of person vs. situation (Block, 1977; Kendrick & Funder, 1988; Mischel, 1968, 1982). Mischel attacked the assumption of personality psychology at that time, that there are stable personality traits. He argued that consistencies in behaviors reflect *stable environments*, not *stable traits*. In the turmoil of the person vs. situation debate, the new construct of self-monitoring as a moderator was an excellent resolution for the debate and was welcomed by researchers who wanted to shift their attention from an attempt to discover whether situation or personality is more important, to an attempt to find those variables that moderate when and under what conditions each factor contributes to behaviors (Snyder & Ickes, 1985). However, this resolution encouraged researchers to accept a simplified version of self-monitoring: High self-monitors change their behaviors depending on the situation and low self-monitors do not change their behaviors because low self-monitors do not care about self-presentation.



do things) in order to please someone or win their favor,” and “I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.” These endorsements clearly show that low self-monitors do not change or adjust their behaviors to please others (sincerity) and they try to maintain their attitudes across situations and times (consistency).

Since self-monitoring researchers have rarely explored the idea of low self-monitors’ consistency as a form of self-presentation, traditional beliefs about low self-monitors have depicted them as lacking concerns about self-presentation. In contrast, we argue that low self-monitors are concerned with self-presentation and try to deliver a message to their audience that they are sincere by behaving consistently. The purpose of the present research is to distinguish low self-monitors’ concerns about wanting to appear to be sincere from their possible desires to be sincere.

Several researchers, including Snyder, have also begun to question the traditional view of low self-monitors lacking self-presentation concerns (Arkin, Gabrenya, & Appelman, 1979; Fiske & Von Hendy, 1992; Gangestad & Snyder, 2000; Ratner & Kahn, 2002; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985). They have suggested the possibility that low self-monitors do have concerns about self-presentation.

In their study, Arkin and his colleagues (1979) chose low self-monitors as a baseline for assessing the influence of impression management strategies on people’s attributions of their own performance. Arkin and his colleagues expected that low self-monitors would not be affected by a self-presentation manipulation because they are considered to be persons who do not care about what others think. Unexpectedly, low self-monitors took greater responsibility for success than for failure when their

performance was private, but they took almost equal responsibility for their success and failure when their performance was public. Low self-monitors' self-serving bias (i.e., people's tendency to attribute their success to themselves but to attribute their failure to the situation) was influenced by whether or not their performance was monitored by others.

Arkin and his colleagues argued that "An intriguing possibility is that low self-monitors' attributions were actually self-presentational in nature. . . . the data reported in this experiment at least question the cross-situational consistency of low self-monitors and suggest the fruitfulness of further investigating the critical antecedent conditions for when cross-situational consistency can and cannot be expected" (pp. 75-76).

Advocates of the impression management perspective (e.g., Baumeister, 1982; Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1971) had challenged the long standing dominance of intrapsychic theories (which focus on cognitive process of the individual, without reference to social context). They designed studies to show that many seemingly intrapsychic responses have interpersonal features. Tetlock and Manstead (1985), in a review paper, argued that the approach of pitting interpersonal (e.g., impression management) explanations against intrapsychic (e.g., cognitive dissonance) explanations does not necessarily help in deciding which explanation is right.

As an example of this kind of approach, Tetlock and Manstead discussed self-monitoring. Because high self-monitors care about public opinion and low self-monitors behave consistently across situations without any self-presentation concerns, some investigators thought that self-monitoring was a personality variable that could

distinguish between impression management and intrapsychic explanations. “Overall, the behavior of high self-monitors appears to be primarily under the control of impression management concerns; the behavior of low self-monitors, primarily under the control of intrapsychic processes” (Tetlock & Manstead, 1985, p. 70).

But Tetlock and Manstead questioned the traditional perspective on self-monitoring: “It is also possible that high and low self-monitors differ not so much in their concern for impression management, but in the types of impression they seek to create on others. Low scorers [*low self-monitors*] may be much more concerned than are high scorers [*high self-monitors*] with projecting an honest and principled image” (p. 70, italics added).

Fiske and Von Heny (1992) did an interesting series of studies of self-monitoring and impression formation processes. In their first study, an experimenter gave bogus personality test feedback to participants. Half of the participants received feedback that they tend to perceive others by using their stereotypic, category-based processes (categorizer). The other half received feedback that they tend to perceive others by using individuating, data-driven processes (individuator). After that, participants were told about a future interaction partner, named Frank, who was labeled as either a paraplegic or a schizophrenic and they were also told that they would interact with Frank. Participants read information about Frank that was either consistent or inconsistent with typical descriptions of paraplegics or schizophrenics. The experimenter unobtrusively measured participants’ attention time to the information about Frank.

Low self-monitors paid more attention to the inconsistent information when they were told they were good individuators, whereas they paid less attention to the inconsistent information when they were told they were good categorizers. However, high self-monitors were not affected by the personality test feedback. In this situation, low self-monitors, not high self-monitors, were influenced by what others said and they assimilated the feedback to their self-concept and behaved accordingly.

In their second study, the experimenter gave participants situational norms about how others generally form impressions (either category-based impressions or individuated-based impressions). After being told about situational norms, participants read the consistent and inconsistent comments about Frank's adjustment. The experimenter unobtrusively measured participants' attention time to the information. In this situation, high self-monitors paid more attention to the inconsistent information in the individuating norms condition and paid less attention to the inconsistent information in the categorizing norms condition. On the other hand, low self-monitors showed no attentional differences as a function of situational norms.

In Fiske and Von Hendy's (1992) studies, low self-monitors changed their behaviors in line with the personality test feedback about themselves. It did not matter whether the feedback about themselves was accurate or not; as long as the feedback was about what type of person they are, low self-monitors followed the feedback. In other words, under certain situations (e.g., personality test feedback) low self-monitors, not high self-monitors, responded and adjusted to external cues.

After reviewing 25 years research on self-monitoring, the developers of the self-monitoring construct (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000) raised a question about the original definition of low-self-monitors: “As much as high self monitors are concerned with constructing social images, low self-monitors may be equally motivated to establish and protect reputations of being earnest and sincere” (p. 533). “Are low self-monitors, far from being unconcerned about public opinion, in fact highly concerned that they have reputations of being genuine and sincere people who act on their beliefs?” (p. 547).

When consumers are asked to choose more than one item among various items, they often select a considerable variety of items (Kahn, 1998, for a review). Ratner and Kahn (2002) studied how different types of self-presentation goals affect high and low self-monitors on variety-seeking behavior. In their study, participants were asked to choose a total of five pieces of candy from five different types of candy. They were allowed to choose as many of each type as they wanted. There were three different feedback conditions: Evaluation-Interesting, Evaluation-Rational, or No-Evaluation. In the Evaluation-Interesting condition, participants were told that others would evaluate how *interesting* their decision was. In the Evaluation-Rational condition, they were told that others would evaluate how *rational* their decision was. In the No-Evaluation condition, they were told that their decisions would not be shown to anyone.

Ratner and Kahn (2002) found that low self-monitors chose more diverse types of candy under the Evaluation-Rational condition than the No-Evaluation condition, whereas there was no significant difference between the Evaluation-

Interesting condition and the No-Evaluation condition. On the other hand, high self-monitors chose more diverse types of candy under the Evaluation-Interesting condition than the No-Evaluation condition whereas there was no significant difference between the Evaluation-Rational condition and the No-Evaluation condition.

This was surprising because the low self-monitors changed their behaviors depending on their expectations of others' reactions to their choices. The authors cited Gangestad and Snyder (2000), and argued: "Low self-monitors may be concerned about maintaining public images as principled people. Our results are consistent with the idea that some types of impression-management concerns may influence low self-monitors" (Ratner & Kahn, 2002, p. 252).

Low self-monitors did not change their behaviors simply to please or entertain others (i.e., in the Evaluation-Interesting condition) but they changed their behaviors if they thought they could convey to an audience an appearance of following their own dispositions and principles (i.e., in the Evaluation-Rational condition). When low self-monitors behave consistently regardless of situational demands, they cannot rely on an arbitrary principle; if they do, they may be challenged by others about their stubbornness. To defend themselves from those challenges, low self-monitors need to rely on a reasonable principle such as rationality. Regardless of what the principle is, it is clear from the Ratner and Kahn (2002) study that low self-monitors do care about what others think.

The question of low self-monitors' self-presentation concern (Arkin et al., 1979; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985; Fiske & Von Hendy, 1992; Gangestad & Snyder,

2000; Ratner & Kahn, 2002) suggests that self-monitoring researchers will benefit from reexamining low self-monitors in terms of self-presentation concerns.

When we consider a traditionally accepted bold statement (i.e., low self-monitors do not care about self-presentation) and the fact that some researchers have questioned this statement, it makes us wonder why there is a paucity of investigation of low self-monitors' self-presentation concern to appear sincere.

There are at least two problems that confront experimenters attempting to address low self-monitors' self-presentation concerns. First, it is difficult to show a difference between high self-monitors and low self-monitors in terms of concern about sincerity. Because sincerity is a highly valued virtue in our society (e.g., Anderson, 1968<sup>3</sup>; Trilling, 1971), there is no reason to suspect that high self-monitors do not care about being perceived as sincere by others. If high self-monitors think it is situationally appropriate to present themselves so that they appear to be sincere, they may do so in the same way low self-monitors do. Because high self-monitors are sensitive to cues in social situations, manipulating the importance of sincerity alone may be insufficient to distinguish between high and low self-monitors. Experimenters need to create a manipulation that gives high self-monitors a self-presentational concern other than sincerity.

In our investigation, we will provide participants two motivations at the same time. One is a “go along to get along” motivation and the other one is a “sincerity” motivation. We expect that high and low self-monitors will respond differently when these two competing motivations are present at the same time. We hypothesize that

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<sup>3</sup> Among 555 personality trait words, “sincere” and “honest” were rated as the most favorable and desirable trait words, whereas “phony” and “liar” were ranked as the least favorable and desirable trait words (Anderson, 1968).

low self-monitors are more likely to choose the “sincerity” motivation over the “go along to get along” motivation whereas high self-monitors are more likely to choose the latter goal.

Second, the consistency of low self-monitors is closely connected to their concern for sincerity. To test the idea that low self-monitors are concerned about presenting themselves as sincere, experimenters need to separate sincerity from consistency. Goffman (1959) suggested two different types of self-presentation: expression “given” and “given off.”

The first [*given*] involves verbal symbols or their substitutes which he uses admittedly and solely to convey the information that he and the others are known to attach to these symbols. . . . The second [*given off*] involves a wide range of action that others can treat as symptomatic of the actor, the expectation being that the action was performed for reasons other than the information conveyed in this way. (Goffman, 1959, p. 2, italics added)

Goffman's distinction between expressions “given” and “given off” provides us a theoretical background that helps connect consistency and sincerity. In the traditional view, low self-monitors seem to not be concerned about self-presentation. But their seeming indifference to self-presentation may actually be a form of self-presentation. By conveying cross-situational consistency “given” in their behaviors, they “give off” a particular impression to others: They are sincere. The argument is that acting consistently may be a means of creating an impression of sincerity.



It is possible that low self-monitors' consistent behaviors have nothing to do with a concern about appearing to be sincere. They may just behave in a consistent manner without any self-presentational concern. If low self-monitors do not care about what others think, low self-monitors might act in a consistent way regardless of whether their appearance of sincerity is in jeopardy. However, if low self-monitors do care about what others think, a manipulation of perceived sincerity by others should affect their consistency. More specifically, if low self-monitors use consistency as a means of communicating sincerity, as we hypothesize, low self-monitors in a sincerity salient situation will not stick with consistency if doing so means sacrificing the appearance that they are sincere. They will present themselves in an inconsistent manner (i.e., misrepresent themselves) if doing so will allow them to project the appearance of sincerity.

Hence, it is important to demonstrate that low self-monitors do not just behave in a consistent manner without any self-presentational concern but behave in a consistent manner as a means of creating the impression of sincerity. Therefore, it is important to create situations in which low self-monitors must *misrepresent* themselves to appear to be sincere to others. This kind of situation will allow us to distinguish sincerity as a *means* of self-presentation concern from sincerity *with no* self-presentation concern.

We addressed the issue of sincerity by testing how low self-monitors behave when their perceived sincerity was at stake. To examine the hypotheses, we conducted two studies.

## Chapter 2: Study 1

Study 1 was designed to test whether low self-monitors would misrepresent their attitudes in a situation intended to elevate their concerns about appearing sincere. A confederate played the role of a discussion partner in this study. Through verbal statements and actions, the confederate made participants either concerned or not concerned about their appearance of sincerity (Sincerity Salience: salient vs. non-salient). The confederate then expressed attitudes that were the same as or different from participants' attitudes (Attitude Similarity: same vs. different) on a questionnaire. We predicted that low self-monitors, compared to high self-monitors, would misrepresent their attitudes when sincerity was salient and when reporting their actual attitudes could create the appearance of insincerity.

### Method

#### Participants

Seventy-eight female undergraduates at the University of Maryland took part in the study to earn extra credit for introductory psychology courses. Participants were recruited on the basis of their SMS scores: low self-monitors had scores  $\leq 8$  (30th percentile;  $M = 6.49$ ,  $n = 43$ ); high self-monitors had scores  $\geq 11$  (60th percentile;  $M = 13.51$ ,  $n = 35$ ).

#### Procedure

Participants completed the 18-item Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS) (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986, see Appendix 1;  $\alpha = .77$ ) and an opinion survey as part of a mass testing session approximately one month before the experiment. The opinion survey

consisted of 20 items with 10-point scales (see Appendix 2); a short version of the survey was utilized in the experimental session (see Appendix 3).

The experiment was conducted with one participant and one confederate at a time. The confederate and participants were all females. There were three variables in the study: Self-Monitoring (high vs. low), Sincerity Salience (sincerity salient vs. sincerity non-salient), and Attitude Similarity (same vs. different attitudes). High and low self-monitors were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions.

Once a participant arrived in the lab, an experimenter took her to a waiting room. A confederate was already waiting in the room.<sup>4</sup> The experimenter gave informed consent forms to both the participant and the confederate and then left the waiting room. After they completed the informed consent forms, the confederate started to talk to the participant. At this point, sincerity salience was manipulated. In the sincerity salient condition, the confederate presented a plan for finishing the study quickly: “My friend just did this study and told me that to get through it fast to just agree with the other person. I’m just going to do that.” In the sincerity non-salient condition, the confederate did not mention anything about how they could finish the study quickly.

Immediately after the confederate presented a plan for finishing the study quickly, the experimenter entered the waiting room and escorted both the participant and the confederate to the next room.

Once they were seated, the experimenter told them that the study is about how people interact when they meet for the first time. They were each asked to pick a

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<sup>4</sup> The waiting room had a big table divided by a block of computers so the participant and the confederate could not see each other. The computer block was set up to prevent the participant’s nonverbal communication with the confederate.

number from a bag. The number was supposedly either 1 or 2. The experimenter explained that the person picking number 1 would complete the survey first and then give the completed survey to the other participant. The next person would indicate how much she agreed or disagreed with the first person's attitudes on the survey. Then they would discuss any topics for which there was a two-point (or more) difference between the participant and the confederate.

In reality, the lottery was rigged so both the confederate and the participant drew a number 2. But the confederate claimed that she drew a number 1. Therefore, the confederate always completed the survey first. The survey comprised 6 items; it was a short version of the opinion survey in the mass testing session. The confederate worked quickly when completing the survey, allowing one second for each answer; thus she completed the survey in approximately six seconds.

In the sincerity salient condition, the experimenter commented on the confederate's speed and asked her if she took the survey seriously, whereas in the sincerity non-salient condition the experimenter did not say anything about the confederate's speed.

Depending on the experimental condition, the confederate indicated attitudes that were the same as or different from the participant's previous attitudes in the mass testing survey. In the same attitudes condition, the confederate's attitudes were the exactly same as the participant's previous attitudes. In the different attitudes condition, the confederate's attitudes were 5 points away from the participant's previous attitudes.

The experimenter gave the confederate's completed survey and a blank survey to the participant. The participant was told to look over the confederate's survey before completing her survey. When the participant completed the blank survey, the experimenter surreptitiously recorded how long it took. The time was measured from the moment that the participant received the blank survey to the time that the participant completed the survey. Once the participant completed the survey, the experiment was over. The experimenter thoroughly debriefed and thanked the participants for their participation.

### Dependent Measures

Dependent measures included both the self-report measure and the behavioral measure. The self-report measure was derived from the sum of the absolute values of the differences between the participant's pre-attitudes and the participant's post-attitudes. Higher values reflect greater attitude shifts. The behavioral measure was the time participants took to complete the survey.

## **Results**

### Self-Report Measure

A 2 (Self-Monitoring: high vs. low)  $\times$  2 (Sincerity Salience: salient vs. non-salient)  $\times$  2 (Attitude Similarity: same vs. different) between subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on the sum of the absolute values of the differences between the participant's pre-attitudes and the participant's post-attitudes (see Table 1).

The analysis revealed that there was no significant main effect for self-monitoring,  $F(1, 70) = .04$ ,  $p = .84$ . The main effects for sincerity salience,  $F(1, 70)$

= 22.28,  $p < .001$ , and attitude similarity,  $F(1, 70) = 40.00$ ,  $p < .001$ , were significant. The participants shifted their attitudes more when sincerity was salient ( $M = 15.82$ ) than when sincerity was non-salient ( $M = 10.35$ ). The participants also shifted their attitudes more ( $M = 16.75$ ) when the confederate held attitudes different from theirs than when the confederate had the same attitudes as theirs ( $M = 9.43$ ).

There was a significant Sincerity Salience  $\times$  Attitude Similarity interaction,  $F(1, 70) = 12.12$ ,  $p < .005$ . Following it up with a simple effects test indicated that sincerity salient participants showed greater attitude shift ( $M = 21.49$ ) than sincerity non-salient participants ( $M = 12.00$ ) when the confederate had attitudes different from theirs,  $F(1, 70) = 28.89$ ,  $p < .001$ , whereas there was no significant difference between sincerity salient participants ( $M = 10.14$ ) and sincerity non-salient participants ( $M = 8.71$ ) when the confederate had the same attitudes as theirs,  $F(1, 70) = .18$ ,  $p = .67$ .

There was also a significant Self-Monitoring  $\times$  Attitude Similarity interaction,  $F(1, 70) = 4.49$ ,  $p < .05$ , indicating that high self-monitors shifted their attitudes ( $M = 10.77$ ) more than low self-monitors did ( $M = 8.08$ ) in the same attitudes condition,  $F(1, 70) = 7.89$ ,  $p < .01$ , whereas there was no significant difference between high self-monitors ( $M = 15.64$ ) and low self-monitors ( $M = 17.86$ ) in the different attitudes condition,  $F(1, 70) = .02$ ,  $p = .88$ .

The hypothesized three-way interaction (Self-monitoring  $\times$  Sincerity Salience  $\times$  Attitude Similarity) was not significant,  $F(1, 70) = 2.73$ ,  $p = .10$ . Since we were interested in low self-monitors' self-presentation concerns as a function of sincerity salience and attitude similarity, we examined the tests for the simple Sincerity

Saliency  $\times$  Attitude Similarity two-way interaction at the two levels of self-monitoring. There was a significant simple two-way interaction between Sincerity Saliency  $\times$  Attitude Similarity for low self-monitors,  $F(1, 70) = 8.42, p < .01$ . Following it up with a simple effects test indicated that low self-monitors in the different attitudes conditions changed their attitudes more when sincerity was salient ( $M = 23.71$ ) than when sincerity was non-salient ( $M = 12.00$ ),  $F(1, 70) = 16.74, p < .001$ . However, low self-monitors in the same attitudes conditions did not show a significant difference in attitude shifts between the sincerity salient condition ( $M = 7.59$ ) and the sincerity non-salient condition ( $M = 8.17$ ),  $F(1, 70) = .20, p = .65$ . The same patterns were found with high self-monitors. A planned comparison test showed that high self-monitors ( $M = 12.29$ ) shifted their attitudes more than low self-monitors ( $M = 8.00$ ) in the sincerity salient/same attitudes condition,  $F(1, 70) = 7.68, p < .01$ .

### Behavioral Measure<sup>5</sup>

The participant's response times were submitted to a 2 (Self-Monitoring: high vs. low)  $\times$  2 (Sincerity Saliency: salient vs. non-salient)  $\times$  2 (Attitude Similarity: same vs. different) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) (see Table 2).

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<sup>5</sup> In the response time data, the normal distribution assumption was violated. The distribution of response time data was positively skewed. Therefore, the data were transformed by using a logarithm.

The logarithmic transformation was chosen as a method of data transformation because the logarithmic function tends to squeeze together the larger values in the data set and stretches out the smaller values. After the data were transformed, the distribution was normal.

The log-transformed response times were submitted to a 2 (Self-Monitoring: high vs. low)  $\times$  2 (Sincerity Saliency: salient vs. non-salient)  $\times$  2 (Attitude Similarity: same vs. different) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA). The patterns of outcomes were not different from the patterns of outcomes with untransformed data. The analysis was not discussed because log transformed data was expressed in log units, not in the original units of measurement (seconds). The new analysis with log transformed data did not provide any new information over the previous analysis with untransformed data.

The analysis yielded no significant main effects for self-monitoring, sincerity salience, or attitude similarity.

There was a significant Self-Monitoring  $\times$  Sincerity Salience interaction,  $F(1, 70) = 4.61, p < .05$ , indicating that low self-monitors took a longer time to fill out the survey when sincerity was salient ( $M = 50.43$ ) than when sincerity was non-salient ( $M = 38.99$ ),  $F(1, 70) = 6.57, p < .05$ , whereas the response time among high self-monitors did not depend on the sincerity salience manipulation (sincerity salient condition:  $M = 40.82$ ; sincerity non-salient condition:  $M = 42.12, F(1, 70) = .05, p = .82$ ).

The three-way interaction (Sincerity Salience  $\times$  Self-monitoring  $\times$  Attitude Similarity) was not significant,  $F(1, 70) = 1.69, p = .20$ . Since we were interested in how the sincerity salience manipulation would affect the low self-monitors' response times depending on the confederate's attitude similarity, we examined the tests for the simple Sincerity Salience  $\times$  Self-monitoring two-way interaction at the two levels of attitude similarity. The simple Sincerity Salience  $\times$  Self-monitoring two-way interaction was significant in the different attitudes condition,  $F(1, 70) = 4.77, p < .05$ . Following it up with a simple effects test indicated that low self-monitors in the different attitudes condition took longer time to complete the survey when sincerity was salient ( $M = 53.86$ ) than when sincerity was non-salient ( $M = 35.90$ ),  $F(1, 70) = 7.94, p < .01$ , whereas high self-monitors' response times were not influenced by whether sincerity was salient ( $M = 43.64$ ) or non-salient ( $M = 46.11$ ),  $F(1, 70) = .15, p = .70$ . On the other hand, in the same attitudes condition, the simple Sincerity



Saliency  $\times$  Self-monitoring two-way interaction was not significant,  $F(1, 70) = .57$ ,  $p = .45$ .

### **Discussion**

For the self-report measure, the hypothesis that low self-monitors are concerned about appearing sincere was not supported. Low self-monitors, in general, changed their attitudes more when the confederate's attitudes were different from their own, rather than the same. In the different attitudes conditions, low self-monitors shifted their attitudes more when sincerity was salient than when sincerity was non-salient, whereas in the same attitudes conditions, low self-monitors did not show differential attitude shifts depending on whether sincerity was salient or not. Similar patterns were found for high self-monitors.

In the sincerity salient/same attitudes condition, the confederate suggested a plan for finishing the study quickly and then reported attitudes that coincided with the participant's previously expressed attitudes. From the participant's perspective, if the participant responds in consistent fashion, reporting her previous attitudes, she might seem insincere to the experimenter. Since her attitudes would match the confederate's, it may look as if she is willing to lie to get out of the study faster. We predicted that low self-monitors would be more likely to change their responses in the sincerity salient/same attitudes condition than in the sincerity non-salient/same attitudes condition in order to appear to be sincere. Unexpectedly, low self-monitors in the same attitude conditions were unaffected by the sincerity saliency manipulation.

One possible explanation for the unexpected finding is that the confederate's suggestion of finishing the study quickly may have been too appealing for the participants. Therefore, they might have conformed to her suggestion. Since participants were unaware that the confederate and the experimenter knew their previous attitudes, they probably thought that they could respond to the appealing incentive (finishing early) by conforming to the confederate, and their apparent sincerity would remain intact. The data reflect that both high and low self-monitors conformed to the confederate's suggestion in the sincerity salient conditions: Participants maintained their attitudes when the confederate's attitudes were the same as theirs and they shifted their attitudes when the confederate's attitudes were different from theirs.

An interesting result was that high self-monitors shifted their attitudes only moderately in the sincerity salient/same attitudes condition. In all conditions, the group who changed its attitudes the *least* was low self-monitors in the sincerity salient/same attitudes condition ( $\underline{M} = 8.00$ ) and the group who changed its attitudes the *most* was low self-monitors in the sincerity salient/different attitudes condition ( $\underline{M} = 23.71$ ). High self-monitors in the sincerity salient/same attitudes condition ( $\underline{M} = 12.29$ ) appeared to be "middle-of-the-road" between two audiences. Changing their attitudes moderately may have allowed high self-monitors to avoid the appearance of being insincere to the experimenter – their responses were not identical to the confederate's. At the same time, the moderate attitude change allowed them to meet the confederate's need (to get out of the study as quickly as possible). Their

impression management strategy, moderate attitude shifts, seems to meet the demands of both the confederate and the experimenter simultaneously.

Although high self-monitors in the sincerity salient/same attitudes condition may have shifted their attitudes as a self-presentation strategy, the self-report measure does not tell us why low self-monitors shifted their attitudes. It's possible that low self-monitors simply conformed to the attitudes of the confederate.

The findings on the behavioral measure, however, support the idea that low self-monitors are sensitive to whether their sincerity is at stake and that they do care about appearing sincere. During the study, the confederate completed the survey quickly regardless of the sincerity salience manipulation. Therefore the possibility of there being time pressure because the confederate completed the survey quickly was controlled in all conditions. The difference between the sincerity salient and the sincerity non-salient conditions was whether or not the confederate's speed was noticed and challenged by the experimenter. When the experimenter challenged the confederate's speed, if participants completed the survey quickly, they risked appearing insincere to the experimenter. If participants were concerned about appearing sincere, they needed to slow down in order to demonstrate to the experimenter that they were reporting sincere attitudes on the questionnaire.

The effect of sincerity salience on speed would be qualified by the confederate's attitude similarity. If participants were less concerned about the experimenter's challenge of the confederate's sincerity, it would be easier for them to complete the survey quickly in the same attitudes condition than in the different attitudes condition because no misrepresentation was required to agree with the

confederate's attitudes. However, if participants are concerned about the experimenter's challenge of the confederate's sincerity, it would be difficult for them to complete the survey quickly in both the same and the different attitudes conditions. In the sincerity salient/same attitudes condition, if participants did not change their previous responses, their responses ended up being very similar to the confederate's so which would make them look insincere. In the sincerity salient/different attitudes condition, participants needed to misrepresent their attitudes if they want to agree with the confederate's attitudes to finish the study quickly. Both conditions would make participants consider how to create an appearance of sincerity.

Schlenker and Pontari (2000) argue that people tend to monitor their self-presentation more closely when (a) an image that they want to create is highly valued and central to their identity or (b) they anticipate difficulties in accomplishing their self-presentation goal.

Low self-monitors took a longer time to complete the survey when sincerity was salient than when it was not. When the experimenter challenged the confederate's sincerity based upon responding speed, low self-monitors completed the survey at a slower speed, as if demonstrating to the experimenter that they were reading the questions thoroughly and that their responses were sincere. In particular, when the confederate's attitudes were different from theirs, low self-monitors took a much longer time to complete the survey when sincerity was salient than when sincerity was non-salient.

On the other hand, high self-monitors, known as individuals who are sensitive to situational cues, were not sensitive to this particular cue: They did not take more

time when the experimenter questioned sincerity on the basis of speed. In general, they took more time to complete the survey when the confederate's attitudes were different from theirs than they did when the confederate's attitudes were the same. However, their response times were not affected by the sincerity salience manipulation.

The findings on the behavioral measure support the hypothesis that low self-monitors are concerned about appearing sincere. The conformity explanation for the self-report measure data can not explain why low self-monitors' response times were responsive to the sincerity manipulation and high self-monitors' were not.

One of the limitations in study 1 was a possible multiple audience problem. Both the confederate and the experimenter may have been important audiences for the participant. In effect, the confederate asked the participants not to take the experiment seriously, and the experimenter asked them to take the experiment seriously. The two different audiences may have created different self-presentational goals for the participants. In this study, it is unclear which individual the participants perceived as the main audience – the experimenter, the confederate, or both. We addressed this problem in Study 2.

## Chapter 3: Study 2

In Study 1, the audience for participants' self-presentation may have been the experimenter, the confederate, or both. This multiple audience may have created a difficult self-presentation problem for participants. In Study 2, we attempted to reduce this problem by emphasizing the confederate's role as the audience.

Male participants expected to interact with an attractive female to discuss several topics. She supposedly had formed an impression that participants were either sincere or sociable based on participants' previously completed responses (Initial Impression: sincere vs. sociable). After they had been informed of the attractive female's responses to a specific set of attitude items, participants were asked to complete the same set of attitude items. The female's responses provided to participants were either the same as or different from participant's attitudes as assessed in a previous session (Attitude Similarity: same vs. different).

We predicted that low self-monitors would misrepresent themselves when (a) their self-image of sincerity was made salient but (b) expressing their actual attitudes might make them appear to be insincere.

### Method

#### Participants

Seventy-four male undergraduates at the University of Maryland took part in the study in order to get extra credit in their classes. Participants were recruited on the basis of their SMS scores: low self-monitors had scores  $\leq 9$  (40th percentile;  $M = 7.22$ ,  $n = 36$ ); high self-monitors had scores  $\geq 11$  (60th percentile;  $M = 12.68$ ,  $n = 38$ ).

#### Procedure

Participants completed the 18-item Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS) (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986;  $\alpha = .62$ ), an opinion questionnaire, and a personal interest questionnaire, during a large testing session in psychology classes. The same opinion questionnaire used in 1 was employed. The personal interest questionnaire asked about favorite sports or hobbies, favorite movies, and other personal preferences (see Appendix 4).

The design was a 2 (Self-Monitoring: high vs. low)  $\times$  2 (Initial Impression: sincere vs. sociable)  $\times$  2 (Attitude Similarity: same vs. different) factorial. All participants were male and they were tested one at a time.

Once a participant arrived at the lab, a female experimenter greeted him. He was told that the study would examine impression formation processes. The experimenter told him that he would interact with a partner, named Ashley, and that she was in the next room at the moment. The instructions continued:

As you know, in everyday life people don't always have equal types of information about each other, and this information may affect their discussion. To simulate and study these differences, you and Ashley will be given different types of information about each other.

The experimenter showed him the Personal Interest Questionnaire (PIQ) that he completed during the mass testing survey and told him that Ashley would form a first impression of him based on the PIQ. He was also told that Ashley was completing an opinion questionnaire in the other room and that his job would be to

complete the same opinion questionnaire, and then discuss topics addressed in the questionnaire with Ashley.

The experimenter then left the room, allegedly to give the participant's completed PIQ to Ashley. The experimenter returned to the participant's room with Ashley's first impression of him (see Appendix 5), presumably based on his completed PIQ, and two copies of Ashley's opinion questionnaire.

Ashley's first impression consisted of hand-written statements that had been prepared by the experimenter. On the top of the same sheet, some personal information was provided about Ashley to make her attractive to the participants. This personal information was also handwritten, in the form of answers to fill-in-the-blank-questions. The form asked for Ashley's height, age, major, and hometown, and indicated that she was a 5-ft-6, 19 years old, dance major from Baltimore. The form also asked her to indicate if she was "currently in a dating relationship" to which she circled answer choice "No."

The impression information was displayed at the bottom of the form. Ashley's impression of participants in the Sincere Impression condition read as follows:

My impression of you based on your answers to the Questionnaire is that you seem like an authentic and sincere person. I think you probably stay true to yourself regardless of who you are around.

Ashley's impression of participants in the Sociable condition read as follows:



My impression of you based on your answers to the Questionnaire is that you seem like a sociable person. I think you probably get along with others well.

The participant was also given two copies of the 6-item opinion questionnaire with Ashley's answers already marked on them. As in study 1, Ashley's responses on the opinion questionnaire were the same as or different from the participant's attitudes measured in the mass testing survey. In the Same attitudes condition, Ashley's attitudes were exactly the same as the participant's previous attitudes. In the Different attitudes condition, Ashley's attitudes were 5 points away from the participant's previous attitudes.

The participant was told that he and Ashley would discuss the topics presented in the questionnaire once he finished completing it. A pen was provided and the participant was asked to mark his answers in black ink on the same questionnaires on which Ashley had already marked her answers in blue ink. He was told to complete both copies so that, "during your discussion, you and Ashley can each have your own copy to easily see where each other stands on the issues." But the real purpose of having the participants answer on the same sheet that contained Ashley's responses was to ensure that they attended to her responses.

The experimenter left the room while the participant completed the questionnaire. Once the participant was done, the experimenter returned and explained there would be no discussion. The experimenter thoroughly debriefed and thanked the participants for their participation.

### Dependent Measure

As in study 1, the sum of the absolute values of the differences between the participant's pre and post attitudes on the survey served as the dependent measure.

### **Results**

A 2 (Self-Monitoring: high vs. low)  $\times$  2 (Initial Impression: sincere vs. sociable)  $\times$  2 (Attitude Similarity: same vs. different) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on the sum of the absolute values of the differences between the participant's pre-attitudes and the participant's post-attitudes on the survey (See Table 3 for means by conditions).

The analysis showed that there were no significant main effects for self-monitoring,  $F(1, 66) = .62$ ,  $p = .43$ , or initial impression,  $F(1, 66) = 1.63$ ,  $p = .21$ . The main effect for attitude similarity was significant,  $F(1, 66) = 82.04$ ,  $p < .001$ , indicating the participants shifted their attitudes more when Ashley held attitudes different from ( $M = 13.42$ ), compared to the same as theirs ( $M = 5.83$ ).

There was a significant Initial Impression  $\times$  Attitude Similarity interaction,  $F(1, 66) = 4.44$ ,  $p < .05$ . A follow up simple effect test indicated that, when Ashley held attitudes different from theirs, the participants who were told that they were sociable ( $M = 14.84$ ) showed significantly more attitude shifts than did the participants who were told they seemed sincere ( $M = 12.00$ ),  $F(1, 66) = 6.73$ ,  $p < .05$ . On the other hand, when Ashley held the same attitudes as the participants did, there was no significant difference in attitude shifts whether Ashley thought of them as sincere ( $M = 6.17$ ) or sociable ( $M = 5.48$ ),  $F(1, 66) = .34$ ,  $p = .56$ .

There was also an interaction between Self-Monitoring and Initial Impression,  $F(1, 66) = 4.22, p < .05$ . Simple main effects tests showed that high self-monitors shifted their attitudes more when Ashley thought of them as sociable ( $M = 11.35$ ) than when Ashley thought of them as sincere ( $M = 8.56$ ),  $F(1, 66) = 5.91, p < .05$ . On the other hand, low self-monitors did not show differential attitude shifts depending on whether Ashley thought of them as sincere or sociable. When Ashley thought of them as sociable, high self-monitors shifted their attitudes more ( $M = 11.35$ ) than low self-monitors did ( $M = 8.97$ ),  $F(1, 66) = 5.09, p = .03$ .

The three-way interaction (Self-Monitoring  $\times$  Initial Impression  $\times$  Attitude Similarity) was significant,  $F(1, 66) = 6.11, p < .05$ , and is depicted in Figure 1. Tests of simple effects showed that high self-monitors shifted their attitudes more when Ashley thought them to be sociable ( $M = 17.30$ ) than when Ashley thought of them to be sincere ( $M = 10.67$ ) in the different attitudes conditions,  $F(1, 66) = 18.50, p < .001$ . However, they were not influenced by Ashley's initial impression in the same attitudes conditions. In the different/sociable condition, high self-monitors shifted their attitudes ( $M = 17.30$ ) more than did low self-monitors ( $M = 12.38$ ),  $F(1, 66) = 12.95, p < .01$ . Low self-monitors in general shifted their attitudes more in the different attitude condition than the same attitude condition, but they were not affected by Ashley's initial impression of them.

## Discussion

Although there was some evidence that low self-monitors actively present themselves (they exhibited greater attitudes shifts in the different than in the same condition), the hypothesis that low self-monitors are concerned about appearing

sincere was not supported. Low self-monitors were not sensitive to the sincere/sociable manipulation, in both the same and the different attitudes conditions.

In the same/sincere condition, the participant believed that Ashley was expecting the participant to be a sincere person and Ashley's responses on the questionnaire were the same as his previous responses. The problem is that if he did not change his previous responses, the answers ended up matching Ashley's exactly. In this case, we predicted low self-monitors would misrepresent themselves in order to avoid suspicion from Ashley that they deliberately shaped their responses to match hers.

Quite unexpectedly, in the same attitudes conditions, low self-monitors maintained their attitudes, irrespective of whether Ashley considered them to be sincere or sociable. High self-monitors in the same attitudes conditions were also unaffected by the impression manipulation.

One possible explanation for the unexpected finding is that the manipulation of Ashley's initial impression may have had an unintended effect. The sincerity manipulation we employed may have assured participants that they would be perceived as sincere by Ashley, freeing participants from a concern about appearing to be sincere. Because she had already said in the sincere impression condition that she thought he was sincere and authentic, participants may not have felt the need to demonstrate their sincerity to her. Instead of worrying about appearing sincere, they seemed to act on another self-presentation concern, making a good impression on her.

In our study, Ashley was depicted as an attractive woman. During debriefing, most participants voluntarily expressed their disappointment of not meeting her, when

the experimenter told the participant that there would be no discussion with Ashley. They were eager to meet her and they seemed to want to make a good impression on her. Participants' desire to make a good impression on her was reflected in the results of this study. Both high and low self-monitors showed conformity to Ashley's attitudes: They maintained their attitudes when Ashley's attitudes were the same as theirs and they changed their attitudes (in order to agree with her) when her attitudes were different from theirs. The findings are consistent with other research on self-presentation.

People tend to see others as more likable if they expect to interact with them (Berscheid, et al., 1976; Darley & Berscheid, 1967). People also tend to mold their attitudes in a direction that an expected partner prefers when the partner is attractive. For example, Zanna and Pack (1975) tested how people change their attitudes depending on their expectations about their interaction partner and the attractiveness of the partner. All participants in their study were female and they were told that they would meet either a desirable or an undesirable male. The target male described his image of an ideal woman as either stereotypically traditional (e.g., domestic, passive) or as non-traditional (e.g., independent, ambitious). After receiving the target male's information, participants completed a survey. When the target male was desirable, female participants changed their attitudes to conform to the view of the partner's stereotype of women. If he preferred traditional women, they presented themselves as conventional; if he preferred non-traditional women, they presented themselves as liberal. When the partner was undesirable, participants were not influenced by the partner's preferences.

As in Zanna and Pack's (1975) study, both low and high self-monitors may have conformed to Ashley's attitudes in order to meet their self-presentation goal of making a good impression on her.

In the present study, although both low and high self-monitors, in general, conformed to Ashley's attitudes, in the different attitudes conditions, high self-monitors shifted their attitudes more when Ashley thought of them as sociable than when Ashley thought of them as sincere. On the other hand, low self-monitors were unaffected by Ashley's initial impression in the different attitudes conditions. One possible explanation for the unexpected finding could be found from a situational constraint that we will explain as follows.

In the present study we wanted to have participants focus on Ashley as the main audience. Therefore, participants were told that they would discuss several topics with Ashley alone for 20 minutes. By emphasizing Ashley as the main audience, we may have introduced a constraint on participants' self-presentation. The participants were aware that Ashley would receive their completed survey before the discussion. Her knowledge of their attitudes and the anticipated discussion may have placed a constraint on participants to present themselves in a limited latitude.

Their self-presentation in the discussion would need to match Ashley's knowledge of their attitudes (Baumeister & Jones, 1978). Schlenker (2003) argued that a desirable self-presentation should be believable to the target audience and beneficial to the actor. "The believability of an assertion depends heavily on the relationship between the claim and the relevant data (e.g., Is the claim supported by the facts?), and it is also influenced by social considerations, including the

interpersonal, persuasive skills of the advocate” (Schlenker & Weigold, 1989, p. 257).

The extent to which a person can appear sincere depends on the extent to which the person is capable of self-expression.

High self-monitors may be less influenced by the situational constraint than low self-monitors because high self-monitors are more skillful at adapting to new roles depending on situational demands (Snyder, 1987), so they may use broader boundaries in expressing themselves to meet Ashley’s expectation of them (as a sincere or a sociable person). On the other hand, low self-monitors, who are not skillful at adapting to new roles, may choose to express their attitudes within more limited boundaries. This may explain why the amount of attitude shifts on low self-monitors in the different attitudes conditions falls between the amount of attitude shifts on high self-monitors in the sincere condition and the amount of attitude shifts on high self-monitors in the sociable condition. By expressing moderate attitude shifts, low self-monitors would want to make certain that their misrepresentation would not be caught by Ashley during the discussion.

Two limitations of this study have been mentioned. First, the anticipated discussion may have placed constraints on the participants to present themselves in a restricted way. A future study should test whether the results would be different when no discussion is anticipated. Second, Ashley’s initial impression may have had a different effect from what we had originally intended. Instead of making sincerity salient, it is possible that we removed from participants the concern for creating an appearance of sincerity to others. A future study might induce in participants the

motivation to appear sincere having Ashley indicate that she cares about sincerity and cannot tell from the preliminary information whether the participant is sincere.



## Chapter 4: Conclusion

The theory of self-monitoring, which is a theory of expressive control, “concerns differences in the extent to which people value, create, cultivate, and project social images and public appearance” (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000, p. 531). Therefore, researchers who embark on self-monitoring research tend to approach their studies with the implicit or explicit assumption that high self-monitors are impression managers and that low self-monitors are not. By working within this dichotomous frame, researchers generally do not expect findings indicating that low self-monitors have self-presentation concerns (e.g., Arkin, Gabrenya, & Appelman, 1979).

The results of Study 1 and Study 2 of this dissertation, however, suggest that self-presentation should be taken into account in understanding low self-monitors. Both studies showed that low self-monitors shifted their attitudes more when the confederate’s attitudes were different from, compared to the same as, their own. As the self-report measure of Study 1 showed, low self-monitors in the different attitudes conditions shifted their attitudes more when sincerity was salient than when sincerity was non-salient. The motivation of appearing sincere, however, was not the only possible interpretation of the attitude shifts. The shifts could also reflect the participants’ desire to conform to the confederate’s suggestion to finish the study fast, and the findings from the self-report measure did not rule out that desire to conform as the motivation for the shifts.

Nevertheless, the behavioral measure of Study 1 provides evidence that low self-monitors indeed have self-presentation concerns. During the study, the experimenter questioned the confederate’s speed in completing the survey. In this

situation, low self-monitors took a longer time to complete the survey, perhaps to demonstrate to the experimenter that she read the survey thoroughly and took the survey seriously. On the other hand, high self-monitors were not sensitive to the experimenter's drawing attention to the confederate's speed.

In Study 2, the male participants expected to interact with an attractive female during discussions on several topics. Both low and high self-monitors maintained their attitudes when the female's attitudes were the same as theirs, whereas they shifted their attitudes when the female's attitudes were different from theirs. It is quite possible that these participants adjusted their attitudes to make a good impression on her. Study 2, therefore, does not clearly demonstrate that low self-monitors are concerned about appearing sincere, but it does show that they are concerned about self-presentation.

The results of the self-report measure in Study 1 and the results of Study 2 did not demonstrate that low self-monitors are concerned about appearing sincere. On the other hand, the results of the behavioral measure in Study 1 suggest the need for further research into the possibility that the low self-monitors have self-presentation concerns and that those concerns may derive from a desire to appear to be sincere.

Buss and Brigg (1984) suggested that some people are "authentic" in social life; that is, they say only what they believe and are indifferent to how they appear to others. Other, such as high self-monitors, are likely to avoid talking about themselves as they really are, and use pretense and deception in their efforts to play to the crowd. Schlenker and Weigold (1990), however, have argued that recognition as an autonomous and authentic person is an identity that must be constructed and protected

just as any other identity must be. Thus, so-called authentic people also monitor and control how they appear to others and adjust their conduct on the basis of the appearance they seem to be creating (Schlenker & Weigold, 1990, p. 826). Carver and Scheier (1981) argued that “Inasmuch as low self-monitors apparently take pains to try to portray themselves as they believe they really are, it would appear that they are monitoring their actions fully as much as the high self-monitors” (p. 280).

Low self-monitors’ self-presentation may not be as distinctive and flamboyant as high self-monitors’ self-presentation. However, low self-monitors’ consistent behaviors across time and situations may constitute a way of presenting themselves to their audience. An investigation of low self-monitors in terms of self-presentation are of critical importance because lack of low self-monitors’ self-presentation concern has been used to account for many findings in the self-monitoring literature (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000).

## Appendix 1: Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986)

PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS CAREFULLY. PLEASE INDICATE TRUE OR FALSE FOR EACH QUESTION.

1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people. T F
2. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like. T F
3. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe. T F
4. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information. T F
5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others. T F
6. I would probably make a good actor. T F
7. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention. T F
8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons. T F
9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me. T F
10. I am not always the person I appear to be. T F
11. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or win their favor. T F
12. I have considered being an entertainer. T F
13. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting. T F
14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations. T F
15. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going. T F
16. I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite as well as I should. T F
17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end). T F
18. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them. T F

## Appendix 2-1: Opinion Questionnaire

For each of the following items, please indicate your opinion by circling one number. There are no right or wrong answers.

1. Police should not interfere with peaceful Civil Rights demonstrations  

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree									Agree	
  
2. Library size is probably the best single indicator of the quality of a university.  

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree									Agree	
  
3. The United States spends more than necessary on defense.  

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree									Agree	
  
4. The Maryland drinking age should be lowered to 18.  

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree									Agree	
  
5. In general, the best policy is to keep tuition rates constant despite the rising cost of living.  

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree									Agree	
  
6. The University of Maryland should require that all seniors pass a comprehensive examination before they graduate.  

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree									Agree	
  
7. A student exchange plan between U.S. and Arab countries would be a good idea.  

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree									Agree	
  
8. Prison policy should be changed to permit a maximum amount of rehabilitation and a minimum of simple confinement.  

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree									Agree	

9. The University of Maryland should eliminate the mandatory athletic fee, because students should not be required to pay for athletic programs.

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree										Agree

10. A university policy to increase cost of parking permit is a good way to reduce campus traffic.

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree										Agree

11. The death penalty has no place in a civilized society.

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree										Agree

12. Marijuana should be legalized.

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree										Agree

13. We must accept limits on civil liberties to decrease vulnerability to terrorism.

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree										Agree

14. The right to have an abortion must be protected.

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree										Agree

15. Major college basketball and football players should be paid for their services.

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree										Agree

16. Hidden "red light cameras" are a good way to encourage safe driving.

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree										Agree

17. It should be illegal in Maryland to use a hand-held cellular phone while driving.

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree										Agree

18. A system of universal service, in which all Americans would spend one-year working in the public interest, is needed.

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree										Agree

19. There is nothing wrong with getting tattooed.

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree										Agree

20. In general, body piercing increases a person's attractiveness.

Strongly										Strongly
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Disagree										Agree

## Appendix 2-2: Opinion Questionnaire (Short version)

### Questionnaire for Discussion

For each of the following items, please indicate your opinion by circling one number. There are no right or wrong answers.

1. Marijuana should be legalized.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly Disagree									Strongly Agree

2. The right to have an abortion must be protected.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly Disagree									Strongly Agree

3. Major college basketball and football players should be paid for their services.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly Disagree									Strongly Agree

4. Hidden "red light cameras" are a good way to encourage safe driving.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly Disagree									Strongly Agree

5. It should be illegal in Maryland to use a hand-held cellular phone while driving.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly Disagree									Strongly Agree

6. There is nothing wrong with getting tattooed.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly Disagree									Strongly Agree



### Appendix 3: Personal Interests Questionnaire

Now we would like for you to take a moment to think about your personal interests. There are no “correct” answers. Please circle the option that comes closest to expressing your personal interests.

1. What types of movies do you like? (Choose up to two)

Romance Horror Comedy Drama Action

2. What types of music do you like? (Choose up to two)

Alternative Classical Blues Dance Easy listening Jazz R&B HipHop Rock

3. What types of hobbies do you like? (Choose up to two)

Movie Sports Computer Reading Cooking Photography Music Travel

4. What University classes would you enjoy taking? (Choose up to two)

English Mathematics Psychology Physics Sociology History

5. What types of sports do you like? (Choose up to two)

Baseball Basketball Bowling Bicycling Golf Hiking Soccer

Winter Sports Tennis Climbing Football Hockey Martial Arts

Please read each item and answer the following question: “How characteristic is this of you?” Please write your responses for each item from 1 to 5 on the blank line.

1 = Strongly Disagree

2 = Somewhat Disagree

3 = Neutral

4 = Somewhat Agree

5 = Strongly Agree

\_\_\_ 6. I tend to trust my intuition.

\_\_\_ 7. I like to grasp the details first, then big picture later.

\_\_\_ 8. I stay up late.

\_\_\_ 9. I prefer to read a good book over watching television.

\_\_\_ 10. Looking my best is important to me.

\_\_\_ 11. I prefer to live in my imagination instead of reality.

## Appendix 4-1: First Impression

### PERSONAL INFORMATION

#### Instructions:

1. Answer the following demographic questions.
2. Form a first impression of your partner in the box below based on his/her completed Personal Interests Questionnaire.
3. When you complete this form, it will be given to your partner before you meet him/her.

First Name: Ashley

Sex: Female

Age: 19

Height: 5'6"

Major: Dance

Hometown: Baltimore

Are you currently in a dating relationship? Yes  No

#### **(Sincere Impression condition)**

#### **FIRST IMPRESSION OF YOUR PARTNER**

Please read your *partner's* Personal Interests Questionnaire first. When you are finished, write a brief first impression of your partner in 2 to 3 sentences. Please write as if you were talking directly to your partner. For example, use phrases like "My impression of *you*..." or "*You* look like...".

My impression of you based on your answers to the  
Questionnaire is that you seem like an authentic and  
sincere person. I think you probably stay true to yourself  
regardless of who you are around.

## Appendix 4-2: First Impression

### PERSONAL INFORMATION

#### Instructions:

1. Answer the following demographic questions.
2. Form a first impression of your partner in the box below based on his/her completed Personal Interests Questionnaire.
3. When you complete this form, it will be given to your partner before you meet him/her.

First Name: Ashley

Sex: Female

Age: 19

Height: 5'6"

Major: Dance

Hometown: Baltimore

Are you currently in a dating relationship? Yes  No

#### **(Sociable Impression condition)**

#### **FIRST IMPRESSION OF YOUR PARTNER**

Please read your *partner's* Personal Interests Questionnaire first. When you are finished, write a brief first impression of your partner in 2 to 3 sentences. Please write as if you were talking directly to your partner. For example, use phrases like "My impression of *you*..." or "*You* look like...".

My impression of you based on your answers to the  
Questionnaire is that you seem like a sociable person. I  
think you probably get along with others well.

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

## Appendix 5: Script for Study 1

The confederate and the participant will wait in a hallway to participate in the experiment. An experimenter will come to them and check whether they are the participants in the experiment. An experimenter will take them to a waiting room. While they are waiting and completing the consent form, the confederate starts to talk to the participant.

**Experimenter:** “Who’s here for the experiment? Come with me please. Have a seat. I need to set up the experiment. In the meantime read the consent form and sign it if you want to participate.”

**Confederate:** “Hey what’s up? This is my third experiment, how bout you?”

### In Sincerity Salient condition:

**Confederate:** “Yeah, the other two studies didn’t take long. I just filled out a survey. My friend just did this study and told me that to get through it fast to just agree with the other person. I’m just going to do that.”

### In Sincerity Non-Salient condition:

**Confederate:** “The other two studies didn’t take long. I filled out a survey and that was it.”

The experimenter comes to the waiting room and takes them to an adjacent lab. The experiment starts

**Experimenter:** “Can you come with me please. Please have a seat. Welcome to ‘Interpersonal Impressions’ study. Thanks for waiting for the experiment. My name is \_\_\_\_\_.”

Now, let me give you a brief overview of what you are going to do here today. The study is about how people interact when they meet for the first time. Before I start the experiment, let me ask you a question. Did you know each other before you came to the lab?”

**Confederate:** “No.” (Shake head)

**Experimenter:** “Well you seemed friendly, and it’s very important that you did not know each other in advance because we are interested in how two people interact on their first meeting.”

**Confederate:** “No, we didn’t meet before today.”

**Experimenter:** “Okay. Let me describe the procedure. In this bag there are two numbers: 1 and 2. Each of you draws a number from the bag. The person who picks number 1 fills out a short survey first and then gives it to the next person. The next person indicates how much she agrees or disagrees with the first person’s responses on the survey. Then you will discuss the topics that you disagree on. By disagreement we mean when there is a two-point or more difference for a certain question. If there is a difference of two points or more then you and your partner will discuss that question. We want to see how the discussion proceeds. Is the procedure clear to you? Do you have any questions? Ok, please pick a number and look at it. Who has number one? Ok you go first.”

**In Sincerity Salient condition:**

**Experimenter:** [Hand out survey to the confederate]

**Confederate:** [Confederate *hastily* fills out the survey and gives the completed survey to the experimenter.]

**Experimenter:** “You fill that out pretty fast. Did you really read each item carefully before answering?”

**Confederate:** “Yeah. I am a pretty fast reader. It wasn’t that hard.”

**Experimenter:** “Okay.”

[Give two surveys to the participant: One is a blank survey and the other one is the confederate’s completed survey.]

“Please examine the responses on the completed survey and then fill out this blank survey.”

**Confederate:** [Confederate surreptitiously records how long it takes for the participant to fill out each page of the blank survey]

**In Sincerity Non-Salient condition:** (No comment from the experimenter on confederate’s speed)

**Experimenter:** [Hand out a survey to the confederate.]

**Confederate:** [Confederate fills out the survey and gives the completed survey to the experimenter.]

**Experimenter:** [Give two surveys to the participant: One is a blank survey and the other one is the confederate’s completed survey.]

“Please examine the response on the completed survey and then fill out this blank survey.”

**Confederate:** [Confederate surreptitiously records how long it takes for the participant to fill out each page of the blank survey.]

**Debriefing**

## Appendix 6: Script for Study 2

Experimenter: [Be sure you have a clipboard containing an Informed Consent form and the participant's completed Personal Interests Questionnaire].

Hi! Come on in and have a seat.

My name is \_\_\_\_\_.

This is the Impression Formation study, which is a study of how individuals form impressions of others.

Before we start, I want you to read and sign the Consent form, if you agree to participate. If you have any questions, feel free to ask me.

[Hand him the informed consent form. When he is finished, take it back.]

Experimenter:

Let me give you a brief overview of what you are doing today.

Like I said before, this study is about how people form impressions of others, so we set up a situation where you and a partner will interact.

Your partner is in the next room right now. Her name is Ashley.

As you know, in everyday life people don't always have equal types of information about each other, and this information may affect their discussion.

To simulate and study these differences, you and Ashley will be given different types of information about each other.

Ashley will get a questionnaire that you filled out in your PSYC class.

This is the one she will get. We call this the Personal Interest Questionnaire.

[show him Personal Interest Questionnaire and take it back]

She will read this questionnaire and write down a first impression of you based on it. You will get to see what she writes about you.

You will also receive a written description of her.

Let me tell you what Ashley is doing now.

We developed a short Discussion questionnaire for this study which Ashley is filling out right now in the next room.

When she is done, I will go to her room and give her your Personal Interest Questionnaire [show him Personal Interest Questionnaire again] and ask her to write up the first impression of you based on it.

When I come back from her room, I will give you a written description of Ashley and her first impression of you.

Your job is to fill out the same Discussion questionnaire that she is filling out now and discuss topics presented in the questionnaire with her.

You and Ashley will talk for about 20 minutes, alone, in this room.

I want the discussion to be informal, as if you were having a conversation at dinner or a party.

After the discussion, you will form a first impression of her and Ashley will update her impression of you. Is the procedure clear to you?

Okay. Let me check to see how she is doing, and give her your Personal Interests questionnaire.

I'll be back in a couple of minutes.

[Leave the room to go to the room where participant's partner, Ashley is waiting. Return to the room with two copies of Ashley's Discussion questionnaire and a black pen and give the manipulation of Ashley's first impression.]

Experimenter:

Here is Ashley's self-description and her first impression of you. She saw your Personal Interests questionnaire and wrote down her impression of you at the bottom of the page. Please take a moment to look this over [Give the Ashley's description and impression form and pause while they read this over]

(NOTE: There are two different conditions: Sincere Impression vs. Sociable Impression).

**For Sincere Impression condition:**

My impression of you based on your answers to the Questionnaire is that you seem like an authentic and sincere person. I think you probably stay true to yourself regardless of who you are around.

**For Sociable Impression condition:**

My impression of you based on your answers to the Questionnaire is that you seem like a sociable person. I think you probably get along with others well.

**Continue for all conditions:**

(NOTE: There are two different conditions: Same responses vs. Different responses.)

Here are two copies of the Discussion questionnaire.

Ashley has already marked her answers on both of them. (Marked in blue ink pen)

Please circle your answers on the same pages.

Your answers can be the same as, similar to, or different from Ashley's.

(Hand subject a black ink pen)

We are asking you and Ashley to fill out both copies so that, during your discussion, you can each have your own copy to easily see where one another stands on the issues.

Her answers are in blue ink and yours will be in black ink.

Ok, I'll leave the room and give you a few minutes to fill out both copies.

When I come back, you will meet Ashley and begin your discussion. Any



questions? [Give him two copies of the Discussion questionnaire and leave room]

Experimenter: [When he is done, then enter room.]

Are you finished?

Do you have any questions so far? “Does anything see unusual?”

**Debriefing**

**Table 1**

**Attitude Shifts as a Function of Self-Monitoring, Initial Impression, and Attitude Similarity in Study 1 (Self-Report Measure)**

Responses	Low Self-Monitors				High Self-Monitors			
	Sincerity Salient		Sincerity Non-Salient		Sincerity Salient		Sincerity Non-	
	<u>M</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SE</u>
Same	8.00	1.33	8.17	1.44	12.29	1.88	9.25	1.76
Different	23.71	1.88	12.00	1.57	19.27	1.50	12.00	1.66

Note. Higher values reflect greater shifts in attitude responses.

**Table 2**

**Response Times as a Function of Self-Monitoring, Initial Impression, and Attitude Similarity in Study 1 (Behavioral Measure)**

Responses	Low Self-Monitors				High Self-Monitors			
	Sincerity Salient		Sincerity Non-Salient		Sincerity Salient		Sincerity Non-Salient	
	<u>M</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SE</u>
Same	47.00	3.41	42.08	3.68	38.00	4.82	38.13	4.50
Different	53.86	4.82	35.90	4.03	43.64	3.84	46.11	4.25

Note. Time unit is second.


**Table 3**

**Attitude Shifts as a Function of Self-Monitoring, Initial Impression, and Attitude Similarity in Study 2**

Responses	Low Self-Monitors				High Self-Monitors			
	Sincere		Sociable		Sincere		Sociable	
	<u>M</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SE</u>
Same	5.90	1.14	5.56	1.20	6.44	1.20	5.40	1.14
Different	13.33	1.20	12.38	1.27	10.67	1.20	17.30	1.14

Note. Higher values reflect greater shifts in attitude responses.

**Figure 1. Attitude Shifts as a Function of Self-Monitoring, Initial Impression, and Attitude Similarity.**



Note. Higher values reflect greater shifts in attitude responses.

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