We take a tour of various themes in default reasoning, examining new ideas as well as those of Brachman, Delgrande, Poole, and Schlechta. An underlying issue is that of stating that a potential default principle is not appropriate. We see this arise most dramatically as a problem in an attempt to formalize what are often loosely called "prototypes", although it also arises in other formal approaches to default reasoning. Some formalisms in the literature provide solutions but not without costs. We propose a formalism that appears to avoid these costs; it can be seen as a step toward a population-based set-theoretic modification of these approaches, that may ultimately provide a closer tie to recent work on statistical (quantitative) foundations of (qualitative) defaults([1]). Our analysis in particular indicates the need to resolve a conflation between use and mention in many default formalisms. Our treatment proposes such a resolution, and also explores the use of sets toward a more population-based notion of default. (Also cross-referenced as UMIACS-TR-96-61)