Invertebrate Minds: A Challenge for Ethical Theory

No Thumbnail Available

Files

Invertebrate-minds.htm (125 KB)
No. of downloads: 1712

Publication or External Link

Date

2007

Advisor

Citation

Peter Carruthers. Invertebrate Minds: A Challenge for Ethical Theory. Journal of Ethics, 11 (2007)

DRUM DOI

Abstract

This paper argues that navigating insects and spiders possess a degree of mindedness that makes them appropriate (in the sense of ‘possible’) objects of sympathy and moral concern. For the evidence suggests that many invertebrates possess a belief-desire-planning psychology that is in basic respects similar to our own. The challenge for ethical theory is find some principled way of demonstrating that individual insects do not make moral claims on us, given the widely held belief that some other ‘higher’ animals do make such claims on us.

Notes

Rights