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dc.contributor.authorGunnsteinsson, Snaebjorn
dc.date.accessioned2017-07-21T19:08:10Z
dc.date.available2017-07-21T19:08:10Z
dc.date.issued2017-07
dc.identifierdoi:10.13016/M2D795B0R
dc.identifier.citationGunnsteinsson, Snaebjorn. 2017. Experimental Identification of Asymmetric Information: Evidence on Crop Insurance in the Philippines. University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics Working Papers, WP 17-04.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/19600
dc.description.abstractAsymmetric information imposes costs on a wide range of markets and may explain why some important markets, such as most agricultural insurance markets, have failed to develop. It is hard to empirically identify the different dimensions of asymmetric information but doing so is crucial for improving efficiency and solving market failures. I develop a new experimental methodology and apply it to study asymmetric information in crop insurance in the Philippines. Using a combination of preference elicitation, a two-level randomized allocation of insurance and detailed data collection, I test for and find evidence of adverse selection, moral hazard and their interaction – that is, selection on anticipated moral hazard behavior. I conclude that information asymmetry problems are substantial in this context and that they are unlikely to be reduced appreciably through contract redesign alone.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUMD AREC Working Papers;WP 17-04
dc.subjectinsurance, adverse selection, moral hazard, selection on moral hazard, information asymmetries, selective trials, crop insurance, experiment, Philippines, agricultureen_US
dc.titleExperimental Identification of Asymmetric Information: Evidence on Crop Insurance in the Philippinesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.relation.isAvailableAtCollege of Agriculture & Natural Resources
dc.relation.isAvailableAtAgricultural & Resource Economics
dc.relation.isAvailableAtDigital Repository at the University of Maryland
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUniversity of Maryland (College Park, MD)


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