Digital Repository at the University of Maryland (DRUM)  >
Theses and Dissertations from UMD  >
UMD Theses and Dissertations 

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

Title: Essays on Financial Regulation in Macroeconomics
Authors: Bengui, Julien Yonathan
Advisors: Korinek, Anton
Mendoza, Enrique G
Department/Program: Economics
Type: Dissertation
Sponsors: Digital Repository at the University of Maryland
University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
Subjects: Economics
Issue Date: 2012
Abstract: This dissertation investigates two aspects of how to regulate the financial sector optimally in order to increase macroeconomic stability and mitigate the risk of future financial crises. Chapter 1 analyzes the desirability of international coordination in financial regulation. It develops a two-country model of systemic liquidity risk-taking in which financial market imperfections provide a rationale for macro-prudential regulation. In the model, curbing liquidity risk-taking via regulation lowers the price of liquidity during financial crises and thereby reduces the costs associated with market incompleteness. But regulation also entails costs in the form of distortions to productive investment decisions. The discrepancy between the domestic dimension of the costs and the global dimension of the benefits of regulation generates free-riding incentives among regulators operating in different countries. The theory predicts that absent international coordination, national authorities are tempted to regulate their financial systems in a way that results in excessive illiquidity. It therefore speaks in favor of a stronger global coordination of banking regulation. Chapter 2 analyzes the social optimality of private debt maturity choices. It studies debt maturity decisions in a dynamic macroeconomic model in which financial frictions give rise to systemic risk in the form of amplification effects. Long-term liabilities provide insurance against shocks to the asset side of the balance sheet, but they come at an extra cost. The debt maturity structure therefore maps into an allocation of macroeconomic risk between lenders and leveraged borrowers, and fundamental shocks propagate more powerfully in the economy when the maturity is shorter. The market equilibrium is not constrained efficient as borrowers fail to internalize their contribution to systemic risk and take on too much short-term debt in a decentralized economy. The theory indicates that a tax on short-term debt -- a form of macroprudential policy -- leads to Pareto improvements and results in less volatile allocations and asset prices.
Appears in Collections:Economics Theses and Dissertations
UMD Theses and Dissertations

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormatNo. of Downloads
Bengui_umd_0117E_13188.pdf719.25 kBAdobe PDF295View/Open

All items in DRUM are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


DRUM is brought to you by the University of Maryland Libraries
University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7011 (301)314-1328.
Please send us your comments