http://hdl.handle.net/1903/1626 Tue, 18 Jun 2013 06:51:02 GMT 2013-06-18T06:51:02Z http://hdl.handle.net/1903/4357 Title: Suffering without Subjectivity Authors: Carruthers, Peter Abstract: This paper argues that it is possible for suffering to occur in the absence of phenomenal consciousness − in the absence of a certain sort of experiential subjectivity, that is. (‘Phenomenal’ consciousness is the property that some mental states possess, when it is like something to undergo them, or when they have subjective feels, or possess qualia.) So even if theories of phenomenal consciousness that would withhold such consciousness from most species of non-human animal are correct, this needn’t mean that those animals don’t suffer, and aren’t appropriate objects of sympathy and concern. Mon, 01 Nov 2004 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/1903/4357 2004-11-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/1903/4356 Title: Invertebrate Minds: A Challenge for Ethical Theory Authors: Carruthers, Peter Abstract: This paper argues that navigating insects and spiders possess a degree of mindedness that makes them appropriate (in the sense of ‘possible’) objects of sympathy and moral concern. For the evidence suggests that many invertebrates possess a belief-desire-planning psychology that is in basic respects similar to our own. The challenge for ethical theory is find some principled way of demonstrating that individual insects do not make moral claims on us, given the widely held belief that some other ‘higher’ animals do make such claims on us. Mon, 01 Jan 2007 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/1903/4356 2007-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/1903/4353 Title: Conscious Experience Versus Conscious Thought Authors: Carruthers, Peter Abstract: Are there different constraints on theories of conscious experience as against theories of conscious propositional thought? Is what is problematic or puzzling about each of these phenomena of the same, or of different, types? And to what extent is it plausible to think that either or both conscious experience and conscious thought involve some sort of self-reference? In pursuing these questions I shall also explore the prospects for a defensible form of eliminativism concerning conscious thinking, one that would leave the reality of conscious experience untouched. In the end, I shall argue that while there might be no such thing as conscious judging or conscious wanting, there is (or may well be) such a thing as conscious generic thinking. Sun, 01 Jan 2006 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/1903/4353 2006-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/1903/4352 Title: Moderately Massive Modularity Authors: Carruthers, Peter Abstract: This paper will sketch a model of the human mind according to which the mind’s structure is massively, but by no means wholly, modular. Modularity views in general will be motivated, elucidated, and defended, before the thesis of moderately massive modularity is explained and elaborated. Wed, 01 Jan 2003 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/1903/4352 2003-01-01T00:00:00Z