Now showing items 1-10 of 24
Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data
(American Economic Association, 2002-04)
We develop a private-information model of union contract negotiations in which disputes signal a firm’s willingness to pay. Previous models have assumed that all labor disputes take the form of a strike. Yet a prominent ...
Auction Design for Colombia’s Forward Energy Market
(University of Maryland, 2007-06)
Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions
(The Berkley Electronic Press, 2002)
This paper describes the bid signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. Bidders in these auctions bid on numerous spectrum licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no ...
A Capacity Market that Makes Sense
(Elsevier Science, 2005-06-15)
We argue that a capacity market is needed in most restructured electricity markets, and present a design that avoids problems found in the early capacity markets. The proposed market only rewards capacity that contributes ...
Unions, Bargaining and Strikes
(Edward Elgar, 2002-08-25)
The Optimality of Being Efficient
(Elsevier Science, 2001-03)
In an optimal auction, a revenue-optimizing seller often awards goods inefficiently, either by placing them in the wrong hands or by withholding goods from the market. This conclusion rests on two assumptions: (1) the ...
Market-Based Alternatives for Managing Congestion at New York’s LaGuardia Airport
(AirNeth Annual Conference, The Hague, 2007-04)
In the paper, we summarize the results of a project that was motivated by the expiration of the “High Density Rule,” which defined the slot controls employed at New York’s LaGuardia Airport for more than 30 years. The scope ...
Review of the Proposed Reserve Markets in New England
(Market Design, Inc., 2005-01)
ISO New England proposes reserve markets designed to improve the existing forward reserve market and improve pricing during real-time reserve shortages. We support all of the main elements of the proposal. For example, ...
Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets
(Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2004-01)
Profit-maximizing bidding in uniform price auction markets involves bidding above marginal cost. It therefore is not surprising that such behavior is observed in electricity markets. This incentive to bid above marginal cost ...
Uniform-Price Auctions in Electricity Markets
(Elsevier Science, 2006-03-20)
Wholesale electricity markets are commonly organized around a spot energy market. Buyers and suppliers submit bids and offers for each hour and the market is cleared at the price that balances supply and demand. Buyers ...