Now showing items 1-19 of 19

    • Autism as Mind-Blindness: An Elaboration and Partial Defence 

      Carruthers, Peter (Cambridge University Press, 1996)
      In this chapter I shall be defending the mind-blindness theory of autism, by showing how it can accommodate data which might otherwise appear problematic for it. Specifically, I shall show how it can explain the fact that ...
    • The Cognitive Functions of Language 

      Carruthers, Peter (Cambridge University Press, 2002-12)
      This paper explores a variety of different versions of the thesis that natural language is involved in human thinking. It distinguishes amongst strong and weak forms of this thesis, dismissing some as implausibly strong ...
    • Conscious Experience Versus Conscious Thought 

      Carruthers, Peter (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2006)
      Are there different constraints on theories of conscious experience as against theories of conscious propositional thought? Is what is problematic or puzzling about each of these phenomena of the same, or of different, ...
    • Conscious Thinking: Language or Elimination? 

      Carruthers, Peter (Blackwell Publishing, Ltd., 1998-12)
      Do we conduct our conscious propositional thinking in natural language? Or is such language only peripherally related to human conscious thought-processes? In this paper I shall present a partial defence of the former view, ...
    • Consciousness: Explaining the Phenomena 

      Carruthers, Peter (Cambridge University Press, 2001)
      Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Many people argue not. They claim that there is an ‘explanatory gap’ between physical and/or intentional states and processes, on the one hand, and ...
    • Human Creativity: Its Evolution, its Cognitive Basis, and its Connections with Childhood Pretence 

      Carruthers, Peter (Oxford University Press, 2002)
      This paper defends two initial claims. First, it argues that essentially the same cognitive resources are shared by adult creative thinking and problem-solving, on the one hand, and by childhood pretend play, on the other ...
    • Invertebrate Minds: A Challenge for Ethical Theory 

      Carruthers, Peter (Springer Netherlands, 2007)
      This paper argues that navigating insects and spiders possess a degree of mindedness that makes them appropriate (in the sense of ‘possible’) objects of sympathy and moral concern. For the evidence suggests that many ...
    • Moderately Massive Modularity 

      Carruthers, Peter (Cambridge University Press, 2003)
      This paper will sketch a model of the human mind according to which the mind’s structure is massively, but by no means wholly, modular. Modularity views in general will be motivated, elucidated, and defended, before the ...
    • On Being Simple Minded 

      Carruthers, Peter (University of Illinois Press, 2004-07)
      How simple minded can you be? Many philosophers would answer: no more simple than a language-using human being. Many other philosophers, and most cognitive scientists, would allow that mammals, and perhaps birds, possess ...
    • On Fodor's Problem 

      Carruthers, Peter (Blackwell Publishing, Ltd., 2003-11)
      This paper sketches a solution to a problem which has been emphasized by Fodor. This is the problem of how to explain distinctively-human flexible cognition in modular terms. There are three aspects to the proposed account. ...
    • Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences 

      Carruthers, Peter (International Phenomenological Society, 2004)
      Relying on a range of now-familiar thought-experiments, it has seemed to many philosophers that phenomenal consciousness is beyond the scope of reductive explanation. Others have thought that we can undermine the credibility ...
    • Practical Reasoning in a Modular Mind 

      Carruthers, Peter (Blackwell Publishing, Ltd., 2004-06)
      This paper starts from an assumption defended in the author’s previous work. This is that distinctively-human flexible and creative theoretical thinking can be explained in terms of the interactions of a variety of modular ...
    • Reductive Explanation and the 'Explanatory Gap' 

      Carruthers, Peter (University of Calgary Press, 2004-06)
      Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Exponents of an ‘explanatory gap’ between physical, functional and intentional facts, on the one hand, and the facts of phenomenal consciousness, on ...
    • The Roots of Scientific Reasoning: Infancy, Modularity, and the Art of Tracking 

      Carruthers, Peter (Cambridge University Press, 2002)
      This chapter examines the extent to which there are continuities between the cognitive processes and epistemic practices engaged in by human hunter–gatherers, on the one hand, and those which are distinctive of science, ...
    • Simulation and Self-knowledge 

      Carruthers, Peter (Cambridge University Press, 1996)
      In this chapter I shall be attempting to curb the pretensions of simulationism. I shall argue that it is, at best, an epistemological doctrine of limited scope. It may explain how we go about attributing beliefs and desires ...
    • Suffering without Subjectivity 

      Carruthers, Peter (Springer Netherlands, 2004-11)
      This paper argues that it is possible for suffering to occur in the absence of phenomenal consciousness − in the absence of a certain sort of experiential subjectivity, that is. (‘Phenomenal’ consciousness is the property ...
    • Sympathy and Subjectivity 

      Carruthers, Peter (Taylor and Francis Group, 1999-12)
      This paper shows that even if the mental states of non-human animals lack phenomenological properties, as some accounts of mental-state consciousness imply, this need not prevent those states from being appropriate objects ...
    • Thinking in Language?: Evolution and a Modularist Possibility 

      Carruthers, Peter (Cambridge University Press, 1998)
      This chapter argues that our language faculty can both be a peripheral module of the mind and be crucially implicated in a variety of central cognitive functions, including conscious propositional thinking and reasoning. ...
    • Why the Question of Animal Consciousness Might Not Matter Very Much 

      Carruthers, Peter (Taylor and Francis Group, 2005-02)
      According to higher-order thought accounts of phenomenal consciousness (e.g. Carruthers, 2000) it is unlikely that many non-human animals undergo phenomenally conscious experiences. Many people believe that this result ...