

ABSTRACT

Title of dissertation: Corruption, Reform, and Revolution in Africa's
Third Wave of Protest
Jacob S. Lewis, Doctor of Philosophy, 2019

Dissertation directed by: Professor John F. McCauley
Department of Government and Politics

What explains diverging calls for reform and revolution in Africa over the past ten years? African countries have made substantial strides toward actual democratic development, including a concerted effort to address corruption. As African democracies have strengthened, calls by citizens for anti-corruption reform have grown, highlighting the progress that is being made. Yet, in recent years, some anti-corruption movements have called instead for revolution - completely replacing the state or seceding altogether. What explains these calls for revolution? I argue that we need to understand how different types of corruption shape contentious goals. When corruption generates material benefits, citizens lose trust in politicians but do not lose trust in the system. In response, they call for reform, seeking to improve the system. When corruption generates systemic benefits (distorting the system altogether), citizens lose trust in the institutions and instead call for revolution. I test this using individual-level data from survey experiments as well as large-n surveys, and group-level data using statistical analysis of protest events as well as case studies. I find strong support that types of corruption matter greatly in shaping contentious politics in Africa.

CORRUPTION, REFORM, AND REVOLUTION IN
AFRICA'S THIRD WAVE OF PROTEST

by

Jacob S. Lewis

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

2019

Advisory Committee:

Professor John McCauley, Chair/Adviser

Professor Mark Lichbach

Professor David Cunningham

Professor Jóhanna Birnir

Professor Edward Lemay

© 2019
Jacob Scott Lewis
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Foreword

This dissertation is the product of a decade of study, work, and interest in the destructive impact of corruption in Africa. My interest in African corruption emerged from a simple question that I asked while writing my master's thesis: given the abundant wealth of the African continent, why are African countries so poor and conflict-ridden? One need only scratch the surface on any given question about development, poverty, or conflict to encounter the stain of corruption lurking below. I was able to cultivate hands-on experience with this question while working on democratization and post-conflict stabilization in Africa. At the core of this work is a human story that is both troubling and all too common: government corruption in developing countries metastasizes like cancer, slowly capturing and then deteriorating the ability of government institutions to fulfill their promised duties. When governments fail, they do not 'reset' like a video game; instead, they persist, growing steadily worse. Through all of this, citizens are forced to survive in a country where, at best, the government is either increasingly uninterested in serving the people, and at worst, is actively predatory toward them. My fascination with corruption is that in many situations, corruption is the primary culprit responsible for the ongoing cycles of poverty, conflict, trust, and underdevelopment.

Data Collection

Data collection for this dissertation was supported by grants from the University of Maryland and the Association for the Study of Middle East and Africa, which allowed me to conduct fieldwork in Nigeria and South Africa. While in Nigeria, I worked with

highly dedicated research assistants, and benefited from administrative support from Dr. Tunde Oseni and Mr. Akinyemi Stephen of Lead City University in Ibadan. I am grateful to my field researchers in Nigeria: Olusoji Ajao, Akanji Ajibola, Akuche Chukwuemieka, Agidi Emmanuel, Babs Iwalewa, and Prince Obada Olabode. In South Africa, I relied on the expertise of my enumerators, Yinlaifa Cocodia and Clement Mashinini, who not only conducted excellent survey research, but also provided me with a deeper understanding of South African politics. I further benefited from the dedication of several of my students at the University of Maryland in collecting novel data on corruption: Luke Navritil, Andrew Englander, and Maxine Turner.

Personal Acknowledgements

I am indebted to a huge number of individuals without whose support I would not have been able to arrive where I am. I am grateful to Michael Dobkowski, who fostered my intellectual and spiritual development when I was an undergraduate at Hobart & William Smith Colleges. Michael showed me patience and gave me sage advice that ultimately shaped my view of what a faculty mentor could be.

My dissertation advisor and overall spirit-guide, John McCauley, consistently went out of his way to provide excellent and hard-hitting feedback to my work. His support and guidance helped to inject much-needed clarity into my research design, as well as my professional growth. John has exercised commendable patience as he helped me develop as a scholar, reading draft after draft of my dissertation and other manuscripts. I really cannot thank him enough for his friendship and the words of encouragement following journal rejections. Working with John has been the highpoint of my time at

the University of Maryland.

My faculty mentor, Mark Lichbach, sat with me often and pushed me to ask – and answer – big questions. We are all, after all, working and thinking in the midst of things. In my fourth year, Stacy Kosko took me under her wing and extended the friendship and respect that helped shape me into an effective instructor. David Cunningham and Jóhanna Birnir have, throughout my career at the University of Maryland, provided excellent and challenging feedback to this dissertation and other works. My fellow doctoral students, Daniel Siegel and Brandon Ives, provided invaluable feedback on the many drafts of this work, motivating me to always work harder and think deeper. I have spent countless hours with Dan and Brandon sipping coffee and navigating the tricky and perilous world of academia.

I am indebted to – and have modeled myself after – my father, who is a paragon of erudition and kindness. Perhaps it was the constant presence of academic journals in the backseat of his car that drove me to enter into this field. Or perhaps it was our shared love of all things to do with accumulating knowledge. I will be proud to set my dissertation next to his on the bookshelf. Similarly, my fierce and independent mother taught the value of seeing the world clearly and reckoning with it as it is. She has shown me what it means to be strong and to endure, even when it feels that all the chips are stacked against you. I am quite positive that she is the strongest person I know. I am grateful to and inspired by my brother, whose friendship means more than I could ever express, and of whom I am extremely proud. Tyke has supported me and encouraged me, and I couldn't have asked for a better cheerleader. To my two brothers in spirit – Max Linden

and Chris Rogers – thank you for the deep talks about fantasy, science fiction, and politics that both enlightened me and kept me sane. Of course, I could not have done any of this without my grandmother, Florence Lewis, who once asked, “what, you couldn’t have just been a lawyer?” Her support and love have filled my life, and I cherish our conversations deeply.

Finally, my deepest gratitude belongs with my fiancée, Jordana, who has finally helped me start living and experiencing life rather than waiting for it to begin. She has provided support, comfort, and encouragement at the times when it was most needed. She put up with my frantic neurosis over manuscripts, research, and job talks, and tolerated my absence while I was in Nigeria and South Africa. She calms and centers me, and is more than I deserve. I love you, Vixie.

Dedication

For Saul Lewis
1916 – 1989

Table of Contents

Foreword	ii
Dedication	vi
List of Tables	viii
List of Figures	x
Introduction	1
A Theory of Corruption and Contention	20
Causal Linkages of Types of Corruption and Reform or Revolution	54
Cross-National Evidence Linking Types of Corruption to Reform or Revolution	88
Reform and Revolution at the Incident Level	116
Case Studies of Corruption, Reform, and Revolution	152
Putting the Pieces Together	195
Appendix A: Survey Experiment	206
Appendix B: Individual Level Data	208
Appendix C: Case Studies Materials	211
References	213

List of Tables

Table 1 - Sampled States & Districts in Nigeria	60
Table 2 – Sampled Districts in South Africa	60
Table 3 - Material Treatments	62
Table 4 - Systemic Treatments	62
Table 5 - Treatment Balance in Nigeria	68
Table 6 - Treatment Balance in South Africa	69
Table 7 – Broken System T Test in Nigeria	70
Table 8 – Evaluations of the System in Nigeria	71
Table 9 – Average Treatment Effects on Trust in Nigeria	74
Table 10 – Manual Calculation of Mediated Effects	78
Table 11 - Broken System T Test in South Africa	81
Table 12 - Evaluations of the System in South Africa	82
Table 13 - Average Treatment Effects on Trust in South Africa	85
Table 14 - Expected Correlations	102
Table 15 - Corruption & Institutional Trust	103
Table 16 – Tactics and Goals in African Contentious Movements	108
Table 17 – Ordinal Cumulative Linked Mixed Model	110
Table 18 – Ordinal Cumulative Linked Mixed Model	114
Table 19 - Most Frequent Reform Goals	130
Table 20 - Examples of Reform Coding	132
Table 21 - Most Frequent Revolutionary Goals	135
Table 22 - Examples of Revolutionary Coding	136
Table 23 - Contention in Capital Regions	139
Table 24 - Categorical Time Values	140
Table 25 - Directness of Connection to Corruption	141
Table 26 - Material Corruption & Reformatory Contention	144
Table 27 - Systemic Corruption & Revolutionary Contention	147

Table 28 – Recapping the Cases	194
Table 29 - Table of Hypotheses & Results	197
Table 30 - Hierarchical Linear Regression Model	209
Table 31 - Hierarchical Linear Regression	210
Table 32 - Additional Anti-Corruption Cases in Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa	211

List of Figures

Figure 1 - African Corruption in the CPI	17
Figure 2 – How Broken is the System in Nigeria?	72
Figure 3 – Mediated through Institutional Trust	79
Figure 4 - Mediated Relationship in Nigeria	79
Figure 5 - How Broken is the System in South Africa?	83
Figure 6 - Density of Institutional Trust	95
Figure 7 - Free & Fair Elections	97
Figure 8 - Perceptions of Police Corruption	98
Figure 9 - Predicted Institutional Trust	104
Figure 10 – Justification of Violence in Round 5 of Afrobarometer	108
Figure 11 - Predicted Marginal Effects of Justifications for Violence	111
Figure 12 – Would use Force or Violence for a Political Cause	113
Figure 13 - Contentious Incidents from 1997 to 2016	127
Figure 14 - Predicted Probabilities of Reform & Revolution	150
Figure 15 - Contention in Nigeria	157
Figure 16 - Contention in Kenya	171
Figure 17 - StopTheseThieves Protesters	172
Figure 18 – No Trust at all in Electoral Commission	176
Figure 19 – Contention in South Africa	181
Figure 20 - ZumaMustFall Protests	186
Figure 21 - Unemployment in South Africa from 2009 to 2018	187
Figure 22 - Density of Ages between Nigerian Treatments	207
Figure 23 - Densities of Trust in Ruling Party and Institutions	208

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

“My father [Frank Chikane] has been my political school for as long as I can remember and, for most of my young life, he provided me with front-row tickets to a daily screening of How to Build a Democratic South Africa ... It’s probably because of this that I find myself at odds with my father. His work in building a ‘rainbow nation’ is at odds with my desire to break it. Where he seeks to build unity, I seek to fragment it. My dad believes that we can change through reform, while I believe we can only improve through revolution.” (Chikane, 2018)

Africa’s Third Wave

Africa has experienced three great ‘waves’ of protest in the past seventy years. The first wave occurred while African countries remained under the yoke of colonial rule. Unsatisfied with being governed by a political system designed to extract natural resources and relegate them to second-class status, Africans rose up in revolution, demanding an end to colonization and the complete transformation of government from predatory to subservient. Beginning largely in the 1950s, across the continent, colonial powers attempted to fend off highly organized liberation movements. In Kenya, the British violently put down the Mau Mau independence movement. In Algeria, the French fought the *Front de liberation nationale* (FLN). By the mid-1960s, most African countries had successfully become independent (Branch, 2011).

Africa’s second great wave of protest occurred following the end of the Cold War and the reconfiguration of geopolitics away from a bipolar system. As great power support for one-party autocratic and authoritarian parties fell in the 1990s, Africans once again

rose up in large numbers, this time demanding democratic reforms. Tired of democracy in name only, Africans pushed for the introduction of multi-party elections and greater civil liberties. Over the following two decades, in fits and starts, African governments began to make meaningful progress toward true democracy. At the time of writing, Nigeria has just completed its sixth multiparty election. In the past few years, African leaders have been constrained by institutions, including in Kenya, South Africa, the Gambia, and even in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Africa's third wave of protest emerged alongside the Arab Spring (Branch and Mampilly, 2015). Yet, while the Arab Spring was widely reported around the globe despite its relatively paltry gains, Africa's third wave has been largely underreported despite its effective challenge to government corruption, economic inequality, and democratic weakness. The third wave has accompanied several major developments in African society. First, an emerging "new middle class" independent of the government has increasingly organized, supported, and mobilized into contentious anti-government action (Lofchie, 2014). Second, African governments have been surprisingly receptive to the demands of protesters – particularly those demanding an end to the endemic corruption that has hindered African development since independence. These developments have forced African governments to make serious transitions toward improving governance and taking anti-corruption seriously, including calls by the National Assembly in the Gambia to prosecute corrupt government officials (Africa Research Bulletin, 2012b). In Kenya, the Auditor-General has openly criticized the opacity of Kenyan politicians and their wealthy lifestyles, and in January of 2019, the government

hired a British attorney to prosecute corrupt officials (Africa Research Bulletin, 2019b). The Tanzanian president fired six ministers following allegations of graft (Africa Research Bulletin, 2012a) And recently, the Ghanaian government appointed a special prosecutor to examine issues of corruption surrounding the ruling party (Africa Research Bulletin, 2019a).

Yet, despite these meaningful steps taken toward democracy and reducing corruption, Africa's third wave has witnessed the emergence of revolutionary and, in some cases, anti-democratic movements that have picked up steam. This divergence of goals is puzzling. Why do some contentious groups – who regularly voice anger at corruption – seek out reform while other groups – also angry about corruption – lead calls for revolution? And why do these revolutionary groups, including some who advocate for the complete secession from the state, find renewed vigor at the same time that African democracies are making real progress toward fulfilling the demands of protesters? This dissertation seeks to understand this very phenomenon. In order to do so, it examines a critical aspect of contention that help explain contentious patterns in Africa's third wave. Government corruption has been a mainstay in the contentious claims of Africa's third wave of protest, yet scholars have mostly overlooked the important distinctions between different types of corruption. This dissertation addresses this oversight. It examines how different types of corruption generate different contentious outcomes, and finds strong evidence that contentious groups shape their calls for reform or revolution in response to types of government corruption.

The Puzzle

Consider two recent social movements that arose during Africa's third wave that incorporated claims of corruption at the core of their contentious frames: the sustained fuel subsidy protests that rocked Nigeria in 2012 and the ongoing revolutionary secessionist movement conducted in the southern region of Nigeria known informally as Biafra. These cases will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6; right now, I draw upon their outline to frame the case. In 2012, fuel subsidy cuts were met by broad coalitions of protesters incensed at the nerve of the government's application of austerity measures despite its brazen and endemic corruption. The protests began with contentious frames centered on fuel subsidies, but soon transformed into mass anti-corruption protests that paved the way for future anti-corruption organizing by civil society organizations and labor unions (Mark, 2012; Hari, 2014). The declaration of the end of fuel subsidies brought into sharp focus for Nigerians the rampant material corruption – the kleptocratic theft and greed at elite and senior levels – that has long hindered economic development. Protesters initially called for the reinstatement of fuel subsidies. But, as protests grew and with the election of a new president, protesters began to organize around explicitly anti-corruption messages, demanding the prosecution of corrupt elites and the independence of institutions (Sahara Reporters, 2015). These protests sought reform – an improvement to existing policies and institutions in order to improve government performance and the provision of public goods and services.

In Nigeria's southern region of Biafra, renewed calls for secession grew from whispers in the late 2000s to cries and shouts in the period of 2014 to 2018. Two major

revolutionary groups – the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB), the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) – have led the charge for the independent secession of Biafra, and have focused on placing systemic forms of corruption central to their claims. Three major grievances can be found in their contentious frames. First, police and security force corruption and the illegal detention of prominent Biafran separatist leaders. Second, the fraudulent nature of what these groups perceive to be rigged elections. Finally, the (perceived) forceful exclusion of the Igbo people from positions of power in the executive branch, military, and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Pro-Biafran contention has regularly proclaimed the government to be corrupt, and has demanded revolutionary action rather than reform.

Both of the contentious movements above – reformist protesters responding to material corruption and revolutionary protesters responding to more systemic forms of corruption – seem like they should behave similarly. These groups inhabit the same country and inherit the same government. Furthermore, each group has explicitly stated that corruption is a primary mobilizing factor. Yet, one social movement seeks reformative goals while another seeks revolution. Why, in a single state and voicing the same charges of corruption, did these groups decide to mobilize differently?¹

The answer to this puzzle requires a deep dive into the theoretical substance of what

¹ In the Biafran case, anger over sentiments of corruption – both material and systemic – date back to the period immediately following Nigeria’s independence. During this time, Igbos increasingly felt anger at the control that northerners held over the levers of political power and the distribution of petroleum rents that were largely sourced from the southern region that became known as Biafra (Campbell, 2013; Arnold, 2017). Activation of Biafran secession in Africa’s third wave draws upon the long, contentious history between Nigerian southerners and the rest of the country (Smith, 2014).

precisely is meant when scholars, policymakers, and activists mean when they speak about corruption. Corruption is an omnibus term, and its complexity is evident through the numerous working definitions employed in past scholarship. When these groups – or when protesters in South Africa and revolutionaries in Burundi – rise up against government corruption, what type of corruption are they responding to? This distinction, I argue, helps explain the diverging contentious coalitions that emerge in response to corruption.

Why Focus on Corruption?

Contentious politics are driven by many factors, so why do I focus in on the impact of corruption? In the African context, corruption has occupied a central role in state, economic and social development. Since the emergence and development of the post-World War II humanitarian assistance practice, policymakers and scholars have fixated on questions of *why*. Why do African countries remain poor? They are resource-rich and have relatively small populations. Why are African countries prone to violence? Why have African governments followed such similar governance trajectories – from colonialism to autocracy to weak democracies? These issues – poverty, conflict, poor governance – have fueled popular discontent amongst Africans, motivating them to take to the streets to protest their governments. The answers to these questions of *why* may seem elusive to some, but a close examination of African governance – or a handful of conversations with citizens - reveals that the underlying problem of corruption is tied to nearly every major malfunction of the African state.

Corruption causes consequences that help tip protesters into action. As I describe in Chapter 6 of this dissertation, when South African students rose up in 2015 to form the #FeesMustFall movement, they may have been ‘tipped’ by the declaration of a 10 per-cent increase in their tuition fees, but this tipping point was salient only because it came following the widescale looting of hundreds of millions of dollars from the National Student Financial Aid Scheme by ANC connected students and party-members.

Defining Corruption

Since the end of the Cold War, scholars and policymakers alike have developed a great interest in government corruption. For those interested in African politics, this focus was doubly important, as the end of bilateral great power politics meant that African nations might have a chance at a ‘second liberation’, free from American and Soviet influence that often propped up corrupt leaders in favor of regional stability. From the World Bank to USAID to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), anti-corruption programs were pushed in order to give African governments a kick-start in controlling the rampant corruption that characterized many regimes. Organizations like the World Bank and the IMF have generally referred to corruption as “the abuse of public office for personal gain.” This definition has been widely adopted in scholarship (Klitgaard, 1991; Lambsdorff, 2007; Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016), and this definition has largely driven empirical measurements that have pervaded the policy and scholarship

worlds.²

Based on this definition, two major corruption indices were introduced. In the mid-1990s, Transparency International presented its Corruption Perceptions Index (2018), which provided a single index per country per year designed to give an overall view of how corrupt a given nation was. Similarly, the World Bank's Governance Index (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2006) generated a 'control of corruption' score that purported to measure the level to which a government had, intuitively, control of its corruption. In order to provide detailed information for businesses interested in investing in developing nations, The PRS Group developed an index that measured corruption within a larger Country Risk index (2015). Despite widespread popularity and usage by scholars, indices are problematic. First, indices assume a unitary definition of corruption across the world. Second, the indices make no distinction in terms of which types of corruption are most prevalent in a given country, and no weighting is given to sources of corruption.

The result is a series of indices that provide some insight into levels of corruption in a given country, but do not specify what the character of that corruption is. In most cases, this is perfectly fine; country-level indices provide a high-level overview of overall levels of graft and dysfunction and can serve as a quick way to measure political and economic risk in a given countries. There are, of course, shortcomings to this approach.

² For a detailed discussion of the different definitions of corruption, see Johnston (1996), Heidenheimer (1989), and van Klaveran (1989).

For example, unified indices overlook citizen experiences of corruption, general perceptions of corruption, or the political context in which corruption is practiced. These perceptions condition citizen behaviors and responses to government corruption. And importantly, these indices are unable to measure variation in *types of corruption*, which means that despite substantially different structures of corruption, countries like Cameroon and Nigeria are ranked nearly identically. This obscures substantial differences between the two countries: while rampant looting is widespread in Nigeria, elections are generally competitive, whereas in Cameroon, president Paul Biya has rigged elections and captured the state to the extent that Cameroon is essentially a repressive one-party system (O'Donnell and Gramer, 2018).

Beyond the comparative limitations of these indices, there is the matter of the gulf between universal definitions of corruption and local experiences of corruption. As many scholars have pointed out, corruption means different things to different people at different times (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006). From gifts to bribes to practices of patronage, practices vary widely across the world, a fact that the universalistic definitions fail to capture. At its core, this incompatibility hinges on the salience of the ideals of democratic governance to the individual making an evaluation of a violating act. To those for whom democratic ideals are strong and salient, intolerance of violating acts is higher. To those for whom democratic ideals are either weak or not salient, tolerance of violating acts is higher. This helps to explain why policymakers in Washington or Geneva develop definitions of corruption that do not sync up with definitions of corruption adopted by Nigerians or Kenyans.

These shortcomings have important implications in studying the effects of corruption on outcome variables of interest. For example, using these highly aggregated definitions, scholars have arrived at mixed results in determining whether corruption helps or hinders democratic development (Heidenheimer, 2004; Bauhr and Charron, 2018) and economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Méon and Sekkat, 2005), generates the onset of conflict (Le Billon, 2003; Neudorfer and Theuerkauf, 2014), and motivates terrorism (Rotberg, 2003; Teets and Chenoweth, 2009). These competing outcomes are not due to scholarly error nor are they due to weakness in the collection of corruption data (which are extremely difficult to capture).³ Instead, I argue, these competing outcomes emerge because important regional, national, and sub-national variation in the types and effects of corruption are overlooked when relying on highly-aggregated data.

Scholars have already begun to develop more nuanced approaches to understanding how types of corruption produce different effects and remain in place through different mechanisms. Three principal schools of thought have emerged. First, the economic-legalistic school defines corruption largely in material and legal terms, focusing on the way in which corrupt acts violate the law and generate ‘shadow’ economic benefits (Lowenstein, 1989; Rose-Ackerman, 2006; Rose-Ackerman and Soreide, 2013). For these scholars, corruption is primarily used to transform public office into private

³ I base this on two years of hands-on experience working with a governance organization tasked with collecting base corruption and governance data across all of Africa. Even with the strictest coding guides, collecting meaningful data is difficult. The data that I collected on the African Integrity Indicators project with Global Integrity fed directly into the World Bank Governance Indicators as well as into the Ibrahim Index of African governance.

enterprise, violating legally codified ideals regarding the relationship of the individual official to the office itself. As Rose-Ackerman and Palifka note, these definitions rely heavily on the assumption that an a priori expectation of bureaucratic governance will be observed (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016). When a government does not exist, or when it is ruled arbitrarily by leaders such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire⁴ (Deibert, 2013), it could be considered hard to make a legal case that corruption has occurred. Despite this weakness, the economic-legalistic approach touches upon an important aspect of corruption – that it transforms public roles into private entrepreneurial opportunities.

A second school of study focuses on acts that violate norms and ideals of governance. Scholars in the normative-motivational school focus on the manner in which corrupt officials betray the confidence placed in them by their constituency (Bayley, 1989; Heidenheimer, Johnston and LeVine, 1989; Philp, 2008). The confidence is the product of a matrix of norms that serve to generate expectations of behavior with regards to the public official by citizens. Of particular note is the way in which corrupt officials put themselves ahead of those they were elected to serve. Friedrich (1989) notes that, “[corruption] is deviant behavior associated with a particular motivation, namely that of private gain at public expense. Like the economic-legalistic school, the normative-motivational school focuses on the way in which corruption engenders a transformation.

⁴ Zaire is the name given to what is now known as the Democratic Republic of Congo by its former dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko.

The focus of this school, however, is on the transformation of norms within an overarching normative framework. The normative-motivational school embraces Plato's general ideas about pristine metaphysical ideals, arguing that corruption is the deviation from such ideals (1997). This school links definitions of corruption to normative ideals, defining certain acts as corrupt becomes contingent on the presence and strength of a given norm.

A third school examines the manner in which corruption transforms structures of governance into structures of power-perpetuation (Scott, 1989; Johnston, 2005, 2014). The structural-redistributive school focuses largely on politics of redistribution (Wantchekon, 2003; De La O, 2013; Stokes *et al.*, 2013) and patronage (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994, 1997; Grindle, 2012), describing the different types of 'machines' that grow around formal and informal practices of clientelism, patronage, and market domination by political elites. This school of thought focuses on the transformation in political structures from programmatic bureaucratic distributive structures into non-programmatic personalistic distributive structures. As such, this school does well in theorizing about the growth of between-group inequalities, which generally arise following the implementation of non-programmatic distribution. This school of study also addresses an important issue that the other schools do not; namely, the manner in which structures of corruption not only survive their creators, but whether such structures themselves can transform officials within the system.

These approaches to understanding corruption have provided important clarity to the scholarship on government dysfunction; however, they generally focus on the act of

corruption rather than the benefit generated.⁵ Yet, the benefit (or spoil) generated is worthy of study for several reasons. First, examining corrupt spoils provides insight into how and why corrupt actions occur in the first place, and provide policy-relevant information about the institutional weaknesses that allow corrupt misconduct to occur. Second, corrupt spoils are closely linked to social consequences borne by citizens. Material corruption siphons money and resources from the state, channeling it away from much-needed development projects and into private bank accounts. Systemic corruption distorts mechanisms of accountability, disenfranchising and marginalizing citizens. These consequences are all important, but are also quite different to one another. In order to address this, I develop a typology of corruption that builds on these definitions while focusing on the *type of corrupt spoil* generated by any given type of corruption.

The Argument

Let us first return to the puzzle at hand. Why do some movements respond to corruption by seeking reform while others seek revolution? In this dissertation, I argue that this puzzle can be solved by paying attention to the *type of corruption* that reformative and revolutionary movements agitate against. Different types of corruption generate different benefits, and as discussed in the previous section, these benefits have different consequences. Because social movements are incentivized to clearly declare their grievances, studying the varying effects of different types of corruption on social movements

⁵ Michael Johnston's work is the primary exception to this rule.

is feasible.

Generally speaking, I argue that corruption generates either material or systemic spoils. Material spoils are those that are designed to enrich elites or to be distributed via prebendal patronage networks. When the violation is material in nature, I expect citizen responses to favor reformative or limited-aims contention designed to advocate for either the reparation of governance structures or the alteration of distributional structures. Because material corruption does not alter the fundamental relationship between the state institution and the citizen, citizens will retain levels of trust in the institutions themselves, seeking instead to replace those in power.

Systemic spoils are those that distort the system to reduce accountability and accrue power and access to some individuals and groups, thereby reducing the access to power of other groups. Systemic corruption likely leads to revolutionary contention, through which activists, radicals, and combatants seek to restructure the very nature of the state itself. Because systematic corruption transforms the relationship between the state and the citizen at a fundamental level, citizen trust in institutions are corroded to the point in which contentious organizations seek the replacement of the system itself, rather than simply repairing a broken system.

Why Focus on Africa?

“Happy families,” wrote Tolstoy, “are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” (Tolstoy, 1877) There is truth to these words, certainly; however, what the opening line to *Anna Karenina* omits is that, while unique in their suffering, there *are*

general patterns of dysfunction. So, too, I argue, is the case with corruption. Furthermore, I would argue that these patterns are often structured along regional lines. It is no surprise that, following the end of the Cold War, post-Soviet states developed similar dysfunctions of governance and patterns of corruption to one another. It is thus the case, I argue, with most African states. A number of factors encourage the grouping of African countries into a ‘family’, including liberation processes, structures of government, and cultural expectations surrounding corruption.

Depending on how one counts, there are 54 African countries⁶, of which the majority attained independence between 1950 and 1965⁷. Of the countries currently on the African map, only five did not attain independence during this period⁸. A novel configuration of factors exerted a centripetal force on African developmental paths. Most African countries emerged into independence in the midst of the Cold War, joining the non-aligned bloc, and playing the dominant powers against one another. In 1963, the Organization of African Unity was formed, encompassing most African nations, and codifying a general set of rules to govern African development. Additionally, African independence movements and early post-colonial governments shared ideological

⁶In this figure, I do not include European-held territories, such as Mayotte or Saint Helena. Furthermore, I do not include Western Sahara or Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic because they are not universally recognized as nation-states.

⁷The exact number is somewhat difficult to calculate, because many of the “original” independent African states have merged or split up over time. For example, Zanzibar and Tanganyika merged to form Tanzania. Sudan split in 2011 into Sudan and South Sudan.

⁸South Africa, South Sudan, Eritrea, Egypt, and Ethiopia.


motivations with one another, including political pan-Africanism and African socialism. The majority of African countries are unitary presidential republics that experienced a ‘second liberation’ following the end of the Cold War. With some exceptions, most African states are ethnically, religiously, and linguistically diverse.

The unique (and, arguably, shared) history of most African countries led Peter Ekeh to famously describe ‘two publics’ in African life. In his seminal article, Ekeh (1975) delineates two competing publics that are in dialectic with one another. The ‘primordial public’ is the moralistic realm in which Africans play central roles in African history, social structures, and governance. The primordial public is one in which leaders provide for their constituents to reinforce ‘primordial’ group bonds. The ‘civic public’ is an amoralistic realm in which Africans are divorced from their history and traditional norms of governance. In the civic realm, colonialist ideology – built on western extraction of resources from Africa – leads African leaders to extract freely from the state. Thus, the civic public – that which westerners view as the modern governance space – is a realm of extraction, while the primordial public is a realm of provision and moral authority. This ‘dual publics’ structure leads to behavior in which leaders extract as much as possible from the state in order to provide for their in-groups, who are often their ethnic or religious members. This is known as ‘prebendalism’ (Joseph, 1987), and is a form of governance that is common across the African context.

Finally, African countries rate similarly to one another in most existing corruption indices. Transparency International’s *Corruption Perceptions Index* ranks Sub-Saharan Africa as the lowest scoring region of the world in its most recent (2018) index. The

average score is 32 out of 100, and most African countries score similarly (Transparency International, 2019a). Below, Figure 1 displays a choropleth of Transparency International's ratings of corruption across Africa. Most countries are deep red, indicating high levels of corruption.

FIGURE 1 - AFRICAN CORRUPTION IN THE CPI



These factors, I argue, provide reason to treat Africa as a ‘family’ of nations whose governmental dysfunctions bear striking resemblance to one another. Corruption is a universal problem; however, I am deeply skeptical of theories and results that claim universal application. Across Africa, corruption has presented as a persistent obstacle that has delayed African development and manifested itself in relatively similar ways across the continent. For this reason, I limit the focus of this work to Africa, though I recognize that it may have application elsewhere.

Methodology and Summary of Findings

The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 lays out the proposed argument in detail, explaining why we should expect to observe diverging contentious outcomes from different types of corruption. The chapter establishes the link between the proposed structural aspect of corruption (type of violation committed and subsequent spoil generated) and levels of institutional trust, which in turn affects whether social movements seek reformative or revolutionary goals. In order to test the theory and its attendant hypotheses, I marshal evidence from both macro- and micro-level analysis. In order to establish a causal linkage between different types of corruption and calls for reform and revolution, I begin in Chapter 3 by drawing from two field survey experiments conducted in Nigeria and South Africa. This evidence is particularly important because it minimizes the chance of endogenous interference in the relationship between perceptions of material or systemic corruption and reported calls for reform or revolution.

In Chapter 4, I draw heavily from the Afrobarometer survey data, which provide a comparative look at the political and social opinions of African citizens across the continent over multiple rounds of inquiry. This provides individual-level analysis that allows me to tease out the important role that perceptions of corruption play in driving anti-government opinions and evaluations of the system. Following this, in Chapter 5, I draw from event-level data on protests and riots in Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa in order to draw correlational inferences about the links between corruption-oriented grievances and revolutionary or reformative goals. Finally, in Chapter 6, I then present case studies from three countries – Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa – which allow me to draw

from historical analysis and interviews conducted while in the field. These case studies help develop a thick narrative about the link between different types of corruption and diverging contentious goals. Chapter 7 reviews my findings and offers scholarly and practical interpretations of the findings.

Across my analysis, I find strong support for the primary and secondary hypotheses. First, I find consistent support that exposure to material corruption drives support for reform while exposure to systemic corruption drives support for revolutionary contention. This remains consistent across each empirical methodology. Second, I find that exposure to material corruption reduces trust in politicians but not government institutions, while exposure to systemic corruption reduces trust in government institutions substantially. The focus on trust acts as a mechanism through which I am able to help explain why systemic corruption leads to calls for revolution.

CHAPTER

2

A Theory of Corruption and Contention

Introduction

This chapter lays out the foundation for the primary argument made in this dissertation; namely, that different types of government corruption shape whether contentious organizations seek reformative outcomes or revolutionary outcomes. In order to do this, the character of different forms of corruption are examined to understand how a corrupt act like elite theft is different from a corrupt act like electoral fraud. At the crux of the argument is a view of corruption that focuses on a core aspect of any given act of corruption; namely, the manner in which a corrupt act violates normative expectations of the government. Corruption is, at its core, the violation of a set of expectations or rules designed specifically to generate spoils. These spoils may be material in nature, or they may be systemic in nature. Understanding how corrupt acts violate expectations and generate spoils helps provide the groundwork for predictive hypotheses regarding the manner in which forms of corruption help shape contentious politics.

The theory argues that government corruption shapes contentious politics by way of social and institutional trust. As detailed below, corrupt acts tend to focus on two types of spoil: money and power. When corruption generates material benefits, citizens lose trust in politicians but not government institutions, and rally together to demand reform.

When corruption revolves around distorting the system, citizens lose trust in the institutions themselves, and come together to demand revolution.

This theory focuses on contentious politics. The evidence marshalled in the dissertation consists of a subset of contentious politics: social movements. I use the term ‘contentious politics’ in a broad sense, encompassing what McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow (2001) call ‘collective political struggle’. At its core, this term refers to collective action by groups within society to challenge the government. These challenges may be reformative or revolutionary in nature. Reformative action seeks to improve an existing system, often through improved redistribution of resources, the expansion of representation or accountability. Revolutionary action, on the other hand, seeks to replace or transform the very nature of the system. In this dissertation, I measure the impact of corruption on social movements; however, the theory is expected to extend to violent militant and terrorist groups.

Reformative and Revolutionary Claims in Africa’s Third Wave

Africans have long been under-recognized for their spirited and brave defense of democracy. Citizens, organizations, and unions have taken the fight against venality to the streets in many African countries, often defying high costs of mobilization, including imprisonment, and death. In Zambia, protesters took to the streets to protest elite theft, calling for reform (AFP, 2017), and following the ouster of former president Yahya Jammeh, the new Gambian government responded to citizen pressures to clamp down on corruption (Transparency International, 2019b). Much of modern African

contentious politics emerged out of the development of a class of well-educated African évolués under colonial rule who, both within their respective countries and across the continent, developed theories and strategies of anti-colonial thought and pan-African solidarity that shaped ideologies and strategies of contention (Arnold, 2017).

Whereas pro-independence contention generally focused on fighting the inherent moral corruption of colonial regimes, post-independence contention was shaped by emerging salient social cleavages that reasserted themselves as Africans assumed control over the levers of power in their countries. In Kenya, the President Jomo Kenyatta relied heavily on mobilizing his ethnic base of Kikuyus, one of Kenya's major ethnic groups. In taking this decision, Kenyatta shirked advice given to him by advisors to appeal broadly across the country (Branch, 2011), and set into place a powerful tradition of ethnic politics that continues to shape Kenyan politics today. As a result, much of Kenyan contention aligns along ethnic boundaries. The same can be said for Nigeria, whose independence was quickly shaken by an attempted ethnic secession by the Igbo and Ijaw in the Niger Delta (Arnold, 2017) following concerns over the balance of power between the major ethnic groups in the country. While the secession failed, Nigerian contention remains ethnically and religiously driven; Boko Haram in the north seeks an Islamic state, whereas the Biafran agitators in the south seek ethnonationalist autonomy from the state. Next door, in Cameroon, Anglophone separatists rise up against the corrupt rule of Paul Biya, who favors the majority francophone population of the country over its English-speaking inhabitants in the northwest.

When citizens call for government reform, they are in effect stating that, while they are

dissatisfied with the current direction or management of the state, they believe the state system itself is strong or effective enough to be worthy of revising. By modifying or introducing new policies, the state could be made better. In 2015 in Nigeria, President Muhammadu Buhari was elected on exactly this promise: to improve the government by reducing corruption. President Buhari was well-known for his strict self-control and dislike of corruption, and pledged to make the system work again for the Nigerian people.

On the other hand, some movements call for government revolution, demanding deep systemic or structural changes to the system itself. This is what occurred in Burkina Faso in 2014, when broad groups of citizens rose up to ouster corrupt president Blaise Compaore after he announced his decision to seek an extra-constitutional third term in office (Mampilly, 2014). In 2007 in Kenya during the aftermath of a highly fraudulent election, presidential challenger Raila Odinga “called for a million-man march against State House’ ‘civilian coup’ (Hornsby 2013, 764). Kenyans took to the streets in protest and riot demanding new elections, which devolved quickly into ethnic-based slaughter. This political crisis led to a power-sharing agreement and the development of a new constitution (Daniel Wesangula 2017). In 2014 in Cameroon, activist Aboubakar Sidiki was arrested and jailed in response to his quasi-revolutionary calls for change in the country with a president that had been in power, at the time, for 32 years (BBC New 2017).

In 2018, President Paul Biya of Cameroon marked his 35th year in power, ten years after subverting the constitution to remove term limits (BBC News 2018b). In the

decade since the removal of the term limits, broad coalitions of many Cameroonians have risen up against Biya in peaceful protest, often suffering abuse and detention at the hands of Cameroonian security forces (Searcey and Essomba 2018). In 2016 and 2017, thousands of Zimbabweans took to the streets of Harare to protest kleptocracy by the ruling elite; namely, President Robert Mugabe (Jeffrey Moyo 2017). The protests were made up of citizens young and old, who rallied around calls for change following the arrest of anti-corruption activist and pastor Evan Mawarire (Reuters 2017).

Unpacking the Dependent Variable: Diverging Contentious Goals

The concept of classifying social movements in Africa can be found in work by Ferrante (2003) and Falola & Nasong'o (2016), who classify four types of social movements: (a) regressive, (b) reformist, (c) revolutionary, and (d) counter-revolutionary. Because regressive and counter-revolutionary protests are often pro-government and supportive of existing status quo (not to mention existing networks of corruption), I focus instead on the reformist and revolutionary. According to Falola and Nasong'o, reformist social movements target "some specific feature of society as needing change" whereas revolutionary movements "seek broad, sweeping, and radical structural changes to a society's basic social institutions or to the world order" (page 12).

Recent work by Branch and Mampilly (2015) has detailed the importance of understanding localized versus generalized contention, and has pointed to the important role that different grievances and structures of governance play. Mueller's recent work (2018) expounds the important role that class structures play in African protest; the middle class and civil society class is often responsible for shaping high-minded

contentious goals and frames of social movements, while the lower-class provides much of the manpower that drives successful movements against the government.

I contribute to this scholarship by detailing how social movements adopt different contentious goals as they rise up against the government. Rather than referring to all protest as ‘revolution,’ I differentiate between contention designed to reform the existing system and contention designed to revolutionize the system. These two goals are different from one another in how they conceive of the state as it is and the state as it should be. Drawing from Falola and Nasong’o, I define the two contentious goals of interest as:

Reformative Contention seeks to restore the existing system to either an idealized form of what the system should be, or to a specific form that the system once was. For South Africans facing the machine politics of today’s ANC and political system, the halcyon days of Nelson Mandela’s rule serve as a reminder of what the system once was, and still could be. For Nigerians, demands for democracy align with specific normative expectations about what the government could be, if allowed to develop properly.

Revolutionary Contention, on the other hand, seeks to radically reshape the government into an entirely new leviathan. Calls by the Economic Freedom Fighters in South Africa to reform the state as a Marxist parliamentary republic qualify under as revolution under my proposed typology. When Boko Haram demands autonomy and secession from the north to create a theocratic Islamic state, it is proposing a truly revolutionary movement; one in which the new government would be unrecognizable from its prior shape.

Consider two examples of broad anti-corruption contention that responded directly to elite venality. In 2014, following 27 years of rule by President Blaise Compaoré, Burkinabé citizens rose up in revolution against the president. Compaoré had come to power in 1987 after the second of his career coups. In 2014, facing the end of his term, Compaoré and his political party sought to change the constitution to keep him in power indefinitely. In response to this, citizens rose up in revolution, pushing the leader into exile and demanding a new constitution (Mampilly, 2014). As a result, the Burkinabe were able to fundamentally reshape the founding document of their government – the constitution.

In 2016 in South Africa, on the other hand, citizens rose up in protest against president Jacob Zuma's capture of the state by demanding reforms to the existing democratic system (Onishi, 2017). Zuma, who had muscled his predecessor, Thabo Mbeki, out of power in 2007, spent his presidential tenure mired in corruption scandals. When the tenor of those scandals reached a crescendo, protesters did not call for the fall of the system – just the fall of Zuma – which occurred in early 2018 when Zuma was replaced by Cyril Ramaphosa. As a result, the system remained in place – it had been reformed rather than revolutionized.

Linking Types of Corruption to Diverging Contentious Goals

In this section, I dig deep into the relationship between the dependent variable, diverging contentious goals, and the key explanatory factor: different types of corruption. In the previous chapter, I detail why I focus on the important and central role that corruption plays in driving contentious mobilization. Below, I detail previous scholarship on

the role that corruption plays in driving the onset of contention and conflict. While the scope of this dissertation centers on social movements, there is a substantial literature that addresses corruption and the onset of violent conflict. The theory presented in this dissertation seeks to explain not only social movements, but violent conflict in future iterations. As such, I include scholarship on violent conflict to strengthen the argument.

I begin with an open question in political science: is corruption even related to the onset of conflict and contention? Scholarship thus far has returned mixed results. In part, the problem is studying corruption itself. Corruption is the endogenous dysfunction of institutional norms and laws that emerge endogenously from society. I am attempting to then measure contention – an endogenously driven phenomenon – as a response to corrupt governments. All of this endogeneity makes analysis daunting and complicated and suggests caution when making bold assertions about the relationship between cause and effect.

There are numerous examples of mixed evidence when examining corruption's relationship to democratic outcomes. One example is the complicated relationship between corruption and democratic development. Scholars have arrived at mixed conclusions (Klašnja, Tucker and Deegan-Krause, 2014) as to whether corruption mobilizes voting behavior (Kostadinova, 2009) or subdues it (Caillier, 2010). Does democracy hinder corruption (Chowdhury, 2004; Fjelde and Hegre, 2006), enable it (Wantchekon, 2003), or is the relationship more complex (Drury, Krieckhaus and Lusztig, 2006; Rock, 2009; Grindle, 2012)? The answer is not readily forthcoming. Another example, which is the focus of this dissertation, is the relationship between corruption and political contention

and conflict. Scholars have arrived at strikingly contrary results when measuring whether corruption begets conflict and terror (Teets and Chenoweth, 2009; Agbiboa, 2013; Shelley, 2014; Suleiman and Aminul Karim, 2015).

The evidence that social movements have been greatly motivated by a central and core concern over government corruption during Africa's third wave is strong. In South Africa, citizens have regularly risen up against state capture (Ivor Chipkin, 2017; Onishi, 2017; John Campbell, 2018), exorbitant school fees (Ndelu *et al.*, 2016), and poor governance and service delivery at the municipal level (Lancaster, 2018). In Kenya, civil movements have taken the vanguard in protesting against electoral fraud and rigging (de Freytas-Tamura, 2017d) and the rampant machine politics of the government (Mariita, 2018). In Cameroon, citizens braved the truncheons of the police to protest Paul Biya's attempt to remain 'president for life' (Moki Edwin Kindzeka, 2016). In Burkina Faso, citizens also stood up against constitution-rigging, forcing Blaise Compaoré from office and demanding a new constitution be written (Carol, 2016). A substantial body of scholarship has demonstrated the effectiveness of social movement campaigns demanding (and often achieving) reformative or revolutionary change in the face of blatant government corruption (Shelley, 2005; Johnston, 2012; Abdallah *et al.*, 2014; Beyerle, 2014).

The evidence becomes more uncertain when linking corruption to the onset of political conflict and violence. Here, the scholarship provides mixed results. Le Billon (2003) argues that corruption does not drive conflict, but is instead a symptom of circumstances with high levels of political uncertainty. Worth noting, however, is that Le

Billon did not engage in any rigorous qualitative or quantitative empirical testing. With that noted, Le Billon should be credited for bringing to the fore an important and underrepresented empirical question. Furthermore, Le Billon examined the relationship between corruption and the termination of war, as well as the rate of conflict recidivism (2008) in post-conflict zones. Le Billon argues that corruption impedes development aid, which in turn weakens peace-building endeavors and increases the likelihood of conflict. But Le Billon remains skeptical about corruption's power to motivate conflict and contentious political action.

Drawing on Le Billon's work, Fjelde (2009) argued that corruption might actually decrease the likelihood of conflict. Using the PRS ICRG data on corruption, Fjelde argues that leaders flush with ill-gotten corrupt spoils can essentially 'buy off' potential challengers. The work focuses largely on petroleum-rentier states, and finds that within such states, corruption actually reduces the likelihood of conflict onset. Similarly, Arriola's (2009) work finds that the strategic use of patronage by leaders reduces political instability. These arguments are intuitive and strong, and I view my work as building on them by adding nuance rather than challenging them directly.

Neudorfer and Theuerkauf (2014), on the other hand, argue that corruption increases the likelihood of ethnic conflict by generating inter-ethnic inequality and grievances. Neudorfer and Theuerkauf draw from the same data as Fjelde – the PRS data on corruption – but expand the sample to include non-rentier states. They find that high levels of corruption are substantially and significantly more likely to lead to the onset of ethnic civil war. As corruption increases from its lowest level (0) to its highest observed

level (36), the probability of ethnic war approaches 100 percent.⁹

A related body of literature argues that corruption generates opportunities for conflict and terror (Rotberg, 2009). Shelley (2014) details the manner in which corruption provides opportunities to skirt laws and regulations, providing terrorists with the means to engage in violence. This forms the basis of what might best be termed the ‘facilitation’ argument. Teets and Chenoweth (2009) argue that the facilitation argument is the only argument with empirical credibility, and that corruption simply does not motivate conflict by way of grievances. There is reason to believe the facilitation argument: recent gains by Al Shabaab in Kenya are largely due to bureaucratic incompetence flamed by rampant corruption (Higgins, 2015).¹⁰

More recently, evidence has emerged that more clearly demonstrates linkages between perceptions of government corruption and the onset of contentious politics. Chayes (2015) examines the relationship between corruption and conflict by detailing what citizens on the ground actually say about it. She describes how Boko Haram, an Islamist terrorist group, initially grew in response to government corruption. “Corruption was everywhere,” Chayes quotes, “and no development. People thought that if they implemented shari’a, corruption would be cleaned out.” Citizens respond positively to attacks against the corrupt police, even if by groups that they otherwise oppose: “Even

⁹ See page 1870 in *Comparative Political Studies* 47(13), in which Figure 1 demonstrates predicted effects of corruption on ethnic war.

¹⁰ Their test, however, is flawed. First, the tests for facilitation and motivation are tested with different dependent variables. Second, and more strangely, both the facilitation and motivation tests arrive at virtually the same statistical results, yet Teets and Chenoweth argue that the facilitation argument is statistically supported, whereas the motivational argument is not.

among Nigerians who disapprove of [Boko Haram's] aims, the violence elicits a degree of approval. 'When they attacked police stations ... people were happy.'" Other work has shown that perceptions of corruption are positively correlated with support for Boko Haram (Deckard and Pieri, 2017).

Agbibo (Agbibo, 2013, p. 147) makes a similar case: "...many of the members attracted by Boko Haram are animated by deep-seated socioeconomic and political grievances, such as poor governance and elite corruption." Walker (2012), Onuoha (2014), and Lubeck (2010) provide support for the argument that, more than simply facilitating conflict and terror, corruption motivates citizens to join terror groups and participate in terroristic activities. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the rebel group M23 claimed corruption to be a primary motivating factor, going so far as to set up its own form of an anti-corruption commission (Waza, 2013), though reports seem to indicate that M23 practiced a significant amount of corruption on its own. For Kenyans, corruption and brutality by security forces helps not only to facilitate Al-Shabaab's movements into Kenya, but makes easier their calls for mobilization by young, disaffected Kenyans (Allen, 2015).

Material and Systemic Corruption

Having now reviewed the literature linking corruption to the onset of contentious politics, I return to the puzzle at hand: if corruption motivates social movements and protests, why do some anti-corruption movements pursue reformative goals while others pursue revolutionary goals? I argue that two different types of corruption – material

and systemic – drive diverging contentious outcomes. I draw from Wechsle (2016) in denoting the importance between these two specific forms of corruption. Examining these different types of corruption accomplishes two outcomes. First, it sheds light onto the mixed findings of previous scholarship; because previous conflict scholarship has used highly aggregated measures for conflict and has overlooked social movement activity, the results did not reflect the important effects of different types of corruption. Second, it provides a theoretically meaningful way to understand how and why variation in types of corruption matter for contentious politics outcomes.

I begin by building on the definition that corruption is *the abuse of public power for personal gain*, and I infuse Philp's (2008) emphasis on the *violation of norms of governance* that makes corruption so egregious. To do so, I center the norms around a generalized form of the social contract, in which the government provides certain goods and services to citizens in return for their cooptation into the political system. These goods and services extend beyond security and healthcare; they include Rawlsian goods such as fairness, Weberian goods such as bureaucratic impersonality, and Rothstein's emphasis on bureaucratic impartiality. But why measure corruption in relation to democracy? Most African governments claim to be democratic. In doing so, they enshrine standard democratic norms and ideals into their constitutions. For example, as of 2018, all African governments have explicitly outlawed corruption, all but four have instituted independent mechanisms to report police abuse and misconduct, and 40 of 54 countries have established independent commissions to ensure fair and free elections (Global Integrity, 2016). Despite these assurances on paper, African governments

routinely fall short of enforcing them.

The key contribution that I make is to focus on the spoil generated by the act of corruption. The act may be the theft of state goods for personal gain by an elite, the misappropriation of goods and services for distribution via patronal networks, or the defrauding of elections. Between these two components (the ideal and the act) is the first transformation, by which the act violates the foundational essence of the ideal. This transformation is primarily defined by the substance of its violation: material violations concern the misappropriation and theft of material goods and services, such as money, whereas systemic violations concern the transformation of the nature of the state itself. The act of corruption generates spoils to the benefit of the corrupt. This is the primary purpose of corrupt acts. This is the secondary transformation inherent in the process of corruption; corruption transforms public goods and state resources into personal spoils.

In the remainder of this chapter, I describe a novel approach to understanding corruption not as a static construct, but instead as a dynamic process. In a sense, I argue that *syndromes of corruption* are not static, but instead are the product of constant acts of corruption. I draw this insight from work in the social movements literature that considers contention itself to be a dynamic process (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). The result is a strong, more comparative understanding of corruption that can help explain small- and large-scale political contention. Here, I adapt this to better understand corruption.

I begin from the starting proposal that we think of corruption as a portfolio of acts that violate antecedent Platonic ideals of governance. Corruption describes, at its core, the

deviation from ideals of bureaucracy and democracy, replacing them with personalized, non-programmatic behavior and patterns of distribution.

The word ‘corrupt’, in the idealistic social sense, denotes the decay – purposeful or not – of a set of principles that govern social behavior. In his theory of forms, Plato discussed the deviation from ideals as a form of social corruption, and identified such deviation as the primary political concern of civilization (1997). It is from here that I embark. The first component of the process of corruption is indeed the set of metaphysical ideals upon which governments are built. Many forms of government – from democracies to communist regimes or military juntas – can derive their laurels from such ideals. For the sake of this text, and because nearly every African government considers itself to be democratic, I focus on the ideals of democracy.

These ideals span a familiar spectrum. Democracies, on the whole, are built on ideals of political representation, equality of citizens before the law, fairness, equality of economic and social opportunities, formal methods of distribution, and the provision of citizen safety by government security forces. To say that few democracies uphold all – or even most – of these ideals is uncontroversial. But the rhetoric of democracy speaks to these ideals. Ideals are then codified within the precepts of the state. Most African states have constitutions in which they detail a battery of human rights, representational processes, bureaucratic institutions, and other ideals.

These ideals – fairness, representation, equality, security – constitute the foundation of modern contract theory. From the focus of Hobbes (1651) and Locke (1690) on the exchange of freedom for basic political protection and governance to ideals of fairness

(1999), contract theory provides a concrete platform for understanding normative expectations of interactions between the state and citizens. Of all forms of governance, democracy is perhaps the most connected to what Rousseau called the social contract (2013). Rothstein (2011) argues compellingly that the fundamental nature of fair governance is governance built on the principles of impartiality. In this sense, Rothstein expands the Rawlsian contractarian approach by arguing not just that justice is the application of institutional impartiality, but that corruption is the violation of governance structures in that it distorts impartiality, imputing non-programmatic preferences into institutions and networks of distribution. In doing so, Rothstein provides some of the most credible and important theoretical ground upon which to anchor our understanding and operationalization of corruption.

I build on Rothstein's intuition by further embedding corruption in to the larger question of the social contract. Impartiality may be the core foundation of justice and fairness, but valuing fairness presupposes that the ideal of fairness is built into the social contract. The contract consists of certain expectations about the behavior inherent in government-citizen relationships. At the core of the social contract is the assumption that the metaphysical ideals of democratic governance are platonic ideals, and that their violation and corrosion is inherently a denigration of the social contract itself. This, then, forms the foundation of the theory of corruption; at its core, corruption is corruption precisely because it erodes the social contract by violating codified forms and ideals.

In framing corruption as such, its definition becomes both more straightforward and

more strongly grounded in both theory and observable implications. Political corruption occurs when an act by a government official or group of officials deviates in spirit and practice from the enshrined ideals. When elites use their power and privilege to skim money from state coffers and deposit it into their personal bank accounts, ideals concerning the separation of officeholder from office are violated. When elites distribute state funds unequally in order to develop networks of patronage, ideals regarding programmatic and impersonal distribution are violated. When presidents stuff ballot boxes and engage in electoral fraud, ideals regarding representation and electoral mechanisms are violated. And when elites co-opt security forces in order to repress citizens in order to maintain their access to state resources, ideals regarding the security and safety of citizens are violated.

I now introduce a typology of corruption that parses between *material* and *systemic* types of corruption. Material corruption refers to official misconduct with regard to state funds and resources. When a political elite, such as the President, siphons state resources and diverts them to his personal bank account, material corruption has taken place. When a state governor or leader redirects state funds to favor one group over another in exchange for political loyalty and support, material corruption has taken place. In some cases, material corruption takes the form of bribe solicitation by elites in return for a construction contract. In other cases, leaders proffer clientelistic offers to citizens in exchange for their votes, or provide hospitals and clinics while leaving other regions in the country without adequate medical care.

The root of this category is the misuse by an official of state funds, and the spoil being

distributed is generally fiscal in nature. Material corruption violates numerous ideals pertaining to the use of state resources. For example, the Weberian (1978) principle of bureaucratic governance argues that the officeholder and the political office are themselves two separate entities, and that officeholders cannot 'capture' the office and use its resources as a personal trust fund. Furthermore, bureaucratic ideals of distribution are generally merit-based or equality-based, yet systems of patronage and clientelism corrupt these ideals by transforming the property of the whole (state development funds, etc.) into the property of the few.

Material corruption, while deleterious to the state, does not directly challenge the democratic structure of the state. Presidents and leaders may be corrupt, yet the system itself remains relatively unthreatened. For example, the Nigerian presidency has survived, despite the turnover of every elected leader since 1999. Because material corruption does not directly threaten the structure of the state, citizens should be more likely to engage in non-violent protest, directing their contentious efforts toward changing leadership instead of changing the system. Thus, where material corruption is prevalent, citizens should be more likely engage in protests and strikes by way of civil society organizations such as the anti-corruption and governance reform organization, CLEEN, in Nigeria instead of mobilizing using force or violence (Johnston 2012; Rose-Ackerman and Carrington 2013).

Material corruption generates a tangible impact on citizens through two primary mechanisms of change. First, material corruption reduces the overall amount of material resources available for use in state development. Simply put, even if the state did want to

engage in genuine state development, the money ‘just isn’t there’. Nigeria’s former military dictator, Sani Abacha, was known to have stolen over five billion dollars of petrodollars that had originally been slated for purpose of development and state improvement. Second, material corruption redefines public goods into private or club goods.

Material corruption, in addition to the tangible effects on citizen lives detailed above, entails a series of significant transformations that substantively change the nature of state-citizen interactions themselves. The first is rule of law, which describes the overall adherence to the law within the state. Material corruption operates precisely through an informal weakening of the application and strength of formal rules. The presence of rampant material corruption indicates that either the proper legal rules and statutes are not in place, or that such rules have been weakened through customary deviant practices, resulting in weak expectations regarding adherence to such laws by government officials. The second transformation addresses mechanisms and expectations of accountability. Material corruption relies largely on administrators and auditors to ‘turn a blind eye’ and ignore corruption. In doing so, mechanisms for checks and balances as well as holding officials accountable are weakened.

When corruption occurs, the relationship between the citizen and the state is itself transformed. Material corruption is generally accompanied by a disconnection between citizens and their governments (such as in the case of theft), or demonstrates favoritism that leads some groups to be ‘in’ while other groups are left ‘out’. Similarly, the relationship between different nodes of the state are transformed. Material corruption

demonstrates spheres of blindness that allow for the continuation of corrupt practices and the sidestepping of regulation. Pervasive material corruption reinforces these spheres of blindness’.

Scholars of distributional politics (such as clientelism and patronage) may be hesitant to endorse a view of corruption that includes these political behaviors. After all, distributional politics are viewed as normal throughout many regions in the world. African politics have long relied on systems of ‘prebendal’ patronage politics that link patrons to political subjects (Ekeh, 1975; Joseph, 1987; Schatzberg, 2001). Yet, patronage in the modern state system operates by illegally siphoning funds from the state in order to provide material benefit to some citizens and not others. The largesse of each patron is the result of looting and corrupt procurement practices that funnel and siphon state funds away from the public and into private hands. Moreover, patronage is increasingly considered corrupt as expectations of African democracies grow (Ogundiya, 2009).

The second category in this axis is systemic. Unlike material corruption, systemic corruption is a purposeful distortion of the system. When elites engage in electoral fraud by stuffing ballot boxes or gerrymandering, this is systemic corruption that betrays the basic principles of democracy and government and corrodes expectations that the state will actually fulfill its democratic promise. When elites co-opt security forces to repress dissent in order to cover up or maintain access to state coffers, this is systemic corruption that betrays the promises of security and protection offered to citizens by the state. Instead of acting as a protector, the state itself becomes a predator.

The root of this category is the restructuring of the political system by officials seeking

to retain power. The spoil for distribution is thus related to power – either through direct access or indirect representation. The basic ideals and principles of democracies require accountability of politicians to citizens, yet electoral fraud strips the accountability power of voting from citizens. Most modern democracies claim to protect their citizens through the use of internal and external security forces, yet the cooptation of security forces by leaders often leads to the targeted marginalization and discrimination of certain groups within a population.

Systemic corruption, unlike material corruption, directly threatens the democratic ideals of the state. When leaders engage in widespread electoral fraud, such as President Kibaki in the 2007 Kenyan election or attempt to modify the constitution to remain in power, such as Paul Biya in Cameroon in 2016 or Nkurunziza in Burundi in 2015, citizens understand that the very nature of their government is at stake. Such systemic corruption casts a shadow over the future of the nation, calling into question its democratic nature. In most nations in which the system has been captured by corrupt leaders, repression follows. When police and military forces engage in coercive corruption at the end of the barrel of a gun, citizens feel less physically secure and experience higher levels of general uncertainty. As such, citizens should be more likely to engage in violent contention, such as riots, political violence, and even terrorism.

Systemic corruption imparts transformative change on the nature of the state and its engagement with citizens. First, systemic corruption directly impacts rule of law by changing the very content and nature of the rule of law and formal rules. Whereas material corruption diminishes the rule of law through skirting the law, systemic

corruption sets about to change it altogether. In doing so, such corruption changes the nature of the state and shapes future state-citizen interactions in favor of the government. Second, systemic corruption fundamentally reduces and alters formal systems of governance, both within the government itself and by citizens. Within the government, checks and balances are diminished and done away with altogether, whereas with citizens, the primary method of accountability – the electoral system – is reconfigured either as ineffective or is done away with completely.

In doing so, material corruption effects a third transformation: it disempowers citizens, transforming them from (theoretically) empowered citizens into largely powerless subjects. Consider Zimbabwe, where Robert Mugabe has corrupted the system so thoroughly that he is now a ‘democratically elected’ tyrant ruling over his subjects. This transformation operates laterally as well, consolidating power from across the government into a small cadre or winning coalition. This reduces intragovernmental checks on control, such as the independence of anti-corruption agencies or the judiciary.

Fifth, systemic corruption greatly reduces the opportunities for citizens to engage politicians and the political apparatus as a whole. This reduction in political opportunity structures has a tangible impact on the ability of citizens to use legal, non-violent protest when making demands of the government, potentially narrowing the universe of impactful contentious political actions. The sixth transformation expands this reduction in citizen options by reducing time horizons. Systemic corruption, because it directly impacts the structure and rules of government, likely reduces the ability of citizens to ‘vote the rascal out’. The impact of contention over time is thus distorted, and citizens

have little reason to expect that consistent protest, over time, will effect positive change in the government.

Typology of Corruption

I populate a typology by mapping specific instances of different types of corruption: elite theft, patronage, electoral rigging (or fraud), and police/security force corruption. These types of corruption were selected because they are highly salient and present in the general African experience.¹¹ Across the continent, African leaders have generally engaged in elite-level theft, including Kenyan autocrat Daniel Arap Moi, South African president Jacob Zuma, and Cameroon's Paul Biya. Similarly, prebendal ('patronage') politics abound; scholars have demonstrated the prevalence of electoral clientelism in Benin (Wantchekon, 2003; Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2013) and patronage across the continent (Arriola, 2009). Electoral fraud and rigging also remain problematic and widespread. The past three Kenyan elections were rife with allegations of fraud and rigging, to the point where the 2007 election resulted in an unprecedented power-sharing agreement, the 2012 election resulted in the development of a new electoral commission, and the 2017 election was overturned by the Supreme Court of Kenya (Hornsby, 2013; BBC, 2017). Similarly, Nigerian elections have often been suspected of fraud (Kerr, 2013), and many in the Igbo community in Nigeria's south have

¹¹ Of course, there is no singular "African experience," nor do I assert that variation across countries should be minimized. There are important differences at every level of analysis. West African experiences are different than southern African experiences, and the Ugandan experience differs from the Malawian experience.

historically called for boycotts on the elections as a result¹² (Opejobi, 2019). Finally, police corruption is widespread on the continent, affecting Kenyans (Daily Nation, 2018), Mozambicans (Kyed, 2017), South Africans (Faull, 2017), and Ghana (Beek, 2017).

This prediction is not all-encompassing; I do not claim that all responses to elite theft are the same, or that all responses to security co-optation are the same. This is, in part, because types of corruption are not often easily distinguishable. Where there is elite theft, there is often patronage or security co-optation. Instead, I argue that the nature of the type of corruption drives a higher likelihood of certain forms of citizen response, be it non-violent or violent, and in either broad or narrow coalitions. Moreover, I do not assert that these four types of corruption are *the most important* or even *the most prevalent* forms of corruption experienced in Africa. There is a strong argument to be made that, while these are perhaps the most damaging to African states, the most prevalent forms of corruption are petty forms of corruption experienced on a daily basis by citizens attempting to obtain official documents or to simply access public goods.

Material Corruption is corruption designed to generate material benefits for either a small cohort of elites or for politically relevant groups within the population. By material benefits, I refer to a number of potential gains. In many cases, material corruption directly generates the benefit of wealth to a leader and his elite cohort. This form of

¹² As discussed in Opejobi 2019, this trend was reversed at the last minute in 2019, when several secessionist groups advocated for southern Igbos to participate in elections.

looting, which I describe as elite theft, has been prominent across many African countries. For example, in Nigeria, former military dictator Sani Abacha siphoned away over \$5 billion from the African state to his own personal bank account (Smith, 2015). In South Africa, former president Jacob Zuma used millions of taxpayer dollars¹³ to add luxury elements to his personal residence, including an amphitheater, a pool, and a reception center (Madonsela, 2014). In other cases, material corruption involves distributing state funds, public goods, and development projects to some politically relevant groups in order to shore up political support. This has been the case in many African countries, where leaders have distributed Chinese development aid disproportionately to their home regions (Dreher *et al.*, 2014).

Material corruption is the source of a substantial amount of frustration in the African context, but it is relatively concordant with Ekeh's 'two publics.' Leaders take from the civic public and give within the primordial public. In doing so, they strengthen their 'primordial'¹⁴ governance networks at the expense of their duties to the larger population within the 'civic public.' In short, material corruption is considered to be corruption, but is also expected with the existing prebendal system that pervades most African system. As such, I argue that material corruption is likely to reduce trust in individual politicians or political parties but not trust in the institutions themselves.

¹³ Converted from South African Rand for the purpose of discussion here.

¹⁴ For many reasons, using the term 'primordial' is extremely problematic in the African context. Western narratives have traditionally portrayed African politics as backwards and tribal, and the word primordial conjures pre-modern and pre-civilized sentiments that are both demeaning to Africans and reflective of colonial opinions of western superiority and African inferiority. I use this term *only* because it is the terminology used by Ekeh.

Systemic Corruption is that which distorts the system itself in order to generate benefits of power and political access. Defining systemic corruption is more difficult than defining material corruption for two reasons. First, most scholarship has focused on corruption as a material endeavor, which conditions the conversation to revolve around elite theft and other such material violations. Consider the police as an example. The police provide a public service – namely, the provision of security and support of justice. When police demand low-level bribes, they are regularly recognized as having acted corruptly. They violated their mandate in order to generate a small, personalized benefit for themselves. Yet, when police engage in wide-spread intimidation and violence, often at behest of a politician, this is not discussed as corruption. But the same principles remain – the provision of the public good of security and justice has been violated in order to generate political benefits for some and not for others.

Second, much of I consider to be systemic corruption has been discussed in the scholarship by other names. Electoral interference, gerrymandering, and constitutional manipulation all entail the violation of expected norms and principles of governance in order to generate personalized benefits, often by enabling those in power to enact practices that reduce accountability (Glasius, 2018). Aren't these acts separate from corruption? I argue that they are not – and that they may be considered part of what Johnston referred to as 'syndromes of corruption' – networks of privilege and power that enrich and empower elites by rigging systems and re-writing rules (2005).

For example, I include forms of blatant vote-rigging and fraud, which are generally 'safe' to consider as corrupt. But I also include electoral intimidation and attempts to

remove term-limits as acts of systemic corruption. Take the removal of term-limits, which is perhaps the hardest case to justify. If term limits are changed via legal mechanisms, how can it be corrupt to do so? Recall from Chapter 1 that the third major school of thought on corruption focuses on the violation of expected norms and principles of governance. When a president attempts to change the constitution in order to remain in power indefinitely, he is using his power to violate both the spirit and text of the constitution. Most constitutions are designed specifically to provide the public with a major public good – the check against unbridled executive power. As a public good, this ensures that power will be transferred periodically, and that corrupt and authoritarian elites will be ousted. In seeking to change the constitution to remove term limits, a president has decided to violate the public good in order to generate for himself the private good of continued access to power. I argue that systemic corruption is likely to reduce citizen trust in the system itself. Citizens are likely to see the government as ‘rigged,’ and should be more likely to seek out revolutionary alternatives.

Four Types of Corruption

Below, I detail four types of corruption that are common to the African experience. The first two are material in nature, while the second two are systemic. These are by no means the only forms of corruption that matter in the African context; however, they are all highly salient, particularly with regard to contentious politics. Each of the forms of corruption discussed in this dissertation are government corruption – I do not include corruption by non-government organization, religious leaders and institutions, businesses, or other actors. That is because this dissertation seeks to understand variation

in types of anti-government contention, and thus it examines only forms of corruption that the government can reasonably be held accountable for. Moreover, the majority of the corruption within this dissertation falls under the category of ‘grand’ corruption rather than ‘petty corruption.’ This distinction has been shown to be important in the scholarship on corruption (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2000; Nystrand, 2014); however, research has shown that while grand corruption is linked with the onset of civic action, petty corruption is not (Drugov, Hamman and Serra, 2014).

ELITE THEFT

Elite theft refers to forms of material corruption that include high level theft by political elites of state resources and funds. Elite theft is also known widely as ‘kleptocracy.’ Elite theft, such as that conducted by kleptocratic leaders such as Sani Abacha of Nigeria or Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, results in the development of a personal fiscal largesse often located in foreign and offshore bank accounts (Ndikumana and Boyce, 1998; Chayes, 2015; Smith, 2015). Elite theft violates ideals of separation between office and officeholder as outlined in Weber’s works on bureaucracy. In doing so, elite theft generally benefits a small number of elites in the ruling coterie. In countries such as Equatorial Guinea, where the entire oil industry is owned by the ruling family, poverty reigns supreme (McFerson, 2009). The result is that elite theft substantially reduces the ability of state economies to grow (Mauro, 1995), leaving Africans more destitute than they were at independence (Ghazvinian, 2008).

PATRONAGE

Patronage has received perhaps the most dedicated attention by scholars, and occupies

a central role in traditional discussions of corruption¹⁵. In short, patronage is the practice of leaders distributing state funds strategically within its population in order to shore up political stability and/or support. Patronage violates the Rawlsian principle of fairness (Rawls, 1999) and Rothstein's principle of impartiality (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2011), transforming public goods from the 'civic public' and distributing them to one's political base within the 'primordial public.' In doing so, patronage practices result in the siphoning of money away from institutions and programs that could benefit everyone and the investment of that money into particular groups based on favoritism. The result is that some groups have access to more financial aid and better public goods and services while others are left out.

Arriola (2009) has shown that leaders successfully use patronage to shore up political stability by giving access to certain groups within a population to state resources. Stokes et al. (2013) have demonstrates how clientelism is particularly effective in generating support from poor voters that might otherwise choose to punish corrupt leaders, and Grindle (2012) has shown that the provision of jobs via patronal networks has played a vital role in consolidating political power in consolidating democracies. Patronage, then, is a strategic form of corruption designed to empower certain groups within the population.

¹⁵ The foundational text on political corruption by Heidenheimer, Johnston, and Levine (1989) dedicates four entire chapters to patronage systems across the world.

ELECTORAL FRAUD

Electoral fraud – the process of stuffing ballot boxes, reneging on constitutional term limits, and engaging in voter intimidation – has not often been associated with studies of corruption. Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016, para. 8) describe electoral fraud as the “[m]anipulation of election results, through vote buying or threats to the electorate, or by falsification or destruction of votes.” Yet electoral fraud is corruption of the highest order; it not only generates spoils of power, but results in the severe weakening of democratic ideals and deracination of electoral expectations by voters. When leaders are able to circumvent democracy, constituents begin to understand that the system itself has become corrupted, and that the democratic ideals promised by the government – accountability and representation – are not long for this world.

Electoral fraud generates the spoil of continued access to power, which distorts mechanisms of accountability and allows leaders to engage in acts of authoritarianism (Glasius, 2018). In some countries, only a few benefit from such a spoil; the President and his cronies remain in power, and the rest of the population is excluded from power. This is particularly the case in personalistic regimes, which largely characterize African regimes (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982). These regimes engage in systemic corruption by ‘fixing’ the system so that elections automatically return support for the incumbent, or by making it difficult for challengers to compete.

But, do violations of electoral rules – and constitutional manipulations – that allow presidents to remain in power qualify as corruption? Recent scholarship indicates that this form of violation does indeed conjure perceptions of corruption. In his chapter on

electoral rules, Klaas (2018) describes the calculus of electoral rigging as “the fraudster’s dilemma,” and Charles Manga Fombad describes the corrupting and delegitimizing effects of executive breaches of the constitution. Fombad (2017) details the use of bribery in Uganda and Nigeria to force change, and also describes cases in Namibia, Senegal, Burundi, and Eritrea in which presidents simply decided to break the law and ignore term limits. According to Fombad’s research, of the nine successful legal bids to remove term limits, six relied on what Rose-Ackerman and Palifka define as either bribery or “exchange of favors”¹⁶ Of the five legal bids to remove term limits that did not succeed, three relied on bribery and “judicial fraud.”¹⁷

POLICE & SECURITY FORCE CORRUPTION

The final form of corruption refers to the systemic dysfunction of the police and security forces that has been well-documented in the African context (Ruteere, 2011; Wambua, 2015). This includes both concerns of police/security extraction of bribes from citizens (Beek, 2017) as well as bureaucratic and practical malfeasance in which the benefits of protection and order are systematically extended to some segments of the population and withdrawn or withheld from others (Kyed, 2017). Police/security force corruption generates several spoils at different levels. At the level of the individual officer, the spoil generated is largely defined by the number of bribes any given officer was able to extract. More importantly, at the organizational level, police/security

¹⁶ In their typology of corruption, “exchange of favors” is defined as the “exchange of one broken rule for another.”

¹⁷ Defined by Rose-Ackerman and Palifka as “a decision based on any ... type of corruption, or threats to the judge, rather than the merits of the case.”

corruption generates spoils of political influence and control by providing protection and rule of law for some groups and not others. In the Niger Delta, police and security forces have been co-opted to repress indigenous groups seeking better treatment by the government (Okonta and Douglas, 2003), violating their role as providers of security and justice in favor of generating political benefits for elites.

Across Africa, police/security force corruption remains one of the most salient and mobilizing symptoms of state dysfunction. In Kenya, police brutality has been widely reported against political protesters and opponents (Auerbach, 2003; Mavenjina, 2017), and in Zimbabwe, the police have traditionally been used as mob-style enforcers for the ruling ZANU-PF political party (Kasambala, 2008; Godwin, 2011). In 2014 in Burundi, the police arrested a prominent anti-corruption activist in order to disrupt his ability to participate in an anti-corruption protest (Radio France cited in (Raleigh *et al.*, 2010)). In doing so, police and security forces across Africa transform the provision of the public goods of security and justice into selective benefits for either themselves (when soliciting bribes) or politicians (when engaging in politically-motivated policing and repression).

How Do Types of Corruption Shape Diverging Contentious Goals?

When government corruption is material in nature, citizens lose trust in politicians but do not lose trust in the system. Material forms of corruption constitute violations of the democratic promise, but are traditionally concordant with prebendal governance norms. As such, when citizens perceive material corruption, they should be more likely to

mobilize in favor of government reform. When elites raid state coffers for themselves, they do not fundamentally shape the state system; instead, they pilfer from the state in a manner that could be reversed by either replacing the leader or adding policies that introduce transparency and accountability. Similarly, when elites redirect state funds to specific ethnic groups via networks of patronage, the system itself may not be affected. This is perhaps most evident when countries elect new leaders, who promptly redirect patronage to different groups within society.

On the other hand, when government corruption is systemic in nature, citizens will lose trust in the system itself. Due to the distorting effects that systemic forms of corruption have on government institutions, citizens will be less likely to believe that the system *could work* in the first place. Systemic corruption leads to feelings that the system is broken beyond repair. When citizens perceive systemic corruption, they should be more likely to mobilize in support of revolution. When citizens perceive the system to be unfixable and captured beyond repair, the solution is likely to center on revolutionary goals, such as demanding deep structural changes or an entirely new constitution. In cases such as Mugabe's Zimbabwe or Biya's Cameroon, the political and governance systems have been molded to the contours of individuals or political parties, requiring changes to the fundamental systems of governance and the state.

Two primary sets of hypotheses of this dissertation emerge. The first set focuses on the diverging contentious goals that emerge from exposure to different types of corruption.

Hypothesis 1a: when citizens perceive material corruption, citizens will be more likely to demand reform.

Hypothesis 1b: when citizens perceive systemic corruption, citizens will be more likely to demand revolution.

The second set focuses on the trust mechanisms that connect perceptions of corruption to

Hypothesis 2a: when citizens perceive material corruption, they will lose trust in specific politicians rather than in the system itself.

Hypothesis 2b: when citizens perceive systemic corruption, they will lose trust in government institutions themselves.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented a theory linking variation in types of corruption to diverging contentious outcomes. I have argued that material corruption reduces trust in politicians, but does not substantially reduce trust government institutions themselves. Because of this, citizens mobilize in pursuit of reformative goals. Systemic corruption, on the other hand, reduces trust in the system itself, and leads citizens to pursue revolutionary goals.

In the next chapter, I present causal evidence of this by drawing upon two survey experiments conducted in Nigeria and South Africa. Following this, I expand the analysis to include individual-level analysis of the Afrobarometer data. Together, these two chapters provide strong evidence that perceptions of different types of corruption have substantially different effects that lead to diverging contentious outcomes.

CHAPTER

3

Causal Linkages of Types of Corruption and Reform or Revolution

Introduction

I begin by introducing evidence of a causal linkage between perceptions of different types of corruption (material and systemic) and revolutionary sentiments. Specifically, I test this using two survey experiments that were conducted in Nigeria and South Africa, and use a variable to proxy for revolutionary intent. Experimental evidence is particularly useful when analyzing the relationship between endogenous variables such as perceptions of corruption and revolutionary sentiment. For obvious reasons, these two variables are likely highly endogenous to one another; individuals who perceive corruption are likely to use that information to inform their overall support for revolutionary sentiments, and individuals who believe the system should be reformed or revolutionized are likely to perceive corruption differently. In order to address this, I use two survey experiments to impose an exogenous and random treatment of the four types of corruption presented in the previous chapter. I find that when respondents are exposed to treatments of material corruption, they are more likely to state that the system needs reform. When respondents are exposed to systemic forms of corruption, they are more likely to support a revolutionary statement that the system is broken and needs to be created anew.

The chapter proceeds as such: first, I address a growing literature of experimental methods in examining corruption. I then present the methods of both experiments, detailing the treatments and dependent variables. I then present the results of the experiment in Nigeria, followed by the results of the experiment in South Africa.

Experiments in Corruption Studies

Scholars have increasingly relied on experimental methods to study the effects of corruption. In part, this is due to the highly endogenous nature of corruption, which can frustrate attempts to derive causality between corruption and a dependent variable. The use of experiments in studying corruption is still in its infancy, but has led to an impressive catalog of findings.¹⁸ There have largely been three experimental approaches to understanding corruption: (1) field experiments, (2) laboratory experiments, and (3) exploiting so-called ‘natural experiments’.

Wantchekon (2003, 2011) helped pioneer the use of field experiments with his studies on clientelism in Benin. These studies demonstrated that clientelistic promises do generate positive electoral outcomes for political candidates, particularly incumbents. Along similar lines, De La O (2013) finds that government handouts via conditional cash transfers help to mobilize voters in support of incumbent candidates. On the other hand, experiments have shown that when voters are informed about corruption (rather than made promises of a clientelistic nature) in the government, voters turn out in

¹⁸ See Wantchekon and Serra’s (2012) work on experimental evidence in studying corruption for a detailed overview as well as individual studies.

smaller numbers (Chong et al. 2012, 2015). Laboratory experiments have also helped generated impressive results. Abbink et al. (2000, 2002) have helped to demonstrate the importance of reciprocal relationships in networks of bribery and corruption, and Rothstein and Eek (2009) have convincingly demonstrated that exposure to corruption – even at a petty level – results in significantly reduced trust.

Natural experiments have generated significant buzz with regard to understanding corruption, because they offer an internally coherent and externally valid opportunity to explore the effects of corruption. Recent work by Ares and Hernandez (Chong et al. 2015) has documented the deleterious effect of corruption scandals on trust in politicians, which is replicated in the survey experiment conducted for this chapter. Ares and Hernández (2017) exploited the uncovering of a corruption scandal while the European Social Survey was conducted, finding that corruption degrades trust in politicians, and that this distrust crosses partisan lines.

Less frequently, scholars have employed survey experiments to examine the impact of corruption on social behavior and perceptions. Wechsle (2016) employed such a technique in India, testing elite theft versus vote buying, and found that when corrupt spoils were distributed as club goods rather than private goods, respondents had a significantly more positive view of the politician. Klačna and Tucker (2013) demonstrate that perceptions of corruption vary in different countries with high or low expectations of corruption, as well as in richer or poorer countries.

Method

The data include survey experiments conducted in Nigeria and in South Africa. With very few exceptions, the survey experiments are identical. The survey experiment in Nigeria was conducted during a 3-week period in June 2017 during field research in Nigeria. The experiment was conducted by six trained Nigeria enumerators, each of whom was native to their location of research, and thus fluent in local languages and customs. Enumerators were trained at Lead City University in Ibadan, Nigeria, and were equipped with paper copies of the survey experiment in English. Enumerators were instructed to read the survey in English, and to translate concepts and specific words into local languages when necessary.

The survey was initially designed to be nationally representative, with intention to treat 600 respondents. This would result in national representation with a confidence level of 95 percent and a sampling error of 4 percentage points. Once in-country, financial limitations caused one of the randomly selected sampling states (Anambra) to be discounted from the sample. As a result, five states, including both the current (Abuja) and former capital (Lagos) were selected for sampling. The revised sample produced an intention to treat 540 respondents. In the end, the total number of responded treated was 529, resulting in a sampling error of 4.26 percentage points.

The survey experiment in South Africa was conducted during a two-week period in August 2018 during field research in Johannesburg. The experiment was conducted by three trained enumerators, each of whom were highly familiar with Gauteng province.

Enumerators were recruited via the political science department at the University of Johannesburg, and were trained directly by me. The research budget for the South Africa trip was substantially smaller than that for Nigeria, and as a result, the survey was limited to Johannesburg and Soweto in Gauteng province. The sampling schedule includes an intention to treat 495 respondents. In total, 344 observations were recorded.

Locations & Sampling

SAMPLING INSTRUCTIONS

In order to ensure complete randomization, enumerators were instructed to arrive at the center of each primary sampling unit (PSU). PSUs were located at the third-administrative district level. They were then instructed to face in a random direction. Using a deck of four cards, enumerators then picked either the Ace, Two, Three, or Four card from a shuffled pile, which in turn directed them to either: (a) continue straight, (b) turn 90 degrees and begin walking, (turn 180 degrees, or (c) turn 270 degrees. Enumerators then picked every fifth domicile to conduct an interview. In order to ensure that the sample did not exclude working respondents, enumerators occasionally included market stalls in which multiple potential respondents were working.

Once a household was selected, the enumerator randomly selected a respondent from within the household. This was done in accordance with established practice from the Afrobarometer project. In each PSU, enumerators interviewed at minimum 7 males and 7 females, and randomly selected the gender for the remaining interview. If an enumerator sought a female respondent, he asked how many Nigeria women over the age of 18 resided at the house. The initials of each qualifying respondent were recorded. Then,

using his card deck, the enumerator randomly selected a card, and asked to interview the individual whose initials matched up with that card. Therefore, if four women resided in a household and the enumerator selected a 3-card, the third woman would be interviewed.

EXPERIMENT 1: NIGERIA

In total, five out of thirty-six states in Nigeria were included in the sample. Sampling was conducted using stratified random sampling. Sampling was conducted methodically, beginning with the selection of first-level administrative districts (states). At the highest level, five states were selected. Two states – the former and current capital – were purposively included to ensure that the centers of political and social power were included in the sample. After that, one state from each of the three major geopolitical zones were included. From the South, Rivers State was included. From the North, Kano State was included. And from the West, Oyo State was included. Sampled districts are below in Table 1.

Once the five first-level administrative states were selected, second-level administrative districts were randomly selected. The number of districts selected per state was derived by the respective population of each state. Therefore, more populous states, such as Lagos and Kano, received more PSU locations than less populous states, such as the Federal Capital Territory. Because the Federal Capital Territory hosts Nigeria's current capital city (Abuja), the state was purposefully oversampled by assigning four PSUs rather than three.

TABLE 1 - SAMPLED STATES & DISTRICTS IN NIGERIA

State	Locations	ITT	T
Oyo State	Oluyole, Itesiwaju, Ibadan North East, Irepo, Ibarapa Central, Ibadan South East, Egbeda	105	101
Lagos State	Kosofe, Shomolu, Ikeja, Amuwo-Odofin, Lagos Mainland, Eti Osa, Ajeromi-Ifelodun, Ojo, Oshodi-Isolo	135	130
Kano State	Ungogo, Tsanyawa, Tarauni, Rogo, Rimini Gaod, Makoda, Gwale, Gaya, Garun Mallam	135	133
Federal Capital	Gwagwalada, Bwari, Kwali, Municipal Area Council	60	60
Rivers State	Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni, Andoni, Obio/Akpor, Abua/Odual, Degema, Port Harcourt, Emuoha	105	105

Note: ITT = "Intended to Treat", T = "Treated"

EXPERIMENT 2: SOUTH AFRICA

In South Africa, the survey took place in Gauteng province (see Table 2 below). As a result, the responses can be said to be representative of individuals living in Gauteng, but cannot be said to be representative of South Africa as a whole. While this is unfortunate, Chapter 6 established that the vast majority of contention occurs in Johannesburg. Moreover, on several occasions, enumerators reported verbal and physical harassment in some of the more dangerous regions (for example, Diepsloot). For the sake of ensuring the safety of all enumerators, very dangerous regions were sometimes changed to neighboring, safer regions. This may introduce bias into the data. Finally, the data were collected using tablet computers in South Africa rather than the pen and paper method used in Nigeria.

TABLE 2 – SAMPLED DISTRICTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

District	Locations	ITT	T
Johannesburg	Braamfischerville, Ennerdale South, Sandton, Sunninghill, Tswelopele, Waterval	135	142
Soweto	Devland, Jabavu, Mapetla, Moroka, Phiri	90	88
Roodeport	North Riding, Weltevredenpark	90	83
Randburg	Victory Park	30	31

Survey Sections & Treatments

The survey experiment consists of six sections. The first section collected meta information on the conditions of the interview, including whether it was done in an urban or rural area, the number of adults in the household, the time of the interview, and the presence of public goods, services, and facilities in the region. The second section collected basic demographic information. This included basic information, including age, gender, employment, education, and other relevant information.

The third section queried respondents on their general political, social, and economic views of respondents. This included their perceptions of the government's treatment of their respective ethnic and religious groups, the present economy of the country, their personal living conditions, their relative living conditions, the state and future of the respondent's country's democracy, levels of general trust, and levels of civic participation. It also included pre-treatment questions about social trust, freedom of association, and government legitimacy. The questions were largely based on (and in some cases, identical) to questions found in the Afrobarometer dataset. This was by design, so as to increase the comparability between datasets.

Treatments

The fourth section included the treatments of each type of corruption. Treatments included small vignettes highlighting different forms of corruption prevalent across Africa and in Nigeria and South Africa. This includes: (a) elite theft, (b) patronage, (c) electoral fraud, and (d) police corruption. The vignettes presented in Nigeria and South

Africa were nearly identical, save for small changes to adapt the surveys to each country. Below, in Table 3, I present the Nigerian prompts. The South African prompts are available in the appendix. The vignettes for the material treatments were worded as such:

TABLE 3 - MATERIAL TREATMENTS

Elite Theft	Patronage
“Nigerian political elites and Ogas, including heads of state such as the president or leader, have been caught stealing large sums of money from the state for themselves. Sani Abacha was said to have stolen billions from the state and from citizens. When heads of state steal from the state, they often keep the money for themselves and their family, buying expensive cars and houses in foreign countries instead of using the money to help Nigeria.”	“Nigerian politicians and Ogas, including presidents and state governors, often distribute public funds and services to specific groups within the state but not to others. Funds are often distributed along ethnic or geographic lines. This can include favoring some groups with access to jobs, education, training, and public services. When elites do this, some groups benefit and other groups suffer.”

The vignettes for the systemic treatments are presented below in Table 4.

TABLE 4 - SYSTEMIC TREATMENTS

Electoral Fraud	Police Corruption
“Nigerian presidents and political elites have been known to engage in election-rigging and voter fraud. Some politicians have been accused of stuffing ballot boxes or intimidating voters for the opposition. In the 2007 election, there were reports that political parties attempted to buy votes at the ballots. In the past, some presidents such as Olusegun Obasanjo have even tried to change the constitution to run for a third term.”	“In the past, the Nigerian police have been known to solicit bribes from citizens, as well as arrest and detain citizens unfairly and without charges. In some circumstances, police corruption has fueled abuses against citizens. In other circumstances, the police have favored some groups and targeted others. Some have alleged that the police operate on behalf of politicians and/or businesses.”

The fifth section queried respondents on their levels of trust, ranging from social trust in one’s in-group, out-group, ethnic group, and religious group, as well as trust in various institutions. These institutions include trust in electoral courts, the tax agency, and the police. Furthermore, respondents were asked about their trust in different political bodies, including the executive branch, the parliament, as well as national and local governments.

The sixth and final section queried respondents on feelings of government legitimacy, as well as a respondent's hypothetical willingness to engage in collective action. With regard to legitimacy, respondents were asked about the major problems of the government, ways in which the government could be improved, and how closely the government represents the people. With regard to collective action, respondents were asked about how willing they might be to join a group that engages in protests, strikes, or demonstrations. It then asked whether respondents were seeking out information from their religious community, trade community, or ethnic community when making a decision about engaging. Finally, respondents were asked about which types of contentious groups they believed to be most effective.

Variables

QUESTIONS ON REVOLUTION

The primary dependent variable asks respondents to evaluate the overall legitimacy of the government. The question is structured on a three-part ordinal scale, and asks respondents to evaluate government legitimacy by focusing on the severity of the government's problems. Each of the three responses were designed to correspond with the theory that when citizens perceive material corruption, they seek reparative solutions, and when they perceive systemic corruption, they seek revolutionary corruption. The question was worded as follows:

Let's think about the government for a moment. Many people claim that the Nigerian government has significant problems. Others have more confidence in the government. Please decide which of the following statements you agree

with the most:

Following this question, which was put to respondents by the enumerators, respondents were asked to select one of three responses:

1. *“Our system doesn’t have any major issues - it functions well already”*
2. *“Our system has problems, but they can be fixed by replacing or improving specific policies”, or*
3. *“Our system is broken - it can’t be fixed. We need a new system built from scratch.”*

The first response corresponds closely with what Hirschman (1970) would have termed ‘loyalty.’ For those individuals that believe the system doesn’t have any major issues, the likelihood of joining either a reformative or revolutionary protest movement is low. The second response corresponds more closely with Hirschman’s “voice” option; that is, citizens who believe that the government *could be fixed* if only the right policy was in place, or perhaps certain individuals were removed from office. Consider, for example, the Nigerian Labor Congress’ (NLC) participation in the #EndImpunityNow movement that began during the first stages of Africa’s third wave (Hinshaw, 2012; Sahara Reporters, 2015). The NLC did not seek the overthrow of the state; they specifically sought policies that would improve governance in Nigeria.¹⁹ The third response corresponds most closely with Hirschman’s “exit” option. For an individual that believes

¹⁹ See the photo of one of their rallies in the supplemental materials.

that the system is broken beyond repair, the only remaining option is to build a new system from scratch, which would constitute revolution.²⁰

Why query respondents about their evaluations of the system rather than simply asking them whether they would undertake revolutionary action against the government? There are two reasons for this. First, asking respondents about revolutionary intent is not only unlikely to elicit honest responses, but is likely to generate distrust between the enumerator and respondent, potentially leading to a premature conclusion of the survey. In the fifth Afrobarometer round, respondents were asked if they had ever “used force or violence for a political cause.”²¹ Nearly 90 percent stated that they “would never do this.” Put simply, asking about potentially illegal activities forces respondents to evaluate how much they trust the enumerator in relation to the potential consequences of admitting a taboo and incriminating sentiment. Surveying citizens in developing countries about highly sensitive topics such as revolution must be done artfully. With low levels of trust between an enumerator and respondent who have just met one another, questions about intention to engage in revolution – or even support for revolutionary groups – might trigger concerns that the enumerators might actually be working for the federal government. Second, equipping enumerators with surveys that ask about support for or engagement in revolution would likely put enumerators at risk of

²⁰ I do not measure the impact of different types of corruption on the likelihood of mobilization for the reason that this research distinguishes between different types of mobilization rather than between whether citizens do or do not mobilize.

²¹ Question 26E. Afrobarometer (2018) Nigeria, Round 5, 2011/2013. Available at: www.afrobarometer.org.

physical violence or police harassment or detention.

If the systemic corruption treatment is effective, and if citizens are more likely to respond to systemic corruption with revolution claims than with reformative claims, then respondents who receive the systemic treatment should report higher mean values on the dependent variable.

Using prescriptive questions to evaluate legitimacy and propensity toward revolution is both necessary and problematic. It is necessary because feelings of revolutionary zeal are, for obvious reasons, sensitive in nature – particularly in countries with histories of political violence. Nigeria has experienced major revolutionary violence in both the north and south. South Africa has experienced very little revolutionary violence. Two major problems emerge from direct questions. Firstly, while in theory revolution and violence need not be linked, in practice, the two have often gone hand in hand. Therefore, questions on revolution would likely draw out those citizens who support political violence, confounding the results. Secondly, it is likely that a direct question would have required respondents to trust the enumerators that the results would not be communicated to the government. This likely would have resulted in respondents deciding either not to respond to the question, or to select a less ‘intense’ answer.

QUESTIONS ON TRUST

Questions on trust in several different institutions were also asked immediately following the treatment (and preceding the questions on system legitimacy). Institutional trust is measured by trust in three crucial institutions of the state. First, respondents were asked about trust in the electoral system. The electoral system – particularly, the

commission – is a crucial component of procedural conceptions of democratic states. Because elections are the primary mechanism by which groups can compete for control of state power and access to resources, it is important that Africans view electoral commissions are legitimate and independent. This involves maintaining trust in the electoral commission.

The second institution queried is the tax system. The tax system is the primary mechanism by which modern states extract funding from citizens. Taxes are important because – at least in theory – they fund public goods, which are designed to accrue benefits to the population at large. If states are believed to be highly corrupt, citizens should be unlikely to trust the tax system because they believe their taxes are simply lining the pockets of corrupt leaders. In a prebendal patronage system, groups compete for access to tax revenue; however, in a systemically corrupt system, competition for those resources is fundamentally slanted.

Finally, respondents were asked about their trust in the police. The police represent the government institution that citizens are most likely to encounter on a daily basis. The police are charged with the enforcement of the law and the provision of security and justice as public goods. When the police engage in corrupt behaviors, including abuse and solicitation of bribes, citizens are likely to lose trust in them.

Data Structure & Balance

In total, the survey experiment data from Nigeria contains 528 observations. Below, Table 5 displays the treatment balance for the samples in Nigeria. I include relevant

demographic information, including age, gender, employment, and other important parameters of comparison. The balancing statistics indicate that the treatments are remarkably balanced. None of the parameters are substantially different from one another, nor are they statistically distinct from one another at traditional levels of statistical significance. The balance table indicates that respondents who received the systemic treatment are on average 2 years older than those that received the material treatment. The difference comes close to statistical significance with a p value of 0.06.²²

TABLE 5 - TREATMENT BALANCE IN NIGERIA

	Full Sample	Material Treatment (<i>Elite Theft & Patronage</i>)	Systemic Corruption (<i>Electoral Fraud & Police Corr.</i>)	Diff. (<i>P value</i>)
Respondents	528	267	265	-
Age	34.54	33.55	35.69	0.06
Percent Female	48.86	46.79	50.95	0.34
Employed	1.43	1.46	1.41	0.62
Percent Urban	52.84	50.18	55.51	0.22
Education	5.84	5.87	5.81	0.72
Percent Hausa	19.51	21.13	17.87	0.34
Percent Fulani	4.73	4.53	4.94	0.82
Percent Igbo	10.79	12.83	8.74	0.13
Percent Yoruba	33.33	33.21	33.46	0.95
Percent Christian	57.76	56.98	58.55	0.71
Percent Muslim	39.96	41.13	38.78	0.58

Below, Table 6 presents the treatment balance data from the South Africa experiment. Like the data in Nigeria, the treatments are well-balanced. The only parameter that is statistically distinct across treatments is the percentage of respondents who are Zulu. Zulu respondents were about twice as likely to receive the material treatment as the systemic treatment.

²² These results are plotted out in the Appendix on page 240.

TABLE 6 - TREATMENT BALANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

	Full Sample	Material Treatment (<i>Elite Theft & Patronage</i>)	Systemic Corruption (<i>Electoral Fraud & Police Corr.</i>)	Diff. (<i>P value</i>)
Respondents	344	182	162	-
Age	40.20	39.90	40.45	0.75
Percent Female	49.70	51.64	47.53	0.44
Percent Urban	68.60	68.13	69.13	0.84
Education	6.05	5.96	6.15	0.33
Percent Black	13.08	12.63	13.58	0.79
Percent White	19.18	15.93	22.83	0.10
Percent Xhosa	7.26	6.59	8.02	0.61
Percent Zulu	9.88	13.73	5.55	0.01
Percent Atheist	15.40	17.58	12.96	0.23
Percent Christian	36.04	34.06	38.27	0.41

Results

Experiment 1: Nigeria

HYPOTHESES 1A & 1B: REFORM OR REVOLUTION

The first set of hypotheses find strong support from the Nigerian survey experiment. The results are presented below in Table 7. The average treatment effect (ATE) of the material corruption treatment on overall sentiments of system brokenness is substantially lower than the average treatment effect of systemic corruption. In simpler terms, this means that respondents who received the systemic corruption treatment are more likely to believe that the system is broken beyond repair than respondents who received the material corruption treatment. To remind readers: a value of 1 indicates that respondents believe that there is nothing wrong with the system. A value of 2 indicates that respondents believe that the system is flawed, but can be repaired. Finally, a value of 3 indicates that respondents believe the system is broken beyond repair. The results show that the material ATE equals 2.00, which corresponds exactly to the statement that the system can be repaired. The systemic ATE rests at 2.11, and is statistically

distinct from the material ATE beyond conventional 95 percent confidence levels.

TABLE 7 – BROKEN SYSTEM T TEST IN NIGERIA

	Material Corruption	Systemic Corruption	95% CI Lower	95% CI Upper	p-Value
How broken is the system?	2.00	2.11	-0.22	-0.01	0.03

On a scale from 1 to 3, a difference of 0.11 may seem small; however, there are several reasons that this result is meaningful. First, it provides exogenous and causal support to the hypothesis, and is statistically significant at conventional 95 percent confidence levels. Second, the result was generated via a relatively abstract survey experimental treatment in which respondents were exposed briefly to a description of hypothetical corruption. Given this, the effect is actually rather larger; it indicates that even relatively limited exposures to systemic corruption affect perceptions of system legitimacy in meaningful ways. Third, it is worth noting that while the answers range from 1 to 3, the theory distinguishes between the values at 2 (the system is flawed but can be repaired) and 3 (the system is broken). As such, the range of interest is primarily between 2 and 3, meaning that the ATE represents an 11 percentage point increase in respondent likelihood of indicating that the government is broken beyond repair. These effects are meaningful indeed.

In order to further analyze the results, Table 8 below breaks out the responses by percentage to demonstrate the inter-treatment variation. This presents two interesting points of analysis. Firstly, it reveals that the vast majority of respondents believe that the system has problems, but could be fixed by improving specific policies. This indicates, at minimum, a belief that the system carries at least some merit with most

respondents. Secondly, one observes that, for respondents who received either of the two systemic forms of corruption, the proportion of responses indicating ‘no major problems’ decreases, while the number of respondents who selected “broken and needs to be rebuilt” increases. Notably, in the Nigerian context, respondents who received the electoral fraud treatment are 8.1 percentage points more likely to state that the system is broken and needs to be rebuilt from scratch than the material treatments. This suggests that Nigerians view the electoral system as central to the legitimacy of the state. Respondents who receive the electoral fraud treatment are also the least likely to indicate that there are ‘no major problems.’

TABLE 8 – EVALUATIONS OF THE SYSTEM IN NIGERIA

	“No major problems”	“Problems, but can be fixed”	“Broken, and needs to be rebuilt”
Material Corruption	20.20%	59.55%	20.25%
Elite Theft	19.2%	60.8%	20.0%
Patronage	21.2%	58.3%	20.5%
Systemic Corruption	14.60%	59.40%	25.95%
Electoral Fraud	13.3%	58.5%	28.1%
Police Corruption	15.9%	60.3%	23.8%


Note: Percentages in table are by row, gray bold rows are averages per treatment.

In order to unpack this further, I present the ATE of each of the four types of corruption below in Figure 2. On the left of the figure are the two types of corruption that were included in the material treatment: (1) elite theft and (2) patronage. On the right are the two types of corruption that were included in the system treatment (3) electoral fraud and (4) police corruption. The results reveal several things. First, one will note that there is no meaningful substantive or statistically significant difference in the ATE of

either elite theft or patronage. This indicates that, while respondents may distinguish between these two forms of corruption in terms of their substance, they view them as having relatively equal implications on the overall legitimacy of the state. I suspect that this may be because both of these forms of corruption are linked to traditional prebendal politics in which *ogas* ('big men') extract funds from the state in order to both enrich themselves and to benefit their political base (Ekeh, 1975).

Second, the ATE of both forms of systemic corruption are substantively much larger than the two material forms of corruption, and within systemic corruption, the ATE of electoral fraud corresponds with the highest willingness to state that the system is broken beyond repair. I interpret this to mean that Nigerians are keenly aware of the impact of the violation of the independence and fairness of elections; this suggests that Nigerians value highly the procedural electoral aspects of the state and democracy.

FIGURE 2 – HOW BROKEN IS THE SYSTEM IN NIGERIA?



Together, these results provide strong support for the first set of hypotheses. Respondents who received the material corruption treatment were more likely to state that the system could be repaired while respondents who received the systemic treatment were more likely to state that the system was broken beyond repair. I now turn to the results of the treatments on the proposed mechanism (different types of trust) to see whether the second set of hypotheses finds support.

HYPOTHESES 2A & 2B: TRUST MECHANISMS

The second set of hypotheses states that material corruption should cause reduced trust in individual politicians while systemic corruption should cause reduced trust in governmental institutions themselves. The results are presented below in Table 9. The results of the T-Tests show that the directionality of the hypotheses is correct, but that the hypotheses find only moderate support in the Nigerian context. Specifically, while

respondents who received the material treatment *do report lower trust in the president* than respondents who received the systemic treatment (Hyp. 2a), the ATE is substantively small and statistically indistinguishable between the treatments.

TABLE 9 – AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON TRUST IN NIGERIA

Trust	Material Corruption	Systemic Corruption	95% CI Lower	95% CI Upper	p-Value
Trust in the President	2.15	2.16	-0.18	0.16	0.92
Trust in Electoral Commission	2.13	2.06	-0.06	0.21	0.30
Trust in Tax Authorities	1.87	1.78	-0.03	0.22	0.15
Trust in Police	2.06	1.86	0.04	0.36	0.01

In terms of trust in institutions themselves, the average treatment effects provide weak to moderate support for the mechanism hypotheses. Trust in each of the three government institutions is substantively reduced when respondents received the systemic treatment, providing support for Hypothesis 2b. Reporting with 95 percent confidence p-values, trust in the electoral commission does not attain statistical significance. Trust in tax authorities demonstrates a larger diverging ATE, and the results indicate that, while the results are not statistically significant using a two-tailed T-Test, when instead measuring using a one-tailed interpretation (as is theoretically consistent with the hypothesis), the results do attain significance at the 90 percent confidence level. Finally, trust in the police is substantially reduced by exposure to systemic corruption treatments. The results attain statistical significance at the 99 percent confidence level, even in a two-tailed test.

It is important to mention that two of the forms of trust – electoral and police – are directly addressed via the treatments. As such, it was expected that these two forms of

trust would be most affected. This is only partially the case; trust in the electoral commission is the least affected by the systemic treatment, while trust in the police is most affected. There are likely several reasons for this. First, of the three institutions, the police are the most closely tied to the daily experience of Nigerians. The police inhabit the street level, and often harass and inhibit Nigerians who are simply out and about. Moreover, dysfunction in the police is most likely to directly affect the public goods and services received by Nigerians. When the police are corrupt, they fail (or refuse) to provide the public goods and services of security and justice, and this can easily have direct consequences on the daily lives of many Nigerians.

The tax institution is perhaps the second most removed from the daily experience of Nigerians. Nigerians must pay taxes - though skirting the taxman has become something of a sport in Nigeria (Smith, 2007) – and thus feel the impact of taxes relatively closely. This is made all the more frustrating by the fact that the revenue collected by the tax services do not have a direct link to the improved provision of public goods or services. Finally, the electoral commission may be the most powerful of the institutions, but is also the furthest from the daily lives of Nigerians. The electoral commission is responsible for overseeing and accrediting elections, and thus its impact on society is high. At the same time, the institution is highly politicized and does not maintain any sort of quotidian presence visible to the average Nigerian. As such, it makes sense that the electoral commission would be least affected by different treatments in a survey experiment.

MEDIATED RELATIONSHIP

I now turn to the use of a mediation model to determine the interactive effect of the exogenous treatments on institutional trust and revolutionary sentiments. Mediation models were developed in experimental psychology to test how a tertiary variable (m) affects the direct relationship between an independent variable (x) and a dependent variable (y) (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Within a mediated model, there may be a total and significant effect between the independent and dependent variables; however, such an effect is not required (Hayes, 2009; Rucker *et al.*, 2011). This direct relationship is referred to as C , or the ‘Total Effect’. Within the mediated relationship, there are two additional linkage. The first regresses the mediator on the independent variable. This relationships is referred to as A . The second regresses dependent variable on both the independent variable *and* the mediating variable. This is known as *Path B*. Traditionally, this indirect effect is determined by multiplying the unstandardized coefficients of A and B together. Once AB have been accounted for, C becomes C' , indicating that the total effect now includes not only the direct effect, but also the average causal mediated effect.

Mediated effects have To do this, I impose parametric assumptions on the data and run standard linear regression models. Due to limitations with the mediation package²³, this is the most efficient way to conduct the mediation analysis. The survey was

²³ Tingley et al., “mediation: R Package for Causal Mediation Analysis” R Package. Available online at : <http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=mediation>

purposefully designed in such a way that this mediated relationship can be said to realistically exist. Immediately following the treatment, respondents provided overall sentiments of trust. After this, respondents were asked to evaluate the system. This means that, chronologically, respondents were randomly assigned an exogenous treatment, asked about trust, and then asked to evaluate the system. As such, the exogenous treatment has a clear connection to both trust and system evaluations, but it is also very likely that answering questions about trust in the system primed respondents, further mediating their evaluations of the system.

In order to analyze the mediated relationship, an additional step must be taken. Because the three relationships (*A*, *B*, and *C'*) are dependent on one another, the data needed to be subset to include only observations with complete cases. This reduced the dataset from 528 to 507, resulting in a slight loss of statistical power.

Two mediation tests are run. Following Baron and Kenny (1986), the first test uses bootstrap analysis to test each of the mediating relationships (*A* and *B*), noting their size and statistical significance. Following this, a holistic test is run. In the first set of tests, bootstrapped linear regression is used to sample *A*, *B*, *C*, and *C'* 1000 times with replacement. The variables incorporated into the test include:

- IV** Whether the respondent received a material or systemic corruption treatment.
- M** Overall levels of trust in political institutions. This variable was formed by average levels of trust in the police, the electoral courts, and the tax system.
- DV** Evaluations of how broken the system is.

The results of the first test are found below in Table 10. *Path A* regresses the mediator on the independent variable, and reveals that exposure to systemic corruption is positively and statistically significantly correlated with *trust* in political institutions. The effect is substantively small, with a coefficient of -0.132, but statistically significant at convention levels of 95 percent confidence. *Path B*, for which I regress the dependent variable on both the mediator and independent variable, reveals that trust in political institutions plays a substantial role in mediating the relationship between corruption and evaluations of a broken system. Trust exhibits an inverse correlation with overall evaluations of the broken system; the coefficient is substantively large, at -0.225, and is statistically significant at the 99.9 percent confidence level. When the mediator is included, the effect of exposure to different types of corruption is diminished substantially, and is no longer statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level; however, it is significant at the 90 percent confidence level. The interaction *AB* is 0.03, which is very small and indicates that other potential mediators and covariates would substantially improve model fit.


TABLE 10 – MANUAL CALCULATION OF MEDIATED EFFECTS

	DV	Intercept	Systemic Corruption	Institutional Trust
Path A	Institutional Trust	2.030*** (0.044)	-0.132* (0.058)	-
Path B	Broken System	2.465*** (0.055)	0.091 [†] (0.055)	-0.225*** (0.044)

Next, I turn to the second mediation test, which tests these relationships holistically. Below, Figure 3 displays the overall mediated relationship. Similar to the initial test presented above, this mediation reveals the important work that *trust* plays in driving


the causal relationship between exposure to systemic corruption and evaluations that the system is broken beyond repair. In the figure below, the average causal mediated effect is statistically significant, but the direct effect is not. However, because of the strength of the average causal mediated effect, the overall relationship is substantively large and significant.

FIGURE 3 – MEDIATED THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL TRUST



The results of the mediated relationship provide support for the overall hypothesis. Next, I unpack the mediating effects of each type of trust. This is presented below in Figure 4. The figure includes three panels. The first panel mediates the direct relationship via trust of the tax department. The middle panel displays mediation through trust of the electoral courts. Finally, the right panel mediates through trust of the police. This analysis demonstrates the importance of using a mediated model. Each panel includes three horizontal lines. The top line is the average causal mediated effect, or A . The middle line is the direct effect, or C . The bottom line is the total effect, C' .

FIGURE 4 - MEDIATED RELATIONSHIP IN NIGERIA



The results show that mediating the direct effects via a causal mediator results in statistically significant relationships that further strengthen support for the hypothesis that systemic corruption reduces trust in the system and increases overall sentiments that the system is broken. By imposing parametric assumptions via linear regressions, a truer sense of the exogenous effect of the treatments can be seen.

Experiment 2: South Africa

HYPOTHESES 1A & 1B: REFORM OR REVOLUTION

In South Africa, the first set of hypotheses finds tepid support, though not in the aggregate. Below, Table 11 displays the ATE for the material and systemic corruption treatments. The results are indistinguishable from one another, both substantively and statistically. At first glance, this indicates that the theory does not travel well to the South African context. There are plenty of potential reasons for this. South African politics have been dominated since 1994 by a single political party (the African National Congress, or ANC) that has not needed to engage in wanton electoral fraud in order to win elections. Moreover, the country has recently experienced several major corruption revelations focused almost entirely on material forms of corruption; namely, personal

enrichment by the president and ANC elites.

For the most part, the allegations of corruption against Zuma were material in nature, revolving around his taxes and illicit income that he drew from major businesses in which he was enrolled as a ‘ghost employee’ (Pauw 2017). At the same time as he enriched himself, Zuma pursued a course of co-opting individuals and institutions within the government in order to indemnify himself and facilitate his ongoing theft (Madonsela 2016), parceling out ministerial positions based on the preferences of business partners such as the Gupta family (Basson and Du Toit 2017). As I detail further in the discussion section, these results may be interpreted as supporting the theory, though they do not provide support for the hypotheses as strictly stated.

TABLE 11 - BROKEN SYSTEM T TEST IN SOUTH AFRICA

	Material Corruption	Systemic Corruption	95% CI Lower	95% CI Upper	p-Value
How broken is the system?	2.11	2.09	-0.10	0.14	0.77

Why are the treatments indistinguishable in the South African context? In order to answer this, I examine the proportional distribution of responses. These are presented below, in Table 12. What immediately stands out is the between-country differences in overall evaluations of the system. Whereas in Nigeria the category stating that the system had problems, but that they could be fixed (the “reparative” response) essentially did not fluctuate, this same category of response fluctuates highly in South Africa. This fluctuation reveals interesting insight into how South Africans interpret the interaction between corruption and political institutions differently than Nigerians. In Nigeria, the “reparative response” received an average of 59.5 percent of total responses across

categories, with a standard deviation of 1.25. In South Africa, the “reparative response” receives an average of 66.3 percent of responses, with a standard deviation of 2.5 percentage points. There is thus twice the variability in South Africa than in Nigeria. Moreover, while an average of 17.4 percent of respondents in Nigeria stated that the system has no major problems, South Africans were substantially less likely to respond as such, with only 11.4 percent stating that there are no major problems.

Because of this variability, the most important distinction in the South African context is that between citizens choosing the “reparative response” and the “revolutionary response.” Looking more closely at these two categories, reveals mixed support for the first set of hypotheses. Electoral fraud is easily distinguished as the least salient to South Africans; respondents who received the electoral fraud treatment were between 8 and 13 percentage points less likely than any of the other treatments to state that the system is broken and needs to be rebuilt. This is likely due to the absence of major electoral scandals in the South African context. The ANC is a political machine with few realistic challengers.

TABLE 12 - EVALUATIONS OF THE SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA

	“No major problems”	“Problems, but can be fixed”	“Broken, and needs to be rebuilt”
Elite Theft	9.4%	68.2%	22.4%
Patronage	13.7%	63.2%	23.2%
Electoral Fraud	15.7%	68.5%	15.7%
Police Corruption	6.9%	65.3%	27.8%


Note: percentages are by row

What is also interesting is the similarity between the results from the Nigerian experiment and the South African experiment. In both countries, respondents who received

the material treatments display essentially no difference in their evaluations of the overall system. Again, this does not mean that respondents do not distinguish between these forms of corruption theoretically, but instead indicates that they believe them both to have similar effects on the system. Strikingly, respondents who received the police corruption treatment are substantially more likely to state that the system is broken beyond repair. The police corruption ATE is 2.2, and is substantively larger than any of the other treatments. It is also statistically distinct at the 95 percent confidence level from any other treatment, which lends confidence to the finding that it is particularly salient in the South African context.

Why do we observe such a large effect from police corruption and not from electoral fraud? Returning to the explanation provided earlier in this chapter, it is likely that the ‘closeness’ of police corruption to the average South African plays a role. The electoral commission in South Africa has not been embroiled in any system-breaking scandals, unlike Nigeria’s highly contentious elections, and South Africans have not experienced any major electoral fraud at the national level like Nigeria, Kenya, Cameroon, Uganda, and others. Moreover, police corruption is widely criticized in South Africa, and the police have been used particularly perniciously by local ANC leaders to quell service delivery riots – protests against the lack of public services that result from embedded corruption at the local township level. See Figure 5 below.

FIGURE 5 - HOW BROKEN IS THE SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA?



HYPOTHESES 2A & 2B: TRUST MECHANISM

In South Africa, the second set of hypotheses find partial support, and the directionality of the correlations align with expectations. Across the board, when exposed to systemic treatments, South African respondents reported lower trust in the system than their counterparts that were exposed to the material treatments. The results differ in two ways. First, the differential effect sizes are smaller than those found in Nigeria, indicating that perhaps the material/systemic divide is less pronounced to South Africans. This would make sense, given the massive charges of both material and systemic corruption of former president Jacob Zuma. Second, the standard errors are larger. This is likely the result of a smaller sample size than the Nigerian survey experiment.

The survey included questions on levels of trust in both former (and disgraced) president Jacob Zuma as well as his replacement (and former deputy) Cyril Ramaphosa. Because the survey experiment was conducted in 2018 (the same year that Zuma was

forced from office and Ramaphosa ascended), the effects of corruption treatments should be particularly pronounced. Below, Table 13 displays the ATE of the material and systemic treatments on levels of trust in the presidents (Hyp. 2a) and institutions (Hyp. 2b).

TABLE 13 - AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON TRUST IN SOUTH AFRICA

Trust	Material Corruption	Systemic Corruption	95% CI Lower	95% CI Upper	p-Value
Trust in former President Zuma	2.13	2.19	-0.26	0.15	0.59
Trust in President Ramaphosa	2.87	2.96	-0.24	0.05	0.21
Trust in Electoral Commission	2.72	2.81	-0.23	0.06	0.24
Trust in Tax Authorities	2.72	2.87	-0.29	0.01	0.07
Trust in Police	2.39	2.64	-0.42	-0.07	0.00

The results indicate that across the board, exposure to material corruption reduces trust in both politicians and institutions more than exposure to systemic corruption. Curiously, this holds even for trust in the police. Most of the effects are relatively minor, and the ATE for material and systemic treatments are generally smaller than 0.10. However, trust in the tax authorities and in the police are more thoroughly affected by exposure to material corruption. There may be two reasons for this. First, the South African Revenue Service (the tax authority) has long been considered a major impediment to outright graft in the country. The Revenue Service (SARS for short) was a major player in the multi-year personal enrichment scandal of Jacob Zuma, and Zuma worked hard to isolate and then capture the institution in order to remove any barriers to his ability to loot the state (Pauw, 2017). Second, in the years preceding the implementation of the survey experiment, South Africa has been rocked by a seemingly endless cascade of protests and riots (protests hereafter) pertaining to the delivery of public goods and

services. These service delivery protests have brought into the spotlight the disconnection between tax revenue and the provision of goods and services, particularly regarding the disproportionate effect of lack of service on the poor.

Discussion

The use of a survey experiment was designed to measure individual-level factors in mobilization into different contentious organizations while allowing for causal statements to be made. The survey experiment in Nigeria provided strong support for hypotheses 1a and 1b, while the survey experiment in South Africa did not. Similarly, the survey experiment in Nigeria provided support for the hypothesis that exposure to systemic corruption reduces trust in institutions, while the survey experiment in South Africa provided support for the hypothesis that exposure to material corruption reduces trust in individual politicians.

A word of caution is merited for treating the survey experiments as equivalent. The survey experiment conducted in Nigeria is nationally representative, was conducted by six enumerators and a research assistant, and covers all of the major geopolitical regions of Nigeria. As such, it more accurately represents the opinions of Nigerians from across the country. The survey experiment in South Africa covers only a single first-level administrative district, was conducted principally by two enumerators, and is not nationally representative. While every effort was made to ensure that the survey experiment does represent as accurately as possible the views of South Africans, it is simply not realistic to assume that the views found within the most densely populated and

politically powerful region of the country truly represents the rest of the country.

Taken together, the results of the survey experiments provide causal evidence for the argument that different types of corruption help explain variation in attitudes toward reform and revolution. They also provide support that different types of corruption also help shape different levels of trust toward the government. Because the results are causal in nature, they provide a strong cornerstone in the evidence-based argument that I am presenting. In order to build on this causal evidence, I now cast my nets wider to cover most African countries. Using survey data, Chapter 4 will test the same argument using correlational data from the Afrobarometer data that covers 34 countries over five successive rounds of questionnaires.

CHAPTER 4

Cross-National Evidence Linking Types of Corruption to Reform or Revolution

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I presented clear causal evidence from a survey experiment that exposure to systemic corruption leads respondents to be more likely to state that the system is broken. In order to further explore this, I now turn to a large body of cross-country evidence by using the Afrobarometer dataset. To remind the reader, there are two proposed causal linkages hypothesized in this dissertation. The first is that exposure to material corruption reduces trust in politicians (but not the system) and leads to calls for reform. The second is that exposure to systemic corruption leads to reduced trust in the system itself, and thus generates contentious calls for revolution.

Due to limitations with the Afrobarometer data, I can test only the second proposed linkage, which I do in this chapter. In order to do this, I use two primary statistical models. The first analyzes whether exposure to systemic forms of corruption is correlated with a reduction in trust in government institutions. The second model focuses on the proposed mechanism of trust and analyzes whether reduced trust in government institutions increases stated support for revolutionary actions. The rest of the chapter proceeds as such. First, I dig deeper into the important role that trust has played in the political science literature. This was only briefly addressed in Chapter 2, and is further elucidated here in order to emphasize how trust can serve as a link between perceptions

of corruption and revolutionary goals. Second, I analyze the first model linking perceptions of corruption to a reduction in trust. Third, I analyze the second model linking reduced trust to increased support for revolutionary statements. The models find strong support for the hypotheses presented in this dissertation.

A Quick Primer on Corruption and Trust

Trust holds an important and central role in political thought. For the majority of political thought, trust is rather contractual in nature. “Encapsulated Trust” involves a configuration of three components. The first, Person A, trusts the second, Person B, to fulfill Action X (Hardin, 1998). One can substitute “Person B” with “Institution B.” In this sense, trust is localized to a set of judgments by some actors about the intention and capability of another set of actors to behave in an agreed-upon manner. This contractarian approach finds roots in Hobbes’ (1651) reciprocal submission of interest and effort between the citizen and the leviathan, Locke’s (1690) codification of the fundamental principles underpinning that trust, and Rousseau’s (1762) clarification that it is that exact trust-relationship that constitutes the essential underpinning of legitimate governance.

The relationship between corruption and trust has implications for contentious politics. Much scholarship focuses on how corruption corrodes trust between citizens, making it difficult for them to cooperate. Rothstein (2005) describes this self-reinforcing circle as a ‘social trap,’ noting that the lack of social trust and social capital often preclude cooperative solutions that lift an afflicted community out of the trap. This is amplified

by the importance of state institutions as third-party mediators for interpersonal interactions between citizens (Cook, Hardin and Levi, 2005), in which reliable states provide important context for understanding the trustworthiness of others. This coincides with North's (1990, 1991) view that institutions serve as impartial coordinators of interactions between citizens by reducing transaction costs. Uslander (2008) convincingly captures the relationship between high levels of inequality that lead to low levels of trust, and thus lead to corruption.

But whereas the social trust literature has generally looked at corruption as the outcome of low social trust, I instead take corruption as a starting point, arguing instead for its influence on resultant levels of social trust. This approach is centered on institutions, and built on a similar body of work. Delhey and Newton (2003) demonstrate that honest governments help foster conditions in which citizens can work together with less fear of others in society renegeing on their promises. This is mirrored in the trust literature, which has noticed that the mere absence of the state actually disincentivizes cooperation and trust (Levi, 1998).

Types of Corruption and Trust in Politicians and Institutions

As argued in Chapter 2, the theory predicts that material corruption will reduce trust in politicians while systemic corruption reduces trust in institutions. This is because material corruption often works within socially accepted systems of patronage while systemic corruption violates those systems. Institutional trust taps into what some scholars have called *legitimacy*. Lipset (1959) argues that legitimacy is the "degree to which institutions are valued for themselves, and considered right and proper." Legitimacy

and institutional trust are likely endogenous to one another and responsive to systemic corruption. As citizens perceive systemic corruption distorting government institutions, they are likely to lose trust in the system while simultaneously re-evaluating the institutions as less ‘right and proper.’

The evidence that material corruption generates adverse impacts on citizen trust in politicians is relatively well-defined. In a recent article, Ares and Hernández (2017) exploit a natural experiment to demonstrate that the discovery of a major material corruption scandal in the ruling party leads to a precipitous decline in citizen trust of politicians, though that effect decays relatively quickly.

There is also evidence that systemic corruption reduces trust in institutions. Rothstein and Eek (2009) use a cross-national experiment to demonstrate that institutional trust is reduced when police authorities have been shown to be corrupt. Interestingly, the experiment revealed that institutional trust in the police is lowest when no bribe has been offered, and increases significantly when a bribe has been offered by a citizen and refused by the police officer. This is particularly interesting, because it seems to indicate that the mere calculation by a bribe-offeror that a policeman would be willing to accept a bribe sends the signal that the police may very well be corrupt.

Limitations to the Empirical Testing

I turn now to the empirical tests, which draw from the Afrobarometer data. There are limitations to using the Afrobarometer data that means that only half of the mechanisms can be tested. For example, it is not possible to cleanly test Hypothesis 2a, which

proposes that perceptions of material corruption reduce trust in individual politicians rather than the system itself. This is because there is no single variable that directly measures material corruption. There are questions about how corrupt the government is as a whole, as well as how corrupt individuals within the government are; however, these questions do not parse between material and systemic forms of corruption. There are, on the other hand, several questions that directly test perceptions of systemic corruption as well as several questions that test levels of trust in government institutions. As a result, only one of the two mechanism hypotheses can be tested: hypothesis 2b that emphasizes that perceptions of systemic corruption reduce trust in government institutions.

Moreover, models using Afrobarometer data can make correlational inferences, but cannot be said to make causal inferences. This is a limitation of nearly all observational data, and is the reason that this dissertation begins by marshaling causal evidence from the survey experiments run in Nigeria and South Africa. Having listed these two limitations, I now present the empirical evidence in the form of two models. The first model examines the linkage between how perceptions of systemic corruption correlated with reduced overall levels of institutional trust. This tests Hypothesis 1b. The second model examines how reductions in institutional trust correlate with increased willingness to use revolutionary methods; namely, using political violence.

Model 1 – How Systemic Corruption Shapes Institutional Trust

Data

In order to analyze this, I turn to the Afrobarometer data (2016). The Afrobarometer data consist of six cross-national household surveys conducted from 2000 to 2015. The surveys cover many issues, including citizen perceptions of corruption, evaluations of government performance, trust (social and otherwise), socioeconomic evaluations, and more. Over the course of each round, more African countries have been added, leading to a complete dataset of over 204,000 observations. The result is the most robust survey data available from a continent in which data have been scarce or questionable.

Method


The first model examines Hypothesis 2b, which proposes that systemic corrupt violations should result in diminished trust in government institutions. The Afrobarometer include questions on levels of trust in specific institutions, such as the police and electoral courts, as well as trust in a general question about how well the government is handling corruption on the whole. There are some challenges to using these data. First, there are concerns about tautological implications of measuring perceptions of corruption government institutions and then measuring levels of trust in those same institutions. Theoretically, this relationship makes sense; however, statistically, it runs several risks. First, it is likely that there is high endogeneity between perceptions of corruption and overall levels of trust in government institutions. This challenge was addressed in the previous chapter via the use of survey experiments. Second, in this chapter, rather

than speaking of causal relationships, it is important to speak of correlational relationships.

Testing the Mechanism: How Systemic Corruption Shapes Institutional Trust

In order to test this, I generate a variable to measure institutional trust. This variable is comprised of the average of three institutional trust variables: trust in the electoral commission, trust in the courts, and trust in the police. Trust in the electoral commission speaks to citizen trust in the democratic machinery of the state. Trust in the courts speaks to citizen expectations that the legal system is fair and legitimate. Trust in the police speaks to citizen trust in the coercive apparatus of the state, as well as the institution that most citizens are most likely to encounter. Taken together, these three provide insight into a citizen's general evaluations of the institutions of the state. Because the variable is composed of three ordinal scales and then averaged, it generates a quasi-continuous variable that ranges from 0 (no trust) to 3 (high trust), with a median of 1.667 and a mean of 1.606. This is visualized below in Figure 6, which shows levels of trust across the countries in the Afrobarometer data.

FIGURE 6 - DENSITY OF INSTITUTIONAL TRUST



Independent Variables: Systemic Corruption

I regress two forms of corruption on institutional trust. Police corruption and electoral rigging, both forms of systemic corruption, provide information about two of the four types of corruption found in the typology. Electoral rigging represents a systemic form of corruption that generates private goods, while police corruption generates club goods. Including both allows me to measure whether types of distribution matter in driving the relationship between perceptions of corruption and levels of institutional trust. Both variables are ordinal, ranging from 0 (no corruption) to 3 (high corruption).


In order to measure electoral rigging, I draw from a question in the Afrobarometer data that asks respondents, “On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [the year of the last election]?” This question is the most appropriate to test perceptions of electoral fraud and rigging. While the question does not specifically stipulate the source of any potential problems with elections, the election itself is specified as the most recent national election. This reduces the

likelihood that respondents will focus on local or regional governments. It is likely that when evaluating problems with national elections, respondents will focus their attention on potential rigging and fraud conducted by the president and national level parties. Several possible responses were presented to respondents:

1. Not free and fair
2. Free and fair, but with major problems
3. Free and fair, but with minor problems
4. Completely free and fair

Below, Figure 7 displays overall perceptions across Africa about the quality of elections. In general, a plurality of citizens report that their elections are *completely free and fair*. This is particularly pronounced in countries with relatively low levels of internal conflict, such as Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Lesotho, Madagascar, Senegal, and others. However, in countries where there is a history of recent of embedded conflict, such as Cote d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Sudan, and Nigeria, the vast majority of respondents state that elections are marred by at least some minor problems.

FIGURE 7 - FREE & FAIR ELECTIONS




The second systemic variable measures perceptions of corruption within the police force. This question is asked as follows: “How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Police?” The question is somewhat vague in the sense that it does not identify actual corrupt behaviors conducted by the police. For example, it does not mention the solicitation of bribes, the abduction and robbing of citizens, violence by the police against unarmed citizens, or any other forms of abuse that might be lumped into the larger category of corruption. Respondents were able to select one of the following responses:

1. None
2. Some of them
3. Most of them
4. All of them

Below, Figure 8 displays the overall perceptions of police corruption across Africa. Unlike evaluations of electoral fairness, which were slightly skewed in favor of thinking that elections are indeed fair, the vast majority of Africans view their police forces as highly corrupt. The countries in which police are seen to be the least corrupt are North and West African countries with large Muslim populations, such as Algeria, Burkina Faso, and Senegal. Additionally, Cape Verdeans report relatively high confidence in the police.

FIGURE 8 - PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION



Covariates

I include a number of important covariates to help control potential omissions within the model. The covariates are sourced from the Afrobarometer data, and are largely perceptions-based. This approach carries with it several strengths. First, it allows for individual-level variation that increases the statistical effect of each variable. This is

particularly important with economic and other country-level variables, as including World Bank data would simply result in the repetition of data about population or GDP across each respective country for each respective round. As such, these World Bank data could only explain cross-national variation and not sub-national variation. Second, I argue that perceptions are some of the most important – and often unfairly derided – factors to take into consideration for political analysis. How people *perceive* things is much more likely to shape their willingness to engage in political behaviors. For example, perceptions are built directly into the core of Gurr's (2011) work on relative deprivation. Perceptions drive grievances in Nigeria's Niger Delta region, and are largely perception-based (Smith, 2014). And perceptions often differ from experiences – particularly with corruption, and align with partisan preferences (Blais, Gidengil and Kilibarda, 2017) that are ostensibly exogenous to actual experiences of corruption.

I begin by including a general question on respondents' perceptions of how well the government is 'handling corruption.' Responses range from 'very badly' to 'very well.' Because corruption is the major focus of this dissertation, and because perceptions of corruption tend to draw upon latent frustration with levels of corruption on the whole, the inclusion of this question helps to ensure that the model is accurately capturing correlations between systemic forms of corruption and levels of institutional trust, rather than measuring more general feelings about corruption.

Economic evaluations are an important factor in determining perceptions of corruption, and in order to address this, I include evaluations of the country's present economy. This variable ranges from 'very bad' to 'very good,' and includes 5 ordinal responses

total. Citizens who feel optimistic about the economy are likely to judge the government more leniently, and therefore including this is an important component of the model. Along the same vein, I include citizen perceptions of their current living conditions. This is also a 5-point ordinal scale ranging from ‘very bad’ to ‘very good.’ This allows for analytical leverage to understand how citizens perceive their own living condition in comparison with their perceptions of the national economy. Along the same lines, I include a variable that asks respondents to evaluate how they believe the economy will be doing in 12 months’ time. This incorporates a future-oriented outlook that might play an important role in determining overall tolerance for corruption.

Importantly, perceptions of corruption are connected to overall demand for and perception of democracy. Citizens who strongly demand a Weberian or western-style democracy are most likely to be impermissive of corruption. I draw from the Afrobarometer data to include a question on democratic satisfaction. This question asks respondents to evaluate the level of their respective government’s overall quality of democracy, ranging over four potential answers that move from from pessimistic (‘not a democracy’) to positive (‘a full democracy’). Democratic satisfaction is included to control for general citizen evaluations of the country’s democracy. One key aspect of modern democracies is the equal treatment of all citizens. This is hardly upheld in most African democracies, and in order to address this, I include a question that asks citizens to rate how often the government discriminates against the respondent’s ethnic group. African governments have often employed ethnic politics in consolidating power and distributing corrupt spoils along lines of patronage. Citizens who feel mistreated by the

government should report lower levels of institutional trust. Furthermore, it is highly likely that political partisanship plays a major role in evaluations of the state.

I also acknowledge the strong role that partisanship can play in determining perceptions of corruption. In many cases, one would expect that trust in institutions is very closely linked to trust in *who is running the institutions*. In order to incorporate this into the model, I include citizen trust of the ruling party. Those citizens who are partisan in favor of the ruling party should report lower trust in state institutions. This variable asks respondents to evaluate their overall trust in the ruling party, ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much.’ This variable presents a potential statistical issue: is it very highly likely collinear with overall levels of institutional trust. Because partisanship is important from a theoretical perspective, I keep this covariate in the model; however, in the appendix I present the correlation between the two variables (0.603) and a density plot that shows that while they are highly correlated, they are not identical. This can be found on page 208.

Finally, in order to measure legitimacy, I include a general evaluation of the performance of the local government. Recent scholarship has emphasized the importance of local government on African citizens (Fashagba, 2015; Le Van, 2015). Local governments serve as the primary set of institutions responsible for providing services to their constituent populations. While central governments often attract the public’s ire, citizens in most African states are more closely linked to their local governments than to the central government.

Below, Table 14 displays the expected correlations of the two independent variables of interests as well as the three covariates most likely to confound the results.

TABLE 14 - EXPECTED CORRELATIONS

Hypothesis Independent Variables		Major Potential Confounders		
Electoral Fairness Positive	Police Corruption Negative	Handling Corruption Positive	Trust Ruling Party Positive	Democratic Satisfaction Positive

Results


The results are found below, in Table 15. The results provide strong support for the hypothesis that perceptions of systemic corruption are inversely correlated with trust in institutions. Across each model, respondents who report high perceptions of police corruption also report low trust in government institutions. The correlational coefficients are substantively large and robust to the inclusion of covariates. Moreover, the results are statistically significant at the 99.9 percent confidence level. Similarly, evaluations of the freeness and fairness of elections are positively correlated with overall levels of institutional trust. Individuals who believe that elections were fairly conducted report high trust in the system.

TABLE 15 - CORRUPTION & INSTITUTIONAL TRUST

DV: Institutional Trust					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	1.027*** (0.025)	0.922*** (0.025)	0.784*** (0.025)	0.751*** (0.022)	0.620*** (0.022)
Hypothesis					
Police Corruption	-0.249*** (0.003)	-0.242*** (0.003)	-0.224*** (0.003)	-0.181*** (0.003)	-0.173*** (0.003)
Electoral Fairness	0.197*** (0.002)	0.186*** (0.002)	0.144*** (0.003)	0.078*** (0.002)	0.071*** (0.003)
Covariates					
Handling Corruption	0.191*** (0.002)	0.173*** (0.002)	0.149*** (0.003)	0.072*** (0.003)	0.069*** (0.003)
Present Economy		0.076*** (0.002)	0.058*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.002)	0.022*** (0.002)
Living Situation		-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.002)
Ethnic Treatment			-0.041*** (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.003)
Satisf. w/ Democracy			0.151*** (0.003)	0.067*** (0.003)	0.059*** (0.003)
Future Economy				0.011*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)
Trust in Ruling Party				0.356*** (0.002)	0.352*** (0.002)
Local Gov't Perform.					0.075*** (0.003)
AIC	257191.211	253103.503	207488.515	166047.630	150562.923
BIC	257248.987	253180.454	207582.882	166159.624	150683.189
Log Likelihood	-128589.606	-126543.751	-103734.257	-83011.815	-75268.461
Num. obs.	112349	111174	92661	83524	76979
Num. groups: country	34	34	33	32	32
Var: country (Intercept)	0.018	0.017	0.015	0.010	0.010
Var: Residual	0.577	0.569	0.548	0.426	0.413

Below, Figure 9 displays the predicted level of institutional trust based on the two systemic corruption independent variables. When respondents reported that the police were not at all corrupt, they reported a mean level of institutional trust at 2.2, which correlates with a high level of trust. When some police were considered corrupt, institutional trust dropped to 1.8, and the dropped again to 1.5 when most police were considered corrupt. Finally, when all police were considered corrupt, institutional trust was reduced to 1.1. With regards to evaluations of electoral quality, the correlation also provides support for the hypothesis. When elections are deemed to have been neither free nor fair, trust in institutions averages a response of 1.06, which corresponds in real terms to a low level of trust. When elections are considered completely free and fair, trust rises to 1.9, which corresponds with high levels of overall trust.

FIGURE 9 - PREDICTED INSTITUTIONAL TRUST



Model 2 – How Institutional Trust Conditions Revolution

Having now tested the first step in the proposed chain (perceptions of corruption and institutional trust), I turn to measuring the relationship between overall levels of institutional trust and support for revolution. This corresponds with hypothesis 1b. As stated earlier in this chapter, because the data come from the Afrobarometer data, it is not possible to attribute causality to the relationships; instead, these are correlational tests that rely on the causal linkages demonstrated in the previous chapter.

Testing support for revolution is tricky at the best of times due to the fact that few people would openly admit to supporting treasonous and illegal political goals. However, it is possible to proxy for support for revolution by looking at whether respondents believe political violence is politically justified. Why is this the case? Political violence is generally illegal in most African countries. Moreover, with a few exceptions, political violence is used primarily by revolutionary contentious groups. For example, in Kenya the majority of political violence has been used by revolutionary groups demanding to overthrow the democratically elected president in favor of installing their personal candidate. In Burkina Faso, violence erupted when revolutionary zeal against former president Blaise Compaoré hit a fever pitch. In Nigeria, violence is used primarily by revolutionary groups in the north (Boko Haram) and in the south (Biafran militias).

Method & Data

In order to test hypothesis 1b, I turn to the Afrobarometer data again. As mentioned above, I use support for political violence as a proxy for support for revolution. In this

case, the Afrobarometer data provide two very good tests for the hypothesis that institutional corruption is inversely correlated with desire for revolution. The first test looks at whether citizens believe that political violence is ever justified. The second test looks at whether citizens would be willing to use revolutionary violence. As one might expect, respondents are more willing to openly discuss the theoretical justification for violence than actually admit whether they themselves would be interested in performing violence in pursuit of a 'just cause'. I test them both below. The first dependent variable measures justification of violence, while the second dependent variable measures willingness to use violence.

Models

Because Afrobarometer data are, with few exceptions, structured as ordinal categorical data, I rely primarily on using cumulatively linked multilevel models with an ordinal logistic link. In short, these models are able to regress covariates on categorical data that are not numeric, but do have a clear ordinal structure. For example, questions on evaluations of personal well-being are structured as: "very bad," "bad," "neither good nor bad," "good," and "very good."

Ordinal models use a logistical link between categories, and generating predicted outcomes is actually a matter of determining the probability that, given a certain amount of institutional trust, a respondent will select one of the ordinal categories in the dependent variable. five ordinal responses indicating justification for violence. Examining predictions this way is particularly interesting, because it allows for nuanced

analysis of the marginal effects of institutional trust on the probability of each outcome category.

Dependent Variable: Justification of Violence

The first dependent variable is citizen reports of whether “the use of violence is never justified in [country’s] politics today” or whether it is indeed, “sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.”²⁴ This variable is interesting because it does not require citizens to implicate themselves in any violent misconduct, but instead looks at whether they think violence in search of a ‘just cause’ is ever justified at the theoretical level. Of course, violence is not the same as revolution; many revolutions have been non-violent (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008), and not all violent contention is revolutionary.

Looking at Table 16 below which summarizes the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO 3) data project (Chenoweth, Pinckney, & Lewis, 2017), I find support for the use of justifying violence as a measurement of revolutionary support. Within the NAVCO 3 data, reformative campaigns are significantly less likely to use violence. Of the total number of reformative campaigns, only 18.56 percent use entirely violent tactics. On the other hand, of the total number of revolutionary campaigns, 32.12 percent use entirely violent tactics. As such, revolutionary campaigns are 73 percent more likely to engage in violence than reformative campaigns.


²⁴ Round3: question 51. Round 5: question 78.

TABLE 16 – TACTICS AND GOALS IN AFRICAN CONTENTIOUS MOVEMENTS

	Reformative	Revolutionary
Violent	1356 (18.56%)	1142 (32.12%)
Not-Violent	5717 (78.25%)	2382 (67.00%)
Mixed	233 (3.19%)	31 (0.85%)

Justification for violence varies significantly across Africa. Figure 10 below displays variation in justification for violence across the countries surveyed in the fifth round of Afrobarometer. These countries are sorted by respondents strongly supporting the statement that violence is ‘never’ justified. At the left, Tunisia has the highest percentage of citizens (80.20) that strongly believe that violence is never justified. On the right, Namibia has the lowest such percentage, at 22.20 percent.

FIGURE 10 – JUSTIFICATION OF VIOLENCE IN ROUND 5 OF AFROBAROMETER



Covariates

The covariates remain identical to those found in Model 1 in order to preserve continuity across models. Because the Afrobarometer data rely on ordinal data, I use a cumulative linked mixed model. This model evaluates ordinal data on a level-by-level basis,

and links each level with a logistic regression. Because the model allows for mixed effects, I include each country as a level of analysis. Using a multilevel model allows the model to more efficiently address imbalance in the data, particularly as some countries are more represented than others within the dataset.

In the preceding model, I found that systemic corruption (measured by perceptions of police corruption and evaluations of the freeness and fairness of elections) significantly reduce levels of institutional trust. Institutional trust was measured as an average of each respondent's reported level of trust in three state institutions: the police, the electoral courts, and the tax institution. Here, I use two dependent variables: justification of political violence and use of political violence. I generate an institutional trust variable only from the average of trust in the police and trust in the electoral courts.²⁵

Results

Across each model testing justification for violence, the results provide strong support for the hypothesis that as institutional trust increases, support for revolution decreases. On average and holding all else equal, increased institutional trust is inversely correlated with support for the use of political violence. This relationship is statistically significant at the 99.9 percent confidence level. This relationship carries through from the bivariate regression to the full model including all covariates. The results are presented in Table 17.


²⁵ The correlation between the 'old' and 'new' variables of institutional trust is 0.9483, which indicates that high similarity between the variables.

TABLE 17 – ORDINAL CUMULATIVE LINKED MIXED MODEL

DV: Justification for Violence					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Hypothesis					
Institutional Trust	-0.316*** (0.017)	-0.321*** (0.017)	-0.270*** (0.020)	-0.190*** (0.023)	-0.195*** (0.023)
Cut Points (Taus)					
Tau 1 2	-0.573*** (0.069)	-0.345*** (0.072)	-0.426*** (0.086)	-0.558*** (0.092)	-0.617*** (0.093)
Tau 2 3	0.880*** (0.069)	1.110*** (0.072)	1.035*** (0.086)	0.924*** (0.092)	0.865*** (0.093)
Tau 3 4	1.750*** (0.070)	1.982*** (0.073)	1.943*** (0.087)	1.850*** (0.092)	1.790*** (0.094)
Tau 4 5	3.050*** (0.073)	3.295*** (0.076)	3.338*** (0.091)	3.227*** (0.097)	3.169*** (0.098)
Covariates					
Present Economy		0.048*** (0.008)	0.052*** (0.010)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.046*** (0.011)
Living Situation		0.037*** (0.009)	0.048*** (0.010)	0.042*** (0.011)	0.047*** (0.011)
Ethnic Treatment			0.093*** (0.011)	0.072*** (0.012)	0.073*** (0.012)
Satisf. w/ Democracy			-0.050*** (0.011)	-0.050*** (0.012)	-0.051*** (0.012)
Future Economy			-0.023* (0.009)	-0.028** (0.010)	-0.028** (0.010)
Trust Ruling Party				-0.054*** (0.012)	-0.057*** (0.012)
Loc. Gov't Perf.				-0.022 (0.012)	-0.025* (0.012)
Education					-0.016** (0.005)
Log Likelihood	-67434.563	-66293.924	-	-	-
AIC	134881.127	132603.849	47532.343	42042.588	41962.976
BIC	134934.602	132675.023	95180.856	84220.851	84072.042
Num. obs.	54858	53998	38596	34084	34030
Groups (country)	31	31	27	27	27
Variance: country: (Intercept)	0.131	0.131	0.129	0.132	0.130
Cumulative Linked Multilevel Model, ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05					

In order to better understand the correlation between institutional trust and support for violence (hereafter ‘revolution’), I calculate the marginal effects using a boot-strapping method that calculated effects based on observed values rather than statistical means. These are presented below, in Figure 11. The marginal effects provide the *predicted probability of a respondent selecting one of the five categories* based on the observed values of institutional trust and covariates. While there are five categories, the majority of the variation occurs in three, which I present below. On the left is the category in which respondents strongly agreed that political violence is never justified. In the middle is the category in which respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. On the right is the category where respondents strongly agreed that political violence is sometimes justified. Along the x-axis of each plot are the values of institutional trust, ranging from 0 to 3.

FIGURE 11 - PREDICTED MARGINAL EFFECTS OF JUSTIFICATIONS FOR VIOLENCE



The marginal effects display the large variation in the probability of respondents selecting each category. On the left, holding all else equal, respondents who reported absolutely no trust (0) in government institutions were just under 35 percent likely to


state that they strongly agree that political violence is never justified. Respondents who have complete trust in institutions (3) are 48 percent likely to select this option. In short, respondents who have no trust in government institutions are 14 percentage points less likely than respondents who have complete trust to select the response that violence is *never* justified. Moving to the middle category ('neither agree nor disagree'), respondents who have no trust are just under five percentage points *more* likely to state that they are undecided. Five percentage points may seem small, but only about 13 percent of all responses select this option, which means that variation of just under five percentage points comprises more than 33 percent variation. Finally, individuals with no trust are twice as likely as individuals with high trust to state that they agree that political violence is sometimes justified.

In order to visualize the relationship in a more intuitive manner, I also run a mixed-effects linear regression. The model includes the same covariates found in the cumulative linked ordinal model, and the results are nearly identical. Because the linear model is designed to fit normally distributed continuous data, the results are not as statistically efficient as possible, resulting in slightly smaller effect sizes; however, the results provide additional support for the hypothesis that increased institutional trust is correlated with lower levels of justification for violence, and by proxy, revolutionary zeal. The results are found in the appendix in Table 30 on page 209.

Dependent Variable: Use of Violence

The second dependent variable asks respondents whether they personally would ever use force of violence or a political cause. This variable is, of course, problematic. Few

respondents are likely to think of themselves as potentially violent, and those that do are likely to hide that fact from a survey researcher. This is likely for a few reasons. First, it is taboo to admit aspirations of violence. Second, admitting willingness to conduct violence is potentially risky, particularly in mixed-regime countries in which such declarations may lead to jail-time or worse. As a result, the vast majority of respondents (89.24 percent) indicated that they have never used violence, and also that they never would use violence. A small percentage (7.42 percent) indicated that they would be willing to use violence if the right opportunity was presented. Of the remaining categories, which all require respondents to admit to having used violence at least once, only 3.34 percent picked one of those three categories. Frequencies are displayed below in Figure 12.



The results of the ordinal cumulative model reflect this highly skewed distribution. Below, Table 18 displays the results from this secondary test. The results provide strong

secondary support for the hypothesis. Across each of the models, institutional trust displays a statistically significant inverse correlation. This means that respondents with low levels of trust in the system are more likely to state that they would or have used violence.

TABLE 18 – ORDINAL CUMULATIVE LINKED MIXED MODEL

DV: Would Use Violence for Political Reason					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Hypothesis					
Institutional Trust	-0.171*** (0.016)	-0.182*** (0.016)	-0.104*** (0.019)	-0.078*** (0.023)	-0.067** (0.025)
Cutpoints (Taus)					
Tau 0 1	1.965*** (0.099)	2.055*** (0.104)	2.259*** (0.122)	1.994*** (0.131)	1.818*** (0.143)
Tau 1 2	3.233*** (0.100)	3.323*** (0.105)	3.511*** (0.124)	3.225*** (0.133)	3.040*** (0.144)
Tau 2 3	3.942*** (0.102)	4.036*** (0.107)	4.216*** (0.126)	3.933*** (0.135)	3.731*** (0.146)
Tau 3 4	4.910*** (0.109)	4.998*** (0.114)	5.257*** (0.134)	4.983*** (0.143)	4.796*** (0.154)
Covariates					
Present Economy		0.085*** (0.013)	0.080*** (0.014)	0.101*** (0.015)	0.105*** (0.016)
Living Situation		-0.042** (0.013)	-0.030* (0.015)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.011 (0.017)
Ethnic Treatment			0.187*** (0.015)	0.191*** (0.016)	0.190*** (0.016)
Satisf. w/ Democracy			-0.034* (0.016)	-0.018 (0.017)	-0.025 (0.018)
Future Economy				-0.124*** (0.014)	-0.133*** (0.015)
Trust Ruling Party				-0.011 (0.018)	-0.012 (0.019)
Loc. Gov't Performance					-0.043* (0.019)
Education					-0.013 (0.008)
Log Likelihood	-	-	-	-	-
AIC	27845.001	27425.294	22040.623	19975.463	18069.451
BIC	55702.002	54866.588	44101.245	39974.927	36166.902
	55756.203	54938.739	44189.227	40079.213	36286.949
Num. obs.	61916	61019	48930	43938	39136
Groups (country)	31	31	27	27	27
Variance: country: (Intercept)	0.272	0.280	0.315	0.337	0.356
Cumulative Linked Multilevel Model, ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05					

Discussion

Building on the causal evidence marshalled in Chapter 3, this chapter has used Afrobarometer data from across the continent to test the relationship at a larger scale. Overall, the results presented provide support for the hypothesis that institutional trust is inversely correlated with support for revolution, as measured by justification for violence as well as reported willingness to use (or previous usage of) violence. While the dependent variables are imperfect, they do provide important insight into how citizens relate their trust in the government with a willingness to act out in revolutionary manners. Trust is shown to play a major role in conditioning the boundaries of contention that citizens consider acceptable. In demonstrating this, this finding contributes to a large body of literature that has connected trust with social and political behaviors and outcomes. In the next chapter, I test the arguments more directly using geospatial data of contentious incidents.

This chapter uses cumulative linked multilevel models with a logit-based ordinal linkage to test the hypotheses. Because the data are ordinal data, these tests are the most appropriate for the occasion; however, linear regressions are included in the appendix in Table 31 on page 210. They provide robust support for the results presented here.

CHAPTER

5

Reform and Revolution at the Incident Level

Introduction

This dissertation has thus far argued that groups mobilize in support of either reform or revolution in response to different forms of corruption. Material corruption reduces trust in politicians and generates calls for reform. Systemic corruption reduces trust in the system itself, leading to calls for revolution. This is argument that interlocks two levels. At the first level, it examines how exposure to different types of corruption shape individual perceptions of trust and support for revolutionary statements and violence. At the second level, it argues that contentious organizations reflect these micro preferences by responding to different types of corruption with different contentious goals. When groups respond primarily to material corruption, they seek reformative goals. When they respond primarily to systemic corruption, they are more likely to see revolutionary goals.

This argument has been tested causally in Chapter 3 and correlationally at the individual level in Chapter 4. Yet, one important source of data remains untested – the actual protest and riot behavior of contentious groups. After all, thus far the data have only been able to provide information about what respondents *say they would do/have done*. In order to test whether reported contention links to actual contention, I now turn to

data that include observed incidents of protest and riot. This chapter is able to test both hypothesis 1a and hypothesis 1b.

As I detail in the next section, groups engage in a variety of behaviors – revolutionary groups do not solely or strictly mobilize around systemic demands. To do so would be a missed opportunity for their organization to develop and extend a leading role in civil society. In South Africa, socialist organizations seek a revolutionary restructuring of the state (in particular, property rights). Yet, these groups – including the Economic Freedom Fighters – participate in many protests ranging across many grievances. As such, it is important to measure the actual behavior of the organizations by analyzing their behaviors.

Such analysis has recently come to the fore of political science, with the introduction of highly used datasets such as the Armed Conflict Location Event Data (ACLED), Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) and Global Terrorism Database (GTD). In South Africa, MunicipallIQ has developed a dataset tracking South Africa’s prolific service-delivery protests. For the purpose of this dissertation, incidents serve an important role of locating contention in both time and space, which can be incorporated into the analysis.

Restating the Hypotheses

This chapter specifically focuses on the hypotheses that emerge from diverging corrupt violations. I restate these below.

Hypothesis 1a: when citizens perceive material violations of the state – personal

enrichment, patronage, shrinking economic opportunities – they are likely to rise up with demands to reform the existing system. I argue that this is due in part to trust that the system itself could operate well if given the opportunity to do so. Removing a politician or changing a specific law are versions of reform that operate within the system as it is.

Hypothesis 1b: when citizens perceive systemic violations of the state – subverting the constitution, rigging elections – they are likely to rise up with demands for revolutionary change. I argue that this is because systemic violations corrode trust in the system itself, leading citizens to seek outside options. This manifests as demands to overturn elections, scrap the constitution, or engage in socialist land reform efforts that fundamentally diverge from the principles of the government.

Studying Incidents of Contention

Why study incidents of contention? The theory makes predictions about individuals and their mobilization into groups, but says less about the individual protests, riots, and demonstrations that those groups will engage in. Yet, studying incidents provides important insight into the different behaviors of groups. For example, as we observe later in this chapter, social movement organizations engage in many types of contention. The revolutionary group, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), often demonstrates with demands for independence (a revolutionary claim). But they also respond to more local issues – they protested the unfair detention of their members by the state, and even participated in protests about the price of fuel following the removal of subsidies by the government. Similarly, in South Africa, the

Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) primarily agitated on behalf of reform issues – demanding improved wages, women’s rights, and development. But in several rare cases, COSATU sought the overturning of an election and revolutionary land reform.

Moreover, studying incidents of protest and riot allow for the inclusion of temporal and geographic information into statistical analysis. Time and space play important roles in social movements and revolution; protests against extractives corruption tend to occur in the regions most hard-hit by the externalities associated with the mining and petroleum industries. In Nigeria, this is in the South-South region of the Niger Delta. 230 such protests occur in the data. In South Africa, extractives protests take place largely outside of mines. 66 such protests occur in the data.

As I detail later in this chapter, the location of protests also serves to communicate specific messages. Protesting in the capital is often the best way to communicate messages directly to the government, and protesting in front of specific institutions may amplify this message. For example, following issues of electoral fraud, intimidation, and ballot stuffing, protesters in Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa frequently protested directly in front of their respective electoral commissions. In South Africa on several occasions, protests occurred in front of the Constitutional Court to send a message concerning pending challenges to the constitution.

Including geographic information further allows for the identification of specific ‘hotspots’ that may facilitate (or hinder) contention in several ways. Some regions will observe more contention due to factors ranging from increased infrastructure that

allows protesters to march and congregate to high population density that allows SMO organizers to mobilize participants. Salmenkari (2009) also identifies symbolic spaces – spaces that seem to be imbued with symbolic meaning. Understanding where protest incidents occur provides additional information about the content of the protest and the likelihood of future events.

Likewise, time plays an important role in shaping contention. Electoral protests, unsurprisingly, take place in the short periods before, during, and after elections. This is particularly salient in Kenya, where elections have often been marked by allegations of fraud, rigging, and intimidation. Protests often cluster together in cascading waves (Hussain & Howard, 2013; Lohmann, 1994), beginning with small, vulnerable demonstrations that soon give way to large-scale mobilization. This occurred in Nigeria with the #EndSARS campaign, where protests against the abusive Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) began tepidly, but soon grew into nation-wide demonstrations against police abuse, corruption, and brutality. These cascades of protest reveal the importance of timing in understanding who mobilizes and why they do.

Grievances and Contention in Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa

In order to examine the relationship between different types of corruption and diverging calls for reform and revolution at the group-level, I turn to three countries: Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa. These countries are Africa's three most contentious countries, and all three have experienced calls for reform and revolution during the third wave of protest. Additionally, all three countries experience both types of corruption. As such,

they are excellent candidates for study, and I focus on these three countries in this chapter as well as in the next.

Nigeria

Nigeria sits in the crook of Africa's Gulf of Aden. It is Africa's most populous country, and is comprised of myriad ethnic and religious groups. The country became independent in 1960, and enjoyed very little time as a new nation before its first secessionist war. Nigeria has long been an oil-producing country, and its reliance on oil exports emerged as a primary challenge to governance and economic development once the country became independent of the United Kingdom. Petroleum became a primary flash-point for tension in Nigeria, as leaders enriched themselves and their ethnic groups to the detriment of the rest of the country.

Nigeria has long experienced inter-group ethnic and religious tension, owing in large part to the creation of its borders by western politicians. As a result, ethnic and religious groups have often contended with one another over access to resources, public services, and public goods. This dynamic followed through from the colonial state into Nigeria's early years of independence with the attempted secession of Biafra following a coup and subsequent counter-coup that put the northern and southern populations at loggerheads and fed into concerns by both the north and the south about the potential capture of the state by one group or another (McCauley, 2017). The Biafran War, which ran from 1967 to 1970, was an effort by the Igbo population in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta region to gain autonomous rule and control over the rich petroleum wealth of Nigeria's south. The Nigerian state responded harshly, both in combat with the

secessionist forces as well as in blockading the region from receiving aid. It is estimated that over two million Nigerians died of starvation alone (Onuoha, 2011, 2017). Shadows of the Biafran War remain today, exacerbated in large part by the accession of a northern Muslim (Muhammadu Buhari) to the Nigerian presidency in 2015.

Following the end of the Cold War and under the corrupt military rule of Sani Abacha, a northern Muslim, southerners began once again to agitate for increased autonomy and control over resources. Following the repression against a non-violent group of Ogoni activists, southerners began to organize into armed militant groups, and calls for reform turned into calls for revolution. This has ebbed and flowed since the beginning of Nigeria's Fourth Republic in 1999, and has most recently become salient with the election of President Buhari, a Muslim northerner in 2015. Despite the overall improvements in anti-corruption under Buhari, southerners have rallied together around Igbo nationalism (Duruji, 2012; Onuoha, 2012), charging the government with deep systemic corruption. Perhaps most prevalent has been the emergence of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) (2001), which employs both violent and non-violent tactics in calling for the secession of Biafra.

Kenya

If one draws a line directly east and slightly south of Nigeria to the other end of the African continent, one finds Kenya. Kenya, like Nigeria, is a multi-ethnic democracy with a history of both material and systemic corruption. Leading up to its independence, some Kenyan politicians and many British colonial officials strove to develop a system of politics that defied ethnic and tribal identity; however, first president Jomo Kenyatta

relied on rallying votes from Kikuyu (D. Branch, 2011). Kenyatta's patronage helped generate ethnic fault lines that continue to drive much of Kenyan politics (Elischer, 2013). As a result, contentious politics in Kenya is often drawn along ethnic lines.

Kenya's second president, Daniel Arap Moi, often resorted to the use of repressive force by way of the police to shut down his critics. According to Adar and Munyae (Human Rights Watch, 2008), "...Moi systematically usurped the functions of the other institutions of governance to the extent that the principle of the separation of powers was rendered ineffectual." This violation of the system has led to an often highly violent police force at the use of the Chicago-style political machine of patronage that Moi helped build.

Kenya's systemic grievances are tightly clustered and are found in the Rift Valley and Nyanza regions of Kenya. It was in the shadow of this historical political landscape that the highly disputed 2007 elections took place between incumbent Mwai Kibaki and presidential challenger Raila Odinga. The elections were widely considered to have been, at a minimum, interfered with by Kibaki's administration, leading to wide-spread ethnic and anti-government revolutionary violence and contention (Raleigh, Linke, Hegre, & Karlsen, 2010). The majority of this violence took place in the Rift Valley, a focal point in tensions between the Kalenjin and Kikuyu people of Kenya. The defeated supporters of Odinga were often subject to police brutality. Many claimed that the elections had been rigged, and were fraudulent. The revolutionary violence was partly successful – the Kibaki government was forced to enter into a power-sharing agreement with Odinga, reviving the position of Prime Minister and fundamentally changing the

structure of the state. Kenya's electoral violence is worthy of note because it occurred largely without the intervention of highly organized social movement organizations committed to revolution.

Discontent over elections is by far the most prominent systemic grievance observed in the data. In 2017, concerns over the presidential elections once again came to a head. By this election, prominent Kikuyu Uhuru Kenyatta had taken office (elected in the 2013 elections). Kenyatta is the son of former president Jomo Kenyatta. Mirroring the 2007 election, the 2017 election was marred by widespread claims of vote rigging and abuse. Unlike 2007, when it was caught unprepared to address major systemic grievances, in 2017 the Kenyan government was able to rely on the newly created (in 2011) Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). The IEBC annulled the elections, leading to a new election that Kenyatta again won.

South Africa

South Africa lies at the southernmost tip of Africa, spanning the bottom section of the continent and stretching from Namibia to Mozambique, and bordering Botswana and Zimbabwe along the way. Contained within South Africa are two former regions under British rule. Swaziland (officially: the Kingdom of eSwatini) was disincorporated from South Africa's Transvaal region in the early 20th century, while Lesotho declared independence in 1966. Unlike Kenya and Nigeria, which are post-colonial states, South Africa is a settler states in which many government officials from the previous regime have remained in power. As such, South Africa's political institutions have been

substantially more resilient in the face of attempted state capture by the African National Congress (ANC) and president Jacob Zuma. The contours of ethnic and religious politics are also different. The primary ethnic cleavage in South Africa is between ‘blacks’ and ‘whites,’ defined largely by the racist political ideology of apartheid, instituted by the white government in 1948 and lasting through the early 1990s. The specter of apartheid lingers in South Africa today, where whites and blacks struggle to trust one another, and the country remains largely economically segregated along color-lines. Owing to its well-developed civil society and tradition with trade unions, South Africa is Africa’s most contentious nation. In all, there are 8,824 observations of contention in South Africa between 1997 and 2018. The goals of the majority of these are unspecified. Protests that specifically target material corruption, such as the personal enrichment of Jacob Zuma, were found primarily in the Democratic Alliance (DA) stronghold of the Western Cape and in Gauteng province, where most civil society organizations reside.

Data


The principal data used in the analysis are comprised of 5,259 observations of contentious politics, including non-violent protests and violent riots, derived from the Armed Conflict Location Event Data (Raleigh et al., 2010). The full size of the dataset of all recorded incidents of contention during this time is 15,863. Of this larger dataset, the 5,259 observations used for testing make up 33.15 percent, and are comprised of all observations with reasonable connection to issues of corruption. This includes anti-

corruption protests (that directly address corruption) as well as grievances that indirectly address corruption, like those about service delivery and fuel subsidies. Each observation is ranked on the tightness of its recorded grievance with issues of government corruption, so that observations directly addressing electoral fraud are weighed more highly than observations whose grievances concern service delivery.

Importantly, all grievances tested within the dataset are at least indirectly linked to corruption. In the African context, it is extremely difficult to decouple anger over corruption with more immediate anger over ‘hearth and table’ issues like poverty, school fees, and lack of access to economic opportunities. Because of the manner in which elite corruption directly shapes opportunities and public services, corruption is often a central concern of protesters.

The data include all recorded riots and protests in both Nigeria and Kenya over 20 years (from 1997 to 2016) and are geocoded. The data are presented below in Figure 13. Of the observations, there are 1,898 incidents of contention in Kenya and 2,787 incidents in Nigeria. The data indicate that the number of incidents of contention increase significantly over time; however, this may be a function of increased access to sources of information, or alternatively by an increased number of news sources.

FIGURE 13 - CONTENTIOUS INCIDENTS FROM 1997 TO 2016



I run two main models in this section. The first model examines the determinants of reformative contention. The theory hypothesizes that reform contention will be positively correlated with material grievances. The second model examines the determinants of revolutionary contention. The theory hypothesizes that revolution will be positively correlated with systemic grievances. The dependent variables are thus dichotomous variables that indicate whether an incident of contention is labeled as being either reformative or revolutionary. Thus, the reformative variable is coded 0 when an incident is not considered reformative, and 1 when it is. The same goes for revolution. These are two different variables.

Coding the variable was done by using information from the “notes” column in the ACLED data. The initial coding was conducted by an undergraduate student and then checked by me. This minimizes the potential of bias in coding the variables. Each observed protest, riot, and demonstration has a short description of what happened. Some of these notes are too short to be useful. For example, a June 2013 protest in Kenya includes the note: “Striking nurses hold demonstration.” This note yields some

information – the primary actor is a group of nurses; however, it does not provide either a grievance or a goal. Other notes are substantially more detailed, though still provide imperfect information:

Residents of Imenti South block the Meru-Nairobi highway to protest over late arrival of ballot materials at Kaguru Agricultural Centre during the Jubilee Party primaries on April 21, 2017

This note identifies the primary actor (residents of Imenti South) and the grievance – the late arrival of ballot materials. Based on the contents of the note, this was coded as reformative, as it is likely that protesters demanded the timely delivery of their ballot papers, but there is no evidence that they sought to overturn the elections or fundamentally change the structure of the government. Finally, there are notes that include essentially all of the information needed to code:

Hundreds of youth from the Niger Delta area have staged a protest in Warri demanding the immediate sack of the embattled Minister of Petroleum Affairs, and her counterpart at the Ministry of Interior Affairs over alleged misconduct. The protest was attended by many groups, including the Niger Delta People Salvation Front (NDPSF) and Niger Delta Freedom Movement.

This note identifies the primary actor (youths from Niger Delta), the grievance (alleged misconduct), and the goal (the firing of the Minister of Petroleum Affairs. This protest took place in 2014. In 2015, this minister was investigated for money laundering and was fired in 2016. In 2018, an arrest warrant has been issued for her (Alison-Madueke, 2018).

Coding Reformative Goals

Reformative goals are coded when it is either clear or very likely that the overall goal

of the protest was to induce reformatory change in the government. For example, reformatory goals include improving access to jobs and the economy, bringing about economic and infrastructural development to certain regions, improving education, and improving access to public goods and services. In some rare cases, the detailed nature of the data allowed for very specific coding, including demands by protesters to change specific pieces of legislation, the removal of specific individuals from office, or specific demands for change of the electoral commission. More frequently, demands were coded under slightly larger umbrella terms, including protests over service delivery, support for democracy, education, and economic development.

Below, Table 19 displays the most frequent reform goals found within the data. The reform goals reveal strong support for Mueller's (2018) emphasis on the importance of 'bread and butter' issues. In *Political Protest in Contemporary Africa*, Mueller focuses on the interaction between the concerns of protest leaders from the middle class and the needs of the protest participants, generally from the lower classes. This insight is particularly important when measuring popular responses to corruption. Corruption pervades nearly every aspect of economic and systemic development in Africa. Extractives industries, including petroleum and mineral mining, have long been linked to both corruption and low levels of development. This has led to growing inequalities between mine workers and managers (Malala, 2012; Bhorat *et al.*, 2017) and widespread anger at the 'paradox of plenty' in resource-rich regions (Ikelegbe, 2001; Udosen, Etok and George, 2010; Eneh, 2011). Africans watch as government officials cavort and profit from relationships with business leaders (Marinovich, 2016) while average Africans

remain poor and regions remain underdeveloped.

TABLE 19 - MOST FREQUENT REFORM GOALS

	Kenya	Nigeria	South Africa
Development	28	101	62
Economic Reform	29	114	233
Education Reform	66	142	393
Electricity	4	138	180
Pro-Democracy	59	119	205
Service Delivery	8	17	884
Wages	119	459	327

In Nigeria, petroleum companies sign contracts in which they make commitments to provide job training and economic/infrastructural developments to the regions from which they extract their resources. For sixty years, citizens in the Niger Delta and Biafra regions have watched as companies shirk their commitments and responsibilities, failing to train and employ locals (Ghazvinian, 2008) and standing motionless as the environment suffers (Okonta and Douglas, 2003; Akpabio and Akpan, 2010). Petroleum companies are able to do this only because they are allowed to do so by venal government officials who stand to grow wealthy by dint of illicit side-payments from these oil companies (Obi, 2009; Badmus, 2010). Ahonsi (2011) states, “[t]he relatively high levels of poverty in the Niger Delta in the midst of stupendous oil wealth have led to a large and growing proportion of the youth population seeing violence as a solution to their problems.” Widespread fraud in the extractives industry has led to systematic underdevelopment and corruption that leaves citizens in poverty while local governors get rich. This is due in part to the culture of ‘grabbing’ and lack of oversight from the central government: “...since the allocation of revenues from the state is discretionary, the local councils and indeed the citizens may not benefit commensurately from such

an increase [in revenues from petroleum rents]. Thus, while the states will receive substantially more oil revenues, without any institutional provisions and firm guarantees on the democratic utilization of such funds, the funds may be misappropriated ... the evidence shows that, like the [Niger Delta Development Commission] and its progenies, these state commissions are afflicted by the malaises of under-funding, revenue misappropriation and corruption.” (Ako, 2011)

Thus, when social movements rise up in response to corruption, they do so by linking corruption to issues of economic development, education, infrastructure, and other major issues. Underlying the #FeesMustFall student protests in South Africa is frustration with the failure of the South African state to control rising costs of education in an era of growing inequality and poverty in South Africa. In an op-ed for the Daily Maverick, Paul Hoffman (2016) wrote, “Another feature of the debate around the protests is that everyone appears to be *ad idem* that if the country were less corrupt in its procurement system and general governance there would be more than enough resources to make it possible for fees to fall sufficiently for the state to be able to afford the cost of further education out of its general revenue from the taxpayers.” In countries where material corruption siphons state funds away from important public services, economic opportunities, and education, all roads lead back to the underlying government cultures of graft.

Below, Table 20 displays several representative examples of how reform incidents were coded. The full dataset is publicly available online, and incidents were coded by me and by a student coder. After the initial coding, one additional student coder was used

to cross-check the coding.

TABLE 20 - EXAMPLES OF REFORM CODING

Note	Grievance	Goal
Protesters shut down pumping station in protest over compensation from oil companies for oil spill	Material Environment	Reform Compensation
Residents protest the poor state of a road.	Material Infrastructure	Reform Development
Khoisan activists take over block of flats to protest lack of housing. Leaders of the ethnic group claim the land they were occupying was rightfully theirs.	Material Housing	Reform Development
Residents of Modderspruit riot for a third day. The demonstrators accuse a nearby mine of failing to provide employment for locals as promised.	Material Unemployment	Reform Economic
Protesters gather to denounce the end of an oil subsidy.	Material Fuel Prices	Reform Economic
Operations at the governor's office in Nyahururu Town were paralysed following protests against the County Public Service Board. Residents want the board removed over claims of incompetence, nepotism and corruption.	Material Corruption	Reform Removal

Coding Revolutionary Goals

Revolutionary incidents were coded when there was clear evidence that the contentious actors sought to significantly change or replace part or the entirety of the system in order to put in a new or better system. The events were hand-coded by using the research note included for each observation. Revolution is often assumed to refer to the complete social or political upheaval of a state, resembling the great revolutions of America, France, and Russia. Skocpol (1979) describes social revolutions as “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below.”

While this definition does capture the most momentous forms of revolution, it would be difficult to apply in the African context. Perhaps the closest analog would be South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994; yet, this transition was neither

rapid (it built momentum for nearly fifty years before succeeding) nor did it completely reconfigure the structures of the state – the police force changed names, but remained relatively intact. So did the revenue service and all of the major political institutions. Yet, it would not serve to simply call the transition from apartheid to democracy a process of ‘reform’ – it was more structural than that. Similarly, the pro-democracy protests of Africa’s second wave of protest that ultimately ushered in the transition to multi-party democracy were something less than full-scale revolution while also more than reform.

As such, I operate under the definition that revolution can be identified when it consists of mobilization for and demands of substantial structural change to society or the state. Re-writing the constitution, as the Burkinabe did in 2014 (Mampilly, 2014) counts as revolutionary contention because it fundamentally changed the overarching political document guiding the state. Calls for socialism and land reform count as revolution because they fundamentally change the manner in which the state conceives of and enforces one of Locke’s (1690) basic principles of the government – the protection of private property. Calls in Kenya for the overturning of elections count as revolutionary goals because, if realized, they would constitute the abrogation of the fundamental democratic process of election.

In Kenya, many of the revolutionary incidents occurred following the highly contested elections of 2007. Immediately preceding these revolutionary incidents, the Kenyan government had conducted elections that “were so badly flawed that it [was] impossible to know who won” (Smith, 2014). What followed was a period of anti-government and

ethnically-based violence that left over 1,000 Kenyans dead, and forced the government to enter into a power-sharing agreement between the two parties to the election. This electoral and constitutional compromise emerged after Raila Odinga's supporters "rejected the results and vowed to inaugurate its leader ... as 'the people's president,' which the government warned would be tantamount to a coup." (Gettleman, 2007). The Kenyan election in August 2017 also triggered concerns over fraud. Raila Odinga, once again the opposition challenger, alleged that "[t]he 2017 general election was a fraud ... The electoral fraud and fabrication of results was massive and extensive." (de Freytas-Tamura, 2017). Following the announcement of the results of the election, Odinga's supporters took to the streets, demanding that the election be overturned.

In Nigeria, the majority of revolutionary incidents occurred from 2015 onward, including 14 in 2015 and 17 in 2016. These incidents are largely calls for secession of the Biafran state by two major separatist groups, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB). Both groups claim to be non-violent, though violence does occur at their rallies, demonstrations, and protests. Many residents of Nigeria's Delta region believe the federal government is thoroughly corrupt, and operates against the interests against one of Nigeria's most politically relevant ethnic groups, the Igbos (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004a; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Weinstein, 2006). Renewed agitation for the Biafran state emerged as early as 2004, though it began to build momentum following the election of northern Muslim Muhammadu Buhari to the presidency.

The independent variable is a dichotomous measure of whether the grievance claims

made by the contentious mobs and organizations are centered on material or systemic violations. As described above, material violations concern issues of money, food, electricity, and other public services and goods. Systemic violations are coded when they address deep-rooted structural dysfunctions, such as elections, police abuse and corruption, etc. The distribution of grievances is detailed below in Table 21.

TABLE 21 - MOST FREQUENT REVOLUTIONARY GOALS

	Kenya	Nigeria	South Africa
Constitutional Changes	29	2	5
Secession/Independence	0	61	0
Overturning elections	154	64	24
Implementing Religious Law	1	70	0
Socialist/Land Reform	3	8	23

Below, Table 22 displays representative examples of revolutionary coding, ranging from demands for the implementation of religious law over civil law to demands to overturn elections.

TABLE 22 - EXAMPLES OF REVOLUTIONARY CODING

Note	Grievance	Goal
Local government workers on the aegis of the Nigerian Union of Local Government Employees (NULGE) stormed the National Assembly to demand the inclusion of local government autonomy in the current constitution amendment process.	Systemic Constitution	Revolutionary Constitution
During second round of the National Constitutional Conference. Youth rioted in response to the creation of the post of executive Prime Minister. They demanded that senior cabinet minister Raila Odinga be appointed Prime Minister.	Systemic Constitution	Revolutionary Constitution
During second round of the National Constitutional Conference. Youth rioted in 136response to the creation of the post of executive Prime Minister. They demanded that senior cabinet minister Raila Odinga be appointed Prime Minister once the constitutional co	Systemic Constitution	Revolutionary Constitution
Rioting after the controversial announcement of Kibakis presidential election and alleged vote-rigging. Violence, arson and looting ensued. 10 bodies collected from the slums.	Systemic Electoral Fraud	Revolutionary Overturning Election
Youths in Anambra State, under the aegis of National Youth Council of Nigeria (NYCN), marched out en masse on two non-consecutive days in protest, calling on the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to cancel last Saturdays (16/11) gubernatorial elections in the state. On the first day of protest police in the area dispersed the group with tear gas.	Systemic Electoral Fraud	Revolutionary Overturning Election

Covariates

Both models – the model testing reform and the model testing revolution – include the same covariates. In order to test the primary theoretical hypothesis, I include measurements of the grievances claimed by the protesters and riots. First, the models include a measurement of material grievance. As described earlier in this chapter, material grievances largely concern issues of poverty, service delivery, and upward economic movement. Previous work on the onset of violent conflict has emphasized the importance of opportunity costs in determining whether an individual will mobilize into a contentious group (Corrigall-Brown, 2011; Viterna, 2006, 2013; Wood, 2003). Furthermore, thick qualitative work has emphasized the importance of personal circumstance in driving citizens to either rise up or stay home (2018). Second, the models include a

measurement of systemic grievances, ranging from concerns over electoral fraud and police corruption concerns over third-terms and constitutional amendments.

Unlike many other statistical approaches to contention, I do not rely on country-level variables. Other works have examined national-level contention (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004b; Fjelde, 2009; Neudorfer & Theuerkauf, 2014) compare levels of conflict between countries. The theory presented in this text can be adapted to country-level comparisons (as done in the previous chapter), but is adapted to the subnational level in this chapter. As such, using country-level variables would be statistically inappropriate. Moreover, country-level variables are generally updated yearly. As such, an indicator such as GDP would be repeated at the country-level for every incident of contention within that country in the year. As a result, it would explain nothing about within-year or subnational variation.

In the previous chapter, I focused largely on the importance of mobilization into social movement organizations. These groups are generally in charge of charting their contentious goals as well as mobilizing either broad or narrow bases. In order to address the important role that groups play, I include three group-level variables.

The first group-level variable addresses the ethnic and religious makeup of the group. There is a large body of work that has focused on the importance of ethnic issues, such as relative deprivation and marginalization, in producing revolution (Auerbach, 2003; Faull, 2017; Kasambala, 2008). In order to address this, I include a variable that measures whether the group making contentious claims identifies along ethnic or religious lines. Second, I include a variable that measures whether a group represents a

specific community. Communities play an important role in African contention, and Branch and Mampilly (2015) detail the importance of localized protests in driving Africa's third wave. Finally, I include a variable that measures the level of organization of the mobilized group. Groups range from being completely unorganized ("citizens took to the streets...") to being loosely collected ("Muslims in Nigeria protested ...") to being highly trained and organized, including civil society organizations and political parties. Importantly, political parties participate substantially in African protests, mobilizing large groups of individuals and bringing them to the streets in support (or opposition) of a cause.

In order to incorporate subnational level data, I include measurements of population and GDP, both of which are sourced from NASA and Columbia University's Center for International Earth Science Information Network (2009). The CIESIN population data include observations for every five years, ranging from 2000 to 2020. In order to address this, data for the intervening years were interpolated by assuming a linear growth rate between each five-year interval. These variables are measured at the second-administrative district level and then applied to the events that occur in those regions. In South Africa, for example, this means that protests that occur in Pretoria include different population and GDP information than incidents that occur in Johannesburg, despite them both occurring within the larger Gauteng Province.

Drawing on a growing literature of the geography of contention, Salmenkari (2014) describes multiple categories of protest spaces that draw protest. One particular type of space is the 'communicative space'. Communicative spaces are those spaces whereby

a protest will directly communicate a message to a specific authority. A Kenyan dissatisfied with the election may choose to gather with his peers in front of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, whereas a Nigerian protesting pollution by the extractives industry might picket either the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation or a particular Shell plant. In order to account for the geography of protest, I code the incidents to include a variable that measures whether a contentious incident took place in the capitol city of either Kenya, South Africa or Nigeria, since the majority of working agencies and bureaus are found in either Nairobi, Gauteng province (with Johannesburg and Pretoria), or Federal Capitol Territory. The distribution of incidents is found below in Table 23.

TABLE 23 - CONTENTION IN CAPITAL REGIONS

	Other Region	Capital Region
Kenya	523	162
Nigeria	1351	220
South Africa	2174	830

Addressing Autocorrelation

One major challenge to any research on political contention is the potential for an endogenous autocorrelative response of the dependent variable to earlier incidents of the same dependent variable. For example, perhaps revolutionary contention simply happens in regions in which citizens have experienced or observed revolution before. Citizens who have gotten used to revolutionary claims or political instability may simply be more likely to opt for revolution. In order to address this concern, I include a categorical variable derived from a polynomial that measures the amount of time in a given region since the last incident of contention. Categories were used because interpreting

polynomials – particularly when they are logged for normality – can be extremely difficult. The categorical variable is ordinally structured as follows in Table 24.

TABLE 24 - CATEGORICAL TIME VALUES

Value	Interpretation
0	0 days since last incident contention
1	1 day since last incident of contention
2	2 – 7 days since last incident of contention
3	8 – 45 days since last incident of contention
4	46 – 365 days since last incident of contention
5	More than 1 year since last incident of contention

I include three such variables. The first measures the amount of time since the last incident of contention within the specific second-administrative district. Because the distribution of incidents is not randomly assigned, there are large disparities between districts with regard to the number of days since the last incident. For a region that has never or only rarely seen incidents of contention, the passage of an additional day without incident may not be noteworthy. For a region in which incidents of contention happen frequently, the passage of that same day may be very striking. The second measures the amount of time since the last incident of contention in the specific first-administration district. The final temporal variable measures the amount of time since the last incident of contention at the country level.

The grievances considered to be directly connected include anti-corruption protests, elite theft, electoral fraud, police and security corruption, and others. These represent the types of corruption listed within the typology. Grievances considered to be closely but indirectly connected to corruption include service delivery, extractives industries like mining, general concerns over democracy, wages, and economic opportunities. These are grievances that are very often linked to corruption and are often the direct

consequences of corruption. For example, protests over extractives industries very frequently invoke charges of corruption, including those at the Marikana mines in South Africa (Bond and Mottiar, 2013; Sinwell and Mbatha, 2016) and anger at petroleum industries like Shell and BP in the Niger Delta (Ibaba, 2011). In Nigeria, trade unions angry over low wages and sparse economic opportunities regularly voice concern over material corruption (Mohamed and Allah, no date; Sahara Reporters, 2015). Finally, grievances considered to be loosely connected to corruption include education, healthcare, environmental degradation²⁶, and sanitation. These grievances are frequently accompanied by charges of corruption, but not always. For example, while some education protests are closely linked with anger over corruption, like the #Fees-MustFall student protests where students called out corrupt politicians (Ndelu *et al.*, 2016), not all protests about education are. Below, Table 25 displays the frequency of each different category of connection to corruption across each country in the dataset. This variable is included in the full model.

TABLE 25 - DIRECTNESS OF CONNECTION TO CORRUPTION

	Kenya	Nigeria	South Africa
Loosely Connected	234	478	1055
Indirectly Connected	263	935	2114
Directly Connected	347	385	295

²⁶ It is important to note that many environmental protests, such as those run by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, directly linked extractives corruption to environmental degradation.

Method

Model

The model employed is a multi-level mixed-effects binomial logistic model. The model employs random slopes and intercepts at the second-level administrative district as well as at the country-level to address potential unforeseen factors that are particular to each region. The inclusion of random slopes and intercepts at the regional level allows for meaningful subnational comparison. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, a binomial model is the most appropriate means of testing the argument.

The models are run in a step-wise manner to ensure that coefficients do not flip with the inclusion of new variables. Flipped coefficients may indicate high levels of collinearity. This does not present as a challenge in these models. The first model is a bivariate regression between the independent and dependent variables. The second model includes both forms of grievance (violations) and the temporal autocorrelational variables. The third model includes group-level information. The final model (model 4) includes the log of the local population. Additionally, the fourth model is repeated thrice – once per country to measure country-level variation.

Results

Reformative Contention

The results for the analysis of reformative contention are found in Table 26. Across each model, I find strong support for the hypothesis that material violations are positively and significantly correlated with the probability that a contentious incident will

be structured around a reformative goal. In models one through four, material violations are positively correlated with the likelihood of reform, and the result is statistically significant at the 99.9 percent confidence level. Moreover, the coefficient is very large for a logistic regression, indicating a robust relationship. In real terms, when grievances are not material in nature, there is just 27 percent chance that protesters will seek reformative outcomes. When grievances are material, on the other hand, the probability jumps to 97 percent. The correlation between material and reform is strongest in Kenya – likely the product of Kenya’s highly contentious elections and the role that ethnic politics play in its electoral politics. Nigeria and South Africa demonstrate nearly equivalent correlations.

The corruption connection variable indicates that the more directly linked to corruption a grievance is, the more likely that contention is to seek reform. This positive correlation is substantively very large and statistically significant beyond the 99.9 percent level.

TABLE 26 - MATERIAL CORRUPTION & REFORMATIVE CONTENTION

DV: Reformative Contention							
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Nigeria	Kenya	S. Af- rica	Model 4
Intercept	- 1.42*** (0.37)	-1.09** (0.35)	-0.75 (0.65)	0.77 (1.29)	-2.92* (1.34)	-1.54* (0.76)	-0.87 (0.72)
Hypotheses							
Material Violation	4.49*** (0.13)	4.75*** (0.14)	4.91*** (0.15)	4.95*** (0.36)	8.88*** (1.20)	5.03*** (0.19)	2.45*** (0.20)
Systemic Viola- tion		0.99*** (0.15)	1.23*** (0.16)	0.35 (0.27)	1.88*** (0.51)	2.21*** (0.27)	- 5.08*** (0.47)
Temporal Varia- bles							
Admin 2 Level		-0.11 (0.06)	-0.14* (0.06)	-0.18 (0.12)	-0.42* (0.19)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.14* (0.07)
Admin 2 Level		0.08 (0.06)	0.09 (0.07)	0.05 (0.12)	0.57** (0.20)	-0.03 (0.10)	0.08 (0.07)
Country Level		0.02 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	0.05 (0.14)	-0.18 (0.18)	-0.00 (0.11)	0.06 (0.08)
Group Varia- bles							
Ethnic/Religious			- 1.87*** (0.31)	- 1.45*** (0.40)	1.43 (0.88)	-2.31*** (0.57)	- 1.58*** (0.30)
Communal			- 0.71*** (0.16)	-0.50 (0.34)	0.44 (0.52)	-0.35 (0.21)	-0.19 (0.17)
Level of Organi- zation			0.30** (0.10)	-0.57* (0.23)	0.31 (0.18)	0.82*** (0.16)	0.31** (0.11)
Covariates							
Local Population (Log)			-0.07 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.13)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.06)
In Capital City			-0.03 (0.26)	0.17 (0.48)	0.03 (0.67)	0.03 (0.40)	-0.05 (0.28)
Corruption Con- nection							3.27*** (0.22)
AIC	2806.57	2702.11	2624.10	757.17	386.94	1402.95	2364.02
BIC	2859.11	2780.53	2735.01	830.98	448.95	1486.92	2481.45
Log Likelihood	- 1395.28	- 1339.06	- 1295.05	-364.58	-179.47	-687.48	-1164.01
Num. obs.	5259	5088	5034	1440	620	2974	5034
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05							

Interestingly – and unexpectedly – systemic violations also correlate positively with reformative outcomes, though the effect size is substantially smaller. Moreover, variables measuring group characteristics correlate with the likelihood of reformative contention. Across the board, ethnic and religious groups are inversely correlated with the chance of reformative contention. This likely indicates one of two things. Either ethnic and religious groups generally seek more radical, revolutionary outcomes (as one observes with groups like Boko Haram and the Luo protesters in Kenya), or countries in which groups tend to be ethnic or religious also tend to be countries in which citizens rise up in revolution.

Communal groups demonstrate inverse correlation with reformative contention. This effect is statistically significant in the full model (Model 4), but is not significant in any of the individual country models. One potential explanation for this is that communal groups are often made up of ethnically and religiously similar individuals. As such, communal groups may share similar grievances and goals to religious and ethnic groups. Interestingly, when disaggregated by country, communal groups are positively correlated with reform in Kenya. Finally, the group's organizational level plays an important role in the model. As groups become more organized – moving from loose collectives to professionalized social movement organizations – they are more likely to make reformative demands. The effect is small, but statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level.

Revolution

The results for the primary model are presented in a step-wise manner below in Table 27. I include a step-wise results table to demonstrate the relative stability of the coefficients as new factors are introduced. Across the board, on average and inter alia, systemic violations are positively and statistically significantly correlated with revolutionary contention. The results are statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level. The results are substantively very large, and indicate that when citizens and civil society organizations take to the streets to protest in response to systemic corrupt violations such as electoral fraud and police abuse, they are significantly more likely to agitate in favor of revolutionary goals. The variable indicating the directness of connection of the grievance to corruption displays an inverse and statistically significant relationship with revolutionary contention, indicating that most revolutionary movements agitate primarily around grievances that are indirectly linked to corruption.

TABLE 27 - SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION & REVOLUTIONARY CONTENTION

DV: Revolutionary Contention							
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Nigeria	Kenya	S. Af- rica	Model 4
Intercept	- 4.14*** (0.28)	- 3.71*** (0.40)	- 4.93*** (0.80)	-4.53** (1.43)	-7.88** (3.02)	-7.46*** (1.80)	- 4.74*** (0.00)
Hypotheses							
Systemic Viola- tion	4.69*** (0.21)	3.79*** (0.26)	3.59*** (0.26)	3.34*** (0.37)	9.66*** (2.28)	3.44*** (0.46)	5.84*** (0.00)
Material Violation		- 1.42*** (0.29)	- 1.23*** (0.30)	- 1.45*** (0.41)	0.82 (1.83)	-0.83 (0.49)	- 0.09*** (0.00)
Temporal Varia- bles							
Admin 2 Level		0.20* (0.09)	0.24** (0.09)	0.17 (0.15)	0.46* (0.22)	0.06 (0.21)	0.23*** (0.00)
Admin 1 Level		-0.10 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.09)	0.24 (0.15)	-0.61** (0.23)	0.17 (0.23)	-0.11*** (0.00)
Country Level		0.11 (0.11)	0.06 (0.11)	0.18 (0.16)	0.13 (0.22)	-0.17 (0.25)	0.07 (0.09)
Group Varia- bles							
Ethnic/Religious			1.84*** (0.34)	2.33*** (0.39)	-1.26 (1.02)	2.43** (0.79)	1.87*** (0.00)
Communal			-0.15 (0.26)	0.54 (0.37)	-2.85** (0.87)	-0.73 (0.78)	- 0.47*** (0.00)
Level of Organi- zation			0.42** (0.14)	0.94*** (0.28)	-0.34 (0.22)	1.40*** (0.36)	0.41*** (0.00)
Covariates							
In Capital City			0.08 (0.27)	0.14 (0.44)	0.86 (1.21)	0.50 (0.48)	0.09*** (0.00)
Local Population (Log)			0.06 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.12)	0.02 (0.25)	0.06 (0.17)	0.04*** (0.00)
Corruption Con- nection							- 1.15*** (0.00)
AIC	1305.19	1239.89	1200.06	490.71	323.76	345.63	1190.45
BIC	1357.73	1318.30	1310.97	564.52	385.78	429.60	1307.88
Log Likelihood	-644.59	-607.94	-583.03	-231.35	-147.88	-158.82	-577.22
Num. obs.	5259	5088	5034	1440	620	2974	5034
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05							

Material violations present an inverse correlation with revolution. This relationship is statistically significant at the 99.9 percent confidence level, and indicates that citizens are unlikely to seek major revolutionary overhauls to address grievances surrounding economy, jobs, infrastructure, and service delivery. The temporal variable at the second administrative district level presents a positive correlation with revolutionary outcomes. This means that second administrative districts are more likely to observe revolutionary contention as more time passes since the last incident of contention. This outcome is puzzling, and may have one of several explanations. First, it may be that regions that experience revolutionary contention do not experience reformative contention, and thus when revolution does occur, it happens in regions that have been relatively quiet. This seems unlikely, given the high levels of both reformative and revolutionary contention that occur in the capital regions.


Group dynamics play an important role in revolutionary contention. Groups that are ethnic or religious are highly likely to engage in revolutionary contention – an effect most pronounced in Nigeria and South Africa. This is no surprise, as many times ethnic groups with narrowly-focused goals take to the streets to protest perceived and real ethnically-oriented injustices. These results provide additional support for scholars studying ethnic conflict, and particularly those that link ethnic conflict with increased revolutionary contention, such as Neudorfer and Theuerkauf (2014). This effect does not present itself in the Kenyan model, though it is worth mentioning that much of the revolutionary contention occurs on behalf of the aggrieved Luo people of Western Kenya. Communal groups are not statistically correlated with revolution in the main

models, but display a large and strong correlation in the Kenyan model. Finally, group organization matters: more highly organized groups are slightly more likely to engage in revolutionary demands.

Predicted Probabilities of Reform and Revolution

Below, Figure 14 displays the predicted probabilities of each contentious outcome – reform or revolution – based on the two types of grievances tested as well as a third “other” group. These predictions were generated using a bootstrapping method that maintains all values at their observed levels (Hanmer and Kalkan, 2013). This allows for meaningful standard errors to be calculated and included in the visualization. The results are striking. On the left of the plot, predictions for reformative contention are presented. While the model predicted that the presence of a systemic grievance leads to a 42 percent likelihood of reformative contention, material grievances generates a 97 percent likelihood of observing reformative contention. These results strongly support Hypothesis 1a.

FIGURE 14 - PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF REFORM & REVOLUTION



On the right of the plot, predictions for revolutionary contention are presented. When grievances are material, there is only a one percent likelihood of observing calls for revolution. When grievances are systemic, on the other hand, there is a 59 percent likelihood of observing calls for revolution. These results provide very strong support for Hypothesis 1b.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I find strong support for both hypotheses 1a and 1b. When citizens make claims about material violations, they generally seek reformative outcomes designed to alleviate the specific problem or problems that they ascribe to their discontent. Citizens angry about poor service delivery do not demand revolution – they simply want improved service delivery. On the other hand, when citizens make claims about systemic violations that reshape the government itself – fraudulent elections, subversion of the

constitution, etc. – they make major revolutionary demands. Given Africa’s turbulent history with elections, one may be tempted to interpret calls to overturn the election – or, in some cases, simply to install a leader in power despite losing an election – as ‘more of the same’. But these demands, if taken seriously, would completely subvert the electoral structure of a state. Citizens of Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa have strong histories of political participation and voting records. As this chapter has argued and tested, when citizens have concerns over the welfare of the state structure itself, they rise up. As African institutions strengthen and formalize (Cheeseman, 2018), such as the 2017 annulment of Kenya’s problematic election by the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, it is likely that one might observe both a decrease in systemic corruption and an increase in contention when such attempts are made.

CHAPTER 6

Case Studies of Corruption, Reform, and Revolution

Introduction

In order to test the theory in more detail, I turn now to the three case studies that have served as context for much of this dissertation: Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa. These three countries represent, in many ways, as Africa's three major Anglophone giants. Located respectively in West, East, and Southern Africa, these countries have typically exerted substantial influence over their neighbors, and serve as core members in each of their respective regional economic groupings. I describe each case in detail in three sections in this chapter. In this chapter, I provide short histories for each of the three cases, and begin to map out their structures of corruption and contention.

These three cases were selected in order to best test the model. Cases were selected prior to visiting any of these countries, which ensured that I did not have to engage in ad-hoc case justification. No two countries are identical, but several selection criteria were put in place to control for any glaring differences between the cases to the best extent possible.

The selection criteria were founded on several primary factors. First, each country is an English-speaking country with a history of British colonialism. This helps to reduce potential issues that switching between English and French might have introduced. This is particularly important in Chapter 3, where a survey experiment was conducted using

nearly identical language between countries. Second, each country is highly populated, geographically large, and ethnically and religiously diverse (Arnold, 2017). Third, economically-speaking, each country is a regional powerhouse, and exercises relatively strong state penetration throughout its territories. Each country is classified as an electoral democracy, and has held multiple elections (Lindberg, 2006). Each of these three countries experiences the four major categories of corruption, and I detail examples of corruption and contentious responses in each country. I present two cases from each country.

In Nigeria, I focus on the agitation in the southern Niger Delta, detailing the contentious behavior of two different campaigns. The first campaign includes the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, a reformative group that sought redress over material grievances in the 1990s in southern Nigeria. The second campaign includes multiple organizations, but is largely spearheaded by the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra, and calls for the secession of the Biafran region from Nigeria. In Kenya, I focus on two very different campaigns. In responding to allegations of systemic electoral fraud, I document the largely unstructured (though, later captured by political parties) calls for overturning the elections in 2007, 2012, and 2017. I also focus on broad anti-corruption campaigns conducted by civil society and students. In South Africa, I include the broad anti-Zuma campaigns that shook the nation for 4 years following a cascade of revelations of Zuma's personal enrichment to the detriment of the South African people.

Nigeria

Nigeria sits nestled in the crook of Africa's Gulf of Guinea, surrounded by its neighbors Benin, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Nigeria is one of Africa's powerhouses, and hosts the largest population on the continent. Nigeria is a tropical country populated by many different ethnic and religious groups, and rich with petroleum, natural gas, and other minerals. The country is ethnically and religiously diverse (Central Intelligence Agency, 2018). The most powerful among these ethnic groups include the Igbo and Ijaw in the southern Niger Delta region, the Hausa and Fulani in the northern region, and the Yoruba in the west. As a state-building project, Nigeria has never quite commanded the full commitment of its population (Osaghae, 1998), and there has long been tension and 'pull' between ethnic, religious, and regional interests that have confounded centrally-led efforts to unify the country (Campbell, 2013). The northern regions were traditionally populated by conservative Muslims that mixed traditional African religions with Islamic practice (Lubeck, 2010).

In 1914, Nigeria emerged as an amalgam of British protectorates and trading interests, forcing together disparate regions with different languages, cultures, and political interests. The British colonial masters ruled Nigeria by taking advantage of existing networks of governance and patronage rather than establishing a unified bureaucracy and civil service across the entire country (Campbell, 2013, p. 5). Because the British never colonized Nigeria in the way that they colonized Kenya, existing power structures were able to persist, running on established networks of patronage, referred to as 'prebends' by Richard Joseph (1987, p. 8). Joseph argues that prebendal politics define Nigerian

modes of governance, stating that Nigerian democracy has largely been characterized by “the justifying principle that [government] offices should be competed for and then utilized for the personal benefit of office holders as well as of their reference or support group.” More recently, this was described by Bratton and van de Walle (1994) as defining the ‘neopatrimonial state.’

Nigeria emerged into independence on October 1, 1960 following Britain’s determination that it would no longer maintain its colonies on the continent. In a rather rushed departure from the continent, the British left the shell of a state to a people without the means or knowhow to manage it. The discovery of massive reserves of petroleum in the early 20th century had spurred foreign interest in Nigeria, and seemed to stand as a promise of wealth and good fortune for the newly independent state. This was not to be. Nigeria did not enjoy a peaceful independence; tensions between the Igbo in the south and the Hausa and Fulani in the north fueled distrust between the groups as they vied for control over the state and access to the plentiful export receipts that the export of oil provided the government (Adewoye, 1967; McCauley, 2017). Rather than uniting under the great ‘project’ of Nigeria, the three main regions – the North, the East (South-South), and the West – tolerated each other via the apparatus of the state (Arnold, 2017, p. 191), which ensured that “no one tribe could easily dominate the rest” (Schwarz, 1968).

Corruption has long posted a major challenge to Nigerian governance; indeed, Nigeria has often been described as having a ‘culture of corruption’ (Smith, 2007), with political relations built around networks of patronage and ‘prebends’. In 1967, following


increasing agitation by the Igbo against the perceived domination of the northern Hausa-Fulani people, civil war broke out. The people of Biafra, a large southern region of Nigeria in the oil-producing Niger Delta, were dominated largely by the Igbo, but were populated also by the Ijaw, Efik, Ekoi, and others. The Biafran War was conditioned by a set of grievances and social cleavages that emerged from pre-independence dynamics and remain in place today. These grievances centered on access to and control of political power and economic resources. The civil war lasted from 1967 to 1970, and the Nigerian state – dominated by northern Muslims by that time – prevailed only after starving the region of Biafra, leading to the deaths of nearly 2 million civilians (soldiers non-inclusive). The specter of the Biafran War continues to haunt Nigerian politics, conditioning perceptions of ethnically-driven inequality (Smith, 2014), and generating support for social movements in the region.

Contentious Coalitions and Claims in Nigeria

Nigeria is one of Africa's most conflict-prone countries, and houses many contentious coalitions that range from nonviolent social movements to violent militant organizations. Nigeria is second only to South Africa in terms of the number of social movements, and climbs to the top of the rankings when incidents of terror and militant action are included. Below, Figure 15 displays the amount of contention in Nigeria from January 1997 to December 2018, drawn from the ACLED data used in the previous chapter. The dotted line near the bottom displays the average level of contention across all of Africa during the same time. Across time, Nigeria generally experiences more contention than its counterparts, though following the beginning of Africa's 'Third Wave' in

2010, Nigeria observes substantially more contention than the rest of the continent.

FIGURE 15 - CONTENTION IN NIGERIA



There are many examples of anti-corruption contention in Nigeria that merit attention. Nigeria's history is rife with examples of elite theft, ranging from military strongman Sani Abacha, who was able to squirrel away billions of dollars during his time as the military dictator of the country (Smith, 2015), to allegations of massive theft of resources by presidents Obasanjo and Jonathan in recent years. Recently, starting in 2012 and continuing through 2018, broad coalitions of Nigerians have risen up together to challenge rampant corruption. These protests have been organized by two major Nigerian trade unions: the Nigerian Trade Union Congress and the Nigeria Labour Congress (Hinshaw, 2012), who have opposed myriad economic policies that they believe privilege the elites while putting the poor at a disadvantage. Anti-corruption protests began in earnest with the removal of fuel subsidies by Goodluck Jonathan's government, and have continued in response to charges that the state cannot support its pensioners due to unbridled corruption. In December of 2018, the NLC stated, "If government is desirous of addressing the issue of corruption in Nigeria, government must also address

the issue of retirees because the current workers will look at the condition of retirees and now begin to think, ‘will that be my situation when I retire’. That is why people will continue to help themselves. The best way is to make sure that we are able to take care of our citizens so that the workers of today will have the confidence that the future will take care of them” (Olayinka, 2018)

Nigerians have contended electoral rigging, including the annulment of the 1993 general election (Noble, 1993), which saw the rightful election of Moshood Abiola as a civilian, democratic president, and was cancelled by Ibrahim Babangida (Campbell, 2013). This cancellation was designed largely to benefit Babangida rather than to strengthen the position of Muslims in Nigeria, as Abiola was also a Muslim, and Babangida has previously overthrown Muslim dictator (and later democratically elected president) Muhammadu Buhari. As a result, citizens from across the country rose up in violent protest against the government, pressuring it to recant, which it refused to do (Associated Press, 1993). Unlike many electoral protests, which pit supporters of contending political parties together, these protests emerged from pro-democracy supporters across the country, including human rights groups and civilian protesters.

In this section, I focus on two related organizations that explicitly complain about corruption in Nigeria’s oil-producing Niger Delta region. First, I detail the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, who rose up against a violent military dictatorship to challenge material corruption. They called for reform, demanding increased access to petroleum rents and remuneration for the environmental destruction of their homelands. Agitation in the Niger Delta fundamentally changed upon the faulty trial and political

execution of the nine leading members of the organization (known informally as the “Ogoni Nine”). The second case study addresses the ongoing revolutionary movement for the secession of the southern region. The Nigerian government increased its use of security force abuse to stifle further complaints by the Niger Delta people. Importantly, revelations of the capture of key government institutions, such as the Armed Forces and the police, helped push those in the Niger Delta to begin renewed calls for revolution – namely, the secession of the Biafra from the Nigerian state. These are detailed below in the Nigerian case study.

MOVEMENT FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE Ogoni PEOPLE

Corruption in Nigeria’s oil-producing regions thrives largely due to the Nigerian state’s history as a largely corporatist government. This is detailed excellently in Okonta and Douglas’ *Where Vultures Feast* (2003), where the authors detail the linkage between the corporate interests of the oil companies Shell and British Petroleum and the embedded interests of the political elites, who squirreled billions of dollars of petroleum rents into private bank accounts and patronage networks that benefited the north, primarily. A 1996 Greenpeace report stated that “For years Nigeria’s oil-rich southeast has been considered a colony by the Nigerian political and military elite. Those oil revenues that the elite did not use to acquire luxury goods and top up foreign bank accounts were spent exclusively in the north or southwest.” The production of petroleum out of the Niger Delta has led to widespread elite theft within the Nigerian government, both

historically and currently.²⁷

In an attempt to assuage the growing concerns of the people living in Niger Delta in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Nigerian Government established, upon pressure by Shell, to develop a government agency known as the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), which was billed as a way of redistributing more oil rents into the Niger Delta. Despite its promises of material benefits and economic development, OMPADEC quickly became an operating node in a growing network of patronage: “as soon as it was established in 1993, OMPADEC quickly developed a reputation as a government agency where favors were sought and sold for cash” (Okonta and Douglas, 2003).

This corruption has led to major material consequences, which in turn formed the core of MOSOP’s contentious frames and claims. MOSOP’s primary platform consisted of seeking remuneration for the massive environmental damage caused by the extraction of petroleum – and the unwillingness of major petroleum companies to fix leaks and clean spills, as well as frustration with the perceived unfairness of the distribution of rents and public goods funded by the petroleum industry (Harshe, 2003). The Ogoni people watched as elites enriched themselves while the Ogoni suffered increasing poverty in a rapidly degrading environment. And the cozy relationship between corrupt elites and the petroleum companies allowed for a form of corruption known as

²⁷ For example, in 2016 the Minister of Petroleum was fired and prosecuted after \$43 million was found in cash in her apartment in Lagos (Yemisi Adegoke, 2017)

‘exchange of favors’²⁸ whereby petroleum companies never experienced major political pressure to clean their petroleum spills or remunerate the Ogoni people.

The consequences of this corruption were widespread; the environment of Ogoniland became polluted and, in many areas, unusable for agriculture or habitation (Akpabio and Akpan, 2010; Akpan, 2010), indigenous tribes reported high levels of cancer and other illnesses (Ojakorotu, 2009), and the region remained woefully underdeveloped despite massive profits that were ‘eaten’ by the national government. Despite promises of jobs training and positions by petroleum companies, the Ogoni people remained underemployed and highly impoverished (Ghazvinian, 2008).

MOSOP describes the ongoing corrupt structures as the result of an “unholy alliance between the political class and transnational oil corporations.” The structure of corruption linked three major political actors: political elites that stood to be enriched by rent-seeking and corrupt behavior, oil companies that used bribes to ‘capture’ political elites, and the military, who were captured by the political elites and engaged in repression and violence toward MOSOP.

Southern agitation began again in earnest with the emergence of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). Unlike the Biafran separatists of the 1960s, the Ogoni people of the central Niger Delta agitated for compensation for the massive pollution and environmental destruction of their lands by multinational oil companies

²⁸ Discussed in length by Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016)

including Shell and BP, and, by extension, the federal government. While MOSOP was active in the 1980s, it gained international recognition in the early 1990s, when, under the leadership of Ken Saro Wiwa, it led a sustained multi-year campaign against corruption and environmental degradation. MOSOP demanded compensation for the destruction of the Ogoniland environment and agitated for reform of the system by realigning the distribution of extracted petroleum revenues. In 1995, MOSOP's campaign came to an abrupt end when, following fraudulent charges by the Nigerian government, Saro Wiwa and eight of MOSOP's activists were hanged (Soyinka, 1996; Osha, 2006).

The grievances of MOSOP were perhaps most succinctly stated by Ken Saro Wiwa, who stated that, "The Ogoni took stock of their condition and found that in spite of the stupendous oil and gas wealth of their land, they were extremely poor, had no social amenities, that unemployment was running at over 70 percent, and that they were powerless, as an ethnic minority in a country of 100 million people, to do anything to alleviate their condition. Worse, their environment was completely devastated by three decades of reckless oil exploitation or ecological warfare by Shell" (Saro-Wiwa, 1995).

MOSOP was formed in 1990 and acted nonviolently to call attention to their plight and to the structures of material corruption and greed that led to the destruction of Ogoniland and failed promises of development made by the government and Shell. By the standards of today's Niger Delta activists, their demands were reasonable. They demanded remuneration of \$6 billion in unpaid royalties, the cessation of gas flaring and other environmentally destructive behaviors, the burying of high-pressure oil pipelines, remuneration to the tune of \$4 billion in environmental damages, and increased access

to a dialogue between the Ogoni people, the government, and Shell (Okonta and Douglas, 2003). In short, their demands were reformative – they did not seek to overthrow the government, but instead to change policies and behaviors that would bring them their fair share of oil revenues.

Rather than reform, the Nigerian government opted to double down on its corruption, and began a campaign of military and police harassment, detention, and assassination that successfully silenced MOSOP, but opened the door to more radical and violent groups. The government's employment of systemic corruption by using the police and military to repress the Ogoni helped to prepare the ground for the renewal of revolutionary movements, one of which is the subject of the following case study.

MOVEMENT FOR THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF BIAFRA

Following the political murder of the Ogoni Nine, an era of extreme political violence in the Niger Delta emerged. According to Tunji Olaopa (2017), the rise of the renewed calls for Biafran secession have emerged at strategic points in time where southerners have believed that the state has been captured by the north. State capture is a systemic form of corruption in which the institutional rules of government institutions are rewritten to be more favorable toward certain political parties or private interest groups (Meirotti and Masterson, 2018). State capture can take many forms, including election-rigging, the capture of political institutions, or the co-optation of police and security forces. In Nigeria's south, there are pervasive fears that the state has been captured by northerners and elites, particularly with the rise of Muhammadu Buhari to the

presidency in 2015.

Thus, I link the transition from demands for reform to demands for revolution with the transition in types of corruption that the Nigerian government engaged in with regard to the south. As Niger Delta grievances shifted from anger over material corruption to fears over the capture of the state, they switched from seeking reform to seeking revolution. Following the murder of the Ogoni Nine, southerners engaged in substantial violence toward not only the Nigerian state but also oil companies, kidnapping oil workers and holding them hostage “as a means of redistribution.” This violence settled down under president Olusegun Obasanjo, but remerged in force after the 2015 election of northerner Muhammadu Buhari. Undergirding these reinvigorated calls for revolution have been concerns and complaints over the capture of the Nigerian state by corrupt government elites. Importantly, anger over corruption in the police and security forces have helped drive growing support for revolution (Deckard and Pieri, 2017).

As I have just asserted, the case of MASSOB and other Biafran separatists is linked to the experiences and failure of MOSOP to successfully challenge material corruption through reform. With the violent repression of MOSOP and the adoption of more systemic forms of corruption by the government, groups in the Niger Delta began to revive revolutionary calls for secession and independence from the state altogether.

One important dynamic worth noting is that, in Nigeria, corruption is often ‘othered.’ By ‘othered,’ I refer to a process by which the ills and missteps of the government are recognized only when they are disadvantageous to one’s own politically relevant ethnic or religious group. Endemic political corruption, which is very real in Nigeria, is

recognized primarily by groups who are not on the receiving end of active patronage distributions. Daniel Jordan Smith links what he calls ‘corruption complaints’ specifically to the rise of Biafran and Igbo nationalism as perceptions of corruption rose in the south toward the end of former president Goodluck Jonathan’s reign and the beginning of the rise of northern Muslim President Muhammadu Buhari to power:

Ethnic nationalist organisations capitalise on frustrations about corruption to build support for their causes, interpreting corruption and inequality in a language that highlights ethnic discrimination. (Smith, 2014, p. 789)

Corruption is frequently interpreted and challenged through the lenses and languages of ethnicity and religion. Resurging ethnic nationalisms and burgeoning participation in popular religious movements, in both the mostly Muslim North and the predominantly Christian South, have created cultural spaces in which ever-larger numbers of citizens interpret and challenge corruption and inequality in contemporary Nigeria.

This exclusion leads to a dual-frustration that puts two competing principles in tension with one another. On the one hand, when an ethnic group feels excluded from distributions in a patronage network, they become angry that they are not receiving their just desserts. On the other than, that same ethnic group feels umbrage at the existence of a corrupt network of patronage in the first place. Turning once again to Daniel Jordan Smith:

On the one hand, cries of marginalization – particularly the focus on Igbo absence in the highest offices in the federal government, the military, and the oil industry – must be read as an expression of dissatisfaction over being excluded from the mechanisms of corruption through which most people believe that the national cake is shared ... On the other hand, ethnic nationalist rhetoric builds on and stokes anger and discontent over the very system of corruption itself. (Smith, 2007, p. 193)

As a result of growing agitation in the South, several major revolutionary groups have emerged. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is a violent front-runner in the campaign (Boas, 2011), the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB), and the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) is the primary non-violent organization. Because MASSOB is largely non-violent, they are the focus of this case study. MASSOB's grievances emerged out of the confluence of historical and contemporary factors. Historically, southerners – and particularly Igbo – have expressed concerns over high levels of economic inequality and ethnic marginalization by the federal government (Onuoha, 2017), which links back to the Biafran War of 1967-1970. For example, since the Biafran war, Igbo have been excluded from the presidency, the upper echelons of the military, and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, which regulates the petroleum flow from the Biafran region. According to Daniel Jordan Smith, “[e]xclusion from these institutions is more than symbolic; in Nigeria’s military and oil-dominated postcolonial history, controlling the center has translated into controlling the preponderance of the nation’s wealth and power” (2007, p. 193).

More recently, Biafran groups such as MASSOB have renewed agitation in response to a growing perception that the state targets Biafrans unfairly, both by rigging elections (Opejobi, 2019) and by co-opting the police to engage in targeted and politically-motivated abuses (Africa Research Bulletin, 2016). With the growing popularity of MASSOB, the federal government has increasingly sought to repress and stifle the group, often by detaining its leaders using the police to open fire on protesters (Africa

Research Bulletin, 2016). MASSOB has regularly protested increasing police harassment and corruption. For example, the on-again, off-again political detention of its leader, Ralph Uwazurike, has led MASSOB to protest in the streets. The detentions of Uwazurike began largely in 2010, and thousands of MASSOB supporters took to the streets to demand his immediate release.²⁹ MASSOB engages with non-violent tactics including protest marches and demonstrations.

MASSOB has responded to systemic corruption within the Nigerian government by seeking a revolutionary goal: seceding away from Nigeria and receiving international sovereignty. As Daniel Jordan Smith notes, the renewed interest in secession and ethnic nationalism has been driven by growing sentiments that the system is corrupt and broken (Smith, 2014). These cases, taken together, show how dynamic contentious demands can be. The rampant material corruption and elite theft of the late 1980s and early 1990s drove calls for reform from the Ogoni, who demanded remuneration for the externalities of material corruption. But as the Nigerian state began more and more to resemble a captured state – with the arbitrary detention of local leaders and the use of police to repress peaceful movements, there was a decided shift toward demanding revolution.

Kenya

Tracing a line directly to the east across Africa from Nigeria, one arrives at Kenya. Like

²⁹ Sourced from observations within the ACLED data described in the previous chapter.

Nigeria, Kenya is a former British colony, achieving independence in 1963 following a bloody campaign against the British by an armed group known as the Mau Mau in the 1950s. The Mau Mau were largely made up of Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru people. The movement was put down harshly by the British (Arnold, 2017: 257), but helped to form a core constituency for Jomo Kenyatta, who used language that alluded to the Mau Mau uprising once he was president. Moreover, while the uprising did not directly result in the independence of Kenya, it did influence the pace at which independence was achieved. The spirit of the Mau Mau – a rebellious, untamed Kikuyu nationalism – has remained influential in contentious politics in Kenya; the criminal Mungiki group that participated heavily on the post-electoral violence of 2007/8 model themselves as the “true sons” of the Mau Mau (Branch, 2011: 236).

Ethnic politics play a large role in Kenyan politics, and politically relevant identity groups are largely drawn along ethnic lines. Kenya is dominated by five major ethnic groups – the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luo, Luhya, and Kamba – that compete for access to the presidency. Ethnic competition for power and resources remains central to the Kenyan political experience, and shapes much of the country’s combative political dynamics today. As such, patronage networks are largely drawn along ethnic lines, which lends corruption a distinctly ethnic character.

The emphasis on ethnicity in Kenya is the product of two major factors. The first is simply the comparative populations of the different ethnic groups in Kenya. The “big five” ethnic groups comprise nearly 65 percent of the total population, and dwarf all other ethnic groups. The importance of building political coalitions from these five

groups is thus paramount for politicians. The ethnic logic of Kenya politics is largely the result of decisions made by first president, Jomo Kenyatta, who forsook advice from his political contemporaries and pursued a highly ethnic campaign for the position of Prime Minister, which he held from 1963 to 1964, and then as the first President (from 1964 to 1978) (Hornsby, 2013). During Kenyatta's rule, patronage flowed to his native Kikuyu people, generating inter-ethnic enmity between the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, and Luo.

Much like Nigerian politics, Kenyan politics can largely be characterized by the alternation of power between two major politically relevant identity groups. While ethnic politics was first implemented officially by Kenyatta, it was perfected by his predecessor Daniel Arap Moi, who diverted state goods and resources to his native Kalenjin people. The result has been the development of powerful and entrenched networks of patronage that flow from Kenya's 'big man' leaders to their respective political coalitions (Owiti, 2014). Moi's fondness for personal enrichment and his reliance on ethnic patronage networks resulted in an attempted coup by Luo members of the Kenyan Air Force in 1982. Speaking from the Voice of Kenya radio station, the would-be overthrowers stated, "Rampant corruption, tribalism, [and] nepotism have made life almost intolerable in our society. The economy of this country is in shambles due to corruption and mismanagement" (Branch, 2011: 155). The coup failed, ultimately, and Moi was able to remain in office for an additional two decades. During that time, Moi was able to extract nearly \$2 billion from the Kenyan state (Scher, 2005; Hornsby, 2013).


In the Kenyan government, widespread corruption permeates bureaucracies and the

civil service. This looting is in part due to the Kenyan tradition of recruiting the civil service through networks of patronage rather than competitively (Hornsby, 2013, p. 357). In ministry after ministry, funds go missing, leaving Kenyans without jobs training, access to education, or electricity (BBC, 2018). This corruption exacerbates poverty and inequality (Owiti, 2014), generating anger at the government.

Contentious Coalitions and Claims in Kenya

Like Nigeria, Kenya also experiences substantially more contention than the African average. Below, Figure 2 displays overall levels of contention in Kenya from 1997 to the end of 2018. Notably, there are major spikes of contention during and after elections. The first major bump in contention occurred during and after the marred 2007 elections that destabilized the country and forced the Kibaki government into a power-sharing agreement with Raila Odinga. The second major bump in contention occurs following the 2012 election, which brought Uhuru Kenyatta – the son of former president Jomo Kenyatta – to power. This contention occurred along with the general rise of Africa’s third wave of contention, and never settled back to its 2011-level equilibrium. The third bump in contention occurred during and after the failed 2017 elections, which were annulled by the Supreme Court and then largely boycotted by the Luo people.

FIGURE 16 - CONTENTION IN KENYA



As with Nigeria, I present two cases from recent Kenyan history in which contentious groups directly challenge government corruption. The first case examines very recent calls for reform following revelations of material corruption, while the second case examines the calls for the revolutionary overturning of an election following evidence of systemic corruption. Whereas the cases presented in Nigeria were continuous in the sense that they followed the shift from reformative to revolutionary contention within the southern region of the Niger Delta, these cases address broader concerns over the state of the Kenyan government. I begin with an example of how material corruption has driven calls for reform and then move to an example of how systemic corruption has led some in Kenya to seek revolutionary actions by overturning of elections and the dissolution of the electoral commission.

#STOPTHESETHIEVES

In May of 2018, revelations that over \$100 million had been stolen from the coffers of the National Youth Service launched broad coalitions to the streets demanding an end to corruption (Mohammed Yusuf, 2018). Protesters, who marched with signs that

declared “#StopTheseTHIEVES,” clogged the streets of Nairobi, tired of the seemingly constant corruption scandals that characterized Uhuru Kenyatta’s government. In 2018, nearly 50 individuals were charged with the plunder of the National Youth Service, which is responsible for preparing youths for jobs and education (BBC, 2018). In a cascade of prosecutions, it was revealed that the National Youth Service had served as a way to enrich elites by issuing contracts to delinquent vendors who did not produce the services and products they owed. Below, Figure 17 shows Kenyan anti-corruption protesters. The tee-shirt of the foremost activist reads, “Corruption is bleeding Kenya to death” (Mohammed Yusuf, 2018).

FIGURE 17 - STOPTHESETHIEVES PROTESTERS



Corruption in Kenya’s civil service has thrived in a governing environment in which patronage networks remain a primary source of fiscal distribution. The Kenyan system consists of a series of nesting patronage networks, in which local ‘big men’ integrate their patronage networks into regional ‘big men,’ who then integrate into elite level

networks. As such, civil service positions are seen as lucrative ways to fund patronage networks rather than to generate and disseminate public goods (Branch, 2011). One major enabler of this system is the relative impunity with which elites and civil servants operate, combined with the rather toothless office of the Auditor-General. In 2018, Auditor-General Edward Ouko lashed out, saying that elite corruption would ‘engulf’ all of Kenya. Ouko’s audits have found that billions of Kenyan shillings go missing in corrupt schemes, but that his reports and recommendations are ignored by parliament (Fick, 2018).

According to the BBC (2018), “According to a March report by the auditor general, some \$400m of public funds could not be accounted for ... fraudulent payments of \$30m [were] uncovered at the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB). Meanwhile, multi-million dollar contracts were awarded to friends and families of employees at electricity utility Kenya Power.” Corruption in Kenya’s civil service and government have been a persistent presence since independence, and the consequences have been felt by Kenyans of all stripes. The consequences of elite corruption in Kenya – particularly that which extracts resources directly from agencies – are manifold. High levels of unemployment remain a fixture of the social landscape, and sentiments of hopelessness begin to creep in. Jobs are acquired through connection and bribes rather than acumen and training, leaving a bulge of young Kenyans without access to employment (Max Bearak, 2018). In a style similar to the anti-Zuma campaign in South Africa from 2015 to 2018, Kenyans have risen up.

“We are tired of the theft that is going on in this country. We have waited for so

long for action to be taken but nothing is happening ...The kind of money that they have stolen this time is money that is embarrassingly huge,” - Ndungi Githuku (Associated Press, 2018)

The #StopTheseTHIEVES protest of 2018 was an inaugural march, and was the product of efforts by Transparency International, Action for Transparency, and the Kenya Human Rights Commission (Mariita, 2018). The march brought together a broad group of Kenyans, including civil society and private citizens to protest material corruption in the civil service. The protesters demanded improved policies to crack down on corruption, as well as the implementation of ‘lifestyle audits’ designed to provide a check on the personal enrichment of government elites and officials by examining their assets (Max Bearak, 2018).

ELECTORAL CONTENTION AND REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE IN KENYA


Contention and violence during and after Kenyan elections has become almost routine, to the detriment of the Kenyan people. Similarly, expectations of widespread vote rigging and fraud are not the exception, but unfortunately the rule. Due to the high stakes of Kenyan elections – access to state coffers and control over the means of distribution – elections are both actually and perceived to be highly corrupt and rigged (Wangui Kanina, 2008). In 2007, several technical hitches in the electoral process led to a false expectation of victory by the long-suffering Luo people, who revolted upon hearing that they had lost, not won, the election (Branch, 2011, p. 271). The Luo candidate, Raila Odinga, declared the election a sham, and the outbreak of ethnic violence that followed has been widely studied in electoral and African politics (Snow, 2007; Ruteere, 2011; Klaus and Mitchell, 2015).

But what corruption did occur during the 2007 election? And how has it repeated itself in the following 2013 and 2017 elections? There is substantial evidence that vote rigging and fraud occurred on both sides in the 2007 election. Branch (2011: 271) states, “As the reports of domestic and foreign observers made clear, the elections were at best marked by significant irregularities, the extent of which made it impossible to declare a true winner; at worst they had been fixed ... rigging took place on both sides, the paper trail was retrospectively tampered with, and the margin of victory for either candidate was almost certainly tiny.”

Evidence of tampering in Kenyan elections has remained relatively constant since the end of Moi’s reign. In 2011, the Kenyan Independent Electoral Boundaries Commission was re-established to replace the former electoral commission (Africa Research Bulletin, 2011). In 2013, it was revealed that there were approximately 20,000 double registrations on the voter rolls (allAfrica, 2013); a number that ballooned to 400,685 in 2017 (Olick, 2017). According to the argument of this dissertation, the systematic nature of corruption should reduce trust in the system, and specifically with the electoral commission.

This is exactly what the data show. Trust in the IEBC had declined drastically following the 2007 elections, but was generally restored with the introduction of the IEBC. Yet, irregularities with the voting systems in the 2013 election began to erode trust in the IEBC, presaging concerns of voter fraud and rigging in the 2017 election (Gettleman, 2013). Below, Figure 18 displays levels of absolute distrust in the electoral commission. Drawing from six rounds of the Afrobarometer data, trust in the IEBC is initially very

strong – less than ten percent of citizens did not trust the commission at all. By 2016, that number was nearly 35 percent.



Note: data sourced from Rounds 2 – 7 of the Afrobarometer data

Trust in the system took yet another blow in 2017, when a senior IEBC figure was found dead. Christopher Chege Musando, who was in charge of the IEBC’s information technology systems, went missing and then was found dead in July 2017 (de Freytas-Tamura, 2017c). That Musando was in charge of the IEBC’s information technology systems was critically important, as there were already widespread concerns of vote-rigging and ‘hacking.’ In this increasingly fraught setting, the elections proceeded in 2017. Incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta was proclaimed the winner. Raila Odinga , alleged that the election was rigged (de Freytas-Tamura, 2017b, 2017d, 2017a), and following an investigation, the Supreme Court annulled the election, finding that the polls were “neither transparent nor verifiable” (Burke, 2017). Odinga stated, “[t]he electoral fraud and fabrication of results was massive and extensive” (de Freytas-Tamura, 2017a).

Following the election, supporters of Raila Odinga took to the streets to protest his

electoral loss. Unlike the broad movements against elite corruption in the preceding case study, post-electoral contention was driven largely by a narrow group of Odinga's Luo supporters. Odinga's supporters sought the overturning of the electoral results, demanding that Odinga be placed into office despite having lost the first election and boycotted the second election. The demands made were revolutionary in nature, and consist of installing Raila Odinga into power despite not having credibly won an election. These revolutionary demands, I argue, are a function of systemic corruption and the product of the corrosion of trust in the system. The constant concerns over rigging have left Kenyans uncertain about the legitimacy of their system, and to the political losers, systemic corruption leads to the rejection of the democratic system itself.

Together, these two case studies provide clear evidence of how Kenyan anti-corruption movements have responded to different types of corruption. When Kenyans learned about the unchecked looting that robbed the National Youth Service of millions of dollars, they organized into broad contentious groups and marched together demanding reform. On the other hand, following the third successive election in which systemic electoral corruption has marred confidence in the results, a group of supporters of the political challenger, Raila Odinga, took to the streets in sustained violent and non-violent protests and riots demanding that he be instated as the president without another election.

South Africa

South Africa is vast and resource-rich, with mineral mining of gold, diamonds, and

platinum (Meredith, 2014). South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world, with extremely high levels of unemployment and poverty, particularly among young black men (Chikane, 2018). South Africa is a country of just over 55 million people, made up of many different ethnic groups, and grouped under a colonial racial rubric that was developed by the colonial settlers. Under this rubric, South Africans are categorized as black (about 81 percent), coloured (about 9 percent), white (about 8 percent), and other (comprised of Indians and Asians) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2019).

The colonial history of South Africa is a long, dense affair, and is too complicated to explain in full; however, the country was formally and effectively colonized by the British from the period of 1870 to 1910, when it primarily drew upon South Africa's major resources to generate wealth (Thompson, 2014). In 1910, South Africa became an officially recognized white-led union within the British Empire, and then emerged as a nation-state in 1934 with the Status of the Union Act. In 1961, the South African Union became a republic with the passage of a constitution that enshrined white domination over the majority black population. Importantly, and distinct from both Kenya and Nigeria, South Africa is a settler state rather than a postcolonial state, meaning that the British (and Dutch) colonizers did not leave the state upon its independence; instead, like in the United States of America and Canada, the colonizing European population took full control over the mechanisms of authority and governance. Following years of growing segregation, the white minority established the policy of apartheid, which is Afrikaans for "apartness" or "separation."

The history of South Africa under apartheid remains firmly embedded in South African contentious politics, even today. First, much of the political rhetoric in South African social movements centers on the vestiges of apartheid and unfair white privilege (Chikane, 2018), ranging from protests against colonizing statues of Cecil Rhodes to protests against increased university fees. Social movements and political parties regularly use the terminology of ‘liberation’ and ‘freedom,’ and the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), frequently reminds its constituents about its legacy as the independence party of Nelson Mandela (Booyesen, 2015). Second, the structures of South African contention and society remain heavily influenced by the apartheid era. For example, under apartheid the trade unions were the only black-majority organizations that were not banned and repressed (Marinovich, 2016; Sinwell and Mbatha, 2016), and thus were able to play a major role in shaping politics, both during and after apartheid.


South Africa is Africa’s most contentious country, and developed symptoms of Africa’s third wave several years before the rest of the continent. Below, Figure 3 displays levels of protest and riot from January of 1997 to December 2018. South Africa’s high levels of contention are in part due to the well-organized labor unions as well as the role that several political parties – particularly through their youth wings – play in mobilizing and framing contention. Protests reached their zenith in 2015 with the growing cascade of service-delivery protests and the rise of the #MustFall movements (described below). For the most part, protests in South Africa revolve around material forms of corruption, and contentious coalitions are generally broad in scope.

Contentious Coalitions in South Africa

Below, I present two cases of anti-corruption contention in recent South African history. In the first, broad coalitions of South Africans came together to respond to former president Jacob Zuma's personal enrichment via elite theft – a type of material corruption – with calls for reform. In the second, a rising insurgent political party has sought Marxist revolution in response to the perception that the ANC has actively 'captured' the political system in order to create a political machine. This is a form of systemic corruption.

South Africa is Africa's most contentious country, with active civil society groups, trade unions, and upstart political parties taking part in anti-government protest. South Africa is perhaps the best embodiment of Africa's third wave, with a clear rise in contention from 2011 through 2017. The bulge between 2011 and 2016 was driven largely by a combination of anti-corruption protests targeting Jacob Zuma and the ANC, mining-sector protests against the capture of trade unions by management and the high levels of inequality and wage stagnation, and a rising wave of service-delivery protests that shook rural townships and impoverished regions. Below, Figure 19 displays the total number of protests and riots that took place in South Africa from January 1997 to December 2018.

FIGURE 19 – CONTENTION IN SOUTH AFRICA



Recent examples of anti-corruption protest have included the broad demonstrations against the obscene personal enrichment by former president Jacob Zuma and the anti-Zuma protests that shook the nation for nearly 4 years. Corruption generates grievance-generating consequences in South Africa; at the ward and township levels, localized corruption conducted by regional and local governors has led to a crisis in the delivery of public goods and services. Communal groups have risen up in demand of improved service delivery to their regions. These service delivery protests were analyzed in the previous chapter, but are not presented here. I begin with the case of the broad anti-Zuma protests and then turn to the insurgent Marxist revolutionaries thereafter.

#ZUMAMUSTFALL

Jacob Zuma was elected president of South Africa in 2009 under a haze of scandals about his tax records and charges of corruption (Pauw, 2017). Zuma had been a major player in ANC politics for decades, and had served as Vice President to his predecessor, Thabo Mbeki. Zuma's presidency was plagued with scandals from the beginning, with outstanding concerns about Zuma's unpaid taxes (Pauw, 2017). Once in office, Zuma

began to engage in two overlapping, yet distinct, forms of corruption. Zuma began to engage in egregious personal enrichment, in which he extracted funds from the state to enrich himself (Madonsela, 2014).

Throughout his presidency, Zuma faced multiple corruption scandals. These included growing concerns over his slow ‘capture’ of the ANC, his relationship with foreign businessmen, and others. But perhaps the most damning of these scandals was the revelation that he had spent 246 million South African Rand (Madonsela, 2014) of state funds on his personal abode, Nkandla. Nkandla is a sprawling compound in South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal state, the home of Zuma’s fellow Zulu coethnics, and one of his regions of political support.

Nkandla was built over the course of several years. Initially, Zuma assured the public that no state funding was used on the build the complex (Basson and Du Toit, 2017). This was soon revealed to be a lie. In 2014, Madonsola released Secure in Comfort, a nearly 450-page report detailing the exorbitant expenditures of state monies on Nkandla. Despite these revelations, Zuma remained firmly committed to the lie that he had not broken the law. Below, the Telegraph detailed the increasingly ridiculous claims by Zuma’s team that his opulent house improvements – including a swimming pool, an amphitheatre, and a cattle stable – actually serve as ‘security features’:

He showed videos including a demonstration of how a firepool works and an interview with a “cultural expert” about the “spiritual value” of a cattle kraal or pen. The police minister said a fire expert had agreed that the pool was “the best water source available on site to replenish the fire engine” in the event of a major fire. An “amphitheatre” installed in the grounds with decorative aloes was, he said, necessary to prevent soil erosion by heavy vehicles including fire engines and armoured police vehicles using the adjoining road. It also served

as an assembly point for polygamist Mr. Zuma's large family in the event of an emergency. (Alexander and Laing, 2015)

The brazenness of Zuma's personal enrichment was stunning, even to those within the ANC. Zuma, known for his affable personality, attempted to draw upon his charm – backed up by his deep structures of support within the ANC – to avoid acknowledging his deception. His willingness to lie openly led to increasing anger in the general public, who were experiencing increasing interruptions in their public service delivery, their ability to attend college, and who felt that the 'grand bargain' they had struck with the ANC in 1994 might be unraveling. One observer spoke about the general anger toward Zuma, summing it up succinctly by stating, "[w]e all know that politicians eat [steal money], but Zuma eats like a baby – he doesn't wipe the crumbs from his mouth!"³⁰ A second anonymous source stated that Zuma's corruption was particularly egregious because it was not sophisticated; it was bald-faced, brash, and embarrassing.³¹

Zuma's personal enrichment was made possible largely by his status within the African National Congress. Since its rise to political power in 1994, the ANC transformed from a democratic party under Mandela to a political machine under Mbeki and Zuma. In developing this machine, Zuma helped indemnify himself against internal attacks and challenges, which in turn made it difficult for external challenges to land. Known as a 'securocrat,' Zuma was rumored to have used threats and blackmail to ensure political loyalty within the ANC (Booyesen, 2015). Moreover, Zuma began to 'capture' key

³⁰ Anonymous impromptu conversation, face-to-face. Johannesburg, South Africa, August 2018.

³¹ Anonymous interview with civil society activist, face-to-face. Johannesburg, South Africa. August 2018.

political positions – ranging from ministerial positions to law enforcement and even tax enforcement. In doing so, Zuma sought to build a firewall against accountability for his outstanding tax debts and his increasingly egregious personal enrichment. Moreover, his corruption did not benefit the ANC; it was focused on his own enrichment. This fact rankled many ANC party members, and, combined with the growing scrutiny on him, led to the development of a schism within the ANC that ultimately led to his downfall (Basson and Du Toit, 2017).

President Zuma's personal enrichment was supported by an expanding cast of characters who were brought in by Zuma to insulate him against growing calls for investigation and impeachment. Zuma's history in the ANC and his entrenched network of patronage helped insulate him initially against concerns of corruption and graft. Moreover, in order to strengthen his firewall against accountability, Zuma strategically began to replace highly qualified individuals within important institutions in the country. This included replacing the head of the South African Revenue Service, who had thereunto been pursuing him for tax evasion (Pauw, 2017) and Finance Minister, who had not been adequately 'loyal' to Zuma (Basson and Du Toit, 2017).

The #ZumaMustFall protests emerged out of a larger established framework known as the #MustFall politics (Chikane, 2018), and was triggered by a series of missteps on Zuma's behalf. Following the 2014 revelations of the Public Protector that Zuma had spent hundreds of millions of rand on his personal house, South Africans of many colors and classes took to the streets to demand his removal.

One potential alternative explanation is that Zuma's corruption scandals occurred as

South Africa's economy shrank. I treat this alternative explanation as complementary rather than competitive – it seems very likely that tolerance for corruption ebbs and flows with the economy. For example, anger over Zuma's corruption was intensified by his mishandling of an economic crisis, in which he replaced a highly qualified and popular finance minister, Nhlanhla Nene, with an unqualified ANC back-bencher, (and close ally of Zuma) David van Rooyen. The result was a near immediate devaluation of the rand in international markets, sending South African markets tumbling. The revelations of Zuma's entanglement with an Indian business family, the Guptas, helped to put the final nail in the coffin. Importantly, van Rooyen was allied with Zuma and said to be a pawn of Zuma's powerful business associates, the Guptas (Hogg, 2016).

It is in this sense that I argue that Zuma's underlying reputation for corruption conditioned the response to his removal of Nene as finance minister; because van Rooyen was seen as a stooge selected by the corrupt relationship between Zuma and the Guptas, analysts immediately downgraded economic expectations of the Rand, leading the economy to contract, leading to additional outrage. In one interview, opposition party member Solly Malatsi stated, "the entire machinery [of the South African state] was surrendered to a private family [the Guptas]."³² Below, Figure 20 shows protesters in an anti-Zuma demonstration. On the left, the woman holding the sign lists grievances against Zuma. The first two are forms of corruption. The third is inequality and the

³² Interview with Solly Malatsi, Democratic Alliance member of parliament. Face-to-face interview. August 24, 2018.

fourth is hunger, which can be interpreted as economic protests. These signs are common in these protests, and demonstrate why it is important to think of corruption and other grievances as complementary rather than competitive.

FIGURE 20 - ZUMAMUSTFALL PROTESTS




Source: (BBC News, 2017)

Protesters expressed outrage at the economic costs of Zuma's inept and corrupt leadership. One prominent members of civil society, Mark Heywood, stated that the protesters "feel that [Zuma] has behaved recklessly with our economy and therefore with our lives" (Laing, 2015). During the period of Zuma's presidency, displayed below in Figure 21, unemployment rose steadily from 23.5 percent to 27.5 percent, throwing the country into an increasing crisis of youth unemployment that undoubtedly led more youths to mobilize into protest groups. Like Zuma's mishandling of the economy, anger over unemployment is amplified by underlying frustration with Zuma's personal enrichment and the willingness of members of the ANC to loot from the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NFSAS), leaving unemployed and poor South Africans without

access to education (Rosa Lyster, 2016).

FIGURE 21 - UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA FROM 2009 TO 2018



The #ZumaMustFall movement focused on two major factors: growing evidence of Jacob Zuma's venality and a worsening economic situation in which unemployment was steadily rising. These two issues worked in tandem; without the worsening economic crises, it is unlikely that Zuma's corruption alone would have cost him his job. After all, it took not only a sustained campaign of civil society, trade unions, and citizens to protest against him, but also fissures within the ANC to lead to him being removed from office. The reverse can also be said: without evidence of brazen corruption, the myriad economic crises likely would not have signaled his downfall. But, together, they stoked material grievances in those who felt anger over continued unemployment, rising university fees, or the blatant demonstrations of corruption growing more common in the ANC.

The #ZumaMustFall protests responded to revelations of widespread material corruption. Zuma sought to enrich himself, his family, and his business associates while South

Africa experienced an increase in unemployment and a financial crisis. In response, South Africans took to the streets with calls for reform, which they achieved in February of 2018 with the ‘retirement’ of Zuma and his replacement within the ANC by Cyril Ramaphosa.³³

THE ECONOMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS AND THE RISE OF SOUTH AFRICAN REVOLUTION

The rise of Zuma in 2009 not only generated outrage against his material enrichment, but soon generated frustration against growing evidence of his attempted capture of the ANC and the South African state itself. Zuma’s capture of the state – institution by institution – has led to a rising backlash against the ANC’s entrenched machine politics and the underlying socioeconomic structure of South African society. But this form of systemic corruption – state capture – was not exclusively a product of Zuma. Zuma’s efforts continued existing work by the ANC to create a form a political machine that systematically controlled elections as well as the police and security forces.

The transformation of the ANC into a political machine began before Zuma took office. Noted expert on South African politics, Susan Booysen (2015), called this the *fused party-state*. She writes, “[t]he ANC has become an organisation boosted (if not sustained) by drawing on the state and its resources. It has almost undisputed control, a reality that is also evident from the state mechanisms through which the ANC regenerates its power. Given the ANC’s power and resources in relation to the stat it is almost

³³ Interview with David Lewis of Corruption Watch South Africa. Face-to-face, August 22, 2018.

inconceivable that it could be defeated by any opposition party.”

The rise of the ANC political machine – and particularly Jacob Zuma’s capture of the state – can be exemplified with several vignettes. First, the ANC engaged in collusion with the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) leadership and the owners of mineral mines themselves (e.g., Lonmin) to generate an anti-labor conspiracy designed to disempower laborers while aggregating wealth upward. Central to this relationship was now-present Cyril Ramaphosa, who had served as secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers and had helped the union become ‘cozy’ with the ANC. Another ANC official, Susan Shabangu, the Minister of Mineral Resources, had previously served as the deputy minister of police. In 2008, Shabangu gave a speech in which she stated, “you must kill the bastards if they threaten you or the community. You must not worry about the regulations. I want no warning shots. You have one shot and it must be a kill shot. I want to assure the police station commissioners and the policemen and women from these areas that they have permission to kill these criminals” (Marinovich, 2016).

In August 2012, mineworkers for the company Lonmin began to agitate in pursuit of higher wages for rock-drilling operators (RDOs). This agitation threatened Lonmin’s bottom line as well as the upward flow of profits through the managing ranks of NUM and the ANC. During the Marikana protests, “[a] series of phone calls and a flurry of emails with Ramaphosa at the centre showed just how profoundly the former unionist and socialist had come around to the thinking of big capital, and how much influence he wielded with government ministers and the president” (Marinovich, 2016: 137). Ramaphosa took the side of Lonmin in the dispute, stating that the protesting miners

were criminals. In responding to the protests, the police, who were operating under the influence of Shabangu, Lonmin, and Ramaphosa, opened fire, killing 34 protesters.

The second vignette concerns the attempts by Jacob Zuma to capture the South African Revenue Service (SARS). This capture is theoretically distinct to Zuma's personal enrichment. Whereas Zuma's material corruption focused on stuffing his bank account, his engagement in systemic corruption was all about distorting the system by replacing qualified ministers and department-heads with stooges who would to diminish his accountability to the people. Glasius describes this as an act of authoritarianism (2018).

Zuma owed significant amounts of back-taxes to SARS, and worked hard to evade and then capture the institution when it became clear he could not wipe his debt clean (Pauw, 2017). SARS was one of South Africa's most respected institutions; it had successfully pursued high-level criminal and corruption activity (Pauw, 2017), and had successfully built trust with citizens, increasing tax-payer rolls three-fold since independence (Basson and Du Toit, 2017). Zuma's problems with SARS extended beyond his own arrears; many members of his family had been accused and prosecuted by the Revenue Service, and SARS was seen as the primary obstacle to Zuma's capture of the South African state.

The capture of SARS began in 2014, when Zuma's appointed head, Thomas Moyane, began to unravel SARS' executive leadership. As it became clear that SARS executives, including Johann Van Loggerenberg, would not stop pursuing and investigating Jacob Zuma and his family, Zuma and his supporters enacted a plan. Using a 'journalist' who also happened to be on the payroll of two tobacco companies and the State Security

Agency, Zuma's administration launched a 'shadow war' against the SARS team, ensnaring Loggerenberg in a 'honey trap,' and using the contents of his romantic relationship with the journalist to sideline him. As the shadow war continued, Moyane found reason to disband some of the most effective anti-corruption units. In doing so, Moyane was able to clear out much of Zuma's political opposition from SARS, clearing the way for his capture of the institution (Pauw, 2017).

In response to the capture of the ANC and the South African state by elite interests, an insurgent party known as the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) has risen in popularity. The EFF is a renegade leftist party that emerged from the ANC's Youth League after Zuma was elected to office, and the EFF describes its creation as a response to the growing attempts by the ANC to systemically capture the political system (Basson and Du Toit, 2017). The EFF is a nontraditional organization that merges a political party and a larger social movement calling for socialist revolution in South Africa. Garbed in red, the Economic Freedom Fighters have engaged in contentious politics both within the parliament and on the streets. They seek socialist revolution in South Africa, advocating for the nationalization of mines, banks, and the expropriation of land. The EFF describes itself as a "radical and militant economic emancipation movement that brings together revolutionary, fearless, radical, and militant activists, workers' movements, nongovernmental organisations, community-based organisations and lobby groups under the umbrella of pursuing the struggle for economic emancipation" (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2018).

The EFF argues that the ANC has become an anti-democratic political machine that

engages in neo-imperialist policies against the South African population. The EFF makes four primary critiques of the ANC and the South African state: high levels of economic inequality and poverty, the unfair distribution of land to white farmers during the apartheid era, the inadequate social services provided by the state, and the rampant corruption that remains pervasive in the ANC (Booyesen, 2015). At the core of the EFF's critiques of the ANC is the argument that the ANC has become a corporatist political machine that colludes with businesses against the interests of South Africans and laborers. For example, the EFF has focused on reminding South Africans about the collusion between ANC elites, mining companies, and mining unions that led to the massacre of 34 miners at Marikana in 2012. The EFF was launched on the one-year anniversary of the Marikana massacre (Sinwell and Mbatha, 2016), and exerted substantial effort into reminding South Africans about the collusion between the National Union of Miners (NUM), mining executives, and the ANC.

The policies that the EFF pursued are truly revolutionary proposals, including the expropriation and redistribution of land and the nationalization of banks, mines, and other strategic institutions and economic sectors. Perhaps what differentiates the EFF from a leftist-reform party is the set of exemplars that the EFF proclaims: “[Malema] sees socialist success stories and models for the EFF in Venezuela, Cuba, China and Zimbabwe” (Booyesen, 2015, p. 230)

The EFF uses the language of Marxist revolutionaries. The leader of the EFF, Julius Malema, is known as the “Commander in Chief.” Malema speaks with idealistic fervor in response to the systemic impunity with which ANC leaders operate:

One of the crucial elements of our constitutional vision is to make a decisive break from the unchecked abuse of State power and resources that was virtually institutionalised during the apartheid era. To achieve this goal, we adopted accountability, the rule of law and the supremacy of the Constitution as values of our constitutional democracy. For this reason, public office-bearers ignore their constitutional obligations at their peril. This is so because constitutionalism, accountability and the rule of law constitute the sharp and mighty sword that stands ready to chop the ugly head of impunity off its stiffened neck. Economic Freedom Fighters quoted in (Madonsela, 2016)

It is this impunity – and the state capture that allowed it – that has mobilized the EFF.

The EFF is a revolutionary organization seeking to implement Marxism in South Africa.

It emerged out of the ANC's Youth League as a response to the systemic corruption the ANC, which became most evident under former president Jacob Zuma. The EFF ties its demands for revolution directly to its claims that the ANC has captured the system, and form of systemic corruption that has reduced the quality of elections and led to the co-optation of the security forces when dealing with trade unions and miners.

Conclusion

These case studies have provided strong support for the major hypotheses that run through this dissertation. In each of the three cases presented, protests responded differently to different types of corruption. When corruption produced material benefits, as seen in the Nigerian case of MOSOP, the Kenyan case of #StopTheseTHIEVES, and the South African case of Zuma's personal enrichment, groups sought reformatory goals. When corruption produced primarily systemic benefits, as in the Nigerian case of MASSOB, the Kenyan case of electoral fraud, and the South African case of state capture, groups instead sought revolutionary ends.

Below, Table 28³⁴ provides a short summary of the cases presented in this chapter. Each case provides a unique example of how different types of corruption shape contentious demands for either reform or revolution. In addition to providing support for the hypotheses, these cases also provide important nuance to the study of contentious groups and corruption more generally. Anti-corruption demands take many shapes, and are sometimes linked with ethnic mobilization while other times motivated by broad economic concerns.

TABLE 28 – RECAPPING THE CASES

Movement/Organization	Grievances	Contentious Demands
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP)	Material Corruption Extraction of oil rents to benefit government elites rather than Ogoni	Reformative Remuneration for oil rents extracted from the Niger Delta
Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)	Systemic Corruption Security corruption and abuse of political opponents.	Revolutionary Biafran secession
#StopTheseTHIEVES	Material Corruption: massive bureaucratic and elite theft from public programs.	Reformative Anti-corruption policies, 'lifestyle audits'
Pro-Odinga protesters	Systemic Corruption Allegations of electoral fraud and rigging	Revolutionary Demands to overturn elections and put Raila Odinga in power
#Zuma Must Fall	Material Corruption Personal enrichment by Jacob Zuma.	Reformative Remove Jacob Zuma
Economic Freedom Fighters	Systemic corruption State capture by the ANC	Revolutionary Marxist revolution

³⁴ A larger table with more cases for study can be found in the Appendix can be found on page 231.

CHAPTER

7

Putting the Pieces Together

Restating the Results

Throughout this dissertation, I have sought to understand how different types of corruption shape contentious demands made by civil society groups and organizations. In doing so, I have sought to re-examine exactly what is meant when scholars talk about the rise of revolution in *Africa's uprising* (Branch and Mampilly, 2015). Specifically, I have endeavored to better distinguish between contentious demands that work within the system (reform) and contentious demands that work outside the system (revolution). This distinction is important because it helps provide clarity to a field where the term 'revolution' has been used rather loosely.

This dissertation has also focused on drilling deep into better understanding what we mean when we talk about corruption. As discussed in Chapter 2, corruption is a term that has been used widely in the political science and economics literatures, but has been difficult to clearly and consistently link with contentious and conflict outcomes. This research has demonstrated that the seemingly contradictory outcomes may be due in part to treating 'corruption' as a singular and monolithic term rather than unfolding it and perusing its contents. By looking at the consequences of different types of corruption, this dissertation has shown that contentious politics vary in accordance to

different types of corruption.

I have put forth two primary hypotheses. The first is that different types of corrupt violations engender different corruption responses. On the one hand, when corrupt violations generate material goods, citizens rise up to reform the system. They call upon the system to prosecute venal officials and seek redress through official means. This is facilitated through trust that is maintained in the system. Citizens may band together in broad coalitions, like those that opposed Jacob Zuma in South Africa, or in narrow ethnic coalitions like the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People in Nigeria. On the other hand, when corrupt violations distort the system and generate systemic benefits for some, citizens instead rise up in search of revolution. The distortion of the system corrodes trust in the system itself, and citizens do not believe that it can adequately sanction corrupt actors in government. Sometimes, the distortion of the system is so great that it calls into question its legitimacy altogether. In Kenya, following multiple flawed elections, the Luo people have risen up in demand of revolution, believing the system is rigged against them. And in South Africa, the Economic Freedom Fighters have responded to concerns of state capture by demanding the state be revolutionized according to Marxist ideals.

Below, Table 29 restates the hypotheses and the results of the hypothesis tests. Hypotheses 1a and 1b, the primary theoretical thrusts of this dissertation, receive robust support throughout each mode of testing. The survey experiment conducted in Nigeria provided strong causal support that citizens who observe material corruption are more likely to support statements that call for reform, while citizens who observe systemic

corruption are more likely to support statements that call for revolution. Chapter 4 tested this across the African continent and found that when citizens perceive systemic corruption, they are more likely to believe that revolutionary violence is justified. In Chapter 5, I used analysis of nearly 6,000 incidents of contention to show that when contentious groups express grievance claims about material corruption, they seek re-formative outcomes, whereas when they express systemic corruption claims, they seek revolutionary outcomes. Finally, in Chapter 6, I drew from rich case study support to demonstrate the thick connections between material and systemic corruption and calls for reform and revolution, respectively.

TABLE 29 - TABLE OF HYPOTHESES & RESULTS

	Hypothesis 1	Hypothesis 2
	<i>Violations shape contentious goals</i>	<i>Violations shape trust</i>
	<i>1a: Material Corr. → Reform</i> <i>1b: Systemic Corr. → Revolution</i>	<i>2a: Material Corr. → Reduce trust in politi- cians</i> <i>2b: Systemic Corr. → Reduce trust in system</i>
Chapter 3	Supported in Nigeria Not supported in South Africa	Supported in Nigeria Supported in South Africa
Chapter 4	Supported	Supported
Chapter 5	Supported	Not Tested
Chapter 6	Supported	Not Tested

The two hypotheses that test the trust mechanisms – hypothesis 2a and hypothesis 2b – were tested in Chapters 3 and 4, and were supported. This provides evidence that a major mechanism through which different types of corruption shape contentious demands is the diverging effects that material and systemic corruption have on trust in politicians and institutions. Due to limitations with the data, hypothesis 2a was difficult to test in Chapter 4; however, it received causal support in the survey experiment conducted in South Africa. Hypothesis 2b was tested thoroughly in Chapters 3 and 4, and was supported robustly in each test.

The results of the research help expand scholarly understanding of the linkage between corruption and contentious demands. Specifically, the results show that material corruption reduces trust in individual politicians (but not institutions) and leads groups to make contentious demands for reform. Systemic corruption, on the other hand, reduces trust in the institutions themselves, leading groups to make calls for revolutionary contentious demands. While the majority of analysis examined the direct relationship between different types of corruption and diverging contentious demands, the important role that trust plays as a mechanism was examined in Chapters 3 and 4. I turn now to an interpretation of the results.

Interpreting the Results

What do these results mean in the larger picture? Calls for reform and revolution are complex and multi-causal, and it is not my intention to insinuate that they respond only to variation in types of corruption. Instead, these results highlight the importance in understanding and disaggregating types of corruption – and, more broadly, variation in quality of governance – in order to improve our understanding of the complex puzzle of conflict and contention. This is critical to the larger research program that this dissertation addresses. What stands between most African states and meaningful development? What shapes contention and conflict, potentially destabilizing fragile countries on the continent? Certainly, many factors apply, but corruption occupies a central position in those factors. Corrupt incentives fortify unfair and ethnically-driven distributions of goods and services. Corrupt leaders seek unfettered access to power, bringing some groups in and leaving other groups out. Corrupt relationships, built through acts

of material and systemic corruption, shape what Johnston called *syndromes of corruption* that threaten to stultify growth and lock countries into unhappy equilibria in which elites dominate and non-elites see conflict as a meaningful way out.

Moreover, these results shed light on the importance of understanding the contentious goals of different groups. It is not enough to call all mass-uprisings ‘revolutions,’ or to assume that contention is primarily ethnic in nature across Africa. Rather than falling back on traditional western assumptions of primordial identity, scholars from around the world should focus more closely on how political structures shape outcomes that might be interpreted as ethnic or religious conflict. This dissertation has shown that corruption is a major driver in determining not only whether countries will experience calls for reform or revolution, but also about how government venality shapes trust and sentiments of legitimacy. In countries where political legitimacy remains a major point of discussion – such as in Nigeria (Igbuzor, 2012) – the role of corruption cannot be ignored. These outcomes have wide-ranging implications for state stability across the continent, and they help drive the human story in the African context.

Africans are in the process of renegotiating the social contract with their respective governments. Understanding what they are demanding – and why they are demanding it – is crucial to understanding how to improve the lives of Africans from Algeria to Zimbabwe. The social contract – that crucial set of expectations about the relationship between the government and the governed – has perhaps never been more salient in the African context than now. With the success of the second wave of protest’s calls for multiparty democracy and the meaningful strengthening and improvement of

institutions in recent years, there is a real chance that the continent could fulfill the democratic promise that it sought during the first wave of protest in the colonial era.

By understanding the social contract in Africa to be a dynamic and ongoing process rather than a stultified codex of rules ignored by elites, researchers can improve their understanding of African context in several ways. First, viewing social contention through the lens of the social contract places agency in the hands of Africans, treating them as actors rather than subjects. Similarly, viewing corruption as a violation of the social contract can drastically reshape the cynicism that some scholars have demonstrated when discussing the prevalence of corruption throughout African governments. Ekeh (1975) and Joseph's (1987) work provide a strong starting point for this.

Expanding the Argument

I have focused primarily on the role that different types of corruption play in generating diverging contentious outcomes. Yet, as I have stated earlier in this text, by no means do I assert that corruption is the only important driver of varying conflict outcomes. Rather, below, I briefly touch on several potential interactive effects that could serve as complementary arguments that might be able to improve the explainability of the theory made herein.

First, it is possible that different types of corruption produce different distributional strategies that might affect how and why citizens and groups mobilize as they do. Corruption creates winners and losers, and thus it is unlikely that a 'winner' would be as inclined to take to the streets – or demand revolutionary actions – as much as a 'loser'

would. Understanding how corruption shapes the distribution of corrupt spoils is an important and underexplored territory in scholarship, and could have implications on conflict in two ways. First, perhaps the creation of winners and losers is more readily perceived when material corruption occurs than when systemic corruption occurs. If this is the case, then citizens might be more able to accurately identify *who is benefiting* from *which forms of corruption* and thus more easily be able to make demands for specific reforms. On the other hand, because systemic corruption metastasizes across the government, it might be more difficult to know who exactly benefits, and thus citizens are simply more likely to think the entire system needs to be brought down.

Second, the distributions of corruption may impact overall levels of social trust. Members of a ‘losing group’ may be more likely to distrust members of a ‘winning group,’ and thus be less likely to participate in broad coalitions. If this is the case, then ‘losing groups’ might be more likely to simply band together in a narrow contentious coalition and make specialized demands. While this might explain the revolutionary zeal of MASSOB, this would not explain the reformative mobilization of MOSOP; however, the issue of social trust is worthy of consideration.

Moreover, the role that ‘hearth and home’ grievances like poverty, wages, unemployment, hunger, and feeling of ethnic marginalization and disenfranchisement cannot and should not be overlooked. It is not my intention to do so, and I attempted to link these grievances to the types of corruption that I discussed in this dissertation. By linking types of corruption to consequences, I seek to show that one cannot disentangle anger over rising school fees when the very pots of money designed to keep fees low

have been plundered by members of the ruling party. This is the case in South Africa, and in 2015 led to the beginning of a movement of protests known as ‘#FeesMustFall’ that shook campuses across the country and forged a new cohort of South African activists (Ndelu *et al.*, 2016; Chikane, 2018).

Practical Applications

The best social science is that which seeks to improve social outcomes, and to this end, this dissertation has several potential applications. The first application is for international donors. International donors, like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the International Monetary Foundation (IMF), and the World Bank (WB), have long sought to tie humanitarian assistance with improved governance. Humanitarian assistance programs include post-conflict stabilization programs, political institution building, and economic development programs. Each of these is designed to generate long-lasting stability and trajectories of development that will bring African countries out of poverty and cycles of conflict and into stable statehood.

Yet, international donor programs rarely focus on the linkage between corruption and contention, and pay even less attention to targeting systemic corruption. Doing so would be politically difficult, as it requires host governments to approve humanitarian packages that constrain the ruling party; however, as this dissertation has shown, these forms of corruption are linked with the most destabilizing form of contention – revolution. Organizations like INES, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute should seek to improve the quality of elections not only by

passively observing them, but actively improving their quality. And donors should seek to incentivize leaders to refrain from rigging the system in their favor.

Moreover, tackling issues of police corruption is paramount, and efforts to do so should be redoubled across the continent. Professionalization programs should be encouraged, and police salaries should be prioritized in order to ensure that police are not incentivized to continue preying on citizens. At the same time, practices of accountability, including the randomization of partners, the rotation of shifts, and the rotation of command units could serve to reduce the development of cronyist networks that permit misconduct to thrive.

For African governments seeking to improve stability, the results of this dissertation are clear: respecting and strengthening the independence of institutions is a key factor in reducing the chances of the onset of revolutionary contention. As strongman leaders have become less common in Africa and as the middle class has become more independent of the government, citizens should be decreasingly tolerant of system-distorting corruption. Leaders should follow the lead of Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan who, after losing a bid for a second term, respectfully transferred power to Muhammadu Buhari. Recent examples of problems with the transfer of power in the Gambia, Ivory Coast, and Burkina Faso provide further evidence that it is in the best interest of leaders to respect both the spirit and the letter of the law.

Within governments, reform-oriented ‘softliners’ should seek to build networks of change by working together to force reform-oriented policies that reassert the independent character of political institutions, impose oversight protocols over processes

of procurement and ballot-box preparation, and drain the pool of executive power that dominates most African governments. Importantly, reformers should seek to implement e-government practices that allow citizens access to up-to-date and rigorously-collected statistics, budget information, and the status of all procurements and legislative actions. One potential solution might include the application of distributed digital ledgers, known varyingly as HyperLedger and BlockChain, to track and monitor all government expenses at each level of government. This could also be implemented to track public records, including police records, as well as voting records that might alleviate concerns over vote-rigging.

Future Research

This research helps to reveal the first step in a larger research agenda. Understanding the relationship between corruption and conflict requires more analysis than a single volume could hold, and this dissertation is no exception to that rule. This research suggests several next steps. Having highlighted the important role that different types of corruption play in shaping contentious demands for either reform or revolution, scholars of conflict should integrate corruption information into their analysis of terrorism, coups, and rebellion. A large body of work on conflict has focused on the drivers of conflict in Africa, yet only a small body of work has directly addressed corruption, and none have integrated information about the important differences in types of corruption. Doing so will help to improve studies of conflict in Africa and corruption-prone countries across the developing world. Second, the body of research that examines the impact of corruption on social trust should begin to disaggregate between types of

corruption to test how material and systemic corruption shape social trust in different ways. Given the important role that trust plays in generating state cohesion and encouraging political cooperation and collective action, this work should be able to speak broadly across political science and sociology.

Corruption has dominated much of the African political discussion, both in African conversations as well as in the language and frames used by western academics and scholars. Understanding how corruption shapes African politics is important, and this dissertation has shown that it is important to disaggregate between different types of corruption. As civil society organizations, separatist movements, rebel militias and terrorist groups make demands for reform and revolution across Africa, understanding why they invoke corruption so frequently but seem to arrive at different contentious demands is a key to understanding how to improve stability and reduce conflict overall. This dissertation shows that material corruption leads to reformative engagement, which in turn may lead to the strengthening of the national conversation and social contract. It also shows that systemic corruption encourages revolutionary engagement, which has historically weakened states and left them vulnerable and unstable. This understanding of how different types of corruption shape contentious demands has broad applications across policy and scholarship, and helps explain diverging calls for reform and revolution in Africa's third wave of protest.


APPENDICES

Appendix A: Survey Experiment

Survey Experimental Treatments from South Africa

Elite Theft	Patronage
South African political elites, including heads of state such as the president or leader, have been caught stealing large sums of money from the state for themselves. Some have alleged that President Jacob Zuma has stolen large sums of state money to benefit himself and his close friends. When heads of state steal from the state, they often keep the money for themselves and their family, buying expensive cars and houses in foreign countries instead of using the money to help South Africa.	South African politicians have been known to distribute money, public goods and services, and development projects to some groups but not others. Politicians may distribute funds along ethnic and geographic lines. This can include favoring some ethnic groups with access to jobs, education, training, and public services. Former President Jacob Zuma was alleged to have favored the Zulu people to the detriment of other groups within South Africa.
Electoral Fraud	Police Corruption
In recent years, there have been allegations of election-rigging and fraud in the South African political system. Some politicians have been accused of stuffing ballot boxes or intimidating voters that might vote for the opposition. Following the 2014 General Elections, there are concerns that the vote was neither free nor fair.	The South African Police Service has often been accused of soliciting bribes from citizens, as well as arresting citizens unfairly and without charges. In some circumstances, police corruption has fueled abuses against citizens. In other circumstances, the police have favored some groups and targeted others. Some argue that the police operate on behalf of politicians. In recent years, there have been several high profile cases of police misconduct in South Africa.

FIGURE 22 - DENSITY OF AGES BETWEEN NIGERIAN TREATMENTS



Appendix B: Individual Level Data

FIGURE 23 - DENSITIES OF TRUST IN RULING PARTY AND INSTITUTIONS




TABLE 30 - HIERARCHICAL LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL

DV: Justification for Violence					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	2.091*** (0.034)	2.013*** (0.035)	2.054*** (0.040)	2.095*** (0.043)	2.114*** (0.044)
Institutional Trust	-0.106*** (0.004)	-0.112*** (0.004)	-0.086*** (0.006)	-0.068*** (0.007)	-0.069*** (0.007)
Present Economy		0.024*** (0.004)	0.030*** (0.004)	0.027*** (0.005)	0.027*** (0.005)
Living Situation		0.010* (0.004)	0.013** (0.005)	0.011* (0.005)	0.013** (0.005)
Ethnic Treatment			0.051*** (0.005)	0.045*** (0.005)	0.046*** (0.005)
Satisf. w/ Democracy			-0.036*** (0.005)	-0.041*** (0.005)	-0.041*** (0.005)
Future Economy			-0.013** (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.004)
Trust Ruling Party				-0.015** (0.006)	-0.016** (0.006)
Loc. Gov't Perf.				0.003 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)
Education					-0.006* (0.002)
AIC	241827.857	238077.741	169011.376	150183.288	149939.717
BIC	241865.117	238133.544	169092.046	150280.605	150045.862
Log Likelihood	-120909.928	-119032.871	-84496.688	-75080.644	-74957.859
Num. obs.	82055	80858	57717	51379	51300
Num. groups: country	31	31	27	27	27
Var: country (Intercept)	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.035	0.035
Var: Residual	1.113	1.110	1.091	1.085	1.084
Hierarchical Linear Regression, ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05					

TABLE 31 - HIERARCHICAL LINEAR REGRESSION

DV: Would Use Violence for Political Reason					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	0.204*** (0.013)	0.187*** (0.014)	0.148*** (0.017)	0.203*** (0.019)	0.233*** (0.021)
Institutional Trust	-0.026*** (0.003)	-0.028*** (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.012** (0.004)	-0.012** (0.005)
Present Economy		0.016*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.019*** (0.003)	0.021*** (0.003)
Living Situation		-0.007** (0.002)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
Ethnic Treatment			0.034*** (0.003)	0.036*** (0.003)	0.038*** (0.003)
Satisf. w/ Democracy			-0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)
Future Economy				-0.024*** (0.003)	-0.026*** (0.003)
Trust Ruling Party				-0.002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)
Loc. Gov't Perf.					-0.004 (0.004)
Education					-0.004** (0.002)
AIC	105034.676	103483.648	83484.453	75968.036	68936.591
BIC	105070.810	103537.762	83554.838	76054.942	69039.489
Log Likelihood	-52513.338	-51735.824	-41734.226	-37974.018	-34456.296
Num. obs.	61916	61019	48930	43938	39136
Num. groups: country	31	31	27	27	27
Var: country (Intercept)	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Var: Residual	0.319	0.318	0.321	0.329	0.339
Hierarchical Linear Regression, ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05					

Appendix C: Case Studies Materials

TABLE 32 - ADDITIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION CASES IN NIGERIA, KENYA, AND SOUTH AFRICA

Movement/Organization	Grievances	Goals	Model Fit
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP)	Material. Destruction of living habitat and unfair distributions of wealth	Reformative	Strong
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)	Material. Destruction of environment; economic underdevelopment and poverty	Reformative: massive redistribution of oil wealth to the Niger Delta communities	Strong
Ijaw Youth Council	Material. Distribution of Nigerian funds and “looting of national treasury by the Abacha junta”	Reform: cultural and political autonomy, but remaining in Nigeria	Strong
Niger Delta Vigilantes	Material. Destruction of environment; economic underdevelopment and poverty	Reform: controlling petroleum resources	Strong
Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF)	Material. Destruction of environment; economic underdevelopment and poverty	Reform: controlling petroleum resources	Strong
Boko Haram	Systemic: police and security corruption, adoption of Western values	Revolutionary: build new Islamic state in the north	Strong
#EndSARS	Systemic: Police corruption, abuse and violence	Reformative: disband the SARS unit	Weak
Niger Delta Avengers	Material & Systemic. Favoritism of the North, use of oil money to develop the north. Abuse by security forces against Niger Delta.	Reformative & Revolutionary: Redistribution of wealth, self-determination (unclear extent)	Moderate
Niger Delta Liberation Front	Material & Systemic. Favoritism of the North, use of oil money to develop the north. Abuse by security forces against Niger Delta.	Revolutionary: Secession from Nigeria	Moderate
Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)	Systemic. Security corruption and abuse of political opponents	Revolutionary: Biafran secession	Strong
Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)	Systemic: security corruption and abuse of political opponents.	Revolutionary: Biafran secession	Strong
Human and Environmental Development Agenda (HEDA)	Material: “Corruption reduces public revenue with direct consequences to healthcare delivery, education, and other	Reformative: Passing anti-corruption laws and pro-whistleblowing laws	Strong

	social infrastructure” (Sahara Reporters, n.d.)		
End Impunity Now (campaign)	Material: “Corruption is why basic services and infrastructures cannot be provided ...” (Premium Times, 2012)	Reformative: implementation of report on fuel subsidy fraud, investigate fraud	Strong
#StopTheseTHIEVES	Material: massive bureaucratic and elite theft from public programs.	Reformative: anti-corruption policies, ‘lifestyle audits’	Strong
Act or Resign anti-corruption protests	Material: \$300 million misappropriated by Ministry of Health	Reform: calling on politicians to either meaningfully engage in anti-corruption policies or resign	Strong
Pro-Odinga protesters	Systemic: allegations of electoral fraud and rigging	Revolutionary: demands to overturn elections and put Raila Odinga in power	Strong
Maasai Ethnic Protests	Material: protests against misappropriation of tourist funds	Reformative: removal of corrupt governor	Strong
Anti IEBC Demonstrations (2017)	Systemic: IEBC engaging in corruption and receiving bribes for election materials	Revolution: disband the IEBC	Strong
Kenya Human Rights Commission Protests	Material: Government corruption (indescript)	Reformative: Demanding anti-corruption action	Strong
#Zuma Must Fall	Material: personal enrichment by Jacob Zuma.	Reformative: remove Jacob Zuma	Strong
Anti-Apartheid Campaign	Systemic: disenfranchisement, racist marginalization	Revolutionary: transition from oligarchy to democracy	Strong
#Fees Must Fall	Material: rising school fees in face of high levels of corruption	Reformative: free education, per the ANC’s proposed fee plan	Strong
Mining Campaigns	Material: low wages	Reformative: increase wages	Strong
#Rhodes Must Fall	Material & Systemic: anger about legacy of racism and apartheid in an increasingly unequal society	Reformative: despite rhetoric of revolution, protesters sought material redress with school administrators	Medium
Service Delivery Protests	Material: lack of adequate public services delivered at the local level	Reformative: improve public service delivery	Strong
Zulu Secessionist Movement	Material & Systemic: anger over the potential expropriation of Zulu land by the ANC government	Revolutionary: secession from South Africa	Medium
KhoiSan Secessionist Movement	Material & Systemic: anger over perceived political domination by the ANC and high levels of corruption	Revolutionary: secession from South Africa	Medium

References

Abdallah, S. *et al.* (2014) ‘Corruption drives the emergence of civil society.’, *Journal of the Royal Society, Interface / the Royal Society*, 11(93), p. 20131044. doi: 10.1098/rsif.2013.1044.

Adewoye, O. (1967) ‘The Biafra Secession’, *Africa Today*, 14(5), pp. 35–36.

AFP (2017) ‘Police and anti-corruption protesters clash outside Zambian parliament’, *News24*, 29 September. Available at: <https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/clashes-outside-zambia-parliament-20170929>.

Africa Research Bulletin (2012a) ‘Tanzania: Corruption Dismissals’, *Africa Research Bulletin*, 49(4), p. 19517.

Africa Research Bulletin (2012b) ‘The Gambia: Prosecution for Corrupt Officials?’, *Africa Research Bulletin*, 49(4), p. 19514.

Africa Research Bulletin (2016) ‘Nigeria: Government Offensive’, *Africa Research Bulletin*, 53(1).

Africa Research Bulletin (2019a) ‘GHANA: 2019 Prospects’, *Africa Research Bulletin*, 56(1), pp. 22426C-22427C. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6346.2019.08738.x.

Africa Research Bulletin (2019b) ‘Kenya: Graft Cases’, *Africa Research Bulletin*, 55(11), pp. 22356A-22356A. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6346.2018.08645.x.

Agbiboa, D. E. (2013) 'Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective', *African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review*, 3(1), pp. 144–157. doi: 10.1353/acp.2013.0012.

Ahonsi, B. A. (2011) 'Capacity and governance deficits in the response to the Niger Delta crisis', in *Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta*. London, UK: Zed Books, pp. 28–41.

Akpabio, E. M. and Akpan, N. S. (2010) 'Governance and Oil Politics in Nigeria's Niger Delta: The Question of Distributive Equity', *Journal of Human Ecology*, 30(2), pp. 111–121.

Akpan, N. S. (2010) 'Governance and communal conflicts in a post-democratic Nigeria : A case of the oil-producing Niger Delta Region', *Journal Of African Studies*, 2(April), pp. 65–74.

Alexander, H. and Laing, A. (2015) *Jacob Zuma's lavish Nkandla estate described as 'obscene' by MP inspectors - Telegraph, The Telegraph*. Available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/southafrica/11755145/Jacob-Zumas-lavish-Nkandla-estate-inspected-by-MPs.html> (Accessed: 8 February 2019).

Allen, K. (2015) 'Kenya failings drive al-Shabab recruitment', *BBC*, 19 April.

Ares, M. and Hernández, E. (2017) 'The corrosive effect of corruption on trust in politicians: Evidence from a natural experiment', *Research & Politics*, 4(2), p. 205316801771418. doi: 10.1177/2053168017714185.

Arnold, G. (2017) *Africa - A Modern History: 1945-2015*. 2nd edn. London, UK: Atlantic

Books.

Arriola, L. R. (2009) 'Patronage and Political Stability in Africa', *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(10), pp. 1339–1362. doi: 10.1177/0010414009332126.

Associated Press (2018) *Hundreds of Kenyans in the capital march against corruption*, Associated Press. Available at: <https://www.apnews.com/f2f20c108aea40d2be77f00bce3d28d1> (Accessed: 19 February 2019).

Auerbach, J. N. (2003) 'Police Accountability in Kenya', *African Human Rights Law Journal*, 3, pp. 275–313.

Badmus, I. A. (2010) 'Oiling the Guns and Gunning for Oil: Oil Violence, Arms Proliferation and the Destruction of Nigeria's Niger-Delta', *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*, 2(1), pp. 323–363.

Baron, R. M. and Kenny, D. A. (1986) 'The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 51(6), pp. 1173–1182.

Basson, A. and Du Toit, P. (2017) *Enemy of the People*. Jeppestown, SA: Jonathan Ball Publishers.

Bauhr, M. and Charron, N. (2018) 'Insider or Outsider? Grand Corruption and Electoral Accountability', *Comparative Political Studies*, 51(4), pp. 415–446. doi: 10.1177/0010414017710258.

Bayley, D. H. (1989) 'The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation', in *Political Corruption: A Handbook*. 5th edn. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 935–952.

BBC (2017) *Kenya's Supreme Court criticises IEBC electoral commission*, BBC. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41334702> (Accessed: 19 February 2019).

BBC (2018) *Head of Kenya youth agency arrested in \$78m corruption scandal - BBC News*, BBC. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44280453> (Accessed: 19 February 2019).

BBC News (2017) *South Africa leaders divided after President Zuma sacks Gordhan*, BBC. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39451040> (Accessed: 14 April 2019).

Beek, J. (2017) 'Money, Morals and Law: The Legitimacy of Police Traffic Checks in Ghana', in Beek, J. et al. (eds) *Police in Africa: The Street Level View*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Beyerle, S. (2014) *Curtailling Corruption: People Power for Accountability and Justice*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Bhorat, H. et al. (2017) 'Betrayal of the promise: How South Africa is being stolen', *State Capacity Research Project*, (May), pp. 1–72.

Le Billon, P. (2003) 'Buying peace or fuelling war: The role of corruption in armed conflicts', *Journal of International Development*, 15(4), pp. 413–426. doi: 10.1002/jid.993.

Le Billon, P. (2008) 'Corrupting Peace? Peacebuilding and Post-conflict Corruption', *International Peacekeeping*, 15(3), pp. 344–361. doi: 10.1080/13533310802058851.

Blais, A., Gidengil, E. and Kilibarda, A. (2017) 'Partisanship, information, and perceptions of government corruption', *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 29(1), pp. 95–110. doi: 10.1093/ijpor/edv037.

Blundo, G. and Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. (2006) *Everyday Corruption and the State: Citizens and Public Officials*. London: Zed Books.

Bond, P. and Mottiar, S. (2013) 'Movements, protests and a massacre in South Africa', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 31(2), pp. 283–302. doi: 10.1080/02589001.2013.789727.

Booyesen, S. (2015) *Dominance and Decline: The ANC in the Time of Zuma*. Johannesburg, SA, SA: Wits University Press. Available at: <http://witspress.co.za/catalogue/dominance-and-decline/>.

Branch, A. and Mampilly, Z. C. (2015) *Africa Uprising: Popular Protest and Political Change*. Zed Books.

Branch, D. (2011) *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Bratton, M. and van de Walle, N. (1994) 'Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa', *World Politics*, 46(4), pp. 453–489.

Bratton, M. and van de Walle, N. (1997) *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime*

Transitions in Comparative Perspective. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Caillier, J. (2010) ‘Citizen Trust, Political Corruption, and Voting Behavior: Connecting the Dots’, *Politics and Policy*, 38(5), pp. 1015–1035. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-1346.2010.00267.x.

Campbell, J. (2013) *Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink*. 2nd Editio. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Carol, S. L. (2016) *Burkina Faso’s constitutional reform process to accommodate the spirit of the popular uprising*, *Constitution Net*. Available at: <http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/burkina-fasos-constitutional-reform-process-accommodate-spirit-popular-uprising> (Accessed: 25 March 2018).

Central Intelligence Agency (2018) *Nigeria, The World Factbook*. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html>.

Central Intelligence Agency (2019) *Africa :: South Africa — The World Factbook - Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook*. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html> (Accessed: 11 February 2019).

Chayes, S. (2015) *Thieves of State*. 1st edn. W. W. Norton & Company.

Cheeseman, N. (2018) ‘Introduction: Understanding African Politics: Bringing the State Back In’, in Cheeseman, N. (ed.) *Institutions and Democracy in Africa*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

- Chikane, R. (2018) *Breaking a Rainbow, Building a Nation*. Johannesburg, SA: Picador.
- Chowdhury, S. K. (2004) ‘The effect of democracy and press freedom on corruption: An empirical test’, *Economics Letters*, 85(1), pp. 93–101. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.024.
- Cook, K. S., Hardin, R. and Levi, M. (2005) *Cooperation Without Trust?* New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Daily Nation (2018) *Kenya Police ranks as most corrupt*, *Daily Nation*. Available at: <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Kenya-Police-tops-corruption-list/1056-4359964-sc80d3z/index.html> (Accessed: 8 September 2018).
- Deckard, N. D. and Pieri, Z. (2017) ‘The Implications of Endemic Corruption for State Legitimacy in Developing Nations: an Empirical Exploration of the Nigerian Case’, *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 30(4), pp. 369–384. doi: 10.1007/s10767-016-9242-6.
- Deibert, M. (2013) *The Democratic Republic of Congo: Between Hope and Despair*. New York, NY: Zed Books.
- Delhey, J. and Newton, K. (2003) ‘Who trusts?: The origins of social trust in seven societies’, *European Societies*, 5(2), pp. 93–137. doi: 10.1080/1461669032000072256.
- Dreher, A. *et al.* (2014) ‘Aid on Demand : African Leaders and the Geography of China’s Foreign Assistance’, *Working Paper*, (3), pp. 1–41. doi: 10.1016/S1043-2760(97)84344-5.
- Drugov, M., Hamman, J. and Serra, D. (2014) ‘Intermediaries in Corruption: An Experiment’, *Experimental Economics*, 17(1), pp. 78–99. doi: 10.1007/s10683-013-9358-

8.

Drury, A. C., Kriekhaus, J. and Lusztig, M. (2006) 'Corruption, Democracy, and Economic Growth', *International Political Science Review*, 27(2), pp. 121–136. doi: 10.1177/0192512106061423.

Economic Freedom Fighters (2018) *About EFF*, *EFFOnline*. Available at: <https://www.effonline.org/Abouteff> (Accessed: 20 February 2019).

Ekeh, P. P. (1975) 'Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 17(1), pp. 91–112.

Eneh, O. C. (2011) 'Crippling Poverty Amidst Corporate Social Actions: A Critique of Peripheral Corporate Community Involvement in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria', *Asian Journal of Rural Development*, 1(1), pp. 1–20.

Falola, T. and Nasong'o, S. W. (2016) *Contentious Politics in Africa: Identity, Conflict, and Social Change*. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.

Fashagba, J. O. (2015) 'Subnational Legislatures and National Governing Institutions in Nigeria, 1999-2013', in *African State Governance: Subnational Politics and National Power*. Palgrave MacMillan.

Faull, A. (2017) 'Fighting for Respect: Violence, Masculinity and Legitimacy in the South African Police Service', in Beek, J. et al. (eds) *Police in Africa: The Street Level View*. 1st edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ferrante, J. (2003) *Sociology: A Global Perspective*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thompson

Learning.

Fick, M. (2018) *Kenya corruption threatens to engulf government, auditor general says*, *Reuters*. Available at: <https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN1JA1HF-OZATP> (Accessed: 19 February 2019).

Fjelde, H. (2009) 'Buying Peace? Oil Wealth, Corruption and Civil War, 1985--99', *Journal of Peace Research*, 46(2), pp. 199–218. doi: 10.1177/0022343308100715.

Fjelde, H. and Hegre, H. (2006) *Democracy Depraved: Corruption and Institutional Change 1985-2000*. Trondheim.

Fombad, C. M. (2017) 'Presidential Term Limits Through Constitutional Amendments in Africa: Deconstructing Legitimacy', in Masterson, G. and Meirotti, M. (eds) *Checks and Balances: African constitutions and democracy in the 21st century*. Johannesburg, SA: EISA South Africa, pp. 45–58.

de Freytas-Tamura, K. (2017a) *Kenya Election Returns Were Hacked, Opposition Leader Says*, *The New York Times*. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/09/world/africa/kenya-election-results-raila-odinga.html?module=inline> (Accessed: 30 December 2018).

de Freytas-Tamura, K. (2017b) *Kenya Opposition Leader Says He'll Expose Election Fraud - The New York Times*, *The New York Times*. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/16/world/africa/kenya-opposition-leader-says-hell-expose-fraud-for-all-to-see.html> (Accessed: 30 December 2018).

de Freytas-Tamura, K. (2017c) *Kenyan Election Official Is Killed on Eve of Vote*, *The New York Times*. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/world/africa/chris-musando-kenya-election-official-dead.html?module=inline> (Accessed: 19 February 2019).

de Freytas-Tamura, K. (2017d) *Kenyan Election Tensions Rise as Opposition Claims Fraud*, *The New York Times*. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/10/world/africa/kenya-election-raila-odinga-uhuru-kenyatta.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article®ion=Footer> (Accessed: 19 February 2019).

Friedrich, C. J. (1989) 'Corruption Concepts in Historical Perspective', in *Political Corruption: A Handbook*. 5th edn. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 15–24.

Fujiwara, T. and Wantchekon, L. (2013) 'Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin', *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 5(4), pp. 241–255. doi: 10.1257/app.5.4.241.

Ghazvinian, J. (2008) *Untapped: The Scramble for Africa's Oil*. Mariner Books.

Glasius, M. (2018) 'What authoritarianism is . and is not: A practice perspective', *International Affairs*. doi: 10.1093/ia/iyy060.

Global Integrity (2016) 'Africa Integrity Indicators (Rounds 1 - 5)'. Washington, DC: Global Integrity. Available at: <http://aii.globalintegrity.org>.

Godwin, P. (2011) *The Fear: Robert Mugabe and the Martyrdom of Zimbabwe*. Back Bay Books.

Grindle, M. S. (2012) *Jobs for the Boys: Patronage and the State in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Gurr, T. R. (2011) *Why Men Rebel*. 40th Anniv. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

Hanmer, M. J. and Kalkan, K. O. (2013) 'Behind the Curve: Clarifying the Best Approach to Calculating Predicted Probabilities and Marginal Effects from Limited Dependent Variable Models', *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(1), pp. 263–277.

Hardin, R. (1998) 'Trust in Government', in Braithwaite, V. and Levi, M. (eds) *Trust & Governance*. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 9–27.

Hari, S. I. (2014) 'The Evolution of Social Protest in Nigeria: The Role of Social Media in the “#OccupyNigeria” Protest', *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention*, 3(9), pp. 2319–7714. Available at: www.ijhssi.org.

Harshe, R. (2003) 'Politics of Giant Oil Firms: Consequences for Human Rights in Africa', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 38(2), pp. 113–117.

Hayes, A. F. (2009) 'Beyond Baron and Kenny: Statistical Mediation Analysis in the New Millennium', *Communication Monographs*, 76(4), pp. 408–420. doi: 10.1080/03637750903310360.

Heidenheimer, A. J. (1989) 'Perspectives on the Perception of Corruption', in *Political Corruption: A Handbook*. 5th edn. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 149–164.

Heidenheimer, A. J. (2004) 'Disjunctions between corruption and democracy? A qualitative

exploration', *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 42(1), pp. 99–109. doi: 10.1023/B:CRIS.00000041039.59712.db.

Heidenheimer, A. J., Johnston, M. and LeVine, V. T. (1989) *Political Corruption: A Handbook*. Transaction Publishers.

Hellman, J., Jones, G. and Kaufmann, D. (2000) 'Seize the State, Seize the Day: An Empirical Analysis of State Capture and Corruption in Transition Economies', *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, (2444), pp. 1–41. Available at: papers2://publication/uuid/B15B06FA-4346-4788-A9CB-C07431F4B63A.

Higgins, A. (2015) 'Kenyans Blame Corrupt Government for Escalating al-Shabab Violence | TIME', *Time*, April. Available at: <http://time.com/3771445/kenyans-blame-corrupt-government-al-shabaab-violence/> (Accessed: 7 March 2016).

Hinshaw, D. (2012) *Nigerians Strike Over Gas Costs, Corruption - WSJ, The Wall Street Journal*. Available at: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204124204577150671319979532> (Accessed: 9 February 2019).

Hirschman, A. O. (1970) *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hobbes, T. (1651) *Leviathan*.

Hoffman, P. (2016) *The pending destruction of higher education in South Af...*, *Daily Maverick*. Available at: <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2016-09-27-the->

pending-destruction-of-higher-education-in-south-africa-can-be-avoided/ (Accessed: 30 December 2018).

Hogg, A. (2016) *Van Rooyen was with the Guptas the night before Nene was fired*, BizNews. Available at: <https://www.biznews.com/undictated/2016/10/14/bbc-van-rooyen-was-with-the-guptas-the-night-before-nene-was-fired> (Accessed: 14 April 2019).

Hornsby, C. (2013) 'Kenya: A History Since Independence', (1998), p. 976. Available at: <https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=AolXsK16qtYC&pgis=1>.

Ibaba, I. S. (2011) 'Corruption, human-rights violation, and the interface with violence in the Niger Delta', *Development in practice*, 21(2), pp. 244–254. doi: 10.1080/09614524.2011.543278.

Igbuzor, O. (2012) *Overcoming the Challenges of Transformation in Nigeria*. Lagos: Joe-Tolalu & Associates.

Ikelegbe, A. (2001) 'Civil society, oil and conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria: ramifications of civil society for a regional resource struggle', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39(03), pp. 437–469. doi: 10.1017/S0022278X01003676.

Ivor Chipkin (2017) 'Jacob Zuma and the Theft of South Africa', *The New York Times*, 12 December. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/opinion/jacob-zuma-gupta-corruption.html> (Accessed: 23 May 2018).

Jackson, R. H. and Rosberg, C. G. (1982) *Personal Rule in Black Africa*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

John Campbell (2018) *Jacob Zuma's Undoing*, *Council on Foreign Relations*. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/jacob-zumas-undoing> (Accessed: 23 May 2018).

Johnston, M. (1996) 'The Search for Definitions of Corruption', *International Social Science Journal*, 48(149), pp. 321–335.

Johnston, M. (2005) *Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Johnston, M. (2012) 'Building a Social Movement Against Corruption', *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 18(2), pp. 57–74.

Johnston, M. (2014) *Corruption, Contention, and Reform*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Joseph, R. A. (1987) *Democracy and prebendal politics in Nigeria*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Kasambala, T. (2008) *Perpetual Fear: Impunity and Cycles of Violence in Zimbabwe*. Human Rights Watch. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/03/08/perpetual-fear/impunity-and-cycles-violence-zimbabwe> (Accessed: 11 November 2017).

Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2006) 'Measuring corruption: Myths and realities', *Development outreach*, (December), pp. 1–7. Available at: <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corecourse2007/Myths.pdf>.

Kerr, N. (2013) 'Popular evaluations of election quality in Africa: Evidence from Nigeria', *Electoral Studies*. Elsevier Ltd, 32(4), pp. 819–837. doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2013.02.010.

Klaas, B. (2018) 'Electoral Rules: The Relationship between Political Exclusion and Conflict', in Cheeseman, N. (ed.) *Institutions and Democracy in Africa*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Klašnja, M., Tucker, J. a. and Deegan-Krause, K. (2014) 'Pocketbook vs. Sociotropic Corruption Voting', *British Journal of Political Science*, 46(1), pp. 67–94. doi: 10.1017/S0007123414000088.

Klaus, K. and Mitchell, M. I. (2015) 'Land Grievances and the Mobilization of Electoral Violence: Evidence from Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya', *Journal of Peace Research*, 52(5), pp. 622–635. doi: 10.1177/0022343315580145.

Klaveren, J. van (1989) 'The Concept of Corruption', in *Political Corruption: A Handbook*. 5th edn. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 25–28.

Klitgaard, R. (1991) *Controlling Corruption*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Kostadinova, T. (2009) 'Abstain or rebel: Corruption perceptions and voting in East European elections', *Politics and Policy*, 37(4), pp. 691–714. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-1346.2009.00194.x.

Kyed, H. M. (2017) 'Inside the Police Stations in Maputo City: Between Legality and Legitimacy', in Beek, J. et al. (eds) *Police in Africa: The Street Level View*. 1st edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

De La O, A. L. (2013) 'Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico', *American Journal of Political*

Science, 57(1), pp. 1–14.

Laing, A. (2015) ‘Zuma Must Fall’ rallies against South African president across the country - *Telegraph, The Telegraph*. Available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/southafrica/12053485/Zuma-Must-Fall-rallies-against-South-African-president-across-the-country.html> (Accessed: 8 February 2019).

Lambsdorff, J. G. (2007) *The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform: Theory, Evidence and Policy*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Lancaster, L. (2018) ‘Unpacking Discontent: Where and why protest happens in South Africa’, *South African Crime Quarterly*, (64), pp. 29–44. doi: 10.17159/2413-3108/2018/v0n64a3031.

Levi, M. (1998) ‘A State of Trust’, in Braithewaite, V. and Levi, M. (eds) *Trust & Governance I*. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.

Lindberg, S. I. (2006) *Democracy and Elections in Africa*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lipset, S. M. (1959) ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy’, *American Political Science Review*, 53(1956), pp. 69–105. doi: 10.2307/1951731.

Locke, J. (1690) *Two Treatises of Government (10th edition)*. Available at: <http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext05/trgov10h.htm>.

Lofchie, M. (2014) 'The Political Economy of the African Middle Class', in Ncube, M. and Lufumpa, C. L. (eds) *The Emerging Middle Class in Africa*. Routledge.

Lowenstein, D. H. (1989) 'Legal Efforts to Define Political Bribery', in *Political Corruption: A Handbook*. 5th edn. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 29–38.

Lubeck, P. M. (2010) *Nigeria: Mapping the Shari`a Movement*. Available at: <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/436307k8>.

Madonsela, T. (2014) *Secure in Comfort*. Johannesburg, SA.

Madonsela, T. (2016) *State of Capture*. Johannesburg, SA.

Malala, J. (2012) *The Marikana action is a strike by the poor against the state and the haves | Justice Malala | Opinion | The Guardian, The Guardian*. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/aug/17/marikana-action-strike-poor-state-haves> (Accessed: 11 October 2017).

Mampilly, Z. C. (2014) 'Burkina Faso's uprising part of an ongoing wave of African protests - The Washington Post', *The Washington Post*, 2 November. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/11/02/burkina-fasos-uprising-part-of-an-ongoing-wave-of-african-protests/?utm_term=.b7274ce62c05 (Accessed: 9 March 2018).

Mariita, A. (2018) *#STOPtheseThieves – Demo against Corruption – Action for Transparency, Action for Transparency*. Available at: <https://actionfortransparency.org/view/accountability/stopthesethieves-demo-against->

corruption/ (Accessed: 19 February 2019).

Marinovich, G. (2016) *Murder at Small Koppie: The Real Story of the Marikana Massacre*. Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan State University Press.

Mark, M. (2012) *Nigeria fuel subsidy scheme hit by corruption*, *The Guardian*. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/19/nigeria-fuel-subsidy-scheme-corruption> (Accessed: 16 February 2019).

Mauro, P. (1995) 'Corruption and Growth', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110(3), pp. 681–712.

Mavenjina, M. (2017) *Protest in Kenya: repressive and brutal policing has become normalised* | *openDemocracy*, *openDemocracy*. Available at: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/protest/repressive-policing-kenya> (Accessed: 20 February 2019).

Max Bearak (2018) *Kenyans have had it with corruption. Their leaders may finally be doing something about it.* - *The Washington Post*, *The Washington Post*. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/kenyans-have-had-it-with-corruption-their-leaders-may-finally-be-doing-something-about-it/2018/07/09/1a895830-7984-11e8-ac4e-421ef7165923_story.html?utm_term=.b2cce3e22ebb (Accessed: 8 September 2018).

McCauley, J. F. (2017) *The Logic of Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Africa*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

McFerson, H. M. (2009) 'Governance and Hyper-corruption in Resource-rich African

Countries', *Third World Quarterly*, 30(8), pp. 1529–1547. doi: 10.1080/01436590903279257.

Meirotti, M. and Masterson, G. (2018) *State Capture in Africa: Old Threats, New Packaging?* Johannesburg, SA: EISA South Africa.

Méon, P.-G. and Sekkat, K. (2005) 'Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth?', *Public Choice*, 122, pp. 69–97.

Meredith, M. (2014) *The Fortunes of Africa: A 5,000-Year History of Wealth, Greed, and Endeavor*. New York, NY: PublicAffairs.

Mohamed, A. and Allah, H. (no date) *SIS 30 Perspectives African The Role of the Nigerian Labour Movement in the Democratic Transformation*.

Mohammed Yusuf (2018) *Kenya Protesters March Against New Corruption Scandal, Voice of America*. Available at: <https://www.voanews.com/a/kenya-protesters-march-against-new-corruption-scandal/4417698.html> (Accessed: 8 September 2018).

Moki Edwin Kindzeka (2016) *Cameroon Opposition Defies Police, Protests Biya's Hold on Power, Voice of America*. Available at: <http://www.voanews.com/a/cameroon-opposition-protest-president-biya/3267016.html>.

Mueller, L. (2018) *Political Protest in Contemporary Africa*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/9781108529143.

Ndelu, S. et al. (2016) *#Hashtag: An analysis of the #FeesMustFall Movement at South African universities*. Johannesburg, SA. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world->

africa-34615004.

Ndikumana, L. and Boyce, J. K. (1998) 'Congo's Odious Debt: External Borrowing and Capital Flight in Zaire', *Development & Change*, 29(2), pp. 195–217. doi: 10.1111/1467-7660.00076.

Neudorfer, N. S. and Theuerkauf, U. G. (2014) 'Buying War Not Peace The Influence of Corruption on the Risk of Ethnic War', *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(13), pp. 1856–1886.

Nystrand, M. J. (2014) 'Petty and grand corruption and the conflict dynamics in Northern Uganda', *Third World Quarterly*, 35(March 2015), pp. 821–835. doi: 10.1080/01436597.2014.921432.

O'Donnell, J. and Gramer, R. (2018) *Cameroon's Paul Biya Gives a Master Class in Fake Democracy, Foreign Policy*. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/22/cameroons-paul-biya-gives-a-master-class-in-fake-democracy/> (Accessed: 11 April 2019).

Obi, C. (2009) 'Nigeria's Niger Delta: Understanding the complex drivers of violent oil-related conflict', *Africa Development*, 34(2), pp. 103–128. Available at: <http://www.ajol.info/index.php/ad/article/download/57373/45753> (Accessed: 8 November 2014).

Ogundiya, I. S. (2009) 'Political Corruption in Nigeria: Theoretical Perspectives and Some Explanations', *Anthropologist*, 11(4), pp. 281–292.

- Ojakorotu, V. (2009) *Fresh Dimensions on the Niger Delta Crisis of Nigeria*. Delray Beach, FL: The Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, Inc.
- Okonta, I. and Douglas, O. (2003) *Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights, and Oil*. London, UK: Verso.
- Olaopa, T. (2017) 'Personal interview'. Ibadan, Nigeria.
- Onishi, N. (2017) 'Thousands March in South Africa to Demand Jacob Zuma's Resignation', *New York Times*, 7 April.
- Onuoha, F. C. (2014) *Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?*, *United State Institute of Peace*. Washington, DC.
- Onuoha, G. (2011) 'Contesting the space: The "New biafra" and ethno-territorial separatism in South-Eastern Nigeria', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 17(4), pp. 402–422. doi: 10.1080/13537113.2011.622646.
- Onuoha, G. (2017) 'Bringing " Biafra " back in: narrative, identity, and the politics of non-reconciliation in Nigeria', *National Identities*. Taylor & Francis, 0(0), pp. 1–21. doi: 10.1080/14608944.2017.1279133.
- Opejobi, S. (2019) *2019: Why members of IPOB, MASSOB should vote during elections - Ohanaeze* - *Daily Post Nigeria*, *Daily Post*. Available at: <http://dailypost.ng/2019/02/07/2019-members-ipob-massob-vote-elections-ohanaeze/> (Accessed: 9 February 2019).
- Osaghae, E. E. (1998) *Crippled Giant: Nigeria since Independence*. Bloomington, IN:

Indiana University Press.

Osha, S. (2006) 'Birth of the Ogoni Protest Movement', *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 41(1–2), pp. 13–38. doi: 10.1177/0021909606061746.

Owiti, J. (2014) 'Political Drivers of Inequality in Kenya', *Development (Basingstoke)*, 57(3–4), pp. 547–558. doi: 10.1057/dev.2015.38.

Pauw, J. (2017) *The President's Keepers: Those keeping Zuma in power and out of prison*. Johannesburg, SA: Tafelberg Publishers Ltd.

Philp, M. (2008) 'Peacebuilding and Corruption', *International Peacekeeping*, 15(3), pp. 310–327. doi: 10.1080/13533310802058786.

Plato (1997) *Plato: Complete Works*. Edited by J. M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Raleigh, C. *et al.* (2010) 'Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset: Special Data Feature', *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(5), pp. 651–660. doi: 10.1177/0022343310378914.

Rawls, J. (1999) *A Theory of Justice*. Revised. Belknap Press.

Rock, M. T. (2009) 'Corruption and Democracy', *Journal of Development Studies*, 45(1), pp. 55–75. doi: 10.1080/00220380802468579.

Rosa Lyster (2016) *The Student Protests Roiling South Africa*, *The New Yorker*. Available at: <http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-student-protests-roiling-south-africa>.

Rose-Ackerman, S. (2006) *International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume 1*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Rose-Ackerman, S. and Palifka, B. J. (2016) *Corruption and Government*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Rose-Ackerman, S. and Soreide, T. (2013) *International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume 2*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Rotberg, R. I. (2003) 'Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators', *State Failure and State Weakness In a Time of Terror*, pp. 1–26.

Rotberg, R. I. (2009) *Corruption, Global Security, and World Order*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Rothstein, B. (2005) *Social Traps and the Problem of Trust*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Rothstein, B. and Eek, D. (2009) 'Political Corruption and Social Trust: An Experimental Approach', *Rationality and Society*, 21(1), pp. 81–112. doi: 10.1177/1043463108099349.

Rothstein, B. and Uslaner, E. M. (2011) 'All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust', *World Politics*, 58(1), pp. 41–72. doi: 10.1353/wp.2006.0022.

Rousseau, J. (1762) 'The social contract', *Public Reason in Political Philosophy: Classic Sources and Contemporary Commentaries*, (December 2010), pp. 201–247. doi: 10.4324/9781315110868.

Rucker, D. D. *et al.* (2011) 'Mediation Analysis in Social Psychology', *Social and*

Personality Psychology Compass, 5(6), pp. 359–371. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2011.00355.x.

Ruteere, M. (2011) ‘More than political tools: The police and post-election violence in Kenya’, *African Security Review*, 20(4), pp. 11–20. doi: 10.1080/10246029.2011.630805.

Sahara Reporters (2015) *Nigeria Labor Congress Members Protest Against ‘Massive Corruption’*; In Abuja, Sahara Reporters. Available at: <http://saharareporters.com/photos/nigeria-labor-congress-members-protest-against-massive-corruption-abuja> (Accessed: 16 February 2019).

Schatzberg, M. G. (2001) *Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Scher, D. (2005) ‘Asset Recovery: Repatriating Africa’s looted billions’, *African Security Review*, 14(4).

Schwarz, W. (1968) *Nigeria*. Pall Mall Press.

Scott, J. C. (1989) ‘Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change’, in *Political Corruption: A Handbook*. 5th edn. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 275–286.

Serra, D. and Wantchekon, L. (2012) *New Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption*. Bingley, UK: Emerald Books.

Shelley, L. (2005) ‘Civil Society Mobilized Against Corruption: Russia and Ukraine’, in Johnston, M. (ed.) *Civil Society and Corruption: Mobilizing for Reform*. 1st edn. Oxford:

University Press of America, pp. 3–22.

Shelley, L. I. (2014) *Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime, and Terrorism*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Sinwell, L. and Mbatha, S. (2016) *The Spirit of Marikana: The Rise of Insurgent Trade Unionism in South Africa*. London, UK: Pluto Press.

Smith, D. (2015) ‘Switzerland to return Sani Abacha “loot” money to Nigeria’, *The Guardian*, 18 March. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/18/switzerland-to-return-sani-abacha-loot-money-to-nigeria> (Accessed: 6 May 2015).

Smith, D. J. (2007) *A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Smith, D. J. (2014) ‘Corruption Complaints, Inequality and Ethnic Grievances in Post-Biafra Nigeria’, *Third World Quarterly*, 35(5), pp. 787–802. doi: 10.1080/01436597.2014.921430.

Snow, S. (2007) ‘South African Journal of International Affairs Unhindered by the rule of law: ethnic terrorism and the 2007 Kenyan presidential election’, *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 16(1), pp. 115–127. doi: 10.1080/10220460902986156.

Soyinka, W. (1996) *The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Stokes, S. C. et al. (2013) *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive*

Politics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Suleiman, M. N. and Aminul Karim, M. (2015) 'Cycle of Bad Governance and Corruption: The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria', *SAGE Open*, 5(1), pp. 1–11. doi: 10.1177/2158244015576053.

Teets, J. C. and Chenoweth, E. (2009) 'To Bribe or to Bomb: Do Corruption and Terrorism Go Together?', in Rotberg, R. I. (ed.) *Corruption, Global Security, and World Order*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 167–193.

The PRS Group (2015) *List of all variable definitions*. Available at: <http://epub.prsgroup.com/list-of-all-variable-definitions> (Accessed: 6 January 2016).

Transparency International (2018) *Corruption Perceptions Index: 2017*. Available at: https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017.

Transparency International (2019a) *How corruption weakens democracy, Transparency International*. Available at: https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/cpi_2018_global_analysis (Accessed: 14 April 2019).

Transparency International (2019b) *The Gambia: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption*. Available at: https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Gambia-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2019_PR.pdf.

Udosen, C., Etok, A.-I. S. and George, I. N. (2010) 'Fifty years of oil exploration in Nigeria:

the paradox of plenty', *Global Journal of Social Sciences*, 8(2), pp. 37–47. doi: 10.4314/gjss.v8i2.51579.

Le Van, A. C. (2015) 'Introduction: Subnational Legislative Politics and African Democratic Development', in *African State Governance: Subnational Politics and National Power*. Palgrave MacMillan.

Walker, A. (2012) 'What Is Boko Haram?', *United States Institute of Peace*, p. 16. Available at: <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf>.

Wambua, P. M. (2015) 'Police corruption in Africa undermines trust, but support for law enforcement remains strong'. Ann Arbor, MI.

Wangui Kanina (2008) *Kenya's election seen as badly flawed*, *Reuters*. Available at: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-kenya-election/kenyas-election-seen-as-badly-flawed-idUKLI38786120080918> (Accessed: 18 March 2018).

Wantchekon, L. (2003) 'Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin', *World Politics*, 55(3), pp. 399–422.

Waza (2013) *A condensed guide to corruption, M23 style*, *Waza*. Available at: <https://wazaonline.com/en/power-people/condensed-guide-to-corruption-m23-style>.

Wechsle, S. (2016) 'Punishing personal and electoral corruption: Experimental evidence from India', *Research & Politics*, 3(2), p. 2053168016645136. doi: 10.1177/2053168016645136.

Yemisi Adegoke (2017) *Nigerian anti-corruption unit finds \$43 million in cash in Lagos*

apartment - CNN, CNN. Available at: <https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/13/africa/efcc-recovers-funds-nigeria/index.html> (Accessed: 9 September 2018).