

DIALECTICAL METHODS IN MARXISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS.

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## ABSTRACT

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Some of the first attempts to integrate the theories of Marx and Freud began at The Frankfurt School of Germany in the 1920's. The significance of psychoanalytic theory to marxist studies arose with the critical theorist's emphasis on ideologies and the human element behind social phenomena.

This paper shall trace the origins of dialectical methods in marxism and psychoanalysis from its birth within the school of critical theory. My purpose is to describe and clarify the inherent dialectical content within both conceptual frameworks. In addition, I shall discuss the major contributions to marxian-psychoanalytic theory construction and implementation. Further, I will suggest much of the rationale for combining Marx with Freud inside the discipline of political theory and political philosophy. One of my primary motives for integrating psychoanalysis and marxism is to develop a theory of "dialectical unity" for purposes of political and personal inquiry.

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## PREFACE

Some of the first attempts to integrate the theories of Marx and Freud began at The Frankfurt School of Germany in the 1920's. The significance of psychoanalytic theory to marxist studies arose with the critical theorist's emphasis on ideologies and the human element behind social phenomena.

This paper shall trace the origins of dialectical methods in marxism and psychoanalysis from their birth within the school of critical theory. My purpose is to describe and clarify the inherent dialectical content within both conceptual frameworks. In addition, I shall discuss the major contributions to marxian-psychoanalytic theory construction and implementation. Further, I shall suggest much of the rationale for combining Marx with Freud inside the discipline of political theory and political philosophy. One of my primary motives for integrating psychoanalysis and marxism is to develop a theory of "dialectical unity" for purposes of political and personal inquiry.



## CHAPTER I. CRITICAL THEORY AND DIALECTICS.

### INTRODUCTION AND SUBSTANTIVE BACKGROUND TO CRITICAL THEORY:

In the early stage of its history the Institute for Social Research, better known as The Frankfurt School, concerned itself with a Marxian analysis of bourgeois society's socio-economic substructure. That is, the school's interest prior to 1930 lay with investigation and research of the commodity exchange world of capitalism and the 'cash-nexus.' In the years after 1930 its prime interest lay in Marxist theoretical analysis of the cultural super-structure, which included questions concerning the legal and socializing institutions of society. As Martin Jay points out in The Dialectical Imagination, the traditional Marxist formula regarding the relationship between the two, socioeconomic substructure and cultural superstructure, was called into question by critical theory. In 1929, Max Horkheimer was appointed to the chair of social philosophy at Frankfurt, and it was then that he outlined the first task of the Institute under his leadership: "a study of worker's and employee's attitudes towards a variety of issues in Germany and the rest of developed Europe. In Horkheimer's first article which followed, "Observations on Science and Crisis," he developed the connection between the "splintering of knowledge and the social conditions that helped produce it."<sup>1</sup>

Critical theory is expressed through a series of critiques of other thinkers and philosophical traditions. Its development was through dialogue, "its genesis as dialectical as the method it purported to apply to social phenomena."<sup>2</sup> The first critical theorists lived at a histori-

cal moment when a new "negative" (that is, revolutionary) force in society-the proletariat- was stirring, "a force that could be seen as the agent that would fulfill their philosophy. By the 1930's, however, signs of the proletariat's integration into society were becoming increasingly apparent; this was especially evident to the members of the Institute after their emigration to America."3

Critical theory can be most clearly defined by its foremost architect, Max Horkheimer. He states:

Critical theory proceeds from the theorists awareness of his own partiality. Thus theory is neither neutral nor objective. Its partisanship consists in its goals: the reconstruction of society based on nonexploitative relations between persons; and the restoration of man to center place in the evolution of human society as a self-conscious, self-managing subject of social reality.4

Horkheimer and the Frankfurt School of critical theorists not only admit to their own prejudice and biased perceptions, but overtly point toward their political goals related to the construction of a theory. Critical theory has a purpose in the world of things, and that purpose is a demystification of social forms. Its primary objectives are to slice away at layers of political 'reification' and 'abstractification' covering material reality, as defined by Marx, and to expose the consequences of capitalist exploitation to the consciousness of the masses. You might say that the critical theorists were interested in praxiology.

Critical theory disagrees with and objects to the widespread and influential philosophical positivism of the 19th and 20th centuries. The critical school takes issue with Marx on these grounds only in relation to his later "scientific" writings in Capital. The initial



premise of the positivists's orientation is that there is a 'real' reality, objective reality, and through certain steps we can all reach the same certain conclusions about observable phenomena. Critical theory was only one of several reactions to the 'science claims' of positivism and the doctrines of so-called "pure" objectivity and universal laws. Many of the German phenomenologists disagreed wholeheartedly with the theory of positivism and puzzled over perception and reality. Particularly, and more crucially, for the study of politics, critical theorists and German phenomenologists, such as Karl Mannheim and Alfred Schutz sharply critiqued the philosophical positivists dismissal of value-relativism in studying social and political phenomena. More critically, it can be argued that the philosophical positivists through the application of 'scientific procedures' are incapable of formulating decisive answers to questions of individual value systems. Yet, positivists such as Carl Hempel and Karl Popper deny the entrance and existence of value phenomena within their own "value-free" methods of scientific inquiry.

Max Weber suggests:

Only a small portion of existing concrete reality is colored by our value-conditioned interest and it alone is significant to us. It is significant because it reveals relationships which are important to us due to their connection with our values.<sup>5</sup>

The focus of attention on reality under the guidance of values which lend it significance and the selection and ordering of the phenomena which are thus affected in the light of their cultural significance is entirely different from the analysis of reality in terms of laws and general concepts.<sup>6</sup>

For many members of the critical school of thought, the basic premise



of philosophical positivism, that there exists a scientific method of "pure" objectivity, advanced the political rationale of "reactionary" thought. The reasoning behind this notion is that: if all of us share the same objective reality regardless of values and the coloring of subjective perceptions onto the world of things; then we are less apt to criticize "scientific" findings and more apt to the control and domination of political society. Although, their views on empiricism and scientific theory changed somewhat upon their arrival in the United States after fleeing Germany during the rise of Fascism, Herbert Marcuse and, to some extent Horkheimer and Adorno, remained outside the grasp of positivists doctrines.

Much of critical theory was derived, one could argue, from Karl Mannheim's premise that all knowledge is rooted in socio-historical conditions. The Frankfurt School viewed Mannheim's position on relativism-all historical thinking, social and political, is bound up with the concrete position in the life of the thinker-as crucial to its basic Marxist premise of materialism. According to Mannheim:

The ideas expressed by the subject are thus regarded as functions of his existence. This means that opinions, statements, propositions, and systems of ideas are not taken at their face-value but are interpreted in light of the life-situation of the one who expresses them. It signifies further that the specific character and life-situation of the subject influence his opinions, perceptions, and interperceptions.<sup>7</sup>

On the other hand, critical theorists rejected the separation of subjectivity from material reality as found in the philosophy of Immanuel

Kant. According to the Institute, many philosophers had gone too far in bifurcating subjectivity and inwardness from objective structures. According to Horkheimer, these philosophers overlooked the material dimension in reality and minimized the importance of action in the historical world. Horkheimer argued that philosophers such as Kant, seemed to be rejecting reason itself in favor of bourgeois rationalism. Martin Jay claims:

As might be expected, Horkheimer's interest in the question of bourgeois individualism led him back to a consideration of Kant and the origins of inwardness. Among the dualistic elements in Kant's philosophy, he noted, was the gap between duty and interest. Individual morality, discovered by practical reason, was internalized and divorced from public ethics. Here Hegel's ethics, with its emphasis on bridging the public-private opposition, was superior to Kant's morality. Despite this, Kant's view was closer to a correct reflection of conditions in the early nineteenth century; for to assume that a harmony could exist at that time between personal morality and moral code, was to ignore the real irrationality of extreme order. Where Kant had been wrong was in considering these contradictions immutable.<sup>8</sup>

Horkheimer saw in Kantian thought, the philosophical separation of the objective and subjective reality. As Jay explains, Kant's thinking may have correctly perceived the world at that historical-moment but for Max Horkheimer and the critical school his philosophical doctrines were of no 'practical' use. In other words, the doctrines of Kant sever the relationship between personal and political, ideal and material reality, self and social. They do not understand, include, perceive the inherent connection between subject and object so crucial to the theorist's dialectical view of the world nor how that connection may be functional in the realm of political practice. Hegel's philosophical conception of the social and individual world fit more comfortably with Horkheimer and



the Frankfurt School than Kant's philosophical interpretation. Hegelian tenets display the ever important synthesis of subject-object and individual-social dichotomies of life.

The critical theorists believe that positivism has a particular political goal which is both unstated and unrecognized by the positivists, as for example, such bourgeois doctrines of John Locke and other rational notions of contract. Critical theory recognizes and clearly establishes its political goals, thus, its goals are available and conscious to those who study and analyze its arguments. In contrast positivistic influence allowed political philosophers to develop such notions as equality, justice, inalienable rights, liberty, and freedom without exposing the hidden, perhaps, unconscious, political motives of their thought. For Horkheimer and the Frankfurt School, John Locke and other contract theorists were conservative at best; they offered no alternatives to the prevailing inequitable organizations and institutions of society. Their line of reasoning searched for the best that could be expected in a material world of inequality and oppression. The theories of John Locke offered no critical analysis of the existing system but, rather, an acceptance and recognition of it. As Horkheimer points out in Jay's Dialectical Imagination, "Positivism of all kinds was ultimately the abdication of reflection. The result was the absolutizing of "fact" and the reification of the existing order."<sup>9</sup> In other words, the conservative trend in positivism originates with its undialectical and ahistorical approach to viewing social and political phenomena.

Traditional theory maintained a strict separation of thought and action. According to Jay:

Critical theory differed on several counts. First of all, it refused to fetishize knowledge as something apart from and superior to action. In addition, it recognized that disinterested scientific research was impossible in a society in which men were themselves not yet autonomous; the researcher, Horkheimer argued, was always part of the social object he was attempting to study.<sup>10</sup>

Critical theory takes for granted human participation and value-orientation in the social world. More importantly, it attempts to synthesize theory and practice, thought and action, for the purpose, and conscious goal, of social change.

#### THE HISTORY AND ORIGIN OF DIALECTICAL METHOD IN CRITICAL THEORY.

The scientific community (Kuhn 1970) surrounding Horkheimer during his chairmanship of social philosophy at the Institute consisted of such scholars as Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, Eric Fromm, Leo Lowenthal, and others. The Frankfurt community of social theorists refused to accept the positivist's hypothetical notion of the existence of "true" knowledge. It was this notion they believed which informed the traditional theorists. Nor did the critical theorists view seriously the idea of general principles, universal truths, and/or verifying or falsifying examples. The original "paradigm" (Kuhn 1970) of the critical school was the dialectical method as developed by Hegel, and later "turned on its head" by Karl Marx.

The dialectic proposed by Hegel consists of 'thesis-antithesis-synthesis.' This view of political reality differs from positivism because it rejects the notion of 'social facts' independent of history. The substratum of its social theory consists of a constant interplay of



the particular and the universal, of "moment" and totality. In other words, subject and object are separate phenomena but are in continuous intercourse and overlap. The critical theorist, as Marx himself, studies history through the use of the dialectical method. According to Marx's materialist conception of history:

The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. The first fact to be established, therefore, is the physical constitution of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of Nature.<sup>11</sup>

Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion, or by anything one likes. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is determined by their physical constitution. In producing their means of subsistence men indirectly produce their actual material life.<sup>12</sup>

The Marxist notion of history as practiced by the Frankfurt School, examines the mode of production and the consequential human conditions of material life. The historical status of human life is directly dependent upon the level of material production. Conscious thought and ideas are essentially derived, ideologically, from the activity of material production; i.e. man relates to others and himself as commodities. All forms and 'products' of consciousness can be abandoned only by the "practical overthrow of actual social relations."<sup>13</sup> In Marxist theory, revolution becomes the dynamic human element behind history. At this point, it is clear how the conscious political goals of critical theory were established, and why the Frankfurt School choose Marx's dialectical method as its paradigm. Only Horkheimer, Marcuse, Adorno, and Fromm remained loyal to their Left Hegelian roots and the early works of Karl Marx. There seemed to be much disagreement among the critical school

of Marxist 'humanists' and the orthodox circle of 'structural' Marxists. The primary differences among these separate Marxist intellectuals focused on the importance and significance of Marx's earlier writings such as his manuscripts of 1844 versus the later "scientific" analysis of Capital. The critical theorists accused structural Marxists of accepting a "fetish" of dialectics as an objective process outside wo/man's control.

Horkheimer studied the works of Karl Mannheim, in an effort to broaden the perspective of critical theory to include the relationship of ideas to material reality and the dialectical method. Much of what he and other members of the Institute discovered fit comfortably with their own interpretations of history and the Marxian dialectic. The Mannheimian concepts of "situational determinism" and "situational relativity" are within the scope critical theories' philosophical framework of interests. Further, Mannheim himself recognized a historical link between his theory of knowledge and the ideas of Marx's social theory and material. For Mannheim, as for Marx, all thought, all consciousness and ideology were derived from the social position of the individual. Yet, there was some crucial distinction which Horkheimer felt urgent. In Marxist theory, the concept of "false-consciousness" is critical to an understanding of the connection of thought to the material reality, or the existing mode of production. This is not necessarily implying that for Marx, contra Mannheim, that there is some objectively correct consciousness. The prevalent consciousness of the worker, for instance, is not "true-consciousness," rather, it is an extension of his alienated position to his own labor. This "false-consciousness," Marx expresses, becomes a tool for



the further exploitation of the worker. Ideas and thought may express the opposite of material reality. In other words, one must search behind ideas and thought for the "concrete" reality, the actual relationships among human beings. It was this theoretical purpose of Marxism, which the Frankfurt School grasped with fervor. Most particularly, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse imagined critical theory as a dialectical method of plunging into the depths of conscious illusions. Aside from a great epistemological gap between Mannheim and Marx, Horkheimer insisted that Mannheim's relativistic conception of history and consciousness overlooked the importance of Marx's notion of "false-consciousness." According to Horkheimer, Mannheim was leaving Marxism, the dialectical method and material reality for a "metaphysical quest for pure knowledge."<sup>14</sup> Mannheim claims:

This tendency towards abstraction on a higher level is still in accord with the theory of the situational determination of thought, for the reason that the subject that engages in his thinking is by no means an absolute autonomous "mind-in-itself," but rather a subject which is ever more inclusive, and which neutralizes the earlier particular and concrete points of view.<sup>15</sup>

The critical theorist views political, social, and cultural phenomena as multidimensional, dynamic and flowing process, mediated through a social totality. During the 1930's, and still controversial among Marxists, the critical theorists feared a reductionism among Marxist circles, whose greater emphasis was placed upon the socioeconomic substratum and less emphasis upon the ideological superstructure. The structural Marxist, it was argued, minimized the significance of human participation and consciousness within his/her interpretive framework. The scholars of critical theory could not accept the conjecture that consciousness was

merely epiphenomenal. The Frankfurt School interpreted true materialism as an ongoing process of intermaneuvers and exchanges among subject and object. The dialectic, for the critical theorist, must be investigated within and among the subjective and objective elements of the social totality. Further, the "human-element" must be recognized as equally relevant factor for research among others. The key here is the distinction between early Marx and later Marx.

As Left Hegelians, the critical theorists persisted within the original confines of Hegel's dialectical method, with the added reversal proposed by Marx. For example, Adorno blasted Kierkegaard and Husserl's stress on the self. He specifically rejected Husserl's idea of transcendent subject. For Theodor Adorno, such an introspective, self-indulgent idea had negative ramifications for the theoretical application of the Hegelian dialectic. The political objectives of critical theory would fail if the dialectic between subject and object was ignored. In the case of Husserl and Kierkegaard the subjective was the entire realm of study. The concept of a dialectical relationship between subject-object received constant theoretical nurturance. The Frankfurt theorists produced many essays critiquing those philosophers of the right and left who they viewed as politically antagonistic to social change; such as, Husserl and Kierkegaard.

Many of the insights of the critical theorists arise from an analysis of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim; specifically, the phenomena of the separation of the individual from society, and the relevance of this separation to political practice and theory. Durkheim's concept of "anomie," although recognized by the critical school, was discounted as



positivistic and conservative. That is, in the context of his theory, it was "non-critical" of the existing modes of idea and thought. More emphasis was placed upon Weber's concept of the "disenchantment of the world" and, of course, Marx's notion of "alienation." Eric Fromm, as many members of the Institute, relied on the early works of Marxist "humanism" for an explanation of this phenomena. He, Marcuse, Adorno, and Horkheimer turned to Freud and psychoanalysis, for a further psychological explanation of alienation. Marxism could provide the social context for an explanation of phenomena such as, alienation and disenchantment, but it could not provide the investigator with a psychological understanding. Therefore, the introduction of psychoanalytic theory was necessary in providing the researcher with a truly dialectical method of inquiry into these phenomena. That is, it viewed the phenomena from a dialectical dynamic of subject-object.

The materialist conception of the political world and history contrasts sharply with the positivists and pragmatics. The traditional theorist denies subjective analysis and relies upon cognitive, rational, and verifiable approaches to an analysis of the physical world. This unreflective mode of research is inadequate to the critical theorists. The reliance upon scientific criteria for the validity, significance, and proof of so-called universal laws leaves out the element of human intentionality, important both to psychoanalysis and marxism. The 'scientific method' does not take into account individual perception, motivation and intention as these processes effect social and physical reality. The positivist social scientists attempt to apply the same rigorous procedures to the study of phenomena such as hierarchy that

they would apply to physical phenomena such as gravity. In the process they neglect the fact that they are self-interested actors in a hierarchy, whereas gravity is unaffected by their relation to it.

In summary, the dialectical method as used by the critical theorist combines and synthesizes the methods of Marx and Hegel. It unites the concept of material reality with ideology and consciousness. Critical theory is clearly a break from the scientific method as proposed by Hempel and Popper. It accepts the idea that subject and object are intertwined and cannot be heuristically separated, which is crucial to the dialectical synthesis of marxism and psychoanalysis. Finally, one who uses the dialectical method perceives the world as a product of human activity.

#### CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT IN CRITICAL THEORY:

The dialectical paradigm rests on an active analysis of material reality and the dominant ideology of the moment. Bertell Ollman describes the "dialectic as outlook," he states:

Marx's dialectic is a way of viewing things as moments in their own development in, with, and through other things. The vocabulary of the dialectic-'moment', 'movement', 'contradiction', 'mediation', 'determination', etc.-was Marx's preferred mode of expression, more so in his early than in his later writings. However, as the assignment of priorities has indicated, I consider that the basic scaffolding of Marxism is best constructed of 'relations'.

Besides a way of seeing things, Marx's dialectic is also his approach to the study of problems which concentrates on looking for relationships, not only between different entities but between the same one in time past, present and future. Finally, the dialectic is Marx's method of exposition; this includes how he organizes his topic as well as the terms he chooses to clothe his views. Much confusion over Marx's dialectic, and Hegel's also, has been due to the inability to grasp that it has these three distinct functions.<sup>16</sup>



Ollman's description of dialectics coincides, most distinctively, with the Left Hegelian-critical theorist's epistemological orientation to dialectical method. Critical theory derives its title from the method of inquiry. Implicit within critical theory is the recognition that reality is negotiated through a power struggle, and that the holders of power determine reality for the majority of people. This conception of reality construction was derived from the socio-historical conditions within which members of the Frankfurt School lived and worked. The rise of authoritarian ideologies and fascism became the major concern of critical theorists. These theorists investigated underlying connections between various doctrines which were prevalent within their culture, such as liberalism versus authoritarianism. Herbert Marcuse's concept of "repressive-tolerance" explored the "counter-revolutionary" and submissive aspects of both forms of political preference. For Marcuse, both liberalism and authoritarianism aided the current mode of domination and political oppression within the fascist culture. Neither of these political ideologies could promote progressive social change. In addition, because of "false-consciousness" individuals in society were unaware of their internalization of repressive tolerance. The underlying, but active tolerance for repressive conditions within the state meant that both liberalism and authoritarianism were ineffective ideologies during the growth of the critical school. The irrational doctrines of fascism could grow and be nurtured in this environment. According to traditional Marxists and critical theorists, behind these commonalities between the doctrines of liberalism and authoritarianism, is the commodity exchange world of capitalism and the cash-nexus flow. They believe that all cultural, ideological, movements are rendered impotent

by capitalism because they do not necessarily function to produce increased surplus-value. Capitalism is ideologically neutral as long as it serves the accumulation of surplus-value and profit, but when this process is interfered with, the ideological hegemony of the ruling economic class asserts itself through the superstructure.

Critical theory separated the basic Marxist assumption that the mode of production is "determinant" from the ideological superstructure it determined. That is, the superstructure is derived from the commodity exchange relations under capitalism, and, according to orthodox-structural Marxists, these relations determine the ideology of every society. Marx defined the superstructure as the legal and socializing institutions in society: religion, education, family, culture, and ideology. For critical theory the ideology of western capitalism comes to dominate the economic substructure. After the economic accumulation of capital reaches its apex, it is only prevented from entering a decline by the ideology developed to support it, hence, ideology rather than material survival comes to dominate advanced capitalism. As this occurs ideology comes to acquire a reality of its own, quite separate from the commodity production and exchange relationships. The irrationality of this historical development in which consciousness and ideology exist only to perpetuate themselves without reference to a material base led the critical theorists to an examination of how consciousness was created, maintained and manipulated, individually and collectively. Many turned to Freud, his studies of consciousness and the unconscious for answers to these questions.



Many of the critical theorists believed that an integration of psychoanalysis could provide the missing link between the marxist socioeconomic substructure and the ideological superstructure. "In short," according to Martin Jay, "it could flesh out materialism's notion of man's essential nature."<sup>17</sup> Psychoanalysis could explain, as for Marcuse, the repetitive failings of revolutions throughout the world. Psychoanalysis could provide a theory of needs and instincts; a theory missing from the rationalized, macro-economic orientation of the orthodox marxists. The human element of the "unconscious" could provide an understanding of the historic past, through recognition and recollection, in order to develop an understanding of wo/man's relation to society, and the possibilities for his/her future. They were particularly interested in the synthesis of method and content derived from psychoanalytic studies of individuals, and how this could be collectively applied.

One of the first members of the Institute to attempt an integration of Marx and Freud was Eric Fromm. Fromm strived to develop a theory of social psychology based on the early economic and philosophic manuscripts of Marx, and Freud's theory of libido. In his work, Beyond The Chains Of Illusion, Fromm uncovers the "critical mood" in both Marx and Freud. He writes:

The assumption underlying Marx's "weapon of truth" is the same as with Freud: that man lives with illusions because these illusions make the misery of real life bearable.<sup>18</sup>

In both epistemologies, there exists a "false-consciousness." For Marx, this false, oppressive reality exists within the external world of labor; while for Freud, the "fictitious character" of ideas takes place on the psychological level of consciousness. Fromm strived to develop an idea

of socialism arising from a matriarchial society. Here, he was in agreement with the Marxist analyst, Wilhelm Reich, whose theoretical construction of a Marxist psychology was founded on Freud's theory of instinct. According to Reich, the patriarchial family had emerged precisely in order to support the system of exploitation and domination. It fulfilled its purpose by performing a single function: that of suppressing all manifestations of genital sexuality in children and adolescents. The family might serve other ends as well, but primarily its function was sexual repression. Further, the connection between sexual repression and the authoritarian social order, for instance, was simple and direct: the child, according to Reich, who experienced the suppression of natural sexuality was permanently "maimed" in his/her character development; inevitably became submissive, apprehensive of all authority, and completely incapable of rebellion (Reich, The Sexual Revolution). With the aid of psychoanalytic theory, Reich had expressed the critical role of the family, in relation to oppressive forms of authority and man's alienation from his nature. Although, these theorists, Fromm and Reich, were quite distinct from one another, particularly in practice, they agreed upon the significance of matriarchy for socialism. Later Fromm deviated from the "orthodox" Freudian theory of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic therapy, whereupon, he severed his ties with the Institute for Social Research.

Essentially, Fromm argued that Freud's theories of psychoanalysis were negative and overly pessimistic of wo/man's opportunity for liberation. Fromm's argument, and critique of Freud, was based upon the his-

torical conditions in Vienna where Freud was writing and doing treatment with his patients. Fromm argued that Freud's pessimism, the inevitable "neurotic" condition of man, in the analysis of individuals arose out of a liberal social milieu, and was, therefore, not theoretically valid in generalizing to all of mankind. Consequently, Fromm denied much of Freud's theory and technique, specifically, the crucial "Oedipus complex." Other members of the Institute discounted Fromm's criticism of Freud. They viewed Freud's Viennese roots with less suspicion, and in the Mannheimian tradition, saw them as implicit to the discovery of psychoanalysis. The historical severity of sexual morality was essential to Freud's discovery of "repressed" instinct. Furthermore, the Frankfurt School could make theoretical use of psychoanalysis to develop the link, as mentioned earlier, between marxist base and superstructure. Most of the critical school viewed Freud's theories as relevant to their own studies of the individual and his relationship to culture. For Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse, psychoanalysis provided a valid general statement of the basic human condition, and its relationship to society in the western world. For the Institute of Social Research, the theory of psychoanalysis, as proposed by Freud, could enhance the theorist's dialectical critique of modern technological society, and the politically and instinctually oppressive, cultural superstructure. Following Eric Fromm, but more aligned with the intellectual trend of the Frankfurt School, Herbert Marcuse constructed a philosophical inquiry into Freud entitled, Eros and Civilization.



For Marcuse, as for Wilhelm Reich, and Norman O. Brown, the radical proclivity of psychoanalysis derives from Freud's primary focus on sexuality, and its dialectical, or conflictual, method of inquiry. Marcuse writes:

According to Freud, the history of man is the history of repression. Culture constrains not only his societal but also his biological existence, not only parts of the human being but his instinctual structure itself.<sup>19</sup>

Marcuse appears to place emphasis on Freud's theory of repression, and views the effectiveness of this theory through its "negation" of culture, a factor necessary and complimentary to critical theory and its view of culture. In his book, Marcuse attempts to develop the "revolutionary" Freud. He perceives psychoanalysis as a theory and technique of demystification and confrontation. Furthermore, Marcuse, a self-proclaimed Marxist, views psychoanalysis as a useful technique and theoretical approach for exposing "false consciousness" by reminding the masses of and reorienting them to their instinctual origins and basic needs. These needs are not defined and created by modern technological society. Marcuse proclaims:

The unconscious, the deepest and oldest layer of the mental personality, is the drive for integral gratification, which is the absence of want and repression. As such it is the immediate identity of necessity and freedom. According to Freud's conception the equation of freedom and happiness tabooed by the conscious is upheld by the unconscious.<sup>20</sup>

This is the hidden trend (radically political trend) in psychoanalysis. For Freud, as for Marcuse and the critical theorists, regression assumes a progressive function. The culturally denied expression of the unconscious contains an element of truth value for the analytic investigator.



The psychoanalytic liberation of memory through a recollection of childhood and infantile desires, whether fantasy or reality, expresses those most primitive and natural needs and wants which society most often neglects. The consequence of this renunciation, it is believed, is the fragmentation of the instinctual human structure, the separation, perhaps, of feeling and thought.

In Marcuse's section on Ontogenesis, in Eros and Civilization, or the origin of the repressed individual, he attempts to synthesize the theoretical systems of marxism and psychoanalysis. For instance, according to Marcuse, and Freud for that matter, civilization has progressed as organized domination. With this point in mind, Marcuse attempts to capture the historical substance in Freud's theory with the introduction of two concepts: surplus-repression and the performance principle. Briefly, the performance principle is the prevailing historical form of Freud's reality principle, and surplus-repression is the restriction necessitated by social domination (Robinson, *The Freudian Left.*, 1969). This is distinguished from basic repression, the "modification" of the instincts necessary for the perpetuation of the civilized human race. The additional controls arising from specific institutions of domination, for Marcuse, is surplus-repression. That is, surplus-repression signifies repression under capitalism, whereas, basic repression, as proposed by Freud, exemplifies repression under any form of civilization. Marcuse writes:

Throughout the recorded history of civilization, the instinctual constraint enforced by scarcity has been intensified by constraints enforced by the hierarchial

distribution of scarcity and labor; the interest of domination added surplus-repression to the organization of the instincts under the reality principle. The pleasure principle was dethroned not only because it mitigated against a civilization but also because it mitigated against a civilization whose progress perpetuates domination and toil.<sup>21</sup>

Marcuse accepts the need for social controls and authority (i.e. a planned economy), but he distinguishes this need from domination and unnecessary levels of instinctual repression, "surplus-repression," in profit oriented economies. Marcuse, further, ties in the marxist concept of "labor-time" with repressed sexuality. He explains that labor-time, in capitalist society, becomes an oppressive tool of the state apparatus, because the worker enjoys less leisurely activity for free uninhibited thought and sensual fantasy.

The further civilization progresses, according to Marcuse, the necessity for domination increases. Domination takes the form of repression and renunciation of instinctual gratification on the individual level, while it develops the form of labor and technology, conducive to control, on the societal level. Accordingly, and dialectically, the repressed libidinal energy through the process of genital sexuality, is channeled into 'labor-power' (a term borrowed from later Marx). Therefore, sensuality and primal sexuality are transformed into socially acceptable, economically feasible and productive forms of genital sexuality. Thus, the instinctual structure becomes muted and modified into a solely re-productive function. This remains one of the primary contributions by Marcuse to a dialectical synthesis of marxism and psychoanalysis, in Eros and Civilization.

Work has now become general, and so have restrictions placed upon the libido: labor time which is the largest part of the individual's life time, is painful time, for alienated labor is absence of gratification, negation of the pleasure principle.<sup>22</sup>

Marcuse is clearly and articulately integrating Freud's theory of libido and Marx's idea of "alienated labor." He emphasizes labor time in order to synthetically and dialectically describe the origins of the repressed individual as s/he exists under advanced capitalism. Specifically, he is combining Freud's notion that any civilization is a sacrifice of sexuality with the Marxian notion that under capitalism, the human being becomes a mere commodity and an instrument of alienated labor. Although, there arises some overlap and distortion of the two theories when integrated, which I shall make a point of later, Marcuse's manipulation of the two theoretical frameworks remains quite useful in developing a critical analysis of modern technological culture, and its relation to human nature. Further, the dialectical quality of marxism and psychoanalysis is repeatedly displayed by Marcuse in Eros and Civilization. For instance:

The conflict between sexuality and civilization unfolds with this development of domination. Under the rule of the performance principle, body and mind are made into instruments of alienated labor; they can function as such instruments only if they renounce the freedom of the libidinal subject-object which the human organism primarily is and desires. <sup>23</sup>

For Marcuse in Eros and Civilization ideology comes to dominate the lives of individuals in society. As with several other critical theorists, ideology, in the form of false consciousness, obliterates the



conceptual awareness for the masses of the exploited economic substructure. Therefore, the critical theorist attacks the overwhelming power of ideological institutions as the necessary battleground for a politically efficacious theory of social change.

Finally, the dialectical method serves to point out the relationships between the substructure of society and the superstructure of society; the relationship between the individual needs and societal demands; and the relationship of ideologies to other ideologies as epiphenomena of the superstructure. Psychoanalysis, as "conflict psychology" is the essential link to Marxism, as "conflict sociology," when these theories are integrated they present a composite dialectical theory of reality.

## CHAPTER II. PSYCHOANALYSIS AND MARXISM, POST FRANKFURT SCHOOL.

Freud's conception of the "psychic apparatus," his descriptions of the human's developmental psychohistory are as dialectical, composed of 'contradictions' and 'relations', as Marx's materialist perspective of historical phenomenon. For Freud, the dynamic conflict between id-ego-superego proceeds throughout the human life cycle. The origins of the dialectical self are exposed in early childhood and infancy where the cultural, ideological, beginnings of sexual organization takes place.

Norman O. Brown in Life Against Death captures the psychoanalytic meaning of history, comparable to and complementary of the marxist dialectical analysis of history. He describes "the essence of repression" as lying "in the refusal of the human being to recognize the realities of his human nature."<sup>24</sup> For Freud, as later interpreted here by Brown, the individual's "false-consciousness" or misrepresentation of material reality in human nature is derived from man's "denial" of infantile sexuality. According to Brown, the crucial point in Freud's hypotheses is the existence of psychic conflict, as with Marx, the crucial point is the existence of social conflict.

In linking the relations and contradictions of neurosis to history, Brown states:

Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny (each individual recapitulates the history of the race): in the few years of childhood "we have to cover the enormous distance of development from primitive man of the Stone Age to civilized man of today." From this it follows that the theory of neurosis must embrace a theory of history; and conversely a theory of history must embrace a theory of neurosis.<sup>25</sup>

For Brown, the "riddle of history" is found not in Reason but in Desire.

Freud and psychoanalytic theory have no inherent disagreement with the marxian notion of human activity in work, or labor. In psychoanalysis, work is the very essence of the "reality principle." But the reality of human nature which marxism cannot analyze, is the reality of the repressed unconscious desires. Norman O. Brown, in theoretical agreement with the psychoanalytic-anthropologist Ceza Roheim, (The Evolution of Culture), suggests that history began with the repression of sexual instincts. And, further, that the progression of history throughout civilization has only increased the level of collective repression. Accordingly, the psychic apparatus has developed the process, known in psychoanalytic theory, as the repressed unconscious. At this point in Brown's work, the internally subjective struggle between Eros, the life instinct, and Thanatos, the death instinct, becomes crucial. For Brown, the reunification of these historically competitive instincts means the ultimate break from our neurotic ties to history.

The reunification of Life and Death- accepting Freud's equation of Death and Nirvana can be envisioned only as the end of the historical process.<sup>26</sup>

Brown describes three elements in Freud's death instinct: 1). Nirvana, inactivity, rest, or sleep; 2). repetition-compulsion, principle of instinctual conservatism or a fixation to the past; 3). masochism, or sado-masochistic complex--departure from and an effort to regain paradise.

The abolition of history, or the Sabbath of Eternity, which is the ultimate aim of repetition-compulsion, is also the attainment of Nirvana, which is the ultimate aim of the pleasure-principle.<sup>27</sup>



According to Norman O. Brown, it is only the sado-masochistic element of the death instinct which presents death in the "real" sense. That is, the destructive element of the death instinct manifests itself in the sado-masochistic complex. The conflict within human nature occurs at the instinctual level; between Eros and the aggressive (death) instinct. Freud suggested that man's innate tendency towards aggression had only two alternatives; to turn the libidinal energy outward and destroy others or to turn it inward and destroy oneself.

For Brown, what distinguishes man from animal is man's flight from death. He claims that death is a part of life and that man is not only fleeing from his own death, but he is escaping his own life's Eros (sexuality). In other words, wo/man represses his own life as well as his own death. Here, Brown's argument in Life Against Death returns to the origins of repression in unconscious desires. He contends that the human beings unconscious fixation to the infantile past represents the disruption of instinctual unity between the life and death impulses. Further, aggressiveness if not repressed, creates a fusion of the life instinct with the death instinct, saving the human organism from self-destruction, turning the "desire" to die into a "desire" to kill. However, when the innate tendency to aggressiveness is repressed in early childhood, a disastrous split takes place within human nature between the two general instincts, Eros and death.

Freud's theory of anxiety brings birth and death together as separation crises. (my emphasis)  
Freud is thus moving toward a structural analysis of organic life as being constituted by a dialectic between unification or interdependence and separation and independence.<sup>28</sup>

This idea is crucial to understanding not only Brown's thesis in Life Against Death but in comprehending the dialectical nature of psychoanalytic theory as a "conflict psychology." In accordance with Freudian psychoanalytic theory, Brown describes the death instinct as the activity of separation and independence in preparation for individuality. Yet he point out, on the contrary, that mankind's historical nature is to flee the impulse of the death instinct through repression. Meanwhile, the instinctual tendency of Eros draws the organism towards unification and interdependence with the caretaker parent, contradicting and complicating the death instinct's struggle to give life individuality. Life begins with the "birth trauma"- separation from the maternal womb- and ends with death- separation from the physical world of reality. Both separation crises of life and death are prototypes for anxiety throughout the human life cycle. Moreover, this phenomena explains the human need for ideologies which function to sustain immortality of the species, such as religion and history-making. Brown states:

Hence there are no social groups without a religion of their own immortality, and history-making is always the quest for group immortality. Only an un-repressed humanity, strong enough to live-and-die, could let Eros seek union and let death keep separateness.<sup>29</sup>

Therefore, the dialectical dilemma of human nature, in psychoanalytic terms, is the inability and unwillingness of the species to accept death-separateness and independence as part of and necessary for human life, as expressed through individuality. In that sense, the death instinct becomes a healthy counterpart to the life instinct; when the two inherent tendencies are accepted as human nature.

The division of Eros from the death instinct originates, phylogenetically, as a fear of castration and separation from the mythical primal horde. The brother clan are restricted from possession of the mother and sisters by the authority of the omnipotent father. The sons fear the punishment of the father, as fantasy of castration, and also fear the inevitable separation from the protecting mother and expulsion from the horde at the hands of the powerful father. At the same moment they fear the primal father, the sons feel guilt for desiring to devour him and possess the mother. Their instinctual aggressiveness is unconsciously repressed and, consequently, the life instinct and death instincts do battle with one another. Brown writes:

The ultimate cause of repression and neurosis is anxiety, and anxiety is "the anxiety of separation from the mother." One of the hallmarks of the neurotic personality is a lifelong fixation to the infantile pattern of dependence on other people.<sup>30</sup>

Brown suggests that the prolonged period of "helpless" dependency during childhood conflicts with the innate strivings of the death instinct towards separation, independence, and individuality. The culprit is the ideological institution of the family.

In man the dialectical unity between union and separateness, between interdependence and independence, between species and individual- in short, between life and death- is broken. The break occurs in the human family.<sup>31</sup>

Critical to any theory of socialism is an analysis of the family and childhood. Moreover, the ultimate change within the very structure of



the self must occur on a psychological level as well as, the sociological metamorphose of the marxian notion of "social man." Thus, human transformation means wo/man's conciliation with the elements of the death instinct such as; separation, independence, and individuality. Brown's thesis in Life Against Death exposes a universal dilemma of mankind. And, only, psychoanalytic theory can effectively capture this oppressive psychological condition.

In summary, I will attempt to trace the ontogenetic origins of the dialectical break between Eros and the aggressive instinct in wo/man. In psychoanalytic terms, Eros (sexuality) symbolizes the actual unification and interdependence between infant and mother. While the death instinct (aggressivity) represents separateness and independence from the protection and love of the mother. The consequence of that separateness and independence from the maternal affection and caretaking is individuality and development of the mature, healthy, autonomous personality. The infant's first sensations of extrauterine life is experienced as trauma ("birth-trauma"). According to psychoanalytic literature, the birth trauma set the stage as the prototype of anxiety for the human organism throughout the life cycle. More importantly, the birth trauma is the result of the infants actual separation from the mother's womb, which develops into the later childhood fears and adult anxieties caused by "separation crises." Therefore, the human birth trauma is our first confrontation between Eros, as warmth and nurturance of intrauterine life, and the death instinct, as separation from the maternal womb.

The pre-oedipal phase of life is overwhelmingly dominated by the "pleasure-principle" and Eros. Infantile sexuality is "polymorphously perverse." That is, the whole body of the living organism is experienced as erotic and pleasure-giving. Further, at this "primary narcissistic" stage of development, the infant is related to by parents or significant others as bi-sexual, and therefore, relates to itself as neither male nor female gender. Consequently, the pre-oedipal moment of life is the most envied time of all existence, when Eros experiences little inhibition from the contradicting death instinct and the "reality principle."

Next, the oedipal project takes over with an onslaught of powerful contradictions and conflict situations for the child. In general, the oedipal project has a very social function. I will argue that it is the beginnings of socialization into patriarchy, which is experienced by the human life as a process of desexualization. Its origins are the "incest taboo" and the castration complex. Broadly speaking, it takes place for both sexes as a rejection of the mother, but for different motives. The little boy desires to possess the mother, the original love-object, but discovers that he cannot have her due to the overbearing presense of the omnipotent, patriarchal father. The male child represses the desires to posssess the mother, which become "unconscious," in addition to his fear of separation from the mother, in response to the castration anxieties he experiences as emanating from the threatening father. The little girl perceives herself as "missing something" or, in some traumatic instances, injured and castrated, in comparison to the father or brother in the family. Whereupon, she rejects the mother for not being given the penis.

The crucial Oedipal project functions to repress infantile sexuality, and to develop a coping mechanism, sublimation, for desexualization of the organism. It further constructs a socially acceptable genital organization with a preference for masculinity through an obsessive concern and idolization of the penis. At this moment of psychohistory, the death instinct, in the guise of separation and reality principle, overwhelms Eros and reconstructs human sexuality.

On the other hand, throughout all of childhood, most of us live an existence of prolonged, "helpless," dependency upon our parents. The unreality of prolonged dependence upon the other, makes the transition into adulthood and "responsible" life that much more traumatic and anxiety-ridden. In retrospect, it is easy to understand why the common neurotic would be fixated to the infantile past of the pleasure-principle. Individuality, that "healthy" element of the death instinct, becomes the existential goal and collective struggle of "psychological" man.

Juliet Mitchell: Patriarchy, Rationality, And The Dialectics Of Castration Anxiety.

Juliet Mitchell in Psychoanalysis and Feminism describes the Oedipus Complex as the 'nucleus of neurosis', not due to the actual incest wishes that it mirrors - but the act of repression of these. Therefore, neurotic symptoms are derivatives of repression not wishes alone. Mitchell states that the "energies of the Oedipal desires will continue in operation in the formation of the superego." 32 In other words, the unresolved Oedipal Complex reemerges through rationality and reification, in the context of the superego as distorted and unrecognizable neurotic symptom.



The fear of castration by the father transfers into a threat from the superego that was formed out of an identification with the father.

Anxious that he will suffer castration from his father, if he does not give up his desires for his mother, the little boy represses the idea of incest. If the castration complex is not adequately resolved - and that means if the possibility of castration is not symbolically accepted, then the Oedipus Complex is not shattered and aspects of its irresolution will recur in later neurosis. 33

In patriarchal society, rationality becomes a theory of castration. Rationality and conscience are developed out of a fear of castration. Furthermore, if the symbolic castration is accepted and the Oedipus Complex thus extinguished, the next stage of anxiety, as Mitchell describes, must be the integrated superego, which has taken the position of conscience from the dominating father. The Oedipal project, for Mitchell, arose psychohistorically alongside the creation of patriarchal civilization. Castration anxiety is a normal occurrence of patriarchy, and only in its exaggerated form neurotic. With the acceptance of the Oedipus situation, castration anxiety converges (is sublimated) into a form of patriarchal moral anxiety. The moral self has temporarily conquered the desires and wishes of the 'evil self'.

For Mitchell, the castration complex comes to be the all important distinction between the sexes:

. . . while the child is at the highest point of its infantile sexual development a genital organization of a sort established; but only the male genitals play a part in it, and the female ones remain undiscovered. At this stage the contrast between the sexes is not stated, in terms of 'male' or 'female' but of 'possessing a penis' or 'castrated'. The castration complex that arises in this connection is of profoundest importance in the formation of character and neuroses. 34

Moreover, the impact of the pre-Oedipal period for the female, which recognizes her castration, predisposes the woman, as Mitchell explains, to a significantly feminine type of neurosis- hysteria; whereas the Oedipus and castration complexes dispose men to their particular brand of neurosis- obsessionality. Further, in western patriarchal society, "obsessionality is closely linked to excessive rationality, a quality that is valued- the description 'hysterical' is invariably derogatory." 35 Obsessional neuroses becomes the counterpart of western technological rationality in the collective cover-up of human instinctual drives and natural impulse; i.e., the fear of the father and the desire for the mother, in the little boy; or the hostility to the mother, for the little girl, in response to her mother's failure to make her a boy.

Further, Mitchell argues that the Oedipus complex, and specifically, the castration anxieties, reinforce the division of labor in patriarchy and, more importantly, paves the ideological path to capitalism. The sexual contradictions within the castration complex among male and female counterparts makes it possible for the construction of male dominated families. By way of the castration complex, the female (without the penis) is socially inferiorized to the male (with the omnipotent phallus). The Oedipal complex, alongside patriarchy, originated with the beginnings of recorded history in civilization. Therefore, the question of where it began is irrelevant. More crucial is recognition of its existence and the social context of its role in patriarchy. Broadly speaking, the "castrated" women remain at home to reproduce the necessary labor-force; where they are exploited as unpaid labor. Meanwhile, the



husband sells his labor-power for wages, whereupon he returns to the patriarchal family with its material sustenance. In this sense, the traditional male has an objective sense of power in his relation to the family as "bread winner" and a subjective sense of power in possessing the "biggest" phallus in the family.

Eli Zaretsky: The Family, The Mode Of Production, And The Split Between Politics And Personal Life.

Eli Zaretsky's Capitalism, The Family, And Personal Life suggests, following the ideas putforth by Juliet Mitchell in Women's Estate, that the family unit be recognized as the ideological link between the economic structure under capitalism and inner psychological life arising from male supremacy in the Oedipus complex. Accordingly, psychoanalysis provides a theory of the family. One of its primary theoretical concerns is the role instinctual sexuality plays in social life. Through the process of psycho-sexual development within the family unit under capitalism, the instinctual life is "constrained" and socially reformed. The mature adult product arises from the family desexualized but economically marketable as labor-power. The little boys acceptance of the Oedipal complex and his subsequent identification with the socially dominant father molds his character structure to fit the totemic nature of the capitalist system. Meanwhile, the little girl's confrontation with her Oedipal phase eventually forms an identification with the mother-housewife, manifesting yet another generation of male supremacy, patriarchy, and capitalist production. Zaretsky writes:

The organization of production under capitalism is predicated upon the existence of a certain form of family life. The wage labor system socialized pro-



duction under capitalism is sustained by the socially necessary but private labor of housewives and mothers. Child-rearing, cleaning, laundry, the maintenance of property, the preparation of food, daily health care, reproduction, etc. constitute a perpetual cycle of labor necessary to maintain life in this society. In this sense, the family is an integral part of the economy under capitalism. 36

Zaretsky's epistemological orientation of psychoanalysis and marxism recognizes that certain forms of personal life are necessary and, at the same moment, reflective of the capitalist system. A common failure among political theorists and socio-political movements, for that matter, are their resistances in investigating the primary sexual interrelationships within the family and their subsequent relationship to social, psychological, and economic conditions.

Zaretsky argues that a 'split' exists between personal life and politics due to historical ideological movements since the rise of capitalism.

Just as capitalist development gave rise to the idea of the family as a separate realm from the economy, so it created a 'separate' sphere of personal life, seemingly divorced from the mode of production. 37

The illusion of separateness between personal life and the public realm came about with the decline in necessary labor-time. According to Zaretsky, a social movement towards personal fulfillment occurred. This meant an individual turning-inward and a search for personal meaning in ones life. The family became a refuge for subjectivity. The women, whom at one time were among the labor-force, attached themselves to the social status of housewives and mothers. Meanwhile, the husbands, with additional free leisure time outside of production, became more obsessed with personal life.

The family now became the major space in society in which the individual self could be valued 'for itself'. This process, the private accompaniment of industrial development, cut women off from men in a drastic way and gave a new meaning to male supremacy. 38

The family came to be defined and regulated through a belief in the Protestant ethics. In addition, a new conception of human nature arose as 'possessive individualism'. The separation between personal life and the social division of labor was complete.

### CHAPTER III. CONCLUSIONS

#### A NOTE ON THE ORTHODOX-STRUCTURALIST MARXIST POSITION.

The structural marxist, or what used to be called the orthodox marxist, diverges from many critical theorist who leaves the sphere of commodity exchange and enters the world of ideology. According to such marxists as Louis Althusser and Maurice Godelier, without a material base as the origin of ideological conflicts, every ideology has the same weight, and the struggle becomes a struggle between ideologies rather than a struggle between the relation of material reality to separate and competing ideologies, each having their basis in individual and class interests. Godelier states in his article, "Structure and Contradiction in Capital:"

If capital is not a thing, but a social relationship, i.e. a non-sensible reality, it must inevitably disappear when presented in the sensible forms of raw materials, tools, money, etc. It is not the subject who deceives himself, but reality which deceives him, and the appearances in which the structure of the capitalist production process conceals itself are the starting point for individual's conceptions. 39

The structuralist believes that the mode of production of goods plays the "determinant" role in Marx's economic theory of Capital, and I agree with this important distinction of his later work. He points out two contradictions or conflicts in Capital: 1) the contradiction between capitalists and workers which arose along with capitalism itself, and 2) the contradiction between the increasingly social nature of the forces of production and the still private character of appropriation. The structuralist moves from a description of the functioning of the capitalist system to its hidden internal structure. The



role of the individual, dominant in critical theory, and the work of Marcuse, Brown, Mitchell, and Zaretsky, has been virtually removed to backstage within the structuralist interpretation of Marx. More to the point, the orthodox-structuralist Marxist feels less compelled than the critical or humanist theorist to place any significant value on the early philosophical works of Karl Marx. The structuralist views the Marx of Capital as scientific, and crucial to an understanding of Marxist theory of political economy. Emphasis upon the economic substructure, the mode of production, has relevance to marxist political economic theory without concern for ideology and human consciousness, as explored through other interpretations of marxist methodology. As explained by Louis Althusser:

By rejecting the essence of man as his theoretical basis, Marx rejected the whole of this organic system of postulates. He drove the philosophical categories of the subject, of empiricism, of the ideal essence, etc., from all domains in which they had been supreme. 40

The structuralist focuses upon the social formations of history not the subjective element of these social formations.

#### PSYCHOANALYSIS: A STRUCTURAL INTERPRETATION OF THE MIND- THE PSYCHIC APPARATUS.

The predominance of psychoanalytic theories description of the workings of the mind is derived from Freud's structural analysis of the psychic apparatus in The Ego And The Id. He describes a tripartite structure consisting of superego, ego, id, devoid of any externally objective elements. That is, a clear conception of the mind is apprehended if we examine the internal structures. Freud declares:

We shall soon see whether we can derive any advantage from this view for purposes either of description or of understanding. We shall now look upon an individual as a psychical id, unknown and unconscious, upon whose surface rests the ego, developed from its nucleus the Pcpt. system. If we make an effort to represent this pictorially, we may add that the ego does not completely envelope the id, but only does so to the extent which the system Pcpt. forms its (the ego's) surface, more or less as the germinal disc rests upon the ovum. The ego is not sharply separated from the id; its lower portion merges into it.<sup>41</sup>

The structural analysis of both methodologies of marxism and psychoanalysis are crucial to their independent comprehensibilities. But these particular conceptual frameworks fall short in their ability to critically analyze dialectical relationships of subject-object reality. Hence, the development of Freud's metapsychology and the Left-Hegelian Marxist emphasis upon ideologies, functions to complete the dialectical unity.

PSYCHOANALYSIS: A CONFLICT PSYCHOLOGY AND MARXISM: A CONFLICT SOCIOLOGY.

From his work Dialectical Materialism And Psychoanalysis, Wilhelm Reich contends that psychoanalysis shares several crucial presuppositions with marxism. At the onset, he argues that psychoanalysis is basically a materialist science, although not in the "touchable" and/or "measurable" sense. "Like Marx, Freud focused on real human needs and experiences. He began with the concrete material facts of love and hunger, and he followed the tragic fate of these instincts as they came up against the equally concrete hostility of nature and society."<sup>42</sup> According to Reich, psychoanalysis was a dialectical science; the underlying theme in all of Freud's work was the activity of psychic conflict. "As Marxism was a conflict sociology, Freudianism was a conflict psychology."<sup>43</sup>



Reich's ideas continued to enrich the notion that psychoanalysis was as revolutionary a science as marxism. "He suggested that just as Marxism represented a critique of bourgeois economics brought forth by contradictions within capitalism itself, psychoanalysis was a critique of bourgeois morality which, in dialectical fashion, arose out of contradictions inherent in sexual repression."<sup>44</sup> Psychoanalysis became a critical methodology of repressive civilization and social mores, while marxism became a conceptual framework critical of the capitalist mode of production.

#### INTEGRATION OF MARXISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

Some methodological difficulties with integrating both theories:

To begin, Freud's theory of psychoanalysis ventures to examine and comprehend the unconscious (repressed) desires of the mind, while Marx's theory of labor embarks upon an interpretation of structural phenomena existing outside the self. Therefore, it would appear the two theoretical models are derived from separate realms of reality, and perhaps, rendered incompatible. The psychoanalyst studies internal mental phenomena, while the orthodox marxist studies external structural social phenomena. One might argue that the theories of Marx and Freud should be held separate and comprehended as exclusive entities. Only confusion, misunderstanding, and definitional inconsistency, might result from undertaking a study of both theories as integrated at the outset; rather than par-taking of them as separate and make full conceptual use of both methods of inquiry within their own theoretical framework. I feel no overwhelming need to develop one overarching theory from two already solid



and distinctive epistemologies, marxism and psychoanalysis, They serve their independent theoretical claims to social inquiry quite well. But let us not rule out the efficacy and applicability of utilizing both theories simultaneously and dialectically.

Psychoanalysis - a psychology for Marxism:

From his essay on Alienated Labor, Marx distinguishes between human functions (and needs) and animal functions (and needs). According to Marx, the characteristics of human needs are: 1) working to produce; 2) working in accordance with one's own conscious plan; and 3) doing work that one can take pride in what he has produced, such as, the artist who produces along a rational plan and who creates an object of value to himself and others. The Marxian concept of human needs involves a "conscious" activity with one's environment. "It is just in his work upon the objective world that man really proves himself as a species-being."<sup>45</sup>

A person who lives for eating, drink, and procreating alone, for Marx, would be no more than an animal. Animal needs, contrary to human needs, are strictly survival needs. Under capitalism species life is "reduced" to a level of animal functions, due to the alienation of man from his labor and species life.

Man becomes separated and eventually controlled by that which he produces. In capitalist society, the worker is forced to continue producing, since he possesses no other means of survival aside from his labor-power. "His work is not voluntary but imposed, forced labor. Its not the satisfaction of a need, but only a means for satisfying other needs." <sup>46</sup>

The worker does not belong to himself anymore but to another person. He can no longer realize his nature (potential) in the objective world of conscious activity, because he no longer controls his personal, productive activity. He does not own nor control the means of production. And, as the technology of capitalist society becomes more clearly defined a greater division of labor appears. The systematic technique of devoting certain people to certain tasks creates greater productivity for capitalism. Hence, alienation from the act of production results because workers no longer perceive of their work as their own- extension of self. Although, they continue to labor for subsistence wage alone. According to Marx, the human function is violated in capitalist society due to the specialization of tasks. But Marx does not claim the impact of capitalism on human sexuality, rather on man and his relation to labor. Meanwhile, alienation realizes its peak in capitalist society. The wage relationship governs the process of commodity production. Human beings become commodities, in capitalism, and they are regarded by one another as commodities. Further, there is an enormous competition for jobs due to a surplus labor-force under capitalism, and worker regard other workers as threats to their subsistence.

Marx's notion of need in capitalist society is mentioned in his article on Needs, Product, And Division Of Labor.

Everyone tries to establish over others an alien power in order to find there the satisfaction of his own egoistic need. With the increasing mass of objects, therefore, the realm of alien entities to which man is subjected also increases. 47

Capitalism takes away a person's freedom by creating appetite. You become economically subservient to the product, in order to, pay it off. It creates artificial desires for things people do not ordinarily need. This system, according to Marx, makes people more dependent on their appetites, they lack control of themselves, dragged by passions and desires in capitalism. The more exploitation through appetite for products, the more capital the capitalist accumulates, the more oppressed the workers become, resulting in, more commodities produced by the capitalist. Each person's capacities are reduced because of alienation. Marx claims that a distinction between false needs and genuine needs is necessary where capitalism makes no distinction.

Marx derived a psychological idea of freedom from Hegel. For Hegel, "to be free" meant to feel no presence of an object other than one self. For example, if the moral requirements imposed by society feel not as a part of the self; then one is "unfree" in the Hegelian sense. But, on the contrary, I might internalize those moral requirements of society as a part of the self. Yet, for Marx, this could be interpreted that the worker who labors to get paid and supply rent and food for his family is "unfree." Whereas, the worker who works for the sake of itself, the pride of his labor, is "free." Of course, Marx does not think that psychological unfreedom is the most important kind of unfreedom. He recognizes the objective sense of unfree. That is, the capitalist is unfree by his accumulation of possessions which make demands on his emotional life. Hence, the capitalists are unfree, in a psychological sense, as well as the alienated workers in capitalist



society. Marx's primary concern is with a critique of capitalism and a description of needs manifested within the capitalist form of production.

Marx does not develop a concept of "real human needs" or "species needs." His theory of alienation only begins a discussion on the concept of needs. These early writings of Marx leave us to infer a great deal on what are man's real needs. And, moreover, his later "scientific" work in Capital remove the human element of analysis into the background of consideration. The psychoanalytic perspective adds considerably to the marxian notion of human needs.

First of all, the distinction between Marx's conception of needs and Freud's conception of needs (desires) must be clarified. For Marx, human needs are those functions involved in work, productivity, and activity on the objective world, whereas, animal needs are survival necessities such as; eating, drink, and procreating. Of course, its not clear whether human sexuality, for Marx, is considered separate from procreating. Anyway, for Freud, the basic needs are instinctual and constitute sexual and aggressive (sometimes destructive) drives. While Marx, in his early writings, focused on the "human needs" to produce and to work, Freud observed the individual's needs and drives to satisfy sexual and aggressive desires. According to Freud, contrary to Marx, the human phenomenon of work is described as the activity of sublimating primary sexual and aggressive needs. Although Freud accepts the necessity in civilized life to sublimate instinctual energy in work, Marx did not the dialectical relations between sexuality and labor. The Marcusean synthesis of Marx and Freud is most useful and extensive on this topic.

According to the Freudian psychoanalytic perspective, man's alienation from his nature begins in the early life of infancy and childhood, separate from the mode of production. It is Freud's contention that civilization is built upon the renunciation of instinctual life. Freud bases this claim of renounced instinctual gratification in the origins of the "primal horde." The further civil society progresses the more suppressed becomes human sexuality and instinctual life. Therefore, with each additional moment of history man becomes more alienated from his instinctual nature.

In developing a concept of "real human needs" and "instinctual gratification," Freud describes the consequence of repressed human nature in his theory of anxiety and neuroses. He explains that due to frustrations of sexual life, the neurotic creates substitute satisfactions for him/herself in the form of symptoms. Whereas, Marx describes human needs and so-called animal needs in terms of capitalist society, Freud traces these primary needs to their origins in the phylogenetic (i.e. the primal horde) and ontogenetic (i.e. pre-oedipal and oedipal complexes) worlds. Freud describes basic human needs as dialectically opposing actions of two instincts, Eros and the death instinct. He states that the inclination to aggression is an original, self-subsisting, instinctual disposition in man which constitutes the greatest impediment to civilization. The struggle between Eros and death, the instinct of life (sexuality) and the instinct of aggressivity describes the universal dialectic of the civilized human species. The conflict takes shape the moment that

wo/man are confronted with the task of living together, i.e. the family. Freud discovered that a universal law against human nature existed within the childhood experience under patriarchal, family life, in the "Oedipus Complex," where the conscience (super-ego) and the very first "sense of guilt" arose in mankind.

Marxism- a social context for psychoanalytic theory and praxis:

Integrating Marxist theory with psychoanalysis is crucial for developing a comprehensive political theory. Both theoretical models describe reality from opposite, yet dialectically related, positions; one psychological and the other sociological. A psychoanalytic theory of politics must not only concern itself with relations and contradictions within the family unit, but it should also entail the investigation of relations and contradictions inside the social realm of the political economy. Moreover, a psychoanalytic-marxist theory of politics must take on a conceptual framework which oversees the dialectical relations between the family unit and the capitalist system. That is, it must involve the investigator with examining the contradictions not only inside the family and the capitalist market place, but with the relationship and contradictions between personal life and political reality. The dialectic is three-dimensional: 1) it exists within a psychological sphere where subject-object interact and become internalized within the self; 2) it exists within a sociological sphere where subject-object interact and are externalized away from the self and projected onto the other; 3) finally, the dialectic exists on a psychological and sociological plane at the same moment interacting and contradicting one another. A political theory combining the critical tools of investigation from marxism and psychoanalysis is



capable of examining the whole of man's relations, both conscious and unconscious, to his/her world.

A marxist theoretical approach can place the interpersonal relationships within the family on a social perspective in connection with patriarchy and the capitalist mode of production. The marxist-analyst can point out to the psycho-analyst the ideological function patriarchal families perform for capitalist societies; i.e. as consumers and as paid and unpaid labor, etc.

In practice, the psychoanalytic-psychotherapist of the marxist variety, which I am proposing, should be sensitive to two significant sources of anxiety arising in modern technological society. In general, first, the neuroses arising from one's alienation from his human nature in work and his/her potential to create; and secondly, neuroses (as symptoms) arising from psychosexual developments or fixations in early psychic formations of reality in object relations. In addition, the analyst must be conscious of the dynamic relations between the two areas of discomfort.

A Final Note On The Work Of Herbert Marcuse

In my estimation, the theoretical work of Herbert Marcuse best exemplifies the applicability of psychoanalytic theory and marxism for political inquiry. For instance, he utilizes Freudian theory and its conception of the "unconscious" to explain the occurrence of repeated, failed revolutions, and the consequent authoritarian domination of the masses which follows. Such a social phenomena is of crucial relevance to marxist theory, but marxism does not address itself to the problem. Marcuse writes:

Freud's hypothesis on the origin and perpetuation of guilt feeling elucidates, in psychological terms, this sociological dynamic: it explains the "identification" of those who revolt with the power against which they revolt. . . .

The revolt against the primal father eliminated an individual person who could be (and was) replaced by other persons; but when the dominion of the father has expanded into the dominion of society, no such replacement seems possible, and guilt becomes fatal.<sup>48</sup>

According to Marcuse, by way of Freud's metapsychology, revolutionaries unconsciously identify with the power against which they revolt. The revolt is no longer against an individual person, the father, who can be replaced by others, the brother clan, rather, it is against a society of institutions and structures (as Marx would have it) which provides goods and services.

For Marcuse, labor becomes a reaction-formation to renunciation of instincts, thereby, funneling original guilt into exploitable libidinal energy for labor and the progress of civilization. The further civili-

zation progresses under the capitalist mode of production; greater and more intense forms of political domination come about through massive control over consciousness. Furthermore, the continuance of domination results in the rigidification of human instinct by ideological transformations of people into automats; from species-being to commodities; from Eros to Thanatos; from creative, impulsive work to alienated labor; and, finally, from use-value productivity to surplus-value for the elite.

On the brighter-side of Marcuse's argument, a liberation of repressed instincts may surface with the extension of free-time and play. That is, in the later stages of capitalism the length of the working day decreases leaving more free-time, if not dominated by technological consciousness, for satisfying libidinal energy over the whole of the body, rather, than the genitals alone.

It is Marcuse's belief that a re-definition of human sexuality as polymorphous erotic will ultimately dissolve the oppressive, patriarchal institutions of the reality principle. Specifically, he has in mind, the destruction of the patriarchal family unit and monogamic genital supremacy. Marcuse, much like Brown, is arguing for the liberation of the body as an "instrument of pleasure," a reestablishment of pre-genital polymorphous sexuality. For Marcuse, "civilized morality" has dictated against the use of the body as an object of pleasure and sexuality has become dignified by "love." He argues that with the emergence of a non-repressive reality principle, the fixated, sexual process will reverse itself.



. . . the process just outlines involves not simply a release but a transformation of the libido: from sexuality constrained under genital supremacy to erotization of the entire personality. It is a spread rather than explosion of the libido--a spread over private and societal relations which bridges the gap maintained between them by a repressive reality principle. This transformation of libido would be the result of a societal transformation that released the free-play of individual needs and faculties.<sup>49</sup>

The economic and political prerequisite for the transformation of work into play and sexuality into Eros is the conquest of scarcity and alienation, which Marcuse predicts will arise with the apex of capitalism and modern technological society.

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