


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
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THE UNITED STATES ARMY'S CONTRIBUTION  
TO THE MARSHALL MISSION IN CHINA  
JANUARY 1, 1946, TO MARCH 1, 1947

by  
Wesley Carlton Wilson

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School  
of the University of Maryland in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
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## CHAPTER I

### 1945: JAPANESE ARMY SURRENDER EXPLODES CHINESE NATIONALIST AND COMMUNIST PARTY ARMIES

The formal surrender of the Japanese on the deck of the U. S. Battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay, Japan, on September 2, 1945, was the signal for the National Government Forces and the Communist Party Forces in China to expand and grab territory with great vigor and resource.<sup>1</sup>

On order of the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers in Tokyo, the Chinese National Republic of Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek was designated as the agent of the Allies to take over the surrender of the Japanese and the Japanese Controlled Forces on the Chinese Mainland.<sup>2</sup> The Japanese Commanders carried out their orders with precision and detail.

At the same time, General Chu Teh - the Commander in Chief of the Communist Party Armies, whose headquarters was

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<sup>1</sup>"Move in North China," The Times (London), August 21, 1945, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup>F. C. Jones, Hugh Borton, and B. R. Pearn, The Far East 1942-1947, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955) p. 499.



located in Yen-an, Shansi Province - ordered the Japanese to turn over their arms and equipment to the Communist Forces.<sup>3</sup> This order was issued because it was a part of Chinese Communist strategy in 1945 to secure all the military supplies possible in order to increase their strength against the day when they would challenge Chiang Kai Shek for supremacy in China. As early as 1939 in his book, "My Country and My People", Lin Yutang had suggested that the future of China would be resolved between these two opposing forces. He says: "The internal political system of China will take a middle road fought out between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party, or between Chiang Kai Shek and the Eighth Route Army, Generals Chu Teh and Mao Tse Tung."<sup>4</sup> In spite of General Chu Teh's order, the Japanese would not and did not turn over their arms to the Chinese Communists.

Teams of United States Army officers were designated as observers to witness the surrender of Japanese military equipment to Chinese Nationalist Forces. These were dispatched from Kunming and Chungking to all areas occupied by the Japanese Army on the mainland of China with the exception of units in Manchuria and the Russian sphere of action. Colonel W. C. Wilson was one of the U. S.

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<sup>3</sup>Harley F. MacNair and Donald F. Lach, Modern Far Eastern International Relations, (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1950), p. 637.

<sup>4</sup>Lin Yutang, My Country and My People, New York: The John Day Company, Inc., 1939, p. 415.

Army officers delegated to witness the surrender of the 12th Japanese Army Group at Chenghshien, Honan Province, on September 9, 1945.<sup>5</sup> The Chinese Commander of the First War Zone, General Hu Tsu Nan, was the commander disarming the Japanese Armies in the area of Chenghshien on the Yellow River.<sup>6</sup> This city sometimes referred to as Chengchow, is in Honan Province and is the junction of the Lunghai and Peiping-Hankow Railroads. The surrender was effected in a ceremony which took place in a pleasant courtyard of a large Chinese administrators home. The Japanese Commander in Chief presented his sword to General Hu Tsu Nan and his Chief of Staff presented a listing of the officers, men, rifles, guns, and impedimenta to General HU's representative. General Hu and his officers were so happy and excited over the turn of events which had suddenly caused the Japanese Army to give up, that they could not contain themselves.

After the ceremony, a second meeting was held with the Japanese General and his staff officers<sup>7</sup> and the U. S. Army Team in which duplicate lists of officers, men, and military equipment were given to the U. S. Army officer witnesses. The General explained to them that his army had lived and maintained itself in the area for more than

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<sup>5</sup>Private papers, Colonel W. C. Wilson, September 9, 1945.

<sup>6</sup>"Chinese Troops Continue to Disarm Japs", The Chungking Reporter, Vol. II, No. 27, September 6, 1945.

<sup>7</sup>Search in files of Chief of U.S. Military History fails to reveal name of Japanese General.



a year. He announced that he did not understand why his nation was surrendering to China. He pointed out that he and his men and units performed a very great service because they provided peace and protection for all the citizens to carry out their normal pursuits. On his wall maps he showed the American officers where guerilla activities were centered and stated that guerillas occupied all the country except the railroads and well travelled roads.<sup>8</sup>

His words proved to be true. Within Twenty-four hours after his troops marched away from the Railroad Stations, the Civic Buildings, the food warehouses, and distribution centers, pandemonium reigned. The previously orderly streets were a scene of confusion. Some shopkeepers closed and boarded their places of business. Crowds of country people roamed without direction. Groups of soldiers engaged in altercations with civilians. Emergency policemen made no attempt to direct traffic and keep the peace.

After a day of such discord General Hu sent a messenger for Colonel James O. Wade,<sup>9</sup> the senior officer of the U. S. Army delegation that was taking part in the surrender, and asked him to act as a mediator with the

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<sup>8</sup> Private papers, Colonel Wilson, September 9, 1945.

<sup>9</sup> Interview with Colonel James O. Wade, September 11, 1945.

Japanese General. He specifically wanted an immediate audience with the Japanese General. It was arranged in a short time and that afternoon the Chinese, the Americans and the Japanese met in the dimly lighted room that the Japanese General used as a sitting room in his Headquarters at Chenghsien. General Hu was agitated and upset. "I want you to lend me your forces to protect the property of the citizens and the National Government," he said.

The Japanese General was businesslike and polite. "Of course," he replied. "I'll do anything you desire. My men are not very busy. We have put them to planting gardens because we do not know how long they will be here."<sup>10</sup>

General Hu then explained to the group that the bandits in the outlying areas, the normal cutthroats, robbers and thugs in the city were not the real trouble, but that his own, the Chinese Division Commanders, were not controlling their men. The 19th Army had been given one area in the city and the 23rd Army had been given the adjacent area. When the troops of both came to a warehouse with particularly valuable property, they took it over for their own generals and a pitched battle ensued which was as deadly as any engaged in during the past war. The Japanese General outlined that he would put guards on the areas who would respect the boundaries of the City as

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid.



General Hu Tsu Nan prescribed them. General Hu gave up a map which showed the necessary information and the conference was over.

The next time that one of the American observers passed one of the indicated warehouses, everything was quiet and peaceful.<sup>11</sup> Two sturdy, completely armed Chinese soldiers were marching back and forth. Each was armed with a Light Machine Gun and a magazine of 45 caliber shells inserted in the magazine. In addition, both had two German type potato masher grenades strapped to their chests. From the straw sandals on their feet to the cotton cap with the blue and white star of the Kuomintang on it, they looked the part of military sentries. But the real master of the situation was a small squat figure in a light cotton sleeveless shirt and cotton shorts. The Japanese soldier cap bore no insignia and the man was bare handed. He was there and that was all that was needed to preserve order.

In a few days the American team flew back to Kunming<sup>12</sup> and the Headquarters of the Chinese Combat Command, from whence they had come. The American Army was withdrawing from Western China as fast as planes could carry them back over the Hump to India or trucks could haul them

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<sup>11</sup>"Japanese Forces Disarmed, Order Restored", The Chungking Reporter, Vol II No. 29, September 20, 1945.

<sup>12</sup>Private papers, Colonel W. C. Wilson, September 15, 1945.

back over the Stilwell Road, enroute to Calcutta and thence to the United States.

All of the officers, men, and equipment in Western China were not sent back to the United States in this memorable fall of 1945. A few were diverted to Shanghai on orders of General Albert C. Wedemeyer, China Theater Commander. There they were put to work supervising the movement of other U. S. soldiers, officers, and records, back to the United States; and they assisted the movement of Nationalist Chinese Armies into South and Central China.<sup>13</sup> Those Americans detained, had no inkling of the unusual events which they were soon going to be called upon to take part in. For the present they busied themselves with numerous activities in Shanghai, which arose because of the changeover from the Japanese occupation, the evacuation and repatriation of the Japanese, and the taking over of sovereignty by the Republic of China Forces.

Speculations of the officers and men remaining in Shanghai ranged from topics such as praise for the Eighth Route Army in Shansi Province, or the training Stilwell's Command gave the Kuomintang New Sixth Army at Ramgahr, India; and how soon they would bring their wives and families to China to take up a sort of occupation duty which did not appear to be too arduous. These speculations

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<sup>13</sup> U.S. Department of State, Memorandum by Secretary Byrnes, for the War Department, December 9, 1945, Appendix 2.



were heightened on December 20 by the appearance of General George Catlett Marshall at the entrance of the China Theater Command, in company with General Wedemeyer at Shanghai.<sup>14</sup>

General George C. Marshall arrived on Chinese soil and directed the lives and activities of part of the U.S. Military Forces in China as the Special Representative of President Harry S. Truman with the rank of an Ambassador. He was appointed on November 27, 1945,<sup>15</sup> and served in this capacity until he left China on his nomination to be Secretary of State of the United States on January 7, 1947. This appointment of General Marshall to China filled the vacancy created by the resignation of General Patrick J. Hurley as personal representative of President Roosevelt to China.

General Patrick J. Hurley had labored since August 18, 1944, to bring about a conciliation between the Nationalist and the Communist elements in China and succeeded in several particulars of preparing the groundwork for whatever success the retired Army Chief of Staff was to experience.<sup>16</sup> It was January 8, 1945, that General Patrick Hurley presented his credentials as the American

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<sup>14</sup>Richard E. Lauterbach, Danger from the East (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 269.

<sup>15</sup>Harry S. Truman, Memoirs Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1952 (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1957), p. 61.

<sup>16</sup>"Crisis in China Eased," The Times (London), August 28, 1945, p. 4.

Ambassador to Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek at Chungking; and from that moment until his resignation was sent to the President on November 26, 1945, he faced one crisis and dilemma after another.<sup>17</sup> The aggressive leaders on both sides of the Chinese political situation were not to be denied the opportunity to struggle for land and power through his endeavors.

The man who was to experience the full impact of this struggle was General George C. Marshall, and with him those officers and men of the United States Army that were sent to assist him during the period January 1, 1946, to March 1, 1947. Even though General Marshall was the head of a diplomatic mission, he utilized the resources of the U. S. Army to carry out the practical measures which the interest of the United States policy dictated. It had been General Marshall who persuaded Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson in 1942 to send General Joseph Stilwell to China because of his military reputation and knowledge of that area.<sup>18</sup> During the period of the war, Secretary Stimson and General Marshall had developed China aid to the best of their abilities in this crowded global conflict, with emphasis on Europe rather than Asia, and it was a fortuitous choice of President Harry S Truman to pick

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<sup>17</sup>U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations with China, 1944-1949, Annex 50.

<sup>18</sup>Henry L. Stimson, Diary, January 14, 1942, quoted in Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948) p. 530.

General Marshall and the United States Army to further United States policy in this unusual aspect of foreign affairs.



## CHAPTER II

### EFFORTS OF THE U. S. TO KEEP CHINA IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The mission of the Allied Powers and the United States from 1941 to 1945 was to keep China in the War. This was expressed in the Declaration of Cairo, which was released on December 1, 1943.<sup>1</sup> This Declaration agreed to by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, announced allied policy to Japan and Germany. Essentially, Japan was to know that "the Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan", and with these objects in view, the Three Allies, in harmony with other nations at war with Japan, "will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan". One of the purposes as stated in the Declaration was that "all territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria,

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<sup>1</sup>U.S. Department of State Bulletin, IX (December 1, 1943), p. 393.



Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China".<sup>2</sup>

In spite of this public pronouncement, the U. S. contribution to the Chinese war effort was primarily in diplomatic endeavor and military supplies.<sup>3</sup> Only two routes of passage existed from the United States to China. These were the Burma Road and the so-called Hump. The latter was the name given to the air transport of military equipment, gasoline, and impedimenta over the unusually high Himalaya Mountains by the U. S. Air Force. Complications developed almost immediately after the outbreak of war with Japan. In the first place the Japanese closed the Burma Road when they occupied Burma in 1942. Secondly, the amount of supplies and equipment that an airplane could carry over the Himalaya Mountains was seriously limited. The pay load of the average airplane was two ton. Finally Chiang Kai Shek continually hoarded the thin trickle of military equipment for future action against the Chinese Communists instead of employing them at once against the Japanese. General Joseph Stilwell struggled manfully with these problems as U. S. Armed Forces Representative in China and Chief of Staff of Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek, but he was relieved from his post because

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>U.S. Department of State, loc. cit., p. 71.

he insisted that the Kuomintang leader make changes in his control and administration of the Chinese Armies and of the resources of the Chinese nation.<sup>4</sup>

When General Stilwell was recalled, General Albert C. Wedemeyer was appointed to the China Theater as Commander of the U. S. Forces and Advisor to Chiang Kai Shek. General Patrick J. Hurley, who had been Secretary of War under President Herbert C. Hoover and a successful corporation lawyer, was already on the ground, having been dispatched by President Roosevelt to act as a mediator between the Kuomintang and the Communists.<sup>5</sup> He had been accompanied to Chungking by Donald M. Nelson to survey China's economic future. Mr. Donald Nelson returned to Washington on September 24, 1944, and rendered a report to the President on what steps the United States should take to strengthen China's war economy. Then at the Generalissimo's request, the Nelson group was returned to China as the American War Production Mission. It gathered data and continued to operate until its final report was given to President Truman on December 18, 1945.

China's contribution to the war effort was diversionary and served to keep great quantities of men and

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<sup>4</sup>"Stilwell Must Go," New York Times, October 31, 1944, p. 3.

<sup>5</sup>"Yahoo," Time, Vol. 45, January 1, 1945, p. 28.



war materials of Japan tied up on the mainland of China.<sup>6</sup>  
These men and materials could not be withdrawn and used against the U. S. combined air, sea and land invasion program which was proceeding under General Douglas MacArthur in the Pacific.

While en route to Chungking, General Hurley and Donald M. Nelson visited Moscow to talk over Chinese participation in the War. They conferred with the Russian Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov, who convinced them of Russia's desire for complete Chinese cooperation.<sup>7</sup> His remarks are reflected in the report which General Patrick Hurley transmitted to President Roosevelt on September 23, 1944. They are:

"As early as the 8th of September the Generalissimo said to me that he was willing, for the purpose of the unification of China, that the Communist troops should be incorporated into the National Army but they should serve as components of the Chinese Army and not as a separate or independent force and finally, that they must submit to the command of the Generalissimo. The Generalissimo has been working on this subject diligently since our arrival here. Last week he caused to be published the terms submitted by the so-called Communists, and he delivered an address on the subject to the People's Political Council. All of which leads toward harmony with the so-called Communist troops. I am insisting that the conference be shortened and that action be taken without delay. I am familiar with the State Department message to the Generalissimo on the Communist question. I have informed the Generalissimo that the so-called Communist troops in China are not considered real Communists by Molotov; Russia's attitude toward China is friendly and that Russia is not attempting to use the Communist troops to prevent military unification of China.

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<sup>7</sup> U.S. Department of State, loc. cit., p. 71.

Russia desires closer and more harmonious relations with China. I am familiar with your message which General Stilwell delivered to the Generalissimo on September 19th. I have been advising the Generalissimo not to make a response to your note which might cause a deadlock. What is needed to save the situation in China is harmonious action, not a deadlock. The Generalissimo realizes this."<sup>8</sup>

The purpose of U. S. policy makers, to reconcile the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists into one working, harmonious, compact nation had existed ever since the U. S. had recognized the Republic of China as the legitimate government on July 6, 1928. When Chiang Kai Shek was arrested and held captive in Sian, Shensi, and held captive from December 12 to 25, 1936, by the independent leader of Manchuria, Chang Hseuh-liang, Americans were appalled.<sup>9</sup> However, when it became known that he and his captors had agreed on combining the Communist effort against the Japanese with that of his Kuomintang forces, the U. S. policy makers were pleased.

One of the results of the Undeclared War of Japan on China on July 7, 1937, was that the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued a Manifesto announcing the formation of a united front with the Kuomintang.<sup>10</sup> The very next day, the Generalissimo applauded the Manifesto.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Report, Hurley to President, 23 September 1944, quoted in Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems (Washington: Office of Chief of Military History, 1955), p. 450.

<sup>9</sup>Gunther Stein, The Challenge of Red China, (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc. 1945) p. 16.

<sup>10</sup>U.S. Department of State, loc. cit., Annex 36.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid, Annex 27.



In the early days of World War II both the Nationalists and the Communists actively fought the Japanese, but as American aid continued to flow over the Hump route in increasing quantities, none of it was given to the Communists by Chiang Kai Shek; and as the Communist Eighth Route Army became more firmly established and learned how to govern populace and area, its unit commanders became less inclined to fight the Japanese, except in guerrilla operations.<sup>12</sup> Communist growth ran counter to U. S. policy of recognizing the National Government of Chiang Kai Shek, as the only legal government in China. The problem of reconciling these two major factions was pointed up later among the instructions which General Marshall received from President Truman, when he departed on his mission.<sup>13</sup> The instructions were excerpts from a public hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 7, 1945, in which Secretary of State James E. Byrnes said:

"During the war, the immediate goal of the United States in China was to provide a military union of the several political factions in order to bring their combined power to bear upon our common enemy, Japan. Our long range goal, then as now, and a goal of at least equal importance, is the development of a strong united and democratic China.

"To achieve this longer range goal, it is essential

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<sup>12</sup> Gunther Stein, loc.cit., p. 335.

<sup>13</sup> Memorandum by Secretary Byrnes, December 9, 1945, quoted in John L. Stuart, Fifty Years in China (New York: Random House, 1954) p. 316.

that the central Government of China as well as the various dissident elements approach the settlement of their differences with a genuine willingness to compromise. We believe, as we have long believed and consistently demonstrated, that the Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek affords the most satisfactory base for a developing democracy. But we also believe that it must be broadened to include the representatives of those large and well organized groups who are without any voice in the government of China.

"This problem is not an easy one. It requires tact and discretion, patience and restraint. It will not be solved by the Chinese leaders themselves. To the extent that our influence in the light of shifting conditions in such a way as to encourage concessions by the Central Government, by the so-called Communists, and by the other factions."<sup>14</sup>

Experienced negotiator that he was, General Hurley's role as a mediator was made more difficult by the gradual awareness of the Chinese of the terms of the Yalta agreement. This agreement was signed on February 11, 1945, by the three Allied chiefs; Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. The terms, though apparently pleasing to the Allies, were a bitter pill for the Chinese to swallow.<sup>15</sup> It was hard for them to recognize that the Western Nations would pay the price for Russia's participation in the War against Japan by the partition of Manchuria especially since that Province had been accepted as belonging to China in the 1943 conference at Cairo. Specific applicable agreements were:

"(1) The status quo in Outer Mongolia shall be preserved.

"(2) The former rights of Russia lost to the Japanese

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>"The Yalta Conference"(editorial), The Chungking Reporter, Vol. II No. 50, February 14, 1946.



in 1904 shall be restored with respect to (a) the southern part of Sakhalin, (b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized with the Soviet Union having the pre-eminent interest and the lease of Port Arthur as a Naval base will be revived, and (c) the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad shall be operated jointly by a Soviet Chinese Company, it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty.

"(3) The Kurile Islands will be ceded to Russia."<sup>16</sup>

The Yalta Conference resulted in several unusual understandings and statements among the Allies who signed the agreement. One was that the President will take measures in order to obtain the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek, on the advice of Marshal Stalin, of the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads of Manchuria. The Yalta Agreement then concludes: "For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance, between the USSR and China; in order to render assistance to China, with its armed forces, for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke."

Of course, China was not represented at the Yalta Conference and President Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945.

The purposes of the Yalta Agreement were accepted and formalized by the Government of Chiang Kai Shek in the

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<sup>16</sup>"The Yalta Agreements", New York Times, March 25, 1947, p. 144.

Sino-Soviet Treaty of friendship and alliance, which was negotiated by Wang Shih Chieh and Molotov in Moscow.<sup>17</sup> This and five other treaties, were signed on August 14, 1945, and were scheduled to continue for thirty years. Their reception in China was favorable; as it was a step towards the solution of problems that plagued both countries for many years. The provisions of these treaties which stated that both powers pledged themselves "to give each other all possible economic assistance in the postwar period with a view to lightening and speeding up the national rehabilitation of both countries" when viewed in the light of subsequent events, proved to be high sounding words.<sup>18</sup>

Immediately after the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, Ambassador Hurley was successful in bringing together Mao Tse Tung and Chiang Kai Shek in conference on August 28, 1945.<sup>19</sup> This meeting continued until October 11, 1945, when Chairman Mao departed for Yen-an.<sup>20</sup> Both Communists and Nationalists seemed desirous of ending the civil strife and reaching a political settlement. These meetings with Mao Tse Tung clearly showed the basic problems which were

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<sup>17</sup>Harold Isaacs (ed.), New Cycle in Asia (New York: Mac Millan Company, 1947), pp. 33-39.

<sup>18</sup>U.S., Department of State, loc. cit., Chapter 1V.

<sup>19</sup>Mayling Soong Chiang, "China", Ten Eventful Years, Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 1, 1947, p. 654.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., pp. 73-107; New York Times, September 2, 1945, p. 3.



current and ran so deeply through Chinese thinking. The Communists demanded an immediate end of one party rule, the establishment of a coalition government, and a new election of delegates for the fabulous National Assembly. The Generalissimo agreed to recognize the legal status of all political parties. He insisted, however, that the Communists lay down their arms before negotiations continued. Provision was made that a Political Consultation Conference should be assembled. The purpose of this group was to decide the when and the how of the calling of the National Assembly. It was to consist of thirty eight members from all parties and non-partisan groups.

While the talks with Mao Tse Tung were going on, in September, General Patrick Hurley left China and returned to the United States. Perhaps because he had been a Republican Secretary of War under President Herbert C. Hoover and because he was out of sympathy with what he called pro-Communist leanings of the State Department advisors in Chungking and Washington, he resigned in bitterness on November 26, 1945.<sup>21</sup>

The reception of General Hurley's resignation coincided with the availability of the services of General George C. Marshall. He retired from the exacting position of Chief of Staff of the Armies of the United States on November 20, 1945, at his own request. In this position

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<sup>21</sup>Harley F. MacNair and Donald F. Lach, loc. cit., p. 639.

he had been present and guided the build-up of United States military might, ever since the month of September, 1939, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed him.

This one time aide-de-camp of General John J. Pershing and distinguished graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, had been present with President Roosevelt at the pre-war conference where the Atlantic Charter was formulated and at all subsequent Big Three Meetings.<sup>22</sup> He also attended the Cairo Conference with Chiang Kai Shek. He was held in esteem throughout China by both the Chinese Nationalist and the Communist Party sympathizers.<sup>23</sup> During his junior officer days, he had served with the 15th U. S. Infantry Regiment in Tientsin, China for a period of three years. Above all he was aware of the great contribution that China made to the overall war effort and more than familiar with the price which the United States had paid in men and money to keep China in the war.

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<sup>22</sup>Katherine Tupper Marshall, Together, Annals of an Army Wife, (New York: Tupper and Love, Inc., 1946), p. 290.

<sup>23</sup>Tillman Durdin, "Chinese Government and Communist Reaction to General Marshall", The New York Times, December 17, 1945.



### CHAPTER III

#### GENERAL MARSHALL'S CONCEPT OF HIS MISSION TO CHINA

General Marshall was appointed by President Harry S. Truman to be his special representative to China with the rank of an Ambassador on November 21, 1945. Immediately thereafter he was on the way to that war torn area with Colonel Henry A. Byroade, U. S. Army, as military attache and Mr. James Shepley, representing the State Department.<sup>1</sup> General Marshall's office was to continue until January 7, 1947, when he was nominated to be Secretary of State of the United States. During this period of slightly over one year, General Marshall proved to be one of the most active and resourceful mediators employed by the United States in the post-war period.

On December 15, 1945, while General Marshall was flying over the Pacific enroute to his new place of duty, President Truman issued a statement of United States policy toward China. It outlined the hopes for peace entertained

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<sup>1</sup>Felix Belair, Jr., "Truman to Issue China Plan Today", New York Times, December 15, 1945, p. 1.

by the citizens of the United States and was to govern General Marshall's thoughts and actions for the coming year.<sup>2</sup> The policy declaration was published in the New York Times over an Associated Press dateline of December 16, 1945. It reads as follows:

"The Government of the United States holds that peace and prosperity of the world in this new and unexplored era ahead depend upon the ability of the sovereign nations to combine for collective security in the United Nations Organization.

"It is the firm belief of this Government that a strong, united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to the success of this United Nations Organization and for world peace. A China disorganized and divided either by foreign aggression, such as that undertaken by the Japanese, or by violent internal strife, is an undermining influence to world stability and peace, now and in the future.

"The United States Government has long subscribed to the principle that the management of internal affairs is the responsibility of the people of the sovereign nations. Events of this century, however, would indicate that a breach of peace anywhere in the world threatens the peace of the entire world. It is thus in the most vital interest of the United States and all the United Nations that the people of China overlook no opportunity to adjust their internal differences promptly by methods of peaceful negotiation."

The policy continues with objectives which General George Marshall was expected to bring about by applying the full force of the American diplomatic power upon the civil war, against both the Chungking Government and the Yenank Committee Communist Party units. These are in brief;

(1) The return of all China to effective Chinese control including the immediate evacuation of Japanese forces,

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<sup>2</sup>"President Truman's Statement of China Policy," The New York Times, December 16, 1945, p. 3.



(2) a National Conference of representatives of major political elements to develop an early solution to the present international strife, (3) all of China, including Manchuria to be under Chinese control and all agreements made with the National Government of the Republic of China, (4) to assist the National Government in effecting the disarmament and evacuation of the Japanese in the liberated areas; the U. S. Marines are in Northern China for that purpose, (5) to assist the National Government in every reasonable way to reestablish the agrarian and industrial economy and establish a military organization capable of discharging Chinese national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order, (6) the United States support will not extend to U. S. military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife, and (7) The U. S. will be prepared to give fair consideration to Chinese requests for trade and loans under reasonable conditions, for projects which would contribute toward the development of a healthy economy throughout China and healthy trade relations between China and the United States.

General Marshall set foot on Chinese soil on Thursday, December 20, 1945, at Shanghai and conferred with Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who was then in command of the United States Forces in China.<sup>3</sup> After a business

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<sup>3</sup>Lauterbach, loc. cit., p. 269.

consultation, he proceeded to Chungking where he met Chiang Kai Shek. The Generalissimo accepted his credentials and on January 1, 1946, General Marshall commenced his labor of mediator and friend of China with the aid of both parties. His residence, Yu Gardens, provided by the National Government, became the scene of a three party conference from which emanated an armistice in a period of ten days. The conferees were General Chang Chung for the National Government, representing Chiang Kai Shek, and General Chou En Lai, who represented the Communist Party of Mao Tse Tung.<sup>4</sup> General Marshall was at home to all political parties and all visitors.<sup>5</sup> He asked them questions, listened to the answers, and did not make many comments. In dealing with Chang Chung and Chou En Lai, however, General Marshall was persuasive and made bold compromising suggestions. Since Chang Chung had the confidence of the Generalissimo -- he had been a former classmate and the Governor of Szechwan Province -- and Chou En Lai was well known to him, having been Chief of the Wampoa Military Academy under his command, bold suggestions were required. Both negotiators trusted General Marshall. In spite of differences of opinion, General Marshall's initial efforts were richly rewarded when on January 10, 1946, the President of the Chinese Republic

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<sup>4</sup>U. S. Department of State, op. cit., p. 134.

<sup>5</sup>"Marshall Receives Party Delegates," The Chungking Reporter, Vol II, Nr. 43, December 27, 1945.



unexpectedly announced the cessation of hostilities.<sup>6</sup>

A Central News Agency dispatch from Chungking, China, dated January 11, 1946 announced the terms of the 'cease fire' armistice.<sup>7</sup> It provided that all forces of the National Government and all fighting units under the control of the Communist Party, whether they be regular forces, militia, irregular troops or guerrillas, carry out the following orders:

"1. All armed clashes to be stopped immediately.

"2. Unless otherwise permitted, all troop movements within Chinese territory to be halted. However, military movements deemed necessary for insuring safety in restoration work, transfer of garrisons and transfer of military supplies and enforcements of political administration and local peace are to be accepted.

"3. All activities calculated to destroy or obstruct communications to be suspended. All obstacles to communications to be removed immediately.

"4. For the enforcement of cease fire, an Executive Headquarters to be established which is to be composed of three members: one representing the Chinese Government; one the Chinese Communist Party; and one the United States of America. All instructions or orders shall be issued with full agreement between the three members and shall be promulgated through the Headquarters in the name of the President of the National Government of the Chinese Republic."

An explanation of the unusual feature of the American member in the enforcement of the cease fire, according to the news dispatch was that the American was to assist both Chinese. It was further agreed that the Headquarters was to have such a number of officers and enlisted men

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<sup>6</sup>"Political Consultation Conference Opens Today," The Chungking Reporter, Vol II, Nr. 45, January 10, 1946.

<sup>7</sup>"Cease Fire Order Issued to All Chinese Commanders Last Night," The Peiping Chronicle, January 11, 1946, p. 1.

as to insure the enforcement of the cease fire. Each member of the Headquarters was authorized to set up separate lines of communications in order to insure a speedy and uninterrupted flow of messages.

In addition to the reaching of an agreement on the cease fire order, the meeting of the Political Consultative Conference convened at Chungking and met in session until January 31, 1946.<sup>8</sup> The calling of this conference had been an enterprise of Ambassador, Major General Patrick J. Hurley, who had angrily resigned his position just prior to the appointment of General Marshall to the China post. General Hurley had visited Mao Tse Tung in Yen-an and obtained his agreement that the Political Consultative Conference should meet. General Hurley also brought Chou En Lai back to Chungking with him, and laid the groundwork for the meeting of the political representatives of the Communist and splinter parties in China. Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek opened the conference with the announcement of the 'cease fire' armistice and his desire to carry it out. There were representatives of all parties present.<sup>9</sup> Among the number present were eight from the Kuomintang; seven from the Communist Party; five from the China Youth Party; nine from the

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<sup>8</sup>H. P. Tseng, "The Political Consultative Conference", (editorial) The Chungking Reporter, Vol. II, Nr. 45 (January 10, 1946), p. 4.

<sup>9</sup>U. S. Department of State, op. cit., p. 139.



four party Democratic League; and nine from independent groups. In spite of their diverse backgrounds, and because of their desire for peace and cooperation, the conference found much to agree on and in closing, voiced several propositions which indicated their accord.<sup>10</sup> These included:

- (1) That a coalition government be formed immediately;
- (2) that constitutional government be approved;
- (3) that the National Assembly meet on March 5, 1946;
- (4) that the draft constitution of 1936 be liberalized;
- (5) that the opposing armies be reorganized and nationalized;
- (6) that agrarian, educational, and industrial reforms be instituted; and
- (7) that civil liberties be made available to all persons and groups.

The agreements of the Committee of Three and the Political Consultative Conference provided the basic principles which were to be tried and tested during the remainder of the critical year 1946.

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<sup>10</sup> Tillman Durden, "Reds Won Big Gains in China Coalition," The New York Times, February 2, 1946, p. 3; and "Reds will Keep PCC Agreements", North-China Daily News (Shanghai), Vol. XXXVII, February 2, 1946, p. 1.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE TOOLS OF THE OPERATION

General Marshall was a man of action and the United States Army had been and was to continue to be his operating tool. In his conference with General Wedemeyer, on December 20, 1945, at Shanghai, he had indicated that he would establish a Headquarters at Peking, to operate his truce mechanism.<sup>1</sup> In order to prepare for this activity, Colonel Wesley C. Wilson was flown, on a United States Marine C46 plane, to Peking on January 1, 1946, with a mission to find a suitable location and set up facilities for a Three Government Headquarters.<sup>2</sup> It was outlined that each unit would contain about fifty officers, each with accompanying stenographers, command, and communication systems to cover all of China. The Fifth United States Marine Regiment was controlling Peking at the time. It was commanded by Brigadier General Lawrence

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<sup>1</sup>"Peiping Named Cease Fire Headquarters", The Peiping Chronicle, January 12, 1946.

<sup>2</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters in the Office of Chief of Military History, U.S. Army file, First Quarter, 1946, Folder V. Hereafter cited as History, Peiping Executive Headquarters.



Jones of the United States Marine Corps. Lieutenant Colonel J. W. M. Read of the United States Army was the officer representing the China Theater in that ancient capital city. Colonel Wilson found these two officers very helpful during the process of looking through existing buildings and talking through interpreters to Chinese officials who had just received custody of palaces, offices, warehouses, compounds, and dwellings from the recently defeated and still present Japanese Army.

The teeming city of Peking, with its uncertain future, seemed an impossible place to locate a building suitable as a headquarters for a civil mission. Then by a stroke of good fortune, Mr. Trevor Bowen, Administrator of the Peking Union Medical College, offered to lend the resources of that facility for the purpose. It was a masterpiece of Chinese and American architecture. The Medical College and Hospital had been built by the Rockefeller Foundation, China Medical Board Division, and utilized during the war by the Japanese as a military hospital.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Trevor Bowen was anxious to keep the properties from falling into the hands of the Nationalist Chinese who were appropriating everything in the city which their force and aggressiveness could put a finger on. Mr. Bowen told Colonel Wilson and General Jones

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<sup>3</sup>Letter of Dr. Harold H. Louchks, MD. China Medical Board of New York, August 14, 1956, to Colonel W. C. Wilson.

when he offered the giant hospital: If this peace effort fails, all of China as we know it will fall into anarchy and civil war."<sup>4</sup>

Within a period of fourteen days the Executive Headquarters, as it was titled, was set up by a small capable staff of United States Army officers and enlisted men who had been sent up from Shanghai on orders of General Wedemeyer.<sup>5</sup> His China Theater Command was already busily engaged in numerous missions. It was in the process of returning the United States troops from China, supplying lend lease to the French in Indo-China, and transporting Nationalist Armies by air to Shanghai, Nanking, and Peking.<sup>6</sup> The latter moves were part of the program of assisting the Nationalist Kuomintang Government in reoccupying Japanese held areas and opening lines of communications. It is estimated that between four hundred thousand and five hundred thousand Chinese soldiers were moved to key areas by air and water alone. In order to assist the China Theater, fifty thousand United States Marines were placed in Peking, Tientsin, the coal mines in the vicinity of Tientsin, and along the railroad lines between both places. The Marines also assisted in the repatriation of the

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<sup>4</sup>Interview with Mr. Trevor Bowen, January 4, 1946.

<sup>5</sup>Bertram D. Hulen, "New Directive to General Wedemeyer," The New York Times, December 18, 1945, p. 1.

<sup>6</sup>"Big Chinese Units Flown into Manchurian Areas," The Peiping Chronicle, January 7, 1946.



Japanese.

The members of the Peiping Executive Headquarters arrived from two locations on January 11, 1946 in United States Army planes. The planes came at dusk from Chungking and Shanghai and landed at West Field, Peking. The passengers included Colonel Henry A. Byroade, Colonel Louis W. Haskell, Colonel Eugene B. Ely, Colonel Milo H. Matteson, seven other officers and ten enlisted men. The 3198th Signal Service Battalion from Shanghai also sent a detachment of three officers and ten enlisted men.

A Headquarters was temporarily established in the Grand Hotel de Wagon-Lits which was being operated by the War Area Service Corps of the National Military Council of the Chinese National Government. Officers were billeted in the Hotel de Peking and enlisted men were billeted in the Central Hotel. Travel by plane was furnished by the Air Transport Command, Shanghai, and the 513th Troop Carrier Squadron. Motor transportation was supplied by the 5th Regiment, United States Marine Corps. Colonel Henry A. Byroade, General Staff Corps, United States Army, assumed command of the personnel in Peking in accordance with General Order Number 1, Peiping Headquarters Group, dated January 11, 1946.<sup>7</sup>

On January 12th an Army C47 plane brought an additional three officers and nine enlisted men from Shanghai.

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<sup>7</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., First Quarter 1946, Folder I.

This raised the strength of the military personnel in Peiping Headquarters to a total of sixteen officers and twenty-eight enlisted men. All made ready for the three cease fire commissioners who were to arrive soon at West Field aboard General Marshall's personal airplane from Chungking. The Commissioners were Mr. Walter S. Robertson, U. S. Charge D'Affaires of the Embassy with the rank of Minister and United States Commissioner of the Executive Headquarters;<sup>8</sup> Major General Cheng Kai-Ming of the Ministry of Operations, the National Government's representative; and General Yeh Chien-Ying, Chief of Staff, Eighteenth Group Army, Communist Party. They were all to be quartered in the Grand Hotel de Peking until more permanent accommodations could be arranged.<sup>9</sup> They arrived on schedule at about 2 P.M. that same afternoon.

On January 14 the Executive Headquarters began operation in the Peking Union Medical College. Besides the Three Commissioners, a detail of numerous assistants was provided for each. Immediately under them was a three man group known as the Plans and Operations Section.<sup>10</sup> Its members were Major General Chow Li-wu, Nationalist Government Branch; Major General Li Chu-kui, Communist

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<sup>8</sup>U.S. Department of State, loc. cit., Annex 71.

<sup>9</sup>"Three Commissioners of New Headquarters Here," The Peiping Chronicle, January 14, 1946.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., Annex 71c.



Party Branch; and Colonel Eugene B. Ely of the United States Army. Planes of the 513th Troop Carrier Squadron kept arriving from Shanghai and were unloaded as fast as possible. In all 7 jeeps, 372 arctic parkas, 479 sleeping bags, radios, general military stores, and to add to the worries of all, two truckloads of Post Exchange candy, tobacco, sundries, and toilet supplies were unloaded and moved to protected storage. This small force of officers and enlisted men who had previously served in China in many capacities were inclined to be sceptical of the project but Colonel Henry A. Byroade was so enthusiastic that he persuaded the United States personnel of the rightness of the Peace Mission and fired them with his zeal. Later on the Department of the Army promoted him to the grade of Brigadier General.

The Three Commissioners met at the Executive Headquarters and began building up their own personal staffs. They hired workers locally and brought officials from other Nationalist and Communist Headquarters in China. Their first major consideration was the danger areas where difficulties might occur in enforcing the truce which had been declared effective on January 13, 1946. In an attempt to head off potential difficulties they directed three related actions: first, on January 15, U. S. Marine aircraft were to drop leaflets in the area of Chih-Feng in Jehol Province and over fourteen tons of leaflets in the area

of Sui Yuan, Shantung, and Hopei;<sup>11</sup> second, Executive Headquarters by Special Orders Number One dispatched field teams to Chi Ning, Sui Yuan Province; Chih Feng, Jehol Province; Tsinan, Shantung Province; Hsuehchow, Kiang Su Province; Tatung, Shansi Province; and Kalgan, Chahai Province; and third, Trusum Number One, the first of many truce Summaries of the Three Commissioners was approved and dispatched to the Chungking Liaison Group, Chungking, China, for transmission to General Chiang Kai Shek, General Mao Tse Tung, and General Marshall.<sup>12</sup>

By the terms of the original agreement of General Marshall's Committee of Three, the Commissioners at Peking were to act under the United States Commissioner as the chairman. They were to issue directives in the name of Chiang Kai Shek. The latter had insisted on this recognition and further that he name both the Communist and Nationalist Commissioners.

United States Air Force planes were placed at the disposal of the Communists to enable them to bring representatives to Peking to man the office and the field teams. The first truce team was that dispatched to Chih Feng under the direction of Colonel Raymond R. Tourtillot of the U. S. Army. It and similar teams consisted basically of three

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<sup>11</sup>"U.S. Marine Aircraft Drop Stop Fire Order," The Peiping Chronicle, January 17, 1946.

<sup>12</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., First Quarter, 1946, Folder I.



key members: a Nationalist Army Colonel; a Communist Party Colonel; and a U. S. Army Colonel. Three interpreters, and one American soldier who was to be both the jeep and radio operator rounded out each team. Each team depended on the planes of the Troop Carrier Squadron to bring supplies when needed. All teams were instructed to deliver "cease fire" orders to both Nationalist and Communist Commanders, stop local fighting, and maintain contact with the Executive Headquarters.<sup>13</sup> Within a week, seven teams were on the ground and active in North China. Initially their efforts were successful because they were employing the tools of war and speaking the language of war to officers and men in order to effect peace.

The truce teams were first dispatched and in place by the end of January 1946 were as follows:<sup>14</sup>

Team 1	Col. Alexander H. Craig	Chi Ning
Team 2	Col. Ray R. Tourtillot	Chih Feng
Team 3	Col. Harold W. Holly	Ta Tung
Team 4	Col. Donald Q. Harris	Hsuchow
Team 5	Col. Lee V. Harris	Kaigan
Team 7	Col. John P. Lake	Tsinan
Team 8	Col. Paul R. Miller	Canton
Team 10	Col. John M. Ferguson	Hsin Hsiang

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<sup>13</sup>"Cease Fire Order Arrives", The Peiping Chronicle, January 14, 1946.

<sup>14</sup>"Additional Cease Fire Orders are Announced", The Peiping Chronicle, January 22, 1946.

In the hurry of equipping, dispatching, and setting up field teams, many incidents occurred which had a tragic-comedy appearance. To begin with, points were picked out on the map for teams to go to because the existing maps showed an important, centrally located town or road junction. Several teams arrived at the map location and found themselves exactly nowhere. The maps had been drawn and places marked in the map makers laboratory without reference to the ground. One Army Colonel with his Communist and Nationalist associates and the rest of the team, landed on an airfield and found the location as planned, but all were immediately placed under arrest by the Russian Battalion which was holding the area.<sup>15</sup> After a week of living on a diet of barbecued mutton and millet as provided by their captors in a Chinese mud hut in sub-zero weather, the party was released. Before allowing them to return to Peking, they were royally entertained.<sup>16</sup> Vodka toasts in huge water glasses soon thawed the peace makers out. The Russian Battalion Commander had obtained a release for them from Moscow. Then he let the party go back as soon as a plane could be brought in. This incident is illustrative of the lack of information and preparation that the United States Army personnel, with their Chinese counterparts had in the

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<sup>15</sup>"Team Guests of Soviet Commander", North-China Daily News(Shanghai), January 21, 1946, p. 1.

<sup>16</sup>"Truce Team Cordially Received by the Russians," New York Times, January 21, 1946, p. 2.



initial stages of this enterprise.

In Peking, the three branches of the headquarters were expanding rapidly. The halls of the great Hospital resounded with American and Chinese conversation, the noises of typewriters and telephones, and the footfalls of newspaper correspondents and "Very Important Persons". By January 21, Major Charles R. Malony of the U. S. Marine Corps had installed a telephone switchboard whose initial circuit was to the Marine Headquarters Brigade in Tientsin. This Brigade was in direct contact with Shanghai by teletype and acted as a relay station for the Peiping Executive Headquarters. With the assistance of Dr. Wayne Wuhu King, who had once conducted classes of anatomy at the Peking Union Medical College before the War, forty one Chinese Nationals were employed to drive vehicles, answer telephones, handle supplies, unload and load airplanes and process orders and telegrams. The United States Army strength was now fifty six officers and ninety four enlisted men. It almost equalled the number originally scheduled by the China Theater. Besides the radio facilities of the headquarters, each field team operated heavy radio transmitters and receivers which enabled each group to communicate with its Party Headquarters and with the Executive Headquarters.<sup>17</sup>

General Henry Byroade in a speech to the populace

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<sup>17</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., First Quarter, 1946, Folder I.

at Penki, Manchuria, stated the United States mission in a few well chosen words. "The Americans are not in Executive Headquarters to judge who is right or wrong,"he said. "Our mission is to form a framework of personnel and equipment in which the Chinese themselves can work to reach agreements."<sup>18</sup>

An observer of the Headquarters in operation, Mr. Richard E. Lauterbach, Time and Life magazine correspondent, who visited Peking and published his observations in his book, "Danger from the East", writes as follows: "Americans were more than equal members. The Chairman was to be the American Commissioner (Walter S. Robertson) and under him an American Director (Brigadier General H. Byroade) was to run the staff work. In addition the United States contributed all the office and field equipment and most of the administrative know how. Throughout the whole organization the Americans were to be the dynamic yet magnetic force which linked two antagonistic bodies together and kept them moving in one main direction."<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>Lauterbach, loc. cit., p. 311.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 271.



## CHAPTER V

### TEAM PARTICIPATION IN THE FIELD AND EVENTS AT PEKING

The organization and dispatch of Field Teams to important localities in China was one of the easiest tasks to perform by the United States Army personnel in the Peiping Executive Headquarters. The guiding principles of the team participation in the area were a different matter and came directly from the "cease fire" order. This order General Chiang Kai Shek of the Nationalist Government and General Mao Tse Tung, Communist Party Chairman, issued jointly on January 10, 1946.<sup>1</sup> It was the memorandum drawn up and agreed to by General Chang Chun and General Chou En-lai working with General George C. Marshall. In addition to providing for the formation and operation of the Executive Headquarters at Peking, it stated:

"All units, regular, militia, guerrilla and irregular of the National Armies of China and of Communist led troops of the Republic of China, are ordered to carry out the following directives:

a. All hostilities will cease immediately.

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<sup>1</sup>U. S. Department of State, Annex 63.

b. Except in certain specific cases, all movements of forces in China will cease. There also may be movements necessary for demobilization, redistribution, supply, administration, and local security.

c. Destruction of and interference with all lines of communications will cease and you will clear, at once, obstructions placed against or interfering with such lines of communications."<sup>2</sup>

On their arrival in Peking, and concurrent with the establishment of the Executive Headquarters, the Three Commissioners developed, step by step, and word by word, General Directive Number Two, which was issued to the field teams and tactical units of both Armies on January 20, 1946. It reads as follows:

"In order to enforce the joint cease fire order of the National Government and the Chinese Communist Party, the following implementation principles and procedures are adopted:

"1. Principles of cease fire implementation:

a. Both parties of all conflicting forces will, upon receipt of cease fire directive from this Executive Headquarters, cease fire immediately and carry out separation of the two conflicting forces with a view to safeguard recurrence of conflicts.

b. Separation of the conflicting forces will be carried out in consonance with procedures stipulated in Paragraph 2 and action of this Headquarters.

"2. Procedures of cease fire implementation:

a. If one force holds a city, the other force will withdraw one day's march.

b. If both forces are within a city, both forces will withdraw one day's march.

c. In the open, both forces will withdraw one day's march from the points of contact.

d. All commanders must take immediate steps to make known to all troops, Cease Fire Order and to enforce the order at once.

e. As soon as forces are separated and fighting has stopped, steps will be taken by commanders to restore position held as of midnight 13 January 1946 following same principles enunciated herein before.

f. It is desired to point out to commanders that decisions as to whom might be right or wrong in any

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid.



particular case cannot be promptly or effectively rendered, under the existing, difficult communications. The important objective is to stop fighting in compliance with jointly issued Cease Fire Order and withdraw. Final judgment and adjustments must come at a later date.

g. One day's march will be considered at least sixty (60) Chinese li.

h. Field teams from this headquarters cannot be dispatched to each locality; therefore, commanders must take initiative to establish a liaison team and to maintain liaison between the two forces for enforcement of instructions given by this Headquarters.

i. Special instructions will be issued to a Commander by the Executive Headquarters when careful evaluation and study of the situation reveals that the forces under his command are engaged in offensive action. Opposing parties on the ground will be instructed to establish liaison in each instance. The assumed defender will be given instructions to cooperate fully.

j. Where large forces are involved and at strategic places, this Headquarters will make every endeavor to dispatch teams to assist in the accomplishment of the measures prescribed herein before.

By Order of President Chiang Kai Shek of the National Government."<sup>3</sup>

The date/time of midnight January 13, 1946, became all important. Each field team representative searched and brought proof to show where the troops were fighting at that specified time.

One of the first successful teams was Team #10 at Hsin Hsiang in Honan Province. This team on February 5 announced local agreement after a long and difficult meeting between General Huang Wei-king, Chief of Staff, Communist Tai Hong Area Forces, and Colonel Chang Chin-chu, National Government 85th Army, located at Hsin Hsiang and Chen Hsien. The Truce Team was composed of Colonel Hwang Chung, representing the Communist Party, Lieutenant Colonel Tseng Lo-tao, representing

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<sup>3</sup>"Peiping Headquarters Issues Directive #2". The Peiping Chronicle, January 22, 1946.

the Nationalist Government, and Colonel Alexander H. Cummings, United States Army, Chairman.<sup>4</sup> The agreement they reached was as follows:

- "1. Neither side would take any offensive action.
- "2. Both sides would release innocent captives.
- "3. The Communists would assume responsibility for repairing those sections of the Hsin Hsiang-Chi-Yuan branch railroad now in their hands.
- "4. The important road west of Hsin Hsiang between Hwu Wu (held by the Nationalists) and Chiao Tso (occupied by the Communists) would be repaired, and would not be used for aggressive action. Unarmed civilians would use the road, under the supervision of a liaison staff of political workers of both sides, who would insure that the travelers were unarmed. Civilians could move coal east from Chiao Tso to Hsin Hsiang and goods and commodities west from Hsin Hsiang to Chiao Tso."<sup>5</sup>

The problem of stopping aggressive action was, as Henry R. Liebermann, New York Times correspondent, pointed out, one of improving communications and re-establishing the roads and railroads.<sup>6</sup> The Communists had operated so long in the hills and the Nationalists in the hinterlands that when they began jointly to share areas, each would build a military barrier against the passage of the other. Then one would tear up the railroads and telephone and telegraph lines to the other's territory. But the Chinese people made the best of whatever was available. So each military island would find itself with a part of a railroad running in its area. By mutual disagreement, the railroad train ran from one end of

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<sup>4</sup>"Four Agreements Reached by Hsin Hsiang Field Team," The Chungking Reporter, Vol. II, No. 49, February 7, 1946.

<sup>5</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., Team Ten, Folder IV.

<sup>6</sup>Henry R. Liebermann, "North China Peace Almost Complete," The New York Times, February 2, 1946, p. 3.



the rails to the other. The passengers would alight. They would then trudge on foot across the no man's land of both sides and board the train in the adjacent area to continue their journey as far as the train would travel.

The next mission of the Executive Headquarters was to attempt to patch up this railway tangle.<sup>7</sup> Colonel Donald C. Hill of the Corps of Engineers, United States Army, was placed in charge of railroad construction teams which were termed light teams. These consisted of three representatives, a Nationalist, a Communist and an American. They had no supplementary personnel because they depended on Truce Teams in their area of endeavor for assistance in the transmission of messages and the receipt of information. The senior communication member for the National Government was Colonel Chen Lu-hwa. A quantity of United States military equipment and Lend Lease supplies were available. Immediately surveys were made, and it was determined that one thousand kilometers of railway had to be repaired and that if this was done in three months time, a usable communications net would exist. The first priority was given to the vital north-south link of the Tientsin-Pakow road. On this line there were approximately 322 kilometers of the road destroyed, and four major breaks between Tientsin and Hwu-chow. Restoration of the Tientsin-Pakow road would give a boost to the economy of all eastern China. Teams were

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<sup>7</sup>"Headquarters Issue Order to Restore Communications," The Chungking Reporter, Vol II, No. 50, February 14, 1946.

sent to strategic communication centers. Work was commenced on roads, bridges, locomotives, and telephone and telegraph lines by cooperation with the local military authorities and civilian magistrates.

Breaks in communications and the ability to coordinate actions between Communist and Nationalist factions, caused the repatriation of the Japanese to be brought to the attention of the Three Commissioners.<sup>8</sup> As days passed and the familiarity of the personnel with the problem grew, so did the responsibility. This was crystalized on February 18 when the Peiping Executive Headquarters received Joint Communique Number 13 from General MacArthur's Far Eastern Headquarters. This Communique outlined the responsibilities of the Truce Headquarters in conjunction with the United States Marines to receive, process, and ship the repatriates to Japan. It was also repeated, and amplified for implementation by General Directive Number 5, and agreed to and signed by the Three Commissioners of the Peiping Executive Headquarters. This directive stated that "the presence of large numbers of Japanese is a disturbing factor in North China, which makes the release of these Japanese from present locations, and the insurance of their orderly movement to ports of embarkation a matter of direct concern to Executive Headquarters."<sup>9</sup> The estimated number of Japanese to be

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<sup>8</sup>"U.S. General on Repatriation", The Peiping Chronicle, January 23, 1946.

<sup>9</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., Repatriation.



repatriated was 120,000 military and 189,000 civilians. Two ports had facilities to accommodate them. These were Tangku and Tsingtao and it was planned to process 3,000 a day through Tangku and 1,500 a day through Tsingtao.

In the meantime reports of all the field teams, though bright with hopes, were not entirely encouraging.<sup>10</sup> The expansion of the truce team system by the addition of railroad control light teams was so rapid that the Headquarters could list on February 20, a total of twenty-one teams, large and small, in the field. These reported many small conflicts which were soon settled, some which were not settled, and others which were forgotten.<sup>11</sup> The Puppet Troops, the name given to any bandit, guerrilla, armed group, partisan and non-partisan, began to enter and complicate the already mixed up situation. In a given area someone would report a conflict. The particular Truce Team involved would at once drive to the scene of conflict and more often than not find a full scale battle in progress. It was often most difficult to stop such engagements. Even when it was stopped the problem was only half solved. More than likely, one or the other of the Chinese representatives would make a statement about one of the commanders: "He is a Puppet Troop Commander!" he would say. "He was recognized when we were fighting the Japanese but now he is no longer recognized."<sup>12</sup> In other words, the commander

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<sup>10</sup>"Bright Hopes in China," editorial New York Times, February 3, 1946, p. 1e.

<sup>11</sup>"Conflicts Cease in Shansi, Hopei, and Sui Yuan" The Chungking Reporter, Vol II, No. 48, January 31, 1946.

<sup>12</sup>"Private Papers, Colonel W. C. Wilson, February 9, 1946.

and his troops were fighting for their own glory and booty. The American chairman was thus in a dilemma. He had authority to mediate between the Communists and the Nationalists only. So strictly speaking the Puppet Troop Commander did not fall within his jurisdiction. In time this situation was corrected by an agreement of the Three Commissioners that was issued on February 10, 1946.<sup>13</sup>

An incident which took place on the grounds of the Peking Union Medical College on February 20 was indicative of events occurring all over China. About two o'clock in the afternoon a large crowd of about 3,000 people bearing printed slogans began to push down the street to the Headquarters. They were orderly but insistent. Colonel W. C. Wilson was sitting in his office with Mr. Wayne W. King when the group literally swarmed over the formal gate and gate house. At the gate were two burley Chinese soldiers of the Nationalist Army, assisted by a Sergeant, and two equally formidable Communist soldiers. Colonel Wilson rushed to Mr. Bowen, the building Administrator, who suggested that they see General Tsai Weh-Chih, the National Government Chief of Staff and the man responsible for safety in the Three Party Headquarters. By the time General Tsai was on his feet and could see what was going on, the large crowd had passed the gate keepers and were all over the large courtyard. General Tsai went out on

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<sup>13</sup>"Puppet Troops Included in the Cease Fire Order," The Peiping Chronicle, February 10, 1946.



on the porch overlooking the courtyard and the crowd stopped milling and talking. Several of the group came forward and made various demands.<sup>14</sup> First of all they wanted to see the Communist Party Commissioner, General Yeh Chien-Ying; secondly, they wanted to be allowed to return to their homes safely; thirdly, they wanted Communist troops to be evacuated from their villages; fourthly, they asked that border district paper money be abolished, conscription stopped, and finally that the liberated area governments be abolished. General Yeh came out on the porch and addressed the throng. They listened with respect but after he ceased speaking they stayed and pushed into the halls of the Headquarters building where they silently occupied space and prevented any work from going on.

As General Tsai, the Nationalist Chief of Staff, came back through the door, Colonel Wilson asked: "How did you know that the people meant no harm, but only wanted to talk?"

General Tsai thought a moment and replied: "They had fruit and peanut sellers with them. If they were in a dangerous mood, they wouldn't have had time to eat and the peddlers wouldn't have come along."<sup>15</sup> He advised that the Headquarters personnel continue with their work. When quitting time came they filed out as they normally did and

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<sup>14</sup>"Demonstrators in Peiping Call on Communist Leader"  
The Peiping Chronicle, February 22, 1946.

<sup>15</sup>Private Papers, Colonel W. C. Wilson, February 20, 1946.

paid no attention to the demonstrators. The latter in return withdrew from the area on their own accord. That evening Colonel Wilson closed the doors on the last of the protestors at about seven o'clock.

The Americans in the Headquarters were surprised and annoyed by this demonstration and the lack of any effective means of controlling it. They demanded apologies. The Mayor of Peking did express his regrets, saying that the people were refugees from Hopeh Province and that they had gotten out of hand. The very next day he surrounded the buildings with the local fire fighters, who looked very capable with their fire hoses, canvas aprons, and large brass head helmets. But no crowd arrived that day, so the fire fighters did not come again. This was so typical of Chinese action.

While incidents such as those mentioned above were taking place in North China, General Marshall and the Committee of Three continued to meet in Chungking. Here they considered problems which eventually were passed on to the Executive Headquarters for solution on local levels. One of the knottiest of these was that the two independent armies in China - the Nationalists and the Communists - were both faced with the perplexing question of Russia's invasion of Manchuria and North China during the last week of World War II. There should have been no



problems,<sup>16</sup> however, because in the Sino-Soviet Treaty which was signed on August 14, 1945, an accompanying note stated: "The Government of the USSR agrees to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be entirely given to the National Government as the central government of China."<sup>17</sup>

But such was not the case. At the end of the War, when Russian units departed from areas in Manchuria, they did not permit any organized Chinese units to enter the communities they vacated and take over the arms and munitions which they had received on the surrender of the Japanese.<sup>18</sup> Quite the contrary, the Russians handed over Japanese arms to private citizens and bandit groups who soon became organized Communist units. Then when the Kuomintang troops arrived on the communications lines, after having been ferried there by United States air transport, they found themselves faced by completely equipped Communist troops.

In spite of these difficult circumstances, General Marshall continued to make progress. His ability to find practical solutions to diametrically opposed viewpoints<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>"China and Her Allies," The Times (London), August 28, 1945, p. 5.

<sup>17</sup>U. S. Department of State, loc. cit., p. 117.

<sup>18</sup>Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Modern China, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954) p. 196.

<sup>19</sup>Lauterbach, loc. cit., p. 311.

and, to make his opposite members of the Committee of Three recognize these solutions, led to an important accord on February 25, 1946.<sup>20</sup> Essentially it was a plan for unification of the Communist Armies and the National Government Armies into one National Army.<sup>21</sup> This announcement was received with joy in the field because the agreement gave promise to settle many armed clashes then in progress or about to break out.

By this time the U. S. Marines as well as the U. S. Army had officers and soldiers serving on the truce teams. All teams were exercising every known method of influencing people and making them hold to the agreements that they had made. In some areas there were conflicts that had been going on for a generation and other situations which the local officers could not resolve. The mass of evidence grew into such a proportion that the Three Commissioners in Peking prevailed on General Marshall, General Chou En-lai, and General Chang Chun to visit their truce teams in the field. They also considered it desirable for them to visit Mao Tse-tung in Yen-an. They thought this would lend prestige and authority to the field teams and better enable them to obtain workable solutions. Two days after the signing of the agreement to reorganize the Chinese Armies, General Marshall's C54 Air Force plane arrived at West

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<sup>20</sup> U. S. Department of State, loc. cit., p. 140.

<sup>21</sup> "3 Man Military Committee Signs Agreement", The Chungking Reporter, Vol II, No. 52, February 28, 1946.



Field, Peking, bearing the Committee of Three on their visit of inspection to five of the field teams, and also to Yen-an.<sup>22</sup>

A memorable event occurred at five o'clock in the afternoon on February 27, when the Committee of Three met with the entire staff of the Three Party Headquarters in the auditorium of the Peking Union Medical College. General Byroade introduced each Commissioner to the group. He in turn introduced each member of the Committee of Three. Translations of both Chinese and English were made and spoken as the sentences were finished. Noteworthy was General Chou En-lai's hope that the Executive Headquarters would accomplish the mission assigned to it. "In all things I think it necessary that we first help ourselves and if we remain united then all questions may be solved without too much difficulty," he said.<sup>23</sup> Then he added that all decisions reached by the National Government and the Communist Party had to be carried out one hundred percent, in order to bring about necessary peace, democracy, and unity of China.<sup>24</sup>

General Marshall's speech was an appraisal of the situation as it existed. He thanked the members of the teams which were carrying out the directives and announced that

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<sup>22</sup>"Generals Chang, Chou and Marshall Leave for Peiping Today," The Chungking Reporter, Vol II, February 28, 1946.

<sup>23</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., First Quarter, Folder 1.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

one of the major tasks would be the unification of the armies of China, and the subsequent demobilization of several million troops. His closing remarks were an inspiration to all who heard them. "I am confident that the experience you already have had with the daily increase of your regard and respect for each other and your spirit of cooperation, that this exceedingly important and complicated task, will be carried out with high spirit, for the good of the Chinese people and for the prosperity and dignity of China," he said. "Many individuals will be called upon to make, what may seem to them at this time, great personal sacrifices. Some must sacrifice, but I think the majority will profit greatly. The prosperity of China is directly dependent upon your execution of this new mission. The prosperity of China will mean the prosperity and happiness of all Chinese. The tremendous resources of China, the industry of its people, the demand of the world for China's products, all should combine to free the people from their present distress, and lift China to its rightful position among the nations of the world."<sup>25</sup>

Thereafter the Committee of Three continued on its round of visiting the field team locations and Yen-an. General Marshall and his coworkers listened to team reports passed on local problems, and ordered commanders to work

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<sup>25</sup>"Peiping Headquarters is Given High Praise," The Peiping Chronicle, March 2, 1946.



out solutions. Most of the problems fell into three categories: (1) The 'cease fire', (2) the repatriation of the Japanese, and (3) the opening up of railroad and road communications.

At a given station, however, almost any kind of problem would be presented. At Hsuchow, in South China, for example, the outstanding question of the day was the need for coal. So it was agreed that the Tsao Chuang Coal Mine, one of the most productive in the area, would be opened. But the Chairman of Team No. 4, Colonel Donald Q. Harris, who was responsible for that area, soon discovered that agreements reached on paper were not so easily carried out in practice. He was to experience numerous difficulties before the mine was put in actual operation.

At Hsin Hsiang on the Yellow River in Central China, the principal problem was the continual fighting between the Chinese Nationalist and Communist forces in the Menghsien area, about 18 miles distant. In this case the National Government's 90th Division was gaining ground from the Communist defenders.

At the conference on March 3 in Yen-an where Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh were present, General Chou En-lai

told of the accomplishments of the Committee of Three. Among the issues he discussed were (1) the necessity for further implementation and clarification of the 'cease fire' order, (2) the status of besieged forces whether they were called puppets or not, (3) the raising of sieges of important towns and the passing of food into them, and (4) the immediate restoration of severed communications. Out of the meeting came a directive from the Communist Hierarchy ordering that all sieges be lifted and that food be allowed free and uninterrupted passage to important towns.<sup>26</sup>

At Huei Sui on March 3, 1946, the chairman of Railway Control Team 19 at An Yung reported that local Communist Party members would not permit rail construction to begin. The Communists were objecting because, when repaired, the railways were used to transport National Government troops to fight the Communists.

On March 6, the inspection trip was completed. Though General Marshall had not seen all of the twenty-one light and heavy teams in the field, he was satisfied with the solutions which military commanders had worked out locally, and he hoped the political leaders would do as well.

After inspecting the field team, General Marshall

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<sup>26</sup> History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., First Quarter, Folder I. In this source there are complete and verbatim records of what Marshall and Chou En-lai said at Peking but unfortunately not for what was said at Yenai.



and the Committee of Three returned to Chungking. Soon thereafter, he was recalled to the United States by President Truman to discuss financial and economic aid for China.<sup>27</sup> He departed on March 12, 1946, after effecting an agreement with the Committee of Three that the cease fire truce would also be operative in Manchuria.<sup>28</sup> This was imperative because much hostility was engendered in China over the Russian occupation of Manchuria and their systematic destruction of industries. Everything movable, including machinery, doorsills, fixtures, window frames, and the like, were taken out of plants and shipped to Siberia. When the Russians finished dismantling a plant the only thing they left was the bare walls.

At the time of General Marshall's departure the number of field teams had increased to twenty-five. These teams supervised an area of 700 by 900 miles. Progress was being made and an air of confidence permeated the group. Much help had been obtained from the U. S. Marines.<sup>29</sup> There were eleven officers, one warrant officer, and eighteen marines from the III Amphibious Corps who were working on truce teams. When the Marine garrison of Peking was reduced to one battalion of Infantry and one battalion of Artillery the Marines gave surplus trucks to the Peiping

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<sup>27</sup>U. S. Department of State, loc. cit., p. 145.

<sup>28</sup>Lauterbach, loc. cit., p. 266.

<sup>29</sup>John Hersey, "A Marine in China," Life, Vol XX, May 27, 1946, p. 17.

Headquarters to perform necessary haulage. They relinquished the Austrian and the Netherlands Legation East Compound for future billeting needs. They gave up the Frazier Garage on Hatamen Street for a vehicle repair center. The confidence of the Military personnel of the Peiping Headquarters was increased by the knowledge that the United States military forces had adapted the skills of their officers and men, hired necessary local help, and were doing a creditable job in bringing peace to China.

On the eve of General Marshall's departure, Lieutenant General Alven C. Gillem, Jr., United States Army, assumed his duties in the meetings of the Committee of Three at Chungking.

The high point of the success of the Marshall Mission was actually reached at the time he left for the United States in March 1946. He had plans to further augment the Executive Headquarters and continue to spread peace and reconstruction in China.

But General Marshall was too optimistic. At that very moment the political pendulum was beginning to swing in Chungking back into its reactionary, rightest, Kuomintang controlled domination, and the climate for peace began to deteriorate. The Kuomintang Central Executive Committee had commenced meeting in Chungking on March 1



and concluded its deliberations on March 17, 1946.<sup>30</sup>

Even though Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek and the liberal elements in his Government were in favor of unification and a political settlement with the Communists, the entrenched conservatives and reactionaries, such as Chen Li, head of the Board of Organization of the Kuomintang, and his brother Chen Kuo-fu, member of the standing Committee of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee since 1939, would not budge.<sup>31</sup> They interpreted the growing tension between the United States and Russia as a situation which would cause the United States to support wholeheartedly the Kuomintang against the Communists.<sup>32</sup> When the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee adjourned, it had so amended the original agreement of the Political Consultative Conference that liberal and democratic ideas were submerged. Realizing this return to old positions, the Communists refused to participate in the National Assembly that was scheduled to meet on May 15. Faced with this problem and hoping for a timely compromise, the meeting of the National Assembly was postponed to November 15, 1946.

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<sup>30</sup>U. S. Department of State, loc. cit., p. 144.

<sup>31</sup>John K. Fairbank, "Our Changes in China," The Atlantic, Vol. 178 (November 3, 1946), p. 37; John Leighton Stuart, loc. cit., p. 64.

<sup>32</sup>Tillman Durdin, "Key to Lasting Peace Seen in US-Soviet Harmony," New York Times, February 10, 1946, p. 4.

## CHAPTER VI

### TRUCE TEAM TEN

The Committee of Three had agreed at Hsin Hsiang in Honan Province that the Nationalist and Communist troops in the Menghsien area on the Yellow River should be separated and that Truce Team Ten should supervise the operation.<sup>1</sup> The members of the Team at that time were, Colonel Huang Ching of the Communist Party, Lieutenant Colonel Tseng To-Tao, representing the Nationalist Government, and Colonel Wesley C. Wilson, the United States Chairman. The interpreters were Mr. Chen Su, United States, Jr. Yang Pao, Communists, and Mr. Hwang Ti-thin, National Government.

This chapter will describe the general work of Truce Team Ten and the nature of the problems it faced in supporting the Marshall Mission. The situation at Menghsien was crucial to the Communists because it constituted a strategic position on the north bank of the Yellow River in an area which the famous Eighth Route

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<sup>1</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., First Quarter, Team Ten.



Army, commanded by General Chu Teh, had held many years. For this reason alone they had no intention of giving up the area without a serious struggle. The Nationalist 90th Division commanded by General Yeh Li-chin, who had been a long time friend of the Generalissimo and believed in living with his soldiers and fighting. Before the armistice was signed on January 13, he had captured a beachhead on the north bank of the Yellow River and was constantly expanding it. Nowwithstanding the armistice agreement.

The road from Hsiu Wu and Hsin Hsiang to Chiao Tso, an important communications artery, also figured in the situation. Chiao Tso was the location of a very important and productive soft coal mine which the Communists were operating. This mine had been developed by a Belgian firm and made to function at full scale when the Japanese controlled the area. The Nationalists needed this coal, But the Communists created a no man's land just west of Hsiu Wu and would not let any traffic, civilian or military, cross it in spite of an agreement made by Truce Team Ten early in the month of February.

Before starting for Menghsien the team was called upon to solve a minor problem in the siege of Tung Men in Hopei Province. After some discussion between the Communist Commander who was besieging the town and the members of Team Ten, the siege was lifted enough to allow Mr. Henry W. Stokes of the Friends Ambulance Unit to carry food and





medical supplies to that city.<sup>2</sup> An additional problem was that of arranging a conference with General Liu Chih, National Government Troop Commander, and General Liu Pocheng, Communist Commander, on April 4, 1946. These two officers were the senior troop commanders in the area.

After this, on March 25, the Team set out to accomplish its primary mission on jeep and trailer and proceeded to Hsiu Wu.<sup>3</sup> This was a small town by Chinese standards of about 15,000 inhabitants located approximately 15 miles west, southwest of Hsin Hsiang. It was of strategic significance for the Nationalists because it was the last town on the railroad in Nationalist held territory. At Hsiu Wu a guide was furnished who took the team to the vicinity of Ching Tun-tsung, a village of about 2,500 people some five miles south of Hsiu Wu. This was also an area of sharp and constant conflict. The commander of the Nationalist Troops in the area had been a clever bandit leader and he had his own force of about 12,00 men. They were a rough, capable lot and the rifles and small arms they carried though motley represented a formidable collection. The weapons had been made in the United States, Czechslovakia, Japan, and China. The Team interviewed the leader and talked with some of

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<sup>2</sup>Interview with Mr. Henry W. Stokes, March 23, 1946.

<sup>3</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., First Quarter, Team Ten: "Sino American Field Team to Menghsien," North China Daily News, Shanghai, March 28, 1946, p. 5.

his men. The commander proudly explained that his men had captured their arms and the implications were that they intended to keep them.

At the conclusion of this visit the Team returned to the road from Hsiu Wu and began its journey to Chiao Tso. Along the way it was joined by a Communist patrol which emerged from the side of an abandoned railroad engine. This patrol escorted the Team during the rest of the journey to Menghsien. The members of the patrol were mounted on stocky Mongolian Ponies that looked as though they had fought through many marauding campaigns. The party arrived in Chiao Tso at nightfall. It was a city of about 50,000 people five miles inside the Communist lines. The local magistrate greeted the team with normal Chinese courtesy and quartered them in one of the houses originally occupied by the Belgian engineers of the Li-feng Mine.<sup>4</sup>

During the night a heavy rain commenced falling. It continued in the morning, making travel practically impossible, so the team decided to remain where they were for the day. This was the signal for the magistrate and the Communist representative, Colonel Huang, to bring in delegations of various groups within the city. This was the Communist way of trying to impress the truce team with the effect their type of government had on the people. Each delegation had a leader who always gave a speech.

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<sup>4</sup>Private Papers, Colonel W. C. Wilson, March 26, 1946.



The theme of his discourse was invariably progress, or democracy, or brotherhood, or a similar subject.

Later on during the afternoon, in spite of the rain, the shaft and the buildings of the mine were inspected by the members of the team. The operation was proceeding just as fast as the elevator could bring up loads of coal in the huge mine bucket. The manager, who had previously worked for the Belgians and the Japanese, said that none of the equipment was safe but that he had to keep the coal coming up to the surface. Stock piles of coal were standing in the yard. The favorite means to haul it away was by bull or donkey cart and the hand pushed wheelbarrow.

The next day the rain continued. Nevertheless, the team moved out on the muddy road and with a squad of Communist Cavalry accompanying, slowly pushed toward Po Si where a branch of the Yellow River was crossed. Early in the afternoon the jeep with its trailer became stuck in the road where it traversed an embankment of a river. When Colonel Wilson, who was driving, started to get out, Colonel Huang held his shoulder and indicated that he should not alight. The Colonel called the Corporal of the soldier escort over and spoke a few words. The Corporal rode off. Ten minutes later he returned with about sixty peasant farmers. These crowded around the jeep and trailer with its cargo of Truce Team members and their baggage and pushed the whole along the road in

the ankle deep mud. Reaching the wooden bridge the laborers swung the load around until it was firmly set and was able to proceed under its own power.<sup>5</sup>

That night the group stayed in a private home and the only visitors were a Catholic priest and his two helpers, nuns from the town of Chin Yang a short distance away. The priest was Austrian and one of the nuns was an American. The other was a Chinese lady. They were part of Bishop Arthur Meeghan's group located at Hsin Hsiang. They brought a pint of milk and stayed and drank Government issue coffee with sugar. Their conversation with truce team members shed interesting light on local conditions. The problem of adequate care of the sick, they said, was overwhelming. The Communists allowed them to carry on their hospital work because there were no other doctors or nurses in the entire area. Communist officers brought their own wives and mothers to be treated in the hospital and though they would not help to support the enterprise, they at least did not hinder its work.

The next day was March 28 and the journey continued.<sup>6</sup> By now the rain had stopped. The character of the roadbed and the surrounding terrain had changed to gravel and this made travel easier. About two o'clock in the afternoon the team arrived at Menghsien where it was installed in a

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.



small farm house with a walled enclosure. The Truce team was visited by several delegations. Lt. Colonel Tseng, the Nationalist representative, occasionally asked a question. When he did, the person he asked would become excited and launch into a tirade. What was usually said in the tirade was that the area had been under the control of a Nationalist Tyrant named Jon Fa Gue who murdered, raped, shot, hung, and generally harassed good trades people and farmers.

The next morning members of the Truce Team mounted staunch Mongolian ponies and surveyed the Communist position. With Battalion Commanders and Regimental Commanders showing the way, they wound in and out among the small hills and mounds which dotted the area. Soldiers occupied slight holes, depressions, places in house roofs, trees, and were so well worked into the local ground it was difficult to determine whether there were three thousand or thirty thousand men defending the lines. This was in decided contrast to positions occupied by Nationalist troops, which the team inspected later. Communist positions were traversed from the north bank of the Yellow River near Kan Ko Sho to Lan Ke Tao, a distance of about fifteen miles. At several villages that the team rode through, the people came out en masse to greet them with rice wine, cooked food, flowers, and speeches. The Communist member explained that this was the treatment accorded to dignitaries. He further explained that the Communists

used guerilla methods exclusively because their army was used to traveling and fighting in the mountains. In the early days of the Eighth Route Army, the numbers of Communists was so small that the squad leaders developed a system of forcing half a dozen farmers' sons to go with them on their raids. When the action was completed, the impressed men were allowed to return home.

As the team worked its way from hidden position to hidden position, on the Communist side, the National Government's system of field fortifications was clearly visible in the distance. Whereas it was very difficult to trace the positions of the Communist forces, the National Government's were as clear as day. Without attempt at camouflage they occupied large dirt blockhouses, pillboxes, communication and fighting trenches. No firing occurred at any time during the inspection tour. By nightfall the tired team returned to Menghsien for a well deserved sleep.

The morning hours of March 30 were spent interviewing delegates and witnesses from the farmers cooperative, the workmans league, the governor's office and the middle school representatives. It was apparent that there were very few old people in the groups. However, hundreds of thumb printed petitions were given the team for the team to bring peace, prosperity and happiness to the populace. One old man in a warm grey gown and wool stocking cap appeared clutching the Saint James Version of the Bible under his arm. He obviously was frightened. He recited a few lines



that he had learned and was relieved when the words were finished. Colonel Tseng asked a few questions. The old man would start to answer, fumble and run out of words. Something occurred during the meeting which forced the American chairman to depart. After a few attempts to question witnesses the session became a three way argument between the Communist member, Colonel Huang, his witness, and the Nationalist member, Lt. Colonel Tseng. In the end Colonel Tseng accused the witness of lying and Colonel Hwang was outraged.

In the afternoon, after saying goodbye to Liu Po Chun's representative, the team mounted the jeep and rode into the Nationalist lines at Chi-li. The Commander of the 90th Division, General Yeh, held a dinner for Colonel Wilson and the members of the team.<sup>7</sup> For seven months during World War II Colonel Wilson had been an instructor in Infantry technique and small unit tactics with this same division in a little community called Ho Nan, 40 miles west of Sian, China, and made friends with many of its officers. At the testimonial dinner, General Yeh voiced the opinion of many Chinese dignitaries at that time. "I do not understand the United States of America," he said. "In 1945 they send Colonel Wilson into the middle of China and he teaches us how to fight the Japanese and Communists so we can win. Then in 1946 they send Colonel Wilson back to us to say, 'You can't fight; you must have peace. You

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<sup>7</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc.cit., Team Ten, Folder IV.

must give up all you have won'". With that he sat down and the dinner went on.<sup>8</sup>

In the morning more ponies appeared and the long trek began along the Nationalist lines. As indicated previously, these were plainly visible, being of the trench warfare type. They extended from Po-To on the Yellow River, through Tsung-Yuan, I-Ko, Chian-Tung, Yen Shenhsin-Cheng and thence to Dien-Chiang on the eastern boundary, a distance of about twelve miles. By nightfall the team had completed the circuit of the whole position. It was plotted and a stormy session began between the Communist and the Nationalist members of Team Ten. Neither Colonel Tseng or Colonel Huang wanted to trace their respective positions on a map. After a long and acrimonious debate they finally agreed on the area and the boundaries which would be plotted on the map. After more bitter discussion, Colonel Huang of the Communists reluctantly agreed to an armistice with free interchange of travel between the Communists and Nationalists on the main route along the Yellow River which passes through Chi-li.

The armistice reached at Menghsien was considered by the Executive Headquarters as a major achievement. Until this time the Communists had been able to justify any reported attacks they made throughout China by pointing to a definite attack that the Nationalists made in the Menghsien area. The members of Team Ten felt proud

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<sup>8</sup>Private Papers, Colonel W. C. Wilson, 30 March 1946.



and happy. Colonel Huang seemed to be satisfied and Lt. Colonel Tseng resigned to the solution.

With the armistice recognized and the position mapped, Team Ten crossed the Yellow River the next day on an ancient boat manned by twenty-four men poling it with the current. The arrival on the south bank of the river brought the jeep to a road which led into Kai-feng. The Lung Hai Railroad was in operation so the jeep and trailer, team and interpreters proceeded on flat cars and coaches to Kai-feng. After dinner at the headquarters of General Liu Chih in Kai-feng and again in Chengshien, the team arrived back at Hsing Hsiang on April 2.<sup>9</sup> One of the stories which was told the chairman of the team was that General Liu Po Chung, the Communist and General Liu Chih, the Nationalist, were more than mortal enemies and no reconciliation would ever be possible. The enmity went back to a period about thirteen years before, when Liu Chih was a regimental commander. He had a remote battalion heavily engaged in fighting the Communists. He sent Liu Po Chun out to direct the fighting. The next report he received was that his assistant had taken over the command of the battalion and directed its fighting all right, but was fighting as a Communist and had taken the soldiers and officers with him.

Whatever the reason, when the meeting of the field team and the commanders of the troops in the Hsin Hsiang

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<sup>9</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, Team Ten, Folder IV.

area was held, both commanders sent their Chief's of Staff to the conference. Being the host area, the Nationalist displayed a map on which their boundaries were shown. Then the Communists presented a map with their boundaries indicated. At no single point did the maps agree. In an attempt to reconcile the claim and counter claim, it became apparent to the team that except for the agreement at Menghsien, the maps just had a twenty mile band of overlapping territory which both sides maintained they occupied. A plan of reconnoitering was worked out and approved.

One concrete proposal was made and accepted. The Communists agreed to set up a coal purchasing station at Chiao-Tso for the Nationalists to come in and buy coal for cash.<sup>10</sup>

There were two sequels to this activity of Team 10, and both are indicative of the climate of the truce effort.

There were approximately 18,000 Communists fighting 20,000 Nationalists in the vicinity of Menghsien. It was vital to the Communists to contain the advance of the Nationalists because this was the home area of the whole Communist effort. When the truce agreement was affected which brought so much joy to the American Headquarters, the Communists withdrew their tactical units, but replaced them with Home Pacification units on the indicated positions, and marched on foot the tactical fighting units over mountain trails and back roads, and threw them

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid.



against the Nationalist New 6th Army at Sze Ping Kai in Manchuria several months later.<sup>11</sup> This was the sort of treachery that doomed the whole Marshall Mission.

The coal post at Chiao Tso could be the basis for a Gilbert and Sullivan opera. After much negotiation it was agreed that a bipartisan station would be installed there and coal purchased by the Nationalists for cash.

A bull cart train was assembled and in October made one complete trip between Chiao Tso and Hsing Hsiang. The American chairman at the time went with the train and escorted it through both opposing lines and across the no man's land. He noticed and reported that as he passed through Hsiu Wu thousands of Nationalist Government troops were moving through the town.<sup>12</sup> Two days later, it was reported that the Nationalist troops jumped off in an attack and occupied Menghsien; Kwi-leh; Po Ai and Chiao Tso.

On October 13, the Communists officially protested at the Peiping Executive Headquarters. They also, in conversation, accused the American Chairman of Team Number Ten of being a spy for the Nationalists in that he was the negotiator for the coal post at Chiao Tso.

The foregoing incidents are indicative of the highly antagonistic situation in every field of Chinese living

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<sup>11</sup>"Red Activities Cause Anxiety," The Peiping Chronicle, July 7, 1946.

<sup>12</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., Team Ten Folder IV.

and politics. The fight for power was intense between the Kuomintang Government led by the Generalissimo, and the Communist Party led by Mao Tse Tung. In spite of the professed desire of the leaders to agree and live in harmony, the rank and file were so imbued with fighting to the last man for the party they were affiliated with that peace and harmony was impossible. The best comparison to be made was that China was a small bone and two big dogs wanted it. There was not enough for two to have. The experiences of Truce Team Ten were similar to those of the other Truce Teams of the Marshall Mission.



## CHAPTER VII

### CONFLICT AND REPATRIATION

General Marshall returned to China on April 18, 1946, with his wife and found that the situation had changed greatly during his absence.<sup>1</sup> While in the States he had arranged with the United States War Department to use a hundred more senior Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels in jobs he thought were necessary for the success of his mission. But on April 15, just three days prior to his arrival, General Chou En-lai had announced a state of open hostilities in Manchuria.<sup>2</sup> The possibility of such an outbreak had been apparent to the personnel of the Executive Headquarters for some time. On March 28, General Byroade flew to Mukden to prepare for the arrival of four field teams.

The National Government and American representatives arrived in Mukden on March 30 and the Communist members on April 2. Colonel Raymond Tourtillot was the senior American while the Nationalist representative was Major General

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<sup>1</sup>Mayling Soong Chiang, "China," Encyclopedia Britannica, Ten Eventful Years, Col. I, 1947, p. 655.

<sup>2</sup>Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Modern China, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954), pl. 195.

Tsai Tsung-lien and the Communist Party representative, Lt. General Yao Shu-shih. One team of the four was to be the senior and remain at Mukden for the purpose of maintaining communication and forwarding supplies. The other three teams were to gather information, implement general and special directives, and enforce 'cease fire' directives. The first team dispatched was Team 29 with twelve National Government officers, eight Communist officers and six Americans under Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Drake, United States Army, a telephone engineer from Pennsylvania who had been in the Burma campaign during World War II. This team was to undergo a variety of experiences similar to those already told concerning Team 10 at Hsin Hsiang. They have been vividly described by Richard E. Lauterbach who accompanied the team and lived with it on this mission.<sup>3</sup>

As previously indicated in Chapter V, the acting Committee of Three functioned in General Marshall's behalf during his absence. The Committee, composed of U. S. Army General Gillem, Nationalist General Tsai Tsung-lien and the Communist Party General Yao Shu-shih, continued to hold meetings in Chungking, the seat of the Nationalist Government. The most important problems they discussed in the period immediately after General Marshall's departure were

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<sup>3</sup>Lauterbach, loc. cit., p. 282.



the reorganization of the Chinese Armies and railroad reconstruction.<sup>4</sup>

The latter led to acrimonious debate and ended in a virtual deadlock. To break the deadlock the Committee of Three decided to go to Peking, the rail network of North China and hub of the transportation problem. There they met at a dinner on March 30, given by General Li Tsung-jen, who was later to become the Vice-President of the Nationalist Government. Though the atmosphere was congenial, the discussions ended in another draw with each side accusing the other of failure to remove fortifications and block houses which were all along the railroad lines in North China.

In the meantime the situation in Manchuria became so critical that the acting Committee of Three flew to Mukden on March 31 to observe the situation there. They remained for one day during which time they visited the Nationalist Commander, Tu Li-Ming, who briefed them on the problems in his area.<sup>5</sup> The next day they returned to Chungking. After they arrived there, reports continued to come in concerning the fighting in the Sze-pin-Kai area of Manchuria where the New Sixth Army and the New First Army were engaged with the Communists. Farther north at

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<sup>4</sup>"Reds Want Marshall Back as Arbiter," North China Daily News (Shanghai), March 30, 1946.

<sup>5</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., 2d Quarter, Folder 1.

Changchun, the old capitol of Manchukuo, the Nationalist troops had taken over the city and capitol, only to be thrown out by the Communist forces. The latter had also occupied areas west of Mukden.

The day that General Marshall arrived in China, the new Sixth Army moved back into Changchun. This Stilwell trained force, under the leadership of General Liao was proving a match for whatever troops the Communists pressed into action against them.

When General and Mrs. Marshall arrived at Peking on April 18, they were house guests of the Walter Robertson's at the American Embassy. After an overnight visit they returned to Chungking. Here the Committee of Three met with General Marshall and conversations were immediately resumed with the Generalissimo to patch up the deteriorating situation.<sup>6</sup> No agreement was reached and consequently no positive action was taken. Shortly thereafter, Chiang Kai Shek took a step which revealed his obstinacy in the whole China issue. On May 1, 1946, he moved his Nationalist Government from Chungking to Nanking. He did this in spite of the fact he knew that such a gesture would be strongly opposed by the Communists. It was their contention that the Communist Party rightly represented the three principles of Sun Yat-sen (people's nationalism, people's democracy, and people's livelihood) and not the

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<sup>6</sup>"Six Hour Meeting No Result," North China Daily News (Shanghai), March 27, 1946.



nationalists. The Communists did not want to see Chiang and the Kuomintang claiming Sun Yat-sen's heritage in the city which contains his shrine.<sup>7</sup>

With each passing day conditions went from bad to worse. General Marshall issued his first statement since his return to China on May 23. It characterized the period as follows:

"General Marshall is daily engaged in discussions with representatives of Chinese political parties and others concerning the restoration of peace in Manchuria. He is deeply concerned over the critical situation in North China and is endeavoring by every means within his power to avoid the spread of the fighting in Manchuria to this region. The present publicity or propaganda campaign conducted by both sides naturally inflames feelings and increases the possibility of some hot-head precipitating a general conflagration. This reckless propaganda of hate and suspicion seriously aggravates the present serious situation and can lead to results that would be disastrous for the people of China.

"Operation of truce teams has been made especially difficult by the spreading of propaganda among the officers and soldiers of both sides, and it is on the success of these teams that China must largely depend for the effort at least to localize, if not suppress conflict. The American members of the team are coping with conditions that involve, not only hardship, but risking of their lives in a determined and impartial effort to better the situation."<sup>8</sup>

Despite General Marshall's vigorous efforts, team chairmen faced hardened members and angry problems everywhere they were sent. In an effort to alleviate the situation, Chiang Kai Shek ordered the Nationalist forces to 'cease fire' on June 6, 1946. This originally was to

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<sup>7</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., Second Quarter, Folder I.

<sup>8</sup>U. S. Department of State, loc. cit., p. 648.

last for fifteen days but the time was extended to June 30, 1946.<sup>9</sup> No similar pronouncement was made by the Communists. However Chiang Kai Shek made this gesture with ulterior motives in view. He was willing to cooperate to a point because the United States State Department had announced that American military aid would go to China if and when the Kuomintang and Communist Armies were united.

Nevertheless Chiang Kai Shek's step aroused new hope and the field teams assigned to Manchuria were eager to set to work. On June 6, General Byroade moved the subordinate headquarters to Changchun and there established an advanced section of the Peiping Executive Headquarters in the Chinese Eastern Railroad Building. This group was responsible for eight teams which were dispatched to widespread locations in Manchuria. These were:

Team 27	Mukden
Team 28	Sze Ping Kai
Team 29	Hailung
Team 30	Haicheng
Team 33	La Fa Chen
Team 34	Tehui
Team 35	Harbin
Team 36	Tsitsihar

All had varied and strange experiences. Some performed yeoman service, some scarcely functioned, and one, not at all.

Take the case of Team 35 scheduled for the Harbin area. On the military front, the Sungari River became

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<sup>9</sup>"15 Day Truce Extended Eight Days to June 30,"  
The Peiping Chronicle, June 23, 1946.



the dividing line between the two military forces,<sup>10</sup> and because Team 35 was to work in a sensitive region under Communist control, the Senior Communist Commander of the forces in Manchuria never let it function.

Team Number 33 also found itself in the vise of opposing Chinese forces. It was assigned to La Fa Chen, an important railway junction. The city, whose population numbered about 30,000, was also located on the eastern flank which was just beyond the extent of the Nationalist advance.

On the day the Nationalist truce was announced, the advance guard of the advancing troops was overwhelmed and thrown back to Lao Yeh Ling Pass by an aggressive Communist force in superior positions.

In spite of the bitter fighting and the complete destruction of the railroad, the flow of Japanese repatriates continued. They were gathered up by the Communists, assembled in groups of from 500 to 1,000 and moved by train to the edge of the town of La Fa Chen, which had been an important railroad junction.<sup>11</sup> There they spent the night sleeping in the open fields. In the morning they trudged on, men, women, and children, with all they could carry ((and the Chinese would allow), including cooking

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<sup>10</sup>"Neutral Zones for Northeast," The Peiping Chronicle, August 2, 1946, p. 1.

<sup>11</sup>Private papers, Colonel W. C. Wilson, September 11, 1946.

pots, wood for fuel, a few boards to make coffins, and some food - across the twelve mile no man's land to the Nationalist controlled area. There open flat cars or coal cars were standing on the railroad tracks. These the people mounted, erected barriers of sorts, and journeyed on to Changchun. A bigger camp was in operation there. The Japanese completely cared for themselves. Each detachment of one hundred had a middle-aged man as a leader. Usually a small boy walked alongside him with a flag designating the group. The group was so self sufficient that every contingency of living and dying was handled as it arose.

Officers of the Communist Army and officers of the Nationalist Army were on hand at various junction points to see that the movements continued without unnecessary delays. This was one of the most unique situations United States Field Teams met with in China. Surprising as it may seem, both sides refrained from fighting in the vicinity of Japanese repatriates. This proved at least two things - (1) both sides wanted to rid China of the Japanese, and (2) they could and would cooperate if they felt they could reap some particular advantage from mutual cooperation. Thus it was that U. S. Truce Teams were able to help speed the Japanese back to their homeland. As repatriation was one of the most successful accomplishments in China during the period of the Marshall Mission, it is well to examine the magnitude of the task that was achieved in this field of U. S. Truce Team activity.



The shipping ports for Japanese repatriates were Tsingtao and Tangku in North China and Hulutao in Manchuria.<sup>12</sup> During the week of April 13 to 19, 22,620 Japanese had been processed through Tangku and 2,942 through Tsingtao. During the week May 7 to 15, 29,535 were sent through Hulutao. Four ports of entry received them in Japan. These were Sasebo, Kagoshima, Hakota and Kure. As a matter of interest, the first Japanese ship assigned to this work was the "Enoshima Maru."<sup>13</sup> Thereafter, various other Japanese ships, U. S. Navy LST's and Liberty Ships were made available. In addition to the well and able-bodied, it is estimated that 70,000 sick and wounded were moved. The repatriation in North China was completed on August 11, 1946, with the processing of 1,246 Japanese from Tangku. Under the auspices of the Executive Headquarters, Colonel Paul G. Bell negotiated an agreement between Major General Liu Chu-yih, Chief of the Japanese Civilian and Prisoner of War Administration, National Government North East Headquarters, and General Li Li San, Chief of Reparations for the Communist Party at Harbin, Manchuria. This agreement insured the uninterrupted flow of repatriates from Communist to Nationalist territories.

The repatriation team at Hulutao processed numbers of repatriates which are amazing in size considering the

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<sup>12</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., Quarter II, Repatriation.

<sup>13</sup>"Splendid Feat by USN Freighters," North China Daily News, (Shanghai) Vol. CXXXXVII, January 24, 1946, p. 1.

multitude of problems that were encountered. Throughout the summer of 1946 a steadily increasing number of persons were processed until on September 24 a peak load of 23,580 was reached. From the day repatriation started in Manchuria until July 31, a total of 441,349 persons were processed of which 432,321 were civilian and 9,028 military. By September 15, the number had grown until a total of 685,836 were processed of which 675,251 were civilian and 9,575 were military.

A small but no less important U. S. Army section had the mission of helping to repatriate the Japanese in Formosa. During the period November 4, 1946, to January 4, 1947, there were 16,889 Japanese shipped to the homeland; 7,351 Okinawans; and 3 Koreans.

In the final report of the Communications Group of the Executive Headquarters a recapitulation of the Repatriation Mission is given. It shows the vast number of people that were shipped out of China during 1946.

Japanese military personnel	1,241,296
Japanese civilians	<u>1,776,279</u>
	3,017,575
Koreans	61,371
Okinawans	15,407
Indonesians	95
Filipinos	<u>29</u>
Grand Total	3,094,477 <sup>14</sup>

President Truman summarized the huge task in a statement he made on United States Policy toward China on

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<sup>14</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., Quarter IV, Repatriation.



December 18, 1946. "American forces helped in the disarmament of Japanese units. Executive Headquarters and its truce teams were able to make the complicated arrangements necessary to transfer Japanese across lines and through areas involved in civil conflict on their way to ports of embarkation. American units also participated in the inspection at the port. American medical units supervised all inoculation and other medical work. Finally, American and Japanese ships, under the control of General MacArthur in Japan, and a number of United States Navy ships under the Seventh Fleet, transported this number of persons to reception ports in Japan."<sup>15</sup>

When General Marshall came to China as President Truman's personal representative he did far more than negotiate between the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists. He also assumed the responsibilities of Ambassador Hurley who had resigned his position on November 27, 1945. However, the peace offensive was tottering so badly on its political and military supports that on July 11, 1946, the President nominated and the United States Senate confirmed, the appointment of John Leighton Stuart as Ambassador to China.<sup>16</sup> No one was better qualified to act as an impartial representative and supporter of the United States'

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<sup>15</sup>U. S. Department of State, loc. cit., p. 693.

<sup>16</sup>"Chou En-lai on U. S. Envoy," The Peiping Chronicle, August 6, 1946, p. 1.

peaceful desires than Doctor Stuart. He had lived in China many years and knew the country and the people thoroughly. He was just retiring from the Presidency of Yenching University in Peking, an institution he had founded in 1919. His name had been submitted to President Truman by General Marshall, who found in him the ideal man for the job. "I took this action because of Doctor Stuart's fifty odd years experience in China and his character, his personality, and his temperament," General Marshall later wrote in the preface of Dr. Stuart's book. "With Doctor Stuart beside me, I had more than fifty years of vast experience unprejudiced by personal involvements in Chinese partisanship. On his appointment, I found his advice and leading assistance of invaluable help to me. I doubt if there is anyone whose understanding of Chinese character, history, and political complications equals that of Doctor Stuart. His high standard of integrity made his opinions all the more important."<sup>17</sup>

General Marshall had need of all the support Doctor Stuart was capable of giving. Events were shaping up which had no answers and suggested no solutions. In the course of time United States personnel were deliberately and brutally maltreated. Although there was only one shooting affair, it was serious and tragic. It took place on July 29 when a band of uniformed soldiers in the vicinity

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<sup>17</sup>John Leighton Stuart, Fifty Years in China (New York: Random House, 1954), p. ix.



of Peiping ambushed a United States Marine convoy on the road at Anping. The Marines were escorting a supply convoy to Peiping. The skirmish lasted four hours and during the firing one officer and two enlisted Marines were killed, four were seriously wounded and eight suffered minor wounds.<sup>18</sup>

On the first of August Mr. Robertson wired the Committee of Three for permission to investigate. The permission was granted but no impartial investigation was ever made. The Three Commissioners wrangled over the subject until September 30. "This was not only a blow at the American military personnel, the attack had the appearance of an attempt to discredit the activities of Executive Headquarters in the United States and to cause the whole Marshall Mission to lose face in China, and a logical follow through of the current propaganda campaign," says the official History of the Peiping Executive Headquarters.<sup>19</sup>

This event undoubtedly influenced the United States in withdrawing many of its Marines who had been protecting the great coal mines east of Tientsin and the passage of the coal from the mines to the sea where it was transhipped for the railroads and cities of central China.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>"Marine Killed, Wounded Listed," The Peiping Chronicle, August 1, 1946, p. 1.

<sup>19</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., 2d Quarter, Folder I.

<sup>20</sup>U. S. Department of State, op. cit., p. 175.

Anyone without a first-hand acquaintance with China could not possibly appreciate the importance of the work which the United States Marines performed in the Tientsin area. This was because coal possesses a value in China out of all proportion to its value in the United States. Consider the fact that unless two vigilant men armed with guns and orders to shoot did not ride each coal car from the loading station to its final destination the local inhabitants would steal every chunk of coal enroute.

The Joint Communiqué issued by General Marshall and Doctor Leighton Stuart on August 10 bespoke the growing seriousness of the situation in China.<sup>21</sup> It pointed out that they had been exploring every possibility of terminating the growing conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists and the initiation of preliminary steps in the development of a truly democratic government. "The desire for a peaceful solution of political problems appears practically unanimous on the part of the people," read the communiqué. "The economic situation demands prompt solution if disastrous collapse is to be avoided.

"Fighting, daily growing more widespread, threatens to engulf the country beyond the control of those responsible. Government and Communist leaders are anxious to put an end to the fighting, but there are certain issues concerned in the immediate settlement involved regarding

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<sup>21</sup>U. S. Department of State, op. cit., p. 175.



which agreements have not been found. It appears impossible for the two parties to reach a settlement of these issues which will permit a general order to be issued for the complete cessation of hostilities in all China.

"Certain of the unsettled issues relate to the military redistribution of troops. However, these apparently present less difficulty for settlement than the main fundamental issues concerning the character of local or county governments to be maintained in regions which will be evacuated as the result of military redistributions pending the basic decision on such matters as the Constitutional Assembly."<sup>22</sup>

A few weeks after the joint communique was issued the conclusion of a Sino-American surplus property sale agreement was announced on August 30. This was a sale of war supplies to the Nationalists at bargain prices and caused immediate and bitter reactions among the Communist members of the truce teams. They erupted in frenzied speeches and accusations about the impartiality of the Americans and how they were actively assisting the Nationalists.<sup>23</sup> For months the Communists had complained because the United States had air-lifted three Nationalist Armies and moved them by sea to central China, Formosa, north

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<sup>22</sup>"China's Economic Problems," The Peiping Chronicle, August 22, 1946.

<sup>23</sup>Lauterbach, loc. cit., p. 348.

China, and Manchuria. Then when the United States sold all the surplus property resulting from World War II in the islands of the south and central Pacific to the Chinese Nationalist Government, the Communists were bitter. On the other hand, this surplus property agreement also confirmed in the minds of the Kuomintang extremists their estimate that the United States desired to support them regardless of the consequences. An interesting summary concerning the effect of this sale is found in Harley F. MacNair and Donald F. Lach's book, Modern Far Eastern International Relations, "This decision placed Marshall in the untenable position of mediating between two Chinese parties while the United States furnished war supplies to one of the parties."<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>Harley F. MacNair and Donald F. Lach, Modern Far Eastern International Relations (Chicago: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 1950), p. 642.



## CHAPTER VIII

### ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

The Peiping Executive Headquarters started with a few Army personnel and grew in size from the date of its organization on 11 January 1946. It was activated in accordance with General Order Number 12 of the United States Forces in China Theater, Shanghai, China, and signed by Brigadier General Paul W. Carraway, General Staff Corps, Acting Chief of Staff.<sup>1</sup> Later on when General Marshall effected with the Committee of Three new missions for the Headquarters, it was apparent that the number of U. S. Army personnel, officers, enlisted men, civilian technicians and civilian employees would have to be augmented. These missions included the assignment of a U. S. Army chairman to field teams in Manchuria, repatriation assistance, and the planning, coordinating and reconciling of the junction of the Communist Party Army with the National Government Army. The initial key organization was simple. A total of one hundred U. S. Army officers and soldiers with thirty-two civilians constituted the unit. The civilians were Chinese, hired in Peiping

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<sup>1</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., Second Quarter, Folder I.

and Shanghai to be interpreters, translators, warehousemen and coolies. The organization chart was as follows:

Commissioner  
Walter S. Robertson

Director of Operations  
Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade

Chief of Staff  
Colonel Louis W. Haskell

Administration	Plans & Operations	Railway Control
Capt. C. N. Beckwith	Colonel Eugene B. Ely	Colonel Donald C. Hill

Signal Section	Public Relations
Colonel J. H. Ferrick	Major W. J. Buttain

The personnel chart had assignments as here indicated:

Position	Officers	EM	Civilian
Staff			
Headquarters	4	12	
Field Teams	8	8	
Headquarters Commandant			17
Signal			
Main Station	1	12	
Field Teams (5)	5	15	
Military Police	1	10	
Interpreters			10
Translation Section	1		5
Public Relations	1	1	
Intelligence Section	1	2	
Finance Section	1	2	
Medical Section	1	3	
	<u>26</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>32</u>

Due to the increase in missions and number of field teams, officers and soldiers from the China Theatre and the Marines were added to the complement. More Chinese civilians were hired. Foreign Nationals in China, who had been more or less confined by the Japanese, flocked to the headquarters for jobs as office help, truck drivers, radio



operators and repairmen. General Marshall, during his visit to Washington in March, requested that older officers be assigned to duty with his mission. Consequently each ship to the Orient brought officers, soldiers, technicians and Department of the Army civilian employees for service in China to augment the initial organization in Peiping.<sup>2</sup> These were assembled under a subsidiary called the Peiping Headquarters Group under the supervision of Colonel Emons B. Whisner who was named Deputy Chief of Staff for Service.

The mission statement of this is as follows: "The Executive Headquarters is a diplomatic agency responsible to General George C. Marshall. The Peiping Headquarters Group is a purely military organization, responsible to the War Department, and furnishing the Executive Headquarters with military and civilian personnel, supplies, transportation, medical services, police protection, mail and communications service, engineering, administrative, entertainment and educational services, and other requirements for the efficient operation of the Executive Headquarters."<sup>3</sup>

Colonel Whisner further subdivided the activities by setting up the Peiping Depot on June 2, 1946. This Depot

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<sup>2</sup>John Hersey, "Why Were You Sent Out Here," The Atlantic, Vol. 179, February 1947, pp. 88-91.

<sup>3</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., Second Quarter, Folder II.

consisted of thirteen sections in accordance with War Department procedures. These sections were:

Depot Headquarters	Transportation Section
Army Exchange	Special Services
Information and Education	Purchasing and Contracting
Team Supply	Signal
Ordnance	Quartermaster
Medical	Salvage Engineer

Each of these sections was headed by a Colonel or Lt. Colonel. The Headquarters records show that by June 15 there were 257 U. S. Army officers, 353 enlisted men, 16 members of the Women's Army Corps and 865 civilians in the Peiping Executive Headquarters. The latter constituted a regular tower of Babel. Chinese, who had been educated in U. S. schools or foreign mission schools, aided the Headquarters as did Frenchmen, Germans, Austrians, Englishmen, Australians and Russians. These constituted a foreign corps of eager workers.

Part of the number of civilians hired consisted of 371 that helped the 332nd Troop Carrier Squadron unload, load and maintain the C46 and C47 airplanes that acted as couriers and draft horses for this extended operation. Without these hardy vehicles of transport and the 145 officers and 298 enlisted men who made weekly trips to each team, transported supplies to the teams, and brought in supplies from Manila, Shanghai, and Tokyo, General Marshall's mission would have been impossible. For in



fact it was completely air supplied; day after day, in all kinds of weather and without navigational aids except radio, courageous U. S. flyers took off and landed on makeshift airfields all the way from the icy plains of the Gobi and Manchuria to the warmth and tropical terrain of South China. Several times these planes were fired on, and at least in one case a U. S. airman was wounded while flying in a plane in a combat area.

The continued stream of good luck seemed to have deserted one pilot, Lt. Bill F. Jeanes, temporarily, when he was taking off for Mukden from West Field in Peiping early in the afternoon on May 1.<sup>4</sup> Immediately after taking off one engine quit running. "I was afraid to turn and started looking for a place to make a belly landing," he said. The plane gradually lost altitude for a distance of twelve miles. He had a narrow escape but managed to steer to the middle of a valley between two hills where he landed in a farmer's field. Lashed in the back was a jeep and sitting against the bulkhead was Colonel Benjamin Lindaaur.<sup>5</sup> The plane skidded for about fifty feet through the soft paddy field and came to a stop. The stop caused the jeep to break loose. The jeep, hurtling through the plane, pushed the navigator, Lt. R. E. Chamliiss, through

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<sup>4</sup>Interview with Lt. Bill F. Jeanes, May 8, 1946.

<sup>5</sup>Interview with Colonel Benjamin Lindaaur, May 1, 1946.

the bulkhead and pinned Colonel Lindaur to his seat. Colonel Lindaur's foot was amputated on the spot while Lt. Chamliss suffered two broken legs and a broken arm. Lt. Jeanes, the pilot, was knocked about suffering severe cuts around the face and lost several teeth. It was two hours before effective help arrived from the air field to extricate the Lieutenants and the Colonel. The Colonel was hospitalized in Peking and Shanghai. He died shortly in Tokyo on the way back to the States of a liver disruption.

As representative months, the record for the month of May when the 332nd Troop Carrier Squadron was under command of Lt. Colonel G. H. Van Deusen of Battle Creek, Michigan, was outstanding. During this thirty-one day period, 102,235 passenger miles were flown; 426,151 pounds of cargo were carried; and 109,104 gallons of gasoline were used.<sup>6</sup> Twenty planes were operated by 157 officers, and, in carrying out their support, they reconnoitered and developed new fields in areas of dissension. They also re-supplied old fields, operated a courier schedule, and took mail, food, and pay to the men in the field.<sup>7</sup>

Air transportation was augmented by motor, railroad, and water borne transportation. In the first few days of the mission, five jeeps with drivers were lent by the 5th

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<sup>6</sup>"Army Air Squadron Stationed Here is Keeping up Record," The Peiping Chronicle, August 13, 1946.

<sup>7</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., Fourth Quarter, Folder VI.



Regiment of Marines, but with the increase in tasks and areas, the motor transport was increased greatly. In April, the Transportation Section averaged 40 vehicles in operation with 80 civilian drivers and mechanics to keep them going. Most of the drivers spoke no English, but they were better and had less accidents on the Chinese roads, amongst the Chinese traffic, than most American Marines or soldiers had. By the middle of June when the job of unloading ships at Tangku was placed on the Peiping Headquarters Group, the number of personnel and vehicles assigned was 4 officers, 5 soldiers, and 250 civilian employees with 100 vehicles.

A summary for the month of December shows 127 light passenger vehicles, 27 buses and 78 cargo trucks operating a daily average of 10,000 miles. In an average month the gasoline and oil consumption was a major supply need. All items came in 55 gallon drums. Several times the Military Police caught Chinese contractors buying empty 55 gallon drums and carrying off full ones. However, these figures are compiled from the Transportation users. They are:

100 Octane gas	4,758 Drums	1,120 Oil	150 Drums
80 Octane gas	1,056 Drums	1,100 Oil	80 Drums
7 Octane gas	280 Drums	Diesel Fuel	1,280 Drums
Kerosene	250 Drums		

In addition to the costs of food, clothing, supplies and maintenance there were other costs of this operation which are not normally considered. These include the pay

of the military personnel, the pay of the Department of Army employees and local purchase payments. A representative month, January 1947, shows costs to have been as follows:<sup>8</sup>

	U. S. Funding	Chinese Funding
Pay & Allowances of Military Personnel	\$ 438,181.37	
Pay of Foreign Nationals		\$ 208,360.80
Pay of U. S. Civil Service Employees	40,766.80	
Repairs and Utilities		45,753.77
Miscellaneous Expenses	<u>9,777.77</u>	<u>26,430.15</u>
	\$ 489,752.94	\$ 280,547.72

The Chinese funding was paid out of the Chinese National Government's revolving fund. The Nationalist Government had originally agreed to pay the cost of the Three Party Peace Mission. They could not have foreseen, however, how it was to grow in size or that a terrific inflation would occur which changed daily with the possibilities of lasting peace. At the time a typewriter operator was hired on May 1, he was receiving 560,000 Chinese National currency dollars which was equivalent to 170 American dollars. This was figured at a rate of 5,275 to 1.<sup>9</sup> By the time the same operator's job ceased in February, 1947,

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<sup>8</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., Fourth Quarter, Folder VI.

<sup>9</sup>"New Exchange Rate for U. S. Dollar Announced," The Peiping Chronicle, August 20, 1946.



he was being paid \$1,000,000 Chinese National currency to one American dollar. Literally he was a multimillionaire, but he couldn't purchase anything with his millions.

The Chinese Revolving Fund was an arrangement between General Marshall and Dr. T. V. Soong which had been concluded on July 21, 1946. This initially was one billion dollars, Chinese National Currency, which was later increased by money allotments made by the U. S. Army, one of \$500,000 from the China Service Command while it was operating and \$1,079,000 from the War Department Budget Office to charge against.<sup>10</sup>

The foregoing facts and figures are an exposition of the proportion of the United States Army's support to the mission of General Marshall during this interesting period. This vast undertaking involved the lives of officers, soldiers, and civilians that are impossible to calculate in money. On the cash cost, the average dollar expenditure was about \$400,000 per month for a period of fifteen months. The number of typewriters, radios, jeeps, trailers, gallons of gasoline and similar equipment would come up to another half million dollars a month; so, in conclusion, the cost of the Marshall Mission to the United States was about one billion dollars a month. This seemed a small price to pay for the evacuation of three million Japanese repatriates and the return of 110,000 United States soldiers, sailors, and marines to their homes and civilian occupations.

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<sup>10</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., First Quarter, 1947, Folder I.

## CHAPTER IX

### RECOGNITION OF DEFEAT

The military and political situation in China deteriorated rapidly from mid-April. During the summer months and the early fall, the military advantages seemed to be all in the favor of the Nationalist Government forces who were on the offensive everywhere.<sup>1</sup> Activities on the part of the Communists and Communist inspired sympathizers helped to undermine the Marshall Mission. The fate of Team No. 11 under Colonel J. H. Rustemeyer provides an example of the deplorable condition that existed in the very locales where truce teams were in operation. As early as July 2, Colonel Rustemeyer's compound at Chengteh was invaded.<sup>2</sup> This happened while the truce members were conducting a conference. A group of citizens accompanied by some Communist soldiers forced their way into the compound and made numerous demands. They asked the Americans to cease operating their radio, as the Nationalists were receiving information from it. In later days the civilian populace

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<sup>1</sup>"Government Driving Wedge Between Yen-an Kalgan," The Peiping Chronicle, September 17, 1946.

<sup>2</sup>Interview with Colonel J. H. Rustemeyer, September 13, 1946.



destroyed roads and bridges in the area, and on August 27, the Communist section of the Team placed the Americans and Nationalists under arrest. Colonel Rustemeyer was forced to dismantle his radio. It thus became apparent that in North China, Nationalist forces were launching a drive on Cheng-teh and Chihfeng. On August 13 the Team was forced to evacuate the area with the Communists who were leaving by foot and ox cart. During their retreat the column was strafed by two National Government airplanes in the vicinity of the road between Lung-hua and Wei d'ang. Four members of the Team's Communist helpers were killed and one National Government team helper. Sergeant Gilbert S. Hangen of the United States Army was badly burned as was a foreign national who had been hired as a translator and radio technician by the Americans. Despite their injuries, they were forced to accompany the column all the way to Kalgan, a distance of about forty-five miles eastward. They arrived on September 10, 1946, and Colonel Rustemeyer and his team were airlifted back to Peiping for recuperation.

Kalgan was a strategic stronghold of the Communists on the edge of the Gobi Desert.<sup>3</sup> A city of some 60,000 inhabitants, it was also the gateway to Peiping. Among the many reports sent in by team commanders to Peiping Headquarters, one that arrived on October 4 from Team No. 3

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<sup>3</sup>George Moorad, Lost Peace in China, (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1949) pp 114-125.

under Colonel Holly at Taiyuan stated that General Fuy Vso Yi's forces, the 34th Group Army, would capture Kalgan in three days. General Sun Lien Chung's XI War Zone Forces were also converging on Kalgan along the Peiping-Swyuan Railway.

To creat a diversion, the Communists attacked and occupied for a day the town of An-tung which was 25 miles southeast of Peiping. Chou En-lai and his fellow Communist negotiators had been aware of the drive on Kalgan and were anxious to prevent the Government troops advance. As early as October 1, General Chou sent General Marshall a note from Shanghai formally demanding an immediate cessation of the Nationalist drive. The message was presented to General Marshall by the Communist spokesman Wang Ping-nan in Nanking.<sup>4</sup> It also said that if the drive continued, a final split in China would be effected. Wang Ping-nan accused government troops of abandoning the governments pronounced policy of peaceful settlement. When Chiang Kai Shek received Chou's memorandum, he submitted a counter proposal that embodied all the ideas so far discussed between both sides which included the government reorganization plan and the Army reorganization program. If the Communists would completely agree to these points, said Chiang Kai Shek, then the

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<sup>4</sup>Christopher Rand, "Chou Demands Chiang Cease Kalgan Attacks," New York Herald Tribune, October 2, 1946, p. 3.



Nationalists would cease advancing on Kalgan.

October 10, "the Double Tenth," is a big holiday in China and that day in 1946 was the 35th Anniversary of the establishment of the Chinese Republic. A commemorative ceremony was held in the Nationalist Government's auditorium in Nanking and the Generalissimo was reelected President of China by the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.<sup>5</sup> The Government also announced the placing of military commanders over civilian administrators and the renewal of military conscription.<sup>6</sup> A summons was issued for the meeting of the National Assembly on November 12, 1946, the birthday of Sun Yet-sen.<sup>7</sup>

In the meantime so much pressure was brought to bear on Kalgan that the Communists literally walked out of Kalgan and allowed the Nationalists to take it without a struggle. They did this in order to put the full load of responsibility for fighting on the shoulders of the Nationalists. Before they left, however, they stripped the city of food and produce. They destroyed the manufacturing capability of the city, disrupted its communications, and left a bitter and disgruntled populace to greet the incoming Government forces.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>"Chiang's Term of Office Extended," The Peiping Chronicle, October 11, 1946.

<sup>6</sup>Stuart, loc. cit., ;. 169; "New Conscription Law Promulgated," The Peiping Chronicle, October 12, 1946.

<sup>7</sup>"Mixed Reactions to Government Stand; Assembly Calling Draws Regret," The Peiping Chronicle, October 17, 1946.

<sup>8</sup>"Kalgan is Test to Nationalists After Red Rule," A. T. Steele, New York Herald Tribune, December 21, 1946, p. 2.

About mid-October Mr. Walter S. Robertson withdrew as the United States Commissioner at Peiping and returned to the United States to continue further duties in the State Department. Lieutenant General Alvin C. Gillem, Jr., was named as his successor as Commissioner and also took command of the Peiping Executive Headquarters Group.<sup>9</sup>

Approximately ten days later on October 26, Chou En-lai called on General Marshall in the capital. He pointed out that the government's policy, which was that of force, was necessary, continued to overshadow the peace efforts of minority groups and that military leaders were obviously running the government.<sup>10</sup>

Fuel was poured on the flame of Communist dissatisfaction with the United States and General Marshall's peace negotiations, with the signing in Nanking of a five year treaty of "friendship, commerce and navigation" between the United States and Chiang Kai Shek's Government on November 4. Ambassador Stuart and Robert Lacy Smith, the United States Consul-General at Tientsin signed for the United States and Wang Shih-chieh, the Foreign Minister, for China.<sup>11</sup> This treaty superseded all previous treaties with the United States, including the original agreement

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<sup>9</sup>"Robertson Will Leave Post at Headquarters," The Peiping Chronicle, September 27, 1946.

<sup>10</sup>"New Technique in Peace Talk," The Peiping Chronicle, October 25, 1946.

<sup>11</sup>U.S. Department of State, Press Release Nr. 773, November 4, 1946.



that had been signed on July 3, 1844. It was a reciprocal treaty but included a most favored nation clause, but nowhere in its pages were there any provisions for extra-territoriality. The rights of Americans were greatly curtailed when compared to the privileges they had previously enjoyed.

Chou En-lai conferred with General Marshall on November 10 and attended a full scale meeting of the Committee of Three on the next day. No agreement resulted in this meeting. Immediately thereafter the Government announced that the National Assembly would meet on the fifteenth of the month.<sup>12</sup>

Just one day before the Assembly was to meet, General Chou announced that he was returning to Yen-an because his mission was finished. In the announcement he repeated that the Nationalists occupation of Kalgan had brought about a national split militarily. "Subsequently the Government has taken over Antung," he said on November 14 in Nanking. "Then the unilateral Assembly was called. When that opens," he continued, "all the agreements, the cease fire, the Political Consultative Conference, and military reorganization will have been torn to pieces. Since the basis of my negotiations is being made a scrap of paper, my mission has terminated. Therefore, nothing remains but for me to go back to Yen-an."<sup>13</sup> He also stated that a Communist liaison

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<sup>12</sup>"General Chou Off to Yen-an", The Peiping Chronicle, November 21, 1946.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

officer, Tun Pi-wu, would remain in Nanking.

As the Government had previously announced, the National Assembly met on November 15, in spite of Communist objections.<sup>14</sup> It then continued to sit in session for a period of six weeks during which time it drafted a new constitution.

The day after the meeting, General Chou En-lai held a press conference in which he presented his case in more detail.<sup>15</sup> It is a significant summary of the Communist attitude toward developments in China during 1946:

"The government authorities have thoroughly destroyed the status quo of the 'Cease Fire' order of January 13, and the four promises pledged by the responsible authorities of the Government at the inaugural meeting of the PCC have been broken utterly by the Kuomintang's gestapo rule from the time of the Chiaoch'angkuo incident in Chungking in February to the assassinations of Li Kung Po and Wen Yi To, leading members of the Democratic League.

"The underlying principle of the military agreement was the separation of the military and civilian administration. Nevertheless, it is an obvious fact that at the present moment all the Provincial governors appointed by the Kuomintang Government are military men on active service.

"The decision regarding the National Assembly was the last piece of compromise reached during the PCC discussions. The Kuomintang authorities at the time pledged not to call the National Assembly which was manipulated by one party alone and would entail a split.

"Only when civil war is stopped, the PCC decisions are carried out, the people's freedoms are safeguarded, and the reorganization of the government achieved, should delegates regard the National Assembly as a reunited congress participated in by all parties."

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<sup>14</sup>"National Assembly has First Formal Meeting," The Peiping Chronicle, November 26, 1946.

<sup>15</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit. Fourth Quarter, Folder 1.



The very next day on November 17, 1946, Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek opened a Conference of Governors which was called to give them directions on how to govern areas taken over from the Communists. "The Government can crush the Communist Army in five months, whereas the political fight will take another five years," he declared. Later on in the conference he is reported to have said that land reforms must be better than the Communist Economic Policy in order to win over the people. "The people's livelihood must be improved, so as to make the people capable of doing things for their own welfare and the good of the Kuomintang," he emphasized.

On the same day, Chou En-lai, his wife, and thirteen members of his staff went to Yen-an on General Marshall's new transport plane which was piloted by Colonel J. Hart Caughey of the United States Air Force. Similarly on November 21, ten members of the Communist Party group in Peiping went to Yen-an from Peiping. This was the beginning of the complete Communist departure from Nanking and their disassociation with the Marshall Mission.

The taking of Kalgan and the lack of political agreement concerning the calling of the National Assembly was reflected in the attitude of the Communist members of the field teams. All were bitter and resentful and as a result truce negotiations came to a halt in every truce team area.

They refused to attend meetings, and where they did one or another of their members would launch into a long discussion on democratic principles or cooperative action which would bog the meeting down completely. By the end of November conditions were so bad that out of a total of 28 truce teams in China, eleven were sent to Peiping to give physical protection to either the Communist or the Nationalist Government members.<sup>16</sup> Only four of the seventeen teams remaining in the field had a full complement of negotiators and one of the four - No. Ten - because of the restrictions imposed by the National Government against the Communist member of the team, General Huang, was inactive. He was released and returned to Han Tan on October 30, 1946, in custody of the American member.<sup>17</sup> By Thanksgiving Day what teams were left in Manchuria were in the Headquarters at Changchun. For all practical purposes truce team activity had come to an end in China by that time.

The day that General Chou left Nanking seemed propitious for the whole headquarters to fold up and quit but each party hesitated to take the step.<sup>18</sup> General Marshall had faith in the Headquarters as a nucleus around which to build a Peace Administration in the event that agreement should be reached between the two opponents. The personnel

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<sup>16</sup>"Changchun Again Threatened with New Red Attack," The Peiping Chronicle, November 24, 1946.

<sup>17</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., Fourth Quarter, Team Ten.

<sup>18</sup>Christopher Rand, "Chou En-lai in Yenan," New York Herald Tribune, December 18, 1946, p. 3.



of the headquarters also presented him with enough eyes and ears in many areas to determine actual conditions without relying on the reports of the two opposing parties. The Communists encouraged General Marshall and the United States members to stay in China and continue their work because they feared that if the Americans departed the United States would give their all out aid to Chian Kai Shek. The Communists were also enabled to operate and intelligence and communication net and maintain contact with many of their units with which they otherwise would have had no contact.<sup>19</sup> The Nationalists were able to use the Executive Headquarters as a communication center and a point of contact in areas where otherwise there would have been none, and they also encouraged the United States members to vouch for their need of the United States economic support.

When the National Assembly met without the Communists, there were 2,050 delegates. They represented 760 regional areas in China. Of these delegated 379 represented farmers, laborers, and commercial workers; 153 special delegates represented overseas communities; 58 represented professions and 700 represented political organizations which included the Democratic League and the Youth League. Among the presiding officers were Chiang Kai Shek; Doctor Hu Shih,

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<sup>19</sup>"Reds Protest Over Changchun Affair," North-China Daily News, Shanghai, January 27, 1947.

President of the Peiping National University; and General Ho Chung-chun.<sup>20</sup> This group was successful in formulating and presenting to General Chiang Kai Shek on Christmas Day, a draft constitution with many liberal principles. On December 31, 1946, the Constitution was promulgated as the law of the land.<sup>21</sup> It was realized by both the Communist Party Commissioner in Peiping, and the National Government there, that the peace negotiating machinery which had been set up in the beginning of the year was now discarded completely.

Soldiers and officers of the United States Army in China had been speculating, as military personnel will, whether the Marshall Mission would quit and whether they would be allowed to return to the United States.<sup>22</sup> Most of them were agreed that their work was finished and they could do no more to solve the Chinese riddle. Virtually anticipated an immediate trip back to the good old USA. But their hopes were dashed by President Harry S. Truman's China policy statement on December 18, 1948, which was published in the newspapers of the United States and China. President Truman reiterated that the views he had expressed one year before were still sound. He stated that China is a sovereign nation and expressed the hope that

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<sup>20</sup>"National Assembly has First Formal Meeting," The Peiping Chronicle, November 26, 1946.

<sup>21</sup>"Chiang Signs Promulgation Order for Constitution," North-China Daily News (Shanghai), January 1, 1947.

<sup>22</sup>A. T. Steele, "U. S. Navy Likely to Make a Long Stay," New York Herald Tribune, December 16, 1946.



the Government would find a peaceful solution to the unification crisis. He repeated that the United States would not interfere with the internal affairs in China and would search for ways and means for constructive aid. President Truman emphasized that "when conditions in China improve, we are prepared to consider aid in carrying out other projects, unrelated to civil strife, which would encourage economic reconstruction and reform in China, and which in so doing, would promote a general revival of commercial relations between American and Chinese businessmen."

The President concluded his statement by summarizing American economic and military aid to China: "(1) Three Armies were moved by air and eleven by sea to Central China, Formosa, North China, and Manchuria. (2) The United States Government authorized \$66,000,000 in six specified projects for rehabilitation. (3) United States assistance took the form of goods and equipment and services, almost half being the cost of transportation of troops. (4) From VJ Day to the end of February the total lend lease was \$600,000,000. (5) China agreed to buy all surplus property owned by the United States in China and on seventeen Pacific islands and bases with certain exceptions. Aircraft, all demilitarized combat material, and fixed installations outside of China were excluded, and (6) At peak strength a year ago, the United States had

some 113,000 soldiers, sailors and marines in China. Today this number is reduced to less than 12,000 including some 2,000 directly concerned with the operations of Executive Headquarters and will be further reduced to the number required to supply and secure American personnel of Executive Headquarters and the airfield and stores at Tsingtao."

After reading and pondering Mr. Truman's statement the members of the United States Army with its sister services, the Marine Corps, the United States Navy, and the Air Force, concluded that they would remain in China for an indefinite period. Time, however, showed that this was not to be the case.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Frank Kelley, "Marshall to Stay at Post," New York Herald Tribune, December 19, 1946.



## CHAPTER X

### WITHDRAWAL OF THE MISSION

Events in other parts of the world were shaping up which called for major policy decisions in the United States regarding the use of its army and its resources. Contrary to expectations, General Marshall was recalled to the United States on January 7, 1947, to serve as Secretary of State in President Truman's cabinet.<sup>1</sup> This position he held from the time of his appointment on January 21, 1947, until January 20, 1949. Upon receipt of the announcement of General Marshall's recall, both factions in China were greatly surprised but fulsome in their praise of General Marshall's work.<sup>2</sup> The head of the Communist liaison group at Nanking, Mr. Wang Ping-nan, said, "General Marshall has more understanding about China than anyone else, and this is what we can expect upon his assumption of his new post."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>"Marshall Named Secretary of State as Byrnes Resigns," North-China Daily News, (Shanghai) January 3, 1947.

<sup>2</sup>"Nanking Surprised by Marshall's Recall," North-China Daily News, (Shanghai) January 8, 1947.

<sup>3</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., First Quarter, 1947, Folder I.

Generalissimo Chiang thought so highly of General Marshall and his work that he offered him the post of Supreme Advisor so that "he could continue to make of China the kind of country which Chinese and Americans alike desired."<sup>4</sup>

Chen Li-Fu, leader of the Kuomintang right wing was "a great friend and a great ally" and would have succeeded in his "struggle in China's cause" except for the distrust of the "handful of Chinese that is the Communist party."<sup>5</sup>

General Chou En-Lai, in a speech delivered at Yen-an on January 10, 1947, laid at Chiang Kai Shek's door the responsibility for General Marshall's lack of success. He asked that the new Secretary of State "review the United States Government's China policy during the past year, cease repeating past mistakes, cease aiding the Chiang Kai-Shek government in waging of civil war, withdraw American troops from China, refrain from intervening in Chinese internal affairs, and readjust Sino-American relations."

Before General Marshall left China he issued a personal statement which summarized his work there as the Special Representative of President Truman.<sup>6</sup> The main purpose of his statement was to explain to the American people the chief difficulty which he encountered in trying to negotiate a settlement between the Nationalists and the Communists.

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<sup>4</sup>Stuart, loc. cit., p. 178.

<sup>5</sup>Isaacs, loc. cit., p. 69.

<sup>6</sup>U.S. Department of State, loc. cit., p. 686.



"In the first place," he said, "the greatest obstacle to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other." He went on to emphasize the vicious propaganda used by the Communists. He found that in both parties the military officers and hierarchy dominated civil government which he considered an unhealthy state. General Marshall described the long-suffering, inarticulate masses in China who went about their daily tasks bearing patiently their burdens like beasts in the field. He also estimated the probable course of action the Communists would take in the future. "The Communists by their unwillingness to compromise in the national interest are evidently counting on an economic collapse to bring about the fall of the government, accelerated by extensive guerrilla action against the long lines of rail communications - regardless of the cost in suffering to the Chinese people."<sup>7</sup>

This has proved to be a correct estimate.

Upon receipt of the announcement of General Marshall's appointment to the position of Secretary of State, General Gillem, who succeeded him, began to bring into the Headquarters at Peking the officers, men, and equipment of the various field teams. This was actually the first step in closing out United States Army effort to bring order to China. Communist and Nationalist truce team members, their

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

wives, children, and dependents, were soon airlifted to their homes.<sup>8</sup> United States Army officers and soldiers were screened and those with insufficient overseas time were sent to Korea, Japan, or to Nanking where an advisory group was being assembled to coach the Nationalist Army. An official pronouncement was made by the American embassy in Nanking on January 29, 1947, concerning the withdrawal of the United States from the Committee of Three and the Executive Headquarters in Peking. Accordingly, on January 30, the Nationalist Government announced that the Committee of Three and the Executive Headquarters were dissolved.<sup>9</sup>

Lieutenant General A. C. Gillem, Jr., United States Commissioner at Peking, gave the final death blow to the Marshall Mission on February 6, 1947, when he delivered identical letters to the Communist Party and the National Government Headquarters just before the normal time for quitting daily business.<sup>10</sup> These letters were as follows:

"This is the conclusion of the most unique mission during the long history of the United States Army.

"The United States Army, closely following its great victory of the Second World War, turned to the task of assisting the Chinese in the tortuous job of accomplishing internal peace and recovery. Many of the officers and men who had served in China during the war with the Japanese turned their organizational ability and their other talents to the establishment of a peace, not based on the superiority

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<sup>8</sup>"U.S. Withdrawing Troops from Executive Headquarters," North-China Daily News (Shanghai) January 30, 1947.

<sup>9</sup>History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., First Quarter, 1947, Folder I.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.



of arms, but on the firmer foundations of compromise and understanding. The dependents of many officers and men were brought to China and homes established in Peiping before the decision of our government was made to withdraw from mediation."

In a press conference the same day, General Gillem told listeners that taps had sounded for the American organization. The General did not utilize this opportunity to tell why the Marshall mission had failed. In his sensitive position one could not have expected that he would.

One of the influential National Government spokesmen, Doctor Hu Shih, writing in 1953, explained why he thought the Marshall Mission did not achieve its goals. "The first objective was to cause the Chinese to form a coalition government with the Chinese Communists fairly and effectively represented," he wrote; "the second was to cause them to eliminate the autonomous armies of the Chinese Communist Party and integrate them into the National Army. Such was the inherently impossible dual task of the Marshall Mission. . . . . The weapon was to be not military pressure or intervention, but the withholding of American aid to China. But this weapon could only checkmate the Chinese Government and had no effect whatever on the Chinese Communists . . . . . So the Marshall Mission failed because of the inherently impossible objectives." Doctor Hu Shih also concludes that Doctor Leighton Stuart failed as an assistant to General Marshall because he had no form of pressure to apply on the Communists except that of friendship and good will.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Stuart, loc. cit., pp. xvi-xvix.

This estimate is a different aspect than that of Mr. Lo Lung-Chi, one of the leaders of the Left Wing Democratic League which had boycotted the National Assembly along with the Communists. His remarks were, "General Marshall is operating on two mistaken assumptions. First is his expectation that this Government can be democratic; and second, that, even granting that this is possible, the Communists will join it provided it is liberalized. These assumptions show a lack of understanding of Chinese psychology and Chinese history since 1911."<sup>12</sup>

Referring to General Chou En-Lai's speech of January 10, 1947, he states flatly the Communist view that the failure of General Marshall's mission "is all the result of the carrying on of the civil war by Chiang Kai Shek."<sup>13</sup>

The United States Army population connected with the Marahall Mission on February 5, 1947, included 352 officers, 626 enlisted men, 128 War Department civilian employees and 2,132 locally hired civilians.<sup>14</sup> There were also 339 vehicles of both the quarter-ton jeep variety and 2½-ton cargo trucks. The discharge of the civilians came as quite a blow to the foreign nationals who had survived the previous Japanese occupation of North China. Within the next two months the officers and dependents, the soldiers, and the War

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<sup>12</sup>Lieberman, loc. cit., January 6, 1947, p. 6.

<sup>13</sup>Isaacs, loc. cit., p. 77.

<sup>14</sup>"GIs Await Signal," North-China Daily News, (Shanghai) January 31, 1947.



Department civilian employees were shipped to the United States on the two Army Transports, the General Weigel and the General Brewster, and the Navy hospital ship, Benevolence, which was returning home from the Bikini Tests.

The vehicles, radios, post exchange supplies, and hundreds of other items that the U. S. Army finds necessary at home or away from home were turned over to representatives of the U. S. Foreign Liquidation Commission that came to Peking for that purpose.<sup>15</sup>

The 332nd Troop Transport Squadron, after delivering all to their new assignments, reported to the Army Advisory Group in Nanking. All quarters were turned back to the National Government except the Peking Union Medical College which was returned to the Administrator, Mr. Trevor Bowen. Among the supplies which were not disposed of in China by the Foreign Liquidation Commission was a 100 bed hospital unit. This equipment was shipped to the 24th U. S. Army Corps in Korea.

Many conclusions can be and are drawn from the experiences of the personnel of the U. S. Army in this year-long effort at mediation. The first and obvious one was that the goal to be achieved and the methods to be utilized obtaining the goal must be agreed upon by the contending factions before an attempt is made to mediate. The second conclusion is that when the United States accepts the role of mediator,

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<sup>15</sup>"Americans Prepare to Quit Peiping," North-China Daily News (Shanghai), February 6, 1947.

limits should be announced beyond which the mediators will not go. Members of the Truce Teams knew their work was being bogged down in minute details after the return of General Marshall to China in April. With the passing of each day thereafter the U. S. mediating group lost prestige and influence.

In considering the larger picture, President Truman sent General Marshall to China to obtain the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods. He gave him as a weapon of pressure the power to grant or withhold American economic assistance. In addition he was given two tasks, the evacuation of Japanese troops from North China and the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from the mainland of China. Both tasks General Marshall achieved through the operation of the Peiping Executive Headquarters which was provided by the United States Army.

The failure of General Marshall to accomplish the unification of China was because it was an impossible task founded on false foundations. The United States had accepted the Nationalist Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek as the Government of China when it was not so in fact by any stretch of the imagination. In an article appearing in the New York Times on January 7, 1947, James Reston stated, "It cannot be said that his mission to China was a spectacular success. That mission was to use his influence to bring the contending parties in China together. This has not been accomplished but at least a certain



balance of power between these parties has been attained, and this in turn has prevented any great shift in the balance of power in Asia since the end of the war."<sup>16</sup>

There is no doubt that the U. S. Army's role in China during this trying time was an unusual one. The carrying out of this role depended upon the adaptability and resourcefulness of the officers and soldiers serving in China. By the application of their abilities they were able to utilize military administration and communication techniques to the task of reconciling warring factions in China and achieved some measure of success. This was a trial period. It was a good introduction to diplomacy and foreign relations for General Marshall. It prepared him for the position of Secretary of State and proved to be an excellent foundation both for him and the United States during the troubled years which followed.

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<sup>16</sup>James Reston, "Marshall is Summoned by Truman for Report on His Efforts in China," New York Times, January 7, 1947, p. 2.

APPENDIX I  
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD  
CHINA, 1945

President Truman to the Special Representative of the  
President to China

Washington, D.C.  
15 December 1945

My Dear General Marshall:

On the eve of your departure for China, I want to repeat to you my appreciation of your willingness to undertake this difficult mission.

I have the utmost confidence in your ability to handle the task before you but, to guide you insofar as you may find it helpful, I shall give you some of the thoughts, ideas and objectives which Secretary Byrnes and I have in mind with regard to your mission.

I attach several documents which I desire should be considered as part of this letter. One is a statement of U.S. policy towards China which was, I understand, prepared after consultation with you and with officials of the Department. The second is a memorandum from the Secretary of the State to the War Department in regard to China. And the third is a copy of my press release on policy in China. I understand that these documents have been shown to you and received your approval.

The fact that I have asked you to go to China is the clearest evidence of my very real concern with regard to the situation there. Secretary Byrnes and I are both anxious that the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible. It is my desire that you, as my Special Representative, bring to bear in an appropriate and practicable manner the influence of the United States to this end.

Specifically I desire that you endeavor to persuade the Chinese Government to hold a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, to effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in north China.



It is my understanding that there is now in session in Chungking a Peoples Consultative Council made up of representatives of the various political elements, including the Chinese Communists. A meeting of this Council should furnish you with a convenient opportunity for discussions with the various political leaders.

Upon the success of your efforts, as outlined above, will depend largely, of course, the success of our plans for the evacuation of Japanese troops from China, particularly north China, and for the subsequent withdrawal of our own armed forces from China. I am particularly desirous that both be accomplished as soon as possible.

In your conversations with Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese leaders, you are authorized to speak with the utmost frankness. Particularly, you may state, in connection with the Chinese desire for credits, technical assistance in economic field and military assistance (I have in mind the proposed U.S. military advisor group which I have approved in principle), that a China disunited and torn by civil strife could not be considered realistically as having proper place for American assistance along the lines enumerated.

I am anxious that you keep Secretary Byrnes and me currently informed of the progress of your negotiations and of obstacles you may encounter. You will have our full support and we shall endeavor at all times to be as helpful to you as possible.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

## Memorandum by Secretary Byrnes

Washington, D.C.  
December 9, 1945

For the War Department

The President and the Secretary of the State are both anxious that the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible. At a public hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on December 7, the Secretary of State said:

"During the war, the immediate goal of the United States in China was to provide a military union of the several political factions in order to bring their combined power to bear upon our common enemy, Japan. Our long range goal, then as now, and a goal of at least equal importance is the development of a strong united and democratic China.

"To achieve this longer range goal it is essential that the Central Government of China as well as the various dissident elements approach the settlement of their differences with a genuine willingness to compromise. We believe, as we have long believed and consistently demonstrated, that the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek affords the most satisfactory base for a developing democracy. But we also believe that it must be broadened to include the representatives of those large and well organized groups who are without any voice in the government of China.

"This problem is not an easy one. It requires tact and discretion, patience and restraint. It will not be solved by the Chinese leaders themselves. To the extent that our influence is a factor, success will depend upon our capacity to exercise that influence in the light of shifting conditions in such a way as to encourage concessions to the Central Government, by the so called Communists, by the other factions."

The President has asked General Marshall to go to China as his special representative for the purpose of bringing to bear in an appropriate and practicable manner, the influence of the United States for the achievement of the ends set forth above. Specifically General



Marshall will endeavor to influence the Chinese government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, affect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in north China.

In respect to General Wedemeyer's recent messages, the State Department requests the War Department to arrange for directions to him stipulating that:

1. He may put into effect the arrangements to assist the Chinese National Government in transporting Chinese troops to Manchurian ports, including logistical support of such troops;

2. He may also proceed to put into effect the stepped up arrangements for the evacuation of Japanese troops from the Chinese Theatre;

3. Pending the outcome of General Marshall's discussion with Chinese leaders in Chungking for the purpose of arranging a national conference of representatives of the major political elements and for a cessation of hostilities, further transportation of Chinese troops to north China, except as north China ports may be necessary for the movement of troops and supplies into Manchuria, will be held in abeyance;

4. Arrangements for transportation of Chinese troops into north China may be immediately perfected, but not communicated to the Chinese government. Such arrangements will be executed when General Marshall determines either -

- (a) that the movement of Chinese troops to north China can be carried out consistently with his negotiations, or

- (b) that the negotiations between the Chinese groups have failed or show no prospect of success and that the circumstances are such as to make the movement necessary to effectuate surrender terms and to secure the long term interest of the United States in the maintenance of international peace.

U. S. Policy Toward China

Statement by President Harry S. Truman  
(December 15, 1945)

The Government of the United States holds that peace and prosperity of the world in this new and unexplored era ahead depend upon the ability of the sovereign nations to combine for collective security in the United Nations Organization.

It is the firm belief of this Government that a strong, united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to the success of this United Nations Organization and for world peace. A China disorganized and divided either by foreign aggression, such as that undertaken by the Japanese, or by violent internal strife, is an undermining influence to world stability and peace, now and in the future.

The United States Government has long subscribed to the principle that the management of internal affairs is the responsibility of the people of the sovereign nations. Events of this century, however, would indicate that a breach of peace anywhere in the world threatens the peace of the entire world. It is thus in the most vital interest of the United States and all the United Nations that the people of China overlook no opportunity to adjust their internal differences promptly by methods of peaceful negotiation.

The Government of the United States believes it essential:

1. - That a cessation of hostilities be arranged between the armies of the National Government and the Chinese Communists and other dissident Chinese armed forces for the purpose of completing the return of all China to effective Chinese control, including the immediate evacuation of the Japanese forces.

2. - That a national conference of representatives of major political elements be arranged to develop an early solution to the present internal strife - a solution which will bring about the unification of China.



The United States and the other United Nations have recognized the present National Government of the Republic of China as the only legal Government in China. It is proper instrument to achieve the objective of a unified China.

The United States and the United Kingdom by the Cairo Declaration in 1943, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, by adhering to the Potsdam Declaration of last July and by the Sino-Soviet treaty and agreement of August 1945 are all committed to the liberation of China, including the return of Manchuria to Chinese control. These agreements were made with the National Government of the Republic of China.

In continuation of the constant and close collaboration with the National Government of the Republic of China in the prosecution of this war, in consonance with the Potsdam Declaration, and to remove possibility of Japanese influence remaining in China, the United States has assumed a definite obligation in the disarmament and evacuation of Japanese troops in the liberated areas. The United States Marines are in North China for that purpose.

The United States recognizes and will continue to recognize the National Government of China and cooperate with it in international affairs and specifically in eliminating Japanese influence from China. The United States is convinced that a prompt arrangement for a cessation of hostilities is essential to the effective achievement of this end.

United States support will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife.

The United States has already been compelled to pay a great price to restore the peace which was first broken by Japanese aggression in Manchuria. The maintenance of peace in the Pacific may be jeopardized, if not frustrated, unless Japanese influence in China is wholly removed and unless China takes her place as a unified, democratic and peaceful nation. This is the purpose of the maintenance, for the time being, of United States military and naval forces in China.

The United States is cognizant that the present National Government of China is a one-party Government and believes that peace, unity and democratic reform in China will be furthered if the basis of this Government is broadened to include other political elements



in the country. Hence, the United States strongly advocates that the national conference of representatives of major political elements in the country agree upon arrangements which would give those elements a fair and effective representation in the Chinese National Government. It is recognized that this would require modification of the one-party political tutelage established as an interim arrangement in the progress of the nation toward democracy by the Father of the Chinese Republic, Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

The existence of autonomous armies, such as that of the Communist army, is inconsistent with, and actually makes impossible, political unity in China. With the institution of a broadly representative government, autonomous armies should be eliminated as such and all armed forces in China integrated effectively into the Chinese National Army.

In line with its often expressed views regarding self-determination, the United States Government considers that the detailed steps necessary to the achievement of political unity in China must be worked out by the Chinese themselves and that intervention by any foreign government in these matters would be inappropriate.

The United States Government feels, however, that China has a clear responsibility to the other United Nations to eliminate armed conflict within its territory as constituting a threat to world stability and peace—a responsibility which is shared by the National Government and all Chinese political and military groups.

As China moves toward peace and unity along the lines described above, the United States would be prepared to assist the National Government in every reasonable way to rehabilitate the country, improve the agrarian and industrial economy, and establish a military organization capable of discharging China's national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order.

In furtherance of such assistance, it would be prepared to give favorable consideration to Chinese requests for credits and loans under reasonable conditions for projects which would contribute toward the development of a healthy economy throughout China and healthy trade relations between China and the United States.



APPENDIX II

GENERAL MARSHALL'S PRESS CONFERENCE

March 16, 1946

EXECUTIVE HEADQUARTERS  
PEIPING CHINA

20 March 1946

TO: All Executive Headquarters Field Teams

1. The inclosed official account of General Marshall's press conference in Washington on 16 March (in English) has been reproduced for distribution to all Executive Headquarters Field Team personnel. Copies of the free Chinese translation as released to the Chinese Press by USIS are also inclosed.

2. General Marshall's statement is a clear indication of the importance of the work that each of you is doing.

WALTER S. ROBERTSON  
U. S. Commissioner.

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

Capt. K.H. MOSES

WASHINGTON, March 16 - General C. Marshall, holding his first press conference today since his return yesterday from three month mission in China as President Truman's personal representative, told of progress being made in uniting that country, and of importance of its unity to the world.

"If the world wants peace," he said, "China's effort must succeed, and that success will depend largely on other nations."

General Marshall revealed that he will be going back to China soon.

General Marshall authorized direct quotation of the following statement made at the beginning of his press conference:

"The Chinese people are engaged in an effort which I think should command the cooperation of the entire world. It is an effort almost without precedent. Their leaders are making daily progress towards the settlement by peaceful discussion of deep-seated and bitter conflicts over the past twenty years.

"They are succeeding in terminating the hostilities of the past twenty years. They have reached agreements and are now engaged in the business of demobilizing vast military forces and unifying and integrating the remaining forces into a national army. They have agreed to the basic principles for the achievement in China of political and economic advances which were centuries coming to western democracies.

"If we are to have peace, if the world wants peace, there are compelling reasons why China's present effort must succeed and its success will depend in a large measure on action of other nations. If China is ignored or if there is scheming to thwart the development of unity and present aspirations, why of course, their efforts inevitably will fail.

"The United States, I think, at the present time is best able to render material assistance to China. I feel quite certain of the sympathetic interest of the U.S. people in China, but I am not quite so certain as to their understanding or the understanding of their political leaders of the vital importance to the United States of the success of the present Chinese efforts towards unity and economic stability if we are to have the continued peace we hope for in the Pacific.

"Incidentally, I don't believe any nation can find justification for suspicion as to our motives in China. We are asking for no special preferences of any kind whatsoever regarding economic or similar matters. We are placing no price on our friendship. I must say, though that we have a vital interest in a stable government in China and I am using the word 'vital' in its accurate sense.



"The next few months are of tremendous importance to the Chinese people and, I think, to the future peace of the world. I am now using that term in its longer sense, that is, through the years. Stable governments in Asia are of great importance to us not to mention what they mean to the people who have suffered to a degree which the Chinese have during the past decade.

"I have met on every hand the most generous reception, the most remarkable reception, I might say, and it seemed to me a very understanding cooperation towards whatever efforts I might be making. The situation of course has been most complicated throughout my brief stay in China, first by the disturbed conditions in this country, in the army in the Pacific, and then later by the critical state of affairs in Manchuria.

"Despite these difficulties I think tremendous progress has been made.

"I would like to have you understand something of an organization that has been established in Peiping which we call Executive Headquarters. That is the most important instrument we have in China at the present time. Agreements are all very well but unless you have a means for carrying them out, particularly when they are intended to resolve bitter differences of large groups of people, you must have some means of implementing those agreements.

"So we have in Peiping a headquarters consisting of three commissioners, the Chairman of which is an American, the other two members representing the Government and the Communist party, and then we have an American Chief of Staff and under him is a group of about 250 officers. The core of the organization is American with the representatives of the National Government on one side and the Communists on the other, and they are brought together with this framework of an American staff. They are represented out in the field throughout the critical portions of China by little teams of three men, one American, one Governmental representative and one Communist representative, and the force and effect of these agreements and the detailed orders to carry them into effect are in that way carried upon the group at the scene of the trouble, whether it is fighting, whether it is restoration of communications, whether it is relieving the encirclement of a city, the evacuation of Japanese, or, as is now coming up, the demobilization reorganization, and integration of the armed forces in China.

"We would have gotten nowhere without that headquarters. It is absolutely essential in every step of the way in connection with these agreements which have application to the military situation which of course includes communications.



"Now the last evening I was in China, up to ten minutes before my departure, we were reaching agreements regarding sending these teams into Manchuria. We reached a general agreement and they had certain details to work out after my departure. They should be on their way now.

"It is of great importance that they get there as soon as possible. You must understand that it is exceedingly difficult with the best intentions in the world to transmit orders where there are very limited radio communications and almost no highway communications over these great forces are not well-knit organized units. I found it necessary to make a trip of about 3,500 miles to the principal region where there was still trouble. I was accompanied by the Government representative and part of his staff.

"I found in the case of the latter, they hadn't seen some of the leaders, for two years and had very limited communications with them from time to time. We were able to resolve almost every difficulty once we got the people together. It was very remarkable how quickly we could straighten out what seemingly were impossible conditions and which had their tragic effect on the Chinese people. A single conference of a few hours in an afternoon would raise the encirclement of what amounted to ten or twenty besieged cities where people were starving. It only took that long to straighten out but until we arrived nothing could be done.

"Now in Manchuria they have no representative of the Executive Headquarters there up to this time. The situation has been very fluid, troops moving here and there and of course all sorts of minor clashes occurring. There is no doubt whatever in my mind in many instances, particularly on the communist side, that they are almost unaware of the agreement we have reached, therefore, it is most important that we have these teams appear in that country as quickly as possible.

"I would like to say the American officers in these small groups are rendering a very remarkable service not only under the difficult conditions of the task but under extremely difficult conditions of life. I repeat again that without the headquarters of the nature that we have established in Peiping with its representatives, it would be literally impossible to carry out any of these agreements, even with the best intentions of the world at the top.

"I saw General MacArthur in Japan and talked over with him the representation of Chinese troops in the army of occupation. He was very happy to have them and I think you will shortly read of an announcement by the Generalissimo to that effect."



### APPENDIX III

#### STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN ON UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD CHINA, DECEMBER 18, 1946

Last December I made a statement of this Government's views regarding China. We believed then and do now that a united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to world peace, that a broadening of the base of the National Government to make it representative of the Chinese people will further China's progress toward this goal, and that China has a clear responsibility to the other United Nations to eliminate armed conflict within its territory as constituting a threat to world stability and peace. It was made clear at Moscow last year that these views are shared by our Allies, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. On December 27th, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Bevin issued a statement which said in part:

"The three Foreign Secretaries exchanged views with regard to the situation in China. They were in agreement as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government, and for a cessation of civil strife. They affirmed their adherence to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China."

The policies of this Government were also made clear in my statement of last December. We recognized the National Government of the Republic of China as the legal government. We undertook to assist the Chinese Government in reoccupation of the liberated areas and in disarming and repatriating the Japanese invaders. And finally, as China moved toward peace and unity along the lines mentioned, we were prepared to assist the Chinese economically and in other ways.

I asked General Marshall to go to China as my representative. We had agreed upon my statement of the United



States Government's views and policies regarding China as his directive. He knows full well in undertaking the mission that halting civil strife, broadening the base of the Chinese Government and bringing about a united, democratic China were tasks for the Chinese themselves. He went as a great American to make his outstanding abilities available to the Chinese.

During the war, the United States entered into an agreement with the Chinese Government regarding the training and equipment of a special force of 39 divisions. That training ended V-J Day and the transfer of the equipment had been largely completed when General Marshall arrived.

The United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics all committed themselves to the liberation of China, including the return of Manchuria to Chinese control. Our Government has agreed to assist the Chinese Government in the reoccupation of areas liberated from the Japanese, including Manchuria, because of China's lack of shipping and transport planes. Three armies were moved by air and eleven by sea, to central China, Formosa, north China and Manchuria. Most of these moves had been made or started when General Marshall arrived.

The disarming and evacuation of Japanese progressed slowly- too slowly. We regarded our commitment to assist the Chinese in this program as of overwhelming importance to the future peace of China and the whole Far East. Surrendered but undefeated Japanese armies and hordes of administrators, technicians, and Japanese merchants, totalling about 3,000,000 persons, had to be removed under the most difficult conditions. At the request of the Chinese Government we had retained a considerable number of American troops in China, and immediately after V-J Day we landed a corps of Marines in north China. The principal task of these forces was to assist in the evacuation of Japanese. Only some 200,000 had been returned to Japan by the time General Marshall arrived.

General Marshall also faced a most unpropitious internal situation on his arrival in China. Communications throughout the country were badly disrupted due to destruction during the war and the civil conflicts which had broken out since. This disrupting was preventing the restoration of Chinese economy, the distribution of relief supplies, and was rendering the evacuation of Japanese a slow and difficult process. The wartime destruction of factories and plants, the war-induced inflation in China, the Japan-



ese action in shutting down the economy of occupied China immediately after V-J Day, and finally the destruction of communications combined to paralyze the economy of the country, spreading untold hardship to millions, robbing the victory over the Japanese of significance to most Chinese and seriously aggravating all the tensions and discontents that existed in China.

Progress toward solution of China's internal difficulties by the Chinese themselves was essential to the rapid and effective completion of most of the programs in which we had already pledged our assistance to the Chinese Government. General Marshall's experience and wisdom were available to the Chinese in their efforts to reach such solutions.

Events moved rapidly upon General Marshall's arrival. With all parties availing themselves of his impartial advice, agreement for a country-wide truce was reached and announced on January 10th. A feature of this agreement was the establishment of a unique organization, the Executive Headquarters in Peiping. It was realized that due to poor communications and the bitter feelings on local fronts, generalized orders to cease fire and withdraw might have little chance of being carried out unless some authoritative executive agency, trusted by both sides, could function in any local situation.

The Headquarters operated under the leaders of three commissioners- one American who served as chairman, one Chinese Government representative, and one representative of the Chinese Communist Party. Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Charge d'Affaires of the American Embassy in China, served as chairman until his return to this country in the fall. In order to carry out its function in the field, Executive Headquarters formed a large number of truce teams, each headed by one American officer, one Chinese Government officer, and one Chinese Communist officer. They proceeded to all danger spots where fighting was going on or seemed impending and saw to the implementation of the truce terms, often under conditions imposing exceptional hardships and requiring courageous action. The degree of cooperation attained between Government and Communist officers in the Headquarters and on the truce teams was a welcome proof that despite two decades of fighting, these two Chinese groups could work together.

Events moved forward with equal promise on the political front. On January 10th, the Political Consultative Conference began its sessions with representatives of the Kuomintang or Government Party, the Communist Party, and



several minor political parties participating. Within three weeks of direct discussion these groups had come to a series of statesmanlike agreements on outstanding political and military problems. The agreements provided for an interim government of a coalition type with representation of all parties, for revision of the Draft Constitution along democratic lines prior to its discussion and adoption by a National Assembly and for reduction of the Government and Communist armies and their eventual amalgamation into a small modernized truly national army responsible to a civilian government.

In March, General Marshall returned to this country. He reported on the important step the Chinese had made toward peace and unity in arriving at these agreements. He also pointed out that these agreements could not be satisfactorily implemented and given substance unless China's economic disintegration were checked and particularly unless the transportation system could be put in working order. Political unity could not be built on economic chaos. This Government had already authorized certain minor credits to the Chinese Government in an effort to meet emergency rehabilitation needs as it was doing for other war devastated countries throughout the world. A total of approximately \$66,000,000 was involved in six specific projects, chiefly for the purchase of raw cotton, and for ships and railroad repair material. But these emergency measures were inadequate. Following the important forward step made by the Chinese in the agreements as reported by General Marshall, the Export-Import Bank earmarked a total of \$500,000,000 for possible additional credits on a project by project basis to Chinese Government agencies and private enterprises. Agreements to extend actual credits for such projects would obviously have to be based upon this Government's policy as announced December 15, 1945. So far, this \$500,000,000 remains earmarked, but unexpended.

While comprehensive large scale aid has been delayed, this Government has completed its wartime lend-lease commitments to China. Lend-lease assistance was extended to China to assist her in fighting the Japanese, and later to fulfill our promise to assist in reoccupying the country from the Japanese. Assistance took the form of goods and equipment and of services. Almost half the total took the form of goods and equipment and of services. Almost half the total made available to China consisted of services, such as those involved in air and water transportation of troops. According to the latest figures reported, lend-lease assistance to China up to V-J Day totalled approximately \$870,000,000. From V-J Day to the end of February, shortly after



General Marshall's arrival, the total was approximately \$600,000,000 - mostly in transportation costs. Thereafter, the program was reduced to the fulfillment of outstanding commitments, much of which was later suspended.

A considerable quantity of civilian goods has also been made available by our agreement with China for the disposal of surplus property which enabled us to liquidate a sizable indebtedness and to dispose of large quantities of surplus material. During the war the Chinese Government furnished Chinese currency to the United States Army for the use in building its installations, feeding the troops, and other expenses. By the end of the war this indebtedness amounted to something like 150,000,000,000 Chinese dollars. Progressive currency inflation in China rendered it impossible to determine the exact value of the sum in United States currency.

China agreed to buy all surplus property owned by the United States in China and on seventeen Pacific Islands and bases with certain exceptions. Six months of negotiations preceded the agreement finally signed in August. It was imperative that this matter be concluded in the Pacific as had already been done in Europe, especially in view of the rapid deterioration of the material in open storage under tropical conditions and the urgent need of the partial alleviation of the acute economic distress of the Chinese people which it was hoped this transaction would permit. Aircraft, all non-demilitarized combat material, and fixed installations outside of China were excluded. Thus, no weapons which could be used in fighting a civil war were made available through this agreement.

The Chinese Government cancelled all but 30,000,000 United States dollars of our indebtedness for the Chinese currency, and promised to make available the equivalent of 35,000,000 United States dollars for use in paying the United States governmental expenses in China and acquiring and improving buildings and properties for our diplomatic and consular establishments. An additional sum of 20,000,000 United States dollars is also designated for the fulfillment of a cultural and educational program.

Before General Marshall arrived in China for the second time, in April, there was evidence that the truce agreement was being disregarded. The sincere and unflagging efforts of Executive Headquarters and its truce teams have succeeded in many instances in preventing or ending local engagements and thus saved thousands of lives. But fresh outbreaks of civil strife continued to occur, reach-



ing a crisis of violence in Manchuria with the capture of Changchun by the Communists and where the presence of truce teams had not been fully agreed to by the National Government.

A change in the course of events in the political field was equally disappointing. Negotiations between the Government and the Communists have been resumed again and again, but they have as often broken down. Although hope for final success has never disappeared completely, the agreements made in January and February have not been implemented, and the various Chinese groups have not since that time been able to achieve the degree of agreement reached at the Political Consultative Conference.

There has been encouraging progress in other fields, particularly the elimination of Japanese from China. The Chinese Government was responsible under an Allied agreement for the disarmament of all Japanese military personnel and for the repatriation of all Japanese civilians and military personnel from China, Formosa and French Indo-China north of the sixteenth degree of latitude. Our Government agreed to assist the Chinese in this task. The scope of the job was tremendous. There were about 3,000,000 Japanese, nearly one-half of them Army or Navy personnel to be evacuated. Water and rail transportation had been destroyed or was immobilized. Port facilities were badly damaged and overcrowded with relief and other supplies. The Japanese had to be disarmed, concentrated and then transported to the nearest available port. In some instances this involved long distances. At the ports they had to be individually searched and put through a health inspection. All had to be inoculated. Segregation camps had to be established at the ports to cope with the incidence of epidemic diseases such as Asiatic cholera. Finally 3,000,000 persons had to be moved by ship to Japan.

American forces helped in the disarmament of Japanese units. Executive Headquarters and its truce teams were able to make the complicated arrangements necessary to transfer Japanese across lines and through areas involved in civil conflict on their way to ports of embarkation. American units also participated in the inspections at the port, while American medical units supervised all inoculation and the other medical work. Finally, American and Japanese ships under the control of General MacArthur in Japan, and a number of United States Navy ships under the Seventh Fleet transported this enormous number of persons to reception ports in Japan.

At the end of last year, approximately 200,000 Japanese had been repatriated. They were leaving Chinese



ports at a rate of about 2,500 a day. By March of this year, rapidly increased efforts on the part of the American forces and the Chinese authorities involved had increased this rate to more than 20,000 a day. By November, 2,986,438 Japanese had been evacuated and the program was considered completed. Except for indeterminate numbers in certain parts of Manchuria, only war criminals and technicians retained on an emergency basis by the Chinese Government remain. That this tremendous undertaking has been accomplished despite conflict, disrupted communications and other difficulties will remain an outstanding example of successful American-Chinese cooperation toward a common goal.

Much has been said of the presence of United States armed forces in China during the past year. Last fall these forces were relatively large. They had to be. No one could prophesy in advance how well the Japanese forces in China would observe the surrender terms. We had to provide forces adequate to assist the Chinese in the event of trouble. When it became obvious that the armed Japanese would not be a problem beyond the capabilities of the Chinese Armies to handle, redployment was begun at once.

The chief responsibility of our forces was that of assisting in evacuation of Japanese. This task was prolonged by local circumstances. Provision of American personnel for the Executive Headquarters and its truce teams has required a fairly large number of men, particularly since the all important network of radio and other communications was provided entirely by the United States. The Executive Headquarters is located at Peiping, a hundred miles from the sea and in an area where there was the possibility of local fighting. Hence, another responsibility was to protect the line of supply to and from Headquarters. Another duty our forces undertook immediately upon the Japanese surrender was to provide the necessary protection so that coal from the great mines northeast of Tientsin could reach the sea for shipment to supply the cities and railroads of central China. This coal was essential to prevent the collapse of this industrial area. Our Marines were withdrawn from this duty last September. Other units of our forces were engaged in searching for the bodies or graves of American soldiers who had died fighting the Japanese in China. Still others were required to guard United States installations and stores of equipment, and to process these for return to this country or sale as surplus property.

At peak strength a year ago we had some 113,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines in China. Today this



number is being reduced to less than 12,000 including some 2,000 directly concerned with the operations of Executive Headquarters and will be further reduced to the number required to supply and secure the American personnel of Executive Headquarters and the air field and stores at Tsingtao.

Thus during the past year we have successfully assisted in the repatriation of the Japanese and have subsequently been able to bring most of our own troops home. We have afforded appropriate assistance in the reoccupation of the country from the Japanese. We have undertaken some emergency measures of economic assistance to prevent the collapse of China's economy and have liquidated our own wartime financial account with China.

It is a matter of deep regret that China has not yet been able to achieve unity by peaceful methods. Because he knows how serious the problem is, and how important it is to reach a solution, General Marshall has remained at his post even though active negotiations have been broken off by the Communist Party. We are ready to help China as she moves toward peace and genuine democratic government.

The views expressed a year ago by this Government are valid today. The plan for political unification agreed to last February is sound. The plan for military unification of last February has been made difficult of implementation by the progress of the fighting since last April, but the general principles involved are fundamentally sound.

China is a sovereign nation. We recognize that fact and we recognize the National Government of China. We continue to hope that the Government will find a peaceful solution. We are pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of China. Our position is clear. While avoiding involvement in their civil strife, we will persevere with our policy of helping the Chinese people to bring about peace and economic recovery in their country.

As ways and means are presented for constructive aid to China, we will give them careful and sympathetic consideration. An example of such aid is the recent agricultural mission to China under Dean Hutchison of the University of California sent at the request of the Chinese Government. A joint Chinese-American Agricultural Collaboration Commission was formed which included the Hutchison mission. It spent four months studying rural problems. Its recommendations are now available to the Chinese Government, and so also is any feasible aid we can give in implementing those recommendations. When conditions in China improve, we are prepared to consider aid in carrying out other projects, unrelated to civil strife, which would encourage economic reconstruction and reform in China and



which, in so doing, would promote a general revival of commercial relations between American and Chinese businessmen.

We believe that our hopes for China are identical with what the Chinese people themselves most earnestly desire. We shall therefore continue our positive and realistic policy toward China which is based on full respect for her national sovereignty and on our traditional friendship for the Chinese people and is designated to promote international peace.

## APPENDIX IV

### MARSHALL'S REPORT ON CHINA

(Text of statement by General of the Army George C. Marshall, President Truman's Special Ambassador to China, on the situation in China, at Nanking, Jan. 7, 1947. The statement was made only a few hours before announcement of General Marshall's appointment as U. S. Secretary of State.)

The President has recently given a summary of the developments in China during the past year and the position of the American Government toward China. Circumstances now dictate that I should supplement this with impressions gained at first hand.

In this intricate and confused situation, I shall merely endeavor here to touch on some of the more important considerations - as they appear to me - during my connection with the negotiations to bring about peace in China and a stable democratic form of government.

In the first place, the greatest obstacle to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other.

On the one hand, the leaders of the Government are strongly opposed to a Communistic form of government. On the other, the Communists frankly state that they are Marxists and intend to work toward establishment of a Communistic form of government in China, though first advancing through a medium of a democratic form of government of the American or British type.

The leaders of the Government are convinced in their minds that the Communist-expressed desire to participate in the government of the type endorsed by the Political Consultative Conference last January had for its purpose only a destructive intention. The Communists felt, I believe, that the Government was insincere in its apparent acceptance of the PCC resolution for the formation of the new government and intended by coercion of mili-



tary force and the action of secret police to obliterate the Communist Party. Combined with this mutual deep distrust was the suspicions of the other party in estimating the reason for proposals or opposition regarding the settlement of various matters under negotiation. They each sought only to take counsel of their own fears. They both, therefore, to that extent took a rather lopsided view of each situation and were susceptible to every evil suggestion or possibility. This complication was exaggerated to an explosive degree by the confused reports of fighting on the distant and tremendous fronts of hostile military contact. Patrol clashes were deliberately magnified into large offensive actions. The distortion of the facts was utilized by both sides to heap condemnation on the other. It was only through the reports of American officers in the field, teams from Executive Headquarters, that I could get even a partial idea of what was actually happening and the incidents were too numerous and the distances too great for the American personnel to cover all of the ground. I must comment here on the superb courage of the officers of our Army and Marines in struggling against almost insurmountable and maddening obstacles to bring some measure of peace of China.

I think the most important factors involved in the recent breakdown of negotiations are these: On the side of the National Government, which is in effect the Kuomintang Party, there is a dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition government. This has usually been under the cover of political or party action, but since the party was the Government, this action, though subtle or indirect, has been devastating in its effect. They were quite frank in publicly stating their belief that cooperation by the Chinese Communist Party in the Government was inconceivable and that only a policy of force would definitely settle the issue. This group includes military as well as political leaders.

On the side of the Chinese Communist Party, there are, I believe, liberals as well as radicals, though this view is vigorously opposed by many who believe that the Chinese Communist Party discipline is too rigidly enforced to admit of such differences of viewpoint. Nevertheless, it has appeared to me that there is a definite liberal group among the Communists, especially of young men who have turned to the Communists in disgust at the corruption evident in the local governments - men who would put the interest of the Chinese people above ruthless measures to establish



a Communist ideology in the immediate future. The dyed-in-the-wool Communists do not hesitate at the most drastic measures to gain their end as, for instance, the destruction of communications in order to wreck the economy of China and produce a situation that would facilitate the overthrow or collapse of the Government, without any regard to the immediate suffering of the people involved. They completely distrust the leaders of the Kuomintang Party and appear convinced that every Government proposal is designated to crush the Chinese Communist Party. I must say that the quite evidently inspired mob actions of last February and March, some within a few blocks of where I was then engaged in completing negotiations, gave the Communists good excuse for such suspicions.

However, a very harmful and immensely provocative phase of the Chinese Communist Party procedure has been in the character of its propaganda. I wish to state to the American people that, in the deliberate misrepresentation and abuse of the action, policies and purposes of our Government, this propaganda has been without regard for the truth, without any regard whatsoever for the facts, and has given plain evidence of the determined purpose to mislead the Chinese people and the world and to arouse a bitter hatred of Americans. It has been difficult to remain silent in the midst of such public abuse and wholesale disregard of facts, but a denial would merely lead to the daily necessity of denials; an intolerable course of action for an American official. In the interest of fairness, I must state that the Nationalist Government publicity agency has made numerous misrepresentations, though not of the vicious nature of the Communist propaganda. Incidentally, the Communist statements regarding the Anping incident which resulted in the death of three marines and wounding of 12 others were almost pure fabrication, deliberately representing a carefully arranged ambush of a marine convoy with supplies for the maintenance of Executive Headquarters and some UNNRA supplies, as a defense against a marine assault. The investigation of this incident was a tortuous procedure of delays and maneuvers to disguise the true and privately admitted facts of the case.

Sincere efforts to achieve settlement have been frustrated time and again by extremist elements of both sides. The agreement reached by the Political Consultative Conference a year ago was a liberal and forward-looking charter which then offered China a basis for peace and reconstruction. However, irreconcilable groups



within the Kuomintang Party, interested in the preservation of their own feudal control of China, evidently had no real intention of implementing them. Though I speak as a soldier, I must here also deplore the dominating influence of the military. Their dominance accentuates the weakness of civil government in China. At the same time, in pondering the situation in China, one must have clearly in mind not the workings of small Communist groups or committees to which we are accustomed in America, but rather of millions of people and an army of more than 1,000,000 men.

I have never been in a position to be certain of the development of attitudes in the innermost Chinese Communist circles. Most certainly, the course which the Chinese Communist Party has pursued in recent months indicated an unwillingness to make a fair compromise. It has been impossible even to get them to sit down at a conference table with Government representatives to discuss given issues. Now the Communists have broken off negotiations by their last offer which demanded the dissolution of the National Assembly and a return to the military positions of January 13 which the Government could not be expected to accept.

Between this dominant reactionary group in the Government and the irreconcilable Communists who, I must state, did not so appear last February, lies the problem of how peace and well being are to be brought to the long-suffering and presently inarticulate mass of the people of China. The reactionaries in the Government have evidently counted on substantial American support regardless of their actions. The Communists by their unwillingness to compromise in the national interest are evidently counting on an economic collapse to bring about the fall of the Government, accelerated by extensive guerrilla action against the long lines of rail communications - regardless of the cost in suffering to the Chinese people.

The salvation of the situation, as I see it, would be the assumption of leadership by the liberals in the Government and in the minority parties, a splendid group of men, but who as yet lack the political power to exercise a controlling influence. Successful action on their part under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would, I believe, lead to unity through good government.

In fact, the National Assembly has adopted a democratic Constitution which in all major respects is accordance with the principles laid down by the all-party

Political Consultative Conference of last January. It is unfortunate that the Communists did not see fit to participate in the Assembly since the Constitution that has been adopted seems to include every major point they wanted.

Soon the Government in China will undergo major reorganization pending the coming into force of the Constitution following elections to be completed before Christmas Day 1947. Now that the form for a democratic China has been laid down by the newly adopted Constitution, practical measures will be the test. It remains to be seen to what extent the Government will give substance to the form by a genuine welcome of all groups actively to share in the responsibility of Government.

The first step will be the reorganization of the State Council and the Executive Branch of Government to carry on administration pending the enforcement of the Constitution. The manner in which this is done and the amount of representation accorded to liberals and to non-Kuomintang members will be significant. It is also to be hoped that during this interim period the door will remain open for Communists or other groups to participate if they see fit to assume their share of responsibility for the future of China.

It has been stated officially and categorically that the period of political tutelage under the Kuomintang is at an end. If the termination of one-party rule is to be a reality, the Kuomintang should cease to receive financial support from the Government.

I have spoken very frankly because in no other way can I hope to bring the people of the U. S. to even a partial understanding of this complex problem. I have expressed all these views privately in the course of negotiations; they are well known, I think, to most of the individuals concerned. I express them now publicly, as it is my duty, to present my estimate of the situation and its possibilities to the American people who have a deep interest in the development of conditions in the Far East promising an enduring peace in the Pacific.



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## UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

The History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, is a collection of orders, reports, observers statements, telegrams, Truce Team Commanders day to day diaries, and staff officers notes. These are on file in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. There are approximately 1200 documents which compose the collection. They date from January 10, 1946, to March 10, 1947. The file is set up in Quarters of three months and there are five Quarters. Within each quarter there are eight folders in which documents are arranged chronologically. These folders are as follows:

- I        General History.
- II       Operations-High Level.
- III      Operations-Current.
- IV       Operations-Field Teams.
- V        Operations-Advanced Section.
- VI       Communications.
- VII      Repatriation.
- VIII     Chinese Army Reorganization.