

ABSTRACT

Title of Document: INDIAN MUSLIM WOMEN'S EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERNIZATION, RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION AND DISADVANTAGE, AND THE RISE OF HINDU FUNDAMENTALISM AND MUSLIM IDENTITY POLITICS

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Research on Muslim women in India has increased in recent years, but remains sparse. The few existing studies rarely examine the interplay of religion and gender on Muslim women, nor do they investigate the historical influences shaping Muslim women's lives. Using the National Sample Survey (NSS), this dissertation seeks to make a unique contribution to the literature by examining Muslim women's educational enrollment and wage employment in the context of three historical forces: modernization, religious discrimination and disadvantage, and the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics.

We find that modernization has played an important role in increasing school enrollment for children ages 12 to 15. Modernizing forces have also influenced employment in India, modestly increasing wage employment. While Muslims have

benefited from modernizing forces, they continue to face discrimination and disadvantage in the educational system and labor market; therefore they have lower levels of school enrollment and slightly lower engagement in wage employment compared to non-scheduled caste Hindus. There is also evidence that the rise of Hindu fundamentalism has had a negative impact on Muslim enrollment and wage employment over time, however these effects appear greater for Muslim enrollment compared to Muslim wage employment. Evidence suggests that enrollment for Muslims above the poverty line may have been more affected by Hindu fundamentalism relative to poorer Muslims from 1983 to 1987; however, wealthier and poorer Muslims appear similarly affected by Hindu fundamentalism after 1987. Contrary to expectations, results suggest that poorer Muslim's wage employment is more affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism relative to wealthier Muslims. As expected, the interplay of religion and gender has affected Muslim women's enrollment and wage employment. Specifically, they experience lower levels of enrollment and wage employment compared to Muslim men and Hindu men and women. Muslim women have been further affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics in both enrollment and wage employment. However, it appears that these factors have been relatively more detrimental to Muslim women's wage employment compared to their enrollment.

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MUSLIM IDENTITY POLITICS

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Dedication

To Langston.

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Introduction

Muslim women in India are a disadvantaged group often marginalized in scholarly literature and policy interventions. Over the past few decades, researchers, international agencies, and the Indian government have paid particular attention to gender issues in India, however, explicitly and implicitly these issues tend to focus primarily on Hindu women. This occurs in large part because Hindus are the majority in India. Researchers focus on Hindu women because it is necessary to bring to light the patriarchal obstacles facing the majority of women in India. In addition, individuals in positions to conduct scholarly research or frame policy interventions tend to overwhelmingly be Hindu, contributing to the bias towards research on Hindu women. As a result, less is known about the experience of Muslim women in India.

Recently, there has been an increasing interest in the issues Muslims face, as illustrated by the recent publication of *The Social, Economic, and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India: a Report*¹, commissioned by the Indian Prime Minister to address the dearth of information regarding Muslims in India. However, literature on Muslims is still in its infancy and often looks at all Muslims, grouping Muslim men and women together. While some scholars, particularly Zoya Hasan and Ritu Menon (2005a, 2005b) have made considerable inroads in research on Indian Muslim women, few studies contain a comprehensive framework centering on the interplay of religion and gender on Muslim women, and virtually none focus on how these relationships have been modified by historical forces. Moreover, little research has empirically examined the effect of these forces on Muslim women's lives. A

primary aim of this dissertation is to contribute to this nascent literature on Indian Muslim women, focusing on changes in education and employment over the last two decades of the 20th century.

Over the past thirty years, India has experienced tremendous social, political, and economic change. Many of these changes have been salient to Muslim women's lives. This dissertation argues that three factors have influenced their experience: modernizing forces, religious discrimination and disadvantage, and the intricate relationship between the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and the Muslim community's response to this threat.

Modernization is a process, which involves economic growth, urbanization, and industrialization. For developing countries, it also entails the diffusion of Western ideas and systems. Modernization causes immense transformations in societies such as changes in education, employment, gender roles, and ideologies (Inglehart and Baker 2000). While these changes are not always positive, particularly for women (Boserup 1970), this dissertation argues that modernization has expanded education and employment opportunities for Hindu and Muslim men and women.

However, for Muslim men and women, modernizing forces are often moderated by historical disadvantage and religious discrimination. Historically, occupational and educational mobility in India has been limited. Influenced by an occupationally based caste system, individuals have been generally expected to remain in the same social and economic position as their parents and ancestors. While this is changing for some disadvantaged groups, particularly scheduled castes

¹ Otherwise known as the Sachar Committee Report.

and scheduled tribes² who benefit from affirmative action programs in public employment and education, Muslims are generally not afforded this assistance despite the disadvantages they face. The disadvantage Muslims have experienced in the past and continue to experience is in part a product of religious discrimination. Muslims face considerable discrimination in both employment (Hasan 2005, Khandker 1992) and education (Jeffery et. al. 2005). Evidence also suggests that discrimination against Muslims is increasing (Basu 1997, Jeffery and Jeffery 2005). This dissertation argues that Muslim men and women have lower levels of wage employment and education because of past and current disadvantage and discrimination. Moreover, this disadvantage may have intensified in recent decades due to increased communal tensions.

India has been experiencing a deepening religious divide and a rise in Hindu fundamentalism resulting in an increasingly defensive response from the Muslim community. This may have a unique influence on Indian Muslim women. When minority groups are threatened or attempt to gain previously denied social, political, and economic resources, they often try to create unity among group members. Various literatures argue that there are often negative implications for women within these communities, particularly among groups defining their identity in religious terms. However, literature discussing these issues primarily emerges from the field of cultural studies and tends to lack an empirical basis. The impact of these forces on women's day to day experiences in such areas as education and employment

² In 1950, the Indian Constitution gave special status to lower castes and tribes. Lower castes have been historically marginalized in the Indian caste system, working menial jobs with little chance for upward mobility, facing considerable discrimination. Tribes are indigenous ethnic minorities,

consequently have received little attention. This dissertation makes a unique contribution to the literature by empirically analyzing changes in gender disparities in education and employment among Muslims, and by comparing them to similar changes among Hindus, in an era during which the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and the Muslim community's response to it has dominated the lives of Muslim men and women.

While modernization, religious discrimination and disadvantage, and the complex relationship between the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and the Muslim community's response are three potentially important features influencing Muslim women's lives, no study has examined these factors simultaneously. Using the National Sample Survey (NSS), this dissertation seeks to broaden our understanding of Indian Muslim women's education and wage employment in the context of these three important factors.

The first chapter of this dissertation addresses post-colonial Hindu-Muslim communal tensions and the rise of Hindu fundamentalism; Muslim disadvantage and discrimination; and patriarchal constraints Hindu and Muslim women experience. The second chapter discusses modernization's influence on education, and employment; Muslim disadvantage and discrimination in employment and education; and the potential impact of the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and the Muslim community's response on Muslim women. The third chapter describes my conceptual framework and hypotheses. Chapter four describes the dependent, independent and control variables; and research design and methods. The fifth and sixth chapters

generally living in remote hilly forest areas. The term schedule is used because the constitution listed castes and tribes eligible for this special status in schedules.

present the enrollment and wage employment analysis results respectively. Finally, the seventh chapter discusses the enrollment and employment results and concludes this dissertation.

Chapter 1: Communal Tensions and the Rise of Hindu Fundamentalism, Religion, and Patriarchy in India

Tensions between Hindus, the majority group in India making up 80.5 percent of the population, and Muslims, the largest minority group comprising 13.4 percent of the population (Census of India 2001)³, have escalated over the past several decades. This recent outbreak of religious tensions has adverse consequences for all Muslims, but may uniquely affect Muslim women. Muslim women experience the disadvantage and discrimination that affect all Muslims and experience patriarchal practices that all women face in India. In addition, Muslim women's experience is influenced by the intersection between their affiliation with a religious community and their gender. This chapter provides a context for the Muslim experience in India, focusing on both the Muslim community as a whole and Indian Muslim women. The first section discusses the intricate relationship between Hindus and Muslims highlighting post-colonial communal tensions and the rise of Hindu fundamentalism in India. The second section addresses the disadvantage and discrimination that Muslims face in India. Finally, the third section describes the patriarchal customs and constraints experienced by Hindu and Muslim women.

Post-Colonial Communal Tensions and the Rise of Hindu Fundamentalism

Relations between Hindus and Muslims in India have changed over the years depending on, among other factors, historical circumstances. There are many instances in Indian history where Hindus and Muslims have lived peacefully with one another and other horrific occurrences where events have culminated in communal

violence. Similar to many inter-group conflicts throughout the world, religious identities have been exploited to create divisions between Hindus and Muslims in India. A common idea propagated by the British colonial power, both Hindu and Muslim communalists and a belief absorbed among the wider population is that Hindu Muslim tensions are primordial and continuous (Thapar 2005). However, in reality, the construction of Hindu-Muslim religious identities have depended on space and time and are often related to the political interests of various groups. This section discusses the variegated and complex relationship between Hindus and Muslims in India, highlighting post-colonial Hindu and Muslim communal tensions and the rise of Hindu fundamentalism.

While Hindu and Muslim relations were at times contentious during British colonial rule, communal tensions reached an apex during the Partition of India in 1947, when East and West Pakistan⁴ were carved out of the Indian subcontinent. As riots between Hindus and Muslims engulfed India, particularly the northwestern part of the country, hundreds of thousands, and by some estimates, millions of people were massacred (Collins and Lapierre 1975, Wolpert 1993). In the 20 years following the partition, most Hindus left East and West Pakistan and migrated to India, however, for Muslims, migration out of India proved relatively more difficult. While many Muslims, particularly the middle class, migrated from India to Pakistan, a substantial proportion of Muslims remained in India. After the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, modern India became the home to the largest

³ Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and others make up about 6 percent of the Indian population.

⁴ Upon independence from Pakistan in 1971, East Pakistan became Bangladesh.

block of Muslims in South Asia. However, the partition served to create serious divisions between Indian Muslims and their Hindu brethren.

After the Partition, although sectarian violence was subdued, tensions continued to simmer. There was an upsurge in riots from 1964 to 1971. Hindu nationalism rose during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, where Hindu mistrust of Muslims is evident in the rhetoric claiming that Muslims are Pakistani spies who give signals to Pakistani aircraft (Banerjee 1990). Religious tensions and violence subsided from 1971 to the late 1970s, only to rise again with increasing Hindu fundamentalism (Banerjee 1990).

While political Hinduism existed in the 1950s and 1960s, it was relatively more prevalent among Hindu upper castes compared to other castes.⁵ Increasingly, campaigns against Muslims and political maneuvers in the 1970s slowly led to the spread of Hindu fundamentalism, bringing more moderate Hindus into the fundamentalist fold, sowing the seeds for Hindu fundamentalism to intensify in the 1980s and 1990s. During the 1970s, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the association of national volunteers, and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), two Hindu political parties under the wider coalition of Sangh Parivar, meaning Family of Associations, resumed the spread of negative stereotypes and propaganda about Muslims. Fueled by the supposed mosque restorations funded by petro-dollars⁶, campaigns to build Hindu temples were initiated. Propaganda also proliferated about the Muslim population overtaking the Hindu population because of higher Muslim fertility (Banerjee 1990).

⁵ Many upper caste Hindus had strong secular leanings, however those engaged in political Hinduism in the 1950s and 1960s tended to belong to upper castes.

However, the RSS and a newly founded Hindu nationalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) did not have complete legitimacy among the majority of Hindus until they became symbols of anti-authoritarianism (Banerjee 1990). In the 1970s, Indira Gandhi was convicted of election fraud and was forced to resign, however, instead of resigning, she suspended the constitution and called a national emergency that lasted for 18 months (Keay 2000). In addition to inhumane slum removal and birth control campaigns, numerous people were jailed and the press was censored. It is in this context that the BJP and RSS became the antithesis of Indira Gandhi's authoritarian measures. They made gains politically in the 1977 elections by joining the ruling coalition, Janata party (Banerjee 1990). When Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, she did so by capitulating to the ever growing powerful Hindu component, often by supporting the Hindu police and political parties involved in Hindu-Muslim riots, denouncing minorities for not assimilating to India (Banerjee 1990), and stating that foreign interference from Pakistan is to blame for Hindu-Muslim riots (Brass 2003).

The reach of Hindu fundamentalist parties continued to expand. New front political organizations were created for lower castes who felt uncomfortable with the upper caste dominated RSS and for those Hindus who did not want to be identified as members of RSS (Banerjee 1990). Furthermore, the RSS tried to capture scheduled caste⁷ allegiance by trying to cause conflict between scheduled castes and poor minorities. To rally support for a fundamentalist agenda, the VHP and other

⁶ Money from oil rich Islamic countries in the Middle East.

⁷ In 1950, the Indian Constitution gave special status to lower castes. Lower castes have been historically marginalized in the Indian caste system, working menial jobs with little chance for upward

organizations used the issue of conversions from Hinduism to Islam to demonstrate that Hinduism was under attack. These parties used the scheduled caste conversions in Meenakshipuram, Tamil Nadu in January of 1981 to bolster their argument that Hinduism is threatened by Islamic Fundamentalism and the power of petro-dollars (Banerjee 1990). Not only were counter-conversions arranged, but campaigns, which were particularly effective for mobilizing the middle and lower-middle classes, were organized around the idea that “I am not ashamed to be a Hindu” (Banerjee 1990). All of these activities led to the spread of Hindu fundamentalism from mid-sized towns to small and large cities (Banerjee 1990).

Tensions between Hindus and Sikhs, a minority religious group in India comprising 2 percent of the population, following the assassination of Indira Gandhi by one of her Sikh bodyguards catapulted Hindu fundamentalist and nationalist rhetoric at the forefront of politics (Banerjee 1990). Sikh political parties and the Congress party battled for power, particularly in the state of Punjab, where the majority of Sikhs reside. In June 1984, to route out Sikh militants, Indira Gandhi initiated Operation Bluestar, a raid on an important temple that was a base for alleged Sikh militants. This fueled the fire of Hindu and Sikh communalism culminating in the assassination of Indira Gandhi by one of her Sikh bodyguards in November of 1984. Riots ensued or rather Hindus attacked Sikhs en masse, killing, maiming, and burning down shops and homes of Sikhs.

This turn of events had a crucial impact on Indian politics. In the 1984 and 1985 elections, the mass media was influenced to promote a Hindu agenda, not by the

mobility, facing considerable discrimination. The term schedule is used because the constitution listed castes eligible for this special status in schedules.

usual suspects of Hindu fundamentalist parties, but by the Congress party (Banerjee 1990). Simultaneously, Hindu fundamentalist groups launched multiple campaigns to promote Hinduism. Among the campaigns were calls for destroying the Babari Masjid, a mosque built in 1528, claimed to stand on the birthplace of a Hindu God, Ram. These parties also called for a uniform civil code to apply to all religious groups, targeting Muslim Personal Law, codes that dictate rules for Muslims. The Hindu rhetoric used by the normally moderate Congress party and campaigns led by Hindu fundamentalist and nationalist groups deepened Hindu and Muslim tensions.

In 1989, campaigns to build a temple in place of the Babari Masjid involved collecting bricks and money for the temple (Shah 1998). In 1992, the VHP called for a holy war against Muslims to rally support for the destruction of the Babari Masjid. Some of the following slogans and advertisements were used in newspapers and rallies: “Everyone will be shown their place, Those who are sleeping in Delhi, Their Sleep will be disturbed, We have to live in Hindustan with respect, we will pay for the price for maintaining dignity” and “There is a dictate to murder Hindus, see, once again Mughal rule has come to Delhi (Shah 1998).” The campaigns and rhetoric were successful, the Babari Masjid was destroyed on December 6, 1992 by Hindus, while Hindu police and government officials did nothing. Riots once again engulfed India resulting in Hindu and Muslim neighbors murdering one another.

The campaigns to destroy the Babari Masjid and its eventual destruction coincided with the BJP’s rise to power in the 1990s. While the Hindu nationalist and fundamentalist agendas had considerable influence over the activities and beliefs of many Hindus, resulting in worsening Hindu Muslim tensions, the early 1990s was the

first time an overtly Hindu nationalist party gained considerable political power. The BJP gained many seats in western and northern India, particularly the states of Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, and Rajasthan from 1990 to 1995 (Chiriyankandath 1998). In 1996, they won enough seats to hold together a coalition government for only 13 days. Another coalition government was formed by the BJP in 1998, only lasting one year. Their power was finally solidified in 1999, where they led a coalition government until 2004.

Thus, India has experienced a rapid spread of Hindu fundamentalism and nationalism from the 1980s to the present. Hindu nationalism has become more pervasive, eventually leading to the rise of the BJP to political power in the 1990s. Contrary to Hindu nationalist propaganda, it was not Hindus that were under attack, but Muslims. Evidence suggests that the rise of Hindu fundamentalism politically and socially, the proliferation of negative stereotypes about Muslims, riots which are often initiated by Hindus (Brass 2003, Mann 1992), state and police complicity and often participation in anti-Muslim riots (Brass 2003), attacks on Muslim Personal Law, and local 'everyday' communal interactions between Hindus and Muslims (Jeffery and Jeffery 2005) have resulted in a more cohesive Muslim community identity (Mann 1992). Mann (1992) finds that Muslim solidarity does not only occur at the local level. When anti-Muslim riots occurred in the 1980s and early 1990s, Muslims in the city of Aligarh went to aid those Muslims left homeless by the violence (Mann 1992). Mann (1992) also finds that Hindu attacks on Muslim Personal Law and the destruction of the Babri Masjid mosque further reinforced Muslim community solidarity.

While communal tensions and the rise of Hindu fundamentalism is well documented, there has been limited empirical examinations of their impact on the day to day lives of Muslims, particularly on their employment and educational opportunities. Furthermore, there has been scant empirical analysis of how these communal tensions affect Muslim women's education and employment. This dissertation seeks to expand our understanding of the rise of Hindu fundamentalism on the Muslim experience, with a particular focus on Muslim women.

Muslim Disadvantage and Discrimination in India

Although Muslims experience advantages in infant and child survival, child sex ratios⁸, life expectancy, and maternal mortality (Government of India 2006), Muslims continue to experience disadvantage in many socioeconomic arenas, despite the considerable gains they have made. Several factors contribute to the current disadvantage that Muslims experience in India. First, Muslims have faced substantial discrimination at the hands of the Hindu majority since the Partition of India. Additionally, most of the Muslims who left for Pakistan during the Partition were from the middle and upper classes, leaving many poorer Muslims behind. Furthermore, to escape the rigidities of the Hindu caste system and discrimination from higher castes, there have been low caste conversions to Islam.⁹ The poorer Muslims who stayed in India after the Partition and low caste converts to Islam have not had the resources for educational, occupational, or income mobility, thus

⁸ Muslims experience higher child sex ratios compared to other groups, suggesting that Muslims discriminate less against girls than other groups.

⁹ With the hope of attaining greater equality and escape discrimination and disadvantage within the Hindu caste system, many individuals belonging to lower castes, particularly Dalits or untouchables, those of the lowest castes, converted to other religions in India such as Islam, Sikhism, Christianity, and Buddhism.

contributing to the disadvantage we observe among Muslims in India. This section highlights some of the disadvantage and discrimination that Muslims face in Indian society.

One area where Muslims experience disadvantage is literacy. The literacy rate for Muslims was 59.1 in 2001, compared to 65.1 for Hindus (Census of India 2001). Muslims also face considerable disadvantage in school enrollment (Kulkarni 2002, Rastogi 2003, Shariff 1995) and educational achievement (Desai and Kulkarni 2005, Kulkarni 2002, Unni 2001a). This is particularly surprising since a greater proportion of Muslims live in urban areas, which have a better educational infrastructure than rural areas: 35.7 percent of Muslims live in urban areas compared to 27.8 percent of the general population (Government of India 2006). Kulkarni (2002) finds that these disparities in education are partially due to past discrimination in education, income, and residence, however, he also finds that there is an independent effect of religion despite controls for family endowments suggesting that current discrimination plays a role as well. The provision of government schools also contributes to lower levels of enrollment and educational achievement. Districts with higher proportions of Muslims also have fewer educational inputs compared to districts with higher proportions of non-scheduled caste Hindus (Betancourt and Gleason 2000). Moreover, government schools in or near villages with higher portions of Muslims have fewer resources compared to non-scheduled caste Hindus (Jeffery and Jeffery 2005). Muslims also face discrimination in government and non-Muslim private schools from predominantly Hindu teachers (Jeffery and Jeffery 1998). Teacher's lower expectations of Muslim children and lack of attention could negatively affect

Muslim children's school performance and achievement. In addition, discrimination from teachers and texts extolling the virtues of Hinduism (Sikand 2005) may result in Muslim parents withdrawing their children from schools.

Muslim disadvantage is also illustrated by various socioeconomic factors, such as poverty (Bhagat and Praharaj 2005, Unni 2001a), landownership (Kulkarni 2002, Shariff 1995), and earnings (Khandker 1992, Unni 2001a). Muslims experience higher levels of poverty compared to the Indian population as a whole. About 23 percent of India's total population is poor compared to 31 percent of Muslims (Government of India 2006). In urban areas (see Table 1), Muslims experience the highest poverty rate (38.4) compared to scheduled castes and tribes (36.4), other backward castes¹⁰ (25.1), upper caste Hindus (8.3) and other minorities (12.2) (Government of India 2006). Muslims in rural areas are slightly better off, experiencing the second highest poverty rate (26.9 percent). Scheduled castes and tribes have the highest poverty rate (34.8), while other backward castes (19.5), upper caste Hindus (9.0), and other minorities (14.3) experience considerably lower poverty rates (Government of India 2006).

In rural areas, landownership is an important basis for material well-being. There are more landless Muslims compared to Hindus. Among rural dwellers, 35 percent of Muslims are landless compared to 28 percent of Hindus (Shariff 1995). When Muslims do own land, they own less than Hindus. For example, while 20

¹⁰ Other backward castes have faced exclusion and discrimination in India, resulting in low socioeconomic status. The majority of other backward castes are from the shudra caste, the lowest category out of the four varna caste system, higher only to Dalits, who have such low status that they are not included in the four varna system.

percent of Hindus in rural areas own five or more acres of land, the corresponding figure is only 10 percent for Muslims (Shariff 1995).

There are also earnings and income gaps between Hindus and Muslims. There is some evidence that Muslims earn less than Hindus, and have less income mobility (Khandker 1992). Educational advances among Muslims do not appear to aid in increasing their earnings, pointing to wage discrimination. Unni (2001a) finds that among salaried and self-employed workers, Muslims do not receive any significant returns to their education, while other disadvantaged groups such as scheduled castes and tribes do experience educational returns in both salaried employment and to a lesser extent self-employment.

Muslims also experience disadvantage in employment compared to Hindus. The work participation rate, defined as the percentage of workers to the total population, is 31.3 percent for Muslims compared to 40.4 for Hindus. Furthermore, Muslims are underrepresented in both public and private sectors (Hasan 2005) and are largely confined to non-farm self-employment (Das 2002). Muslims are also less likely to be employed in the protected sector, and are therefore in more vulnerable employment positions (Khandker 1992). It is important to note that wage employment itself does not confer economic advantages and historically, Muslim participation in self-employment has protected them somewhat from the dire poverty faced by landless agricultural laborers, but their exclusion from regular employment reduces their avenues for upward economic mobility, particularly in the current era where rewards to white collar work have been rising.

Discrimination against Muslims is also evident in fertility rhetoric. Sadhavi Saraswati, a well-known Hindu nationalist party member, can be heard on a widely distributed tape proclaiming, “For every five children the Hindu’s have, the Muslims have 50. And who feeds these 50 children? Hindus do! After Muslims divorce, the *waqf* boards support the children with taxes we pay... Within 25 years you will be living like a poor minority in this country (Basu 1997).” Another Hindu nationalist referring to Muslims cried, “The state tells us Hindus to have only two or three children. After a while they will say ‘do not have even one’. But what about those who have six wives, 30-35 children, and breed like mosquitoes and flies (Basu 1997)?” This rhetoric also stereotypes Muslim men as being oversexed (Jeffery and Jeffery 2005) and Muslim women as being over fertile (Sarkar 2002). These pronouncements are what Jeffery and Jeffery (2005) call saffron demography, where myths about Muslims are propagated. These myths are becoming ‘common wisdom’ to Hindus in India, proliferating beyond Hindu fundamentalist circles (Basu 1997, Jeffery and Jeffery 2005).

Violence against Muslims and the state and police complicity in this violence also demonstrates the discrimination Muslims face. While Hindu fundamentalist rhetoric often paints Muslim men as aggressive and hot-blooded during communal tensions, in reality the majority of riots consist of attacks on Muslims and are provoked by Hindus (Brass 2003, Jeffery and Jeffery 2005). Government officials and the police are often indirectly or directly involved in these riots. Government officials and police are indirectly involved when they do nothing to stop the riots or

protect Muslims. They are directly involved when they give orders for the violence or participate in the riots.

The disadvantages facing Muslims in India may be worsening with the rise of Hindu fundamentalism. This may occur for two reasons. First, as negative stereotypes about Muslims spread and communal tensions intensify, Muslim's may face greater discrimination in areas such as education, and employment. Second, Muslims may withdraw from these arenas where they must interact with Hindus because of safety concerns, fear of harassment, and distrust of the state apparatus, which has failed to protect them in riots and in worst cases perpetrated the violence. This dissertation seeks to illuminate our understanding of the Muslim experience in education and employment, in the face of increasing communal tensions and discrimination.

Patriarchy: Hindu and Muslim Women in India

In India, as in many societies, patriarchal ideologies and practices place a lower value on females compared to males, resulting in, among other things, lower access to education, health care, and employment. Furthermore, patriarchal beliefs play an integral role in excess female child mortality and the increasing utilization of sex selective abortions. This section discusses the complicated and often oppressive patriarchal beliefs and practices in India that shape Hindu and Muslim women's lives.

Social, economic, and cultural customs diminish women's economic worth. In India, sons make important economic contributions to their parents' household. If living in an extended family, sons typically reside in the same home as their parents with their wives. In this situation, a son contributes his wages to the household, or

makes economic contributions by working on the farm or in a household business. In contrast, a daughter moves in with her husband's family. If a woman works for wages, these wages are given to her husband's household, not her natal family, lowering women's economic worth to her natal family.

Another factor related to the economic worth of women in India is their exclusion from wage labor. Although Indian women make substantial contributions to the Indian economy by working on family farms and in family businesses, they are often excluded from wage labor and direct control of income earning enterprises, making it difficult to make valued financial contributions to their natal family or husband's household. According to the 1991 Indian Census, only 23 percent of women reported being employed (Desai 1994). When women are employed, they make lower wages than men (Banerjee 1985, Khandker 1992). Constraints on their labor force participation and lower wages if employed make it difficult for women to make economic contributions to their natal family or husband's family, reducing their economic value, despite other important productive contributions they make to the household.

Old age support practices also lower the economic worth of females and raise the value of males. The majority of Indians do not have access to formal avenues of old age support. Most people are not employed in jobs that give old age pensions and the government does not provide social security. Therefore, the majority of Indians must rely on other forms of financial support in their old age. Parents often rely on their sons to provide for them in old age, thus bolstering the economic worth of sons and devaluing daughters.

The economic worth of women in India affects all women, while certain cultural practices affect mainly Hindu women. Dowry, a custom where the bride's family gives gifts and money to the groom's family, also contributes to a woman's economic worth affecting primarily Hindu women. Historically, dowry often consisted of a woman's family preparing and giving goods, such as bedding and rugs, to the groom's family (Sharma cited in Desai 1994). However, dowry has become more oriented towards monetary transactions and expensive consumer items, such as refrigerators, televisions, and cars. Instead of producing relatively inexpensive items such as bedding, households must save considerable amounts of money to provide an adequate dowry for their daughters' marriage. This is an economic drain on a family, lowering the value of having daughters. Despite laws outlawing dowry, this practice has become more commonplace and has even spread to communities, particularly in the South, that traditionally paid a bride price whereby the groom's family gives the bride's family money at that time of marriage (Rahman and Rao 2004). The prevalence of dowry in Muslim communities in India is not well documented. Some small-scale studies suggest that Muslim communities practice dowry (Fazalbhoy 2005), while others suggest that dowry is not practiced in the community (Lateef 1990). It is likely that there is considerable regional variation among Muslim communities. Specifically, Muslim communities in areas where dowry is widespread may be more likely to practice it.

The value of Hindu women is further diminished by religious prescriptions at the time of death. Sons are valuable because they, not daughters, can perform religious rites for their parents upon death. For Hindu women, particularly in the

north, kinship patterns also determine a woman's worth in India. Communities that practice village exogamy, require that marriage partners be unrelated and come from different villages. Under this system, girls move away from their natal families and village to live with their husband's family in another village. This practice deprives women of support from their natal kin and social networks leaving them at the mercy of the husband's family. Additionally, women from these communities are not able to provide support to their natal families by virtue of distance. In contrast, the practice of village endogamy, observed primarily in the south of India, entails marriage partners often marrying cross cousins or girls marrying their maternal uncles (Bittles 1994). Furthermore, endogamy is characterized by marriage within the village, whereby daughters remain in close proximity to their natal family, enjoying support from their kin and existing social networks. This proximity also allows daughters to provide support to their family. Therefore, the worth of women in communities that practice village endogamy is greater than the worth of women belonging to communities practicing village exogamy.

Relative to Hindu communities, particularly in northern India, which often practice village exogamy, Muslim women reside closer to their natal homes and are more often married into a household they have known for years (Bloom et. al. 2001). Moreover, it is common for maternal cousins to marry in these communities (Bloom et. al. 2001). Similar to other communities that practice village endogamy, this feature of Muslim communities may enhance a Muslims woman's worth.

Muslim women's worth should also be bolstered by the rights conferred to them by Islam; however, in practice these rights are not always observed. A practice

that is more similar to a bride price rather than dowry, *mahr*, in theory, should be a potentially liberating force for Muslim women in India. According to Islamic law, a man must give a woman *mahr*, money or goods promised at the time of their marriage (Vatuk 2005) and women have the right to stipulate the amount (Engineer 1996).

Mahr can be given at the time of the wedding, but it is more common in India for it to be 'deferred' to an agreed upon date (Vatuk 2005). In the event of divorce or death of her husband, the woman is to receive the *mahr* she was promised (Vatuk 2005).

While Islamic law dictates that women should receive *mahr*, this does not necessarily occur in practice among Muslims in India. It is common for women to give up their *mahr* (Vatuk 2005). Moreover, if a couple divorces and the husband chooses not to give his wife her *mahr*, she has few options. Legally, she could file a suit, but this is not common (Vatuk 2005).

Widow remarriage is another area where Muslim women are granted rights under Islam, however, Hindu customs of widow remarriage have influenced Muslims and therefore Muslim women's rights under Islam have been curtailed. Widow remarriage is encouraged under Islamic law where widows have many social and religious rights and are technically supposed to have higher status in society (Husain 1976). Following the example of Prophet Mohammad, marrying a widow and raising her children as his own confers high status on a man. In contrast, among Hindus, widow remarriage has been seen as a sign of lower status (Husain 1976). However, Husain (1976) observes that Hindu custom has had a clear effect on the Muslim community in India, where in reality widows are stigmatized and do not enjoy the status or rights conferred upon them by Islamic law.

Inheritance of land and wealth is an area where Islamic law conferred greater rights to Muslim women compared to Hindu women until the Hindu Code Bill of 1956 was passed (Lateef 1990). According to Islamic law, Muslim women have the right to inherit property and wealth to secure their well-being, however they receive less than men. Prior to the passage of the Hindu Code Bill of 1956, for Hindu women, cultural practices dictated that any property or wealth a woman had or obtained became that of her husband's family. Therefore, parents willed their property to their sons to diminish land and wealth fragmentation, thereby, increasing the value of having sons, while reducing the value of women. While Hindu women now have inheritance rights under the law, the cultural practices that were observed before the Hindu Code Bill persist today. Moreover, the rights that Islamic law gives Muslim women are generally not observed. Rather, there is evidence that Muslims in India have assimilated to the inheritance practices of Hindus (Rathbone 1934 in Lateef 1990). Therefore, while Hindu women have legal rights and Muslim women have religious rights to inheritance, in practice both Hindu and Muslim women are denied their rights.

Purdah or female seclusion, a practice where women's sexuality is controlled, is another patriarchal constraint affecting both Hindu and Muslim women. Beginning at puberty, purdah imposes restrictions on women's mobility, involves full or partial veiling, and delineates ways in which men and women interact (Desai 1994, Jeffery 1979). Generally, women from poorer households do not strictly adhere to purdah because their lower socioeconomic status requires them to seek employment. Since they must work, they are not able to follow rules about mobility and interaction with

men. In contrast, purdah is commonly practiced among wealthier households where women do not have to work (Desai 1994). This practice reduces women's control over social and material resources by curtailing women's interactions with men within and outside the household and restricting women's movement outside the household.

While Hindu women have ample legal rights and Muslim women have many religious rights under Islam, in practice both Hindu and Muslim women experience patriarchal controls and discrimination in India. However, Muslim women may be more disadvantaged compared to their Hindu counterparts because of the intersection of their gender and religion. This disadvantage which Muslim women experience emanates from the discrimination and disadvantage that all Muslims face in Indian society as well as patriarchy that all Indian women experience. Furthermore, Muslim women may experience increasing disadvantage as the Muslim community tries to preserve its identity in the face of rising Hindu fundamentalism.

Conclusion

The first section of this chapter highlighted post-colonial communal tensions and the rise of Hindu fundamentalism. The communal tensions in the 1980s and 1990s, while not new, have taken on a different flavor. The spread of Hindu fundamentalism and its eventual rise to political prominence during this period has severely threatened the Muslim community. As section II has shown, Muslims already face considerable disadvantage and discrimination in India. With the rise of Hindu fundamentalism, they may experience even more discrimination from Hindus and may withdraw from certain public arenas for fear of safety and harassment,

thereby worsening their disadvantage. Muslim women may be uniquely affected by the increase of Hindu fundamentalism. Muslim women already face substantial disadvantage through the interplay of religious membership and gender, however, the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and the Muslim community's sharp response to this threat may exacerbate the disadvantage they experience.

Chapter 2: Modernization, Religious Disadvantage and Discrimination, and the Rise of Hindu Fundamentalism and Muslim Identity Politics

Over the past 30 years in India, Muslim women's education and wage employment have been affected by a variety of influences including modernization and globalization; religious discrimination and disadvantage; and the complex relationship between increasing Hindu fundamentalism and the Muslim community's response to this threat. While critics of modernization theories have identified many negative aspects of integration into the global economy, modernization is seen as being synonymous with education, particularly Western education, and the incorporation into a cash economy. Thus, when looked at in terms of education and wage employment, modernization favorably influences the lives of all communities, Hindus and Muslims, men and women. However, religious discrimination and disadvantage may diminish the influence of modernization for Muslims. Moreover, the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and the Muslim community's response may uniquely shape the lives of Muslim women. This chapter discusses the influence these three factors have on various groups in India. The first section addresses modernization issues pertaining to all Indians and then only females. The second section focuses on the religious discrimination and disadvantage experienced by Muslim men and women. Finally, the third section addresses how Muslim women may be uniquely affected by Hindu fundamentalism and the Muslim community's response.

Modernization and Secular Changes

Modernization theory, once a dominant theory in the sociological and development literature, contends that modernization, a process that involves industrialization, economic growth, economic development, and urbanization, are not unique processes to Western countries and that developing countries can emulate this progress in the course of development. In recent years, this theory has been widely criticized in the development literature and many of its central tenets have been called into question. However, one aspect of this theory has remained; modernization causes profound transformations in society such as changes in education, employment, gender roles, and ideologies (Inglehart and Baker 2000).

Historically, modernization has had an important influence on education. When Western countries began to industrialize in the late 1800s and early 1900s, a more educated workforce was required to perform relatively more complex jobs, thus mandatory education was instituted (Weiner 1991, Notestein 1953). Similarly, as developing countries undergo development, their governments invest in education and promote policies that increase educational levels. Increasingly, educational provisions are now recognized as one of the central functions of government and a major part of nation building projects (Meyer et. al. 1992).

Through colonization, imperialism, and globalization, western countries have always had a profound influence on developing nations. These historical and contemporary processes have resulted in the diffusion of western ideas and systems, playing a vital role in increasing education in developing nations. Specifically, the diffusion of western ideas and systems regarding the development of the nation state

and the role of education in that development has had a crucial effect on education throughout the world (Meyer et. al. 1992). In particular, mass education increased dramatically after World War II as the western model of the nation-state and the centrality of mass education expanded and intensified (Meyer et. al. 1992).

In developing nations, the net enrollment ratio for primary school, which is the number of children enrolled in primary school in the relevant age group as a percentage of all children in that age group, increased from 48 percent to 77 percent from 1960 to 1991 (United Nations 1996). The net enrollment ratio has also increased for secondary school, from 35 percent to 47 percent for this same period (United Nations 1996). There are exceptions, specifically some countries in Sub Saharan Africa have experienced a decline in primary school enrollment in the context of economic decline, however, overall, the trend has been upward. Looking more specifically at India, it experienced economic growth from 1951 to 2001 and made important gains in education. In particular, from 1951 to 2001 the gross enrollment ratios, the total enrollment of the school age population divided by the relevant age group, increased from 43 to 96 for primary school (I-V) and 13 to 60 for upper primary school (VI-VIII) (Ministry of Education 2006).

Urban-rural differences in education also demonstrate the role of the modern market and developmental forces in increasing education levels. Urban areas represent greater levels of modernization and development and experience higher levels of educational attainment compared to rural areas. Using literacy rates as a proxy for advances in education, urban-rural differences in literacy rates illustrate that development has an influence on education. In India, the literacy rate for the urban

population was 73 in 1991 compared to 45 in rural areas (Ministry of Education 2006). Furthermore, as economic growth progressed, these rates increased over a ten-year span for both urban and rural areas. Specifically, in 2001, the literacy rate for the urban population increased to 80 and the literacy rate in rural areas increased to 59 (Ministry of Education 2006).

While many modernizing forces increase enrollment and educational attainment, other modernizing forces may have adverse consequences. Specifically, structural adjustment and liberalization policies, adopted by many developing countries to avoid a debt crisis, have potentially negative influences on education. Some liberalization programs have increased the cost of schooling by instituting fees, reduced government spending on education, and resulted in recession, increasing the financial strain on many households. Households may have difficulties investing in education if educational costs and financial strain increase. While India adopted liberalization policies in the 1980s, and although these policies intensified in the 1990s, the government did not institute fees for government schools for children 6 to 14 and did not cut its investments in the educational system. Furthermore, India experienced economic growth rather than recession. Therefore, it is unlikely that liberalization policies have considerably hampered education in India.

In theory, a major part of the modernization process is economic growth, which has a crucial impact on employment. Economic growth is the expansion of the economy, where more goods and services are produced, resulting in more income per person. When economic growth occurs, employment increases as more people are needed to produce valued goods and services. Moreover, economic growth changes

the types of jobs that workers hold (World Bank 1995). In countries with low levels of development, most of the working age population is engaged in agricultural work, particularly agricultural self-employment. As a country experiences economic growth, more opportunities are created in wage employment in services and industry (World Bank 1995).

Modernization may not necessarily have this effect on employment in many developing countries because they have been plagued by structural adjustment policies. Evidence from numerous countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa demonstrate that liberalization policies have slowed job creation, increased informal employment particularly as public sector employment decreased, and increased unemployment and underemployment (Baden 1993). In the 1980s, India embarked on a series of economic reforms. In the early 1990s, facing an exchange rate crisis, the Indian government was forced to adopt more drastic liberalization policies. Many argue that these reforms were instrumental in generating economic growth in the 1980s, and particularly in the 1990s (Delong 2001). The growth of the Indian economy accelerated in the 1980s and continued to grow at a rapid pace, making it one of the fastest growing economies in the 1990s (Delong 2001). From 1950 to 1980, India experienced a steady annual growth rate of 3.7 percent (Delong 2001). From 1980 to 1990, the annual rate of growth jumped to 5.9 percent and continued to increase in the 1990s to 6.2 percent.

Contrary to expectations, the rapid growth experienced by India from 1980 to 2000 did not accelerate employment growth, instead, the rate of employment growth declined. There appears to be two noticeable trends in employment during this period

of liberalization and economic growth. First, India experienced a casualization or informalization of the labor force during this period, as the growth of organized or formal employment declined and growth of informal employment increased (Sinha and Adam 2004). Second, there has been a decline in self-employment. It appears that the decline in self-employment was absorbed by casual wage work, contributing to the casualization of the labor force. The percentage of workers engaged in self-employment decreased from the early 1980s to 2000 from 57 to 53 percent, while casual wage employment increased from 29 to 33 percent (Desai and Das 2004).

The influence of liberalization policies and economic growth on regular salary employment trends is less clear. Duraisamy (2000) finds a slight decrease in regular salary employment from the 1980s to 2000, which has been in part attributed to public sector employment decline (Desai and Das 2004). Other estimates suggest that regular salaried employment increased during this same period (Sundaram 2004). However, Anant (2004) finds that regular salaried workers remained at 14 percent from 1983 to 1999. Therefore, it is unclear what impact liberalization policies have had on regular salaried employment.

Contrary to the experiences of many countries in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa, India did experience considerable economic growth while adopting structural adjustment and liberalization policies. Despite this considerable economic growth, India shares the experience of slow job growth and the casualization of the labor force with these countries.

Modernization and Female Education and Employment

Thus far, we have discussed the broad influences of modernization on education and employment. Now we will turn to the effects of modernization on female education and employment. Development has an important influence on women's education. The level of economic development, measured by Gross National Product (GNP), and its relationship to the gender gap in school enrollment illustrates the importance of development on girls' education. Hill and King (1993) find that low-income countries have the largest gender gap in primary school enrollments, lower-middle-income countries have a relatively smaller gender enrollment gap, and upper-middle-income countries have the smallest gender gap. Furthermore, the gender gap in enrollment decreases as regions develop over time. In Eastern Asia, a region which has experienced considerable economic growth over the past few decades, the gender gap in enrollment for individuals aged 6 to 23 was 16 percentage points in 1960 and decreased to 5 percentage points in 1990 (Wils and Goujon 1998). Southern Asia and Arab states have experienced more moderate declines in the gender gap in enrollment. In Southern Asia and for Arab states, the gap decreased 3 percentage points from 1960 to 1990 for individuals aged 6-23 (Wils and Goujon 1998). These numbers conceal some of the progress that occurred for women in these regions. For example, in Arab States and Southern Asia, only 14.7 and 14.2 percent of girls aged 6-23 were enrolled in school in 1960, however, in 1990 enrollments increased to 45.3 and 34.5 percent (Wils and Goujon 1998). While considerable progress still needs to occur, modernizing influences have had a positive influence on girls' education and to a lesser extent on the gender gap in education.

Unfortunately in countries where economic growth stagnated, the benefits to girls were far more limited as was the case for countries that adopted structural adjustment policies uncritically. If structural adjustment policies increase financial strain on households, households may choose to invest in boys' education where the returns to investment are higher. As mentioned above, structural adjustment policies in India have likely not had a huge impact on education, therefore it is unlikely that girls have been adversely affected by structural adjustment and liberalization policies.

In India, girls' enrollment has been increasing and the gender gap in enrollment has been narrowing. In 1983, 37 percent of girls ages 6 to 18 were enrolled in school. This figure increased to 61 percent in 1999-2000 (National Sample Survey Organization 1983-1999-2000). As a result of girls' increasing school enrollment, the gender gap in school enrollment has decreased. In 1983, the difference between the percentage of boys and girls enrollment for ages 6 to 18 was 21 percentage points. By 1999-2000, the difference decreased to 12 percentage points.

While the gender gap in education has been decreasing, there are several factors that moderate modernizing influences. In particular, in the face of scarce resources, households choose to invest in boys' rather than girls' education. This occurs for several reasons. First, boys have considerably more economic opportunities and greater returns to education relative to girls (Dreze and Saran 1995, The Probe Team 1999). Furthermore, boys are expected to provide financial and old age support to their parents (Dreze and Saran 1995, The Probe Team 1999), therefore households have a direct stake in their sons' education and employment opportunities.

Even if daughters are expected to work in the future, their husband's family would benefit from their employment, not their natal family, therefore their natal family has little economic incentive to invest in their education. This is particularly true for areas that practice village exogamy, a practice where daughters marry someone outside their village, thus restricting the contact and support of their natal families.

Restrictions on girls' movement at the age of menarche also negatively affect girls' enrollment. To ensure the purity of their daughters, households often put restrictions on girls' movement when they start menstruating. Therefore, it is common for girls to drop out of school around the ages of 12 or 13 (Rastogi 2003). The shortage of primary and middle schools, particularly girls only schools, exacerbate this problem. While the supply of both primary and middle schools has been expanding since the early 1990s, access to middle schools is still relatively limited (Nayer 2002, The Probe Team 1999). Many villages may have a primary school, however, children may have to travel to another village for middle school. Parents are often reluctant to have their daughters travel the further distance (Nayer 2002, The Probe Team 1999). Both concerns over girls' safety (Nayer 2002) and the observance of purdah play a role in this reluctance.

Marriage markets also affect girls' enrollment. It is believed, particularly among disadvantaged castes, that higher levels of education encumber girls' marriage prospects and increases their dowry since they must marry men of similar education (The Probe Team 1999). Higher castes feel that marriage prospects improve for educated girls, as long as their education does not surpass the men in their community (The Probe Team 1999). In addition, the gender division of labor in the household

requires women to perform most of the domestic chores, diminishing educational attainment for girls. Older girls are often required to take care of younger siblings in the household and help other women with domestic chores, leaving them little time to attend school.

While these cultural factors dampen girls' enrollment, it appears that modernization has had an important impact. This is evident by increasing girls' enrollment and the decreasing gender gap in enrollment, despite cultural factors that negatively influence girls' enrollment.

Modernization and development also play a role in female employment. According to the World Bank (1995), development and female employment are expected to have a U shaped relationship. When work is organized around the family, which corresponds to lower levels of development, women's participation in work is high, particularly in agricultural activities. As economic growth and urbanization occur, women's work participation generally decreases as women stay at home while men seek formal non-agricultural employment. This is partially related to the higher wages that men receive compared to women (Goldin 1995). As development progresses and employment opportunities expand, women's formal nonagricultural employment increases. Goldin (1995) argues that increases in girls' secondary schooling and the expansion of white-collar jobs facilitate the movement of female labor force participation up the U shaped curve.

Modernizing forces also alter ideologies about gender roles and break down barriers to women's employment. Modernizing forces, through development, diffusion of ideas, and active fertility campaigns, have reduced fertility in many

developing countries, potentially reducing the span of women's reproductive responsibilities, which often hinders women's labor force participation. However, modernizing forces such as structural adjustment policies may adversely affect women's employment, decreasing women's participation if employment opportunities worsen (Baden 1993).

Modernization and mechanization of agriculture in India further illustrates potential negative consequences for women's employment. From 1950 to 1991 women's economic activity decreased. In 1950, 30.45 percent of women were involved in economic activities, whereas in 1991 only 22.70 percent of women were economically active (Datta 2002). Datta (2002) attributes this decline in women's economic activity to mechanization and modernization of agriculture. Specifically, traditional modes of agricultural production were replaced by factories and mills, which adversely affected women's employment. However, it is not clear how modernizing forces will affect the structure of women's employment, specifically women's wage employment and self-employment.

In India, it is evident that women's share of non-agricultural employment, defined as being engaged in industry, trade or services, has been increasing (Unni 2001b). From 1971 to 1994, the share increased from 12 to 21 (Unni 2001b). However, it appears that women's labor force participation remained stagnant and even decreased slightly from 1980 to 1995 (Das and Desai 2003). These contradictory findings may be related to increased participation by women in non-agricultural work and compensating declines in agricultural work, suggesting a need to focus on non-familial work to determine the changes in wage work for women.

Several factors diminish female employment in India. Purdah can negatively influence female labor force participation. Women practicing purdah have limited interactions with non-related men and have restrictions on where they can go. Generally, lower caste households cannot afford to practice purdah because scarce resources in the household require women to work. Therefore, this practice tends to be observed by upper castes. However, the trend of Sanscritization, a process where lower castes emulate higher castes to attain higher status, may increase the prevalence of purdah among lower castes (Srinivas 1966).

The gender division of labor also affects female employment. As in many other countries, women are primarily responsible for domestic chores. Furthermore, many do not have modern conveniences to shorten the time to complete these duties. Therefore, preparing meals, taking care of children, collecting fuel wood or water in rural areas, are all time consuming and arduous tasks, which may hinder female employment. Discrimination in the labor market further dampens female labor force participation. In many jobs, males are making hiring decisions and the prevalent view is that males are superior workers, decreasing women's employment opportunities (Banerjee 1985).

Modernization and development influence female employment in countervailing ways. Rising female educational attainment generally increases female labor force participation (Sethuraman 1998 cited in Unni 2001b). However, Das and Desai (2003) find that primary and post-primary education decreases women's employment opportunities in India. They argue that this is partly due to the lack of employment opportunities for educated women in India. Despite these

constraints, female labor force participation in non-agricultural work does appear to be increasing, particularly in informal employment. Unni (2001b) argues that modernization is increasing in informal employment and the feminization of the workforce in this type of employment (Unni 2001b). Modernizing forces have also influenced legislation aimed to incorporate greater numbers of women into the labor force. The government passed a law in 2005 allowing women to work night shifts, shifts from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. Teleworking is also being promoted to include women in the labor force. Technological advances are also important modernizing influences that affect women's work. Technology, particularly in urban areas, reduces the time women must devote to domestic chores. This is also true in rural areas. For example, the installation of a village pump may reduce the time it takes women to fetch water, potentially freeing up time for other productive activities. However, advances in technology also have adverse effects on women's employment. For example, when rice mills and husking machines replaced women's manual rice husking in India, males dominated the new technological advances, decreasing women's employment in this arena (Mukherjee 1999).

In summary, modernizing forces are expected to increase overall enrollment and girls' enrollment in India. Modernizing forces will also likely increase wage work as casual wage work increases. However, it is unclear how modernization will influence female employment in India, an issue to be further explored in this dissertation. We will now turn to factors that influence Muslim's educational and employment experiences in India.

Muslim Education and Employment: Disadvantage, Discrimination, and Segmentation

Despite modernization's positive influences, Muslims face continual disadvantage and discrimination in education and employment in India. Although enrollment has risen for both Hindus and Muslims, educational differences between the two groups have persisted over time and even increased for secondary school and college (Desai and Kulkarni 2005). This is particularly discouraging considering that other disadvantaged groups, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, have experienced gains in education, resulting in a decline in the educational gap between these groups and upper caste Hindus (Desai and Kulkarni 2005).

One site where discrimination against Muslims manifests itself is in the allocation of publicly provided education. In their study of the Bijnor district in Uttar Pradesh, Patricia and Roger Jeffery (1998) and Jeffery et. al. (2005) find that few Muslim villages and Muslim dominant wards within large multi-caste villages have government primary schools. The Muslim villages and wards with government primary schools are of lower quality and have fewer resources. Specifically, these schools serve larger populations, yet they are smaller, have less teachers, and experience higher rates of teacher absenteeism. This qualitative analysis is substantiated by a national study using district data conducted by Betancourt and Gleason (2000). They find that there are less publicly provided educational inputs in districts that have higher proportions of Muslims. This occurs despite high Muslim demand for secular schooling, particularly among the middle and upper classes (Engineer 2001, Mann 1994).

Government and private school partiality towards Hindus also affect Muslim educational attainment. Jeffery et. al. (2005) find that Muslims perceive government schools to be communal. They believe that government schools have mainly Hindu teachers with a bias towards other Hindus. Specifically, Hindu students are more likely to receive private tutoring and receive higher grades. Furthermore, government school textbooks exalt Hinduism, while negatively portraying Muslims (Sikand 2005). These prejudices against Muslims in government and secular private schools are likely to affect the decisions that Muslim households make about educating their children in these institutions.

Discrimination in the labor market also has adverse consequences for Muslim educational attainment. Since Muslims face considerable discrimination in the labor market, limiting their opportunities in both the public and private sectors, they often do not see the value of educating their children beyond a particular level (Mann 1994, Sikand 2005).

Many authors argue that poverty and madrasa education, religious schools focusing on Islamic scholarly teachings, negatively influence educational attainment among Muslims. However, these claims are problematic. First, although many wealthy Muslims did leave for Pakistan during Partition, leaving poorer Muslims behind in India, and some Muslims are low caste converts, Muslims have higher levels of urbanization compared to the rest of the population (Government of India 2006) and are therefore better off than many rural dwellers. Second, even though there is a growing Muslim middle class and Muslims have high levels of urbanization, relative to Hindus, Muslims do not have distinct class/caste differences

in education (Jeffery and Jeffery 1998). This suggests that poverty is not the driving factor for low Muslim educational attainment, however it is likely that socioeconomic status does play some role.

Other questionable claims are that most Muslim parents prefer to send their children to madrasas, most Muslim children are enrolled in madrasas, and as a result Muslims have difficulties transferring to upper level secular schools. In fact many Muslim parents prefer to send their children to secular schools (Sikand 2005, Mann 1994) and they in fact do. Most Muslim children go to secular schools rather than madrasas, even as madrasa facilities and enrollments expand (Sikand 2005). Specifically, only 3 percent of school age Muslim children attend madrasas and of the children that are enrolled in schools, only 4 percent are enrolled in madrasas (Government of India 2006).

Research indicates that Muslims also face considerable disadvantage and discrimination in the labor market. Das's (2002) study, using nationally representative data, suggests that Muslims are discriminated against in regular salaried employment and therefore are concentrated in non-farm self employment as owners of small businesses. In his case study of Bombay, Khandker (1992) finds that the labor market is segmented according to gender, caste, and religion. He argues that adjusting for human capital factors such as skill level and training will not breakdown the discriminatory institutional barriers facing these disadvantaged groups. In particular, Muslims are more likely to hold less secure jobs. Muslims are more likely to be in the unprotected wage market and have fewer occupational and income mobility opportunities.

Muslim disadvantage is also apparent in government employment (Hasan 2005, Singh 1980). Even though Muslims make up around 14 percent of the population, they only make up 2.83 percent of elite Indian Administrative Service (IAS) employment (Hasan 2005). While one would expect their share of IAS employment to increase as educational levels increase, Muslim share of IAS employment actually decreased from 2.98 percent in 1980 to 2.83 percent in 2000 (Hasan 2005).

While there are few affirmative action programs for Muslims, three states have modest programs for poor Muslims, Kerala, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu (Hasan 2005). Even though these affirmative action programs for poor Muslims in these three states have been small in scale, they are purported to have made important strides towards greater proportional representation of Muslims in public employment (Hasan 2005). The effectiveness of these programs illustrates the discrimination that Muslims face in government employment and offers solutions for combating this discrimination.

While Muslims have faced discrimination in education and the labor market, there is little empirical data regarding whether religious differences in education and wage employment have increased or worsened in the face of communal tensions. Hindu-Muslim communal tensions have a long history in India, since the early 1980s these tensions, with encouragement from state governments, have erupted into renewed violence. On one hand, these tensions could worsen the discrimination that Muslims face in education and the labor market. On the other hand, the tensions could cause Muslims to choose not to assimilate or integrate with a hostile dominant

group, resulting in the withdrawal from secular schooling and wage employment. In the case of education, Muslims already feel that government schools are biased towards Hindus. In light of communal tensions, Muslims may feel that it is important to send their children to madrasas, so their children can escape the discrimination they face in school and preserve their heritage. The increase in communal tensions poses a similar problem for wage employment. Hindus dominate wage employment and may become more discriminatory in their hiring practices. Muslims already feel that they are discriminated against in government jobs. This perception may be heightened during communal tensions and Muslims may not pursue particular forms of wage employment.

In addition, communal tensions may affect upper and lower class Muslims differently. Evidence suggests that economic competition and increasing Muslim prosperity contribute to communal tensions and the often resultant riots (Ahmad in Sengupta 2006, Hasan 1982, Lateef 1990). For example, communal groups politicize the threat of Muslim prosperity to Hindu dominance in many western Uttar Pradesh cities, culminating into riots (Hasan 1982) that some suggest were, “aimed at the economic base of the community (Lateef 1990).” Since they pose a greater threat to Hindus, upper class Muslims may be more targeted during communal tensions and riots, therefore they may be more affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism compared to lower class Muslims.

Thus far, we have focused on the experience of all Muslims; now we turn to the experience of Muslim women. As discussed above there are many factors, which hinder girls’ educational attainment. Gender differences in economic opportunities,

gender differences in financial and old age support, the practice of purdah, marriage markets, and the gender division of labor affect educational attainment for all girls. However, because Muslim girls belong to a minority group, additional factors may influence their educational attainment. First, marriage markets may negatively affect Muslim girls more than Hindu girls. Households generally take into consideration community norms for boys' education when making decisions about their daughters' education. Girls are expected to have lower educational levels than boys because of concerns of finding a spouse and affording dowry (The Probe Team 1999). Therefore, the lower educational attainment of Muslim men has a ceiling effect on the educational attainment of Muslim women (Hasan and Menon 2005a).

Muslim women are further disadvantaged by the same factors that affect all Muslims, namely discrimination in access to schools and within government and non-Muslim private schools. Therefore, Muslim women face disadvantage through the interplay of gender and religion. This results in lower levels of educational attainment compared to Hindu men and women and Muslim men.

Muslim women are disadvantaged by gender and religion in wage employment as well. As mentioned earlier, employment for all women in India is influenced by the practice of purdah, the gender division of labor in the household, and segmented labor markets. Muslim women face these constraints that all women face and face constraints that Muslim men face. Similar to Muslim men, Muslim women generally are employed in the unprotected wage market and have less chances for occupational and income mobility (Khandker 1992).

Therefore, the low employment levels of Muslim women can be attributed to the intersection of gender and religion. On one hand, similar to other women in India, Muslim women are affected by patriarchal controls such as purdah, the gender division of labor in the household, and markets segmented based on gender. On the other hand, they also face discrimination and disadvantage in the labor market based on their minority group status.

In summary, Muslims face considerable disadvantage in both education and employment. There are fewer government schools placed in Muslim dominated areas and when they are accessible to Muslims, they are of lower quality. Furthermore, Muslim children face prejudice in government and non-Muslim private schools through interactions with mainly Hindu teachers and textbooks that extol Hinduism and deprecate Islam. Muslims also face disadvantage in the labor market. This is evident by their confinement to non-farm self-employment (Das 2002) and vulnerable jobs with limited occupational and income mobility (Khandar 1992). Muslim women are likely to be negatively affected by the interplay of gender and religion. Specifically, cultural factors that dampen educational attainment and wage employment for all Indian women, affect Muslim women. Furthermore, Muslim women's education and wage employment are negatively affected by their minority religious status. Additionally, communal tensions in India have worsened overtime, which may result in more prejudice against Muslims in education and wage employment. Evidence also suggests that upper class Muslims may be relatively more affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism compared to lower class Muslims. In this dissertation, we will examine Muslim enrollment and wage employment to see

how their experiences may have changed over the years, in the context of both modernization and heightened communal tensions.

Rising Tide of Fundamentalism and Identity Politics

Muslim women's education and wage employment must also be viewed in the context of increasing religious tensions in India. As discussed in Chapter 1, the divide between Hindus and Muslims has widened considerably in the past 30 years. Hindu fundamentalism and propaganda regarding the "backwardness" of Muslim culture has had a complex impact on the Muslim community in India.

Various literatures argue that women's agency, empowerment, rights, education, and employment are vulnerable in the context of religious politicization (Hawley 1994, Jeffery and Basu 1998, Moghadam 1994). While these literatures use different terminology such as identity politics, politicized religion, and religious fundamentalism, all argue that women belonging to these communities are adversely affected. I have chosen to use the terminology "religious identity politics" to refer to the context in India, despite the numerous critiques of the term identity politics by Marxists and post-structuralists (Heyes 2002).

Identity politics is a movement or discourse, which focuses on defining identities, namely religious, nationalist, ethnic (Moghadam 1994), feminist, racial, and sexual identities (Heyes 2002). Many identity politics movements attempt to gain social, political, and economic resources that have been denied to a particular group. Feminist movements, the United States Civil Rights Movement, and Gay and Lesbian movements are examples of identity politics movements (Heyes 2002). Religious identity politics movements may also try to gain resources that have been

previously denied to them, however these movements may also form if the groups' culture is threatened by other religious groups, modernization, or Westernization. Religious identity politics movements and discourses include: the New Right in the United States (Klatch 1994), the pro-life movement in the United States (Papanek 1994), Iran under Khomeini (Papanek 1994), Gush Emunim in Israel (Tress 1994), Orthodox Jewish women in The United States (Kaufman 1994) and Pakistan under Zia ul Haq (Rouse 1998). In most circumstances, these discourses and movements have negative implications for individuals who are less powerful in the group (Papanek 1994). In particular, women are negatively affected in many religious identity politics discourses and movements (Moghadam 1994).

Religious identity politics literature suggests that women may be negatively affected by identity politics in two ways. First, to buttress the needs of the entire subordinate group, women's needs are often neglected. Specifically, women in subordinate groups often experience oppression by the dominant group and by patriarchal ideologies; however, the recognition of the intersection of their oppression is often sacrificed to serve the needs of the entire subordinate community. Second, women often become symbols for the community. Too often, this entails appeals for a return to traditional gender roles, where women represent motherhood and protectors of culture, resulting in demands for women to return to the home and domestic sphere.

One way in which religious identity politics can be potentially harmful to women is in the arena of women's rights. The abortion debate in the United States and the reinsertion of Sharia law in several countries are examples of religious

identity politics negatively affecting women's rights. Adherents to the pro-life movement in the United States often long for an idyllic past where female sexuality is more controlled, men have more control in the family and society, and the family is stable (Papanek 1994). The pro-life movement, in seeking to overturn *Roe v. Wade*, attempts to restrict women's right to choose to have an abortion and their control over their bodies. The re-establishment of conservative interpretations of Islamic law is another example of how women's rights may potentially be harmed in the name of religious identity politics. In several countries, the reintroduction and conservative interpretations of Islamic law can potentially harm women in the areas of marriage, divorce, and inheritance (Hale 1994), even though the Quran itself has modern views about marriage, divorce, inheritance, child custody, and maintenance (Engineer 1996). For example, conservative interpretations of Islamic law allow a husband to readily divorce his wife, but make it difficult for a woman to divorce her husband. Furthermore, while Islamic law does grant Muslim women rights to inheritance and wealth, women's access to inheritance is more restricted compared to many secular laws. Specifically, while Muslim women are granted the right to receive inheritance and wealth, they receive less than males in the household.

In India, Muslim women's rights have been affected by the interplay of Hindu Fundamentalism and the resultant Muslim identity politics. The Shah Bano case represents Muslim women's rights and empowerment being sacrificed in the face of threatened Muslim identity. Shah Bano, a Muslim woman, was divorced from her husband in 1975. Her husband paid her maintenance of 200 rupees until 1978. In 1986, under article 125 of the India Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires

husbands to pay 500 rupees a month, Shah Bano sued her husband. The court, using language that was inflammatory towards Muslims, ruled that her husband had to pay 25 rupees a month, increasing this amount to 180 rupees when Shah Bano petitioned the court (Awn 1994). Muslim groups were outraged because the court was interfering with the religious law of the Muslim community and threatening their identity (Awn 1994). Hindu fundamentalists further threatened Muslim identity by using this issue to paint Muslims and Islam as barbaric and harmful to women's status, ironically arguing that they would never treat Hindu women in this way. Women's groups legitimately concerned with the way in which Muslim Personal laws adversely affected Muslim women, found themselves on the same side as Hindu Fundamentalists (Chhachhi 1991) and were thus forced to let go of their demands. The women's movement's withdrawal from this issue and Muslim resistance to the threat to their identity resulted in the passage of the Muslim Women Protection of Rights on Divorce Bill of 1986, which contrary to its name, restricts Muslim women's rights in terms of marriage, divorce, and child support relative to what is currently sanctioned by law for other women in India.

Religious identity politics movements also have controlled women's dress and sexuality. For example, in Iran, during the revolution, it was made compulsory for women to wear a veil and it was forbidden for women to wear make-up (Tavakoli-Traghi 1994). There is evidence of religious identity political movements of Sikhs, Vishva Hindu Parishad, the Tailban, and Pakistani government restricting women's movements and dress (Hawly and Proudfoot 1994).

The religious identity politics literature suggests that women's education and employment are affected by identity politics movements, however there is little empirical research on these potential linkages. Even conceptually, these linkages have not been fully developed. Religious identity politics may have different implications for women's education and wage employment. In religious identity politics movements, education is valued in as far as it enhances the role of mother and wife (Moghadam 1994). This argument for the education for women is not unique to religious identity politics movements, for example, both Hindu and Muslim households partially view girls' education in the context of how it improves their domestic role. This focus may enhance primary and middle school education but may reduce higher levels of educational attainment, meaning that one needs domestic skills which do not require high levels of education (Jeffery and Jeffery 1998). Modernizing forces aid in changing these views about educating girls. If identity politics movements seek to maintain these calls for educating girls only so they can be better wives and mothers, modernizing forces may not penetrate the reinforcement of these ideologies.

In addition, in India, Muslim households may be reluctant to send girls to government and non-Muslim private schools, since females are given the responsibility of being vessels of religion and teaching their children how to be good Muslims. Government and non-Muslim private schools inhibit their ability to do this, therefore Muslim households may feel compelled to send their daughters to madrasas for religious instruction for a few years. Once children are sent to madrasas, it may

become difficult to transition into government and non-Islamic middle and secondary schools. Therefore, Muslim women's education may be curtailed.

Employment carries little redeeming value ascribed to education. Through exalting women's domestic roles and their responsibilities to be a good wife and mother, religious identity politics movements often circumscribe women's ability to work, under the assumption that if a woman works, then time is taken away from her children and husband, thus the woman cannot fulfil her duties to be a good mother and wife and also work (Bouatta and Cherifati-Merabtine 1994). In such diverse identity political movements as Khomeini's Iran, Hitler's Germany, and Sudan, there were explicit calls for women not to work. In Iran, the state encouraged women not to work through such policies as mandatory retirement, harassment, and incentives for men whose wives do not work (Gerami 1994). Despite these sanctions against women working, it seems to have mostly affected educated upper class women, rather than lower class women (Moghadam 1988). Similarly, in Sudan, identity politics movements called on women not to work unless they did not have children or if their family was in need of income (Hale 1994).

In India, Muslim women's wage work may be susceptible to these influences. Furthermore, if the Muslim community perceives itself as being subject to hostile Hindu influences, withdrawal from intensive contact with these groups, particularly for women, may be one of the responses. Wage work frequently involves working in factories, offices and shops under supervisors who are most likely Hindu. Fears of harassment may lead to withdrawal from these work environments. In addition,

stereotypical images of Muslim women as being backward, unreliable and unable to communicate may lead to employer discrimination and inability to secure work.

While the religious identity politics literature argues that women's rights, status and empowerment are vulnerable to religious identity politics, it is unclear if religious identity politics movements actually depress women's education and employment. This dissertation makes a unique contribution to the literature by examining empirical trends in Muslim women's school enrollment and wage employment in the context of intensifying Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics.

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted factors shaping Indian Muslim women's lives. Modernizing forces may positively affect enrollment and wage employment for all Indians. Religious disadvantage and discrimination negatively influences enrollment and wage employment for both Muslim men and women. In addition, there is evidence that discrimination against Muslims has been increasing as a result of the rise of Hindu fundamentalism, which would further depress enrollment and wage employment for Muslims. Additionally, there is evidence that upper class Muslims may be particularly affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism. Muslim women's lives may be further shaped by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics. This dissertation makes an important contribution to the literature on Muslim women, by empirically testing these relationships.

Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses

Over the past thirty years, India has experienced profound economic, political, and social changes, greatly influencing Muslim women's lives. The preceding chapters highlight three primary trends, modernization, religious disadvantage and discrimination, and the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics. Despite the confluence of these trends and their potential impact on Muslim women, they have never been simultaneously empirically examined. Utilizing the National Sample Survey (NSS), this dissertation empirically tests these trends, focusing on measurable outcomes, enrollment and wage employment. This chapter discusses the conceptual framework and hypotheses.

Conceptual Framework

Enrollment

As Figure 1 illustrates, I hypothesize that modernization, discrimination and disadvantage, and Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics have influenced school enrollment from 1983 to 1999 primarily through parental value and demand for education.

Modernizing forces have increased the supply of schools, increased the economic benefits of schooling and changed ideologies about the non-economic benefits of schooling. Educational expenditure (Ministry of Education 2006) and the provision of educational facilities have increased considerably (Govinda 2002), granting greater access to education for larger portions of the population. Increased supply of schools lowers many of the household level costs associated with education. For example, children's enrollment is hindered when they must travel long

distances to school, often on difficult terrain (The Probe Team 1999). If a child must walk a long distance to attend school, there may be safety concerns and there are opportunity costs associated with the time the child is away from home. Time traveling to and from school may come at the expense of children's household chores. Safety concerns and domestic responsibilities particularly affect girls schooling. Social distance poses another hindrance to schooling for disadvantaged groups (The Probe Team 1999). Many schools are located in higher caste sections of villages. Disadvantaged groups may not feel comfortable traveling to those schools because of safety and harassment concerns. To the extent that more schools are built in areas where disadvantaged groups reside, parental demand for education among disadvantaged groups may increase. In particular, parental demand for Muslims may increase as schools become more accessible.

Modernizing processes also increase the economic benefits of schooling affecting parental value and demand for education. Development changes the structure of the economy and the types of jobs that are available, requiring a more skilled workforce. Additionally, these forces change the returns to education in terms of attaining better jobs and higher earnings. Caldwell et. al. (1985) and The Probe Team (1999) find that households increasingly view education as a venue to obtain better paying jobs. Specifically, Caldwell et. al. (1985) find that parents in rural India want to increase their children's chances of obtaining non-farm, urban, or government employment. Developmental processes have also changed the rural economy, increasing parental demand for schooling (Caldwell et. al. 1985). Decreasing farm sizes, changes in rural technologies, and changes in employment

relationships have resulted in less reliance on children's labor. This reduction in the need for children's labor has played an important role in increasing school enrollment (Caldwell et. al. 1985). Modernization also changes ideologies about the non-economic benefits of schooling. Households increasingly view education as important for literacy, numeracy, enlightenment, and a better ability to interact with the social world (Caldwell et. al. 1985, The Probe Team 1999).

Discrimination and disadvantage also influence parental demand for schooling. Low cultural and economic worth of women in Indian society influences girls schooling. Households faced with scarce resources will choose to invest in boys' education over girls' education because of the greater returns to boy's education. Furthermore, cultural practices such as purdah, restrictions on girls' movement at menarche, also hinder girls' school enrollment. These societal and community values about girls' cultural and economic worth are enacted through parental demand for girls' education, depressing their education.

Muslims also face discrimination and disadvantage which influences parental demand for schooling. The school climate may adversely affect Muslim school enrollment. Textbooks and curriculums that have a pro-upper caste Hindu and anti-Muslim biases, and hostilities from teachers and students may deter Muslim children's enrollment. Specifically, Muslim parents may not want to send their children to schools where the school climate is hostile. As Hindu fundamentalism increases, the school climate is likely to become more negative towards Muslims, having further depressive effects on their enrollment. Moreover, if Muslim children must travel in Hindu dominated areas to attend schools, Muslim parental concern for

their children's safety may influence their children's enrollment. Historical discrimination and disadvantage may also adversely influence Muslim school enrollment. Past discrimination and disadvantage have negatively affected Muslim households' educational attainment and economic opportunities, reducing the socioeconomic resources they have to send their children to school. Present discrimination in the labor market also influences Muslim parental demand for schooling. Muslim parents may not see the value in investing heavily in education if the returns to education in the labor market are lower for Muslims. Discrimination and disadvantage in terms of the allocation of schools also negatively influences Muslim children's enrollment. Areas with high concentrations of Muslims have less schools (Jeffery and Jeffery 1998, Jeffery et. al. 2005). Parents' reluctance to send their children to schools that are at a great distance, may hinder Muslim children's school enrollment.

Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics may have a unique influence on Muslim girls. To the extent that Muslim women and girls have become symbols for the Muslim community, in the face of rising Hindu fundamentalism, then parental demand for girls education will likely decrease. More specifically, if the Muslim community, as a reaction to Hindu fundamentalism, adopts more conservative ideologies about gender roles, then parental demand for girls' education will decrease. The further delineation of gender roles, where women attend to domestic duties while men engage in market work, devalue the importance of education for girls, resulting in household's choosing not to invest heavily in girls education. Moreover, in religious identity politics movements, women are seen as

vessels for religion and must impart their religious knowledge to their children. This may result in Muslim parents sending their girls to madrasas to receive religious instruction. Madrasa schools often do not provide education at higher levels of schooling and transitions to madrasas to government and non-Islamic private schools can be difficult, potentially curtailing Muslim girls' education when madrasa education is no longer available. Furthermore, in the face of rising Hindu fundamentalism, parents may fear for the safety of their daughters while traveling to school, potentially restricting their education.

Thus far we have discussed how external forces have likely influenced parental demand for enrollment. There are also important factors within the household that affect children's school enrollment. The economic resources of the household determines who is able to go to school and for how long. Families that have scarce economic resources will likely have a lower demand for education, having to spend their resources on more basic needs. Furthermore, they may have a greater demand for children's help in the household. Additionally, scarce economic resources hinder girls' education more than boys, since households would choose to send boys to school because of the greater returns to their education and because boys will provide for their parents in old age. Girls' education is further hindered by responsibilities in the household, such as care of younger children.

Wage Employment

Figure 2 illustrates the factors that have influenced the wage employment patterns of Hindu and Muslim men and women. Modernizing forces change the structure of employment, decreasing self-employment and increasing opportunities in

wage employment. These forces also increase education and earnings and, in theory, should change patriarchal ideologies. As often coveted wage employment, educational, and earnings opportunities become more available, households will increasingly attempt to gain access to these opportunities. To the extent that modernization changes patriarchal ideologies, cultural practices that inhibit women's work, such as purdah, may be relaxed. These changes are likely to occur at both the community and household level. At the household level, households may be attracted to the earning potential of women, and relax cultural practices that limit women's wage work. In theory, modernization is also supposed to break down the importance of ascriptive characteristics such as gender and race in the labor market, since it becomes too costly for firms to discriminate. Therefore, modernizing forces should decrease the effects of discrimination that women and Muslims face in the market place.

While development may reduce the discrimination that women and Muslims face in the labor market, discrimination in the labor market persists. Women face discrimination in the labor market and are also encumbered by cultural practices that inhibit their labor force participation. Labor force discrimination has a direct impact on their access to jobs, while other cultural constraints operate through household decision-making about women's work. The delineation of strict gender roles, where men are involved in market work and women tend to reproductive and domestic responsibilities are broader ideologies of society which operate through labor force opportunities and household decision-making about women's work. Moreover, cultural practices such as purdah also operate via household decision-making. Many

upper caste households observe purdah, this practice is becoming more prevalent as other households emulate higher caste households and attempt to gain status through the observance of purdah. However, households who have scarce resources are often not in a financial position to practice purdah.

Muslims also face discrimination in the work place having a direct negative influence on their wage employment. Employers, who tend to be Hindu, since Hindus are the majority in India, may discriminate against Muslims resulting in not hiring Muslims or relegating them to low paying jobs. Where Muslims do have jobs, working primarily with Hindus, their work environment could be hostile and these hostilities may worsen with the rise of Hindu fundamentalism, possibly resulting in Muslims withdrawing from such work places. Moreover, the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and resultant riots in many areas, have led many Muslims to leave their homes to live in Muslim dominant areas (Government of India 2006). Muslim dominant areas tend to have less resources (Government of India 2006) and may result in Muslims living further away from lucrative job opportunities, curtailing their wage employment.

Muslim women may be further affected by Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics. If the Muslim community adopts more conservative ideologies about gender roles, then households may decide to withdraw women from wage employment. Religious identity politics movements often call for a further delineation of gender roles. The increased demarcation of gender roles reinforces the importance of women's reproductive and domestic duties and denounces their participation in market work. Market work conflicts with women being good wives

and mothers because it takes time away from their husbands and children (Bouatta and Cherifati-Merabtine 1994). Muslim women's market work may be further depressed if Muslim households decide to curtail women's contact with Hindus over concerns for Muslim women's welfare in an increasingly hostile environment.

There are also factors within the household that influence wage employment. Economic resources within the household may determine whether women engage in market work. Women from poorer households may have no choice but to engage in market work. Children in the household, particularly young children are likely to decrease women's engagement in market work, since women are responsible for child care duties.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1

Modernizing forces will increase overall school enrollment and wage employment over time.

Economic growth and the diffusion of western ideas have been increasing school enrollment in developing countries. As the economy grows, a more educated workforce is needed to perform complex tasks (Notestien 1953), resulting in government educational investment and promotion. Furthermore, colonial and post-colonial relationships with Western countries have led developing nations to emulate the western model of the nation-state and place importance on mass education (Meyer et. al 1992). Thereby, increasing the commitment that developing nations have to education.

In India, since Independence, there have been many factors that have increased school enrollments. In order to enhance the development process, the Indian government has made important commitments to raise school enrollment levels, particularly by increasing access to schools. In addition, the changing economic structure in India resulting in economic benefits to those who are more educated has influenced household decision-making about school enrollment. Parents are increasingly sending their children to school to raise their chances of obtaining better employment opportunities (Caldwell et. al. 1985). Moreover, parents are increasingly aware of the social benefits of schooling, such as enlightenment and a better ability to interact with the social environment (Caldwell et. al 1985, The Probe Team 1999). However, literature suggests that structural adjustment and liberalization policies may reduce school enrollments due to lower expenditures on education, the institution of fees, and recession. While India did undergo structural adjustment and liberalization policies, the Indian government did not reduce expenditures or institute fees, nor did India experience a recession. Therefore, we expect total educational enrollment to increase over time.

Modernization also influences employment patterns. During early periods of development, the family is the center of production (Notestein 1953). As development progresses, outside forms of production develop, pulling household members out of family production into jobs such as factory work (Notestien 1953). As economic growth occurs, more people are needed to produce goods and services, increasing service, manufacturing, and industrial wage employment opportunities outside the household (Anderson and Leiserson 1980). However, these arguments

largely rely on the experience of developed nations and do not account for, among other factors, the impact structural adjustment and liberalization policies have on developing nations. As a result of structural adjustment and liberalization policies, many developing countries experienced a slow down in job growth, casualization of the labor force, and increased unemployment and underemployment.

From 1950 to 1980, India experienced slow and steady economic growth, with a per capita economic growth rate of 1.7 (Rodrik and Subramanian 2005). The 1980s ushered in a new era of economic growth. From 1980 to 2000 the per capita economic growth rate increased to 3.8 percent (Rodrik and Subramanian 2005). Contrary to expectations, but similar to the experience of many other developing nations that underwent structural adjustment programs, the economic growth that India experienced did not accelerate growth in employment, rather the employment growth rate declined from the 1980s to 2000. However, this economic growth has resulted in the reduction of self-employment, which partially reflects employment in household enterprises. The percentage of workers engaged in self-employment decreased from 59 percent in 1977-78 to 53 in 1999-2000 (Anant 2004). While economic development decreased self-employment, wage work increased. Those engaged in wage work are either regular salaried employees or casual wage laborers. While the overall percentage of workers engaged in wage work increased during this period, it is unclear whether regular salaried wage employment increased. Anant (2004) finds that from 1977-78 to 1999-2000 regular salaried employment remained stagnant, with roughly 14 percent of workers engaged in regular salaried employment in both periods. However, other estimates indicate that regular salaried employment

increased (Sundaram 2004), while others (Duraismy 2000) suggest a slight decrease in regular salaried employment from the 1980s to 2000. There is more agreement regarding the trend in casual wage employment, with many arguing that India is experiencing a casualization of the labor force. The percentage of workers engaged in casual wage employment has increased from 27 percent in 1977-78 to 33 percent in 1999-2000. It appears that much of the decrease in self-employment is associated with the increase in casual wage work. In other words, it appears that those engaged in self-employment are increasingly moving in to casual wage employment. Despite the ambiguity surrounding the trends for regular salary employment, we expect that as India experienced accelerated economic growth during the 1980s through 2000, total wage work, encompassing both regular salaried employment and casual wage labor will increase, largely driven by increases in casual wage employment.

Hypothesis 2

Modernizing forces will narrow the gender gap in enrollment in education. It is unclear how modernizing forces will influence the gender gap in wage employment, at least in the short run.

As development proceeds, gender gaps in enrollment decrease. Examining the relationship between development and gender inequality in education, Hill and King (1993) find that low-income countries tend to have the largest gender gaps in school enrollments, while developed nations have the smallest gaps. The experiences of urban and rural areas also demonstrate that development narrows gender differences in enrollment. Urban areas are more developed than rural areas and experience lower gender differentials in education. In addition, as governments actively promote

schooling and provide greater access to schools, girls benefit. Wils and Goujon's (1998) study of six world regions from 1960 to 1990 suggests that as enrollment increases, the gender difference in enrollment decreases as girls' enrollment catches up to boys' enrollment.

In India, education of women was dismal prior to Independence from Britain (Basu 1999, Dreze and Sen 1995). The Indian government, recognizing that girls' education was considerably lower than boy's education, wrote a provision in the constitution urging states to make special efforts to encourage girls' education (Basu 1999). Over the years, educational commissions and the women's movement called for more substantial efforts to increase girls' enrollment, resulting in special programs and campaigns to enhance girls enrollment and literacy (Basu 1999).

Through these efforts and the government's commitment to expand educational facilities, girls' access to education has increased. Since girls' enrollment is sensitive to proximity to schools, this has played a major role in increasing their enrollment. Parents' reluctance to send girls to schools outside their village or far distances reduces girls' enrollment (Nayer 2002, The Probe Team 1999).

Government expansion of educational facilities removes this barrier to girls' education. Work by Rastogi et. al. (2004) substantiates this claim. They find that gender inequality in education is reduced in districts with higher levels of school quality, proxied by the number of teachers in a district.

However, supply of schools is not enough. A major hindrance to girls' schooling is household demand. As discussed in Chapter 2, girls' low economic and cultural worth in India diminishes their school enrollment. Despite these barriers,

demand for girls' schooling has been increasing since Independence. One factor that has increased the demand for girls' schooling is the importance of education in marriage markets. Households increasingly want to educate their daughters to enhance their marriage prospects (Caldwell et. al. 1985, The Probe Team 1999). Households also believe that some education for girls is important to improve their domestic abilities, accounting skills, and letter writing skills (The Probe Team 1999). Increasingly, households are also indicating that they would like to educate their daughters to increase their employment opportunities (Caldwell et. al. 1985, The Probe Team 1999). Caldwell et. al. (1985) argue that this was not the case 15 years before their study.

Another potential hindrance to girls' schooling is structural adjustment policies, however we do not expect that girls' education in India has been affected by these policies. The Indian government has invested considerably in education, has not instituted any fees, and India has experienced significant economic growth. Therefore, households do not feel additional financial constraints that would likely hinder girls' enrollment.

Increased school expansion, efforts of women's groups and educational commissions, campaigns directed at girls schooling and literacy, and the increasing demand of girls schooling has had an important impact on girls schooling. As a result, girls' enrollment in India has increased at a faster rate compared to boys (Basu 1999, Nayer 2002). Therefore, we expect that modernizing forces have reduced the gender gap in school enrollment over time.

Women's labor force participation is expected to follow a U shaped curve. At low levels of development, women's work participation is high as both men and women are engaged in economic activities based around the home. As development proceeds, wage work outside the home pulls men into market work, while women continue to work at home. As development further progresses, particularly when there is a sufficient level of secondary schooling and white collar jobs (Goldin 1995), women's market work increases, and female labor force participation moves up the curve of the U. However, it is unclear what threshold of development will significantly propel women's labor force participation. Structural adjustment policies may facilitate the increase of women's market work, if household incomes decrease requiring women to work outside the home. However, if the labor force does not expand, then women's market work may be curtailed.

The effect of modernizing influences on Indian women's wage employment is not clear because there are various potentially countervailing trends. There is evidence that women's wage employment has been increasing over time. In particular, the percentage of women as agricultural wage laborers has increased since 1961 (Mukherjee 1999). Unni and Rani (2000) also find that women's share of non-agriculture employment is increasing, suggesting that women are increasingly entering wage employment. However, there is also evidence that overall female labor force participation rates have remained stagnant and even decreased from 1980 to 1995 (Das and Desai 2003). The pattern behind this stagnation and even labor force decline for Indian women is unclear. Therefore, it is unclear how modernization will influence women's wage work in India.

Hypothesis 3

Discrimination and disadvantage adversely affect Muslim enrollment and wage employment.

Discrimination and disadvantage that Muslims face in India influence both their school enrollment and wage employment. There are several factors, which lead to lower school enrollment among Muslims. First, there are fewer publicly provided schools in wards, villages and districts that have higher proportion of Muslims (Jeffery and Jeffery 1998, Jeffery et. al. 2005). Second, there is Hindu bias in government and non-Islamic private schools. Teacher bias towards Hindus and government texts which extol Hinduism, while deprecating Islam negatively influences Muslim school enrollment. Absence of Urdu schools may further affect enrollment, particularly in southern states where Muslims often use Urdu at home which is very different from Kannada, Malyalam, Tamil and Telugu taught in schools. Discrimination in the labor market also depresses Muslim school enrollment. Muslims are discriminated against in both the public and private sectors. This reality often discourages Muslim households from investing scarce resources in education, when they will not be rewarded for these human capital investments (Mann 1994, Sikand 2005). Therefore, we expect Muslim enrollment to be lower than Hindu enrollment.

Muslims also face discrimination and disadvantage in the labor market. Muslims face considerable discrimination in both the public and private sectors (Hasan 2005). Muslims are largely confined to non-agricultural self-employment (Das 2002), hold more vulnerable jobs, and have less occupational and income

mobility compared to Hindus (Khandker 1992). Therefore, we expect Muslim wage employment to be lower than Hindu wage employment.

Hypothesis 4

As Hindu fundamentalism intensifies, discrimination against Muslims increases, reducing growth in enrollment and wage employment for Muslims, thereby increasing the enrollment and wage employment gap between Hindus and Muslims, particularly in states where Hindu fundamentalist currents are strong.

As Chapter 1 documents, Hindu fundamentalism has been increasing since the early 1980s, intensifying throughout the 1990s, resulting in the proliferation of negative Muslim stereotypes and prejudice against Muslims. Increased prejudice against Muslims may further depress Muslims enrollment and wage employment. The propagation of negative stereotypes of Muslims, may further lower Hindu teachers' expectations of Muslim children affecting Muslim children's performance and progress in school. Children may find this environment frustrating and unmotivating and as a result drop out. Parents often stop investing in their child's education when they are not making adequate progress (Caldwell et. al. 1985). Households do not have enough resources to keep a child in school who is not performing well because of the opportunity cost of lost labor and costs of schooling such as textbooks, uniforms, and other fees (Caldwell et. al. 1985). Another potential factor depressing Muslim school enrollments is that Muslim households may view increased prejudice against Muslims in government and non-Muslim private schools as detrimental to children's wellbeing. In addition, in the face of rising Hindu fundamentalism Muslim households may find it important to have their children

retain part of their religious heritage by sending them to madrasas. If Muslim households increasingly choose to send their children to madrasas in the face of rising Hindu fundamentalism, it becomes more difficult for children enrolled in these schools to attend government secondary schools after madrasa education is no longer available. Therefore, as Hindu fundamentalism increases, Muslim enrollment may decrease.

Increased prejudice and discrimination towards Muslims will likely also influence their wage employment. Since Muslims are predominantly in non-farm small scale self-employment, hiring decisions for wage employment are in the purview of Hindus. Even if Muslims were in wage work, they are only 13 percent of the population so most will work for Hindu employers. As negative portrayals of and prejudice against Muslims intensify, it will be even more difficult for them to find jobs in wage employment. Therefore, wage employment is likely to decrease for all Muslims in the face of increasing prejudice from Hindus.

Hypothesis 5

Upper class Muslims may be relatively more affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism compared to poorer Muslims. If this is true, then we would expect the enrollment and wage employment gaps between upper class Muslims and Hindus to be larger than the gap between poorer Muslims and Hindus, particularly in states where Hindu fundamentalism is strong.

There is evidence that communal groups have utilized the increasing economic prosperity of Muslims in particular areas to incite communal tensions and riots (Hasan 1982, Lateef 1990). As a result, upper class Muslims may be more

targeted during these tensions and riots and may also face more discrimination from Hindus. Thus, potentially increasing the enrollment and wage employment gaps between upper class Muslims and Hindus more than for poorer Muslims and Hindus.

Hypothesis 6

Similar to the relationship between Hindu females and males, Muslim females will have lower levels of enrollment and wage employment compared to Muslim males because of gender discrimination in schooling and the labor market.

Muslim females will experience similar disadvantages that Hindu females face in school enrollment. In the face of scarce resources, households choose to invest in boys' education because they have more economic opportunities. Furthermore, males provide future financial and old age support to their parents, making investment in their education more crucial. In addition, the practice of purdah, marriage markets, and the gender division of labor result in lower educational levels for Muslim females compared to Muslim males. Moreover, Muslim females, like Muslim males, face discrimination in government and non-Islamic private schools. Therefore, due to the interplay of gender and religion, Muslim female enrollment will be lower than Muslim male enrollment.

Similar to Hindu women, Muslim women's wage employment is depressed by the practice of purdah, the gender division of labor, and segmented labor markets. Moreover, Muslim women face discrimination in the wage labor market because of their religious affiliation. Therefore, the intersection between gender and religion results in lower wage employment for Muslim women, compared to Muslim men.

Hypothesis 7

The rise in Hindu Fundamentalism and religious identity politics will increase the Muslim gender gap in enrollment and wage employment over time, particularly in states where Hindu fundamentalism is strong. Furthermore, these factors will have a greater influence on Muslim women's employment compared to their enrollment in education.

Although Muslim women share gender discrimination with their Hindu sisters, they are further affected by the way in which religion has been politicized in India. Muslim women's lives have been strongly affected by political currents in the 1980s and 1990s. The rising tide of Hindu fundamentalism and the resultant identity politics among Muslim communities are likely to have an increasingly negative impact on Muslim women's education and wage employment.

Religious identity politics movements call for women to return to the domestic sphere and for the reinforcement of the gender division of labor. Enrollment in education, particularly at levels such as middle school and above, and participation in wage employment are in opposition to the gender division of labor. While both employment and enrollment contradict the appeals for women to return to the domestic sphere, education is still somewhat appealing for identity movements, since education seemingly makes women good mothers. Therefore, if identity politics plays a role in Muslim women's lives, we do expect the gender gap in Muslim enrollment to increase over time, but only moderately. In contrast, we expect the effect of identity politics to be much greater on employment since wage employment is not tied to motherhood or the domestic sphere.

Chapter 4 Data: Dependent, Independent, and Control Variables; and Research Design and Methods

This chapter discusses the data; describes the dependent, independent and control variables; and explains the research design and methods.

Data

We employ the National Sample Surveys (NSS), allowing us to examine enrollment and wage employment patterns over time. The NSS all-India household surveys have been conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization (NNSO) annually since 1950, collecting important cross-sectional employment and consumption data. Starting in 1972, every five years, surveys with larger samples have been collected called the quinquennial surveys. This paper utilizes the larger sample sizes of the quinquennial surveys, using four NSS rounds, 38, 43, 50, and 55, which were collected in 1983, 1987-1988, 1993-1994, and 1999-2000 respectively. The quinquennial surveys use a multi-stage stratified sample design, conducting in-person interviews from a sample of randomly selected households to collect data on approximately 100,000 to 120,000 households or around 500,000 individuals per round. For rounds 38, 43, 50, and 55, there were 120,921, 129,194, 115,409, and 120,309 households were interviewed respectively. Data was collected on 623,494, 667,848, 564,740, and 596,688 individuals for rounds 38, 43, 50, and 55 respectively. An adult respondent answers questions about the household and individuals within the household.

We will now turn to a discussion of the dependent variables and sample for the enrollment and wage employment analyses. Tables 2 and 3 display the means and

standard deviations for independent and control variables for the enrollment and employment analyses respectively.

Dependent Variables and Sample

The primary aim of this dissertation is to understand Muslim women's school enrollment and wage employment in light of several countervailing influences such as modernization, religious disadvantage, and the rising tide of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics. These factors are crucial to understanding Muslim women's experience in India for a variety of reasons. First, both of these components allow us to gauge the well-being of Muslim women in India and how it has changed over time in the face of increasing Hindu fundamentalism. Second, the use of these two factors allows us to make a unique contribution to the identity politics literature. While many researchers argue that women's status in the form of education and employment is threatened by identity politics movements, it has not been examined empirically. Both of these factors also tap into a slightly different aspect of Muslim women's lives and this difference has interesting theoretical implications. Therefore, I utilize two dependent variables for this analysis: school enrollment and wage employment.

Education

India's educational system consists of preprimary, primary, middle, secondary, and higher education. Preprimary schools are similar to kindergarten in the United States. Primary school is for children ages 6 to 11 and consists of grades 1 through 5. Children 12 to 14 attend middle schools, grades 6 to 8. Children ages 15 to 18 attend high school and junior college, grades 9 through 12. Higher education consists of

technical schools, colleges, and universities. There is also non-formal education for children ages 6 to 14, who are not able to attend regular schools. While school ages are designated for each level of education, in practice ages vary because children are sent to school at different ages and can be held back. Also, there are some differences in transition points between primary and middle and middle and high school across states and whether grades 11 and 12 are located in high schools or in separate junior colleges. By focusing on ages 12-15, this dissertation will focus on middle school and the first year of secondary school, although some students who have started school late or have been held back may be in primary school.

The dependent variable for education is enrollment of children 12 to 15 coded 1 if the respondent is enrolled and 0 if the respondent is not enrolled. The individuals in the age group 12 to 15 could potentially be enrolled in primary, middle, or secondary schooling, however they will mainly be enrolled in middle and the first year of secondary school. While primary schooling is becoming increasingly accessible to most groups, and inequalities are diminishing at this level, considerable gaps between various groups in upper primary and secondary schooling still persist. I expect the greatest differences between religious groups and males and females to be in middle and secondary school enrollment, by looking at the age group 12 to 15 we will be able to examine these differences. We have chosen the upper limit of 15 to minimize the effects of selectivity issues of early age at first marriage on the gender gap in enrollment. Once girls are married and move in with their husbands, their education is often curtailed, augmenting the gender differences in education. If we include these girls in our analysis then any household level control variables are

measuring characteristics of their husband's family, not the characteristics of their natal family, which heavily influences their educational attainment. The average age at first marriage is rising in India, however it continues to be an issue. Sixty-five percent of women aged 25 to 49 were married by the age of 18 (ORC Macro 2000). In several states, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh about 80 percent of women aged 25 to 49 were married by the age of 18 (ORC Macro 2000). Moreover, for the cohort of women aged 20 to 24 in the 1998-1999 National Family and Health Survey, 50 percent were married before the age of 18, among those married before 18, 24 percent were married before 15. The median age of marriage and median age of first cohabitation are similar for this age group, 18 and 18.3 respectively, suggesting that many of these women who married at young ages moved in with their husbands at that time (ORC Macro 2000).¹¹

The total sample for the analysis of enrollment is 218,306 individuals ages 12 to 15. Due to missing values on various variables, 2,336 observations were dropped from the analysis. Therefore, the sample size is 215,970. Excluding the dropped observations, there are 56,948, 58,741, 47,565, and 52,716 individuals ages 12 to 15 in NSS rounds 38 (1983), 43 (1987-1988), 50 (1993-1994), and 55 (1999-2000) respectively.

Table 4 shows total enrollment, enrollment by gender, and enrollment by gender and religion by round. Fifty-eight percent of all children ages 12 to 15 are enrolled in school for all rounds. As expected enrollment increases over time, 47

¹¹ There are cultural practices, for example *gauna* in North India, where there is a lag between when a couple marries and when they cohabit, particularly for couples who marry at young ages.

percent of children aged 12-15 were enrolled in school in 1983, this figure increased to 67 percent by 1999.

There is considerable variation in enrollment across states (see Table 5). For all rounds combined Andhra Pradesh has the lowest level of enrollment, where 45 percent of children aged 12 to 15 for all rounds were enrolled in school. In contrast, Mizoram has the highest levels of school enrollment, where 91 percent of children 12 to 15 were enrolled from 1983 to 1999.

Whether a child resides in an urban or rural setting influences their chances of enrollment. Figure 3 shows urban and rural enrollment by gender. Urban enrollment is considerably higher compared to rural enrollment. Seventy-three percent of urban children aged 12 to 15 were enrolled in school for all rounds combined, while only 54 children residing in rural areas were enrolled. Similarly, enrollment for boys and girls in urban areas is higher compared to rural areas. Seventy-eight percent of urban boys were enrolled in school from 1983 to 1999, compared to 64 percent of rural boys. Similarly, 69 percent of urban girls were enrolled in school for all rounds combined, while only 42 percent of their counterparts were enrolled in rural areas.

Age is an important factor in determining school enrollment. Figure 4 shows enrollment by age and gender for all rounds combined. Sixty-four percent of children aged 12 are enrolled in school. Similarly, for children aged 13, 64 percent are enrolled. However, as children age, their enrollment declines, 58 percent of children aged 14 are enrolled in school, this figure declines to 47 percent for children aged 15. Both boys and girls experience this decline. Seventy-one percent of boys aged 12 are enrolled in school for all rounds combined, compared to 55 percent of boys aged 15.

Similarly, 53 percent of girls aged 12 are enrolled in school, declining to 36 percent for girls aged 15.

Over time, enrollment by gender and religion has increased over time, however differentials between groups persist (see Table 4). Both males and females have experienced increases in school enrollment over time. Male enrollment increased from 59 percent in 1983 to 73 in 1999. Female enrollment grew at a faster rate than male enrollment, although female enrollment remains lower. Thirty-four percent of females aged 12-15 were enrolled in 1983, increasing to 60 percent by 1999. Hindu and Muslim girls and boys all experienced increases in school enrollment over time, however persistent differences remain. Hindu males enrollment increased from 65 percent to 79 percent from 1983 to 1999, increasing 14 percentage points. Muslim males made similar gains, although their enrollment remains lower than Hindu males. Muslim male enrollment increased from 49 percent to 63 percent from 1983 to 1999, a 14 percentage point gain. Hindu females experienced the greatest gains in school enrollment, even surpassing Muslim male enrollment. Hindu females experienced a 29 percentage point gain in enrollment, increasing from 39 percent in 1983 to 68 percent in 1999. Muslim females also made important gains, although their enrollment remains the lowest compared to all other groups. Muslim girls' enrollment increased 25 percentage points from 29 percent to 54 percent from 1983 to 1999. Multivariate analysis will be used to test whether patterns of school enrollment have been influenced by modernizing forces, discrimination and disadvantage, and Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics, which will be discussed in further depth below.

Employment

We utilized the ‘usual status’ variable in the NSS to create our wage employment variable. The reference period for the ‘usual status’ variable is 365 days prior to the survey. The ‘usual status’ variable measures the major activity which individuals were engaged in over the past year: self-employment as own account workers; helpers in a household enterprise; regular salaried or wage employees; casual wage work; did not work but are seeking and available for work; attending educational institutions; engaged in domestic work; landlords, pensioners, and remittance recipients; not able to work due to disability, beggars and prostitutes, and others. Some of these activities are self-evident, such as attending an educational institution, while other activities require some explanation. Self-employed own account workers run their own enterprises. Helpers in a household enterprise work full or part time, assisting in but not running a household enterprise, receiving no regular salary or wages. Regular salaried and wage workers work full or part-time in others’ farm and non-farm enterprises, receiving a salary or wages on a regular basis (National Sample Survey Organization 1983-2000). Similar to regular salary or wage workers, casual wage workers work in others’ farm and non-farm enterprises, however, they receive a daily or periodic wage.

For employment, the dependent variable is a three category variable coded 1 if the respondent is employed in regular salaried work or casual wage labor, 2 if the respondent is self-employed and 3 if the respondent is unemployed, or out of the labor force. The sample is restricted to individuals ages 25 to 55. The upper bound of 55 is used because retirement is expected at this age and is mandatory for many

individuals working in formal organizations or the government. The sample does not include individuals attending an educational institution or not working because of disability.

We utilize a variable measuring wage employment because it represents integration into the labor market. This type of employment is where Hindus and Muslims must interact. Therefore, this type of employment allows us to better examine the discrimination Muslims face in employment. Furthermore, it is this type of employment where Muslim identity politics may affect Muslim women.

Unemployment is categorized with out of the labor force because in the context of India, unemployment is very low (Visaria and Minhas 1991). When faced with extreme poverty it is common for individuals to find some work (Desai and Das 2004), thus, fine distinctions between unemployed and out of labor force are not meaningful in this context. Therefore, it is important to focus on the better quality jobs rather than on whether an individual is employed or unemployed (Desai and Das 2004). While wage employment by itself does not imply better quality jobs, it does indicate market integration and access to cash income.

The total sample for the wage employment analysis is 840,912 individuals ages 25 to 55. There were 2,103 missing observations on a few independent variables, therefore these observations were dropped. After dropping missing observations, the sample size is 838,809 individuals aged 25 to 55. The samples for round 38 (1983), 43 (1987-1988), 50 (1993-1994), and 55 (1999-2000) respectively are 201,054, 223,646, 198,389, and 215,720.

Table 6 shows unweighted frequencies and weighted percentages of wage employment, self-employment, and unemployment/out of the labor force by gender and religion for each year. Thirty-four percent of men and women aged 25 to 55 are engaged in wage employment for all rounds. Similarly, 34 percent are engaged in self-employment. Largely driven by women not being in the labor force, 32 percent of the sample is unemployed or out of the labor force. Wage employment has increased modestly from 1983 to 1999, increasing from 33 percent to 35 percent.

There is considerable variation in wage employment by state. Table 7 shows the unweighted frequencies and weighted percentages for individuals 25 to 55 engaged in wage employment. Manipur has the lowest levels of wage employment, where 17 percent of individuals 25 to 55 are engaged in wage employment. Chandigarh has the highest level of wage employment, 52 percent of individuals 25 to 55 are engaged in wage employment.

Wage employment varies by urban and rural setting and gender. Figure 5 shows that individuals living in urban areas are more likely to be employed in wage employment, 37 percent of individuals aged 25 to 55 are engaged in wage employment in urban areas, compared to 32 percent in rural areas. Men are more likely to be engaged in wage work in urban areas compared to men in rural areas, however, interestingly the opposite holds true for women. Fifty-nine percent of urban men aged 25 to 55 are engaged in wage employment, compared to 44 percent of rural men. Only 14 percent of urban women aged 25 to 55 are engaged in wage employment, compared to 21 percent of rural women.

Figure 6 shows wage employment by age and gender. Individuals in younger age groups are more likely to be engaged in wage work. For the age group 25 to 34, 34 percent are engaged in wage employment, compared to 36 percent for the age group 35-44, and 31 percent for the age group 45 to 55. Men in the age groups 25 to 34 and 35 to 44 experience similar levels of engagement in wage employment, 49 percent of those aged 25 to 34 are engaged in wage work, compared to 50 percent in the age group 35 to 44. Men in the age group 45 to 55 have lower levels of wage employment, 44 percent of males in this age group are engaged in wage employment. Women in the age group 25 to 34 and the age group 45 to 55 are slightly less engaged in wage employment compared to women aged 34 to 44. Nineteen percent of women aged 25 to 34 are employed in wage work compared to 21 percent of women aged 35 to 44 and 17 percent of women aged 45 to 55. Wage employment may be lower for women in the age group 25 to 34 as they attend to reproductive and child-care responsibilities. While women in the older age category are likely affected by low labor force participation throughout their lives.

Patterns of wage employment vary by gender and religion over time (see Table 6) Male engagement in wage employment increased slightly more than female engagement in wage employment. Male wage employment increased from 46 percent to 49 from 1983 to 1999, a 3 percentage point increase, while females experienced a 1 percentage point increase from 19 percent to 20 percent. Hindu males are slightly less likely to be engaged in wage employment compared to Muslim males, however, Hindu males experienced a slightly higher increase in wage employment. Hindu male wage employment increased from 41 to 43 from 1983 to

1999, while Muslim male wage employment increased from 43 to 44. Hindu female wage employment also increased moderately from 15 percent to 16 percent from 1983 to 1999. In contrast to the experience of all other groups, Muslim women experienced a decline in wage employment from 10 percent in 1983 to 8 percent in 1999, suggesting that Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics may be influencing their wage employment. While descriptive statistics indicate that Muslim women may be adversely affected by Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics, it is necessary to utilize multivariate analysis to evaluate the influence historical factors have had on wage employment over time.

Independent and Control Variables

Variables for Enrollment and Wage Employment Analyses

Historical Period

The historical period captures the influence of modernization on education and employment for all individuals in the sample. As indicated in the Data section, this dissertation utilizes four rounds of NSS data. The historical period variable is measured based on these four rounds. Historical period is coded as a series of dummy variables for each period, 1983 (round 38) is the omitted category.

Male

The advantage that males enjoy in both education and employment are captured by the variable male. It is coded 1 if the respondent is male and 0 if the respondent is female.

*Male*Historical Period*

The interaction between the variables Male and Historical Period measures female's education and employment experience over time.

Muslim - Religion and Social Background

The disadvantage and discrimination Muslims face in education and employment in India is captured by the variable Muslim. There are also dummy variables, serving as controls, included in this analysis to measure groups from other social backgrounds, even though comparisons between non-scheduled caste Hindus and Muslims is the main focus of this dissertation. The variable Scheduled Caste captures lower caste Hindus, Buddhists, and Sikhs. The variable Scheduled Tribes captures any respondent that is from a scheduled tribe regardless of religion. Hindus that are not in the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe category are the omitted category.

*Muslim*Historical Period*

The interaction between the variables Muslim and Historical Period measures the potential intensification of disadvantage and discrimination Muslims experience in the context of rising Hindu fundamentalism.

*Male*Muslim*

The interaction between the variables Male and Muslim measures the disadvantage that Muslim women face in enrollment and wage employment.

*Male*Muslim*Historical Period*

The three-way interaction between the variable Male, Muslim, and Historical Period measures the potential impact of the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics on Muslim women in enrollment and wage employment.

Control Variables

Age

For enrollment, age is a continuous variable representing 12 to 15 years olds. For wage employment, age is a continuous variable measuring 25 to 55 year olds.

Age Squared

Age squared is included in the analysis because age may have a curvilinear relationship with enrollment and wage employment.

Marital Status

The variable will only be used as a control in the analysis for wage employment. Younger women who are not married may be more likely to work. Similarly, divorced and widowed women may have to help support themselves and their families, pushing them into the workforce. Two dummy variables measure marital status. Never married is the first variable. The second variable captures whether a woman has been divorced or widowed. The omitted category is currently married.

Household Size

The size of the household may influence whether a child goes to school or not. On one hand, a larger household size may have scarce resources and this may inhibit a child going to school. On the other hand, larger households may have more

resources to pool together to send children to school. Household size may also influence employment. If a household is burdened by many members, then more individuals from that household may have to work. Household size is a continuous variable.

Urban

Whether a locality is urban or rural influences wage employment and enrollment opportunities. Therefore we control for Urban, which is coded 1 if the location is urban and 0 if it is rural.

Number of Children in the Household

This variable is used as a control for the wage employment analysis. Since women are primarily responsible for childcare, the number of children in the household may influence women's employment.

Completed Education

The variable completed education will only be used in the wage employment analysis. One's education has an important effect on employment opportunities. Completed education is measured by two dummy variables, 'Primary' measures whether the respondent completed primary or middle school, and 'Secondary' measures whether the respondent completed secondary and above. The omitted category is Below Primary which captures individuals who did not complete primary school or who are illiterate.

Consumption Index

The consumption index will only be used in the enrollment analysis. Consumption is a proxy for the wealth of the household. Children from wealthy

families are more likely to be enrolled in school compared to poor families. The consumption index will not be used in the wage employment analysis because consumption is endogenous to wage employment.

State

States have different levels of development and economic growth, affecting both enrollment and wage employment opportunities. Also, state governments play an important role in education. Therefore, we control for state by a series of dummy variables. The omitted category will vary depending on the analysis. As will be discussed below, the models will be run on all states combined, states that have strong Hindu fundamentalist leanings, and non-fundamentalist states. For all states combined and fundamentalist states, Uttar Pradesh has the largest population and therefore will be the omitted category. For non-fundamentalist states Bihar has the largest population and is therefore the omitted category. As will be discussed in more detail below, models are also run for individuals above the poverty line and below the poverty line for all states combined, fundamentalist states, and non-fundamentalist states. Therefore, particular states were combined with neighboring states to ensure sufficient sample sizes of Muslims for these models. The state combinations are as follows: Tamil Nadu, Pondicherry, and Andaman and Nicobar Islands; Kerala and Lakshadweep; Gujarat and Dadra Nagar Haveli; Haryana, Chandigarh, Himachal Pradesh, and Punjab; Sikkim, Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, and Tripura; and Karnataka, Goa, and Daman and Diu. The remaining states are not combined with any other states, Assam, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan, West Bengal, and New Delhi. Even though

only the poverty analyses, particularly for enrollment since the sample size is much smaller compared to employment, requires state combinations to secure sufficient sample sizes for Muslims, we utilize these state combinations for all models to be consistent across analyses.

Research Design and Methods

I have argued that Muslim women's lives are affected by a variety of processes including, modernization, religious discrimination and Muslim identity politics. In order to examine how these processes shape Muslim women's lives, I have focused on three key sets of independent variables – gender, religion and historical period. The role of gender and religion in determining education and wage employment has been discussed in detail above. However, my hypotheses focus on social changes over the past twenty years and hence, historical period plays an important role in my analyses. I focus on four major effects: (1) The main effect of historical period indicates the secular change in education and employment brought about by the passing of time and increasing modernization; (2) The interaction between historical period and gender indicates how these forces of modernization further diminish gender inequality in Indian society; (3) The interaction between historical period and religion is meant to capture increasing isolation and marginalization of Muslims over time; (4) The interaction between gender, religion and historical period uniquely captures the way in which rising fundamentalism and identity politics differentially affect the social construction of gender in Muslim communities.

To better tease out the influence of Hindu fundamentalism on all Muslims and Muslim women, models are run on all states combined, states that are known to have stronger elements of Hindu fundamentalism, and non-fundamentalist states. States were deemed to have Hindu fundamentalist leanings if they were early and strong supporters of the Hindu nationalist party, the BJP and are known to have considerable communal tensions. As mentioned in Chapter 1, several western and northern Indian states, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat and Rajasthan, awarded the BJP many seats in the early to mid-1990s, demonstrating their Hindu nationalist leanings before the BJP's power was solidified in the late 1990s (Chiriyankandath 1998). An analysis of Lok Sabha election data also revealed that New Delhi was an early supporter of Hindu nationalist parties (see Table 8). In 1991, roughly 71 percent or 5 of the 7 Lok Sabha seats went to the BJP or SHS, another Hindu nationalist party. Moreover, an analysis of the Varshney-Wilkinson dataset on Hindu-Muslim Violence in India 1950-1995, indicates that all of these states have experienced Hindu-Muslim riots from 1982 to 1995 (see Table 9). Since these states were supporters of the BJP during a time when the party was arguably the most overtly anti-Muslim and because they also experienced Hindu-Muslim riots from 1982 to 1995, the following states were selected to represent Hindu fundamentalist states for this dissertation: Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, New Delhi, Gujarat, and Uttar Pradesh.

Table 10 shows various socioeconomic and social characteristics by states and the means of these characteristics by fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states. Three additional states besides the fundamentalist states are highlighted in this table. Chhattisgarh and Uttaranchal are highlighted because they were formerly part of the

states of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh respectively. Both of these states achieved statehood in 2000, therefore for this dissertation they are a part of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. Dadra and Nagar Haveli were combined with Gujarat to ensure an adequate number of Muslims in the poverty analysis, therefore Dadra and Nagar Haveli is also highlighted.

Looking at the mean literacy rates¹² of fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, we see that fundamentalist states have a slightly lower level of literacy (66.9) compared to non-fundamentalist states (70.5). This appears to be largely driven by lower literacy rates of females in fundamentalist states. The literacy rate for females in fundamentalist states is 54.2 compared to 61.9 in non-fundamentalist states. While there is a difference in the female literacy rate for fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, the literacy rates for males is similar in both state categories, approximately 78 percent. Higher percentages of workers are engaged in agricultural work in fundamentalist states relative to non-fundamentalist states. In fundamentalist states, 36.1 percent of workers are cultivators¹³ and 18.7 percent are agricultural laborers¹⁴ compared to 29.9 percent and 15.8 percent in non-fundamentalist states respectively.

There are also differences in monthly per capita expenditure¹⁵ by fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states by rural and urban area.

¹² The literacy rate is calculated for individuals aged 7 and above. A person is deemed literate if they can both read and write in any language (Census of India 2001 <http://demotemp257.nic.in/httpdoc/Metadata/Metada.htm#2m>).

¹³ Cultivators are individuals engaged in cultivation of Government owned land or land owned by private individuals or institutions (Census of India 2001 <http://demotemp257.nic.in/httpdoc/Metadata/Metada.htm#2m>).

¹⁴ Agricultural laborers are individuals who work on someone else's land for payment of money, kind, or share (Census of India 2001 <http://demotemp257.nic.in/httpdoc/Metadata/Metada.htm#2m>).

¹⁵ The monthly per capita expenditure of households is based on a 7 day recall.

Fundamentalist states have a lower rural mean monthly per capita expenditure (572.9) compared to non-fundamentalist states (646.1). However, the urban mean monthly per capita expenditure for fundamentalist states (931.4) is higher than non-fundamentalist states (901.9). There is considerable variation in the proportion of Muslims among states. Mizoram has the lowest proportion of Muslims (1.1 percent), while Lakshadweep has the highest proportion (95 percent). Fundamentalist states (9.1 percent) have a lower mean proportion of Muslims compared to non-fundamentalist states (14.3).

Child sex ratios along with female literacy rates indicate that there is more discrimination towards females in fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states. As mentioned above, the female literacy rate is lower in fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states. Child sex ratios, the number of females per 1000 males for children 0 to 6, are also lower in fundamentalist states. The mean child sex ratio for fundamentalist states is 920.3 compared to 938.0 for non-fundamentalist states. This suggests that women are discriminated against in both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, but they are relatively worse off in fundamentalist states.

In order to test the hypothesis that wealthier Muslims may be relatively more affected by Hindu fundamentalism compared to poorer Muslims, we divide the sample into those above the poverty line and those below the poverty and run models separately for these groups. We use the Official Planning Commissions (Dubey and Palmer-Jones 2007) poverty lines by year (round), state, and whether one resides in an urban or rural area, since poverty lines vary by these factors (see Table 11). For

each round of NSS data, individuals are designated as below (or above) the poverty line if per capita expenditure is below (or above) the Official Planning Commission's state urban/rural poverty line. The experience of Hindus and Muslims above the poverty line and Hindus and Muslims below the poverty line are then evaluated in all states, fundamentalist states, and non-fundamentalist states.

Enrollment is a dichotomous variable, therefore I will employ logistic regression. Employment is a three category variable, thus multinomial logistic regression will be used. The omitted category in the employment analysis is wage employment. I will do a stepwise regression for these analyses. To correct for correlation bias for siblings for the enrollment analysis and spouses in the employment analysis, we correct the standard errors by using the cluster command in STATA.

Coefficients and predicted probabilities from multivariate analysis are utilized to examine our hypotheses. Predicted probabilities are calculated for each dependent variable category for relevant models by using the `prvalue` command in STATA. Depending on the hypothesis being tested, explanatory variables of interest are assigned a 1, while the rest of the independent and control variables are held equal to their means. If the explanatory variable of interest is a series of dummy variables, then the category of interest is assigned a 1, while the other categories are assigned a 0.

Chapter 5: Educational Enrollment in the Context of Modernization, Religious Disadvantage and Discrimination, and the Rise of Hindu Fundamentalism and Muslim Identity Politics

This chapter examines the influence of modernization, religious disadvantage and discrimination, and the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics on school enrollment from 1983 to 1999. As discussed in Chapter 4, we utilize stepwise logistic regression to evaluate the impact of these historical processes on school enrollment. Enrollment predicted probabilities are also used to help clarify the logistic regression results when necessary.

Modernization and Secular Changes

Modernizing forces such as economic growth, development, and the diffusion of western ideas regarding education have an important influence on educational enrollment in developing nations. These forces have not only increased overall enrollment in many developing countries, but they have also played an important role in decreasing the gender gap in education.

Modernization influences both supply and demand of schooling, resulting in increases in educational enrollment. The Indian government has made great strides in providing both primary and secondary schools since the 1950s (Govinda 2002). In particular, the 1990s was a period of time where the commitment to making schools more accessible, particularly primary schooling, was paramount. By making schools more accessible disadvantaged groups, such as girls, scheduled castes, and scheduled tribes have all benefited.

Not only has the supply of schooling increased tremendously, but also considerable demand for schooling has been generated (Caldwell et. al. 1985).

Parents increasingly want their children to have the opportunity to obtain better employment (Caldwell et. al. 1985, The Probe Team 1999) and receive non-economic benefits from schooling (Caldwell et. al. 1985).

For this dissertation, the influence of modernization on enrollment in India is evaluated by looking at the variable “Historical Period.” Looking at Table 12, Model 1, we see that the coefficients for the years 1987, 1993, and 1999 are all positive and significant. This suggests that relative to 1983, overall school enrollment increased for all three years, indicating that enrollment has increased over time. This finding is consistent across all models, Model 1 to Model 6. Predicted probabilities illustrate this trend: in 1983 the probability of being enrolled for children aged 12 to 15 was 0.54, by 1999 this figure increased substantially to 0.75 (see Table 15).

In addition, we find that school enrollment increased over time for states that have been defined as Hindu fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist (see Tables 13 and 14). Interestingly, the magnitude of the increase in school enrollment is greater for Hindu fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states. This suggests that while modernizing forces positively influence enrollment in both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, the growth has been somewhat higher in fundamentalist states. Predicted probabilities of being enrolled in school further illustrate this finding. Table 15 shows the predicted probabilities of being enrolled in all states as well as in fundamentalist, and non-fundamentalist states by year. Children in non-fundamentalist states have a higher probability of being enrolled compared to children in fundamentalist states for all years. However, the enrollment gap between fundamentalist states and non-fundamentalist states decreases over time.

Specifically, the probability of being enrolled in non-fundamentalist states was 0.06 higher than fundamentalist states in 1983, by 1999 this figure declined to 0.02.

Modernizing forces also have a vital impact on the gender gap in school enrollment in many developing countries. In India, economic growth and development, the commitment of the Indian government to make schools more accessible, educational and literacy campaigns, and the educational commission's and women's groups efforts have had a considerable impact on girls' education. However, there are also important cultural and economic barriers affecting household demand for girls' schooling, mitigating the effects of modernization and development on girls' enrollment. Greater returns to boys' schooling, males providing old age support to their parents, girls' domestic responsibilities, and restrictions on girls' movement at menarche are some factors that dampen school enrollment for girls.

Despite these barriers, demand for girls' schooling has been increasing. Households want to educate their daughters to improve their chances in the marriage market (Caldwell et. al. 1985). In addition, households indicate that they would like their daughters to enhance their domestic skills of letter writing and accounting (The Probe Team 1999). More importantly, there has been a growing trend in household desire to enhance girls' economic opportunities (Caldwell et. al. 1985, The Probe Team 1999).

We evaluate the influence of modernization on the gender gap in school enrollment by examining the variables "Male," and "Male*Historical Period" interactions (Table 12, Model 2). The variable "Male" is positive and significant, indicating that boys' enrollment is higher than girls' enrollment. The coefficients for

the variables “Male*1987,” “Male*1993,” and “Male*1999” are all negative and significant, demonstrating that the gender gap in school enrollment decreased over time. Predicted probabilities for enrollment illuminate this trend. Table 16 shows male and female enrollment predicted probabilities, and the gender difference and gender ratios for the predicted probabilities for all states combined, fundamentalist, and non-fundamentalist states by year. Both males and females experience an increase in the probability of enrollment over time. However, the gender difference in the predicted probability declines from 0.30 in 1983 to 0.12 in 1999, illustrating that the gender gap in school enrollment has declined over time in India. This trend occurred in all, Hindu fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states (See Tables 13 and 14 for Hindu fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states respectively).

The magnitude of the coefficients and the gender difference in predicted probabilities suggest that males in fundamentalist states have more of an advantage over females compared to males in non-fundamentalist states. The coefficient for males in fundamentalist states is 1.515 compared to 1.064 for boys in non-fundamentalist states (Tables 13 and 14, Model 2). Looking at Table 16, in 1983, the gender difference in predicted probabilities show that the probability of being enrolled for boys in fundamentalist states was 0.36 higher than the probability of girls being enrolled. In non-fundamentalist states, the probability of boys being enrolled was only 0.26 higher than the probability of girls being enrolled. This larger gender difference in predicted probabilities for fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states persists over time, demonstrating that the gender gap in enrollment is larger in fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states.

Religious Discrimination and Disadvantage

Muslims experience considerable discrimination and disadvantage in school enrollment. One source of discrimination is the provision of public schools, which is lower in areas with higher concentrations of Muslims (Jeffery and Jeffery 1998, Jeffery et. al. 2005). Another source of discrimination is teacher bias towards Hindus in public and non-Islamic private schools affecting Muslim educational outcomes. Furthermore, labor market discrimination reduces the returns to Muslim schooling, depressing Muslim enrollment. Therefore, we expect discrimination and historical disadvantage to result in lower Muslim school enrollment relative to non-scheduled caste Hindus.

The variable “Muslim” in Table 12, Model 4, is negative and significant, substantiating our hypothesis that Muslims are less likely to be enrolled in school compared to non-scheduled caste Hindus. Tables 13 and 14 display results for fundamentalist states and non-fundamentalist states respectively. Looking at the magnitude of the coefficient for “Muslim” in both Hindu fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, the magnitude of the coefficient is larger in fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states. Specifically, the coefficient for “Muslim” in Model 4 in fundamentalist states is -1.086 and in non-fundamentalists states it is -0.706. While Muslims are less likely to be enrolled in school compared to non-scheduled caste Hindus in both Hindu fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, the magnitude of the coefficients indicate that the effect is greater in Hindu fundamentalist states. Predicted probabilities reveal a similar observation. Table 17 displays the predicted probabilities for enrollment for Hindus and Muslims over time

for all states combined, fundamentalist states, and non-fundamentalist states. The Hindu Muslim difference in predicted probabilities of enrollment in fundamentalist states is higher for every year compared to non-fundamentalist states. This finding suggests that Muslims experience more discrimination and disadvantage in Hindu fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states.

To examine whether the intensification of Hindu fundamentalism has a negative effect on Muslim enrollment over time we examine “Muslim*Historical Period” interactions. Looking at Table 12, Model 4, variable “Muslim*1987,” the coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that compared to 1983, the Hindu-Muslim gap in school enrollment increased. “Muslim*1993” and “Muslim*1999” are both negative, but not significant, suggesting that the Hindu-Muslim enrollment gap has not widened significantly in 1993 and 1999 compared to 1983. We find similar results in both Hindu fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states. Table 17 illustrates that the Hindu Muslim difference in predicted probabilities increases from 1983 to 1987 for all states combined, fundamentalist states, and non-fundamentalist states. The difference in predicted probabilities decrease from 1983 compared to 1999, however, as the regression results indicate, this decrease is not significant.

The results suggest that discrimination against Muslims worsened in all, Hindu fundamentalist, and non-fundamentalist states during a period where Hindu-Muslim tensions were on the rise in the late 1980’s. Tensions between Muslims and Hindus were simmering during the Shah Bano case, a hotly debated issue, with overt anti-Muslim rhetoric. These tensions considerably worsened during the 1990s. At the same time, the economic growth India experienced in the 1990s was

unprecedented and the Indian government made crucial strides in the provision of education. Despite this strong economic growth and also important gains in school accessibility, the enrollment gap between Hindus and Muslims did not diminish in 1993 and 1999 compared to 1983, suggesting that rise of Hindu fundamentalism and anti-Muslim rhetoric played an important role in dampening school enrollment for Muslims during this period.

Literature suggests that wealthier Muslims may be more affected by the intensification of Hindu fundamentalism relative to poorer Muslims. Tables 18 through 23 show models for all, fundamentalist, and non-fundamentalist states for those below the poverty line and those above the poverty line. Looking at Model 4, the variable “Muslim” and the “Muslim*Historical Period” interactions, we see that there is some evidence to support that wealthier Muslims are more affected by Hindu fundamentalism compared to poorer Muslims. The enrollment gap between Muslims and Hindus below the poverty line is not significantly different in 1987, 1993, and 1999 relative to 1983 (Table 18). For Muslims above the poverty line, the enrollment gap between Hindus and Muslims increases from 1983 to 1987, then the enrollment gap is not significantly different in 1993 and 1999 compared to 1983 (Table 21). This suggests that Muslims above the poverty line may have been adversely affected by Hindu fundamentalism from 1983 to 1987 compared to Muslims below the poverty line, however, this is not the case after 1987. After 1987, for Muslims below and above the poverty line, the differences in enrollment they experience compared to non-scheduled caste Hindus remains the same in 1993 and 1999 relative to 1983.

Gender and Religious Discrimination and Disadvantage

Muslim females face similar discrimination in schooling compared to Hindu women. Various cultural and economic factors inhibit girls' schooling. Among these factors are girls' domestic duties, the practice of purdah around the age of menarche, and the lower returns to education for girls compared to boys. Muslim girls also face the same discrimination that Muslim boys face in school. Due to this interplay between gender and religious discrimination, we expect Muslim girls' enrollment to be lower than Muslim boys'.

In Table 12, Model 5, the variables "Male," "Muslim," and "Muslim*Male" suggest that Muslim women are less likely to be enrolled in school relative to Muslim males. This is true for all states combined, fundamentalist states, and non-fundamentalist states. Predicted probabilities demonstrate this finding. The predicted probabilities for Muslim male and female enrollment are 0.63 and 0.37 respectively. We also find that the Muslim gender difference in enrollment is greater in fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states. The gender difference in the predicted probabilities for fundamentalist states is 0.33 compared to 0.26 in non-fundamentalist states.

The Rise of Hindu Fundamentalism and Muslim Identity Politics

We expect that as Hindu fundamentalism intensifies, the Muslim community will respond by using Muslim women as symbols for the community. Literature discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that in these circumstances women are idealized as wives and mothers. These representations pull women back into the domestic sphere. Modernizing forces will continue to have an important impact on enrollment for

Muslim women, however, we expect that if religious identity politics has an effect on Muslim women's enrollment, then the Muslim gender gap in enrollment will increase. While we do not find an increase in the Muslim gender gap in enrollment, we find evidence of religious identity politics by comparing the Muslim and non-scheduled caste Hindu gender differences in predicted probabilities in all states combined, fundamentalist, and non-fundamentalist states.

We first turn our attention to Table 24, which shows the enrollment predicted probabilities for Muslim and non-scheduled caste Hindu males and females, and the Muslim and Hindu predicted probability gender difference and ratio. The Muslim and Hindu gender differences in predicted probabilities over time in all states, fundamentalist, and non-fundamentalist states provides evidence for the Hindu fundamentalism/Muslim identity politics hypothesis. In all, fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, we find that the Muslim and Hindu gender difference in predicted probabilities decreases over time. In all, fundamentalist, and non-fundamentalist states we find the Muslim gender difference in predicted probabilities is lower than the non-scheduled caste Hindu difference in 1983. While in 1999, the Muslim gender difference in predicted probabilities remains lower than the non-scheduled caste Hindu gender difference for all and non-fundamentalist states, this is not true for fundamentalist states. In non-fundamentalist states, the Muslim gender difference in predicted probabilities was 0.2140 in 1983, the same figure was 0.2482 for Hindus. By 1999, Muslims continued to have a smaller gender difference in predicted probabilities of enrollment, 0.0346 compared to 0.0781 for non-scheduled caste Hindus. In contrast, in fundamentalist states, while the Muslims gender

difference in predicted probabilities is lower than Hindus in 1983, by 1999 the gender difference for Muslims is higher than Hindus. Specifically, in fundamentalist states, the Muslim gender difference in predicted probabilities decreases from 0.2839 in 1983 to 0.1996 in 1999, the Hindu gender difference was 0.3556 in 1983 and decreased to 0.1521 in 1999. This comparison between all states and non-fundamentalist states versus fundamentalist states suggests that Hindu fundamentalism/Muslim identity politics may adversely affect Muslim women's enrollment in fundamentalist states.

In Table 13, Model 5, the Wald test statistic for the addition of Muslim*Male*Period, SC*Male*Period, and ST*Male*Period corroborates the story that the predicted probabilities indicate. For all and non-fundamentalist states, the addition of the three way interaction terms are not statistically significant, indicating that adding these nine variables to the model does not improve model fit (Table 12 and 14). However, for fundamentalist states, the Wald test is significant for the addition of these nine variables, indicating that these variables improve the fit of the model (Table 13).

Interestingly, there is some evidence that the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics may have a larger influence on wealthier Muslim women compared to poorer Muslim women. Table 25 shows the predicted probabilities and the gender difference of predicted probabilities for Muslims and Hindus below and above the poverty line. In fundamentalist states, Muslims below the poverty line experience a smaller gender gap in predicted probabilities compared to Hindus below the poverty line from 1983 to 1999. In contrast, for Muslims and Hindus above the

poverty line in fundamentalist states, the Muslim gender difference in predicted probabilities was lower than Hindus in 1983, however, we see that by 1999 Muslims experience a larger gender gap in predicted probabilities compared to Non-scheduled caste Hindus, 0.21 and 0.13 respectively. This suggests that Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics may play a greater role for Muslim women above the poverty line. However, the results are not statistically significant, nor do the Wald tests indicate that the model fit is improved with the addition of Muslim*Male*Historical Period interactions. Nevertheless, this observation is interesting and warrants further examination.

Conclusion

Our findings suggest that modernization has increased overall enrollment from 1983 to 1999. It appears that economic growth, the diffusion of ideas regarding the importance of education, and efforts to make schooling more accessible have influenced school enrollment in India. While modernization played an important role in increasing educational enrollment in both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, these forces had a greater effect in fundamentalist states. Modernizing forces also reduced the gender gap in education from 1983 to 1999.

Muslims in India have experienced considerable disadvantage and discrimination. The rise of Hindu fundamentalism exacerbates the disadvantage and discrimination that Muslims face. Muslims do have lower enrollment in education compared to non-scheduled caste Hindus; pointing to the discrimination they face in education. Moreover, Muslim enrollment relative to non-scheduled caste Hindu enrollment is even lower in fundamentalist states, suggesting that fundamentalist

states are more discriminatory towards Muslims. The rise of Hindu fundamentalism also has a negative impact on Muslims over time. Modernizing forces had a strong influence on enrollment, particularly in fundamentalist states. However, the rise of Hindu fundamentalism counteracted the influence of modernizing forces on Muslims. Specifically, the religious gap in education increased from 1983 to 1987, then the gap remained unchanged in 1993 and 1999 relative to 1983. This persistent religious gap in school enrollment in the context of strong modernizing forces such as greater school accessibility and significant economic growth, demonstrates the considerable influence Hindu fundamentalism has on Muslim school enrollment. We do find some evidence that Muslims above the poverty line are more affected by Hindu fundamentalism than Muslims below the poverty line for the period of 1983 to 1987. However, from 1993 to 1999 it appears that Muslims below and above the poverty line were similarly affected by Hindu fundamentalism.

Muslim women face double disadvantage for being female and Muslim. Similar to Hindu women they have lower levels of enrollment compared to men in Indian society because of economic and cultural factors. Like Muslim men, they face discrimination and disadvantage in schooling because of their religious affiliation. We find that Muslim women are less likely to be enrolled in school compared to Muslim men. Muslim women's lives are also shaped by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics. The comparison of Muslim women's experience in fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states reveals that Muslim women's enrollment is dampened by the complex relationship between Hindus and Muslims in fundamentalist states. Interestingly, there is evidence that wealthier Muslim women

may be more affected by these religious tensions. However, our results are not significant. Further refinement of models and examination of the hypothesis is warranted.

Chapter 6: Wage Employment in the Context of Modernization, Religious Disadvantage and Discrimination, and the Rise of Hindu Fundamentalism and Muslim Identity Politics

This chapter examines wage employment in the context of three historical forces: modernization, religious disadvantage and discrimination, and the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics. Stepwise multinomial logistic regression and employment predicted probabilities are utilized to evaluate the impact of these historical processes on wage employment over time. As discussed in Chapter 4, the omitted category for the multinomial regressions is wage employment.

Modernization and Secular Changes

Literature suggests that economic growth increases overall employment and changes the structure of employment, generating more wage work (World Bank 1995). India experienced economic growth from 1983 to 1999. The 1990s, in particular, was a period of intense growth. Therefore, we expect modernizing forces will increase overall wage employment over time in India.

The variable “Historical Period” is used to evaluate whether wage employment has increased over time relative to self-employment and being out of the labor force. Our findings support the hypothesis that modernizing forces increase wage employment over time, although the increase has been modest. Looking at Table 26, Model 1, the coefficients for 1987, 1993, and 1999 are negative and significant indicating that self-employment has declined relative to wage employment over time. In contrast to the clear self-employment trend over time, the trend for the category “unemployed/out of the labor force” is mixed. From 1983 to 1987, there

was no change in unemployment/out of the labor force relative to wage employment. For 1993, the coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that in 1993 compared to 1983, being unemployed or out of the labor force increased relative to wage employment. The coefficient for 1999 is negative and significant, suggesting that compared to 1983, unemployment or being out of the labor force decreased relative to wage employment. Employment predicted probabilities support and clarify these assessments. Table 29 displays the predicted probabilities for wage employment, self-employment, and unemployment/out of the labor force over time. In all states combined, the probability of being employed in wage work increased from 1983 to 1999. The predicted probability of being employed in wage work was 0.38 in 1983 and increased to 0.41 in 1999. There was a corresponding decline in self-employment during this period. The probability of being self-employed in 1983 is 0.44 and declines to 0.41 in 1999. The probability of being unemployed or out of the labor force increased slightly from 1983 to 1999, however, since wage employment increased during the same period, relative to wage employment, the likelihood of being unemployed or out of the labor force decreased. The increase in wage employment and corresponding decrease in self-employment and unemployment/being out of the labor force indicates that economic growth as well as changes in the sectoral composition of the economy moderately shifted the structure of jobs in India.

This trend is relatively more pronounced in fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states. Tables 27 and 28 show multinomial regression coefficients for fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states respectively. Looking

at Model 1 in both tables, the sign, magnitude, and significance of the coefficients reveal that self-employment declined relative to wage employment more dramatically in fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states. Employment predicted probabilities illustrate this trend. In 1983, in fundamentalist states, the probability of being engaged in wage employment was 0.34. The probability increases to 0.39 in 1999, an increase of 0.05. While non-fundamentalist states also experienced an increase in wage employment from 1983 (0.40) to 1999 (0.43), the probability of being employed in wage work increased 0.03 during this period. Fundamentalist states also experience a greater decline in self-employment compared to non-fundamentalist states. In fundamentalist states, the predicted probability of self-employment declines from 0.52 in 1983 to 0.46 in 1999, a 0.06 decline. Non-fundamentalist states also experience a decline, but it is considerably smaller. The predicted probability of being self-employed in non-fundamentalist states is 0.39 in 1983 and declines to 0.38 in 1999, a 0.01 decline. For both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, the trend for being unemployed or out of the labor force is mixed from period to period, however from the periods 1983 to 1999, both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states experience a decrease in the unemployment/being out of the labor force relative to wage employment (see Tables 27 and 28 Model 1).¹⁶ Thus, the trends of wage employment, self employment, and unemployment/out of the labor force suggest that both fundamentalist and non-

¹⁶ Note that the predicted probability of being unemployed/out of the labor force declines slightly for fundamentalist states (0.1401 to 1499 from 1983 to 1999). Even though unemployment/out of the labor force increases slightly, it declines relative to wage employment from 1983 to 1999 because of the increase of wage employment during this period. The slight increase in the probability of being unemployed out of the labor force may be caused by individuals engaged in self employment moving to wage work and also moving into the unemployed/out of the labor force category.

fundamentalist states experience a modest increase in wage employment over time, however, fundamentalist states experience a slightly greater increase compared to non-fundamentalist states.

Modernizing forces may also play an important role in the gender gap in wage employment. Modernization may break down economic and cultural practices, which hinder women's employment. Additionally, as modernizing forces increase educational opportunities for women, this increase in human capital may increase women's opportunities in wage employment. Even if women's wage employment increases, the gender gap in wage employment may increase if men benefit more in the labor market from modernizing forces than women. Moreover, cultural and economic practices and norms hindering women's employment may take time to break down, dampening the growth of women's wage employment relative to men.

To evaluate the trend in gender differences in wage employment over time we look at the variables "Historical Period," "Male," and "Male*Historical Period" interactions (Table 26 Model 2). Male self-employment declines relative to wage employment, while women's self employment first increases relative to wage employment from 1983 to 1987, then decreases in 1993 and 1999. Overall, from 1983 to 1999, the gender gap in self-employment relative to wage employment decreases. For men, unemployment increases slightly from 1983 to 1999 relative to wage employment. For women, being unemployed or out of the labor forces decreases slightly over time. Predicted probabilities for employment by gender and the gender difference in predicted probabilities illustrate these findings (Table 30). For all states combined, wage employment modestly increases for both men and

women over time. The probability of males being engaged in wage employment is 0.48 in 1983 and increases to 0.51 in 1999. Women's engagement in wage employment is considerably less than males, but women also experience a slight increase in wage employment over time. The probability of being engaged in wage work for women is 0.12 in 1983 and increases to 0.13 in 1999. These results suggest that men experience a greater increase in wage employment compared to women from 1983 to 1999. The gender difference in the predicted probability of wage employment reflects this trend, increasing over time from 0.36 to 0.38. The probability of men being engaged in self-employment decreases from 0.51 to 0.47 from 1983 to 1999. Women also experience a slight decline in the probability of being self-employed, 0.15 in 1983 to 0.14 in 1999. Driven mostly by the decreases in the probability of male's being engaged in self-employment, the gender gap in self-employment declines from 1983 to 1999. The probability of males' being unemployed or out of the labor force increases slightly from 0.0178 to 0.0200. For women, this probability decreases slightly from 0.7342 to 0.7333. Males increase in the probability of unemployment/out of the labor force and women's decrease in this probability results in a slight decrease in the gender gap for unemployment/being out of the labor force.

Wage employment increases for both men and women in fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, however men in fundamentalist states experience a greater increase in wage employment. The probability of males being employed in wage work is 0.41 in 1983 and increases to 0.48 in 1999 in fundamentalist states. Men in non-fundamentalist states have a higher probability of being employed in wage work

compared to men in fundamentalist states, but they do not experience as great an increase from 1983 to 1999. In non-fundamentalist states, the probability of males being employed in wage work increases from 0.52 in 1983 to 0.53 in 1999. Women in fundamentalist states have a slightly higher probability of being employed in wage work compared to women in non-fundamentalist states. The probability of women being engaged in wage work in fundamentalist states is 0.12 in 1983 and increases to 0.14 in 1999. Similarly, the probability of women being employed in wage work in non-fundamentalist states is 0.11 in 1983 and increases to 0.13 in 1999. Since men in fundamentalist states experience a more pronounced increase in wage employment, the gender difference in the predicted probability of wage employment increases from 0.30 in 1983 to 0.34 in 1999. In contrast, in non-fundamentalist states, the gender difference in the wage employment predicted probability does not change, remaining at 0.40.

As wage employment increases for men in fundamentalist states, there is a corresponding decrease in self-employment. The probability of men being engaged in wage work is 0.57 in 1983 and decreases to 0.51 in 1999. Men in non-fundamentalist states have a lower probability of being self-employed compared to men in fundamentalist states and they experience only a slight decline in the probability of being self employed. The probability of being self-employed for men in non-fundamentalist states is 0.46 in 1983 and this figure decreases to 0.45 in 1999. Women in fundamentalist states have a higher probability of being engaged in self-employment compared to women in non-fundamentalist states. Furthermore, women in fundamentalist states experience a decline in self-employment from 0.21 in 1983 to

0.17 in 1999, while the probability of self-employment for women in non-fundamentalist states remains virtually unchanged, remaining at 0.12.

In both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, relative to wage work, the probability of being employed or out of the labor force increases slightly for men. In fundamentalist states, for men, the probability of being unemployed or out of the labor force is 0.0132 in 1983 and decreases to 0.0163 in 1999. Men in non-fundamentalist states also experience a slight increase in being unemployed or out of the labor force, the probability increases from 0.0210 in 1983 to 0.0219 in 1999. For women, the unemployment/out of the labor force trend is different in fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states. In fundamentalist states, the probability of women being unemployed or out of the labor force increases from 1983 (0.68) to 1999 (0.69). In contrast, in non-fundamentalist states, this figure decreases for women from 0.77 in 1983 to 0.75 in 1999. Wald test statistics substantiate our findings for all states combined, fundamentalist states and non-fundamentalist states. That is to say, adding Male*Historical Period interactions to Model 2 improves the model fit for all states combined, fundamentalist states and non-fundamentalist states and this improvement is statistically significant at 0.000 level.

Overall, our results suggest that modernizing forces modestly increase wage employment over time. These forces increase wage employment for both men and women in fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states. Men in fundamentalist states experience more of an increase in wage employment over time, increasing the gender difference in the predicted probability of wage employment. In non-fundamentalist states, men and women experience a similar increase in wage

employment from 1983 to 1999, thus the gender difference in predicted probabilities remains unchanged. Therefore, it appears that economic restructuring associated with modernization has increased the gender gap in wage employment in fundamentalist states, but has not had an impact on the gender gap in wage employment in non-fundamentalist states.

Religious Discrimination and Disadvantage

Literature suggests that Muslims face substantial discrimination and disadvantage in the labor market (Das 2002, Hasan 2005, Khandker 1992). The disadvantage and discrimination that Muslims experience in education dampens their opportunities in the labor market. However, even when human capital is taken into account, Muslims continue to face disadvantage in the labor market compared to Hindus (Khandker 1992).

As indicated in Model 4 of Table 26, the variable “Muslim” is significant and negative for self-employment, suggesting that Muslims compared to Hindus are less likely to be engaged in self-employment relative to wage employment. This statement needs to be qualified in the context of other literature, which suggests that Muslims are far more entrepreneurial and tend to be located in petty trade and artisanal work. My models combine agricultural self-employment with petty trade and other types of self-employment. Since Muslims are less likely to engage in farming, overall they are somewhat less likely to be self-employed. The variable “Muslim” is significant, positive, and large for unemployed/out of the labor force, indicating that Muslims compared to non-scheduled caste Hindus, are more likely to be unemployed/out of the labor force relative to being engaged in wage employment.

Predicted probabilities presented in Table 31 better illustrate the relationship between employment and religious affiliation. The results suggest that Muslims are slightly less likely to be employed in wage work compared to Hindus. The probability of being employed in wage work for Muslims is 0.31, while the probability for Hindus is 0.33. Muslims are also less likely to be self-employed compared to non-scheduled caste Hindus, the probability of Muslim self-employment is 0.41 compared to 0.47 for Non-scheduled caste Hindus. Furthermore, Muslims are more likely to be unemployed/out of the labor force compared to non-scheduled caste Hindus. The probability of Muslims being unemployed/out of the labor force is 0.28 compared to 0.19 for Non-scheduled caste Hindus. Note that this reflects the probabilities evaluated at the mean value for all other variables.

As Hindu fundamentalism intensifies the disadvantage and discrimination Muslims face will likely worsen. Table 32 displays predicted probabilities for wage, self, and other employment for Hindus and Muslims over time. In all states combined, both Hindus and Muslims experience an increase in wage employment. The probability of wage employment for Hindus is 0.33 in 1983 and increases to 0.36 in 1999. Muslims also experience an increase in wage employment, in 1983 the probability of being engaged in wage employment was 0.32 for Muslims, this figure increases to 0.34 in 1999. The Hindu-Muslim difference in predicted probabilities increases slightly during this period since Hindus experience a greater increase in wage employment over time compared to Muslims. This trend provides some evidence that Hindu fundamentalism may dampen Muslim progress in wage employment relative to Hindus but the effect is small.

The experience of Muslims in fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states provides further evidence that Muslim wage employment is influenced by Hindu fundamentalism (see Table 32). In 1983, Muslims in fundamentalist states appear to have a slight advantage over Hindus in wage employment. However, Hindus experience a substantial increase in wage employment compared to Muslims, increasing the difference in their predicted probability of wage employment. In 1983, the probability of wage employment for Hindus is 0.28, this figure increases to 0.33 in 1999. For Muslims, the probability of being engaged in wage employment increases from 0.31 in 1983 to 0.32 in 1999. In non-fundamentalist states, both Hindus and Muslims experience an increase in wage employment. The probability of Hindu wage employment is 0.35 in 1983 increasing to 0.38 in 1999. Muslims experience a similar increase, the probability of Muslims being engaged in wage employment was 0.32 in 1983 increasing to 0.36 in 1999. Since Muslims experienced a slightly higher increase, the wage employment gap between Muslims and Hindus decreases slightly.

Literature suggests that wealthier Muslims may be more affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism compared to poorer Muslims. Our results do not support this hypothesis; in fact, we find the opposite is true. Tables 33 and 34 display the predicted probabilities of wage employment, self-employment, and being unemployed or out of the labor forces over time for all states combined, fundamentalist, and non-fundamentalist states, for individuals below and above the poverty line respectively. Muslims below the poverty line appear to be more influenced by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism compared to Muslims above the

poverty line. In all states combined, fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, non-scheduled caste Hindus experience an increase in the probability of being engaged in wage employment, while Muslims experience a slight decrease from 1983 to 1999. For all states combined, for non-scheduled caste Hindus below the poverty line, the probability of being engaged in wage employment increases from 0.37 in 1983 to 0.44 in 1999. In contrast to non-scheduled caste Hindus, the probability of Muslims being engaged in wage employment decreases slightly, from 0.3855 in 1983 to 0.3841 in 1999. We see this same trend for non-scheduled caste Hindus and Muslims in fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states.

In contrast to the experience of non-scheduled caste Hindus and Muslims below the poverty line, both non-scheduled caste Hindus and Muslims above the poverty line experience an increase in wage employment over time in all states combined, fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states. In all states combined, the probability of non-scheduled caste Hindus being engaged in wage employment increases from 0.29 to 0.34. Muslims also experience an increase in the probability of being engaged in wage employment, from 0.26 in 1983 to 0.33 in 1999. We see similar trends for fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states. Muslims below the poverty line experience a slight decline in wage employment over time, while non-scheduled caste Hindus below and above the poverty line and Muslims above the poverty line experience an increase in wage employment over time, suggesting that Muslims below the poverty line may be affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalist more than Muslims above the poverty line. It is important to note that these results on poverty and change in the employment sector must be treated with caution since the

two are closely related, as the type of work determines income. Since the purpose of this dissertation is to examine broad trends rather than ascribe causation, this endogeneity may be acceptable.

Gender and Religious Discrimination and Disadvantage

Muslim women experience discrimination for being Muslim and, like their Hindu sisters experience gender discrimination in the labor market. Therefore, we expect Muslim women to have lower levels of wage employment compared to Muslim men. Our hypothesis is substantiated by the results. The predicted probability of wage employment is around 0.45 for Muslim men and about 0.06 for Muslim women. In fundamentalist states, the predicted probability for Muslim men's wage employment is lower (0.40) than in non-fundamentalist states (0.48). Muslim women in fundamentalist states (0.07) and non-fundamentalist states (0.06) have a similar wage employment predicted probability.

The Rise of Hindu Fundamentalism and Muslim Identity Politics

The rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics may have adverse consequences for Muslim women. This complex relationship between Hindus and Muslims may result in the Muslim community utilizing Muslim women as symbols for the community. Literature suggests that under these circumstances women represent motherhood and being a good wife, returning them to the domestic sphere. This may have a negative influence on Muslim women's employment.

We find evidence that identity politics is playing a role in Muslim women's employment. Looking at Table 41, the predicted probabilities for all states suggest that Muslim women's wage employment decreases over time, from 0.07 in 1983 to

0.06 in 1999. This differs from the experience of Muslim males, Hindu males, and Hindu females, all of whom experience an increase in the probability of being engaged in wage employment. The predicted probability of being engaged in wage employment for Muslim males is 0.45 in 1983 and increases to 0.47 in 1999. Hindu males experience a similar increase, 0.42 in 1983 increasing to 0.44 in 1999. The probability of Hindu women being engaged in wage employment also increases from 0.09 in 1983 to 0.10 in 1999.

The gender differences in the predicted probabilities in Table 41 provide further evidence for the influence of the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics on Muslim women's wage employment. The Muslim gender difference in predicted probabilities increases from 1983 (0.38) to 1999 (0.41), while the Hindu gender difference remains unchanged at 0.33 in both 1983 and 1999.

The different experience of Muslim women in fundamentalist states versus non-fundamentalist states provides further evidence for our hypothesis that the complex relationship between the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics negatively affects Muslim women. We see similar trends for fundamentalist states for wage employment as for the all states models. Muslim men, and non-scheduled caste Hindu men and women's wage employment increases over time, while Muslim women's wage employment decreases. Muslim men's probability of wage employment increases from 0.40 in 1983 to 0.42 in 1999. Hindu men also experience an increase in wage employment from 0.36 to 0.39 from 1983 to 1999. Non-Scheduled caste Hindu women's probability of wage employment also increased from 0.0876 to 0.1043 from 1983 to 1999. However, Muslim women do not see these

gains in wage employment over time. The probability of Muslim women's employment actually decreases slightly from 0.0832 to 0.0659 from 1983 to 1999. In contrast to fundamentalist states, in non-fundamentalist states, Muslim women experience gains in wage employment over time like Muslim men and non-scheduled caste Hindu men and women. In non-fundamentalist states, the probability of being engaged in wage employment increases from 0.48 in 1983 to 0.50 in 1999. Non-scheduled caste Hindu males experience a slight increase in the probability of being engaged in wage employment, from 0.46 in 1983 to 0.47 in 1999. For non-scheduled caste Hindu women the probability of being engaged in wage employment increases slightly from 0.0922 in 1983 to 0.1062 in 1999. In contrast to fundamentalist states, Muslim women experience an increase in the probability of being engaged in wage employment from 0.0582 in 1983 to 0.0631 in 1999. The different employment experience of Muslim women in fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states suggests that the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics may influence Muslim women's employment.

Further substantiating our findings, the Wald tests are significant for Muslim*Male*Period interactions for Model 6 for all states combined, fundamentalist, and non-fundamentalist states indicating the goodness of fit of the model when these variables are added (Tables 26, 27, and 28).

Literature suggests that wealthier Muslims may be more affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism relative to poorer Muslims. If this were the case, then we would expect Muslim women above the poverty line to be more adversely affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics. We find evidence that

the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics affects both poor and wealthy Muslim women, however poorer Muslim women may be affected more. In fundamentalist states, poorer Muslim women's wage employment decreases, while the probability of wage employment increases for Muslim males, non-scheduled caste Hindu males and females (Table 42). Poorer Muslim women's wage employment also decreases slightly in non-fundamentalist states. The probability of Muslim men's engagement in wage employment also decreases, while the probability of being engaged in wage employment for non-scheduled caste Hindu men and women increases from 1983 to 1999.

For wealthier Muslim women, they also experience a decrease in wage employment over time in fundamentalist states, however, unlike poorer Muslim women, they experience an increase in wage employment in non-fundamentalist states (Table 43). Surprisingly, non-scheduled caste Hindu men experience a slight decrease in wage employment in both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, while both Muslim men and non-scheduled caste Hindu women experience an increase in wage employment.

Overall, it appears that poorer Muslim women have been more adversely affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics compared to wealthier Muslims women. Poorer Muslim women experienced declines in wage employment in both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, while wealthier Muslims also experienced a decline in wage employment in fundamentalist states, yet they did not have this experience in non-fundamentalist states. This suggests that both groups, Muslim women above and below the poverty line are influenced by the

rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics, but poorer Muslim women may be affected more.

Conclusion

We find that economic growth and modernization seems to have had some impact on the likelihood of engaging in wage work in India. Over time economic growth and other modernizing factors have modestly increased wage employment and decreased self-employment, slowly changing the structure of the Indian economy. These forces have had a greater impact on fundamentalist states relative to non-fundamentalist states.

Men and women in fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states experience increases in wage employment. However, it appears that men have benefited more from these forces than women in fundamentalist states. Men made greater gains in wage employment compared to women, increasing the gender gap in wage employment in fundamentalist states. In contrast, in non-fundamentalist states, the gender gap in wage employment remained unchanged. While women have made gains in wage employment, it appears that economic and cultural practices remain obstacles for them even as modernization progresses.

Muslims face disadvantage in wage employment compared to Hindus. The rise of Hindu fundamentalism further dampens Muslims disadvantage as illustrated by the experience of Muslims in fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states. In fundamentalist states, Hindus experience a greater increase in wage employment compared to Muslims, increasing the wage work gap. In contrast, the wage employment gap between Hindus and Muslims decreases slightly in non-

fundamentalist states. Moreover, there is evidence that poorer Muslims may be more affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism relative to wealthier Muslims.

As hypothesized, Muslim women experience lower levels of wage employment compared to Muslim men. They experience both gender discrimination and discrimination for being Muslim. Our findings also suggest that identity politics has influenced Muslim women's employment over time. In all states combined, we find Muslim women's employment decreases over time, as other groups experience an increase in wage employment. The different experience of Muslim women in fundamentalist versus non-fundamentalist states provides more evidence that the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics has influenced Muslim women's wage work. Muslim women in fundamentalist states experience a decline in wage employment, while Muslim men, Hindu men, and Hindu women all experience an increase in wage employment over time. In contrast to fundamentalist states, Muslim women in non-fundamentalist states experience an increase in wage employment, just as other groups do. Furthermore, consistent with our finding that poorer Muslims are more affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism compared to wealthier Muslims, it appears that poorer Muslim women's wage employment is more influenced by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics. While both Muslim women below and above the poverty line appear to be affected by these forces, poorer Muslim women appear to be more greatly affected.

Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion: School Enrollment and Wage Employment in the Context of Modernization, Religious Disadvantage and Discrimination, and the Rise of Hindu Fundamentalism and Muslim Identity Politics

Modernization and Secular Changes

Modernizing forces such as the diffusion of western notions of education, economic growth and development, and government efforts to increase the supply of schools has had an important impact on school enrollment in India. School enrollment has increased considerably over time. Specifically, for children ages 12 to 15, the probability of being enrolled in school is 0.54 in 1983 and increases to 0.75 by 1999. Children in non-fundamentalist states have a higher probability of being enrolled in school, however, interestingly, modernizing forces may have a greater influence on enrollment in fundamentalist states. In particular, fundamentalist states experienced greater gains in school enrollment from 1983 to 1999 compared to non-fundamentalist states.

This is surprising because out of the six fundamentalist states, three of them are among the worst performing in terms of education, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan.¹⁷ It is possible that the educational experience of Maharashtra, Gujarat and Delhi, the other three fundamentalist states, are driving the greater gains in enrollment for fundamentalist states. A lower starting level may also lead to greater gains as the other states begin to approach a ceiling in enrollment. It is also possible that poor performing states are more sensitive to increases in the supply of schools and national literacy and educational campaigns. Some non-

fundamentalist states in the south of India, such as Kerala, have had a long history of promoting education, these states may not have been as sensitive to increases in educational investments and educational campaigns in the 1990s as other states, such as Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh or Rajasthan. Furthermore, successful schemes such as mid-day meals,¹⁸ pioneered and universalized in Tamil Nadu, a non-fundamentalist state, in 1982, were adopted by many states in the 1990s (Govinda 2002). Since mid-day meals tend to boost the enrollment of poorer children, perhaps enrollment is more sensitive to these types of schemes in poorer states such as Uttar Pradesh. On the other hand, institutional and infra-structural problems may hinder the progress of these schemes in poorer states.

Modernizing forces also had an influence on wage employment, but to a much lesser extent. Literature suggests that economic growth and development changes the structure of the economy, creating more wage work. Since India has been experiencing economic development and growth over time, particularly in the 1990s, one would expect wage work to increase considerably. However, we only find a modest increase in wage work in all states combined. Individuals in non-fundamentalist states have a higher probability of being employed in wage work compared to individuals in fundamentalist states. However, fundamentalist states experience a slightly greater increase in wage work compared to non-fundamentalist states. It does appear that the structure of the economy has shifted slightly over time

¹⁷ Bihar, defined as a non-fundamentalist state for this dissertation, is also a poor-performing state in terms of education.

¹⁸ Mid-day meals were initially designed as lunch programs, where lunch is served to children at school. However, this varies according to state. Some states have mid-day meal schemes, which do not distribute hot meals at lunch, instead they distribute dry rations monthly or quarterly. Dry ration mid-day meal schemes are likely to boost enrollment, but they do not ensure attendance.

as individuals primarily move out of self-employment to wage work. However, there may have been a series of factors that dampened employment growth as GNP increased in the 1990s.

Some attribute the dampening of employment growth during the 1980s and 1990s to a rigid labor market, arguing that an inflexible labor market increases costs for businesses and impedes investment and growth (Sharma 2006). While some labor market rigidities exist, there is evidence that the labor market has become more flexible as the organized sector declines and firms hire temporary workers (Sharma 2006). Others argue that increases in wages due to inflation and labor market pressures dampened employment in the 1980s and 1990s (Ahluwalia 1992 cited in Sharma 2006, ILO-ARTEP 1993 cited in Sharma 2006, Sundaram and Tendulkar 2002 cited in Sharma 2006), causing businesses to start making adjustments and investments in capital rather than labor (Ghose 1994 cited in Sharma 2006). Additionally, India adopted liberalization policies in the 1990s likely also influencing the labor market. Therefore, wages, labor market flexibility, investments in capital, and liberalization policies may have adversely affected the labor market, hindering wage employment growth.

Overall, it appears that enrollment is more positively affected by modernizing factors compared to wage employment. While both school enrollment and wage employment increased from 1983 to 1999, the increase in school enrollment has been much more dramatic, while the increase in wage employment has been quite modest. There are a myriad of factors that have affected enrollment and employment over time, however, the differential role of the government in education and the labor

market during this period may have had an impact of the dissimilar trends in enrollment and employment. The Indian government was directly involved in shaping education by making important efforts to increase school enrollment through increased supply of schools, educational and literacy campaigns, and educational schemes such as mid-day meals. In contrast, the labor market, as was the rest of the economy, was subject to less governmental guidance and control as India was forced to adopt liberalization policies. While these policies may have outcomes widely valued by many, such as GNP growth, these policies take away the power for the government to help shape employment outcomes during immense economic change. In addition, school enrollment does not appear to be as sensitive to economic restructuring as the labor market. Therefore, the role of the government and the process of liberalization may have differentially affected school enrollment and wage employment from 1983 to 1999.

Modernizing forces also influence gender differences in enrollment and wage employment. While cultural and economic obstacles continue to dampen girls' enrollment, significant progress has been made as evidenced by the decreasing gender difference in school enrollment over time. Girls' school enrollment is sensitive to access to schools, therefore the increased supply in schools has had an important impact on girls schooling over time. Also, modernizing forces change ideologies about gender, breaking down some of the cultural and economic barriers of education for girls.

Both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states experience decreases in the gender gap in enrollment for children ages 12 to 15, however, the gap remains larger

in fundamentalist states. While the gap is larger in fundamentalist states, they did experience a slightly greater decline in the gender gap in enrollment compared to the decline non-fundamentalist states experienced. However, the gap remains larger in fundamentalist states because many of the fundamentalist states, such as Uttar Pradesh, and Rajasthan have more cultural and economic obstacles for girls' education. While many of the non-fundamentalist states such as Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Himachal Pradesh have less gender inequality in many realms.

Modernizing forces do increase women's employment over time; however, these factors do not decrease the gender gap in wage employment. In fundamentalist states, both men and women experience an increase in wage employment over time, however, men experience more gains in wage employment relative to women, increasing the gender gap in wage employment. In non-fundamentalist states, men and women experience a similar increase in wage employment over time; therefore, gender differentials in wage employment remain the same over time.

Several factors could be contributing to the slight increase in women's employment over time. Modernization could break down ideologies about gender roles, breaking down barriers to women's employment. However, even if modernizing forces break down obstacles for women's employment, it appears that modernizing forces benefit men more than women, increasing the gender gap in wage employment. Literature suggests that liberalization or structural adjustment policies have adverse effects on women's employment. It may be that these policies dampened women's employment relative to men's, increasing the gender gap in wage employment. Goldin (1995), in discussing the U shaped female labor force function

to illustrate the relationship between development and female labor force participation, argues that once a sufficient number of women complete secondary schooling and the availability of white-collar employment increases, then married women's engagement in wage employment increases. In other words, once a particular threshold has been reached for girls' secondary schooling and white-collar employment expansion, then female labor force participation will begin to follow the rising portion of the U. While secondary schooling for girls and white-collar jobs have been increasing it does not appear that sufficient gains have been made to significantly boost wage employment for women.

It appears that modernizing forces differentially impact the gender gap in school enrollment and wage employment. The gender gap in enrollment declined in all states combined, fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states. In contrast, the gender gap in wage employment increased in fundamentalist states and persisted in non-fundamentalist states. This indicates that modernizing forces are more effective at breaking down barriers to girls' schooling compared to barriers women face in the labor market. This may be because efforts to increase the supply of schools have an important impact on girls schooling, that is, households are more willing to send their daughters to school if it is close. Additionally, many efforts have been made by the government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to promote girls schooling. While efforts have been made by NGOs and women's organizations to promote women's employment, it appears these forces have not been as successful in this arena as efforts to promote education. Perhaps ideologies about women and men's roles as they relate to the labor market are more difficult to break down. These

ideologies have a strong effect on both households and employers. Moreover, an important difference between the enrollment experience of girls and women's wage employment experience is that the supply of schools increased, while the employment growth rate declined.

Religious Discrimination and Disadvantage

Muslims face discrimination and disadvantage in both school enrollment and wage employment. Muslims in India have lower levels of enrollment compared to non-scheduled caste Hindus, reflecting past and present discrimination. Muslims are even worse off in fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states, experiencing a larger religious gap in school enrollment in fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states. In all states combined, fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states, there is an increase in the religious gap in educational enrollment from 1983 to 1999. For the years 1993 and 1999, the religious difference in education is not significantly different from 1983, demonstrating that the school enrollment gap between Muslims and non-scheduled caste Hindus has persisted over time. This religious gap in enrollment has persisted despite major advances in enrollment due to modernizing forces, further highlighting the extent of the discrimination and disadvantage Muslims experience.

The comparison of the enrollment experience of girls' and Muslims in India over time sheds further light on the strength of Hindu fundamentalism in shaping Muslims' lives. Modernization theory posits that as development proceeds, ascriptive qualities such as gender, race, and ethnicity will diminish in importance and individual achievements will become more important. We see that indeed,

modernizing forces had a significant influence on the gender gap in enrollment over time despite cultural and economic factors that hinder girls' educational outcomes. However, there is no corresponding effect in the ascriptive characteristic of being Muslim. Rather, the religious gap in enrollment persists over time.

Muslims are slightly less likely than non-scheduled caste Hindus to be engaged in wage employment. In fundamentalist states, non-scheduled caste Hindus made greater gains in wage employment, increasing the religious gap in wage employment over time. In contrast, in non-fundamentalist states, there is a slight decline the religious gap in wage employment.

The religious gap in school enrollments is much larger than the gap in wage employment. However, this does not necessarily mean that Muslims fair better in the labor market. Being unemployed or out of the labor force is higher for Muslims. Muslims who are a part of the labor force experience discrimination. Muslims are less likely to be in the private and public organized sectors; instead, they tend to be in the informal unprotected market (Government of India 2006). Therefore, seemingly similar wage employment predicted probabilities for Muslims and non-scheduled caste Hindus mask many of the inequalities that exist in the labor market.

Gender and Religious Discrimination and Disadvantage

Muslim women face discrimination and disadvantage in education and employment. Similar to Hindu women relative to Hindu men, Muslim women are less likely to be enrolled in school and to be engaged in wage employment compared to Muslim men. Muslim women also face religious discrimination for being Muslim, therefore compared to non-scheduled caste Hindu men and women and Muslim men,

Muslim women are the least likely out of the four groups to be enrolled in school or to be engaged in wage employment.

The Rise of Hindu Fundamentalism and Muslim Identity Politics

Muslim women not only face a double disadvantage for their gender and religion, but we also find evidence of the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics adversely affecting Muslim women. Muslim women residing in fundamentalist states appear to be negatively affected by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics. As discussed above, our results suggest that all Muslims face considerable discrimination and disadvantage in all states, both fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist, but Muslims face even more discrimination in fundamentalist states. This has a corresponding influence on Muslim women in fundamentalist states, where the complex relationship between Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics further dampens their enrollment and decreases wage employment.

As mentioned previously in relation to all Muslims, modernizing forces have a greater influence on children's enrollment in fundamentalist states compared to non-fundamentalist states. Furthermore, modernizing forces have a greater impact on the gender differences in school enrollment in fundamentalist states. Despite the important role modernization has played in increasing school enrollment and reducing gender differences in enrollment in fundamentalist states, it appears that Muslim girls do not benefit from these forces as much as Hindu men and women and Muslim men. In contrast to fundamentalist states, Muslim women in non-fundamentalist states do make considerable gains in enrollment relative to other groups. Therefore, the

experience of Muslim girls in fundamentalist states compared to other groups and the comparison between Muslim girls in fundamentalist states and non-fundamentalist states suggests that Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics play an important role in Muslim girls' enrollment in fundamentalist states.

Evidence suggests that in the face of communal tensions, fearing for the safety of their daughters, Muslim households are reluctant to send their daughters to school, particularly middle schools that are further away from home (Government of India 2006). This could be a contributing factor to Muslim girls' dampened enrollment growth in fundamentalist states. Additionally, in the face of Hindu fundamentalism, the Muslim community may use women as symbols and repositories for community and tradition.

As discussed in Chapter 2, often in religious identity political movements, education is valued in so far as it makes girls good wives and aids in their domestic abilities. This may dampen Muslim girls' enrollment, if it is viewed that girls do not need to attend middle school to obtain the necessary domestic skills. Additionally, communal tensions may result in Muslims households sending their daughters to Madrasas. They may feel that Madrasa education would help preserve Muslim heritage and tradition, which can be passed on to future generations. Due to differences in language and curriculum, it is often difficult to transition to a government or non-Islamic private school, thus potentially dampening girls' secondary school enrollment.

There is also evidence that Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics has influenced Muslim women's wage employment. Similar to school

enrollment, the experience of Muslim women in fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist states illustrates that Muslim women's lives are affected by communal tensions. Muslim women in fundamentalist states experience a decline in wage employment over time. While the decline is small, it is still important in lieu of the experiences of Muslim men, and Hindu men and women in fundamentalist states. All three groups experience an increase in wage employment over time. Further weight is added to this observation once we take into consideration the experience of Muslim women in non-fundamentalist states. In contrast to their experience in fundamentalist states, Muslim women experience an increase in wage employment, as do Muslim men and non-scheduled caste Hindu men and women. These two different experiences point to the influence of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics affecting Muslim women's wage employment.

A hostile communal environment and fear of harassment may cause Muslim women to withdraw from the labor force. Discrimination against Muslim women may also intensify as communal tensions worsen. Muslim women may come to represent the community, which often involves calls for women to return to the domestic sphere and be good wives and mothers. This representation is at odds with employment, which takes mothers and wives away from their domestic duties, their children, and their husbands.

As expected, it appears that wage employment is more affected by Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics compared to school enrollment. Muslim women's wage employment actually declines in fundamentalist states, whereas Muslim girls' enrollment has increased in fundamentalist states, but remains

dampened compared to other groups. While both enrollment and wage employment are in opposition to women's domestic roles, enrollment is still viewed as being important for women to be good mothers, contributing to the greater influence that Hindu Fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics have on Muslim women's wage employment compared to school enrollment.

In sum, modernizing forces had a more profound affect on enrollment compared to wage employment. Not only have modernizing forces increased overall enrollment, but they have also decreased the gender gap in school enrollment. In contrast, modernizing forces have only modestly increased wage employment and the gender gap has increased in fundamentalist states and persisted in non-fundamentalist states.

Muslims face discrimination in the educational system and the labor market. The religious gap in enrollment persists even though modernizing forces have clearly benefited other disadvantaged groups such as girls. This persistence of the religious gap in school enrollment, when there were crucial gains made in school enrollment via increases in access to schools and educational campaigns indicates that the rise of Hindu Fundamentalism has had an adverse affect on Muslim school enrollment.

Muslims do not appear to fair as badly in wage employment relative to school enrollment, particularly in non-fundamentalist states, where the religious gap in wage employment decreases slightly over time. In contrast to non-fundamentalist states, the religious gap in wage employment increases in fundamentalist states.

Muslim women have the lowest levels of school enrollment and wage employment compared to Muslim men and Non-scheduled caste Hindu men and

women. The rise of Hindu fundamentalism and Muslim identity politics further disadvantage Muslim women in school enrollment and wage employment.

The findings of this dissertation indicate that communal tensions have been detrimental to Muslims. While both Muslim men and women face discrimination and disadvantage in school enrollment and wage employment and their experiences in these arenas have worsened due to the rise of Hindu fundamentalism, Muslim women are more adversely affected by these tensions.

It is important that more efforts are made to reveal and understand the true plight of Muslims in India instead of relying on rhetoric based on communalism. Recent efforts by scholars and the government are important steps toward understanding the Muslim experience in India, however more concerted efforts are necessary. The discrimination and disadvantage that Muslims face in India is increasingly documented. It is now time for greater efforts to combat rampant discrimination against Muslims. Furthermore, it is apparent that special efforts are needed to focus on Muslim women.

These findings are not only relevant to current debates in India, but also to the experience of Muslims in western countries. Historical discrimination against Muslims in many western countries and now global events such as the “War on Terror” have intensified negative rhetoric and discrimination against Muslims in Western countries, threatening to further isolate Muslim communities. The debates about veiling in England and France, riots in France set off by two boys being chased to their death by police were the product of discontent from discrimination and marginalization, the unusual intolerant rhetoric from the Netherlands after Theo Van

Gogh was stabbed by a Muslim, rhetoric utilized in immigration and the war on terror debates, increasingly threaten Muslim communities in Western countries. Like in India, this increased intolerance and racism towards Muslims, will have adverse consequences for Muslims and may particularly affect Muslim women.

Table 1 Urban Rural Incidence of Poverty by Social Group

	Urban	Rural
Total	22.8	22.7
Hindu		
All	20.4	22.6
Scheduled Castes and Tribes	36.4	34.8
Other Backward Castes	25.1	19.5
Upper Caste Hindus	8.3	9.0
Muslims	38.4	26.9
Other Minorities	12.2	14.3

Source: Government of India 2006.

Table 2 Means and Standard Deviations of Independent and Control Variables for Enrollment Analysis

Variable	Mean	Standard		
		Deviation	Min	Max
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.272	0.445	0	1
Historical Period 50 (1993)	0.220	0.414	0	1
Historical Period 55 (1999)	0.244	0.430	0	1
Male	0.536	0.499	0	1
Male*Historical Period 43	0.147	0.354	0	1
Male*Historical Period 50	0.149	0.356	0	1
Male*Historical Period 55	0.111	0.314	0	1
Muslim	0.147	0.355	0	1
Scheduled Caste	0.119	0.324	0	1
Scheduled Tribe	0.129	0.335	0	1
Muslim*Male	0.041	0.197	0	1
Scheduled Caste*Male	0.028	0.166	0	1
Scheduled Tribe*Male	0.038	0.191	0	1
Muslim*Period 43	0.038	0.190	0	1
Muslim*Period 50	0.033	0.178	0	1
Muslim*Period 55	0.040	0.195	0	1
Scheduled Caste*Period 43	0.030	0.169	0	1
Scheduled Caste*Period 50	0.024	0.153	0	1
Scheduled Caste*Period 55	0.031	0.173	0	1
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43	0.078	0.267	0	1
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50	0.082	0.274	0	1
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55	0.059	0.236	0	1
Muslim*Male*Period 43	0.022	0.146	0	1
Muslim*Male*Period 50	0.015	0.121	0	1
Muslim*Male*Period 55	0.020	0.140	0	1
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43	0.021	0.144	0	1
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50	0.018	0.133	0	1
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55	0.021	0.144	0	1
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43	0.016	0.125	0	1
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50	0.013	0.113	0	1
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55	0.016	0.126	0	1
Age	13.383	1.172	12	15
Age Squared	180.471	31.562	144	225
Urban	0.345	0.475	0	1
Household Size	6.605	2.348	1	12
Log Monthly Expenditure	6.078	0.699	0	9.2
Andra Pradesh	0.061	0.240	0	1
Assam	0.041	0.198	0	1
Bihar	0.087	0.282	0	1

Continued on next page

Table 2 Means and Standard Deviations of Independent and Control Variables for Enrollment Analysis

	Standard			
	Mean	Deviation	Min	Max
Jammu and Kashmir	0.033	0.180	0	1
Madhya Pradesh	0.078	0.269	0	1
Maharashtra	0.078	0.268	0	1
Orissa	0.038	0.190	0	1
Rajasthan	0.049	0.217	0	1
West Bengal	0.067	0.250	0	1
New Delhi	0.008	0.089	0	1
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	0.063	0.243	0	1
Kerele/Lakshadweep	0.034	0.182	0	1
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	0.045	0.208	0	1
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	0.062	0.242	0	1
Northeast	0.067	0.249	0	1
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	0.048	0.214	0	1

Source: National Sample Survey Organization 1983-1999, author's tabulations.

Table 3 Means and Standard Deviations of Independent and Control Variables for Employment Analysis

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.3	0.4	0	1
Historical Period 50 (1993)	0.2	0.4	0	1
Historical Period 55 (1999)	0.3	0.4	0	1
Male	0.5	0.5	0	1
Male*Historical Period 43	0.1	0.3	0	1
Male*Historical Period 50	0.1	0.4	0	1
Male*Historical Period 55	0.1	0.3	0	1
Muslim	0.1	0.3	0	1
Scheduled Caste	0.1	0.3	0	1
Scheduled Tribe	0.1	0.3	0	1
Muslim*Male	0.0	0.2	0	1
Scheduled Caste*Male	0.0	0.2	0	1
Scheduled Tribe*Male	0.0	0.2	0	1
Muslim*Period 43	0.0	0.2	0	1
Muslim*Period 50	0.0	0.2	0	1
Muslim*Period 55	0.0	0.2	0	1
Scheduled Caste*Period 43	0.0	0.2	0	1
Scheduled Caste*Period 50	0.0	0.2	0	1
Scheduled Caste*Period 55	0.0	0.2	0	1
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43	0.1	0.2	0	1
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50	0.1	0.3	0	1
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55	0.1	0.2	0	1
Muslim*Male*Period 43	0.0	0.1	0	1
Muslim*Male*Period 50	0.0	0.1	0	1
Muslim*Male*Period 55	0.0	0.1	0	1
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43	0.0	0.1	0	1
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50	0.0	0.1	0	1
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55	0.0	0.1	0	1
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43	0.0	0.1	0	1
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50	0.0	0.1	0	1
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55	0.0	0.1	0	1
Age	37.4	8.9	25	55
Age Squared	1478.8	696.2	625	3025
Urban	0.4	0.5	0	1
Household Size	5.9	2.6	1	12
Primary School	0.2	0.4	0	1
Middle School	0.2	0.4	0	1
College	0.1	0.2	0	1
Never Married	0.1	0.2	0	1
Widow/Divorced/Separated	0.1	0.2	0	1
Number of Kids in Household	2.2	1.7	0	6
Andra Pradesh	0.1	0.3	0	1
Assam	0.0	0.2	0	1
Bihar	0.1	0.3	0	1

Continued on next page

Table 3 Means and Standard Deviations of Independent and Control Variables for Employment Analysis Continued

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Jammu and Kashmir	0.0	0.2	0	1
Madhya Pradesh	0.1	0.3	0	1
Maharashtra	0.1	0.3	0	1
Orissa	0.0	0.2	0	1
Rajasthan	0.0	0.2	0	1
West Bengal	0.1	0.3	0	1
New Delhi	0.0	0.1	0	1
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	0.1	0.3	0	1
Kerele/Lakshadweep	0.0	0.2	0	1
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	0.0	0.2	0	1
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	0.1	0.2	0	1
Northeast	0.1	0.3	0	1
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	0.1	0.2	0	1

Source: National Sample Survey Organization 1983-1999, author's tabulations.

Table 4 Unweighted Frequencies and Weighted Percentages of Children 12 to 15 Enrolled in School by Gender and Religion

	Unweighted Frequency	Weighted Percentage
Total Sample	215,970	
Round 38 (1983)	56,948	
Round 43 (1987)	58,741	
Round 50 (1993)	47,565	
Round 55 (1999)	52,716	
<i>Total Enrollment</i>		
All Rounds	137,001	58.2
Round 38 (1983)	29,798	47.2
Round 43 (1987)	35,217	52.6
Round 50 (1993)	33,355	62.7
Round 55 (1999)	38,631	67.0
<i>Male Enrollment</i>		
All Rounds	82,239	66.8
Round 38 (1983)	19,010	58.7
Round 43 (1987)	21,850	62.7
Round 50 (1993)	19,699	70.9
Round 55 (1999)	21,680	72.9
<i>Hindu Male Enrollment</i>		
All Rounds	52,670	72.9
Round 38 (1983)	12,557	64.8
Round 43 (1987)	14,265	69.4
Round 50 (1993)	12,944	77.2
Round 55 (1999)	12,904	79.1
<i>Muslim Male Enrollment</i>		
All Rounds	10,320	57.2
Round 38 (1983)	2,393	48.8
Round 43 (1987)	2,805	52.4
Round 50 (1993)	2,124	61.8
Round 55 (1999)	2,998	63.2
<i>Female Enrollment</i>		
All Rounds	54,762	48.0
Round 38 (1983)	10,788	33.5
Round 43 (1987)	13,367	40.5
Round 50 (1993)	13,656	52.8
Round 55 (1999)	16,951	60.4
<i>Hindu Female Enrollment</i>		
All Rounds	36,124	54.3
Round 38 (1983)	7,550	39.2
Round 43 (1987)	9,147	47.4
Round 50 (1993)	9,175	60.0
Round 55 (1999)	10,252	67.5

Continued on next page

Table 4 Unweighted Frequencies and Weighted Percentages of Children 12 to 15 Enrolled in School by Gender and Religion

	Unweighted Frequency	Weighted Percentage
<i>Muslim Female Enrollment</i>		
All Rounds	6,916	42.4
Round 38 (1983)	1,332	29.2
Round 43 (1987)	1,648	33.2
Round 50 (1993)	1,549	46.8
Round 55 (1999)	2,387	53.7

Source: National Sample Survey Organization 1983-1999, author's tabulations.

Table 5 Unweighted Frequencies and Weighted Percentages of Enrollment by State

State	Unweighted Frequency	Weighted Percentage
A & N Islands	1,156	84.6
Andhra Pradesh	6,771	45.2
Arunachal Pradesh	705	62.2
Assam	6,558	73.4
Bihar	10,152	49.1
Chandigarh	342	82.6
Dadra & Nagar Havel	255	50.1
Daman & Diu	177	81.1
Delhi	1,410	81.9
Goa	452	82.2
Gujarat	5,966	61.5
Haryana	2,639	66.4
Himachal Pradesh	3,535	79.1
Jammu & Kashmir	4,510	65.5
Karnataka	5,583	54.9
Kerala	5,834	85.9
Lakshdweep	564	90.3
Madhya Pradesh	9,834	55.3
Maharashtra	12,147	71.0
Manipur	2,899	88.0
Meghalaya	1,796	71.5
Mizoram	2,285	90.5
Nagaland	830	89.2
Orissa	4,453	51.1
Pondicherry	564	76.5
Punjab	3,069	61.9
Rajasthan	5,715	51.0
Sikkim	1,095	85.7
Tamil Nadu	6,958	59.7
Tripura	2,327	80.9
Uttar Pradesh	17,108	54.1
West Bengal	9,312	61.0

Source: National Sample Survey Organization 1983-1999, author's tabulations.

Table 6 Unweighted Frequencies and Weighted Percentages of Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force by Gender, Religion, and Round

	Wage Employment		Self-Employed		Unemployed/Not in LF		Total	
	Unweighted Frequency	Weighted Percentage	Unweighted Frequency	Weighted Percentage	Unweighted Frequency	Weighted Percentage	Total Unweighted Frequency	Total Weighted Percentage
<i>Employment</i>								
All Rounds	259,274	33.57	292,611	34.48	286,924	31.95	838,809	100
Round 38	63,197	32.68	71,829	36.13	66,028	31.2	201,054	100
Round 43	66,769	32.88	81,189	35.5	75,688	31.61	223,646	100
Round 50	62,211	33.74	67,017	33.51	69,161	32.74	198,389	100
Round 55	67,097	34.52	72,576	33.44	76,047	32.04	215,720	100
<i>Male Employment</i>								
All Rounds	196,794	47.85	216,515	49.43	13,494	2.72	426,803	100
Round 38	47,326	46.17	52,697	51.3	2,676	2.54	102,699	100
Round 43	51,159	47.41	58,775	49.49	3,971	3.1	113,905	100
Round 50	47,565	48.58	50,395	49.02	2,894	2.4	100,854	100
Round 55	50,744	48.69	54,648	48.47	3,953	2.84	109,345	100
<i>Hindu Male Employment</i>								
All Rounds	113,541	42.59	140,345	54.5	8,742	2.9	262,628	100
Round 38	27,288	41.35	33,529	41.35	1,735	2.58	62,552	100
Round 43	29,763	42.69	37,593	53.97	2,581	3.34	69,937	100
Round 50	28,052	43.42	34,017	53.95	1,984	2.63	64,053	100
Round 55	28,438	42.69	35,206	54.27	2,442	3.04	66,086	100
<i>Muslim Male Employment</i>								
All Rounds	21,086	43.27	29,088	53.74	1,649	3	51,823	100
Round 38	5,421	43.14	7,537	54.05	360	2.81	13,318	100
Round 43	5,788	43.02	8,260	54.1	461	2.88	14,509	100
Round 50	4,416	42.43	5,848	54.89	315	2.69	10,579	100
Round 55	5,461	44.2	7,443	52.33	513	3.47	13,417	100

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Table 6 Unweighted Frequencies and Weighted Percentages of Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force by Gender, Religion, and Round Continued

	Wage Employment		Self-Employed		Unemployed/Not in LF		Total	
	Unweighted Frequency	Weighted Percentage	Unweighted Frequency	Weighted Percentage	Unweighted Frequency	Weighted Percentage	Total Unweighted Frequency	Total Weighted Percentage
<i>Female Employment</i>								
All Rounds	62,480	18.98	76,096	19.21	273,430	61.81	412,006	100
Round 38	15,871	18.79	19,132	20.52	63,352	60.7	98,355	100
Round 43	15,610	17.97	22,414	21.14	71,717	60.88	109,741	100
Round 50	14,646	18.54	16,622	17.63	66,267	63.82	97,535	100
Round 55	16,353	20.19	17,928	18.25	72,094	61.56	106,375	100
<i>Hindu Female Employment</i>								
All Rounds	32,421	15.2	46,904	20.79	173,790	64.01	253,115	100
Round 38	8,007	14.74	11,975	22.05	39,824	63.21	59,806	100
Round 43	8,319	14.76	13,710	22.59	45,539	62.65	67,568	100
Round 50	7,821	14.98	10,476	19.37	43,308	65.65	61,605	100
Round 55	8,274	16.06	10,743	19.76	45,119	64.18	64,136	100
<i>Muslim Female Employment</i>								
All Rounds	3,526	8.73	4,536	10.26	42,737	81	50,799	100
Round 38	988	9.65	1,061	10.1	10,907	80.25	12,956	100
Round 43	933	8.98	1,356	11.07	11,799	79.95	14,088	100
Round 50	757	8.35	917	9.41	8,854	82.24	10,528	100
Round 55	848	8.25	1,202	10.46	11,177	81.29	13,227	100

Source: National Sample Survey Organization 1983-1999, author's tabulations.

Table 7 Unweighted Frequencies and Weighted Percentages of Wage Employment by State

State	Unweighted Frequency	Weighted Percentage
Andhra Pradesh	22,788	43.1
A & N Islands	2,342	40.3
Arunachal Pradesh	949	27.9
Assam	8,689	26.8
Bihar	20,287	30.1
Chandigarh	957	51.5
Dadra & Nagar Havel	945	43.5
Daman & Diu	361	42.1
Delhi	3,047	38.7
Goa	892	39.3
Gujarat	12,755	37.5
Haryana	2,927	26.1
Himachal Pradesh	3,390	20.1
Jammu & Kashmir	5,241	20.5
Karnataka	14,192	39.0
Kerala	10,252	40.4
Lakshdweep	751	38.3
Madhya Pradesh	20,284	34.5
Maharashtra	27,903	44.3
Manipur	2,148	17.0
Meghalaya	2,796	24.8
Mizoram	2,341	18.7
Nagaland	1,094	31.1
Orissa	10,156	34.7
Pondicherry	1,312	47.2
Punjab	6,027	35.6
Rajasthan	7,907	22.2
Sikkim	1,464	27.1
Tamil Nadu	22,547	47.0
Tripura	3,651	30.2
Uttar Pradesh	19,922	20.4
West Bengal	18,957	32.1

Source: National Sample Survey Organization 1983-1999, author's tabulations.

Table 8 Lok Sabha Election Results, Total Seats, Number of Elected Hindu Nationalist Seats, and Percent of Elected Hindu Nationalist Seats by State and Election Year

	1991			1998			1999		
	Total Seats	Hindu Nationalist Seat	Percent Hindu Nationalist Seat	Total Seats	Hindu Nationalist Seat	Percent Hindu Nationalist Seat	Total Seats	Hindu Nationalist Seat	Percent Hindu Nationalist Seat
Andhra Pradesh	42	1	2.4	42	4	9.5	42	7	16.7
Arunachal Pradesh	2	0	0.0	2	0	0.0	2	0	0.0
Assam	14	2	14.3	14	1	7.1	14	2	14.3
Bihar	52	5	9.6	54	20	37.0	54	23	42.6
Goa	2	0	0.0	2	0	0.0	2	2	100.0
Gujarat	26	20	76.9	26	19	73.1	26	20	76.9
Haryana	10	0	0.0	10	1	10.0	10	5	50.0
Himachal Pradesh	4	2	50.0	4	3	75.0	4	3	75.0
Jammu and Kashmir	Not Available			6	2	33.3	6	2	33.3
Karnataka	28	4	14.3	28	13	46.4	28	7	25.0
Kerala	20	0	0.0	20	0	0.0	20	0	0.0
Madhya Pradesh	40	12	30.0	40	30	75.0	40	29	72.5
Maharashtra	48	9	18.8	48	10	20.8	48	28	58.3
Manipur	2	0	0.0	2	0	0.0	2	0	0.0
Meghalaya	2	0	0.0	2	0	0.0	2	0	0.0
Mizoram	1	0	0.0	1	0	0.0	1	0	0.0
Nagaland	1	0	0.0	1	0	0.0	1	0	0.0
Orissa	21	0	0.0	21	7	33.3	21	9	42.9
Punjab	13	0	0.0	13	3	23.1	13	1	7.7
Rajasthan	25	12	48.0	25	5	20.0	25	16	64.0
Sikkim	1	0	0.0	1	0	0.0	1	0	0.0
Tamil Nadu	39	0	0.0	39	3	7.7	39	4	10.3
Tripura	2	0	0.0	2	0	0.0	2	0	0.0

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Table 8 Lok Sabha Election Results, Total Seats, Number of Elected Hindu Nationalist Seats, and Percent of Elected Hindu Nationalist Seats by State and Election Year Continued

	1991			1998			1999		
	Total Seats	Hindu Nationalist Seat	Percent Hindu Nationalist Seat	Total Seats	Hindu Nationalist Seat	Percent Hindu Nationalist Seat	Total Seats	Hindu Nationalist Seat	Percent Hindu Nationalist Seat
Uttar Pradesh	84	51	60.7	85	57	67.1	85	29	34.1
West Bengal	42	0	0.0	42	1	2.4	42	2	4.8
Andaman & Nicobar	1	0	0.0	1	0	0.0	1	1	100.0
Chandigarh	1	0	0.0	1	1	100.0	1	0	0.0
Dadra and Nagar Haveli	1	0	0.0	1	1	100.0	1	0	0.0
Daman and Dui	1	1	100.0	1	1	100.0	1	0	0.0
Delhi	7	5	71.4	7	6	85.7	7	7	100.0
Lakshadweep	1	0	0.0	1	0	0.0	1	0	0.0
Pondicherry	1	0	0.0	1	0	0.0	1	0	0.0

Source: Election Commission of India, <http://www.eci.gov.in/database/database.asp>, author's tabulations.

Table 9 Number of Riots from 1983 to 1995 by State

State	Frequency	Percent
Andhra Pradesh	29	4.32
Assam	10	1.49
Bihar	38	5.66
Gujarat	192	28.61
Haryana	2	0.3
Jammu & Kashmir	24	3.58
Karnataka	62	9.24
Kerala	8	1.19
Madhya Pradesh	18	2.68
Maharashtra	114	16.99
Manipur	1	0.15
Orissa	6	0.89
Rajasthan	19	2.83
Tamil Nadu	13	1.94
Uttar Pradesh	95	14.16
West Bengal	20	2.98
Delhi	20	2.98
Total	671	100

Source: Varshney-Wilkinson Dataset on Hindu-Muslim Violence in India, 1950-1995, author's tabulations.

Table 10 Literacy, Employment, Monthly Per Capita Expenditure, Proportion of Muslims, and Child Sex Ratios by State

State	Literacy			Workers			Monthly Per Capita Expenditure of Households 1999		Proportion of Muslim Population	Child Sex Ratio	
	Total	Male	Female	Cultivators	Agriculture Laborers	Household Industry	Other Worker	Rural			Urban
India	64.8	75.3	53.7	31.7	26.5	4.2	37.6	502	860	13.4	927
Andaman & Nicobar Islands	81.3	86.3	75.2	15.8	3.8	5.2	75.3	737	1121	8.2	957
Andhra Pradesh	60.5	70.3	50.4	22.5	39.6	4.7	33.1	464	791	9.2	961
Arunachal Pradesh	54.3	63.8	43.5	57.8	3.9	1.3	37.0	788	871	1.9	964
Assam	63.3	71.3	54.6	39.1	13.2	3.6	44.0	460	842	30.9	965
Bihar	47.0	59.7	33.1	29.3	48.0	3.9	18.8	414	599	16.5	942
Chandigarh	81.9	86.1	76.5	0.6	0.2	1.1	98.1	1040	1398	3.9	845
Chhattisgarh	64.7	77.4	51.9	44.5	31.9	2.1	21.5	418	717	2.0	975
Dadra & Nagar Haveli	57.6	71.2	40.2	34.6	12.9	0.7	51.8	646	1336	3.0	979
Daman & Diu	78.2	86.8	65.6	5.5	1.8	1.6	91.0	969	1010	7.8	926
Delhi	81.7	87.3	74.7	0.8	0.3	3.1	95.7	1110	1474	11.7	868
Goa	82.0	88.4	75.4	9.6	6.8	2.8	80.7	976	1198	6.8	938
Gujarat	69.1	79.7	57.8	27.3	24.3	2.0	46.4	560	928	9.1	883
Haryana	67.9	78.5	55.7	36.0	15.3	2.6	46.1	739	927	5.8	819
Himachal Pradesh	76.5	85.3	67.4	65.3	3.1	1.8	29.8	702	1221	2.0	896
Jammu & Kashmir	55.5	66.6	43.0	42.4	6.6	6.2	44.8	732	1073	67.0	941
Jharkhand	53.6	67.3	38.9	38.5	28.2	4.3	29.1	460	599	13.8	965
Karnataka	66.6	76.1	56.9	29.2	26.5	4.1	40.2	530	918	12.2	946
Kerala	90.9	94.2	87.7	7.0	15.8	3.6	73.6	793	937	24.7	960
Lakshadweep	86.7	92.5	80.5	0.0	0.0	5.9	94.1	-	-	95.0	959
Madhya Pradesh	63.7	76.1	50.3	42.8	28.7	4.0	24.5	418	717	6.4	932

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Table 10 Literacy, Employment, Monthly Per Capita Expenditure, Proportion of Muslims, and Child Sex Ratios by State Continued

State	Literacy			Workers			Other Worker	Monthly Per Capita Expenditure of Households 1999		Proportion of Muslim Population	Child Sex Ratio
	Total	Male	Female	Cultivators	Agricultural Laborers	Household Industry		Rural	Urban		
Maharashtra	76.9	86.0	67.0	28.7	26.3	2.6	42.4	487	974	10.6	913
Manipur	70.5	80.3	60.5	40.2	12.0	10.3	37.6	572	687	8.8	957
Meghalaya	62.6	65.4	59.6	48.1	17.7	2.2	32.0	603	989	4.3	973
Mizoram	88.8	90.7	86.7	54.9	5.7	1.5	37.9	915	1041	1.1	964
Nagaland	66.6	71.2	61.5	64.7	3.6	2.6	29.0	1071	1328	1.8	964
Orissa	63.1	75.3	50.5	29.8	35.0	4.9	30.3	374	628	2.1	953
Pondicherry	81.2	88.6	73.9	3.2	21.1	1.8	73.9	598	812	6.1	967
Punjab	69.7	75.2	63.4	22.6	16.3	3.7	57.4	776	921	1.6	798
Rajasthan	60.4	75.7	43.9	55.3	10.6	2.9	31.2	551	809	8.5	909
Sikkim	68.8	76.0	60.4	49.9	6.5	1.6	42.0	548	886	1.4	963
Tamil Nadu	73.5	82.4	64.4	18.4	31.0	5.4	45.3	522	886	5.6	942
Tripura	73.2	81.0	64.9	27.0	23.8	3.0	46.1	547	912	8.0	966
Uttar Pradesh	56.3	68.8	42.2	41.1	24.8	5.6	28.5	483	714	18.5	916
Uttaranchal	71.6	83.3	59.6	50.1	8.3	2.3	39.3	483	714	11.9	908
West Bengal	68.6	77.0	59.6	19.2	25.0	7.4	48.5	469	854	25.2	960
Mean											
Fundamentalist States	66.9	78.4	54.2	36.1	18.7	2.8	42.4	572.9	931.4	9.1	920.3
Non-Fundamentalist States	70.5	78.3	61.9	29.9	15.8	3.7	50.6	646.1	901.9	14.3	938.0

Source: Indian Census 2001 and National Sample Survey Organization 1999.

Table 11 Official Planning Commission Urban and Rural Poverty Lines by Year and State

	1983		1987		1993		1999	
	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
All India	89.5	115.65	115.2	162.16	205.84	281.35	327.56	454.11
Andhra Pradesh	72.66	106.43	108.29	151.88	163.02	278.14	262.94	457.4
Assam	98.32	97.51	122.92	126.6	232.05	212.42	365.43	343.99
Bihar	97.48	111.8	120.5	150.25	212.16	238.49	333.07	379.78
Gujarat	83.29	123.22	127.3	173.18	202.11	297.22	318.94	474.41
Haryana	88.57	103.48	113.93	143.22	233.79	258.23	362.81	420.2
Himachal Pradesh	88.57	102.26	117.04	144.1	233.79	253.61	367.45	420.2
J&K	91.75	99.62	109.56	148.38	233.79	253.61	367.45	420.2
Karnataka	83.31	120.19	114.39	171.18	186.63	302.89	309.59	511.44
Kerala	99.35	122.64	120.84	163.29	243.84	280.54	374.79	477.06
Madhya Pradesh	83.59	122.82	108.52	178.35	193.1	317.16	311.34	481.65
Maharashtra	88.24	126.47	119.58	189.17	194.94	328.56	318.63	539.71
Orissa	106.28	124.81	111.28	165.4	194.03	298.22	323.92	473.12
Punjab	88.57	101.03	108.52	144.98	233.79	253.61	362.68	388.15
Rajasthan	80.24	113.55	119.69	165.38	215.89	280.85	344.03	465.92
Tamil Nadu	96.15	120.3	121.54	165.82	196.53	296.63	307.64	475.6
Uttar Pradesh	83.85	110.23	105.29	154.15	213.01	258.65	336.88	416.29
West Bengal	105.55	105.91	114.28	149.96	220.74	247.53	350.17	409.22
New Delhi	88.57	123.29	122.9	176.91	233.79	309.48	362.68	505.45

Source: Dubesh and Palmer-Jones 2007.

Table 12 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for All States Combined for Children Ages 12-15

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
<u>Independent Variables</u>												
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.246 ***	0.018	0.329 ***	0.025	0.268 ***	0.018	0.389 ***	0.029	0.388 ***	0.029	0.380 ***	0.032
Historical Period 50 (1993)	0.654 ***	0.020	0.833 ***	0.027	0.703 ***	0.020	0.914 ***	0.031	0.915 ***	0.031	0.901 ***	0.034
Historical Period 55 (1999)	0.943 ***	0.023	1.260 ***	0.029	1.032 ***	0.023	1.373 ***	0.036	1.374 ***	0.036	1.336 ***	0.040
Male	0.968 ***	0.014	1.261 ***	0.025	1.021 ***	0.019	1.296 ***	0.026	1.299 ***	0.028	1.270 ***	0.033
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)			-0.143 ***	0.035			-0.136 ***	0.035	-0.134 ***	0.035	-0.121 **	0.045
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)			-0.322 ***	0.037			-0.326 ***	0.037	-0.328 ***	0.037	-0.301 ***	0.048
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)			-0.611 ***	0.041			-0.634 ***	0.041	-0.636 ***	0.041	-0.560 ***	0.056
Muslim					-0.776 ***	0.033	-0.855 ***	0.044	-0.722 ***	0.048	-0.730 ***	0.054
Scheduled Caste					-0.612 ***	0.029	-0.480 ***	0.039	-0.590 ***	0.044	-0.666 ***	0.054
Scheduled Tribe					-0.714 ***	0.039	-0.768 ***	0.047	-0.741 ***	0.056	-0.814 ***	0.072
Muslim*Male					-0.269 ***	0.045			-0.227 ***	0.044	-0.211 **	0.079
Scheduled Caste*Male					0.110 **	0.038			0.171 ***	0.038	0.294 ***	0.073
Scheduled Tribe*Male					-0.094 +	0.049			-0.041	0.049	0.077	0.090
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)							-0.155 **	0.058	-0.157 **	0.057	-0.179 *	0.074
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)							-0.028	0.062	-0.044	0.062	-0.035	0.080
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)							-0.084	0.073	-0.105	0.072	-0.069	0.088
Scheduled Caste*Period 43							-0.159 **	0.052	-0.157 **	0.052	-0.091	0.074
Scheduled Caste*Period 50							-0.136 *	0.054	-0.122 *	0.054	-0.057	0.076
Scheduled Caste*Period 55							-0.013	0.057	0.010	0.057	0.141 +	0.078
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43							0.062	0.066	0.060	0.065	0.089	0.098
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50							-0.015	0.076	-0.018	0.076	0.063	0.104
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55							-0.025	0.070	-0.030	0.070	0.101	0.101
Muslim*Male*Period 43 (1987)											0.037	0.105
Muslim*Male*Period 50 (1993)											-0.018	0.113
Muslim*Male*Period 55 (1999)											-0.075	0.127

Continued on next page

Table 12 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for All States Combined for Children Ages 12 to 15 Continued

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE										
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43											-0.103	0.100
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50											-0.101	0.102
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55											-0.234 *	0.108
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43											-0.042	0.126
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50											-0.131	0.133
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55											-0.233 +	0.134
Age	3.081 ***	0.177	3.071 ***	0.177	3.043 ***	0.180	3.031 ***	0.180	3.034 ***	0.180	3.036 ***	0.180
Age Squared	-0.125 ***	0.007	-0.125 ***	0.007	-0.124 ***	0.007	-0.124 ***	0.007	-0.124 ***	0.007	-0.124 ***	0.007
Urban	0.751 ***	0.022	0.758 ***	0.022	0.824 ***	0.022	0.831 ***	0.022	0.831 ***	0.022	0.831 ***	0.022
Household Size	0.038 ***	0.004	0.038 ***	0.004	0.039 ***	0.004	0.039 ***	0.004	0.039 ***	0.004	0.039 ***	0.004
Log Monthly Expenditure	0.883 ***	0.025	0.891 ***	0.025	0.755 ***	0.025	0.762 ***	0.025	0.762 ***	0.025	0.762 ***	0.025
Andra Pradesh	-0.415 ***	0.035	-0.413 ***	0.035	-0.468 ***	0.034	-0.465 ***	0.034	-0.466 ***	0.034	-0.465 ***	0.034
Assam	0.982 ***	0.042	0.990 ***	0.042	1.169 ***	0.043	1.178 ***	0.044	1.180 ***	0.043	1.180 ***	0.043
Bihar	-0.063 *	0.030	-0.057 +	0.030	-0.069 *	0.031	-0.065 *	0.031	-0.063 *	0.031	-0.064 *	0.030
Jammu and Kashmir	0.389 ***	0.046	0.396 ***	0.047	0.769 ***	0.048	0.793 ***	0.049	0.788 ***	0.049	0.788 ***	0.049
Madhya Pradesh	0.071 *	0.029	0.077 **	0.029	0.104 ***	0.030	0.110 ***	0.030	0.109 ***	0.030	0.109 ***	0.030
Maharashtra	0.732 ***	0.032	0.738 ***	0.032	0.729 ***	0.032	0.736 ***	0.032	0.736 ***	0.032	0.736 ***	0.032
Orissa	0.111 **	0.035	0.116 ***	0.035	0.103 **	0.036	0.107 **	0.036	0.107 **	0.036	0.107 **	0.036
Rajasthan	-0.330 ***	0.033	-0.326 ***	0.033	-0.296 ***	0.034	-0.291 ***	0.034	-0.291 ***	0.034	-0.290 ***	0.034
West Bengal	0.396 ***	0.039	0.399 ***	0.039	0.572 ***	0.038	0.579 ***	0.038	0.582 ***	0.038	0.582 ***	0.038
New Delhi	0.599 ***	0.144	0.594 ***	0.142	0.626 ***	0.137	0.616 ***	0.134	0.624 ***	0.134	0.624 ***	0.135
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	0.338 ***	0.035	0.345 ***	0.035	0.262 ***	0.035	0.268 ***	0.035	0.270 ***	0.035	0.269 ***	0.035
Kerele/Lakshadweep	1.870 ***	0.051	1.898 ***	0.051	2.072 ***	0.051	2.114 ***	0.052	2.105 ***	0.052	2.106 ***	0.052
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	0.286 ***	0.038	0.290 ***	0.038	0.297 ***	0.039	0.300 ***	0.039	0.302 ***	0.039	0.302 ***	0.039

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Table 12 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for All States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Continued

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	0.452 ***	0.040	0.456 ***	0.040	0.481 ***	0.041	0.484 ***	0.040	0.488 ***	0.041	0.488 ***	0.041
Northeast	1.267 ***	0.045	1.279 ***	0.045	1.533 ***	0.048	1.545 ***	0.048	1.544 ***	0.048	1.547 ***	0.048
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	0.033	0.036	0.038	0.036	0.014	0.036	0.020	0.036	0.021	0.036	0.021	0.036
Intercept	-25.135 ***	1.188	-25.284 ***	1.191	-23.868 ***	1.209	-24.008 ***	1.210	-24.032 ***	1.210	-24.031 ***	1.210
Wald Test												
Variables Tested			mper43 = 0		musmale = 0		musper43 = 0		musmale = 0		musmaleper43 = 0	
			mper50 = 0		scmale = 0		musper50 = 0		scmale = 0		musmaleper50 = 0	
			mper55 = 0		stmale = 0		musper55 = 0		stmale = 0		musmaleper55 = 0	
							scper43 = 0				scmaleper43 = 0	
							scper50 = 0				scmaleper50 = 0	
							scper55 = 0				scmaleper55 = 0	
							stper43 = 0				stmaleper43 = 0	
							stper50 = 0				stmaleper50 = 0	
							stper55 = 0				stmaleper55 = 0	
Number of Variables Tested			3		3		9		3		9	
chi2			249.5		57.0		25.7		59.3		7.3	
Prob > chi2			0.000		0.000		0.002		0.000		0.607	

+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***<.001

Table 13 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Hindu Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Independent Variables												
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.273 ***	0.026	0.353 ***	0.038	0.283 ***	0.026	0.397 ***	0.042	0.396 ***	0.042	0.392 ***	0.045
Historical Period 50 (1993)	0.647 ***	0.028	0.857 ***	0.039	0.693 ***	0.029	0.921 ***	0.044	0.920 ***	0.044	0.883 ***	0.048
Historical Period 55 (1999)	1.018 ***	0.033	1.380 ***	0.043	1.104 ***	0.033	1.461 ***	0.050	1.460 ***	0.050	1.406 ***	0.055
Male	1.181 ***	0.021	1.515 ***	0.036	1.253 ***	0.027	1.570 ***	0.037	1.572 ***	0.040	1.522 ***	0.045
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)			-0.131 **	0.050			-0.127 *	0.052	-0.125 *	0.052	-0.119 +	0.064
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)			-0.364 ***	0.053			-0.378 ***	0.054	-0.376 ***	0.054	-0.303 ***	0.068
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)			-0.694 ***	0.059			-0.728 ***	0.059	-0.726 ***	0.059	-0.614 ***	0.079
Muslim					-1.005 ***	0.051	-1.086 ***	0.064	-0.990 ***	0.074	-0.992 ***	0.088
Scheduled Caste					-0.642 ***	0.045	-0.526 ***	0.055	-0.656 ***	0.067	-0.821 ***	0.092
Scheduled Tribe					-0.659 ***	0.055	-0.866 ***	0.068	-0.750 ***	0.081	-0.852 ***	0.110
Muslim*Male					-0.211 ***	0.064			-0.150 *	0.065	-0.140	0.115
Scheduled Caste*Male					0.114 +	0.058			0.191 ***	0.059	0.443 ***	0.114
Scheduled Tribe*Male					-0.233 ***	0.070			-0.168 *	0.071	-0.009	0.130
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)							-0.161 +	0.088	-0.163 +	0.087	-0.138	0.124
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)							-0.059	0.094	-0.074	0.093	-0.019	0.127
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)							0.030	0.098	0.008	0.097	-0.024	0.131
Scheduled Caste*Period 43							-0.167 *	0.077	-0.167 *	0.078	-0.169	0.127
Scheduled Caste*Period 50							-0.124	0.080	-0.109	0.082	0.073	0.126
Scheduled Caste*Period 55							0.052	0.084	0.084	0.085	0.377 **	0.124
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43							0.081	0.095	0.072	0.093	0.108	0.151
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50							0.171 +	0.098	0.154	0.097	0.275 +	0.150
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55							0.056	0.100	0.031	0.099	0.200	0.148
Muslim*Male*Period 43											-0.041	0.162
Muslim*Male*Period 50											-0.113	0.168
Muslim*Male*Period 55											0.054	0.178

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Table 13 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Hindu Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 Continued

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE										
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43											0.005	0.157
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50											-0.284 +	0.161
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55											-0.509 **	0.164
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43											-0.047	0.184
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50											-0.197	0.187
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55											-0.296	0.190
Age	3.182 ***	0.258	3.151 ***	0.259	3.130 ***	0.262	3.092 ***	0.263	3.101 ***	0.263	3.099 ***	0.263
Age Squared	-0.129 ***	0.010	-0.128 ***	0.010	-0.128 ***	0.010	-0.127 ***	0.010	-0.127 ***	0.010	-0.127 ***	0.010
Urban	0.769 ***	0.032	0.780 ***	0.032	0.922 ***	0.032	0.936 ***	0.032	0.936 ***	0.032	0.936 ***	0.032
Household Size	0.040 ***	0.005	0.041 ***	0.005	0.041 ***	0.005	0.041 ***	0.005	0.041 ***	0.005	0.041 ***	0.005
Log Monthly Expenditure	0.894 ***	0.037	0.905 ***	0.038	0.739 ***	0.037	0.748 ***	0.037	0.748 ***	0.037	0.748 ***	0.037
Madhya Pradesh	0.070 *	0.030	0.076 *	0.030	0.082 *	0.032	0.086 **	0.032	0.086 **	0.032	0.087 **	0.032
Maharashtra	0.752 ***	0.033	0.762 ***	0.033	0.739 ***	0.034	0.747 ***	0.034	0.747 ***	0.034	0.748 ***	0.034
Rajasthan	-0.335 ***	0.035	-0.332 ***	0.035	-0.310 ***	0.036	-0.307 ***	0.036	-0.306 ***	0.036	-0.305 ***	0.036
New Delhi	0.623 ***	0.149	0.621 ***	0.146	0.618 ***	0.143	0.607 ***	0.141	0.619 ***	0.141	0.622 ***	0.142
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	0.304 ***	0.039	0.310 ***	0.040	0.298 ***	0.041	0.302 ***	0.041	0.304 ***	0.041	0.305 ***	0.041
Intercept	-25.98 ***	1.729	-26.03 ***	1.737	-24.42 ***	1.757	-24.42 ***	1.764	-24.48 ***	1.765	-24.44 ***	1.763

Continued on next page

Table 13 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Hindu Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 Continued

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Wald Test												
Variables Tested			mper43 = 0		musmale = 0		musper43 = 0		musmale = 0		musmaleper43 = 0	
			mper50 = 0		scmale = 0		musper50 = 0		scmale = 0		musmaleper50 = 0	
			mper55 = 0		stmale = 0		musper55 = 0		stmale = 0		musmaleper55 = 0	
							scper43 = 0				scmaleper43 = 0	
							scper50 = 0				scmaleper50 = 0	
							scper55 = 0				scmaleper55 = 0	
							stper43 = 0				stmaleper43 = 0	
							stper50 = 0				stmaleper50 = 0	
							stper55 = 0				stmaleper55 = 0	
Number of Variables Tested			3		3		9		3		9	
chi2			160.4		28.7		17.8		26.7		17.8	
Prob > chi2			0.000		0.000		0.038		0.000		0.038	

+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***<.001

Table 14 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Non-Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Independent Variables												
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.222 ***	0.025	0.317 ***	0.034	0.251 ***	0.025	0.383 ***	0.039	0.381 ***	0.039	0.375 ***	0.044
Historical Period 50 (1993)	0.662 ***	0.028	0.830 ***	0.036	0.716 ***	0.028	0.922 ***	0.043	0.927 ***	0.043	0.932 ***	0.047
Historical Period 55 (1999)	0.882 ***	0.033	1.179 ***	0.041	0.972 ***	0.033	1.314 ***	0.051	1.317 ***	0.051	1.293 ***	0.057
Male	0.786 ***	0.020	1.064 ***	0.035	0.814 ***	0.025	1.089 ***	0.036	1.079 ***	0.039	1.067 ***	0.046
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)			-0.169 ***	0.048			-0.160 ***	0.049	-0.157 ***	0.049	-0.145 *	0.063
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)			-0.309 ***	0.051			-0.308 ***	0.051	-0.318 ***	0.051	-0.330 ***	0.067
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)			-0.575 ***	0.057			-0.593 ***	0.058	-0.600 ***	0.058	-0.552 ***	0.078
Muslim					-0.640 ***	0.043	-0.706 ***	0.059	-0.588 ***	0.064	-0.602 ***	0.069
Scheduled Caste					-0.609 ***	0.038	-0.446 ***	0.053	-0.571 ***	0.059	-0.588 ***	0.068
Scheduled Tribe					-0.748 ***	0.056	-0.672 ***	0.067	-0.701 ***	0.077	-0.741 ***	0.096
Muslim*Male					-0.253 ***	0.061			-0.211 ***	0.059	-0.185 +	0.108
Scheduled Caste*Male					0.149 **	0.051			0.204 ***	0.051	0.234 *	0.098
Scheduled Tribe*Male					0.005	0.070			0.047	0.069	0.114	0.128
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)							-0.146 +	0.077	-0.147 +	0.076	-0.209 *	0.094
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)							0.035	0.083	0.024	0.082	0.020	0.104
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)							-0.136	0.102	-0.149	0.100	-0.059	0.120
Scheduled Caste*Period 43							-0.147 *	0.070	-0.142 *	0.071	-0.047	0.094
Scheduled Caste*Period 50							-0.151 *	0.073	-0.135 +	0.073	-0.160 +	0.096
Scheduled Caste*Period 55							-0.058	0.078	-0.034	0.078	-0.012	0.104
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43							0.052	0.092	0.053	0.092	0.076	0.130
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50							-0.199 +	0.115	-0.196 +	0.116	-0.163	0.147
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55							-0.108	0.097	-0.104	0.097	-0.024	0.140
Muslim*Male*Period 43											0.112	0.141
Muslim*Male*Period 50											0.011	0.153
Muslim*Male*Period 55											-0.176	0.174

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Table 14 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Non-Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 Continued

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE										
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43											-0.161	0.133
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50											0.051	0.136
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55											-0.039	0.146
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43											-0.036	0.176
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50											-0.051	0.192
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55											-0.147	0.190
Age	3.048 ***	0.243	3.054 ***	0.243	3.027 ***	0.247	3.038 ***	0.247	3.036 ***	0.247	3.042 ***	0.247
Age Squared	-0.124 ***	0.009	-0.124 ***	0.009	-0.123 ***	0.009	-0.124 ***	0.009	-0.124 ***	0.009	-0.124 ***	0.009
Urban	0.738 ***	0.029	0.742 ***	0.029	0.758 ***	0.030	0.761 ***	0.030	0.762 ***	0.030	0.762 ***	0.030
Household Size	0.037 ***	0.006	0.037 ***	0.006	0.037 ***	0.006	0.038 ***	0.005	0.038 ***	0.005	0.038 ***	0.005
Log Monthly Expenditure	0.877 ***	0.035	0.883 ***	0.035	0.772 ***	0.034	0.778 ***	0.034	0.779 ***	0.034	0.779 ***	0.034
Andra Pradesh	-0.359 ***	0.039	-0.362 ***	0.039	-0.394 ***	0.038	-0.394 ***	0.038	-0.396 ***	0.038	-0.396 ***	0.038
Assam	1.020 ***	0.044	1.021 ***	0.044	1.182 ***	0.046	1.182 ***	0.046	1.184 ***	0.046	1.184 ***	0.046
J&K	0.432 ***	0.050	0.432 ***	0.050	0.746 ***	0.052	0.769 ***	0.053	0.764 ***	0.053	0.766 ***	0.053
Orissa	0.157 ***	0.038	0.155 ***	0.038	0.169 ***	0.039	0.170 ***	0.039	0.169 ***	0.039	0.169 ***	0.039
West Bengal	0.437 ***	0.043	0.434 ***	0.042	0.597 ***	0.042	0.600 ***	0.041	0.600 ***	0.041	0.599 ***	0.041
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	0.375 ***	0.038	0.375 ***	0.038	0.322 ***	0.040	0.325 ***	0.039	0.324 ***	0.039	0.324 ***	0.039
Kerele/Lakshadweep	1.882 ***	0.053	1.897 ***	0.053	2.045 ***	0.054	2.072 ***	0.054	2.065 ***	0.054	2.066 ***	0.054
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	0.490 ***	0.044	0.487 ***	0.044	0.530 ***	0.045	0.530 ***	0.045	0.531 ***	0.045	0.531 ***	0.045
Northeast	1.294 ***	0.048	1.298 ***	0.048	1.569 ***	0.053	1.565 ***	0.053	1.569 ***	0.053	1.570 ***	0.053
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	0.082 *	0.039	0.081 *	0.039	0.073 +	0.040	0.075 +	0.040	0.075 +	0.040	0.075 +	0.040
Intercept	-24.85 ***	1.633	-25.08 ***	1.634	-23.85 ***	1.663	-24.14 ***	1.662	-24.12 ***	1.661	-24.16 ***	1.661

Continued on next page

Table 14 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Non-Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 Continued

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Wald Test												
Variables Tested			mper43 = 0		musmale = 0		musper43 = 0		musmale = 0		musmaleper43 = 0	
			mper50 = 0		scmale = 0		musper50 = 0		scmale = 0		musmaleper50 = 0	
			mper55 = 0		stmale = 0		musper55 = 0		stmale = 0		musmaleper55 = 0	
							scper43 = 0				scmaleper43 = 0	
							scper50 = 0				scmaleper50 = 0	
							scper55 = 0				scmaleper55 = 0	
							stper43 = 0				stmaleper43 = 0	
							stper50 = 0				stmaleper50 = 0	
							stper55 = 0				stmaleper55 = 0	
Number of Variables Tested			3		3		9		3		9	
chi2			111.5		32.4		21.2		36.8		7.6	
Prob > chi2			0.000		0.000		0.012		0.000		0.579	

+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***<.001

Table 15 Enrollment Predicted Probabilities for All, Fundamentalist, and Non-fundamentalist States Over Time

	All States	Fundamentalist	Non-Fundamentalist	Fundamentalist and Non-Fundamentalist Difference
1983	0.5392	0.5027	0.5632	0.0605
1987	0.5995	0.5705	0.6169	0.0464
1993	0.6922	0.6588	0.7143	0.0555
1999	0.7504	0.7368	0.7570	0.0202

Table 16 Enrollment Predicted Probabilities by Gender, Gender Difference in Predicted Probabilities, and Gender Ratio

	Male	Female	Gender Difference	Gender Ratio
All States				
1983	0.6762	0.3718	0.3044	0.5498
1987	0.7156	0.4513	0.2643	0.6307
1993	0.7769	0.5765	0.2004	0.7421
1999	0.7999	0.6761	0.1238	0.8452
Fundamentalist				
1983	0.665	0.3038	0.3612	0.4568
1987	0.7125	0.3831	0.3294	0.5377
1993	0.7646	0.5068	0.2578	0.6628
1999	0.7976	0.6343	0.1633	0.7953
Non-Fundamentalist				
1983	0.6798	0.4228	0.2570	0.6219
1987	0.711	0.5014	0.2096	0.7052
1993	0.7814	0.6269	0.1545	0.8023
1999	0.7953	0.7042	0.0911	0.8855

Table 17 Educational Enrollment Predicted Probabilities for Children ages 12-15 by Religion

	Hindu	Muslim	Hindu- Muslim Difference	Hindu Muslim Ratio
All States				
1983	0.5694	0.3600	0.2094	0.6322
1987	0.6610	0.4154	0.2456	0.6284
1993	0.7673	0.5770	0.1903	0.7520
1999	0.8392	0.6712	0.1680	0.7998
Fundamentalist				
1983	0.5323	0.2776	0.2547	0.5215
1987	0.6287	0.3274	0.3013	0.5208
1993	0.7408	0.4765	0.2643	0.6432
1999	0.8306	0.6306	0.2000	0.7592
Non-Fundamentalist				
1983	0.5893	0.4147	0.1746	0.7037
1987	0.6778	0.4731	0.2047	0.6980
1993	0.7831	0.6487	0.1344	0.8284
1999	0.8422	0.6970	0.1452	0.8276

Table 18 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for All States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Below the Poverty Line

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Independent Variables												
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.191 ***	0.028	0.258 ***	0.039	0.206 ***	0.028	0.321 ***	0.047	0.321 ***	0.047	0.284 ***	0.053
Historical Period 50 (1993)	0.613 ***	0.030	0.805 ***	0.042	0.660 ***	0.031	0.893 ***	0.052	0.892 ***	0.052	0.887 ***	0.059
Historical Period 55 (1999)	0.868 ***	0.039	1.227 ***	0.047	0.950 ***	0.039	1.350 ***	0.062	1.349 ***	0.062	1.255 ***	0.069
Male	0.991 ***	0.023	1.283 ***	0.038	1.055 ***	0.032	1.323 ***	0.039	1.330 ***	0.044	1.269 ***	0.053
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)			-0.107 *	0.053			-0.110 *	0.055	-0.109 *	0.055	-0.044	0.074
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)			-0.321 ***	0.056			-0.334 ***	0.058	-0.331 ***	0.058	-0.328 ***	0.081
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)			-0.660 ***	0.066			-0.698 ***	0.067	-0.694 ***	0.067	-0.512 ***	0.099
Muslim					-0.620 ***	0.053	-0.800 ***	0.068	-0.596 ***	0.075	-0.678 ***	0.081
Scheduled Caste					-0.543 ***	0.044	-0.373 ***	0.054	-0.489 ***	0.063	-0.538 ***	0.074
Scheduled Tribe					-0.760 ***	0.057	-0.833 ***	0.064	-0.848 ***	0.080	-1.056 ***	0.110
Muslim*Male					-0.386 ***	0.072			-0.327 ***	0.071	-0.190	0.119
Scheduled Caste*Male					0.113 *	0.057			0.175 **	0.058	0.258 *	0.102
Scheduled Tribe*Male					-0.048	0.072			0.021	0.073	0.328 *	0.131
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)							-0.133	0.089	-0.140	0.088	-0.094	0.113
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)							0.028	0.096	-0.003	0.094	0.027	0.121
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)							-0.063	0.124	-0.109	0.121	0.086	0.142
Scheduled Caste*Period 43							-0.179 *	0.075	-0.179 *	0.076	-0.128	0.109
Scheduled Caste*Period 50							-0.191 *	0.078	-0.180 *	0.079	-0.194 +	0.112
Scheduled Caste*Period 55							-0.069	0.088	-0.044	0.088	0.092	0.119
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43							0.095	0.090	0.096	0.091	0.368 *	0.149
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50							0.045	0.097	0.047	0.097	0.175	0.154
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55							0.040	0.103	0.044	0.104	0.373 *	0.156
Muslim*Male*Period 43											-0.078	0.161
Muslim*Male*Period 50											-0.038	0.168
Muslim*Male*Period 55											-0.370 +	0.205

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Table 18 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for All States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Below the Poverty Line
Continued

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE										
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43											-0.086	0.145
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50											0.034	0.150
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55											-0.258	0.163
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43											-0.406 *	0.183
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50											-0.164	0.191
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55											-0.546 **	0.203
Age	3.086 ***	0.287	3.055 ***	0.288	3.049 ***	0.292	3.029 ***	0.293	3.020 ***	0.293	3.026 ***	0.292
Age Squared	-0.125 ***	0.011	-0.124 ***	0.011	-0.124 ***	0.011	-0.123 ***	0.011	-0.123 ***	0.011	-0.123 ***	0.011
Urban	0.789 ***	0.032	0.798 ***	0.033	0.824 ***	0.033	0.834 ***	0.034	0.835 ***	0.034	0.835 ***	0.034
Household Size	0.041 ***	0.007	0.041 ***	0.007	0.044 ***	0.006	0.044 ***	0.006	0.044 ***	0.006	0.045 ***	0.006
Log Monthly Expenditure	0.118 ***	0.020	0.122 ***	0.021	0.101 ***	0.020	0.104 ***	0.020	0.104 ***	0.020	0.104 ***	0.020
Andra Pradesh	-0.331 ***	0.060	-0.337 ***	0.061	-0.365 ***	0.061	-0.373 ***	0.061	-0.373 ***	0.061	-0.374 ***	0.061
Assam	1.038 ***	0.062	1.039 ***	0.062	1.208 ***	0.064	1.205 ***	0.065	1.213 ***	0.065	1.213 ***	0.065
Bihar	-0.131 **	0.045	-0.130 **	0.046	-0.141 **	0.046	-0.143 **	0.046	-0.142 **	0.046	-0.141 **	0.046
Jammu and Kashmir	0.549 ***	0.096	0.553 ***	0.099	0.751 ***	0.104	0.762 ***	0.108	0.760 ***	0.107	0.761 ***	0.107
Madhya Pradesh	0.087 +	0.045	0.086 +	0.046	0.172 ***	0.047	0.169 ***	0.047	0.169 ***	0.048	0.169 ***	0.047
Maharashtra	0.733 ***	0.048	0.734 ***	0.049	0.754 ***	0.048	0.754 ***	0.048	0.754 ***	0.048	0.755 ***	0.048
Orissa	0.051	0.052	0.054	0.052	0.090 +	0.053	0.090 +	0.053	0.091 +	0.053	0.090 +	0.053
Rajasthan	-0.291 ***	0.064	-0.296 ***	0.064	-0.232 ***	0.065	-0.236 ***	0.065	-0.237 ***	0.065	-0.239 ***	0.065
West Bengal	0.295 ***	0.069	0.294 ***	0.069	0.469 ***	0.066	0.470 ***	0.064	0.474 ***	0.064	0.473 ***	0.063
New Delhi	0.763 ***	0.184	0.756 ***	0.186	0.816 ***	0.184	0.789 ***	0.185	0.812 ***	0.186	0.813 ***	0.186
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	0.387 ***	0.051	0.391 ***	0.051	0.294 ***	0.052	0.295 ***	0.052	0.297 ***	0.052	0.296 ***	0.051
Kerele/Lakshadweep	1.961 ***	0.078	1.996 ***	0.079	2.117 ***	0.078	2.171 ***	0.080	2.154 ***	0.079	2.157 ***	0.079
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	0.322 ***	0.065	0.325 ***	0.066	0.367 ***	0.067	0.370 ***	0.068	0.369 ***	0.068	0.369 ***	0.068

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Table 18 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for All States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Below the Poverty Line
Continued

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	0.532 ***	0.081	0.536 ***	0.081	0.553 ***	0.081
Northeast	1.335 ***	0.078	1.354 ***	0.079	1.568 ***	0.081
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	0.161 **	0.060	0.165 **	0.060	0.152 *	0.059
Intercept	-21.187 ***	1.913	-21.184 ***	1.923	-20.566 ***	1.949
Wald Test						
Variables Tested		mper43 = 0	musmale = 0	musper43 = 0	musmale = 0	musmaleper43 = 0
		mper50 = 0	scmale = 0	musper50 = 0	scmale = 0	musmaleper50 = 0
		mper55 = 0	stmale = 0	musper55 = 0	stmale = 0	musmaleper55 = 0
				scper43 = 0		scmaleper43 = 0
				scper50 = 0		scmaleper50 = 0
				scper55 = 0		scmaleper55 = 0
				stper43 = 0		stmaleper43 = 0
				stper50 = 0		stmaleper50 = 0
				stper55 = 0		stmaleper55 = 0
Number of Variables Tested		3	3	9	3	9
chi2		113.8	40.2	15.5	40.5	11.9
Prob > chi2		0.000	0.000	0.078	0.000	0.220

+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***<.001

Table 19 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 Below the Poverty Line

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Independent Variables												
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.165 ***	0.040	0.230 ***	0.061	0.174 ***	0.040	0.262 ***	0.071	0.262 ***	0.071	0.220 **	0.079
Historical Period 50 (1993)	0.542 ***	0.044	0.761 ***	0.065	0.573 ***	0.045	0.782 ***	0.077	0.782 ***	0.077	0.706 ***	0.086
Historical Period 55 (1999)	0.921 ***	0.053	1.332 ***	0.067	1.007 ***	0.052	1.425 ***	0.086	1.425 ***	0.086	1.308 ***	0.095
Male	1.152 ***	0.034	1.486 ***	0.054	1.223 ***	0.047	1.548 ***	0.055	1.548 ***	0.063	1.443 ***	0.072
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)			-0.100	0.078			-0.116	0.079	-0.115	0.079	-0.045	0.105
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)			-0.355 ***	0.083			-0.393 ***	0.085	-0.394 ***	0.085	-0.263 *	0.116
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)			-0.744 ***	0.095			-0.803 ***	0.094	-0.803 ***	0.095	-0.581 ***	0.144
Muslim					-0.885 ***	0.078	-1.071 ***	0.094	-0.968 ***	0.108	-1.042 ***	0.132
Scheduled Caste					-0.525 ***	0.067	-0.434 ***	0.075	-0.543 ***	0.094	-0.753 ***	0.120
Scheduled Tribe					-0.817 ***	0.084	-1.068 ***	0.092	-1.005 ***	0.118	-1.237 ***	0.170
Muslim*Male					-0.238 *	0.094			-0.154	0.097	-0.029	0.168
Scheduled Caste*Male					0.070	0.086			0.157 +	0.088	0.473 **	0.150
Scheduled Tribe*Male					-0.170	0.104			-0.087	0.107	0.251	0.193
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)							-0.112	0.128	-0.116	0.126	0.039	0.180
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)							0.088	0.143	0.070	0.141	0.181	0.198
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)							0.121	0.154	0.092	0.153	0.172	0.200
Scheduled Caste*Period 43							-0.145	0.109	-0.145	0.110	-0.123	0.177
Scheduled Caste*Period 50							-0.068	0.116	-0.057	0.118	0.239	0.179
Scheduled Caste*Period 55							0.001	0.127	0.027	0.129	0.370 *	0.178
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43							0.231 +	0.129	0.227 +	0.128	0.456 *	0.229
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50							0.324 *	0.139	0.314 *	0.138	0.463 *	0.231
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55							0.097	0.149	0.081	0.150	0.456 *	0.228
Muslim*Male*Period 43											-0.249	0.233
Muslim*Male*Period 50											-0.192	0.245
Muslim*Male*Period 55											-0.136	0.274

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Table 19 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Fundamentalists States for Children ages 12 to 15 Below the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE										
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43											-0.042	0.220
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50											-0.459 *	0.227
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55											-0.579 *	0.243
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43											-0.328	0.269
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50											-0.204	0.280
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55											-0.620 *	0.293
Age	2.766 ***	0.423	2.660 ***	0.426	2.696 ***	0.424	2.584 ***	0.426	2.578 ***	0.427	2.582 ***	0.425
Age Squared	-0.113 ***	0.016	-0.109 ***	0.016	-0.111 ***	0.016	-0.106 ***	0.016	-0.106 ***	0.016	-0.106 ***	0.016
Urban	0.796 ***	0.044	0.810 ***	0.046	0.887 ***	0.046	0.907 ***	0.048	0.907 ***	0.048	0.907 ***	0.047
Household Size	0.037 ***	0.008	0.038 ***	0.008	0.044 ***	0.008	0.045 ***	0.008	0.045 ***	0.008	0.045 ***	0.008
Log Monthly Expenditure	0.130 ***	0.031	0.135 ***	0.031	0.109 ***	0.029	0.113 ***	0.029	0.113 ***	0.029	0.113 ***	0.029
Madhya Pradesh	0.084 +	0.046	0.083 +	0.046	0.183 ***	0.050	0.179 ***	0.051	0.179 ***	0.051	0.179 ***	0.050
Maharashtra	0.741 ***	0.049	0.745 ***	0.049	0.774 ***	0.050	0.776 ***	0.050	0.776 ***	0.050	0.777 ***	0.050
Rajasthan	-0.291 ***	0.065	-0.297 ***	0.066	-0.228 ***	0.068	-0.239 ***	0.068	-0.239 ***	0.068	-0.239 ***	0.068
New Delhi	0.789 ***	0.187	0.786 ***	0.191	0.791 ***	0.189	0.769 ***	0.192	0.791 ***	0.193	0.797 ***	0.195
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	0.336 ***	0.066	0.342 ***	0.067	0.388 ***	0.070	0.392 ***	0.071	0.392 ***	0.071	0.394 ***	0.071
Intercept	-19.26 ***	2.816	-18.79 ***	2.838	-18.38 ***	2.829	-17.86 ***	2.847	-17.82 ***	2.847	-17.78 ***	2.837

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Table 19 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 Below the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Wald Test												
Variables Tested			mper43 = 0		musmale = 0		musper43 = 0		musmale = 0		musmaleper43 = 0	
			mper50 = 0		scmale = 0		musper50 = 0		scmale = 0		musmaleper50 = 0	
			mper55 = 0		stmale = 0		musper55 = 0		stmale = 0		musmaleper55 = 0	
							scper43 = 0				scmaleper43 = 0	
							scper50 = 0				scmaleper50 = 0	
							scper55 = 0				scmaleper55 = 0	
							stper43 = 0				stmaleper43 = 0	
							stper50 = 0				stmaleper50 = 0	
							stper55 = 0				stmaleper55 = 0	
Number of Variables Tested			3		3		9		3		9	
chi2			71.3		10.7		13.5		8.8		13.8	
Prob > chi2			0.000		0.013		0.142		0.033		0.131	

+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***<.001

Table 20 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Non-Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 Below the Poverty Line

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Independent Variables												
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.211 ***	0.038	0.289 ***	0.052	0.230 ***	0.039	0.370 ***	0.063	0.368 ***	0.063	0.331 ***	0.071
Historical Period 50 (1993)	0.676 ***	0.042	0.853 ***	0.056	0.731 ***	0.043	0.999 ***	0.070	0.997 ***	0.070	1.044 ***	0.079
Historical Period 55 (1999)	0.823 ***	0.057	1.154 ***	0.067	0.899 ***	0.056	1.297 ***	0.087	1.292 ***	0.087	1.214 ***	0.099
Male	0.857 ***	0.032	1.131 ***	0.052	0.916 ***	0.043	1.158 ***	0.055	1.166 ***	0.062	1.133 ***	0.075
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)			-0.130 +	0.074			-0.123	0.076	-0.119	0.076	-0.050	0.104
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)			-0.308 ***	0.077			-0.305 ***	0.079	-0.299 ***	0.079	-0.398 ***	0.113
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)			-0.618 ***	0.091			-0.644 ***	0.094	-0.633 ***	0.092	-0.477 ***	0.131
Muslim					-0.441 ***	0.071	-0.605 ***	0.093	-0.359 ***	0.101	-0.447 ***	0.104
Scheduled Caste					-0.560 ***	0.059	-0.325 ***	0.076	-0.454 ***	0.084	-0.419 ***	0.095
Scheduled Tribe					-0.667 ***	0.077	-0.610 ***	0.089	-0.677 ***	0.107	-0.866 ***	0.145
Muslim*Male					-0.460 ***	0.101			-0.410 ***	0.097	-0.259	0.165
Scheduled Caste*Male					0.156 *	0.076			0.202 **	0.076	0.152	0.139
Scheduled Tribe*Male					0.040	0.097			0.098	0.098	0.382 *	0.179
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)							-0.145	0.122	-0.154	0.120	-0.170	0.148
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)							-0.025	0.128	-0.057	0.126	-0.077	0.155
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)							-0.181	0.178	-0.229	0.173	0.047	0.195
Scheduled Caste*Period 43							-0.204 *	0.102	-0.204 *	0.104	-0.114	0.140
Scheduled Caste*Period 50							-0.300 **	0.106	-0.286 **	0.107	-0.498 ***	0.144
Scheduled Caste*Period 55							-0.121	0.120	-0.096	0.120	-0.078	0.161
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43							0.002	0.128	0.006	0.129	0.351 +	0.194
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50							-0.205	0.135	-0.198	0.136	-0.079	0.206
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55							0.032	0.139	0.046	0.139	0.312	0.213
Muslim*Male*Period 43											0.028	0.222
Muslim*Male*Period 50											0.063	0.229
Muslim*Male*Period 55											-0.535 +	0.281

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Table 20 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Non-Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 Below the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE										
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43											-0.152	0.194
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50											0.377+	0.201
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55											-0.059	0.219
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43											-0.539 *	0.250
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50											-0.143	0.262
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55											-0.438	0.276
Age	3.437 ***	0.387	3.460 ***	0.386	3.428 ***	0.398	3.478 ***	0.397	3.468 ***	0.397	3.470 ***	0.396
Age Squared	-0.139 ***	0.014	-0.139 ***	0.014	-0.139 ***	0.015	-0.140 ***	0.015	-0.140 ***	0.015	-0.140 ***	0.015
Urban	0.782 ***	0.044	0.788 ***	0.045	0.779 ***	0.047	0.780 ***	0.048	0.782 ***	0.048	0.783 ***	0.047
Household Size	0.044 ***	0.011	0.044 ***	0.010	0.044 ***	0.010	0.045 ***	0.009	0.045 ***	0.009	0.046 ***	0.009
Log Monthly Expenditure	0.108 ***	0.027	0.111 ***	0.027	0.092 ***	0.027	0.096 ***	0.026	0.096 ***	0.027	0.097 ***	0.027
Andra Pradesh	-0.205 ***	0.064	-0.211 ***	0.065	-0.217 ***	0.066	-0.220 ***	0.066	-0.222 ***	0.066	-0.222 ***	0.065
Assam	1.154 ***	0.063	1.153 ***	0.064	1.292 ***	0.066	1.286 ***	0.066	1.296 ***	0.066	1.297 ***	0.066
J&K	0.659 ***	0.097	0.660 ***	0.098	0.840 ***	0.103	0.841 ***	0.108	0.836 ***	0.107	0.838 ***	0.107
Orissa	0.176 ***	0.054	0.177 ***	0.054	0.212 ***	0.057	0.212 ***	0.056	0.213 ***	0.056	0.213 ***	0.056
West Bengal	0.418 ***	0.072	0.415 ***	0.071	0.577 ***	0.068	0.583 ***	0.064	0.585 ***	0.063	0.582 ***	0.063
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	0.503 ***	0.056	0.505 ***	0.056	0.446 ***	0.059	0.449 ***	0.058	0.449 ***	0.058	0.448 ***	0.058
Kerele/Lakshadweep	2.059 ***	0.080	2.084 ***	0.080	2.190 ***	0.080	2.230 ***	0.082	2.213 ***	0.081	2.217 ***	0.081
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	0.641 ***	0.082	0.642 ***	0.082	0.695 ***	0.085	0.695 ***	0.083	0.701 ***	0.084	0.699 ***	0.084
Northeast	1.444 ***	0.079	1.458 ***	0.080	1.639 ***	0.083	1.642 ***	0.083	1.653 ***	0.084	1.653 ***	0.084
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	0.282 ***	0.063	0.284 ***	0.063	0.291 ***	0.063	0.296 ***	0.063	0.297 ***	0.063	0.298 ***	0.063
Intercept	-23.46 ***	2.582	-23.80 ***	2.580	-23.08 ***	2.655	-23.63 ***	2.652	-23.57 ***	2.648	-23.57 ***	2.646

Continued on next page

Table 20 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Non-Fundamentalist States for Children ages 12 to 15 Below the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE								
Wald Test			mper43 = 0		musmale = 0		musper43 = 0		musmale = 0		musmaleper43 = 0	
Variables Tested			mper50 = 0		scmale = 0		musper50 = 0		scmale = 0		musmaleper50 = 0	
			mper55 = 0		stmale = 0		musper55 = 0		stmale = 0		musmaleper55 = 0	
							scper43 = 0				scmaleper43 = 0	
							scper50 = 0				scmaleper50 = 0	
							scper55 = 0				scmaleper55 = 0	
							stper43 = 0				stmaleper43 = 0	
							stper50 = 0				stmaleper50 = 0	
							stper55 = 0				stmaleper55 = 0	
Number of Variables Tested			3		3		9		3		9	
chi2			51.3		31.4		14.2		33.2		17.7	
Prob > chi2			0.000		0.000		0.115		0.000		0.038	

+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***<.001

Table 21 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for All States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Above the Poverty Line

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
<u>Independent Variables</u>												
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.266 ***	0.024	0.355 ***	0.033	0.286 ***	0.024	0.399 ***	0.037	0.398 ***	0.037	0.406 ***	0.040
Historical Period 50 (1993)	0.734 ***	0.027	0.897 ***	0.035	0.772 ***	0.026	0.944 ***	0.039	0.945 ***	0.039	0.928 ***	0.042
Historical Period 55 (1999)	1.073 ***	0.028	1.363 ***	0.038	1.147 ***	0.029	1.433 ***	0.044	1.434 ***	0.044	1.427 ***	0.048
Male	0.982 ***	0.019	1.266 ***	0.034	1.028 ***	0.024	1.299 ***	0.035	1.299 ***	0.037	1.290 ***	0.042
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)			-0.162 ***	0.046			-0.154 ***	0.047	-0.153 ***	0.047	-0.169 **	0.057
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)			-0.304 ***	0.049			-0.306 ***	0.050	-0.308 ***	0.050	-0.271 ***	0.061
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)			-0.577 ***	0.053			-0.593 ***	0.054	-0.597 ***	0.054	-0.582 ***	0.069
Muslim					-0.838 ***	0.042	-0.875 ***	0.056	-0.797 ***	0.063	-0.760 ***	0.076
Scheduled Caste					-0.586 ***	0.039	-0.548 ***	0.054	-0.647 ***	0.062	-0.751 ***	0.080
Scheduled Tribe					-0.587 ***	0.056	-0.647 ***	0.074	-0.583 ***	0.084	-0.534 ***	0.102
Muslim*Male					-0.180 ***	0.056			-0.142 *	0.056	-0.212 *	0.102
Scheduled Caste*Male					0.089 +	0.052			0.156 **	0.053	0.322 **	0.106
Scheduled Tribe*Male					-0.156 *	0.072			-0.105	0.072	-0.188	0.135
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)							-0.149 *	0.075	-0.148 *	0.074	-0.210 *	0.101
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)							-0.021	0.083	-0.028	0.082	-0.028	0.111
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)							-0.046	0.084	-0.053	0.083	-0.119	0.114
Scheduled Caste*Period 43							-0.097	0.072	-0.092	0.073	0.002	0.105
Scheduled Caste*Period 50							-0.023	0.076	-0.008	0.077	0.125	0.108
Scheduled Caste*Period 55							0.099	0.078	0.121	0.079	0.253 *	0.109
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43							0.042	0.100	0.038	0.099	-0.151	0.140
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50							-0.053	0.123	-0.056	0.122	-0.035	0.157
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55							-0.050	0.103	-0.058	0.102	-0.096	0.142
Muslim*Male*Period 43											0.116	0.136
Muslim*Male*Period 50											-0.008	0.153
Muslim*Male*Period 55											0.126	0.159

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Table 21 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for All States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Above the Poverty Line
Continued

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE										
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43											-0.144	0.141
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50											-0.223	0.145
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55											-0.223	0.151
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43											0.333 +	0.186
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50											-0.047	0.200
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55											0.060	0.193
Age	2.988 ***	0.232	2.983 ***	0.232	2.943 ***	0.234	2.928 ***	0.234	2.936 ***	0.234	2.938 ***	0.234
Age Squared	-0.123 ***	0.009	-0.123 ***	0.009	-0.121 ***	0.009	-0.121 ***	0.009	-0.121 ***	0.009	-0.121 ***	0.009
Urban	0.941 ***	0.030	0.947 ***	0.029	0.996 ***	0.029	1.003 ***	0.029	1.003 ***	0.029	1.003 ***	0.029
Household Size	0.056 ***	0.004	0.056 ***	0.004	0.055 ***	0.004	0.056 ***	0.004	0.056 ***	0.004	0.056 ***	0.004
Log Monthly Expenditure	0.972 ***	0.033	0.980 ***	0.033	0.885 ***	0.032	0.892 ***	0.032	0.892 ***	0.032	0.892 ***	0.032
Andra Pradesh	-0.485 ***	0.043	-0.480 ***	0.043	-0.538 ***	0.042	-0.532 ***	0.042	-0.533 ***	0.042	-0.534 ***	0.042
Assam	1.077 ***	0.057	1.089 ***	0.057	1.250 ***	0.059	1.262 ***	0.060	1.261 ***	0.059	1.261 ***	0.059
Bihar	0.080 +	0.041	0.088 *	0.041	0.086 *	0.041	0.093 *	0.041	0.094 *	0.041	0.093 *	0.041
Jammu and Kashmir	0.289 ***	0.053	0.296 ***	0.053	0.701 ***	0.055	0.720 ***	0.056	0.718 ***	0.056	0.719 ***	0.056
Madhya Pradesh	0.078 *	0.039	0.086 *	0.038	0.074 +	0.039	0.082 *	0.039	0.082 *	0.039	0.081 *	0.039
Maharashtra	0.803 ***	0.044	0.811 ***	0.044	0.780 ***	0.045	0.787 ***	0.045	0.787 ***	0.045	0.788 ***	0.045
Orissa	0.277 ***	0.052	0.282 ***	0.052	0.234 ***	0.052	0.237 ***	0.052	0.238 ***	0.052	0.238 ***	0.052
Rajasthan	-0.377 ***	0.039	-0.371 ***	0.039	-0.364 ***	0.039	-0.355 ***	0.039	-0.355 ***	0.039	-0.354 ***	0.039
West Bengal	0.545 ***	0.044	0.552 ***	0.044	0.708 ***	0.044	0.718 ***	0.045	0.720 ***	0.045	0.720 ***	0.045
New Delhi	0.398 *	0.180	0.392 *	0.176	0.383 *	0.170	0.378 *	0.167	0.381 *	0.166	0.379 *	0.167
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	0.328 ***	0.048	0.336 ***	0.048	0.280 ***	0.049	0.286 ***	0.049	0.287 ***	0.049	0.287 ***	0.049
Kerele/Lakshadweep	1.916 ***	0.068	1.939 ***	0.068	2.120 ***	0.069	2.154 ***	0.070	2.151 ***	0.070	2.150 ***	0.070
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	0.263 ***	0.048	0.267 ***	0.048	0.254 ***	0.049	0.258 ***	0.049	0.260 ***	0.049	0.261 ***	0.049

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Table 21 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for All States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	0.385 ***	0.047	0.388 ***	0.046	0.401 ***	0.047	0.407 ***	0.047	0.409 ***	0.047	0.408 ***	0.047
Northeast	1.197 ***	0.054	1.207 ***	0.055	1.417 ***	0.059	1.434 ***	0.059	1.426 ***	0.059	1.427 ***	0.059
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	-0.034	0.046	-0.029	0.045	-0.058	0.046	-0.055	0.046	-0.053	0.046	-0.053	0.046
Intercept	-25.01 ***	1.569	-25.18 ***	1.572	-23.944 ***	1.581	-24.04 ***	1.585	-24.09 ***	1.585	-24.10 ***	1.584
Wald Test			mper43 = 0		musmale = 0		musper43 = 0		musmale = 0		musmaleper43 = 0	
Variables Tested			mper50 = 0		scmale = 0		musper50 = 0		scmale = 0		musmaleper50 = 0	
			mper55 = 0		stmale = 0		musper55 = 0		stmale = 0		musmaleper55 = 0	
							scper43 = 0				scmaleper43 = 0	
							scper50 = 0				scmaleper50 = 0	
							scper55 = 0				scmaleper55 = 0	
							stper43 = 0				stmaleper43 = 0	
							stper50 = 0				stmaleper50 = 0	
							stper55 = 0				stmaleper55 = 0	
Number of Variables Tested			3		3		9		3		9	
chi2			127.3		19.9		13.4		21.0		9.47	
Prob > chi2			0.000		0.000		0.145		0.000		0.395	

+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***<.001

Table 22 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Fundamentalist States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Above the Poverty Line

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Independent Variables												
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.341 ***	0.035	0.420 ***	0.049	0.349 ***	0.035	0.447 ***	0.053	0.446 ***	0.053	0.461 ***	0.057
Historical Period 50 (1993)	0.768 ***	0.037	0.953 ***	0.051	0.810 ***	0.038	1.012 ***	0.056	1.010 ***	0.056	0.987 ***	0.060
Historical Period 55 (1999)	1.160 ***	0.042	1.487 ***	0.056	1.227 ***	0.043	1.525 ***	0.062	1.525 ***	0.062	1.499 ***	0.066
Male	1.240 ***	0.028	1.557 ***	0.049	1.304 ***	0.035	1.604 ***	0.050	1.602 ***	0.053	1.582 ***	0.058
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)			-0.137 *	0.067			-0.124 +	0.068	-0.121 +	0.068	-0.151 +	0.081
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)			-0.334 ***	0.071			-0.335 ***	0.073	-0.330 ***	0.073	-0.282 ***	0.087
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)			-0.653 ***	0.076			-0.674 ***	0.077	-0.673 ***	0.077	-0.617 ***	0.097
Muslim					-1.046 ***	0.070	-1.068 ***	0.090	-0.993 ***	0.103	-0.968 ***	0.122
Scheduled Caste					-0.659 ***	0.060	-0.604 ***	0.080	-0.763 ***	0.098	-0.886 ***	0.145
Scheduled Tribe					-0.432 ***	0.075	-0.616 ***	0.104	-0.464 ***	0.118	-0.478 **	0.153
Muslim*Male					-0.176 +	0.091			-0.123	0.091	-0.163	0.163
Scheduled Caste*Male					0.154 +	0.080			0.240 **	0.082	0.426 *	0.174
Scheduled Tribe*Male					-0.295 **	0.098			-0.236 *	0.099	-0.211	0.186
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)							-0.150	0.125	-0.148	0.124	-0.205	0.178
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)							-0.153	0.130	-0.164	0.129	-0.105	0.174
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)							0.003	0.132	-0.011	0.130	-0.087	0.179
Scheduled Caste*Period 43							-0.095	0.109	-0.094	0.111	-0.094	0.188
Scheduled Caste*Period 50							-0.056	0.114	-0.033	0.117	0.034	0.186
Scheduled Caste*Period 55							0.188	0.116	0.229 +	0.120	0.477 **	0.182
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43							-0.002	0.145	-0.014	0.141	-0.163	0.212
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50							0.055	0.148	0.041	0.144	0.188	0.211
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55							0.033	0.144	0.006	0.142	0.031	0.204
Muslim*Male*Period 43											0.099	0.231
Muslim*Male*Period 50											-0.125	0.239
Muslim*Male*Period 55											0.139	0.247

Continued on next page

Table 22 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Fundamentalist States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE										
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43											0.010	0.228
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50											-0.093	0.236
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55											-0.446 +	0.235
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43											0.257	0.266
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50											-0.258	0.267
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55											-0.053	0.265
Age	3.322 ***	0.338	3.321 ***	0.339	3.271 ***	0.343	3.258 ***	0.344	3.278 ***	0.344	3.281 ***	0.344
Age Squared	-0.136 ***	0.013	-0.136 ***	0.013	-0.134 ***	0.013	-0.134 ***	0.013	-0.135 ***	0.013	-0.135 ***	0.013
Urban	1.059 ***	0.049	1.070 ***	0.048	1.190 ***	0.047	1.202 ***	0.047	1.203 ***	0.047	1.204 ***	0.047
Household Size	0.060 ***	0.006	0.061 ***	0.006	0.059 ***	0.006	0.059 ***	0.006	0.059 ***	0.006	0.059 ***	0.006
Log Monthly Expenditure	0.928 ***	0.049	0.941 ***	0.049	0.820 ***	0.048	0.834 ***	0.048	0.832 ***	0.048	0.831 ***	0.048
Madhya Pradesh	0.072 +	0.040	0.082 *	0.040	0.032	0.041	0.040	0.041	0.039	0.041	0.040	0.041
Maharashtra	0.830 ***	0.046	0.842 ***	0.046	0.785 ***	0.047	0.794 ***	0.047	0.794 ***	0.047	0.796 ***	0.047
Rajasthan	-0.381 ***	0.041	-0.375 ***	0.041	-0.391 ***	0.042	-0.383 ***	0.042	-0.383 ***	0.042	-0.381 ***	0.042
New Delhi	0.408 *	0.193	0.403 *	0.187	0.363 +	0.186	0.353 +	0.182	0.359 *	0.182	0.357 +	0.183
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	0.280 ***	0.050	0.286 ***	0.050	0.240 ***	0.052	0.243 ***	0.052	0.245 ***	0.052	0.246 ***	0.052
Intercept	-27.07 ***	2.270	-27.32 ***	2.277	-25.78 ***	2.303	-25.96 ***	2.311	-26.07 ***	2.312	-26.08 ***	2.312

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Table 22 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Fundamental States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE								
Wald Test												
Variables Tested			mper43 = 0		musmale = 0		musper43 = 0		musmale = 0		musmaleper43 = 0	
			mper50 = 0		scmale = 0		musper50 = 0		scmale = 0		musmaleper50 = 0	
			mper55 = 0		stmale = 0		musper55 = 0		stmale = 0		musmaleper55 = 0	
							scper43 = 0				scmaleper43 = 0	
							scper50 = 0				scmaleper50 = 0	
							scper55 = 0				scmaleper55 = 0	
							stper43 = 0				stmaleper43 = 0	
							stper50 = 0				stmaleper50 = 0	
							stper55 = 0				stmaleper55 = 0	
Number of Variables Tested			3		3		9		3		9	
chi2			82.3		18.5		9.4		18.9		10.8	
Prob > chi2			0.000		0.000		0.403		0.000		0.287	

+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***<.001

Table 23 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Non-Fundamentalist States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Above the Poverty Line

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Independent Variables												
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.198 ***	0.033	0.301 ***	0.045	0.227 ***	0.033	0.348 ***	0.052	0.348 ***	0.052	0.360 ***	0.057
Historical Period 50 (1993)	0.709 ***	0.038	0.865 ***	0.049	0.749 ***	0.037	0.898 ***	0.055	0.903 ***	0.055	0.890 ***	0.060
Historical Period 55 (1999)	1.004 ***	0.039	1.281 ***	0.053	1.086 ***	0.039	1.378 ***	0.062	1.385 ***	0.063	1.399 ***	0.070
Male	0.756 ***	0.025	1.031 ***	0.048	0.771 ***	0.032	1.053 ***	0.049	1.038 ***	0.052	1.044 ***	0.061
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)			-0.193 **	0.063			-0.184 **	0.064	-0.186 **	0.064	-0.209 **	0.080
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)			-0.297 ***	0.069			-0.297 ***	0.069	-0.308 ***	0.069	-0.281 ***	0.085
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)			-0.548 ***	0.074			-0.564 ***	0.075	-0.578 ***	0.075	-0.608 ***	0.099
Muslim					-0.737 ***	0.054	-0.775 ***	0.072	-0.744 ***	0.080	-0.706 ***	0.097
Scheduled Caste					-0.573 ***	0.050	-0.516 ***	0.075	-0.623 ***	0.083	-0.688 ***	0.097
Scheduled Tribe					-0.736 ***	0.085	-0.694 ***	0.107	-0.676 ***	0.119	-0.535 ***	0.141
Muslim*Male					-0.097	0.072			-0.061	0.073	-0.136	0.130
Scheduled Caste*Male					0.113	0.069			0.179 *	0.070	0.285 *	0.140
Scheduled Tribe*Male					-0.074	0.105			-0.031	0.103	-0.287	0.202
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)							-0.120	0.095	-0.118	0.094	-0.205	0.125
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)							0.162	0.109	0.160	0.109	0.154	0.148
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)							-0.040	0.110	-0.041	0.109	-0.089	0.152
Scheduled Caste*Period 43							-0.077	0.097	-0.070	0.098	0.040	0.129
Scheduled Caste*Period 50							0.003	0.102	0.019	0.103	0.146	0.134
Scheduled Caste*Period 55							0.037	0.105	0.056	0.106	0.078	0.140
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43							0.097	0.140	0.097	0.139	-0.184	0.188
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50							-0.174	0.192	-0.173	0.191	-0.295	0.226
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55							-0.170	0.147	-0.172	0.147	-0.303	0.202
Muslim*Male*Period 43											0.167	0.172
Muslim*Male*Period 50											0.008	0.203
Muslim*Male*Period 55											0.094	0.210

Continued on next page

Table 23 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Non-Fundamentalist States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE										
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43											-0.182	0.186
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50											-0.228	0.189
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55											-0.015	0.202
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43											0.515 +	0.266
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50											0.217	0.300
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55											0.239	0.284
Age	2.749 ***	0.320	2.742 ***	0.320	2.716 ***	0.321	2.703 ***	0.321	2.705 ***	0.321	2.708 ***	0.321
Age Squared	-0.113 ***	0.012	-0.113 ***	0.012	-0.112 ***	0.012	-0.112 ***	0.012	-0.112 ***	0.012	-0.112 ***	0.012
Urban	0.841 ***	0.035	0.845 ***	0.036	0.849 ***	0.035	0.853 ***	0.036	0.853 ***	0.036	0.853 ***	0.036
Household Size	0.054 ***	0.006	0.054 ***	0.006	0.055 ***	0.006	0.055 ***	0.006	0.055 ***	0.006	0.055 ***	0.006
Log Monthly Expenditure	1.017 ***	0.044	1.022 ***	0.044	0.950 ***	0.043	0.955 ***	0.043	0.955 ***	0.043	0.955 ***	0.043
Andra Pradesh	-0.569 ***	0.049	-0.573 ***	0.049	-0.614 ***	0.048	-0.613 ***	0.047	-0.615 ***	0.047	-0.616 ***	0.047
Assam	0.960 ***	0.061	0.962 ***	0.061	1.119 ***	0.064	1.118 ***	0.064	1.117 ***	0.064	1.117 ***	0.064
J&K	0.177 **	0.058	0.175 **	0.058	0.506 ***	0.061	0.533 ***	0.063	0.531 ***	0.063	0.532 ***	0.063
Orissa	0.175 **	0.056	0.171 **	0.056	0.149 **	0.056	0.149 **	0.056	0.147 **	0.056	0.148 **	0.056
West Bengal	0.435 ***	0.050	0.433 ***	0.050	0.571 ***	0.050	0.573 ***	0.050	0.572 ***	0.050	0.572 ***	0.050
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	0.221 ***	0.053	0.220 ***	0.053	0.175 ***	0.054	0.175 ***	0.054	0.175 ***	0.054	0.175 ***	0.054
Kerele/Lakshadweep	1.766 ***	0.072	1.775 ***	0.072	1.919 ***	0.073	1.939 ***	0.074	1.937 ***	0.073	1.936 ***	0.074
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	0.271 ***	0.052	0.265 ***	0.052	0.284 ***	0.053	0.284 ***	0.053	0.284 ***	0.053	0.284 ***	0.053
Northeast	1.069 ***	0.059	1.069 ***	0.059	1.354 ***	0.069	1.354 ***	0.068	1.350 ***	0.068	1.350 ***	0.068
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	-0.132 *	0.051	-0.135 **	0.051	-0.157 **	0.051	-0.157 **	0.051	-0.157 **	0.051	-0.156 **	0.051
Intercept	-23.52 ***	2.176	-23.64 ***	2.179	-22.67 ***	2.180	-22.76 ***	2.181	-22.77 ***	2.180	-22.78 ***	2.180

Continued on next page

Table 23 Enrollment Step-Wise Regression Results for Non-Fundamentalist States Combined for Children ages 12 to 15 Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE								
Wald Test			mper43 = 0		musmale = 0		musper43 = 0		musmale = 0		musmaleper43 = 0	
Variables Tested			mper50 = 0		scmale = 0		musper50 = 0		scmale = 0		musmaleper50 = 0	
			mper55 = 0		stmale = 0		musper55 = 0		stmale = 0		musmaleper55 = 0	
							scper43 = 0				scmaleper43 = 0	
							scper50 = 0				scmaleper50 = 0	
							scper55 = 0				scmaleper55 = 0	
							stper43 = 0				stmaleper43 = 0	
							stper50 = 0				stmaleper50 = 0	
							stper55 = 0				stmaleper55 = 0	
Number of Variables Tested			3		3		9		3		9	
chi2			57.3		6.1		14.6		8.8		7.8	
Prob > chi2			0.000		0.106		0.1029		0.0324		0.56	

+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***<.001

Table 24 Educational Enrollment Predicted Probabilities for Children ages 12-15 by Religion and Gender

	Muslim Male	Muslim Female	Muslim Gender Difference	Muslim Gender Ratio	Non- Scheduled Caste Hindu Male	Non- Scheduled Caste Hindu Female	Non- Scheduled Caste Hindu Gender Difference	Non- Scheduled Caste Hindu Gender Ratio
All States								
1983	0.5149	0.2691	0.2458	0.5226	0.7311	0.4330	0.2981	0.5923
1987	0.5443	0.3105	0.2338	0.5705	0.7789	0.5277	0.2512	0.6775
1993	0.6471	0.4666	0.1805	0.7211	0.8320	0.6528	0.1792	0.7846
1999	0.6664	0.5666	0.0998	0.8502	0.8553	0.7440	0.1113	0.8699
Fundamentalist								
1983	0.4600	0.1761	0.2839	0.3828	0.7254	0.3656	0.3598	0.5040
1987	0.4835	0.2161	0.2674	0.4469	0.7763	0.4604	0.3159	0.5931
1993	0.5712	0.3365	0.2347	0.5891	0.8250	0.5822	0.2428	0.7057
1999	0.6594	0.4598	0.1996	0.6973	0.8536	0.7015	0.1521	0.8218
Non-Fundamentalist								
1983	0.5507	0.3367	0.2140	0.6114	0.7292	0.4810	0.2482	0.6596
1987	0.5834	0.3747	0.2087	0.6423	0.7722	0.5741	0.1981	0.7435
1993	0.6979	0.5683	0.1296	0.8143	0.8310	0.7018	0.1292	0.8445
1999	0.6702	0.6356	0.0346	0.9484	0.8496	0.7715	0.0781	0.9081

Table 25 Educational Enrollment Predicted Probabilities for Children ages 12-15
Below and Above the Poverty Line by Religion and Gender

	Muslim Male	Muslim Female	Muslim Gender Diff.	Muslim Gender Ratio	Non-Scheduled Caste Hindu Male	Non-Scheduled Caste Hindu Female	Non-Scheduled Caste Hindu Gender Diff.	Non-Scheduled Caste Hindu Gender Ratio
Below Poverty Line								
All States								
1983	0.3899	0.1785	0.2114	0.4578	0.6033	0.2996	0.3037	0.4966
1987	0.4061	0.2081	0.1980	0.5124	0.6590	0.6590	0.0000	1.0000
1993	0.5250	0.3514	0.1736	0.6693	0.7267	0.5094	0.2173	0.7010
1999	0.5026	0.4537	0.0489	0.9027	0.7617	0.6001	0.1616	0.7878
Fundamentalist								
1983	0.3722	0.1260	0.2462	0.3385	0.6338	0.2903	0.3435	0.4580
1987	0.3642	0.1575	0.2067	0.4325	0.6735	0.3376	0.3359	0.5013
1993	0.4776	0.2594	0.2182	0.5431	0.7296	0.4532	0.2764	0.6212
1999	0.5595	0.3876	0.1719	0.6928	0.7816	0.6019	0.1797	0.7701
Non-Fundamentalist								
1983	0.4026	0.2194	0.1832	0.5450	0.5771	0.3053	0.2718	0.5290
1987	0.4361	0.2481	0.1880	0.5689	0.6436	0.3795	0.2641	0.5897
1993	0.5589	0.4250	0.1339	0.7604	0.7226	0.5554	0.1672	0.7686
1999	0.4636	0.4979	-0.0343	1.0740	0.7404	0.5966	0.1438	0.8058
Above Poverty Line								
All States								
1983	0.5968	0.3349	0.2619	0.5612	0.7963	0.5183	0.2780	0.6509
1987	0.6307	0.3799	0.2508	0.6023	0.8321	0.6176	0.2145	0.7422
1993	0.7337	0.5531	0.1806	0.7539	0.8829	0.7313	0.1516	0.8283
1999	0.7763	0.6506	0.1257	0.8381	0.9010	0.8176	0.0834	0.9074
Fundamentalist								
1983	0.5345	0.2174	0.3171	0.4067	0.7805	0.4224	0.3581	0.5412
1987	0.5848	0.2641	0.3207	0.4516	0.8290	0.5369	0.2921	0.6476
1993	0.6487	0.4017	0.2470	0.6192	0.8781	0.6625	0.2156	0.7545
1999	0.7451	0.5327	0.2124	0.7149	0.8958	0.7661	0.1297	0.8552
Non-Fundamentalist								
1983	0.6339	0.4111	0.2228	0.6485	0.8007	0.5856	0.2151	0.7314
1987	0.6597	0.4491	0.2106	0.6808	0.8236	0.6695	0.1541	0.8129
1993	0.7892	0.6647	0.1245	0.8422	0.8807	0.7749	0.1058	0.8799
1999	0.7935	0.7214	0.0721	0.9091	0.8986	0.8514	0.0472	0.9475

Table 26 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States

	Model 1		Model 2				Model 3					
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Historical Period 43 (1987)	-0.031 *	0.012	0.002	0.014	0.068 ***	0.020	0.028	0.017	-0.027 *	0.013	0.003	0.014
Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.084 ***	0.013	0.035 *	0.015	-0.127 ***	0.021	0.034 +	0.018	-0.056 ***	0.013	0.055 ***	0.015
Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.182 ***	0.014	-0.089 ***	0.016	-0.236 ***	0.022	-0.131 ***	0.019	-0.131 ***	0.015	-0.051 **	0.017
Male	-0.200 ***	0.008	-5.082 ***	0.020	-0.207 ***	0.015	-5.136 ***	0.038	-0.213 ***	0.011	-5.120 ***	0.025
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)					-0.140 ***	0.020	0.156 ***	0.043				
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)					0.061 **	0.021	-0.146 ***	0.046				
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)					0.076 ***	0.023	0.169 ***	0.049				
Muslim									-0.139 ***	0.034	0.543 ***	0.027
Scheduled Caste									-1.247 ***	0.021	-0.928 ***	0.017
Scheduled Tribe									-0.381 ***	0.023	-1.020 ***	0.023
Muslim*Male									0.078 *	0.036	-0.699 ***	0.053
Scheduled Caste*Male									0.128 ***	0.021	0.442 ***	0.043
Scheduled Tribe*Male									-0.052 *	0.021	0.793 ***	0.061
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)												
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)												
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)												
Scheduled Caste*Period 43												
Scheduled Caste*Period 50												
Scheduled Caste*Period 55												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55												
Muslim*Male*Period 43												
Muslim*Male*Period 50												

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Table 26 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Continued

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Muslim*Male*Period 55												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55												
Age	-0.009 +	0.005	-0.220 ***	0.006	-0.009 +	0.005	-0.220 ***	0.006	-0.018 ***	0.005	-0.230 ***	0.006
Age Squared	0.000 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.000 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.000 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000
Urban	-0.613 ***	0.013	0.671 ***	0.015	-0.612 ***	0.013	0.672 ***	0.015	-0.676 ***	0.014	0.554 ***	0.015
Household Size	0.195 ***	0.003	0.241 ***	0.004	0.195 ***	0.003	0.241 ***	0.004	0.186 ***	0.004	0.235 ***	0.004
Primary School	0.543 ***	0.012	0.921 ***	0.016	0.545 ***	0.012	0.921 ***	0.016	0.432 ***	0.012	0.791 ***	0.016
Middle School	0.444 ***	0.013	1.099 ***	0.018	0.442 ***	0.013	1.099 ***	0.018	0.259 ***	0.013	0.945 ***	0.019
College	-0.369 ***	0.026	0.193 ***	0.041	-0.372 ***	0.026	0.196 ***	0.041	-0.621 ***	0.027	-0.003	0.043
Never Married	0.144 ***	0.021	0.785 ***	0.044	0.142 ***	0.021	0.786 ***	0.044	0.108 ***	0.021	0.772 ***	0.043
Widow/Divorced/Separated	-0.212 ***	0.017	-0.750 ***	0.020	-0.214 ***	0.017	-0.751 ***	0.020	-0.218 ***	0.017	-0.771 ***	0.021
Number of Kids in Household	-0.105 ***	0.005	-0.160 ***	0.006	-0.105 ***	0.005	-0.160 ***	0.006	-0.096 ***	0.005	-0.164 ***	0.006
Andra Pradesh	-0.778 ***	0.022	-1.883 ***	0.026	-0.778 ***	0.022	-1.883 ***	0.026	-0.890 ***	0.022	-1.926 ***	0.026
Assam	-0.724 ***	0.027	0.107 ***	0.033	-0.725 ***	0.027	0.105 **	0.033	-0.833 ***	0.028	0.064 +	0.035
Bihar	-0.735 ***	0.021	-0.234 ***	0.023	-0.735 ***	0.021	-0.234 ***	0.023	-0.795 ***	0.021	-0.233 ***	0.024
Jammu and Kashmir	-0.238 ***	0.035	0.557 ***	0.038	-0.237 ***	0.035	0.547 ***	0.038	-0.370 ***	0.036	0.310 ***	0.042
Madhya Pradesh	-0.530 ***	0.022	-1.557 ***	0.026	-0.531 ***	0.022	-1.557 ***	0.025	-0.553 ***	0.023	-1.370 ***	0.026
Maharashtra	-1.021 ***	0.022	-2.115 ***	0.025	-1.021 ***	0.022	-2.115 ***	0.025	-1.134 ***	0.022	-2.123 ***	0.026
Orissa	-0.887 ***	0.026	-0.799 ***	0.028	-0.888 ***	0.026	-0.799 ***	0.028	-0.893 ***	0.028	-0.596 ***	0.029
Rajasthan	0.157 ***	0.024	-0.789 ***	0.028	0.157 ***	0.024	-0.790 ***	0.028	0.152 ***	0.025	-0.681 ***	0.029

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Table 26 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Continued

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
West Bengal	-0.957 ***	0.023	-0.185 ***	0.026	-0.958 ***	0.023	-0.184 ***	0.026	-0.890 ***	0.024	-0.121 ***	0.026
New Delhi	-0.863 ***	0.073	-0.737 ***	0.082	-0.862 ***	0.073	-0.734 ***	0.082	-0.874 ***	0.076	-0.679 ***	0.078
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	-1.193 ***	0.023	-1.912 ***	0.026	-1.194 ***	0.023	-1.913 ***	0.026	-1.237 ***	0.023	-1.908 ***	0.026
Kerele/Lakshadweep	-1.785 ***	0.029	-1.333 ***	0.034	-1.785 ***	0.029	-1.332 ***	0.034	-1.877 ***	0.030	-1.462 ***	0.034
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	-0.901 ***	0.027	-1.381 ***	0.030	-0.902 ***	0.027	-1.382 ***	0.030	-0.987 ***	0.028	-1.310 ***	0.031
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	-0.639 ***	0.028	-0.288 ***	0.033	-0.640 ***	0.028	-0.288 ***	0.033	-0.501 ***	0.028	-0.128 ***	0.033
Northeast	-0.204 ***	0.031	-0.758 ***	0.030	-0.204 ***	0.030	-0.759 ***	0.030	-0.187 ***	0.033	-0.394 ***	0.032
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	-0.875 ***	0.025	-1.589 ***	0.028	-0.875 ***	0.025	-1.590 ***	0.028	-0.968 ***	0.025	-1.616 ***	0.029
Intercept	-0.132	0.091	4.805 ***	0.111	-0.124	0.092	4.813 ***	0.112	0.482 ***	0.094	5.347 ***	0.114

Continued on next page

Table 26 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Continued

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Wald Test								
Variables Tested	[2]mper43 = 0				[2]musmale = 0			
	[3]mper43 = 0				[3]musmale = 0			
	[2]mper50 = 0				[2]scmale = 0			
	[3]mper50 = 0				[3]scmale = 0			
	[2]mper55 = 0				[2]stmale = 0			
	[3]mper55 = 0				[3]stmale = 0			
Number of Variables Tested	6				6			
chi2	272.2				659.5			
Prob > chi2	0.000				0.000			

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Table 26 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Other		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.058 *	0.023	0.001	0.021	0.060 **	0.023	0.003	0.022	0.020	0.026	-0.032	0.024
Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.090 ***	0.023	0.013	0.022	-0.088 ***	0.023	0.015	0.022	-0.115 ***	0.027	-0.016	0.024
Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.175 ***	0.026	-0.107 ***	0.025	-0.172 ***	0.026	-0.104 ***	0.025	-0.224 ***	0.030	-0.147 ***	0.028
Male	-0.190 ***	0.015	-5.167 ***	0.039	-0.215 ***	0.017	-5.166 ***	0.040	-0.259 ***	0.020	-5.277 ***	0.047
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)	-0.143 ***	0.020	0.174 ***	0.045	-0.146 ***	0.021	0.162 ***	0.044	-0.090 ***	0.027	0.286 ***	0.054
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)	0.057 **	0.021	-0.133 **	0.047	0.055 **	0.021	-0.151 ***	0.046	0.092 ***	0.028	-0.001	0.057
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)	0.079 ***	0.024	0.169 ***	0.051	0.075 **	0.024	0.146 **	0.050	0.147 ***	0.032	0.288 ***	0.065
Muslim	-0.151 ***	0.029	0.404 ***	0.033	-0.213 ***	0.041	0.508 ***	0.040	-0.327 ***	0.057	0.436 ***	0.045
Scheduled Caste	-1.184 ***	0.025	-0.936 ***	0.032	-1.269 ***	0.030	-0.999 ***	0.032	-1.312 ***	0.039	-1.058 ***	0.034
Scheduled Tribe	-0.290 ***	0.033	-1.034 ***	0.042	-0.258 ***	0.035	-1.057 ***	0.041	-0.350 ***	0.040	-1.132 ***	0.043
Muslim*Male					0.078 *	0.036	-0.704 ***	0.053	0.223 ***	0.060	-0.546 ***	0.107
Scheduled Caste*Male					0.127 ***	0.021	0.440 ***	0.043	0.187 ***	0.039	0.819 ***	0.094
Scheduled Tribe*Male					-0.056 **	0.021	0.778 ***	0.062	0.085 +	0.043	1.124 ***	0.159
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)	0.092 *	0.040	-0.026	0.045	0.096 *	0.040	-0.010	0.049	0.138 +	0.081	0.054	0.064
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)	0.147 ***	0.041	0.114 *	0.047	0.146 ***	0.041	0.117 *	0.052	0.206 *	0.086	0.157 *	0.067
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)	0.046	0.046	0.009	0.052	0.045	0.046	0.029	0.058	0.342 ***	0.096	0.182 *	0.075
Scheduled Caste*Period 43	0.114 ***	0.034	0.074 +	0.041	0.114 ***	0.034	0.065	0.040	0.225 ***	0.053	0.138 **	0.045
Scheduled Caste*Period 50	-0.014	0.035	0.110 **	0.041	-0.016	0.035	0.108 **	0.040	-0.021	0.056	0.168 ***	0.045
Scheduled Caste*Period 55	0.005	0.038	0.103 *	0.043	0.004	0.038	0.096 *	0.042	0.057	0.058	0.181 ***	0.048
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43	-0.113 **	0.042	0.156 **	0.053	-0.113 **	0.043	0.135 **	0.052	-0.021	0.056	0.216 ***	0.057
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50	-0.181 ***	0.045	0.120 *	0.056	-0.180 ***	0.045	0.115 *	0.055	-0.055	0.058	0.226 ***	0.060
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55	-0.152 **	0.049	-0.049	0.059	-0.152 **	0.049	-0.060	0.058	-0.026	0.062	0.029	0.063
Muslim*Male*Period 43									-0.058	0.084	-0.310 *	0.142
Muslim*Male*Period 50									-0.078	0.090	-0.121	0.144

Continued on next page

Table 26 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Muslim*Male*Period 55									-0.370 ***	0.102	-0.182	0.153
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43									-0.163 **	0.054	-0.299 *	0.117
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50									0.005	0.057	-0.521 ***	0.125
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55									-0.076	0.060	-0.559 ***	0.130
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43									-0.139 *	0.059	-0.400 *	0.185
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50									-0.195 ***	0.059	-0.635 **	0.204
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55									-0.193 **	0.061	-0.310	0.195
Age	-0.018 ***	0.005	-0.229 ***	0.006	-0.018 ***	0.005	-0.230 ***	0.006	-0.018 ***	0.005	-0.230 ***	0.006
Age Squared	0.000 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.000 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.000 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000
Urban	-0.674 ***	0.014	0.551 ***	0.015	-0.675 ***	0.014	0.555 ***	0.015	-0.675 ***	0.014	0.555 ***	0.015
Household Size	0.186 ***	0.004	0.234 ***	0.004	0.186 ***	0.004	0.235 ***	0.004	0.186 ***	0.004	0.235 ***	0.004
Primary School	0.435 ***	0.012	0.796 ***	0.016	0.434 ***	0.012	0.792 ***	0.016	0.434 ***	0.012	0.792 ***	0.016
Middle School	0.256 ***	0.013	0.947 ***	0.019	0.256 ***	0.013	0.946 ***	0.019	0.257 ***	0.013	0.947 ***	0.019
College	-0.630 ***	0.027	0.001	0.043	-0.626 ***	0.027	0.001	0.043	-0.626 ***	0.027	0.001	0.043
Never Married	0.107 ***	0.021	0.769 ***	0.044	0.107 ***	0.021	0.774 ***	0.043	0.106 ***	0.021	0.775 ***	0.043
Widow/Divorced/Separated	-0.219 ***	0.017	-0.767 ***	0.020	-0.220 ***	0.017	-0.772 ***	0.021	-0.220 ***	0.017	-0.772 ***	0.021
Number of Kids in Household	-0.097 ***	0.005	-0.164 ***	0.006	-0.096 ***	0.005	-0.164 ***	0.006	-0.096 ***	0.005	-0.164 ***	0.006
Andra Pradesh	-0.890 ***	0.022	-1.926 ***	0.026	-0.889 ***	0.022	-1.926 ***	0.026	-0.888 ***	0.022	-1.926 ***	0.026
Assam	-0.837 ***	0.029	0.058 +	0.035	-0.835 ***	0.028	0.065 +	0.035	-0.835 ***	0.028	0.064 +	0.035
Bihar	-0.797 ***	0.021	-0.236 ***	0.023	-0.795 ***	0.021	-0.234 ***	0.024	-0.795 ***	0.021	-0.234 ***	0.024
Jammu and Kashmir	-0.353 ***	0.037	0.249 ***	0.039	-0.354 ***	0.037	0.313 ***	0.042	-0.354 ***	0.037	0.313 ***	0.042
Madhya Pradesh	-0.555 ***	0.023	-1.379 ***	0.026	-0.554 ***	0.023	-1.371 ***	0.026	-0.554 ***	0.023	-1.371 ***	0.026
Maharashtra	-1.135 ***	0.022	-2.121 ***	0.025	-1.134 ***	0.022	-2.123 ***	0.026	-1.134 ***	0.022	-2.123 ***	0.026
Orissa	-0.896 ***	0.028	-0.599 ***	0.029	-0.893 ***	0.028	-0.596 ***	0.029	-0.893 ***	0.028	-0.596 ***	0.029

Continued on next page

Table 26 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Other		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Rajasthan	0.151 ***	0.025	-0.684 ***	0.029	0.152 ***	0.025	-0.682 ***	0.029	0.152 ***	0.025	-0.681 ***	0.029
West Bengal	-0.888 ***	0.024	-0.123 ***	0.026	-0.890 ***	0.024	-0.120 ***	0.026	-0.889 ***	0.024	-0.120 ***	0.026
New Delhi	-0.874 ***	0.076	-0.673 ***	0.078	-0.873 ***	0.076	-0.675 ***	0.078	-0.873 ***	0.076	-0.676 ***	0.078
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	-1.239 ***	0.023	-1.912 ***	0.026	-1.236 ***	0.023	-1.909 ***	0.026	-1.236 ***	0.023	-1.910 ***	0.026
Kerele/Lakshadweep	-1.879 ***	0.030	-1.455 ***	0.034	-1.876 ***	0.030	-1.461 ***	0.034	-1.877 ***	0.030	-1.461 ***	0.034
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	-0.990 ***	0.028	-1.314 ***	0.031	-0.988 ***	0.028	-1.310 ***	0.031	-0.988 ***	0.028	-1.311 ***	0.031
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	-0.500 ***	0.028	-0.120 ***	0.034	-0.501 ***	0.028	-0.129 ***	0.033	-0.501 ***	0.028	-0.128 ***	0.033
Northeast	-0.188 ***	0.033	-0.391 ***	0.033	-0.184 ***	0.033	-0.394 ***	0.033	-0.183 ***	0.033	-0.393 ***	0.033
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	-0.969 ***	0.025	-1.616 ***	0.029	-0.967 ***	0.025	-1.616 ***	0.029	-0.967 ***	0.025	-1.616 ***	0.029
Intercept	0.474 ***	0.094	5.349 ***	0.114	0.484 ***	0.094	5.370 ***	0.115	0.518 ***	0.095	5.401 ***	0.115

Continued on next page

Table 26 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Continued

	Model 4		Other		Model 5		Unemp./Out LF		Model 6		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Wald Test												
Variables Tested	[2]musper43 = 0				[2]musmale = 0				[2]musmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]musper43 = 0				[3]musmale = 0				[3]musmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]musper50 = 0				[2]scmale = 0				[2]musmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]musper50 = 0				[3]scmale = 0				[3]musmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]musper55 = 0				[2]stmale = 0				[2]musmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]musper55 = 0				[3]stmale = 0				[3]musmaleper55 = 0			
	[2]scper43 = 0								[2]scmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]scper43 = 0								[3]scmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]scper50 = 0								[2]scmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]scper50 = 0								[3]scmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]scper55 = 0								[2]scmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]scper55 = 0								[3]scmaleper55 = 0			
	[2]stper43 = 0								[2]stmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]stper43 = 0								[3]stmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]stper50 = 0								[2]stmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]stper50 = 0								[3]stmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]stper55 = 0								[2]stmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]stper55 = 0								[3]stmaleper55 = 0			
Number of Variables Tested	18				6				18			
chi2	114.6				651.3				76.5			
Prob > chi2	0.000				0.000				0.000			

+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***<.001

Table 27 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist States

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Historical Period 43 (1987)	-0.123 ***	0.018	-0.082 ***	0.022	-0.016	0.028	-0.046 +	0.026	-0.116 ***	0.019	-0.079 ***	0.022
Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.163 ***	0.019	0.091 ***	0.023	-0.194 ***	0.030	0.108 ***	0.027	-0.147 ***	0.020	0.101 ***	0.023
Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.283 ***	0.022	-0.084 ***	0.026	-0.340 ***	0.032	-0.133 ***	0.031	-0.234 ***	0.023	-0.042	0.026
Male	-0.253 ***	0.013	-5.172 ***	0.034	-0.253 ***	0.021	-5.210 ***	0.064	-0.260 ***	0.018	-5.235 ***	0.042
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)					-0.157 ***	0.028	0.227 **	0.073				
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)					0.044	0.030	-0.330 ***	0.078				
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)					0.084 *	0.035	0.210 *	0.086				
Muslim									-0.188 ***	0.052	0.454 ***	0.046
Scheduled Caste									-1.229 ***	0.031	-1.014 ***	0.028
Scheduled Tribe									-0.593 ***	0.033	-1.077 ***	0.035
Muslim*Male									0.128 *	0.055	-0.541 ***	0.093
Scheduled Caste*Male									0.109 ***	0.031	0.483 ***	0.071
Scheduled Tribe*Male									-0.045	0.031	1.129 ***	0.109
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)												
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)												
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)												
Scheduled Caste*Period 43												
Scheduled Caste*Period 50												
Scheduled Caste*Period 55												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55												
Muslim*Male*Period 43												
Muslim*Male*Period 50												

Continued on next page

Table 27 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalistic States Continued

	Model 1		Unemp./Out LF		Model 2		Unemp./Out LF		Model 3		Unemp./Out LF	
	Self Employed				Self Employed				Self Employed			
	Coef.	SE										
Muslim*Male*Period 55												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55												
Age	-0.026 ***	0.007	-0.224 ***	0.009	-0.026 ***	0.007	-0.224 ***	0.009	-0.036 ***	0.008	-0.236 ***	0.010
Age Squared	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000
Urban	-0.694 ***	0.021	0.880 ***	0.026	-0.693 ***	0.021	0.881 ***	0.026	-0.756 ***	0.023	0.753 ***	0.027
Household Size	0.211 ***	0.006	0.247 ***	0.006	0.211 ***	0.006	0.247 ***	0.006	0.200 ***	0.006	0.238 ***	0.006
Primary School	0.378 ***	0.019	0.809 ***	0.027	0.379 ***	0.019	0.809 ***	0.027	0.249 ***	0.020	0.664 ***	0.028
Middle School	0.237 ***	0.021	0.962 ***	0.031	0.233 ***	0.021	0.962 ***	0.031	0.032	0.022	0.783 ***	0.033
College	-0.520 ***	0.042	-0.023	0.063	-0.524 ***	0.042	-0.019	0.064	-0.798 ***	0.043	-0.247 ***	0.068
Never Married	0.164 ***	0.037	0.917 ***	0.085	0.163 ***	0.037	0.918 ***	0.085	0.103 **	0.037	0.884 ***	0.084
Widow/Divorced/Separated	-0.168 ***	0.025	-0.618 ***	0.033	-0.169 ***	0.025	-0.619 ***	0.033	-0.169 ***	0.026	-0.637 ***	0.033
Number of Kids in Household	-0.122 ***	0.008	-0.175 ***	0.009	-0.122 ***	0.008	-0.174 ***	0.009	-0.112 ***	0.008	-0.175 ***	0.009
Madhya Pradesh	-0.542 ***	0.022	-1.600 ***	0.027	-0.542 ***	0.022	-1.601 ***	0.027	-0.507 ***	0.024	-1.407 ***	0.028
Maharashtra	-0.995 ***	0.022	-2.173 ***	0.027	-0.995 ***	0.022	-2.173 ***	0.027	-1.083 ***	0.024	-2.180 ***	0.029
Rajasthan	0.147 ***	0.024	-0.816 ***	0.029	0.146 ***	0.024	-0.818 ***	0.029	0.171 ***	0.026	-0.706 ***	0.030
New Delhi	-0.750 ***	0.075	-0.833 ***	0.089	-0.748 ***	0.075	-0.827 ***	0.090	-0.756 ***	0.079	-0.766 ***	0.084
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	-0.883 ***	0.028	-1.420 ***	0.031	-0.883 ***	0.028	-1.421 ***	0.031	-0.931 ***	0.029	-1.348 ***	0.033
Intercept	0.332 *	0.141	5.001 ***	0.180	0.337 *	0.142	5.005 ***	0.180	1.004 ***	0.144	5.635 ***	0.182

Continued on next page

Table 27 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist States Continued

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3					
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF			
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE		
Wald Test														
Variables Tested					[2]imper43 = 0					[2]musmale = 0				
					[3]imper43 = 0					[3]musmale = 0				
					[2]imper50 = 0					[2]scmale = 0				
					[3]imper50 = 0					[3]scmale = 0				
					[2]imper55 = 0					[2]stmale = 0				
					[3]imper55 = 0					[3]stmale = 0				
Number of Variables Tested					6				6					
chi2					196.7				261.2					
Prob > chi2					0.000				0.000					

Continued on next page

Table 27 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist States Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.003	0.033	-0.053	0.032	0.005	0.033	-0.048	0.033	-0.083 *	0.039	-0.118 ***	0.036
Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.152 ***	0.034	0.074 *	0.033	-0.151 ***	0.034	0.075 *	0.033	-0.225 ***	0.040	0.012	0.036
Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.246 ***	0.039	-0.082 *	0.041	-0.245 ***	0.039	-0.079 +	0.041	-0.335 ***	0.047	-0.152 ***	0.047
Male	-0.225 ***	0.022	-5.218 ***	0.065	-0.249 ***	0.024	-5.258 ***	0.065	-0.342 ***	0.028	-5.410 ***	0.075
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)	-0.171 ***	0.029	0.233 **	0.075	-0.175 ***	0.029	0.210 **	0.073	-0.052	0.039	0.376 ***	0.089
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)	0.039	0.031	-0.313 ***	0.080	0.038	0.031	-0.322 ***	0.077	0.140 ***	0.040	-0.127	0.094
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)	0.072 *	0.036	0.192 *	0.089	0.070 +	0.037	0.170 +	0.087	0.196 ***	0.053	0.365 ***	0.112
Muslim	-0.234 ***	0.047	0.262 ***	0.058	-0.331 ***	0.064	0.300 ***	0.067	-0.505 ***	0.086	0.181 *	0.071
Scheduled Caste	-1.161 ***	0.036	-1.040 ***	0.042	-1.238 ***	0.042	-1.106 ***	0.043	-1.351 ***	0.053	-1.201 ***	0.046
Scheduled Tribe	-0.401 ***	0.049	-0.956 ***	0.064	-0.376 ***	0.050	-0.984 ***	0.062	-0.541 ***	0.053	-1.113 ***	0.061
Muslim*Male					0.127 *	0.055	-0.538 ***	0.093	0.354 ***	0.089	-0.313	0.213
Scheduled Caste*Male					0.114 ***	0.031	0.482 ***	0.071	0.277 ***	0.053	0.905 ***	0.134
Scheduled Tribe*Male					-0.051 +	0.031	1.107 ***	0.110	0.207 ***	0.065	1.591 ***	0.288
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)	0.203 **	0.065	0.125 +	0.076	0.207 ***	0.065	0.143 +	0.081	0.459 ***	0.124	0.362 ***	0.105
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)	0.230 ***	0.067	0.229 **	0.082	0.228 ***	0.067	0.234 **	0.087	0.253 +	0.136	0.254 *	0.112
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)	0.122	0.076	0.176 *	0.087	0.120	0.076	0.204 *	0.094	0.486 ***	0.146	0.419 ***	0.126
Scheduled Caste*Period 43	0.076	0.051	0.047	0.058	0.076	0.051	0.040	0.057	0.270 ***	0.075	0.155 *	0.066
Scheduled Caste*Period 50	-0.029	0.053	0.176 **	0.061	-0.033	0.053	0.175 **	0.059	0.121	0.081	0.298 ***	0.068
Scheduled Caste*Period 55	-0.016	0.057	0.125 +	0.064	-0.017	0.057	0.118 +	0.063	0.073	0.085	0.234 ***	0.073
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43	-0.222 ***	0.062	0.032	0.080	-0.223 ***	0.062	0.005	0.078	-0.050	0.075	0.146 +	0.081
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50	-0.272 ***	0.065	0.012	0.082	-0.271 ***	0.065	0.014	0.080	-0.080	0.079	0.176 *	0.083
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55	-0.296 ***	0.072	-0.265 **	0.092	-0.297 ***	0.072	-0.278 **	0.089	-0.054	0.088	-0.111	0.097
Muslim*Male*Period 43									-0.325 *	0.128	-0.603 *	0.259
Muslim*Male*Period 50									-0.047	0.141	-0.080	0.269

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Table 27 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist States Continued

	Model 4		Unemp./Out LF		Model 5		Unemp./Out LF		Model 6		Unemp./Out LF	
	Self Employed				Self Employed				Self Employed			
	Coef.	SE										
Muslim*Male*Period 55									-0.467 **	0.155	-0.243	0.285
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43									-0.286 ***	0.075	-0.236	0.175
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50									-0.220 **	0.082	-0.572 **	0.196
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55									-0.129	0.088	-0.692 ***	0.203
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43									-0.266 **	0.084	-0.545 +	0.324
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50									-0.298 ***	0.085	-0.890 *	0.363
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55									-0.384 ***	0.091	-0.484	0.352
Age	-0.037 ***	0.008	-0.235 ***	0.010	-0.037 ***	0.008	-0.236 ***	0.010	-0.037 ***	0.008	-0.236 ***	0.010
Age Squared	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000
Urban	-0.750 ***	0.023	0.742 ***	0.027	-0.754 ***	0.024	0.755 ***	0.028	-0.754 ***	0.024	0.755 ***	0.028
Household Size	0.201 ***	0.006	0.236 ***	0.006	0.200 ***	0.006	0.237 ***	0.006	0.201 ***	0.006	0.237 ***	0.006
Primary School	0.252 ***	0.020	0.670 ***	0.028	0.251 ***	0.020	0.665 ***	0.028	0.251 ***	0.020	0.666 ***	0.028
Middle School	0.026	0.022	0.783 ***	0.033	0.026	0.022	0.784 ***	0.033	0.027	0.022	0.786 ***	0.033
College	-0.810 ***	0.043	-0.239 ***	0.068	-0.806 ***	0.043	-0.242 ***	0.069	-0.806 ***	0.043	-0.241 ***	0.069
Never Married	0.103 **	0.037	0.857 ***	0.084	0.102 **	0.037	0.885 ***	0.084	0.102 **	0.037	0.887 ***	0.084
Widow/Divorced/Separated	-0.170 ***	0.026	-0.634 ***	0.033	-0.171 ***	0.026	-0.639 ***	0.033	-0.171 ***	0.026	-0.639 ***	0.033
Number of Kids in Household	-0.113 ***	0.008	-0.173 ***	0.009	-0.113 ***	0.008	-0.174 ***	0.009	-0.113 ***	0.008	-0.175 ***	0.009
Madhya Pradesh	-0.513 ***	0.024	-1.412 ***	0.028	-0.510 ***	0.024	-1.411 ***	0.028	-0.510 ***	0.024	-1.411 ***	0.028
Maharashtra	-1.084 ***	0.024	-2.173 ***	0.028	-1.083 ***	0.024	-2.180 ***	0.029	-1.083 ***	0.024	-2.180 ***	0.029
Rajasthan	0.169 ***	0.026	-0.704 ***	0.030	0.172 ***	0.026	-0.707 ***	0.030	0.172 ***	0.026	-0.706 ***	0.030
New Delhi	-0.758 ***	0.079	-0.755 ***	0.084	-0.756 ***	0.079	-0.761 ***	0.084	-0.755 ***	0.079	-0.762 ***	0.084
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	-0.935 ***	0.029	-1.347 ***	0.033	-0.932 ***	0.029	-1.349 ***	0.033	-0.932 ***	0.029	-1.350 ***	0.033
Intercept	0.976 ***	0.145	5.614 ***	0.182	0.984 ***	0.145	5.639 ***	0.183	1.053 ***	0.145	5.698 ***	0.183

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Table 27 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamental States Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Wald Test												
Variables Tested	[2]musper43 = 0				[2]musmale = 0				[2]musmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]musper43 = 0				[3]musmale = 0				[3]musmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]musper50 = 0				[2]scmale = 0				[2]musmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]musper50 = 0				[3]scmale = 0				[3]musmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]musper55 = 0				[2]stmale = 0				[2]musmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]musper55 = 0				[3]stmale = 0				[3]musmaleper55 = 0			
	[2]scper43 = 0								[2]scmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]scper43 = 0								[3]scmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]scper50 = 0								[2]scmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]scper50 = 0								[3]scmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]scper55 = 0								[2]scmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]scper55 = 0								[3]scmaleper55 = 0			
	[2]stper43 = 0								[2]stmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]stper43 = 0								[3]stmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]stper50 = 0								[2]stmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]stper50 = 0								[3]stmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]stper55 = 0								[2]stmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]stper55 = 0								[3]stmaleper55 = 0			
Number of Variables Tested	18				6				18			
chi2	88.6				256.0				70.5			
Prob > chi2	0.000				0.000				0.000			

+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***<.001

Table 28 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.037 *	0.016	0.060 **	0.019	0.131 ***	0.028	0.079 ***	0.023	0.038 *	0.017	0.059 **	0.019
Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.012	0.017	-0.014	0.019	-0.041	0.029	-0.021	0.024	0.023	0.017	0.011	0.020
Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.087 ***	0.019	-0.103 ***	0.021	-0.129 ***	0.031	-0.138 ***	0.025	-0.034 +	0.019	-0.067 **	0.021
Male	-0.139 ***	0.011	-5.029 ***	0.025	-0.139 ***	0.021	-5.099 ***	0.048	-0.161 ***	0.015	-5.051 ***	0.030
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)					-0.128 ***	0.028	0.115 *	0.054				
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)					0.040	0.029	-0.022	0.057				
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)					0.059 +	0.031	0.149 *	0.058				
Muslim									-0.081 +	0.046	0.591 ***	0.033
Scheduled Caste									-1.283 ***	0.029	-0.873 ***	0.021
Scheduled Tribe									-0.162 ***	0.033	-0.969 ***	0.032
Muslim*Male									0.037	0.049	-0.828 ***	0.063
Scheduled Caste*Male									0.171 ***	0.029	0.401 ***	0.054
Scheduled Tribe*Male									-0.054 +	0.030	0.632 ***	0.070
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)												
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)												
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)												
Scheduled Caste*Period 43												
Scheduled Caste*Period 50												
Scheduled Caste*Period 55												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55												
Muslim*Male*Period 43												

Continued on next page

Table 28 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Continued

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Muslim*Male*Period 50												
Muslim*Male*Period 55												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55												
Age	0.002	0.006	-0.221 ***	0.007	0.002	0.006	-0.221 ***	0.007	-0.005	0.006	-0.229 ***	0.008
Age Squared	0.000 *	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.000 *	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.000 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000
Urban	-0.511 ***	0.015	0.490 ***	0.017	-0.510 ***	0.015	0.491 ***	0.017	-0.590 ***	0.015	0.388 ***	0.017
Household Size	0.181 ***	0.004	0.238 ***	0.005	0.181 ***	0.004	0.238 ***	0.005	0.173 ***	0.004	0.234 ***	0.005
Primary School	0.676 ***	0.015	0.988 ***	0.019	0.677 ***	0.015	0.989 ***	0.019	0.576 ***	0.015	0.868 ***	0.019
Middle School	0.612 ***	0.016	1.195 ***	0.023	0.612 ***	0.016	1.195 ***	0.023	0.441 ***	0.017	1.054 ***	0.023
College	-0.214 ***	0.031	0.356 ***	0.053	-0.216 ***	0.031	0.358 ***	0.053	-0.443 ***	0.032	0.174 ***	0.053
Never Married	0.107 ***	0.025	0.733 ***	0.050	0.106 ***	0.025	0.734 ***	0.050	0.084 ***	0.026	0.728 ***	0.050
Widow/Divorced/Separated	-0.210 ***	0.023	-0.823 ***	0.025	-0.212 ***	0.023	-0.825 ***	0.025	-0.226 ***	0.024	-0.847 ***	0.026
Number of Kids in Household	-0.091 ***	0.006	-0.149 ***	0.007	-0.091 ***	0.006	-0.149 ***	0.007	-0.082 ***	0.007	-0.157 ***	0.007
Andra Pradesh	-0.039 +	0.022	-1.605 ***	0.026	-0.039 +	0.022	-1.605 ***	0.026	-0.078 ***	0.022	-1.649 ***	0.026
Assam	-0.031	0.027	0.331 ***	0.033	-0.032	0.027	0.329 ***	0.033	-0.098 ***	0.028	0.291 ***	0.035
Jammu and Kashmir	0.475 ***	0.036	0.784 ***	0.038	0.476 ***	0.036	0.780 ***	0.038	0.414 ***	0.037	0.543 ***	0.043
Orissa	-0.163 ***	0.026	-0.555 ***	0.028	-0.164 ***	0.026	-0.555 ***	0.028	-0.142 ***	0.027	-0.361 ***	0.028
West Bengal	-0.264 ***	0.023	0.060 *	0.026	-0.264 ***	0.023	0.061 *	0.026	-0.133 ***	0.024	0.115 ***	0.027

Continued on next page

Table 28 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Continued

	Model 1		Unemp./Out LF		Model 2		Unemp./Out LF		Model 3		Unemp./Out LF	
	Self Employed				Self Employed				Self Employed			
	Coef.	SE										
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	-0.493 ***	0.023	-1.627 ***	0.026	-0.493 ***	0.023	-1.627 ***	0.026	-0.454 ***	0.023	-1.627 ***	0.026
Kerele/Lakshadweep	-1.111 ***	0.030	-1.108 ***	0.034	-1.111 ***	0.030	-1.108 ***	0.034	-1.133 ***	0.030	-1.243 ***	0.035
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	0.060 *	0.028	-0.049	0.033	0.060 *	0.028	-0.049	0.033	0.279 ***	0.028	0.101 **	0.033
Northeast	0.480 ***	0.031	-0.531 ***	0.030	0.480 ***	0.031	-0.531 ***	0.030	0.469 ***	0.033	-0.177 ***	0.033
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	-0.152 ***	0.025	-1.319 ***	0.028	-0.152 ***	0.025	-1.319 ***	0.028	-0.177 ***	0.025	-1.349 ***	0.029
Intercept	-1.195 ***	0.118	4.501 ***	0.140	-1.193 ***	0.120	4.510 ***	0.141	-0.707 ***	0.122	4.990 ***	0.144

Continued on next page

Table 28 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Continued

	Model 1		Unemp./Out LF		Model 2		Unemp./Out LF		Model 3		Unemp./Out LF	
	Self Employed				Self Employed				Self Employed			
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE								
Wald Test												
Variables Tested					[2]mper43 = 0					[2]musmale = 0		
					[3]mper43 = 0					[3]musmale = 0		
					[2]mper50 = 0					[2]scmale = 0		
					[3]mper50 = 0					[3]scmale = 0		
					[2]mper55 = 0					[2]stmale = 0		
					[3]mper55 = 0					[3]stmale = 0		
Number of Variables Tested					6						6	
chi2					83.0						456.4	
Prob > chi2					0.000						0.000	

Continued on next page

Table 28 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.094 **	0.031	0.037	0.029	0.095 **	0.031	0.037	0.029	0.087 *	0.036	0.020	0.031
Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.012	0.032	-0.034	0.029	-0.010	0.032	-0.030	0.030	-0.012	0.037	-0.050	0.032
Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.095 **	0.035	-0.135 ***	0.032	-0.092 **	0.035	-0.131 ***	0.032	-0.127 **	0.041	-0.162 ***	0.035
Male	-0.131 ***	0.022	-5.146 ***	0.050	-0.161 ***	0.023	-5.118 ***	0.050	-0.178 ***	0.028	-5.210 ***	0.060
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)	-0.122 ***	0.029	0.141 *	0.056	-0.124 ***	0.029	0.136 *	0.055	-0.113 **	0.037	0.237 ***	0.058
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)	0.038	0.029	-0.016	0.059	0.035	0.029	-0.036	0.057	0.037	0.038	0.096	0.047
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)	0.069 *	0.031	0.160 **	0.061	0.064 *	0.032	0.141 *	0.059	0.113 **	0.041	0.255 ***	0.058
Muslim	-0.072 +	0.038	0.469 ***	0.040	-0.108 +	0.055	0.625 ***	0.050	-0.202 **	0.078	0.572 ***	0.068
Scheduled Caste	-1.208 ***	0.036	-0.873 ***	0.044	-1.323 ***	0.042	-0.936 ***	0.044	-1.315 ***	0.056	-0.980 ***	0.071
Scheduled Tribe	-0.222 ***	0.042	-1.136 ***	0.052	-0.186 ***	0.048	-1.156 ***	0.053	-0.220 ***	0.060	-1.196 ***	0.075
Muslim*Male					0.039	0.049	-0.832 ***	0.063	0.155 +	0.081	-0.710 ***	0.081
Scheduled Caste*Male					0.166 ***	0.029	0.398 ***	0.054	0.157 **	0.059	0.755 ***	0.085
Scheduled Tribe*Male					-0.058 +	0.030	0.618 ***	0.070	-0.007	0.056	0.876 ***	0.092
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)	0.025	0.050	-0.116 *	0.055	0.028	0.050	-0.105 +	0.062	-0.041	0.109	-0.110	0.060
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)	0.086	0.052	0.055	0.057	0.087 +	0.052	0.054	0.064	0.185	0.113	0.116	0.059
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)	-0.013	0.058	-0.083	0.065	-0.013	0.058	-0.075	0.073	0.274 *	0.130	0.056	0.062
Scheduled Caste*Period 43	0.146 **	0.047	0.100 +	0.056	0.146 **	0.047	0.088	0.054	0.177 *	0.075	0.138 *	0.079
Scheduled Caste*Period 50	0.015	0.048	0.069	0.055	0.013	0.048	0.066	0.054	-0.100	0.079	0.106 +	0.085
Scheduled Caste*Period 55	0.031	0.051	0.096 +	0.058	0.030	0.051	0.088	0.056	0.071	0.082	0.162 **	0.081
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43	0.068	0.057	0.315 ***	0.069	0.070	0.057	0.298 ***	0.067	0.107	0.084	0.350 ***	0.115
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50	-0.043	0.061	0.234 **	0.076	-0.042	0.061	0.228 **	0.074	0.034	0.087	0.305 ***	0.124
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55	0.073	0.062	0.208 **	0.072	0.074	0.061	0.198 **	0.071	0.097	0.088	0.230 **	0.152
Muslim*Male*Period 43									0.082	0.114	-0.146	0.166

Continued on next page

Table 28 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Muslim*Male*Period 50									-0.118	0.117	-0.171	0.166
Muslim*Male*Period 55									-0.348 *	0.139	-0.148	0.174
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43									-0.047	0.079	-0.335 *	0.152
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50									0.151 +	0.080	-0.510 ***	0.160
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55									-0.061	0.083	-0.482 **	0.164
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43									-0.057	0.081	-0.336 +	0.198
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50									-0.117	0.082	-0.448 *	0.220
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55									-0.031	0.082	-0.202	0.196
Age	-0.006	0.006	-0.228 ***	0.007	-0.005	0.006	-0.229 ***	0.008	-0.005	0.006	-0.229 ***	0.008
Age Squared	0.000 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.000 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.000 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000
Urban	-0.590 ***	0.015	0.390 ***	0.017	-0.590 ***	0.015	0.387 ***	0.017	-0.590 ***	0.015	0.388 ***	0.017
Household Size	0.174 ***	0.004	0.234 ***	0.005	0.173 ***	0.004	0.234 ***	0.005	0.173 ***	0.004	0.234 ***	0.005
Primary School	0.580 ***	0.015	0.873 ***	0.019	0.578 ***	0.015	0.869 ***	0.019	0.578 ***	0.015	0.869 ***	0.019
Middle School	0.439 ***	0.017	1.056 ***	0.023	0.440 ***	0.017	1.055 ***	0.023	0.440 ***	0.017	1.056 ***	0.023
College	-0.449 ***	0.032	0.175 ***	0.053	-0.445 ***	0.032	0.178 ***	0.053	-0.445 ***	0.032	0.177 ***	0.053
Never Married	0.083 ***	0.026	0.731 ***	0.050	0.083 ***	0.026	0.729 ***	0.050	0.083 ***	0.026	0.729 ***	0.050
Widow/Divorced/Separated	-0.226 ***	0.024	-0.842 ***	0.026	-0.228 ***	0.024	-0.849 ***	0.026	-0.228 ***	0.024	-0.849 ***	0.026
Number of Kids in Household	-0.083 ***	0.007	-0.157 ***	0.007	-0.082 ***	0.007	-0.157 ***	0.007	-0.082 ***	0.007	-0.157 ***	0.007
Andra Pradesh	-0.077 ***	0.022	-1.650 ***	0.026	-0.078 ***	0.022	-1.649 ***	0.026	-0.077 ***	0.022	-1.649 ***	0.026
Assam	-0.100 ***	0.028	0.281 ***	0.035	-0.099 ***	0.028	0.292 ***	0.035	-0.099 ***	0.028	0.292 ***	0.035
Jammu and Kashmir	0.428 ***	0.038	0.490 ***	0.041	0.426 ***	0.038	0.552 ***	0.044	0.426 ***	0.038	0.551 ***	0.044
Orissa	-0.142 ***	0.027	-0.365 ***	0.029	-0.142 ***	0.027	-0.360 ***	0.028	-0.142 ***	0.027	-0.360 ***	0.028
West Bengal	-0.130 ***	0.024	0.117 ***	0.026	-0.132 ***	0.024	0.117 ***	0.027	-0.132 ***	0.024	0.118 ***	0.027

Continued on next page

Table 28 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	-0.455 ***	0.023	-1.633 ***	0.026	-0.454 ***	0.023	-1.628 ***	0.026	-0.454 ***	0.023	-1.628 ***	0.026
Kerele/Lakshadweep	-1.136 ***	0.030	-1.232 ***	0.035	-1.134 ***	0.030	-1.242 ***	0.035	-1.134 ***	0.030	-1.242 ***	0.035
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	0.282 ***	0.028	0.110 ***	0.033	0.279 ***	0.028	0.100 **	0.033	0.279 ***	0.028	0.100 **	0.033
Northeast	0.466 ***	0.033	-0.187 ***	0.033	0.466 ***	0.033	-0.181 ***	0.033	0.467 ***	0.033	-0.181 ***	0.033
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	-0.176 ***	0.025	-1.349 ***	0.028	-0.176 ***	0.025	-1.349 ***	0.029	-0.176 ***	0.025	-1.349 ***	0.029
Intercept	-0.711 ***	0.123	5.001 ***	0.145	-0.694 ***	0.123	5.023 ***	0.146	-0.679 ***	0.124	5.042 ***	0.146

Continued on next page

Table 28 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Continued

	Model 4		Unemp./Out LF		Model 5		Unemp./Out LF		Model 6		Unemp./Out LF	
	Self Employed		Coef.	SE	Self Employed		Coef.	SE	Self Employed		Coef.	SE
	Coef.	SE			Coef.	SE			Coef.	SE		
Wald Test												
Variables Tested	[2]musper43 = 0				[2]musmale = 0				[2]musmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]musper43 = 0				[3]musmale = 0				[3]musmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]musper50 = 0				[2]scmale = 0				[2]musmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]musper50 = 0				[3]scmale = 0				[3]musmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]musper55 = 0				[2]stmale = 0				[2]musmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]musper55 = 0				[3]stmale = 0				[3]musmaleper55 = 0			
	[2]scper43 = 0								[2]scmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]scper43 = 0								[3]scmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]scper50 = 0								[2]scmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]scper50 = 0								[3]scmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]scper55 = 0								[2]scmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]scper55 = 0								[3]scmaleper55 = 0			
	[2]stper43 = 0								[2]stmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]stper43 = 0								[3]stmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]stper50 = 0								[2]stmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]stper50 = 0								[3]stmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]stper55 = 0								[2]stmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]stper55 = 0								[3]stmaleper55 = 0			
Number of Variables Tested	18				6				18			
chi2	61.8				451.0				41.6			
Prob > chi2	0.000				0.000				0.001			

+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***<.001

Table 29 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployment/Out of the Labor Force Over Time in All, Fundamentalist, and Non-Fundamentalist States

	1983	1987	1993	1999
<u>All States</u>				
Wage Employment	0.3774	0.3824	0.3887	0.4143
Self-Employment	0.4429	0.4351	0.4196	0.4052
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force	0.1797	0.1825	0.1918	0.1805
<u>Fundamentalist States</u>				
Wage Employment	0.3356	0.3615	0.3591	0.3904
Self-Employment	0.5243	0.4994	0.4766	0.4597
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force	0.1401	0.1391	0.1643	0.1499
<u>Non-Fundamentalist States</u>				
Wage Employment	0.4035	0.3928	0.4065	0.4260
Self-Employment	0.3894	0.3933	0.3877	0.3768
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force	0.2071	0.2140	0.2058	0.1972

Table 30 Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self Employment, Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force by Gender

	Male	Female	Gender Difference	Gender Ratio
<u>All States</u>				
Wage Employment				
1983	0.4764	0.1153	0.3611	0.2420
1987	0.4920	0.1118	0.3802	0.2272
1993	0.4934	0.1145	0.3789	0.2321
1999	0.5144	0.1313	0.3831	0.2552
Self-Employment				
1983	0.5057	0.1505	0.3552	0.2976
1987	0.4859	0.1561	0.3298	0.3213
1993	0.4901	0.1316	0.3585	0.2685
1999	0.4656	0.1354	0.3302	0.2908
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force				
1983	0.0178	0.7342	-0.7164	41.2472
1987	0.0221	0.7321	-0.7100	33.1267
1993	0.0165	0.7540	-0.7375	45.6970
1999	0.0200	0.7333	-0.7133	36.6650
<u>Fundamentalist States</u>				
Wage Employment				
1983	0.4147	0.1163	0.2984	0.2804
1987	0.4548	0.1203	0.3345	0.2645
1993	0.4519	0.1118	0.3401	0.2474
1999	0.4759	0.1358	0.3401	0.2854
Self-Employment				
1983	0.5721	0.2066	0.3655	0.3611
1987	0.5278	0.2103	0.3175	0.3984
1993	0.5366	0.1635	0.3731	0.3047
1999	0.5078	0.1717	0.3361	0.3381
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force				
1983	0.0132	0.6772	-0.6640	51.3030
1987	0.0173	0.6694	-0.6521	38.6936
1993	0.0115	0.7247	-0.7132	63.0174
1999	0.0163	0.6925	-0.6762	42.4847

Continued on next page

Table 30 Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self Employment, Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force by Gender Continued

	Male	Female	Gender Difference	Gender Ratio
<u>Non-Fundamentalist States</u>				
Wage Employment				
1983	0.5150	0.1147	0.4003	0.2227
1987	0.5120	0.1062	0.4058	0.2074
1993	0.5157	0.1171	0.3986	0.2271
1999	0.5315	0.1292	0.4023	0.2431
Self-Employment				
1983	0.4640	0.1187	0.3453	0.2558
1987	0.4626	0.1253	0.3373	0.2709
1993	0.4641	0.1164	0.3477	0.2508
1999	0.4466	0.1176	0.3290	0.2633
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force				
1983	0.0210	0.7666	-0.7456	36.5048
1987	0.0254	0.7684	-0.7430	30.2520
1993	0.0201	0.7665	-0.7464	38.1343
1999	0.0219	0.7531	-0.7312	34.3881

Table 31 Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self Employment, Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force by Religion

	Hindu	Muslim	Hindu- Muslim Difference	Hindu Muslim Ratio
<u>All States</u>				
Wage Employment	0.3342	0.3127	0.0215	0.9357
Self-Employment	0.4723	0.4091	0.0632	0.8662
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force	0.1935	0.2782	-0.0847	1.4377
<u>Fundamentalist States</u>				
Wage Employment	0.3004	0.2915	0.0089	0.9704
Self-Employment	0.5429	0.4813	0.0616	0.8865
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force	0.1567	0.2272	-0.0705	1.4499
<u>Non-Fundamentalist States</u>				
Wage Employment	0.3569	0.3254	0.0315	0.9117
Self-Employment	0.4251	0.3692	0.0559	0.8685
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force	0.218	0.3054	-0.0874	1.4009

Table 32 Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self Employment, Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force by Religion Over Time

	Hindu	Muslim	Difference	Ratio
<u>All States</u>				
Wage Employment				
1983	0.3255	0.3165	0.0090	0.9724
1987	0.3163	0.2991	0.0172	0.9456
1993	0.3387	0.2982	0.0405	0.8804
1999	0.3604	0.3421	0.0183	0.9492
Self-Employment				
1983	0.4819	0.4029	0.0790	0.8361
1987	0.4963	0.4424	0.0539	0.8914
1993	0.4583	0.4019	0.0564	0.8769
1999	0.4481	0.3829	0.0652	0.8545
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force				
1983	0.1926	0.2806	-0.0880	1.4569
1987	0.1874	0.2585	-0.0711	1.3794
1993	0.2030	0.3000	-0.0970	1.4778
1999	0.1915	0.2750	-0.0835	1.4360
<u>Fundamentalist States</u>				
Wage Employment				
1983	0.2848	0.3072	-0.0224	1.0787
1987	0.2867	0.2729	0.0138	0.9519
1993	0.3057	0.2758	0.0299	0.9022
1999	0.3293	0.3185	0.0108	0.9672
Self-Employment				
1983	0.5643	0.4814	0.0829	0.8531
1987	0.5694	0.5253	0.0441	0.9226
1993	0.5200	0.4673	0.0527	0.8987
1999	0.5101	0.4408	0.0693	0.8641
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force				
1983	0.1508	0.2114	-0.0606	1.4019
1987	0.1440	0.2019	-0.0579	1.4021
1993	0.1744	0.2570	-0.0826	1.4736
1999	0.1606	0.2407	-0.0801	1.4988

Continued on next page

Table 32 Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self Employment, Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force by Religion Over Time Continued

	Hindu	Muslim	Difference	Ratio
<u>Non-Fundamentalist States</u>				
Wage Employment				
1983	0.3547	0.3212	0.0335	0.9056
1987	0.3378	0.3148	0.0230	0.9319
1993	0.3592	0.3106	0.0486	0.8647
1999	0.3799	0.3567	0.0232	0.9389
Self-Employment				
1983	0.4224	0.3560	0.0664	0.8428
1987	0.4419	0.3930	0.0489	0.8893
1993	0.4226	0.3706	0.0520	0.8770
1999	0.4114	0.3549	0.0565	0.8627
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force				
1983	0.2229	0.3228	-0.0999	1.4482
1987	0.2203	0.2922	-0.0719	1.3264
1993	0.2182	0.3188	-0.1006	1.4610
1999	0.2087	0.2884	-0.0797	1.3819

Table 33 Religious Differences in Employment Predicted Probabilities 25-55 for Individuals Below the Poverty Line

	Hindu	Muslim	Religious Diff.	Religious Ratio
<u>All States</u>				
Wage Employment				
1983	0.3715	0.3855	-0.0140	1.0377
1987	0.3574	0.3541	0.0033	0.9908
1993	0.4015	0.3545	0.0470	0.8829
1999	0.4407	0.3841	0.0566	0.8716
Self-Employment				
1983	0.4511	0.3476	0.1035	0.7706
1987	0.4728	0.4175	0.0553	0.8830
1993	0.4144	0.3712	0.0432	0.8958
1999	0.3917	0.3670	0.0247	0.9369
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force				
1983	0.1775	0.2669	-0.0894	1.5037
1987	0.1698	0.2284	-0.0586	1.3451
1993	0.1842	0.2743	-0.0901	1.4891
1999	0.1676	0.2488	-0.0812	1.4845
<u>Fundamentalist States</u>				
Wage Employment				
1983	0.3178	0.3576	-0.0398	1.1252
1987	0.3139	0.3033	0.0106	0.9662
1993	0.3476	0.3228	0.0248	0.9287
1999	0.4220	0.3569	0.0651	0.8457
Self-Employment				
1983	0.5377	0.4300	0.1077	0.7997
1987	0.5527	0.5090	0.0437	0.9209
1993	0.4908	0.4483	0.0425	0.9134
1999	0.4377	0.4106	0.0271	0.9381
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force				
1983	0.1444	0.2124	-0.0680	1.4709
1987	0.1334	0.1877	-0.0543	1.4070
1993	0.1615	0.2289	-0.0674	1.4173
1999	0.1403	0.2325	-0.0922	1.6572

Continued on next page

Table 33 Religious Differences in Employment Predicted Probabilities 25-55 for Individuals Below the Poverty Line Continued

	Hindu	Muslim	Religious Diff.	Religious Ratio
<u>Non-Fundamentalist States</u>				
Wage Employment				
1983	0.4107	0.4040	0.0067	0.9837
1987	0.3912	0.3894	0.0018	0.9954
1993	0.4411	0.3745	0.0666	0.8490
1999	0.4469	0.4014	0.0455	0.8982
Self-Employment				
1983	0.3860	0.2954	0.0906	0.7653
1987	0.4078	0.3571	0.0507	0.8757
1993	0.3581	0.3245	0.0336	0.9062
1999	0.3668	0.3517	0.0151	0.9588
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force				
1983	0.2033	0.3007	-0.0974	1.4791
1987	0.2010	0.2535	-0.0525	1.2612
1993	0.2007	0.3010	-0.1003	1.4998
1999	0.1863	0.2469	-0.0606	1.3253

Table 34 Religious Differences in Employment Predicted Probabilities 25-55 for Individuals Above the Poverty Line

	Hindu	Muslim	Religious Diff.	Religious Ratio
<u>All States</u>				
Wage Employment				
1983	0.2910	0.2641	0.0269	0.9076
1987	0.2885	0.2696	0.0189	0.9345
1993	0.3134	0.2688	0.0446	0.8577
1999	0.3353	0.3275	0.0078	0.9767
Self-Employment				
1983	0.5079	0.4473	0.0606	0.8807
1987	0.5173	0.4553	0.0620	0.8801
1993	0.4777	0.4176	0.0601	0.8742
1999	0.4670	0.3862	0.0808	0.8270
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force				
1983	0.2011	0.2886	-0.0875	1.4351
1987	0.1943	0.2751	-0.0808	1.4159
1993	0.2090	0.3136	-0.1046	1.5005
1999	0.1977	0.2864	-0.0887	1.4487
<u>Fundamentalist States</u>				
Wage Employment				
1983	0.2532	0.2713	-0.0181	1.0715
1987	0.2665	0.2584	0.0081	0.9696
1993	0.2838	0.2542	0.0296	0.8957
1999	0.2959	0.3044	-0.0085	1.0287
Self-Employment				
1983	0.5910	0.5179	0.0731	0.8763
1987	0.5856	0.5325	0.0531	0.9093
1993	0.5369	0.4677	0.0692	0.8711
1999	0.5383	0.4533	0.0850	0.8421
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force				
1983	0.1557	0.2107	-0.0550	1.3532
1987	0.1479	0.2091	-0.0612	1.4138
1993	0.1793	0.2781	-0.0988	1.5510
1999	0.1657	0.2423	-0.0766	1.4623

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Table 34 Religious Differences in Employment Predicted Probabilities 25-55 for Individuals Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Hindu	Muslim	Religious Diff.	Religious Ratio
<u>Non-Fundamentalist States</u>				
Wage Employment				
1983	0.3184	0.2606	0.0578	0.8185
1987	0.3040	0.2748	0.0292	0.9039
1993	0.3303	0.2772	0.0531	0.8392
1999	0.3615	0.3411	0.0204	0.9436
Self-Employment				
1983	0.4486	0.4036	0.0450	0.8997
1987	0.4680	0.4108	0.0572	0.8778
1993	0.4473	0.3984	0.0489	0.8907
1999	0.4245	0.3513	0.0732	0.8276
Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force				
1983	0.2330	0.3359	-0.1029	1.4416
1987	0.2280	0.3144	-0.0864	1.3789
1993	0.2224	0.3244	-0.1020	1.4586
1999	0.2140	0.3076	-0.0936	1.4374

Table 35 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Below The Poverty Line

	Model 1		Model 2				Model 3					
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Historical Period 43 (1987)	-0.072 ***	0.020	-0.012	0.022	0.090 **	0.029	0.031	0.025	-0.070 ***	0.020	-0.012	0.023
Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.193 ***	0.021	-0.036	0.023	-0.188 ***	0.032	-0.012	0.026	-0.164 ***	0.022	-0.022	0.024
Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.337 ***	0.025	-0.195 ***	0.026	-0.310 ***	0.035	-0.187 ***	0.028	-0.289 ***	0.026	-0.163 ***	0.027
Male	-0.151 ***	0.013	-4.734 ***	0.034	-0.079 ***	0.022	-4.740 ***	0.061	-0.132 ***	0.018	-4.717 ***	0.046
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)					-0.239 ***	0.030	0.175 *	0.072				
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)					-0.009	0.032	-0.204 **	0.076				
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)					-0.040	0.037	0.031	0.095				
Muslim									0.062	0.053	0.659 ***	0.039
Scheduled Caste									-1.069 ***	0.031	-0.741 ***	0.024
Scheduled Tribe									-0.091 **	0.032	-0.790 ***	0.031
Muslim*Male									-0.179 ***	0.056	-0.938 ***	0.089
Scheduled Caste*Male									0.022	0.032	0.286 ***	0.070
Scheduled Tribe*Male									-0.051 +	0.030	0.642 ***	0.098
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)												
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)												
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)												
Scheduled Caste*Period 43												
Scheduled Caste*Period 50												
Scheduled Caste*Period 55												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55												
Muslim*Male*Period 43												

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Table 35 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Below The Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1		Unemp./Out LF		Model 2		Unemp./Out LF		Model 3		Unemp./Out LF	
	Self Employed				Self Employed				Self Employed			
	Coef.	SE										
Muslim*Male*Period 50												
Muslim*Male*Period 55												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55												
Age	-0.020 **	0.008	-0.228 ***	0.009	-0.020 **	0.008	-0.227 ***	0.009	-0.025 **	0.008	-0.235 ***	0.010
Age Squared	0.000 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.000 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000
Urban	-0.169 ***	0.023	1.023 ***	0.022	-0.167 ***	0.023	1.020 ***	0.022	-0.218 ***	0.026	0.867 ***	0.023
Household Size	0.183 ***	0.006	0.222 ***	0.006	0.183 ***	0.006	0.222 ***	0.006	0.174 ***	0.006	0.216 ***	0.006
Primary School	0.420 ***	0.019	0.645 ***	0.027	0.420 ***	0.019	0.645 ***	0.026	0.350 ***	0.019	0.550 ***	0.027
Middle School	0.572 ***	0.024	1.053 ***	0.043	0.569 ***	0.024	1.054 ***	0.043	0.471 ***	0.025	0.973 ***	0.043
College	0.201 **	0.073	1.385 ***	0.118	0.197 **	0.073	1.393 ***	0.119	0.063	0.074	1.291 ***	0.121
Never Married	0.030	0.041	0.666 ***	0.079	0.029	0.041	0.668 ***	0.080	-0.016	0.042	0.651 ***	0.080
Widow/Divorced/Separated	-0.196 ***	0.028	-0.738 ***	0.033	-0.197 ***	0.028	-0.738 ***	0.033	-0.205 ***	0.029	-0.771 ***	0.034
Number of Kids in Household	-0.052 ***	0.008	-0.103 ***	0.009	-0.052 ***	0.008	-0.103 ***	0.009	-0.049 ***	0.009	-0.118 ***	0.009
Andra Pradesh	-0.945 ***	0.040	-1.985 ***	0.044	-0.947 ***	0.040	-1.981 ***	0.044	-1.085 ***	0.041	-2.013 ***	0.044
Assam	-0.691 ***	0.046	0.308 ***	0.053	-0.692 ***	0.046	0.310 ***	0.053	-0.922 ***	0.048	0.167 **	0.056
Bihar	-0.799 ***	0.031	-0.157 ***	0.031	-0.798 ***	0.031	-0.156 ***	0.031	-0.917 ***	0.032	-0.183 ***	0.032
Jammu and Kashmir	-0.050	0.080	0.811 ***	0.076	-0.048	0.080	0.802 ***	0.076	-0.163 *	0.081	0.642 ***	0.080
Madhya Pradesh	-0.581 ***	0.033	-1.634 ***	0.036	-0.581 ***	0.033	-1.632 ***	0.036	-0.728 ***	0.037	-1.466 ***	0.038

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Table 35 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Below The Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Maharashtra	-1.135 ***	0.036	-2.184 ***	0.038	-1.135 ***	0.036	-2.182 ***	0.037	-1.323 ***	0.038	-2.206 ***	0.038
Orissa	-0.714 ***	0.039	-0.698 ***	0.039	-0.714 ***	0.039	-0.698 ***	0.039	-0.853 ***	0.043	-0.525 ***	0.040
Rajasthan	0.086 *	0.043	-0.872 ***	0.049	0.085 *	0.043	-0.869 ***	0.049	0.033	0.045	-0.741 ***	0.050
West Bengal	-0.996 ***	0.039	-0.020	0.039	-0.997 ***	0.039	-0.020	0.039	-1.000 ***	0.042	-0.016	0.041
New Delhi	-0.717 ***	0.170	-0.916 ***	0.174	-0.718 ***	0.170	-0.918 ***	0.174	-0.534 **	0.181	-0.680 ***	0.179
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	-1.237 ***	0.037	-1.804 ***	0.038	-1.237 ***	0.037	-1.802 ***	0.038	-1.297 ***	0.039	-1.788 ***	0.039
Kerele/Lakshadweep	-1.878 ***	0.056	-1.050 ***	0.058	-1.877 ***	0.056	-1.049 ***	0.058	-2.006 ***	0.057	-1.211 ***	0.059
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	-1.153 ***	0.055	-1.392 ***	0.053	-1.155 ***	0.055	-1.390 ***	0.053	-1.324 ***	0.056	-1.291 ***	0.054
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	-0.810 ***	0.067	-0.216 *	0.091	-0.811 ***	0.067	-0.216 *	0.091	-0.608 ***	0.064	-0.006	0.088
Northeast	0.088	0.054	-0.193 ***	0.058	0.088	0.054	-0.193 ***	0.058	-0.075	0.058	0.081	0.061
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	-1.045 ***	0.043	-1.588 ***	0.045	-1.044 ***	0.043	-1.587 ***	0.045	-1.165 ***	0.045	-1.603 ***	0.047
Intercept	-0.329 *	0.147	4.462 ***	0.180	-0.375 *	0.148	4.441 ***	0.181	0.186	0.152	4.928 ***	0.186

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Table 35 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Below The Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.086 *	0.036	-0.005	0.034	0.086 *	0.036	-0.003	0.034	0.068	0.042	-0.021	0.037
Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.163 ***	0.039	-0.041	0.036	-0.161 ***	0.039	-0.038	0.036	-0.207 ***	0.046	-0.088 *	0.039
Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.312 ***	0.045	-0.228 ***	0.040	-0.311 ***	0.045	-0.226 ***	0.040	-0.338 ***	0.052	-0.254 ***	0.043
Male	-0.063 **	0.023	-4.783 ***	0.063	-0.046 +	0.026	-4.726 ***	0.064	-0.079 *	0.032	-4.851 ***	0.078
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)	-0.251 ***	0.031	0.221 **	0.075	-0.252 ***	0.031	0.195 **	0.073	-0.226 ***	0.044	0.294 **	0.094
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.027	0.033	-0.201 *	0.079	-0.029	0.033	-0.208 **	0.077	0.039	0.047	0.063	0.100
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.054	0.038	0.033	0.100	-0.055	0.038	0.015	0.098	-0.015	0.057	0.162	0.148
Muslim	-0.298 ***	0.044	0.371 ***	0.048	-0.159 *	0.062	0.593 ***	0.058	-0.240 **	0.081	0.570 ***	0.062
Scheduled Caste	-1.101 ***	0.037	-0.796 ***	0.044	-1.113 ***	0.044	-0.819 ***	0.044	-1.146 ***	0.055	-0.872 ***	0.047
Scheduled Tribe	-0.048	0.047	-0.888 ***	0.058	-0.016	0.049	-0.901 ***	0.056	-0.049	0.053	-0.951 ***	0.056
Muslim*Male					-0.185 ***	0.056	-0.935 ***	0.090	-0.081	0.086	-0.971 ***	0.188
Scheduled Caste*Male					0.020	0.032	0.297 ***	0.072	0.071	0.057	0.680 ***	0.137
Scheduled Tribe*Male					-0.053 +	0.030	0.624 ***	0.099	-0.001	0.060	1.045 ***	0.235
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)	0.183 **	0.061	-0.065	0.067	0.184 **	0.061	-0.054	0.075	0.104	0.116	-0.098	0.090
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)	0.312 ***	0.063	0.152 *	0.070	0.317 ***	0.064	0.142 +	0.078	0.321 *	0.126	0.127	0.095
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)	0.370 ***	0.077	0.162 +	0.086	0.374 ***	0.077	0.170 +	0.096	0.740 ***	0.156	0.324 **	0.117
Scheduled Caste*Period 43	0.076	0.052	0.059	0.059	0.076	0.052	0.052	0.057	0.130 +	0.076	0.089	0.063
Scheduled Caste*Period 50	-0.017	0.056	0.076	0.061	-0.017	0.056	0.076	0.059	0.055	0.086	0.178 **	0.065
Scheduled Caste*Period 55	0.118 +	0.064	0.177 **	0.066	0.118 +	0.064	0.173 **	0.065	0.127	0.091	0.242 ***	0.071
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43	-0.126 *	0.060	0.239 ***	0.074	-0.127 *	0.060	0.218 **	0.073	-0.071	0.075	0.283 ***	0.075
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50	-0.098	0.065	0.131 +	0.079	-0.097	0.065	0.130 +	0.077	0.022	0.082	0.259 ***	0.081
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55	-0.061	0.073	0.118	0.081	-0.061	0.073	0.109	0.080	-0.079	0.088	0.133	0.082
Muslim*Male*Period 43									0.102	0.123	0.034	0.249

Continued on next page

Table 35 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Below The Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Muslim*Male*Period 50									-0.015	0.132	0.049	0.241
Muslim*Male*Period 55									-0.458 **	0.170	0.009	0.279
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43									-0.083	0.078	-0.210	0.172
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50									-0.110	0.086	-0.768 ***	0.191
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55									-0.017	0.093	-0.591 **	0.227
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43									-0.089	0.082	-0.475 +	0.271
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50									-0.188 *	0.084	-1.065 ***	0.310
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55									0.036	0.090	-0.307	0.309
Age	-0.025 **	0.008	-0.233 ***	0.010	-0.025 **	0.008	-0.234 ***	0.010	-0.025 **	0.008	-0.234 ***	0.010
Age Squared	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000
Urban	-0.215 ***	0.026	0.861 ***	0.023	-0.216 ***	0.026	0.865 ***	0.023	-0.217 ***	0.026	0.866 ***	0.023
Household Size	0.174 ***	0.006	0.215 ***	0.006	0.174 ***	0.006	0.216 ***	0.006	0.174 ***	0.006	0.216 ***	0.006
Primary School	0.352 ***	0.020	0.554 ***	0.027	0.350 ***	0.020	0.550 ***	0.027	0.350 ***	0.020	0.550 ***	0.027
Middle School	0.473 ***	0.025	0.982 ***	0.043	0.470 ***	0.025	0.977 ***	0.043	0.470 ***	0.025	0.979 ***	0.043
College	0.065	0.074	1.298 ***	0.121	0.061	0.074	1.301 ***	0.122	0.061	0.074	1.304 ***	0.122
Never Married	-0.014	0.042	0.652 ***	0.081	-0.017	0.042	0.654 ***	0.080	-0.017	0.042	0.653 ***	0.080
Widow/Divorced/Separated	-0.206 ***	0.029	-0.762 ***	0.033	-0.208 ***	0.029	-0.771 ***	0.034	-0.208 ***	0.029	-0.771 ***	0.034
Number of Kids in Household	-0.049 ***	0.009	-0.119 ***	0.009	-0.049 ***	0.009	-0.119 ***	0.009	-0.049 ***	0.009	-0.119 ***	0.009
Andra Pradesh	-1.091 ***	0.041	-2.006 ***	0.044	-1.090 ***	0.041	-2.010 ***	0.044	-1.090 ***	0.041	-2.011 ***	0.044
Assam	-0.940 ***	0.048	0.159 **	0.055	-0.936 ***	0.048	0.168 **	0.057	-0.935 ***	0.048	0.166 **	0.056
Bihar	-0.918 ***	0.032	-0.179 ***	0.031	-0.918 ***	0.032	-0.182 ***	0.031	-0.918 ***	0.032	-0.182 ***	0.031
Jammu and Kashmir	-0.116	0.082	0.596 ***	0.076	-0.111	0.082	0.661 ***	0.079	-0.116	0.082	0.662 ***	0.080
Madhya Pradesh	-0.729 ***	0.037	-1.468 ***	0.037	-0.729 ***	0.037	-1.462 ***	0.038	-0.729 ***	0.037	-1.463 ***	0.038

Continued on next page

Table 35 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Below The Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Maharashtra	-1.329 ***	0.038	-2.199 ***	0.038	-1.328 ***	0.038	-2.205 ***	0.038	-1.328 ***	0.038	-2.206 ***	0.038
Orissa	-0.857 ***	0.043	-0.525 ***	0.040	-0.856 ***	0.043	-0.524 ***	0.040	-0.856 ***	0.043	-0.524 ***	0.040
Rajasthan	0.028	0.046	-0.742 ***	0.050	0.028	0.045	-0.741 ***	0.050	0.029	0.045	-0.741 ***	0.050
West Bengal	-1.008 ***	0.042	-0.018	0.041	-1.006 ***	0.042	-0.016	0.041	-1.005 ***	0.042	-0.016	0.041
New Delhi	-0.538 **	0.182	-0.665 ***	0.179	-0.539 **	0.182	-0.680 ***	0.178	-0.537 **	0.182	-0.685 ***	0.178
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	-1.304 ***	0.039	-1.791 ***	0.039	-1.302 ***	0.039	-1.788 ***	0.039	-1.301 ***	0.039	-1.788 ***	0.039
Kerele/Lakshadweep	-2.003 ***	0.057	-1.197 ***	0.057	-2.002 ***	0.057	-1.208 ***	0.059	-2.002 ***	0.057	-1.207 ***	0.059
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	-1.332 ***	0.055	-1.291 ***	0.053	-1.331 ***	0.055	-1.290 ***	0.054	-1.331 ***	0.055	-1.289 ***	0.054
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	-0.610 ***	0.064	0.009	0.090	-0.612 ***	0.064	-0.007	0.088	-0.612 ***	0.064	-0.006	0.088
Northeast	-0.079	0.058	0.081	0.062	-0.077	0.058	0.076	0.061	-0.076	0.058	0.077	0.061
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	-1.169 ***	0.045	-1.599 ***	0.046	-1.168 ***	0.045	-1.601 ***	0.047	-1.168 ***	0.045	-1.602 ***	0.047
Intercept	0.169	0.154	4.936 ***	0.188	0.155	0.154	4.940 ***	0.189	0.179	0.154	4.963 ***	0.189

Continued on next page

Table 35 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Below The Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4		Unemp./Out LF		Model 5		Unemp./Out LF		Model 6		Unemp./Out LF	
	Self Employed		Coef.	SE	Self Employed		Coef.	SE	Self Employed		Coef.	SE
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Wald Test												
Variables Tested	[2]musper43 = 0				[2]musmale = 0				[2]musmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]musper43 = 0				[3]musmale = 0				[3]musmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]musper50 = 0				[2]scmale = 0				[2]musmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]musper50 = 0				[3]scmale = 0				[3]musmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]musper55 = 0				[2]stmale = 0				[2]musmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]musper55 = 0				[3]stmale = 0				[3]musmaleper55 = 0			
	[2]scper43 = 0								[2]scmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]scper43 = 0								[3]scmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]scper50 = 0								[2]scmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]scper50 = 0								[3]scmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]scper55 = 0								[2]scmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]scper55 = 0								[3]scmaleper55 = 0			
	[2]stper43 = 0								[2]stmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]stper43 = 0								[3]stmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]stper50 = 0								[2]stmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]stper50 = 0								[3]stmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]stper55 = 0								[2]stmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]stper55 = 0								[3]stmaleper55 = 0			
Number of Variables Tested	18				6				18			
chi2	92.1				227.4				54.8			
Prob > chi2	0.000				0.000				0.000			

+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***<.001

Table 36 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Historical Period 43 (1987)	-0.188 ***	0.029	-0.110 ***	0.034	0.031	0.040	-0.020	0.038	-0.183 ***	0.030	-0.107 **	0.035
Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.299 ***	0.032	-0.020	0.036	-0.242 ***	0.045	0.045	0.039	-0.276 ***	0.032	-0.009	0.037
Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.561 ***	0.038	-0.299 ***	0.040	-0.511 ***	0.048	-0.278 ***	0.042	-0.515 ***	0.040	-0.265 ***	0.041
Male	-0.184 ***	0.019	-4.661 ***	0.056	-0.059 +	0.031	-4.626 ***	0.109	-0.178 ***	0.027	-4.666 ***	0.080
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)					-0.336 ***	0.041	0.147	0.123				
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)					-0.089 *	0.044	-0.369 **	0.134				
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)					-0.075	0.051	0.057	0.163				
Muslim									-0.035	0.076	0.629 ***	0.065
Scheduled Caste									-1.057 ***	0.044	-0.817 ***	0.038
Scheduled Tribe									-0.247 ***	0.045	-0.746 ***	0.045
Muslim*Male									-0.047	0.080	-0.903 ***	0.152
Scheduled Caste*Male									0.019	0.046	0.256 *	0.115
Scheduled Tribe*Male									-0.049	0.043	1.022 ***	0.167
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)												
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)												
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)												
Scheduled Caste*Period 43												
Scheduled Caste*Period 50												
Scheduled Caste*Period 55												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55												
Muslim*Male*Period 43												

Continued on next page

Table 36 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Muslim*Male*Period 50												
Muslim*Male*Period 55												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55												
Age	-0.036 **	0.011	-0.237 ***	0.015	-0.036 **	0.011	-0.237 ***	0.015	-0.040 ***	0.012	-0.245 ***	0.015
Age Squared	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000
Urban	-0.267 ***	0.035	1.265 ***	0.032	-0.267 ***	0.035	1.263 ***	0.032	-0.316 ***	0.043	1.095 ***	0.035
Household Size	0.195 ***	0.009	0.226 ***	0.009	0.195 ***	0.009	0.225 ***	0.009	0.188 ***	0.010	0.221 ***	0.010
Primary School	0.264 ***	0.030	0.554 ***	0.047	0.264 ***	0.030	0.554 ***	0.046	0.191 ***	0.031	0.462 ***	0.048
Middle School	0.372 ***	0.036	0.897 ***	0.075	0.368 ***	0.036	0.901 ***	0.074	0.268 ***	0.038	0.827 ***	0.076
College	-0.122	0.093	0.868 ***	0.170	-0.126	0.093	0.871 ***	0.171	-0.277 **	0.098	0.796 ***	0.178
Never Married	0.163 *	0.067	0.927 ***	0.139	0.161 *	0.067	0.935 ***	0.138	0.100	0.069	0.900 ***	0.141
Widow/Divorced/Separated	-0.156 ***	0.041	-0.554 ***	0.052	-0.158 ***	0.041	-0.554 ***	0.052	-0.144 ***	0.042	-0.563 ***	0.054
Number of Kids in Household	-0.065 ***	0.013	-0.112 ***	0.014	-0.065 ***	0.013	-0.112 ***	0.013	-0.066 ***	0.013	-0.127 ***	0.014
Madhya Pradesh	-0.574 ***	0.033	-1.662 ***	0.037	-0.574 ***	0.034	-1.659 ***	0.037	-0.664 ***	0.040	-1.521 ***	0.040
Maharashtra	-1.101 ***	0.037	-2.239 ***	0.040	-1.102 ***	0.037	-2.237 ***	0.040	-1.266 ***	0.041	-2.280 ***	0.042
Rajasthan	0.075 +	0.043	-0.902 ***	0.050	0.074 +	0.043	-0.900 ***	0.050	0.057	0.046	-0.785 ***	0.052
New Delhi	-0.614 ***	0.172	-1.122 ***	0.179	-0.614 ***	0.172	-1.125 ***	0.179	-0.431 *	0.182	-0.862 ***	0.184
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	-1.141 ***	0.055	-1.442 ***	0.054	-1.143 ***	0.055	-1.441 ***	0.054	-1.270 ***	0.057	-1.372 ***	0.056
Intercept	0.130	0.213	4.750 ***	0.283	0.053	0.215	4.704 ***	0.283	0.659 **	0.218	5.269 ***	0.289

Continued on next page

Table 36 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE								
Wald Test												
Variables Tested					[2]mper43 = 0					[2]musmale = 0		
					[3]mper43 = 0					[3]musmale = 0		
					[2]mper50 = 0					[2]scmale = 0		
					[3]mper50 = 0					[3]scmale = 0		
					[2]mper55 = 0					[2]stmale = 0		
					[3]mper55 = 0					[3]stmale = 0		
Number of Variables Tested					6				6			
chi2					115.2				112.1			
Prob > chi2					0.000				0.000			

Continued on next page

Table 36 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.040	0.052	-0.067	0.051	0.043	0.052	-0.058	0.051	-0.016	0.061	-0.108 +	0.056
Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.181 ***	0.056	0.022	0.054	-0.177 **	0.056	0.028	0.054	-0.300 ***	0.065	-0.072	0.057
Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.489 ***	0.065	-0.312 ***	0.060	-0.486 ***	0.065	-0.310 ***	0.059	-0.561 ***	0.073	-0.377 ***	0.064
Male	-0.042	0.032	-4.670 ***	0.112	-0.035	0.035	-4.621 ***	0.112	-0.131 **	0.042	-4.825 ***	0.146
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)	-0.356 ***	0.043	0.196	0.128	-0.361 ***	0.043	0.131	0.123	-0.272 ***	0.060	0.311 +	0.168
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.099 *	0.046	-0.326 *	0.140	-0.105 *	0.046	-0.358 **	0.133	0.077	0.063	0.011	0.180
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.101 +	0.054	0.051	0.177	-0.106 +	0.055	0.032	0.168	0.007	0.085	0.287	0.252
Muslim	-0.341 ***	0.067	0.268 **	0.085	-0.311 ***	0.091	0.446 ***	0.096	-0.479 ***	0.119	0.348 ***	0.097
Scheduled Caste	-1.101 ***	0.052	-0.903 ***	0.059	-1.117 ***	0.060	-0.926 ***	0.060	-1.231 ***	0.073	-1.027 ***	0.064
Scheduled Tribe	-0.104	0.070	-0.761 ***	0.093	-0.077	0.071	-0.784 ***	0.087	-0.180 *	0.070	-0.885 ***	0.080
Muslim*Male					-0.048	0.080	-0.909 ***	0.153	0.180	0.121	-0.741 *	0.358
Scheduled Caste*Male					0.024	0.046	0.266 *	0.117	0.200 **	0.074	0.780 ***	0.204
Scheduled Tribe*Male					-0.050	0.043	0.986 ***	0.169	0.114	0.091	1.536 ***	0.409
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)	0.293 **	0.094	0.108	0.110	0.301 ***	0.094	0.129	0.121	0.473 **	0.171	0.272 +	0.142
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)	0.325 ***	0.100	0.155	0.122	0.329 ***	0.101	0.131	0.132	0.466 *	0.194	0.192	0.158
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)	0.445 ***	0.119	0.404 **	0.139	0.446 ***	0.119	0.428 **	0.151	0.805 ***	0.222	0.615 ***	0.191
Scheduled Caste*Period 43	0.129 +	0.075	0.121	0.085	0.128 +	0.075	0.113	0.084	0.257 *	0.106	0.187 *	0.094
Scheduled Caste*Period 50	-0.085	0.082	0.090	0.089	-0.086	0.082	0.088	0.088	0.142	0.120	0.274 **	0.097
Scheduled Caste*Period 55	0.164 +	0.094	0.211 *	0.096	0.164 +	0.094	0.207 *	0.095	0.264 *	0.125	0.335 ***	0.104
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43	-0.239 **	0.086	0.160	0.114	-0.240 **	0.086	0.127	0.112	-0.164	0.100	0.223 *	0.108
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50	-0.231 *	0.094	0.091	0.122	-0.230 *	0.094	0.092	0.118	0.010	0.110	0.299 *	0.116
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55	-0.197 +	0.110	-0.033	0.126	-0.198 +	0.110	-0.041	0.123	-0.088	0.120	0.061	0.121
Muslim*Male*Period 43									-0.230	0.175	-0.459	0.414

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Table 36 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4		Model 5		Model 6		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Muslim*Male*Period 50									-0.198	0.204	-0.048	0.442
Muslim*Male*Period 55									-0.468 *	0.233	-0.200	0.489
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43									-0.199 +	0.107	-0.221	0.262
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50									-0.343 **	0.118	-0.987 ***	0.306
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55									-0.155	0.133	-0.828 *	0.360
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43									-0.119	0.117	-0.617	0.451
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50									-0.383 **	0.122	-1.199 *	0.519
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55									-0.173	0.131	-0.486	0.536
Age	-0.040 ***	0.012	-0.243 ***	0.015	-0.040 ***	0.012	-0.245 ***	0.015	-0.040 ***	0.012	-0.245 ***	0.015
Age Squared	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000
Urban	-0.311 ***	0.042	1.079 ***	0.034	-0.315 ***	0.042	1.094 ***	0.035	-0.315 ***	0.042	1.093 ***	0.034
Household Size	0.188 ***	0.010	0.219 ***	0.009	0.188 ***	0.010	0.220 ***	0.009	0.188 ***	0.010	0.220 ***	0.009
Primary School	0.191 ***	0.031	0.467 ***	0.048	0.190 ***	0.031	0.462 ***	0.048	0.191 ***	0.031	0.463 ***	0.048
Middle School	0.265 ***	0.038	0.832 ***	0.076	0.263 ***	0.039	0.831 ***	0.074	0.263 ***	0.039	0.833 ***	0.075
College	-0.279 **	0.097	0.779 ***	0.174	-0.282 **	0.098	0.794 ***	0.178	-0.282 **	0.098	0.799 ***	0.178
Never Married	0.103	0.069	0.863 ***	0.141	0.099	0.069	0.907 ***	0.140	0.100	0.069	0.910 ***	0.140
Widow/Divorced/Separated	-0.147 ***	0.042	-0.559 ***	0.053	-0.147 ***	0.042	-0.566 ***	0.054	-0.147 ***	0.042	-0.566 ***	0.054
Number of Kids in Household	-0.067 ***	0.013	-0.126 ***	0.014	-0.067 ***	0.013	-0.127 ***	0.014	-0.067 ***	0.013	-0.127 ***	0.014
Madhya Pradesh	-0.667 ***	0.040	-1.515 ***	0.040	-0.666 ***	0.040	-1.518 ***	0.040	-0.666 ***	0.040	-1.518 ***	0.040
Maharashtra	-1.273 ***	0.040	-2.267 ***	0.041	-1.272 ***	0.040	-2.281 ***	0.042	-1.272 ***	0.040	-2.281 ***	0.041
Rajasthan	0.052	0.046	-0.781 ***	0.052	0.053	0.046	-0.786 ***	0.052	0.054	0.046	-0.785 ***	0.052
New Delhi	-0.430 *	0.184	-0.835 ***	0.183	-0.429 *	0.184	-0.859 ***	0.183	-0.428 *	0.184	-0.865 ***	0.182
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	-1.282 ***	0.057	-1.363 ***	0.055	-1.280 ***	0.056	-1.373 ***	0.055	-1.280 ***	0.056	-1.372 ***	0.056
Intercept	0.590 **	0.220	5.242 ***	0.288	0.578 **	0.220	5.259 ***	0.289	0.642 **	0.220	5.314 ***	0.288

Continued on next page

Table 36 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Self Employed	Unemp./Out LF	Self Employed	Unemp./Out LF	Self Employed	Unemp./Out LF
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Wald Test						
Variables Tested	[2]musper43 = 0		[2]musmale = 0		[2]musmaleper43 = 0	
	[3]musper43 = 0		[3]musmale = 0		[3]musmaleper43 = 0	
	[2]musper50 = 0		[2]scmale = 0		[2]musmaleper50 = 0	
	[3]musper50 = 0		[3]scmale = 0		[3]musmaleper50 = 0	
	[2]musper55 = 0		[2]stmale = 0		[2]musmaleper55 = 0	
	[3]musper55 = 0		[3]stmale = 0		[3]musmaleper55 = 0	
	[2]scper43 = 0				[2]scmaleper43 = 0	
	[3]scper43 = 0				[3]scmaleper43 = 0	
	[2]scper50 = 0				[2]scmaleper50 = 0	
	[3]scper50 = 0				[3]scmaleper50 = 0	
	[2]scper55 = 0				[2]scmaleper55 = 0	
	[3]scper55 = 0				[3]scmaleper55 = 0	
	[2]stper43 = 0				[2]stmaleper43 = 0	
	[3]stper43 = 0				[3]stmaleper43 = 0	
	[2]stper50 = 0				[2]stmaleper50 = 0	
	[3]stper50 = 0				[3]stmaleper50 = 0	
	[2]stper55 = 0				[2]stmaleper55 = 0	
	[3]stper55 = 0				[3]stmaleper55 = 0	
Number of Variables Tested	18		6		18	
chi2	65.3		108.6		39.9	
Prob > chi2	0.000		0.000		0.002	

+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***<.001

Table 37 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.014	0.027	0.058 *	0.029	0.135 ***	0.042	0.070 *	0.034	0.011	0.027	0.056 +	0.030
Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.100 ***	0.029	-0.054 +	0.031	-0.124 **	0.046	-0.048	0.035	-0.070 *	0.029	-0.036	0.031
Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.129 ***	0.032	-0.136 ***	0.034	-0.096 +	0.052	-0.122 ***	0.038	-0.081 *	0.033	-0.102 **	0.035
Male	-0.098 ***	0.019	-4.793 ***	0.042	-0.051	0.032	-4.814 ***	0.071	-0.072 **	0.025	-4.773 ***	0.051
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)					-0.168 ***	0.043	0.204 *	0.088				
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)					0.031	0.046	-0.109	0.091				
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)					-0.046	0.052	-0.034	0.099				
Muslim									0.186 *	0.074	0.657 ***	0.049
Scheduled Caste									-1.112 ***	0.045	-0.705 ***	0.032
Scheduled Tribe									0.065	0.047	-0.810 ***	0.043
Muslim*Male									-0.311 ***	0.080	-0.993 ***	0.106
Scheduled Caste*Male									0.066	0.045	0.312 ***	0.086
Scheduled Tribe*Male									-0.058	0.043	0.439 ***	0.106
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)												
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)												
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)												
Scheduled Caste*Period 43												
Scheduled Caste*Period 50												
Scheduled Caste*Period 55												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55												
Muslim*Male*Period 43												

Continued on next page

Table 37 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	-0.469 ***	0.036	-1.575 ***	0.039	-0.469 ***	0.036	-1.573 ***	0.039	-0.385 ***	0.037	-1.548 ***	0.039
Kerele/Lakshadweep	-1.126 ***	0.055	-0.879 ***	0.059	-1.126 ***	0.055	-0.879 ***	0.059	-1.121 ***	0.055	-1.011 ***	0.060
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	-0.037	0.066	-0.028	0.092	-0.038	0.066	-0.029	0.092	0.305 ***	0.063	0.185 *	0.089
Northeast	0.880 ***	0.054	-0.055	0.058	0.881 ***	0.054	-0.055	0.058	0.769 ***	0.057	0.268 ***	0.061
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	-0.268 ***	0.042	-1.369 ***	0.045	-0.269 ***	0.042	-1.368 ***	0.045	-0.257 ***	0.042	-1.367 ***	0.046
Intercept	-1.453 ***	0.203	4.144 ***	0.224	-1.484 ***	0.203	4.133 ***	0.226	-1.087 ***	0.210	4.560 ***	0.235

Continued on next page

Table 37 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1		Unemp./Out LF		Model 2		Unemp./Out LF		Model 3		Unemp./Out LF	
	Self Employed				Self Employed				Self Employed			
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE								
Wald Test												
Variables Tested					[2]mper43 = 0					[2]musmale = 0		
					[3]mper43 = 0					[3]musmale = 0		
					[2]mper50 = 0					[2]scmale = 0		
					[3]mper50 = 0					[3]scmale = 0		
					[2]mper55 = 0					[2]stmale = 0		
					[3]mper55 = 0					[3]stmale = 0		
Number of Variables Tested					6						6	
chi2					50.7						152.7	
Prob > chi2					0.000						0.000	

Continued on next page

Table 37 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.104 *	0.050	0.038	0.045	0.101 *	0.050	0.036	0.045	0.118 *	0.058	0.036	0.049
Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.146 **	0.055	-0.084 +	0.048	-0.148 **	0.055	-0.085 +	0.048	-0.136 *	0.066	-0.107 *	0.051
Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.135 *	0.063	-0.172 ***	0.054	-0.139 *	0.062	-0.171 ***	0.053	-0.140 +	0.075	-0.178 **	0.058
Male	-0.039	0.032	-4.863 ***	0.074	-0.019	0.037	-4.805 ***	0.075	-0.010	0.046	-4.881 ***	0.089
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)	-0.174 ***	0.045	0.244 **	0.091	-0.170 ***	0.045	0.237 **	0.089	-0.193 **	0.062	0.296 **	0.112
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)	0.011	0.047	-0.131	0.095	0.013	0.047	-0.118	0.093	0.000	0.068	0.091	0.118
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.050	0.053	-0.020	0.103	-0.046	0.053	-0.035	0.100	-0.043	0.075	0.022	0.133
Muslim	-0.251 ***	0.059	0.408 ***	0.057	-0.008	0.086	0.667 ***	0.071	-0.044	0.113	0.681 ***	0.081
Scheduled Caste	-1.115 ***	0.054	-0.740 ***	0.060	-1.156 ***	0.063	-0.772 ***	0.060	-1.107 ***	0.082	-0.797 ***	0.064
Scheduled Tribe	-0.070	0.060	-1.017 ***	0.070	-0.028	0.067	-1.020 ***	0.071	-0.009	0.081	-1.038 ***	0.076
Muslim*Male					-0.315 ***	0.080	-0.986 ***	0.107	-0.272 *	0.120	-1.158 ***	0.179
Scheduled Caste*Male					0.060	0.045	0.326 ***	0.086	-0.004	0.086	0.625 ***	0.178
Scheduled Tribe*Male					-0.064	0.043	0.426 ***	0.106	-0.090	0.077	0.724 ***	0.213
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)	0.123	0.081	-0.172 *	0.084	0.117	0.081	-0.165 +	0.094	-0.102	0.161	-0.294 *	0.114
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)	0.316 ***	0.083	0.161 +	0.085	0.322 ***	0.083	0.161 +	0.095	0.225	0.168	0.104	0.120
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)	0.316 **	0.100	-0.019	0.109	0.321 ***	0.099	-0.022	0.122	0.726 ***	0.215	0.124	0.147
Scheduled Caste*Period 43	0.038	0.073	0.035	0.078	0.039	0.073	0.028	0.076	-0.001	0.112	0.043	0.084
Scheduled Caste*Period 50	0.069	0.077	0.071	0.081	0.069	0.077	0.075	0.079	0.007	0.124	0.131	0.085
Scheduled Caste*Period 55	0.097	0.084	0.163 +	0.088	0.096	0.084	0.161 +	0.086	0.003	0.133	0.190 *	0.094
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43	0.097	0.082	0.352 ***	0.095	0.097	0.082	0.337 ***	0.093	0.153	0.117	0.399 ***	0.106
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50	0.107	0.088	0.187 +	0.100	0.108	0.088	0.187 +	0.099	0.122	0.124	0.258 *	0.110
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55	0.186 *	0.092	0.323 **	0.104	0.188 *	0.092	0.316 **	0.102	0.075	0.129	0.278 *	0.113
Muslim*Male*Period 43									0.283	0.172	0.322	0.288

Continued on next page

Table 37 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4		Unemp./Out LF		Model 5		Unemp./Out LF		Model 6		Unemp./Out LF	
	Self Employed				Self Employed				Self Employed			
	Coef.	SE										
Muslim*Male*Period 50									0.117	0.176	0.109	0.258
Muslim*Male*Period 55									-0.495 *	0.236	0.181	0.293
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43									0.053	0.117	-0.228	0.224
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50									0.078	0.125	-0.635 **	0.241
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55									0.125	0.131	-0.398	0.261
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43									-0.088	0.114	-0.422	0.288
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50									-0.029	0.115	-0.872 **	0.335
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55									0.173	0.121	-0.070	0.291
Age	-0.016	0.011	-0.228 ***	0.012	-0.016	0.011	-0.229 ***	0.012	-0.016	0.011	-0.229 ***	0.012
Age Squared	0.000 **	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.000 **	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.000 **	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000
Urban	-0.088 ***	0.028	0.643 ***	0.029	-0.089 ***	0.028	0.641 ***	0.030	-0.090 ***	0.028	0.642 ***	0.030
Household Size	0.162 ***	0.008	0.212 ***	0.008	0.161 ***	0.008	0.213 ***	0.008	0.161 ***	0.008	0.213 ***	0.008
Primary School	0.481 ***	0.025	0.612 ***	0.032	0.478 ***	0.025	0.608 ***	0.032	0.478 ***	0.025	0.607 ***	0.032
Middle School	0.660 ***	0.032	1.093 ***	0.049	0.656 ***	0.032	1.087 ***	0.049	0.655 ***	0.032	1.087 ***	0.049
College	0.485 ***	0.105	1.764 ***	0.162	0.480 ***	0.105	1.757 ***	0.162	0.479 ***	0.105	1.760 ***	0.163
Never Married	-0.104 *	0.052	0.584 ***	0.094	-0.106 *	0.052	0.580 ***	0.093	-0.108 *	0.052	0.578 ***	0.093
Widow/Divorced/Separated	-0.212 ***	0.039	-0.878 ***	0.042	-0.216 ***	0.039	-0.889 ***	0.043	-0.215 ***	0.039	-0.888 ***	0.043
Number of Kids in Household	-0.030 **	0.011	-0.111 ***	0.011	-0.030 **	0.011	-0.110 ***	0.011	-0.030 **	0.011	-0.111 ***	0.011
Andra Pradesh	-0.173 ***	0.039	-1.752 ***	0.044	-0.172 ***	0.039	-1.751 ***	0.044	-0.171 ***	0.039	-1.751 ***	0.044
Assam	-0.070	0.046	0.352 ***	0.055	-0.064	0.046	0.370 ***	0.057	-0.063	0.046	0.368 ***	0.057
Jammu and Kashmir	0.828 ***	0.084	0.800 ***	0.076	0.837 ***	0.084	0.872 ***	0.080	0.831 ***	0.084	0.868 ***	0.081
Orissa	0.024	0.040	-0.338 ***	0.039	0.025	0.039	-0.331 ***	0.039	0.025	0.039	-0.331 ***	0.039
West Bengal	-0.112 **	0.040	0.190 ***	0.040	-0.109 **	0.040	0.194 ***	0.041	-0.109 **	0.040	0.195 ***	0.041

Continued on next page

Table 37 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	-0.393 ***	0.037	-1.559 ***	0.039	-0.390 ***	0.037	-1.550 ***	0.039	-0.388 ***	0.037	-1.550 ***	0.039
Kerele/Lakshadweep	-1.120 ***	0.055	-1.001 ***	0.059	-1.120 ***	0.055	-1.011 ***	0.060	-1.120 ***	0.055	-1.010 ***	0.060
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	0.302 ***	0.063	0.196 *	0.091	0.299 ***	0.063	0.183 *	0.088	0.300 ***	0.063	0.184 *	0.088
Northeast	0.767 ***	0.057	0.258 ***	0.061	0.768 ***	0.057	0.263 ***	0.060	0.768 ***	0.057	0.264 ***	0.061
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	-0.262 ***	0.042	-1.369 ***	0.046	-0.261 ***	0.042	-1.366 ***	0.046	-0.259 ***	0.042	-1.367 ***	0.046
Intercept	-1.068 ***	0.212	4.586 ***	0.238	-1.082 ***	0.211	4.581 ***	0.239	-1.085 ***	0.213	4.588 ***	0.240

Continued on next page

Table 37 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Below The Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4		Unemp./Out LF		Model 5		Unemp./Out LF		Model 6		Unemp./Out LF	
	Self Employed		Coef.	SE	Self Employed		Coef.	SE	Self Employed		Coef.	SE
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Wald Test												
Variables Tested	[2]musper43 = 0				[2]musmale = 0				[2]musmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]musper43 = 0				[3]musmale = 0				[3]musmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]musper50 = 0				[2]scmale = 0				[2]musmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]musper50 = 0				[3]scmale = 0				[3]musmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]musper55 = 0				[2]stmale = 0				[2]musmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]musper55 = 0				[3]stmale = 0				[3]musmaleper55 = 0			
	[2]scper43 = 0								[2]scmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]scper43 = 0								[3]scmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]scper50 = 0								[2]scmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]scper50 = 0								[3]scmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]scper55 = 0								[2]scmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]scper55 = 0								[3]scmaleper55 = 0			
	[2]stper43 = 0								[2]stmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]stper43 = 0								[3]stmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]stper50 = 0								[2]stmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]stper50 = 0								[3]stmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]stper55 = 0								[2]stmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]stper55 = 0								[3]stmaleper55 = 0			
Number of Variables Tested	18				6				18			
chi2	53.2				150.6				36.8			
Prob > chi2	0.000				0.000				0.006			

+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***<.001

Table 38 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Above the Poverty Line

	Model 1		Model 2				Model 3					
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Historical Period 43 (1987)	-0.030 +	0.016	-0.029	0.019	0.024	0.027	-0.026	0.025	-0.018	0.016	-0.021	0.019
Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.071 ***	0.016	0.023	0.019	-0.183 ***	0.028	-0.031	0.025	-0.035 *	0.016	0.056 **	0.019
Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.170 ***	0.018	-0.106 ***	0.021	-0.313 ***	0.029	-0.219 ***	0.027	-0.108 ***	0.018	-0.052 *	0.021
Male	-0.223 ***	0.011	-5.267 ***	0.026	-0.315 ***	0.021	-5.439 ***	0.049	-0.239 ***	0.015	-5.284 ***	0.029
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)					-0.075 **	0.027	0.198 ***	0.055				
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)					0.155 ***	0.028	-0.007	0.057				
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)					0.198 ***	0.030	0.369 ***	0.059				
Muslim									-0.256 ***	0.045	0.509 ***	0.038
Scheduled Caste									-1.270 ***	0.028	-0.950 ***	0.023
Scheduled Tribe									-0.403 ***	0.036	-0.988 ***	0.037
Muslim*Male									0.231 ***	0.047	-0.657 ***	0.066
Scheduled Caste*Male									0.163 ***	0.028	0.413 ***	0.057
Scheduled Tribe*Male									-0.117 ***	0.032	0.702 ***	0.081
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)												
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)												
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)												
Scheduled Caste*Period 43												
Scheduled Caste*Period 50												
Scheduled Caste*Period 55												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55												
Muslim*Male*Period 43												

Continued on next page

Table 38 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1		Unemp./Out LF		Model 2		Unemp./Out LF		Model 3		Unemp./Out LF	
	Self Employed				Self Employed				Self Employed			
	Coef.	SE										
Muslim*Male*Period 50												
Muslim*Male*Period 55												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55												
Age	-0.017 **	0.006	-0.235 ***	0.007	-0.018 **	0.006	-0.235 ***	0.007	-0.027 ***	0.006	-0.243 ***	0.008
Age Squared	0.000 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.000 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.000 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000
Urban	-0.766 ***	0.015	0.589 ***	0.021	-0.764 ***	0.015	0.592 ***	0.021	-0.834 ***	0.016	0.490 ***	0.021
Household Size	0.207 ***	0.004	0.257 ***	0.005	0.207 ***	0.004	0.257 ***	0.005	0.198 ***	0.004	0.250 ***	0.005
Primary School	0.475 ***	0.015	0.897 ***	0.020	0.477 ***	0.015	0.898 ***	0.020	0.367 ***	0.016	0.783 ***	0.021
Middle School	0.200 ***	0.016	0.903 ***	0.023	0.198 ***	0.016	0.904 ***	0.023	0.019	0.017	0.758 ***	0.023
College	-0.637 ***	0.029	-0.109 *	0.045	-0.640 ***	0.029	-0.107 *	0.045	-0.870 ***	0.030	-0.293 ***	0.047
Never Married	0.159 ***	0.025	0.854 ***	0.052	0.157 ***	0.025	0.854 ***	0.052	0.127 ***	0.025	0.837 ***	0.052
Widow/Divorced/Separated	-0.212 ***	0.022	-0.727 ***	0.026	-0.214 ***	0.022	-0.729 ***	0.026	-0.220 ***	0.022	-0.747 ***	0.026
Number of Kids in Household	-0.065 ***	0.007	-0.112 ***	0.008	-0.065 ***	0.007	-0.112 ***	0.008	-0.062 ***	0.007	-0.121 ***	0.008
Andra Pradesh	-0.855 ***	0.027	-2.018 ***	0.034	-0.855 ***	0.027	-2.020 ***	0.034	-0.936 ***	0.027	-2.045 ***	0.034
Assam	-0.639 ***	0.033	0.105 *	0.043	-0.640 ***	0.033	0.101 *	0.043	-0.684 ***	0.035	0.106 *	0.045
Bihar	-0.454 ***	0.029	-0.051	0.035	-0.454 ***	0.029	-0.053	0.035	-0.504 ***	0.029	-0.061 +	0.036
Jammu and Kashmir	-0.396 ***	0.040	0.357 ***	0.046	-0.396 ***	0.040	0.345 ***	0.046	-0.503 ***	0.042	0.104 *	0.050
Madhya Pradesh	-0.441 ***	0.030	-1.440 ***	0.037	-0.442 ***	0.030	-1.442 ***	0.037	-0.432 ***	0.031	-1.284 ***	0.037

Continued on next page

Table 38 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1		Model 2				Model 3					
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Maharashtra	-0.935 ***	0.028	-2.069 ***	0.034	-0.936 ***	0.028	-2.070 ***	0.034	-1.019 ***	0.028	-2.074 ***	0.035
Orissa	-0.842 ***	0.036	-0.610 ***	0.042	-0.843 ***	0.036	-0.611 ***	0.042	-0.829 ***	0.037	-0.478 ***	0.042
Rajasthan	0.086 **	0.030	-0.893 ***	0.036	0.085 **	0.030	-0.895 ***	0.036	0.104 ***	0.031	-0.792 ***	0.037
West Bengal	-0.858 ***	0.028	-0.195 ***	0.034	-0.858 ***	0.028	-0.191 ***	0.034	-0.767 ***	0.029	-0.124 ***	0.034
New Delhi	-0.901 ***	0.084	-0.755 ***	0.090	-0.899 ***	0.084	-0.750 ***	0.091	-0.916 ***	0.086	-0.725 ***	0.085
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	-1.126 ***	0.029	-1.934 ***	0.035	-1.126 ***	0.029	-1.935 ***	0.035	-1.168 ***	0.030	-1.941 ***	0.036
Kerele/Lakshadweep	-1.755 ***	0.036	-1.443 ***	0.043	-1.755 ***	0.036	-1.443 ***	0.043	-1.824 ***	0.036	-1.558 ***	0.043
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	-0.883 ***	0.032	-1.485 ***	0.038	-0.883 ***	0.032	-1.487 ***	0.038	-0.935 ***	0.033	-1.421 ***	0.039
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	-0.707 ***	0.032	-0.459 ***	0.038	-0.707 ***	0.032	-0.460 ***	0.038	-0.558 ***	0.033	-0.296 ***	0.038
Northeast	-0.247 ***	0.029	-0.991 ***	0.037	-0.248 ***	0.029	-0.993 ***	0.037	-0.164 ***	0.033	-0.605 ***	0.040
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	-0.833 ***	0.031	-1.648 ***	0.037	-0.833 ***	0.031	-1.649 ***	0.037	-0.908 ***	0.031	-1.673 ***	0.038
Intercept	0.256 *	0.118	5.363 ***	0.143	0.329 **	0.119	5.420 ***	0.144	0.833 ***	0.121	5.841 ***	0.144

Continued on next page

Table 38 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1		Model 2				Model 3					
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Wald Test												
Variables Tested	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 45%;"> <p>[2]mper43 = 0</p> <p>[3]mper43 = 0</p> <p>[2]mper50 = 0</p> <p>[3]mper50 = 0</p> <p>[2]mper55 = 0</p> <p>[3]mper55 = 0</p> </div> <div style="width: 45%;"> <p>[2]musmale = 0</p> <p>[3]musmale = 0</p> <p>[2]scmale = 0</p> <p>[3]scmale = 0</p> <p>[2]stmale = 0</p> <p>[3]stmale = 0</p> </div> </div>											
Number of Variables Tested	6						6					
chi2	202.1						455.0					
Prob > chi2	0.000						0.000					

Continued on next page

Table 38 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.027	0.030	-0.026	0.028	0.029	0.030	-0.024	0.029	-0.012	0.034	-0.064 *	0.031
Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.135 ***	0.030	-0.035	0.028	-0.136	0.030 ***	-0.034	0.029	-0.144 ***	0.035	-0.051	0.031
Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.226 ***	0.033	-0.159 ***	0.033	-0.226	0.033 ***	-0.157	0.033 ***	-0.273 ***	0.038	-0.196 ***	0.037
Male	-0.300 ***	0.021	-5.457 ***	0.050	-0.331	0.022 ***	-5.436	0.051 ***	-0.367 ***	0.026	-5.526 ***	0.059
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)	-0.072 **	0.028	0.198 ***	0.056	-0.076	0.028 **	0.196	0.055 ***	-0.021	0.034	0.326 ***	0.067
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)	0.157 ***	0.028	-0.005	0.059	0.158	0.028 ***	-0.023	0.058	0.168 ***	0.035	0.073	0.070
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)	0.207 ***	0.031	0.356 ***	0.061	0.206	0.031 ***	0.337	0.059 ***	0.270 ***	0.040	0.444 ***	0.074
Muslim	-0.030	0.039	0.458 ***	0.046	-0.218	0.056 ***	0.492	0.056 ***	-0.386 ***	0.083	0.352 ***	0.067
Scheduled Caste	-1.156 ***	0.036	-0.949 ***	0.045	-1.265	0.041 ***	-1.022	0.045 ***	-1.301 ***	0.056	-1.075 ***	0.051
Scheduled Tribe	-0.352 ***	0.044	-0.936 ***	0.056	-0.273	0.050 ***	-0.928	0.058 ***	-0.363 ***	0.063	-0.994 ***	0.065
Muslim*Male					0.234	0.047 ***	-0.668	0.066 ***	0.442 ***	0.084	-0.293 *	0.124
Scheduled Caste*Male					0.158	0.028 ***	0.396	0.057 ***	0.207 ***	0.057	0.737 ***	0.131
Scheduled Tribe*Male					-0.129	0.032 ***	0.684	0.081 ***	0.004	0.061	0.838 ***	0.169
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)	-0.030	0.053	-0.043	0.060	-0.029	0.053	-0.019	0.066	0.166	0.115	0.184 *	0.093
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)	0.049	0.055	0.101	0.064	0.044	0.055	0.121	0.069 +	0.186	0.122	0.259 **	0.096
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)	-0.136 *	0.058	-0.064	0.066	-0.140	0.059 *	-0.027	0.072	0.130	0.123	0.152	0.100
Scheduled Caste*Period 43	0.107 *	0.047	0.052	0.058	0.106	0.047 *	0.043	0.056	0.244 ***	0.075	0.142 *	0.066
Scheduled Caste*Period 50	-0.012	0.047	0.154 **	0.057	-0.016	0.047	0.153	0.055 **	-0.081	0.077	0.175 **	0.064
Scheduled Caste*Period 55	-0.060	0.050	0.077	0.059	-0.060	0.050	0.073	0.057	-0.001	0.079	0.150 *	0.067
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43	-0.091	0.060	0.012	0.074	-0.090	0.060	-0.005	0.073	-0.059	0.087	0.043	0.087
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50	-0.209 ***	0.061	0.060	0.078	-0.208	0.061 ***	0.051	0.077	-0.132	0.087	0.114	0.090
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55	-0.125 +	0.068	-0.168 *	0.084	-0.129	0.068 +	-0.180	0.082 *	0.041	0.095	-0.078	0.099
Muslim*Male*Period 43									-0.241 *	0.118	-0.649 ***	0.167

Continued on next page

Table 38 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Muslim*Male*Period 50									-0.173	0.125	-0.434 *	0.178
Muslim*Male*Period 55									-0.332 **	0.128	-0.348 +	0.181
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43									-0.197 *	0.077	-0.371 *	0.163
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50									0.091	0.079	-0.360 *	0.170
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55									-0.081	0.081	-0.453 **	0.168
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43									-0.041	0.086	-0.266	0.225
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50									-0.115	0.084	-0.208	0.239
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55									-0.258 **	0.087	-0.102	0.224
Age	-0.027 ***	0.006	-0.243 ***	0.008	-0.027	0.006 ***	-0.243	0.008 ***	-0.027 ***	0.006	-0.243 ***	0.008
Age Squared	0.000 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.000	0.000 ***	0.003	0.000 ***	0.000 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000
Urban	-0.831 ***	0.016	0.489 ***	0.021	-0.832	0.016 ***	0.493	0.021 ***	-0.833 ***	0.016	0.493 ***	0.021
Household Size	0.199 ***	0.004	0.250 ***	0.005	0.198	0.004 ***	0.250	0.005 ***	0.198 ***	0.004	0.250 ***	0.005
Primary School	0.372 ***	0.016	0.789 ***	0.021	0.371	0.016 ***	0.785	0.021 ***	0.371 ***	0.016	0.785 ***	0.021
Middle School	0.016	0.017	0.763 ***	0.023	0.017	0.017	0.759	0.024 ***	0.017	0.017	0.760 ***	0.024
College	-0.879 ***	0.030	-0.283 ***	0.047	-0.875	0.030 ***	-0.288	0.048 ***	-0.874 ***	0.030	-0.288 ***	0.048
Never Married	0.126 ***	0.025	0.836 ***	0.052	0.126	0.025 ***	0.837	0.052 ***	0.126 ***	0.025	0.838 ***	0.052
Widow/Divorced/Separated	-0.222 ***	0.022	-0.746 ***	0.026	-0.222	0.022 ***	-0.749	0.026 ***	-0.222 ***	0.022	-0.749 ***	0.026
Number of Kids in Household	-0.062 ***	0.007	-0.120 ***	0.008	-0.062	0.007 ***	-0.121	0.008 ***	-0.062 ***	0.007	-0.121 ***	0.008
Andra Pradesh	-0.936 ***	0.027	-2.049 ***	0.034	-0.933	0.027 ***	-2.046	0.035 ***	-0.933 ***	0.027	-2.046 ***	0.035
Assam	-0.685 ***	0.035	0.098 *	0.045	-0.684	0.035 ***	0.104	0.045 *	-0.684 ***	0.035	0.104 *	0.045
Bihar	-0.505 ***	0.029	-0.066 +	0.036	-0.503	0.029 ***	-0.063	0.036 +	-0.503 ***	0.029	-0.063 +	0.036
Jammu and Kashmir	-0.479 ***	0.042	0.051	0.048	-0.485	0.042 ***	0.108	0.050 *	-0.485 ***	0.042	0.105 *	0.050
Madhya Pradesh	-0.434 ***	0.031	-1.297 ***	0.037	-0.432	0.031 ***	-1.288	0.037 ***	-0.432 ***	0.031	-1.288 ***	0.037

Continued on next page

Table 38 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Maharashtra	-1.019 ***	0.029	-2.076 ***	0.035	-1.018	0.028 ***	-2.074	0.035 ***	-1.018 ***	0.028	-2.074 ***	0.035
Orissa	-0.831 ***	0.037	-0.480 ***	0.042	-0.827	0.037 ***	-0.480	0.042 ***	-0.827 ***	0.037	-0.480 ***	0.042
Rajasthan	0.102 ***	0.031	-0.797 ***	0.037	0.105	0.031 ***	-0.792	0.037 ***	0.105 ***	0.031	-0.792 ***	0.037
West Bengal	-0.762 ***	0.029	-0.122 ***	0.034	-0.765	0.029 ***	-0.122	0.034 ***	-0.765 ***	0.029	-0.121 ***	0.034
New Delhi	-0.915 ***	0.086	-0.718 ***	0.086	-0.913	0.086 ***	-0.719	0.086 ***	-0.913 ***	0.086	-0.719 ***	0.086
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	-1.169 ***	0.030	-1.948 ***	0.036	-1.166	0.030 ***	-1.942	0.036 ***	-1.166 ***	0.030	-1.942 ***	0.036
Kerele/Lakshadweep	-1.826 ***	0.036	-1.555 ***	0.043	-1.822	0.036 ***	-1.556	0.043 ***	-1.822 ***	0.036	-1.557 ***	0.043
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	-0.936 ***	0.033	-1.429 ***	0.039	-0.933	0.033 ***	-1.423	0.039 ***	-0.933 ***	0.033	-1.423 ***	0.039
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	-0.556 ***	0.033	-0.289 ***	0.039	-0.557	0.033 ***	-0.295	0.038 ***	-0.557 ***	0.033	-0.295 ***	0.038
Northeast	-0.170 ***	0.034	-0.608 ***	0.041	-0.163	0.033 ***	-0.603	0.041 ***	-0.163 ***	0.033	-0.603 ***	0.041
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	-0.908 ***	0.031	-1.676 ***	0.038	-0.905	0.031 ***	-1.673	0.038 ***	-0.905 ***	0.031	-1.674 ***	0.038
Intercept	0.882 ***	0.122	5.879 ***	0.145	0.892	0.122 ***	5.899	0.145 ***	0.920 ***	0.122	5.927 ***	0.145

Continued on next page

Table 38 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in All States Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Self Employed	Unemp./Out LF	Self Employed	Unemp./Out LF	Self Employed	Unemp./Out LF
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Wald Test						
Variables Tested	[2]musper43 = 0		[2]musmale = 0		[2]musmaleper43 = 0	
	[3]musper43 = 0		[3]musmale = 0		[3]musmaleper43 = 0	
	[2]musper50 = 0		[2]scmale = 0		[2]musmaleper50 = 0	
	[3]musper50 = 0		[3]scmale = 0		[3]musmaleper50 = 0	
	[2]musper55 = 0		[2]stmale = 0		[2]musmaleper55 = 0	
	[3]musper55 = 0		[3]stmale = 0		[3]musmaleper55 = 0	
	[2]scper43 = 0				[2]scmaleper43 = 0	
	[3]scper43 = 0				[3]scmaleper43 = 0	
	[2]scper50 = 0				[2]scmaleper50 = 0	
	[3]scper50 = 0				[3]scmaleper50 = 0	
	[2]scper55 = 0				[2]scmaleper55 = 0	
	[3]scper55 = 0				[3]scmaleper55 = 0	
	[2]stper43 = 0				[2]stmaleper43 = 0	
	[3]stper43 = 0				[3]stmaleper43 = 0	
	[2]stper50 = 0				[2]stmaleper50 = 0	
	[3]stper50 = 0				[3]stmaleper50 = 0	
	[2]stper55 = 0				[2]stmaleper55 = 0	
	[3]stper55 = 0				[3]stmaleper55 = 0	
Number of Variables Tested	18		6		18	
chi2	70.1		457.7		53.4	
Prob > chi2	0.000		0.000		0.000	

+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***<.001

Table 39 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Historical Period 43 (1987)	-0.089	0.024 ***	-0.093	0.028 ***	-0.091 *	0.040	-0.129 ***	0.037	-0.073 **	0.024	-0.083 **	0.028
Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.103	0.024 ***	0.125	0.029 ***	-0.246 ***	0.041	0.055	0.037	-0.080 ***	0.025	0.147 ***	0.029
Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.180	0.028 ***	-0.028	0.034	-0.350 ***	0.046	-0.170 ***	0.045	-0.118 ***	0.028	0.030	0.035
Male	-0.297	0.019 ***	-5.437	0.041 ***	-0.426 ***	0.030	-5.648 ***	0.069	-0.294 ***	0.025	-5.455 ***	0.047
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)					-0.001	0.040	0.376 ***	0.084				
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)					0.198 ***	0.041	-0.140	0.089				
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)					0.235 ***	0.049	0.465 ***	0.092				
Muslim									-0.268 ***	0.072	0.400 ***	0.065
Scheduled Caste									-1.235 ***	0.044	-0.993 ***	0.041
Scheduled Tribe									-0.630 ***	0.051	-1.071 ***	0.055
Muslim*Male									0.186 *	0.077	-0.509 ***	0.118
Scheduled Caste*Male									0.125 **	0.044	0.398 ***	0.094
Scheduled Tribe*Male									-0.093 *	0.045	0.907 ***	0.143
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)												
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)												
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)												
Scheduled Caste*Period 43												
Scheduled Caste*Period 50												
Scheduled Caste*Period 55												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55												
Muslim*Male*Period 43												

Continued on next page

Table 39 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Muslim*Male*Period 50												
Muslim*Male*Period 55												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50												
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50												
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55												
Age	-0.038	0.010 ***	-0.242	0.012 ***	-0.038 ***	0.010	-0.242 ***	0.012	-0.049 ***	0.010	-0.252 ***	0.012
Age Squared	0.001	0.000 ***	0.003	0.000 ***	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000
Urban	-0.834	0.026 ***	0.800	0.040 ***	-0.833 ***	0.026	0.804 ***	0.040	-0.896 ***	0.027	0.697 ***	0.042
Household Size	0.222	0.007 ***	0.260	0.008 ***	0.222 ***	0.007	0.260 ***	0.008	0.210 ***	0.007	0.249 ***	0.008
Primary School	0.291	0.026 ***	0.741	0.035 ***	0.293 ***	0.026	0.743 ***	0.035	0.168 ***	0.027	0.614 ***	0.036
Middle School	-0.031	0.026	0.713	0.039 ***	-0.033	0.026	0.712 ***	0.039	-0.230 ***	0.028	0.539 ***	0.042
College	-0.792	0.046 ***	-0.367	0.074 ***	-0.797 ***	0.046	-0.364 ***	0.074	-1.048 ***	0.047	-0.579 ***	0.079
Never Married	0.151	0.045 ***	0.985	0.099 ***	0.149 ***	0.045	0.983 ***	0.099	0.097 *	0.045	0.944 ***	0.099
Widow/Divorced/Separated	-0.189	0.033 ***	-0.644	0.042 ***	-0.190 ***	0.033	-0.645 ***	0.042	-0.199 ***	0.033	-0.670 ***	0.043
Number of Kids in Household	-0.075	0.011 ***	-0.112	0.013 ***	-0.076 ***	0.011	-0.111 ***	0.013	-0.071 ***	0.011	-0.116 ***	0.013
Madhya Pradesh	-0.460	0.030 ***	-1.490	0.039 ***	-0.461 ***	0.030	-1.493 ***	0.039	-0.407 ***	0.031	-1.321 ***	0.039
Maharashtra	-0.915	0.028 ***	-2.126	0.038 ***	-0.916 ***	0.029	-2.128 ***	0.038	-0.980 ***	0.030	-2.123 ***	0.040
Rajasthan	0.060	0.031 *	-0.940	0.039 ***	0.059 +	0.031	-0.943 ***	0.039	0.101 **	0.032	-0.835 ***	0.040
New Delhi	-0.802	0.088 ***	-0.821	0.098 ***	-0.800 ***	0.088	-0.811 ***	0.100	-0.817 ***	0.091	-0.785 ***	0.094
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	-0.876	0.033 ***	-1.532	0.041 ***	-0.876 ***	0.033	-1.534 ***	0.041	-0.897 ***	0.034	-1.459 ***	0.043
Intercept	0.790	0.191 ***	5.612	0.233 ***	0.888 ***	0.193	5.690 ***	0.235	1.429 ***	0.195	6.170 ***	0.234

Continued on next page

Table 39 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Self Employed		Self Employed		Self Employed	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Wald Test						
Variables Tested			[2]mper43 = 0		[2]musmale = 0	
			[3]mper43 = 0		[3]musmale = 0	
			[2]mper50 = 0		[2]scmale = 0	
			[3]mper50 = 0		[3]scmale = 0	
			[2]mper55 = 0		[2]stmale = 0	
			[3]mper55 = 0		[3]stmale = 0	
Number of Variables Tested			6		6	
chi2			131.2		132.2	
Prob > chi2			0.000		0.000	

Continued on next page

Table 39 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Historical Period 43 (1987)	-0.060	0.044	-0.103 *	0.043	-0.057	0.045	-0.101 *	0.043	-0.122 *	0.052	-0.154 ***	0.048
Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.210 ***	0.045	0.027	0.043	-0.213 ***	0.045	0.024	0.043	-0.232 ***	0.052	0.004	0.048
Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.249 ***	0.052	-0.093 +	0.056	-0.251 ***	0.052	-0.093 +	0.056	-0.311 ***	0.063	-0.140 *	0.064
Male	-0.396 ***	0.030	-5.633 ***	0.070	-0.415 ***	0.032	-5.642 ***	0.072	-0.467 ***	0.038	-5.721 ***	0.081
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)	-0.015	0.041	0.358 ***	0.086	-0.019	0.041	0.355 ***	0.085	0.067	0.052	0.467 ***	0.101
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)	0.193 ***	0.042	-0.156 +	0.091	0.197 ***	0.042	-0.145	0.089	0.221 ***	0.053	-0.068	0.106
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)	0.230 ***	0.050	0.430 ***	0.095	0.231 ***	0.051	0.417 ***	0.094	0.311 ***	0.070	0.514 ***	0.116
Muslim	-0.201 **	0.068	0.234 **	0.078	-0.347 ***	0.093	0.221 *	0.093	-0.499 ***	0.129	0.099	0.109
Scheduled Caste	-1.149 ***	0.051	-1.039 ***	0.060	-1.238 ***	0.061	-1.106 ***	0.062	-1.293 ***	0.078	-1.159 ***	0.070
Scheduled Tribe	-0.478 ***	0.061	-0.853 ***	0.075	-0.414 ***	0.069	-0.844 ***	0.078	-0.559 ***	0.083	-0.947 ***	0.087
Muslim*Male					0.188 *	0.078	-0.501 ***	0.119	0.378 **	0.134	-0.226	0.214
Scheduled Caste*Male					0.128 **	0.044	0.380 ***	0.095	0.202 *	0.078	0.640 ***	0.190
Scheduled Tribe*Male					-0.110 *	0.046	0.885 ***	0.144	0.109	0.081	1.078 ***	0.263
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)	0.137	0.093	0.144	0.104	0.139	0.093	0.167	0.109	0.403 *	0.184	0.413 **	0.159
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)	0.174 +	0.094	0.316 **	0.108	0.167 +	0.094	0.345 **	0.114	0.105	0.193	0.339 *	0.160
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)	0.001	0.105	0.118	0.112	-0.001	0.105	0.158	0.118	0.322	0.198	0.365 *	0.172
Scheduled Caste*Period 43	0.028	0.070	-0.031	0.082	0.029	0.070	-0.034	0.080	0.188 +	0.108	0.066	0.096
Scheduled Caste*Period 50	0.051	0.072	0.307 ***	0.085	0.047	0.072	0.306 ***	0.083	0.105	0.115	0.354 ***	0.098
Scheduled Caste*Period 55	-0.059	0.076	0.135	0.087	-0.060	0.076	0.130	0.086	-0.053	0.118	0.183 +	0.104
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43	-0.170 *	0.085	-0.112	0.104	-0.172 *	0.085	-0.135	0.103	-0.024	0.118	-0.019	0.120
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50	-0.302 ***	0.085	-0.124	0.103	-0.302 ***	0.085	-0.126	0.102	-0.236 *	0.116	-0.058	0.115
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55	-0.239 *	0.097	-0.400 ***	0.124	-0.243 *	0.097	-0.414 ***	0.122	0.012	0.136	-0.255 +	0.147
Muslim*Male*Period 43									-0.326 +	0.192	-0.665 *	0.302

Continued on next page

Table 39 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4		Unemp./Out LF		Model 5		Unemp./Out LF		Model 6		Unemp./Out LF	
	Self Employed				Self Employed				Self Employed			
	Coef.	SE										
Muslim*Male*Period 50									0.065	0.200	-0.181	0.303
Muslim*Male*Period 55									-0.402 +	0.213	-0.255	0.321
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43									-0.227 *	0.109	-0.160	0.248
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50									-0.080	0.117	-0.239	0.267
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55									-0.006	0.122	-0.424	0.261
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43									-0.217 +	0.116	-0.287	0.359
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50									-0.097	0.112	-0.382	0.414
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55									-0.398 ***	0.124	-0.127	0.372
Age	-0.050 ***	0.010	-0.252 ***	0.012	-0.049 ***	0.010	-0.252 ***	0.012	-0.050 ***	0.010	-0.252 ***	0.012
Age Squared	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.001 ***	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000
Urban	-0.891 ***	0.027	0.688 ***	0.042	-0.895 ***	0.027	0.700 ***	0.042	-0.895 ***	0.027	0.700 ***	0.042
Household Size	0.210 ***	0.007	0.248 ***	0.008	0.210 ***	0.007	0.248 ***	0.008	0.210 ***	0.007	0.248 ***	0.008
Primary School	0.172 ***	0.027	0.620 ***	0.036	0.171 ***	0.027	0.616 ***	0.036	0.171 ***	0.027	0.617 ***	0.036
Middle School	-0.234 ***	0.028	0.545 ***	0.042	-0.234 ***	0.028	0.541 ***	0.042	-0.234 ***	0.028	0.541 ***	0.042
College	-1.057 ***	0.048	-0.561 ***	0.080	-1.054 ***	0.047	-0.571 ***	0.080	-1.054 ***	0.047	-0.572 ***	0.080
Never Married	0.096 *	0.045	0.926 ***	0.099	0.095 *	0.045	0.941 ***	0.099	0.096 *	0.045	0.941 ***	0.099
Widow/Divorced/Separated	-0.200 ***	0.033	-0.670 ***	0.043	-0.200 ***	0.033	-0.673 ***	0.043	-0.200 ***	0.033	-0.673 ***	0.043
Number of Kids in Household	-0.071 ***	0.011	-0.115 ***	0.012	-0.071 ***	0.011	-0.116 ***	0.012	-0.071 ***	0.011	-0.116 ***	0.012
Madhya Pradesh	-0.414 ***	0.032	-1.335 ***	0.040	-0.411 ***	0.032	-1.331 ***	0.040	-0.411 ***	0.032	-1.331 ***	0.040
Maharashtra	-0.982 ***	0.030	-2.124 ***	0.039	-0.980 ***	0.030	-2.125 ***	0.040	-0.979 ***	0.030	-2.125 ***	0.040
Rajasthan	0.098 **	0.032	-0.835 ***	0.040	0.102 ***	0.032	-0.835 ***	0.040	0.102 ***	0.032	-0.834 ***	0.040
New Delhi	-0.816 ***	0.091	-0.773 ***	0.094	-0.814 ***	0.091	-0.776 ***	0.094	-0.814 ***	0.091	-0.777 ***	0.094
Gujarat/Dadra and Nagar Haveli	-0.899 ***	0.035	-1.461 ***	0.043	-0.895 ***	0.034	-1.459 ***	0.043	-0.895 ***	0.035	-1.459 ***	0.043
Intercept	1.505 ***	0.195	6.228 ***	0.235	1.509 ***	0.195	6.243 ***	0.235	1.551 ***	0.196	6.280 ***	0.235

Continued on next page

Table 39 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4		Unemp./Out LF		Model 5		Unemp./Out LF		Model 6		Unemp./Out LF	
	Self Employed		Coef.	SE	Self Employed		Coef.	SE	Self Employed		Coef.	SE
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Wald Test												
Variables Tested	[2]musper43 = 0				[2]musmale = 0				[2]musmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]musper43 = 0				[3]musmale = 0				[3]musmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]musper50 = 0				[2]scmale = 0				[2]musmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]musper50 = 0				[3]scmale = 0				[3]musmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]musper55 = 0				[2]stmale = 0				[2]musmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]musper55 = 0				[3]stmale = 0				[3]musmaleper55 = 0			
	[2]scper43 = 0								[2]scmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]scper43 = 0								[3]scmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]scper50 = 0								[2]scmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]scper50 = 0								[3]scmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]scper55 = 0								[2]scmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]scper55 = 0								[3]scmaleper55 = 0			
	[2]stper43 = 0								[2]stmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]stper43 = 0								[3]stmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]stper50 = 0								[2]stmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]stper50 = 0								[3]stmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]stper55 = 0								[2]stmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]stper55 = 0								[3]stmaleper55 = 0			
Number of Variables Tested	18				6				18			
chi2	62.3				132.7				33.8			
Prob > chi2	0.000				0.000				0.013			

+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***<.001

Table 40 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.014	0.021	0.016	0.025	0.109 **	0.038	0.043	0.033	0.022	0.021	0.023	0.025
Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.032	0.021	-0.058 *	0.025	-0.097 *	0.038	-0.098 **	0.033	0.012	0.021	-0.018	0.025
Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.145 ***	0.023	-0.166 ***	0.027	-0.264 ***	0.040	-0.260 ***	0.034	-0.081 ***	0.023	-0.115 ***	0.027
Male	-0.150 ***	0.015	-5.161 ***	0.033	-0.205 ***	0.029	-5.318 ***	0.065	-0.184 ***	0.018	-5.173 ***	0.038
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)					-0.125 ***	0.038	0.090	0.071				
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)					0.088 *	0.038	0.084	0.074				
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)					0.165 ***	0.039	0.331 ***	0.075				
Muslim									-0.238 ***	0.059	0.579 ***	0.046
Scheduled Caste									-1.299 ***	0.038	-0.915 ***	0.029
Scheduled Tribe									-0.173 ***	0.049	-0.929 ***	0.050
Muslim*Male									0.259 ***	0.060	-0.786 ***	0.080
Scheduled Caste*Male									0.200 ***	0.038	0.388 ***	0.070
Scheduled Tribe*Male									-0.114 *	0.045	0.641 ***	0.098
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)												
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)												
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)												
Scheduled Caste*Period 43												
Scheduled Caste*Period 50												
Scheduled Caste*Period 55												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50												
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55												
Muslim*Male*Period 43												

Continued on next page

Table 40 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	-0.695 ***	0.031	-1.833 ***	0.037	-0.695 ***	0.031	-1.833 ***	0.037	-0.668 ***	0.032	-1.830 ***	0.037
Kerele/Lakshadweep	-1.353 ***	0.037	-1.407 ***	0.045	-1.353 ***	0.037	-1.407 ***	0.045	-1.367 ***	0.038	-1.522 ***	0.046
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	-0.269 ***	0.034	-0.398 ***	0.039	-0.269 ***	0.034	-0.398 ***	0.039	-0.050	0.035	-0.225 ***	0.039
Northeast	0.170 ***	0.031	-0.934 ***	0.038	0.170 ***	0.031	-0.935 ***	0.038	0.207 ***	0.035	-0.558 ***	0.042
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	-0.374 ***	0.032	-1.556 ***	0.039	-0.374 ***	0.032	-1.556 ***	0.039	-0.394 ***	0.033	-1.575 ***	0.039
Intercept	-0.579 ***	0.148	5.233 ***	0.182	-0.533 ***	0.150	5.275 ***	0.183	-0.120	0.151	5.647 ***	0.184

Continued on next page

Table 40 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE								
Wald Test												
Variables Tested					[2]mper43 = 0					[2]musmale = 0		
					[3]mper43 = 0					[3]musmale = 0		
					[2]mper50 = 0					[2]scmale = 0		
					[3]mper50 = 0					[3]scmale = 0		
					[2]mper55 = 0					[2]stmale = 0		
					[3]mper55 = 0					[3]stmale = 0		
Number of Variables Tested					6				6			
chi2					86.2				352.3			
Prob > chi2					0.000				0.000			

Continued on next page

Table 40 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Historical Period 43 (1987)	0.089 *	0.041	0.025	0.038	0.091 *	0.041	0.026	0.038	0.063	0.046	-0.010	0.041
Historical Period 50 (1993)	-0.040	0.041	-0.083 *	0.038	-0.039	0.041	-0.078 *	0.038	-0.051	0.047	-0.102 *	0.042
Historical Period 55 (1999)	-0.182 ***	0.044	-0.212 ***	0.040	-0.180 ***	0.044	-0.210 ***	0.041	-0.228 ***	0.050	-0.248 ***	0.044
Male	-0.199 ***	0.029	-5.356 ***	0.067	-0.241 ***	0.031	-5.312 ***	0.068	-0.275 ***	0.035	-5.416 ***	0.080
Male*Historical Period 43 (1987)	-0.111 **	0.038	0.103	0.073	-0.114 **	0.038	0.100	0.072	-0.076 +	0.046	0.246 **	0.088
Male*Historical Period 50 (1993)	0.092 *	0.038	0.090	0.076	0.092 *	0.038	0.056	0.075	0.108 *	0.046	0.176 +	0.091
Male*Historical Period 55 (1999)	0.179 ***	0.040	0.328 ***	0.077	0.174 ***	0.040	0.309 ***	0.076	0.239 ***	0.050	0.427 ***	0.094
Muslim	0.095 *	0.047	0.566 ***	0.057	-0.126 +	0.071	0.651 ***	0.072	-0.318 **	0.109	0.492 ***	0.085
Scheduled Caste	-1.169 ***	0.049	-0.889 ***	0.064	-1.299 ***	0.057	-0.962 ***	0.063	-1.340 ***	0.080	-1.029 ***	0.070
Scheduled Tribe	-0.236 ***	0.063	-1.066 ***	0.080	-0.159 *	0.072	-1.071 ***	0.082	-0.208 *	0.097	-1.121 ***	0.094
Muslim*Male					0.264 ***	0.060	-0.797 ***	0.080	0.499 ***	0.110	-0.371 *	0.152
Scheduled Caste*Male					0.187 ***	0.038	0.368 ***	0.071	0.245 **	0.083	0.763 ***	0.169
Scheduled Tribe*Male					-0.120 **	0.045	0.628 ***	0.098	-0.050	0.091	0.832 ***	0.218
Muslim*Period 43 (1987)	-0.124 +	0.063	-0.144 +	0.074	-0.123 +	0.063	-0.122	0.083	0.034	0.151	0.062	0.116
Muslim*Period 50 (1993)	-0.036	0.068	-0.014	0.078	-0.036	0.068	-0.010	0.088	0.254	0.158	0.216 +	0.121
Muslim*Period 55 (1999)	-0.226 ***	0.070	-0.146 +	0.081	-0.230 ***	0.070	-0.118	0.091	0.026	0.161	0.060	0.123
Scheduled Caste*Period 43	0.173 **	0.063	0.111	0.079	0.171 **	0.063	0.098	0.077	0.291 **	0.105	0.201 *	0.089
Scheduled Caste*Period 50	-0.033	0.063	0.070	0.077	-0.034	0.063	0.067	0.075	-0.149	0.106	0.105	0.084
Scheduled Caste*Period 55	-0.045	0.067	0.047	0.079	-0.044	0.067	0.043	0.076	0.082	0.108	0.143 +	0.087
Scheduled Tribe*Period 43	0.025	0.084	0.194 +	0.104	0.028	0.084	0.183 +	0.101	-0.023	0.131	0.199	0.125
Scheduled Tribe*Period 50	-0.093	0.088	0.262 *	0.117	-0.091	0.088	0.251 *	0.114	0.028	0.134	0.338 *	0.138
Scheduled Tribe*Period 55	0.035	0.087	0.115	0.105	0.032	0.087	0.106	0.102	0.108	0.129	0.164	0.123
Muslim*Male*Period 43									-0.197	0.154	-0.623 **	0.202

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Table 40 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Muslim*Male*Period 50									-0.351 *	0.161	-0.588 **	0.221
Muslim*Male*Period 55									-0.315 +	0.164	-0.405 +	0.218
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 43									-0.169	0.110	-0.482 *	0.208
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 50									0.153	0.109	-0.457 *	0.214
Scheduled Caste*Male*Period 55									-0.179	0.111	-0.476 *	0.213
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 43									0.076	0.127	-0.335	0.289
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 50									-0.177	0.129	-0.242	0.302
Scheduled Tribe*Male*Period 55									-0.108	0.124	-0.166	0.272
Age	-0.012	0.008	-0.242 ***	0.010	-0.011	0.008	-0.242 ***	0.010	-0.011	0.008	-0.243 ***	0.010
Age Squared	0.000 **	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.000 **	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000	0.000 **	0.000	0.003 ***	0.000
Urban	-0.762 ***	0.019	0.336 ***	0.022	-0.761 ***	0.019	0.334 ***	0.022	-0.761 ***	0.019	0.334 ***	0.022
Household Size	0.188 ***	0.005	0.253 ***	0.006	0.188 ***	0.005	0.253 ***	0.006	0.188 ***	0.005	0.253 ***	0.006
Primary School	0.528 ***	0.019	0.895 ***	0.025	0.525 ***	0.019	0.891 ***	0.025	0.525 ***	0.019	0.891 ***	0.025
Middle School	0.209 ***	0.021	0.903 ***	0.028	0.211 ***	0.020	0.901 ***	0.028	0.211 ***	0.020	0.901 ***	0.028
College	-0.713 ***	0.035	-0.093 +	0.056	-0.708 ***	0.035	-0.094 +	0.057	-0.708 ***	0.035	-0.094 +	0.057
Never Married	0.115 ***	0.030	0.778 ***	0.061	0.116 ***	0.030	0.773 ***	0.060	0.116 ***	0.030	0.773 ***	0.060
Widow/Divorced/Separated	-0.215 ***	0.030	-0.787 ***	0.033	-0.216 ***	0.030	-0.791 ***	0.033	-0.216 ***	0.030	-0.792 ***	0.033
Number of Kids in Household	-0.055 ***	0.008	-0.126 ***	0.010	-0.055 ***	0.008	-0.127 ***	0.010	-0.055 ***	0.008	-0.127 ***	0.010
Andra Pradesh	-0.390 ***	0.029	-1.930 ***	0.035	-0.391 ***	0.029	-1.928 ***	0.036	-0.391 ***	0.029	-1.928 ***	0.036
Assam	-0.239 ***	0.036	0.136 **	0.046	-0.239 ***	0.036	0.143 **	0.046	-0.239 ***	0.036	0.144 **	0.046
Jammu and Kashmir	0.017	0.045	0.106 *	0.050	0.009	0.045	0.156 **	0.053	0.007	0.045	0.151 **	0.053
Orissa	-0.354 ***	0.038	-0.416 ***	0.042	-0.352 ***	0.038	-0.415 ***	0.042	-0.352 ***	0.038	-0.415 ***	0.042
West Bengal	-0.295 ***	0.031	-0.062 +	0.036	-0.300 ***	0.031	-0.065 +	0.036	-0.299 ***	0.031	-0.064 +	0.036

Continued on next page

Table 40 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF		Self Employed		Unemp./Out LF	
	Coef.	SE										
Tamil Nadu/Pondicherry/Andaman	-0.668 ***	0.032	-1.834 ***	0.037	-0.667 ***	0.032	-1.830 ***	0.037	-0.667 ***	0.032	-1.830 ***	0.037
Kerele/Lakshadweep	-1.371 ***	0.038	-1.514 ***	0.045	-1.368 ***	0.038	-1.522 ***	0.046	-1.368 ***	0.038	-1.523 ***	0.046
HP/Punjab/Haryana/Chandigarh	-0.049	0.035	-0.218 ***	0.040	-0.052	0.035	-0.226 ***	0.039	-0.052	0.035	-0.226 ***	0.039
Northeast	0.202 ***	0.035	-0.571 ***	0.042	0.203 ***	0.035	-0.559 ***	0.042	0.203 ***	0.035	-0.558 ***	0.042
Karnataka/Goa/Daman and Dui	-0.392 ***	0.033	-1.575 ***	0.039	-0.393 ***	0.033	-1.575 ***	0.039	-0.393 ***	0.033	-1.575 ***	0.039
Intercept	-0.101	0.153	5.668 ***	0.185	-0.084	0.153	5.697 ***	0.185	-0.057	0.154	5.725 ***	0.186

Continued on next page

Table 40 Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployed/Out of the Labor Force for Individuals 25 to 55 in Non-Fundamentalist States Above the Poverty Line Continued

	Model 4		Unemp./Out LF		Model 5		Unemp./Out LF		Model 6		Unemp./Out LF	
	Self Employed		Coef.	SE	Self Employed		Coef.	SE	Self Employed		Coef.	SE
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Wald Test												
Variables Tested	[2]musper43 = 0				[2]musmale = 0				[2]musmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]musper43 = 0				[3]musmale = 0				[3]musmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]musper50 = 0				[2]scmale = 0				[2]musmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]musper50 = 0				[3]scmale = 0				[3]musmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]musper55 = 0				[2]stmale = 0				[2]musmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]musper55 = 0				[3]stmale = 0				[3]musmaleper55 = 0			
	[2]scper43 = 0								[2]scmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]scper43 = 0				chi2(6) = 350				[3]scmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]scper50 = 0				Prob > chi2 = 0				[2]scmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]scper50 = 0								[3]scmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]scper55 = 0								[2]scmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]scper55 = 0								[3]scmaleper55 = 0			
	[2]stper43 = 0								[2]stmaleper43 = 0			
	[3]stper43 = 0								[3]stmaleper43 = 0			
	[2]stper50 = 0								[2]stmaleper50 = 0			
	[3]stper50 = 0								[3]stmaleper50 = 0			
	[2]stper55 = 0								[2]stmaleper55 = 0			
	[3]stper55 = 0								[3]stmaleper55 = 0			
Number of Variables Tested	18				6				18			
chi2	47.8				350.4				41.2			
Prob > chi2	0.000				0.000				0.001			

+p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***<.001

Table 41 Religious and Gender Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployment/Out of the Labor Force

	Muslim Male	Muslim Female	Muslim Difference	Muslim Ratio	Hindu Male	Hindu Female	Hindu Difference	Hindu Ratio
<u>All States</u>								
Wage Employment								
1983	0.4476	0.0663	0.3813	0.1481	0.4219	0.0907	0.3312	0.2150
1987	0.4455	0.0641	0.3814	0.1439	0.4363	0.0926	0.3437	0.2122
1993	0.4224	0.0583	0.3641	0.1380	0.4274	0.0934	0.3340	0.2185
1999	0.4714	0.0637	0.4077	0.1351	0.4389	0.1048	0.3341	0.2388
Self-Employment								
1983	0.5354	0.0822	0.4532	0.1535	0.5602	0.1561	0.4041	0.2787
1987	0.5377	0.0932	0.4445	0.1733	0.5398	0.1625	0.3773	0.3010
1993	0.5612	0.0792	0.4820	0.1411	0.5548	0.1433	0.4115	0.2583
1999	0.5080	0.0889	0.4191	0.1750	0.5397	0.1441	0.3956	0.2670
Unemp./Out LF								
1983	0.0170	0.8515	-0.8345	50.0882	0.0179	0.7532	-0.7353	42.0782
1987	0.0169	0.8427	-0.8258	49.8639	0.0239	0.7449	-0.7210	31.1674
1993	0.0164	0.8625	-0.8461	52.5915	0.0178	0.7633	-0.7455	42.8820
1999	0.0206	0.8474	-0.8268	41.1359	0.0214	0.7511	-0.7297	35.0981
<u>Fundamentalist States</u>								
Wage Employment								
1983	0.3965	0.0832	0.3133	0.2098	0.3610	0.0876	0.2734	0.2427
1987	0.3968	0.0652	0.3316	0.1643	0.3905	0.0968	0.2937	0.2479
1993	0.3684	0.0667	0.3017	0.1811	0.3810	0.0908	0.2902	0.2383
1999	0.4224	0.0659	0.3565	0.1560	0.3918	0.1043	0.2875	0.2662
Self-Employment								
1983	0.5911	0.1225	0.4686	0.2072	0.6261	0.2139	0.4122	0.3416
1987	0.5906	0.1399	0.4507	0.2369	0.5915	0.2175	0.3740	0.3677

Continued on next page

Table 41 Religious and Gender Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployment/Out of the Labor Force

	Muslim Male	Muslim Female	Muslim Difference	Muslim Ratio	Hindu Male	Hindu Female	Hindu Difference	Hindu Ratio
<u>Fundamentalist States Continued</u>								
Self-Employment								
1993	0.6194	0.1011	0.5183	0.1632	0.6069	0.1769	0.4300	0.2915
1999	0.5581	0.1128	0.4453	0.2021	0.5909	0.1820	0.4089	0.3080
Unemp./Out LF								
1983	0.0124	0.7943	-0.7819	64.0565	0.0129	0.6985	-0.6856	54.1473
1987	0.0126	0.7949	-0.7823	63.0873	0.0180	0.6858	-0.6678	38.1000
1993	0.0122	0.8322	-0.8200	68.2131	0.0121	0.7323	-0.7202	60.5207
1999	0.0195	0.8213	-0.8018	42.1179	0.0173	0.7137	-0.6964	41.2543
<u>Non-Fundamentalist States</u>								
Wage Employment								
1983	0.4768	0.0582	0.4186	0.1221	0.4641	0.0922	0.3719	0.1987
1987	0.4733	0.0628	0.4105	0.1327	0.4673	0.0898	0.3775	0.1922
1993	0.4547	0.0543	0.4004	0.1194	0.4575	0.0960	0.3615	0.2098
1999	0.4980	0.0631	0.4349	0.1267	0.4664	0.1062	0.3602	0.2277
Self-Employment								
1983	0.5038	0.0629	0.4409	0.1249	0.5143	0.1221	0.3922	0.2374
1987	0.5075	0.0711	0.4364	0.1401	0.5046	0.1297	0.3749	0.2570
1993	0.5270	0.0698	0.4572	0.1324	0.5202	0.1256	0.3946	0.2414
1999	0.4817	0.0791	0.4026	0.1642	0.5098	0.1239	0.3859	0.2430
Unemp./Out LF								
1983	0.0193	0.8789	-0.8596	45.5389	0.0216	0.7858	-0.7642	36.3796
1987	0.0192	0.8662	-0.8470	45.1146	0.0281	0.7806	-0.7525	27.7794
1993	0.0183	0.8759	-0.8576	47.8634	0.0223	0.7784	-0.7561	34.9058
1999	0.0202	0.8578	-0.8376	42.4653	0.0238	0.7700	-0.7462	32.3529

Table 42 Religious and Gender Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployment/Out of the Labor Force, Below the Poverty Line

	Muslim Male	Muslim Female	Muslim Difference	Muslim Ratio	Hindu Male	Hindu Female	Hindu Difference	Hindu Ratio
<u>All States</u>								
Wage Employment								
1983	0.5226	0.0894	0.4332	0.1711	0.4421	0.1335	0.3086	0.3020
1987	0.5091	0.0966	0.4125	0.1897	0.477	0.1337	0.3433	0.2803
1993	0.4883	0.0857	0.4026	0.1755	0.4827	0.1468	0.3359	0.3041
1999	0.5376	0.081	0.4566	0.1507	0.5277	0.168	0.3597	0.3184
Self-Employment								
1983	0.4632	0.093	0.3702	0.2008	0.54	0.1764	0.3636	0.3267
1987	0.4739	0.1194	0.3545	0.2520	0.4977	0.1892	0.3085	0.3801
1993	0.4964	0.0999	0.3965	0.2012	0.4982	0.1577	0.3405	0.3165
1999	0.4439	0.1258	0.3181	0.2834	0.4528	0.1583	0.2945	0.3496
Unemp./Out LF								
1983	0.0141	0.8176	-0.8035	57.9858	0.0179	0.6902	-0.6723	38.5587
1987	0.017	0.784	-0.7670	46.1176	0.0253	0.6771	-0.6518	26.7628
1993	0.0154	0.8144	-0.7990	52.8831	0.019	0.6954	-0.6764	36.6000
1999	0.0185	0.7933	-0.7748	42.8811	0.0195	0.6737	-0.6542	34.5487
<u>Fundamentalist States</u>								
Wage Employment								
1983	0.4335	0.108	0.3255	0.2491	0.3615	0.1259	0.2356	0.3483
1987	0.4443	0.0891	0.3552	0.2005	0.4268	0.1351	0.2917	0.3165
1993	0.4222	0.0964	0.3258	0.2283	0.4133	0.1412	0.2721	0.3416
1999	0.4836	0.087	0.3966	0.1799	0.4929	0.1807	0.3122	0.3666
Self-Employment								
1983	0.5548	0.1316	0.4232	0.2372	0.6241	0.2479	0.3762	0.3972
1987	0.5435	0.1714	0.3721	0.3154	0.5523	0.2617	0.2906	0.4738

Continued on next page

Table 42 Religious and Gender Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployment/Out of the Labor Force, Below the Poverty Line

	Muslim Male	Muslim Female	Muslim Difference	Muslim Ratio	Hindu Male	Hindu Female	Hindu Difference	Hindu Ratio
<u>Fundamentalist States Continued</u>								
Self-Employment								
1993	0.5654	0.1387	0.4267	0.2453	0.5712	0.2059	0.3653	0.3605
1999	0.4983	0.1354	0.3629	0.2717	0.4891	0.203	0.2861	0.4150
Unemp./Out LF								
1983	0.0117	0.7604	-0.7487	64.9915	0.0144	0.6262	-0.6118	43.4861
1987	0.0122	0.7395	-0.7273	60.6148	0.0209	0.6032	-0.5823	28.8612
1993	0.0124	0.7649	-0.7525	61.6855	0.0155	0.6529	-0.6374	42.1226
1999	0.018	0.7776	-0.7596	43.2000	0.018	0.6164	-0.5984	34.2444
<u>Non-Fundamentalist States</u>								
Wage Employment								
1983	0.5809	0.0796	0.5013	0.1370	0.5012	0.136	0.3652	0.2713
1987	0.5523	0.0985	0.4538	0.1783	0.5149	0.1304	0.3845	0.2533
1993	0.5302	0.0792	0.4510	0.1494	0.5339	0.1496	0.3843	0.2802
1999	0.5683	0.0785	0.4898	0.1381	0.5466	0.1576	0.3890	0.2883
Self-Employment								
1983	0.4044	0.0734	0.3310	0.1815	0.4783	0.1311	0.3472	0.2741
1987	0.4276	0.0923	0.3353	0.2159	0.4558	0.1414	0.3144	0.3102
1993	0.4534	0.0798	0.3736	0.1760	0.4446	0.1258	0.3188	0.2830
1999	0.415	0.1301	0.2849	0.3135	0.4343	0.1321	0.3022	0.3042
Unemp./Out LF								
1983	0.0147	0.847	-0.8323	57.6190	0.0205	0.7328	-0.7123	35.7463
1987	0.0201	0.8092	-0.7891	40.2587	0.0293	0.7281	-0.6988	24.8498
1993	0.0164	0.8409	-0.8245	51.2744	0.0215	0.7245	-0.7030	33.6977
1999	0.0167	0.7915	-0.7748	47.3952	0.0191	0.7103	-0.6912	37.1885

Table 43 Religious and Gender Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployment/Out of the Labor Force, Above the Poverty Line

	Muslim Male	Muslim Female	Muslim Difference	Muslim Ratio	Hindu Male	Hindu Female	Hindu Difference	Hindu Ratio
<u>All States</u>								
Wage Employment								
1983	0.391	0.0554	0.3356	0.1417	0.4043	0.071	0.3333	0.1756
1987	0.4175	0.0493	0.3682	0.1181	0.4097	0.0748	0.3349	0.1826
1993	0.3836	0.046	0.3376	0.1199	0.3987	0.0755	0.3232	0.1894
1999	0.4388	0.0582	0.3806	0.1326	0.403	0.086	0.3170	0.2134
Self-Employment								
1983	0.5908	0.0776	0.5132	0.1313	0.5779	0.1465	0.4314	0.2535
1987	0.5666	0.0806	0.4860	0.1423	0.5669	0.1524	0.4145	0.2688
1993	0.6011	0.0673	0.5338	0.1120	0.5835	0.1348	0.4487	0.2310
1999	0.5397	0.0706	0.4691	0.1308	0.5743	0.135	0.4393	0.2351
Unemp./Out LF								
1983	0.0182	0.867	-0.8488	47.6374	0.0177	0.7824	-0.7647	44.2034
1987	0.0159	0.8701	-0.8542	54.7233	0.0234	0.7728	-0.7494	33.0256
1993	0.0153	0.8867	-0.8714	57.9542	0.0179	0.7898	-0.7719	44.1229
1999	0.0215	0.8712	-0.8497	40.5209	0.0227	0.779	-0.7563	34.3172
<u>Fundamentalist States</u>								
Wage Employment								
1983	0.3818	0.069	0.3128	0.1807	0.3537	0.069	0.2847	0.1951
1987	0.3765	0.054	0.3225	0.1434	0.3644	0.079	0.2854	0.2168
1993	0.3454	0.0524	0.2930	0.1517	0.3564	0.0717	0.2847	0.2012
1999	0.3972	0.0573	0.3399	0.1443	0.3516	0.081	0.2706	0.2304
Self-Employment								
1983	0.6065	0.1199	0.4866	0.1977	0.634	0.1973	0.4367	0.3112
1987	0.6112	0.1242	0.4870	0.2032	0.6182	0.2001	0.4181	0.3237

Continued on next page

Table 43 Religious and Gender Predicted Probabilities for Wage Employment, Self-Employment, and Unemployment/Out of the Labor Force, Above the Poverty Line

	Muslim Male	Muslim Female	Muslim Difference	Muslim Ratio	Hindu Male	Hindu Female	Hindu Difference	Hindu Ratio
<u>Fundamentalist States Continued</u>								
Self-Employment								
1993	0.643	0.0802	0.5628	0.1247	0.632	0.1627	0.4693	0.2574
1999	0.583	0.1007	0.4823	0.1727	0.6306	0.1699	0.4607	0.2694
Unemp./Out LF								
1983	0.0117	0.811	-0.7993	69.3162	0.0123	0.7337	-0.7214	59.6504
1987	0.0123	0.8218	-0.8095	66.8130	0.0174	0.7209	-0.7035	41.4310
1993	0.0116	0.8674	-0.8558	74.7759	0.0116	0.7656	-0.7540	66.0000
1999	0.0198	0.8421	-0.8223	42.5303	0.0178	0.7491	-0.7313	42.0843
<u>Non-Fundamentalist States</u>								
Wage Employment								
1983	0.3949	0.0489	0.3460	0.1238	0.4384	0.0725	0.3659	0.1654
1987	0.4388	0.0465	0.3923	0.1060	0.439	0.0726	0.3664	0.1654
1993	0.4066	0.0436	0.3630	0.1072	0.4245	0.0792	0.3453	0.1866
1999	0.4617	0.0585	0.4032	0.1267	0.4339	0.0909	0.3430	0.2095
Self-Employment								
1983	0.583	0.0577	0.5253	0.0990	0.5398	0.1176	0.4222	0.2179
1987	0.5434	0.0604	0.4830	0.1112	0.5334	0.1253	0.4081	0.2349
1993	0.5765	0.063	0.5135	0.1093	0.5528	0.122	0.4308	0.2207
1999	0.5165	0.0564	0.4601	0.1092	0.5404	0.1174	0.4230	0.2172
Unemp./Out LF								
1983	0.0221	0.8934	-0.8713	40.4253	0.0218	0.8099	-0.7881	37.1514
1987	0.0177	0.8932	-0.8755	50.4633	0.0276	0.8021	-0.7745	29.0616
1993	0.0169	0.8934	-0.8765	52.8639	0.0227	0.7987	-0.7760	35.1850
1999	0.0219	0.8851	-0.8632	40.4155	0.0257	0.7917	-0.7660	30.8054

Figure 1 Factors Influencing School Enrollment From 1983 to 1999




Figure 2 Factors Influencing Wage Employment from 1983 to 1999






Figure 3 Urban and Rural Enrollment by Gender




Source: National Sample Survey Organization Rounds 1983-1999, author's tabulations.

Figure 4 Enrollment by Age and Gender




Source: National Sample Survey Organization 1983-1999, author's tabulations.

Figure 5 Urban and Rural Wage Employment by Gender



Source: National Sample Survey Organization 1983-1999, author's tabulations.

Figure 6 Wage Employment by Age and Gender



Source: National Sample Survey Organization 1983-1999, author's tabulations.

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