

ABSTRACT

Title of dissertation: THE POLITICS OF INSURGENCY

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This dissertation introduces a new definition of insurgency for academic discourse. It also argues that four components of a defined relationship framework must interoperate to satisfy organizational requirements and processes in order for an insurgency to achieve increasing levels of scale. From a systemic perspective, it presents a connective theory of constitutive and destructive mechanisms to assess why certain movements expand or ignite while others degrade or get stuck in a particular phase. The proposed perspective provides improved analytic leverage over existing phasing models.

Chapter 1 introduces the scope and definition of the politics of insurgency. Chapter 2 presents academic, military, and legal perspectives of the phenomenon. Chapters 3 and 4 explain the limitations of existing insurgency models within the context of two historic case studies, the Chinese and Algerian Revolutions. Chapter 5 introduces the dissertation's full phasing model. Chapters 6 and 7 present case studies to further elucidate the proposed relationship framework and composite phasing construct, assessing strengths and weaknesses in light of two comparable cases. The Chechen and Kosovar Albanian insurgencies provide insight and applied examples of the activities that occur within each phase. Chapter 8 then consolidates the findings and analysis from the case studies and assesses the viability of the phasing model as a usable tool to better comprehend insurgency behavior, movement scalability, and associated response options.

THE POLITICS OF INSURGENCY

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables

2.1	Legal Thresholds of Insurgency	56
2.2	Basic Phases of Insurgent Movements	63
2.3	Preliminary Phases of Insurgent Movements	64
3.1	Mao's Stages and Steps	73
3.2	Mao's Strategy Impacts	77
3.3	Mao and Galula Orthodox Step Comparison	89
3.4	Preliminary Phases of Insurgent Movements	91
3.5	Mao and Galula Orthodox Step Comparison	109
4.1	Mao and Galula Orthodox and Shortcut Step Comparison	123
4.2	Galula and SORO Step Comparison	138
4.3	Mao, Galula, and SORO Synthesized Phasing Comparison	146
5.1	Mao, Galula, and SORO Synthesized Phasing Comparison	152
5.2	Preliminary Phases of Insurgent Movements	153
5.3	Violent Mechanisms in Coordination with the Vanguard	157-8
5.4	Composite Insurgency Phasing Model	159
6.1	Composite Insurgency Phasing Model	165
6.2	Chechen Insurgency Maturity by Phase	210-11
7.1	Composite Insurgency Phasing Model	215
7.2	Kosovar Albanian Insurgency Maturity by Phase	299
8.1	Mao, Galula, and SORO Synthesized Phasing Comparison	304
8.2	Composite Insurgency Phasing Model	309
8.3	Chechen Insurgency Maturity by Phase	312-13
8.4	Kosovar Albanian Insurgency Maturity by Phase	313-14

List of Figures

1.1	Insurgency Relationship Framework	8
2.1	A Globalized Web of Militancy	28
2.2	Increasing Levels of Insurgent Violence in Revolution	33
2.3	FM 3-25, Figure 4-1 Conflict Resolution Model	46
2.4	Resistance Movements on the Continuum	51
2.5	Insurgency Relationship Framework	58
2.6	Internal Insurgency Assimilation across the Framework	60
2.7	Insurgency Assimilation of State Mechanisms across the Framework	61
3.1	Insurgency Relationship Framework	85
6.1	Insurgency Relationship Framework	163
6.2	Political Map of the Caucasus Region (2008)	166
7.1	Insurgency Relationship Framework	216
7.2	Political Map of Kosovo (2015)	218
7.3	Three Principal KLA Zones	259

Chapter 1:	Introduction to the Politics of Insurgent Movements	1
1.1	Introductory Vignettes: A Legacy of Insurgency across the Centuries	1
1.1.1	Eighteenth-Century America	1
1.1.2	Nineteenth-Century Egypt	2
1.1.3	Twentieth-Century China	4
1.1.4	Twenty-first-Century Mexico	5
1.2	Where is the Comparative Anatomy of Insurgency?	6
1.3	Purpose	11

1.4 Organizing Questions	12
1.5 Defining Insurgency in the Literature	12
1.6 Research Methods and Procedures	19
Chapter 2: Literature Review	23
2.1 Insurgency Theory	23
2.2 Academic Perspectives of Insurgency, Civil War, and Revolution	24
2.2.1 Insurgency Basics	24
2.2.2 Insurgency and Civil War	27
2.2.3 Insurgency and Revolution	32
2.3 Operational Perspectives of Insurgency	39
2.4 Legal Perspectives of Insurgency and the Synthesized Model Foundation	50
2.5 A Theory of the Politics of Insurgency	56
Chapter 3: The Chinese Communist Revolutions and Basic Insurgency Modeling	66
3.1 Introduction	66
3.2 Mao's Theory on the Practice of Revolution	66
3.2.1 Stage One: The Strategic Defensive	74
3.2.2 Stage Two: Strategic Stalemate	78
3.2.3 Stage Three: Strategic Counteroffensive	82
3.2.4 A Solid Foundation from Which to Grow	83
3.3 Galula's Contribution to the Communist Model	88
3.3.1 Step One: A New Addition to the Orthodox Model	91
3.3.2 Step Two: New Meaning to the United Front	94
3.3.3 Steps Three through Five: Building a Military Capacity	109
3.4 The Emerging Picture	114
Chapter 4: The Algerian Revolution and Integrating Insurgency Models	117
4.1 Galula's Shortcut Pattern: An Evolutionary Process	117
4.2 The Algerian Case and Galula	119
4.2.1 Shortcut Steps – A Shotgun Strategy via Blind Terrorism	124
4.2.2 Shortcut Steps – Selective Terrorism	130
4.3 The Special Operations Research Office (SORO)	137
4.3.1 The SORO Contribution Regarding Insurgent Behavior	139
4.4 Do the Available Models Measure Up?	147
Chapter 5: A Framework for Insurgency Analysis	149
5.1 Insurgency Theory	149
5.2 A Deeper Discussion of Insurgency Phasing and the Relationship Framework	151
Chapter 6: The Politics of Insurgency Case Study 1: The Chechen Revolution	162
6.1 The Case of Chechnya	162
6.2 Insurgency Origins in Chechnya	166
6.2.1 Relationships and Phasing of the Initial Chechen Resistance	179
6.3 Chechnya's Insurgency Anatomy	186
6.4 The First Chechen War and Its Aftermath	195
6.5 The Second Chechen War and Beyond	203
6.6 Chechnya Today and Concluding Thoughts	208

Chapter 7:	The Politics of Insurgency Case Study 2: The Kosovar Albanian Revolution	212
7.1	The Case of Kosovo	212
7.2	Insurgency Origins in Kosovo	217
7.3	The Birth of Kosovo's Political Mechanism and Continued Rural Resistance	224
7.4	A National Reawakening and the Emergence of the Vanguard	234
7.5	Kosovo's Parallel Government	243
7.6	The Founding of the KLA	256
7.7	Three Catalyzing Events – Mainstreaming the KLA	264
7.8	War, Exodus, and Western Intervention – A Seat at the Table An End to the Insurgency	284
7.9	Insurgency Transformation	297
Chapter 8:	Conclusion to the Politics of Insurgent Movements	301
8.1	The Blind Men and the Elephant	301
8.2	How did the Model Measure Up?	314
8.2.1	Concept Utility	314
8.2.2	Future Research Opportunities	319
8.2.3	Significant to Policy	322
Bibliography		326

Chapter 1

Introduction, The Politics of Insurgent Movements

1.1 Introductory Vignettes: A Legacy of Insurgency across the Centuries

1.1.1 Eighteenth-Century America

The American Revolution came to an end with the Treaty of Paris in April of 1783. The Continental Army, by then a conventional military force, had defeated the British at the Battle of Yorktown, effectively capturing thousands of soldiers. The initial rebellion, however, began through political channels eighteen years earlier when the First Congress of the American Colonies protested the British Stamp Act and issued a Declaration of Rights and Grievances addressed to Parliament and the king. Also in 1765, the resistance established the Sons of Liberty, a very capable growing underground organization that circulated propaganda across the colonies, mobilizing colonists into mobs and persecuting loyalists. Many participants in the underground served as members of state and continental governing bodies. They leveraged connections within business and trade and joined the leadership of local communities through church congregations and other important civic organizations.

Although independence was not declared until 1776, the American resistance established a unified federated government in the Continental Congress in 1774. As John Adams's personal letters suggest, "the revolution was effected before the war commenced" because the inhabitants of the colonies were "formed by law into corporations, or bodies politic," possessing the right to assemble in town halls "to

deliberate upon the public affairs;" it was "in these assemblies of towns or districts that the sentiments of the people were formed in the first place."¹

Political constitution-making ran in parallel to armed resistance and achieved milestones toward statehood in numerous areas.² Local guerrilla forces such as the Minutemen and the Green Mountain Boys confronted British troops while George Washington, who was appointed commander in chief in 1775, developed a viable conventional military capacity out of regional militias and resisting local communities. The nation also moved away from colony-based currencies toward the establishment of the Continental dollar. The first Bank of North America was founded in 1782 and soon transitioned the colonial confederation to a gold-based economy. In 1777, the leaders of the revolution published the Articles of Confederation, a constitutional framework based on principles of democratic governance. What began as an insurgent movement matured into a viable state that continues two centuries later.

1.1.2 Nineteenth-Century Egypt

Between 1880 and 1882, Ahmad Urabi led a growing nationalist movement against Egypt's established political regime. Opposed to foreign interference in Egyptian affairs and discontented with economic hardships and social displacement created by a corrupt and extravagant government,³ Colonel Urabi's movement began with "Egypt for

¹ Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (The Viking Press, 1963; repr. with introduction by Jonathan Schell, New York: Penguin Group, 2006), footnotes 4 and 5 on p. 109. Arendt quotes Adams's letter to Niles on January 14, 1818, and letter to the Abbe Mably in 1782.

² "These two altogether different stages of the revolutionary process began at almost the same moment and continued to run parallel to each other all through the years of the war" (Arendt, *On Revolution*, 132).

³ Because of government bankruptcy, "Egypt was effectively delivered into the hands of European financial interests who, with the support of the British and French governments, progressively took over the running of the country." John Newsinger, "Liberal Imperialism and the Occupation of Egypt in 1882," *Race & Class* 49, no. 3 (2008): 59, doi:10.1177/0306396807085901.

Egyptians” and yet ended in the nation’s occupation by the British.⁴ The transition in governance to British control represented one link in a longer chain of cooptation between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. Egypt moved from Ottoman control (1517–1798), to French occupation (1798–1802), back to Albanian/Ottoman control (1802–1879), to government collusion with and indebtedness to Britain and France (1879–1882).

Native Colonel Urabi unified Egypt’s military and advanced it to become a self-proclaimed independent political actor; for example, in 1880, the military published a list of grievances against the government and began to intervene on behalf of civilian revolutionaries forwarding the cause of an independent state.⁵ Initially, the movement supported a moderate reformist agenda, and Urabi successfully leveraged Egypt’s political leadership to create a new nationalist government, which appointed him minister of war.⁶ In 1882, the movement distributed a moderate political manifesto entitled the *Programme of the National Party of Egypt*. The program honored Egypt’s debt to its Anglo-French debtors, called for an end to European control, and sought to introduce a constitutional government.

Britain, however, was unable to conceive of Egyptian self-determination and feared losing investments, trade, and status.⁷ Popular riots within the city began between Egyptian and European inhabitants after British warships gathered around Alexandria to

⁴ Newsinger, “Liberal Imperialism,” 60.

⁵ Newsinger, “Liberal Imperialism,” 61–62.

⁶ Marco Pinfari, “The Unmaking of a Patriot: Anti-Arab Prejudice in the British Attitude Towards the Urabi Revolt, 1882,” *Arab Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (2012): 98. Also, Newsinger in “Liberal Imperialism” (61) writes: “[G]rowing unrest adopted an Islamic rhetoric, provoked not just by the European takeover of the country, but by the ensemble of racist attitudes that accompanied it.” For this reason, there is a rhetorical debate on the authenticity of the party’s desired political outcome and its connections to Islamic holy war.

⁷ Pinfari, “The Unmaking of a Patriot,” 94.

compel capitulation to European interests. The British bombarded the city and then defeated the Egyptian army during a surprise attack at the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir in September 1882; once defeated, the British occupied Cairo and took control of Egypt. Urabi's insurgency temporarily leveraged state institutions and garnered popular political support from Egyptians. Because Egyptians could not overcome European dominance, British troops did not leave Egypt until 1954.

1.1.3 Twentieth-Century China

In October 1949, Mao Tse-tung's Chinese Communist Party (CPC) established the People's Republic of China after a twenty-two-year insurgency against China's Nationalist Party led by Chiang Kai-shek. Two years after the CPC's initial founding in 1921, and prior to its split with the Nationalist-led Kuomintang (KMT), Mao joined other Chinese communists as a member of the KMT. At the time, the Nationalist affiliation with Soviet communism was on the rise. In 1926, however, after Chiang Kai-shek took control of the KMT army and began his famous Northern Expedition to unite China's divided provinces under one state, the CPC attempted to take over the KMT in his absence. In 1927, Chiang expelled the communists from the KMT and the Chinese Civil War began.

Over the course of the protracted conflict, which also included a temporary cease-fire that enabled CPC and KMT adversaries to focus on routing Japan's invading army, the CPC grew beyond a political party with limited infrastructure and administrative capacity. Mao's organization strategically developed and co-opted institutional components necessary for state agency, to include scaling from localized guerrilla tactics to broader conventional military capabilities, growing local and national political

organizations, and then inserting an overarching secret service loyal to the communist leadership. At great human expense, Mao's party founded and shortly thereafter solidified an authoritarian state that persists sixty-five years later.⁸ The Chinese Communists learned from successful revolutionary predecessors to infiltrate and take over "popular societies" that would then declare the prominence of the party over a nascent grassroots council system.⁹

1.1.4 Twenty-First-Century Mexico

It is estimated that since 2007, more than 77,000 Mexicans have died as a result of drug-related violence.¹⁰ Cartels such as the Sinaloa Federation, the Gulf Cartel, La Familia Michoacán, and Los Zetas began to multiply in strength and number in the late 1990s. After Colombian drug-trafficking organizations fragmented, Mexican cartels eventually gained enough prominence and power to confront state institutions and legitimacy; today they compete to capture the United States' \$40 billion market for illegal drugs.¹¹ Territorial-based operations move major drug shipments across corridors called plazas as cartels alternately collaborate and fight with one another. Recent conflicts have become particularly brutal because public violence enforces compliance

⁸ Richard Louis Walker, *Casualties to Communism*, Report to the United States Senate Committee of the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, (China: US Government Printing Office, 1971). According to Walker's report, the communist insurgency between 1927 and 1949 cost 1.5–2 million human lives. The political liquidation campaigns that then consolidated the state led to 15–30 million deaths.

⁹ The development of grassroots social organizations into political machinery became "very familiar through the course of the Russian Revolution, where the Bolshevik party emasculated and perverted the revolutionary soviet system with exactly the same methods (as the French). For Robespierre's rule of terror was indeed nothing else but the attempt to organize the whole French people into a single gigantic party machinery" (Arendt, *On Revolution*, 239).

¹⁰ "Who Is Behind Mexico's Drug-Related Violence?" *BBC News*, February 10, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-10681249>.

¹¹ "Mexican Drug Gangs 'Spread to Every Region of US'," *BBC News*, March 26, 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8588509.stm>.

and dissuades opposition. In a lethal dance that the state is unable to overcome and with which its representatives are sometimes complicit, “arrests, killings, and betrayals give rise to kaleidoscopic changes in alliances.”¹²

Mexican cartels, a type of Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO), “are in fact commercial insurgencies designed to influence . . . national power to seek economic gain from illicit drug trafficking.”¹³ They garner enough political and territorial autonomy to leverage local populations and the Mexican government to achieve their objectives. “They do so by hollowing out the state and creating criminal enclaves to maneuver.”¹⁴ As insurgencies, cartels take political, military, economic, and social control within their associated zones; they create parallel states that erode government legitimacy and solvency; and they combat the state directly by engaging in belligerent acts.¹⁵

1.2 Where is the Comparative Anatomy of Insurgency?

Whether posterity calls the American, Egyptian, Chinese, and Mexican cases above revolts, rebellions, or revolutions, each story is, at its base, one of insurgency. Regardless of its success or failure, each shares an anatomy of political resistance that exhibits distinct attributes in structure, process, and character—falling within the broader ontology of contentious politics and collective violence. For example, as contentious politics, insurgency often involves “discontinuous, public, collective claim making in

¹² G. W. Grayson, *La Familia Drug Cartel: Implications for U.S.-Mexican Security* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 3.

¹³ Christopher Martinez, “Transnational Criminal Organizations, Mexico’s Commercial Insurgency,” *Military Review*, September–October 2012, 62.

¹⁴ John P. Sullivan, “States of Change: Power and Counterpower Expressions in Latin America’s Criminal Insurgencies,” *International Journal on Criminology* 2, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 65.

¹⁵ Sullivan, “States of Change,” 65.

which one of the parties is the government” as the object of claims or third party to claims.¹⁶ As collective violence, insurgencies include a spectrum of orchestrated violence that moves beyond individual aggression toward increasingly mature means of “coordinated destruction” against the state or reigning regime, including lethal contests, campaigns of annihilation, and conspiratorial terror.¹⁷

This dissertation argues that insurgencies exhibit comparative patterns and innovations in violence that repeat and mature across time and geographic regions. They blend with forms of interpersonal violence in which persons or organizations specialize in the deployment of coercive means.¹⁸ At the same time that destructive processes tear down or resist incumbent regimes, however, insurgencies also support and build new constitutive and civic political processes. As seen in the opening exemplars, they build armies, establish constitutions, collect taxes, control currency, align with civic organizations, generate and enforce laws, and engage in international relationships. Therefore, similar to traditional social movements, insurgencies exhibit adaptive strategies, calling upon a common repertoire of political and violent action to establish alternative political futures. They require a psychological motivation and bond to drive

¹⁶ “A government is a substantial, durable, bounded organization that exercises control over the major concentrated means of coercion within some territory.” In this respect, a government is not necessarily a state government. Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9.

¹⁷ Tilly, *Politics of Collective Violence*, 14-16. Tilly’s typology of interpersonal violence moves from individual aggression to collective violence in which the extent of coordination among violent actors increases. This includes brawls, opportunism, scattered attacks, broken negotiations, violent rituals, and coordinated destruction. Although coordinated destruction is a requirement for civil war, insurgency may use all of these means. These categories are interesting but are optimized later in this dissertation to expressly connect to increasingly levels of violence geared toward scaling insurgencies.

¹⁸ Political entrepreneurs overlap “with the category of violent specialists. At the intersection of the two we find leaders of mercenaries, international weapons merchants, regional warlords, military rulers, and many a political figure who disposes of his or her own armed force. Over the long run of human history, indeed, most important political figures have combined entrepreneurship with control of coercive means” (Tilly, *Politics of Collective Violence*, 36).

commitment, unity, and displays of worthiness, within and across participants and supporters.¹⁹

Ultimately, revolts, rebellions, and revolutions, like those described above, should comprise their own distinctive ontology. Uniquely categorized as insurgencies, these kinds of movements develop interconnected institutions and capabilities designed to scale in power and authority. Their leaders coordinate public support, establish political and administrative mechanisms, and control destructive mechanisms to create an altered legal, economic, political and social system for their constituency. Their resulting success and scalability varies according to the successful mastery of common processes across four relationship components that signify thresholds of regime maturity. See Figure 1.1.




Figure 1.1 Insurgency Relationship Framework

Even so, as an area of concentrated academic focus, the field of inquiry regarding insurgency is wide open, particularly regarding how operational trends change over time

¹⁹ Charles Tilly and Lesley Wood, *Social Movements 1768-2012*, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, LLC, 2013).

across the relationship framework. In part, this is because insurgency is more often an area of practice than study. Additionally, when insurgency is considered by academics, it is defined by a movement's success rather than by its association to a broader political context. Without exception, the same activity when unsuccessful or limited is considered a revolt or terrorism, when somewhat successful is considered a civil war, and when extremely successful is considered a revolution. Scholars have yet to analyze the body of insurgent movements within the context of the international system as a unique form of politics; this is surprising because insurgencies yield observable and repeated expressions of authority, power, and violence.

More surprising, a substantive insurgency framework from which to compare and analyze the differences between insurgencies simply does not exist. There is no systems model available to assess the comparative growth and best practices of insurgencies over time. For example, the 1776 American Revolution and its aftermath successfully packaged the nation in a form that other societies later adopted and customized for their own insurgencies.²⁰ "The independence movements in the Americas became, as soon as they were printed about, 'concepts,' 'models,' and indeed 'blueprints.'"²¹ In successive geographic regions, similar and yet distinctly unique events converged to produce changes necessary to foster growth elsewhere. If this is true though, and the American Revolution provided a repeatable blueprint for other insurgencies, where is the associated field of comparative analytics driven by data rather than conjecture regarding their

²⁰ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 67. "When nationalism started to spread in the eighteenth century, the emergence of national identities in other countries was no longer a result of original creation, but rather of the importation of an already existing idea. The development of national identities thus was essentially an international process, whose sources in every case but the first lay outside of the evolving nation." Greenfeld, "The Formation of Russian National Identity," 550.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 81.

influence and impact? The composite analytic insurgency model presented in the following chapters attempts to fill this gap.

The outcome of previous ad hoc diagnoses is that practitioners and academics look at insurgency in insular ways, even among themselves, preventing a broader systemic perspective of scalable requirements.²² Practitioners include those who make decisions and act within the insurgent space, for example, national and international policy makers, military forces, or nongovernmental organizations who try to understand organizational constructs, threat networks, and behaviors. Practitioners confront insurgency as a political and military form but have been unable to define or address it from the insurgent perspective; they lack analysis from which to draw. Without an actual theory of insurgency, decision-makers frequently move to a one-size-fits-all concept of counterinsurgency operations in response.

Most academics, on the other hand, are removed from the realities of insurgency characteristics and practice because data are difficult to acquire. Studies are created in order to make measurements and find connections between variables that lack substantive meaning to practitioners; they don't necessarily provide a deeper understanding of the problem frame or the broader picture. As a result, the differences in lexicon between practitioners and academics who study violence and politics prevent an integrated framework from which to approach insurgent movements.

The overarching purpose of this exploration therefore is to connect these two worlds, to provide those practitioners trying to make a positive impact with a useful way

²² Doug, McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, "To Map Contentious Politics," *Mobilization: An International Journal* 1, no. 1 (March 1996): 18.

to understand and begin to address the complex problem of insurgency. It is to identify processes specific to insurgency that might allow for further study, criticism, and contribution. Ultimately, this analysis brings these disparate communities together by synthesizing the academic and operational literatures that exist, to add my findings, and to present the resulting arguments in such a way that they resonate with those who must act.

1.3 Purpose

Because there is little work to delineate the politics of insurgency as its own domain, the goals of this dissertation are fourfold:

- To develop clear conceptual categories regarding a theory of insurgency that begins to define its scope within a coherent domain and provide analytic leverage for future study;
- To synthesize associated competing and complementary models on insurgency into an empirically based (anatomy) construct that will help to account for its evolution and variation over time, place, groups, and forms;
- To introduce a mechanism for mapping the health and maturity of insurgency movements as political phenomena; and
- To identify recurrent socio-institutional insurgent processes and requirements through a series of case studies that supports the synthesized construct.

The politics of insurgency comprises a dialectic process, though not necessarily a linear one. I attempt to capture that process.²³ And, although the purpose of this work is not to test or validate the proposed model through an explicit set of measurable variables, the relationships between variables are observed across four case studies so that we might

²³ Stathis Kalyvas calls this meso-level analysis. Macro-level analysis treats violence as a natural outcome of war, in military strategy, comparative politics, and international relations. Unitary actors fuse elites and their populations. Micro-level analysis looks specifically at intracommunity dynamics and individual behaviors, dividing populations and groups into competing families, clans, and factions. Meso-level analysis problematizes processes and operational structures within wars. Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 10–11.

begin to see behavioral patterns and organizational requirements.²⁴ I hope to introduce new ways of thinking about insurgency as a constituting mechanism for the state as well as to provide scaling limitations associated with isolated insurgent movements. The proposed model in Chapter 5 begins to provide empirical requirements for insurgencies at scale that may be assessed and analyzed over time.

1.4 Organizing Questions

This dissertation is organized around the following questions.

1. How is insurgency a political form? How are insurgencies organized in relationship to the evolution of the state over time—both as constitutive and destructive mechanisms?
2. Are existing operational insurgency models sufficient to accommodate the broad range of contemporary insurgent political goals and processes?
3. From a political perspective, what nominal capacity thresholds exist to differentiate shifts into and out of insurgent forms or phases?
4. When is an insurgency an insurgency and not some other form of political violence or expression?
5. Do insurgencies exhibit patterns of behavioral development that link insurgent political capacity to associated mechanisms and networks across social, economic, and security domains?

1.5 Defining Insurgency and the Literature

In light of the questions above, and given the expressed associations between insurgency, nationalism, social movement theory, and contentious politics, the definition of insurgency in this context is not the same as that presented in conventional academic descriptions. Therefore, before peeling back the layers of various divisions and camps within the literature, it will be helpful to provide the ontological definition of insurgency

²⁴ One exception to this is the adaptation of collective violence and social movement theory to the framework. “We can fashion theories by importing existing theories from one domain and adapting them to explain phenomena in another.” Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 29.

to be used throughout the rest of this work. An insurgency is a condition of formalized resistance or revolt against a governing authority in which the perpetrating parties are not initially recognized as belligerents.²⁵ Rather, at the outset they are insurgents and as such act without the protection of or subjection to the laws of war that govern the behavior of state forces.²⁶ A governing authority may include “an established government, a military occupation government, an interim civil administration, or a peace process.”²⁷

Insurgent goals are political and focus on influencing who makes political decisions and who has access to political power within a given constituency.²⁸ For example, an insurgency may renounce allegiance or subjection to a government; challenge political control; demand participation in the political process; or attempt to end the rule of one government and start a new one by means of subversion or interpersonal violence.²⁹ Subversion encompasses a broad range of activities designed to undermine the “military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority.”³⁰ Fundamentally, insurgencies “attempt to modify the existing political system at least partially through the unconstitutional or illegal use of force or

²⁵ Belligerent status may be reached eventually as an insurgency progresses to the point it is recognized as a de facto state. If this happens, the Law of Armed Conflict applies and its forces receive combatant and prisoner of war (POW) status.

²⁶ Erin N. Hahn and W. Sam Lauber, *Legal Implications of the Status of Persons in Resistance*, ed. Erin N. Hahn (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, forthcoming), 6. If and when an insurgency attains the status of a “belligerency” and legally begins to interoperate with the international community, it then becomes subjection to the laws of war that govern the behavior of state forces. See Chapter 2 for further information.

²⁷ According to Joint Publication 3-24 (JP 3-24), *Counterinsurgency* (Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 22, 2013), I-1.

²⁸ Terrorist organizations interested in affecting laws regarding the environment or nature would not be considered insurgencies. If these organizations determined that their agendas would be better served if they changed their political leadership and developed coordinated plans to replace that leadership, then they would constitute an insurgency. Also, mere targeted assassination does not count.

²⁹ This definition selectively borrows terms and concepts from the Merriam-Webster dictionary. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/insurgency>, /insurgent, /revolution, /revolt, and /belligerent.

³⁰ Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02), *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 8, 2010), 245.

protest.”³¹ This means that even nonviolent movements, if illegal, constitute an insurgency. Additionally, an insurgency is not limited or constrained by duration; it may build over a century or transpire more quickly – as in the case of a coup.³²

Part of an organized movement designed to cross the threshold between discontinuous collective claim making and the execution of persistent campaigns, insurgents act in ways that show they do not accept the control or influence of the governing authority. At the least, the insurgent vanguard³³ displays worthiness, unity, obligation, and a commitment to use illegal or unconstitutional methods.³⁴ These attributes may be hidden at first and then grow with an expanding social movement. Insurgents are not anarchists and often maintain a design—however valid or mature, invalid or immature—for an alternative political system, even if that system cohabits alongside an existing regime.

Some insurgents are concerned with breaking down the existing political regime at the start with the intent to develop a political alternative at a future date. Some insurgents are parasitical to the state and do not intend to take the burden of rule if they can achieve their political objectives without gaining international legitimacy. Others design a political solution first then grow their military and internal security capabilities.

(Chapter 2 provides further discussion of insurgency categorization, particularly Section

³¹ Chuck Crossett, ed., *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2012), xvi.

³² Even the back end support to a coup is likely to take quite some time to build should the outcome produce a stable regime.

³³ The use of the term vanguard in this dissertation should not be confused with Paul Staniland’s use of the vanguard organization. Staniland creates a typology of four kinds of insurgent organization: integrated, vanguard, parochial and fragmented. The vanguard exhibits robust processes of central control while maintaining weak local processes of control. In this dissertation, the vanguard is represents the core, or high level, of insurgent leadership. Paul Staniland, *Networks of Rebellion, Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse*, (Ithica and London: Cornell University Press, 2014), 6-8.

³⁴ Insurgent organizations that have not transitioned to the strategic use of force, and rather stay more within the realm of protest, are frequently called resistance movements.

2.2.) Regardless of their intent, insurgents and insurgencies should not be thought of in terms of good or bad as an ontological class. Each insurgency follows a unique path that exhibits similar processes and physical anatomy. Decisions within each scaling phase engage a range of options that subsequently configure one insurgency to be viewed pejoratively and another to be viewed positively by different constituencies.

There is an extensive amount of work to be done to connect common pathways that distinguish insurgency as a distinct form of intrastate politics.³⁵ Although the definition provided above is well-founded, part of the task of the dissertation itself is to substantiate why it is accurate, how it was developed, and where it may be improved. The proposed framework introduces insurgency mechanisms at an operational and strategic level, “specific causal patterns” that more fully explain interconnected processes and “actions over a wide range of settings.”³⁶ By looking at how insurgencies pass through various levels of scale, we may begin to overcome the current analytic box of treating insurgent organizations as static entities with capped capability levels of violence or governance. Riots may become popular rebellions that may become revolutions because of the actions taken to leverage the categorical relationships within framework. Riots may also, however, become rebellions that disintegrate into extremist terrorist organizations.

³⁵ The capacity to use insurgency as a form of interstate politics represents an additional field of study outside the scope of this work. There are two ways to think about external involvement. The first is in reference to the globalization of insurgency. This concept is briefly explored later. The second focuses on external support to resistance movements and insurgencies—in which foreign states attempt to impact the behavior of other states through substate actors. In the latter case, external support still must work through the insurgent pathways identified in this work. At this point in time, such activity is called hybrid warfare by practitioners. Russian behavior in the Ukraine serves as a primary example.

³⁶ Roger D. Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion, Lessons from Eastern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 10.

Numerous areas of academic literature contribute to explaining insurgency in addition to the nationalism,³⁷ contentious politics and collective action literature.³⁸ For example, political science literature specific to insurgency and civil war approaches environmental causes and consequences of the phenomenon. As will be further explored in Chapter 2, this literature links measurable environmental variables to the onset of domestic conflicts at various thresholds of casualties or fatalities.³⁹ It also looks at specific social movement mechanisms and limited insurgent strategies of controlled or uncontrolled violence; limited refers to both the rural terrain (non-urban environments) and the specificity of guerrilla-related activity.

³⁷ This dissertation does not focus specifically on the nationalism literature because the model does not require insurgencies to define their desired end as a nation state. For relevant nationalism literature, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York: Verso, 1983); Mark Ashley, "It Takes a Victim: The Construction of National Identity and the Narrative of National Victimization," Draft Paper (University of Chicago, 2001); Craig Calhoun, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 19 (1993): 211–239; Maegen Gandy, "A Case Study of Identity Politics in America," Master's thesis, (Virginia Tech University, 2003), (ETD-08262003-164836); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Umut Ozkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (London: Routledge, 1998); Jack L. Snyder, *From Voting to Violence*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000); and Louis Wirth, "Types of Nationalism," *American Journal of Sociology* 41, no. 6 (May, 1936): 723-737.

³⁸ Recall that contentious politics is a much vaster category of politics and collective claim-making than the identified subset here. Additionally, this dissertation does not ask what accounts for the "enormous variability" within methods of public claim interactions. Rather, it is interested in what activities must occur in order for an insurgency to move through designated phases. For collective action literature, for example, see Mark Irving Lichbach, *The Rebel's Dilemma* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995); Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); Roger D Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion, Lessons from Eastern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Elizabeth Jean Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

³⁹ Kalyvas explains that a "recent boom in civil war studies has been fueled by the global shift from interstate to intrastate conflict: of the 118 armed conflicts that have taken place between 1989 and 2004, only 7 have been interstate wars (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005)" (Kalyvas, *Logic of Violence*, 16). On the same page, he reviews literature that has explicitly or implicitly studied revolution, rebellion, or ethnic conflict from the perspectives of onset, resolution, social bases, outcome, political and social consequences, rebuilding and reconciliation, and postwar justice.

Existing literature does not emphasize enough the constituting processes associated with political mechanisms. It also fails to incorporate the connectivity between violent and passive antiregime activity necessary to insurgent practice.⁴⁰ To most in this grouping of political scientists, insurgency begins with a threshold of violent behavior by definition. It starts after the guerrilla force or terrorist organization is already in play. It doesn't illustrate how youth groups, social-patriotic organizations, economic organizations, trade unions, political parties, and families connect by design or by chance to the official political and violent mechanisms of the insurgency.⁴¹

Political theory regarding revolution also speaks to causes and consequences of insurgency.⁴² Either in the form of detailed case study or theoretical analysis, this literature addresses the complexities of constituting a new political framework. It does so, however, on an individual state basis or without a systemic perspective. Hannah Arendt, for example, addresses the choices and tensions during revolution between developing a political solution that safeguards participation in the resulting political process and the dominance of the revolutionary party. She asks whether the end of the revolution marks the end of the revolutionary party, or whether it marks the beginning of the dominance of

⁴⁰ Weinstein does speak to the challenge of collective action and social movement impacts as a resource mobilization challenge at the beginning of a rebellion. Jeremy Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion, The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 8–9. And Chenoweth and Stephan ignore the connection between passive civil resistance and its frequent connection and interplay with violent measures. Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works, the Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 11–15.

⁴¹ Roger D. Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion*, 48–5. Petersen looks at some of these connections specifically for lower levels of collective opposition in light of triggering and sustaining norms and psychological mechanisms.

⁴² See the “Introduction” to Stephen M. Walt, *Revolution and War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 6–12. Walt summarizes the vast literature on revolution and explains that, “Our theoretical understanding of revolution and war thus consists largely of untested ‘folk theories.’ We may group the alternative explanations into three broad families, whose focus, respectively, is on revolutionary ideology (the regimes aggressive beliefs), domestic politics (conflicts within the state encourage aggressive behavior), and the revolutionary personality (revolutionary leaders are ruthless)” (Walt, *Revolution and War*, 7).

the revolutionary regime. Meaning, will the insurgency lead to true reforms and a new governmental system? Will it represent simply regime change or decapitation with new rulers? Or will the new environment remain socially unstable and political fragile through the violent enforcement of insurgent norms? I contend that the identification and qualification of various insurgent processes, when systemically observed, will be able to answer questions regarding the nature, stability, and maturity of the resulting state. The practices of the insurgency are illustrative of the future regime; they become the constituting mechanisms for an altered state.⁴³

The final category of literature that needs to be addressed and synthesized with various academic perspectives includes military doctrine and international legal perspectives. This literature better aligns increasing levels of violence for growing insurgencies than the collective violence literature. By connecting each of these literatures, we may begin to see broader general patterns across the insurgency landscape. Because insurgent practices connect to one another, establishing a comparative meta framework will identify the milestones and relationships insurgencies must foster and develop in order to scale to levels of increasing maturity.

Challenges to the arguments presented in the following chapters may come from numerous sources. First, when synthesizing the models or constructs of others, there is always the possibility for misinterpretation, particularly when dealing directly with the

⁴³ Montesquieu's *The Spirit of the Laws* discusses the cultural mechanisms and passions that lie underneath a state's political form. He links the structure, or nature, of states with an associated internal disposition, a phenomenon that he labels a principle. "There is this difference between the nature of the government and its principle: its nature is that which makes it what it is, and its principle, that which makes it act. The one is its particular structure, and the other is the human passions that set it in motion. Law should be so appropriate to the people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely that the laws of one nation can suit another." Charles de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 21, 8.

nature of relationships. Similarly, data regarding critical model relationships may not be available or may come from inaccurate sources and opinion. Second, information and analysis may exist that could counter the architecture I develop across phases of maturity or repudiate the connections required across noted groups and capabilities during the progress of those phases. Third, the case studies utilized to verify the utility of the model in Chapters 6 and 7 are intended to map two comparative forms of insurgency across the model. There may be contradictory evidence within any given case that would counter my findings. And fourth, logical flaws may exist in my analysis.

1.6 Research Methods and Procedures

Because no meta-framework exists to enable the comparison of insurgent practices and methods as they scale over time, I develop my own composite model in the first part of the dissertation. Chapters 2 through 4 explore the insufficiency of existing insurgency theory to accommodate comparative analytics of the broad range of contemporary insurgent institutions and processes across phases. As briefly mentioned in the last section, Chapter 2 organizes and synthesizes academic literature on insurgency, as well as legal and military doctrinal views. It uses this material to build the foundation for a simple conceptual model that defines thresholds of insurgency phasing. Scaling boundaries are represented by six phases in which the insurgency continues to advance toward its goals, loses capability, or stalls in a given category. It argues that scaling is accomplished by the manipulation of four components of a relationship framework: the vanguard, public support, political constitutive mechanisms, and destructive violent mechanisms. Again, see Figure 1.1.

Once the basic fundamentals of insurgency are proposed in Chapter 2, Chapters 3 and 4 analyze four classic insurgency theories and two case studies. These theories are applied to associated historic exemplars that illustrate their utility as well as their limitations for contemporary use. The case studies include the Chinese Communist Revolution (1927-1949) and the Algerian Revolution (1954-1962). The phasing models include the work of observers and participants in those insurgencies: Mao Tse-tung, David Galula, and the United States' Special Operations Research Office (SORO). Mao, Galula, and SORO were selected in combination with the insurgencies that informed their work because these theorists continue to impact national operational thought and planning today. Additionally, such well known classic cases make any subsequent findings easier to assimilate and to refute should they be off the mark.

Because Chapters 3 and 4 find the current phasing models to be historic artifacts and poorly compartmented, Chapter 5 returns to the phasing construct and relationship framework proposed in Chapter 2. It uses the cumulative findings of the first four chapters to propose a more advanced composite model from which to view and assess maturing, or declining, insurgencies. It illustrates the logical process behind the development of the composite model and presents clear conceptual categories of the resultant analytic framework. Chapter 5 provides the mapping mechanism used to assess the development, health and maturity of the Chechen and Kosovar Albanian movements in Chapters 6 and 7. I chose Kosovo and Chechnya because they share numerous pre insurgency attributes while experiencing vastly different outcomes. They are also rich in

available data, widely recognized as insurgencies, and span numerous phases of the model.⁴⁴ Neither insurgency began with the monolithic intention to create a new state.

Chapters 6 and 7 should be considered an *application* of the model to identify its utility over previous constructs. Stephen Walt calls his methodology “process tracing” after the work of George and McKeown, Stephen Van Evera, Bruce Russett, and others. “Process tracing allows the analyst to ‘get inside’ the case... and to evaluate the separate causal links that connect the explanatory variables with the predicted outcomes.”⁴⁵ Although not all insurgencies need to reach the highest phasing levels to obtain their political objectives, a qualitative case study methodology illustrates phasing processes and relationships extremely well, showing how phasing variables connect and scale. The selected movements drastically change over time – declining from national movement to terrorist organization or expanding from a simple network of like-minded underground organizations to a national movement and eventually a state regime.

Overall in terms of case selection, this dissertation consists of four historic and high-profile insurgency studies. As previously mentioned, Chapters 3, 4, 6, and 7 examine the Chinese and Algerian revolutions, as well as more recent insurgencies that played out in Chechnya and Kosovo, respectively. Across all four cases, the insurgency pathways, as well as their “timing, geographic location, and ideological orientation” vary

⁴⁴ “Picking relatively uncontroversial examples of revolution may reduce controversy over whether the cases chosen were appropriate for testing the theory” (Walt, *Revolution and War*, 14). The selection of these cases intends for the same effect. “Most theories of war are best tested by case-study methods because the international historical record of prewar politics and diplomacy, which serves as our data, usually lends itself better to deep study of a few cases than to exploration of many cases” (Van Evera, *Guide to Methods*, 30).

⁴⁵ Walt, *Revolution and War*, 15–16.

considerably from one another.⁴⁶ For example, the Chinese revolution leveraged communism and nationalism as ideological principles. The Algerian insurgency began under the Communist banner and then transitioned to Islamic nationalism. The Chechen nationalist movement transitioned from democratic intentions to Sunni-led fundamentalism. And the Kosovar Albanian insurgency shifted in the opposite direction, becoming more democratic and politically inclusive over time – though always focusing on ethnic nationalism as a unifying theme. The proposed model itself is agnostic to the reason behind an insurgency and focuses instead on the ability of the vanguard as well as political and violent mechanisms to connect with the public – or some supportive feeding element like a diaspora – to grow and scale.

Finally, Chapter 8 reframes the overall arguments regarding the needed analytic shift toward insurgency as part of a broader ontological phenomenon and the associated proposed framework. It summarizes the impact of each case study and looks at important findings enabled by the framework. Chapter 8 introduces possible avenues for future research and explores policy implications based on initial findings. Ultimately, security policies designed to drive nations toward stability without an understanding of the necessary mechanisms and processes of growth miss opportunities to find tailored solutions. They don't significantly account for the nuances of the relationship framework at substate levels that might be leveraged or engaged to prevent or induce phasing transitions.

⁴⁶ Walt, *Revolution and War*, 14. Walt references Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune's use of the 'most similar systems' design. Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: John Wiley, 1970), 34–39. "By applying the theory to a diverse set of (insurgencies) rather than a set of very similar cases, we can gain greater confidence in its range." Walt, *Revolution and War*, 14.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

2.1 Insurgency Theory

In spite of the practical and theoretical importance of better understanding the anatomy of insurgencies, their comparative structures and processes, there is little work that exists to connect variation of insurgent forms within one domain.¹ The current literature is divided into two broader perspectives previously mentioned: academic and practitioner approaches. The next three sections review prevailing academic, US military, and international legal perspectives of insurgency and intertwined forms of civil war and revolution.² Although military operations must fall in line with international legal

¹ For example, Paul Staniland focuses specifically on social resources of trust, information, and shared political meaning along vertical and horizontal elements of guerrilla organizations, distinguishing between the relational fragility and robustness of their central and localized forces. Paul Staniland, *Networks of Rebellion, Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse*, (Ithica and London: Cornell University Press, 2014). This dissertation does not contradict these findings but illustrates additional methods of motivation. Fear, ideology, emotional engagement, proximity and payment are also important mechanisms to manipulate, sustain, and develop what operational theorists call the united front. Numerous mechanisms are used in every insurgency depending on the targeted audience. For additional information on this topic, see Scott Gates, "Recruitment and Allegiance, The Microfoundations of Rebellion," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 1 (February 2002): 111-130. Zacharia Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers, Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War* (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011). Elizabeth Jean Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Roger D. Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion, Lessons from Eastern Europe*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Mark Irving Lichbach, *The Rebel's Dilemma* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995).

² James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *The American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75-90; Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars," *International Organization* 63, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 67-106; Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Cunningham, David E. "Veto Players and Civil War Duration," *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 4 (2006): 875-892; Jeremy Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion, The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); J. David Singer and Melvin Small, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982); Nicholas Sambanis, "What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 6 (2004): 814-58, doi:10.1177/0022002704269355; Jack A. Goldstone et al., "A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability," *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 1 (2010): 190-208, doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00426.x; Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, "International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal

standards, differentiating academic and practitioner approaches pulls out distinct attributes that will fit into the ensuing model. Each section builds upon another and includes the strengths, weaknesses, and limitations of the associated perspectives, highlighting systemic concepts regarding processes and structural components of insurgency. Section 2.4 then synthesizes all three “camps” and leverages them to provide the model that will be explored and developed throughout the rest of the dissertation.

2.2 Academic Perspectives of Insurgency, Civil War, and Revolution

2.2.1 *Insurgency Basics*

This category introduces the prevalent academic definition regarding insurgency. It immediately establishes the inaccuracy and inadequacy of understanding regarding the concept. Even though current methodologies attempt to determine what environmental conditions impact the onset and cessation of war, they hold little help or meaning for decision-makers. For example, Fearon and Laitin explain insurgency as “a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas.”³ According to this definition, insurgency is an operational tactic limited to and conflated with rural guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare, however, is distinct from insurgency because it focuses on military objectives and may be practiced

Conflict,” *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 3 (2010): 415–29, doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055410000286>; Hannah Arendt, Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (The Viking Press, 1963; repr. with introduction by Jonathan Schell, New York: Penguin Group, 2006); Theda Skocpol, *Social Revolutions in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Delhi: Adarsh Enterprises, Yale University, 1968); and Stephen M. Walt, *Revolution and War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). It also briefly touches on social movement theory of Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Rex Hopper, “The Revolutionary Process, A Frame of Reference for the Study of Revolutionary Movements,” *Social Forces* 28, no. 3 (1950): 270–79, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2572010>; and Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare,” *Special Warfare* 26, no. 3 (July–September 2013): 27–32.

³ Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 75, 79.

by state forces or by insurgents in urban or rural environments. Insurgents are more than guerrillas. They “fight to attain political, not military ends” and are not confined to rural environments or defined by military measures alone.⁴

Lyall and Wilson describe insurgency as “a protracted violent struggle by nonstate actors to obtain their political objectives – often independence, greater autonomy, or subversion of existing authorities – against the current political authority (the incumbent).”⁵ This definition moves closer to capturing insurgency from a political perspective. At the same time, however, similar to Fearon and Laitin, Lyall and Wilson also see insurgency confined to guerrilla warfare. To recast the response above, insurgent movements may adopt a guerrilla warfare strategy that “uses small, mobile groups to inflict punishment on the incumbent through hit-and-run strikes while avoiding direct battle when possible.”⁶ But they may also use terrorist tactics strategically, conventional capabilities as they develop, or a combination of all three.⁷ In addition to this limitation, Lyall and Wilson suggest that guerrilla warfare “seeks to win the allegiance of at least some portion of the noncombatant population.”⁸ This is not part of guerrilla warfare; it is, however, an attribute of insurgency at particular stages, though not necessarily all stages depending on conditions of capability and human geography.⁹

⁴ Walter E. Kretchik, *U.S. Army Doctrine, From the American Revolution to the War on Terror* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 99.

⁵ Lyall and Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines,” 70.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Tedd Gurr looks at collective violence in stages akin to the phases utilized in this dissertation framework. Gurr buckets sporadic terrorism and unsuccessful coups with other low levels of violence. He differentiates strategic terrorism from low levels of guerrilla activity. He combines civil war, revolutionary war and guerrilla activity involving more than 1,000 armed fighters over a large area. And then caveats protracted civil war fought from base areas. This work shares topics later in this chapter but phases these activities by levels of needed training and maturity. Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk. A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ In some cases, it is easier to drive unassimilated populations out of an area, as ISIS did in Northern

Both quantitative studies introduced here employ an additional caveat that reduces insurgency to a threshold of casualty outputs for study. In order to provide measurable and testable requirements for data collection and hypotheses, an insurgency exists when 1) at least 1,000 people are killed in the conflict, “with a yearly average of at least 100” and 2) when “[a]t least 100 [are] killed on both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels).¹⁰ For the purposes of this dissertation, insurgency is not about counting deaths. Rather, it is about using numerous forms of resistance for political ends. Insurgency is defined by claimant political goals, processes of violence, control and authority, as well as organizational components.

The largest limitation of the casualty threshold when assessing insurgent politics is that events considered as independent civil wars may be connected within one broader insurgency.¹¹ As is often the case with insurgent movements, fighting stops and starts as an insurgent organization or movement strategically uses a cease fire to gain political ground or some other measure of power or advantage.¹² Within the social movement literature, this time may be labeled as abeyance, a period “characterized by little or no mobilization. During this period, SMOs (Social Movement Organizations) often focus

¹⁰ Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 76. Fearon and Laitin hold to additional criteria for coding shared by others in the field. For example, data set requirements are often pulled from David Singer and Melvin Small’s Correlates of War (COW) Project (<http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/9905>); Nicholas Sambanis’s (2004) work on definitional complexities; and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Armed Conflict Dataset that tracks conflicts back as far as 1946. See www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/dataset/.

¹¹ In “International System and Technologies of Rebellion,” Kalyvas and Balcells (418) argue that civil wars may be conventional wars, symmetric nonconventional wars, or insurgencies, ‘guerrilla’ or ‘irregular’. But Kalyvas and Balcells utilize the COW criteria in their coding and limit the definition of insurgency to a “technology of rebellion whereby the rebels privilege small, lightly armed bands operating in rural areas.”

¹² Liberia. Chechnya.

inward on identity or values.”¹³ Under other circumstances, fighting may stop while an insurgency rebuilds materiel or personnel strength to reengage in violence.

2.2.2 *Insurgency and Civil War*

Civil war literature builds upon the concepts above. It looks more closely at local level behaviors during insurgent movements to better understand the internal dynamics of insurgent organizations and their relationship to surrounding populations. This means that concepts of resourcing, training, logistics, persuasion, and coercion are investigated, to include methods of implementation and their effects.¹⁴ For this reason, academic definitions of civil war and revolution come closer to an appropriate summation of insurgency, in part because they are forms of insurgency, and in part because revolution and civil wars are overtly political phenomena.¹⁵ The contributions of Stathis Kalyvas and Jeremy Weinstein are introduced below.

According to Kalyvas, beyond the casualty requirements described in the previous section, “[c]ivil war is defined as armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities.”¹⁶ This is frequently true for insurgencies, although external intervention or motivation may play a large role in the development of a movement. It may also be true that transnational organizations include foreign nationals who are part of an insurgency in

¹³ Jonathan Christiansen, “Four Stages of Social Movements,” EBSCO Research Starters (EBSCO Publishing Inc., 2009).

¹⁴ Kalyvas found fault in macrolevel analysis that explained local behavior by referencing elite actions. “The current emphasis on the macrolevel implies that ‘on-the-ground’ dynamics are perceived as a rather irrelevant local manifestation of the macrolevel” (Kalyvas, *Logic of Violence*, 390). This work attempts to make a connection between the macro and micro levels of analysis.

¹⁵ Certain scholars argue revolution is a pinnacle to be reached in terms of intrastate violence. Others suggest that revolution is “one of the most common events producing civil wars.” Goldstone et al., “Global Model,” 191.

¹⁶ Kalyvas, *Logic of Violence*, 5.

a given state. This trend will increase as the globalization of insurgency continues. Take the current context of Syria, for example. The number of foreign fighters contributing to numerous sides of the civil war is estimated to include 15,000 militants from eighty nations.¹⁷ In this respect, the government contributes to one side while a number of organizations with competing interests vie for supremacy across the state.




Figure 2.1 Washington Post October 12, 2014, A globalized web of militancy¹⁸

¹⁷ "Foreign Fighters Flow to Syria," *The Washington Post*, October 11, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/foreign-fighters-flow-to-syria/2014/10/11/3d2549fa-5195-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_graphic.html.

¹⁸ Note: "Figures for fighters from Western Europe are from the International Center for the Study of Radicalization's high-estimate category. All other numbers are from the Soufan Group. Per country fighter

Kalyvas looks specifically at the use of coercive homicidal violence in irregular civil wars against noncombatants. Irregular civil war includes “large-scale insurgencies with a predominantly rural basis” and should not be confused with “spontaneous peasant uprisings, jacqueries, food riots, and the like. These undisciplined, unstable, anarchic, and decentralized processes are not sustained long enough to challenge sovereign authority effectively.”¹⁹ Because Kalyvas focuses on local rural conditions, the lack of urban diversity within his theory does not detract from his focus on how violence is enacted against populations where “at least two political actors... enjoy partial and/or overlapping monopolies of violence.”²⁰ A corresponding hypothesis could logically be made that similar conclusions might result in urban environments as well.

Kalyvas argues that during civil war, violence “aims primarily to deter defection” but also to help mobilization efforts at the local level; he finds that in the cases he studied, violence is more

related to local issues rather than the ‘master cleavage’ that drives the civil war at the national level. This is the case despite the fact that local cleavages are usually framed in the discursive terminology of the master cleavage.²¹

Because the use of violence can backfire, “collective and individual preferences, strategies, values, and identities are continuously shaped and reshaped in the course of a war.”²² Popular loyalty, disloyalty, and support cannot be assumed as exogenous and

estimates determined from a date range of December 2013 to October 2014. Small numbers of fighters are also reported to have come from Bangladesh, New Zealand, Philippines, Senegal, Singapore and Trinidad and Tobago. These countries are not shown because they are off the map.” “Foreign Fighters Flow to Syria.”

¹⁹ Kalyvas, *Logic of Violence*, 19.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 31.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 364. Chapters two and three will discuss the changing use of narrative in much more detail.

²² Backlash is more often associated with indiscriminate violence. Indiscriminate violence is used more frequently when there is a lack of information. “If the ‘guilty’ cannot be identified and arrested, then

fixed.”²³ It makes sense then that a resultant theory of selective violence should indicate that areas experiencing the greatest levels of homicidal violence are those villages split²⁴ between warring groups. Violence patterns shift when a particular organization gains complete control, or when control in an area is entirely fragmented.

Weinstein’s work follows Kalyvas. He also builds upon Fearon and Laitin’s standard quantitative definition of insurgency and civil war as political violence between state agents and organized nonstate groups. In addition to the casualty caveat, he identifies “conditions under which rebellion mobilizes the disenfranchised for political change, and when it serves only the narrow interests of its leaders”²⁵ – when it produces “insurgents that seek to transform governance while others give rise to predatory organizations that sow terror among noncombatant populations.”²⁶ In doing so, Weinstein adopts a typology that distinguishes between conflicts in which participants “seek to capture the center,” secede, or “use violence but have no interest in achieving territorial control of any sort.”²⁷ His work looks specifically at micro-level patterns of selective and uncontrolled violence as a function of internal movement characteristics, including “membership, policies, structures, and culture.”²⁸

violence ought to target innocent people that are somehow associated with them... the targeted population will collaborate with” one side because they are feared more than another (ibid., 150).

²³ Ibid., 389.

²⁴ Labeled as “dominant but incomplete control” (ibid., 328).

²⁵ Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*, xvi.

²⁶ Ibid., 327. Weinstein begins to approach the organizing question listed above, “Might we surmise what kinds of insurgent behavior would lead to the creation of sustainable states?”

²⁷ Ibid., 17.

²⁸ Ibid., 19. “Selective violence is difficult to implement in practice. Differences in the membership and structure of rebel groups are reflected in the quality of a group’s institutions – its capacity to obtain information and use it to direct violence without making mistakes. Activist rebellions attract individuals committed to longer-term goals and embedded in networks of repeated interaction that enable leaders to shape the incentives and interests of their followers. Opportunistic rebellions, on the other hand, attract participants interested only in short term, material gains. Joined together by nothing more than their material interests, opportunistic groups are plagued by indiscipline, as combatants often sacrifice a group’s objectives to their individual interests” (ibid., 204).

Weinstein's approach addresses insurgent behavior regarding resourcing, recruitment, governance and violence within Mozambique, Uganda and Peru. Similar to the definition of insurgency introduced at the beginning of Section 1.3, he treats "civil wars as a form of political violence" that seeks "to capture control of the government or over a region or to influence government policy."²⁹ He indicates that groups seeking actual control of the state constitute only "56 percent of belligerent groups in civil wars fought since 1945."³⁰ His framework opens the aperture of insurgency to terrorist organizations as well as transnational criminal organizations like the Mexican drug cartels.

[T]he imperative of capturing a national territory creates a unique set of opportunities and constraints that may or may not hold in other types of warfare. The prospect of territorial control disciplines rebel behavior across geographic regions because it embeds insurgents in an interaction with civilians that, if they are successful, will be repeated over time.³¹

Weinstein allows for insurgency to exist where and when the state cannot control or govern the entirety of its territory, and is therefore a second or third party to internal conflict within its borders. His work forms part of the basis of the model presented later in the chapter.

Where Kalyvas is concerned, we learn how and why violence is used by parties in given various demographic environments during civil wars. Where Weinstein is concerned, we begin to understand that the maturity of insurgency is heavily dependent upon the central leadership's ability to control forces of organizational entropy. He looks

²⁹ Ibid., 16.

³⁰ Ibid., 17. Weinstein references Monica Tofts unpublished data regarding the belligerent group objectives since 1945. The term belligerent here is not used in a legal way that identifies a state participant. It just means fighting or warring groups.

³¹ Ibid., 17. Weinstein references Monica Tofts unpublished data regarding the belligerent group objectives since 1945. The term belligerent here is not used in a legal way that identifies a state participant. It just means fighting or warring groups.

more specifically at the ability – or inability – of different kinds of insurgent organizations to discipline and restrain the use of force, finding this quality to depend upon the resources that the leadership has available at the beginning of rebellion.³² This is a partial story, which will be elaborated in chapters three and four.

2.2.3 *Insurgency and Revolution*

Academic literature regarding revolution adds greater depth to the understanding of insurgency in five ways. First, revolution is described with respect to varied levels of violence. Second, some revolutions may not be insurgencies. Third, revolution is more clearly framed in the language of social movements and resistance movements. Fourth, revolution is depicted as distinct from other forms of insurgency. And fifth, revolutionary theorists present broader typologies regarding these full blown forms of insurgent movements.

Academic descriptions of revolution further illustrate the breadth and depth of the insurgency spectrum and are more prone to provide corresponding theoretical explanations of resulting change. Revolution presents an aspect of the insurgency process that gathers extensive social momentum and penetration into political, social and economic structures and communities within a state. Because revolution is not defined by degrees of violence but rather by the permeation of psychological and structural transformation within the fabric of an existing nation, it exhibits diverse collective

³² According to Weinstein, “Leadership, skill, and ideology all take a backseat to broader, macro-level factors that structure the universe of possibilities individual rebels confront. Rebel organizations are transformed, at least in theory, from groups defined by the personalities and ideologies of their leaders to teams of would-be rebels shaped by conditions that affect the viability of challenging the state. Violence becomes the natural outcome of a path of organizational evolution rather than a strategic choice made in response to changing conditions on the ground” (ibid., 21). Chapter 3 of this dissertation directly confronts this finding, though resources are part of the calculus. The use of particular forms of violence, particularly in urban settings, may certainly be a strategic choice.

activities. In a handful of examples, such as the 1989 Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia, violence is not fundamental to the insurgency.³³

Processes that yield revolution with limited levels of violence fall into traditional social movement or resistance movement categories. Recall that certain revolutions and social movements are not insurgencies at all and fall outside the scope of this study. To review briefly, insurgencies accompany a commitment to the unconstitutional or illegal use of force or protest. Figure 2.2 may make this concept clearer given the associated terminology definitions that follow.




Figure 2.2

Sidney Tarrow defines social movements as “collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents and authorities.”³⁴ Charles Tilly adds the “WUNC” behavioral requirements presented previously – that is social movements must display worthiness, unity and commitment. Tilly would argue that movements that engage in sustained violent campaigns,

³³ The 1989 Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia ended over forty years of communist control of the state. Mass demonstrations and strikes yielded a shift to democracy, a multiparty state, and market economy that persists today, although it is now called Slovakia. Jonathan Schell speaks to a series of democratic revolutions in the late twentieth century. “[T]he series seemed to begin in southern Europe with the overthrow of the Greek junta in 1974, the autocracy in Portugal that same year, and the transition to democracy in Spain in 1975.” Jonathan Schell’s introduction in Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (The Viking Press, 1963; repr. with introduction by Jonathan Schell, New York: Penguin Group, 2006), xxi. He also references the fall of Brazil’s dictatorship in 1985, the Philippines in 1986, Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003, and others.

³⁴ On p. 28 of “Social Movement Approach,” Lee references p. 4 of Tarrow’s *Power in Movement*.

particularly at the level of coordinated destruction, are not social movements. For this reason, I call movements that do not exercise violence in a sustained or strategic way, “traditional social movements” and claim that they are insurgencies when they fit the definition. Public protest that is legal in one state may be illegal in another.

In comparison, other academic theorists do connect social movement theory to the broader politics of insurgency and revolution. Rex Hopper, for example, postulates that revolutionary “movements pass through four stages in their development: the Preliminary Stage of Mass (Individual) Excitement, the Popular Stage of Crowd (Collective) Excitement and Unrest, the Formal Stage of Formulation of Issues and Formation of Publics, and the Institutional Stage of Legalization and Societal Organization.”³⁵ Hopper’s work – as well as that of Herbert Blumer who in 1969 similarly described four stages of social movements as Social Ferment, Popular Excitement, Formalization, and Institutionalization – continues to be relevant; today these stages are called Emergence, Coalescence, Bureaucratization, and Decline.³⁶ Because many insurgencies comprise contentious social movements, they necessarily interact with a public, especially if the goal of the movement is to ascend to state leadership or to assume territorial control. Chapter 5 will put this framework into further context.

To return to the concept of levels of violence in insurgency and the discussion of Figure 2.2, the term resistance movement has a similar nuanced distinction regarding the use of violence. According to the “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms,”

³⁵ Hopper, “Revolutionary Process,” 270.

³⁶ On p. 2 of “Four Stages of Social Movements,” Christiansen references both Herbert Blumer, “Collective Behavior,” in *Principles of Sociology*, ed. A.M. Lee, 3rd ed. (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1969) and Donatella De la Porta and Mario Diani, *Social Movements: An Introduction*, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006). These social movement stages will be incorporated into the insurgency model in Section 1.4.

a resistance movement is, an “organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability.”³⁷ Resistance movements may begin as traditional social movements and by definition are limited in means of violence. Revolutionary processes, however, often impact resistance movements. For example, they may be suppressed by the state. In many cases, due to controlled or uncontrolled levels of increasing collective violence, they may become contentious social movements and transition from resistance movements to full blown violent insurgencies.

Numerous theorists who study revolution consider this particular form of insurgency distinct from factional strife, civil war, coups d'états and national liberation movements.³⁸ Although they are all brought about by comparative processes of political violence and organizational constructs, as Hannah Arendt argues, “only where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether different form of government, to bring about the formation of a new body politic... can we speak of revolution.”³⁹ Similarly, Samuel Huntington argues that, “revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values, and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies.”⁴⁰ Stephen Walt defines revolution as “the destruction of an existing state

³⁷ Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02), *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 8, 2010, as amended through August 15, 2014), 218.

³⁸ Walt, *Revolution and War*, 13.

³⁹ Arendt, *On Revolution*, 25.

⁴⁰ “Revolutions are thus to be distinguished from insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups, and wars of independence. A coup d'état in itself changes only leadership and perhaps policies; a rebellion or insurrection may change policies, leadership, and political institutions, but not social structure and values; a war of independence is a struggle of one community against rule by an alien community and does not necessarily involve changes in the social structure of either community. What is here called simply ‘revolution’ is what others have called great revolutions, grand revolutions, or social revolutions.” Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (Adarsh Enterprises, Yale University, 1968), 264.

by members of its own society, followed by the creation of a new political order;” he too references new “values, myths, social classes, political institutions, and conceptions of the political community.”⁴¹

Revolution, however, does not stand independently of other insurgency forms. I contend rather that it is differentiated by its ends and not necessarily its means or even duration.⁴² Doowan Lee studies the mobilization and manipulation of social movements during social revolution and other forms of state resistance.⁴³ He illustrates that resistance movements may be manipulated and that social movements are not only part of a bottom up form of revolution. Lee leverages Skocpol’s definition of social revolution as “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures, accompanied and in part accomplished through popular revolts from below.”⁴⁴ Lee distinguishes between reform-oriented traditional social movements; indigenous movements seeking to overthrow or disrupt a target regime; indigenous coups d’états; and externally sponsored insurgencies. Each of these types of activity represents a pathway within insurgency politics that might begin as factional strife, civil war, coups d’états or national liberation movements and end in revolution. In the case of the coup d’états where top down change is initiated, the revolution may happen after the transition of political power.⁴⁵

To delve more specifically into aspects of political theory regarding typologies of revolution, both Huntington and Walt simplify revolutions into polarized standards. Walt describes those that occur from above and those that occur from below.

⁴¹ Walt, *Revolution and War*, 12.

⁴² Even though Skocpol, Walt, and Huntington describe revolution as a rapid transition, insurgent movements thus far in history tend build slowly. In fact, insurgency is frequently described as being protracted or prolonged. By the time it reaches the stage of revolution, however, it is like a car with a turbo engine – acceleration that began slowly picks up exponentially over time.

⁴³ Lee, “Social Movement Approach,” 27–32.

⁴⁴ On page 28 of “Social Movement Approach,” Lee references p. 5 of Skocpol’s *Social Revolutions*.

⁴⁵ Arendt would agree.

In a mass revolution, the old regime is swept away in an explosion of political participation by individuals or groups that were marginalized or excluded under the old order. In an elite revolution, by contrast, the old regime is challenged and eventually replaced by a movement whose leaders were themselves part of the old regime—normally military and civil bureaucrats who become convinced that the old order can no longer defend vital national interests.⁴⁶

In both cases, methods of action against the existing regime are illegal and usually include violence. These behaviors are accompanied by an “explosion of political activity.”⁴⁷ Walt connects the inner leadership of the revolution to both the social community as well as the political community. “By definition, successful revolutionary organizations are good at mobilizing social power and directing it toward specific political ends.”⁴⁸ Beyond these observations though, Walt presents no theory regarding the revolutionary process.⁴⁹ There are numerous hybrids, other potential pathways to explore for revolution that fall between the extreme elite and mass movement types.

Huntington speaks of Eastern and Western typologies that are based on a pre-1968 understanding of insurgency and are accompanied by linear patterns of steps and actions. He writes that Western revolutions evolve

from the fall of the old order, through the revolutionary honeymoon, the rule of the moderates, the efforts at counterrevolution, the rise of the radicals, the reign of terror and of virtue, and, eventually, the thermidor.⁵⁰ The pattern of the Eastern revolution is quite different. The expansion of political participation and the creation of new political institutions are

⁴⁶ Walt, *Revolution and War*, 12–13.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 20.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 22. Interestingly, Walt expresses less conviction about the role of ideology in revolution. He argues that, “ideological themes are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for revolutionary success” (ibid., 28). Some form of psychological unifier or platform is necessary for this to occur.

⁴⁹ Walt is more concerned with the external effects a revolution in one state has upon the behavior of the international system.

⁵⁰ His account falls in line with Arendt’s description of the French Revolution and completely ignores the American revolutionary experience, perhaps because he sees it as an aberration. According to the Merriam Webster Dictionary, a thermidor is a “moderate counterrevolutionary stage following an extremist stage of a revolution and usually characterized often through the medium of a dictatorship by an emphasis on the restoration of order, a relaxation of tensions, and some return to patterns of life held to be normal.” <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/thermidor>.

carried on simultaneously and gradually by the revolutionary counterelite and the collapse of the political institutions of the old regime marks the end rather than the beginning of the revolutionary struggle. In the Western revolution the revolutionaries come to power in the capital first and then gradually expand their control over the countryside. In the Eastern revolution they withdraw from central, urban areas of the country, establish a base area of control in a remote section, struggle to win the support of the peasants through terror and propaganda, slowly expand the scope of their authority, and gradually escalate the level of their military operations from individual terroristic attacks to guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare and regular warfare. Eventually they are able to defeat the government troops in battle.⁵¹

Huntington describes a variety of important facets of the politics of insurgency within this short narrative even though it is dated given the proliferation of hybrid typologies that exist today.

For example, having read Mao Tse-tung's theory regarding the Chinese Communist Revolution, he touches on the use of political methods that include a broad range of violent tactics, both rural and urban. He accounts for terrorism, guerrilla warfare, conventional warfare, the growth of administrative and political institutions, as well as the rise of numerous competing groups during the course of the insurgent movement. Although his description does not necessarily cover the scope of what can be understood about the developmental process of contemporary globalized insurgencies, he identifies a level of complexity that is missing from the insurgency or civil war academic literature. Huntington grasps important administrative and tactical variables of insurgency that will be explored further.

Section 2.1 introduced academic literature regarding insurgency, civil war, and revolution that begins to piece together interrelated ideas needed for a broader conceptual understanding of the politics of insurgency. Once the military and legal perspectives of

⁵¹ Huntington, *Political Order*, 271–72. As his Western template is based on the French Revolution and his Eastern template is based on the Chinese Communist Revolution.

insurgency are presented below, I will return to connect concepts within all three sections and synthesize a more refined framework of insurgency politics divided into phases of increasing maturity and capability. From this framework, we might begin to see how insurgency practice changes over time, both in its repertoire of violence and administrative political and economic capacity.

2.3 Operational Perspectives of Insurgency

In contrast to the contemporary academic descriptions of insurgency in the last section, this section provides a practitioner's perspective – at least a U.S government military operational perspective of insurgency. Much of the academic literature looks at insurgency from a pre-9/11 vantage. Insurgency, however, like terrorism changes over time. For example, political terrorism can be divided into three primary categories of sub-state terrorism, state supported terrorism, and regime or state terrorism.⁵² Within the sub-state category, we seldom see the social revolutionary terrorism of the left, or the right wing terrorism that dominated the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Those activities, like today's forms of terrorism, were part of insurgent movements that no longer hold psychologically for a constituent audience. Their "business processes," however, if not their technologies, are very similar to today's equivalent practices. Interestingly, the academic community has addressed the emergence of religious fundamentalist terrorism as a separate area of study that is seldom connected to the broader insurgency framework in which terrorists move. When politically motivated by substate actors, terrorism does not stand apart from insurgency, except in lone wolf or

⁵² Gerald Post class notes.

sociopathic/psychopathic situations. Rather, it reflects the context and maturity of an insurgent base.⁵³

Military doctrine does not question why individuals behave in particular ways but instead explores how they behave. It asks, “what do these actors do and what functions do we see repeated over time? Military strategist David Kilcullen suggests that insurgents are members of “an organized movement that aims at overthrowing the political order within a given territory, using a combination of subversion, terrorism, guerrilla warfare and propaganda.”⁵⁴ In this context, subversion includes “[a]ctions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority.”⁵⁵ Kilcullen describes apparent impacts of globalization and urbanization on the emergence of insurgent networks moving in and against the international political order; the connotation of insurgency as a rural phenomenon or a military function associated with counting casualties quickly disappears. At the same time though, Kilcullen’s description looks at insurgency solely from a perspective of breaking down existing political regimes and ignores conventional warfare as a means of coordinated destruction. He says nothing about establishing a new order or building an alternative social, security or political framework. Although not all participants are witting, at its core, insurgent movements attempt to offer an alternative political design or change to the status quo.

⁵³ For example, Walter Laqueur notes that terrorism is largely a matter of “historical, social, and cultural traditions, and of political calculus.” Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism, Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 8-9.

⁵⁴ David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla, Fighting Small Wars In the Midst of a Big One* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 12.

⁵⁵ JP 1-02, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 245. According to Joint Publication 3-24 (JP 3-24), a governing authority could be “an established government, a military occupation government, an interim civil administration, or a peace process.” JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 22, 2013), I-1. The definitions of subversion and governing authority were introduced earlier in the dissertation definition of insurgency.

Kilcullen writes from a Western military ethos and uses current operational lexicon. It therefore is not surprising that the U.S military similarly defines insurgency as, “[t]he organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.”⁵⁶ An insurgency in its nascent stages may not yet have the means to utilize violence, even though the intent exists and the movement has begun. As a “protracted politico-military struggle” insurgencies do not begin once violence erupts.⁵⁷ Rather, “conflict often begins long before it is recognized, allowing the insurgency to spread and develop a covert organization within the host nation until it reveals its presence through overt subversive acts and violence, as will be explored in future chapters.”⁵⁸

Insurgencies “struggle for some form of political power, whether that power is sought through reform, revolution, secession, nullification, or resistance.”⁵⁹ In some circumstances, “achieving victory for an insurgent may depend less on defeating an armed opponent [and taking control of a state] and more on a group’s ability to garner support for its political interests and to generate enough violence to achieve political consequences.”⁶⁰ In other words, as Weinstein and others indicate, gaining control of a state may not be in the interest of the movement. It may reach its goals by acquiring and maintaining autonomy in a prescribed area to carry out criminal or economic objectives.

⁵⁶ Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02), *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 8, 2010, as amended through January 15, 2015), 119.

⁵⁷ JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, I-1. “Insurgencies are typically protracted conflicts of 10 to 20 years... and often end through a negotiated settlement involving political reform by the incumbent host nation government” (ibid., II-1).

⁵⁸ Ibid., II-1.

⁵⁹ Ibid., I-3.

⁶⁰ Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24), *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 13, 2014), 1–2.

It may also reach its goals by forcing the government to the negotiating table in order to gain access to local and national political processes.

This is the current context of thought and practice regarding insurgency within the U.S. Department of Defense. From the perspective of a state, the politics of insurgency touches security sectors within it, but also commercial and economic sectors, political and administrative capacities, as well as social organizations and movements. We see Huntington's arguments scattered across this landscape. As Moises Naim indicates, the numbers of insurgencies proliferate because human beings proliferate – there are two billion more people than there were twenty years ago and there will be four times more people by 2050 than there were in 1950.”⁶¹ Most states simply cannot keep up with the growing bureaucratic demands of administering to their own populations.⁶² Opportunities to develop or take control of ungoverned spaces are increasing where both the state and the insurgent vie to organize personnel, finances, logistics, intelligence and communications.⁶³

Given this operational context, there are three primary documents available within the U.S. operational literature that explore insurgency related operations. These

⁶¹ Moises Naim, *The End of Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 54.

⁶² In addition to his systemic observations of revolutionary impacts on political, military, social and economic facets of the state, Huntington (1968) speaks directly to the impact of affiliation and association between members of society. He quotes de Tocqueville on page 4. “Among the laws that rule human societies, there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased.” Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*. (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1945. Repr. and abridged with introduction by Thomas Bender, New York: Random House, 1981), 408.

⁶³ It is from this vantage that the original academic focus on conditions that enable insurgency and civil war become helpful. See Goldstone et al., “Global Model,” 190–208. Goldstone et al. found that regime type, infant mortality, and armed conflict in more than four bordering states were the variables most associated with civil war onset and adverse regime change.

are the *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies Field Manual* (FM 3-24)⁶⁴, the *Counterinsurgency Joint Publication* (JP 3-24), and the *Special Operations Joint Publication* (JP 3-05).⁶⁵ The latter publication introduces the core activities that special operators may be required to perform at large. Those that necessitate a significant understanding of insurgency include counterinsurgency (COIN), counterterrorism, unconventional warfare (UW), special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, foreign humanitarian assistance, civil affairs operations, and military information support operations.⁶⁶ A significant understanding is required for these specific activities because U.S forces conducting them operate through, with and by local populations within the environment of the insurgency.

Take, for example, COIN and UW.

Counterinsurgency is a comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. UW consists of operations and activities that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.⁶⁷

The last sentence in the quote above provides a unique framework from which to identify and explore insurgency politics because it starts to get at an organizational view of capabilities and personnel requirements. Clearly the military has a vested interest in

⁶⁴ Field Manual No. 3-24 is also referred to as the Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) No. 3-33.5.

⁶⁵ Interestingly, within the two-hundred page FM, only twenty-seven pages are spent on the foundation of insurgencies. The Joint Publication is little better spending eighteen pages on insurgency within a 229 page document.

⁶⁶ This list is derived by my own analysis. Direct action is left off the list, for example, because little time is spent working with the local populations during in and out operations. Each of these are described more fully throughout Joint Publication 3-05 (JP 3-05) and are highlighted on pages x-xii. JP 3-05, *Special Operations* (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2014), dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf.

⁶⁷ JP 3-05, *Special Operations*, xi.

better understanding the broader politics of insurgent movements. Doctrine provides insight into concepts of insurgency structure, organization, and phasing.

Within military parlance, the underground, the auxiliary, and the armed component represent three base structural components, interdependent parts of the anatomy, of insurgent movements. “Underground cells conduct clandestine combatant and logistics operations in areas controlled by government forces.”⁶⁸ The auxiliary includes active workers who contribute to various support requirements such as intelligence, political and information operations and economic support. And the armed component comprises the members or groups that engage in violence.

This doctrinal list should also include a public component that connects the insurgency to forms of prescribed or tolerated resistance. The Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgency Studies (ARIS) *Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies* casebook provides greater definition to these components and includes the public component.

Underground—A clandestine organization established to operate in areas denied to the armed or public components or conduct operations not suitable for the armed or public components.

Auxiliary—The support element of the irregular organization whose organization and operations are clandestine in nature and whose members do not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement with the irregular movement. Members of the auxiliary are more likely to be occasional participants of the insurgency with other full-time occupations.

Armed component—The visible element of a revolutionary movement organized to perform overt armed military and paramilitary operations using guerrilla, asymmetric, or conventional tactics.

Public component—The overt political component of an insurgent or revolutionary movement. Some insurgencies pursue military and political strategies. At the termination of conflict, or occasionally during the

⁶⁸ FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, 4-17.

conflict, the movement can transition to the sole legitimate government or form part of an existing government.⁶⁹

In terms of development, an insurgency may begin within a public - moderate or peaceful – political or social resistance movement. Over time, an elite or vanguard may emerge that breaks away from the mainstream group to try and accelerate claim making through collective violence. Conversely,

At the start of an insurgency, the underground might be the only active sphere. As time goes on, auxiliary and guerilla contingents begin to grow and operate. Eventually, pursuant to a political agreement, the insurgency can begin to operate in the public political process. If successful there, the entire movement might at some point become public.⁷⁰

The public component of an insurgency is integral to the success of the movement and bears an interesting relationship to the political outcome of associated emergent states. In fact, the human relationships and networks across an insurgency are critical to the kind of state that might ensue. The role of the vanguard will become increasingly clear over the next few chapters, so much so that I argue that it should be a distinct component.

In addition to concepts regarding the standard organizational components described above, current doctrine lightly introduces insurgent phasing and timing in two ways. First, the Counterinsurgency Field Manual introduces a conflict resolution model to understand insurgent strength through a generic phasing process. It defines insurgent strength as a “subjective measure of the size of a movement, its ability to mount attacks and inflict casualties, popular support, logistics capacity, and/or territorial control.”⁷¹ As one of eight dynamics, the construct is completely hypothetical, not actually tied to

⁶⁹ Nathan Bos, ed., *Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies*, 2nd ed. (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 35.

⁷⁰ Robert Leonhard, ed., *Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2013), vii–viii.

⁷¹ FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, 4-15, Figure 4-1. Conflict resolution model

organizational growth or functional political or administrative capability.⁷² Beyond the minimalist definition of insurgent strength, the proposed model depicts in a single graph the hypothetical trajectory of an insurgency's strength across four specific phases. (See Figure 2.3.)




Figure 2.3⁷³ (FM 3-25, Figure 4-1 Conflict Resolution Model)

According to doctrine, the first phase is called the preinsurgency phase and is not on the chart though it is a crucial period of insurgency development. This “nonviolent” stage may last from days to years. Nonviolence is misleading because this time is often full of contentious politics and collective violence on a discontinuous timeline. It may even last fifty to one hundred years. The Algerian case study in Chapter 4 will describe

⁷² The eight dynamics include leadership, ideology, objectives, environment and geography, external support, internal support, phasing and timing, and organizational and operational patterns. Doctrine does not capture the fact that leadership, ideology, objectives, and support change over time, often in association with phasing requirements. FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, 4-8–4-20.

⁷³ FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, 4-15, Figure 4-1. Conflict resolution model

the extremely long duration of this first and second phases. “Preinsurgency activities include the emergence of insurgent leadership; creation of initial organizational infrastructure and possibly training; acquisition of resources, and unarmed, political actions, such as organized protests.”⁷⁴ The early (growth) phase is suggested to last from three to five years, the middle (mature) phase from three to five years, and the end (resolution) phase for 2 plus years.

FM 3-24s conflict resolution model gives some insight into the potential impact of a more rigorous and systematic phasing construct. The contribution of this particular model to doctrine, however, is minimal because it provides little insight into potential insurgent movements. Primarily the model communicates that insurgencies have a beginning, middle, and an end – ignoring most activity prior to overt violence. It does not look at what insurgencies need to do in order to grow during different phases and says nothing of activities in the last two phases.

The second brief description of insurgent phasing and timing dynamics within the Field Manual utilizes another three phased approach that is based on Mao Tse-tung’s communist insurgency model developed prior World War II. This is the same theory Huntington referenced.⁷⁵ According to Mao’s prescription, the first phase, the latent and incipient phase, marks the beginning of the organization, its training, political activities, and protests. The second phase transitions to guerrilla warfare and small unit tactics. And

⁷⁴ FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, 4-15, Figure 4-1. Conflict resolution model

⁷⁵ Other theorists also reference Mao concepts. For example, Brian Crozier noted, “Terrorism is the natural weapon of men with small resources, fighting against superior strength... But the pattern of the rebellions that have been allowed to run their course suggests that when the opportunity comes, the rebels will drop terrorism in favor of guerrilla activities, or at least relegate it to second place.” Brian Crozier, *The Rebels: A Study of Post-War Insurrections* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1960), 127–28. Thornton similarly postulates five stages of insurrection based on Mao: a previolent preparatory stage, initial violence through terrorism, expansion through guerrilla warfare, victory through conventional warfare, and postviolent consolidation. Thomas Thornton, “Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation,” in *Internal War: Problems and Approaches*, ed. Harry Eckstein (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 92.

the third builds to a more conventionally styled war of movement. Mao's long term success was heavily based upon his own ability to transform the communist insurgent apparatus into the follow-on state apparatus. This said, in order take down an opposing regime or government power, "an insurgency does not necessarily need to transform into a conventional military;"⁷⁶ "insurgent success can occur in any phase."⁷⁷ Mao, for example, continued to consolidate power within China long after the opposing regime fled to Taiwan. To briefly continue this line of logic, "Not all insurgencies progress through all three phases, and progression through all three phases is not a requirement for success."⁷⁸ Although this is technically true, the challenge of maintaining power is significant once initial control is taken of a state. Internal residual social friction, war torn economic conditions, and external influencers must be confronted. Additionally, in many regions, a conventional military is needed in order to protect the state once power is assumed.

Doctrine does little to fully express the richness of Mao's nuanced phasing model or to highlight the criticality of phasing to other dynamics like leadership development or support requirements. Within the presentation of Army doctrine, Mao's protracted approach becomes one of many disjointed approaches to insurgency.⁷⁹ And although his perception of insurgency is dated, similar to Huntington – history simply hadn't happened yet - his systemic perspective is the focus of the next chapter and is part of the foundation of the model constructed here.

⁷⁶ FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, 4-14.

⁷⁷ FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, 4-13.

⁷⁸ FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, 4-13.

⁷⁹ Others include the urban terrorist approach, the subversive approach, and the military-focused approach.

Military doctrine does a better job than academic publications at capturing the diversity of insurgent environments and scoping the range of persuasive and coercive means of activity. One weakness is that without a broader theory of insurgency to support counterinsurgency operations, it holds a perspective that, “Political power is nearly always the end, not the method, of the insurgent’s strategy and tactics.”⁸⁰ This is not the case. At certain levels of political and evolutionary maturity, insurgent movements frequently utilize political power as a method of gaining legitimacy and status. This can be seen as various administrative capacities shift during insurgent movements.

These capacities may be economic, financial, oriented toward social services, or judicial responsibilities. Insurgent movements “include acts of sabotage, violence against individuals, public demonstrations, small-scale attacks, and eventually larger attacks and mobile warfare, on the military side;” but they “also include the exercise of administrative and governmental jurisdiction (village aid projects, education and training, formation of youth and other organizations concerned with group action programs).”⁸¹ Often the term shadow government is used to describe those insurgent groups that have attained enough capability to provide social services and political services to local populations. Think of Hezbollah today. Another way to conceptualize this notion of advancing political power is to look at insurgency from a legal perspective of armed conflict and deduce corresponding political requirements at each level of insurgent advance.

⁸⁰ JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, I-3.

⁸¹ Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), 34.

2.4 Legal Perspectives of Insurgency and the Foundation of a Synthesized Model

This section represents a preliminary phasing exercise to provide the groundwork of the dissertation's phasing model. It combines lessons from academic and military perspectives with legal parameters and caveats. Ultimately, when we think about putting an insurgent movement into a broader systemic frame of reference, we want to leverage existing caveats and thresholds – not only in functional areas of politics, economics, social movement, and violence – but also across the organizational structure. Legal perspectives help to categorize the politics of insurgency because levels of violence and resistance already fall under standardized legal provisions. Increasing levels of intensity, duration, and organization, indicate corresponding changes within resistance methods and capabilities.

Erin Hahn explores the status of personnel in nonviolent and armed resistance. She illustrates conceptually how the legal status of forces is divided during the growth of an insurgency into five categories. The first two fall within nonviolent resistance classifications and include the use of legal processes for political advantage as well as illegal political acts. The last three categories of increasing armed resistance include rebellion, insurgency (narrowly defined), and belligerency. Although it may be temporarily confusing to call one subdivision of the broader insurgent movement context insurgency, it is of temporary necessity. Categories are based on nominal levels of intensity of the fighting, the duration of the conflict, and the constitution of the resistance organization. As further organizational detail and nuance are added to her categories below, the framework to be used throughout this work begins to build. See Figure 2.4.



Figure 2.4⁸² Resistance Movements on the Continuum

At the lowest level, the first of five categories, nonviolent opposition occurs when individuals or groups use existing legal processes of resistance such as litigation, lobbying, peaceful sanctioned demonstrations, or social media messaging where legal.⁸³ In some circumstances, this resistance may be widespread and already part of a traditional social movement. At the second level, methods regarding political change become more intense and turn to collective violence as individuals and groups resort to illegal political acts, refusing to comply with certain laws. Activities include civil disobedience, illegal demonstrations, passive noncompliance with the law, short-lived riots, or malicious destruction of property.⁸⁴ Organizational structure and networking across political actors, financial backers, protestors and activists increases as the complexity of a movement expands. Under both of these circumstances, citizens are subject to civil and criminal law procedures of the state. These forms of resistance may or

⁸² “Figure 1-2. Resistance movements on the continuum.” In Erin Hahn and Sam Lauber, *Legal Implications of the Status of Persons in Resistance*, ed. Erin N. Hahn (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, forthcoming), 7.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

may not be part of an insurgent movement, though the likelihood at this stage is low in the absence of additional contributing factors.

The next level of intensity constitutes rebellion and may include “short-term, isolated, violent engagements” such as riots, protests, and “armed attacks by disparate groups separated in time by weeks or months.”⁸⁵ As law enforcement mechanisms successfully engage violent behavior, participants continue to be subject to domestic criminal law. When associated with an insurgent movement, more sophisticated acts necessitate additional administrative and support capabilities from the movement. Additionally, as levels of violence continue to intensify, a threshold of violence may surpass a state’s ability to maintain the rule of law. Stated another way, at some relative location along the spectrum of violence, rebellion- also called insurrection, challenges the control of the state. To return to the doctrinal perspective, “Rebellions are forms of insurgency in which an organized group is leading the population, the causes of instability exist, and the movement enjoys some passive support among the population.”⁸⁶ Legally speaking, and according to the Geneva Convention, members of a rebellion are described as insurgents.⁸⁷

As the level of intensity, duration and organization of an insurgent movement continues to build, the insurgency may act in ways that increase its political, economic, and administrative capital. It will continue to use as appropriate the mechanisms of previous phases – such as the use of legal processes for political advantage, illegal

⁸⁵ Ibid. “What constitutes “low intensity” remains highly debated. There is as yet no standard legal definition. Instead, a court’s analysis would compare the alleged conflict under review with conflicts previously found to be noninternational armed conflicts (NIACs) or falling short of that threshold. One must ask: do the violence and organization of the alleged conflict under question approximate closely enough those of conflicts known to be NIACs?” (Hahn and Lauber, *Legal Implications*, 14).

⁸⁶ FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, 4-1.

⁸⁷ See volume II, section B of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949.

political acts, and rebellion. But it will also attempt to grow into an externally identifiable and full-fledged insurgency, category 4.⁸⁸ This often includes limited areas of territorial control. At this stage, insurgent “fighting is more sustained and intense and cannot be easily suppressed by the government;” legally, as a noninternational armed conflict (NIAC), insurgencies with this level of associated violence come under International Humanitarian Law protections and protocols.⁸⁹

After the level of full-fledged insurgency, there is one additional legal category and two additional doctrinal descriptors of increasing violent intensity, duration and organization. They are familiar categories of insurgency from the academic perspectives section above. And yet they don’t necessarily match the definitions used in academic research. Militarily speaking, both revolution and civil war fall into the broader insurgency movement classification – often expanding through legal categories one through five.

The doctrinal definition of revolution is very close to the academic conception. It is described as a form of

popular insurgency with plans to overthrow a government and transform its society and government from one form to another. Revolutions generally evolve from a rebellion but in revolutions popular support comes in the form of a fully mobilized population, which differs from simply passive or active support.⁹⁰

The distinguisher here is that revolution is more about the level of mobilization within the population than social, psychic, or political changes to the state. From the same frame of

⁸⁸ The category four descriptor is, “In general, the fighting is more sustained and intense and cannot be easily suppressed by the government. Other elements include increased levels of insurgent group organization and territorial control.” Erin Hahn and Sam Lauber, *Legal Implications*, 6.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, 4-1.

reference, doctrine finds civil war to be “condition-based” and another distinct permutation of insurgency;

Once the insurgency achieves certain characteristics of organization and resembles an alternate government, the conflict reaches the state of civil war. This is often characterized by performing tasks associated with a state and having a defined government. If the insurgency loses the ability to meet these criteria, the status or state of the insurgency is no longer that of a civil war.⁹¹

The associated legal perspective of civil war is defined by the Geneva Convention. It also looks at political and administrative capacities of an insurgency when determining civil war status. Without providing detailed specifics of what constitutes a state, it stipulates that

insurgents must have an organization purporting to have the characteristics of a State; that the insurgent civil authority must exercise de facto authority over persons within a determinate territory; that the armed forces must act under the direction of the organized civil authority and be prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war; that the insurgent civil authority must agree to be bound by the provisions of the Convention.⁹²

Interestingly there is no litmus test to determine what capabilities do or do not comprise a state.

Clare Lockhart and Ashraf Ghani provide a list of ten functions of a state. These include the monopoly on the legitimate means of violence; administrative control managed by government professionals; the management of public finances, investments in human capital; the creation of citizenship rights through social policy; the provision of infrastructure services; the formation of a market; the management of public assets; and

⁹¹ Ibid., 4-2.

⁹² Ibid.

effective public borrowing.⁹³ On a very small scale, an insurgent movement has corresponding categories of operation that must scale up, transition from support of the organization alone to penetration of the components across a state. Part of the task of this dissertation will be to see how this transformation may take place over time. What are the indicators and practices that have been used during this transition? Many insurgencies take control of a state tenuously without meeting these kinds of requirements. What do these states look like?

This said, there is still a final legal category of transition during insurgency that connects revolution, civil war and the state. This is the category of belligerency. Both revolution and civil war fall into the belligerency category when they meet the following four criteria. First, conflict becomes general rather than local armed conflict. Second, belligerents control and administer to a substantial portion of territory. Third, “belligerents follow the laws of war and use a command system;” and fourth, “circumstances require states to define their positions in relation to the conflict.”⁹⁴ Belligerents are considered to be state representatives according to the Law of Armed Conflict.

This means that by this level of advanced insurgency, the resistance is “deemed a de facto state and its forces receive combatant/POW status.”⁹⁵ The crossover is extremely important for antigovernment forces fighting in revolutions and civil wars because it is the first step to legal sovereignty. Although the classification transition from insurgent to belligerent may change back to insurgent at some future point of the conflict, the

⁹³ Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States, A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 124–63.

⁹⁴ Erin Hahn and Sam Lauber, *Legal Implications*, 6.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

appellation requires the international community to provide recognition of that status and behave accordingly.

Given this legal paradigm, we may now return more fully to the previous reference from military doctrine that, “Political power is nearly always the end, not the method, of the insurgent’s strategy and tactics.”⁹⁶ Political capacity is as much a part of the context of insurgent activity as the use of violence. The model introduced in the next section provides a framework from which to assess insurgency maturity and capability.

2.5 A Theory of the Politics of Insurgency

A place to start then, in order to build a theory on the politics of insurgency, begins with the five legal thresholds established in Section 2.3: the use of legal processes for belligerent acts, illegal political acts, rebellion, insurgency and belligerency. See Table 2.1. These categories already correspond to conceptual levels of intent and maturity regarding an insurgency’s capacity for political leadership as well as its security and military capabilities. They serve as a basis of thought for the broader requirements needed to grow an insurgent movement.

Legal Thresholds of Insurgency
Use of legal processes for belligerent acts
Illegal political acts
Rebellion
Insurgency
Belligerency

Table 2.1 Legal Thresholds of Insurgency

⁹⁶ JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, I-3.

Also implied across the legal thresholds, however, is a connection between the insurgency's monopoly on violence and scalable control mechanisms of the inhabitants living in or associated with a particular territorial area. Control mechanisms may inspire supportive behavior through hard or soft power constructs, fear or affinity respectively. The case studies in the following chapters explore those behaviors internal to the insurgency that enable it to acquire or lose control across stages; this happens through the actions of the vanguard, the political apparatus that represents constituting mechanisms, and the security apparatus that enables destructive mechanisms through a monopoly on violence. I argue that the maturity and efficiency of an emergent regime depends upon the vanguard's capability to develop and master political constitutive and destructive mechanisms associated with each phase of the insurgency. If it cannot scale, the only way to progress to the next level of maturity is through external support.

External support might come at any time during the growth of an insurgency and contribute to or detract from its cause. For example, external actors routinely provide resources that impact funding and finance methods; trade, the illicit and licit economy; manpower; sanctuary, passage and refuge; logistics and supplies; and local or long distance communications. External actors may impact the development and execution of strategy, ideology, or training and development. They may help to isolate an enemy internationally or provide a second front kinetically. Finally, they may support intelligence collection and dissemination functions or control information and tailor messaging to support the insurgency's institutional legitimacy.

Figure 2.5 presents the primary relationships that will be explored to explain insurgency phase transitions in future chapters. It illustrates necessary connections

between the vanguard, public support, political mechanisms and organizations, as well as violent mechanisms and organizations. These four categories are different than the doctrinal groupings discussed earlier regarding the underground, the auxiliary, and the armed component. In this construct, the vanguard uses formal and informal organizations of politics and violence to draw support and participation from social networks within the public. Participation includes both licit and illicit activity from within the state or externally from a diaspora or transnational organizations.




Figure 2.5 Insurgency Relationship Framework

Although the doctrinal components are not explicitly called out, their activities are still required to serve the overall political, economic and violent needs of the movement. This work changes the focus of analysis from intelligence on individuals to information regarding systemic licit and illicit activities and communications that impact organizational and institutional relationships that vary across insurgent movements. I look at broader systems of interaction rather than deduce who is in the underground and who is in the auxiliary. For the purposes of this work, the underground, the public

component, and the auxiliary roll into illicit clandestine political and violent mechanisms as well as the public that supports them. The armed component falls clearly within emergent security mechanisms of the movement over time.

Citizen support feeds and builds an insurgency's political bureaucracy as well as its military and security apparatuses. The politics of insurgency as a phenomenon should more explicitly connect vanguard influence over the public through political administration and the use of violence, whether those components are part of state institutions, social hierarchies such as clans, or underground political organizations. The nature of and relationships between framework components over time indicate what type of a regime will emerge. Analysis of the framework will explain how the developing regime rectifies the disparity in licit and illicit behaviors, and whether the insurgency is a national movement capable of building a national army or a networked organization capable of supporting a limited paramilitary unit. How pervasive is the insurgency within the public and how adept might it become in overtaking the anatomy of the state?

There are two ways to look at the optimal relationships within this framework for a given state. The first outcome for regime success over time is the assimilation and growth of the vanguard identity with the political and security apparatuses, as well as public support. This relationship appears in Figure 2.6. In cases such as these, the vanguard disperses into the political apparatus of the new state or the political apparatus becomes entirely subordinate to the vanguard leadership. The same concept holds for the military or security apparatus. The military and security organizations of the state incorporate the insurgent forces, or become an extension of the insurgent force and

leadership. The case studies in chapters six through eight will more fully express these connections and changes across phases.




Figure 2.6 Internal Insurgency Assimilation across the Relationship Framework

The second perspective to achieve the optimal outcome for a movement merges the illicit or informal mechanisms of control of the insurgency with the formal state mechanisms across stages. The former subsumes the latter through defeat or assimilation; at the least it must achieve some form of parity across the balance of capabilities and relationships.⁹⁷ Figure 2.7 depicts this movement. Picture the state framework moving to the left as the bottom overlay and the insurgent framework moving to the right as the top overlay. In Figure 2.7, the insurgency begins to overcome the existing regime while Figure 2.5 speaks to the necessary balance and maintenance of the relationships within the insurgency.

⁹⁷ The concept of parity is important. If an insurgency exists within a state that has an ineffective conventional force, there is little reason for the movement to attempt to grow its own conventional force. It may be enough that its military capability matches its opponent. This is why external support is crucial to parity levels.




Figure 2.7 Insurgency Assimilation of State Mechanisms across the Relationship Framework

As an exemplar, take the Tea Party movement in the United States. Not an insurgency, but not unlike an insurgency. The Tea Party “vanguard” began to support political candidates running under the Republican Party in 2009. Responsible for making gains in Republican victories following 2010, the Tea Party began to gain enough traction from public support through elections – a constitutive political mechanism – that it began to challenge traditional Republican leadership and prevent the overall party from reaching internal consensus on some issues and external compromise with the Democratic Party on others. In this sense, with respect to Figure 2.6, the Tea Party gained political access and a voice within the Republican Party through public support and constitutive political mechanisms. With respect to Figure 2.7, it gained political access and voice within the U.S. legislative branch through those same processes.

Comparative examples include the American Revolution and Civil War. With respect to the American Revolution, the vanguard and the political mechanisms of the emergent resistance developed from existing representative colonial political institutions. These bodies then coalesced into a new political organization that overtook the

incumbent power. One of the first tasks of this group included the institutional establishment of a military mechanism of resistance that subsequently grew and overcame the British forces. With respect to the American Civil War, while the coupling of all components within the internal insurgent framework developed quickly, it failed to assume or subsume the existing state framework depicted in Figure 2.7.

Given the primary internal organizational stakeholders within an insurgency (the vanguard, the political apparatus, the military apparatus, and the public) and the milestones that a movement must reach as it matures, Table 2.2 adapts the five legal categories to incorporate a construct that includes six generic insurgency phases. The content of these phases are developed within chapter three and four case studies.⁹⁸ They represent distinct stages in insurgent maturity and growth for which each component has correlated requirements, to include the acquisition of physical space or territory, levels of political administration, and levels of military capability.

It should be understood that the security and political apparatuses, or public affinity, may not achieve the same phase of maturity at the same time. One may lag or lead the other in movement development, even from the outset. Take again the example of the American Revolution, where the political mechanisms of the resistance began at a much higher level of maturity than the ensuing development of an Army. General George Washington literally brought over a Prussian officer to build a conventional capability. French warfighting manuals were distributed among conscripts and a training program ensued to enable American forces to fight the British on their own terms.

⁹⁸ This section gives away some of the findings of future chapters. But the concepts will be reintroduced and substantiated in greater context and rigor.

Phase	Insurgent Movement Phase
phase 0	Perceived inequity / injustice
phase 1	Violence as a possibility Building to systemic violence
phase 2	Internal Darwinism Path toward public legitimacy
phase 3	Monopoly on localized violent resistance Emergent identity
phase 4	Violence and regional political administration
phase 5	Violence and national political administration

Table 2.2 Basic Phases of Insurgent Movements

Table 2.3 shows the next level of depth within the phasing model that might show comparative aspects of the insurgency across phases. This particular chart illustrates the specific legal alignment discussed above, but it also incorporates very basic military milestones across phases. Chapter 5 will introduce a more mature variation of the phasing framework, to include the comparative political mechanisms associated with each phase. Table 2.3 is intended to build the concept to a level appropriate for more detailed discussion in Chapters 3 and 4.

Phase #	Insurgent Movement Phase	Military	Legal
Phase 0	Perceived inequity / injustice	Existing militant or violent culture	Use of legal processes for belligerent acts
Phase 1	Violence as a possibility Building to systemic violence	Begin terrorist tactics	Illegal political acts
Phase 2	Internal Darwinism Path toward legitimacy	Strategic terrorism Small unit tactics	Rebellion
Phase 3	Monopoly on localized violent resistance Emergent identity	Guerrilla warfare	Insurgency
Phase 4	Violence and regional political administration Reconquest	Mobile warfare	Insurgency
Phase 5	Violence and national political administration Consolidation	Full conventional capability	Belligerency

Table 2.3 Preliminary Phases of Insurgent Movements

Basic discussion of the phases is as follows.

- Phase zero begins with perceived injustice or inequity within a region or environment. It is a state of mind and action that sets the starting context of the location, associated stakeholders, and their claims, goals and interests within a developing movement. In the language of Hopper and Blumer, Phase zero comprises increased individual excitement and social ferment of the movement.
- During phase one, ad hoc insurgent violent behavior begins and builds toward a systemic application. The insurgency reaches coalescence as a movement, a time of collective excitement and unrest. At the least, land and buildings are required to conduct or support the necessary activities that comprise its activities. In many cases this means terrorism.
- Phase two builds upon destabilizing, inconsistent, and opportunistic terrorist and small unit tactics to provide an ability to control territory in limited duration and emerge as the primary stakeholder in a given constituency and region. Issue

formulation and the rise of public coalitions of support to the insurgency create competition between elements of a given organization or between insurgent organizations in the same environment.

- Phase three ties the monopoly of violence to an insurgent brand that is able to conduct guerrilla warfare in limited areas. The insurgency attempts to formalize political and security institutions and connect them to public via an expanding bureaucracy. Heavy competition between elements of a given organization or between insurgent organizations in the same environment persists.
- Phase four insurgent movements control both a monopoly of violence through maneuver warfare as well as administer politically and economically to defined regions of the state. The insurgency defeats, is defeated by, assimilates or coopts the broader public and state functions. Truly, at any time the insurgency may be defeated. External support to the insurgency will become key to its accession into the international community.
- By the end of phase five, the insurgency controls national level military assets and administers to state political and economic assets. The acceptance of the international community is required. Often, this phase is completed after a turnover in power but while another state subsidizes the transition.

Arrival on the dynamics across the particular phases introduced above is informed by two insurgency case studies and my own analysis of four insurgency models that correspond to those cases. The case insurgencies include the Chinese Communist Revolution (1927-1949) and the Algerian Revolution (1954-1962) while the models incorporated include the work of Mao Tse-tung, David Galula, and the United States' Special Operations Research Office. The next two chapters unpack each case, to include the narratives that link the dynamic of the vanguard, the political institutions, the security institutions, and the public in a unique relationship that yielded the Chinese and Algerian states of the 1950s and 1960s, respectively.

Chapter 3

The Chinese Communist Revolution and Basic Insurgency Modeling

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to substantiate and deepen the phasing framework introduced at the end of Chapter 2. The following sections analyze the Chinese Communist Revolution (1927–1949) in light of two comparative phasing theories on insurgency. Section 3.1 synthesizes the work of Mao Tse-tung while Section 3.2 brings David Galula into the discourse. What Galula labeled the communist “orthodox pattern” differs extensively from Mao’s model, although both make significant contributions to a meta-theory on insurgency. Because US military operations today take direction from these two key insurgency theorists, addressing and deconstructing their work is important to use as a foundation for new ways to approach related operations. This chapter identifies the content, limitations, and characteristics of their models in association with the attributes and dynamics of the Chinese insurgency.

3.2 Mao’s Theory on the Practice of Revolution

In 1938, when Mao argued that China’s conflict with Japan would progress through three stages of war, his strategy aligned with the details of his circumstance. China was a heavily agrarian, semi-feudal and semi-colonial state whose leaders spent much of the nineteenth century resisting Western and regional imperialism. When the Qing dynasty fell in 1911 and the Republic of China stood up in 1912, division within the

country proliferated—fragmenting further along political, economic, and cultural lines.¹ Competing feudal warlords controlled the north while the Kuomintang (KMT), variously backed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviets, began to dominate the south. “The Chinese Communist Party, founded in 1921 in Shanghai, originally existed as a study group working within the confines of the First United Front with the (KMT) Nationalist Party.”² In 1923, when Mao joined the KMT, the Nationalist Party affiliation with the Soviets was still on the rise.

During the ten years that preceded the publication of *On Guerrilla War* (1937) and *On Protracted War* (1938), the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) and the KMT disintegrated at the same time that conditions with the Japanese came to a head. In 1926, when Chiang Kai-shek took control of the KMT army, he began the Northern Expedition to unite China’s divided provinces under one state. The CPC grew to about 10,000 strong and attempted to take over the KMT in his absence. In 1927, Chiang expelled the Communists from the KMT and the Chinese Civil War began. The CPC openly rebelled when the two parties split, failing to seize power through armed urban uprisings.³ “A Communist group with Mao Tse-tung took refuge in the Kiangsi-Hunan area, while other groups scattered in various places. They slowly initiated guerrilla

¹ “The fall of the dynasty stirred the national consciousness and the desire for change in only a small number of Chinese, and there was little agreement as to what should replace the old order. Revolutionary and counterrevolutionary elements competed for domestic and foreign support.” Paul A. Jureidini et al., “The Chinese Communist Revolution: 1927-1949,” *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume I: 1927–1962*, rev. ed. (United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC, 2013), 571.

² “The Chinese Revolution of 1949,” Office of the Historian, accessed February 26, 2015, <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev>.

³ Arthur Waldron and Edward O’Dowd, Second Edition Introduction to *On Guerrilla War* (Yu Chi Chan), by Mao Tse-tung. (Baltimore, Maryland: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1992), 7. “At this time, Mao Tse-tung was assigned the task of organizing the peasants into unions. The party failed in its attempt to secure mass support through the urban proletariat” (Jureidini et al., *Casebook*, 572-573).

warfare, and, although at first they committed the mistake of attacking well-defended towns, they managed to develop their military strength.”⁴

In 1931, when the Japanese invaded Northeast China (Manchuria), Chiang directed his army to continue its course against the warlords and the communists—not to confront the Japanese. By 1933, the CPC membership reached roughly 300,000 members and the KMT controlled China’s government.⁵ During 1933, the Nationalists strongly persecuted the CPC which lost 60,000 soldiers when surrounded by 500,000 KMT troops in the Jiangxi province. The Communist forces within southeastern China retreated under attack in 1934 for roughly 6,000 miles. Beginning the trek with around 85,000 troops, they lost roughly 90% of their numbers along the route to the Shensi province in the northwest. “When those who survived the march reached Yenan, they combined with the communist troops there to form a fighting strength of 80,000.”⁶

In 1936, as the Japanese threat to China intensified, Chiang’s military leadership pressured him to sign a cease-fire with the CPC and to work together against the Japanese. When Japan’s army invaded central China in 1937 and the Sino-Japanese War broke out in earnest,⁷ the CPC and KMT established a tenuous unified front. *On Guerrilla War* and *On Protracted War* are products of Mao’s contradictory

⁴ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1964), 25.

⁵ Ibid. Galula also wrote that, “By V-J day, the Party had grown to 1,200,000, controlled an area of 350,000 square miles with a population of 95 million, and had a regular army of 900,000 men and a militia force of 2,400,000. It was no longer vulnerable.”

⁶ “The Long March 1934 to 1935,” History Learning Site, accessed February 26, 2015, http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/long_march_1934_to_1935.htm.

⁷ “The first great battle of the war in China began at Shanghai on 13 August 1937 and was totally conventional. It pitted fifty Nationalist Chinese divisions, numbering about 700,000 men, against more than ten Japanese divisions, totaling more than 300,000 men plus three hundred heavy guns, two hundred tanks.. etc.. Ten thousand of China’s irreplaceable junior officers were killed and seventy percent of her modern German-trained forces destroyed. It lasted four months.” Waldron and O’Dowd, Introduction to *On Guerrilla War*, 13. Previous Japanese presence on the mainland was isolated in Manchuria.

circumstances, written to support the united front but after the Long March when the Nationalists continued to be a viable threat and long-term enemy.⁸

Although both of Mao's seminal works focus on the defeat of Japan's army, not the Nationalists, they reflect Mao's lessons and experiences against the KMT. They illustrate a partnership between the Nationalist army and communist forces against Japan and promote the perception of a unified front between the KMT and the CPC.⁹ Mao's works present arguments in which guerrilla war is one component of a broader strategy that depends on an active conventional capability, albeit one inferior to Japan's forces. Mao argued that if the KMT could tie up the Japanese army temporarily, this would allow the Communists time to build bases and mature their guerrilla component; in this way they might eventually work with the KMT army to counter their mutual enemy. Even though the CPC continued to drive toward legitimate state leadership, not a Nationalist-Communist coalition, Mao's resulting doctrine and written strategy is silent regarding any coordinated political solution beyond the Japanese defeat.¹⁰ On the surface Mao

⁸ This work does not discuss Mao's rise to power within the CPC or the tactical split – for both political and military reasons with the Soviet Union. His works represent lessons learned after difficult tactical failures against the Nationalists – under the advisement of the Soviets and even against the CPC's own military leadership. Mao's leadership in the party was not always secure and the Japanese threat helped the Communists remain viable during a critical point in their path to power. "Mao's closest colleagues were skeptical of his military views for two reasons. One was political: Mao consistently opposed the orthodox and pro-Moscow position within the party; but secondly and more importantly, Mao's ideas went against the military concepts of some Chinese Communist soldiers who had received formal military training, and most importantly, often did not lead to success on the battlefield." Waldron and O'Dowd, Introduction to *On Guerrilla War*, 9.

⁹ U.S. Marine Corps FMRP 12-18, *Mao Tse-tung On Guerrilla War (Yu Chi Chan)*. Translation and introduction by Samuel B. Griffith. (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1989), 19. Forward is dated 5 April 1989. Introduction and Translator's note is dated 1940. Further note is dated 1961.

¹⁰ "The final group of Mao's articles, written from 1946 to 1949, outline the strategy for defeating the Nationalist army in a conventional war of maneuver." Edward O'Dowd, Bibliographic Essay in *On Guerrilla Warfare (Yu Chi Chan)*, by Mao Tse-tung. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. (Baltimore, Maryland: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1992), 139.

targets the Japanese, but under the surface he intends for the Communists' full dominion over China.

As a result of this context, *On Protracted War* and *On Guerrilla War* do not signify factually accurate representations of history. They don't depict the unadulterated insurgent strategy of a party that starts a revolution from nothing against an isolated ruling government regime.¹¹ They don't communicate what transpired during the Sino-Japanese War—or what transpired before and after between the Nationalists and the Communists.¹² Rather, *On Protracted War* and *On Guerrilla War* serve as primary examples of Mao's operational and strategic narrative, distributed within China at the time and intended for a number of audiences.¹³

In this way, Mao's two texts served as tools of the communist revolution.

[C]ommunist fighting doctrines were written with the intent of indoctrinating in every sense of the word. Soldiers and auxiliaries were politically educated. They were imbued with the ideology of the Party, and provided with the tools of propaganda applicable to themselves, the populations they lived off of, and their enemies, which they invariably sought to rally”¹⁴

Mao argued that the internal communication and reception of the Communist political message should focus on the relationships across a trinity of players. Rather than think of the army, the people, and the enemy as independent targets, he spoke to messaging that

¹¹ A useful distinction should be made between “partisan and pure guerrilla war.” In partisan warfare, irregular forces operate in coordination with large state or party-supported conventional formation. This style of war, as Clausewitz observed, could prove very successful, and it has from the Spanish campaigns of the early nineteenth century right down to recent conflicts in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and other states. But without the main forces, the partisans or guerrillas are far less effective.” Waldron and O’Dowd, Introduction to *On Guerrilla War*, 29–30.

¹² Competition between the two internal enemies never truly stopped and fighting in earnest began again by 1940 so that the armies fought the Japanese separately.

¹³ Mao's ideas rely on those who preceded him, including other Marxist theorists, Clausewitz, and even Sun Tzu. Although his ideas transcended into broader revolutionary theory, he did not personally export his ideas or ascribe them to other situations for other states

¹⁴ A. A. Cohen, *Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer Who Defined the Art of Counterinsurgency* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012), 74.

layers relationships across the operational environment. This practice appeals to the spiritual identification of individuals affected by the movement, as is common to the practice of nationalism. “The fundamental problems are: first, spiritual unification of officers and men within the army; second, spiritual unification of the army and the people; and last, destruction of the unity of the enemy.”¹⁵ This concept, though modified, forms the basis of the insurgency framework of relationships introduced in Chapter 2, between the vanguard, the political and violent mechanisms or institutions of the insurgency, and the people. The strength of the relationships between these institutions and mechanisms provides insight into the level of support those relationships provided to vanguard goals and desired outcomes. The nature of this relationship as it plays out over time also enables analysis and assessment of emerging regimes and political environments.¹⁶

The Communist message was designed to appeal to the entire Chinese population, an attribute Mao claimed to be integral to the success of the national movement.¹⁷ Although his propaganda was written with the intent of full-spectrum national appeal, his leadership directed communist supporters to focus particularly on the semi-colonial and semi-feudal mass constituency.¹⁸ Whereas Lenin’s revolutionary model looked to an

¹⁵ Mao, in USMC *On Guerrilla War*, 90.

¹⁶ This will be seen in future dissertation chapters.

¹⁷ “Guerrillas must never forget that primitive weapons alone, without political work, will never suffice to gain victory over a stronger enemy. Every guerrilla fighter must engage in political work, becoming an armed agitator and organizer in the war of resistance.” On p. 86 of *Galula*, Cohen quotes Chu Te, “Problems in Guerrilla Warfare,” in *Chinese Communist Guerrilla Tactics*, ed. Gene Z. Hanrahan (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1974), 67.

¹⁸ “The great reservoirs of human material in the revolutionary Chinese people will still be pouring forth men ready to fight for their freedom into our front lines.” Tse-tung, Mao, “On Protracted War.” In *Strategy for Conquest, Communist Documents on Guerrilla Warfare*, edited by Jay Mallin. (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1970), 118.

industrialized proletariat, China's agrarian society compelled a modified approach to access the greatest potential for political and ideological support.¹⁹

Beyond the trinity of the people, the army, and the enemy, Mao also targeted international support, not excluding the sympathy of Japan's people who were ambivalent about the Japanese military.²⁰ To this contingent, he argued that China's fight for independence was just and that Japan's goal to enslave the Chinese population was "barbaric".²¹ China needed international support in order to gain access to resources and to isolate the enemy.²² In fact, Japan's final defeat on the mainland corresponded to and coincided with Japan's defeat in World War II and not to the actions of the resisting Chinese; therefore, external support played a very large role in the Communist success.²³

While *On Protracted War* and *On Guerrilla War* are primary sources of Mao's ideology—meant to stir up support and generate a political base—they also provide a variety of heuristics regarding how the CPC's revolution should be successfully fought, given China's specific circumstances in 1937 and 1938.²⁴ Interpretations of this direction

¹⁹ Once Mao came to power, he attempted to alter China's agrarian base through a forced Industrial Revolution. This effort failed and decimated much of the country.

²⁰ Mao, *On Protracted War*, 59.

²¹ "The Japanese bandits have invaded our country not (68) merely to conquer territory but to carry out the violent, rapacious, and murderous policy of their government, which is the extinction of the Chinese race." Mao, USMC *Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War*, 68–69.

²² Mao, *On Protracted War*, 70.

²³ In addition to Japan's surrender after World War II in 1945, the Communists also received help from the Soviet Union who occupied Manchuria just before the surrender. The Soviet Union barred the KMT from entering Manchuria and supported the CPC; "the arms and equipment of the Japanese Kwantung Army were turned over to 100,000 soldiers from the People's Liberation Army who had crossed into Manchuria from Jehol and Shantung. The Communists in Manchuria were at once able to conduct large-scale sustained operations, and the nature of the fighting in this area was markedly different from the Communist operations south of the Great Wall. Access to the Japanese Army stores was not the decisive factor in the outcome of the war, since the Communist forces in China proper, who received few supplies from Manchuria, succeeded in arming themselves with captured Nationalist equipment; but it certainly hastened the defeat of the best Nationalist troops in Manchuria." Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 29.

²⁴ Throughout history, there have been many famous political and military theorists like Mao, who, for whatever political reason at the time, could not speak openly or freely regarding their views. Mao was constrained for some number of years to guide the Communist revolution within China under the illusion of

and guidance were exported outside of China after the war and still serve as the basis of thought for organizations both interested in revolution and countering revolution.

For example, Mao argued for a series of linear and “fundamental steps necessary in the realization” of his political goals. In addition to these steps, he also introduced and elaborated upon three phases, or stages, of protracted conflict. The alignment between steps and stages is indicated in Figure 3.1. There is a limited alignment between Mao’s steps and stages and the broader model introduced at the end of Chapter 2. Across the rest of Chapters 3 and 4, this figure will transform into the dissertation’s final version that will be used to assess future case studies in Chapters 6 through 8.

<u>Mao's Stages</u>	<u>Mao's Steps</u>
1. Strategic Defense	1. Arouse and organize the people 2. Achieve internal unification politically 3. Establish bases ²⁵
2. Strategic Stalemate	4. Equip forces 5. Recover national strength
3. Strategic Counteroffense	6. Destroy the enemy's national strength 7. Regain lost territories

Table 3.1 Mao Stages and Steps

partnership with the Nationalist party. This does not mean that we cannot learn or identify the true nature of his teaching. Leo Strauss, a contemporary of Mao, wrote a piece entitled “Persecution and the Art of Writing” in 1941. Strauss argued that “the influence of persecution on literature is precisely that it compels all writers who hold heterodox views to develop a peculiar technique of writing, the technique which we have in mind when speaking of writing between the lines.” Leo Strauss, “Persecution and the Art of Writing,” *Social Research* 8, no. 4 (1941): 488.

²⁵ “A guerrilla base may be defined as an area, strategically located, in which the guerrillas can carry out their duties of training, self-preservation and development.” Mao, USMC *Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War*, 107. “There is a difference between the terms base area and guerrilla area. An area completely surrounded by territory occupied by the enemy is a ‘base area.’ On the other hand, the area east and north... is a guerrilla (109) area. Such areas can be controlled by guerrillas only while they actually physically occupy them.” Mao, USMC *Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War*, 109–10.

The next three sections describe and dissect Mao's strategic stages and explore how his steps are incorporated within them in the case of the CPC insurgency and resistance against the Japanese army.

3.2.1 *Stage One: The Strategic Defensive*²⁶

In alignment with the brief historic backdrop of the last section, Mao argued that the first stage of China's protracted war of liberation ought to begin with the Kuomintang's conventional forces as the primary point of kinetic contact with Japan.²⁷

The external threat would continue to push into the country with overwhelming force and superior technical and organizational capabilities. China's limited conventional forces, supported by the United States and the British, would slow down the enemy's offensive gains, impact the Japanese economy and negatively affect their troop morale.²⁸

Conventional engagement would enable communist guerilla units to grow and circle around behind the Japanese army to build needed base areas of support within and among the local population.²⁹

While the KMT's conventional forces engaged the Japanese, Mao's doctrine directed the CPCs political movement to promote national "internal unification" and spur the development of guerrilla units, local self-defense units, and corresponding political

²⁶ The subheading labels are appropriated from the categorization found within Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24), *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 13, 2014), paragraph 1-31. This particular one stems from Mao's *On Protracted War* concept that the first stage is the enemy's strategic offense and China's strategic defense.

²⁷ Mao's stage one sits squarely within phase 2 of the Chapter 2 framework, "Internal Darwinism / Path to internal legitimacy.

²⁸ Mao, *On Protracted War*, 72.

²⁹ "It is our task to develop intensive guerrilla warfare over this vast area and convert the enemy's rear into an additional front. Thus the enemy will never be able to stop fighting. In order to subdue the occupied territory, the enemy will have to become increasingly severe and oppressive." Mao, USMC *Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War*, 107.

committees that would lead political and military decision making at local levels.³⁰ For example, *On Guerrilla Warfare* describes numerous sources of guerrilla forces, what types of positions and skills to accommodate, and how to “harmonize military operations and local political affairs.”³¹ For example, guerrilla units are to “exterminate small forces of the enemy; to harass and weaken large forces; to attack enemy lines of communication; to establish bases capable of supporting independent operations in the enemy’s rear; (and) to force the enemy to disperse his strength.”³²

Comparatively, self-defense units incorporate all men and women between the ages of sixteen and forty-five voluntarily. These forces self-organize and arm themselves. With the help of the CPC leadership, they receive military and political training—to include transporting the wounded, providing food, “local sentry duties, securing information of the enemy, arresting traitors, and preventing the dissemination of enemy propaganda.”³³ Neither the self-defense forces nor the guerrilla units begin as disciplined organizations. Over time, the political and military leadership gradually overcomes “the lack of discipline, which first prevails; they will establish discipline in their forces, strengthening them and increasing their combat efficiency.”³⁴

³⁰ Ibid., 63.

³¹ Ibid., 78.

³² Ibid., 53.

³³ Ibid., 80.

³⁴ Ibid., 45. Even where Mao introduces his stages in *On Protracted War*, he does not discuss how to build a guerrilla force or explain how to rally the people or mobilize them politically to form new institutions. He limits his guidance to the use various media – such as schools, films, word of mouth, or leaflets, bulletins, newspapers and the like to build support. Mao does explain that in order to transform the country into a new China, “It is necessary for every soldier and civilian to understand why the war must be fought and how it concerns him” – both the aim and “the steps and policies for its attainment.”

And finally, the political apparatus incorporates each element to awaken the “national consciousness.”³⁵ According to Mao, all people needed indoctrination to the political military struggle. “Hence a concrete explanation of the political systems used is important not only to guerrilla troops but to all those who are concerned with the realization of our political goal.”³⁶ For this reason, propaganda and associated tools are integral to the success of national unification. Along these lines, Mao suggested that, “Every large guerrilla unit should have a printing press and a mimeograph stone. They must also have paper on which to print propaganda leaflets and notices. They must be supplied with chalk and large brushes.”³⁷

During the course of the first stage of the protracted conflict, Mao argued that two types of changes, good and bad, would occur in both China and Japan. (See Figure 3.2.) While Japan might expand its territory and gain certain resources, it would also incur heavy casualties, a “drain on arms and ammunition, deterioration of troop morale, popular discontent at home, shrinkage of trade,” a heavy financial burden, and a decrease in international opinion.³⁸ China, on the other hand, would experience “decreases in territory, population, economic strength, military strength and cultural institutions.”³⁹

The CPC specifically, however, would accomplish goals critical to future resistance during the first stage. The communists would begin to develop a national army from its emergent self-defense units and guerrilla capability,⁴⁰ make political progress

³⁵ Mao, USMC *Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War*, 89.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., 85.

³⁸ Mao, *On Protracted War*, 75.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ “The organization of self-defense units is a transitional step in the development of universal conscription;” this provides “reservoirs of manpower for the orthodox forces” (Mao, USMC *Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War*, 81).

and mobilize people to its cause, foster a unifying culture around the communist ideology, and increase international support.⁴¹ The strategy implied greater negative effects on both the KMT and the Japanese while the CPC built its capability.

Impacts Japan	Positive	Negative
	Expand Territory Expand Resources	Heavy Casualties Drain on Arms/Ammo Drop in Troop Morale Financial Burden Decreasing Trade Discontent at Home Decline in World Opinion
Impacts China	Positive	Negative
	Increase Guerrilla Capability Grow National Army Mobilize the People Make Political Progress Develop Communist-based Culture Increase International Support	Decrease Territory Decrease Population Decrease Economic Strength Decrease Conventional Mil Strength Decrease in Cultural Institutions

Table 3.2 Mao's Strategy Impacts

A particular relationship between offensive and defensive gains and attributes then signifies the beginning of Mao's second stage of protracted conflict. He described it as a point of "strategic stalemate" whereby the gains made in the maturity and capability of the Chinese national movement would correspond to a cessation in the Japanese offensive advance.⁴² Mao projected that by the end of the first stage, Japanese forces would experience an offensive limitation due to troop shortages and increased Chinese

⁴¹ Mao, *On Protracted War*, 75. Interestingly, positive gains which would impact the transition between strategic stages depended upon increasing levels of maturity within the communist movement and guerrilla forces, not the Kuomintang.

⁴² Ibid., 72.

resistance. Forced to safeguard occupied territory, stage two would be ruthless, seeing the growth of puppet governments and serious widespread devastation.⁴³

For this reason, the second phase would find the Chinese resistance to be increasingly vulnerable to compromise with Japan. Mao suggested that, “We will have to call upon the whole country resolutely to maintain a united government, oppose splits, and systematically improve our fighting technique, reform the armed forces, mobilize the entire people, and prepare for the counteroffensive.”⁴⁴ When US Marine Corps Brigadier General Samuel Griffith first translated and introduced *On Guerrilla Warfare* to the American military in 1940, he warned that,

Revolutions rarely compromise; compromises are made only to further the strategic design. Negotiation, then, is undertaken for the dual purpose of gaining time to buttress a position (military, political, social, economic) and to wear down, frustrate, and harass the opponent.⁴⁵

General Griffith, however, advised that the use of negotiation as a strategic tool would be more endemic to stage three than stage two.

3.2.2 *Stage Two: Strategic Stalemate*

With the expectation that some territory would be regained in the second stage, *On Protracted War* describes the development of a playing field comprising three categories: “first, the enemy base areas; second, our base areas for guerrilla warfare; and, third, the guerrilla areas contested by both sides.”⁴⁶ Mao’s second-stage strategy directed widespread guerrilla warfare within the enemy’s rear to limit Japanese “occupation to

⁴³ Ibid., 74.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 73.

⁴⁵ Griffith’s introduction to U.S. Marine Corps, *Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War*, 22.

⁴⁶ Mao, *On Protracted War*, 73.

narrow zones” in between the Kuomintang forces and the guerrilla forces.⁴⁷ At this point, conventional mobile warfare was to be supplemental and guerrilla war primary.⁴⁸

Except for the troops engaged in frontal defense against the enemy, our forces will be switched in large numbers to the enemy’s rear in comparatively dispersed dispositions, and, basing themselves on all the areas not actually occupied by the enemy and coordinating with the people’s local armed forces, they will launch extensive, fierce guerrilla warfare against enemy-occupied places, keeping them on the move.⁴⁹

As the most pivotal stage of the conflict, Chinese independence or subsequent colonization would be determined by “the extent to which the whole nation exerts itself in the second (stage),” not by the initial territorial footprint captured by the enemy in stage one.⁵⁰ Participation and mobilization of local people would be crucial to the effort.

In fact, Mao argued that unification of the Chinese people would be more critical to the success of the war than weapons,⁵¹ in part because of a holistic “dependence upon the people themselves to organize battalions and other units” across each stage.⁵²

Popular political mobilization “throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority in arms and

⁴⁷ Ibid., 76.

⁴⁸ Overall, Mao describes three types of warfare: positional, mobile, and guerrilla. Positional and mobile warfare are conventional forms. The first regards the offense and defense of fortified positions and territory; the Chinese could not use positional warfare during stage one. On the offense, their forces could not match the Japanese in weapons and tactics. Ibid., 107. On the defense, because the country was so large, the Japanese would simply go around their fortified positions. China’s conventional forces had to be agile on both the offense and defense in order to preserve manpower and capability. By stage three, however, China would have to develop a positional capability in order to push the Japanese out of occupied territories.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 72.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 74. “[I]t is extremely important to arouse all the people who are opposed to the enemy, in order that they may arm themselves to the last man, make widespread raids on the enemy, and also prevent the leakage of news and provide a screen for our own forces; thus the enemy is kept in the dark about where and when our forces will attack, and an objective basis is created for misconceptions and unpreparedness on his part” (ibid., 98).

⁵¹ Ibid., 77.

⁵² Mao, *USMC Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War*, 51.

other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming every difficulty in war.”⁵³ Once accomplished, the end of the second phase would be signified by an increased level of maturity of China’s new national forces—the professionalization of its emergent local armed groups; continuing challenges for Japan; and a buildup of international support.⁵⁴

With respect to the development of China’s national forces, Mao discussed a very specific vision of the requirements and benefits of different forms and capabilities. He argued that mobile warfare, not guerrilla warfare, was more important to China’s success against Japan.⁵⁵ “The outcome of the war depends mainly on regular warfare, especially in its mobile form, and that guerrilla warfare cannot shoulder the main responsibility in deciding the outcome.”⁵⁶ Guerrilla units at that time could not coordinate operationally across the country and instead worked independently—communicating if possible with adjacent guerrilla groups or nearby conventional forces. Mao projected that if they could “gradually develop into regular units,”⁵⁷ the emergent orthodox capability would be able to execute unification of efforts through command and coordinated operations.⁵⁸ For this reason strategically, the CPC needed to develop independent localized guerrilla units into an interconnected unified capability that would conduct mobile and conventional

⁵³ Mao, *On Protracted War*, 87.

⁵⁴ In the third stage, Mao argued that better weapons would be needed to fully drive the Japanese out of their fortified positions to regain lost holdings and deplete their forces - hence the need for external support. He also said that “China’s strength alone will not be sufficient, and we shall have to rely on the support of international forces and on the changes that will take place inside Japan, or otherwise we shall not be able to win; this adds to China’s tasks in international propaganda and diplomacy” (ibid., 74).

⁵⁵ Mobile warfare is the form in which regular armies wage quick-decision offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines along extensive fronts and over big areas of operation. Its characteristics are regular armies, superiority of forces in campaigns and battles, the offensive and fluidity. We must adopt offensive mobile warfare as our primary mode of operations, supplementing it by others and integrating them all into mobile warfare” (ibid., 102).

⁵⁶ Ibid., 103.

⁵⁷ Mao, *USMC Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War*, 55.

⁵⁸ He called this “decision” (ibid., 56).

warfare.⁵⁹ “Guerrilla warfare will not remain the same throughout this long and cruel war, but will rise to a higher level and develop into mobile warfare... to transform itself into regular warfare.”⁶⁰

As previously discussed, Mao contended with two critical enemies. The first was the external threat of the Japanese army – which he argued required a conventional force to defeat it. The second was the internal threat – primarily comprised of a conventional force as well.⁶¹ In order for the communists to gain legitimate political power over the state, Mao had to defeat the Japanese, the Kuomintang and other regional internal parties and political institutions within China. By building a guerrilla capability from the ground up that aligned directly with his socio-political movement, he could accomplish all three interrelated tasks. Mao intended to foster an integrated nation – unified around a central party narrative – and to embed local participation around the country within the military. In this way, the army would “become one with the people... the richest source of power to war... so that they see it as their own army.”⁶²

⁵⁹ “There must be a gradual change from guerrilla formations to orthodox regimental organization. The necessary bureaus and staffs, both political and military, must be provided. At the same time, attention must be paid to the creation of suitable supply, medical, and hygiene units. The standards of equipment must be raised and types of weapons increased. Communication equipment must not be forgotten. Orthodox standards of discipline must be established” (ibid., 113).

⁶⁰ Mao, *On Protracted War*, 104. “During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army. Thus the regularly organized troops, those guerrillas who have attained that status, and those who have not reached that level of development combine to form the military power of a national revolutionary war” (Mao, USMC *Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War*, 42).

⁶¹ Neither work spoke directly to confronting the KMT because at the time of publication, the appearance of a unified front against the Japanese was more important.

⁶² Mao, *On Protracted War*, 116. Mao argued that China’s strength lay in an ability to outnumber the enemy. “The fountainhead of guerrilla warfare is in the masses of the people, who organize guerrilla units directly from themselves” (Mao, USMC *Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War*, 73).

3.2.3 *Stage Three: Strategic Counteroffensive*

Mao understood that unification of the nation in support of a guerrilla force was not enough to constitute a functional state. To him, war signified a political tool, a “political action.”⁶³ As such, by the end of stage three, the CPC had to accomplish two complementary tasks. First, it needed to attrite the Japanese and KMT forces and push them out of remaining occupied territories. Second, the party’s emergent political apparatus had to fill any subsequent leadership vacuums and control the state.

With respect to the first, Mao considered the overall attrition of the enemy a component of all three stages, not just the third. He argued that “campaigns of annihilation are the means of attaining the objective of strategic attrition,” where the combination of conventional and guerrilla warfare both attrite and annihilate the enemy.⁶⁴ “Generally speaking, mobile warfare performs the task of annihilation, positional warfare performs the task of attrition, and guerrilla warfare performs both simultaneously.”⁶⁵ This interrelationship is apparent across the transition stages of the revolution.

The forms of warfare in the three strategic stages of the War of Resistance are as follows. In the first stage mobile warfare is primary, while guerrilla and positional warfare are supplementary. In the second stage guerrilla warfare will advance to the first place and will be supplemented by mobile and positional warfare. In the third stage mobile warfare will again become the primary form and will be supplemented by positional and guerrilla warfare. But the mobile warfare of the third stage will no longer be undertaken solely by the original regular forces; part, possibly quite an important part, will be undertaken by forces which were originally guerrillas but which will have progressed from guerrilla to mobile warfare.⁶⁶

⁶³ Mao, *On Protracted War*, 85. Mao referenced Clausewitz when he wrote that “[w]ar is politics and war itself is political action” (ibid., 85).

⁶⁴ Ibid., 106.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 104.

During the first stage, Mao relies on the Kuomintang to give the communists time to build needed bases and support. The second phase professionalizes and institutionalizes the guerrilla movement into a national movement. And the third stage begins when an alignment of the force and the political institutions of the people emerge.⁶⁷

Mao wrote that, “Because of the unevenness in China’s political and economic development, the strategic counteroffensive of the third stage will not present a uniform and even picture throughout the country in its initial phase but will be regional in character, rising here and subsiding there.”⁶⁸ At this point, however, “[o]nce the insurgent has acquired strength and possesses significant regular forces, it would seem that the war should become a conventional one, a sort of civil war in which each camp holds a portion of the national territory from which he directs blows at the other.”⁶⁹ The insurgency in this case does turn into a more conventional engagement, though Mao suggested the continued use of guerrilla components and asymmetric approaches where appropriate.

3.2.4 *A Solid Foundation from Which to Grow*

The groundwork of the relationship framework and the phasing model presented in Chapter 2 clearly link to Mao’s popular guidance within *On Protracted War* and *On Guerrilla War*. His theory provides an incomplete outline for how insurgencies might play out across stages that relate the movement’s overall capability to the enemy’s overall capability. This section discusses concepts and attributes that his template contends will

⁶⁷ “Positional attack will become quite important in the third stage... guerrilla warfare will still provide strategic support by supplementing mobile and positional warfare, but it will not be the primary form as in the second stage” (ibid., 74).

⁶⁸ Ibid., 74.

⁶⁹ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 11.

be consistent across numerous insurgencies and illustrates where they fall within the cumulative theory presented in this dissertation.

First, insurgency is a political tool that depends upon political and violent mechanisms for the creation of a legitimate state regime and executive administration. In Mao's case, the insurgent desires to control the state and to become the legitimate governing regime. This includes fostering full territorial integrity through a process that builds military and political capability through national mobilization. All military operations in his model and each use of violence connect to a political goal or to local political affairs. Violent mechanisms are tied to at least one of three ends that correspond to messaging efforts: destroying enemy national strength; building insurgent national capacity; and gaining external support.

For Mao, political compromise occurs only for strategic gain that cannot be accomplished by violence. This is why information operations become important and indoctrination of all people to the violent struggle a necessity. Propaganda through social media must be integrated throughout society and supporting organizations. Mao's particular brand focuses on spiritual unification of officers and men within the army as well as spiritual unification of the army and the people, both in support of the destruction of the unity of the enemy.

From his perspective, only tight control of the use of violence and insurgent behavior could enable the transition across maturity phases because of the coordination required for his desired institutional end state – a communist regime. On the one hand, Mao's desired means of collective violence needed high levels of bureaucratization and personnel infrastructure to foster a national military. On the other, the communist

political template also required extremely high levels of bureaucratization across the state landscape.

The outcome of the Chinese insurgency depended mainly on the transformation of the guerrilla force into a regular army. Because the insurgency could not be won without mobile warfare, Mao's regime grew the Chinese national army in stages. The insurgency started from a pool of civilians to create self-incentivized local self-defense units for eventual national conscription; localized guerrilla units; and localized political committees. In this respect, the development or transformation of the insurgent party into the state regime also occurred in stages connected to the development of the army. The executing arm of the political core subsumed the state's mechanisms of politics and violence. This movement is one of many potential outcomes that can occur across phases between components of the relationship framework. (See Figure 3.3)




Figure 3.1. Insurgency Relationship Framework

Mao's theory and corresponding changes across the relationship framework represents a unique path to achieve Phase 5 of the insurgent movement model introduced

in Chapter 2. This final phase characterizes the highest level of state maturity and requires the development of a legitimate national army in order to control the state and defeat the counterinsurgent. Such a lengthy process is the reason why traditional insurgency is protracted and why the mobilization of the people into a national force is critical to any Phase 5 end state. Because the insurgent moves from a small guerrilla force to a conventional force, discipline and combat efficiency of self-defense units and guerrillas builds over time.

Logistic variables are essential to the successful attainment of growing needs. Bigger bureaucracies and armies require funding and the procurement, processing, transportation and distribution of food, ammunition, and fuel.⁷⁰ At the start, base areas of support from sympathetic and participatory local populations within enemy-held territory are necessary to practice guerrilla warfare, to annihilate and attrite the enemy. Mao realized, and the hypothesis remains unchanged at present, that sponsorship is required to join the international system of states. External support on some level is a requirement to advance through all three stages. While citizens initially are self-armed, this is not enough to practice mobile warfare against a conventional force. While less institutionalized forms of organization may resupply more easily on the move than when stopped, conventional armies find it difficult to fend for themselves and become increasingly dependent on supply from base areas that push needed materials from the rear.⁷¹ This level of infrastructure is difficult for substate regimes to develop because the transition phase between clandestine and overt forces yields targetable vulnerabilities.

⁷⁰ Edward N. Luttwak, "Logistics and the Aristocratic Idea of War," in *Feeding Mars, Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present*, ed. John A Lynn (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 7.

⁷¹ John A. Lynn, "The History of Logistics and Supplying War" in *Feeding Mars, Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present*, ed. John A Lynn (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 12.

Mao's use of a second front in the KMT, and even a third front with the Allies against the Japanese, enabled him to grow. Chapter 7 on Kosovo follows a similar pattern of external state involvement.

While Mao's work is apparent within the Chapter 2 model, it still only comprises a portion of the synthesized framework's applicability and flexibility for two reasons. First, his theory does not accommodate a comparative analysis of insurgencies over time. And second, with respect to Mao's practice, his own model is incomplete. There are aspects of Mao's strategy upon which he did not publicly comment, but which observers discuss in further detail. David Galula, one such observer, was a Western student and contemporary of Mao. In fact, today's American counterinsurgency doctrine is based on Galula's counterinsurgency theory.⁷²

David Galula was a seasoned practitioner of insurgency and his work introduces important elements of Mao's practice. A French officer stationed in China during the revolution, Communist forces captured Galula for some time. His observations in China during the war and his experiences with the CPC are discussed in his 1964 text. *Counter-Insurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice* describe two complementary forms or paths to revolution. The first is the orthodox, or Communist, pattern; the second he considers to be a shortcut process that found later use and that achieved a similar end. This he calls the

⁷² "Galula's importance to the American military's understanding of counterinsurgency in the Afghan and Iraq campaigns can hardly be overstated; his thinking was the single greatest influence on the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual of 2006. Through his book's impact on that doctrinal publication, and through its assignment as required reading at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and at the U.S. Army center that prepares advisors for Iraqi and Afghan security forces, Counterinsurgency Warfare may ultimately be seen as the most important French military writing of the past century." Cohen, *Galula*, 288 ("Appendix B: The Preface to Contre-Insurrection: Theorie et Pratique," written by David H. Petraeus and John A Nagl). Interestingly, even though Galula's impact on counterinsurgency is very high, his theory on insurgency is not comprehensive.

bourgeois-nationalist pattern. The second model precipitates the growth of an insurgency when no standing military capability exists.

The next two sections discuss both the discrepancies between Galula and Mao, as well as Galula's contributions to the orthodox body of knowledge. Section 3.3 begins with general comments on the two parallel frameworks and introduces a side by side comparison. Galula's process is then compared in the order of ascending steps. This remains consistent with the cumulative growth of the insurgency as idealized by both theorists. For this reason, discrepancies and additional impactful information is presented as they arise in chronological order. Section 3.4 then consolidates identified discrepancies, additional insights and modifications to the dissertation's insurgency phasing model and prepares for the Chapter 4.

3.3 Galula's Contribution to the Communist Model

With respect to the orthodox model, Galula observed that "To the Communists, revolution consists not merely in overthrowing the existing order but also in carrying out afterward a complete Communist transformation of the country."⁷³ Galula was a military man, not a politician. His orthodox model therefore lacks the political depth attained in Mao's writing, the profound connection between politics, violence, and the nation. As a result, where Mao's progression of steps enables the emergence of a new stable state, Galula's might end with a particular organization ascending a throne – claiming a title without the capability to hold on to that title and function as a nation state. Galula's orthodox vision is also not as consistent in character as Mao's. There are at least seven

⁷³ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 33.

major discrepancies between the two theories that will be explored to tease these political-military concepts out.

Mao's Stages	Mao's Steps	Galula's Steps
1. Strategic Defense	1. Arouse and organize the people 2. Achieve internal unification politically 3. Establish bases	1. Create the party 2. Establish a United Front 3. Execute guerrilla warfare
2. Strategic Stalemate	4. Equip forces 5. Recover national strength	“
3. Strategic Counteroffense	6. Destroy the enemy's national strength 7. Regain lost territories	4. Execute movement warfare 5. Annihilation campaign

Table 3.3 Mao and Galula Orthodox Step Comparison

Figure 3.4 reviews the alignment between Mao's linear steps and stages and Galula's complimentary steps. Immediately we begin to see the correlation to the framework introduced in Chapter 2. Galula thought more in terms of finite or independent frames of activity, although the united front accomplished in his step two must be maintained once established. Mao's steps are cumulative; once a particular step is begun or accomplished, it must mature across the duration of the revolution. For example, while the process of establishing bases begins in stage one (step three), the majority of the work done to develop occupied or guerrilla areas into guerrilla and regular bases occurs in stage two.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ Galula's observations of communist behavior bring this attribute to the fore. "*Occupied areas*, under the counterinsurgent's political and military control, where the insurgent works only underground. *Guerrilla areas*, where the counterinsurgent forces and governments are constantly contending with the insurgents. *Guerrilla bases*, with active regular troops in addition to the other types, fully organized under the insurgent's political control, with administrative organs devised to function either openly or underground, as circumstances dictate. They are subject to more frequent enemy penetrations, but the enemy is generally unable to remain in them. *Regular bases*, areas garrisoned by regular troops (at rest, in training, or in the process of being organized) and local troops, with an openly functioning government carrying out administration, economic policy, taxation, justice, education, and public services, safe from enemy

The critical takeaway from this view is that Mao's three stages are connected to, or are made up of steps that connect insurgent progress in social, political, and military/security efforts. The three stages don't just describe tactics or indicate points in time when the counterinsurgent is stronger, when the insurgent and counterinsurgent are of equal match, and when the insurgent is stronger. Each stage is connected to the maturity of the insurgent movement, the relative strength of the enemy, and the insurgent organization's connection to state viability – meaning its relationship with the people, the emerging army, and the capacity to stand up a new regime.

The framework describing revolutionary or insurgent activity developed in Chapter 2 attempts to accommodate for these factors rather than the differences in the relative strength of the insurgent and counterinsurgent organizations.⁷⁵ Additionally, it incorporates Galula's findings into the broader model. For example, Galula's five-step process, in relation to Mao's seven steps, teaches us something new about the requirements and attributes of the Chinese communist practice and theory. Mao's original model skips phases zero through much of phase two. (See Figure 3.5.) Mao begins directly with advanced small unit tactics and guerrilla warfare. It says nothing of the origins of the communist party within China that developed that capability and split from the larger Nationalist Party of the Kuomintang.

penetration unless the counterinsurgent mobilizes forces from other parts of the country for a major campaign." Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 41.

⁷⁵ Military doctrine accommodates a political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information kinds of concepts – PMESII – when it prepares to enter a physical environment. There is, however, no template that exists that connects the maturity or nature of an insurgency to particular attributes of these variables. This thesis attempts to do just that.

Phase #	Insurgent Movement Phase	Military	Legal
Phase 0	Perceived inequity / injustice	Existing militant or violent culture	Use of legal processes for belligerent acts
Phase 1	Violence as a possibility Building to systemic violence	Begin terrorist tactics	Illegal political acts
Phase 2	Internal Darwinism Path toward legitimacy	Strategic terrorism Small unit tactics	Rebellion
Phase 3	Monopoly on limited localized violent resistance Emergent identity	Guerrilla warfare	Insurgency
Phase 4	Violence and regional political administration	Mobile warfare	Insurgency
Phase 5	Violence and national political administration	Full conventional capability	Belligerency

Table 3.4 Preliminary Phases of Insurgent Movements

Similar to the manner in which Mao's three stages incorporate his seven steps, Galula's process also attends to many of Mao's subcategories from a complementary perspective. Sections 3.2.1-3.2.4, introduce Galula's observations and augment and broaden the details of Mao's framework, thereby creating a composite model that then serves as a more complete comparison for future insurgency forms in Chapter 4.

3.3.1 Step One: A New Addition to the Orthodox Model

The first discrepancy that distinguishes Galula from Mao is that before the Strategic Defensive can begin, before the people can be aroused and mobilized in Mao's first step, a small corps of leaders must emerge to provide the intellectual base of the

movement and define the grievance or cause of ensuing action.⁷⁶ Brigadier General Samuel Griffith also agreed with Galula on this point in his introduction to the Field Manual he developed for the Marine Corps in 1940. “A resistance is characterized by the quality of spontaneity; it begins and then is organized. A revolutionary guerrilla movement is organized and then begins.”⁷⁷ Resistance may take many forms and in the preliminary phases are marked by widespread discontent and social ferment.⁷⁸ Insurgent leadership often emerges and organizes as actors coalesce in discussion over shared grievances or through shared experiences. This is the key identifier between the Phase 0 and Phase 1 threshold in the dissertation model.

A second discrepancy is that while Galula’s framework starts with a *tabula rasa* for the insurgency and his first step predates Mao’s model on the organizational timeline, Galula does not accommodate for the fact that guerrilla warfare isn’t the only form of warfare an insurgent group can leverage during the strategic defensive stage. Other forms of warfare may accompany the beginning of an insurgent movement. Because Mao’s model begins in the middle of China’s conflict against the Japanese Army, the Communists required a conventional capability at the outset. Reflection on both models and subsequent case studies indicates that an insurgent organization may come out of a mature political movement with a conventional armed force. It may splinter off from a

⁷⁶ This concept accords with academic perspectives regarding social movements. Jonathan Christiansen, “Four Stages of Social Movements,” EBSCO Research Starters (EBSCO Publishing Inc., 2009); Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare,” *Special Warfare* 26, no. 3 (July–September 2013): 27–32; Rex Hopper, “The Revolutionary Process, A Frame of Reference for the Study of Revolutionary Movements,” *Social Forces* 28, no. 3 (1950): 270–79, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2572010>.

⁷⁷ Griffith’s Introduction to U.S. Marine Corps, *Mao Tse-tung On Guerilla War*, 27. The field manual is also called FMRP 12-18.

⁷⁸ Donatella De la Porta and Mario Diani, *Social Movements: An Introduction*, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006); Hopper, “The Revolutionary Process.” Social movement theory describes the process by which discontent moves from a general feeling of grievance to a pinpointed source of grievance with a directive leadership.

conventional capability and radical political movement. It may grow slowly from a grassroots social organization enabled by external support. It may start during a time of relative peace or during a time of advanced civil war. It may grow as a result of external meddling from the outset.

Regardless of when an insurgent organization comes into being, however, Galula explains that the inner insurgent leadership must be screened, disciplined, tested, and weeded out in order to stay pure, strong and elite.⁷⁹ It must also maintain open and clandestine components for two reasons. From a defensive perspective, a clandestine capability will protect the elite from suppressive counterinsurgent activity. From an offensive perspective, a clandestine capability will enable the insurgency to conduct “mass struggles in the enemy’s areas once the party has gone into open rebellion.”⁸⁰

Although slow and painstaking, step one, “[b]uilding a strong, reliable revolutionary party is certainly the most difficult part in the insurgency.”⁸¹ This is one reason it is easier to establish a revolutionary network in politically tolerant countries, and why resolution can often be accomplished in those states by peaceful means. In open societies, resistance movements are often enabled through political processes and negotiated settlement. Alternatively stated, Galula’s first and second steps – creating the party and establishing the united front, respectively – can often be accomplished in tolerant states “within the bounds of legality and nonviolence.”⁸² Recall according to the

⁷⁹ “The Red Army itself was notorious for self-purging to instil fear, thus catalyzing the indoctrination of its own fighters” (Cohen, *Galula*, 85). The thought at the time also indicated that the energy needed for leadership tasks might be most effectively delivered by students because they are also of fighting age.

⁸⁰ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 34.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid., 35. This may be why partial democracies tend to house a greater number of insurgent enterprises than harsher totalitarian or authoritarian regimes.

definition used across the dissertation, that insurgency does not begin until the execution of illegal acts.

3.3.2 *Step 2: New Meaning to the United Front*

The concepts of negotiation, political settlement, and the nature of the united front represent the next three differences between Mao and Galula's models, although their dissimilarities are in part a function of placement on the organizational timeline. Specifically, the third discrepancy is that Mao's literature is adamant that violence is a requirement. The fourth discrepancy is that Galula is extremely utilitarian about the development of the united front because he sees it as a networked organization rather than a national movement. (The model developed in Chapter 2 accommodates both.) Similarly, the fifth discrepancy is related. For Galula, the civilian population represents a tool for particular elite to come to power; for Mao, the civilian population represented the host or impetus of the revolution itself.⁸³ These three differences provide diverse perspectives of the Chinese Communist revolution – as if Mao and Galula spoke of two completely separate revolutions rather than the same phenomenon. They represent varied relationships across the insurgency relationship framework.

To briefly review step two and further explore this variation, Mao's concept of the united front embodies the development of an entity that unifies the national movement; here the population is integral to the front itself. Where Mao advocated national transformation, Galula advocated that once the elite and ideological core of the party develops within step one, a broader network must mature and come together to rally around that elite. A clandestine apparatus uses infiltration, agitation, and propaganda to

⁸³ At least according to his rhetoric.

manipulate and compel allies to stay aligned with the united front, as well as to leverage the masses to support the cause and uphold their struggle against the counterinsurgent; the same methods are used to mitigate, prevent and sabotage the counterinsurgent's eventual response.⁸⁴

With respect to the third discrepancy, where *On Protracted War* and *On Guerrilla War* argue for violence as a requirement of the Chinese Communist revolution, Galula allows that the Chinese Communist path might have happened differently – at least with respect to the KMT. Galula's theory provides room for an insurgent organization to come to power through "political play and subversion" during the first two steps; should that fail, then "armed struggle is the logical continuation."⁸⁵ For example, would Mao's theory have required a peasant revolution had Chiang Kai-Shek never taken leadership of the KMT or expelled the Communists from the party?

Mao's model began after the Communists were committed to violence. In line with their strategic national narrative, the Chinese Communists asserted that "armed struggle is both necessary and indispensable, that victory must be won by force" and not granted or gained by compromise.⁸⁶ Violence was necessary for three reasons. First, the Communist narrative was part of a global movement of armed revolution against capitalism. Second, it purged internal weakness; if the insurgent is "put into power by external intervention, the party's internal weakness will plague him for years." And third, once in power, the means of remaining there is guaranteed by the developed

⁸⁴ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 35.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 36.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

military establishment. Without a tested and reliable national army, any extended political transformation would be limited or impossible.

Once a political solution with the KMT was not viable and the CPC became strong enough, physical conflict represented a methodology to commit growing support within the population and therefore a growing army to the communist cause. Mao's narrative attempted to draw in the nation and secure a preponderance of civil support. The interference in this struggle by the Japanese became an opportunity for the Communists in their long term goal to take over China; the Japanese threat temporarily impacted the united front as the KMT, clearly a competing organization, became part of the CPC alliance in order to route a common enemy. Even before the Japanese were fully routed from China, however, the CPC turned on that organization and eventually defeated it in order to assume control of the state.

Galula's comparative perspective of the united front offers a way to distinguish the internal elite from temporary alliances that are a necessary part of warfare or even other parts of the clandestine movement. The introduction of his step one keeps the internal effort pure. Where Mao said nothing about a requirement to work with enemies in his rhetorical publications, for obvious reasons, Galula is explicit on this point.

A large united front will necessarily include dubious allies whose use must be curbed short of the point where they can endanger the basic program of the insurgent. The solution is "salami tactics": once the party is firmly in power, the allies no longer needed will be rejected one by one.⁸⁷

Galula stressed that within the orthodox methodology the "party," or the vanguard, should never merge with allies due to resulting impurities. He does not include this strict line when discussing the united front.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 35.

This is a principal reason within the synthesized dissertation model for the Phase 2 and Phase 3 concepts of Internal Darwinism (nationally) and an Emergent Identity (internationally). These thresholds speak to the required iterative weeding out process by the vanguard for control of the political and military leadership of the growing insurgent movement. They apply regardless of whether the vanguard is a secret isolated group, as Galula suggests, or a more open organization amenable to working partnerships. By the time an insurgency reaches a full Phase 4 status, the vanguard must align and integrate on an institutional level with political and violent mechanisms of the insurgency.

The bridge between guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare, localized resistance and regional political administration requires at least the emergent identity of a confederation of players that can make decisions on a level that provides for the mobilization and sustainment needs of conventional war.⁸⁸ By using a comparative approach across phases – and analyzing the relationships between the vanguard, the public, and the political and violent (military and internal security) mechanisms, the choice between a networked movement and a public movement is less important. Insurgencies vary systemically and the proposed framework enables meaningful comparative analysis of how they develop and operate.

Because the vanguard connects the clandestine and overt support activities of the public, political and military components of an insurgency, Galula argues that negotiation and alliances are important tools to achieve desired outcomes – whether or not they are facades of the party or temporary conditions to meet the needs of the united front. As such, the associated insurgent narrative cannot be monolithic and is crucial to the

⁸⁸ This assumes that the military capability used during the insurgency is homegrown, rather than provided by an external state actor or transnational actor.

movement. The four components listed above, for example, comprise many interests and motivations to support insurgent activity. For this reason,

The party's platform at any given time during the conflict must contain something that appeals to each ally and nothing that may be too objectionable to them. So the real postwar intentions of the party must be kept secret; they need to be disclosed only to the top leadership.⁸⁹

The rank and file membership (the citizenry) and the networked organizations of the extended united front receive only watered down versions of the true party line.

This is a critical concept because the most important initial criterion for a successful insurgency is the attractiveness of its cause. Supporters must be recruited by persuasion, attracting the most devotees and repelling the fewest detractors. Except to the inner elite, all other members of the united front will be manipulated by a narrative. This includes external support. Outside help such as other state governments and organizations maintain their own interests in the outcome of insurgencies. They can “destroy or harm self reliance in the insurgent ranks” depending on their ability to coopt or influence the movement.⁹⁰

This poses a dilemma for the insurgent who is drawn to outside help for economic or subsistence reasons. When the time comes “

for the insurgent to pass from guerrilla warfare to a higher form of operations, to create a regular army, the need for much larger and more varied supplies becomes acute. Either he is able to capture it from the counterinsurgent, or it must come from the outside. If not, the development of the insurgent military establishment is impossible.”⁹¹

⁸⁹ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 35. Certainly this is a very negative view of insurgency. It may not apply to all insurgencies as relationships between the vanguard and other network nodes likely vary.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 30.

⁹¹ Ibid., 29.

For this reason, an internal ability to finance the threat organization becomes important to independent maneuverability. This logistic and economic capacity must be integrated or aligned with access to state economic capacity as the insurgency grows. In the dissertation relationship framework, the vanguard connects to public funds and value chains through its political and violent mechanisms. As the movement grows into a state, the state economy is run through the political apparatus.

To return to the concept of persuasion, during an insurgency, the vanguard maintains a requirement to continually connect components across the relationship framework, in part because of the insurgency's need to control territorial mechanisms of violence. Perceived grievances, and a state's ability or inability to redress discrepancies between members of its population, make nations vulnerable to insurgency. The success of an insurgency will be based in large part on the insurgent capability to take a grievance and make it acute by imbuing it with "psychological value" and "raising the political conscious of the masses."⁹²

Unless he has found an over-all cause, like anti-colonialism, which is sufficient in itself because it combines all the political, social, economic, racial, religious, and cultural causes described above, he has much to gain by selecting an assortment of causes especially tailored for the various groups in the society that he is seeking to attract.⁹³

Galula argued that until war itself forces a population to take sides through acts of violence and illegal behavior, the importance of cause is integral because it represents the

⁹² Ibid., 17.

⁹³ Ibid., 18.

prime inducement to violence; it is the impetus. Over time, cause becomes progressively less essential because the insurgent becomes more conventionally capable.⁹⁴

In order to maintain psychological leverage, the insurgent organization needs to remain flexible and open to adaptation of the revolutionary narrative. “Nothing obliges the insurgent to stick to the same cause if another one looks more profitable.”⁹⁵ With respect to China, for example,

the Communists initially took the classic Marxist stand in favor of the workers (1921–25). Then they actively espoused the national cause of the Kuomintang, for the unification of China against the warlords (1925–27). After the Kuomintang—Communist split, they largely dropped the workers in favor of the poor peasants, advocating land reform by radical means (1928–34). Then Japanese aggression became the central issue in China, and the Communists advocated a patriotic united front against Japan (1927–45), adopting meanwhile a moderate agrarian policy: Land redistribution would be ended, but instead, the Communists would impose strict control of rents and interest rates. After the Japanese surrender, they finally reverted to land reform with the temperate proviso that landlords themselves would be entitled to a share of land (1945–49). What the Communists actually did after their victory, between 1950 and (18) 1952, was to carry out their land reform “through violent struggles” in order to conduct a class war among the rural population and thereby definitely to commit the activists on their side, if only because these activists had shared in the crimes. Once this was achieved, the Party buried land reform for good and started collectivizing the land.”⁹⁶

The additional information provided by Galula regarding his step two (establish a united front) better describes China’s Communist insurgency practice regarding the use of violence and negotiation at various thresholds of action and across complex levels of relationship within the organization. It also further highlights aspects of the overall insurgency framework that Mao did not discuss in his work.

⁹⁴ There is some suggestion here that Galula found the people to be the center of gravity for an insurgency until it became strong enough to deter the counterinsurgent on an equal conventional footing.

⁹⁵ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 18.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 18–19.

Beyond this, Galula's observations on insurgent behavior further bring into focus the fourth and fifth discrepancies between Mao's work and Galula's writing. To reiterate, the fourth discrepancy regards whether the united front is a networked organization or a national movement. The fifth turns on whether the civilian population is a tool rather than the impetus or seat of the revolution. Ultimately, Galula did not find that the orthodox model required an encompassing national movement; civilian populations represent one more instrument to gain power. "If the insurgent has understood his strategic problems well, revolutionary war never reverts to a conventional form."⁹⁷ Mao, on the other hand, committed to a national and rural narrative for China dedicated to full scale revolution and the growth of a conventional national army.⁹⁸ To Galula's credit, Mao only did so once the Soviet liaison's preferred strategy of urban-led resistance failed miserably.⁹⁹ Only after this tactical lesson did Mao suggest that, for China's revolution to succeed, work within the rural populations was particularly critical. Rural areas were to be the grounds for initial insurgent military operations. Had China been an industrialized country, he might never have abandoned the narrower proletariat appeal of the Soviets.¹⁰⁰

Galula treated the civilian population principally as a tool for active use by the elite through the mechanism of the united front. He indicated that actions with respect to "the masses" are designed to manipulate the population to support the insurgency. It is because of this perspective that Galula's united front cannot support a national movement. Unlike Mao, Galula provided very little discussion or impetus to foster

⁹⁷ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 11.

⁹⁸ Of course one did not exist at all in China at the time so the Communists could not coopt them or turn them.

⁹⁹ *Counterinsurgency Theory and Practice* reflects as far back as 1921 upon CPC behavior when the Communists still supported classic Soviet Marxist models in favor of a worker led uprising.

¹⁰⁰ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 15. I don't identify this as a discrepancy because Mao does not speak to this point.

internal unification politically through locally-led or self-led mobilization. This is an interesting distinction. All of Galula's actions are about building the military strength of the central insurgent organization and urging populations to violence. He provides little focus or attention to the insurgency's political and economic power. Galula's mechanisms across the relationship framework are coercive, accomplished through infiltration, agitation and propaganda directed at a network of supporting entities, a string of manipulated partners. Even though Galula offered that political play could be enough to gain power without resorting to violence, he never discussed the attraction of soft power to move the nation. Although he introduced nonkinetic solutions as potential options, he neglected their importance or broader efficacy to the emergent nation state. Perhaps they were not important to his target audience – one interested primarily in a military response option. Galula appeared to lack faith that political or nonkinetic means could bring success once violence began.

The theoretical argument between Mao and Galula regarding the purpose, efficacy and constitution of the elite and the united front mirror certain arguments about the Russian revolution between Vladimir Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg at the beginning of the twentieth century – although both Luxemburg and Lenin were extremely interested in the development and growth of the political revolutionary apparatus. James Scott, in *Seeing Like a State*, details differences between these two Marxist revolutionary theorists who debated “the possibility and desirability of a revolution planned from above by the

vanguard party.”¹⁰¹ Similar to Galula’s arguments, Scott explores Lenin’s conviction that

The vanguard party not only is essential to the tactical cohesion of the masses but also must literally do their thinking for them, ensuring that the otherwise diffuse brute force of the masses was effectively used. The party functions as an executive elite whose grasp of history and dialectical materialism allows it to devise the correct ‘war aims’ of the class struggle... What the party has is the blueprint of the entire new structure... The role of the workers is to follow that part of the blueprint allotted to them in the confidence that the architects of revolution know what they are doing.¹⁰²

In his 1903 publication *What Is to Be Done, Burning Questions of Our Movement*, Lenin describes the vanguard party as “professional revolutionists” who develop a “machine to produce a revolution.”¹⁰³ His initial intention is to direct the revolution tightly from the top.

As a result, similar to Galula’s operational concept, Lenin supported a secret elite cadre removed from the broader united front. In this case, Scott assesses that party secrecy was designed to “prevent contamination from below as much as arrest and exile.”¹⁰⁴ In 1903, Lenin looked upon the larger mass population as necessary to efficient factory-like production of the organized revolution.¹⁰⁵ His state vision centered on the forced attainment of party goals that combined “scientific” knowledge with his version of socialist utopian ideals.

¹⁰¹ James C. Scott, “Chapter 5: The Revolutionary Party: A Plan and a Diagnosis,” in *Seeing Like a State, How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (Yale University Press, 1998), 147.

¹⁰² Ibid., 149, 151–52.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 152.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 154.

¹⁰⁵ “Lenin conceived of a division of revolutionary labor that resembled what came to be the expectation (if rarely the practice) of Communist parties both in and out of power. The central committee made all the crucial decisions about tactics and strategy, while the mass organizations and trade unions affiliated with the party served as ‘transmission belts’ for instructions.” Ibid., 156.

By 1917, however, Lenin's concepts linking the vanguard to the movement changed – at least until the Bolsheviks could seize state control. In his 1903 text, Lenin argued against popular autonomous action – even implying that the working class was “incapable of acting on its own without outside leadership;” in his later work, “everything depended on destabilizing the (Kerensky) regime, even if the crowds were not at all under Bolshevik discipline.”¹⁰⁶ Once the 1917 military collapse of the Russian offensive in Austria made a revolutionary outcome more likely at home, Lenin communicated that “Socialism is not created by orders from above. State bureaucratic automatism is alien to its spirit; socialism is alive, creative—the creation of the popular masses themselves.”¹⁰⁷ Lenin realized he needed more than just his organizational united front to sway the tide; he recast himself in order to destabilize the situation, biding time until the vanguard could take advantage of the revolutionary environment and seize full control of the state apparatus.

Scott argues that the original narrative of executive command and control in Lenin's *What Is to Be Done* was a “pipe dream, bearing hardly any relation to the facts” of the actual revolutionary process.¹⁰⁸ The victors, however, weaved the post-revolutionary story into a packaged account, further enhancing the citizen “confidence in the clairvoyance, determination, and power of their revolutionary leaders.”¹⁰⁹

In the case of the Bolshevik Revolution, it was also necessary that the official narrative include a genuinely popular mass movement of which the Bolsheviks eventually assumed leadership. Marxist historiography required a militant, revolutionary proletariat. This was an aspect of the

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 160 and 162, respectively.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 161. Here Scott quotes Lenin on page 160 of Paul Avrich's *Kronstadt, 1921*. He thinks Lenin might have lifted this sentiment from Luxemburg's work to appeal to a broader constituency temporarily.

¹⁰⁸ Scott, “Revolutionary Party,” 159.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 160.

February and October events that did not have to be invented. What had to be written out of the account, however, was the ferocious struggle between the new state apparatus on one hand and the autonomous soviets and peasantry on the other.¹¹⁰

Consistent with his open avowal for “violence after the seizure of power,” one he set down within the 1917 text *State and Revolution*, the years following the Revolution were spent going back on the promises made to establish the united front across the state. Scott calls it a reconquest – “not simply a civil war against the ‘Whites’; it was also a war against the autonomous forces that had seized local power in the revolution.” Take for example the Chechens who will be discussed in a later chapter.¹¹¹

Lenin’s actions and words help to better understand the discrepancies between Mao and Galula regarding the united front and the requirements or potential efficacy of the elite. Revolution is messy and Lenin eventually capitulated to forming alliances and supporting autonomous and independent action in order to get the revolution moving. Even so, he continued to see the masses as pieces of machinery – somewhat like Galula’s description. The comparative story enables one to see a broader scope of potential insurgent realities – avenues that lead to insurgent forms and phases. Does a vanguard lead a movement from the outset? Can a mass movement occur against a regime with enough perturbation from a manipulative force? How does a vanguard come back in to control the political and violent mechanisms in the movement and gain the public support needed to control a state? By tracking the nature of the relationship framework across phases and across insurgencies, the answers to these questions begin to form.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 391, footnote 38.

¹¹¹ Scott also reverences other “erstwhile beneficiaries, as the uprisings of Kronstadt, Tambov, and the Maknovchina in the Ukraine” (ibid., 159).

Similarly, after synthesizing Mao's narrative with Galula's observation of the CPC's behavior, rather than solely relying on the rhetoric Mao used to describe the communist revolution, questions emerge regarding the viability of a true national movement. What kinds of revolutions are capable of empowering as opposed to imprisoning its citizenry? Did Mao truly believe in the rhetoric of his publications? Is the vanguard always a radical element of a less monolithic political entity? Can an insurgency be led in a manner that might produce inclusive democratic values rather than an authoritarian state?

Some revolutionary Marxist thinkers and contemporaries of Lenin disagreed with his ideas on manipulation. Rosa Luxemburg, for example, "viewed the revolutionary process as being far more complex and unpredictable than did Lenin" and looked to foster creativity and initiative from below; in three essays written between 1904 and 1918, she expressed optimism and "relative faith in the autonomous creativity of the working class." Her first essay, entitled *Organizational Questions of Russian Social Democracy*, responded directly to Lenin's *What Is to Be Done*.¹¹² Like Lenin, Luxemburg also believed in the necessity of a vanguard; the workers interests needed representation by a party intelligentsia.¹¹³ Contrary to the authoritarian leader, however, Luxemburg insisted that revolution comprised "the wills and knowledge of many human agents of which the vanguard party was only one element."¹¹⁴ An organic series of processes of learning and adaptation,

¹¹² Ibid., 168 and 169, respectively.

¹¹³ Ibid., 169. At the same time, "she attacked both the German and Russian revolutionists for substituting the ego of the vanguard party for the ego of the proletariat—a substitution that ignored the fact that the objective was to *create* a self-conscious workers' movement, not just to use the proletariat as instruments" (ibid., 173).

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 170.

A strike or a revolution was not simply an end toward which tactics and command ought to be directed; the process leading to it was at the same time shaping the character of the proletariat. How the revolution was made mattered as much as whether it was made at all, for the process itself had heavy consequences.¹¹⁵

Because of this, the role of the vanguard as a mechanism of centralized revolutionary control represented an illusion rather than reality.¹¹⁶

For Luxemburg, collaboration between the vanguard and the people was preferential to control and regimentation. Organic processes do not have hard starts and stops like mechanical processes; they grow, move, and persist in patterns that increase over time. Large social movements cannot be tied to narrow grievances but build and break at varying speeds depending on the conditions. Scott quotes Luxemburg in her description of revolution as a natural, living phenomenon that cannot be controlled – a metaphor more similar to Mao’s references to nature.

As the Russian Revolution [1905] shows to us, the mass strike is such a changeable phenomenon that it reflects in itself all phases of politics and economic struggle, all stages and movements of the revolution. Its applicability, its effectiveness, and the moments of its origin change continually. It suddenly opens new, broad perspectives of revolution where one thought he could reckon on it in full certitude. Now it flows like a broad billow over the whole land, now it divides itself into a gigantic net of thin streams; now it bubbles forth from under the ground like a fresh spring, now it trickles flat along the ground.... All [forms of popular struggle] run through one another, next to each other, across one another, flow in and over one another; it is an eternal, moving changing sea of appearances.¹¹⁷

Luxemburg believed the whole proletariat deserved political freedoms, not just an elite group within the central committee. The central committee as a political entity should have worked through, with, and by the trade unions as a partner to empower the people

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 170.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 171.

¹¹⁷ Scott quotes Luxemburg on p. 173.

and build socialism within the state. Selection of the vanguard and balance within the united front are crucial to the outcome of the revolution. Success of a revolution does not correlate to a successful state.

Luxemburg and Lenin show us a great deal about the nature of the united front and the development of the vanguard with respect to potential political outcomes and alliances. Both members of the Marxist revolutionary party, their paths illustrate how differences between political views and methods make significant impressions upon the direction of the revolution. Luxemburg believed the Bolshevik elite and its use of terror “blocked up the fountain of political experience and the source of the rising development [and attaining of higher stages of socialism] by their suppression of public life.”¹¹⁸ Levels of relationships overlay actions and processes. A united front across the elite, the political, economic, and social components of the insurgency are necessary, but the nature of the relationships between them defines the kind of state that emerges. Once the phasing model is fully exposed in Chapter 5, the following chapters will explore how various relationships between the vanguard, the public, and the political and violent mechanisms of insurgencies evolve through phases of maturity. In various cases, it is possible for Mao, Galula, Lenin, and Luxemburg to all be right.

To sum up this section and bring the conversation back to the orthodox composite model, although Galula’s second step compares to Mao in at least three ways, their differences underpin one unifying theme. Mao’s work clearly paints revolution and war as a tool for politics and a national movement in which the population itself organizes and grows the heart of the resistance. Luxemburg would agree. Galula’s perspective,

¹¹⁸ Scott quotes Luxemburg on p. 174, footnote 76.

more akin to Lenin, is almost opposite – the use of political persuasion is a tool for insurgent organizations committed to violence so they may gain enough power to defeat competitors and win control of the state. Both realities are possible. Galula’s alternate perception of orthodox insurgency foreshadowed the nature of the revolutions he experienced after his assignment in China, and is more fully expressed within his shortcut model.

3.3.3 *Steps Three Through Five: Building a Military Capacity*

Over time, Galula focused even further on violence as an organizational tool; his lack of detail regarding the political nuance needed to foster a cohesive nation carries forward through the rest of his orthodox model. For example, one contribution that Galula provides regarding his third step of guerrilla warfare, one that Mao does not discuss openly, is how to ensure the complicity of the population once the party can effectively conduct guerrilla operations. Galula observed that although the Communist political organization living among the population might make a contribution to ensure locals support the insurgency, the party leadership was backed by the force of a local guerrilla gang who *eliminated* open enemies and *intimidated* potential ones.¹¹⁹

<u>Mao's Stages</u>	<u>Mao's Steps</u>	<u>Galula's Steps</u>
1. Strategic Defense	1. Arouse and organize the people 2. Achieve internal unification politically 3. Establish bases	1. Create the party 2. Establish a United Front 3. Execute guerrilla warfare
2. Strategic Stalemate	4. Equip forces 5. Recover national strength	“
3. Strategic Counteroffense	6. Destroy the enemy's national strength	4. Execute movement warfare

¹¹⁹ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 37.

	7. Regain lost territories	5. Annihilation campaign
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Table 3.5 Mao and Galula Orthodox Step Comparison

To refine the growing theme from steps one and two, "Persuasion brings a minority of supporters—they are indispensable—but force rallies the rest. There is, of course, a practical if not ethical limit to the use of force; the basic rule is never to antagonize at any one time more people than can handle."¹²⁰ If unaffiliated leaders within desired areas cannot be won over via persuasion, they must be neutralized.¹²¹ By the time movement warfare begins in the fourth step, "An additional organization helps to keep everybody in line: the party's secret services, whose members remain unknown to the local cadres and answer only to the top hierarchy."¹²² In the case of China, and Russia to an equal extent, these secret enforcement organizations continued to thrive and grow after the revolution. They became part of the state.

This is not always the case though. When many Americans think of revolution against an occupying force, they think about the American Revolution against the British. Mao's works would convince us that the relationship between the emerging political institutions and the civilian population within China was akin to an idealized version of the American story – where the narrative of the independence movement alone was enough to persuade the vast majority of civilians to willingly support the revolution. Even in US history, however, there existed significant populations of British support and

¹²⁰ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 37. Galula provides more insight into how much the people can handle. "Protracted guerrilla activity, so cheap to carry out and so expensive to suppress, may eventually produce a crisis in the counterinsurgent camp, but it could just as well alienate the population and disintegrate the united front" (ibid., 39).

¹²¹ This could be a discrepancy in the two models but Mao simply does not speak of it. According to Galula, he clearly utilized this method.

¹²² Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 41.

violence served as a means to coerce those populations; it certainly played a role defeating the British Army.

After the termination of the war, however, the depth of sustained violence within China was not part of the American process. The nature of the emergent American government and regime – the foundational principles of its constitution – was vastly different. For example, the resulting political process within the post-colonial confederation of states did not depend on authoritarian elite that used administrative mechanisms of tight control and arbitrary violence to control the nation. Provisional regional governments were stood up during the war and a national government coalesced through representative mechanisms throughout the colonies. What had become the national army during the revolution, however, stood down. And so too did the spectrum of wartime intelligence functions.¹²³

The myth or narrative that Mao created regarding the Chinese Communist Revolution looks very similar to the narrative that surrounds the American Revolution – even though the outcomes and resulting constitutional frameworks differed greatly. From Mao's work, one finds little difference between the American and Chinese processes and liberation narrative. This seeming is important for purposes of loyalty to the nation state as a socially constructed community. Nation state legitimacy derives in part from its story and interconnected system of beliefs. Each transcending narrative must show the corruption of the counterinsurgent, the victimization of the population by that force, and

¹²³ Maegen Gandy Nix, "Military Counterintelligence Transformation in Context," *National Intelligence Journal* 1, no. 1 (2009): 109–32. This standing down of security capabilities may not be a possibility for young states today.

the defense of that population by the insurgent – who then with the people overcomes injustice to eventually take control of the state.¹²⁴

Galula corrected the singularly benevolent image that Mao portrayed but at the same time neglected to include political nuance or awareness within his writing regarding insurgent requirements. He agreed with Mao that there are limits to what guerrilla warfare can accomplish. As Mao advocated previously, so too Galula argued that the success against a conventional counterinsurgent depends upon acquiring mature bases and armament and transforming guerrilla units into regular units.

Guerrilla warfare cannot win the decision against a resolute enemy. Protracted guerrilla activity, so cheap to carry out and so expensive to suppress, may eventually produce a crisis in the counterinsurgent camp, but it could just as well alienate the population and disintegrate the united front. The enemy must be met on his own ground; an insurgent regular army has to be created in order to destroy the counterinsurgent forces”¹²⁵

The focus on the need for a conventional force here still centers upon a military path for the insurgency.

It is difficult to tell whether Galula simply did not observe political needs of the emerging nation state or if he even believed it to be a requirement of the insurgency model. For example, Galula’s model skips the step of political unification in stage one as well as the final requirement to align political and military institutions while regaining lost territories in Mao’s sixth step. This is the sixth discrepancy between Mao’s theory

¹²⁴ Maegen Gandy (Nix), “A Case Study of Identity Politics in America,” Master’s thesis, Virginia Tech University, 2003. (etd-08262003-164836).”

¹²⁵ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 39. This is the difference between fights in which the enemy is a host nation regime or an external occupier. Guerrilla tactics may be enough to repulse an invading external force.

and Galula's orthodox pattern.¹²⁶ Galula stops at the annihilation of the enemy, a concept that could be overlooked if the primary goal of the insurgency did not include taking control of the state. Where Galula described this goal as a task that could be accomplished after the insurgency, Mao argued that state power is not consolidated until the new regime is incorporated into the national conscious and has an administrative capacity. The capability to run the state is connected to the nation and the people. In current terms, think of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although the insurgent organization's path to legitimacy followed a very different construct than the orthodox model, its goal to integrate with formal political institutions is intertwined with a successful outcome.

As an insurgency transitions across Galula's phases three and four, from guerrilla-led warfare to conventional maneuver warfare, its nature changes. "Once the insurgent has succeeded in acquiring stable geographical bases... he becomes *ipso facto* a strong promoter of order within his own area, in order to show the difference between the effectiveness of his rule and the inadequacy of his opponent's."¹²⁷ This transition is a time when the insurgent force is extremely vulnerable, because it gains physical assets that can be taken out. Its ability to hide and agilely retreat dissipates as infrastructure becomes set and the insurgent forces look and behave more like a regular army.¹²⁸

Where Mao suggested that this point would be the time at which the insurgent organization would need to act like a state, Galula called only for order and security.

¹²⁶ Although on some level this could be seen as part of the fourth discrepancy – which includes Galula's attention to force as opposed to the corresponding national movement needed to stabilize or underpin the nation state – it is important enough to draw out separately.

¹²⁷ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 9. "The insurgent is obliged to remain fluid at least until he has reached a balance of forces with the counterinsurgent. However desirable for the insurgent to possess territory, large regular forces, and powerful weapons, to possess them and to rely on them prematurely could spell his doom." Ibid., 9.

¹²⁸ The profile of an organization that has no interest in state control may never progress beyond, or even desire to progress beyond, phases 2 or 3 defined by Chapter 2.

Similarly, Galula based the titles of the last three steps of his orthodox model on the primary military activities that Mao gave to his model, again leaving out the political nuance with which Mao was concerned. This detail comprises a seventh discrepancy: none of Mao's steps reference any form of military warfare. As explained previously, Mao described strategic stages by warfare forms but did not use them explicitly to caveat actions. He wrote that stage two was defined militarily by guerilla warfare and stage three by movement warfare – the very titles of Galula's steps three, four and five. Full annihilation of the enemy was completed cumulatively across the insurgency by all operational forms. A slight difference between the two models then is that where Mao considered all forms of warfare part of the annihilation task, Galula wrote that, "When the balance of forces is reached between the sides, a "series of offensives aiming at the complete destruction of the enemy will constitute the last and final step."¹²⁹ Again, he described annihilation as a separate independent step within the insurgency framework.

3.4 The Emerging Picture

While Galula's contributions to the communist orthodox form of insurgency are important to the composite model, Mao's vision of a political military conception holds firm across their visions. This doesn't mean, however, that Galula lacked other contributions to a deeper understanding. Section 3.2 explored the variation that Galula contributed to Mao's communist model. He introduced new phasing elements and modified certain points made by Mao. For example, Galula argues that certain initial grievances and power transitions may be resolved peacefully, especially in tolerant

¹²⁹ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 42. Galula does in this instance describe insurgent strength as a combination of military assets and the solidity of the insurgent political structure.

countries. If this cannot be done, select elite must form and create both clandestine and open components of support. This concept forms the basis of the dissertation's Phase 0 and Phase 1 concepts. It also underpins variation within the relationship framework across phases.

In addition, Galula argues that the true intention of the elite must remain pure and externally watered down, targeted to different audiences. Because of this, indoctrination of the public may be limited and must be adaptive. From his vantage, for example, Chinese indoctrination programs were limited because the communists did not require a full national movement and instead connected only to portions of the population that they needed in order to achieve operational goals. Indoctrination was adaptive because the targeted populations varied over time as well as the message itself. In general, until people are committed to the insurgency through acts of violence, the importance of the narrative and the cause is critical.¹³⁰

Once violence begins, a balance between force and persuasion to garner support must be taken into account. There is a threshold of acceptable internal violence against the civilian population and the decision to begin acts of violence and armed resistance depends upon four factors. The first factor includes the level of division within the population. The second accounts for the growing capability and success of internal subversive actions. The third waits for crisis within the counterinsurgent. And the fourth requires attainment of external political and military support.

Political compromise may be made temporarily with a competing organization or enemy if their capability helps move the insurgency closer to its goal. If compromise is

¹³⁰ Mao would argue it is always critical.

made, however, or if competitors are temporarily allowed to join the united front, they do so until their utility is no longer necessary to the vanguard. All competitors must be coopted or purged. For this reason, once mature enough, the insurgent organization should begin to use local militant volunteers to eliminate or neutralize opposing internal or political civilian leaders. Similarly, once mature enough, the insurgent organization should establish a formal secret service known only to the top elite.

Finally, Galula argues that once the vanguard commits to a path of violence, the insurgency cannot be won without mobile warfare. At the same time, however, the ultimate objective of the insurgency may be the annihilation of the enemy rather than the growth of an administrative or political institutional form capable of behaving like a state. Consolidation of state powers may occur after the defeat of the counterinsurgent.

Through these discrepancies we begin to see ways in which existing insurgency models are thus far tied to the particulars of a given insurgency or historic perspective than first suspected. It is part of the impetus for looking at various “forms” or “models” of insurgency and to determine better ways to understand a more diverse range of patterns and behavior. No two insurgencies begin with the same starting conditions. Ideas, politics, technologies, grievances, and capabilities change across time and space.

The next chapter provides additional depth to the composite model presented in Chapter 2. It incorporates Galula’s shortcut pattern that addresses insurgencies of the 1950s and 1960s, as well as SOROs contribution to phasing. The application of these two models to the Algerian Revolution (1954-1962) identifies an even broader range of comparative insurgent pathways and component connections. Chapter 5 then reintroduces and deepens the proposed dissertation phasing model and relationship framework,

exploring the scope of associated comparative concepts that provide context to assess movement maturity.

Chapter 4

The Algerian Revolution and Integrating Insurgency Models

4.1 Galula's Shortcut Pattern: An Evolutionary Process

Galula observed the Chinese Revolution firsthand and derived his initial thoughts on the stages of insurgency from the Chinese Communist revolutionary model. Other forms, however, were soon to follow. Even before Mao assumed control of China, similar revolutionary movements and charismatic leaders emerged across the globe and drew from his theories. These then proliferated over time. For example, Jose Maria Sison (1939-?), the leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, outlined three stages of revolution that reflected Mao's ideas.¹ North Vietnamese strategist Truong Chinh (1909-1986) adapted Mao's thought to the Vietnamese situation.² Josip Broz Tito developed an outgrowth theory from Mao.³ And, Regis Debray and Che Guevara developed a complementary thesis that argued "successful guerrilla warfare depends less on local leaders exploiting local conditions than on the creation of conditions for a revolution by a cadre of dedicated revolutionists."⁴ Che was killed and Debray imprisoned when they attempted to test their theory of *focoism* in Bolivia.

As Mao transformed the insurgency practices of the Russian communists, so too did other indigenous leaders adapt to their particular circumstances. In Southeast Asia,

¹ Edward O'Dowd, Bibliographic Essay in *On Guerrilla Warfare (Yu Chi Chan)*, by Mao Tse-tung. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. (Baltimore, Maryland: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1992), 142.

² O'Dowd, Bibliographic Essay in *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 143.

³ Tito, "the leader of the Yugoslav Communist party, organized an army of guerrilla forces that enabled him to harass and pin down German forces while successfully winning legitimacy in the eyes of most sectors of Yugoslavia's diverse population. The military methods of Tito's strategy were similar to those outlined by Mao... the mobilization of the political will of the entire population, a protracted war of attrition, and the gradual build-up of the regular forces" (Ibid., 142).

⁴ Ibid., 145.

for example, although communism played some part in the independence movements of Vietnam, Laos, Malaya, the Philippines, Burma, and Indonesia, its role as a mechanism for change “differed considerably from country to country.”⁵ In Vietnam, as introduced above, and in Laos, the Chinese Communist methodology strongly correlated to Mao’s exhibited practice.⁶ In Burma, although the Burmese negotiated a settlement for independence with Britain, the Communists and the Karens revolted after independence in 1949. And, while communism posed a challenge to the Malayan government, “[t]he Communist rebellion in Malaya was not responsible in any way for Malayan independence.”⁷

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, waves of national movements transpired globally as states became containers for competing forces of nationalism, colonialism and communism. In addition to the Soviet Union, China and other areas of Southeast Asia, regional pockets of insurgencies occurred in Central and South America, as well as North Africa – to include Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya. Like the anticolonial environment of Southeast Asia, much of North Africa was held by the French, Spanish and Italians. Galula’s second model of insurgency was triggered by his

⁵ Paul A. Jureidini, Norman A. La Charite, Bert H. Cooper, and William A. Lybrand, *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume I: 1927–1949* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 25.

⁶ “A strong Vietnamese nationalist movement developed prior to and during World War II, with some encouragement from the Chinese Nationalists... a coalition of Vietnamese nationalist groups, dominated by Communist leaders, declared Vietnam independent in 1945” (Jureidini et al., *Casebook Volume I*, 31). “In 1943, the Chinese Government forcibly persuaded Ho Chi Minh, after jailing him for 18 months, to reorganize the Vietnamese nationalist groups on Chinese soil. A coalition of nationalists called the Vietminh was created under the auspices of the Kuomintang, and a provisional government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was established. The revolutionary organization that fought the French had its origin in these developments.” (Jureidini et al., *Casebook Volume I*, 38).

⁷ Jureidini et al., *Casebook Volume I*, 25. “The Communist effort in Malaya failed and the events illustrate effective countermeasures taken by the British Security Forces in combatting Communist guerrillas and the creation of an environment which was not conducive to a successful revolutionary effort” (Jureidini et al., *Casebook Volume I*, 29).

participation as a French military officer in Algeria. During his assignment there, he developed an alternative framework and a corresponding counterinsurgency strategy that is used by the United States today.

The association between the Algerian revolution and Communism is complex. Prior to 1954, Communists within the French government both supported and countered the Algerian nationalists. Communism and socialism in France were part of the legitimate political establishment at the time. By the time the insurgency manifested in violence in 1954, the Communists once again “denounced” their nationalist counterparts. “Less than 2 years later, the Algerian Communists sought to join the (Front de Liberation Nationale) FLN, while the French Communist Party supported the FLN in the French National Assembly.”⁸ Certain Algerian nationalist parties and movements were led by former communist party members and “had structural organizations patterned along Communist lines.”⁹ This includes the organizations founded and run by Communist Party members Hadj Abdel Kader and Messali Hadj. Over time, Communism as a cause lost primacy as a foothold in the Algerian case and Islamic nationalism came to the fore. The Algerian example offers an alternative beginning pathway to insurgency—very different than the Chinese Communist case study, but no less relevant to the dissertation model.

4.2 The Algerian Case and Galula

The official Algerian Revolution for independence against French sovereignty took place between 1954 and 1962. At that time, Europeans comprised almost one million of Algeria’s population of ten million.¹⁰

⁸ Jureidini et al., *Casebook Volume I*, footnote “d” on p. 301.

⁹ Jureidini et al., *Casebook Volume I*, footnote “e” on p. 301.

¹⁰ “The official census of 1954 placed the total population of Algeria at 9,528,670 inhabitants, of which 1,042,426 were Europeans and 8,486,244 were Muslims of Arab-Berber stock. The European inhabitants

A divided and ambivalent French authority in World War II and subsequent defeat of the French military in Indochina in 1954, only months before the onset of revolution in Algeria, promoted the hopes of Algerian nationalists but stiffened French resolve not to lose another battle or abandon another territory, especially after Tunisia and Morocco received their independence in 1956.¹¹

Arab and Berber Algerians were subjects rather than citizens of France and the foreign European government controlled policy over the North African state from a settler lobby and the national assembly in Paris.¹² Over the course of the war, “colonialism lost legitimacy in world politics. Views of the rights of colonizers underwent a transformation as international values changed. National self-determination became the prevailing moral standard after the 1960s.”¹³ Just as external support and a second front for Japan during World War II affected the outcome of the Chinese Communist Revolution, so too did the international community affect Charles de Gaulle’s decision to support an independent Algeria.

Also similar to Mao’s practice of targeting Japanese citizenry, elements of the Algerian resistance targeted French sentiment and went further to conduct attacks on French territory. “Reports of terrorism dominated press headlines in France during the

included about 450,000 of French stock; 140,000–150,000 Jews of North African, Spanish, and Italian origin; 325,000 of Spanish ancestry; 100,000 of Italian descent; 50,000 of Maltese lineage; and a still smaller minority from Corsica. Of the Europeans, however, 89 percent were born in Algeria” (Jureidini et al., *Casebook Volume I*, 295).

¹¹ Martha Crenshaw, “The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War,” in *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 479.

¹² European settlers comprised a minority political, economic and social elite and denounced indigenous rights and Muslim political participation (Jureidini et al., *Casebook Volume I*, 292). “[O]f the settler population 400,000 were descendants of the original French settlers of the nineteenth century, 400,000 were of various Mediterranean origins, and 150,000 were Jews. The settlers of Algeria, most of whom were from Mediterranean rather than exclusively French backgrounds, were divided between rich landowners, colons, and the majority working classes, or *pieds-noirs*” (Crenshaw, “Effectiveness of Terrorism,” 477).

¹³ Crenshaw, “Effectiveness of Terrorism,” 481.

entire course of the war.”¹⁴ Development in communication technology made the tactic valuable and it served at least four purposes:

The revolutionary-nationalist terrorism of the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) which formed part of a broad political and military struggle for independence from French rule, is widely supposed to have succeeded in attracting international attention to the cause of Algerian national self-determination, mobilizing the Algerian population against French rule (in part by provoking indiscriminate repression against civilians), spreading insecurity among European settlers in Algeria, and making the war unpopular in France.”¹⁵

By the time de Gaulle assumed the presidency of France’s Fifth Republic in 1958, the French military effectively ruled Algeria rather than the civilian government in Paris.¹⁶

French civilian led institutions failed in North Africa because they were unable to stop Algeria’s growing insurgency. Due to the failure of the resident colonial leadership and the administration in France, the military took over with a heavy hand. The military’s action abroad countered French democratic principles and weakened the legitimacy of the government at home. Poor handling of the Algerian crisis caused the failure of the Fourth Republic.¹⁷ So much so, that when de Gaulle came to power, it was difficult for him to regain control of the military leadership in Algeria that ran the country.

Galula’s “direct participation in the Algerian War, two years after it began, would convince him that an offshoot pattern of insurgency had grown out of the ‘orthodox’ pattern he attributed to Mao.”¹⁸ Based on his observations of the FLN in Algiers, Galula

¹⁴ Ibid., 473.

¹⁵ Ibid., 474.

¹⁶ Ibid., 480.

¹⁷ De Gaulle’s rise to power resulted from “an appeal from military commanders in Algiers” (Ibid., 478).

¹⁸ A. A. Cohen, *Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer Who Defined the Art of Counterinsurgency* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012), 79. “General Jaques Massu had come to head the Algiers region because the civilian authorities could not halt terrorism, called in a public speech for de Gaulle’s return to office.” Crenshaw, “Effectiveness of Terrorism,” 478.

called this phenomenon the *bourgeois-nationalist pattern* and considered it to be a *shortcut* process to the same revolutionary end with a significant exception.

The goal of the insurgent in this case is generally limited to the seizure of power; post insurgency problems, as secondary preoccupations, are shelved for the time being. The precise and immediate aim of the initial core of insurgents, a dedicated but inevitably small group of men with no broad organization to back them, is to set up a revolutionary party rapidly.¹⁹

Galula's shortcut framework focuses on this perception, even though it grossly oversimplifies the insurgent behavior and limits the insurgent context to a military perspective.

The next section reviews Galula's five-step phasing process in which he abandons the first two steps of the orthodox process and introduces a new initiating mechanism. The shortcut process also skips Mao's actions of arousing and organizing the people, achieving internal unification politically, recovering national strength, and regaining lost territories. Galula's shortcut steps stick completely to military actions of executing guerrilla warfare, movement warfare, and an annihilation campaign. See Table 4.1.

¹⁹ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc, 1964), 43.

<u>Mao's Stages</u>	<u>Mao's Steps</u>	<u>Galula's Orthodox Steps</u>	<u>Galula's Shortcut Steps</u>
-	-	-	1. Blind Terrorism 2. Selective Terrorism
Strategic Defense	1. Arouse and organize the people 2. Achieve internal unification pol. 3. Establish bases	1. Create the party 2. Establish a United Front 3. Execute guerrilla warfare	3. Execute guerrilla warfare
Strategic Stalemate	4. Equip forces 5. Recover national strength 6. Destroy enemy national strength	“	“
Strategic Counter-offense	7. Regain lost territories	4. Execute movement warfare 5. Annihilation campaign	4. Execute movement warfare 5. Annihilation campaign

Table 4.1 Mao and Galula Orthodox and Shortcut Step Comparison

Galula justifies his approach through an argument that, “By terrorism, small groups of insurgents have been catapulted overnight to the top of large revolutionary movements, and some have won their victory at that very time, without need for further action.”²⁰ He does concede that these regimes often disintegrate post-victory. If this is the case, then one may argue that the actual insurgency movement is incomplete and never matures to a stable state. The relationship framework is one-sided and the vanguard is only in relationship with the violent mechanisms of power. Without political mechanisms or public support, it remains in a holding pattern of persistent conflict. Again, a successful revolutionary movement does not make a successful state. (The Chechen case exercises this dynamic in Chapter 6. The Kosovar Albanian case looks much like this until its final year of conflict. See Chapter 7.)

²⁰ Ibid., 44.

4.2.1 *Shortcut Steps – A Shotgun Strategy via Blind Terrorism*

If Galula's understanding of the FLN were assessed in terms of his standalone construct, one could argue that he misinterpreted the relationship of the FLN to Algeria's broader historic and political revolutionary movement. This is because the first step of the shortcut pattern is blind terrorism. In his orthodox model, Galula contended that Mao missed the critical step of creating the party. In his own shortcut model, however, he ignored a similar requirement. Galula argued that the blind terrorism of step one occurs in a chaotic fashion to gain publicity and attract like-minded supporters. The model does not incorporate a step to connect these coordinated terrorist actions to the development of a preceding clandestine organization. Interestingly, while Galula claimed that "no more than 400-500 Algerian Nationalists took part in the terrorist actions on D day" other sources argue that the "FLN developed from a small band of 2,000-3,000 militant nationalists."²¹ Although still small in number, coordinated action across cells supporting participants of this size requires leadership and resources; in addition to a logistic backbone, the military would use the term command and control.

Furthermore, the acts of violence that Galula – and the French – labeled "blind terrorism" were the product of a systemic rise in violence over many years of repression and colonialism in Algeria.²² The Algerian insurgency movement and its most notorious

²¹ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 43. According to SOROs work on Algeria, "In more than 7½ years of bitter and bloody fighting, with casualties estimated at over 1,000,000, the FLN developed from a small band of 2,000–3,000 militant nationalists to a revolutionary force of about 130,000" (Jureidini et al., *Casebook Volume I*, 291).

²² Martha Crenshaw explains that the use of violence, and particularly terrorism, in the Algerian war became an end in itself rather than a means to a political end. The cycle of engrenage became its own involuntary and mechanistic dynamic of "a tit-for-tat cycle of violence and retaliation" (Crenshaw, "Effectiveness of Terrorism," 475).

violent organization, the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN), did not come onto the scene out of nowhere in 1954 as one might expect from Galula's construct.²³

The motivations behind the formation of a nationalist organization driven to seek separation through armed struggle (in contrast to citizenship and equality within some 'integrated French system) were deeply rooted in Algerian history. The initiation of conflict was gradual, not abrupt, despite French perceptions of its unexpectedness. It began as a political process in the years after the First World War. The beginning of the war is recognized as 1 November 1954, the *Toussaint*, or All Saints' Day, the date on which the newly formed FLN, through its leaders in the Comité Revolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action, symbolically threw down the gauntlet by organizing a series of small-scale bombings, raids, and shootings directed against French security forces throughout Algeria. However shocked the French may have been, and this shock seems to be more retrospective than contemporaneous, the outbreak did not mark a sudden transition from passive acceptance of French rule to open rebellion. The FLN did not spring up over the night of the Toussaint." (Crenshaw, 478).

Rather, the FLN formed after a small group of radicals separated from Algeria's broader political movement, again – an underground that traced its lineage to World War I.

In fact, even prior to World War I, Algeria maintained a tradition of resistance to French colonialism. After the first French military expedition to Algeria in 1830 and its subsequent limited occupation of coastal Algeria, France spent 50 years pacifying Algeria. Although uprisings took place in 1864, 1871, 1872, and 1881, "[b]y the beginning of the 20th century, the settlers had acquired all of Algeria's most fertile lands."²⁴ French rule relied almost exclusively on force and never successfully penetrated into the Algeria's mountainous interior.²⁵

²³ More specifically, "The FLN bombings that initiated the Battle of Algiers in 1956, for example, were responses to French executions of FLN prisoners and to civilian extremist violence, particularly the bombing of a house in the Algiers Casbah" (Crenshaw, "Effectiveness of Terrorism," 483).

²⁴ Jureidini et al., *Casebook Volume I*, 291. "The economy of Algeria is primarily and predominantly agricultural. In 1954, 32 million acres of land were considered to be arable, although only 17.5 million acres were actually fit for modern-type cultivation due to irrigation problems. Of the last, 5–7 million acres of the most fertile land belonged to some 22,000 European settlers—an average holding of 250 acres per settler—while 6,300,000 Muslim peasants,

Whereas the French conceived of themselves as the defenders of an essential outpost of Western civilization reacting to an unexpected outburst of violence that could only be comprehended as primitive or subversive, Algerian nationalists regarded French oppression and coercion... as a catalyst—even perhaps an opportunity—for building an Algerian identity through counterviolence.²⁶

Algerian resistance continued throughout French expansion and forceful repression across the state and saw a renewed opportunity for independence after World War II.

In terms of its heritage along the political component, in 1907 the first Algerian political group called the Young Algerians (*Jeunesse Algérienne*) called for the same rights as French citizens and over time gained limited voting accessions. When Muslim soldiers who served in the French Army returned from World War I, they and a small number of French educated Muslims demanded political and economic equality.²⁷ Formal movements and organizations then followed, initially led by intellectuals looking for parity within the existing system and then expanding toward complete separation from France based upon religious and nationalist separatist platforms.

Specifically, three nationalist movements formed between World War I and World War II. The first continued the integrative Young Algerian platform for political equality and assimilation. Ferhat Abbas, a French-educated intellectual, founded the Young Algeria Movement in the early 1920s, calling for social and electoral reform, equal pay and the removal of travel restrictions. After World War II, Abbas reconstituted the movement in 1946 as the *Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien* (UDMA). The UDMA held little popular support and called for a free Algeria that was with France.

practicing subsistence-type farming, lived on the rest of the land, broken up into 600,000 holdings of about 10–12½ acres each” (Jureidini et al., *Casebook Volume I*, 297).

²⁵ Crenshaw, “Effectiveness of Terrorism,” 479, 481.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 479.

²⁷ 173,000 Algerians served in the French Army during World War I. “Nationalism and Resistance in Algeria,” *Wikipedia*, last modified January 19, 2015, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_independence_movement.

The second strain of organizations moved from a communist to a more nationalist platform. The Star of North Africa, or Étoile Norde Africaine (ENA), was founded in 1925 by Hadj Abdel Kader and then led by Messali Ahmed ben Hadj after 1927. The ENA called for total independence and originally began as a French solidarity organization in France, part of the French communist and labor party calling for suffrage, freedom of the press and association, as well as social reform. The ENA was banned in 1929 and operated underground until 1934. In 1937, Hadj reconstituted the ENA as the Party of the Algerian People, or the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA). Hadj turned away from communism and moved to a nationalist agenda that fused socialist and Islamic values. It called for direct action in the countryside and was quickly outlawed.

Hadj again reconstituted the PPA in 1946 as the Mouvement Pour Le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MLTD). The MLTD was a legal party and held its first congress in 1947, voting to maintain political action. It formed into cells and territorial units like a template Communist organization – complete with a Central Committee and a Political Bureau. In 1948, however, Hadj developed an armed organization from this party called the Organization Secrète (OS). Although the French quickly stifled designs to foster armed insurrection and arrested its membership, “the OS became a model for the FLN in terms of organization, membership, and strategy. Many early FLN militants gained experience in the OS (or, like Ben Bella, in the French military during World War II.”²⁸ Nine members of the MLTD again reconstituted a new armed organization in 1954 called the Comité Révolutionnaire Pour L’Unité et L’Action (CRUA). CRUA is the organization that planned the All Saints Day Algerian uprising in 1954. On the morning of the uprising, they renamed themselves the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN).

²⁸ Crenshaw, “Effectiveness of Terrorism,” 478–79.

The third strain of nationalist organizations focused on an Islamic agenda and narrative and accompanied the ENA. Founded upon orthodox Islamic principles in 1931 by Sheik Abdel Hamid ben Badis, the Association of Ulemas (the Association des Uléma Musulmans Algériens or AUMA) began with the intent to modernize Islamic religious practice in Algeria. Over time, it became more political and Wahabi. Although the group was constrained in practice beginning in 1933, the Saudi and Egyptian influence helped the AUMA to pursue independence and an Arabic identity in opposition to French culture and control.

Given the FLN pedigree and the increase in resistance movements within Algeria over time, it is obvious that the culture of violence and resistance in Algeria negates the concept of blind terrorism as a starting point for insurgency. For example, the French responded to acts of Muslim violence harshly and immediately. French actions were also immensely disproportionate and indiscriminate, contributing to feelings of revenge and desired recompense throughout the state.²⁹ For example, in 1945, the Muslim riots in

the area of Setif caused approximately a hundred European casualties. The French authorities answered with bombardments of Algerian villages, mass arrests, and summary executions. European settlers formed vigilante squads to comb the countryside. Estimates of Algerian deaths range from fifteen thousand to a high of forty-five thousand. The terrible memory of Setif was a compelling motive for violent nationalism in the 1950s. It found an echo in similar circumstances at Philippeville in 1955, when Europeans were attacked by Algerian mobs. These deep historical grievances provided each side with justification for seeking revenge.³⁰

²⁹ Ibid., 482. "Leaders of the FLN were indignant that bombs they delivered by hand to cafes and restaurants were condemned as 'blind terrorism,' whereas French bombs dropped from the air were not, despite their disproportionate destructiveness and indiscriminacy with regard to combatants and noncombatants" (ibid., 480).

³⁰ Ibid., 479.

And to make the matter more complicated, the noted process of revenge seeking and power seeking across the Algerian state was not simply divided into two components: those for or against the French government and the Algerian resistance.

The French camp itself was deeply divided. Violence occurred both in France and in Algeria. And the FLN was involved in its own civil war among native Algerians – “between FLN and MNA, Arabs and Kabyles, among factions, tribes, and clans, and social classes.”³¹ Galula’s framework, which focuses on military mechanisms of terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and movement warfare, misses the struggles across numerous nationalist and colonial camps. Ultimate governance over Algeria from the outset was “not just about independence or colonialism but who was to govern on either side.... Each side was divided within itself over questions of legitimacy, and those divisions stimulated violence.”³² This is a key distinction between phases two and three of the proposed framework in Chapter 2 – between “Internal Darwinism / Path toward legitimacy” and “Monopoly on violent resistance / Emergent Identity.”

“This internal Algerian struggle led not only to clashes between armed militants of the two movements but also to a battle between them to gain the support of the uncommitted population.”³³ Given this background and century long build of Algerian resistance to French dominance, blind terrorism does not seem an appropriate caveat. It could be that the clandestine nature of the planning and approach made the acts of terrorism seem chaotic. But the use of terror in this case represented a strategic method to initiate protracted conflict and required a motivated and coordinated vanguard.

³¹ Ibid., 483. “According to Mohammed Harbi, political rivalries often degenerated into uncontrollable personal or tribal vendettas” (ibid., 483).

³² Ibid., 476.

³³ Ibid., 477.

4.2.2 *Shortcut Steps – Selective Terrorism*

Step two of Galula's shortcut construct is selective terrorism and quickly follows step one. The goal is to "isolate the counterinsurgent from the masses, to involve the population in the struggle, and to obtain as a minimum its passive complicity."³⁴ It is interesting to note that the use of selective terrorism as a strategic messaging tactic aimed at specified internal and external audiences is not defined as a component of Mao or Galula's orthodox approach. This could be because the proliferation of the message was limited due to technology and therefore less effective in the absence of a culture of mass media. Mao did say that guerrilla activity is used in all stages, but he did not use terrorism as a method of mass propaganda, perhaps because it drives a wedge between the insurgency and the civilian population.³⁵ Civilians, after all, are frequently the victims of targeted violence.

Galula's form of selective terrorism reflected his observations regarding how the FLN forced key components of a social movement repertoire, including displays of worthiness, unity, and commitment, onto the population. For example,

The FLN's efforts to dominate the resistance also included measures to control both metropolitan and Algerian Muslim populations by enforcing bans on smoking and drinking (in part a boycott of French products but also an expression of Islamic puritanism) and punishing the disobedient as 'traitors.' Such boycotts also served to separate the Muslim population from the French government. In 1957 this policy led to the massacre of the inhabitants of a small hamlet who had transferred their allegiance to the French (in part because of the taxes and the punishments such as physical mutilations that the FLN imposed). The 'Melouza affair' (known by the name of the nearest town) caused consternation in France, where the Communist party accepted the FLN claim that French troops had perpetrated the atrocity. Such violence by the FLN against Muslim populations was extensive.³⁶

³⁴ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 43.

³⁵ The Communists' use of terrorism in China occurred but on a less spectacular scale.

³⁶ Crenshaw quoting Perville, "Combien de morts," in "Effectiveness of Terrorism," 483–84.

This is the type of FLN activity that Galula referenced in his second step of Selective Terrorism. Through analysis based on the Chapter 2 relationship framework and associated insurgent movement phases, the Algerian case becomes much clearer across transitions, actions, and levels of political and armed maturity.

As a follow on concept to the transition between Galula's phases, however, there is no guide to better understand how insurgencies that use terrorism as an integral component of warfare from the outset continue to use the tactic as the movement progresses toward an established guerrilla capability and then a conventional military capability. Martha Crenshaw argues that even

specific government practices can qualify as terrorism. In this sense, the use of torture or the resort to the guillotine, a particularly dreadful form of execution, may be considered terrorism when they are intended to create fear in the population and to discourage potential resistance, rather than simply to acquire information or to punish. Similarly, if terrorism is defined as violence that society regards as unacceptable, whether according to the rules of war or the standards of peace, then violence that is unusually cruel or arbitrary in the view of the targeted audience, and that the perpetrator knows to be such, can reasonably be considered terrorism.³⁷

Given Crenshaw's observations, does the insurgent regime that relies on terrorism become a government that relies on terror as well? Or, if terrorism is a commonly used tactic of an insurgency, how does the leadership of the insurgency break the cycle of terrorism as applied to its citizens once it becomes legitimate? So far, no existing model provides an alternative mechanism of violence as an alternative to terrorism in early phasing stages.

Lenin and Mao considered terrorism and guerrilla operations to be tactical options, "methods of struggle that could be adopted by the revolutionary party and the

³⁷ Crenshaw, "Effectiveness of Terrorism," 481.

revolutionary classes.”³⁸ Any class could be taught effective forms of violence – or combat methods – as the capacity and capability to enact damage against the counterinsurgent matured. The Maoists “made full use of terrorism in China” as have numerous revolutionary movements dating back across recorded history.³⁹ While terrorism could be used to take out specific small targets, steal money, and transmit strategic messaging, “Lenin emphasized that these actions were to be tightly controlled by the revolutionary party and not to replace political mobilization and agitation.”⁴⁰ Galula’s first step ignores requirements of political control or even the need of a political party.

Galula’s shortcut framework uses terrorism as an actuating phenomenon in the context of the development and maturation of a revolutionary movement. His subsequent steps focus specifically on the growth of militant activity rather than required change in the corresponding political, social or economic contexts. As such, the selective terrorism of step two becomes a transitional or hybrid form of violence to bridge the capability gap between steps two and three, or to meet requirements calling for the use of both terrorism and guerrilla warfare. In the case of Algeria specifically, the rebellion “manifested in rural insurgency and in urban terrorism that took its most spectacular form in the 1956-1957 Battle of Algiers.”⁴¹ Blind terrorism did not occur throughout the country and would not have been appropriately used in all environmental settings.

Galula’s shortcut pattern of insurgency provides no thought to the orthodox concept concerning balance and the use of force among and upon civilian populations.

³⁸ O’Dowd, Bibliographic essay in *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 138.

³⁹ Cohen, *Galula*, 79.

⁴⁰ O’Dowd, Bibliographic essay in *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 138.

⁴¹ Crenshaw, “Effectiveness of Terrorism,” 480.

The methodology introduces terrorism as a distinctly separate series of acts that occur prior to guerrilla warfare – prior to Mao’s first steps of Strategic Defense. Terrorism purposefully kills people working closely with the population so that they serve as public examples. In addition, insurgents collect money from the people to implicate the masses and kill some of those unwilling to contribute. They violently set up an immediate counterculture where counter-cultural laws result in death if broken - as described by the previous examples of drinking and smoking boycotts.⁴² These activities depend upon violence to quickly destroy “all bridges linking the population with the counterinsurgent and his potential allies.”⁴³ Such actions do not connect the community as a whole to the insurgent group and instead play on fear as the ultimate vehicle to power from the outset. It induces the counterinsurgent to overreact with its own violent solutions.

Recall how different this path is from Mao’s proposed communist methodology that more slowly raises levels of violence. Galula’s shortcut steps bypass the crucial political activities of the orthodox methodology that Mao argued the most important task of stage two was to unify and mobilize the people to create their own self defense capability and to recover national strength. It was not to equip the force during Strategic Stalemate. Galula does not provide any account for these kinds of requirements and appears to be part of a broader change in thinking regarding the Maoist doctrine.

For example, Chalmers Johnson pointed out that the Maoist tradition was “Military Power Through Political Means” while certain movements that followed, such

⁴² Conditioning a population toward obedience is utilized frequently and occurred in China, Vietnam as well as Algeria. People may be “conditioned for obedience through the imposition of small and seemingly benign tasks and restrictions in their daily lives, as could be common in organized religion (which revolutionary communism unarguable took the form of in practice.” Cohen, *Galula*, 86.

⁴³ Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 44.

as the Viet Cong's synthesis, focused on "Political Power Through Military Means."⁴⁴

Prior to the Viet Cong, the Viet Minh began to move away from a population-centric approach – possibly because they were a much smaller country and did not need the mass movement to gain territorial control – and possibly because they were expelling an outside colonizer rather than facing both an independent nationalist movement and an occupying force. Compared to the Chinese Communists, the Viet Minh Communists focused more on using guerrilla tactics to gain operational advantage and military victory.

The Viet Minh did some of these things, although less thoroughly than had the Chinese, and they did other things that the Chinese thought risky and in violation of theory. The Viet Minh cut short the protracted war (when the French withdrew without being annihilated) and thereby set their own successor generation to rethinking the problems of overall revolutionary strategy and to experimenting with a new definition of revolutionary 'victory'.”⁴⁵

In a similar vein to Galula's first two steps, the Viet Cong actively utilized selective terrorism to keep the political struggle alive. In the absence of a broader political leadership, a smaller organization can use terrorism to maintain particular grievances on the political agenda.

Organizations that would use Galula's shortcut path ignore the advice of former orthodox movement leaders: "Guerrillas must never forget that primitive weapons alone, without political work, will never suffice to gain victory over a stronger enemy. Every guerrilla fighter must engage in political work, becoming an armed agitator and organizer

⁴⁴ Chalmers Johnson, "The Third Generation of Guerrilla Warfare," in *Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: Theories, Doctrines, and Contexts*, ed. Sam C. Sarkesian (Rutgers, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1975), 357 and 386, respectively.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 368.

in the war of resistance.”⁴⁶ If the bourgeois-nationalist movements, as Galula calls them, advance through later military steps, they do so under a tenuous social and political framework because the resulting regime is not cohesive or well thought out. Without an actuating spiritual focus or an identifiable popular political movement— without associated political activities that lead to an ability to administer to the state, revolution yields vulnerable or fragile political outcomes. Action may attract active supporters hoping to route the counterinsurgent. But the guerrilla force may look more like the vigilante banditry described by Mao and enact a form of rule based on arbitrary decision-making rather than on uniform rule of law.

For this reason, Galula’s shortcut methodology is more appropriate to deter or route outside invaders than to set up a new stable national regime.⁴⁷ It is also more appropriate to propagate an unstable environment in order for an insurgency to maintain its existence without assuming the mantle of political responsibility. With respect to achieving statehood as a desired political end,

terrorism is more likely to be effective than successful, because the political changes to which terrorism can plausibly be linked diverge from those its users seek. As a method of achieving radical political change, terrorism has no inherent efficacy. Indeed, from a strategic perspective it is often counterproductive.⁴⁸

As such, Galula’s shortcut process does accommodate insurgent movements that start out with random and unorganized violence and are in search of limited political goals. It may not work as well to accommodate those that also intend to mature into a stable state

⁴⁶ On p. 86 of *Galula*, Cohen quotes Chu Te’s 1938 essay “Problems in Guerrilla Warfare.” It may be found in *Chinese Communist Guerrilla Tactics*, ed. Gene Z. Hanrahan (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1974), 67.

⁴⁷ Granted, Galula did not come up with this as an ideal path. His model is based on his observations of actual revolutionary activity more concerned with the seizure of power rather than post insurgency political transition. He is not making recommendations on behavior.

⁴⁸ Martha Crenshaw, “Effectiveness of Terrorism,” 509.

ruling entity at some unspecified future date; this is what Galula “advertises” regarding his shortcut process.

Galula’s framework does not present a viable path to a stable form of government. It doesn’t really even connect the maturing forms of the militant organization. The Algerian insurgency against the French, whose origins began within a complex social and political movement, certainly did not happen according to Galula’s bourgeois-nationalist pattern, particularly at the outset. As Mao stated, revolution and insurgency is inherently political and Galula’s shortcut process only provides a militaristic focused lens from which to view the full scope of the movement.

It is unclear whether and how an insurgent organization that focuses on terrorism in the absence of political, economic and administrative growth and development could run a nation state – or even mature into a viable national guerrilla movement. Terrorism is a kind of tactical tool, a form of violence directed at various targets, and can be used by any organization – including states. But it isn’t an agent of order or stability that is needed to foster the rule of law. Maturation of an insurgency along other lines of operation must also occur while violence ensues. These lines hold together the relationship framework described in Chapter 2 across the phases of an insurgent movement. Galula’s shortcut process could likely hold portions of territory ungoverned by the state or deter counterinsurgent control in narrowly defined areas – as the FLN did in areas of Algiers. Many insurgent organizations today are in fact content with this outcome.

Alternatively stated, when considering a phasing construct that indicates a path to viable statehood or more advanced military capability, Galula’s shortcut path does not

contain the substantive underpinning of an executable theory or executing organization.

Although Galula claims that his shortcut model moves directly from selective terrorism to guerrilla warfare, he does not provide insight into movement leadership or administrative mechanisms that advance the insurgent capability. Compare this to Mao's integrated conception of guerrilla and political warfare. Galula misses the political and social connections between terrorist activity and the development of a military capability connected to the people. Therefore, if we are to better understand the shortcut path we need another pairing – similar to the Galula/Mao combination of the orthodox case.

4.3 The Special Operations Research Office

Besides Galula's work on insurgency at the time, a second insurgency phasing theory was published in 1963, a year prior to Galula's publication of *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice* in 1964. The ideas within the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) phasing construct overlap with Galula's shortcut pattern. They also provide a stronger connection to how the insurgency played out within Algeria. The SORO work uses the phrase "Evolutionary Dynamics of Revolutionary Movements" when discussing a five-phased approach to describe emerging insurgencies at the time:

1. The Clandestine Organization Phase,
2. The Psychological Offensive Phase,
3. The Expansion Phase,
4. The Militarization Phase, and
5. The Consolidation Phase.⁴⁹

Table 4.2 correlates Galula's shortcut process and SORO's lines of effort.

⁴⁹ Andrew R. Molnar, William A. Lybrand, Lorna Hahn, James L. Kirkman, and Peter B. Riddleberger, *Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare* (Washington, DC: Special Operations Research Office, The American University, 1963), 37–39. The entire discussion of insurgency phases occurs within three pages of text and in a small way represents both a cliff note interpretation and variation of Galula's observations.

<u>Galula's Shortcut Steps</u>	<u>SORO Phases</u>
	1. Clandestine Organization Phase
1. Blind Terrorism	2. Psychological Offensive
2. Selective Terrorism	“
	3. Expansion Phase
3. Execute guerrilla warfare	4. Militarization Phase
4. Execute movement warfare	“
5. Annihilation campaign	“
	5. Consolidation Phase

Table 4.2 Galula and SORO Comparison

Although the SORO work suggests a linear pattern to the phases, it also indicates that no phase is “completely separate from the others;” there is no minimum or maximum time associated with any phase; and the predominant activity in each phase overlap into others.⁵⁰ For example, even though the consolidation phase is listed as fifth, it references political and economic tasks that must be accomplished in the fourth phase of militarization.⁵¹ Similarly, phase one clandestine operations must expand throughout the insurgency.

Because SORO observations indicate further variation within revolutionary practice, their work contributes to the understanding of insurgent requirements as manifested through the early 1960s. It is worth introducing its value added to the phasing discussion as an addendum to the concepts already introduced by Galula and Mao. If the insurgent goal is to push out another regime, Galula’s shortcut theory may be enough. If the insurgent goal is to use the shortcut method but to also create a nation state, then the SORO work is critical.

⁵⁰ Molnar et al., *Undergrounds*, 37.

⁵¹ It is unclear why SORO didn’t point out that political and economic actions were key to all aspects of the developing insurgency.

4.3.1 *The SORO Contribution Regarding Evolving Insurgent Behavior*

The first phase that SORO focuses on is the establishment of the insurgency's Clandestine Organization. It is similar to Galula's first step in the orthodox model of *create the party*, though no political entity is required. SORO supposes that terrorism doesn't just happen; there is some organizational preparation and development behind it. As such, during this phase, "clandestine cells typically are established in heavily populated areas, organizations and industries are infiltrated, and cadres are recruited, trained, and tested."⁵² Additionally, according to the updated ARIS Undergrounds work published in 2013,

During the early stages of an insurgency, leaders seek to carefully select, investigate, and approach potential fellow insurgents. The theme of early recruiting is the mitigation of security risks. Typically, insurgent leaders establish a revolutionary movement in league with a few close friends who share their ideology and become trusted allies. From these modest beginnings, insurgent leaders will seek out individuals or groups that share their fundamental (if not identical) beliefs.⁵³

In order to build the insurgency over time, bases within safe-areas and sanctuaries are established "to develop the necessary training schools, create a supply and logistics system, and try out various political and organizational appeals upon the local inhabitants."⁵⁴ For SORO, this accomplishes the recruitment and development of the insurgency's executing arm, the "skeletal framework" of the organization that is prepared to take action. It also sets up escape mechanisms for the group in case subversive activities are discovered.

⁵² Molnar et al., *Undergrounds*, 37.

⁵³ Robert Leonhard, ed., *Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 23.

⁵⁴ Molnar et al., *Undergrounds*, 37.

According to SORO, external support may come during this or any phase. It could take the form of resources, such as training, funding, manpower and equipment. Or it could increase international legitimacy of the movement and isolate the enemy. Unlike Mao, who saw external support to the internal elite as a liability and desirable only at designated points in time for specific purposes, SORO introduces external support as a potentiality from the outset. It found that external activity may play an essential role to an insurgency at any time – regardless if Mao’s warnings about the dilution of internal purity are right or wrong. With respect to the shortcut method, because of the lack of political focus to mobilize the people against the counterinsurgent, external support may be heavily relied upon to make up for the capability gap.

Again, this is a distinctly different kind of first phase than the communist model in four respects. At the start, SORO and Galula’s lack any requirement for the insurgency to establish a guiding internal political vision or to establish a politically solidified clandestine or overt political component. According to the orthodox methodology, stages one and two, arousing and organizing the people as well as achieving internal unification politically, begin before bases are established and the army is equipped. While all methodologies agree that exploration of usable causes and narratives are essential, for the orthodox path, the purity of the elite political regime comes before the creation and expansion of the broader insurgent organization.

Second, because SORO and Galula do not require political constitutive mechanisms from the outset, they target only illicit activity and membership within three quarters of the relationship framework. Specifically, SORO’s model targets the emergence of the vanguard and the growth and support of destructive mechanisms from

limited public support. Its first phase looks to build the clandestine united front and is little concerned with the possibility that the unified front might already have a conventional capability or a political machine to leverage, unless that capability comes from external support beyond the state.

Similarly, or third, the consolidated orthodox model identifies nuances among all four of the relationship components at the beginning of stage one and explains how they blend, grow and change over time. The shortcut process models advocate that violence may be seen as a faster way to spark revolution, but ignores the development of the networked enterprise. For example, Mao's doctrine directed the CPCs political membership to promote national "internal unification" and spur the development of guerrilla units, local self-defense units, and corresponding political committees that would lead political and military decision-making at local levels.⁵⁵

There is a nuance here that bears further description. Because the SORO work states that phases may overlap, and because SORO's second phase includes terrorism, there is nothing to prevent the first two steps in the SORO construct from happening concurrently. There is no mention of how mature the clandestine organization needs to be before indiscriminate and selective terrorism begin. In this case, a linear temporal framework begins to get murky. (It will get more undecided in comparison to the orthodox model as the SORO phases progress.)

Finally, the context of SORO's first phase is decidedly urban, with no mention of the rural component that is so integral to Mao's work. Clandestine cells are established in heavily populated areas and infiltrate industry as well as other targeted organizations.

⁵⁵ U.S. Marine Corps FMRP 12-18, *Mao Tse-tung On Guerrilla War (Yu Chi Chan)*. Translation and introduction by Samuel B. Griffith. (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1989), 63.

Prescribed violence in both Galula and SORO target populated areas that get the most media attention. Now that the first SORO phase has been added to the shortcut insurgency path, we can move to the second phase.

SORO's second phase on the insurgency timeline is called the Psychological Offensive Phase in which the insurgent objective is to "bring about the loss of effectiveness of the social and governmental institutions of the country and to create unrest and disorder."⁵⁶ With the exception of its inclusion of critical external support, this phase looks similar to steps one and two of Galula's shortcut phase.⁵⁷ It uses agitators to take advantage of social grievances, spread discontent and propaganda about regime corruption and oppression, "lead demonstrations, start riots and organize strikes;" it employs selective terrorism against officials at all levels of government to threaten, intimidate, and conduct assassinations.⁵⁸

For the SORO methodology, terrorism is used as a psychological operation in the same way that propaganda is used. While Mao speaks to messaging that builds relationships and provides unity among the people and the army, the type of insurgency that SORO describes initially does not. There is little if any spiritual identification of the broader local population with the movement because terrorism attracts a different kind of participant who is outside of the mainstream population.

Where Mao's phases are designed to build a political landscape with violence as a means, SORO phases at this point – as well as in Galula's shortcut process - include

⁵⁶ Molnar et al., *Undergrounds*, 37.

⁵⁷ Technically, SORO never prescribes blind terrorism. It actually uses the term selective terrorism. But because it was printed before Galula's work came out, and there is not significant detail to explain phasing, it is difficult to completely exclude acts of blind terrorism within the psychological offensive phase. The objectives of blind terrorism fall within the purpose of the phase.

⁵⁸ Molnar et al., *Undergrounds*, 37.

activities that are more appropriate to supporting a militant group. Clandestine networks and psychological operations sustain violent organizations in general – criminal, terrorist, or insurgent – and will occur in perpetuity as long as those organizations survive.

Without a requirement to grow formal institutional mechanisms for the state, and without the responsibility to create order, the manipulation of social movements enable illicit activities and destabilize highly populated environments without committing to any political follow through.

For this reason, SORO's first and third phases, the third being the Expansion Phase, connect Galula's selective terrorism step to the insurgency's follow-on capability to conduct guerrilla warfare. SORO's model assumes a continued maturity in the phase one task of growing the clandestine organization and begins work in the third phase to gain popular support and to eliminate other competing nationalist opposition groups. The insurgent organization must destroy all other alternatives so that only one solution is left after the chaos within the state dies down. (Again, this is the crucial political development that distinguishes Phase 2 Internal Darwinism requirements in the proposed phases from Chapter 2 of this dissertation.) Every model notes this requirement to some degree.

During the expansion phase, the insurgency connects a growing body of supporters to a training and political indoctrination system. SORO's lexicon introduces political concepts directly from Mao's terminology regarding the establishment of a "united front," directing widespread recruitment "through mass organizations."⁵⁹

The revolutionary group must demonstrate continually that it exists and that it is determined to gain control of the government in the name of the people or a large majority of the people... To prove their determination to

⁵⁹ Ibid., 38.

rule the country, the insurgents often seek as soon as possible to establish a provisional government. Formal ‘committees’ are set up in other countries to lobby on behalf of the revolutionary movement.⁶⁰

The expansion phase, without any noted work on a political foundation, seeks to draw the government’s heavy hand upon the populace in order to more efficiently build the public component. During this time the insurgency moves out of urban areas and interacts more broadly across the country. Terrorism continues because it “exaggerates the movement’s strength,” making it appear larger and more popular than it actually is.⁶¹ The armed component remains immature, but should be able to conduct guerrilla warfare by the end of the expansion phase.

During SORO’s fourth phase, the Militarization Phase, the insurgency robustly increases political and economic activity in parallel with military professionalization and capability. As provisional governments begin to stand up and international recognition becomes part of the externally oriented political process, “when the existing government begins to lose popular support and the revolutionary ranks begin to fill, the movement enters the militarization phase.”⁶² Full guerrilla warfare ensues and is designed “to overcome the government’s military forces;” to “wear down the government troops while the guerrillas” organize; and to build their insurgent conventional army.⁶³ Interestingly, SORO places the entirety of Mao’s stages within the militarization phase. This is a crucial point.

SORO’s addition of Mao’s three stages to the shortcut process greatly impacts the depth and relevance of the combined shortcut model. At the same time, the change

⁶⁰ Ibid., 38.

⁶¹ Ibid., 38.

⁶² Ibid., 38.

⁶³ Ibid., 38–39.

dramatically alters the framework; it is no longer a shortcut. By adding these components, we can begin to see the emergence of a meta-structure regarding a more complete insurgent playbook. Instead of interpreting the various models as independently right or wrong approaches to all insurgencies, view them instead as options along a tooth to tail path toward insurgent control of a nation state. The orthodox path implies a political beginning. The shortcut path offers a faster track to force action through violence and is available to organizations that do not have the capacity to think about nation building from the outset.⁶⁴ This is illustrated in the table below where the blacked out areas of Galula's shortcut process are accounted for when combined with the SORO steps. See Table 4.3.

⁶⁴ The broader phasing framework suggested in the following chapter builds upon this concept. The common theme among the variables and concepts used across Mao, Galula, and SORO all center upon the final objective of who is to govern and rule the state. Today's insurgencies do not always focus on this. So other political options must be available within the framework.

<u>Mao's Stages</u>	<u>Mao's Steps</u>	<u>Galula's Orthodox Steps</u>	<u>Galula's Shortcut Steps</u>	<u>SORO Phases</u>
				1. Clandestine Organization
			1. Blind Terrorism	2. Psychological Offensive
			2. Selective Terrorism	3. Selective Terrorism
Strategic Defense	1. Arouse and organize the people 2. Achieve internal unification pol. 3. Establish bases	1. Create the party 2. Establish a United Front 3. Execute guerrilla warfare		4. Militarization
Strategic Stalemate	4. Equip forces 5. Recover national strength	“	3. Execute guerrilla warfare “	
Strategic Counter-offense	6. Destroy enemy national strength 7. Regain lost territories	4. Execute movement warfare 5. Annihilation campaign	4. Execute movement warfare 5. Annihilation campaign	5. Consolidation

Table 4.3 Mao, Galula, and SORO Synthesized Phasing Comparison

In addition to Mao's full range of steps, SORO, adds a final fifth phase onto Mao's theory called the Consolidation Phase. A close inspection of Mao would suggest that most of SORO's consolidation activities are actually covered by the compiled orthodox model. For example, "Once in control, revolutionaries frequently use instruments of force to eliminate opposition, create new mass organizations, and establish surveillance systems to prevent a counterrevolution."⁶⁵ SORO also mentions the importance of political and economic actions during the consolidation phase. "If the guerrilla force cannot decisively defeat the government's military forces, the drain on the economy and the effect of political pressure by the insurgents are often enough to ensure success."⁶⁶ There is no discussion, however, of what success means to the state when the

⁶⁵ Molnar et al., *Undergrounds*, 39.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 39.

revolutionary party takes control of a broken population with little ability to support itself or sustain anything other than the revolutionary regime.

On the whole, Mao does a much better job of tying political efforts and the development of necessary administrative and security institutions to the orthodox theory. He also does a better job at explaining the impacts of economic forces on the counterinsurgent. The largest gap in theory across Mao, Galula and SORO regards the transition of running the financial responsibilities of the insurgency to running the economy of the state. None provide a large amount of detail on the economics of insurgency or how financial strategies could more seriously be used. Economic requirements are considered political constitutive mechanisms within this dissertation and will be discussed in the next chapter.

4.4 Do the Available Models Measure Up?

Chapters 2 through 4 introduce the complexity of insurgency in an organized approach that builds upon existing literatures, operational perspectives, and existing models of phasing applied to two case studies. The current models, however, are limited and lack the power of an analytic framework from which to better understand the growth, development, and evolution of insurgency over time. They tell the story of or provide explanatory power to the two cases at the time, but do not hold for the broad range of insurgencies described in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. Mao, Galula and SORO offer overarching themes that fall across a metanarrative for insurgent practice. But their specifics encompass historic artifacts and require synthesis to enable comparison of similar components and processes concurrently.

Given the prolific number of insurgencies across the political landscape, the absence of a comparative framework or substantive political theory that develops the constituting requirements and needs of emerging regimes is puzzling, particularly because effective policy implementation relies on data driven analysis. In order to fill this void in theory, the next chapter draws on the broad range of accumulated knowledge gathered in previous chapters and lays out a theoretical framework regarding the politics of insurgency. If Lockhart and Ghani are correct and quantifiable state functions exist, then an insurgent movement maintains corresponding categories of operation that must scale up and transition from support of the organization to penetration of the components across a state. If “the particular framing of nation-ness is malleable,”⁶⁷ then an emerging regime must sustain itself in a way that keeps those within it cohesive and unified across its imagining.

⁶⁷ Mark Ashley, “It Takes a Victim: The Construction of National Identity and the Narrative of National Victimization,” Draft Paper (University of Chicago, 2001), 4.

Chapter 5

A Framework for Insurgency Analysis

5.1 Insurgency Theory

Chapter 1 defines insurgency as a condition of formalized resistance or revolt against a governing authority in which the perpetrating parties are not initially recognized legally as belligerents. Depending on associated political goals, an insurgency may renounce allegiance or subjection to a government or may attempt to end the rule of one government and start a new one by means of subversion or interpersonal violence. Although insurgencies may also participate in legal forms of resistance, attempts to modify the standing political system fundamentally include the unconstitutional or illegal use of force or protest. Some insurgents are concerned with breaking down an existing political regime with the intent to develop a political alternative in the future. Others find little reason to become the territorial regime and thus cohabit in parallel with the existing government, preventing the state from attaining a monopoly on violence or control over apportioned areas. The promise of Chapter 1 is that the dissertation will introduce a comparative framework capable of assessing the anatomy of varied forms of insurgent practice as well as their maturity as potential state regimes.

Chapter 2 presents academic, military, and legal perspectives of insurgency as a political and military phenomenon. It explores the seldom defined transition from resistance organization – through the vehicle of insurgency – to state regime. While academic literature looks systemically at the international system of states and interstate relationships in a comparative way, its approach to the making of states and the internal dissolution of states is absent. For this reason, Chapter 2 synthesizes existing

compartmented literature and pieces together a cumulative approach toward insurgency that can be used to build a common anatomy and enable comparative analytics. It introduces 6 phases of insurgency and a relationship framework with four component parts. The power of explanation within the dissertation comes from the relationship assessment, both psychological and physical, of the vanguard, public support, political constitutive mechanisms, and violent destructive mechanisms across phases.

Because no existing work presents insurgency dynamics across component lines of effort so they may be compared or assessed along a baseline standard, the next two Chapters look closely at well-respected phasing constructs, synthesizing their findings with the work of Chapter 2. Chapters 3 and 4 explore how the dissertation's phasing actions are further derived by reviewing four insurgency models within the context of two historic case studies. They present interrelated concepts and requirements that enable insurgent organizations to grow and develop into viable state regimes. Chapter 4 concludes that existing insurgency models are insufficient to provide a meta-framework for comparison across insurgencies. Historic models do, however, provide limited analytic tools and metrics for those insurgencies about which they were written. They also introduce extremely important themes and ideas that cross insurgencies.

This Chapter returns to the phasing construct and relationship framework introduced in Chapter 2. It incorporates the lessons of Mao, Galula, and SORO and more fully presents the proposed phases of insurgent movements. Each of the phasing thresholds explored below and in Chapters 6 and 7 utilizes themes and lessons that trace back to the cumulative literature. For example, they include concepts regarding the strength of the vanguard to leverage both political and violent mechanisms; the maturity

and penetration of an insurgency's political administration and constituency; its military and security administration and constituency; the psychological cohesion of the insurgency internally and internationally; as well as the level of persistent control (both in size and duration) of territory within the state.

5.2 A Deeper Discussion of Insurgency Phasing and the Relationship Framework

Chapters 3 and 4 presented important information regarding the requirements of insurgent movements. Mao's theory, for example, illustrates both political and military components of a national movement. Galula's work adds a more informed understanding of open and clandestine support that underpins insurgent activities. And SORO discusses explicit logistical requirements, explaining that organizations that rely solely on terrorism cannot mature to statehood. See Table 5.1. Only Mao and SORO focus on the development of a state while Galula looks at destruction of an enemy. All three theories play with variables regarding control of territory, movement leadership, politics, violence, and public support.

With respect to the increasing maturity of an insurgency movement, however, insurgent tasks in Table 5.1 are jumbled across steps and stages. For example, arousing and organizing the people is a component of public support and must be coordinated across every phase. Public support feeds political mechanisms such as creating a party and vanguard responsibilities such as establishing a united front. Similarly, it also feeds mechanisms of violence such as processing and developing new recruits into effective local militias. The attributes and penetration of political parties, local militias, or the united front, when associated with an insurgent movement, indicate the level of strength

and maturity between an insurgency's political institutions, violent mechanisms, and the public.

<u>Mao's Steps</u>	<u>Galula's Orthodox Steps</u>	<u>Galula's Shortcut Steps</u>	<u>SORO Phases</u>
			1. Clandestine Organization
		1. Blind Terrorism	2. Psychological Offensive
		2. Selective Terrorism	3. Selective Terrorism
1. Arouse and organize the people 2. Achieve internal unification pol. 3. Establish bases	1. Create the party 2. Establish a United Front 3. Execute guerrilla warfare		4. Militarization
4. Equip forces 5. Recover national strength	“	“	
6. Destroy enemy national strength	4. Execute movement warfare 5. Annihilation campaign	4. Execute movement warfare 5. Annihilation campaign	
7. Regain lost territories			5. Consolidation

Table 5.1 Mao, Galula, and SORO Synthesized Phasing Comparison

Therefore, as an insurgency matures toward increasing levels of resistance, the characteristics of component relationships change. For example, establishing local political leaders, equipping forces, establishing bases, and conducting certain kinds of warfare speak to improving levels of relationship between them. Relationships and organizational structures that began from a horizontal architecture must eventually become hierarchical in order to establish functional command and control of increasingly complex operations. The key to scaling lies in the way the vanguard leadership interoperates and develops with the military, the political institutions, and the public. The

vanguard must be able to cross thresholds of scale associated with political and military functions, all the while growing sufficient public support.

Phase	Generic Descriptor	Public Support	Territory	Legal
Phase 0	Perceived inequity and injustice	Perceived inequity and injustice and social ferment	None	Use of legal processes for belligerent acts
Phase 1	Violence as a possibility building to systemic violence	Collective excitement and coalescence	Safe houses, training camps, small buildings	Illegal political acts
Phase 2	Internal Darwinism, Path toward constituent legitimacy	Bureaucratize and build coalitions to develop higher organizational levels	Control of local territory for limited duration	Rebellion
Phase 3	Monopoly on localized violent resistance, Emergent political identity	Assimilation or cooptation	Localized enduring control	Insurgency
Phase 4	Violence and regional political administration	Assimilation or cooptation	Enduring regional control	Insurgency
Phase 5	Violence and national political administration	Repression or success	State territory	Belligerency

Table 5.2 Preliminary Phases of Insurgent Movements

Table 5.2 depicts the original phasing construct introduced at the end of Chapter 2 and takes the first step to organize the actions and concepts presented in Table 5.1. These phases are neither dependent nor independent variables of the proposed framework. Rather, they comprise a heuristic overlay from which to address varying thresholds of

regime maturity during an insurgency. Each phase represents meta-categories and does not differentiate or separate vanguard, political, violent, or social movement lines of effort. Instead they speak to the nominal relationship across components. This simple form of the dissertation model captures increasing levels of maturity over time, even though it does not independently address the components of the relationship framework. It is very similar to the generic steps presented by the theoretic models in Table 5.1 with four exceptions. First, the focus of each generic descriptor speaks to the necessary effects of vanguard development – what political and violent milestones must be achieved and coordinated in order to reach that phase.

Second, Table 5.2 corresponds to the thresholds of the social movement phases explored in Chapter 2 and incorporates an agnostic yet integral psychological component around which to build the movement narrative and ideology. In order to come fully into the capability defined by each generic phase descriptor, an insurgency requires the associated level of public support for both political and violent mechanisms. As discussed in Chapter 2, governance is not accomplished through formal regime-led participation channels alone; civilian organizations align their behavior and goals bureaucratically and legally to support or counter a desired endstate. The insurgency leadership must develop a unifying constitutive vision that will yield political legitimacy to the broader constituency as the movement scales. If it cannot, then legitimacy will have to come solely through violent mechanisms that coopt and repress the public.

Third, the culmination of the phasing construct ends with the insurgency's ability to control the territory and population of the movement's defined nation – both politically and through violence. Specifically, insurgency mechanisms either incorporate into a

modified political order or become the foundation of a new state regime. The last three phases move from a monopoly on localized violence, to regional violence, to violence across the state. Similarly the political system moves from local forms and acceptance to stronger regional and national forms. Although these later phases create stronger states, an insurgency may still acquire the mantle of statehood without attaining advanced capabilities given external support. If this is the case, tasks may still occur during a transition period. Ultimately, the composite model will enable analysis to determine whether an insurgency has the potential to reach these more advanced forms.

And finally, the model does not focus on defeating the enemy. It is independent of the tactical interplay between insurgent and counterinsurgent as well as the context of the actuating cleavage. It does not predict whether the insurgency will win or be defeated by the opposing force. Instead, it indicates whether counterinsurgent political and violent mechanisms are being replaced by the insurgency within a contextually defined area of interest. It does not speak to the content of the ideational motivation but rather to its strength, reinforcing the concept that the vanguard and political narrative cannot solely rely upon a destructive goal as the movement progresses.

The absence of a win-lose mentality through violent mechanisms is purposeful. This is not to say that who wins or who loses the fight is incidental. Rather, it is a byproduct of the insurgency as it scales and is affected by external actors and actions within the international system. Winning or losing against an armed enemy is just one component of becoming a nation-state. War is a political tool, not the end but one mean. Those organizations that lose sight of this either do not want to progress across all phases

or cannot. Creating a phasing construct focused on scaling may better inform decision-makers interested in breaking down insurgent movements or in building stronger states.

Although the phasing construct of Table 5.2 makes significant improvements to existing models, it still requires input from Chapters 3 and 4 lessons learned. If the dissertation proposition is that an insurgent organization needs to make strides and build relationships across and between the four relationship components, then those components need to factor directly into the model. Because public support is already accounted for, this leaves the vanguard, political constitutive mechanisms, and violent destructive mechanisms.

And yet it is possible to provide so much detail across each line of effort that the model becomes too cumbersome. Take Table 5.3, for example. This list incorporates the activities discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 between the vanguard and the insurgency's mechanisms of violence. Some actions, such as narrative development, execution, and analysis also play into political mechanisms as well. Although each component may not enlist the same narrative, over time, component activities should nest together as the formal bureaucracy begins to coalesce.

Violent mechanisms in Coordination with the Vanguard
Phase 0
Existing militant/violent culture
Phase 1
Identify broader network
Build united front
Spiritual unification / passive complicity
Recruit / train cadre
Establish sanctuaries for:
supplies and logistics / training schools
Begin to stockpile
Establish escape mechanisms
Infiltrate/coopt organizations and industries

Connect with external support
Formulate narratives
Execute narratives
Assess narratives
Elicit repressive behavior by the counterinsurgent
Fund the effort
Begin terrorist tactics
Phase 2
Destabilize targeted areas
Expand united front
Gain public awareness
Isolate counterinsurgent from masses
Incite counterinsurgent oppression of people
Professionalize/ indoctrinate/ increase cadre
Neutralize dissent / eliminate opposition
Spiritual unification of officers/men with army
Recruit/ train local militia/self-defense units
Increase discipline
Expand funding/supply/logistic network
Develop support areas
Involve population in the struggle
Obtain population passive complicity (at minimum)
Introduce countercultural laws with violation penalties
Threaten, intimidate, conduct assassinations
Kill people working closely with population as examples
Solidify external support mechanisms
Strategic terrorism/some small unit engagements
Exterminate small forces, harass and weaken counterinsurgency
Increase destructive capacity
Attrite enemy forces - increase target scope
Annihilate enemy capabilities
Attack enemy lines of communication
Phase 3
Guerrilla warfare
Expand tasks in Phase 2
Move toward professional security forces
Increase discipline
Phase 4
Mobile warfare
Expand tasks in Phase 3
Attrite the enemy

Professionalize local/regional militias
Establish secret service
Regional security efforts
Phase 5
Eliminate opposition
Expand tasks in Phase 4
Control national security forces
Full conventional capability
Maintain unconventional elite
National conscription

Table 5.3. Violent Mechanisms in Coordination with the Vanguard

If the purpose of the dissertation sought to develop a detailed Indications and Warning framework to be used to track insurgent capabilities and potential, then Table 5.3 would require even further operationalization and detailed metrics across each phase. But doing so would be premature. The proposed conceptual model still requires substantial vetting and verification before this process might start. For this reason, Table 5.4 represents the first attempt to combine critical activities for each component across phases. In addition to the four components, legal and territorial conditions from Chapter 2 are still included.

Phase	Legal	Territory	Vanguard	Political Mechanisms	Violent Mechanisms	Public Support
Phase 0	Use of legal processes	None	Identify elite core; Define end state and principal ideology; Stand up the Vanguard	Define political goals and agenda	Existing military/violent culture	Perceived inequity and injustice and social ferment
Phase 1	Illegal political acts	Safe houses, training camps, small buildings	Expand and place network in military, political and financial infrastructure	Establish targeted campaigns and grow the party	Begin terrorist tactics and grow the network and training programs	Collective excitement and coalescence
Phase 2	Rebellion	Control of local territory for limited duration	Weed out competition within the movement - capture lead of illicit networks	Develop and support growing political committees	Conduct strategic terrorism, small unit tactics and grow the component	Bureaucratize and build coalitions to develop higher organizational levels
Phase 3	Insurgency	Localized enduring control	Expand hold on resistance and secure international support. Taxation system	Set up local provisional leadership and collect taxes	Conduct guerrilla warfare and professionalize the armed component	Assimilation, cooptation or repression
Phase 4	Insurgency	Enduring regional control	Begin to move in the open and lead pol/mil forces. Establish secret service.	Execute regional political administration and hold elections	Mobile warfare, reconquest, gain technology, and build an army	Assimilation, cooptation or repression
Phase 5	Belligerency	State territory	Assimilate the vanguard into formal mechanisms	National political administration Constitution Execute state budget and conscription	Conventional capability and consolidation of armed components into national forces	Repression or success

Table 5.4 Composite Insurgency Phasing Model

The legal status in the left column of the phasing model is appropriate when capability thresholds are achieved horizontally across the other columns. For example, a belligerency is achieved when the insurgent movement controls the majority of the state territory; when the vanguard assimilates into formal political and violent mechanisms; when the insurgency establishes a national administration, a constitution, a budget, and a method of conscription; when the military incorporates insurgent organizations and becomes a national force; and when the public successfully assimilates into the state or is repressed.

Variation across insurgency phases, however, will be frequently observed and occurs when violent mechanisms are in a higher phase than public support or political mechanisms – and vice versa. This is often the case with insurgency starting conditions that almost always fluctuate across phases. Additionally, some organizations do not have the will or capacity to progress through increasingly complex functions. The ways in which the components of the framework align in relationship will define their maximum phasing capacity and create a range or typology of insurgent movements.

By highlighting the interworking thresholds of the relationship framework, the proposed framework helps to illustrate whether or not an insurgency may successfully scale. For example, if we think of each column as a pathway for insurgency comprised of associated tasks, it becomes apparent that certain insurgencies may begin where the level of maturity along a given pathway is more advanced than another. One insurgent movement may top out in phase two or three. Another may reach advanced stages in one component but lack capability in others. The quality of the relationships across

framework components and the actions taken within each phase speak to the nature of the emergent state.

This comparative methodology provides greater insight than current doctrinal models presented in Chapter 2, especially when each box within the phasing construct is operationalized. In isolation, each column is interesting but less impactful. However, when one begins to understand how armed components across insurgencies operationalize to control violence, or how different vanguards leverage the public, then the framework becomes a tool for assessment. Awareness arises regarding how insurgent movements build as connections between columns strengthen over time—or conversely degrade as these relationships or capabilities deteriorate.

Chapters 6 and 7 unpack the relationship framework and composite phasing construct, assessing strengths and weaknesses in light of two comparable cases. The Chechen and Kosovar Albanian insurgencies provide insight and specific examples of the activities that occur within each phase. They also present pathway combinations of strength and coordination between the vanguard, the political and violent mechanisms, as well as public support. Chapter 8 then consolidates the findings and analysis from the case studies and assesses the viability of the phasing model as a usable tool to better comprehend insurgency behavior, movement scalability, and associated response options.

Chapter 6

The Politics of Insurgency Case Study 1: The Chechen Revolution¹

6.1 The Case of Chechnya

The Republic of Chechnya declared independence from the Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and for three years maintained autonomy with little interference. By December 1994, however, Moscow attempted to recapture the breakaway republic and Russian troops advanced on the Chechen capital of Grozny to end the Chechen insurgency. The next two years proved disastrous for the Chechen people as approximately 100,000 civilians died during the Russian siege. When the First Chechen War ended with a cease-fire agreement signed in 1996, violent resistance did not end. Rather, it transformed over the next five years from a broadly based nationalist movement to a less politically engaged network led by radical Islamic elements. When the Second Chechen War commenced in 1999, the insurgency would never gain the momentum it acquired at the outset of the first war. The organization that persists today in Chechnya is primarily limited to small unit tactics and terrorist activities.²

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship framework across the phasing model introduced in Chapter 5. The development of the Chechen insurgency supports the arguments advanced in the previous chapter and illustrates the dynamics of scaling necessary to progress across phases. See Figure 6.1. Each of the five sections

¹ Much of the research and groundwork for this chapter comes from a previously published work. Maegen Nix and Shana Marshall, “Chechen Revolution: 1991–2002,” in *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009*, ed. Chuck Crossett (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2012), 489–524.

² Many members of the Chechen organization are involved in direct support to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). They continue to counter Russia interests.

describes a different period across the conflict. For example, the first section explores the context of the revolution's origin and the associated phasing variation across the relationship framework at its start. It breaks out the phasing analysis separately to provide a foundation from which to build the subsequent narrative across the chapter. All additional sections merge the discussion of events with phasing analysis.




Figure 6.1 Insurgency Relationship Framework

The second section examines the initial period of Chechen independence and the preliminary efforts of the insurgency to consolidate power. The third section assesses the First Chechen War and the actions and behaviors of the evolving vanguard, the public, and the movement's political and military mechanisms during its aftermath. The fourth section explains the diminishing impact of the insurgency during and after the Second Chechen War and relates these changes to associated variation across components. External support and actions taken by the Russians will also be discussed in terms of their impact on the movement. Finally, I conclude the chapter by reflecting on the analysis of

the insurgency and the arguments made in Chapter 5. This section also describes the state of Chechnya's insurgent framework today.

Ultimately the Russians targeted the Chechen civilian population to such an extent that they could not emotionally or physically support insurgency growth. They eliminated and restricted the base from which to draw. In addition, the vanguard leadership became alienated from the public over time. Although the predominant Chechen characteristics of independence and competition became assets in maintaining clan identity and growing a substate economy, the political apparatus could not scale to build a state economy or develop constitutive political mechanisms across the nation.

Table 6.1 serves as a heuristic reference across the build of the chapter. Each section discusses phase maturity in relation to the associated concepts.

Phasing #	Legal	Territory	Vanguard	Political Mechanisms	Violent Mechanisms	Public Support
Phase 0	Use of legal processes	None	Identify elite network; Define core ideology and end state; Stand up the Vanguard	Define political goals and agenda	Existing military/violent culture	Perceived inequity and injustice and social ferment
Phase 1	Illegal political acts	Safe houses, training camps, small buildings	Expand and place network in military, political and financial infrastructure	Establish targeted campaigns and grow the party	Begin terrorist tactics and grow the network and training programs	Collective excitement and coalescence
Phase 2	Rebellion	Control of local territory for limited duration	Weed out competition within the movement - capture lead of illicit networks	Develop and support growing political committees	Conduct strategic terrorism, small unit tactics and grow the component	Bureaucratize and build coalitions to develop higher organizational levels
Phase 3	Insurgency	Localized enduring control	Expand hold on resistance and secure international support. Taxation system	Set up local provisional leadership and collect taxes	Conduct guerrilla warfare and professionalize the armed component	Assimilation cooptation or repression
Phase 4	Insurgency	Enduring regional control	Begin to move in the open and lead pol/mil forces. Establish secret service.	Execute regional political administration and hold elections	Mobile warfare, reconquest, gain technology, and build an army	Assimilation cooptation or repression
Phase 5	Belligerency	State territory	Assimilate the vanguard into formal mechanisms	National political administration Constitution Execute state budget and conscription	Conventional capability and consolidation of armed components into national forces	Repression or success

Table 6.1 Composite Insurgency Phasing Model

6.2 Insurgency Origins in Chechnya

Chechnya sits in a geographic region known as the Caucasus. See Figure 6.2.

Covering an expanse of territory between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus ranges as far south as Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, and as far north as numerous republics in the Russian Federation. By the eleventh century, the area hosted a predominantly Muslim population that today is home to more than seventy-five different ethnicities. Although Chechnya itself is roughly the size of New Jersey, historically, it is one of the most ethnically homogenous societies in the region. Even in 1998, 70 percent of the population remained ethnically Chechen, while less than 2 percent identified Russian as their national language.³



Figure 6.2 Political Map of the Caucasus Region (2008)⁴

³ Gail W. Lapidus, "Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 10.

⁴ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caucasus>.

When Russian troops first entered Chechen territory during the reign of Ivan the Terrible in 1552, Chechen resistance to Russia began. At the time, Chechnya's northern neighbor represented one of many outside invaders within the region, including Arabs, Persians, and the Ottomans. More persistent efforts by Russia to subdue Chechnya began during the reign of Catherine the Great in the late eighteenth century. As early as 1816, records indicate that Russian treatment of Chechnya included "means of punitive raids on mountain villages, collective punishment, razing of houses and crops, deforestation, forced mass deportation, and settlement of Cossacks on lands vacated by the Chechens."⁵

Resistance against tsarist Russia fluctuated over time. Between 1830 and 1859, Chechen Shaykh Shamil established a Sufi Naqshbandi Islamic Imamate across both Chechnya and Dagestan.⁶ The Imamate originated a localized and culturally specific system of taxation that became integral to North Caucasian self-identity. Although the Naqshbandi were eventually defeated,

the Sufi brotherhoods never ceased to wield influence and formed an alternative system of administration. This system permeated all levels of social, religious, and political life in Chechnya and Dagestan and, based as it was on a clandestine network of Murid (students of Sufism) organizations, remained largely outside Russian reach.⁷

⁵ Tony Wood, *Chechnya, The Case for Independence* (New York: New Left Books/Verso, 2007), 21. Also see Moshe Gammer, *Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnya and Daghestan* (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1994). Gammer's full book analyzes the Russian conquest of Chechnya and Daghestan.

⁶ The Chechen Sufi tradition derives from Arab/Sunni origins rather than Shia/Persian origins. Many scholars would call Chechens Sunni. The purpose of the distinction here is differentiating Sufi practice from radical Sunni Wahhabi practice in future sections.

⁷ Anna Zelkina, "Jihad in the Name of God: Shaykh Shamil as the Religious Leader of the Caucasus," *Central Asian Survey* 21, no. 3 (2002): 260.

In accordance with the Sufi mystical tradition of *tariqa* that included *shari'a* law, *ghazavat* (holy war), and jihad, the Imamate collected funds to support pensions for widows, invalids, and military hospitals.⁸

Chechnya's stance toward Russia became a tenacious struggle across clans that fostered a collective desire for Chechen autonomy from the Russian state. The Chechen insurgency of the late twentieth century would draw from socio-cultural institutions and practices of violent resistance that developed over centuries. At the same time, however, the resistance never constituted political institutions or social practices needed to build a modern nation state. Little interest existed to unify politically outside of independent clan identities or to develop a unified governmental structure across the region.

In 1917, Vladimir Lenin made false promises to the Chechen clans and manipulated their desire for autonomy from Russia. The broader region proclaimed itself to be the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus and included a 27,000-square-mile footprint covering the areas that now comprise Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia–Alania, Kabardino–Balkaria, and Dagestan. In order to recruit fighters to support the Russian revolution, Lenin declared the Chechen people free and inviolable. Once the Communists came into power, however, the Red Army moved into the region as occupiers and Chechen resistance to Russia, then the Soviet Union, reemerged.

Through the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviets collectivized agriculture within the republic. Resistance to such practices

forced the predominantly peasant population to turn inwards in an attempt to resist communism and Russian rule. This process led to the increased influence of religious brotherhoods and the preservation of traditional village and clan structures as well as customs and traditions.⁹

⁸ Wood, *Chechnya*, 24.

⁹ Bogdan Szajkowski, "Chechnia: The Empire Strikes Back," *GeoJournal* 37, no. 2 (1995): 231–32.

The Chechen people developed a parallel way of life underneath the Russian political system to maintain their identity and access subsistence resources. Numerous uprisings continued between 1922 and 1942 after Stalin first “sliced away and incorporated” components of the Mountainous Republic into Russia.¹⁰

Interestingly, during World War II, roughly 20,000 Chechens joined the Soviet Army against Hitler. When Chechen territory briefly came under German occupation during the war, Stalin believed the Chechens collaborated toward this end with the Germans.¹¹ He subsequently recalled all soldiers and officers of Caucasian origin from the German front and sent them to work in Siberian Gulags.¹² Then, in 1944, Stalin deported the entire Chechen population to Central Asia where 30 percent of its men, women, and children died. “Even by the most conservative estimate, the Chechen and Ingush people lost, across the years of exile, over a third of their total number.”¹³ Although Nikita Khrushchev rehabilitated the Chechens in 1957, the Soviet Union did little to ameliorate Chechen political marginalization or displacement. For many, upon return, their homes and land stood occupied by Russian settlers and government officials.

Anti-Russian sentiment among the Chechen population coalesced further during exile and solidified the base of a national consciousness; it also strengthened traditional networks and certain cultural norms within the succeeding generation. For example,

¹⁰ Wood, *Chechnya*, 31. “The Soviet period of the history of Chechnia is punctuated by a succession of popular uprisings against Moscow rule: 1924, 1928, 1937, 1940 and 1942” (Szajkowski, “Chechnia,” 231).

¹¹ David R. Stone, “Chechnya Wars (1990s–present),” in *The Encyclopedia of War*, ed. Gordon Martel (Online: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2011), 1. Comparative accounts suggest that the Germans never reached the territory and the reason for the annihilation of the people was entirely fabricated by the Soviet propaganda machine (Szajkowski, “Chechnia,” 232).

¹² “Remembering Stalin’s Deportation,” *BBC News*, February 23, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3509933.stm>.

¹³ Valery Tishkov, *Chechnya, Life in a War-Torn Society* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), 27.

“[t]he mass deportation of the Chechens in 1944 far from destroying the Sufi brotherhoods, actually promoted their expansion” and reinforced the importance of clan structures.¹⁴ In 1992, when Chechnya declared national independence and adopted its first constitution, one in three Chechens was a 1944 deportation survivor, including both of the first two Chechen presidents.¹⁵ Dzhokhar Dudayev, for example, was born in Chechnya in 1944 and then spent thirteen years living with his family in exile in Kazakhstan.¹⁶

During the Chechen period of exile in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, the Soviet Union continued to collectivize the arable land within Chechnya and brought some industry to Grozny. In particular, the region became central to the Soviet capacity to refine oil and move gas from the Caspian basin.¹⁷ After rehabilitation, Chechens continued to maintain an agrarian lifestyle and depended on livestock and poultry production for sustenance.¹⁸ Although farming provided clan subsistence, wealth generation derived from raising livestock.¹⁹ The prominence of a shadow economy, or an alternative method of transferring wealth and value other than through formal state institutions or licit mechanisms, benefited the future Chechen resistance. Even during exile, the shadow economy served as “one of few means of generating income free of state scrutiny and official discrimination... transforming the nature of its national

¹⁴ Szajkowski, “Chechnia,” 231.

¹⁵ Wood, *Chechnya*, 38.

¹⁶ Andrew Higgins, “Profile: Dzhokhar Dudayev: Lone Wolf of Grozny,” *The Independent*, January 22, 1995, <http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/profile-dzhokhar-dudayev-lone-wolf-of-grozny-1569145.html>.

¹⁷ By the early 1990s, two large refineries and a petro-chemical complex stood outside Grozny. “Chechnia has 25% of Russia’s oil refining capacity” (Szajkowski, “Chechnia,” 234).

¹⁸ Technical Cooperation Department, The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), *The FAO Component of the Inter-agency Consolidated Appeals 2005* (Rome: Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division, 2004), <http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/y5805e/y5805e06.htm#TopOfPage>.

¹⁹ Moshe Gammer, *The Lone Wolf and the Bear, Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), 4.

movement.”²⁰ The parallel economy became its own social mechanism and grew after rehabilitation to include smuggling, criminal gangs, and migrant work; by the late 1980s, “an estimated 40,000 Chechen and Ingush men were taking part each year in the unofficial labour migrations” and often spent time in prison for their violations.²¹ Prison time solidified criminal ties and also forged emergent Islamic connections outside of the Sufi network to begin weakening traditional social structures.

As indicated previously, low levels of industrialization came to Grozny over time. All of it, however, was run by the Soviet government and primarily employed Russian workers; 95 percent of profits from resource extraction and industry fed the central Soviet budget.²² Benefits from land resources never made their way to the Chechen infrastructure or the population. Furthermore, because Chechens tried to regain their numbers after deportation without a backbone for growth and development, the nation could not support its growing population based on agricultural output. Unemployment and poverty became pervasive and the “labor surplus reached perhaps 100,000 to 200,000, or 20-30% of the able-bodied population” by the First Chechen War.²³

After Chechen rehabilitation, a small minority of the population entered into the Soviet bureaucracy. The federal Soviet system allowed privileges to certain ethnic elites in return for public and military service. This enabled the Soviet Union to develop ethnic enclave networks across its competitive construct of ethno-territorial federalism. Institutionally, the Soviet Union maintained a hierarchy of ethnicities that gained different rights and benefits based on their status within the system. Certain ethnic

²⁰ Wood, *Chechnya*, 42.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 44.

²² Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 41.

²³ Svetlana Glinkina and Dorothy Rosenberg, “The Socioeconomic Roots of Conflict in the Caucasus,” *Journal of International Development* 15, no. 4 (2003): 517–19.

territories reached the level of an ASSR, an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, but not an SSR, a Union Republic or Soviet Socialist Republic. According to practice, one's status was not absolutely static.

[T]he borderline between the status of a 'Union' republic, which had the right 'to leave' the Union and that of an 'autonomous' republic, which had no such right, was never impassable. Kazakhstan was at first an autonomy within the Russian Federation; Moldova was once also an autonomy within Ukraine.²⁴

When infighting between the Soviet and Russian leadership began in the early 1990s and the Soviet state began to disintegrate, Chechnya had yet to attain the status of a Union Republic with the right to leave. At the time, President Mikhail Gorbachev led the Soviet Union while Boris Yeltsin led the Russian Republic within it.²⁵

Chechnya was of course part of the Russian SSR, also called the Soviet Federated Socialist Republic or SFSR. As the Soviet Union fell apart, the regions that began to declare independence included the republics of Lithuania in March 1990 and Armenia in August. These two initial declarations were shortly followed by Georgia in April 1991; Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan that August; Tajikistan in September; Turkmenistan in October; and Kazakhstan in December. Chechen political moves toward independence coincided with this timeline and hinged upon the leadership of Dzhokhar Dudayev, who became the first Chechen president.²⁶ His leadership and that of other key Chechens within the Soviet system, in

²⁴ Wood, *Chechnya*, 187.

²⁵ Traditional Soviets liked neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin though the two were rivals and competed for power.

²⁶ In addition to the fact that the Soviet GPU picked off pre-Revolutionary leaders and intellectuals, exile and discrimination within the Soviet system against the Chechens prevented the development of a Chechen political elite "who could have conducted a seamless oligarchic restoration of the kind that took place elsewhere in the former Soviet lands" (Wood, *Chechnya*, 46). The GPU stands for the Gossudarstvennoye Polititscheskoje Upravlenije.

conjunction with the Yeltsin–Gorbachev rivalry, “paralyzed the operations of government in Moscow and” contributed to Chechen separatism.²⁷

Dudayev entered the political scene in Chechnya after a distinguished career in the Soviet Air Force; he was the first Chechen to make the rank of general officer.²⁸ Russian President Yeltsin hoped to gain Dudayev’s advocacy in order to secure Chechen support for his broader political campaign. Perhaps not so unlike his predecessors during the Russian Revolution, Yeltsin hoped to accrue the allegiance of various ethnic leaders within the Chechen administrative system for his own political goals. Consequently, Yeltsin initially supported Dudayev’s leadership progression within the Executive Committee of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People (ANCCP), hoping to outmaneuver regional elites loyal to Gorbachev.

A handful of Moscow-based Chechens within the emergent Vainakh Democratic Party led by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev formed the ANCCP in late November 1990. These individuals included aggressive nationalists, some with very little political experience, who split away from their membership within the region’s moderate and Soviet-supported Popular Front, the Checheno-Ingushskii Narodnyi Front Sodeistviia Perestroike (ChINFSP). The ChINFSP had formed in the late 1980s to align with Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika and comprised intelligentsia and local Russians working on initiatives to protect Chechen religious freedom and culture, improve its political status within the Soviet system, and block future plans to establish a local biochemical plant.²⁹

²⁷ Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 63.

²⁸ Dudayev became one of the privileged ethnic elite discussed above.

²⁹ Gammer, *The Lone Wolf*, 200.

When the ANCCP first came together, it declared that the legitimacy of its representatives derived from local surveys distributed across Chechnya.³⁰ Other sources suggest that delegates were “elected at village assemblies throughout Chechnya and from the Chechen diaspora in other parts of the Soviet Union.”³¹ From those efforts, approximately 1,000 delegates, including Dudayev as an invited guest, convened during the first congress meeting to publish a political agenda similar to that of the ChINFSP.³² For example, the ANCCP approved measures to support “the Chechen language and culture, the Muslim religion, and restitution of their losses for those previously deported.”³³ The ANCCP narrative, however,

was more nationalist and radical than the ChINFSP, at least on two counts: first, it demanded that the Chechen-Ingush ASSR become an SSR (that is, a fully-fledged Union republic equal to and not part of the RSFSR). Second—and more important—it did not recognize the existing Soviet authorities of the republic.³⁴

In addition to defining political goals and a future agenda during the first ANCCP meeting, the founding leadership asked Dudayev to play a larger role in the future of the organization.³⁵

Therefore, after being elected as Chairman of the ANCCP in 1990, and with Yeltsin’s initial support, Dudayev spearheaded the Chechen national movement to dissolve the Chechen Supreme Soviet leadership and to derail Gorbachev’s parallel political efforts in the region. When the second national congress took place in July 1991, the ANCCP declared itself to be the sole legal organ of power in the new republic and

³⁰ Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 58.

³¹ Paul B. Henze, “Islam in the North Caucasus, the Example of Chechnia,” Circassian World.com, accessed February 27, 2015, www.aheku.org/datas/users/l-henze_islam_northcaucasus.pdf, 14.

³² Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 58.

³³ *Ibid.*, 59.

³⁴ Gammer, *The Lone Wolf*, 201.

³⁵ Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 59.

negated ties to the former soviet political structure. In August, while Yeltsin made his own moves against Gorbachev in Moscow, Dudayev further countered the legitimacy of existing Soviet political institutions locally.

The ANCCP called for new elections, a general strike, and a mass-*miting* or “non-stop demonstration in the central square of Grozny which went on for several weeks.”³⁶ According to some interpretations, “leaders in Grozny began engineering demonstrations against the acting authorities... Participants in the Sheik Mansur Square demonstrations, for example, received up to 100 rubles a day” for participation.³⁷ Organizers served food and supporters participated in traditional dances. In order to protect these activities from Soviet retaliation or response, Yeltsin and other Chechens within the Russian administration and police prevented the use of force against protestors.³⁸

By late August 1991, some demonstrators began to carry weapons and armed supporters seized government buildings, radio stations, and television stations. In September, Dudayev demanded the resignation of the regional Soviet elite and the establishment of a new provisional government.³⁹ On September 2, the ANCCP declared from Grozny that the Supreme Soviet was overthrown and “handed over powers” to its executive committee.⁴⁰ On September 6, the Grozny Supreme Soviet chairman was thrown from a window and killed after “the National Guard (whose ranks had swelled with released criminals) stormed the Supreme Soviet headquarters.”⁴¹ Dudayev commanded the National Guard during these activities; the ANCCP executive committee

³⁶ Gammer, *The Lone Wolf*, 202.

³⁷ Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 60.

³⁸ Anatol Lieven, *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 60.

³⁹ Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 61; Szajkowski, “Chechnya,” 233.

⁴⁰ FBIS Report, “Political Guide to Chechen Ingushetia,” *Central Eurasia*, (1995) quoted in P. L. Dash, “Russia’s War of Attrition in Chechnya,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 30, no. 7/8 (1995): 373.

⁴¹ Gammer, *The Lone Wolf*, 202.

had created the armed National Guard and made Dudayev its leader in 1990 when he became the executive committee chairman.⁴² “Later, when circumstances changed, Yeltsin would accuse Dudayev of seizing power by an ‘illegal coup d’état’; however, at the time he put pressure on the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR to dissolve.”⁴³ By September 15, surrounded by the National Guard, the Soviet-led chamber conducted its last session and then dissolved.⁴⁴

The relationship between Yeltsin and Dudayev quickly soured when the Chechens disbanded the provisional council that was established to replace the Soviet system. Again, Dudayev used the National Guard to suspend the organization and occupy its building on October 5.⁴⁵ On October 27, 1991, Chechnya held presidential and parliamentary elections. As the Russian Federation contested the election and declared it illegal, Chechen separatist rhetoric increased.⁴⁶ Dudayev became the first president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI) on November 2 and proclaimed Chechen independence less than two months before the official breakup of the Soviet Union.⁴⁷ When Yeltsin declared a state of emergency on November 8, “Dudayev reciprocated by declaring martial law” and used the National Guard to take over the roads, communications, and the airport.⁴⁸

⁴² Gammer, *The Lone Wolf*, 201; Wood, *Chechnya*, 49.

⁴³ Gammer, *The Lone Wolf*, 202-203.

⁴⁴ Gammer, *Ibid.*, 203.

⁴⁵ Gammer, *Ibid.*, 203.

⁴⁶ “Although the newly elected parliament was split between Dudayev’s Vainakh (Our People) party, the Green Movement, and various Islamic groups, Dudayev was elected president by 85% of the vote from among four candidates” (Szajkowski, “Chechnia,” 233). Moshe Gammer writes that, “Out of 638608 eligible voters 458,144 (71.74 per cent) cast their vote, of whom 412,671 (90 per cent of the votes, 64.62 per cent of the electorate) voted for Dudayev” (Gammer, *The Lone Wolf*, 203).

⁴⁷ Julie Wilhelmsen, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 57, no. 1 (January 2005): 36.

⁴⁸ On p. 233 of “Chechnia,” Szajkowski cites Martin McCauley, ed., *Longman Biographical Directory of Decision-makers in Russia and the Successor States* (Longman, Harlow, 1993).

Trenin and Malashenko offer an explanation of the declining relationship between the Russian and Chechen leadership. They describe that Dudayev supported Yeltsin's August 1991 coup attempt against Gorbachev in Moscow. The initial ANCCP campaign against the "local apparatchiks" in Grozny should be considered in this light; the Chechen leader, however, became surprised and offended when "the victorious Yeltsinites continued ungratefully, to treat the NCCP with suspicion, regarding it as a stronghold of separatism. The Russian parliament refused to recognize the congress and supported instead" a provisional council composed of individuals they "considered to be old-guard nomenklatura" rather than leadership that would take Chechnya in a new direction.⁴⁹ "[T]he Chechen congress described this lack of support as a provocation 'fraught with unpredictable consequences and fratricidal bloodshed.'"⁵⁰ It impacted the unfolding of events that compelled the new Chechen government to fully separate from the Soviet Union and from Russia.

According to Valery Tishkov, a member of the Russian governmental committee who worked to define a peace plan between Russia and Chechnya in 1995,

The post-Soviet collective manifestation is an interesting anthropological phenomenon: it was not a political outpouring in the usual sense; rather, it was a demonstration of group solidarity, a liberated spirit, and a provocative militancy, all of it mobilized and directed by a small circle of activists.⁵¹

Tishkov noted that the Chechen resistance within Grozny lacked an underlying "agreement on power-sharing" at the beginning of the insurgency throughout

⁴⁹ Dmitri Trenin and Aleksei Malashenko, *Russia's Restless Frontier, the Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 17.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 60.

participatory parties and the clans.⁵² Rather, it relied on the funding and leadership of the Muskovite Chechen elite to interfere with Soviet decision making and to support mobilization.

Although Yeltsin began to deploy troops and threatened invasion, he was forced to rescind these units when the Russian parliament declined to support his actions and instead required a political approach. For example, on November 10, “600 Interior Ministry troops landed at the airport of Grozny, where they were surrounded by vastly larger numbers of the National Guard and armed civilians.”⁵³ Yeltsin remained limited to the Interior Ministry troops in November because he did not yet hold the authority to command the state Army, which still fell under Gorbachev’s jurisdiction.

As previously mentioned, once the Soviet Union fell apart on December 26, 1991, a number of other autonomous republics rejected participation in the new Commonwealth of Independent States. Because the losses of the Baltic States and other territories were perceived to pose a greater security risk than Chechnya, and because of serious internal domestic challenges within Russia, Chechnya was able to act independently of Russia between 1991 and 1994. It adopted a new constitution in March 1992 that embraced religious freedom within a secular framework and for a short time appeared to move toward democratic political reform. Unfortunately for Chechnya, however, its territorial placement within the Caucasus represented a strategic crossroads along the Russian pipeline system and therefore would not be indefinitely overlooked.⁵⁴ Knowledgeable of

⁵² Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 60.

⁵³ Gammer, *The Lone Wolf*, 203.

⁵⁴ There are additional explanations for why Russia moved to retake Chechnya. For example, some contend Yeltsin’s pride depended on it or that he needed to boost his popularity. Others suggest fear of a kind of domino theory that would set a bad precedent for other regions hoping to gain autonomy.

this situation, and because of Yeltsin's subsequent behavior, Dudayev very quickly looked to consolidate a military capability.

6.2.1 Relationships and Phasing of the Initial Chechen Resistance

With respect to the level of public support for Chechnya's insurgency, clearly its people coalesced around the inequity and injustice done to them by Russia and the Soviet Union. Opposition to Russian rule became part of the Chechen social and psychological fabric over the course of three centuries. Even so, by the early 1990s and according to the phasing construct, public support for the insurgency only matured to levels between Phases 2 and 3. While fully assimilated to the idea of opposition to Russian rule, Chechens experienced limited opportunities to exercise acceptance and build institutional support for the new government. The nation still needed to develop community-embedded coalitions at localized levels to support political and armed mobilization. Although hope existed that the new government and an emergent civil society would gain the opportunity to build these relationships, an agreement regarding the makeup and administration of a Chechen state between the clans, emergent political parties, and new state institutions never materialized.

Much of the insurgency's resistance activity through 1991 revolved around limited interdependent and competitive underground mechanisms rather than the development of unified constitutive forces or social institutions needed to support a state.⁵⁵ As previously mentioned,

⁵⁵ Sources disagree regarding the number of active clans in the region, which is the size of New Jersey. The number ranges from thirty to 170. Caspar ten Dam suggests 150 to 170, although Szajkowski argues approximately thirty big clans based on Helen Krag and Lars Funch, *The North Caucasus: Minorities at a Crossroads* (London: Minority Rights Group International, 1994). "The social structure based on the clan system plays a dominant role regarding who can get married or trade with whom, who is regarded as a friend or foe. The traditional non-hierarchical social structure of the clan formations centered around a

[t]o start with, the Chechens' definition of independence (this included members of the [ANCCP] leadership) was a 'negative' one. In other words, to them, independence meant being left alone, living no more under the... Soviet authorities. None of them had a 'positive' definition of the independence they had declared. When asked how they envisioned their future relations with Russia, the answer was always 'as they used to be'. No one thought in terms of border control, visas, a separate currency etc.⁵⁶

There are some indicators, however, that provide evidence of limited instances of higher levels of collective socio-political mobilization.

For example, mobilization of the public in Grozny began in the late 1980s. Prior to the mass-*miting* called for by the ANCCP and other political parties such as the Greens and Islamists in August 1991, isolated citizen demonstrations occurred after glasnost brought broader freedom of expression to the media. In one case, a controversial article revealed that Russian practices within Chechen biochemical plants produced and disseminated lysine, posing a health hazard. "This information sparked revolt in the republic," and mass demonstrations then demanded a "ban on the production of lysine."⁵⁷ P. L. Dash suggests that, "[t]his was the genesis of confrontation between the Communist authorities and the democratic public."⁵⁸ Mass meetings in Grozny brought out leaders who eventually helped to form the ANCCP. Yandarbiev, a Chechen scholar and poet who became involved in the demonstration leadership, represents the quintessential example.

fellowship of free and equal people endures to this day" (Szajkowski, "Chechnya," 230). Caspar ten Dam, "How to Feud and Rebel: 2.Histories, Cultures and Grievances of the Chechens and Albanians," *Iran and the Caucasus*, Vol. 15, No 1-2, May 2011, pp. 247-248.

⁵⁶ Gammer, *The Lone Wolf*, 206. Gammer uses OKChN rather than ANCCP as an acronym:

Obshchenatsional'nyi Kongress Chechnskogo Naroda or All National Congress of the Chechen People.

⁵⁷ Dash, "Russia's War of Attrition," 370.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

He founded the Vainakh Democratic Party and became the deputy chairman of the ANCCP in 1990.⁵⁹

A second example of higher levels of collective public organization came in the form of emerging political parties within Chechnya.

By early 1992 more than 50 associations, movements, organized groups, and political parties were in existence in the erstwhile Chechen-Ingush ASSR... At least twelve were exclusively Chechen... Only six of the total had a specifically Islamic character... At least eight other groups in addition to the Islamic Path Party called themselves parties or had characteristics of nascent political parties. These include: the Vainakh Democratic Party, the Daimokkh (Fatherland) Movement, the Movement for Democratic Reform, the Green Movement, the Popular Front, the Republican Party, the Justice Party, and the Chechen National Congress and its Executive Committee. The last-named organization, Dudaev's governing group, functioned as a coalition which included several of the others (as well as the Islamic Path).⁶⁰

The majority of Chechen political parties became active around the same period after perestroika. Even so, public affinity for these organizations and the birth of a multiparty system supported by participatory interest groups proved nascent and ineffective as a mechanism to bind the public to the political system and create institutional ties to the intended constitutional government.

In light of these limited steps toward state-like behavior, public participation within the emergent national political system remained immature. The layering between the clan system, local laws and customs, and the state remained ill-defined from a civic and political context and did not improve. With respect to public support for violent resistance on the other hand, hatred of the Russians and existing cultural institutions soon enabled the bureaucratization and organizational development of Chechen mechanisms to

⁵⁹ In *Chechnya* (46), Wood mentions Zelimkhan Yandarbiev and Akhmed Zakaev, who were prominent cultural figures.

⁶⁰ Henze, "Islam in the North Caucasus," 19–20. Henze cites Timur Muzaev and Zurab Todua, *Novaya Checheno-Ingushetia* (Moscow: Panorama, 1992).

drive increasing levels of collective violence. Local residents, for example, independently attacked various military installations to obtain access to weapons. This trend increased significantly over time and moved toward a combination of government and clan-led collective action.

As early as 1992, Chechen forces began to capture former Soviet stockpiles in order to gain weapons and materiel. They also established relationships with Russian service members who were open to bribes and payment for weapons. In 1994, when Russian troops first entered Chechnya, mass demonstrations by civilians effectively delayed the advance of the tanks on their way to Grozny.⁶¹

While the Chechen government focused on building units centered about Grozny, field commanders within the clan structures ran their own limited security capabilities in order to build locally based militias.

With respect to the maturity of formal political mechanisms within the state, the Chechen insurgency quickly reached an apparent Phase 4 by 1991, except within the Northern Clans who resisted the new government from the outset. The appearance of enduring regional control, however, is misleading. Because the nature of the political takeover of Chechnya occurred more along the lines of a coup than a slow-growing political movement, and because existing Soviet institutional support for needed infrastructure very quickly vanished, the funding, processes, services, and organizations required to uphold and execute regional political administration did not exist.⁶² Similarly,

[i]t is not surprising that the Soviet system did not produce large numbers of men with the political skills necessary to lead open societies, set rational priorities, bargain with interest groups and work to persuade

⁶¹ Nix and Marshall, "Chechen Revolution: 1991–2002," 507.

⁶² In many ways, events unfolded as a coup within a coup. Dudayev supported Yeltsin's moves against the Soviet system and then rejected the perceived terms that developed within that relationship.

competing constituencies to recognize the necessity to compromise for the common good.⁶³

The Soviet system conditioned administration officials to obey and implement priorities from the centralized organization.

So although on the surface the political system appeared to reach a regional level of control, its capability tended to the Phase 1 and Phase 2 levels of state maturity. Phase 1 activity in terms of a political and administrative infrastructure remained in its infancy. More substantive Phase 2 activity would require further interconnectivity between local, regional, and national level jurisdictions that could eventually introduce a consistent rule of law and collect funding needed to drive the government in subsequent phases.⁶⁴ For example, even though much of the Chechen economy existed in a realm parallel to the state, the consolidation of these activities within a licit system was absent from any political agenda at the time. A future Chechen state would need to further develop its political capacity to implement a system of taxation to get a handle on the economy—both licit and illicit.

With respect to the maturation of a military capability, Chechnya's institutional forces remained in a Phase 2 and Phase 3 level of development at the time of independence. After the founding of the National Guard, Dudayev very quickly called for the establishment of the Chechen armed forces on November 10, 1991. By December 24, in order to develop an institutional defense capability, he

introduced a law for the 'Defence of the Chechen Republic.' This law introduced mandatory military service for all male citizens of the republic aged 19-26... [It] placed under the disposal of the Chechen leadership the following units to carry out military missions: the president's personal

⁶³ Paul B. Henze, *Conflict in the Caucasus* (RAND Corporation, 1993), <http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P7830.html>, 11.

⁶⁴ Enforcement would hypothetically come from an emergent security apparatus.

guard of 30 to 50 men, two special purpose platoons of 50 men each, a detachment of the Islamic Path Party of 200 men, a headquarter defence platoon of 50 men, the border custom service regiment of 1,200 men, the mountain people's quick response force of 100-150 men, and the Chechen national guard of 10,000 to 15,000 men.⁶⁵

Although the National Guard and mass demonstrations constituted a large enough force in 1991 to push out limited counterinsurgent forces, without funding mechanisms to pay state institutional elements of violence, the development of a state-led armed force would prove impossible. State forces would be kept to the defense of Grozny.

So this begs the question, where did the vanguard exist with respect to the broader insurgency? If public support, political capability, and military capability all remained limited to attributes across Phases 1 through 3, what level of control and maturity did the vanguard wield to connect the actions and behaviors of these components? I argue that by the time Chechnya was able to declare independence in 1991, Dudayev's vanguard still operated on a Phase 1 to Phase 2 level of maturity. For example, the core of the elite network had yet to come together and Dudayev had only just begun to define key selection and placement of the vanguard leadership—to gather the reigns of influence over Chechen political parties, the National Guard, the new legislature, and regional alliances.

This status soon evolved. As Dudayev's command base grew between December 1991 and June 1992, he violated the new constitutional division of power across legislative, executive, and judicial branches and delegitimized the tripartite system. When the parliament attempted to hold a June 1992 referendum to limit Dudayev's violations, the president directed armed soldiers to raid the "parliament building, killing several

⁶⁵ In "Russia's War of Attrition" (372), Dash heavily references p. 6 of a *Central Asia* 1992 FBIS Report entitled "Political Guide to Chechen Ingushetia."

opposition deputies and arresting others.”⁶⁶ Dudayev took over the government and established full presidential control. Like Yeltsin in Russia, Dudayev “used tanks to disperse a defiant parliament.”⁶⁷ He suppressed the emerging representative political system and drove political power away from moderate and secular state institutions within Grozny. He did so, however, without strengthening or solidifying the essence of his base.

In terms of other phasing activities, Dudayev successfully directed small unit tactics executed by the National Guard and initiated a weeding out process regarding competition within the movement. Here he began primarily with the Popular Front reformists and then moved to the parties and leaders within the new Chechen government. Chechnya’s insurgent vanguard had yet to be tested since the insurgency exhibited such strong political origins.⁶⁸ Many Phase 2 activities still sat on the horizon in terms of capturing the leadership of potential illicit networks, further identifying and weeding out emergent political competition, and securing international support.

In order to strengthen the coordination between political and violent capabilities of a state, Dudayev needed to consolidate power and develop formal mechanisms of institutional control. Onsite international observers suggested in October 1992 that he lacked any visible inclination toward Islamic militancy and held Islamic fundamentalism did not pose a danger to Chechnya; given this assessment at the time, however, Dudayev

⁶⁶ Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 65.

⁶⁷ Gammer, *The Lone Wolf*, 205.

⁶⁸ Whereas many traditional insurgencies keep the vanguard hidden until later phases because of operational vulnerabilities, the initial leadership of the Chechen insurgency started publicly and then moved in the other direction over time.

also indicated that Russian actions could change Chechnya's path toward Islamic extremism.⁶⁹

6.3 Chechnya's Insurgency Autonomy

Once Chechnya declared independence in 1991, Yeltsin and the Russian legislature—even the Russian judicial system—acted in contradiction to one another until the large-scale Russian invasion of Chechnya began in 1994. For example, the Russian Federation legislature made several conciliatory overtures to bring Chechnya to the negotiating table. And after successful dialogue on legal, economic, and security issues in March 1992, Russian and Chechen representatives signed protocols recognizing Chechen political independence and state sovereignty.⁷⁰ Yeltsin, on the other hand, never accepted the Chechen claim of independence and worked against Dudayev in many ways.

First, in 1991, the Russian president severed financial and economic ties and imposed a blockade on Chechnya, arguing that their new political and economic infrastructure would fail. In response, the Chechen government formed its own currency that Russian banks quickly rejected. Second, Yeltsin sent Russian forces into Chechnya to expel the new government at least five times. Each coup traced directly to Yeltsin's office and the Russian Intelligence Service that leveraged conventional troops to conduct direct action missions.⁷¹ Third, Yeltsin dissolved the Russian Constitutional Court that

⁶⁹ Henze, "Islam in the North Caucasus," 20. "The international observer mission to Chechnia which I headed in September/October 1992 (sponsored by the London-based NGO, International Alert)... was invited to survey the situation in Chechnya by Valery Tishkov, then head of Goskomnat (the State Committee on Nationalities) in Moscow. We were encouraged to interview a wide range of officials and private individuals in Grozny and traveled extensively in the Chechen countryside. We also met with government officials" (Henze, "Islam in the North Caucasus," 20).

⁷⁰ Wood, *Chechnya*, 52.

⁷¹ Stephen J. Blank and Earl H. Tilford Jr., *Russia's Invasion of Chechnya: A Preliminary Assessment*, Strategic Studies Institute Special Report (US Army War College, 1995), 6–8.

ruled his actions against Chechnya were criminal and illegal. And finally, he also worked to implement a new constitution, eventually signed in December 1993, which negated any previously negotiated rights of constituent republics like Chechnya.

Chechnya's limited and rudimentary political and economic institutions and bureaucracy deteriorated without funding. "Formal institutions were replaced by informal family and clan ties, the only instrument available to ensure socially enforceable commitments, safety and the sharing of resources."⁷² The traditional substate economy based on informal networks within the region rapidly expanded to further encompass criminal networks often sponsored by Russian elites who benefited from the unregulated economy.⁷³ "The expansion of the black market put legal governance and the development of the rule of law in direct competition with the interests of local power brokers who divided control over political authority and resource flows."⁷⁴ The Russian blockade and subsequent black market activities polarized clan interests while Yeltsin bred both infighting and opposition to Dudayev by targeting specific clans for Russian support as early as 1991.⁷⁵

⁷² Glinkina and Rosenberg, "Socioeconomic Roots," 519.

⁷³ Activity requiring partnerships across and outside Chechen territory included "racketeering, money laundering, smuggling, criminal privatization, intentional bankruptcy, fraudulent securities, counterfeiting, unfair competition, illegal trade, tax crimes, etc" (Glinkina and Rosenberg, "Socioeconomic Roots," 517–20). Three of the largest gangs in Russia came from Chechnya: the Tsentralnaya, Avtomobilnaya, and one based in Ostankino; "[t]he number of members in these gangs was estimated at over two thousand, and they were feared both for their cruelty and their sophistication. They had intelligence as well as legal departments, they bribed officials on a massive scaled, and they maintained international connections with many countries" in support of the Chechen war effort and to expand their businesses. Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism, Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 220–21.

⁷⁴ Glinkina and Rosenberg, "Socioeconomic Roots," quoted in Nix and Marshall, "Chechen Revolution: 1991–2002," 494.

⁷⁵ In "Chechnia" (footnote 16, p. 236), Szajkowski cites a *Guardian* article (Andrew Harding, "Chechens Run Out of Time and Money," *The Guardian*, September 15, 1994, 12) that discusses a leader and former Red Army officer in the northern Terkh-hu clan who claimed to have received around 10 billion rubles from the Russian government. Szajkowski writes: "Russia has supplied technical expertise and advice, but not, Avturkhanov insisted direct military aid."

To reiterate themes introduced in the last section, although the dissolution of the Soviet Union enabled the potential for self-determination and democratic governance in Chechnya, Chechen political leadership lacked experienced elites and the infrastructure to mobilize its constituency for state institutional reform. Even though the first Chechen Constitution called for democracy and a liberal rule of law, when Russian state services disappeared and the Chechen economy crumbled, “Dudayev disbanded the state’s formal political opposition, empowered new corrupt elites who appropriated the republic’s natural resources for personal gain, and turned to narrow religious appeals in order to garner domestic support and attract financial resources from abroad.”⁷⁶ In a very short time, Chechnya lost its window of opportunity for meaningful state building. Dudayev fundamentally altered the initial relationship framework that started the early insurgency and directly impacted phasing maturity.

For example, Dudayev’s break with the Chechen constitutional construct spurred internal resistance to his leadership within the movement and contributed to some Russian success. Leaders such as Ruslan Labazanov, Yaragi Mamodayev, and Beslan Labazanov, who had originally joined Dudayev’s movement in 1992, switched sides to unite with a pro-Moscow opposition when Dudayev dismissed parliament in the spring of 1993.⁷⁷ As a result of this defection, Yeltsin supported a small northern coalition of Chechen warlords who might serve as proxies to overthrow Dudayev. These leaders “demanded a referendum on independence, accusing Dudayev of having usurped power and of violating the Chechen constitution.”⁷⁸ Russia contributed financially and through military aid to the development of their “pro-Moscow” provisional committee headed by

⁷⁶ Nix and Marshall, “Chechen Revolution: 1991–2002,” 500.

⁷⁷ Dash, “Russia’s War of Attrition,” 370.

⁷⁸ Trenin and Malashenko, *Russia’s Restless Frontier*, 20.

(Umar) Avturkhanov, an elected mayor within the northern Nadterechny district; for example, in June 1994, Yeltsin supplied Avturkhanov “40 billion rubles in cash, besides a fleet of 70 tanks and combat gunships with crew.”⁷⁹ Russian support to the resistance at this time, however, did not deter Dudayev’s forces, who defeated the opposition at Argun, just East of Grozny, in November 1994.⁸⁰

Fighting on this scale required a significant increase in Chechen military capabilities. Between 1991 and 1994, except for within those northern regions that aligned with Russia, Dudayev officially divided the Chechen security apparatus into areas of command based on clan structure as ground units began to emerge there anyway. This represents an additional major change to the framework. Dudayev repeatedly appeared to turn toward expedient options to consolidate a united front focused principally on building the Chechen capacity for violent resistance and empower clan independence at the expense of a central insurgent authority.

Where others might have turned toward international political and military support for independence, Dudayev would not find international validation of secession because it countered Russian interests as a United Nations Security Council member.⁸¹ The conflict occurred too close to Russia for the West to intervene as it did in places such as Kosovo, stressing already the new relationship between Russia and the West. Therefore, while the dissolution of legislative and judicial institutions prevented the establishment of an effective central government, moving both political and military authority to regional field commanders pushed the country toward decentralized

⁷⁹ In “Russia’s War of Attrition” (370), Dash quotes the *Moscow News Weekly*, December 2–8, 1994.

⁸⁰ Dash, “Russia’s War of Attrition,” 370.

⁸¹ Wood, *Chechnya*, 56.

warlordism.⁸² At the same time, however, it also strengthened the Chechen capacity for military resistance to Russian forces.

In a related effort to gain military capability, by 1993 Dudayev began to make direct appeals to Islamic organizations—both to support the insurgency and to serve in his political administration.⁸³ Unable to secure the development of a conventionally aligned national army through internal assets and public support, he turned to external donors in the realm of funding and training. At the outset, the psychological narrative of Sunni extremism did not threaten or detract from public support to Russian resistance. Over time, however, it intertwined with portions of the armed resistance, particularly outside of Grozny, and became central to the armed component’s psychological narrative.

It is unclear whether Dudayev understood the future implications of his decisions in this respect. The official transformation of insurgent goals and motivations to align with Sunni extremism proved polarizing and yielded two very different violent mechanisms within the broader Chechen movement—both among the elite and between the vanguard and the population. When Russian troops focused on the destruction of Chechnya’s moderately aligned national forces that defended Grozny, it left the strength of the political and military mechanisms within Chechnya to increasingly radical warlords—or to those warlords dependent on external resources provided by the radical transnational network and organized crime.

⁸² “The former separatist movements had produced a ‘Federation of Field Commanders.’ Rather than creating a coherent ethno-nationalist movement, Chechen separatism only served to devolve control over the region to a variety of warlords.” Sergey Markedonov, “Chechnya in Russia and Russia in Chechnya: 20 Years after the ‘Revolution’ in Grozny” (presentation, Center for Strategic and International Studies Russia and Eurasia Program, September 13, 2011).

⁸³ Nix and Marshall, “Chechen Revolution: 1991–2002,” 500.

Radical extremism carried a higher payoff to Dudayev's resistance than did the regional Sufi ideology, so much so that it entered a place within the vanguard and the new formal mechanisms of politics and violence within Chechnya. Recall this violates Mao's principal rule regarding the purity of the vanguard and its subsequent ability to control the movement. Because the vanguard started at such low levels of capability regarding initial phasing requirements, its elite network remained in flux without a positive agenda or sense of constitutive identity. By adding a new psychologically based element into the infrastructure, the Sunni agenda began to dominate the mindset and patterns of behavior of the Chechen insurgent leadership.

The initial introduction of Sunni extremism into the region began closely before Chechen independence as a result of conflict just outside of Chechnya. Although it fragmented when the Soviet Union collapsed, the first fundamental Sunni (as opposed to Sufi) political party emerged within the North Caucasus in 1990.⁸⁴ The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) aligned ideologically with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Pakistani Jama'at-I Islami. The IRP established connections between the resistance and Islamist groups in the Middle East and began to advocate for the establishment of a Northern Caucasus caliphate to unify regional Islamic populations under fundamental Salafi and Wahhabi principles.⁸⁵

The localized Chechen practice of Islam conflicted with Wahhabism because the Caucasus traditions merged pre-Islamic cultural tradition with a more mystical form of

⁸⁴ Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, "Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31, no. 5 (2008): 416.

⁸⁵ An interview with Chechnya's Grand Mufti Mahomad Arsanukaev discussed his view of the IRP. "The Islamic Renaissance party, present in many Muslim regions of the ex-Soviet Union, is not active in Chechnya, the Mufti said, 'and we do not want it to be. We do not believe in political activity by Muslims as Muslims.' On the other hand he said he felt an important responsibility for education of young people and described their weekly Thursday evening radio and television programs and educational activity" (Henze, "Islam in the North Caucasus," 21).

Sufism. Chechen Sufi leadership at the time also eschewed overt political power. When two Chechen Sufi leaders declined to participate in Dudayev's administration and Sufi orders refrained from supporting Dudayev's policies, they were labeled traitors and infidels by the state apparatus. Soon after, Islamic organizations outside Chechnya began to answer Dudayev's calls and a network of Arab financiers and facilitators connected the insurgency to transnational opportunities for support. "Initial alliances between emerging indigenous Salafists and their Middle Eastern counterparts at this critical historical juncture were one of the key enablers that opened up the region to foreign fighters."⁸⁶ Because Chechen society rejected large numbers of outside fighters, those foreign militants who did participate often held strategic positions within the movement.

In addition, Chechens returning from the diaspora to fight for an independent homeland provided an important connection between the insurgency and Sunni radicalization. Throughout the nineteenth century, thousands of Chechens moved to Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan and participated in Arab struggles against Russia as mujahedeen in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo.⁸⁷ For example, Khabib Ali Fathi, a long-standing member of the Muslim Brotherhood who fought in Afghanistan, returned to Chechnya in 1993.

In conjunction with local Islamists, [Fathi] established a Salafi Islamic jamaat known in Islamist circles as al-Jama'at al-Islamiyya. Capitalizing on his Chechen ancestry, Fathi organized his group and began da'wa (literally "the call," but more accurately proselytizing) among the Chechen population in alliance with a small number of Jordanian-Chechens, quickly creating a following numbering around ninety.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Moore and Tumelty, "Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya," 416.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

Fathi provided Dudayev access to funding channels and recruitment. During the first Chechen War, Dudayev appointed him principal Chechen religious adviser. “By 1995, approximately fifty hand-selected Arab fighters with Wahhabi allegiances were paired with Chechen field commanders under the leadership of Omar Ibn al-Khattab.”⁸⁹ Khattab was Fathi’s foremost recruit from Saudi Arabia, arriving in Chechnya in 1995. He trained Chechen forces in guerrilla warfare and would later impact the movement’s transition to terrorism. At the outset of the First Chechen War, Khattab’s units sat subordinate to the Chechen Armed Forces.⁹⁰

Besides Fathi, Khattab, and Yandarbiev, other key leaders became prominent within the vanguard movement after 1991. For example, Aslan Maskhadov, a retired Soviet Army colonel, joined the Chechen resistance in 1992 and became Dudayev’s military deputy, leading the Chechen defense forces as well as the defense of Grozny during the First Chechen War.⁹¹ Maskhadov represented a moderate force within the insurgency and resisted radicalization of the national movement.⁹² Shamil Basayev, on the other hand, became a force toward Sunni radicalization and served in Dudayev’s administration and as a field commander. Also a former Russian military member, Basayev held extensive special operations and intelligence experience in Russian conflicts against Georgia and Moldova.⁹³ The specific pairing of Basayev and Khattab

⁸⁹ Nix and Marshall, “Chechen Revolution: 1991–2002,” 503–504.

⁹⁰ Moore and Tumelty, “Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya,” 417.

⁹¹ Maskhadov was born in Kazakhstan and returned to the Chechen highlands during rehabilitation when he was six.

⁹² Aslan Maskhadov, leader of the Chechen rebels, died on March 8 at age 53. “Obituary: Aslan Maskhadov,” *The Economist*, March 10, 2005, <http://www.economist.com/node/3738936>.

⁹³ “A dropout from agricultural college in Moscow and sometime computer salesman, Basaev was on the barricades in 1991, defending Yeltsin against the August putsch, and fought as a guerrilla – he was an ardent admirer of Che Guevara – in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh in 1992–3” (Wood, *Chechnya*, 144).

became of great import to the direction of the Chechen vanguard after the Dudayev's death in 1996.⁹⁴

All in all, the three-year lull between the declaration of Chechen independence and the invasion of Russian troops saw a consolidation of power from the vanguard through the growth of violent mechanisms. Interlinked armed clans and emerging state-run forces exhibited increasing levels of phasing maturity in this area and will be explored in the following section. Dudayev supported expansive regional security interests and accomplished inconsistent Phase 2 and Phase 3 activities required of the vanguard. For example, he attracted international support from Sunni Islam and directed the development of insurgent guerilla and mobile units. On the other hand, Dudayev skipped essential components needed to handle and maintain leadership of the insurgency's growing mechanisms of violence. He could not control the momentum of compounding illicit networks or establish purity within the core of the vanguard. His actions instead began to breed internal competition among the vanguard leadership.

Additionally, any thought of an independent state political institution disintegrated in subordination to Chechnya's preparations for combat. Thus the Chechen political institutional maturity fell to Phase 0 levels. While much of the public mobilized to fight, political and economic institutions fell into further disarray. In this way, the relationship framework proved uneven between constitutive and destructive mechanisms. Public support to political mobilization shifted toward a Phase 0 status while support to

⁹⁴ Shamil Salmanovich Basayev, a Chechen warlord, died on July 10 at age 41. "Shamil Basayev," *The Economist*, July 13, 2006, <http://www.economist.com/node/7160644>. In *Chechnya* (144), Wood argues that Basayev adopted Islamist "rhetoric and terroristic methods" because it was a logical response to the Russian violence; he then goes on to note, however, that revenge against Russia for killing eleven members of his family during a bombing raid also played a part.

military mobilization moved across Phases 1 through 4 depending on the geographic area.

Yeltsin's own actions and coup attempts spurred Dudayev to consolidate military power at the expense of other requirements for state building, both politically and across the civil sector. Some sources describe Dudayev's building paranoia of attack from Yeltsin. Others reference a military-oriented vice politically focused background and capability.

Dudayev has done little to consolidate Chechen statehood and has been very slow to implement economic reform. His military background has not equipped him to develop a clear concept of political leadership or an understanding of the complexities of forging a democratic government. He has gathered a small clique of followers around him and governs arbitrarily and secretively. As a result he has fallen increasingly under the influence of corrupt "mafia" types and political adventurers.⁹⁵

Not only did the lack of resources hinder constitutive decision making, but the vanguard influenced and limited political growth and the development of state-level institutions. It simply couldn't scale.

6.4 The First Chechen War and Its Aftermath

One hypothesis for Russia's invasion in 1994 argues that Yeltsin initiated a large-scale attack in order to "forestall any parliamentary investigation of the previous five failed coups undertaken by the government."⁹⁶ The last of these occurred in late November 1994 when a small contingent of troops attempted to capture Grozny. After the fiasco, the Kremlin was presented with a choice between another "ignominious retreat and a decisive military intervention"; consequently, on December 11, Russian federal

⁹⁵ Tishkov cites Paul Henze's RAND Corporation report on Chechnya, which pulls from the International Alert mission he led to Chechnya in October 1992 (Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 83).

⁹⁶ Blank and Tilford, *Russia's Invasion of Chechnya*, 7.

forces commenced the war's first air campaign followed by the commitment of ground troops.⁹⁷

The First Chechen War thus began with an attempt to take Grozny and included indiscriminate "air and ground strikes on villages, targeting civilian infrastructure such as residences and hospitals, not allowing civilians to leave, shooting at fleeing civilians, establishing filtration centers, and taking hostages."⁹⁸ Between Dudayev's control of military assets around the capital and the armed mobilization established across the clans, the insurgency exhibited Phase 3 and limited Phase 4 capabilities of violent resistance. Both guerrilla warfare and low-level conventional tactics focused on traditional military targets at the outset. Chechens used former Soviet stockpiles and weaponry against Russian forces, shooting down air platforms with surface-to-air missiles and conducting low-level assaults and frequent night raids.⁹⁹ "In addition to small arms, the rebel arsenal included truck-mounted multibarrel *Grad* rocket launchers, a handful of T-72 and T-62 tanks, BTR-70s, some self-propelled assault guns as well as anti-tank cannon, and some portable anti-aircraft missiles."¹⁰⁰ More knowledgeable than the Russians on local avenues of approach and transportation infrastructure, Chechens ambushed these routes and frequently employed snipers on Russian targets. Some accounts indicate that the number of well-armed Chechen forces "did not exceed three or four thousand."¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ Trenin and Malashenko, *Russia's Restless Frontier*, 21.

⁹⁸ Nix and Marshall, "Chechen Revolution: 1991–2002," 510. Tishkov also speaks to practices of torture within Russian filtration camps where civilians were dropped alive from helicopters (Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 102).

⁹⁹ Mark Kramer, "Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Terrorism in the North Caucasus: The Military Dimension of the Russian-Chechen Conflict," *Europe-Asia Studies* 57, no. 2 (2005): 232.

¹⁰⁰ Olga Oliker, *Russia's Chechen Wars 1994–2000, Lessons from Urban Combat* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 17.

¹⁰¹ Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 97.

Eventually, however, Russian forces adapted to urban tactical requirements and the number of troops in Chechnya increased to “30,000 by February of 1995, with significant concentration near Grozny.”¹⁰² By late April, when Russian forces pushed Chechen fighters out of Grozny and into traditional southern mountain strongholds, Chechen capabilities degraded to Phase 2 and Phase 3 levels.¹⁰³ Many descriptions compare the *boyeviki*, or guerrilla-style forces that replaced the rank-and-file troops. Chechens from Grozny, for example, referred to the highland forces as scoundrels and criminals, or “renegades, idlers, and parasites” who often had as little compunction as Russian forces for killing city civilians.¹⁰⁴ Distinctions between the regular city forces and the methods of the field commanders are pronounced and highlight cultural distinctions between highland and lowland Chechens. The lowland Chechens represented the urban population while the highland Chechens conformed to isolated clan identities and evolving affinities.

Once Russia compromised the integrity of Grozny’s national defense force and drove the resistance into the highlands, Chechen tactics changed dramatically and incorporated the use of terrorism against Russians within Chechnya and across the border. First, on June 14, 1995, Chechen troops led by Basayev killed 150 civilians when they seized two bank buildings, a local hospital, and an administrative center in the border town of Budennovsk. Insurgents captured over 1,500 hostages and “promised that the hostages would be released if the Russians agreed to cease hostilities in Chechnya and

¹⁰² Olikier, *Russia’s Chechen Wars*, 23. The duration of the Russian push in Grozny stemmed heavily from Russian mistakes and incompetency. “The 1994-1996 campaign began without serious preparation, was waged ineptly, and ended with a disgraceful outcome for the federal government... the first Chechen campaign proved the Russian military organization to be grossly deficient at all levels” (Trenin and Malashenko, *Russia’s Restless Frontier*, 106).

¹⁰³ Dianne L. Sumner, “Success of Terrorism in War: The Case of Chechnya” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1999).

¹⁰⁴ Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 102.

withdraw their forces from the region.”¹⁰⁵ Ultimately, after a standoff with Russian forces and rounds of failed negotiations, Basayev’s forces returned to Chechnya, building some momentum for the resistance and a case for the efficacy of future terrorist tactics.

By the end of 1995, a small group of Chechen fighters assaulted Gudermes, Chechnya’s second largest city, through control of transportation nodes and attacks on key command points. The Gudermes attack reached a stalemate after two weeks of fighting. Then in March 1996, Basayev’s guerrilla forces made a similar trial run on Grozny that lasted five days. Finally that August, Chechens made coordinated attacks on

Grozny, Argun and Gudermes while Russian and Chechen officials negotiated to end the conflict. In Grozny, rebel troops began infiltrating the city a few days in advance. On the morning of August 6, two 50- to 60-man units captured the railroad station and other facilities and began moving toward the center of town. Estimates of the Basaev-led force were on the order of 600 guerrillas... The rebels succeeded in doing what the Russians had failed to do a year and a half before: they sealed off the three main avenues of approach into Grozny, restricting Russia’s ability to reinforce.¹⁰⁶

Russian troops were unprepared and responded both slowly and poorly for numerous reasons.¹⁰⁷

Following two weeks of fighting, roughly 2,000 Russian soldiers were dead, missing, or wounded; “[w]hen the battle finally ended, it was not with a military victory, but a cease-fire agreement finalized by negotiators Aleksandr Lebed and Maskhadov on

¹⁰⁵ Olikier, *Russia’s Chechen Wars*, 28.

¹⁰⁶ Olikier, *Russia’s Chechen Wars*, 30. Olikier cites Timothy Jackson, *David Slays Goliath: A Chechen Perspective on the War in Chechnya (1994-1996)*, Appendix C, “Chechen Technique for Urban Ambushes,” Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, 2000.

¹⁰⁷ “Most Russian analysts highlighted three key failures, one of them unique to Grozny and the other two generally applicable to the Chechen war as a whole. The first failure was that Russian forces had not effectively ‘blockaded’ or sealed the city of Grozny prior to attack. The second failure was the poor coordination between the forces in theater, particularly the MVD and the MoD. Air-ground coordination was also deficient. The third failure, discussed at length in the years after the war, was the loss of ‘the information war’ for public opinion” (Olikier, *Russia’s Chechen Wars*, 33).

August 22.”¹⁰⁸ (Dudayev died in April from a Russian air-to-ground missile and was temporarily succeeded by Yandarbiyev.) After two years of hostilities, both Chechens and Russians stood stunned at the emergent result.¹⁰⁹ Although the Chechens did not win, they also did not lose. The question would become whether or not the insurgency could recover from the devastating toll of the war to build constitutive mechanisms of a state. Chechnya had lost roughly 10 percent of its population to death and 30–40 percent as refugees; this means the region went from hosting 1,000,000 residents before the war to 500,000 to 600,000 after the cease-fire.¹¹⁰ The counterinsurgents decimated the Chechen population. On the Russian side, figures indicated “more than 25,000 [were] killed, wounded and missing in action.”¹¹¹ The Russian government needed to reframe the war in the minds of its own population and redirect its capabilities in the future to better handle the Chechen problem. The cease-fire agreements gave both sides an opportunity to make new moves regarding the conflict.

Specifically, the August 1996 Khasav Yurt agreement and the Moscow peace accord of May 1997 left the status of Chechnya open to future negotiation for the next five years and established some expectation of aid from Russia to help rebuild the infrastructure and agriculture it destroyed. According to Khasav Yurt, by October 1996, the Russian government would work toward “the reconstruction of currency, fiscal and budgetary mutual relations,” as well as initiate programs “for the rebuilding of the socio-

¹⁰⁸ Olikier, *Russia's Chechen Wars*, 31. Olikier cites Vladimir Trushkovskiy, “Terrible Dispatch” [alternatively, “Dispatch from Grozny”] (in Russian), *Kommersant-Daily*, August 15, 1996; Sergei Arbuzov, “Chechnya and the Army” (in Russian), *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, August 23, 1996; Vladimir Mukhin and Aleksandr Yavorskiy, “War Was Lost Not by the Army, But by Politicians” (in Russian), *Nezavisimaya Gazeta—Osobaya Papka*, Internet edition, no. 37 (2009), February 29, 2000; and “How It Was Taken” (in Russian), *Vremya Moscow News*, February 7, 2000.

¹⁰⁹ Tishkov explains that Chechens perceived their “victory” to be a “miracle” (Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 181).

¹¹⁰ Gammer, *The Lone Wolf*, 210.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

economic infrastructure of the Chechen Republic.”¹¹² Similarly, according to the Moscow peace accord, both sides agreed to “reject forever the use of force or threat of force in resolving all matters of dispute” between them.¹¹³

Contrary to written agreements, however, what followed after the cease-fire included further efforts by Russia to hasten the failure of the Chechen resistance. First, Moscow immediately reorganized its military doctrine and began to train and exercise troops for a follow-on military engagement within a Chechen operating environment.¹¹⁴ Second, it continued to identify future proxy leadership that would support a pro-Moscow agenda. And third, aid to the recovering territory never came. Instead, subversive black market activity continued to thrive and grow. For example, local warlords associated with criminal Islamic networks supported narcotic production in many highland and foothill districts. A culture of hostage-taking also greatly intensified. Although the practice started to build during the first war, it “developed into a branch of Chechnya’s economy” during the interwar period and generated “tens of millions of dollars” to purchase modern arms for the insurgency.¹¹⁵

Although the cessation of hostilities opened up a window for state building, by August 1996, Grozny and the other former city centers in Chechnya sat decimated and incapable of self-sustainment. “Unwilling to relinquish their power,” independent field commanders controlled the highlands and divided Chechnya’s territory between

¹¹² The Khasav Yurt Truce Agreement Between the Russian Federation and the Government of the Chechen Republic. 25 August 1996. Joint Statement. This is appendix A of Gammer’s *Lone Wolf and the Bear*, pp. 221–23.

¹¹³ Peace Treaty and Principles of Interrelation between Russian Federation and Chechen Republic Ichkeria, 1997, www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/rus2.pdf.

¹¹⁴ Michael Orr, “Second Time Lucky,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, March 8, 2000. Olikier, *Russia’s Chechen Wars*, 36–37.

¹¹⁵ Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 107.

themselves.¹¹⁶ And the relationship between the Chechen people, the vanguard, and the insurgency's political and violent mechanisms continued to decline. Observers note that

[t]he end of the war was followed by apathy and internal division, rather than the expected enthusiasm and solidarity. The split could be seen in several directions: between the commanders and the rank and file, the war veterans and the new recruits, the highland (red-haired) and lowland (city) Chechens.¹¹⁷

The manifestation of decline escalated across the relationship framework and the phasing construct.

For example, the political organization and associated public mobilization in support of a Chechen state that had begun to fail before the war degraded even further after the cease-fire. During the fighting, Grozny underwent months of heavy shelling and bombardment.

The "national revolution" also shattered the foundations of the civic system and its former political frameworks. Many new political parties and assorted public organizations emerged, few with real influence and few with outstanding leaders. During the three years following the war, Chechnya had few civil institutions. Many of their enterprises and organizations had disintegrated, leaving the military and religious-political groupings as the dominant actors. Various internal Chechen conflicts, including clan tensions and clashes between mafia groups, emerged or were revived. The new society, so thoroughly dominated by the armed segment of the population, amazed even many Chechen observers.¹¹⁸

For example, when Maskhadov won the January 1997 elections, defeating both Basayev and acting President Yandarbiev, the vanguard of the insurgency split between moderate nationalists and leaders espousing radical Sunni rhetoric. Basayev initially became Maskhadov's prime minister but resigned by June 1998 and separately united the field

¹¹⁶ Gammer, *The Lone Wolf*, 212; Wilhelmsen, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place," 37.

¹¹⁷ Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 105.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 191–92.

commanders against the president. The substantive political mechanisms fell to Phase 0-1 even though elections occurred.

Warlords coerced and threatened the administration in Grozny in order to control the evolving political process. Basayev and Khattab, for example, held Maskhadov at gunpoint to gain seats on the State Defense Council.¹¹⁹ Basayev also formed separate regional political and military organizations with an agenda to unite Dagestan and Chechnya under an Imamate like Shaykh Shamil.¹²⁰

Basayev, for his part, established and led the ‘Congress of the Peoples of Daghestan and Ichkeria’, the declared goal of which was to unite ‘the Muslim peoples of Daghestan and Chechnya in one free state’ and by that achieve ‘peace and stability in the region’ (ITAR-TASS, 26 April; Kommersant-Daily, 28 April 1998). For that purpose the Congress established a ‘Peacekeeping Brigade’, which in July 1998 conducted maneuvers near the Daghestani border (Interfax, 6 July 1998).¹²¹

Maskhadov couldn’t control his own decision-making body let alone the actions of the field commanders. But because he needed their resources to run the government and rebuild a national defense force, he vacillated between cracking down on them and including them in decision making. This behavior led to retaliation against him to include assassination attempts and an offensive campaign.¹²²

Therefore, even though Maskhadov won Chechnya’s presidential elections, a unified insurgent leadership became untenable without an imminent Russian threat. Maskhadov lost legitimacy in the eyes of the independent field commanders. He also lost legitimacy in the eyes of the Russian government because he could not manage the

¹¹⁹ Wilhelmsen, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” 49.

¹²⁰ Rajan Menon and Graham Fuller, “Russia’s Ruinous Chechen War,” *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 2 (2000): 38.

¹²¹ Gammer, *The Lone Wolf*, footnote 41 on p. 213.

¹²² Nix and Marshall, “Chechen Revolution: 1991–2002,” 515.

warlords and failed to “comply with stipulations of the 1996 cease fire agreement.”¹²³ Maskhadov had no mechanism through which he could funnel public support, “solve economic problems, rebuild a state structure and maintain order.”¹²⁴ The relationship framework stood broken in terms of its ability to constitute a functioning state. Moreover, a new competing insurgent organization now existed in the form of a radical regional Sunni network capable of conducting Phase 2 and Phase 3 violent operations. The disparate and competing command structure drove the activity that spurred the Second Chechen War and continued through Maskhadov’s death in 2005.¹²⁵

6.5 The Second Chechen War and Beyond

In August 1999, Basayev and Khattab led an armed incursion into Dagestan to support their new movement against Russian authorities there. At the time, Vladimir Putin came to power within Moscow and fully replaced Yeltsin that December. “Moscow, with a new leader now in the Kremlin, reacted with a full-scale military operation, with the intention of taking control of the country, deposing the Maskhadov regime and re-annexing it to the Russian Federation.”¹²⁶ From the Russian perspective, the engagement in Chechnya served to oust a radical Islamist network and afforded an increase in terror and brutality to the Russian response.

At the beginning of the second war, Putin mobilized 93,000 troops in comparison to the 40,000 that Yeltsin employed during the First Chechen War. Although Russia still

¹²³ Miriam Lansky, “Daghestan and Chechnya: The Wahhabi Challenge to the State,” *SAIS Review* 22, no. 2 (2002): 183–92; Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 183.

¹²⁴ Gammer, *The Lone Wolf*, 211.

¹²⁵ Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, “Assessing Unholy Alliances in Chechnya: From Communism and Nationalism to Islamism and Salafism,” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 25, no. 1 (2009): 87.

¹²⁶ Gammer, *The Lone Wolf*, 213.

could not defeat the terrorist and guerrilla networks hiding within the population and within the highlands, it mobilized a force large enough that the Chechens could not further their military capability. Putin's overwhelming commitment of forces against the Chechen mechanisms of violence led to the capture of Grozny by February 2000.¹²⁷ Full-scale operations after that moved systematically through the periphery to subdue the remainder of Chechnya's towns and villages. Similar to the First Chechen War, Russia and Chechnya entered into a kind of stasis.

By 2002, Grozny was described as a "lunar landscape" where Russian forces ruled the day and guerrilla resistance forces worked best at night from bases within the highlands.¹²⁸ The insurgent military capability hovered between Phase 2 and Phase 3 levels. While terrorism and guerrilla activity from the highlands remained steady, terrorist systems became more instantiated. For example, Basayev's organization systematically incorporated the use of women suicide bombers by the end of the interwar period. It recruited "Black Widows" into local terrorist camps from an immense population of women who had lost husbands and family members.¹²⁹ The psychological rhetoric of terrorism became more pervasive within Chechnya overall. "Many Chechen widows have been convinced by separatists that they have become burdens and that the loss of their husband was a punishment for their sins."¹³⁰ Accounts discuss methods of brainwashing and coercion, possibly even drugging of female recruits.

¹²⁷ Oliker, *Russia's Chechen Wars*, 75.

¹²⁸ Wood, *Chechnya*, 103.

¹²⁹ "Widespread rape by Russian troops" is also credited for high recruiting numbers. Wood, *Chechnya*, 141.

¹³⁰ Cited in Nix and Marshall, "Chechen Revolution: 1991–2002." "Terrorist Organization Profile: Black Widows," National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland, accessed January 26, 2010, http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3971.

In terms of counterinsurgent options regarding targetable areas of an insurgency, the relationship framework provides clarity on the effects of Russian behavior and the insurgency's ability to advance toward a mature national regime. In order to scale, an insurgency must be able to constitute a viable political mechanism that gains support of its public through fear or free will. Because any growth of a Chechen military force would come from the population, and because Russian forces did not differentiate between civilians and guerrillas, Putin devastated its civilian population and focused heavily on the suppression of noncombatants.¹³¹ "Russian planes bombed dams, bridges and oil wells, and it rapidly became clear that the civilian population was the real target of the 'anti-terrorist' operation."¹³² Filtration camps systematically tortured civilians, and firebombing tactics against villages killed numerous men, women, and children. For the majority of the nation, Phase 1 support to the insurgency became the standard through harsh violence and fear.

Putin then selected Akhmad Kadyrov as Russia's proxy and empowered him to take control of legitimate political institutions. Activity in Chechnya to support this effort coincided with Putin's takeover of media outlets and a "clampdown on dissent and civil liberties in Russia."¹³³ His transformation of Russia back into an autocratic regime included Chechnya under the same umbrella. He chose Kadyrov because the religious leader had been the Chief Mufti of the Chechen revolution during the 1990s. Putin needed an Islamic center of power to counter the Wahhabi allure and reinvigorate cultural lines of power.

¹³¹ Unlike Syria, where numerous foreign fighters participate both in the Syrian Civil War and in ISIL/ISIS, Chechnya hosts a different operating environment.

¹³² Wood, *Chechnya*, 99.

¹³³ Ibid., 111.

Once counterinsurgent forces achieved a stalemate in 2002, Russia began to build a political institutional footprint within Chechnya and to subvert the insurgency's broken political mechanism. The activity crippled Chechnya's relationship framework dependencies by negating and replacing its capability to administer or control a substantive formal political line of effort connected to its citizenry. It of course used violence to back up the proxy political apparatus. Beginning in 2003, Chechens officially began to vote through elections and referenda.¹³⁴ This drove a wedge between the population and the insurgency's constitutive capability.

Through these actions, Moscow delegitimized Maskhadov's political status. For example,

In March 2003, a referendum was held on a new made-in-Moscow constitution that declared Chechnya to be part of the Russian Federation. It was duly approved by a thunderous 96 per cent, though the vast majority of ordinary Chechens stayed away from the polls. In another rigged ballot in October 2003 – in which 30,000 occupying troops were eligible to vote – Kadyrov was elected president with a supposed 83 per cent of the vote. In practical terms, operations were increasingly put into the hands of Kadyrov's private army, run by his son Ramzan, who rapidly acquired a reputation for psychotic brutality. Now it would be the Chechens themselves who would be tasked with crushing pro-independence forces.¹³⁵

Ramzan became head of the Chechen Republic when his father died in May 2004 and his forces "incorporated into the Russian Interior Ministry's structures," thereby legitimizing their violent behavior within the formal state mechanism.¹³⁶ Following this, a fully pro-

¹³⁴ Ibid., 161. John Dunlop indicates that any support for the Russian-designed constitution sent a message to Russia to leave Chechnya in peace. Ninety percent of Chechens did not even know the content of the document.

¹³⁵ Wood, *Chechnya*, 104. Wood references Tanya Lokshina, ed., *Imposition of a Fake Political Settlement in the Northern Caucasus: The 2003 Chechen Presidential Election* (Stuttgart, Germany: ibidem-Verlag, 2005), 16, 36–37.

¹³⁶ Wood, *Chechnya*, 163.

Russian parliament came to power under conditions of very low voter turnout in the November 2005 elections.¹³⁷

Besides using violence, Russia and Kadyrov tried to attract support as well. Citizens and field commanders who agreed to support Russian interests received perks and benefits. For example, certain former separatists who switched allegiances also incorporated into the formal force structure. By 2005, the new United Russia party provided card-carrying members with career and education benefits as well as “health benefits and salaries unavailable to the general populace.”¹³⁸ Card holders were also promised safe passage and immunity from abduction.¹³⁹ The major motivation behind Chechen compliance, even given some small positive incentives, remained violence and fear. Kadyrov’s regime continued corrupt practices of torture and abduction without impunity; enforced a practice of tribute to his clan; and set up a parallel penal system.¹⁴⁰

Without a political rudder, the Chechen vanguard continued to grow further apart from the mainstream public. Its leadership could no longer turn to the broader population to mobilize or arm a force for mass violent resistance. Although inefficient and poorly executed, Russian conventional operations reduced the Chechen vanguard to Phase 1 to Phase 3 activities solely focused on destructive mechanisms. After the second Russian invasion, Maskhadov rejoined Basayev to lead guerrilla forces and direct the war as he had done between 1994 and 1996. Although he called for cease-fires and negotiations, open video indicated his participation in terrorist activities that marred his moderate

¹³⁷ Ibid., 165.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 166.

¹³⁹ International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF), International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Norwegian Helsinki Committee, Center “Demos,” and Human Rights Center “Memorial,” *In a Climate of Fear: “Political Process” and Parliamentary Elections in Chechnya*, November 2005.

¹⁴⁰ Wood, *Chechnya*, 168.

identity. During the war, the schism between him and the field commanders became subordinate to the need to survive. Throughout the second war and beyond, Russian targeting of the elite continued to impact the growth and operations of the vanguard leadership. “Aping the Israelis’ approach to Hamas, Russia has repeatedly resorted to targeted assassination, notably with the killing of former president Yandarbiev in Qatar by car bomb in February 2004”; they also killed Maskhadov in March 2005.¹⁴¹

6.6 Chechnya Today and Concluding Thoughts

Unable to reacquire legitimacy, the insurgency’s state-level political apparatus never regained support from what remained of the broader population. Even in 2006, Russia continued “to maintain an enormous military and police presence in Chechnya: the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) [had] 80,000 troops stationed there, while the FSB [had] a force numbering up to 20,000.”¹⁴² After 2006, Putin continued to funnel resources for the development of political and military infrastructure to his proxy Ramzan Kadyrov. As Kadyrov further consolidated power, Putin transitioned counterterrorism efforts to him so that by 2009, operational leadership fully transferred from Russia to Chechen-led administrators.

From the insurgent perspective, after the Second Chechen War, terrorism continued to thrive with the support of criminal and Wahhabi financing. “The succession of leaders from Dudaev onwards – Yandarbiev, Maskhadov, Sadulaev, Umarov – reveals an oscillation between the rhetorical poles of nationalism and Islam that” uncovered deep

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 141.

¹⁴² John Dunlop, “Putin’s Upbeat Message on Chechnya Contradicted by Realities on the Ground,” *North Caucasus Analysis* 6, no. 21 (2005).
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=30476&no_cache=1#.VP3CDqPD_IU.

persistent cleavages within the movement.¹⁴³ In October 2007, the insurgency transitioned its goals to the exportation of radical Islam rather than solely Chechen independence; the change elicited a backlash within the wider Chechen resistance movement and effectively signaled “the end of the independence project under the banner of the Chechen Republic.”¹⁴⁴ Today’s Chechen insurgents still claim to represent the Chechen population and that of others within the Caucasus, but they have become part of a broader transnational movement that uses the region as a home base to keep up their capability to attack Russian interests.

Today, routine counterterrorism purges from regional bases across Chechnya continue, sometimes led by Kadyrov personally. Larger pushes that include greater Russian involvement support security for high-visibility events like the Sochi Olympics.¹⁴⁵ Kadyrov’s administration is described by its similarities to “life under Stalin in the 1930s”; his forces frequently abduct and murder with impunity.¹⁴⁶ The difference is that he has attempted to take on the mantle of religious legitimacy as way to appeal to cultural and clan law. For example, in order to resist the Wahhabi attraction, Kadyrov built a \$20 billion mosque in the center of Grozny. And although transnational organized crime runs throughout the territory, much of it is led by Putin and Kadyrov supporters. Ultimately, public support continues at Phase 0 and Phase 1 levels. Political mechanisms remain at Phase 0 levels; and both vanguard and violent mechanisms sit between Phase 0 and Phase 2. But the increase in capability here is due to the presence of external support.

¹⁴³ Wood, *Chechnya*, 145.

¹⁴⁴ Trenin and Malashenko, *Russia’s Restless Frontier*, 88.

¹⁴⁵ “Chechen Rebel Threatens Attacks,” *Associated Press*, July 3, 2013, http://espn.go.com/olympics/story/_/id/9447035/2014-sochi-olympics-chechen-rebel-calls-attacks-games.

¹⁴⁶ “Women in Today’s Chechnya Documentary Muslim Chechens Girls Caucasus People,” posted by “avikbelic7,” February 1, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o_TmFwFvWpU.

Table 6.2 illustrates the macro changes across the relationship framework within the Chechen insurgency by phase. It accompanies the narrative provided by the chapter and begins to illustrate the limitations of scale based on the relational dependencies. Although the insurgency briefly reached certain attributes within the Phase 4 category regarding violence,

Section 6.2 <u>Origins of Insurgency in Chechnya by 1991</u>		
	Vanguard	Phase 1-2
	Public Support	Phase 2-3
	Political Mechanisms	Phase 1-2
	Violent Mechanisms	Phase 2-3
	Territory	Phase 2
Section 6.3 <u>Initial Autonomy, 1991-1994</u>		
	Vanguard	Phase 2-3
	Public Support	Phase 4 for violent mechanisms
	Political Mechanisms	Phase 0
	Violent Mechanisms	Phase 2-4
	Territory	Phase 3 due to united front
Section 6.4 <u>The First Chechen War (1994-1996) through 1999</u>		
	Vanguard	Phase 2
	Public Support	Phase 1
	Political Mechanisms	Phase 0-1 (Phase 1 for alternate Sunni network)
	Violent Mechanisms	Phase 2-3 (Phase 2-3 for alternate Sunni network)
	Territory	Phase 2
Section 6.5 <u>The Second Chechen War (1999-2002) through 2005</u>		
	Vanguard	Phase 1-3 focused on violent mechanisms
	Public Support	Phase 1
	Political Mechanisms	Phase 0
	Violent Mechanisms	Phase 1-2
	Territory	Phase 2
Section 6.6 <u>Chechnya Today, 2005-2015</u>		
	Vanguard	Phase 0-2
	Public Support	Phase 0-1

Political Mechanisms	Phase 0
Violent Mechanisms	Phase 0-2
Territory	Phase 0-1

Table 6.2 Chechen Insurgency Maturity by Phase

because it could never build momentum within the other categories, it degraded back to lower levels of capability. Conversely, once Putin entered the scene, Russian behavior directly countered the very same levers of the relationship framework. It successfully countered the movement by uniting political and violent mechanisms tied to networks of cultural and religious power in Chechnya.

The next chapter will illustrate a comparative case study to further explore the framework's dynamics in Kosovo. It effectively illustrates how the decisions made by the Kosovar Albanian insurgency ultimately worked along relational lines of effort to capture Western support, both politically and militarily, to gain a seat at the international negotiating table. It did this without ever needing to become a full conventional military. Although not native to the insurgent movement, it coordinated effectively enough through the advent of a weak united front, to align with the ethnic nation's political movement – holding out until NATO and the United Nations could ensure stability and transition the region to statehood.

Chapter 7

The Politics of Insurgency Case Study 2: The Kosovar Albanian Revolution¹

7.1 The Case of Kosovo

The Kosovar Albanian insurgency shares numerous attributes with its Chechen equivalent, even though the comparative efforts concluded in significantly different outcomes. Like the Chechens, Albanians within Kosovo inherited a legacy of social and violent resistance dating back hundreds of years. Both populations mixed Islamic practice with clan-based law and social norms. And both insurgency vanguards initially attempted to build a broadly based national movement in order to gain further political autonomy within the existing state, only to press for full independence after violent repression by the state.

Although the international community officially incorporated Kosovo into Yugoslavia after World War II, the insurgency did not begin to gain nation-wide momentum until 1989 when Slobodan Milosevic negated Kosovo's autonomy within Yugoslavia's political system. Even after political marginalization, mechanisms of violence developed slowly. With respect to political mechanisms of the 1990s, Kosovar Albanians established a parallel internal government led by pacifist Ibrahim Rugova who espoused equality for Kosovo within the Yugoslav Federation. When the Dayton Accords of 1995 failed to improve Kosovo's standing within Yugoslavia, it fueled militant arguments that the use of violence could offer the only mechanism to protect Kosovo's Albanian population from Serbian injustices and attract international interest.

¹ Pockets of the research and groundwork for this chapter comes from a previously published work. Maegen Nix and Dru Daubon, "Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA): 1996–1999," in *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009*, ed. Chuck Crossett (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2012), 343–378.

By 1993, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began to conduct limited violent operations within Kosovo. When it went public in 1996 without a discernible leadership, members primarily attacked Serbian police, state security forces, and suspected Serbian collaborators.² The kinetic practice prompted counterinsurgent action that heavily suppressed and displaced civilians, thereby feeding the resistance organization new recruits. When the neighboring Albanian regime collapsed in 1997, supply routes to Kosovo provided access to arms and ammunition that supported the growth of the insurgency's armed component. Then, in 1998 and 1999, Milosevic began to cleanse Kosovo of all Albanians; as a result, over 1.3 million citizens fled to neighboring states or into the mountains. Many of those who sought the mountains also sought KLA membership.

As the humanitarian crisis intensified, the international community interceded in the engagement – first as an international monitoring force under the auspices of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) and then as a military force led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). When diplomatic efforts failed between Milosevic, the international community, the KLA, and associated Kosovar Albanian interests, NATO forces worked with the insurgency to eject Serbian forces from Kosovo. Once cleared of Milosevic's rule in June of 1999, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 established an interim government under UNMIK, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. KLA acceptance of UNMIK's terms became an integral component of regional stabilization.

² "I saw an accused collaborator tried before a revolutionary court and then tied to the back of a car in Glodjane and dragged through the streets until he died," said a former KLA officer in Albania, who asked not to be identified. Chris Hedges, "Kosovo's Rebels Accused of Executions in the Ranks," *New York Times*, June 25, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/learning/students/pop/articles/062599kosovo-kla-purge.html>.

Overall, Kosovo's insurgency, unlike that in Chechnya, gained international backing and sponsorship that enabled the vanguard, the political mechanisms and violent mechanisms of state, and the population to scale and mature. In return for aid against the Serbians, the KLA helped their state sponsors to control the level of violence within Kosovo. Slow to transition power to an indigenous political regime over the next five years, however, mass Kosovar Albanian demonstrations in 2004 turned into riots across the nation. And a subsequent UN-led initiative between 2005 and 2007 to negotiate Kosovo's final status between Belgrade and Pristina failed. Although Serbia continued to insist that Kosovo stay part of Serbia, Kosovo's Albanian political leadership, now fully integrated with the former KLA components, declared independence in February of 2008 with the help of key state sponsors. The International Court of Justice declared the action to be lawful in July 2010.³

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship framework across the phasing model introduced in Chapter 5. See Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1. The development of the Kosovar Albanian insurgency accentuates different aspects of the phasing model than the Chechen case, while still advancing the concepts of scaling necessary to progress across phases. Also, the Kosovo study is significantly longer than the Chechnya case. This is because of the expansive literature available on the topic and the extensive information regarding the complexity of the actions across lines of effort and relationships. Kosovo had no Putin-like figure quelling the press. Additionally, the positive outcome for the Kosovar Albanians means their stories and narrative continue to be captured by academia and publications such as memoirs.

³ After the ICJ ruling, 192 UN member countries, to include the United States, recognized Kosovo's independence. See "Kosovo Independence Move Not illegal, Says UN Court," *BBC News*, July 22, 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-10730573>.

Phase	Legal	Territory	Vanguard	Political Mechanisms	Violent Mechanisms	Public Support
Phase 0	Use of legal processes	None	Identify elite network; Define core ideology and end state; Stand up the Vanguard	Define political goals and agenda	Existing military/violent culture	Perceived inequity and injustice and social ferment
Phase 1	Illegal political acts	Safe houses, training camps, small buildings	Expand and place network in military, political and financial infrastructure	Establish targeted campaigns and grow the party	Begin terrorist tactics and grow the network and training programs	Collective excitement and coalescence
Phase 2	Rebellion	Control of local territory for limited duration	Weed out competition within the movement - capture lead of illicit networks	Develop and support growing political committees	Conduct strategic terrorism, small unit tactics and grow the component	Bureaucratize and build coalitions to develop higher organizational levels
Phase 3	Insurgency	Localized enduring control	Expand hold on resistance and secure international support. Taxation system	Set up local provisional leadership and collect taxes	Conduct guerrilla warfare and professionalize the armed component	Assimilation, cooptation or repression
Phase 4	Insurgency	Enduring regional control	Begin to move in the open and lead pol/mil forces. Establish secret service.	Execute regional political administration and hold elections	Mobile warfare, reconquest, gain technology, and build an army	Assimilation, cooptation or repression
Phase 5	Belligerency	State territory	Assimilate the vanguard into formal mechanisms	National political administration Constitution Execute state budget and conscription	Conventional capability and consolidation of armed components into national forces	Repression or success

Table 7.1 Composite Insurgency Phasing Model




Figure 7.1 Insurgency Relationship Framework

The rest of this chapter is divided into eight sections, paralleling the format of the Chechen study and illustrating advancements across each phase of the composite insurgency phasing model. For example, the next section examines the insurgency's origins within Kosovo and sets up the historic foundation for resistance through World War II and the birth of Yugoslavia in 1945. Section 7.3 assesses the development of Kosovo's political mechanism and the growth of its rural-based resistance through 1980. It addresses the proliferation of underground movements and the emergence of a symbolic internationally-known figurehead of the resistance. Section 7.4 covers the period between 1980 and 1987, explaining how the vanguard developed a persistent and organized presence, as well as how the public awakened to embrace the idea of Kosovar Albanian autonomy.

Section 7.5 examines how Kosovar Albanians throughout Kosovo constituted, funded and established a parallel government between 1987 and 1993. It also explores actions taken by the insurgent leadership to bureaucratize and grow more capable mechanisms of violence. Section 7.6 provides insights into the culmination of those mechanisms through the founding and advancement of the KLA between 1993 and 1995.

And Section 7.7 addresses three significant events that brought the KLA into mainstream acceptance, making violence more accessible to those interested in taking up arms. It also describes ways in which the insurgency improved upon its business practices to the point of successfully accommodating initial public mobilization for war. Section 7.8 details phasing modulation across the relationship framework throughout the war, as well as the impacts on the insurgency that resulted from Serbian-led ethnic cleansing and resulting western intervention. Finally, I conclude the chapter by reflecting on the applicability of my analysis to the phasing construct presented in Chapter 5.

7.2 Insurgency Origins in Kosovo

Kosovo, once a province of the former Yugoslavia, is a landlocked country in the Western Balkans slightly larger than Delaware.⁴ Covered by mountain ranges and plains, rivers crisscross the state to feed its lakes, gorges, and falls. Serbia lies to the north and northeast of Kosovo while Macedonia sits on the southeast; Albania lies to the southwest and Montenegro the west. See Figure 7.2. Kosovo's shared border with Albania falls across the Sar Mountains that contain its highest peak at 8,000 feet; this area supported numerous logistics trails during the Kosovar Albanian insurgency against Serbian-led Yugoslavia and enabled resistance members access to training and weapons in Albania itself.

⁴ Bosnia, Croatia, Herzegovina, and Slovenia comprise the additional former Yugoslavia provinces.



Figure 7.2 Political Map of Kosovo (2015)⁵

Albanians trace their historic connection to Kosovo back to the Illyrian and Dardanian tribes who inhabited the region during the fourth century BC. Demographically speaking, Kosovo is surrounded by related Albanian populations who collectively think in terms of a broader ethnic nation. While Kosovo hosts roughly 1.75 million Albanians who comprise 95 percent of its population, Albania holds roughly 2.5 million Albanians, Macedonia half a million, and Montenegro another 32,000.⁶ Outside of the region, many Kosovar Albanian diaspora communities remain connected and supportive of their homeland. For example, Kosovar Albanian communities integral to the insurgency during the 1980s and 90s hailed from Switzerland, Germany, the United States, Austria, Italy, Scandinavia, Greece, and Great Britain.

⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, “Kosovo,” *The World Factbook*, accessed Oct 10, 2015, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html>.

⁶ See “The CIA World Factbook: Kosovo,” accessed October 11, 2015, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html>. Also, The International Crisis Group, “Religion in Kosovo,” Balkans Report no. 105, January 31, 2005 claims 100,000 in Montenegro.

Non-Albanian ethnicities in Kosovo include Serbian, Bosniak, Gorani, Roma, Turk, Ashkali, and Egyptian. With respect to this case study, the Kosovar Albanian relationship with the Serbian population became the principal rivalry involved in the struggle for independence. Serbians began to successfully dominate Yugoslavia and Kosovo after World War II even though competition between the two ethnicities began much earlier. According to the Slavic Serbian narrative, Serbians arrived in the region during the sixth century and became the dominant demographic during the twelfth century Nemanjic Dynasty. During the thirteenth century, Serbians founded their own Orthodox Church whose religious center became tied to Kosovo. The Serbian account argues that Albanians did not become the prevailing ethnicity in Kosovo until after the arrival of the Ottomans in the fourteenth century. They disregard the chronological significance to the initial Albanian presence and focus instead on the spiritual and cultural significance of the region to the Orthodox Church.

Interestingly, Serbians and Albanians fought together on both sides of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 when Serbian Prince Lazar made a final stand against the Ottoman sultan.⁷ The Ottoman Empire dominated the Kosovo region by 1459 when “the Serbian and Orthodox population gradually shifted northward, to Hungary, to what is today Vojvodina, and to Bosnia, Dalmatia, and Croatia.”⁸ Serbia never existed as a geopolitical entity within the Ottoman Empire. And, between the fifteenth and the nineteenth centuries, regional Albanian clans gained autonomy under the hegemony of Constantinople. In 1878, Albanian clan leaders established the League of Prizren to form an administratively autonomous Ottoman Albanian province.

⁷ Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), xxix.

⁸ Tim Judah, *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 32.

While Albanians worked within the Ottoman system, Serbians and Montenegrins fought to establish independence from the waning empire and expand their dominion in the region. Because of this expansion, the League of Prizren also served to deter Serbian movement into Kosovo.⁹ Serbian practices expelled Muslims from conquered territories and romanticized newfound sovereignty as a spiritual experience.¹⁰ In October 1912, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia attacked the Ottoman Empire and began the first Balkan War.¹¹ When Serbian and Montenegrin forces gained control over the region, much of the local population fled.¹² Serbia and Montenegro annexed Kosovo, although the Montenegrin territory remained confined to the Metohija region. Even as the Ottoman Empire waned, the League of Prizren continued to represent Albanian interests and advocated autonomy from both the Ottoman Empire and Christian control.¹³

During World War I, Kosovo changed hands numerous times. At its end, the Serbians, Croatians, and Slovenes unofficially called the region “The Kingdom of Yugoslavia” and began a campaign to colonize Kosovo with Serbians. The Institute of History in Pristina provides an account of the Serbian colonization from an Albanian perspective and estimates that 13,938 Serbian families settled into Kosovo during the

⁹ One argument suggests that, “[t]he specter of the rise of Christian states in the Balkans made those for whom an Albanian nation remained an alien concept receptive to new ideas. They were now ready to contemplate the unification of the four Albanian vilayets and demands for territorial autonomy within the Empire.” Felix Kuntzsch, “The Violent Politics of Nationalism, Identity and Legitimacy in Palestine, Kosovo and Quebec,” Ph.D. thesis. (Quebec: Universite Laval, 2014) 282.

¹⁰ Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History*, xxx.

¹¹ In this year, future revolutionary leader Adem Demaci’s mother witnessed the execution of four of her uncles by Serbian forces. Shkëlzen Gashi, *Adem Demaçi Biography: a Century of Kosova’s History through One Man’s Life*. Translated by Elizabeth Gowing. (Prishtina: Rrokulia Publishing House, 2010) 240.

¹² Katariina Simonen, “Operation Allied Force: A Case of Humanitarian Intervention?” (Athena Papers Series, Partnership for Peace, Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, 2004), 93, fn 78.

¹³ The tradition of resistance continued after the defeat of the League of Prizren which was first replaced by the League of Peja and then the Young Turk revolution. The Albanian population did not stand in monolithic support of any of these movements. Kuntzsch, *Violent Politics*, 285.

campaign, often taking the land and homes of Albanian residents.¹⁴ Albanians subsequently began a rural clan-based resistance of poorly armed rebels and farmers conducting small unit tactics and guerrilla attacks.¹⁵ Known as the Albanian *kacak* tradition, commitment to resistance remained part of family lines across generations throughout the twentieth century.¹⁶ The Jashari family, who will play a prominent role in future sections, became well known community leaders of the *kacak* tradition.

Mussolini occupied Albania in 1939 and divided the Balkan region between Germany, Bulgaria and Italy. Because the Serbians fought for the Allies during World War I, the Axis forces sent many Serbians to local labor camps and to concentration camps, causing a significant Serbian migration out of Kosovo. The Nazis then fostered Albanian autonomy and enabled self-government, to include the allowance of Muslim religious courts and access to education.¹⁷ The Albanian National Front, also called the Balli Kombetar, formed in 1942 to support Albanian nationalist interests and combat both Serbian-led communist and monarchist movements in Kosovo.¹⁸ Familiarly called Ballists, the front supported conservative Islamic goals and worked with the Nazi

¹⁴ See The Institute of History, Prishtina, Kosovo Information Center, "Expulsion of Albanians and Colonisation of Kosova," <http://www.kosova.com/arkivi1997/expuls/chap2.htm#n6>.

¹⁵ James Pettifer goes back even further. "The Kosova Albanian rebel or outlaw was often from the family that resisted displacement from their land first by Ottoman *ciflik* landlords and then Serbian and Montenegrin colonization." James Pettifer, *The Kosovo Liberation Army: Underground War to Balkan Insurgency, 1948-2001*, (London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2012) 12.

¹⁶ The heart of the *kacak* region stood along the border with Albania and tie back to the *hayduk* rebels who resisted the Ottoman Empire. Pettifer, *The KLA*, 19.

¹⁷ "The near medieval conditions of village life were a shock to the German and Italian soldiers who encountered them without modern military briefings or prior indoctrination. The rigid dictates of the Kanun and Muslim social tradition towards outsiders discouraged fraternization and sexual relationships, and a wall of mutual incomprehension divided the rural Albanian majority from their new masters." Pettifer, *The KLA*, 17.

¹⁸ Interestingly, two resistance forces emerged from the Serbian demographic against the Nazi's. The Chetniks hoped to ethnically cleanse the region of non-Serbs and supported the return of the Yugoslav monarch. The Partisans were led by communist Josip Broz ("Tito") who claimed to support a diverse ethnic state.

leadership against Serbian control. The Ballists never convinced the Axis powers to unify Kosovar Albanian with greater Albania.

Similar to the time of the Ottomans, Kosovar Albanians supported differing political interests during the war. For example, many Albanians in Kosovo resisted the Axis powers and joined the communist Partisans led by Josip Tito. When the Axis powers began to capitulate toward the end of the war, fighting among the region's different ethnic, religious and political factions intensified.¹⁹ As the Partisans moved into Drenica, the central Partisan leadership commanded the persecution of local Albanians on the grounds of collaboration with the Axis forces.

A prominent Albanian Partisan commander, Shaban Polluzha, refused to accept these orders and within a short time his force of perhaps 5,000 Albanian militants had attacked the Trepca mine complex and other centres of importance. They were joined by up to 20,000 irregulars, drawn from Drenica. Fighting soon spread all over northern and central Kosova²⁰ and included an attack on Partisan-controlled Ferizaj. It took Tito five divisions to put down the rebellion.²¹

In this case, the Balli Kometar joined the leadership of the revolt but could not beat hardened guerrilla Partisans enabled by the communists' interconnected political and military organizational frameworks. The communists, for example, maintained a superior logistics train, to include communications equipment, ammunition and weapons, and medical supplies.

¹⁹ "[F]ighting on a serious scale continued till 1949." James Pettifer, *Kosova Express: A Journey in Wartime*, (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 93.

²⁰ Albanians call Kosovo by the name Kosova, with the emphasis on the second syllable. Many other location name differences also exist. For example Pristina, the capital, is called Prishtina. I use the former versions but keep the latter when referencing Albanian-centric sources. Hasan Prishtina was one of the first Albanian nationalists who stood up against Turkish rule and orchestrated a revolt in the early 20th century. His gains for Albania were reversed after the first Balkan War. President Wilson supported the establishment of an Albanian state after World War I though Kosovo remained with the Serbs. Prishtina continued to fight for unification through the kacak movement.

²¹ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 25

The Kosovar Albanian drive for autonomy during and after World War II embodied “the Ottoman and pre-Ottoman traditions of clan based rural resistance. A great weakness of the *ceta* system was that it deeply inhibited the capacity to concentrate overwhelming force.”²² In addition, similar to the Chechen communities from the last chapter, the clans preferred to be left alone rather than to align with a centralized political organization focused on statehood.²³ Albanians in Kosovo did not ideologically align with the concept of a state-led government construct. Many clans held fierce rivalries with their neighbors.

[M]inor conflicts over such matters as grazing rights were endemic and were regulated by the ancient rules of the Kanun. This was a law code based on local custom and a code of revenge dating back to the Middle Ages, and embodied a deeply patriarchal and reactionary ideology, but it was all the Albanian majority had in the absence of a respected or democratic state.”²⁴

The dominance of rural culture at the time kept combatants disorganized though ready to defend their autonomy and fight foreign occupation.

Therefore, in terms of the phasing model, Albanian self-government in Kosovo remained extremely premature and lacked a state-level organizational capacity – constitutive or destructive. Like the Chechens, Kosovar Albanians did not define collective political goals or set an agenda that could unify clans into a state

²² Pettifer argues that the “central problem of strategic focus on the Albanian side” recurred “time and time again until 1999 in attempts to build a successful Kosova insurgency” (Pettifer, *The KLA*, 25).

²³ Pettifer describes it similarly. “The habits and local resistance traditions were very strong and there was an almost infinite supply of fighters who were prepared to risk their lives against Slavic supremacy. But they emerged from family structures and inward-looking village environments where community defence was paramount and where the forces of production and the level of daily (27) life were archaic. The types of military skill and organization needed to challenge a modern army were not merely non-existent in practice, they were hardly even understood. Yet the violent tragedy of these years also enabled the generation of the 1990s to understand the forces they had to overcome. A formal army would be needed that would be capable of confronting the Yugoslav army, not a motley collection of local fighters. It would need a clear and focused political leadership.” (Pettifer, *The KLA*, 27-28).

²⁴ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 23.

administration. The decentralized concept of the league construct implied a loose confederation of interested parties interacting in parallel spheres, with little to no coordinating vanguard. Additionally, the Kosovar Albanian hold of territory oscillated between Phases 0 and 2 – moving between no hold on territory to control of local territory for limited duration. An organized vanguard did not exist and public support oscillated between Phase 0 and Phase 2 levels. Without a political framework for example, the public lacked any national political party or parallel social institution like a worker's union. Collective excitement and the formation of local clan coalitions, however, supported Phase 0 through Phase 3 mechanisms of violence – to include terrorist tactics, small unit tactics, and pockets of guerrilla warfare. Over the next forty years, however, each of these areas would experience growth and development that would enable the foundation of a new state regime.

7.3 The Birth of Kosovo's Political Mechanism and Continued Rural Resistance (1945-1980)

In November 1945, Josip Broz ("Tito") declared Yugoslavia to be a communist state and fellow communist Enver Hoxha took control of neighboring Albania. "Despite Tito's promise that Kosovo citizens would decide by referendum whether to remain part of Yugoslavia or join Albania, he divided Yugoslavia into six republics and incorporated Kosovo into Serbia as an autonomous region."²⁵ This is similar to the status that Chechnya endured within Russia. Serbians took control of all government and Communist positions within Kosovo and utilized heavy-handed security tactics against

²⁵ Nix and Daubon, *Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA): 1996-1999*, 351. "Declaring that self-determination up to secession remained open to debate it pledged that the territorial question would be settled after the war" (Kuntzsch, *Violent Politics*, 293). The 1946 constitution combined Kosovo and Metohija as the Autonomous Region of Kosovo and Metohija.

the Albanian population in order to maintain control. Former Serbian Partisan leader Aleksander Rankovic became minister of the interior and chief of the military intelligence agency for Yugoslavia; Rankovic installed a military regime within Kosovo and imposed martial law.²⁶ He closed Muslim religious institutions, outlawed the education of the Albanian language, and stifled economic development.

Kosovar Albanians continued to resist Tito after the communists rose to power. Opposition came from the Ballists as well as from family lines in rural areas and small villages, particularly in Drenica and the Llap valley.²⁷

Large-scale massacres of Ballist fighters like that in Tivat in Montenegro in 1945, involving the death of over 3,000 people after a forced march from Kosova, terrorised ordinary Kosova Albanian families and left them in awe of the power of Tito's military and security machine.²⁸

Even so, "[t]hroughout socialist Yugoslavia there were always areas in central Kosova where Belgrade rule was only maintained by the most draconian threats of force and de facto martial law."²⁹ Targeted farms, for example, became the "frontline in the repression of Albanians."³⁰ By February 1949, "Forty-seven villages were burnt out by Titoists, and thousands of cattle and other livestock were plundered."³¹

²⁶ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 26.

²⁷ Pettifer, *Express*, 134. "In the nineteenth century Drenice had been at the forefront of the struggle against the Ottomans, and in the twentieth it had produced many brave soldiers who fought the Anglo-French imposition of royalist Yugoslavia in 1921 after the Versailles Treaty and the Axis occupation after 1941. But the most important Drenice rebellion in the twentieth century was after the Second World War, an uprising and guerrilla campaign against the Titoist communists that lasted until February 1949."

²⁸ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 32. Another example includes "the mass executions and mass graves of Balli Kombetar families, such as the pogrom in the Cekliku district of Prishtina in 1950." Pettier, *The KLA*, 41.

²⁹ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 8.

³⁰ Pettifer, *Kosova Express*, 94. "The farms never had any money to restore their great gates after a Serbocommunist police truck had crashed into them for the tenth time." 94.

³¹ Pettifer, *Kosova Express*, 134.

As Tito put down the Ballist movement in 1948-49, he established an emigration policy that forced associated Albanian families to leave Albania and move to Turkey.³² Persecution induced Albanians to relocate to not just to the former seat of the Ottoman Empire, but also to Switzerland, the United States, and Austria. In spite of terrorism and repression by the state, however, many supporters of Kosovar Albanian independence decided to remain in Kosovo in order to foster the Albanian identity in defiance of the communist regime.³³ They maintained ties to family and friends who moved out of the country.

To illustrate the generational and familial relationships that enabled the insurgency after Tito's rise to power, "[t]he grandfather of Hashim Thaci, Sinan Idriz Thaci, was centrally involved in this resistance movement, and a close associate of Sadik Rama."³⁴ Rama was a nationalist leader after World War I and a *kacak* who worked to bring Kosovo into the state of Albania.³⁵ Hashim would become a central figure to connect the diaspora leadership to the formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army during the early 1990s. He also served the region during its transition to statehood and became Kosovo's first prime minister.

In addition to expelling and suppressing radical rural communities in Kosovo, Tito instituted constitutive measures to strengthen the Yugoslav state and overcome the traditional Islamic and clan-based Albanian identity. First, he identified Pristina as Kosovo's capital and directed the growth of infrastructure to serve as the focal point for

³² Roughly 246,000 Turks, Muslim Slavs, and Albanians left Yugoslavia for Turkey. Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History*, 323.

³³ For example, in the fifteen-year period from 1952 to 1967, approximately 175,000 Muslims immigrated to Turkey. See Judah, *What Everyone Needs to Know*, 52.

³⁴ Pettifer, *Kosova Express*, 134.

³⁵ "The Yugoslav State and the Albanians, Part III," Serbia World News, posted February 21, 2015. <http://fbreporter.org/2015/02/21/the-yugoslav-state-and-the-albanians-part-iii/>.

Rankovic's regional administration. During World War II, the Nazi's considered Pristina and Kosovo to be backward and underdeveloped; it contained a population of less than 10,000, had few paved roads and exhibited poor levels of public health. Second, Tito instituted a policy of urbanization to drive Kosovar Albanians to settle in Pristina and grow its communist constituency.³⁶ Other reforms included Albanian conscription into the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), collectivizing the region's agricultural production,³⁷ and developing both industrial and extractive capacities.³⁸

[M]ost investment in Kosovo was concentrated in 'primary' industrial projects such as mines, basic chemical works and power stations, which supplied raw material or energy for use elsewhere in Yugoslavia. This primary industry was capital-intensive but not labour-intensive, which was also unfortunate, given that Kosovo was the area of Yugoslavia with the fastest-growing population.³⁹

Like the rest of Yugoslavia, the secret police tightly controlled religious institutions, as well as vocational unions that began to emerge.⁴⁰

In 1948 Tito split with the Soviet-led international communist movement while Enver Hoxha initially remained party to the Soviet controlled bloc.⁴¹ After the split, Russia supported an industrial revolution within Albania and Hoxha hoped to gain Soviet support for the armed overthrow of Tito's government.

³⁶ "[T]he only way for socialism to make progress in Kosova was by the construction of cities which would hopefully destroy the radical rural communities, in alliance with the growth of mining and the extractive industries." Pettifer, *The KLA*, 32.

³⁷ After collectivization, "a graph of grain production in Kosovo, accordingly, shows dramatic falls in 1949, 1951 and 1953. Serious food shortages developed in many parts of Yugoslavia by 1950. Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History*, 320.

³⁸ "Industrial development was slow: it was only after 1957 that Kosovo began to receive investment funds for industrialization under the federal budget. By 1958 there were forty-nine industrial enterprises in the whole of Kosovo, employing 16,000 people;" Kosovar Albanians became relatively poorer in comparison to other demographics in Yugoslavia. Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History*, 323.

³⁹ Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History*, 323.

⁴⁰ For example, Rankovic's forces engaged in "massive searches for weaponry in the mid-1950s" and registered the dossiers of over 120,000 Albanians "who bought the official Albanian language newspaper." Malcolm, *Short History*, 327.

⁴¹ Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History*, 320. The Cominform expelled Yugoslavia in June 1948, potentially because Tito's and Hoxha planned to unify Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania.

Hoxha began to organize infiltration of Kosova of trained militants, who were tasked ostensibly with beginning the formation of underground cells of 'sleepers' to be ready to fight against Belgrade's control in the long term future and to provide intelligence to Tirana and Moscow in the short term.⁴²

The Russians, however, were more concerned with intelligence and espionage than with the success of a resistance.⁴³ Regardless of the discrepancy, a relationship developed between rural Kosovar Albanian leaders and contacts within Albania. These relations enabled persistent resistance to Yugoslavia, first supported by the Russians and then by the United States after the 1990s.⁴⁴ Albanian backing endured whether or not the official Tirana government supported Kosovar Albanian efforts.⁴⁵ For example, during times when the Albanian regime did not officially foster the resistance, or worked with Belgrade against it, both ties of kinship as well as "informal networks of sympathy within the Albanian Party of Labour and key organisations in Albania, particularly the secret service, the Sigurimi and the military" supported sustained efforts.⁴⁶

During the 1950s, remnants of the Ballist resistance in Drenica and Peje (Pec) continued to fight communist control. For example, the Organizata per Bashkimin e

⁴² Pettifer, *The KLA*, 34. Malcolm, *Short History*, 320.

⁴³ Hoxha walked a fine line with the Soviets; both he and Tito feared Soviet interference in their communist regimes similar to the Moscow invasions of Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1968 and 1956, respectively. "While Tito remained alive, Hoxha moderated his calls for the establishment of a Greater Albania, and kept his eye on the most radical Albanian nationalists who might threaten Hoxha's Marxist dictatorship" thereby bringing the Soviet Union into a war. The resistance represented a tool and a threat to Hoxha. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., *Kosovo Liberation Army, The Inside Story of an Insurgency*, (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 22.

⁴⁴ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 36. Pettifer argues that the Serbians developed a paradigm which convinced their leaders that "virtually all future work against Yugoslavia" would come through Albania. This proved to be a weakness later during the insurgency when the KLA and the insurgency moved away from a platform advocating reunification with Albania.

⁴⁵ Albania's relationship with Russia changed after Stalin died and Khrushchev came to power. Khrushchev rehabilitated the Yugoslav standing with the international communist movement and split with Albania by 1960. Albania feared future interference and did not support reunification. "National activists who sought shelter in Albania were... swiftly handed back to the Yugoslav authorities while others were jailed under suspicion of spying – a practice that continued well into the 1980s." Miranda Vickers, *Between Serbs and Albania: A History of Kosovo*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 206 and 224.

⁴⁶ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 39.

Trojeve Shqiptare operated in Peje between 1959 and 1964 when it was disbanded by the secret police.⁴⁷ Also, Adem Demaci came onto the scene to reinvigorate the resistance community.⁴⁸ While the Ballists served a conservative Islamic support base, Demaci advocated an anti-Stalinist communist agenda to unify Kosovo with Albania proper. He developed his own political theory on liberation and eventually led a small clandestine organization⁴⁹ called the Revolutionary League for the Unification of Albanians (Levizja Revolucionare per Bashkimin e Shqipteve-LRBSH).⁵⁰

The novelist and short story writer who attended the university in Belgrade became a psychological symbol of twentieth century resistance against the Serbians.⁵¹ He “was first arrested and charged with offences against the state in 1956, and first went to prison in 1958. In total he spent 28 years of his life in Yugoslav prisons.”⁵² Even though Demaci’s organization obtained limited physical results, it provided an opportunity to maintain the resistance community of interest broadly and gained a small committed following. For example, in April 1964, Llap valley member Ahmet Haxhiu coordinated the flying of Albania’s illegal flag in several cities – for which he was imprisoned.⁵³ In addition, Demaci sought to overcome the divide between conservative Islamist

⁴⁷ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 44.

⁴⁸ Demaci’s mother watched members of the Serbian army murder her four uncles in front of her and her family in their front yard during the First Balkan War. Pettifer, *The KLA*, 43.

⁴⁹ Malcolm suggests a membership of 300. Malcolm, *Short History*, 322.

⁵⁰ For example, he rejected the Soviet and Chinese Communist models. See Shkelzen Gashi, *Adem Demaci – Biography*, (Prishtina: Rrokullia, 2010).

⁵¹ Malcolm, *Short History*, 322. “Kosovar Albanian Nelson Mandela, and his courage in prison was the fire that kept the colors of Albanian hope vivid in the early days.” Perritt, *KLA*, 34.

⁵² Pettifer, *Kosova Express*, 28.

⁵³ Pettifer, *Kosova Express*, 117. The Haxhiu family was famous for resisting Serb colonization within Llap after 1912.

nationalists and communist nationalists, an example that the KLA would eventually incorporate as well.⁵⁴

Rankovic and Tito began to hold different beliefs regarding the Kosovar Albanian population and the direction of Yugoslavia. Similar to Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic nationalism, Rankovic believed in an ethnic hierarchy of Serbs over other Yugoslav ethnicities. Tito, on the other hand, began to move closer to the egalitarian ideology of communism. "Rankovic had been opposing the new tendency in Tito's thinking, which was to abandon the attempt to create a homogeneous 'Yugoslavism' and encourage more elements of national self-direction instead."⁵⁵ As a result, Tito deposed Rankovic in 1966, after which he "made an effort to address Kosovar Albanian grievances," briefly providing "breathing space" for Kosovar Albanian nationalism."⁵⁶

In 1968, for example, Tito made constitutional reforms, reduced certain repressive measures and offered new freedoms to the Albanian people, investing heavily in the development and growth of Pristina. His intent was to improve the republic's economic well-being and begin a period of rapprochement.⁵⁷ Rather than calming tensions, however, Kosovar demands reemerged for greater independence and autonomy, leading to riots that same year. In compromise, Tito reinstated the use of Albanian language in schools and founded the University of Pristina as an independent institution; previously the school served as a satellite of the University of Belgrade.

⁵⁴ Pettifer recognizes "clear links between the old Ballist organisations such as the Second League of Prizren who still had a few underground activists in the Llap region and Demaci's Marxist allies in the LBRSH" (Pettifer, *The KLA*, 297).

⁵⁵ Malcolm, *Short History*, 324.

⁵⁶ Perrit, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 21.

⁵⁷ Kuntzsch, *Violent Politics*, 303.

In 1974, Tito again revised the state constitution to enable certain self-governing authorities in Kosovo and Vojvodina.⁵⁸ The province became the Socialist Autonomous Republic of Kosovo within the Socialist Republic of Serbia.⁵⁹ As in the other larger Yugoslav republics, Kosovar Albanians could now provide for their own local “banking, police, legal, and parliamentary system.”⁶⁰ They could also develop their own communist base and send representatives to the greater federal institutions.⁶¹ The process of Albanians coming to the table to join the political and institutional ranks in Kosovo

took time; in 1971, while Serbs and Montenegrins made up 21 per cent of the population, they still occupied 52 per cent of the managerial positions. In fact the overall imbalance in public employment was never overcome; in 1980 it was calculated that one in five Serbs had a state-salaried job, but only one in eleven Albanians. But where the Albanians made most progress was in entering the ranks of the party and the local administration. By the late 1970s the proportion of Albanians in the League of Communists in Kosovo had risen to roughly two-thirds; and by 1981 it was claimed that the police and other security forces were three-quarters Albanian.⁶²

Kosovar Albanians, particularly in the cities, became accustomed to a nationalized political process – both organizationally based within the political and administrative systems as well as within the socio-cultural system.

Evolving avenues for Kosovar Albanian political expression undermined nationalist goals for independence and relegated their agenda to the political fringe; “Albanians, particularly those among the emergent urban elite, experienced significant gains. The success of the elites and their complaisance worried more ardent nationalists, who feared assimilation unless some conscious effort was made to keep Albanian culture

⁵⁸ Tito’s motion to change the constitution relates more to demands from the 1971 Croatian Spring than it to a response to Kosovar Albanian grievances specifically.

⁵⁹ Perritt, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 7–22. This was the fourth constitutional revision since World War II. Like Chechnya, Kosovo was never attained the status of a federation republic with the right to secede.

⁶⁰ Simonen, “Operation Allied Force,” 4.

⁶¹ Judah, *What Everyone Needs to Know*, 57.

⁶² Malcolm, *Short History*, 326.

and national symbols alive.”⁶³ The political will and experience of life within growing urban areas became more removed from the experience and aspirations of the rural clans and villages. Because the political apparatus in Kosovo derived its power from Belgrade, the constituencies that supported Kosovar Albanian constitutive and destructive mechanisms came from separate populations. They operated in separate spheres and did not interact.

This is not to say that isolated resistance activity disappeared. Adem Demaci, for example, formed another revolutionary organization called “the Levizjes per Clirimin Kometar te Kosoves (LCKK), the League for the National Liberation of Kosova, founded during his second prison term with Jusuf Gervala.”⁶⁴ Then, in 1976, they founded another small underground organization called the Organizata Marksiste-Leniniste e Kosoves (the Marxist-Leninist Organization of Kosovo or OMLK). In 1978, Gervala and Metush Krasniqi formed a league called the Levizja Nacional-Climitare e Kosoves dhe Viseve Shqiptare ne Jugosllavi (the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo or LNCKVSJ). These groups espoused Demaci’s communist political theory but included no political capacity, remaining as hidden as possible underground.

Although Tito made progress within a socio-political context for the Kosovar Albanians, Yugoslavia’s economic policies made conditions worse in Kosovo. His industrialization policies attempted to integrate Kosovar Albanians into Yugoslavia, unlike the case in Chechnya where jobs were primarily reserved for the Russian elite. Tito did, however, require parity between ethnicities as well as bilingualism from the

⁶³ At the time, “the goal for most of the militant Kosovar Albanians was to become part of a ‘Greater Albania.’” Perritt, *KLA*, 21-22.

⁶⁴ Pettiifer, *The KLA*, 48.

Albanians as a condition of employment.⁶⁵ In fact, between 1971 and 1982, 45,000 Albanians left Kosovo.⁶⁶

The changes Tito affected within Kosovo created disparity between rural and growing urban components within region. Conditions for Kosovar Albanians varied greatly under Tito's direction and impacted the potential for insurgency across the phasing framework. For example, Tito enabled the development of a regionally aligned political party and corresponding political mechanisms for Kosovar Albanians. As a result, their political capacity moved from Phase 0 levels to Phase 4, with associated public support for this political line of effort at Phase 2 and three levels. Recall that Phase 4 represents the sum of earlier phases that support elections and regional political administration – to include the development of political committees and incorporated provisional leadership structures. The nuance here, however, is that these capacities supported the Yugoslavia regime and not an insurgent movement. So in terms of the insurgency itself, that capacity remained at zero. It would need to be coopted by the vanguard if the movement were to scale.

Comparatively, the capability for violence decreased under Tito and Rankovic. The Ballists and families traditionally aligned with Kosovar Albanian resistance organizations left the country or were heavily suppressed. Resistance mechanisms could no longer support guerrilla warfare at World War II levels although public support in rural communities remained consistent in their collective excitement and limited coalitions. The nascent origins of a true vanguard, however, emerged as the most important development to the future insurgency at the time. Adem Damaci's impact and

⁶⁵ Vickers, *Between Serbs and Albania*, 180.

⁶⁶ Peter Prifti, "Kosova's Economy: Problems and Prospects," in Arshi Pipa and Sam Repishti (eds.), *Studies on Kosova, East European Monographs*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984) 125-129.

the evolving supportive networks that began to move across Albania and Europe would enable the growth of a constitutively-minded leadership to connect national political goals and aspirations to mechanisms of violence and base areas. For example, members began to interface with different interest groups in the public domain, gaining access and placement in organizations such as student unions and construction workers. (See the next section.) While previously independent clandestine organizations and areas of resistance operated separately, Damaci became a public figure that might unify or draw these organizations to a single rallying point. Needed connections to national level political mechanisms stood further in the future, but now at least existed as a possibility due to Tito's reforms.

7.4 A National Reawakening and the Emergence of the Vanguard (1980-1987)

After Tito died in May of 1980, turmoil and ethnic tensions within Kosovo increased once more. In fact, people throughout Yugoslavia began to identify more closely with their sub-national ethnicities than with the contrived Yugoslav nation that Tito advocated.⁶⁷ Pressure rose incrementally, however, and began in Kosovo with Serbian objections to pro-Albanian changes since 1974. Serbians "had already begun to mobilize against what they perceived as discriminating policies and growing Albanian assertiveness in the wake of the 1974 constitution. Now their complaints received even greater attention in central Serbia."⁶⁸ Events less than one year after Tito's death would serve to catalyze ill will on both sides of the ethnic divide and lead to the consolidation of Serbian power over Kosovo.

⁶⁷ Vickers, *History of Kosovo*, 214-217.

⁶⁸ Kuntzsch, *Violent Politics*, 305.

In March 1981, Kosovar Albanian students openly protested overcrowded and underfunded conditions at Pristina University.⁶⁹ Two weeks later, as demonstrations continued and became increasingly violent, several thousand construction, mine, and metal workers joined to protest their own conditions. Demonstrations and violence expanded across six additional cities and villages within Kosovo as police responded and as some protestors targeted local Serbian and Montenegrin businesses and homes.⁷⁰ Yugoslavia's federal government declared a state of emergency while police and military units armed with tanks and riot gear came from all over Yugoslavia to take control.⁷¹

Given the history of resistance within Kosovo, Serbian authorities attempted to paint a picture of revolutionary activity connected to Tirana. And there are some indications that the Prishtina demonstrations were impacted by the OMLK's "hundred or so activists."⁷²

When students and other demonstrators took to the streets in 1981, arguably the issue was primarily one of status rather than a desire for independence. It was true that the rapid growth of the university and the influence from Tirana had fed nationalist aspirations; in 1978 there had been festivities all over Kosovo to celebrate the centenary of the founding of the League of Prizren - the so-called Albanian "national awakening." But the dominant emotion underlying the demand for republic status seems to have been resentment that nationalities, i.e. Albanian or Hungarian, were somehow inferior to nations i.e. Serbs or Croats. In other words they felt like second-class citizens. Among the demonstrators, there were members of clandestine radical groups, generally declaring themselves Marxist-Leninist, who favored unification with Albania. But interviews and commentaries suggest that these were marginal.⁷³

⁶⁹ Simonen, "Operation Allied Force," 4.

⁷⁰ Malcolm, *Short History*, 335.

⁷¹ "The Kosovo Report," Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000.
<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/F62789D9FCC56FB3C1256C1700303E3B-thekosovoreport.htm>.

⁷² Pettifer, *The KLA*, 48.

⁷³ The Kosovo Commission Report.

As a result of the demonstrations, not only were Albanians purged from teaching positions in the university, over the course of the next few years, 1,200 people received “substantial prison sentences... and another 3,000 sent to gaol for up to three months.”⁷⁴ Frequently students were sentenced for a range of minor offenses, including possession of tape-cassette recordings of radio broadcasts about the protests, as well as for writing anti-Yugoslavian slogans in chalk on walls and sidewalks.⁷⁵ Public support for Kosovar Albanian autonomy reached Phase 1 levels though not necessarily in support of violent insurgent methods.

Furthermore, while the legitimate social and political grievances expressed by the population were ignored, Belgrade directed a long-term aggressive imprisonment policy against Kosovar Albanians that resulted in more than half a million citizens being either arrested or questioned by police before the end of the decade. The imprisonment policy coincided with purges of Albanian politicians throughout the 1980s;⁷⁶ for example, “[i]n July 1982, 1,000 Albanian members of the League of Communists of Kosovo (LCK) were expelled, and some of the basic units of the LCK were dissolved altogether.”⁷⁷

Imprisonment impacted a large percentage of Albanian families whose relations spent time in jail. Although “[p]ockets of armed resistance existed in the 1980s and before,... [a]s the scope and intensity of Serb repression grew, the number of pockets of

⁷⁴ Malcolm, *Short History*, 335. Malcolm references the Financial Times of 8 September 1981 which provides a figure of 2,000 arrests at that time. The other figures come from: K. Magnusson, “The Serbian Reaction: Kosovo and Ethnic Mobilization among the Serbs.” *Nordic Journal of Soviet and East European Studies*, 4, no. 3 (1987), 11n.

⁷⁵ Dick Leurdijk and Dick Zandee, *Kosovo: From Crisis to Crisis*, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2001) 18.

⁷⁶ Finding revolutionary activity supported by Tirana “became the main preoccupation of the security clampdown and the trials: secret organizations and cells were constantly being named, and the authorities seemed obsessed with locating a ‘general command’ which was assumed to have coordinated them all.” Malcolm, *Short History*, 336.

⁷⁷ Julie Mertus, “Operation Allied Force: handmaiden of independent Kosovo,” *International Affairs*, 85(2009): 465. Malcolm says that “[f]inal estimates of the number of expulsions from the Party ranged from 900-4,000” (Malcolm, *Short History*, fn 6, 425).

resistance also grew. In many cases, those taking up arms had little choice: The Serbs came to arrest members of their families and they simply fought back.”⁷⁸ As a result, the high number of incarcerations created a radicalizing environment for insurgency and established the foundation of a resistance network, substantiating Phase 1 levels of violent mechanisms and vanguard behavior. “In February 1982 the remnants of the OMLK membership joined with the tiny Partia Komuniste Marksiste-Leniniste eShqiptare nen Jugoslavi (the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Albanians in Yugoslavia or PKMLSHJ) and the equally small Levizja per Republiken Socialist Shqiptare ne Jugosllavi (the Movement for Albanian Socialist Republic in Yugoslavia or LRSSHJ that became the National Liberation Movement of Kosovo and other Albanian Regions or LNCKVSHJ) to form a new organization, the Levizjen Popullore per Republiken e Kosoves (the Popular League for the Republic of Kosovo or LPRK).”⁷⁹ The LPRK argued that Kosovar Albanians could only achieve freedom through an armed uprising.

Time in jail forged connections and sharpened a “desire to see Kosovo liberated from the rest of Yugoslavia.”⁸⁰ Still considered to be on the fringe of Kosovar Albanian opinion, many future insurgency participants joined the LPRK in jail or soon after.⁸¹

Upon release, influential leaders, political activists, as well as movement supporters went

⁷⁸ Perritt, *KLA*, 69.

⁷⁹ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 50.

⁸⁰ Perritt, *KLA*, 23.

⁸¹ Judah, *What Everyone Needs to Know*, 58. Also see Tim Judah, “The Growing Pains of the Kosovo Liberation Army,” in *The Politics of Delusion*, ed. Michael Waller, Kyril Drezov, and Bulent Gokay (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001): 21. And Perritt, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 7. “Some Yugoslav gaols after 1981 had a majority of Albanian ‘politicals’ as inmates for many years. They were to become universities of insurgency development. In a significant break from the Drenica and Dukagjini dominated resistance of the past hundred years, the lists of those arrested and gaoled include many from towns like Gjilan and Ferizaj, which had no radical history.” Pettifer, *The KLA*, 49.

into exile to join what might be considered a “radical” movement.⁸² Those members inside Kosovo “operated with a secret cell structure, members being called upon to help produce and distribute radical leaflets.”⁸³

During the early 1980s, other Kosovar Albanians also fled Kosovo to Switzerland and Germany in order to escape arrest and repression as well as to improve their lives and raise funds for their cause.⁸⁴ They describe the humiliation experienced by a generation of men under thirty who “left their homeland by the thousands to seek political refuge or to earn a living, or both.”⁸⁵ The intergenerational component to the resistance and its ability to be open regarding political alternatives to Islamic fundamentalism or communism offered a unique agility in exile for networking across nationalist groups and to maintain relevance politically. Phase 2 levels of public support developed within the diaspora community even though Serbian repression kept support within Kosovo to Phase 1 attributes of coalescence and collective excitement.

Recall that while the Ottoman Empire came to Kosovo during the fourteenth century and converted the majority of the population to Islam, Albanian identity remained “defined less by religion and race than by language, culture and history.”⁸⁶ For example, by 2001, only 5.8% of Kosovar Albanian Muslims attended daily religious

⁸² Tim Judah explains that, “Throughout the 1980s, the LPRK remained a marginal, extremist and underground organisation.” Tim Judah, “The Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA-UCK,” *Perceptions* 5 (September – November 2000): 66. Radical, however, often implies some kind of strict adherence to a religion or ideology. For the Kosovar Albanians, the concept of radical describes the member beliefs that violence would be required to protect Albanians from Serbians and to gain independence.

⁸³ Judah, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 64.

⁸⁴ On initial fundraising, see Perritt, *KLA*, 88.

⁸⁵ Perritt, *KLA*, 7.

⁸⁶ Perritt, *KLA*, 5; Judah, *What Everyone Needs to Know*, 9. The Albanian language itself is distinct from the Slavic languages used by the Croats, Serbians, and most Macedonians.

services.⁸⁷ Subsequently, the insurgency never depended upon an Islamic narrative and rather drew resources from the Vatican and the Catholic Church.⁸⁸ Unlike the Serbians who aligned with their own Orthodox Church, a popular sentiment explains that “[T]he religion of the Albanians is Albanianism”⁸⁹ ... “fueled by a rich set of historical myths, distinctive folk music closely tied to traditional celebrations of marriage and harvest, and a well-developed body of clan-based law.”⁹⁰

By 1985, interconnected clandestine organizations under the LPRK umbrella worked from Switzerland, Germany, Albania, and Kosovo to intensify Albanian nationalism and to develop further resistance capabilities.⁹¹ For example, a resistance newspaper called *Zeri I Kosoves* operated from Switzerland and published media in Albanian, German and English.⁹² Jusuf and Bardosh Gervalla and Kadri Zeka attempted to create an armed group in Germany during the early 1980s, though it was “snuffed out by a combination of Serbian intelligence and the South German police.”⁹³ They also “sponsored Albanian music concerts, Albanian Flag Day celebrations, and coffeehouse discussions of politics. On January 17, 1982, while emerging from a political meeting, the Gervalla brothers and Zeka were gunned down (by the Yugoslav Secret Service, as most people believe).”⁹⁴

⁸⁷ International Crisis Group, “Religion in Kosovo,” 2-4. In addition, many Kosovar Albanians drink alcohol and certain Sufi sects allowed unveiled women to lead religious rituals

⁸⁸ Mother Theresa is a famous Catholic Albanian who worked to broker a relationship between the two sides.

⁸⁹ International Crisis Group, “Religion in Kosovo,” 3. Pashko Vasa, a historic Albanian patriot coined this phrase.

⁹⁰ Perritt, *KLA*, 20.

⁹¹ Perritt, *KLA*, 7.

⁹² “Kosovo Crisis Center News Sources,” last modified October 14, 2015, <http://www.alb-net.com/misc-pages/links.htm>.

⁹³ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 52.

⁹⁴ Perritt, *KLA*, 24. Note the date of death is January 1982 and the LPRK stood up the following month. Judah asserts that, “[f]ollowing the assassinations, those who had been close to the Gervallas and to Zeka founded” the LPRK.” Judah, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 64.

Overall, and critical to the development of the insurgency, Kosovar Albanian leadership in Switzerland and Germany began to advocate a separate identity for Kosovo's political future, studying and comparing different ideological perspectives and revolutionary theories.⁹⁵

The breeding ground for the Kosovo Liberation Army was as much in Germany and Switzerland as it was in Kosovo itself. Young revolutionaries like Jashar Salihu, Xhavit Haliti, Jusuf and Bardosh Gervalla, and Kadri Zeka made their way to Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium, among other European countries, and began to organize a resistance against the Serb presence in Kosovo... The exile phenomenon contributed to the possibility of insurgency—to the consciousness of potential because it brought tens of thousands of young people in contact with the West, and thereby broke the effect that isolation had on much of the Albanian community.⁹⁶

Contact with Albania proper, not just activity in Europe, also played an integral role in the development of the resistance during this time. Recall that fostering international support is a Phase 3 vanguard function.

For example, Enver Hoxha's death in 1985 brought a new supportive regime from Tirana. President Ramiz Alia established formal links between Albania's secret intelligence service that operated in Switzerland and the LPRK leadership.⁹⁷ Similarly, communications between the LPRK and rural networks in Kosovo began to run through Albania.⁹⁸ Alia connected the insurgent organization to international revolutionary movements such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA).⁹⁹ He also began a program to train

⁹⁵ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 51. Members "also tried to learn how to organize a guerrilla insurgency by studying the experiences in Ireland, Vietnam, Algeria, and the Basque region of Spain; learning where and from whom (7) to get arms; and crafting a fund-raising network" (Perritt, *KLA*, 7-8).

⁹⁶ Perritt, *KLA*, 23-24.

⁹⁷ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 54.

⁹⁸ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 55.

⁹⁹ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 55.

a small number of resistance fighters from Kosovo at the Tirana Defense Academy, again a Phase 1 attribute of maturing mechanisms of violence.¹⁰⁰

During the early and mid-1980s, while repression of Kosovar Albanians reemerged, fear also increased among Serbians living in Kosovo who witnessed the effects of student violence against their businesses and homes. Serbian political rhetoric and sensationalized propaganda attempted to convince Serbian citizens that they were being pushed out of Kosovo because of increased harassment, discrimination, and hostility by ethnic Albanians.¹⁰¹ For example, *A Book about Kosovo* accused Albanians of making Kosovo ethnically pure.¹⁰² Other publications argued that Albanian men rampantly raped girls and women across the region.¹⁰³ Slander accompanied increased politicization and nationalist rhetoric by the Serbian Central Committee.

In addition, Serbian nationalists highlighted the risk of rising Serbian emigration from the Kosovo region that would shift the political power structure back in favor of ethnic Albanians. Serbian sentiment was underscored by a September 1986 memorandum published by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences that warned Kosovo Serbs of an impending genocide against them unless government policies were put in place to promote the permanent return of exiled Serbs.¹⁰⁴ The memorandum advocated the “de-Albanianisation” of Kosovo and the “immediate limitation of Kosovo’s autonomy” – two

¹⁰⁰ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 55. At this time, “the Albanian army itself was in rapid decline.” Pettifer, *The KLA*, 67.

¹⁰¹ Malcolm, *Short History*, 337-344.

¹⁰² The Kosovo Commission Report. Also, Malcolm, *Short History*, 338.

¹⁰³ Malcolm, *Short History*, 339.

¹⁰⁴ Simonen, “Operation Allied Force,” 4. According to census data, in 1948 there were roughly 27.5% Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo with 68.5% Albanians. In 1991, even though Kosovar Albanians abstained from the census, projections estimated the population to be roughly 77.4% Albanian with only 14.9% Serb and Montenegrin.

tenets that soon became central to the political platform of Communist party leader Slobodan Milosevic.¹⁰⁵

By the time Milosevic arrived on the scene in the late 1980s, the level of public support for an outright Kosovar Albanian insurgency still remained low within Kosovo itself. Between 1971 and 1981 the population in Pristina grew from roughly 70,000 to 110,000 inhabitants; and, by 1988 at least half of Kosovo's population lived in urban areas.¹⁰⁶ Although areas of resistance could be found, the heavy majority of Kosovar Albanians still participated in the communist political process and supported peaceful means of protest and advocacy. Overall, Kosovar Albanians did not seek or practice in political organizations separate from Yugoslavia's regime at this point in time although a collective desire for increased autonomy continued. Fear of the state played a large role in pacification as well as some continued footprint in the national political process.

During the decade after Tito's death, the vanguard made important strides in organizational and ideological maturity, reaching Phase 2 and three levels by expanding the network, incorporating numerous illicit networks, and garnering international support. Because of Yugoslavia's imprisonment policies, the resistance network became tangible, developing institutionally inside Kosovo and flourishing in Europe. While methods of communication remained limited, support from Albania in terms of a communications pathway and training connected external and internal members and interests. The number of resistance members dedicated to liberation from Yugoslavia via violent mechanisms opened up new opportunities for the vanguard and the movement at large, though the absence of a broader political mechanism still posed a significant weakness. Milosevic's

¹⁰⁵ Leuridijk and Zandee, *Kosovo: From Crisis to Crisis*, 18.

¹⁰⁶ Kuntzsch on page 304 cites: Holm Sundhaussen, *Geschichte Serbiens: 19. - 21. Jahrhundert*. (Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2007), 495.

actions in 1989, however, drove the disassociation of the Kosovar Albanian political machine from the state of Yugoslavia and created an opening for the vanguard to pull in further public support and mechanisms of power.

7.5 Kosovo's Parallel Government (1987-1993)

Slobodan Milosevic's rise to the presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia rested upon inflammatory and fabricated arguments depicting the victimization of Serbians in Kosovo by Kosovar Albanians intent on genocide. For example, a critical point in Milosevic's career occurred during a visit to Kosovo in late April 1987 while serving as the deputy-president of the Serbian Party.

Milosevic arrived at the meeting place in Fushe Kosove/Kosovo Polje in the middle of a scuffle between Serbs and the police. He then uttered the famous words: "No one should dare to beat you," and proceeded to give a speech about the sacred rights of Serbs. He became a national hero overnight. With the support of Radio TV Belgrade, and with mass rallies throughout the country known as "Meetings of Truth", he was able to mobilize popular feelings and to take control of the party leadership.¹⁰⁷

The following year, further anti-Albanian government purges led to "the November 1988 and January 1989 dismissal of central Albanian leaders, including Kaqusha Jashari, Sinan Hasani and Azem Vllasi."¹⁰⁸ Mass demonstrations protested Serbian actions hoping to regain Albanian influence within the government and similar acts continued through

¹⁰⁷ The Kosovo Commission Report.

¹⁰⁸ Julie Mertus, "Operation Allied Force," 465. "The brutal mistreatment of Vllasi would stand as a warning for all Albanians who wanted to participate in federal politics. In 1989, after being imprisoned for six months without an indictment, he was accused of counterrevolutionary acts, destruction of brotherhood and unity, and destroying the economic base of the country. If Vllasi, once known as Milosevic's right-hand man, could be harassed and imprisoned under trumped-up charges, clearly other Albanians without close connections to Serb nationalists, faced few prospects of getting things done in the formal political sphere." Also see Malcolm, *Short History*, 342-343.

1989, often led by Trepca miners.¹⁰⁹¹¹⁰ After the last Trepca strike was put down in 1990, Serbian officials condemned 3,388 miners to prison; “[m]any fled abroad, most to Germany and Switzerland, and laid the foundations of the continuously tough and creative opposition to Yugoslavia in the Albanian diaspora there.”¹¹¹

In May 1989, Milosevic assumed the presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia and implemented the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomous status, including the abolishment of its semi-independent provincial governments; he also passed “a series of decrees aimed at changing” Kosovo’s ethnic composition in support of a policy of Serbian colonization.¹¹² As a result, “[t]housands of Albanians were dismissed from public employment; according to the independent Kosovar Albanian Association of Trades Unions, 115,000 people out of a total 170,000 lost their jobs” and had to find income or resources for survival elsewhere.¹¹³¹¹⁴

Kosovar Albanian nationalism surged in response to Serbian repression and membership grew in both moderate and underground groups seeking full independence from Serbia within Yugoslavia.¹¹⁵ For example, similar to Poland’s Solidarity movement,

¹⁰⁹ “In November 1988, the miners of Trepce/Trepca marched 55 kilometers from Mitrovica/Kosovska Mitrovica to Prishtina/Pristina in the freezing cold, in protest at the removal of the party leaders. In Prishtina/Pristina they were joined by factory workers and students. They carried Yugoslav and Albanian flags, as well as pictures of Tito, and hailed the 1974 constitution. They shouted Titoist slogans like “Brotherhood and Unity” and even (to show they were not anti-Serb) ‘Long Live the Serbian people!’ And in February 1989, the miners of Trepce/Trepca went on hunger strike to protest the imposition of provincial officials. These demonstrations were probably the last Titoist demonstrations in Yugoslavia.” Kosovo Commission Report.

¹¹⁰ Belgrade called a state of emergency on two occasions and violently cracked down on demonstrations through June 1990. At least 25,000 military troops and police transferred to Kosovo. Malcolm, *Short History*, 345.

¹¹¹ Pettifer, *Express*, 18-19.

¹¹² The Kosovo Commission Report.

¹¹³ The Kosovo Commission Report and Simonen, “Operation Allied Force,” 5.

¹¹⁴ See Malcolm, *Short History*, 352-353 regarding colonization.

¹¹⁵ Alberto Coll, “Kosovo and the Moral Burdens of Powers,” in, *War over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age*. ed. Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001): 131.

University of Pristina intellectuals and Kosovar Albanian members of the communist party founded the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) in December 1989 under the direction of literary historian Dr. Ibrahim Rugova.¹¹⁶ “The LDK drew on village organizations and the traditional clan structure of Kosovar Albanian society. It was also able to fill the void left by the collapse of the previous Albanian political movement.”¹¹⁷ Rugova’s LDK connected Kosovar Albanians to a broader international political community, particularly because he became extremely popular to Western governments and news organizations almost overnight.¹¹⁸

The fact that the League was accepted by Milosevic played both positively and negatively with the Kosovar Albanian constituency over time. Initially it provided hope and legitimacy that the Albanian interests garnered an avenue of political expression with Milosevic on the national stage. People wanted to believe that they would win without fighting and that differences could be resolved without war.¹¹⁹ Over time, however, Rugova’s platform lost relevance and slowly members of his party lost faith in his policies. It is difficult to understand the inside of Rugova’s organization. Because he was accepted by Milosevic, he cannot at this point be considered part of the insurgency. At the same time, the insurgency certainly touched and leveraged the LDK.

Members of Rugova’s organization eventually connected with the KLA. For example, Jakup Krasniqi, an “articulate school teacher and regional leader of Rugova’s party in the Glocovac (Drenas) municipality... became a senior strategist and

¹¹⁶ Malcolm, *Short History*, 348.

¹¹⁷ The Kosovo Commission Report calls it the Socialist Alliance.

¹¹⁸ Perritt, *KLA*, 32.

¹¹⁹ 01 May 2015 interview with Xhavit Gashi, Annapolis Maryland.

spokesperson for the KLA. He began working with” them clandestinely in the 1990s.¹²⁰

Although still early at this point, by 1997 the relationship between LDK members and the KLA exhibited signs of connection as reporters used LDK representatives to arrange meetings with KLA leaders.¹²¹ This relationship will gain further attention in future sections, but it should be highlighted that Phase 1 vanguard activities require expansion and placement inside legitimate political institutions and parallel organizations.

In order to mature and develop at home and abroad, the LDK maintained a national and international presence that drew followers within Kosovo and the diaspora.

Believing that the tide of history was turning their way many members of the LPRK and other underground groups loosely known as the 'the movement' left their secret organisations to join Rugova. So, only the hardest of the hard remained; men who said it was beneath their dignity to be members of a party legal in the eyes of the Serbian state.¹²²

Others resistance leaders also disagreed with Rugova’s methods. For example, Hashim Thaci, whose grandfather helped to lead resistance efforts after World War II, argued with Rugova regarding his stance on passive resistance; Thaci was the “president of Prishtina University’s student union and a secret member of the banned League for the Liberation of Kosova organization.”¹²³ He, like other radicals operating in secret against Serbia, could not yet alert the public or the Serbians to their presence and developed a longer term plan to introduce their ideas and activities to Kosovo and would-be external supporters.

¹²⁰ Perritt, *KLA*, 32. He did not become spokesman until 1998. “There were many LDK leaders with strong private disagreements with the Rugova position with its pacifist focus on diplomatic activity alone, and some such as Fehmi Agani who had private contacts with KLA leaders with some time.” Pettifer, *The KLA*, 117.

¹²¹ Chris Hedges, “Kosovo’s Next Masters?” *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 3 (May-June, 1999): 33.

¹²² Judah, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 64. Again, it is hard to know whether these LPRK members were lost or placed.

¹²³ Pettifer, *Express*, 15.

During the government's initial period of growth, Rugova maintained his conviction that a nonviolent movement would gain international backing for Kosovo's cause. He hoped to see the introduction of a United Nations peacekeeping force in Kosovo.¹²⁴ Rugova also passionately denied the existence of any other resistance organizations other than his own, claiming that talk of Kosovar Albanian clandestine activity were constructions of the Serbian government. Until 1995, the LDK garnered overwhelming public support and claimed a membership of 700,000 by the spring of 1991.¹²⁵

Kosovar Albanian representation in Kosovo's parliament continued until In July 1990 when its Albanian membership took a stand against Milosevic. At that time,

a referendum was held in Kosovo in which 114 of the 123 Albanian members of Kosovo's parliament voted in favor of establishing a Republic of Kosovo that remained part of Yugoslavia yet which was independent of Serbia.¹²⁶ In response to this vote, the Serbian government dissolved Albanian participation in the Kosovo government and assumed full control over the administration of the province.¹²⁷

During a second secret meeting the following September, the Albanian delegates agreed to the new Republic of Kosovo's constitutional provisions and claimed it superseded both Serbian and Yugoslav law.¹²⁸

By 1991, the Kosovar Albanian population held a referendum in support of independence, followed by parliamentary and presidential elections in 1992.¹²⁹ The LDK

¹²⁴ Pettifer, *Express*, 47.

¹²⁵ The Kosovo Commission Report figure. Malcolm suggests this figure is implausible. Malcolm, *Short History*, 348.

¹²⁶ Leurdijk and Zandee, *Kosovo: From Crisis to Crisis*, 19. Malcolm, *Short History*, 346.

¹²⁷ Nix and Daubon, "Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA): 1996-1999," 257.

¹²⁸ Malcolm, *Short History*, 347.

¹²⁹ "[T]he LDK won 96 of the 100 single constituency seats. (Of the other 4 seats, 2 were won by independents who were members of LDK, 1 by the SDA, the Bosniak party, and 1 by the Turkish Peoples Party.) A further 42 seats were distributed by proportional representation, giving the Turkish party 12 seats,

won 96 of 130 seats and Rugova became president while his new government headquarters operated in exile from Bonn, Germany.¹³⁰ Other parties that developed during the 1990s but interacted with Rugova and the LDK included the Albanian Christian Democratic Party (PSHDK), whose members comprised a majority of Muslims, the Parliamentary Party (PKK) led by Adem Demaci, the Social Democratic Party (PSDK), and the Liberal Party of Kosovo (PLK).¹³¹ Given this political parallelism, Milosevic continued to allow Rugova's activities overall while addressing its outcomes on a tactical level. They constitute Phase 2 and Phase 3 levels of growth for political mechanisms, though they cannot necessarily be counted as part of the insurgency.¹³²

For example, Serbia's response to Kosovar Albanian political actions yielded numerous human rights abuses, including segregation practices and the continued dismissal of thousands of Albanian employees from their jobs, particularly in healthcare, education and local security forces. New Serbian laws permitted extended questioning for three days "without being told the reason for the summons... in 1994 15,000 people in Kosovo were questioned in this way."¹³³ Due to systemic abuse, more Kosovar Albanians left the country for Western Europe: 217,000 in early 1992 and 368,000 in 1993.¹³⁴

the Christian Democrats 7 seats, the Social Democrats 1 seat and the SDA 3 seats; 13 seats reserved for Serbs and Montenegrins were left empty." Kosovo Commission Report.

¹³⁰ Perritt, *KLA*, 8. Also See Brown, *Keeping It Safe*, 25. Charles J. Brown, "Keeping it Safe for Serbia," *Freedom Review* 23, no. 25 (September-October 1992): 24.

¹³¹ Sean Patrick Kelley, "Kosovo: The Balkan Time Bomb?" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1998) 41-46.

¹³² This is a difficulty in this kind of analysis. The actual relationships between organizational components and vanguard leaders may remain unclear due to the necessity for secrecy and protection.

¹³³ Malcolm, *Short History*, 349.

¹³⁴ Malcolm, *Short History*, 353. Even with these numbers, "the whole idea of creating an ethnic 'balance' in an area with a population of 200,000 Serbs and nearly two million Albanians remained as illusory as it had always been." Malcolm uses figures from R. Blaku, *Hintergrunde der Auswanderung von Albanern aus Kosova in die westeuropaischen Staaten: Moglichkeite der Wiedereinburgerung in der Heimat* (Vienna, 1996), 55. Another reason for emigration was to avoid conscription into the Yugoslav army as it fought Bosnia and Croatia. Kosovo Commission Report.

In order to maintain some quality of life and tradition, Kosovo's Albanian leadership established a system of government that included tax collection, schools, and medical clinics.¹³⁵ Fundraising based in Germany enabled these parallel systems to operate. Both of these functions represent Phase 3 and 4 political functions, although they don't exercise the full capacity expected regarding hierarchical levels of regional political administration. Once the LDK-led government established its headquarters in exile, however, friction developed between Rugova's government and the LPRK, particularly in terms of competition for resources and fund-raising.¹³⁶ Both groups looked to finance their respective interests from the same broad constituency.

For example, radical leaders like "Bardhyl Mahmuti¹³⁷ and Jashar Salihu,¹³⁸ another Swiss-based exile, began to solicit money for their campaign amongst the gastarbeiters and to prepare for war."¹³⁹ The LDK needed the money to support its own efforts. From the perspective of the LPRK,

The League (LDK) was run in an obscure and impenetrable way by a group of families¹⁴⁰, and it was known to have many critics in the Albanian political underground, mostly in the diaspora—people who had been forced to leave Kosova to escape the police or find work. But at this

¹³⁵ Simonen, "Operation Allied Force," 6.

¹³⁶ Perritt, *KLA*, 8.

¹³⁷ In 1981, Mahmuti was jailed for 7 years under charges of nationalist agitation in Kosovo. Paul Wood, "Kosovo exiles stoke fires of resistance" *The Independent*, October 4, 1998. Accessed 27 June 2015, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/kosovo-exiles-stoke-fires-of-resistance-1176110.html>. He is sometimes labeled as "one of the founders of the KLA." "Kosovo to file a lawsuit against Serbia for genocide and war damages." Genocide Watch, "Kosovo to file a lawsuit against Serbia for genocide and war damages," *Independent Balkan News Agency*, February 23, 2015, <http://genocidewatch.net/2015/02/24/kosovo-to-file-a-lawsuit-against-serbia-for-genocide-and-war-damages/>.

¹³⁸ Salihu became a KLA political representative in Brussels by 1999. He is quoted as saying that, "The only language this (Yugoslav) regime understands is the language of force." "KLA pleads for NATO ground troops" *CNN.com*, March 27, 1999. <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9903/27/kosovo.fighting.02/index.html>. Accessed 27 June 2015.

¹³⁹ Judah, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 66.

¹⁴⁰ For example, "Ibrahim Rugova stayed with a Kosovar Albanian diaspora family when he visited New York, one of the magic circle of five or six very wealthy New York families who were the financial backbone of the Democratic League." Pettifer, *Express*, 68.

stage their (radical) movement was limited and fragmented, and appeared to have little practical influence.¹⁴¹

During the early 1990s, most of the funding and support from the diaspora funneled through the LDK-led organization. But the LPRK-led movement also began at this time to better develop its own fundraising mechanisms, an important Phase 3 task for the vanguard.

In addition to conflicts over funding between the LDK and the LPRK, the potentiality to develop a competing armed organization within Kosovo's new government emerged. A Defense Ministry was provided by the Kacanik Constitution¹⁴² and Bujar Bukoshi, the exiled prime minister of Rugova's Kosovar Albanian government in Germany, believed that "armed resistance would be necessary to attract the attention of the international community and keep pressure on diplomacy."¹⁴³ As a result, his leadership in Germany began to form "a 'Ministry of Defence' (MoD), although it was uncertain what substance or military capacity it would have."¹⁴⁴ Bukoshi saw an opportunity to organize the Albanian security forces in Kosovo that the Serbians had let go from service. He appointed a Minister of Defense¹⁴⁵ and collaborated with the LPRK leadership in Germany on a limited basis.¹⁴⁶ For example, he worked to support the LPRK's members involved in President Alia's training program in Albania.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴¹ Pettifer, *Express*, 46.

¹⁴² Pettifer, *Express*, 66.

¹⁴³ Perritt, *The KLA*, 15. "As early as 1992, Bukoshi, unlike Rugova, recognized that Kosovo could never be liberated from Serb control without armed resistance. The international community simply would not pay serious attention in the absence of armed resistance. Regardless of the prospects for a purely military victory, a visible armed resistance in Kosovo was a necessary lever for any successful diplomatic initiative" (Perritt, *The KLA*, 86).

¹⁴⁴ Pettifer, *Express*, 33.

¹⁴⁵ Pettifer, *KLA*, 66. "Ramush Tahiti, a close associate of Bukoshi, was appointed the first Minister of Defence of the Kosova Republic, but in fact the title represented very little."

¹⁴⁶ "Bukoshi, from the early 1990s, was whispering in some ears and informally encouraging those like Haliti to go ahead with their plans for military action" (Perritt, *KLA*, 86-87).

¹⁴⁷ Perritt, *The KLA*, 15.

The establishment of an MoD within the new LDK-led government did not endure although it illustrates some level of tension even within Rugova's small network. While the new president insisted on nonviolence, his administration did not stand monolithic. Bukoshi's efforts "to make the Ministry functional and form an army were stymied by Rugova's intense pacifism; so although the ministry existed as a post in Germany, on the ground in Kosovo, it did not exist at all."¹⁴⁸ The opportunity to transition the Kosovar Albanian police and army officers who had lost their jobs from the former state organization in 1989 and 1990 dissipated. "The LDK did not provide a political perspective that had any military credibility" and as a result, "[a]fter a year or two, the 'government abandoned any pretence of having a military component... [B]y early 1993 little was ever heard again of the 'Ministry of Defence'" although members of the defense ministry would be seen again once Bukoshi successfully established an LDK-led force years later.¹⁴⁹

Bukoshi's support and collaboration with the LPRK diminished significantly in 1993, although it is likely that he maintained contact. The change in perspective occurred as a result of the infiltration of guerrilla training camps in Albania by Serb secret police that year. The operation represented a Serbian success that severely degraded the resistance movement.¹⁵⁰ (At the same time, it also served as a catalyst to reorganize and reenergize the movement.) Ultimately,

About one hundred Kosovar militants, including Adem Jashari had received training in Albania. When they returned to Kosovo at least half of them were immediately arrested, and the other half—except for Jashari—

¹⁴⁸ Pettifer, *KLA*, 66.

¹⁴⁹ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 67. Pettifer quotes Gjeloši, op. cit., pp. 59 ff. He provides 3 sources for N. Gjeloši in his bibliography but does not indicate which one it is.

¹⁵⁰ Perritt, *KLA*, 8.

felt so threatened that they left Kosovo almost immediately for Germany and Switzerland.¹⁵¹

Bukoshi could not afford official links that would point fingers toward the LDK's political movement and hold it liable for the actions of the LPRK.

The LDK needed to exude both legitimacy and consistency within Kosovo and the international arena. Rugova, for example, reasoned that, "the Serbs only wait for a pretext to attack the Albanian population and wipe it out. We believe it is better to do nothing and stay alive than be massacred."¹⁵² Bukoshi remained tied to Rugova's narrative for the time being and stood overtly responsible for fundraising that supported Kosovo's parallel government inside and outside the province. He established the LDK's principal financial mechanism called the Three Percent Fund and "developed a formal system for getting" the "money where it needed to be spent. He established an Albanian bank, the Dardania Bank, and transferred money out of German accounts and into accounts there."¹⁵³ He then found creative ways to work contributions while maintaining the perception of a clean record internationally and in the eyes of the Serbian government.¹⁵⁴ Formally termed the Fund for the Republic of Kosovo (RFK), the RFK called for Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo and in the diaspora to contribute three percent of their income to help the resistance.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵¹ Perritt, *KLA*, 56. Jashari did not leave, but did remain within his own limited territory.

¹⁵² Judah, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 65. Also, recall that around this time, evidence of Serb run concentration camps in Bosnia were beginning to emerge. Pettifer, *Express*, 53.

¹⁵³ Perritt, *KLA*, 96.

¹⁵⁴ "Many of the Three Percent Fund donors were Kosovar Albanian businesspeople who had amassed considerable wealth from a variety of business activities, most at least formally illegal under Serbian law, some involving various kinds of trafficking in weapons, narcotics, and human beings, and many involving efforts to evade economic sanctions imposed on Serbia." Henry H. Perritt Jr., *The Road to Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan*, (New York: Cambridge University Press: 2010), 35.

¹⁵⁵ Perritt, *KLA*, 16. "Very little of the fund's proceeds were funneled to the KLA. The fund's primary role was the maintenance of Kosovo's parallel system of education: 20,000 teachers and administrative staff, 5,291 preschool pupils, 312,000 elementary school pupils, 56,920 pupils in sixty-five secondary schools, two special schools for disabled children, and 12,000 students enrolled in twenty faculties and colleges.

As Rugova dug in to his pacifist stance for Kosovo's resistance, any link to the LPRK became an even greater danger to his overt efforts. And negative feelings ran both ways along the national divide. Those Albanians espousing force grew increasingly suspicious of Rugova's motives and methods;¹⁵⁶ in fact, many radicals believed that Rugova worked for Milosevic.¹⁵⁷ "Rugova was on television regularly, never failing to reaffirm his commitment to independence but discouraging any form of real resistance."¹⁵⁸ Those who joined the resistance concluded "that there was little difference between Rugova's LDK and Milosevic's regime."¹⁵⁹ To them, Rugova appeared to enable the Serbian president's interests in Kosovo rather than make improvements to the lives of Kosovar Albanians. For example, on 13 October 1992, when Serbian forces "teargased and crushed" a mass Albanian demonstration, Rugova's negotiations with the Serbs produced little effect.¹⁶⁰ In Rugova's defense, Serbia was at this point six months into war with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo was in no way prepared to defend against similar Serbian led atrocities.¹⁶¹

In addition to a lack of impact on the social and political rights of Kosovar Albanians, Rugova simply could not improve the standard of living in Kosovo. For

The fund also supported both social welfare programs (food, health care, and sports) and the work of Kosovo's parallel government" (Perritt, *KLA*, 89).

¹⁵⁶ Perritt argues that "Rugova also sought to minimize the KLA because it was a political movement with the potential to derail the LDK's dominance over Kosovo political life... So Rugova made a political decision to reinforce Milosevic's propaganda minimizing the significance of the KLA." Perritt, *The Road*, 34-35.

¹⁵⁷ Another argument exists that Rugova was "under the de facto control of the secret intelligence service in Rome," closely tied to the Pope and Mother Theresa. It may be one reason that Milosevic did not explicitly target Rugova. Pettifer, *Express*, 47.

¹⁵⁸ Perritt, *The Road*, 32.

¹⁵⁹ Perritt, *The Road*, 32. Rugova refuted the existence of the KLA through broadcasts and print media, "describing its members as a motley collection of bandits and archaic Marxists. When KLA activity could no longer be dismissed so easily, Rugova insisted that the KLA fighters and martyrs were Serb secret police and collaborators in disguise" Perritt, *KLA*, 15.

¹⁶⁰ Pettifer, *Express*, 36.

¹⁶¹ Bosnian War: April 1992-December 1995. The Croatian War began roughly a year in 1991.

example, “[I]n 1952 Kosovo’s Gross Material Product (GMP) per capita was 44% that of the Yugoslav average. It had declined to 29% in 1980 and to 22% in 1990.

Unemployment had reached 27% in 1980 and was to increase to 40% in 1990.”¹⁶²

Hyperinflation across Yugoslavia and the rise of a black market made life extremely difficult as Milosevic further destabilized the economy; by 1994 inflation was over a trillion per cent annually and the “government in Belgrade had stopped giving banks any cash.”¹⁶³ Kosovo’s “shadow state”¹⁶⁴ could not accommodate for Serbian economic repression. In 1993, 250,000 Kosovar Albanians depended on food supplies provided by aid organizations.¹⁶⁵

In spite of these negative fiscal and constitutional trends, by the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993, Kosovo’s insurgency changed drastically in terms of independent political mechanisms and the level of public support for those mechanisms. The majority of its Albanian population stood behind the LDK-led government, nominally reaching appearances of Phase 4 levels in both areas of the phasing model. Political leaders defined goals, established political campaigns, grew a multi-party system, held elections, collected taxes, published a constitution, and administered a semi-successful if underground education and medical system. In this respect, Kosovar Albanians were on their way to becoming a supportable state.

In reality, limitations caveated this level of strength. Kosovo’s parliament was not allowed to meet and did not conduct routine or daily operations of a state. The administration in exile and not at home held the key to political continuity and funding.

¹⁶² Kosovo Commission Report.

¹⁶³ Pettifer, *Express*, 44.

¹⁶⁴ Leurdijk and Zandee, *Kosovo: From Crisis to Crisis*, 21.

¹⁶⁵ Simonen, “Operation Allied Force,” 20.

Also, at this point in the resistance, the new government eschewed a defensive organization and lacked full budgetary/economic control or conscription policies. One might argue that it needed to stay separate from mechanisms of violence in order to remain viable and ignored by the Serbian authorities.¹⁶⁶ Regardless of ethical discrepancies or practical necessity for forgoing violence, the LDK remained overtly separate from the LPRK's vanguard leadership.

Although certain relational links between the LPRK and the LDK did exist, like those with Bukoshi and Krasniqi, they did not, impact Rugova's larger organization that grew more contentious with the LPRK over time. Where certain traditional insurgencies might already have entered a weeding out process with perceived competition, Kosovo's movement did not take an immediate violent internecine track. The LPRK had no interest in alienating its own constituency. Additionally, while the LPRK intended to lead the resistance of Kosovar Albanians against Serbia, it had yet to create any kind of pathway or institutional links that would authoritatively control the political activity of any ensuing state. Members maintained an expectation to participate politically once statehood became fully viable. But culturally and historically, Kosovar Albanian resistance movements hinged upon volunteerism and choice. This attribute would persist across the breadth and depth of the emerging insurgency for participating KLA membership, even though relationships became extremely intense – even violent – at the top of competing organizations.

To provide a small amount of foreshadowing, many KLA leaders were accused of assassination and purges later in the insurgency. For example, Hashim Thaci, Azem Syla, and Xhavit Haliti were accused of murdering “as many as half a dozen top rebel

¹⁶⁶ Or to keep the international backing that supported its operations.

commanders,” although State Department Spokesman James Rubin did not substantiate any of the allegations.¹⁶⁷ Also, once the LDK-led administration stood up the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK) in 1998, numerous tribunals insinuate that assassinations and weeding out occurred on both sides.

To return to phasing attributes during the early establishment of the LDK and Kosovo’s parallel government at this time, Kosovo’s vanguard leadership coordinated with underground organizations interested in violent resistance. In spite of the Serbian infiltration of training camps, the vanguard capability expanded to accommodate Phase 2 and 3 levels. And public support for violent methods grew from Germany and Switzerland as more and more Kosovar Albanians left Kosovo under duress. In spite of growing activity, the majority of Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo continued to be unaware of the LPRK, even though local rural pockets maintained their traditional commitment to violent resistance. Finally, although the violent mechanisms on the ground experienced materiel and logistical setbacks after Serbian infiltration, networking inside Kosovo prepared for armed hit and run tactics. Shortly they would return to Phase 1 and 2 capabilities.¹⁶⁸

7.6 The Founding of the KLA (1993-1995)

While still considered radical in the eyes of most of the Kosovar Albanian constituency, the LPRK rallied its underground networks and regrouped in 1993 to

¹⁶⁷ Chris Hedges, “Kosovo’s Rebels Accused of Executions in the Ranks.”

¹⁶⁸ Pettifer notes that during the winter of 1991-1992, the “Belgrade Communist party newspaper *Politika* was regularly reporting the expansion of areas of northern rural Kosova that were out of control of the Yugoslav security forces.” Pettifer, *The KLA*, 68.

propose an alternative path to Rugova's pacifism.¹⁶⁹ After a series of meetings in Kosovo, the future of the insurgency fundamentally changed for three reasons. First, there emerged a new primary resistance association called the Popular Movement for Kosovo (LPK) that organized into sub organizations and operational zones on the ground in Kosovo.¹⁷⁰ For example, the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK) took on the task to condition Kosovar Albanian citizens to accept violence; members like Valon Murati secretly distributed leaflets and newsletters at considerable risk in Pristina from door to door arguing for violence against the Serbian government.¹⁷¹

Second, as the LPRK disappeared and the LPK became the apex of resistance leadership, its top members comprised the insurgency's new vanguard and focused on fostering an international constituency and presence, raising money, providing a political face to the insurgency, and arranging necessary logistics to the internal network. Leaders in exile set up a funding mechanism called Homeland Calls¹⁷² to control money and

¹⁶⁹ Pettifer writes that these meetings included the LPRK, the LPK, and the LKCK. The LPRK represented the "intellectual founding-father Enverists" while the LPK was originally comprised of "the slightly broader church of younger militants." Pettifer, *The KLA*, 69.

¹⁷⁰ Judah says that the LPRK split into the LKCK and the LPK. Judah, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 66.

¹⁷¹ Perritt, *KLA*, 25-26. Perritt writes that the LKCK originally competed with the LPK vision and argued "fighting should be deferred until after the population had been conditioned to accept violence." Also see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., *The Road to Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan* (2010). Unlike Pettifer, he does not connect the LKCK to the LPK at this time. Interestingly, however, individuals maintained membership in both organizations at the same time. For example, Hashim Thaci is connected to the Liberation organization as well as the LPK. Pettifer says that the LKCK was formed in March 1993 by a "small group of activists" who wanted to prepare "the population for mass mobilization against the Serbs and a popular uprising." Pettifer, *KLA*, 68. Regardless, the LKCK originally was likely a student led movement. Eventually it took up arms under the KLA command in May 1997 and then transitioned back to its own political party, "holding two posts in the provisional government." International Crisis Group (ICG), *Who's Who in Kosovo*, 31 August 1999, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6cf0.html> [accessed 29 June 2015]. Also see Perritt, *The Road*, 32. And Pettifer, *The KLA*, 133.

¹⁷² "In the spring of 1993, Homeland Calls was organized in Arau, Switzerland, under Swiss banking law, by Xhavit Haliti, Azem Sylja, Jashar Salihu, and others. Ibrahim Kelmendi, based in Bonn, coordinated fund raising for Germany... Homeland Calls grew from early, and very modest, efforts by the LPK and its predecessor, the LPRK, to organize an infrastructure for Albanian resistance in the late 1980s for an

support available to zones on the ground. LPK leaders would become the basis for the KLA's General Staff in 1998 that reorganized Kosovo's guerrilla forces, interacted with NATO leadership, and ran lines of intelligence during the height of the insurgency – all capabilities premature to the 1993 association.

Finally, with respect to the armed ground component, the LPK needed a capability to network the independent pockets of resistance throughout Kosovo. It set up a “‘Special Branch’ of four men including Hashim Thaci whose job it was to prepare for a guerrilla war.”¹⁷³ By December of 1993, the insurgency determined the name of the intended armed component would be the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) – also known as the UCK in Albanian, the Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës.¹⁷⁴ The LPK did not fully control any part of the broader organization. Similar to the Chechen resistance, field commanders on the ground were tied to their territory by clan and to the broader resistance by choice, often for convenience.

Operational zones across Kosovo were initially associated with self-made individual commanders and eventually numbered seven by the end of 1998. For example, Ramush Haradinaj led the Dukagjini Zone that held routes across the Albanian border.¹⁷⁵ Rustrem Mustafa, also known as Commander Remi, and Zahir Pajaziti were leaders in the Llap Valley Zone; Remi was one commander who developed a local “training academy.”¹⁷⁶ And Adem Jashiri and Sami Lushtaku led resistance in the Drenica zone.

eventual armed resistance, and had a small fund supported by fifty Deutschmarks per month from each member (though some members, of course, contributed more).” Perritt, *KLA*, 94.

¹⁷³ Judah, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 66.

¹⁷⁴ “A delegate meeting of about 100 people was held in Drenica where leaders of the LPK and of the very Marxist LKCK, mainly a student group, joined the LPRK contingent and the orientation and military symbols of the KLA were chosen.” Over time, other families joined the alliance, some with historic ties to the Bali Kombetar. Petifer, *KLA*, 69.

¹⁷⁵ Perritt, *KLA*, 19.

¹⁷⁶ Perritt, *KLA*, 19.

These three zones saw the most violence across the insurgency. (See Figure 7.3.) Each commander acted with significant independence and made external financial connections to families in Europe and the United States. Some zones were directly supported by independent diaspora contributors who worked around the Homeland Calls process.¹⁷⁷

“Although the zone commanders universally respected the General Staff’s contribution to the war, they often resented the orders that came from ‘above,’” particularly at the outset.¹⁷⁸



Figure 7.3 Three Principal KLA Zones¹⁷⁹

Over the course of the next year, the LPK and the KLA became more comfortable regarding their coordination and solidified the go-betweens who could connect activity across the board.

Leaders of the Planners in Exile met in November 1994 in Tirana, agreeing on a division of duties. Xhavit Haliti, Azem Sylja, and Ali

¹⁷⁷ Perritt, *KLA*, 89.

¹⁷⁸ Perritt, *KLA*, 84.

¹⁷⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, “Kosovo,” *The World Factbook*, accessed August 12, 2010, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html>.

Ahmeti, among others, would work outside Kosovo, concentrating on political representation of KLA, and would supply money and weapons to the group, which would coordinate operations. Hashim Thaci, Rexhep Selimi, and Nait Hasani would work inside Kosovo, forging linkages with the fragmented Defenders at Home. In the meantime, the Planners in Exile would launch a public relations campaign aimed at making the KLA seem more coherent than it actually was at the time.¹⁸⁰

With respect to internal recruiting efforts, KLA efforts built up a “network of sleepers – secret sympathisers ready to fight and take command of their village or town when the time came.”¹⁸¹ Family networks were engaged from rural locations into the cities to find potential supporters and ask them to be ready to support the cause when needed.

It is likely that certain members of the LDK understood the changes occurring within the LPRK. For example, after 1993, Bukoshi became even more reticent and “slow to provide resources to the KLA because he feared their recklessness, naiveté, and disorganization;” he particularly distrusted Hashim Thaci¹⁸² and Xhavit Haliti who began to coordinate “requests from commanders for arms and other supplies within Kosovo.”¹⁸³ Again, Bukoshi feared the more radical resistance “would get slaughtered and would bring down the wrath of Milosevic’s Yugoslav Army on the heads of innocent Kosovar Albanians.”¹⁸⁴ For this reason, the LPK leadership worked independently from the LDK to secretly recruit, train, develop logistics, and fund its own organization.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁰ Perritt, *KLA*, 81-82. Perritt drops the term LPK quickly and considers the KLA to have two primary components: the Planners in Exile and the Defenders at home. This is a simplification that works well as a heuristic in his work.

¹⁸¹ Judah, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 66. Also Pettifer, *The KLA*, 67.

¹⁸² Pettifer explains that Thaci “focused on recruiting ‘sleepers’ who were to continue their normal occupations until the appropriate moment to open the armed struggle.” Pettifer, *KLA*, 67.

¹⁸³ Perritt, *KLA*, 16 and 94.

¹⁸⁴ Perritt, *KLA*, 16.

¹⁸⁵ The LPK “was nearly invisible inside Kosovo, among the Diaspora, and to the international community” (Perritt, *KLA*, 8).

In order to prevent Serbian penetration, the KLA and LPK entered a “silent period” until 1996 that relied upon clandestine tactics.¹⁸⁶ Members mitigated future attempts at penetration by relying “on family linkages and other indicia of trust within the closely knit, village-oriented Albanian culture.”¹⁸⁷ They also “hid their roles from each other,” asking few questions to distinguish between fund raisers, supply managers, and other links between the organization.¹⁸⁸

The early KLA was a horizontal organization with a strong emphasis on rank and file initiatives and no ranks, officers or non-commissioned officer class. This was in line with Enverist theories of underground military-revolutionary work, but would later pose very serious problems when the KLA ‘came out’ and engaged in open warfare on a large scale with the Yugoslavs. There was no theoretical model for a command and control system. Here there was a residue of the old *kacak* ethos, where military authority resided with charismatic local family leaders who led their local men into battle, much as happened in eighteenth-century Scotland at Culloden.¹⁸⁹

Alternatively stated, at this stage, hierarchical command did not exist; commanders felt “they did not need soldiers” but could depend on traditional forms of local resistance.¹⁹⁰ Loose linkages connected like-minded small units determined to target Serbian security forces and related threats.¹⁹¹ The vision from the leadership in exile understood that this paradigm would need to change if the KLA was to act as and appear to be a professional army.

¹⁸⁶ This meant “eliminating or intimidating individuals who were formally or informally part of the Serb secret police” (Perritt, *KLA*, 8).

¹⁸⁷ Perritt, *KLA*, 49-50.

¹⁸⁸ Perritt, *KLA*, 50.

¹⁸⁹ Pettifer, *KLA*, 70. “Despite these efforts to connect pockets of resistance ‘horizontally’ on the ground in Kosovo, it was easier to connect them vertically with the growing political leadership of the Planners in Exile in Albania, Switzerland, and Germany. Horizontal connections on the ground inside Kosovo were too dangerous; the SDB (Serbian Secret Police) would find them. But everyone in Switzerland and Germany, it seemed, had a cousin or two involved in armed resistance in one of the pockets in Kosovo, and the cousins found ways to stay in touch with each other.” Perritt, *KLA*, 82.

¹⁹⁰ Perritt, *KLA*, 81.

¹⁹¹ Perritt, *KLA*, 81. According to Rexhep Selimi, “It was all the same group; we just found ourselves in different places. We couldn’t do politics and logistics from inside; they couldn’t do operations from outside.”

Under the new framework, small armed groups began to conduct hit-and-run operations across Kosovo.¹⁹² “Resistance increasingly took the form of offensive attacks on police stations and police patrols, as by Jashari in the Drenica Valley, the Haradinaj family and others in Dukagjini, and Pajaziti in the Llap Valley.”¹⁹³ Attacks increased over time and by 1996 they “were occurring almost weekly throughout Kosovo” using “surprise, popular support, terrain, and local knowledge” to engage “in hit-and-run tactics.”¹⁹⁴

The Milosevic regime appeared to have adequate resources to keep urban Kosova under full control. This was not the case in the countryside. The nascent KLA grew most effectively on or near the borders, as in Llap and Dukagjini. It had little purchase in towns and cities. Between 1992 and 1995, about 135 armed attacks¹⁹⁵

occurred against Serbian security forces without official attribution.

Then, after a coordinated series of attacks in June 1995, the first official KLA communique came out that publicly introduced the name of the Kosovo Liberation Army.¹⁹⁶ In 1996 the KLA developed a stronger media voice. Citizens slowly became aware that Milosevic and Rugova’s claims were not valid; the KLA was real and the pace of attacks would only accelerate.¹⁹⁷ At this time, however, weapons were in extremely limited supply and the use of explosives was nonexistent. Without needed technology, increased personnel, and training, the insurgency would stay confined to Phase 2, small unit hit-and-run tactics.

¹⁹² Perritt, *KLA*, 31

¹⁹³ Perritt, *KLA*, 69

¹⁹⁴ Perritt, *KLA*, 69.

¹⁹⁵ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 72.

¹⁹⁶ Perritt, *KLA*, 82.

¹⁹⁷ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 73.

By 1995, the vanguard operated comfortably through Phase 3 levels of capability. Infrastructure to collect funding and arms continued to solidify, as well as operational networks within and outside of Kosovo itself. Rural leaders and supporting operatives controlled territory, leveraged safe houses, and set up a handful of training camps within Kosovo and beyond. Certain rural regions approached Phase 3 levels of localized enduring control due to associated clan social norms and insular demographics.¹⁹⁸

A chasm still existed, however, across elements of the relationship framework. While the vanguard interoperated with illicit networks and the armed resistance, the majority of the public still supported Rugova's variation of passive resistance. In order to overcome this challenge, "the KLA thought the best way to win over the population was to start fighting" and increase local perceptions regarding their "likelihood of success."¹⁹⁹

The KLA organizers not only had to overcome the perception that defeat was certain. They also had to persuade the mass of Kosovar Albanians that the KLA was the right agency to lead the rebellion, that the potential for the KLA and its predecessors was greater than that for Ibrahim Rugova's passive resistance.²⁰⁰

And although the small attacks against police targets across Kosovo made a small impact, three major events between 1995 and 1998 would serve to change the playing field and the standing of the foundational insurgency relationships. These events include the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords that undermined Rugova's position and enabled the Serbian government to turn its focus back on Kosovo; the dissolution of the Albanian regime in 1997 and the opening of a sizeable source of arms from Albanian armories; and the

¹⁹⁸ For example, "In December 1996 the Serbian authorities became seriously concerned about totally losing control of parts of the important Llap district in the north-east bordering Serbia, and ordered a crackdown. Newly emerging local KLA leaders like Edmond Hoxha were targeted and he was duly shot down with others near Pestove on 31 January 1997." Pettifer, *The KLA*, 99.

¹⁹⁹ Perritt, *KLA*, 26-27.

²⁰⁰ Perritt, *KLA*, 31.

Serbian attack in the spring of 1998 on the entire Jashari family, killing approximately sixty men, women and children.

7.7 Three Catalyzing Events (1995-Spring 1998) – Mainstreaming the KLA

The uptick of KLA attacks against Serbian targets within Kosovo in 1995 coincided with the ratification of the US-backed Dayton Peace Accords between Serbia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina. Although continuing sanctions against Serbia aimed to bring Milosevic to the negotiating table and to motivate respect for human rights in Kosovo, the final December agreement ended Yugoslavia's secessionist conflict without any mention of Kosovar Albanian rights or autonomy.²⁰¹ The absence of Kosovo's plight from the agreement signaled that the international community would treat Kosovo as an internal issue for Serbia and that Rugova's methodology to achieve independence would not work.²⁰²

Consequently, the KLA's logic of force gained instant credibility and increased its potential for additional public support.²⁰³ As espoused by the LPK and KLA leadership, the relative success of the Bosnian example illustrated that Kosovar Albanian independence could come through armed mobilization and the intervention of NATO or the United States in response to violent conflict. The international community would not force Serbia to let go of Kosovo simply because the cause was just.²⁰⁴ Therefore the

²⁰¹ Richard Holbrooke, the lead U.S. negotiator brought up Serbian behavior toward Kosovo during the negotiations but lost leverage on the issue because he needed Milosevic's cooperation for higher priority concessions. Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 10. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2000).

²⁰² William Hayden, "The Kosovo Conflict and Forced Migration: The Strategic Use of Displacement and the Obstacles to International Protection," *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, February 14, 1999, <http://jha.ac/articles/a039.htm>.

²⁰³ Peritt, *KLA*, 32.

²⁰⁴ Pettifer, *Express*, 69.

actionable key for the KLA would be to find a tipping point that invited intervention and provide Kosovar Albanians a voice in the political process.

The KLA wanted LDK elites to “believe that passive resistance was hopeless”²⁰⁵ and Dayton effectively impacted that thinking. Soon after Dayton, members of Rugova’s administration defected from his policy of nonviolence. Bukoshi, for example, publicly disagreed with Rugova²⁰⁶ and pursued the development of an armed force aligned with the elected LDK-led administration in exile. Eventually, Rugova himself came around to this line of thinking. Because the LDK did not turn to the KLA as the lead organizing body for the growth of violent resistance, however, the relationship between the two became increasingly complicated over the next few years. If the LDK developed a separate armed component, then it would directly compete with the LPK/KLA. The absence of a legitimate KLA political mechanism would give Rugova’s organization a substantial leg up in directing the insurgency if it could also develop its own army.

In terms of alternative options outside of the LDK in 1996, the KLA was still an unknown entity to the Albanian constituency; it did not have the political maturity or the infrastructure to provide a greater role in the insurgency at the time. The “political directorate,” eventually called the “general staff”—was diffuse and disorganized” and its forces were nowhere near a strength that could defend against Serbia’s conventional army.²⁰⁷ Protective and secretive regarding their hidden organizational associations, the KLA had no more than about one or two hundred active armed members – even though

²⁰⁵ Perritt, *KLA*, 32.

²⁰⁶ Perritt, *KLA*, 15.

²⁰⁷ Perritt, *KLA*, 33.

its support network extended well beyond these numbers.²⁰⁸ For logistical and operational security reasons, zone commanders could not accommodate more recruits on the ground at the time.

Therefore, in order to overcome immediate limitations, as Rugova unilaterally pushed back presidential elections and extended his term as president, the KLA acted inside Kosovo without a spokesperson, focusing instead on conducting hit-and-run attacks, avoiding annihilation, and upping its political and strategic game. For example, the LPK leadership worked logistics and fund raising in both Europe and the United States to increase the organization's future access to weapons and associated pass-through capability. Additionally, the handful of liaisons moving between the zone commanders on the ground and the enablers in the diaspora expanded interconnective relationships and communications to facilitate future cross-zone dynamics.

Even without a spokesman, KLA public communiqués proliferated during 1996 and 1997, targeting messages for various audiences. Press releases reached the BBC²⁰⁹ as well as local newspapers such as *Koha Ditore* and *KD Times*; the KLA also “established a radio station called Free Kosovo and a news agency called Kosova Press.”²¹⁰ It is possible these organizations were augmented by the new U.S. Information Agency's cultural center that opened in Pristina in 1996.²¹¹ Regardless, as will be seen, the role of

²⁰⁸ Perritt, *KLA*, 137. Perritt says around 100. Judah says, “perhaps no more than a couple hundred” (Judah, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 69).

²⁰⁹ For a large bundle of numbered communiqués, see “The KLA In Its Own Words,” compiled by Andy Wilcoxson. July 26, 2007. http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/kla_communiques.htm. Each document was published by the Albanian media or entered into evidence at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague.

²¹⁰ Perritt, *KLA*, 149.

²¹¹ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 10. “The Western press, working side by side with the local Kosovar press, was an essential communications conduit. But it took a while to get plugged in. When the KLA leaders introduced themselves to the world in November 1997, it did not take long for them to make a big splash.” Perritt, *KLA*, 137.

the press became increasingly important to the KLA strategy – both in terms of enticing intervention from the West as well as establishing connections to emerging supporters within the local and diaspora populations. Mounting attention afforded by the international press assisted insurgency methods of communication over time.

Although the KLA designed a strategy to trigger external intercession, the vanguard and armed component committed to a path of violent resistance regardless of whether the United States and the West intervened. Its leadership in Europe, however, as well as zone commanders such as Ramush Haradinaj, believed that NATO and US support would prevent a fate for Kosovo similar to that of Northern Ireland;²¹² an insurgency that might take decades to resolve unaided could tread a much shorter path given Western state backing, particularly because the Warsaw Pact could no longer aid Serbia.²¹³ Kosovo needed state sponsors who could help it find a place within the international community. Without sponsorship, total independence from Serbia's dictatorial power and arbitrary control might be impossible; without help, Phase 2 and Phase 3 violence would continue almost in perpetuity unless Serbia could crush the resistance.

Both the KLA message and corresponding insurgency activities, however, had to relate consistently enough for potential international stakeholders and the Kosovar Albanian demographic to fully invest in the effort.

In order to build the popular support for armed resistance, the KLA had to undermine the credibility of the myth of Yugoslavia; it had to convince the Albanians in Kosovo, in western Europe, and in the United States that

²¹² By the summer of 1998, for example, "Although Serbian armour could overwhelm the KLA in particular battles, the Serbs did not have the size of infantry resources available to effectively occupy and pacify the territory they had 'gained' and often the KLA moved back into it when the heavy armour withdrew." Pettifer, *The KLA*, 148.

²¹³ Perritt, *KLA*, 13-14.

Kosovo was a police state—that the Serbs were an occupation army, not the agents of Yugoslav interethnic tolerance.”²¹⁴

Moreover, through word and deed, the KLA would have to show that it could handle the responsibility of speaking for an emergent state and managing the violence in which they engaged.²¹⁵

Fortunately or unfortunately, depending on the perspective, convincing internal and external constituencies would soon become easier; “Milosevic’s forces, now freed from the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, began to turn their attention to Kosovo, intending to stamp out the emerging insurgency.”²¹⁶ Some sources suggest that Milosevic began to revive “the 1930s theory of Vladislav Cubrilovic, who wrote the first coherent plan to subject Kosova to ethnic cleansing.”²¹⁷ Although increasing violence and brutality against Kosovar Albanian civilians provided some indication of what was to come, actions in 1997 could not yet substantiate this claim.

Among the increasing flow of KLA press releases in 1997, a number of communiques requested financial support of Kosovar Albanians globally but did not ask for volunteers.²¹⁸ Until late that year and through the beginning of 1998, Serbian policies regarding weapons control and pacification made it extremely challenging for Kosovo’s armed component to obtain ordnance at all; the lack of munitions posed a serious limitation to their expansion. Many recruits exercised creativity by using ceremonial family weapons or by bribing corrupt Serbian police and military officials to obtain

²¹⁴ Perritt, *KLA*, 30.

²¹⁵ “The war was not going to be a matter of simple Albanian territorial advance and Serbian retreat, culminating in some liberation of Prishtina like the liberation of Berlin in 1945. Kosova was actually a highly complex operating environment that demanded local military leadership with a clear final vision of victory but an almost infinite tactical flexibility in achieving it.” Pettifer, *The KLA*, 140.

²¹⁶ Perritt, *KLA*, 8

²¹⁷ Pettifer, *Express*, 92.

²¹⁸ Perritt, *KLA*, 32 and 196. He cites KLA communiques Nr. 30 (3 Feb. 1997); 33; 35 (12 Aug. 1997); 36 (15 Sept. 1997); 38 (7 Nov. 1997) and 39 (22 Nov. 1997).

guns.²¹⁹ Members who went without functioning arms could not directly contribute to the fight. And until this logistical situation changed, “sleepers” waited across Kosovo to be called to service. When the insurgency could develop a more mature ability to provide both organized leadership and traditional sustainment capabilities – beans, beds, and bullets – and when the operational context required it, the vanguard and zone commanders would call upon this surge capacity and act.²²⁰

In January 1997, the weapons limitation became less of a constraint for the insurgency as Kosovo’s peripheral environment changed. Massive protests broke out in Albania and led to the collapse of Sali Berisha’s regime. Albania’s arms stockpiles became available and an emerging market of weapons signified that more recruits could join the KLA ranks. “Out of the 70 million Kalashnikovs that have been produced world-wide, Albania stored about 600,000 in local magazines in March 1997.”²²¹ As weapons for \$10 a piece moved toward Kosovar Albanian buyers, KLA numbers increased and “multiple supply lines developed, many of them controlled by Dukagjini Zone commander Haradinaj, whose forces were astride the border” and knew the local region.²²²

Over the next two years, new recruits walked through the mountains and across the Kosovo-Albanian border to acquire their own weapons, often through the bodies of men and horses killed by Serbian gunfire, staying some nights in villages and other nights

²¹⁹ Perritt, *KLA*, 53.

²²⁰ Judah, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 66. According to Pettifer, “The emphasis that Thaci placed on security considerations and political reliability in deciding whom to recruit as KLA ‘sleepers’ in the early 1990s was essential to avoid Serb infiltration, but made some vital logistics and organization activities very difficult once the spread of the war.” Pettifer, *Express*, 150.

²²¹ Pettifer, *Express*, 108

²²² Perritt, *KLA*, 125. Judah, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 70.

in the open air.²²³ Once in Albania, they met volunteers from Germany and Switzerland, sleeping in camps set up on empty school grounds along the border.²²⁴ After a two week stay, soldiers received old or broken AK-47s as well as ammunition that they then had to carry back on their person, or sometimes on donkeys.²²⁵ As weapons first became available in Albania, weapons training occurred only after recruits returned back to their original zone headquarters.

Although somewhat cavalier and filled with the risk of Serbian reprisal, the LPK leadership furthered a KLA strategy that garnered visibility in the West, “even at the cost of inducing greater Serb repression.”²²⁶ Accelerating attacks in 1996 and 1997 did not go unnoticed or unanswered by potential friends and foes thanks to the media. Although Rugova still advocated that the KLA was a fabrication, a January 1998 article in *The Times* claimed that KLA rebels forced the withdrawal of “hundreds of police,” from areas along the Albanian border resulting in a breakdown of Serbian control.²²⁷ Similarly in much of Drenica, police were also “forced to withdraw” by February.²²⁸

Ultimately, Kosovo’s insurgency began to make the radar of the international community, although not necessarily in the way the KLA hoped for. Western officials

²²³ Detail in this paragraph provided during 01 May 2015 interview with Xhavit Gashi, Annapolis Maryland. Xhavit ended up being one of many recruits dedicated full time to the weapons supply routes. “The arms supply activities were in full swing by June or July 1998 and continued through just before the NATO bombing campaign began in April 1999, when the VJ increased its efforts to block the border. That is a nine-month or thirty-seven-week period, which suggests that as many as two hundred fighters were required full time just to move weapons. The KLA casualty rate for arms transport was higher than for other activities and many hundreds were killed trying to move arms across the border” Perritt, *KLA*, 124.

²²⁴ The camps were not safe environments serving broader illicit interests and inviting infighting between Albanian gangs. Many Kosovar Albanians expected that Albania would be a beautiful homeland and were quickly disillusioned by impoverished conditions there.

²²⁵ Ammunition resupply travelled frequently through Montenegro.

²²⁶ Perritt, *KLA*, 64. The attitude parallels the Galula shortcut method in which violence is started but the endstate is assumed to be something to figure out later. In this case, the LPK/KLA leadership gambled that the West would intervene given its recent history with Milosevic.

²²⁷ James Pettifer, “Kosovo gunmen for Serb police to beat retreat,” *The Times*, August, 1, 1998, <http://www.bndlg.de/~wplarre/back104.htm>.

²²⁸ Judah, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 69.

still questioned the KLA's legitimacy as a "back-able" organization. For example, in February 1998, the American envoy to the Balkans called the KLA a terrorist group²²⁹ even though it purposefully avoided suicide attack methods and sparingly engaged civilian targets.²³⁰ Due to allegations of kidnapping and murdering Serbian civilians, however, the appellation continued to be used by many members of the international community, even after NATO entered into a relationship with its leadership and began to interface with its zone commanders.

The vanguard did not want the KLA to be perceived as a terrorist outfit by NATO or by the Kosovar Albanian diaspora. Besides methodology, additional characteristics differentiated them from standard terrorist organizations. Regarding ideology and political theory, often a Phase 0 vanguard task, although the "LPK and LPRK was in origin Enverist... it did not have a single coherent theorized ideology by the year 1997" and appeared politically agnostic; similarly, its General Staff wanted to become a capable army but lacked a clear doctrinal model for its insurgent force or a conventionally minded leadership that could develop its capability.²³¹

Accordingly, it issued a political statement in late April of 1998 regarding its agenda.²³² First it stated an objective of liberation of Albanian occupied territories.

Second it denounced terrorism and violence against civilians, stating that the KLA

²²⁹ Perritt, *KLA*, 130. Reporter Chris Hedges argues that this statement made by "U.S. Special Envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbard gave what many have interpreted as a green light to Belgrade to go after the" Jashari compound in March. This will be covered in the next section. Hedges, *Kosovo's Next Masters*, 36.

²³⁰ For example, Haradinaj disqualified a police station in late 1998 from attack during a reconnaissance run because it was close to too many civilians. 01 May 2015 interview with Xhavit Gashi, Annapolis Maryland.

²³¹ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 109. Tension existed between the General Staff and certain regional commanders like Remi who "still envisaged the war ending in a popular armed uprising where traditional military authority structures would have little importance." Pettifer, *The KLA*, 135.

²³² Jakup Krasniqi, *Kthesa e Madhe*, (Prishtina: Publishing House Buzuku, 2006), 83-84. This excerpt may also be found in Appendix D of Pettifer, *The KLA*, 277-278.

observed international war conventions. Next, it expressed a desire to cooperate with the international community and would negotiate with Serbia under the auspices of international mediation. The statement declared invalid any attempt at peace without its express participation. Finally it expressed dependence on its own legal funding mechanism and asked for the help and intervention of the United States and the European Union.

Left alone or given the wrong sponsorship, it might have turned into a radical terrorist organization like the Chechen resistance. At this early point in time, however, the KLA took efforts to overcome any association with terrorism and strove to look like a credible army, to include using standardized uniforms and grappling with the execution of more conventional tactics. Allegations of KLA/LPK connections to illicit trafficking and organized crime are expansive throughout the press and academic literature. While this kind of behavior does accompany terrorist organizations, it is not exclusive to them. That said, organized crime plagues the Kosovar Albanian government today and quickly played a heavy role in political affairs after Serbia withdrew.

In the end, Milosevic might have stayed ahead in international opinion and in overall control of the region by minimizing Serbia's counter reaction to KLA hit-and-run attacks. This, however, was not to be. On 5 March of 1998, Serbian forces massacred the family of a prominent Drenica-based resistance leader over a three day period, killing Adem Jashari and fifty-eight of his family members.²³³ During the week leading up to

²³³ "Several years before (Adem Jashari) had killed a Serbian policeman and been convicted, but the Serbs were frightened to get him because he would shoot at them from his house. They had tried in January but were forced to retreat. Jashari was a maverick. He hated the Serbs, and although he was one of the KLA's early recruits, he was no ideological guerrilla. In the words of one source: "He liked to get drunk and go out and shoot Serbs." In this sense he was a true, dyed in the wool, Drenica kacak. Maverick though he was and associated with the KLA, the police decided they had had enough" (Judah, Kosovo Liberation Army, 69).

the “Jashari Massacre, Serb forces killed another twenty-four, including ten members of the Ahmeti family and rounded up other suspected KLA leaders from around the country, once again decimating” a portion of the armed leadership.²³⁴ Uniformed Serbians “beat ten local Albanian residents to death in front of their families in a classic reprisal action” for the killing of a Serbian policeman by the KLA.²³⁵ While the international community struggled to respond to the massacres, KLA diaspora leadership returned home within a week of the incident to revector efforts on the ground and to quickly reconstitute its leadership in effected regions. For example, “Hashim Thaci, Agim Bajrami, Shukri Buja, Fatmir Limaj and Ismet Jashari” took the reins of the new General Staff in Kosovo.²³⁶

The Kosovar Albanian response to the Jashari Massacre “forced the KLA to become an army some years before it had planned to do so.”²³⁷ Even in Pristina where the KLA held low levels of popular support, over 100,000 citizens marched against the Serbian government. Very quickly the compounding momentum of overlapping insurgency mechanisms and lines of effort successfully leveraged financial assistance and additional manpower from the global Albanian diaspora.²³⁸ Without help from this broader network, the KLA could never have mobilized in such a short amount of time.²³⁹ At the beginning of the buildup particularly, weapons shortages and the absence of local

Interesting that while Judah describes Jashari as an early KLA recruit, Pettifer calls Adem and his brother “founding fathers of the KLA.” Pettifer, *The KLA*, Illustrations Fig. 2 following page 257.

²³⁴ Perritt, *KLA*, 56. The reference to previous “decimation” refers to the Serbian penetration of Albanian-sponsored training camps.

²³⁵ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 112.

²³⁶ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 124.

²³⁷ Perritt, *KLA*, 83. Initial plans place the beginning of major action later in 1999 rather than March 1998. Judah, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 70.

²³⁸ “The rate of contributions from a broader class of contributors began to accelerate only in 1996 and 1997, and mushroomed in 1998 and 1999. Fund raising for the KLA in the United States began in a serious way only in late 1997. Little was raised in the United States before then, though contributions mushroomed in 1998 and 1999.” Perritt, *KLA*, 91. “The American Diaspora, in particular, comprised over 350,000 people and included many wealthy families who after initial suspicion of the KLA, in many quarters, as a ‘Communist’ type army were now moving in with substantial financial support.” Pettifer, *The KLA*, 197.

²³⁹ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 152.

administrative frameworks or training programs made mobilization extremely challenging.

At the time of the massacre, the size of the KLA armed component “was only about 500-600 organized fighters.”²⁴⁰

Overwhelmed with volunteers and struggling to arm them through the supply chain now functioning through the recently collapsed state of Albania, the KLA made use of its newfound riches by broadening its attacks and declaring itself to be an ‘army’ rather than a mere guerrilla movement.²⁴¹ After the massacre, young men from all over Kosovo, from Europe, and from the United States²⁴² swarmed to make contact with the KLA, seeking to enlist in the fight to defend their families.²⁴³

Over the course of a year, approximately one in every one hundred Kosovar Albanians would try to join the armed resistance; that’s roughly 18,000 in a prewar population of 1.8 million. Similar estimates figured 15,000-17,000 KLA fighters in Kosovo and another 5,000 in Albania.²⁴⁴

Furthermore, to provide some detail of capabilities discussed more fully in the next section, over the summer, the KLA’s executive political committee established itself as a General Staff and redefined

operational zones and appointed zone commanders, inevitably ratifying the identity of those who had already emerged as regional insurgency leaders.²⁴⁵ It instructed zone commanders to reorganize their forces into brigades and battalions and to appoint commanders of each subordinate

²⁴⁰ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 121.

²⁴¹ Perritt, *KLA*, 9.

²⁴² “Of the regular soldiers, 60 to 80 percent came from inside Kosovo, and 20 to 40 percent came from outside.” Perritt, *KLA*, 41.

²⁴³ Perritt, *KLA*, 39. To get an idea of the influx, Fatmir Limaj explained in the ICTY, *Limaj Trial Transcript*, 407-409, “In May [1998] we were only seven. At the place which I led, in the municipality of Malisheva, which has 53,000 inhabitants, there were 35 soldiers, approximately. In three months, the number of armed soldiers in that municipality exceeded 2,000, whereas 5,000 or 6,000 others were expecting to get weapons.” Perritt, *KLA*, 83.

²⁴⁴ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 151-152. Daalder and O’Hanlon cite American Admiral Thomas Wilson who also includes diaspora numbers as well.

²⁴⁵ “It was enough for ten people to carry weapons, and one of them to be elected commander. That election was turned into an appointment by the Planners in Exile’s self-styled general headquarters.” Perritt, *KLA*, 83.

unit... The “battalions” were platoon size—ninety to one hundred men each.²⁴⁶

Where volunteers were turned away in March of 1998, because the organization was not ready to access them, they were given a signal by June that the KLA was now better organized and ready to enlist them.²⁴⁷ For example, even though weapons were unavailable for hundreds of new recruits, between the summer of 1998 and March of 1999, training became organized and more formal.²⁴⁸ Llap and Drenica stood up four to eight week programs and Albania organized a number of camps, “both for KLA soldiers coming from Kosovo for weapons and for recruits coming from the Diaspora.”²⁴⁹

In parallel to directed KLA activity, “village militias began to form and clan elders, especially those in Drenica decreed that now was the time to fight the Serbs. Whether they were KLA or not, they soon began to call themselves KLA.”²⁵⁰ The massacre of the Jashari family ignited values intertwined with the rural *kacak* tradition in Drenica and became a symbol across Kosovo and the diaspora that families were unsafe against the Serbian regime.²⁵¹ The KLA worked with many local elements, helping them gain weapons and to build trenches around their positions.

With respect to the insurgency phasing model, the period between 1995 and 1998 saw the continued bifurcation between the political mechanisms of the LDK-led shadow state of Kosovo and the LPK-led vanguard alliance with the region’s underground resistance networks and violent mechanisms. A complication regarding this assessment,

²⁴⁶ Perritt, *KLA*, 83.

²⁴⁷ 01 May 2015 interview with Xhavit Gashi, Annapolis Maryland.

²⁴⁸ Perritt, *KLA*, 103.

²⁴⁹ Perritt, *KLA*, 103.

²⁵⁰ Judah, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 70.

²⁵¹ Perritt, *KLA*, 38 and 51. Also see Judah, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 70. Recall that although the “KLA never engendered overwhelming popular support across Kosovo, particularly in Prishtina and other urban areas like Prizren and Mitrovica; it was able to gain “a critical mass of support” among communities along much of the Albanian border and the North, as well as in many rural locations (Perritt, *KLA*, 26).

however, is that by 1998, it can be argued that two competing vanguards existed. This is because Bukoshi and the other members of Rugova's administration, now with Rugova's permission, established an LDK-led military component and decided to abandon compromise or coordination with Milosevic.²⁵² By June 1998, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK, Forcat e Armatosura te Republikes se Kosoves) moved from Albania into Kosovo and began limited operations on the ground, creating further tension between competing leaderships.²⁵³

In line with Phase 2 vanguard behavior, press reporting indicates that Colonel Ahmet Krasniqi, the newly appointed defense minister, attempted to push FARK commanders to take control of KLA forces, and was murdered soon after on 21 September.²⁵⁴ Additionally, in September, Sabri Hamiti, one of Rugova's closest advisers was gunned down.²⁵⁵ Although inter-Albanian violence was likely the cause, the attack may have been conducted by the Serbian secret police who hoped to further divide the two Albanian factions and deter the West from entering into any arrangements with the Albanians.²⁵⁶

Evidence suggests that the FARK/LKD leadership worked with the KLA/LPK as often they worked against one another during the war, complicating the phasing description. First, "Bukoshi and other critical members of the Kosovar Albanian elite came around. Having initially refused KLA requests for money from his Three Percent

²⁵² Rugova maintained his own headquarters in in Kosovo.

²⁵³ "Kosovo: Witness describes to UN tribunal rivalries between Albanian rebels," *Androkronos International*, September 26, 2011, <http://www.lexisnexis.com>.

²⁵⁴ Chris Stephen, "ARRIVAL OF SECOND KOSOVO FACTION COMPLICATES EQUATION," *The Scotsman*, October 30, 1998, <http://www.lexisnexis.com>.

²⁵⁵ The motive for the killing might have been to prevent any concession by Rugova and the LDK to Milosevic that would keep Kosovo as part of Serbia.

²⁵⁶ Tim Judah, "Gunmen target Kosovo leaders who seek peace; Both rebels and Serbs are accused," *The Observer*, September 27, 1998, <http://www.lexisnexis.com>.

Fund, he was actively channeling money into the KLA by late 1998.”²⁵⁷ In fact most of the funds collected by both funding mechanisms after 1998 went to “buy arms and counter Serb aggression.”²⁵⁸ Second, Bukoshi attended demonstrations in Europe with KLA families who had lost soldiers in the fight, like the Jashari’s.²⁵⁹ And third, the small teams running weapons between Albania and Kosovo provided arms to both FARK and KLA forces even though they were members of Haradinaj’s Dukagjini zone.²⁶⁰

On the ground, the KLA consistently outperformed the FARKs smaller organization of a few hundred soldiers²⁶¹ and zone commanders received Rugova’s forces differently across zones.²⁶² Variation in acceptance is a fourth example of the complicated FARK/KLA relationship. While rejected outright by some commanders, for others “FARK units ceased to operate under their own name” and “began operating as the KLA, though their chain of command remained unclear as they co-operated with other KLA units on the ground but still had their own Minister of Defence.”²⁶³

²⁵⁷ Perritt, *KLA*, 33.

²⁵⁸ Perritt, *KLA*, 98.

²⁵⁹ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 134. One such demonstration of 70,000 Albanians in Bonn, Germany was held during a Contact Group meeting to discuss Kosovo. The Contact Group included Russia plus the NATO members of France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

²⁶⁰ 01 May 2015 interview with Xhavit Gashi, Annapolis Maryland.

²⁶¹ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 117. I am unsure if this was a starting figure for the FARK or a final figure size.

²⁶² This is perhaps because varied FARK units comprised different kinds of men. Some insurgents came from former service in the Yugoslav military. Others were connected to less legitimate organizations. For example, Tahir Zemaj, a former member of the Yugoslav army and transnational criminal, played a large role in growing portions of the LDK’s force from his own right leaning militia in Dukagjini. His role is “inextricably mixed with the militia irregulars who continued to support Berisha and the Albanian Right against the new Tirana government established in June 1999... It has never really been clear who the shadowy backers of these forces really were.” Pettifer, *The KLA*, 117. For example, “a group of mostly Kosova soldiers loyal to the FARK attacked Prime Minister Nano’s offices in Tirana on 14 September in an attempted coup d’etat.” Pettifer, *The KLA*, 161.

²⁶³ Judah, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 72. An additional data point regarding the KLA-FARK dynamic. The KLA tried frequently to recruit former Albanian VJ members. One former VJ MiG 24 pilot was asked repeatedly by family members in the KLA to join and lead. He knew the capability of the Serbian professional army, however, and argued that, “I cannot lead you to your death.” After a night of drinking homemade rakia, the cousin agreed to become a platoon commander. “After the next battle he left the KLA and then went to Albania where he joined the FARK. At the end of the war he came back and joined Kosovo’s air force equivalent.” The KLA did not know what to be afraid of as the FARK did, because

The detailed role played by FARK soldiers in the conflict has yet to be investigated on any objective basis. Anecdotal evidence would suggest the FARK may have contributed something to the liberation of Peje but played a very negative role in border logistics, in Albania, in the fighting at Rahavec and around Prizren at later stages of the conflict.²⁶⁴

Comprised at the outset of former Yugoslav military members and originally the creation of a Pan Albanian assembly sponsored by the Democratic League of Croatia, certain FARK units frequently left their posts during or before battle.²⁶⁵ For all these reasons, for purposes of phasing designations, FARK and KLA are considered together in the category of violent mechanisms. Led and funded by overlapping leadership, the discrepancies of their commanders are looked at as internecine competition.

Between March and July, the KLA developed supply corridors between Kosovo and Albania, set up rear bases areas, reorganized the armed component, pushed initial Serbian security forces out of rural strongholds, and prepared for Phase 3 guerrilla warfare, rather than just small unit tactics.²⁶⁶ Adem Demaci, who was released from prison in 1990, kick started a new beginning to his political career and became a KLA political spokesman, lending legitimacy to its efforts and going as far as to say that he

Rugova's force had leadership with more military experience. New KLA members assumed they would find experienced leaders who would tell them what to do. "But those people didn't exist. We had to figure out what to do, what to eat. We had to let more people know about us. People were afraid but they would open doors and support us. When they would see us in our uniforms that came from Albania, they were very supportive and emotional. Without people you cannot survive." 01 May 2015 interview with Xhavit Gashi, Annapolis Maryland.

²⁶⁴ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 304.

²⁶⁵ Apparently the group was initially conceived in January 1991 to accommodate Albanian conscripts in the Yugoslav army who were deserting to fight for Croatia. Pettifer, *The KLA*, 65.

²⁶⁶ Zone commanders and the General Staff still focused primarily on "personal revenge for aggression" rather than on "sabotage to undermine the Serbian war effort by taking out vital infrastructure such as bridges, stores and petroleum installations that might not involve direct kills;" they also did not use the explosives expertise of those Kosovar Albanians with experience in the "mining and quarrying industry." Pettifer, *The KLA*, 141. By 1999, this would change. It is likely that the KLA received not only help from the Albanian military, but also Western militaries such as the United Kingdom (UK). Pettifer, *The KLA*, 145.

didn't recognize "Rugova's 'Parliament in Kosova.'"²⁶⁷ Public support and organizational development in rural areas rose to Phase 3 and 4 levels where local militias identified with and called themselves the KLA.²⁶⁸ Although the KLA did not have the technology, training, or transportation to conduct mobile warfare against Serbia, the momentum attained by the relationship between the vanguard, the public and associated mechanisms of violence far surpassed the KLA capacity of the pre-Jashari massacre period.²⁶⁹

Milosevic did little to counter the swell in insurgent activity between March and June, likely needing time to register what was actually happening on the ground as well as devising a counterinsurgent strategy.²⁷⁰ Serbian intelligence believed that the KLA was much larger in March than its numbers suggested, 3,500-4,000 strong rather than 500-600 strong; Milosevic's intelligence also misinformed him that KLA motivation spurred from neighboring Albanian leadership to "create a 'Greater Albania' rather than simply liberate Kosova."²⁷¹ Because of this, heavy Serbian tactics began along the Albanian border, and only encouraged people to support or join the KLA.²⁷² While

²⁶⁷ Perritt, *KLA*, 33 and Pettifer, *The KLA*, 145. Demaci hoped to re-enter the political arena and his KLA title was called the "General Political Representative of the Kosova Liberation Army." Pettifer, *The KLA*, 158.

²⁶⁸ In many circumstances armed citizen militias in rural communities were not part of the KLA but did engage in "long distance gun battles" with Serbian villages. Pettifer, *The KLA*, 130.

²⁶⁹ "Training was organized, after mid-1998, on a more or less systematic basis in each of the three main operational zones: Dukagjini, Drenica, and Llap. Training curricula and methods varied widely" (Perritt, *KLA*, 100). Haradinaj, for example, still provided no training and soldiers had "had to learn in battle" (Perritt, *KLA*, 101).

²⁷⁰²⁷⁰ An alternative explanation for a delay in the offensive argues for a deliberate design. "To a certain extent, the frontal war that crystallized in the summer of 1998 was a smoke-and-mirrors operation. The KLA may have 'held' 40 percent of Kosovo, but it did so with miniscule numbers of fighters and relatively light armament, largely because Serb forces withdrew after encountering modest, albeit more-than-expected, amounts of fire. Because the Serbs sought to return with heavier forces, the KLA had no alternative but to try to defend its 'front' until its lines broke. Even in defeat, however, the KLA was now visible to the entire world. No one could deny its existence, and no one could deny that a full-fledged war was on in Kosovo" (Perritt, *KLA*, 76).

²⁷¹ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 122-123.

²⁷² Pettifer, *The KLA*, 123.

Haradinaj's zone took the brunt of the initial fighting, the KLA worked to expand its presence across all the other zones.

Serbia's actions in March 1998 catalyzed the insurgency for two reasons. Not only did the series of attacks set off the next phase of insurgent mobilization, it also brought significantly more outside attention to Milosevic than the KLA could have hoped for on its own. In this way, Jashari and the others truly were martyrs. For example, on 5 March, NATO's North Atlantic Council offered to help Albania, Macedonia, and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) cope with crisis consequences. In June, NATO began exercises in Albanian airspace to demonstrate power projection and also issued directives to develop response options in support of international efforts, "including a phased air campaign and a full range of options for using ground forces."²⁷³ In July, the "United States, Russia, and the EU established the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) to monitor developments in Kosovo."²⁷⁴

The UNSC passed United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1160 and UNSCR 1199 on 31 March and 23 September, respectively.

Within days of the Serb crackdown that left eighty-five people dead, foreign ministers from the six countries met in London to condemn the attack. The ministers demanded that Milosevic agree to cease all action by Serb security forces against the civilian population, withdraw Serb special police units from the territory within ten days, allow humanitarian groups to enter Kosovo, and commence an unconditional dialogue with the Albanian community.²⁷⁵

²⁷³ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 33

²⁷⁴ Perritt, *KLA*, 136.

²⁷⁵ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 24. UNSCR 1199 called for a ceasefire and ordered the withdrawal of forces and attacks against civilians. It also required humanitarian organization access. UNSCR 1160 imposed economic sanctions and an arms embargo on Serbia. It also condemned "acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army or any other group or individual and all external support for terrorist activity in Kosovo, including finance, arms and training." Search engine for the United Nations Security Council Resolutions. "The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1160," UNSCR Search Engine, last modified March 31, 1998, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1160>.

The United States reinstated sanctions lifted only days before the massacre and Europe froze Serbian funds, additionally placing an arms embargo on the country.²⁷⁶

Finally, on 25 June, as violence escalated, US special Balkans envoy Richard Holbrooke visited KLA strongholds to gauge the Liberation Army's partnership potential and determine how to "merge Kosovo's political and military structures."²⁷⁷ After meeting with Holbrooke, KLA Commander Sami Lushtaku stated that although Rugova was an obstacle to Kosovo's independence, the KLA would be willing to accept Rugova as president "provided he changed his line on the KLA, and gave it credit."²⁷⁸ According to some interpretations, Holbrooke hoped to determine if the KLA was a "local defence force" or a "terrorist conspiracy," whether it had political designs of its own or could become part of a broader future political process.²⁷⁹ According to others, his intention was to lay down behavioral boundaries for the KLA in order to pave the way for future coordination.²⁸⁰ Both interpretations are likely valid. After speaking to KLA members in Kosovo, Holbrooke met a week later in Switzerland with KLA spokesman Bardyl Mahmuti. Behavioral changes ensued. For example, following the meeting, the KLA leadership altered Partisan habits and eschewed communist symbols for the duration of the insurgency.²⁸¹

²⁷⁶ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 24.

²⁷⁷ Jonathan Steele, "Kosovan Guerrillas Celebrate Holbrooke Visit; Jonathan Steele Meets the Shadowy Leader of the Army Doing Battle with Yugoslav Security Forces in His Headquarters - A Former Serbian Police Station," *The Guardian (London)*, June 26, 1998. Also see Barton Gellman, "U.S. Reaching out to Kosovo Rebels," *Washington Post*, July 1, 1998, pp. A25, A32.

²⁷⁸ Steele, "Kosovar Guerillas Celebrate Holbrooke Visit."

²⁷⁹ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 146.

²⁸⁰ Perritt, *KLA*, 141.

²⁸¹ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 146. Also, Steele, "Kosovar Guerillas Celebrate Holbrooke Visit."

At this point in the conflict, the West wanted to obstruct Serbian-led violence while preventing Kosovar Albanians from demanding full secession from the tenuous state.²⁸² From the American diplomatic perspective,

Spring 1998 was likely one of the last moments that Western action might have influenced the course of events in Kosovo at relatively little cost. The local population still supported its elected ‘president,’ Ibrahim Rugova, including his nonviolent policies of civil disobedience. The KLA was little more than a small, unorganized, ragtag band of rebels that would most likely have disappeared once a serious political dialogue aimed at granting greater autonomy had started. By summer, (however,) the conflict in Kosovo had escalated as Serb forces responded to KLA advances by terrorizing the civilian population.²⁸³

Once Milosevic’s forces began routine abuse of Kosovar Albanian families and civilians, “the Albanian population became more radical in its demands; the KLA became stronger politically, financially, and militarily; and the Serb desire to take drastic measures in Kosovo correspondingly intensified.”²⁸⁴

Milosevic’s actions, however, did not end in mere abuse. Starting in July of 1998, Serbia’s counterinsurgency campaign transitioned from direct attacks on the population made in retaliation for KLA strikes to a policy of full scale ethnic cleansing. For example, in July, as a result of poor tactical judgment, the KLA lost the town of Rahavec to the Serbs where the infantry terrorized inhabitants for three days.²⁸⁵ Conventional military forces (VJ) augmented Special police and Interior Ministry (MUP) troops across the region. By August, more “than eleven thousand MUP and twelve thousand VJ” forces supported by tanks and artillery forced roughly 1.3 million Albanians from their

²⁸² Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 26.

²⁸³ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 186-187.

²⁸⁴ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 188.

²⁸⁵ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 140.

homes.²⁸⁶ By 1999 the number of troops increased to sixteen thousand MUP, twenty thousand VJ, and five thousand paramilitary troops.²⁸⁷ “Had Milosevic not escalated the conflict dramatically by creating the largest forced exodus on the European continent since World War II, and had alliance leaders not then realized they had to radically overhaul their military strategy, NATO could have lost the war.”²⁸⁸

Section 7.8 further explores the phasing dynamics across the insurgency’s final year of fighting and highlights associated political developments during that time. In terms of the phasing construct and the relationship framework, the period exhibits waxing and waning military capabilities, volatile political alliances, and intensified public support. Because Milosevic attempted to ethnically cleanse Kosovo – his actions induced extreme swelling in the KLA membership and in levels of community assimilation. At times, however, internal public support proved difficult; Serbian forces temporarily routed increasing numbers of civilians from the country. Conversely, international state support successfully impacted the vanguard’s political behavior and credibility, as well as the overall range of the mechanisms of violence available to the insurgency. Because of Western intervention, Kosovar Albanians enjoyed a leveling of the playing field, temporarily attaining needed conventional capabilities to repel Serbia’s conventional military. Although the international community did not immediately allow Kosovo to become a state, or even publicly support its growth in that direction, NATO and the UN took measures to further state-like institutions and mechanisms that benefited insurgency aspirations.

²⁸⁶ For displacement figures, see Daalder and O’Hanlon, 108-109. 800,000 forced out of the country and 500,000 internally displaced within Kosovo. This is roughly three quarters of the prewar population.

²⁸⁷ Daalder and O’Hanlon *Winning Ugly* reviews force numbers on all sides within chapters 4 and 5.

²⁸⁸ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 6.

7.8 War, Exodus, and Western Intervention (Summer 1998-1999) – A Seat at the Table and an End to the Insurgency

As Serbian forces pushed Kosovo's Albanian civilian population out of KLA held areas in July 1998, the resistance movement did not have the capacity to hold newly gained territory or to protect the civilian population.²⁸⁹ The KLA augmented guerilla warfare with frontal engagements but frequently fell back to avoid annihilation, particularly in the three zones where the majority of fighting occurred.²⁹⁰

Whether or not the Serbs had lured the KLA into such a position intentionally, the KLA's efforts to create free zones and to demonstrate its capacity to conduct frontal warfare like a regular army, aimed at defending civilians and increasing its credibility with the Kosovar population and with Western powers, put it in a position that allowed the Serb forces to use their superior military power more easily. The free zone strategy made the battlefield more symmetric, while the quantity of forces and fire power were still as asymmetric as they had been from the beginning.²⁹¹

As a result, over 200,000 civilians fled burning villages to hide in forests and find safety outside of Kosovo. They faced a myriad of threats such as hand-held weapons, grenades, anti-personnel mines, tank and truck mounted artillery, as well as the systematic rape of girls and women.²⁹²

²⁸⁹ Although I have not seen a second source to corroborate, Pettifer says that, "Manpower losses were increasing and by early July were bringing a deeper involvement of the Albanian army in the conflict, although this was largely unknown to the international community. Albanian army helicopters were deployed to bring the KLA wounded for treatment in Tirana hospitals. Within the liberated area of Drenica, Albanian fighters blew up most of the roads leading to central Drenica.

²⁹⁰ Perritt, *KLA*, 69. Again, these three zones included Llap (Zahir Pajaziti and Rustrem Mustafa, also known as Commander Remi), Drenica (Sami Lushtaku), and Dukagjini (Ramush Haradinaj).

²⁹¹ Perritt, *KLA*, 56-57. For example, "[i]n August and September 1998, fewer than two hundred KLA soldiers fought to defend KLA control of the road leading into the Llap Valley from Podujeve against more than five thousand Serb troops backed by tanks and artillery. The number of KLA fighters grew to several thousand by December" (Perritt, *KLA*, 76).

²⁹² Pettifer, *The KLA*, 131-132.

To compound the displacement problem, the KLA zone leadership found it difficult to keep troops engaged on the battlefield. New members on the front lines were little more than armed and uniformed civilians. According to zone commander Haradinaj,

It was the right of everyone to agree to fight and it was the right of everyone to leave. They were inexperienced and they were scared. When they saw that a battle was not going so well or saw two or three of their friends killed or wounded, they just sought the safest possible place. They would run for a half-day until they got there.²⁹³

Consequently, even though on paper KLA numbers expanded by accommodating new recruits, at their base, on a level of capability, the insurgency still constituted a guerrilla organization – albeit one with potential for more. While each zone targeted an end strength of two thousand men divided into battalions, companies, and platoons, zone forces constantly waxed and waned depending on battle circumstances.

For example, shortly after the beginning of Serbia's July offensive, "FARK leader Tahir Zemaj deserted the Dukagjini zone with most of his troops and weapons;" the FARK members, like other volunteers, fought when conditions became favorable to them.²⁹⁴ Tahir's desertion hit Haradinaj hard and reflected the zone commander's greater problem: although he led eight to ten thousand soldiers in June of 1998, by September his forces stood at less than 100 armed insurgents.²⁹⁵ The zone's armed component came extremely close to being eviscerated and needed external support in order to survive.

From the vanguard perspective, Haradinaj's September Dukagjini zone crisis provided the reengineered General Staff an opportunity to prove itself as an adaptive and supportive leadership, overcoming initial judgments that the organization served as a titled figurehead over the zone commanders. The outcome of the summer's

²⁹³ Perritt, *KLA*, 79.

²⁹⁴ Perritt, *KLA*, 79.

²⁹⁵ Perritt, *KLA*, 79.

reorganization moved away from the “Partisan-derived principle that the army was a collection of semi-independent units, with minimal communication between them.”²⁹⁶ Not only had the LPK-KLA implemented a new vertical governance structure, it also made improvements in radio sets, satellite phones, and hand held devices to better enable coordination across zones. Empowered by these changes, the General Staff “responded quickly with several hundred fighters, just in time to mitigate Serb attempts to completely wipe out Haradinaj and his remaining resisters.”²⁹⁷ The KLAs maturing capability represented improvements in communications and coordination between the General Staff and zone commanders.

As the Serbian offensive in July 1998 continued to establish positive gains for Milosevic’s regime, ethnic cleansing practices expanded and became more aggressive, to include a scorched earth policy and further village bombardment from tanks carrying rockets and cannons.²⁹⁸ When civilians left their villages ahead of VJ troops, Serbian forces took the opportunity to destroy their homes, livestock and crops; they also poisoned wells with dead animals and shut down hospitals that served Kosovar Albanians.²⁹⁹ With roughly 300,000 displaced persons on the move, the West finally decided to act. In October, the United States sent Richard Holbrooke back to Kosovo to negotiate a ceasefire agreement and establish the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in Pristina.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁶ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 146.

²⁹⁷ Perritt, *KLA*, 83-84.

²⁹⁸ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 140. Approximately 140 tanks were employed against the town of Lapusnik, reducing the town to “rubble.” Pettifer, *The KLA*, 147.

²⁹⁹ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 135.

³⁰⁰ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 23 and Pettifer, *The KLA*, 146.

In a parallel mode of support, on 12 October, NATO's governing body, the North Atlantic Council, voted to authorize force in support of UNSCR 1199. On 13 October, the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) "announced the deployment of two thousand unarmed personnel" to support the KVM and to monitor compliance on both sides.³⁰¹ Serbia signed Holbrooke's ceasefire agreement on 15 October and the UNSC passed Resolution 1203 eight days later on the 24th. UNSCR 1203 provided a "substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-administration" for Kosovo and demanded compliance by Serbia with all previous agreements and verification missions. It also called for the development of a timetable for a future negotiated settlement.

Although the pause in hostilities and the required withdrawal of Serb heavy forces from Kosovo enabled the KLA to recover from the previous months of battle, the Serbian military did not fully pull out of Kosovo.³⁰² UN figures place drawdown numbers after the ceasefire to be around 14,000 from an initial 30,000.³⁰³ For example, a "battalion of Yugoslav tanks and anti-aircraft weaponry" maintained a position "near KLA strongholds and refugee camps in central Kosovo."³⁰⁴ Inevitably, given continued Serbian placement and the KLAs returning strength, violence resumed in the region without any reprisal from the UN or NATO and the war moved into urban areas like Pristina and Prizren.³⁰⁵

³⁰¹ Perritt, *KLA*, 136.

³⁰² Perritt, *KLA*, 9. For example, "[a]fter the rebuilding that occurred during the October 1998 cease fire, total KLA forces along the ridgeline numbered about 1,700" – having gone as low as 300 in the Lapp Zone." Perritt, *KLA*, 77.

³⁰³ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 164. Pettifer references Laura Rosen's 9 October 1998 International Crisis Group assessment.

³⁰⁴ Philip Smucker, "Holbrooke was duped, KLA commander says," *The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec)*, October 21, 1998, Date Accessed: 2015/07/16. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.

³⁰⁵ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 176. Additionally, it should be noted that violence was perpetrated by both sides. After Christmas, "[t]he KLA had started to attack some of the few ethnic Serb villages" in the north of Llap and Podujeve "where the KLA had expanded considerably in the previous three months"... "By now the

On Christmas Eve in 1998, Serbian “security forces launched a major new offensive around the town of Podujevo.”³⁰⁶ And, in January 1999, they massacred forty-five civilians in the village of Racak.

Army artillery had pounded the village for three days before Serb forces entered. All had been executed. Monitors of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) organized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had been sent to the area as fighting escalated in the days and hours preceding the massacre. They entered Racak within twenty-four hours of the killing and described a scene of unspeakable horror.³⁰⁷

The massacre in Racak pushed the international community to engage its own mechanisms of violence and set the NATO alliance in motion. It also spurred Milosevic to increase ethnic cleansing activities, to include associated atrocities such as beatings, killings, rape, sexual violence, extortion, and “the use of women for forced labor.”³⁰⁸

It should be noted that violence in Kosovo was perpetrated by both sides during the fall and winter of 1998-1999 as the KLA surged in popular support and presence. After Christmas, for example, the KLA began to “attack some of the few ethnic Serb villages” in the north of Llap and Podujeve where it “expanded considerably in the previous three months.”³⁰⁹

[T]he KLAs numerical strength had grown to about 6,000 men and women across Kosova, with no less than a minimum of 2,000 in and around Podujeve. The insurgency here had reached a new point, of the de facto merger of the people with the army on a scale that was absent elsewhere in most of Kosova.³¹⁰

KLAs numerical strength had grown to about 6,000 men and women across Kosova, with no less than a minimum of 2,000 in and around Podujeve.

³⁰⁶ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 61.

³⁰⁷ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 63.

³⁰⁸ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 211.

³⁰⁹ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 181-182.

³¹⁰ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 182.

On the other side of Kosovo, VJ troops engaged Albanian border forces along the northern Has region where refugee tent cities supportive of the KLA provided a “bustling market for munitions and food supplies.”³¹¹

The cumulative violence that mounted in December and January convinced the Contact Group to push a final diplomatic solution in France. During the Rambouillet Conference that February and March, KLA leaders Jakup Krasniqi and Hashim Thaci sat at the negotiating table and found themselves directly in the public eye for the first time.³¹² Under the KLA banner, Thaci led the Kosovar Albanian delegation that also included LDK political leaders such as Bukoshi and Rugova as deputy.³¹³ Thaci’s signature on the resulting agreement signified a brief period of unity across Kosovar Albanian resistance entities as well as the interim supremacy of the KLA over the LDK. Practically speaking, Thaci, not the LDK leaders, would have to convince each of the seven zone commanders on the ground to comply with resulting agreement conditions.

Thaci’s participation and position at Rambouillet applies to both Phase 3 and Phase 4 vanguard attributes. He not only worked to secure international support, but also began to move in the open as a leader of political and military forces in Kosovo. At the same time, however, his designation as an international political representative within a legitimate treaty-making space is absent the composite insurgency phasing model and identifies a weakness in the framework. Signing internationally significant political or

³¹¹ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 183.

³¹² Judah suggests that, “[d]iscreet threats were issued to the KLA in a bid to make sure it sent representatives to Rambouillet,” Judah, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 72. It is interesting to note that Thaci became Kosovo’s prime minister twelve years later. Other delegation members also became politically powerful once Kosovo reached statehood.

³¹³ Pettifer also alludes to an argument about the pressure put on the KLA to come to the political table. “The post-Racak crisis, in addition, soon started to end the autonomy of the KLA as a military force, as they became drawn more and more into the negotiations in France as a political factor and more and more foreign special forces advisers arrived to work with them.” Pettifer, *The KLA*, 185.

military treaties on governance should be included in Phase 5 political mechanisms and coordinated with Phase 5 vanguard assimilation into formal political and security mechanisms. Recall from Chapter 2 that Belligerents are considered to be state representatives according to the Law of Armed Conflict.

While the KLA accepted the Rambouillet terms, Milosevic not only refused its conditions but further “escalated the conflict, forcing well over a million ethnic Albanians from their homes.”³¹⁴ His forces targeted Kosovo’s Albanian civilian population even more than its KLA defenders who worked to leverage their winter capability gains. For example, after the ceasefire, the KLA advanced its organizational and logistics capabilities, declaring a force size of 30,000 troops and obtaining upgraded weapons such as grenades and landmines.³¹⁵ Also, to bolster its international face, former Croatian armed forces Brigadier General Agim Ceku was named the top KLA military commander. Ceku “had developed a close relationship with U.S. Army General Richard Griffiths, who, as head of MPRI (a private defense contractor), had administered the ‘Equip and Train’ program in Croatia.”³¹⁶ By the time NATO’s Operation Allied Force began an air-led bombing campaign on 24 March 1999, the KVM pulled out of Kosovo due to unsafe and deteriorating conditions.³¹⁷

In terms of political objectives of the involved parties, while the KLA declared a right to full autonomy and Milosevic desired an Albanian-free Kosovo, NATO still hoped to bring both parties back to the negotiation table. The KLA, at this point, purposefully

³¹⁴ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 66. “The pace at which Kosovar Albanians left their homes was at least ten times greater than during the worst of the events in 1998.” Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 112.

³¹⁵ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 151.

³¹⁶ Peritt, *KLA*, 85. MPRI stands for Military Professional Resources, Inc.

³¹⁷ “The OSCE Mission in Kosovo,” The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, last modified January 17, 2000, <http://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/osce-mission-kosovo>.

remained agnostic to political ideology in order to substitute a coherent political platform with desired Western intervention. Although the General Staff stood in as a political committee as well, KLA spokesman Jakup Krasniqi related that because the pace of events within the war escalated so quickly in 1998, the higher priority concerned the task of liberation.³¹⁸

In order to further claims of KLA-led statehood, Thaci founded and led a new “Provisional Government of Kosova” at the beginning of April.³¹⁹ Hypothetically, this represented a significant step in publicly aligning phasing efforts across insurgency components, even though his administration did not yet participate in day-to-day actions required of state political mechanisms. Observers noted that Thaci succeeded in the interim, “in large part because the KLA had then built close ties or melded with much of Rugova’s” LDK.³²⁰ Rugova, however, refused to participate or lend support to the mechanism, preferring to wait conditions out and effectively ending a brief period of LDK/LPK/KLA alliance. Thaci hoped Rugova’s absence would diminish the LDK leader’s political appeal to the Albanian nation. Rugova, however, maintained the backing of both Italy and the Vatican and patiently waited out the war outside of Kosovo.³²¹ He chose to reenter the political process under the security and safety of a Kosovo protected by international institutions.

Between March and June of 1999, the KLA confronted Serbia’s conventional army and suffered losses in force numbers that varied by zone.³²² By May, KLA pockets

³¹⁸ Hedges referenced the Albanian-language paper *Koha Ditore*, July 12, 1998. Chris Hedges, *Kosovo’s Next Masters*, 28.

³¹⁹ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 216.

³²⁰ Hedges, *Kosovo’s Next Masters*, 29.

³²¹ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 217.

³²² Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 153. As urban communities fled Kosovo, many men headed for the KLA base areas and “KLA commanders faced again many of the same problems of new and untrained

remained across Kosovo, but “were mostly isolated from each other... smaller than the KLA free zones of 1998.”³²³ When fighters retreated in the face of overwhelming force, KLA members and supporters often reoccupied “lost territory soon after the VJ vacated it.”³²⁴ Given the Serbian offensive, KLA behavior continued to waffle between Phase 2 and Phase 3 insurgency attributes. In numerous zones, guerrilla warfare and limited mobile warfare capabilities diminished in conjunction with the KLA’s ability to control territory.

External conventional capabilities and assistance eventually permitted the KLA to sustain itself and turn its strategic position around once more. In March, however, even with NATO air power supporting them, the KLA failed to make substantive gains against the Serbian army. Surprisingly, the initial NATO bombing efforts provided only limited aid to KLA efforts on the ground, offering poor support to KLA activity and sometimes even mistakenly hitting insurgency forces. This strategic picture persisted because the rules of engagement confined NATO’s military offensive to Serbian targets in Kosovo. Additionally, aircraft were prohibited from flying below 15,000 feet.³²⁵

Over time, collaboration between NATO and the KLA increased, to include small, joint force patrols³²⁶ and better air support to activity on the ground.

[I]t was more effective to combine NATO’s airpower with the KLA’s ground forces synergistically and simultaneously, profiting from whatever the KLA could do to force Serbs out of their protected defensive positions. Using intermediaries such as the Albanian military, and possibly working

recruits as they had faced in the spring of 1998 with the arrival of these new recruits, mostly ex-town dwellers, who wanted guns and uniforms.” Pettifer, *The KLA*, 213.

³²³ Perritt, *KLA*, 60.

³²⁴ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 331, Note 32.

³²⁵ Mark W. Corson and Clemson G. Turregano. “Spaces of Unintended Consequences: The Ground Safety Zone in Kosovo,” *GeoJournal* 57, no. 4 (2002): 274. 13-03-2015 20:20 UTC.

³²⁶ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 220.

through the CIA rather than direct military channels, the alliance knew what the KLA's general patterns of operations were by war's end.³²⁷

Llap's Commander Remi, for example, thanks the US army members in his memoir *War for Kosova* for the advice and assistance they provided him.

In addition to improving tactical coordination, three environmental conditions soon changed wartime dynamics in Kosovo and enabled a final international settlement in June 1999.³²⁸ First, NATO initiated a secondary strategic bombing campaign inside Serbia proper. "[E]lectricity grids were being severely damaged, water distribution was adversely affected in all major cities, and the businesses and other assets of Milosevic's cronies were being attacked with growing frequency."³²⁹ Second, Milosevic believed that he had already won; not only did he drive the KLA back down to a small guerrilla force of around 3,000, but he also believed that he successfully removed the entire Albanian population from Kosovo.³³⁰ And third, Moscow intervened to work with NATO to develop a new agreement, pressuring Milosevic's full acceptance.³³¹

As a result, Milosevic reentered negotiations and on 09 June signed the Military-Technical Agreement in Kumanovo, Macedonia. Under NATO's eye, Serbian troops fully withdrew from Kosovo this time, taking their equipment with them. On 10 June, the UN

³²⁷ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 152. Daalder and O'Hanlon cite Dana Priest and Peter Finn, "NATO Gives Air Support to Kosovo Guerrillas, but Yugoslavs Repel Attack from Albania," *Washington Post*, June 2, 1999, p.A1. There are also unconfirmed reports of NATO Special Forces working inside of Kosovo with the KLA; see Philip Sherwell, "War in the Balkans: SAS Teams move in to Help KLA 'Rise from the Ashes,'" *London Daily Telegraph*, web version, April 18, 1999, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/>.

³²⁸ A conjectured fourth condition might also play a role. Milosevic was told "about NATO's likely invasion plans by Victor Chernomyrdin during the latter's first visit to Belgrade on May 27" 1999, even though President Clinton never publicly committed to a ground force combat operation. Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 160.

³²⁹ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 4.

³³⁰ Stephen Hosmer, *The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did* (Project Air Force Series on Operation Allied Force), (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001): 87-88. Perrit, *KLA*, 59 & 198. Pettifer states that, "By the end of April, the number of KLA soldiers probably amounted to about 18,000 men and women, of all ages, from raw teenagers to men of seventy or more. They were scattered all over Kosova." Pettifer, *The KLA*, 219.

³³¹ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 172-175.

Security Council passed Resolution 1244 and called for the demilitarization of Kosovo. While UNSCR 1244 mandated a new United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to run the autonomous province, 50,000 NATO Kosovo Forces (KFOR) prepared to enter the region in a supporting role.³³² Contrary to Serbian hopes, within weeks, almost all displaced Albanians were able to return to the country.³³³

Initial friction after the Serbian withdrawal occurred between Thaci's provisional government, UNMIK, and NATO's KFOR. UNSCR 1244 lacked the legal basis and "authority for what the KFOR head (General) Mike Jackson and the UN Representative Bernard Kouchner regarded as a 'parallel' government to the international administration."³³⁴ Jackson and Kouchner feared the development of a "nationalist government under the control of ex-KLA figures."³³⁵ Consequently, they projected that their plans would be undermined when the "Serbian administrative structures collapsed across all but a few Serbian majority areas of the province;" this is because the KLA filled the resulting "power vacuum, installing not only its own people in town halls, but also institutionalizing" Thaci's provisional government.³³⁶

Events would soon verify these projections to be unfounded, however, as Thaci remained true to the agreements he signed at Rambouillet.³³⁷ By late September he dissolved the provisional government and worked to demilitarize the KLA, incorporating

³³² Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 3, 176. The first KFOR troops arrived on 12 June.

³³³ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 4.

³³⁴ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 222.

³³⁵ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 226.

³³⁶ Judah, *Kosovo Liberation Army*, 74.

³³⁷ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 222. Pettifer argues that Thaci lacked the "means of preserving the Provisional Government from the forces that wished to destroy it." He blames the UN and NATO's misplaced objectives, Thaci's naiveté and lack of political experience, Rugova's accommodation to external interests in order to reenter the political scene, as well as other KLA members who looked to continue the insurgency in Albanian communities in Macedonia rather than focus on strengthening an independent Kosovo.

its members into the Kosovo Police and the Kosovo Protection Corps led by General Ceku.³³⁸ These kinds of actions represent the integral assimilation of Phase 5 mechanisms of violence, the consolidation of armed components into the new national force. General Jackson certified KLA compliance with international provisions and released an early October report that accounted for over 36,000 voluntarily turned-in weapons.³³⁹

As might be suspected given the history of violence in Kosovo, “demobilization” needs further interpretation. The dissolution of the KLA represented a transition of the armed component led by the KLA back to an armed people. Although soldiers might have handed in their uniforms and a plethora of weapons as they returned to civilian life, many veterans kept and hid their rifles and pistols. “Although KFOR and UNMIK were able to demobilize the KLA... they were unable to stop the Albanian population restoring their traditional heritage of small arms possession in households.”³⁴⁰ Regardless, for Kosovo, this action represented a return to Phase 0 violence, defining the status quo of Kosovo’s existing military and violent culture.

Although many revenge attacks on Serbian communities ensued during the transition period from Serbian control, the KLA contributed to the execution of UNSCR 1244, to include their own demilitarization, “creating a secure environment for refugees and the internally displaced to return to their homes, ensuring public safety, and

³³⁸ Perrit, *KLA*, 151. In August of 1999, Ramush addressed Xhavit Gashi’s company information about the KLA’s future. “We were in KLA uniforms when they told us about the September transformation to the protection corps. There were lots of fights talking about whether the KLA should be dissolved or whether to create a new organization. We wanted to be an army without having a country yet. Until statehood, we would need to join the civil protection organization, similar to the National Guard.” 01 May 2015 interview with Xhavit Gashi, Annapolis Maryland.

³³⁹ Wade Boese, “Belgrade, KLA Move Forward on Arms Control, Disarmament,” *Arms Control Today* 29, no. 6 (September/October 1999): 37. 28-07-2015 15:12 UTC

³⁴⁰ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 229.

providing support for the international civil presence.”³⁴¹ KLA members helped Kosovar Albanians come back to ruined homes by cleaning and rebuilding, digging new wells, and identifying victims.³⁴² And of note, by early 2000 a Serb in Kosovo was no more likely to be killed than an ethnic Albanian.”³⁴³

With respect to insurgency political mechanisms and transition, while KLA members never worked to develop political parties before or during the war, after hostilities ceased, former regional zone leaders, KLA alliance organizations, and members of the General Staff developed independent and competing political parties.

A priority was the formation of political parties, with the Swiss-based KLA spokesman Bardhyl Mahmuti leading the field by holding a party formation conference in Prishtina as early as July 1999.³⁴⁴

Thaci, for example, established his own party called the Party of Democratic Kosovo (PDK) while also contributing to a UN-led joint administration. Former underground organizations such as the LKCK and the LPK became their own parties. The vanguard assimilated into formal political mechanisms – as did a number of former military veterans. Even Rugova would rejoin the fray.

For although he sat out much of the war time fighting, Rugova still remained popular among the Kosovar Albanian citizenry, hovering above much of the KLA centered drama and corruption.

Even as support for the KLA grew, popular opinion in Kosovo remained divided. Opinion polls conducted by the U.S. State Department during the NATO bombing campaign showed Rugova commanding more popular support than KLA leaders. And, after the war, Rugova’s party consistently led the KLA parties at the ballot box.³⁴⁵

³⁴¹ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 176.

³⁴² 01 May 2015 interview with Xhavit Gashi, Annapolis Maryland.

³⁴³ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 177.

³⁴⁴ Pettifer, *The KLA*, 225.

³⁴⁵ Perit, *KLA*, 35.

In terms of the phasing model and public support, the Albanian population rejoined the political process and assimilated to the leadership choices provided by their new autonomy.

Overall, by September of 1999, the Kosovar Albanian insurgency against the Serbian regime in Kosovo ended. And yet its path toward statehood continued. External intervention in the form NATO and the United Nations interceded in the insurgency process, taking ultimate responsibility for the rest of Kosovo's transition to statehood. Although still unrecognized by the United Nations, The Kosovo Assembly declared its independence on February 17, 2008, an action that was affirmed as legal in July of 2010 by the International Court of Justice. Under the United Nations Interim Administration Mission, NATO-led KFOR peacekeepers continue to monitor activity in Kosovo between Albanians and Serbians.

7.9 Insurgency Transformation

In order to better illustrate the transformation of Kosovo's insurgency across phases, it may be helpful to look at improvements across each line of effort over time. See Figure 7.3. The narrative that accompanies the figure explains that the KLA/LPK vanguard eventually became the forcing function that led Kosovar Albanian political mechanisms, violent mechanisms, and the public to autonomy and independence from Serbian control. Granted, without UN, NATO, and Russian intervention, the outcome would have been drastically different – perhaps finding a fate closer to that of Chechnya. But the ultimate vanguard strategy succeeded in eliciting desired behavior from Serbia and the

international community, even though the KLA force never fully entered Phase 4 military operations or local political administration.

Section 7.2	<u>Origins of Insurgency in Kosovo by 1945</u>	Vanguard	Phase 0-1	
		Public Support	Phase 0-2	
		Political Mechanisms	Phase 0	
		Violent Mechanisms	Phase 1-3	
		Territory	Phase 0-2	
Section 7.3	<u>Birth of the Political Mechanism and Continued Rural Resistance, 1945-1980</u>	Vanguard	Phase 0	
		Public Support	Phase 0	
		Political Mechanisms	Phase 0	
		Violent Mechanisms	Phase 0-1	
		Territory	Phase 0-1	
Section 7.4	<u>National Reawakening and Foundation of the Vanguard, 1980-1987</u>	Vanguard	Phase 1-2	(Phase 3 growth, international relations)
		Public Support	Phase 0	(Phase 1-2 pockets in rural areas)
		Political Mechanisms	Phase 0	
		Violent Mechanisms	Phase 1	
		Territory	Phase 1-2	
Section 7.5	<u>Kosovo's Parallel Government, 1987-1993</u>	Vanguard	Phase 2-3	
		Public Support	Phase 1	(Phase 2 rural and diaspora pockets)
		Political Mechanisms	Phase 0	(Phase 2-4 parallel Kosovar organization)
		Violent Mechanisms	Phase 1	
		Territory	Phase 1-2	
Section 7.6	<u>Founding of the KLA, 1993-1995</u>	Vanguard	Phase 3	
		Public Support	Phase 1	(Phase 2 rural and diaspora pockets)
		Political Mechanisms	Phase 0	(Phase 2-4 parallel Kosovar organization)
		Violent Mechanisms	Phase 2	
		Territory	Phase 1-3	
Section 7.7	<u>Three Catalyzing Events, 1995-Spring 1998</u>	Vanguard	Phase 3	
		Public Support	Phase 2-3	

	Political Mechanisms	Phase 0	
	Violent Mechanisms	Phase 3	
	Territory	Phase 1-3	
Section 7.8	<u>War, Exodus, and Intervention, Summer 1998-1999</u>		
	Vanguard	Phases 3 to 4 to 5	
	Public Support	Phases 3 to 0 to 5	(Diaspora 3 to 4 to 5)
	Political Mechanisms	Phases 0 to 1 to 2	
	Violent Mechanisms	Phases 3 to 5	(Never Conventional)
	Territory	Phases 3 to 0 to 4	

Table 7.2 Kosovar Albanian Insurgency Maturity by Phase

After Tito's death in 1980, the vanguard steadily increased its capability by leveraging the safe haven and support afforded by the diaspora in Europe and the United States, as well as Albania. The Chechen community described in Chapter 6 enjoyed no such haven. Also, unlike the Chechen insurgency, whose vanguard lost control of field commanders and associated mechanisms of violence, Kosovo's vanguard maintained influence over zone commanders by providing resources in funding, weapons, and manpower. In its formative period, the KLA leadership brought like-minded resistance groups together by staying ideologically adaptive. It also successfully transitioned those organizations to become new institutions supportive of the emergent regime within Kosovo.³⁴⁶ Unlike the Chechen pathway, the KLA did not just weed out competition within the movement, it also coopted it to serve in its political and violent mechanisms. This speaks to the kind of government that would arise from the insurgency were it to be successful.

³⁴⁶ Some members did break off of the KLA in the fall of 1999 to establish the short-lived Ushtria Clirimitare e Presheves Medvegjes dhe Bujanocit (UCPMB). This organization hoped to liberate Albanians in Preshevo and Macedonia with Western Help. Interestingly, NATO troops did enter Macedonia in August of 2002. This led to the Ohrid Accords that gave "major human rights advances to the Albanians." Pettifer, *The KLA*, 246.

Similarly, the KLA did not interfere with the growth of Kosovar Albanian parallel political mechanisms that fed, taught, and medically administered to the population. By doing so, it enabled future compromise with the LDK, thereby allowing the KLA representatives to lead the Kosovar Albanian delegation at Rambouillet. In accordance with a practice of noninterference, the KLA never forced its agenda at the point of a gun on fellow Albanians. Rather, it let participants come and go in support of the movement. As long as individuals were not considered to pose a threat to the organization, the majority of KLA members worked hard to defend civilians from Serbian aggression. In this way, by the time Milosevic enacted a policy of ethnic cleansing, the KLA became perceived by its constituency as a protective force as opposed to a radical organization intent on claiming power at the expense of other Kosovar Albanians.

This chapter, as well as the Chechnya exemplar, serves multiple purposes in the dissertation. First, it illustrates that insurgencies progress through the conceptual phases presented in Chapter 5 and that the nature of their manifestation speaks to the attributes of the emergent regime. Second, it explains that in order to scale towards statehood, phasing capabilities are determined by tasks that connect the components of the relationship framework. And third, the phasing model can be used as a tool to compare varied insurgent pathways and practices, so that over time, enough data might be gathered to determine preferred policy objectives.

Chapter 8

Conclusion: The Politics of Insurgent Movements

8.1 The Blind Men and the Elephant

In the old Buddhist parable of the blind men and the elephant, a group of blind men are asked to describe an elephant for the raja of Savatthi. Each man approaches a different part of the elephant and explains his own subjective experience.

"The elephant is a pillar," said the first man who touched his leg.

"No! It is like a rope," said the second man who touched the tail.

"No! It is like a thick branch of a tree," said the third man who touched the trunk of the elephant.

"It is like a big hand fan" said the fourth man who touched the ear of the elephant.

"It is like a huge wall," said the fifth man who touched the belly of the elephant.

"It is like a solid pipe," Said the sixth man who touched the tusk of the elephant.¹

Throughout the parable's narrative, while each individual perception explores a limited aspect of the larger elephant, no one accounts for the totality of the full animal.

The lesson of the parable provides an interesting corollary to the politics of insurgency, and further represents the idiomatic elephant on the table. Meaning, political science has failed to broadly define the anatomy of insurgency or its basic components and processes as part of a contiguous spectrum. For example, Petersen and Wood focus on triggering and sustaining mechanisms of civilian mobilization during Phases 2 and 3. Chenoweth and Stephan singularly look at elements of Phases 1 through 3. Fearon and Laitin see insurgency solely as guerrilla warfare. Lyall and Wilson see insurgency as a protracted violent struggle for political objectives that leverages small mobile groups.

¹ "The Elephant and the Blind Men," http://home.earthlink.net/~insure/Elephant_and_blind_men.html. Also see <http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~rywang/berkeley/258/parable.html>.

Many academics espouse that insurgency requires a death count of at least 1,000 people accompanied by annual kill rates.

Such attempts caveat external observables that result from insurgent behavior when the phenomenon is more aptly explained by internal processes and milestones that cause them in the first place. Similarly, revolt, rebellion, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, civil war, and revolution are each given their own separate category of study in traditional academic literature. This is in spite of the fact that respective forms are tightly interconnected by varying levels of political and violent capacity, often moving fluidly from one form to another. The counterinsurgent's belief that he is not at war due to low levels of internal violence does not signify that an insurgency hasn't begun. Those committed to a cause are at war well before coordinated and collective violence begins.

Accordingly, this dissertation argues that insurgencies – at least when involved populations desire access to state political power and decision-making – exhibit consistent organizational requirements and processes across a defined relationship framework during comparative levels of scale. From a systems perspective, it proposes a connective theory on insurgency to assess why certain movements expand or ignite while others degrade or get stuck in a particular phase. Such a paradigm leaves room for numerous more detailed explanations regarding individualized pathways of resistance and insurgent growth.

Think back, for example, to the introductory vignettes of Chapter 1. Now acquainted with the maturation cycle of the relationship framework, recall the familiar component parts of the eighteenth-century American Revolution, Urabi's Revolt of nineteenth-century Egypt, Mao's rise to power in twentieth-century China, and the role

of transnational criminal organizations in twenty-first-century Mexico. Each insurgency case revolves around the emergence of political goals to alter or gain access to an existing state regime. Each attempts to develop new behavioral norms through constituting institutions and mechanisms. And each fosters networked relationships to grow an internal constituency and secure support from external actors. Even the cartel vanguards in Mexico work with state actors and other members of the transnational illicit community to achieve their desired ends. Regardless of initiating political goals, the outcome of all four introductory cases hinge upon vanguard interaction with multiple forms of collective violence (specifically framed for insurgency thresholds) and illegal political and civic acts of resistance.

Based on the work of the last seven chapters, each of these insurgencies now nests within a cohesive comparative model of aligned mechanisms, the advancement of which comprised the first objective of the dissertation: to develop clear conceptual categories regarding a theory of insurgency that begins to define its scope within a coherent domain and to provide analytic leverage for future study. Where insurgency is concerned, indigenous guerrilla groups don't just appear and start wars. They grow and form from within a contextual environment that is political at the heart, aimed at increasing power and supportive membership. Constitutive and destructive mechanisms are crucial to their development at every level. Resulting administrative benefits or acts of violence define the kind of relationship a new regime will have with the people in a given region; in some cases, they predict whether the insurgency will successfully scale to become a state.

By synthesizing associated competing and complementary models on insurgency, Chapters 2 through 5 developed an empirically based conceptual model to account for the

evolution and variation of insurgency over time, place, groups, and forms. For example, through the analysis of two detailed case studies and four existing operational models in Chapters 3 and 4, repeatable processes, relationships and requirements emerged. See Table 8.1. Mao’s seven steps and Galula’s five-step orthodox theory applied to the Chinese Communist Revolution while Galula’s shortcut steps applied to the Algerian Revolution. SORO’s work applied to both historic cases. While each perspective is useful, they fall short of proposing a repeatable model of scalable processes and requirements across mechanisms.

<u>Mao’s Steps</u>	<u>Galula’s Orthodox Steps</u>	<u>Galula’s Shortcut Steps</u>	<u>SORO Phases</u>
			1. Clandestine Organization
		1. Blind Terrorism	2. Psychological Offensive
		2. Selective Terrorism	3. Selective Terrorism
1. Arouse and organize the people 2. Achieve internal political unification 3. Establish bases	1. Create the party 2. Establish a United Front 3. Execute guerrilla warfare		4. Militarization
4. Equip forces 5. Recover national strength	“	3. Execute guerrilla warfare “	
6. Destroy enemy national strength	4. Execute movement warfare 5. Annihilation campaign	4. Execute movement warfare 5. Annihilation campaign	
7. Regain lost territories			5. Consolidation

Table 8.1 Mao, Galula, and SORO Synthesized Phasing Comparison

This theoretical synthesis, therefore, was the work of Chapter 5. In order to frame a meta-model on insurgency, Chapter 5 grouped existing model requirements from Table 8.1. According to the relationship framework and then arranged processes within associated mechanisms by levels of scale. It also introduced additional political and

social behaviors observed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 cases. Integrating considerations for practical use, each suggested phase coordinates with legally accepted categories of intrastate warfare. Identified processes are signified by observable actions that map to the health and maturity of insurgent movements as political and violent phenomena. Actions taken by the leadership and the public are intimately connected to constitutive and destructive mechanisms. Phasing categories represent initial placeholders for itemized behaviors that should be further operationalized by additional study over time.

For example, with respect to milestones across maturing phases of destructive mechanisms, Phase 0 represents a level of violence indicative of the existing culture – provided it is free of active insurgent violence. The Phase 1 threshold is triggered by the advent of training programs geared toward collective violence and the beginning of terrorist tactics. Phase 2 is reached when an insurgency can conduct strategic terrorism and coordinated small unit tactics on a routine basis. Phase 3 is met when the insurgency can execute guerrilla warfare and begins to professionalize its armed component. By Phase 4, the insurgency begins to acquire more advanced technologies to carry out mobile warfare and act like a professional army. During Phase 5, the insurgency is able to stand up a nationalized conventional capability which then transitions into the new armed forces of the emergent state. These forces may be geared toward self-defense, internal defense, or first response requirements.

With respect to political phasing milestones for an insurgency, there exist corresponding maturity thresholds that constitute an altered governmental framework and associated rule of law. The definition of initial political goals and a political agenda for the perceived movement is accomplished in Phase 0. Phase 1 establishes targeted

political campaigns and grows the party infrastructure. Phase 2 includes the development of supportive political committees that lay the groundwork for the growing political and administrative infrastructure. Local provisional leadership stands up during Phase 3 with the ability to collect taxes. Phase 4 expands to the establishment of regional political administrations and the use of elections to substantiate legitimacy. And Phase 5 matures to the creation of a national political administration founded upon an accepted Constitution, guided by a nominal budgetary process, and in charge of conscription.

While the model's nominal political and violent mechanisms of the insurgency scale according to the phasing construct in a parallel path, their success depends upon two other contributing components of the relationship framework: the support of the public as well as the coherence of the vanguard. In most cases the growing political and violent mechanisms are enabled by the public and associated constituencies such as a global diaspora. For this reason, the model incorporates traditional social movement theory into the phasing levels that do not at this time distinguish between bureaucratization and coalition development for political as opposed to violent mechanisms. This is a weakness of the model that should be accommodated in future iterations. Because there are often discrepancies between phasing levels across lines of effort at any given time, sometimes exceptionally so, it will be important to better measure distinct pockets of support for one or the other.

Phase 0 public support is defined by the existing social grievances of the population absent any formal political or violent mechanism of redress. Phase 1 then transitions from perceived inequities to targeted collective excitement and coalescence. The counterinsurgent government might become designated as the cause of injustice as a

result of the campaigning accomplished by the insurgency's parallel political line of effort. Phase 2 engenders broader coalition building to mobilize elements of the population. The goal of this phase is to build resilient networks that will support both political and violent entities. Phase 3 looks for localized public assimilation to the insurgency, cooptation through a united front, and repression of dissent. Phase 4 does the same but at regional levels that penetrate higher percentages of targeted populations at scale, perhaps moving from rural communities into urban environments. In order to achieve this phase, the public has to commit to support a growing army rather than a guerrilla network. Additionally, it will need to feed regional political administrations aligned with the movement, participating in activities such as election processes, tax collection, and governance services. Finally, Phase 5 signifies widespread public repression by the insurgency or support of the movement by the public as the insurgency transitions toward a state-like entity. It is similarly possible that suppression will come from the counterinsurgent.

In order to prevent the momentum of increasing entropy that violence induces in any social system, and in order to maintain a balance between constitutive and destructive mechanisms, successful insurgencies rely upon a coordinating entity that aligns political mechanisms, violent mechanisms, and public support with the overall movement. Ultimately the vanguard enables the insurgency to scale. As such, this frequently amorphous entity manifests differently across every insurgency and is based on the assumption that the insurgency framework is not complete until some kind of cephalized enterprise forms to lead and grow the resistance. In complex environments, there may not be just one vanguard that arises within the Phase 0 environment. For the purpose of

simplicity, however, the cases here leverage conceptual builds based on a single vanguard. Ultimately, the vanguard provides connectivity between political and violent mechanisms but may have less direct interaction with the public than the other two framework components.

For example, during Phase 0 the vanguard comes together to define the insurgency's elite core membership. It delineates a central ideological allegiance and end state that may differ from goals expressed by the united front or from the narrative professed by political elements. The determined ideology will likely include important concepts regarding initial boundaries associated with the use of violence and the insurgency's desired relationship with the public. During Phase 1, the vanguard expands elite access and placement into licit and illicit political, economic, military, and financial infrastructure, often including elements of the existing state infrastructure. It begins to grow the united front, forming broader alliances of convenience that may become threats to future goals. Once the united front is established and different interest groups begin to emerge across the insurgency, the vanguard initiates a weeding out process that frequently begins during Phase 2.

The primary Phase 2 requirement is to capture the leadership of illicit networks and to neutralize threats within the united front. While earlier phases may look to identify international support, the insurgency must secure external backing by Phase 3. This phase also establishes fundraising mechanisms and expands its hold on the political and violent growth of the resistance. Appointed vanguard leadership moves into the open during Phase 4; it is hidden during previous phases. Public leaders assume responsibility for political and military forces and often a secret service type of organization is instituted.

Finally, in Phase 5, the vanguard begins the process of assimilation into formal state mechanisms, followed by the rest of the insurgency's members. See Table 8.2.

Phase	Legal	Territory	Vanguard	Political Mechanisms	Violent Mechanisms	Public Support
Phase 0	Use of legal processes	None	Identify elite network; Define core ideology and end state; Stand up the Vanguard	Define political goals and agenda	Existing military/violent culture	Perceived inequity and injustice and social ferment
Phase 1	Illegal political acts	Safe houses, training camps, small buildings	Expand and place network in military, political and financial infrastructure	Establish targeted campaigns and grow the party	Begin terrorist tactics and grow the network and training programs	Collective excitement and coalescence
Phase 2	Rebellion	Control of local territory for limited duration	Weed out competition within the movement - capture lead of illicit networks	Develop and support growing political committees	Conduct strategic terrorism, small unit tactics and grow the component	Bureaucratize and build coalitions to develop higher organizational levels
Phase 3	Insurgency	Localized enduring control	Expand hold on resistance and secure international support. Taxation system	Set up local provisional leadership and collect taxes	Conduct guerrilla warfare and professionalize the armed component	Assimilation/cooptation or repression
Phase 4	Insurgency	Enduring regional control	Begin to move in the open and lead pol/mil forces. Establish secret service.	Execute regional political administration and hold elections	Mobile warfare, reconquest, gain technology, and build an army	Assimilation/cooptation or repression
Phase 5	Belligerency	State territory	Assimilate the vanguard into formal mechanisms	National political administration Constitution Execute state budget and conscription	Conventional capability and consolidation of armed components into national forces	Repression or success

Table 8.2 Composite Insurgency Phasing Model

Divided into phases and lines of effort, the proposed model surpasses past attempts to accommodate the broad range of insurgent political goals, processes and violent typologies. For each phase, the four relationship components must maintain linkages and activities that build and grow in strength. How that happens, either through attraction and goodwill, or through violence and fear, is unique to each insurgency and ideally controlled by the vanguard. And, as long as the nation-state signifies the grounding unit of measurement and power within the international system, the fundamentals of the proposed framework should hold. This is because the most mature insurgency phase, also called belligerency, is defined by the attainment of statehood or state power. To be clear, reaching the status of a belligerency is not necessarily needed in order for an insurgency to reach its political goals, particularly if it is willing to share power with the existing regime.

After Chapter 5 proposed the initial composite phasing model in accordance with the components of the relationship framework, Chapters 6 and 7 leveraged two case studies to explore their adherence to the model as well as their comparative behavioral development. The Chechen and Kosovar Albanian insurgencies successfully engaged the breadth of the model which proved useful to explain the maturity, growth, and decline of each movement. In the first case, the phasing model and associated relational theory explained the weaknesses and failures of the Chechen endeavor, predicting political and collective violence scalability limitations, and offering a strong explanation for the insurgency's transition from a national movement to a terrorist organization. The Chechen vanguard fed the violent component of the insurgency at the expense of the public and political component.

In the second case, the analysis approached the relational context and processes that the Kosovar Albanian insurgency leveraged to increase their political and violent capacity to advance toward statehood. The Balkan insurgency allowed political mechanisms and public support to grow while moving strategically to trigger international support that validated its organization. Although its inner core would have transitioned toward a model akin to the violent resistance of the Irish Republican Army, the vanguard held out hope of external assistance and behaved in a manner consistent enough with Western norms of applied violence to elicit intervention.

Such behavior highlighted a limitation of the model in the violent mechanism categories of Phase 1 and 2. Although terrorism was used against civilians considered to be a threat to the organization, as well as against some Serbian populations, it was eschewed on a strategic level. Future iterations of the model will need to consider alternate forms of collective violence other than terrorism as an option for these phases. It is possible that the vanguard and the leadership running an insurgency's violent mechanisms may decide to use violence absent the use of strategic terrorism. This level of capability would still be less than the skill required of small unit tactics at the platoon or company level.

Tables 8.3 and 8.4 illustrate the growth and decline of insurgency capabilities over individualized timelines for each studied insurgency. The analysis within Chapters 6 and 7 divided phasing momentum within the relationship framework into chronologic segments in order to more easily digest scaling attributes. These segments account for the subheadings in each table. In the future, as various indicators become apparent within each phase and mechanism, it will be possible to measure and track more specifically the

phasing footprint of a given insurgency. There is the possibility for real time awareness that might also indicate the strength of the relationships between each component of the relationship framework over time. An indications-based model could determine whether an insurgency is tending toward directed violence, growing political institutions, or how it is supported by various public constituencies. If aligned with a demographic or terrain mapping layer, one could see by region where supportive affinities exist.

Origins of Insurgency in Chechnya by 1991

Vanguard	Phase 1-2
Public Support	Phase 2-3
Political Mechanisms	Phase 1-2
Violent Mechanisms	Phase 2-3
Territory	Phase 2

Initial Autonomy, 1991-1994

Vanguard	Phase 2-3
Public Support	Phase 4 for violent mechanisms
Political Mechanisms	Phase 0
Violent Mechanisms	Phase 2-4
Territory	Phase 3 due to united front

The First Chechen War (1994-1996) through 1999

Vanguard	Phase 2	
Public Support	Phase 1	
Political Mechanisms	Phase 0-1	(Phase 1 for alternate Sunni network)
Violent Mechanisms	Phase 2-3	(Phase 2-3 for alternate Sunni network)
Territory	Phase 2	

The Second Chechen War (1999-2002) through 2005

Vanguard	Phase 1-3 focused on violent mechanisms
Public Support	Phase 1
Political Mechanisms	Phase 0
Violent Mechanisms	Phase 1-2
Territory	Phase 2

Chechnya Today, 2005-2015

Vanguard	Phase 0-2
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Public Support	Phase 0-1
Political Mechanisms	Phase 0
Violent Mechanisms	Phase 0-2
Territory	Phase 0-1

Table 8.3 Chechen Insurgency Maturity by Phase

<u>Origins of Insurgency in Kosovo by 1945</u>		
Vanguard	Phase 0-1	
Public Support	Phase 0-2	
Political Mechanisms	Phase 0	
Violent Mechanisms	Phase 1-3	
Territory	Phase 0-2	
<u>Birth of the Political Mechanism and Continued Rural Resistance, 1945-1980</u>		
Vanguard	Phase 0	
Public Support	Phase 0	
Political Mechanisms	Phase 0	
Violent Mechanisms	Phase 0-1	
Territory	Phase 0-1	
<u>National Reawakening and Foundation of the Vanguard, 1980-1987</u>		
Vanguard	Phase 1-2	(Phase 3 growth, international relations)
Public Support	Phase 0	(Phase 1-2 pockets in rural areas)
Political Mechanisms	Phase 0	
Violent Mechanisms	Phase 1	
Territory	Phase 1-2	
<u>Kosovo's Parallel Government, 1987-1993</u>		
Vanguard	Phase 2-3	
Public Support	Phase 1	(Phase 2 rural and diaspora pockets)
Political Mechanisms	Phase 0	(Phase 2-4 parallel Kosovar organization)
Violent Mechanisms	Phase 1	
Territory	Phase 1-2	
<u>Founding of the KLA, 1993-1995</u>		
Vanguard	Phase 3	
Public Support	Phase 1	(Phase 2 rural and diaspora pockets)
Political Mechanisms	Phase 0	(Phase 2-4 parallel Kosovar organization)
Violent Mechanisms	Phase 2	
Territory	Phase 1-3	

<u>Three Catalyzing Events, 1995-Spring 1998</u>		
Vanguard	Phase 3	
Public Support	Phase 2-3	
Political Mechanisms	Phase 0	(Phases 2-4 parallel govt.)
Violent Mechanisms	Phase 3	
Territory	Phase 1-3	
<u>War, Exodus, and Intervention, Summer 1998-1999</u>		
Vanguard	Phases 3 to 4 to 5	
Public Support	Phases 3 to 0 to 5	(Diaspora 3 to 4 to 5)
Political Mechanisms	Phases 0 to 1 to 2	(External Intervention)
Violent Mechanisms	Phases 3 to 5	(Never Conventional)
Territory	Phases 3 to 0 to 4	

Table 8.4 Kosovar Albanian Insurgency Maturity by Phase

8.2 How did the Model Measure Up?

The remainder of this final chapter further addresses the utility of the model to explicate the principal dynamics of each insurgency; it addresses their successes and failures based on framework requirements. It also provides potential improvements and future research opportunities that might prove useful to the proposed ontology. Finally, in addition to the ideas already introduced in the last section, policy implications are addressed in terms of relationship findings.

8.2.1 Concept Utility

Both the Chechen and Kosovar Albanian case studies illustrate that the skills needed to grow a maturing insurgency become progressively more complicated as an insurgency moves toward the embodiment of a nation state. The originating insurgent nucleus begins as a tight horizontal circle of conspirators with high connectedness. It then scales exponentially in task complexity and network nodes in order to build political and

violent capacity across a defined area of interest.² When this happens, the close relationships across the expanding membership become impossible to maintain individually and the vanguard's intent is in jeopardy of dilution or contradicting motives and behavior; recall that Petersen and Shapiro speak of such a dilemma in terms of sustaining mechanisms and control and communication.³ Mao identified the dilemma as the potential for corruption from within the united front.

The lack of scale toward socio-political maturity is a reason why so many insurgent movements stall in Phase 2, remaining confined to terrorism as a method of collective violence. First, leadership activities require minimal levels of public support or territorial safety zones. Second, the low numbers of active participants are also easier to control and sustain. And third, the skills needed to maintain an agile and resilient covert organization are more tenable than the political skills necessary to lead a dynamic society; successfully engage competing civic interest groups; promote internal and external national security; provide for public goods and services; manage a region's natural and labor resources; maintain a balanced budget; and interact with the international community.⁴ (These tasks are even hard for states to accomplish. Recall that we are speaking of the nominal best case competencies.) If the counterinsurgent regime falls when the insurgency is still in early maturity phases, and if the international community does not step in, the resulting state will be limited to the attributes of the insurgent regime at the time.

² This terminology is familiar to social network and big data analysts. I thank Ian McCullough and Kim Glasgow for emphasizing these terms within the context of the dissertation's insurgency phasing theory.

³ Shapiro, Jacob N. Shapiro, *The Terrorist's Dilemma, Managing Violent Covert Organizations*, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013). Roger D. Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion, Lessons from Eastern Europe*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

⁴ And the need for covert organizations does not disappear with state formation; they just become licit in the form of internal security and intelligence services.

In order to overcome Phase 2 scaling challenges, maturing political and security mechanisms across subsequent phases require greater public support and organization. And if the full argument holds, as insurgent capabilities become increasingly powerful and membership within the resistance rises, the insurgency itself must become structurally less complex, more hierarchical, and more transparent. These three attributes sustain the movement's clarity of purpose and behavioral efficiency in support of an emerging state. Results depend upon the vanguard's ability to foster connectivity between all four relationship components. Simply framed, people need to know where to go and who to go to in order to join in the effort, whether their supportive activities include providing food and clothing, relaying messages and information, voting or not voting in elections, finding safe zones, or procuring weapons to join the fight. In order to psychologically align with the insurgency, they also need to understand why and for whom they are fighting.⁵

A growing insurgency that tends toward increasing network complexity without finding organizational efficiency moves toward greater and greater entropy, unable to effectively control the tools of state. As such, a balance must be reached between top down direction and bottom up spontaneity, as well as between the use of violence and civically-aligned political mechanisms. In each case, the combination of how these elements align depends upon the attributes of the working system. For example, in some circumstances, an insurgency is able to coopt existing forms of political and social institutions with little disturbance to the counterinsurgent's original functioning units. In

⁵ Recall Wood's emotionally-based endogenous variables of the righteousness of participation, the defiance of injustice, and the pleasure of agency. Elizabeth Jean Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 232-236.

other cases, however, the receiving society or ethnic group may have no history or precedent of national rule in a state capacity.

The Kosovar Albanian and Chechen attempts at secession are examples of the latter circumstance. Additionally, at the outset, their organizations were shrouded in secrecy and lacked the organized hierarchy and efficiencies of modern state administrations. Because of these attributes, they relied on horizontal networks and relationships that were by definition illicit and outside of the law. Their united fronts encompassed numerous deals and affiliations with transnational organizations in order to obtain resources such as funding and arms. The Kosovar Albanians, however, had two principal advantages over the Chechens. First, Tito enabled a degree of self-rule during his administration that then transitioned into a viable shadow government prior to heavy fighting in Kosovo. Significantly, the KLA never interfered with this process and maintained many personal connections to the parallel political leadership.

The Chechens, on the other hand, never historically evolved to socially support or participate in the mechanisms of a central state, in part because the Soviets excluded them from the USSR's substantive political process. The Chechen vanguard also hosted numerous internal divisions, unable to scale, gain, and maintain control over rural based strongholds. As a result, the initial state-focused leadership quickly disintegrated. Chechnya's vanguard proved most collaborative in the face of mandatory collective defense but clan governance defaulted to local desires for political autonomy rather than for a state-wide political form when state-building opportunities developed. Outside of the Chechen case, warlordism may not be the only possible outcome of similar circumstances though it is one of only a handful of comparable political forms; such

conduct, for example, might also yield an unstable mafia-like or gang-dominated environment such as in regions of Mexico.

The necessity of scale regarding political mechanisms is highly apparent in the Chechen and Kosovo cases because of the model's stipulated requirements. In the former instance, independent clan autonomy prevented political consolidation of the movement at the outset. Because the central vanguard was unable to provide resources or gain political momentum, military leaders turned toward Wahhabi donors who fundamentally transitioned the ideology of Chechnya's armed operatives away from publicly acceptable behavior.

Comparatively, in the Kosovo case, the vanguard successfully controlled funding and personnel resources so that its violent mechanisms relied upon the vanguard leadership for both international relationships and physical support. It catered internally and externally to adopt an increasingly open-minded political ideology, keeping within mainstream Kosovar Albanian public opinion. Over the course of the insurgency, the KLA perceptibly moved from the social fringes and toward a narrative of moderation. It also leveraged the illicit economy- an economic attribute that continues under former KLA-turned-civilian government leaders today. These insights are facilitated by the model's systems-based approach across required relationships.

Another advantage to an insurgency's hierarchical transition revolves around its acceptance by the international community. In an ideal case, as an insurgency's leadership not only increases and strengthens the number of connections required to sustain the relationship framework across its desired spatial and human geography, it also transitions its upward-facing organization. It has to look like a state so that it may interact

with the hierarchical structures of other states and resident international partners. Titles, authorities, and processes of states and international organizations speak a particular operating language grounded in law. The expectation from the existing system of states is that this language is consistent internally and externally.

Internally, as the transition occurs, the domestic population finds stability in a rule of law that follows consistent procedures across political and violent mechanisms. Externally, as the transition occurs, new peers and regional alliances understand how to engage and accept or resist the new regime. Due to mismanagement and lack of capacity, Chechnya's insurgency lost its very brief window to act like a state with the new Russian legislature. Additionally, because of its physical proximity to Russia's territorial domain, it never enjoyed an opportunity to court Western support. The Kosovar Albanian leadership, on the other hand, worked very hard to appear as mature as possible in order to gain international acceptance and sponsorship. Once it garnered a guiding Western hand, the vanguard made specific behavioral choices to gain entry into the international system.

8.2.2 Future Research Opportunities

One of the benefits of a meta-framework on insurgency is that it provides a map to the preponderance of the current literature. And as such, contributions from previously stovepiped schools of thought may be connected and located across the phased continuum. Subsequently, as pockets of current research coalesce, gaps in understanding and areas that lack academic focus become clear. Besides addressing those gaps, future research opportunities might also look at processes involved in isolated phasing

transitions across mechanisms: between Phase 0 and Phase 1, or between Phase 2 and Phase 4.

Additional detailed case studies could provide depth and specificity to verify model pathways and to distinguish actual methods of phasing operationalization. Even in the Kosovar Albanian case, a political behavior that needs to be added to Phase 5 maturity is the development, signing, and execution of international treaties. What other kinds of actions provide legitimacy to the emergent regime? Given these broad potential future contributions, the rest of this section explores three detailed opportunities to address what I consider to be important research questions for the politics of insurgency.

First, one of the most promising areas of study includes research regarding the transition between nonviolent movements and the adoption of violence mechanisms. This is an area that precedes the development of a guerrilla capability and incorporates a the question of how the utilization of one mechanism affects the capability of the other. Although Chenoweth and Stephan discuss the advantages of nonviolence to certain forms of insurgency, they do not attend to the fact that the use of violence in an insurgency is not necessarily a controlled choice. Take Kosovo as the primary example. What started out as a nonviolent campaign by Rugova's inner circle transformed over a significant period to include the development of a supporting army – even against the leadership's expressed interest and attempts to maintain a nonviolent stance.

Additionally, the LDK could not in any way control the separate rise or development of underground movements in support of violence. As such, an excellent future area for study would be to determine the attributes of the relationship framework in circumstances where the vanguard, the political mechanisms, and public support mature

in the absence of violent mechanisms. A question to ask in such circumstances includes: where does the control of the use of force hold residence? Conversely, a study specific to the impact of high levels of violence on the political mechanism is called for. This is because when the use of violence increases to a certain level, political mechanisms often disappear. Associated research would then determine how comparative environments play into the relationship framework for scaling considerations.

Second, an important aspect that should be further studied in detail includes the impact of external actors during different phases. In order for an insurgency to gain ground in the international domain, it requires an external state actor – or group of states – willing to guide and sponsor its transition. This may not be the case for insurgencies with lesser political goals, but it is certainly true in secession and circumstances which lead to Phase 5 insurgencies. It could even be argued that to reach any kind of conventional military capability, an insurgency requires another state to provide the weaponry and ordnance needed to conduct sustained mobile warfare. Therefore, the specific study of actions by external actors in support of and counter to insurgent goals deserves explicit study in light of their impacts on the relationship framework.

And finally, the proposed model does not focus heavily on the scaling of insurgency requirements with regard to finance and economy. More work is required to develop a separate line of effort that teases out critical economic activities that are distinct from the political mechanism. The growth of modern economies, for the most part, is not controlled by hierarchical state forms and as such may not trend in the way that the political and military forms of state would. They would align more closely with the expanding civic networks in support of the insurgent regime.

Economic functions blend very closely with public support, and the existence of licit and illicit networks is vital to the resourcing of insurgencies. Future work may add this component in some way across the relationship framework. Regardless, an insurgent movement must learn to develop its own initial budget and resources and then scale economically to incorporate state functions – incorporating or influencing the presence of transnational criminal organizations within its midst and getting hold of economic development.

8.2.3 *Significance to Policy*

The arguments made regarding the ontology of insurgency within this dissertation illustrate the complexity of insurgent scaling based on the perspective of the insurgent organization. At the same time, however, they highlight opportunities for effective interaction across numerous points of contact – both in the support of insurgent organizations as well as against them. Security policies designed to drive nations toward stability without an understanding of the necessary mechanisms and processes of growth miss opportunities to find tailored solutions. They don't significantly account for the nuances of the relationship framework at substate levels that might be leveraged or engaged to prevent or induce phasing transitions.

For example, because territorial bases and safe havens are required to surpass Phase 2 efforts, the identification and development of geographically aligned supportive populations are integral to insurgency and counterinsurgency success. And, while fear motivates behavior to follow regime or insurgent law, psychological affinity lasts far

longer with less investment.⁶ For this reason, both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent should develop civic support and mobilization directly aligned with their political visions, particularly among demographic areas of interest that can provide both cover and safety. Such areas would hide underground activity as well as host future training initiatives and house weaponry.

The key of course is engaging the right location and population when and if there is a choice. In the United States at least, policy that might serve both information-gathering and communications functions is mired in a confusing swirl of competing and ambiguous titles and authorities. One of the largest hurdles to accomplish these kinds of tasks as an external actor involves the coordination of disparate organizations designed to uncover the detailed relationship framework in a given region and those designed to communicate and interact with substate populations.

Regardless of the intricacies of the American policy-making realm, if statehood is an insurgent goal, it is crucial for an emerging regime to mature aligned political mechanisms. And in order to scale, its vanguard must leverage existing civic networks that hold respect and moral dominion for inhabitants. Whether such networks originate within labor unions, student movements, diaspora communities, religious denominations, and historic clan or class divisions, engagement with these substate actors should reinforce intended regime outcomes with civic norms and desires. The counterinsurgent should additionally work with demographic populations that could go either way in the insurgency and maintain or foster a perception that the insurgent is radically outside of behavioral norms. The counterinsurgent should show that its standing regime looks

⁶ Recall that Wood accounts for higher levels of public mobilization and participation against an insurgent or counterinsurgent if that entity uses violence in against civilians in a given public.

toward negotiation and broader civilian interests. Sincere action would include looking more closely at insurgent and local grievances in order to address their validity and find areas of compromise with political leaders not connected to the insurgency.

Growing grassroots political and cultural leaders supportive of the counterinsurgent and then bestowing legitimacy on those individuals, providing them decision-making power and access to violent mechanisms, is imperative to counter insurgencies in all phases. At higher phasing levels, both the counterinsurgent and the insurgent compete to drive their own civically-reinforced political systems that engender the public's psychological priority. As such, insurgent policies must ensure that nationalism, or a hybrid form, drives the insurgency to create a modern state rather than a loose and ad hoc collaboration of local or regional partners. Russian actions in Chechnya, Crimea, and Ukraine are significant examples of this type of policy driven activity. In the cases of Crimea and Ukraine, Russia has used the same tactic but in support of insurgency against the existing state.

From the perspective of an external actor, in order to determine what policies and actions will impact an insurgency, the relationship between the vanguard and political mechanisms should be closely studied to uncover areas of dissonance. And depending on whether interests lie in support of or against the insurgency, those areas should be targeted with persuasive information and activities designed to affect the strength of relationship framework. Knowing how to leverage the communications capability between the insurgent leadership, political mechanisms, and growing public support is as important as influencing the insurgency's violent capabilities.

In the end, the biggest impact to policy from the suggested theory on insurgency derives from an improved ability to understand the operational environment. Policy cannot be made effectively in the absence of critical information about the problem at hand. A systemic perspective of insurgency strengths and weaknesses help to prioritize the placement of assets and activities that might keep levels of violence low while sustaining or building political institutions. In Kosovo, NATO became a proxy on some level to the insurgency itself. From the perspective of the insurgent, the KLA borrowed a conventional military capability so that it did not need to develop the capacity on its own. This is not necessarily a bad thing. The point is that policy should look at the scaling needs of an insurgency's growing regime in order to understand relational levers to impact behavior.

By opening up the framework to numerous additional comparative case studies, a better understanding of circumstances, actions, and effects might eventually elucidate best practices for potential adoption. Choices exist regarding insurgent behavior at each level of maturity, within and across each phase. The decisions made and actions taken across lines of effort affect the resulting regime's impact and scalability. Knowing the challenges and requirements involved in each phase, particularly if further operationalization continues, will better elucidate the properties of insurgency practice and growth within the international system.

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