

ABSTRACT

Title of Thesis: IS COUNTER TERRORISM COUNTERPRODUCTIVE?
THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND

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Combining data from a newly created global terrorism database and a chronological index of deaths from the conflict in Northern Ireland, I evaluate 3,328 terrorist attacks perpetrated by Northern Irish groups between 1969 and 1992. I assess whether responses to terrorism increase or decrease subsequent terrorist activity using two competing theoretical perspectives. While rational choice theories assume that government intervention decreases terrorism by increasing the costs of crime, legitimacy theories suggest retaliation may increase terrorism by decreasing the legitimacy of the government. Using Cox proportional hazard models, I estimate the impact of six government interventions on the hazard of a terrorist attack. My results provide minimal support for rational choice theories but ample support for theories of legitimacy. In five of the six cases examined, government intervention resulted in increased activity for at least one terrorist group. Overall, my results support the conclusion that military-oriented counter terrorism may be counterproductive.

IS COUNTER TERRORISM COUNTERPRODUCTIVE?
THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND

by

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Among criminologists, a longstanding debate concerns whether harsh, immediate responses to criminal behavior increase or decrease subsequent deviance. The classical perspective in criminology maintains that certain, swift and severe punishment will reduce the likelihood of future deviant behavior through deterrence. However, a number of researchers criticize this notion, suggesting that severe punishments may decrease government legitimacy and provoke additional criminal activity instead (see Braithwaite, 2002; Tyler, 1990; Tyler, 2000; Sherman, 1993). In this paper I test two competing perspectives that have been applied to the crime of terrorism, the rational choice/deterrence perspective and the theory of governmental legitimacy. Rational choice/deterrence theories assume that government retaliation *increases* the perceived costs of crime, thereby *decreasing* terrorist strikes. Conversely, the theory of legitimacy asserts that government retaliation *decreases* the perceived legitimacy of the government, thereby *increasing* terrorist activity.

The rational choice perspective, a model of human choice based on the rational calculation of costs and benefits, has consistently been applied to a variety of criminal behaviors including robbery, burglary, drunken driving, income tax evasion, shoplifting, drug selling and white collar crime (Dugan, LaFree & Piquero, 2005). For three decades, rational choice theories have also been used to understand types of political violence including assassinations, guerilla warfare and terrorism (for examples see Brophy-Baermann & Conybeare, 1994; Chauncey, 1975; Dugan et al, 2005; Enders & Sandler, 1999; Landes, 1978; Minor, 1975; Ross, 1993). On the contrary, the competing

perspective of governmental legitimacy has only recently begun to be applied to the crime of terrorism (see Braithwaite, 2002).

In this paper, I directly test whether responses to terrorism increase or decrease subsequent terrorist activity. Specifically, I employ hazard modeling to estimate the impact of counter terrorism on the hazard of attacks perpetrated by Northern Irish terrorist groups between 1969 and 1992. In a similar analysis of the effectiveness of counter terrorism, Enders and Sandler (1993) delineate passive and active responses to terrorism. Passive responses include erecting barriers such as metal detectors, hardening targets, and imposing stricter laws and penalties. Active responses encompass retaliatory raids, preemptive strikes and covert actions. My research analyzes two passive responses and four active responses to terrorism. The passive responses, Diplock Courts and Criminalization/Ulsterization, were introduced by the British government during the 1970s. The active responses, Falls Curfew, Internment, the Loughall Incident and the Gibraltar Incident, were carried out by British and Northern Irish security forces throughout the conflict.

Compelling arguments support the efficacy of both passive and active responses to terrorism; however there are some indications that active responses, in particular, may generate retaliatory violence (see Collins, 2004; Geraghty, 2000; Kenney, 2003; Lichbach, 1987; Malvesti, 2002; Nevin, 2003; Soule, 1989; Turk, 2002). Though not an exhaustive list of government actions, the six responses I selected represent the vast majority of British interventions, and provide a useful test of the effectiveness of counter terrorism in Northern Ireland. In addition to testing hypotheses derived from

assumptions of the rational choice theory, this analysis allows me to evaluate differences in how groups respond to government intervention.

Previous research regarding the effectiveness of counter terrorism is limited by an absence of reliable empirical data. As a result, much of the current literature presents anecdotal, qualitative assessments (see Eppright, 1997; Malvesti, 2002; Mason, 1996; Roberts, 2002; Shapiro & Suzan, 2003; Shultz, 1979; Wilkinson, 1996). Prior research on Northern Irish terrorism offers valuable insight as well, however the conclusions reached in these studies are often speculative (see Jeffery, 1990; Lee, 1981; Reilly, 1994; Sacopulos, 1989; Soule, 1989). In contrast, my research benefits from twenty-three years of data obtained from a newly created global terrorism database that catalogues terrorist events in Northern Ireland. For this study I adhere to the definition of terrorism used in creating the database, which refers to *the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation* (LaFree & Dugan, 2002).

Northern Ireland provides an appropriate test of the effectiveness of counter terrorism for three reasons. First, British responses to terrorism provide a diversity of interventions which involve both active and passive responses. Second, the primary groups involved in the conflict, the Nationalists and the Loyalists, have both used terrorist tactics. Although Nationalist groups consistently perpetrated acts of terrorism at a higher rate than Loyalist groups, over time, general trends in the frequency and lethality of attacks follow relatively similar patterns on both sides (see Figures 1 and 2). Interestingly however, only the Irish Nationalists were the focus of consistent military campaigns. As such, I expect the three military responses which directly targeted

Nationalist groups to affect only Nationalist terrorism. Conversely, I expect the remaining three responses, directed at terrorism in general, to affect both Nationalists and Loyalists. Admittedly, Loyalist terrorism offers an imperfect comparison group, as government intervention targeting Nationalists may have indirectly affected Loyalists as well. However, I believe the comparison is worthwhile because depending on the results, it may bolster the argument that government intervention, and no other unmeasured variable, is responsible for observed changes in terrorism trends. Third, Clutterbuck (2004) argues that Northern Irish extremists were the progenitors of modern terrorism. This alone qualifies Northern Ireland as a singularly interesting case study.

Although I will refer to the opposing groups of terrorists involved in this conflict as Nationalists and Loyalists, I do not mean to imply that all Nationalists or all Loyalists in Northern Ireland are terrorists. I am simply referring to those Nationalists and Loyalists who engage in terrorism. Sinn Fein, the political arm of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) legally pursue the Nationalist agenda through politics. Likewise, the Democratic Unionist Party and the Ulster Unionist Party pursue the Loyalist agenda (CAIN Web Service).

History of the Northern Irish Conflict

Before presenting an analysis of Northern Irish terrorism, it is necessary to provide a brief summary of events leading up to the outbreak of violence in 1969. In 1801, the Act of Union combined Ireland and Great Britain into a single kingdom, known as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (Geraghty, 2000). This merger abolished Irish parliament in Dublin and implemented direct rule by the United Kingdom from Westminster. In 1916, an Irish Nationalist named Michael Collins led an uprising

in opposition to British rule in Ireland. Easter Rebellion, as it was called, incited a swift and violent response resulting in the execution of many Nationalist leaders at the hands of the British (McGloin, 2003). The executions further angered Irish Nationalists and convinced the newly formed IRA to forge a violent campaign against the British (McGloin, 2003). The result of the civil unrest was the 1920 Anglo-Irish Treaty, an agreement between England and Ireland in which the British government granted independence to the 26 southern counties of Ireland while retaining control over the six counties in the north. The northern region, comprised of Antrim, Down, Armagh, Londonderry, Tyrone and Fermanagh has subsequently come to be known as Northern Ireland.

Britain's division of Ireland was a strategic move, designed to ensure a Protestant, or Loyalist majority in Northern Ireland that would likely be in favor of the union between Britain and Ireland (McGloin, 2003). In the eyes of Irish Nationalists, Britain retained control over Northern Ireland for another reason as well, to ensure Britain's continued ability to exercise economic control over Ireland as a whole (Cox, 1998). Despite the eventual abatement of serious violence in the region, the division between Protestants and Catholics continued, as did Nationalist sentiment that British rule in Ireland was unacceptable (McGloin, 2003). In the late 1960s, Irish Nationalists, inspired by the civil rights movement taking place concurrently in the United States, began a full fledged protest against the perceived political and economic discrimination in Northern Ireland (McGloin, 2003). The Nationalist IRA also remained committed to the original goal of a united Ireland entirely independent from Britain. According to Nationalists, Britain was occupying their country by force and therefore an armed struggle was

justifiable and necessary to rid Northern Ireland of the British (Alonso, 2001). Thus began the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland which has come to be known as ‘the Troubles.’

Relevant Terrorist Organizations

Oglaigh na hEireann or ‘the Irish Volunteers,’ was established in November of 1913 to “secure and maintain the rights and liberties common to all the people of Ireland” (McDowall, 2003). In 1919, when this organization officially became known as the IRA, it comprised several military groups, all committed to fighting for Ireland’s independence from Britain (Sutton, 1994). Following the division of Ireland in 1920, support for the organization gradually diminished. However, with the beginning of the Troubles in the late 1960s, the IRA quickly reemerged (Sutton, 1994). Within a few months, the IRA split into two factions, the Provisional IRA (PIRA) and the Official IRA (OIRA). ‘The Officials,’ though not adverse to the use of violence, felt that “a single-minded dedication to physical force would lead to...sectarian war and would never unite the whole people of Ireland” (Bell, 1997, p. 371). In May of 1972 the OIRA declared a unilateral ceasefire (Bell, 1997). PIRA, alternatively referred to as ‘the Provisionals’ or ‘Provos,’ is generally considered synonymous with the IRA (Lee, 1981). The United States and Britain classify the IRA as a terrorist organization because the group’s tactical objectives include attacking British armed forces and political leaders, as well as bombing civilian targets in order to undermine British authority and government legitimacy (Soule, 1989).

Although the IRA is the most prolific and well known of the Nationalist terror groups in Northern Ireland, it is by no means the only one. The Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), a splinter group of the OIRA, was founded in 1972 in response to

dissatisfaction with the OIRA's declaration of ceasefire (Sutton, 1994). This group initially called themselves People's Liberation Army, and has also committed terrorism under the names People's Republican Army and Catholic Reaction Force. The INLA announced a ceasefire which came into effect in August of 1998. The Irish People's Liberation Organization (IPLO) broke from the INLA in late 1986, and the British government forced the group to disband in 1992.

While Nationalist paramilitary organizations desperately fought for Northern Ireland to be free of British rule, paramilitary organizations loyal to Britain were equally committed to the prevention of this outcome. Rather than attacking British interests, Loyalist terrorists predominantly targeted Nationalists and other civilians (Sutton, 1994). The most active of the Loyalist groups that used terrorist tactics were the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defense Association (UDA). The UVF first emerged in 1966, with an announcement to the Belfast press that asserted: "From this day on we declare war against the IRA and its splinter groups. Known IRA men will be executed mercilessly and without hesitation" (Lee, 1981, p. 112). The UVF was banned by the British Government after a series of killings in the late 1960s (Sutton, 1994). Although the ban was lifted during 1974, it was re-imposed the following year after another string of terrorist attacks. The UVF have also claimed attacks using the names Protestant Action Force and Protestant Action Group (Sutton, 1994). The UVF entered into a ceasefire in October of 1994. The UDA was formed in 1971 as a Loyalist military group, but have never claimed responsibility for any terrorist killings. Instead they have attempted to preserve their legitimacy by engaging in terrorist activity under the name Ulster Freedom Fighters (Clare, 1998). The UDA was eventually declared illegal by the

British government in late 1992. Other splinter groups exist but will not be discussed because they were formed after 1992, the final year of this study.

Involvement of British Security Forces

In 1969, with violent demonstrations by Nationalists continually being met with equally violent counter-demonstrations by Loyalists, Northern Ireland virtually dissolved into sectarian conflict (McGloin, 2003). The police force in Northern Ireland, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and a locally recruited militia, the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR), were ill equipped to respond to the demonstrations and often resorted to brutality and violence themselves (Reilly, 1994). The UDR, who frequently conducted searches at designated checkpoints, occasionally beat, or shamed Catholic citizens in front of their families (Soule, 1989). As Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein, pointed out, many Catholics in working class areas were sympathetic to the IRA and unable to see its members as terrorists (Lee, 1981). According to Adams, IRA members were known to local civilians not as staff officers Maguire and O'Connor, but as "Mrs. Maguire's wee boy" and "Mrs. O'Connor's son whose wedding you attended" (Lee, 1981, p. 40).

As allegations of differential treatment of Catholics and Protestants by the mostly Protestant (generally upwards of 90 percent) RUC and UDR became commonplace, Irish Catholics and Nationalists began to perceive the RUC as illegitimate and undeserving of cooperation (Reilly, 1994). In 1969, when Britain deployed their army to help contain the violence, Nationalists were not surprised to discover that the army also engaged in differential treatment of Catholics and Protestants. Some researchers have suggested that British and Northern Irish security forces functioned more as active participants in the conflict than as objective peacekeepers (Jeffrey, 1990; Lee, 1981). Whatever the case, of

the 363 people killed during the Troubles by the army and the RUC, 145 were Nationalist paramilitaries and only 14 were Loyalist paramilitaries. The remaining 192 casualties were civilians (Sutton, 1994). As a Northern Irish newsmagazine analyzed the situation, the IRA's "strategy, whether deliberate or accidental, was to provoke confrontations with the security forces...and then base its recruitment on the repressive measures adopted by the Army as a result" (Lee, 1981, p. 124).

During the early years of the Troubles, one event in particular created an atmosphere of distrust in the government among Northern Irish Catholics. The events of January 30, 1972, otherwise known as 'Bloody Sunday,' were perhaps the most important turning point in the Irish civil rights movement (Geraghty, 2000). During a civil rights march organized to protest the recent implementation of internment without trial, peaceful protesters intended to march from the outskirts of Londonderry to the city center. The Parachute Regiment of the British Army, responsible for policing the event, blocked entry to the city center and denied passage to protesters. As the marchers approached the line of troops, a small group of young people began to throw stones at the soldiers (Geraghty, 2000). A major arrest operation by the army ensued.

Whether any shots were fired at the troops remains a matter of some dispute, however, members of the Parachute Regiment proceeded to fire 108 shots at the crowd killing fourteen Catholic protesters and injuring thirteen others (Geraghty, 2000). The British government asserted that the slain protesters had been IRA members while witnesses insisted they were unarmed civilians. Events such as Bloody Sunday prompted one IRA member to acknowledge only half jokingly that "the British security forces are the best recruitin' officer we have" (Geraghty, 2000, p. 36). Due to the unplanned nature

of the event, for the purposes of this paper, Bloody Sunday will not be considered a counter terrorist action. However, I will control for any effects of the event in my analysis.

This research evaluates six distinct governmental actions directed against the Northern Irish terror groups between 1969 and 1992. Falls Curfew, Internment, the Loughall Incident and the Gibraltar incident represent active responses carried out by the British military. The remaining responses, Diplock Courts and the implementation of Criminalization and Ulsterization, are passive interventions. Ideally, a comprehensive evaluation of the Northern Irish conflict would present data ranging from 1969, when violence first erupted, until after 1998, when the last of the major Nationalist and Loyalist terror groups entered into a long-term ceasefire agreement. However, the dataset employed here represents the most complete information source currently available. It is appropriate for my particular research question because the majority of governmental interventions involving the British military fall within the timeframe of these data.

CHAPTER 2

Theoretical Basis

The Rational Choice Perspective

The roots of rational choice theory extend back to the classical school of criminology and the work of philosophers Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham. Advocates of free will, Beccaria and Bentham believed that man could determine his own destiny through the use of reason and knowledge (Moran, 1996). The principle of utility, advanced by Bentham, proposes that individuals act in their own self-interest and therefore, effective punishment will deter individuals from engaging in specific actions that serve their self-interest. Contemporary rational choice models of crime often express this utilitarian philosophy in mathematical terms, illustrating that individuals choose from a set of alternatives, selecting the alternative that offers the greatest benefit and lowest cost (Cornish & Clarke, 1986). Mathematically, if $p(\text{success}) * \text{benefits} > [1 - p(\text{success}) * \text{costs}]$, then crime is more likely to occur. Alternatively, if $p(\text{success}) * \text{benefits} < [1 - p(\text{success}) * \text{costs}]$, then crime is less likely to occur (Dugan et al, 2005).

Modern rational choice theory, as advanced by Cornish and Clarke (1986), assumes that offenders are rational people who seek to maximize their pleasure and minimize their pain. In essence, the rational choice perspective suggests that individuals take advantage of opportunities to commit a crime when the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (Nagin & Paternoster, 1994). Expected benefits include tangible gains as well as psychological benefits including the thrill of breaking the law. Expected costs relate to the certainty and severity of the anticipated punishment, as well as the strength

of moral regret (Nagin & Paternoster, 1994). Rational choice models assume that offenders calculate their probability of success when deciding whether to engage in future criminal activities. Cornish and Clarke (1986) separate this decision making process into two parts: criminal involvement decisions and criminal event decisions. Involvement decisions deal with the choice to engage in crime, as well as the decision to continue with and to withdraw from deviant activity. Event decisions involve a choice between various tactics and types of crime.

Although it may be tempting to characterize terrorists as irrational, the literature frequently supports the notion that terrorists are rational actors who pursue their interests while attempting to maximize goals and minimize risk (Enders et al, 1990; Enders & Sandler, 1999; Lichbach, 1987). Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley (1983) explain that terrorists rank the tactics they use with regard to personal risk and the probability of a confrontation with authorities. For example, Sandler et al (1983) demonstrate that high-risk activities, such as hijackings and hostage takings, have the lowest incidence among terrorist acts. Conversely, lower-risk activities like bombings and assassinations have the highest incidence. The rational choice approach does not imply that terrorists always make good decisions, or that their decisions are particularly well thought out, it simply emphasizes that decisions, however quick and undeveloped, are made. Moreover, certain variables play a role in the selection of one choice over another (Silke, 2003).

Three variables, when combined, produce an expected cost of punishment: the probability of arrest, the probability of conviction and the severity of punishment (Mendes, 2004). The choice of terrorism presumably loses appeal when legal ramifications increase in severity, or when the costs of terrorism outweigh the benefits,

however, these presumptions may not hold for suicide bombers. Additionally, as potential terrorists observe other terrorist activity being carried out successfully, they may be more likely to engage in similar terrorist acts themselves. Costs specific to terrorists include the threat of injury or death and the possibility of being captured, tortured or imprisoned (Frey & Luechinger, 2002). Again, these costs depend upon the terrorist, and may not be applicable to suicide terrorism.

Rational choice models suggest that crime can be deterred through appropriate public policy. Accordingly, policy makers and officials who create systems of punishment endeavor to control this calculation through policies and actions aimed at reducing the likelihood of success (Dugan et al, 2005). Enders and Sandler (1999) describe the underlying choice process occurring between the terrorists and the intervening government as follows,

First, the terrorists decide their allocation of resources between terrorist and nonterrorist activities. Second, they allocate their terrorism-designated resources among various modes of operations. Since a government's terrorism-thwarting or terrorism-sponsoring policies may impact the relative price of terrorist versus nonterrorist actions, the terrorists' resource supply, or the relative prices of alternative attack modes, these policies influence the decisions of the terrorists (p. 148).

Counter terrorist activities have the potential to reduce terrorism by imparting a sense of legitimacy to the intervening government through the arrest and trial of terrorists (Nevin, 2003; Turk, 2002). From a theoretical perspective, a government viewed as legitimate is a less attractive target than one seen as illegitimate because the former likely enjoys more popular support. Popular support of the government translates into opposition to the terrorists' cause, which results in fewer recruits and less benefit to the

terrorists. Military operations, such as the assassination of terrorist group leaders, may serve as a deterrent, raising the cost of terrorism by disrupting the operations of the terrorist group (Rasler, 1996). Similarly, attacks targeted against specific terrorist organizations may drastically reduce group membership (Kenney, 2003). Finally, Nevin (2003) argues that government actions involving force may impede the recruitment of new members to terrorist groups by increasing the perceived risk of participating in terrorist activities.

Contrary to these arguments, some researchers challenge that history has proven counter terrorist actions, especially those involving the military, to be ineffective in reducing terrorist activity (Braithwaite, 2002; Geraghty, 2000; Lichbach, 1987; Soule, 1989; Turk, 2002; United States Institute of Peace, 2002). According to Shultz (1979), insurgency situations that evolve over a substantial period of time generate intense emotion and ideological commitment. As such, terrorists' willingness to incur costs in order to achieve goals may increase beyond the point of rationality. In essence, Shultz (1979) explains that intangible benefits such as ideology, indoctrination, dedication and a desire to "rally to the cause," all contribute to the decisions made by terrorists (p. 453). Shultz (1979) concludes that when the behavior of terrorists results from several factors not easily understood by counterinsurgents, the importance of rationality comes into question. These conclusions suggest that the rational choice perspective may be an inappropriate theoretical framework to apply to terrorism.

Indeed, recent findings suggest that counter terrorism involving the military not only fails to reduce terrorism through deterrence, as rational choice theories predict, it actually increases terrorism by provoking a retaliatory response (Collins, 2004; Malvesti,

2002). According to Nevin (2003), violent military action runs the risk of increasing public support for terrorism by transforming slain terrorists into martyrs, thereby decreasing the legitimacy of the government. Achieving martyr status often allows terrorist groups to recruit members more easily, increasing the benefits of terrorism overall. Indeed, much research in this area supports the argument that deterrence-based counter terrorism is not only ineffective, but potentially counterproductive (Collins, 2004; Geraghty, 2000; Kenney, 2003; Lichbach, 1987; Malvesti, 2002; Nevin, 2003; Soule, 1989; Turk, 2002).

The effectiveness of deterrence-based crime policies has also been challenged by several reviews of the deterrence literature (see Nagin & Paternoster, 1991; Paternoster, 1989; Tyler, 1990). Nagin and Paternoster (1991) concluded that overall, deterrence-based policies had a very minor impact on criminal behavior. Consistent with this finding, MacCoun (1993) asserts that at best, variations in the perceived certainty and severity of punishment explain five percent of the variance in criminal behavior.

Theories of Governmental Legitimacy

Several arguments contrary to the rational choice perspective seek to explain the paradox of ineffective deterrence-based policies (Braithwaite, 2002; Shultz, 1979; Tyler, 1990). Over the past twenty years, research has provided especially widespread support for theories of legitimacy (see Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992 for reviews). According to Tyler (1990), perceptions of government legitimacy stem from perceptions of procedural justice. Procedural justice concerns the fairness of the processes by which enforcement decisions are made. The procedural justice model has two components. The first is the role of procedural justice in shaping people's reactions to government

decisions. Procedural justice theorists argue that people accept decisions because of the manner in which they are made (see Tyler, 1990; Tyler, 2000; Tyler, Degoey & Smith, 1996). The second component of the procedural justice model is concerned with the manner in which people determine the fairness of the government action. The relational model of procedural justice (Tyler & Lind, 1992) proposes that procedural justice judgments develop from people's reactions to the interpersonal aspects of their experiences with authorities. In other words, perceptions of government legitimacy stem from the level of fairness people associate with government policies rather than the actual outcome of the policy (Tyler, 2000).

The relational model of procedural justice suggests that citizens care about the quality of their treatment by authorities, because it communicates information about their stature within society (Tyler, 2000). To be treated with respect and dignity signals to people that they are valued members of society who are entitled to recognition of their rights. According to the relational model, three relational judgments determine the perceived legitimacy and fairness of the sanctioning agent: neutrality, trustworthiness and status recognition (treatment with dignity and respect). The neutrality of the sanctioning agent stems from their evenhandedness, their lack of bias and their willingness to make objective decisions (Tyler, 2000). The trustworthiness of the sanctioning agent relates to the benevolence of their motives, while perceptions of status recognition relate to polite and respectful treatment by authorities (Tyler, 2000). According to Tyler (2000), the procedural-relational underpinnings of legitimacy are crucial to the effectiveness of government policy.

Also a proponent of legitimacy theories, Braithwaite (2002) challenges the simplistic view of deterrence taken by rational choice theorists. Instead, he supports the more complex conception of deterrence put forth by Brehm and Brehm (1981), in their theory of psychological reactance. Similar to the rational choice perspective, this theory suggests that when a government escalates deterrent threats, a deterrence curve with a positive slope results. However, the theory of psychological reactance also posits that a defiance curve, with a negative slope, results simultaneously. Therefore, whether deterrence works as expected depends upon the positive slope of the deterrence curve being steeper than the negative slope of the defiance curve (Brehm & Brehm, 1981).

Defiance theory itself, proposed by Sherman (1993), seeks to understand how criminal sanctions account not only for deterrence, but for defiance or irrelevance as well. Sherman (1993) and Tyler (1990) assert that law enforcement and other types of social control work only when carried out in a manner their targets perceive as legitimate and procedurally fair. Combining Tyler's (1990) results with defiance theory, Braithwaite (2002) concludes that deterrence effects will exceed defiance effects when sanctions are seen as the result of fair procedures. According to Braithwaite (2002), when terrorists provoke sanctions that are perceived as unfair, deterrence is "engendered counterproductive by defiance" (p. 4). Braithwaite (2002) goes on to suggest a more dynamic approach to deterrence-based counter terrorist policies. This approach, described by Braithwaite (2002) as a responsive regulatory pyramid, begins with restorative justice techniques (the base of the pyramid), then, if necessary, escalates through a hierarchy of forms of deterrent justice. Finally, if deterrence fails, the intervening government resorts to 'incapacitative justice' (the apex of the pyramid),

which involves either incarcerating or killing the terrorists. Braithwaite (2002) hypothesizes that had the United States employed a similar policy toward Iraq during the Gulf War and toward Afghanistan in 2001, the Muslim world would be less resentful and defiant toward Americans today. Instead, according to Braithwaite (2002), in both cases, the U.S. intervened with excessive deterrence followed by insufficient de-escalation of deterrence.

Review of the Literature

A review of the literature reveals a near consensus that government interventions influence (in one direction or another) the level of terrorist violence within their boundaries. However, widely variable and sometimes contradictory findings leave the nature of this influence uncertain. First, I discuss the results of several studies that confirm the deterrent effect of counter terrorism. Next, I detail findings contrary to the rational choice perspective, which lend support to theories of legitimacy instead.

Support for the Rational Choice Perspective

Theoretically, deterrence-based policies alter terrorists' behavior by raising the costs of terrorism enough to exceed the benefits (Prunckun & Mohr, 1997). Accordingly, government regimes design counter terrorist strategies that deliver quick, forceful punishment, believing that such swift and severe actions will minimize impending terrorist strikes. To a certain extent, the literature supports this belief. In their rational choice evaluation of transnational terrorist events, Enders and Sandler (1993) examined several U.S. counter terrorism policies implemented between 1968 and 1988. Enders and Sandler (1993) determined that the most effective policies were the implementation of metal detectors in airports in 1973, and the fortification of U.S. embassies in 1976. Each

policy reduced terrorists' likelihood of success by increasing the certainty of apprehension. Metal detectors proved particularly effective in decreasing threats and hoaxes, presumably because the benefits of making a threat decreased when such threats were no longer taken seriously. Similarly, Chauncey (1975) evaluated five deterrence-based policies designed to reduce hijackings. In agreement with Enders and Sandler (1993), Chauncey (1975) found that metal detectors produced the largest reduction in hijacking attempts. Enders, Sandler and Cauley (1990), as well as Dugan et al (2005) concur, finding that the installation of metal detectors reduced all types of aerial hijackings. Dugan et al (2005) also concluded that hijackings to Cuba decreased following a 1970 Cuban policy that declared hijacking a crime.

Using a slightly different approach, Prunckun and Mohr (1997) documented the frequency and severity of terrorist acts surrounding a single severity-based measure: the U.S. raid on Libya in 1986. The Regan administration devised the raid as a warning to all Nations that the United States would no longer tolerate state support of terrorism. Prunckun and Mohr (1997) concluded that while their examination of the U.S. raid on Libya produced inconclusive findings, their results were consistent with an overall deterrent effect on international terrorism. Specifically, the authors reported that despite an immediate upsurge, the frequency of attacks against U.S. targets decreased over time. Additionally, the post raid period witnessed a decline in Libyan-associated terrorist activity. Prunckun and Mohr (1997) noted that although worldwide levels of terrorism failed to decrease following the raid, the post raid period was characterized by increasingly less severe incidents. Malvesti (2002) reached a similar conclusion regarding the 1993 U.S. missile attack on Iraq. This retaliatory attack on the Iraqi

Intelligence Service was designed to deter Saddam Hussein's support for terrorist activities. Malvesti indicated that subsequent to the U.S. attack, Iraq refrained from targeting U.S. interests for many years.

Providing additional support for the deterrent value of military action, three studies addressed Israel's counterinsurgent strategies. Eppright (1997) evaluated Israel's 1996 incursion into Lebanon, which enjoyed the immediate tactical success of significantly reducing, if not completely stopping Hezbollah's rocket attacks on Israel. Similar to the effects reported by Prunckun and Mohr (1997), Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare (1994) concluded that violent Israeli reprisals convinced Egypt and Jordan to discontinue their support of terrorist operations. Finally, according to Greener-Barcham (2002), the Israeli commando raid of a hijacked aircraft in 1976 greatly diminished hostage situations and airline hijackings in the years following the event. The success of these three violent reprisals supports the rational choice assumption that deterrence results when the certainty and severity of punishment increases.

Evaluating several non-violent government actions, Chalk's (1998) study focused on Peruvian counter terrorism. In order to combat the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement and Sendero Luminoso, the Peruvian government enacted several highly repressive certainty-based sanctions between 1992 and 1996. Not only did Peru refuse bail to accused terrorists, they prohibited cross examination by defense lawyers and prevented defense lawyers from challenging judges' decisions. According to Chalk (1998), by 1996, the repressive policies effectively destroyed the support bases of both groups, greatly diminishing the threat they posed previously.

In each case presented above, the governments of the United States, Cuba, Israel and Peru employed various deterrence-based counter terrorist policies with apparent success. Although these cases provide ample support for the rational choice perspective, the literature also provides support for the opposing theoretical perspective of legitimacy.

Support for Governmental Legitimacy Theories

Counter terrorist activities may fail because such measures, though directed against enemy combatants, often have a profound, negative effect on innocent civilians as well. This diminishes the perceived legitimacy of the government and to the extent that citizens feel unjustly repressed, increases the defiant response of the society (Lichbach, 1987). Not surprisingly, terrorists often attempt to lure the government into overreacting, provoking the use of unconstitutional measures (Chalk, 1998). In 1980, after a rescue attempt failed to free several U.S. diplomats taken hostage in Tehran, the Regan administration encountered a similar scheme (Wilkinson, 1996). Out of desperation, the government obtained the release of the hostages through a secret conspiracy to supply weapons to Iran in return. The whole affair greatly undermined the legitimacy of the government (Wilkinson, 1996).

Turk (2002) asserts that collateral damage is inevitable in all military operations. Further, Lichbach (1987) suggests that civilians caught up in the destructive path of the military may go beyond questioning governmental legitimacy; they may perceive the military as the enemy and join the terrorists' cause (see also Nevin, 2003; Turk, 2002). Military air strikes, for example, may reduce counterinsurgent casualties,

...by replacing ground troops with airborne technology, but they do not discriminate between rebel supporters and non-supporters. Thus, air strikes deny non-supporters the option of avoiding sanctions by refraining from providing any assistance to the rebels.

The result is that civilian nonelites, motivated by the same desire to survive the conflict regardless of who wins, may look to the rebels as the one group that can offer them protection from indiscriminate government violence (Mason, 1996, p. 80).

In this sense, counter terrorism that relies on military force may backfire. Similarly, Wilkinson (1996) explained that in any large conflict, it must be assumed that the terrorists have garnered at least some support among the general population. If so, an unnecessarily great military presence may escalate the level of violence by polarizing the pro and anti-government factions within the community (Wilkinson, 1996).

In an assessment of the United States' 1998 attempt to subdue terrorist activity in Afghanistan, Malvesti (2002) alleged that the strikes increased Osama bin Laden's popularity throughout the region. She also concluded that the military intervention intensified public animosity toward the U.S., and may have contributed to the events of September 11, 2001. Although Malvesti (2002) does not explicitly tie the reaction of the Afghan people to a questioning of U.S. legitimacy, her findings lend support to the assertion that military counter terrorism produces defiance rather than deterrence. Roberts (2002) concurs with Malvesti, concluding that the 2001 U.S. bombing campaign in Afghanistan inspired a defiant response as well. Roberts (2002) explains that despite attempts to minimize civilian casualties, the U.S. targeted Taliban military assets which happened to be located in the centers of towns. Collateral damage caused by the bombings prompted accusations that the United States places little value on Afghan lives, thereby undermining the legitimacy of the U.S. government (Roberts, 2002). Though both Malvesti (2002) and Roberts (2002) provided compelling arguments to support their claims, it is worth mentioning that neither of the researchers presented data to reinforce their assertions.

To the contrary, Nevin (2003) conducted molar analyses to determine whether retaliation against terrorists reduced or increased subsequent terrorism. Using a rational choice perspective, Nevin (2003) examined seven cases including Palestine, Morocco, Algeria, Northern Ireland, Spain, Sri Lanka and Peru. He found no evidence that retaliatory attacks decreased terrorist activity. Instead, Nevin (2003) reported that the intensity of terrorist actions either increased, or decreased less, following a more severe, violent retaliation, a finding in direct contradiction to the expectations of rational choice theory. Nevin (2003) concluded that violent responses to terrorism should be avoided, as they not only fail to reduce terrorism, they harm innocent civilians and may increase recruitment for terrorist groups. These conclusions provide support for legitimacy theories rather than rational choice theories.

In direct opposition to the findings reported by Prunckun and Mohr (1997) (discussed in the previous section), Malvesti (2002) suggests that the U.S. military campaign against terrorism in Libya produced a defiant effect. Malvesti (2002) found that the U.S. strikes generated an amplification of terrorist violence, culminating in the 1988 hijacking of a Pan Am flight which took the lives of 270 people. Collins (2004) quantitatively supports Malvesti's assertions, demonstrating that military air strikes conducted by the U.S. in 1986 were related to a large increase in the lethality of incidents involving Libyan terrorists. Collins (2004) demonstrates that in the five years prior to the military action, Libyan supported terrorism claimed 91 lives, however, over a similar length of time following the strikes, 491 people were killed in such incidents. These numbers represent a 440 percent increase in the number of fatalities due to Libyan supported terror. The discrepancies between the findings presented by Malvesti (2002)

and Collins (2004) and those reported by Prunckun and Mohr (1997) illustrate the difficulty of interpreting trends in terrorist activity without the benefit of statistical analysis. Enders et al (1990) explain that although the U.S. strikes generated an immediate surge in terrorist activity, the surge was followed by a sustained reduction in resource using incidents and an increase in threats and hoaxes (which use no resources). Enders et al (1990) conclude that retaliatory raids such as the attack on Libya should be avoided, as they impose short-term costs without any long-term benefits.

Another contradictory finding pertains to the 1973 installation of metal detectors in airports. In their analysis of terrorist skyjackings, Cauley and Im (1988) discovered a ‘substitution effect’ associated with this certainty-based policy. Consistent with the findings discussed in the previous section, Cauley and Im (1988) concluded that the installation of metal detectors resulted in approximately three fewer hijackings per month. Contrary to the other findings however, Cauley and Im (1988) noted that the installation of metal detectors was associated with approximately eight more non-hijacking terrorist events per month (Cauley & Im, 1988). According to the rational choice perspective, terrorist groups select their tactics by balancing the costs and benefits that come from government responses to their activities (Lichbach, 1987). However, Cauley and Im (1988) explain that when an intervening government represses a certain tactic, rather than being deterred from terrorist activity entirely, terrorists may simply defy their oppressor by altering their mode of attack. In so doing, the terrorists are rethinking criminal event decisions, while remaining steadfast in the criminal involvement decision (see Cornish and Clarke, 1986). Cauley and Im (1988) argue that

the substitution phenomenon is a fundamental problem faced by authorities who attempt to thwart terrorism.

The current literature provides empirical support both in favor of and in opposition to deterrence-based counter terrorism. The rational choice/deterrence perspective garners robust support from studies evaluating the installation of metal detectors in airports, a passive, non-violent response to terrorism. Conversely, the most convincing evidence in support of legitimacy theories comes from analyses of active, military counter terrorism. Overall, the literature generally supports the idea that while non-violent responses to terrorism may be effective, violent, military-oriented responses appear counter productive.

CHAPTER 3

Current Focus

Selected Counter Terrorist Measures

After a review of British counter terrorism policy during the Troubles, I selected six government actions. The actions, listed in chronological order by date of occurrence or implementation are Falls Curfew, Internment, Diplock Courts, Criminalization/Ulsterization, the Loughall Incident and the Gibraltar Incident. These interventions represent every significant government action during the Troubles with the exception of several acts, such as the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act, which did not substantially alter British policy, and the Good Friday Agreement, which took place in 1998, after the final year of this study (see CAIN Web Service; Campbell & Connolly, 2003; Geraghty, 2000; Jeffrey, 1990; Lee, 1981; McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney, Thornton & McVea, 2004; Reilly, 1994; Soule, 1989).

Falls Curfew

On July 3, 1970, a 36 hour military curfew was imposed by the British government and enforced by British soldiers in the Falls Road area of Belfast. According to Campbell and Connolly (2003), this incident was the closest Northern Ireland had come to martial law since the 1920s. In an attempt to locate IRA members and discover stockpiles of weapons belonging to the terrorist group, the army conducted extensive house searches and severely restricted the activities of those living in the area. During the curfew, the army made over 300 arrests, confiscated approximately 100 weapons and 21,000 rounds of ammunition (Jeffrey, 1990). From a rational choice perspective, the Falls curfew and search operation increased the terrorists' certainty of apprehension.

Although the British Army was successful in many ways, they were also responsible for the deaths of four civilians and severe damage to several homes (Campbell & Connolly, 2003). Further, Campbell and Connolly (2003) argue that use of military force in this situation, at least beyond the initial hours of the curfew, was unnecessary and probably unlawful. This coupled with the destructive manner in which the searches were conducted and the army's inability to distinguish between terrorists and civilians, have been said to have undermined the legitimacy of the government and alienated civilians throughout the area (Geraghty, 2000; Jeffrey, 1990). For the purposes of this paper, I am considering Falls Curfew an active response to terrorism.

Internment

Slightly more than one year later, the British government's policy of Internment allowed for the arrest and detention of suspected terrorists without any type of trial (Geraghty, 2000). On August 9, 1971, the day the policy took effect, 342 people were arrested through a series of raids across Northern Ireland. Following the arrests, the Minister of Home Affairs for Northern Ireland stated, "I have taken this serious step solely for the protection of life and the security of property... We are, quite simply, at war with the terrorist" (Deutsch & Magowan, 1974). The arrests made were based on lists drawn up by the RUC. However, those arrested included some who were no longer active members of a terrorist group and others who had never been involved in any paramilitary activity (Coogan, 1995). Throughout the entire Internment period (which lasted until late 1975) nearly 2,000 people experienced detention without trial. Of the detainees, over 1,800 were Nationalists and 107 were Loyalists.

Internment, which increased the certainty of apprehension, should, from a rational choice perspective, decrease future criminal behavior. However, several scholars consider this policy a failure (Campbell & Connolly, 2003; Geraghty, 2000; McKittrick et al, 2004; O'Brien, 1999; Soule, 1989). On August 15, 1971, the major Catholic political party in Northern Ireland, the SDLP, announced that it was starting a campaign of civil disobedience in response to the introduction of Internment. The SDLP then indicated that they would not become involved in any political talks while Internment continued (CAIN Web Service). The following day, over 8,000 workers went on strike in protest of the policy they perceived as unfair. Regarding Internment, one soldier remarked, "It has, in fact, increased terrorist activity, perhaps boosted IRA recruitment, polarized further the Catholic and Protestant communities and reduced the ranks of the much needed Catholic moderates" (CAIN Web Service). Though many opinions exist, the effectiveness of Internment has yet to be assessed quantitatively. I consider Internment an active government response to terrorism.

Diplock Courts

In 1972, shortly after the implementation of Internment, the British government established a committee to investigate possible changes to legal procedures in cases involving terrorists. The committee, headed by Lord Diplock, recommended that these cases be heard by a single judge with no jury (Geraghty, 2000). This recommendation stemmed from concerns over possible juror bias and witness intimidation in cases involving terrorists (Jackson & Doran, 1995). The committee also proposed relaxed standards for the admission of coerced confessions and advocated allowing the uncorroborated testimony of so-called 'supergrasses' or snitches (Jackson & Doran,

1995). These recommendations were introduced as law on August 8, 1973, as part of the Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act. Courts of this type became known as ‘Diplock Courts’ (Geraghty, 2000). The introduction of Diplock Courts effectively increased the certainty of punishment for terrorists by eliminating jury trials, a development rational choice theorists connect with a deterrent effect on criminal activity. By Enders’ and Sandler’s (1993) definition, the implementation of Diplock Courts represents a passive response to terrorism.

Criminalization and Ulsterization

Dissatisfied with the effectiveness of Internment, in 1976 the British government established a working group of bureaucrats, civil servants, military and intelligence personnel to examine the future of policy in Northern Ireland. The group came up with an approach known as ‘The Way Ahead’ (Jeffrey, 1990). Moving away from the strategy of military primacy, the resulting policy abandoned Internment and adopted Criminalization and Ulsterization instead (Campbell & Connolly, 2003). Prior to the implementation of Criminalization on March 1, 1976, paramilitary prisoners in Northern Ireland had been considered political detainees and they were treated very differently than ordinary criminals (Jeffrey, 1990). Before Criminalization, jailed terrorists enjoyed ‘Special Category Status’ which allowed them privileges such as the right to wear their own clothes, to interact with other prisoners, to have extra visits, to avoid working within the prisons and to participate in educational and recreational activities (von Tangen Page, 1998). Based upon the findings of a 1975 investigative commission into prison practices in Northern Ireland, Criminalization revoked the aforementioned rights in an attempt to

strip away the political nature of terrorism, treating it instead as an ordinary crime. The findings of the commission were the following:

The housing of male special category prisoners in compounds means that they are not closely controlled as they would be in a normal cellular prison...and they are more likely to emerge with an increased commitment to terrorism than as reformed citizens. The special category prisoners regard themselves in much the same light as detainees, expecting that an amnesty will result in their not having to serve in full the sentences imposed on them by the courts... The result of this is that the sentences passed in the courts for murder and other serious crimes have lost much of their deterrent effect (Lee, 1983, p. 133-134).

These recommendations emphasized the need to increase the deterrent value of punishment in Northern Ireland. Although the rational choice perspective predicts that raising the costs and decreasing the benefits of terrorism should produce a deterrent effect, thereby reducing terrorist activity, some researchers theorize that Criminalization may have increased terrorist activity instead (Geraghty, 2000; Lee, 1981). One mechanism by which Criminalization may have increased terrorism is the loss of government legitimacy that occurred during the hunger strikes in Northern Irish prisons. On March 1, 1981, the fifth anniversary of the implementation of Criminalization, the imprisoned leader of the IRA began a hunger strike hoping to reintroduce Special Category Status for jailed terrorists. Although the strikes resulted in the starvation deaths of ten Nationalist prisoners over eight months, government policy remained unchanged. According to Bew and Gillespie (1993), Nationalists achieved a huge propaganda victory over the British government and also obtained a lot of international sympathy during the

strikes. Although Criminalization has been studied extensively, its effectiveness as a measure of counter terrorism has yet to be assessed using longitudinal data.

On March 25, 1976, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland announced the implementation of Ulsterization. Ulsterization, also known as 'police primacy,' shifted responsibility for policing the security situation in Northern Ireland from the British military to local authorities, the RUC and UDR (Jeffrey, 1990). Like Criminalization, this dramatic reduction in the role of the British Army was intended to portray terrorism as criminal, rather than political (von Tangen Page, 1998). Ultimately, the policy was intended to decrease the benefit of engaging in terrorism, by eliminating the notion that terrorist acts were a necessary part of a political struggle. The effects of this policy will be considered in conjunction with the effects of Criminalization because the implementation dates are extremely close and the intended consequences nearly identical. I consider Criminalization and Ulsterization passive responses to terrorism.

The Loughall Incident

On May 8, 1987, eight members of the IRA were shot and killed during an ambush by British soldiers in Loughall, County Armagh. The IRA paramilitaries were in the process of bombing the police station at Loughall, a tiny, mostly Protestant village, when approximately 40 British Special Air Service (SAS) soldiers surprised them (Geraghty, 2000). Using a mechanical digger, the terrorists carried a 200 pound bomb nine miles to the police barracks. An informer compromised the operation prior to the bombing and as a result, SAS soldiers learned the likely route of the terrorists as well as the type of bomb to expect (Geraghty, 2000). The soldiers later confirmed that they fired

at least 600 shots at the terrorists; however, the IRA still managed to detonate the bomb as planned (McKittrick et al, 2004).

The Loughall Incident provides an important example of British military counter terrorism because it was the highest loss of life suffered by the IRA in any single incident since the 1920s (O'Brien, 1999). It also represents a change in British strategy from policy based counter terrorism back to outright military force. According to O'Brien (1999), the message to the IRA was clear, "men caught in the act could be shot dead, no prisoners taken" (p. 141). The terrorists killed were all members of the IRA's East Tyrone brigade, and by all accounts were virtually irreplaceable (Geraghty, 2000; McKittrick et al, 2004; O'Brien, 1999). One of the men was suspected of murdering two RUC officers and another, known as 'The Executioner,' had killed a former Member of Parliament (Geraghty, 2000; O'Brien, 1999). Two of the men had over 12 years experience with the IRA. To further illustrate the dangerousness of the terrorists killed on that day, weapons recovered from the scene were later linked to seven murders and 12 attempted murders (O'Brien, 1999). From a rational choice perspective, the deterrent value of this event should have been immense. The soldiers effectively raised the perceived costs of engaging in terrorism, increased the severity of punishment, and decreased the terrorists' likelihood of success during this active, forceful response to terrorism. However, the soldiers shot, rather than arresting the terrorists. The IRA likely construed this action as unfair and public perceptions of governmental legitimacy may have decreased as a result. The Loughall Incident is an active response to terrorism.

The Gibraltar Incident

On March 6, 1988, in a similar incident of active, military counter terrorism, SAS soldiers killed three members of the IRA under controversial circumstances in Gibraltar (O'Brien, 1999). The terrorists, who planned to explode a car bomb during a changing of the guard ceremony, had been under surveillance by the SAS for several months (McKittrick et al, 2004; Murray, 1998). Among the IRA's most experienced activists, the bomb team included a high ranking intelligence operative and an explosives expert (O'Brien, 1999). The killings generated a great deal of controversy when witnesses challenged the official version of events, claiming that the terrorists were unarmed at the time of the military action. Again, questions arose as to why the SAS failed to arrest the two men and one woman rather than shooting them (McKittrick et al, 2004; O'Brian, 1999). According to the SAS, the soldiers involved believed the terrorists were carrying a remote controlled detonator for the bomb. The Gibraltar killings are worthy of investigation because they generated a retaliatory attack against British soldiers less than two weeks later (Geraghty, 2000). The event is also important because it brought the number of IRA members killed in the one year period surrounding the event to nineteen, thereby delivering another severe blow to the terrorist organization (O'Brien, 1999).

Hypotheses

In order to evaluate whether counter terrorist strategies used during the Northern Irish conflict achieved the goal of reducing terrorism, I developed six hypotheses. Since the literature provides considerable support for both rational choice theories, which predict a decrease in terrorist activity following government intervention, and legitimacy theories, which predict the opposite, I structured my hypotheses as two-tailed. The first

four hypotheses derive from assumptions of the rational choice perspective and the final two pertain specifically to the Troubles. For the first four hypotheses, a result in the negative direction supports the rational choice perspective, while a result in the positive direction supports the theory of legitimacy. Hypothesis 1, a success related hypothesis, draws from the rational choice prediction that subsequent illegal behavior will diminish when offenders believe their chances of success have decreased. I use the implementation of Falls Curfew, a certainty-based military intervention, to test Hypothesis 1.

H1: Increasing the certainty of apprehension will affect the hazard of a terrorist attack either positively or negatively.

Hypotheses 2a and 2b, derived from the cost-related portion of rational choice theory, refer to the expectation that increasing the certainty and severity of punishment will reduce criminal activity. To test Hypothesis 2a, I use the implementation of Diplock Courts and Internment, two measures designed to increase the certainty of punishment. To test H2b I use the Loughall Incident and the Gibraltar Incident, two military interventions intended to increase the severity of punishment.

H2a: Increasing the certainty of punishment will affect the hazard of a terrorist attack either positively or negatively.

H2b: Increasing the severity of punishment will affect the hazard of a terrorist attack either positively or negatively.

Hypothesis 3, regarding expected benefits, comes from the rational choice notion that decreasing the perceived benefits associated with terrorism will decrease future

criminal activity. I use Criminalization and Ulsterization, two related policies implemented to decrease the benefits associated with terrorism, to test this hypothesis.

H3: Decreasing the expected benefits associated with terrorist activity will affect the hazard of a terrorist attack either positively or negatively.

Hypotheses 4a and 4b capture the idea that while the Nationalists and Loyalists both engaged in terrorism and were both targets of Internment, Diplock Courts and Criminalization/Ulsterization, only the Nationalists were targeted by the military during Falls Curfew, the Loughall Incident and the Gibraltar Incident.

H4a: Internment, Diplock Courts and Criminalization/Ulsterization will affect both Nationalist and Loyalist activity.

H4b: Falls Curfew, the Loughall Incident and the Gibraltar Incident will impact Nationalist terrorism, but will have no affect on terrorist activity engaged in by Loyalists.

CHAPTER 4

Methods

Data

This study combines two data sources: a newly created global terrorism database compiled at the University of Maryland and *An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Northern Ireland: 1969-1993*, compiled by Malcolm Sutton (1994). The global terrorism database originally contained information regarding 1,751 terrorist incidents perpetrated by Northern Irish terror groups between 1973 and 1992. I used Sutton's (1994) data to supplement the existing database, resulting in the addition of 1,577 terrorist incidents occurring between 1969 and 1992. All told, my final dataset, hereafter referred to as the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), contained a total of 3,328 incidents of terrorism perpetrated by Nationalist and Loyalist terror groups between 1969 and 1992. Table 2 provides a breakdown of incidents by group.

Limitations

To my knowledge, the GTD is the most comprehensive longitudinal data set available regarding terrorist activity in Northern Ireland. However, the primary limitation of the data is its bounded nature. Since the major Nationalist and Loyalist terrorist groups remained active until 1998, an ideal data set would include incident information at least until 1999. A second limitation of the GTD is the lack of complete information for the years 1969 through 1972. While the original global terrorism database included both fatal and non-fatal incidents, the Sutton data included only fatal incidents. The inclusion of a control variable, *Sutton*, reduces any bias introduced into my statistical model through the use of multiple data sources. However, complete data

during this time frame would still be preferable. The third potential limitation of the data is the possibility of duplicate entries. However, I compared each incident taken from Sutton (1994) against all similar incidents already contained within the global terrorism database to eliminate this possibility. Fourth, there is no guarantee that every terrorist event was documented and no assurance that all casualties produced by each event have been identified. I have addressed this potential issue by comparing incident information in the GTD to data collected by McKittrick et al (2004) and the CAIN Web Service. McKittrick et al (2004) present a collection of stories, amassed over ten years, that they believe encompass every death directly caused by the Troubles. CAIN is based within the University of Ulster in Northern Ireland and contains information pertaining to incidents of terrorism during the Northern Irish conflict. As a quality control measure, I compared fatality data from McKittrick et al (2004) and the CAIN Web Service with the fatality data from the GTD (see Figure 3). The similarity of these sources over time confirms that the GTD, at least in terms of the fatalities caused by terrorism in Northern Ireland, appears fairly reliable.

Model

In order to test my hypotheses, I estimated models for three subsets of terrorist incidents: total terrorist activity, Nationalist terrorism and Loyalist terrorism, using the incident as the unit of analysis. Per Dugan et al (2005), I estimated the coefficients associated with the hazard of another terrorist attack, measured by the number of days until the next incident perpetrated by each terrorist group (Nationalist and Loyalist). I used the following specification for the hazard models in the analysis:

$$h(Y)=\lambda_0(Y) \exp(\beta_1\textit{Government Actions}+ \beta_2\textit{Context}+\beta_3\textit{Controls})$$

Y is a function of an unspecified baseline hazard function and other risk or protective variables represented by *Government Actions, Context and Controls*. These vectors reflect my hypotheses and several control variables.

Variables

The dependent variable is the hazard of a terrorist attack, measured by the number of days until the next incident perpetrated by each terrorist group. The independent variables are the precise dates relating to the six government interventions mentioned previously. Each date is dummy coded such that one indicates that the policy has been implemented or the intervention carried out, and zero indicates that it has not. Passive responses to terrorism include Diplock Courts (August 8, 1973) and Criminalization/Ulsterization (March 25, 1976). Active responses to terrorism include Falls Curfew (July 3, 1970), Internment (August 9, 1971), the Loughall Incident (May 8, 1987) and the Gibraltar Incident (March 6, 1988).

I also included four variables in each of the models to measure the context of each incident: *Success, Number Killed, Year* and *Sutton*. *Success* is a dummy variable, coded such that one denotes a successful attack and zero denotes an unsuccessful attack. A successful attack was defined as one in which the terrorists accomplished their original objective. For example, an assassination would be considered successful only if the intended target was killed. *Number killed* relates to the number of deaths directly caused by each incident, ranging from zero to 26. *Year* is simply the year of each incident, included to control for any linear trends in the data over time. *Sutton*, described above, is a dummy variable coded such that one means the incident came from the supplemental data source, and zero indicates it was present in the original global terrorism database.

This crucial addition to the model controls not only for possible bias introduced by using two different data sources but for the possibility that information on the early years of the conflict, 1969 to 1972, is fundamentally different from information in the rest of the data. I added one additional variable, *Nationalist Group*, to the model which includes all terrorist incidents. *Nationalist Group* is a dummy variable where one denotes a Nationalist group and zero indicates a Loyalist group. The inclusion of this variable allows the average dependent variable to differ for Nationalist and Loyalist groups.

Finally, I included a number of statistical controls in the analysis to isolate the effects of the counter terrorist actions on the levels of terrorism. Three of these control variables are typically used by researchers when conducting analyses of violent crime trends (see LaFree, 1999; Neuman & Berger, 1988). First, I included a measure of economic production, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the United Kingdom. Information regarding the GDP was obtained through the United Nations Statistics Division and is listed in constant prices, as is typical of recent research on violent crime (Neumayer, 2005). Although ideally I would have preferred to control for the GDP of Northern Ireland alone, that measure was not available for the entire timeframe of my study. Second, I added the homicide rate of Northern Ireland using World Health Organization data obtained from LaFree (2005) and third, I included data on crimes recorded by the police in Northern Ireland, obtained from the British Home Office. I included one additional variable, *Bloody Sunday*, in all three models to control for the possible escalation effects of Bloody Sunday on subsequent terrorism in Northern Ireland. See Table 3 for summary statistics on all variables included in the models.

Hazard Modeling

In order to estimate the impact of the six selected policies and military interventions on the hazard of subsequent terrorist attacks, I used Cox (1972) proportional hazard models. Hazard modeling was originally designed to be applied to the study of one-time events such as death; however, it has also been used to investigate the effects of repeated events, such as earthquakes, car accidents, stock market crashes, arrests and revolutions (Allison, 1995). Most commonly, the Cox hazard model is used to estimate the hazard of a single event using many observations. My approach, taken from Dugan et al (2005), expands upon previous research by estimating the hazard of many events (terrorist attacks), on only one or two observations (the type of terrorist group). By conditioning all events on one or two observations, I reduce the risk of dependence across observations. As suggested by Allison (1995), I further tested for dependence by including in the models a variable that measures the time since the last incident. If there was dependence across incidents it would be strongest for the most recent attempts. The null association of this variable ($p=0.50$) supports the assumption that the observations are conditionally independent. Given this conditional independence, the multiple events in the current model will be akin to the more typical hazard model's multiple observations (Dugan et al, 2005).

CHAPTER 5

Results

Trends in Terrorism

Figure 4 shows trends in total terrorist activity over time while Figure 5 breaks this information down by group. For illustrative purposes, these figures include indicators representing the six government interventions analyzed here. The large increase in incidents, from less than a handful in 1969 to nearly 300 in 1972, conveys the intensity of escalation during the early years of the conflict. Not surprisingly, during the first five years of the Troubles, authorities responded with three disparate counter terrorist interventions (Falls Curfew, Internment and Diplock Courts). Although the years following 1972 witnessed a substantial decline in activity, the reprieve proved only temporary when in 1979, terrorist activity spiked again. The comparison between Nationalist and Loyalist activity presented in Figure 5 reveals that the spike in 1979 is almost entirely attributable to Nationalist groups. Indeed, during a single day in March of 1979, the IRA detonated 24 bombs at different locations throughout Northern Ireland (McKittrick et al, 2004). As seen in Figure 5, throughout the 1980s Loyalist activity fell to relatively minimal levels while Nationalist activity continued to fluctuate erratically. It is interesting to note that apart from minor legislative action, terrorists were met with little governmental retaliation during this time. During the late 1980s, around the time of the British military interventions at Loughall and Gibraltar, both Nationalist and Loyalist levels of terrorism rose rather substantially. This dramatic increase continued into 1992, the final year of this study.

Offering a different perspective on the Troubles, Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the number of deaths attributable to terrorism over time. During 1972, the single deadliest year of the Troubles, nearly 300 deaths were attributed to Nationalist terrorism. Although Loyalist killings also spiked in 1972, Loyalists caused their greatest number of fatalities in 1975. Interestingly, 1975, one year prior to the implementation of Criminalization and Ulsterization, was the first year of the Troubles wherein the carnage caused by Loyalist terror groups nearly equaled that caused by Nationalists. This pattern was not repeated again until 1992.

Apart from the dramatic spike in the early 1970s, the pattern of terrorist killings differs greatly from the patterns in total activity described above. As opposed to the extreme fluctuation in incidents throughout the 1980s (especially on the part of Nationalist groups), the lethality of terrorist events decreased drastically for both groups in 1977, and continued to diminish until 1979, when there was a slight increase for both groups. The minor spike in fatalities in 1979 was followed by a steady, seven-year decline in fatal violence throughout the 1980s, especially noticeable for Nationalist groups. Not surprisingly, when this decline came to an abrupt end in 1987, British military action targeting Nationalists was quick to follow (see Figure 7). The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed an unusual pattern of violence for Nationalists and Loyalists, with Nationalist killings actually decreasing as Loyalist killings increased. The decline in fatalities associated with Nationalist terrorism is unexpected, given the concurrent rise in overall incidents during that time (see Figure 5). Although the analysis presented in this paper does not address possible reasons for this disparity; an interesting future research

project might explore the possibility of a link between this rise in non-fatal incidents and changes in Nationalist modes of attack.

Statistical Analysis

Table 4 shows the hazard model results for total incidents, Nationalist perpetrated incidents and Loyalist perpetrated incidents. In each model, a positive coefficient suggests that the variable increases the hazard of another terrorist attack, lending support to legitimacy theories, while a negative value suggests it decreases the hazard of another attack, lending support to rational choice theories. Derived from an assumption of rational choice theory, Hypothesis 1 predicts that the hazard of a terrorist attack will change following the implementation of counter terrorist measures that increase the certainty of apprehension. I examined the effect of a single certainty-based measure: Falls Curfew, occurring in July of 1970. The hazard model results show partial support for Hypothesis 1 and the theory of legitimacy. Falls Curfew was related to a significant increase in Nationalist activity as well as non-significant increases in Loyalist activity and total terrorism. However, I should note that the differences in magnitude between the coefficients in the Nationalist model (1.484) and the Loyalist model (1.011) were not significantly different from one another ($z=0.47$; see Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, and Piquero 1998 for test).

Hypotheses 2a and 2b are drawn from the cost-related portion of rational choice theory. Hypothesis 2a predicts that as the certainty of punishment increases, the hazard of a terrorist attack will change. In order to address this possibility, I analyzed the implementation of two counter terrorist policies: Diplock Courts, in August of 1973 and Internment, in August of 1971. Both policies increased the certainty of punishment for

committing the crime of terrorism either by altering the trial process (Diplock Courts) or by eliminating it altogether (Internment). The results of the analysis provide support for Hypothesis 2a. Supportive of H2a and the rational choice perspective, the implementation of Diplock Courts was related to a decrease in the hazard of terrorism in all three models; however, this decrease was only significant for Loyalist groups. Interestingly, a z-test confirms that the implementation of Diplock Courts affected Loyalist activity significantly more than it affected Nationalist activity ($z=2.17$). The implementation of Internment had the opposite effect on the hazard of terrorism, significantly increasing the hazard of a Nationalist attack as well as terrorism overall. These findings run contrary to the expectations of rational choice theorists, however, they support theories of legitimacy. The implementation of Internment resulted in a decrease in Loyalist activity, however this change was non-significant. The coefficients for the Nationalist model and the Loyalist model were significantly different ($z=2.90$). It is interesting to note that the Internment variable produced the largest significant coefficient, positive or negative, of any of the six government actions evaluated.

Hypothesis 2b predicts that as a counter terrorist measure increases the severity of punishment, the hazard of another terrorist attack will change. I tested this assertion by examining two military interventions that increased the perceived costs of engaging in terrorism: the Loughall Incident, occurring in May of 1987 and the Gibraltar Incident, taking place in March of 1988. My findings regarding these two interventions provide strong support for H2b and the legitimacy perspective. For all three models, the Loughall Incident was related to an increase in the hazard of another terrorist attack. This increase was significant for both Nationalist and Loyalist groups, but insignificant for terrorism

overall. A z-test confirmed that the increase in Nationalist activity was not significantly different from the increase in Loyalist activity ($z=1.01$). The Gibraltar Incident was also related to a significant increase in both overall terrorist activity and Nationalist terrorism; however, it was not related to any significant change in terrorism perpetrated by Loyalists. The coefficient for the Nationalist model differs significantly from the coefficient for the Loyalist model ($z=2.46$).

My next hypothesis (H3) examines the impact of the perceived benefits of terrorism on the hazard of another terrorist attack. Hypothesis 3 posits that the hazard of a terrorist attack will change when an intervention decreases the expected benefits associated with terrorist activity. In order to evaluate this assertion, I analyzed the implementation of Criminalization and Ulsterization in March of 1976. The British government designed these policies to decrease the benefits associated with engaging in terrorism. Supportive of Hypothesis 3 and the legitimacy perspective, Criminalization and Ulsterization were related to a significant increase in the hazard of a terrorist attack for Nationalist groups as well as for terrorism overall. By contrast, terrorism perpetrated by Loyalists decreased (but not significantly so) following the implementation of the policies. The coefficients for Nationalist and Loyalist activity were significantly different, providing stronger support for the increased hazard of Nationalist terrorism ($z=2.84$).

Finally, hypotheses 4a and 4b address the potential differences between Northern Irish Nationalist and Loyalist terror groups in their responses to counter terrorist actions. As mentioned previously, one active response (Internment) and two passive responses (Diplock Courts and Criminalization/Ulsterization) were aimed at fighting terrorism in

general, while the remaining three active, military-oriented responses (Falls Curfew, the Loughall Incident and the Gibraltar Incident) were targeted at Nationalist groups in particular. Hypothesis 4a posits that Internment, Diplock Courts and Criminalization/Ulsterization should affect both Nationalist and Loyalist activity. I tested this hypothesis by evaluating the effect of each of the three interventions on subsequent Nationalist and Loyalist terrorism. Failing to support Hypothesis 4a, Internment significantly increased the hazard of Nationalist perpetrated terrorism while having no significant effect on Loyalist activity. A z-test also indicates that statistically, the coefficients in the Nationalist model are significantly different than the coefficients in the Loyalist model ($z=2.90$). This confirms that the groups were not affected similarly by the intervention. The results of the analysis with regard to Criminalization and Ulsterization also fail to support H4a, as the policies only significantly affected Nationalist activity. Finally, providing some support for Hypothesis 4a, the implementation of Diplock Courts decreased the hazard of both Nationalist and Loyalist terrorism. As mentioned above however, a z-test revealed that Loyalist activity decreased significantly more than Nationalist activity.

Three active, military interventions: Falls Curfew, the Loughall Incident and the Gibraltar Incident, were used to test Hypothesis 4b. H4b predicts that because the aforementioned government actions directly targeted Nationalist terrorists (the IRA), they should only affect Nationalist terrorism. This hypothesis received partial support. Supportive of the Hypothesis 4b, the Gibraltar Incident significantly impacted terrorism perpetrated by Nationalist groups, while Loyalist activity was not affected. The z-score, mentioned above, adds additional support to the finding that Nationalists were affected

more strongly by the intervention than Loyalists. Offering partial support to H4b, Falls Curfew significantly affected only Nationalist terrorism. However, the z-test presented above shows there was actually no significant difference between the coefficients in the Nationalist and Loyalist models. Finally, as I suspected, the Loughall Incident significantly affected Nationalist terrorism. The surprising result is that the military intervention also affected Loyalists. Further testing confirmed that the Loughall Incident did not even affect Nationalists more strongly than Loyalists ($z=1.01$). These findings are contrary to Hypothesis 4b.

CHAPTER 6

Discussion and Conclusions

In this paper I developed six hypotheses regarding terrorist activity and the Northern Irish Troubles. I used a chronological index of deaths from the conflict, as well as data from a newly created global terrorism database, to determine whether government intervention reduced or increased terrorism. I also examined whether Nationalist and Loyalist groups responded differently to various types of counter terrorist action. The six government interventions selected for this paper targeted the certainty of apprehension, the certainty and severity of punishment and the perceived benefits of engaging in terrorism. Overall, I found more support for the theory of governmental legitimacy than for the rational choice perspective, indicating that counter terrorist activity may be counter productive, especially when it involves military force.

The first major military intervention of the Troubles, Falls Curfew, resulted in a significantly greater hazard of Nationalist terrorism. Given the nature of the search operation, the failure of this intervention to reduce terrorism is not entirely surprising. During the curfew, the army successfully disarmed and incapacitated a number of potentially dangerous terrorists, effectively raising the certainty of apprehension. However, the positive effects of the army's efforts were apparently mitigated by their questionable handling of the situation. The unprovoked ransacking of private homes and the killing of civilians likely generated considerable animosity toward the government. In turn, this animosity may have increased support for terrorists among the local population. As suggested by Braithwaite (2002), deterrence may not always work as the rational choice perspective predicts. Perhaps Falls Curfew is one case in which the

negative slope of the defiance curve was steeper than the positive slope of the deterrence curve. This finding also provides support for Tyler's (2000) assertion that perceptions of government legitimacy stem from the level of fairness people associate with government policies rather than the actual outcome of the policy. Although the curfew achieved many of the government's intended goals, it was also conducted in a manner that those affected perceived as unfair.

The intriguing finding with regard to Diplock Courts is that they were significantly more effective in decreasing Loyalist activity than Nationalist activity. While the added costs of engaging in terrorism appear to have dissuaded Loyalists, Nationalists remained virtually undeterred. This result implies a fundamental difference between the two groups in perceptions of the cost-benefit ratio associated with engaging in terrorism. I suspect that Loyalists were more easily deterred because their cause, maintaining the union with Britain, is not as deeply ingrained in Irish history as the cause of the Nationalists (thus Loyalists receive fewer benefits from terrorist activity). As a result, Loyalist groups may have fewer highly motivated individuals who are capable of ignoring the rising costs of engaging in terrorism.

The most definitive result of the entire analysis is the resounding failure of the Internment policy. In both the Nationalist model and the total terrorism model, the implementation of Internment produced a significant increase in the hazard of a terrorist attack. The rational choice assumption that deterrence results from an increased certainty of punishment simply does not hold in this case. Perhaps, as Braithwaite (2002) and Tyler (2000) suggest, theories of legitimacy can more adequately explain the effects of Internment. The erroneous arrests of non-terrorists during the initial day of Internment

likely undermined the legitimacy of the sanctioning agents. Additionally, the policy of internment without trial is, by definition, unfair.

The aggravating effects of the Loughall and Gibraltar Incidents on Nationalist terrorism contradict the assumptions of rational choice theories. Given the high loss of life suffered by the IRA in Loughall and Gibraltar, rational choice theorists would anticipate a lull in terrorist activity while the organization regrouped. The extreme severity of punishment surely did not go unnoticed by other terrorists, yet the escalation of incidents following the event fails to suggest a deterrent effect. Indeed, compromised government legitimacy appears a more plausible explanation. Since the terrorists were killed, rather than arrested by the army, there were whispers of a shoot-to-kill policy among British security forces (Geraghty, 2000). Always aware of the value of propaganda, perhaps the IRA portrayed the ‘murdered’ terrorists as martyrs (Geraghty, 2000). Lethal force may have been perceived as unnecessary and the killings therefore unjust. Regardless, the findings provide support for legitimacy theories rather than rational choice theories.

The aggravating effect of the Loughall Incident on Loyalist terrorism is puzzling. I can conceive of no theoretical reason for this finding, as the intervention targeted only the IRA (a Nationalist group). Perhaps Loyalists were simply caught up in retaliatory attacks against Nationalists during the increase in Nationalist violence that followed the military action.

From a rational choice standpoint, the simultaneous decrease in benefits and increase in costs of Criminalization and Ulsterization should have produced a deterrent effect for both groups. However, the deterrent effect proved insignificant for Loyalist

groups and non-existent for Nationalists. Again, similar to the results of the analysis of Diplock Courts, the results regarding Criminalization and Ulsterization hint at some fundamental difference between Nationalists and Loyalists. Perhaps the Nationalists' unwavering commitment to their cause, as evidenced by the hunger strikes in 1981, sets them apart. While I hesitate to imply that Loyalist terror groups were more rational than Nationalists, the Loyalists did appear more responsive to changes in the cost-benefit ratio associated with terrorist activity. Maybe, as Shultz (1979) suggests, Nationalist groups were simply so driven by ideology and emotion, that they were willing to incur costs above and beyond the point of rationality. Alternatively, perhaps the animosity harbored by Nationalists against a government they perceived as illegitimate was simply aggravated by the introduction of each new counter measure.

All in all, these results support two main conclusions. First, I failed to find support for the rational choice assumption that terrorist attacks decrease in likelihood when the certainty of apprehension or the certainty and severity of punishment increase. On the contrary, I found that four of the five interventions used to test this assumption (Falls Curfew, Internment, the Loughall Incident and the Gibraltar Incident) significantly increased the risk of another terrorist attack in at least one of the models. Just as violence spiked dramatically in the early 1970s, Britain intervened with Falls Curfew and Internment, two repressive military interventions that served to exacerbate the conflict. Military action at Loughall and Gibraltar also increased, rather than reduced violence in the late 1980s. Only the introduction of Diplock Courts in 1973 effectively reduced the activity of some groups. These results indicate that retaliating against terrorists with military force is counter productive, and should be avoided. Governments must

anticipate the possibility that the consequences of military counter terrorist action may be as severe as the consequences of additional terrorism and must take extreme care to weigh the benefits of violence against the costs of potentially escalating the conflict.

Secondly, I ascertained that Nationalist terror groups, consistently more violent than Loyalists, were virtually undeterred in their campaign of terror. Regardless of arrest, imprisonment, condemnation by authorities and death of their members, Nationalist organizations did not falter in their relentless stream of attacks. The interventions examined here not only failed to diminish Nationalist terrorism, five of the six resulted in significantly increased terrorist activity. The desire for vengeance against British authorities, stemming from the security forces' lack of neutrality in handling the situation, likely provided a powerful motivation for Nationalist terrorists and future recruits to Nationalist groups. Ultimately, while my results provide minimal evidence for the rational choice perspective and the effectiveness of deterrence-based counter terrorism, they provide strong support for theories of governmental legitimacy. In the future, perhaps legitimacy theories will offer a more complete understanding of the apparent counter productivity of counter terrorism as it applies to Irish Nationalists.

Despite the strength of the database created for this research, my study has several limitations. First, it suffers from a shortcoming common to many previous tests of the rational choice perspective: a lack of perceptual data regarding the specific motivations of terrorists (Dugan et al, 2005). As a result, I had no way of knowing whether Nationalists remained motivated by the original goal of a united Ireland, or if at some point they began acting out of revenge, hatred toward the authorities, or simply for the exhilaration of the experience. Unfortunately, this limitation precludes a complete understanding of

the benefits expected by terrorists, as well as their perception of government sanctions. Second, I was unable to obtain a measure of social attitudes in Northern Ireland that could speak to changing levels of public support for paramilitary campaigns. This addition may have been useful in understanding perceptions of government legitimacy. Third, though I attempted to account for many of the variables determined in prior research to be associated with terrorist activity, it is possible that I neglected to include an important additional measure. Finally, as a case study, the external validity of this research is limited. However, although my research is unique in geographical location and data source, the findings align my research with previous studies that conclude that military counter terrorism is counterproductive (see Collins, 2004; Geraghty, 2000; Kenney, 2003; Lichbach, 1987; Malvesti, 2002; Nevin, 2003; Soule, 1989; Turk, 2002).

Suggestions for Future Research

My research represents an initial application of hazard modeling and legitimacy theories to terrorist activity in Northern Ireland. Accordingly, numerous potential projects could expand upon the current findings. First, the bounded nature of this research prevented me from examining the effects of one major government intervention, the Good Friday Agreement, reached on April 10, 1998. When more complete data becomes available, future research should examine the entire span of the Northern Irish Troubles, from 1969 until after the peace agreement in 1998. Second, I believe an extremely interesting future research project would be an analysis of terrorism and counter terrorism in Northern Ireland using fatalities, rather than incidents, as the dependent measure. As mentioned previously, while the number of terrorist attacks fluctuated fairly erratically from year to year, the number of fatalities decreased markedly

over time. Had I analyzed the impact of government interventions on the lethality of attacks rather than on the attacks themselves, my results may have been different. Third, I envision a more in depth analysis of attack mode, target type and choice of weapon. This analysis could determine whether the single outwardly successful policy identified in this paper (Diplock Courts) generated substitution effects, as cautioned by Cauley and Im (1988). Fourth, in agreement with Dugan et al (2005) I suggest a more thorough evaluation of the differences between terrorists and ordinary criminals in their perceptions of costs and benefits before drawing further conclusions regarding terrorism and the rational choice perspective. Finally, I suggest further exploration of the applicability of legitimacy theories to terrorism. Public attitudes toward the British Army and the RUC, gleaned from attitudinal surveys, speak directly to perceptions of legitimacy over time. Similarly, an analysis of attitudes toward terrorism might correlate trends in recruitment with upswings in terrorist activity. Attitudinal surveys for Northern Ireland are available, though potentially difficult to obtain, for the later years of the Troubles.

TABLES

Table 1. Description of Interventions Selected for Analysis.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Intervention</i>	<i>Description and Intended Effect</i>	<i>Response Type</i>
July 3, 1970	Falls Curfew	36 hour military curfew imposed by the British government. 337 people were arrested and four killed. Falls Curfew was intended to increase terrorists' perceived certainty of apprehension.	Active
August 9, 1971	Internment	Imprisonment without trial. During the Internment period nearly 2,000 people were jailed without a conviction. Internment was intended to increase terrorists' perceived certainty of punishment.	Active
August 8, 1973	Diplock Courts	Juryless courts were designed to handle cases involving suspected terrorists. Diplock Courts were intended to increase terrorists' perceived certainty of punishment.	Passive
March 25, 1976	Criminalization/ Ulsterization	Jailed terrorists were treated as criminals rather than political prisoners and primary responsibility for the security situation shifted from the army to the police force. Criminalization and Ulsterization were intended to decrease the benefits associated with terrorism.	Passive
May 8, 1987	The Loughall Incident	Eight IRA members were killed by the SAS. This was the highest loss of life suffered by the IRA in any single incident. The incident was intended to increase terrorists' perceived severity of punishment.	Active
March 6, 1988	The Gibraltar Incident	Three IRA members were killed by the SAS. The incident was controversial because witnesses claimed the SAS gave no warning. It was intended to increase terrorists' perceived severity of punishment.	Active

Table 2. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Group.

<i>Group Name</i>	<i>Number of Incidents</i>	<i>Percent of Overall Total</i>
Nationalists		
Irish Republican Army (IRA)	2,362	70.97
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)	102	3.07
Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA)	42	1.26
Irish People's Liberation Organization (IPLO)	20	0.60
Non-specific Nationalist Terrorists	76	2.28
Total Nationalist Incidents	2,602	78.18
Loyalists		
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)	238	7.15
Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)	179	5.38
Non-specific Loyalist Terrorists	309	9.29
Total Loyalist Incidents	726	21.82
Overall Total	3,328	100.00

Table 3. Summary Statistics for all Included Variables.

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>	<i>Minimum Value</i>	<i>Maximum Value</i>
Interventions				
Falls Curfew	0.997	0.057	0	1
Internment	0.286	0.452	0	1
Diplock Courts	0.843	0.364	0	1
Criminalization/Ulsterization	0.683	0.465	0	1
The Loughall Incident	0.268	0.443	0	1
The Gibraltar Incident	0.247	0.431	0	1
Context				
Success	0.879	0.326	0	1
Number Killed	0.890	1.250	0	26
Year	1980.855	6.801	1969	1992
Sutton	0.474	0.499	0	1
Controls				
Gross Domestic Product	451.765	65.168	344.553	557.300
Homicide Rate	7.014	3.668	0.848	14.311
Crimes Recorded by Police	507.911	129.898	228.680	682.550
Bloody Sunday	0.968	0.176	0	1
Nationalist Group	0.747	0.435	0	1

Table 4. Coefficients for Cox Proportional Hazard Models.

	<i>All Incidents N=3,328</i>	<i>Nationalist Incidents n=2,602</i>	<i>Loyalist Incidents n=726</i>
Government Actions			
Falls Curfew	0.818 0.556	1.484* 0.743	1.011 0.692
Internment ^a	1.573** 0.327	0.930** 0.267	-0.042 0.203
Diplock Courts ^a	-0.095 0.236	-0.176 0.183	-0.756** 0.194
Criminalization/Ulsterization ^a	0.939* 0.376	0.631* 0.299	-0.437 0.228
The Loughall Incident	0.503 0.272	0.597** 0.231	1.031** 0.361
The Gibraltar Incident ^a	0.908** 0.273	0.780** 0.236	-0.333 0.385
Context			
Success	-0.022 0.121	-0.019 0.099	-0.181 0.171
Number Killed	-0.005 0.030	-0.012 0.025	0.062* 0.029
Year	-0.284** 0.091	-0.230** 0.077	0.332** 0.117
Sutton	-0.056 0.097	-0.156 0.084	-0.439** 0.182
Controls			
Gross Domestic Product	0.011* 0.006	0.007 0.005	-0.031** 0.007
Homicide Rate	0.037 0.019	0.015 0.016	0.032 0.021
Crimes Recorded by Police	0.007** 0.002	0.006** 0.002	-0.007* 0.003
Bloody Sunday	0.135 0.317	0.568 0.291	2.812** 0.474
Nationalist Group	-0.174 0.099	-- --	-- --

* $p \leq 0.05$ and ** $p \leq 0.01$, all two tailed tests. Standard errors are listed below coefficients.

^a Denotes interventions that affected Nationalists and Loyalists significantly differently.

FIGURES

Figure 1. Terrorist Activity by Group.




Figure 2. Total Killings by Group.




Figure 3. Total Killings by Data Source.




Figure 4. Overlay of Interventions on Total Terrorist Activity.




Figure 5. Overlay of Interventions on Terrorist Activity by Group.




Figure 6. Overlay of Interventions on Total Killings.





Figure 7. Overlay of Interventions on Killings by Group.



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