

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: BUILDING A MILITARY SECURITY
COOPERATION REGIME IN NORTHEAST ASIA:
FEASIBILITY AND DESIGN

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This study explores the feasibility and design of a military security cooperation regime in Northeast Asia consisting of the U.S., China, Japan, Russia and the two Koreas. The author undertook this research for two primary reasons: first, to determine why key actors in Northeast Asia have not yet developed regional security arrangements like Europe has demonstrated in the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Security and Defense Policy. Second, based on personal experiences and observations as a policy maker in the military security cooperation area over the ten years, which has included extensive contacts with foreign colleagues, the author is confident that Northeast Asia has the potential to institutionalize a new military security regime in the region. To create such a regime, key regional actors must develop a joint strategy to implement the concept.

To develop a theoretical framework for a regional security regime in Northeast Asia, the study examines some prevalent theories of international relations, notably realism and liberalism. Research findings confirm that neoliberal institutionalism is the approach most compatible with the goal of building a regional security regime. The study argues that realism—the theory which posits that the purpose of international relations is to maximize state power—has inherent weakness in terms of resolving

potential regional conflicts. In contrast to realism, neoliberal institutionalism could overcome the vulnerabilities and strains built into the Cold War structure which still prevail in Northeast Asia. Neoliberalism institutionalism holds out the promise of reconciliation and cooperation by inculcating commonly accepted norms, principles, rules, and decision-making procedures.

The study identifies four conditions necessary to the formation of a security regime in Northeast Asia: the evolution of existing security arrangements; regional economic interdependence with spill over security cooperation; transnational threats as a set of commonly perceived threats; and support of key actors for a new security regime.

First, existing security cooperation arrangements, which may serve as the basis for a new regional security regime including ASEAN Regional Forum, the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific, the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, and the Six Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program, have already made great strides in terms of accumulating the habits of dialogue among regional powers.

Second, the dynamics of economic interdependence have encouraged the states of the Northeast Asia region to integrate and cooperate with one another. Sustained economic development via trade and investment, co-development of Siberia's oil and gas, economic cooperation between the two Koreas, has positively spilled over into regional security cooperation.

Third, transnational threats, which call for cooperative security policies, include terrorism, international crime, infectious diseases, unregulated population movements,

natural disasters, and environment degradation, pose greater challenges than do traditional, conventional threats because they cannot be mastered by states acting individually but should be resolved in a multilateral framework.

Finally, in the 1990s the key actors in Northeast Asia tended to perceive multinational security cooperation as detrimental to both regional stability and their national interests. In the post-post Cold War era, however, particularly after the 9.11, a new spirit has arisen in the region in favor of multilateral cooperation to resolve security issues such as terrorism and North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

The findings of the current study indicate that security cooperation is a more effective, less costly solution to regional conflicts in Northeast Asia than either unilateral approach or arms races and bilateral alliances.

The final section of the study analyzes the practical measures needed to construct a new Northeast Asia Military Security Cooperation Regime. The concept of a security regime in Northeast Asia can be implemented along three basic lines of strategy. First, to create a more favorable security cooperative environment is the most important area for the success of the security regime building. A multinational epistemic community consisting of security policy makers, lawmakers, and scholars must be cultivated as the basis of a new regional consensus as well as a domestic consensus. As a multi-tier network among opinion leaders in the region emerges, misunderstanding, miscalculation, and misinterpretation will be ameliorated and the chances of regional conflict reduced. Second, on the military level key actors should systematically expand bilateral and multilateral security and military exchanges and

cooperative programs. Such cooperative programs should include defense minister talks and the establishment of a regional multinational headquarters with a rotating command structure. Third, no movement toward a new security system in Northeast Asia can be made without strong leadership. In this regard, the Six Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program could form the backbone of new regional security architecture. The Six Party Talks, then, are an essential test of whether key actors in the region can deal with security issues on a multilateral basis.

The study concludes that an approach of neoliberal institutionalism and security cooperation is practicable and will entail the most benefits for Northeast Asia. Although the European model of security cooperation offers relevant lessons and insights, Northeast Asia's distinct historical heritage, cultural aspirations, and economic dynamics call for an approach to cooperative security that is responsive to the unique dynamics of the area.

In conclusion, the Northeast Asia Military Security Cooperation Regime is feasible and has a bright future. The U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral Strategic Talks have already initiated in building a regional security regime. During the era of the Cold War and even today, the security environment of Northeast Asia has been characterized by conflict, animosity, Great Power dominance, and contradictory interests. In the early twenty-first century, leaders in the region must transform the region into a new security order exemplified by reconciliation, mutual respect, power sharing, and complementary interests. A realistic strategy to achieve the goal is to build a security regime.

Building A Military Security Cooperation Regime in Northeast Asia: Feasibility and Design

by

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Note

* Concepts, opinions, and policy recommendations discussed in this research are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Korea National Defense University, the Ministry of National Defense, or the Republic of Korea government.

* The surnames of the author and other persons mentioned in this dissertation are positioned according to country practice.

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Southern California, a year tour for a Master of Military Art and Science at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and eight years for a Ph.D. in International Relations at the Graduate School, UMCP. The Ph.D. coursework and dissertation were demanding due to my one short year tour at the UMCP as a research fellow and my professional career assignments including as Division Artillery Regiment Commander along the Eastern Frontline of the DMZ and East Coastline and policy maker at the foreign military cooperation area, J-5, ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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ACRONYMS

ABB	Alex Boncayao Brigade
ACO	Allied Command Operations
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
AFNORTH	Allied Force North Europe
AFTA	Asian Free Trade Area
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AOC	Air Operations Center
APCSS	Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Council
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN-ISIS	ASEAN Institute for Strategic and International Studies
ASEAN-PMC	ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference
ASF	African Standby Force
ASG	Abbu Sayyaf Group
AU	African Union
CBM	Confidence Building Measures
CHOP	Change of Operational Control
CICA	Conference on Interaction & Confidence-Building Measures
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific
CSCE	Council for Security Cooperation in Europe
CVID	Completely, Verifiably, Irreversibly Dismantlement
DIS	Defense Information Sharing
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
GATT	General Agreement for Trade Treaty
GDP	Gross Development Production
GNP	Gross National Production
GPR	Global Defense Posture Review
HIV	Human Immune Deficiency Virus
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IEA	International Energy Agency
IGCC	Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPR	Institute for Pacific Region
ISAF	International Security Assistance Forces
ISR	Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance
JALLC	Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Center
JFC	Joint Forces Command
JFTC	Joint Force Training Center
JI	Jemaah Islamyah
JWC	Joint Warfare Center
KEDO	Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization
KMM	Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia

LHD	Landing Helicopter Dock
LNWFZ-NEA	Limited Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Northeast Asia
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
MFN	Most-Favored-Nation
MILF	More Islamic Liberation Front
MIT-SG	Minsulpala Islamic Theocratic Shadow Government
MNF	Multi-National Forces
MPAT	Multilateral Planning Augmentation Team
MRM	Mutual Reassurance Measures
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDPO	National Development Program Outline for Japanese
NDU	National Defense University
NEAAN	Northeast Asia Area Network
NEACD	Northeast Asia Cooperative Dialogue
NEAEF	Northeast Asian Economic Forum
NFP	New Frontier Party
NGO	Non-Government Organizations
NLL	Northern Limit Line
NPT	Nuclear Proliferation Treaty
NRF	NATO' Response Forces
NSA	Negative Security Assurances
OSCE	Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
PCC	PACOM Coalition Council
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PKO	Peace Keeping Operations
PLA	Chinese People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
RCR	Ranger Commando Regiment
RMSI	Regional Maritime Security Initiative
ROK	Republic of Korea
SAIS	School Advanced International Studies
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SEANWFZ	South East Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
SEAS	Symposium for East Asia Security
SLOC	Sea Line of Communication
SOP	Standing Operation Procedures
SWC	South Korea Army Special Warfare Command
TCOG	U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Coordinating Oversight Group
TF	Task Forces
TKR-TCR	Trans Korea Railroad – Trans China Railroad
TKR-TSR	Trans Korea Railroad – Trans Siberia Railroad
TRADP	Tuman River Area Development Program
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UPM	Unregulated Population Movement
USIA	United States Information Agency
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

USPACOM
WMD
WTO
WTO

United States Pacific Command
Weapons of Mass Destruction
World Trade Organization
Warsaw Treaty Organization

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Pessimistic and Optimistic Views of Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia

1.1.1. Pessimistic Views

Northeast Asia lacks a regional security framework analogous to the security cooperation that has been well developed in Europe. Besides the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) ¹ has become one of the leading organizations in the construction of a new European security order.

However, an overwhelming consensus has emerged in academic circles that multilateral security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region is undesirable and unachievable. The heterogeneous nature of the region is the main reason that is given for the absence of multilateral security institutions. They also point out that Asia has no common threat like European countries. As is true throughout Asia, with the exception of Southeast Asia, the Northeast Asian region - one of the tensest regions in the world - has no cooperative security organizations.

A number of destabilizing factors exist in Northeast Asia. North Korea provides the closest thing to a residual Cold War threat. North Korea's nuclear and missile programs have been a significant issue since the 1990's. There is deep mistrust and suspicion between both sides of Korea and territorial disputes between China and Japan, Japan and Russia, and Japan and Korea. There is also the possibility that the

¹ On January 1, 1995 the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe adopted its new name: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

regional powers' arms build-ups could develop into an arms race. Even after the collapse of the Cold War, there remain many potential threats to regional stability from the major powers. The rival nationalism has long been apparent. The historical antagonisms and rivalries are increasingly re-emerging in the region. Under such circumstances, the potential risk of major conflict is growing.²

What factors prevent Northeast Asian countries from building multilateral institutions to ensure the stability and predictability in the region like Western Europe? First, the construction of security institutions in Western Europe benefited from the presence of two major powers, Britain and France, which were willing and able to take the initiative and play leading roles in this process. In Northeast Asia, in contrast, no countries of comparable rank existed. Second, geographic proximity also made it more natural and easier for Western European states to work together. In Northeast Asia, by contrast, greater distances meant that threats to one country did not necessarily translate into common security concerns requiring joint solutions.

Third, the state-level perspective directs our attention to differences in the character of Germany and Japan and in regional perceptions of them, differences which have had important institutional consequences. Germany aggressively pursued reconciliation with its neighbors, championing novel schemes for European integration that might even involve the sacrifice of important aspects of state sovereignty. Japan, in contrast, had minimal dealings with nearby countries, focusing instead on its bilateral relationship with the United States. Japanese nationalism took on its modern form as a philosophy with fascist underpinnings, and as a movement

² Peggy F. Meyer, "Post-Cold War Northeast Asia: Regional Trends and Prospects," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, vol. XI, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 1997), p. 72.

that would cause instability throughout the region.³ Finally, the fact that the countries of Europe area have been characterized by a high degree of political, economic, and cultural homogeneity has arguably contributed to a natural cohesiveness and mutual identification that facilitated the emergence of multilateral security arrangements independently of any favorable geographical circumstances. In the Northeast Asia region, by contrast, security cooperation has often been impeded by significant differences in the level of political and economic development.

NATO is an institution with deep roots that helped win the Cold War. There is considerable evidence, however, that the U.S. and its Cold War allies are now drifting. This trend is most apparent in Europe, where NATO's 1999 war against Serbia and its messy aftermath have damaged transatlantic relations and prompted the European Union to begin building a military force of its own that can operate interdependently of NATO and in particular, the U.S. The absence of the former Soviet Union threat has led America's allies to question how long the U.S. will take its commitments to their security seriously.⁴ The U.S. and its European allies, moreover, have conflicting views about the Iraq War and Stabilization Operations, and about employing NATO forces outside of Europe. The central problem lies in the divergence of U.S. and European agendas. Whereas Washington remains obsessed with rogue states and weapons of mass destruction, and while Europeans are concerned with them, they are more concerned with the future of the planet and of their food.⁵

Asia is characterized by strongly nationalistic governments. The shallowness of multilateral organizations such as APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum, and their

³ Eugene A. Matthews, "Japan's New Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2003, p.75

⁴ John J. Mearsheimer, "The Future of the American Pacifier," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 80 No.5, (Sep/Oct 2001), pp.46-61.

⁵ Dominique Moisi, "The Real Crisis Over the Atlantic," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 80 No.4 July/August 2001), p.150.

inability to resolve regional crises including the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis and the 2000 East Timor and the 2003 terrorist attack to Bali, only adds to the sense of this caution. Even where favorable change does occur, it cannot bring with it a strong sense of nationalism. The ARF has many operational drawbacks. First, the biggest obstacle to the ARF being an efficient security regime is its cumbersome decision-making procedure. Operational decisions simply cannot be taken in a group of 23 states, particularly by consensus. Second, for the time being, the ARF has no military force at its command for resolving crisis situations with regard to an ARF peacekeeping operation. Third, the mandate for crisis management and conflict settlement is still severely limited. Fourth, the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs poses an obstacle to carrying out urgent and just international intervention as we observed in Cambodia and East Timor. Given the situation in Asia, a new principle of legitimized international intervention is necessary. East Asian states are especially sensitive to prerogatives of sovereignty because of a historical legacy of frequent fighting between kingdoms during pre-contact centuries, and the painful Western colonial experience after contact. At present, ARF does not have a secretariat of its own to lend support to year-long activities. It could be that strengthening the ARF Chair will lead to establishment of a secretariat. In any case, these shortcomings are acknowledged here with the hope that bringing attention to them will cause them to be addressed in future. Some proposals regarding the future direction of ARF are appropriate here.

One of the most fundamental reasons for the lack of a multilateral security regime is the perception that to join such a regime is to forgo some level of national sovereignty. This is especially important in domestic political considerations.

Beijing used to be reluctant to join multilateralism, sensing that it could be turned into an anti-China bandwagon by the region's weaker states fearful of the rise of China and who were seeking ways to counter its territorial claims in the South China Sea.

The United States has preferred bilateral security treaties to multilateral ones throughout most of its security arrangements with Asian countries. It wants to remain a constant presence in East Asia with the network of bilateral security treaties to prevent the emergence of any security vacuum or substitute a regional hegemony in this region. The negative attitude of the U.S. toward multilateral security cooperation in East Asia is due to the fact that first, multilateral security cooperation might impede traditional bilateral relations. Second, U.S. policymakers seem to believe all the pessimistic reasons outlined above.

1.1.2. Optimistic Views

In the meantime, growing multilateralism is one of the current conspicuous features in Northeast Asia. As David C. Unger has indicated, the bilateral alliance system in Northeast Asia is inappropriate, and there are many advocates for the argument that new security strategies and new security arrangements are needed to manage the problems of the post-Cold War era.⁶ Under these circumstances a framework for security cooperation in the region is necessary. The question is not 'whether' but 'when' and 'how' to proceed in nurturing and establishing such a regional security institution.

The dismantlement of the Cold War structure has had a great impact on the security

⁶ David C. Unger, "Asian Anxieties, Pacific Overtures Experiments in Security for a New Asian Community," *World Politics Journal* 70, no. 5 (Summer 1994), pp. 37-8.

arena. The world community is struggling to achieve a peaceful and stable security order. An international order based on a multilateral security concept could spread to every corner of the world. This paradigm offers a great chance to replace the past century's dominant order characterized by egocentric national interest with the 21st century's new peace order characterized by co-prosperity. In this context, the multilateral cooperative security concept is a useful method for establishing a new international order. A changing security situation is an evident in East Asia. New security issues including the economy, environment, nuclear weapons, and terrorism further threaten to destabilize the security environment. These facts clearly indicate that the bilateral alliance relations found in the region that are dominated by the U.S. are not enough to resolve regional issues.

It is important to shape a new security environment to overcome the regional unstable security factors and inevitably this must be done to secure lasting peace. The regional security structure needs to be oriented toward harmony, reconciliation and integration rather than competition, conflict and confrontation. What is more important is to prevent the key actors in the region from achieving unilateral security through an individual arms buildup, thus preventing an arms race. It is essential to establish a regional multilateral security cooperative system to deal with security issues in the region. The multilateral security cooperative system is the most appropriate and feasible security architecture in terms of the need and relevancy for Northeast Asia. The establishment of a regional multilateral security cooperation system would ensure regional stability, and contribute to dynamic economic development in the region.

The existing security cooperation arrangements, which may serve as the basis for a new regional security regime including ASEAN Regional Forum, the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific, the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, and the Six Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program, have already made great strides in terms of inculcating the habits of dialogue among regional powers. The foundation exists in Asia, the optimistic view is the recent successes can be built upon to establish a truly multilateral security regime.

Most proponents of a multilateral security arrangement possess a shared perception that the existing unilateral and bilateral security structures are inadequate to tackle security issues resulting from the emerging security uncertainties in their region, and have become prohibitively expensive. In some cases, the financial burden has become too much for some to bear. They accept the *status quo* and believe that whatever changes are needed should be achieved through peaceful means, such as security cooperation.⁷

Regional states have indicated an increased interest in the concept of multilateral cooperative arrangements to address the current security threats they are encountering. There is an emerging realization that multilateral cooperative measures can provide less costly, and sometimes more effective, solutions to conventional and unconventional threats than either unilateral approaches or bilateral alliances.⁸

The cooperative security concept appears to be the most applicable to Northeast

⁷ Kim Dal Choong, "Prospects for a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia," in Werner Gumpel, Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, and Hyun Jung Ku, eds. *Integration and Disintegration in Europe and Northeast Asia* (Seoul: Institute of East and West Studies in Yonsei University, 1994), pp.94-97.

⁸ Harry Harding, "Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific Region," in Janne E. Nolan ed. *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), pp.420-21.

Asia. First, cooperative security is among the more widely used terms, complementing more traditional views, such as collective security, collective defense, deterrence, and mutual assurance that focus almost solely on the territorial state and highlight the military dimensions of security and threat. Cooperative security, however, acknowledges a more inclusive definition of security, and challenges to security, encompassing, but moving beyond, the traditional notion of military threat and response.

Second, because of the underlying assumption that bilateral agreements become highly problematic and vulnerable to collective security politics, the idea of cooperative security becomes more applicable to Northeast Asia, as Northeast Asian countries not only prefer to keep bilateral relationships, but also admit the current alliance of other parties. For example, the U.S.-Japan security treaty is still regarded as one of the most important pillars of the Asia-Pacific security architecture. Even China sees the security alliance between the United States and Japan as a useful tool, as it constrains Japan's potential remilitarization.

Third, while an outside threat of the Soviet Union was needed to form a Collective Defensive system in Europe, the cooperative security idea is more appropriate in Northeast Asia, where the nature and source of potential security threats differ widely. Moreover, the cooperative security idea does not require a particular state as a potential threat to help form a security regime. On the contrary, it is inclusive in its approach, by seeking to engage adversaries and non-like-minded actors, as well as putative friends. When it is considered that the bilateral gaps separating those regional powers are bound to be narrow, and also the flexibility and inclusiveness of the cooperative security to bilateral relations, and alliances, a cooperative security system is more applicable to Northeast Asia than collective security.

Fourth, presuming that the current trend of economic cooperation is inextricably connected with one of the principles of cooperative security, it could be argued that cooperative security has become more applicable to Northeast Asia. This is because cooperative security does not privilege the military as the repository of all wisdom related to security issues, and it does not assume that military conflict or violence are the only challenges to security.

Last, unlike collective security, cooperative security presumes that states are the principal actors, but does not preclude, by definition or by intent, that non-state actors, whether institutional or more *ad hoc* trans-national actors and NGOs, have critical roles to play in managing and enhancing security relevant dynamics. With the expansion of the number of NGOs in Northeast Asia, the cooperative security idea is applicable to Northeast Asia. The purpose of multilateral security cooperation is to accumulate dialogue custom among nations in the region, pursue sharing common norms, and enhance the possibility of predictability on a state's behavior through discussion of common interest of participation. The consultative body pursues security in the manner of gradual approaches through political dialogue, military confidence and arms reduction. Participating nations not only mitigate security's uncertainty but also share gains in the other spheres including security. Multilateral security cooperation initially shapes non-permanent organization and attempt to achieve its own goal through institutionalization and permanent body in the course of the coordination. Regional cooperation approaches enhance regional security. It means preventive diplomacy through preventing and eliminating the causes of the inter-state disputes and regional instability.

Regardless of the pessimism and the costs of establishing a multilateral security

regime, there is historical precedence and there are current opportunities that provide an optimistic outlook for the future. Certainly the benefits of a regime outweigh the costs of establishing one.

1.2. Objectives of the Study

There are five objectives of this study. First, this study will explore whether Northeast Asia has the potential to build a multilateral security cooperative regime. Second, it will review theories that bear most closely on this study and examine the appropriateness of neoliberal institutionalism as a construct for Northeast Asia. Accordingly, the study will examine alliances in Northeast Asia and determine their compatibility with the concept of cooperative security in the region, review the alleged limitations on the creation of a security regime in Northeast Asia and examine the cooperative security idea as an alternative.

Third, the study will research multilateral cooperative security cases, such as OSCE (the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe), ARF (ASEAN⁹ Regional Forum)¹⁰ and CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific)¹¹ in East Asia and draw lessons learned from the case study to apply to building a military cooperation regime in Northeast Asia. Fourth, grasping the reality of bilateral security and military cooperation in Northeast Asia, this study will examine the key actors' perceptions and interests toward Northeast Asia military security cooperation regime,

⁹ Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in 1967 in order to facilitate economic and cultural cooperation among its members through a forum.

¹⁰ ARF was created in 1993. This is the first multilateral security system fitting the concept of security regimes.

¹¹ The concept of CSCAP was first articulated at the Seoul meeting in 1992 and formally announced in 1993.

to identify transnational threats and security implications of economic interdependence in the region. Fifth, this study will design multilateral military cooperation architecture in the region, develop a roadmap to institutionalize a Northeast Asia military cooperation regime to achieve enduring peace based on predictability and stability, and will make policy recommendations to bring this concept to reality.

After the demise of the former Soviet Union, the world was faced by the dramatic change: the end of the East-West confrontation, which was characterized by United States-Soviet Union hegemonic rivalry. The break-up of the bipolar world order had a great impact on the global situation and the world began to move toward multipolarity. The United States became, in terms of overall national strength, the only Superpower. The new structure of the post-Cold War era has seen a new trend of several great powers aligning in order to balance the U.S. as the world's remaining superpower.

In addition, the nations of the world face a new security agenda. Domestic political and economic problems, ethnic and religious conflicts, territorial disputes on land and at sea, cultural clashes left over from the Cold War era, increases in military procurement and deployments, and such trans-national threats as terrorism, refugee, AIDS, drug and human trafficking, piracy, illegal fishing, and environmental pollution are some of the new issues that have emerged.

1.3. Scope and Methodology

The study will not attempt to predict the future of Northeast Asia. The study intends to

make a realistic and objective analysis of the current changing patterns of the security order. The study will explore new security architecture, which is applicable to the changed security order. The goal is to discover an alternate option to the existing security order.

The dissertation is structured by a theoretical review of multilateral security cooperation. Based on this theoretical framework, the study examines the significance of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia. Considering the connectivity of the present and future Northeast Asia security environmental analysis, the study will research how the multilateral security cooperation contributes to the practical security order in terms of relevancy and feasibility.

The scope of the study will limit the timeframe which the researcher can realistically cover in relation to the Northeast Asia security environment. The study will focus on the security environment in Northeast Asia as it has evolved in the post-Cold War era. The study will cover from the 1990s to the early 2000s.

The geographical scope of the study is limited to the major actors in Northeast Asia. Major actors include the United States, China, Japan, Russia and two Koreas. We need to examine the question of the United States relationship to the Northeast Asian security region. Should the United States be conceptualized as an in-region power or as a global power with deep geopolitical interest in the region? The United States is treated here as a global power with deep geopolitical interests in Asian security. The United States is not an Asian power, but it is a Pacific Power and is an integral part of Northeast Asia-at least for now and in the foreseeable future. North Korea is a complex state, and it is difficult to predict the possibility of its eventual participation in the multilateral security cooperation system. North Korea imposingly threatens regional and global security as well as South Korea's security because of the regime's

military strength, illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons, “military first” policy at the cost of mass starvation of its citizens, proliferation of arms and missiles, record of state-sponsored terrorism, continued hostile military stance toward South Korea and other neighbors such as Japan, and its continued widespread violations of the human rights of its own people.¹² Considering the regional security implication of North Korea’s threat, it is not possible to establish a safe, enduring peace in the region without fundamentally resolving North Korea’s continued issues. It is desirable to include North Korea because consultation on the Korean peninsula issue is constrained by the absence of North Korea.

However, Taiwan and Mongolia are excluded. South Korea considers North Korea's participation to be desirable. It assumed that China will not want Taiwan's participation. Subsequently, if other members insist that Taiwan's participation is necessary, the possibility of China's participation in the regional security regime is low. Since the scope of the activities of a security regime would be very and consultation agenda, limited in the event of China's absence, the study excludes Taiwan. It is not expected that Mongolia will play a significant role in the regional security consultation. The reason why Mongolia is excluded from the list of key actors in the region is that Mongolia is not such a strong player terms of political, economic and particularly military spheres.¹³

The dissertation begins with a literature survey focused especially, on scholars’ viewpoints related to multilateral security cooperation. In addition, political leaders’ official statements on regional security issues, the researcher’s personal experience

¹² Balbina Y. Hwang, “Minding the Gap: Improving U.S.-ROK Relations.” <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1814.cfm> 12-30-2004

¹³ Many experts on the region ignore Mongolia as part of Northeast Asia and exclude Taiwan because of ‘one China’s policy’. O. N. Mehrotra, “Peace and Security in Northeast Asia,” *Strategic Analysis*, January, 1996, p. 1317; Kim Dal Choong, “Prospects for a Multilateral Security Arrangement in Northeast Asia,” in Werner Gumpel, Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, and Hyun Jung Ku, eds. *Integration and Disintegration in Europe and Northeast Asia* (Seoul: Institute of East and West Studies at Yonsei University, 1994), pp. 89-90.

and observations on the process of regional military cooperation as a policy maker, and the mass media's comments are incorporated along with other relative data. Comparative analysis of experimental cases enables us to explore the fundamental nature of Northeast Asia security issues and to examine the relevancy and appropriateness of theory.

1.4. Structure of the Study

This study also finds weak points in previous research related to multilateral security cooperation. Previous literature tends to view multilateral security cooperation from the perspective of international institutions. However, this dissertation examines institutionalization, not a regional institution itself. Pointing out the perception and research methodology's limitations, the dissertation discusses international environmental change patterns with evolving multilateral security cooperation. In addition, the study develops an operational definition of multilateral security cooperation that is dynamics. The study attempts to integrate theory and reality and to provide policy makers with a new solution to conflicts. The study establishes an enduring peace regime in the region.

The attempt to design a security military cooperation regime in Northeast Asia with particular reference to the neoliberal institutionalism theory must begin with the design of an analytical framework which can be used in analysis as a generalized, hypothetical description based upon an analogy. The subject of this study implies that the possibility to build a security regime in the region can be measured and patterned through institutionalization.

Even though there are several insightful integration theories, there is no single theory to classify variables that lead to integration definitively. For example, the classic study of Karl Deutsch and his colleagues on integration had a clear and grand ambition, saying “We undertook this inquiry as a contribution to the study of possible ways in which men some day might abolish war.”¹⁴ However, as always in such cases, it failed to deliver the straightforward and definitive answer to the problem of war and peace.

In 1957 Karl Deutsch developed the concept of a “pluralistic security community” as opposed to “amalgamated security community.” As the conditions for the emergence of a pluralistic security community, he suggested three requirements: (a) compatibility of major values, (b) mutual responsiveness and (c) mutual predictability. Still, the notion of a security community developed in his work has had a lasting influence in international relations theory.

While Karl Deutsch’s conditions are more abstract and have many variables to be considered, Jervis presented more concrete and clearer conditions for forming a security community. Jervis has proposed four such conditions relevant to form a security regime; first, that great powers must want to establish a regime; second, that the actors must also believe that others share the value they place on mutual security and cooperation; third, that regimes cannot form if one or more actors believe that security is best provided for by expansion; and fourth, that war or the individualistic pursuit of security must be regarded by all potential regime participants as more costly than collaboration.¹⁵

However, this study will examine four conditions to build the Northeast Asia

¹⁴ Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 3.

¹⁵ Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” *International Organization*, col.36, no.2 (Spring, 1982), pp.360-62.

Military Security Cooperation Regime. First, the evolution of the regional security cooperation arrangements is mature enough to build a security cooperation regime to resolve the conflicting factors detrimental to forming the Regime. Second, the dynamics of regional economic interdependence lead the member states to the need to design a security regime to ensure sustained economic growth. Third, the fact transnational issues are perceived as common threats oblige the key actors to establish the Regime to counter non-traditional threats. Lastly, key actors including the U.S., China, Japan, South Korea and even North Korea have recognized the importance of building a regime, which will contribute to enhancing their regional co-prosperity as well as their national interests.

The point of departure for the analytical framework must be based on the validity of applying the main approaches, neoliberal institutionalism and the concept of cooperative security, to Northeast Asia. Since this study will attempt to find out if Northeast Asia has the potential to form a security regime according to the conditions set out in this study, the next step is to choose the subjects and cases to be examined by the respective conditions. Finally the selected cases and subjects will be examined and analysed as a test of the possibility of forming a security military cooperation regime in Northeast Asia.

This research will begin with the examination of the connection between cooperative security and neoliberal institutionalism in Chapter 2. To compare the core assumptions and tenets of the two concepts, cooperative security and neoliberal institutionalism, the ramifications of both concepts will be abstracted. Neoliberal institutionalism will be examined as a conceptual mediator between two concepts, since cooperative security appears to be the theoretical framework that is most congenial to developing a security regime in the view of neoliberal institutionalists.

Before proceeding with the actual examination, neo-realism will be explored because it is deemed relevant to understanding the subsequent concept of neoliberal institutionalism.

After establishing the relationship between neoliberal institutionalism and the concept of cooperative security, three types of multilateral security systems - the collective security system, the collective defense system and the cooperative security system will be examined. From the examination, the choice of the cooperative security concept the most hopeful approach to solve the current security issues in Northeast Asia will be explained.

Chapter 3 is dedicated to analyzing the evolution of the existing security cooperation arrangements. Prior to the discussion, the facilitating and constraining factors are examined to explore key actors' efforts to resolve the conflicting interests and issues in the region. This chapter draws lessons from ARF, CSCAP, and NEACD which lead the researcher to apply lessons to form a multilateral military cooperation regime.

Chapter 4 examines the connectivity between a security community and economic interdependence. The chapter will discuss how increasing economic interdependence among the six countries can facilitate the concept of a cooperation security regime in Northeast Asia. The interactions among actors in the international system may range from intermittent armed conflict to the high levels of economic interdependence found in the modern world.¹⁶ The concept of economic interdependence is founded on the liberal thesis that trade fosters peaceful relations by giving countries an economic incentive to avoid war: the benefits received from trade make continued peace more advantageous than war. The chapter will explore the trade among key

¹⁶ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in world Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.27.

actors in the region, co-development of Siberia oil and gas in terms of the geostrategic importance of oil security, TKR-TSR, and finally the security implication of North-South Korea economic cooperation including railroad reconnection between the Two Koreas in the DMZ and Kaesung Industrial Complex.

In Chapter 5, why actors should share common transnational security threats to formulate a security cooperation regime will be explained. The chapter will discuss the current situation of transnational threats to include terrorism, transnational crime including illegal human trafficking, infectious diseases including AIDS/HIV, unregulated population movement including refugees/illegal labor, and environment degradation. This chapter will discuss military responses to transnational threats discuss key actors' perception and interests toward a security regime.

Chapter 6 will also explain the question of what a 'key actor' is and why the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia are selected as key actors in Northeast Asia. Furthermore, South Korea as a middle power in the region will be explained and why South Korea is so important in playing a linkage role. Even North Korea is a key actor since the regime will not successfully work in the event of North Korea's isolation.

Chapter 7 intensively designs a security military cooperation regime in Northeast Asia. The chapter attempts to shape a favourable security environment by expanding public consensus domestically and externally establishing multi-tier networks among security policymakers, lawmakers and scholars in the region. The chapter designs the regime from the perspective of dialogue, multilateral combined exercise, and secretariat and multinational forces HQs based on rotational command relations.

The chapter also explores which country or block will play a leadership role in institutionalizing a multilateral military cooperation regime in Northeast Asia. It will be explained why a feasible roadmap for the regional security regime is essential and

that the possibility of a state's misunderstanding, misinterpretation, and miscalculation toward opponents in the region for its participants are more costly than collaboration.

Chapter 8, summarizing what the study has discussed, makes policy recommendations for key actors in Northeast Asia to build a multilateral security military cooperation regime in the region.

Table 1-1 illustrates the key concepts of framework of Northeast Asia Security Military Cooperation Regime from the perspective of analysis of feasibility and regime proposal.

Table 1-1 Framework of Northeast Asia Security Military Cooperation Regime

Chapter 1 Introduction : Objectives, Scope and Methodology, Structure

Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework for Analysis

- Key Terms of Multilateral Cooperative Security
- Neoliberal Institutionalism and Security Regime
- Conditions to establish Security Military Cooperation Regime
- Design of Security Military Cooperation Regime

Analysis of Feasibility

Chapter 3 Evolution of the Regional Security Military Cooperation Arrangements

- Asian Pacific: ARF, CSCAP, APEC, Sangri-la dialogue, CHOD, SCO
- Northeast Asia: NEACD, LNWFZ-NEA, Six Party Talks
- Strength and Limitations

Chapter 4 Security Implication of Economic Interdependence

- Connectivity between Economic Interdependence and Security Cooperation
- Economic Interdependence: Trade in the region, TKR-TSR, Co-development of Strategic Resources including Siberia Oil and Gas, and North-South Korea Economic Cooperation

Chapter 5 Transnational Issues as Common Threats

- Transnational Threats: Terrorism, International Crimes, Infectious Disease, Unregulated Population Movement and Environment Degradation
- Emerging Non-traditional Military Threats
- Military Responses to Transnational Threats

Chapter 6 Key Actors' Perception and Interests toward Security Military Cooperation Regime: U.S., China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and North Korea

Regime Proposal

Chapter 7 Building a Security Military Cooperation Regime in Northeast Asia

- Shape: Domestic Consensus, Multi-tier Networking
- Establish: Multilateral Dialogue, Military Exchanges, Multilateral Combined Exercise, Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities and Establishment of Secretariat, Regional Multinational Forces HQs
- Lead: U.S.-South Korea Co-Leadership, U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral, Six-Party Talks Approach

Chapter 8 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework for Analysis

This chapter will discuss the definition of key concepts used in this study including multilateralism and cooperative security, and examine the relationship between the concept of cooperative security and neoliberal institutionalism. By comparing the core assumptions and tenets of the two concepts, cooperative security and neoliberal institutionalism, the actual ramification of both concepts will be examined. In this context, neoliberal institutionalism will be examined as a basic concept for cooperative security, since it appears to be the theoretical framework congenial to the construction of a military security cooperative regime, in the view of neoliberal institutionalists.

2.1. Multilateral Security Cooperation

2.1.1. Multilateralism

It is necessary to examine multilateralism as a mean of exploring the relations between and among the states. There are two distinct definitions of the term multilateralism. In the first and most commonly used diplomatic jargon, multilateralism refers to “the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions.” In Keohane’s view, multilateral institutions are simply “multilateral arrangements with persistent sets of rules.”

John Gerard Ruggie takes issues with Keohanes' minimalist, nominal definition. He argues that multilateralism is a "generic institutional form" and says that the conventional definition does not tell what makes these institutions multilateral. Ruggie argues multilateral relationships involve three or more states coming together to tackle a specific issue or set of issues on the basis of specific generalized principles of conduct.¹ These principles specify what constitutes "appropriate conduct for a class of actions" irrespective of the particular interests of the participants or the circumstances that may exist.² Ruggie argues there are several clearly identifiable qualities that constitute multilateralism. These principles are indivisibility, non-discrimination, and diffuse reciprocity. For example, Ruggie says, "There are GATT (General Agreement for Trade Treaty) members, adherence to the MFN (Most-Favored-Nation) norm of reciprocal non-discrimination which makes the system of trade an indivisible whole, not some attribute of trade itself." All members agree to treat other members in a similar manner. Analogously, for a collective security arrangement to be multilateral, all its member states are required to respond to aggression wherever and whenever it occurs - not simply when it suits their interests. Ruggie also argues that successful multilateralism must generate expectations of what Keohane calls "diffuse reciprocity" among members.³ This means that members of a multilateral arrangement can expect to receive roughly the same amount of benefit in aggregate over a period of time. In contrast, bilateral relations require a "specific reciprocity," or specific quid pro quos between parties.⁴ Whenever statesmen and people strive to realize their goal by means of international politics, they do so by

¹ John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," *International Organization*, 46, No. 3 (Summer 1992), pp.565-567.

² Ruggie, *ibid.*, p.571.

³ Robert Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," *International Organization* 40, no. 1 (Winter 1986): p.274.

⁴ Ruggie, *ibid.*, p.571.

striving for power.⁵

The background of the emerging multilateralism is as follows; first, the end of the Cold War and the demise of former Soviet Union led to the dissolution of the bipolar system; second, imbalances of internal power were mitigated and the world order initiated by great powers got loose. Subsequently, unilateralism revealed the limit of its strength; third, interdependence and integration among nations provide a momentum for reinforcing the framework of multilateral institutions; fourth, institutional inertia and adaptation from multilateral institution draw the focus of international relations framework. Multilateralism became limited during the Cold War era. However, multilateralism emerges the frontal sphere of international relations during the post-Cold War era. Multilateralism currently spreads out global, regional, and sub-regional dimension.

Since multilateralism provides us for minimizing the uncertainty and fluidity of international relations, multilateralism is very effective mechanism which contributes to resolving the new international issues. Especially, multilateralism enhances transparency of security policy in the world community and contributes to promoting confidence building and eventually actualizes the preventive diplomacy.

Although multilateralism is a very unique alternative for ensuring stable peaceful international order in the future, multilateralism requires endurance and a relatively long time to pursue common interests rather than individual and immediate interests. Regardless of the degree of the contribution to the international institutions, free-riding exists in the international stage. Especially, weak states get relative interests from the multilateralism. The free-rider refers to the temptation of states to let other states assume the costs of eliminating a threat while they share in the greater security-

⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p.31.

public good from which they cannot easily be excluded - that results. In its most simplified form, this can be formalized as an N-person prisoner's Dilemma where each state is left with a dominant strategy of not cooperating in the security system. If other states choose to act, the free-riding state gains all of the benefits that the others do and pays none of the cost.⁶

Multilateral security cooperation greatly relies on security situation. Power structure in Northeast Asia is a mixture of multi-polar and bilateral relations in reality. Under the dynamic of multipolar structure, the continuity of bilateral alliances contains constraints. New perception is required to overcome the constraints. Considering the security situation in the region, multilateralism is the best appropriate option.

In addition to multilateralism, there are other two types of perception toward nations including unilateralism and bilateralism. The distinct difference between these is not only numerical difference between the two types. One state disregards related states' position and enforces them to adjust their policy. Therefore unilateralism is almost equivalent to imperialism. Multilateralism is saliently different from bilateralism. Multilateralism pursues each nation's interests and pays attention to common purpose including international peace and stability. Equal relation among nations from multilateralism is more flexible to objective situational change than bilateralism, which is based on certain interest relation and situational consideration.

Bilateralism deals with changed situation through bilateral dialogue and negotiation. It indicates that powerful nation's request is more effective than weak nation.

⁶ George W. Downs and Keisaku Lida, "Assessing the Theoretical Case against Collective Security," in George W. Downs, ed., *Collective Security beyond in the Cold War* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994), p.26.

Contrasted with bilateralism, since multilateralism refers to participation with equal right and duty, it is based on indiscriminate application to rule and norms rather than superiority of power.

Characteristics and major difference of unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism is summarized in the table 2-1.

Table 2-1 Characteristics & Difference of Unilateralism, Bilateralism, and Multilateralism

Classification	Unilateralism	Bilateralism	Multilateralism
Number of Nations	One	Two	Three nations and more
Basic Objective	Individual Interest	Individual Interest	Common Interest
Behavior of Nations	Forceful	Enforce and Compromise	Compromise, Adjustment, Persuasion
Pattern of Being	Imperialism, Hegemony	Alliance	Multilateral Cooperation

Source: The classification of the unilateralism, bilateralism and multilateralism was drawn from the following books: David M. Malone, Yuen Foong Khong, *Unilateralism and Foreign Policy* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003); Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Sephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliance* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987); Amitav Acharya, *Regionalism and Multilateralism* (Singapore: Time Academic Press, 2002); Ryoo Jae Kap, Kang Tae Hoon, Kim Sung Joo, eds., *Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Geopolitics in International Relations: Theory and Practice* (Seoul: The Korea Association of International Studies, 1999)

2.1.2. Security Cooperation

A multilateral security system is a supranational system that is designed to ensure security and mutual interest among member countries. The goal of the system is to prevent war and maintain the *status quo* by ensuring peace and stability through either the balance of power or international cooperation. There are three types of multilateral security system; collective security system; collective defense system and cooperative security system.

Collective Security System

In the beginning of the twentieth century, the idea of a collective security system had appeared as a way to complement the system of regular conferences among the powers. The old system, referred to as a Concert system, had several defects as a way of resolving international conflicts. These included its *ad hoc* basis, and the fact that it was less representative and less institutionalized.⁷

The concept of collective security asserts that the security dilemma of states can best be overcome, not through national self-help or the balance of power, but through the institution of communal commitments, whereby each state undertakes to join in common actions against those who threaten the territorial integrity or political independence of others. Its main promise is the oath of “all for one and one for all.”⁸

According to this definition, countries have converged expectations when it comes to controlling the use of force in international relations. This creates an interdependent security relationship with the shared objective of maintaining international peace and

⁷ Evan Luard, *Basic Texts in International Relations: The Evolution of Ideas about International Society* (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 453-55.

⁸ Graham Evans and Jeffery Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), p. 53.

security, and multilateral procedures for taking action and achieving these objectives.⁹

The collective security system has several codes of conduct. First, it is not the goal of collective security arrangements to provide their members with a way of defending against their national enemies or for the defense of their national interest, unless one redefines the terms “national enemy” and “national interest” in accordance with the philosophy upon which collective security rests. Thus, collective security is directed against any and every country anywhere that commits an act of aggression, allies and friends included.¹⁰ Second, the offenders of this principle shall be punished by all available means, including military force. Third, the member countries rely on the participation of each state as an individual, non-aligned entity, as opposed to involving unstable, constantly shifting alliances.¹¹ It has been tried, most notably with the League of Nations and the United Nations (UN). Usually this system has some permanent institutions and member countries are expected to obey the rules and norms of that institution.¹²

Collective Defense System

Nations enter into collective defense arrangements to ward off threats to their national security interests, as traditionally conceived, emanating from some specific country or group of countries regarded as the chief national enemy, actual or potential. The motive behind such arrangements is the conviction that the creation of military strength, sufficient to ward off the specific threat, would be beyond their national capacity or would prove excessively and unnecessarily costly in view of the

⁹ Albert Legault, ed., “The United Nations at fifty: Regime Theory and Collective Security,” *International Journal* 50, no. 1 (Winter 1994/5), p. 81.

¹⁰ Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 183.

¹¹ David P. Barash, *ibid.*, p. 330.

¹² Alfred Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918-1935* (London: Macmillan, 1936), pp. 13-22.

opportunities for mutual support and common defense.¹³

Collective defense systems are different from collective security systems in that the former is predicated on mutual defense against a potential aggressor from outside each alliance, whereas the latter is specifically directed at defense against any aggression from within the system.¹⁴ Therefore, there are elements peculiar to collective defense. First, they are directed against an opponent clearly known to the signatories of the pacts. Second, the allies can define, in geographical terms, the danger they are seeking to thwart and are thus able to make their military preparations and work out their strategy in advance of any conflagration.¹⁵

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the representative example which was the most effective collective defense system when the U.S. and the Soviet Union with the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), confronted each other on the basis of ideological conflict during the Cold War era.

Among the advantages of collective security over balance of power is that, by agreement, any aggression will be forcefully opposed. Another advantage of collective security is that under a balance of power system, an attempt to increase power by one state might occasionally meet with an enthusiastic response by another, thereby adding fuel to the fire.¹⁶

However, there are a number of criticisms that can be made with respect to collective security. First, members of the system must be willing and able at all times to muster overwhelming strength for collective defense at successive stages of conflict, since enforcement must have a degree of autonomy among the members of

¹³ Arnold Wolfers, *ibid.*, p. 183.

¹⁴ David P. Barash, *ibid.*, pp. 330-31.

¹⁵ Arnold Wolfers, *ibid.*, p. 183.

¹⁶ David P. Barash, *ibid.*, pp. 330-31.

the collective security system.¹⁷ Given the extreme destructiveness of war, states may be understandably reluctant to meet their treaty obligations, especially if their populace does not strongly support the military action that is called for.

Second, theoretically, the autonomy of this system is so complicatedly interconnected with sacrificing national and alliance interests that nations fail to honor commitments to automatic actions.¹⁸ The League of Nations provides a good example in this respect. Article 10, one of its key Covenant Articles, states that member states agreed to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of other member states against external aggression. This was interpreted by them as meaning that it was up to them to decide what action they should take. Therefore they were by no means obliged to go to war in defense of the attacked state.¹⁹

Another similar case occurred with Article 16, declaring that, if a League member went to war in defiance of its obligations under the Covenant, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the league which whereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade and financial relations. However, in 1921, the League Assembly decided that there existed no automatic obligation to go to war, but that it depended on the views of member states. Recognizing that Article 16 was only implemented once,²⁰ Michael Sheehan pointed out that over Abyssinia the League's member states did not impose full immediate sanctions and their token efforts failed to impress Italy and led to a breakdown in confidence in the League and in collective security.²¹

¹⁷ Kenneth W. Thompson, "Isolationism and Collective Security: The Uses and Limits of Two Theories of International Relations," in Alexander DeConde, ed., *Isolation and Security* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1957), p. 45.

¹⁸ Mark T. Clark, "The Trouble with Collective Security," *Orbis* 39, no. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 240-42.

¹⁹ Michael Sheehan, *ibid.*, pp. 158-59.

²⁰ It was a war against Italy after their invasion of Abyssinia in 1935.

²¹ In this regard, see other examples written by Michael Sheehan, *ibid.*, pp. 158-62.

Finally, a problem of collective security involves the appropriate timing of any reaction. Although the theory of collective security generally allows for a preventive diplomatic function to breaches of the peace, the mechanism for military reaction is not well developed. In contrast to an alliance, where deployments, joint training, and doctrine may be well established, “collective security is likely to delay response to attack, because the members of the system must react, mobilize, and coordinate their response *ad hoc*.”²²

According to Arnold Wolfers, few of even the most forceful exponents of collective security expect it to assure the deterrence of all aggressors at the outset. Instead, they place their hopes on the success of a kind of learning process, in which the punishment of one or more actual aggressors will deter subsequent would-be aggressors from deeds that would lead to ‘police action’ against them. However, he argues that this delay in the immediate effectiveness of the collective security system rules out any pre-stabilized harmony between collective defense and collective security. After all, he says:

During the period of the learning process with its indefinite duration, nations may be attacked or annihilated by their chief national opponents because they have diverted their strength to a struggle with some other aggressor or have antagonized and weakened an indispensable ally. Collective defense system does not provide stable and symmetrical order in the world community and does not play a more active role in maintaining global peace through preventing international conflict and war. Collective defense system provides the members for binding power under the superpower sphere. NATO in the Cold War era as well as the post-Cold War era retains the nature of military alliance, vertical structure of alliance dominated by the U.S., and military readiness.²³

²² Mark T. Clark, *ibid.*, p.243.

²³ Arnold Wolfers, *ibid.*, p.184.

Cooperative Security

Since the Second World War, international relations scholars have largely defined security in terms of the ability of states to defend against external military threats.²⁴ Thus, the realist conception of security formed the basis of East-West security structures during the Cold War, and this was marked by an emphasis on military force, nuclear deterrence, and military competition. However, in the post-Cold War era, the classic thinking, in the traditional East-West context, has been judged deficient. As a result of the danger of war in the nuclear age, the growing interdependence among nations imposing constraints on the use of force, and the ethical issues related to living as hostages of mutual assured destruction (MAD), a new approach, which of security through cooperation, has arisen.²⁵

The concept of cooperative security has, at its origins, the principles of common security. In the Report of the Palme Commission, *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival*, the concept of common security was first defined in 1982: A more effective way to ensure security is to create positive processes that can lead to peace and disarmament. Acceptance of common security as the organizing principle for efforts to reduce the risk of war, limit arms, and move toward disarmament means, in principle, that cooperation will replace confrontation in resolving conflicts of interest.²⁶

This concept is based on the notion of 'security with' as opposed to 'security against' the adversary. Accordingly, common security advocates regard the strategic doctrines and alliance systems, which are based on the idea of deterrence, as a source of insecurity triggered by the security dilemma and arms races.

In this respect, game theory provides a useful metaphor for thinking about cooperative security, in that it is one in which the result is that both sides win. Two

²⁴ Ibid., p. 150.

²⁵ David Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security," *The Pacific Review* 7, no. 1 (1994), p. 1.

²⁶ Olaf Palme, ed., *Common Security: A Blue Print Survival* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), p.7.

nations unsure of the others motives have often acted on the assumption that their security relationship was, in essence, a zero-sum game. They believe that the result of any action will be that, whatever one side gains will equal, at least roughly, what the other side loses. In this way of thinking, policies, aimed at improving security, will necessarily operate at the expense of the other side's security.²⁷

However, the concept of cooperative security advances the idea that the two sides, presently in a state of shared insecurity, can take actions that create a positive-sum game - that is a game in which both win, in the sense that both improve their security together.²⁸

In the early 1990s, Gareth Evans, the Australian Foreign Minister, developed the concept of cooperative security further. Assuming that cooperative security embraces three separate ideas, collective security, common security and comprehensive security,²⁹ he defined cooperative security as:

...multi-dimensional in scope and gradualist in temperament; emphasizes reassurance rather than deterrence; is inclusive rather than exclusive; is not restrictive in membership; favors multilateralism over bilateralism; does not privilege military solutions over non-military ones; assumes that states are the principal actors in the security system, but accepts that non-state actors may have an important role to play; does not require the creation of formal security institutions, but does not reject them either; and which, above all, stresses the value of creating 'habits of dialogue' on a multilateral basis.³⁰

²⁷ It is not necessary to assume that both sides lose in equal degree or that both sides win in equal degree. This statement of the concepts is substantially oversimplified from the viewpoint of game theory, but will suffice for the simple, metaphoric use intended here. For a different conceptual approach to the question of repeated play of game-theoretic games, see Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

²⁸ Richard Smoke, "A Theory of Mutual Security," in Richard Smoke and Andrei Kortunov, eds., *Mutual Security: A New Approach to Soviet-American Relations*, (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 62.

²⁹ "Cooperating for Peace," Address by Senator the Hon Gareth Evans QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, at the 30th Otago Foreign Policy School, "The United Nations at Fifty Retrospect and Prospect," *Dunedin*, New Zealand, June 30 1995.

³⁰ Gareth Evans, *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and beyond* (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1993), p. 16.

Table 2-2 Comparison of Collective Security, Collective Defense, and Cooperative Security

Classification	Collective Security	Collective Defense	Cooperative Security
Systems	Open	Closed	Open
Objective	Military, Internal	Military, External	Comprehensive, Internal
Management	Community	Unilateral	Interdependence
Means	Military	Military	Political
Effectiveness	Sequential Preventive	Sequential Preventive	Preventive

Source: The classification was based on the following books: George W. Downs, ed., *Collective Security beyond the Cold War* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994) and Janice Gross Stein and Lous W. Pauly, eds., *Choosing to Cooperate How States Avoid Loss* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1933)

Accordingly, cooperative security differs from common security in that: it is a more gradual approach to developing multilateral institutions; it is a more flexible concept as it recognizes the value of existing bilateral and balance of power arrangements in contributing to regional security and for retaining them, even for working with and through them.

However, both concept share many common features in that; they are inclusive in their approach, by seeking to engage adversaries and non-like-minded actors as well as putative friends; they emphasize the need to move beyond the deterrence mind-set; they emphasize security as a broad concept, incorporating a range of non-military

elements.³¹ Thus any attempt to differentiate between them runs the risk of drawing artificial boundaries.³²

2.2. Neoliberal Institutionalism and Security Regime

2.2.1. Realism vs. Neorealism

Over the centuries, there have been many scholars who have highlighted international anarchy, reliance on self-help, the utility of military force, and the importance of balance of power calculations. This tradition is called political realism.³³

As long ago as the time of Thucydides, political realism contained three key assumptions:

The state-centric assumption: (1) States are the most important actors in world politics; (2) The rationality assumption: world politics can be analyzed as if states were unitary rational actors, carefully calculating costs of alternative courses of action and seeking to maximize their expected utility, although doing so under conditions of uncertainty and without necessarily having sufficient information about alternatives or resources (time or otherwise) to conduct a full review of all possible courses of action; (3) The power assumption: states seek power (both the ability to influence others and resources that can be used exercise influence); and they calculate their interests in terms of power, whether as end or as necessary means to a variety of other ends.³⁴

These key notions of realism can be found in Thucydides' discussion of the causes

³¹ Geoffrey Wiseman, "Common Security in the Asia-Pacific Region," *The Pacific Review* 5, no. 1 (1992), pp. 42-59.

³² Beside these two ideas, common security and cooperative security, there is another idea, called 'comprehensive security.' Gareth Evans described this idea that "Comprehensive security is simply the notion that security is multidimensional in character, encompassing a range of political, economic, social and other non-military considerations as well as military capability," Address by Senator the Hon Gareth Evans QC, op. cit.

³³ David A. Baldwin, "Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics," in David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 11.

³⁴ Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 164-65.

of the Peloponnesian War. He points out, “The real cause I consider to be the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable.”³⁵ That is, as the Lacedaemonians rationally noticed that Athens exerting its growing power

In the post-1945 era, would adversely affect their interests, they decided to attack while they had influence on the course of events. Hans Morgenthau summed up the underlined tenets of political realism in six articles. The main points are the following:

- (1) Objective laws, which have their roots in human nature, govern politics.
- (2) Statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power; a rational foreign policy is a good foreign policy. Power can include anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man.
- (3) Universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract form, but must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place.
- (4) Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.
- (5) The autonomy of the political sphere must be defended against its subversion.³⁶

States are considered by realists as the main actors in international relations and moreover are visualized as the means to pursue the national interest, defined in terms of power. Hans Morgenthau maintains that the principal national interest is the pursuit of national security, and that this is to be achieved in essence through state power. As he contemplates that the purpose of international politics is the maximization of state power, politics can be reduced to one of three basic goals: “to keep power, to increase

³⁵ Thucydides, “History of the Peloponnesian War,” in Richard Grawley, trans., *The History of Herodotus, The History of the Peloponnesian War*; ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins (London: Encyclopaedia Britannica, INC., 1952), p. 355.

³⁶ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1973), pp. 3-15.

power, or to demonstrate power.”³⁷ Power is to the national leader what treasure is to the economist, or righteousness to the ethicist. States are presumed to be concerned with strengthening their power, and are not hesitant about going to war to accomplish that aim.

Another characteristic of the world illustrated by the realist is anarchy. As a result of the assumption of anarchy,³⁸ that is, that there exists no superior governing authority, the self-reliant sovereign states have to contest to safeguard their own interests. Arguing that the essential aim of a state’s foreign policy must be to maintain territorial integrity and political independence, Michael Sheehan says, “The processes and activities of states in the realist image of international relations become naturally limited to achieving the short-term or immediate goals of security and survival.”³⁹

Thus states are perpetually supposed to compete and fight over issues of national security, when a security dilemma exists. Therefore states must do whatever is necessary to survive in this highly vulnerable situation, since, if most states behave in this way, then those who do not will be disadvantaged in their pursuit for security. Hence, explaining the nature of the system in which all states exist as the determining factor in their behaviour, Michael Sheehan argues that it forces them to play the ‘balance of power’⁴⁰ game if they are to survive.⁴¹ Realism and balance of power thinking are closely linked, since their main propositions are very similar. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the term ‘balance of power’ referred less to arms races than to a consistently changing system of alliances whereby states grouped

³⁷ Ibid., p. 40.

³⁸ Helen Milner wrote the various concepts of anarchy, see her “The assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique,” in David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 144-53.

³⁹ Michael Sheehan, *The Balance of Power: History & Theory* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 8.

⁴⁰ Michael Sheehan selected a number of useful definitions of balance of power in his book, the most elaborate analysis of the entire balance of power theory. Ibid., pp. 2-4.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 8.

themselves to prohibit any one state from becoming dominant. In the late twentieth century, however, the term came to refer largely to the relative military and economic power of the United States and the USSR. Hence, adherence to a balance of power system indicated a persisting arms race, or possibly, mutual agreements to keep the system stable by keeping the mutual threat balanced and equal. Thus, balance of power represented the extreme of real-politik in that states were seen to shift alliances readily, looking out only for their own interests.⁴² Political realism has strongly influenced the study of international relations. Even for analysts who distance themselves from realism, it could be seen as agenda setting. However, the basic hypotheses of realism have been challenged from several different perspectives.

Modern neo-realists, like Kenneth Waltz, tend to take into greater account the growing interdependence of states by focusing on the international system and its structure, rather than the nation-state. Criticizing reductionism that attempts to explain international relations with human nature analogies or foreign policy behavior studies, Waltz has consistently urged a shift of emphasis toward the systemic level. He advocated a structural approach, referred to as *structural realism*. In spite of the differences from realism mentioned below, the Waltzian synthesis will be referred to as neo-realism. However, it still indicates its intellectual similarity with the classical realism of Morgenthau and its elements of originality and distinctiveness.

First of all, as far as the structure of the international system was concerned, he willingly conceded that states were not the only actors, while maintaining that they remain the most important ones.⁴³

Second, neo-realists have paid more attention than their predecessors to economic

⁴² David P. Barash, *Introduction to Peace Studies* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1991), pp. 324-25.

⁴³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 93-4, 105.

factors, in general, and to trans-national economic actors in particular. Robert Gilpin characterized the state as ‘a coalition of coalitions’ rather than a sole actor.⁴⁴ Furthermore, Gilpin deserted the realist predilection for the *status quo* with his acceptance of transformations of the international system as inevitable. Arguing that the change of system was more war-prone, he contended that economic factors might bring about a war-prone situation. According to him, nations were presumably directed by cost-benefit estimations in their intrinsically expansive policies, and would thus tend to expand to the point when the marginal costs surpassed the marginal gains.⁴⁵

Third, other neo-realists have focused their attention on the idea of security. Barry Buzan says that security is synonymous with power to a lesser degree than normally assumed by realists. This is because threats came in a variety of types, and therefore might be averted by a variety of means, among which military power did not even rank as the most important one.⁴⁶ From a critical point of view, Robert O. Keohane points out that the assumptions of neo-realism can be compared to realist assumptions as follows:

(1) The assumption that the principal actors in world politics are states would remain the same, although more emphasis would be placed on non-state actors, intergovernmental organizations, and transnational and transgovernmental relations than is the case in realist analysis.

(2) The rationality assumption would be retained. It should be kept in mind, however, as is made clear by sophisticated realists, that the rationality postulate only assumes that actors make calculations “so as to maximize expected value across a given set of consistently ordered objectives.” It does not assume perfect information, consideration of all possible alternatives, or

⁴⁴ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 18-9. See also his “The Richness and Tradition of Political Realism,” in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 318.

⁴⁵ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, *ibid.*, pp. 39-55.

⁴⁶ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), pp. 11, 18-92, 156-72.

unchanging actor preferences.

(3) Power and influence would still be regarded as important state interests (as ends or necessary means), but the implication that the search for power constitutes an overriding interest in all cases, or that it always takes the same form, would be rejected. Under different systemic conditions states will define their self-interests differently.⁴⁷

Regardless of its numerous defects, realism seems valid as a basic approach to the study of international relations. It focuses attention on states, which, to all intents and purposes, remain the most important actors in the international field. Realism tries to focus on the world as it actually is, while acknowledging the permissibility of idealist speculations about how it ought to be. It takes into account the actual mechanisms of how the world works, an understanding of which must be assumed to be a precondition for its transformation. Its merits notwithstanding, realism, however, requires some modification, revision, and modernization. The main point of the theory of the security dilemma is that threats foster threats, and that a quest for security by means of power may be dysfunctional. This notion is intrinsic to both realism and neo-realism.

Among modern analysts of international politics, John Herz stands out as the first to focus explicitly on the security dilemma, which was evident in more than interstate relations. It was depicted in his work as a basic condition affecting individuals and groups in society as well as states.⁴⁸ A number of other classical realists have likewise illustrated the security dilemma, albeit most often without using the actual term. Hans Morgenthau comes close to formulating the same idea with, for example, his observation that “the policy of imperialism pursued by the victor in anticipation of

⁴⁷ Robert O. Keohane, *ibid.*, pp. 193-94.

⁴⁸ John M. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 226-27.

his victory is likely to call forth a policy of imperialism on the part of the vanquished.” In addition, while acknowledging that “it would be fatal to counter imperialist designs with measures appropriate to a policy of *status quo*,” the opposite, mistaking a policy of the *status quo* for a policy of imperialism, might be equally fatal:

By doing so, State A resorts to certain measures defensive in intent, such as armaments, bases, alliances, with respect to State B. The latter, in turn, resorts to countermeasures, for it now sees State embarking upon a policy of imperialism. These countermeasures strengthen the initial misapprehension, on the part of State A, of State B’s policies, and so forth.... Out of an initial error develops a vicious circle. Two or more nations, each who is only seeking to preserve the *status quo*, but each convinced of the imperialist designs of the other, find support for their own errors of judgment and actions in the errors of the others.⁴⁹

The first dilemma is that a decrease in security comes forth as a paradoxical result of the quest for security. The second is that, at any stage, either party to the spiralling interaction would leave himself open to exploitation if he were to refrain from reciprocal moves, for example, by withholding his response to an armaments increase on the part of his opponent.

This theory of the objective security dilemma has been supported by perceptual arguments, expressed by Jervis⁵⁰ whose analyses showed how “the basic security dilemma becomes overlaid by reinforcing misunderstandings.”⁵¹ The origin of these misunderstandings is the inevitable application of double standards. As a state is aware of its own plans, and is sure that it would never even consider an attack, alleged fears on the part of its adversaries can be removed as mere figments of the

⁴⁹ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1960, 3rd ed), pp. 54, 63-64, 67.

⁵⁰ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1976), pp.58-93.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p.75.

imagination, or as deceitful propaganda. The security dilemma is thus based on the lack of confidence within states to identify, with any certainty, the true goals of their rivals. This leads to the leaning for over-insurance, with states preferring the moral ‘better safe than sorry.’

As far as crisis scenarios are concerned, a number of authors, most of who belong to the strategic studies community, have warned of the potential evolution of a vicious circle of reciprocal fears of surprise attack between two *status quo*-oriented and pacific countries. According to such analyses, it is imaginable that, in the midst of a political crisis, pre-emptive moves might obtain a momentum of their own, which could ultimately result in war. Thomas Schelling illustrated such an imaginary sequence of events:

A modest temptation on each side to sneak in a first blow a temptation too small by itself to motivate an attack-might become compounded through a process of interacting expectations, with additional motives for attack being produced by successive cycles of ‘he thinks we think he’ll attack., so he thinks we shall; so he will; so we must.’⁵²

In accordance with neo-realism theory, international relations reproduce anarchism and remain premature status with incessant conflict and confrontation for power and security among nations. Additionally, since international community retains its order relying on hegemony, a balance of power, and alliance, international cooperation is limited to the scope of contributing to a certain superpower’s benefit. It is criticized that the theory is justified for superpower nation, particularly the U.S.’ international role in the Cold War era, and inherently retains status-quo based on hierarchical international order. Multilateral security cooperation efforts to prevent conflict and disputes were very limited under the Cold War system. However, the relevancy and

⁵² Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), p.207.

possibility of multilateral security cooperation have been saliently increased under the termination of the Cold War. Unlike neorealism argues that international cooperation by spontaneous and equal relations is not possible, spontaneous security cooperation is currently on going in regional as well as global dimension. Subsequently, the relevancy of neorealism theory in the post-Cold War era is very limited.

The increase of interdependence, transnational actor's role expansion, non-military affairs, and interest infusion are being evaporated in the post-Cold War. It is more reasonable for a state to pursue common interests rather than pursue dominance with power. The neo-realism proposition that international order by either hegemony or dominant alliance is maintained is no longer persuasive. Therefore, what we attempt to apply neo-realism to Northeast Asia in security arena without prudence resulted from historical ignorance underestimating the expansionism policy by anarchistic international political order dominated by Western Europe. Therefore, security issues and security cooperation in Northeast Asia need to be discussed based on full consideration of historical experience and regional sentiment.

2.2.2 Liberalism: its Challenge to Realism

The major opponent to realism has been liberal institutionalism.⁵³ Compared to realism, liberal institutionalism offers a more hopeful prediction for international cooperation and a more optimistic assessment of the potential of institutions to help

⁵³ Liberal institutionalist theories may be distinguished from three other variants of liberal theory. One of these, trade liberalism, articulated by Richard Cobden and John Bright, finds that international commerce facilitates greater interstate cooperation. A second variant, democratic structural liberalism, posited by Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson, finds that democracies based on national self-determination are conducive to greater international cooperation. Finally, a liberal transaction approach suggests that private international interactions promote international integration. Nye refers to the first two variants as commercial and democratic liberalism, respectively, and suggests that the third might be termed sociological liberalism. Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," *World Politics* 40, January, 1988, p. 246.

states accomplish it.⁵⁴

Thus liberal institutionalism seeks to refute the realist perception of world politics. First, realism's proposition about the centrality of states has been rejected. Functionalists see the specialized international agencies and their technical experts as the main new actors in world politics.⁵⁵ For neo-functionalists, the key players are supranational bureaucracies, trade associations, political parties, and labor unions.⁵⁶ Likewise, for the interdependence school, they are transnational coalitions and multinational corporations.⁵⁷

Second, liberal institutionalism criticized the realist notion that states are sole or rational agents. Functionalists maintain that authority is already decentralized within modern states and it is experiencing a similar process internationally. For instance, interdependence theorists claim that modern states are considerably marked by "multiple channels of access."⁵⁸

Third, liberals indicate that states are becoming less concerned about power and security. Internationally, nuclear weapons and mobilized national populations are rendering war a prohibitively costly experience.⁵⁹ Domestically, industrialization built the current "social century," in which the advanced democracies are becoming welfare states less directed toward power and prestige and more toward economic

⁵⁴ Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," in David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 116.

⁵⁵ Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 32-40.

⁵⁶ Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economical Forces 1950-1957* (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1958), pp. 16-31, 113-239, 283-340.

⁵⁷ Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, "Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Massachusetts, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 371-99.

⁵⁸ Ernst B. Haas, "Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ed., *International Regionalism* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), pp. 152, 155-56; Edward L. Morse, "The Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernization, Interdependence, and Externalization," *World Politics* 22, no. 3, (April 1970), pp. 387-89.

⁵⁹ Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), pp. 27-9.

achievement and social security.⁶⁰ Thus finding that states increasingly see one another not as enemies but as partners, needing to ensure the comfort and well-being for their own population, liberals refute realism's fourth proposition, that states are basically disinclined to cooperate.⁶¹

Finally, liberal institutionalism rejects realism's pessimism about international institutions. Functionalists argue that specialized agencies could promote cooperation, because they perform valuable tasks without forming a frontal threat to state sovereignty.⁶² For neofunctionalist theory, supranational bodies, like the European Union, are "the appropriate regional counterpart to the national state which no longer feels capable of realizing welfare goals within its own narrow borders."⁶³

Events in the 1970s appeared to support realist theory, and to invalidate liberal institutionalism, by demonstrating that the use of force continued to be a pervasive feature of world politics.⁶⁴ However, states achieved cooperation through international institutions, even in the harsh 1970s, and international cooperation did not collapse during the 1970s as it had during the 1930s.⁶⁵ This set the stage for a renewed liberal challenge to realism in the 1980s.

2.2.3. Analysis of Neoliberal Institutionalism and Security Regime

Neoliberal institutionalists, who accept several of the main realist propositions and

⁶⁰ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 1966), pp. 41-2, 95-6, 136-37, 144

⁶¹ Richard Cooper, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-67, 170-72, 179.

⁶² David Mitrany, "A Working Peace System," in Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb, eds., *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), pp. 83-97; Ernst B. Haas, "Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe," *ibid.*, pp. 16-31.

⁶³ Ernst B. Haas, "Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe," *op. cit.*, p. 159.

⁶⁴ For example, increases in East-West tensions and the continuation of the Soviet-American arms competition; direct and indirect military intervention and counter-intervention by the Superpowers in Africa, Central America, and Southwest Asia; and the Yom Kippur and Iran-Iraq wars. Joseph M. Grieco, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-21.

⁶⁵ Stephen D. Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983) p. vi.

have mounted the strongest challenge to neo-realism, are conspicuous from the traditional liberals in a number of ways.⁶⁶ First, neoliberal institutionalists accept several realist propositions: that states are the major actors in interstate relations: that they are unitary-rational agents, and act on the basis of perceptions of their own self-interests. Second, they are also ready to accept realism's stance on anarchy, as an explanation for state behavior.⁶⁷ Finally, they recognize the likelihood that states' interests in relative gains will make cooperation more strenuous. However, as can be seen, they ended with a rejection of neo-realism.

Neoliberalism vs. Neorealism:

The first difference of opinions with neoliberal institutionalists is over their divergent perceptions of anarchy. Suggesting that it is the self interest of autonomous states in a state of anarchy that leads them to create international regimes, Arthur Stein defines anarchy as “independent decision making,” against the “joint decision making” in international regimes.⁶⁸ Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane put an emphasis on the importance of anarchy characterized as the absence of government. However, they also claim that this continuous characteristic of world politics includes various patterns of interaction among states.⁶⁹

Helen Milner regards the “discovery of orderly features of world politics amidst its seeming chaos” as “perhaps the central achievement of neo-realists” but she agrees

⁶⁶ The term distinguishes these scholars from earlier varieties of liberalism, such as commercial liberalism, republican liberalism, and sociological liberalism. Commercial liberalism refers to theories linking free trade and peace; republican liberalism refers to theories linking democracy with peace; and sociological liberalism refers to theories linking transnational interactions with international integration. The immediate intellectual precursors of liberal institutionalism are theories of international regimes. David A. Baldwin, *ibid.*, p. 4; Joseph M. Grieco *ibid.*, p. 116.

⁶⁷ Joseph M. Grieco, *ibid.*, p. 121.

⁶⁸ Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), p. 324.

⁶⁹ Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” *World Politics*. 38, (1985), p. 226-54.

with Lipson that the idea has been overemphasized while interdependence has been neglected.⁷⁰

While they accept the significance of anarchy in world politics, they also criticize the stress that realists place on it within their literature.⁷¹ The neoliberal institutionalists basically argue that, even if the realists are correct in believing that anarchy constrains the willingness of states to cooperate, states nevertheless do cooperate, especially with the assistance of international institutions. Clearly, cooperation among states is an option in the anarchic international system, in which coercive domination and war options are also available.⁷²

Another problem that neoliberal institutionalists face is the problem of relative gains. Unlike neo-realists, they have their own prescription for relative gains. While neoliberal institutionalists recognize the possibility that states' interests in relative gains will make cooperation more difficult, they argue that this case is very conditional. It matters only when gains in one period change power relations in another, and when there is some probability that subsequent advantages in power may be used against oneself.⁷³

Some neoliberals go further. According to Duncan Snidal, states receive equal gains from cooperation, even though there are gaps between gains. These gaps are narrowed, to the satisfaction of the disadvantaged partner, through a process of coordination and collaboration.⁷⁴ He recognizes that relative gains have the greatest

⁷⁰ Helen Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory," *Review of International Studies*, 17, (January 1991), pp. 70, 81-2.

⁷¹ Charles Lipson, op. cit., p. 30.

⁷² Seyom Brown, *International Relations in a Changing Global System* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 30.

⁷³ Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in David A. Baldwin, Ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 275.

⁷⁴ Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," *American Political*

impact when the number of states is small or there exists asymmetries between them. However, he continues, in a multi-polar system, where more than a small number of states has roughly equal power, states will not worry much about relative gains. Increasing the number of states decreases the overall concern for relative gains.⁷⁵

Even though they agree that international cooperation is possible, Neorealists have a different point of view as to the ease and possibility of its occurrence.

Grieco says that neorealists view international cooperation as harder to agree, more difficult to maintain, and more dependent on state power than do the neoliberalists.⁷⁶ Hence both sides differ as to the best method to foster coordination and collaboration among states. Neoliberal institutionalists offer two methods. The first one is to restrict the number of participants in a cooperative arrangement. Neoliberalists find that a small number of participants permit verification of compliance and sanctioning of cheaters. They would predict that states with a choice would tend to prefer a smaller number of partners.

Axelrod and Keohane argue that reciprocity to induce cooperation among self-interested players depends on three conditions: (1) players can identify defectors; (2) they are able to focus retaliation on defectors; and (3) they have sufficient long run incentives to punish defectors.⁷⁷ However, when there are a number of actors, the conditions become more difficult to satisfy.

Science Review, vol. 85, no. 3, September 1991, pp. 701-26. He defined coordination as a cooperative process through which actors try to avoid a particular outcome, and collaboration is a cooperative process through which actors try to insure common interests. See Arthur A. Stein, *ibid.*, pp. 35-45.

⁷⁵ Arthur A. Stein, *ibid.*, pp. 35-45

⁷⁶ Joseph M. Grieco, *ibid.*, pp. 116-18.

⁷⁷ Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, *ibid.*, p. 235.

**Table 2-3 Liberal Institutionalism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and Realism:
Summary of Major Propositions**

Proposition	Liberal institutionalism	Neoliberal institutionalism	Realism
States are the only major actors in world politics	No; other actors include: -specialized international agencies -supranational authorities -interest groups -trans-governmental policy networks -trans-national actors	Yes (but international institutions also play a major role)	Yes
States are unitary-rational actors	No; state is fragmented	Yes	Yes
Anarchy is a major shaping force for state preferences and actions	No; forces such as technology, knowledge, welfare-orientation of domestic interests are also salient	Yes	Yes
International institutions are an independent force facilitating cooperation	Yes	Yes	No
Optimistic/Pessimistic about prospects for cooperation	Optimistic	Optimistic	Pessimistic

Source: Joseph M. Grieco, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,' in David A. Baldwin ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 123.

However, realists would offer a very different hypothesis. A state may believe that it might do better than some partners in a proposed arrangement, but not as well as others. If it is uncertain about which partners would do relatively better, the state will prefer more partners. The larger numbers would increase the likelihood that a more favorable sharing will arise due to interactions with weaker partners, which then could

offset the relative achievements of gains advantaging better-positioned partners.⁷⁸

For neoliberals, the second method to foster coordination and collaboration among states is regime building. While, neo-realists recognize the plethora of international regimes and institutions that have emerged since 1945, they differ with respect to the significance of such arrangements. Grieco notes that neoliberals exaggerate the extent to which institutions are able to “mitigate anarchy’s constraining effects on inter-state cooperation.”⁷⁹

For neoliberals, international regimes nevertheless arise when actors forgo independent decision-making to deal with collaboration and coordination problems. This collaboration and coordination process the costs of verifying one another’s compliance and sanctioning cheaters. If the costs of verification and sanction are lower than the benefits of joint action, cooperation will be promoted. Axelrod and Keohane describe the role of regime as follows:

Regimes do not enforce rules in a hierarchical sense, but they do change patterns of transaction costs and provide information to participants, so that uncertainty is reduced. International regimes do not substitute for reciprocity; rather, they reinforce and institutionalize it. International regimes may also help to develop new norms.⁸⁰

Security Regime

The term ‘regime’ was originally borrowed from domestic politics, where it refers typically to an existing governmental order or to a set of rules and institutions established to govern relations among individuals, groups, or classes within a state. In its international context, given the absence of a super-ordinate or overarching central authority, these rules are established by states to provide some degree of order in

⁷⁸ Joseph M. Grieco, *ibid.*, p. 134.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

⁸⁰ Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, *ibid.*, p. 250

international relations, either by force or through negotiations.⁸¹

Stephen Krasner has given the classical definition of international regimes. Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.⁸²

The concept of an international regime is complex, because it is defined in terms of four distinct components: principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. However, a brief analysis of the functions of the above components that constitute a regime will suggest why they are important for fulfilling the overall function of international regimes.

First, the principles of regimes define the purpose that their members are expected to pursue. The value of open non-discriminatory patterns of international economic transactions for IMF and GATT, prevention of proliferation of dangerous nuclear weapons for NPT are such examples.⁸³ Robert Keohane regards "reciprocation" as an important principle that is shared by most, if not all, international regimes.⁸⁴ Second, norms contain somewhat clear injunctions to members about legitimate and illegitimate behaviour, defining responsibilities and obligations in relatively general

⁸¹ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), pp. 243-45.

⁸² Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequence: Regimes as Intervening Variables," *International Organizations* 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), p. 186.

⁸³ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 57-8.

⁸⁴ The brief that if one helps others or fails to hurt them, even at some opportunity cost to oneself, they will reciprocate when the tables are turned. Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," *International Organizations* 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), p. 342.

terms.⁸⁵ Norms require members to act as if one will benefit from others' behaviour in the future if one behaves now in a regime-supporting way.⁸⁶ Third, rules are well-defined guides to action or standards, setting forth actions that members of some specified subject of groups are expected to carry out under specific circumstances.⁸⁷ Usually rules can be altered more easily than principles or norms, since there can be more than one set of rules to a given set of purposes. Finally, decision-making procedures are the recognized arrangements for resolving situations requiring collective choice.

Considering the connections between these four components, it can be concluded that changes in principles and norms mean changes to the regime itself. This is because principles and norms provide the basic defining characteristics of a regime, while changes of rules and decision-making procedures are mere changes within a regime.⁸⁸

Neoliberal Institutionalists and International Regime

Neoliberal institutionalists have promoted two methods to foster coordination and collaboration among states. The first one is to restrict the number of participants in a cooperative arrangement,⁸⁹ the second is regime building.⁹⁰

Neoliberal institutionalists place much greater emphasis on the latter method. They argue that international regimes not only create reiteration but also reduce verification

⁸⁵ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World Political Economy*, *ibid.*, p. 58.

⁸⁶ Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," *ibid.*, pp. 342-43.

⁸⁷ O. R. Young, "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation," *World Politics* 32, no. 3 (April 1980), pp. 334-35.

⁸⁸ Stephen D. Krasner, *ibid.*, pp. 187-89.

⁸⁹ Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, *ibid.*, p. 234-238.

⁹⁰ In some literatures on the theory of international regimes, the term "regimes" and "institutions" are often used as containing synonymous concepts while some scholars argue that "regimes" must be distinguished from the broader concept of "institutions." However, in this study, these two words, in general, will be used in the same context. See, Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," *International Organizations*, vol. 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 495-96.

costs and make it easier for member states to punish cheaters. As Keohane argued, regimes make it more sensible to cooperate by lowering the likelihood of being cheated.⁹¹ Similarly, Keohane and Axelrod assert that, since regimes incorporating the norm of reciprocity delegitimize defection and thereby make it more costly, international regimes do not substitute for reciprocity; rather, they reinforce and institutionalize it.⁹² Recognizing “coordination conventions” as an element of conditional cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Charles Lipson argues that such conventions in international relations, which are typically grounded in ongoing reciprocal exchange, range from international law to regime rules.⁹³

Finally, just as societies create states to resolve collective action problems among individuals, Arthur Stein argues that regimes in the international arena are also created to deal with the collective ‘sub-optimality’⁹⁴ that can emerge from individual state behavior. Keohane concludes, “When we think about cooperation after hegemony, we need to think about institutions.” Hegemonic power may be necessary to establish cooperation among states. However, neoliberals argue that it may endure after hegemony, with the aid of institutions.⁹⁵

⁹¹ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World Political Economy*, *ibid.*, p. 97.

⁹² Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, *ibid.*, p. 250.

⁹³ Charles Lipson, *ibid.*, p. 6.

⁹⁴ In Prisoner’s Dilemma, if cheating is successful, the cheater will get the ‘optimal’ outcome, if the actors cooperate competitively, both can have only ‘equilibrium’ outcome which is smaller than the ‘sub-optimal’ outcome that can be acquired when both actors avoid their dominant strategies. Stein argues that international regime can play its role in order to prevent collusion and enforce the outcome that is sub-optimal for the actors. Arthur A. Stein, *ibid.*, pp. 307-08.

⁹⁵ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World Political Economy*, *ibid.*, p. 246.

2.3. Conditions to Form a Northeast Asia Military Security Cooperation Regime

The four conditions to form Northeast Asia security military cooperation is as follows; (1) the evolution of the existing military security cooperation arrangements is sufficiently mature to establish a military security cooperation regime; (2) There is an emerging economic interdependence on spill-over in creating a cooperative security regime in Northeast; (3) the key actors willingly join in establishing a regional regime in the event of transnational issues as common threats; and (4) Great powers need to support a regional security regime and middle power plays a linkage role among great nations.

2.3.1. Evolution of Existing Military Security Cooperation Arrangements

Following the end of the Cold War, a lot of positive developments have been witnessed in the regional security in Northeast Asia. These developments include the continuous relaxation of the tension in the region, which resulted from the Soviet and Russian withdrawal from the region and the end of superpower confrontation; political solutions to the hot spots, positive development in the situation on the Korean Peninsula in particular; sustained and rapid economic development; profound security cooperation at different levels and on different issues; and the emerging regionalism in both economic and security fields, etc.

A sound security situation in the future in Northeast Asia depends heavily on the establishment of new security concepts, enhancement of security cooperation, collective efforts in countering transnational threats, practical and feasible programs for overcoming the constraining factors, the ARF and the peaceful unification of the splitting countries.

In the past decade, there have been many security dialogue initiatives in the whole Asia-Pacific region. However, there are only a few governmental or non-governmental organizations in Northeast Asia. Some of the representative cooperative security organizations where most Northeast Asian countries attend as members will be examined. CSCAP as an example of regional non-governmental organizations will be discussed. It is the most ambitious proposal to date for a regularized, focused and inclusive non-governmental process on Asia-Pacific security matters. Finally, other security and defense dialogues including NEACD in Northeast Asia will be explored.

2.3.2. Economic Interdependence

Presuming that the current levels of economic cooperation are inextricably connected with one of the principles of the cooperative security idea, it could be argued that the cooperative security idea is more applicable to Northeast Asia. As far as security is concerned, multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region, when compared to Europe, does not have deep roots. Donald Crone says that Asia-Pacific “has lagged behind every other world area in constructing explicit, cooperative arrangements.”⁹⁶ Friedberg writes that the situation may be getting worse instead of better: “Divergence of interests among some of the region’s most important states ... may actually be growing.”⁹⁷

When it comes to economic concerns, however, the Asia-Pacific region has a long history of cooperation between countries. Historically, trade was taking place among the countries of the Asia-Pacific centuries long before Western influences were

⁹⁶ Donald Crone, “The Politics of Emerging Pacific Cooperation,” *Pacific Affairs* 65, no. 1 (Spring 1992), p. 68.

⁹⁷ Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” *International Security* 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993-94), p. 19.

experienced.⁹⁸ Lawrence Woods concluded that the modern “impetus for Pacific Regionalism can be traced to the years immediately before and after the First World War....”⁹⁹ It started with the establishment in Honolulu of the Pan-Pacific Union in 1907. Among other non-governmental mechanisms was the Institute for Pacific Relations (IPR), founded in 1925 in Honolulu, which brought together many distinguished public figures and academics from around the region.¹⁰⁰ Since the early post-war decades, a number of regional institutions including APEC and ASEAN+3 have been developed.

2.3.3. Transnational Issues as Common Threats

There is a firm belief that NATO originated in response to outside military threats, the Communist authoritarian regimes, and the bloc-to-bloc military confrontation, and thus is irrelevant to Asia and the Pacific. Assuming that NATO is an example of a collective defense system, which needs an outside military threat to exist, this becomes a reasonable argument. In fact, in Northeast Asia, the nature and source of potential security threats differ widely - whereas in Europe, until the collapse of the Cold War, the threat was uniform and widely recognized.¹⁰¹

However, the cooperative security idea does not need a particular state as a potential threat to form a security regime. On the contrary, it is inclusive in its approach by seeking to engage adversaries and non-like-minded actors as well as putative friends.¹⁰² For example, the OSCE aimed at achieving security cooperation among actors in the absence of a common external enemy. It instituted a European

⁹⁸ Mark Borthwick, *Pacific Century: The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), p. 507.

⁹⁹ Lawrence Woods, *Asia-Pacific Diplomacy: Non-governmental Organizations and International Relations* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993). p.29.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p.31.

¹⁰¹ Park Hee Kwon, “Multilateral Security Cooperation,” *The Pacific Review*. 6, no. 3 (1993), p. 252

¹⁰² David Dewitt, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

security regime in which the interests of the national actors “are neither wholly compatible nor wholly competitive.”¹⁰³

Moreover, according to Karl W. Deutsch, a military threat usually provided an impetus toward only temporary military alliances, while more permanent unions derived their main support from other factors.¹⁰⁴ Considering that the cooperative security idea is based on the recognition that security can no longer be attained unilaterally or exclusively through military means; that economic and environmental dimensions of security are just as vital to security concern as the military dimension; and that cooperation, even with ex-adversaries, would be in the interests of security in the post-Cold War era, this view carries a great deal of conviction. Furthermore, in the Asia-Pacific region, as in Europe, the Cold War no longer draws a line between friends and enemies. New political and economic realities transcend old political alliances and confrontations.¹⁰⁵

To put it in a nutshell, in the post-Cold War, it is hard to find a strong confrontation and a clear enemy between the four regional powers in Northeast Asia. Furthermore, Northeast Asia has observed a great improvement in bilateral relations. Thus, theoretically, it is difficult to form a collective security style regime, or a collective defense system in Northeast Asia. However, observing the existence of transnational threats in the region, practically, Northeast Asia has the potential to form a cooperative security style regime.

As a result of the acceleration and deepening of globalization, the U.S. and China, and other globalizing states mutually face the dangers posed by transnational threats,

¹⁰³ Janice Gross Stein, “Detection and Defection: Security “Regimes” and the Management of International Conflict,” *International Journal* XL, no. 4 (1985), p. 600.

¹⁰⁴ Karl W. Deutsch ed., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 156.

¹⁰⁵ Park Hee Kwon, *ibid.*, p. 253.

which are exacerbated by the failing state in the region.¹⁰⁶

2.3.4. Key Actors' Perception and Interests

One of the theoretical disadvantages of collective security for Northeast Asia is the underlying assumption and prerequisites that bilateral agreement becomes highly problematic and vulnerable to collective security politics, while cooperative security does not.¹⁰⁷ In this respect, the cooperative security idea is more applicable to Northeast Asia than a collective security system, as Northeast Asian countries not only prefer to keep bilateral relationships, but also admit the alliance of other parties.

This argument can be drawn from the current bilateral relationship between the four powers in Northeast Asia. First, multilateral approaches to security are not considered for six key players as being a substitute, but rather a supplement to bilateral arrangements. Thus bilateralism and the cooperative security idea are regarded as not mutually exclusive, but mutually supportive.¹⁰⁸ From a regional point of view, for example, the U.S.-Japan security treaty is still regarded as one of the most important pillars of the Asia-Pacific security architecture. Even China sees the security alliance between the United States and Japan as a tool to constrain the potential consequences of Japan's remilitarization.¹⁰⁹


¹⁰⁶ Banning Garret and Jonathan Adams, "U.S.-China Cooperation on the Problem of Failing States and Transnational Threats," United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 126, September 2004, p.4.

¹⁰⁷ David Dewitt, *ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁰⁸ Ralph A. Cossa, "Multilateral Dialogue in Asia: Benefits and Limitations," *Korea and World Affairs* 19, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 106-120.

¹⁰⁹ "Nixon promised China in 1972 to restrain Japan," *AFP*, 20 April 1999; Edward A. Olsen and David Winterford, "Asian Multilateralism: Implications for U.S. Policy," *U.S. News and World Report*, May 10, 1993, pp. 9-40; Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific Region and its Impact on Chinese Interests: Views from Beijing," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 16, no. 1, June 1994, p. 23.

Figure 2-1 Restructuring of Six Key Actors



USSR/Russia-Japan: Full diplomatic relations, 1956; Constructive Partnership, 1998

U.S.-PRC: Normalization, 1971; Full diplomatic relations, 1978

U.S.-Japan: Diplomatic Relations, 1854; U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, 1951 & 1961

PRC-Japan: Normalization, 1972; Full diplomatic Relations, 1978

Russia-China: Strategic Partnership, 1996

U.S.-Korea: Diplomatic Relations, 1882; U.S.-South Korea Defense Treaty, 1954

China-South Korea: Normalization, 1992

China-North Korea: Defense Treaty, 1962

USSR/Russia-South Korea: Normalization, 1990

USSR/Russia-North Korea: Defense Treaty, 1962 & 2001

Japan-South Korea: Normalization, 1965

North-South Korea: Basic Treaty and Pyongyang Common Communique, 1991, 2000

Source: Yang Sung Chul, "The Restructuring of an East Asian Order and Two Koreas," in Pak Chae Ha, Nam Sung Woo, and Eugene Craig Campbell, eds., *A New World Order and the Security of the Asia-Pacific Region* (Seoul: The Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 1973), p. 179; "Relative Status of Political, Security and Economic Cooperation in PRC-Russian Relations," *World Outlook*, no. 21, 1997, pp. 10-11; *Izvestia*, "Moscow and Tokyo Chose Constructive Partnership," November 14, 1998, in *Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network (NAPSN) Daily Report*, November 17, 1998; Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J. Ellings, *Korea's Future and the Great Powers* (Seattle and London: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001)

Likewise, the United States uses the U.S.-Japan security alliance as a way to check China's power expansion, to use China as a power to check Russo-Japanese ties, and to check Japan's attempt to strengthen its military power and increase its influence in the Asia-Pacific rim region.¹¹⁰

Second, one of the major elements of collective security is that there must be some level of commitment to the *status quo*.

That is to say, the members of the system are states, and the vast majority of such states regard as sufficiently equitable their boundaries and other relationships, so that preponderant force can be mobilized to deter, or reverse, an act of aggression.¹¹¹

As the cooperative system, unlike the system of collective security, has shown greater flexibility with regard to the *status quo*, it has a greater possibility of achieving cooperation between states than the other alternatives.

The figure 2-1 illustrates Dr. Moon's concept of 2 + 4 + 2 (2= The U.S./South Korea; 4 = The U.S., China, Japan and Russia; 2 = North-South Korea) in which South Korea is the nation that is the only one commonly connected in each group.¹¹²

Third, there has been a significant improvement in a number of important bilateral relationships in Northeast Asia, in the wake of the collapse of the Cold War system.¹¹³

Considering that the bilateral chasms separating those regional powers are bound to narrow, and the flexibility and inclusiveness of the cooperative security approach to

¹¹⁰ Japan also needs Russia to check and balance the improving Sino-U.S. ties, while Russia needs Japan and China in the face of the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). "Nixon promised China in 1972 to restrain Japan," *AFP*, April 20, 1999; "Four Big Powers," *The Korea Times*, November 4, 1997.

¹¹¹ Kenneth W. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

¹¹² Moon Chung In discussed the concept of '2+4+2' at the Pol-Mil Game in Seoul in November, 2004

¹¹³ "Japan, Russia Eager to Benefit From Economic Cooperation," *The Korea Times*, November 3, 1997

bilateral relations, and alliances, the cooperative security system seems more applicable to Northeast Asia than collective security.

There is massive development in terms of the number of security cooperation arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region. Observing the expansion of unofficial security arrangements, there is a need for the Asia-Pacific region to complement and develop the current various security arrangements rather than replace them with new arrangement.

Moreover, this point is compatible with the main idea of cooperative security. Unlike collective security, the cooperative security idea presumes that states are the principal actors, but it does not preclude, by definition or by intent, that non-state actors, whether institutional or more *ad hoc* trans-national actors and NGOs, having critical roles to play in managing and enhancing relevant security dynamics.¹¹⁴ The key operational focus of the cooperative security process has been ‘to establish habits of dialogue’ and to move toward inclusive participation. From this, what cooperative security could provide is a means for challenging long-held or emergent fears, for overcoming the hesitancy that accompanies political risk taking, for lowering the walls which have been erected between societies, governments, and countries in the wake of the colonial, pre-independence and Cold War periods, and for transcending the barriers of sectarian and national interests.¹¹⁵ Seeing that the expansions of various security arrangements, the changing concept of security and the compatibility between the current situation in Northeast Asia and the cooperative security idea, the cooperative security idea is highly applicable to Northeast Asia.

¹¹⁴ David Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security,” *The Pacific Review* 7, no. 1 (1994), p. 8.

¹¹⁵ David Dewitt and Paul Evans, “The Changing Dynamics of Asia Pacific Security: A Canadian Perspective,” *NPCSD Working Paper Series*, no. 3 (1994), Appendix I.

Multilateral security cooperation contributes to achieving affirmative effectiveness as follows; (1) it contributes to peace and security in the world community by maintaining stable international systems; (2) it contributes to increasing interdependence and co-prosperity through overall exchange and coordination enhancement; (3) it contributes to ensuring economic investment by saving capital from arms reduction and military expenditure reduction; (4) it can establish an institutionalized mechanism to resolve uncertainty in the post-Cold War; (5) it can contain a certain state's unilateral hegemony; and (6) it can prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The institutionalization of regional multilateral security cooperation tends to be a useful tool in resolving security issues. As an example, once a certain state proclaims its commitment to join regional multilateral security cooperation, the mechanism retains inertia in maintaining cooperation field by preventing disregard of the member even in the event of unfavorable condition.

2.4. Northeast Asia Military Security Cooperation Regime Proposal

Multilateral security cooperation architecture will be implemented as follows: (1) shaping stage, favorable security environment through the public diplomacy to gain the domestic consensus and the epistemic community consisting of policy makers, parliamentarians, and scholars to achieve regional affinity; (2) multilateral military security cooperation activities, the gradual expansion of security military dialogues, military exchanges, multilateral exercises, prevention of dangerous activities and institutionalization including secretariat and multinational forces HQs; (3) who takes the lead in building: option 1, U.S.-South Korea co-leadership; option 2, U.S.-

Japan-South Korea trilateral approach; and option 3, the Six Party Talks approach.

2.5. Evaluation

Realism and neoliberalism, two schools of international relations theory, offer contending explanations of state behavior within the international system. The latter believes that interstate cooperation will create institutions and regimes for the peaceful settlement of conflicts. The former argues that only ‘self-help,’ the building of individual state military capabilities, can ensure that state interests will be protected.

Neoliberals believe that anarchy hinders cooperation, because of the doubts states have about the compliance of other parties. For neoliberals, the worst outcome for states, in mixed-interest situations, is to be cheated. However, because successful unilateral cheating is highly unlikely, the more likely “outcome” for neoliberals is for all states to defect and find themselves less well off than if they had all cooperated. According to neoliberal institutionalists, anarchy and mixed interests occasionally cause states to suffer the opportunity costs of not achieving an outcome that is more mutually beneficial. Keohane and Axelrod argue that games like Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and Chicken explain how many international relationships offer both the danger that “the myopic pursuit of self-interest can be disastrous” and the prospect that “both sides can potentially benefit from cooperation - if they can only achieve it.”¹¹⁶

As ‘regime’ is defined in terms of four distinct components: principles, norms,

¹¹⁶ Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” *World Politics*, vol. 38.

rules and decision-making procedures; the concept of global regime becomes more complex. Considering the connections between these four components, it can be concluded that changes in principles and norms lead to changes in the regime. Principles and norms provide the basic defining characteristics of a regime, this is because changes of rules and decision-making procedures are mere changes within a regime.

There are strong connections between the ideas of neoliberals and the functions of a regime. Neoliberals argue that international regimes not only create reiteration, but also reduce verification costs and make it easier for member states to punish cheaters. Furthermore, they assert that regimes incorporating the norm of reciprocity delegitimize defection, and make it more costly. Thus international regimes do not substitute for reciprocity, but reinforce and institutionalize it.

The concept of cooperative security regime has important connotations for the concept of neoliberal institutionalism. The cooperative security concept appears to be the most applicable to Northeast Asia.

Chapter 3. Analysis of the Evolution of Security Cooperation Arrangements

This chapter will discuss the evolution of cooperative security in Northeast Asia as well as in the Asia-Pacific region. First, we need to explore the constraining and facilitating factors in building a military security cooperation regime. Then, we will review the existing security cooperation arrangements. Following the end of the Cold War, a lot of positive developments have been witnessed in the regional security in Northeast Asia. These developments include the continuous relaxation of the tension in the region, which resulted from the Soviet and Russian withdrawal from the region and the end of superpower confrontation; political solutions to the hot spots, positive development in the situation on the Korean Peninsula in particular; sustained and rapid economic development; profound security cooperation at different levels and on different issues; and the emerging regionalism in both economic and security fields, etc.

However, there are still some constraining factors in the security future in the region. They are unstable relations among the major powers, structural problems in Northeast Asia, arms race and proliferation, non-tradition threats, etc. Therefore, a sound security situation in the future in Northeast Asia depends heavily on the establishment of new security concepts, enhancement of security cooperation, collective efforts in countering transnational threats, practical and feasible programs for overcoming the constraining factors, and the peaceful unification of the splitting countries.

In the past decade, there have been many security dialogue initiatives in the whole

Asia-Pacific region. However there are only a few governmental or non-governmental organizations in Northeast Asia. Some of the representative cooperative security organizations where most Northeast Asian countries attend as members will be examined. Among those, dealing with security issues in Asia-Pacific, ARF is the most promising organization in that it is an official security related organization bringing together most great powers and regional countries. CSCAP as an example of regional non-governmental organizations will be examined. It is the most ambitious proposal to date for a regularized, focused and inclusive non-governmental process on Asia-Pacific security matters. Finally, other security and defense dialogues including NEACD in Northeast Asia will be discussed.

3.1. New Northeast Asian Security Order

The region of Northeast Asia refers to the northern part of the Asian continent, including the Asian mainland, the Japanese islands, the Korean peninsula and Siberia. The first group of regional actors is composed of core states including the People's Republic of China (PRC), Japan, Russia, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). External to but influential in the region is the United States, which has been the major power and driving force of the Pacific region since the turn of the 20th century.

Northeast Asia can be characterized as the convergence of interests of four of the world's most powerful nations-the United States, China, Japan, and Russia. It is also a unique region where both free-market economy and socialist-control economy as well as developed and developing countries coexist. The Northeast Asia region is the most

economically dynamic area in the world. The new security environment in the Asia-Pacific is shaped by the U.S. as superpower with economic and military dominance, the economic and political emergence of a reforming China, Japan as a more extended security role with industrial power, the changing role of Russia as a land-based power, the middle power of South Korea, and North Korea as a source of security tension.

It is clear that no one in the region considers Russia to be a formidable strategic threat today. Not only has Russia become a non-threat, it has in fact provided new opportunities for economic and security cooperation. For example, Russia is able to influence the Korean peninsula to reduce tension, at least by refusing to provide North Korea with military aid. Next to the demise of the former Soviet Union, the most positive factor in the post-Cold War environment in Asia has been the dynamic evolution of the Chinese economy into a so-called “socialist-market” economy. While there is concern about the growth of Chinese military power, the impact of Chinese economic reform might overwhelm negative developments and shape China into a rational and reasonably cooperative power in Asia.¹

Growing multilateralism is also one of the current conspicuous features in Northeast Asia. The bilateral alliance system in Northeast Asia is inappropriate. Instead, new security strategies and new security arrangements are needed to manage the problems of a new geopolitical era.² As compared with Europe where the collective defense arrangement of NATO served the Western allies, the Asia-Pacific region has been characterized by the absence of common threats to a set of countries, as well as by the absence of an intergovernmental regional security organization. In its place a series of bilateral alliances were forged between the United States and its

¹ Khil Young Whan and Oh Kong Dan, “From Bilateralism to Multilateralism in Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific,” *Korea Observer* (Autumn 1994), pp. 395-96.

² David C. Unger, “Asian Anxieties, Pacific Overtures Experiments in Security for a New Asia-Pacific Community,” *World Policy Journal*, vol. 11, no. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 37-8.

security partners including Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines and Australia.

The Asian security environment, less structured than the European NATO-WTO environment, is rapidly becoming more complex and multi-polar.³ In place of the balance of power games that the regional powers may be tempted to play, a multilateral institution of regional security may serve to maintain peace and stability in the region.

A strong America, an advancing China, an uncertain Japan and a struggling Russia, will make up the new quartet of major powers in the Asia-Pacific.⁴ The interplay of their interests in Northeast Asia will influence the shape of regional order in the 21st century.

³ Francis Fukuyama and Oh Kongdan, *The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship after the Cold War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), p. 8.

⁴ "The New World Order," *The Economist*, January 8, 1994, pp. 21-3.


Map 3-1 Asia and Northeast Asia

Asia



Source: <http://edu.chungbuk.ac.kr/~geo/worldmap.htm#>, 11-13-2004

Northeast Asia



Source: <http://ace.acadiau.ca/history/nearwor/nearmap.htm> 11-13-2004

3.2. Analysis of Facilitating and Constraining Factors

3.2.1. Facilitating Factors

To study the Northeast Asian regional security into the future, one should first of all have a retrospect of the positive developments in the security situation in the region in the recent years. Such a study will help foster a true and clear understanding of sound aspects of the situation and increase the confidence in the regional security, thus contributing joint efforts to the maintenance of the peaceful and stable regional security environment.

Continuous Relaxation of the Tension

Following the end of Cold War, Russia had greatly reduced its armed forces in the Asian-Pacific region, by withdrawing its military presence from Vietnam and Mongolia, and by reducing its armed forces in the Russian Far East. The Russian actions had not only reduced its military pressure on its neighbors, but also led to the diminishing of the military confrontation between the two superpowers. The end of the superpowers' military confrontation has promoted the further relaxation of the security situation in the region. Thanks to the joint efforts of the countries concerned, the relaxation is still continuing.

Political Solutions to the Hotspots

The end of Cold War has made entirely different impact on the European and the East Asian security situation. On the one hand, the principles and norms of the West for a new international order have catalyzed disorder, disintegration and wars in Europe. On the other hand, the East Asian region has entered the post-war era. This is mainly

manifested in the political solutions to the hot spots. The war in Cambodia settled politically. The end of civil war in Cambodia has helped to bring about continuous improvement of the relations among the nations, finally leading the full coverage of all the Southeast Asian nations by the ASEAN. Thanks to the joint efforts from the countries concerned, the situation in South China Sea has also brought under the control through the political dialogues and consultations.

What the researcher wants to discuss in particular is the development of the situation on Korean Peninsula. In 2000, a miracle was witnessed in the relations across the DMZ. There have been not only meetings and talks at different levels, including the summit, but also some practical measures for the improvement of the relations between the North and the South and for national reconciliation. These efforts of both Koreas have not only helped to ease the situation on the Peninsula and improve the relations of the two sides, but also helped to relax the security situation in the entire Northeast Asian region and improve the relations between North Korea on the one hand and the United States and Japan on the other. Although it is too early to say that the two Koreas will be unified very soon, yet the recent progresses in the relations between the North and the South are very conducive to the long-lasting stability, peace and prosperity in the East Asia.

Sustained and Rapid Economic Development

In the past 20 years or so, the Asian-Pacific region has been very dynamic in the economic development. Its average economic growth rate is about 6%. The sustained rapid economic growth in the region has not only attracted many investors, taken in large amount of investments, promoted rapid growth of the trade among the nations in

the region, increased the regional economic cooperation, but also increased the internal stability of the countries in the region, deepened their interdependence, thus creating conditions for enhancing the political and security cooperation among them and for the political solutions to the disputes on the basis of dialogue and negotiation. All these have effectively promoted regional stability and peace and improved the security situation.

Dynamics of Information Technology

Advances in information and communications technology did more than almost anything else to drive the last decade's economic boom and cultural exchanges in Northeast Asia. The Internet has increased the speed of development – electronic commerce, although still in an early phase, has already transformed industry after industry by enabling greater efficiency. E-mail and instant messaging are ubiquitous in industrial states. The money spent on the digital infrastructure that supports these burgeoning new services – from the Internet servers to fiber-optic networks –has itself become a major factor in security cooperation. With mobile phones or the Internet links to report diseases and order vaccines and other medicines, new partnerships between NGOs and pharmaceutical companies could discover large new markets for low-priced basic medicines packaged in disposable self-injectors. Continuous, profitable innovation requires three things: knowledge development, the cross-fertilization of ideas among knowledgeable people, and good government.⁵

Access to digital networks could improve quality of life more generally, by allowing people to summon help, share experiences with others, form political coalitions across borders, and their voices to regional security affairs. Greater

⁵ Nian Hachigian, "China's Cyber-Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 80 No. 2, (March/April 2001), p.133.

connectivity will also help fulfill the nearly insatiable human thirst for information and expose geographically isolated communities to wider horizons and new opportunities, which could create a more modern social and political within a single generation.⁶

Most important, information technology and specifically the Internet, provides the nerve system for the epistemic community to share ideas and influence domestic populations. This more than anything else can contribute to an understanding of and desire for a multilateral security regime.

Profound Security Cooperation

Thanks to the relaxation of the situation and improvement of the relations between the countries in the region, security cooperation at different levels, on different issues and in the different frameworks has been very dynamic in the past few years, the security cooperation in the framework of ARF in particular, of which all the East Asian nations are members. Thanks to the joint efforts, ARF has been playing a very positive role in enhancing the mutual understanding and mutual trust. Since its founding in 1994, remarkable achievements have been materialized in CBMs on the basis of consultation and dialogue. The members of ARF have reached a lot of consensus in the CBMs. They agreed to exchange views on regional security situation and security concepts, carry out dialogues on defense policies, exchange information on military exercises, invite observers to the military exercises, call for the registration of conventional weapons, discuss the global and regional nonproliferation, circulate the information on the defense exchanges, promote the engagement of the senior officers and defense education institutions, explore the maritime security and cooperation,

⁶ Allen L. Hammond, "Digitally Empowered Development," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 80, No.2 (March/April 2001), pp. 96-106.

strengthen the cooperation between search and rescue agencies, run training classes for the peace keepers and exchange experience in disaster relief. These CBMs are important component of the security cooperation in the region.

Besides the security cooperation in the framework of the ARF, there are also other forms of security cooperation in East Asia. In the bilateral cooperation, there are different ways of U.S. cooperation with its allies in the region. There are different levels of cooperation between the United States and China in different fields. There are also other forms of bilateral cooperation, such as the Sino-Vietnamese cooperation in the peaceful settlement of the border disputes, that between China and Russia in delimiting the boundary, that between China and Japan in establishing different CBMs in different fields. In the past few years, we have witnessed the multilateral cooperation, such as the security consultations between the United States, China and Japan, Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, etc. The security cooperation at different levels and in different forms has contributed a lot to the peace and stability.

Emerging Regionalism

After the end of the Cold War, the development of the regionalism in East Asia could be found in both economy and security. The economic regionalism in the region is developing simultaneously with the globalization. Economic regionalism may lead to the security regionalism. Regionalism is not new in other regions like Western Europe or North America, where the countries concerned have not only established economic cooperation organizations, like EU and Free Trade Zone in North America, but also corresponding mechanism to ensure the economic cooperation in the regions. These have not only increased their economic competitiveness, but also increased their

capability to prevent and deal with any economic crisis which might occur. Because of the tremendous diversities in the region, regionalism in East Asia is still yet to be developed. There is neither economic cooperation organization, nor mechanism to ensure the economic cooperation in the region. Therefore, many scholars and statesmen have urged to establish an organization of economic cooperation and corresponding mechanism, so as to rail the economic cooperation among the countries in the region on the right track. They believe that without such an organization and mechanism, it is difficult for any country in the region, including Japan, to compete with the other two economic zones, and difficult for any country in the region to prevent the occurrence of economic and financial crisis like that happened in 1997, and also difficult for the region to manage the crisis once it happens. Fortunately, thanks to the efforts of the scholars and statesmen, consensus is being reached on the establishment of such an organization. Many scholars and statesmen have suggested to develop the present "10+3" into such an organization. If that suggestion is materialized, the economic regionalism will develop rapidly. This will in turn promote the development of the security regionalism in the region.

In accordance with '2002 Open Door,' the total number of foreign students in the U.S. was 66,836 from India, 63,211 from China, and 49,046 from South Korea, and 46, 810 from Japan were on order in terms of number.⁷ 56 percent of foreign students came from Asian students, 12 percent from Latin America. In the mean time, numbers of American students in foreign states were 154,168. Exchange of students contributes to alleviating anti-American sentiment and facilitating cultural solidarity and resolving conflict in the peaceful manner.

In accordance with National Oversea Fund Management Committee, Chinese

⁷ *Yunhap*, November 18, 2002

Education Ministry, 35,353 South Korea students occupied 45.5 percent of the total foreign students in China. 12,765 Japan students are the second, 3,693 U.S. students as third largest studied in China. China sends 85,829 students to foreign countries. The dynamic exchange of education exemplifies regionalism, which greatly contributes to reshaping young generation mindsets in the region.⁸

3.2.2. Constraining Factors

The countries and people in the East Asia have enjoyed peaceful security environment for pretty long time. Observing the improving relationship between the six actors in Northeast Asia, there are several major issues frequently debated by researchers. However, we have to see that in the regional security situation, there are still some problems, which are quite negative to the maintenance of peace and stability, and to the further improvement of the security environment in the region.

Unstable Relations among the Major Powers

Security concerns also arise from the changing distribution of power among the major players, including the perceived negative implications of American hegemony, the perception of China threat, and the fear of a remilitarized Japan as it becomes a “normal” power.⁹

First, an unexpected key development, the consequences of which are still unfolding, is the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the U.S., the U.S. base realignment issue and planned reduction of U.S. troops in Korea and Japan has been noted as an uncertain factor in regional security. Second, the successful economic

⁸ *Daily Economy Newspaper*, March 3, 2004

⁹ Muthiah Alagappa, “Predictability and Stability Despite Challenges,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Order* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p.6.

development of Asia has been a frequent subject for Asian security researchers. Thus the complexity of the interrelationships between economic growth and security in Asia has also been a popular subject in numerous articles.¹⁰ Third, the future of China is perhaps the most pressing question in what is becoming the world's most important region. The possibility of a "China threat," therefore, has become a hotly debated topic.¹¹

Structural Problems in the Northeast Asian Economy

Although Northeast Asian economy has been growing very fast, yet the financial crisis started in 1997 has fully indicated the fact that the Asian economy is very fragile because of the following reasons.

First, the economy in most of the countries in East Asia is problematic in structure. This economy has been very successful and developing very fast in the industrial era, because the countries have been able to adept themselves to manufacture industry in

¹⁰ James A. Dorn, "Economic Liberty and Democracy in East Asia," *Orbis*, vol. 37, no. 4 (1993), pp. 599-618; Bernard K. Gordon, "The Asia-Pacific Rim: Success At a Price," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 1, (1991), pp. 142-59; Robert B. Oxnam, "Asia-Pacific Challenge," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 1 (1993), pp. 56-73; Stuart Harris, "Policy Networks and Economic Cooperation : Policy Coordination in the Asia-Pacific Region," *The Pacific Review*, vol. 7, no. 4 (1994), pp. 381-95, and, "The Economic Aspects of Security in the Asia/Pacific Region," op. cit. ; James A. Dorn, op. cit.; Viochi Funabashi, "Bridging Asia's Economics-Security Gap," *Survival*, vol. 38, no. 4 (1997), pp. 101-16.

¹¹ Weixing Hu, "China's Security Agenda after the Cold War," *The Pacific Review*, vol. 8, no. 1 (1995), pp. 117-35; Harry Harding, "A Chinese Colossus," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 18, no. 3 (1995), pp. 104-22; Bonnie S. Glaser, "China's Security Perception: Interests and Ambitions," *Asian Survey*, vol. 33, no. 3 (1993); Yasheng Huang, "China's Economic Development: Implications for its Political and Security Roles," *Adelphi*, no. 275 (1993), pp. 49-57; "Preventive Measures," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 4, 1994; Vincent Cable and Peter Ferdinand, "China as an Economic Giant: Threat or Opportunity?" *International Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 2 (1994), pp. 243-261; Yihong Zhang, "China Heads toward Blue Waters," *International Defense Review*, no. 26 (1993), pp. 879-80; David Wall, "China as a Trade Partner: Threat or Opportunity for the OECD," *International Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 2 (1996), pp. 329-44; Larry M. Wortzel, "China Pursues Traditional Great-Power Status," *Orbis*, vol. 38, no. 2 (1994), pp. 157-75; Ross H. Munro, "China's Waxing Spheres of Influence," *Orbis*, vol. 38, no. 4 (1994), pp. 585-605; Denny Roy, "The China Threat Issue: Major Arguments," *Asian Survey*, vol. 36, no. 8 (1996), pp. 758-71; Gary Klintworth, "Greater China and Regional Security," in *Asia Pacific Security: Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities?*, ed. Gary Klintworth (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 35-49; David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," *Survival*, vol. 36, no. 2 (1994), pp. 43-59; Gary Klintworth, "China: Status Quo Power or Regional Threat," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, vol. XII, no. 2 (Summer/Fall, 1998), David Hale and Hughes Hale, "China Takes Off," *Foreign Affairs* vol.82, no.6, (Nov/Dec, 2003)

the past decades. It will be very difficult for them to sustain their high-speed economic development. The economic problem has brought about internal turbulence and new instability in some countries in Northeast Asia.

Second, many countries in the region have attached great importance to the globalization of the world economy, but neglected the other trend of the world economy, that is the regionalism. Therefore, the countries in Northeast Asia have done very little to promote the development of the regionalism in the region. As a result, there is no organization of economic cooperation among the countries in the region, not to mention the mechanism to ensure the effective economic cooperation among the countries in the region.

Third, because of the lack of an organization for economic cooperation, it is very difficult, or even impossible, for the countries to cooperate and coordinate their policies in case of crisis. Because of this, security cooperation is difficult to go deeper.

Arms Race and Proliferation

After the end of the Cold War, tremendous achievements have been witnessed in international arms control and countering the proliferation of WMD in the world.

However, the Northeast Asia has been the most dynamic region in arms build-up and proliferation. In terms of arms proliferation and military posture, countries in Northeast Asia had experienced a sustained build-up of modern conventional weapon systems even after the end of the Cold War. There has been a major destabilizing factor in this region. There is frequent speculation that an arms race is taking place in East Asia. The Northeast Asia region is now the second largest weapons market to the Middle East.

Table 3-1 National Power of Six Countries

(): 2005 defense

budget

Classification	GDP Per capita	Population	Defense Budget	Military Manpower
U.S.	10.9tr 37,750	291,004,000	404.9bn(453.6bn)	1,433,600
China	1.43tr 1,115	1,288,400,000	22.4bn(25.0bn)	2,255,000
Japan	4.34tr 34,120	127,210,000	42.8bn(45.1bn)	239,900
Russia	1.31tr 9,190	143,425,000	10.6bn(14.2bn)	1,212,700
South Korea	605bn 12,635	47,479,000	14.6bn(16.4bn)	687,700
North Korea	22bn 973	22,612,000	1.6bn(1.8bn)	1,106,000

Source: *The Military Balance 2004-2005* (London: Oxford University Press for IISS, 2004)

What is certainly true is that defense expenditure is increasing in the region as shown on Table 3-1, while world military expenditure is decreasing. Of great concern is spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery system. North Korea's nuclear issue has caused major international concern. North Korea's test of the Taepodong missile in August 1998 over Japan's main island created much consternation in Tokyo and Washington.¹²

Non-traditional Threats

Since the end of the Cold War, the traditional military threat has been diminishing gradually with the end of the military confrontation between the United States and Russia, yet the non-traditional threats are arising. In the recent years, non-traditional threats have been found in terrorist attacks, piracies, drug-smuggling, uneven

¹² Muthiah Alagappa, *ibid*, p.5.

development, worsening environment, political instability in some countries, hacker attacks through computers, etc. Although these threats are non-traditional, they are very realistic and practical. They are posing threats to almost all countries in the region. If these threats are not properly handled in concerted efforts, they may seriously undermine the peaceful and stable security situation in the region.

Territorial Disputes and Militant Nationalism

Last, in Northeast Asia, there remains much fertile ground for regional conflict. There are numerous issues of simmering and potential conflict involving competing sovereignty claims and territorial disputes.¹³


There are competing Russian and Japanese claims to the Southern Kuril islands—referred to by the Japanese as ‘the Northern territories,’ Japan and China are also competing over the Diaoyutai (Senkaku) islands in the East China Sea. Korea and Japan are competing over small island Dokdo (Dakeshida) in East Sea.

Though Russia and China have apparently come to an understanding on how to end their centuries-old border dispute, agreeing to the joint development of several islands on the Amur and Ussuri rivers, which have divided the countries for 300 years, a lot

¹³ Ji Guoxing, “The Diaoyutai (Senkaku) disputes and prospects for settlement,” *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, vol. 6, no.2 (1994), pp. 285-311; “The Diaoyutai Islands (Senkaku Islands) and Other Islands are China’s Territory,” *Peking Review*, vol. 15, Part 19 (May 1972), pp. 18-23; Tao Cheng, “The Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands and the law of Territorial Acquisition,” *Virginia Journal of International Law*, vol. 14, Part 2 (1974), pp. 221-66; “Naval confrontation in Spratly Islands,” *International Defense Review*, no. 28 (1995); “No need for war in South China Sea,” *International Defense Review*, no. 28 (1995), pp. 22-6; Eric Hyer, “The South China Sea disputes: implications of China’s earlier Territorial settlements,” *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 68, no. 1 (1995), pp. 34-54; Mark Valencia, “China and the South Sea disputes,” *Adelphi*, no. 298, (1996), pp. 1-67; Rajan Menon, “Japan-Russia Relations and Northeast Asian Security,” *Survival*, vol. 38, no. 2, 1996, pp. 59-78; Hiroshi Kimura, “The Soviet Proposal on Confidence-Building Measures and the Japanese Response,” *Journal of International affairs*, vol. 37, no. 1 (1983), pp. 81-104; George Ginburgs, “The End of the Sino-Russian Conflict”

remains to be done to put this into practice. These territorial disputes have been the most serious obstacle to a major improvement of the security of Northeast Asia.

Map 3-2 Territorial, Historical Disputes



Source: 2004 Northeast Strategic Balance (Seoul: Korea Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004)

One of the principal surprises of the post-Cold War era has been the degree to which ethnic nationalism has emerged as a cause of horrific conflict. We need to watch the trend of regional hostile nationalism, which is exemplified in China's historical manipulation of the Kokuryo incident, the re-emergence of right wing in Japan, and anti-American sentiment in Korea.

3.3. Existing Security Cooperative Arrangements in the Asian Pacific

3.3.1. ARF

The most striking effort recently made in Asia is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This is the first multilateral security system fitting the concept of security regimes. This system was created in 1993 when the ASEAN- Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) took place in Singapore with eighteen participant countries. ASEAN which was formed in 1967 in order to facilitate economic and cultural cooperation among its members, agreed to call for more talks on security matters through a forum such as ASEAN's annual meeting with its main trading partners – the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea in January 1992.¹⁴ In the July meeting of the same year, security issues were placed on the agenda for the first time. At that time, in the so-called 'Singapore Declaration,' heads of the ASEAN states agreed to intensify external dialogue on political and security matters by using the ASEAN-PMC. This meeting was a milestone not only for ASEAN, but for the entire Asia-Pacific region, for it brought together the twelve Pacific Rim countries and the European Community for multilateral talks. Indeed, this was the first post-Cold War attempt in Asia to cement continuing discussions on regional security on a multilateral basis.

While most of the participating countries in ASEAN-PMC shared a belief in the necessity of the formation of an institution for multilateral security cooperation, they had not reached an agreement on membership, process or agenda. They agreed to develop a pattern for a region-wide security forum in July 1993 and had their first

¹⁴ *Korea Herald*, January 29, 1992.

meeting in Bangkok in July 1994.¹⁵

In the first meeting in Bangkok in July 1994, participants agreed to an arrangement designed to start the process of building trust among nations, including the United States, China, Russia, and Vietnam.¹⁶ In the final communiqué it was agreed that the Forum had enabled countries within the region to engage in dialogue and consult with each other on “political and security issues of common interest and concern” and that participants saw the ARF as a body capable of making “significant contributions to efforts toward confidence building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.”¹⁷ In relation to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, the ARF expressed concern about nuclear developments on the Korean Peninsula, welcomed the continuation of the U.S.-North Korea negotiations and “endorsed the early resumption of inter-Korean dialogue.”¹⁸

The second meeting was held on August 1, 1995 at Bandar Seri Begawan, the capital of the ASEAN host nation, Brunei. This meeting followed up on the first meeting decision, releasing a ‘concept paper’ that provided more concrete steps for developing confidence building and implementing preventive diplomacy. These steps constituted a three-stage evolutionary approach: Stage I involves the promotion of confidence-building measures (CBMs); Stage II, the development of mechanisms for preventive diplomacy; and Stage III, the development of mechanisms for conflict resolution. Other measures, such as establishing a zone of cooperation in the disputed South China Sea, were identified as more ambitious medium to long-term objectives. These proposals were adopted at Brunei with the caveat that the ARF should only

¹⁵ *Dong-a Ilbo*, July 26, 1994.

¹⁶ *Korea Herald*, July, 26 1994.

¹⁷ ASEAN Regional Forum, Press Release, *Chairman’s Statement, The First Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)*, July 25, 1994, Bangkok.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

progress at a pace comfortable for all.¹⁹ The signing of the South East Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty by all Heads of Government of Southeast Asia countries in Bangkok in December 1995 also signifies another important contribution of the countries of Southeast Asia to the strengths of security in the region.²⁰

The third ASEAN Regional Forum was held in Jakarta on July 23, 1996. The participants discussed the criteria for participation in the ARF. India and Myanmar joined the ARF as new participants. The meeting also discussed a wide range of issues relevant to the question of peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region, such as nuclear testing in the region, the global elimination of anti-personnel mines, seeking solutions on the South China Sea territorial disputes by peaceful means and, peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.²¹ Despite these active discussions, this meeting had no concrete results on CBMs in that they merely expressed a concern on the security issues on the Korean Peninsula.

The fourth ASEAN Regional Forum was held in Subang Jaya, Malaysia on July 27, 1997. In the meeting a wide range of issues relevant to the question of peace and security of the region were discussed. As well as the same issues discussed in the third meeting, the new issues were as follows:

The regional countries

- Encouraged ARF participants to continue pursuing bilateral and sub-regional measures suited to their needs, and applicable to their specific conditions, to advance mutual trust and confidence in a gradual and incremental manner;
- Underlined the importance of the development of positive relations, particularly among the

¹⁹ William T. Tow and Richard A. Gray, "Asia-Pacific Security Regimes: Conditions and Constraints," *Australian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 30, 1995, pp. 436-51.

²⁰ ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), *Chairman's Statement: The Second ASEAN Regional Forum*, Brunei Darulsalam, August 1, 1995.

²¹ ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), *Chairman's Statement: The Third ASEAN Regional Forum*, Jakarta, 23 July 23, 1996.

major countries in Asia Pacific – the United States, China, Japan, and the Russian Federation– in sustaining stability in the region;

- Welcomed the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention which provides for a verifiable global ban on chemical weapons;
- Expressed concern over the latest developments on the situation in Cambodia;
- Discussed the trans-boundary movement of nuclear waste in the region.²²

In spite of all these developments, however, an initiative of the relatively small nations of Southeast Asia raised the question of whether it can realistically address the problems of Northeast Asia or draw in the major powers on important peace and security issues. Even though the ARF agreed to express a concern about North Korean nuclear issues in the first meeting, the two Koreas may well feel that this is an inappropriate place to discuss their sensitive relationship.²³

A second question to be addressed is the scope of the CBMs: that is, whether the ARF will be able to establish region-wide CBMs in the Asia-Pacific Region. In 1996, a policy was agreed to freeze the expansion of membership, at least for the time being.²⁴ This means that the application of CBMs within the framework of the ARF might not be expanded to Northeast Asia beyond the Southeast Asian sub-region, because of the non-participation of North Korea. Besides other major security issues in Northeast Asia, like APEC, CBMs can not be expected on the Korean Peninsula through the ARF process without the participation of North Korea. Moreover, ARF member states do not seem very interested in addressing the question in Northeast Asia. According to Masahiko Asada, it is due to the many problems they have among

²² ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), Chairman's Statement: *The Fourth ASEAN Regional Forum*, Subang Jaya, July 27, 1997.

²³ Edward C. Luck, "Layers of Security: Regional Arrangements, the United Nations, and the Japanese-American Security Treaty," *Asian Survey*, vol. XXXV, no. 3, March 1995, p. 251.

²⁴ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 11, 1996; *Asahi Shimbun*, May 11, 1996.

themselves and with their immediate neighbors.²⁵

Last, Asada also raised another question that should be addressed in relation to Asia-Pacific CBMs which is the objects of measures to be applied. He argued that it would make little sense to agree on CBMs, which do not cover naval activities in the Asia-Pacific region. The region has witnessed a tremendous naval build-up, which has amplified the already predominantly naval character of the regional confrontation based on territorial disputes. Moreover, the possible further reduction of the U.S. troops from the region would also make its presence even more naval than now.²⁶ Establishing a zone of cooperation in the disputed South China Sea was identified as a more ambitious medium to long-term objective in the fifth ARF meeting,²⁷ leaving the maritime CBMs in Northeast Asia untouched as one of those major limits of ARF.

On June 18, 2003 China proposed that a security group involving defense authorities should be set up under the aegis of the ASEAN Regional Forum. This followed China's October 2002 request for bilateral dialogue with NATO on border regional security issues – a subject at the heart of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperative Organization).²⁸ Some political analysts have compared the ASEAN Regional Forum with the OSCE. However, the ARF lacks mechanism for comprehensive mutual security measures and cooperative threat reduction measures. Moreover, the ARF does not contain the same sort of human rights initiatives as the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.²⁹

North Korea's entry into the ARF in 2000 would be significant, since it would be

²⁵ Masahiko Asada, "Japan and a New Drift toward Confidence Building in the Asia Pacific Region: Retrospect and Prospect," in Robert E. Bedeski *ed.*, *Confidence Building in the North Pacific: New Approaches to the Korean Peninsula in the Multilateral Context*, presented in Canada/Korea North Pacific Arms Control Workshop, June 10 to 13, 1966 (Canada: University of Victoria, 1996), p.134.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.135.

²⁷ William T. Tow and Richard A. Gray, *op. cit.*, pp. 436-51.

²⁸ *The Military Balance 2003-2004* (London: IISS, 2003), p.147.

²⁹ Larry M. Wortzel, *The ASEAN Regional Forum: Asian Security Without an American Umbrella* (Carlisle, P.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1976), pp.1 and 30.

part of the hermit kingdom's gradual opening up to the rest of the world and would increase Pyongyang's familiarity with the international norms and procedures. The creation and success of the Six Party Talks related to North Korea nuclear issue will be regional security dialogue mechanism, but this would serve more as a confidence-building measure, not as a substitute for the U.S. military alliance structure. The ARF remains an ineffective tool for settling or even managing regional disputes. The ARF had the potential to evolve from a forum for tentative dialogue to a more institutionalized framework that would promote regional confidence-building. As a new century dawns and the security problems of the region intensify, even the boldest advocates of multilateral approaches to Northeast Asia security have been chastened.

ASEAN, the anchor for Asia-Pacific cooperative security arrangements, was especially hard hit. While it could not be blamed for failing to prevent the economic crisis, its inability to arrest the strategic and political fallout, including renewed bilateral tensions among its members, was damaging to its credibility as a regional security community. Lately, ASEAN has recovered some lost ground. Terrorism has spurred greater security cooperation among its members, even though much of it is outside of the formal ASEAN framework. ASEAN's response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was prompt and effective.

The ARF has been slow to move from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy. It has had little role in managing the crisis on the Korea peninsula, even though North Korea is a member. ARF will undoubtedly continue to play an important role. The major powers in the region should modify their policies a little bit so as to adapt themselves to the situation in which major powers are led by the countries which are smaller in size and weaker in strength. The ARF itself has to be practical. It should work out a feasible program for the future. In working out the program, the

members should fully take into account of the reality and diversities in the region. It should never introduce the mechanism for the intervention of the internal affairs of its members.³⁰

Cooperation between ASEAN and China, Japan and South Korea is an important channel for East Asian leaders to exchange views on strengthening cooperation in the region, and is conducive to enhancing mutual understanding, trust and mutually beneficial cooperation among East Asian countries. It advocates that it should be expanded into all-directional cooperation on the existing basis, that dialogue and cooperation in the political and security fields be gradually developed on the principles of achieving unity through consultation and making steady advance, and that this cooperation be started with cooperation in the non-traditional fields of security.

At the sideline of the ASEAN summit in October 2003 the leaders of China, Japan, and South Korea have pledged to promote a security dialogue to maintain stability in East Asia. Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi, and South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun agreed to cooperate to ensure that the Korean Peninsula would remain nuclear-free, set up a joint committee to monitor activities, and submit a progress report to future summit meetings. These proposals have the potential to become the building blocks of a Northeast Asia community but, despite the encouraging moves, most regional cooperation thus far has been in the form of economic cooperation. This East Asian economic interdependence alone is not sufficient to stem the rising tide of nationalist sentiment

Despite all good intentions, ASEAN and ARF remain weak institutions. The ASEAN+3 falls short of being a rule-based multilateral institution, let alone a solely

³⁰ <http://www.nautilus.org/nukepolicy/workshops/shanghai-01/zhucpap>, 08-29-2004

East Asian community, mainly because it has neither a political base nor leadership structure that allows members to develop a sense of community, for neither Japan nor China is prepared to accept the other as leader with a view to achieving regional cooperation. The group was formed by ASEAN member states in 1999 to protest the U.S. refusal to accept the setting up of an Asian monetary fund that Japan had proposed. The result of the feeling of Wounded Nationalism and the drive to build an Asian community is in conflict with the principle of open regionalism espoused by APEC, which is now languishing due to the lack of decisive leadership by the Bush administration.

Although some scholars describe ASEAN as an “epistemic community,” it falls far short of this ideal and lacks a common identity, and it has become very clear – since the currency crisis of 1997-1998, the East Timor crisis of 1999, and the 2002 terrorist attack in Bali – that ASEAN lacks leadership and solid consensus on such issues as the fight against terrorism, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

ARF ministers endorsed a Chinese proposal to establish an ARF defense official forum at the deputy minister level during the 11th annual ARF Ministerial meeting in Jakarta in early July 2004. The first ARF Security Policy Conference took place in Beijing on November 4-6, 2004. Military representatives from all 24 ASEAN countries participated. This annual gathering of senior military officials is meant to open new channels of dialogue and exchange among defense officials, and to promote the participation of national defense officials in the ARF, enhance mutual trust and understanding, and improve and enrich the ARF process. The participants reviewed the international and regional security situation, briefed each other on their own security policies, discussed the role defense departments play in dealing with nontraditional security threats including terrorism, drug-trafficking, money-laundering,

and weapons smuggling.³¹

3.3.2. CSCAP

The Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) stands as the most ambitious proposal to date for a regularized, focused and inclusive non-governmental process on Pacific security matters. A significant feature of the regional security landscape in the 1990s has been a proliferation of channels for multilateral discussion of regional security issues. Especially at the “non-governmental” level, great achievements have been made on the matter of multilateral security cooperation. The peculiar characteristic of these non-governmental approaches is that most of the channels have been of a “blended” or “track two” nature.³² They involve meetings of academics, journalists and occasionally politicians and also include governmental officials attending in “unofficial” or “private” capacity. Nowadays, the number of such non-governmental dialogue channels is more than twenty-three.³³

The concept of the CSCAP was first articulated at the Seoul meeting in November 1992 and formally announced in June 1993. The main thrusts of the CSCAP are:

- (1) To provide an informal mechanism by which political and security issues can be discussed by scholars, officials, and others in their private capacities;
- (2) To encourage the participation of such individuals from countries and territories in the Asia Pacific on the basis of the principle of inclusiveness;
- (3) To organize various working groups to address security issues and challenges facing the region;
- (4) To provide policy recommendations to various intergovernmental bodies on political-security

³¹ Raph A. Cossa and Jane Skanderup, Pacific Forum CSIS, 4th Quarter 2004: Regional Overview, p.9. <http://www.org/pacfor/cc/0404Qoverview.html> 01-25-2005

³² Paul M. Evans, “Managing Security Relations After the Cold War: Prospects for the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific,” *The Indonesian Quarterly*, vol. XXII, no. 1, 1994, pp. 62-3.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 62, and for details of such regional or sub-regional dialogue channels, See Desmond Ball, “The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP),” *The Indonesian Quarterly*, vol. XXI, no. 4, 1993, pp. 500-01.

issues;

- (5) To convene regional and international meetings and other cooperative activities for the purpose of discussing political-security issues;
- (6) To establish linkages with institutions and organizations in other parts of the world to exchange information, insights and experiences in the area of regional political-security cooperation; and
- (7) To produce and disseminate publications relevant to the other purposes of the organization.³⁴

In December 1994, the North Koreans, through their Institute for Disarmament and Peace in Pyongyang, joined CSCAP after the South Korean member committee signaled its strong support for their admission.³⁵ On December 9-10, 1996, in the sixth meeting of the CSCAP Steering Committee in Canberra, the two new members, China and Vietnam attended. The accession of China to CSCAP opened the way for CSCAP to more effectively support other regional security cooperation activities, including those of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). When it held its first General Meeting in Singapore on June 4, 1997, leaving the frequency, agenda, locations and modalities of such meetings for later decision, it agreed to convene a General Meeting on a regular basis.

As shown on Figure 3-1, CSCAP activities are guided by a Steering Committee composed of representatives of the broad-based member committees that have been established in each of the member countries. The CSCAP Steering Committee meets twice a year – in June in Kuala Lumpur and in December in one of the other member countries. The Steering Committee is co-chaired by a member from an ASEAN Member Committee and a member from a non-ASEAN Member Committee.

³⁴ CSCAP, “The CSCAP Charter.”

<http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSPAS/AUSCSCAP/Cscap.html#Struct>. 06-12-2004

³⁵ Ralph A. Cossa, “Multilateral Dialogue in Asia: Benefits and Limitations,” *Korea and World Affairs*, Spring 1995, p. 12.

Figure 3-1 CSCAP Structure³⁶

CSCAP STEERING COMMITTEE

Co-Chairs

Sub-Committees	Secretariat
<i>By-laws</i>	
<i>Finance</i>	
<i>Membership</i>	
<i>Planning</i>	
<i>Working Groups</i>	
Member Committees	Working Groups
<i>Australia</i>	<i>Comprehensive and Cooperative Security</i>
<i>Cambodia</i>	<i>Confidence and Security Building Measures</i>
<i>Canada</i>	<i>Maritime Cooperation</i>
<i>European CSCAP</i>	<i>North Pacific</i>
<i>India</i>	<i>Transnational Crime</i>
<i>Indonesia</i>	
<i>Japan</i>	
<i>Malaysia</i>	Observer
<i>Mongolia</i>	<i>Pacific Islands Forum</i>
<i>New Zealand</i>	
<i>North Korea</i>	
<i>Papua New Guinea</i>	
<i>People's Republic of China</i>	
<i>Philippines</i>	
<i>Russia</i>	
<i>Singapore</i>	
<i>South Korea</i>	
<i>Thailand</i>	
<i>USA</i>	
<i>Vietnam</i>	

Working groups established in 1993-4 are the primary mechanism for CSCAP

³⁶ <http://www.cscap.org/structure.htm>. 04-09-2004

activity:

- Maritime cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
- Enhancement of security cooperation in the North Pacific
- Concepts of cooperative and comprehensive security
- Confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), and particularly transparency, with regard to the proliferation and control of weapons of mass destruction and new weapons technology.³⁷

However, the CSCAP proposal has been challenged by some critics questioning to what degree the results of discussions could be reflected in real governmental policy making process.

Furthermore, like ARF, the broad-range membership of CSCAP might not be a proper venue where the Northeast Asia issues in particular can be dealt with.³⁸ Regardless of this criticism, the combinations of activities at different levels could break the fixed idea about sensitive and complex security issues. Thus, the CSCAP could act as a catalyst stimulating official thinking and policy and, in so doing, it is expected to prepare the ground for a more stable and peaceful regional order into the next century. Moreover, CSCAP is one of the few venues where the solution was found to the China-Taiwan membership. China is a member of CSCAP, and Taiwanese participants participating in the Working Groups have observer status in their personal capacity only.³⁹ It is also a promising signal for Northeast Asian security in that it includes all of major Northeast Asian countries, even North Korea. Ending the allergy to multilateral discussion, CSCAP no longer needs to be

³⁷ CSCAP, "About CSCAP."

<http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSPAS/AUSCSCAP/Cscap.html#Struct>. 06-12-2004

³⁸ Paul M. Evans, "Building Security: The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)," *The Pacific Review*, vol. 7, no. 2, 1994, pp. 128-130.

³⁹ Australia and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, *AUS-CSCAP Newsletter*, no.2, January 1996, <http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSPAS/AUSCSCAP/Auscnews2.html>. 04-09-2004

legitimated at either the non-governmental or governmental level. However, it does need to produce more concrete results.

The CSCAP is a unique forum for discussions on the transnational threat including terrorism. The CSCAP deals with the impact of the 9/11 event on regional politics and security, examines Islam and the West and in particular emphasized the role of political Islam and the difficulties the West has in understanding the aspirations of Muslims. The implications of the arrest a militant group in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia suggest “not just a security threat that can be crushed by military power but more of an ideological war for the hearts and minds of the Muslims of Southeast Asia who compromise part of the transnational community of Muslims called the Ummah.” There was some anxiety expressed about the direction of the American led war on global terrorism but there was far more agreement that military action was unlikely to resolve the problem. The problem that needs to be addressed was seen to be more ideological, political and especially economic. A war against terrorism that involves Muslim states should include diplomatic measures aimed at reassuring Muslims world wide, the paper went on to suggest, “that the West is not going to war against Islam and is not out to subjugate them.

America and her coalition partners should be actively respecting the rights of regional governments to deal with terrorist threats and terrorist activity in the region in their own way and should be consulting in the region with this principle in mind.

The CSCAP is normally attached to an academic institute at the university. Governments on the whole have a close relationship with the local CSCAP. Given the uncertain and perhaps critical situation in the region in the wake of September 11, it would seem essential for the University to retain the Center for Strategic Studies and consider strengthening its capability in consultation with the Government.

Networking is an obvious and integral part of being involved in the CSCAP regional working groups in the Council is essential.

It is obvious that terrorism and particularly counter terrorism is going to be a major element in the immediate future of CSCAP and is essential to be well represented and to contribute its expertise and to relate to its Asian neighbors in a professional and knowledgeable way. This is where police involvement becomes significant. James Veitch, Report of the 11th Meeting of CSCAP Working Group on Comprehensive and Cooperative Security, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Feb 4-5, 2002.⁴⁰

A Northeast Asian initiative for peace, prosperity and stability that is designed to direct change in the region, not simply to react to events, and which demonstrates commitment and pressure for institutional cooperation is required. Passivity is not an option as this allows for others with perhaps less benign intentions to take the initiative.

There is nothing automatic or inevitable about the process of bringing prosperity, peace and stability to Northeast Asia. Political courage and imagination combined with strategic vision should be the order of the day for the region's policy-makers.

Despite visible achievement, the ARF faces a number of uncertainties and constraints. One likely source of problem concerns ASEAN's central role within the ARF. ASEAN members leave no doubt as to who will "dominate and set the pace" of the ARF. Although ASEAN promises to "recognize the concerns and interests of" outside power, including the four major powers including the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia, it clearly expects the latter to accept ASEAN's leadership of the forum and the norms and principles that are specified by ASEAN. Another important question about

⁴⁰ http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/cscap_reports/Rpt11CCSWMtg.html 04-09-2004

the ARF's effectiveness concerns the relevance of ASEAN's sub-regional-conceived norms in a larger and, in many respects, a more complex security arena.

The "ASEAN way" of problem-solving, which involves consultations and consensus and a habit of avoiding direct, public confrontation in the interest of corporate solidarity, was developed when the threat of communist expansion served as a cementing factor for its otherwise divided membership. It is doubtful whether these norms and practices (which rely heavily on inter-personal and informal ties within the ASEAN grouping) can be successfully duplicated within a wider regional setting. Finally, the ARF faces a significant challenge in securing meaningful support from its largest Asian member, China's hitherto opposition to multilateralism is particularly debilitating for the ARF.

Beijing prefers bilateral solutions to the territorial dispute in the South China Sea. It has also taken a particularly hardline stand against Taiwanese participation in any regional security discussions.

The ARF could become the crucial institutional anchor for a regional security community. Politically, the ARF's roots are indigenous; it is not considered to be an implantation of foreign models of multilateralism such as the OSCE.

To be an effective instrument of a regional security community, the ARF must overcome a number of uncertainties and limitations. It does not have any specific "road map" or blueprint for action. Mere security consultation, or prescription of abstract norms will not suffice.

It should be noted that regional security institution-building in Southeast Asia is no longer an exclusively inter-governmental affairs. A number of non-governmental actors are increasingly active in promoting dialogues and suggesting policy options on regional security. While Northeast Asia Center for Regional Conflict Management

will play a key role in pushing Northeast Asia states in the direction of a formal process of security dialogue, the newly formed Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific might be expected to provide similar inputs into the ARF. Both have initiated studies on confidence-building and crisis-management measures; for example, a recent ASEAN Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) study has proposed measures ranging from national defense white papers, a Northeast arms register, greater regional cooperation in arms purchases, exchange of intelligence information, mutual invitation to observe force maneuvers, notification of forthcoming military exercises, exchange of information and comparison of estimates of military strengths, establishment of a procedures for crisis management based on the provision of the Treaty and the launching of security symposium program for facilitating contacts among senior and middle level officers in the region.

The impact of these studies remains to be seen. The so-called Track-II processes could compensate for some of the deficiencies and sensitivities obstructing the generation of policy ideas and options in the inter-governmental process of security dialogue and cooperation.

At present, ARF does not have a Secretariat of its own to lend support to year-long activities. It could be that strengthening the ARF Chair will lead to establishment of a Secretariat. In any case, these shortcomings are acknowledged here with the hope that bringing attention to them will cause them to be addressed in future. Some proposals regarding the future direction of ARF are appropriate here. ASEAN should increase its institutional capacity for managing the ARF; the main focus should continue to be on CBMs and preventative diplomacy measures; a subregional body should be encouraged for the Northeast Asian region (invoking only regional states) or the North Pacific region (including the U.S. and Canada); it is recommended that the ARF

should also facilitate strong instruments and processes for bilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia.⁴¹

3.3.3. The Shangri-La Dialogue

Since 2002, the IISS has hosted Asia's premier defense conference, the Shangri-La Dialogue. Over the first three years of this unique IISS experiment in multilateral defense diplomacy, defense ministers have attended and participated from the following countries: the U.S., UK, France, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Cambodia, the Philippines, Mongolia and Singapore. Deputy Defense Ministers or senior defense / security officials have participated from Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar and Russia. In 2003 the Asia Security Conference introduced to the delegations chiefs of defense staff, national security advisors, and permanent undersecretaries of ministries of defense, and the dialogue has also invited other officials with responsibility for intelligence, police and national security matters.

The result has been the growth of the Shangri-La Dialogue into the richest collection of defense professionals in the Asia-Pacific. The Asia-Pacific has many institutions, but it has no formal defense organization and it is expected that the Shangri-La Dialogue will serve as the best available vehicle for developing and channeling astute and effective public policy in the Asia-Pacific on defense and security.

The 3rd Shangri-La Dialogue took place at the Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore in early June 2004, U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Walter F. Doran stressed that Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI)

⁴¹ The Pacific Symposium, 2001 "Enhancing Regional Cooperation through New Multilateral Initiatives"
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~corcoran/NDU_2001_Pacific Symposium , 04-09-2004

was still embryonic, and that its focus was on intelligence-sharing rather than U.S. military deployments. Malaysia entered into discussions with the U.S. on maritime security, and defense ministers from the countries comprising the Five Power Defense Arrangements including the U.K., Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore announced plans for maritime counter-terrorism exercises. In late June, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia agreed to stage trilateral coordinated naval patrols in the Malacca Strait.⁴²

3.3.4. CHOD

U.S. PACOM annually hosts the regional conference, bringing together Asia-Pacific Chiefs of Defense (CHOD), Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff equivalents, for a series of discussions on regional defense issues.

The first-ever Chiefs of Defense Conference, held in Honolulu, Hawaii, was hosted by Adm. Joseph W. Prueher, Combatant Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. The theme for this two-day inaugural conference in October 1998 was "Asia-Pacific Security Challenges for the 21st Century," giving Asia-Pacific military leaders a chance to meet and discuss security, political and economic issues. Fourteen of the top military officials in the Asia-Pacific region attended.

The conference was designed to increase high-level dialogue and foster regional military-to-military cooperation. Expert regional speakers and round table discussions examined current challenges to maintaining security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Some specific issues on the agenda included methods to enhance interoperability, potential areas for multilateral cooperation, and the impact of economic interdependence and political challenges on security.

⁴² IISS, *The Military Balance 2004-2005* (London: Oxford University, 2004), p.165.

The conference broadened the opportunity for senior military leaders to talk about common problems and to share solutions. In conjunction with the senior level conference, defense attachés and military deputies of the 14 participating nations took part in a separate, but parallel, conference to discuss problems and solutions to issues such as modernization, interoperability and multilateral cooperation. The CHOD's conference continues to provide an excellent opportunity to foster understanding, build confidence among participants, strengthen relationships, and promote stability.⁴³

3.3.5. SEAS

The US Pacific Command and the Department of State have jointly sponsored the annual symposium on East Asia Security (SEAS) since 1986. This three-week, highly intensive program is designed for Asia-Pacific military and civilian security and defense professionals from throughout the Pacific Command area of responsibility, who are already policy-makers or are entering policy-making ranks. The Symposium begins in Hawaii and then travels to two or three Asian nations. At each stop the participants meet senior military and diplomatic officials, visit military units, and engage in discussions with security experts from think tanks. SEAS approaches security from a regional perspective, examines the U.S. role in the Asia-Pacific region, promotes theater security cooperation and identifies emerging issues in regional security.

The SEAS is designed to stimulate frank and open discussion. The program is conducted informally and all sessions are off-the-record so that participants can establish personal relationship and share their perspectives frankly. No uniforms are worn during the three weeks of the program. Protocol plays only a minor role. Social

⁴³ <http://forum.apan-info.net/spring99/cdc1.html> 02-12-2005

events are planned at each stop, so that the participants can get to know each other, their interlocutors and counterparts.

The SEAS alumni currently number 375 professionals in 25 nations in the Asia-Pacific region. The Office of the Public Diplomacy Advisors at USPACOM facilitates communication among this network and annually updates contact information for the SEAS alumni.

The SEAS Program goals are to create a forum in which security experts from the Asia-Pacific region can discuss security issues including counter-terrorism, affecting their nations with each other and with senior officials and specialists in each of the countries visited; to provide an understanding of U.S. security policies and operations in the Asia-Pacific region and to demonstrate American commitment and capabilities; to provide a venue for security policy-makers to develop a regional perspective on security issues and to examine the linkages among political, economic, and security issues in the region; and to identify emerging issues in regional security and areas of future cooperation among the nations of the region.⁴⁴

3.3.6. SCO

In June 2001, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This organization is a regional multilateral cooperation body established on the basis the “Shanghai five.” Since its founding, it has signed and published in succession the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separation and Extremism, the joint communiqué of the defense ministers, the statement of the prime ministers, the statement of the leaders of

⁴⁴ https://einstein.apan-in.net/QuickPlace/seas/Main.nsf/h_Toc/16e6_04-09-2004

⁴⁵ IISS, *The Military Balance 2003-2004* (London: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.128.

the law enforcement and security departments, and joint statement of the foreign ministers. The SCO propagates the “Shanghai Spirit” that features mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diverse civilizations and seeking common development, and promotes the establishment of a fair and rational new international political and economic order, thus advancing regional security and stability.

Attempts to form cooperative initiatives to tackle the main issues confronting Central Asian countries-namely drug trafficking, religious extremism and terrorism-have been undertaken through the regional security groupings.

The SCO became a fully-fledged international organization by January 1, 2004. It is establishing an anti-terrorism center in Bishkek, having conducted its first joint counterterrorism exercise in October 2002. With about 250 troops from China and Kyrgyzstan, this rapid reaction to terrorist threats is employed. Meanwhile, China and Kyrgyzstan, this marked China’s first military exercise with a foreign country, and was intended to test cooperation and rapid reaction to terrorist threats. Meanwhile, China and Kazakhstan have started cooperating against terrorist organizations such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, a Uighur separatist group in China’s Xinjiang province which is classed as a terrorist organization by both the UN and the U.S. State Department. Furthermore SCO counter-terrorism exercises took place in August 2003 in Kazakhstan and China, and some of these will include CRDF units. The SCO and the CSTO are showing signs of cooperation – a logical outcome given that their objectives and membership are similar, and both now have counter-terrorism bases in Kyrgyzstan.⁴⁵

The SCO has opened a Regional Anti-Terrorist Center (RATC) in Tashkent, which

gives Uzbekistan a more emphatic role in this Russian and Chinese-centered organization. In June 2003, NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson visited Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan seeking improved counter-terrorism cooperation. Kazakhstan voiced support for NATO's regional border security initiatives, dealing with the smuggling of drugs, weapons and radioactive material, while Kyrgyzstan asked for NATO support in border security matters and agreed to broaden ties with NATO. NATO also hopes to increase cooperation with Uzbekistan. These new initiatives are in addition to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program which NATO already runs with many central Asian countries. PfP includes joint training and exercises.

3.4. Existing Military Security Cooperative Arrangements in Northeast Asia

3.4.1. NEACD

The most prominent of the formalized subregional Track Two dialogue mechanism is the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) sponsored by the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC).⁴⁶ The NEACD was founded in 1993. Meeting roughly once a year, NEACD provides a "track-two," or unofficial, forum where foreign and defense ministry officials, military officers, and academics from China, Russia, North and South Korea, Japan, and the United States are able to meet for frank discussions of regional security issues. NEACD

⁴⁶ Ralph A Cossa, "Asia-Pacific Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security," in Michael Krepon, Michael Newbill, Khushid Khoja, Jenny S. Drezin, eds., *Global Confidence Building* (London: Macmillan Press LTD, 2000), p.25.

meets annually and brings together foreign and defense ministry officials, military officers and academics from the six nations involved in the Six-Party talks, for talks on security issues.⁴⁷

The NEACD, which is funded by the U.S. Department of State, is considered the leading track-two forum in Northeast Asia. Northeast Asia contains a number of ongoing ideological and territorial conflicts that stem from the Cold War era. Four of the world's most powerful nations (the United States, China, Japan, and Russia) possess important interests in Northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula, yet the region lacks multilateral forums for resolving long-standing security conflicts, let alone for averting new ones. The risk of instability at best, and direct military conflicts at worst, compels the search for new mechanisms to reduce the dangers and enhance cooperation in Northeast Asia. Until the establishment of the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, however, not even an informal consultative process existed to advance such important objectives.

While there are other broader regional processes, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), that deal with a wider selection of nations in the Asia Pacific and their security concerns, the goal of the NEACD is to supplement these regional forums with a sub-regional approach; namely by involving the six nations with the largest militaries and the most at stake in the security situation in Northeast Asia. Generally, six representatives from each country participate in the NEACD meetings: one policy-level official each from the foreign and defense ministries, a uniformed military officer, and two participants from private research facilities, think tanks, or universities. Participants from the United States have included deputy assistant secretaries for East Asia and the Pacific from the Defense and State Departments.

⁴⁷ "Northeast Asia Needs Security Structure" Say http://www.townhall.com/news/politics/200411/FOR_2004_1117c.12-28-2004

The informality of the process allows the participants to air their concerns and brainstorm about new approaches to building cooperation and reducing the risk of conflict in Northeast Asia. At each meeting of the Dialogue, there is a session on national perspectives on security in Northeast Asia. One participant from each of the states concerned, almost always the foreign ministry representative, is invited to give a brief presentation to the group to outline his/her country's perspective about the security situation in Northeast Asia. The substance of the presentation is completely up to the presenter, but can include the country's policies in the region and its concerns about the policies of other states in the region. Emphasis is upon what has changed since the previous meeting. Following each presentation, there is a question and answer period when any participant can ask questions to the presenter or the presenter's colleagues from that country.

A pair of similar study projects on defense information sharing and principles of cooperation in Northeast Asia were held in Honolulu, Hawaii, with the principles group establishing a set of principles that were endorsed by the NEACD plenary discussions. The Defense Information Sharing (DIS) study project has now met seven times since its creation. In the fall of 1999, DIS met in Tokyo and discussed the drafting and contents of each state's defense budget. North Korea representatives participated in the NEACD in Moscow in 2002 for the first time.⁴⁸ The most recent DIS study project took place in California in May 2004.

One conclusion that has emerged is that military confidence-building measures (CBMs) may be conceptually too narrow for this region. Mutual reassurance measures (MRMs), broader measures to promote a basis for mutual confidence and reassurance

⁴⁸ North Korea used to expressed discomfort with NEACD's "four plus two" format since it has never trusted the U.S. or Japan. North Korea became increasingly suspicious of China, given China's improved relations with South Korea, and wrote off Russia as generally unreliable. As a result, Pyongyang felt somewhat isolated; it tended to see "four plus two" as "four plus two" as "four or five versus one."

that include but are not limited to military-related measures, may be more appropriate to Northeast Asia. Second, there was understanding among participants that the NEACD process should continue. There currently exists no other channel, formal or informal, for this particular set of nations to come together in a multilateral setting. Third, participants see the NEACD as open-ended: while over the long run, this forum may move toward an official multilateral process, this possibility remains premature for the near term.⁴⁹

3.4.2. LNWFZ-NEA

Since 1992, senior retired military officials, diplomats, nuclear scientists, business leaders, and security-oriented academics from the U.S., China, Japan, Russia, Korea, and Mongolia have been involved in an effort sponsored by Georgia Tech. The Limited Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (LNWFZ-NEA) was established to find common ground on issues related to nuclear weapons in the region. We are at a crossroads in Northeast Asia. The current crisis could provide a window of opportunity to take some initial steps toward a cooperative regional security arrangement for Northeast Asia. Initially, concentrating on a concept for a limited nuclear weapons free zone in Northeast Asia, areas of discussion have gradually expanded to include other initiatives for cooperative security.

The “Three plus Three Nations Arrangement provides for a trilateral NWFZ treaty among three nations—the two Koreas and Japan—with protocols for Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) by the surrounding three nuclear weapons states—the U.S., China, and Russia. It might be better to include NSAs in the main provisions of the treaty rather than in protocols in order to enhance incentives for some countries to

⁴⁹ http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/regions/northeast_asia/neacd/neacddefault.php 03-24-2004

join. It is to be noted that six nations involved in this arrangement are the same who participated in the recent Six Party Talks. Two years after the historic inter-Korean summit of June 2000, when the peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula was reconfirmed, another historic summit took place in September 2002, when Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and Kim Jong Il, Chairman of North Korea National Defense Commission, signed the “Pyongyang Declaration.” Both sides shared the recognition that it is important to have a framework in place in order for these regional countries to promote confidence-building.

3.4.3. The Six-Party Talks

China has hosted three rounds of six-party talks in Beijing, where representatives of the U.S., Japan, Russia, North and South Korea, and the host nation have tackled Pyongyang's nuclear programs. As the North Korea nuclear issue has economic, military and diplomatic aspects intertwined, we need a comprehensive solution which takes all factors into account. In this respect it is reassuring that the first round of six party talks reached a consensus on the need for a comprehensive solution which will not only resolve the nuclear issue but also address North Korea's security concern and economic needs. At the same time the complex nature of the problem requires us to adopt a multilateral approach as well. This is because North Korea's nuclear development is not just a bilateral issue between the United States and North Korea. Of course the issue is related to the Agreed Framework of 1994, but it is also related to the NPT and the 1992 Joint Declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula between the two Koreas. North Korea's demand for security guarantee also has a multilateral aspect as any such assurance will directly influence U.S.- Korea relations, U.S.-Japan relations and relations among other regional countries.

Furthermore, any kind of economic assistance to North Korea will have to involve not only the U.S. but also North Korea's neighboring countries and various international financial institutions. The coming rounds of the Six Party talks will discuss detailed methods of terminating North Korea's nuclear weapons program and seek ways to ease North Korea's security concern and economic hardship in one way or another.

The current standoff began in October 2002 when North Korea admitted to U.S. officials that it was pursuing a highly enriched uranium program in violation of several international agreements, including the 1994 Agreed Framework. When the United States suspended fuel oil shipments to North Korea, per the Agreed Framework, North Korea responded by ejecting UN inspectors from its plutonium facility in Yongbyon and restarting its reactors.

North Korea's position is that its nuclear arms programs are a defensive response to the hostility of the Bush administration, and it therefore demands security guarantees in addition to diplomatic recognition from the United States.

But Pyongyang's claims are spurious. North Korea's nuclear programs go back to the 1990s, well before the Bush administration came into office. Moreover, North Korea already possesses a successful deterrent against potential U.S. military action: its conventional forces, including a million-man army arrayed at the border with South Korea that is capable of destroying Seoul.

North Korea has hinted that it will offer to freeze its activities in Yongbyon in exchange for energy assistance, security guarantees, and the lifting of trade sanctions by the United States. But the Bush Administration's position has remained firm: only upon North Korea's initial actions to "completely, verifiably and irreversibly" dismantle (CVID) its nuclear programs will the United States consider economic assistance and security assurances.

The Six-Party talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program have continued with meetings in August 2003, and February and June 2004. During the third round, held in Beijing from 23-26 June, the U.S. proposed a conditional security guarantee and resumption of heavy fuel oil shipments from China and South Korea in exchange for North Korean disclosure and disarmament after a three-month preparatory period. The U.S. is keen to expand the Proliferation Security Initiative to prevent the transfer of WMD-related materials and exert increased pressure on the regime.⁵⁰

The international community is faced with a difficult dilemma of its own at the six-party crisis resolution process in Beijing. Namely, will the global hegemony (the U.S.), aligned with three great powers (China, Japan, and Russia) and a rising middle power (ROK), be able to gang up on a recalcitrant small power (a weak, hungry, and declining DPRK) in order to convince or coerce the latter to disarm and change its internal policies and external behavior in accordance with its wishes?

Washington should be able to form an ad hoc multilateral anti-DPRK coercive coalition of the "intimidated" (ROK and PRC), "the weak" (Russia), and "the greedy" (Japan) and may attempt to bring down the North Korean regime by intensifying blockade, increasing international pressure, and through the use of force, if necessary, thereby resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis once and for all.

In the mean time, the six nations participating in the Beijing talks can create new multilateral security architecture in Northeast Asia, which will embody these fundamental principles and assurances and set up a six-party organization, to monitor and verify the number-states adherence to their treaty obligations, to negotiate and to

⁵⁰ The IISS, *The Military Balance 2004-2005* (London: Oxford University, 2004), p.163.

implement the enabling agreements. The Beijing process can offer a diplomatic venue for creating a multilateral regional security architecture that will eventually reduce mutual insecurity.

For the six-party talks to succeed, the U.S. and Republic of Korea must display genuine foresighted leadership and push the negotiation process toward their ultimate vision of the united democratic capitalist Korean peninsula free from weapons of mass destruction and at peace with its neighbors without delay, for “where the head goose flies, the flock will ultimately follow.”

The need for a security structure in Northeast Asia has become increasingly pressing in recent years, and the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear activities may provide the vehicle to establish such a framework. Six-Party talks provided a structure and precedent for institutionalization, but argued that any move in that direction would hinge on progress with the Six-Party talks. If they broke down, it would be unlikely the six governments would agree to a larger mechanism and also unlikely - bar a significant attitude change - that the Chinese would support a forum that excluded North Korea.

The cloud of potential hostilities hanging over the Korean Peninsula was underscored especially by the North's nuclear program. It is expected that the Beijing talks between the six participating nations will ultimately keep the Korean peninsula nuclear free. While those talks did not appear to produce any real breakthroughs, at least all agreed on the importance of the objective.

3.5. Evaluation

The Asia-Pacific region can draw on many lessons from the European experience. One key lesson for Asia is that new structures evolve and existing ones can adapt and expand from limited political consultation to operational military cooperation for collective security in a relatively short time. Practical, event-driven operational cooperation has often enabled difficult structural/political problems or hesitancy to be overcome. Enhanced military transparency and openness can contribute to and accelerate this process of developing practical cooperation. Various systems are born to deal with new challenges. No single system can be counted on to handle all issues. Interlocking, not “inter-blocking” systems are to be sought.

While ASEAN has undoubtedly been a force for peace, stability and development over the past three decades, new questions have arisen over the “ASEAN way” of consensual problem solving that emphasizes informality and is characterized by the absence of formal institution. A system is needed that maintains the strength of relationships developed by such informality but it has sufficient formal structure to function effectively in crisis. The expansion of membership to include all ten countries in the region has resulted not in unity but to an erosion of the collective will, given the much greater diversity of members, the inter-state tensions between them and their inability to respond to regional developments, such as the economic crisis of 1997 and the East Timor crisis of 1999. The crisis of September 1999 arose when Indonesian controlled militias attempted to overturn the pro-independence majority vote. ASEAN member states, cautious not to upset Jakarta, were hesitant to take the lead in organizing humanitarian intervention. Instead, Western states, spearheaded by Australia and the U.S., led the effort, while the UN Security Council provided the authorization necessary to legitimize intervention.

While the ARF has undertaken a number of useful initiatives in the area of confidence building, it has been unable to effectively assume preventive diplomacy and crisis management roles.⁵¹

ASEAN needs to be actively engaged in norm setting within its wider international environment and to retain leadership of ARF, as well as keep a careful watch on APEC and UN activities that impact on its roles.

The ARF has yet to address, much less resolve, any major flashpoint like the Korean conflict or the Cross-Straits problem. ARF has no permanent Secretariat more than a decade of existence. Conversely, the OSCE is certainly useful as a comparison and as a pointer to what kind of security cooperation might be developed, but it cannot be the standard against which the ARF should be judged because, mainly, the strategic environments of the two organizations are different. The OSCE would be a non-starter in the Asia-Pacific region, and hence a failure. Similarly, the European states would have abandoned the ARF model if all the organization had to show were the ARF as it now stands. For many Asian states security is perceived comprehensively as encompassing economic, political, and social dimensions besides the military.

To establish multilateral security cooperation mechanisms in East Asia should progress step by step. For example, the ARF regarded its three major functions, namely CBMs, preventive diplomacy and then seeking for ways to resolve conflicts, as the three phases of its development. At present, the ARF is going from the first phase, CBMs, into the second one, preventive diplomacy.

From the long run, in East Asia, cooperative security mechanisms may take shape with multi-levels including regional level, sub-regional level and bilateral level, multi-

⁵¹ Andrew T.H. Tan and J.D. Kenneth Boutin, eds., *Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategy Studies, 2001), p. 8-10.

forms including official and unofficial and multi-functions coexisting. An increase in cooperative security in the region is likely in the next 2-3 years, because growing economic interdependence between countries, especially between major powers, will make them expend great effort to avoid conflicts, to maintain stable relationships and to seek cooperation in security fields, although sometimes they have tensions in their relations. The ideas of "ASEAN + 3" and ARF are the most likely to work, and, the "ASEAN + 3" will develop into an "East Asian Regional Cooperation" mechanism, which may play an important role in the future regional cooperative security mechanisms.

Asia is characterized by strongly nationalistic governments. The shallowness of multilateral organizations such as APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum, and their inability to resolve regional crises, only adds to the sense of the caution. Even where favorable change does occur, it could bring with it a strong sense of nationalism: for example, in a unified Korea. Although an accommodation between China and Japan would clearly be preferable, it would not be to the benefit of the Western alliance system if it involved a strategic partnership between Asia's two great powers. Similarly, if a "triple entente" were to emerge between China, Russia, and India, it would threaten the entire stability of the region. Neither of these scenarios is at all likely.

The ARF has many operational drawbacks. First, the biggest obstacle to the ARF being an efficient security regime is its cumbersome decision-making procedure. Operational decisions simply cannot be taken in a group of 23 states, particularly by consensus. Second, for the time being, the ARF has no military force at its command for resolving crisis situations with regard to an ARF peacekeeping operation. Third, the mandate for crisis management and conflict settlement is still seriously limited.

Fourth, the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs poses an obstacle to carrying out urgent and just international intervention as we observed in Cambodia and East Timor. Given the situation in Asia-Pacific, a new principle of legitimized international intervention is necessary. East Asian states are especially sensitive to prerogatives of sovereignty because of a historical legacy of frequent fighting between kingdoms during pre-contact centuries, and the painful Western colonial experience after contact. At present, ARF does not have a secretariat of its own to lend support to year-long activities. It could be that strengthening the ARF Chair will lead to establishment of a secretariat. In any case, these shortcomings are acknowledged here with the hope that bringing attention to them will cause them to be addressed in future. Some proposals regarding the future direction of ARF are appropriate here.

ASEAN should increase its institutional capacity for managing the ARF. The main focus should continue to be on CBM and preventative diplomacy measures. A subregional body should be encouraged for the Northeast Asian region invoking only regional states or the North Pacific region including the U.S. and Canada and it is recommended that the ARF should also facilitate strong instruments and processes for bilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

Security dialogues are primarily run by foreign ministries and attended by military men in a supporting role. Track-1.5 and Track-2 conferences are limited in terms of lack of the substantial discussion and binding results among scholars and policy makers in private capacities. Most multilateral security arrangements and dialogues excluding the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue broadly discuss the agenda

relating to Asia-Pacific regional security issues, not specific Northeast Asia issues. NEACD is a unique instrument for security practitioners and military officers in the region to share defense information including defense policy and strategy, doctrine and military transformation. Further defense dialogues need to be explored for Northeast Asia.

Chapter 4. Security Implications of Economic Interdependence

This chapter attempts to explore the inter-connection between economic interdependence and security cooperation. Then, we examine the prominent examples of economic interdependence in the region. The research reviews trends of trade and direct investments among key actors in Northeast Asia since the post-Cold War era.

We discuss co-development of strategic resources to resolve energy security including oil and gas in Siberia. TKR– TSR project will be discussed to resolve constraints in regional security cooperation. North-South Korea economic cooperation needs to be reviewed to examine the regional security implications of the Two Koreas reconciliation and cooperation.

4.1. Inter-connection between Economic Interdependence and Security Cooperation

Expansion in international economic activities leaves states increasingly dependent upon one another for the achievement of such state aims as growth, full employment, and price stability.¹ Presuming that the current levels of economic cooperation are inextricably connected with one of the principles of the cooperative security idea, it could be argued that the cooperative security idea is more applicable to Northeast Asia. Regarding the cooperative security idea, David Dewitt argues that “it does not

¹ Richard Cooper, “Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies,” *World Politics* 24, no. 2 (1972), pp. 161-68.

privilege the military as the repository of all wisdom related to security issues; it does not assume that military conflict or violence is the only challenge to security.”²

Fundamentally, security is a prerequisite for long-term consumption and economic growth. Without confidence that resources invested today will still be owned and available for use tomorrow, investment will wither, growth will decline, and, eventually, as assets depreciate, the economy will collapse. In this sense, security and wealth are necessary complements; one cannot exist without the other.³

In the past 20 years or so, the Asian-Pacific region has been very dynamic in terms of economic development. The sustained rapid economic growth in the region has not only attracted many investors, taken in large amount of investments, promoted rapid growth of regional economic cooperation, but also increased the internal stability of the countries in the region, deepened their interdependence, thus creating among them the possibility of political solutions to the disputes on the basis of dialogue and negotiation. All these have effectively promoted regional stability and peace and improved the security situation.

Along with these economic links, the change to the security concept is another reason that makes cooperative security more applicable in Northeast Asia. Compared with the bilateral relationship of the Cold War era, which was motivated by rival ideologies and their organizing principles which accentuated the military competition based on a zero-sum logic, Yang Sung Chul has argued that the present new order in the region has been prompted by a broader definition of security, including economic, environmental, resource, and the way of life. Hence, the new organizing principle in the making of a new regional order put an emphasis on economic cooperation and

² David Dewitt, *ibid.*, p. 8.

³ David A. Lake, “Economics and National Security: The Evolutionary Process,” in Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Roy Gordson and George H. Quester, eds., *Security Studies for the 21st Century* (Washington: Brassey’s, Inc. 1997), p.248.

mutual prosperity based on non zero-sum logic.⁴

The nature of challenges, which face the world and will have to be confronted in the future, requires different solution methodologies unlike past solution methodologies. Especially, a state's security is no longer a limited problem related to the state. Considering the deepening of interdependence under the present situation, most security issues retain the nature of crossing national borders. Security arena also emerge multilateral cooperation rather than an individual nation's tackle. Security requires integrative and collective approaches. The economic crisis in Asia has created a deep sense of gloom about the prospects for order and stability in the region. Most assessments of its political and security implications tend to be pessimistic. A prolonged economic decline could fuel nationalism, undermine regional cooperation, and foster confrontation over long-standing territorial and other disputes. Asian misgivings about the role in helping them out of the crisis, the failure of Japan to provide decisive leadership, and China's ability to project itself as a responsible power by promising not to devalue its currency, are reshaping perceptions about their relative position and role in the regional strategic equation. Institutionalism is facing a serious credibility problem, largely because of the conflict-causing effects of the economic downturn and the weak response of regional institutions in dealing with them.⁵ The 1977 Asia economic crisis drew several lessons:

First lesson is that the process of economic aid should be implemented through continuing inter-governmental dialogue based on support for economic and legal and jurisdiction institution building in the context of the creation of a stable intra-regional institutional framework of collaboration. Second lesson is that economic institution building should be complemented by a policy regional military deterrence with the possibility left open of eventually creating an intergovernmental

⁴ Yang Sung Chul, "The Restructuring of an East Asian Order and Two Koreas," in Pak Chae Ha, Nam Sung Woo, and Engene Craig Campbell, eds., *A New World Order and the Security of the Asia-Pacific Region* (Seoul: The Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 1993), pp. 179-80.

⁵ Amitav Acharya, *Regionalism and Multilateralism* (Singapore: Time Academic Press, 2002), p.242.

Northeast Asian organization designed to institutionalize military cooperation in which all states in the region would be members, including North Korea. Third important lesson is that the promotion of peace and freedom is more likely to succeed as a spill-over process from support for economic transformation rather than from the application of the threat of force, the pursuit of diplomatic isolation and the application of megaphone diplomacy as a substitute for diplomatic dialogue.⁶

In a global economy, as Desmond Ball points out, a “high degree of interdependence can serve as transmission belt for spreading security problems through the region, and more particularly, if growth falters, or if conflict is introduced into the system, that friction and disputation are likely to quickly permeate the region. Since the crisis began, there have been significant reductions in national defense budgets and arms acquisitions as well as training activities in East Asia. As an example, in 1998, Japan carried out its first cut in defense spending since 1954 although the cut had already been anticipated as part of a U.S. \$8 billion reduction to the 1996-2000 defense program.⁷

Japan has also cut back on its support payments for the 43,000 U.S. troops in its territory. The uneven reduction in defense spending and arms purchases increases the potential for military disparities, which may fuel suspicions and tensions among regional countries. The crisis exposed East Asia’s dependence on foreign capital and its vulnerability to the global market and political forces. Within East Asia, hopes that the crisis would engender greater unity and a sense of solidarity among the troubled economics, prompting them to deepen existing level of cooperation and develop common responses to the crisis.

⁶ Hazel Smith, “Creating Community: Prospects for Institutionalized Cooperation,” Paper for fifth symposium on “Korea and the Search for Peace in Northeast Asia,” Titsumeikan University, Kyoto, March 15-16, 2004.

⁷ Beyond the Asian Financial Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities for U.S. Leadership, Washington, D.C. *USIP*, April 1998, p.11.

Table 4-1 shows the rising intra-regional trade shares of these three countries. The intra-regional trade among them has increased substantially and their shares of exports and imports have reached 20.3% and 27.6%, respectively in 2003. Therefore China, Japan and Korea are very important trading partners to each other. Given deepening economic interdependence among three countries, the need for policy cooperation among them is obvious.

Table 4-1 Trend and Status of a China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Trade

Unit: billion dollar, %

		1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Korea to(from) China	Export(A)	11.9	13.7	18.5	18.1	23.8	35.1
	Import(B)	6.5	8.9	12.8	13.3	17.4	21.9
	A-B	5.4	4.8	5.7	4.8	6.4	13.2
Korea to(from) Japan	Export(A)	12.2	15.9	20.5	16.5	15.1	17.3
	Import(B)	16.8	24.1	31.8	26.6	29.9	36.3
	A-B	-4.6	-8.2	-11.3	-10.1	-14.8	-19.0
China to(from) Japan	Export(A)	29.5	32.4	41.6	45.1	48.5	59.5
	Import(B)	28.3	33.8	41.5	42.8	53.5	74.2
	A-B	1.2	-1.4	0.1	2.3	-5.0	-14.7
Intra-regional trade share	Export	13.6	15.3	17.0	18.1	18.9	20.3
	Import	22.5	24.0	24.2	24.7	26.3	27.6

Source: Korea International Trade Association, KOTIS Data

Although Northeast Asian economy has been growing very fast, yet the financial crisis started in 1997 has fully indicated the fact that the Asian economy is very fragile because of the following reasons: First, the economy in most of the countries in East Asia is problematic in structure. This economy has been very successful and developing very fast in the industrial era, because the countries have been able to adept themselves to manufacture industry in the past decades. Most of the countries are facing the similar challenges in adjusting their economic structure, otherwise it will be very difficult for them to sustain their high-speed economic development. The economic problem has brought about internal turbulence and new instability in some

countries in East Asia.

Second, many countries in the region have attached great importance to the globalization of the world economy, but neglected the other trend of the world economy, that is the regionalism. Therefore, the countries in Northeast Asia have done very little to promote the development of the regionalism in the region. As a result, there is no organization of economic cooperation among the countries in the region, not to mention the mechanism to ensure the effective economic cooperation among the countries in the region. Third, because of the lack of an organization for economic cooperation, it is very difficult, or even impossible, for the countries to cooperate and coordinate their policies in case of crisis. Because of this, security cooperation is difficult to go deeper.

In the mean time, one of the most valuable lessons learned from the East Asian economic 1997-1998 crisis is the crucial interdependence of economic cooperation and security cooperation. With the development of integration of trade and finance in Northeast Asia, the possibility of establishing Northeast Asia Free Trade zone will be increased. In order to fit in with the process, political and security dialogue and coordination will be also developed.

4.2. Economic Interdependence

4.2.1 Trade in the Region

Economic development in East Asia has accompanied with growing regional integration. The intra-regional trade ratio for East Asia was 30.98 percent in 1970,

lower than EU and NAFTA countries. It increased to 50.38 percent in 2000, higher than NAFTA, indicating growing economic linkage within the regions as a result of the long-term economic growth.⁸

Table 4-2 represents the export and import trends of China, Japan and South Korea. The total exports of three countries have increased from 699.7 billion U.S. dollars in 1998 to 1,102 billion dollars in 2003, and the total imports of them also have increased from 513.7 billion dollars to 974.2 billion dollars during the same period. As the rate of trade expansion in these three countries was much faster than the world average, the corresponding three countries' shares out of world trade than have increased by 2.4% points and 3.6% points from 1998 to 2003, respectively, mainly due to China. They account for 15.3% and 12.8% in 2003, respectively.

One of the notable findings from the trilateral trade is that the trade between Korean and China has increased remarkably. Especially, Korea's exports to China have increased by more than 100% during the last 5 years due to the rapid economic growth of China, and have reached 35.1 billion dollars in 2003. They passed those to Japan in 2001, and also passed those to U.S. in 2003. Consequently, China became the biggest export market for Korea.

Using email and Internet technique, huge amount of information can be transmitted globally in real time and virtually at no cost. Revolution of information and communication technology (ICT) has greatly reduced the information costs associated with coordination of business unit's activities in various countries. Trade facilitation measures such as enhanced customs procedures, standardization, free mobility of business, and implementing e-commerce technology can be used to promote trade

⁸ Fen Lu, "Free Trade Area: Awakening Regionalism in East Asia" Paper for the conference "Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia" organized by the Institute of Northeast Asia Business and Economics of Korea University and China Center for Economic Research at Beijing University, held in Seoul, September 19, 2003.

among countries in the region as well as between regions by drastically reducing the transaction costs incurred in the process of international trade.

Table 4-2 Export and Import Trend of a China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Trade

Unit: billion dollar, %

		1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Export	Korea	132.3 (2.4)	143.7 (2.5)	172.3 (2.7)	150.4 (2.5)	162.5 (2.5)	193.8 (2.7)
	China	180.5 (3.3)	196.2 (3.5)	249.2 (3.9)	403.0 (4.4)	325.6 (5.1)	438.5 (6.0)
	Japan	386.9 (7.1)	417.4 (7.4)	479.3 (7.5)	403.0 (6.6)	415.6 (6.5)	470.6 (6.7)
	Total	699.7 (12.9)	756.4 (13.4)	900.8 (14.2)	820.1 (13.4)	903.7 (14.1)	1,102.9 (15.3)
Import	Korea	93.3 (1.7)	119.8 (2.1)	160.6 (2.4)	141.1 (2.2)	152.1 (2.3)	178.8 (2.3)
	China	140.4 (2.5)	165.8 (2.9)	225.1 (3.4)	243.6 (3.8)	295.3 (4.5)	413.1 (5.4)
	Japan	280.0 (5.0)	309.6 (5.3)	379.9 (5.8)	349.0 (5.5)	336 (5.1)	382.3 (5.1)
	Total	513.7 (9.2)	596.2 (10.3)	765.5 (11.7)	733.7 (11.6)	784.2 (12.0)	974.2 (12.8)

Source: Korea International Trade Association, KOTIS data.

Economic development is a powerful reason for many Asian states to join multilateral activities in the region. Some of them are designed to open markets, reduce mutual trade and investment barriers, facilitate labor, capital, and technology flows, such as APEC, and Asian Development Bank. Asian nations that are interested in promoting free, preferential trade areas participate actively in APEC, AFTA, or Asian Free Trade Area, as well as in efforts to establish free trade areas between Japan and Korea, and China, and between China and ASEAN.

China's remarkable economic growth over the past two decades has substantially increased China's importance in the world economy. At the same time China's progressive integration into the global economy has had a profound impact on the

economies of its main trade partners. Table 4-3 shows that China exports to the U.S. have soared 200% over the period between 1990 and 2003, the U.S. has become one of the top export markets for the China: China bought \$ 34 billion worth of U.S. good and the number is growing impressively.

While the U.S.'s large trade deficit with China inevitably draws much attention, the U.S. government is producing real results, expanded trade, good jobs for American, better living conditions for Chinese, and a relationship of peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The U.S. and other member states need to work with China to integrate its rising power into regional and global security, economic and political arrangements.

Table 4-3 Trend of China Trade with the U.S.

unit: \$ million


Year	Export	Import	trade	Total trade	Ratio(%)
1990	5179.46	6588.43	11767.89	115436.56	10
1991	6158.51	8007.83	14166.34	135633.17	10
1992	8593.73	8899.85	17493.58	165608.38	11
1993	16964.00	10688.06	27652.06	159713.36	17
1994	21461.03	13893.57	35354.60	236619.96	15
1995	24711.33	16118.23	40829.56	280847.90	15
1996	26683.10	16154.88	42837.98	289880.31	15
1997	32694.80	16298.10	48992.90	325057.45	15
1998	37947.67	16883.17	54830.84	324045.88	17
1999	41946.91	19478.28	61425.19	360629.98	17
2000	52099.22	22363.15	74462.37	474296.28	16
2001	54282.69	26202.23	80484.92	509768.13	16
2002	69950.53	27230.06	97180.59	620768.08	16
2003	92473.63	33860.78	126334.41	851207.29	15

Source: Lee, Tae Hwan, *Sino-U.S. Relations Prospect for 2nd Term of Bush*, unpublished paper.

The member states seek to integrate China peacefully, prosperously, and positively into the regional co-prosperity. China benefits from the current arrangements for regional stability and the open international economy. The member states also have a common interest in addressing dangers to that security and challenges to the regional economy.

Chinese economic growth is beneficial to its neighbors, and that Beijing views economic ties as a means to lubricate political ties with its neighbors and with the U.S. Political and economic cooperation reduce conflict, and policy coordination helps create understanding.

Figure 4-1 Trend of China trade with the U.S.



Source: Lee, Tae Hwan, *Sino-U.S. Relations Prospect for 2nd Term of Bush*, Unpublished Paper.

The pace at which the economic bilateralism expanded prior to the normalization

underscores the “special” relationship between the two former adversaries.⁹ In 1993, only a year after the normalization, China already became South Korea’s third largest trading partner, only the U.S. and Japan. In 2001, China became number two destination of South Korea’s exports, only second to the U.S. In 2003, China finally surpassed the U.S. as South Korea’s top export market. The share of China trade is in South Korea’s top export market. China’s growing economic influence will naturally give rise to multiple lines of communication with neighbors and trade agreements will continue to yield more sophisticated dispute settlement mechanisms, such as those already in existence between the U.S. and South Korea.

Washington should not try to compel Seoul to see relations between it and Beijing as a zero-sum equation. Despite considerable changes in the international security environment and in domestic politics in each of these countries, the key actors in the region have common interests and objectives. The governments can accomplish a great deal if they work together. A failure to cooperate will make those objectives difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

The share of China trade in South Korea’s total trade rose from 2.8 percent in 1990 to 9.4 percent in 2000, and to 15.2 percent in 2003. Sino-South Korean trade made a huge leap from U.S. \$ 6.4 billion in 1992 to U.S. \$ 56 billion in 2003.

Investment is another pillar of Sino-South Korean economic bilateralism. As of 1992, South Korea already became the tenth largest investor in China.¹⁰ By June 2002, U.S. \$ 5.8 billion was committed in China over 6,634 projects in cumulative terms. In 2003, South Korea invested U.S. \$ 1.3 billion in China, becoming the third

⁹ “Sino-South Korean Economic Cooperation: An Analysis of Domestic and Foreign Entanglements,” *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol.9, No.2 (Summer 1990), pp.59-79.

¹⁰ *Joonang Ilbo*, May 10, 1993

largest investor in China only after Hong Kong and Japan.¹¹ Most important is the fact that South Korea-China economic relations have been highly profitable for Seoul.

Table 4-4 Trend of South Korea Trade in the Region

Unit: 100million \$, increase or decrease rate compared with previous year

	2002			2003			2004 (Jan-May)		
	Export	Import	Balance of trade	Export	Import	Balance of trade	Export	Import	Balance of trade
Total	1,625	1,625	104	1,625	1,625	150	1,625	894	122
U.S	328(5.0)	230(2.8)	98	342(4.39)	248(7.85)	94	164(24.3)	112(8.1)	52
Japan	151(-8.3)	299(12.1)	-148	173(14.09)	363(21.63)	-190	89(31.8)	188(33.2)	-99
China	238(30.6)	174(30.8)	64	351(47.81)	219(25.92)	132	194(57.2)	111(32.4)	83
Russia	11(13.6)	22(14.9)	-11	17(55.66)	25(13.72)	-8	8.5(50.2)	14(44.5)	-5.5

Source: Oversea Trade Office, South Korea

The successful economic relationship between the PRC and the ROK has increased bilateral ties and enhanced China's economic influence with South Korea. Currently, trade between the two is growing 20 percent a year, and is projected to reach \$100 billion by 2008. Whereas China had scored more trade surpluses prior to the normalization, South Korea has reaped huge surpluses successively throughout 1993-2003. As of 2003, the China trade marked 20 percent of South Korea's total trade, 21.6 percent of its total exports, and 88 percent of Korea's total trade surplus.¹²

¹¹ *Chosun Ilbo*, November 3, 2003

¹² See *Chosun Ilbo*, January 12 and May 1, 2004

Given North Korea's lack of access to conventional channels of international finance, the question naturally arises: How has it financed the chronic trade deficits? One possibility is arms exports. The Kim Jong Il regime is a continuing criminal enterprise, and illicit activities – smuggling, drug trafficking, and counterfeiting – offer another possibility for financing the trade gap.¹³ Another possibility is that the trade deficits have been implicitly financed by China, which has permitted North Korea to accumulate large area in its trade account. A final possibility is that these deficits have been financed with remittances from Japan, which are sometimes reported to be in the billions of dollars.

Table 4-5 shows the trend of trade between North and South Korea. After the summit talk in 2000, civilian side trade between the Two Koreas has significantly increased.

Table 4-5 Trade between North-South Korea

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Mil \$	13	111	173	187	195	287	252	308	222	333	425	403	641	724

Year	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
\$ 10,000 (civilian)	25	155	2056	2085	1863	3513	6494	5117

Source: Oversea Trade Office, South Korea

¹³ Marcus Noland, *North Korea's External Economic Relations*, *ibid.*, pp.171-3.

Every year Asia becomes increasingly richer with interlocking patterns of multilateral cooperation. Complex interdependence between Asian states is growing amidst sweeping globalization trends. Asia is well on its way to develop international norms and values acceptable to all members of the Asian community of nations, with a couple of exception only.¹⁴

The U.S.-China-South Korea relationship has been evolving; understanding this triangular relationship requires examining it as a whole and on individual levels. On the first level, the PRC's policy toward the Korean Peninsula has changed. North Korean nuclear crises not only changed the PRC's orientation, but also created a new diplomatic role for China vis-à-vis its Korean neighbors and the U.S., signaling a potentially more activist and indispensable role for Beijing in contributing to regional stability.

Economic and Trade Regimes

Northeast Asian regimes focused on economic and trade issues form more easily than security regimes due to the expansion of trade and investment networks established over time. They have numerous domestic interest groups lobbying for specific benefits. Motivated by the East Asian financial crisis, in late 1998, the South Korean Trade Ministry called for a Northeast Asian economic consultation regime that included China, Japan, Russia and Korea. The crisis sharpened differences over issues such as trade and investment liberalization, the region's international financial architecture and need for reform. Concern focused on Japan's domestic finance and

¹⁴ Alexandre Y. Mansourov, "Multilateralism in Asia and Prospects for Multilateral Conflict Resolution in Northeast Asia," in Conference on North Korea "North Korea, Multilateralism, and the Future of the Peninsula" held in November 20-21, 2003, Seoul, pp.1-5.

banking system since it so strongly affected the regional system. In mid-1999, Chinese, Japanese and Korean business organizations met to consider tripartite consultative mechanisms for facilitating trade and investment, and for preparing for trade liberalization under the World Trade Organization (WTO). In late 1999, South Korean scholars called for a Northeast Asian free trade zone that included China, Japan, and South Korea to counter other regional zones, the European Union (EU) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).¹⁵ Chinese have responded positively with a proposal for a Trilateral Economic Commission of government officials to be formed first.¹⁶

Step toward Northeast Asian FTA

In November 1999, the idea of trilateral cooperation shifted to the government level when the leaders of China, Japan, and South Korea had their first trilateral summit on trade and economic issues in conjunction with an ASEAN meeting in Manila. Prime Minister Obuchi called it the first joint effort between the three countries toward building peace and stability in the region. The three leaders agreed to establish a research forum composed of senior economic advisors. The three countries' top economic think tanks would study collaboration in 10 sectors—including trade, finance, environment, and fisheries. The historic mini-summit expected this initial collaboration would lead to creation of a framework for cooperation in Northeast Asia that would eventually resemble Southeast Asia's ASEAN.

It has long been held by economists that in a distortion-free world, free trade is the optimal trade policy. This is stronger than trade argument because it states that free

¹⁵ "Consultative Body among Korea, China, Japan Proposed," *Korea Times*, June 3, 1999.

¹⁶ Zhang Yan, "Northeast Asian Free Trade Zone Considered," *China Business Weekly*, October 24 1999, p. 1.

¹⁷ "China-Japan-South Korea agreed on the establishment of the FTA," *Yonhap*, November 29, 2004.

trade not only is good for each individual country, but also is the best that all the countries when taken together can get.

A proposed declaration for economic cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea agreed in October 2003, after a summit between Chinese President Hu Jintao and South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun and marked the initial step toward the formation of a Northeast Asian economic bloc modeled on the European Union or North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). China-Japan-South Korea agreed on the establishment of the trilateral FTA at the summit in Laos in November 2004. The FTA is expected to accelerate economic integration of the three countries, which account for a fifth of the global economy.¹⁷

In addition, Roh's vision for South Korea as a Northeast Asian business hub will get a further boost from the closer economic ties with the two neighboring countries. South Korea government proposed finances, logistics and energy as the three most important areas of cooperation for the Northeast Asian economies. The immediately feasible projects would include a railway link between Korea and Europe via China and Russia and the connection of natural gas pipelines between Russia and South Korea via North Korea. The three countries are therefore likely to pursue the economic-bloc idea through brisk contacts on two-way levels in the initial stage. The Beijing-proposed China-Korea vision team, for example, will be part of the future trend, while Seoul and Tokyo would further advance bilateral FTA talks.

4.2.2. Co-development of Siberia's Oil and Gas

The wars in Iraq and Afghani, standing and recent developments in Central Asia and the Russian Far East have stimulated a great deal of attention on energy issues, including the various competing pipeline projects in a region where there also exist


serious geopolitical and religious fault lines. The study examines the prospects for energy competition and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

Socio-political turmoil in the major oil-exporting countries could result in the disruption of global oil flows, thereby producing worldwide energy shortages and triggering a global economic slowdown. Key judgments and major conclusions are summarized below:

In terms of pure economics, the outlook for energy security in the Asia-Pacific looks particularly troubling, with rising levels of oil consumption and an even stronger rise in demand. Some experts, such as Ji Guoxing of the Shanghai Institute of International Strategy Studies, contend that the Asia-Pacific region's dependence on Middle Eastern oil may exceed 90% by 2010. While oilfields in Russian Siberia and Central Asia do offer some short-term energy relief, the lack of existing infrastructure to facilitate the transport of this oil poses costly political and economic challenges of their own.¹⁸

Figure 4-2 Projected Oil and Gas Pipeline Network in Northeast Asia

¹⁸ Richard Giragosian, "East Asia Tackles Energy Security," Asian Economy, http://atimes?Asian_Economy/FH24K01.html 01-26-2005



Source: //www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj02-4/Harrison.html 01-11-2005

The Sakhalin natural gas pipeline construction plan which will produce natural gas in the area of Sakhalin and building a 2,400 km-long pipeline that passes through Far East Siberia and reaches the East seashore of the Korean Peninsula. This is a multilateral joint project in which South Korea, North Korea, the U.S., Japan, China, Russia, and Europe participate. This project is highly meaningful in realizing the vision of the future ‘Northeast Asia Union’, as it is an exchange-cooperation project that involves not only government-level officials but also private businesses¹⁹ and a great number of specialists. This is a truly cooperative positive sum game that benefits all participants. Russia, North and South Korea had a meeting to consult the linkage issue of Northeast Asia energy network at Khabarovsk in Russia Far East in February 2005.²⁰

First, this project induces North Korea to be a member of the global community by enabling the Stalinist country to join an international joint project. Pyongyang will be able to establish energy infrastructure and settle the current energy crisis by collecting

¹⁹ For now, ExxonMobil accounts for 30% of the investment capital, SODECO 30%, and Rosnet 8.5%

²⁰ *Finance News*, January 11, 2005

pipeline passage toll and operating thermoelectric power plants with natural gas.

Second, by investing its own capital into Northeast Asia, the U.S. can exercise continuous influence on this region without offering direct financial support. Third, the South Korean government has often been accused by the public of giving largess to North Korea in a one-sided fashion in supporting North Korea's power supply and energy procurement. This project may contribute to the long-delayed establishment of a regional cooperative body in Northeast Asia by expanding the scope of exchanges and collaboration with this region. This contribution is all the more significant as it can serve as a basis for cultivating a multilateral cooperative framework on regional security and foreign relations. This energy cooperation project among Northeast Asian countries does meet these conditions.²¹

Energy Security

Energy security in Asia may be characterized as “geopolitics light.” That is, it is more *energy politics* rather than *energy geo-politics*. The former encompasses the use of diplomacy, deals (legal and illegal), profit motives, and considerations of efficiencies. The latter would encompass energy security concerns as a driver of security and foreign policy and a shaper of military structures, deployments and modernizations.

Energy security of Asia will continue to depend heavily on the Middle East—whether or not pipelines under consideration get constructed. The geopolitical implications of closer economic interdependence between the volatile Middle East and dynamic Asia could be unsettling. Asian economies' growing thirst for oil implies, which they will rely on others for continued access to energy—primarily, the U.S. and the Middle East states.

²¹ Lee Su Hoon, “Proposal for Cooperation on Natural Resources in Northeast Asia,” Korea-China-Japan Symposium on a Northeast Asian Community, hosted by the Sejong Institute, Oct 30, 2003.

There was a consensus that energy security and national security today are inextricably linked. However, energy security also has implications for human security and regime security—not to mention environmental security. At times, the search for security in one area may be incompatible with another.

Establishing Multilateral Petroleum Reserves need to be made to meet with crisis situations. We need to cultivate re-imagining Geopolitics: the need to think beyond “borders, orders and others” because pipelines are not only about oil and gas but are also part of the wider geopolitical context. We will be able to establish an Asian Energy Security Complex that would transcend national rivalries. We can further pursuing transparent, reformist but culturally-sensitive policies that will not only ensure oil and gas flows but also facilitate broader economic cooperation and may eventually facilitate conflict resolution.²² If and when these pipelines are built, then their protection and safety may well become as important as the safety of SLOCs.

While SLOCs will remain critical to Asian energy security, there is little evidence that (1) they will become chokepoints (countries can go around them); (2) countries exhibit signs of preparing to control them; and (3) interfering with SLOCs would be viewed worldwide as an act of war.

Due to the growing interdependence of the world and the heavy dependence on foreign trade by all countries, the ability to ensure unimpeded passage of ships on the oceans of the world has become identified with the very survival of the nation states, especially of their economy. The dependence on imports and exports of raw materials, energy and food products is almost absolute for most of the member states and in this sense, the SLOCs are a vital artery for the survival of the Northeast Asia countries.²³

²² http://www.apcss.org/Conference/CR_ES/031021-23ES.htm 04-04-2004

²³ Bilveer Singh, “Security of the Sea Lanes of Communications in the Asia-Pacific in the Post-Cold War,” in Wilfried A. Herrmann, ed., *Asia Security Challenge* (Cammack, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1998), pp.51-52.

The SLOCs running through the Paracels and Spratlys are extensively used by oil tankers plying from the Persian Gulf from the Indian Ocean to the demand centers in Northeast Asia. India has made naval yards available to U.S. ships in the Arabian Sea, and has provided escorts for U.S. ships passing through the Malacca Strait.

Before determining competition and cooperation over pipelines, there is still considerable uncertainty over the availability and accessibility of energy resources to send through the pipelines. Government, corporate and NGO/public influences on pipeline development within and across countries remain highly complex and negotiable.

Therefore, as these dependencies persist, even increase, U.S.-Asia cooperation regarding the Middle East will become more critical. There are few signs that any Asian country can unilaterally ensure secured access to energy resources through military means. Energy security is an issue of growing weight in key bilateral relationships in the Asia-Pacific (U.S.-Russia, U.S.-China, Russia-China, Russia-Japan, China-Japan, China-India, U.S.-India). As the dependence of booming Asian economies on external energy sources increases, the future of security cooperation in general and major powers relationships in particular may well be influenced by the degree of energy cooperation or the lack of it. In this context, China-Japan competition for Russian energy pipelines in Siberia evoked a great deal of discussion. The U.S., China, Japan and India are currently seen as pursuing “energy diversification” strategy to varying degrees of success.

Along with its huge natural resources in Siberia, Russia is in the position to lead regional countries toward a multilateral cooperation project. For instance, Russia is interested in the Tuman River project and the gas pipeline project that have the

potential to change the regional environment both economically and geo-politically.²⁴ Its neighbors, such as Japan, have what Russia needs: manufacturing technology, management and marketing skills, and investment capital. To enhance its image among these potential economic partners, Russia needs to become an integral member of the region.²⁵

The area of energy cooperation holds perhaps the most promise for multilateral cooperation in the region. All the major actors have an interest in pipelines that transport natural gas from Russia and yet all have developed varying notions of how such a regional pipeline grid might work. There are adequate amounts of Russian gas from Iskutsk and East Baikal to meet long-term projected needs of Japan and Korea, as well as China, but such a project requires enormous financing. Other issues that lend themselves to multilateral cooperation are the development of the Tuman River basin and the Yellow Sea area, natural gas pipelines from Siberia and Sea of Okhost, and environmental pollution. A could be managed by such a Northeast Asian entity.²⁶ Economic interdependence between countries in the region has been developing, and has increased the necessity for countries to cooperate with each other to resolve problems through peaceful means. The 1997 Asian financial crisis made countries in the region recognize that they should strengthen their economic cooperation to prevent future crisis, and has caused them to establish ASEAN+3 mechanism.

Efforts to design a Northeast Asian multilateral regime in the 1990s saw many different and disparate meetings and groupings tackling the wide array of regional problems. These distinct groupings have not fully articulated how they are linked and where they fit into a larger regional architecture. Northeast Asian regional regime

²⁴ Vasily V. Mikheev, "Russian Policy toward Korean Peninsula after Yeltsin's Re-election as President," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, vol. 11, no. 2, Summer/Fall 1997, p. 367.

²⁵ Khil Young Whan and Oh Kong Dan, "From Bilateralism to Multilateralism in Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific," *Korea Observer*, vol. XXV, no. 3, (Autumn 1994), p. 409.

²⁶ Robert A. Manning, "PACOM: Nuclear Cooperation in Asia?" *The Washington Quarterly* (20:2), pp.217-232.

formation in general can be distinguished between nongovernmental trilateral and bilateral security dialogues on the one hand, and governmental trade and investment regimes on the other. Energy networks can be bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral, governmental and nongovernmental, and are distinct from the other two categories. These networks are the beginning of institutionalizing architecture for Northeast Asian energy cooperation.²⁷

4.2.3. Tuman River Area Development Program

Of the minilateral institutions in Northeast Asia, the Tuman River Area Development Program (TRADP) is perhaps best for testing neoliberal institutionalism in the Northeast Asian setting. Nearly a decade old, the TRADP, in which China, North and South Korea, Russia, and Mongolia have all been involved, seems tailor-made for exploring the possibilities and limitations of a multilateral Northeast Asia economic regime. The TRADP presents a unique case of regime formation involving multiple sets of actors - provincial, national, and international - all engaged in bargaining over the nature, scope, and direction of Northeast Asia economic development. As originally conceived, the TRADP was an ambitious project to turn the sleepy backwaters of Rajin in North Korea, Hunchun in China, and Posyet in Russia's Far East into a Northeast Asia Hong Kong, with estimated costs of thirty billion dollars over a fifteen - to twenty - year period. The six participating member states - the earlier five plus Japan - were meant to complement one another. Japan and South Korea would provide investment capital, modern technologies, and management and marketing skills; North Korea and China provide cheap labor; and China and Russia would supply the coal, timber, minerals, and other raw materials. China needed a port

²⁷ Gaye Christoffersen, "Problems & Prospects for Northeast Asian Energy Cooperation," Institute for Global Learning California State University, Monterey Bay, prepared for presentation at IREX March 23, 2000.

of out-let to the East Sea. Russia wanted to integrate the political economy of its Far Eastern region into the dynamics of the Northeast Asia economy. Mongolia, as a landlocked country, obviously wanted access to an international port. North Korea apparently wanted to turn the Tuman River into a Chinese style special economic zone, and South Korea finally saw another gate-way to North Korea.²⁸

Northeast Asian economic cooperation, as proposed by the Northeast Asian Economic Forum and the TRADP, drew on this ancient sense of economic complementarity, arguing there was an international comparative advantage that would use Chinese and North Korean cheap labor, Japanese and South Korean investment capital, and raw materials from the Russian Far East. This formula of economic complementarity would be repeated in every conference paper at every meeting on Northeast Asian economic cooperation, 1985-1999, continuing to assume that the Russian Far East would be willing to be merely a supplier of raw materials, and Japan was willing to invest in a region lacking infrastructure even though there were better opportunities elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

Within the Tuman project, the confidence-building phase 1991-1994 had not produced regional consensus in multilateral fora, partly because of local Russian resistance. Countries decided to pursue CBMs bilaterally. The outside world by late 1994 thought the Tuman project was "dead," because the UNDP Tuman office in New York closed in October 1994, having spent its \$3.5 million budget on conferences and consultants, "just talk," rather than producing anything "concrete." However, Chinese infrastructural development in support of Tuman generated a northeast regional economic development plan, presented at the Fourth Northeast Asian Economic

²⁸ "North Korea and Northeast Asia in World Politics," in eds., Samuel S. Kim and Kim Tae Ho, *North Korea and Northeast Asia* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2002), p.15.

Forum (NEAEF) meeting, indicating China was restructuring Northeast China for regional cooperation. These spatial arrangements were meant to breakdown the provincial administrative divisions of Northeast China, better integrate the provinces into a unified regional market, and reduce the conflicts of interest between provinces. Despite this distributive policy spreading Tuman participation throughout Northeast China, the Tuman River area and Hunchun were still the focal points.

Different stages in the formation of a potential Northeast Asian energy regime can be identified. The first stage was the idea of local-level economic cooperation in numerous conferences, which still continue to bring together a network of scholars and analysts to discuss potential projects. NGOs continue to be an important component of transnational communication and network formation. The second stage saw two local-level government projects, the Tuman River Development Program and the East Sea project. Tuman has had financial and technical support from United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and continued to be supported by the Chinese government. The third stage evolved from the November 1999 China-Japan-South Korea tripartite summit in Manila, which has already institutionalized environmental cooperation. Until now, there is no substantial progress in the Tuman River Development Program. There are still many more stages to go.

Although the idea of energy cooperation in Northeast Asia has existed for a long time and has numerous supporters, the region has been the battleground for major power politics for more than a century. There has been no multilateral forum created for the management of this regime, leaving its formation to the work of NGOs and a particular sequence of bilateral official meetings, with much of its goals and purposes not transparent. Although a Northeast Asian energy regime was initially conceived of

in the Tuman and the East Sea Rim projects, the agreements that emerged far exceeded the local-level framework of these projects. International organizations, such as the International Energy Agency (IEA), draw China into the international energy system within a global framework. Somewhere between the local level and the global level, there may be space for a regional project.

4.2.4. Two Koreas Economic Cooperation

The June 2000 summit between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il on the Korean Peninsula, was remarkable political theater. Following this historic event, the two sides have signed an agreement for a Seoul-to-Shinuiju rail link, Pyongyang has attended ASEAN Regional Forum for the first time, joint de-mining activities continue along the DMZ, North and South Korean defense ministers met on Cheju Island and there has been a dialing down of the propaganda aimed at the South.

The South Korean governments, in particular, as elaborated in President Kim Dae Jung's 'Sunshine' policy and President Roh Moo Hyun's 'Peace and Prosperity' policy, believe that economic engagement is one of the best ways of improving relations, turning the North into a stakeholder in peninsula economics and ultimately offering all sides in the security equation an opportunity to shift resources from the military sphere into the economic sphere:

And once North Korea normalizes its relations with the United States and Japan, a relationship of interdependence, or even dependence, will develop between North Korea and the rest of the world. Such a network of interdependence or dependence will serve as leverage with which to dissuade North Korea from any other activities that undermine peace and stability in the region.²⁹

²⁹ Yoon Young Kwan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Republic of Korea, "The North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Settlement of Peace in and around the Korean Peninsula," *Speech at the Asia Society*, New York, September 26, 2003.

The North Korean economy desperately needs two things to meet the minimum survival requirements of its population: food and energy. The decline in relations with the Soviets and the Soviet Union's eventual collapse were blows from which the North Korean economy has never recovered. The focus of policy should be aimed at supporting the constructive transformation of the North. Militarily, North Korea already holds Seoul hostage with its forward-deployed artillery. The South Koreans might as well engage North Korea in an attempt to reduce tensions and ultimately achieve reconciliation and unification.

The two sides have agreed on plans to repair and reconnect the severed North-South railroad that ran through the peninsula until the country was divided more than half a century ago, and to build a highway alongside the tracks to facilitate commerce and other exchanges. Rail reconstruction and mine clearing has begun, to make possible the new links through the heavily fortified DMZ. In a development which started earlier, South Korean and foreign tourists have continued to visit North Korea's Diamond Mountain by the thousands. North Korea and South Korea's Hyundai Corporation have continued discussions on the establishment of an export processing zone at Kaesong, a historically important city in the center of the militarily sensitive area just north of the DMZ. Many of these items represent interactions which are incomplete and in some cases have run into problems. But every one of them is unprecedented in the 50-year struggle between the rival regimes that inhabit the Korean Peninsula.³⁰

Kaesung Industrial Complex

South Korea considers the Kaesung industrial complex as a national security priority.

³⁰ Don Oberdorfer, *North Korea's Historic Shift: From Self-Reliance to Engagement*, Unpublished Paper.

This large economic zone, which will eventually employ 100,000 South Koreans and 725,000 North Korean workers, is located just north of the DMZ and, as such, represents as significant a confidence-building measure as troop withdrawal from the border. With a thriving economic center located in the middle of a potential war zone, North Korea is less likely to launch an attack that would put its “golden-egg-laying goose” in the path of danger.³¹

The Kaesung Industrial Complex Project is designed to enhance South Korean Security and Economic position. The North Korean population is a source of low cost labor that can help South Korean companies recapture its share of the manufacturing marketplace just as it did in the 1960’s to 1980’s and has now been eclipsed by China. It also serves as a mechanism to increase transparency and reconciliation between North and South thus improving the conditions for security cooperation. A by-product of this is the potential to prevent a catastrophic collapse of North Korea as well as renewed civil war.

North and South Korea agreed on the railroad and land road reconnection between the Two Koreas along the East and West across the DMZ in 2002. The reconnected railroad project is supposed to complete early 2005. The reconnected railroad system will enable the Trans Korea Railroad (TKR)-Trans Siberia Railroad (TSR) project to come into being. These projects will greatly contribute to reducing the tension on the Korean Peninsula and ultimately enhancing the peace and stability in the region.

During the post-Cold War, the expansion of democratic states, deepening of interdependence and emerging of transnational behavior contributes to mitigating

³¹ John Feffer, “Untangling the Gordian Knot: the Future Strategic Relationship between the U.S. and South Korea,” in the 19th Annual Conference entitled *The ROK-U.S. Relationship: the Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict in the Past, Present, and Future* hosted by the Council on Korea-U.S. Security Studies, Seoul, October 7-8, 2004, pp.85-6.

conflict among nations and facilitating cooperation among nations. The nature of challenge, which faces the world and will confront in the future, requires different solution methodology unlike past solution methodology. Especially, a state's security issue is no longer a limited problem related to the state. Considering the deepening of interdependence under the present situation, most security issues retains the nature of crossing the national border. Security arena also emerge multilateral cooperation rather than an individual nation's tackle. Security requires integrative and collective approaches.

The Korean government's strategy to achieve such mid to long-term goals is best described in the "Peace and Prosperity Policy" of the current administration. This policy is based on the premise that politics and economics are inseparable. It regards the unstable North Korean economy as one of the main factors causing instability on the Korean Peninsula. Introducing elements of a market economy will vitalize North Korea's economy which in turn will have a positive impact on North Korea's domestic, political and diplomatic behavior. The more North Korea becomes economically interdependent or dependent within the global network, the more natural will it be for North Korea to follow international norms in diplomatic dealings. The Peace and Prosperity Policy aims at boosting interdependence, not only between the Two Koreas but also between the Koreas and their neighboring countries such as the United States, China, Japan, Russia and the ASEAN. The European experience in the 1950s is a good guide for us here. During the span of 100 years until the end of the Second World War, France and Germany had fought three major wars against each other. Yet the two countries were able to thaw their confrontational relationship through growing economic cooperation under the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and as a result have made possible the peace and prosperity of today. Successful achievement

of these goals will not only bring peace to the Korean Peninsula but with that as a stepping stone will also contribute to stability and prosperity in northeast Asia. Conversely, increased economic engagement among the Two Koreas and neighboring countries will positively affect the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. In this sense, the objectives of South Korea's economic policy and its policy toward North Korea overlap with one another. In pursuing the short-term goal of resolving the nuclear issue and the mid to long-term goal of establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula the U.S.-South Korea alliance should serve as the central pillar.³²

This is the sort of approach Seoul should follow, taking care that the principle of reciprocity is enforced against the North. It is important for Seoul to resume the point position in dealing with North Korea. Real progress toward tension reduction must be achieved primarily by the Koreans, with the US, China, Japan and other concerned nations playing important but supporting roles. The North must now show substantive efforts and make rapid progress toward achieving peace and stability on the Peninsula. President Kim, North-South summit initiative gives rise to considerable hope that this process has begun and that the two Koreas are implementing a practical, step-by-step journey toward peace and reunification. Washington should step back, support the South in its efforts, and ensure that future aid is tied to real reciprocity on the part of the North.

In fact, many of the voices counseling caution in implementing the agreement are from conservative security-minded and economy-minded South Koreans, who are concerned that the reconnection of road and rail links will make the South more vulnerable to an invasion from the North, and that economic aid and investment will

³² Yoon Young Kwan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Republic of Korea, "The North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Settlement of Peace in and around the Korean Peninsula," *Speech at the Asia Society*, New York, September 26, 2003.

strengthen the Kim Jong Il regime and its military while draining the battered South Korean economy.³³

Inter-Korean engagement is complicated by the impact of the Korea policies of the United States, China, and Japan. For example, while South Korea may be satisfied to pursue a controlled engagement process even if it does not yield substantial social consequences, the status quo will not satisfy the United States, which seeks to turn back North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities.

Engagement as a process is a fact. The South Korean people have gained tremendous confidence in their ability to lead Korea along the path of reunification, even though some of this confidence may be misplaced. The Two Koreas have taken an irrevocable step toward reconciliation, and barring outside-initiated events, it is almost inconceivable that they will ever again sink to the level of fratricidal warfare. After the 2000 Summit Talks in Pyongyang, there are defense talks including Defense Ministerial Talk between the two Koreas to reduce tension on the Peninsula.³⁴

4.3. Evaluation

Interdependence directs our attention to the specific conditions that shape the way states interact with each other. Where interdependence is strong, it should reduce

³³ For a cautionary security note, see *Korea Times* (Internet version), September 4, 2000.

³⁴ Oh Kongdan, North Korea's Engagement: Implications For South Korea, in the 19th Annual Conference entitled *The ROK-U.S. Relationship: the Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict in the Past, Present, and Future* hosted by the Council on Korea-U.S. Security Studies, Seoul, October 7-8, 2004, pp.85-6.

incentives to resort to armed force.³⁵ In part it points to issues where either the scale of the problems transcends the abilities of individual actors to make effective policy by themselves, or where the linkages are so strong that independent action by any unit cannot avoid engaging other concerns. Interdependence also points to the general conditions of interaction, especially the capacity of the communication, transportation and organizational networks that not only tie them together, but also determine the speed and volume of everything from trade and finance to military attack. Common security invites us to consider what military, economic, political, societal and ecological conditions in the international system might work to ameliorate the power-security dilemma.³⁶ Common security and cooperative security based on comprehensive security draws our attentions. Renewed renunciation of force as an instrument of national policy is an important element in a policy of common security. It is reinforced by interdependence and the recognition of common interests, by a process of disarmament and confidence-building. Reactive approaches and to deter conflict in the 20th century revert to proactive forward looking approaches through multilateral security cooperation.

Presuming that the current levels of economic cooperation are inextricably connected with one of the principles of the cooperative security idea, it could be argued that the cooperative security idea is more applicable to Northeast Asia. The sustained economic growth in the region has not only attracted many investors, taken in large amount of investments, promoted rapid growth of the regional economic cooperation, but also increased the internal stability of the countries in the region, deepened their interdependence, thus creating among them and for the political

³⁵ Barry Buzan, "Is International Security Possible?" in Ken Booth, ed., *New Thinking about Strategy and International Security* (London: Harper Collins Academy, 1991), p.42.

³⁶ Barry Buzan, *ibid.*, p.44.

solutions to the disputes on the basis of dialogue and negotiation. The new organizing principle in the making of a new regional order put an emphasis on economic cooperation and mutual prosperity based on non zero-sum logic.³⁷

Economic development in East Asia has been accompanied with growing regional integration. The intra-regional trade ratio for East Asia was 30.98 percent in 1970, lower than EU and NAFTA countries. It increased to 50.38 percent in 2000, higher than NAFTA, indicating growing economic linkage within the regions as a result of the long-term economic growth.³⁸ The study shows the rising intra-regional trade shares of China, Japan, and South Korea. The intra-regional trade among them has increased substantially and their shares of exports and imports have reached 20.3% and 27.6%, respectively in 2003. Therefore China, Japan and Korea are very important trading partners to each other. Given deepening economic interdependence among the three countries, the need for policy cooperation among them is obvious.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, recent developments in Central Asia and the Russian Far East have stimulated a great deal of attention on energy issues, including the various competing pipeline projects in a region where there also exist serious geopolitical and religious fault lines. There was a consensus that energy security and national security today are inextricably linked. However, energy security also has implications for human security and regime security. The Sakhalin natural gas pipeline construction plan which will produce natural gas in the area of Sakhalin and

³⁷ Yang Sung Chul, "The Restructuring of an East Asian Order and Two Koreas," in Pak Chae Ha, Nam Sung Woo, and Engene Craig Campbell, eds., *A New World Order and the Security of the Asia-Pacific Region* (Seoul: The Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 1993), pp. 179-80.

³⁸ Fen Lu, "Free Trade Area: Awakening Regionalism in East Asia" Paper for the conference "Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia" organized by the Institute of Northeast Asia Business and Economics of Korea University and China Center for Economic Research at Beijing University, in Seoul, September 19, 2003

build a long pipeline that passes through Far East Siberia and reaches the East seashore of the Korean Peninsula.

This is a multilateral joint project in which the U.S., China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, North Korea, and Europe participate. This project also induces North Korea to be a member of the global community by enabling the Stalinist country to join an international joint project. This project is highly meaningful in realizing the vision of the future 'Northeast Asia Union'. This contribution is all the more significant as it can serve as a basis for cultivating a multilateral cooperative framework on regional security and foreign relations.

Of the multilateral institutions in Northeast Asia, the Tuman River Area Development Program (TRADP) is perhaps best for testing neoliberal institutionalism in the Northeast Asian setting. The TRADP seems tailor-made for exploring the possibilities and limitations of a multilateral Northeast Asia economic regime. The TRADP presents a unique case of regime formation involving multiple sets of actors - provincial, national, and international - all engaged in bargaining over the nature, scope, and direction of Northeast Asia economic development

The South Korean governments, in particular, as elaborated in President Kim Dae Jung's 'Sunshine' Policy and President Roh Moo Hyun's 'Peace and Prosperity' Policy, believes that economic engagement is one of the best ways of improving relations, turning the North into a stakeholder in peninsula economics and ultimately offering all sides in the security equation an opportunity to shift resources from the military sphere into the economic sphere.

The Kaesung Industrial Complex Project is designed to enhance South Korean security and economic position. The North Korean population is a source of low cost labor that can help South Korean companies recapture its share of the manufacturing marketplace just as it did in the 1960's to 1980's and has now been eclipsed by China. It also serves as a mechanism to increase transparency and reconciliation between North and South thus improving the conditions for security cooperation. A by-product of this is the potential to prevent a catastrophic collapse of North Korea as well as renewed civil war.

Interdependence directs our attention to the specific conditions that shape the way states interact with each other. Where interdependence is strong, it should reduce incentives to resort to armed force.³⁹ In part it points to issues where either the scale of the problems transcends the abilities of individual actors to make effective policy by themselves, or where the linkages are so strong that independent action by any unit cannot avoid engaging other concerns. Interdependence also points to the general conditions of interaction, especially the capacity of the communication, transportation and organizational networks that not only tie them together, but also determine the speed and volume of everything from trade and finance to military attack. Common security invites us to consider what military, economic, political, societal and ecological conditions in the international system might work to ameliorate the power-security dilemma.⁴⁰

The Asian economic crisis has wide-ranging effects on regional order. It has

³⁹ Barry Buzan, "Is International Security Possible?" in Ken Booth, ed., *New Thinking about Strategy and International Security* (London: Harper Collins Academy, 1991), p.42.

⁴⁰ Barry Buzan, *ibid.*, p.44.

unleashed severe domestic strife in South Korea, rekindled inter-state disputes in the region and reshaped perceptions of the regional balance of power. The crisis has contributed to a general momentum toward democratization, reduced the prospects for a regional arms race, and led to a rethinking of the purposes and practices of regional institutions. The insecurity generated by the crisis may well be a blessing in disguise to those advocating reform not just in domestic politics, but also in regional governance. During the post-Cold War, the expansion of democratic states, deepening of interdependence and emerging of transnational behavior contributes to mitigating conflict among nations and facilitating cooperation among nations.

Chapter 5. Transnational Issues as Common Threats

This chapter will explore the vast array of transnational security challenges facing Northeast Asia. As a region, it is considered to be dominated by the ‘traditional’ security concerns of territoriality and sovereignty. These include the Cross-Straits issue, the Korean Peninsular, the South China Sea, Relations between China and Japan have been marred by historical animosity and contemporary rivalry.

In recent times, however, issues such as terrorism, transnational crime, infectious disease, illegal migration and environmental degradation, have become ‘securitized’ in the minds of policy makers in many Northeast Asian states.¹ Major security concerns, in the early 1990s, included concerns about maintaining a balance of power in light of U.S. military cutbacks and the rise of China. In the early 2000s, there were concerns about rising inter-state tensions and new-found concern regarding transnational issues.²

As transnational challenges grow in severity and scale, many security planners throughout the region are characterizing them as key challenges to the nation state in the 21st century. As part of its effort to collect data about and analyze these issues, this study focuses on transnational security threats from both a regional perspective as well as an issue-based perspective. The chapter continues to address the concerns of both proponents and opponents of military intervention in transnational issues.

¹ <http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/curley.html> 12-28-2004

² Amitav Acharya, *Regionalism and Multilateralism* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2002), p.286.

5.1. Transnational Security Threats

Transnational security issues are emerging as key security challenges for Asia-Pacific states. Transnational security issues, as the name implies, are nonmilitary threats that cross borders and either threaten the political and social integrity of a nation.³ Moreover, such issues might be deemed as threats that tend “to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state.”⁴

Transnational Terrorism

In the security environment today, threats have also taken on new and more diverse forms. They can range from conventional attacks to low intensity conflicts to terrorist activities. In particular, the September 11 terrorist attacks and subsequent bombings in Jakarta, Bali and Madrid to name a few, have shown that non-conventional threats can be just as intimidating, and devastating, as conventional ones. These threats can take many forms such as chemical and biological terrorism, as well as threats to the information infrastructure that underpins our economic well-being.

The threat of terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region has not abated with the end of the Cold War; if anything, the problem has worsened due to increased globalization, more cooperation between terrorist organizations, and the emergence of new terrorist sources and tactics. Various terrorist groups in Asia are increasingly linked with each other and with suppliers of money, weapons and training outside the region. Terrorism overlaps with other transnational security threats, as terrorist groups frequently engage in organized crime and narcotics trafficking to raise funds. Combating

³ Paul J. Smith, “Transnational Security Threats and State Survival: A Role for the Military?” *Parameters*, Autumn 2000, p.77.

⁴ Richard H. Ullman, “Redefining Security,” in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), p. 19.

terrorism effectively may prove to be an obstacle to democratization in Asia, exacerbating the tension between state police powers and individual rights.

The new trend, however, seems to be for large-scale violence for its own sake. Wreaking violence and massive destruction has now become the goal itself, while the desire for publicity has evidently become a secondary consideration. When members of the Japanese religious cult Aum Shin Rikyo released sarin gas on the Tokyo subway system in 1995, their intent was to kill thousands of people, although in fact only 12 people died and roughly 5,000 were injured. As mass violence has increasingly become the goal of modern terrorism, the possibility of nuclear terrorism threatens to raise the magnitude of physical and human destruction to an entirely new level. Aum Shinrikyo had nearly US\$1 billion at its disposal, much of which was used to build an elaborate chemical and biological weapons program.

The development of this program was facilitated by the cult's policies of recruiting students from Japan's top universities who specialized in physics, biochemistry, biology and electrical engineering. In April 1990, the group attempted major terrorist attacks using biological agents at three major locations: the Japanese Diet (Parliament), the Yokosuka naval base (home to the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet) and the Narita International Airport. These attacks were unsuccessful. Later in June 1993, the group used botulinum toxin in an attempt to murder the Japanese royal family during the wedding of Prince Naruhito. During the same month, the group attempted another attack in which they released anthrax spores from the top of a building they owned in Tokyo. Aum Shinkyō may represent a new type of terrorist organization that lends open-ended and highly volatile millenarian belief structures with the type of extremist Manichean outlook characteristic of many fundamentalist religious organizations.

The only major populated region in which transnational Islamist terrorists have not appeared heavily active is East Asia. In China's Xinjiang province, there are militant Muslim Uighur separatists, some trained in Afghanistan, but there relatively few and containable. In May 2004, however, Japanese authorities – prompted by the arrest in Germany of a Frenchman convicted in France absentia of several violent crimes who had worked in Japan and was suspected of assisting Islamic militants – launched a probe for al-Quaeda operatives that resulted in the detention of three Bangladeshis, an Indian and a Malian on immigration charges. More generally, Japan and South Korea's close strategic alignments with the U.S. and the large U.S. military deployments that they host make them potential targets.⁵

International Crimes

The Asia-Pacific region is a major crossroads for transnational crime activities and international criminal syndicates. A variety of transnational crimes occur in the region, including narcotics trafficking, human smuggling, piracy, illegal fishing, credit card fraud, and cybercrime. Criminal organizations are taking advantage of globalization and loose border arrangements to disguise the scale and locations of their operations. Crime in the region thrives in the presence of government corruption or in areas with weak government structures. Making matters worse, crime--especially sophisticated transnational crime--can undermine the development of legal or democratic institutions.

In addition, the sexual exploitation of female illegal immigrants in Japan and Korea is a growing concern. These female immigrants usually come to Japan and Korea with

⁵ IISS, *The Military Balance 2004-2005* (London: Oxford University, 2004), p.385.

the purpose of realizing the “Japan and Korean dream,” but usually get unintentionally involved in the sex industry, at times selling themselves for almost nothing in return. Such practices must be eradicated at all levels of society, with the government taking an active initiative.

Traditional law enforcement initiatives are constrained in Asian maritime regions because of jurisdictional issues, political sensitivities, failure of states to accept responsibility, lack of enforcement capacity, among other reasons. To diminish maritime crime, states should share information and cooperate for their common good. Coordination must also occur between regional and international agencies.

Despite the frequency of tensions deriving from illegal fishing in the Yellow Sea, these issues have not been sufficiently acknowledged and affected countries do not appear keen on procedural coordination to jointly resolve the situation. If illegal fishing and migration are not carefully managed, they could deteriorate into traditional security concerns, given the scarcity of land and maritime resources in meeting future national needs.⁶

Infectious Disease

Infectious disease is a major threat to the Asia-Pacific region and is growing in severity for a variety of reasons: globalization and increased travel, urbanization, changing sexual habits, poor water quality, invasion of humans into natural areas containing latent pathogens, etc. Common diseases in the region include Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)/Human Immune Deficiency Virus (HIV),

⁶ Andrew T.H. Tan and J.D. Kenneth Boutin, eds., *Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategy Studies, 2001), p.22.

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Tuberculosis, Malaria, Dengue Fever, Cholera, Bird Flue, etc. AIDS is now generally recognized as a major potential economic and security threat to the nation, a threat which is propagated through migration.⁷ Diseases not only detract from human security and quality of life, they can also undermine national security by degrading civil governance, causing a disruptive loss in the labor force, and posing an enormous burden on government health budgets. Diseases must be managed or mitigated by the use of regional initiatives and international cooperation.

Infectious diseases have stalked mankind since time immemorial, although recent medical advances have contributed to the perception that these diseases no longer pose as serious a threat. In the era of globalization, however, infectious diseases are rapidly experiencing a resurgence. Urban crowding, migration, overuse of antibiotics, and changing sexual behaviors are just a few factors that explain the trend. In 1995, infectious disease was responsible for over one third of the 52 million deaths that occurred in the world and the numbers were similar for 1996 and 1997. In 1997, moreover, the world witnessed more than 60 new outbreaks of both known infectious disease and new, unfamiliar varieties. One expert has noted that “infectious diseases are potentially the largest threat to human security lurking in the post-Cold War world.”⁸

Perhaps the most insidious and destructive infectious disease is the AIDS epidemic. In April 2000, the Clinton Administration formally designated AIDS as a threat to the U.S. national security, one that could “topple foreign governments, touch off ethnic wars, and undo decades of work in building free-market democracies abroad.” As *The*

⁷ James E. Coughlan and Robert T. Burstall, Migration as Challenge to Asian Security, in Wilfried A. Herrmann, ed., *Asia's Security challenges* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1998), p.103.

⁸ Dennis Pirages, “Microsecurity: Disease Organisms and Human Well-Being,” *The Washington Quarterly*, 18 (Autumn 1995), p.5.

Washington Post reported:

The National Security Council, which has never before been involved in combating an infectious disease, is directing a rapid reassessment of the government's efforts. The new push is reflected in the doubling of budget requests--to \$254 million--to combat AIDS overseas and in the creation on February 8, 2000 of a White House interagency working group which has been instructed to "develop a series of expanded initiatives to drive the international efforts" to combat the disease.⁹

In December 1998, there were more than 33.4 million people around the world living with HIV (the virus that causes AIDS) or fully developed AIDS, and more than 2.5 million people died of the disease that year. By the year 2005, it is estimated that more than 100 million people worldwide will have become infected with HIV.

As the threat of infectious disease has grown around the world, many governments believe it constitutes a security concern, and not merely a public health matter. The AIDS epidemic, once considered a major public health problem, is now described by officials as a security concern. A U.S. State Department report warned that the AIDS epidemic is "gradually weakening the capacity of militaries to defend their nations and maintain civil order."¹⁰ AIDS and other diseases can devastate a country's economy, thereby potentially contributing to increased unemployment, reduced social stability, and, in the worse case, political collapse.

Illegal Immigration

Illegal migration and human smuggling are growing transnational challenges in Asia and are inextricably linked to economic disparities that exist throughout the region. Migration is not merely a movement of people, but rather, migration is a process, a dynamic socio-cultural and eco-political process: it involves not only the physical

⁹ Barton Gellman, "AIDS Is Declared Threat to Security," *The Washington Post*, April 30, 2000, p. A1.

¹⁰ *U.S. International Response to HIV/AIDS* (Washington: Department of State, January 1999)
http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/health/1999_hivaids_rpt/contents.html 12-02-2004

movement of people from one spatial location to another, but also the movement of economic resources, cultural practices, political ideologies and social values.¹¹

From the perspective part of the explanation for the labor shortage in the more developed countries of the region has been the rising wealth and levels of education in these countries – such as Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, etc.- which has led to a distaste for doing manual labor, and thus creating a demand for the immigration of workers to fill unskilled job vacancies.

International migration is likely to emerge as one of the thorniest political and social challenges of the 21st century. Millions of individuals, spurred by joblessness, poverty, political persecution, and various other motivations, are crossing international borders to find opportunity or sanctuary. With the substantial portion of future global population growth predicted to occur in the developing world--combined with a looming unemployment crisis that is predicted for many developing countries--some predict that international migration will become a much greater phenomenon in the 21st century. Currently there are roughly 130 million international migrants, with about 25 million of those falling within the more legally-defined category of refugee. The number of international migrants grows by about three to four million per year.¹²

As the scale of international migration--and particularly illegal or mass migration--has grown, nation-states are increasingly characterizing it as a security concern. Some states fear that immigration might alter the ethnic balance and cause political instability, while others blame migrants for the importation of crime and disease. Still others fear that neighboring states may seek to use the threat of mass emigration as a tool for gaining political or economic concessions of some sort. In some countries,

¹¹ James E. Coughlan and Robert T. Burstall, Migration as Challenge to Asian Security, in Wilfried A. Herrmann, ed., *Asia's Security challenges* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1998), p.87.

¹² Philip Martin and Jonas Widren, "International Migration: A Global Challenge," *Population Bulletin*, April 1996, p. 2.

officials fear that political instability or chaos in a neighboring state might result in mass migration.

Migration in the region has increased substantially in the past 25 years. Roughly a third of the world's refugees are located in Asia, and yet most Asian nations are not parties to international refugee treaties. Moreover, many Asian and Pacific nations do not consider themselves “immigration countries” and, consequently, view immigration as a long-term cultural and economic threat. Illegal migration and defectors are growing more severe in the region, and is affecting many Northeast Asian countries such as China, Japan and South Korea. Illegal migration can lead to crime in host countries, as migrants who are unable to find legitimate employment must turn to crime to survive. Effective management of migration in the region must require honest assessment and avoidance of xenophobic mass expulsion policies.

Environment Degradation

The Asia-Pacific region is witnessing an almost catastrophic destruction of its environment. Air, water, and land pollution are rife and the trend in most countries is worsening. Key environmental challenges in the region include poor water quality, food insecurity, marine pollution, depletion of fish resources, deforestation, acid rain, and transboundary pollution, and global climate change. Environmental issues have traditionally been excluded from the realm of traditional security issues. As environmental problems worsen, however, that perception is changing. In some cases such as the 1997 smog crisis in Southeast Asia environmental degradation has caused major inter-state tensions. In other cases such as the 1998 and 2001 East Coast forest fires in South Korea has resulted in the loss of 50 human lives and huge property.

Responses to environmental crises must include both a crisis response to an immediate crisis and a more long-term preventive defense including effective early warning systems.

Pollution of the marine environment is a major problem throughout Northeast Asia, but it has not been effectively tackled at this time. Land-based pollution is pervasive in the region. The Russian tanker Nakhodka broke in two in the East Sea, spilling 19,000 tons of fuel oil on the southwest coast of Honshu. Russia dumped 18 nuclear reactors and 13,150 containers of radioactive waste from 1978 to 1993, mostly in the East Sea. These degradations cause grave damage to the ability of citizens to enjoy their coastal areas and reduce tourist potential, as well as causing problems for the region's fisheries.

Perhaps even more significantly, the environment ministers of China, Japan, and South Korea met in Seoul in January 1999 and in Beijing in February 2000. China and South Korea have made initial efforts to coordinate efforts to protect the marine ecosystem of the Yellow/West Sea.

5.2. Analysis of Issue-Based Transnational Threats

5.2.1. Transnational Terrorism

The events of September 11 have provided an impetus for countries to cooperate more closely. We have seen collective actions ranging from joint statements condemning terrorism; expanded intelligence exchanges; cooperation among law enforcement agencies; and tightening of border surveillance, just to name a few.

Terrorism remains the definitive challenge for many of us, more specifically,

catastrophic or WMD terrorism. Time and time again, from Bali to Baghdad to Madrid, the terrorists have shown that they are willing to kill and maim innocent civilians in a bid to achieve their aims. The 9/11 also revealed the highly organized global network of terrorist organizations that are well-financed and supported. The risk of WMD such as North Korea's nuclear technology and material falling into the hands of terrorists is real and immediate, and we should neither underestimate their ability nor their will to use such weapons.

Despite our best efforts, terrorist networks are far from being eradicated. We know that Al Qaeda and its network of affiliate groups are still active, and the wellspring of support for these terrorist organizations are disrupted, they are on the constant lookout for new terrorists targets.

The most shocking revelation of all was the existence of terrorist cells in Singapore. We discovered that we are not immune. The Jemaah Islamic(JI) is an Islamic group that wants to turn South Asia into an Islamic state, a caliphate that comprises Malaysia, Indonesia, south Philippines and Singapore. The JI set up a regional network of terrorist cells. The JI also has links with extremist and separatist groups in the region like Philippines' More Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Malaysia's Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM), as well as the wider terrorist network like Al Qaeda. In fact, JI is the Southeast Asian arm of Al Qaeda.

Like international criminal groups, terrorists have benefited greatly from globalization and its attendant benefits, including mass communications, technology, and advanced financial services which provide the critical covert financial support for terrorist operations. The vast global arms market--including the ubiquitous black market--provides key weapons for terrorist groups. Porous borders and international migration also play a role in facilitating modern terrorism. A terrorist's ability to enter

and exit countries is contingent on his or her ability to circumvent a nation's immigration control system--hence terrorists' interest in the growing racket of false passports and fabricated entry-visas.

The threat that transnational terrorism poses to the nation-state is fairly direct. Terrorists may target key infrastructures within nations, and their attacks might prompt a breakdown in civil order even in those areas far beyond the target of the attack. If terrorists attack a financial target, it could spark financial panic which could, depending on where the attack occurred, spread overseas and disrupt international markets. So-called "cyber-terrorism" could destroy a nation's power grid or destroy sensitive computer technology or networks through the use of computer viruses. If the trend toward "catastrophic terrorism" continues, then human carnage could increase substantially. The specter of biological or chemical weapons being used in terrorist attacks substantially raises the possibility of widespread human and social destruction.

The battle against terrorism will be a protracted one, requiring the collaboration of all members of the international community. Through multilateral institutions and processes such as UN, ARF, states can come together to work out a collective responses to these challenges.

Efforts to combat terrorism under the pretext of war on terrorism not only failed but created additional animosity to the already troubled world. For the developed and powerful countries, globalization means strengthening their position to control economies that are able to take advantage of free trade. It is really a new form of "colonialization" through the use of the IMF, the World Bank and WTO.

Having discussed the world's challenges, what do we really want our world to be. If world peace and prosperity are to be achieved for every one, efforts must be made among others to: 1) prevent recurrence of war and conflict; 2) resolve inter-state

rivalries through peaceful resolutions; 3) restructure the UN so as to be more democratic and design it to protect every member nation; 4) remove root causes of terrorist threats. The present approaches on the war on terrorism are to cease immediately.

It is a key to tracking terrorist activities in the region, as well as maintaining warning indicators and situation awareness on areas such as Korea. In the region, Signal Intelligence remains our best means to provide timely information on threat developments and intentions.¹³

5.2.2. International Crime

The growth of transnational organized crime has emerged as a major security issue in the post-Cold War era. Ironically, an increasingly globalized economy that features international commerce, travel, and the movement of goods and services is also allowing the easy passage of illicit money, narcotics, illegal aliens, and nuclear material.¹⁴ Many organized crime groups are taking advantage of global communications and transportation advances to establish bases in multiple countries in pursuit of illegal profits.

Transnational crime presents a real and protracted threat to the nation-state. It can undermine political institutions in countries with nascent democratic governments and foster mistrust of legitimate governments.

The study focuses on the various transnational criminal threats confronting the Asia-Pacific region. Northeast Asia is facing four major types of transnational crime: (1) small arms trafficking (2) drug trafficking (3) credit card fraud and (4) human

¹³ Statement of Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, Combatant Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Before the Senate Armed Service Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, March 13, 2003

¹⁴ Roy Godson and Phil Williams, "Strengthening Cooperation Against Transnational Crime," *Survival*, Autumn 1998.

smuggling. Small firearms are flowing into Japan from the United States, and China. Narcotics smuggling is fueled by many immigrant groups, with Iranian nationals playing a prominent role. Credit card fraud, meanwhile, is partially an outgrowth of the lack of domestic laws against this category of crime. Finally, human smuggling involves many countries. In particular, the Philippines are emerging as a major source country for young women who are smuggled into Japan and Korea where they are often forced to work in the sex industry.

An examination of transnational organized crime as a security issue, finessed by reference to security as a self-defined and evolving concept which eludes the boundaries of traditional concepts of state security, would be in serious danger of predetermining its own conclusion. Instead, we need to seek to understand the threat to security posed by transnational organized crime in the same terms we have employed to approach security issues in the past several decades.

This approach reflects the fact that it is precisely on these terms that the matter of transnational organized crime has been raised in security dialogues. In the last few years, a number of authors have argued that criminal organizations are particularly well-positioned to exploit the opportunities of an opening global economy, the breakdown of political barriers, and the communications revolution.

Moreover, it is argued that the combined and often cooperative activities of many of the leading criminal organizations are by nature borderless operations, running counter to and often directly threatening the interests – and the security – of states, who seem powerless to slow the growth of criminal activity. One encounters the following, fairly unequivocal, statements in the literature: Transnational criminal organizations pose serious threats to both national and international security, and are

extremely resistant to efforts to contain, disrupt, or destroy them.¹⁵

Transnational organized crime has been a serious problem for most of the 20th century, but it has only recently been recognized as a threat to the world order. This criminality undermines the integrity of individual countries, but is not yet a threat to the nation-state. Failure to develop viable, coordinated international policies in the face of ever-growing transnational criminality, however, may undermine the nation-state in the 21st century.¹⁶ Transnational crime is now emerging as a serious threat in its own right to national and international security and stability.

There is no attempt in these statements to suggest that it is simply the security of individuals that is in danger as a consequence of criminal activities. On the contrary: transnational organized crime is a direct threat to the state. Beyond this, it has been claimed that the degree of integration and cooperation amongst criminal groups has been increasing.

While there is certainly enough evidence to suggest that crime poses a considerable challenge for the developed democracies and an even greater hurdle for many regions of the developing world, and while the globalization of the world economy has necessarily seen crime take on a transnational character, casting this threat as an economic, political, security, or social threat has significant implications for policy. In particular, the joining of law-enforcement, foreign policy-making and the security apparatus represents a mixture of executive powers with which democracies have traditionally been uncomfortable.

Trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; trafficking in conventional arms; trafficking in nuclear materials; trafficking in women and children; smuggling of illegal aliens;

¹⁵ Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Organizations and International Security," *Survival* 36: 1 (Spring 1994), p.96.

¹⁶ Louise I. Shelley, "Transnational Organized Crime: An Imminent Threat to the Nation-State?" *Journal of International Affairs* 48: 2 (Winter 1995), p.463.

. large-scale car theft; trafficking in body parts; money-laundering; tax evasion; and, corruption.¹⁷

Third, there is a degree of *state complicity* in five of the ten areas listed. That is to say, in these cases it is not meaningful to describe a global situation in which states attempt to counter threats posed by transnational criminal groups. It is more reasonable to suggest that in these realms, some states find themselves opposed to a range of criminal behaviors by these groups which are either tolerated or on occasion directly supported by foreign governments. The issue then becomes less one of enforcing global norms, and more one of regime-building to establish those norms in the first instance.

In no field of criminality is the situation of knowledge as bad as in the drug criminality. Reason for this is the secrecy of all involved persons concerning the events and their fear of brutal revenge by their accomplices in case they are making statements to the police.¹⁸ Narcotic trafficking continues to be a major challenge for the entire region. Criminal groups are entering into transnational alliances to facilitate drug trafficking and are exploiting countries or areas with loose government structures and minimal law enforcement activities. This is an expected outcome since transnational crime thrives within weaknesses in particular jurisdictions. Dysfunctional or underdeveloped civil institutions act as a magnet for international criminal cartels eager to find a venue for their illicit activities. Problems for the structure and stability of the Asian countries caused by aggravation of the criminal situation, impairment of the internal security, restriction of the freedom of action in

¹⁷ R.T. Naylor, "From Cold War to Crime War: The Search for a New 'National Security Threat,'" *Transnational Organized Crime* 1: 4 (Winter 1995), p.52, notes that "while perhaps crime is now sufficiently international as to require some sort of political response, it is important to caution that when law enforcement and foreign policy are mixed together, on the ideological justification of meeting a new threat to national security, all too often the first gets twisted to serve the independently-derived requirements of the second."

¹⁸ Martin Tuffner, "Drug Criminality as a Security Problem in Asia," in Wilfried A. Herrmann, ed., *Asia Security Challenge* (Cammack, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1998), p.68.

domestic and international politics, and threat to the national unity of a country. A solution for the social problems emerging in the slums of the big cities in Asia can only be found a long-term basis. The main aim has to be the cut of the heroin supply, so that the miserable situation of the junkies does not become worse.¹⁹

Web of Criminal Behavior in Northeast Asia

The significance of this longer term threat, however, may be muddled as long as the focus of concern rests primarily on cataloguing and confronting a world of organized crime which, it is often alleged, is dominated by a number of key organized groups responsible for a series of nefarious behaviors. The Japanese *yakuza*, Chinese triads, Russian *mafija*, Italian and American mafias, along with others, are often highlighted as the key actors in a web of criminal behavior in which the actors, relationships and hierarchies involved are often seen as far more organized and coherent than is probably warranted. There is no denying the existence of these groups, and it would not be of use to underestimate their impact. However, their status as bogeys may be misleading for several reasons.

First, whether due to the pervasive influence of “mafia models” of organized criminal behavior, or to other factors, there are few common denominators to these groups beyond their existence as criminal entities. Some are relatively tightly-knit actors, based on kinship, internal group morality and closely monitored hierarchy along the model of Italian-based organized crime. Others are looser collections of criminal gangs, with little binding the group or perpetuating its existence beyond immediate criminal opportunity and contingency, as in the Russian situation. Still others are vague, enduring networks in which loyalty is important but where greater

¹⁹ Ibid., p.76-77.

social distance and insulation exist between the various parts of the hierarchy, as in the model of the Japanese *boryukudan*.

Second, global criminal organizations vary in terms of their cohesion, their longevity, their degree of hierarchical control, their size, their degree of penetration and acceptance within legitimate society, making comparison or general statements regarding the direct threat posed by these actors per se to be extremely difficult, and most probably misleading. This point is underscored by a second: that there are many criminal activities linked to our normal conception of organized crime which are performed in a “one-off” or unstructured manner by other actors, for instance, money-launderers, and yet which perpetuate the activities listed above.

Third, there are a variety of criminal activities which are unrelated to “classic” organized crime, but which operate at times through similar conduits and have many similar effects. Tax evasion, misappropriation of government funds, profits from corruption, and other primarily individual criminal acts involve substantial amounts of capital and rely on and promote the same illegalities in international financial networks and business relationships as do the laundering activities of major drug traffickers, arms traders, and other organized groups.

Ultimately, these activities are best conceptualized from a policy viewpoint and arguably from a conceptual viewpoint as well in terms of their effects, rather than their predicate nature. These effects must surely include a long term economic threat with respect to the rule of law in financial networks, which in turn has significant implications for democratic institutionalization, a grave policy concern for those amongst the developed democracies with trading, human rights, and political interests in the newly democratizing economies of Asia and the former Soviet Union. This threat may be stated in dramatic terms, but it is in the longer term where significant

dangers lie. The Russian situation is clearly a current cause for concern. The degree to which criminality has pervaded the political, institutional and financial infrastructure of the post-Soviet apparatus has done much to undermine the fragile democratic institutionalization of the past decade. In China, where governing and regulatory eyes are trained hard on the Russian experience given Chinese moves toward economic deregulation, the problems of financial fraud (of many kinds) and misappropriation of public funds are currently experiencing exponential growth rates, abetted by the introduction of new information technologies.²⁰

In Japan, an advanced democracy whose political system is nonetheless currently in flux due to a repeated series of scandals involving ruling groups, the current financial crisis has been exacerbated by the degree of *yakuza* penetration of the banking sector. What is true for Russia and China (if less so for Japan) is also a problem for other leading economies in the newly-democratizing regions: the degree of economic advance and growth currently outstrips the degree of democratic institutionalization and the sophistication of regulatory controls over financial networks. The first states to experience the step-level increase in financial sophistication wrought by the information revolution were those states already possessing a well-institutionalized banking and supervisory system. The states currently undergoing the transition to this degree of sophistication have not had the advantage of a pre-existing, sophisticated regulatory structure. Thus for example China does not yet have in place a money-laundering law, and the problem of regulating suspicious or illegal financial transactions is simply awesome in an economy which is not only huge, but is

²⁰ The remarks by the Chief Justice of the Shanghai High People's Court, Address to the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform, Vancouver, September 22, 1997. 14 stable global democratization than perhaps any other current set of activities. If the current short-term concern for state control and stability is confined to a few localized problems in the developing world, the long term threat presents itself at the doorsteps of the leading democracies and their financial policymakers, and is exacerbated by inconsistencies within ruling elites in these societies vis-à-vis the desirability of plugging leaks in international financial regulatory networks.

primarily cash as opposed to credit based.

5.2.3. Infectious Disease

The study explores the rise of infectious disease around the Asia-Pacific region and addressed how this issue affects regional security. Underpinning the discussions was the idea that the concept of security and particularly its traditional emphasis on state-based conflict should be expanded to reflect current post-Cold War realities. Security should be defined not merely as the absence of external physical, or internal political threats, but as the attainment of national and global sustainability and resilience. Because security is generally defined in military terms, resources generally flow to military forces accordingly. If, however, the causal links between disease and security can be established, it could expand the flow of resources into this critical area.

From a human security perspective, transnational security threats destroy lives and ultimately undermine the fabric of human society. In the United States, for example, over 15,000 people die every year as a result of the narcotics trade including collateral violence and health impacts. The AIDS epidemic and its precursor HIV/AIDS marching across Asia with determined speed and far-reaching impact. International health authorities now consider Asia to be the next epicenter outside of Southern African or the global AIDS epidemic. In southwest China, narcotics trafficking across the China-Burmese border is facilitating the spread of HIV into neighboring Yunnan and other Chinese provinces. HIV/AIDS continues to be a debilitating factor on regional militaries, working against their ability to deliver military capability.²¹

²¹ IISS, *The Military Balance 2004-2005* (London: Oxford University, 2004), p.219.

Table 5-1 AIDS/HIV Infected Personnel

The U.S.	China	Japan	Russia	South Korea
500,000	240,000	5,058	280,000	2,679

Source: bric.postech.ac.kr/bbs/daily/janews/janew0034-1/0821-01d.gi/ 01-10-2005

* North Korean authority announced that they do not have any AIDS/HIV infected person, however, they expelled 24 AIDS infected foreigners.

Infectious disease poses a security threat to the nation state and its inhabitants for the following five reasons: (1) it impacts the state's most basic unit the human being; (2) it can undermine public confidence in the state's general custodian function; (3) because of its trans-border fluidity and ephemeral nature, diseases cannot be controlled by traditional border control mechanisms; (4) transnational disease pandemics can complicate already tense bilateral and multilateral relations and thus indirectly cause regional instability; (5) disease can threaten military operations by disabling soldiers and diminishing the will of nations to participate in coalition operations.

The burgeoning AIDS/HIV epidemic clearly provides a direct example of the linkage between disease and security. More than 34 million people around the world are infected with HIV, a trend that continues to worsen. In Africa, the epidemic is so severe that it threatens to stall or perhaps undermine economic development in many countries. In Southeast Asia, the HIV epidemic is growing faster than in any other part of the world. It threatens to overwhelm health budgets in many countries as the cost of HIV treatment continues to skyrocket. AIDS not only threatens human beings, it also undermines social structures because of the fear and stigma generated by the disease. In many countries, one of the societal effects of the HIV epidemic is the creation of

large orphan populations as parents and older relatives succumb to the disease.

International pandemics are growing because of various medical, demographic and social factors. One of these factors is rising antibiotic resistance. Medical advances have led to a sharp reduction of many infectious diseases that traditionally killed millions. Much of this progress is linked to the introduction of antibiotics. But recently many antibiotic resistant strains have emerged that threaten human populations once again. Diseases that could once be controlled by relatively inexpensive antibiotics must now be treated with more expensive medication for much longer periods of time. In East Asia, examples of antibiotic resistant diseases include *Mycobacterium tuberculosis*, cholera, and malaria. Environmental degradation is another factor fueling the spread of infectious diseases. Climate change is expected to result in a greater incidence of disease through its influence on insect vectors as well as other means.

Globalization and international migration also facilitate the rise and spread of infectious diseases. Every year, millions of people migrate to other countries, either permanently or temporarily. Millions more are displaced by humanitarian emergencies and other factors. As human beings move into previously uninhabited areas, they may risk contact with pathogens, traditionally associated with animals that have mutated to infect humans. Examples of such mutations include the zoonosis of measles from animal distemper, smallpox mutated from cow or monkey pox, and influenza related to Newcastle disease or fowl or swine influenza. International migration is also a major risk in large-scale pandemics. Immigrants and refugees can carry diseases from their homeland to their new country of destination, even before the disease is recognized. The resurgence of tuberculosis in many developed countries, moreover, is partially linked to mass immigration from countries

where the disease is highly prevalent.

As noted earlier, disease poses a threat to human security and state security in a number of ways. First, disease threatens individuals through death or disability. Second, when countries face mass outbreaks of disease, they can undermine state capabilities and public confidence. Disease, as one participant noted, is inherently political because of the powerful psychological and emotional reactions that it invokes. People react violently to threats of disease and focus their ire on political leaders whom they have trusted for protection against such calamities. Disease can also exacerbate inter-state tensions or cause conflict.

Another security aspect of disease is bio-terrorism. Biological warfare has been used sporadically throughout history. During the World War II years and earlier, Japan's notorious Unit 731 performed biological experiments on Chinese nationals that resulted in thousands of deaths. According to some estimates, Japan deployed biological warfare agents in Burma, Indonesia, Russia, Singapore and Thailand during this period. More recently, Iraq has displayed a propensity to use biological war agents, although much of Iraq's capability has reportedly been destroyed. For security and law enforcement officials today, a bio-terrorist attack remains a primary concern. As part of their security preparations for the 2000 Summer Olympics and 2002 Japan-Korea World Cup, Australian officials and South Korean-U.S. Forces in Korea prepared contingency plans to address a possible terrorist attack involving biological weapons. Similar concerns are evident in many other countries throughout the world.

5.2.4. Unregulated Population Movement

The migration literature has generally grouped these factors into two main groups: pull factors which act as an attraction to alternative locations, and push factors which

compel individuals to leave their current abode. Both the pull and push factors are based on an assessment of a perceived or real belief that the overall standard of their cultural (restrictions on cultural practices, e.g., large families, religion, cultivation of certain crops), economic (inflation, poverty), political (civil unrest, corruption, communism, democracy, socialism), physical (drought, famine, flood) and social (abuse of human rights) environment will be greater in another location.²²

The state with the greatest capacity to affect the future volume and direction of illegal immigrant or unregulated population movement (UPM) is China, because of its location, size and population. Large numbers of people have relocated from rural to urban areas, forming a vast itinerant pool of potential disaffected citizens numbering more than 100 million people.²³ Migration-induced tensions between China and the rest of the region could reawaken latent historical animosities and fuel anxieties about China's potential to promote its political and strategic influence through its expanding diaspora.

Upwardly mobile Chinese workers are already seeking their fortune in Japanese cities and towns, giving rise to fears that areas like Kabuchiko, Tokyo's largest entertainment district, are being taken over by Chinese business and criminal interests and are becoming a magnet for illegal workers from China.²⁴ Officials in Moscow harbor the fear that sparsely populated Siberia may be infiltrated and eventually overwhelmed by illegal immigrants from China's adjacent provinces.²⁵

The refugees also trigger off environment damage. The term economic refugee has been coined to describe an individual who is fleeing poverty or economic disadvantage, rather than fleeing their country due to a fear, or experience, or political

²² Ibid., p.89

²³ Nicholas D. Kristof, "Unregulated Population Flows in East Asia: New Security Dilemma?" *Pacific Review*, 9(1)1997, p.1.

²⁴ International Herald Tribune June 18, 1999, 'Chinese Outcompete Locals in Tokyo's Sex District'

²⁵ 'Chinese Influx into Russian Far East worries leaders,' *Straight Time*, August 26, 1995.

persecution.

Some 200,000 North Koreans are thought to be living illegally overseas, mainly in China and Russia. It could constitute the vanguard of a major problem for Beijing and Moscow if living conditions in North Korea were to deteriorate further.²⁶ Direct defection to the South through the heavily land-mined and tightly guarded Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which divides the Korean peninsula, has been rare. The majority of defectors have illegally crossed the Yalu River or the northeastern Chinese border to enter China, and then sought refuge in foreign embassies or traveled to a third country in order to come to South Korea. South Korean officials, who once made much of the threat posed by a hostile, nuclear capable North Korea, are these days more inclined to worry about an inflow of refugees from across the border in the event of the collapse of North Korea.

North Korean migration into China has a long history. Many of the people clandestinely leaving North Korea in the middle 1990s and massive defectors who leave North Korea in the early 2000s have been termed economic refugees and endure political persecution. Internationally, the issue began to attract attention against the background of the economic flight North Korea suffered in the 1990s. The issues for debate are about the legal status of the North Korean individuals who have managed to cross the shared Sino-North Korean border into China and international responsibilities for dealing with the suffering of the Korean people. The event that changed China's overall policy approach to North Korean migration is the spate of attempts by North Koreans to forcefully enter foreign diplomatic facilities in China in

²⁶ There are 20,000 North Korean workers in forestry, construction and agriculture in the Russian Far East. *South China Morning Post*, March 6, 1999.

the summer of 2002. The diplomatic strain resulted in a large part from international NGOs taking full advantage of the power of international electronic media to maximize the public impact of the incident. As a result, one option China adopted is to tighten the policing of North Korean already in the country.²⁷ A second option is to tighten the policing of the shared border with North Korea.²⁸ In the event of an internal collapse in North Korea, China might be to some degree preparing for such a possibility by amassing over 100,000 troops near the southern border. Granted, China's change of its border police from lightly armed paramilitary forces to a regular military one carries implications beyond a desire to stem the flow of North Korea migration. The forced repatriation of the illegal workers not only challenges domestic stability but also serves as a source of inter-state tension and regional insecurity.²⁹

The refugee Commission in the U.S. insisted that China government enforced 8,000 North Korean defectors to North Korea. The Chinese government does not allow UN Refugee Judge Office authority to meet defectors.³⁰ These mass displacement of defectors reinforce political tension between the two Koreas, China and South Korea, and obstruct badly needed regional political settlements.

The internationalization of NGO operations within China, as exemplified by the movement of North Korean immigrants into and through China, is not always in line with the Chinese government's preference for conducting diplomatic ties with its Northeast Asian neighbors.

²⁷ "North Koreans in China now live in fear of dragnet," *New York Times*, July 18, 2002, p.A3.

²⁸ "China moves troops to area bordering North Korea," *New York Times*, September 16, 2003, p.A3.

²⁹ Amitav Acharya, *Regionalism and Multilateralism* (Singapore: Time Academic Press, 2002), p.253.

³⁰ [http://kr.news.yahoo.com/service/news/ShellView.htm?ArticleD=2004 ----05-25-2004](http://kr.news.yahoo.com/service/news/ShellView.htm?ArticleD=2004----05-25-2004)

Table 5-2 Legal and Illegal Immigrants in Northeast Asia

U.S.	China	Japan	Russia Far East	South Korea	North Korea
Foreign Students: 600,000 (Chinese: 64,757, Japanese: 46,800, Korean: 56,390) Korean American: 2,150,000	Korean Chinese: 2,140,000 North Korean Illegal Refugees: 200,000 Foreign Students: 77,715 (Korean: 35,360, Japanese: 12,765, U.S.:3,693)	Legal Foreigners 1,354,000 (Chinese: 424,282, Korean: 646,800) Illegal foreigners: 219,500, Korean Students: 16,992	Chinese Illegal Immigrant: One-two million, Korean Russian: 560,000 North Korean Workers: 20,000	North Korean Defectors: 6,000 Legal Foreigners: 340,000 Illegal Foreign Workers: 290,000 Foreign Students: 16,832	-

Source: Lee Shin Wha, “The Realities of South Korea’s Migration Policies”; *Asian Pacific Issues*, December 29, 1996; http://www.jasso.go.jp/kikaku_chosa/ukeire4.html; and other various East Asian newspapers and Internets.

Although they have faith-based motivations, and hiring policies, and funding sources, but do not do religious sectors - like education, health, and charitable work under the supervision of education, health, or civil affairs authorities, not religious affairs authorities. But when such-faith organizations become involved in assisting the movement of North Korean migrant into and through China, the issue becomes a political one, not only for China itself but also for China’s management of its political relationships with South Korea and Japan.

Some of the domestic maids and laborers from Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand who work in the more advanced economies of the region such as Japan,

South Korea are university graduates. From this perspective part of the explanation for the labor shortage in the more developed countries of the region has been the rising wealth and levels of education in these countries such as Japan, South Korea which has led to a distaste for doing manual labor, and thus creating a demand for the immigration of workers to fill unskilled job vacancies.³¹

Security is best guaranteed when military capability is backed by effective diplomacy and trade and other contacts – building up a set of relationships, and networks of interdependence, that will minimize the likelihood of conflict breaking out.³² In countries where issues of culture, ethnicity, race or religion are sensitive, the presence of foreign workers, legal or illegal, is likely to contribute to domestic political insecurity.

With Russia, the traditional northern counterweight in Asia, losing a large part of its economic, military, and political power, China has radically increased its own geopolitical status assuming a potentially hegemonic position in continental Asia. The situation is further complicated by a massive migration of Chinese to the scarcely populated Russian Far East. Estimates of the number of permanent residents who have moved to the region from China range from one to two million people. So far this largely illegal immigration has brought only some ethnic and economic tensions, but if it is not regulated and curtailed, it could also lead to political problems under some future circumstances.³³

³¹ Keiko Yamanaka, “New Immigration Policy and Unskilled Foreign Workers in Japan,” *Pacific Affairs*, vol.66, no.1, (Spring 1993), pp.72-79.

³² Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, *Australia’s Foreign relations: In the World of the 1990s* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press,1993), p.107

³³ Sergi A. Karaganov, “Military Force and International Relations in the Post-Cold War Environment” in An Aspen Strategy Group Report, *The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era*

It is apparent that some of these migrations will be of security concern to both receiving and sending countries. How much importance is to be placed on these security concerns will in part be determined on how the receiving and sending countries regard the citizenship and human rights of the migrants, as well as the status of the bilateral relations between the countries concerned. It is probable that national policies of inclusion and multiculturalism will foster acceptance, while policies of exclusion and separation will foster distrust and tension, and heighten national security concerns.³⁴

5.2.5. Environment Degradation

Environmental degradation continues to persist as a major transnational challenge throughout the world. Despite increasing global awareness about environmental issues, the state of the environment continues to deteriorate, especially in developing countries, which are witnessing unprecedented levels of air, ground, and water pollution. Other environmental problems, such as land degradation and desertification, are also worsening. Today more than 900 million people around the world are affected by desertification and drought, and that number will double by the year 2025.³⁵ Millions of people around the world are denied access to safe drinking water because of pollution, which is commonly the result of domestic sewage, industrial effluents, and runoff from activities such as agriculture and mining.

Climate change is perhaps the most strategic environmental challenge facing the world community. A preponderance of evidence suggests that human activity--

(Queenstown, Maryland: The Aspen Institute, 1995), p.227.

³⁴ James E. Coughlan and Robert T. Burstall, Migration as Challenge to Asian Security, in Wilfried A. Herrmann, ed., *Asia's Security challenges* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1998), p.103.

³⁵ See Box 4.1 "Global Environmental Issues," in Chapter 4 of *Entering the 21st Century: World Development Report 1999/2000* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press for the World Bank, 1999), p. 88.

especially the release of carbon emissions--is a major culprit. When carbon is released during the combustion process, it forms carbon dioxide, which tends to trap heat in the atmosphere, resulting in increased surface temperatures. Carbon output continues in rich, developed countries, although the rate is much slower than in previous years. The opposite trend can be found in developing countries, where the rate of carbon emissions is growing significantly.

Environmental degradation presents a number of security challenges to the nation. First, there are the effects on human health as environmental degradation tends to increase rates of cancer, heart disease, and other diseases. Transboundary pollution may also be considered a security threat by recipient nations that are forced to endure a neighboring country's pollution. Climate change is arguably the most serious long-term global environmental threat, however.

Many scientists believe that the Korean peninsula and Japan suffer from transfrontier acid rain originating upwind from Manchurian China. Some have also noted that Mongolia may receive acid rain originating over its northwestern border with Russia. Depending on the time of year, some countries may be originators and recipients of acid rain, especially North Korea. The precise scale and impact of transfrontier acid rain deposition remains unclear, in part due to the lack of monitoring stations and ecological studies. China itself has noted the possibility that acid rain may be transmitted long distances and that it has seriously affected areas of China. The relative density of total annual emissions of about 16 million tons of sulfur dioxide emissions, by province, is shown for 1980. In the area adjacent to the Yellow Sea, Chinese industry has been estimated to emit about 700,000 tons of sulfur dioxide per year, some of which could be transported across the Yellow Sea to Korea by the

predominantly northwesterly winds. In winter (January), the air flows are generally from the Asian land mass to the ocean, while in summer (July), the opposite is the case.

A first step toward environmental cooperation has occurred with the establishment of a Regional Seas Program for the North-West Pacific, and the subsequent establishment of the Northwest Pacific Region Environmental Cooperation Center at Toyama, Japan, and a comparable center established at Pusan, South Korea. This arrangement connects North and South Korea, Russia, Japan, and China. When the first contact meetings occurred, it was said that it was “the first time that Government representatives of the Two Koreas have sat down around the same table -- as distinct from opposite each other -- and certainly was their first known contacts on environmental issues.” The centers have a relatively modest but still important research agenda, focusing on the exchange of information, and data collection on ocean pollution and its effect on sea animals.³⁶

Regional Organizational Infrastructure

A regional organizational infrastructure, such as a Northeast Asian Commission on Trade and Environment, may be needed to use scientific and citizen input both in the setting and the monitoring of environmental standards. Second, Northeast Asian nations could cooperate in promoting environmentally-friendly “green” industries, including export-oriented industries. Trade-environment linkages, in other words, offer not only new constraints but also new opportunities for industry growth. Environmental “sunrise” industries might include environmentally sensitive tourism, sustainable harvested forest products and fishing industries, and environmentally

³⁶ Northwest Pacific Regional Cooperation Center <http://www.npec.or.jp/index2.html> 04-11-2005

sound value-added industries. Industries could be targeted with research and development support, donor support, and/or domestic credit or other subsidies. A regional eco-label could also be developed to target “green consumers” in Japan and other OECD countries. Regional cooperation could also help to promote an international eco-labeling framework.

Growing environmental concern in democratic, developed states probably will result in increased public pressure for the military to reduce substantially the damage it causes to the environment in preparing for war. Although many military activities are harmful to the environment, the military has assumed a significant role in conserving biodiversity and endangered environments, such as wetlands.³⁷

5.3. Emerging Non-traditional Threats

There are those who argue that military forces should not become involved in non-traditional military operations regardless of how serious they may be. Many nations have and maintain a tradition of keeping military forces out of non-combat tasks, except in the most dire emergencies. This attitude is sometimes apparent even when military forces successfully carry out humanitarian missions that gain them popularity with the general population. India's army, for instance, fears that humanitarian operations fuel "disaster fatigue" and is detracting from the military's fundamental

³⁷ Terry Terriff, “Environmental Degradation and Security,” in Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Roy Gordon and George H. Quester, eds., *Security Studies for the 21st Century* (Dulles, Virginia: Brassey’s Press, 1997), pp.264-265.

role of defending the nation from external attack.³⁸ Indian military officials have reportedly urged the government to equip civilian agencies to handle such emergencies and hence free the military to focus on purely defense matters. Similar sentiments exist within the U.S. military. Referring to the increased involvement of American military forces in humanitarian operations, one writer has observed, “The purpose of the U.S. military is to fight and win the nation's wars. Military officers trained to have that mindset will inevitably find humanitarian operations to be a secondary activity.”³⁹ Within the U.S. military, there is also a strong party of “conventional warfighters” that would like to erase the institutional memory of such “nontraditional” missions because it considers such missions to be dangerous distractions from the “bread and butter” business of fighting and winning major conventional wars.⁴⁰

In general, the argument against deploying military forces hinges on practical concerns. First, there are fears that such operations will detract from operational readiness--in other words, military units accustomed to operating a refugee camp may have lost some of the battlefield skills needed to fight a war. A corollary to this is the financial drain to military budgets. Deploying military troops against organized crime or environmental threats, for instance, costs an enormous amount of money and can drain funds away from training or military equipment. Other objections include fears about the possible corruption of troops who might be deployed on anti-narcotics missions where millions of dollars are at stake. Moreover, there are legitimate

³⁸ Mahesh Uniyal, “Environment--India: Earthquake or Flood, Call in the Army,” *Inter Press Service*, 12 April 1999.

³⁹ John E. Lange, “Civilian-Military Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance: Lessons from Rwanda,” *Parameters*, 28 (Summer 1998), p.106.

⁴⁰ Alberto R. Coll, “Nontraditional Uses of Military Force,” in Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Roy Gordson and George H. Quester, eds., *Security Studies for the 21st Century* (Washington: Brassey's, Inc. 1997), p.160.

concerns about miscalculation and overreaction, especially when military troops are placed in a law enforcement environment. One could easily imagine a similar scenario occurring with troops deployed to guard national borders against illegal immigrants. For these and other reasons, many traditional military planners believe a nation's armed forces are not appropriate for these types of missions.

As the scale of transnational security threats has grown, many governments are increasingly inclined to deploy military force in either preventive roles or in the aftermath of a major event or disaster. In many cases, countries will turn to their military forces only after they realize that the particular threat is capable of overwhelming such frontline agencies as police or public health organizations which would normally address the issue. For example, the United States has deployed military troops in anti-narcotics missions along the U.S.-Mexican border instead of relying solely on civilian law enforcement officers. Thailand relies extensively on military troops to counter illegal migration and drug smuggling in its northern regions, especially along the border with Myanmar. Military forces were also deployed in Indonesia in 1997 to counter widespread forest fires that contributed to a massive haze that blanketed almost the entirety of Southeast Asia. As these examples indicate, military deployments against transnational security issues are on the rise. 100,000 China PLA troops have been deployed to the border to prevent massive illegal immigrants from North Korea.

Nevertheless, as governments deploy military forces to counter transnational threats, they are sparking a debate about the appropriateness of that course of action. Essentially the debate pits those who support military involvement in such missions against those who are opposed. Some of the main arguments for each viewpoint can be summarized as follows.

As transnational security challenges continue to grow in severity around the world, military leaders and planners are facing the almost inevitable reality that armed forces will be deployed against them in the decades ahead. This trend is not occurring without controversy, however. Some military leaders strongly oppose the use of military forces in non-warfare operations for a variety of reasons, including fears that such missions detract from military training and readiness. Nevertheless, governments around the world are increasingly discovering that civilian agencies which would normally manage these problems--such as police, health, environment, or immigration ministries--simply cannot cope with the magnitude of the problems they are confronting. This trend implies a major change in how countries will likely deploy their armed forces in the decades ahead. More important, however, it suggests a fundamental new role for military forces in the 21st century.

For military leaders, the dilemma is becoming clear. On one hand there is the imperative to maintain war readiness within the armed forces, particularly since more-traditional threats are not likely to dissipate anytime soon. On the other hand, military leaders must recognize that transnational threats will increasingly demand more attention and resources from the armed forces. Government leaders may attempt to create specialized agencies to alleviate the burden from the military. But that is likely only if nation-states perceive transnational issues as imminent threats to their security. Until that recognition occurs, military leaders should prepare to confront the growing transnational security challenges that lie ahead.

5.4. Military Responses to Transnational Threats

Proponents for military deployment argue that transnational security threats are the major security challenges to the nation in the 21st century and, given this reality, it is natural and appropriate to call upon military forces to address them. Some argue that in the post-Cold War era, the notion of security should be expanded to include issues that will have a direct impact on state stability and the welfare of individuals. In some countries, transnational security threats constitute a greater threat to political stability than even traditional state-based military threats. Because military troops are the ultimate instrument of the state in maintaining its security, it is logical that military forces would be involved in combating such threats. Moreover, the likely scale of transnational problems in the future--mass migration, pandemics, environmental catastrophes--requires a massive state response. In general, only the military has the ability to react quickly enough with adequate resources.

Another argument for military involvement concerns the nature of transnational threats themselves. In general, transnational threats are driven by non-state actors, but occasionally there are situations in which governments act as the “hidden hands” behind transnational security events. Evidence has surfaced that North Korea engages in official acts of narcotics trafficking and money laundering. Similarly, Thai officials have claimed that criminal maritime piracy is sometimes sanctioned by Vietnamese officials. Mass migration events, moreover, are not always as accidental as press accounts might portray.

Some health officials, meanwhile, fear that a massive infectious disease outbreak could be precipitated by a biological terrorist attack which might be orchestrated by a hostile government. More broadly, in 1999 a popular Chinese strategic book urged

that China engage in “unrestricted war” by employing various transnational threats such as information and biological warfare, drug smuggling, environmental attack, and other types of asymmetrical warfare techniques.⁴¹ These several examples suggest that it would be unwise for a government to simply downplay transnational threats as mere law enforcement or public health matters. Consequently, a prudent response would be for governments to prepare to use their military forces to deal with these types of threats.

A Possible “Middle Way”?

One way governments might address the problem is to consider alternative plans that would address the concerns of both proponents and opponents of military intervention in transnational issues. For example, a possible solution might be for governments to designate a particular division of their military forces to deal specifically with transnational security issues, thus freeing up the remaining forces to focus exclusively on war-fighting missions. Alternatively, governments might consider creating units within civilian agencies--such as environment or immigration ministries--to deal with transnational problems. Members of these specialized “agencies within agencies” might even undergo military training to acquire certain specific and relevant skills.

Some countries are already considering such options in ways most appropriate to their domestic needs, culture, and financial situation. Australia, for example, has contemplated the creation of a coast guard that would be devoted exclusively to addressing transnational problems in addition to numerous other maritime issues. However, financial limitations may circumscribe such proposals. Transnational

⁴¹ John Pomfret, “China Ponders New Rules of ‘Unrestricted War,’” *The Washington Post*, August 8, 1999, p. A1.

problems are often episodic and sporadic and are difficult to plan for. Countries facing budgetary constraints may determine that it is impractical to create additional agencies and fund military-style training to counter such threats.

Strategies for dealing with transnational threats must contain long-term measures designed to address the causes of transnational threats as well as actions designed to reduce near-term dangers they pose. Root causes may include the interrelated phenomena of economic decline, lack of physical security, poor governance including weak institutions and high levels of corruption, crumbling or nonexistent systems of communication and transportation, inadequate health and education facilities, high levels of official debt, the presence of criminal networks, insufficient financial and government resources, and potential for large-scale human slaughter. Analysts will need to agree on two seemingly contradictory points regarding how to respond to these threats and challenges: one, identifying the right remedy for the symptoms of transnational threats can be difficult unless the underlying problem is properly diagnosed; and two, in practice, near-term actions will be necessary to thwart emerging and immediate threats, whether or not the ultimate cause of the problem has been determined and addressed.⁴²

Good governance, security, and economic health in these troubled states can often best be achieved by nurturing democratic, accountable governments and by developing free market and free trading economies. Security is best guaranteed when military capability is backed by effective diplomacy and trade and other contacts – building up a set of relationships, and networks of independence, that will minimize the likelihood of conflict ever breaking out.⁴³

⁴² Banning Garret and Jonathan Adams, “U.S.-China Cooperation on the Problem of Failing States and Transnational Threats,” *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report 126, September 2004, p.4.

⁴³ Grant Evans, “Internal Colonization in the Central Highlands of Vietnam,” *Sojourn*, vol.7, no.2, August 1992, p.107.

As the severity of transnational challenges grows in the region, countries are increasingly inclined to deploy military forces to address them. This trend reflects the reality of conflict in the post-Cold War world, which features the rise of sub-national conflicts that may displace traditional state-to-state conflict. Regarding specific transnational issues, military forces are likely to be involved based on a 'spectrum of relevance.' For example, certain transnational issues money laundering and computer crime should be less likely to require a military response. Issues such as drug trafficking, maritime piracy and terrorism, however, are more likely to evoke a military response. The challenge for many military forces is to adjust the traditional military culture with its preference for traditional war-fighting missions to take into account the reality of these new, non-traditional missions. Military forces will also need to learn to cooperate with their law enforcement counterpart.

Transnational security challenges are emerging as the dark and violent side of globalization. Rapid economic, technological and social changes have brought an unprecedented era of beneficent international trade, migration, and communication throughout the world. But such changes have also spawned a much more sinister by-product in the form of international crime, terrorism, human smuggling, arms trafficking, environmental degradation and infectious disease. Many countries in the Asia-Pacific region are slowly recognizing that transnational security issues are emerging as their top security challenges, and may pose an even more long-term threat to state and regional security than inter-state conflict. Moreover, military forces in the region are discovering that in addition to their traditional role of defending their home country from external attack, they must contend with the ever-present reality of transnational security issues that threaten to undermine the very foundation of their societies.

International crimes are often driven by non-state actors such as criminal gangs or terrorist groups who have little regard for international laws or standards. They often emerge slowly, beyond the scrutinizing gaze of the international media and only get noticed after a particular catastrophic event in interception of a human smuggling vessel or a region-wide pollution crisis. Their causes are multifarious and not easily ascertainable. Solutions are equally elusive, especially for long-term problems that cannot simply be swept away by a single policy change or introduction of an international law or convention. Yet their effects can be devastating and long-lasting.

Moreover, the Asia-Pacific region confronts massive environmental degradation. Transboundary pollution is spawning both human health and diplomatic problems throughout the region. Climate change poses the ultimate environmental wildcard and if predictions concerning its effects are accurate, it could decimate coastal areas and entire island states. Economic disparities among countries in the region are spurring large-scale human smuggling and illegal migration. Small-arms trafficking is fueling a rise in transnational crime and terrorism. Sea lanes are increasingly infested with pirates who no longer hesitate to murder ship crews or create environmental devastation as part of their illegal acts. These are just a few examples of the transnational challenges that the region confronts.

The first part provides a survey of transnational issues from a regional perspective. That is followed by an inquiry into transnational issues from a subject-matter perspective.

Regional Survey of Transnational Issues in Northeast Asia

Perspectives on transnational security threats in Northeast Asia were provided by

China, Japan and Russia. All nations in Northeast Asia emphasize certain common themes, such as concern about crime and narcotics. China is particularly concerned about narcotics trafficking, which is described as China's top transnational security threat.

Japan also emphasizes the threat of illegal drugs, but, in addition, listed other transnational problems such as arms smuggling, nuclear smuggling, infectious disease, illegal migration, environmental degradation and international terrorism. The Japan Self-Defense Force might have a role in countering these threats if they threaten Japan's internal security environment. We also stress the importance of having a regional approach to mitigating these threats.

Similarly, Russia is concerned about such transnational threats as crime and corruption in its society, but views these threats as part of the larger threat of economic disintegration and social fragmentation. Russia also describes its country's concerns about maritime piracy, environmental degradation and arms trafficking. Only international cooperation could mitigate these threats.

Throughout the region, drug trafficking is spurring violence and increasingly involves money laundering, and other transnational crimes such as terrorism and kidnapping. Common concerns included worries about trans-border narcotics trafficking, terrorism, small-arms trafficking and illegal migration. All three countries are concerned with certain key transnational threats, including crime, environmental degradation, narcotics trafficking, and illegal migration. International drug trafficking syndicates view the region as a key transshipment point for drugs headed for richer nations. In the field of foreign policy no country can afford public accusations, not to fight active against the international drug traffic, at least in order not to threaten

measures of international development aid. Therefore, a country has to establish a specialized police, e.g. Drug Enforcement Units, found expensive paramilitary units, e.g. Task Forces, Border “Patrol Police, etc., establish a civil authority for drug control, e.g. Narcotics Control Board and develop a general counter drug policy. This is done quite often with the support of the United Nations Drug Control Program according to their “Policy Master Plan.”⁴⁴

Given their intense concern about climate change, many island states are urging industrialized nations to sign and ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which seeks to limit the emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Illegal migration as one of its top transnational security threats, particularly the organized trafficking of migrants. Human smuggling has grown in the region and is affecting states in various ways, such as by promoting crime or altering ethnic balances.

Intra-Regional Cooperation against Trans-national Threats

Intra-regional cooperation against terrorism remained patchy. National counter-terrorism responses have usually involved a variety of agencies, and in some regional states the armed forces have been gearing up to face new challenges. Singapore’s army, for example, revealed that it had set up a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Explosive Defense Group. The Australian Defense Force established an Incident Response regiment with a similar role.

On May 17, 2004, U.S. and Russia Army officers begin a joint six-day command post exercise that is the first of its kind and aims at ensuring better cooperation in the war on terrorism. On June 7, 2004, the U.S. and China hold the fourth in a series of

⁴⁴ Martin Tuffner, “Drug Criminality as a Security Problem in Asia,” in Wilfried A. Herrmann, ed., *Asia Security Challenge* (Commack, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1998), pp.82-3.

bilateral consultations on counterterrorism in Washington. On June 14, 2004, the SCO held a one-day summit in Tashkent, Uzbekistan opening an anti-terrorism center.⁴⁵

In order to meet various new security threats, including international terrorism, the Japanese Self Defense Forces' role is being broadened and capabilities are moving away from traditional systems and structures. For example, in March 2004 the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces established a 300-strong special operations unit for anti-terrorist operations. The JGSDF also has extra funding for NBC defense, addressing criticism which followed the 1995 sarin attacks on the underground by the Aum Shinrinkyo cult.⁴⁶

5.5. Evaluation

Transnational security issues are clearly growing problems. Issues that at one time might have been classified as law enforcement, health, or labor issues are now emerging as threats to the nation and to international stability. Ironically, it is their diffused nature and protracted emergence that makes these issues particularly dangerous. Infectious diseases spread slowly and inexorably, beyond the scrutinizing cameras of the international media. Cyber-crime, narcotics trafficking, alien smuggling, and climate change are phenomena that exist and thrive on a daily basis, and yet are rarely noticed by the general population. Only when a sudden newsworthy incident occurs--such as the interception of an alien smuggling ship or a deadly terrorist attack--do governments seem to react decisively. When such events do happen, government leaders, fearful of appearing powerless, are tempted to turn to

⁴⁵ Regional Overview, Chronology of key events www.csis.org/pacfor/ccejournal.html, 09-01-2004

⁴⁶ The IISS, *The Military Balance 2004-2005* (London: Oxford University, 2004), p.162.

military forces to deal with the problem.

For military leaders, the dilemma is becoming clear. On the one hand there is the imperative to maintain war readiness within the armed forces, particularly since more-traditional threats are not likely to dissipate anytime soon. On the other hand, military leaders must recognize that transnational threats will increasingly demand more attention and resources from the armed forces. Government leaders may attempt to create specialized agencies to alleviate the burden from the military. But that is likely only if nation-states perceive transnational issues as imminent threats to their security. Until that recognition occurs, military leaders should prepare to confront the growing transnational security challenges that lie ahead.

The future, and, likely, problems, of applying military forces to combat such international criminal activity as narcotics smuggling, compared with earlier uses of naval and ground forces to combat piracy or to terminate the slave trade. And also issues of practicality and of political principle on the interface of military and police functions need to be resolved.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ George H. Quester, "Nontraditional Uses of Military Force," in Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Roy Gordson and George H. Quester, eds., *Security Studies for the 21st Century* (Washington: Brassey's, Inc. 1997), p.150.

Chapter 6. Key Actors' Position toward Northeast Asia Military Security Cooperation Regime

A security regime¹ as Stein points out, normally describes a situation in which the interests of the actors “are neither wholly compatible nor wholly competitive.”² The Concert of Europe, or the Organization of the Security and Cooperation in Europe constitute examples of a “security regime,” while the relationship between the U.S. and Canada and that among the members of the European Community are better described as having the attitudes of a security community.

As the final condition for the formation of a security regime, the key actors must want to establish it.”³ The perceptions of the United States, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and North Korea toward a cooperative security regime will be examined to test the feasibility of forming a security regime in Northeast Asia. Since the countries' supports are referred as the condition to form a security regime, thus, this chapter will deal with the following questions:

- (1) What are the perceptions of the regional powers toward a cooperative security regime in Northeast Asia? Positive or negative?
- (2) If negative, have those attitudes changed? Why?
- (3) What kind of advantages and disadvantages would the regional countries expect from taking part in a cooperative security regime in Northeast Asia?

¹ Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” *International Organization*, vol.36, no.2 (Spring 1982), p.357.

² Janice Gross Stein, “Detection and Defection: Security ‘Regimes’,” *the Management of International Journal*, vol. 40 (Autumn 1985), p.600.

³ Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” *International Organization*, op.cit., p. 360.

(4) Do key actors want to establish a security regime in Northeast Asia?

To answer these questions, major leader's speeches of regional countries, their remarks and addresses in newspapers and, mostly their official positions and proposals in international conferences will be used to analyze. Regarding governmental and non-governmental organizations, most of the references come from their official homepages on the Internet. Articles from a number of scholars, which show considerable insight into these ongoing security dialogues and organizations in Asia-Pacific are cited.

6.1. U.S. Position toward a Security Regime in Northeast Asia

6.1.1. U.S. Perception

The United States has preferred bilateral security treaties to multilateral ones throughout most of its security arrangements with Asian countries. It wants to remain a constant presence in East Asia with the network of bilateral security treaties to prevent the emergence of any security vacuum or substitute a regional hegemony in this region. The negative attitude of the U.S. toward multilateral security cooperation in East Asia is due to the fact that first, multilateral security cooperation might impede traditional bilateral relations. Second, the U.S. also saw a regional security forum as a potential platform for the former Soviet Union to exert greater influence over the region. Finally, Americans had thought that proposals for multilateral security cooperation in East Asia might aim at counterbalancing the naval inferiority of the

former Soviet Union.⁴

However, along with the end of the Cold War American economic influence over the Asian region has relatively declined.⁵ While the end of the Cold War caused the restructuring of U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia, the process of maturation in U.S. relations with its alliances in Northeast Asia is yielding a trend toward partial divergence, rather than convergence.⁶ To adjust to these new trends, the U.S. has perceived that there are mounting interests in applying multilateral approaches to the region's issues.⁷

Renewed U.S. interest in multilateral security cooperation becomes clear by considering several measures it has taken during the past few years. The United States has not yet suggested any concrete proposals for multilateral security cooperation in East Asia. However, the first signal was shown in the speech of the U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker who visited Seoul to attend the third APEC meeting in 1991. He announced that active support from nations around the Korean peninsula was needed to promote dialogue between South and North Korea. As part of this support, he suggested a "two plus four" formula of dialogue system among South and North Korea and the four surrounding major powers in Northeast Asia.⁸ However, it was

⁴ Trevor Findlay, "Disarmament, Arms Control and the Regional Security Dialogue," in Gary Klintonworth, ed., *Asia Pacific Security: Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities?* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p.234.

⁵ Robert G. Sutter argued that the pre-eminence of the United States is moving incrementally toward relative decline from now on, and explained five reasons for the decline. See his "Peaceful Cooperation between Asian Countries and the United States in the New Pacific Community of the 1990s," in Kim Young Jeh, eds, *The New Pacific Community in the 1990s*, Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Research Project no. 3, Pacific States University and Kon-Kuk University (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 49-50; See also, Robert A. Manning and Paula Stern, "The Myth of the Pacific Community," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 6, November/December 1994, p. 82.

⁶ Edward A. Olsen, "U.S.-Northeast Asian Security Relations: From Bilateralism to Multilateralism," in Kwak Tae Hwan and Edward A. Olsen, eds., *The Major Powers of Northeast Asia: Seeking Peace and Security* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), pp. 137-41.

⁷ For analyses of these precedents, see Andrew Elek, "Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)," *Southeast Asian Affairs* (Singapore and Boulder, Colo.: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies and Westview Press, 1991), pp. 33-48; and Stuart Harris, "Varieties of Pacific Economic Cooperation," *Pacific Review*, vol. 4, 1991, pp. 301-11.

⁸ James A. Baker, "America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community," *Foreign Affairs*,

dropped following South Korea's policy statement that any dialogue on issues on the Peninsula should be handled solely by the South and the North.

Further enthusiasm for such multilateral arrangements was expressed through various unofficial channels in the United States. In May 1992 Richard Solomon, Assistant Deputy Secretary in the State Department, for example, commented that the U.S. would be prepared to approve a multilateral consultative body for the case-by-case solution of regional issues. Stephan Solarz, former Chairman of the Asia-Pacific subcommittee, demonstrated a similar view by saying that if U.S. participation was guaranteed, the establishment of a collective security consultative body like the CSCE could be considered.

Another demand for a collective security arrangement was also mentioned in a New York Times editorial. In the editorial, the paper argued that America wasn't 'Asia's cop,' thus instability in Asia should be resolved through a new regional security organization that included China, Japan, and South Korea as well as the United States and Russia.

There's no good reason for America to bear this regional security burden alone as Asian societies grow increasingly rich and powerful. ... Moving from a U.S.-centred security system toward regional collective security won't be simple. But it could establish a more reliable basis for future regional peace.⁹

This is certainly not the official position of the U.S. government. Nevertheless, the important point is that the U.S. even through unofficial channels has begun to express increasing interest in multilateral security cooperation in East Asia. More concrete concern of the U.S. on the matter of multilateral security cooperation is well

vol. 70, (Winter, 1991/92), pp. 11-3.

⁹ *New York Times*, August 10, 1992; *Korea Herald*, August 11, 1992.

expressed by Winston Lord, the Assistant Secretary of State. In his address at the Confirmation Hearings in March 1993, he mentioned the development of a multilateral security cooperation as one of the ten American diplomatic goals toward East Asia.¹⁰

In 1995, Joseph Nye, the Assistant Secretary of State, argued in his contribution to *Foreign Affairs* that though maintaining U.S. leadership role is the best alternative for both the U.S. and countries in East Asia, creating a loose regional institution can be also considered as an option for future strategy in that region.¹¹ Furthermore, President Clinton showed his support for the multilateral regional dialogue in his speech at the Korean National Assembly during his visit to Korea in 1993,¹² and put more stress on the multilateral theme. Emphasizing the phrase “a new Pacific Community,” speaking at Waseda University in Tokyo,¹³ he asserted that Asia and the Pacific required a new multilateral security dialogue so that the end of the Cold War would not lead to new regional rivalries, chaos and arms races.¹⁴ The U.S. President and the Japanese Prime Minister jointly declared U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century in April, 1996. In the Joint Declaration, the two leaders reaffirmed that the two governments will continue working jointly and with other countries in the region to further develop multilateral regional security dialogues and cooperation mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, eventually, security dialogues regarding Northeast Asia.¹⁵ Nowadays, the United States is supporting the ASEAN Regional Forum and tries to

¹⁰ “A New Pacific Community Ten Goals for American Policy,” Opening Statement at Confirmation Hearings for Ambassador Winston Lord Assistant Secretary of State-Designate Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, March 31, 1993.

¹¹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “East Asian Security: the Case for Deep Engagement,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 4, 1995, pp. 92-96.

¹² *Korea Herald*, June 11, 1993.

¹³ Text (broadcast on the Cable News Network) from America Online, July 8, 1993.

¹⁴ “Clinton’s Clarion Call,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 22, 1993.

¹⁵ Defense of Japan 2003 (Tokyo: Inter Group Corporation, 2003), p.441.

participate actively in that forum.¹⁶

U.S. alliances, as well as its wide range of bilateral security relationships, are a centerpiece of American security. The U.S. has enjoyed unparalleled success building regional security arrangements. The security arrangement and coalitions constitute a formidable combination of actual and potential power that enables the U.S. and its partners to make common causes to shape the strategic landscape, protect shared interests, and promote stability.¹⁷

The National Security Strategy of the U.S. clearly states that alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of free-loving nations. The U.S. is committing to lasting institutions as well as other long-standing alliances. The U.S. will build on stability provided by these alliances, as well as institutions such as ASEAN and APEC forum, to develop a mix of regional and bilateral strategies to manage change in this dynamic region.¹⁸

Condallice Rice, then U.S. NSC adviser, proposed to the Chinese leadership during her July 2004 visit to Beijing that 6 party talks should be shifted to a Northeast Asia security cooperative arrangement, which consult on common agendas including the peace treaty issue on the Korean Peninsula, conventional weapons reduction, and the missile issue.¹⁹

Gradually, the U.S. has accepted that multilateral security cooperation and the alliance could be mutually supportive in strengthening regional stability, and that multilateralism could strengthen bilateral relationships, including those alliance partners. The regional push to multilateralism in the security field poses no threat to the alliance in the foreseeable future, given its lack of collective security processes

¹⁶ For example, Malaysia proposed the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) which precludes the participation of non-Asian countries especially the U.S. as an alternative of APEC.

¹⁷ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, September 30, 2001, pp.5-6.

¹⁸ White House, *The National Security Strategy*, September 17, 2002, p.26.

¹⁹ *Nihongeijai Newspaper*, November 19, 2004.

and its limited influence in addressing the continuing problems of North Korea and Taiwan. To the extent that such processes involve the U.S. in discussions of regional matters, they should be seen as valuable supplementary consultation process.²⁰

6.1.2. U.S. Interests

U.S. attitudes toward security multilateralism in the region have evolved. The Bush Administration greeted multilateralism with open hostility by calling it “a solution in search of a problem” out of fear that it would undermine the relevance of the existing bilateral U.S. security arrangements in the region. The Clinton Administration, realizing that the Asian proponents of multilateralism are also strongly supportive of the U.S. military presence and regional alliance system, revised U.S. policy. It supported multilateralism as one of the ten major goals of the new U.S. policy in Asia.²¹ But this support remained a qualified one. Current U.S. policy on multilateralism envisages a concentric circle of security institutions which includes: (1) its existing bilateral alliances; (2) the newly developed security consultations within the ASEAN-PMC and the ARF; where appropriate, (3) multilateral actions by the most concerned and relevant actors to resolve specific security problems such as on the Korean peninsula.

Forging multilateral security cooperation would be a useful strategy for the U.S. First, this strategy could provide the U.S. with strong supports in world and regional affairs from regional countries. There is growing criticism of the U.S. unilateral action in world affairs in the post-Cold War. The U.S. current situation in Iraq can be attributed to its inability to establish a truly effective multilateral effort to deal with Saddam Hussein. Similarly, the U.S. faces the same problem in terms of economic

²⁰ White House, *The 2002 National Security Strategy*, op.cit., p.27-28.

²¹ White house, *The 1996 National Security Strategy*
<http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps1340/1996stra.htm> 04-11-2005

relations in Asia. There are growing trade disputes between the U.S. and China. Furthermore, because of growing nationalism in Northeast Asia, it is very difficult for the United States to say that the strong alliance will surely be maintained in the future. For instance, a strong nationalist Japanese politician, Ishihara, a former transport minister, known as author of the book, *The Japan That Can Say No*, won election as governor of Tokyo. In his acceptance speech, he said that unless the U.S. agrees to defend the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) islands, which are also claimed by the PRC and Taiwan, “Japan should throw the U.S. forces out the door.”²² Reflecting those difficulties faced in the post-Cold War, former U.S. House Speaker Newt Gingrich said:

If we don’t modify our ability to knit together our friends and to listen to our friends and to work across the planet, we will someday have an anti-American coalition that is large and real and that will bond itself together just on the idea that at least, we are not the Americans.²³

To overcome those difficulties, it is natural to see the altered American perception of multilateralism. In addition, the United States, since the end of the Cold War, has seen cuts in its overseas military deployments, the closure of its Philippine bases and the long-term prospect of a further pullback across the Pacific. With this in mind, it has already begun to slowly appreciate the potential value of a regional security dialogue.²⁴ Second, it could be able to meet the rising voice of domestic politics calling for more burden-sharing with its Asian alliances and a reduction of its defense

²² “Nationalist critical of U.S. air base is elected governor of Tokyo,” *New York Times*, April 12, 1999; “Author wins Tokyo’s governor race,” *The Associated Press*, April 12, 1999; “Tough-talking Ishihara elected Tokyo governor,” *The Wall Street Journal*, April 12, 1999.

²³ Gingrich, “U.S. Must Change or Risk Resentment,” *Korea Times*, October 8, 1997.

²⁴ Trevor Findlay, “Disarmament, Arms Control and the Regional Security Dialogue,” in Gary Klintworth, ed., *Asia Pacific Security: Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities?* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), p. 236.

budgets.²⁵ The end of the Cold War spurred the United States to reassess its interests and purposes. This began with President Bush via a major strategic reappraisal²⁶ and continued under President Clinton and U.S. Secretaries of Defense Aspin and Perry.²⁷ Both administrations tried to come to terms with domestic pressures for a “peace dividend” and to adapt what the United States has been doing strategically to post-Cold War circumstances in a safe and prudent way.²⁸ Due to growing domestic pressure, it is difficult for the United States not to ask its allies for more burden sharing. Fortunately, South Korea and Japan have assumed substantial costs associated with the maintenance and operation of U.S. forces stationed in their countries since the early 1980s.

However, democratic consolidation at home and the advent of the post-Cold War environment abroad makes it difficult for the governments to push for additional defense spending. Building a strong national security infrastructure is no longer the foremost priority.²⁹ For instance, South Korea’s defense budget shows a pattern of relative decline. According to the Defense White Paper of Korea, the proportion of defense outlays in the government budget decreased from an average 33.5 percent during 1975-1984 to 28.7 percent in 1991 and 20.4 percent in 1997.³⁰ Japan is not an

²⁵ However, there exist some anxious voices about this trend for multilateralism. These fear that failure to reach an agreement in this multilateral framework would cause deterioration of the relationship among states. In addition to that, if the existing disputes could be resolved within the multilateral framework, then a genuine political vacuum may be fostered that would be far more difficult for Washington to attempt to fill than its efforts to date to pre-emptively fill a perceived military vacuum. See Edward A. Olsen and David Winterford, “Asian Multilateralism: Implications for U.S. policy,” *The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis*, vol. 9, no. 2, Summer/Fall 1995, pp. 33-4.

²⁶ For a mainstream treatment of that adjustment of U.S. priorities, see James J. Tritten and Paul N. Stockton, eds., *Reconstituting America’s Defense: The New U.S. National Security Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1992).

²⁷ For surveys of the Clinton administration’s defense policy shifts, see *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 16, 1993, pp. 12-3, and *U.S. News and World Report*, December 6, 1993, pp. 30-2.

²⁸ Edward A. Olsen, op. cit., p. 137.

²⁹ Moon Chung In, “The Post-Cold War Alliance Politics and Security-Economic Linkages: The Case of the United States and South Korea,” in Kwak Tae Hwan and Edward A. Olsen, eds., *The Major Powers of Northeast Asia: Seeking Peace and Security* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p. 236.

³⁰ Defense White Paper 1997-1998, p. 259.

exception to this example. Due to growing domestic pressure and nationalism in Japan, it is difficult for the United States to expect a more substantial portion of the costs associated with its presence. One Japanese rightist-newspaper said:

Japan has long been criticized for getting a “free ride.” But Japan now pays as much as 70% of the cost of supporting the U.S. military presence in Japan. We are thus paying ten times the rate Germany pays per American Serviceman. Must we pay so much?³¹

As for the notion that Washington should cut its presence in East Asia to shrink its budget deficit, Sato retorts that, “In fact, Japan pays the most generous host nations support. It is cheaper to base American ships in Japan than in the U.S.” He adds that “if the U.S. retreats for economic reasons, it will lack the tools to influence events, like on Taiwan and North Korea. Mere rhetoric is not powerful.”³² However, if a network of security organizations evolves in Northeast Asia, the United States, to some extent, could meet its domestic demands with less direct military involvement and the expenditure of fewer resources.³³ Thus, it is quite probable that the U.S. will put more efforts on developing multilateral security cooperation in East Asia.

Third, multilateral security cooperation could be used as a tool to supplement America’s “double containment” policy³⁴ toward Northeast Asia, which has been one of the main factors to be contemplated by its strategists since World War II. For instance, early in the post-war period, one objective of U.S. policy was to prevent a resurgent imperial Japan as well as to block communists, the USSR and China. As the possibility of that threat faded and Japan gained economic strength of a superpower nature, Tokyo’s potential geopolitical ambitions again became an issue to be

³¹ “Give us a New Security Treaty to Address Our Future,” *Ashai Shinbun*, November 15, 1995.

³² “Japan’s Future Role in Transpacific Security Cooperation,” *Asian Defence Journal*, November 1995, p. 12.

³³ Thomas L. Wilborn, “U.S. Security Policy for Northeast Asia: Handmaiden of Export Promotion?” in Kwak Tae Hwan and Edward A. Olsen, eds., *The Major Powers of Northeast Asia: Seeking Peace and Security* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p. 162.

³⁴ Regarding this term and concept, see Edward A. Olsen and David Winterford, op. cit., pp. 9-40.

considered by U.S. strategists.³⁵ The Kyodo news agency quoting newly declassified U.S. government documents on a series of Nixon's talks with Zhou during the Beijing visit in 1972 reported that Nixon assured then-Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai that U.S. military bases in Japan would serve to prevent a resurgence of Japanese militarism.³⁶ Moreover, Japan is the only country that attacked United States territory in the 20th century and, this is a never to be forgotten memory to America. Although presently China has exceeded Japan in terms of level of criticism, the American media still tends to have an adversarial position regarding Tokyo.³⁷ Along with this form of "double containment," as Korea's potential for regional power might be evident, the restraining influence the United States had over Japan became a form of U.S. leverage over Seoul as well-what can be considered "double containment squared."³⁸

Fourth, multilateral security cooperation could promote the U.S. engagement, not containment policy toward China. In the post-Cold War World China is regarded as a potential power to confront the U.S., which is now the only superpower in the world. As Secretary Albright pointed out in her confirmation testimony, "there should be no doubt about the importance of this (U.S.-China) relationship and the need to pursue a strategy aimed at Chinese integration, not isolation." That means engaging China on a wide range of issues as China continues to emerge as a great power.³⁹ While China's neighbors are wary of her re-emergence as a major regional power and nervous about her growing military capabilities, they also worry about the state of U.S.-China relations. This circumstance supports the U.S.'s engagement policy toward China.

Regarding this, Toby T. Gati clearly noted:

³⁵ See Edward A. Olsen and David Winterford, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-40.

³⁶ "Nixon Promised China in 1972 to Restrain Japan," *AFP*, April 20, 1999.

³⁷ Donald C. Hellmann, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

³⁸ Edward A. Olsen and David Winterford, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-40.

³⁹ Madeleine K. Albright, "American Principle and Purpose in East Asia," Remarks and Q&A Session at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, April 15, 1997. <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/970415.html>

No nation in the region wants to be forced to choose between the powerful, friendly but distant superpower, and the emerging neighboring giant. No nation wants to return to the uncertainty, instability, and ruinous military budgets that would be triggered by hostilities between Washington and Beijing.⁴⁰

To upgrade the U.S. policy of engagement with China the Council on Foreign Relations said in a report, entitled ‘Redressing the Balance: American Engagement with Asia’ that the United States “should seek a full-scale summit meeting at least once a year with the Chinese leader regardless of the state of political relations.”⁴¹ Multilateral cooperative security could not only provide those countries with a venue in which the high level decision makers can come together regularly, but also soothe China’s concern and promote the U.S. engagement policy toward China.

Fifth, it has been U.S. policy to oppose efforts at domination of the region by a power or group of powers hostile to the United States.⁴² Gilbert Rozman argued “the bilateral chasms separating each part of the Northeast Asian triangle are bound to narrow with serious implications for the relations of each with America. Managing these convergences and divergences constitutes the most important test facing American policy makers in the decades to come.”⁴³ In fact, China and Russia are discovering their affinities as post-collectivist continental giants struggling for reform and modernization.⁴⁴ Classic balance-of-power theory would suggest the wisdom of the United States’ seeking to split those countries apart by playing on existing tensions or fretting only about the balance between the United States and each of the countries separately. However, as Gilber Rozman noted, those tensions are not serious

⁴⁰ “Assessing Current and Projected Threats to U.S. National Security,” Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Toby T. Gati before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC, February 5, 1997, http://www.state.gov/www/global/general_foreign_policy/970205.html

⁴¹ Cited in “China’s Rise to Great Power Poses Major Challenge to U.S. in Asia,” *Korea Times*, April 13, 1996.

⁴² Robert G. Sutter, op. cit., p. 52.

⁴³ Gilbert Rozman, “A Regional Approach to Northeast Asia,” *Orbis*, vol. 39, no. 1, 1995, p. 67.

⁴⁴ “Beneath the Smiles,” *The Economist*, September 3, 1994, p. 39.

enough to blind leaders to what can be gained from working with them on a global level and using them to balance each other and the United States.⁴⁵ Thus, it is worth noting what Newt Gingrich said, “America needs to adopt a style abroad of listening, learning, helping and then leading.”⁴⁶ To meet those conditions and requirements, multilateral security cooperation, once again, could be a legitimate place not only to narrow the divergences between the United States and those countries but also to lead the convergence of those countries to constructive results for regional security.

Finally, multilateral security cooperation can provide the United States with a venue where they can deal with major threats including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. According to a report from the National Security Council, entitled, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, the U.S. regards weapons of mass destruction as the greatest potential threat to global security.⁴⁷ In this report, explaining its bilateral relationships with each of the Northeast Asia countries, the United States consistently emphasizes seeking universal adherence to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and addressing the dangers posed by the transfer of destabilizing conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.

Putting aside the regional arms build-up, the Northeast Asia region has posed considerable danger regarding the expansion of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. There is a nuclear and chemical/biological threat from the Korean Peninsula and the possible danger that it could be a catalyst for Japan to become a nuclear power. Japan holds quite excessive amounts of Plutonium and also has the sophisticated technologies required to manufacture nuclear bombs. In addition, China has constantly conducted nuclear tests. Russian domestic instability, and the

⁴⁵ “Beneath the Smiles,” *The Economist*, September 3, 1994, p. 39.

⁴⁶ Gingrich, “US Must Change or Risk Resentment,” *Korea Times*, October 8, 1997.

⁴⁷ National Security Council, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century,” May 1997, Section II: Advancing U.S. National Interests, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy/>

danger of loose control over its massive nuclear arsenal also cast shadow over regional security. All of these issues are intricately inter-connected with each Northeast Asian country. Thus, they might lead to unfavorable ripple effects producing an expansion of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in Northeast Asia. Multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia is one of the most favorable options to bring all those intricate and dangerous issues together on a table where all those countries can understand each others' position, negotiate, compromise and make constructive results. Such a development would clearly be in the U.S. national interest. The National Security Strategy, which was published in September 2002, clearly indicates how crucial multilateral cooperation is required to encounter terrorism:

The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. We continue to encourage our regional partners to take up a coordinated effort that isolates the terrorists.⁴⁸

6.2. China's Position toward a Security Regime in Northeast Asia

6.2.1 China's Perception

Beijing initially opposed multilateralism, sensing that it could be turned into an anti-China bandwagon by the region's weaker states fearful of the rise of China and who were seeking ways to counter its territorial claims in the South China Sea. But now, Beijing has come to accept these institutions as a positive force through which it can explain its own perceptions and policies to its neighbors and thereby counter a China threat. Multilateralism has contributed to a broadening of foreign and security policy-making in Asian states. Second track dialogues involving academics and non-

⁴⁸ White House, *The National Security Strategy*, September 2002, p.10.

governmental actors have generated information and created transparency in what used to be considered as ultra-sensitive security issues. Multilateralism might have contributed to a softening of the adverse security implications of the Asian economic crisis.

There are several reasons for a negative assessment. To begin with, regional multilateral institutions such as ASEAN, the ARF and APEC, have acquired a reputation for being little more than “talk shops,” “teahouses,” with little to show in terms of concrete policy initiatives and action.⁴⁹ Recent interest among Asia-Pacific states in a multilateral security cooperation dialogue and possible regional multilateral security arrangements have posed a new challenge to China. China has adopted a cautious and vague policy aimed at showing a willingness to become involved in the current process, while waiting to see the next moves of other regional actors, especially the United States.

China has been inherently suspicious of multilateral security cooperation arrangements as a result of its historical experience with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union tried to use its collective security design to force China into a strategic role subordinate to Moscow during the period of the Sino-Soviet alliance.⁵⁰ Then following the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet Union sought to organize a collective security pact for Asia that aimed at encircling China under Brezhnev’s leadership. This past experience has prevented China from initiating or participating actively in proposed regional multilateral security arrangements.⁵¹

Besides the historical background, some pitfalls may also be posed by the creation

⁴⁹ Amitav Acharya, *Regionalism and Multilateralism* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2002), p.277.

⁵⁰ Osamu Miyoshi, “Soviet Collective Security Pacts,” in *Asia in Soviet Global Strategy*, ed. Ray S. Cline (Boulder, Colo., and London: Westview Press, 1987), p. 26.

⁵¹ Joo Seung Ho, “Russia’s Policy Toward the Two Koreas,” in Kwak Tae Hwan and Edward A Olsen, eds., *The Major Powers of Northeast Asia: Seeking Peace and The Major Powers of Northeast Asia: Seeking Peace and Security* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner publishers, 1996), p. 111.

of a multilateral security cooperation arrangement. First, China worries that a multilateral security forum could be a platform for ‘China-bashing.’⁵² The Chinese government fears that China’s military modernization will be the major agenda within such a dialogue. Second, China is concerned that the U.S. or Japan could seek to set the agenda of a multilateral security arrangement and to dominate the other states in the region. In particular, Beijing worries about the U.S. pressure on the matter of China’s human rights, which might be discussed in multilateral security dialogues. Finally, China expresses concern that some countries might attempt to use a multilateral security forum to resolve the disputes such as the Russo-Chinese dispute and the conflict over ownership of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. China insists that such bilateral problems should be settled by the countries concerned, without outside interference.⁵³

However, with the collapse of the Cold War, these Chinese threat perceptions have changed due to the favorable security environment around China. First, the security relationship between China and Russia has become extremely positive, following the announcement of a Joint Communiqué for a strategic 21st century partnership in April 1996 signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Chinese counterpart Jiang Zemin.⁵⁴ China and Russia ended centuries of their border disputes in 1997 by signing an historic accord mapping out the frontier between the two giants for the first time.⁵⁵

Regarding territorial disputes particularly that involving the Spratly Islands, China

⁵² Zhang Wutang, “Security Environment of East Asia and Prospect for Security Cooperation,” Paper prepared for presentation at the KIDA/RIPS Forum, Korean Institute for Defense Analyses, Seoul, Korea, November 3-5, 1993, p. 77.

⁵³ Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, “Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific Region and its Impact on Chinese Interest: Views from Beijing,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 16, no. 1, June 1994, p. 26-7. In 1995, China opposed the ARF’s placing the Spratly dispute on the agenda. See *Hankook Ilbo*, June 14, 1995.

⁵⁴ *Korea Times*, April 27, 1996.

⁵⁵ “Yeltsin, Jiang Sign Historic Border Treaty,” *Korea Times*, November 11, 1997.

has attempted to ease widespread regional suspicion over her territorial ambitions.⁵⁶ Finally, its growing economic size has refuted the suspicion that other countries are adopting containment policies against China. For example, the United States has emphasized an engagement policy toward China, stressing the importance of Sino-American economic relations for the U.S. In addition, the ARF's primary goal is to enhance China's self interest in regional cooperation. As Michael Leifer notes, the ARF hopes "to draw China into a pattern of relations where it becomes obliged to take account of international norms, instead of acting unilaterally to prosecute its own agenda."⁵⁷

Along with this favorable regional environment, China has shown a somewhat different attitude toward such arrangements. In 1993, Chen Chi, then Chinese Ambassador in Korea, gave his opinion about Chinese perception toward multilateral security cooperation. He said that bilateral, sub-regional and regional multi-tier and multi-channel dialogue systems should be opened in a gradual manner to facilitate the exchange of views, to build trust and to eliminate factors that are likely to spark conflicts.⁵⁸

China's approach toward regional multilateralism is based on a set of principles and broad positions that were more clearly outlined by Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in Singapore on July 24, 1993.

In our view, we may start off with bilateral and regional security dialogues of various forms at different levels and through various channels in response to the diversity of the region. Through such dialogues and consultation, we may improve our communication and confidence in one another.

⁵⁶ "China to Embrace ASEAN in pursuit of new order," *Financial Times*, August 25, 1997.

⁵⁷ Michael Leifer, "North America and the Asia-Pacific in the 21st Century: Changing Rules of Engagement," Paper presented to the Malaysian Association for American Studies International Conference, Petaling Jaya, November 7-8, 1995, p. 21.

⁵⁸ Chen Chi, "Multilateral Cooperative System in Northeast Asia," in a paper presented at international art and science conference on Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia, sponsored by Korean Local Study Institute, Seoul, 1993, p. 146.

China will actively participate in these dialogues and the consultations.⁵⁹

Quin also put forward general principles on which the multilateral security cooperation should be based:

All countries should be treated as equals on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

- No country should seek hegemony, spheres of influence, nor organize or join any military bloc directed against other countries.
- No country should interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.
- Disarmament and arms control should be carried out in a fair and reasonable manner efforts should be made to end arms races and prevent nuclear proliferation.
- Territorial disputes, border disputes and other differences among regional states should be settled peacefully without the use of force.⁶⁰

China acknowledges its suspicion of multilateral security arrangements as a result of its historical experience with the Soviet Union. However, it does not completely reject multilateral approaches to security, and is exploring the implications of other countries' proposals for regional stability.⁶¹ For instance, arguing that it should evolve gradually, Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser maintain that most Chinese officials and researchers see sub-regional multilateralism as a more realistic and desirable approach than efforts to establish a region-wide security dialogue or structure.⁶²

Sino-U.S. relations involve the cooperation concerning certain common interests

⁵⁹ "China ready to Take Part in Asian Security Dialogues," excerpts from speech by Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at the Foreign Correspondents' Association in Singapore, July 24, 1993, *Beijing Review*, August 9-15, 1993.

⁶⁰ Qian Qichen, "China ready to Take Part in Asian Security Dialogue," op. cit.

⁶¹ Guo Zhenyuan, "Changes in the Security Situation in the Asia-Pacific Region and Establishment of regional Security Mechanism," *Foreign Affairs*, no. 29, September 1993, p. 32.

⁶² Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, op. cit., p. 20.

preventing terrorism, arms proliferation and conflict over Taiwan, human rights, and missile defense. Since 9/11, however, Sino-U.S. relations have improved as Beijing has avoided confrontation but sought cooperation with Washington to preserve its economic access to the U.S. China appears to be responding positively to U.S. requests for cooperation in eliminating the threat of terrorism and WMD, as well as the North Korean challenge. The Chinese Government, under the new leadership of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, adopted a more flexible, open, and proactive foreign policy. This new activism has been especially apparent in establishing the forum for the Six Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons, which have been held in Beijing.⁶³

Especially, as a responsible member of the international community, China stands ready to develop coordination and cooperation with other countries in the field of nontraditional security issues ... to have further nontraditional security dialogue and cooperation so as to make a positive contribution to the maintenance of regional peace and stability.⁶⁴

6.2.2. China's Interests

Even though China has not clearly expressed interest in security cooperation in Northeast Asia, several important advantages can be identified. First, China's foremost security objective for the coming decade will be to create an international environment conducive to the successful implementation of China's economic reform.⁶⁵ Thus, favorable international relations to which multilateral security cooperation could contribute are one of the essential factors for its economic development. Chinese President Jiang Zemin has said that the economy has become

⁶³ Banning Garret and Jonathan Adams, "U.S.-China Cooperation on the Problem of Failing States and Transnational Threats," *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report 126, September 2004, p.3.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p.11.

⁶⁵ Qimao Chen, "New Approaches in China's Foreign Policy: The Post-Cold War Era," *Asian Survey*, vol. XXXIII, no. 3, March 1993, p. 241.

the first and foremost factor in relations between countries in this world of interdependence.⁶⁶ Shown in his speech to the Korean National Assembly in 1995, China has changed step by step its traditional planned economy into, what they have called, the basic framework of a socialist market economy.⁶⁷ Moreover, Chinese leaders well understand that the Communist party's continued control depends on its ability to sustain the country's economic growth via trade and foreign investment. If the general standard of living does not continue to improve, the Communist Party of China could face the same fate as its counterparts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Since foreign trade is already 40 percent of the country's GNP, the government must continue to facilitate China's continued integration into the global economy.⁶⁸ However, as Guo Zhenyuan wrote, "a favorable cycle of economic growth is functioning in the region," but "along with economic growth, economic contradictions and frictions among some countries will increase and may even lead to conflicts of bilateral interests, thus affecting the region's stability." The sources of conflict, including territorial disputes and ethnic and religious differences, he asserted, have led regional states to "pay attention to the establishment of a new security system."⁶⁹ For this objective, China has increased political dialogue and expanded economic contacts with states with which China has territorial disputes and other differences that could erupt into military conflict. In addition, along with those activities, nowadays, its perception toward multilateral security cooperation has been changing.

Second, multilateral security cooperation will bring advantages to China's security

⁶⁶ "International Perspectives from World Leaders," *Presidents & Prime Ministers*, vol. 4, no. 2, 1995, p. 28.

⁶⁷ "Jiang Zemin's Speech," *Korea Herald*, November 15, 1995.

⁶⁸ Sheldon W. Simon, "Alternative Visions of Security in the Asia-Pacific," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 3, 1996, p. 387.

⁶⁹ Guo Zhenyuan, *op. cit.*

interest serving to constrain Japan's military role in the region.⁷⁰ Noticing Japan's high-level economic development along with the U.S. pressure on her to shoulder more international responsibility, China fears that there would likely be a resurgence of Japanese militarism.⁷¹ With the end of the Cold War, the convenient arrangement whereby Japan's focus on its own defense against Soviet attack served the U.S. and Chinese interests, as well as finessing Japanese constitutional constraints on the military, fell apart. From Beijing's perspective, a healthy U.S.-Japan relationship is still vital to contain Japanese remilitarization, but the diminished Soviet threat dilutes the value of Japan's own military capabilities to China.⁷² However, China also worries that the U.S. will dominate the world. Regarding Japan and the U.S. as potential threats to China, at the same time puts China in a difficult situation in which it has to achieve those two objectives for its security. Concerning the U.S. hegemony, Beijing had to take a guarded approach to recasting the U.S.-Japan alliance, wary of both a U.S. withdrawal and an expanded role for Japan. In Sino-Japanese security consultations in mid-January 1996, Beijing noted that "continued friendly relations between the United States and Japan are in China's interests."⁷³ Multilateral security cooperation could meet the Chinese interests, sharing leadership with the U.S. over regional affairs and improving trust with Japan.

Third, multilateral security cooperation could also be a forum for enhancing understanding of China's defense strategy. In the process of creating a multilateral cooperative security mechanism, suspicions of other states toward China could be

⁷⁰ Bonnie S. Glaser, "China's Security Perceptions: Interests and Ambitions," *Asian Survey*, vol. XXXIII, no. 3, March 1993, p. 269.

⁷¹ Lam Lai Sing, "From Mikhail Gorbachev's Policy to China's Regional Role," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, vol. 7, no. 2, 1993, p. 598.

⁷² Michael J. Green and Benjamin L. Self, op. cit., p. 42.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 43.

alleviated.⁷⁴ To allay these suspicions, Chinese leader Jiang Zemin said “China is well aware of the value of peace and independence. As one of the initiators of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, China is resolutely opposed to hegemony and power politics.”⁷⁵ So far, Chinese future intentions are clouded by its continuing threat to use force against Taiwan, should a regime emerge on the Island, which advocates an independent role as a sovereign nation.⁷⁶ Why did Beijing feel compelled to proceed with the Anti-Secession Law in February 2005? The real answer seems to be that the law was originally aimed at stopping the sweeping independence that seemed to be speeding up in Taiwan as a result of Chen’s narrow reelection as president in March 2004. Beijing seems wary of Chen’s intentions on the all-important independence issue. Passing a law in a country where the rule of law is applied selectively, often at the leadership’s whim hardly makes an attack any more or less likely.

Putting aside this intention to use force, however, most other countries worry about Chinese foreign policy in the future because of its huge potential economy and its possible emergence as a new great power in Northeast Asia. Thus active Chinese participation in a broad range of security-oriented forums could also promote greater transparency regarding Chinese military capabilities and intentions, and this would clearly contribute to regional stability.⁷⁷

China seems to view increasing multilateral security arrangements in East Asia as inevitable and to have concluded that non-participation in the process could be more

⁷⁴ John R. Faust, “East Asia’s Emerging Security System,” *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, vol. VIII, (Winter/Spring 1994), p. 83.

⁷⁵ “Jiang Zemin’s Speech in National Assembly,” *Korea Herald*, November 15, 1995.

⁷⁶ John R. Faust, op. cit., p. 82.

⁷⁷ Ralph A. Cossa, “Multilateral Dialogue in Asia: Benefits and Limitations,” *Korea and World Affairs*, (Spring 1995), p. 116.

risky for China's national interest than selective involvement. China is likely to continue to maintain a cautious stance toward multilateral security arrangements and wait for other countries to take the initiative while emphasizing that most security problems in the region are not amenable to multilateral solutions. Thus China will seek to limit the scope and extent of multilateral security cooperation while stressing that bilateral ties must be the mainstays of regional security. China will especially seek to avoid or minimize restrictions on its own behavior that might be imposed as a result of multilateral security cooperation. Conclusively, China's participation in the multilateral security cooperation arrangement will depend on whether its participation could produce greater advantage to its security interest than non-participation. Thus, China will participate in the emerging security cooperation institution reluctantly rather than actively and be involved in such a mechanism selectively rather than wholly.

The fundamental basis for the formulation of China's national defense policy is China's national interests. It primarily includes: safeguarding state sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security; upholding economic development as a central task and unremittingly enhancing the overall national strength; adhering to and improving the socialist system; and striving for an international environment of lasting peace and a favorable climate in China's periphery.

The goals and tasks of China's national defense are, in the main, as follows:

- To consolidate national defense, prevent and resist aggression.
- To stop separation and realize complete unification of the motherland.
- To stop armed subversion and safeguard social stability.
- To accelerate national defense development and achieve national defense and military modernization.

- To safeguard world peace and oppose aggression and expansion.⁷⁸

This guideline highlights and carries forward the concept of people's war. In the face of new changes in modern warfare, China persists in relying on the people in national defense, and instituting an armed forces system of combining a small but capable standing army with a powerful reserve force; upholds the principle of combining peaceful footing with wartime footing, uniting the army with the people, and having a reserve among the people, improving the mobilization mechanism with expanded mobilization scope, and establishing a national defense mobilization system in line with the requirements of modern warfare; and adheres to flexible applications of strategies and tactics, creating new ways of fighting so as to give fuller play to the strength of a people's war.

Conducting dialogue and cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries is an important content of China's policy concerning Asia-Pacific security, and a component part of its policy of good-neighborly relationship and partnership with its neighbors and strengthens regional cooperation constantly. Over the past two years, China has worked hard to boost the formation and development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and continued to support and participate in the ARF, Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), Six Party Talks and other activities for multilateral security dialogue and cooperation, thus playing a positive role in deepening regional security cooperation with Asian characteristics.

⁷⁸ *China's National Defense in 2002* (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2002), pp.7-10.

6.3. Japan's Position toward a Security Regime in Northeast Asia

6.3.1. Japan's Perception

Before 1990, Japan had taken a negative position toward establishing multilateral security cooperation in East Asia. This negative attitude can be explained with two main reasons: first, Japan has greatly relied upon the U.S.-Japan alliance system for its national security. Thus, they feared that multilateral security cooperation might endanger the U.S.-Japan alliance system. The negative U.S. attitude toward such a system has also contributed directly to this Japanese position; second, Japan thought that territorial disputes especially with Russia on the northern territory could not be settled effectively through a multilateral approach.⁷⁹

However, with the rapid changes of the security environment in East Asia, Japan's attitude toward multilateral security cooperation is changing toward a more positive position in the post-Cold War era. First, multilateral cooperative security may provide Japan with an alternative to permanent military alliance with the U.S. as a tool of its security and economic interests. This changed position is due to the demise of the major Japanese military threat, the Soviet Union; the downsizing of American troops in Asia; the growing economic conflicts between the U.S. and Japan, and U.S. statements implicating possible linkage between their economic conflicts and their security relations. Furthermore, based on its increased economic power, Japan has pursued an expansion in its diplomatic status that has changed it from a patron-client relationship to partners with the U.S.

⁷⁹ Masahiko Asada, "Japan and a new drift toward Confidence Building in the Asia Pacific Region: Retrospect and Prospect," in Robert E. Bedesk, ed., *Confidence Building in the North Pacific: New Approaches to the Korean Peninsula in the Multilateral Context*, presented in the Canada/Korea North Pacific Arms Control Workshop, June 10-13, 1996 (Canada: University of Victoria, 1996), pp. 123-24.

Second, there are positive signs that the territorial problem between Japan and Russia can be solved in a peaceful way. Japan had previously argued that the Soviets should first return the Northern islands to Japan before seriously thinking about the Soviet concept of a Helsinki-type conference for Northeast Asia. Japanese officials believed the real goal of this Cold War proposal was to freeze existing international borders and legitimize Soviet territorial gains. Leaving this issue to be resolved subsequently, Japan reached a basic agreement to start discussions on CBMs with Russia. This fact seems to show that the final settlement of territorial disputes is not necessarily a prerequisite for introducing confidence building measures in Northeast Asia, although some commentators once argued to the contrary.⁸⁰ In addition, attention should be given to the fact that the Russian Federation agreed with Japan in the “Tokyo Declaration” of October 13, 1993, issued on the occasion of Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s first visit to Japan, that the territorial dispute should be settled based on the documents that have been produced with the agreement of the two countries as well as on the principles of law and justice.⁸¹ Subsequently in 1997, both countries agreed to try to resolve their half-century territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands and sign a peace treaty by 2000.⁸²

Japan’s first concern on the matter of multilateral security cooperation was articulated in the “Nakayama proposal” in 1991. At that time, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Taro Nakayama, offered to use the ASEAN Post-Ministerial

⁸⁰ Hiroshi Kimura, for instance, once argued that: “Theoretically, agreements on CBMs and a border settlement are two completely different things and yet can be very easily linked because strictly speaking the former assumes the latter.” Hiroshi Kimura, “The Soviet Proposal on Confidence-Building Measures and the Japanese Response,” *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 37, no. 1, (Summer 1983), p. 87.

⁸¹ “The Tokyo Declaration: Toward Normalization,” *Japan Times*, October 14, 1993. The “Japan-Soviet Joint Communiqué” issued on the occasion of Soviet President Gorbachev’s visit to Japan in 1991 also referred to the issue of territorial demarcation and cited the four Islands, but did not refer to the principles of law and justice as a basis on which to solve the problem. “Text of Japanese-Soviet Communiqués,” *Japan Times*, April 20, 1991.

⁸² *Korea Times*, November 3, 1997.

Conference (PMC) as a process of political discussion designed to improve the sense of security among Asian countries at the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference held in Kuala Lumpur.⁸³ However, his proposal met with a negative response from Malaysia, the host of the conference, as well as from the United States, and South Korea.⁸⁴

A similar idea was again suggested in Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa's speech at the National Press Club in Washington D.C. in June 1992. At that speech, Miyazawa called for the establishment of a dialogue framework for security discussion through institutions like the ASEAN-PMC and added that China and Russia can be invited as "constructive members" for the maintenance of security in East Asia. He also stressed the 'track two'⁸⁵ mechanism as the most effective way to build confidence among Asia-Pacific countries.⁸⁶

Japan has emphasized the importance of the ASEAN countries to Japan's national interest as well as the security of East Asia. This point is well expressed in the so-called "Miyazawa doctrine." Miyazawa, in an address to the Foreign Correspondents Club in Bangkok in 1993, emphasized Japan's new international political role in East Asia and hoped for more cooperation with the ASEAN countries. At the heart of the putative doctrine was the assertion that countries of the Asia-Pacific region needed to develop a long-term vision regarding the future order of peace and security in this

⁸³ *Korea Herald*, July 23, 1991.

⁸⁴ Although Nakayama's proposal was not given immediate support by the regional countries at that time, the ASEAN summit meeting in January of the following year, 1992, adopted the Singapore Declaration in which it agreed that 'ASEAN should intensify its external dialogues in political and security matters using the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences,' "Singapore Declaration of 1992, ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting," January 28, 1992.

⁸⁵ A key operational focus of the cooperative security process has been to establish habits of dialogue and to move toward inclusive participation. Out of this, and complemented by the burgeoning number of channels of trans-Pacific communications on a broad range of security-relevant issues, has been the emergence of what has become known as 'track two' diplomacy, whereby experts from the academic, governmental, official, non-governmental, and private communities can meet, each in their individual capacity, to converse about issues of common concern. See David Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security," *The Pacific Review*, vol. 7, no. 1, 1994, p. 8. Desmond Ball has used the 'second track' rather than 'track two' as a term. See his, "A New Era in Confidence-Building: The Second Track Process in the Asia/Pacific Region," *Security Dialogue*, vol. 25, no. 2, 1994, p. 168.

⁸⁶ *Chosun Ilbo*, July 4, 1992.

region and that Japan would actively take part in such discussions. He also emphasized Japan's unwillingness to be a militaristic state in that declaration.⁸⁷

In 1997, Japan invited North Korea to join informal talks with the U.S., China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and. to discuss security cooperation in Northeast Asia. The Japanese government aimed to engage the isolated nation in multilateral dialogue in order to increase stability on the Korean peninsula.⁸⁸

In February 1998, Japanese Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi articulated an international framework including the four nations in the Asia-Pacific region: the United States, China, Japan, and Russia. He said that it is essential to ensure the cooperation among the four states for the establishment of a framework for the peace and stability of the region.⁸⁹ Additionally, in April 1998, indicating his positive stance to the security dialogue, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto said, "Such a non-binding dialogue, U.S.-PRC-Japan-Russia security dialogue at the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference, could occur anywhere. Given that we supported Russia's participation in APEC, we find no other place rather than APEC where the U.S., the PRC, Japan, and Russia can talk with one another in a rather relaxed way."⁹⁰

In June 1999, Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura again called for a dialogue framework for Northeast Asian security. Komura stated:

Establishment of a forum among the U.S., the PRC, Japan, Russia, the ROK and the DPRK and also a network of dialogues among the PRC, Japan, and the ROK, and among the U.S., the PRC, and Japan, and linking these frameworks with the existing ones, would contribute to peace and stability in Asia.⁹¹

⁸⁷ *Korea Herald*, January 17, 1993.

⁸⁸ *Nikkei Weekly*, October 25, 1997.

⁸⁹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Foreign Policy Speech by Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi to the 142nd Session of the Diet, February 16, 1998, http://www2.nttca.com:8010/infomofa/f_m/obuchi/142nd.html.

⁹⁰ "Prime Minister proposes U.S.-PRC-Japan-Russia Security Dialogue at APEC," *Asahi Shimbun*, April 17, 1998.

⁹¹ "Foreign Minister Komura proposes expansion of security dialogue in Northeast Asia," *Nikkei*

6.3.2. Japan's Interests

Japan's interests in active participation in regional security dialogue can be explained as follows. First, Japan was concerned with China's possible emergence as a military superpower in the near future. For decades, Japanese defense documents had been premised on the Soviet threat. However, calling for further study of 'collective self-defense,' earlier drafts of the new National Development Program Outline (NDPO), the Liberal Democratic Party's Report, refocused on the threat posed by China's growing military modernization, nuclear tests and expansionist policies in the South China Sea and the Senkaku islands near Japan.⁹² In addition, the New Frontier Party (NFP) report also cited the long-term destabilizing potential of China and called for an explicit recognition of the right of 'collective defense.'⁹³

On the whole, the balancing game is difficult for Japan, because Japan does not have the power to contain China alone and must therefore rely on U.S. power. However, the U.S. can be fickle. It may seek more confrontation with Beijing than Tokyo desires; or at times it may cause less of a deterrent to Chinese behavior than Tokyo would want. Japan is therefore turning to other strategies to complement the balance of power. Japan has already demonstrated an enthusiasm for using Asia's burgeoning multilateral institutions as a way to indirectly influence Chinese behavior. The years 1994 and 1995 saw a spate of policy papers from Japanese government advisory panels urging the Tokyo leadership to strengthen multilateral security mechanisms.⁹⁴ Japan joined other Southeast Asian nations in using the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Summer 1995 to express concern over China's continued

Shimbun, June 3, 1999.

⁹² "DA Plan Reportedly Drops China Threat Phrase," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, November 24, 1995.

⁹³ "Shinseiki no anzen hosho taiko," *New Frontier Party policy paper*, November 8, 1995.

⁹⁴ For example, the August 12, 1994 report of the Prime Minister's Advisory Panel on Defense, the May 1995 "Proposal for Assertive Strategic Multilateralism" by the Japanese Diet-affiliated Asia Forum, and the January 1995 report on China by the Japan Forum on International Relations.

nuclear tests. As one Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) official notes, ‘Japan wants to say nice things to China bilaterally and bad things multilaterally.’⁹⁵ Tokyo will also continue to use multilateral economic institutions such as the APEC to integrate China into the regional economic system, while pushing faster than Washington for Chinese inclusion in global institutions like the World Trade Organization. Thus to avoid confronting China directly alone and to maintain its strategic interests under the delicate strategic situation with the United States and China, Japan has strategic motivation to promote a multilateral security dialogue.⁹⁶

Second, many of Japan’s neighbors remain uncomfortable about expanding Japan’s security role in Asia. A multilateral cooperation Regime could offer a particularly effective means for Japan to become more actively involved in regional security matters in a manner that is non-threatening to neighboring countries. Japan seems to be trying to lay the cornerstone to end its isolation in the region by planning a leading role in discussing the establishment of multilateral security cooperation.⁹⁷ Along with this effort, Japan is seeking to make its political status commensurate with its economic power by working to join the UN Security Council as a permanent member and expand the scope of its military’s role in Asia. In a speech to the General Assembly of the UN in the 52nd session in 1997, it was proposed that Japan would be willing to pay UN expenses as high as the Americans, if it gained a permanent seat on the Security Council.⁹⁸ Japan is also moving toward revising the post-war “Peace-Constitution” to expand its activities in the world community such as through Peace

⁹⁵ Cited from Michael J. Green and Benjamin L. Self interview with Japanese official, February 1996. See their “Japan’s Changing China policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism,” *Survival*, vol. 38, no. 2, (Summer 1996), p. 52.

⁹⁶ Song Young Sun, “Prospects for a New Asia-Pacific Multilateral Security Arrangement,” *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, vol. V, no. 1, (Summer 1993), p. 196.

⁹⁷ Song Young Sun, “The prospect for Asia-Pacific Cooperation,” paper prepared for presentation at a Seminar on South Korea and Japan’s role in Collective Security system in Asia, the Institute for International Cultural Studies, Seoul, Korea, January 13, 1992, pp. 49-50.

⁹⁸ “Japan willing to pay more, if it wins Security Council Seat,” *Korea Times*, September 24, 1997.

Keeping Operations (PKO).⁹⁹ In addition, the revised Japan and the United States defense guidelines, which replace guidelines drawn up in 1978, for the first time to allow a limited military role for Japan in the event of conflicts in surrounding areas.¹⁰⁰

However, all these efforts have not been supported by the regional countries, particularly China and the Two Koreas, they have instead aroused their suspicion and opposition.¹⁰¹ Arguing that Japan is bitterly distrusted by its Northeast Asian neighbors, Donald C. Hellmann says that Japan cannot be expected to play a leader position in Asian security affairs. Furthermore, he emphasized that this is because of the failure of Tokyo to come to terms with the ill will created by decades of Japanese imperialism in the first half of the 20th century and by the atrocities committed by the military throughout East Asia during World War II. The refusal of Japan to accept responsibility and the effort to expand its independent military role without belonging to any other security cooperation mechanisms caused its neighboring countries' suspicion that Japan might want to be a regional power as shown in the past.¹⁰² Thus Japan has clear interests in taking part in a Cooperative Security Regime in Northeast Asia in that it would help it ease isolation in regional society and allay the concern of neighboring countries.

In addition, the nuclear threat from North Korea is another factor which brought the change of Japan's attitude.¹⁰³ Preventing development of nuclear weapons and missiles in North Korea and eliminating the danger of nuclear proliferation in

⁹⁹ "Revising Japanese Constitution," *Korea Herald*, January 7, 1998.

¹⁰⁰ "Seoul Wants say in Expanded Japanese Defense Role," *Korea Herald*, September 24, 1997.

¹⁰¹ *Chosun Ilbo*, September 24, 1997, September 30, 1997.

¹⁰² The Asian Development Bank, of which Japan was a cofounder, is an exception, but it has functioned essentially as an arm of Japanese Foreign Policy. See Donald C. Hellmann, "America, APEC, and the Road Not Taken: International Leadership in the Post-Cold War Interregnum in the Asia-Pacific," in Donald C. Hellmann and Kenneth B. Pyle, eds., *From APEC to Xanadu: Creating a Viable Community in the Post-Cold War Pacific* (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 77-9.

¹⁰³ Hong Kyu Deok, *The Prospect for the Establishment of Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia and Appropriate Counter-plot* (Seoul: The Research Institute for National Unification, 1993), pp. 44-5.

Northeast Asia is one of the highest Japanese security interests.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, Japan worries that a united Korea might become a nuclear power. Japanese experts have made elements of conditionality for a reunification of the Korean peninsula. One of those elements states that unification is desirable if the united Korea is not a nuclear weapon's state.¹⁰⁵ Fortunately, as far as the nuclear issues are concerned, most regional countries, with the exception of North Korea, agree with the Japanese condition. For dealing with the whole nuclear concern in Northeast Asia, a cooperative security regime could provide those countries with a venue where they would discuss nuclear issues relating to North Korea. Otherwise, at least it could create a favorable atmosphere to fulfill the U.S.-North Korea agreements on North Korea's nuclear issues.

With all these possible interests from taking part in a cooperative security regime, since the middle of the 1990s, Japan has made an effort to create a favorable atmosphere for the multilateral security system more actively.¹⁰⁶ In addition, Japan is the only country in Asia, which was invited to the CSCE meeting held in July 1992. That CSCE meeting might provide Japan with some momentum to consider taking an initiative in forming a multilateral security cooperation system in Asia equivalent to CSCE.

¹⁰⁴ Hajime Izumi, "Multilateral Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Building a Multilateral Security Mechanism and the Role of Japan," in a paper presented at International Art and Science Conference on Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia, sponsored by Korean Local Study Institute, Seoul, 1993, p. 121.

¹⁰⁵ Amos A. Jordan, "Korean Unification: the Stakes for Japan and the United States," in Amos A. Jordan, ed., *Korean Unification: Implications for Northeast Asia* (Washington, D. C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), p. 2.

¹⁰⁶ The rationale for this regionalist's contention is that in a world where economic strength is becoming increasingly politicized, Japan should consider its role from the perspective of peace and security. Certainly any unilateral attempt by Japan to play a larger role in the maintenance of Asian regional security will meet with stiff resistance from several neighboring countries for the foreseeable future, Japan should soothe their anxieties by sharing such roles with neighboring countries within a multilateral framework. See, Eugene Brown, "The Debate over Japan's Strategic Future: Bilateralism versus Regionalism," *Asian Survey*, vol. XXXIII, no. 6, June 1993, pp. 546-54.

6.4. Russia's Position toward a Security Regime in Northeast Asia

6.4.1. Russia's Perception

When it comes to Multilateral or Multinational Security Cooperation, regardless of region, Russia is the strongest advocate. It was as early as the final stage of the Conference for Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which eventually resulted in an agreement on the first-generation military CBMs, that the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev had hinted at promoting CBMs in non-European contexts. Proposals for East Asian CBMs both on a regional and a bilateral basis came in the early 1980's. On February 23, 1981, in a speech to the 26th Party Congress, General Secretary Brezhnev declared that:

There is a region where elaboration and use of confidence-building measures ... could ... make a very useful contribution to strengthening the foundations of universal peace. That region is the Far East.¹⁰⁷

This initial proposal for collective CBMs in the Far East was followed in the next year by a proposal for bilateral CBMs. In his Tashkent speech of March 24, 1982, Brezhnev explicitly referred to Japan and China as possible candidates with which to start bilateral CBMs.

Mikhail Gorbachev had proposed a conference to discuss Asian security issues following the example of the CSCE. As early as May 21, 1985, only two months after taking office, the new Soviet General Secretary suggested the convocation of an "All-Asian Forum" in a speech welcoming Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Moscow. In proposing that forum, he suggested that the 'European Experience' should be taken

¹⁰⁷ Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1981, pp. 38-9.

into account. This proposal was followed, though with different designations, by similar overtures, including those for a 'Pacific Conference' in his Vladivostok speech of July 28, 1986,¹⁰⁸ and an Asia-Pacific security 'negotiating mechanism' in his Krasnoyarsk speech of September 16, 1988.¹⁰⁹ In proposing a 'Pacific Conference' in Vladivostok, Gorbachev stated that "we would propose a conference, 'in the mould of the Helsinki Conference,' to be attended by all the countries gravitating toward the ocean." On April 17, 1991, when Gorbachev visited Japan for the first time, he proposed a quintepartite conference with the participation of the U.S., USSR, Japan, China, and India.¹¹⁰

The multilateral policy framework developed by Gorbachev for the Asia-Pacific region served specific Soviet security and economic interests and is no longer appropriate as a basis for the Russian Republic's policy, given that those interests have been reformulated. Gorbachev's multilateralism differed considerably from that tentatively promoted by the Russian Republic in terms of range and scale. Gorbachev attempted to apply the European experience with the Helsinki security framework to the Asia-Pacific, which was to embrace the entire Western Pacific and include all major security issues. The scale of Gorbachev's multilateralism reflected the global interests of the Soviet Union as a superpower and its inherent need to be assured of recognition by the West. By contrast, the Russian Republic's steps toward multilateralism have been limited to areas of Northeast Asia that relate to its immediate security.¹¹¹

During his official visit to Seoul in November 1992, President Yeltsin proposed a mechanism of multinational negotiations beginning with expert-level consultations on

¹⁰⁸ Mikhail Gorbachev's Speech in Vladivostok, July 1986, p. 8.

¹⁰⁹ "Gorbachev Affirms Drive for Asia-Pacific Foreign Policy Thaw," *Financial Times*, September 17-18, 1988.

¹¹⁰ "Text of Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev's Address to the Diet," *Japan Times*, April 18, 1991.

¹¹¹ *Australian Financial Review*, March 23, 1992.

security issues in the potentially conflict-prone sub-region of Northeast Asia. Particularly emphasizing military issues such as nuclear and missile non-proliferation, he called for a crisis regulation system, including the creation of conflict prevention and strategic studies centers in the region.¹¹²

On March 24, 1994, the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed convening a “multilateral conference on security and nuclear-weapon-free status of the Korean Peninsula” with the participation of Russia, China, the United States, Japan, the DPRK and the ROK and representatives of the UN secretary-general and the IAEA secretary-general, to seek a settlement of questions related to ensuring nuclear non-proliferation on the Korean Peninsula.¹¹³

During his visit to Beijing in May 1995, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev proposed a collective security system for the Asia Pacific region. As a first step in this direction, he suggested a sub-regional security system in Northeast Asia, which would include the United States, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and North Korea. Grachev further clarified that such a security system would serve as a regional forum to discuss “the safeguarding of peace by means of collective actions.”¹¹⁴

In 1996, Russia shared the view with South Korea at a policy consultation meeting in Seoul that the regional security cooperation mechanism should be established as soon as possible for peace and stability.¹¹⁵

In spite of these various suggestions, the regional countries did not support the Russian initiatives until Yeltsin’s era. At least from a Japanese perspective, Soviet

¹¹² Joo Seoung Ho, “Russian Policy on Korean Unification in the Post-Cold War era,” *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 1, 1996, p. 46.

¹¹³ Amangueldy Irguebaev, “The Prospects of a Settlement in Korea and Russia’s Approach: Beyond the U.S.-North Korea Nuclear Accord,” *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, vol. 7, no.1, 1995, p. 65; Valery Denisov, “The Problem of Nuclear Non-proliferation in Korea,” *International Affairs* (Moscow), August 1994, p. 12.

¹¹⁴ Joo Seoung Ho, “Russia’s Policy Toward the Two Koreas,” op. cit., p. 112.

¹¹⁵ “Korea, Russia Eye Security Body in Northeast Asia,” *Korea Times*, November 8, 1996.

proposals for CBMs were designed to consolidate the post-war territorial *status quo*.¹¹⁶

However, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia preoccupied with immense domestic problems can not afford to think of the balance of power policy with the U.S. Charles E. Ziegler argues that Russia accepts the continued presence of U.S. forces in the Pacific in order to guarantee regional stability.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, when evaluating the progress of Russian-American relations, it is necessary to bear in mind what Professor Sergei E. Blagovolin, the President of the Institute for National Security and Strategic Studies said:

Russia has completely abandoned the concept of “naval parity with the United States,” which for many years dominated Soviet thinking. The issue is not just that our Pacific Fleet presently finds itself in very difficult circumstances - a considerable part of its warships has lost their fighting efficiency due to a lack of funding and spare parts. It is instead a matter of fundamental change in policy, reflecting new thinking on Russia’s role in the world. A part of this new thinking is the rejection of the Soviet goal of achieving a global military presence comparable to that of the United States.¹¹⁸

At the same time, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economic crisis in Russia and its aspiration for economic development lead it to adopt a more flexible policy toward its territorial disputes with Japan. Due to Russia is more active foreign policy toward Japan and new Japanese efforts to regain those Islands, the two countries are ready to break the barrier leading to a closer relationship. In November 1997, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and Russian President Boris Yeltsin

¹¹⁶ Masahiko Asada, op. cit., p.125.

¹¹⁷ Charles E. Ziegler, “Russia and East Asia after the Cold War,” in *East Asia in Transition: Toward a New Regional Order*, ed. Robert S. Ross (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 83.

¹¹⁸ Sergei E. Blagovolin, “Some Aspects of Russian Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in Michael D. Bellows, ed., *Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994), p. 48.

announced at the end of a two-day summit in Siberia that the two countries would work toward a formal peace treaty by 2000, bringing a formal end to their World War II era conflict.¹¹⁹ Furthermore both countries reached an agreement for the Framework of Fishing Operations in the waters surrounding the Four Northern Islands at the end of 1997.¹²⁰

Despite the fact that there has been no formal resolution to the Kuril Island dispute or a formal peace treaty, the economic cooperation led by the Siberian oil and gas development has helped to reduce tensions and enhance dialogue and cooperation in other areas.

6.4.2. Russia's Interests

Russian has several interests in pursuing multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia. First, multilateral security cooperation could promote a favorable international environment for the Russian economy. Since Gorbachev gave the economic and social needs of the Soviet Union top priority, as did Yeltsin, the primary tasks of Russia's policy in the region are to ensure a peaceful and stable environment for domestic reforms, to establish stable relationships with the region's leading powers, and to join the economic and political structures of the region as a full-fledged member.¹²¹ As Mikhail Nossov argued, business would never invest money in a politically unstable country, at the same time political stability could only result with economic growth, which was impossible without investments.¹²²

Furthermore, geographically the eastern part of Russia is adjacent to the northern

¹¹⁹ *Korea Times*, November 11, 1997.

¹²⁰ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Foreign Policy Speech by Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi to the 142nd Session of the Diet," February 16, 1998.

¹²¹ Joo Seung Ho, "Russia's Policy Toward the Two Koreas," op. cit., p. 110.

¹²² Mikhail Nossov, "Russia and the Security Environment in the Far East," in Nam Sung Woo, Koo Bon Hak and Curt Cornish, eds., *The Korean Peninsula: Prospects for Peace and Reunification* (Seoul: The Korean Institute for Unification, 2003), p.34.

part of the Korean peninsula and Japan, and the eastern part of China. Along with its huge natural resources in Siberia, Russia is in the position to lead regional countries toward a multilateral cooperation project. For instance, Russia is interested in the Tuman River project and the gas pipeline project that have the potential to change the regional environment both economically and geo-politically.¹²³ Its neighbors, such as Japan, have what Russia needs: manufacturing technology, management and marketing skills, and investment capital. To enhance its image among these potential economic partners, Russia needs to become an integral member of the region.¹²⁴

Second, it would create a regional environment in which reform-minded Russian leaders are politically more able to reduce military expenditure, defend their actions before critics at home and embrace the idea of regional security.¹²⁵ In the mid-1980s, Soviet armed forces in the Far East were enormous: 25 per cent of all Soviet ground and air forces were in the region; and the Pacific Fleet the largest of the four fleets in the navy.¹²⁶ Notwithstanding substantial cuts during Gorbachev's rule in the late 1980s, new domestic pressures in 1993 forced Russia to cut its ground forces in the region by 100,000 troops, and the number of fighter planes and warships by 40 percent.¹²⁷ Major scaling back of exercises and training occurred and the Pacific Fleet experienced a 33 percent reduction in ship-days at sea.¹²⁸ The Pacific Fleet has

¹²³ Vasily V. Mikheev, "Russian Policy toward Korean Peninsula after Yeltsin's Re-election as President," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, vol. 11, no. 2, Summer/Fall 1997, p. 367.

¹²⁴ Khil Young Whan and Oh Kongdan, "From Bilateralism to Multilateralism in Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific," *Korea Observer*, vol. XXV, no. 3, (Autumn 1994), p. 409.

¹²⁵ Rajan Menon, "Japan-Russia Relations and Northeast Asian Security," *Survival*, vol. 38, no. 2, (Summer 1996), p. 74.

¹²⁶ Robert Scalapino, "The United States and the Security of Asia," in Robert Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato, and Jusuf Wanandi, eds., *Internal and External Security Issues in Asia* (Berkeley, Cal: University of California Press, 1986), p. 64.

¹²⁷ Eugene Bazhanov and Natasha Bazhanov, "Russia and Asia in 1993," *Asian Survey*, vol. 34, no. 1, January 1994, p. 88.

¹²⁸ Tai Ming Cheung, "The Eastern Front: Russian Military Development in Asia Sparks Concern," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 26, 1993, p. 28.

suffered a rapid decrease in the number of warships available and fit for service and is considered to be in the worst shape of all four Russian fleets – notwithstanding the dispute with Ukraine over ownership of the Black Sea Fleet.¹²⁹ Despite the weakness of the Russian military, it is still a very powerful force in Northeast Asia, and a regional security concern to China and Japan. The important new feature of the response of regional countries to Russian military power is their willingness to consider cooperative responses, though these can only be described as embryonic.¹³⁰ Cooperative engagement between Russia and other powers could lead to a multilateral process that could reduce force requirements to less than what they would otherwise be. This alone could make the total active force structure in the Russia Far East less important for Moscow than under either previous or current circumstances.¹³¹

Third, the multilateral approach is also a means of bringing pressure upon China over nuclear force reductions, illustrating Russian concern over China's nuclear arsenal. The Moscow leadership has declared its intention of eliminating nuclear weapons altogether, which would require an extension of strategic nuclear arms reduction negotiations to cover all nuclear powers besides Russia and the United States. Moscow cannot eliminate its nuclear arsenal alone and requires the assurance of reciprocal Chinese action, the desire for which was incorporated in Yeltsin's United Nations proposal of January 29, 1992. The Russian President called upon Britain, France and China to accept nuclear weapons reductions in an attempt to go

¹²⁹ Joshua Handler, "Russia's Pacific Fleet-Submarine Bases and Facilities," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol. 6, no. 4, April 1994, p. 159; John Jordan, "The Russian Navy in Transition," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol. 6, no. 4, April 1994, p. 155.

¹³⁰ Russia and China agreed in 1994 on military exchanges, joint training, intelligence-sharing and logistical support, while South Korea and Japan have agreed to information exchanges and talks on security issues.

¹³¹ Vladimir I. Ivanov, "Russia's New Military Doctrine: Implications for Asia," in Michael D. Bellows, ed., *Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994), pp. 216-17.

beyond bilateral Russian-American strategic reduction. In Geneva on February 12, 1992, Kozyrev proposed that both Russia and the United States reduce strategic nuclear weapons to a certain level as a first step to encourage other nuclear powers including China to join the common reductions process subsequently. The proposal was intended to meet the Chinese demand that Russia and the United States should reduce their nuclear arsenals to China's level first before reductions would be considered.¹³² However, because of North Korea's nuclear policy, inclusive nuclear issues in Northeast Asia have not drawn much attention from regional countries. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and Six Party Talks designed to discourage North Korea's nuclear ambition are concentrating on Korean Peninsula security issues. Thus this ongoing framework is not a proper venue to deal with the regional country's wider nuclear concerns.

Fourth, some of Russia's most insightful foreign-policy specialists worry that a weak Russia estranged from Japan, uninvolved in regional security structures, and the short-term gains from arms sales to China could be vulnerable as China becomes increasingly powerful and nationalistic.¹³³ According to Vladimir Li, the representatives of the different branches of authority (executive, legislative, military, etc) in Moscow believe that various discriminatory barriers that arose during the Cold War are kept intact and even secured in the economic development of the Asian Pacific Rim. For example, he claimed that Russia has not been granted membership in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation yet.¹³⁴ Additionally, he assumed that Russia would step up its search for national ways to deal with regional security issues if it

¹³² Leszek Buszynski, "Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 65, no. 4, 1992/3, p. 502.

¹³³ Rajan Menon, *op. cit.*, p.60.

¹³⁴ However, Japan, one of the major participants in APEC, proclaimed that it supports Russian participation in APEC on November 1, 1997, see *Chosun Ilbo*, November 2, 1997.

were excluded from involvement in key forums, such as tripartite talks between the United States, China and Japan¹³⁵ For instance, excluding Russia from the Four-party Talks incites its nationalists' suspicions saying it is against strategic Russian interests and it could take an anti-Russian direction.¹³⁶ To avert this scenario, Raja Menon argues that improved relations with Japan including the resolution of the territorial dispute and participation in regional security initiatives are Russia's critical interests.¹³⁷

Finally, Russia is interested in being freed from the Japanese threat. A self-assertive and nationalistic Japan, if it drifts from the security alliance with the United States toward a more independent military posture, represents another source of insecurity for Russia. After the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the symmetrical pattern of security interests and perceptions between Washington and Tokyo is slowly dissolving. Henry Kissinger notes that:

Under post-Cold War conditions, Japanese long-range planners will not believe that they can always rely on America to perceive Asian rivalries from their perspective... It can be no accident that the Japanese defense budget has been creeping upward, making it already the third largest in the world (and, given the Soviet internal problems, perhaps the second most effective).¹³⁸

Charles E. Ziegler shows similar perception that:

With the impending cutbacks of U.S. forces in the Pacific, the threat from the Japanese-American alliance has receded. Over the long term, Russia cannot ignore the potential challenge

¹³⁵ Vladimir Li, "Russia's Interests in the Versatile Structure of Security in Northeast Asia and the Korean Issue," in the proceedings of The Research Institute for International Affairs, the international forum on the New Discourses on Peace Regime in Northeast Asia and Korea: Contending Views and new Alternatives, held at the Intercontinental Hotel in Seoul on November 22-23, 1996, pp. 62-3.

¹³⁶ Nevertheless, there are signs that the U.S. and South Korea can make their Four-party Talks more flexible if Moscow is able to explain clearly what it can contribute to what it expects in return regarding the Korean settlement. Vasily V. Mikheev, op. cit., p. 366.

¹³⁷ Rajan Menon, op. cit., p. 60.

¹³⁸ Henry Kissinger, "Why We Can't Withdraw From Asia," *Washington Post*, June 15, 1993.

posed by Japan. ... Other countries are wary of the possibility of a militarily stronger Japan moving to fill the vacuum left by American disengagement.¹³⁹

Thus if the United States failed to be available as a partner for Japan, if it continued to withdraw inward and concentrated its foreign policies on economics, if it adopted the minimum of political and security commitments seemingly sufficient to sustain America's place in the world, Japan could be pushed into an independent foreign policy, raising suspicions among neighboring countries. To avoid this scenario, Hanns W. Maull argues that regional countries have to help Japan to continue its security reliance on others, to deny its willingness to turn unilateral military options, to belong to 'civilizing' international relations through the development of international cooperation, integration and institutionalization.

6.5. South Korea's Position toward a Security Regime in Northeast Asia

6.5.1. South Korea's Perception

South Korea has made strenuous efforts to establish multilateral security architecture with participation of all key players in the region while simultaneously and actively participating in bilateral arrangements. The primary concern is derived from the perception that North Korea's nuclear issue is not only the two Koreas' issue but also a regional and global issue. South Korea believes that multilateral security cooperation directly contributes to resolving the current issues and ultimately implementing a long-term reunification strategy, while maintaining close relations with neighboring states which would enable Korea to gain their coordination and

¹³⁹ Charles E. Ziegler, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

support in the event of unification.

In the early 1990s, South Korea normalized with Russia and China, which contributed to creating necessary conditions for the establishment of multilateral security cooperative arrangements. More than ten proposals were made by the South Korean government for the establishment of Northeast Asia multilateral security cooperative arrangements.¹⁴⁰ South Korean government and civilian organizations have formally and informally proposed the establishment of security cooperation institutions such as the Roh Tae Woo administration's 'Northeast Asia Peace Consultative Council' in 1988 and 1990, President Kim Young Sam's 'Mini-CSCE model Northeast Multilateral Security Talks' in 1993, 'Six Party Talks' in the manner of two+four in 1994, 'Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Mechanism' in 1995, 'Northeast Asia Security Talks' in 1996, and 'Northeast Asia Security Organization' in 1997, the Kim Dae Jung administration's 'Joint Declaration for Peace and Stability of Northeast Asia' in 1998 and the Roh Moo Hyun administration's 'Northeast Asia Peace and Security Consultative Arrangement' in 2003.

One of the variables for South Korea's proposals is the perception that a multilateral security cooperative system complements U.S.-South Korea bilateral military alliance. Furthermore, Presidents Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam's proposals were not fully supported by U.S. and China. Honorary President of Liberal, Democratic Coalition Party Kim Jong Pil visited China in 1997 and proposed the Joint Declaration of the Six Parties. Since U.S., China, and Japan supported the

¹⁴⁰ U.S. Secretary of State Baker proposed Six Party Talks in the manner of two+four in 1991. The primary background of his proposal was to support North-South Korea Talk, assurance of negotiation between the Two Koreas and to compromise conflicting interests of neighboring states around Korean peninsula. Japanese Prime Minister Gaijoo proposed Six Party Talks related to the reduction of Korean Peninsula's tension in 1990, Northeast Asia Security Apparatus as diplomatic policy guideline by Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, Six Party talks by Prime Minister Obuchi in 1998, and Russia Titarenko, director of Far East Institute of Soviet Union Science Academy proposed the establishment of International Negotiation Institution including North-South Koreas and related countries.

proposal, his diplomatic initiative for the establishment of Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Architecture was favorably assessed by the key players.¹⁴¹

The reason for the support of the neighboring states in the Joint Declaration of the Six Parties proposed by the Kim Dae Jung's administration seems to shift the center of gravity from the Koreanization strategy of the Korean Peninsula's issue to an internationalization strategy of the Korean Peninsula issue. Under the banner of an internationalization strategy of the Korean Peninsula issue, the connection strategy of the establishment of a peace regime on the Korea Peninsula and in Northeast Asia enables the Roh Moo Hyun administration to simultaneously pursue the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia Peace Community Initiative.¹⁴²

South Korea government's diplomacy for the establishment of Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Cooperative arrangements was successful in the past 15 years. The background for the success was a result from the increase of adaptability of the key players in the region against uncertainty and instability which existed in the early stage of the post-Cold War, and the recognition of the necessity of institutional apparatus to stabilize the fluidity of regional security order. Potential conflicts, including North Korea's nuclear issue and the Taiwan Straits crisis, leads national security policy makers in the region to seriously consider multilateralism in national security decision making.

South Korean government from Roh Tae Woo, Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung to the Roh Moo Hyun administration has strenuously proposed options for Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Cooperative Architecture. Even though U.S. and China

¹⁴¹ China President Jiang Jemin and Japan Prime Minister Hasimoto Ryutaro positively expressed their support and U.S. State Department principally supported South Korea's proposal by news release.

¹⁴² Blue House Policy Planning Committee, *New Initiative of Northeast Asia's Peace and Prosperity: Security Cooperation*, 2003

used to be very reluctant to support the idea of a Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Cooperation Initiative, and despite North Korea's stubborn opposition of the initiative, the South Korean government has made untiring efforts to establish Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Cooperative Architecture as a mean of achieving a connection strategy between Korean Peninsula's peace and Northeast Asia's stability. The Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam administration's proposals for the establishment of Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Cooperative Architecture were opposed and ignored by some neighbouring states. However, the attempt was to explore the feasibility as a pilot test. The Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun governments' proposals were pursued with assurance and confidence. Subsequently, it could draw favourable responses from its neighboring states resulting in 'half success.'

6.5.2. South Korea's Interests

The foundation of the Six Party talks held in Beijing was co-initiated by South Korea, U.S. and China. The six party talks were supported by Japan and Russia. It is a result of a multilateralism policy which South Korea's government has pursued to establish a peace regime on the Korea peninsula and stability in the region ever since the Roh Tae Woo administration. The Roh Tae Woo administration declared Nord Politik in 1988 and as a result, established the foundation for the Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Architecture by respectively normalizing with Russia and China in 1990 and 1992. He delivered a speech entitled "Northeast Peace Consultative Council" at the UN in 1988 and in the Japanese Diet in 1990. The Kim Young Sam administration proposed feasible applications of European regional integration and security multilateralism in the post-Cold War era to the Korean Peninsula's peace and

Northeast Asia regional integration. Foreign Ministers Han Seung Joo, Kong Roh Myung, and Ambassador Kim Kyung Won to the UN attempted to demonstrate South Korean will to establish European style multilateral security cooperative system in the region in the name of ‘Mini-CSCE,’ ‘two+four Northeast Consultative Body,’ ‘Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Organization,’ and ‘Northeast Asia Security Dialogue.’¹⁴³

The Kim Dae Jung’s administration proclaimed ‘the Joint Declaration of the Six Parties’ to achieve regional peace and stability by emphasizing balanced diplomacy with great powers in the region as two pillars of South Korea’s security with the ROK-U.S. Alliance. Subsequently, he succeeded in gaining support from the U.S., China and Japan. President Kim dynamically pursued comprehensive security policies with the neighbouring states from the perspective of assessment of regional stability crucial to dismantling the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula. The Kim Dae Jung administration expanded his reconciliation and cooperation policy to Northeast Asia including North Korea so the South Korean government could facilitate its efforts of a Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Cooperation Architecture. President Roh eventually proposed the ‘Northeast Asia Peace Security Consultative Organization’ as a regional multilateral framework in the name of a ‘New Initiative of Northeast Asia Era for Peace and Prosperity’ as a crucial project of the administration.¹⁴⁴

First, the South Korean government did not underestimate the importance of comprehensive security cooperation among key players in the region to contribute to the Korean peninsula’s peace by regional stability and order. Policy makers’ strenuous

¹⁴³ Um Tae Am, “Korea Peninsula’s Security and Northeast Asia Six Party Talk,” *ibid.*, pp.228-230.

¹⁴⁴ Policy Planning Committee of Blue House, “New Initiative of Northeast Asia for Peace and Prosperity: Multilateral Meeting for the solution of North Korea nuclear issue transfer to Northeast Asia Peace Security Consultative Body,” *Sekye Ilbo*, June 19, 2003

efforts to implement the multilateralism policy and to push for a policy mindset in the regional framework of the Korea Peninsula provided a momentum for the establishment of a Northeast Asia Security Cooperation Body.

Second, the power to sustain the establishment of a Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Cooperative Body will come from balanced diplomacy within Northeast Asia. South Korea's balanced diplomacy toward the four great powers as a pillar of South Korea's security with the U.S.-South Korea alliance needs to be sustained. In the course of a balanced diplomacy, in a China-Japan-South Korea tripartite security cooperative body, South Korea will act as a bridge role between China and Japan. If South Korea will stick to China, it will be considered as an anti-Japanese movement and will collide with the U.S.' interests. Considering China-South Korea economic interdependence, it is not a feasible diplomacy option for South Korea to stick solely to the U.S.-South Korea alliance and tripartite U.S.-Japan-South Korea. In the past, South Korea has learned that the influence of Japan on the Korean peninsula was negative, however, increased influence of China on the Peninsula also would not be a positive option. An active engagement policy with both states is required.¹⁴⁵ South Korea needs to rebuild new China-Japan-South Korea cooperative security relations that mirror their growing economic interdependence. However, at the same time, South Korea can not disregard the value of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. This policy will contribute to Korea's national interest as well as the U.S., China and Japan's policy toward the Korean Peninsula and strategic interests of Northeast Asia. Maintaining tripartite relations with a U.S.-Japan-South Korea security cooperative body would also lead to collaborative relations with Japan through a linkage with the

¹⁴⁵ Ha Young Sun, "Future of South Korea-China-Japan," *Chosun Ilbo*, Dec 3, 1999

U.S. Additionally, consolidating with China through the establishment of tripartite relations with China-Japan-South Korea, would enable South Korea's government to prevent being forced to make a strategic selection. Furthermore, if the U.S. and China attempt to trade-off dealing with the Korean issue and Taiwan issue, then it will be detrimental to Korea's national interests. That is why South Korea needs to maintain close relations with neighbour states in the region and also why the Northeast Asia Multilateral security cooperative body needs to be established.

Third, South Korea might be in a position to be abandoned by the U.S. as an allied partner related to the Korean Peninsula security. The South Korean government perceives a negative outcome with the withdrawal of the U.S. forces in accordance with U.S. strategic interests and transformation.¹⁴⁶ As a result, the vision of President Park Chung Hee's desire to reduce South Korean dependence on the U.S. has been renewed with the utmost efforts to reinforce a national self-reliant defense posture. This trend will continue.

Since the post-Cold War, the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun's administrations have made powerful strides to push for a more independent diplomacy. The scope of this independence from the U.S. is comprehensive and its behaviour is not based on an ideological foundation. South Korea's reconciliation and cooperation policy toward North Korea proclaim a more politically independent self reliant defense. However, the increase of independent policy of South Korea toward the U.S. is a characteristic of the post-Cold War era and should not be interpreted as a sign of the disintegration or weakening of the alliance. The overall change including South Korea's economic growth, its international prestige, and national confidence has led South Korea to gain national consensus to become more independent from its U.S. reliant security posture.

¹⁴⁶ Chun Jae Sung, "Assessment of 50 years ROK-U.S. Alliance and Future Vision"; Han Yong Sup, "Status and Role of U.S. Forces in Korea" hosted by 2003 National Security Academic Seminar International Politics Association, ROK Veteran Club, October 24, 2003.

To encounter this change, the South Korean government simultaneously attempts to establish a multilateral security cooperative organization as a supplementary security apparatus while transforming the U.S.-South Korea alliance.

As before described, the U.S.-South Korea alliance and Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Cooperative Organization are two pillars of South Korea's security. If South Korea relies too much on the alliance, and shifts to an interdependent international relationship in uncertain security issues, then it will be difficult for South Korea to deal with those future complicated security issues facing South Korea. Although the U.S.-South Korea alliance is solid, self-reliant defense posture needs to be reinforced. An independent sense of sovereignty on national security is a driving force for the establishment of a multilateral security cooperative organization.

Fourth, the multilateral security arrangement is one of the best options to institutionalize a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. The Korea unification strategy of the Korean Peninsula issue is a legacy of an old era. As an example, the nuclear issue or the North Korean implosion will not be resolved by South Korea alone. International support and cooperation from its neighboring nations is crucial to dismantle the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula, which will ultimately contribute to regional peace.

The South Korean government has attempted to induce the North out of isolation, reassured Japan, and stimulated Russian interest in mutually beneficial contacts in trade, transportation, and energy. What South Korea attempts to achieve is to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula leading to a multilateral security regime in the region. An isolated North in the region will only threaten the regional peace as well as the Peninsula's stability. The proliferation of WMD and the missile program

by North Korea needs to be resolved by key players. Subsequently, South Korea has a strong obligation to resolve the very complicated issues by adopting a 'let's go together strategy' with neighboring states. Key players' support in the region for South Korea's engagement policy and its deterrence and defensive strategy exemplifies the need and demonstrates the possibility for the establishment of a Northeast Asia Multilateral security cooperative arrangement. The Six Party Talks are a de facto establishment of a nascent multilateral security regime. Currently they are limited in scope with focus primarily on the North's nuclear program but it has the potential to expand to other security issues. The test of whether a broader cooperative security mechanism can be established will be if the Six Party Talks can be broadened successfully.

Fifth, South Korea's firm policy relating to the Northeast Asia multilateral security cooperative arrangement also results from the geopolitical location of the Korean Peninsula and the importance of South Korea in Northeast Asia. South Korea is in a position to play an impartial mediator or act as a bridge in the region. The competition surrounding the Korean Peninsula can be interpreted from geopolitics. The confrontation and conflict between U.S. and China and the competitive system between China and Japan is a result of international relations' power politics, which does not look to be resolved in the near future. Fifteen years have passed since the post-Cold War era. South Korea is in a position to play a bridging role in these competitive structures. South Korea has maintained its friendly cooperative relationship with all neighboring countries including even North Korea due to the North-South Korea reconciliation cooperation policy.

Additionally, South Korea is in a position to take a more leading role in establishing the Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Cooperative architecture than any other state. If the U.S. took the lead, then China would have criticized the U.S. attempt to consolidate its regional hegemony structure. Had China attempted to proceed, the U.S. and Japan would not have endorsed the action. If Japan demonstrates its leadership, a resurgence of an ‘East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere’ would be resisted. Considering these conditions, South Korea’s attempt to play a more leading role in constructing a multilateral security cooperative regime is likely to be supported or endorsed by all neighboring states.

6.6. North Korea’s Position toward a Security Regime in Northeast Asia

6.6.1. North Korea’s Perception

North Korea has always been reluctant and pessimistic regarding a multilateral security cooperation initiative for either the Asia-Pacific or Northeast Asia. This has been true during Kim Jung Il as well as Kim Il Sung’s reigns. North Korea expressed its negative position regarding to the ‘Pan Asia Security Cooperative Conference’ proposed by Soviet Union Gorbachev and the ‘Consultative Conference for Peace in Northeast Asia’ proposed by South Korea President Roh Tae Woo because those proposals were unrealistic due to the applicability of CSCE to the Asia-Pacific region. Also, North Korea expressed their negative position toward the ‘two+ four conference initiative’ initiated by U.S. Secretary of State Baker in late 1992.

North Korea also retained its negative position toward the ‘Six Party Talks in Northeast Asia’ proactively pursued by South Korea and Japan since 1988. Regarding

the initiative of the regional security organization establishment for stability and peace in Northeast Asia, North Korea expressed their position through the Korea Central Broadcasting Agency:

The President of South Korea proclaimed the necessity of regional security organization establishment for stability and development. However, it is their intent because South Korea's puppet regime collaborates with the U.S. and Japan to achieve a tripartite cooperative system, leading to the isolation of North Korea. Independent sentiment of East Asia is stronger than other regions. The people in the region thoroughly reject collective internal interference. The South Korea's authority has initiative for the construction of multilateral security cooperation organization attempts to exploit military political chance space and contain and isolate North Korea.¹⁴⁷

South Korea's Prime Minister Kim Jong Phil proposed the six party talks including China and Russia in addition to four party talks at a lecture invited by the ROTC Central Association in December, 1998. The North Korea Pyongyang Broadcasting Agency criticized that "there is no doubt the external intervention needs to be excluded in Northeast Asia for enduring peace and stability. We all know that Northeast Asia including the Korean Peninsula is one of the highest tension areas due to the great powers' external intervention to exploit resources."¹⁴⁸

Although key players actively discuss Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Cooperative system at the government or the civilian level, multilateral security cooperative regime is yet at the initial stage. The feasibility of multilateral security cooperation in the region is all interfered due to the divergent threat perceptions of key actors, lack of a multilateral security cooperation tradition because of the lack of value identity, immature economic, institutional interdependence, competitive rival of key players in the region, China's reluctance and North Korea's negative position.

¹⁴⁷ *Chosun Central Broadcasting Agency*, October 29, 1998.

¹⁴⁸ *Chosun Central Broadcasting Agency*, January 9, 1999.

However, North Korea seems to have at least tactically changed its perception toward Northeast Asian multilateral security cooperation, although it is unlikely to ever change its strategic perception because of the fundamental nature of the regime. But this does offer a glimmer of hope in that the current conditions within the North and its belief that it can achieve some tactical advantage by altering its stance has led to a change in outlook that can be exploited. North Korea is currently a member of ARF, CSCAP, and NEACD. Although North Korea still retains its negative perception toward various multilateral security cooperation body initiatives, North Korea selectively participated in security organizations within limited capacity.

North Korea became the 23rd member of ARF in July 2000 but has maintained an inactive position. When North Korea had foreign ministers' talks with the Philippines and Australia at the U.N in September 1999, North Korea Foreign Affairs Minister Pack Nam Soon officially requested the entrance into the ARF to the Thai Chair Foreign Minister at 7th ARF in April 2000. Then at the Senior Official Meeting held in Bangkok in May 2000, it discussed and recommended that North Korea should attend at the ARF Foreign Ministers Meeting in July. Eventually, the North Korean Foreign Minister participated in the Foreign Ministers Meeting as the 23rd member of ARF on July 27, 2000. Since entering the ARF as an official member, North Korea has attended the official meetings and has joined other various meetings ranging from ARF CBM Seminar held in Helsinki in October, 2000 to ARF Conventional Weapons Seminar. North Korea ambassador Hur Jong to UN attended the ARF as the acting representative held in Hanoi in 2001. Foreign Minister Pack Nam Soon attended the 9th ARF Foreign Affairs Minister Meeting held in Borneo in 2002.

North Korea's participation enabled ARF to provide a dialogue forum and contributed to consolidating the objectives of ARF establishment by reduction of

tension and confidence building measures. Considering the importance of habit of dialogues, North Korea's participation enabled the state to facilitate the speed for eventually joining the world community and to expand the North-South Korea cooperation on the international stage. North Korea has adjusted themselves to the multilateral security cooperative body by submitting an annual security outlook from 2001.

North Korea also joined CSCAP in 1995 and has continuously participated in the North Pacific working group and CBM working group.

North Korea participated in preliminary meeting of the NEACD as a non-governmental security cooperation mechanism in San Diego, in the U.S. in July, 1993, Although North Korea did not attend the annual meeting, North Korea participated in the NEACD conference in Moscow for the first time in October, 2002.

Since Kim Jong Il took office, North Korea has established various channels with China and Russia and has conducted exchange programs. North Korea has put priority over restoring its relationship with China since Kim Jong Il assumed the chairmanship of the Military Commission in September 1998. The renewed relationship between North Korea and China has worked as a momentum for the North Korea Supreme People's Committee Chairman Kim Young Nam's visit to China in May 1999. Kim Jong Il's two visits to China in May 2000 and January 2001, and China's President Jiang Zemin's state visit on September 3-5, 2001, provided an additional momentum to reduce the uncomfortable relations due to the 1992 China-South Korea normalization. Chinese President Jiang Zemin and the North Korea Military Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il pursued the development of political relations between the two states through a solid bilateral relationship by recommending China-North Korea friendly relation consolidation, and China sent rice, oil, and fertilizer to

North Korea. North Korea was actively involved in North-South Korea Talks and improvement of relations between North Korea, the U.S., and Northern Europe.¹⁴⁹

On the fiftieth anniversary of China's participation in the Korean War, a high ranking military representative delegation including National Defense Minister and additional job title Vice President of Chinese Communist Party Central Military Commission Zea Ho Zen, visited Pyongyang during October 22-26, 2000. The Chinese National Defense Minister delivered his speech on strengthening the friendly cooperative relations described as the traditional friendship in blood, the visit for implementing agreement between the two states leaders, and the perfect agreement at the meetings between North Korea People Army Minister Kim Il Chul and China National Defense Minister Zea Ho Zen regarding various issues.¹⁵⁰ However, North Korea and China are losing their past "relations in blood" because of China's principle of separation of politics and economy, and increasingly visible improved relations between China and South Korea in the areas of politics, military and culture as well as economy.

The North Korea Military Commission's 1st Vice Chairman Cho Myung Rok had office calls with China's President Hu Chintao and Defense Minister Chao Kangchun during his official visit to China on April 21-23, 2003 to discuss North Korea's reemerging nuclear issue. General Cho's visit to China was the first high ranking General since North Korea People's Army Minister Kim Il Chul visited China in June 2000. His visit enabled North Korea and China to restore the uncomfortable relations due to the arrest of Yangbin, the Administration Minister designee of Shinuiju Special Administration Zone. General Cho's visit to Beijing also contributed to strengthening the North Korea's position toward the U.S. by demonstrating the military friendly

¹⁴⁹ Ministry of Unification, "Weekly North Korea Spectrum," No 555 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2001), pp.6-10.

¹⁵⁰ *Yunhap News, 2002 North Korea Year Book* (Seoul: Samhwa Publishing Co., 2001), pp.905-906.

“relations in blood” prior to U.S.-China-North Korea tripartite Talks relating to the North Korea nuclear issue.

In the mean time, Russia-North Korea relations have declined due to the former Soviet Union’s demise and Russia’s increased engagement with South Korea. However, the established alliance relations still remain. North Korea normalized with Russia, the successor of the former Soviet Union on December 27, 1991 and continued to establish its normalization with 13 other states consisting of CIS, including Armenia in February 13, 1992. Diplomatic corps representative from CIS visited Pyongyang in March 1992. North Korea demonstrated their diplomatic activities to maintain military cooperative relations. However, Russia’s Presidential envoy, Vice Foreign Affairs Minister Geory Kunaze visited Pyongyang and consulted with the North Korea Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Suk Joo to discuss the continuity of the automatic involvement prescribed in the 1st Article, the North Korea-Soviet Union Friendly Cooperation and Mutual Support Treaty signed in 1961. Russia officially proclaimed that they will not extend the period of the treaty, and therefore, it was inevitable for North Korea and Russia to reestablish their new relationship in the areas of military alliance.

Russia’s Vice Foreign Minister Karashin visited North Korea on January 22, 1997 and discussed the new treaty with North Korea Vice Foreign Minister Lee In Kyu and two years later, both states temporarily signed a new treaty as described in “spontaneous mutual contact in the event of security threat” instead of “spontaneous military intervention and support” in March 1999. The two states eliminated the alienation due to Russia-South Korea normalization and restored their normal relationship with one another by signing the Russia-North Korea Friendly and

Amicable Neighborhood and Cooperation Treaty on February 9, 2000.¹⁵¹

Russia's President Putin visited North Korea on July 19-20, 2000 for the first time since Russia was established in 1990 and proclaimed "the Joint Communiqué"¹⁵² with Kim Jong Il by expressing his strategic cooperative will to immediately keep in contact with North Korea in the event of threatening security as described in the new treaty. North Korea Kim Jong Il paid a reciprocal visit to Moscow and had summit talks with President Putin in August 2001. It was for the first time in the past 15 years since he visited Russia in October 1986. They adopted a 'Moscow Joint Communiqué' which stated "the two states have objection against the U.S. missile defense system, political, economic, and military cooperation and every effort to connect the Trans-Korea Railroad-Trans-Siberian Railroad." Kim Jong Il visited Vladivostok and had the third summit talk in August 2002. Kim and Putin agreed on the expansion of economic cooperation between two states including the connection between the TKR-TSR, joint development of mineral resources in North Korea and the Far East's electricity support to North Korea. Although the current military cooperation between Russia and North Korea has visibly been reduced, the Russia-North Korea cooperation in comparison with the Soviet Union-North Korea, the bilateral relations was significantly restored from the uncomfortable relations since 1991.¹⁵³ However, Russia-North Korea relations transformed their national interest

¹⁵¹ Ministry of Unification, *Understanding of the 2003 North Korea* (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2003), pp.87-88.

¹⁵² Russia-North Korea Joint Communiqué confirmed New Russia-North Korea Treaty in February 9, 2000, on the basis of bilateral support and cooperation development, immediate contact in the event of mutual aggression and threatening security, support of North-South Korea's independent reunification efforts in accordance with North-South Korea Joint Declaration, respect of UN Charter and Principle, object of internal intervention in the name of power use, threat and humanitarian. Both Presidents abide by ABM treaty, implement START-2, urge signature of START-3, peaceful use of North Korea's missile, object of TMD establishment in Asia-Pacific and internal crime including international terrorism and drug, and support international economy and peace and stability in the region.

¹⁵³ North Korea broadcasted in October 12, 2002 through Chosun Central Broadcasting Agency in the following comment related to the development of Russia-North Korea relations; The two states' leaders consolidated friendship and trust through meeting and negotiation which led us to have a bright future

into number one priority, without restoring an ‘ideological military alliance’ which the former Soviet Union and North Korea had established.

6.6.2. North Korea’s Interests

Although North Korea has traditionally been in a negative position and reluctant of multilateral security cooperation, as we observed, Kim Jong Il has participated in multilateral negotiations including the participation in multilateral security organizations, bilateral dialogues and exchange, three party talks, and six party talks even through only in a limited scope. The reason for North Korea’s participation in multilateral cooperation derived from a more unfavorable condition for North Korea due to the external security environment than the Cold war era.

First, the significant change in the international security environment. Since the post-Cold War era began forced North Korea to seek multilateral security cooperation. China’s reform and open policy due to Deng Shao Ping’s regime in 1978, and the great reform of the socialist world, which was stimulated by the shift of Perestroika and the New Thinking oriented diplomacy of Gorbachev’s regime led to the collapse of Eastern European Socialist states in 1989 and dissolved the Soviet Union in 1991. In the course of this great change over the century, the perception was spread that the causes of the poverty, retrogression and stagnation were derived from Marxism and Leninism. China and the former Soviet Union, which used to be the best patrons of North Korea, produced new regimes. The power shift of China and the former Soviet Union directly and indirectly impacted North Korea. The South Korea’s normalization

in the bilateral relations. North Korea people make more active efforts to further reinforce Russia-North Korea friendly cooperative relations in the name of independence, peace, and amicable ideology, traditional Russia- North Korea amicable relations will be strengthened and developed by bilateral governments and people’s joint efforts in the future.”

with the former Soviet Union and China intensified the international isolation of North Korea, and further, North Korea did not trust Russia and China as their allies any longer and this created a sense of crisis for North Korea.

Second, North Korea perceived that imperialist attack and pressures toward them came from three sources, including political and military pressure, strenuous economic sanction, contemptible ideology, and cultural maneuver. North Korea perceives that U.S. military threat and economic sanction is the primary reason for North Korea to aggravate their difficult situation.

North Korea insisted that “the behaviors isolate North Korea and suffocates us and that its imperialist and reactionary elements attempt to crush our great socialist holy mission in the unprecedented spiteful manner, leading to the main reason the situation of our great nation is becoming increasingly aggravated.”¹⁵⁴

North Korea also insisted that “the U.S. attempt to disrupt and disorder North Korea’s economic life in the manner of reactionary economic sanction, suffocate our economy and eventually destroy our socialist system by creating the people’s complaint and dissatisfaction.” North Korea’s vice chair for Foreign Economic Policy Committee presented his key note speech entitled “Several Issues regarding North Korea Foreign Economic Policy” at a seminar hosted by George Washington University on April 22, 1996. “The inevitable background North Korea has to adopt self-reliant autarky” derived from the deteriorating economic situation due to Japanese imperialism and the Korean War and closed policy due to external elements’ economic sanction, have led to North Korea’s attempts to actively approach capitalist markets and extensively adopt international transaction practice.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴ “1994 New Editorial,” *Kim Il Sung Bibliography 44* (Pyongyang: Chosun Worker Party Publishing Co., 1994), p.291.

¹⁵⁵ Ministry of Unification, *Weekly North Korea Review 277* (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 1996), pp.14-16.

North Korea has made efforts to induce the U.S. to remove North Korea from the list of terrorism support states. North Korea's Foreign Ministry spokesperson officially proposed to the U.S. to discuss the exclusion issue through Pyongyang Broadcasting on January 30, 2000. Terrorism talks between North Korea Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan and the U.S. Terrorism Ambassador Michael Sheehan were respectively held in New York and Pyongyang on March 7-15, 2000 and August 9-10, 2000, and a third meeting was held in New York on September 28-30, 2000. They agreed on a U.S.-North Korea Joint Communiqué.¹⁵⁶ However, the removal of North Korea from the list of terrorism support states was not implemented. North Korea expressed its strong perception regarding the lifting of U.S. economic sanction as a way to shift North Korea's foreign economic policy.

Another inevitable reason for North Korea to partially join security cooperation was the domestic factors to overcome serious economic difficulty. The economic crisis facing North Korea in the 1990's were the result of the intrinsic defect of a socialist planned economy and the demise of socialist states. The internal factors for North Korean economic crisis fundamentally were derived from the decrease of productivity due to the socialist possession mode and the loss of the centrally planned economy's mediating role. The external factors exacerbated North Korean economic difficulty, including severance of foreign relations due to the socialist sphere camp's dissolution, Russia and China's assistance increasingly visible decrease and the U.S.'s economic sanctions.

North Korea's economic difficulty which consisted of food, energy, and foreign currency shortage, were results of the decrease in productivity and economic stagnation. Severe economic difficulty forced North Korea to allow its national supply

¹⁵⁶ International Intelligence Agency, *North Korea Economy Review 2002* (Seoul: Hyuntotalprint, 2002), p.930.

capability to deteriorate, disrupt the national control system and the planned economic system, and paralyzed the national food ration system, as well as the customer product demand system. The North Korea people's geographic mobility increased because of their need to seek food and necessities of life, which eventually reduced the organized political life infrastructure.

Considering the unique situation, North Korea adheres to a North Korean style socialist system, minimizing reforms and open policy despite China's advice as a traditional ally. It is estimated that North Korea participates in multilateral security cooperation to ensure Kim Jong Il's regime security and gradually improve North Korea residents in paying attention to normalization with the U.S. and Japan.

Ironically, North Korea's self-created nuclear issue led North Korea to participate in multilateral negotiations. China's mediator role guided U.S., China and North Korea to have tripartite talks. Other key players including U.S., China, Japan, Russia and South Korea, welcomed North Korea to join the Six Party Talks. Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy and Roh Moo Hyun's Policy for Peace and Prosperity enabled North Korea to easily approach multilateral security cooperation in a limited manner.

6.7. Evaluation

It can be seen therefore that all the key regional states modified their attitude toward multilateral security in the 1990s. The United States has preferred bilateral security treaties to multilateral ones throughout most of its security arrangements with Asian countries, since it wants to remain a constant presence in East Asia with a network of bilateral security treaties designed to prevent the emergence of any security vacuum

or substitute regional hegemony in the region.

The negative attitude of the U.S. toward multilateral security cooperation in East Asia is because of the possible impediment of its traditional bilateral relation and its fears on Russia and China's influence on the region.

However, because of its decreasing economic influence over the region, lack of any vital threat and growing divergence with its alliances, the U.S. interest in a multilateral security cooperation has somewhat increased. There have been several proposals from the United States. These are mostly not the official position of the U.S. government with the exception of the Clinton's proposal for a 'Pacific Community.'

Thus the important point is that the U.S. has begun to express increasing interest in multilateral security cooperation in East Asia. There are several U.S. interests in forging multilateral security cooperation. First, it would be a useful strategy for the U.S. in that this strategy could provide the U.S. with strong supports in world and regional affairs from regional countries.

Second, the U.S. government could meet rising voices in domestic politics calling for more burden-sharing with Asian allies and a reduction of the American defense budget. Third, multilateral security cooperation could be used as a tool to supplement the U.S. 'double containment' policy; contain China and Japan at the same time toward Northeast Asia, which has been one of the main objectives of its strategy since World War II.

Fourth, multilateral security cooperation could promote the U.S. engagement, not containment policy toward China. Fifth, it has been U.S. policy to oppose efforts at domination of the region by a power or group of powers hostile to the United States, so it could be a legitimate substitute. Finally, multilateral security cooperation can provide the United States with a venue where they can deal with one of the major

threats, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Table 6-1 Key Actors' Position toward a Northeast Asia Security Regime

Key Actors	Perception	Interests
The U.S.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Prefer bilateral alliance - The Need to resolve regional issues including North Korea Nuclear in multilateral Framework 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A useful strategy toward regional issues - A tool for engagement policy
China	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A platform for China-Bashing - Reduce Regional Suspicion over China's hegemony 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Contribute to sustainable China's economic growth - A forum for enhancing China's defense strategy
Japan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Negative position regarding U.S.-Japan alliance - The need to enhance their security role in the region 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Contain China's emergence as a military superpower - Contribute to non-proliferation of WMD
Russia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The strongest advocate - Create Favorable environment for the Russia economy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Help Russia to reduce defense expenditure - Be interested in being free from Japanese threat
South Korea	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Utilize geo-strategic importance to reduce tension on the Peninsula - Prevent the emergence of regional hegemony 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Induce North Korea to become a regional responsible member - Contribute to the unification of Korea
North Korea	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Force to seek security cooperation - Prevent isolation from North Korea by collective pressures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Contribute to resolving economic hardship - Help North Korea maintain regime

While Bush believes that the U.S. can use its power to shape world politics at will, he has overestimated what the unilateral exercise of its power can achieve. America may be the only superpower, but it is not omnipotent. To achieve most of its security goals, it still requires the cooperation of others.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁷ Ivo H. Daalder and James M Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), pp.188-89.

China has been inherently suspicious of multilateral security cooperation arrangements as a result of its historical experience with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, China worries that a multilateral security forum could become a platform for China-Bashing and it is concerned that the U.S. or Japan could seek to set the agenda of a multilateral security arrangement and to dominate the other states in the region. A preference for bilateral settlements to its security issues, such as the Spratly Islands dispute, over multilateral negotiations has been another reason limiting Chinese enthusiasm for multilateral structures. In the post-Cold War era, however, China has shown a somewhat different attitude toward such arrangements. This is because first, the security relationship between China and Russia is getting closer than before. Second, in 1997, China and Russia ended centuries of border disputes by signing an historic accord mapping out the frontier between the two giants for the first time. Finally, China has attempted to ease widespread regional suspicion over her territorial ambitions. Even though it does not completely reject multilateral approaches to security, however, Beijing is the least enthusiastic country toward building multilateral security arrangements in Northeast Asia.

Nevertheless, there are several important advantages to its passive support for a security regime in Northeast Asia. First, China's foremost security objective for the coming decade will be to create an international environment conducive to the successful implementation of China's economic reform. Second, multilateral security cooperation will bring advantages to China's security interest serving to constrain Japan's military role in the region. Finally, multilateral security cooperation could also be a forum for enhancing understanding of China's defense strategy and easing the suspicions of other states toward China. Thus China seems to view increasingly multilateral security arrangements in East Asia as inevitable and to have concluded

that non-participation in the process could be more risky for China's national interest than selective involvement. However, China is likely to continue to maintain a cautious stance toward multilateral security arrangements and wait for other countries to take the initiative while emphasizing that most security problems in the region are not amenable to multilateral solutions.

Before 1990, Japan was in a negative position in establishing multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, because it feared that multilateral security cooperation might endanger the U.S.-Japan alliance system and it might freeze the northern territory disputes with Russia permanently. However, due to the demise of the major Japanese military threat, the Soviet Union, the possible downsizing of American troops in Asia and the growing economic conflicts with the United States, Japan has changed her position. Furthermore, there are positive signs that the territorial problem between Japan and Russia can be solved in a peaceful way. Since 1992, Japan has become one of the strongest advocates of building a security regime in Northeast Asia.

The changed Japanese position can be explained due to the following interests in a cooperative security regime in Northeast Asia. First, Japan was concerned with China's possible emergence as a military superpower in the near future. On the whole, the balancing game is difficult for Japan, because Japan does not have the power to contain China alone and must therefore rely on the U.S. power. Thus Japan has an enthusiasm for using Asia's burgeoning multilateral institutions as a way to indirectly influence Chinese behavior. Second, many of Japan's neighbors remain uncomfortable about expanding Japan's security role in Asia. A multilateral cooperation regime could offer a particularly effective means for Japan to become

more activity involved in regional security matters in a manner that is non-threatening to neighboring countries. Last, preventing the development of nuclear weapons in North Korea and eliminating the danger of nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia is one of the highest Japanese security interests.

When it comes to a multilateral or multinational security cooperation, regardless of region, Russia is the strongest advocate. It has continuously proposed various types of security arrangements in Northeast Asia. Compared with other regional countries, Russia has more clearly expressed its interests in pursuing multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia. First, multilateral security cooperation could promote a favorable international environment for the Russian economy. Second, it would create a regional environment in which reform-minded Russian leaders are politically more able to reduce military expenditure, defend their actions before critics at home and embrace the idea of regional security. Third, the multilateral approach is also a means of bringing pressure upon China over nuclear force reductions, illustrating Russian concern over China's nuclear arsenal. Fourth, some of Russia's most insightful foreign-policy specialists worry that a weak Russia estranged from Japan, uninvolved in regional security structures, and focused on the short-term gains from arms sales to China could be vulnerable as China becomes increasingly powerful and nationalistic. Finally, Russia is interested in being freed from Japanese threat. A self-assertive and nationalistic Japan, if it drifts from the security alliance with the United States toward a more independent military posture, represents another source of insecurity for Russia.

South Korea has made strenuous policy efforts to establish Northeast Asia a

multilateral security cooperation architecture ever since the late Cold War era. South Korea has pursued bilateral security cooperation with five key players and mini-lateral security cooperation policy including a U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation system and a China-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperative grouping. South Korea partially succeeded in receiving favorable responses from the key players related to its active efforts in the region. The facilitating factors for South Korea's efforts to establish a Northeast Asia multilateral security cooperation system are previous South Korea governments' consistent multilateralism policy, a balanced diplomacy between U.S. and China, South Korea's independent sense toward national security from heavy dependence on the U.S. It is inevitable for South Korea to require neighbor states' cooperation in establishing a peace structure on the Korean Peninsula. The importance of the geoeconomic, political and strategic location, which South Korea retains, contributes to facilitating the establishment of a Northeast Asia multilateral security cooperation system.

Although North Korea used to be reluctant about participating in regional multilateral security cooperation, there are several facilitating factors from the domestic and foreign perspectives. The demise of the former Soviet Union and the dissolution of Eastern European socialist states resulted in the collapse of the Cold War system, in which North Korea lost their reliable allies. Especially, the South Korea's normalization with Russia and China forced North Korea to isolate themselves from the diplomatic community. Unfortunately, North Korea is under serious pressure from U.S. economic sanction and military threat due to the North Korean nuclear issue. Domestically, severe economic crisis, which could almost lead North Korea to collapse, induce its ideological hazard and social deviation. The

domestic pressures forced North Korea to shift their focus toward the external world.

To summarize, while South Korea, Japan and Russia eagerly support a multilateral security regime in Northeast Asia, the United States, China and North Korea have shown less enthusiasm over the idea. However, the United States and China have seriously recognized the inevitability of multilateral security cooperation from their experiences with terrorism and the North Korean nuclear issue. More dynamic multilateral security cooperation activities are required to actually form a security regime. In the mid-to the long terms, a Northeast Asia cooperative security mechanism may take shape with multi-levels including at the regional level and bilateral level, and with multiple-forms including official and unofficial, and multi-functions coexisting.

Chapter 7. Building A Military Security Cooperation Regime in Northeast Asia

We identified through the analysis in the previous chapters that there is a broad consensus among key actors in Northeast Asia that a multilateral security cooperation arrangement needs to be institutionalized. It was assessed that it is feasible to create a new security order relating to reconciliation, peace, stability and co-prosperity in the region.

Based on the assessment of the feasibility study, this chapter proposes three approaches to build a regional military security cooperation regime. First, opinion leaders need to make every effort to gain domestic consensus. The epistemic community consisting of policy makers, lawmakers, and scholars with security expertise needs to be networked to achieve regional affinity. Second, the military security cooperation regime needs to be established through the gradual expansion of defense and security dialogue, military exchanges, multilateral exercises, prevention of dangerous military activities, and institutionalization including establishment of a secretariat and multinational forces (MNF) HQs. Third, a rotational leadership process must be established among the member states. This chapter examines those areas.

The table 7-1 outlines the steps that will provide a roadmap leading to the achievement of a cooperative security regime. The roadmap could be considered by policymakers, lawmakers, and scholars with security expertise for further debate on the strategy of regional security cooperation architecture. The roadmap would be a stepping stone toward a Northeast Asia Military Security Cooperation Regime to ensure a more secure, stable, and enduring peace in the region

Table 7-1 A Proposed Roadmap for Northeast Asia Military Security Cooperation Regime

Classification	1st Phase (-2004)	2nd Phase (2005-08)	3rd Phase (2009-12)	4th Phase (2013-2015)
Domestic Consensus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Reshaping Opinion Leaders' perception on Cooperative Security □ Identify Favorable Groups and opposition Groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Symposium/Panel Discussion in media □ Revise Curriculum for Security Cooperation □ Increase Budget on Security Cooperation □ Reorganize international Cooperation Office 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Public Diplomacy □ Symposium □ Panel Discussion in media □ Increase Budget on Security Cooperation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Continuous Strategic and Security Awareness Education Program
Multi-tier networking	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Japan-South Korea Lawmakers-Scholar Solidarity(2004) □ Intra-NDU Workshop: China-Japan-South Korea(Seoul 2004) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Policymaker-Lawmakers Scholars Epistemic Community □ Foreign Minister Talks □ NDU Workshop: US-China-Japan-South Korea □ Multidisciplinary NGO □ Regional Security Policy Conference 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Foreign Affairs+Defense Minister □ Intra-NDU Workshop: US-China-Japan-Russia-South Korea 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Regional Summit Talks □ Policymakers-Lawmakers-Scholars Epistemic Community Network
Military Exchange & Cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Security/Military Dialogue □ U.S.-Japan-South Korea Strategic Talks □ Port Call: China-South Korea(03) □ Student Officer Exchange Programs: U.S.-Japan-South Korea □ Military Transportation Aircraft Visit: Japan-South Korea(02), China-South Korea(03) □ SAREX: Japan-Russia-South Korea(03) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ General Officer Talks □ Sister unit Affiliate □ Student Officer Exchange Program □ Regional Cadet Workshop □ Battlefield Terrain Walk □ Multilateral Planning Augmentation Team □ Regional SAREX 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Regional Chief of Defense Conference □ Multilateral Port Call □ Multilateral Planning Augmentation Team □ Regional Simulation Center □ Regional Military Diplomacy Center 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Annual Chief of Defense Conference □ Regional Defense University
Prevention of Military Dangerous Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Russia-South Korea Prevention of Military Dangerous Activities(03) □ Hot-line: Two Koreas(03), Japan-South Korea(90) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Military Committee for the implementation of the Treaty □ North-South Korea CBMs □ China-South Korea Hot-Line, U.S-China Hotline(05) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ China-Japan Hot-Line □ China-North-South Korea Hot-line 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Regional Multilateral Hot-Line □ Crisis Action Team
Institutionalization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ NEACD □ 6 Party Talks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Political Council Secretariat, Military Council □ Counter-Terrorism Training Center □ PKO Center 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Regional Response Forces □ Regional Crisis Action Center 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Regional Multinational Forces HQs
Lead nation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ ASEAN+3(China-Japan-South Korea) Summit Talks(04) □ U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Working Group Conference(04) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ U.S-South Korea Colleadership □ U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral □ Successful Six Party Talks Model if necessary, Five Party Talks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ U.S-South Korea □ U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral+China+Russia □ Induce North Korea to Join Multilateral Talks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ U.S-South Korea □ U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral+China+Russia+North Korea □ Successful Six Party Talks Model

The remainder of this chapter will discuss these steps in detail. It should be understood that this will be a long term process and although a timeline is provided this should be considered only as a guide.

7.1. How to Shape Favorable Cooperative Security Environment

7.1. 1. Domestic Consensus

Epistemic Community

The epistemic community members share the following in common: inter-subjective understanding; a shared way of knowledge; shared patterns of reasoning; policy projects drawing on shared values, shared causal beliefs, and they use shared discursive practices. Most importantly, they have a shared commitment to the application and production of knowledge.

The epistemic community needs to educate the public that security cooperation is a more secure, enduring and safer national security strategy than an arms race and unilateral policy. Policy practitioners need to be aware that non-traditional issues increasingly threaten national security rather than traditional-threats.

The current state of major actors' professional military education will have to be re-examined in light of the cooperative security developments in the region. Currently, there is a strong push to produce strategic leaders with critical thinking skills. The role of advanced academic degrees will increase in terms of an officer's progress through the ranks. This is all to the good for a military that will operate in a highly complex environment. Curriculum stresses doctrine and planning, and operational procedures. The portion of an officer's education devoted to strategic studies has all but withered until they reach the rank of Colonel, by which time it is almost too late. Military leaders will be attempting to cope with highly unpredictable circumstances in their operational career.

To be able to achieve some sort of workable regional military security cooperation regime and policy coordination, the policymakers of all member states must first make every effort to learn about other members. Being aware of each country's national interests, studying their culture and language, learning their historical perspectives, and pursuing true economic and security cooperation are all necessary

for it to become a habit for the policymakers of all member states to be able to truly think multilaterally.

Public diplomacy will not be effective unless the style and substance of foreign policies are consistent with a broader security community.¹ Having discussed the world's challenges, what do we really want our world to be? If world peace and prosperity are to be achieved for every one, efforts that must be made include: (1) preventing the recurrence of war and conflict; (2) resolving inter-state rivalries through peaceful resolutions; (3) restructuring the UN so as to be more democratic and designed to protect every member nation; and (4) removing terrorist threats at their roots.

The "end state" vision can be achieved through mobilizing public opinion against war. This is achievable if strategic and security studies are given their importance and educating the public is given top priority.

Strategic and Security Awareness

Presently, as practiced in the past, there are several approaches already taken to inculcate strategic and security awareness. To name a few, these approaches include: (1) states including those less-developed continue to establish more research organizations; (2) conduct continuous research on strategic and security studies issues with its findings distributed freely for public consumption; (3) enhance interactions among states and cultures; and (4) strengthen national capacity to promote peaceful resolution to international conflicts.

In addition to the present approaches in enhancing the strategic and security studies, it is proposed that additional approaches be considered. These include: (1) organize

¹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Decline of America's Soft Power," *Foreign Affairs*, (May/June 2004), Volume 83, Number 3, pp.17-19.

more public seminars, not only for practitioners but for all levels of the general public; (2) create more opportunities to study in as many institutions of higher learning as possible, i.e. in both military and non-military higher learning; (3) encourage writing competitions on issues related to strategic and security studies with winning articles published and authors provided with handsome recognition, including financial rewards; (4) government and private institutions encouraged to create new job opportunities and allocate extra funds to sponsor strategic and security studies.

Further, the proposals to get more people involved and convinced that war is not the only option, it is also proposed that the focus of the field of inquiry be extended to include studies on how to prevent state actors from using the military capability to achieve their security goals.

7.1.2. Multi-tier Network to Establish Regional Affinity

As a start, a prototypical epistemic community, a transnational group of security experts cutting across government and academic lines, able and willing to explore and promote confidence building ideas within at least the majority of states needs to be established. The group has to have reasonable access to at least some influential, senior government policy makers.

Such a mechanism needs to be transparent among the member states and allow for the free flow of information in order to establish a foundation of trust. Through continuous information exchange and dialogue member states will understand each others' domestic as well as international political concerns and can work together to find win-win solutions to issues. Most important, in times of crisis the previously established transparency and routine communication at all levels of government can

serve as the basis for diffusing confrontation and potential conflict. A model for such an arrangement exists in the business community particularly in the high tech world where the sharing of proprietary information is critical to the mutual benefit of companies within such a network.

Member states need to revamp their public diplomacy in the region, in order to redress the serious militant nationalism and foster public support for the security cooperation arrangements. In particular, the U.S., China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and North Korea should encourage more interaction between member states' counterpart government officials, members of legislature,² the private sector, the media, and civil society groups. This should be done in an inclusive manner, with an emphasis on young and emerging leaders including cadets, and junior officers exchange programs.

Table 7-2 Diffusion Rate of the Internet

No. of Internet			
Users			
The U.S	China	Japan	South Korea
166,000,000(60.6%)	51,300,000(3.9%)	56,600,000(43.7%)	30,000,000(63.1%)

Source: iNEWS24(02.04.24), //ch-53.com/inro01.htm

The amazing network via Internet in the region as shown on Table 7-2 enables the epistemic community to facilitate the information flow and establish a security community.

² The intra- legislative agencies in the region include the U.S. Congress, China's National People's Congress, Japan's Diet, Russia's Duma, South Korea's National Assembly, and North Korea's Supreme People's Congress, in which their subcommittees relating to security or foreign areas could establish a regional legislative network.

Track-I

Bilateral dialogues in the region are dynamic. The U.S. has maintained annual security and military talks with key actors in Northeast Asia: staff talks with China and Russia; two+two talks (foreign and defense ministers) with Japan³; Security Consultative Meeting (defense ministers) and Military Committee Meeting (chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff) with South Korea. China has defense minister talks with Russia. Japan has pol-mil and military staff talks with Russia and South Korea. Russia has military staff talks with South Korea. The Peace Solidarity of East Asia which consists of 90 Japan Diet members and South Korea National Assemblymen and various experts was established in December 2004.

An example of a minilateral dialogue among foreign policy makers includes the U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Coordinating Oversight Group (TCOG) that was established in 1999 as a result of the Perry Process to coordinate with policy toward North Korea. Another example is the defense policy maker led Trilateral Meetings that were activated in 1994 due to the North Korea nuclear issue.⁴

Based on the visible emergence of multilateral dialogue among policy makers and scholars, regional security and military dialogue needs to be expanded and leveled up in a gradual manner. The level of policy maker meetings in the region needs to be enhanced from foreign and defense ministerial meetings to summits at the chief executive level. Member states in Northeast Asia should hold an annual summit as in NATO. This would allow for a more substantive exchange of ideas and positions, as

³ Efforts should be made to build on the “2 plus 2” dialogues that currently exist between the U.S. and Japan. These are gatherings at fixed times of foreign policy and defense agency officials from each nation to exchange opinions on foreign policy and securities issues. Including other nations officials from the appropriate ministries for “2 plus 2” discussions would represent a big step forward. Because it is predicted that cabinet-level participation would be difficult, the process could be launched with only mid-level officials. To start, perhaps these discussions could begin on the policy planning staff level.

⁴ Lee Suk Soo, Lee Soong Hee, and Chung Kyung Yung, KNDU Policy Paper entitled “Northeast Asia Defense Dialogue,” March 2004, p.20.

well as to demonstrate to the region that regional cooperation and solidarity is possible. Likewise, the U.S. should support further integration within Northeast Asia.

Track-II

Further track-two dialogue will be essential to push the ambitious cooperative effort forward. Initial steps in this direction by nongovernmental actors should be taken in accordance with the following guidelines: agree on specific transnational issues as areas for further dialogue and cooperation. These could include not only the issues of terrorism and proliferation but also others, such as maritime security and energy security. They could develop recommendations for actionable policies aimed at building strategic trust among member states that also leverage the operational impact of joint actions; and identify the organizations and agencies within each government that are responsible for the various potential cooperative efforts.⁵

Differences between member states political systems may limit how closely counterparts can cooperate, or at the very least, how quickly cooperation and trust can develop. In light of these domestic structural constraints, expectations should be modest, at least initially. Another group of challenges centers on the activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs can play constructive roles in addressing many of the challenges associated with nontraditional, transnational threats, especially, humanitarian disasters, public health crises, and environment degradation. Some governments in the region perceive NGOs as disrupting society and creating associations that are outside state oversight, thereby diminishing the government's power and potentially feeding political dissents.

⁵ Banning Garret and Jonathan Adams, "U.S.-China Cooperation on the Problem of Failing States and Transnational Threats," *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report 126, September 2004, p.8-9.

Policy differences constitute still another major challenge. Even if member states have the political will to cooperate, there can be difficulties in developing common policies toward transnational threats. Because policy differences can impede effective multilateral cooperation, unofficial dialogues on these issues are all the more critical in minimizing misunderstandings and differences and maximizing the prospects for coordinated policy and actions.⁶

A joint research and dialogue project on the U.S.-China-Japan trilateral relationship was conceived by several individuals in the three states who believed that promoting analysis and dialogue among them would be critical and essential in managing the trilateral relationship. The Japan Center for International Exchange, in collaboration with the Institute of American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Chinese Reform Forum on the Chinese side and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on the U.S. side, launched a trilateral joint project in December 1996 with policy thinkers from the three countries.⁷

In the eighth dialogue in a series, the Pacific Forum joined with the Tokyo-based Research Institute of Peace and Security and the Beijing-based China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations in August 2004 to bring together more than 30 analysts from the three countries to exchange views on a range of contemporary issues.⁸

The U.S., Japan and Russia have sequentially held a trilateral security forum co-hosted by SAIS/NDU from the U.S., Institute of International Affairs Studies from Japan and IMEMO from Russia, respectively.

In that context, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) brings together

⁶ Banning Garret and Jonathan Adams, *ibid.*, p.8.

⁷ Morton, I. Abramowitz, Funabashi Yoichi, and Wang Jisi, *China-Japan-U.S.* (Tokyo and New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998), p.7.

⁸ PacNet 54A, December 30, 2004 - 2004 Publications List

current and future military and civilian leaders to discuss regional security concerns. The Center provides a unique platform to discuss security issues while promoting regional cooperation. Each country must contribute to regional security to assure its continued political, economic, and social stability. Through executive courses and conferences, the APCSS gives Asia-Pacific leaders a regional forum to recognize security challenges from the regional perspective.⁹

To best exploit the current window of opportunity, cooperation in the region should proceed in a pragmatic manner. Specifically, member states should take the following steps:

- (1) Increase information sharing and dialogue on transnational issues: identify issues and areas amenable to effective multilateral cooperation, including opportunities for engaging in both preventive and remedial measures to deal with transnational threats; specific measures to counter nontraditional and transnational threats, including piracy, drug trafficking, the spread of infectious diseases, and environment degradation; mechanism to cooperate on peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations to strengthen international order, including PKO cooperation among member states; and develop an agenda of concrete steps to build strategic trust and to optimize operational capabilities for joint actions.
- (2) Improve cooperation and capacity building for joint action and interoperability: establish mechanisms to coordinate measures to respond to transnational threats; identify the organizations and agencies within each government that are responsible for the various potential cooperative efforts and establish lines of communication between counterpart organizations; educate the public of member states about the nature of the threats emanating from transnational threats and the need for multilateral cooperation to meet these challenges; and demonstrate sensitivity to national and regional concerns about cooperation between a strong U.S. and a rising China through dialogue and consultation with regional states about the scope and intentions of bilateral cooperation on transnational threats.¹⁰

⁹ <http://www.apcss.org/> 12-29-2004

¹⁰ James Macintosh, *Confidence Building in the Arms Control* (Canada: Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data, 1966)

Agenda

The member states will need to agree on the scope and focus of cooperation. They need to focus less on providing financial assistance and more on sharing information and training to help member states understand each others' governance challenges and infrastructure development needs. Enhanced multilateral dialogue would be an especially important tool for identifying potential crises and for exploring the resources available to foster stability. Remedial measures would include both near-term crisis steps and long-term reconstruction responses. Three major approaches are considered for immediate responses when a state attempts to proliferate transnational threats: first, containment strategies that focus on fencing-in problems to keep instability from spreading; second, deal brokering, which often involves separating warring parties as a first step toward a peaceful settlement; and finally, military operations that focus on compelling one or more parties into a cease-fire and negotiations.

The emergence of a new generation of more flexible and sophisticated mid-level policy makers in key ministries and agencies willing to embrace new, more cooperative security ideas and with adequate influence to advance these ideas would be encouraged. The central element in the transformation view is the importance of discussion, interaction, and that the development of shared security conceptions mature when conditions are appropriate – not solely through the adoption of standard CBM packages.¹¹ Strategic talks need to include “an assessment of the regional security environment, and areas such as force structure and force posture, security strategies, member states' role and missions during contingencies and cooperation in

¹¹ James Macintosh, *Confidence Building in the Arms Control* (Canada: Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data, 1966), pp.38-9

peacetime.¹²

Network of Professionals

A network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area must be developed. This is possible because “they have (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of validity – that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighting and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise – that is, a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as consequence.”¹³

The epistemic communities approach is a particularly powerful and useful way of looking at how ideas can transform the way policy makers conceptualize the world and influence what courses of action they select as being in their best interest, both on the national and international level. The approach helps us to understand about collective interpretive processes and the role played in them by networks of professionals with recognized policy-relevant knowledge.¹⁴

¹² Ted Osius, *The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance* (Westport: Praeger, 2002), p.81.

¹³ Peter M. Hass, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” *International Organization* Vol. 46, No.1 (Winter 1992), p.3.

¹⁴ James Macintosh, *Confidence Building in the Arms Control*, op.cit., p.41

A security military cooperation regime will be the most consequential product of a successful confidence building process. This is how the cooperative practices and underlying ideas associated with a successful confidence building process can help to restructure a portion of international life and alter ideas about how to think and act with respect to that set of security relationships.

These issues require consistent attention at a very senior level, preferably by a single person with broad responsibilities. Implementing the policy building support within the administration, winning legislative backing, and coordinating with key actors will all be indispensable to forming the regime in the region.

7.2. Military Security Cooperation Regime Proposal

7.2.1. Framework of Northeast Asia Military Security Cooperation Regime

The various elements of historical conflicts in the region need to be dissolved and mutual understanding must be enhanced. Through Confidence Building Measures, obstacles can be overcome and peace and stability gradually achieved. As a means to achieve the purpose, the goal should be to foster mutual respect, reconciliation and cooperation. This will allow member states to transform current bilateral and mini-lateral military cooperation into multilateral cooperation. The vision can be described as Northeast Asia employing a multilateral council as a means to resolve transnational threats.

If the regional summit meeting reaches an agreement to establish regional security architecture, which will counter against transnational threats, two sub elements

including political and military council should be institutionalized. In the event of large scale transnational threat in Northeast Asia, the political council should decide whether employing regional multinational forces to take appropriate actions against the threat. Then each member state takes follow-on action to implement the decision. It is required that each state domestically take lawmaker agency's confirmation process whether to deploy their designated regional response forces. Once, final decision by each government regarding the deployment, the military committee should implement that decision to conduct military operations against the threat. The military specific actions will include CJTF, command structures, operational concept, sustainability support and actual deployment.

The researcher's concept for implementing a Northeast Asia Military Security Cooperation Regime (NEASCR) is as follows: categorize possible military cooperation within NEAMSCR into three areas: council meetings, combined exercises, and other military confidence measures. In broader terms, all of the three categories have its own distinct characteristics. Council meeting means military dialogues among flag officers, which can be considered as the directing body of NEAMSCR. Combined exercise is another area that promotes military cooperation by working together with action. Of the three, council is the decision body to plan, monitor implementation, review, and apply lessons learned from the U.S., Japan, and Korea to other key players in the region. The council will deal with easy issues at first, then proceed to more difficult, challenging issues. Combined exercises will focus on non-war-fighting exercises, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, search and rescue exercise (SAREX), non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), counter-piracy and so on. Other military confidence building measures include seminars, hot-

line system, and information sharing, etc.

There are some principles for the implementation of NEAMSCR. First of all, NEAMSCR is an initiative to supplement, not replace, current bilateral alliances. That is, the China-North Korea alliance as well as the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S.-South Korea should be maintained along with NEAMSCR. NEAMSCR is neither a collective security nor a collective defense. NEAMSCR denies any concept related to collective security like NATO against certain countries or specific block. NEAMSCR will build military confidence and mitigate causes of potential conflicts, such as historical animosity, militant nationalism, and arms races. Therefore, combined exercises will be conducted under the scenarios of non-warfighting. Participants will be limited to regional states in Northeast Asia. North Korea's participation can be considered with the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. Last, NEAMSCR should pursue common interests. As NEAMSCR is based on multilateral cooperation, it will not involve any bilateral issues between states. How the NEAMSCR council should be organized and implemented will be discussed in subsequent sections.

A list of proposed multilateral exercises is search and rescue, counter-terrorism exercise, and regional multilateral planning augmentation training that focus on non-fighting exercises. The actual exercises will be determined by the Council. The concept is to begin with trilateral exercises such as SAREX, humanitarian assistance, salvage, disaster relief, etc., before progressing to the more complex and politically sensitive exercises that may require the use of lethal force counter-piracy/narcotic/terrorism, etc. When NEAMSCR is expanded to include additional states, the intent would be return to the simpler exercises in the multilateral forum before attempting the more challenging exercises.

In summary, there needs to be some consensus building among key players in the region to promote mutual understanding through regular dialogues and to move forward to enhance Northeast Asia Military Security Cooperation. Therefore it is possible that if member states work on this together based on their mutual understanding, then they can build the foundation for peace and prosperity in the region.

7.2.2. Security and Defense Dialogue

The primary purpose of military dialogue and council has been a mutual desire to avoid accidental or advertent clashes, improve mutual military confidence, and prevent or correct dangerous misconceptions, misunderstanding, misinterpretation, and miscalculation relating the security issues. When soldiers have been involved in major talks with their counterparts in the region, they have usually played a supporting role to civilians, and, until recently, the overall effect of military negotiations has been relatively modest. These limited and carefully conceived military relations reflect a traditional resistance on both sides to letting the uniformed elite play a direct role in the formulation and execution of diplomacy with other states and in the decision to use force. This is a basic tenet of democratic government.¹⁵

This principle has been publicly and profoundly demonstrated on many occasions in the post-war era, perhaps most memorably when President Truman relieved General MacArthur of his command in Korea. All in all, however, the military has been an exemplar of institutional commitment, not only to the separation of military and civilian power but also to its own subordination to civilian authority.

The difficulty of establishing confidence between potentially hostile armies is an

¹⁵ See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957)

ancient problem. However, a sobering reminder for current military leaders attempting to build trust and remove stereotypes is that the Persian expedition ended in war in spite of mutual assurances, timely communication, and attempts to convey and build confidence. The ultimate responsibility of the armed forces is not to communicate during a crisis or to reassure potential armed forces and a potential adversary but, rather, to be prepared to fight. This places inherent limits on the effects and extent of military-to-military dialogue and exchanges. There are clear bureaucratic lines and jurisdictions that would be difficult for the military to cross in the realm of direct counterpart dialogue. Defining an agreeable framework for the future of the military contacts program¹⁶ will almost certainly involve considerable bureaucratic friction.

From the bureaucratic standpoint, the process is benefited by open and wide discussion of possible programs for military exchanges, but it better served by a centralized process of review and implementation of the overall contacts program. In the United States and South Korea, the office of the chairman of the JCS and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in close consultation with, and using clear guidelines from, the departments of State or ministries of foreign affairs and defense, should be responsible for the formulation and execution of military dialogue and exchanges.

7.2.3. Military Exchange

Originally described as simple forms of communication, these proposals, arranged in

¹⁶ “Military contact programs” refer to increased visits by high ranking defense/military officials; “Exchange among Defense Staff Colleges and training” is intended as an exchange between faculty and students at various national defense colleges, to include participation in one another’s training program. See Ralph A Cossa, “Asia-Pacific Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security,” in Michael Krepon, Michael Newbill, Khushid Khoja, and Jenny S. Drezin, eds., *Global Confidence Building* (London: Macmillan Press LTD, 2000), p.39.

order of increasing comprehensiveness and complexity, are as follows:

- (1) Identification of military and civilian research organizations, individuals, and journals which wish to cooperate.
- (2) Exchange of correspondence and conduct of liaison visits between potential cooperating organization.
- (3) Formation of a standing committee made up of the heads or representatives of cooperating organizations and designated points of contact.
- (4) Development of a list of subjects suitable for joint research, discussion, and publication and initiation of joint research and publication projects.
- (5) Exchange of editorial board members of appropriate participating military journals.
- (6) Investigation and development of publishing conduits for the research work (articles and books, joint or individual) of cooperating organizations.
- (7) Organization of a series of annual conferences or symposia to focus the cooperative efforts.
- (8) Development of a list of researchers and establishment of a fellowship program for research exchanges between cooperating organizations on a reciprocal basis for a negotiated period (3-12 months) in pursuit of specific research aims agreed upon by cooperating organizations.
- (9) Organization of a "speakers exchange" program of candidates drawn from participating organizations for the benefit of these or other organizations.¹⁷

As a measure of the commitment and to underscore the importance of the cooperative program, we need to recommend that a timetable be established as a guide for its implementation.

It is noteworthy that South Korea National Defense University signed an exchange, cooperation agreement with its counterpart institutions including the U.S. NDU and Chinese PLA NDU in 2004.¹⁸ In particular, in terms of enhancing exchange and

¹⁷ Department of Defense, *Security Cooperation Guidance*, 2003.

¹⁸ South Korea NDU signed the exchange and cooperation agreement with its counterpart including the U.S. NDU in October 2004 and China PLA NDU in April 2004 respectively. They agreed on the following activities such as academic exchange, professor and researcher exchange program, and student officer exchange programs. Two professors from KNDU joined professor exchange program to deliver two-week lecture at China NDU in September, 2004. A U.S. student officer joined exchange

cooperation among regional NDU's security experts and policy makers, South Korea NDU hosted the entitled "New Alliance Strategy of the U.S. and Its Implications" international security workshop, in Seoul in December 2004.¹⁹

Military Exchange and Cooperation in the Region

Military exchange and cooperation program contribute to enhancing mutual understanding, solidarity, which helps military officers prevent military conflict. The following programs can be considered: publications of defense white papers, counterpart visitation programs, port calls, military education exchange programs, and sister unit affinities,

The U.S. has published its official security related official documents including *National Security Strategy*, *Military Strategy*, *Quardrennial*, *Annual Report to Congress*. Japan has published its Defense of Japan white paper annually for over two decades, South Korea began publishing an annual Defense White Paper in 1988. China lags far behind other Northeast Asia countries in accepting military transparency. Beijing published its first Defense White Paper²⁰ in July 1998, proposing a two-part strategy based on international security cooperation via the UN Security Council and on promoting mutual understanding through military exchanges. China has rapidly expanded its military exchange programs with countries around the world as a means of providing some transparency and as a means of gaining a first-hand understanding of foreign military doctrine and strategy.²¹

program at South Korea NDU in 2005.

¹⁹ Policy makers from South Korea Ministry National Defense, JCS, and ROK-U.S. Combined forces Command, defense attaché corps to include British, German, France defense attaché in Seoul joined the workshop. They discussed desirable arrangements for the regional security cooperation.

²⁰ China published their Defense White Paper in December, 2004 for the five times. China will reduce 200,000 PLA forces in 2005, their forces will be 2,300,000. *Joongang Ilbo*, December 28, 2004.

²¹ Kenneth W. Allen, "China's Approach to Confidence-Building Measures," in Michael Krepon, Michael Newbill, Khushid Khoja, Jenny S. Drezin, eds., *Global Confidence Building* (London:

Military education exchange programs expose future leaders to counterpart nation values and commitment to the role of a professional military in a military-security cooperation regime, and it promotes military professionalism. Having a core group of well-trained, professional leaders with first hand knowledge of military culture and institutions will make a difference in achieving security goals in the region.

Table 7-3 South Korea Military Education Exchange Program with Neighboring Countries

Unit: Student Officers Number, (): the current student officers number as of April 1, 2004

The U.S.	China	Japan	Russia	North Korea
3,058(110)	17(3)	127(15)	61(7)	-
89	0	29	0	-

Source: South Korea's Ministry of National Defense

South Korea also has made strides in improving further cooperative military relationship with its neighboring states including U.S., China, Japan, and Russia. Particularly, South Korean officers who have taken oversea education have played crucial roles in strengthening their relations with friendly nations.

Sisterhood Affinity Program

Establishing sisterhood relationships among member states' militaries is one of the best confidence building measures. This includes training observation exchange teams. U.S. Forces in Korea have established various multi-tier channel sisterhood affinity programs with their South Korea counterparts. For example, U.S. 2nd Division has established friendly cooperative relationship with its neighborhood South Korea

Macmillan Press LTD, 2000), p.49.

Army 26th Mechanized Infantry Division. The programs saliently contribute to enhancing their comrade in arms by tactical discussion, athletic activities and other cultural events.

South Korea Armed Forces made sisterhood arrangements with its neighboring counterpart: the Second Republic of Korea Army with Western Army of Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces; the Third Field Army with Jinan Military Region in China PLA and the First Field Army with Far Eastern Military District HQs located at Khabarovsk in Russia.

South Korea Navy 2nd Fleet and China East Fleet established sisterhood affinity programs including reciprocal port visits to discuss illegal fishing, piracy, illegal immigrants, and smuggling.

Future military leaders need to enhance the identity of the security community prior to their commission. It is required that cadets from U.S. Military Academy, Chinese PLA Academy, Japanese Defense University, Russia Military Academy, South Korea Military Academy and North Korea Kim Il Sung Military School meet together via their military transportation aircrafts. They could enjoy playing athletic activities and conduct terrain walking the battlefield to remind them of the tragedy from military confrontation. It is also imperative that a regional Defense University should be established. The faculty, which consists of member states in the region, might provide curriculum related to regional security and strategic awareness to the military officers and security policy makers to pursue common security.

Bilateral Military Relations in Northeast Asia

We need to examine current status of bilateral military relationship in Northeast Asia

to rebuild a regional security regime.

The U.S.-China Military Relations

The U.S. National Security Strategy stresses that the Bush administration will seek a 'constructive relationship with a changing China.' It implicitly identifies China as one of the 'main centers of global power' that will need to collaborate with each other to counter the growth of international disorder and instability.²² International development post-9/11 has helped by shifting the focus of U.S. national security policy away from containing China as its future rival toward the elimination of transnational terrorist networks. There seems to be a growing awareness that China may have been the biggest beneficiary of the post-9/11 global climate as it is now off the U.S. official list of enemies. More specific to the anti-terrorist struggle, it has taken steps to enhance information sharing about terrorist networks. China agreed to promulgate and implement new missile-related export-control regulations. China, fearing its marginalization in the merging international security environment, has also been trying to project an image of itself as a responsible global player. Its active role in bringing North Korea to the negotiating table has been much appreciated by the member states in the region. North Korea policy issues seem set to have a corrosive effect on Sino-American relation in the future.

Given the mutual suspicion with which the U.S. and Chinese militaries view each other, it is crucially important that they foster a high degree of regularized interaction.

Beijing's proposal in June 2003 for the creation of a regional 'Security Policy Conference' under the auspices of the ARF, to be primarily attended by defense officials, was part of its diplomatic campaign to qualify U.S. influence in Southeast

²² The White House, *National Security Strategy*, September 2002, pp.27-8.

Asia.

Chief of the PLA General Staff General Liang Guanglie visited the U.S. in October 2004. “U.S.-China Global Issues Forum” aimed at strengthening bilateral cooperation on transnational issues and exploring new possibilities for joint work on a global issue in November 2004.

The U.S.-Japan Military Relations

In the past five decades, the multifaceted alliance between the U.S. and Japan, the world’s two largest and most technologically advanced economies has deterred aggression and provided the bedrock for Asian stability. The U.S. and Japan want to see China integrated into the world economy and the global community, and both want to see it adhere to international norms of behaviour. The U.S. and Japan share the goal of ensuring that China’s rise not jeopardize their vital strategic and commercial long-term interests in the regional stability. The U.S. has yet to remove North Korea from the U.S. list of states that sponsor terrorism. Japan has suffered from North Korea-supported terror attacks, and Pyongyang may continue exporting ballistic missile technology to terrorist organizations and states that harbour them. The U.S. and Japan share a vital interest in ensuring that such sales cease.²³ The two states can promote confidence-building measures in such areas as protecting sea lines of communication, combating piracy, and conducting rescues at sea. The U.S. and Japan will almost certainly increase cooperation on counterterrorism, energy security, WMD proliferation, transborder crime, piracy, and illegal narcotics, as well as on certain issues identified in their common agenda: environment protection, infectious disease, and regional and global economic development.

²³ Ted Osius, *The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance* (Westport: Praeger, 2002), p.12.

A key agenda item between U.S. and Japanese officials was U.S. plans to realign U.S. forces in Asia. Three items have dominated public discussion: the transfer of functions of the Fifth Air Force from Yokota Air Base to the HQs of the 13th Air Force in Guam; the transfer of the Army I Corps HQs from Washington state to Camp Zama; and the relocation of the Marine Corps Futenma Air Station and some Marines in Okinawa to the Japanese mainland or out of Japan.²⁴

The main points of Japan's "New Defense Program Guidelines" are increased efforts to cooperate with the U.S. on a missile defense system, the specific identification of China and North Korea's as potential threats to Japanese security, and increased antiterror efforts.

The U.S.-Russia Military Relations

The U.S.-Russia military relations of coordination and competition continue to evolve. The unprecedented U.S.-Russia Torgau-2004 exercise concentrated on anti-terrorism and peacekeeping in May 2004. The expansion of NATO up to the Russian borders, and NATO activity in the Caucasus are both issues which will shape the future of the relationship and future debate in the NATO-Russian Council.

Relations between the U.S. and Russia are entering a delicate phase. American involvement on the Russian periphery is reaching unprecedented proportions. U.S. efforts in the former Soviet states are simply an extension of the global war on terrorism and are intended to provide security and stability to states still struggling with independence. But to many Russians, the U.S. military presence in Central Asia and security assistance to many former Soviet states seem to be deliberate attempts at

²⁴ Raph A. Cossa and Jane Skanderup, *Pacific Forum CSIS, 4th Quarter 2004: Regional Overview*, p.2. <http://www.org/pacfor/cc/0404Qoverview.html> 01-25-2005

encirclement.²⁵

The U.S.-South Korea Military Relations

Since the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-South Korea alliance in 2003, the two nations have transformed their relationship into a more mature alliance. The restructuring of U.S. forces in Korea was a symbolic transformation between the two allies. The emphasis on improving rapid and flexible power projection capability also continues through the Pentagon's Global Defense Posture Review (GPR), which examines the global distribution of U.S. forces and facilities as follows. First, there should be main operating bases – permanently stationed forces with families. Second, there will be forward operating bases with equipment pre-positioned. Third, cooperative security locations are 'more austere' facilities for training, exercise and liaison.²⁶

In October, 2004, Washington and Seoul reached agreement on a plan to delay the previously announced cut of U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. pulled back 5,000 troops by the end of 2004, including the 3,500 already redeployed to Iraq, and will gradually withdraw 12,500 troops, one-third of the approximately 37,500 U.S. by 2008. South Korea deployed 3,600 troops to Iraq to join peace and reconstruction efforts initiated by the U.S. in September 2004. Meanwhile, at home, South Korean troops have taken over duties at the DMZ from U.S. forces. The U.S. and South Korean government agreed on relocation of U.S. ground forces including the Yongsan garrison from the north of Seoul to the south of the Han River. However, to offset the effect of a reduction of forces the Pentagon will carry out an \$11bn program.²⁷

In the meantime, South Korea embarked on an unusually aggressive diplomatic

²⁵ Eugene B. Rumer, "Collision Avoidance: U.S.-Russian Bilateral relations and Former Soviet States", Strategic forum, Institute for National Strategic Studies, U.S. NDU, No.207, April 2004.

²⁶ IISS, *The Military Balance 2004-2005*, p.16.

²⁷ IISS, *The Military Balance 2004-2005*, pp.163-164.

campaign to prevent neo-conservative hardliners in the Bush administration from obtaining a dominant role in U.S. policymaking toward North Korea. The most notable U.S. reaction to President Roh's diplomatic initiative came from incoming National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, who had stressed the U.S. favored the "transformation" of North Korea by economic means, and not harsh measures that would bring about the collapse of the Kim Jong Il regime.²⁸

China-Russia Military Relations

By the early 1980s, the Soviet leadership recognized that normalizing relations with China was a key to reducing its military burden and exploiting its vast Far Eastern resources. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed most of the factors that had complicated bilateral relations. Neither post-Soviet Russia nor China viewed the other as a serious military threat. China's sudden decision formally to adopt a strategic partnership was prompted by heightened concern over U.S. power and Moscow's determination to place its relationship with Beijing on the same footing as that with Washington.²⁹ China would prefer to maintain strong Sino-Russian solidarity as a check on U.S. power even while improving Chinese relations with the U.S.

It is practically impossible to guarantee security in Northeast Asia without the active involvement of China and Russia, and that the two must pursue a concerted policy, come out with joint initiatives to deepen a constructive dialogue in the military – political sphere in the region. The importance of the Shanghai Security Organization (SCO) that has evolved into a forum for discussion on regional security and economic issues cannot be overstated for Sino-Russian relations. Russian ties with China in the

²⁸ Donald G. Gross, "South Korea Confronts U.S. Hardliners on North Korea," *Pacific Forum CSIS*, 4th Quarter 2004: *U.S.-Korea Relations*, pp.1-2.

<http://www.org/pacfor/cc/0404Qoverview.html> 01-25-2005

²⁹ Jennifer Anderson, *The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.22.

areas of defense and military technology remain central to the overall Sino-Russian relationship. Critics have charged Russia with abetting China's irredentist agenda, fuelling arms proliferation in Northeast Asia, and heightening a regional arms race in the region by offering the PLA offensive weaponry and technology transfer.

Pulling out an old card, the Russian government has also announced a series of large-scale military exercises with China in 2005. The attempt to bolster relations with China goes hand in hand with attempts to reenergize relations with India as well.

China-Japan Military Relations

The Sino-Japanese military relationship has been tense due to the conflict between an emerging powerful influence of China and an extended security role of Japan. The Chinese government said that China was "deeply concerned with the great changes of Japan's defense strategy and its possible impact and also expressed "strong dissatisfaction" with "New Defense Plan Guideline's call for alertness with regard to China's military modernization in December 2004. Japan suggested that the Chinese submarine's incursion incident made a reference to China unavoidable.³⁰ The Chinese government perceives that Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni were the reason for the political stagnation in the relationship. Koizumi understands that he visited the shrine to pay homage to the unwilling war dead and as a pledge never again to resort to war.

However, they resumed their defense official talks in Tokyo in October, 2004; first meeting of defense vice meetings since November 2000. Among the issues discussed were the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, China's continuing research activities in

³⁰ *ibid.*, p.8.

Japan's EEZ, the maritime boundary in the East China Sea, and Taiwan.³¹

China-South Korea Military Relations

As if to demonstrate the hidden faces in the new Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang strategic partnership, China and South Korea held their first-ever defense ministerial talks in Beijing, August 23 through 29, 1999, to coincide with the seventh anniversary of normalization between China and the ROK and as another benchmark event in the Sino-ROK relationship. For Seoul, Defense Minister Cho Sung Tae's visit was part of a diplomatic blitz aimed at winning China's support for President Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy." Moreover, Seoul's requests for broader Sino-ROK military exercises, joint-maritime search and rescue exercise, exchanges of naval port calls, the establishment of multilateral arms control and disarmament dialogue to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and a return visit by Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian. Not surprisingly, Beijing responded with maxi-mini strategy. Chi's return visit was carried out in January 2000. In 2001 and 2002, Sino-ROK exchanged naval port calls. Beijing's maxi-mini equidistance strategy may be seen as a two-handed approach, propping up North Korea on geostrategic grounds while simultaneously engaging South Korea for new military exchange and cooperative partnership.

South Korea student officers visited China via Korean Air Force military transportation aircraft in September 2002 for the first time. South Korea Chairman, JCS proposed search and rescue exercise to the Chief of General Staff, Chinese PLA in November 2003. As of April 2004, 17 South Korea military officers and 7 defense

³¹ James J. Przystup, "A Volatile Mix: Natural Gas, a Submarine, Shrine, and a Visa," in *Pacific Forum CSIS, 4th Quarter 2004: Regional Overview*, p.8.
<http://www.org/pacfor/cc/0404Qoverview.html> 01-25-2005

policy makers took various courses in military and civilian education institutions in China. In the mean time, three North Korea People's Army officers took low session in a language institute in China.

China-North Korea Military Relations

Is a genuine two-Korea security policy feasible as long as the 1961 PRC-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance remains in force? Although the present-day Sino-North Korea relationship is not as close as it once was, neither Beijing nor Pyongyang has shown any interest in modifying the treaty. During Jiang Zemin's state visit to South Korea in 1995, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that the alliance does not commit Chinese troops to defending North Korea.³² On other occasions, Beijing has indicated that it would not provide support if the North launched "an unprovoked attack," or if the treaty did not require the dispatch of Chinese military forces, or China were not willing "automatically" to intervene, and so on. It also seems to indicate that China does not consider the treaty to be ipso facto a hard and fast commitment and that in crisis situation Chinese leaders may "change their minds, change their policies, or, of course, even act with reckless abandon."³³

China's interest in North Korea is focused on its function as a buffer zone, and assumes that Beijing regards Pyongyang mainly in terms of geopolitical strategy.³⁴ If China lost North Korea, China might face uncertain and unpredictable consequences due to ideological and strategic contradictions with the U.S. North Korean refugees in China would become widely noticed. The Chinese government would face grave

³² *Korea Times*, www.hankookki.com/times.htm 03-14-2004

³³ Eric A. McVaden, "Chinese Military Strategy for the Korean Peninsula," In James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., *China's Military Faces the Future*, *ibid.*, pp. 306-9.

³⁴ Andrew Scobell, "China and North Korea: The Close but Uncomfortable Relationship," *Current History* (September 2002), p.279.

consequences as more North Korea refugees would flood across the Chinese border, representing a long- term burden and pressure on China.

Any mistaken measures could give rise to a refugee riot, or a sudden swarm of entrants or a humanitarian disaster due to closing the border, which would incur serious concern and criticism from the international community. The North Korea nuclear program is a grave threat to Chinese long-term security interests. China's Foreign Ministry described Pyongyang's action as dangerous adventurism aimed at obtaining U.S. concessions.³⁵ Some radical views even maintain that this is also an attempt to blackmail China.³⁶ The optimal pattern for North Korea seems to be to work out a partial opening and reform policy based on pragmatism, gradualism and the country's unique characteristics. China does not yet completely rule out the worst-case scenario of collapse in North Korea as a result of social turmoil, military conflict with the U.S. following economic sanctions or a maritime embargo, or power struggle among the North Korean leadership.

Japan-South Korea Military Relations

The South Korean national sentiment regarding the legacy toward Japanese colonial harsh rule was a stumbling block in military exchange. However, military exchange Programs between South Korea and Japan have been dynamic since President Kim Dae Jung declared a joint communiqué 'New Partnership for 21st Century' during his 1998 state visit to Japan. Recognizing the need to share lessons learned from the history and to cooperate together forward, military exchange programs have resumed. The Korea Air Force military band visited Japan using military transportation aircraft

³⁵ "North Korea Nuclear Diplomacy is Dangerous Adventurism," *Joonang Ilbo*, March 6, 2003

³⁶ Wu Guiguang, "Pyongyang Is Also Blackmailing," *Lianhe Zaobao* (United Morning Paper, Singapore), Feb 21, 2003, <http://www.zaobao.com/>

for the first time visited Japan in November 2002 to join the Musical Festival hosted by the Japanese Self Defense Force. Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces military band participated in the 2002 World Fanfare hosted by Kangwon Province in Korea. Especially, Japan Maritime Self Defense Forces and South Korea Naval forces have conducted maritime search and rescue exercises on the high sea in the vicinity of Jeju Island since 1999. Japan Self Defense Forces and South Korea Forces also sent Peace Keeping Forces in East Timor in 2002. They successfully took the window of opportunities to enrich military cooperation between the two PKFs, including information sharing and mutual support.

Japan hosted a multilateral joint military drill for the Proliferation Security Initiative against WMD. Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force, together with forces from the U.S., Australia, and France, boarded and searched an imaginary ship carrying WMD. Eighteen countries sent observers. Significantly, neither China nor South Korea took part in the exercise. Japan will either move more firmly into the U.S. camp that advocates a harder line toward North Korea, or it will continue to stay with South Korea and China, advocating slow measures and cautious engagement. This could have long-term implications for both the resolution of the North Korea crisis and for the future of dynamics of the region.

Russia-North Korea Military Relations

A compromise reached in August 1994 involving Russian weapons transfers to Seoul as partial payment of the Soviet outstanding debt further dramatized for North Korean leaders the extent to which the new relationship between Seoul and Moscow posed a security threat to Pyongyang. There are indications that the Putin government is

opposed to continuing the debt-for-arms arrangement.³⁷ The new Russian president dispatched his Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to Pyongyang, the highest-level Russian official delegation to North Korea in a decade. A new Russian-North Korean treaty was finally signed in February 2000 during Ivanov's visit. During the summit meeting between Putin and Kim Jong Il in July 2000 in Pyongyang, Russia-North Korean relations were fully normalized, and the two leaders signed a joint declaration outlining their shared interests. In a demonstration of their new vigorous relationship, in April 2000 Russia agreed to resume military cooperation with North Korea, although this will be limited to upgrading weapons supplied during the Soviet era.³⁸ North Korean defense officials reportedly requested five hundred million dollars in new weapons systems, including fighter aircraft and reconnaissance planes, but Moscow refused, given Pyongyang's inability to pay hard currency for the order.³⁹

To play a meaningful role in great power diplomacy, the answer is yes, but in terms of bilateral cooperation, the summit brought mixed results. On the positive side, Russian and North Korean officials agreed to connect the Trans-Siberia railroad to the North Korean rail network as a part of the inter-Korean railway plan. The Russian government also reportedly proposed building a nuclear reactor for North Korea in Primorski Krai in an effort to resume Russia's role in energy cooperation with Pyongyang.⁴⁰

North-South Korea Military Dialogue

Despite the global trend toward dismantling Cold War structure since the late 1980s, Two Koreas have been trapped in a vicious cycle of mutual distrust, negation, and

³⁷ *Yonhap*, August 17, 2001

³⁸ *Reuter*, April 28, 2001.

³⁹ *Chosun Ilbo*, April 29, 2001.

⁴⁰ *Agence France-Press*, August 2, 2001

protracted military confrontation. However, the first inter-Korean summit talk that was held in Pyongyang in June 2000 has brought about revolutionary changes in inter-Korean relations, and has given a new hope for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Despite remarkable progress in inter-Korean relations, an array of new and tough agendas for future inter-Korean negotiations await, military issues need to be addressed: tension reduction, military confidence-building, arms control and reduction, weapons of mass destruction and missile issues including implementation of the joint declaration of de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and replacement of the armistice treaty by a new inter-Korean peace treaty. Resolutions of these items are not likely to be easy or smooth, not only because of their backlash effects on vital interests of the North Korean regime and state, but also because of inherent differences between the two Koreas in setting their priority.

Although there are some signs of tension reduction evident through the ban on propaganda warfare along the DMZ, the first inter-Korean defense ministerial talk, and the partial removal of mines in the DMZ for the western and eastern corridor reconnection of a railroad between North and South Korea, both Koreas still consider each other principal enemies, and strategic and tactical doctrine have not been changed.

By abandoning the structure of balance of power determinism, the four major powers can also play a constructive role in facilitating peaceful co-existence and reunification. But it should be remembered that reunification cannot be achieved without first achieving peace. Once peace is realized, the door to reunification will open.⁴¹

⁴¹ Moon Chung In, "Security Pragmatics for the Korean Peninsula," <http://www.nautilus.org/nukepolicy/workshops/shanghai-01/moonpap>, 04-09-2004

7.2.4. Multilateral Exercise

MPAT

Multilateral Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) is defined as a cadre of military planners from nations with Asia-Pacific interests capable of rapidly augmenting a multinational force headquarters established to plan and execute coalition operations in response to small scale contingencies including natural disaster and piracy.⁴² U.S. PACOM has initiated MPAT since 2000. PACOM and South Korea JCS co-hosted MPAT in 2002.

The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team was designed to organize operational planning augmentation for multinational force staff. Team composition determined by contingency and nations cooperating in a common response. The Team may include experts in ground, air, sea, communications, intelligence, legal, logistics, medical, engineering and other areas as required. Missions of the MPAT are to conduct humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peace operations, non-combatant evacuation operations. The vision of the MPAT is to provide a cadre of military planners with interests in the region capable of rapidly augmenting a multinational force headquarters established to plan and execute coalition operations in response to small scale contingencies. The goals of the MPAT are to improve the interoperability and multilateral cooperation, rescue crisis response time, increase planning effectiveness, strengthen command, control and communications, and develop common operating procedures.

There is some advance planning, and reserve units of national militaries are trained in nontraditional uses of military force, often called “operations other than war” or

⁴² What is MPAT? http://www2.apan-info.net/mpat/main-files/What%20is%20MPAT_files/frame.htm
12-22-2004

OOTW.

A way to begin the process of combined exercises among the member states may be to begin with sending observers to out of area regional combined exercises. For example, South Korea, Japan, and China have all sent observers to Exercise Cobra Gold in Thailand over the years. If this could be expanded to include Russian and North Korean observers it would be a way to observe exercises and establish the initial stage of mutual understanding. Other regional exercises could be included until the conditions become appropriate for observers to participate in Northeast Asian exercises such as Yama Sakura in Japan. Eventually the NEASMCR could develop its own series of exercises for all parties.

The South Korean navy hosted the Western Pacific rescue exercise with the participation of five nations, including Korea, the U.S., Australia, Japan and Singapore during April 3-12, 2004 in the vicinity of Jeju Island. The Western Pacific rescue exercise intended to enhance the joint rescue capability in the event of submarine accidents.⁴³ Japan-Russia-South Korea conducted trilateral search and rescue exercises in August 2003 and April 2004. These exercises greatly contributed to enhancing interoperability in the event of ship's wreckage and humanitarian relief and disaster.⁴⁴

The agenda for PACOM Coalition Council (PCC) includes a formal situation report by the U.S. (operations/intelligence/logistics), followed by status reports from partners and component representatives which focus on future operations and

⁴³ *Jungang Ilbo*, April 3, 2004

⁴⁴ As Cobra Gold 2002 participants, Singapore Armed Forces and Royal Supreme Thai command members were directly involved with U.S. initiatives for collaboration tools and virtual Civil Military Operation Center. USPACOM served as the host Combatant for the Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration 2002. For the first time, Japan, Korea, and Singapore have been invited to sit on the Coalition Task Force staff. Their inclusion in the traditional mix of U.S., NATO, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand participants is pushing the envelope on coalition interoperability as it demonstrates the true nature of interoperability challenges.

missions, discussion of issues and problems to resolve, and a follow-up on previous actions. The MPAT and MNF Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and Tactics, Techniques, Procedures (TTP) efforts represent the major regional program aimed at developing multilateral planners using common planning and operating procedures for coalition operations. Internet-based Northeast Asia Area Network (NEAAN) will enable the working-level communications required to develop these procedures.

An Ad Hoc system of collaboration exists.

- Networks exist between existing Centers and training establishments.
- Scheduling and coordination of activities/exercises needs better coordination.
- Develop greater collaborative teaching between organization in the region that support staff colleges and war colleges.
- Establish fellowships for civilian attendance to training courses/programs.
- Increase training output.
- ROE – national requirements vice UN.
- Determining participation in activities – who gets to come.⁴⁵

Regional Training/Exercises

- Bilateral arrangements that seek standardization within a doctrinal framework.
- Evolve multi-national exercises such as Cobra Gold, Tempest Express & Tandem Thrust to more accurately reflect the operating environment, help establish common training standards.
- Utilize common operating procedures, SOPs and guidelines in Regional training activities – MNF SOP, MPE training standards.

⁴⁵ Department of Defense, *Security Cooperation Guidance*, 2003 as referenced in U.S. Army Security Cooperation (Washington, D.C.:RAND, 2004)

- Utilize existing structures such as FPDA to test common standards.⁴⁶

The Secretary of Defense Security Cooperation Guidance document also provides a non-inclusive definition of what constitutes security cooperation: (1) combined exercises; this category includes CJCS and Combatant Commander-sponsored exercises, as well as bilateral and multilateral exercises conducted by the forces of the service components with forces of other nations; (2) security assistance; includes Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, International Military Education and Training, and Enhanced International Training, Excess Defense Articles and potential direct commercial sales. (3) combined education, including activities involving the education of foreign defense personnel by U.S. institutions and programs both in CONUS and overseas. (4) combined experimentation (5) defense and military contacts, including senior defense official and senior official visits, counterpart visits, participation in defense shows, and demonstration, bilateral and multilateral staff talks, defense cooperation working groups, military-technical working groups, regional conferences, State partnership for Peace, and personnel and unit exchange program (6) humanitarian assistance; includes transportation of humanitarian relief, and de-mining training, and (7) OSD-managed programs encompassing arms control treaties, obligations, or on going negotiations including information exchanges.⁴⁷

While the U.S. DOD has embarked on a wide scale transformation and security cooperation program the Chinese leadership has recognized the need for transformation. Though somewhat in its infancy the Chinese leadership has decided to

⁴⁶ Department of Defense, *Security Cooperation Guidance*, 2003, as referenced in U.S. Army Security Cooperation (Washington, D.C.:RAND, 2004)

⁴⁷ Department of Defense, *Security Cooperation Guidance*, 2003. The definition of security cooperation categories is taken from the section of this document entitled “implementing Security Cooperation Guidance.”

enhance its military's capability and training for engaging in such operations as outlined above, including through establishing a new PKO training center for the People's Liberation Army.⁴⁸ This demonstrates that there is room for mutual cooperation.

Counter-terrorism Training Center

The South Korea Armed Forces desire to undergo transformation as U.S. Forces in Korea undergo repositioning and redeployment of U.S. forces on and off the Peninsula. South Korea Special Forces must ensure future, long term relevance to South Korea. With U.S. forces redeployment from forward areas, the local populace will experience decline. U.S. military facilities in the "Western Corridor" in the vicinity Highway 1 north of Seoul are in generally good repair and available for further military use. South Korea military and in particular, South Korea Special Forces have recent, relevant, and practical experience in PKO. South Korea Special Force has a robust Counter-terrorism (CT) capability and a highly capable CT force. A significant shortfall in UN PKO is the deployment of forces that have little training in PKO, particularly forces from lesser developed nations.

For the concept of CT, the South Korea Army Special Warfare Command (SWC) becomes the focal point for training of international forces in South Korea. The South Korea SWC establishes program of instructions in PKO, counter-terrorism and nation-building, reconstruction operations. The SWC will establish training sites using the vacated U.S. Military infrastructure in the Western Corridor. We can exploit recent and extensive South Korea Special Forces experience in PKO including East

⁴⁸ Banning Garret and Jonathan Adams, "U.S.-China Cooperation on the Problem of Failing States and Transnational Threats," *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report 126, September 2004, p.6.

Timor and others and the excellent capabilities of their CT Forces. The concept will fit President Roh's concept of becoming a regional economic hub by making Korea a regional military hub. It will provide for expanded military to military contact between South Korea and other international forces. It will also provide a foundation for cooperation on future PKO and other operations to include potential operations with coalition forces in North Korea in any scenario. Facilities and training areas already exist with U.S. facilities being turned over to the South Korea Government as U.S. forces redeploy off the Peninsula and to the southern hubs. It will provide tangible and strong support to the War on Terrorism and to UN operations. It will improve U.S.-South Korea relations. It will increase South Korea influence within the UN. It will also aid in sustaining the local economy of areas where U.S. forces have withdrawn. It will gain South Korea SWC increased resources, personnel and equipment. Advanced countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the U.K., Singapore, and perhaps even NATO countries could contract for training facilities prior to deploying on operations. It will absolutely establish long term relevance of South Korea SWC.

In terms of cost, the South Korean Government will be required to sustain former U.S. military facilities. South Korea SWC will have to establish new international training. Some lesser developed nations would not be able to bear the cost of such training, however, the UN might be willing to pay for training of such forces.

The South Korean government could consider the possibility of establishing a regional training hub to establish programs of instructions in PKO, Counter-Terrorism and nation building, reconstruction operations.

Non-Traditional Threat Exercises

With the rise of non-traditional threats many bilateral and multi-lateral exercises have evolved to help member states deal with them. Balikatan 04 was held in Feb-Mar 2004 in which the U.S. and the Philippines conducted counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism exercises. Cobra Gold 04 was held in May 2004 in Thailand to conduct interoperability, combat readiness, NEO, and disaster relief. Mongolia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the U.S. have all joined in these annual exercises.

RIMPAC 04 was conducted in Pacific and Hawaii areas to test ASuW, ASW, humanitarian missions, medical. Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Peru, South Korea, UK, and U.S. participated in RIMPAC.

A Chinese/Indian naval exercise took place in late 2003 and in March 2004 a search and rescue exercise involving a PLAN destroyer and support vessel took place with two French warships. There have also been more military-to-military events with members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), particularly following the SCO's coalition 2003 anti-terrorist exercise, which took place in August 2003 in eastern Kazakhstan and in the Uighur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang province.⁴⁹ The SCO detailed its own antiterrorism strategy at the organization's June summit and a Regional Anti-Terrorist Center was opened in Tashkent. These last two developments reflect the emphasis paid to antiterrorism and the illicit drugs trade by countries and organizations in the region.⁵⁰

A more operationally oriented instrument of cooperation is the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) currently under discussion among Asian nations. This initiative aims to combat the transnational threats of maritime piracy and terrorism in

⁴⁹ The IISS, *The Military Balance 2004-2005* (London: Oxford University, 2004), p.161.

⁵⁰ *The Military Balance, 2004-2005*, *ibid.*, p.97-101.

the Strait of Malacca and the Singapore Strait by introducing joint naval exercises and other mechanisms for information sharing and cooperation on law enforcement operations.⁵¹

7.2.5. Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities

Crisis Communication

Perhaps the most important area for further military exploration and discussion is in the realm of crisis communication. Several standing agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union call for timely communication in the event of a military clash, nuclear accident, unauthorized use of military weaponry, or third party provocative attack.⁵² Some of these agreements include the 1972 Incidents at the Sea Agreement, the 1971 Accidental Measures Agreement, and the 1989 Dangerous Military Activities Agreement. There are also two U.S.-Soviet agreements that establish crisis communication links - hot-line - and the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center.⁵³ Furthermore, the NATO summit statement of June 1990 called for establishing a new crisis prevention and communication center for Europe as part of the CSCE process. Russia signed on to a Sino-Russia Dangerous Military Activities Agreement in 1994.

There is an inherent tension between two competing visions of military involvement in crisis communication. A dominant civilian view is that the military should take preventive steps to avoid a military clash but should not be involved directly in crisis control after the outbreak of initial hostilities. This view holds that

⁵¹ Gal Luft and Anne Korim, "Terrorism Goes to Sea," *Foreign Affairs*, (November/December 2004) Volume 83, Number 6, p.69.

⁵² John Borawski, ed., *Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age: Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stability* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986)

⁵³ See Barry M. Blechman, ed., *Preventive Nuclear War* (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1985)

state-to-state communication in a crisis should be conducted and coordinated centrally by the civilian leaders. However, an enlightened military view has it that many inadvertent or small skirmishes could well be contained at an early stage through prompt and timely communications, first between local commanders on the scene and then up the chain of command if necessary. This view holds that in the time it takes to assemble and brief a national security team in Washington, a minor misunderstanding that could be cleared up on the scene may escalate. This tension is inherent to the process about the merits of military involvement in crisis diplomacy. A recurring example of the ability of military forces to diffuse conflicts can be found in the many skirmishes and clashes that have occurred on the Korean DMZ between North and South Korean forces. In nearly every instance despite the fact that there had been exchanges of gunfire and even loss of life, the combat was halted by the orders of local commanders before national level governments could intervene. If these two military forces can diffuse conflict in combat situations other military forces should be able to do the same.

Further, there should be mechanisms to facilitate official communication and to gather and pass information at early stages of a crisis before a national-level crisis team can be constituted.⁵⁴ These institutions should pose no reasonable threat to civilian control over crisis decision making, particularly if the procedures and guidelines for communication are well developed in advance. In any event, the issue of military involvement in crisis communication deserves more serious consideration by a regional working group.

Russia and South Korea Defense Ministers signed a Prevention Treaty of Dangerous Military Activities Agreement in Moscow in November 2002.

⁵⁴ When the author visited the command, control and communication center of French Joint Chiefs of Staff in April 2001 and December 2003, the author could find the multinational crisis action center which consisted of the liaison element from the EU.

During the co-hosted Japan and Korea FEFA 2002 World Cup, the two governments agreed on installing a hotline between the South Korea Ministry of National Defense and Japanese Defense Agency. The objectives of the hotline enabled the two governments and military authorities to share terrorism information and take collaborative actions to prevent terrorism.

Establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula can be defined as the transition from the state of armistice to the state of peace. The South Korean government plans to support those actions necessary to build confidence between the two Koreas on military issues.⁵⁵

Talks between the North and South Korean military organizations were also high on the agenda of security-conscious South Koreans. The two defense ministers, meeting on Jeju Island on September 25-26, 2002, issued a communiqué in which the two sides agreed to ease military tension in unspecified ways and permit entry into the DMZ for the purpose of reconnecting rail and road links. By early February 2001 five working-level military talks had been convened to discuss the issue of handling security in the DMZ during the reconnection of road and rail lines, with only vague reference to other tension reduction measures. North-South Korea have implemented certain bilateral confidence-building measures, including the installation of a naval hotline with a common radio frequency, and removal of propaganda signs and a cessation of broadcasts on both sides of the DMZ.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ *Participatory Defense Policy 2003* (Seoul: The Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2003), p.109.

⁵⁶ The IISS, *The Military Balance 2004-2005* (London: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.163. During May 25-26, 2004, North-South Korea senior military officers held talks to examine proposals to improve communications between their forces; agree to further talks in June. On June 4, 2004, ROK and DPRK agreed to measures to ease military tension along their border, agreeing to adopt standard radio frequency and naval signaling system, to exchange data on illegal fishing, to establish an inter-government hot line, and end the broadcast of propaganda along the border.

7.2.6. Regional Military Security Cooperation Architecture

Secretariat and Military Council

A secretariat will provide logistical, administrative, and other assistance to the rotating chair. It will serve as the regime's "institutional memory" by acting as a central archive and clearing house for regime information, documents and data. Once formally established, the secretariat could allow the regime finally to move forward toward its forecasted preventive diplomacy mission. Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, raised the issue's profile with his testimony to the U.S. House of Representative in March 2004 and a speech in Vancouver in May, in which he proposed a Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI). According to Fargo, an 'architecture' was needed that would 'allow us to share information and to share intelligence' and to establish 'operating procedures' to facilitate effective action against illicit maritime activities. He also suggested that the U.S. might need to deploy special operations forces in the Malacca Strait to combat maritime crime.⁵⁷

Military Council need to be organized and be operated to implement NEAMSCR. Representatives of Trilateral Council will be consisted of J-5 of U.S. PACOM, Japan, and South Korea. The representatives are one or two star flag officers. In order to facilitate participation of Japan and other states, J-5 PACOM will chair first. Chairmanship rotates annually by a council decision. Council will meet annually, and membership expansion will be decided by unanimous decision. Exercises and CBMs will be approved by majority decision, which has no binding force to any country. To facilitate Council meeting, a U.S.-Japan-South Korea working group of O-6s will

⁵⁷ The IISS, *The Military Balance 2004-2005* (London: Oxford University, 2004), p.165.

develop concepts and detailed plans. Other member states including China, Russia and even North Korea could join the Military Council.

Command Relations

The newly born command will not be a NATO-like style single-dominant structure.⁵⁸ Political oversight is affected either in a formal, standing council or through ad hoc political consultative fora. Political oversight becomes the province of a regional multinational force employment and decisions, while at the same time recognizing the continued existence of national authorities.⁵⁹ The command will be a power sharing one with the rotation of command among all member states on a periodic basis with an additional caveat. Closely related to the issues of command authorities is the question of when do forces “transfer,” transfer of authority (TOA) or “change of operation control,” from national command structures for operational matters to a multilateral land force commander.⁶⁰ For operations the nation having the greatest functional expertise will be given command. As an example, in the event of natural disaster contingency, commander, the Regional Multinational Forces TF, will be Japanese. The council will decide this based on established procedures.

The International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) model could be considered in future regional national forces command structure.⁶¹ The political direction and co-

⁵⁸ In June 2003, NATO announced a plan to reduce command structures, in an effort to reflect the alliance’s likely new missions. This restructuring process is expected to be complete by 2006. A new command, Allied Command Transformation, has been set up in Norfolk, Virginia which will oversee the introduction of new concepts and doctrines and transformation of the alliance’s military capabilities. See, *The Military Balance, 2003-2004* (London: Oxford University for the IISS, 2003)

⁵⁹ Thomas-Durell Young, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and Coalition Operations: Problem Areas and Solutions,” *Defense & Security Analysis*, vol 19, no 2, (June 2003), p.113.

⁶⁰ Thomas-Durell Young, *ibid*, p.115.

⁶¹ In reality, the U.S. authority in Afghanistan retains their command authority over their forces. Presidential Decision Directives 25 strongly limits American cooperation with the United Nations in peacekeeping missions. The conditions of American involvement in any UN peacekeeping missions would include a clear demonstration of how the operation would advance U.S. interests, the availability of American personnel and funds, support of Congress, clear objectives and exit strategy, and

ordination for the mission is provided by NATO's principal decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council. Based on the political guidance from the Council, strategic command and control is exercised by NATO's top operational headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium.⁶² Commander of the ISAF has been rotated from Italy, Turkey to France commander for six months. Afghanistan is NATO's first out of area operations, and is a crucial test of the Alliance's ability to deliver new capabilities. On August 11, 2003, NATO assumed responsibility for the ISAF in Kabul, which currently numbers around 6,500 troops drawn from 26 NATO allies, nine nations from Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and two non-NATO, non-EAPC nations. This demonstrates NATO's unique capacity to command broad multinational operations.⁶³

Transformation is, thus, characterized not only by changing strategic circumstances, but also by three other factors: jointness, new operational concepts, and new technology.

Transformation is a process and mind-set. Adopting a transformational mind-set means applying current fielded capabilities – in the current environment – to accomplish any assigned mission. In today's dynamic world, no armed service's core competences can accomplish the mission alone. Transformation unites unique service capabilities into a seamless joint fashion to accomplish the joint force commander's objectives.⁶⁴

Second, transformation implies wholly new operating concepts, organizations and a

acceptable command control of arrangements. Recite Elaine Scioline: New U.S. Peacekeeping Policy De-emphasizes Role of the UN," New York Times, May 6, 1994, p.A1. Placing American forces under UN command is resisted by many who argue that U.S. troops should not be subject to the orders of foreign officers. See Steven R. David, "Regional Security in the Third World," in Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Roy Gordson and George H. Quester, eds., *Security Studies for the 21st Century* (Dulles, Virginia: Brassey's Press, 1997), p.300. However, U.S. augmented Corps which deploy in the event of another Korean War, will be operational control to their ally ground forces field army.

⁶² <http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/> 12-28-2004

⁶³ The IISS, *The Military Balance, 2004-2005* (London: Oxford University for the IISS, 2004), p.35.

⁶⁴ General Richard B. Meyers, "Understanding Transformation," *Proceedings*, Feb. 2003, p.38.

willingness to try different ways of approaching problems. A one size fits all doctrine is no longer appropriate in this novel environment.

Transforming the U.S. military means employment in new ways and sometimes with untested procedures. The new idea may not work, but it should never be dismissed because it has not been considered before.⁶⁵ Finally, transformation inevitably implies that new technology will dramatically change the way in which militaries have traditionally operated. In particular, new technology will enhance the role that shared information will have on every aspect of the battlefield. Thus, networks of sensors, shooters, and warfighters will have a dramatic impact on battlefield efficiency.

In the past, joint warfare was segregated warfare—In the future, joint war fighters must meld component capabilities into a seamless joint framework. The key to this effort will be shared information among the components.⁶⁶ These concepts have direct application to the NEAMSCR.

Response Forces

Multinational Forces HQs need to designate member states' forces. Regional response force aims at altering the military structure away from territorial defense toward highly mobile well-equipped forces that can be rapidly deployable to meet specific crises. An example from Australia is the operational command comprised of a joint headquarters from the Special Air Service Regiment, consisting of one Special Operation Forces Brigade, Ranger Commando Regiment (RCR), Terrorist Incident Response Regiment and a Special Operations Combat Service Support Company. The

⁶⁵ Ibid, p.39.

⁶⁶ Ibid, p.40.

latter unit will provide specific logistics, heavy weapons and communications support for the Special Forces. RCR has an additional company as a Tactical Assault Group. The Special Operation Command will also receive Black Hawk helicopters.⁶⁷

We can also consider NATO, EU, and AU's response forces. As part of the reforms announced at the Prague Summit in November 2002, the scope of future NATO missions will expand beyond Cold War boundaries. This is exemplified by NATO's command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (which it took over in August 2003), and its support to the Polish-led division which started deploying to Iraq in July 2003. The support package for the latter formation comprises logistics, communications and intelligence assets.

We can draw a pretty good idea from NATO's Response Forces (NRF).⁶⁸ In a bid to overcome problems of deployability and readiness in the Alliance, preparations continue for the NRF, NATO's first standing integration reaction forces. The NRF was activated on October 15, 2003 at AFNORTH headquarters in Brunssum, and is scheduled to reach initial operational capability by October 2004 and be fully operational by October 2006 with 21,000 personnel (joint air, land and maritime components) deployable within 5-30 days either independently, as a spearhead, or as

⁶⁷ The bulk of the force is Australian including 15,000 military and 155 federal Police officers, as well as 90 Protective Security officers. The Australian military component to the RAMSI deployed under the title Operation Anode, and included an infantry battalion, a command ship with helicopters and medical facilities, and a Fremantle-class patrol boat. The 2003 defense review *Defense 2000, Our Future Defense Force* resulted in a significant readjustment of the Australian Defense Force's capability priority. The Special Forces have been increased and a Special Operations Command has been established with equal status to the land, maritime and air environmental commands.

⁶⁸ The increased focus on expeditionary operations has prompted adjustment to many countries' force structures. On the naval front, this has resulted in a focus on Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) vessels, while Italy has an LPD specifically outfitted for disaster relief and France has two with extensive medical facilities. Meanwhile, Spain is expanding its amphibious capability with a new Strategic Projection Ship (of LHD-type), and Norway is forming a Task Group intended to secure coastal access for landings in multinational crisis operations. Finally, Sweden is configuring its five Visby-class corvettes, which will be capable of multi-national trans-oceanic deployment in addition to their role in homeland defense. See *The Military Balance, 2004-2005* (London: Oxford University for the IISS, 2004)

part of a coalition.⁶⁹

The Response Force has committed itself to enhancing its capabilities for coalition operations and is developing improved communications systems, enhanced electronic warfare self-protection measures and a suite of new weapons systems.⁷⁰

To further enhance capability the Joint Warfare Center (JWC) staged Exercise Allied Action '03 in Istanbul in November for the Allied Force North Europe (AFNORTH) Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) and Exercise Allied Action '04 in June 2004, in Italy for AFSOUTH's CJTF and NRF commands. By 2005, the JWC hopes to have introduced live exercises to complement its current simulated training. Plans are also underway to expand the JWC's operational-level training focus to tactical training for the NRF by January 2005.

The establishment of the NRF and JWC result from the 2003 reform which included the setting up of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) operation counterpart Allied Command Operations (ACO). ACO controls the NRF program, while ACT oversees not only the JWC, but Joint Force Training Center (JFTC) at Bydgoszcz in Poland and the Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Center (JALLC) at Monstanto in Portugal.⁷¹ Through bilateral links and NATO's Allied Command Transformation, America's allies can learn and judge how best to adapt to the emerging new U.S. mode of operations for their own purposes, and especially for coalition warfare.⁷² Elite troops from 11 NATO countries participated in seminar. First elements of NRF had discussed on air, land, and sea crisis response: rescue and evacuation, embargo, and counterterrorism.

⁶⁹ *The Military Balance, 2004-2005* (London: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 2004), p.35.

⁷⁰ The acquisition of additional combat capabilities is being from January 2004, and will be followed by a delivery of U.S. Javelin ATGW, expected between 2005 and 2007. Further orders for RB-70 SAM systems have been made, and these will be delivered by 2006. See, IISS, *The Military Balance 2003-2004* (Oxford: IISS, 2003), p.149.

⁷¹ *The Military Balance, 2004-2005* (London: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 2004), p.36.

⁷² The IISS, *The Military Balance 2004-2005*, *ibid.*, p.256.

On February 11, 2004, Germany, the UK and France, announced plans for the formation of rapid reaction forces, to comprise 1,500-strong 'battle groups' with strategic airlift, artillery, communications and engineering support. These are expected to be ready for deployment in 2007 with a goal of being ready in under 15 days and the ability to stay in the field for at least 30 days but possibly for as long as four months.⁷³

On January 20, 2004 at the African Union (AU) headquarters in Addis Ababa, African defense minister adopted a Common Defense and Security Policy. This was endorsed by AU leaders in Libya, on February 28. They agreed to establish the African Standby Force (ASF), a joint military force with peace-building and humanitarian roles, which is intended to be capable of unilateral intervention in the event of 'war crimes, genocide and crime against humanity, as well as serious threats to legitimate order.' Plans are that the ASF will be in a position to deploy about 15,000 troops by 2005, while the main force elements – five regional brigades – are intended to be available to handle 'less complex' peace support operations and intervention operation by 2010. The European Union has pledged \$310m toward the setup and initial operation of the ASF.⁷⁴ East Africa is also in process of establishing a regional early-warning system, with a situation room linked to the continental early warning system.

What each of the above examples illustrates is that throughout the world regional response forces have been considered and developed as a way to stabilize areas of conflict. Northeast Asia should not be an exception.

⁷³ *The Military Balance, 2004-2005*, *ibid.*, p.37.

⁷⁴ *The Military Balance 2004-2005*, *ibid.*, p.219.

Simulation Exercise

Computer-aided command post exercise for crisis management in Northeast Asia scenarios could focus on staff procedures and processes at Multinational Forces HQs. Combined Joint Task Force command post exercises could be used to practice deployment of deployable joint task force HQs for crisis responses in Northeast Asia.

The U.S., South Korea, and Japan have extensive experience in computer simulation exercises in their bilateral exercise programs. This experience could be expanded to include other regional scenarios of trans-national threats and include the other member states.

Information sharing with Information Technology

Information sharing between and within agencies and infrastructure protection are key objectives. The use information technology to link up different kinds of multinational forces, allows them to fight jointly. Thanks to the rapid global expansion of digital networks, spread of the Internet, and the proliferation of cyber-cafes, village phones, and other forms of shared access to information and communication technology information can be disseminated much more rapidly and to broader target audiences.⁷⁵ This is intended to be facilitated by such measures as a real time counter-terrorism communication network as well as the creation of Unified National Database of Critical Infrastructure. Other priorities include: communications and equipment interoperability; new technologies and tools to detect nuclear, biological, and chemical threats; community preparation and coordination of plans and procedures through a National Incident Management System; improved assistance to immigrants;

⁷⁵Allen L. Hammond, "Digitally Empowered Development," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 80, No.2 (March/April 2001), p.98.

and continued departmental modernization in terms of management and technology. Biological security threats are also an area of concern for the security in the region.

Now that information is the cornerstone of all action, the existence of separate networks operating at different speeds will have an undeniable impact on every partner's battle rhythm.

The U.S. is certainly willing to share most of its information with certain partners. For forces of nations not in this privileged club, integration into American networks will be increasingly difficult, depending on how often they operate with the U.S. and the degree of trust extended to them. Forces not permitted to take part in planning will ultimately be restricted simply to taking orders – possibly to assume high-casualty or politically distasteful role. Information release ability policy, would ultimately decide not only the shape and nature of coalitions but maybe even their very existence.

Even if the Army deploys by itself into an operational theater, it will need to be capable of operating “jointly” with American or Britain naval and air forces.

7.3. Who Takes the Lead

In launching this project, we should try to develop a better understanding of the nature of security military cooperation regime in Northeast Asia, and openly explore whether Northeast Asia Council will make sense and be feasible. The first premise is that a security military cooperation regime would benefit not only the six key actors but also the entire Asia-Pacific region. China, whose largest trade partners are the U.S. Japan, and South Korea, would benefit from a formal economic partnership to strengthen and expand the regional ties of economic interdependence. Likewise, the U.S. Japan, and

Korea could foster greater regional security and prosperity through encouraging fuller participation by China in the multilateral security cooperation.

Second, building a harmonious relationship poses a major challenge for key actors. Clearly there is no auspicious historical precedent for cooperation among the six countries. Equitable relations among them will be extremely difficult to achieve, as each party tends to envision a nightmarish scenario of the other nations ganging up on it. A traditional concern in Japan is that the U.S. may revive its strong affinity for China and form a new China-U.S. relationship, by passing Japan. Some Americans worry that the two Asian powers may forge a “China-Japan condominium” that might serve as the cornerstone of an East Asian bloc. Similarly, the Chinese are anxious about possible U.S.-Japan collaboration to “contain” China.

Third, management of the six party relationships has become more complicated by the growing tendency of domestic sociopolitical dynamics to intrude on the foreign policy of each nation, which reflects the power of globalization and the greater interdependence among nations.

The fourth premise is that despite many challenges and constraints, it can be assumed that there is a strong interest in the region in managing transnational threats. There is a general understanding in Japan and the U.S. on the need to come to grips with an increasingly powerful China, regardless of emotional attachments or reservations about China. China, too, recognizes that it must learn to manage the multilateral relationships, a skill many Chinese leaders admit is not their forte.⁷⁶

National security of South Korea will no longer be exclusively defined as defense from North Korea alone, but should be seen more broadly in terms of national survival in the vortex of powerful regional actors in Northeast Asia, China, Japan, and

⁷⁶ Yamamoto Tadshi, “Is a U.S.-China-Japan Trilateral Dialogue possible?” pp.9-11.

Russia.⁷⁷ South Korea has already taken a step in this direction in its recent National Security White Paper in which it no longer defines North Korea as its main enemy. Although controversial this can be viewed as an enlightened first step to establish a more regional focus.

7.3.1. U.S.-South Korea Co-leadership Approach

South Korea has been steadily increasing its regional security role. Since the late 1980s, the ROK government adopted Nordpolitik and normalized with the former Soviet Union in 1990 and with the PRC in 1992. The South Korean government also maintained forward-looking relations with Japan and even North Korea. South Korea has retained close, cordial relations with all neighboring countries. The power structure of key actors in the region illustrates '2 + 4 + 2' concept (2= The U.S./South Korea; 4 = The U.S., China, Japan and Russia; 2 = North and South Korea) in which South Korea is the nation that is the only one connected in each group.⁷⁸

The U.S has demonstrated its leadership to deter war by multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific area over a half-century. This experience contributed to the U.S. government's successes in building a regional security regime. USPACOM is working with the ROK Joint Staff to ensure our regional security cooperation efforts are in consonance with one another and integrated where appropriate. In particular, South Korea supports USPACOM exercises and seminars aimed at increasing regional cooperation and interoperability among U.S. friends and allies. Korea's contributions to regional peace and stability were clearly demonstrated in East Timor, where South Korea Army troops participated in UN peace keeping efforts

⁷⁷ Kim Tae Ho, "Korea: A Country Profile" in Wilfried A. Herrmann, ed., *Asia Security Challenge* (Commack, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1998), p.242.

⁷⁸ See Chapter 2's Figure 2-1 Restructuring of Six Key Actors in Northeast Asia.

to support the region's newest nation. South Korea continues steadfast support to anti-terrorism efforts as exemplified in Iraqi peace and reconstruction efforts.

7.3.2 U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Approach

U.S.-Japan-South Korea have faithfully maintained free democratic political systems, market economic system, and human rights as common values. In addition, three states have maintained their trilateral collaboration in managing North Korean threats, in particular, the North Korean nuclear issue. Another example is the highly useful and long overdue Trilateral Oversight and Coordination Group (TCOG), a U.S.-ROK-Japan mechanism recommended in the Perry Report.⁷⁹

A U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral working group will be formed to prepare trilateral director council meetings. In a trilateral director council, the U.S., Japan, and South Korea will develop consensus on the regime, and implement combined exercises and confidence building measures and progress from easy and feasible areas to more difficult and complicated ones. If their cooperation is strengthened, the council may expand its membership to China, Russia, and even North Korea. By expanding to include other Northeast Asia states, Director of the Council may revert to basic level of multilateral exercises and CBMs. The end-state as well as the process of the regime will contribute to enhancing mutual understanding, confidence building, and security cooperation in the region.

However, this approach needs to be transparent to prevent misunderstanding of the trilateral option as a means of containment.

⁷⁹ Perry presented his major findings of his "Review of United States Policy toward North Korea" in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs on October 12, 1999. The Perry Report also used this reasoning in explaining its "two-path strategy" toward the North. This can also be found in David Albright and Kevin O'Neill, eds., *Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle* (Washington, D.C.: ISIS, 2000), pp. 299-313.

7.3.3. Six Party Talks Approach

The six nations participating in the Beijing talks can create a new multilateral security architecture in Northeast Asia, which will embody these fundamental principles and assurances and set up a six-party organization, to monitor and verify the member states adherence to their treaty obligations, to negotiate and to implement the enabling agreements. The Beijing process can offer a diplomatic venue for creating a multilateral regional security architecture that will eventually reduce mutual insecurity.

The need for a security structure in Northeast Asia has become increasingly pressing in recent years, and the Six-Party talks on North Korea's nuclear activities may provide the vehicle to establish such a framework. The Six-Party talks provide a structure and precedent for institutionalization.

Successes in less important issues could build trust and create an atmosphere which would help deal with harder issues later. If these countries can sit down and talk about one of the most intractable issues of the region; North Korea's nuclear programs, why can't they sit down and talk about other issues that are perhaps less sensitive? Talks on these "easier" topics could either be held concurrently with those on the nuclear question, or at a later stage. This is not as a replacement for bilateralism but a useful supplement.

If they break down, it is unlikely the six governments would agree to a larger mechanism and also unlikely - bar a significant attitude change - that the Chinese would support a forum that excluded North Korea. The other five parties should set a meeting date, invite Pyongyang, and go ahead regardless of whether the North Koreans turned up.

7.4. Evaluation

As discussed earlier, involvement in war and conflict are costly and the decision to use war as a means to an end should be avoided unless it is the last option. One of the powerful ways to avoid war is to mobilize public support to force their respective government to abandon war. To be effective, strong public support is needed and is achievable if the public is fully educated in strategic and security studies. Educating the public in any discipline is no easy task, but if serious and continuous efforts are taken, they would no doubt it would be successful. Hopefully the day will come when we are able to enjoy the end state of a peaceful and prosperous world for every one.

We need to make every effort to discover the need for public diplomacy, to master the complexities of wielding soft power in an information age. We suggest appointing a new director of public diplomacy directly supporting the President, building libraries and information centers, translating more member states' books into English, Chinese, Japanese, Russian and Korean, increasing the number of scholarships and visiting fellowships, and training more regional speakers and public relations specialists.

The most effective spokespeople are indigenous surrogates who understand other key actors' virtues and faults. Corporations, foundations, universities, and other non-governmental organizations – as well as governments – can all help promote the development of a security military cooperation regime. Corporations can offer technology to modernize educational systems. Universities can establish more exchange programs for students and faculty. Foundations can support institutions of regional studies and programs to enhance the professionalism of journalists. Governments can support the teaching of language and finance student exchanges.

To demonstrate a strong regional will to deter any instability from transnational threats, member states need to organize regional response forces. Saliency is distinguished from relevance in its concern with operational performance and effect. Thus, salient contributions are those that stand out and are notable for their significant effect on operations. Relevance concerns itself with operational pertinence, with the fact that member states' unique contributions should have a significant and demonstrable bearing on coalition operations. Relevance is associated largely with numbers of troops, however, relevance is correlated also with the specialization of contributing troops. Finally, interoperability is defined as the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services and/or accept services from others forces to enable them to operate effectively together. Interoperability is more than the exchange and utilization of data. There are important human dimensions to the problem as well. At the strategic level, interoperability is conducted between national units and concerns itself with coalition building, the search for consensus and the ability to make compromises. It is the attempt to build a common front amongst disparate actors in order to enhance deterrence or negotiating positions. At the operational and tactical level, interoperability concerns itself with the level of integration among force elements. Issues of doctrine, organization, rules of engagement, and command and control all play important parts in establishing the level of interoperability with a coalition at these levels.⁸⁰

In terms of leadership for establishment of the regional security cooperation architecture, U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral working group needs to take

⁸⁰ Myron Hura, ed., *Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), pp.8-13.

appropriate action including the concept and strategy of the regime. Then China, Russia and even North Korea would be invited to join the regime.

Dialogues or other related activities such as joint research, conferences, symposia, and information exchanges that may come under the rubric of “intellectual exchange” and that have a positive role in the development of relations between nations and region, have proliferated in the region. Joint efforts by private policy research institutions, such as CSCAP, are another critical element in building an Asia-Pacific regional community. The management of the regional transnational threats should take advantage of several useful functions of existing non-governmental dialogue efforts. The Military Security Cooperation Regime will encourage sharing of the same information and enhance knowledge about each other, reducing misperceptions and stereotyping.

One function of the Military Security Cooperation Regime is to build close working relationships among the partners. The habit of working together makes it possible for the participants in the dialogue to have shared understanding of the issues confronting them and think together about the joint responses. It is believed that this “sharing process” will eventually lead to the sharing of values, which is critical in building a sense of community among the parties.

Chapter 8. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

One of the objectives of this study was to explore whether Northeast Asia has the potential to build a multilateral security cooperative regime. The study examined alliances in Northeast Asia and determined their compatibility with the concept of cooperative security in the region, reviewed the alleged limitations on the creation of a security regime in Northeast Asia and examined the cooperative security idea as an alternative.

Grasping the reality of bilateral security and military cooperation in Northeast Asia, this study, identified security implications of economic interdependence and transnational threats in the region and discussed the key actors' perceptions and interests toward Northeast Asia military security cooperation regime. Other objective of the study were to design multilateral military cooperation architecture in the region, develop a roadmap to institutionalize a Northeast Asia military cooperation regime to achieve enduring peace based on predictability and stability, and to make policy recommendations to bring this concept to reality.

The study revealed the following findings: Neoliberal institutionalism as a theoretical framework was appropriate; the evolution of the existing Asia-Pacific and Northeast Asia security cooperation arrangements is sufficiently mature to institutionalize in a gradual manner; the economic interdependence is so intertwined with security cooperation to ensure regional sustained co-prosperity through a more secure and enduring stability arrangement and transnational threats are more

imperative than traditional threats. Further, non-traditional threats require collective efforts by key actors in the region; in particular all member states in the region could transform negative perceptions, and negligible gains into favorable perceptions, and visible gains through facing counter-terrorism and the North Korean nuclear issue. Finally, the study explored a potential regional military security regime based on the assessment of a feasibility study. This chapter summarizes what the main part of the study has examined and makes policy recommendations which could be considered by foreign security policy makers and strategic experts.

Neoliberal Institutionalism was Validated as the Appropriateness of a Theoretical Foundation of Northeast Asia Security Cooperation.

Realism and neoliberalism, two schools of international relations theory, offer contending explanations of state behavior within the international system. The latter believes that interstate cooperation will create institutions and regimes for the peaceful settlement of conflicts. The former argues that only ‘self-help,’ the building of individual state military capabilities, can ensure that state interests will be protected.

Neoliberals believe that anarchy hinders cooperation, because of the doubts states have about the compliance of other parties. For neoliberals, the worst outcome for states, in mixed-interest situations, is to be cheated. However, because successful unilateral cheating is highly unlikely, the more likely “outcome” for neoliberals is for all states to defect and find themselves less well off than if they had all cooperated. According to neoliberal institutionalists, anarchy and mixed interests occasionally cause states to suffer the opportunity costs of not achieving an outcome that is more mutually beneficial. Keohane and Axelrod argue that games like Prisoner’s Dilemma,

Stag Hunt, and Chicken explain how many international relationships offer both the danger that “the myopic pursuit of self-interest can be disastrous” and the prospect that “both sides can potentially benefit from cooperation - if they can only achieve it.”¹

As a ‘regime’ is defined in terms of four distinct components to include principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, the concept of international regime becomes more complex. Considering the connections between these four components, it can be concluded that changes in principles and norms lead to changes in the regime itself. Principles and norms provide the basic defining characteristics of a regime, this is because changes of rules and decision-making procedures are mere changes within a regime.

There are strong connections between the ideas of neoliberals and the functions of a regime. Neoliberals argue that international regimes not only create reiteration, but also reduce verification costs and make it easier for member states to punish cheaters. Furthermore they assert that regimes incorporating the norm of reciprocity delegitimize defection, and make it more costly. Thus international regimes do not substitute for reciprocity, but reinforce and institutionalize it.

The concept of cooperative security regime has important connotations for the concept of neoliberal institutionalism. The cooperative security concept appears to be the most applicable to Northeast Asia.

¹ Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” *World Politics*, vol. 38,

First, cooperative security is among the more widely used terms, complementing more traditional views, such as collective security, collective defense, deterrence, and mutual assurance that focus almost solely on the territorial state and highlight the military dimensions of security and threat. Cooperative security, however, acknowledges a more inclusive definition of security, and challenges to security, encompassing, but moving beyond, the traditional notion of military threat and response.

Second, because of the underlying assumption that bilateral agreements become highly problematic and vulnerable to collective security politics, the idea of cooperative security becomes more applicable to Northeast Asia, as Northeast Asian countries not only prefer to keep bilateral relationships, but also admit the current alliance of other parties. For example, the U.S.-Japan security treaty is still regarded as one of the most important pillars of the Asia-Pacific security architecture. Even China sees the security alliance between the United States and Japan as a useful tool, as it constrains Japan's potential remilitarization.

Third, while an external threat of the Soviet Union was needed to form a collective defense system in Europe, the cooperative security idea is more appropriate in Northeast Asia, where the nature and source of potential security threats differ widely. Moreover, the cooperative security idea does not require a particular state as a potential threat to help form a security regime. On the contrary, it is inclusive in its approach, by seeking to engage adversaries and non-like-minded actors, as well as putative friends. When it is considered that the bilateral gaps separating those regional powers are bound to be narrow, and also the flexibility and inclusiveness of the

cooperative security to bilateral relations, and alliances, a cooperative security system is more applicable to Northeast Asia than collective security.

Fourth, presuming that the current trend of economic cooperation is inextricably connected with one of the principles of cooperative security, it could be argued that cooperative security has become more applicable to Northeast Asia. This is because cooperative security does not privilege the military as the repository of all wisdom related to security issues, and it does not assume that military conflict or violence are the only challenges to security.

Last, unlike collective security, cooperative security presumes that states are the principal actors, but does not preclude, by definition or by intent, that non-state actors, whether institutional or more *ad hoc* trans-national actors and NGOs, have critical roles to play in managing and enhancing security relevant dynamics. With the expansion of the number of NGOs in Northeast Asia, the cooperative security idea is applicable to Northeast Asia. The purpose of security cooperation is to accumulate dialogue custom among nations in the region, pursue sharing common norms, and enhance the possibility of predictability on a state's behavior through discussion of common interest of participation. The consultative body pursues security in the manner of gradual approaches political dialogue, military confidence and arms reduction. Participating nations not only mitigate security's uncertainty and share gains in the other spheres including security. Security cooperation initially shapes non-permanent organization and attempt to achieve its own goal through institutionalization and establishment of a permanent body in the course of the coordination. Regional cooperation approaches enhance regional security. It means preventive diplomacy through preventing and eliminating the causes of the inter-state

disputes and regional instability.

Evolution of the Existing Asia-Pacific and Northeast Asia Security Arrangements is Sufficiently Mature enough to Institutionalize a Security Regime.

The Asia-Pacific region can draw on many lessons from the European experience. One key lesson for Asia is that new structures evolve and existing ones can adapt and expand from limited political consultation to operational military cooperation for collective security in a relatively short time. Practical, event-driven operational cooperation has often enabled difficult structural/political problems or hesitancy to be overcome. Enhanced military transparency and openness can contribute to and accelerate this process of developing practical cooperation. Various systems are born to deal with new challenges. No single system can be counted on to handle all issues. Interlocking, not "inter-blocking" systems are to be sought.

While ASEAN has undoubtedly been a force for peace, stability and development over the past three decades, new questions have arisen over the "ASEAN way" of consensual problem solving that emphasizes informality and is characterized by the absence of formal institutions. A system is needed that maintains the strength of relationships developed by such informality but that has sufficient formal structure to function effectively in crisis. The expansion of membership to include all ten countries in the region has resulted not in unity but an erosion of the collective will, given the much greater diversity of members, the inter-state tensions between them and their inability to respond to regional developments, such as the economic crisis of

1997 and the East Timor crisis of 1999. The crisis of September 1999 arose when Indonesian controlled militias attempted to overturn the pro-independence majority vote. ASEAN member states, cautious not to upset Jakarta, were hesitant to take the lead in organizing humanitarian intervention. Instead, Western states, spearheaded by Australia and the U.S., led the effort, while the UN Security Council provided the authorization necessary to legitimize intervention.

NEACD is a unique instrument for security practitioners and military officers in the region to share defense information including defense policy and strategy, doctrine and military transformation. While the ARF has undertaken a number of useful initiatives in the area of confidence building, it has been unable to effectively assume preventive diplomacy and crisis management roles.²

ASEAN needs to be actively engaged in norm setting within its wider international environment and to retain leadership of ARF, as well as keep a careful watch on APEC and UN activities that impact on its roles.

The ARF has yet to address, much less resolve, any major flashpoint like the Korean conflict or the cross-straits problem. ARF has no permanent Secretariat after more than a decade of existence. Conversely, the OSCE is certainly useful as a comparison and as a pointer to what kind of security cooperation might be developed, but it cannot be the standard against which the ARF should be judged because, mainly, the strategic environments of the two organizations are different.

² Andrew T.H. Tan and J.D. Kenneth Boutin, eds., *Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategy Studies, 2001), p.8-10.

To establish multilateral security cooperation mechanisms in East Asia should progress step by step. For example, the ARF regarded its three major functions, namely CBMs, preventive diplomacy and then seeking for ways to resolve conflicts, as the three phases of its development. At present, the ARF is going from the first phase, CBMs, into the second one, preventive diplomacy.

From the long run, in East Asia, cooperative security mechanisms may take shape with multi-levels including the regional level, sub-regional level and bilateral level, multi-forms including official and unofficial and multi-functions coexisting. The ideas of "ASEAN + 3" and ARF are the most likely to work, and, the "ASEAN + 3" will develop into an "East Asian Regional Cooperation" mechanism, which may play an important role in the future regional cooperative security mechanisms.

Asia is characterized by strongly nationalistic governments. The shallowness of multilateral organizations such as APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum, and their inability to resolve regional crises, only adds to the sense of the caution. Even where favorable change does occur, it could bring with it a strong sense of nationalism: for example, in a unified Korea. Although an accommodation between Japan and China would clearly be preferable, it would not be to the benefit of the Western alliance system if it involved a strategic partnership between Asia's two great powers. Similarly, if a "triple entente" were to emerge between China, Russia, and India, it would threaten the entire stability of the region. Neither of these scenarios is at all likely.

The ARF has many operational drawbacks. First, the biggest obstacle to the ARF

being an efficient security regime is its cumbersome decision-making procedure. Operational decisions simply cannot be taken in a group of 23 states, particularly by consensus. Second, for the time being, the ARF has no military force at its command for resolving crisis situations with regard to an ARF peacekeeping operation. Third, the mandate for crisis management and conflict settlement is still seriously limited. Fourth, the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs poses an obstacle to carrying out urgent and just international intervention as we observed in Cambodia and East Timor. Given the situation in the Asia-Pacific, a new principle of legitimized international intervention is necessary. East Asian states are especially sensitive to prerogatives of sovereignty because of a historical legacy of frequent fighting between kingdoms during pre-contact centuries, and the painful Western colonial experience after contact. At present, ARF does not have a Secretariat of its own to lend support to year-long activities. It could be that strengthening the ARF Chair will lead to establishment of a Secretariat. In any case, these shortcomings are acknowledged here with the hope that bringing attention to them will cause them to be addressed in the future. Some proposals regarding the future direction of ARF are appropriate here.

ASEAN should increase its institutional capacity for managing the ARF. The main focus should continue to be on CBM and preventative diplomacy measures. A subregional body should be encouraged for the Northeast Asian region invoking only regional states or the North Pacific region including the U.S. and Canada and it is recommended that the ARF should also facilitate strong instruments and processes for bilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

Security dialogues are primarily run by foreign ministries and attended by military men in a supporting role. Track-1.5 and track-2 conferences are limited in terms of lack of the substantial discussion and binding results among scholars and policy makers in private capacities. Most multilateral security arrangements and dialogues excluding the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue broadly discuss the agenda relating to Asia-Pacific regional security issues, not specific Northeast Asia issues. Further defense dialogues need to be explored for Northeast Asia.

The Dynamics of Economic Interdependence is So Intertwined with Security Cooperation to Ensure Regional Co-Prosperity.

Presuming that the current levels of economic cooperation are inextricably connected with one of the principles of the cooperative security idea, it could be argued that the cooperative security idea is more applicable to Northeast Asia. The spillover effect reflects the expansive logic of integration because economics and security are not separate spheres of national integration, but are intimately and inextricably intertwined. The sustained economic growth in the region has not only attracted many investors, taken in a large amount of investments, and promoted rapid growth in regional economic cooperation, it also has increased the internal stability of the countries in the region and deepened their interdependence, thus creating among them the conditions for political solutions to disputes on the basis of dialogue and negotiation. The new organizing principle in the making of a new regional order put an emphasis on economic cooperation and mutual prosperity based on non zero-sum logic.³

³ Yang Sung Chul, "The Restructuring of an East Asian Order and Two Koreas," in Pak Chae Ha, Nam Sung Woo, and Eugene Craig Campbell, eds., *A New World Order and the Security of the Asia-Pacific*

Economic development in East Asia has been accompanied with growing regional integration. The intra-regional trade ratio for East Asia was 30.98 percent in 1970, lower than EU and NAFTA countries. It increased to 50.38 percent in 2000, higher than NAFTA, indicating growing economic linkage within the region as a result of the long-term economic growth.⁴ The study shows the rising intra-regional trade shares of China, Japan, and South Korea. The intra-regional trade among them has increased substantially and their shares of exports and imports have reached 20.3% and 27.6%, respectively in 2003. Therefore China, Japan and Korea are very important trading partners for each other. Given deepening economic interdependence among these three countries, the need for policy cooperation among them is obvious.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and recent developments in Central Asia and the Russian Far East have stimulated a great deal of attention on energy issues, including the various competing pipeline projects in a region where there also exist serious geopolitical and religious fault lines. There was a consensus that energy security and national security today are inextricably linked. However, energy security also has implications for human security and regime security. The Sakhalin natural gas pipeline construction plan will produce natural gas in the area of Sakhalin and build a long pipeline that passes through Far East Siberia and reaches the East seashore of the Korean Peninsula.

This is a multilateral joint project in which South Korea, North Korea, the U.S., Japan, China, Russia, and Europe participate. This project also induces North Korea

Region (Seoul: The Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 1993), pp. 179-80.

⁴ Fen Lu, "Free Trade Area: Awakening Regionalism in East Asia" Paper for the conference "Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia" organized by the Institute of Northeast Asia Business and Economics of Korea University and China Center for Economic Research at Beijing University, held at Seoul, September 19, 2003.

to be a member of the global community by enabling the Stalinist country to join an international joint project. This project is highly meaningful in realizing the vision of the future 'Northeast Asia Union.' This contribution is all the more significant as it can serve as a basis for cultivating a multilateral cooperative framework on regional security and foreign relations. The fact that the European Union started from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) is fully suggestive for the conception of a Northeast Asian cooperative body.

Of the minilateral institutions in Northeast Asia, the Tuman River Area Development Program (TRADP) is perhaps best for testing neoliberal institutionalism in the Northeast Asian setting. Nearly a decade old, the TRADP, in which China, North and South Korea, Russia, and Mongolia have all been involved, seems tailor-made for exploring the possibilities and limitations of a multilateral Northeast Asia economic regime. The TRADP presents a unique case of regime formation involving multiple sets of actors-provincial, national, and international – all engaged in bargaining over the nature, scope, and direction of Northeast Asia economic development

The South Korean governments, in particular, as elaborated in President Kim Dae Jung's 'Sunshine' policy and President Roh Moo Hyun's 'Peace and Prosperity' policy, are premised on the belief that economic engagement is one of the best ways of improving relations, turning the North into a stakeholder in peninsula economics and ultimately offering all sides in the security equation an opportunity to shift resources from the military sphere into the economic sphere.

The Kaesung Industrial Complex Project is designed to enhance South Korea's security and economic position. The North Korean population is a source of low cost labor that can help South Korean companies recapture their share of the manufacturing marketplace just as it did in the 1960's to 1980's and has now been eclipsed by China. It also serves as a mechanism to increase transparency and reconciliation between North and South thus improving the conditions for security cooperation. A by-product of this is the potential to prevent a catastrophic collapse of North Korea as well as renewed civil war.

Interdependence directs our attention to the specific conditions that shape the way states interact with each other. Where interdependence is strong, it should reduce incentives to resort to armed force.⁵ In part it points to issues where either the scale of the problems transcends the abilities of individual actors to make effective policy by themselves, or where the linkages are so strong that independent action by any unit cannot avoid engaging other concerns. Interdependence also points to the general conditions of interaction, especially the capacity of the communication, transportation and organizational networks that not only tie them together, but also determine the speed and volume of everything from trade and finance to military coordination. Common security invites us to consider what military, economic, political, societal and ecological conditions in the regional system might work to ameliorate the power-security dilemma.⁶

⁵ Barry Buzan, "Is International Security Possible?" in Ken Booth, ed., *New Thinking about Strategy and International Security* (London: Harper Collins Academy, 1991), p.42.

⁶ Barry Buzan, *ibid.*, p.44.

Transnational Threats are More Imperative than Traditional Threats. Non-traditional Threats should be Resolved by Member States Collectively.

Transnational security issues are clearly growing problems. Issues that at one time might have been classified as law enforcement, health, or labor issues are now emerging as threats to the nation-state and to regional stability. Ironically, it is their diffused nature and protracted emergence that makes these issues particularly dangerous. Infectious diseases spread slowly and inexorably, beyond the scrutinizing cameras of the international media. Cyber-crime, narcotics and human trafficking, alien smuggling, and climate change are persistent phenomena. Various terrorist groups in Asia are increasingly linked with each other and with suppliers of money, weapons and training outside the region. Terrorism overlaps with other transnational security threats, as terrorist groups frequently engage in organized crime and narcotics trafficking to raise funds. Combating terrorism effectively may prove to be an obstacle to democratization in Asia, exacerbating the tension between state police powers and individual rights.

Common diseases in the region include Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)/Human Immune Deficiency Virus (HIV), Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Tuberculosis, Malaria, Dengue Fever, Cholera, Bird Flue, etc. AIDS is now generally recognized as a major potential economic and security threat to the national-state, a threat which is propagated through migration.⁷ Infectious diseases can devastate a country's economy, thereby potentially contributing to increased unemployment, reduced social stability, and, in the worse case, political collapse.

⁷ James E. Coughlan and Robert T. Burstall, Migration as Challenge to Asian Security, in Wilfried A. Herrmann, ed., *Asia's Security challenges* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1998), p.103.

Diseases not only detract from human security and quality of life, they can also undermine national security by degrading civil governance, causing a disruptive loss in the labor force, and posing an enormous burden on government health budgets. Diseases must be managed or mitigated by the use of regional initiatives and international cooperation.

Illegal migration and human smuggling are growing transnational challenges in Asia and are inextricably linked to economic disparities that exist throughout the region. Migration is not merely a movement of people, but rather, migration is a process, a dynamic socio-cultural and eco-political process: it involves not only the physical movement of people from one spatial location to another, but also the movement of economic resources, cultural practices, political ideologies and social values.⁸

North Korean migration into China has a long history. Many of the people clandestinely leaving North Korea in the middle 1990s and massive defectors who leave North Korea in the early 2000s have been termed economic refugees and victims of political persecution. Internationally, the issue began to attract attention against the background of the economic flight North Korea suffered in the 1990s. The issues for debate are about the legal status of the North Korean individuals who have managed to cross the shared Sino-North Korean border into China and international responsibilities for dealing with the suffering of the Korean people. In the event of an internal collapse in North Korea, China might be to some degree preparing for such a possibility by amassing over 100,000 troops near the southern border. Granted,

⁸ James E. Coughlan and Robert T. Burstall, "Migration as Challenge to Asian Security," in Wilfried A. Herrmann, ed., *Asia's Security challenges* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1998), p.87.

China's change of its border police from lightly armed paramilitary forces to a regular military one carries implications beyond a desire to stem the flow of North Korea migrations. The forced repatriation of the illegal workers not only challenge domestic stability but also serves as a source of inter-state tension and regional insecurity.⁹

Environmental degradation presents a number of security challenges to the nation-state. There are the effects on human health as environmental degradation tends to increase rates of cancer, heart disease, and other diseases. Transboundary pollution may also be considered a security threat by recipient nations that are forced to endure a neighboring country's pollution.

To counter transnational threats, what role should the military take? Proponents for military deployment argue that transnational security threats are the major security challenges to the nation-state in the 21st century and, given this reality, it is natural and appropriate to call upon military forces to address them. Some argue that in the post-Cold War era, the notion of security should be expanded to include issues that will have a direct impact on state stability and the welfare of individuals. In some countries, transnational security threats constitute a greater threat to political stability than even traditional state-based military threats. Because military troops are the ultimate instrument of the state in maintaining its security, it is logical that military forces would be involved in combating such threats. Moreover, the likely scale of transnational problems in the future--mass migration, pandemics, environmental catastrophes--requires a massive state response. In general, only the military has the ability to react quickly enough with adequate resources.

⁹ Amitav Acharya, *Regionalism and Multilateralism* (Singapore: Time Academic Press, 2002), p.253.

Another argument for military involvement concerns the nature of transnational threats themselves. In general, transnational threats are driven by non-state actors, but occasionally there are situations in which governments act as the "hidden hands" behind transnational security events. Evidence has surfaced that North Korea engages in official acts of narcotics trafficking and money laundering. Similarly, Thai officials have claimed that criminal maritime piracy is sometimes sanctioned by Vietnamese officials. Mass migration events, moreover, are not always as accidental as press accounts might portray. Some health officials, meanwhile, fear that a massive infectious disease outbreak could be precipitated by a biological terrorist attack which might be orchestrated by a hostile government. Traditional law enforcement initiatives are constrained in Asian maritime regions because of jurisdictional issues, political sensitivities, failure of states to accept responsibility, lack of enforcement capacity, among other reasons. To diminish maritime crime, states should share information and cooperate for their common good. Coordination must also occur between regional and international agencies.

For military leaders, the dilemma is becoming clear. On the one hand there is the imperative to maintain war readiness within the armed forces, particularly since more-traditional threats are not likely to dissipate anytime soon. On the other hand, military leaders must recognize that transnational threats will increasingly demand more attention and resources from the armed forces. Government leaders may attempt to create specialized agencies to alleviate the burden from the military. But such an attempt is likely only if nation-states perceive transnational issues as imminent threats to their security. Until that recognition occurs, military leaders should prepare to confront the growing transnational security challenges that lie ahead.

Key Actors in the region could Transform Negative Perception, Negligible Gains into Favorable Perception, Visible Gains through Multilateral Framework.

All the key regional states modified their attitude toward multilateral security during the 1990s. The United States has preferred bilateral security alliance to multilateral ones throughout most of its security arrangements with Asian countries, since it wants to remain a constant presence in East Asia with a network of bilateral security alliances designed to prevent the emergence of any security vacuum or substitute regional hegemony in the region. The negative attitude of the U.S. toward multilateral security cooperation in East Asia is because of the possible impediment of its traditional bilateral relation and its fears regarding Russia and China's influence on the region. However, because of its decreasing economic influence over the region, lack of any vital threat and growing divergence with its alliance, the U.S. interest in multilateral security cooperation has somewhat increased. There have been several proposals from the United States. These are mostly not the official position of the U.S. government with the exception of Clinton's proposal for a 'Pacific Community.' Thus the important point is that the U.S. has begun to express increasing interest in multilateral security cooperation in East Asia.

There are several U.S. interests in forging multilateral security cooperation. First, it would be a useful strategy for the U.S. in that this strategy could provide the U.S. with strong support in world and regional affairs from regional countries. Second, it could be able to meet the rising voice of domestic politics calling for more burden-sharing and responsibility with its Asian allies and a reduction of the American defense budget. Third, multilateral security cooperation could be used as a tool to supplement

the U.S. 'double containment' policy; to contain China and Japan at the same time toward Northeast Asia, which has been one of the main objectives of its strategy since World War II. Fourth, multilateral security cooperation could promote the U.S. engagement, not containment policy toward China. Fifth, it has been U.S. policy to oppose efforts at domination of the region by a power or group of powers hostile to the United States, so it could be a legitimate substitute. Finally, multilateral security cooperation can provide the United States with a venue where they can deal with one of the major threats, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While Bush believes that the U.S. can use its power to shape world politics at will, he has overestimated what the unilateral exercise of its power can achieve. America is the only superpower, but it is not an omnipotent one, it still requires the cooperation of others to achieve most of its security goals.¹⁰

China has been inherently suspicious of multilateral security cooperation arrangements as a result of its historical experience with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, China worries that a multilateral security forum could become a platform for China-bashing and it is concerned that the U.S. or Japan could seek to set the agenda of a multilateral security arrangement and to dominate the other states in the region. A preference for bilateral settlements to its security issues, such as the Spratly Islands dispute, over multilateral negotiations has been another reason limiting Chinese enthusiasm for multilateral structures. In the post-Cold War era, however China has shown a somewhat different attitude toward such arrangements. This is because first, the security relationship between China and Russia is getting closer than before. Second in 1997, China and Russia ended centuries of border

¹⁰ Ivo H. Daalder and James M Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), pp.188-89.

disputes by signing an historic accord mapping out the frontier between the two giants for the first time. Finally, China has attempted to ease widespread regional suspicion over her territorial ambitions. Even though it does not completely reject multilateral approaches to security, however, Beijing is the least enthusiastic country toward building multilateral security arrangements in Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, there are several important advantages to its passive support on a security regime in Northeast Asia. First, China's foremost security objective for the coming decade will be to create an international environment conducive to the successful implementation of China's economic reform. Second, multilateral security cooperation will bring advantages to China's security interest serving to constrain Japan's military role in the region. Finally, multilateral security cooperation could also be a forum for enhancing understanding of China's defense strategy and easing the suspicions of other states toward China. Thus China seems to view increasingly multilateral security arrangements in East Asia as inevitable and to have concluded that non-participation in the process could be more risky for China's national interest than selective involvement. China is likely to continue to maintain a cautious stance toward multilateral security arrangements and wait for other countries to take the initiative while emphasizing that most security problems in the region are not amenable to multilateral solutions.

Before 1990, Japan was negative about establishing multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, because it feared that multilateral security cooperation might endanger the U.S.-Japan alliance system and it might freeze the northern territory disputes with Russia permanently. However, due to the demise of the major Japanese military threat, the Soviet Union, the possible downsizing of American

troops in Asia and the growing economic conflicts with the United States, Japan has changed her position. Furthermore, there are positive signs that the territorial problem between Japan and Russia can be solved in a peaceful way. Since 1992, Japan has become one of the strongest advocates of building a security regime in Northeast Asia.

The changed Japanese position can be explained due to the following interests in a cooperative security regime in Northeast Asia. First, Japan was concerned with China's possible emergence as a military superpower in the near future. On the whole, the balancing game is difficult for Japan, because Japan does not have the power to contain China alone and must therefore rely on the U.S. power. Thus Japan has an enthusiasm for using Asia's burgeoning multilateral institutions as a way to indirectly influence Chinese behavior. Second, many of Japan's neighbors remain uncomfortable about expanding Japan's security role in Asia. A multilateral cooperation regime could offer a particularly effective means for Japan to become more actively involved in regional security matters in a manner that is non-threatening to neighboring countries. Last, preventing the development of nuclear weapons in North Korea and eliminating the danger of nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia is one of the highest Japanese security interests.

When it comes to multilateral or multinational security cooperation, regardless of region, Russia is the strongest advocate. It has continuously proposed various types of security arrangements in Northeast Asia. Compared with other regional countries, Russia has more clearly expressed its interests in pursuing multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia. First, multilateral security cooperation could promote a favorable international environment for the Russian economy. Second, it would create

a regional environment in which reform-minded Russian leaders are politically more able to reduce military expenditure, defend their actions before critics at home and embrace the idea of regional security. Third, the multilateral approach is also a means of bringing pressure upon China over nuclear force reductions, illustrating Russian concern over China's nuclear arsenal. Fourth, some of Russia's most insightful foreign-policy specialists worry that a weak Russia estranged from Japan, uninvolved in regional security structures, and focused on the short-term gains from arms sales to China could be vulnerable as China becomes increasingly powerful and nationalistic. Finally, Russia is interested in being freed from the Japanese threat. A self-assertive and nationalistic Japan, if it drifts from the security alliance with the United States toward a more independent military posture, represents another source of insecurity for Russia.

South Korea has made strenuous policy efforts to establish a Northeast Asia multilateral security cooperation architecture ever since the end of the Cold War. South Korea has pursued bilateral security cooperation with five key players and mini-lateral security cooperation policy including a U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation system and a China-Japan-South Korea cooperation arrangement. South Korea partially succeeded in winning a favorable response from the key players related to the active efforts in the region. The facilitating factors for South Korea's efforts to establish a Northeast Asia multilateral security cooperation system are the South Korean governments' consistent multilateralism policy, a balanced diplomacy between the U.S. and China, and South Korea's desire to strengthen the independent national security from heavy dependence on the U.S. It is inevitable for South Korea to require neighboring states' cooperation in establishing a peace regime on the

Korean Peninsula. The importance of the geo-economic, political and strategic location, which South Korea retains, contributes to facilitating the establishment of a Northeast Asia multilateral security cooperation regime. For those who hold the engagement assumption, they see many gains despite no specific reciprocation by North Korea.

Although North Korea used to be reluctant about regional multilateral security cooperation, there are several facilitating factors from domestic and foreign perspectives. The demise of the former Soviet Union and the dissolution of Eastern European socialist states resulted in the collapse of the Cold War system, at which time North Korea lost its most reliable allies. Especially, the normalization between South Korea and Russia and China forced North Korea to isolate themselves from the diplomatic community. Unfortunately, North Korea is under serious pressure from U.S. economic sanction and military threat due to the North Korean nuclear issue. Domestically, severe economic crisis, which could almost lead North Korea to collapse, induced its ideological hazardous and socially devious behavior. The domestic pressures force North Korea to shift their focus toward external world.

While South Korea, Japan and Russia eagerly support a multilateral security regime in Northeast Asia, the United States, China and North Korea have shown less enthusiasm over the idea. However, the United States and China have seriously recognized the inevitability of multilateral security cooperation after experiencing terrorism and the North Korean nuclear issue. More dynamic multilateral security cooperation activities are needed to actually form a security regime.

In the mid to the long run, the Northeast Asia cooperative security mechanism may take shape at multiple-levels including the regional level and bilateral level, official and unofficial, and multi-functional arrangements.

A Proposal for Northeast Asia Military Security Cooperation Regime

Based on the assessment of a feasibility study, we could identify there is a broad consensus among key actors in Northeast Asia that a multilateral security cooperation arrangement needs to be institutionalized to create a new security order. Security cooperation in the region focuses on establishing a framework for reconciliation, peace, stability and co-prosperity by implementing feasible options relating to security issues. The establishment of a regional security cooperation regime needs to consider the following factors. First, and most important is to identify issues relating to regional security cooperation. The potential security cooperation issues will include the North Korean nuclear program, arms control in the region, and the establishment of regional security cooperation arrangements.

Second, how to proceed in developing the regional security cooperation is the next consideration. The security cooperation needs to be implemented gradually taking into considerations its feasibility and its impact. The first step necessary for the implementation of regional security cooperation will be creating a favorable environment for the improvement of cooperation, the second step will be enlarging the realistic cooperation and the final step will direct the institutionalization.

Third, how to define the relations between the actual improvement of mutual cooperation and the institutionalization of norms is a final consideration factor. As an example, the priority is given to make an action plan about how to resolve the North Korean nuclear program and arms control issues, or to the establishment of an institutional framework for Northeast Asian multilateral security dialogue. It is more appropriate that the actual norms and institutions will be established through the increase of dialogue and cooperation. Igniting cooperation and interaction improvement will contribute to creating conditions for integration. It is required that we need to make visible efforts in institutionalization through explicit norm and construction of institutions. The military security cooperation architecture will be implemented by the gradual expansion of military exchanges, multilateral exercises, prevention of dangerous military activities, and institutionalization including secretariat and multinational forces (MNF) command.

Opinion leaders need to make every effort to gain domestic consensus. The epistemic community consisting of policy makers, lawmakers, and scholars relating to security areas needs to be networked to achieve regional affinity.

Dialogues or other related activities such as joint research, conferences, symposia, and information exchanges that may come under the rubric of “intellectual exchange”, that have a positive role in the development of relations between nations and region, have proliferated in the region, as have joint efforts by private policy research institutions. The management of the regional transnational threats should take advantage of several useful functions of existing non-governmental dialogue efforts.

The Military Security Cooperation Regime will encourage sharing of information and enhancing knowledge about each other, reducing misperceptions and stereotyping.

One function of the Military Security Cooperation Regime is to build a close working relationship among the partners by establishing a regional multinational forces headquarters. The habit of working together makes it possible for the participants in the dialogue to have shared understanding of the issues confronting them and think together about the joint responses by employing crisis action center, simulation center and regional response forces. It is believed that this “sharing process” will eventually lead to the sharing of values, which is critical in building a sense of community among the parties.

Figure 8-1 Northeast Asia Security Architecture



As shown on the Table 8-1, regional summit talks should be held to discuss security

issues in the region. Annual summit talks need to be established to provide a guidance and policy related to resolve transnational threats. In the event of transnational contingency situation, political committee of political leaders' or ministerial meeting, should decide whether they deploy regional response forces to counter the threats. Each member state should take appropriate actions to get the domestic political consensus including lawmakers' confirmation. Once each member state decides the size of response forces, military committee should develop the command structure of the CJTF related to the contingency.

Policy Recommendations

The following policy recommendations should be considered by policy practitioners, lawmakers, and the intellectual community related to security areas:

Strategic and Security Awareness should be Inculcated for the Public. Appoint a New Director of Public Diplomacy directly Supporting the President. Wield Soft Power in an Information Age. Increase Member States' Participation in Other Member States' Internet Sites.

Presently, as practiced in the past, there are several approaches already taken to inculcate strategic and security awareness. To name a few, these approaches include: (1) states including those less-developed should continue to establish more research organizations; (2) conducting continuous research on strategic and security studies issues with findings being distributed freely for public consumption; (3) enhancing interactions among states and cultures; and (4) strengthening national capacity to promote the peaceful resolutions of regional conflicts.

In addition to the present approaches in enhancing the strategic and security studies, it is proposed that additional approaches be considered. These include: (1) organize more public seminars, not only for practitioners but for all levels of the general public; (2) create more opportunities to study in as many institutions of higher learning i.e. in both military and non-military higher learning; (3) encourage writing competitions on issues related to strategic and security studies. Winning articles are published and provided with more handsome recognition including financial rewards;

(4) government and private institutions are encouraged to create new job opportunities and allocate extra funds to sponsor strategic and security studies.

We need to make every effort to discover the need for public diplomacy and to master the complexities of wielding soft power in an information age. We suggest appointing a new director of public diplomacy directly supporting the President of each member state, building libraries and information centers, translating more member states history, culture and security book into English, Chinese, Japanese, Russian and Korean to enhance mutual understanding, increasing the number of scholarships and visiting fellowships, and training more regional speakers and public relations specialists.

The most effective spokespeople are indigenous surrogates who understand other key actors' virtues and faults. Corporations, foundations, universities, and other non-governmental organizations – as well as governments – can all help promote the development of a security military cooperation regime. Corporations can offer technology to modernize educational systems. Universities can establish more exchange programs for students and faculty. Foundations can support institutions of regional studies and programs to enhance the professionalism of journalists. Governments can support the teaching of language and finance student exchanges.

The member states should increase their participation in other member states' Internet sites, which are a primary source of information for the public. Foreign, defense ministries in the region should be more vigilant in monitoring the other member states' media to respond to and refute misinformation and misunderstanding.

Member states governments should seek other member states' government's commitment to correct inaccurate information about other members.

Foreign and defense policy makers should be more active and visible in engaging in dialogue— particularly with the younger generation— through lectures and forums conducted at counterpart policymaking agencies and military education institutions throughout the region. Foreign and defense ministries in the region should also invite non-governmental experts on regional security cooperation to other member states for regular visits. Member states should be encouraged to establish a regional visitor's program that will invite other member states experts on regional security cooperation to come to their countries to participate in public forums.

Six-Party Talks should be a vehicle for a structure and precedent for Regime Institutionalization. Regional Defense Dialogues should be Initiated and Expanded by Military officers. Additionally, a U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Working Group for the Regime should be Operated.

The need for a security structure in Northeast Asia has become increasingly pressing in recent years, and the Six-Party talks on North Korea's nuclear activities may provide the vehicle to establish such a framework Six-Party talks providing a structure and precedent for institutionalization. To prevent competing alignments from forming and to ensure its role in the region's expanding multilateral diplomacy, the key actors should move swiftly to convert the Six-Party talks into a broader regional security mechanism focused on stabilizing relations among the five, or preferably six nations,

Successes in less important issues could build trust and create an atmosphere which would help deal with harder issues later. Talks on these "easier" topics could either be held concurrently with those on the nuclear question, or at a later stage. We can argue that any move in that direction would hinge on progress with the Six-Party talks. If they broke down, it was unlikely the six governments would agree to a larger mechanism and also unlikely - bar a significant attitude change - that the Chinese would support a forum that excluded North Korea. The other five parties should set a meeting date, invite Pyongyang, and go ahead regardless of whether the North Koreans turned up.

Security dialogues are primarily run by foreign ministries and attended by military men in a supporting role. Track-1.5 and track-2 conferences are limited in terms of lack of the substantial discussion and binding results among scholars and policy makers in private capacities. Most multilateral security arrangements and dialogues excluding the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue broadly discuss the agenda relating to Asia-Pacific regional security issues, not specific Northeast Asia issues. Further defense dialogues need to be explored for Northeast Asia.

In terms of leadership for establishment of the regional security cooperation architecture, a U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral working group needs to take appropriate action including the concept and strategy of the regime. Then China, Russia and even North Korea would be invited to join the regime.

Establish the Northeast Asia Multination Forces Command as an end state of the Regional Military Security Cooperation Regime in order to Counter

Transnational Threats. The Newly Born Command will be a Power Sharing One with the Rotation of Command among All Member States on a Periodic Basis with an Additional Caveat. Activate Regional Crisis Action Center and Response Forces, and Conduct Coalition Exercises. Counter-transnational Threats Training Center should be established.

For operations the nation having the greatest functional expertise will be given command. As an example, in the event of natural disaster contingency, commander, the Regional Multinational Forces TF, will be Japanese. The council will decide this based on established procedures.

To demonstrate a strong regional will to deter any instability from transnational threats, member states need to organize regional response forces, in which member states designate forces and periodically conduct coalition exercises. Interoperability is more than the exchange and utilization of data. There are important human dimensions to the problem as well. At the strategic level, interoperability is conducted between national units and concerns itself with coalition building, the search for consensus and the ability to make compromises. It is the attempt to build a common front amongst disparate actors in order to enhance deterrence or negotiating positions. At the operational and tactical level, interoperability concerns itself with the level of integration among force elements. Issues of doctrine, organization, rules of engagement, and command and control all play important parts in establishing the level of interoperability with a coalition at these levels.¹¹

¹¹ Myron Hura, et al., *Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), pp.8-13.

Member states also need to establish relief operational forces, which military personnel and equipment including deployment assets may increasingly be used in relief efforts in the aftermath of the climatic catastrophes, such as the Tsunami earthquake in December 2004. Significantly, the conditions under which each type of operation will be authorized, when it will be successful, and how to train soldiers and policy makers for it are dramatically different across some of the options.¹²

The South Korean government could consider the possibility in establishing a regional training hub to establish program of instructions in counter-transnational threats training center, PKO, Counter-Terrorism and nation building/reconstruction operations. The concept will fit President Roh's concept of becoming a regional economic hub by making Korea a regional military hub. It will provide for expanded military to military contact between South Korea and other international forces. It will also provide foundation for cooperation on future PKO and other operations to include potential operations with coalition forces in North Korea in any scenario.

War is not the Final Option.

Involvement in war and conflict are costly and a decision to use war as a means to obtain strategic ends should be avoided. One of the powerful ways to avoid war is to mobilize public support to force their respective government to abandon war. To be effective, strong public support is needed and is achievable if the public is fully educated in strategic and security studies. Educating the public in any discipline is no easy task, but if serious and continuous efforts are taken, no doubt it would be

¹² Paul F. Diehl, "Non-traditional Uses of Military Force," in Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Roy Gordson and George H. Quester, eds., *Security Studies for the 21st Century* (Washington: Brassey's, Inc. 1997), p.300.

successful. Hopefully the day will come where we are able to enjoy the end state of a peaceful and prosperous world for every one.

In order to get more people involved and convince them that war is not solely the final option, it is also proposed that the focus of the field of inquiry be extended to include studies on how to prevent state actors from using the military capability to achieve their military goals.

Limitations of the Study

This study is limited in the following areas. There is a lack of knowledge of Chinese, Russian and North Korean perception toward cooperative security. Military cooperation activities between China and North Korea and Russia and North Korea are not transparent; therefore it is difficult to analyze their current and potential future levels of cooperation.

An area for additional study includes transformation of traditional military organizations to operate against non-traditional threats.

Cooperative security among the member states allows each to focus more resources on economic expansion rather than military expenditures. By cooperation among member states' militaries, they can apply the strengths of each against the threats instead of each military developing all the capabilities necessary to counter-transnational threats.

Despite the in-depth research of this study, the above shortfalls illustrate that this dissertation is merely a stepping stone for future development. Adopting the regime outlined in this dissertation can lead to expanded cooperation that will mutually benefit all member states economically as well as militarily.

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