Abstract


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This dissertation investigates the Polish political, economic, and social transition from 1989 to 2003 from communism to capitalism, specifically its impact on a powerful Polish institution – the Roman Catholic Church - and by extension, the Church's electronic media properties. As Poland changed from an eastern-looking collectivist society to a more western individualist society, its conservative Catholic Church likewise moved from a more autocratic, cohesive force towards a more liberal, Post-Vatican II approach to worship supported by the first Polish pontiff, John Paul II. Various Catholic religious orders – with political viewpoints ranging from liberal to ultra-conservative – managed the Church’s radio, television and Internet properties and shaped the Church’s mediated messages along their own religious ideology. This divisiveness was similarly reflected in fragmentation within the Church hierarchy, with individual Polish bishops supporting the media properties that most closely espoused their viewpoint.
BUILDING THE STAINED GLASS PRISM:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLISH CATHOLIC CHURCH’S
ELECTRONIC MEDIA PROPERTIES
1989-2003

by

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Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of the University of Maryland in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2004

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my two sweeties - Jillian and Adrienne, and to my uncle, Pat Monachino, who stayed with me until I finished my doctoral work.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation is possible because of the cooperation and work of so many people. First and foremost, I would like to thank my wife, Jillian, for her providing moral support and guidance as well as for her outstanding copy editing skills and guidance. I would also like to thank Anna Jasińska for being my sounding board for ideas and my Polish cultural compass, and Sue Kopen-Katcef for helping me make time between newscasts to write a dissertation.

The public diplomacy people at the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw and Kraków – especially John Matel, Grzegorz Gortat, and Iwona Sadecka - were invaluable in helping me set up interviews, provide media briefings, and even occasionally translate conversations. Thanks to Katarzyna Spiechlanin and Danuta Libby for interpreting, translating and transcribing the interviews. Special recognition goes to Magdalena Kopczyńska who took time from her busy schedule to help me find translators and to introduce me to potential interview subjects.

I would like to especially recognize Dr. Ray Hiebert for the guidance and support he has given me from my first day here at Maryland. You made my doctoral goals your own and pushed, prodded, and cajoled me through the entire process. I would also like to thank Drs. Maurine Beasley, Douglas Gomery, Christopher Hanson, and Bart Kaminski for their ideas and thoughts; you have added a great deal to the following pages.

Research for this dissertation was supported in part by the Hiebert Journalism International Travel Award from the Philip Merrill College of Journalism and from a University of Maryland doctoral fellowship grant. The people and organizations above are not responsible for the views expressed herein, and any errors are mine alone.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Statement of Problem

Americans turned to their political and social institutions during the tumultuous days following the September 11th terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. People were glued to their television sets for news of President Bush, our members of Congress and other key politicians. At the same time, churches announced they would remain open all night to serve the lines of people spilling out onto sidewalks and streets. Days later, churches reported higher than average attendance at weekend services, and politicians closed ranks in support of the President. The media also obliged by covering developments commercial-free around the clock for days on end. In a number of ways, the situation we witnessed in the United States after the terrorist attacks was a microcosm of how Poles coped with the large scale social and political turmoil that occurred before, during and after the transition from communism to capitalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

If the national institutions Americans turned to were the presidency, the Congress, the media, and the church during threatening times, the Poles relied on their Polish national symbols - the Solidarity labor union which rose up to challenge the communist regime and its leader, Lech Wałęsa, other key political dissidents, and the Polish Catholic Church. These icons served Poland well in the beginning phase of the transition, but eventually even they came be held suspect. Poles ceded political power to these new leaders, but then quickly became disillusioned by their new governance and disenchanted by the continual economic hardships they had to endure. The populace reacted by
demanding a more pluralist form of government and ousting most of the original players elected by landslides in Poland’s first democratic elections. Today, Solidarity is a mere shadow of itself in stature and in numbers; Lech Wałęsa has become less of an elder statesman and more of a historical relic, the dissidents-turned-politicos have retired, have quit out of frustration, or have been marginalized into ineffectiveness. Moreover, the politicians affiliated with the Polish Catholic Church were devastated in parliamentary elections winning not a single seat in parliament. However, unlike Solidarity, the influence from the pulpit remains significant. Of the symbols of nationalism that calmed the populace in 1989, only the Catholic Church has remained a persistent influential force in the Polish public sphere.

Fleres (2001), in a study that examines secularization trends in seven Central European countries, states that “a more detailed analysis of the role of the Roman Catholic Church, its stands and actions, [and] its organizational structure should be made” (p. 198). The People’s Republic of Poland and its Catholic Church were chosen for this study for many reasons: Geographically, Poland is the largest country in Central Europe, both in terms of land mass and population. Politically, Poland stood at the vanguard of the changes that swept through Central and Eastern Europe, setting an example for those countries that followed on its heels. Socially, Poland has more Catholics per capita than any other Central and Eastern European country, and the Polish Catholic Church held the unique position of being the only legal opposition to the Communist Party in the Eastern Bloc because of the Church’s social and political position it held with Poles. From an economic perspective, Poland was the first country to successfully implement the Balcerowicz Plan (the economic ‘shock therapy’ that many
transitioning countries used to quickly move from communism to capitalism), giving it a head start on other countries transitioning in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Finally, Poland’s dominant social institution, the Polish Catholic Church, has historically demonstrated a desire to influence every aspect of Poland’s political, social and economic sectors since the country’s inception.

Poland’s media tradition instituted a privatized free press very soon after transitioning from communism to capitalism. Therefore, an investigation into the influences a dominant, national institution like the Polish Catholic Church has on a country’s media, especially during a tumultuous time of national change is an excellent way to look at the impact media has on a culture in flux. One example of the Church’s attempts to have a controlling hand in Poland is a broadcast media provision it negotiated with the communists and implemented with the democratic administrations that followed, giving it access to the country’s broadcast frequencies. This put the Polish Catholic Church in a unique position to influence Polish politics and culture for the near future.

The Polish Catholic Church is a survivor. The Church has been present for, and often dominated over, Poland’s one thousand year history. The Church’s influence has always been indirect -- always influential, rarely seen. Vatican representatives served as political advisors to Polish kings for centuries. During the days of the partition (1772-1918), when Poland ceased to exist as a nation for over a century, the Polish Church remained influential both with the government in exile in Italy and with Poles inside the former borders. When Poland was “given” to the communists by the Western Allies in 1945, the Catholic Church managed to create for itself a dual role, of working with the atheist Communist Party to maintain social stability in the country, while the Church
gave voice to dissident views as the only legal opposition against the communists in Poland.

The Church played an integral part in the rise of Solidarity as a political force and of Lech Wałęsa as its national leader. In 1981, when the Solidarity union was clashing with the communist regime in the Lenin Shipyards in Gdańsk, Pope John Paul II, a native Pole, released *Laborem Exercens* an encyclical endorsing a papal encyclical by Pope Leo XIII from nearly a century before called *Rerum Novarum*. Both encyclicals warned against the evils of socialism while extolling man’s spiritual need for meaningful work and the Church’s obligation to help workers form unions. The result was world-wide Catholic support for Solidarity and against the communists. Less than ten years later, communism was dead in Poland and members of Solidarity were propelled to power.

After Wałęsa took office as Poland’s first democratically elected president, the Church advised the fledgling government and in doing so, advanced the Church’s own agenda. The Church was adapting to a friendlier political atmosphere and began seeking a much more direct role in Polish politics. Even when Wałęsa was voted out of office in 1995 and a former communist won the presidency, a political party with the backing of the Church was able to take control of parliament. However, after being decimated at the polls in the 2001 parliamentary elections, the Catholic Church was forced to revisit the role it could play in Poland. Thanks to contingency steps taken shortly before the transition, the Catholic Church is well situated to remain a social force in 21st century Poland. The Church has positioned itself, primarily through electronic media properties established in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to be a political, social and economic force in Poland for the near future. This study examines the steps the Church took during
communism’s last gasps and Solidarity’s first steps that assured the Church a permanent place as a Polish symbol of nationalism and influence.

The current Pope, John Paul II, the first Polish cleric to rise to the papacy, played an integral part in the fall of communism, the rise of Solidarity, and political concessions won by the Church after the transition. The pontiff continues to cast a watchful and interested eye on his native home and often guides the workings of the Catholic Church in Poland from the Vatican. It is difficult to assess how successful the Church would have been in adapting throughout the transition without John Paul II’s active approach.

While visiting Poland in 1991, Pope John Paul II put in motion a shift in Polish religious doctrine. The pontiff convened the Second All-Polish Plenary Synod and charged them with pioneering a new path for the Church in post-1989 Poland. The Pope called for:

A transition from the kind of ministry that enabled people to be free and to act independently to a ministry that helps them grow as active Christians, able to find their religious identify in the face of the modern world’s complexity. The Pope called for evangelization efforts to be doubled, [for more Church openness toward laity], for ecumenical work, and for entering into a dialogue with those at the edge of the Church (Królak & Żbilowski, 1999, p. 287).

In reference to the Church’s evangelization efforts, the Synod placed as top priorities the promotion of the Catholic press and the education and pastoral care of Catholic journalists (Królak & Żbilowski, 1999, p. 207), placing a new emphasis on the role of the mass media in Church activism. A key player in the Synod was Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, an expert in canon law, a key negotiator for State-Church autonomy, and one of the people responsible for warming relations between the Church and the majority of the mass media. He became Secretary of the Polish Episcopate in 1993, making him responsible for carrying out the Pope’s vision of a transformed Catholic
Church in Poland. In response to John Paul II’s call from two years before, a Catholic news wire service and a Catholic television station were started in 1993. The goal of the Catholic Information Agency (KAI) is to promote “the Catholic Church in the lay mass media and [provide] the Catholic editorial offices with all necessary Church news and information,” (p. 294). The Church also established TV Niepokalanów, a television station with nearly a national reach that airs religious programming and family-oriented entertainment.

This study takes a detailed look at how and why one gatekeeper, the Polish Catholic Church, asserted itself as a media force soon after the transition to capitalism. The years under study for this project are 1989-2003. This period is significant because it begins with Poland’s political, social and economic transition and the Church hierarchy’s attempts to adapt to the new Polish landscape and concludes with the Church’s difficulties establishing itself in a meaningful way in Poland’s media landscape. More precisely, this study examines the steps Church officials took and investigates the motivation behind the Church’s development of KAI and its other Polish media properties, the goals Church leaders had for these channels and whether these goals have been realized.

One distinguishing feature of the Polish transition has been the transformation of the Polish media system from a communist to a free-market capitalist structure. Government-owned media organs now compete with Church-owned, private, and foreign properties. This study, “Building the Stained Glass Prism: The Development of the Polish Catholic Church’s Electronic Media Properties 1989-2003” details the initial steps of the Catholic Church into the electronic media industry in post-communist Poland.
This study is unique in that very little research has discussed this aspect of the Polish transition.

**About the Title**

The title of this paper, “Building the stained glass prism” conjures up visions of light refracted into its various elements. My intention here is to use the prism metaphor to describe the way the Catholic media in Poland operates. My metaphorical descriptions range from figurative descriptions to perspectives that are more abstract. For example, from a very rudimentary position, the stained glass element of the prism denotes the Catholic tinge applied to every message, person, and signal that passes through the Church’s filters (the prism).

Another figurative translation of the stained glass prism metaphor describes the institutionalization of the Catholic Church in Poland. The obvious religious application denotes the stained glass as representing the institution of the Catholic Church and religiosity. The prism denotes taking a singular idea, breaking it down into its elements and dispersing that message with a Catholic tinge to the masses. In Poland, the Catholic media tints all of its messages with the evangelical message of the Church. Since the Catholic Church’s approach has always been extremely hierarchical, it is not difficult to envision the stained glass prism as a dominant, some even say authoritarian, presence - dispersing its version of reality via its media properties.

The stained glass prism metaphor can also describe the fragmentation of a single message. The Catholic media, not unlike the secular media, takes a single informational item and changes (bends and colors) the message to suit its various media properties. Along the same lines, the Catholic Church’s various gatekeepers give new meaning to the
informational items it disperses by supplying their own unique frame of reference as it passes through its stained glass prism.

Looking at the refraction process from the reverse direction, a metaphorical vision of taking various information channels and presenting them in a unified Catholic worldview comes to mind. Moreover, continuing to view the prism in reverse, you can envision the many faces of Polish society unifying by means of the Polish Catholic Church into a powerful sociological faction. The stained glass aspect of the prism alludes to the indoctrination efforts of the Church in the post-communist era to influence Poles and Polish society.

An abstract approach to this paper’s title requires a post-modernist viewpoint. Post-modernism questions the existence of a single truth, and the solitary beam of light, which could represent a single event in time, passes through the tinted prism of the Church where the institution paints the event with the Church’s version of Poland’s past, present and future.

From a political perspective, the stained glass prism represents Poland and the role the Catholic Church played in Poland’s first decade of transition from a one party communist system (the single beam of light) into the democratic plural party system that now exists.

Throughout this discussion, the prism represents Poland, the Catholic Church, or the Catholic media; a prism forever cloaked in the stained glass markings of the Catholic Church representing the Church’s role as Christian evangelist, protector of Polish social norms, and champion of Polish nationalism and identity.
Purpose of Study

This study takes a unique look at the Catholic Church’s involvement in Polish society during and after communism. It focuses on the Catholic Church as a social institution and its direct involvement with Polish politics and with Poland’s public sphere at a time when the country’s social system was being redefined. Poland is a unique case when considering the transitional countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Poland’s homogenous society of people who closely identified themselves with their Catholic faith made it difficult for the communist system to fully establish itself within the fabric of Polish society. The Catholic Church’s role as the only legal opposition to the communist party increased its power and status not only in Poland but in all of Central and Eastern Europe. This study focuses on Poland, the country with the largest and strongest Catholic presence, because it best exemplifies the impact of the Church before, during and after the transition from communism to capitalism.

Triandis (1995) encouraged more intercultural and intra-cultural communication research be conducted in Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in order to gauge the multi-faceted cultural changes that have occurred since 1989. This study attempts to do that by updating the research concerning the complex media system that has developed in Poland, putting its media system in historical context, and by highlighting how one cultural institution, the Polish Catholic Church, use its media properties to deliver messages intra-culturally to the masses.

This study accepts the anthropological premise that a nation’s people define the cultural norms that ultimately make up the culture. People also make up the groups, or social institutions, within a culture. These societal institutions also influence the cultural
norms that define a culture. This study focuses on two societal institutions, the mass media and the Polish Catholic Church, and describes how the mass media act as a conduit between the society and the individual, and how the Church use the media for evangelization and acculturation.

Reinforcement of cultural norms is the responsibility of a culture’s social institutions like religious organizations and the mass media. The Church does this through civil leadership, liaising with the church community, and via religious ceremonies that validate accepted social behavior. The media reinforce cultural norms by affecting cultural reality through their dissemination of cultural information, reinforcing socially acceptable behavior, and marginalizing those who deviate from established norms. Power brokers within a society influence the media, and thus the cultural information it disseminates, influencing cultural norms more than a person with no access to mass media operations.

In the case of Central and Eastern Europe in general, and Poland, specifically during the transitional time from communism to capitalism, definitive power figures and even the society’s cultural norms were, and some say still are, in flux. In Poland, these power relationships have yet to be fully determined, leaving the mass media in a transitional state and Poland’s cultural norms in flux. This study focuses on the Catholic Church’s attempts to maintain its status in today’s Poland by asserting its views via both the pulpit and the press.

Past studies on Poland have obviously focused a great deal on the political turmoil that has occurred since the transition. Studies on the Polish media have also focused on the transition from a communist media system to one that is more libertarian in nature.
Studies on media ownership focus on the trend toward foreign ownership and the birth of new media organs. These studies, however, gloss over, or avoid altogether, the gatekeeping functions of the media owners and the way they frame the messages they disseminate to the Polish population and the world.

As an influential social gatekeeper the Church has added status as a media operator. Although the number of media properties the Church operates is relatively small in comparison to all mass media properties in Poland (Church properties comprise 5.5% of all radio stations, 2% of all television stations, and 1% of all newspapers and magazines in Poland), the Church’s electronic media properties represent a larger share of its outlets in relation to its print properties and are therefore more worthy of in-depth examination.

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**Research Questions**

Horowitz (2001) recognizes the integral part the Polish media play in the changing societal norms occurring in Poland today and their influence on the Polish people. This study examines how the Polish Catholic Church from 1989-2003 developed and managed media institutions to support its political and social agendas in Poland. In particular, this study looks at the Church as a gatekeeper attempting to influence the new Polish society through both politics and mediated messages.

This study seeks to answer four basic questions:

1. What was the aim of the Polish Catholic Church in forming its electronic media institutions?

2. To what extent is the operation of these media organs a result of Pope John Paul II’s direct intervention with members of the Polish Catholic Church?
3. How did the actions taken by the Church in forming electronic media institutions work in concert with the political and social goals of the Church during the same period?

4. To what extent are the Catholic media properties in Poland contributing to: (a) the maintenance of the Polish identity; (b) social acculturation; (c) the reinforcement of the Church’s philosophical and/or political beliefs; (d) the reinforcement of denominational beliefs; (e) the creation of a civil society; and (f) the promotion of the normative organization of the congregation in the changing Polish society?

**Research Findings**

The results of this study portray a Polish Catholic Church that was in flux at nearly the same time as Poland’s transition. Internal policy changes divided the Church hierarchy causing an ideological fragmentation among the Episcopate. These internal changes also brought about a more secular approach to Catholicism than Poland had known for its first one thousand years. As the Church moved away from its more traditional role as the keeper of the Polish national identity and modernized its approach to religion, the Church alienated itself from some of its congregation. These secularization and alienation trends can best be seen in the Church’s operation of its mass media properties where the Church diluted its evangelization messages and pursued financial viability for its media properties over overt evangelization. In this way, this study indicates that since the fall of communism the Polish Catholic Church has failed to capitalize on its iconoclastic position within the Polish culture and to serve its basic evangelical function in Poland.

Immediately after the transition, the Polish Church – against the Church’s own doctrine – tried to play a direct political role in the new State. After realizing that the Polish public would not accept it in this new role, the Church retreated. The Church also
sought to use its media properties both to evangelize and to indirectly influence political events in this time period when Poland was recreating its identity. Its success has been mixed – while it has attempted to use individual media channels to target specific audiences in order to reach a wider variety of audiences, it has not exercised discipline over the messages being communicated. This division of media properties to target specific groups is also reflective of the fragmentation and secularization going on within the Church itself. Confusion over what role the Church should play in this new era has resulted.

Today, Poland is adopting a more secular society, fewer Catholics are attending mass, and new Church membership is down. The Church’s problems stem from three changes that occurred during the period under study: (1) a fragmentation of the Polish Episcopate after the death of the Church’s patriarchal Primate; (2) the secularization of the Polish Conference of Bishops following the adoption of the Second Vatican Council’s modernization recommendations; and (3) a lack of familiarization with operating commercial electronic media properties.

Outline by Chapter

Chapter 1 provides a thumbnail sketch of the study, the research questions being considered, and a brief explanation of the study’s findings. Chapter 2 reviews the academic literature that preceded this study. This study adds a new dimension to mass communication’s body of literature in that it focuses on a powerful religious institution that uses its own media properties to remain a political and social force during a time of tremendous social change. A thorough literature review reveals that little research has been conducted on the gatekeeping function of religious institutions in general, and even
less has been done on those in Poland. In addition, most literature on the Central and
Eastern European transitions, normative press theory, framing theory, politics and media,
and religion and media either gloss over or ignore all together the topics addressed in this
book. These research divisions help build the foundation for the entire study and set the
stage for the more detailed chapters to follow.

Chapter 3 focuses on the methodology used for this study. Since many of the
research questions require a qualitative assessment of past events, this study utilizes
several tools of the qualitative researcher: oral history interviews and textual analysis of
documentation. These types of data gathering techniques usually yield massive amounts
of information to be sorted, organized, and analyzed. This study is no exception. In
addition, this study compares its findings to information gathered by other academicians.

Chapter 4 outlines the evolution of Church doctrine over the past century as it
pertains to the Church’s relationship with the State. It also examines the thinking on the
potential applications for mass media to further Church goals, particularly proselytizing.

Chapter 5 takes a unique look at the political role the Catholic Church played in
pre and post-communist Poland. As stated earlier, Roman Catholicism is the dominant
religion in Poland, and the Polish clergy has played a part in Polish politics since the
early monarchies. The chapter’s principal focus is on how this role for the Church
changed after communism fell. It also outlines one of the key events that shaped the
Polish Catholic Church’s operation in post-communist Poland. The death of Poland’s
long-time Primate Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński caused divisions within the Church’s
hierarchy. This fragmentation of the Polish Episcopate has negatively influenced the
Church’s media properties in a profound way.
Chapter 6 takes a rare and comprehensive look at the history of mass media in Poland before the transition and how it was completely reconfigured by the new government after 1989. This chapter sets the historical and present day context for the discussion of the Church’s current media outlets which follows in Chapter 7.

Chapter 7 outlines the exclusive findings of this study: the changes the Polish Catholic Church underwent in the past two decades and why they occurred. It covers the political and media roles the Church tried to assume after the fall of communism, when it lost its cache as an activist force against the regime. Chapter 7 then assesses why the Church failed in its attempt to become a major player in politics in the 1990s. It reviews the Church’s most significant media properties and discusses their strengths and weaknesses, and the causes of such. Finally, it makes recommendations on how the Church could more effectively serve its congregation.

Chapter 8 reviews and answers this study’s research questions. It also discusses the limitations of the study and proposes possible follow on applications.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

To lay the groundwork for the placement of this study amongst the current and past research pertaining to this topic, literature from several different research genres must be examined, critiqued, and discussed. This literature review culls research from cultural transition research, normative press studies, framing theory, politics and media, and religion and media in order to establish this study’s unique place within communication’s academic body of research.

The existing literature regarding intercultural communication theory in general and normative cultural theory specifically, as well as articles on normative theories of the press, and literature focusing on the transitional period of Eastern Europe (especially as it pertains to religion, politics and hegemony) is rich in description and analysis but lacks current examples. This study looks specifically at the Polish Catholic Church’s electronic mass media properties in order to better understand not only the changes that took place in Poland after the transition from communism, but also to look at how the Catholic Church in Poland changed during the period under study. This type of investigation has not been attempted in past and current studies. These past studies, however, do provide context for understanding this study. Therefore, a thorough discussion of the findings of each type of research as it relates intra-culturally to Poland is needed.

Cultural Transition Research
Parsons (1951) divides social systems into economic, political, educational and religious subsystems. Johnson and Tuttle (1989) add two others -- the family and the media. Johnson and Tuttle stress that these social systems “bring different meanings to the communication process (p. 464),” and thus are important to examine when researching a culture.

Herskovits (1955) and Triandis (1994) provide excellent, adoptive definitions of culture. Herskovits describes culture as the “human-made part of the environment.” Triandis’s definition of ‘subjective culture’ serves as an excellent description of what can simply be called “culture.”

Subjective culture results in automatic processing of information, because it specifies what is worth noticing, for which the language provides a label; how that is to be evaluated; what are desirable or proscribed behaviors for members of the culture (norms); what are desirable or proscribed behaviors for those holding positions in the social structure (roles); and what are important goals and principles in life (values) (p. 44).

Cultural norms are formed, instituted and reinforced by societal institutions. As previously described, the Polish culture and its institutions are undergoing an enormously difficult transitional period from what researchers like Triandis (1995) and Hofstede & Bond (1988) would deem a collectivist societal structure (the communist system), to a largely individualist culture based on free-market competition and individual entrepreneurship.

Applying Triandis’s culture definition to the Polish Catholic Church – one of Poland’s most significant social institutions – it is easier to understand the Church’s place in the changing Polish culture. Since the vast majority of Poles consider themselves Catholic, they have often looked to the Church in varying degrees for the culture’s norms.
Since Poland’s transition, cultural influences from Western Europe have pervaded the Polish culture, threatening the Church’s proscriptive influence on society.

Not only has the Church’s power to influence normative behavior among the new Poland been threatened, but the Church’s role within the new Poland has changed as well. The Church has always held influence in Polish society, but since Poland’s transition, the society has adopted a more secular, some may say consumer-driven, ideology that is antithetical to the Catholic Church’s tenets. Not only does this shift in societal roles threaten the Church’s influence it also forces the Church to adapt to the new culture or be further marginalized by the new Polish society.

Lastly, this Polish cultural shift towards the West is also changing Polish values. Under communism, the good of the state outweighed the good of the individual – a philosophical ideal that Catholicism also supports. The economic reversal that occurred in Poland after the transition set that philosophy on end, and forced Poles to pursue self betterment over the collective. In this way, the approach toward Catholic teachings had to be amended, allowing for a freer flow of communication between church leaders and their congregation. In this way, understanding the ideological changes that occurred in the Church is crucial to understanding the changes that social institutions like the Church had to undergo after the cultural shift from a collectivist to an individualist culture.

Hofstede & Bond (1988) describe an individualist culture as one that reinforces loose ties between individuals, in contrast to collectivist cultures, which tie individuals to strong, cohesive in-groups. In a collectivist society, an individual’s identity is strongly linked to his/her in-group memberships. In an individualist society, personal identity is found in the individual’s personal successes.
Cultural communication studies often refer to “in-groups” and “out-groups” competing for dominance within a culture. According to Ting-Toomey (1999), an in-group is “a group whose values, norms, and rules are internalized by its members,” and an out-group is defined as “a group whose values, norms, and rules appear to be inconsistent from those of the in-group and are viewed as out-group values or attributes” (p. 82). In addition to Ting-Toomey’s definitions, a societal in-group can also be described as a group whose values are internalized by a large group of people in a society.

In-groups within collectivist cultures use the society’s political structure to preserve the collective (Triandis, 1995). In totalitarian states, the political regime tries to eliminate competing out-groups that challenge its authority. The communist party was very effective in limiting competing out-groups throughout the Soviet Empire. (One exception was its unsuccessful attempt to stifle the Catholic Church’s voice in Poland. The Church was the only legal opposition in Poland throughout communism’s reign, and enjoyed the support of the Polish people more profoundly than the communist party ever did. However, surviving in this communist environment required the Polish Catholic Church to adopt Church policies unique to the Polish situation.)

Following 1989, a complete change in the societal structure away from collectivism and toward individualism was necessary in all countries that rejected the communist ideology for a more democratic system because, as Triandis (1995) states, “democracy requires individualism” (p. 143).

Triandis (1995) also found that “the greater the cultural distance between two societies [i.e., between individualist and collectivist societies], the more difficult is the
adjustment” (p. 122) for people. An assumption can then be made that it would be equally difficult for people within a culture to adjust to a complete shift in cultural ideology. This is exemplified in the Polish case, where the attempt is made to replace a cultural blueprint that requires a highly collectivist populace with one that rewards individualist behavior. Add to that the influence a highly respected, and highly collectivist, social institution like the Catholic Church, would have on Poles, and the cultural confusion that results can be better understood. The resulting uncertainty among Poles during this transitional time may make traditionally collectivist societal institutions like the Polish Catholic Church appealing because these institutions offer familiar societal surroundings in a vastly changing world. In the same vein, these collectivist institutions must also adapt to survive the changing societal norms that accompany the transition from a collectivist to an individualist society.

Koh et al (2001) paint a bleak economic picture for Poles during the transition -- complete job changes, job responsibility restructuring and gender pay bias made for an unstable private life for many Poles. Rural residents, especially farmers, and retirees – who followed a collectivist ideology but were never “collectivized” by the communist system – were hit the hardest. Since Polish farmers were never forced into the collectivization process by the communists, the farms were never modernized and so after the transition, privately operated farms had to leap frog from a horse-and-plow existence to a large-scale production model in order to compete on the open agricultural market. Retirees found their monthly pensions would buy fewer and fewer things in a competitive marketplace as compared to the cost-controlled communist system. Female pensioners, who were paid less during their working lives and therefore received less in
retirement pay, were forced to rely more heavily on the incomes of other members in their household to live.

The economic uncertainties that accompanied the transition to a capitalist system marginalized Poles that had neither the human nor the monetary capital to benefit from the transformation. Some of these disenfranchised people became nostalgic for a more collectivist system like communism and the leaders that espoused that doctrine became more reliant on institutional support for food and necessities, and became more isolationist in their political thinking. In short, many of these Poles turned to the ideologically collectivist and philosophically conservative messages the Polish Catholic Church was delivering by pulpit and via its mass media channels like its Radio Maryja radio station. Zandberg (2001) calls these ultra-conservative messages anti-liberal, and since they were delivered by Catholic clergy over a Church-owned radio station, they contributed to the battle between the newly formed individualist society and the members of the society that wanted a return to a more collectivist culture.

Conversely, traditionally individualist societal institutions like political parties, business and finance institutions and universities would have a better chance of thriving in the new system. Similarly, those people who valued individualist successes over that of the collective would have a better chance of succeeding in the new system – leaving those collectivists behind. The Catholic Church used its more moderate media properties – namely radio stations like Radio Plus – to reach those individualists who were adapting to the new Polish rules. In both the Radio Maryja and the Radio Plus examples, the owner of the media – the Catholic Church – was using its media properties to reach its congregants, but with very different messages.
The individualism-collectivism model is an important body of communication research. However, the model’s propensity to lump all people within a society into one broad behavioral category that is based largely on the culture’s political system is flawed at best, and therefore has to be questioned. Communist Poland, for example, which, according to researchers like Triandis, would fall squarely into the collectivist model, should have a population of people that value the safety and security of the collective. Although this may be true of some Poles, the actions of the masses to participate in and acquire personal gain from, for example, Poland’s underground second economy businesses contradicts the notion that all people within the culture act similarly and aspire to similar goals. The simple fact that many Poles disregarded the communist collectivist ideology is testament to the individualist spirit that occurred in the collectivist-centered society, and predicts that collectivist institutions, like the Catholic Church, would have difficulty in an individualist culture without adaptation.

Although the individualism-collectivism theory is widely faulted for painting an entire culture with the same broad brush, the data that this body of theoretical research has yielded is substantial and well respected among communication scholars. Indeed this type of research is beneficial when looking at societies from a ‘macro’ level; however, more research needs to be done at the ‘micro’ level to investigate institutions and subcultures within a transitional country. To this end, alternative ways to define cultures besides individualism-collectivism are worth investigating.

Markus and Kitayama (1998) question the practice of defining people within a nationality using a single personality framework. They argue that a single culture may be composed of people who act both individually and collectively – necessitating a re-
thinking of Triandis and his colleagues’ individualism-collectivism paradigm. In addition, the researchers examine the culture psychology of personality (also known as sociocultural psychology) in order to shed light on how culture affects a person’s psyche, and vice versa.

Markus and Kitayama specify that one’s culture is solely responsible for a citizen’s psychological development while, at the same time, the personalities within a culture then work in concert to form the culture. The authors then claim that it is impossible to examine a person on an individual level without taking into account the cultural setting in which the person lives.

Since people form the culture, as well as the institutions within the culture, one could also extrapolate that cultural norms are influenced not only by individuals but by societal institutions as well. Applying Markus and Kitayama’s ideas to Poland, institutions like the Catholic Church need to recognize, communicate with, and appeal to collectivists and individualists within the Polish culture in order to remain viable. Pettigrew’s (1991) work with normative theory develops this perspective even further.

Pettigrew divides norms into two types, formal and informal. Formal norms are the ways intergroup communication “ought to happen,” and informal norms describe the way intergroups actually communicate. He theorizes that the global changes that have occurred within and between countries and cultures this century have caused instability in formal norms, while informal norms have so far remained relatively unchanged. However, Pettigrew fears this formal norm breakdown has begun affecting informal norms and could have dire consequences to intergroup relationships both globally and domestically.
Pettigrew establishes social psychological processes that underlie normative change. In his view, members of a society have to view change as a critical component to an institution. If they do not see the inevitability of change, members may feel that a refusal to change can keep the old system in place. Secondly, Pettigrew agrees with contemporary research that supports the notion that behavioral change begets attitudinal change. Thirdly, Pettigrew stipulates the need for intergroup co-mingling to establish positive attitudes toward the ‘other’ group. Successful intergroup communication requires each group to view the other as equals, the groups should be interdependent to some degree, and leaders in each group should encourage interaction between the groups.

Pettigrew recognizes, and is concerned about, the changes taking place in many cultures around the world and invites researchers to study change in these countries. This study focuses on how normative change is affecting the Polish culture, specifically how the Polish Catholic media are affecting and influencing normative change in Poland.

Pettigrew emphasizes the need for researchers to look past the existence of formal and informal norms and delve into the historical origins of both types of norms. An examination of the historical, political and religious issues that have brought Poland to this point of change is needed and occurs within these pages. In addition, since cultural norms are relayed and reinforced by societal institutions during a time of transition the culture’s mass media system plays a large part in redefining the new culture.

Current published research on transitional countries like Poland has focused largely on the political and economic changes that have occurred since 1989 and views an evolution of each nation’s mass media as simply a consequence of political and economic
restructuring. Although this is true, a thorough investigation into who is controlling the media and the messages they are disseminating to the culture is overdue.

Giorgi (1995) identifies three inter-related factors to define transformation of the media structures in transitional countries like Poland: ownership, regulation, and control of the media. All three of these factors concern power brokers and the people or institutions that aspire to power. Giorgi fails to thoroughly discuss the Catholic Church’s role in these three factors, however they are worth noting. The Church operates many radio and a few television properties that reach most of Poland. Church leaders, since the waning days of communism, have played an influential role in affecting Polish media regulation to suit the Church’s goals, and, through political affiliations, the Church continues to keep a watchful eye on who controls the Polish mass media. In this way, this study adds to Giorgi’s previous work and places the media issue more in a social context than does Giorgi’s research.

Marxism-Leninism advocates a strong, prominent mass media system to be used by an authoritarian government as a vehicle for propaganda, social control, and acculturation (DeBardeleben, 1997). This utilitarian view of the media as a tool of acculturation is not easily overcome. Even today, more than a decade after the countries of Central and Eastern Europe began their transition to democracy, dominant in-groups continue to vie for control of the mass media systems in their respective countries. Spotlighting one of these organizations for study is beneficial for identifying how these institutions are redefining society and the methods being utilized to reach that end.

According to Triandis (1995), current inter- and intra-cultural communication research needs to be conducted in Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
to gauge the multi-faceted cultural changes that have occurred since 1989. Here, Triandis promotes learning more about the society writ large. This study focuses more on understanding how one relatively inaccessible social institution that epitomized the collectivist culture, the Polish Catholic Church, adapted to the cultural changes taking place. To this end, the study looks at the Catholic Church’s media properties since they are the most visible and overt product of that institution’s conduit to the members of that society.

Looking at subordinate organizations within a larger institution in order to better understand what is happening inside that institution is a viable method of study. Callinicos (1991) studies the media systems in various Eastern European countries to better understand the political changes that occurred in those countries after 1989. To Callinicos, these revolutions constituted a change only in the political order. At the social level, he describes a mere re-composition of the capitalist class. For Callinicos, a more individualized form of capitalism replaced the old communist order, which was essentially capitalist, albeit state-capitalist. Democratization was necessary to allow this re-composition of the ruling class to take place. As the system shifted from a collectivist to a more individualized form, fragmentation of the ruling class occurred.

This class fragmentation is best seen in relation to each country’s mass media system. Those elites who lost their jobs in the upper echelon of state-owned broadcasting after the fall of communism gravitated toward the privately owned media. Therefore, there was no shift in the political power structure per se; the same people were controlling the media system – albeit some in the public sector and some in the private sector.
Callinicos’ held up for the first few years after the transition, but now needs to be updated. As each government opened their media systems to private ownership, other stakeholders – like foreign media conglomerates and the Catholic Church - with their own institutional goals began to challenge the government’s media dominance to a degree. A better understanding of how those non-governmental media owners are using the media to further their own agendas is needed.

Tismaneanu (1998) also describes the revolutions of 1989 as a “collective mirage,” re-shuffling the old bureaucracies without wresting power away from the elites. He, too, sees the shift to democratization as a pragmatic exercise. The ex-communists, to Tismaneanu, were more organized and better prepared to adapt to the political shift, and therefore became the profiteers of the new system. He sees the motivation of the post-communists pushing for privatization, integration into the European Union and reduction of the deficit not for the social good, but to fill their personal coffers. Tismaneanu identifies the real enemy of democracy to be the “clericalist, fundamentalist, nationalist, anti-liberal fanatics” – among them, the Catholic Church (p. 165). An investigation of this “enemy of democracy” by examining how it operates its “public face” – their mass media properties can go a long way in understanding the institution as a whole.

**Normative Press Theories**

In the 1960s and 1970s, a vast body of research was produced which attempted to model the various press systems of the world. The Cold War was raging and much of this research – heavily funded by democratic government institutions – was tinged with a ‘free press is best’ slant. Also during this period, most societies’ choices of electronic media channels were rather limited, predominantly domestically owned, heavily
regulated by government, and relatively homogenous vis-à-vis content. Therefore, the research produced at this time did not differentiate between the various media (print media versus the electronic media, for example). The research models also did not focus on the business of mass communication properties and the media owner’s desire to advance institutional rather than societal goals in those press systems that featured private media ownership. In addition, the research did not consider non-domestic signals into countries’ media system equations. In short, these normative press models described what system was established in a country by the political system in place, and even hint at the kind of press system that might be put in place during a political shift, but they do not explain or explore the topic of this paper - how media organizations operate within a country’s political system to reach their desired goals. Given this, it is worthy to review the various normative press theories to understand the historical context in which they were developed, and discuss today’s media systems as they relate to those press models.

Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1963) in their landmark and controversial book, *Four Theories of the Press*, identified four press theories: authoritarian, soviet-communist, libertarian and social responsibility and developed a model (Figure 2.1, Model A).

Siebert and his colleagues developed their theory on the assumption that “the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates” (p. 1). Their definitions of these theories were adopted by other researchers of the time and therefore are included within these pages.

Siebert et al. define authoritarianism as the oldest of the four press systems. In this type of press system the mass media, although privately owned, exist at the pleasure
of the state. The government retains control of the flow of information and the opinions expressed (p.2).

Figure 2.1

"FOUR THEORIES" TYPOLOGY
(Evolutionary & Relational Implications):

Standard Four-Theories Model

(Model A)

Authoritarian  Communist  Libertarian  Social Resp.

A → C  → L  → SR

More Realistic Theoretical Models

(Model B):

- media cooperation
- outside pressure & coercion of media
- social determinism
- monistic concept of "good" journalism

Journalistic Control

A  C

SR

Journalistic Freedom

- media competition
  - no outside coercion
  - self determination (media)
  - "non consensus" orientation
  - pluralist concept of "good" journalism

(Model C):

Developmental Triangle Model

Natural flow: Authoritarian to Libertarian to Social Responsibility and back again to either Authoritarian or Communist.
According to its authors, the soviet-communist theory is descended from, and shares many similarities with, the authoritarian model with two exceptions: the communist party, not the government, controls the press, and the mass media are state-owned rather than privately owned (p. 3). In practice, the difference between the two theories is very small.

The libertarian theory of the press describes an authoritarian system with the primary players’ roles reversed. This theory contends that the press exists at the pleasure of its citizenry. One responsibility of the media is to present myriad viewpoints to the population so that citizens can direct their politicians to implement proper policy. Meanwhile, the media also serve as the people’s watchdog on the government. The libertarian theory assumes there is one truth, and a country’s citizenry has the right to search for that truth, which it cannot do if the government controls the flow of information (p. 3).

The social responsibility theory arose from a 1947 Freedom of the Press Commission, headed by Robert Hutchins, in the United States. The Hutchins Commission, in its report entitled A Free and Responsible Press, criticized the American libertarian press for not living up to its social responsibilities. This led Siebert and his colleagues to develop their social responsibility theory, describing a system in which,

…[T]he owners and managers of the press determine which persons, which facts, which versions of these facts, shall reach the public…[T]he power and near monopoly position of the media impose on them an obligation to be socially responsible, to see that all sides are fairly presented and that the public has enough information to decide; and that if the media do not take on themselves such responsibility it may be necessary for some other agency of the public to enforce it (p. 5).
Berry et al. (1995) in their book *Last Rites: Revisiting Four Theories of the Press* take a critical look at Siebert, Peterson and Schramm’s seminal work. They take their former colleagues to task on several issues regarding their text and their ideas. They criticize *Four Theories* for (1) “defining the four theories from within one of the four theories – classical liberalism” (p. 21); (2) assuming press freedom is largely political when in some cases it can be economical (p. 22); (3) using culturally biased language, for example, by describing systems as “good” or “bad” (p. 23); (4) not recognizing forms of power other than state power; and (5) for being a product of their sociological environment – for being Westerners in the Cold War West (p. 29).

Most of Berry et al.’s assessments of the Four Theories model are valid. The loaded language used and the ‘best system’ approach is forgivable considering the historical era in which it was created but is deserving of criticism today. However, Berry and his colleagues are not correct in criticizing Siebert et al. for linking a country’s mass media system to its political system.

Berry’s argument that a press system is sometimes based on a country’s economy is skirting the premise that a country’s economic system is also based on a country’s political system. For example, without a political system that recognizes and respects an enforceable rule of law, property cannot be owned and a free market economy cannot exist. The researchers make up for this by recognizing that powerful influences on the media do not come solely from the government. The Catholic Church in Poland serves as an excellent example. Even while Poland was under communist influence the Catholic Church was able to influence Polish society. In addition, Western mediated messages, in
the form of Radio Free Europe, were able to infiltrate Polish airwaves providing another voice to that of the communist party.

Sparks (1998) agrees the paradigm Siebert and his colleagues developed do not hold up to the test of time. He criticizes the researchers for not developing a model that explains the changes in the media systems that occurred in Central and Eastern Europe after the transition.

Many attempts have been made to improve upon the four theories model and to develop a normative press theory that describes all worldwide press systems. In developing their own models, many researchers have incorporated some elements of the four theories model into their press paradigms. For example, the concept of a socially responsible press system was held as the ultimate press model by several researchers. However, the researchers who developed these models fail to realize that even if a country espouses a social responsibility model, the fact that the media channels are privately owned means those media owners are empowered to pursue their idea of what is good socially responsible and not the government. This was certainly the case with the Polish Catholic Church after the transition; the Church hierarchy pursued their version of social responsibility which concerned using their media channels to evangelize and persuade Poles of their political agenda. Despite their shortcomings, it is helpful to investigate these normative press theories and compare their usefulness to today’s Eastern Europe.

Merrill (1974) developed two theoretical models he felt were more realistic than the four theories model: the Three-and-One Model (Figure 2.1, Model B) and the Developmental Triangle Model (Figure 2.1, Model C).
Merrill’s Three-and-One Model defines the social responsibility (SR), authoritarian (A), communist (C) and libertarian (L) theories based on their level of control and direction asserted by a ruling body. In this model, the SR, A and C theories appear as interlocking circles placed within an area labeled “journalistic control.” These theories describe a press system that is co-opted by the ruling power, subject to coercion by outside forces, socially directed and loyal to a unified definition of “good” journalism. Alone in a sector labeled “journalistic freedom,” the libertarian theory is represented. Merrill defines the libertarian theory as a system in which media competition dominates, coercion is non-existent, self-determinism is stressed, and a pluralist concept of “good” journalism exists (pp. 36-37).

Merrill’s Developmental Triangle Model (Figure 2.1, Model C) focuses more on the progression aspect of a country’s press system. This model conceptualizes a press system going through the four theories as a developmental process. Merrill assumes the press system would begin as an authoritarian or communist system (he barely differentiates between the two). Over time the press will ascend to a libertarian press system, and after an undetermined period of time, descend again into a press system that adheres to the social responsibility theory. Unlike Siebert and his colleagues, Merrill sees only the libertarian theory as the “best” system and views the social responsibility theory as a path toward a return to authoritarianism or communism. His rationalization for this premise is that a press system that is socially responsible allows a power figure to define what is socially significant, and therefore is less free. Merrill does not elaborate on what conditions will occur to plunge the press system from a libertarian model to a social responsibility model.
Both of Merrill’s models have problems that make them unacceptable. Merrill’s Three-and-One Model presents a system in which very few of today’s media systems would fit – the libertarian theory. Merrill’s libertarian theory is characterized by no (my emphasis) outside coercion. Even the United States’ press system has many outside forces massaging its message ranging from advertisers to government institutions to media moguls, effectively eliminating it from this category. One could not place the American media system in any of the A, C, or SR categories either. The authoritarian and communist theories are immediately since media are privately owned in the United States. Although one might think the United States is pursuing a socially responsible model of the press, Merrill’s characterization of that system excludes the U.S. One could argue that the U.S. press neither focuses on social determinism nor practices a monistic concept of “good” journalism. Instead, the American press system focuses more on self-determinism (corporate profit) and has always been criticized for its pluralistic ideas of what is “good.”

Merrill’s Three-and-One Model does not apply to Poland’s media system either. As with the United States, the Polish press is subjected to regulation as well as foreign and religious influence, and therefore could not be described as a libertarian system. In the same vein it is neither an authoritarian nor a communist system, as evidenced in the multitude of factions, domestic and foreign, vying for Polish media properties. It also does not fit the definition of a socially responsible press system since it, too, is profit-driven and does not represent the ideal of a singular “good” journalism. To buttress this point, for example, one need only read the Polish press or consume Polish broadcasting to
see that there are few, if any, stories about the widespread pollution that plagues the country, demonstrating a lack of a social deterministic ethic.

Merrill’s Developmental Triangle Model suggests a progression from one media system to another which is debatable. For example, even if one agrees to Merrill’s hierarchical positioning of the four theories, which many researchers do not, Merrill’s placement of the SR sphere in the same horizontal plane as the A and C theories is far from fair or conceptually accurate. The social responsibility theory, as defined by Siebert and his counterparts and adopted by Merrill, assumes at least some level of consideration for the citizenry. As has been documented in volumes of publications, this was, and still is not a necessary consideration for authoritarian or communist regimes when presenting information for public distribution – their goal is the dissemination of the ruling power’s ideas for adoption by the population.

In addition, Merrill’s suggested progression from a communist or authoritarian press system to libertarian to social responsibility did not happen in transitional countries like Poland. After the transition, Poland’s electronic media system moved quickly from a communist system to a system many would describe as socially responsible – some radio and television was privatized, social institutions, like the Catholic Church, pressured and coerced politicians and media owners in pursuit of Church goals, and journalists began flexing their free press muscles. However, one chief complaint of Polish journalism during this time was the lack of social determinism and a focus on self determinism – namely corporate profit.

Lowenstein, in Merrill’s Imperative of Freedom publication, presents a model (Figure 2.2) that adopts the four theories’ authoritarian and libertarian monikers but
abandons the term “soviet-communist” (because of its negative connotations) and “social responsibility” (due to its vagueness) for, what he considers, the more accurate “social-centralist” and “social-libertarian” terms, respectively. However, Lowenstein’s model suffers from problems of exclusivity and, once again, a pro-libertarian bias.

Figure 2.2

Lowenstein’s model utilizes five theories: authoritarian, libertarian, social libertarian, social centralist, and the utopian. These theories are placed into four categories. The authoritarian theory is included in the “new” or “underdeveloped” (simple) system, the libertarian theory is part of the “moderately developed system,” the social libertarian and social centralist theories are both included in the “well developed or advanced system,” and the utopian theory is in a system of the same name.
This model is not, as the name implies, progressive. According to this model, a media system, at a single point in time, could never possess properties of two systems simultaneously. Even within the same category, i.e., “well developed or advanced system,” one press system, for instance social libertarian, could not share similar characteristics with the other, the social centralist theory.

Poland’s media system falls under both of these headings. Poland’s media system is owned by both the governmental (state-run radio and television channels) and the non-governmental sectors (i.e., PolSat, a privately owned television channel, and TV Niepokalanów, a television channel owned privately by the Catholic Church). The print media, too, is, for the most part, privately owned with only a few state-sponsored newspapers in existence.

Furthermore, the author includes a category (Utopian) that, by his admission, has no current and no past examples. Although an interesting academic exercise, it has limited practical use. For example, Lowenstein lists the characteristics of a utopian system as one that offers the maximum number of channels, maximum social stability and maximum individual freedom, etc. (emphases added by me) but does not define the ambiguous term ‘maximum.’

Merrill’s (1974) Political-Press Circle (Figure 2.3) is an improvement upon the above mentioned normative press theories. In this model, the press system is tied not to a political system but to a political philosophy. This model is progressive in the true sense of the word – as a political philosophy changes in a country, the press media system follows.
The Political-Press Circle Model assumes less politically controlled media systems are more difficult to achieve and sustain than authoritarian systems, thus the work involved in transforming a press system away from authoritarianism and toward libertarianism is graphically depicted as an uphill motion (depicted in the model as moving up the page). Although the Political-Press Circle Model is an improvement on Merrill’s previous attempts, it lacks an economic perspective that is needed when describing today’s press systems.

Hachten (1992) presents a more up-to-date theory of the press. Hachten combines the elements of the Four Theories into his “Five Concepts.” Hachten’s Western concept is a combination of the libertarian and social responsibility theories. His Development concept combines the authoritarian and social responsibility theories with educational press responsibilities. Hachten’s Revolutionary concept recognizes the important role that the mass media play in revolutions, and his authoritarian and communism concepts retain the characteristics established in the Four Theories model (p. 2).

Hachten’s Five Concepts allow for different types of media in a country to practice different concepts – a real advantage for this model. However the revolutionary concept is too vague and lacks a clear differentiation between it and the other four concepts. In addition, with the proliferation of outside media intruding into any country via satellite communication for example, some channels within the same media may be advocating one concept while another media channel may be practicing another. One advantage that Hachten’s model has over its predecessors is the added recognition of a media’s economic responsibilities.
THE POLITICAL-PRESS CIRCLE

Philosophical
Milton
Mill/Locke
Thoreau/Gandhi
Proudhon/Bakunin
Tolstoy/Robt. Owen

INFLUENCES:
Milton
Mill/Locke
Thoreau/Voltaire
John Adams/Burke
A. Huxley/Ayn Rand

Philosophical
Plato
Hegel
Marx
Trotsky
Sartre/Stalin

TOTALITARIANISM

TOWARD STATISM
DELIBERATIVE SOCIALISM
AUTHORITARIANISM

LEFT
"FREE" JOURNALISTIC FREEDOM
"RIGHT"
JOURNALISTIC ENSLAVEMENT

TOWARD FREEDOM
COMMUNISM/FASCISM

STATE CAPITALISM
DELIBERATIVE SOCIALISM

ANARCHY

Influences:
Plato
Hegel
Hobbes
Machiavelli
Mussolini/Hitler

State Socialism
Hachten’s model fits the Polish transition better than any of the previous models. It recognizes that mass media operators play a part in how a mass media system is developed. For example, after Poland’s transition to capitalism would-be mass media owners began pirating spectrum space for broadcasting. When the military would block the transmission the pirates would reappear on another frequency. Realizing there was little the government could do to stop them, these pirates actually sped up privatization of the broadcast spectrum and helped redefine the type of mass media system that Poland would have. These pirates were later granted licenses and became legitimate broadcasters in Poland’s new mass media system.

The Catholic Church also played a part in directly influencing the type of media system Poland would later adopt. After the transition, the Church exercised its right to launch new media channels in Poland and develop Catholic programming on government-owned media channels without censorship. In a way, these Catholic programs being broadcast around the country provided an additional voice to the government’s during this transitional time. Although Hachten allows for outside media institutions’ influences in a culture in his ‘five concepts,’ it is worth investigating how these outside media brokers influence the media systems after the transition.

**Framing Theory**

Research conducted by Rath (1984), Tuchman (1978), Altschull (1984), Goban-Klas (1994) and Downing (1996) all focus on the premise that media institutions act as conduits between society and the individual, thus reinforcing norms and affecting cultural reality. Tuchman and Altschull add that power figures within a society control the media
and, therefore, the information that is disseminated to the society. In this way the media play an active role in influencing cultural norms.

Confusing the traditional view of national culture, Rath (1984) postulates that since television signals do not conform to the national borders established by a nation’s political structure, their transmissions form a new geographic entity that infuses a culture with the norms of the ‘other’ and thus help to reshape the previously defined space of nationality or culture:

New communications technologies not only present themselves as bearers of new forms of socio-cultural reality, which touch upon traditional boundaries – of the nation-state, but of politics itself as well. Their location is not the arena of political decision-making or of official communications between nation-states, but within the tensions between the public sphere and private daily life, between the idea of collective life and the rituals of the TV viewer (p. 199).

Rath describes how messages from outside a country’s border can reshape the culture within. This is certainly the case in Central and Eastern Europe prior to the transition where pro-democracy messages broadcast on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty from outside the Iron Curtain helped fuel the fire of revolution within the Soviet Bloc. After the transition, foreign entities have established themselves within the borders of these former communist countries, through joint-ventures or outright media acquisition, allowing them to present the views of the ‘other’ under the guise of a native media property. The Polish Catholic Church, under the direction of the Vatican, expresses the views of Rome via Polish media properties in this same way.

Tuchman (1978) also sees the media playing an important role in constructing a culture’s reality. However, the author narrows the subject to the electronic media’s role in information dissemination. Using framing theory, Tuchman forwards two themes. First, in the creation of news items, news organizations are actually constructing reality
rather than reflecting reality, and secondly, news professionals serve the interests of the
organizations for which they work, institutionalizing newsgathering. In short, the author
delineates that news is gathered and disseminated by institutions existing within a cultural
setting and then placed in a social context.

Tuchman’s research highlights two key factors. Firstly, the media within a
culture are heavily influenced by, and in some cases operate at the pleasure of, a culture’s
power brokers. Secondly, the decisions made by media management regarding
programming, news coverage, and information gathering and dissemination, are directed
by the culture’s power brokers. This influence may be direct (censorship) or indirect
(formation of media laws or a person’s association with media owners).

Since 1989, no one group in Poland has yet to win, and will likely never win,
complete control of the Polish media system. However, what was once a relatively large
pool of possible players has become greatly reduced through political maneuvering. In
the arena of the electronic media, the Polish government has been able to put off
privatizing state-owned television and radio properties - possibly indefinitely -
guaranteeing those in political power an influential tool for disseminating their ideologies
and warding off oppositional forces. At the same time, the government’s reticence to
privatize state-owned media reduces national competition for Church-owned media
properties.

Like Tuchman, Altschull (1984) feels the media help a nation’s power brokers
maintain the cultural status quo. He calls the idea of a socially responsible media
‘absurd’ since the media’s sole purpose is “reaffirming the social order while at the same

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time providing the cloak of moral rectitude for those who claim to follow the doctrine” (p. 304).

Altschull lays out ‘seven laws of journalism’ that describe the world’s various press systems: (1) all news media operate at the pleasure of the political and economic leaders in a country; (2) the content of media reports reflect the bias of the power brokers; (3) every press system is based on a belief in free expression; however, the definition of free expression varies by culture; (4) every press system claims to follow the doctrine of social responsibility and claims to exist for the benefit of the people; (5) media systems in other countries that follow a different press system are considered deviant; (6) schools of journalism propagate the ideologies of the ruling class, helping it maintain its position of power; (7) press theory differs from what the media actually do.

Altschull feels the proliferation of electronic mediated messages, which cross borders and shower down unregulated on all cultures, deliver a diversity of voices that are censored not by a country’s power elite but by the power brokers from other cultures, supplying at least a different perspective to a nation’s people. Altschull’s view on a diversity of voices delivered through the reception of foreign broadcasts, and his seven journalistic laws are valid descriptions of media institutions. The actions of the Polish Catholic Church in establishing media properties like Radio Maryja and TV Niepokalanów, forming the Catholic Information Agency (KAI), and in influencing the reformation of Polish media law, follow Altschull’s seven laws nearly to the letter.

For example, church leaders worked the Polish political systems – both the communist and the democratic systems - to become an accepted media owner. In addition, the Church makes no apologies for using its media properties for evangelization
purposes; presenting its slant on domestic and international events while justifying its stained glass tinted version of reality as justifiable from a free press perspective.

Goban-Klas (1994) claims that power brokers control Western-type media systems in much the same way as the communist party-controlled media of the Soviet bloc. To Goban-Klas, the issue is not media control but media access. Like Altschull, Goban-Klas feels citizens should have access to alternative information to the state’s political line. In this way, foreign broadcast signals are important, as are alternative media channels like the Polish Catholic Church’s radio and television stations and other privately owned media outlets.

Zandberg (2001) investigates how the mass media in Poland are being used by various power brokers to selectively co-opt the concept of national identity to not only create new meanings but to further their vision of Poland’s new national identity. Zandberg found the actions of these power brokers were politically motivated and their ideas were framed in relation to their stance vis-à-vis Poland’s relationship with European Union membership. In her study, she analyzes the mass media to understand the culture and the transitional change that is occurring in Poland:

Media are a window through which one can examine social, economic, and political processes...media discourses on collective/national identities provide rich analytical material that facilitates the observation of social tensions and clashing visions of the future developments within the societies.

At the same time, however, media provide a space in which meaning making activity – crucial for the character and outcome of these processes – takes place. Media are the forums in which symbolic universes are forged and in which these compete for legitimacy. Such a competition for legitimacy implies a problem of power, asking which of the conflicting definitions of reality (and linked to it collective identity) will prevail. This competition becomes especially harsh during systemic transitions, when media become forums in which meanings compete for legitimacy, as well as a stake in the political competition (pp. 303-304).
Zandberg’s spotlights Catholicism as one of many national identities that are being redefined in post-communist Poland:

Catholicism is being redefined by the liberal discourse as an optional part of Polish national identity, not an inseparable component. Autonomy of the political sphere from the religious is stressed, as are the values of pluralism and religious tolerance. Anti-liberal discourse situates Catholicism at the center of the Polish national identity and sees it as an inseparable part. This Catholicism, however, is not reflective but highly anti-intellectual, [and] anti-ecumenical. It is also intertwined with nationalism, militant and politicized. Poles are supposed to carry out a messianic mission of protecting such Catholicism from the poisonous influence of European liberalism and, ultimately, re-Christianize Europe, which is seen as immersed in paganism. In general, Catholicism becomes both an identity aspiring to achieve a legitimizing function (through building the institutional power) but at the same time, as an identity of resistance (through the mental exercise of defining itself as a minority (pp. 309-310).

In her analysis, Zandberg uses the media as a window to understand how power brokers manipulate public discourse to redefine society in their likeness. The difference between Zandberg’s work and this study is that this study too uses the media as a window but in this case in order to understand the changes that the Catholic Church, as a social institution itself, underwent after 1989. In other words, during a social transition, systemic changes are not the only ones that take place – organizational changes naturally occur as well.

Downing (1996) also attempts a totalist approach to explaining the changes taking place in Poland and other post-communist transitional countries. Downing focuses on the ‘media-society-culture-power relationship’ within all aspects of the Polish, Hungarian and Russian cultures. Regarding the media, Downing proposes that: (1) the media play a pivotal role in all power struggles within a country; (2) the alternative media play a key part in developing and maintaining social movements within a country; (3) all forms of
media expression, not just traditional ones, should be included in any media analysis of a culture; (4) both qualitative and quantitative analyses are equally significant and critical to the study of communication; (5) investigating the international dimensions of media communication should be a fundamental practice; (6) interpersonal communication and mass communication are linked – to study one without considering the other is ‘idiotic’.

According to Altschull, the type of media system a country uses is determined by the power structure in place. Downing goes further, adding that traditionally, media theorists have incorrectly placed authoritarian and liberal democratic regimes at different ends of a spectrum. To him, they are less the contrast between ‘night and day’ as ‘night and twilight,’ with the latter’s control over media being much more subtle and, therefore, harder to detect.

Political scientist Aaron Wildavsky (1998) segments democratic societies into four political cultures that compete for power within the democratic tradition. Wildavsky maintains that all four of these cultures play off one another and thus are imperative to the democratic process. These political cultures are (a) individualists, (b) hierarchical elitists, (c) egalitarians, and (d) fatalists. These cultures are identified by the number or prescriptions (behavioral norms) each group requires of a member to be accepted, and, to borrow from Triandis’s research, whether those groups reinforce collectivist or individualist tendencies (p. 198).

For example, members of the individualist group have few norms to follow and, obviously, tend to make self-determinist decisions. Hierarchical elitists require many prescriptions for membership and support decisions that further the group. Egalitarians have few prescriptions but believe the good of the many outweigh the good of the few.
Fatalists – who have no control over the rules that govern them and allow themselves to be ruled from the outside - tend toward individualism (they will not cooperate with others), but require strict adherence to the idea that social interaction is futile (pp. 198-199). Wildavsky compares the other political cultures:

Individualism controls by results, hierarchy by processes, and egalitarianism by joint decision...Only individualism has overt objectives (profit) that can be measured by results. Hierarchy is designed to keep its processes going, the assumption being that good processes will have desirable outcomes. Form – who is allowed to do what and how – matters more than function. Just the opposite is true of egalitarians: the results that matter to them involve the equality, not the size, of outcomes (p. 203).

Wildavsky explains these political cultures can exist within a single country, compete with each other for members and vie for power, and will even join forces in order to propagate the culture. He describes the American political culture as one that features “weak hierarchy, strong individualism, and fluctuating egalitarianism,” while the political culture of Europe can be described as “very strong hierarchy, moderate individualism, and weak egalitarianism” (p. 206). By comparison, Poland can be favorably compared to Europe than to the United States since it is best identified with strong hierarchical institutions (the Catholic Church and the Poland’s combination bicameral parliament and presidential governmental structure) and its fledgling transition from a collectivist to an individualist social structure.

Wildavsky’s cultural categories can be used to describe the various cultures in post-1989 Poland. Individualists existed in Poland even during its communist days as exemplified by the successful black market, or second economy, which thrived during communism. Add to that group, domestic and international entrepreneurs and college-
aged adults who opened businesses in Poland and enrolled in business schools to prepare them for Poland’s new societal makeup.

The Catholic Church is an excellent example of a hierarchical institution. The Church tried to reign in Poles who strayed from Church tenets and even implemented a relaxation of some normative requirements in order to keep congregants from leaving. Church membership, however, was adversely affected by the transition.

One could ascribe Polish politicians and mass media owners to the egalitarian ranks after 1989. Initially, the Polish dissidents who had engineered the transition were among this group’s few members, but later, in order to survive in the new democratic atmosphere, the former communists transitioned from the hierarchical communist culture to one supporting some level of equality. Wildavsky adds that egalitarians self-select themselves into the mass media in order to pursue societal justice for its members.

The disenfranchised left in the wake of the transition constitute Poland’s fatalists. This group can include those Poles who lost their jobs due to privatization, Polish farmers who were forced to compete in a free market economy with limited resources, pensioners trying to live on a fixed income amount that was fine under communism but a pittance under capitalism, marginalized and unrepentant socialists and communists, and devout Catholics who resisted the new relaxed religious rules implemented by the Church. As Wildavsky states, if the fatalist group culture gets too large, their passive resistance can threaten democracy (p. 199).

Wildavsky asserts that leaders among these political groups play key roles in the democratic process. Learning more about hierarchical institutions like the Catholic Church – especially in regard to how they operate their media properties - can go a long
way in understanding the past, explaining the present, and predicting the future direction of Polish society. Therefore, a closer look at the religion-media linkage is worthy of further investigation.

**Religion and Media**

Michel (1991), in his book *Politics and Religion in Eastern Europe*, states the pre-1989 relationship between the Catholic Church in Poland and the communist state was obviously adversarial. “The Soviet system and Catholicism are both potentially ‘totalitarian’ systems; one of them is in power and the other, by its very existence, challenges that power” (p. 6). The communist system shunned nationalistic feelings toward one’s country, promoting the goals of the communist party. The Church, as it had done in previous centuries when confronted with other authoritarian regimes, opposed the communist system and promoted its historical and nationalistic ties. This led many Poles to see Catholicism as the champion of the Polish heritage and to identify Catholicism with nationalism.

Stout and Buddenbaum (1996) say there is a need for studies that investigate what secularizing trends in society do to religious institutions and their power within the secular society:

One of the most intensely debated issues in the sociology of religion is the process of secularization in Western cultures. Yet although a small number of sociologists have touched on mass communication issues, researchers have not adequately examined how media contribute to a religious institution’s gain or loss of power in society (p. 8).

This study intends to do what Stout & Buddenbaum suggest: investigate the operation of the Polish Catholic Church’s media in an attempt to gauge how secularization in Poland and inside the Catholic Church is impacting the Church’s power.
Moyser (1991) found that a regime that discourages nationalistic policies is more apt to have adversarial policies toward the relevant church. This can certainly be said of the communist system in Poland. The communists only colluded with the Catholic Church to maintain social stability. The Church became a socializing tool for the communists. They used the Church’s influence to reinforce the already strict Catholic formal and informal norms that were inherent in the country since in many ways these norms mirrored the collectivist ideology of Marxism-Leninism. However, there is little doubt the communists would have preferred the Church stay out of Polish politics entirely and stop promoting Polish nationalism during the communists’ reign. Lech Wałęsa’s Solidarity also co-opted the Church, but in a different way; the members of the Solidarity Movement used the Church’s ties to Polish nationalism and Polish identity to boost their credibility in their battle against the communists, then, after being elected into office, used their relationship with the Church to lend legitimacy to their governance. In turn, the Catholic Church itself used both the communists and the Solidarity members to advance the Church’s political and social goals.

Flere (2001) found that when considering the impact of religiosity on politics in seven Central European countries, Poland was unique in several respects. He found that although most Poles, like the majority of other people in the seven Central European countries, do not allow their religiosity to influence their voting, nearly one fifth of Polish respondents said religiosity did impact their voting behavior. According to the study, Poles also feel the Church should not publicly declare its position on governmental policy, despite nearly a 40 percent favorable response to recognizing the Church as a guiding force for people and governments. Flere’s study may point as much toward a
backlash of Poles to the Church’s meddling in Polish politics as it does toward a secularization trend among the Polish people.

Today, former communists have to contend with a past that encouraged hostile policies toward nationalism, whereas the Church and Solidarity are seen as champions of Polish culture. Recent claims by the Vatican that leftists are discriminating against Catholics have once again fueled the fire between the two sides. This study looks at the Catholic Church’s media properties in order to gain perspective on how the Church is responding to this perceived discrimination.

Through a review of the literature we have established that powerful people define the cultural norms that ultimately make up their culture, and also comprise the groups, or social institutions, within a culture. These societal institutions in turn influence the cultural norms that define a culture. During a time of drastic transition like the one that occurred in Poland in 1989, social institutions are forced to adapt in order to maintain power in the new political, economic and social reality. This study focuses on two of those societal institutions, the mass media and the Polish Catholic Church, and describes how the Church changed during the transitional period and how that influenced their mass media properties and thus the Church’s conduit between the organization and the new Polish society.

When a powerful social institution like the Catholic Church owns and operates its own media property, that conduit becomes tinged with the stained-glass messages that are presented by the Church. One of the media’s primary responsibilities is reinforcing cultural norms and affecting cultural reality through its dissemination of cultural information. When a culture undergoes a major shift in its structure, there is an
opportunity for those norms to be renegotiated to an extent. This study looks at how the Church used its media channels to establish, indoctrinate, and enforce its own cultural norms in a post-communist Poland.

The Church’s chief tools for realizing their objectives are their print and electronic media properties. However, the Church itself changed during the time of Poland’s transition – becoming more fragmented and secularized internally as the country itself faced political pluralism. Also, in the face of major erosion in its direct political influence through parliamentary representation, the Church turned to its media properties to maintain its relevance and influence in Polish society.

Politics and Media

While the purpose of this study is not to examine Poland’s media system in any broad sense, it is important to understand Poland’s evolving system to get a better picture of the new role the Catholic Church played in the media landscape after the 1989 transition. In this chapter, the body of theory which examines various press systems will be discussed, to better understand the structural limits on free expression of ideas imposed on the media in Poland before and after the transition. Chapter 6 will later describe the actual make-up of Poland’s media system under communism, how the new government restructured it after the fall of communism, and what role the Catholic Church sought for itself in the new marketplace of ideas.

As discussed in the previous section, a country’s media system is dependent upon the political structure of the country. One of the main determinants of a press system is the level of press freedom that the government allows people, institutions and politicians to present their ideas. Stevenson (1994) defines press freedom “as the right to speak,
print, or broadcast what you want to without prior restraint but with limited liability afterward” (p. 120). The way the government addresses this question determines the type of media and the relationship the government has with the media.

To examine the mass media from the perspectives of three political systems - communism, capitalism, and developing nations, five criteria for analysis must be applied. An examination of the media systems based on: (1) whether the ownership of the media is privately or publicly (governmentally) owned; (2) whether the media is centralized around the political power base or decentralized around the country; (3) what press philosophy a nation’s mass media could be categorized as, and therefore the degree of press freedom the government allows the media to enjoy; (4) the type of economic support the media utilize to stay financially solvent; and (5) the uses of the media that serve the society.

This section focuses on how mass media regulation, especially the concept of free expression, is addressed in these three types of economic/political environments - communism, under which Poland operated prior to 1989; and capitalism and developing nations, both of which apply to the New Poland - to show the differences in the politics-media linkage. Broadly speaking, under communism, the government does not subscribe to the notion that free expression for either its citizenry or its mass media channels is a benefit for society as a whole. Mass media in communist Poland were considered merely tools to disseminate the information (or disinformation) and opinions the communist party wanted broadcast to its citizens. Access to information was strictly controlled and the government attempted to silence, or marginalize, dissenting voices. For developing countries like post-1989 Poland, freedom of expression is still a work in progress. While
the new Polish government included press freedom in its new constitution, constraints still exist.

**Private vs. Public Ownership and Centralized vs. Decentralized Media**

Dominick (1992) describes media systems by cross-referencing ownership with the physical location of the media properties to the base of political power. Private ownership refers to countries that allow their media systems to be run by individuals or corporations not related to the governmental structure. The assumption here is that privately owned media are more difficult to control by the ruling power and therefore are freer than media channels that are publicly owned. Public ownership, of course, refers to governmentally owned and operated media properties. Dominick also looks at whether the media are centrally located in one city, usually the nation’s political or economic capital, or whether the media are spread throughout the country. The implication here is a centralized media system is easier to control and dominate by the government since all news and information flows to, and is disseminated from, one location. A decentralized media system allows for more information to be collected, reviewed and reported away from the center of political power, making it more difficult to censor.

Goban-Klas (1994) divides media systems into “open” and “closed” systems. Comparing the two systems Goban-Klas describes each in this manner:

An open, or liberal, system has a complex, internal, horizontal structure of lines of communication and a dense network of connections in and out of its external environment. In systems of this kind, messages may flow freely in all directions, vertically as well as horizontally. Corresponding media doctrine stresses the value of freedom of expression and the profits of openness. A closed system has a much simpler communication structure. Not only do vertical lines of communication dominate, but the information that flows is also differentiated. From above come plans, orders, regulations, and propaganda. From the masses might come complaints, suggestions, and information about corruption; however,
positive support for the leadership is expected above all. Both external and internal communication lines are strictly controlled and regulated. The corresponding doctrine demands responsibility and stresses dangers of unrestricted communication and expression. Such a system was perfectly visualized in a typical spatial organization of communist party conventions in the form of a pyramid with the leaders on top and the followers at the base. (pp. 13-14).

As mentioned above, a country’s press system is defined by the degree of freedom the regime allows it, and the success of the media system to support itself is dependent upon the economic system that drives the nation. What is missing is an investigation into how a media operator works within the open or closed system to realize the media operator’s objectives.

Under communism, Poland’s mass media system has been described as a totalitarian system by Sparks (1998, p. 21). The workings of the media system were completely closed not only to people outside the country (with the exception of the Kremlin) but also to people outside the communist party. Arendt (1973) describes the philosophy of totalitarianism.

Wherever totalitarianism possesses absolute control, it replaces propaganda with indoctrination and uses violence not so much to frighten people (this is done only in the initial stages when political opposition still exists) as to realize constantly its ideological doctrines and its political lies (p. 341).

Miklos Haraszti, a Hungarian philosopher, dissident, and social critic paints a picture of complete domination and control of the public sphere by the communist state throughout the Soviet bloc (See The Velvet Prison, 1987). As Arendt indicated, punishment at first was harsh especially under Josef Stalin’s dictatorial rule; killings, unlawful imprisonment and beatings were commonplace. Haraszti describes the Stalinist period as the time when police displayed a closed fist in public to maintain order.
Stalin’s brutal ‘show trials’ often charged innocent citizens with crimes against the state and subjected them to trials before magistrates. These trials often followed written scripts that read like screenplays and ended with the defendant delivering the state-prepared lines that condemned him to death or life imprisonment.

After Stalin’s death in 1953, the Soviet Union and their satellite states moved into a less restrictive period of de-Stalinization known as ‘socialism with a human face.’ Haraszti sardonically notes this period was marked by a small change - the police’s hand was still in a fist, but the fist was hidden inside the policeman’s pocket (Miklos Haraszti, personal communication, 30 June 1999).

In an open system like the United States lines of communication emanate from every city and town and its communication system sends and receives information to and from other countries. Messages themselves permeate every strata of society via multiple means of mass communication. In this open system, free expression is protected by the rule of law.

A developing nation like post-1989 Poland has a communication network in transition. Horizontal lines of communication are just beginning to spread to the four corners of the country and message flow is still predominantly top down – from the ruling class to the average Pole. Free expression is valued, but citizens are willing to sacrifice personal freedom for nation building. The network infrastructure that connects the nation to the outside world, and vice versa, is still being developed, and restrictions on the type of information coming into the country is controlled by the ruling class.

In all, a country’s press philosophy is determined by the political system that exists in the country. Likewise, the political system in place determines the amount of
free expression that is afforded a country’s people and press, and the judiciary determines the application of such rights.

**Economic Support**

Another very important determinant of freedom of expression is linked to the economic basis of the press. If news organizations, for example, are funded by the government, free expression can be stifled. Media properties that operate without government interference are less beholden to the power base, are evaluated by the veracity of the information they present, and therefore are more apt to express views with fear or favor.

The communist party realized the importance of media channels for continued indoctrination and propaganda efforts and therefore gladly provided the financial support for the party press organs. A closed system like the communist model necessitated careful coordination between Soviet State security and the media channels. This type of closed system also controlled the means of production – presenting a formidable barrier to entry for any group wishing to oppose the communist party.

Underground *samizdat* publications written by oppositionists to the regime were barely able to get paper and ink to publish their oppositional materials. In many cases publishers of *samizdat* newspapers would recruit state employees to print *samizdat* newspapers in the wee hours of the morning on state-owned presses (Gabor Demszky, personal communication, 9 July 1999).

With Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev’s introduction of *glasnost* or greater openness within the Soviet bloc, journalists became more aggressive in their
investigations of the communist system. At the same time, the communist party was gradually less inclined to support the state-owned papers financially. *Perestroika*, Gorbachev’s policy of institutional restructuring, required newspapers to find alternative financing. The newspapers financial obligation to sell newspapers provided the necessity and *glasnost*’s increased openness provided the opportunity to investigate the regime, the result was a press system that criticized the regime. (Stevenson, 1994, p. 190).

After the transition, Poland’s print media was privatized and became commercially supported. Poland’s electronic media, however, featured a combination of state-funded stations, commercial stations, and privately funded stations. With this organization it is little wonder that Poland’s electronic media properties’ press organizations are highly politicized among the state-financed the privately funded stations. State radio and television stations are at the whim of the regime and privately funded stations, like the Catholic Church’s media properties, have news organizations that present information tinged with the Church’s ideological slant.

**Uses of the Media**

Folkerts, Lacy and Davenport (1998) state that individuals within a culture use the mass media for decision-making, diversion, surveillance, social and cultural interaction, and for self-understanding. Decision-making refers to people using the media to collect information in order to select between options; diversion refers to using the media for entertainment; surveillance refers to a person’s ability to monitor the environment, including the government; social and cultural interaction allows a member of society to maintain their membership within that society; and self-understanding allows people to learn more about themselves (p. 24).
The media in communist Poland was used primarily for disseminating propaganda. The surveillance function primarily entailed news about the impending dangers that existed outside beyond the Iron Curtain. Any internal perils, like the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, were kept from the public. Entertainment programming was carefully selected to reinforce the communist party line and focused on the citizen’s place within the communist system. The party, through story morals, told the masses how to understand their environment and also reinforced their place within Soviet society.

Miklos Haraszti (1987), in his book *The Velvet Prison*, describes how and why all cultural outlets like music, the visual arts, theatre, radio, and television were produced in Hungary, and how the party kept the creative intellectuals at bay through punishment, banishment and bribery.

Media content in today’s Poland is also in transition. Poles rely heavily on the press to serve the surveillance and decision-making functions of society. Located between two countries that formerly invaded and occupied Poland (Germany and Russia) the Poles keep a watchful eye on their neighbors. International news fills Polish papers and Polish talk shows. In the early transitional years, unemployment increased and the Polish currency decreased in value, making for difficult financial times for Poles. Citizens relied heavily on the cheap entertainment that radio and television provided as a diversion from the day’s worries. Local programming, especially those provided by the Polish Catholic Church, helped citizens maintain their cultural center and reminded them of their religious heritage. With the proliferation of foreign signals reaching across the Polish border via cable and satellite, a diverse kind of programming has entered the Polish household supplying a counterweight to Poland’s traditional programming.
National Politics and Corporate Globalization

Deregulation is the governmental practice of relaxing regulation in hopes of spurring market competition. The deregulatory atmosphere that began in the United States in the 1980s had a ripple effect throughout the globe. The media conglomerates that were formed in the West used their capital to enter media markets in other countries. Mohammadi (1999) states that this rapid deregulation policy “resulted in the domination of world markets by transnational corporations which faced very little competition or resistance due to their overwhelming market force” (p. 68). These global corporations needed capitalistic economies in target countries in order to thrive.

International lending organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund rewarded countries that adopted democratic political systems and capitalist economies with loans to develop, among other things, their communication infrastructures. Stevenson (1994) sees the workings of the IMF and the World Bank as benevolent lenders who assist in propelling a nation into a competitive global position. Hamelink (1997) feels the global marketplace that these lending organizations help fund threaten the existence of the nation-state and enable developed nations like the United States to infiltrate and dominate foreign markets. Hamelink and his contemporaries see this as just another form of imperialism.

This chapter places this study in the context of past mass communication research. It positions itself uniquely in mass communication’s body of literature in that it seeks to understand the actions of a powerful and influential social institution during a time of social turmoil by looking at its mass media properties.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This study incorporates qualitative methodologies in gathering its data. The qualitative methods used in this study - in-depth, semi-structured interviewing and textual analysis of key documents - help answer the research questions more fully than implementing quantitative methods. Gaskell (2000) confers legitimacy to this choice of research methodology when he rationalizes that qualitative research inherently attempts to explore “the range of opinions, the different representations of issue” (p. 41), instead of simply counting opinions or people.


Interactive methods entail inserting the researcher into the data gathering process. Some empirical researchers feel this taints the data since the information has been filtered through the researcher (refer to works by Wimmer & Dominick, 1987; Denzin & Lincoln, 1998a; and Berger, 2000 for a thorough discussion of the advantages and disadvantages to both quantitative and qualitative research methods). However, based on the type of questions raised in this study, interactive methods of inquiry are necessary especially since interaction between the researcher and the subject is one of the foundations of qualitative research (see the writings of McCracken, 1988; Denzin & Lincoln, 1998b; Seidman, 1998; and Berger 2000).

Non-interactive methods, or unobtrusive measures as researchers like Berg (2001) term them, are a recognized method of data gathering that receive very little academic ink (see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996; Webb et al., 1981; and Babbie, 1998). In
this study, the public archives of legal and religious documents were collected and analyzed. Since this study concerns Poland, many of the documents targeted for study were written in Polish originally. However, in some cases, the government creates official English translations of its documents; the researcher treated these English translations as primary documents in these cases. Where English translations were not available, professional native-speaking interpreters translated the documents into English for the researcher.

Non-interactive methods allow the researcher to gather data with little or no exchange with the participants of a study (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984). This study utilized artifact collection and analysis since it has been found to be less reactive or obtrusive than interactive strategies (see Webb et al., 1966).

Lincoln and Guba (1985) delineate between documents and records based on their purpose. The term ‘document,’ in their view, refers to accounts saved for personal reasons, while ‘records’ are official documents (For a complete discussion of document and record analysis refer to Denzin, 1978; Altheide, 1996; and Berg, 2001.)

This study examined governmental records dealing with State-Church relations specifically and Polish media laws in general, Church records, especially papal directives, translated media law publications, and translated diary entries, for analysis. These records were supplemented with other documentation analysis concerning mass media regulation in Poland, especially those that pertain to the Catholic media (including, but not limited to, the Polish Constitution, the 1992 National Radio and Television Law on Broadcasting, the Polish Concordat between the Polish government and the Vatican, and the 1989 Act of the State-Church Relationship – the document that gave the Church
special media privileges). The official English translations of these texts were used in some cases while English translations from reputable interpreters were used in others.

Derrida (1978) has shown that meaning is derived in the writing and the reading of text documents. As the social context in which the text is re-read changes, the meaning of the text changes as well. Thus, an argument can be made that the ‘true meaning’ of the text is illusory, and no ‘original’ meaning ever existed. Hodder (1998) suggests that texts are useful for accompanying other forms of evidence like interviews so that the particular biases of each can be understood and compared (p. 111).

Fontana & Frey (in Denzin & Lincoln, 1998a) divide interviews into three types: structured, semi-structured, and unstructured (p. 48). The semi-structured interview method was used in this study. An interviewer with a written list of prepared questions conducts semi-structured interviews; however, the interview process itself takes on a more free-form air that enables the researcher to deviate from the topic guide to ask probing and clarifying questions (Berger, 2000). This gives the interview a greater breadth that a structured interview with already established questions lacks (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998a).

Since this study required conducting personal interviews with people from disparate occupations (political figures, clergy, media owners and experts, political dissidents, scholars, etc.), the interviews can best be described as oral histories. Fontana & Frey explain that oral histories are suitable for “reconnecting with [people] missing in history” - explaining the plight of society’s disenfranchised subcultures – in order to not only describe that untapped culture more fully but to attempt to understand how that subculture operates (p. 61). The Polish Catholic Church is a powerful social institution
that operates in relative obscurity. Learning more about the operation of this closed
institution fills gaps in our knowledge not only of the Catholic Church as an organization,
but of the influential media properties the Church operates.

In this study, the data collected from the oral histories was analyzed to discern
individual and institutional motivations of the Polish Catholic Church by putting the
events that unfolded during the period under study into historical context. The goal here
is to explain in detail the situational decision-making of the Polish Catholic Church by
investigating the point at which the institution meets the public – in this case their
national media properties.

These in-depth, semi-structured interviews of key informants were used for these
oral histories. As Seidman (1998) states, in-depth interviews shed light on the
motivations of people who make important contributions to the subject being studied:

Interviewing provides access to the context of people’s behavior and thereby
provides a way for researchers to understand the meaning of that behavior. A
basic assumption in in-depth interviewing research is that the meaning people
make of their experience affects the way they carry out that
experience…Interviewing allows us to put behavior in context and provides
access to understanding their action (p. 4).

Goetz and LeCompte define key informants as individuals who possess special
knowledge, status, or communicative skills and who are willing to share that knowledge
and skill with the researcher. The key informants interviewed come from three sectors:
the Polish clergy, including managers of several Catholic media properties in Poland
among them the head of the Catholic Information Agency, the Radio Plus network, and
TV Niepokalanów; media experts knowledgeable about the Polish Catholic Church and
the events that occurred during the period under study; scholars whose research has
focused on Church-State relations both before and after the transition; political dissidents
who worked underground to undermine the communist regime in Central and Eastern Europe; and other individuals who possess personal experience with the Polish mass media. This final group may include but are not limited to U.S. officials who have served in the U.S. Embassy in Poland during the period under study.

Choosing informants based on their experience or knowledge of the information targeted by the researcher has been called “strategic” (Hunt, 1970), “purposive” (Warwick & Lininger, 1975), “intensity” (Morse, 1998) or “judgment” (Bernard, 1988; Honigmann, 1970; Pelto & Pelto, 1979) sampling by past ethnographers.

Judgment sampling allows the researcher to select participants “by virtue of their status (age, sex, occupation) or previous experience, qualities which endow them with special knowledge that the ethnographer values” (Johnson, 1990, p. 28). Morse (1998) also stresses choosing “experiential experts” about a certain occurrence or issue).

In this study, this type of nonprobability sampling is preferred over a more quantitative selection process like random probability sampling because judgment sampling eliminates those participants without first-hand knowledge of the events being studied (For more on nonprobability sampling, refer to Morse, 1996, 1991). Gaskell (2000) prefers the word ‘selection’ to ‘sampling’ to distinguish the qualitative identification of respondents from the quantitative process of cultivation (p. 40).

Tremblay’s (1957) criterion for selection were used to choose the key informants whose oral histories were chosen. Tremblay’s five criteria for selection are: (1) the subject’s role in the community, (2) the subject’s knowledge of the topic, (3) the subject’s willingness to communicate and cooperate, (4) the subject’s communicative abilities, and
(5) the subject’s impartiality (p. 689). A brief biographical sketch of this study’s informants follows.

**Interview Biographies**

**Fr. Adam Boniecki**, it is said, is one of the few people who dine one-on-one with Pope John Paul II when visiting the Vatican. In 1999, on the wishes of former *Tygodnik Powszechny* editor-in-chief Jerzy Turowicz, Boniecki took over the chief editor’s position at the highly respected liberal daily newspaper in Kraków.

Boniecki is a member of the Marians of the Immaculate Conception religious order – a liberal wing of the Catholic Church that has its origins in Poland. Prior to assuming the editorship of *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Boniecki created and served as the editor-in-chief of the Polish edition of *L'Osservatore Romano* (1979 – 1991) – the official voice of the Holy See. *L'Osservatore Romano* is the leading and most authoritative and comprehensive source for papal writings and activities.

Boniecki authored a book published by the Marian order entitled, "The Making of the Pope of the Millennium: Kalendarium of the Life of Karol Wojtyla."

**Gábor Demszky** was born in 1952 in Budapest. He became a student of the Faculty of Law and Political Science at ELTE in 1970, but two years later was charged with subversive political activity and was expelled from the university. He was later allowed back into the university and earned his law degree in 1976. He also has a degree in sociology from the Faculty of Arts of ELTE.

He worked for Világosság, a periodical, until 1981, and in 1979, while working for that publication, Demszky signed the statement declaring solidarity with Charter '77 –
the Hungarian dissidents’ Bill of Rights. He was also a founding member of SZETA (Fund to Support the Poor), one of the opposition groups of the regime.

Demszky’s political activities cost him his job, and the regime denied any and all travel and publication requests. In 1981, he and fellow dissident László Rajk launched AB Független Kiadó (AB Independent Publishing House) which published several samizdat periodicals. In 1988, he was one of the founding members of the Network of Free Initiatives political party and then the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ).

Demszky was elected to Parliament in Hungary’s 1990 parliamentary elections. In October of that year, he was elected Mayor of Budapest at the inaugural meeting of the General Assembly. He was re-elected as Mayor of Budapest in 1994 and again in 1998 and 2002 (http://english.budapest.hu/engine.aspx?page=leaders&bs-long-content=1).

Pundits call Demszky a rarity in Eastern Europe. Whereas, many of his former dissident colleagues are now failed politicians, victims of their own idealism or ineptitude, Demszky is a popular mayor who runs a booming, well-managed city (http://www.keepmedia.com/pubs/BusinessWeek/2000/06/19/22964?extID=10026). Hungarian political watchers say Demszky has aspirations to be Prime Minister of Hungary one day (http://www.ontheglobe.com/notes/notes20.htm).

Grzegorz Gortat is a media specialist working for the American Embassy in Warsaw’s press office. He is a graduate of Warsaw University’s English-Philology Department. Gortat worked as a high school English teacher for eight years, and then became the Indonesian Embassy’s culture and press officer in Warsaw. After a stint as a freelance English translator he moved to the United States Embassy’s press office.
Gortat follows Poland’s media issues and handles media relations for the Embassy. His analyses of Polish society, including the mass media, are read by diplomats at the highest level within the Embassy and in Washington, DC. Gortat is also an accomplished fiction writer who has had four books in print and often translates English fiction into Polish.

Gortat supplied several briefings to the author during two visits to Poland. He was also interviewed in depth regarding the Polish radio and television industry and on Polish media law.

Miklos Haraszti is a Hungarian poet, musician, essayist, editor, journalist and writer who was born in Jerusalem in 1945. He is a graduate of Budapest University’s Hungarian Language and Philosophy school. In 1976, while working as a factory laborer, he helped create the Hungarian Democratic Opposition Movement. In the 1980s he was editor of the *samizdat* periodical Beszélo. Also during this time he penned two of his most renowned works, *A Worker in a Worker’s State* (1983) and *The Velvet Prison* (1987).

*A Worker in a Worker’s State* details the communist treatment and the ideological indoctrination of a Hungarian machinist under communism. *The Velvet Prison* is a sardonic look at the treatment of artists and artistic expression under communist rule. Both books brought him unwanted notoriety among the communist secret police; Haraszti is said to have had one of the thickest case files in Hungary – taking up over three feet of shelf space in the secret police’s vault.
Tragically, his books also cost him his mother’s life. A crazed fan of Haraszti’s broke into his apartment when he was away and murdered his mother who lived with him. He also sacrificed his relationship with his father – a worker whose livelihood depended on his membership in the communist party. Father and son agreed to not see each other so that his father could honestly say he did not know of his son’s whereabouts when questioned by the secret police.

Haraszti was elected to the Hungarian Parliament in 1990 where he served until 1994. He left politics and now lectures on democratization and media politics at several universities. His books on life under communism have been translated into several languages including English. Presently, he is working on a volume of his memoirs.

Anna Jasińska has degrees in both law and journalism from Warsaw University. From 1980-1992 she worked as a journalist for Poland’s state-run radio stations, Program I and II. During her radio tenure she covered news and music and literature.

Jasińska left state radio in 1992 to become director of undergraduate academic programs for the Warsaw Journalism Center, a United States funded undergraduate journalism school that taught Polish students new methods of radio, television and newspaper reporting following the transition. While at the Warsaw Journalism Center she led several training programs for veteran journalists in both the print and electronic media who were making the transition from communist censored newspapers to privately-owned, free press enterprises. The Warsaw Journalism Center, under Jasińska’s direction, also supplied English classes to working Polish journalists.
In 1996, Jasińska created the ‘Green’ public relations firm with several other former journalists. ‘Green’ specializes in media consulting and media planning and is one of the country’s best known planners of large media events like film festivals, concerts and charity galas.

**Tomasz Królak** was interviewed twice for this project – once in 1999 and again in 2002. In the initial years after the transition, Królak oversaw the production of “Czasy” (Times), a Catholic Church produced talk show which aired on state-run Polish television’s first channel (Program I). Królak’s tenure as head of Catholic programming for state run television is marked by a substantial expansion of Catholic television programming before the Catholic Church launched its own television stations.

By 2002, Królak was editor-in-chief of the Catholic Information Agency (KAI) based in Warsaw. Królak oversaw the expansion of KAI into a major wire service on par in both coverage and credibility with the Polish Press Agency. Under his direction KAI, increased its Internet presence by providing news and information on the Catholic Church’s Internet portal, Opoka.

In addition to his journalistic work, Królak is also an accomplished author; he has written three books about the pontificate of John Paul II.

**Maciej Pawlicki** has been a fixture, and a political lightning rod, in Poland’s electronic media since the transition. In many ways, Pawlicki personifies the political battles that plague Poland’s media landscape.
In 1996, Pawlicki, who is described as a right wing conservative, worked as the director of Polish Television’s Program I (comparable to a station manager at a radio or television station or the editor-in-chief of a newspaper). He lost his job when state-run television’s ruling board, comprised of politically appointed members, was reconstituted after the former communists took control of the government and replaced the Solidarity-backed members with their own supporters.

Pawlicki’s firing was just the first of a general house cleaning of other conservative producers who, the television board claimed, was producing shows critical of the new administration. Those shows were canceled and others that supported the new administration were put on the air.

Pawlicki became director for TV Niepokalanów in Warsaw and served in that capacity during the time of the interview (2002). At that time, the organization was struggling financially and failing in its attempts to launch the Telewizja Familyjna channel. Telewizja Familyjna never got off the ground, but in 2004 a second TV Niepokalanów channel was launched carrying Church-centric programming.

**Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek**, as one of the Polish Catholic Church’s representatives, played an integral role in Poland’s early transitional years and continues to be a key spokesperson for the Church in media issues. His influence and contributions transcend Poland’s borders however, as he has taken part in some of the Catholic Church’s most historical contemporary moments.

Pieronek was ordained a priest in 1957 with the future Pope John Paul II as the head consecrator. He studied canon law and later became one of the Church’s eminent
specialists in the field. In 1989, he served as a Church representative at the Round Table Talks between the Communist government, the Solidarity Trade Union, and the Catholic Church.

Pieronek played a key role in organizing the Second Polish Plenary Synod which was formally opened by the Pope during his fourth visit to Poland in 1991. Pope John Paul II made Pieronek bishop in 1992. The Synod was tasked with studying new ways the Church can serve its congregants in the new social and political situation of the country. The Synod presented their findings to the Pope in 1999 and the council was adjourned.

Bishop Pieronek continues to be the Church’s point man for discussing Church-media issues and has been a vocal supporter of Poland’s membership in the European Union. Pieronek presently serves as the rector of the Pontifical Academy of Theology in Kraków.

Michał Rynkowski was a doctoral student at the University of Wrocław at the time of the interview. His academic research focuses on European Union issues, Church-State relations, and media law. He is the author of Architecture of the European security: materials of the International Conference, Opolnica, 6-9 May 2001.

Kai Schoenhals is an American born independent film producer, philanthropist, and media expert in Poland. From 1992 to 1994, Schoenhals was vice-director for the Warsaw Journalism Center, a United States Information Agency-funded school for young Poles wishing to learn free press journalism directly following the Polish transition.
Schoenhals graduated from a Danish film school in 1996, returned to Poland and opened his own film company, Open Door Entertainment. Schoenhals produces, writes, and directs films and documentaries throughout Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (former Soviet Union) and has television and film credits from around the world. Open Door has several joint partnership agreements with various foreign partners, including well-known Belgian, Danish, French, Irish, Polish, Russian, and United Kingdom film makers.

Schoenhals is also involved with the Artistic Vitamin Foundation which provides international exchange scholarships for those in the Arts. Schoenhals is married to Polish film star Katarzyna Figura (http://www.artisticvitamin.com/index1.html).

Marek Skwarnicki is a veteran correspondent for the Tygodnik Powszechny newspaper and a personal friend of Pope John Paul II for the last fifty years. His book A Hard Night Tonight: A Diary of 1982 details his personal experiences during Poland’s martial law period (http://letters.krakow.pl/books/skwarnicki.html).

As a journalist for Tygodnik Powszechny, Skwarnicki has covered nearly one dozen international trips by Pope John Paul II and every papal visit to Poland. Inspired by Skwarnicki, the Pope wrote, “The Stream” a collection of verses mostly about nature and written at his summer residence (http://www.fp1.com/news/news.html).

Skwarnicki, at the request of the Episcopate, used his own poetic talents to translate the psalms and canticles used in church services, lectionaries, and breviaries into contemporary Polish prose in 1976. Furthermore, Skwarnicki is the author of a series of verse collections about the experience of clinical death. Skwarnicki has also written
dozens of articles on Pope John Paul II's pilgrimages. Marek Skwarnicki, the Pontiff’s
dfriend of almost 50 years has authored seven books on the Church, the Pope, and church
teachings.

**Fr. Kazimierz Sowa** is one of the Polish Catholic media’s rising stars. After the
transition, Sowa was tasked with creating and then managing Radio Plus’s regional radio
station in Kraków. Sowa envisioned programming similar to successful commercial
stations in Western Europe and the United States that target young Catholics – plenty of
music, engaging announcers, and regularly scheduled news briefs.

Sowa delivered on his vision and Radio Plus is one of the Catholic Church’s most
successful media properties however, it did come at a price. Sowa’s vision of a
successful radio station did not leave room for much overt evangelization, which caused
friction among his superiors.

Sowa’s successful venture in Kraków resulted in a promotion to the Radio Plus
headquarters in Warsaw where he now directs the Radio Plus network. Sowa has turned
the entire network into a commercial success for the Church. He was interviewed twice
for this project – once in 1999 and again in 2002. In 1999 he was director of Radio Plus
in Kraków, and by 2002 he was directing the Radio Plus network from Warsaw.

**Artur Sporniak** was the acting editor-in-chief of *Tygodnik Powszechny* at the
time of the interview (1999). At the time Sporniak was replacing long time Editor Jerzy
Turowicz after Turowicz’s death in 1999 and prior to Father Adam Boniecki taking over
A Historical Perspective

Tuchman (1998) places a premium importance on contextualizing, fact-checking, and interpreting data when conducting a historical study. Placing historical events into context not only helps to understand the gravity of those events, it also helps to understand why the historians who documented those occurrences thought those events important enough to write about. As a researcher using historians’ accounts of events as secondary sources, it is invaluable to understand the controversies that existed between historians while they determined which version of history would be told. Williams (1977) calls this unconscious sense of the present the “structure of feeling” that defines an era.

Assuming that history as described by eyewitnesses, scholars, and historians is tainted by that person’s place in history, the necessity to corroborate facts becomes integral to a legitimate study. Tuchman advocates analyzing texts not only for corroboration, but for differences as well. To her, the differences between two descriptions of the same event may be more significant than a factual validation. And, in this way, both texts are equally important in the information confirmation process because they describe the same event through different filters. Neither is completely right, nor completely wrong, but both shed light on the events importance. The term “text” in these cases does not only refer to written documents, but can be oral recollections as well (p. 245).
The data gathered here is historical in nature. The interviews and the resulting transcripts deal with the recollections of people who may have played adversarial roles during the period under study. Conflicting recollections do not foul the research; it provides texture and legitimacy for the study. The documents collected for analysis were treated as artifacts created in time to advance a political agenda. As Joan Scott (1989) explains, if history is the result of politics, then finding the truth is illusory:

History is inherently political. There is no single standard by which we can identify “true” historical knowledge…. Rather, there are contests, more and less conflictual, more and less explicit, about the substance, uses, and meanings of the knowledge that we call history…. This process is about the establishment [and challenge] and protection [and contestation] of hegemonic definitions of history. (Paraphrased in Tuchman in Denzin & Lincoln, 1998b, p. 249)
The Roman Catholic Church, as a global religious institution, touts one objective – saving souls around the world by spreading the word of God and delivering the Church’s holy sacraments. ‘Salus animarum suprema lex’ – salvation of the individual soul as the supreme law – remains first and foremost the Catholic Church’s main objective (Stehle, 1981, p. 8). Thus, the Church’s responsibility toward Man transcends political and economic systems. The Church’s philosophy dictates that since all Men must be allowed to seek salvation, the Church must be able to fully serve both the devout and convert non-believers. Therefore, the Church supports any political system that recognizes human rights and religious freedom. In the Church’s view, the hierarchy is simple: governments are answerable to Man, and Man is answerable to God’s representative on Earth - the Catholic Church.

With such a lofty objective as saving souls, Church doctrine understandably orients the Church for a marathon race and not a sprint. Therefore, for a Church entering its third millennium, changes in Church policies and practices are slow and methodical – an organization that thinks in terms of centuries instead of years. This chapter outlines the Catholic Church’s evolving doctrine on its relationship with governments in general, its attitudes towards socialism in particular, and its views of the growing force of mass media.
The Roman Catholic popes of the 20th century performed a difficult juggling act. In a world where two political systems – capitalism and communism – vied for domination, the Church tried to stay politically neutral, in order to continue to evangelize in every country of the world while trends of secularization and atheism grew in strength. The Church also tried to remain neutral during two world wars because Catholics fought on both sides of those wars, and to criticize one group meant ostracizing the other.

Two very important papal documents defined 20th century Vatican policy and progress. Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*, defined the Church of Rome’s role vis-à-vis human rights and the various political systems that exist in the world. Despite being written in the late 19th century, the ideas expressed in Leo’s encyclical received renewed Church support in the late 20th century when Pope John Paul II spotlighted the validity of the ideas expressed in Leo’s encyclical in two encyclicals *Laborem Exercens* and *Centesimus Annus*. The second document, an encyclical written by Pope Paul VI, called *Miranda Prorsus*, foreshadowed the policies that would be established by Paul’s Vatican Council II in 1963 in *Inter Mirifica*, a decree establishing the modern Catholic Church’s approach to understanding mass media and utilizing mass communication channels for evangelization purposes. *Rerum Novarum* and *Miranda Prorsus*, as well as the papal papers and positions that sprung from both over the last century, particularly John Paul II’s *Centesimus Annus* issued in 1991, are worth further investigation for they illuminate the Church’s approach to saving the human soul through diplomacy and propaganda in the information age. They also put into perspective the actions of the current Pope, John Paul II, before, during and after the democratic revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe.
The author of *Rerum Novarum*, Pope Leo XIII and Pope John Paul II possessed similar philosophies and faced similar pontifical challenges during their tenure, despite being elevated to the papacy one hundred years apart. Both pontiffs were elected to power at a time of great secularization trends in the world. Both had been leading the Church of Rome for 14 years when they published their encyclicals on the latest challenges facing the world. In *Rerum Novarum*, Pope Leo XIII addressed the birth of socialism as an ideology and the power of the capitalist robber barons and industrialists. Pope John Paul II, in *Centesimus Annus* – his attempt to comment upon and to update Leo XIII’s *Rerum Novarum* encyclical – was written at a time when communism in Eastern Europe was in ruin, capitalism was on the rise, and the livelihood of the common worker was threatened by the economic ruination of communism and the technological and scientific developments that ushered in the third millennium.

The Popes that governed between Leo XIII and John Paul II dealt with, among other things, two World Wars and a Cold War, the Jewish Holocaust, the birth of post-modernist thinking, and the rapid technological advancements of secular science. These worldwide events challenged the Catholic Church’s legitimacy on a global level and ultimately brought about a rethinking and restructuring of the Church’s power. It is worthwhile to view the last century through papal encyclicals, addresses and decrees in order to understand how the Roman Catholic Church in general and the Polish Catholic Church in particular faced these challenges.

**Pope Leo XIII’s *Rerum Novarum***

Pope Leo XIII, in his encyclical on labor, *Rerum Novarum*, attempted to put the many changes taking place around the world at the end of the 19th century into religious
perspective. By 1878, the date *Rerum Novarum* was published, industrialists were operating sweatshops that objectified the men, women, and children that toiled at their jobs seven days a week, twelve hours a day. The 19th century empiricists’ approach to science was less mystical and more secular and “faceless,” with its quantitative applications and statistical results. For example, Pope Leo XIII penned *Rerum Novarum* less than two decades after Charles Darwin challenged the Book of Genesis’s account of The Creation in his book, *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*. The industrial and scientific revolutions of the late 19th century were threatening the effectiveness of the Catholic Church by exploiting laborers, keeping them out of the churches by working employees seven days a week, and questioning traditional spiritual tenets of the Church. Through his address of these issues in *Rerum Novarum*, the Pope established for his successors the Church’s position for the turbulent and trying 20th century.

Not surprisingly, *Rerum Novarum* develops a socio-political hierarchy that favors the Church of Rome. Within its pages, the encyclical establishes that Man is the product of God and, therefore is beholden to God. The State is the result of man’s desire to establish societal associations; hence the State exists to serve Man. The natural hierarchy then exists that both Man and the State should answer to the Church, and the Church, which answers to a higher calling, answers to neither the State nor Man. *Rerum Novarum* then addresses the needs of Man for the remainder of the encyclical and the way various political systems serve the needs of Man (*Rerum Novarum*, 32).

Pope Leo XIII dictates that the Church should never favor one political philosophy over another. The Church, Leo avers, believes that a man’s worth is reflected
in his work. Man can only improve his lot in life by fully utilizing the talents given him by God. In order for Man to improve his standing in society, his work must be rewarded with pay, and that money empowers Man to possess property. Therefore, it is the natural right of man to own property since that property is the physical result of his work. By owning property a man is able to better his lot in life and can achieve a greater sense of worth and realize the potential given him by God. In the event that a man grows wealthy from his labor, he must be generous in support of the Church and to the people who labor under his supervision.

The Pope’s underlying assumption is that the State should be the champion of the workingman, prompting critiques of both capitalist and socialist ideologies. In Rerum Novarum, Pope Leo XIII is adamant in his dislike for socialism’s tenets. For example, in his view, work has no rewards under socialism, thus depriving the worker of the spiritual benefits of work. Even in these early days of socialist thought, the Pope could see the shortcomings of a socialist state’s approach to serving the working class:

To remedy these wrongs the socialists, working on the poor man’s envy of the rich, are striving to do away with private property, and contend that individual possessions should become the common property of all, to be administered by the State or by municipal bodies. They hold that by thus transferring property from private individuals to the community, the present mischievous state of things will be set to right, inasmuch as each citizen will then get his fair share of whatever there is to enjoy. But their contentions are so clearly powerless to end the controversy that were they carried into effect the working man himself would be among the first to suffer. They are, moreover, emphatically unjust, for they would rob the lawful possessor, distort the functions of the State, and create utter confusion in the community (4)…Socialists, therefore, by endeavoring to transfer the possessions of individuals to the community at large, strike at the interests of every wage-earner, since they would deprive him of the liberty of disposing of his wages, and thereby of all hope and possibility of increasing his resources and of bettering his condition in life (Rerum Novarum, 5).
Rerum Novarum shows the Pope’s equal contempt for capitalists who exploit workers. Pope Leo XIII criticizes sweatshops that force workers to toil for long hours with no rest and no holidays (41) and condemns factory owners who take advantage of women and child labor (42). The Pope sees this kind of exploitation as anti-Christian and therefore worthy of Church intervention on behalf of the worker:

According to natural reason and Christian philosophy, working for gain is creditable, not shameful, to a man, since it enables him to earn an honorable livelihood; but to misuse men as though they were things in the pursuit of gain, or to value them solely for their physical powers – that is truly shameful and inhuman. Again justice demands that, in dealing with the workingman, religion and the good of his soul must be kept in mind. Hence, the employer is bound to see that the worker has time for his religious duties…. [But] wealthy owners and all masters of labor should be mindful of this – that to exercise pressure upon the indigent and the destitute for the sake of gain, and to gather one’s profit out of the need of another, is condemned by all laws, human and divine (Rerum Novarum, 20).

In fact, the plight of the working classes dominates the message in this encyclical. According to the Pope, the working man is the basic element of any labor system and support for workers’ rights should occur at two levels: internally, at the state level via political institutions, and externally, via civil society through social associations (Rerum Novarum, 51).

In Rerum Novarum, Pope Leo XIII condemns the atrocious working conditions and labor abuses of the working class (42). He reaches back to the previous century and touts the advantages that the ancient guilds provided the craftsmen, and he espouses the benefits of a similar system. Pope Leo XIII recognized that unions did exist during the time, but many were secular associations and did not address the workers’ spiritual needs. The Pope condemns secular associations and encourages Catholics to either infiltrate the secular unions, to evangelize within the organization, or establish new Christian
associations outright (*Rerum Novarum*, 54). Leo then calls on the clergy to assist the working classes in the formation of these unions. The Pope viewed civil society as the sole domain of the Catholic Church and felt that only through civil society could Man acquire equity with the State. He felt the State had to accept these Christian associations and accept the Church’s right to control civil society:

Private societies, then, although they exist within the body politic, and are severally part of the commonwealth, cannot nevertheless be absolutely, and as such, prohibited by public authority. For, to enter into a ‘society’ of this kind is the natural right of man; and the State…if it forbid its citizens to form associations, it contradicts the very principle of its own existence, for both they and it exist in virtue of the like principle, namely, the natural tendency of man to dwell in society (51)...And here we are reminded of the confraternities, societies, and religious orders which have arisen by the Church’s authority and the piety of Christian men…In their religious aspect they claim rightly to be responsible to the Church alone. The rulers of the State accordingly have no rights over them, nor can they claim any share in their control; on the contrary, it is the duty of the State to respect and cherish them, and, if need be, to defend them from attack (*Rerum Novarum*, 53).

Pope Leo XIII rose to the papacy in the late 19th century when the world was in flux. The industrial revolution was in full swing, and Karl Marx’s ideas of a socialist society were beginning to be debated by intellectuals. Although no practical approach to socialism would be practiced until 1917, the ideology had enough intellectual momentum that Leo found it worthy to address in his *Rerum Novarum* encyclical. In many ways, *Rerum Novarum* laid the foundation for 20th century papal policy regarding the Church’s stance on the world’s political systems. Pope Leo XIII centered this encyclical not around any one system, but on the issue foremost in the minds of late 19th century and early 20th century politicians and industrialists – labor relations. By focusing on the worker, Leo XIII was able to transcend political rhetoric by establishing the Church as the moral compass for political and economic issues.
Pope Leo XIII believed it was futile for the Church to endorse one political system over another, since any political system was a product of its time and the socio-political conditions in that country. If forced to choose, the Vatican would isolate practicing Catholics living under particular political systems, weakening the Church’s evangelization efforts and limiting its effectiveness with parishioners in certain countries.

Leo XIII also recognized that despite the radical differences between capitalism and socialism, both shared a focus on the laborer as a social and economic entity. In *Rerum Novarum*, Leo XIII discusses in detail the plight of the worker and the exploitation that workers suffer under all political systems. By aligning the Church with the plight of labor, Leo XIII was able to hold political sway with bureaucrats, who profited from a docile labor force, and intellectual elites, who empathized with labor and sided with human rights issues, regardless of a country’s adopted political system. Also, since the working classes were relatively inexperienced in the ways of politics, the Church offered its guidance and support, both from the pulpit and by assisting with the development and management of labor unions, thus playing an influential role in most political systems in the Christian world.

Pope John Paul II revisited the “labor question” in two encyclicals *Laborem Exercens* in 1981 and *Centesimus Annus* ten years later. *Laborem Exercens* was intended to be released in May 1981 in time for the ninetieth anniversary of the publishing of *Rerum Novarum*; however an assassination attempt on the Pope’s life that same month delayed the release of John Paul’s encyclical four months.

In *Laborem Exercens* John Paul approaches the labor issue not from a class perspective as Leo XIII did but as a global issue. Nonetheless, like Leo XIII’s, John
Paul’s view of labor issues are synonymous with human rights. From this perspective, *Laborem Exercens* - without touting one political system over another - supports the human rights initiatives furthered by the Helsinki Accords and the Anti-Politics spirit of the Eastern European intellectuals’ struggle against the communist regimes:

While in the past the “class” question was especially highlighted as the center of this issue, in more recent times it is the “world” question that is emphasized. Thus, not only the sphere of class is taken into consideration but also the world sphere of inequality and injustice, and, as a consequence, not only the class dimension but also the world dimension of the tasks involved in the path toward the achievement of justice in the modern world. A complete analysis of the situation of the world today shows in an even deeper and fuller way the meaning of the previous analysis of social injustices; and it is the meaning that must be given today to efforts to build justice on earth, not concealing thereby unjust structures but demanding that they be examined and transformed on a more universal scale (*Laborem Exercens*, 2.4).

Whereas *Laborem Exercens* did not espouse one political system over another, John Paul II made no such pretense in *Centesimus Annus*. At the time of its writing, communist states were toppling, democratic forms of government were being established based the rule of law and a free market economy. In *Centesimus Annus*, John Paul II outlines and supports the main points established in *Rerum Novarum*, especially its condemnation of socialism. *Centesimus Annus* then attempts to put the politically pivotal year 1989 into religious perspective. John Paul II blames communism’s atheistic ways and its disregard for human rights through worker exploitation as the key factors to the societal rejection of it as an ideology. The Pope then calls on church leaders to increase global evangelization to fill the spiritual void left by toppled communist regimes (*Centesimus Annus*, 24).

**Pope Paul VI’s *Miranda Prorsus*, Vatican Council II’s *Inter Mirifica***
Presciently, Pope Paul VI published *Miranda Prorsus* in 1957, less than a month before the Soviet Union sent Sputnik into space, which launched true global mass communication. In this encyclical Paul puts forth his papacy’s view of the means of social communication, including newspapers, motion pictures, radio, and television. *Miranda Prorsus* laid the groundwork for the creation of Vatican Council II’s doctrinal outline for social communication – *Inter Mirifica* (*Miranda Prorsus*, 1957). *Inter Mirifica* is the building block for the Church’s contemporary ideological position on the mass media.

The Catholic Church calls mass communication ‘social communication,’ because it feels media use should focus on the betterment of humans and society. The Vatican viewed the mass media as way to educate and evangelize the world’s population, and Pope Paul VI felt the mass media was a good communication tool for disseminating the Church’s modern approach to Catholicism. The convening of Pope Paul VI’s Second Vatican Council caused a sea change in church doctrine, structure, and in the Church’s approach to humanity and specifically addressed the use of the mass media as a social communication tool (*Inter Mirifica*, 2).

“Vatican II,” as it came to be called, dragged a reticent Church into the 20th century. Physical and presentational changes to weekly worship were implemented to make the Mass more inclusive for the devout and to promote communication between the priest and his parish. The Mass, for instance, was no longer universally presented in Latin but in the dominant language of the country, and priests were instructed to present the Mass while facing the congregation instead of facing the Blessed Sacrament with his
back to parishioners. These cosmetic changes helped to personalize weekly worship and promote a sense of community within a parish.

Structurally, Vatican II attempted to give parishioners, through their bishops, more power in church workings and to develop a more collegial atmosphere between the Pope and his bishops. As a result, the age-old doctrine of papal infallibility was questioned and challenged - albeit in measured tones. Religious and lay committees provided input about church doctrine to the Pope through academic and pontifical councils and through various religious synods. Paul VI’s Vatican II may be the best example of a pope working together with the rest of the Church’s power structure to develop church doctrine. It is within this atmosphere of collegiality that Vatican II produced the Decree on the Means of Social Communication known as *Inter Mirifica*. This decree explains how the Church views the mass media as both a source for concern and as a tool for exploitation. It presents the Church’s viewpoint regarding the pluses and pitfalls of the media, the responsibilities media professionals have when disseminating information, the caveats concerning Catholics’ consumption of the mass media, and the role the media should play in advancing church doctrine. *Inter Mirifica* set the doctrinal foundation for numerous papal encyclicals, papal addresses and pontifical council documents related to all church matters including mass media over the last four decades.¹

According to *Inter Mirifica*, humans have a right to diverse and accurate information. In order for factual information to be disseminated, a society’s mass media

channels have to be free to pursue the truth. Man-made governmental institutions, according to the Church, must ensure and enforce a free and open media that promotes morality and good conscience — Christian morality specifically:

The civil authority should foster religious, cultural and artistic values... The civil authorities, which rightly regard the well-being of the citizens as their concern, are also bound to ensure, equitably and vigilantly, that public morality and social progress are not gravely endangered through the misuse of the media. This they can achieve by promulgating laws and tirelessly enforcing them. The liberty of individuals and groups is not in the least compromised by such vigilance, especially where serious guarantees cannot be given by those who use these media professionally (Inter Mirifica, 12).

The encyclical asserts that since the service that mass media provide is crucial to a healthy society, mass media professionals have an obligation to act in a moral and ethical way. The Church views itself as the paragon of moral virtue, and therefore the Church rationalizes that it should be able to own and operate media channels and use these channels for evangelization purposes:

It is the Church’s birthright to use and own any of these media which are necessary or useful for the formation of Christians and for pastoral activity (Inter Mirifica, 3).

Likewise, the Church holds its members accountable for supporting the religious press both philosophically and financially:

[Catholics] have the obligation to sustain and assist Catholic newspapers, periodicals, film-projects, radio and television stations and programs; for the main aim of all these is to propagate and defend the truth and to secure the permeation of society by Christian values (Inter Mirifica, 17).

In this decree, the Church asserts that because social communication can be used for both good and evil, it is imperative the Church train its clergy in the methods of social communication. These priests must then train their parishioners on wise media.
consumption. In addition, the Church should also teach media professionals in the ways of Christianity:

Lay people must be given the necessary technical, doctrinal and moral formation. To this end, schools, institutes or faculties must be provided in sufficient number, where journalists, writers for films, radio and television, and anyone else concerned, may receive a complete formation, imbued with the Christian spirit and especially with the Church’s social teaching…Literary critics and critics of films, radio, television and the rest should be carefully prepared so that they will be fully competent in their respective spheres and will be trained and encouraged to give due consideration to morality in their critiques (Inter Mirifica, 15).

In the spirit of Rerum Novarum, Inter Mirifica encourages Christian media professionals to form professional organizations that establish moral codes of ethics that bind their members to the Church’s moral guidelines (Inter Mirifica, 11). It also calls for the establishment of the ‘Pontifical Commission for the Means of Social Communication’ to oversee the implementation and ultimately enforce the guidelines set out in the document.

These papal encyclicals make clear that even after Vatican Council II and the doctrinal sea change it spearheaded in Catholic practice, the Vatican has maintained salvation of the individual soul as the supreme law as its focal point for public diplomacy. The popes of the 20th century were saddled not just with the responsibility of battling hostile political regimes that exploited Man and discouraged human spirituality; the popes also had to contend with the concept of modernity. Pope Paul VI revolutionized the Church’s stance toward the mass media by promoting mass media use as a tool of evangelization. Pope John Paul II went a step further by challenging church leaders in countries to devise and implement ways to increase church involvement by the devout
and to evangelize the masses through the media. In response, the Polish Episcopate formed a council, or synod, to address the Pope’s modernization objectives.

The steps the Church took in the early 1990s to increase evangelization efforts and put Poles back into church pews meant modernizing church doctrine along the lines of Vatican II tenets - eschewed by Polish Primate Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński - much later than most countries. Pope John Paul II convened a Polish Plenary Synod in 1991 to develop a blueprint for implementing these changes. Using papal encyclicals, guidelines produced from Vatican II, and other religious documents, the Synod set to work assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the Catholic Church in Poland.

A Plenary Synod is a legislative body that has the power to make official Church decisions. This All Polish Plenary Synod was comprised of both clergy and lay people and attempted to address the social, economic, political and personal changes that occurred in Poland after 1989, and to prepare the Catholic Church in Poland for the new millennium. The Synod met from 1991 to 1997, their findings accepted in 1998, and was finally adjourned by the Pope during his 1999 visit to Poland. The Synod’s conclusion was clear: Especially since the transition from communism, secularization trends were permeating Polish culture. The Church must increase its presence in Polish culture by increasing its evangelization efforts in schools, using the mass media, and by influencing the lives of individuals through catechism and recruitment of the laity for church involvement. A fresh approach was needed, as described in a 1999 pre-Papal visit press booklet:

The Synod stresses that the evangelisation is not to be a ‘repetition of history’ nor [sic] a restoration of the old world order. Now a new kind of pastoral ministry
and a new kind of preaching is needed; the kind that would ‘match the mentality of each generation’ (Królak, T. & Żbilowski, 1999, p. 204).

Apart from some successes such as the formation of the Catholic Information Agency wire service (KAI), the Polish Plenary Synod is considered a relative failure because church leaders could not make the transition from delivering sermons to the laity to moderating discussions with the laity (Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, personal communication, 30 July 2002). Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek served as Secretary to the Plenary Synod. He calls the Synod mostly a failure because it took place during a turbulent and dynamic time in Poland:

The task of the Synod was to activate lay people within the Church, which means giving them a chance of speaking in public about their faith and the Church. This work required tremendous engagement from both lay people and priests working on it in small groups. The Synod was mostly a failure, because of the lack of the engagement of the people who were supposed to create it, but, in fact, they did not do it effectively. It is easier to prepare a church service than to get down to the work in which you have to learn and to teach other people. These people require, and they have the right to do so, some explanation and persuasion. Such teaching is also a form of evangelisation.

Formally, the Synod took place, but nothing more happened. There were seven thousand discussion groups, which is nothing with reference to the whole Church. It is too little. Now that the Synod has been closed and its documents published, it seems that the Catholicism presented in these documents is an open, post-Council Catholicism. Paradoxically, now there is much more interest in the Synod documents than there was in the Synod itself. It was a fascinating work, but I think that it was beyond the will and the engagement of its people. It required too much from them (Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, personal communication, 30 July 2002)

This chapter has traced the Catholic Church’s evolving doctrine toward relationships with governments, its views on the mass media, and the Church’s adaptation to worldwide social changes in general and Poland’s in particular. Using Poland as a
case study, a closer look at how Pope John Paul II went against the Church’s longstanding position on nonpolitical involvement inside countries helps shed light on the Polish Church’s situation today.
CHAPTER 5

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH’S POLITICAL ROLE IN POLAND PRE AND POST-1989

The Catholic Church, which has maintained a presence in Poland since nearly the beginning of the country’s establishment over a thousand years ago, has served as educator, administrator, partner, enforcer and even lackey to the various political powers that have controlled Poland. Throughout Poland’s millennial history, the Catholic Church has successfully woven itself into the fabric of Polish nationalism, becoming a unique Catholic country worthy of the Vatican’s respect and vigilance.

The Polish monarchy in the sixteenth century never encouraged strict Catholicism for the masses, wanting to avoid setting themselves in direct competition with the divine King – Jesus Christ. Nonetheless, Polish kings maintained a rather unique asymmetric relationship with the Vatican. The monarch chose the bishop, who subsequently received the Vatican’s symbolic stamp of approval. Consequently, the king named political allies to these positions, even non-Catholics, who would go through the motions of converting to Catholicism before assuming office. One king went so far as to name a Jew to the bishopric who never converted – an unparalleled case in Europe (Zamoyski, 1987, p. 79). Though stripped of some of its authority, the Vatican welcomed the political influence their bishop had in Poland’s power structure, and the Church gradually came to view the bishopric as its envoy to the highest levels of government. Similar to today, the Church never shied away from expressing its wishes to Poland’s rulers.
Ogrodzinski & Szlajfer (1992) explain that the battle regarding the separation of Church and State never took place in Poland as it did in other countries, enabling a constant church presence in Polish politics:

Since Poland never went through the bloody Reformation and Counter-reformation, its clash with the Orthodox Church in the time of the partitions (1772-1918) only strengthened the bonds between the nation on one side and the church and religion on the other. In this way, Poland missed out on the Western-type nation-building processes that involved the separation of church and state and the rise of secularism (p. 18).

‘La Polenia fara da se:’ Poland takes care of its own affairs

The introduction of atheist communism to Russia and Eastern Europe in the early 20th century threatened the existence of the Catholic Church in that region. As its name implies atheism, communism eschews institutional religion; Lenin thought communism itself would be the state religion. After the Soviet Union assumed control of Poland in 1945, however, the communists realized the unique dilemma posed by Poland; how to institutionalize a God-less doctrine in a country that so closely identified with God. The results were often frustrating, prompting Josef Stalin to say, “Communism fits Poland like a saddle fits a cow” (Zamoyski, 1987, p. 397). Adam Zamoyski, in his book The Polish Way, describes the communists’ dilemma:

[The communist regime] could not do entirely as it pleased, for it was dealing with a nation whose most learned intellectuals and simplest peasants alike worshipped democracy and legality. They also worshipped God. This was an anomaly in a Marxist state, and it baffled and irritated the [communist] theoreticians. If at first the rulers of Poland believed that a mixture of materialism, social engineering, indoctrination and persecution would eventually alter it, they soon had to concede that it would not. The deep and enduring faith of the people was backed up by a Church led by redoubtable Cardinals (p. 374).

Soviet communists naively believed they could dictate State-Church relations from Moscow. During the strong-arm days of Stalin, this was much more feasible (since Stalin rarely negotiated anything and the Vatican approached the regime with suspicion).
however in the Post-Stalin Era, where varying “flavors” of communism evolved among the Soviet satellites, this posed enormous internal difficulties. Poland continued to cause the most problems. The Soviets’ centrally-controlled diplomacy also posed a problem for the Church since Catholics were dispersed throughout the Soviet Union in varying numbers.

As the communist ideology morphed into a form to coexist with the distinct cultures of each Soviet satellite state, the Catholic Church was able to develop a diplomatic approach to dealing with each regime. *Modus Vivendi* became the Vatican’s general approach to Eastern European relations. While ever mindful of the political situations in countries, the Church of Rome always believed it had a philosophical responsibility to transcend mere politics. Church leaders were not interested in preserving or overthrowing regimes; their job was to save souls. According to contemporary Church philosophy, if this tenet turned the Church into a political player, its role would be as shepherd leading the politicians, as well as the populace, toward everlasting life. It would not be to dominate and indoctrinate the society (*Rerum Novarum*, 26).

In actuality, the Catholic Church’s diplomatic endeavors do not differ that much from traditional state-to-state diplomacy. The Church’s approach to obtaining its desired policy goals in Eastern Europe was simple: If coexistence is impossible, defend the Church’s interest through confronted; compromise when coexistence is tolerable; and cooperate when credible partners present themselves (Stehle, 1981, p. 5). As in all international discourse, church policy fluctuates between holding fast to principles and giving ground for minor advancement. As in the case of the Church’s relationship with
Eastern European communism, with church leaders inside the countries acting independently of each other, the application of a unified Church approach to communism, at times, appeared haphazard, arbitrary, and often contradictory.

The Catholic Church’s propensity for being a reactive institution further complicated the situation. The Church’s main indictment of communism was its failure to recognize Man’s human rights; most importantly Man’s right to spirituality. In this way, the Church’s stance was simple: It was not necessary fighting against communism as it was fighting for the devout living under communism. Therefore, the application of the Church’s anti-communism philosophy varied by religious leader and therefore by country.

The reactions to atheist communism among national churches ran the gambit. In Hungary, for instance, *modus vivendi* was interpreted as a form of détente until a final settlement was established Hungarian Primate József Mindszenty’s utter refusal to negotiate with the Communists served to publicize the religious plight of the devout under atheistic rule. In Poland, *modus vivendi* took on a more conciliatory form at times (Skilling, 1989, p. 215), with Polish Primate Stefan Wyszyński’s willingness to cooperate with the Soviets and gain enough concessions for the Church to remain viable in a totalitarian regime.

Although the status of the Church was somewhat unique in Poland compared to the rest of the communist bloc, the Church’s *modus vivendi* in Poland was consistent with how it operated elsewhere. The Vatican has always treated Poland differently from the rest of its congregations because of Poland’s unique brand of renegade spiritualism compared with other countries, and because it is home to the largest number of Catholics.
in the region (Stehle, 1981, p. 253). Historically, the Vatican has had a long, largely successful record of fighting for a place at the Polish table throughout different regimes, and so, not surprisingly, the Church’s approach to the introduction of a communist government was remarkably similar to the way it survived and thrived under Poland’s monarchy. The communists quickly came to realize the futility of trying to instill their atheistic ideology in a country that so closely tied its identity with its religion, and Poles were allowed to worship relatively free from persecution.

Reluctantly, but in order to ensure that its largest congregation continued to receive the Holy Sacraments and spiritual guidance, ‘La Polenia fara da se’ – Poland takes care of its own affairs - became the Vatican’s motto. The Polish Episcopate essentially had a free hand to act as it pleased. The result was not only the Holy See’s severance from the largest number of Catholics in the Soviet bloc, but also the successful isolation of the Polish Catholic Church by elated anti-clerics and the Communist Party faithful. This isolation, however, did not break the back of the Polish Catholic Church. Instead, it led to an empowered, independent Church.

Throughout the Eastern bloc, communists systematically tried to undermine the Catholic Church through infiltration, in order to demonstrate its authority over the religious institution (KGB Document translated in Corley, 1996, p. 25). In those countries where the Church was allowed a continued presence, the naming of local Church officials required Party approval and usually occurred without the Vatican’s input, not unlike during the days of Poland’s early monarchs.
To counter the imposition of puppet clergy sympathetic to the communist regime, the Vatican responded by secretly naming bishops in some countries.\(^2\) Although the secret bishop system allowed the Catholic Church a continued presence within Poland, it also created a powerful national church leadership that grew to resist administrative interference – whether from Moscow or the Vatican (Michnik, *Letters from Prison*, pp. x-xi). Since communication between a country’s church leaders and Rome was often forbidden by the regime, these underground bishops operated without the guidance of the Vatican and were able, in many cases, to effectively isolate or marginalize the state-imposed priests (Stehle, 1981, p. 253). Due to this isolation from Rome, however, the Polish Catholic Church’s Primate became nearly as powerful as the Pope within the country and sought to carve out the Church’s own identity. The Primate built popular support by exploiting the Church’s historic ties to Poland and Polish nationalism and easily justified its opposition to the communists based on religious, philosophical and historic foundations.

If the Kremlin acted naively by attempting to rule from without, the Pope inside the Vatican had added obstacles – lead the world’s Catholics without feedback from Church officials inside countries most hostile to Catholics. Political standoffs pitted powerful local bishops, alienated from the Vatican and free to interpret and apply Church

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\(^2\) In the Catholic faith, the Church must always be free to install new bishops, since they are the key to the long-range survival of the Church. Salvation is attained through receiving the seven sacraments (baptism, confirmation, the Eucharist, penance, Holy Orders, matrimony, and Anointing of the Sick). Since ordained priests are the only ones who can administer these sacraments, the Church’s organizational succession must never be compromised. The indispensable link in the Church’s structure is the bishop, and the succession is simple: Upwards, popes derive from the bishopric. Downwards, without bishops there would be no priests, without priests there would be no sacraments, and without sacraments, eternal salvation is lost.
doctrine as they saw fit, against communist politicians, who acted primarily on explicit directives from Moscow. A charismatic Primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, ensured a strong role for the Polish Catholic Church for decades, with little assistance from the Vatican, until the ascent of a Polish Pope and the Primate’s death changed the scene. Wyszyński used his personal charisma, political cunning, and obstinacy to successfully thwart communist attempts to infiltrate the Church hierarchy, marginalize the Church’s power in the country and separate the Church from its congregants. A closer look at how Wyszyński maintained a Church presence in communist Poland is worthwhile.

**Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński**

Throughout Poland’s years as a Soviet satellite state, the Church hierarchy thwarted continuous attempts by the regime to divide and conquer the Church – the communists’ only legal opposition in Poland. Furthermore, the Church managed to continuously communicate a unified message to the Polish population and against the communist government. The Church’s philosophical and ideological stance vis-à-vis the communist regime was personified in Poland’s Primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, a man who dealt with some form of socialism his entire life.

Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński was a man who understood the importance of history, the value of compromise, and the power of influencing the masses. Born in 1901, his life spanned two World Wars, including the occupation of Poland by both the Germans and Russians and its brief independence between the wars. Wyszyński viewed the Yalta Agreement as a selling out of Poland by Western Europe and the United States, and thus distrusted the West’s intentions and interest in Poland. He saw the Soviet occupation as the bane, not the savior, of the labor force, and knew the communists would gladly
replace the Polish Catholic Church with any other entity that could control the Poles as effectively. A brilliant politician, he had a keen ability to understand his opponents’ political motivations, and was able to keep the Catholic Church in Poland a viable player in an atheist communist country (Wyszyński, 1982/1983).

Wyszyński had the mind of a diplomat and the disposition of a martyr. His staunch religious beliefs were borne from, and were a reflection of, Poland’s national struggles. He concluded from World War II that Poland could only rely on herself for preservation; its allies had abandoned the country too many times. The highly structured and disciplined life he led in Catholic seminary, with its religious canons and black and white theologies, was reflected in Wyszyński’s austere ministerial style. Many priests in his seminary class either perished in World War II’s concentration camps or barely survived only to be imprisoned by the Soviet regime. Until he was imprisoned in the early 1950s, Wyszyński felt he and his faith had not been properly tested. He felt guilty that his classmates had the opportunity to prove their devotion to God and country while he had not spent a day in prison. His incarceration by the communist regime for “anti-government” activities from 1953-1956 was, in a way, a catharsis, and he used his time in prison to deepen his faith and analyze the political situation that was playing out around him (Wyszyński, 1982/1983, p. 4).

After Wyszyński’s release from prison, he rejoined the Church’s struggle to stay viable in post-Yalta Eastern Europe. He had become resolved in the personal sacrifices that would need to be made, by him and others, to keep both the Polish Church and the country on the map. To him, there was little difference between the struggle of Polish Catholicism and the struggle against the communists; the two were fatalistically
intertwined. As the keeper of Poland’s national identity, and as the spiritual leader of the Polish people, the fate of Poland was largely in the hands of the Church. And, as leader of the Polish Catholic Church – isolated from the Vatican by the communist regime – all of Poland looked to Wyszyński for guidance.

Wyszyński understood that as Primate of Poland he held advantages the communist regime would never possess - he had the hearts and shepherded the souls of Poles. On a broader level, the Church was the guardian of Poland’s collective national identity. The Church also held special sway over the farmers in Poland’s agricultural regions – areas that were never collectivized by the regime but prominently featured a church in the center of town. Just as the communists in Poland never succeeded in eliminating the Church, they did not achieve agricultural collectivization as they did in other communist countries.

In his journal kept in prison, Wyszyński makes clear his contempt for the communists, and his confidence that the Church would ultimately triumph over communism:

A black crow sits on the top of a tall pine tree. It looks around proudly and lets out a cry of victory. The crow – that noisy apparition – truly believes that the pine owes everything to it – the tree’s being, its tall beauty, its evergreen splendor, its power in battling the winds. What uncanny gall! The great benefactor of the serene pine tree. But the pine tree never stirs; it seems not even to notice the black crow. Lost in thought, it stretches the arms of its branches heavenward. It tolerates its noisy intruder calmly. Nothing can disturb its thoughts, its dignity, its serenity. So many clouds have floated past its brow, so many migrant birds have perched upon its branches.

They passed, as you will. This is not the place for you; you feel insecure, and that’s why you compensate for your lack of courage with your screaming. I am the one who has grown from this soil – my roots endure in its heart. And you, meandering cloud, who cast the shadow of sorrow upon my golden brow, are nothing but a toy tossed by the winds. I must endure you calmly. You, crow, will caw your boring, empty, meaningless song – and then you will depart. What can you accomplish with your screaming? I shall remain to contemplate, to build with
my patience, to survive gale winds and attacks, ever to climb so peacefully. You cannot hide the sun from me, nor thrill me with delight, nor change my course of my ascent. The forest stood long before you came – you will be gone, and the forest will remain (Wyszyński, 1982/1983, p. 71).

Wyszyński may have known the structure and workings of the communist system better than those apparatchiks applying the model in Poland. After all, the pyramidal structure of the communist hierarchy – with the General Secretary of the Communist Party in Moscow at the head of ALL systems both foreign and domestic – was not unlike that of the Catholic Church with its pontiff in Rome overseeing congregations all over the world. The social infrastructure established by the communists allowed, promoted, and needed a strong social force that would guide the people. The top-down structure of the communist system preferred to delegate one person to run large organizations. By allowing the Catholic Church to remain an institution in Poland, the regime was afforded a modicum of credibility in the eyes of Poles. At the same time, it could hold the Church in check by holding it responsible for social calm. As head of the Polish Catholic Church, the Primate would be the person held accountable. The Primate saw in this bargain his opportunity to keep the Church alive in Poland. To do this, he maintained a *Truega Dei* (Truce of God) with everyone, including the communists.

Wyszyński knew he and his Church had a social and moral advantage over the Soviets and their Polish counterparts. He knew an underdog who can open the smallest cut over an opponent’s eye could ultimately bring down the strongest fighter. Wyszyński also knew you could never win the fight if you were not in the match. To triumph, the Church in Poland needed to slowly wear down its opponent – giving ground when necessary and taking it when possible – and, to do that, the Church had to stay in Poland.
Reaching a *modus vivendi* with the regime, however, was not received well abroad - especially since more incendiary means of protest were being waged in other Soviet bloc countries. Cardinal József Mindszenty in Hungary, for example, was opposing the regime at every turn and consequently spent decades of his primacy either in prison or in the American Embassy where he sought political asylum in 1956 – a symbol of opposition for Hungary’s dissidents but, to Wyszyński, a shepherd away from his flock and thus a less effective leader.

Wyszyński felt the Polish situation required a different approach than that in Hungary. In a 1953 diary entry, Wyszyński reflected on this philosophy:

> In closely studying the historical development of the October Revolution [in the U.S.S.R. in 1917], I noticed that the tactical approach to religion underwent changes by exhibiting a type of certain flexibility. The original brutality of the trials [against the Russian Orthodox Church] broke down and gave way to the Dimitrov method…This evolution shows that any form of government, no matter how ruthless, will slowly cool and wane as it runs up against difficulties that the bureaucrat cannot resolve without cooperation from the people. Somehow the people must be taken into account. It was possible, therefore, to expect that in our native experiment, which is not too original a copy of the Soviet model, such an evolution would be possible. In fact, even the very point of departure indicated this type of evolution…Assuming, then, the unequal position of the two sides, assuming the atavistic nature of the lies with which the negotiating tactics of the other side are burdened, assuming the inconsistency of the behavioral patterns and the evolution of the methods applied, I was justified in expecting that the Polish experiment would turn out differently and could be approached boldly (Wyszyński, 1982/1983, pp 23-25).

As the Church’s chief representative in Poland, Wyszyński used his vast experience with the communist regime – either from his day-to-day administrative dealings with the state or dealing with the state’s police force during his time in prison - to learn how the regime operated. At the very least, his observations taught him that the regime was an unreliable diplomatic partner. As mentioned above, he also distrusted the West Europeans and Americans for what he considered their abandonment of Poland at
Yalta. Furthermore, Wyszyński never doubted the communists’ tendency – even post-Stalin - to resort to force to put down insurrection. Although Wyszyński was always ready to engage with the state, the regime’s history of duplicity made him rightfully leery of any deals and overtures toward compromise and hence extremely careful to always guard the Church’s interests. Wyszyński felt it was his responsibility to insure the Church presented a unified voice from the pulpit.

Taking advantage of his relative independence from Rome, one of the largest criticisms leveled against Wyszyński was his refusal to implement the changes in the Church set forth by the Second Vatican Council. Vatican II, as it is popularly called, promoted more lay involvement with the Church, open liturgical debate among clerics, and a relaxing of some religious obligations. Wyszyński opposed the implementation of Vatican II’s doctrine in Poland, despite complaints from church leaders in Western Europe and admonishments from Pope Paul VI.3 Wyszyński feared that if the Church allowed more lay involvement in religious matters it would be easier for communist spies to infiltrate the Church.

Wyszyński was also worried that more open debate among priests about the liturgy would give the communists an easy way to divide the power base of the Church. And, a divided church is a much easier church to conquer. He also took advantage of the Church’s unique situation in Poland to push for more conservative social mores than those advanced by both the communist state and Vatican II. Thus, Wyszyński’s strong-

3 Wyszyński’s opposition to Vatican II is a contested issue. Andrzej Micewski, in his biography of Wyszyński, claims Wyszyński supported the concepts of Vatican II philosophically, but found them impractical to apply in a communist state where words like “freedom,” “law,” and “justice” are ambiguous (p. 253). In the biography, Micewski takes exception to Hansjakob Stehle’s view of Wyszyński in regard to Vatican II in his book Eastern Politics of the Vatican 1917-1979 in which he portrays Wyszyński as opposed to the concepts of a modern Catholic Church.
willed leadership navigated the Polish Catholic Church through the turbulent years of communism and helped keep the Church active, viable and important through the 1970s.

Since Wyszyński led the Polish Catholic Church during a time when press censorship by the communist was total, Wyszyński supported the Church newspapers that existed – publications like Tygodnik Powszechny, Przewodnik Katolicki, and Więź - but knew their ability to deliver a clear Church message to their readers was limited. Wyszyński did control another form of mass communication – the church pulpit – and the sermons delivered by parish priests at Masses around the country portrayed a Church unified in thought and action (Micewski, 1984, p. 166).

Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński died in May 1981 when Poland was in its most precarious position both politically and socially. Before his death, Wyszyński indicated his candidate to succeed him to the primacy – a professor of canon law who had worked closely with Wyszyński, Bishop Józef Glemp. Pope John Paul II elevated Glemp to the primacy two months later. The Church that Cardinal Glemp inherited was soon to face some of its most significant changes in its Polish history.

As 1981 began, Poland’s dissidents in general, and the Solidarity trade union specifically, were continuing to push the social envelope. In February, on orders from the Kremlin, General Wojciech Jaruzelski began military maneuvers in preparation for imposing martial law if the need arose. May 1981 hit the Catholic Church in Poland hard. Firstly, on 13 May a communist-led assassination attempt on the Pope not only took the international spotlight off of Solidarity and the Polish regime’s woes, it threatened to extinguish the light of hope the Pope offered to Poles. Two weeks later, Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński died, creating an enormous spiritual and leadership void in
Poland at a very precarious time. For a brief time, Solidarity lost the full attention of the Polish Catholic Church as the Church scrambled to get back on track. If by coincidence or cunning, Jaruzelski’s timing for imposing martial law in December 1981 was impeccable since, by that time, the Church was preoccupied with its internal affairs leaving the Polish opposition vulnerable.

With Wyszyński’s death, the Polish Catholic Church would be forever changed. The Polish Church would now be led more from the Vatican, by Pope John Paul II himself, than from its own Episcopate. Wyszyński’s replacement, Glemp, would never have the power that his predecessor had.

When Cardinal Józef Glemp took the helm by Vatican appointment two months after Wyszyński’s death, the nature of the primacy was modernized and redefined. The Polish Catholic Church would adopt a more modern approach to religion by implementing Vatican II ideals. As a result, the Church would have to contend with the one thing its former Primate feared the most – ideological and political fragmentation by the Church’s clerics and its congregation. During his tenure, Cardinal Wyszyński’s position as Poland’s Primate was a position held for life, and the sway he held over the Conference of Bishops was nearly total. When Cardinal Glemp assumed Poland’s Primacy in July 1981, he was elected for a finite term, and his position vis-à-vis the Conference of Bishops carried far less authoritative weight. These authoritative restrictions limited the power Glemp could wield within the Polish Catholic Church’s hierarchy since his position became more counselor than commandant. The normalization of Glemp’s power meant members of the Conference of Bishops began to have more of an impact on Church actions. This increase in individual power among the
Polish bishops divided a Church hierarchy that once acted in a unified way under the autocratic Cardinal Wyszyński.

Cardinal Glemp’s life contrasts that of Wyszyński’s greatly. Born in Wrocław, Poland in 1929, Glemp was assigned to a Nazi labor camp from the age of ten through his early teen years. Glemp lived his early adult life under communism and participated in some of the Party’s organizations. With the exception of a two year assignment as the Chaplain of the Institute for Children Suffering from Incurable Diseases - an institution operated by the Dominican nuns at Mielzny, Poland - his tenure within the Church focused primarily on administrative duties and less on ministering to the laity (http://www.dailycatholic.org/issue/archives.htm).

Father Adam Boniecki, the Editor-in-Chief of the liberal Catholic newspaper Tygodnik Powszechny, compared the two Primates, their times, and the Polish Catholic Church they led:

During the primacy of Cardinal Wyszyński, there was a need in Poland to have some informal moral leader or [un]crowned king whom society could follow. It had to be the person who society could trust and to whom they could confide their hopes. And this function was consciously undertaken and fulfilled by Cardinal Wyszyński, whereas today there is no need to have a personality like his. Obviously, the personal character of Stefan Wyszyński was very appropriate to this role, with his far-reaching vision of what might happen, both in national and religious terms.

Glemp was proposed by Wyszyński as his possible successor and [Glemp] started acting in a situation when nobody could actually match the role of the leader. In canonical law, a primate is defined as the bishop of the oldest diocese in the country. The Church definition does not suggest anything about being the leader. The difference in their functions is that Wyszyński was nominated the Primate for life, whereas Glemp is elected every a few years. He will never have the authority that Wyszyński had: He [Wyszyński] was the Pope’s legate in Poland.

The role of Cardinal Glemp cannot be compared [to Cardinal Wyszyński’s], because their times are not comparable. There is, of course, some generational difference. During the partition of Poland, Cardinal Wyszyński, as a boy, was
beaten by Russian authorities for belonging to a secret scouting organization. Cardinal Glemp, as a boy, belonged to the Socialist Youth Association (Fr. Adam Boniecki, personal communication, 30 July 2002).

**Rome Re-asserts Itself Over the Polish Church**

In 1978, the College of Cardinals named Karol Wojtyła as the Catholic Church’s new pope and the first pope to come from Poland. Wojtyła took the name John Paul II in honor of his predecessor, John Paul I, who led the Holy See for only a month. As a bishop in Kraków, John Paul II, was popular among his congregation and his clerical peers. He was successful in getting churches built during the communist regime by working the communist system to the Church’s advantage (Bernstein & Politi, 1996).

The Church’s new Polish Pope, a charismatic leader in his own right, had a far more modern and militant approach toward the communist question than did Wyszyński or Glemp. As a disciple of Pope Leo XIII’s *Rerum Novarum* encyclical on labor, Pope John Paul II, still a bishop in Poland, supported the human rights movement that sprung from the Helsinki Accords and the Anti-Politics movement of the mid-1970s.

Throughout his ministry, even as Pope, John Paul II helped the Church build and support an underground civil society in Poland to defy the communist state and its infrastructure. In line with Leo’s thoughts regarding trade unions, especially Christian trade unions, John Paul II threw the support of the Vatican behind the formation and maintenance of the Solidarity trade union that eventually helped topple the communist regime. After the fall of communism, the Pope continued to take strong stands on social issues and became a vociferous opponent of worker exploitation and warned against a culture of consumerism that could plague capitalism (*Centesimus Annus*, 36).
With the loss of its strong charismatic Primate, the Polish Church attempted a new strategy. The Catholic Church would employ a dual faceted approach to maintaining its influence in Poland; the Vatican would exert pressure on the communists from Rome by keeping communist oppression a topic of discussion on the world stage, and Primate Glemp would continue to reach a *modus vivendi* with the regime. Pope John Paul II would also shepherd dissidents within Poland by passing on intelligence received from other countries, give them international legitimacy by receiving them at the Vatican, and advise their underground activities inside Polish borders.

The Pope also expanded the Church’s use of mass media in its efforts against communism. His experiences as a theatrical actor and as an instigator to the communists while serving as Bishop of Kraków came in handy from the first days of his pontificate. For example, Pope John Paul II’s carefully orchestrated message during his televised induction ceremony as Pope to ‘Be not afraid’ was a not so subtle message to his fellow countrymen not to lose hope and demonstrated the Pope’s expertise in using the mass media to thwart the communist regime. In his book, “The Final Revolution,” George Weigel recounts the event:

The new pontiff [did not] wait very long to exploit the techniques for dealing with communists he had developed over thirty years, but which could now be deployed on a much vaster stage...[In 1978], Polish national television (then under strict communist control) had agreed to broadcast four hours of the installation Mass from Rome. John Paul, knowing that the Polish authorities hoped that the Mass would not last quite that long, so that regime propagandists could put the government spin on Wojtyła’s election at the end of the broadcast while exploiting the visual backdrop of St. Peter’s Square, called in the papal master of ceremonies and told him that the ceremony had to last four hours: However the MC did it, it had to last four hours. Thus, as many will remember, there was a seemingly interminable procession of the cardinals to the newly installed Pope’s throne, each of whom got more than a perfunctory embrace from John Paul II. And at the end of four hours, there was the Polish Pope, cross held high, exhorting
the crowd, “Be not afraid!” It was a media masterstroke, made possible by the
erience of a very savvy John Paul II (Weigel, 1992, p. 93-94).

During John Paul II’s first pilgrimage to Poland as Pope in 1979, he chastised the
Polish government for not respecting human rights, and told the devout that a government
that did not respect human rights was committing a crime against humanity. His message
led many Poles to begin living life ‘as if’ they were free men and women, rejecting
oppression, and causing what political scientist Bogdan Szajkowski called a
“psychological earthquake, an opportunity for mass political catharsis” (Szajkowski,
Next to God, 1983, p. 72). That political philosophy, best exemplified in the Anti-
Politics Movement of the time, would later be adopted and employed in the early 1980s
by Polish priests and Polish political dissidents.

By 1981, Pope John Paul II’s interest in, and influence on, the political and social
upheaval occurring in Poland in the early 1980s was profound. In Poland, the Catholic
Church was playing a very active oppositional role, despite fairly large setbacks. By May
of 1981 - the month Cardinal Wyszyński died - Poland’s dissidents were aggressively
opposing the communist regime with encouragement from both Miodowa4 Street and the
Vatican. The Jaruzelski regime was being backed against a wall, and talk was rampant
that Moscow was urging Jaruzelski to reassert power. Poland was seven months away
from the imposition of martial law and Pope John Paul II was recuperating from an
assassin’s bullet – leaving Primate Glemp to oversee the Polish situation. At a time when
the Church needed a leader with the power and presence of Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński,
the leadership tendencies of Glemp bordered more on the clerical than the charismatic

4 The residence of Poland’s Primate is at 17-19 Miodowa Street in Warsaw. Here, Miodowa Street is
sometimes used to refer to the offices of the Primate.
Under Glemp, the Polish Catholic Church tried to continue the balancing act between opposition and accommodation set by Wyszyński. At the same time, Poles’ attitudes toward the communist regime were changing as well. The Anti-Politics movement, which encouraged citizens living in communist countries to live “outside” the state in their minds and actions, was gaining supporters in Poland even among the Catholic clergy. In addition, Polish supporters of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, the document that established “fundamental freedoms” for every society, counted Polish clergy among their numbers. Young priests, like Father Jerzy Popiełuszko, who, by the mid 1980s, were delivering fiery speeches from church pulpits advocating defiance of authority as a religious obligation, were pursuing increasingly aggressive lines against the regime. This saber rattling made it less possible for Cardinal Glemp to maintain a modus vivendi between Church and State. Moreover, with a Polish Pope in Rome, Poles increasingly looked to John Paul II as a leader and to their local priests as both their spiritual and political advisors, leaving Glemp with more of a figurehead position.5

Cardinal Glemp’s personality did not mesh well with the more confrontational style the opposition was exhibiting toward the regime, so he increasingly looked to the Vatican for guidance. Pope John Paul II, although still recovering from the failed assassination attempt, returned to playing a more active role in the events in Poland. For example, the Pope received intelligence reports from the West on the pressure Moscow was putting on Jaruzelski to get his house in order without Soviet intervention (Weigel, 1992). These reports were shared with Solidarity through the Church in Poland, making it easier for the opposition to exploit the weaknesses in the system. Glemp, on the other

5 For an excellent description of the changes Glemp faced in succeeding Cardinal Wyszyński, refer to George Weigel’s “The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism.”
hand, sometimes defied the Pope and took a more conciliatory tone toward the regime than the Pope advocated and at times criticized the opposition.

In early November 1981, much to the consternation of Moscow, Jaruzelski invited State, Church, Communist Party, and union officials together to form a kind of advisory triumvirate called the “Front of National Accord.” Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa declined the opportunity to participate. Glemp joined the group and, although still opposing many of the demands of the Jaruzelski regime, tried on many occasions to convince Solidarity to join. The regime was seemingly finding moderate success pitting the Polish Episcopate against Solidarity.

Glemp realized that based on the composition of the Front of National Accord - its membership included government, Communist Party, and several communist unions – it could enable Jaruzelski to easily divide and conquer both the Church and Solidarity while seemingly giving them a place at the table. However, Glemp also believed that being a part of the organization enabled the Church to diplomatically apply heat from within. The Church also felt that turning down the offer of membership gave the regime no wiggle room for negotiation, which could expedite military action and Soviet intervention, and thrust Poland into a civil war. Thus, on several occasions leading up to the imposition of martial law, Glemp tried without success to persuade Solidarity leaders to take a less militant approach to their dealings with the regime and to join the Front of National Accord.

At the same time, however, Pope John Paul II was meeting with Solidarity leaders and other Polish dissidents and advising them against joining the Front of National Accord and encouraging them to keep applying pressure to the regime. The pontiff was
convinced that constant pressure on the regime would lead to the fall of communism in Poland.

By December 1, 1981, Jaruzelski realized failure to squelch the disquiet in the country was leading him towards military action; he laid the blame for imposing martial law squarely on Glemp’s shoulders for the Primate’s inability to control Solidarity leaders and failing to convince them to join the Front of National Accord.

Tanks rolled into the streets in the early hours of Sunday, December 12. Poles awoke to no telephone service and a mass mediated message from General Jaruzelski that, due to social unrest, Poland was in a state of war. Solidarity leaders and other dissidents were whisked away to Polish prisons, leaving Cardinal Glemp the leader of a decimated opposition. Among the restrictions, curfews were imposed on all citizens, and travel within and outside Poland’s borders were restricted. Attendance at Church services was one of the few permissible gathering spots for Poles. Poles turned to the Catholic Church for guidance and social stability during the martial law years, and used Church attendance as a way of making a political statement against a regime that was stifling their civil rights.

Present day pundits question Wyszyński’s support of Glemp as his successor. Some feel Wyszyński wanted to cement his historical legacy by naming a weak successor as the next Primate. Others argue that due to Wyszyński’s strong personality and top-down management style, very few bishops were able to establish themselves as leaders within the Church, thus limiting Wyszyński’s options within the Conference of Bishops for an effective successor. A third camp portrays Wyszyński as a visionary who foresaw the changes awaiting the Church and Polish society and named someone who would
pluralize the Church hierarchy and shepherd the Polish Catholic Church into the
traditional Vatican fold and under the leadership of the Polish pontiff (Anna Jaśinska,
personal communication, 27 July, 2002).

During the turbulent decade of martial law and the close of the communist chapter
in Poland, the Polish Church increasingly looked to the Vatican for guidance and
leadership. The Vatican choreographed many of Glemp’s official actions, as the Pope
monitored developments in Poland and counseled oppositional leaders on nearly a day-
to-day basis.

As Solidarity gained in strength and the regime weakened, Jaruzelski capitulated
to the demands of Solidarity. Jaruzelski convened formal talks between the State,
Solidarity and the Catholic Church. These Round Table Talks of 1989 - named for the
enormous round table where the parties met - resulted in the communist regime agreeing
to Solidarity’s demands for democratic elections, and the granting of many Church
concessions. These talks would eventually lead to sweeping victories by Solidarity
leaders in democratic elections and the dismantling of the communist system in Poland.
The talks also yielded an increased role for the Church in Poland’s political realm. By the
time of the transition, the Polish Catholic Church may have gained political clout, but it
lost its isolated, independent nature and returned to the fold of the Vatican.

**The Polish Church in Post-1989 Poland**

Just as the Church attempted to protect its interests and pursue its own agenda
during communism, it adopted the same approach with the new regime. The difference,
of course, was that the Church felt entitled to a sizeable chair at the table, given the active
role it had played over a decade in guiding Solidarity to its ultimate democratic victory in
the 1989 elections, winning control of the presidency and the parliament. Solidarity initially relied heavily on the Catholic Church to organize the new government and build Solidarity’s credibility among the Polish people. The Church itself controlled several seats in the Polish parliament, making church leaders confident that the political issues important to them would be positively received and expeditiously implemented. The Church possibly also wanted a political presence in the new government to silence any criticism that it had been co-opted in the past by the communists (Przeworski, 1991).

Directly after the transition, the Church sought to influence public life and morality more directly than it was allowed to do under communism. Church leaders saw this period as their chance to realize their evangelical mission (Sabbat-Swidlicka, 1993). Przeworski (1991) describes the political maneuvering: “in the bid to end authoritarian rule, the struggle for democracy always takes place on two fronts: Against the authoritarian regime for democracy and against one’s allies for the best place under democracy” (p. 67). After Poland’s transition to a democratically elected government, the Catholic Church - still heavily influenced by the hand of Pope John Paul II and in direct opposition to its usual position of non-involvement in political matters- saw the opportunity to become a more active political player and push for adoption of its ideas by the new government.

Pope John Paul II capsulated the role the Catholic Church should play in Poland during his 1995 visit to his home country. He called for more Church activism in public affairs, and he expressed his concern for Poland’s path toward embracing secular Western ways, including a post-transition law legalizing abortion, a push toward commercial consumerism, and the ridiculing of Christian values by the post-communist
society (Pope John Paul II in Poland, May 23, 1995). Through the political role now played by the Church, the Pope was attempting to directly influence the new legal foundations being formulated by the country, including the Polish Constitution and Poland’s media laws.

Two issues that the Church saw as critical to establishing a truer Christian state were the inclusion of Christian ideals within the new Polish Constitution, and the signing of a Concordat (the formal re-establishment of diplomatic relations) between the new Polish democratic government, and the Holy See. The Church wanted a reference to God in the constitution’s preamble and a guarantee of the protection of human life from conception to death, not unlike those in the Republic of Ireland’s Constitution. In addition, the Church demanded that only heterosexual marriages be recognized and, again, that the Constitution reflects Christian values (Eberts, 1998). While the new Constitution, enacted in 1997, does not contain all the provisions laid out by the Church, many of its ideals are reflected.

For example, Article 18 of the constitution defines marriage as “a union of a man and a woman,” and places the responsibility for protecting “the family, motherhood and parenthood” on the State. In addition, there is reference in the preamble to the Polish culture, “rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation and in universal human values.” The preamble also refers to God twice, once to remind Poles of their “responsibility before God or our own consciences” to respect human rights, and the other to welcome “both those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty, as well as those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as arising from other sources.” Article 25 of the constitution deals solely with Church-State relations; in it, the

The religious right has not been able to reach again the popularity it had at its peak at the beginning of the 1990s. The Church’s waning influence over the Polish people - more than 90 percent of whom consider themselves Catholic - is epitomized by the results of the 1993 parliamentary and the 1994 presidential elections. At that time, the Church, and the Solidarity politicians it supported, espoused a more isolationist approach to Polish politics. Their political opponents, mostly comprised of former communists who were now fully committed to Poland’s new free-market economy and prepared to participate in free elections, campaigned on a platform of aligning Poland with Western Europe through international organizations and joint ventures. At election time, the Polish electorate replaced the Church-supported Solidarity Party and its presidential candidate, Lech Wałęsa, with former communists in Parliament, and elected former communist Aleksander Kwaśniewski to the President’s office. In the presidential election, Poles clearly favored Kwaśniewski’s future-oriented intention to tie Poland to the West over Solidarity hero Lech Wałęsa’s lackluster ‘fear a return to communism’ campaign message.

After taking office in January 1995, Kwaśniewski aggressively pursued a free-market economy, seeking inclusion in West European institutions such as NATO and the European Union, much to the consternation of the Pope. According to Byrnes (1997), the Vatican views Kwaśniewski’s actions as leading the Poles down the path of “desire and
consumption.” As a former communist, Kwaśniewski also received the vote from the isolationist and nationalist electorate who thought he would return Poland to the days when the common man had job security. These people preferred the former state-run economy, centered largely on unprofitable heavy industry, to the present market-dominated one, with unemployment, foreign-owned companies, and rising prices. They tend to fear the future and seek a stable economic situation for themselves. Democracy is seen as the source of this instability, and in today’s Poland, fewer Poles have a better financial situation than before the transition (Ogrodzinski and Szlajfer, 1992).

In an attempt to regroup and recover seats lost in the 1993 parliamentary elections, a new rightist party called Solidarity Election Action (AWS) was formed to thwart the leftist push and take back the parliament in the 1997 elections. The AWS culled every Christian faction together, combining strange political bedfellows into one party. “The AWS encompass[ed] liberals, Christian democrats, and conservatives of varying stripes, including even radical nationalists and Catholic integralists” (Smolar, 1998, p.126). The AWS successfully won the largest share of votes in the September 1997 parliamentary elections and formed a coalition government with the centrist Freedom Union party. However, nearly immediately after forming the AWS coalition, infighting between the ideological factions threatened to destroy the party and break up the coalition. The result was a largely ineffectual parliament while AWS was in control. The AWS was so soundly defeated by the former communists in the next parliamentary elections, and by 2003 there was hardly any Christian presence in either the Polish House or the Sejm (Durlik, 2004, p. 299).

The Church and Poland’s Integration into the European Union

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European Union membership is a difficult issue in Poland as a whole, and for the Church in particular. The country is predominantly an agrarian state with the majority of its population living in small farm communities with a Catholic Church at its societal epicenter. Many of these farms are smaller than an acre and are still tended by hand with animals pulling plows led by the farmer’s whip. The Polish farm is a family affair and farmers’ children still return to their homes for planting or harvest. The farmers largely eschew change and live by tradition and familial ties. These farming communities successfully resisted the communalization under communism and view post-1989 political changes in Warsaw with equal disinterest and distrust. The traditional teachings of their ancestors and of the Church hold more sway than economic models and political ideologies.

The trust that the agricultural community has for the Catholic Church stems mostly from the Church’s long-standing presence in the farmers’ lives and the support the Church has given Polish farmers over the centuries. However, farmers’ allegiances are to family first, the Polish tradition second, and the Church third (Hetnal, 1999, p. 513). In the past, these factions were interlocked, but now conflicts have arisen. The Church recognizes that to marginalize its support in rural Poland by supporting positions that the farmers oppose could further damage its eroding power base in Poland. The issue of European Union integration has become a lightning rod for this controversy.

Most sides agree that Poland’s membership into the European Union will drastically change Poland. Integration into the EU will not only open Poland to free trade with other member countries, it will align Poles to Europe economically, politically and culturally. Polish farmers recognize that to compete with the large, corporate European
farming industry, they will have to modernize their farming practices. Their numbers and service to the Polish culture guarantee Polish farmers substantial political sway. So, it is not surprising that the farmers’ price to Polish politicians for their support in the EU membership debate was a promise to receive larger subsidies by the EU than the Polish government alone could ever offer.

As early as 1997, the Polish Catholic Church was in a difficult position in regard to the European Union debate. Church leaders realized that many Poles supported EU membership, and to go against this tide of public opinion would alienate the Church with a large portion of Polish society. However, church leaders also felt Poland’s ascension to the EU meant socially diluting Poland’s national identity. Since the Catholic Church has historically been linked to Poland’s national identity, any shift in cultural values toward Western Europe would mean an erosion of Church influence in Polish society. Lastly, the Church realized that supporting EU integration meant selling out the Church’s power base – the Polish farmers and the myriad agrarian communities that make up Poland.

Consequently, the Church officially supported Poland’s membership into the European Union, but church leaders at the highest levels peppered their public statements with caveats about Poland’s membership. From the pulpit, priest’s statements were even more skeptical - presenting scenarios of lost cultural identity and portraying Poland as a slave labor source for Western European industrialization – with the intention of swaying the congregation away from EU membership. (Mical Rynkowski, personal communication, 29 July 2002).

In August 1997, after several anti-European Union statements by the Pope, Cardinal Glemp and several Polish bishops were invited to Brussels by the European
Commission for EU-related discussions in August 1997. At the airport, before leaving for Belgium, the Primate commented that “EU integration should be looked at with hope and not with fear,” a position that was never previously advocated by the Church, signifying a concession to popular cosmopolitan opinion and the Polish government (Glemp Supports Integration, November 4, 1997).

At the same August 1997 airport meeting with the press in which Cardinal Glemp first stated the Church’s support of Poland’s pursuit of joining the EU, Glemp also expressed his satisfaction with the Kwaśniewski government’s decision to work closely with the Vatican to ratify the Concordat. Speculation soon arose about a quid pro quo being offered between the Church and state regarding the Church’s support of Poland’s integration into the EU and the Kwaśniewski administration’s reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the Vatican – an agreement that had been languishing for years in Parliament due to a lack of support from the leftist party that Kwaśniewski heads (Glemp Supports Integration, November 4, 1997).

Now that Poles have voted to join the European Union despite Church warnings, the Church has slipped more into the shadows regarding taking political stances. By fully supporting Poland’s European Union membership publicly, the Church in essence endorsed Poland’s modernization. EU integration could produce a more robust Polish economy, a more wealthy and influential Polish people (especially its more cosmopolite, educated and Catholic young people), and a more stable Polish society. Nonetheless, by supporting Poland’s membership, the Church ran the risk of alienating its most diehard supporters – the uneducated, politically powerful, religiously devout, and conservative farmers. In a personal interview, Father Kazimierz Sowa, Director of the Church’s
Radio Plus network, said these days the Church still has to rely on the support of the traditionally religious conservatives - comprised mostly of Polish farmers and other members of Poland’s rural communities. As farmers grapple with the changes that European Union membership will surely bring, the Church will be uniquely positioned to help the farmers through the transitional time (Fr. Kazimierz Sowa, personal communications, 31 July 2002).

However, the Church’s earlier warnings from the pulpit elicited criticism from Polish politicos, intelligentsia, and the younger generation who painted a picture of an isolationist, alarmist, and out of touch Catholic Church. The Church’s initial reticence to support EU integration could still lead to an overt backlash against Christian values and the further secularization of Poland. In all, the European Union debate has resulted in the Church coming off as fickle and blatantly self-minded.

Whether or not the signing of the Concordat was the result of the Church’s attempt at a *modus vivendi*, the outcome was crucial to the Church’s future in Poland. The Concordat outlines the relationship between the Vatican and the Polish state, in essence codifying the Church’s continued legitimacy and influence in Poland. Among other things, the agreement allows the Church to teach religious education in public schools, choose the textbooks used for religious instruction, and appoint, approve and oversee the school teachers who conduct religious instruction (Eberts, 1998). After long delays and many revisions, President Kwaśniewski signed the Concordat in January 1998, ensuring the Catholic Church a privileged position in Polish society. Although the ratification of the Concordat gave the Catholic Church added status within Polish society
on paper, those gains paled in comparison to the rapid political, economic and cultural changes that were taking place in the late 1990s in Poland.
CHAPTER 6

THE BATTLE FOR THE POLISH PUBLIC SPHERE

To understand the current marketplace of ideas in Poland in which the Church must operate, it is useful to take a look at the Poles’ experience with mass media over the past few decades, before and after the fall of communism. The experiences they have grown up with impact how they consume media today. This chapter will give an overview of the media landscape that existed in communist Poland and how it changed after the transition, focusing on the battle for control of the public sphere. It will investigate the role both the new government and the Catholic Church played in rewriting the legal framework for the press, as well as take a look at the new media landscape that resulted from this restructuring. This chapter provides the historical and current context for the findings in Chapter 7 which, among other things, examine the Church’s new role as a media owner in Poland and what its goals are for operating media outlets.

Habermas defines the public sphere as “a domain of our social life in which public opinion can be formed (Habermas, 1989, p. 231).” In large, populous societies, this public discourse can take place not only through interpersonal communication but through the mass mediated channels as well. Habermas wrote:

The requirement of publicness is extended by state organs to all organizations acting in relation to the state. To the extent to which this becomes a reality, a no longer intact public of private persons acting as individuals would be replaced by a public or organized private persons. Under current circumstances only the latter could participate effectively in a process of public communication using the channels of intra-party and intra-organizational public spheres, on the basis of a publicness enforced for the dealings of organizations with the state (p. 236).
If one group can control a country’s mass media it can guide the path of public discourse and shape public opinion more easily. For many years, the communist party, with its party-run media monopoly, was relatively successful in controlling the public sphere in countries like Poland and Hungary.

Lenin (in Novaya Zhizn, 1905) felt it was the media’s duty to support the continuous communist revolution by publishing articles that support the “common cause of the proletariat.” Lenin hypocritically criticized in Pravda (September 20, 1918) the bourgeois press for not writing about the “‘holy of holies [sic]’ – the working conditions in privately owned factories,” despite the fact that during his regime, and those of his successors, taboo subjects were either covered up or whitewashed by the party press.

Poland’s media system prior to 1989 followed the communist example of state-run press, radio and television. The government tried to keep out dissenting views, attempting to jam foreign shortwave signals, such as the United States’ Radio Free Europe and the United Kingdom’s BBC. The communist regime, recognizing the power of the media to disseminate information to the masses, strictly controlled who operated the media organs and what was published in those media organs. Goban-Klas (1997) characterized the mass media under communism this way:

Before the late 1980s, media ownership and control throughout Eastern Europe was rather simple. Radio and television were state-owned, while the print media were usually owned by political organizations, mostly by the communist party....The control of the media was exercised directly by the communist party itself, and by state censorship, which in turn was controlled by the party (p. 25).

Goban-Klas described “journalists” working for media organs during this time as “a living 'transmission belt' between the party and society. Thus objectivity, professional
values and professional ethics took different meanings from what they held in traditional, liberal journalism (p. 27).

The communist regime also tried to squelch any independent internal press. For example, the Catholic Church was allowed a few ‘Roman Catholic’ press organs. These publications had a communist party member who controlled the newspaper content while the Church was allowed a single “church assistant” on the editorial board (Goban-Klas, 1997, p. 39). In this way, the Church was allowed to own mass media in name only; the church press was just another communist party tool that commandeered the Church’s name.

However, for a Church trying to reach a modus vivendi with the communist government, having any press organ with their name on it was important. Nonetheless, the Catholic Church’s media properties, consisting of newspapers, magazines, and newsletters, were a favorite target for the communists - ink and paper were often in short supply for the Catholic press, and little pastoral news actually made it to print.

Even during the Post-Stalinist era, a period marked by a slight relaxing of overt repression by the regime on oppositional factions, the communists introduced a censorship office and selectively enforced censorship laws. In 1946, the Main Office for the Control of the Press, Publications and Publishing Houses (Polish acronym: GUKPPIW) was established and tasked to censor the contents of broadcast and published materials. The communists also dusted off a 1938 Press Law still on the books that allowed strict punishments for calumny and allowed the government to react to unjustified criticism (Bar, 2000, p. 429).
For example, in 1947, the Episcopate, reacting to what it considered increased ridicule of its Catholic magazines in communist periodicals, sent a letter of protest to the Communist Party. In response, a special meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers’ Party resulted in an order to “strengthen the censorship of the Catholic press and cut the illegal sources of paper” (Bar, 2000, p. 429).

Marek Skwarnicki, a veteran correspondent for Tygodnik Powszechny, a well respected liberal Catholic Church newspaper, illustrates the challenges faced by journalists at a Catholic newspaper operating in an authoritarian regime:

The content of Tygodnik was forced on us. We could not, for example, print when John Paul II was elected Pope [in 1979]. We could not print his first Christmas homily, which was purely religious. We were not sure what to do about that. We did not want to speak up, and we didn’t... In political affairs, our opinion was so oppositional [in nature] that there wasn’t any point in trying to get it by the censors. We could not communicate what was going on in the Church. It was important for the communists that the Catholics and the Church be conservative -- that they fit in with that picture (lines 286-293).

The long arm of the GUKPPiW did not extend, however, into church buildings. The regime was not allowed to censor sermons and church announcements that were delivered during church services. Also, posters placed in church showcases (this included not only inside buildings but also in announcement lists near churches and in religious cemeteries) were free from censorship (Bar, 2000, p. 430).

The confrontational relationship between the State and its censors and the Church’s press properties warmed slightly in the early 1980s thanks in large part to the pressure being exerted on the regime by the Solidarity trade union. In September 1980 the union negotiated with the regime the broadcast of a Sunday Mass on state run radio, and a speech by the Pope was reported in the Polish media (Weschler, 1982, p. 176). Those Mass broadcasts remained the only religious content on State radio until the Round
Table Talks in 1989 between the State, the Solidarity Trade Union, and the Catholic Church which helped bring about the fall of communism and triggered Poland’s transition to democracy (Bar, 2000, p. 427).

Goban-Klas (1997) explained that, especially after martial law was imposed, the regime preferred granting concessions to the Church rather than to outlaw the Solidarity trade union:

Paradoxically, martial law increased the prestige and possibilities of the church in Poland. The ruling generals were more willing to allow the church to operate than they were to tolerate Solidarity; the church was the only legal oppositional institution, and remained so to the end of the decade. [The Church] equipped thousands of parish centres with video cassette recorders, organized video shows of underground political films, supported Catholic discussion clubs, and, most importantly, influenced editors and journalists of many papers to relay the church's position (p. 41).

Another example of this warming by the regime is an August 1981 act which exempted magazines approved by the Church, pictures, tapes with religious content, information leaflets, letters, and internal memoranda from censorship (Concerning the Control of the Press, Publications, and Dramas, The Journal of Laws, No. 20, paragraph 99). By November 1981, the Church was allowed to indicate what the censor’s had changed within a text that had been cleared for publication (The Decree of the State Council Concerning the Seats and the Territorial scope of the District Offices for the Control of the Publications and Dramas, The Journal of Laws, No. 24, paragraph 125).

Father Adam Boniecki, Tygodnik Powszechny’s present day editor, tells of an anniversary card the liberal Catholic newspaper received from the GUKP PiW. The card read simply, “Best wishes from your most careful reader” (Fr. Adam Boniecki, personal communication, July 2002).
As communist power began to wane, the Church worked with both the regime and the Solidarity trade union to maintain a religious, social and political presence in Poland. The oppositional Solidarity force, led by Lech Wałęsa, needed the Church’s support to lend legitimacy to the struggle against the communists and, since the Church was the only legal oppositional institution in Poland at the time, relied on the Church to hold meetings and organizational conferences (Goban-Klas, 1994, p.237).

**The Underground Press**

For four decades, the communist regime’s attempts to dominate the public sphere in Central European countries like Hungary and Poland were largely effective in marginalizing dissident views. However, as the dissidents slowly made inroads into the social sphere through their underground activities, the regime’s credibility among the citizenry dropped and the credibility of the dissidents grew. The *samizdat* press stoked political debates by intellectuals and gave the average citizen an alternative, oppositional view to the government’s activities and motivations. In Poland, brazenly reading an underground newspaper in public places became the moniker for a Pole to register dissatisfaction with the communist regime. Poland’s *samizdat* press eventually became a template for other countries’ underground information networks. The Church assisted *samizdat* publishers by providing a meeting place for “editorial meetings” and sometimes supplying a hiding place for contraband printing presses (Demszky, personal communications, July 1999).

Gradually, the communist system developed not just cracks but entire fissures in its foundations. Political dissidents were able to commandeer a covert share of the public sphere through the development of underground or “*samizdat*” press and devised a
traveling institution known as the Flying University for teaching closeted anti-communists a revolutionary brand of politics. Flying University “professors” moved meeting locations often to keep the secret police guessing. In Poland, Catholic Churches were often the meeting places since, as the only legal opposition to the communist party, churches were considered the most secure. Nonetheless, despite dissidents’ efforts at covert instruction, the secret police infiltrated the Flying University and compiled lists of attendees and speakers (Gabor Demszky, personal communications, July 1999).

The Flying University proved an effective way for Central European intellectuals to critically examine the activities of the communist regime. The Flying University expanded the public sphere and forced issues to the fore that governmental leaders would have preferred to keep in the shadows. Not only did the *samizdat* press and the Flying University spotlight many of the societal ills and inequalities in the communist system, it helped train a new generation of critical thinkers to challenge the socialist system.

Dissident activities varied in scope and effectiveness throughout the Eastern bloc. Adam Michnik’s new evolutionism, which preached the ideals of behavioral change among the citizenry rather than expecting the communists to reform (Michnik, 1987, p. 144), would not have won many supporters in Ceaucescu’s Romania. However, Michnik’s ideas were later exemplified in Hungary’s *samizdat* press under the leadership of dissidents like Gabor Demszky and Miklos Haraszti. Nonetheless, even during Post-Stalinism, a time in which Stalin’s terror tactics were abandoned and criminal charges began being based more on the legal system and less on the whim of the administration, the underground or *samizdat* press and its authors were prosecuted for exposing flaws in
the communist society (See Haraszti’s *A Worker in a Worker’s State* (1977/1978) and *The Velvet Prison* (1987)).

**Round Table Talks Expand Church’s Mass Media**

Both the communists and Solidarity needed the support of the Catholic Church, which served as a stabilizing force in the country. As outlined earlier, the communists granted special privileges to the Church in return for its efforts to maintain social stability (Sabbat-Swidlicka, 1993). Those privileges were exemplified at the Round Table talks with the ‘Act on the relationship between the Church and State’ on 17 May 1989 (Sabbat-Swidlicka, 1993). Among other things, the act granted the Church preferential rights to the airwaves thus empowering them to establish and operate media properties including radio and TV stations, newspapers, publishing properties, film and audiovisual enterprises for the purpose of teaching and evangelizing to the masses (Pietrzak, 2000, p. 431).

Goban-Klas (1997) felt the Church was rewarded with the mass media provisions by both the outgoing communists and Solidarity as recognition of its power and influence over Polish society:

As an institution seeking to extend the freedom of religious practice and to promote Christian values, the church proved to be the clear winner in the confrontation between the old regime and Solidarity. It gained a dominant position within Polish television and, to a lesser extent, radio. Its position has been based formally on an official agreement between the communist government and the Episcopate made in May 1989, but it stems more from the moral and political power that the church acquired during its prolonged struggle with communism in Poland (p. 38).

After the fall of communism, Solidarity, having democratically won control of the government, relied heavily on the Catholic Church to organize the new government. However, after largely failing to influence Polish society by political means after the
transition, the Church began focusing on exercising its newly won rights under communism to spread the Christian word by developing its media properties. With a sympathetic Wałęsa administration in office, the Church’s unique broadcast privileges negotiated with the communists were given legitimacy by the new administration. The Catholic Church’s right to launch electronic media properties was confirmed by the Communications Act on 22 November 1990 (The Journal of Laws, No. 86, paragraph 504) and the Broadcasting and Television Act on 29 December 1992 (The Journal of Laws 1993, No. 7, paragraph 34). Pietrzak, (2000) explains the Church’s privileges extended beyond radio and television and provided exemptions to the Church in regard to launching mass media interests:

These rights comprise establishing and running theatres, cinemas, film production studios, other audio-visual media, archives, museums and libraries. This act relieves the obligation to obtain the permissions and licenses for this activity from [the Polish Catholic Church] and defines it sufficient to notify appropriate administrative bodies about establishing and carrying out such activity (p. 278).

During the drafting of a new Polish broadcast law, the Church fought for a provision that would obligate radio and television stations to reflect ‘Christian values’ in their programming. After several failed attempts, the draft, with the Christian value provision, became law in 1992 (Hiebert, 1998, p. 100). Although similar Christian parties have attempted similar moves in other countries (Spain, Ireland, and Mexico, for instance), their level of success pales in comparison to the success of Poland’s Christian right. Regardless, the Christian values proviso is difficult to enforce among Polish media channels, and has no real teeth with foreign media imported into the country via electronic transmission channels like satellite or cable (Goban-Klas, 1997, p. 38).
It is important to note that being able to simply inform governmental bodies of the Catholic Church’s intention to open a mass media channel was not extended to other churches and religious unions – relegating these other institutions to the same lengthy, competitive and political application and concession process as any would-be media hopeful.

In a sense, there was an ongoing war for control of the Polish public sphere, and the Catholic Church was a leading participant. Pope John Paul II described the media as the “meeting point of the contemporary times;” a place where the Bible must be present and evangelization efforts must be focused (Bar, 2000, p. 427). The Polish mass media was a fertile battleground for domination of that public sphere, and the Church, thanks to advantageous media concessions won from the waning communist party in its final days of power in Poland, had multiple media channels to realize its evangelization mission. The Church wanted its voice to be one of the loudest in the cacophony of voices that were developing in Poland’s new media realm.

**New Poland’s New Mass Media System**

After its transition from communism, the new Polish government opened its media system, attempting to move from the communist system to a more libertarian system. Poland’s mass media system is now both publicly and privately owned and politicized in its editorial content. Article 14 of the Polish Constitution guarantees freedom of the press and “other means of social communication.” However, as with many fledgling democracies, once the Solidarity opposition assumed power and began receiving criticism from a once friendly press, attempts were made to curb the critics (Tismaneanu, 1998).
In 1997, Goban-Klas described the Polish media as “still far from [being] truly autonomous and objective, and many politicians prefer that they serve as a political trumpet rather than an independent information society (p. 32). Whereas the electronic media are still at the mercy of the ruling political party through the National Council of Radio and Television (KRRiTV), newspapers operate relatively free of restrictions.

Despite these initial potential setbacks, the Polish press enjoys a press freedom that mirrors that of Western Europe (Rosenbaum, 1998). Nonetheless, Mickiewicz (1998) feels that although Poland’s press institutions are relatively advanced, its legal system is lagging far behind and thus does not support a vigorous investigative press tradition. For example, public officials are afforded privacy rights that hamper corruption investigations. Mickiewicz asserts these issues jeopardize the evolution of a completely free press (p. 36).

Poland’s newspapers are privately owned and funded heavily by foreign investment. After 1989, privately owned newspapers sprung up virtually overnight as the formerly clandestine *samizdat* publications came above ground. One example of such a paper is the *Gazeta Wyborcza* newspaper, now the most widely read daily in Poland. The paper was born in 1989 as the unofficial organ of Solidarity. The paper proudly carried Solidarity's logo and a masthead that proclaimed 'There Is No Freedom Without Solidarity.'

Polish employees of state-owned newspapers that were being privatized pooled their money to buy the newspaper before it was either closed or sold to other interests. One example is the *Super Express* tabloid newspaper; its employees purchased the paper before it was sold to another interested party. Those interested parties were usually
foreign, primarily Western European and American investors who flooded the new Polish market to launch newspapers of their own or acquire existing Polish titles.

Although there are local and regional newspapers, the widely read press organs are based in Warsaw and rely to varying degrees on the Polish Press Agency (PAP), Poland’s national wire service, and increasingly the Catholic Church-run Catholic Information Agency (KAI) for news (Pieklo, 2002, p. 4, http://www.ejc.nl/jr/emland/poland.html#6).

The National Broadcasting Council (Polish acronym: KRRiTV), a nine-member council appointed by both houses of the Polish National Assembly and the president, controls the broadcast media in Poland (Rosenbaum, 1998). The KRRiTV manages Poland’s spectrum space, issues licenses, and considers new applications for licenses. This council was designed to be apolitical, but in fact, the selection of members to the council is highly political. The selection process can be easily manipulated by the ruling party who often load the council with party sympathizers. As a result, the party in power can influence the country’s electronic media (Pieklo, 2002, p. 5, www.ejc.nl/jr/emland/poland.html). Poland’s leftist parties, comprised mostly of former communists, have controlled the council since 1997 (“Two New Members,” November 28, 1997).

The content of State-run television and radio stations has been challenged by the KRRiTV. The council has been criticized for canceling programming that criticized the administration in power and ousting employees who are critical of the government in power (“Political Infighting,” May 12, 1998).
The Catholic Church has also been criticized for having its political representatives exercise undue restraint on television programs. Goban-Klas (1997) recounts one example:

[A Christian-National Alliance] leader accused a television cabaret programme of being especially dedicated to ridiculing Catholics, which was in his opinion a criminal act. Demanding the banning of the [program], he added that 'Poland is a country of religious tolerance, because in Muslim countries the producer would have had her throat slit long ago for such acts of blasphemy.' By early 1993, circumstances had developed to such a point that one columnist from a fundamentalist Catholic weekly openly called for 'setting up sane, humane, and patriotic censorship' (p. 39).

Poland’s electronic media is both privately and publicly owned and centralized in the nation’s capital. There are roughly 250 national and regional radio stations and about 70 television stations in Poland (www.onet.pl). State-run television, which can be received by over ninety percent of the country, carries limited advertising on its channels. At first, the government limited the percentage of revenue a state-run channel could generate through advertising to one percent. However, government officials quickly began to rethink these limits after the immense interest from advertisers and the impressive revenue even this small percentage of advertising generated.

During the period under study, defining the extent of foreign ownership of Poland’s media properties was a key concern for the KRRiTV. Interest in acquiring commercial radio and television properties came shortly after the introduction of the free market economy in Poland.

“Radio Fun,” now called RMF-FM (a Polish acronym for Radio, Music, and Facts), began in 1989 in Kraków. The commercial station was the result of a call by round-table talk members for more pluralism in the media. The station is supported by
advertising and a foundation that receives its financial backing from Polish émigrés and the political backing of a powerful former Polish senator, who had chaired the media talks at the round table and later became the minister for internal affairs.

The United State’s Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was brought in to consult with the Polish government about auctioning Poland’s broadcast spectrum to private firms (Burns, 1995, p. 10). At the same time, taking advantage of an out-of-date broadcast law, pirate broadcasters began commandeering the airwaves outright. Later, some of these Polish pirate broadcasters were given bona fide licenses as the first private television and radio stations in Poland.

Although limited to a 33 percent minority ownership in Polish broadcast properties, foreign investors helped Poland make the transition to a commercialized mass media (Rosenbaum, 1998). The decision to require majority Polish ownership of national media was received coolly by foreign investors but did not deter massive investment in privatized “old” Polish media and also resulted in a surge in new media launches by large, transnational media corporations like the French firm Hachette and German firm Bertelsmann (Pieklo, 2002, p. 5, www.ejc.nl/jr/emland/poland.html). To combat the ownership restrictions laid out in Poland’s 1992 Broadcasting Act, many joint ventures and partnerships with Polish nationals have developed. In addition, the increase in cable penetration, the use of satellite programming, and a political environment friendly to investors, have all made Poland an attractive media market for investment. Also, advertisers find media properties in Poland, Europe’s largest country by land mass and population, excellent cost per thousand purchases (Pieklo, 2002, p. 3, www.ejc.nl/jr/emland/poland.html). Today, foreign investment contributes a large share
of the economic support to the Polish mass media and also allowed Poland’s media to leapfrog from its 1960s and 1970s-style television technology to more advanced media technology.

Polish television offers a cornucopia of programming. Original Polish programs are still produced either in Warsaw (the commercial and governmental seat of Poland), or at large regional broadcast centers in Kraków, Gdańsk or Poznań for distribution around the country. News organizations are centralized in Warsaw and broadcasts originate from there as well. Although regional radio and television stations exist, most of their signals are transmitted through their Warsaw-based headquarters. Polish radio programming runs the gamut between large city stations broadcasting targeted radio program formats familiar to those in the United States - like jazz, sports talk, and classical music – to more general interest programming on small town radio stations that scatter talk shows, local news and varied music selections throughout their broadcast day. Despite having a longstanding reputable film industry, evening television programs usually feature foreign films, predominantly American. However, as Poland moves toward European Union membership, Poland is adjusting its broadcast laws in preparation. The Polish program day will have to feature more indigenous and EU member movies and programs, per EU regulation.

The Polish Catholic Church’s media properties have only been briefly mentioned in this chapter. A look at the Church’s electronic media is detailed in the findings chapter.
CHAPTER 7
RESEARCH FINDINGS

The Polish Catholic Church experienced massive changes in the lead up to and after the transition from communism. Some of those changes were caused by factors out of the Church’s control, while others were purposely set in motion in an attempt to create a new role for the Church now that communism had ended. The Church’s role in fighting communism resulted in widespread popular support from Poles, but when that struggle ended, the Church risked losing its central role in Polish society. Faced with the reality that Western European Catholic countries like France and Italy experienced low mass attendance and waning power in an increasingly secularized society, the Polish Catholic Church sought a voice in the new Polish public sphere.

The changes that forced the Polish Catholic Church to redefine itself were (1) pressure from the Vatican to modernize the Church through the implementation of Vatican II ideals; (2) the death of Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński – Poland’s charismatic and autocratic primate; and (3) the fall of communism in Poland and the construction of a new social structure.

Vatican II Reforms

Catholic Churches globally began adopting more modern Vatican II principles beginning in the 1960s. These new tenets welcomed open debate of the Scriptures by both the laity and clerics. Poland’s Primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, feared questioning the tenets of Catholicism would give the communists an opportunity to divide and conquer the Church in Poland and so purposely delayed the Polish Church’s adoption of Vatican II tenets, despite opposition from the Vatican. For over two decades,
the Polish Catholic Church under communism resisted church modernization. However, Wyszyński’s death in 1981 opened the door to the adoption of Vatican II reform in Poland.

**Death of Wyszyński Reforms Role of Primate**

The Polish Church was able to maintain a strong presence during the communist regime’s tenure because the autocratic communist system, which rewarded order and hierarchy, relied on the Catholic Church’s hierarchy to establish and reinforce a strict social infrastructure in Poland. In return, the communists allowed the Polish Church to remain united organizationally and ideologically under the direction of its Primate - Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński.

Although often criticized for being obstinate, close-minded, and non-progressive in the way he shepherded the Polish flock, in hindsight, Wyszyński’s keen political sense may have been the Church’s saving grace for much of his tenure as Poland’s Primate. He was adept at knowing how best to approach the regime to advance the Church’s interests.

For example, when the regime tried to implement a ten day uninterrupted work week instead of the seven day week with Saturdays off, Wyszyński opposed the plan, saying it would keep workers from attending Mass, thus undermining Poles’ religion and the Church’s influence over the Polish population. The Church turned to Solidarity for help, and the trade union was able to get the communists to agree to grant Saturdays off (Weschler, 1982, p. 211).

After Wyszyński’s death in 1981, his successor, Bishop Josef Glemp, faced increased pressure from Rome to implement Vatican II, even as he had to deal with the impact of martial law in Poland. In a sense, the Church underwent a similar
metamorphosis in 1981 to the one the Polish nation would experience only a few years later – exchanging an autocracy under its Primate, for a more pluralist, post-Vatican II democracy.

Glemp is described as less of a charismatic leader and more as an administrator. In this Vatican II environment, Glemp’s duties as primate were revised, devolving some power away from the Primate and toward the Conference of Bishops. This led to a greater independence among the clergy.

**Fall of Communism/Construction of New Capitalist State**

By the time communism fell, the newly empowered Polish bishopric began voicing their views on, and forming political blocs for, influencing social policy. Whereas the Episcopate was once a body that spoke in unison regarding Poland, the Church, and society under the direction of Cardinal Wyszyński, the Conference of Bishops now began to fragment into small cliques, each with its own social and political visions. As Primate with limited powers, Glemp was the leader of an organization that was splintering on nearly every issue, becoming more and more difficult to control and becoming less effective as a leading influence in society.

**Backlash Against the Church’s Political Involvement**

In the 1970s and 1980s, Poles relied heavily on one of the few outside organizations they knew to help form civil society -- the Polish Catholic Church. While maintaining a relationship with the communist regime, the Church nonetheless provided leadership, direction, shelter, funding and, most importantly, the full weight of the Vatican to help Poland throw off the shackles of communism. However, once communism fell and the revolutionaries that led the civil society became the regulators,
the Church opted to take on a more direct role in politics after the transition than
proscribed by its own encyclicals. It won some seats in Parliament, and some
concessions in the Constitution, broadcast laws, and the Concordat, but in the meantime,
caused a backlash against it within the population, which resented what they perceived to
be the Church’s heavy-handed involvement in their new, democratic state.

A political cartoon in a post-transition Polish newspaper depicts a weary Pole
trudging through the cartoon frame lugging a hammer and sickle. The man drops the
hammer to the ground and flings the sickle into the air. The sickle flies through the air
like a boomerang, transforming itself into a Christian cross. The cross finishes its return
loop, hitting the unsuspecting man in the back of the head. Although this illustration may
exaggerate the situation, it certainly expresses the feelings and fears of some Poles who
feel that, at least at the sociological level, they have unknowingly traded one ideological
dictatorship for another.

After the fall of communism, the focus of blame for societal problems shifted to a
degree toward the Church. The same Polish people who flocked to the Church during the
heady days of Solidarity began to resent its powerful role in the restructuring of the new
Polish society. Indulging their new freedoms to air dissent, Poles embraced a society that
allowed freer thought and personal actions, and they readily exercised their new rights.
Poles not only enjoyed voicing their opinions at the polls, they were quite vocal as to the
way they wanted their new society structured. That included a Church presence in their
religious lives, but not in secular matters (U.S. Library of Congress,
http://countrystudies.us/poland/87.htm).
Faced with a more pluralist political structure (both in the Polish Parliament and in the Church’s Conference of Bishops), a free-market economy, a more open media system, and a population struggling to survive in a world of consumption, Catholic Church leaders in Poland began to tone down the religious rhetoric in order to remain relevant in the New Poland (Michał Rynkowski, personal communication, 29 July 2002).

**Popular Disillusionment with Wałęsa and Church**

Disillusionment with Solidarity leader Wałęsa as president also tainted the Church because of their close association. Dissidents who had once openly opposed communism later felt disappointed by the way their longed-for independent Poland was now evolving. A Polish film director and intellectual once shared his experience living in Warsaw under martial law. One would have expected to hear of the inconvenience the 10 p.m. curfew had on his social life, the uneasiness of seeing the military on the street corners, or the isolation he and his family felt being penned up in their small flat. However, instead, he began to wax nostalgic for those days.

He asserted that the imposition of martial law by General Jaruzelski on December 13, 1981 only served to steel the resolve of the Polish people and helped them band together against the communist regime. He recalled how neighbor helped neighbor cope with the everyday struggles to survive. Since money could buy very little in an empty store, social connections and the black market put food on the table. A devout atheist, he nonetheless had attended church religiously in those days. He said the pews were filled with both the devout and the dissident to make a political point. The priests, knowing the makeup of their audience, delivered weekly sermons with healthy amounts of both revelation and rebellion. All these things, he concluded, gave Poles an enormous feeling
of unity. Poles were making a statement by ignoring the political machinations of the
communist regime. Now, he reminisced in 1995, everything has changed.

He registered his dissatisfaction with Lech Wałęsa and his government. While
half-heartedly defending Wałęsa as the man Poland needed to shake the bonds of
communism, he maintained that Wałęsa lacked the intellect, diplomacy and vision to run
the New Poland and, therefore, was not the man the country needed in the Belvedere
Palace (the Polish presidential residence, sometimes called the Polish White House). By
the mid 1990s, a kind of cultural reshuffling was taking place throughout the country.
Privatization eliminated jobs and caused friction in the Polish family; young Poles who
embraced capitalism were becoming successful entrepreneurs, while their elders, who
had worked under, and were familiar with, the communist system, struggled to adapt.
Pensioners - who were promised a modest monthly retirement allowance by a communist
system that existed under the adage, “you pretend to work, and we will pretend to pay
you” - didn’t receive enough financial support from the government to live on. Poles
turned inward to establish their place in the new social, political and economic systems,
forgetting their neighbors and even their religious obligations. Some even partly blamed
the Catholic Church for their problems since the Church was heavily involved in the new
administration led by Wałęsa. This man’s recollections encapsulated the social
consequences that were the result of the tumultuous 1980s and the 1990s in Poland.

Other factors that may have cost Wałęsa and the Church political support in the
1990s included drastic measures like Poland’s implementation of economist
Balcerowicz’s “Shock Therapy” - which introduced a market economy to Poland
overnight with little social safety net to cushion the fall - and Lech Wałęsa’s “thick line”
he drew with the past that absolved individual Polish citizens’ and institutions’ involvement in and with the communist party.

In the Polish centrist newspaper Cash, prior to that year’s presidential elections in which Wałęsa lost to Kwaśniewski, Gadomski (1995) described the electorate’s dilemma. He prophesied that since the Catholic Church had not declared its acceptance of free-market reforms and showed a lack of overall support for the spirit of democratic capitalism that was developing in Poland at the time, voters favoring these issues would be forced to vote for the former communists in the upcoming elections. Gadomski also criticized the Church’s right-wing factions for pursuing their own political agenda instead of attacking substantive issues important to the Polish people. As an example, Gadomski cites the Church’s insistence on a Christian values provision in the broadcasting law that would require policing of television program content (Gadomski, 1995, p. 5).

Unhappiness with the Polish Church extended as far as Rome. One week after the Pope’s 1995 visit to Poland, The Warsaw Voice, an English language newspaper, reported on political infighting between the Vatican and Miodowa Street. The story maintained that the Pope blamed Primate Glemp for “entangling the Catholic Church in hopeless political conflicts.” The Vatican also held Glemp responsible for the landslide drop in public confidence in the Church from 88 percent in November 1989 to 47 percent three years later. The story maintained that the Pope had already chosen Glemp’s successor (Church of Discord, May 28, 1998). Glemp survived these rumblings and remains Primate of Poland, but, as discussed earlier, he has lost most of his political capital among the Conference of Bishops and, in many ways, his position has been reduced to one of a more ceremonial nature.
Political analysts, however, place the blame for this drop in Church support less on Glemp and more on the changing political environment. They feel a more likely scenario is that much of the Church’s popular support pre-1989 stemmed more from the Church’s anti-communist stance than its religious doctrines (Hetnal, 1999, p. 506). A country study on Poland published in 1998 by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress and sponsored by the U.S. Department of the Army takes a somewhat different position. It postulates that Poles prior to the transition viewed the Church as infallible and surrounded by an almost mystical veneer as it engaged in a moral battle against communism. The revelation of the post-transition, post-Vatican II Church, with all of its public infighting and its overt political agenda, cost the Church support of disillusioned Poles:

Experts point to certain characteristics of Polish Catholicism to explain its unique resilience in a population bombarded for decades with state-sponsored atheistic propaganda. Polish Catholic religiosity focuses more strongly on the Virgin Mary and the saints than on the direct relationship of the individual to God or on abstract religious doctrine. The most important pilgrimage destination for Polish Roman Catholics is the image of the Virgin (called the Black Madonna) at Jasna Góra Monastery in Częstochowa. The image is believed to have rescued Poland miraculously from invasions by the Tatars and the Swedes, and some Solidarity leaders wore replicas of the icon.

Especially for less-educated Poles, Mary represents a tangible yet mystical connection with God much preferable to contemplation of abstract theological doctrine. During the communist era, this more immediate and anthropocentric religiosity seemed uniquely resistant to replacement by the intellectual doctrine of atheism. On the other hand, in the early 1990s, once the specter of state-sponsored atheism had disappeared, this immediacy promoted individual expression of beliefs in ways that questioned the church's authority over secular social ethics. Thus, the official church, that had protected the spiritual interests of all Poles under communism, risked separation from the everyday religious practice that retained great meaning for the average Polish Catholic (U.S. Library of Congress, http://countrystudies.us/poland/40.htm).
With its political prowess virtually gone, the Catholic Church in Poland has become far less vocal in political matters and has once again focused on its role as ideological watchdog – a role many Poles are now wary to extend to the Church. Nonetheless, experts characterize the relationship between the Catholic Church and the State today as fully normalized; the Church weighs in on matters, but those opinions are added to the other multitude of opinions expressed by other societal factions.

**Impact of Disillusionment on Catholic Church**

Poles preferred the Church stay out of politics and focus on providing spiritual leadership, and many of the democratically elected politicians wanted less heavy-handed Church involvement in policymaking. At the same time, the changes that were occurring within Polish society were being mirrored within the Polish Catholic Church – as society pluralized, the Church fragmented into various political camps, and as society pursued a secular democracy, the Church became more secular in its approach as well.

**Fragmentation**

Currently, within the Polish Catholic Church, there is an ideological split. Conservative hardliners, who promote a unified, introspective, nationalistic and ethnocentric Polish Church, are vying for power with the more liberal clergy, who see the Church’s role as an apolitical spiritual leader providing a moral compass to Poles navigating the myriad societal changes facing the New Poland.

Ideological clashes with the Episcopate and parish priests have long plagued Glemp’s administration. In the early and mid 1980s it was renegade priests, like Father Jerzy Popiełuszko, urging parishioners to live ‘as if’ the Soviets weren’t occupying Poland. Later, after the transition, members of the Episcopate directly defied Cardinal
Glemp on various ideological and doctrinal matters, something that did not happen under the previous Primate.

For example, Cardinal Glemp once received a request by Polish homosexuals for a chaplain to give them spiritual guidance. Catholic Church doctrine forbids same sex relationships and urges homosexuals to seek redemption within the Church. Cardinal Glemp denied the assignment of a chaplain, claiming that no one stepped forward to take the assignment. One member of the clergy contradicted Cardinal Glemp in the press, saying he would have volunteered for the job. Rarely in the past would a clergyman openly challenge the Primate of Poland in this way, exemplifying, over the last decade, the fragmentation that has developed in the Polish Catholic Church (Michał Rynkowski, 29 July 2002).

This factionalism among the Polish clerics has perturbed Pope John Paul II considerably. During his summer 2002 visit to Poland, John Paul II’s private message to the Conference of Bishops was to get its house in order. The fragmentation of the Polish Church was minimizing its effectiveness at a crucial time in Poland’s history and marginalizing its power in Poland’s political and social spheres (Tomasz Królak, personal communication, 26 July 2002).

**Secularization**

A statue depicting Zygmunt The Old, Poland’s first king and the man credited with bringing Catholicism to Poland, stands outside Warsaw’s Old Town holding a cross in one hand and a double-edged sword in the other. Legend has it the king gave Poles an option – they could accept the cross and convert to Catholicism or they could fall at the hands of the sword.
The Catholic Church faces a similar dilemma today – it could accept and participate in a secular Poland, or be one of many casualties of Poland’s social transition. It appears the Church has taken the course of the former, albeit more out of necessity than choice.

Ironically, Poles as a whole are becoming more secular now than they ever were under atheistic communism, feeling they no longer need the Church as a motivational and spiritual force in their now-resolved struggle against totalitarianism. As in Western Europe, the new ideals of democracy and free-market economy have helped empty church pews of Polish Catholics, depriving the Church of much of its voice in the Polish public sphere.

Possibly by design, possibly from turmoil, the Church has become more pluralistic in its message and as such, able to speak to a more politically diverse population. As will be discussed below in the media section, the Church’s media products run the gamut of ideological viewpoints. It has enough media properties to ensure its general stance on political, social and economic issues is disseminated.

**Alienation**

Many Poles, both inside and outside the Church, felt the Church should no longer meddle in politics, but instead work for the social good. They feared Church involvement in democratic politics would make religion too pervasive in a society striving for the separation of Church and State. The Church, on the other hand, viewed the reconstruction of the state as pivotal to its success and relevance in the new Poland.

The Church’s brief period of significant, direct political influence won a few concessions during Poland’s early transitional years, but its political power waned
quickly in the new democratic system of government that advocated separation of Church and State. The failure of the Church to get a “Christian values” provision included in Poland’s new constitution, adopted in 1997, was only one such setback. A Church-supported political coalition party called AWS that led the Polish Parliament in the late 1990s seemed doomed from the outset. The coalition, comprised of various political factions that represented the fragmented views of the Church, was tenuous at best and was never able to govern effectively. The party lost control of Parliament in the 2001 elections and by the end of the period under study, Church-influenced parties held no seats in the Polish Parliament.

A New Church Plan

The Habermassian idea of publicly sanctioned organizations representing the private person and influencing public opinion is alive and well in Poland. While the Church’s efforts to exert its influence directly in the political realm have been met with mixed success and its interpersonal contact with its congregation has dropped, it has retained significant ability to communicate its messages to the Polish people using its sizeable mass media resources.

The Church was already involved in mass media, even under the strict controls of communism. In keeping with Inter Mirifica, the Polish Catholic Church maintained parish newspapers, and Poland’s charismatic Primate ensured that the Church’s newspapers delivered a unified Church message that would pass through governmental censors. At the same time, the Church also called for consumption of the underground mass media which were laced with anti-communist messages. During communism’s
dying days, the Church used its influence with the government to secure the allocation of hundreds of radio broadcast frequencies.

Pope John Paul II’s respect for the views put forth by Paul VI’s *Miranda Prorsus*, and later *Inter Mirifica*, is evidenced by the steps his pontificate has taken toward utilizing the means of social communication in general and Poland’s situation specifically. As noted in Chapter 4, the Polish Plenary Synod in 1991 found that the Church should increase its presence in Polish culture by increasing its evangelization efforts in schools, using the mass media, and by influencing the lives of individuals through catechism and recruitment of the laity for Church involvement. The Synod stressed the need to capitalize on the concessions the Church won from the communists to evangelize more directly using the Church’s own media properties and to more aggressively utilize the lay media to disseminate Church news. In this way, the Church is not unlike the communist party, in that it views mass media as a tool to carry its message, as opposed to the commercial concept of media for profit.

After the transition to democracy, the Church put much of its energy into developing its media properties, expanding the number of newspapers and radio networks and initiating cable and television stations, all in an effort to evangelize to the masses directly. In late 1991, the Catholic Church obtained consent from the Communication Ministry to open eleven radio stations. By 1994, it was running 104 relay stations, including 60 relay stations of Radio Maryja, an ultra-conservative Catholic radio station. In 1997, it received a license to operate its first television station, TV Niepokalanów (Hiebert, 1999, p. 100). In the meantime, the Pope and his Polish bishops worked
successfully to get Christian provisions added to the Polish broadcasting laws, but were unsuccessful in attempts to add a similar proviso to the Polish Constitution.

Once the communist censors were lifted, the Church became more overtly political in its messages and directed Catholics toward Church goals, at a time when mass media properties could influence the rebuilding of the country’s social and political institutions. In this way, Church media created a Stained-Glass Prism in which information was disseminated.

**Impact of Fragmentation on Church Mass Media**

The Church’s media properties reflect the internal and external upheaval both within Polish society and the Catholic Episcopate. The Church hierarchy, inexperienced in the management of media channels, parsed its media properties out to various religious orders that comprise the Church and allowed them to assume control of them. The Redemptorist Fathers (ultra-conservatives), Jesuits (moderates), Dominicans (liberals), and Marians (liberals) operated Church media properties under the media-naïve direction of the Episcopate. With independent, and largely unchecked, control over these properties, each religious order tinged its media property with its own religious philosophies and political bent. Although these orders do not codify varying political ideologies, their overall tendencies can be deduced from their practices. Subsequently, Church media properties run the gamut from promoting ultra-conservative isolationist ideologies to promoting liberal, nearly secularist, Pan-Europeanism. Those Poles who looked to the Church for guidance as their culture debated the redefinition of social norms and mores were often met with differing and sometimes contradictory messages, depending on which Church-owned media they consumed.
The varying ideological slants that each order disseminates results in political clashes between, and alliances struck among, members of the Conference of Bishops. The bishops, who approve of the message being sent by a particular station or publication, protect that property from being closed down by competing members of the Episcopate (Fr. Kazimierz Sowa, personal communication, 30 July 1999).

Despite their political leanings, one thing remains constant - all Catholic media properties have an official Church representative that oversees content and coverage. This official, always a member of the clergy, implements the directives of the Polish Episcopate, which, in turn, justifies its position and actions to the Vatican (Fr. Kazimierz Sowa, personal communication, 30 July 1999). After the death of long-time editor-in-chief of Tygodnik Powszechny Jerzy Turowicz, a layman who never shied away from disagreeing with the Church or the State, the Church replaced him with a Polish priest with religious newspaper experience and years working directly with the Episcopate (Fr. Adam Boniecki, personal communication, 30 July, 2002).

Liberal newspapers like Tygodnik Powszechny, which once counted Pope John Paul II, then Kraków Bishop Karol Wojtyła, as one of its contributing writers, as well as ultra-conservative Radio Maryja, have at times directly challenged the Polish Episcopate in their editorial stance on some issues. However, these public deviations from the norm among organizations within the Church are exceptions to the rule and usually do not represent substantial divergences from traditional Catholic positions.

**Impact of secularization/commercialization**

Given the societal shift from communism to capitalism that necessitates Catholic media either make a profit or rely solely on Church funding, the Church’s financial
burden becomes apparent (Fr. Kazimierz Sowa, personal communication, 31 July 2002). Since the transition, the Church’s media properties have undergone drastic adaptations – they have broken away from the yoke of communist censorship and been forced to succeed in a media-glutted economy where foreign investors with deep pockets offer Western European titles, and Polish startup publications begin hopefully but end abruptly like the notes from the bugler in Krakow’s Old Town Square heralding a new hour. It also, for the purposes of media ownership laws and also for public acceptance, is viewed as a local owner, despite having the backing of the international Catholic Church. The favorable media rights the Church negotiated with the Communists before the transition gave the Church a head start over other operators in launching electronic media properties around Poland.

The Church, like a multi-national corporation, also has deep pockets, but getting financial information about the extent of their investment is nearly impossible. Furthermore, while it wants its media outlets to be financially self-sufficient, its proselytizing goals come foremost and could if it chose, underwrite losses or target donations. Struggling to keep its media properties financially viable, the Church has looked to foreign Catholic entities to finance and advise the Church’s media managers. It found willing investors in American religious media owners like the Catholic News Service and the Eternal World Television Network (EWTN).

The American media owners/investors, savvy about producing financially viable media organs, advocate narrowcasting to a specific audience and delivering audience-
friendly commercial fare that will not ostracize viewers. This presents a paradox – one of the world’s most traditional and conservative Catholic congregations (the Polish Catholic Church) asking the United States’ Catholic Church, one of the world’s newest and least respected (due to its more secular approach to Catholicism) church congregations to help get the Polish Church’s message out to devout Poles. In short, those media properties with American religious advisors take a more liberal approach to church media than the Polish Church traditionally took and are Western-style cookie-cutter corporate channels – whose managers are concerned with ratings books and bottom lines – that serve generic G-rated family fare. These channels are in sharp contrast to ultra-conservative religious stations run by charismatic firebrands who reject Western influence.

Despite the increased number of media channels available in Poland after the transition, the Catholic Church’s media have maintained a small but strong presence. KAI is one of three influential press agencies, the Church’s Internet portal, Opoka, is one of seven key online Polish gateways, and the TV Puls and Radio Plus commercial channels attract respectable audiences, as does the controversial Radio Maryja (Pieklo, 2002, p. 4, www.ejc.nl/jr/emland/poland.html). These properties are discussed in more depth later in this chapter.

The growing alienation of the Church and the ideological divide discussed above can be seen in the failure of the Church’s media properties to be financially self-sufficient. The two exceptions – Radio Maryja and the Radio Plus Network – occupied opposite ideological ends of the political continuum, possibly demonstrating a lack of popular consensus on the role of the Church in the new Poland.
The Radio Plus and TV Puls networks are the Catholic Church’s attempts at commercially successful electronic media enterprises. They are, in a sense, experiments with a more secular media targeting young listeners, in the case of Radio Plus, and “thirty-something nesters,” in the case of TV Puls. In both media ventures, the Catholic stations provide a large dosage of Western programming with minimal overt evangelization.

The dilemma for the Church is, in order to reach these influential audiences, they must limit the evangelization, thus limiting the Church’s message. They end up, in a sense, promoting the culture of consumerism that the Catholic Church rails against.

Tygodnik Powszechny correspondent Artur Sporniak sees the Church’s policy of placing clergy aligned with the Episcopate into Church media managerial positions as an attempt to maintain the Church’s place in Polish society and counter the influx of foreign media owners’ attempts to westernize the Polish media landscape:

In my opinion, the Church is very afraid that society might go entirely secular. You have to understand a little bit about the nature of Poles to understand why the Church, for example, really struggled for the inclusion of Christian values in the Constitution (lines 231-233).… For Poles, the realm of symbolism is very important. It’s connected with our national romanticism…the struggle for our own nationhood (lines 236-238). It’s very important for the Church that national symbols also be religious ones. I view it like this: the Church fears that if various national symbols lose their religious meaning, then society will become completely secularized. Of course, most often the symbols today do not have a direct influence in public life, in private life, in the lives of private people in Poland. That’s why, at Tygodnik, we view this like “tilting at windmills.” This is why it seems all the more crucial to us that the Church should concentrate on working on its “base,” so to speak. That is, among the people (lines 242-248).

**Catholic Mass Media Assessments**

As of 2004, The Polish Catholic Church has about 34 different media properties (see Appendix A for a thumbnail sketch of each; some of those listed started
subsequently to the time frame of the study). Many of these are local or regional enterprises, so the Polish Catholic Church’s mass media presence in Poland is still relatively small, but, since they are considered unique Polish enterprises, could be potentially powerful. The Church’s 13 radio properties constitute 5.5% of all radio stations in Poland (out of 235 Polish radio stations overall). Of the 74 television stations (this number includes Polish cable stations) the Church’s 2 stations make up only 2% of the television landscape. The Church’s media properties increase in status when one considers the fact that many of the total population of television properties are local or regional stations whereas both of the Church’s TV stations reach national audiences. It is difficult to place the Church’s 5 internet sites in a national context as the number of Polish sites is still very changing and the content of every site varies significantly. Although this study does not focus on the Polish print industry, it is worth mentioning that of the 994 daily and weekly Polish newspapers and magazines (827 daily and 167 weekly publications), the Catholic Church’s 10 publications represent about 1% of the Polish newspaper and magazine industry. Although the number of Church-owned media properties does not seem overly impressive or significant it is important to examine each property more carefully to understand the scope and general impact they may have on the Catholic audience.

The Church’s Polish electronic media properties are varied in their reach, content and overt religiosity. The various levels of religiosity of the Church’s properties that have a national reach, like TV Niepokalanów, Radio Plus, and Radio Maryja represent two extremes. TV Niepokalanów and Radio Plus are commercial enterprises, and their content is quite secular – nearly imitating the programming of Western European
commercial stations. Radio Maryja, on the other hand, not only broadcasts to Poland but reaches Poland’s expatriate community in Europe and the United States via short wave transmissions. Its content is extremely religious and, as stated earlier, touts ultra-conservative ideologies.

A new addition to Poland’s television landscape is TV Trwam. This station began in 2003 and is based in Torun in the same facility as the Radio Maryja headquarters. TV Trwam touts an ultraconservative line, is funded solely by private donations, and mirrors the content and operation of its sister radio property, Radio Maryja, in many respects.

Regional Church-owned radio stations like Radio eM and Radio Jasna Góra broadcast a religiously conservative message to their listeners. These stations broadcast evangelical messages, and present Church news in addition to its regular regional, national and international news. Of its radio properties, the majority of the Church’s channels are local stations that are operated by individual diocese with a clergy member in charge of each station. The stations are staffed by both religious and lay people. Generally, these local properties keep listeners informed about Church activities and community events, as well as supplying catechism, daily prayers and general evangelization.

The amount of overt religious messages broadcast by these media properties are worth noting. Radio Plus and TV Niepokalanów do not overtly evangelize, keeping their religious identity ambiguous. Radio Maryja and TV Trwam, on the other hand, focus their content on Catholic doctrine as does many of the Church’s local diocesan operated radio stations.
The Church’s internet presence is still new and developing. Very little information was able to be gathered about these sites. The Church’s Opoka website may be the Church’s most utilized web property at present and will be examined further along with the Church’s most exemplary and significant electronic media properties – the Catholic Information Agency, Radio Plus, TV Puls and Radio Maryja. These properties dominated the Church’s electronic media landscape during the period under study and remain the most significant Church-owned properties because of their reach and popularity. Each one is profiled below:

**KAI**

The Church opened the Catholic Information Agency (KAI), a wire service that covers all types of news, while acting as the Church’s press agent. Although not the only wire service in Poland, the formation of the Catholic Information Agency gave the Church a channel for controlling the information disseminated to the masses. KAI controls the Church’s press relations; it utilizes media professionals to “spin” religious information released to the press and allows the Church to sidestep other information services like the governmentally controlled Polish Press Agency (PAP). KAI remains a legitimate disseminator of information to Poland’s media industry.

For about a decade, the Church, through KAI, also offered Christian-focused training seminars, as suggested in *Inter Mirifica* and supported by succeeding pontifical documents, to secular and religious media professionals to help them understand and correctly report Christian issues. Some maintain that KAI proved an effective tool for training the newly independent lay media to write about church issues (Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, personal communication, 30 July 2002). The Church says the classes helped to
properly train Polish journalists in the new ways of responsible journalism in the era of a free press. Others say the classes were designed more to indoctrinate than to educate.

**Radio Plus and TV Puls**

The Radio Plus network of stations (now called the Plus Programme Alliance) has grown steadily since its establishment and is considered a commercial success. Its popular music format based on a programming wheel of regularly scheduled music, news, and weather, with American and West European music and phone-in contests, was unique among Church properties. Not surprisingly, the lack of overt evangelical messages was viewed skeptically by the Conference of Bishops.

Father Kazimierz Sowa, director of the Radio Plus network, remembers regularly having to explain to bishops why Radio Plus did not broadcast masses or offer prayers at noon every day like the other Catholic owned stations. Today, although there are general messages of human kindness broadcast on a daily basis, Radio Plus is still very secular in its program content, so secular that young people may not realize Radio Plus is a Church-owned entity (Fr. Kazimierz Sowa, personal communication, 31 July 2002). It is Sowa’s view that reaching a greater audience of young people with a more subtle Christian message is preferable to reaching fewer people with an overt message.

The TV Puls network is the Church’s attempt to use the financially successful Radio Plus model with one of its television properties. TV Puls operates the TV Niepokalanów channel, the first Catholic television station in Poland, which began local broadcasting from a Franciscan Monastery outside Warsaw in 1996. A year later, the KRRiTV granted the station permission to become a commercial enterprise and to broadcast via satellite (Bar, 2000, p. 434). From its inception, TV Niepokalanów was to
be a commercial success in order to bankroll another project, Telewizja Familyjna, which was to be the quintessential Polish Catholic electronic media property. Telewizja Familyjna would be developed along the lines of the EWTN network in the United States - it would feature all religious programming including regular broadcasts of religious services, religious talk shows, and other religious programming. However, in the time period covered by the study, TV Niepokalanów was not the commercial success the Church had hoped and Telewizja Familyjna never materialized (Maciej Pawlicki, personal communication, 25 July 2002).

To use an American electronic media property as a point of programming comparison, TV Niepokalanów’s program content is nearly identical to both PAX and the Fox Family stations. It obtains programs like *Touched by An Angel* and the like at a significantly reduced rate, or at no cost, keeping program budgets low. However, Maciej Pawlicki, a member of the TV Puls board and director of TV Niepokalanów, considers the station’s approach a commercial failure. Pawlicki blames the proliferation of satellite delivered and cable programming in Poland which offers similar fare for the station’s low viewership. Ironically, one “thirty-something nester” remarked that when choosing “family oriented” programming for his children, he preferred shows that better reflected Polish family values rather than American family values. Polish programming, he complained, is not being broadcast on the Church’s electronic media properties because American programs are cheaper to buy and air than Polish programming is to create (Kai Schoenhals, personal communication, 31 July 2002).

**Radio Maryja**
In 1991, Radio Maryja became the first Church-owned radio station on the air in Poland. To date, Radio Maryja still garners the largest number of listeners among all the Church’s radio properties (Bar, 2000, p. 433), and it also garners the lion’s share of controversy. Zandberg (2001) describes Radio Maryja’s content as anti-Semitic, anti-European Union, anti-democratic, anti-Western, anti-liberal, ultra-national, isolationist, and even anti-Episcopate (p. 295). Although the Episcopate claims the themes espoused by Radio Maryja do not represent the sentiments of the Church or of Polish Catholics, the reality that Radio Maryja continues to broadcast its content over a Church-owned media channel, funded by legions of private, individual financial supporters (both foreign and domestic), speak volumes.

The Redemptorist Fathers, one of the Catholic Church’s most conservative orders, operate Radio Maryja under the direction of Father Tadeusz Rydzyk – a charismatic and controversial priest who is beloved by Radio Maryja’s devoted listeners and scorned by much of the Polish Episcopate. Tucked away in a compound-like set of buildings in the conservative town of Torun, Radio Maryja is able to isolate itself from its detractors and surround itself with its target audience. Father Rydzyk’s critics, many of them Polish clergy themselves, claim he promotes a “cult of personality.” Religious journalists qualify Rydzyk’s status among the Polish Church community by pointing out that he has “not been excommunicated.”

In a small church, not far from a large statue of Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, a small poster promoting Radio Maryja hangs on an ancient looking bulletin board intended for announcing community events. In neat, hand-written script the words “Listen to the ‘Unfinished Conversation’” are scrawled across the bottom of the poster.
This image is repeated in dozens of churches around Warsaw; in some churches the poster wasn’t there, but the call to listen to the ‘Unfinished Conversation,’ Radio Maryja’s most popular show, was everywhere. Radio Maryja is the Church’s lightning rod for internal and external criticism and controversy, but it is also arguably the Church’s most successful electronic media property. The station’s self-proclaimed goals are threefold: To unite listeners through daily prayer and regular masses, to provide religious instruction, and to interact with its listeners directly through call-in talk shows like “The Unfinished Conversation” (http://www.radiomaryja.pl/english.htm). The show is a sounding board for the frustrated and disenfranchised Poles and Polonia. Some callers wax nostalgic for the days of communism where work was guaranteed, wages were largely irrelevant, and a Pole’s existence wasn’t dependent upon the shifting sands of a transitory society.

Although the Polish Episcopate vilifies Father Rydzyk and publicly denounces Radio Maryja, the Conference of Bishops recognizes the station’s loyal legions of listeners may be the Church’s most ardent supporters, both in Poland and outside. In that way, Radio Maryja’s programming may best meet the Church’s objective of reaching devout Poles. Media experts estimate Radio Maryja attracts 4 to 5 million listeners – making it the fourth most listened to radio station in Poland (Bar, 2000, p. 433). Radio Maryja also broadcasts to the Polish expatriate community, called “Polonia,” via short wave radio. The station is non-commercial, supported by donations. Many of these listeners help keep Radio Maryja running by joining the “Family of Radio Maryja” and donating money to keep the station afloat. The “Family of Radio Maryja” number two
hundred thousand strong and are comprised of both Poles and Polonia (History of Radio Maryja, http://www.radiomaryja.pl/english.htm).

Polish media experts describe Radio Maryja’s listeners as typically uneducated, rural farmers and disenfranchised pensioners (Grzegorz Gortat, personal communication, August 3, 1999). However, even on a walk down the side streets of an urban center like Warsaw on a warm summer evening brings, the sound of Radio Maryja comes through the open windows and into the alleyways between communist built “blockie” apartments. On various pilgrimages to the Vatican, Radio Maryja patrons and devout listeners, known as the “Family of Radio Maryja,” have received audiences with Pope John Paul II. According to the station’s Internet site, the Pope has also recognized and applauded the work of Father Rydzyk himself (The History of Radio Maryja, http://www.radiomaryja.pl/english.htm).

In addition, in a 1998 Financial Times of London article, Bobinski states that Radio Maryja has become nearly financially self-sufficient thanks to private donations from the “Family of Radio Maryja.” The radio station’s financial solvency means freedom to act without the approval, constraints, or control of the Polish Episcopate, and without fear of financial retribution from the Polish Catholic Church in general (p.4).

Although Radio Maryja may be financially the Church’s most successful media property, the most successful in disseminating a unified message backed by the Church hierarchy may be one of the most recent additions to the Church’s media properties – its Internet presence, Opoka.

Opoka
Opoka is the Episcopate-backed Catholic Church’s internet portal. It is intended to be the central point for all Internet-related activities emanating from the Polish Catholic Church. The website contains both technical and editorial content. Parts of the page allow users to access the Church’s electronic mail system and chat rooms, and other links allow users to ask hardware and software questions. Opoka web users can also read news reports from KAI, and listen to audio files from Radio Vatican in Rome, interviews previously aired on Radio Plus, and various types of religious music. Users can also view archival video clips of Pope John Paul II’s messages or see brief stories on religious topics like the Shroud of Turin.

Opoka also provides a healthy supply of Catholic evangelization, but the aforementioned non-evangelical services of the site (providing e-mail accounts, topical chat rooms, etc.) may help build goodwill between Poles and the Church.

The Opoka website appears to be the best conceived media property of all the Polish Catholic properties. Opoka serves as a clearinghouse for the Church’s information organs, and contains doctrinal documents to keep its congregants informed. Through Opoka, the news of the day is filtered through the lens of the Polish Catholic Church for its readers. There are links that discuss business ethics, Poland’s European integration, and even a link on its home page to its charity organization, Caritas. In a sense, the Opoka web page serves as an electronic parish providing evangelical information, interpreting world events, and providing a connection between the parishioners and the Vatican all from one electronic pulpit directly supervised by the Conference of Bishops. Unlike the other media outlets, it is not run by any of the religious orders.
The potential for Opoka to meet the Church’s evangelical goals is lessened – for the time being, anyway – by the fact that few Poles have regular Internet access. A 2004 overview of Poland, published by Freedom House, estimates only about thirteen percent of Poles use the Internet. Although this number is rising, the high cost of Internet connectivity means most Poles access the Internet only at work and not at home (Durlik, 2004, p. 303).

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

The Catholic Church is a closed, hierarchical system that adopts reforms slowly and deliberately. As mentioned earlier, it is an institution that changes over centuries not years. The Catholic Church rarely opens itself up for inspection by the laity or even introspection by its clergy. The adoption of modern Vatican II principles which promoted open dialogue among and between the laity and clergy and the synods which followed were landmark occurrences for just this reason; the Church opened itself up for evaluation and reformation for the first time in centuries. That said, even a post-Vatican II Catholic Church is by no means transparent. For example, the Church’s financial records are rarely released, and operational decisions are often done in conclaves behind closed doors.

The Polish Catholic Church has exemplified this closed system throughout much of its history. During communism, Poland’s Primate ignored the Pope’s Vatican II modernization efforts of the 1960s and 1970s in order to keep the Church unified. He operated the Catholic Church as an island - with little or no input from even the Vatican. However, the fall of communism, as well as Poland’s eventual adoption of Vatican II tenets following the Primate’s death, ushered in a new era for the Polish Catholic Church.
This post-Vatican II Church openness, however, resulted in a fracturing of the Church hierarchy along political lines.

After 1989, the Polish Church tried its hand at direct involvement with politics. After experiencing some initial success at legislating more Christian focused laws and getting Catholic-friendly politicians into office, the Church’s political influence lessened as public opinion about the Church’s involvement in State matters became harsher.

Much can be learned from the Church’s overall failed attempt at politics in Poland. By purposely ignoring previous Church encyclicals warning against active participation in national politics, the Polish Church alienated its devotees, lessened its political and social power in the country, and threatened its efforts of evangelization.

According to Father Kazimierz Sowa, losing its political clout meant the Church had to rely on its media to disseminate its ideas. Sowa states that although the older generation can be reached by conventional means – the pulpit and church newsletters and leaflets - the younger, media savvy generation, who are not regular church attendees, are tougher to reach. The Church instead uses its mass media to try to reach them.

Instead of the Polish Episcopate formulating a coordinated media plan to make best use of its extensive media properties, it turned them over to various religious orders within the Church. Each one takes a relatively unique approach to evangelizing the audience. In a sense, each media property operates like a Post-Vatican II electronic parish; they mold their messages to reach their own unique congregation. In the media business, this is called narrowcasting to an audience – customizing a message to a small distinct audience – and in post-transition Poland, there is a splintering of ideological thought. So, in one sense, it was advantageous for the Church to package its various
media outlets to reach different audiences. However, the extreme differences between their messages may in fact be working against the interests of the Church, both by exacerbating its internal divisions and by confusing its audience.

Radio Plus attempted to reach young pragmatic Poles who were trying to fit into the more secular, capitalist Poland. This group had seen the old communist system crumble but was not personally invested in the ideology enough to be adversely impacted. They inherited a free market Poland and were required to adapt quickly to this system.

On the other end of the spectrum, the Church’s Radio Maryja station targeted those disenfranchised Poles who were still reeling from the societal and economic earthquake the transition brought. Some of these listeners were fully invested in a social, political and economic system that no longer existed and were ill equipped to survive in this New Poland. Radio Maryja’s programming delivered an audience ripe for evangelization, but it also pandered to the Poles who yearned for a system in which they were more familiar, allowing its Catholic channel to be used by malcontents who wrapped themselves in the Polish flag and espoused isolationist rhetoric.

Sowa feels in many ways the most important audience for the Church – the middle-aged and middle class audience - is being abandoned. This segment of the population are also not regular churchgoers, and may confuse the anti-EU, anti-consumerism and pro-isolationist rhetoric from extreme Christian stations like Radio Maryja with official Catholic Church doctrine. Sowa feels the Polish Catholic Church is not targeting this population with any of its media properties, isolating a very influential group that is contributing to and defining today’s Polish society and rearing Poland’s next
generation of Catholics. Sowa fears that since the transition, the Church has been steadily losing touch with the Polish people, and may ultimately lose its moniker as the bearer of the Polish nationalist standard (Fr. Kazimierz Sowa, personal communication, 31 July 2002).

In this way, the Catholic media properties failed as effective evangelization tools because they do not support the Church as an institution. The conservative media like Radio Maryja are considered renegade media outlets that ignore the Episcopate and are at times hostile toward it. The liberal media, like Tygodnik Powszechny, do not like the Church’s lack of transparency and reluctance to change, and sometimes openly criticize the Church hierarchy’s more conservative stances. The Church’s more moderate media properties, like Radio Plus and TV Puls, are forced to soft-sell its Catholic doctrine, minimizing its effectiveness in reaching an already indifferent crowd.

Lastly, the Polish Church’s attempt to have its media properties become financially self-sufficient is detrimental to the evangelical goals of the Church. The Church would be well served to focus on delivering the Christian message and not in turning a profit. In attempting to do both, the Church must program to the lowest common denominator in each of its properties. The result in its commercial endeavors like Radio Plus and TV Puls is the promotion of a Western-style consumerism that contradicts its own Catholic doctrine, and television content that promotes Western cultures over Poland’s rich heritage. In its non-commercial properties like Radio Maryja that are funded by donations from inside and outside Poland’s borders, the lowest common denominator tends toward the anti-liberal, ultra-conservative nationalist.
Overall, the Catholic Church in post-transition Poland has had difficulty realizing all of its political goals. The result of Poland’s transition and the simultaneous reformation of the Polish Catholic Church to adopt Vatican II ideals resulted in the fragmentation and secularization of the Church hierarchy, reflected in some of its electronic media properties. This fragmentation, left unchecked, could also eventually lead to the alienation or isolation of the Church within Poland. Taking a lesson from Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, a divided Church is much easier to conquer. This is especially true if the onslaught of foreign financial investors and the country’s ascension to the European Union continue to ideologically influence Poland’s market-driven media landscape. However, using its Stained-Glass media prism, the post-transition Catholic Church still has a chance to realize its evangelical social mission.

Some Poles feel the Church’s best chance to remain viable in post-transition Poland and stem a perceived tide of secularization is to re-establish itself as the epicenter for civil society, using their community churches and its electronic pulpit – their mass media properties.

Poles have survived wars, occupation and transition with pragmatism. If history is any predictor, with all the media choices and media voices available to the predominantly Catholic Polish population, Poles will not fall lock-step in with the Church’s messages it broadcasts, but will instead accept the viewpoints of those that tout the most realistic approach to survival in today’s New Poland. This viewpoint seems to be a pro-NATO, pro-European Union membership, consumer-based market economy approach; a view that flies in the face of the Church’s initial hope of a 21st century Poland that more closely represents a truly Christian state.
By focusing its efforts only on evangelizing in a way that both attracts its various audiences but presents a more unified message, and focusing on financial self-sufficiency for its media outlets, the Church can maintain a place in the Polish public sphere.

However, the multitude of media voices in Poland’s open media market makes domination of the public sphere impossible. The Catholic Church sees the Polish people embracing the secular ideals of Western consumerism and attempts to parry those advances with its Christian doctrine. As a result, some Poles view the Catholic message as out-of-date, isolationist and alarmist in nature. Some, in a culture prone to conspiracy theories, even equate the behind-the-scenes machinations of the Church today with the secretive maneuverings of the communist party in its heyday. As reflected in the political cartoon showing the communist sickle transformed into the Christian cross, Poles are ever wary of being blindsided by any reincarnation of the same old system.

As stated earlier, the Church would be well served to refocus its efforts on contributing to Poland’s civil society. Although its transformation is considered a success story among former Soviet bloc countries, Poland still suffers economically as its transition to a free-market system continues. Rural Poles operating tiny, inefficient farms that were never collectivized under communism will struggle for years as Poland integrates its agricultural system with that of its European Union partners. Despite an unprecedented increase in commercial building construction in Poland’s metropolitan areas, many urban Poles have difficulty finding good jobs, both because of job shortages and inadequate preparation for the new job market. The country’s unemployment rate remained in the double digits throughout the period under study. In this environment of uncertainty, the Church can once again serve as the country’s conscience and keeper of
the Polish heritage. During the period under study, the Church began this process, as it began to limit its direct engagement with politics, but it still has a long way to go.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

This study set out to answer four basic questions:

5. What was the aim of the Polish Catholic Church in forming its electronic media institutions?

6. To what extent is the operation of these media organs a result of Pope John Paul II’s direct intervention with members of the Polish Catholic Church?

7. How did the actions taken by the Church in forming electronic media institutions work in concert with the political and social goals of the Church during the same period?

8. To what extent are the Catholic media properties in Poland contributing to: (a) the maintenance of the Polish identity; (b) social acculturation; (c) the reinforcement of the Church’s philosophical and/or political beliefs; (d) the reinforcement of denominational beliefs; (e) the creation of a civil society; and (f) the promotion of the normative organization of the congregation in the changing Polish society?

Addressing the Research Questions

What was the aim of the Polish Catholic Church in forming its electronic media institutions?

Since the technological introduction of the mass media, the Catholic Church as an institution has recognized the media’s ability to influence public opinion in a uniquely powerful way. Through various encyclicals the Church has promoted the use of the mass media to evangelize and educate Catholics on the Church’s tenets. In the case of Poland, the Church put into place these doctrinal recommendations in hopes of maintaining its position in the new Polish public sphere.
To what extent is the operation of these media organs a result of Pope John Paul II’s direct intervention with members of the Polish Catholic Church?

The Polish Church had been isolated from Rome under communism, during Primate Wyszyński’s time in office. When Pope John Paul II was installed, the Polish pontiff worked to reassert Vatican influence in Poland. In Catholicism, the Pope is the embodiment of the Church and therefore has the ability to calibrate the Church’s degree of involvement in, or disengagement from, the global public discourse. In this way, Pope John Paul II - always a very political person - has involved the Church more in international politics than many of his predecessors. As a young man in Poland, the Pope mastered his ability to use the media to further his political ideas - in the clandestine art communities that existed under communism. Later, as a bishop in Kraków, Wojtyła again turned to the mass media as a political vehicle by contributing columns to the liberal newspaper Tygodnik Powszechny. His writings, while evangelizing for the Church, also advocated ideals supporting human rights and Vatican II initiatives.

After the transition, Pope John Paul II spearheaded the modernization of Poland’s religious media directly by convening synods to address how the Polish Church could use its existing media properties to educate, evangelize and influence Polish culture as well as how to acquire new media properties from the State. Through its good relations with the new government, the Church was able to capitalize on promises made by the communist regime in its dying days and gained access to many new media tools.

How did the actions taken by the Church in forming electronic media institutions work in concert with the political and social goals of the Church during the same period?
As mentioned above, the Church’s electronic media properties fit well with its evangelization goals for socialization. However, the Church’s political plan, especially in the initial years after the transition, was too ambitious in the minds of many Poles and even the Vatican, negatively impacting the Church’s reputation as a champion of the Polish people. Add to that the political infighting and resulting fragmentation that occurred within the Polish Episcopate as a result of the Church’s adoption of Vatican II principles, and a picture of a Polish Church becomes apparent.

The Church as an institution, however, remains a closed organization making it difficult to glean what is going on internally. The Church’s electronic media properties, therefore serve as excellent windows to the changes that occurred within the Church. This fragmentation mentioned above is evidenced in the varying religious orders that run the Church’s media properties; they tinge their stations’ operations and programming fare with their ideological slant.

To what extent are the Catholic media properties in Poland contributing to: (a) the maintenance of the Polish identity; (b) social acculturation; (c) the reinforcement of the Church’s philosophical and/or political beliefs; (d) the reinforcement of denominational beliefs; (e) the creation of a civil society; and (f) the promotion of the normative organization of the congregation in the changing Polish society?

(a) Maintenance of the Polish identity and (b) social acculturation

Poland’s social transition has upended the country’s traditional national identity – converting a society that reinforced group mores and religiosity to one that rewards individual success and secular thought. The Church’s electronic media properties, by narrowcasting to specific audiences, accept and thereby reinforce this new Polish identity
in some of their media properties – like the Radio Plus and TV Puls stations, while railing against that very culture in others – as in the case of Radio Maryja.

The Radio Plus Network’s commercial hit radio-type station reinforces today’s secular society. There is little talk of religion but plenty of American and European music and news. American consultants contribute to Poland’s “westernization” by formatting the station with an American-style sound. Young Poles seem to find this “soft selling” of religiosity palatable, and the Church seems willing to tone down its proselytizing in order to reach the new generation.

In the television market, TV Puls’s TV Niepokalanów featured Christian-concept programming but also with little overt evangelization. TV Niepokalanów broadcasts Western-produced programs limiting its socialization uses in Poland. However, TV Niepokalanów never became successful enough in the time period under study to serve its real purpose, to underwrite an additional channel, Telewizja Familyjna, which was intended to be the quintessential Catholic channel with Masses and religious programming.

At the other end of the spectrum, during the period under study, Radio Maryja appears to reinforce the collectivist Polish identity of yesterday. Not surprisingly, its listeners are among Poland’s disenfranchised and marginalized population. In this way, Radio Maryja hampers its listeners’ acculturation to the new social realities in their country.

Nonetheless, in a way the Church is reinforcing the new pluralist Polish identity by offering a diverse selection of media properties targeting the multitude of voices that exist in today’s Poland.
(c) Reinforcement of the Church’s philosophical and/or political beliefs and (d) the reinforcement of denominational beliefs;

The fall of communism eliminated one of the most important roles the Church played in Poland in the minds of Poles – the role of facilitator for the anticommunists. Without a communist presence, the Church had to find a new role for itself. As discussed in depth in previous chapters, during the period under study, the Church appeared to have missed an opportunity to reinforce its philosophical tenets and denominational beliefs when it chose to commercialize some of its media products and seek Western advisors and investors. In addition, the Church’s political influence waned after it failed to unify its political coalition of disparate Catholic organizations. The Church’s lagging political influence in Poland and declining attendance at masses necessitated a shift toward delivering the Church’s message via its media properties. However, because the Church’s various media properties were given to various religious orders to manage seemingly without a coordinated plan, each media property tended to reinforce the ideological beliefs of the religious sect that managed the channel instead of communicating a unified purpose.

(e) The creation of a civil society; and (f) the promotion of the normative organization of the congregation in the changing Polish society

For many rural Poles, the Catholic Church has long been the center of their social and spiritual lives and still serves, to a great degree, as society’s moral center. Other Poles, however, had less need for the Church after communism ended. During communism, the Church helped develop a civil society that assisted Poles when the communist system would not. During the period under study, the Church chose to directly join the political fray, in a sense becoming no different than any other political
party. Through its work with Caritas, the Church’s charitable arm that provides humanitarian assistance during troubling times, the Church was able to win back some of that respect. Nonetheless, many Poles now view the Church more jadedly, believing that after the transition, the Church put its own political agenda over the social plight of the Poles by, for example, pursuing the legal return of land the communists took from the Church while ignoring other land issues and seeking the inclusion of Christian values provisions in Poland’s post-transition broadcast law.

Through their very existence, the Church’s media properties contribute to Poland’s civil society and its normative structure through their journalistic work. For example, the Catholic Information Agency (KAI), the Church run wire service, keeps checks on the Polish government through its news coverage. As one of only a few wire services in the country, KAI plays a very important role as part of the fifth estate and is well respected. In addition, although Radio Maryja is vilified by some in the Episcopate, there is little argument that Radio Maryja addresses the everyday needs of its listeners, keeping those needs in the forefront of Polish society, and thus impacting the country’s civil society.

**Study Limitations**

This study has four main limitations: the limited scope of the study, both in terms of its time frame and focus, the researcher’s non-native affiliation with the country under study, the language barrier between researcher and interview subjects, and the study’s limited ability to extrapolate across cultures.

This study, like most, is by no means exhaustive. In fact, in many ways, this study only begins to scratch the surface of a very large and complex issue. However,
since little research has been conducted on the impact that a large and dominant national institution, like the Polish Catholic Church and its mass media properties, has had on a society in transition, this small step in the overall body of literature is a good start. It is hoped that this work will pique the heuristic nature of other researchers, and further studies will be conducted to assess media owners’ impact on social systems. This study is not a content analysis of the Church’s media properties. Also, this study does not include any kind of audience analysis to measure how many people use the Church’s various media properties. Instead, this study attempts to gain insight into the inner workings of a relatively closed social institution – the Polish Catholic Church – by looking at how its media properties are run.

This study is an attempt by a non-Pole to understand the subtle nuances of the Polish culture. In and of itself, this is a difficult proposition. Analyzing the data requires the researcher to don a different pair of cultural glasses in order to understand the events that took place. The researcher lived in Poland during part of the years under study (1994-1996). However, living in a culture as a non-native Pole for a relatively brief period of time is vastly different than the experience of a Pole who has lived in Poland during both communism and the transitional years after communism, and whose cultural experience provides understanding and context. Ethnographic researchers claim that outsiders can provide unique perspectives and a fresh view of a culture that natives cannot; this study was conducted using that rationale.

The language barrier presented problems in conducting this study. The researcher used professional interpreters when conducting research. However, the simultaneous translation during face-to-face interviews slowed the information gathering and the
resulting lag time compromised the effectiveness of the interview. However, the ability to follow up on information gathered during the interview process helped to ensure the quality of information collected. Some key personnel were not available for interviews; specifically no one from the staff of Radio Maryja would agree to meet.

The narrow focus of this study not only makes it difficult to generalize across cultures, it makes it difficult to generalize across Polish media enterprises. The Polish Catholic Church holds a unique position in Poland since it enjoyed a close social link with the country’s national identity, was afforded a “head start” of sorts through its mass media negotiations with the communists, was granted special privileges by the first democratic administration elected to office, and was heavily supported early by outside financiers (in particular, the international Catholic Church). In this way, the Church’s media situation can be considered a “best case scenario” when discussing the actions of other media owners, in general, and other religious media owners, specifically.

**Research Implications and Areas for Further Research**

Transitional research studies often qualify that although the developments that occur in one transitional country may be unique to that country, looking for general trends can be both informative and significant.

This study spotlights how a seemingly intractable and powerful social institution - the Polish Catholic Church - adapted to conform to the social changes that took place in Poland as the country revamped its social, political and economic systems from a closed communist state to a free and democratic nation. It further assesses how these changes were reflected in that institution’s external communication to the Polish population via its mass media properties. Although it may be difficult to draw exact parallels to other
countries and other media systems, comparing the actions of large institutions in similar situations could be fruitful and beneficial to mass media’s overall body of literature.

The impact religion and religious institutions have on a country’s media system is an important yet relatively untapped area for study. The information learned from this study may be useful to researchers investigating contemporary Church-State and religion-press relationships in unstable regions like the Middle East. For example, the study presented here can assist researchers investigating the internal debate among Iranian clerics as to whether the clergy’s role in politics and the mass media in that country are somehow corrupting Islam.

Another application to this study might be to compare Poland and Iran in a historical context. For example, comparing the Catholic Church’s unsuccessful attempt at establishing itself as a political player in a transitional democratic Poland using its mass media properties, with the Ayatollah Khomeini and his clerical circle’s successful use of media to establish and maintain its political power base in Iran to overthrow the Shah and establish an Islamic state. The comparison between these two powerful religious institutions that vied for political power from a secular entity with different results would be an important contribution to mass communication research.

This study addresses topics that are making the daily headlines: the role of religion in society and the role of religion in the media. As the Iraqi people consider the type of political system their country will have after the ouster of Saddam Hussein, it is clear that Iraq’s eventual mass media system will reflect their decisions. In a country with an Islamic tradition, Muslim clerics will likely play a large role in guiding the Iraqi people in the country’s rebuilding. Once the political system is established, the mass
media’s role within that political system will begin a metamorphosis. This study may not be able to serve as a roadmap to those changes, but it could assist those involved in the country’s rebuilding by shedding light on what happens when powerful social institutions build their own media prism to filter information for mass consumption.
APPENDIX A

CATHOLIC MEDIA PROPERTIES

Catholic Television

Telewizja Niepokalanów:
Location: Warsaw
Reach: Regional
Personnel:
  Management: Clergy
  Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding: Advertising
Content: Church News; Evangelization programs and reports; local programming, films on Biblical Fables.
Launch Date: 2001
Web site: www.tn2.com.pl

Telewizja Trwam (Television equivalent of Radio Maryja)
Location: Torun
Reach: Global (via Satellite)
Personnel:
  Management: Clergy
  Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding: Church and Private Donations
Content: Church news; religious education;
Launch Date: 2003
Website: www.radiomaryja.pl/trwam2.htm

Catholic Radio

Radio Ave Maria
Location: Jarosław
Reach: Local
Personnel:
  Management: Clergy
  Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding: Church
Content: Church news, catechism, music and audience call-in
Launch Date: 1993
Website: Not available
Radio eM (107.6 FM)
Location: Katowice
Reach: Regional
Personnel:
  Management: Not available
  Staff: Not available
Funding: Church and advertisements
Content: Church news; international/national/regional news; culture and sports information
Launch Date: Not available
Website: www.radioem.pl/

Radio Fara
Location: Krosno
Reach: Local
Personnel:
  Management: Clergy
  Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding: Church
Content: Catholic programming; Diocesan information
Launch Date: 1997
Website: www.radifara.przemysl.opoka.org.pl

Radio Fiat (94.7 FM)
Location: Częstochowa
Reach: Local
Personnel:
  Management: Laity
  Staff: Laity
Funding: Church
Content: General interest programming for older and middle-aged people; evangelization and catechism; religious music
Launch Date: 1991
Website: www.radiofiat.com.pl

Radio Jasna Góra
Location: Częstochowa
Reach: Regional
Personnel:
  Management: Clergy
  Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding: Church
Content: General religious programming
Launch Date: 1995
Website: www.atm.com.pl~sepol/14.htm
Radio Józef (96.5 FM)
Location: Warsaw
Reach: Local
Personnel:
  Management: Clergy
  Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding: Church
Content: Evangelization and catechism
Launch Date: Not available
Website: www.sielskiefale.pl/sielski.php?fra=1&men=1&b=0

Radio Katolickie Diecezji Kaliskiej
Location: Kalisz
Reach: Local
Personnel:
  Management: Not available
  Staff: Not available
Funding: Church
Content: General Catholic programming
Launch Date: 1994
Website: Not available

Radio Maryja
Location: Łomża, Olsztyn, Stalowa Wola, Suwałki, Toruń, Zamość
Reach: International
Personnel:
  Management: Clergy
  Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding: Private Donations (Family of Radio Maryja)
Content: Evangelization, catechism, audience call-in, religious news, public affairs programming
Launch Date: 1991
Website: www.radiomaryja.pl

Radio Nadzieja (103.6 FM)
Location: Łomża
Reach: Local
Personnel:
  Management: Not available
  Staff: Not available
Funding: Church and Private Donations
Content: Church news and information
Launch Date: Not available
Website: Not available
Radio Niepokalanów (102.7 FM)
Location: Teresin
Reach: Local
Personnel:
  Management: Clergy
  Staff: Laity
Funding: Church
Content: Church news, international/national/regional/sports news; broadcasts about predominant local heroes, family, and church culture; programs for children, the young and sick; religious music and live concerts
Launch Date: 1995
Website: http://www.rn.com.pl/

Radio Plus
Reach: National
Personnel:
  Management: Clergy
  Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding: Advertisements
Content: General information; varied musical programming; general religious messages
Launch Date: 1994
Website: Not available

Radio Podlasie (101 FM)
Location: Siedlce
Reach: Local
Personnel:
  Management: Clergy
  Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding:
Content: Church news, local/diocesan information; evangelization, catechism, religious music
Launch Date: 1992
Website: www.tnet.pl/radiopodlasie
Radio Poznań
Location: Poznań
Reach: Local
Personnel:
  Management: Clergy
  Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding: Church
Content: Information on religion, society and culture; Programming on important information about local diocese; 80% of programming intended for adult listeners, 20% for young listeners
Launch Date: 1995
Website:  www.archpoznan.org.pl/radio/home.htm

Radio Quo Vadis? (92.4 FM)
Location: Pasłęka
Reach: Local
Personnel:
  Management: Clergy
  Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding: Church
Content: Local and church news
Launch Date: 1994
Website:  www.kki.net.pl/quovadis

Radio Radomskie
Location: Radom
Reach: Local
Personnel:
  Management: Laity
  Staff: Laity
Funding: Church
Content: Programming focuses on evangelization, church information, and religious music
Launch Date: 1993
Website:  www.free.polbox.pl/r/radave

Radio Rodzina (92 FM)
Location: Wrocław
Reach: Local
Personnel:
  Management: Clergy
  Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding: Church
Content: Diocesan news and information; general church news, catechism
Launch Date: 1994
Website:  http://www.radiorodzina.wroc.pl/
Radio Św. Maksymilian
Location: Konin
Reach: Local
Personnel:
Management: Clergy
Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding: Church
Content: General Catholic programming
Launch Date: 1998
Website: [www.atm.com.pl~sepol/31.htm](http://www.atm.com.pl~sepol/31.htm)

Radio VIA (103.8 FM)
Location: Krasne
Reach: Local
Personnel:
Management: Laity
Staff: Laity
Funding: Church
Content: Religious education, church information, and religious interviews
Launch Date: 1994
Website: [www.intertele.pl](http://www.intertele.pl)

Radio Warszawa Praga (106.2 FM)
Location: Warsaw/Praga
Reach: Local
Personnel:
Management: Clergy
Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding: Church
Content: General religious programming
Launch Date: Not available
Website: [www.radiowarszawapraga.pl/](http://www.radiowarszawapraga.pl/)

Radio Zamość 90.1 FM
Information not available
Newspapers and Magazines

Dominik
Type: Newspaper
Location: Kraków
Reach: National
Frequency: Weekly
Personnel:
  Management: Laity
  Staff: Laity
Funding: Not available
Content: Polish religious news for children; information on travel; general interest interviews
Circulation: 20,000
Website: Not available

Droga
Type: Newspaper for young people
Location: Kraków
Reach: National
Frequency: Weekly
Personnel:
  Management: Laity
  Staff: Laity
Funding: Advertisements
Content: Religious illustrations; discussions of everyday problems of young people; evangelization and catechism
Circulation: 27,000
Website: www.droga.com.pl

Gość Niedzielny
Location: Katowice
Reach: National
Frequency: Weekly
Personnel:
  Management: Clergy
  Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding: Church
Content: General religious news, information about Polish and international church activities, catechism and reports on social problems
Circulation: 176,700
Website: www.goscniedzielny.pl

Jasna Góra
Type: Magazine
Location: Częstochowa
Reach: National
Frequency: Monthly
Personnel:
  Management: Clergy
  Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding: Not available
Content: Evangelization, catechism and information about Mary of Jasna Góra
Circulation: 6,000
Website: Not available

Mały Gość Niedzielny
Type: Magazine
Location: Katowice
Reach: National
Frequency: Monthly
Personnel:
  Management: Clergy
  Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding: Church
Content: Magazine that teaches Christian morals to school children; catechism
Circulation: 120,000
Website: Not available

Nasza Arka
Type: Magazine
Location: Legionowo
Reach: Local
Frequency: Not available
Personnel:
  Management: Laity
  Staff: Laity
Funding: Not available
Content: Local parish news and information
Circulation: 1,000
Website: Not available

Nasz Dziennik
Location: Warsaw
Reach: National
Frequency: Daily
Personnel:
  Management: Laity
  Staff: Laity
Funding: Advertising
Content: General news, information, and public affairs with Catholic orientation; daily information about the Catholic Church
Circulation: 178,330
Niedziela
Location: Częstochowa
Reach: National
Frequency: Weekly
Personnel:
  Management: Clergy
  Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding: Advertising
Content: Covers pastoral work of the church in Poland; catechism; promotes traditional Polish culture, Polish Catholicism, and Christian values. Features articles on assisting children and the elderly, theology, ethics, and family values
Circulation: 285,000
Website: www.niedziela.pl

Tygodnik Powszechny
Type: Newspaper
Location: Kraków
Reach: National
Frequency: Weekly
Personnel:
  Management: Clergy
  Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding: Advertisements
Content: Covers general news, culture and church activity
Circulation: 42,000
Website: www.tygodnik.com.pl

Catholic Internet Sites
Alleluja.pl
Information not available

Bosko.pl
Information not available

Katolik.pl
Location: Kraków
Personnel:
  Management: Not available
  Staff: Not available
Funding: Church and advertisements
Content: Internet portal for religious news, discussions, and fellowship
Niebieska Strona
Information not available

Pascha.org.pl
Location: Not available
Personnel:
  Management: Not available
  Staff: Not available
Funding: Church
Content: Catechism, liturgy, religious book lists, discussion
Launch Date: Not available
Number of users: Not available
Website: http://pascha.org.pl/

Opoka
Location: Warsaw
Personnel:
  Management: Clergy
  Staff: Religious and Laity
Funding: Church
Content: Free Internet Portal; computer, programming and business information; church news; general news (international/national/regional)
Launch Date: Not available
Number of users: 7000
Website: www.opoka.org.pl
GLOSSARY

**Anointing of the Sick (also known as Extreme Unction)** - A sacrament of the New Law instituted by Christ to give spiritual aid and comfort and perfect spiritual health, including, if need be, the remission of sins, and also, conditionally, to restore bodily health, to Christians who are seriously ill. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Apostolic See** - The Apostolic See is the seat of authority in the Roman Church, continuing the Apostolic functions of Peter, the chief of the Apostles. Heresy and barbarian violence swept away all the particular Churches which could lay claim to an Apostolic see, until Rome alone remained; to Rome, therefore, the term applies as a proper name. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Apparatchik** – A Russian colloquial term for a full-time, professional functionary of the Communist Party, or government i.e., a member of the governmental or party "apparat" (apparatus) that held any position of bureaucratic or political responsibility, with the exception of the higher ranks of management. (http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Apparatchik)

**Archbishop (Metropolitan)** - A bishop who governs a diocese strictly his own, while he presides at the same time over the bishops of a well-defined district composed of simple dioceses but not of provinces. Hence none of these subordinate bishops rule over others. These bishops are called the suffragans or comprovincials. The archbishop's own diocese is the archdiocese. The several dioceses of the district form the archiepiscopal, or metropolit an, province. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Atheism** - Atheism is that system of thought which is formally opposed to theism. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Authoritarianism** – A system of rule in which power does not depend on popular legitimacy but rather on the coercive force of the political authorities. Hence there are few personal and group freedoms. It is also characterized by near absolute power in the executive branch, and few if any legislative and judicial controls (DeBardeleben, 1997, p. 271).

**Balcerowicz Plan (also referred to as “Shock Therapy”)** – Named for Polish Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, a variant of economic market reform employed first in Poland after 1989 which involves the state simultaneously imposing a wide range of radical economic changes, with the purpose of “shocking” the economy into a new mode of operation. Shock therapy can be contrasted with a more gradual approach to market reform (DeBardeleben, 1997, p. 277).

**Baptism** – The first of the Seven Sacraments. It is the sacramental washing by which the soul is cleansed from sin at the same time that water is poured upon the body. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)
**Bishop** - The title of an ecclesiastical dignitary who possesses the fullness of the priesthood to rule a diocese as its chief pastor, in due submission to the primacy of the pope. In the hierarchy of order they possess powers superior to those of priests and deacons; in the hierarchy of jurisdiction, by Christ's will, they are appointed for the government of one portion of the faithful of the Church, under the direction and authority of the sovereign pontiff, who can determine and restrain their powers, but, not annihilate them. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Canon Law** - Canon law is the body of laws and regulations made by or adopted by ecclesiastical authority, for the government of the Christian organization and its members. The word adopted is here used to point out the fact that there are certain elements in canon law borrowed by the Church from civil law or from the writings of private individuals, who as such had no authority in ecclesiastical society. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Capitalism** – An economic system in which productive assets (capital) are privately owned, rather than owned by the state, and in which resources are allocated primarily on the basis of supply and demand, that is, market competition. In a capitalist system, production is carried on for profit, that is, owners of capital make investment decisions on the basis of what they judge will bring them the highest profits (DeBardeleben, 1997, p. 271).

**Cardinal** - A dignitary of the Roman Church and counselor of the pope. It is the duty of the cardinals to assist the pope at the chief liturgical services; also to counsel him and aid in the government of the Church. After the death of the pope, it is the responsibility of the congregation of all Cardinals (called the College of Cardinals) to elect the next pope by ballot. The pope is a cardinal’s only judge, and the pope alone can depose a cardinal. The honorary rights of the cardinals are numerous. They come immediately after the pope, and precede all other ecclesiastical dignitaries. As Roman princes they follow immediately the reigning sovereign, and rank with the prince of reigning houses. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Catholic Church** - See ‘Catholicism.’

**Catholicism** – The doctrine, faith, practice, and organization of a Catholic church, especially of the Roman Catholic Church (Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1988, p. 222).


**Charter 77** – The document signed in 1977 by a group of Czechoslovak intellectuals (including Vaclav Havel) that called for greater respect for human rights and for the fundamental freedoms provided for in the Helsinki Accords; the term came to be used to refer to the human rights movement in Czechoslovakia, though Charter 77 was never a formal organization. (Mason, 1996, p. 213)
**Church of Rome (synonymous with Roman Catholic Church, Catholic Church)** – See ‘Catholicism.’

**Civil Society** – Refers to the space occupied by voluntary associations outside the state, for example, professional associations (lawyers, doctors, teachers), trade unions, student and women’s groups and religious bodies, and other voluntary association groups. The term is similar to society, although civil society implies a degree of organization absent from the more inclusive term society (DeBardeleben, 1997, p. 272).

**Clergy** - In the strict sense, any member of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Cleric** - A person who has been legitimately received into the ranks of the clergy. By clergy in the strict sense is meant the entire ecclesiastical hierarchy. Consequently a cleric is one who belongs in some sense to the hierarchy. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Collectivization** – A process undertaken in the Soviet Union under Stalin in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and in China under Mao in the 1950s, by which agricultural land was removed from private ownership and organized into large state and collective farms (DeBardeleben, 1997, p. 272).

**Communism** – A system of social organization based on the common ownership and coordination of production; according to Marxism (the theory of German philosopher Karl Marx, 1818-1883), communism is a culminating stage of history, following capitalism and socialism. In historical practice, leaders of China, the Soviet Union, and other states who have proclaimed themselves seeking to achieve communism have ruled through a single party, the communist party, which has controlled the state and society in an authoritarian manner, and have applied Marxism-Leninism to justify their rule (DeBardeleben, 1997, p. 272).

**Conference of Bishops** - An assembly of the Catholic hierarchy in a country who jointly exercise certain pastoral functions on behalf of that country’s Christian faithful. The purpose of the Conference is to promote the greater good which the Church offers humankind, especially through forms and programs of the apostolate fittingly adapted to the circumstances of time and place. This purpose is drawn from the universal law of the Church and applies to the Episcopal conferences which are established all over the world for the same purpose. Generally, its purposes under civil law are: To unify, coordinate, encourage, promote and carry on Catholic activities within a country; to organize and conduct religious, charitable and social welfare work; to aid in education; to care for its congregants; and generally to enter into and promote by education, publication and direction the objects of its being. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Confirmation** – One of the Seven Sacraments in which the Holy Ghost is given to those already baptized in order to make them “strong and perfect Christians” and “soldiers of Jesus Christ.” (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)
**Counter-Reformation** – A movement within the Catholic Church to answer the growth of the Protestant movement. The Catholic Church instituted its own series of reforms that balanced real reform with a strident and conservative reaction to Protestantism ([http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/REFORM/COUNTER.HTM](http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/REFORM/COUNTER.HTM)).

**Council** - Councils are legally convened assemblies of ecclesiastical dignitaries and theological experts for the purpose of discussing and regulating matters of church doctrine and discipline. The terms council and synod are synonymous. ([http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/](http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/))

**Democracy** – A political regime in which leaders are chosen by citizens in elections that are free and fair. For a regime to qualify as democratic, all citizens must possess the legal right to compete for office and vote, critics of the government must have the right to express their opposition, and the government must be accountable to the electorate, the parliament, and/or judicial authorities (DeBardeleben, 1997, p. 273).

**Demokratizatsiia** – The policy of democratization identified by former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987 as an essential component of *perestroika*. The policy was part of a gradual shift away from a single party approach toward an acceptance of liberal democratic reforms. Initially the policy embraced multicandidate elections for the soviets and a broadening of political competition within the Communist Party itself; after 1989 it involved acceptance of a multiparty system (DeBardeleben, 1997, p. 273).

**Diocese** - The territory administered by a bishop. ([http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/](http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/))

**Doctrine** - Taken in the sense of "the act of teaching" and "the knowledge imparted by teaching", this term is synonymous with Catechesis and Catechism. ([http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/](http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/))

**Ecumenical** – A furthering or intended to further the unity or unification of Christian churches (Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1988, p. 430).

**Encyclical** - An encyclical is nothing more than a circular letter. In modern times, usage has confined the term almost exclusively to certain papal documents which are explicitly addressed to the patriarchs, primates, archbishops, and bishops of the Catholic Church in communion with the Apostolic See. Encyclicals addressed to the bishops of the world are generally concerned with matters which affect the welfare of the Church at large. They condemn some prevalent form of error, point out dangers which threaten faith or morals, exhort the faithful to constancy, or prescribe remedies for evils foreseen or already existent. ([http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/](http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/))

**Episcopate** - A collective body of bishops ([http://www.brainydictionary.com/words/ep/episcopate161004.html](http://www.brainydictionary.com/words/ep/episcopate161004.html)).
European Union – A network of organizations whose aim is economic integration and political unity. It has a common membership and evolved from the European Community (EC) and the European Economic Community (EEC) first formed in 1957. (Mason, 1996, p. 214)

Evangelism – A preaching of, or zealous effort to spread, the gospel, as in revival meetings or by televised services; any zealous effort in propagandizing for a cause (Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1988, p. 470).

Extreme Unction – See ‘Anointing of the Sick.’

Flying University (also known as the Society for Academic Courses) – An organized attempt by Eastern bloc intellectuals to maintain an independent intellectual life, free from communist censorship and official restrictions. This society arranged, at various secret locations, lectures, seminars, and discussions in fields which in official academic teaching was distorted by the communist regime’s rhetoric and propaganda. This was especially the case in the social and human sciences. (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/7545)

Glasnost – Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of “openness” or “publicity,” which involved an easing of controls on the media, arts, and public discussion, leading to an outburst of public debate and criticism covering most aspects of Soviet history, culture, and policy (DeBardeleben, 1997, p. 273).

Glemp, Józef – The current Primate of Poland.

Hegemony – Predominant influence or control; for example, when exercised by one state over another or, within a country, by one group over the rest of society. (Mason, 1996, p. 215)

Helsinki Agreements (also Helsinki Accords) – A major diplomatic treaty signed by thirty-five nations in Helsinki in 1975 at the conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Besides numerous provisions promoting peace and security in Europe and East-West cooperation, the agreements also obliged all signatory states to promote human rights. (Mason, 1996, p. 215)

Holy Eucharist – One of the Seven Sacraments in which a wafer of bread (symbolically representing the body of Jesus Christ) is sometimes dipped in wine (symbolically representing Jesus Christ’s blood) and consumed in remembrance of Christ’s sacrifice for all Christians. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

Holy Orders – One of the Seven Sacraments in which a Catholic is ordained to the priesthood in the Catholic Church. Every baptized male can validly receive ordination. The bishops, who are the ministers of the sacrament ex officio, must inquire about the birth, person, age, title, faith, and moral character of the candidate. They must examine
whether he is born of Catholic parents, and is spiritually, intellectually, morally, and physically fit for the exercise of the ministry. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Holy Sacraments (also referred to as the Seven Sacraments)** - According to the teaching of the Catholic Church, accepted today by many Episcopalians, the sacraments of the Christian dispensation are not mere signs or rites of passage; they do not merely signify Divine grace, but in virtue of their Divine institution, they cause that grace in the souls of men. There are seven sacraments of the Catholic Church: Baptism, Confirmation, Holy Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Holy Orders, and Matrimony. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Holy See** - The term means, in a general sense, the actual seat (i.e. residence) of the supreme pastor of the Church (the pope), together with the various ecclesiastical authorities who constitute the central administration. In this canonical and diplomatic sense, the term is synonymous with "Apostolic See", "Holy Apostolic See", "Roman Church", "Roman Curia." (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**John Paul II, Pope (Karol Wojtyła)** - The current pope of the Catholic Church, 1978-Present.

**Inter Mirifica (synonymous with Vatican II and Second Vatican Council)** – Pope Paul VI’s papal decree that encouraged promotion of the Gospel using “the modern means of social communication” – the mass media.

**Laborem Exercens** – Pope John Paul II’s papal encyclical on Human Work issued September 14, 1981.

**Leo XIII, Pope (Gioacchino Vincenzo Raffaele Luigi)** – Pope of the Catholic Church, 1823-1829.

**Marxism-Leninism** – An ideology loosely derived from the theories of Karl Marx (1818-1883) about the superiority of socialism and communism over capitalism, and the theories of V.I. Lenin (1870-1924) about the need for a centralized political party needed to reach socialism and communism (DeBardeleben, 1997, p. 275).

**Metropolitan** – See ‘Archbishop.’

**Miranda Prorsus** – Pope Pius XII’s papal encyclical on mass communications issued September 8, 1957.

**Modus vivendi** – Literally, a temporary arrangement of affairs until disputed matters can be settled. Here it refers to the Catholic Church’s philosophy toward dealing with the communist regime in Poland.

**NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)** – A mutual defense alliance formed in 1949, originally aimed at blocking the threat of Soviet military aggression in Europe.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO membership is expanding and the mutual
defense focus has become more general in scope. (Mason, 1996, p. 215)

**Nationalism** – An ideology that seeks to create a nation-state for a particular community;
a group identity associated with membership in such a political community. Nationalists
often proclaim that their state and nation are superior to others (DeBardeleben, 1997, p.
275).

**Nomenklatura** – A system of personal selection utilized in the Soviet Union under which
the Communist Party maintained control over the appointment of important officials in
all spheres of social, economic, and political life. The terms is also used to describe
individuals chosen through this system and thus referred more broadly to the privileged

**Orthodox Church** - The technical name for the body of Christians who use the
Byzantine Rite, and who recognize the Patriarch of Constantinople as the head of the
church and not the Pope of Rome. Over time, the "Catholic" Church became the most
common name for the original Church in the West, and the "Orthodox" Church signified
that in the East. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Papacy** - This term is employed in an ecclesiastical and in an historical signification. In
the former of these uses it denotes the ecclesiastical system in which the pope as the
supreme head of the Catholic Church. In the latter, it signifies the papal influence viewed
as a political force in history. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Parish** - A parish is a portion of a diocese under the authority of a priest legitimately
appointed to secure in virtue of his office for the faithful dwelling therein, the helps of
religion. The faithful are called parishioners. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Parliament (Poland)** - The parliament, consisting of 460 members of the Sejm
(pronounced ‘Same’) and 100 members of the Senate, is elected in free and fair elections.
The current government structure consists of a council of ministers led by a Prime
Minister, typically chosen from a majority coalition in the bicameral legislature's lower
house. The president elected every 5 years is head of state. The judicial branch plays a
minor role in decision-making. (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2875.htm)

**Paul VI, Pope (Giovanni Battista Montini)** – Pope of the Catholic Church, 1963-1978.

**Penance** - Penance is one of the Seven Sacraments in which forgiveness of sins
committed after baptism is granted through the priest's absolution to those who with true
sorrow confess their sins and promise to repent. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Perestroika** – The policy of “restructuring” embarked upon by Mikhail Gorbachev when
he became head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985. Initially, the policy
emphasized decentralization of economic decision-making, increased enterprise
autonomy, expanded public discussion of policy issues, and a reduction in the
international isolation of the Soviet economy. Over time, however, restructuring took on a more political tone, including a commitment to *glasnost* and *demokratizatsiia* (DeBardeleben, 1997, p. 275).

**Plenary Synod** - A canonical term applied to various kinds of ecclesiastical councils. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Pontiff** – A synonym for ‘Pope.’

**Pope** - The Bishop of Rome, who, in virtue of his position as successor of St. Peter, is the chief pastor of the whole Church, the Vicar of Christ upon Earth. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Post-communism** – The period after the collapse of a communist party-state. Most post-communist states face the twin challenges of replacing a dictatorial regime with a democratic political system and central planning with a market-based economy (DeBardeleben, 1997, p. 276).

**Priest** - By his ordination a priest is invested with powers rather than with rights, the exercise of these powers (to celebrate Mass, remit sins, preach, administer the sacraments, direct and minister to the Christian people) being regulated by the common laws of the church, the jurisdiction of the bishop, and the office or charge of each priest. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Primate** – A bishop possessing superior authority, not only over the bishops of his own province, like the metropolitan, but over several provinces and metropolitan. This does not refer to Episcopal powers, which each bishop possesses fully, but to ecclesiastical jurisdiction and organization, especially in national churches. There is no uniformity in the institution, it has no place in common law; primatial rights are privileges. In their widest acception these rights would be: to convok and preside over national councils, to crown the sovereign, to hear appeals from the metropolitan and even Episcopal courts, and finally the honorary right of precedence. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Privatization** – The transfer or sale of state-owned enterprises to private companies or investors (DeBardeleben, 1997, p. 276).

**Proselytize** – To try to convert a person to one’s religion through persuasion and inducements. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Protestant Reformation** – See ‘Reformation.’

**Pulpit** - An elevated stand to preach on. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

**Reformation (synonymous with Protestant Reformation)** - The usual term for the religious movement which made its appearance in Western Europe in the sixteenth century, and which, while ostensibly aiming at an internal renewal of the Church, really
led to a great revolt against it, and an abandonment of the principal Christian beliefs.
(http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

*Rerum Novarum* – Pope Leo XIII’s papal encyclical on capital and labor issued May 15, 1891.

**Roman Catholic Church (synonymous with Universal Church)** - See ‘Catholicism.’

Samizdat – From the Russian words for “to publish on one’s own,” this refers to the illegal underground publications in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that proliferated during the 1970s. (Mason, 1996, p. 216)

Schism - In the language of theology and canon law, the rupture of ecclesiastical union and unity. (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/)

Second economy – Refers to the black market or unofficial private sector in the communist countries, which operated outside of the official state sector. (Mason, 1996, p. 216)

Second Vatican Council (here used interchangeably with ‘Vatican II’ and *Inter Mirifica*) – See ‘*Inter Mirifica.*’

Secret Bishop System - The practice of installing bishops without the approval of the pope. The main purpose was to safeguard pastoral care, even under conditions of chicanery and repression, and if necessary under illegality. The primary precondition was thus to secure the succession of bishops. Therefore the local chairman of episcopates above all had to be able to install bishops, if necessary without asking Rome and by secret installation. At the same time, they had to draw up a confidential list of successors who could assume their functions immediately – also secretly – in case the actual official was obstructed or arrested” (Stehle, 1981, p. 253).

Secular – Of or relating to worldly things as distinguished from things relating to church and religion (Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1988, p. 1212).

Sejm – The lower house in Poland’s National Assembly (the upper being the Senate), the country’s bicameral legislative body. There are 460 members of the Sejm. *(http://www.sejm.gov.pl/english/sejm/sejm.htm)*

Seven Sacraments – See ‘Holy Sacraments.’

“Shock Therapy” – See ‘Balcerowicz Plan.’

Socialism – In a socialist regime, the state plays a leading role in organizing the economy and most business firms are publicly owned. A socialist regime, unlike a communist party-state, may allow the private sector to play an important role in the economy and be committed to political pluralism. In *Marxism-Leninism*, socialism refers to an early stage in development of communism. Socialist regimes can be organized in a *democratic*
manner, in that those who control the state may be chosen according to democratic procedures. They may also be governed in an undemocratic manner, when a single party, not chosen in free competitive elections, controls the state and society (DeBardeleben, 1997, p. 277).

**Society** – The totality of private individuals, citizens, and groups within a country. Society is usually defined by distinguishing it from the state or political institutions (DeBardeleben, 1997, p. 277).

**Solidarity Trade Union** – The first independent trade union in the communist world. Created by a small group of workers in the shipyards along Poland’s Baltic Sea coast, this union, lead by Lech Wałęsa helped topple the communist regime in Poland through organized strikes and political negotiations (Mason, 1996).


**Stalinism** – The movement instituted by Soviet leader Josef Stalin from 1929-1953 that subjected Soviet society to major political, economic, and social upheavals. Stalinism revived the themes of personal dictatorship, a strong state structure, and appeals to Russian nationalism (DeBardeleben, 1997, p. 24).

**Synod** – See ‘Council’

**Totalitarianism** – A political system in which the state attempts to exercise total control over all aspects of public and private life, including the economy, culture, education, and social organizations, through an integrated system of ideological, economic, and political control. The terms has been applied both to communist part-states and fascist regimes as Nazi Germany.

**Universal Church** – See ‘Catholicism.’

**Vatican (including ‘Roman Curia’ and ‘Holy See’** - The name ‘Vatican’ comes from the ancient Roman name for the hill and land around it on which St. Peter’s Basilica, the Apostolic Palace, and the Vatican museums are built...The Roman Curia is the complex of offices, housed in or near the Vatican, that help the pope in governing the universal church. The term ‘see’ in Holy See (Santa Sedes) refers to ‘seat’ (as in the seat of government) or “diocese. (Reese, 1996. p. 5)

**Vatican II (here used interchangeably with ‘Second Vatican Council’ and Inter Mirifica** – See ‘Inter Mirifica.’
Wałęsa, Lech – Leader of the Solidarity Trade Union, the Solidarity Party, and the first Polish president

Wyszyński, Stefan Cardinal – Pope Pius XII made Wyszyński archbishop of Gniezno and Warsaw and primate of Poland in 1949 and then a cardinal in 1953. A fierce opponent of the Polish Stalinist government’s efforts to limit church influence, he was arrested and imprisoned (1953–56). In 1956, Wyszynski was restored to his functions by the new anti-Stalinist first secretary of the Communist party, Władysław Gomułka. A church-state agreement restoring religious education in state schools followed. Despite periodic setbacks, he subsequently enjoyed a considerable amount of personal and pastoral liberty. In 1962 he served as president of the Second Vatican Council. A charismatic leader, Wyszyński not only served as the country’s spiritual and moral compass during the communist regime, but often assumed the role of political foil to communist officials. (http://www.bartleby.com/65/wy/Wyszynsk.html)

Yalta Agreements – The provisions concerning the postwar order in Europe signed by Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Josef Stalin at a February 1945 summit meeting in the Soviet resort town of Yalta. Though they called for democratic governments in Eastern Europe, they also affirmed predominant Soviet influence in the region. (Mason, 1996, p. 217)
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