ABSTRACT

Title of Document: SOFT POWER OF INTERNATIONAL NEWS
                        MEDIA: AMERICAN AUDIENCES'
                        PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA'S COUNTRY
                        IMAGE MEDIATED BY TRUST IN NEWS

                        Yacong Yuan, Doctor of Philosophy, 2017

Directed By: Associate Professor, Ronald A. Yaros, Ph.D.,

                        Philip Merrill College of Journalism

This experimental study explores the concept of "soft power" in the context of international news management and concepts that may influence soft power, such as trust in news. Specifically, this study investigated how a news source (Chinese versus American) and the valence of a news story (positive versus negative news) affect an audience's perception of a country's image along with several dimensions. Theories on social categorization from psychology and image management theory from public relations were synthesized with branding and international politics in a cross-cultural communication context. Hypotheses predicted that positive images or "soft power" for a foreign country would be mediated by the audience's perceived

trust in news coverage. Results suggested that regardless of the source or valence of a news story, the aspects of China's image in the contexts of responsibility and leadership - were enhanced significantly by mere exposure to news about China. However, positive news about China did not always work in favor of the country's image. When comparing effects of source, negative news about China from a Chinese source enhanced Americans' perceived image of China as a socially responsible country while the identical news story presented with a U.S. news source had little effect. American participants also perceived negative news stories to be more objective (regardless of its source). Finally, American participants perceived the American news source as more accurate and objective as compared to when the identical news story was presented with a Chinese media source.

SOFT POWER OF INTERNATIONAL NEWS MEDIA: AMERICAN
AUDIENCES' PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA'S COUNTRY IMAGE
MEDIATED BY TRUST IN NEWS.

by
Yacong Yuan

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
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Advisory Committee:
Associate Professor Ronald A. Yaros, Chair
Professor Sarah Ann Oates
Professor Emerita Katherine McAdams
Associate Professor Ira Chinoy
Professor Michael R. Dougherty

Foreword

To the Friendship between China and U.S.:

"As iron sharpens iron, so one person sharpens another."

(Proverbs 27:17, NIV)

中美之谊：

"鐵磨鐵、磨出刀來．朋友相感、〔原文作磨朋友的臉〕也是如此。"

（箴言 27 章 17 节，新译本）

Dedication

To God the creator of all knowledge and all creatures in the Universe, to His Son Jesus Christ, who redeemed all our sin with His life and blood on the Holy Cross, and to the Holy Spirit who lives in our bodies and in our hearts to guide us towards the right from wrongs.

献给创造世界万有的神 － 上帝、引导我们分辨对错的圣洁的灵，和他的儿子耶稣基督－他曾献上自己的生命，在十字架上流尽自己的宝血，来赎免我们世人所犯下的一切罪过。

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I would also like to thank Prof. James Z. Gao for his insightful advice from a wide arrange of knowledge on soft power and the image of China in a cross-cultural communication context; Prof. Michael Dougherty for his advice on statistical analysis; Prof. Ira Chinoy for his advice on how to connect today's journalism challenges with historical lessons and for training me to be a great presenter; Prof. Kevin Klose for his generosity and patience in proof-reading my dissertation, and for

Thanks to mom and dad. Their love and trust has made me travel afar and abroad to break the limits inside of me and outside of my world.

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Thank you, Jesus, for saving my life and making me rise above my own weaknesses.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The term *soft power* has been broadly defined as the ability to attract others and to achieve goals through co-optive means by "shaping what others want" (Nye, 2004:7, Keohane and Nye, 1998; Nye, 1990; Nye, 2008). Scholars of international politics (Nye, 2004), organizational campaigns (Shell and Moussa, 2007), and interpersonal communication (Grant, 2013) have explored the concept of soft power since it was coined more than two decades ago by Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye.

Related to the application this study's focus on international news, some scholars have further refined the meaning of soft power to represent a country's ability to win favorable public opinions among its international constituencies (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle, 2014). This ability was detected in studies that explored how a nation's image was perceived by international audiences (Nye, 2008; Kurlantzick, 2007, 2016; Wang, 2008). Indeed, both precedent and subsequent research have found that a nation's image can be influenced and formed by strategic narratives and agenda setting in international news (Gultang & Ruge, 1965; Manheim & Albritton, 1983; Wanta, Golan & Lee, 2004; Entman, 2008; Miskimmon et al, 2014).

While the term *soft power* is not new to some fields such as marketing, the term has had limited operational explication to international journalism and the claim by some that soft power has become "a straightjacket for those trying to understand power and communication in international affairs" (Roselle, Miskimmon and O'Loughlin, 2014). Although a few journalism studies associated a nation's image

with the agenda of international news (Manheim and Albritton, 1983; Entman, 1991; Shoemaker and Riccio, 1991; Wanta, Golan and Lee, 2004), there are other unexplored dimensions of soft power that merit attention in a digital world with increasing amounts of - and exposure to - international news. Associating a country's soft power with only the "agenda" of news, for example, offers new opportunities to address a gap in what we know about the influences of international news on foreign audiences.

Specifically, previous journalism studies have not paid enough attention on at least three other dimensions that could arguably affect a nation's image as perceived by foreign audiences. These three dimensions include the source of the information (domestic or foreign), the valence of the information (positive versus negative framing) and an audience's perceived trust in the information based on its valence and source.

This study addresses the gap by experimentally testing how these unexplored dimensions might also play a significant role in the reception of international news by foreign audiences. As explicated in the following chapters, the first three of eight research questions seek answers about the effects of valence and/or source of international news (i.e. China) on the perceptions of domestic audiences' (i.e. Americans). The remaining five of the eight research questions focus on audiences' perceived trust in information depending on the valence and/or source of the information.

The concept of trust, in particular, is salient given the reported significant decline in the public's trust in legacy media during the 2016 U.S. Presidential

election. Since levels of trust in legacy media by American news consumers were very different, one can only speculate about the differences in perceived trust for news that originates in another country and is exposed to a foreign audience.

Trust in News and Soft Power – Old Questions in a New Context

The 2016 election was one of the most controversial in American journalism history. Public opinion among American citizens has never been so divided since the American civil war[1]. Half of the country supported the first mainstream female presidential candidate from a major party Hillary Clinton. The other half supported Donald Trump, a businessman and a self-made media-celebrity.

On the one hand, election coverage from mainstream or legacy media deviated greatly from the real public opinion[2], showing favoritism towards Hillary Clinton. For

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[1] Views on top ten policy issues are highly polarized between residents of Trump states and residents of Clinton states, see pre-election polling results summarized by the *Washinton Post* article below, and post-election polling results from Gallup below.
Achenbach, J. & Clement, S. (2016, July 16). America really is more divided than ever. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/america-really-is-more-divided-than-ever/2016/07/17/fbfebee6-49d8-11e6-90a8-fb84201e0645_story.html?utm_term=.96db2d72d90d
Tarrance, V. L. (January 11, 2017). The 'Divided States of America? *Gallup*. Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/201728/divided-states-america.aspx
[2] The discrepancy between public opinion and the news frame presented by the media is not a new phenomenon today. Robert Entman (2004)'s study on media framing of the nuclear freeze movement, military spending, and foreign aid reveals that news organizations do not necessarily represent public opinion. Source: Entman, R. (2004). *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy.* Chicago University Press: Chicago, IL.

instance, she has received favorable endorsements[3] from almost all major national

and regional print media in the U.S. Additionally, she has also received

comparatively positive coverage[4] in major cable television networks than her rival

candidate Donald Trump. Moreover, polling results[5] from mainstream media deviated

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[3] a. According to the census published on the 2016 Election Day at Neiman Lab, summarized by Pablo Boczkowski, a professor in the School of Communications at Northwestern University, "Hillary Clinton was endorsed by 229 dailies and 131 weeklies, including news organizations that historically have not been identified with either party and others clearly representing a conservative ideology normally linked to Republican candidates. By contrast, Trump received the endorsement of 9 dailies and 4 weeklies. That's a 27-to-1 difference." Quotes from Neiman Lab, November 8, 2016, *Has Election 2016 been a turning point for the influence of the news media?* by Pablo Boczkowski, Accessed from http://www.niemanlab.org/2016/11/has-election-2016-been-a-turning-point-for-the-influence-of-the-news-media/
 b. According to the lists accumulated by *Business Insider*, "While Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton has garnered the support of more than 240 editorial boards, her Republican rival Donald Trump has only received 19." Quotes from *Here are all the major newspapers that have endorsed Donald Trump for president* by Rebecca Harrington, November 7, 2016. Accessed from http://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trump-endorsements-newspaper-editorial-board-president-2016-10
c. Lists of major newspapers endorsed Hillary Clinton for President by Rebecca Harrington and Jeremy Berke, November 7, 2016. Accessed from http://www.businessinsider.com/hillary-clinton-endorsements-newspaper-editorial-board-president-2016-2016-9
[4] a. Quotes from *The Week*, October 18, 2016, *The election is not rigged against Trump. But the media is biased against the GOP* by Edward Morrissey. Accessed from http://theweek.com/articles/655596/election-not-rigged-against-trump-but-media-biased-against-gop
b. Tone of Clinton coverage are more positive than Trump coverage http://www.niemanlab.org/2016/11/has-election-2016-been-a-turning-point-for-the-influence-of-the-news-media/

[5] "On Tuesday morning, FiveThirtyEight's "polls-only" prediction model put the probability of Clinton winning the presidency at 71.4 per cent. And that figure was perhaps the most conservative one. The *Times*' Upshot model said Clinton had an eighty-five per cent chance of winning, the Huffington Post's figure was ninety-eight per cent, and the Princeton Election Consortium's estimate was ninety-nine per cent." Quotes from *Media Culpa? The Press and the Election Result* by John Cassidy,

vastly from the actual election results[6]. Until the last few days before the election date, predictions provided by mainstream media all indicated a dominant Hilary Clinton win[7]. Ironically, she ended up losing the support from nearly half of the American citizens[8]. Without audiences' trust, effect of positive news coverage on Hillary Clinton turned out to be futile.

On the other hand, this decay of trust in prestigious legacy news media has led the public to turn to alternative sources such as social media. For instance, many of the most-circulated news articles during the election season on Facebook turned out

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November 11, 2016. Accessed from http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/media-culpa-the-press-and-the-election-result

[6] Hillary Clinton won the majority of popular votes during the 2016 Presidential Election (65,844,610 votes, 48.1% vs. Trump 62,979,636 votes, 46.0%); Donald Trump won the Electoral College Votes (306 votes vs. Hillary 232 votes). Source from *New York Times*, Accessed on January 15, 2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/elections/results/president

[7] "On Tuesday morning, FiveThirtyEight's "polls-only" prediction model put the probability of Clinton winning the presidency at 71.4 per cent. And that figure was perhaps the most conservative one. The *Times*' Upshot model said Clinton had an eighty-five per cent chance of winning, the Huffington Post's figure was ninety-eight per cent, and the Princeton Election Consortium's estimate was ninety-nine per cent." Quotes from *Media Culpa? The Press and the Election Result* by John Cassidy, November 11, 2016. Accessed from http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/media-culpa-the-press-and-the-election-result

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to be fake news[9]. However, audience engagement in these fake stories such as share

outperformed the top election stories from 19 major news outlets combined[10]. Donald

Trump also has far more followers than Hilary Clinton on both Twitter and Facebook

[11]. Twitter has become his main battle base to engage his audiences and fight back the

mainstream narratives against him[12]. He became the 45th President of the United

States. There is no current consensus on whether or not, or to what extent those fake

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[9] *The Hoaxes, Fake News and Misinformation We Saw on Election Day.* Source from
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/us/politics/debunk-fake-news-election-day.html
This is what fake news actually looks like — we ranked 11 election stories that went viral on Facebook. Source from http://www.businessinsider.com/fake-presidential-election-news-viral-facebook-trump-clinton-2016-11/#11-sarah-palin-banned-muslims-from-entering-her-daughter-1

[10] This Analysis Shows How Fake Election News Stories Outperformed Real News On Facebook. https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook?utm_term=.rqJ2G5WM1#.bdqpkVOg9

[11] a. *Commander-In-Tweet: Trump's Social Media Use and Presidential Media Avoidance.* NPR. November 18, 2016.
http://www.npr.org/2016/11/18/502306687/commander-in-tweet-trumps-social-media-use-and-presidential-media-avoidance
b. *Trump: The Social Media President? CNN. October 26, 2015.*
http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/26/opinions/jones-trump-social-media/

[12] a. "Donald Trump's social media operation has clearly surpassed that of Hillary Clinton. As of late last week, Trump's Facebook page had accumulated 11.9 million likes; his Twitter account had 12.9 million followers. Clinton's numbers were 7.8 million and 10.1 million, respectively." Quotes from
http://www.niemanlab.org/2016/11/has-election-2016-been-a-turning-point-for-the-influence-of-the-news-media/
b. Trump cited picking up his growing legion of Twitter followers as a method of "fighting back' against stories he considers "inaccurate or bad". *Commander-In-Tweet: Trump's Social Media Use and Presidential Media Avoidance.*
http://www.npr.org/2016/11/18/502306687/commander-in-tweet-trumps-social-media-use-and-presidential-media-avoidance

news stories on social media have influenced the 2016 election result[13]. However, why the public put trust in them is worth investigation.

The rise of President Trump has posed a critical limitation on the power of any intended media effects relating to trust: with audiences' trust, even fake news has the potential to shift the public opinion; without trust, any intended media effects might turn out to be futile or counter-productive to suspicious audiences, regardless of the prestige of the media sources. It has also raised questions to the long-time studied and assumed effects of news framing, agenda-setting and priming on public opinion, which I will discuss later in this chapter. It seems a central element that mediates those effects of news is missing during the 2016 Clinton campaign and among those mainstream media coverage that once tried to back her up – the audience's trust. These phenomena suggest the study of audiences' trust in news and its effect on audiences' perception are important for today's journalism educators and media effect researchers.

Not only can trust in news affect how audiences view and participate in domestic civic engagement[14], but it also has the potential of influencing audiences'

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[13] a. Did fake news help elect Trump? Not likely, according to new research
https://www.poynter.org/2017/did-fake-news-help-elect-trump-not-likely-according-to-new-research/445724/
b. Social Media and Fake News in 2016 Election.
https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/fakenews.pdfs
c. Russian propaganda effort helped spread 'fake news' during election, experts say
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/russian-propaganda-effort-helped-spread-fake-news-during-election-experts-say/2016/11/24/793903b6-8a40-4ca9-b712-716af66098fe_story.html?utm_term=.fcabe776022f

[14] Jan Müller (2013) found lower level of audience trust in democratic societies, where the role of news media is to keep the public informed to guide their political

perception of foreign countries and related public affairs[15]. This question is highly

relevant to today's globalized communication context. Specifically, Chinese media

has been a growing force providing international news services in today's global

media landscape. The key to its pursuit of soft power to successfully reshape China's

country image lies in foreign audiences' trust in its media and news[16].

A Practical Problem: China's Soft Power Conundrum

Growing Hard Power but Stagnating Soft Power

In 2015, China produced $11.01 trillion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP),

making it the world's second largest economy (The World Bank, 2017). Despite its

increase in hard power through economic growth and domestic social development,

the symbolic power of China has not kept up. Wang concluded that China still

"doesn't command the appeal and respect of other nations among foreign publics"

based on analysis of the U.S. media coverage and public opinion polling questions

(Wang, 2011: 5). At the same time, global recognition of China as the leading global

economic power has risen from 20% in 2008 to 34% in 2013 (Pew, 2013). Nearly

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engagement; he also found higher level of audience trust in the news media in
authoritarian states, where the news media spread a shared ideology to legitimate the
regime in power. Source: Müller, J. (2013). *Mechanisms of Trust: News media in
democratic and authoritarian regimes*. Frankfurt, Germay: Campus Verlag.

[15] Russian propaganda effort helped spread 'fake news' during election, experts say
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/russian-propaganda-effort-
helped-spread-fake-news-during-election-experts-say/2016/11/24/793903b6-8a40-
4ca9-b712-716af66098fe_story.html?utm_term=.fcabe776022f
[16] Trust here refers to two aspects: trust in media source (e.g.: the *Guardian* is
trustworthier than a tabloid like the *Daily Mail*) and trust in individual stories
(journalistic assessment of content alone). Definition and measures of trust will be
discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

half of the people (49%) in countries outside China believe China will be the next

superpower (Pew, 2014a; Figure 1), and the majority of countries (53%) believe that

China's booming economy will benefit their own countries (Pew, 2014b). This

recognition of China's rising economic power, however, does not translate to the

global public opinion about China. In fact, international favorability towards China is

still relatively low (Pew, 2014a).

Figure 1: Global public opinion of the superpowers: China vs. US

World Sees China as Eventual Top Power, U.S. as Current Leading Economy

Which comes closer to your own view?

■ China will eventually replace/
has replaced U.S. as superpower
■ China will never replace U.S. as superpower

49%
34%
Global median

Today, which one of the following do you think is the world's leading economic power?

■ China   ■ U.S.

45%
29%
Global median

Note: Median percentages based on the 44 countries surveyed in 2014.
Source: Spring 2014 Global Attitudes survey. Q33 & Q34.
PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Source: Pew Research Center, *Balancing Power: U.S. vs China*, 2014a.

There also appears to be significant differences between how China perceives

itself from how the world perceives China (Wang, 2011: 5). China's self-perceived

image has been overwhelmingly favorable during the past decade, with an average of

95% favorability in the eyes of its own population (Pew, 2016a). At the same time,

comparing data from 38 countries, global favorability of China has been at 50%,

compared with 63% favorability of the U.S. by the countries polled (Pew, 2013).

Median favorability of China is also relatively low in most developed countries and

regions (Pew, 2013).

Figure 2. China Image: Global Favorable Opinion by Country (2016)

China Image

Opinion of China

Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of China?   Chart Map

2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 **2016** All **Favorable** Unfavorable

Percent responding **Favorable** (2016)

COUNTRY	2016	■ > 75% ■ 50-74% ■ 25-49% ■ < 25%
China	95%	
Greece	57%	
Australia	52%	
Netherlands	46%	
Canada	45%	
Hungary	45%	
Poland	37%	
Sweden	37%	
United Kingdom	37%	
United States	37%	
France	33%	
Italy	32%	
India	31%	
Germany	28%	
Spain	28%	
Japan	11%	

(Source: Pew Research Center: *Global Indicators Database*, 2016c)

As detailed in Figure 2, findings indicated 37% favorability of China among American respondents compared with 45% from respondents in Canada, 52% in Australia, and less than 40% among most European countries (Pew, 2016c). Figure 3 shows that while most people around the world foresee China as the future economic leader that will surpass the U.S.[17], global favorability towards China remains much lower than that of the U.S. (Pew, 2016d)

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[17] See Figure 1, 49% of global respondents see China will eventually replace the U.S. as superpower, compared with 39% see China will never surpass U.S. as superpower (Pew, 2014a).

Figure 3. U.S. Image: Global Favorable Opinion by Country (2016)

U.S. Image

Opinion of the United States

Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of the U.S.? Chart Map

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 **2016** All **Favorable** Unfavorable

Percent responding **Favorable** (2016)

COUNTRY	2016		> 75% ■ 50-74% ■ 25-49% ■ < 25%
United States	83%		
Poland	74%		
Italy	72%		
Japan	72%		
Sweden	69%		
Canada	65%		
France	63%		
Netherlands	63%		
Hungary	62%		
United Kingdom	61%		
Australia	60%		
Spain	59%		
Germany	57%		
India	56%		
China	50%		
Greece	38%		

Source: Pew Research Center: *Global Indicators Database*, 2016d

Particularly in the U.S., with whom China shares the most important and

growing economic ties[18], public opinion has shown a declining favorability towards

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[18] Figures from the United States Census Bureau show that China is U.S.' top trading partner (16.9% of total trade), exceeding Canada (14.8%) and Mexico (14.2%) as of January 2017. China is U.S.' exports third largest destination. Source: https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/toppartners.html Vice versa, figures from the World Bank show that U.S. is also China's top trading partner ($410.8 billion, 18% of total China exports) in 2015. Source: http://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/CHN

China, perhaps because of the growing trade deficit as U.S. imports from China far exceed its exports to China[19].

Other results from the Pew Research Center's *Global Attitudes and Trends Project* show that America's public opinion of China's image has been declining in recent years (Figure 1.2). In 2005, 43 percent of U.S. participants held a favorable opinion of China (results combined the responses of "very favorable" and "somewhat favorable"). Figure 1.2 shows that the percentage of favorable opinions toward China rose to about 50 percent between 2009 and 2011 (50% in 2009, 49% in 2010, and 51% in 2011), but then declined below 40 percent with 40% in 2012, 37 % in 2013, 35% in 2014, 38% in 2015, and 37% in 2016 (Pew, 2016). While China's exports to the U.S. continue to grow and outperform U.S. exports to China[20], China is becoming increasingly unpopular among U.S. audiences.

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[19] Historical figures also show a growing volume of both U.S. exports and imports with China over the past few years, but the U.S. import from China grows much faster than the U.S. export to China.
Source: 30 years of U.S. – China Trading in gif: https://howmuch.net/articles/this-gif-shows-how-china-trumps-us-on-trade
U.S. Foreign Trade in Goods with China (1985-2017):
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2016

[20] U.S. trade with China has grown from balance to an increasing deficit during the past three decades. In 1985, both countries exported roughly the same amount of goods ($3.9 billion) to each other. In 2015, U.S. exports to China totals $116.2 billion, almost 30 times of that in 1985. However, China's export to the U.S. totals $481.9 billion in the same year (in 2015), making a $365.7 trade imbalance for the U.S.
Source: 30 years of U.S. – China Trading in gif: https://howmuch.net/articles/this-gif-shows-how-china-trumps-us-on-trade
Figures from: U.S. Foreign Trade in Goods with China (1985-2017):
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2016

Figure 4. U.S. Public Opinion of China with Declining Favorability (2005-2016)

Opinion of China

Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of China?

Favorable   Unfavorable   View all countries on this question

Custom Group: Percent responding **Favorable** all years measured

COUNTRY	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
United States	43	52	42	39	50	49	51	40	37	35	38	37

Full question wording: Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of China.

Notes: Favorable combines "very favorable" and "somewhat favorable" responses. Unfavorable combines "very unfavorable" and "somewhat unfavorable."

Source: Pew Research Center: *Global Indicators Database*, 2016b

Meanwhile, figure 1.3 shows how the number of Americans holding an unfavorable opinion of China has been rising from under 40 percent between 2005 and 2012, to more than 50 percent in over a three year period: 52% in 2013, 55% in 2014, 54% in 2015 and 55 % in 2016 (Pew, 2016b). Between 2012 and 2015, more Americans expressed more negative than positive ratings for China (Pew, 2015). Before 2011, less than 40 percent of the Americans surveyed gave negative ratings to China (Pew, 2015). Since 2013, more than half of the Americans surveyed held a negative view towards China (Pew, 2015). In sum, it appears that despite the growing economic ties between China and the U.S., the image of China in America is still not enhancing the public's opinion. Winning the hearts and minds of U.S. audiences has become a soft power conundrum for China.

Figure 5. U.S. Public Held Increasing Unfavorable Opinion of China (2005 - 2016)

Opinion of China

Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of China?

Favorable **Unfavorable** View all countries on this question

Custom Group: Percent responding **Unfavorable** all years measured

COUNTRY	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
United States	35	29	39	42	38	36	36	40	52	55	54	55

Full question wording: Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of China.

Notes: Favorable combines "very favorable" and "somewhat favorable" responses. Unfavorable combines "very unfavorable" and "somewhat unfavorable."

Source: Pew Research Center: *Global Indicators Database*, 2016b

China's Soft Power Effort: Expansion of Global News Services

To address the uneven status between China's growing hard power and stagnating soft power, China started public diplomacy efforts to improve its country image, including expo events, cultural and educational exchange programs, regional dialogic forums, and international news services (Zhao, 2012). In addition, in an effort to change its negative image, China has been expanding its transnational news services especially for U.S. audiences. These expansions encompass different media platforms, including the broadcasting of television and radio news online and off, as well as printed news and news on social media. In April 2010, China Central Television (CCTV) launched its English services CCTV News in Beijing as an expansion of its general English service "Channel 9" started more than a decade ago in September 2000 (CCTV America, 2015). In February 2012, CCTV America launched its programming from Washington, DC, and expanded its services from

New York to Los Angeles plus more field coverage from correspondents in Central and South America (CCTV America, 2015). Today, CCTV News in English is broadcasted by both cable and satellite to nearly 30 million households reaching 75 million viewers in the U.S. (CCTV America, 2015).

One of the goals of this media expansion was "to provide alternative global coverage with a Chinese perspective" (CCTV America, 2015). China's national English-language newspaper, *China Daily*, launched its U.S. edition in 2009. Today, *China Daily USA* has offices in six major U.S. cities including Washington D.C., New York, San Francisco, Los Angles, Seattle and Houston (China Daily USA, 2015). The goals of *China Daily USA*, are "to keep North American readers current on developments in one of the world's fastest-growing countries and to facilitate constructive dialogue between China, the U.S., and the world at large" (China Daily USA, 2015).

CCTV America (now CGTN America[21]) and *China Daily USA* both have an active presence on social media in English[22]. China's overseas broadcast, *China*

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[21] CCTV America used to be very active on both Twitter and Facebook, but has currently removed all contents posted under their Facebook account and their Twitter account has ceased to disappear as of May 2, 2017. As of December 30, 2016, CCTV (China Central Television) has rebranded its sign, name and re-launched its foreign language channels to CGTN (China Global Television Network), with the English channel CGTN English as its flagship channel.
Source: CGTN.com. "About Us". https://www.cgtn.com/home/info/about_us.do
Frater, P. (January 4, 2017). CCTV International Channels Relaunched as CGTN. *Variety*. http://variety.com/2017/tv/asia/cctv-international-channels-relaunch-cgtn-1201952228/
@CGTNAmerica and @CGTNOfficial have been adapted and created as new Twitter accounts. @CGTNOfficial has 30.5K tweets and 2.64million followers as of May 9, 2017. @CGTNAmerica has 37.9K tweets and 232k followers as of May 9, 2017.
Source: https://twitter.com/cgtnamerica/status/815041780009738240

Radio International (CRI) was founded in 1941, and operates 27 foreign bureaus

(CRI, 2015a). CRI broadcasts in 37 languages including English 24 hours a day with

a total of 392 hours of programs daily (CRI, 2015b). In 1998, CRI's English service

was launched online at CRIENGLISH.com, and has since continued to improve its

online services (CRI, 2015c). The goal of CRI's broadcasting is "promoting

understanding and friendship between the people of China and people throughout the

world" (CRI, 2015b). Whether these media expansions and their news services have

made a significant difference in American audiences' understanding of China is

worth further investigation.

Given China's efforts to increase its outreach and its image globally, this

study seeks to examine American audiences' perceptions of China influenced by

news stories produced by Chinese global newsagents. Specifically, this study tests

effects that might be mediated by American audiences' trust in Chinese news sources.

These effects, if shown to exist, would demonstrate an example of the soft power of

news to shape a country's image in cross-cultural communication.

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https://twitter.com/cgtnamerica

[22] China Daily USA's Twitter account @ChinaDailyUSA has 707k followers and
46.1k tweets as of May 2, 2017. However, audience engagement such as likes or
retweets are relatively low. This is possibly because the leaders at *China Daily*
foresee the China Daily mobile app as the best channel to engage with audiences in
the long term, while Facebook and Twitter might lose its popularity in the next
decade (Lee, personal communication, 2016). Thus limited efforts were invested on
Facebook and Twitter to reduce the risk of losing audience base when they shift to a
different media platform such as snapchat.

The Knowledge Gap in Soft Power studies

The power of news media power is symbolic and persuasive with the potential to manipulate the audiences' minds to some extent (Klapper, 1960; McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Van Dijk, 1995). In particularly, works by Entman (1991; 2004; 2008) showed that facts framed in different ways in a news story can yield different political outcomes. His work (Entman, 2004, 2008) demonstrated how the power of news information could influence domestic public opinion that supported White House decisions on a number of foreign policies. Entman employed a cascading model[23] to illustrate how a frame preferred by the White House was extended to Congress and even foreign leaders (frames by words and image), and the general public (reflected in polls). Entman's work (2008) on mediated public diplomacy[24] further discussed the power of news frames in US media and global media to influence a targeted nation's media, news frame and their public opinion.

Other journalistic studies have demonstrated the power of second-level agenda setting[25] in international news on public perception of foreign nations by comparing content of foreign nations in national news network and survey results of national polling (Manheim and Albritton,1983; Perry, 1985, 1987; McNelly and

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[23] For more details of the cascading network activation model, see Figure 1.2 on pg. 10 in Entman (2004) and Figure 6 on pg. 98 in Entman (2009).

[24] Mediated public diplomacy refers to "targeted efforts using mass communication (including the internet) to increase support of a country's specific foreign policies among audiences beyond that country's borders." (Entman, 2008)

[25] First level of agenda setting refers to transmission of issue salience from media coverage to public concerns; second level of agenda-setting refers to transmission of actors' attributes in the news to public recall of the same attributes.

Izcaray,1986; Wanta, Golan and Lee, 2004). McNelly and Izcaray (1986) found positive correlations between news exposure and positive feelings and recognitions towards foreign countries. Semetko, Brzinski, Weaver and Willnat (1992) found attention to foreign affairs news is a stronger predictor of liking a foreign nation than simple exposure to general news.

Wanta, Golan and Lee (2004) also found that the salience and attributes of a foreign nation in the news influenced public perceptions and more recent studies reported similar results (Besova and Cooley, 2009; Zhang and Meadows, 2012). In the context of news about foreign nations in the U.S., negative news produced more negative impressions about the foreign country while positive news did not significantly affect U.S. public perceptions of the foreign country (Wanta, Golan and Lee, 2004; Besova and Cooley, 2009; Zhang and Meadows, 2012). On average, however, more news coverage increased perceptions of importance to U.S. interests (Wanta, Golan and Lee, 2004; Zhang and Meadows, 2012). These analyses on framing and agenda-setting effects suggest that it is difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle public opinion from media coverage. In fact, some have claimed that public opinion has become the only one superpower left on this planet (Anholt, 2010).

To further explicate the role of soft power in news and its effects on public perception, this study tests the effects of news on American audiences' perception of China's country image and experimentally explores whether perceptions are mediated by trust in news. This study also attempts to synthesize theoretical explorations of soft

power from marketing, psychology and public diplomacy with journalism to bridge the gaps in our understanding of the effects of soft power.

Current Understanding of Soft Power

A Non-traditional Form of Power: Soft Power vs. Hard Power

Power is a sociological concept with different debatable meanings. One common definition of power is the ability to control resources and others to make things happen, or the capacity to produce desired outcomes despite opposition from others. Max Weber (1987) defined power as:

> *"the ability of an individual or group to achieve their own goals or aims when others are trying to prevent them from realizing them"*

Developing from the Weberian definition of power, Nye equated hard power to material power, such as a country's military and economic competence (Nye, 1990). Hard power occurs by force or by coercion such as economic sanctions or even war (Nye, 1990).

Different from the Weberian definition of power that acts against other actors' will, Nye's research distinguished soft power as the ability to achieve goals by affecting others through co-optive means and attraction (Nye, 2008; Keohane and Nye, 1998; Nye, 1990). For instance, while the Vatican has less military power compared to some countries, a speech by the Pope could still motivate millions of Catholics around the world (Nye, 2004). In this case, the power of faith became the force, which could go well beyond material power.

In public diplomacy, soft power represents a country's ability to win favorable public opinions among its international constituencies (Miskimmon et al,

2014). It is a symbolic power backed up by a nation's hard power in the practice of public diplomacy. A nation can accumulate soft power through state-driven cultural and educational exchange programs such as Fulbright Scholarships and extended institutions to support the government, such as information services provided by the former U.S. Information Agency, or broadcasting services to influence oversea public opinions like the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe (Nye, 2004; Semetko, Kolmer, and Schatz, 2011). Other ways to accumulate soft power and gather international constituencies include productions of internationally-popular cultural products such as Japanese Animations, Hollywood Films (Nye, 2004), as well as commercial products associated with a nation image, such as French wine, Italian food, or German cars (Anholt, 2006, 2007). Much like practicing international public relations for a country's image, production of these programs and activities needs the financial and policy support from the state government projecting its soft power (Kunczik, 2002, 2003; Pamment, 2014). Image of nations projected in the news media, in turn, can influence a country's rating by financial agencies and foreign direct investment it can attract (Kunczik, 2002). Therefore, if soft power occurs, it could be measured in targeted audiences' perceptions.

Table 1: Hard Power vs. Soft Power

Type	Hard Power		Soft Power
	Military	Economic	
Resources	Military forces	Monetary forces	Values, cultures, policies, news
Behaviors	Coercion; threats; war; military alliances	Coercion; sanctions; inducements; payments; aids	Attraction; agenda-setting; co-operation
Accumulation Strategy[26]	Kept in reserve	Kept in reserve	Must be shared
Frequencies	Rarely used; only on special occasions	Rarely used; only on special occasions	Highly frequent; constant and continuous
Emotions induced	Fear, Anxiety	Fear, Anxiety	Hope, Admiration

(Sources: Gilboa, 2008; Nye, 2004; Roselle et al, 2014).

The Advantages of Soft Power

Soft power has at least one advantage over hard power. Soft power requires

fewer resources to build and less effort to maintain while greatly increasing a nation's

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[26] Accumulation strategy refers to ways to increase power in this context (Roselle et al, 2014). To accumulate hard power, a country needs to build up its economic scale and military capacity. Having the capacity to initiate a military alliance or start a trade war does not mean a country has to use those options to get what it wants. Keeping those powers in reserve will give this country more leverage in international negotiations. However, consuming those power reserve will reduce this leverage. For instance, every country wants to have the nuclear weapons to guard itself, but no country really wants to use it. The military parade on North Korea's national day and the joint military drills by US and South Korean army close to North Korean territory serve the same purpose: to show off the muscles of military power without actually going into war. Similarly, holding large amount of US treasuries gives China more negotiation power over China-US trade relationship, but selling off those treasuries will reduce China's leverage.
Accumulation strategy for soft power is different than that for hard power. A country must share its soft power products to increase its soft power (Roselle et al, 2014). For instance, a BBC documentary about the British royal family or a CCTV documentary about the giant panda must be shared with its foreign audiences to gain favorable opinion among international constituencies in targeted nations.

influence in international politics. Nye used leadership to explain this advantage (Nye, 2004: 6): "If a leader represents values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead." Misuse of hard power could damage a nation brand. For example, poverty resulted from economic sanctions and a disturbance of lives from war would not only cost human lives and money, but could also breed hatred toward a nation that initiated economic sanctions and military actions (Nye, 2004). On the contrary, a positive nation brand, if built successfully, can make a lasting impression in the minds of audiences (Anholt, 2007). So, while soft power has become widely popular concept among scholars in public policy, political science and political communications, a persistent knowledge gap remains in its effects on audiences' perception. This is the dimension to be empirically explored.

The Importance of Understanding the Audiences in Soft Power Studies

Our current understanding of soft power generally centers around the sender's perspective, namely, efforts to change a country's image through international public opinion (Heath and Coombs, 2005; Pahlavi, 2007; Pamment, 2014; Roselle, Miskimmon and O'Loughlin, 2014). Nye has been one of only a few scholars to recognize the importance of audience in tracing soft power: It is crucial to understand the target audience because the effects of soft power "depend heavily on acceptance by the receiving audiences" (Nye, 2004: p. 99). This argument also dates back to the encoding and decoding processes of communication studies in which a message receiver might interpret a message differently than what its sender intended (Hall, 1980). This proposes new challenges in a cross-cultural context of soft power. Just as a producer's delicacy may be an audience's poison, what is considered attractive in

one culture might be repulsive in another culture. Pamment (2014) called for "the analysis of why and how certain practices emerge in certain places and certain times". This is one argument why the study of soft power must be context-specific if we are to fully understand the cross-cultural communication processes.

Another myth that needs theoretical explication is what constructs the attractiveness of soft power. Nye (2004: x) defines the attractiveness of "a country's culture, political ideals, and policies" as a currency of soft power for a country. This definition is so broad it could include elements ranging from athletic tours to cultural exchange events to emergency foreign aid, and lacks a conceptual framework (Hall, 2010), which undermines its analytical value (Rønning, 2014). As we expand our understanding of soft power, we need to learn how to measure the effects of soft power, and whether a country's image portrayed in news influences the target audiences' perceptions of that nation. What does an audience perceive from cross-cultural communication messages? Which factors contribute to an audience's perception of another country's image? To what extent can positive coverage of a country influence its national image among the foreign audiences in a targeted nation?

Understanding of the Soft Power Audience

Questions asking whether soft power strategies work, and how these strategies work, remain unanswered. Most of the literature to date focused on soft power strategies, not its effects on audiences. Some scholars point out that public diplomacy begins with a search for an ideal practice model to reach the best outcome (Pahlavi, 2007; Pamment, 2014). That approach only analyzed goals a public diplomacy

campaign, but did not evaluate the actual outcome of a campaign based on empirical data (Heath and Coombs, 2005; Pahlavi, 2007; Pamment, 2014). Roselle et al summarized that the term has "lost its explanatory power" since analysis of this concept "overwhelmingly focus on … how to wield them, not how influence that does or does not take place." (Roselle, Miskimmon and O'Loughlin, 2014).

Further, original explications of soft power[27] require a better understanding of how audiences interpret messages (Nye, 2004: 111). The effects of soft power "depend heavily on acceptance by the receiving audiences" (Nye, 2004: p. 99). In short, advancing the understanding of soft power requires evaluation of its media effects on targeted audiences. Therefore, this exploration of the soft power of news focuses on audiences' perceptions of the same news produced by two different sources.

Dissertation Purpose:

This study seeks to expand our understanding of the soft power concept by explicating it within the realm of international news production and consumption. This study introduced the notion of trust of news as one of the key factors to influence audiences' perception of another country's image. In doing so, this study combines two approaches in the literature of soft power. The first is media effects of international news. The second is a country's image influenced by nation branding.

Specifically, this study tests whether China's soft power efforts through its English news services can influence its national image as perceived by American

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[27] Soft power is "the ability to get desired outcomes because others want what you want." (Keohane and Nye, 1998:86)

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audiences. Of all nations' branding and international public relations efforts, China is one of the primary countries applying soft power strategies via mass media (Hu and Ji, 2012). The majority of China's branding is aimed at U.S. audiences. The scale of these efforts and the investments that China has devoted to building its English-news services compete with the current efforts of the United States in its international system (Lee, personal communication, March 23, 2016). *China Daily US Edition* is a customized version of China Daily for American readers (China Daily USA, 2011):

> "Launched in 2009 and published Monday through Friday, the US Edition was created to provide a unique window into China by giving the Chinese perspective on the major financial, political and social issues that affect China and the United States today."

Featured on the most recent *China Daily USA* website are thirteen tabs of topics that include Home, China-US, China, US, World, Business, Culture, Lifestyle, Travel, Sports, Opinion, Forum and Video (see Figure 6)

As of 2011, *China Daily USA* operated offices in five major U.S. cities including New York, Washington DC, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle (*China Daily USA*, 2011a). Its Washington DC office in the National Press Building is within walking distance of the White House, U.S. Treasury, and U.S. Capitol. Among its 779 workers globally, "approximately 100 employees are senior journalists from the U.S., UK and other Anglophone countries" and work with their Chinese colleagues to produce content that is tailor-made to the taste and standards of its targeted audiences (*China Daily USA*, 2011b).

Figure 6. Homepage of China Daily USA Website

Accessed on Feb 3, 2017. Source: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn

  In this study's evaluation of the effects of China's branding in its international English news service received by American audiences, we ask three major questions. What is China's image as perceived by American audiences? How do news sources and news frames influence audiences' perceptions of China? What is the relationship between an audiences' trust in a news story and their perceived image of the nation in the news story? The pursuit of the answers to these questions includes experimental

measurement of reactions to news stories varied by valence (positive vs. negative) and from two different sources (Chinese news media vs. U.S. news media).

Research Values

This study unpacks the composite of the soft power concept of news and tests this explication with a focus on the audience's perspective in a cross-cultural communication context. This will complement the past soft power research that concentrated on the transmitter(s) of a message. This study also measures the audiences' perceptions and attitudes toward the information.

Findings from this study will be of particular interest to practitioners in journalism, public relations, diplomacy, international relations, and media theorists, especially those interested in effects of today's rapidly-changing and highly competitive media environment. News coverage that could effectively address the communication needs of a nation-state by enhancing the trust of its target audience in a foreign nation could contribute to the transformation of a country's image.

Media Effects of Image Branding on Audiences' Perception: Old Questions in the New Age:

Traditional journalism values are facing the increasing challenge of maintaining the trust of news audiences. The concerns of journalists at mainstream news organizations reflect those of early communication scholars who studied effects of propaganda during the two world wars, especially during the rise of Hitler and anti-Semitism.

Today's questions about trust in media are not much different from the questions mass communication scholars have been exploring since the emergence of framing and agenda-setting, which have been shown to affect audiences' perceptions. Tuchman (1978) posited that how information is presented or framed can significantly influence the interpretation of isolated facts. Entman (1993) expanded the framing process into the selection and salience of information that define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments and suggest remedies. Even sources supplying information to news organization might have a 'built-in' frame of a message that suit purposes of the source and which are unlikely to be entirely objective (Entman, 2007).

For instance, much of the information released by Julian Assange from WikiLeaks during the 2016 U.S. Presidential election worked against Hillary Clinton but almost none of the information from the same source worked against Trump. During the Cold War era, almost all news about the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China was reported under the Cold War mindset as the Communist 'enemy' (McNair, 1988; Holstein, 2002).

When it comes to international news, framing inevitably reflects the interests of the sources and the national context in which the news is produced. For instance, Entamn (1991) analyzed U.S. media's reporting of two similar civilian plane crash events caused by military actions, but found quite different framing in the manner, words, tone and problematizing of the reporting reflecting the national interests of the U.S. and international tensions during the Cold War. Entman's study (1991) found one event was framed as a deliberate attack with an emotional tone (a Korean aircraft

shot down by a Soviet plane in 1983), the other was reported as a tragedy caused by technical mistake with a neutral tone (an Iranian civil flight shot down by a U.S. naval vessel in 1988 in the Persian Gulf). Similar ethnocentrism is reflected in the negative framing of China's country image across different times in major U.S. media (Holstein, 2002; Zhang and Cameron, 2003; Stone and Xiao, 2007; Peng, 2007). For instance, Stone and Xiao (2007) analyzed the amount, themes, and positivity of coverage on China from *Time*, *Newsweek* and *US News and World Report*, and found the anti-China coverage in U.S. media have increased significantly in amount and negativity after the break-up of the Soviet Union than before because China was viewed as a new enemy for the U.S. in the post-Cold War era.

Chapter 2: Concepts

Trust: a Theoretical Bridge Between Media Effects and Public Diplomacy

Scholars from different fields including sociology, economics, and political science have studied the concept of trust from multiple perspectives. Sociologists studied the social benefits of trust and its function in forming and maintaining relationships in social networks (e.g.: Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1988; Bourdieu, 2005). Social economists investigated how trust contributes to the prosperity of a family, a community, a social class, or even a country (e.g.: Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 2000; Zak and Knack, 2001). Political scientists explored how public opinions reflect citizens' trust in government and their policies (e.g.: Citrin, 1974; Nye, Zelikow and King, 1997; Chanley, Rudolph and Rahn, 2000; Welch, Hinnant and Moon, 2005). In summary, trust is considered a social lubricant that contributes to resolving conflicts, facilitating access to resources, building relationships, and strengthening cooperation (Arrow, 1974; Granovetter, 1985; Hardin, 2002; Esser, 2008; Labarca, in press). All of these goals are key to the practice of public diplomacy.

At the same time, there is an ongoing debate about whether trust is a strategy for public diplomacy (Szondi, 2008) or an outcome of public diplomacy (Zaharna, 2007; Mogensen, 2014). This dissertation argues that trust can also bridge the theoretical gaps between the disciplines of public diplomacy, nation branding, and media effect studies. Public diplomacy and nation branding are often related, which

will be discussed later in this chapter. Since both remain theoretically divided from media studies, the concept of trust can bridge this gap.

Trust in Nation Branding and Public Diplomacy

To better understand the bridge between public diplomacy and nation branding, we must first consider how contemporary scholarship on both nation branding and public diplomacy discuss trust. Public diplomacy and nation branding are relatively new disciplines that are both evolving into a relationship-building paradigm, in which trust is a core. Public diplomacy has evolved from monologue persuasion, to dialogic communication, and to relationship building (Wang, 2008; Szondi, 2008; Melissen, 2011; Fullerton and Kendrick, in press). Nation branding is also evolving from image formation to a relational paradigm (Szondi, 2010), which can also be viewed as a way to forge public engagement and to produce relationship (Wang, 2008). The most recent discussions relating to the country concept suggest that trust is the ultimate goal of *both* nation branding and public diplomacy (Labarca, in press). Both are tools to engage, to communicate and to build relationships with foreign publics (Zaharna, 2007; Fitzpatrick, 2010; Szondi, 2008, 2010). Even their immediate goals such as information dissemination and intermediate goals such as reputation and image improvement are sources of trust (Labarca, in press). Thus, recent scholarship centers trust at the heart of both public diplomacy and nation branding.

It is important to note that trust has not been extensively analyzed under the country concept framework[28] (Labarca, in press), though its importance has been increasingly noteworthy as the disciplines of public diplomacy and nation branding evolve. In public diplomacy, there is an ongoing debate of whether trust is a strategy (Szondi, 2008) or just an outcome of strategy (Zaharna, 2007; Mogensen, 2014). Szondi (2008) draws upon the theory of mediated public diplomacy[29] and argues trust is a tool to carry out public diplomacy. Zaharna (2007) draws upon the social benefit theories from social network formation (e.g.: Bourdieu, 2005; Putnam, 2000; Lin, 2002) and argues trust emerges as an outcome of relationship building.

In models of nation branding, trust is only implicitly included, but is associated with higher levels of trust between countries in inter-nation cooperation (Anholt, 2007; Szondi, 2008; Labarca, in press). Some scholars have viewed trust as an emotional appeal and a driver of national reputation (e.g.: Passow, Fehlmann and Grahlow, 2005; Yang, Shin, Lee and Wrigley, 2008). Others have viewed trust as an asset that extends beyond reputation or image to safeguard deceptive and non-cooperative behaviors from other international actors (Gambetta, 1988; Luhmann, 1979; Lui & Ngo, 2004). At a maximum level of network formation, trust is also considered one of the dimensions to evaluate mutuality between nations and the country image of one another (Kleiner, 2012: 223). On a minimum level of nation

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[28] For details of the country image framework, see Fullerton & Kendrick (in press).
[29] Successful mediated public diplomacy will invite favorable coverage of a country in foreign media and will thus yield more favorable public opinion and positive country image. For an overview on the theories of mediated public diplomacy, see Entman, R. M. (2008). Theorizing mediated public diplomacy: The US case. *The International Journal of Press/Politics, 13*(2), 87-102.

branding, Anholt, the "father of nation branding concept," listed trust as one of the many goals of nation branding in global completion: "all countries must compete with each other for the attention, respect and *trust* of investors, consumers, donors, immigrants, the media, and the governments of other nations…" (Anholt, 2006: 186). Anholt also noted the irreplaceable role of trust for both companies and their country of origin to sell competitive products in the global market (Anholt, 2007: 20). In summary, trust has been a key component in the theoretical discussions of both public diplomacy and nation branding.

Trust in the News Media

Trust: Source of Power in News Media

Trust is an important source of the power for the news media (Tsfati, 2003; Cassidy, 2007; Kohring and Matthes, 2007; Karlsson, 2011). News media and transnational journalism are often viewed as tools for the practice of public diplomacy and nation branding to influence foreign public opinion about another country's image (Wang, 2006; Dale, 2009; Gilboa, 2008; Seib, 2010; Mogensen, 2014). Trust can also be a crucial variable for media effects because audiences' reception of news depends on trust (Tsafti, 2003; Karlsson, 2011). If the public does not trust the information from a news organization, the public will be less likely to consume the information (Cassidy, 2007). In a democratic society, the news media keeps audiences informed about political activities. In an authoritarian state, the news media spreads a shared ideology to legitimize the regime in power (Müller, 2013). Without trust, the news media is unable to fulfill its function in public life. Given the central role that the news media plays in modern public life, trust in the news media has

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received relatively little scholarly attention compared with extensive research on political trust in democratic institutions (e.g.: Levi and Stoker, 2000; Dogan, 2005; Catterberg and Moreno, 2005). In short, a better understanding of the power of news media merits a closer examination of trust.

Many studies on trust use the term *credibility* instead of audiences' *trust*, though the two terms are arguably measuring the same concept. Similarly, the most recent studies on trust draw from media credibility literature (Kiousis, 2001; Tsfati & Cappella, 2003; 2005; Kohring and Matthes, 2007; Self, 2014). The literature on news media credibility suggests that trust can be studied at different levels of analysis (Metzger, Flanagin and Eyal, 2003; Kohring and Matthes, 2007; Pjesivac and Rui, 2014). As examples, studies have explored trust in the news media system in general, trust in individual news stories, and trust in news media channels or sources[30]. Other studies include the dimension of persuasiveness[31], such as the presentation of the story, or gender of the author or anchorman (see summaries by Müller, 2013). Another group of studies compared the audiences' trust in different news media such as television versus print media[32]. Those studies extend beyond the scope of this

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[30] Tewksbury et al. (2006) found little effect of source type on credibility from their study on the use of government-supplied video information on credibility. Greer (2003) found news from high-credibility source (from the *New York Times*) had a major impact on audiences' ratings of a story than news from a personal blog online.
[31] Weibel et al. (2008) studied the gender effect on credibility, and found news presented by female newscasters are perceived to be more credible. Burgoon (1976) found certain features contributing to message credibility associated with the message presenter include appearing competent, moderately composed, highly sociable but neutral on extraversion.
[32] There is currently no consensus on audience trust across different media platform, as the media landscape is constantly changing. A number of past studies compared audience trust in newspapers to television and found that television news is seen as

research. This dissertation will specifically test audiences' trust in both article and media source credibility, which focus on two areas of trust in news scholarship, as discussed below.

Research on trust in news, or news credibility, comes from two primary traditions (Gaziano and McGrath, 1986). One tradition addresses the accuracy in the reporting of news information (e.g.: Charnley, 1936). The other tradition addresses the believability of news sources[33] such as the communicator (e.g. Hovland and Weiss, 1951; Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953; Hovland, 1959). These two lines of research suggest the content of the message and the source of the message are both important to audiences' trust in news. Therefore, this study will measure both elements to evaluate the impact of trust in news on audiences' perceived country image. Given this focus, this dissertation will examine the effect of two dimensions of

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more accurate than print news (e.g.: Westley and Severin, 1964; Jacobson, 1969; Gaziano and McGrath, 1986). More recent studies have shown that newspapers have closed that gap (Flanagin and Metzger, 2000) and surpassed television and online news in audience perception of credibility (Kiousis, 2001).

[33] For instance, Hovland and Weiss (1951) tested the influence of source credibility on communication effectiveness by comparing identical information presented to audiences via "high-credibility" sources versus "low-credibility" sources relating to each topic of interests (e.g.: Robert J. Oppenheimer versus Pravda on Atomic Submarines; *Bulletin of National Resources Planning Board* versus a widely syndicated anti-labor, "rightest" newspaper columnist on The Steel Shortage). They found subjects' initial suspicion of information from "untrustworthy" sources face away over time. "Untrustworthy" materials were not only accepted but might be remembered better than information from "trustworthy" sources. Their findings are consistent with the "sleeper effect" found by Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield (1949), where audiences may remember and accept the information communicated to them, but not remembering who communicated it.

Source: Hovland, C.I., Lumsdaine, A. A., & Sheffield, F.D. (1949), *Experiments on Mass Communication.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 101f.

trust in news relating to a foreign audiences' perception of country image, (1) trust in individual stories and (2) trust in their media source.

Message Credibility

Message or article credibility focuses on the content of a message. In some messages, the content alone could be more important than the source of the message (Metzger et al., 2003). This often occurs when only limited information is available about the source of a message (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986), or when issue involvement and personal relevance are so high that audiences depend on message cues more than relying on logical judgment by cognition (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981). In research of the news media, story characteristics can influence the level of credibility that audiences attribute to those stories. For instance, the balance of information in a story can influence audiences' perceived bias, and further influence their perceived credibility of newspapers (Fico et al., 2004).

Other studies have found mixed results on the effect of negativity of messages (see Callison, 2001 and Jo, 2005). Callison (2001) tested the effect of information source (public relations spokesperson vs. generic spokesperson) and valence of message topic (organization-negative vs. organization-neutral) on audience's perception of source credibility, and found sources communicating organization-negative news are perceived as less credible compared with those communicating organization-neutral news. Later studies have shown contradictive findings with audiences more likely to believe in negative news stories about organizations (Jo, 2005). Jo (2005) tested the effect of online media credibility on audience trust with variation of sources (newspaper news vs. online press release) and valence of news

(negative vs. positive news) in a 2x2 experiment, and found significant effects of media source type and valence of story content on audiences' perceived media credibility and their trust relationship with organizations covered in the news. Audiences are more likely to believe in negative news stories about organizations reported by traditional journalistic media source (Jo, 2005). As this debate continue to develop on the effect of message valence on credibility of news and media source, these studies have shown that message credibility is a central component of trust in news.

Message Credibility in a Cross-cultural Context

Most studies examined the message credibility in news from a single country (Müller, 2013; Pjesivac and Rui, 2014). Only a few studies compared the effects of different journalism standards on audiences' trust in news outside a given country[34]. Some scholars have also argued that transnational journalism need to follow the standards and norms of professional journalism among targeted audiences[35], even for governments who attempt to use international journalism for propaganda purposes (Seib, 2010; Morgensen, 2014). However, what constitutes such norms might be for

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[34] Pjesivac and Rui (2014) compared American audiences' trust in news stories with Chinese audiences reading the same stories translated into Chinese. Their findings shows anonymous sources quoted in the stories harm the perceived credibility of stories among both groups. Müller (2013) compared general trust in news media by audiences from European countries and America using polling data from Freedom House, Word Values Survey (2000, 2005) and Eurobarometer (1997-2005).

[35] Seib pointed out that transnational news agencies such as France 24, Russia Today, Deutsche Welle and CCTV need to "earn and maintain the trust of the publics they seek to reach requires an adherence to established principles of journalism, more specifically those of foreign correspondence" among their targeted audiences (Seib, 2010: 734).

their targeted audiences to decide. In a cross-cultural communication context, what counts as professional journalism in one country might be viewed as propaganda in another. For instance, China's transnational news coverage projects a positive image of China, which is considered a norm of journalism practice in China. On the other hand, the coverage of American news is prone to be more negative not only toward other countries (Weaver and Wilhoit, 1981, 1983; Beaudoin and Thorson, 2001a, 2001b; Golan & Wanta, 2003), but also the United States. Given these different norms of journalism practice, American audiences might find negative news to be more trustworthy than positive news.

I argue that in transnational journalism and message credibility must be measured and compared in a cross-cultural context. This would address a major challenge for transnational journalism practice in public diplomacy - that different audiences in different countries might respond differently to different journalism standards. To examine the effects of transnational journalism and its relationship to public diplomacy, this dissertation will perform a cross-examination of trust in news produced in one country but consumed by the audience from another country.

Based on the explorations of past studies relating to message credibility, I propose the following research questions and hypothesis in this study:

RQ1: (Effects of story valence on country image): what impact, if any, does exposure to a negative (vs. positive) story about China would have on American audiences' perception of China's image?

H1: (positive story, positive impact) Regardless of media source, after exposure to a positive story about China, American audiences will have a more positive perception of China's country image.

H2: (negative story, negative impact) Regardless of media source, after exposure to a negative story about China, American audiences will have a more negative perception of China's country image.

Source Credibility

Source credibility is defined as "the amount of believability" attributed to an individual or organization (Bracken, 2006: 724; Sternadori and Thorson, 2009). A source must have a certain level of expertise and trustworthiness to be perceived as credible (Hovland et al, 1953; Hovland, 1959). Expertise refers to the extent to which a communicator is perceived to be capable of making correct assertions, which gives him or her legitimacy to make valid assertions (Hovland, 1959; Jo, 2005). Perceived expertise can be highly subjective, as confirmed by Chaiken's study (1994) that people can form or change their attitudes by invoking source-related heuristics like "experts can be trusted". Trustworthiness in a communicator refers to the degree to which an audience perceives a communicator's assertions to be valid or the degree to which the communicator has a genuine intent to express those assertions (Milburn, 1991; Jo, 2005; Pjesivac and Rui, 2014).

A number of past studies have examined multiple aspects of the impact of source credibility on audiences' trust in persuasive messages (e.g.: Hovland et al, 1953; Chaiken, 1994; Slater and Rouner, 1997; Johnson and Kaye, 1998; Austin and Dong, 1994; Sundar, 1998). Depending on different conditions, source credibility

seems to vary, based on findings from different studies. For instance, Austin and

Dong (1994) compared the source effect and message effect, and found that

sometimes the audience relies more on the believability of the news content than the

reputation of its media source. Petty and Cacioppo (1994) found source credibility is

more influential when an audience perceives low personal relevance to the issue

discussed in the message. On the contrary, the audience is less likely to perceive

credibility in reputable sources with persuasive intentions (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981).

In general, the effect of source credibility has been confirmed in different media

experiments (Chaiken, 1994; Sundar, 1998).

The credibility of information source in a media message plays an important

role in the successful persuasion of a target audience (Hovland and Weiss, 1952;

Hovland et al, 1953, 1959; Milburn, 1991) and in the formation of public trust

(Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). Driven by optimized effects of persuasion, early

studies of news media credibility on propaganda research found that given the same

amount of knowledge from both credible and non-credible sources, individuals are

more easily convinced by materials from credible sources (Hovland et. al, 1953;

Hovland and Weiss, 1952; Hovland, 1959). Post-WWII empirical evidence has also

been consistent in that audiences are more likely to be persuaded by sources they find

more credible (McCroskey et al., 1974; Greer, 2003[36]; Pornpitakpan, 2004).

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[36] Greer (2003) examined the credibility of online information by comparing effects
of media source and advertising cues. In a 2 (high vs. low-credibility news source:
nytimes.com vs. a personal home page) x 2 (high vs. low-credibility advertising)
experimental design, she examined whether in the absence of a brand-name news
source, audiences will resort to advertising surrounding the news story as a secondary
cue for information processing. Greer's study (2003) found media credibility was

Because information from high-credibility sources leads to the greatest

attitude change among those receiving the message, while low-credibility sources

produce typically no changes in attitude, news produced from a credible source has a

greater influence on the audience (Milburn, 1991). Therefore, if a news story aims at

changing audience attitudes, credible information will be more effective than non-

credible information (Nelson, 1997). A case in point is that one of the key propaganda

principles followed by the Propaganda Minister Goebbels during Nazi Germany is

establishing credibility of the German Propaganda, meanwhile destroying the

credibility of the English and American Propaganda (Doob, 1950). Thus, establishing

the credibility of media sources is essential to changing audiences' attitudes, which is

a key goal in nation branding and image improvement.

Media Credibility in a Cross-Cultural Contexts

Most past studies of source credibility in news did not extend beyond the

effect of information from one country (as pointed out by Müller, 2013; Pjesivac and

Rui, 2014). I posit that in transnational journalism, trust in a source should be

measured at a level beyond only individual sources such as trust in foreign media or

the perceived credibility of international news agencies. This extension would address

a major challenge for transnational journalism practice in public diplomacy. That is

establishing trust in the authority of the message from a transnational news media

among its targeted foreign audiences.

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significantly related to audiences' perceived credibility of the story, but advertising
was not because they paid little attention to advertising.

Based on the explorations of past studies, I propose the following research questions and hypothesis in this study:

RQ2: (Effects of Source on Country Image): What impact, if any, does exposure to a story from a Chinese media source (vs. American media source) about China have on American audiences' perception of China's country image?

H3: (US source, positive impact) Exposure to a story about China from a U.S. source will have a more positive impact than exposure to a Chinese source on American audience's perception of China's country image.

To examine the combined effects of media source and story valence of a news coverage in shaping a country's image, the study proposes the following research question and hypothesis:

RQ3: (Effects of Source x Valence on Country Image): What impact, if any, are the combined effects of an exposed story version (source x valence) have on American audiences' perception of China's country image?

H4: (US positive coverage, positive impact) After exposure to a positive story about China from a U.S. source, American audiences will have a more positive perception of China's country image.

H5: (US negative coverage, negative impact) After exposure to a negative story about China from a U.S. source, American audiences will have a more negative perception of China's country image.

H6:(Chinese positive coverage, positive impact) After exposure to positive story about China from a U.S. source, American audiences will have a more positive perception of China's country image.

H7: (Chinese negative coverage, negative impact) After exposure to a negative story about China from a Chinese source, American audiences will have a more negative perception of China's country image.

Trust in News in a Cross-cultural Context

This dissertation seeks to fill the gap of media source credibility (or news organizations' credibility) in a cross-cultural communication context by comparing audiences' perceived trust of both American and Chinese news media. Most past studies on trust in the news media were either conducted in or focused on a single country at one time (see summaries by Müller, 2013; Pjesivac and Rui, 2014). Pjesivac and Rui's (2014) cross-cultural experiment was one of the first to verify the power of individual source credibility in countries with different journalistic standards. Müller (2013) compared audience general trust in news media from European countries and America using integrated polling data from World Values Survey (2000, 2005) and Eurobarometer between 1997 and 2005. This is because, in part, data collection in a cross-cultural study can be challenging and, in part, because equivalent measures for data collection in a comparative study involving countries with different standards of journalism are much more complex to design (Pjesivac and Rui, 2014). Therefore, factors contributing to different levels of trust beyond a given national news media system are rarely taken into consideration (Müller, 2013). However, by default, public diplomacy involves communicating with foreign publics in a cross-cultural context. This is why we must expand the research of trust in news beyond a single country. This dissertation addresses this gap in the process by

comparing audiences' trust in news across the news sources from two very different

countries (China and the United States).

Measures of Credibility:

Discussions on methodological problems of operationalizing trust in news

show consensus among scholars that there is still lack of theoretically derived,

reliable and validated measures of trust in news (Kiousis, 2001; Metzger, Flanagin,

Eyal, Lemus & McCann, 2003; Self, 2014). Past studies of trust in news measures

credibility in two categories: source credibility and comparative credibility. Measures

on source credibility were first developed by the Yale Communication Research

Program from the old concept of prestige (see works by Hovland et al, 1959). It was

praised for its multidimensional measurement but criticized by later scholars for its

lack of theoretical clarifications of the credibility construct (see discussions by Earle

& Cvetkovich, 1995; Kiousis, 2011; Metzger et al, 2003). Hovland et al. (1959)

emphasized on the influence of sources in news, including individual sources,

institutions, and journalism media organizations. Hovland et al's work (1959)

distinguished two components of credibility: expertness and trustworthiness.

However, it is unclear whether expertness is a dimension of credibility or a reason

attributing to credibility. Measures on comparative credibility can be traced back to

seminal works developed by Roper (1978) and tested among the U.S. audience every

two years since 1959. Roper's studies compared the credibility of news from radio,

television, newspapers and magazines. The Roper question was widely adapted in

later surveys (e.g.: Westley & Severin,1964; Greenberg & Razinsky, 1966; Shaw,

1973; Mulder, 1980), but was also criticized for its uni-dimensional measure based on

one single indicator, which makes it impossible to do reliability evaluations (Ganz, 1981).

Kohrning and Mattes (2007) developed a multidimensional scale of trust in news media. They first derived a model from past theoretical discussions on trust and credibility tested it on a representative sample using confirmatory factor analysis, modified the sample, then validated the measures on another independent sample. Their final model consists of four hierarchical factors, including trust in topic selection, trust in facts selection, trust in the accuracy of reporting, and trust in journalistic evaluation. Each factor consists of multiple items of measurements. Their study was originally operationalized in the German language. This study will incorporate the measures Kohrning and Mattes developed in trust in English.

Importance of international journalism to Public Diplomacy:

"International journalism can be an essential element of public diplomacy. Some news organizations have been created to produce foreign news reports that advance the "national values" of their governments by disseminating them throughout the world. Whether the results are worth the effort varies significantly from case to case." (Seib, 2010)

Media Coverage and Trust in Other Countries:

Not only can audiences' trust in media influence their perceived image of a country, but news coverage can also have an impact on audiences' trust in another country (Perry, 1985, 1987; McNelly and Izcaray, 1986; Kim et al, 2000; Willnat & Weaver, 2003; Wanta, Golan and Lee, 2004; Sides and Gross, 2013: 585; Seib,

2010). Trust also can be affected by other factors, such as historical links, previous conflicts, shared norms and values as well as tolerance and respect for differences in cultures (see summary by Mogensen, 2014). This suggests that journalists play a significant role in influencing international trust (Mogensen, 2014).

Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding

Public Diplomacy (PD) and Nation Branding (NB) are relatively new disciplines (Labarca, in press). Their conceptualizations have been discussed through different perspectives, mostly in terms of scope, main actors, definition, and theoretical foundations (e.g.: Entman, 2008; Gilboa, 2008; Szondi, 2008; Golan, 2013). Consensus can be reached regarding the major functions of public diplomacy and nation branding, despite different theoretical approaches (Labarca, in press).

Public diplomacy research investigates country image and public opinion from a political perspective. Public diplomacy is viewed as a tool to gather international support for a country's foreign policy (Golan & Yang, 2013). The goals of public diplomacy are to inform, influence, and shape international public opinion (Tuch, 1990; Nye, 2008; Szondi, 2008), and to create and shape a country's international image (Gilboa, 2006; Cull, 2008, 2009; Nye, 2008; Yang, Klyueva & Taylor, 2012). Public diplomacy is primarily concerned with the public's perceptions of a country (Wang, 2008) as well as the country's relationship building with other countries (Zaharna, 2007). The assumption is that if foreign publics, and especially foreign elites and policy makers, are better informed about and familiar with a country, they will be more supportive of that country's foreign policy (Nye, 2008; Entman, 2008). In short, Public Diplomacy addresses country image shaping as an

intermediate goal to serve its ultimate goal of serving foreign policy (Labarca, in press).

At the same time, research of nation branding studies country image and public opinion from a business perspective. The goals of nation branding are similar to public diplomacy, but come from the marketing discipline. Nation branding is mostly concerned with creating a nation's reputation, country image and identity (van Ham, 2001; Anholt, 2002; Wang, 2006; 2008; Dinnie, 2008). Despite their different approaches, public diplomacy and nation branding both intend to shape positive attitudes of foreign publics towards a nation's policies, cultures, ideas, activities and its products.

Defining Soft Power

Some scholars have argued that it is more effective to achieve one's desired outcomes by winning the hearts and minds of others and influencing them to co-opt and work toward one's desired outcomes, rather than coercing them to do so by force (Keohane and Nye, 1998; Nye, 1990; Nye, 2004).

Nye's argument is based on two aspects of reasoning. First, the possession of power resources does not always guarantee the desired outcomes (Nye, 2004). For instance, Nye pointed out the fact that the US is a super power in the world did not prevent the horrific 911 attacks from happening. In addition, the fact that the US military is more resourceful than those in other countries did not help the US to be successful in the Vietnam War (Nye, 2004). On the other hand, others would cooperate and even follow a leader who shares their values (Nye, 2004: 6).

Secondly, the power of affective appeal can surpass the limitations of rational reasoning under certain circumstances. Nye (2004: 6) contended that soft power is an attractive power that is "more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument." When a country's image is perceived as positive and trustworthy in the eyes of its international constituencies, its motives and actions will be interpreted positively too into international news coverage about that country. Similarly, Entman (2008) used an cascading activation model to illustrate how the dominance and different framing of news promoted by U.S. governmental foreign policies can be applied in the American media and further in the minds of the public audiences. Entman (2008) termed this extended effect into the international communication process "mediated public diplomacy."

Attraction as Soft Power: A Media Effect Perspective

What Nye failed to consider is the central role of emotion in the construction of the audience's perception of soft power and the image of others. Solomon (2014) examined the affective underpinnings of soft power in international relations and concluded that emotion is central to the construction of attractiveness. He noted that emotion is also central to a country's political identity and the power of discourse, and that attraction is produced through identity construction and language discourse. Sasley (2011) added that images of self and others are also built upon emotion. Ross (2006) found that emotions that audiences feel could subconsciously affect their perception of identities. Mercer (2006) also wrote that it is the emotional connections audiences feel that gives a political identity its power.

Moreover, Crawford (2000) addressed a gap in studies of international politics: arguing for the need to analyze foreign policy decision-making based on emotion not just pure cognition. There is also a need to examine positive emotions such as empathy and love and not just fear. Solomon (2014) called for more exact measures of an audience's emotional perception of soft power. In response, this dissertation proposes to examine the role of trust as a key emotion in audience perception of country image and its soft power, which could be mediated by international news coverage of a country.

International News as a Fourth Source of Soft Power

It is often said that the pen is mightier than the sword. So what the chart did not include is that journalism can be another weapon that can bring a change of a country's image. Nye's discussion of soft power can be interpreted to suggest that a nation's international news media presents a powerful avenue for building soft power. This dissertation argues that a country's international news media such as *China Daily* may be used as a powerful institution on which to build a nation's image and can be the primary medium to carry first-hand information about a nation's culture, political values, and foreign policies to those in other countries.

The power of news to construct and reconstruct reality in the minds of audiences cannot be ignored. The very nature of soft power is its role in reconstructing the perceived reality in the minds of audiences about another nation's image. Since news addresses all three kinds of soft power messages (cultural, political, and foreign policies), and because "the medium is the message" (McLuhan,

1964; Yaros 2005), understanding the soft power of news to reconstruct a nation's image begs further investigation.

China's Understanding of Soft Power: Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics

Different Meanings and Understandings of Propaganda between Chinese and English

Little research has been devoted to the "much-addressed dichotomy in the Western literature between public diplomacy and propaganda" in China. In Chinese, the word "propaganda" (*Xuanchuan* 宣传) is a synonym to "communication" (*Chuanbo*), which is more neutral in meaning; *Xuanchuan* literally means "to declare" and "to communicate," and "to publicize" (China Daily, 2009; China Daily, 2010), "to disseminate" or "to propagate", and even "to promote" or "to advertise," depending on the context of the language. In Chinese, *Xuanchuan* does not have the negative implication of the English word *propaganda*, which means "ideas or statements that may be false or exaggerated and that are used in order to gain support for a political leader or party, or to influence public opinion" (China Daily, 2009; China Daily, 2010). For instance, *Xuanchuan Gongzuo* (宣传工作) means communication work; *Duiwai Xuanchuan* (对外宣传) external communication (if translated verbatim), or communicate (a message) to the countries outside China. The official translation for *Duiwai Xuanchuan* is 'international communication" (China Daily, 2009). Thus, propaganda in Chinese literally means to simply communicate, or spread the word. To some extent, it bears the same meaning as mass communication in English. In Chinese, the equivalent meaning to propaganda is political

communication (Zhengzhi Chuanbo or political propaganda, *Zhengzhi Xuanchuan* 政治宣传).

China's Understanding of Public Policy and Propaganda

Among the scholars who discussed the differences between public policy and propaganda in China, Han Fangming, the founder and chairman of China's Brooking's Institute, CharHar Institute (The Charhar Institute, 2015), distinguished the two practices with three major aspects: (1) the relationship between the messenger and the audiences, (2) the content and form of communication, and (3) communication objectives (Southern Weekly, 2010).

In public diplomacy, the relationship between the messenger and the audiences is an equal one and the authenticity of information is a prerequisite for communication. The presentation of information has been fine-tuned to appeal to audiences. The communication objective is building a positive national image in the long term (Han in Southern Weekly, 2010).

In political propaganda, the messenger's status is being superior to the audience, the presentation of information is unyielding, and the goal is often short term and specifically defined (Han in Southern Weekly, 2010).

Other Chinese scholars have noted that the official English translation of *Xuanchuan* (宣传), which changed from 'propaganda' to 'publicity', is a sign that Chinese scholars and policy makers are not only aware of the differences in meaning, but are moving from "false information" to requiring "reliable and truth information, based on facts well-known to the public." (Su, 2008: 26; Jia, 2013; China Daily, 2009).

Importance of Soft Power in China

While soft power may be considered by many to be a peripheral strategic

concept in the U.S., it is a strategic compass in China's practice of international

public diplomacy (Cho and Jeong, 2008; Li, 2008). Public policy is "a defining

element of its strategy" in China's foreign policy (Hayden, 2012: 195). In both formal

government statements and in debates in academic circles, China has emphasized the

necessity to manage its image by promoting a Chinese voice that explains and

communicates China's image as a form of soft power (ChinaScope, 2010;

Kurlantzick, 2007). The importance of soft power can be seen from the large number

of debates among Chinese academics and policy makers, ranging from journalistic

coverage of academic conferences, to foreign policy speeches to reports and

statements from government leaders at domestic and international events (Ding,

2008; Hayden, 2012; Li, 2009; Li, 2008).

Given the perception that "China's soft power is weak relative to other

Western powers" (Li, 2008), soft power is considered as a weak link in China's

national power, and soft power has been elevated to a new level of importance. As

Hayden observed from numerous studies on China's public policy, soft power is a

"major issue" in Chinese foreign policy discourse and media (Hayden, 2012: 169):

> "China has devoted significant resources and rhetoric to the concept of soft
>
> power, both to inform a strategic framework to guide China's rise as a global
>
> power and to justify policies, programs, and institutions of public diplomacy
>
> designed to amplify and cultivate China's influence."

For instance, China has invested significantly in its international communication capabilities, including its international news services and broadcasting agencies, such as China Radio International, China Daily, CNC World, CCTV and Xinhua (Hayden, 2012). Aside from events such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics and 2010 Shanghai World Expo to grab global attention, China also invested in diplomatic outreach activities that reflect a new "harmonious world" that demonstrates "responsible power" in diplomatic discourses such as G20, ASEAN, and the Boao forum for Asia to bring together government, corporate and social stake holders for discussions and the exchange of ideas (Jia, 2010; Pang, 2008). In a multi-modal approach, China also translates its cultural assets through educational programs like the Confucius Institutes (Hayden, 2012).

Such comprehensive efforts to utilize resources and cultivate soft power in international politics are comparable only to the United States (Cho and Jeong, 2008). It is a strategy to promote China's image while also reacting to other soft power actors such as the U.S. (Robers, 2014). These efforts also reflect China's larger goal of managing its rise and address challenges in an increasingly transparent environment for international politics (Kalathil, 2011). The activities serve as a strategic framework to justify China's growing prominence over other aspects of its desired outcomes (Li, 2008): to frame its intentions, to establish legitimacy as a responsible state, and to influence the narratives and agendas of international systems (Hayden, 2012).

Narratives of Chinese Soft Power: Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics

China's understanding of Soft Power has deep roots and a long history from ancient, classic Chinese philosophers such as Confucius, Mencius and Sun Tzu (Wu, 2015; Hayden, 2012; Wang and Lu, 2008). Nye's proposed concept of soft power resonates with classic Chinese philosophy on the "The Art of War"[37] by strategist and thinker Sun Tzu published in 5th century BC, who believed the best strategy to win a battle is "to avoid wars without bloodshed and to pursue diplomacy instead" (Wu, 2015):

"(Hence) to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting."

[Original Text in Chinese: "是故百战百胜，非善之善者也；不战而屈人之兵，善之善者也"]

With those roots in history, China proposed its core soft power concept as "*He*" (合), or managing international politics by building a harmonious society domestically and to be at peace with the international community (Sheng, 2008). Promoting the concept of harmony instead of competition, the three key terms frequently used in China's strategic narrative are "peaceful rise" (和平崛起), "peaceful development" (和平发展), and "peaceful coexistence" (和平共处) (Zheng, 2005; Wang, 2008; Li and Worm, 2011).

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[37] Sun, Tzu. (2012). *The Art of War*. 《孙子兵法》 Translated by Lionel Giles. First Published in 1910. E-artnow.

Major Differences between China's Public Diplomacy and U.S. Public Diplomacy

Many Chinese scholars analyzed the differences in public diplomacy between the China and the U.S. (Yang, 2011; Wei, 2011; Zhao, 2012; Wang, Y., 2010; Wu, 2010). One common understanding between China and U.S. is that public diplomacy is a communication activity targeted at the civil public as audiences (Wei, 2011). There are some major differences in the understanding of the public diplomacy concept, however, resulting in different approaches between China and U.S. public diplomacy practices.

In the American context, the primary objective of public diplomacy is to communicate a country's image, attitudes (on certain issues) and ideas (political ideologies) to the population of a foreign country. To reach this objective, the initiating country must be willing to initially understand the public opinion of its targeted country, making sure the ideas in its message correspond with those in the minds of the targeted foreign audiences as opposed to clashing with foreign audiences. Any ideas in public diplomacy messages that are at odds with the values of the targeted foreign population could be viewed as governmental propaganda instead of sincere communications (Wei, 2011).

One difference, therefore is that the main objective for U.S. public diplomacy is to convey ideas while Chinese public diplomacy seeks understanding from foreign audiences the building of friendship, according to Yang Jieshi, China's Minister of Foreign Affairs (Yang, 2011) to enhance China's international image, improve foreign public opinion of China, and influence foreign governments' policies toward China, according to Zhao Qizheng, former Minister of the State Council Information

Office of China and Director of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the CPPCC (Zhao, 2012; Wei, 2011).

Based on the communication objectives, public diplomacy messages from China promote the positive aspects of China's culture, political, and economic progress. To U.S. audiences, however, such a positive image-promoting approach not only implies government propaganda, but also a lack of confidence in China's image building. Always pushing positive aspects and promoting its progress could be interpreted as though China cannot accept criticism and a need for recognition of whatever it has achieved (Yang, 2012).

Sources of China's Soft Power: the China Model and Chinese Culture

In general, scholars do not agree on whether the China Model could be used to be promoted as China's image building and soft power strategy. Some posit that in a world where the Western system cannot solve today's problems and global challenges such as hunger and poverty, the China model could offer enrichment, inclusiveness and innovation of universal values to the world (Wang, 2013). Others have questioned the universal adaptability development model with the argument that each country has its own differences in economic and social situations and should choose its own development model based on its unique realities (Li, 2009; Zhang, 2012). It is argued that the China Model is only suitable to the unique situation in China, which is different from the Western free-market democracy and from the former Soviet-Union model (Li, 2009). For instance, while the China model's innovation of "selection and election" model of meritocracy enables its strong "collective leadership", it also challenges the stereotypical dichotomy of democracy versus autocracy (Zhang, 2012).

For this reason, some believe that China should not impose its ideology, ideas and model onto others in the international community, but defend and improve its own model (Li, 2009).

Chinese Culture as a Source of Soft Power

Aside from the dispute on the China model, China is invested in developing its cultural diplomacy. This is mainly because public diplomacy scholars and policy makers from China regard traditional Chinese culture as a primary source of China's soft power (d'Hooghe, 2015) to safeguard its cultural security and fight against cultural dominance by the West (Hua, 2011). The viewpoint of needing to defend and improve China's cultural competitiveness became popular after a speech by former President Hu Jintao at the annual Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee in 2012 (Hu, 2011). This view has been repeated and expanded by current President Xi Jinping (Xinhua News, 2014), who calls for strengthening China's soft power by integrating the socialist culture with Chinese characteristics to interpret and publicize the "Chinese dream." However, to promote its cultural soft power, China faces several challenges to address:

Challenges of China's Public Policy and Soft Power Development

Scholars and practitioners of public diplomacy in China have realized that China's rich cultural heritage does not necessarily translates to a rich cultural power, according to Yu Yunquan, deputy director of the International Publishing Group's International Communication Research Center of China. (Yu, in Zhao et al, 2012). Though China, with its long history, has a rich cultural heritage, there are several reasons why China is facing difficulties in capitalizing on its culture.

One reason is that the Chinese government has focused heavily on traditional Chinese culture (Jiang, 2007; Tong, 2008; Wang, Y., 2008), but there has not been emphasis or efforts into nurturing a modern Chinese culture. One possible reason is that Chinese leaders are under a misconception that "key aspects of traditional Chinese culture and politics have presented major obstacles for Chinese public diplomacy" (Wang, 2008: 262), and that China's international image will improve as long as the Western public recognizes and understands the value of traditional Chinese culture. Supporting this logic is another misconception of cultural public diplomacy coupled with cultural arrogance: "the Chinese assume that China should be respected by the world for its long history and splendid civilization but forget that historical significance does not automatically convert into contemporary influence." (Wang, Y., 2008: 261)

Another challenge for China lies in its lack of ability to effectively communicate the "China story" and "Chinese ideas" in a cross-cultural communication context. For one thing, the cultural industry in modern China is relatively young compared to its Western counterparts (d'Hooghe, 2015). First, the Chinese are still exploring Chinese cultural expressions that have an international appeal. Second, restrictions on cultural productions for political purposes have served as a straightjacket for the development of a thriving modern Chinese culture. With strict political constraints on cultural productions and circulation, only a limited number of cultural innovations with international appeal will be produced in contemporary Chinese films, music, literature, and other forms of art (Han, 2011; Zhou, in Landreth, 2011). With strict government restrictions, Chinese media will

continue to lack the competitiveness needed to build large audiences abroad (Rumi, 2004)

China's overseas media is facing language barriers and the hegemony of English media discourse (Jia, 2012), as most of the world's news is expressed within the framework of Western concepts, ideologies and dominated by the English-language media (Wang, J., 2008). Therefore, as the messenger for Chinese public diplomacy, the Chinese overseas media carry "the burden of a huge language and cultural gap in communicating with the world" (Wang, Y., 2008: 266). For instance, there are no precise English translations to express the meaning of some of key terms in the Chinese political discourse, such as *peaceful rise*, *harmonious world*, and *strategic opportunities*. Even more difficult to translate is how to explain the thinking model behind those terminologies. For instance, China needs to explain to the world its plans following its *peaceful rise*, especially with the United States (Wang, Y., 2008: 267). The concepts proposed by China's policy makers need to be comprehensible in English. Jia Qingguo (2012) pointed out that verbatim translations of what is published in China's government newspapers, such the People's Daily, are not usable, because:

> "Their targeting audiences are local Chinese, who are familiar with the content, context and meaning of those political languages. But foreign audiences live in completely different countries and cultural context, the majority of them do not have proficient familiarity of China, they will rarely understand the articles and political terms used in government documents and People's Daily."

A third challenge is the product of cultural differences, which are de facto existing barriers for cross-cultural communications (Zhao, 2012; Wang, J., 2008; Wang, Y., 2008; Zhuang, cited in Wu, 2012). Cultural public diplomacy is especially difficult because its target audiences are foreigners with different historical backgrounds, cultural contexts, and communication styles from China (Wu, 2012). Cross-cultural communication trainer Zhuang Enping (cited in Wu, 2012) identified three types of differences underlying communications between the East and the West. First are the differences of integrated thinking (Eatern) versus analytical thinking (Western). Second are the differences from high-context (Eastern) versus low-context (Western) cultural environments. Third are the differences in cross-cultural conflict management. These differences in communication contexts and styles suggest that a single message that is transmitted might not always reach its communication objective and exacerbate misunderstanding. According to Wang Yiwei (2008: 262), "Chinese culture poses a considerable obstacle to effective Chinese public diplomacy". Zhao Qizheng, former Minister of the State Council Information Office of China, said, "Cultural differences create barriers and difficulties for the world to understand China and vice versa" because "culture is in the DNA of all aspects of society." (Zhao, 2012) Wang (2008: 262) summarized four major paradoxes in the Western public's view of China:

a. "Westerners seem to like Chinese history and traditional culture but dislike contemporary China since today's China is viewed as too political and less cultural in their minds."

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b. "They like the Chinese people but dislike the Chinese government and the Communist Party."

c. "They like the concept of 'China' but dislike the concept of 'People's Republic of China,' which they associate with communism."

d. "They like to travel to and invest in China but are unwilling to live in China; in other words, they seem to enjoy the benefits of the rise of China but are unwilling to suffer from the costs of the rise of China, such as the resulting pollution."

The Irreplaceable Role of Media in China's Soft Power Strategy

To address the challenges discussed in this chapter, public policy practitioners, policy makers, and academic scholars in China have reached a consensus of the indisputable importance of building China's own communication network of news with the ability to effectively reach foreign audiences. Policy makers are urged to be innovative in promoting China's cultural heritage. To do so, a communication network with fast and extensive coverage is needed to broadcast cultural content with a unique attraction (Tong, 2008). According to the government report of the CCP's 17th General Assembly, in the information age, the ability for cross-cultural communication has become a determining factor for a country's cultural soft power. Because a country's cultural influence is determined by the advanced communication technology and the ability to tell good stories, not just by the uniqueness of its cultural content.

China needs to build its mainstream media in the English-dominated world to voice its policies that correspond to a growing economic and political influence

(Tong, 2008). Mass media, including television, films, the internet and print media are the most important media for soft power, which is relevant to the rebuilding of China's international image (Yang, 2012). Scholars of Chinese public diplomacy acknowledge the irreplaceable role of news media in its power for agenda-setting to redirect public opinion and to form policy as well as its role in transmitting massive amounts of information (Southern Weekly, 2010).

Soft Power of News: Reshaping a Nation's Image through International News

Power of News Media: Construction of Reality

Media power, commonly referred to as the fourth brand of the U.S. government, is a source of soft power. The power of the press can convey soft power, because it depends on voluntary participation and trust of audiences, rather than authoritative consent or coercive force (Nye, 1990; 2004). It is the trust from audiences that grants news media the power to influence audiences' construction and reconstruction of reality during news distribution and consumption (Tuchman, 1973; Weimann, 1999).

The practice of journalism also represents construction of social reality. This is not just distributing information to audiences, but giving audiences ways to categorize such information. According to American Express Institute (2015):

> *"Journalism is the activity of gathering, assessing, creating, and presenting news and information. It is also the product of these activities."*

Scholars from different fields have reached a consensus on defining journalism as an institution to wield power, shape public opinion, and control "the distribution of informational or symbolic resources in society" (Zeliger, 2004:36).

Soft Power of International News Media: Construction of a Nation Brand

Some believe that international news media possess only soft power (Powers and Gilboa, 2007), and is thus the best channel on which to build a national brand image of a country. A national brand image is the subjective impression audiences have in their minds about a country and is typically constructed through strategic narratives. A strategic narrative is a sequence of events connecting unrelated information with causal transformations (Todorov, 1997, in Miskimmon et al, 2014) to build a new world order with frames of issues plus identities and systems that shape domestic and international behaviors (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin).

Some public policy scholars view the soft power of news media as a central part of a country's public diplomacy in forming international public opinion. Gilboa (2008) stated that communication is the most decisive factor among the three fundamental parts of an integral strategy in international relations. The other two are force and diplomacy Others have argued that public diplomacy, by its nature, requires yielding soft power (Nye, 2004; Mellissen, 2005). This prompted Leonard (2002) to propose three distinctive dimensions of public diplomacy, all of which cannot be executed without news media. The three dimensions are: (1) news management, (2) strategic communication, and (3) relationship building. Gilboa (2008) also stated that the media play a central role in framing public opinion in the three time dimensions of: immediate, intermediate and long-term. Immediate outcomes require efforts in news management; intermediate outcomes require strategic communication; and long term outcomes require building favorable conditions.

Soft power also can also help to establish state identities in international affairs as well as to build international constituencies (Seib 2013, in Roselle et al, 2014). The goal of international news media is often to influence public opinion of their target audiences by building a national brand of its host country.

Key Concepts Related to Soft Power of News

Strategic Narrative

Strategic Narratives as a Tool to Reconstruct Reality

Narratives are spoken or written accounts of connected events that provide frameworks for humans to connect unrelated information and to make sense of the world through causal transformations (Todorov, 1977, in Miskimmon et al, 2014:5). Strategic narratives are representations of events sequence and identities; they are communication tools with articulated political goals and how to get there (Miskimmon et al, 2014).

Miskimmon and colleagues pointed out two major functions of strategic narratives. One is to build a new world order (with system, identity, and issue narratives). The other one is to construct a shared meaning including its formation, projection, and reception of the past, present and future (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle, 2013). This helps to shape both domestic and international behaviors. Although one could question the effects of a single news story, empirical evidence was found that successful narratives could make a change in audiences' attitudes and behavior intentions. For instance, Freeman (2006) found news stories with a successful strategic narrative could help audiences to connect emotionally and identify a common mission. Oliver et al (2012) found that compared with stories with

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no strategic narratives, news stories with formatted narratives can initiate empathetic

feelings towards stereotyped social groups, such as immigrants, prisoners and the

elderly, and generate more favorable attitudes towards them. News stories with

formatted narratives can also generate more information seeking behavior with

beneficial intentions towards those social groups.

Strategic Narratives: How News Builds a Nation into a Brand

Strategic narratives play a critical role in building a nation's brand in

international news coverage. Every news story is a narrative of the what, where, who,

when, why and how. A strategic narrative is a tool to reconstruct reality in the

audiences' minds, providing information that is considered to be most important.

International news media can be used to help build a nation's brand as media

collect, select, refine and distribute information. Seib (2013) believes that the

resources for soft power can be channeled through public diplomacy. Addressing the

issue of security in the Baltic states and disputes with Russia, for example, Seib

argued that soft power could be used to establish cultural and political identities,

which in turn, might build international constituencies. A strategic narrative must also

encompass three elements. It needs a brand image as the first impression on the minds

of audiences. It strategic narrative needs a brand identity for audiences to explore.

When both are established, the third element, a brand equity, can emerge.

Strategic Narrative of Soft Power: Exoticism and Hybridity

In this proposed study, I will further define a strategic narrative of soft power

by two key elements: exoticism and hybridity. Both have been identified in the

literature as effective frames for soft power in cross-cultural communication.

Exoticism makes a news story attractive to a transnational audience. Hybridity places a foreign story within the understanding capacity of its transnational audience.

Specifically, exoticism means the charm of the unfamiliar (Kelts, 2006; Allison, 2008; Jung, 2009). For years, cultural scholars such as Segalen (1955) and Jones (2007) have argued that exoticism is an effective way to cover cultural otherness and to promote cultural dialogue for target audiences in a different culture. In this proposed study, hybridity is explicated as a combination of Eastern tradition and Western modernism. Fraser (2005) examined contemporary East Asian cultural products and found two types of appeals to the Western audience by blurring the historical and national boundaries. The first type is a presentation of traditional, exotic East Asian values in modern, Western life-style settings. The second type is the elaboration of modern Western social values presented in traditional East Asian settings with exotic appeals. To open a possible cultural dialogue, such hybridity allows audiences to expand their cultural identity to a transnational level thus increasing their likeability of the story presented (Hall, 1990).

Nation Branding

Nation branding is a much broader concept than mere political propaganda. It is also more complex than applying corporate branding techniques for nations to promote economic interest. Branding is "concerned with a country's whole image on the international stage, covering political, economic and cultural dimensions" (Fan, 2010: 98). Kaneva (2011) examined 186 studies on nation branding, and identified three major perspectives: economical, political and cultural perspectives. The economical approach treats nation branding as purely functional - to build and

maintain a country's competitive advantage for economic growth. The purpose of ensuring a favorable perception among the target audience is to compete more effectively with other nations for exporting products, governance, tourism, cultural heritage, investment and immigration of people (Anholt, 2007). The political approach treats nation branding as a political tool, especially for smaller nations to strengthen their economic and political foothold and to leverage against superpowers (Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011). The cultural approach of nation branding explores the implications of national identities, social power relations and agenda setting (Kaneva, 2011). Whichever approach it takes, a nation brand must be constructed before nation branding has an effect.

Defining a Nation Brand

There is a difference between a nation's brand and nation branding. A brand is "a product or service or organization, considered in combination with its name, its identity and its reputation" (Anholt, 2000:4). Branding, however, refers to "the process of designing, planning and communicating the name and the identity, in order to build or manage the reputation" (Anholt, 2000:4). Thus, a nation brand is the identity and reputation associated with a nation. Branding can also refer to the actions and efforts made to construct and maintain the identity and reputations of a given brand. Therefore, nation branding refers to the designing, constructing and communicating efforts associated with the identity and the reputation of a nation's brand.

There are other differences to note. A national brand is not a brand about a country, but a commercial brand owned by big corporations. It is either a brand

marketed throughout a whole country (e.g.: Wendy's, Costco or Verizon, etc,.), or a world-famous brand originated within its home nation (e.g: Apple from US, BMW from Germany, Phillips from Netherland, Samsung from Korea, and Alibaba from China, etc,.).

Brand Identity: Producer's Message

Four primary aspects of a brand include: brand identity (core concept), brand image (reputation), brand purpose (shared values and goals), and brand equity (asset value of reputation) (Anholt, 2004).

Brand identity is "the core concept of the product" (Anholt, 2004: 5) that can be easily identified by its audience. This includes a brand's logo or slogan. It features the distinctiveness and uniqueness of a brand. A nation, too, has a brand identity to manage. However, a nation's brand identity is more complicated than a product's brand identity since a nation's brand involve different and more complex aspects. Brand identity for a nation represents its cultural, economic, and political "personalities". For instance, America is known for its innovative, state-of-the-art technology, and democratic political values. Germany has a reputation of excellent engineering. France is associated with style and fashion. Australia is known for its richness of diversity in nature and natural resources. Finally, China is known for its long history, rich cultural heritage and its massive population with centralized goals[38].

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[38] According to the Results of the 2015 China National Image Global Survey among 9,500 people from 19 G20 member countries, 43 percent of overseas respondents considered China to be a large Eastern country full of charm and with a rich history, 54 percent of the respondents in developing countries agreed with this perception. The survey was conducted by the Center for International Communication Studies at the China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration, British multinational market

In sum, the central component of brand identity is the personality of a brand. De Mooij wrote (2014: 29):

> *"Successful brands are viewed as human personalities, ideologies, belief systems, stories, icons, or myths."*

Brand identity is not, of course, shaped by one single news event, but by a series of events. Consistent coverage of issues over time with a strategic narrative can make a country's national identity stand out and help to formulate a brand image in the minds of the audiences. For instance, coverage of the 2008 Olympic Games' grand opening ceremony in Beijing extended a congruent brand identity of China, reflecting the same brand identity since the building of its Great Wall or collaborative efforts by the masses for a collective goal.

Brand Image: Audience Perception

It is also important to differentiate brand image from brand identity. Brand identity can reflect how a business constructs itself. Brand image, however, is how audiences perceive a brand. It is how audiences decode the identity that the message sender has encoded. Bernstein (1992) pointed out in corporate communication and brand marketing:

> *"Image is not what the company believes it to be, but the feelings and believes about the company that exist in the minds of its audiences."*

Brand image is "the picture of the brand in the mind of the consumers" (De Mooij, 2014: 29), especially for people who have never used that product or have

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research company Millward Brown and Lightspeed GMI, a company with offices in the U.S., Europe and Asia Pacific. Highlights of results can be seen at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-08/30/content_26638411.htm

never been to that country. It is subjective rather than an objective perception. As De

Mooij (2014, 29) stated:

> *"For users, brand image is based on practical experience of the product or service concerned (informed impressions) and how well it meets expectations; for nonusers, it is based almost entirely on impressions, attitudes, and beliefs."*

Similarly, a nation's brand identity can be what it aspires to be in the eyes of

its audiences. Its brand image is an exterior impression including emotions,

memories, expectations and associations with that country (Anholt, 2000). The nature

of a nation's brand image is its reputation.

Brand image is critical to a nation's soft power, because it may or may not

match with its brand identity, i.e., the way it wants to be seen. As Anholt (2000:5) put

it: "Brand image is the context in which messages are received: it's not the message

itself." In other words, depending on a brand's image, identical messages might be

received with completely different responses from its audiences. For instance, if the

image of China is deemed positive, China's move to host the 2022 Winter Olympics

might receive positive press coverage and public responses. The same message,

however, might receive critical responses if the prior impression of China is negative

in the first place. In all, a nation's brand image is the subjective perception that

resides in the mind of its audiences.

Because few international audiences have visited every country in the world,

their impressions of each country are only subjective, which does not come from

direct experiences with a country. Based on previous studies from social learning

theory, when direct learning experience is lacking, audiences rely on beliefs, values

and behaviors from the media vicariously to learn about other countries they have no

direct interactions with (Perry, 1985; Brewer, Graf & Willnat, 2003; Gerbner, Gross,

Morgan & Signorelli, 2001; Bandura, 2002; Harris, 2004). They also form attitudes,

impressions and stereotypes about other countries largely from what they see or hear

from the media (Perry, 1985; Brewer, Graf & Willnat, 2003). As Fullerton and

Kendrick pointed out (in press, pg. 16):

> "International citizens come into contact with nations in many ways, through
> direct and mediated sources. International citizens hear about other countries
> from domestic and international news sources."

Brand image is powerful because it is the first step of the learning process of a

nation's brand, and it can dictate the thinking process and behaviors that follow. As

Kotler (1997: 607, in Jaffe and Nebenzahl, 2006: 15) put it:

> *"People's attitudes and actions toward an object are highly conditioned by
> that object's image."*

The effectiveness of international news media can frame the strength (or

weakness) of a country's national image. China's effort to send an international

rescue team of 62 people to Nepal immediately after the massive Katmandu

earthquake is an effort to portray an image of a regional power with responsibility to

its neighbors and sympathy to human lives in times of disaster.

Brand Purpose: The Internal Brand Image

Brand purpose can mirror brand image. Brand image is how a brand identity is

externally perceived; a brand purpose is how a brand is internally perceived. In other

words, brand purpose refers to the spirit, shared values or a common purpose of an

organization. It is the internal equivalent to brand image (Anholt, 2000). Brand

purpose is an important part of national branding. According to Anholt (2000), a

brand image (external values) is consistent with its brand purpose (internal values) to create a strong and powerful reputation. On the other hand, inconsistency between a brand's external promise and its internal culture could make those external promises meaningless in the eyes of the audiences.

Brand Equity: Soft Power of a Nation Brand

Brand equity is the public evaluation of a brand (INC., 2015). It is a measure of the strength of consumers' attachment to a brand, i.e., consumers' purchasing preferences in a target market (Feldwich, 1996). Brand equity also describes the associations and beliefs a consumer has about the brand (Feldwick, 1996). According to Keller (1993),

> *"Customer-based brand equity occurs when the consumer is familiar with the brand and holds some favorable, strong, and unique brand associations in the memory."*

Brand equity is based on two things: mindshare and consumer equity. Mindshare is the positive perceptions of a brand in a consumer's mind. It measures "how often a consumer thinks about one particular brand as a percentage of all the times they think about all the brands in its category" (de Mooij, 2014: 29). Consumer equity refers to a brand's influence on a consumer's purchasing behavior (de Mooij, 2014). It is consisted of five key elements: brand awareness, brand association, brand symbols, perceived quality, and brand loyalty (Aaker, 1999; de Mooij, 2014).

Both concepts can be applied to our expanded understanding of soft power. In terms of a country's nation brand, mindshare is the positive perceptions of the country, and how often an audience thinks of that country when reading international news. Consumer equity, which could be deemed audience equity in this case, consists

of nation brand awareness, nation brand association, nation brand symbols (cultural symbols), perceived positivity, and audience loyalty (constituency).

Just like the solid effect branding can have on the market performance of a product, soft power can affect hard power, too. Marketing scholars have found that a country of origin can greatly affect how consumers perceive brand equity and the quality of a product, which influences customer loyalty (Liu, Johnson and Johnson, 2005; Jaffe, 2006; Mohd Yasin, Nasser Noor and Mohamad, 2007).

A successful, positive, and solid reputation can become an intangible asset of an organization. In international politics and international relations, brand equity of a nation is part of the soft power of a nation.

Country Image

Marketing researchers Buhmann and Ingenhoff (2015) applied the branding concepts of identity, image, and reputation to a nation's branding, which produced a 4-D model of a country's image, (Figure 2.2).

Figure 7. The 4-D Model of Country Image in Nation Branding

Source: Buhmann & Ingenhoff (2015), *4-D Model of the Country Image*

Past studies of a country's image originate from the marketing scholars researching international trade. Some scholars studied country of origin image to find out how consumers' perceived image of a country can affect their purchasing preference of products from certain countries. Past studies did not reach a consensus on the conceptualization and operationalization of this concept (Laroche, Papadopoulos, Heslop & Mourali, 2005). Roth and Diamantopoulos (2008) did a systematic review of the country image concept, and summarized a list of explication of general country of origin image by past scholars. Some scholars' definition of country of origin image highlighted two aspects in audience perception of an object: cognitive and affective.

Specifically, Verlegh (2001: 25) defined country of origin image as "a mental network of affective and cognitive associations connected to the country." Similarly, Askegaard and Ger (1998: 36) defined country of origin image as a "schema, or a network of interrelated elements that define the country, a knowledge structure that synthesized what we know of a country, together with its evaluative significance or schema-triggered affect." Others have also highlighted the subjective nature of country of origin image, calling it "mental representations" (Verlegh and Steenkamp, 1999:25), "a product of the mind" and "sum of beliefs and impressions" (Kotler et al, 1993: 41) "present in a consumer's mind" (Desborde, 1990: 44) that contain "widely shared cultural stereotypes" (Verlegh and Steenkamp, 1999: 25).

In general, the country-of-origin image reflects two things: 1) the quality of products made in that country; and 2) the nature of people from that country (Knight & Calantone, 2000). This proposed study wishes to apply Fiske et al's (2007) dimensions of social judgment of outer-groups in social psychology in the context of cross-cultural communication management of a country's image. Fiske et al (2007) argued that people everywhere judge one another by two universal dimensions: respect (based on perceived competence or efficiency) and liking (based on perceived warmth, or trustworthiness). Fiske et al's model of intergroup stereotypes will be detailed in the theory of Chapter 3.

Stereotypes and Nation Branding

Stereotypes are oversimplified images or ideas preconceived of a particular type of people or things. They are "pictures in our heads" (Lippman, 1922) representing our cognitive associations and expectations about social groups (Fiske

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and Taylor, 1991). As Hilton and von Hippel (1996: 20) define it, stereotypes are "beliefs about the characteristics, attributes, and behaviors of certain groups". Stereotypes, therefore, can be a result of a cognitive process called social categorization, which occur when we start placing others into certain social groups (Stangor, 2009). For the purpose of this proposed study, national stereotypes are subjective perceptions of qualities associated with a nation and its people (Schneider, 2005).

Stereotypes of Nation Brand: Pros and Cons

Anholt (2000) pointed out that a positive national stereotype image might make it immune to negative information and events, which is a strong brand effect:

> *"[t]he fact that there may be negative associations isn't necessarily a problem. Strong brands tend to be rich and complex, successfully combining many different character traits within their personality."*

A strong brand of national image, once established in an audience's mind, can be immune to negative media coverage and negative events (Anholt, 2010):

> *"[C]ountries with very good, very broad and complex reputations frequently show a remarkable immunity to negative events: this is often a fairly straightforward matter of the degree of knowledge people have about the country in the first place."*

In other words, once a positive national image has been established, audiences are more likely to absorb information consistent with that image instead of changing their formulated view, even when given information that is inconsistent with that image. This is called assimilation.

Anholt (2010) used a comparison of public opinions with National Brand Index (NBI) to illustrate this point. The NBI measures how a nation is liked or disliked by populations in another country. To illustrate, favorability of Denmark

among Egyptians dropped to the bottom of the list following the Prophet Muhammad cartoon episode. In contrast, the NBI of the U.S. dropped only a few places after its invasion and occupation of two predominately Muslim countries. This might sounds counter-intuitive. Just like the branding effect on consumers' choices of purchase in marketing[39], soft power of country image based on nation branding also does not work in a logical way based on only cognitive judgment but through affective cues and heuristics such as liking or positive feelings towards a nation.

Three Key Steps to Transform a Negative Nation Brand

Unfortunately, strong brands of positive national images are relatively rare. A challenge many countries face is how to transform their negative image into a positive one. Anholt (2010) explains that the three key steps to address this are: attracting attention, producing compelling evidence, and using an interpretive key. He emphasized the importance of a nation telling its own story when facing negative media coverage.

The first step in tackling negative media coverage is to attract audience attention for re-appraisal of the nation's image (Anholt, 2010). The three "rules of thumb" for that are that the content of a story must be dynamic rather than static. For instance, a developing story with a strong narrative involving suspense, drama and even danger is more likely to attract an audience's continuous interest in the story. Second, stories need to have the essence of human interest, including personalities

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[39] An example of branding effect on consumer choice: Apple products are significantly more expensive than its competitors' products with similar functions, but because of its good marketing and branding, Apple fans will follow Apple's new products regardless of its pricing

and human relationships. Third, a story should have a clear and clean narrative. A storyline with less noise is easier for the audience to follow and to remember.

Another important step in rebuilding a positive national image is to produce compelling evidence that the audience can later use to justify a change of mind (Anholt, 2010). An essential element for changing a national image is an interpretive key for the change. That allows audience justifications for an altered perception of a national image and reassures them that the new behaviors of a nation are consistent with its new image. For instance, a change of leadership in a country might facilitate change of its national image among international constituencies.

An Intercultural perspective: Soft Power from China

This section introduces the history of China's media "going out" project, an image improvement investment including recent developments of China's global media expansion in its efforts to build China's soft power. Other forms of soft power efforts that China made to transform its national image in the most recent decade are also discussed. Finally, we review the current Western audiences' perceptions of China and China's news media.

Soft Power Portrayed: China's International Media Going Global

As a strategy to change its national image, China has been expanding its media services globally (Barborza, 2009; Hu & Ji, 2012; Nelson, 2013; Shambaugh, 2013; Zhao, 2008). Despite China's progress in economics and international relations, international audiences' understanding of China is still quite limited, inaccurate and biased (Hu & Ji, 2012). Coverage from both major news networks and major print

newspapers portray China in a negative light (Liss, 2003; Wanta, Golan & Lee, 2004). Coverage on China from four major television news network in the U.S., ABC, CBS, NBC and CNN, portrayed China as either challenge the U.S. values or threaten the U.S. interests (Wanta, Golan & Lee). Coverage on China from four major print newspapers in the U.S., *The New York Times*, *The Los Angeles Times*, *The Washington Post* and *The Wall Street Journal*, portrayed China as "an aggressive, brutal and dangerous place" (Liss, 2003: pg. 130). The negative coverage and critiques of the 2008 Beijing Olympics by Western media[40] was a wake-up call for Chinese policy makers to realize the urgent need to tell China's stories proactively (Wang, 2008; Yang, 2011; Hu & Ji, 2012; Sun, 2014). As Sun (2014) summarized:

> "*China needs to reclaim the 'discursive right' to tell its own stories, rather than let the West monopolize the global narrative of China.*"

Since 2009, China has committed to invest an estimation of $6 billion (Hu & Ji, 2012) in its "going out" project to improve its global image, with efforts including

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[40] Becker (2011) analyzed the coverage of the Tibet Crisis (March 2008) and the Olympic Games in China (August 2008) in the German-language media and found the image of China by Western perception still followed the traditional stereotype of the yellow peril and the China threat theory. Positive coverage on the 2008 Beijing Olympics were overwhelmed and overshadowed by media coverage on the Tibetan social unrest several months prior to the Beijing Olympics. Media reports also revealed that the Anti-Chinese media coverage were planned, operated and coordinated by The National Endowment for Democracy in Washington D.C. and the British advertising agency Saatchi & Saatchi. The latter was commissioned by Reporters without Borders, a supposedly independent non-government organization. Huang and Fahmy (2011) analyzed photos from four major U.S. newspapers on the same event and found American newspapers use a pro-Tibetan independence narrative, indicating a suppressive nature of the Chinese government. Manzenreiter (2010) analyzed empirical data from global opinion polls on China to investigate possible change of global perception of China after the Beijing Olympic games. His findings concluded that "China had no chance in the contest for meaning-making which the Western media won hands down".

launching multi-lingual TV channels and websites targeted towards international

audiences, staging cultural exhibitions and art performances overseas, sponsoring

Chinese-language programs at oversea educational institutions and providing

scholarship for visiting students to China (Barborza, 2009; Zhang, 2010). Among

those activities, China has viewed its global media expansion a key part of this

project, with the hope of providing an alternative view to the dominance of Western

voice in international news coverage to English speaking audiences by providing a

"China's voice" to cover both China and non-China issues (Zhang, 2010; Hu & Ji,

2012). The aims for such global media expansion of state-run media were two-

dimensional: to counteract negative coverage and prejudice against China and to

enable China's own global media conglomerate to compete with its Western

counterparts (Hu & Ji, 2012).

China's state media are leading the way for global expansion, including China

Central Television (CCTV), China Radio International (CRI), Global Times, China

Daily, and Xinhua News Agency, which is similar to Associated Press in the U.S.

Sun (2014) summarized the three major pathways that Chinese media

followed to improve its country image as: direct offshore offices, co-production of

media contents, and exchange of media contents and programs.

Setting up direct offices offshore in important regions targets mass audiences

(Sun, 2014). Specifically, CCTV now has three global offices in Beijing, Washington

D.C., and Nairobi, and more than 70 international bureaus. CCTV's D.C. bureau

employs more than 100 people who produce programs in both Chinese and English

(Nelson, 2013). *China Daily*, an English Newspaper in China since 1981, tailors its

stories to each targeting audience and manages 16 print publications in five

continents. *China Daily USA* is produced especially for American audiences, with 16

printed pages Monday through Thursday and a 20-page edition on Fridays

(ChinaDaily, 2011). *China Daily* has two U.S. offices in New York and Washington

D.C.

The second approach is establishing partnerships with local media in foreign

countries to assist coverage about China. Many lack appropriate correspondents and

rely on international news services (Sun, 2014). Such an approach is popular among

developing countries. In China, the state media would provide technical,

infrastructural and personnel support (Sun, 2014; Gagliardone, Repnikova &

Stremlau, 2010). This has been one of the most effective ways to reach oversea

audiences. China's official news agency, Xinhua, has been quoted as the leading

news source in a number of developing countries (Fish & Dokoupil, 2010).

The third effort is exchanging program contents with local media to reach

target audiences in foreign countries (Sun, 2014). This practice usually happens when

China's international media cannot secure an operational license offshore. For

instance, ChinaWatch (formerly known as Reports from China) is produced by *China

Daily*, but appears in the *Washington Post* as a paid supplement service to reach

American readers since 1996 (ChinaWatch, 2015), long before *China Daily* set up its

own office in Washington, D.C. in 2009.

As a result, Sun (2014) noticed a trend of increasingly ambiguous boundaries

between three symbolic spaces of journalistic reporting on China. There are Chinese

media inside China to serve its domestic audience; Chinese-language media operated

by diaspora Chinese serving the diaspora ethnic communities, such as a local Chinese-language media serving the Chinese diaspora in California; and non-Chinese, international-language foreign media, produced by foreign correspondents serving foreign audiences outside China, such as BBC, CNN or *New York Times*. The boundaries between Chinese state media and diaspora media are blurring as Chinese state media, in search for global expansion, are cooperating and investing in the diaspora media. However, the boundaries between the Chinese state media and foreign media conglomerates are getting more pronounced (Sun, 2014).

The greatest challenge for China's international media expansion is perhaps the skepticism and even distrust among the foreign audiences regarding the credibility of China's state media (Sun, 2014). For one thing, the relationship between China and foreign correspondents working in China has, historically, been antagonism (Zhang, 2008), and the intention of China's efforts to rebuild its image or to serve the international community might be misinterpreted because some existing beliefs can be difficult to change. When it comes to cross-cultural communication, there is a plethora of political and ideological differences between the message sender and the audience. Even the standards of journalism might be different. What counts as journalism in one country might be viewed as propaganda in another. Moreover, as the three symbolic spaces start to overlap, a message intended for one audience (e.g.: domestic) received by another (e.g.: international) might make the matter more complicated. For example, in 2011, China's media campaign to publicize China's efforts to rescue every Chinese citizen from Libyan civil War against Gadhafi was intended to strengthen the trust in the Chinese government and the patriotism among

Chinese citizens living domestically and abroad. However, Western media commentaries interpreted the same message as an aggressive act of ambition by China (Sun, 2014). Sun proposed a possible solution to this problem. State-media produced content carried by media platforms outside China need to appear independent of the control from China's state media.

The effectiveness of the soft power of China's international media is closely related to its trustworthiness or credibility in the minds of the Western audiences. Therefore, it is worthwhile to explore the possible gaps between an audience's perception of a country and the accurate information about that country, especially through international media. Many changes have taken place within China's domestic media and international media, as a result of the economic marketization in China since its Open and Reform Policies in 1978. However, it is possible that an audience's perception lags behind those changes, and an audience remains skeptical of information from China's news outlets.

China's External Communication Efforts in Other Areas to Build Soft Power

Prior to the "going out" project (also known as the "going global" project) to improve China's image in the global public sphere, China's public diplomacy has gradually moved from passive in the 1980s to pro-active in the 2000s (Zhang, 2010). In January 1991, China established the State Council Information Office (SCIO) to balance the international journalism media sphere dominated by Western media conglomerates. SCIO's main responsibilities are (China.org.cn, 2014: paragraph 2):

> *"to assist news media in presenting aspects of China to the world, including its domestic and foreign policies, economic and social development and its history, science, technology, education and culture, by coordinating reports for both domestic and foreign journalists, organizing news conferences, and*

providing books, information, television and film products about China. In addition, it assists foreign journalists working in China, in presenting a true and objective China to the world."

In 2004, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up its Division of Public Diplomacy as a separate division to manage the overseas publicity, communication, and exchange activities to improve China's national image on the international stage. Since 2005, China has been gradually building a centrally managed framework to influence global public opinion (Zhang, 2010).

In addition to China's expansion of global media, China has been investing in other forms of soft power platforms, such as heritage and art exhibitions, cultural performances overseas, attracting foreign students to study in China, and sponsoring Chinese language programs through Confucius Institutes. By August 2009, there were a total of 212 Confucius Institutes around the world, including 65 in North America (Zhang, 2010).

Soft Power Perceived: Western Perceptions of Chinese Media

The Chinese media system has changed over the past three decades, but some Western perceptions of the Chinese media have lagged behind. Some Western scholars have framed the problem as unjust critiques of Chinese media from the West. Hugo de Burgh, director of the China Media Center at University of Westminster wrote (International Media Support, November 2008: 15),

"It is true that the Chinese media are characterized by a measure of state control", however, "[t]o focus on the prohibitions is to miss the main story".

Susan Shirk (2011: 4, 5) noted the importance of the other side of the story of

Chinese media system during its transition between government control and

commercialization:

> *"[A]n equally important part of the story is the exponential expansion of the amount of information available to the public and how this is changing the political game within China."*

De Burgh pointed out the root of the prejudice against Chinese media from the

West by stating (International Media Support, November 2008:16):

> *" [T]he assumption is that because China's polity is organized differently, the media are somehow uniform; that they merely parrot Party statements and that they do not provide opportunities for social conversation and the airing of views as in the West."*

De Burgh (International Media Support, November 2008) identified two

major developments of Chinese media in the past three decades. On the one hand,

investigative journalism is thriving in print journalism, with three leading

newspapers: *Beijing Youth Daily* from the North, *Nanfang Weekend* from the South,

and the *Finance and Economics Magazine*. It is a magazine covering societal,

political and economic issues, with a focus on civil rights, public affairs and business.

On the other hand, light entertainment on local, market-oriented television started to

draw greater audience than the best investigative journalism, a leader being *Hunan*

TV, a provincial station in central China.

Chinese Realities

The Chinese media system, with a mission to cater to the world's biggest

audience with diverse needs and interests, is one of the most extensive in the world.

Chinese media varies extraordinarily in its contents and choices of news, including

extensive discussions of social issues and investigations into policy and economic issues. Today, there are more Internet users in China than in the US.

Two Levels of Perception of China's Country Image

There appears to be a divided perception between the image that China portrays and the image its Western audiences perceive. Western scholars researching attitudes towards China found that the country's image does not "project a satisfactory brand" (de Burgh in International Media Support, November 2008). Specifically, de Burgh identified two major levels on which the country image of China is constructed. One is its rational reputation and another is its emotional brand (de Burgh in International Media Support, November 2008). Rational reputation means how a country narrates and justifies its political and economic actions, plus what others say about that country (de Burgh in International Media Support, November 2008).

An emotional brand image comes from all aspects of popular and high culture, engaging international audiences directly at an emotional level. It takes time to build an emotional brand image, but if built successfully, it can override short-term political preconceptions and critics (de Burgh in International Media Support, November 2008). In short, emotional brand image can override rational reputation.

De Burgh (International Media Support, November 2008) justified his point with Japan, Germany and Italy. All three countries possessed appalling country images after the WWII, but have successfully transformed their images in the past three decades. For instance, shortly after WWII, Germany was perceived as evil and dangerous; Japan was perceived as a greedy economic rival in Asia, and Italy was

known for mafia and corruption in the 1950s and 60s. Today, Germany is seen as the economic engine of the European Union, Japan is admired for its preservation of traditional culture and innovation of new technology, and Italy is recognized as the motherland of poets, painters and philosophers as well as a major source of human civilization in the art history of Western Europe.

The challenge for Chinese media today, as de Burgh (International Media Support, November 2008) noted, is how to portray China as "a new Italy" but 200 times bigger, by exporting its culture that an audience will admire.

Chapter 3: Theory

Central Theories Guiding this Study

Three major theories are central to the effectiveness and challenges of soft power. They are the image theory in public relations, image theory in international politics, and intergroup stereotype perception theory from social psychology. A central element connecting all three theories is trust, which is the currency of building soft power through narratives in news. This chapter intends to draw connections between the three theories and to propose a theoretical model of studying the soft power of news.

Image Theory

Image Theory from Public Relations

The first theory is the image theory developed from public relations. Image theorist Boulding (1969) defined image of a nation as "total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behavior unit, or its internal view of itself and the universe" (in Kunczik, 2003: 423). Kunczik (2003) extended the definition of image as a person's beliefs about a nation and its people, or the cognitive representation a person holds about a given country.

Kunczik (2003) further pointed out that by forming a positive image, a nation could effectively transfer its soft power to hard power. For instance, positive image of a country's currency reflects public confidence in that country's future. Kunczik (2003) argued that the main objective of public relations for a country by building a

positive national image is to establish trust. Trust is the currency of transferring soft power to hard power, because "trust is money, and money is trust" (Kunczik, 2003). Kunczik noted that when other actors in the world system place their trust in a nation and confidence in its future because of perceived reliability, trust could be equivalent to money. For instance, perceived national image can affect financial decisions of international credit rating agencies and that of international businessman and foreign investors (Kunczik, 2002); exchange rate of a country's currency is also determined mainly by trust in the future of that country (Kunczik, 2003).

Such images are shaped mostly by news media (Manheim & Albritton, 1983; Kunczik, 1997, 2003; Wanta, Golan & Lee, 2004) . Kunczik (1997: 20) argued that the ubiquity and perseverance of news media have made them the "first-rate competitors for the number one position as international image former". Media coverage of a nation can influence not only opinions of the general public (Kunczik, 2002), but also decisions of top policy makers in international politics (Manheim, 1991). Manheim (1991, p.130) argued that top decision makers in international politics "received at least as much information about the June 1989 massacre in Beijing… from media reports as from diplomatic or intelligence sources" and thus top politicians probably know little more than ordinary citizens is an example that how influential news media can be in forming a national image. Media representation of a country not only shapes its image, but can also strengthen its existing status quo as stereotypes thus influence the intentions and actions of other states towards it (Östgaard, 1965).

Kunczik (2002) noted that negativism often dominates the selection of international flow of news and coverage of foreign countries, such as natural disasters, debt crisis and human rights violations. Distortions of images were further deteriorated when the world's leading daily newspapers selectively perceive and propagate events in the world (Davidson, 1973; Kunczik, 1997). Because of the structural conditions of the international news flow, countries intended in having a positive image in a certain region must organize and initiate publicity campaigns to "offset communication deficits due to the structures of news flow." (Kunczik, 2002)

To examine the power of positive versus negative news coverage in shaping a country's image, the study proposes the following research questions and hypotheses:

RQ1: (Effects of story valence on country image): what impact, if any, does exposure to a negative (vs. positive) story about China would have on American audiences' perception of China's image?

H1: (positive story, positive impact) Regardless of media source, after exposure to a positive story about China, American audiences will have a more positive perception of China's country image.

H2: (negative story, negative impact) Regardless of media source, after exposure to a negative story about China, American audiences will have a more negative perception of China's country image.

To examine the power of the media source of a news coverage in shaping a country's image, the study proposes the following research question and hypothesis:

RQ2: (Effects of Source on Country Image): What impact, if any, does exposure to a story from a Chinese media source (vs. American media source) about China have on American audiences' perception of China's country image?

H3: (US source, positive impact) Exposure to a story about China from a U.S. source will have a more positive impact than exposure to a Chinese source on American audiences perception of China's country image.

To examine the combined effects of media source and story valence of a news coverage in shaping a country's image, the study proposes the following research question and hypothesis:

RQ3: (Effects of Source x Valence on Country Image): What impact, if any, are the combined effects of an exposed story version (source x valence) have on American audiences' perception of China's country image?

H4: (US positive coverage, positive impact) After exposure to a positive story about China from a U.S. source, American audiences will have a more positive perception of China's country image.

H5: (US negative coverage, negative impact) After exposure to a negative story about China from a U.S. source, American audiences will have a more negative perception of China's country image.

H6:(Chinese positive coverage, positive impact) After exposure to positive story about China from a U.S. source, American audiences will have a more positive perception of China's country image.

H7: (Chinese negative coverage, negative impact) After exposure to a negative story about China from a Chinese source, American audiences will have a more negative perception of China's country image.

Image Theory from International Politics

In international relations, the image of a nation is an organized stereotype of an out-group (Alexander, Brewer & Herrmann, 1999). They are "patterns or configurations of coherent beliefs about the character, intentions, motives, and emotions attributed to or associated with the out-group as a whole." (Alexander, Brewer & Livingston, 2005) An out-group is a social group with which a person does not identify and is likely to discriminate against; it is in contrast with an in-group, to which a person identifies him or herself as a member or psychologically belong to and is likely to favor towards (Tajfel, 2010). Empirical evidence has shown that the role of affective state and behavioral intent can shape the content of social stereotypes (Alexander, Brewer & Herrmann, 1999).

The image of a nation is shaped by three components in perceived intergroup relationships: goal compatibility, relative political and economic power, and relative cultural status (Alexander, Brewer & Herrmann, 1999). According to this theory, soft power can only occur when a country is compatible with the goals and competent in power and culture with another country.

Country image theorists have identified five generic images of the out-groups, including one positive image – ally, and four negative images - enemy, barbarian, dependent, and imperialist images, as shown in Figure 5 (Alexander, Brewer &

Livingston, 2005). However, they have left out from the discussion a sixth possible

image, to which soft power is essential, as shown in Figure 6.

*Figure 8. Five images in perceived intergroup relations**

Relationship Pattern	Behavioral Orientation	Outgroup Image
Relations		

Goal compatibility
  Status equal
  Power equal
	Cooperation	Ally

Goal incompatibility
  Status equal
  Power equal
	Containment or attack	Enemy

Goal incompatibility
  Outgroup status lower
  Outgroup power higher
	Defensive protection	Barbarian

Goal incompatibility
 	
  Outgroup status lower
  Outgroup power lower
	Exploitation or
	  paternalism
		Dependent

Goal incompatibility
  Outgroup status higher
  Outgroup power higher
	Resistance or rebellion	Imperialist

*Behavioral orientations and out-group images (Source: Alexander et al. 2005, pg.

783)

Figure 9. Six image-roles in international relationships

(Source: Figure generated based on theory in Alexander et al, 2005)

A positive image of an ally would emerge only when an intergroup relationship is characterized by goal compatibility, equal power and equal cultural status. The ally image is nonthreatening, and is perceived as cooperative, trustworthy, and democratic, which serves to facilitate cooperation (Alexander, Brewer & Livingston, 2005). (See Figure 5)

The rest of the images are negative, generated from incompatible goals in the intergroup relations. The enemy image is similar to an ally except it is perceived with competing goals with the in-group, it is equal in power or status with the in-group. The enemy stereotype portrays a "hostile, manipulative, opportunistic and

untrustworthy" image of the out-group (Alexander, Brewer & Livingston, 2005).

Appraisal of the enemy image will result in perceived threat, a behavioral intention to

attack the out-group or containment, as well as moral justifications for the attacks

(Alexander, Brewer & Livingston, 2005).

The other images arise from unequal status or power in intergroup

relationships. The barbarian image arises when the out-group is perceived with higher

power and lower cultural status than the in-group. The barbarian image is perceived

as highly threatening, "violent, ruthless, irrational and wantonly destructive"

(Alexander, Brewer & Livingston, 2005). Perception of the barbarian image will

induce behaviors of defensive protection from the in-group. (see Figure 5)

The dependent image arises when the out-group is perceived with lower

power and lower cultural status than the in-group. Because of such power imbalance,

the in-group has the ability to eliminate the goal incompatibility by taking advantage

of the out-group, often in the form of exploitation (Alexander, Brewer & Livingston,

2005). To justify the moral injustice of its exploitation behavior, the in-group would

depict the out-group as "lazy, lacking discipline, naïve, incompetent and vulnerable"

(Alexander, Brewer & Livingston, 2005). As Alexander et al. (2005) pointed out:

> "This dependent image justifies exploiting the outgroup in the guise of
> helping them or protecting them from themselves."

The imperialist image arises when an out-group is perceived politically

threatening and culturally more sophisticated, or higher in both power and status than

the in-group. Because of such relative power difference, the in-group can only

respond with rebellion instead of direct attacks to the out-group's incompatible goals.

The imperialist out-group is often seen as "arrogant, paternalistic, controlling, and exploitative" (Alexander, Brewer & Livingston, 2005).

One important image left out by previous image theory scholars is an ambivalent image, when the perceived out-group has relatively lower power but higher cultural status compared to the in-group, such as Switzerland, Sweden or Iceland to the United States. It is quite unstable and can shift between enemy and ally images, depending on the perceived goal compatibility in the intergroup relationship. This is where soft power can come in handy for an ambivalent image of more likely a friend than a foe, which is illustrated in Figure 6.

For instance, in this new model, China would fall into the ambivalent category to the U.S. because China is still behind the U.S. in hard power, but does have a richer cultural legacy and longer history in soft power resources. If the goals of China are perceived as incompatible with that of U.S. by the American audiences (e.g.: the migration of jobs and the growing China-US trade imbalance), China will be viewed as an enemy to the U.S. On the other hand, if its goals are perceived as compatible, China will be viewed as an ally to the U.S. instead. The goal for China's international media then, is to project a positive image of China in ways that will be viewed as compatible with the U.S. goals. The question boils down to one thing - what frames of news story can make China's country image more appealing to the U.S. audience? To seek answers to this question, we propose the following research question and hypothesis:

RQ4: (Effects of Valence on Trust of News): What impact, if any, did exposure to a negative (vs. positive) story about China have on American audiences' perceived trust of that story?

H8: Regardless of variation of media source, American audiences put more trust on negative stories than positive ones.

Perception of Stereotypes from Intergroup Relationships

The image theory from international politics is closely related to the stereotype perception theory from intergroup relationships in social psychology. Audience perceived image of another country is, in essence, perception of an out-group. The origin of out-group stereotypes comes from the emotional and behavioral orientations as well as from the intergroup relations (Alexander et al, 2005).

Fiske and colleagues (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy & Glick, 1999; Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2007; Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2008) have identified two universal dimensions of social perception in inter-group relationships: warmth and competence, or trustworthiness and efficiency. Within that four-quadrant dimension, they identified two ambient social stereotypes: disliked but respected; and disrespected but liked (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy & Glick, 1999), as shown in Figure 7 Out-groups perceived as cold and competent will be respected but disliked, eliciting a lot of admiration but also resentment (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2007), which is similar to the imperialist image in international politics (Alexander et al, 2005). Out-groups perceived as warm, trustworthy but incompetent will elicit pity, compassion and sympathy (Fiske et al, 2007), which is similar to the role of the ambivalent image as proposed in Figure 6 Out-groups high in both competence (efficiency) and warmth

98

(trustworthiness) will lead to admiration from the in-group, which is similar to the ally image in international politics proposed by Alexander et al (2005). Low level of both will induce contempt, which is similar to the dependent image inducing an exploitation behavioral intent. High competence and low warmth (or likeability, trustworthiness) will induce envy, and low competence and high warmth will induce pity (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2007). As shown in Figure 3.3, perceived warmth predicts active facilitation (actions to help) or active harm (to attack) towards the out-group, and perceived competence predicts passive facilitation (to associate with) or passive harm (to neglect) (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2007).

Figure 10. Perceptions of Stereotypes from Intergroup Relationships

(Source: adapted from Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2007)

International marketing scholars Chattalas and colleagues (Chattalas, Kramer & Takada, 2006) applied Fiske et al's (1999, 2002, 2007) stereotype content model in the context of consumer attitudes towards product's country of origin. They found the two independent, continuous dimensions of perceived warmth and perceived competence holds true for national stereotypes when it comes to the country of origin effects of international products. They also proposed a matrix of nation branding strategy for international products based on these two stereotype dimensions (see Figure 8 below):

Figure 11. Nation Branding Strategy in different positions:

National Stereotype Dimension	Lower Warmth	Higher Warmth
Higher Competence	Mixed Position: Best Fit for Utilitarian Products and Low-Contact Services (e.g., United Kingdom)	Most Desirable Position: Need to Maintain (e.g., France)
Lower Competence	Least Desirable Position: Need to Reposition and/or make country more familiar by promoting higher Competence and/or Warmth (e.g., Belgium)	Mixed Position: Best Fit for Hedonic Products and High-Contact Services (e.g., Italy)

Source: Nation examples shown are adopted from a study of German perceptions of the European Union (Fiske 2004, p. 418)

(Source: Chattalas et al, 2006: 69)

Implications for Soft Power: The Role of Trust in Audience Perception

In all three theories discussed above, trust plays a central role in audience perception of soft power. Trust is what connects the language in a news story and a country's identity in a narrative. Trust also mediates the persuasiveness in a news story thus might consequently influence the perceived country image.

In image theory from public relations, trust is the currency of building a positive image and accumulating soft power for a country. As Kunczik (2003) pointed out, the very main objective of international public relations is "to appear

trustworthy to other actors in the world system" in order to "establish or to maintain positive images of one's own nation."

In image theory from international politics, trust is the audience equity emerged from compatible goals between different actors in the international system. A positive image of an ally would emerge characterized by goal compatibility, equal power and equal cultural status. The ally image is nonthreatening, trustworthy, and would serve to facilitate cooperation (Alexander, Brewer & Livingston, 2005).

In the intergroup perception theory from social psychology, trust is one of the two the key dimension to build an attractive and admirable image across all cultures (Fiske et al, 2007). The other dimension is perceived competence, which are equivalent to hard power in international politics (Fiske, 2004; Chattalas et al, 2006).

To measure the trust of news and its impact on audience perception of country image, the researcher proposes the following model based on past literature, as illustrated in Figure 9 below. In this proposed model, a story version (varies by media source and story valence) can directly affect audience perception of a country image. It can also directly affect audience trust of news (measured by perceived accuracy and objectivity of news), which mediates audience perception of a country image (measured by cognitive and affective dimensions).

Past studies have inconclusive findings when investigating the impact of source credibility on trust of news. For instance, Westley and Severin (1964) examined news consumption preferences and habits of Wisconsin residents to explore factors correlated with news credibility, and found that audience perceived credibility and prestige of news media are not the same. Their findings suggest the same sample

of participants did not assign the greatest credibility to the medium they assigned with greatest preferences (Westley and Severin, 1964). Tewksbury et al. (2006) studied the credibility of video source labeling with a focus on the use of government supplied video information but found little effect of type of source on news credibility. Greer (2003) studied credibility of online news and found the source of news organization such as NYT had a major impact on news credibility. Supporters of source as a contributing factor in news credibility argue that source may serve as a cue of cognitive shortcut in the process of building trust (Müller, 2013).

Another major factor contributing to trust of news is the valence of a news story. Although international news coverage is increasingly focused on negative news when reporting other countries (Kunczik, 2016), especially U.S. news media (Patterson, 1993), negative reporting can also sow the seeds of public cynicism that lead to mistrust in news media themselves (Capella and Jamieson, 1996; Müller, 2013).

Measurement of Trust in News

There are two primary classics of credibility research regarding trust in news (Gaziano and McGrath, 1986), one focused on the reporting accuracy of newspapers (Charnley, 1936), the other one focused on the impact of source credibility on persuasion and believability (Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953; Hovland and Weiss, 1951). Hovland and colleagues identified two major components of source credibility: trustworthiness and expertise (Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953; Hovland and Weiss, 1951), while others followed to explore underlying dimensions such as

accuracy, fairness, completeness, qualification, knowledgeability (Jacobson, 1969; Berlo, Lemert and Mertz, 1969; Lee, 1978; Gaziano and McGrath, 1986).

Regarding the source component, a great number of past studies have focused on comparing audiences' credibility perceptions across different forms of media platforms, which changes with the alternation and updates of emerging media in different ages. For instance, early studies follow the widely used the Roper polling questions[41] and compared audiences' trust in TV versus newspapers (e.g.: Lee, 1978; Newhagen and Nass, 1989). Later research examined credibility of on-air TV news with online news and found synergy effects between the two (Bucy, 2003). More recent research examined how traditional media source and Internet usage influence web users' perception of credibility of news on weblogs (Johnson and Kaye, 2004; Johnson, Kaye and Bichard, 2007). Most recently studies are concerned with credibility of news on social media (Kang, 2010; Castillo, Mendoza and Poblete, 2011; Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017) especially with the controversial case of the widely spread fake news during the 2016 U.S. Presidential election season[42].

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[41] Interest in comparing the relative believability of media surged after the Roper polling organization began to ask the following question and found different results between 1959 and 1961, suggesting a shift to increased public trust in TV compared with newspapers: "If you got conflicting or different reports of the same news story from radio, television, the magazines and the newspapers, which of the four versions would you be most inclined to believe - the one on radio or television or magazine or newspapers?" Source: Roper, B.W. (1985). *Public Attitudes Toward Television and Other Media in a Time of Change*. New York: Television Information Office.

[42] According to the findings from the following Stanford study, fake news favoring Donald Trump were shared a total of 30 million times on social media, which almost quadrupled the number of pro-Hillary Clinton news shares leading up to the election. Source of study: Allcott, H., & Gentzkow, M. (2017). *Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election*. The full study can be accessed here: http://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/fakenews.pdf

Following these two foundational areas of credibility research, this study measured audiences' trust in international news stories provided by international news organizations in a cross-cultural communication context, based on the same two factors suggested by past literatures with potential influence on audiences' trust: reporting accuracy and source credibility.

RQ5: (Effects of Source on Trust of News): What impact, if any, did exposure to a story from a Chinese media source (vs. American media source) about China have on American audiences' perception of the perceived trust of that news story?

H9: (more trust in local source than foreign source) Holding constant the story content, American audiences put more trust on a story from an American media source than that from a Chinese media source.

RQ6: (Relationship between Trust in Media Source & Trust in News Story): What impact, if any, did audience trust of the media source (e.g.: a Chinese media source vs. an American media source) have on their trust of a news story supplied by the source (e.g.: accuracy and objectivity)?

H10: (more trust in media source, more perceived accuracy) There is a positive correlation between audience trust in a news source (news organization) and their perceived accuracy of a news story supplied by that news source.

H11: (more trust in media source, more perceived objectivity) There is a positive correlation between audience trust in a media source (news organization) and their perceived objectivity of a news story supplied by that news source.

Summary of the study: https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook?utm_term=.esygWoB2w#.tan6dVjQP

RQ7: (Effects of Source x Valence on Trust in News): What impact, if any, does story version (source x valence) have on audience perceived trust in news story?

Relationship between Trust of News and Audience Perceived National Image: A Mediated Model

China's image in the news might vary depending on the issue and situation. At the heart of the challenge for China's soft power today is how to maintain an image of warmth and trustworthiness while promoting its competence in growth. For instance, a story about China's exploration into the moon might invite respect but also dislike in fear of a space race from the U.S. audience. The key issue is to transfer audience trust of a news story to their perception of country image. To answer this question, we propose the following research question and hypotheses:

RQ8: (Relationship: Trust in News and Perceived Country Image) What impact, if any, does audience trust in the news story they read, have on their perceived image of the country in the news?

H12: (higher accuracy, better country image) There is a positive correlation between audiences' perceived accuracy of a news story and their perceived image of the country involved in the news.

H13: (higher objectivity, better country image) There is a positive correlation between audiences' perceived objectivity of a news story and their perceived image of the country involved in the news

Figure 12. A Theoretical Model: Story Version, Trust of News and Country Image

Chapter 4: Method

Experiment Design

Experiment Conditions

      This study employs a 2 (media source) x 2 (story valence) x 2 (repeated measures) factorial experiment to investigate the possible effects of soft power in news by measuring audience responses to news about another country, and how the sources and the valence of such news influence their perceptions of a foreign country's image. In particular, this study focuses on news about China and its image in the eyes of the U.S. audiences. Media source and story valence are manipulated between-subject conditions, repeated measures on pre and post-exposure of perceived country image are within subject conditions. As summarized in Table 2 below, the independent variable of media source is manipulated on two levels of content identified as originating from Chinese media or from an American media. The second independent variable of news valence includes the two levels of a negative news story frame versus a "soft power" frame that presents the content in a more positive light for the country of China. The negative version of news story is considered as the "normal news frame" in this study because negativism is a structural element in the coverage and production of international news on foreign countries (Kunczik, 2016; Vázquez, 2003; Chaudhary, 2001; Korzenny, del Toro and Gaudio, 1987; Bohle, 1986; Sparkes and Robinson, 1976; Galtung, 1974; Galtung and Ruge, 1965). The positive version of news story is considered as the "soft power" news frame in this study because promotion of positive aspects of China's

country image has been a dominate factor in the past and current practice of China's

soft power and public diplomacy (Jiang, 2007; Tong, 2008; Su, 2008; Wu, 2010; Hu,

2011; Jia, 2012; Wu, 2012; Yang, 2012; Zhao et al, 2012).

Table 2: Experiment Conditions: Valence x Source x Time

4 between subject conditions: (2x2)	Source: from China			Source: from US	
Valence: positive (soft power frame)	(2 within subject conditions):				
	Pre-exposure	Post-exposure		Pre-exposure	Post-exposure
Valence: negative (normal news frame)	Pre-exposure	Post-exposure		Pre-exposure	Post-exposure

The Stimulus Stories

The core conundrum of China's soft power addressed to the U.S. audience is

how to bridge the gap in a setting of cross-cultural communication. To explore

possible solutions for this conundrum, the researcher selected potential stimulus

stories for the experiment based on two primary criteria: attractive and

understandable to the American audiences. As stated earlier in Chapter 2, this study

defines a strategic narrative of soft power by two key elements: attractive (reflecting

exoticism element) and understandable (reflecting hybridity element). Exoticism

makes a news story attractive to a transnational audience. Hybridity makes a foreign

story within the understanding capacity of its transnational audience. In other words,

a news story about China with a strategic narrative of soft power must be both

attractive to a transnational audience, and also within the grasp of understanding to its

audience. Both elements of soft power were later measured by response questions

during the pre-test for validity check. Exoticism is measured by two dimensions in evaluation of the news story: uniqueness from China, positivity of China; hybridity is also measured by two dimensions: affinity to United States; affinity to the reader's personal interest[43] (see Appendix C).

The researcher sought for potential stimulus stories fitting the exoticism and hybridity criteria in several exploratory ways. Initially, the researcher surveyed the top stories from all platforms of *China Daily* and *China Daily USA* between January 1, 2015 to March 1, 2016, including the tops stories for each month on *China Daily USA* website, the China Daily App, China Daily Facebook and Twitter accounts. Materials were inquired by the support of the *China Daily USA* management team. However, most of the top stories were not suitable to fit in the exoticism and hybridity criteria. They are either stories only discussing the development of or figures from China, without addressing the connection to United States or U.S. audience, or picture stories with less than 100 words in text, or Buzzfeed style stories such as "Top 10 big cities to for business in China".

The researcher then expanded the search to three major Chinese media sources published in English: *China Daily USA*, *Global Times*, *Xinhua News*. The above-mentioned media outlets were selected because of their prominent status in

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[43] Evaluation of Soft Power News Frame were measured by the following questions: Using a ranking scale from 1-7 (with 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree), how much do you agree with the following statement?
1. [Exoticism1] "This type of news story could originate ONLY from China."
2. [Exoticism2] "This story frames China in a POSITIVE light" (Positivity of China)
3. [Hybridity1] "Information in this story affects the United States." (Affinity to U.S.)
4. [Hybridity2] "This story affects me personally."
For more details on each measurement item, see Appendix C: Pre-test Questionnaire.

China's soft power strategy in its global media landscape and external

communication development.

To enhance external validity, the researcher used existing online news stories

about China on the same topic or event covered by both major American media

outlets and Chinese media outlets in English published between January 1, 2015 and

March 1, 2016 as templates (searched by Google news). The researcher selected three

pairs of stories with clear opposing views among the following topics covered heavily

by both mainstream American media and Chinese media in English: business,

technology and health. The following three stories were selected because of their

prominence as major news stories between January 1, 2015 and March 1, 2016

(search date): Google's plan to return to China; the establishment of Asian

Infrastructure Investment Bank; and the 2015 Nobel Medicine Award to a traditional

Chinese medicine doctor. They are stories unique to China, and shed a positive light

of China as a country. Using Google news search engine and key words with the three

Chinese media, the researcher summarized the valence and major narratives of

different versions of each story, and selected the stories with the most positive frames

on China. The three positive stories below are selected as potential stimulus:

1. *Tech / Global Times: Google reportedly planning a return to China, eyeing*
   app market

   http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/952117.shtml

2. *Business / Xinhua:* Spotlight: AIIB to be run with highest standards of "21st
   century governance"

   http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-10/22/c_134740305.htm

3. *Health / ChinaDaily*: Will TCM ever go mainstream?

   http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-01/15/content_23174490.htm

   To ensure a story is of interest to the U.S. audience, the researcher also used a pairing scheme in search of stimulus stories. In other words, the researcher checked whether a pairing version of the same story covered by a major English news outlet from China existed in the coverage by a major news outlet from the U.S. To do so, the researcher then searched in Google using the key words from the positive stimulus stories. For instance, using key words "Google return china" under category "news" in Google generated the following two stories from prominent U.S. media on the same issue.

   To ensure the selected stories are typical exemplar in their respective categories and can represent both the American audiences' interests in China and the uniqueness and positivity of China's country image, the researcher tested all positive stories from the three pairs in a pre-test. The story with highest overall rankings on soft power was later used for the actual experiment, which was about traditional Chinese medicine for American patients. Both negative and positive versions of the story focused on the effectiveness, safety, and availability of traditional Chinese medicine. The positive story indicated that traditional Chinese medicine is safe (has been tested over hundreds of years of practice), effective (can provide alternative solutions to symptoms not curable in American medical practice) and available (is blooming in the practice of American hospitals). The negative story indicated that traditional Chinese medicine is not safe (consisted of unknown elements to American healthcare system), not effective (pseudo effect) and not readily accessible to

American patients (there are many challenges for traditional Chinese medicine to be incorporated into current U.S. healthcare system). To enhance internal validity, the researcher removed any positive elements on China or on traditional Chinese medicine from the negative story; the researcher also removed any negative elements from the positive story. The researcher further edited the two stories so they were similar in length and comparable in visual aspects. To increase perceived authenticity of each story and elaborate source effects, the researcher retained the author's names of each story, and included banners from the media outlets on top of the story. The content of the stories is shown in Appendix A.

Instrumentation

Instrumentation of the study include: (1) A pre-test to select the best fitting stimulus news stories; (2) A pilot study to refine the design and operation of the online experiment; and (3) The actual online experiment to test the effects of framing and sources of soft power stories. All instrumentation, including the pre-test, the pilot study, and the experiment were hosted online on Qualtrics to reach a larger audience.

The Pre-test

In order to find the stimulus story with the maximum soft power effect, the pre-test exposed participants to three selected news stories, with each story addressing a different topic (e.g.: technology, business, health). The three stories were selected based on their significance, uniqueness, and potential of controversy for an alternative narrative for the U.S. audience. All three elements are key elements of newsworthiness identified in past literature on news values (Gans, 1979; Galtung and

Ruge, 1970). Following the rule of the inverted pyramid, the researcher modified all three stories into similar length by using the first 600 words of each story, without cutting off an original paragraph. Picture elements were taken out to avoid confounding variables.

Participants were asked to rate (1) which news headlines are they most likely to click online to read, before being exposed to the actual stories. Participants were then asked to read and to rate each story on the following items: (2) how unique is the story about China, (3) how positive or negative does the story frame China, (4) how does the information in the story affect the United States, and (5) how does the story affect the reader personally. Participants were exposed to the three stories in randomized orders. Finally, after reading and rating all three stories, participants were asked to (6) select the most newsworthy story to them.

Items (1) and (6) were measured based on categorical single-choice. Items (2) through (5) were measured using a 7-point Likert scale.

The pre-test was distributed among faculty members of a major public university in the Mid-Atlantic region. The average age of the participants was 40.75 (n=24, $SD = 8.269$).

Results from the pre-test showed that the story regarding traditional Chinese medicine in the health category had received the highest total ratings and highest categorical ratings, among the three stories (Table 4).

Table 3: Means of Audience Ratings on Pilot Stories – Soft Power Frames

Mean Score	Technology (Google's return to China)	Business (Establishment of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank)	Health (Nobel Prize and Traditional Chinese Medicine)
Unique to China	3.14	**3.91**	2.95
Positive to China	4.36	4.41	**4.95**
Affects the U.S.	4.52	4.82	**5.24**
Affects the reader personally	2.95	2.59	**3.73**

Results of participants' ratings of intended interest before reading any stories and evaluation after reading all stories also showed the same story received the highest ratings (Table 5). The majority of participants in the pilot study (41.7%, n = 24) reported they are most likely to read the story on Chinese medicine among all three headlines they were exposed to, before reading any stories. The majority of participants (50%, n = 24) also reported the same story being the most newsworthy among three stories, after reading and rating all three stories.

Table 4: Audience Ratings of Pilot Stories – Newsworthiness

Percentage of selection	Technology (Google's return to China)	Business (Establishment of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank)	Health (Nobel Prize and Traditional Chinese Medicine)	None of the stories were "newsworthy" to me.
Intention to read the story with exposure to headlines	12.5%	4.2%	**41.7%**	41.7%
Perceived newsworthiness after reading all three stories.	27.3%	4.5%	**50%**	18.2%

The health story regarding traditional Chinese medicine was selected as the final stimulus story to be used for further procedures of the experiment.

Before proceeding to the pilot study, the researcher modified the chosen stimulus story into two versions: a soft power version vs. an alternative version of negative news story. The soft power version of the story was modified based on a story originally published by *China Daily USA*, with the headline of "Will TCM ever go mainstream". All negative discussions of TCM were taken out of the story to reduce the noise and to enhance the signal of its soft power narrative. The main

narrative of the story is that traditional Chinese medicine can provide effective alternative treatments for American patients who find no cure in its current healthcare system.

The alternative version of the negative news story was modified based on a story on the same issue, originally published by *the New York Times*, with the headline of "Nobel renews debate on Chinese medicine". All positive discussions of TCM were taken out of the story to reduce the noise and to enhance the signal of its negative narrative. The main narrative of the alternative story is that it is very difficult to incorporate traditional Chinese medicine into the U.S. healthcare system due to inherent differences and concerns by doctors and patients.

Following the rule of the inverted pyramid, both stories were then cut down to the similar length of around 750 words to avoid confounding effects from other factors. Professional journalists read and reviewed both versions of the stimulus story to ensure they are balanced and are suitable for both Chinese and U.S. news sources.

The Pilot Study

After selecting the stimulus story, a pilot study was launched to improve the designed interface and procedures of the experiment. The researcher sent the pilot study to 13 participants, asking them to provide feedbacks on any errors, confusion or suggestions upon completion of the experiment. The researcher then modified the survey flow, and reframed questions to clarify confusions according to the feedbacks, and added confederate questions to avoid exposing the purpose of the study before the stimulus story.

Online Experiment

After confirming the validity of scales and the experimental procedures from the pre-test and obtaining IRB approval, the researcher launched the online experiment and collected data using the online survey tool Qualtrics. The experiment consisted of three data-collection stages: pre-exposure, stimulus exposure, and post-exposure questionnaires.

Participants first visited a webpage that provided general study information, which described the study as a survey on international news without priming the participants or exposing them to the real research questions relating to country image of China. Informed consent was obtained electronically as participants clicked the "agreed to participate" button at the bottom of the informational webpage. Upon entering the study website, participants first responded to two screening questions. Those who are not eligible are directed to the end of survey. Eligible participants who are U.S. citizens and have spent no more than five years of their pre-teen and early adult-life living outside the U.S. are directed to proceed into the study. Eligible participants then answered a series of preliminary questions, including those about their general knowledge and familiarity about some Asian countries (including China, Japan and Korea), and their perceived country image of those nations. Confederate questions regarding the country image of Japan and Korea were also asked to avoid getting socially desirable responses from the participants in their answers to evaluate the country image of China. Next, participants were told that they were about to read a news story about one of the countries they have rated in earlier questions by clicking the "proceed to read the news story" button in a pre-warn page. The button

was programed such that participants were randomly directed to one of the four different story versions corresponding to the four experiment conditions: positive story presented by a Chinese source; positive story presented by a U.S. media source; negative story presented by a Chinese media source; negative story presented by a U.S. media source (see design of experiment conditions and selection of stimulus stories later). After participants finished reading the news story, they proceeded to complete a post-intervention survey that include questions about recall of media source in the story, their trust in the source, their perceived accuracy and objectivity of the news story, and their perceived image of the foreign country discussed in the story. Next, participants answered questions about their news consumption habit regarding international news, including their frequency and interests to seek international news, and what sources they prefer to read news about the country they read about in the experiment. The last section of the study asked participants about their demographics including age, gender, level of education, ethnicity and their state of residence. The entire study took an average of 11 minutes to complete.

Unless otherwise noted, response to measurement items were indicated on 1-5 Likert scales with "strongly disagree" (1) and "strongly agree" (5) as endpoints. Items measuring each construct were averaged to form an index for that variable.

Trust of News. Established scales were adapted to measure trust of news (Kohring and Matthes, 2007). Perceived accuracy of news was measured by the following items: (1) the news organization supplying the story is credible; (2) the information in the story is true; and (3) the story presented facts truthfully; (4) the facts that I received regarding Traditional Chinese Medicine were correct

(Cronbach's α = .56, M = 3.06, SD = 0.77). Higher scores indicate greater perceived

accuracy of reporting in the news story. Removing the first item increased the

reliability of the perceived accuracy index to over .70 (Cronbach's α = .85, M = 3.51,

SD = 0.77). Thus, that item was removed from perceived accuracy, but was used as

perceived trust of news source (news organization) in data analysis. Perceived

objectivity of news was evaluated through three items: (1) criticism in the story is

expressed in an adequate manner; (2) the opinions of quoted sources in the story were

well-founded; (3) the commentary regarding Traditional Chinese Medicine consisted

of well-reflected conclusions; and (4) the journalistic assessments regarding the topic

of Traditional Chinese medicine were useful. (Cronbach's α = .81, M = 3.47, SD =

0.70).

Perception of Country Image. Perception of country image was assessed by

measures adapted from synthetic studies[44] on country image concept and

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[44] Roth and Diamantopoulos (2009) did a systematic review of the country image
construct based on literatures in the past three decades. Their review extracted two
major aspects of country image construct: country beliefs (cognitive aspect) and
country emotions (affective aspect). Their review also showed a lack of generalizable
model for country image measurement. For the cognitive aspect, measures on country
beliefs varies from country personality (Chao and Rajendran, 1993; Nebenzahl et al.,
2003 ; d'Astous and Boujbel, 2007) to climate (Verlegh, 2001 ; Ittersum *et al*.,
2003), landscape (Allred *et al*., 1999 ; Ittersum *et al*., 2003), competence of labor
(Parameswaran and Yaprak, 1987; Parameswaran and Pisharodi, 1994; Papadopoulos
and Heslop, 2000 ; Heslop *et al*., 2004), politics (Weber and Grundhöfer, 1991;
Martin and Eroglu, 1993 ; Knight *et al*., 2003), culture (Wang and Lamb, 1983;
Desborde, 1990; Allred *et al*., 1999 ; Brijs, 2006), economy (Wang and Lamb, 1980;
Wang and Lamb, 1983 ; Martin and Eroglu, 1993) and technology (Desborde, 1990;
Martin and Eroglu, 1993; Heslop and Papadopoulos, 1993 ; Kühn, 1993).

Buhmann and Ingenhoff (2015a, 2015b) further advanced the country image concept
and its measurement by combining the national identity concept (Smith, 1987),
attitude theory (Azjen and Fishbein, 1980) and model of reputation (Ingenhoff and

measurement (Buhmann and Ingenhoff 2015a, 2015b; Roth and Diamantopoulos, 2009). Perception of country image was measured on four dimensions: functional, normative, aesthetic and emotional dimensions (Buhmann and Ingenhoff, 2015). Each dimension is measured by three items. Higher scores indicate more favorable perceptions of country image.

Functional dimension is measured by the following items: (1) I associate China (or Japan, Korea) with creative ideas and innovative solutions; (2) China is recognized internationally as a country that is significant for science and research; (3) China holds a strong position in the global economy (Pre-intervention: Cronbach's α = .71, M = 4.12, SD = 0.74; post-intervention: Cronbach's α = .75, M = 4.04, SD = 0.73).

Normative dimension is measured by the following items: (1) China takes responsibility for future generations; (2) China shows solidarity and responsibility in tackling global challenges; (3) China helps solve the contemporary problems in the world economy (Pre-intervention: Cronbach's α = .85, M = 3.05, SD = 1.02; post-intervention: Cronbach's α = .89, M = 3.33, SD = 0.91).

Aesthetic dimension is measured by the following items: (1) China has unique and internationally recognized cultural assets; (2) China has a rich history; (3) China has appealing traditions (Pre-intervention: Cronbach's α = .63, M = 4.32, SD = 0.67; post-intervention: Cronbach's α = .70, M = 4.21, SD = 0.67)

Sommer, 2007; Eisenegger and Imhof, 2008) into a generalizable model. Using items from past literatures, their study generated a multi-dimensional model of country image concept with four blocks of measurements: functional dimension (political and economic competence); normative dimension (values, norms and integrity); aesthetic dimension (culture and beauty); affective dimension (emotional attractiveness).

Emotional dimension is measured by the following items: (1) I like China; (2) China is fascinating; (3) I am drawn to China (Pre-intervention: Cronbach's α = .82, M = 3.65, SD = 0.88; post-intervention: Cronbach's α = .81, M = 3.59, SD = 0.87)

Covariates. A number of variables expected to account for variance in one or more of the dependent variables were also measured so they could be incorporated in later analyses as control variables or covariates. These variables included previous knowledge, past visits, and close friends from China.

Previous knowledge about China was measured by three fact-checking questions. Each correct answer counts for 1, no answer or incorrect answer counts for 0, maximum total score for correctly answering all three questions is 3 (Cronbach's α = .71, M = 1.57, SD = 1.17). Familiarity is measured by past visits and friendship connections. Scores are counted as following for past visits: China (5), Japan (1) or Korea (1) or never visited any of those countries (0). Scores for close friends are counted as follows: have close friends from China (5), Japan (1) or Korea (1) or don't have friends in these countries (0).

Participants

Undergraduate students from a large East Coast university were invited to complete an online experiment in exchange for course credit with also the chance of winning a $25 Amazon gift card. Participants were also encouraged to share the link to the experiment with their social networks outside class. The sample was composed of 188 individuals, including 91 men and 96 women with a mean age of 29.71 (SD = 16.14, min=18, max=79). Caucasians constituted 61.2% of the sample, African

Americans 10.6%, Hispanics 5.9%, Asians 13.8%, other or multiracial 4.8% and prefer not to answer 3.2%.

Data Collection Procedure:

Participants for a snowball sample were recruited with an initial email distribution to faculty members, employees, and students at the University of Maryland, with follow-up emails as reminders to increase the response rate. The study link was also distributed to social media such as Facebook in and outside the University community, including the researcher and participants' personal networks to reach a diverse audience. Participants interested in acquiring more information were directed to the online study. Participants who choose to voluntarily participate – and complete the study - were also asked to forward the link to their friends and families via email or through their social networks. The data collection procedure was completed between September 1, 2016 and September 30, 2016.

Chapter 5: Results

Sample

A total of 285 responses were collected between September 11, 2016 to September 30, 2016 via the online survey platform *Qualtrics.* Among the 285 responses, 56 unqualified cases were removed because respondents were either not a U.S. citizen or had spent more than five years of their teenage or early adult life outside of the U.S. Ten more cases were removed because respondents completed the experiment more than once. Additionally, responses from an additional 27 participants were removed because they spent either less than five minutes or more than 30 minutes to complete the experiment. The average time participants took to complete the survey was about 11 minutes (661 seconds), with a minimum of 3 minutes and a maximum of less than 30 minutes (1,779 seconds), SD = 349 seconds. Another four cases were removed because respondents reported their age as under 18. This yielded a total of 188 valid cases for analyses.

The sample of 188 individuals included 91 men and 96 women with a mean age of 29.7 (SD = 16.1, minimum=18, maximum=79 years). Caucasians constituted 61.2% of the sample, African Americans 10.6%, Hispanics 5.9%, Asians 13.8%, other or multiracial 4.8% and prefer not to answer 3.2%. Nearly half of the respondents (48%) received a high school education with or without a diploma, 9.5% obtained an associate degree, 20.2% received a bachelor's degree, 14.9% held a master's degree and 6.9% had earned a Ph.D.

Randomization of Stimulus

The four versions of the news story were evenly distributed among the 188 participants, with 49 (26.1%) respondents viewing the positive story from Chinese media source, 43 (22.9%) viewed the positive story from American media source, 52 (27.7%) viewed the negative story from Chinese media source, and the remaining 44 participants (23.4%) were exposed to the negative story from American media source.

Effects of Time (Exposure)

Effects of Exposure on Country Image

The first three research questions in this study explored what impact, if any, exposure to a story about China would have on American audiences' perception of China's image. A mixed between-within subject analysis of variance revealed two main effects and no interactions.

First of all, following exposure to a story about China, regardless of the valence or source of the story, perceived normative dimension of China's country image has increased significantly (see Table 5 and Table 6 below).

Table 5: Compare Means of the Normative Dimension of Country Image (pre vs. post exposure)

Valence	Source	Mean		SD		N
		Pre-exposure	Post-exposure	Pre-exposure	Post-exposure	
Positive	CH	3.06	3.18	1.11	1.01	48
	US	3.12	3.40	1.10	0.94	43
	Total	3.09	3.28	1.10	0.98	91
Negative	CH	2.96	3.43	1.05	0.91	52
	US	3.08	3.30	0.82	0.75	44
	Total	3.02	3.37	0.95	0.84	96
Total	CH	3.01	3.31	1.07	0.96	100
	US	3.10	3.35	0.96	0.85	87
	Total	3.05	3.33	1.02	0.91	187

Table 6: Within-subject changes of Normative Dimension of Country Image

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Time	6.84	1	6.84	25.97	*0.00	0.12
Time x Valence	0.49	1	0.49	1.86	0.17	0.01
Time x Source	0.04	1	0.04	0.17	0.68	0.00
Time x Valence x Source	0.97	1	0.97	3.70	0.06	0.02
Error(Time)	48.18	183	0.26			

*$p<.05$

Secondly, following exposure to a story about China, regardless of the valence or source of the story, the perceived aesthetics dimension of China's country image has decreased significantly. (see Table 7 and Table 8 below).

Table 7: Compare Means of the Aesthetics Dimension of Country Image (pre vs. post exposure)

Valence	Source	Mean		SD		N
		Pre-exposure	Post-exposure	Pre-exposure	Post-exposure	
Positive	CH	4.32	4.16	0.59	0.68	48
	US	4.32	4.30	0.67	0.66	43
	Total	4.32	4.23	0.63	0.67	91
Negative	CH	4.28	4.16	0.76	0.71	52
	US	4.37	4.24	0.67	0.63	44
	Total	4.32	4.20	0.72	0.67	96
Total	CH	4.30	4.16	0.68	0.69	100
	US	4.35	4.27	0.67	0.64	87
	Total	4.32	4.21	0.67	0.67	187

Table 8: Within-subject changes of Aesthetics Dimension of Country Image

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Time	1.05	1	1.05	6.47	*0.01	0.034
Time x Valence	0.03	1	0.03	0.20	0.65	0.001
Time x Source	0.11	1	0.11	0.67	0.41	0.004
Time x Valence x Source	0.13	1	0.13	0.82	0.37	0.004
Error(Time)	29.80	183	0.16			

*p<.05

Effects of Valence

Effects of Valence on Country Image

The first research question in this study explored what impact, if any, exposure to a negative (vs. positive) story about China would have on American audiences' perception of China's image.

A paired-samples *t-test* (Table 5 and Table 6) revealed that following exposure to the positive story, three of the four dimensions (perceived functional, aesthetics, emotional) decreased. Comparing pre and post exposure to the story, perceived emotional attraction decreased but the perceived normative dimension increased significantly.

Following exposure to the negative story, two of the four dimensions (perceived normative and emotional) increased. At the same time, the perceived functional and aesthetics dimensions decreased.

Participants' perceived normative image of China's significantly increased following exposure to either the positive or negative story.

Effects of the positive story. There was a statistically significant increase in the perceived normative image of China (e.g.: China takes responsibility for future generations, shows solidarity and responsibility in tackling global challenges, and helps to solve the contemporary problems in the world) from pre exposure ($M = 3.09$, $SD = 1.09$) to post exposure [$M = 3.28$, $SD = .97$, $t(90) = -3.09$, $p <.005$, $\eta^2 = .10$].

The positive story also produced a statistically significant decrease in participants' perceived emotional attraction of China (e.g.: I like China; I am drawn

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to China; China is fascinating) from pre exposure ($M = 3.71$, $SD = .87$) to post exposure [$M = 3.59$, $SD = .91$, t (90) = 2.40, $p <.05$, $\eta^2=.06$].

A paired-sample t-test (Table 5 and Table 6) showed that the perceived functional dimensions of China's image (e.g.: I associate China with creative ideas and innovative solutions; China is recognized internationally as a country that is significant for science and research, China holds a strong position in the global economy) before exposure ($M = 4.14$, $SD = .79$) decreased slightly following exposure ($M = 4.10$, $SD = .76$) to the positive story. Similarly, the perceived aesthetics dimension of China's image decreased from pre-exposure ($M = 4.32$. $SD = .63$) to post exposure ($M = 4.23$, $SD = .67$) to the positive story. Neither of these decreases were statistically significant.

Effects of the negative story. There was a statistically significant increase in the perceived normative dimension of China's image (e.g.: China takes responsibility for future generations, shows solidarity and responsibility in tackling global challenges, and helps to solve the contemporary problems in the world) between pre-exposure ($M = 3.02$, $SD = .95$) and post exposure [$M = 3.37$, $SD = .84$, t (95) = -4.16, $p <.001$, $\eta^2 =.15$] to the negative story.

There was also a significant decrease in perceived aesthetics of China's image (e.g.: China has unique and internationally recognized cultural assets, a rich history and appealing traditions) from pre-exposure ($M = 4.32$, $SD = .72$) to post exposure [$M = 4.20$, $SD = .67$, t (95) = 1.99, $p =.05$, $\eta^2=.04$] to the negative story.

A paired-sample *t-test* (Table 9 and Table 10) indicated that the perceived functional dimension of China's image (e.g.: I associate China with creative ideas and innovative solutions; China is recognized internationally as a country that is significant for science and research, China holds a strong position in the global economy) decreased slightly between pre-exposure (*M* = 4.10, *SD* = .68) and post exposure (*M* = 4.00, *SD* = .69) to the negative news story. However, the difference was not significant. The perceived emotional dimension of China's image increased slightly between pre-exposure (*M* = 3.58, *SD* = .90) and post exposure (*M* = 3.59, *SD* = .85) to the negative story but this difference was not statistically significant.

Table 9: Changes in perceived country image by story valence (pre vs. post exposure)

Valence			Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Upper	t	df	Sig. (2–tailed)
Positive	Pair 1	PrFunc_Sum – PoFunc_Sum	.0440	.7457	.0782	–.1113	.1993	.562	90	.575
	Pair 2	PrNorm_Sum – PoNorm_Sum	–.1941	.5985	.0627	–.3188	–.0695	–3.094	90	.003
	Pair 3	PrAesth_Sum – PoAesth_Sum	.0916	.5166	.0541	–.0160	.1992	1.691	90	.094
	Pair 4	PrEmo_Sum – PoEmo_Sum	.1245	.4960	.0520	.0212	.2278	2.395	90	.019
Negative	Pair 1	PrFunc_Sum – PoFunc_Sum	.0972	.5639	.0575	–.0170	.2115	1.689	95	.094
	Pair 2	PrNorm_Sum – PoNorm_Sum	–.3542	.8346	.0852	–.5233	–.1851	–4.158	95	.000
	Pair 3	PrAesth_Sum – PoAesth_Sum	.1250	.6161	.0629	.0002	.2498	1.988	95	.050
	Pair 4	PrEmo_Sum – PoEmo_Sum	–.0104	.7294	.0744	–.1582	.1374	–.140	95	.889

Table 10: Means of Perceived Country Image

Valence			Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Positive	Pair 1	PrFunc_Sum	4.143	91	.7968	.0835
		PoFunc_Sum	4.099	91	.7658	.0803
	Pair 2	PrNorm_Sum	3.088	91	1.0953	.1148
		PoNorm_Sum	3.282	91	.9762	.1023
	Pair 3	PrAesth_Sum	4.319	91	.6264	.0657
		PoAesth_Sum	4.227	91	.6720	.0704
	Pair 4	PrEmo_Sum	3.711	91	.8667	.0909
		PoEmo_Sum	3.586	91	.9086	.0952
Negative	Pair 1	PrFunc_Sum	4.090	96	.6831	.0697
		PoFunc_Sum	3.993	96	.6857	.0700
	Pair 2	PrNorm_Sum	3.017	96	.9494	.0969
		PoNorm_Sum	3.372	96	.8403	.0858
	Pair 3	PrAesth_Sum	4.323	96	.7165	.0731
		PoAesth_Sum	4.198	96	.6729	.0687
	Pair 4	PrEmo_Sum	3.583	96	.9035	.0922
		PoEmo_Sum	3.594	96	.8449	.0862

Effects of Valence on Trust

This study's second research question asked what impact, if any, does exposure to a negative (vs. positive) story about China have on American audiences' perceived trust of a news story?

According to an independent-sample *t-test* (Table 11 and Table 12), although participants' perceived accuracy of the news was higher for the negative story (*M*=3.514, *SD*=.582) than for the positive story (*M*=3.507, *SD*=.763) the difference was not statistically significant but the perceived objectivity was significantly higher for the negative story (*M*=3.573, *SD*=.612, *n*=96; *t* (188) = -2.05, *p*<.05, η^2=.02) than for the positive story (*M*=3.364, *SD*=.774, *n*=92).

Table 11: Means of Perceived Accuracy and Objectivity of News (by story valence)

	Valence	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Accuracy	Positive	92	3.507	.7631	.0796
	Negative	96	3.514	.5822	.0594
Objectivity	Positive	92	3.364	.7743	.0807
	Negative	96	3.573	.6123	.0625

Table 12: Results of Independent Samples t-test

		Levene's Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
						Sig. (2-t)	Mean Dif.	S.E. Dif	95% C.I.	
		F	Sig.	t	df				Lower	Upper
Accuracy	Equal var assumed	5.47	0.02	-0.07	186	0.95	-0.01	0.10	-0.20	0.19
	Equal var not assumed			-0.07	170	0.95	-0.01	0.10	-0.20	0.19
Objectivity	Equal var assumed	3.94	0.05	-2.06	186	0.04	-0.21	0.10	-0.41	-0.01
	Equal var not assumed			-2.05	173	0.04	-0.21	0.10	-0.41	-0.01

For both measures on trust (perceived accuracy and perceived objectivity), negative stories were perceived as more trust-worthy than the positive story. Perceived objectivity was significantly higher for the negative story than that for positive story; perceived accuracy was higher for the negative story, too, but the difference was small. In other words, regardless of source, participants rated the negative story as less opinionated toward China.

Figure 13. Means of Perceived Accuracy: Positive Story vs. Negative Story

Figure 14. Means of Perceived Objectivity: Positive Story vs. Negative Story

Effects of Source

Effects of Source on Country Image

The third research question asked what impact, if any, does exposure to a news story about China from a Chinese source (vs. American source) have on American audiences' perception of China (e.g.: functional, normative, aesthetic and emotional dimensions)?

Less than half of the participants (n=88 or 46.8%) recalled the source of the news story they read. Of the 88 participants, 29 correctly reported the name of the Chinese media organization and 39 participants correctly recalled the name of the American media organization.

Among those who did recall the sources, a paired-samples *t-test* (Table 13 and Table 14) indicated that three of the four dimensions (functional, aesthetics and emotional) decreased following exposure to news from a Chinese source. The two dimensions of functional and normative increased, while the other two dimensions of aesthetics and emotional decreased following exposure to news from a U.S. source. The perceived normative dimension of China's image significantly increased following exposure to news from either a Chinese or U.S. source.

Table 13: Change in perceived country image by news source (pre vs. post exposure)

Source			Paired Differences					t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
			Mean	S.D.	S.E.	95% Confidence Interval				
						Lower	Upper			
CH	Pair 1	PrFunc_Sum - PoFunc_Sum	0.1367	0.634	0.0634	0.0109	0.2625	2.155	99	0.034
	Pair 2	PrNorm_Sum - PoNorm_Sum	-0.3	0.7286	0.0729	-0.4446	-0.1554	-4.117	99	0
	Pair 3	PrAesth_Sum - PoAesth_Sum	0.14	0.6199	0.062	0.017	0.263	2.259	99	0.026
	Pair 4	PrEmo_Sum - PoEmo_Sum	0.09	0.7199	0.072	-0.0528	0.2328	1.25	99	0.214
US	Pair 1	PrFunc_Sum - PoFunc_Sum	-0.0038	0.6791	0.0728	-0.1486	0.1409	-0.053	86	0.958
	Pair 2	PrNorm_Sum - PoNorm_Sum	-0.249	0.7388	0.0792	-0.4065	-0.0916	-3.144	86	0.002
	Pair 3	PrAesth_Sum - PoAesth_Sum	0.0728	0.5043	0.0541	-0.0347	0.1803	1.346	86	0.182
	Pair 4	PrEmo_Sum - PoEmo_Sum	0.0153	0.5055	0.0542	-0.0924	0.1231	0.283	86	0.778

Table 14: Means of Perceived Country Image by news source

Source			Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
CH source	Pair 1	PrFunc_Sum	4.113	100	.7846	.0785
		PoFunc_Sum	3.977	100	.7731	.0773
	Pair 2	PrNorm_Sum	3.010	100	1.0725	.1073
		PoNorm_Sum	3.310	100	.9620	.0962
	Pair 3	PrAesth_Sum	4.300	100	.6775	.0678
		PoAesth_Sum	4.160	100	.6939	.0694
	Pair 4	PrEmo_Sum	3.703	100	.8875	.0887
		PoEmo_Sum	3.613	100	.9122	.0912
US source	Pair 1	PrFunc_Sum	4.119	87	.6876	.0737
		PoFunc_Sum	4.123	87	.6630	.0711
	Pair 2	PrNorm_Sum	3.100	87	.9620	.1031
		PoNorm_Sum	3.349	87	.8459	.0907
	Pair 3	PrAesth_Sum	4.345	87	.6695	.0718
		PoAesth_Sum	4.272	87	.6420	.0688
	Pair 4	PrEmo_Sum	3.579	87	.8841	.0948
		PoEmo_Sum	3.563	87	.8327	.0893

Effects of a Chinese source. There was a statistically significant decrease in perceived functionality of China's country image (e.g.: associate China with creative ideas and innovative solutions, and a strong position in the global economy) from pre-exposure ($M = 4.13$, $SD = .78$) to post exposure [$M = 3.98$, $SD = .73$, $t(99) = 2.16$, $p <.005$, $\eta^2 = .05$] to news from a Chinese source.

There was a statistically significant increase in the perceived normative dimension of China's image (e.g.: China takes responsibility for future generations, shows solidarity and responsibility in tackling global challenges, and helps to solve the contemporary problems in the world) from pre-exposure ($M = 3.01$, $SD = 1.07$) to

post exposure [M = 3.31, SD = .96, t (99) = -4.12, p <.001, η^2 =.15] to news from a

Chinese source.

There was also a statistically significant decrease in perceived aesthetics of

China's image (e.g.: China has unique and internationally recognized cultural assets,

a rich history and appealing traditions) from pre-exposure (M = 4.30, SD = .68) to

post exposure [M = 4.16, SD = .69, t (99) = 2.26, p <.05, η^2 =.05] to news from a

Chinese source.

The perceived emotional attraction for China (e.g.: I like China; China is

fascinating; I am drawn to China.) decreased from pre-exposure (M=3.70, SD=.89) to

post exposure (M = 3.61, SD = .91) to news about China from a Chinese source, but

his difference was not statistically significant [t (99) = 1.25, p =.24].

Effects of a U.S. source. Similar to the effects of a Chinese source, there was a

statistically significant increase in the perceived normative dimension of China's

image (e.g.: China takes responsibility for future generations, shows solidarity and

responsibility in tackling global challenges, and helps to solve the contemporary

problems in the world) from pre-exposure (M = 3.10, SD = .96) to post exposure [M =

3.35, SD = .85, t (86) = -3.14, p <.01, η^2 =.10] to news from a U.S. source.

Results also showed an increase in the perceived functional dimension of

China's image (e.g.: e.g.: associate China with creative ideas and innovative

solutions, and a strong position in the global economy) from pre (M = 4.119, SD =

.687) to post exposure (M = 4.123, SD = .663) to a news story about China from an

American source but this difference was not significant [t (99) = -0.53, p =.96].

Participants' perceived aesthetics dimension of China's image (e.g.: China has unique and internationally recognized cultural assets, a rich history and appealing traditions) decreased from pre-exposure (M = 4.35, SD = .67) to post exposure (M = 4.27, SD = .64) to news about China from an American source. This difference was not significant, however [t (99) = 1.35, p =.18].

The measure for a perceived emotional dimension of China's image (e.g.: I like China; China is fascinating; I am drawn to China.) decreased from pre-exposure (M = 3.58, SD = .88) to post exposure (M = 3.56, SD = .83) to news about China from an American source but this difference was not significant [t (99) = .28, p =.78].

Effects of Source on Trust

The fourth research question explored what impact, if any, does exposure to a story about China from a Chinese media source (vs. American media source) have on American audiences' perceived trust of news (e.g.: accuracy and objectivity)?

For those who recalled the source of the story they read (n=88 or 46.8% of total participants), results showed that American audiences perceived news from an American media source as more accurate and more objective than the same news presented from a Chinese source, regardless of story valence. However, neither difference was statistically significant.

For perceived accuracy of the news, an independent sample *t-test* indicated that participants' perceived accuracy of news presented from an American source (M = 3.68, SD = .75) was higher than the same news from a Chinese source (M = 3.41, SD = .66) (Figure 15 below). However, the difference between the means is not significant [t (86) = -1.83, p =.07, η^2=.04] (see Table 15 and Table 16 below).

For perceived objectivity of the news story, participants reported higher perceived objectivity for the story presented by an American source ($M = 3.57$, $SD = 74$.) compared to the same news from a Chinese source ($M = 3.36$, $SD = .7$) (see Figure 16 below). This difference was not significant [$t(86) = -1.34$, $p = .18$, $\eta^2 = .02$] (see Table 15 and Table 16 below).

Table 15: Means of Perceived Accuracy and Objectivity of News by Source (recalled)

	Source	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Accuracy	CH source	42	3.405	.6607	.1019
	US source	46	3.681	.7502	.1106
Objectivity	CH source	42	3.357	.7117	.1098
	US source	46	3.565	.7387	.1089

Table 16: Means of trust (perceived accuracy and objectivity) in news by source (recalled)

		Levene's Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means					95% C.I.	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-t)	Mean dif.	S.E. dif.	Lower	Upper
Accuracy	Equal var Assumed	1.3	0.26	-1.83	86	0.07	-0.28	0.15	-0.58	0.02
	Equal var not assumed			-1.84	85.90	0.07	-0.28	0.15	-0.58	0.02
Objectivity	Equal var assumed	0.22	0.6	-1.34	86	0.18	-0.21	0.15	-0.52	0.09
	Equal var not assumed			-1.35	85.74	0.18	-0.21	0.15	-0.52	0.09

Figure 15. Means of Perceived Accuracy (Chinese vs. U.S. source)

Figure 16. Means of Perceived Objectivity (Chinese vs. U.S. source)

The Relationship between Trust of Source and Trust of Content

The fifth research question examined what impact, if any, does trust of a media source (e.g.: a Chinese media source vs. American media source) have on trust of news (e.g.: accuracy and objectivity) supplied by that source?

Relationship of Trust of Source and Trust of Story. Pearson's correlation coefficient testing was conducted to examine the relationship, if any, between trust of news source and trust of story. Results showed a significant positive correlation between trust in the source and perceived accuracy of the story ($r = .207$, $n = 188$, $p < .005$), with higher levels of trust of a source associated with higher levels of perceived accuracy of a story. Among the participants who recalled the news source to which they were exposed ($n = 88$), the correlation was stronger ($n = 88$, $r = .602$, $p < .001$). There was also a significant positive correlation between trust of news source and perceived objectivity of a story ($n = 188$, $r = .160$, $p < .05$), with higher levels of trust of source associated with higher perceived objectivity of a story. Of the 88 participants who recall the source, the correlation was significantly stronger ($n = 88$, $r = .505$, $p < .001$).

Effects of Trust in Source on Trust of Story (by source). Of the 88 participants accurately recalling the source they viewed, significant positive correlations were found between trust of source and perceived accuracy of news for those participants exposed to a Chinese source ($n = 42$, $r = .571$, $p < .001$) and those exposed to an American source ($n = 46$, $r = .465$, $p < .001$). Higher trust in a news source were associated with higher perceived accuracy of the news. However, the correlations were not statistically significant ($z_{obs} = .217 < 1.96$). Significant positive correlations

were measured between trust of source and perceived objectivity from those exposed to a Chinese source ($n = 42$, $r = .542$, $p <.001$) or the American source ($n = 46$, $r = .465$, $p <.005$). Higher trust of source was associated with higher levels of perceived objectivity of a story but there were no significant correlations of the two groups ($z_{obs} = .461 <1.96$).

Trust of Chinese versus American source. Results (Table 17 and Table 18) show that Americans trust a U.S. news source (M=3.98, SD=1.02) more than they trust a Chinese source (M=3.14, SD=.87) on stories about China, and this difference is significant ([t (86) = -4.11, $p <.001$ η^2=.16]

Table 17: Means on Trust of News Source (Chinese vs. U.S.)

	Source	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
Trust of News Source	CH	42	3.14	.872	.134
	US	46	3.98	1.022	.151

Table 18: Trust of Chinese Source vs. U.S. Source

		Levene's Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
										95% C.I.	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Dif.	S.E. Dif.	Lower	Upper
Trust of News Source	Equal var assumed	1.052	0.308	-1.827	86	0.00	-0.835	0.203	-1.240	-0.431
	Equal var not assumed			-4.137	85.62	0.00	-0.835	0.202	-1.237	-0.434

Effects of Source x Story Valence

Effects of Source x Valence on Country Image

The sixth research question explored what impact, if any, are the combined effects (news source and story valence) on American audiences' perception of China's image.

Effects of Source and Valence combined. As shown in Table 19 and Table 20, three of the four dimensions decreased following exposure to a Chinese source. The three were perceived functional, aesthetics and emotional dimensions. Exposure to a negative story about China from a U.S. source had no significant impact on U.S. audiences' perception of China's image. However, exposure to a positive story from a Chinese source pushed the American audience away emotionally from China. Positive coverage from a U.S. source about China increased perceived solidarity and responsibility of China in its normative dimension. In contrast, exposure to negative coverage from a Chinese source increased the perceived normative dimension of China among American audiences.

Emotional attraction towards China. Testing the positive story from a Chinese source, there was a statistically significant decrease in emotional attraction to China's image (e.g.: I like China; I am drawn to China; China is fascinating) between pre-exposure ($M = 3.78$, $SD = .84$) to post exposure [$M = 3.61$, $SD = .89$, t (47) = 2.15, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .09$].

The normative dimension following exposure to a positive story from a U.S. source. When testing effects of the positive story from a U.S. source there was a statistically significant increase in the normative dimension of China's image (e.g.:

China takes responsibility for future generations, shows solidarity and responsibility in tackling global challenges, and helps to solve the contemporary problems in the world) between pre-exposure ($M = 3.12$, $SD = 1.10$) and post exposure [$M = 3.40$, $SD = .94$, $t(42) = -2.78$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .16$].

The normative dimension of perceived country image of China following exposure to a negative story from a Chinese source. Similar to the impacts of exposure to a positive story from a U.S. source, exposure to the negative story from a Chinese source produced a statistically significant increase in the perceived normative of China's image (e.g.: China takes responsibility for future generations, shows solidarity and responsibility in tackling global challenges, and helps to solve the contemporary problems in the world) between pre exposure ($M = 2.96$, $SD = 1.05$) to post exposure [$M = 3.43$, $SD = .91$, $t(51) = -4.01$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .24$].

Table 19: Changes in perceived country image (pre and post exposure) by story version

StoryVersion			Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower	Upper	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
PosCD	Pair 1	PrFunc_Sum – PoFunc_Sum	.1597	.6450	.0931	-.0276	.3470	1.716	47	.093
	Pair 2	PrNorm_Sum – PoNorm_Sum	-.1181	.5348	.0772	-.2733	.0372	-1.529	47	.133
	Pair 3	PrAesth_Sum – PoAesth_Sum	.1597	.5711	.0824	-.0061	.3256	1.938	47	.059
	Pair 4	PrEmo_Sum – PoEmo_Sum	.1667	.5370	.0775	.0107	.3226	2.150	47	.037
PosNYT	Pair 1	PrFunc_Sum – PoFunc_Sum	-.0853	.8328	.1270	-.3416	.1710	-.671	42	.506
	Pair 2	PrNorm_Sum – PoNorm_Sum	-.2791	.6584	.1004	-.4817	-.0764	-2.779	42	.008
	Pair 3	PrAesth_Sum – PoAesth_Sum	.0155	.4422	.0674	-.1206	.1516	.230	42	.819
	Pair 4	PrEmo_Sum – PoEmo_Sum	.0775	.4474	.0682	-.0602	.2152	1.136	42	.262
NegCD	Pair 1	PrFunc_Sum – PoFunc_Sum	.1154	.6293	.0873	-.0598	.2906	1.322	51	.192
	Pair 2	PrNorm_Sum – PoNorm_Sum	-.4679	.8408	.1166	-.7020	-.2339	-4.013	51	.000
	Pair 3	PrAesth_Sum – PoAesth_Sum	.1218	.6668	.0925	-.0638	.3074	1.317	51	.194
	Pair 4	PrEmo_Sum – PoEmo_Sum	.0192	.8541	.1184	-.2185	.2570	.162	51	.872
NegNYT	Pair 1	PrFunc_Sum – PoFunc_Sum	.0758	.4815	.0726	-.0706	.2222	1.044	43	.302
	Pair 2	PrNorm_Sum – PoNorm_Sum	-.2197	.8163	.1231	-.4679	.0285	-1.785	43	.081
	Pair 3	PrAesth_Sum – PoAesth_Sum	.1288	.5578	.0841	-.0408	.2984	1.531	43	.133
	Pair 4	PrEmo_Sum – PoEmo_Sum	-.0455	.5549	.0837	-.2142	.1233	-.543	43	.590

Paired sample T-test: Significant change in perceived country image before and after exposure – groups split by story version

Table 20: Means of Perceived Country Image (pre and post exposure) by story version

StoryVersion			Mean	N	S.D.	S.E. Mean
PosCD	Pair 1	PrFunc_Sum	4.181	48	.8164	.1178
		PoFunc_Sum	4.021	48	.7912	.1142
	Pair 2	PrNorm_Sum	3.062	48	1.1059	.1596
		PoNorm_Sum	3.181	48	1.0081	.1455
	Pair 3	PrAesth_Sum	4.319	48	.5873	.0848
		PoAesth_Sum	4.160	48	.6841	.0987
	Pair 4	PrEmo_Sum	3.778	48	.8431	.1217
		PoEmo_Sum	3.611	48	.8948	.1292
PosNYT	Pair 1	PrFunc_Sum	4.101	43	.7819	.1192
		PoFunc_Sum	4.186	43	.7357	.1122
	Pair 2	PrNorm_Sum	3.116	43	1.0956	.1671
		PoNorm_Sum	3.395	43	.9379	.1430
	Pair 3	PrAesth_Sum	4.318	43	.6744	.1028
		PoAesth_Sum	4.302	43	.6579	.1003
	Pair 4	PrEmo_Sum	3.636	43	.8962	.1367
		PoEmo_Sum	3.558	43	.9336	.1424
NegCD	Pair 1	PrFunc_Sum	4.051	52	.7566	.1049
		PoFunc_Sum	3.936	52	.7614	.1056
	Pair 2	PrNorm_Sum	2.962	52	1.0492	.1455
		PoNorm_Sum	3.429	52	.9107	.1263
	Pair 3	PrAesth_Sum	4.282	52	.7566	.1049
		PoAesth_Sum	4.160	52	.7094	.0984
	Pair 4	PrEmo_Sum	3.635	52	.9294	.1289
		PoEmo_Sum	3.615	52	.9367	.1299
NegNYT	Pair 1	PrFunc_Sum	4.136	44	.5898	.0889
		PoFunc_Sum	4.061	44	.5852	.0882
	Pair 2	PrNorm_Sum	3.083	44	.8232	.1241
		PoNorm_Sum	3.303	44	.7533	.1136
	Pair 3	PrAesth_Sum	4.371	44	.6714	.1012
		PoAesth_Sum	4.242	44	.6323	.0953
	Pair 4	PrEmo_Sum	3.523	44	.8787	.1325
		PoEmo_Sum	3.568	44	.7316	.1103

Combined Effects of Source x Valence on Trust of News

The seventh research question explored what impact, if any, does story version (source x valence) have on audience perceived trust of news story. Results of a one-way ANOVA showed that no significant difference was found between the four story versions.

Table 21: Means of Perceived Accuracy and Objectivity of News Source x Valence

		N	Mean	S.D.	S.E.	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Min.	Max.
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Accuracy	PosCD	22	3.303	0.7623	0.1625	2.965	3.641	1.3	5
	PosNYT	24	3.667	0.8847	0.1806	3.293	4.04	1.3	5
	NegCD	20	3.517	0.524	0.1172	3.271	3.762	2.7	4.7
	NegNYT	22	3.697	0.5901	0.1258	3.435	3.959	2.7	5
	Total	88	3.549	0.7184	0.0766	3.397	3.701	1.3	5
Objectivity	PosCD	22	3.193	0.8414	0.1794	2.82	3.566	1	5
	PosNYT	24	3.406	0.7899	0.1612	3.073	3.74	1.8	4.5
	NegCD	20	3.538	0.4952	0.1107	3.306	3.769	2.8	4.5
	NegNYT	22	3.739	0.6523	0.1391	3.449	4.028	2.3	5
	Total	88	3.466	0.7293	0.0777	3.311	3.62	1	5

Table 22: Perceived Accuracy and Objectivity between four story versions

		Sum of Sqr.	df	Mean Sqr.	F	Sig.
Accuracy	Between Groups	2.166	3	.722	1.419	.243
	Within Groups	42.732	84	.509		
	Total	44.898	87			
Objectivity	Between Groups	3.461	3	1.154	2.263	.087
	Within Groups	42.812	84	.510		
	Total	46.273	87			

*Figure 17. Means of Perceived Accuracy of News by Story Version*

*Figure 18. Perceived Objectivity of Criticism By Story Valence and Source*

Figure 19. Means of Perceived Objectivity by Story Valence and Source

Correlations: Trust of News and Perceived Country Image

examined what impact, if any, does an audience's trust of news read have on the perceived image of the country addressed in the news. Pearson *r* was used to test the relationship between trust (measured by perceived accuracy and perceived objectivity of news) and perceived country image (measured by the four dimensions of: functional, normative, aesthetics and emotional). Audiences' perceived country image was measured pre and post exposure to the story. Preliminary analyses ensured no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity. Small to medium positive correlations were observed between trust (for both perceived accuracy and perceived objectivity of news) and nearly all dimensions of a country's image (for both before and after exposure) except the normative dimension. The correlation between perceived

accuracy and the emotional dimension of a country were statistically stronger after exposure to the news than pre-exposure. Conversely, statistically stronger correlations were evident after exposure as compared to be before exposure for perceived objectivity and the aesthetics dimension of country image, plus perceived objectivity and the emotional dimension of country image.

Relationship of perceived accuracy and perceived country image. As is shown in Table 23 and Table 24, Pearson's *r* showed a significant positive correlation between perceived accuracy and the functional dimension of country image before exposure (*n*=188, *r*= .250, *p*<.005). Higher perceived accuracy was associated with higher perceived functionality (e.g.: I associate China with creative ideas and innovative solutions; China is recognized internationally as a country that is significant for science and research; China holds a strong position in the global economy). The same correlation was significantly higher after exposure to the news (*n*=187, *r*= .391, *p*<.001). However, there was no significant difference between the strength of the two correlations (z_{obs}= -1.508 > - 1.96) of perceived accuracy and perceived country image before and after exposure.

No significant correlations between perceived accuracy and perceived normative dimension of country image were measured before exposure, but a significant positive correlation was observed after exposure (*n*=187, *r* = .258, *p* <.001).

There was also a significant positive correlation between perceived accuracy and country image before exposure (*n*=188, *r*= .223, *p*<.005), with higher levels of accuracy associated with higher aesthetics of China (e.g.: China has unique and

internationally recognized cultural assets; China has a rich history and appealing traditions). The same correlation coefficient was not only significant but also stronger after exposure to the news story (n=187, r= .321, p<.001). There was is no significant difference between the strength of the two correlation coefficients (z_{obs} = -1.632 > -1.96) in terms of perceived accuracy and the aesthetics dimension of country image before or after exposure.

Pearson's r revealed a significant, positive correlation between perceived accuracy and the emotional dimension of country image before exposure (n=188, r= .172, p<.05), with higher perceived accuracy associated with higher emotional attraction of China (e.g.: China is fascinating; I like China; I am drawn to China). The same was significantly higher after exposure (n=187, r= .238, p<.001). There was a significant difference between the strength of the two correlation coefficients (z_{obs} = -2.49 < - 1.96) between perceived accuracy and the emotional dimension of country image both before and after exposure. The positive correlation between perceived accuracy and the emotional dimension of country image was significantly stronger after exposure.

Table 23: Pre-exposure Correlations: Perceived Accuracy and Country Image

		Accuracy	PrFunc	PrNorm	PrAesth	PrEmo
Accuracy	Pearson's r	1	.250**	0.094	.223**	.172*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.001	0.2	0.002	0.018
	N	188	188	188	188	188
PrFunc	Pearson's r		1	.401**	.491**	.425**
	Sig. (2-tailed)			0	0	0
	N		188	188	188	188
PrNorm	Pearson's r			1	.194**	.427**
	Sig. (2-tailed)				0.007	0
	N			188	188	188
PrAesth	Pearson's r				1	.518**
	Sig. (2-tailed)					0
	N				188	188
PrEmo	Pearson's r					1
	Sig. (2-tailed)					
	N					188

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 24: Post Exposure Correlations: Perceived Accuracy and Country Image

		Accuracy	PoFunc	PoNorm	PoAesth	PoEmo
Accuracy	Pearson's r	1	.391**	.258**	.321**	.238**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0	0	0	0.001
	N	188	187	187	187	187
PoFunc	Pearson's r		1	.364**	.542**	.359**
	Sig. (2-tailed)			0	0	0
	N		187	187	187	187
PoNorm	Pearson's r			1	.251**	.454**
	Sig. (2-tailed)				0.001	0
	N			187	187	187
PoAesth	Pearson's r				1	.474**
	Sig. (2-tailed)					0
	N				187	187
PoEmo	Pearson's r					1
	Sig. (2-tailed)					
	N					187

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Relationship of perceived news objectivity and perceived country image. With the exception of the normative dimension, small to medium positive correlations (Tables 25 and 26) were occurred between perceived objectivity and nearly all dimensions of country image (both before and after exposure). The strengths of the correlation between (1) Perceived objectivity and the aesthetics dimension of country image, and (2) The perceived objectivity and the emotional dimension of country image were all statistically stronger following exposure than before exposure to the story.

There was also a significant positive correlation between perceived objectivity and the functional dimension of country image before exposure (n=188, r= .209, p<.005). Higher perceived objectivity was associated with higher perceived functionality (e.g.: I associate China with creative ideas and innovative solutions; China is recognized internationally as a country that is significant for science and research; China holds a strong position in the global economy). The same correlation was significant (and stronger) after exposure to the news (n=187, r= .388, p<.001). However, the difference between the strength of the correlations (z_{obs} = -1.89 > - 1.96) between perceived objectivity and the functional dimension of country image was not significant before or after exposure to the news story.

Before exposure to the news story, there was no significant correlation between perceived objectivity and the normative dimension of country image is observed, but a significantly positive correlation occurred after exposure (n=187, r = .320, p <.001).

There was a significant positive correlation between perceived objectivity and the aesthetics dimension of country image before exposure (n=188, r= .154, p<.05),

with higher perceived accuracy associated with higher perceived aesthetics of China (e.g.: China has unique and internationally recognized cultural assets; China has a rich history and appealing traditions). This same correlation was significant and stronger after exposure (n=187, r= .299, p<.001). There was a statistically significant difference between the strength of the two correlation coefficients (z_{obs} = -3.217 < -1.96). The positive correlation between perceived objectivity and perceived aesthetics dimension of country image was significantly stronger after exposure.

No significant correlation was observed before exposure between participants' perceived objectivity and the emotional dimensions of country image (e.g.: China is fascinating; I like China; I am drawn to China), but a significant positive correlation occurred after exposure (n=187, r = .213, p <.005). This difference between the strength of the two correlation coefficients (z_{obs} = -2.88 < - 1.96) between perceived objectivity and the emotional dimensions of country image were significant both before and after exposure (n=187, r = .213, p <.005). The positive correlation between perceived objectivity and the emotional dimensions of country image was significantly stronger after exposure to the news.

Table 25: Correlations: Perceived Objectivity and Country Image (Pre-exposure)

		Objectivity	PrFunc	PrNorm	PrAesth	PrEmo
Objectivity	Pearson's r	1	.209[**]	0.125	.154[*]	0.11
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.004	0.087	0.034	0.134
	N	188	188	188	188	188
PrFunc	Pearson's r		1	.401[**]	.491[**]	.425[**]
	Sig. (2-tailed)			0	0	0
	N		188	188	188	188
PrNorm	Pearson's r			1	.194[**]	.427[**]
	Sig. (2-tailed)				0.007	0
	N			188	188	188
PrAesth	Pearson's r				1	.518[**]
	Sig. (2-tailed)					0
	N				188	188
PrEmo	Pearson's r					1
	Sig. (2-tailed)					
	N					188

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 26: Correlations: Perceived Objectivity and Country Image (Post-exposure)

		Objectivity	PrFunc	PrNorm	PrAesth	PrEmo
Objectivity	Pearson's r	1	.388[**]	.320[**]	.299[**]	.213[**]
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0	0	0	0.003
	N	188	187	187	187	187
PrFunc	Pearson's r		1	.364[**]	.542[**]	.359[**]
	Sig. (2-tailed)			0	0	0
	N		187	187	187	187
PrNorm	Pearson's r			1	.251[**]	.454[**]
	Sig. (2-tailed)				0.001	0
	N			187	187	187
PrAesth	Pearson's r				1	.474[**]
	Sig. (2-tailed)					0
	N				187	187
PrEmo	Pearson's r					1
	Sig. (2-tailed)					
	N					187

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Chapter 6 Discussion

Impact of Story Version on Country Image

To summarize, the results of this study suggest that *independent* of story version, mere exposure to a news story about China had a positive impact on American audiences' perception of China as a responsible country. This result confirmed the first of three key steps[45] proposed by Anholt (2010) to transform a negative nation brand. This finding was also similar to those from previous studies that more exposure to foreign news (McNelly and Izcaray, 1986), and more attention paid to foreign affairs news (Semetko, Brzinski, Weaver and Willnat, 1992), are predictors of positive perceptions of foreign nations. It's also important to note that this study employed measures of country image were more detailed from the previous research. This study also tested a more advanced model of country image (Buhmann and Ingenhoff, 2015) compared to previous branding literature by combining both cognitive and affective aspects of audience perception. In general, this finding confirmed the previously measured agenda-setting effects of international news.

One counter-intuitive finding was that after reading a news story about China, American audiences had a less positive image of China as a country with appealing cultural traditions. Specifically, the perceived aesthetic dimension of country image

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[45] Anholt (2010), the father of *Nation Branding*, proposed three key steps to transform a negative nation brand into a positive one. The very first step to tackle negative media coverage is to attract audience attention for re-appraisal of the nations' image. The second step is to build compelling evidence for that new narrative. The third is an interpretive key for the actual change. It seems China is in between the first two steps, where a new narrative is formed, but not strong enough (first step), and more evidences are also needed to back up that peaceful rise China narrative (second step).

decreased. This outcome was unexpected because it contradicts image perception theory that posits out-group stereotypes[46]. More research is needed to confirm this finding and to explore more possible explanations for it. If the finding is confirmed by future research, it could assist public diplomacy practitioners and policy makers in China in deciding whether it is effective to continue promoting traditional Chinese culture[47] as a source of Chinese soft power.

This finding also reflects the challenge previously noted by Chinese scholars on public diplomacy. The challenge was that soft power represented in traditional Chinese culture may not always translate to soft power of today's Chinese culture (Yu, in Zhao et al, 2012). In other words, capitalizing on the past heritage of China may have little to no effect. If audiences only appreciate traditional but not modern Chinese culture (as noted by Wang, Y., 2008) that is shadowed by self-censorship and Communist ideologies, any efforts to modernize China's cultural traditional would be

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[46] Empirical evidences from psychology have shown that people are less likely to accept information incongruent with their existing beliefs, but are more ready to accept information consistent with their prior beliefs (for detailed discussion, see Bruner and Postman ,1950 or summaries in Wang, 2008). So it will be likely for people to accept a positive image if it is consistent with their previous perception about of that country's image. But it will be very difficult for them to accept a positive image that challenges their existing stereotype of a rivalry country. In this study, the aesthetics dimension of China's country image (perception on values of its unique cultural assets, rich history and appealing traditions) scores the highest among all four dimensions being measured, both pre- and post- the exposure of news. The other three dimensions measures competence (technology, economic and educational advancement - functional), integrity (responsible actions for international community and future generations - normative), and emotional attraction (positive feelings and general likings – affective).

[47] The Chinese government has focused heavily on traditional Chinese culture as a source of Chinese soft power in its practice of public diplomacy (Jiang, 2007; Tong, 2008; Wang, 2008; d'Hooghe, 2015).

an iconoclastic act to China's image[48]. If true, this suggests that China needs to build

a new identity beyond its cultural identity in history – a nurturing and open, modern

Chinese culture with universal values to which global audiences can relate and values

that nurture dialogue and an exchange of ideas.

On the other hand, in the context of research questions one, two and three, the

tested story version on a perceived country image[49], variation of media source or

positive/negative valence of story frames did not significantly change audience

perceptions of another country's image. Hypotheses one (positive story, positive

image) and two (negative story, negative image) were not supported. This outcome

was unexpected, because past agenda-setting and framing studies found that

negatively framed news negatively influenced foreign nations' image, while positive

stories had little to no impact (e.g.: Wanta, Golan and Lee, 2004; Besova and Cooley,

2009; Zhang and Meadows, 2012).

My third hypothesis (local source, positive impact on country image) also

failed to obtain support. The effect of source was not significant perhaps because

participants were not paying attention to the media source that appeared with the

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[48] The two versions of stimuli stories used in this study both tackled on the issue of modernizing traditional Chinese medicine. The negative version of story focused on the challenges and problems. The positive version of story focused on the opportunities and benefits. For more details, see the stories in Appendix A.

[49] RQ3 (Effects of source x Valence on Country Image) examined what impact, if any, are the combined effects of an exposed story version (source x valence) have on American audiences' perception of China's country image. No significant impact from this interaction is found on the audience perceived country image before and after reading the news. H4 – H7 were all rejected. H4: US positive news, positive impact on country image; H5: US negative news, negative impact on country image. H6: Chinese positive news, positive impact on country image; H7: Chinese negative news, negative impact on country image.

stories participants were given to read. Future studies need to take this factor into consideration especially with younger audiences who may easily overlook sources and focus only on the story content. Given the relatively limited literature comparing the effects of sources in transnational journalism on perceived trust (Müller, 2013; Pjesivac and Rui, 2014), this study's finding suggests that only one study with two manipulated stories may not have provided enough statistical power to answer the research question.

One possible explanation may be the limitations of source credibility effects on an audience's memory, which can diminish or even change over time. For instance, it is possible that the audience might remember only the story content without recalling from where the content originates (for more on misattribution of memory, see Schacter, 1999; or source amnesia, see Schacter et. al, 1984). Equally possible is the audience remembering previously read information, but later attributing it to the wrong source (For more on source confusion, see Schacter, 1999). In either case, false information from a non-credible source could always be perceived as truth. Therefore, the effects of source might not surpass the stronger effects of the message itself, which is consistent with previous findings (e.g.: Metzger et al., 2003) This may explain why mere exposure to a news story about China might could affect American audiences' perception of China's country image, regardless of the source of the news story.

Impact of Story Version on Trust in News

The second group of research questions in this study (research questions four through seven) examined the impact of story version on audiences' trust in news.

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Results suggest that story valence (research question four) made a significant difference in audiences' perceived trust in the news, but not in the originating source (research question five) of that news. In addition, there was no significant interaction (research question seven) of story valence and source on perceived trust in the news. The correlation between trust in media source and trust in news story (research question six), however, was statically significant, but appeared to be attenuated by the fact that only about half of the participants could recall the media source.

Findings from research question four (addressing effects of story valence on perceived trust of news) suggest that American audiences place more trust in a news story about another country if that news is presented in a negative frame as opposed to a positive frame, *regardless of its source.* In support of hypothesis eight, American audiences appeared to evaluate negative news about China as more objective[50] than positive news about the same topic. This result confirmed the structural negativism in international news production found in previous studies (e.g.: Galtung 1974; Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Davidson, 1973; Kunczik, 2002). This is congruent with the literature in cognitive psychology that people tend to pay more attention to negative information than positive information. Media psychology experiments have consistently confirmed that this editorial practice of negative newsworthiness will automatically engages the audiences' attention. Our brains automatically pay more attention to negatively compelling stimuli, given our limited cognitive ability to do

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[50] Perceived objectivity is measured by whether a story is expressed in an adequate manner, whether opinions of quoted sources in the story were well-founded, and whether the journalistic assessment regarding the topic of the story were useful.

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information-processing (Plutchik, 1984; Lang, Newhagen & Reeves, 1996; Reeves & Nass, 1996; Newhagen, 1998; Grabe, Lang & Zhao, 2003). This also reflects the general norm of journalism practice in America: that negative news fits the newsworthy standards for both general news (Östgaard, 1995; Shoemaker, 1996; Shoemaker, Chang & Brendlinger, 1987; Berkowitz, 1991; Lichter & Noyes, 1996; Spencer-Thomas, 2005, March 31) and especially international news (Gultung and Ruge, 1965, 1970; Peterson, 1979, 1981). This persistent pattern of editorial emphasis on negative news has become a phenomenon known as "if it bleeds, it leads" (Briller, 1993) or "bodybag journalism" (Salerno, 1995). This finding provides additional insights for the leadership of Chinese media in their practice of transnational journalism. The outcome suggests that the current practice of promoting positive images[51] of China via positive stories might not be the most effective way to win the trust from American audiences. On the contrary, discussing China's problems and challenges are perceived as more trustworthy to American audiences. This suggests a change of the strategic narratives in China's discourse in transnational journalism and reflects concerns by some of the public diplomacy scholars in the sinosphere (e.g. Yang, 2012). Instead of constantly pushing positive aspects of China, acknowledging some of China's problems could make China's transnational journalism to appear as more transparent and trustworthy. If that occurred, it could yield soft power for news in the long term.

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[51] A major goal of China's public diplomacy was to enhance China's international image, improve foreign public opinion of China (Zhao, 2012; Wei, 2011). Based on those goals, public diplomacy messages from China promote the positive aspects of China, from culture to political reforms and economic progress (Yang, 2012).

The fifth research question[52] explored the effects of media source on trust in news. These results should be interpreted with caution because before testing correlations of some variables, the researcher noticed half of the respondents could not recall the source of the information read. Future studies should explore whether this oversight was the result of readers' inability to recall information source (a so-called "sleeper effect"[53]) or the limited attention readers paid to the source in the first place. The latter could be related to a lack of media literacy but other pre measures would be needed if that is indeed the cause.

Among those participants who correctly recalled the media source of the story read, however, there was no statistically significant difference between perceived trust in news from a U.S. media source as compared to the foreign Chinese source. This meant no support for hypothesis nine[54]. Given that the majority of this study's participants were younger adults with a college education, future research could

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[52] RQ5 (Effects of media source on trust of news): What impact, if any, did exposure to a story from a Chinese media source (vs. American media source) about China have on American audiences' perception of the perceived trust of that news story?

[53] A sleeper effect is a delayed increase of persuasion effect of a message, usually accompanied by a declining effect of a discounting cue. A discounting cue is information that will cause an audience to become suspicious of the credibility of a message, such as a message disclaimer (e.g. sponsor information from an election candidate by the end of a negative political ad attacking the rival candidate in the message), or a low-credibility source. It is hypothesized that with repeated exposure of the same message (such as advertising), overtime an audience will forget about the discounting cue (that reduce the credibility of the message source). Findings and conditions where sleeper effect occurs are mixed so far. Longitudinal studies are needed to further detect the sleeper effect. (Source: Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Cook & Flay, 1978).

[54] H9: (More trust on news from local media than foreign media) Holding constant the story content, American audiences put more trust on a story from an American media source than that from a Chinese media source.

explore the impact of source on perceived trust with a larger and more age-diverse sample. Given that only half of this study's participants recalled the source of the news read may also bolster the importance of media literacy education for younger adults. Although this extends beyond the scope of this study, one could only speculate whether this result also relates to the amplified power of "fake news" on social media during news events such as the 2016 U.S. election. Future studies are needed to explore what other factors might contribute to an audience's trust of international news coverage.

Additionally, among those participants who did recall the media source, trust in source was an indicator for trust in the news, which answered research question six that explored the relationship between trust in both source and news. Higher trust in a source was not only associated with higher trust in news originating from that source but also in higher levels of perceived accuracy and objectivity.

The statistically significant positive correlation between trust in media source and perceived accuracy in news supported hypothesis ten that addressed the relationship between the two. Perceived objectivity of a story was also positively correlated with trust in its media source, again supporting hypothesis eleven. These results suggest that trust is currency for building soft power in news.

Impact of Trust in News on Country Image

The final research question number eight sought answers about the impact of trust in news on audiences' perceptions of country image.

Results indicated small to medium positive correlations between trust (plus perceived accuracy and objectivity) and most of the dimensions of country image.

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Interestingly, while this relationship held constant before and after exposure to the news, the positive correlation between trust with an emotional attraction to China became significantly stronger following exposure to the news story. The correlation between perceived accuracy and emotional attractions towards China was also significantly stronger after reading the story about China. This trend indicates that an American audience may have more positive feelings about China if s/he views a news story as truthful reporting about China. In addition, the positive correlation between perceived objectivity and the emotional dimensions of China's country image was significantly stronger after reading the story about China. This finding also suggests that the more trust an audience has in a story's journalistic assessment, the more positive feelings a reader will have for China as a country.

Admittedly, given only limited previous research exploring the relationships of trust of news and country image, these findings are still preliminary. More research would be needed to replicate these findings with larger samples that are diverse in age, region and nationality. If confirmed, this finding implies that perceived accuracy and objectivity could and should be key measurements of performance in China's transnational journalism if it is to form a favorable country image among American audiences.

The positive correlation between perceived objectivity and the aesthetics dimensions of China's image was significantly stronger after reading the news about China. This suggests that the more trust an audience places in a story's journalistic assessment, the more value audiences perceive in a country's culture. In other words, attribution of credibility is transmitted from the news to the actor being covered. This

finding was consistent with previous studies investigating second-level agenda

setting, or attribute agenda setting[55]. Attribute agenda setting is applicable from

media content onto country image and nation branding, in addition to individual

actors. Thus, trust in news may be the currency of soft power for transnational media,

and its agenda setting for a given country. All of these correlations indicate that

acquiring an audience's trust in news is critical to gaining the audience's positive

perception of the country discussed in that news.

Interestingly, it appears that higher level of trust - as indicated by perceived

accuracy or objectivity - does not appear to make a difference in a country's hard

power competence (the functional dimension) or a country's ethics integrity (the

normative dimension). However, higher levels of trust were associated with increases

in recognized values of a country's culture (the aesthetics dimension) and more

positive feelings toward that country (the emotional dimension). These results suggest

that news can indeed make a soft power impact on the perceived aesthetics and

emotional dimensions of a country's image. Again, the currency of that power

appears to be perceived trust in the news. This result also points back to the notion

that if a country wants to improve its image through international news, it needs to

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[55] For details on attribute agenda setting or second-level agenda setting, see
McCombs (2005), McCombs et al (1997) and Balmas and Sheafer (2010).
Source: McCombs, M. (2005). A look at agenda-setting: Past, present and future.
Journalism studies, *6*(4), 543-557.
McCombs, M. E., Llamas, J. P., Lopez-Escobar, E., & Rey, F. (1997). Candidate's
images in Spanish elections: Second-level agenda-setting effects. *Journalism & Mass
Communication Quarterly*. **74** (4): 703–717. doi:10.1177/107769909707400404
Balmas, M., & Sheafer, T. (2010). Candidate image in election campaigns: Attribute
agenda setting, affective priming, and voting intentions. *International journal of
public opinion research*, *22*(2), 204-229.

rely on the content and the sources that are perceived to be most trustworthy to its target audiences.

Implications for China's Public Diplomacy Communication

Findings from this study have several implications relating to the communication goals and approaches of China's public diplomacy. In terms of communication goals, China needs to define and adapt a more modern identity with universal values, and reduce its reliance on more traditional Chinese culture as the major source of soft power. In terms of communication approach, considering different standards of journalistic practice, and embracing self-critiques in its news coverage, could help to enhance not only audiences' trust in transnational media from China but also more positive images about China as a country.

In the context of the results reported here, China's communication goals of public diplomacy can be summarized into four aspects (Hayden, 2012; d'Hooghe, 2015). Economically, the goal is to present China as a responsible and reliable partner and to abate the fear of its rising economy as a rivalry to the U.S. Politically, the goal is to present China as a trustworthy and responsible member of the international community, willing to build a more peaceful world. The third goal is to promote and seek better international audiences' understanding of China's political system and its policies and to reduce misunderstanding of its cultural, political and ideological differences. The fourth goal is to revive China's image as a country by combining ancient history with a more vibrant modern culture. Scholars have maintained that the first goal of abating fear with a peaceful rise and the third goal of seeking

understanding in a cross-cultural context may be particularly hard to achieve in a cross-cultural communication context (d'Hooghe, 2012; Wang, 2010).

On the other hand, the findings from this study show that the second goal of presenting China as a responsible member of the international community (normative dimension of country image) may be achievable if audiences were provided more exposure to news about China. Findings from this study also suggest the last goal of cultural revival could be reconsidered and repositioned since promoting traditional Chinese culture only widens the imbalance between China's rich cultural heritage (identity in the past) and its weak modern culture (identity of present). This might do more harm than good to China's image building efforts.

Need to define China's identity in a constant flux

While China still sees itself as a developing country, many of its international audiences have started to regard China as a developed country. China, itself, is still looking for its identity in transition, which is also constantly changing. Before explaining itself to others, China needs to first adapt and redefine its identity reflecting the internal changes in China's social reality, such as the growing gap between rich and poor, its environmental issues, and the unaffordable rising housing price, etc. It must also address external changes with targeted nations, such as its growing trade imbalance with the U.S., and a lack of the mutual flow of information and merchandise between countries. In other words, China needs to know what it wants before it can explain itself to others.

In doing so, China needs to define, accept, and demonstrate its role. Instead of finding an identity as it develops, China must define its role as a future world leader,

and work toward it with periodic milestones and increasing accountability. The next step from the perspective of international journalism is to accept its identity as it is and be more transparent to its audiences both domestically and internationally. These efforts would represent a major change for China's policy in domestic governance and its approach to foreign audiences since it would deviate from China's highly centralized control of governance. However, this is a necessary step before China can play its role as a future world leader. If China wants to be the future world leader as portrayed in its transnational news to its global audiences, it also needs to act like one by addressing global challenges beyond China's own interests, such as fighting with world poverty and inequality, war on terror, climate change and resolving intercultural and inter-religious conflicts. This means that China's communication goals in public diplomacy practice should be changing.

The need to present a truthful China instead of a perfect China

As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, China's public diplomacy practice is driven by its constant positive image projection to counter-balance a negative image presented by Western media in the post-Cold War era. Findings from this study suggest that American audiences place more trust in negative news, and trust is positively correlated with both positive feelings towards China and more value in China's culture. These findings suggest that a truthful China would be more acceptable and approachable for foreign audiences than "a perfect China." These findings confirm with a warning by previous scholars that China should avoid seeking the perfect image for itself (Wang, 2010).

Presenting a more truthful China with self-critiques in its news coverage is more likely to generate a positive image of China as opposed to self-promoting its positive image. Findings from this study also show that positive news alone does not necessarily make a positive impact on American audiences' perception of China, even if that positive news originates from a U.S. media source such as the *New York Times*. This result is consistent with previous findings by Wanta, Golan and Lee (2004).

Even though China proposed the concept of *He* (harmony or peace) in its strategic narratives with the key terms of "peaceful rise", "peaceful coexistence", and "peaceful development" and "community of shared interests", "community of common destiny", and "people of shared interests", those concepts and narratives are at odds with the narrative of the "China Threat Theory" portrayed in mainstream Western media during at least the past two decades. Many in Western audiences are afraid of a rising China for historical[56] and current reasons. Some fears from the Cold War still linger in a polarized view of the world. The rising trade imbalance between China and America, for example, also generate fear among some Americans of the U.S. losing its leadership in the global economy. In short, China's strategy of only a positive image of China could backfire as it is supports existing stereotypes of a rival country in the minds of many Americans.

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[56] Melissen (2005) pointed out that people's present perception of another country's image will be contaminated by perception of image in the past. Thus American audiences' perception of China's past image during the Cold-War era (e.g.: the stereotype of a Communist authoritarian regime, or its media as government organ) may overshadow how they see China's image today, and how they see China's public diplomacy messages and China's media today.

Moreover, an all-positive image-promoting approach (as noted by d'Hooghe, 2015) not only implies governmental propaganda, but a lack of confidence in China's image building. Constantly communicating only positive aspects and promoting its progress, might only demonstrate that China is still not comfortable admitting shortcomings and accepting criticism because it seeks recognition for its achievements and progress, as pointed out by Yang (2012). Unless China can genuinely acknowledge the internal and external problems it is also facing, China wouldn't appear transparent and trustworthy to some foreign audiences with preconceived perceptions. In this case, the story China tells wouldn't seem convincing to those foreign audiences. As noted by Melissen (2005), successful public diplomacy activities and agents should be perceived as independent as possible from the advocate-country's government and its foreign policy objectives to avoid the risk of being counterproductive.

Promising Aspects to Make a Difference on Trust

Indeed, there are external aspects and historical aspects of its image that China cannot change, such as abating the loud, constant and accumulated media effects of the China Threat Theory and the Cold War mentality from news coverage by Western media that dominate international news channels or unexpected factors affecting U.S. foreign policy, such as the election of President Donald Trump. However, China could still make a noticeable effort with promising aspects of change through more trust in its own media and reporting, by building partnerships with media in targeted nations, and by expanding its presence on popular social media platforms. By building trust in its own transnational media, China could increase the credibility of

its voice in the long term and increase audiences' exposure to China's policies and intentions.

As suggested by Riordan (2003), employing local networks in targeted countries could bring more effective public diplomacy outcomes, and would lessen the audiences' suspicion on governmental influences behind public diplomacy activities. For instance, in areas and regions where lots of economic, cultural and educational cooperation is taking place between the academic institutions and business enterprises in the local community and China, coverage about China would have a readership with a vested interest.

Trust on Relationship with Influential Media in China

In addition to increasing the credibility of more transparent coverage of China by its own media, China's image could be improved by changes in coverage by the media located in targeted nations. Personnel within the local and national Chinese governments need to learn more effective strategies to communicate with foreign journalists located in China. The image of China is not just about what China says about itself, but what other international media, such as BBC, the *New York Times*, or CNN report about China. There is little advantage in promoting only good governance coming explicitly from the home country (Leonard, 2002, pp. 22-30). If China wants to be a respected leader in the world, it needs to place itself with the other great world leaders who are open to criticism, willing to listen, and taking the concerns of others into consideration.

Expand China's Media Presence on Social Media

There is a significant void of China's voice in the English social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter. *China Daily*'s presence on Twitter, for example, is much smaller compared to other media such as the *Washington Post*, for which *China Daily* pays for web content. Followers of *China Daily USA* Twitter account (@ChinaDailyUSA) numbered about 709,000 as of May 2017; in comparison the number of followers of the Washington Post's account (@washingtonpost) was 9.96 million. Postings from *China Daily USA*'s Twitter account rarely receives more than 30 retweets or 50 likes[57]; compared to the retweets from *Washington Post*'s account that can be 100 or even 200 times more (as of May 2017)[58]. Reporting by targeted regions might have divided readership between different *China Daily* accounts on Twitter between *China Daily USA*, *China Daily Europe*, and *China Daily Asia*. However, *China Daily Europe* (Twitter handle: @ChinaDailyEU) has 8,420 followers and rarely gathers a double-digit retweet or likes in a single tweet, and *China Daily Asia* (@ChinaDailyAsia) is similar in its performance, with 8,249 followers and rare likes or tweets. These simple comparisons show the opportunities for China's media to make a stronger presence on social media. Without a presence, there is no audience exposure or audience engagement, and little to no media effects of soft power in news.

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[57] Between January 1, 2015 and May 20, 2016, top tweets of @ChinaDailyUSA with most retweets gathers has been retweeted more than 110 times; top tweets with most likes has been liked more than 90 times. (Integrated data accessed from China Daily USA team).

[58] Some tweets gathers over 800 retweets and 2.1k likes, such as:
Opinion: Sally Yates demolishes White House defenses
(https://twitter.com/washingtonpost/status/861675226358321155.

Limitations

Like any study, this one has limitations. First, while the study pretested the most attention-attractive and newsworthy topic for young American audiences with topics that included technology, business, health, etc., this study did not test or compare the media effects associated with different story topics on American audiences' perception of China's country image. Given the complex design to study multiple variables, this experimental research did not test multiple stories and various topics. Consequently, this study does not claim conclusions that are always generalizable to all news stories.

Secondly, this study tested one cross-cultural communication context. That context was an American audience's perception of only China's image mediated by news about China from two different sources. Future studies should expand the design in two dimensions. One would be to replicate this study in a different cultural context (e.g.: American audiences' perception of Russia mediated by news from Russia vs. news from U.S. media). Another expansion could introduce a third-party source (e.g.: American audiences' perception of Russia mediated by news from China vs. news from the U.S. vs. news from Russia,).

Thirdly, the audience in this study was a convenience sample of younger participants in their early twenties who reside in the northeastern region of the US. Results reported in this study may not be generalizable to older demographics living in other regions of the U.S.

There are other limitations associated with an online experiment. For example, researchers cannot guarantee that participants followed all of the instructions for the

experiment. Future studies might replicate the design in a physical lab setting. Many of the measures relied on self-reported responses, which could potentially misrepresent what participants recalled or felt. Future should test different or additional objective measures, such as implicit measurements.

There is also a limitation with the mediated effects related to the construction of a country's image. As previous scholars noted, changes in country concept or nation brand are usually slight and short-lived, "especially for countries that are well-developed and widely known on the international stage" (Fullerton & Kendrick, in press, pg. 17). This topic deserves further investigation in a longitudinal design and future studies exploring soft power of news could also expand the emotional aspects of audience perceptions of a country's image plus the role of news to inform that image. Researchers studying China's media and soft power must also consider the ongoing changes in China's news media and journalistic practices.

Conclusion

This study proposed to examine the role of trust to connect a theoretical bridge between public diplomacy and media effects. Previous literature suggested the need for a stronger theoretical foundation of public diplomacy as a concept (Entman, 2008; Gilboa, 2008; Cull, 2009), despite extensive investigations on the public diplomacy practice in the past half century (see summaries by Entman, 2008; Gilboa, 2008 and Golan, 2013). This study sought to enrich the theoretical framework of public diplomacy by examining the role of trust in news as an independent component. This study also attempted to evaluate soft power of news as an outcome of nation branding. In doing so, this study contributed to an emerging theoretical

model to measure the media effects of transnational journalism on foreign audiences' perception of country image.

This study also offered to enrich the conceptualization of soft power in context of news. In particular, this study highlighted the importance of trust as a currency of soft power in transnational journalism. Previous research of perceived trust in news and credibility of news media have largely operated in the setting of a single country (Müller, 2013; Pjesivac and Rui, 2014). This study expanded the literature in the context of transnational journalism by measuring an audience's perceptions of news about a foreign country. In a cross-cultural context, this study also measured and compared message credibility and source credibility following the two traditions of credibility research in news (message credibility by Gaziano and McGrath, 1986; Charnley 1936; and source credibility by Hovland et al, 1935; Hovland, 1959).

This study attempted to address a major challenge for transnational journalism in the practice of public diplomacy – that different audiences in different countries might have different journalistic standards. This study examined the soft power of news and its impact on audiences' perception of a country's image mediated by media source and message valence. Based on the reported findings, two general conclusions are evident. One is that trust appears to be the central element in building soft power of news. The other is that trust can subsequently influence audiences' perceptions of a country's image being covered.

This study's framework for studying the potential of soft power in news employed trust as the central element in the construction and mediation of soft power

for building a country's positive image. Empirical results suggest a positive correlation between audience trust of news and their perceived country image in foreign coverage. For trust formation in nation branding and public diplomacy, reputation becomes a source of trust only when the mediators are trusted to be truthful (Dasgupta, 1988). In this case, the mediators were international news organizations. Building trust of transnational news media, therefore, is an important step of nation branding. Building soft power through news is to build credibility of the media.

Finally, this study suggested two ways to build credibility through self-critiques and partnerships with local media in targeted nations. Results suggested that all positive messages about China from a Chinese source were likely to be framed in the older stereotypes of propaganda agents (a point noted by Leonard, 2002). To effectively use soft power of news to reshape a country's brand image, a news organization can build its credibility and trust among its audiences with coverage that is more self-critical. In other words, a Chinese news source being more critical of China in its coverage might earn more trust from international audiences. On the other hand, this study found that American audiences often perceive negative news to be more objective, regardless of its source. American audiences tested in this study also perceived a news story from an American source as more accurate and objective than the same story from a Chinese source. The bottom line is that either Chinese media need to build more trust among American audiences by tailoring its stories to American audiences' expectations and judgments related to good journalism, or Chinese media should find ways to cooperate more with American media to gain more trust of American audiences.

Appendices

Appendix A: Stimulus Stories

Story Version 1:

Will TCM ever go mainstream?

Updated: 2016-01-15 03:58
By Dong Leshuo (China Daily USA)

Youyou Tu, the first Chinese Nobel laureate in Physiology or Medicine, is known "for her discoveries concerning a novel therapy against Malaria", which saved millions of lives.

"Artemisinin is a gift to the world from Traditional Chinese Medicine," Tu said in her 2015 Nobel lecture.

Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) is made up of Chinese herbal medicine, along with acupuncture and many different practices and therapies.

For more than 4,000 years, TCM has been an integral part of Chinese culture and the predominant medical treatment for a large part of the world's most populous country.

Many Chinese remedies appear to have significant therapeutic value and some work on conditions for which Western doctors have no pharmaceutical drugs.

Dr Quansheng Lu is a licensed acupuncturist in Rockville, Maryland and had worked in China as a doctor specializing in TCM for 14 years. One of Lu's patients was a senior executive at an international organization in Washington. He had been suffering from eczema for a long time. Despite seeing dozens of dermatologists and specialists at established institutions such as the Johns Hopkins Hospital, nothing helped.

Lu treated him with acupuncture and herbal medicine in 2014, and after a month, the man was fully cured.

"I think acupuncture and other forms of TCM can be shown that they are effective to treat diseases. We have a very long clinical trial of acupuncture and there is a published paper that it is a safe in practice" said Dr. Brain Berman, a tenured professor and director of the University of Maryland School of Medicine Center for Integrative Medicine. As a Western trained medical doctor who was looking for solutions to chronic diseases in particular, Berman started to study acupuncture 30 years ago.

According to Berman, "TCM has an enormous treasure of different herbs for different conditions, which can be utilized in the Western world."

In 1994, Chinese herbal medicine first entered medical treatment in the U.S. with the passage of the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act (DSHEA) signed by President Bill Clinton.

Two decades later, the Cleveland Clinic opened its herbal clinic. It is part of Ohio hospital's Center for Integrative Medicine, which also provides acupuncture, holistic psychotherapy and massage therapy.

"Western medicine does acute care phenomenally.… But we're still struggling a bit with our chronic-care patients and this fills in that gap and can be used concurrently," said Melissa Young, an integrative medicine physician at the clinic.

"People use TCM for diseases that have not been successfully treated by modern medicine. Sometimes for diseases when there is no other kind of treatment available," said Ted J. Kaptchuk, a professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School and author of The Web that Has No Weaver: Understanding Chinese Medicine. Kaptchuk went to Macao to study TCM from 1971 to 1975 and graduated with a degree in Chinese Medicine.

In different parts of the world, a number of Chinese herbal medicine trials have been done and are being done. "Among them, there are about 35 Chinese medicines in trial in areas such as for headaches," Berman said.

In the U.S., the first Chinese medicine to become a prescription drug will probably be the compound Danshen Dripping Pill, a Chinese herbal treatment for angina and coronary heart disease. It has successfully completed the FDA's Phase II clinical trials in 2010 and is likely to pass the final investigations this year.

This would be an FDA endorsement of the herbal combination to treat potentially serious illnesses, said Mark Blumenthal, founder and executive director of the American Botanical Council.

This pill is one of the products produced by Tasly Pharmaceuticals, Inc that it calls "modern Traditional Chinese Medicine (mTCM)".

"Our goal is to bring our well-evidenced mTCM products to benefit American patients." said Henry Sun, president and CEO of Tasly, based in Rockville, Maryland.

Sun said he believes that the development of chemical pharmaceuticals has reached a bottleneck because lead compounds, new structures and disease targets have been explored extensively. "But in a way, mTCM is all natural, and it provides a new, significant resource for new development of pharmaceuticals," he said.

"Once approved by the FDA, lots of pharmaceutical companies will be doing research on it and may develop new chemical pharmaceuticals from it. In this sense, the Chinese medicine, based on extensive clinical experiences, could contribute a whole repository to science and clinical research in the future," Sun said.

And in her speech in Stockholm, Tu said: "If we inherit and keep developing (TCM), there will be new findings and inventions which will benefit every human being."

Contact the writer at leshuodong@chinadailyusa.com

Story version 2:

The New York Times

ASIA PACIFIC

Will TCM Ever Go Mainstream?

点击查看中文版 | Read in Chinese

By IAN JOHNSON OCT. 10, 2015 / NEW YORK TIMES CHINA

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Story version 3:

Nobel Renews Debate on Chinese Medicine

Updated: 2016-01-15 03:58
By Dong Leshuo (China Daily USA)

As China basks in its first Nobel Prize in science, few places seem as elated by the honor as the China Academy of Chinese Medical Sciences. Three scientists, each from Ireland, Japan and China, have won the Nobel Prize for discoveries that helped doctors fight malaria and infections caused by roundworm parasites.

However, China's award to one of the academy's retired researchers, Tu Youyou renewed a century-long debate in China about Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM).

In fact, the Nobel committee specifically said it was not honoring Chinese medicine, even though Artemisia has been in continuous use for centuries to fight malaria and other fevers, and even though Dr. Tu said she figured out the extraction techniques by reading classical works. Instead, it said it was rewarding Dr. Tu for the specific scientific procedures she used to extract the active ingredient and create a chemical drug.

Some Chinese think Traditional Chinese Medicine should not be respected at all. Scientists like He Zuoxiu, a member of the prestigious Chinese Academy of Sciences, say that the ancient pharmacopoeia should be mined, but the underlying theories that identified these herbs should have been discarded long ago.

"I think for the future development of Chinese medicine, people should abandon its medical theory and focus more on researching the value of herbs with a modern scientific approach," Dr. He said in an interview.

In 2007, an editorial in the scientific journal Nature described TCM as "largely just pseudoscience, with no rational mechanism of action for most of its therapies."

Due to inherent differences in how Western medicine and TCM are practiced, employing the Western medicine-based gold standard research methods to evaluate TCM is challenging, said Dr. Brian Berman, a tenured professor of family and community medicine, director of the University of Maryland School of Medicine Center for Integrative Medicine. As a Western trained medical doctor who was looking for solutions to chronic diseases in particular, Berman started to study acupuncture about 30 years ago.

"Traditional Chinese medicine has different herbs for different conditions, which have been trying to be utilized in the Western world," said Dr Brian Berman.

In Chinese herbal medicine, a single formula is usually composed of many herbs, each of which has numerous chemical compounds. Thousands of herbs — mainly plant but also animal and mineral products — are used in TCM. If taken in the wrong dose, they can be toxic.

There is also concern about quality control and the consistency of herbal preparation because quality and chemical constituents vary from field to field, season to season and one extraction process to another.

"Many patients are being told by their doctors that we don't really know about these therapies. They

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are not collectively introducing them," Berman said. To get accepted in the U.S., Berman said TCM will have to undergo a "gold standard" medical trial and efficacy study.

It is even hard to do research on herbal medicine.
"When we decided to do a Chinese herbal formula study, it was hard for us to recruit people to do the study. Because people were concerned about whether the medicine would contaminate them," Berman said.

"Getting the funding to do the research is also a challenge. There was a huge challenge to even study it. People asked what it was like and why are you doing this." Berman said.

Another challenge facing TCM in the U.S. has been positioning it in the health system, whereas in China it is a mainstream medical and health solution.
Insurance companies pose a major problem to the legitimacy of TCM in the U.S. A patient can make an insurance claim for acupuncture but not for herbal treatment.

"The complexity of Chinese herbal medicine is much more than acupuncture. It's going to be a much slower process for Chinese herbs," said Ted J. Kaptchuk, a professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School and author of The Web that Has No Weaver: Understanding Chinese Medicine, a book on the theory and practice of Chinese alternative medicine.

"Most of the time, acupuncture works best with medicine. That's why acupuncturists in China usually also prescribe Western medicine as well as herbal medicine to the patients. But in the U.S., without an MD license, the acupuncturist cannot prescribe the Western medicine. We can give the patient herbal medicine, but the cost must be covered by the patient," said Dr Quansheng Lu, who worked in China as a doctor specializing in TCM for 14 years and is a licensed acupuncturist in Rockville, Maryland.

Contact the writer at leshuodong@chinadailyusa.com

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Appendix B: Online experiment questionnaire

1. Introduction Page:

"THANK YOU for your interest in this brief online study on American audiences' consumption of international news. You will have the option to win a $25 Amazon gift card upon completion of the study. This study is anonymous and is open to any U.S. citizens 18 years of age or older.

ABOUT US

The researchers of this study are professor Ronald A. Yaros and doctoral candidate Yacong Yuan from the Philip Merrill College of Journalism at the University of Maryland. The purpose of this study is to better understand how people process international news online.

WHAT YOU WILL DO

You will be asked to respond to choices and answer questions about various types of international news stories. The average time to complete this survey is 15 minutes. You can now choose to either proceed to the next page for details OR close this window to exit if you do not wish to participate."

2. Consent Form Page:

"Your agreement indicates that you have read the consent form below; you are a U.S. citizen at least 18 years of age; your questions have been answered to your satisfaction and you voluntarily agree to participate in this survey. If you do not wish to continue, you may now close this window." (*Followed by a checkbox next to the statement: "I understand and wish to proceed with the experiment.")

"CONSENT FORM

RISKS: There are no known risks associated with participating in this project. You are asked to read the news story in the same way you would any news online. This research is not designed to help you personally, but the results may help us to learn more about the consumption international news online. We hope that, in the future, others may benefit from this study through improved understanding of these effects.

PRIVACY : We will do our best to keep your provided data confidential. To help protect your confidentiality, data collected through the survey will remain anonymous and will not contain information that may personally identify you. Any potential loss of confidentiality will be minimized by storing data in a password-protected computer. Only the principal investigator and the student investigator will share the password. If you enter the chance for the Amazon gift card, your email address be used only to notify you. Your email will remain separate from the data collected and NOT shared with any other third party.

RIGHT TO TERMINATE AT ANY TIME: Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may choose not to take part at all. If you

decide to participate, you may stop at any time. Although incomplete sessions will NOT be eligible for the chance to win the Amazon gift card, you will not be otherwise penalized or lose any other benefits to which you otherwise qualify.

If you have questions, concerns, or complaints, or if you need to report an injury related to the research, please contact the investigators: Yacong Yuan (Email: yy230709@umd.edu, Office: 301-405-8322) or Dr. Ronald A. Yaros (Email: ryaros@umd.edu, Office: 301-405-2425).

If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or wish to report a research-related injury, please contact:

University of Maryland College Park

Institutional Review Board Office

1204 Marie Mount

College Park, Maryland, 20742

 E-mail: irb@umd.edu

Telephone: 301-405-0678

This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects. Your signature indicates that you have read this consent form or have had it read to you; your questions have been answered to your satisfaction and you voluntarily agree to participate in this research study. You may now print this page if you would like a copy of this consent form or you can email us for a copy of the form."

3. Pre-exposure questions: previous knowledge of China and international news

Scrn1 Before you read news, we need to ask you some questions.   Are you a U.S. citizen?
○ Yes (1)
○ No (2)
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey

Scrn2 Were you born and raised in the United States? (not spending more than 5 years of your pre-teen and early adult-life living outside the U.S. ?)
○ YES (1)
○ NO (2)
If NO Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey

Kng1 We will now ask you about your familiarity with selected Asian countries.   Xi Jinping is the current President of
❍ Thailand (1)
❍ Taiwan (2)
❍ China (3)
❍ None of the above (4)
❍ Honesty, I don't know (5)

Kng2 The Forbidden City is located in
❍ Beijing (1)
❍ New Delhi (2)
❍ Hiroshima (3)
❍ None of the above (4)
❍ Honesty, I don't know (5)

Kng3 Terra Cotta Warriors represent the cultural heritage of
❍ Taiwan (1)
❍ Korea (2)
❍ Japan (3)
❍ None of the above (4)
❍ Honestly, I don't know (5)

Fam1 I have visited this/these countries. (Check that all apply.)
❑ China (1)
❑ Japan (2)
❑ Korea (3)
❑ Have not visited any of these (4)

Fam2 I have close friends from this/these countries. (Check all that apply.)
❑ China (1)
❑ Japan (2)
❑ Korea (3)
❑ I don't have friends in these countries. (4)

Text Next, we will ask you a few questions about your general impressions on some Asian countries selected from above.

PrFunc Tell us how you would rate your impressions on the country CHINA. Thinking of only the country CHINA, to what extent do you agree with the following three statements?

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Somewhat Disagree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Somewhat Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
I associate CHINA with creative ideas and innovative solutions. (1)	○	○	○	○	○
CHINA is recognized internationally as a country that is significant for science and research. (2)	○	○	○	○	○
CHINA holds a strong position in the global economy. (3)	○	○	○	○	○

PrNorm Thinking of only CHINA, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Somewhat Disagree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Somewhat Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
CHINA takes responsibility for future generations. (1)	○	○	○	○	○
CHINA shows solidarity and responsibility in tackling global challenges. (2)	○	○	○	○	○
CHINA helps to solve the contemporary problems in the world. (3)	○	○	○	○	○

PrAesth Thinking of only CHINA, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Somewhat Disagree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Somewhat Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
CHINA has unique and internationally recognized cultural assets (e.g.: literature, music, arts, film, design, architecture, etc,.) (1)	○	○	○	○	○
CHINA has a rich history. (2)	○	○	○	○	○
CHINA has appealing traditions. (3)	○	○	○	○	○

PrEmo Thinking of only CHINA, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Somewhat Disagree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Somewhat Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
I like CHINA. (1)	○	○	○	○	○
CHINA is fascinating. (2)	○	○	○	○	○
I am drawn to CHINA. (3)	○	○	○	○	○

Q184 Tell us how you would rate your impressions on the country JAPAN:Thinking of only the country JAPAN, to what extent do you agree with the following three statements?

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Somewhat Disagree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Somewhat Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
I associate JAPAN with creative ideas and innovative solutions. (1)	○	○	○	○	○
JAPAN is recognized internationally as a country that is significant for science and research. (2)	○	○	○	○	○
JAPAN holds a strong position in the global economy. (3)	○	○	○	○	○

Q185 Thinking of only JAPAN, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Somewhat Disagree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Somewhat Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
JAPAN takes responsibility for future generations. (1)	○	○	○	○	○
JAPAN shows solidarity and responsibility in tackling global challenges. (2)	○	○	○	○	○
JAPAN helps to solve the contemporary problems in the world. (3)	○	○	○	○	○

Q186 Thinking of only JAPAN, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Somewhat Disagree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Somewhat Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
JAPAN has unique and internationally recognized cultural assets (e.g.: literature, music, arts, film, design, architecture, etc,.) (1)	○	○	○	○	○
JAPAN has a rich history. (2)	○	○	○	○	○
JAPAN has appealing traditions. (3)	○	○	○	○	○

Q187 Thinking of only JAPAN, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Somewhat Disagree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Somewhat Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
I like JAPAN. (1)	○	○	○	○	○
JAPAN is fascinating. (2)	○	○	○	○	○
I am drawn to JAPAN. (3)	○	○	○	○	○

Q190 Tell us how you would rate your impressions on the country KOREA:Thinking of only the country KOREA, to what extent do you agree with the following three statements?

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Somewhat Disagree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Somewhat Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
I associate KOREA with creative ideas and innovative solutions. (1)	○	○	○	○	○
KOREA is recognized internationally as a country that is significant for science and research. (2)	○	○	○	○	○
KOREA holds a strong position in the global economy. (3)	○	○	○	○	○

Q191 Thinking of only KOREA, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Somewhat Disagree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Somewhat Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
KOREA takes responsibility for future generations. (1)	O	O	O	O	O
KOREA shows solidarity and responsibility in tackling global challenges. (2)	O	O	O	O	O
KOREA helps to solve the contemporary problems in the world. (3)	O	O	O	O	O

Q192 Thinking of only KOREA, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Somewhat Disagree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Somewhat Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
KOREA has unique and internationally recognized cultural assets (e.g.: literature, music, arts, film, design, architecture, etc,.) (1)	O	O	O	O	O
KOREA has a rich history. (2)	O	O	O	O	O
KOREA has appealing traditions. (3)	O	O	O	O	O

Q193 Thinking of only KOREA, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Somewhat Disagree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Somewhat Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
I like KOREA. (1)	○	○	○	○	○
KOREA is fascinating. (2)	○	○	○	○	○
I am drawn to KOREA. (3)	○	○	○	○	○

Q194 In the next page, you will be presented with one news story regarding one of the countries above. Please view the story as you would typically view any news online. Click below when you are ready to view the story.

Text-PCD Timing
    First Click (1)
    Last Click (2)
    Page Submit (3)
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PosCD   Will TCM ever go mainstream? Updated: 2016-01-15 03:58 By Dong Leshuo (China Daily USA) Youyou Tu, the first Chinese Nobel laureate in Physiology or Medicine, is known "for her discoveries concerning a novel therapy against Malaria", which saved millions of lives. "Artemisinin is a gift to the world from Traditional Chinese Medicine," Tu said in her 2015 Nobel lecture. Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) is made up of Chinese herbal medicine, along with acupuncture and many different practices and therapies. For more than 4,000 years, TCM has been an integral part of Chinese culture and the predominant medical treatment for a large part of the world's most populous country. Many Chinese remedies appear to have significant therapeutic value and some work on conditions for which Western doctors have no pharmaceutical drugs. Dr Quansheng Lu is a licensed acupuncturist in Rockville, Maryland and had worked in China as a doctor specializing in TCM for 14 years. One of Lu's patients was a senior executive at an international organization in Washington. He had been suffering from eczema for a long time. Despite seeing dozens of dermatologists and specialists at established institutions such as the Johns Hopkins Hospital, nothing helped. Lu treated him with acupuncture and herbal medicine in 2014, and after a month, the man was fully cured. "I think acupuncture and other forms of TCM can be shown that they are effective to treat diseases. We have a very long clinical trial of acupuncture and there is a published paper that it is a safe in practice" said Dr. Brain Berman, a tenured professor and director of the University of Maryland School of Medicine Center for Integrative Medicine. As a Western trained medical doctor who was looking for solutions to chronic diseases in particular, Berman started to study acupuncture 30 years ago. According to Berman, "TCM has an enormous treasure of different herbs for different conditions, which can be utilized in the Western world."   In 1994, Chinese herbal medicine first entered medical treatment in the U.S. with the passage of the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act (DSHEA) signed by President Bill Clinton. Two decades later, the Cleveland Clinic opened its herbal clinic. It is part of Ohio hospital's Center for Integrative Medicine, which also provides acupuncture, holistic psychotherapy and massage therapy. "Western medicine does acute care phenomenally.… But we're still struggling a bit with our chronic-care patients and this fills in that gap and can be used concurrently," said Melissa Young, an integrative medicine physician at the clinic. "People use TCM for diseases that have not been successfully treated by modern medicine. Sometimes for diseases when there is no other kind of treatment available," said Ted J. Kaptchuk, a professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School and author of The Web that Has No Weaver:

Understanding Chinese Medicine. Kaptchuk went to Macao to study TCM from 1971 to 1975 and graduated with a degree in Chinese Medicine.   In different parts of the world, a number of Chinese herbal medicine trials have been done and are being done. "Among them, there are about 35 Chinese medicines in trial in areas such as for headaches," Berman said.   In the U.S., the first Chinese medicine to become a prescription drug will probably be the compound Danshen Dripping Pill, a Chinese herbal treatment for angina and coronary heart disease. It has successfully completed the FDA's Phase II clinical trials in 2010 and is likely to pass the final investigations this year.   This would be an FDA endorsement of the herbal combination to treat potentially serious illnesses, said Mark Blumenthal, founder and executive director of the American Botanical Council.   This pill is one of the products produced by Tasly Pharmaceuticals, Inc that it calls "modern Traditional Chinese Medicine (mTCM)".   "Our goal is to bring our well-evidenced mTCM products to benefit American patients." said Henry Sun, president and CEO of Tasly, based in Rockville, Maryland.   Sun said he believes that the development of chemical pharmaceuticals has reached a bottleneck because lead compounds, new structures and disease targets have been explored extensively. "But in a way, mTCM is all natural, and it provides a new, significant resource for new development of pharmaceuticals," he said.   "Once approved by the FDA, lots of pharmaceutical companies will be doing research on it and may develop new chemical pharmaceuticals from it. In this sense, the Chinese medicine, based on extensive clinical experiences, could contribute a whole repository to science and clinical research in the future," Sun said.   And in her speech in Stockholm, Tu said: "If we inherit and keep developing (TCM), there will be new findings and inventions which will benefit every human being."   Contact the writer at leshuodong@chinadailyusa.com

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PosNY   ASIA PACIFIC Will TCM Ever Go Mainstream?   点击查看中文版 | Read in Chinese

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_____   By IAN JOHNSON OCT. 10, 2015 / NEW YORK TIMES CHINA
Youyou Tu, the first Chinese Nobel laureate in Physiology or Medicine, is known "for her discoveries concerning a novel therapy against Malaria", which saved millions of lives.   "Artemisinin is a gift to the world from Traditional Chinese Medicine," Tu said in her 2015 Nobel lecture.   Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) is made up of Chinese herbal medicine, along with acupuncture and many different practices and therapies.   For more than 4,000 years, TCM has been an integral part of Chinese culture and the predominant medical treatment for a large part of the world's most populous country.   Many Chinese remedies appear to have significant therapeutic value and some work on conditions for which Western doctors have no pharmaceutical drugs.   Dr Quansheng Lu is a licensed acupuncturist in Rockville,

Maryland and had worked in China as a doctor specializing in TCM for 14 years. One of Lu's patients was a senior executive at an international organization in Washington. He had been suffering from eczema for a long time. Despite seeing dozens of dermatologists and specialists at established institutions such as the Johns Hopkins Hospital, nothing helped.   Lu treated him with acupuncture and herbal medicine in 2014, and after a month, the man was fully cured.   "I think acupuncture and other forms of TCM can be shown that they are effective to treat diseases. We have a very long clinical trial of acupuncture and there is a published paper that it is a safe in practice" said Dr. Brain Berman, a tenured professor and director of the University of Maryland School of Medicine Center for Integrative Medicine. As a Western trained medical doctor who was looking for solutions to chronic diseases in particular, Berman started to study acupuncture 30 years ago.   According to Berman, "TCM has an enormous treasure of different herbs for different conditions, which can be utilized in the Western world."   In 1994, Chinese herbal medicine first entered medical treatment in the U.S. with the passage of the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act (DSHEA) signed by President Bill Clinton.   Two decades later, the Cleveland Clinic opened its herbal clinic. It is part of Ohio hospital's Center for Integrative Medicine, which also provides acupuncture, holistic psychotherapy and massage therapy.   "Western medicine does acute care phenomenally.… But we're still struggling a bit with our chronic-care patients and this fills in that gap and can be used concurrently," said Melissa Young, an integrative medicine physician at the clinic.   "People use TCM for diseases that have not been successfully treated by modern medicine. Sometimes for diseases when there is no other kind of treatment available," said Ted J. Kaptchuk, a professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School and author of The Web that Has No Weaver: Understanding Chinese Medicine. Kaptchuk went to Macao to study TCM from 1971 to 1975 and graduated with a degree in Chinese Medicine.   In different parts of the world, a number of Chinese herbal medicine trials have been done and are being done. "Among them, there are about 35 Chinese medicines in trial in areas such as for headaches," Berman said.   In the U.S., the first Chinese medicine to become a prescription drug will probably be the compound Danshen Dripping Pill, a Chinese herbal treatment for angina and coronary heart disease. It has successfully completed the FDA's Phase II clinical trials in 2010 and is likely to pass the final investigations this year.   This would be an FDA endorsement of the herbal combination to treat potentially serious illnesses, said Mark Blumenthal, founder and executive director of the American Botanical Council.   This pill is one of the products produced by Tasly Pharmaceuticals, Inc that it calls "modern Traditional Chinese Medicine (mTCM)".   "Our goal is to bring our well-evidenced mTCM products to benefit American patients." said Henry Sun, president and CEO of Tasly, based in Rockville, Maryland.   Sun said he believes that the development of chemical pharmaceuticals has reached a bottleneck because lead compounds, new structures and disease targets have been explored extensively. "But in a way, mTCM is all natural, and it provides a new, significant resource for new development of pharmaceuticals," he said.   "Once approved by the FDA, lots of pharmaceutical companies will be doing research on it and may develop new chemical pharmaceuticals from it. In this sense, the Chinese medicine, based on extensive clinical experiences, could contribute a whole repository to science and

clinical research in the future," Sun said.   And in her speech in Stockholm, Tu said: "If we inherit and keep developing (TCM), there will be new findings and inventions which will benefit every human being." _____ A version of this article appears in print on October 11, 2015, on page A10 of the New York edition with the headline: Will TCM ever go mainstream?   © 2016 The New York Times Company

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negCD   Nobel Renews Debate on Chinese Medicine   Updated: 2016-01-15 03:58 By Dong Leshuo (China Daily USA) As China basks in its first Nobel Prize in science, few places seem as elated by the honor as the China Academy of Chinese Medical Sciences. Three scientists, each from Ireland, Japan and China, have won the Nobel Prize for discoveries that helped doctors fight malaria and infections caused by roundworm parasites.   However, China's award to one of the academy's retired researchers, Tu Youyou renewed a century-long debate in China about Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM).   In fact, the Nobel committee specifically said it was not honoring Chinese medicine, even though Artemisia has been in continuous use for centuries to fight malaria and other fevers, and even though Dr. Tu said she figured out the extraction techniques by reading classical works. Instead, it said it was rewarding Dr. Tu for the specific scientific procedures she used to extract the active ingredient and create a chemical drug.   Some Chinese think Traditional Chinese Medicine should not be respected at all. Scientists like He Zuoxiu, a member of the prestigious Chinese Academy of Sciences, say that the ancient pharmacopoeia should be mined, but the underlying theories that identified these herbs should have been discarded long ago.   "I think for the future development of Chinese medicine, people should abandon its medical theory and focus more on researching the value of herbs with a modern scientific approach," Dr. He said in an interview.   In 2007, an editorial in the scientific journal Nature described TCM as "largely just pseudoscience, with no rational mechanism of action for most of its therapies."   Due to inherent differences in how Western medicine and TCM are practiced, employing the Western medicine-based gold standard research methods to evaluate TCM is challenging, said Dr. Brian Berman, a tenured professor of family and community medicine, director of the University of Maryland School of Medicine Center for Integrative Medicine. As a Western trained medical doctor who was looking for solutions to chronic diseases in particular, Berman started to study acupuncture about 30 years ago.   "Traditional Chinese medicine has different herbs for different conditions, which have been trying to be utilized in the Western world," said Dr Brian Berman.   In Chinese herbal medicine, a single formula is usually composed of many herbs, each of which has numerous chemical compounds. Thousands of herbs — mainly plant but also animal and mineral products — are used in TCM. If taken in the wrong dose, they can be toxic.   There is also concern about quality control and the consistency of herbal preparation because quality and chemical constituents vary

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from field to field, season to season and one extraction process to another. "Many patients are being told by their doctors that we don't really know about these therapies. They are not collectively introducing them," Berman said. To get accepted in the U.S., Berman said TCM will have to undergo a "gold standard" medical trial and efficacy study. It is even hard to do research on herbal medicine. "When we decided to do a Chinese herbal formula study, it was hard for us to recruit people to do the study. Because people were concerned about whether the medicine would contaminate them," Berman said. "Getting the funding to do the research is also a challenge. There was a huge challenge to even study it. People asked what it was like and why are you doing this." Berman said. Another challenge facing TCM in the U.S. has been positioning it in the health system, whereas in China it is a mainstream medical and health solution. Insurance companies pose a major problem to the legitimacy of TCM in the U.S. A patient can make an insurance claim for acupuncture but not for herbal treatment. "The complexity of Chinese herbal medicine is much more than acupuncture. It's going to be a much slower process for Chinese herbs," said Ted J. Kaptchuk, a professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School and author of The Web that Has No Weaver: Understanding Chinese Medicine, a book on the theory and practice of Chinese alternative medicine. "Most of the time, acupuncture works best with medicine. That's why acupuncturists in China usually also prescribe Western medicine as well as herbal medicine to the patients. But in the U.S., without an MD license, the acupuncturist cannot prescribe the Western medicine. We can give the patient herbal medicine, but the cost must be covered by the patient," said Dr Quansheng Lu, who worked in China as a doctor specializing in TCM for 14 years and is a licensed acupuncturist in Rockville, Maryland. Contact the writer at leshuodong@chinadailyusa.com

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negNYT   ASIA PACIFIC   Nobel Renews Debate on Chinese Medicine 点击查看中文版 | Read in Chinese

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_____ By IAN JOHNSON OCT. 10, 2015 / NEW YORK TIMES
CHINA   As China basks in its first Nobel Prize in science, few places seem as elated by the honor as the China Academy of Chinese Medical Sciences. Three scientists, each from Ireland, Japan and China, have won the Nobel Prize for discoveries that helped doctors fight malaria and infections caused by roundworm parasites. However, China's award to one of the academy's retired researchers, Tu Youyou renewed a century-long debate in China about Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM). In fact, the Nobel committee specifically said it was not honoring Chinese medicine, even though Artemisia has been in continuous use for centuries to fight malaria and other fevers, and even though Dr. Tu said she figured out the extraction techniques by reading classical works. Instead, it said it was rewarding Dr. Tu for the

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and is a licensed acupuncturist in Rockville, Maryland. _____ A version of this article appears in print on October 11, 2015, on page A10 of the New York edition with the headline: Nobel Renews Debate on Chinese Medicine. © 2016 The New York Times Company

+Check- Thinking about the story you just read, it was
❍ Mostly negative (1)
❍ Somewhat negative (2)
❍ A Balance of Positive and Negative (3)
❍ Somewhat Positive (4)
❍ Mostly Positive (5)

Recall Do you remember the source of the news story?
❍ Yes (1)
❍ No (2)
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To The facts that I received regarding T...

NwsOrg What was source of the news story you just read?

FamL I am familiar with the news organization supplying this news story.
❍ YES (1)
❍ NO (2)
❍ Don't recall the news organization (3)

TrusT I trust the news organization supplying this news story.
❍ YES (1)
❍ NO (2)
❍ Don't recall the news organization (3)

Accu1 To what extent do you agree with the following statement?   The news organization supplying the story is credible.
❍ Strongly Disagree (1)
❍ Somewhat Disagree (2)
❍ Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
❍ Somewhat Agree (4)
❍ Strongly Agree (5)

Accu4 To what extent do you agree with the following statements? The facts that I received regarding Traditional Chinese Medicine were correct.
○ Strongly Disagree (1)
○ Somewhat Disagree (2)
○ Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
○ Somewhat Agree (4)
○ Strongly Agree (5)

Accu2 The information in the story is true.
○ Strongly Disagree (1)
○ Somewhat Disagree (2)
○ Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
○ Somewhat Agree (4)
○ Strongly Agree (5)

Crit1 Criticism in the story is expressed in an adequate manner.
○ Strongly Disagree (1)
○ Somewhat Disagree (2)
○ Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
○ Somewhat Agree (4)
○ Strongly Agree (5)

Accu3 The story presented facts truthfully.
○ Strongly Disagree (1)
○ Somewhat Disagree (2)
○ Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
○ Somewhat Agree (4)
○ Strongly Agree (5)

Crit3 The commentary regarding Traditional Chinese Medicine consisted of well-reflected conclusions.
○ Strongly Disagree (1)
○ Somewhat Disagree (2)
○ Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
○ Somewhat Agree (4)
○ Strongly Agree (5)

Crit2 The opinions of quoted sources in the story were well-founded.
○ Strongly Disagree (1)
○ Somewhat Disagree (2)
○ Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
○ Somewhat Agree (4)
○ Strongly Agree (5)

Crit4 The journalistic assessments regarding the topic of Traditional Chinese Medicine were useful.
○ Strongly Disagree (1)
○ Somewhat Disagree (2)
○ Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)
○ Somewhat Agree (4)
○ Strongly Agree (5)

Q60 The foreign country in the story I just read was:

PoFunc Thinking of the country discussed in the news, to what extent do you agree with the following three statements?

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Somewhat Disgree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Somewhat Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
I associate the foreign country in the news with creative ideas and innovative solutions. (1)	○	○	○	○	○
The foreign country in the news is recognized internationally as a country that is significant for science and research. (2)	○	○	○	○	○
The foreign country in the news holds a strong position in the global economy. (3)	○	○	○	○	○

PoNorm To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Somewhat Disgree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Somewhat Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
The foreign country in the news takes responsibility for future generations. (1)	○	○	○	○	○
The foreign country in the news shows solidarity and responsibility in tackling global challenges. (2)	○	○	○	○	○
The foreign country in the news helps to solve the contemporary problems in the world. (3)	○	○	○	○	○

PoAesth To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Somewhat Disgree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Somewhat Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
The foreign country has unique and internationally recognized cultural assets (e.g.: literature, music, arts, film, design, architecture, etc,.) (1)	O	O	O	O	O
The foreign country has a rich history. (2)	O	O	O	O	O
The foreign country has appealing traditions. (3)	O	O	O	O	O

PoEmo To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Somewhat Disgree (2)	Neither Agree nor Disagree (3)	Somewhat Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
I like the foreign country in the news. (1)	O	O	O	O	O
The foreign country in the news is fascinating. (2)	O	O	O	O	O
I am drawn to that country. (3)	O	O	O	O	O

hab1 Please answer the following questions about your engagement with news. In general, how often do you read international news?
- ○ Never (1)
- ○ one or twice a month (2)
- ○ weekly (3)
- ○ daily (4)

hab2 How would you rate your general interest in international news?
- ○ No interest (1)
- ○ Low interest (2)
- ○ Some interest (3)
- ○ High interest (4)
- ○ Extremely interested (5)

PrefMdia Which ONE of the following sources would you most likely consult for news about the country in the story you just read? (choose only one)
- ○ Washington Post (1)
- ○ New York Times (2)
- ○ Global Times (3)
- ○ China Daily (4)
- ○ Other, please specify (5) _____

Age Finally, some basic information about you.   How old were you on your last birthday?

Gen My gender is:
- ○ Male (1)
- ○ Female (2)
- ○ Prefer not to say (3)

Edu What level of education have you have completed?
- ○ High school or less (1)
- ○ Associate degree (2)
- ○ Bachelor's (3)
- ○ Master's (4)
- ○ Phd (6)

Race Race: My race / ethnicity is:
- ○ White (1)
- ○ Black (2)
- ○ Hispanic (3)
- ○ Asian (4)
- ○ Other or multiracial (5)
- ○ Prefer not to answer (6)

Geo In which state do you currently reside?
- ○ Alabama (1)
- ○ Alaska (2)
- ○ Arizona (3)
- ○ Arkansas (4)
- ○ California (5)
- ○ Colorado (6)
- ○ Connecticut (7)
- ○ Delaware (8)
- ○ District of Columbia (9)
- ○ Florida (10)
- ○ Georgia (11)
- ○ Hawaii (12)
- ○ Idaho (13)
- ○ Illinois (14)
- ○ Indiana (15)
- ○ Iowa (16)
- ○ Kansas (17)
- ○ Kentucky (18)
- ○ Louisiana (19)
- ○ Maine (20)
- ○ Maryland (21)
- ○ Massachusetts (22)
- ○ Michigan (23)
- ○ Minnesota (24)
- ○ Mississippi (25)
- ○ Missouri (26)
- ○ Montana (27)
- ○ Nebraska (28)
- ○ Nevada (29)
- ○ New Hampshire (30)
- ○ New Jersey (31)
- ○ New Mexico (32)
- ○ New York (33)
- ○ North Carolina (34)
- ○ North Dakota (35)
- ○ Ohio (36)
- ○ Oklahoma (37)
- ○ Oregon (38)
- ○ Pennsylvania (39)
- ○ Puerto Rico (40)

❍ Rhode Island (41)
❍ South Carolina (42)
❍ South Dakota (43)
❍ Tennessee (44)
❍ Texas (45)
❍ Utah (46)
❍ Vermont (47)
❍ Virginia (48)
❍ Washington (49)
❍ West Virginia (50)
❍ Wisconsin (51)
❍ Wyoming (52)
❍ I do not reside in the United States (53)

Poli One last questions: If today was the 2016 Presidential election, you would mostly likely vote for:
❍ Donald Trump (1)
❍ Hillary Clinton (2)
❍ Other (3) _____

4. Exit Page

"If you wish to be eligible for the drawing for either the randomly awarded a $25 Amazon gift card, enter your email address below so you can be notified if you are the winner!" (If you do not wish to enter the drawing, simply skip this step and complete the study.)

(text box)

 "Thank you.

We would appreciate it if you shared this study link with family and friends. Just copy the link below.

(Embed Qualtrics study link here) "

Appendix C: Pre-test Questionnaire

[open] "PRE-TESTING" NEWS   My name is Yacong Yuan, a Ph.D. student in the

Philip Merrill College of Journalism who is designing a study for my dissertation

about international news. You are NOT about to participate in that study but are

asked to take a few minutes to help in my "pre-testing" of three possible news stories

for my study. Specifically, after reading each story, you will be asked to rank the

story on things such as whether you consider the story to be mostly positive (or

negative), the extent to which the information in the story affects Americans,

etc.   While your answers to this "pre-test" will be anonymous and NOT be included

in the actual study, your feedback is critical to the design of my study. THANK YOU

for your valuable assistance!

[born] Before you start reading, please confirm the following statements. I was BORN in the United States.

○ True (1)

○ False (2)

[citizen] I am a U.S. citizen

○ True (1)

○ False (2)

[age] My current age is

[gender] My gender is

○ Male (1)

○ Female (2)

○ Prefer not to say (3)

headline Of the three news headlines below, which headline, if any, would you most likely to click to read online?

- ○ "Google reportedly planning a return to China, eyeing app market" (1)

- ○ "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to be run with highest standards of '21st century governance'" (2)

- ○ "Will Traditional Chinese Medicine ever go mainstream?" (3)

- ○ I probably would not have selected any to read. (4)

[instruct1] Here are portions of the three different news stories for you to read and then rank.

[GooG] Google reportedly planning a return to China, eyeing app market   After a five-year absence, speculation runs high that Google is eyeing a return to the Chinese mainland.   The move, if true, would be a win-win solution for both China and the global Internet giant, experts said.   Refusing to filter search results, Google exited the mainland market in 2010 in a high-profile gesture of defiance against the Chinese authorities, which insist that all domestic or foreign companies in China must abide by local laws and regulations.   "It's not the first time that Google is reportedly pursuing a return to China. Nothing is for sure until an official announcement comes out," said Aaron Tian, an Internet engineer from a San Francisco-based Internet company.   Google responded to our questions on Monday, refusing to make any comment on the speculation of its return. However, Google executives have emphasized recently that the company has "never left China."   A market too big to

ignore   Eric Schmidt, executive chairman of Google's parent company Alphabet, said that Google is planning to expand its presence in China during a speech at the TechCrunch conference in Beijing on November 2, the BBC reported. His remarks echoed Sergey Brin, one of Google's co-founders, who suggested that some services would return.   "The Chinese market is too big for Google to ignore, since China has the world's largest online population," said Fang Binxing, an expert on network information security at the Chinese Academy of Engineering.   According to figures from China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), the number of China's online population hit 668 million in June, with an Internet penetration rate of 48.8 percent.   "China's Internet industry has witnessed fast development during the past five years. Thanks to the government's favorable policies and strong domestic demand, many Internet companies have made great profits," said Qin An, a cyber security expert at the China Institute for Innovation and Development Strategy.   According to a CNNIC report released in October, there are so far 328 listed Internet companies in China, whose total market value reached 7.85 trillion yuan ($1.23 trillion), comprising 25.6 percent of the nation's market capitalization. Four of them have made their way to the top 10 world Internet companies, including Baidu, the archrival of Google which has since secured its dominance of the Chinese search market after Google left.   Although several Internet giants such as Facebook and Twitter are also not accessible in China, a number of foreign companies have struck gold in the mainland market. Apple, for instance, has made $12.5 billion in China in the fourth fiscal quarter, up 99 percent and the highest growth rate among the company's global regions, while smart phone sales rose 87 percent in China

during the quarter.   In fact, many US Internet firms have been actively seeking

business opportunities in China. The CEOs of Silicon Valley, for instance, reportedly

scrambled to join the photo op with visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping in

September.   Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg has been visiting China frequently.

And when a Chinese top Internet official visited Facebook's headquarters in the US

last year, a book by President Xi, The Governance of China, was reportedly seen on

Zuckerberg's desk.   According to Qin, Chinese Internet users and companies could

also benefit from Google's return to China.

[GoogUni] 1. Using a ranking scale from 1-7 (with 1 = strongly disagree and 7 =

strongly agree), how much do you agree with the following statement?   "This type

of news story could originate ONLY from China."

○ 1-Strongly Disagree (1)

○ 2 - Disagree (2)

○ 3 - Somewhat Disagree (3)

○ 4 - Neither Disagree nor Agree (4)

○ 5 - Somewhat Agree (5)

○ 6 - Agree (6)

○ 7 - Strongly Agree (7)

[GoogPos] 2. Using the same 1-7 scale, how much do you agree with the following

statement?   "This story frames China in a POSITIVE light"

○ 1 (1)

○ 2 (2)

○ 3 (3)

○ 4 (4)

○ 5 (5)

○ 6 (6)

○ 7 (7)

[GoogUS] 3. Using the same 1-7 scale, how much do you agree with the following

statement?   "Information in this story affects the United States."

○ 1 (1)

○ 2 (2)

○ 3 (3)

○ 4 (4)

○ 5 (5)

○ 6 (6)

○ 7 (7)

[GoogMe] 4. Using the same 1-7 scale, how much do you agree with the following

statement?   "This story affects me personally."

○ 1 (1)

○ 2 (2)

○ 3 (3)

○ 4 (4)

○ 5 (5)

○ 6 (6)

○ 7 (7)

[instruct2] Please read the portion of a news story below, then respond to the ranking questions.

[AIIB] AIIB to be run with highest standards of "21st century governance" The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will be built into a new type of development bank with "21st century governance," said Jin Liqun, president-designate of the institution, on Wednesday. "I've decided to take up this honorable job, understanding that Chinese leaders intended to create a first-class multilateral development institution with 21st century governance," said Jin at an event held by Brookings Institution, a Washington-based think tank. "I will not have taken this job without this condition," said Jin, who has many years of experience as high-ranking officials at the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Jin was appointed by the Chinese government in February 2014 to head the Working Group to establish the AIIB, which has once been widely doubted by Western countries, especially the United States. Now, the bank has 57 prospective founding countries including several U.S. allies and will have an authorized capital of 100 billion U.S. dollars. It is expected to start operation by the end of this year. Jin said the creation of the AIIB is the results of the efforts of all the prospective founding members who agreed that the governance of the institution should be measured up to "the highest possible

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standards," combining the merits of the existing multilateral development banks and those of the successful private sector companies. "When you see today the results of the efforts of all the prospective founding members, a new type of development bank is taking shape, a new development bank with 21st century governance," said Jin. Jin said depending on rigorous implementation of the governance, the AIIB will be "lean, clean and green." To keep lean means there should be no redundant positions, said Jin. "If you allow one redundant position today there will be two, there will be three and there will be four. Once the redundancies become massive, it' s very hard for you to cut it out. So we have to be cautious of keeping lean." Jin vowed to take a "zero tolerance" approach toward corruption in the AIIB as he has already done very successfully in the World Bank when his team managed about 40 billion dollars. "Under my leadership not a single staff member was involved in corruption cases. None of them was put into prison just because I implemented the anti-corruption policy. It's the implementation. It's not the policy on papers that matters. It's the way you deal with it in a very tough way. If you as a head is clean nobody dares to do it. That's the key." Jin said. The AIIB will enjoy a "first-class top management" as the bank will have universal recruitment and universal procurement, a new feature of AIIB compared to the existing multilateral development banks and the fundamental guarantee for its success, said Jin. "We do not reject any nationals even if their countries are not members. We do not reject professionals from the highest caliber just because their passports. We do not reject any companies to help develop infrastructure just because their countries are not members," said Jin. Talking about the relationship between the AIIB and the World Bank, the Asian Development

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Bank and other existing multilateral development banks, Jin said the AIIB is not a rival to them and is cooperating with them very smoothly at present."Hopefully the AIIB will also be a boost to the reform process in those institutions," he added. Jin also said the AIIB is not created exclusively for the "Belt and Road" initiative, but a bank to cover all the developing countries in Asia. "Of course some countries in the 'One Belt and One Road' area are members, we certainly should help them, but we will not neglect those countries which are not part of it," he said.   The professional teams in the AIIB are preparing for the first batch of projects which might be launched in the second quarter of 2016, Jin said.

[AIIBuni] Q1. Again, using the ranking scale from 1-7 (with 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree), how much do you agree with the following statement?   "This type of news story could originate ONLY from China."

❍ 1 - Strongly Disagree (1)

❍ 2 - Disagree (2)

❍ 3 - Somewhat Disagree (3)

❍ 4 - Neither Disagree nor Agree (4)

❍ 5 - Somewhat Agree (5)

❍ 6 - Agree (6)

❍ 7 - Strongly Agree (7)

[AIIBpos] Q2. Using the same 1-7 scale, how much do you agree with the following statement? "This story frames China in a POSITIVE light"

○ 1 (1)

○ 2 (2)

○ 3 (3)

○ 4 (4)

○ 5 (5)

○ 6 (6)

○ 7 (7)

[AIIBus] Q3. Using the same 1-7 scale, how much do you agree with the following statement? "Infomation in this story affects the United States"

○ 1 (1)

○ 2 (2)

○ 3 (3)

○ 4 (4)

○ 5 (5)

○ 6 (6)

○ 7 (7)

[AIIBme] Q4. Using the same 1-7 scale, how much do you agree with the following statement? "This story affects me personally."

○ 1 (1)

○ 2 (2)

○ 3 (3)

○ 4 (4)

○ 5 (5)

○ 6 (6)

○ 7 (7)

[instruct3] Please read the portion of a news story below, then respond to the ranking questions.

[TCM]Will Traditional Chinese Medicine ever go mainstream?   At the Karolinska Institutet in Stockholm, one of the largest and most prestigious medical universities in the world, hundreds of the world's top medical researchers and practitioners listened as a Chinese lady spoke.   The speaker on Dec 7 was Youyou Tu, awarded the 2015 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine "for her discoveries concerning a novel therapy against Malaria."   Tu, the first Chinese national to win a Nobel Prize, talked about how she with other Chinese scientists, extracted the malaria-fighting compound Artemisinin from the plant Artemisia annua to treat Malaria.   She called her breakthrough "a successful example of collective exploration in Chinese medicine."   "Artemisinin is a gift to the world from Traditional Chinese Medicine," Tu said. Shennong, an emperor of China who is said to have lived about 4,500 years ago, is thought to have taught the ancient Chinese the use of herbal drugs. Chinese herbal medicine, along with acupuncture and many different practices and therapies,

make up Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM).   For more than 4,000 years, TCM

has been an integral part of Chinese culture and the predominant medical treatment

for a large part of the world's most populous country.   But the Chinese herbal

medicine, from which Tu extracted Artemisinin to fight malaria, is still not a legal

drug in the United States.   Twilight zone Chinese herbal medicine continued to

remain in the twilight zone of medical treatment in the US until 1994 with the

passage of the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act (DSHEA).   President

Bill Clinton signed the Act into law, saying that "after several years of intense efforts,

manufacturers, experts in nutrition, and legislators, acting in a conscientious alliance

with consumers at the grassroots level, have moved successfully to bring common

sense to the treatment of dietary supplements under regulation and law."   Under the

act, Chinese herbal medicine can only be sold to supplement a diet, must be taken by

the mouth and contain a dietary ingredient, which includes vitamins, minerals and

herbs or other botanicals.   While the Chinese practice of acupuncture is accepted

and practiced widely in the US, it will be much harder for Chinese herbal medicine to

integrate because "there are all kinds of issues about safety around quality control,"

said Ted J. Kaptchuk, a professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School and author

of The Web that Has No Weaver: Understanding Chinese Medicine, a book on the

theory and practice of Chinese alternative medicine.   "The complexity of Chinese

herbal medicine is much more than acupuncture. It's going to be a much slower

process for Chinese herbs," said Kaptchuk, who went to Macao to study TCM from

1971 to 1975 and graduated with a degree in Chinese Medicine.   In 2007, an

editorial in the scientific journal Nature described TCM as "largely just

pseudoscience, with no rational mechanism of action for most of its therapies." "Traditional Chinese medicine has an enormous treasure of different herbs for different conditions, which have been trying to be utilized in the Western world," said Dr Brian Berman, a tenured professor of family and community medicine, director of the University of Maryland School of Medicine Center for Integrative Medicine and president and founder of the Institute of Integrative Health. As a Western trained medical doctor who was looking for solutions to chronic diseases in particular, Berman started to study acupuncture, and the Chinese exercises Taiqi and Qigong about 30 years ago. "I think there are many challenges. One of them is the quality of product. Some of the herbal companies are very good. But some of the other products are not as good, giving the companies a bad reputation," Berman said.

[TCMUni] Q1. Again using the 1-7 ranking scale (with 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree), how much do you agree with the following statement? "This type of news story could originate ONLY from China."

❍ 1 - Strongly Disagree (1)

❍ 2 - Somewhat Disagree (2)

❍ 3 - Disagree (3)

❍ 4 - Neither Disagree nor Agree (4)

❍ 5 - Somewhat Agree (5)

❍ 6 - Agree (6)

❍ 7 - Strongly Agree (7)

[TCMpos] Q2. Using the same 1-7 scale, how much do you agree with the following statement?   "This story frames China in a POSITIVE light"

○ 1 (1)

○ 2 (2)

○ 3 (3)

○ 4 (4)

○ 5 (5)

○ 6 (6)

○ 7 (7)

[TCMus] Q3. Using the same 1-7 scale, how much do you agree with the following statement?   "Infomation in this story affects the United States."

○ 1 (1)

○ 2 (2)

○ 3 (3)

○ 4 (4)

○ 5 (5)

○ 6 (6)

○ 7 (7)

[TCMme] Q3. Using the same 1-7 scale, how much do you agree with the following statement?   "This story affects me personally."

- ❍ 1 (1)

- ❍ 2 (2)

- ❍ 3 (3)

- ❍ 4 (4)

- ❍ 5 (5)

- ❍ 6 (6)

- ❍ 7 (7)

[newswthy] Finally, of the three stories that you just read, which one, if any would you say was the most "newsworthy" to YOU?

○ Google reportedly planning a return to China, eyeing app market (1)

○ AIIB to be run with highest standards of "21st century governance" (2)

○ Will Traditional Chinese Medicine ever go mainstream? (3)

○ None of the stories were "newsworthy" to me. (4)

[close] Q28 Please add any other comments or clarification about the stories you just read. Otherwise, you may now click the button below to submit your rankings.

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