

ABSTRACT

Title of Thesis: THE ROLE OF RACE IN NEGOTIATIONS:
UNDERSTANDING WHEN AND WHY RACIAL
MINORITIES ARE HINDERED AT THE
NEGOTIATION TABLE

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Previous research has demonstrated that racial discrimination exist across a number of organizational settings. Research on race and negotiation is sparse, yet some studies suggest that African Americans receive differential treatment at the negotiation table (Ayers & Siegelman, 1995). The purpose of this research is to examine whether, why, and when there are racial differences in negotiations. In study 1, race and gender of a negotiation partner was manipulated. An individual's negotiation aspirations were found to mediate the relationship between partner race and negotiation behavior. When negotiating with African Americans, people set higher targets and first offers and this mediated the impact of partner race on demands. In study 2, partner race, gender, and power were manipulated to see if it equalized outcomes for African Americans and Caucasians. While power did have some main effects on negotiators expectations, race and power did not interact to predict negotiator aspirations or outcomes.

THE ROLE OF RACE IN NEGOTIATIONS: UNDERSTANDING WHEN AND WHY
RACIAL MINORITIES ARE HINDERED AT THE NEGOTIATION TABLE

By

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Negotiations are inherent in organizational life wherein people need to manage their interdependence on a daily basis. When our personal interests are not in line with others we must negotiate to find appropriate solutions for conflict. Negotiation can be defined as “...a process by which two or more people make a joint decision with regard to an issue about which there are initial differences in preference” (Carnevale & Isen, 1986, p. 1). Negotiation contexts can range from insignificant everyday issues such as where to go to dinner to high-risk crises that impact individuals, organizations, or the broader society. Indeed, several important aspects of an individual’s life and career depend on the outcome of negotiations. Namely, one’s negotiated job package, salary, and bonus can dramatically impact financial outcomes and are the starting point for one’s future earning potential (Babcock & Laschever, 2003) as well as career advancement (Grieg, 2008). Therefore, it is clear that being an effective negotiator is important in organizational life.

Given its central importance in organizations, there has been decades of research on the psychological and social processes that inhibit or facilitate individual’s negotiation success (see Gelfand, Fulmer, & Severance, 2010 for a recent review). Yet as I will argue in this thesis, much of the negotiation literature is based on Caucasian samples, and has yet to examine the barriers that other racial and ethnic groups experience at the negotiation table. There is a rich literature that suggests that African Americans experience differential treatment in many areas of organizational life, from access discrimination, which prevents subgroup members from entering an organization, to treatment discrimination, which prevents subgroups from access to job-related resources and opportunities despite satisfying legitimate job-related criteria, which impact the

career trajectory of African Americans (Greenhaus, Parasuraman, & Wormley, 1990). For example, in the selection process it has been shown that resumes submitted by fictional African Americans were rated as less suitable for jobs despite having strong credentials (King, Madera, Hebl, Knight, & Mendoza, 2006; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004). Likewise, African American managers receive less favorable performance appraisals, and these negative ratings are justified by minor past mistakes (Knight, Hebl, Foster, & Mannix, 2003). Minorities also report barriers to acquiring mentors (Thomas, 1990; Thomas, 1993; Smith, Smith, & Markham, 2000) and have less access to informal social networks (Ibarra, 1995; Thomas & Alderfer, 1989). In all, minorities experience discrimination in a number of organizational contexts even today.

However, what is less clear is if minorities experience differential treatment at the negotiation table. This question is important for theoretical reasons, as it is critical to expand negotiation theory to incorporate experiences of racial minorities, and it is important for practical reasons, as one's ability to secure financial and other job outcomes through negotiations is critical for career success. Although there are few studies on race and negotiation, the few studies that do exist suggest that African Americans do indeed receive less favorable initial offers and fewer concessions during the course of negotiations (Ayers & Siegelman, 1995; Oore, Gagnon, & Bourgeois, 2013). The purpose of this research is to address this gap in the literature and to examine whether, why, and when there are racial differences in negotiations that hinder African Americans. More specifically, do African Americans receive differential treatment when they negotiate as compared to Caucasians? If so, what factors mediate this relationship and what factors might moderate this relationship?

In what follows, I review research on discrimination of African Americans in general and negotiation in particular. I then theorize on possible mediators and moderators of the relationship between race and negotiation outcomes. In study 1, I tested a mediated model for the relationship between a negotiation counterpart's race and negotiation outcomes. More specifically, a computer-simulated negotiation was utilized to examine if perceptions of Caucasians and African American partner's negotiation goals, limits, and expectations influence the first offer behavior, concession-making behavior, and demand behavior over the course of the negotiation. In study 2, I explored power as a possible moderator for this relationship to see if it levels the negotiation playing field for African Americans. In both studies, gender will also be explored in an attempt to determine how intersectionality influences negotiations, however there are no formal hypotheses in regards to gender.

The current studies provide the first empirical examination of how race, and possibly gender, affect negotiation outcomes and what factors mediate and moderate this relationship. This information is useful for organizations and scholars alike given the theoretical and practical implications. More specifically, the current studies are among the first to explicitly and empirically examine if race has a direct and/or indirect relationship to negotiation outcomes. Also, by examining power as a moderator we may be able to develop interventions to help minority employees achieve better negotiation outcomes. Research in this area is long overdue, and the current studies provide an important foundation for future research and theory on race and negotiation processes.

Differential Treatment of Racial Minorities in Organizations

Discrimination is alive and well in today's organization. Though numbers are steadily rising, in 2010 the Officer of Personnel Management reported that women make up 43.9 percent of the workforce, while minorities only account for 33.8 percent. Compared to Caucasian counterparts, women and minorities are still earning less (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010), seen as less competent and influential (Heilman & Welle, 2006), and are less likely to hold senior level positions (Officer of Personnel Management, 2010). In addition, minorities are also more likely than their Caucasian counterparts to experience treatment discrimination (Greenhaus, Parasuraman, & Wormley, 1990), which contribute to negative organizational attitudes, increased absenteeism (Avery, McKay, Wilson, Tonidandel, 2007), greater intent to leave (McKay, Avery, Tonidandel, Morris, Hernandez, & Hebl, 2007), and actual turnover (Hom, Roberson, Ellis, 2008).

Indeed, African Americans experience differential treatment before they even enter organizations (King, Madera, Hebl, Knight, & Mendoza, 2006; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004). Research has shown that high status jobs are perceived to be more suitable for Asians and Caucasians, whereas low status jobs are perceived as more suitable for African Americans and Hispanics (King et al., 2006; Shih, 2002). Likewise, selection decision research shows that resumes submitted by fictional African Americans received fewer callbacks than Caucasians. African Americans, moreover, did not benefit from having high resume quality as compared to Caucasians (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004).

In addition to job applicant and resume evaluation, differential treatment of African Americans has been found once employees enter organizations. For example, Knight, Hebl, Foster, & Mannix (2003) asked study participants to evaluate a African American or Caucasian leader or subordinate that made either a small or large mistake on a number of dimensions. They found that African American leaders and Caucasian subordinates were evaluated more negatively than Caucasian leaders and African American subordinates. In addition, participants justified the negative evaluations of African American leaders and Caucasian subordinates more readily when these employees made job-related mistakes. Their results suggest that individuals in stereotype inconsistent social roles (Caucasian subordinates, and African American leaders) are punished, especially when they make minor mistakes. By contrast, individuals who are perceived to be in line with their appropriate role in society (Caucasian leaders, African American subordinates) are rewarded. Such stereotypical views of African Americans as inferior to Caucasians maintain organizational power imbalances in favor of Caucasian males.

African Americans also experience treatment discrimination when it comes to promotion (James, 2000; Lukstye, Waite, Avery, & Roy, 2013). James (2000) found that African American managers reported a slower rate of promotion and less psychosocial support from informal networks than their Caucasian counterparts. Additionally, access to training and education –or human capital—was a significant predictor of promotion rates. However, race moderated the relationship between human capital and promotion, such that African Americans with the same level of training did not advance at the same rate as Caucasians. Other factors, such as tardiness negatively impact performance

evaluations and career advancement of African Americans, but not Caucasians (Lukstye et al., 2013). The direct and indirect effects of race on promotion rate highlight the issues of treatment discrimination in organizations.

Overall, research shows that minorities are at a disadvantage at many stages of organizational life from selection to promotion. Racial differences exist, yet little research examines the critical processes within organizations that may help or hurt minorities advance, such as negotiation. Therefore, racial treatment discrimination may inform much needed research on race and negotiation.

Race and Negotiation

Negotiation theory and research has advanced our understanding of the psychological and social factors that impede versus help the attainment of high economic outcomes. While there is a large literature on gender, personality, and individual differences in negotiations (Barry & Friedman, 1998, Gelfand et al. 2010; Elfenbein, Curhan, Eisenkraft, Shirako, & Baccaro, 2008), to date there has been little research on race and negotiation. Of the major recent reviews that I have examined in major *Handbooks and the Annual Review of Psychology* (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Gelfand et al., 2010; Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010), none discuss issues of race.

The literature that does exist suggests that African Americans achieve lower outcomes at the negotiation table. Research on salary negotiations for example indicates that African Americans negotiate lower starting salaries than Caucasians (Seidel, Polzer, & Stewart, 2000). Seidel et al. (2000) examined over 3,000 real salary negotiations and discovered that minority group members negotiated lower starting salaries than majority

group members. However, this relationship was attenuated when the researchers controlled for social ties in the organization. While social ties did reduce inequalities, minorities were less likely to have extensive social networks in the organization. Although the researchers demonstrated racial differences in salary negotiation outcomes and the impact of social network ties, they did not examine how Caucasians attitudes and perceptions of African American negotiation partners might have affected salary outcomes as well. In another study, Oore, Gagnon, & Bourgeois (2013) indeed found that Caucasians preferential liking for their in-group did affect negotiation outcomes as for Caucasians and African Americans. Caucasians, particularly those who had high liking for their own racial in-group – what they termed racial group affect—negotiated more effectively with Caucasian than African American negotiation partners. When paired with African Americans, Caucasians’ high in-group affect was associated with lower joint gains; however, high in-group affect predicted higher joint gains when Caucasians were paired with Caucasian partners. Additionally, African American partners elicited higher opening offers from Caucasians with high in-group affect. While these results do suggest that race has an effect on negotiation, alternatively they may simply indicate an in-group – out-group effect, an issue addressed in the Study 1 by including Caucasians treatment of both African American negotiators and Asian negotiators.

African Americans have been shown to also achieve lower outcomes in negotiations outside of organizational contexts. Ayers and Siegleman (1995) conducted a field experiment at car dealerships in order to see how race and gender impact financial outcomes in negotiation. African American and Caucasian confederates negotiated the price of a car at local car dealerships. All confederates were trained to follow the same

script and the same counteroffer procedures during the negotiations; the only manipulation in the study was the race and gender of the confederate buyer. Results showed that African American males received the worst initial offers and received the least amount of concessions during negotiations in this setting. Caucasian males, on the other hand, received the best initial offers and the most concessions resulting in drastically lower final offers than African American males, African American females, and Caucasian females.

Taken together, these studies show that negotiator race does predict differential treatment in general and in the context of negotiations. Based on the above literature I seek to examine interracial negotiations in a controlled setting and examine mediating and moderating influences on negotiation outcomes. In order to control for different behavior in negotiation, established computer simulations were utilized wherein Caucasians are told they are negotiating with either a Caucasian or African American. I first hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 1: African American negotiation partners will receive more competitive (higher) first offers than Caucasians.

Hypothesis 2: African Americans negotiation partners will receive fewer concessions than Caucasians.

In addition to exploring effects of race on negotiation outcomes, I seek to understand why they may occur –in other words, what mediates the proposed effects. Following their examination of car dealership negotiations Ayers and Siegelman (1995) briefly speculated about the potential sources of discrimination that may explain the disparate treatment yet did not provide empirical evidence. They suggest that racial and

gender differences could be due to overt discrimination. They also speculate that implicit discrimination and beliefs about racial group members' reservation prices and their knowledge of negotiation in general could be the culprit, yet they did not test this in their field study. Research shows that perceptions held by majority group members have a significant impact on the evaluation and treatment of African Americans across a number of social and organizational contexts (King et al., 2006; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Knight et al., 2003; Ayers & Siegelman, 1995). Therefore, it is possible that other factors like stereotypes about out-group members' abilities, and deservingness (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) might mediate the relationship between race and negotiation.

An exploration of mediating factors is critical for theory, as it will open the "black box" that exists with respect to race and negotiation outcomes, and is critical for practice, as it will help to design interventions to level the negotiating field. As I describe below, there are several mediators that I propose might explain why African Americans achieve lower outcomes, including expectations about their negotiation opponent's a) power and b) negotiation aspirations in the form of target, limits, and expectations (Study 1). Moreover, I seek to examine if manipulating power moderates the effects of race on negotiation outcomes (Study 2).

Figure 1 illustrates the mediational model being tested. I hypothesize that the race of a negotiation partner will predict stereotypes of minorities power, negotiation limits, targets, and expectations, which is expected to predict first offers and concession making during a negotiation. Each path will be discussed in turn.




Figure 1. The Mediating Role of Perceived Relative Power, and Negotiation Aspirations and Expectations in the Effect of Partner Race on Negotiation Outcomes.

Minority Power, Negotiation Limits, Targets, and Expectations

Research in the realm of social cognition examines how individuals understand and make sense of the world (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). In the negotiation context, social cognition researchers have attempted to examine how individuals' perceptions and attributions guide their negotiation behavior. Some of the work in this area focuses on how individuals perceive their negotiation counterparts' skills, objectives, and preferences and how they are likely to behave in a negotiation. Given the often ambiguous and uncertain terrain of negotiations, negotiators may rely on cognitive shortcuts and make decisions based on assumptions, since they are likely to have limited facts, especially in regards to their opponent (Neale & Fragale, 2006; Curhan, Neale, & Ross, 2004; Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Van Kleef & de Dreu, 2002).

In particular, heuristics about the other negotiators' power can have a profound effect on these social interactions. Power is inherent in negotiation settings. Negotiation

literature has defined power as “..an individual’s relative capacity to modify other’s states by providing or withholding resources or administering punishments” (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003, p. 265). Initially power is determined by individual differences (personality traits and attractiveness), dyadic variables (interest in relationship, relative commitment), within group variables (authority, status), and between-group variables, which include gender, class, and ethnicity. Racial minorities may experience a chronic state of low status and power in today’s society and within organizations. Underrepresentation of minority group members in upper level management may also signal low power and status to majority group members.

As suggested by Kim, Pinkley, & Fragale (2005), perceived power, or the perception of an individual’s potential power within a negotiation setting, may influence how negotiation counterparts interact with one another. In their dynamic integrative model, Kim et al. (2005) suggest that negotiators perceive the power of their counterpart in regards to their alternative options and access to resources. These perceptions are embedded in the context of the negotiation setting and the surrounding social environment. If people perceive others as having low power – less access to resources and no ability to administer punishments – then they will assume they will have less ambitious negotiation goals, lower limits, and deserve lower offers during a negotiation. In addition, these perceptions of negotiation goals, limits, and deservingness should predict offers and concessions during a negotiation.

More specifically, since African Americans are still negatively stereotyped as ignorant (Devine & Elliot, 1995; Madon et al., 2001) and viewed as low power (Ridgeway, 2014), Caucasians may assume African American counterparts have low

power and therefore will expect less in a negotiation and ultimately settle for less. This assumption might have some basis in reality, as previous research suggests that minorities may have lower salary expectations than Caucasian counterparts (Gasser, Flint, & Tan, 2000). Minorities also settle for less during early salary negotiations and this pattern seems to persist because they continue to settle for less in future salary negotiations (Seidel et al., 2000). Thus, on the flip side, perceptions of low power may shape Caucasians' perceptions of negotiation aspirations and expectations. If African Americans are perceived to have chronically low power in society, they may be perceived to have low power in a negotiation setting and therefore they will have less ambitious negotiation goals and limits. If Caucasians perceive African Americans to have lower negotiation limits, targets, and aspirations, they may make lower offers and fewer concessions.

In addition to perceptions of a negotiation partner's negotiation aspirations, the negotiation context and perceptions of an out-group member's power may also influence individual's own negotiation aspirations. A large body of research confirms that an individual's own negotiation aspirations influence negotiation behavior (Thompson, 1990; White & Neale, 1994; Blount White, Neale, 1994; Siegel & Fouraker, 1960). Thus, partner race and power perceptions may also influence self-aspirations, which influence negotiation outcomes.

Hypothesis 3: Race of partner will predict relative power perceptions and perceptions of partner negotiation aspirations and self-aspirations. African Americans will be perceived as less powerful and therefore participants will

perceive them to have lower negotiation aspirations, while their own negotiation aspirations will increase.

Hypothesis 4: Perceptions of a partner's negotiation aspirations and self-aspirations will predict first offers and concession making behavior during a negotiation.

Hypothesis 5: Perceptions of power and perceptions of self and other negotiation aspirations will mediate the relationship between race of partner and negotiation outcomes.

Chapter 2: Study 1

In the first study, I tested a mediated model to examine if differential treatment is present in interracial negotiations. Also, I examined what factors might explain why partner race affects negotiation outcomes. Gender of negotiation counterpart was included for exploratory interest in the current study. In order to ensure the effects are due to differential treatment of African Americans, Asian American partners were included as a control group, as well. While both are technically out-groups, Asian Americans are categorized as a model minority and stereotyped as highly intelligent and capable (Chao, Chiu, Chan, Mendoza-Denton, & Kwok, 2013; Ying, Lee, Tsai, Huang, Lin, & Wan, 2001; Cheryan, & Bodenhausen, 2000). Additionally, research shows that Asian Americans are not seen as inherently threatening, yet calm and reserved (Gilbert, 1951; Katz & Braly, 1933). Therefore, I expect that Asian Americans will receive better treatment, equal to that of Caucasians, because they will be seen as having higher power and more ambitious negotiation targets, limits, and expectations than African Americans. In addition to controlling for out-group effects, a computerized negotiation simulation

was utilized to control for the behavior of the negotiation partner that participants interacted with.

Experimental Design and Participants

Study 1 was a between-subject design in which the race, and gender, of the negotiation counterpart was manipulated. Given that men and women perform differently at the negotiation table (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001), we limited our sample to include only White males. This allowed us to explore how race, and potentially gender, of a negotiation counterpart are perceived by this particular group since a majority of upper-level management is still predominantly White males. While research on gender and negotiations suggests that women receive less favorable negotiation outcomes (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001; Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007), research is lacking in understanding how the intersectionality of race as well as gender impact negotiation outcomes. As previously mentioned, Ayers and Siegelman (1995) found that race and gender effect car dealership negotiations, however, their study did not empirically test why. Although gender was not the primary focus of this study, we sought to explore it nevertheless.

A power analysis was conducted using G*Power software to determine the sample size necessary for the 3 (Race: African American vs. Caucasian vs. Asian) x 2 (Gender of Partner: Male vs. Female) study design. In order to achieve an effect size of .25, with an alpha of .05, and power of .8, I will need to recruit at least 158 participants. Participants were recruited through Cint, a market research platform similar to Mechanical Turk and Qualtrics. This platform allowed us to collect data with a specified sample for a reasonable rate. This service also allowed us to include attention checks

throughout the study and only collect data from participants who were paying attention for the entire study. Participants were aware that they would only receive compensation, and credit for participating, if they answered all attention check questions correctly. This allowed us to eliminate participants who were not eligible or not paying attention prior to addressing other exclusion criteria.

In an attempt to capture a sample of working Caucasian males, only males, who identified as White/Caucasian, over the age of 25, were eligible to participate. A total of 212 Caucasian males participated for a monetary compensation of \$10, however after testing manipulation checks and implementing the exclusionary criteria 140 participants were included in the analyses ($M = 45.75$, $sd = 13.52$). When asked about annual household income, 4.3% of participant reported making less than \$19,999, 10% indicated that they earned \$20,000-39,999, 22.9% earned \$40,000-59,999, 21.4% earned \$60,000-79,999, 16.4% 80,000-99,999, 22.1% of participants earned over \$100,000, and 2.9% did not report their annual household income. In terms of political affiliation, 25.7% identified as Republican, 32.1% as Democrat, 34.3% as Independent, and 2.9% as Libertarian. The remainder of participants selected other (2.1%), preferred not to answer (1.4), or failed to answer (1.4%).

We also asked participants to provide their religious affiliation, 65.7% selected Christian, 15% indicated they had no religious affiliation, 7.1% were Jewish, 5.7% identified as Atheist, and the remainder identified as Atheist (8%), other (2.9%), preferred not to answer or failed to answer (2.8%). In terms of highest level of education attainment, 15% participants only earned a high school diploma or GED, 5% obtained a degree from a vocational or technical school, 20% attended some college, 35% earned a

Bachelor's degree, 15% had a Master's degree, 2.1% earned a doctoral degree, and 7.1% had a professional degree.

Procedures

Participants partook in an online computer simulated negotiation, which has been used successfully in negotiation research to control for the negotiation counterparts' behavior (Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b; Van Kleef et al. 2006). Race of the negotiation counterpart was manipulated following Adam and Shirako's (2013) methodology. Upon arrival, participants were welcomed and instructed to review and sign an informed consent form. Based on the methodology used by Adam and Shirako (2013), participants were told that the researchers would like them to know whom they are negotiating with prior to the negotiation. Therefore, participants were asked to complete a short form in which they provided descriptive information about themselves such as their first name, age, gender, race/ethnicity, hobbies, etc. They were told that the computer would then select a subset of their responses at random and send that information to their negotiation counterpart. In return, the participants received a subset of the same information about their counterpart. This served as the race manipulation (see figures 2 & 3 below). In reality, all participants negotiated with a simulated counterpart. Participants were randomly paired with a Black, White, or Asian male or female negotiation partner. The subset of information they received included this information.

Participants who were paired with a Caucasian counterpart negotiated with Greg or Emily. Participants in the African American counterpart condition negotiated with Darnell or Ebony. These Caucasian and African American names were taken from previous research where a target's name has been used to manipulate race (Bertrand &

Mullainathan, 2003) and/or also appeared on a list of the ‘Whitest and Blackest names’ for boys and girls compiled by Dubner and Levitt (2005). An additional condition for an Asian counterpart was included to disentangle out-group effects. Participants in the Asian counterpart condition negotiated with Liang or Lei. The Asian partner names were taken from an online list posted by babynames.net of popular Chinese baby names and selected because they appeared among the top 40 names for a boy or girl.

Please wait while we find a participant for you to negotiate with...

Participant ID: ...



The page will automatically refresh when we have found another participant!

Figure 2. Race manipulation connection waiting screen.

We have now found the other participant

Participant ID: **177**



Name: Darnell
Gender: Male
Ethnicity: Black or African American

Please take a few moments to review the information about your partner and prepare for the negotiation.

Figure 3. Race manipulation for an African American male.

Participants then received information about the negotiation task. The task was

adapted from the computer-simulated negotiation used by Van Kleef et al. (2004, 2006), which was originally adapted from De Dreu and Van Lange (1995). This buyer-seller negotiation task involved multiple issues, which varied in importance. Participants learned that they would be assigned to either the buyer or seller role in the negotiation regarding a cell phone package. In reality, all participants were assigned to the seller role and tasked with negotiating the price, warranty period, and service contract for the phone. Participants received a payoff chart that provided details about which issues were the most important (had higher point values) and which outcomes were the most beneficial. All participants were told that the objective was to earn as many points as possible, but also they should strive to reach an agreement with their partner. Table 1 depicts a sample payoff chart.

Table 1. *Participants Payoff Chart*

Level	Price of phones		Warranty Period		Service Contract	
	Price (\$)	Payoff	Warranty	Payoff	Contract	Payoff
1	150	400	1 month	120	1 month	240
2	145	350	2 months	105	2 months	210
3	140	300	3 months	90	3 months	180
4	135	250	4 months	75	4 months	150
5	130	200	5 months	60	5 months	120
6	125	150	6 months	45	6 months	90
7	120	100	7 months	30	7 months	60
8	115	50	8 months	15	8 months	30
9	110	0	9 months	0	9 months	0

Participants did not receive any information regarding their counterpart's corresponding payoff table, and were only told that it differs from their own. Once reading through the negotiation task instructions participants were quizzed on their knowledge of the task and the instructions were again summarized to ensure participants

understood the task and their role. After a short pause, participants were connected with their negotiation partner and asked a series of pre-negotiation questions about initial perceptions of their partner, their partner's goals and perceived relative power. We also asked participants to think about their own negotiation goals and approach to the negotiation (see measures section below).

Participants then learned that they would make the first offer and that the negotiation would continue until an agreement is reached or until time ran out. In reality, following Van Kleef and colleagues (2004, 2006) methodology, the negotiation went for six rounds. Therefore, the simulation is intended to capture the early stages of the negotiation process, allowing participants to engage in a realistic negotiation with the simulated negotiation partner. However, since the participants were unaware that their partner was actually a computer, a true final agreement could not be negotiated. By programming the simulation to end after 6 rounds, we were able to control the length of the negotiation task and maintain the cover story that participants were negotiating with a real partner. After each round there was a short pause in which participants were instructed to wait for their partner to respond to their offer. See below for additional information about the simulation and the offers made by the simulation during the negotiation task. Also see Figures 4-6 below for an example of how offers were sent by participants and received from their negotiation partner for each round.

Please enter your offer for **Price**:

Please enter your offer for **Warranty Period**:

Please enter your offer for **Service Contract**:

Figure 4. The drop down list participants used to send offers during the negotiation task. *Note.* The negotiation payoff chart was always visible to participants during the negotiation.

Your offer has been sent to the buyer. We are now waiting for the buyer's counteroffer. As soon as they make an offer, it will appear on your screen.

Please wait while your partner responds



Once they enter a response it will appear on the page.

Figure 5. Simulated waiting screen viewed by participants after they sent their offers during the negotiation.

Darnell Offers:

Price: 8

Warranty Period: 7

Service Contract: 8

Figure 6. The message and offer sent by the simulated negotiation partner. Participants then sent a counteroffer until the simulation accepted an agreement or six rounds of negotiation were completed and the task ended with no agreement.

Over the negotiation rounds the buyer (computer simulated partner) made the

following offers for the three issues of price, warranty, and service contract; 8–7–8 (Round 1), 8–7–7 (Round 2), 8–6–7 (Round 3), 7–6–7 (Round 4), 7–6–6 (Round 5), and 6–6–6 (Round 6). This computer simulation has been shown to have face validity and is seen as intermediate in cooperativeness and competitiveness (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995). If a participant made an offer that was equal to or exceeds the next offer from the computer, than their offer was accepted and the negotiation ended in an agreement. For example, if the participant offers 8-6-7 in Round 3, the computer accepted the demand since its next offer (Round 4) would have been 8-6-7. Otherwise, participants continued to negotiate for six rounds total as discussed above.

The computer recorded all offers made by the participant, which were be used to compute an index revealing demand behavior and concession-making behavior during the negotiation. After the sixth round, the negotiation was artificially interrupted and ended if an agreement was not reached. A small pilot study was conducted to ensure that the race manipulation and simulated negotiation task were realistic. In the pilot study we asked participants to go through the entire study and at the end discuss if they remembered their negotiation partner and if the negotiation task was easily understood and realistic. Participants were able to identify their negotiation partner, indicating that the race manipulation was successful, and most participants indicated that the simulation was convincing.

As previously mentioned, in order to conduct repeated measures analyses participants who did not reach six rounds of negotiation were excluded ($n = 52$) (Tripp & Sondak, 1992). Given that the simulated negotiation partner started with a competitive and undesirable offer from the participants' perspective, and gradually adjusted their

offers over each round, having the offer accepted prior to reaching the sixth round of negotiation may not be an appropriate negotiation strategy since the goal was for participants to maximize the points the offer was worth to them. In the full sample there were no effects of race ($F(2, 206) = .91, p = .40$), gender ($F(1, 206) = .47, p = .49$), or interaction ($F(2, 206) = .02, p = .98$) for the individuals that did not reach the sixth round of the negotiation. Once participants completed the negotiation task they completed a questionnaire, which included follow up questions about the negotiation and their partner.

Measures

Perceptions of Relative Power. Three items were taken from Van Kleef et al. (2006) to measure participants' perceptions of relative power prior to the negotiation. The following items were rated on a scale of '1' definitely the other to '7' definitely me; 'Who do you think will have the strongest position in the negotiation?', 'Who do you feel will have the most influence on the course of the negotiation?', 'Who do you feel will have the most power in the negotiation?'. These items were combined into a single index of initial perceived relative power ($\alpha = 0.88$). Higher scores on this measure indicated that the participant perceived that they had more power than their opponent, while lower scores indicated that they felt their partner had more power.

Perceptions of Limits, Targets, and Expectations. Prior to the start of the negotiation, participants were also asked a series of questions about their perceptions of their negotiation partner's target offer, the lowest offer they would accept, and the offer they felt their partner deserved. Participants were instructed to think about the negotiation they were about to begin and use their payoff chart to answer a series of questions (keeping in mind that on their payoff chart, level 1-1-1, where they get the highest payoff,

the buyer gets nothing and on level 9-9-9, where they get nothing, the buyer gets the highest payoff). Perception of ideal negotiation outcome was measured using the following item, ‘What is the highest agreement your partner is hoping for?’ (e.g. 7-7-7). Perception of a partner’s reservation price and was measured using the following items, ‘What is the lowest agreement your partner would accept?’. Perceptions of offer deservingness was measured by asking ‘What agreement do you think your partner deserves?’. These items were recoded to reflect the true values of an inverse payoff chart, in other words the items were reverse scored such that the offers reflect the theoretical payoff chart of the partner. These items were not all highly correlated therefore they were analyzed separately.

We also asked participants the same series of questions in reference to their own negotiation goals, ‘What is the highest agreement you are hoping for?’, ‘What is the lowest agreement you would accept?’, ‘What agreement do you think you deserve?’. These items were correlated and therefore combined into a self-aspiration index score ($\alpha = 0.71$).

First offer, demand behavior, and concession making behavior. The computer recorded all the offers that participants made during the negotiation. These offers were transformed to represent the total payoff value of each offer after each round (e.g. total payoff value for price, warranty, and service contract). These offers were then combined to create an index for demand behavior and concession-making behavior.

Results

Treatment of the Data. In both studies, following Van Kleef et al. (2004, 2006), two indices were created to represent demand behavior and concession-making behavior

during the negotiation. First, the offers made by participants in each negotiation round were summed across the three negotiation issues (price, warranty, and service contract). These offers were then totaled to create a total demand index variable. A single concession-making index was also computed such that the offer from each round was subtracted from their offer in the round before, in other words the score reflects the difference between the first and last offers in the negotiation.

Manipulation Check and Exclusions. As previously mentioned participants who did not reach 6 rounds of negotiation were excluded. In addition to this exclusion criterion, we included manipulation checks for race and gender for exploratory purposes by asking ‘What race/ethnicity do you believe your first negotiation partner was?’ and ‘What gender was your negotiation partner?’ Participants were excluded if they did not correctly answer these questions according to which condition they were in ($n = 20$).

Table 2. *Descriptives and Bivariate Correlations Between Key Variables of Interest*

	<i>M</i>	<i>sd</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Partner Target	490.41	291.50							
Partner Limit	303.24	185.93	.01						
Offer Partner Deserves	248.09	167.09	.14	.29**					
Self-aspirations Index	510.44	140.04	-.12	-.24**	-.66**				
Pre-negotiation Relative Power	4.63	1.32	-.18*	-.16	-.19*	.20*			
First Offer	569.60	193.70	.05	-.14	-.45**	.56**	.12		
Concession-Making Behavior Index	2668.35	900.82	.04	-.08	-.22*	.17*	.04	.70**	
Demand Behavior Index	178.75	178.90	.08	-.11	-.42**	.62**	.11	.79**	.16

p < **.01*****p* < **.05***

Effect of Partner Race and Gender on Pre-negotiation Perceptions

Relative Power Perceptions. Three items were used to measure perceptions of relative power prior to the negotiation task. These items were highly correlated and therefore were combined into a single index of initial perceived relative power ($\alpha = 0.88$). A 3 (Partner Race: African American v. Caucasian v. Asian) x 2 (Partner Gender: Male v. Female) was conducted to investigate the effect of partner race and gender on pre-negotiation perceptions of relative power. Results indicated that there was no main effect of partner race on relative power perceptions $F(2, 134) = 1.04, p = .35$, (White: $M = 4.39, sd = 1.40$, Asian: $M = 4.76, sd = 1.19$, Black: $M = 4.75, sd = 1.34$) nor of gender on relative power perceptions $F(1, 134) = .14, p = .71$, (Male: $M = 4.57, sd = 1.33$, Female: $M = 4.69, sd = 1.31$). There was also no significant interaction between partner race and gender $F(2, 134) = .02, p = .98$. These findings indicate that across all conditions of partner race and gender, individuals reported that they had more relative power than their negotiation partner, but there were no differences in this perception across conditions.

Table 3. ANOVA Results and Descriptive Statistics for Perceived Relative Power by Partner Race and Partner Gender.

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	
Caucasian				
Male	4.33	1.26		25
Female	4.48	1.58		21
Total	4.39	1.40		46
African American				
Male	4.72	1.56		23
Female	4.77	1.14		27
Total	4.75	1.34		50
Asian				
Male	4.72	1.13		19
Female	4.79	1.26		25
Total	4.76	1.19		44
Source	SS	df	MS	F
Partner Race	3.69	2	1.85	1.05
Partner Gender	2.55	1	.255	.14
Interaction	.08	2	.04	.02
Error	236.73	134	1.77	

Perception of partner's negotiation aspirations. A 3 (Partner Race: African American vs. Caucasian vs. Asian) x 2 (Partner Gender: Male v. Female) was conducted to investigate the effect of partner race and gender on pre-negotiation perceptions of a partner's negotiation aspirations. Three items were used to measure partner negotiation aspirations. Results indicated that partner race did not have a significant effect on perceptions of a partner's negotiation target offer ($F(2, 129) = .23, p = .79$), limits ($F(2, 130) = .01, p = .85$), or the offer participants felt their partner deserved ($F(2, 130) = 1.64, p = .61$). There were no significant interactions between partner race and gender for any of these partner aspiration items. These findings indicate that across all conditions of partner race, individuals perceived their partners to have similar negotiation aspirations.

Perceptions of self-aspirations. Three items were used to measure an individual's negotiation aspirations. These items were all correlated and therefore combined into a single index ($\alpha = .71$).

Table 4. *Descriptive Statistics for Self-Aspiration Items*

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2
Target Offer	626.46	186.91		
Limit	397.92	157.62	.27**	
Offer you deserve	505.82	173.91	.61**	.52**

A 3 (Partner Race: African American v. Caucasian v. Asian) x 2 (Partner Gender: Male v. Female) was conducted to investigate the effect of partner race and gender on pre-negotiation perceptions of a self negotiation aspirations. Results indicated that partner race did have a significant effect on self negotiation aspirations $F(2, 131) = 7.37, p < .01$. Post hoc analyses were conducted using the least squared difference to examine the differences between groups. Results showed that when participants were paired with an African American negotiation partner ($M = 569.15, sd = 114.99$), they aspired to higher negotiation outcomes as compared to when they were paired with a Caucasian ($M = 475.20, sd = 113.91, LSD_{critical} = 74.61, M_{difference} = 96.18, p < .01$) or when they were paired with an Asian counterpart ($M = 480.56, sd = 170.00, LSD_{critical} = 74.61, M_{difference} = 88.47, p < .01$). However, self-aspirations did not significantly differ when partners were paired with a Caucasian partner as compared to an Asian negotiation partner. The main effect of partner gender was not significant ($F(1, 131) = .65, p = .42$), nor was the interaction between partner race and gender $F(2, 131) = .33, p = .72$.

Table 5. ANOVA Results and Descriptive Statistics for Perceptions of Self Negotiation Aspirations by Partner Race and Partner Gender.

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	
Caucasian				
Male	495.87	111.63	25	
Female	450.60	114.35	21	
Total	475.20	113.91	46	
African American				
Male	572.01	138.71	22	
Female	566.82	94.11	27	
Total	569.15	114.99	49	
Asian				
Male	483.70	184.07	18	
Female	478.19	162.67	24	
Total	480.56	170.01	42	
Source	SS	df	MS	F
Partner Race	267614.18	2	133807.09	7.37*
Partner Gender	11716.99	1	11716.99	.65
Interaction	12061.03	2	6030.52	.33
Error	2379544.73	131	18164.46	

$p < .01^*$

Together, these findings suggest that while the race of the negotiation partner does not affect perceptions of power, or perceptions of a negotiation partner's aspirations, it does effect an individual's negotiation aspirations. It is possible that when faced with African American negotiation partners, Caucasian negotiators are primed to be more competitive and display a sense of entitlement, which may ultimately affect negotiation behavior and outcomes.

Effect of Partner Race and Gender on Negotiation Behavior

In order to address the hypotheses related to the main effect of race on negotiation behavior, 3 (Partner Race: African American v. Caucasian v. Asian) x 2 (Partner Gender: Male v. Female) between subjects ANOVAs were conducted. The first of which was conducted to compare the effect of partner race and gender on first offer behavior.

Results indicated that partner race had a marginally significant effect on first offer

behavior $F(2, 133) = 2.96, p = .06$, (Caucasian: $M = 533.91, sd = 187.46$, Asian: $M = 547.56, sd = 224.98$, African American: $M = 621.40, sd = 160.16$). Post hoc analyses, showed that African American negotiation partners received more aggressive first offers ($M = 621.40, sd = 160.16$) than Caucasian negotiation partners ($M = 533.91, sd = 187.46$, $LSD_{critical} = 80.17, M_{difference} = 87.49, p < .05$) and marginally more aggressive offers than Asian partners ($M = 547.56, sd = 224.98, LSD_{critical} = 80.17, M_{difference} = 74.33, p = .07$). However, the Caucasian partner condition did not significantly differ from the Asian partner condition ($LSD_{critical} = 80.17, M_{difference} = 15.44, p = .71$). The main effect of partner gender was not significant ($F(1, 133) = .45, p = .50$), nor was the interaction between partner race and gender ($F(2, 133) = .05, p = .96$).

Table 6. ANOVA Results and Descriptive Statistics for First Offer Behavior by Partner Race and Partner Gender.

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	
Caucasian				
Male	543.00	196.39	25	
Female	523.10	180.44	21	
Total	533.91	187.46	46	
African American				
Male	640.43	157.66	23	
Female	605.19	163.45	27	
Total	621.40	160.16	50	
Asian				
Male	554.17	260.65	18	
Female	542.80	201.00	25	
Total	547.56	224.98	43	
Source	SS	df	MS	F
Partner Race	220259.93	2	110129.96	2.96
Partner Gender	16781.25	1	16781.25	.45
Interaction	3388.58	2	1694.29	.96
Error	5177803.24	133	37164.36	

The second 3 x 2 between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of partner race and gender on concession-making behavior, which was defined as the

total points conceded during the course of the negotiation. There was no significant main effect of partner race or gender on total concessions made during the negotiation ($F(2,130) = .45, p = .64$; $F(1,130) = .23, p = .63$, respectively). The interaction was also not significant ($F(2,130) = .40, p = .67$).

Table 7. ANOVA Results and Descriptive Statistics for Concession-Making Behavior by Partner Race and Partner Gender.

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	
Caucasian				
Male	162.08	199.09	24	
Female	197.50	194.94	20	
Total	178.18	195.73	44	
African American				
Male	178.26	167.58	23	
Female	213.70	152.45	27	
Total	197.40	158.93	50	
Asian				
Male	172.35	227.14	17	
Female	146.80	153.64	25	
Total	157.14	184.69	42	
Source	SS	df	MS	F
Partner Race	29562.25	2	14781.12	.45
Partner Gender	7574.33	1	7574.33	.23
Interaction	26247.67	2	13123.84	.40
Error	4247730.78	130	31674.85	

The final 3 x 2 between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of partner race and gender on demand behavior, which was defined as the sum of all offers made during the negotiation. Results showed that there was a marginally significant main effect of partner race on demand behavior ($F(2,130) = 2.89, p = .06$), such that participants demanded more from African American negotiators ($M = 2888.40, sd = 872.250$) as compared to Caucasian negotiators ($M = 2550.45, sd = 801.66, LSD_{critical} = 372.66, M_{difference} = 393.16, p < .05$) and demanded marginally more than Asian negotiators ($M = 2529.88, sd = 997.53, LSD_{critical} = 372.66, M_{difference} = 369.44, p = .05$).

There were no differences in demand behavior when participants negotiated with Asian as compared with Caucasian negotiators ($LSD_{critical} = 372.66$, $M_{difference} = 23.72$, $p = .90$). However, there was no main effect of gender ($F(1,130) = 1.23$, $p = .27$) or interaction between partner race and gender ($F(2,130) = 1.56$, $p = .21$).

Table 8. ANOVA Results and Descriptive Statistics for Demand Behavior by Partner Race and Partner Gender.

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		
Caucasian				
Male	2731.04	761.38		24
Female	2333.75	813.67		20
Total	2550.45	801.66		44
African American				
Male	3069.78	807.43		23
Female	2733.89	910.12		27
Total	2888.40	872.25		50
Asian				
Male	2397.35	1150.17		17
Female	2620.00	892.79		25
Total	2529.88	997.53		42
Source	SS	df	MS	F
Partner Race	4542120.04	2	2271060.02	2.89
Partner Gender	961786.35	1	961786.35	1.23
Interaction	2455855.89	2	1227927.94	1.56
Error	102087539	130	785288.76	

To summarize these findings, a two-way mixed model ANOVA was conducted to show the negotiation behavior over the course of the negotiation. Results showed a significant main effect of negotiation round, $F(5,650) = 85.34$, $p < .001$ ($\eta^2 = .40$). This finding suggests that over time, participant's demands declined across conditions. There was a marginally significant main effect of partner race on negotiation round ($F(2,130) = 2.89$, $p = .06$ ($\eta^2 = .04$)). When participants negotiated with an African American negotiation partner ($M = 483.64$, $se = 20.95$) they demanded more at each round over the six rounds of negotiation as compared to when they were paired with a Caucasian ($M =$

422.07, $se = 22.36$, $p < .05$) or an Asian negotiation partner ($M = 418.11$, $se = 23.22$, $p < .05$). There were no significant main effects of partner gender or interaction between partner race and negotiation round.




Figure 7. The Effect of Partner Race on Negotiation Behavior

Table 9. Means and Standard Deviations for the Effect of Race on Negotiation Behavior over the Course of the Negotiation

Variable	Caucasian		African American		Asian	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Offer 1	542.16	187.42	621.40	160.16	544.41	227.00
Offer 2	455.11	170.50	523.80	172.64	433.21	201.98
Offer 3	423.75	179.60	473.30	175.14	406.55	182.57
Offer 4	386.82	151.30	424.40	174.12	380.71	175.46
Offer 5	378.64	113.87	421.50	147.97	377.74	154.71
Offer 6	363.98	131.19	424.00	151.87	387.26	150.28

Table 10. Means and Standard Deviations for the Effect of Race on Negotiation Behavior

	<i>M</i>	<i>se</i>
Caucasian	422.07	22.36
African American	483.64	20.95
Asian	418.11	23.22

Exploratory Mediation Analysis

Given that neither partner race nor gender were significant predictors of relative power perceptions or perceptions of a partner's negotiation aspirations these mediators were dropped from the discussion. However, our results did indicate that partner race had a significant effect on a negotiator's self-aspirations. As previously mentioned, an individual's negotiation aspirations influences negotiation behavior (Thompson, 1990; White & Neale, 1994; Blount White, Neale, 1994; Siegel & Fouraker, 1960), therefore it should mediate the relationship between partner race and overall demand behavior. Since first offer behavior is a profoundly influential indicator of subsequent negotiation behavior, and serves as a robust anchor (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001) we felt it was necessary to include as a mediator to capture how self-aspirations influence the early stage of negotiations, and together these factors should influence overall behavior. Figure 8 below depicts the revised mediation model that was tested, which proposes that self-aspirations and first offers should mediate the relationship between partner race and demand behavior.




Figure 8. Revised Mediation Model

The mediation model was tested using the Process Macro in SPSS to see if the relationship between race of a negotiation partner and negotiation outcomes can be explained by self-aspirations and first offer behavior. The Process macro only allows for a single independent variable to be entered that is either dichotomous or continuous, however, Hayes and Preacher (2014) recommend a method for entering multicategorical independent variables. When multicategorical variables are being tested, first dummy codes must be created. Two variables were included to account for the three categorical conditions in the partner race manipulation. Both variables were dummy coded such that Caucasian negotiation partners were always the control group, however, African Americans were the comparison group for the first dummy code and Asians were the comparison group for the second variable. Then, the model was run in Process twice, with the first dummy coded variable serving as the independent variable and the second dummy coded variable as a covariate. In the second run of the model, the second dummy coded variable was entered as the independent variable and the first dummy coded variable was entered as a covariate. Since we also manipulated the gender of the negotiation partner, gender condition was included as a covariate in both models.

Results of the first Process model, where Caucasian partners are coded as the control group and African Americans are the comparison group, indicated that partner race was a significant predictor of self-aspirations, $B = 92.76$, $se = 28.08$, $p < .01$, and self-aspirations were a significant predictor of first offer behavior, $B = .75$, $se = .11$, $p < .001$. Lastly, first offer behavior was a significant predictor of total demand behavior, $B = 2.97$, $se = .29$, $p < .001$. Partner race was no longer a significant predictor of demand behavior after controlling for the mediators, $B = -32.18$, $se = 115.03$. Approximately 67%

of the variance in demand behavior was explained by the predictors ($R^2 = .67$). The indirect effect was tested using a bootstrap estimation approach with 1000 samples (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). These results indicated the indirect coefficient was significant, $B = 205.82$, 95% CI= 92.82, 378.63. These results support the exploratory mediational hypothesis that negotiation aspirations and first offer, or early stage assertiveness, explain why individuals negotiate differently with African American and Caucasian negotiation partners.




Figure 9. Unstandardized regression coefficients for African American and Caucasian negotiators and negotiation demand behavior as mediated by self-aspirations and first offer.

$p < .05^*$

$p < .01^{**}$

Results of the second Process model, where Caucasian partners are coded as the control group and Asians are the comparison group, indicated that partner race was not a significant predictor of self-aspirations, $B = 1.18$, $se = 29.42$, $p = .97$, however, self-aspirations were a significant predictor of first offer behavior, $B = .75$, $se = .11$, $p < .001$. Lastly, first offer behavior was a significant predictor of total demand behavior, $B = 2.97$, $se = .29$, $p < .001$. Partner race was not a significant predictor of demand behavior after controlling for the mediators, $B = -1.97$, $se = 115.59$. Approximately 67% of the variance in demand behavior was explained by the predictors ($R^2 = .67$). The indirect effect was

tested using a bootstrap estimation approach with 1000 samples (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). These results indicated the indirect coefficient was not significant, $B = 2.64$, 95% CI = -154.19, 122.44. These results indicate that Caucasian negotiators do not negotiate differently with Asian and Caucasian negotiation partners.




Figure 10. Unstandardized regression coefficients for Asian and Caucasian negotiators and negotiation demand behavior as mediated by self-aspirations and first offer.
 $p < .05^*$
 $p < .01^{**}$

Discussion

Overall, findings from this study suggest that while individuals are generally unable to accurately disambiguate the aspirations of their negotiation partner, they are able to determine how they will approach the negotiation based on limited information about their negotiation partner. Ultimately, the offers that individuals aspire to influence how they behave during the early stages of a negotiation (Thompson, 1990; Heath, Larrick, and Wu, 1999; Zetik and Stuhlmacher 2002), and early negotiation offers serve as a robust anchor throughout the entire negotiation process as confirmed by previous research (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999).

As predicted, the race of the negotiation partner influenced how participants determined their own negotiation aspirations and approached the negotiation table. Given the importance of aspirations on negotiation outcomes, it is important to understand how these aspirations are shaped. Findings from this first study support and extend the field research conducted by Ayers and Siegelman (1995). This first study replicated their findings that African Americans receive less favorable first offers as well as final outcomes in addition to providing an empirically supported rationale. In an extension of Ayers findings, it was found that negotiators racial biases influence how individuals determine their negotiation aspirations. An individual's negotiation aspirations were found to mediate the relationship between partner race and negotiation behavior. When negotiating with African Americans, people set higher targets and first offers and this mediated the impact of partner race on demands. Understanding how negotiators' perceive their own aspirations as a function of their partner's race reveals how intergroup competition persists.

Contrary to our predictions, perceptions of power and the partner's negotiation aspirations did not impact overall negotiation behavior. Additionally, the exploratory inclusion of partner gender did not have a consistently meaningful effect on behavior. In the next study we sought to manipulate a negotiation partner's power, as well as race and gender, in order to see if unambiguous power displays benefit African Americans at the negotiation table.

Chapter 3: Study 2

In the first study power was included as a mediator. However, in study 2, power was manipulated and examined as a moderator. Spencer, Zanna, and Fong (2005) suggest

that while mediation analyses has its merits, manipulating variables and testing moderation effects is a powerful and often more optimal alternative. As mentioned previously, research shows that power influences negotiation behavior (Kim et al., 2005; Keltner et al., 2003). For example, high power is related to higher aspirations (Pinkley, 1995), a tendency to demand more and concede less (De Dreu, 1995), and an increase in action orientated behaviors such as the propensity to move first in a negotiation, which ultimately results in better financial outcomes (Magee et al., 2007). However, no research examines whether power has the same impact on negotiation outcomes when the race, gender, and power of a negotiation counterpart is manipulated. If racial differences in negotiation outcomes do exist, perceptions of higher power may help disadvantaged groups overcome differential treatment in negotiation outcomes. Perceptions of high or low power may alter individuals' perceptions of a counterparts' negotiation aspirations and an individual's own negotiation aspirations, which in turn influence negotiation outcomes.

In this study, the power of the negotiation counterpart was manipulated such that there was a high power, low power, and control condition. If power does indeed help minorities overcome differential treatment in a negotiation, African American and Caucasian counterparts in the high power condition (in which participants are told that the candidate has another excellent offer from another seller) should be perceived to have similar negotiation goals, limits, and expectations. These perceptions may then result in the similar offers and concessions African Americans and Caucasians receive during negotiations. When participants are faced with high power opponents, no matter the race, they should recognize that they are more dependent on their partner to reach an offer,

therefore they will be unable to take advantage of stereotypically low power outgroup members. In the low power condition, participants will be told that their partners have no other negotiation alternatives, which should result in them perceiving Caucasians and African American partners to have similarly low levels of power. Therefore, perceptions of a counterpart's negotiation aspirations and an individual's own aspirations should be similar, resulting in similar negotiation outcomes. In other words, clear power displays will equalize the playing field for African American and Caucasian negotiators in the high and low power conditions.

In the control condition, participants were not told anything about their partner's power and thus it remained ambiguous. Here I expect an interesting effect, namely that Caucasians will assume African Americans have low power and Caucasians to have higher power. Thus, differential treatment in negotiation behavior should persist such that African American partners will receive less favorable negotiation outcomes as compared to Caucasian negotiation partners.

Hypothesis 6: Power will moderate the relationship between partner race and negotiation outcomes. In the high and low power condition, African American and Caucasian negotiation counterparts will be perceived as having equal power and therefore perceptions of a negotiation partner's negotiation aspiration as well as self-aspirations will be similar. There will be no differences in offers or concession making behavior between African American and Caucasian negotiation counterparts in these conditions. However, there will be difference in the control condition such that African American negotiation counterparts will be perceived as having less powerful than Caucasian partners, and have lower

aspirations and limits, and again participants will have higher negotiation aspirations. Therefore, African Americans in the control condition will receive less favorable negotiation outcomes as compared to Caucasian negotiation counterparts.

Hypothesis 7: Perceptions of partner and self-aspirations should mediate the relationship between partner race, power, and negotiation outcomes.

Figure 2 depicts the proposed moderated mediation model.




Figure 11. The Moderated Mediation Model Which Includes Power as a Moderator.

Experimental Design and Participants.

Participants were undergraduate students participating to earn either course credit or \$10. Study 2 was a between-subject design in which the race and power of the negotiation counterpart were manipulated. Again, the sample included all White males. A power analysis was conducted using G*Power software to determine the sample size necessary for the 3 (Race: African American vs. Caucasian vs. Asian) x 2 (Gender of Partner) x 3 (Power Condition: High vs. Low vs. Control) study design. In order to achieve an effect size of .25, with an alpha of .05, and power of .8, 212 participants

should be sampled. Despite extensive recruiting efforts¹, there was a scarcity of Caucasian male participants. Therefore, sample size was approximated. For that reason, a total of 188 Caucasian males came to the lab to participate in the computer-simulated negotiation. After excluding 16 participants for reaching an agreement, and 8 additional participants for failing the race and gender manipulation checks, 164 participants remained ($M = 19.94$, $sd = 1.83$). In terms of political affiliation, 22% identified as Republican, 35.4% as Democrat, 29.3% as Independent, and 5.5% as Libertarian. The remainder of participants selected other (3.7%) or preferred not to answer (4.3%). We also asked participants to provide their religious affiliation, 43.9% selected Christian, 22.6% indicated they had no religious affiliation, 15.9% were Jewish, 15.2% identified as Atheist, and the remainder identified as other, or preferred not to answer (2.4%).

Procedures

All of the same measures from study 1 were used in study 2. The procedures and negotiation task for study 2 also remained the same. However, in study 2 power of the negotiation counterpart was also manipulated. The power of the computer-simulated counterpart was manipulated such that participants were led to believe that their opponent is either high power, low power, or no power information was given. After reading information about their negotiation counterpart, participants were informed of their negotiation counterparts' best alternative to a negotiation agreement (BATNA). Many researchers have used a BATNA to manipulate power before (Magee et al. 2007; Van Kleef et al. 2006), however in these instances it has been used to manipulate the power of

¹ Participants were recruited via flyer postings across campus, online website announcements, and through word of mouth. The study was also posted to two separate online participant recruiting pools where participants could either receive course credit or monetary compensation for participating.

the participant, not the power of their opponent. Therefore, in the current research, participants in the high power condition received an “Urgent message” that their negotiation partner has an alternative buying option with a reasonable offer of 570 points (i.e. 75% of the maximum of 760 points). Participants in the low power condition received an “Urgent message” that their counterpart has no other alternative buying options and will receive 0 points if they do not reach an agreement. In the control condition, no mention of an alternative offer was made. In all conditions participants were also reminded that the goal is to receive as many points as possible.

Measures

The same dependent measures from Study 1 will be assessed in Study 2. In addition, manipulation checks will also be included to ensure that the power manipulation was successful.

Results

Power Manipulation Check. To check whether the manipulation of the negotiation partner’s power was successful we conducted a 2 (Partner Race: White vs. Black) x 2 (Partner Gender: Male vs. Female) x 3 (Partner Power: High vs. Low vs. Control) ANOVA. Results showed the expected main effect of partner power condition on perception of relative power $F(2,152) = 15.74, p < .001$. Participants who were paired with a high power partner rated their partner had more power than they did ($M = 3.62, sd = 1.06$) and in the low and control power partner condition they felt they had more power than their partner ($M = 4.77, sd = 1.10; LSD_{critical} = .55, M_{difference} = 1.15, p < .01; M = 4.42, sd = 1.12; LSD_{critical} = .55, M_{difference} = .77, p < .01$, respectively). There was a

marginally significant difference in power perception between low and control power conditions in which partners rated they had more relative power than their opponent in the low power condition ($LSD_{critical} = .55$, $M_{difference} = .38$, $p < .05$, $p = .07$).

In addition, there was a marginally significant interaction effect of partner race and power condition $F(2,152) = 2.98$, $p = .05$. In the low power condition, participants rated that they had significantly more power when paired with a Caucasian partner ($M = 5.10$, $sd = .92$) as compared to an African American ($M = 4.45$, $sd = 1.18$; $F(1,158) = 5.02$, $p < .05$), no other significant differences emerged. To further unpack this interaction we examined additional pairwise comparisons. For the White condition, simple main effect analysis showed that participants felt they have significantly more power than their partner in the low power condition as compared to the high power condition ($p < .01$) and more power in the control condition as compared to the low power condition ($p < .01$). However, there were no statistical differences of relative power perceptions between the high power condition and the control condition. This may indicate that when participants were paired with Caucasian negotiation partners they viewed relative power similarly when they were given information about their partner having high power and when they are given no information at all.

In the case of the Black partner condition, simple main effect analysis showed that participants rated their partner as having more power than themselves in the high power condition as compared to the low power ($p < .01$) and control conditions ($p < .001$). However, there were no statistical differences between the low power and control conditions. This may indicate that unlike the Caucasian partner condition, when participants are paired with an African American negotiation partner they viewed relative

power similarly when they are given information about their partner having low power and when they are given no information at all.

Table 11. ANOVA Results and Descriptive Statistics for Perceptions of Relative Power by Partner Race, Gender, and Power.

Variable	High Power		Low Power		Control		n
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	
Caucasian							
Male	3.75	1.04	5.24	.91	4.33	1.40	42
Female	3.74	.74	4.96	.94	4.08	1.09	41
African American							
Male	3.23	.92	4.50	1.14	4.44	.95	41
Female	3.76	1.55	4.39	1.29	4.71	1.05	40
Source	SS	df	MS	F			
Partner Race	1.28	1	1.28	1.08			
Partner Gender	.02	1	.02	.02			
Power	37.36	2	18.68	15.74**			
Condition							
Race * Gender	1.67	1	1.67	1.41			
Race * Power	7.08	2	3.54	2.98			
Gender * Power	1.41	2	.71	.56			
Race * Gender * Power	.29	2	.144	.12			
Error	180.36	152	1.19				

$p < .001^{**}$

Effect of Partner Race, Gender, and Power on Pre-negotiation Perceptions

Perception of partner's negotiation aspirations

Table 12. Descriptives and Bivariate Correlations Between Partner Aspiration Items

	M	sd	1	2
Partner target	620.00	210.93		
Partner Limit	249.82	174.32	-.50**	
Offer partner thinks they deserve	267.79	118.37	.19*	.17*

$p < .01^{**}$

$p < .05^*$

A 2 (Partner Race: African American vs. Caucasian) x 2 (Partner Gender: Male v. Female) x 3 (Power: High vs. Low vs. Control) was conducted to investigate the effect

of partner race, gender, and power on pre-negotiation perceptions of a partner's negotiation aspirations. Three items were used to measure partner negotiation aspirations. Results indicated that power condition had a marginally significant effect on perceptions of a partner's lowest negotiation aspiration $F(2, 151) = 2.85, p = .06$. Participants in the high power condition ($M = 292.17, sd = 200.38$) were perceived to have higher limits than low power partners $213.33, sd = 156.69$ ($LSD_{critical} = 67.12, M_{difference} = 79.63, p < .05$). However, perceptions of negotiation limits of high and low power partners did not differ from the control group ($p = .17, p = .33$, respectively).

There was a significant interaction between race and gender on perceptions of the offer a partner deserves $F(2, 151) = 7.87, p < .01$, such that participants indicated that African American males ($M = 294.63, sd = 133.72$) deserved higher first offers as compared to Caucasian males ($M = 232.02, sd = 112.68, F(1,151) = 6.36, p < .05$). Participants also rated Caucasian females ($M = 291.71, sd = 106.23$) as deserving higher offers as compared to Caucasian males ($F(1,151) = 5.34, p < .05$). When individuals were paired with an African American partner, males were seen to be deserving of marginally higher offers as compared to African American females ($M = 252.95, sd = 110.88, F(1,151) = 6.36, p = .10$). There were no significant difference between the offers participant's felt African American and Caucasian females deserved ($F(1,151) = 2.13, p = .15$). There were no significant differences in perception of a negotiation partners target offer. No other significant main effects or interactions were observed.

Perceptions of self-aspirations

Table 13. *Descriptives and Bivariate Correlations Between Self Aspiration Items*

	<i>M</i>	<i>sd</i>	1	2
Self-target	692.09	118.34		
Self-Limit	385.12	120.72	.07	
Offer participant thinks they deserve	516.09	126.30	.23**	.26**

p < **.01****

Three items were used to measure an individual's negotiation aspirations.

Correlational analysis revealed that these items were not all correlated and therefore they were examined separately. A 2 (Partner Race: African American v. Caucasian) x 2 (Partner Gender: Male v. Female) x 3 (Power of Negotiation Partner: High vs. Low vs. Control) was conducted to investigate the effect of partner race, gender, and power on pre-negotiation perceptions of a self negotiation aspirations. Results indicated that there were no significant main effects or interactions of partner race, gender, or power on an individual's negotiation aspirations.

Effect of Partner Race, Gender, and Power on Negotiation Behavior

In order to address the hypotheses related to the main effect of race on negotiation outcomes, 2 (Partner Race: African American vs. Caucasian) x 2 (Partner Gender: Male vs. Female) x 3 (Power: High vs. Low vs. Control) between subjects ANOVAs were conducted. The first of which was conducted to compare the effect of partner race, gender, and power on first offer. Results indicated that power condition had a marginally significant effect on first offer behavior $F(2, 152) = 2.97, p = .05$. High power negotiation partners received marginally more aggressive first offers ($M = 619.72, sd = 86.66$) than partners in the control condition ($M = 575.19, sd = 136.09, LSD_{critical} = 55.19, M_{difference} = 44.53, p < .05$). Low power partners also received more aggressive first offers than the

control group ($M = 618.51$, $sd = 93.90$), $LSD_{critical} = 55.19$, $M_{difference} = 43.32$, $p < .05$.

Lastly, first offer behavior did not differ when participants were paired with a high power as compared to a low power partner. There were no other significant main effects or interactions.

Table 14. ANOVA Results and Descriptive Statistics for First Offer Behavior by Partner Race, Gender, and Power.

Variable	High Power		Low Power		Control		n
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	
Caucasian							
Male	628.44	57.78	638.93	95.28	603.75	153.64	42
Female	606.79	100.09	625.00	106.97	548.33	104.67	41
African American							
Male	625.77	100.79	615.63	84.08	551.67	197.12	41
Female	616.36	95.76	590.42	92.18	590.59	88.88	40
Source	SS		df		MS		F
Partner Race	4133.35		1		4133.35		.35
Partner Gender	8401.28		1		8401.28		.71
Power	70663.13		2		35331.56		2.97
Condition							
Race * Gender	10154.11		1		10154.11		.86
Race * Power	7777.52		2		3888.76		.33
Gender * Power	881.88		2		440.94		.04
Race * Gender * Power	20448.23		2		10224.11		.86
Error	1805622.44		152		11879.10		

The second 2 x 2 x 3 between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of partner race and gender on concession-making behavior, which was defined as the total points conceded during the course of the negotiation. There was a significant main effect of power condition on total concessions made during the negotiation ($F(2,149) = 4.82$, $p < .01$). High power negotiation partners received significantly more concessions ($M = 225.48$, $sd = 101.63$) than partners in the control condition ($M = 153.37$, $sd = 135.82$, $LSD_{critical} = 45.75$, $M_{difference} = 71.33$, $p < .05$). Low power partners

also received significantly more concessions than the control group ($M = 199.47$, $sd = 108.37$, $LSD_{critical} = 45.75$, $M_{difference} = 46.45$, $p < .05$). Concession-making behavior did not differ for those who negotiated with a low as compared to a high power partner.

There were no other significant main effects or interactions.

Table 15. ANOVA Results and Descriptive Statistics for Concession-Making Behavior by Partner Race Gender, and Power.

Variable	High Power		Low Power		Control		n
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	
Caucasian							
Male	232.50	61.64	196.43	114.38	194.58	114.38	42
Female	190.42	157.59	217.67	103.23	120.83	91.62	39
African American							
Male	251.15	84.68	187.81	123.27	141.82	205.42	40
Female	223.18	92.96	195.83	96.78	154.71	119.64	40
Source	SS		df		MS		F
Partner Race	4.72		1		4.72		.99
Partner Gender	11306.97		1		11306.97		.37
Power	133293.99		2		66647.00		4.82**
Condition							
Race * Gender	8382.78		1		8382.78		.61
Race * Power	12821.75		2		6410.88		.46
Gender * Power	20465.77		2		10232.88		.74
Race * Gender * Power	17463.89		2		8731.94		.63
Error	2059100.86		149		13819.47		

$p < .01^{**}$

The last 2 x 2 x 3 between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of partner race, gender, and power on demand behavior. Results showed that there was no significant main effect of partner race ($F(1,149) = .26$, $p = .61$), gender ($F(1,149) = .14$, $p = .71$), nor power ($F(2,149) = .14$, $p = .87$) on demand behavior. There were also no other significant interactions between partner race, gender, and power.

Table 16. ANOVA Results and Descriptive Statistics for Demand Behavior by Partner Race Gender, and Power.

Variable	High Power		Low Power		Control		n
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	
Caucasian							
Male	2827.19	360.52	3022.50	606.51	2987.500	759.16	42
Female	2932.08	640.17	2885.33	532.33	2845.83	619.70	39
African American							
Male	2823.46	573.70	2977.81	553.66	2824.55	661.70	40
Female	2873.18	562.40	2793.75	492.67	2935.00	346.87	40
Source	SS		df		MS		F
Partner Race	81354.81		1		81354.81		.26
Partner Gender	42817.38		1		42817.38		.14
Power Condition	84405.94		2		42202.97		.14
Race * Gender	24633.60		1		24633.60		.08
Race * Power	10699.39		2		5349.69		.02
Gender * Power	387682.84		2		193841.42		.62
Race * Gender * Power	197308.00		2		98654.00		.32
Error	46454709.10		149		311776.57		

$p < .01^{**}$

To summarize these findings, a two-way mixed model ANOVA was conducted to show the negotiation behavior over the course of the negotiation. Results showed a significant main effect of negotiation round, $F(2.71,745) = 232.71, p < .001$ ($\eta^2 = .61$). This finding suggests that over time, participant's demands declined across conditions. There was also an interaction between negotiation round and power condition $F(5.413,745) = 3.02, p < .01$ ($\eta^2 = .04$). No other significant main effects or interactions emerged.




Figure 12. The Effect of Partner Power on Negotiation Behavior

Table 17. Means and Standard Deviations for the Effect of Power on Negotiation Behavior

Variable	High Power		Low Power		Control	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Offer 1	625.29	81.23	618.51	93.90	576.73	136.95
Offer 2	515.87	90.27	522.63	95.79	525.48	116.28
Offer 3	472.02	99.17	485.26	115.78	483.46	109.49
Offer 4	436.06	106.50	452.98	105.01	464.33	113.35
Offer 5	411.15	105.01	427.28	109.52	429.81	107.35
Offer 6	399.81	103.84	419.04	103.28	423.37	103.66

Discussion

Given the counterintuitive findings and insignificant interactions between race and power on the proposed mediators, testing a moderated mediation model was not justified.

Overall, we attempted to manipulate race, gender, and power of a negotiation counterpart to examine how power moderates, while self and other aspirations mediated the relationship between partner race and negotiation outcomes. Upon examination of the

power manipulation check, it appears that there was an interesting effect that relative power perceptions differed for Caucasian and African American negotiation partners. Perceptions of relative power were similar when participants were paired with Caucasian high power partners as compared to control power Caucasian negotiators. For African American negotiators, however, relative power perceptions were similar when participants were faced with partners in the low as compared to the control condition. Surprisingly, however, participants rated themselves as having more relative power than their opponent when faced with a low power Caucasian negotiator as compared to a low power African American negotiator. Therefore, when individuals have no information about their counterparts' power (e.g., the control condition), Caucasian males seem to equate Caucasian negotiators with high power. However, when Caucasian males lack information about an African American negotiator's power, they equate African American negotiators with low power.

In terms of negotiation behavior, in our study, power condition seems to be the only significant (and at times only marginally significant) predictor of first offer and concession-making behavior. These findings compliment previous research on power and negotiation behavior that suggests powerful negotiators have higher aspirations (Pinkley, 1995) and receive more concessions during the course of a negotiation (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Magee, Galinsky, Gruenfeld, 2007).

While race had no main effects or interactions in study 2, this may not be a bad thing. It seems that information about a negotiation partner's best negotiation alternatives, or a negotiation partner's power, allow participants to focus on more meaningful information about how to approach the negotiation task. Therefore,

disambiguating a negotiation partner's power prior to the negotiation may help individuals determine what information to focus on. While providing information about power seems to motivate participants to think more carefully about their negotiation partner's aspirations, the proposed moderated mediation did not appropriately capture negotiation processes in this sample.

General Discussion

Negotiations will always be an important part of organizational life and social interaction whether it is with a colleague, an employer, or an unfamiliar company representative. Negotiation outcomes influence personal, economical, and organizational welfare. As organizations seek to increase diversity, and out-group member interactions become more frequent, understanding how race impacts negotiations is essential and has far reaching practical and theoretical implications. Initially, we hypothesized that power perceptions as well as self and other aspirations would mediate the relationship between race and negotiation behavior. In study 1 we found that negotiation partner race does in fact influence how participants view their opponent, and their own negotiation aspirations prior to engaging in a negotiation task. However, as previous research suggests, an individual's aspirations significantly influenced the early stage of a negotiation (Thompson, 1990) and served as an anchor for the remainder of the interaction (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Our results suggest that participants may fail to consider the perspective of their opponents. Furthermore, it is possible that when Caucasian negotiators are faced with African American negotiators that they feel a sense of entitlement, or feel they have greater license to behave aggressively and show little to no concern for their opponent.

In study 2, power was included to explore a possible moderated mediation model. In this study race was not found to have an effect on negotiation outcomes. However, a partner's power did effect perceptions of the partner's negotiation aspirations and first offer behavior. While these effects are mainly seen in the early stages of the negotiation, further research is necessary to fully understand the effect of race and power on negotiations. Limitations and future directions will be elaborated below.

This research provides a necessary starting point for research on diversity and its effects on negotiation. While we focused on a small handful of potential mediators and the moderator of power, our results have practical implications for individuals as well as organizations. First, our study 1 results suggest that negotiators should be aware of the biases that may exist in intergroup negotiations. African Americans may want to consider focusing on setting high negotiation goals prior to the negotiation and focus on their own targets. Previous research shows that focusing on your own negotiation targets may attenuate the anchoring effect of first offers in negotiation (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Therefore, if African Americans are unable to make the first offer, being aware of the potential biases of their opponent is extremely beneficial and can help participants determine an appropriate negotiation strategy that will attenuate the anchoring effect of undesirable first offers.

This research also provides information that may be useful for organizations, namely how they train individuals who frequently negotiate as part of their job. For instance, organizations may want to present this information to the human resource department or project managers that must negotiate salaries with incoming employees, or negotiate the terms of service with other companies or individual consumers. Exposing

individuals to the potential for bias may help negotiators approach future negotiations more fairly no matter who they happen to be negotiating with.

Theoretically, the addition of race and gender into negotiation research will allow for the development of theories and robust models of intersectionality and negotiation outcomes. The time has come for research in all areas of psychology to pay more attention to the effects of race and gender on processes as important as negotiations.

Limitations and Future Directions. Results for this series of studies are promising, however, a few limitations are worth mentioning. One is related to the inclusion of partner gender to explore how intersectionality impacts perceptions of a negotiation partner and behavior. Since our sample only included males, the sample should be expanded in the future to include female participants as well in order to see how matched and mixed-gender negotiation dyads perceive their opponent and behave when paired with in-group and out-group negotiators. Also, an increased sample size will allow for more power to detect the effects of race, gender, and power.

We were also unable to replicate the findings from study one in our second study. This may be due to the fact that our sample was of college-aged males, who may not have as much experience with negotiating as compared to the working age sample from study one. In the future it may be beneficial to ensure that participants are of working age, or have some experience with negotiation. Additionally, it may also be beneficial to examine how entry-level employees approach negotiations as compared to employees with more tenure, and who likely have more experience negotiating. Therefore, age and experience could serve as additional variables worth examining along with a negotiators race and gender. It is possible that young and inexperienced negotiators simply do not

know how to negotiate at all, let alone display bias. Therefore, it is possible that their behavior is less predictable. Older, more experienced individuals, on the other hand, may have more exposure to biased behavior during negotiations and are therefore socialized to perpetuate aggressive negotiation tactics with certain individuals, namely African American negotiators. It would be fascinating to empirically examine these possibilities to understand how exposure and socialization impact negotiation outcomes.

Another limitation related to the college-age sample, is the fact that data was collected on a college campus, one that is vocal in its quest for diversity and inclusion. This may indicate that our sample was unique, and diversity climate may moderate the relationship between negotiator race and negotiation outcomes. Research shows that diversity climate and intergroup contact have a profound impact on social interactions and organizational behavior (Gelfand, Nishii, Raver, & Schneider, 2005; Cox, 1994; Pettigrew, 1998, Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). It seems likely that if the samples from study one and study two differed on their exposure to outgroup members and an environment that highlights the importance of diversity, that negotiation behavior could have been affected. Measures of diversity climate should be incorporated into future studies, especially if research is to be generalized to a wide range of social and organizational context.

These studies may have also differed in the level of behavioral constraint experienced by participants. Study two was conducted in the lab, therefore participants may have behaved differently due to the presence of a researcher and the knowledge that they were participating in a psychological study. This strong situation may serve as a social cue to behave appropriately. If the lab is a strong context, participants may have

felt fewer licenses to behave aggressively towards African Americans. Additionally, it is possible that findings were not replicated due to participants' interest in providing socially desirable responses given the sensitive nature of diversity research (Paulhus, 1991 and 2002). Measures of social desirability and attitudes towards situational constraint should therefore be included in future research to examine the broader role of individual differences and contextual factors that influence negotiation behavior.

Additionally, even though using a computer-simulated negotiation allowed us to test negotiation behavior as it relates to the race, gender, and power of a negotiation partner while controlling for the behavior of the partner, research should be conducted on real negotiation dyads. Furthermore, research shows that online communication, or other communication mediums, differ from face-to-face interactions, and may be more prone to distrust, competition, and less inhibited behavior (Griffith & Northcraft, 1994; Thompson, 2004; Wallace, 1999; Kiesler & Sproull, 1992; Drolet & Morris, 2000; Ebner, 2011). Therefore, examining face-to-face negotiation dyads would not only increase the realism of the negotiation task for participants, but also provide a broader understanding of how negotiators behave when an opponent is actually present. It is possible that participants display a heightened level of entitlement and license to behave aggressively because they feel a sense of anonymity in the online simulation. Additionally, this future research on face-to-face negotiations should manipulate dyads that are mixed gender as well as mixed race to fully explore how intersectionality influences perceptions and behaviors in a wide variety of negotiation dyads and contexts.

Lastly, future research should also investigate ways to help women and minorities maximize their outcomes at the negotiation table. Glass ceilings still present additional

obstacles for women and minorities, the racial and gender wage gap has yet to be closed, and early career negotiations predict an individual's career trajectory. It is critical for future research to pinpoint how subconscious and overt biases impact organizational processes, like negotiations, that may prevent women and minorities from comparable career advancement to that of Caucasian males. Individual differences such as personality traits, psychological empowerment, and tenure, as well as access to advantageous social networks, climate for diversity, and organizational cultures may all be important indicators of the ability to overcome or improve inherently biased organizational processes.

Overall our research is among the first to examine race in negotiations. Findings suggest that more research is necessary to truly understand diversity and power displays in the context of negotiations. Hopefully, future research will allow organizations to not only understand negotiation processes, but also train individuals to recognize and avoid biases that have the potential to impede the negotiation process. We are optimistic that by exposing negotiators of all races to empirically supported research on negotiation processes, potential biases, and ways to prevent differential treatment that everyone will one day be treated fairly at the negotiation table.

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