

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: A BETTER PLACE TO BE: REPUBLICANISM
AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE
AUTHORITISM-DEMOCRACY DICHOTOMY

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In this dissertation, I argue that in modern or ancient regimes, the simple dichotomy between democracies and autocracies/dictatorships is both factually wrong and problematic for policy purposes. It is factually wrong because regimes between the two opposite regime types exist and it is problematic because the either/or dichotomy leads to extreme thinking in terms of nation-building in places like Afghanistan. In planning for Afghanistan, the argument is that either we can quickly nation-build it into a liberal democracy or else we must leave it in the hands of a despotic dictator. This is a false choice created by both a faulty categorization of regime types and most importantly, a failure to understand history. History shows us that the republic is a regime type that defies the authoritarian-democracy dichotomy.

A republic by my definition is a non-dominating regime, characterized by a (relative) lack of domination by any one interest group or actor, mostly non-violent competition for power among various interest groups/factions, the ability of factions/interest groups/individual actors to continue to legitimately play the political game even after electoral or issue-area defeat and some measure of effectiveness. Thus, a republic is a system of government that has institutions, laws, norms, attitudes, and beliefs that minimize the violation of the rule of law and monopolization of power by one individual or group as much as possible. These norms, laws, attitudes, and beliefs

are essential to the republican system in that they make those institutions that check and balance power work.

My four cases are Assyria, Persia, Venice and Florence. Assyria and Persia are ancient regimes, the first was a republic and then became the frightening opposite of a republic, while the latter was a good republic for a long time, but had effectiveness issues towards the end. Venice is a classical example of a medieval or early modern republic, which was very inspirational to Madison and others in building republican America. Florence is the example of a medieval republic that fell to despotism, as immortalized by Machiavelli's writings. In all of these examples, I test certain alternative hypotheses as well as my own.

A BETTER PLACE TO BE: REPUBLICANISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE
TO THE AUTHORITARIANISM-DEMOCRACY DICHOTOMY

by

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Dedication

To my grandfather, Herman Schoeb, to my supportive parents, Maureen and Ronald, and my sister Tara.

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Without Dr. Philip Pettit and Dr. Ian Ward, I would be nowhere in my dissertation research.

Table of Contents

Dedication	i
Acknowledgements	ii
Table of Contents	iii
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
Introduction to the Introduction	1
An Old Typology/Taxonomy of Human Freedom and Political Regimes Of Republics and Republicanism	3 10
Where I Differ with Other Republican Writers	16
My Definition of A Republic is Based off of Aristotelian and Roman-Italian traditions	20 20
The Four Cases	25
Rival Hypotheses	34
Conclusion of the Introduction	38
Chapter 2: Assyria	40
The Old Assyrian Regime and the Transition into Non-Republicanism	40
The Middle Assyrian and Neo-Assyrian Regime	48
Lessons from the Assyrian Case	58
Chapter 3: Persia	66
From the Origins of Persia to Cyrus the Great	66
The Empire After Cyrus the Great	81
Lessons, Summary, and Conclusions	91
Chapter 4: Venice	97
The Creation of an Unique System	97
Early Modern Venice	108
Collapse of the Republic, Mechanisms, Themes, and Conclusions	114
Chapter 5: Florence	120
A Typical Italian Commune	120
Decline of the Commune and Rise of the Medicis	128
Themes and Conclusions	132
Chapter 6: Conclusion- Making the Best Practicable Regime	139
Introduction of the Conclusion	139
The Criteria for Diagnosing which Type of Republic is Best	140
Assessing of the Four Modern Cases	143
Conclusion of the Conclusion	148
Bibliography	156

A Better Place to Be: Republicanism as an Alternative to the Authoritarianism-Democracy

Dichotomy

Chapter 1: Introduction

A. Introduction to the Introduction

The obsession with individual liberty in the modern or post-modern “West” has led to the formulation of artificial dichotomies: political theory liberalism/libertarianism and communitarianism/authoritarianism and in comparative politics autocracy/authoritarianism and liberal democracy. However the relationship between individuals and the community, between personal, group and state power within any regime are much more complex than these simple dichotomies. Interference in one’s personal life for the benefit of that person is not simply reducible to authoritarianism if properly controlled by institutions, norms, and laws. Interference’s relationship to domination is also often misinterpreted in liberal societies, by actors such as politicians and everyday people to political theorists and comparativists. A more complex, practical view of personal liberty, individual rights, the community/communities, society, and the state is an important part of redefining the typology of human political regimes that holds back contemporary democratic theory and the study of democracies, democratization, and “autocracies” in modern comparative politics.

I argue in this dissertation for a practical definition of personal freedoms and political regimes. I differ in my definition of domination and my conceptualization of its relation to interference and human freedom somewhat from Philip Pettit and others of the classical republican school, but I still find the view point of the republicans mostly correct. I test the republican theory of the ethics of non-domination with four real historical cases of regimes that I

argue were mostly non-dominating regimes of historical importance. Although none of the regimes- Assyria, Persia, Venice and Florence- adopted the often-popular maxim of “Do whatever you want unless you hurt someone else”, a boiled-down version of the modern “liberal” attitude, they still limited their interference in the personal lives of their political subjects through norms, institutions, and laws and for the most part, succeeded in not dominating their subjects.

In a real world in which liberal democracy struggles to overcome the deeply entrenched hierarchical and clan structures of various states in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, many in the policy and political science communities are quick to dismiss these countries as unready for and potentially always incapable of a non-dominating form of self-governance. Better an enlightened despot or other form of strongman dictatorship than chaos, many seem to conclude. Just as in their home countries, “Westerners” see human freedom and the demands of community, society, and the state as a truly dichotomous variable. While in the home countries, they see any restrictions of human choice in “one’s own personal life” as “authoritarian” or “autocratic”, they view the choice in Afghanistan or Iraq as the between failed democratic states and chaos on one hand and authoritarianism on the other.

I view republics and the norms, attitudes, and beliefs that support them, what I call republicanism, as a way out of the dichotomy. To be sure I view republicanism and liberal democracy to be compatible, but they are not synonymous. Additionally, republicanism has both sub-types that are democratic and those that are not, and within these sub-types, some are more liberal than others. However, none of these republics are true authoritarian regimes, nor are they true autocracies. I seek no less to argue both that the political theoretical and comparative political conceptions of freedom and regime types need to be re-taxonimized if you will, but also

that these broken Middle Eastern states, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, are not doomed to the dichotomous dilemma of disastrous democracy or authoritarianism, but have an alternative in some form of republic and the norms of republicanism that would support it. For these countries, republics are truly “a better place to be”.

B. An Old Typology/Taxonomy of Human Freedom and Political Regimes

The famous political theorist and comparativist Dahl has the best classical definition, conceptualization, and taxonomic scheme of democracy in the modern/contemporary period. He views democracy as an ideal condition that is not really attainable in this world. However he views its two major components as two dimensions: participation and contestation. Participation is relatively liberalized, meaning that most people have access to electoral power, the power of the ballot box. Democracies are often measured as allowing 50 percent or more of the adult population to vote (often it is just 50 percent or more of the adult male population). Contestation is relatively high in that more than one party has a reasonable chance to freely campaign and win elections. A polyarchy is measured on a graph as being in the upper part of the right side of the graph, the nexus of high participation and high contestation. But oligarchies never achieve perfect participation or high enough levels of contestation in order to represent the whole populace. Thus they are not true democracies in the ideal sense of perfection on both counts, but merely earthly polyarchies. Still, they are much better than autocracies or authoritarian regimes in the other parts of the graph (Dahl 1973, 1-10).

Of course, Dahl is obsessed with electoral regimes, what we might call electoral democracies. He tends to support a third dimension for nominally democratic states, what I will call liberalism. The state does not merely allow free and fair elections participated in by the

majority of its subjects, but it also refrains from violating the personal freedoms of those individuals in many cases, even when a strong majority of subjects (usually called citizens in this context) support such a restriction. Thus a liberal polyarchy in Dahlian terms, or a liberal democracy to use more common political terms, is a state that tends to refrain from involving itself in the personal affairs of its citizens (where they are not harming other citizens of course) and where those citizens can participate in free and fair elections.

However, notice the relatively superficial relationship of citizens and the regime in the classic liberal democratic model of Dahl. Elections as a restraint on political power are not a surefire solution to the problem of potential domination by a political class. Even a regime that is essentially liberal, that is mostly refrains from interfering in the personal lives of its citizens might not be systematically restrained by anything but the elites', or voters' whims. Also, there is much more potential political participation a voter could have rather than merely voting.

McCormick's Machiavellian democracy illustrates a variety of different ways in which democratic power is bolstered by non-electoral means. He uses the writings of Machiavelli, particularly *the Florentine Histories* and *the Discourses* to show how the people could prosecute or push for the prosecution of problematic elites and formed other institutions that served as pressure groups to push the elite. In modern times, the power of initiative or referendum, the formation of civil society and lobby groups (together, we can safely call them interest groups) to effect political elites. Of course, all of these processes can be effectively coopted or controlled by political elites without the proper institutions, laws, and norms. Still, McCormick brings up the important point that liberal, electoral democracy might need more than elections and a relatively liberal political will to do its job (McCormick 2011, 1-35, 141-188).

What is the job of democracy, in the eyes of democratic theorists? Well, that would lead to a massive dispute. Is democracy about expressing the will of the majority, the will of the consensus, or a peaceful way of protecting the personal liberties of everyone, especially persons or groups in the minority? Perhaps the simplest commonality of all these approaches is that democracy is there to protect people from the worst outcomes human societies, communities, and states can sink to, such as genocide, mass starvation, civil war, and true authoritarianism. Avoiding these human “bads” seems to be universally desired and desirable human goods. Thus democracies strive at minimum to avoid these terrible outcomes.

If this is true of democracies, is this true of other regimes, and if so, of which ones? An authoritarian regime will often claim that it seeks to avoid these “bads” but is often unable or unwilling to avoid thee of other evils. There are many kinds of authoritarian regimes and many names, often confusing or overlapping, for them. A totalitarian regime is supposed to be more severe than an authoritarian one, but this has come under attack by comparativists at times as well. The term autocracy is used in a generic and I will later argue, inappropriate way. Authoritarianism has recently been broken into two main forms by Levitsky and Way, competitive authoritarianism and its less well-defined opposite, non-competitive authoritarianism or just standard authoritarianism. Competitive authoritarianism has features of a democracy in it, argue Levistky and Way, but is still a form of authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2010, 1-8, 82-88). They view it as potentially a third option between traditional authoritarianism of autocracy and democracy. However, I will argue that competitive authoritarianism is still too broad a category that needs to be broken up. Some competitive “authoritarian” regimes are not really autocratic for the most part, and can accord with the

republican principle of non-domination, while others are truly authoritarian for the most part and thus do not accord the ethics of non-domination.

From the perspective of Max Weber, this observation appears to be confirmed. In his famous speech “Politics as a Vocation”, Weber views the state as a form of authority with a monopoly of legitimate violence within a given geographical region. His typologies of historical legitimate types of authority are charismatic, traditional and rational-legal. A charismatic authority binds the state through force of personality, often using religious sentiment to gird the regime together. A traditional authority is similar to the concept of hereditary monarchy, where traditional laws, customs, and institutions hold the regime together. However, in the third, and for Weber, the best and most advanced type of authority, rational-legal authority, is a system of laws, regulations, rules, and norms that constrain citizens and bureaucrats alike. Weber certainly hopes that the rule of law, whereby no one (except perhaps a supreme leader or king for Weber) is above the law, binds the lesser laws and rules together (Weber 2011, 1-7). However rational-legal frameworks do not inherently imply the rule of law. Most countries today, dictatorship, democracy, and republic alike rely on rational-legal authority, but the rule of law principle is not equally vindicated in each rational-legal framework. Thus rational-legal regimes in the Weberian sense can either dominate or not dominate (in a relative sense).

Since the logic of the state in the Weberian paradigm is the rational-legal framework and the rational-legal framework is no guarantor of the rule of law, there is no essential link between the state and the sort of political development that republics and republicanism bring. The state thus consolidated can establish a pattern of behavior and institutions that furthers autocracy and not a system of non-domination. In fact, the state, particularly the nation-state by default oppresses in a way that violates the rule of law. It is the exception of the republic as a non-

dominating regime that generally obeys the rule of law that must evolve under specific historical circumstances, not the autocracy. The nation-state views itself as having a purpose other than governing and protecting all of its political subjects. Nationalism, particularly European-style ethno-nationalism, is a potentially existential threat to republicanism, because it is a threat to the rule of law that guards against the domination of some political subjects by elite interest groups and individuals.

If the nation-state is dangerous because its logic is that other than protecting and providing services to all of its political subjects, then the state with no other aspirations than security in the Hobbesian or Weberian sense will not meet the needs of the people because it is aiming too low. Republicanism and the republics it supports are in a sense in the middle between a state that aspires merely to security and a nation-state that has an exclusivist ideology. The republic has an ideology but an inclusive one that has no specific end. A person needs very little to be an acceptable political subject in a republic other than a willingness to participate and not stop others from fully participating in the system. There is no set end of the republic, this is decided through the participation of all its political subjects. However, there are parameters. The republic must provide some basic services to ensure security, stability and the rule of law and it must constantly inspect its own beliefs and institutions to ensure the system's long-term survival. As there is no set end of the republic and needs to constantly propagate itself, it cannot really succeed in a final sense but can fail in a decisive manner.

The default state of the state is the dictatorship. In a world without a concept of republic, there is only dictatorship in its many forms and democracy. Linz and Stepan divide dictatorships into four types of regimes: authoritarianism, totalitarianism, post-totalitarianism, and sultanism. Authoritarianism is the default autocracy or dictatorship for them. Totalitarianism is an

ideological state that seeks to control the subjects of the regime in all parts of their daily lives. Post-totalitarianism is what happens when a totalitarian regime (like the former Soviet Union) wakes up from its utopian/dystopian dream and starts trying to prepare its people for coming democracy or at least a broader, more liberal ruling class (Linz and Stepan 1996, 44-45).

Sultanism is what Barbara Geddes would call a personalist regime, in which one individual rules he personally owns the whole land, often in a monarchic or monarch-like atmosphere (think North Korea). Normal authoritarianism is further divided by Geddes into military and one-party civilian regimes. She believes that one-party regimes are broader groups of oligarchs and often more ideologically diverse, thus more prone to democratic pressures (Geddes 1999, 115-144).

None of these types of autocracy have an electoral component comparable to Levitsky and Way's competitive authoritarianism, mentioned earlier. Competitive authoritarian regimes are hybrid regimes that are neither true authoritarian regimes nor true democracies, yet unlike other commentators, Levitsky and Way thinks that this regime type is neither necessarily transitional nor temporary but a potentially new kind of regime. O'Donnell and Schmitter likewise view democracy as a complex set of regime types, but unlike Levitsky and Way and similar to most other thinkers in this area, they still view democracy and autocracy/dictatorship as the two main families of regime type, rather than three distinct types (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 13).

The comparative literature that has bolstered and supplemented Dahl thus has three main categories- democracy/polyarchy, an electoral form of government with relatively high contestation, participation, and hopefully civil liberties, dictatorship/autocracy/true authoritarianism, a non-electoral system with relatively low participation and contestation and usually relative low civil liberties, and competitive authoritarianism, an electoral autocracy with

reasonably high levels of participation and contestation but still relatively low levels of civil liberties.

To this I add a fourth major category, the bureaucratic republic. While the electoral republic fits somewhere between a competitive authoritarian regime or a democracy depending on where on the Dahlian chart it falls, the bureaucratic republic is unique in that it is a non-electoral regime with reasonably high civil liberties or whatever term is appropriate to the time periods involved. Participation and contestation, in non-electoral terms are usually also relatively high. However, this takes the Dahlian terms of participation and contestation and takes them out of the electoral sphere. Thus a bureaucratic republic is a non-dominating regime characterized by relatively high contestation and participation of a primarily non-electoral (bureaucratic) nature with reasonably high human protections (stand-in for civil liberties in the modern sense).

I am arguing that republics serve the same purpose as democracies in a way that true authoritarian regimes simply cannot. A republic is a mostly non-dominating regime. Unlike Dahl, I do not divide real or practicable republics from ideal regimes. I do not need a republican equivalent of polyarchy to go with the republican equivalent of the democratic ideal. There is the ideal republic, the ideal non-dominating regime and then there is the real or historical republic that is mostly but not completely non-dominating. Let us assume, unless otherwise stated, that I speak of practicable republics and so when I say “non-dominating regime”, I mean with the common-sense caveat of “mostly” attached to it. I will explain this vague terminology below.

C. Of Republics and Republicanism

When I say that a republic is a non-dominating regime, I mean that a republic is a regime that is characterized by a (relative) lack of domination by any one interest group or actor, mostly non-violent competition for power among various interest groups/factions, the ability of factions/interest groups/individual actors to continue to legitimately play the political game even after electoral or issue-area defeat and some measure of effectiveness (*Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. 1971, 1-10). A republic is, I assert, a type of polyarchy or near-polyarchy in the Dahlian sense, where participation and contestation are at relatively high levels, except unlike his connection of polyarchy to electoral democracy, republics can be a form of non-elective polyarchy in which preferences are formulated, signified, and weighed through bureaucratic institutions rather than formal representative institutions. Republics are defined by institutions, but without norms, beliefs and expectations that support this constitution, they are brittle. This extra support is what I define as republicanism (Pettit, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* 1997, 241-270, himself relying on Machiavelli).

First, to address the obvious: I am claiming that bureaucratic republicanism is a distinct part of republics and republicanism. I am arguing that electoral institutions, while helpful, are not essential to the definition of a republic. This is not the orthodox view of the republic, which is essentially the formal-institutional model. I am arguing through the evidence of my cases that bureaucratic republics exist as a distinct but genuine type of republic.

Breaking this definition down, the first requirement of a regime to fit in the regime type of a republic is that one interest group or actor does not dominate the political life of that regime. Interest groups can vary greatly in composition and type but certainly can include ethnic,

religious, and professional groups. They can also be a subset of these things. Domination does not necessarily equate predominance. Philip Pettit's notion of domination, so influential on this project implies force or the threat of force or coercion on others, not merely having a lot of one group in a regime or state. Domination is about the structural ways in which groups, individuals, and governments (regimes all together) hinder individuals and groups not able to the same thing in return. Whether this occurs in a one interest group predominant area, it is domination and thus disqualifying for a republic. Where it does not, the predominant demographic does not render the republic not a republic (Pettit, 1997, 66-69, 202-205).

The second requirement is mostly non-violent competition for power. Two things are united in this one requirement. Firstly, there is a competition for power, either through a bureaucratic-meritocratic approach, elections, or both. Competition or contestation here follows a Dahlian notion, but extends beyond elections to competition in a fair, meritocratic bureaucratic civil service or military (Dahl 1971, 1-10). In addition to competition, the republic also has mostly non-violent avenues for contesting groups and individuals to vie for power. Truthfully, most republics cannot be held to the standard of nonviolence in the political process at all, because this is not realistic. To say this hypothetically, a terrorist group in a country attacks a polling station and kills two people to make a political point but everything else runs smoothly. Unless that is a very small country, it should still count as a republic because the process is not compromised by a small amount of fringe violence. Just as with the distinction between predominance and domination, the proof is in the pudding per se. Does the political violence negatively affect the rights of people to participate in and shape the contours of competition for power? If not you can still have a republic with some political violence. In the end, a standard of

mostly non-violent competition is a realistic and theoretically sound basis for this second requirement (Pettit 1997, 276-278).

Let us assume a regime has gotten past the first hurdles to being a republic. There is no dominant force in politics and competition is mostly non-violent and vibrant. There is a potential pitfall here that my above definition takes into account. Losers in a political contest for power can oftentimes lose their ability to continue to play the political game; that is to keep contesting for power. As long as you play by the rules, essentially, you keep getting to play by those same rules. This replayability of the political game is thus an essential part of what makes the republic a special sort of political regime. Przeworsky theorizes this for modern representative, electoral democracies. However, the principles of contestation and repeatability are transferrable to republics. The empire-of-law and other principles in Pettit support this contention, I argue. (Przeworsky et al. *Democracy and Development* 2000, 16 and 54; Pettit 1997, 174-182).

Of course, there is a distinction between a republic and a democracy. A democracy is a representative system of government reflecting the will of a majority of voters, where voters include most of the adult citizen population (for a modern definition see Przeworsky et al. 2000, 16, 19, 28, and 54). The definition of republics requires neither elections nor does the electorate have to include most of the adult citizen population. A democracy also does not have to obey the first or third requirements of republics, especially to be considered electoral democracies. A democracy is defined by elections and majority rule; a republic is defined by the four rules above, particularly the ethics of non-domination as explicated in Philip Pettit's classic book, *Republicanism*. I assert that a republic need not be a democracy or even have formal electoral institutions. Instead, bureaucratic institutions can provide the requirements of a republic. Pettit's reliance on Machiavelli and the Roman Republic certainly show that he does not reduce

republics to democracies. Brian Cook goes even further, arguing that bureaucracy is not the enemy of civic republicanism that many theorists had argued. Bureaucracy is even the main support of self-government. (Cook, *Bureaucracy and Self-Government: Reconsidering the Role of Public Administration in American Politics, Second Edition* 2014, 1-24; and Pettit, 27-32).

John P. McCormick in his book, *Machiavellian Democracy*, interprets Machiavelli's political theory vastly differently than I or Pettit do. Mostly through heavy reliance on *the Discourses* and ignoring *the Prince*, McCormick challenges the view of Machiavelli presented here of a republican who is concerned with both popular and elite power. Rather than being a republican, in the sense of ensuring that no one group or individual dominates society or regime, Machiavelli according to McCormick seems to support democracy in a sense closer to direct democracy, which is not republicanism. Popular rule, where mechanisms are arranged only to reduce elite power, is not a republic because it allows for the abuse of power in favor of the popular classes. Other than *the Prince*, there are only two classes in Machiavelli, the poor and rich, the non-elite and elite. There is no middle class to provide a natural barrier to one interest group dominating. Thus if Machiavelli is only or primarily interested in constraining elite power, he is a democrat but not a republican. On the other hand, McCormick brings up the idea that the constraint of power is not merely electoral but involves judicial and other institutions that hold the powerful to account. This opening of the door to non-electoral ways of constraining power, although written from a democratic point of view, does lend plausibility to my idea that republican regimes can constrain power and create non-dominating regimes, in some cases, primarily or completely outside of the electoral framework (i.e. the bureaucratic republic) (McCormick 2011, 1-35, 141-188).

Lastly but no less importantly, a republic must be an effective regime. A failed state that does not oppress anyone, that has free and fair elections, and allows losers to keep playing the political game does not count. Some effective governance must be going on. However, this is not as arbitrary of a criterion as one might think, since a failed or fragile state is rarely a secret or unobvious for most objective observers. If crime is rampant, the land is ungovernable, and the government and military are totally ineffective, then usually this is quite observable. Thus finally, a republic must be an effective regime to some extent. To reiterate, a republic is a regime that is characterized by a lack of domination by any one interest group or actor, mostly non-violent competition for power among various interest groups/factions, the ability of factions/interest groups/ individual actors to continue to legitimately play the political game even after electoral or issue-area defeat and some measure of effectiveness (Pettit 1997 238-240).

The basic model of republican formation is that an ill-formed or previously failed state-type political community comes under intense, mostly external pressure. To survive as a sovereign political community, the various factions of the community need to come together and create some sorts of institutions to effectively govern the political community in a state of extreme stress. There is a history of a failed or defeated regime or a very structurally problematic prior political community or regime. That history, or knowledge of that history, coupled with extreme pressure, creates universal fear of bad things happening. That universal fear makes the community come together to form or improve their political community and leads to political institutional design choice compromise. The political community consolidates into a polity with both effectiveness and divided political power as a way of avoiding dissolution, conquest,

assimilation, and the takeover of any one domestic faction. This allows different factions to rule and be ruled in turn (Aristotle, *The Politics*, 1984, Carnes Lord edition, III., 4).

The kind of regime that results from this history of compromises is a strong, pluralistic regime that gradually develops into a full republic with the four characteristics as noted above. Just because one group is not in power today does not either mean that they will be oppressed by the regime or stop them from gaining power legitimately later on. (For three examples of this phenomenon, see Veenhof, “Kanesh: an Assyrian Colony in Anatolia”, in *Civilizations of the Near East, Volumes I & II*, ed. by Jack M. Sasson. Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 1995: 859-872, Brentjes, Burchard. “The History of Elam and Achaemenid Persia: An Overview”, in *Civilizations of the Near East, Volumes I & II*, ed. by Jack M. Sasson. Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 1995: 1001-1021 and Norwich, John Julius. *A History of Venice*. New York: Alfred A, Knopf, Inc., 1982, 3-25).

Republicanism is not the same thing as the institutional structure of a republic. However, a republic without republicanism can easily be transformed into a non-republic. Simply put, republicanism is the set of norms, beliefs and expectations that support and/or underlie republican institutions. You could consider it the spirit of the republic; the ideology that the more doctrinaire republicans talk about, but it does not have to be so dramatic. What republicanism is to a republic depends on the health and age of the republic. Also just a republic can exist without republicanism, but only poorly, republicanism does not require a republic, but it is then as insubstantial as a spirit without a body. Republics and republicanism do not require each other by definition, however if the norms, beliefs and expectations that the ideology republicanism bring do not line up with the institutions of republics, then neither is very useful to humans (Pettit 1997, 241-270; Aristotle 1984, *The Politics*, Carnes Lord edition, III. 1-4).

D. Where I Differ with Other Republican Writers

So I have laid out my definitions of a republic and republicanism, and why republics and democracies are different. However, the purpose of democracy as defined above, is really two-fold- the surface purpose and the deeper, “back-up” purpose. Of course, democracy is meant to represent the will of people as best as practicable. However, there is a strong argument that it serves a significant purpose even if that surface purpose fails. I am assuming the democracy in question is a liberal democracy, the kind of democracy I argue is compatible with republicanism. If the representative function of democracy does not lead to the active goals of the governed, at least the system allows the least advantaged groups thus represented avoid the worst outcomes such as starvation, mass slaughter, genocide, and well utter domination. This concern, that political systems must serve as a last resort against oppressions seems to underline both modern liberal democracy as envisioned by Robert Dahl and of republicanism. Republics do not have to be liberal per se, but they must seek not to dominate their subjects or citizens and so some restraint from personal lives should be expected. What is important is restraints are law-like, that is they are not up to the whims of leaders but result from the institutions, norms, and laws of the regime and both its elite and non-elite classes. Republics are interested in representation, for at least the defensive purpose of liberal democracies, but more often also the more proactive goal attainment process more associated with surface purpose of democracy. Thus both systems are interested in similar things and are coming from the same intentions, though with institutions and emphases.

I am diverging from mainstream republican theory in that I do not think that electoral institutions while nice to have, are a necessary part of creating a relatively non-dominating regime. In other words, such a thing a bureaucratic republic is possible in my system but not

necessarily in Pettit's or McCormick's. The balancing act of representing competing values and demands from different powerful interest groups, state actors, and subjects is something that bureaucracies are not normally relied upon in democratic or republican theory to be able to do. I have more faith in bureaucracies to do this, based upon my four cases. I also am not afraid to vary a little bit from a traditional liberal model when it comes to the protection of individuals or even society of the community as a whole from itself by government, within strict limits. I do not stray too far from the liberal ideal in this regard.

I view liberalism and republicanism as not radically different. Here I am not in fundamental disagreement with Pettit and other republican theorists. Like them, a liberal republic is probably the goal for any modern state that wishes to follow the principles written here on their path to creating "a better place to be". However, liberalism can be too constraining at times for the police power of the state and it can be too dismissive of the rights of the community vis-à-vis the individual. Still these differences are in effect small. It is not enough to simply not interfere in the personal lives of your citizens or subjects, but one must also not really have the capacity to do so. The technical capacity to do so, I would argue is not a problem. If the king of Persia could slaughter the whole nation legally, but is checked by various institutions from exercising these legal powers in any realistic situation, then that capacity is just a "paper capacity" and does not really exist. Similarly, if the National Security Agency has the ability to look at everyone's personal information but is not able to do so practically through institutions, laws, and the norms both of the community/society and the norms of the actors in the NSA themselves, then the capacity for abuse does not really exist. So, technical capacity to dominate is unimportant as long as the practical capacity does not exist. So a republic is a regime where the capacity to dominate one's own subjects or citizens is remote in reality, at least most of the time.

While this dissertation is mostly a bird's eye view of human freedom, regime type, and the individual vs. the community or society, the fact that tough moral and political issues will come to mind when one reads this dissertation cannot be denied or ignored. I do not reference tough issues such as suicide, assisted suicide, or abortion, because there is no democratic or republican consensus on whether a relatively free society and non-dominating regime can regulate these. I tend to view these issues individually or collectively as insufficient to turn an otherwise non-dominating regime into a dominating one and think that some restraints on personal behavior in a communitarian or humanitarian spirit is not inherently authoritarian. However, disagreement on such matters should not cloud or distract from the general points in this dissertation.

Difficult issues such as abortion, euthanasia, and other moral issues are also relevant to a discussion of republicanism because this is a polity type that is not morally neutral or ambiguous. It is a moral regime, or at least it tries to be. It is not utilitarian in its demand for checks and balances, on constraining all forms of power, individual, elite, and popular, political and often social power included. It is not a system based on strictly modern principles like Mills' harm principle (Mill 2006, 17-20, particularly 18-19). The political community is meant to be a place in which people of different faiths, backgrounds, and especially opinions talk to each other, debate with one another, cooperate and compete, and yes argue (hopefully mostly peacefully). It is a place where morality matters because for the republican, every piece of legislation is moral legislation and the idea that morality can be neatly bifurcated into public and private matters does not work.

It is the job of the liberal republican theorist to ensure that the republican state does not impede the liberties of the individual. At the end of the day, many issues will be left to the judicial and legislative institutions to figure out. Critical moral issues as to whom is to be

included in the political community, such as unauthorized immigrants and the unborn, are not so much basic, constitutional decisions as decisions of the institutions and peoples of each republic to decide. The republics will vary at some relatively fundamental things, but at their core, they will be similar regimes.

Frank Lovett's work on domination proffers many different possible definitions (as fully summarized in the below chart) but endorses only one conception of domination: the arbitrary power conception. For him domination includes three elements. First, there must be a very significant imbalance in the relationship of the accused dominator and the potential dominated, when all interactions between them are considered (one imbalanced interaction is not sufficient). Next, the potential dominated party must be dependent upon the accused dominator in a significant way (Lovett 2010, 26-44 and 49-52). If a governor of one state begins to lord himself over the citizens of another state and the governor of that state soon makes it clear that the first governor's bullying and decrees have no power in the second state, then the governor's power in his home-state and his general amount of power over the citizens of the other state is not important. The capacity of a powerful person in one context to dominate someone is irrelevant when considering whether they are dominated by that person when out of their jurisdiction. Therefore, a dictator in another country's power allows him to dominate his own people but not me, because I am far out of his reach and jurisdiction. Thus, one's dependency upon the imbalanced power relationship is necessary to establish domination (Lovett 2010, 46-52).

The last and most important part of Lovett's three-part definition of the arbitrary power conception of domination is that the power must be procedurally arbitrary. He does not consider substantive arbitrariness as triggering domination. So, if a state uses a rational-legal framework to consistently treat an ethnic, racial, religious group as inferior under the law, say in the form of

blatantly discriminatory laws, Lovett does not think that regime can be said to be dominating the targeted group (Lovett 2010, 85-93 and 111-119).

Here thus is where I disagree with Lovett. I do not think that Lovett, any more than Weber, can get away from the crucial empirical and moral distinction between rational-legal authority and the rule of law. In the rule of law all persons under the law, citizens, subjects, foreigners et cetera, have at least some standing under the law and the criteria for full political subjecthood (whereby the state views the person as fully equal under the law) must be the same across all ethnic, racial, and religious groups, within the range of unbiased human error. To create rational-legal horizontal inequalities in the fields of banking, shopkeeping, fishing et cetera, as has often been done in the past, including in Lovett's example of Nazi Germany (Lovett 2010, 118), violates the rule of law by singling out a specific demographic group for exclusion. Subtle social discrimination is harder to pin down than blatant rational-legal and political discrimination, but my rule of law conception domination is meant to be more of a yardstick to measure political rather than social domination. Thus domination is a significantly imbalanced and dependent power relation involving substantively arbitrary power sufficiently discriminatory to violate the horizontal equality test of the rule of law (the but for test in legal discrimination cases). Essentially, this is Lovett's arbitrary power conception with the rule of law condition added to it.

E. My Definition of a Republic is Based off of Aristotelian and Roman-Italian Traditions

Philip Pettit's views of republicanism more strongly inform this work than does Lovett, but I mostly use his basic tenets as a core starting point. For example, his three basic principles of republicanism are very central to my thinking on republics and republicanism. As shown above, the ethics of non-domination motivates both of our republican worldviews. Pettit also

emphasizes the mixed regime and the need for active encouragement of citizens to participate strenuously in politics and government. I concur strongly with both of these themes, but where Pettit views them as Roman and Italian ideals alone, I see their original genesis in Aristotle's thought. I see Aristotle's influence in Machiavelli, who Pettit otherwise correctly notes as a strong node in the development of the Roman-Italian tradition of republicanism (he also adds the English tradition to the Roman-Italian tradition, but I view this as crass Anglocentrism) (Pettit 2012, 5-8 and 11-19).

Pettit emphasizes Milton as a major founder of the English republican tradition, often conflated with liberal constitutionalism. However, Milton was neither a political theorist nor a person with practical experience in republics and or republicanism. Since the standard for inclusion in the tradition for the purposes of this dissertation is that the author must either have practical experience in republics and republicanism or at least regime typology in general or be a political theorist of regimes, Milton is rejected out from the sample (Pettit 2012, 5-8 and 11-19).

Additionally, Pettit seems to be including the English tradition because he is expected to, due to what I argue is an Anglocentric worldview of the discipline of political theory in English-language countries. I argue that this is not merely Eurocentrism, but cleaves the European cultural sphere into pieces. Anglocentric assumptions emphasize or in fact overemphasize English and Anglo-american contributions while diminishing or de-emphasizing the contributions of the Mediterranean, including Southern European nations, especially Italy. Beyond Eurocentrism, the eastern Mediterranean or the Near East's contributions are often ignored or de-emphasized in this paradigm.

Pettit however, unlike many other theorists of constitutionalism and republicanism, does not forget the Roman-Italian tradition. He emphasizes again and again that his core model, as is mine, is the classical Roman Republic. He argues strongly that the Roman Republic is the primary model of constitutionalism for all who came after it, English, Italian or otherwise. He is correct in viewing the republican tradition in a sense as unitary that the constitutional, liberal or otherwise, and republicanism are from a single intellectual memory stemming from Ciceronian theory in the late Republic. The practical republicans such as Marsilius, Guiccardini, and Maciavelli drew upon Cicero as political theorist and the Roman Republic as the best practicable regime. So did Madison, the greatest of the Anglo-American constitutional theorists (Cicero 2009, in its entirety).

Locke and Hobbes are not part of the republican tradition. Hobbes is simply not in favor of liberalism, constitutionalism, or checks and balance systems of governance. He is the theorist of dictatorships, not republics, thus he must be rejected out from the potential pool of theorists. Locke is not a theorist of republicanism, because he merely believes in property rights, not really checks and balances nor a participatory regime. Locke could support an oligarchical regime in which most property owners were deprived of any meaningful power and most rights except for the right of property. His obsession with property is closer to a form of libertarian feudalism best suited for a medieval castellan than for a form of republicanism (Hobbes 2010, in its entirety and Locke 1988, in its entirety).

As a result, most of the English line theorists are useless to this dissertation. Even Mill, who more properly approaches this subject, is too much of a libertarian rather than a true liberal constitutionalist to fit into the republican tradition as here envisioned. In fact most of the English line “constitutionalists” are in fact not really constitutionalists at all. Madison was inspired

more by the Roman-Italian tradition than the Locke-Hobbes line. Federalist No. 10 is full of observations culled from historical analyses of real republics such as Venice and Florence as well as the core model case of the Roman Republic. The Anglo-American constitutional school is thus really a cultural appropriation of Roman-Italian values, except for Madison, who both advances the tradition and properly attributes the tradition its proper place (Madison 2001, 42-48).

Now, the emphasis in Pettit on the Roman-Italian tradition is quite correct, but he fails, as most commentators do, to realize that the Roman-Italian tradition itself appropriates Aristotle. Cicero and the Romans were often quite aware of this, but would often forget the Greek political institutions that gave rise to his theory. Aristotle was appropriated from the polis to the Roman *res publica*. Luckily for all involved, this was a relatively reasonable proposal, because of the cultural and institutional similarities between the two Mediterranean societies. The republic arises from the Mediterranean in theory and sometimes also in practice. It is not exclusively a practical phenomenon of the Greater Mediterranean but it does seem to have a correlation to that great macro-region. Aristotle is the first great theorist of republics (Aristotle 1984, *Politics* Book II, in its entirety).

Assyria and Persia are other examples of ancient Mediterranean republican systems existing before the great political theorists such as Aristotle and Cicero. While Pettit emphasizes merely the theorists, I am looking at the actual historical republics that inspired Aristotle to create the first real theory of republics.

Aristotle views the world as a set of six main regime types: three good and three deficient (bad, but to varying degrees). The greatest regime type is monarchy but it is too unstable, since

hereditary power has no real institutional bounds and easily degrades into tyranny, illegitimate one-person rule, dynastic or non-dynastic. Aristocracy, the rule of the best persons (usually the virtuous elites, regardless of wealth) is next best, but this is easily corrupted into oligarchy, the conflation of political power and economic power (wealth) (Aristotle, *The Politics* III. 7-8, Lord).

Machiavelli early in *the Discourses* has a more colorful, but similar tale to how the first two good regimes become corrupted. Aristotle however views the third good regime, the least good of the ideals, as actually sustainable, thus the best practicable ideal. This regime is called many things in translation, such the mixed regime, mixed government, constitutional government, and polity. Aristotle's original term, politeia just meant a polity/state in general and only through his description of it as the best practicable regime do we realize that he means a specific type of regime by this word. The polity has all three forms of power according to Aristotle, rule of the one (like monarchy), rule of the few (like aristocracy or oligarchy) and popular rule. Unlike Machiavelli, Aristotle does not believe that there is a pure and good form of popular rule, only the hybrid type of polity or the mixed regime is both good and allows for a strong popular element. Machiavelli replaces polity in the Aristotelian six-type schema with a disciplined popular government (elite-driven democracy). Both agree that mob-based democracy (Machiavellian licentiousness or Aristotle's democratic taxon in general) is bad, but they differ on whether democracy as such is always bad (Machiavelli, *The Discourses* Book I, Chapter 2. and Aristotle, *The Politics*, IV. 2-4, Lord edition).

Thus Aristotle and Machiavelli agree that all three good regimes can decay into the three bad regimes, with the two differences being that Aristotle has already introduced the mixed regime where Machiavelli has disciplined democracy and Aristotle believes one of his three good regimes is sustainable while Machiavelli believes that all good regimes will decay into bad

regimes, and actually creates a cycle including all six regimes and anarchy in a grand circle of regimes. Machiavelli believes that only the mixed regime can stop this cycle, and he agrees with Aristotle that includes aspects of popular government, elite government (primarily oligarchy), and monarchy. This mixed regime for Machiavelli is the republic. The seventh regime of Machiavelli is really the same basic regime type as Aristotle's polity and thus the mixed/hybrid/constitutional government type is really all one category of polity/republic (Machiavelli, Book I, Chapter 2 and Aristotle, *The Politics* IV. 7, Lord).

From now on I will refer to the best practical regime for Aristotle and for Machiavelli (representing the Roman-Italian traditional mainstream dating back at least to Cicero) as a republic. Aristotle and the Roman-Italian tradition, including Cicero, Marsilius of Padua, and Machiavelli, are the core theorists of the republican tradition, backed up by Madison's translation of these ideas into modern-day Anglo-American constitutional terms and all of these theorists are backed up by historical republics and republicanism (Cicero 2009, in its entirety).

F. The Four Cases

To restate my core theory, three main causes, mutual fear of domination, some ability to cooperate and extreme pressure from outside forces encourages republics to form and persist and that the norms and institutions that grow as a result of these factors secures freedoms for members of these states.

I aim to test my theory with four cases. I need to show how republics cannot be pigeon-holed to a certain country, small region, or time period, so I chose from cases broader than any one of these. However, I did not want to break a certain level of cultural-historical comparability, so I only chose cases within the Greater Mediterranean Region. Two main cultural zones needed to

be explored, the Near East/ Middle East and Italy. The two regions/ zones are fairly important historical and culturally and while different from their neighbors and not radically so. More importantly, these two regions or zones were where the majority of republics in the Greater Mediterranean region lay. Ultimately, I wanted at least some cases that went through multiple regimes, republican and non-republican, to show the mechanisms of transformation/maintenance and also the impacts on human protections. I wanted to show three major types of regimes- bureaucratic republics, formal-institutional republics, and non-republics. I chose the four cases of Assyria, Achaemenid Persia, Venice, and Florence.

Assyria had two regimes broadly speaking, an Old Assyrian republic (c. 2000-1800 BC) and a later non-republican regime (c. 1800-612 BC) in the Middle Assyrian (c. 1800-900 BC) and Neo-Assyrian (c. 900-612 BC) periods. That the default state of Assyrian politics tended towards the republican shows that the republican stage often precedes the non-republican one, which is not usually supposed. Old Assyria depended greatly on trade with Anatolia (Asian Turkey; Asia Minor). The institutions that regulated the Assyrian economy were central to the existence of a republic there. There was a City Assembly, so that traces of formal-institutional mechanisms were in play seems to be the case. However, the decentralization, restrictions upon and rotation of officials in the civilian bureaucracy is really the main focus of why I think old Assyria was a republic. Thus it really is a bureaucratic republic but with a secondary mechanism of a formal body as well. When external pressures both in Anatolia and in Upper Mesopotamia where Assyria was located disrupted trade and created an atmosphere of fear, the institutions that divided power and kept the monarch in check slowly evaporated and led to the evolution of the absolutist monarchy of the Middle Assyrian period which became more extreme in the Neo-

Assyrian period, but was basically the same regime (Dercksen 2004, in its entirety and Veenhof 1995, 859-872).

Extreme pressure gave the diverse groups of Asshur incentive to form a non-dominating regime and to produce republican institutions, such as the City Assembly. Mutual fears of domination by foreign tribes and other groups kept them together and the ability of the groups to cooperate was a key factor in the establishment of the capitalist networks that underlay the success of the Assyrian republic. However, the same intense pressure from outside that formed the state led to its fall and transformation in the later non-republican system.

My sources of evidence will include written accounts, such as historical chronicles and narrative inscriptions, other written documents such as economic documents (like contracts) and other forms of inscriptions, as well as archaeological evidence.

Assyria is relevant today as a case because it shows how economics and foreign relations impact the ability of a republic to maintain itself. A good republic ensures itself against the vagaries of fortune. Assyria did not fall because it came to its republican balance the easy way, without conflict, and thus had less institutional knowledge of what was necessary to maintain itself. Machiavelli would understand both of these concepts and the experiences of Assur the city-state do resemble the rise and fall of his Florence. This leads to the second point of relevance regarding Assyria. The same basic situations repeat themselves in history. Assyria, Rome, and Florence are similar in many ways, particularly in that one city grows and becomes an empire with no ability to maintain its republican institutions. The limits of local institutions' ability to be extended is mentioned in *Federalist* No. 10 and continues to influence American political thought not just at the federal level but at the state level too. A third point of relevance is

it shows that there is no inevitable line of progress from oppressive regime to the republic but that the first regime that forms can be often be more republican than that which replaces it. The final point of relevance that the Assyrian case has is that maintenance of the republic is more important than its creation and consolidation. No republic is safe from decline into a horrific polity like Assyria. If Americans feel that it cannot happen here, they need to read the story of Assyria, to see how it started out and what it ended up as, a cautionary tale for them.

Persia had one regime (c. 550 (probably a little earlier)-330 BC), which was a bureaucratic republic. Persia arose from the ruins of Elam, an ancient country by the time of the rise of Persia whose people survived the fall of their state and were very angry at their neighbors. They sought to regain some of their lost prosperity and the new immigrants and rulers of the region, the Persians forged a strategic alliance with them. In the end the Persians overthrew Media, their regional hegemon and grew to begin the world's most powerful regime up to that time, even dwarfing Assyria's power. They created interest group alliances across ethnic, geographic, and religious lines, decentralized their regime, allowed local deliberative assemblies in many places, and created a substantively and descriptively representative military and especially civilian bureaucracy. They were primarily a bureaucratic republic, but certain sub-national units and formal-institutional representative bodies as well. Persia fell not through transformation but for two reasons. Decentralization allowed for opportunistic military leaders who were defeated but weakened the country and it is this combined with the Macedonian invasion that ended the regime in 330 BC (Brentjes 1995, 1001-1021).

The Elamite genocide and the poverty and insecurity of the early Persian tribes provided both incentives to cooperate for mutual benefit and common fears about domination and destruction. As a result an inter-ethnic peace was forged that shaped both early Achaemenid

identity and early Achaemenid policy. Aware that only a big, powerful state could retain republican regime characteristics, the new Achaemenid regime expanded greatly but never lost its core republican character. It eventually fell to foreign conquest, but largely because of the inability to coordinate policy over such a large geographical territory in a federalized state, which led to political and military disconnectedness and uprisings. The Achaemenid regime did not abandon but succumbed to problems of retaining a massive, powerful, diverse republican regime and state in pre-modern technological conditions (Potts 1999, 309-353).

My sources of evidence include written accounts, especially Herodotus's well-known history, narrative inscriptions such as the Behistun Inscriptions, and other primary and secondary sources.

The case of Persia shows how important balancing decentralization with an effective federal government is in maintaining a republic. Morally, Persia was committed to both but did not have the logistics and bureaucratic capability to ensure that local bureaucracies and rulers did not gain too much control of the military and other functions. Madison and the other Federalists very much understood the need for this balance and after debating amongst themselves created a second U.S. Constitution with a strong civilian executive with military powers, a legislature with powers to check and oversee said powers, a judiciary to oversee both and an otherwise decentralized system to perceive the autonomy of the various states, who maintained some control over their own militias. That balance is disrupted in various ways today and Persia is a cautionary tale about what happens when a republic, especially a federal one cannot correctly balance the freedom of decentralization with the effectiveness of central government.

Another lesson of Persia is that bureaucracies can create a non-dominating regime, mixed with decentralization and local institutions more deeply grounded in direct representation of local interest groups. Persia was closer to a liberal republic than most states of the ancient or medieval periods. It was representative of the interest of many different groups and had a diverse, inclusive, and socially-mobile elite. It did not need democratic elections but it had its bureaucratic representative institutions and federalism to constrain the power of the central government. It would have been a perfect model for Afghanistan (with the possible addition of some electoral institutions) had it been able to constrain local rulers and their bureaucracies as effectively as it did the central government.

Venice (727-1797 AD) had a single republican regime type of the formal-institutional type that lasted, with only brief interruptions continuously for over one thousand years, though the specific constitution of the regime varied significantly over this time. Venice was at heart a small republic and thus it is hard to generalize to larger states, but otherwise is the model republic, even greater than Rome. It originated because of the migration of the Germanic tribes and the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. The old order died screaming, but the institutional memory of the old ways, including the by then almost ancient traditions of the old Roman Republic, was still alive. So the Venetians could start civilization again still having a clear idea of their ideals and basic frame of reference in terms of a plan of government. Disparate interest groups huddled together in the Venetian Lagoon to withstand the end of Italian civilization as they saw it and so the mechanism of transactional politics just naturally occurred. Individual actors took brave stands against attempts of one group or individuals' attempts at consolidating power; it was not merely path dependence (Norwich, 1982, in its entirety). However, once the tradition of limited government became well established, it was largely self-sustaining. Venice

expanded and made a clear distinction between three arenas of cultural and political activity: home, near-home and abroad. The republican values practiced at home were largely operable near home when acting with subordinate or even subject peoples in Italy and the near-abroad but the true foreign colonies did not receive that sort of fair treatment. Regardless, the republic's core constituencies are merely its home and near abroad constituencies and a republic's colonies never count as part of the republic, thus why even good regimes treat their colonies poorly. Ultimately, Venice fell because of the foreign pressure of the French Revolution, socially, politically, and militarily (Najemy 1999, 19-21 and King 1999 223-231).

Venice clearly was formed from a mutual motive of fear of conquest, domination, and cultural collapse. The Venetians clearly had some capacity to cooperate throughout their history. Finally, extreme foreign pressures were obviously present in this case. The rich republican traditions and institutions of Venice in some ways were the strongest of these four cases and despite one thousand years of history, the internal divisions at the end of the republic were less important to the regime's demise than the French revolutionary army.

My sources of evidence include Norwich's work on Venice (secondary source), Machiavelli's works, where he speaks of Venice, and additional secondary sources (Najemy 1999, 319-321).

Venice provides three core lessons for the modern reader. First, it shows how a clearly non-democratic republic could function so long with the consent of the governed, in a relatively liberal framework. Second, it shows how the republican framework of the United States both benefits and diverges from the model of the small city-state. Lastly, Venice shows the

importance of class interest balance in the maintenance of the republic, echoing Aristotle's argument about the importance of the middle class in republican stability.

Florence is a very complex case, where at least four different regimes weaved together to create the medieval and renaissance history of the city-state in only a little over four hundred years. The medieval republic came about to the fall of civil order as the decadent Margravate of Tuscany fell apart. The Florentines revolted in 1115 AD and maintained a formal-institutional republic until 1434, with the rise of Medicis the first time. Then a non-republican dictatorship continued until 1494 and the expulsion of the Medicis. For a few years the crazed rule of Savonarola was both pro-republican and not really republican because of its extremity and oppressiveness. However, Savonarola paved the way for the restoration of the republic under Soderini in 1498. This was Machiavelli's republic and one he actively supported. It fell to the Medicis a second time in 1512. The republic officially ended in 1534, but it was not really operative for all the time after 1434 except the Soderini era. It then became the Duchy of Florence in 1532 and later the grand duchy of Tuscany in 1569, completing the cycle of a unified, politically non-republican monarchy that started with the Margravate of Tuscany. Systemic dysfunction led to the rise of the Medicis the first time but external pressure and force, particularly the Medicis, led to the second time (Menning 1999, 375-385).

Florence came about slightly differently from the other cases. While the extreme pressure leading to the rise of the Republic of Florence was technically external to Florence, it was actually the product of clear collapse of the central authorities in Tuscany. Still the extreme pressures of internal collapse provided a stimulus similar to extreme foreign pressures. Mutual fears of control and domination among diverse groups were clearly evident in Florence and similar Tuscan city-states. The capacity of cooperating across interest group lines was evident as

well, but this capacity does seem to have declined precipitously over time. When the pressures abated and the city became prosperous, the various interest groups began to argue vehemently, often violently, with one another. The ideology of the Republic, the republican norms, never gained full power over the parochial interest of the various interest groups. The Guelph and Ghibelline conflict throughout most of Italy (outside of Venice) created more corrosion of republican virtues. Extra-local partisan and group identities poisoned the well of republicanism by creating identities and power structures that the local interest groups could appeal to without resorting to local, geographically-imbedded republican institutions. In the south of Italy, complete subjection to autocratic power made republicanism impossible while a complex and profitable network of rival factions and city-states in most of the mainland of Italy made republics possible but increasing made the norms of republicanism harder and harder to find. Where republicanism failed to develop properly, unlike in the rare case of Venice, republican institutions had no hope of holding off first factional/sectarian/inter-communal fighting other than falling back on a single prince-like figure. Where a unique identity, interest group balance, and republican institutions remained strong, like Venice, Italian republicanism survived both the domestic and foreign pressures of domination, factionalism, and conquest (Menning 1999, 375-385 and Najemy 313-319).

My sources of evidence will include Machiavelli's *the Prince* and *the Discourses*, the work of Marsilius of Padua (primary and secondary source material), the theories of Guiccardini, and other secondary sources (Najemy 1999, 313-321). The main lessons for the Florence example are how political theory and practice intersect (particularly emphasizing Machiavelli here), how economic and political power being closely aligned can polarize and thus destabilize a republic (the US in particular can learn from this), and how republics are most secure when they are

militarily powerful (Machiavelli helps here too). In sum, all of my cases have important lessons for today.

G. Rival Hypotheses

Before I conclude this introduction with a clear statement of my typology/ taxonomy, two main rival hypotheses must be considered. First, the classical Aristotelian argument that a stable free state (he calls it politeia but it could easily be considered a republic) must have a middle class to balance itself and that once a middle class is consolidated, the regime does not require the kinds of elaborate institutions and mechanisms I describe above. The second rival hypothesis is that ethnically homogenous states and regimes are a more telling independent variable in republican formation and perpetuation or dissolution than any of the factors I state above.

As for the first rival hypothesis, I argue that Aristotle is not wrong on the first and most important of his two planks, that the middle class or as he describes them. The middle classes are essential to republics and republicanism. However, while necessary or nearly so to a stable republic, they are far from sufficient. I do not see Aristotle as necessarily making the argument that republics with a strong, empowered middle class do not need my other mechanisms, but I will argue against the interpretation of Aristotle as such, if not the man's arguments themselves.

Aristotle in *the Politics*, Book IV, Chapters 11 and 12, makes the classical and often-repeated argument that without the middle class (or middle classes or middle sort, the terminology for him is not always precise), a regime like I have defined a republic could not exist. By middle class or classes he means people neither rich nor poor but with some

property and not too much. These are property owners but not necessarily small-time capitalists, let alone tradesmen or merchants. Thus, his middle class is by no means unitary. Instead, the only things that bind them are three in number: moderate property, moderate income, and moderate opinions. He assumes that having a moderate property stake in the outcome of the regime or state and being neither very poor nor rich will on average make the middle class or classes more moderate than more extreme rich or poor. I think this assumption is correct for the most part. The rulers of the state seeking to govern in a moderate way must always have at least some members of the middle class involved in the governance of the regime (Aristotle 1984, *Politics IV.*, 11-12, Lord).

As to the first part and most important part of Aristotle's argument, I generally agree. The middle sort of person, neither poor nor rich, is essential to the republic and less likely to be extreme than either. He also makes a very early version of the median voter theorem, in that if the median voter is of median income, i.e. middle class the demands for redistribution will be limited in either direction and produce a more stable state. The reason that my above mechanisms do not explicitly mention the middle class is that the definition of this term is often hard to pin down and I would rather deal with diverse groups of groups that make mechanisms like transactional politics work rather than simplify down to the middle class. However, the first part of the argument is fundamentally sound.

We see this in my own cases. Venice had a strong middle class, not just one unified middle class and much of the transactional politics involved in the Republic of Venice, but by no means all or even most of it, revolved around the middle classes. In Assyria, capitalism in a mixture of mercantile and free market forms created vast caravan networks in northern Mesopotamia into Anatolia. Many of the merchants and bankers were not wealthy,

but were middle-upper middle class persons. When the trade collapsed, these classes collapsed, and never quite recovered and the Old Assyrian Republic collapsed as a result.

However, the second part of the argument, more proffered by later thinkers than Aristotle himself, is wrong. The middle class is far from sufficient to create and, more importantly, sustain a republic. Florence had a very strong middle class when it collapsed first into anarchy then into a dictatorship. The *popolari* were middle class types who sought to create a more oligarchical type of republic by excluding most of the aristocracy and the poor. They were not moderate and thus acted in non-Aristotelian ways. They became immoderate because of a lack of balance of interest groups and because of a lack of transactional politics and alliances with non-middle class groups. Thus the same kind of forces that lead to tyranny and anarchy in classic Aristotelian thought when the middle class is absent occurs when it is too strong. A moderate middle class cannot exist without the factors I have detailed in my theory above and thus the strong middle class alone cannot sustain a republic.

Thus, in conclusion, the first part of the rival hypothesis of the middle class supporting the republic is mostly correct but the second part is incorrect. The middle class, whatever it may mean, is necessary but not sufficient.

The second rival hypothesis is that ethnic heterogeneity makes creating and maintaining a stable republic nearly impossible, while ethnic homogeneity makes it much easier. My argument is that ethnic heterogeneity is only a significant problem when you cannot achieve the mechanisms and institutions I have argued for above in the main argument. Common fears of domination, extreme external pressures on all ethnic groups and some cultural basis of agreement and cooperation is all that is needed. Ethnic heterogeneity does not mean cultural incomprehensibility or incompatibility. In the Persian Empire case, Elamites and

Persians had developed a minor multi-ethnic polity over time due to extreme pressures and mutual fears of domination by other groups and states. Cultural integration and intermarriage did occur by the mid-6th-century BC but not full-blown assimilation. You had ethnic pluralism (multiple ethnicities at peace with one another) but only one political culture. Where multiple ethnicities exist but have one common political culture and where their external and internal incentive structure are as described above in the main argument, there is nothing for the republican to fear of ethnic heterogeneity.

The Persian Empire began as a multi-ethnic political community with a common albeit elastic political culture. It simply spread that formula as it expanded. If anything, the central administration had too much of a light touch, as seen in the inability of the federal system to hold itself together after almost two hundred years. However, the Persian Empire was neither hegemonically Persian nor the modern sense of an empire. It was a series of federal states bound to a central administration (a multi-ethnic central administration at that) whose ideological underpinnings was that each geographical locality and/or ethnic group had the same king and that the common ruler had a central administration that oversaw the various regional federal administrations. In other words, it was a constitutional system in that the various peoples were bound to other peoples through the person of the king and the regime that represented both them (the various peoples of the state) and the king. It was literally constituted of moving parts dedicated to a single monarch, a state constituted of semi-autonomous states, a class of federation. It could have been more ideologically welded together but it was clearly a multi-ethnic, federal republic that stood the test of time longer than many republics do.

The Persian Empire or Achaemenid Federation as I like to call it, gives the lie to the idea that ethnic homogeneity is all but a death sentence for a republic. A republic that seeks to incorporate many ethnic or religious identities into the picture may need to federalize power, ensure diverse political and economic elites, and ensure that ethnic and religious identities do not occlude one common political identity, but it can be done if my main causal mechanisms are obeyed in the main section. The republic is a system of integration not of assimilation or segregation of different identities, but one that can relatively easily accommodate multiple ethnic and religious identities.

H. Conclusion of the Introduction

Having defined my central concepts, explained where I fit into the literature, explicated my main theory, shown my cases briefly, and considered alternate rival hypotheses, I now will conclude the introductory chapter by summarizing my major attempted contributions with this project. I seek to show that there is a better place to be than the all-or-nothing choice of the paradise of the modern liberal democratic republic or the hell of authoritarianism. Just as the two main characters in the song referenced at the beginning of this chapter fall back on the reasonable but not great relationship they can have together, I am saying that there is a wide range of republican outcomes for states that would rather live in the purgatory of pretty good republicanism than the almost-inevitable decline of premature democratic institutions into chaos and/or dictatorship. Those options include an electoral republic with a stronger oligarchical element than democrats would like, but still with a strong popular element as prescribed by the republican principle of the mixed constitution, a bureaucratic republic, in which certain principles of constructing the

bureaucracy apply to create a relatively decent, non-dominating regime, or, most preferably, a regime with both form of representative institution, formal-electoral and bureaucratic.

To be clear, I am not asking anyone to give up on the ideal of liberal democracy. I am presenting an alternative pathway to it rather a full-on alternative to it. Chapter 6 will develop the idea of republican political development. However, the important point is liberal democracy is not desirable or sustainable without republican institutions, laws, and norms and republics are best when liberal and democratic. Yet, democratic elections are less important than a non-dominating regime with significant representation for all relevant interest groups, a system of checks and balances, and a generally non-dominating regime.

In the next four chapters, we will examine all four cases as outlined above. The first two cases, Assyria and Persia show vastly different trajectories in terms of republican outcomes. At the end of Chapter Three, we will reflect on how bureaucratic representation and bureaucratic republican institutions functioned between the two republics of Assyria and Persia and which model would be better today. Chapters Four and Five follow Venice and Florence respectively and the end of Chapter Five compares and contrasts them a bit as well. Chapter Six will look at all four cases together and take another look at electoral vs. bureaucratic representation, theorize a bit more from the cases, and come up with some basic public policy suggestions for those states fighting to stay in republican purgatory and to avoid the hell of strict authoritarianism.

Chapter 2: Assyria

A. The Old Assyrian Regime and the Transition into Non-Republicanism

Assyria is a fascinating case study because it starts off at the beginning of history not as the despotic state for which it is famous (or infamous) but as a republic. It was predominantly a bureaucratic republic, in that its bureaucratic institutions and not formal representative institutions were the most essential to preserving the republic. However, there was also a robust City Assembly which represented a significant portion of the population, its aristocrats and merchants. Thus there was some formal representation though the main organs of republicanism in the state were bureaucratic institutions.

It is important to state from the beginning of this chapter that there was no trace of democracy in Old Assyrian institutions. It was an oligarchy in a fairly clear form. However, the oligarchy appears to be more of the broad type than the narrow one (the broad type being more representative of the political community and more diverse in terms of both interests and life experiences and thus generally more conducive to republicanism than a narrow oligarchy). This broad oligarchy is in fact typical of many historical republics. Both merchants and aristocrats were included in the city and while the mercantile interest group was strong and at times even predominant, it was not dominant in republican terms. The monarch was the nominal sovereign of Assur, the city that eventually spawned the larger country of Assyria. However, though the monarch was not symbolic or powerless as in modern constitutional monarchies, the monarch was not a dominant figure.

The relevance of this case to the modern world of states is an initial concern of course. Do repressive regimes develop first an inevitably progress to less repressive forms or the

optimistic logic of progress a historically flawed theory? How do economics and external pressures cause the sudden breakdown of relatively non-dominating regimes and lead to the redevelopment of republics into extremely oppressive regimes? How far can local republican institutions stretch without considered constitutional engineering? This case goes a long way to answering all of these questions for moderns. Let us start with the regime chicken-or-egg question.

The earliest ruler of the Old Assyrian period for which verifiable information can be gathered is Ilu-shuma. He did not even bear the title of king but of vice-regent of the god Ashur. Still, he was a significant religious official as well as a political one precisely because of this relationship with the god Assur, for which the city and country were named. He created a system of tax privileges that encouraged local merchants, supported by backing from other sectors. That foreign trade was with the east, western Iran including the Zagros Mountains region, southern Mesopotamia, and especially Anatolia (modern-day Asian Turkey). He bragged about how he forced foreign persons and their wealth to come to Assur. In light of later practices of the Assyrians, this was once interpreted as a form of military conquest or series of raids or tribute. However, now it is believed to simply describe the great trade that flowed in and out of Assur (Lewy 1971, 708-709 and 756-757).

Ilu-shuma boasts specifically about establishing the freedom of the Akkadians, in this case, the people of southern Mesopotamia. This seems to mean the freedom to trade. In opening and maintaining these trade routes, Ilu-shuma had also secured freedom of the same kind for his people. A form of government-sponsored capitalism (something like proto-

mercantilism) grew out of Ilu-shuma's actions. One might assume that the king was solely responsible for this great economic and political development (Lewy 1971, 756-758).

On the contrary, the limmu official or limmum in the Old Assyrian dialect of Akkadian, was in charge of regulating all of this activity, if not in Ilu-Shuma's time, certainly in his son Erishum I's time. The limmu official was selected every year by the City Assembly to oversee the "City Hall", a complex institution similar to a palace but which was autonomous from the office of the monarch. The limmu official was in charge of duties (proto-axes that involved barter rather than coin money), trade, and loans, as well as food reserves. However, the limmu official's term was limited and there was an unofficial rotation among the elite families of the city. To check his powers, there were other officials in the city. These senior officials seem to have had functions similar to ombudsmen and senior bureaucratic officials. In total, the picture of the City Hall is that the limmu official was the preeminent or even predominant official but not dominant, as there were other officials with autonomy and backing from the city assembly who could critique and to some extent counteract the limmu official (Lewy 1971, 742-743 and Dercksen 2004, 11-13, 52-54, 86-89).

The limmu institution properly speaking, where the year was named after the limmum and in which the New Years' Festival was at least partly overseen by the limmum, came into being in the time of Erishum, one royal generation after Ilu-shuma his father. The karum system developed in this time. The City Hall had a counterpart in the primary trading colony of Assur, called the karum of Kanesh, or simply karum Kanesh. At karum Kanesh, the main office controlled the actions of the other lesser karums, whose organization seems to have been fairly complex for the early centuries of the Second Millennium BC. These karums were semi-autonomous centers of commerce, trade, and habitation, where Assyrians lived in

dedicated quarters just outside the main habitable areas of native cities throughout many parts of Anatolia. Smaller trading posts would report to the karums and were not permanently inhabited by colonists. These colonists remained separate from the native population and also were granted extraterritoriality by their rulers, thus they were colonists under Assyrian law, but without more than minimal Assyrian military assets on the ground and surrounded by non-Assyrian controlled, though friendly territory (Lewy 1971, 708-709, 721-723; Dercksen 2004, 76-89 and 103-105).

The lesser karums collected dues from the local colonists and tradesmen and sent them to karum Kanesh, which in turn used most of the collected income, though it sends duties to the capital at Assur. Karum Kanesh was also the hub of communication for the Assyrian colonies in Anatolia and their main connection with the homeland, which were essentially still one city and its countryside. A group of politically loyal but still autonomous colonies, the colonists received reinforcements in terms of new colonists, supplies, and barter periodically. The karums relied on karum Kanesh which relied on Assur, but Assur relied on the karum network for its wealth, power and prestige as well. The landowning class of Assur was an important ally to the merchant class and vice versa. Yet this alliance had to deal with institutional fragmentation several distinct and autonomous bureaucracies, the transactional politics of the City Assembly, and the king (Lewy 1971, 723-728 and 758 and Dercksen 2004, 121-147).

The legal system was also very different than it later would become. A written code of laws as a single, well-edited document that was internally consistent did not develop until the Middle Assyrian period. However, written-down precedents, very analogous to modern-day case law in the United States and other common law countries, were often cobbled

together into an informal collection. The law was thus knowable, at least by the elites who could read or hire someone to read for them, and based upon a logical principle in precedence. But it was not as concrete or rigid as the irrevocable law code. Debts were settled, property peaceably and lawfully confiscated, economic institutions regulated and policed and lawyers patrolled the boundaries between private and public spheres. Law and order without a constricting law code, a republics of laws, norms and institutions, created organically. This adaptability served the Old Assyrian state just as the very different Middle Assyrian state required a law code, which was more carved in stone (Dercksen, 48-51, 86-93, and 231-244).

This mixture of legal, economic, and political institutions served the purposes of republicanism because it fragmented power, set competing groups against one another but also allowed for cooperation and transactional politics and also allowed for economic and social as well as political freedom for a significant percentage of the population. The broad oligarchy allowed for more than just the narrowest group to be limmu officials or serve in the City Assembly, karum offices or other senior offices in the Assur City Hall. It was an effective regime where no one interest group or individual (particulars of the regime) dominated the entire regime. Those not selected limmu official or other offices, i.e. the losers of the game could still keep playing the political game. Also, the competition for power was mostly non-violent in the period of 20th century BC until the rise of Shamshi-Adad and through elections, merit, and moving up through the trading and institutional bureaucracies. Thus Assyria was a republic, primarily practicing the bureaucratic type of republicanism. The chicken-or-egg problem is already answered at this point, because clearly the earliest polity in Assyria was a republican city state, Assur and the later despotic polity that

developed was a geographically larger absolute monarchy. This shows that progress is neither inevitable nor linear, but is based upon the development of laws, institutions, and norms. When a non-dominating initial regime becomes more dominating, it is not going backwards but developing, just in the wrong normative direction. Political development from a less normatively developed to a more morally developed form is subject to historical forces and based on hard work not historical certainty. Constant efforts at improving struggling polities such as Iraq and Afghanistan are necessary to improve. Democracy or republicanism will not result from inertia. China will not become democratic just because of economic liberalization either. If dictatorship is morally undesirable it must be worked upon by new historical forces in order to overcome the current state of inertia. Also, this case shows that dictatorship is not natural.

However, the late 19th or early 18th-century BC (the ancient historians still bicker about this), the first nail in the Old Assyrian Republic's coffin was struck by the capture of Assur by Shamshi-Adad, a descendant of the Amorite people with little knowledge of or regard for the intricacies of Old Assyrian institutions. He and his sons shared his large empire, and he thought so little of Assur as to place it as one city of the kingdom of Ekallatum, Shamshi-Adad's original city which became a secondary kingdom of the realm under one of his sons. The limmu institution remained but was most important because the limmu official was the one who undertook certain religious rites and in return had his name made the name of the year for all Assyrians to use. The institution of the limmu did not go away overnight in terms of its contribution to Assyrian republicanism either but trade was largely disrupted between karum Kanesh and Assyria (Lewy 1971, 762, Van de Mieroop 2007, 107-110); Dercksen 2004, 94-95).

It is important to note that Shamshi-Adad was a foreign Amorite, not a native Akkadian because it shows that external force not internal factors led to the collapse of the Old Assyrian Republic. The most advanced ancient Near Eastern research has shown him to be from Ekallatum not Assur originally but even some recent sources insist that he is Assyrian (sometimes for political reasons). Eventually Shamshi-Adad died and his son became king of the Ekallatum region, the regime of Shamshi-Adad losing the rest of his realm. Under the geographically-reduced regime at Ekallatum, the local institutions at Assur were more important and Assur was either the primary or secondary capital of the kingdom by this time. Trade was restored at least in part under the descendants of Shamshi-Adad (Van de Mieroop 2007, 107-110 and Nardo, 27-28). After the rise and fall of the invasive Shamshi-Adad dynastic regime permanently effaced the once powerful broad oligarchy and the merchant and scribal classes that social and economically underwrote the political republic. That dynasty, both directly and indirectly, would ultimately transform Assyria from a republic into an absolute despotic monarchy (Dercksen 2004, 94-95, 244-246).

At the same time, however, the trade routes from Assur to Anatolia were permanently cut due to local political unrest. Part of this was due to the actions of Anitta, who would ultimately lay the foundation of the Hittite kingdom. The increasing domination of the natives by a single dynastic power made it harder for Assur to either keep its extraterritorial colonies or to trade on favorable terms. Thus the Assyrian colonies collapsed and most of the colonists returned home, overpopulating the city at an already bad time for the city. Trade declined with other parts of the trade system outside of the karum zone as well. Without the prosperous copper-for-tin trade in the Zagros Mountains or the prosperous communities of Anatolia, the economic system of the city-state of Assur collapsed fairly quickly. With the

economic system, the political system of the old regime fell too and it is hard to separate the political chaos from the economic chaos. In the end, though internal and external pressure and economic collapse became a dire crisis that led an extreme regime change, though not all at once (Veenhof 1995, 865-866).

These two broad developments: the fall of the Amorites and the rise of the Adasids on one hand and the rise of the Hittites cutting off foreign trade on the other, ultimately led to collapse of the social and economic conditions that made the political pre-requisites of the Old Assyrian republic possible. With this collapse, the struggle for a stable regime started from scratch and unlike the first time, it did not result in a republic.

Here we see how both foreign affairs and economics led to the downfall of the republic of Assur. Economic prosperity often aids liberalism in all its historical forms and economic collapse or doldrums helps repressive forces. The collapse of the trade routes into Anatolia and the Old Assyrian karums devastated the Assyrian economy and its pre-existing political equilibrium, the republic, leading to change in the opposite direction, towards a dictatorship. Republican institutions never recovered because control of the economy passed into the hands of a very closed elite dominated by the monarchy rather than a more liberal and inclusive middle class. If not for military events in Anatolia, the economy would not have collapsed, which shows the importance of foreign affairs and military capability to defend oneself from economic and political collapse. Economic and political development thus goes hand in hand in many cases, even in the modern world.

B. The Middle Assyrian and Neo-Assyrian Regime

On the contrary, the Middle Assyrian period saw the consolidation of an authoritarian monarchical regime. The limmu officials could now be the kings themselves, which got rid of the checks and balances of the old Republican system. The limmu now was not in charge of a complex bureaucracy, but was from this point on a ceremonial official or a petty functionary. The City Assembly seems to have disappeared in these times as well. So the colonial and capital institutions went away leaving the vestiges of the limmu official, which no longer checked royal power of an increasingly dominant monarch. This had consequences in terms of basic human protections.

Basic human protections should apply not only to one's long-running subjects but to one's new subjects as well. When Shalmaneser I conquered Mitanni, a state that a few generations earlier had dominated Assur, he did not allow the captured enemy soldiers to become his subjects without serious penalty; instead, he blinded 14,400 of them in one eye, if we are to believe his own boastful inscription (Nardo 1998, 33 and Kuiper 2011, 85). It is an important ideological point of argument whether he should have taken into his service men that he had conquered without taking something from them. They were harmless and defeated and he was not going to kill them anyway. Why be cruel in such a way, if he was not going to be decisive about it? It is feasible that defeated and frightened soldiers could be persuaded to be loyal to the new regime, as most of them at least would have no great ideological attachment to Mitanni per se (their reason not being clouded by the error of ethno-nationalism). They could be granted some land or at least allowed to keep their old lands subject to the new king. A show of force such as blinding them in one eye would not

be decisive. They would be less efficient fighters against him, but there is no reason to believe that they would be entirely useless in battle, particularly in blocks of spearmen, the main infantry formation of the Late Bronze Age. Additionally, such an outrage would anger their extended families and could ignite more rebellion. On the other hand, winning them over with mercy might make the transition to Assyrian control easier. However, Shalmaneser was an unaccountable ruler and thus could neither be controlled by external actors nor control himself.

Shalmaneser might appear to have been correct in his cruelty, as no successful rebellion of the Mitannians resulted. His regime deported thousands of persons from Hanilgabat (as the Assyrians called Mitanni) and shipped them off to other domains of Assur, which now developed into a territorial kingdom for the first time appropriately referred to as Assyria, the mat Assur (or land of Assur in Akkadian). They were used as cheap labor, but above the level of slave. Their housing and feeding were paid for by the state. In the end, Hanilgabat was held but the state found both keeping their new cheap labor source alive expensive and that the newly conquered province was still prone to rebellion or at least welcoming to Hittite invaders. An expensive military governorate and the civil infrastructure required keeping it afloat, plus the deportations, were the only things keeping the restive province from falling out of control. When this repressive apparatus faltered a few centuries later, the long-held, hard-won ground went back to effective independence (Kuiper, 85).

From Shalmaneser's imperial experiment in Mitanni/Hanilgabat there are two lessons: winning over a population would have been easier to sustain socially, politically, and especially economically and once Shalmaneser made his choice of blinding the 14,400, he

had to become increasingly authoritarian to hold on to the angry province. His inexact cruelty snowballed into outright tyranny and its net benefit long-term to Assyria versus a more lenient policy is dubious at best. However, the lack of republican institutions to hold back the monarch, allowed him to dominate both domestic audiences in the capital and everyone else. The lack of restraint had direct impacts on basic human protections.

After Shalmaneser, his immediate successor Tukulti-Ninurta I epitomized the Middle Assyrian ruler. Tukulti-Ninurta was the Middle Assyrian ruler who most directly led to the excesses of the later Neo-Assyrian rulers. He sacked Babylon, committing a sacrilegious act. However, Babylon was a foreign country unlike later, when it would part of his realm and it is hard to think that this sack created the kind of outrage it later would. Tukulti-Ninurta continued a trend of taking power from the last meaningful check on royal authority, the priesthood of the god Assur. While Tukulti-Ninurta's attempts led to a successful change in favor of the royal prerogative over the religious institutions of Assur, he soon found out what the destruction of the last vestiges of the old republican balance of power system meant in terms of political stability (Nardo 1998, 33-34 and Kuiper, 85). The priesthood rose against him, his sons revolted, he was surrounded in a city he had created for himself so as to be isolated from political pressures in Assur and he was ultimately put under siege and murdered during it. With absolute monarchy came absolute loss in the event of political defeat, something that had not occurred before Shamshi-Adad and the turmoil his dynasty caused during and after the occupation of Assur.

Later on, as the Middle Assyrian Kingdom crumbled and returned to controlling little more than the region around Assur and Nineveh, the gains of Shalmaneser and Tukulti-Ninurta were undone. The historical memory of the regime remained, telling great and

somewhat embellished tales of Tukulti-Ninurta I and Shalmaneser I the great conquerors and leaving little record of the Old Assyrian past. The limmu official remained as an institution but in its pro forma, Middle Assyrian form and presented no check to the king, who could legally become the limmu official himself. The memories of the authoritarian regime helped inspire the Neo-Assyrian monarchs to greater heights of cruelty and absolute monarchy, perhaps viewing the middle Assyrian tyranny as their only reasonable roadmap to the glories of the past.

A series of early Neo-Assyrian kings paved the way for Ashurnasirpal II. Fittingly, Ashurnasirpal's father was Tukulti-ninurta II, named after a great conqueror of the Middle Assyrian period. Ashurnasirpal II conquered vast lands not even conquered in the Middle Assyrian era, either directly or through forcing subject status upon them. He did not consider these subject rulers to be lesser monarchs of a certain dignity, as many Late Bronze Age monarchs, even Middle Assyrian ones, often did. He neither viewed the subjects of his subject/vassal rulers as his own subjects (not uncommon for the pre-Hellenistic Ancient Near East) but neither did he view them as fundamentally distinct from enemy peoples not yet brought to subjection (more unusual for the times) (Kuiper 2011, 89-90 and Smith 1965, 9-17). Subjection or vassalage was viewed in the Late Bronze Age as a permanent thing, in which each successive ruler of the local dynasty is taken into vassalage by each successive ruler of the dynasty of the main state to which it is vassal. There were limitations in the relationship between Mitanni and Assur/Assyria when it was a vassal state of Mitanni's in the Late Bronze Age, for example. There were no mutual obligations in the Assyrian system, especially in the Neo-Assyrian period. It is simple exploitation of resources, including

human resources. It is much closer to imperialism/colonialism of the modern type than the intricate vassal system of the Late Bronze Age (Smith 1965, 9-17).

Ashurnasirpal depicted conquered non-Assyrians as an undifferentiated block in his art. He essentialized, even racialized his enemies into one, mass group of peoples, so different from Assyrians, and inferior to them, that even after conquest, they were meant only to serve. This was to some extent new, in that Late Bronze Age empires, particularly the Hittites and Egyptians, often accorded great respect, dignity, and privileges to ethnic non-majorities (the term minority having tricky modern connotations, especially in America). Conquest and subjection/vassalage had often been seen as different things; now they were seen as distinct stages of the same thing: domination. Assyria settled for subjection or vassalage rather than the full domination of outright conquest only because it could not get more. However, in the Late Bronze Age, direct rule was not really the goal (Smith 1965, 9-17).

As a result of Assyrian political ideology and structure, the territory and extent of the main state was much larger than earlier, Late Bronze Age regimes. It also viewed as its true subjects or citizens only Assyrians. Where Hittites viewed as legitimate political subjects in the domestic context all ethnicities and cultures within their realm and dealt with subject or vassal rulers as both foreign and domestic in different ways, Assyria viewed their non-Assyrian subjects as simply “other”.

Tiglath-Pileser III was so worried that Assyrian high officials were beginning to be a successful check on royal authority that he replaced provincial and most other high officials with eunuchs in order to ensure the lack of dynastic formation. He also reformed the military, decreasing the native Assyrian contingent and increasing the “foreign” that is

conquered, non-Assyrian element of the army. Careful not to allow the power of the “lesser” peoples to percolate up from the ranks, he made sure that the cavalry, heavy infantry and charioteers, the prestigious and most important elements in open battle, were retained for the Assyrian political subjects (the citizen class if you will). Light infantry, such as skirmishers, slingers, and archers, could do the grunt work, but they would have neither power nor opportunity to rise through the military or political ranks. He could control the impoverished ones by small selective incentives, diminishing the power of the generals while not checking his power at all. Thus Tiglath-Pileser III prevented any oligarchical or popular check on his power (Charpin 1995, 823-824).

His reforms and their effects on the Assyrian regime continued even after the Adasid dynasty was overthrown by Sargon II. Sargon conquered Babylon (not for the first time) and the Kingdom of Israel (the northern kingdom) for the first time. He ordered deportations for the second but not for the first. The normal simple bipartite division in the Neo-Assyrian worldview of “us versus them” within the domestic sphere Assyrians verses non-Assyrians had developed up to and including Sargon’s reign a single well-enforced exception: Babylon (Leichty 1995, 949-953). While never considered equal to Assyrians, Babylonians had a second-class citizen sort of status, which perversely in this context was a good thing. They were political subjects of a second class, that is the Assyrian ruler had some regard for them, unlike the majority of his subjects to whom he felt no political responsibility. However, Sennacherib, son of Sargon, violated this last moral and ideological line. Sennacherib did something so awful, so egregious, and so sacrilegious, that even his Assyrian contemporaries and the next generation of Assyrians, including his own son and successor, Esarhaddon, were aghast. This is saying something based on the norms of Assyrian tyranny current in

Sennacherib's days. The massive, terrible thing Sennacherib did was not different from what rulers like him normally did: he sacked a city that was in revolt against him. In 689 BC, he sacked a major subject city. The difference was normative. The problem was which city he sacked. It was Babylon! (Kuiper 2011, 97-101)

This caused a scandal at the time and later. Assyrian religion was largely based off traditions similar to and often fostered by Babylonian religious traditions. The two peoples, Assyrian and Babylonian were considered similar but different and distinct peoples, brother peoples, though the Assyrians were always the older, stronger brother in their own minds. To destroy Babylon and scatter its people to the four corners of the earth was not ideologically or emotionally the same thing for the Assyrian aristocracy, normally unmoved by the fearsome cruelty of their absolute monarchs. Babylon was a place many of them had been to and had enjoyed and they actually knew a fair number of the élites of that city. The destruction of the city, no matter how rebellious it was, how similar its fate was to all the other cities that were destroyed, it still felt different. This seemed to have been a bigger deal at the time than when Tukulti-Ninurta I had sacked Babylon. First, Babylon was part of Sennacherib's dominions; they were to some extent his own people, unlike Babylon in Tukulti-Ninurta's time and also because the ties between the two cultures had only strengthened over time (Leichty 1995, 949-953).

Thus, unlike so many other cities, Babylon was rebuilt only eleven years after its destruction by Esarhaddon, who publicly denounced his father Sennacherib. The rumor was spread that Sennacherib had been murdered by Esarhaddon's brothers with no knowledge of the new king, largely for the destruction of Babylon. It was viewed as divine retribution for tis destruction. However, Esarhaddon waged war against his brothers for the murder and

historians generally view him of innocent and uninvolved in the plot. Still, he made two arguments that did not jive with one another. Firstly, his father was a bad man who spurned the gods and was slain for the sacrilege he imposed on Babylon. However, secondly, his murderers were killed because they had killed the legitimate and great king of Assyria. The tale was also spun that the gods who had been said previously to have judged Babylon unworthy of existence for seventy-seven years had changed their minds and the chief god of Babylon, Marduk, had flipped the tablet over, turning the sentence of seventy-seven years to eleven. In cuneiform, the sign for seventy-seven is the sign for eleven upside down and vice versa. This tale allowed to some extent Sennacherib's original judgment to be modified without arguing that Sennacherib had lied about the gods, a worse sacrilege than destroying Babylon. However Esarhaddon's arguments, namely that Sennacherib had fallen for his sin, that the murderers were to be killed for the unjustified killing of that sinner, and that the sinner who had been crushed to death by the figure of a mythical divine creature had been partially correct in his religious judgment are inconsistent with each other. In the end, Esarhaddon's logic was as unrestrained as his power. He may have felt a duty to rebuild Babylon but he did not feel restrained by the sentiment so much as empowered to rebuild Babylon in his own image; which he largely did (Leichty 1995, 949-958).

Ashurbanipal was Esarhaddon's son and the last significant Neo-Assyrian ruler. He was not as lenient as his father and in some ways epitomized the depravities of the Neo-Assyrian Empire as Tukulti-ninurta I had exemplified the Middle Assyrian kingdom. He did not think of providing real autonomy to the vassal king of Babylon, his own brother Shamash-shum-ukin and often interfered in what was theoretically a lesser but autonomous kingdom. The post-Sennacheribian solution of two kings, the great king in Nineveh, the then-capital of

Assyria and a lesser but still powerful one in Babylon failed because Ashurbanipal wanted no local check on his power in Babylon while Shamash-shum-ukin, who was the older brother of the great king, saw himself as the king's equal if not superior and had the backing of the local elites in Babylon. Ashurbanipal humiliated his brother and did not listen to the outcries for autonomy from all levels of Babylonian society, but he took no decisive aggressive action either. The result was a brutal bloodbath. Shamash-shum-ukin revolted in 652 BC. The king held on and won the day, defeating and slaying his brother in Babylon, but his lack of attention to the needs of Babylonians led to a great amount of suffering, death, and economic loss in both the Assyrian heartland and in Babylonia. He did not sack Babylon but was far from kind. (Charpin 1995, 825-826).

If Ashurbanipal stayed his hand somewhat with Babylon, he did not do so elsewhere. Ashurbanipal deported many people as his ancestors had done before, but what made him uniquely problematic was that he believed conquest and deportations were not enough. The Middle Assyrians had diverged from the Hittites and others by believing the vast majority of the conquered to not automatically gain the protections of subjects. The early Neo-Assyrians extended that by viewing the conquered as little better than animals. Sennacherib had expanded this view to the Babylonians. Now, Ashurbanipal believed that the Elamites, whom had given his ancestors and himself such trouble were not good enough for deportations, dispersal as a people, or normal conquest. He moved into Susa, sacked it, enslaved what he wanted and slaughtered the rest. He kept moving deeper and deeper into Elam trying to do something no group had done in a methodical manner before. His goal was not the subjection or even enslavement of the Elamite people; it was the calculated,

methodical destruction of an entire people. This was the first recorded intentional genocide (Brentjes 1995, 1013-1014 and Potts 1999, 259-309).

Geography betrayed the genocidal Ashurbanipal. The Zagros Mountains of southwestern Iran stopped his army cold. Though Elam appeared dead, the Elamite people survived. They would in fact be a minor factor in the war of revenge against Ashurbanipal's successors a generation later. Elamites continued on as a broken, but still proud people, eventually aligning with the newly-arrived and powerful Persians to forge the first great Persian state, Anshan (later Achaemenid Persia) together. The first genocide failed in the larger context but did bring short-term military gains. The long-term results were not advantageous to Assyria but that is left to the next chapter to describe a little bit more (Brentjes 1995, 1014-1017 and Potts 1999, 259-309).

The issue of whether the Elamite genocide counts as a violation of basic human protections is an interesting philosophical question. Do long-term enemies deserve protection when they submit or will imminently submit to the conqueror? Machiavelli would say yes, but qualify this by arguing that the most problematic elites would have to be disposed of to allow the rest of the people to comfortably coexist with the new rulers. Hobbes would also argue for an initial reprieve of at least the more docile new prospective subjects. The moral principle that this invokes is the same one violated by the legendary Roman hero Aeneas at the end of the *Aeneid*. His sworn enemy, Turnus, has fought long and honorably against him. Now, though, defeated by Aeneas' might, Turnus throws down his weapons and begs for mercy. His claims to being rendered harmless and amenable to submission are credible. However, Aeneas in fury kills him. I call the moral principle he violated the Turnus rule after this scene in the *Aeneid*. When an enemy is rendered helpless,

is genuinely willing to be made subject and is not likely to backstab the conqueror the first chance they get, they are a subject of the Sovereign and thus protected by human rights protection (Vergilius 1910, Aeneid, Book 12, lines 919 to the end; Machiavelli *The Prince* 1950, in its entirety and Hobbes 2010, in its entirety).

The Turnus rule applies to much of the ancient world's moral dilemmas and the Elamite genocide is the most humanly important of them. The Elamite people as a whole were no longer capable of action against him in the near future and many if not most could have been rendered subject without violating their protection (or right) of (to) life. Ashurbanipal could have deported or dispersed them, tried to win them over (they were badly governed by unpopular rulers), or at least established massive fortifications around them to keep them passive. However, he ignored all of this and attempted a partially successful genocide that had consequences for the Assyrian people as well in the end. The basic protections provided at the end of war were violated in the Elamite genocide and thus a human rights framework is not needed to condemn it, s Ashurbanipal violated the Turnus rule of basic human protections theory.

C. Lessons from the Assyrian Case

In this case study, we learned that Assyria started off as a government-sponsored capitalist regime with a fairly liberal (for the times) economy and a republican political system. It collapsed when its security and economic prosperity collapsed and became a command economy ruled by an absolute monarch. From the Middle Assyrian period to the Neo-Assyrian period, the rulers became more and more despotic and authoritarian. Even when the Assyrian sovereigns retreated from the ultimate expression of their tyranny, they

did it in a way that not only retained their unrestrained power but enhanced it by rebuilding the glory of Babylon or did so because of an inability to complete the genocide they started. Both the destruction and rebuilding of Babylon were expensive and weakened the regime financially. Likewise, the Elamite genocide would come back to bite the regime. Truly rational leaders would have acted differently and so would a rational collectively-controlled regime.

However, the kings did what they pleased. They were not rational in the common sense definition of that word. They did things that helped destroy the regime they sought to preserve. The antiquated view of the oriental despot that comes down to us through certain scholars is wrong because it does not take into account that regimes changed in the Ancient Near East in very real and substantive ways. However, the idea that there were often despots of a very tyrannical, decadent and all-powerful type and that the despotism was an often very vile type were not wrong. An old bias was that the despotism was different from other types of regimes, which ebb and flow, grow and change, and even drastically transform. In this case of Assyria, the almost cartoonish villainy of Assyria's despots is shown to have been all too real; however the despotic regime was not timeless. It had a historical beginning, in fact a time of transition from a prior regime. More importantly, the older regime, and the first attempt at an Assyrian state, was not despotic and looked very different from the more well-known Neo-Assyrian times. In fact, the Old Assyrian regime was a republic in all of the senses and aspects described in Chapter One.

That republic had a domestic balance of power, check and balances system working upon the monarchic power. The monarch then checked the high officials, which were checked by the City Assembly. The colonial system of the karums, particularly karum Kanesh checked

the home government. The government was a broad ruling oligarchy (broad at least for the times) with significant input from various political interest groups, particularly the merchants and landowners but also the priest class as well. No one particular (interest group or individual) dominated the regime or state. Losing out in the political game did not stop officials from winning out later and their political subjecthood was not threatened. The government was still effective and prosperous for many years and the political contestation was largely non-violent. This was a bureaucratic republic with certain formal-institutional undertones. Thus we had a republican regime. As a result of that regime, the basic human protections of the people were relatively secure.

However, that regime collapsed due to external pressures and internal strife. It was not restored so much as transitioned into a state of despotism that got increasingly worse over time. There were no checks on monarchical authority at all by the Neo-Assyrian period. The consequences of this regime were real in terms of basic protections. The destruction of Babylon is a very explicit example of the horrors that Assyrians could inflict even on a people they admitted to be largely their own people.

To address the two alternative hypotheses theorized in Chapter 1, this case shows both that the Aristotelian middle class argument is not so much an alternative hypothesis as already part of the current republican model and that the ethnic heterogeneity argument does not hold. The collapse of economic liberalism in Assyria did contribute to the destruction of a middle class segment of society and this result did in fact impact the collapse of republicanism in Assyria and the rise of a despotic regime. However, this result is not unexpected by my own republican model. The collapse of a middle class unleashed social and political forces from constraint and allows them to reshape both politics and society as

they see fit. The middle class is an interest group just like any other and balances out the rich and poor in a socio-economically diverse society. Without that balancing factor, the underpinnings of the transactional politics necessary for republican checks and balances cease to exist. The middle class is not strictly speaking necessary for a republic, but some balancing factor is required and often it often serves as such. Thus, the case of Assyria demonstrates that the Aristotelian argument about the idle class and my theory of republicanism requiring intergroup dialogue (transactional politics) and social, economic, and political checks and balances are not alternative hypotheses so much as his theory is already included within mine.

As for the heterogeneity argument, Assyria was not completely homogenous but it had relatively low levels of heterogeneity ethnically and otherwise and yet it collapsed of its own weight. In fact, the more homogenous it got overtime, both ethnically and socio-economically, the more despotic it became. To argue that heterogeneity is inherently a factor in the collapse or incoherence of a republic is belied by the contrary evidence found in this case.

Assyria thus demonstrated multiple important themes or lessons for the modern world. Firstly, the republic can originate before the non-republican form in the same regime. This has been discussed in detail above and shows that progress is not linear, inevitable, or without great sacrifice and struggle. Second the case demonstrates that the republican institutions that work for a city-state have a hard time when extended to encompass a regional or larger polity without strong constitutional engineering during said extension. The Assyrian army was not made available in any real numbers to protect the karums from the events in Anatolia and the connections between colonists and Assur, while significant, did

not really allow for the full projection of power of the city-state to the regions around the karums. Moreover, as pressure to expand into a regional polity grew in Assyria, the prospects of returning to a republican system evaporated in Assur since those institutions had already fallen and were not equipped to provide for a larger republic. Thirdly, not having these checks and balances led both to incredible increases in the population and size of the state, but also to the depravity of the regime and its particulars. While it remains to be shown that republics can work on a large-scale (until next chapter), the threat of large non-republics to its own people or peoples is quite ably demonstrated by the present case. Moreover, any regime can become despotic even after having a republic for hundreds of years. There is much application of this lesson to modern republics. As has been already explained above economic and foreign military pressures threaten even well-established republican regimes.

A republic needs to maintain itself through continuing to develop its political institutions to deal with changing conditions such as ethnic diversification and geographic and population growth. It also needs to maintain a robust, liberal economy and a strong military. Republicanism is not a theory of limited government only, but it certainly is a theory of limited government in part. Assyria is the case of a limited government becoming the epitome of an unlimited government. Not only is the amount of control that government could exert on any person subject to its authority near absolute but it was quite willing to use it regularly. It did not merely have the capacity to dominate in a non-republican way, it actually did so on a regular basis. In addition to the extent of government, there were no limits of the institutions of the monarchy. There were thus no limits on government internally or externally.

However, the lack of republicanism also led to social consequences. At first, the Neo-Assyrian government worked hard to preserve their dialect of Akkadian, but when they could not preserve the primacy of the traditional language, they began to enforce a standardized version of Aramaic on the parts of the world they dominated. That Aramaic overtook Akkadian so fast was not the product primarily of natural immigration or incorporation of Aramaic speakers, but of the deportation of Aramaic speakers to the Assyrian and Babylonian heartlands (Dion 1995, 1293-1294 and Salvesen 1998, 140). The Assyrian government's socio-cultural policies led to the destruction of much of their own culture but the Neo-Assyrians were reckless with their culture if it meant even short-term political gains. They simply turned towards enforcing strict discipline to the new standard Aramaic they developed, though not with the scientific precision the Persians would later utilize with their standardized Imperial Aramaic. The Assyrians' attempts at a totalitarian-like social authoritarianism failed but it still harmed the cultural diversity of the ancient Near East in many ways. The lack of republican government thus had more than merely political or economic consequences for the peoples included physically in the empire but ignored as potential political subjects.

On the other hand, the republic of Assur was dominated not by a particular group or individual or even the state, but by economics, particularly foreign trade. Sheldon Wolin warns that a similar type of regime, in which large corporations dominate government and governance in the modern world, such as the United States, could produce inverse totalitarianism, which social and economic factors (for him primarily corporate) dominate the political aspects of our lives. However, the republic of Assur was diversified enough in its industries and trade interest groups that no one economic interest group could dominate

the politics of the state. While economics was the primary drive of the state and its governmental machinery, no particular group dominated the political life of the state. Also, the social and economic lives of the common people were protected by the machinery of the state's regulation and partial control of the machinery of economic production. The state could direct policy because the economic interest groups were not organized and disposed to a unified lobbying effort in state institutions. The regime could both ensure governmental-primacy of the state while also benefitting from an economic growth-centric politics. A fervor for economic development need not lead to economic interest groups, such as business groups, dominating the state or the regime that governs it. A capitalist republic need not be a contradiction in terms.

From the perspective of the mixed constitution, the Old Assyrian Republic shows a significant resemblance to the ideal. The monarchy is represented by the king, the aristocracy/oligarchy is represented by the limmu official position and other similar high bureaucratic offices while the many is represented by the City Assembly. The other bureaucratic positions also represent the popular element in the Republic, but this is not one of the three parts of the classic formula. Thus, Assur closely resembles the mixed constitution of Pettit, Machiavelli, and others, but it also shows how bureaucratic representation can supplement the classic mixed constitution.

There are many lessons for a modern state, a republic or one aspiring to be one. Maintenance of republican institutions is more important than the establishment and consolidation of them, economic and military matters are important in their maintenance, and any republic that does not evolve to meet its new challenges is in risk of losing its freedom. Really bad regimes are not natural but produced by historical forces and may in

fact have evolved from relatively normatively good regimes. Extending one's own polity's borders, as Madison stated in Federalist No. 10 (Madison 2001: 42-48), can be extremely hazardous for a republic, especially if that republic is not prepared to change its institutions to meet the new social, economic, and political realities of expansion, just ask Rome. These lessons are for both well-consolidated republics like America and aspirational republics like the Ukraine and Afghanistan.

Chapter 3: Persia

A. From the Origins of Persia to Cyrus the Great

The state and regime that would ultimately succeed the hegemonic power of Assyria was vastly different from it. Achaemenid Persia, so-called because of its ruling dynasty, the Achaemenids, was unique among the pre-Hellenistic Near East for its relatively strict devotion to basic human protections. In some ways, it returned to the more tolerant policies of the older, Late Bronze Age regimes. However, it was much more explicit and consistent in its observation to the code of moral and ethical conduct that gives rise to basic human protections. It did not normally work through vassal states, but created an integrated, though decentralized state, whereby all subjects were directly subject to the king in theory, but also benefitted from local autonomy in many of their own political affairs. The term “Persian Empire” is in many ways. For simplicity and accuracy’s sake, let us call it Persia or Achaemenid Persia in long form (Binetti 2012, 1).

Of course, the state’s original name was not Persia, or Parsa in Old Persian. It was Anshan, a small successor state of the great, ancient regime of the Elamites. In the last chapter, we saw how the Assyrians under Ashurbanipal brutally cut Elam down to size, but could not complete the genocide. It is disputed by historians of the ancient past as whether Elam remained a kingdom and for how long after the genocide, but Anshan probably fell to the migratory Persians around 639, just after it. The Elamite people and lands were divided up, with Anshan relatively stable under the rough, new people of the Iranian Plateau, while Susa and the rest of the lands were either independent, dependent on one major state or another, or in chaos (Potts 1999, 283-307, and Brentjes 1995, 1013-1015).

What is clear is that sometime before the crisis precipitated by Ashurbanipal's death in 627 BC, the Medians (Medes), a related Iranian people, conquered or subjected the Persians of Anshan, including their Elamite subjects. From 626-616 BC, the Babylonians fought against the successors of Ashurbanipal and won their freedom by the end of this period. In the next phase of the post-Ashurbanipal wars, the Babylonians turned north to destroy their former persecutors and enemies, aligned with the Medes. The Medes brought several other people to the fight, the nomadic Iranians known as the Scythians, probably the Elamites of Susa, and the Persians of Anshan (most likely including Elamite-Anshanite conscripts as well). This vast coalition was extremely rare in the ancient world, and was born both of extreme political and military need for alliance and the easy struggle to convince diverse groups to overcome their differences due to utter emotional hatred of the Assyrians (Olmstead 1959, 32-33, Roux 1992, 329-336 and 372-377, and Beaulieu 1995, 971-972).

One might think that the successors of Assyria would learn from her mistakes and treat their subjects and each other more mildly in order to stave off another international revolution. However, they did not, and the post-Assyrian system collapsed, from the inside out, which introduces an important theme and lesson for this chapter- republics cannot be turned on and off like a light switch. If being a republic is advantageous to a state now but was not advantageous before, they will not be able to take advantage of the opportunity because republican habits do not appear out of nowhere, but must be cultivated in Aristotelian virtue ethics fashion. If on the other hand, it is unfashionable or a short-term liability to have republican laws, institutions, and norms, it is easier to change the institutions, but you cannot get them back later either. Republics are rare in forming, hard to consolidate, and very tricky

to maintain. In short, they are precious commodities and republican leaders need to ignore short-term advantage or gain sometimes to keep them alive.

After the fall of Nineveh to the Babylonian and Mede-led coalition, the Assyrian Empire rapidly fell. By 605, after the victory of Nebuchadnezzar, the crown prince, soon to be king of the Neo-Babylonian Empire, at the Battle of Harran, Assyria was essentially done. In the next few years, the Babylonians had an opportunity to create a sustainable balance-of-power international system for itself and the rest of the ancient Near Eastern world. Lydia had arisen in Anatolia and seemed amenable to a division of the region. Egypt had fought on the Assyrian side in the post-Ashurbanipal wars but now could be bought off with some land and tribute. Allied Media was not interested in further conflict as long as it gained control of significant Assyrian lands west of Iran. However, Babylon, probably the strongest regional power at the time, declined to establish a stable balance-of-power system, and thus an unstable and flawed balance-of-power system took the place of Assyria in the immediate post-Assyrian world (Olmstead 1959, 33 and 35-36, Beaulieu 1995, 969-972, Binetti 2011, 33-36 and Binetti 2012, 3-4).

The post-Assyrian balance-of-power system collapsed for two primary reasons. The first one was a lack of cooperation among the leading powers of the region with one another. *Raison de système*, which developed in the eighteenth and particularly nineteenth centuries AD in Europe is the concept of cooperating with one's adversaries or rivals in a system even when no short-term benefit for one's own state is implicated, in order for the international system as a whole to be upheld. The post-Assyrian international system greatly lacked in *raison de système* and as a result was inherently unstable from a classical international power perspective (Binetti 2012, 3-8, 10-12, and 17-18).

In particular, Media and Babylon disputed and then eventually battled over Harran in modern-day southern-central Turkey but in ancient times, in the borderlands of northern Mesopotamia, Anatolia, and Syria (the historical region was not exactly the same geographically as the modern country). The struggle for Harran seems to have been initiated by Babylon, which almost immediately after the victory of Nebuchadnezzar there in 605 BC began to view the Medes as a strange people. Having referred to them before by a respectful term that closely resemble the Hellenized term Mede that comes down to us, they now refer to the Medes as “Umman-Manda”, a highly derogatory term roughly analogous to worst connotations of the Greek term “barbaroi”, i.e. barbarians. The word choice shift is very clear in the main official Babylonian chronicle of the times, because the chronicler clearly refers to the same peoples as “Umman-Manda” and the Babylonian equivalent of “Medes” and never bothered to go back and change the annals recorded for the prior years. Thus, the older, more respectful term remained because no one bothered to go back and change it to the new term. It is telling that in a few years, the Babylonians went from portraying the Medes, who never betrayed them in the contestation for Harran, as honorable allies to referring to them by what was essentially an ethnic slur (Olmstead 1959, 35-37, and Glassner 2004, 213 and 216-227 with Binetti 2011, 3).

This supports the general conclusion that the Babylonians were the main aggressors in the rapidly deteriorating relations between themselves and Media. Lydia, on the other hand, appears to have remained on good terms with Babylon. This may have resulted in the Lydian-Median war that ended in 585 BC at the Battle of the Halys, where an eclipse predicted by the very early Ionian Greek philosopher Thales halted the very vicious fight between Lydians and the Medians (the Medes and various subject allies such as the

Persians). The Babylonians, however, eventually helped negotiate peace between the two sides, so they probably were not directly involved in this conflict, even if they were allied with the Lydians in the larger, longer regional conflict with Media (Olmstead 1959, 32-33, and Beaulieu 1995, 971-972).

The Babylonians settled into a cold war with the Medes, in which actual conflict was short and limited and interrupted with inter-dynastic marriages, but in which the level of contestation was tense and fairly constant. At the same time, relations with Egypt never improved. The invasion of 601 BC, though it failed, embittered Egypt towards Babylon. The destruction of the Babylonian vassal state of Judah was as a result of two revolts encouraged by Egypt. Egypt remained fairly deeply opposed to Babylonian geostrategic interests, however open war was again relatively rare (Beaulieu 1995, 972-977 and Binetti 2012, 3-4). Lydia, on the other hand, maintained friendly relations with Babylon, as did Cilicia for some time. However, as the only independent small-medium power in the system, not including the Greek states on the European mainland that were only starting to become involved in the Near Eastern international system, Cilicia was an oddity. Cilicia had helped negotiate the peace between Lydia and Media alongside the more powerful Babylon. Now, however, Babylon began seeking to undermine the balance of power, not through direct, decisive confrontation with Lydia, Egypt, or Media, but by conquering Cilicia. Neriglissar, an usurper, was the one who broke the peace in the most direct way by attempting to conquer Cilicia. While he makes the claim of victory, it is unclear if he was successful and since Nabonidus soon had to try to conquer it again, it is likely the conquest was not permanent if successful at all. While Lydia seems to have remained aligned with Babylon, the threat to its security through Cilicia may have cooled the relationship somewhat. It also further

antagonized Media (Greenewalt 1995, 1173-176, Olmstead 1959, 35 and 39, Roux 1992, 377-284, and Beaulieu 1995, 972).

Such a weakened international system allowed an opening for a new power to rise up, overthrow the balance-of-power system, and replace Assyria as the real hegemon of the Near East region. What makes this overthrow story so unique is how it happened. Tiny Anshan in 559 BC had a new ruler, Cyrus II, son of Cambyses I. There was little prospect of the kingdom even becoming free of its vassalage to Media, let alone becoming a major kingdom in its own right. Media appeared to be at his height under its king, Astyages, and while there were serious tensions with both Lydia and Babylonia as stated above, they would not necessarily have been so obvious to the common observer. By all surface appearances, the system was stable. However, it really was not. In 554 or 553 (the sources are unsure), Cyrus of Anshan began a revolt against Media. It was a popular one and all elements and levels of society aided him. The Elamites of Anshan were instrumental in various ways. In the end, domestic support of the revolt was not enough. Babylon, seeking to regain Harran under its new usurper, Nabonidus, secretly supported the Anshanite revolt. Also, before the revolt ended in success in 550 BC, Harpagus the Mede, the leading general of the whole state, betrayed Astyages and joined Cyrus' cause. As a result of the defections of Harpagus and many other Mede officers, elites, and soldiers, the support of Babylon, and unified domestic support, the rebellion became a successful Persian revolution (Herodotus 2003, 1.123-130, Olmstead 1959, 36-38 and Brentjes 1995, 1015-1017).

The Persian revolution overthrew Media as a state and regime. However, Cyrus was very careful to not penalize the Medes as a people. In fact, Harpagus and a number of other high-ranking Medes were immediately brought into the new regime. Also, Cyrus promoted a

number of Elamite officials and the Elamite element of the developing bureaucracy continued to expand until it was very well-developed in Darius I's time. Median officers still led their own units in battle and the new elite guard unit, the Immortals included Elamites and Medes alongside ethnic Persians. An inclusive representative military bureaucracy grew up, followed soon after with similarly diverse, inclusive civilian bureaucratic institutions. The Persian state from 550 BC onward grew into a large state through the traditions, institutions, and peoples of the old states of Anshan and Media (Herodotus 2013, 1.129 and 1.162-171; Olmstead 1959, 37, 69, and 238-239, and Brentjes 1995, 1017-1019).

Persia had developed differently from the other states and thus had the foundations or sprouts of republicanism already in its socio-political makeup. Rather than responding to advantage or disadvantage, it developed naturally absent a short-term policy reason for such development. It thus solved the problem mentioned above; where republics cannot be simply switched on or off, but need to develop naturally. You cannot go into Iraq or Afghanistan and command yourself a republic any more than you a democracy. However, working with the elements of non-domination within the laws, institutions, and norms of the local people, plus any traditions in the past of non-dominating policies, allows outside forces to help lay the foundations of republicanism and help natural political development to sprout.

Obviously, the international system attempted to react to the rise of Persia, but the old lack of *raison de système* struck again. Egypt may have pledged to support Lydia in its rapidly escalating dispute with the new owners of the old Median state, but they never sent any help. Babylon never seriously attempted to aid their ally either. In the end, the Persians were attacked by the Lydians on their own new territory and miraculously, the new regime won a defensive victory (at least a stalemate) at Pteria along the Halys river border. They then

attacked in winter along the front and won a decisive victory at Thymbra through the innovation of using camels as heavy cavalry to charge and scare the daylight out of the enemy horses (horses think camels smell funny). Then, the Persians besieged the great city of Sardis and captured it fairly quickly through new innovations, like careful observation of local man of climbing down from the city walls to retrieve his helmet and scaling the city walls at night (Dusinberre 2003, 11, and Herodotus 2013, 1.84-86).

When the city fell to a Persian night attack, another innovation was unleashed on the Lydians- most of the people were spared and the city was for the most part also spared a sack. They did not sack the city and instead restored governance to the conquered city with unusual (for the times) discipline. There is a dispute if the king, Croesus, was killed or not, but most high officials were spared, as were the common people. For a conquest in any age, it was very merciful. Instead of immediately seeking to directly rule Lydia, the Persians sought to establish permanent accommodation with the local elites by appointing as treasurer Pactyes, a local Lydian, who would essentially be second in command for the new local Persian military governor of Sardis and all Lydia, Tabalus (Herodotus 2013, 1.153, and Greenewalt 1995, 1175-1176).

Tabalus was a Persian, our source Herodotus argues. He was after all, a high ranking official in the Persian army and the Persians' ideal candidate for ruling a new and potentially restive province. However, Tabalus' name betrays his ethnically non-Persian origins. Tabalus is not a personal name and thus Tabalus is not Tabalus's real name. Tabalus is the Latinized version of the Greek Tabalos. The -us and -os endings serve the name function as nominative endings, name creators added to a stem. That stem is Tabal-, read simply as "Tabal". Tabal is the well-attested Assyrian name for a major region of Anatolia roughly

analogous the Greco-Roman term Cappadocia. This is the region immediately east of the Halys river line, the border between Media and Lydia after the war ending in 585 BC. As a result, the reign of Tabal would have been under Median sovereignty for at least thirty-five years prior to Cyrus' acquisition of Media. Tabal went along with Media in the deal and thus its inhabitants were granted to same sort of near-equality with Persian leadership as the Medes themselves. Also, partial Median colonization of the Tabal region is likely (that colonization likely being the beginning of Kurdish history in the region, the Medes being a major ancestral factor for the Kurds). Thus a local Cappadocian elite such as the man known as Tabalus may have been partially of Median descent, but was almost certainly of partial or full local Cappadocian descent. He was from Tabal, thus the nickname that became in name in the classical text, Tabalus. He was likely being rewarded for helping in the defense of Cappadocia at Pteria earlier in the war, and also for supporting Persian advance to Sardis (Binetti 2012, 11, Bryce 2012, 141-162, Buckler and Robinson, 1912, p. 50, Brown, 1978, pp., 65-67, Dusinger 2003, 35-36, 48, and 196-198, Esarhaddon, pp. 150-151, McKiernan 2006, pp. 10-11, Olmstead 1959, 33 and 41-42, Potts 1999, 311-314, and Roux, pp. 272, 304, and 314).

That the Persians trusted a local Anatolian to such an important post as commander of the troops of Sardis and governor of the people of Lydia is very revealing of their strategy to promote highly-qualified persons of local background with expertise in the politics, people, and geography of the region. Tabalus remained loyal to Persia, but his adjutant Pactyes the Lydian did not and revolted. In the end, the governor may or may not have been killed by the Lydian rebels, but Pactyes was slain, either an example to the rest of the Lydians or in battle. The Persians, however, did not destroy the city or disperse the people. They instead south to

pacify them to such an extent that the people would be unable or unwilling to take up arms, against them or anyone else. The Lydians were civilianized to a large extent. While at later times, they were definitely rearmed, here the Persians settled upon encouraging the Lydians to focus on trade, their economy, and cultural and religious life instead of warfare and they have banned arms for most of the Lydians, at least in the immediate aftermath of the rebellion. A Persian or Mede governor was placed over them, but local Anatolian governors reappear again in the region later on in Achaemenid Persian history (Binetti 2012, 12, Olmstead 1959, 41-43, Herodotus 2013, 1.154-160, Greenewalt 1995, 1176-1181 and Dusinger 2003, 23-44, 59 and 69, 104-108, 114-126, 141-147, and 207).

The rather moderate treatment of rebels, essentially killing the leaders but leaving the rest of the population mostly disarmed but alive and prosperous, was a product of the ideology of the Persian regime. The rulers were not rulers of a land, a specific ethnic group, or even a unified, coherent nation. They were the rulers of each disparate people, both inside their own homeland and wherever in the empire they travelled. The state was technically an amalgam of smaller regions or lands, but was effectively a coherent state from fairly early Cyrus' time onward. The state and regime were to be representative of the various peoples of the empire and to be run for their mutual benefit. Unlike the Assyrian empire, the Persian Empire was not really about glorifying and benefitting primarily the Persians, though the Persians certainly benefitted the most. The ruling local elites and the common people over whom they ruled benefitted to a greater extent than in most other ancient regimes. At the same time, the Persian king was direct king over each people and chose the governor in each province, called a satrapy. The satrapies however were given extensive autonomy and their satraps sometimes could produce dynasties and even act occasionally as semi-independent rulers,

similar to the semi-independent vassals the late Bronze Age but often more powerful. The Behistun Inscription of Darius I famously describes the king as king of each land and people over which he ruled, which creates a personal set of mutual obligations for king and individual that had not existed in Western Asia before. In theory, the Persian king was a universal monarch (Binetti 2011, 40-41, Binetti 2012, 16-17, Brentjes 1995, 1018-1019, and Darius I 1907, Column One, Sections 1-9).

Universal monarchy was not necessarily a bad ideology for a republic and in this case, it was a marked improvement over the post-Assyrian system, as well as Assyria before that time. The Lydians were entitled to political subjecthood, meaning that they were not to be slaughtered when conquered, they had a right to their property except in dire situations or if they revolted, they were to be provided for by the state in times of emergency through granary reserves, they were eligible to serve in the army and civilian bureaucracies, both locally, in other satrapies, and in the heartland of the empire, where the “federal” government oversaw matters of state-wide concern. The Lydians after the initial revolt remained loyal for a long time (Dusinberre 2003, 35-41, Greenwalt 1995, 1173-1181, and Herodotus 2013, 1.154-1.157).

Another theme that is very helpful to struggling modern states to aspire to republichood is that inclusion is both helpful and necessary a policy for a republic. Excluding groups from the possibility of power in the system, even through democratic methods, is not part of best practices for a republic and is often fully disqualifying. This is a moral precept and a definitional one, and often is not correlated with political need. Small minority groups are often safely ignored in states that would like to considered republics. However, morally, this is unacceptable. In addition, but not necessary for the first proposal to be true, it is very often

helpful to have an inclusive political regime. Civil conflict is usually less than otherwise, the strength of diversity of experiences often helps the republic remain vibrant and creative, and a sense of civic rather than ethnic, religious or racial nationalism to easier to inculcate.

However, it is important to note that institutions must try to include demographically weaker or less vocal minorities too, even when it is politically unpopular or non-advantageous to politicians to do it. In the end, inclusion even of these groups is usually good for the functioning of the system, but that is an added bonus, not the main ethical reason for conclusion. However, individual politicians' electoral calculus must be overridden to protect and represent these smaller groups, even when the system as a whole would benefit or derive an advantage from their effective inclusion in the system.

After conquering Lydia, Harpagus and other generals conquered Ionia, home of many Greeks and Cilicia, where the local ruler was setup as the satrap. Anatolia fell into place and only Egypt and Babylon stood in the way of total hegemony of the Near East by Persia (Herodotus 2003 and Herodotus 2013, 1.162-176). Again, the system failed itself, as Babylon and Egypt did not cooperate. Disputes over Harran and Susa were most likely the immediate causes of war between Babylon and Persia, but the struggle was probably inevitable, as Persia sought at least to secure all of Western Asia for its universal monarch. Babylon made it all too easy for them. Nabonidus, the Babylonian ruler, was an usurper or partial Aramaic descent whose mother was from Harran and taught him to worship one god, Sin (the moon god) over the more traditional Babylonian gods. Once in power, Nabonidus began slowly to alienate the priesthoods and the common people who were also used to the religious status quo. He began promoting Sin over Marduk, the chief god of Babylon, but then began associating Sin with more and more gods, eventually only recognizing three

gods' cults. Sin, Shamash, and Ishtar. Soon, only Sin was to be worshipped. Nabonidus' monolatry, worship of one god (rather than belief in just one god), the economic, social, and political ramifications for the priesthoods of the closing of many of the other gods' temples and forced conversion of other temples to the worship of Sin, and the anger of the local people to the imposition of religious intolerance in a very traditionally tolerant and pluralistic religious environment not only led to elite resentment, but weakened the support for the regime from the common people. Nabonidus also antagonized another religious interest group, the Jews, by continuing to hold them in the great Babylonian captivity. Having been exiled when Judah had been sacked by Nebuchadnezzar, many Jews lived prosperous lives in Babylon, but without freedom of movement, the freedom to return home.

Now under Nabonidus, they most likely faced religious persecution to a degree the normally religiously tolerant Babylonian society had not dreamed of imposing upon them (Beaulieu 1995, 969-974 and 976-977, Binetti 2011, 37, Binetti 2012, 5-6, Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1995, 1039-1040, Van de Mieroop 2007, 277-285, Nabonidus (from Sippar) 2007, in its entirety, Nabonidus (from Ur) 2007, in its entirety, Glassner 2004, 235-239, and Olmstead 1959, 45 and 49-56).

At the same time as Nabonidus' religious intolerance project angered the local Babylonians and the Jews and highlighted his Aramaic, non-Babylonian roots, his withdrawal to Taima in the Arabian desert and leaving the rulership to the arbitrary whims of his son, the Prince Belshazzar, made his regime even less secure (Beaulieu 1995, 974-976). In the 540's, as Persia gained in strength, Babylon was politically divided and politically and militarily weak. Cyrus could exploit this weakness by offering, through secret envoys, certain guarantees and freedoms to domestic interest groups in Babylon that their own

regime could not guarantee. Babylon was not prospering economically under Belshazzar the way it had before. The business environment was arbitrary and stable, as the religious and political environments also were. Business interest groups were thus not opposed to a new regime that to make Babylon the primary financial center of the entire Persian Empire. Banks were already developed in the modern sense at Babylon and Persian policy makers did not seek to move the financial center out of Babylon. Economically, Babylon really did prosper under Persian rule as never before. The promise was not hollow and looking at Sardis and the relatively prosperous post-war peace there, the Babylonian merchant class had less to fear with Cyrus; administration than that of Belshazzar and Nabonidus (Beaulieu 1995, 976-978, Briant 1995, 523-524, Brentjes 1995, 1017, Olmstead 1959, 45, 49-51, 74 and 87, and Binetti 2012, 5-6 and 14-15).

Cyrus also won at least the tacit support of the priests of Samas (or Shamash), Marduk, and others, as well as the Jews. He also encouraged the aspirations of Elamites in Babylonian territory. He won Susa most likely around 540 BC, right before he struck the final blow against Babylon in open war. The region called Gutium in the eastern border region with Persia and inhabited by Elamites and Medes, went over to the Persians, led by Gobryas of Gutium. By the time the hammer blow fell on Babylon in 539 BC, most major interest groups in the empire had already lined up explicitly or tacitly with the invaders (Cyrus II 2007, Sections 1-19, Olmstead 1959, 50-56, Beaulieu 1995, 977, Glassner 2004, 235 and 237-239, Binetti 2012, 8 and 14, and Herodotus 2013, 1.188-191).

The theme inclusion noted above is easily reinforced by the stories of Cyrus and Nabonidus. Around 540 BC, Nabonidus returned and tried desperately correct his neglect and his oppressive religious policies. These reversals did not work and when his army suffered a

great defeat in the Battle of Opis in 539 BC, the rest of the regime collapsed suddenly. He and his son fled, were caught and presumably slain. But the city of Babylon itself opened its gates to the guards of Gutium under Gobryas and surrendered peacefully. The next morning, Persian and Persian-aligned troops secured the market for business; none of the local elites had been rounded up in the night, and business at the temples, markets, and elsewhere proceeded as normal. Instead of bragging about the destruction of the city, as Assyrians and many others would have, the Persians bragged in their inscriptions that no one was much inconvenienced by the conquest and everyone went about their daily lives as usual. The Persians declared that they had in fact liberated Babylon from their own ruler and restored normalcy to the land. For the most part, this seems to be borne out by other sources as well (Brentjes 1995, 1017, Olmstead 1959, 53-56, Beaulieu 1995, 977, and Cyrus II 2007, Section 20-27).

The Persians declared the Jews free to go home in the same year, 539 BC. Although it would take many years to rebuild under Nehemiah and others, the temple and country of Judah was rebuilt. The Jews remained faithful subject of the Empire throughout its existence. The Persians wrote down the names of various people they freed and allowed to return to their homes in the document known as the Cyrus Cylinder. The Cyrus Cylinder proclaims certain protections to all peoples under subjection to the Persian king. Cyrus the Great, as Cyrus II become known, declared freedom of movement for everyone and declared himself the permanent local ruler of each people as well as the Great King overall. The prosperity of every loyal subject individual was guaranteed by this and other documents. The Cyrus Cylinder is often regarded as the first document to affirm universal basic human rights. However, it is much better seen as the first explicit document of basic human protections.

The rights, or protections, guaranteed as for loyal subjects only. This distinction was enforced by later rulers (Cyrus II 2007, in its entirety but especially Sections 32-33, Brentjes 1995, 1017, Olmstead 1959, 51-53 and 56-57, and Binetti 2012, 14-15).

The tolerance and inclusion was extremely helpful to the Persian polity. After Babylon fell, Phoenicia and other regions were surrendered to Cyrus and his generals of their own free will. Local rulers actually retained their thrones, though subject to satraps placed over them and the local autonomy of the Phoenicians was actually increased drastically over their level of autonomy under either the Assyrians or Babylonians. All around, the various vassals became subject largely because they were accepting better deals and had no fear of retaliation if they abided by their contracts. Persia soon easily conquered the entire Near East except for Egypt (Herodotus 2013, 2.1 and 3.19, and Bondi 1999, 30-46).

B. The Empire after Cyrus the Great

After Cyrus died defending his realms and peoples around 530 BC while fighting the Massagetae, and Iranian nomadic people similar to the Scythians, his son Cambyses II became king. In the 530's, Cyrus the Great had left Egypt alone, though permanent diplomatic relations had never been established. Now, Cambyses planned to seize Egypt. He knew that Egypt relied upon its army and navy to survive domestically. The regime was weak internally (due to a lack of legitimacy itself due to usurpation of the throne). The army was reliant upon both (mostly Ionian) Greek and Carian mercenaries and native Egyptian soldiers, mostly of Libyan ethnic descent. The Egyptian nobility for the most part had no natural allies among the army. The navy was influenced more by the nobility than the army and was not altogether friendly towards it. Thus the two main supports of the regime, its

disparate military institutions were separable from one another. One admiral of the navy/noble came over to the Persians after the Battle of Pelusium began in 525 BC. At the same time, the mercenaries in the king's army largely switched sides, owing to the political loyalties of their now subject homelands and also offers of great profit in Persian service. After Pelusium, Memphis and Sais fell quickly, thanks to mercenary and native Egyptian support for Cambyses. Other than killing the ruler, the Persians again refused to punish the elites. Instead they incorporated the old rulers and military in the rapidly growing Persian army and especially the navy. While Egypt revolted more than most other regions, this was unrelated to the level of oppression, which was always fairly low in non-revolt times. As a result Egyptian elites often prospered from Persian rule when not revolting from it (Herodotus 2013, 2.1, 2.154, 2.169, 3.11-15 and 7.89-97, Udjahorresne 1878, in its entirety Olmstead 1959, 86-93, particularly 88, 90 and 91, 364-365, and 461-463 and Dandamayev 1990).

Thus the Persian Empire's core was set. From Egypt, Cilicia, Anshan, Elam, Babylonia, Lydia, the Ionian Greek city-states, Media, Phoenicia, Judah, and other parts came the unified but federated Persian regime. Under Cambyses' eventual successor, Darius the Great (Darius I), the classical form of Persian governance became well-established. Cambyses died after a failed invasion of Nubia. A man claiming to be his brother Smerdis claimed the throne (Olmstead 1959, 92-93 and 107-108, Darius I 1907, Column One, Sections 10-15, and Herodotus 2003, 3.25-37 and Herodotus 2013, 3.61-67). The reading of the whole next phase of Persian history depends on whether we agree with Herodotus that the official Persian story is true or not. According to Herodotus and the Behistun Inscription of Darius, Darius was the son of Cyrus's first cousin, the ruler of a smaller Persian kingdom east of

Anshan that had submitted to Cyrus early on. Hystaspes, Darius' father was rewarded for his submission by being named satrap of Hyrcania. He was still satrap under his own son Darius, if we believe the official story. Anyway, Darius was an Achaemenes by blood as well as by marriage as his wife Atossa was Cyrus's daughter and Cambyses' and Smerdis' sister (Dandamyev 1990, Darius I 1907, Column One, 1-2 and Column Two Section 35-Column Three, Section 37, and Herodotus 2003, 3.61-83).

Herodotus and the official story say that the man claiming to be Smerdis was actually a Median priest (or magus) named Gaumata, who pretended to be the already-dead Smerdis, who had been murdered by Cambyses according to these accounts. The false Smerdis was declared king in many places in the empire and accepted as real by many. Tricked by the false Smerdis, the various peoples loyal to the Empire had to be corrected in their error by force. Darius and other conspirators, plotted against Gaumata and slew him and those of his fellow magi that supported him. However, opportunists each claiming to be legitimate successors of old dynasties of each of many of the peoples of the empire came out of the woodwork and led revolts. Each revolt was slain in turn because most of the common people were not fooled by the claims of the would-be rebel kings. As a result of the wars, only the primary perpetrators were punished rather the common people, either those who had supported Darius or the rebels (Darius I 1907, Columns I-IV in their entirety, especially Column Four, Section 52, and Herodotus 2013, 67-82 and 88).

This account has been called into question by Olmstead, a major writer on Achaemenid Persia, among others. Smerdis may not have been a false one but the original one. Darius, according to this view, is a usurper. The revolts against him were not ethno-nationalistic revolutions, and were not even broadly supported, but the revolt of loyal constituencies on

behalf of the true Achaemenid successor. Darius' claims of being an Achaemenid by birth and the genealogy of his branch of the family is called into question. The whole revolt period is viewed as a civil war or series of civil wars caused by usurpation (Olmstead 1959, 110-116).

If Darius is a usurper, then it is very difficult to view Persia in this period as a republic because most of its political contestation would not be peaceful. Viewing Gaumata/Smerdis as a usurper could be viewed the same way. Again, viewing the revolts of various peoples as popular rather than personal quests for power by petty leaders might have the same effect. However, Gaumata's coup was abnormal even if it existed, in that it was not an outgrowth of political conflict so much as a sudden, isolated incident. This would not defeat this dimension of republicanism. The petty revolts of the various rulers do not form all available evidence seem to have been genuinely supported by most people but instead to have been defeated largely by the ethno-national groups they sought to enlist. If the official story is true, for the most part, the republican view of this period would be the correct one (Binetti 2011, 40, and Binetti 2012, 16-17).

On the other hand, Darius, whether an Achaemenid himself or not, revolting against Smerdis would be much more damaging to the idea of Persia as a republic. However, there is evidence that Darius was an Achaemenid and that whether Smerdis had been slain by Cambyses or not, he was dead by this time (perhaps killed by Gaumata and then replaced by him). Darius' lineage was probably correctly stated, though the claims of another Persian kingship cannot be confirmed. Also, the ruler called Smerdis was probably not really him, but Gaumata. Gaumata had no legitimacy on the throne and seems to have had very real grassroots support. Thus the coup by Darius seems to have restored legitimate order and

Gaumata was just an isolated incident (Darius 1907, Column One, Sections 10-15, Briant 1995, 522-523, and Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1995, 1041).

Also, the revolts of the rebels were not endorsed by their peoples. The revolts did not reoccur in most places (other than Egypt) again. The new Elamite revolt was exceptional and brief and Darius's comment about "faithless Elamites" must be narrowly construed to be talking about the faithless leaders and not as a religiously intolerant statement about the whole people. The common people who had remained loyal and even many of those who had not become loyal afterwards. The local revolts as well as the coup by Darius were thus one-time things, largely supported by the people, caused by threats to the republic and the popular responses to them rather than constituting threats to the republic themselves (Darius 1907, the entire inscription, particularly Column Four, Section 52 and Column Five, Sections 71-72).

After the times written about in the Behistun Inscription, the Persian republican institutions settled down and took on root. Local satrapies were allowed to have their own administrations and a system of regulation of the local bureaucracies was created in which greater satrapies and satraps oversaw lesser satrapies and satraps. The greater satraps and satrapies were in turn overseen by the federal government at Susa and Persepolis, which consisted of administration deeply involved in granary reserves, tribute/dues management, and sending messengers and officials oversee the local administrations. The chief granary official in Darius' time was a Persian, but his chief adjutant was an Elamite. There were many Elamite officials in the central administration at Susa and at Persepolis, which shared the functions of the capital. Elamite officials and their language were widespread in the central administration and the local and regional satrapal levels in the regions they most

inhabited (Darius I 1907, in its entirety, Binetti 2012, 9, Binetti 2011 58 and 62, Vallat 1994, 263-274, Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1995, 1044-1046, Olmstead 1959, 68-85 and 162-171, Potts 1999, 340 and 346, and Garrison and Dion 1999, 1-17).

Likewise, Akkadian and Aramaic were languages spoken by the Mesopotamian populations, especially the Babylonians and were important official languages. Increasingly, Aramaic became the main language outside of the Elamite and Persian speaking regions and was crafted by the central administration into an official script called Imperial Aramaic. However, while Imperial Aramaic became the main written language in many parts of the Empire and was used for most official purposes, plenty of public space was allowed for other major languages, such as Akkadian, Elamite, Old Persian, Hebrew, Lydian, Carian, Greek, and non-standard forms of Aramaic (Olmstead 1959, 116, 185-186, and 296-297, Potts 1999, 317, Dion 1995, 1292-1293, Dusinberre 2003, 26-27 and 113-127, Cyrus II 2007, in its entirety, and Darius I 1907, in its entirety).

Darius's institutional machinery was taken over by his son Xerxes. Desperate for personnel in the Second Persian War, Xerxes called upon all the families, peoples, and lands of the Persian Empire to provide soldiers, sailors, and support for his expedition. This expedition was meant to halt continued interference of the Greeks in the Empire's affairs. The Ionian Revolt and a revolt in Egypt had been caused and supported by European Greek interference. To safeguard the regime, an offensive had to be launched against the Greeks. The king began assembling his army for the long march through Anatolia, over a bridge of boats at the Straits and into Macedonia and Greece below it. Pythius the Lydian was the second wealthiest man in the Empire, after King Xerxes himself. He had grown very wealthy to the tolerant atmosphere in the Empire. Now the king and his army needed somewhere to

stay and food to eat in Lydia and he set up a very expensive feast for them. The king was very appreciative. Even more importantly, Pythius offered to give most of his wealth up to ensure success for the king. Xerxes declined and even paid him back for his generosity (probably to make him whole for the feast). Xerxes was satisfied with his loyalty and did not require his wealth (Herodotus 2013, 7.27-29, Olmstead 1959, 234-236, and Briant 1995, 522-526).

However, Pythius later requested that one of his four sons be excused from his military obligations to care for the old Pythius in his elder years. Xerxes was furious over the violation of a basic social-contractual obligation- conscription was universal and roughly equally applied to all ethnicities, religions, and socio-economic classes. Lydian and Persian, rich and poor, the duties were the same. The universal muster could not have exceptions, especially not for the most powerful, as this would lead to a questioning of the fairness of the demands of Empire, as the universal rules had been bent for the wealthiest non-royal family in the country. Furthermore, the king's sons, nephews, and other relatives and the sons of every other Persian, Mede and other aristocratic families were eligible for conscription. Xerxes would go on to lose close relatives including sons and nephews in this war. He did not even exempt the powerful ones in his own family, thus it made no sense to allow this man to keep his son from all harm due to his wealth. However, technically, Pythius had not violated his obligation to the king, as he was too old to fight and had been willing to make a massive financial contribution to the expedition. Xerxes could not violate the contract with Pythius by moving against him directly. He needed to make an example of him through his son, who was legally and ideologically the perpetrator (assumedly he asked his father to ask the king for permission to go home). The king of course granted his father's

quest, but fairly literally. He was freed from his obligation, but the only way to be freed of that obligation, other than old age, was death. So the son of Pythius was killed and then cut in half after death, so that the army could march through the posts where one half of him hung on either side of the road. They passed through the two posts and got a good look at what refusal to obey the universal law got a person. There was no massive attempt at desertion as a result. Notably, Pythius and the three sons who served with the army were never directly punished and no evidence existed that they ever revolted against Xerxes (Herodotus 2013, 7.39-40).

Xerxes thus made an example of Pythius' son and did not spur others to revolt against him, sparing his family physically. The violator of the contract, not his whole family, was brutally punished. It was cruel, but it was precise and law-like in its own way. The facts and obligations were incontrovertible. Even in the fairest modern trial, the son would have been guilty of attempted desertion. Only the penalty differs from modernity. Xerxes's cruelty was targeted, decisive, and well-used. If anything, he was not Machiavellian because he let the rest of the family live, but the customary law of the times was on his side. It would have been viewed by other subject families, maybe even some of his own family, as legitimate and legal, despite its cruelty (Herodotus 2013, 7.25-27 and 7.38-40 and Machiavelli 1950, in its entirety).

Xerxes is accused by Olmstead of violating the rules of the Persian republic when he killed all of the Phoenician captains after the Battle of Salamis. They had accused the Ionians of cowardice and desertion. Xerxes found them to be lying and killed them instead of the Ionians. Olmstead says the Phoenicians were so upset that their captains were killed that they sailed away. Herodotus does not support this last claim and nothing in Olmstead's own

citations support this claim with any evidence. Instead, Xerxes is portrayed by Herodotus as having been fair but harsh. Thus, Xerxes most likely did not violate the implied social contract he had with the Phoenicians. Their submission having been voluntary, they were ruled over by the Persians according to republican institutions, laws and norms, much in like a modern social and legal contract and Xerxes did not and was not perceived by the Phoenicians of having fatally breached that sacred trust (Herodotus 2013, 3.19 and 8.90 and Olmstead 1959, 255).

Xerxes ultimately died prematurely and is often viewed as murdered. Since only the king was murdered, it is hard to view the republican system as a whole as violating the principle of mostly peaceful contestation. Artaxerxes was the legitimate successor of Xerxes and it is unclear if he were involved in the plot or not. That Xerxes may have become or attempted to become tyrannical is strongly supported by the evidence and because of such an attempted violation of republican principles, his death may have been justified. He is generally blamed for a terrible sack of Babylon in 482, after a revolt, far different from the more tolerant reprisals of Darius I. Thus, if, even somewhat exaggerated, the stories of the sack of Babylon in 482 are mostly true, and then the assignation was the correction of the republican system making itself whole and checking the power of the runaway monarch with extreme measures. However, Herodotus and Roux do not think that the sack of Babylon of 482 was a sack at all and that the Esagila alone was punished, with the temple having some symbolic damage done to it that was mostly soon repaired. It is more probable that the assassination was a politically motivated ruler without justification and that yet another rebellion had not been handled ruthlessly at all. (Herodotus 2013, 1.183, Olmstead 1959, 236-237, and Roux, 1992, 408-409).

What is clear is that all of the other powerful families and power players were unaffected by the palace intrigue, that may have been played up by the Greeks to some extent for effect. Artaxerxes lived a long and prosperous reign and the kingdom mostly prospered for several generations until a civil war broke out at the end of the 5th-century BC between Cyrus the Younger and Artaxerxes III, the two sons of Darius II (Olmstead 1959, 289).

For the time, the gap between political infighting of this sort between incidents was fairly good, despite the poignant examples of their violation. Cyrus the Younger acquired the consent of the various satrapies he ruled in Anatolia and led a popular insurgency against Artaxerxes II. Had Cyrus not meant to unseat Artaxerxes but merely to forge his own republic in Anatolia, modern theorists would applaud him for undergoing the politics of self-determination. In the end, the war was over quickly, with Cyrus' defeat and Artaxerxes swiftly reunified the empire, his former foes and his friends, and pursued the destruction only of the foreign Greek mercenaries from Europe (Olmstead 1959, 371-395 and 541).

The general Xenophon and his troops ultimately survived and so did the republic in Persia. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III were successful at maintaining the unity of the empire, despite continued troubles down the road. The Satraps' Revolt was the result of a desire for greater autonomy and would have resulted in a looser federation most likely rather than the destruction of the regime per se. But pro-regime forces rallied and defeated them. Under the kings before Darius III, the regime seemed to have calmed down. In the end, the republican regime was still alive in the 330's, the time when Alexander conquered it, but the system had definitely been weakened by the violence, however intermittent it had been (Olmstead 1959, 387-395, 417-441, and 541).

C. Lessons, Summary, and Conclusions

The bureaucracy and decentralized institutions had provided a prosperous and usually peaceful realm for over two hundred years. The level of violence was less than those eras immediately preceding and postdating it. The king's power was often circumscribed and the violence that resulted was often a republican correction to defeat a ruler who had, like Xerxes transgressed his bounds. The everyday person was not affected in the way they usually were in the ancient period. The bureaucracy kept humming along, the army and navy as institutions survived. The various peoples thrived. Elites, business leaders and nobles except at the very top were untouched by this violence. The top level alone was affected and the amount of it was most likely exaggerated by the enemy Greeks (Olmstead 1959, in its entirety, Briant 1995, 522-526, Binetti 2011, 40-41, and Binetti 2012, 9).

No one interest group or person dominated the regime; in that the king's unilateral moves were often checked, usually non-violently. Contestation for power did not usually result in violence or expulsion from the political order, except at the highest levels and mostly in the later period. Additionally, most government and politics was done at the local and administrative levels and the common officials were the real power beyond the throne. As a result, the main balance of power was the administrative system, itself checked by its decentralization into central, local, and regional units, as well as the diverse numbers of different interest groups represented and office-seekers involved. The empire was efficiently governed for the time despite all of this. Most contestation was non-violent and most losers got to play the political game again. Mercy for rebels was as likely as Xerxian-style cruelty. Institutional checks on power were established, preventing domination of any one individual

or interest group or collection of interest groups. As a result, Persia was characterized by bureaucratic representation and thus was a bureaucratic republic, despite its imperfections.

Although several times before the 360's BC, the king, the man at the top, had been assassinated, plus a few major revolts, the core of the regime remained intact. This is similar to the late 19th-century AD in America, three presidents were slain by assassination in about thirty five years, but the country remained intact and would still be regarded as republic. Furthermore, there were serious domestic conflicts in 19th-century America and yet we would not say the American republic ceased to exist in this period, only that it was severely challenged. There is thus no reason to view the earlier revolts and assassinations as strongly impacting the firm foundation of the Persian republic. Only the extended civil wars of the Satraps' Revolt period of the 360's and 350's BC have a strong claim to disrupting the republic and these revolts were suppressed and a weaker version of the republican regime restored by the 340's. If the Satrap's Revolt is viewed as ending the effective administration of the republic, which I believe is fair, then the republic still was relatively firm from 550 BC until at least 370BC, or approximately 180 years (Olmstead 1959, 402-429).

The thing that brought down the republic was not despotism but a lack of central control due to many years of administrative neglect. A firm hand in the administration of government is important, but it must not lead to too firm of a hand. Thus the problem that ultimately weakened the republic to the point of ineffectiveness was the opposite of Assyria's demise, too much decentralization and the lack of effective coercive power at the central level. However this slide into central administrative anarchy took a long time and would not pose a challenge to a modern state that has more sophisticated technology and administrative theory and apparatus, unless the basic fundamentals of power and institutional

structures were not sound, which was not the fundamental problem here. A relatively tolerant, broadly inclusive, bureaucratic republican regime was possible for a long time even without modern institutions, but would have been firmer with both more modern technology and clear constitutional moorings, both of which a modern version of Achaemenid Persia could take advantage of in a similar, contemporary republican project.

The four central themes or lessons for moderns from the case of Persia are that 1. The freedom of decentralization must be balanced by an effective central government, 2. that bureaucratic representation can create the conditions for a republic absent electoral representation, 3. that republics are hard to turn on and off at politicians' behest, and 4. that inclusive political regimes are both necessary and helpful to a republic. The Persian Empire's demise was the inability of the central government to balance the power of the decentralized units should have been primarily controlled by the central bureaucracy and not delegated so much to the periphery. Logistics could not have been improved that much back then, but ensuring that the bureaucrats had regular contact and were held accountable for holding the satrapies accountable was possible and actually done in the earlier, more successful days. However, the freedom of decentralization should not be compromised too much by a powerful central government. It is a balance like so much in both republican theory and practice. Decentralization leads to less domination where an effective central or federal government is present but too much decentralization can lead to more domination at the local and regional level, more inter-regional civil conflict, less effective governance. So, it is important to juggle effectiveness with the freedom of decentralization and it requires competent bureaucrats at both central and regional levels.

Another key lesson for moderns is that bureaucratic republics can work and exist under certain circumstances and can create representation without the need for electoral institutions. This is not ideal, though as a mixture of bureaucratic and electoral representative institutions is the best, but it can start a politically-undeveloped country like Afghanistan in the right direction without rushing elections. You need an inclusive, diverse government that is representative of every constituency, populous and small, weak and strong. You need a bureaucracy that thrives on this diversity and inclusion. You also need ways for the lower bureaucrats to have a say without being punished by the upper bureaucrats. At the same time, you need a central administration as well as decentralized or federalized regional administrations. You need whistle-blower protections, compartmentalization of authority, and regional decentralization. Thus, the lessons of inclusion, effectiveness versus decentralization and the viability of bureaucratic representation and republics are fully compatible with each other.

The final lesson or theme is that you cannot simply turn republican institutions, norms, and laws one and off. You cannot turn off the independence of the judiciary, for example in order to get what you want and then turn it back on when you want to do so. You might not be able to wage war the way you want or at all because of republican checks and balances. Democratic majorities may be denied their say from time to time, particularly in liberal republics with protective constitutions. And sometimes you cannot argue that we will all benefit because a republican norm, law, or institution is in place. Sometimes the system seems to lose out because of these things but if we start to view the system as a means to an end, I think it fails much more quickly than if we view it as an end in itself. This systemic logic is not utilitarian and it is not meant to be, instead it meant to create an ethics of the

community and system, a civic ethics, that seeks the common good without sacrificing people or principle to or to spite the system. You can turn these values off, but you will not get them back again so easily. Effectiveness is important but if you want the most effectiveness, you would have a dictatorship anyway. Republics are about freedom, protection from harm, and representation of diverse interests, not primarily effectiveness. They must be relatively effective, but they cannot cut corners to survive.

Lastly, to address the two alternative hypotheses, the ethnic heterogeneity argument takes its strong hit from all of my cases in the Persian case, while Aristotle's middle class argument needs some amending but does much better than the other argument. The very heterogeneous (ethnically, religiously, socio-economically, linguistically et cetera) Persian empire did very well as a republic but it had trouble keeping itself together because of lack of institutional innovation and maintenance. Its institutions failed it not because of ethnic issues, but because of a lack of technology, a lack of leadership, and the hugeness of geography. At its most heterogeneous, in the beginning it did the best, so once again this alternative argument fails spectacularly.

On the other hand, Aristotle's argument only gets somewhat contradicted by the evidence of the Persian case. If we take him strictly as demanding that a middle class is needed for a republic, we might suggest him to be fundamentally wrong, as a clear middle class seems absent from the Persian Empire. But his genius was understanding and adapting his theory to specific circumstances, including cultural ones. Persia had vague "middle classes" even if not a modern middle class, so his argument holds up reasonably well. Each major ethnic group and religious group had elites and non-elites and very often people in the middle. Persia did not substitute ethnic groups for classes, in which the status of a person was

determined by ethnicity and this almost doubled as a class. In some societies this occurred, but not in Persia (for the most part). While there were certainly horizontal inequalities between ethnics of the same class but different ethnic interest group, each ethnicity had three vague classes or series of classes socio-economically. Both Aristotle's middle class checks and balance and the ethno-religious interest group pluralism described more fully in my theory contributed to the impressive, effective republicanism the Achaemenid Persian Empire.

The next two cases, Venice and Florence show what happens when you stay the republican course (Venice) and when you do not (Florence). Persia largely remained a republic but was hampered by mostly remediable effectiveness issues.

Chapter 4: Venice

A. The Creation of an Unique System

The fall of the Roman Empire left Italy open to other invaders. The Ostrogoths and later the Lombards began to overrun most of Italy. The Byzantine Empire had beaten back the Ostrogoths but had destroyed much of Italy in doing so and were beaten back themselves by the Lombards in many places. The Byzantine established the Exarchate of Ravenna to rule the regions in the north of Italy it still controlled. That rule was loose, allowing the communities that developed from refugees of the barbarian invasions to the Lagoon eventually known as the Venetian Lagoon to develop. Mutual fear of invaders gave the communities of the Lagoon from Grado to Chioggia their shape. A joint government for a number of these communities centered on Heraclea formed, then moved to Malamocco and eventually moved again to the Rialto, where the current city of Venice is now. These communities agreed to a loose joint government and to aid each other in times of invasion. The region became known as the Venetiae, a plural name for a pluralistic society similar to a small federation. Overtime this community of communities made up the heart of the Republic of Venice (Norwich 1982, 5-25).

A revolt against Byzantium due to a religious controversy involving icons, or religious pictures that were venerated in churches and monasteries, led to the rise of the first leader, or Dux (Doge in Venetian dialect). The Doge soon made peace with the Byzantines and was recognized as autonomous from the Exarch of Ravenna. His title of Hypatos became a surname used by his family, the first short-lived dynasty of Venice, afterwards. Orso Ipato, as he became known was the first doge of Venice from 726/727 to approximately 738 AD.

After a struggle for power, his son Teodato became doge. However another period of instability defeated this first attempt at a dynasty (Norwich 1982, 12-17).

Eventually, the republic began taking shape. It was guided by the institutional and cultural memory of Rome and also of the Greek city-states (Najemy 1999, 313-315). The people had a strong voice in government, particularly early on. They supported the Galbaio dynasty at first, but over time, the people, most especially the aristocrats, were worried about the consolidation of power by a hereditary dynasty. A coup led to the rise of Antenori, but his tyrannical ambitions were even worse and he even invited a Frankish army to conquer Venice. Agnello Participazio won the day and saved Venice and thus the Participazio dynasty came to power. As was typical in early Venice, there was some violence and contention, but only ever at the top levels of power. The Participazio dynasty was replaced by the Candiano dynasty, essentially peacefully, but the Candiano dynasty eventually led to civil violence and eventually was cast aside for the Orseolo dynasty, which was successful in restoring order to the republic. However the Orseoli did try to become hereditary and they were disposed of, leading to a new era around 1032, in Domenico Flabianico established definitively the promissione, which was a series of specific concessions to the people (especially the aristocracy) and began the evolution of more specific institutions of the republic. The other two Domenici, Domenico Contarini and Domenico Selvo, further developed the internal balance of power, restored domestic peace, reduced the doge's position to a strong constitutional monarch, and worked on improving the Republic's foreign policy situation. This grouping was not a dynasty, but a series of good republican re-founders (Norwich 1982, 29-64).

The second founding of the Republic in the 11th century by Domenico Flabanico and others led to a mixed system of government where the concio, or arengo, the assembly of all citizens retained significant power, but the rise of more aristocratic institutions was also envisioned. Slowly over time, institutions such as the Quarantia, a group of forty officials with initially legislative, executive, and judicial powers but eventually mostly judges was developed to constrain the power of the people and the Doge. The Great Council was formed in 1172 as a standing body of elite aristocrats who would act as a deliberative body similar to the Roman Senate, and act on behalf of the assembly of the people. The pregadi, a more exclusive body within the Great Council, generally called the Venetian Senate, served as the executive committee of the Great Council, while the Minor Council advised the Doge. The Council of Ten later was established as the head of the secret police and espionage networks of the Republic and while much of what they did was secret, the officers were regularly elected by the other aristocratic bodies, so they were not unaccountable and their terms were short (Norwich 1982, 65-75, 108-111, 151-153, and 282-284; and King 1999, 225-227).

The triple basis of authority of the people (the many), the aristocracy (the few), and the Doge (the one) from 1032 until the 1290's was the closest mixture adhering to Aristotelian notions of mixed government that Venice who achieve. However, after the rise of the Great Council in 1172, a gradual slide towards exclusion of the common people built up within the aristocracy. In the 1280's and more successfully in the 1290's, the aristocrats attempted to become oligarchs in the proper sense, which the political power was concentrated in the hands of few (not always rich). In 1296-1297, the Serrata of the Great Council literally "locked" the membership to those serving at time or those descended from those families serving at or before that time. In fact, the Serrata greatly expanded senatorial membership

once in order to be inclusive enough to create a broad, stable oligarchy. In the early 1300's, this system crystallized into a fixed oligarchy, in which an aristocrat was the only one who could serve in the Great Council, the senate, the Council of Ten, the Quarantia, the Minor Council or as Doge. Other, bureaucratic offices were created in addition to the elective, deliberative offices and while most of the top bureaucratic offices were also headed by aristocrats, the *cittadini*, the middle class socially but often wealthier than many aristocrats, filled many of the important offices as well (Norwich 1982, 181-186, 297-301, and 637; King 1999, 225-226).

Venice was no democracy but it was a classical standard republic, with many liberal elements as well. It was an example of how a clearly non-democratic republic with some liberal leanings could function with the consent of the governed for many years. This theme will be reiterated throughout the chapter. However, the limits of Venetian government also become obvious. A city-state or region-state as it would later become, was limited in its ability to expand its institutions in a republican way. It managed to never over-extend its institutions the way Rome and other republics had and have done, but it could never encompass all of Italy as a result. The American system, designed primarily by Madison and outlined in Federalist No. 10 (Madison 2001, 42-48), both models itself upon Venice but also differentiates itself in a way that has allowed it to extend its republican institutions without loss of its republicanism.

As the Venetian state grew, its bureaucracy had to expand with it and the rank and file of the bureaucracy was normally not made up of aristocrats. Many of them idle to higher ranked officers of the bureaucracy were *cittadini* and many of the prosperous merchants remained of the *cittadini* class. The law courts were strictly overseen by the Quarantia and

although that body was representative only of the aristocrats, it was so dependent on the cittadini class that usually respected that class's legal rights as well. The cittadini were literally citizens in every way except holding the highest offices, particularly the elective ones. They were represented in the bureaucracy and through the bureaucracy and courts their rights and interests were preserved. As a result the Venetian system, especially after the abolition of the representative assembly or concio of the whole people, became a strange sort of regime in which a caste-like society created a non-dominating government. The three caste-like classes were the common people, whose citizenship was not always clearly vindicated, on top of which the middle class of the cittadini, who were large and well-enough economically, were placed. The cittadini were represented after 1423 through the bureaucracy and courts. The formal political institutions only directly represented the aristocrats, or oligarchs, but the elective institutions were dependent on the cittadini for stability, order and effectiveness. Additionally, the aristocracy was not a single interest group but fractured (Norwich 1982, 184-185 and 300-301; King 1999, 225-229).

Impoverished aristocrats developed who had the rights of the oligarchs but not their wealth. Wealthier cittadini also existed. Thus socio-economic status was complex because social caste and economic status or class became increasingly out of joint. The impoverished aristocrats were socially superior to cittadini but economically and politically (due to the bureaucracy) dependent on them, particularly if their interests did not align with those of the wealthier aristocrats. A two party or faction system in a sense existed at all times, because the poor aristocrats acted much as the populist party had before the Serrata while the true oligarchs were constrained by their own laws from excluding the newly impoverished citizens from voting or having influence in the elective institutions (King 1999, 226-228).

Protection from atrocity was provided for by fact that the aristocrats were unable to fix the permanent diversity of interest groups amongst themselves without causing a collapse of the republic, as law and order was a tradition that had eased the way for oligarchy. In a law-like manner, the right to vote and be elected had become hereditary, there was not a law-like way to undo the hereditary nature of election without also allowing the cittadini into the Great Council. To undo the laws simply for the interests of one group was not merely against the interests of others or the morality of the republic, it was against the social contract that all persons, from poorest to richest, had been inculcated to take up. As a result, there could be no solution to the divided aristocracy, except for one. A culture of compromise, deliberation and even consulting with interest groups outside of the elective institutions were part of the culture of transactional politics that bridged the gaps within the elites for centuries. The cittadini were not a cohesive group any more than the elites were and so shifting coalitions of the two top class-castes produced an uncertainty about political partners mixed with stable enough political institutions to withstand temporary uncertainty. Because of this stability, civil conflict was confined to a much greater extent than in the rest of Italy in the late medieval, Renaissance, and early Modern periods (Norwich 1982, 181-186 and more broadly, in its entirety, King 1999, 226-228, Menning 1999, 375-385, and Najemy 1999, in its entirety, especially 319-321).

A further factor that preserved the Republic in its more oligarchical stage was the external threat of violence. From 1423 until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, Europe was at war most of the time, and the fighting in Italy was often producing results that stifled if not crushed outright the independence of the states of that peninsula. From a huge number of truly independent states, from around this time (or even a little earlier) until the mid-6th-

century, the number of states decreased precipitously. Among those that remained, many were so under the thumb of foreign powers by the end of the Italian Wars in 1559 that their effective independence was over. Venice however survived as an essentially independent, intact republic despite all of this. Its institutions and the rough balance of power between and within social and economic classes meant that no one group could dominate even if they tried. More importantly enough voices came to the fore that the Republic usually had good and creative leadership, allowing for a collective leadership more effective than the narrower oligarchies and one-man principalities of the time. The broad character of even the post-Serrata elites made it more than the narrow oligarchies that look little different from modern one-party dictatorships. Additionally, the bureaucratic representation of non-elite interests was very real (Norwich 1982, 300-333, 369-444, 460-461, and 559).

As Venice conquered or acquired new territories, a major general trend emerged. In territories on the mainland, Venice tried to have a relatively light touch except in times of crisis (usually in war). Local officials at the highest levels were usually officials, such as the *provvedettori*, from Venice (either *cittadini* or aristocrats), but most of the local government was made up of locals, from Vicenza, Verona, Padua, Treviso, wherever the city government was located. The powers of the local administrator were quite strong in a crisis but otherwise were not dominating. Local autonomy, administered by local laws and local leaders was the norm if not the rule in these areas. Non-Venetians of the Republic were not usually granted access to the closed aristocracy, but rights of the *cittadini*, the main body of citizens between the poor commoners and the aristocrats, were more readily granted. Thus local elites could still prosper, but as *cittadini*-level citizens not true aristocrats. This was very much in keeping with Roman Republican traditions, where elites of the allied cities would gain

partial citizenship fairly easily but not full Roman citizenship (Norwich 1982, 184-185, 208-209 and 280-284; King 1999, 228; and Boatwright 2004, 140-148).

Venice had begun as a mix of peoples and it is quite true that there was never after the creation of the Terraferma, the mainland empire, a single Venetian people. The Vincenzans, Paduans, Veronese, Friulians, and others, were each their own people, with their own laws, customs, and governments, subjects to the essentially federal government at Venice, in which they could be represented only if their citizens were made nobles of Venice, which did happen from time to time. This was different from the way Persia was governed, in that all ethnic, religious, and population groups could be included in the central or federal administration, but it looked much like the Roman Republic, at least before the Social War. Still, Venice asked little in terms of troop contributions except in the worst war crises and their taxes were not usually levied more harshly on the dependent territories than upon the core Venetian people in the city proper (Boatwright 2011, 180-183 and 189-190, Binetti 2011, 49-50, and 53, and Norwich 1982, 283-284, 291, 314-315, and 403-404, and Muir 1998, 13-14, 16, and 40).

A federated system in which local autonomy was preserved, a tax system that relied on the consent of the governed, at least in practice, and a military system that combined all-volunteer mercenaries with conscripts from all of the cities, including Venice, created a workable non-dominating system. The protection of trade and commerce was not restricted to the elite aristocrats and in terms of economic freedom, the citizens of the Republic in the core lands and Terraferma were highly respected. The social contract between both the cittadini and aristocrats and Venice proper and the surrounding territories preserved the republican constitution both within the whole territory and within Venice. However, the

further Venetian rule was extended outside of the heartland of republicanism, the more like colonial rulers they looked. Venice did not extend the same basic human protections to Crete, Cyprus, and Greek-speaking territories that it did to Istria, Dalmatia, and especially the Italian mainland. There, Venetian families were often given lands directly to rule from the Republic and Republican oversight was poor. In general, the Venetians were colonial rulers that governed as conquerors were they did not rule over Latin-speakers of the Catholic faith. Whether they ruled over Italians of the northern communes, such as Verona, Padua, Vicenza, and especially Treviso, which had a special relationship with Venice), or the Friulian, Istrian, and Dalmatian cultures which were not Italian but Latin-descended Catholics with many similar practices as the Venetians, the important aspects of Republicanism were usually considered by the chief officials of the Republic. However, outside of that cultural sphere, Venice did not think that its republican ideals followed the Venetian flag (Norwich 1982, 283-284, 291, 314-315, and 403-404 for the mainland territories, 148-149 and 235-238 for Crete, 354 and 472-474 for Cyprus, Crowley 2011, 232-234; and Jackson 1887, 257, 260-263, 269-272, and 275-278; Muir 1998, 23-25, 29, 40, and 99).

The Venetian Republic had thus five geographical zones of parts. There was the city of Venice itself, where the aristocrat-oligarchs ruled with support from the cittadini. Here, the poorer people benefitted from charity in addition to the public granary system available to the poor in times of famine and drought. The scuole were charitable, social welfare societies, that while technically private, since they were supported by the wealthy cittadini and banned the nobles from them, took on a semi-public, and thus political function. A wealthy merchant, a scribe, a banker, or a poor person could all join a scuola society, but not the

most powerful people. This was the primary form of social power in the city and it was outside of the control of the official political class. This institution both bolstered intra-class solidarity and was a semi-public/political institution that balanced out the power of the Senate (King 1999, 228-229).

Outside the city, there was the original Duchy, the lands that had come to Venice before those of the mainland or Terraferma. Places like Chioggia and Grado, which had been part of the Venetian sphere of influence for as long as there was a Venice, and usually considered part of the Venetian state, were often able to have some representation in the Great Council and Senate because of their elites being part of the pre-Serrata government. In general, these regions were governed in part by Venetian officials but still relatively autonomous and tended to be represented better formally than all others outside of the city proper. The Terraferma cities, such as Vicenza, Treviso, Udine in Friuli, and Padua were governed as more external to Venice than the Venetian Lagoon towns, but were still very locally autonomous and generally granted the rights of citizens other than those privileges held by the aristocrats. The Stato da Mar, the overseas territories were outside of this Terraferma system, but clearly divided into vastly different categories. Istria and Dalmatia were treated fairly mildly and generally according to republican principles except under duress, but unlike the Terraferma, the application of these principles was both less regulated and less consistent. One could argue that the administration of these territories was not so much law-like as fair and mild but true republicanism does demand greater consistency. The Republic itself thus included the Terraferma and excluded the Stato da Mar, though the status of Istria and Dalmatia was sort of in between being part of the Republic and being part of its external territories. The status of the outer Stato da Mar, such as Crete, Cyprus, and the Dodecanese,

on the other hand, was not ambiguous. These were dominated colonies with no say in government in any way even in terms bureaucratic representation terms. The lot of outer region was vastly worse than that of Istria and Dalmatia and even vaguely comparable to the republican rule of the territories of the Venetian Lagoon and Terraferma (Norwich 1982, 148-149 and 235-238 for Crete, 354 and 472-474 for Cyprus; King 1999, 223-224; Berengo 1986, in its entirety; and Crowley 2011, 10-11, 14-15, 232-243 and 247-250; and Muir 1998, 23-25, 29 and 40).

This structure would not work for a large, diverse society such as America's. However, it could be modified. Having a uniform system of decentralization, federalism, instead of a series of autonomies formed around the central city of Venice, like a wheel-and-spoke system, was one innovation of Madison's. With power decentralized in an uniform, regular, legal way, the federal government was not the government of the most powerful geographical region or the majority group per se, but a coalition of interest groups from many different semi-autonomous states. The interest groups would have to organize both federally and regionally which could lead to conflicts between similar interest groups, which would check the ability of any one group to gain dominion over the large, diverse country.

The smaller republics, or states, would be internally cohesive, using many of the same techniques and factors as Venice did, but the larger whole would be based on a coalition of interest organized nationally (the House of Representatives) and one based upon state interests (the Senate). This system was never designed to be democratic but was meant to be a liberal, federal republic based upon the best practices of the Venetian Republic, modified as necessary for a large diverse country (Madison 2001, 42-48).

B. Early Modern Venice

The Venetian structure came under attack from the outside in the Italian Wars (1494-1559), which were also the context for Niccolò Machiavelli of Florence's writing in the early 16th-century. As Machiavelli describes poignantly, Italy's various states (the ones who survived Italy's internal consolidation) were further under pressure from foreign forces of France, the emergent state of Spain, and the Holy Roman Empire, and even the Swiss Confederacy. Milan, Florence, Venice, Naples, and the Papal States were main independent states before this period (Machiavelli 1950, 42-43, 51, and 95-97, and Norwich 1982, 391-396 and 423-433).

In 1494-1495, the Italian states, except for Florence, briefly aligned to stop French invaders. However, the alliance did not last long, as the Papal States determined that France and Spain would eventually overwhelm most of the peninsula and that it alone would remain a viable native Italian power, taking the primary position in central Italy. The result of this defection and the weakness of especially Milan meant that both Milan and Naples fell to the foreign forces in the Second Italian War (1499-1504). The Papal States expanded northwards, led by Cesare Borgia, while Spain defeated France, after the two had conspired to defeat the Kingdom of Naples, ruled by a close relative of the King of Spain. The French took the Duchy of Milan but the Kingdom of Naples was ruled by Spain after 1503. That left Florence, Venice and the Papal States as native powers with some ability to serve as a counterweight to the foreign powers. However, the Papacy continued to support the foreign invaders, while Florence struggled to survive (as covered in the Florence chapter). That left only the Republic of Venice as a potential threat to a foreign partition of Italy. The Papacy, aligned with these forces, encouraged a major alliance of foreign powers against the

Venetians. The small buffer state of Ferrara already ferociously supported the French; it was joined by the jealous Papacy, Spain, France and the Holy Roman Empire. This massive coalition soon overwhelmed the Venetians in the field and Venice suffered its version of the ancient Roman defeat at the battle of Cannae at the Battle of Agnadello in 1509. The War of the League of Cambrai (1508-1516) was meant to dismember the last anti-foreign native power in Italy, but it failed (King 1999, 225, Norwich 1982, 371-433, and Santosuosso 1999, 291-295).

The strength of the Republic of Venice was that the classes of society were mostly in fundamental alignment, despite their differences on various issues. Even the poor were benefitted by the laws and the court system tried to not overly advantage the *cittadini* and the senatorial class. At the same time, the common person had greater chances of becoming a part of the middle class *cittadini* than in many other places and the protections the *cittadini* could call upon were significant in a time when feudalism often completely constrained the rights and privileges of the non-elites. The *cittadini* provided key support to the aristocracy, who perhaps often counted upon the poor to balance the middle class of the *cittadini*. However, despite all the machinations and balances of power Venice was famous or infamous for, the fundamental desire to stick together in a crisis remained until the final crisis of the French Revolutionary Wars. The Republic could rely on even its poor in a pinch and its mild treatment of the outer cities of Terraferma ensured a greater degree of loyalty than a dominating regime could expect. The Republic's armies included mostly mercenaries, but also conscripts from various classes and cities. It strictly enforced discipline and contracts with its army and endeavored to make the burdens of war as low as possible. Still, the war of the League of Cambrai truly challenged Venice and even one more such war

probably would have put into steep and rapid decline. However, it had built a great degree of social and political capital to throw into this one incredible crisis (Norwich 1982, 390-425, with reference to above citations).

It was an incredible crisis, and most of its territories fell, not through revolts or treachery by the citizens of the Terraferma, but the raw power of foreign siege trains and starvation tactics. After the disaster of the Battle of Agnadello, the Venetians refused to fight a pitched battle for several years, using the Fabian tactics of the Roman Republic, since they remembered the old lessons of the Second Punic war. In the end the historical and cultural memory of Venice saved it. It tried to save only one of its outlying cities, Treviso, which had been under its control for longer than the others and whose people were more securely tied to the republican system centered at Venice. The Trevisans, were the most integrated of all the subject peoples in the system and probably benefitted the most from Venetian citizenship. The Trevisans resisted under a senatorial functionary named Andrea Gritti, whose expertise at combining military and civilian infrastructures in a single effort both saved the Republic in part and led to his eventual rise to the Dogeship. The Trevisans and Venetians held on in the siege of Treviso and the Paduans were so angry with the foreign occupiers that they readily welcomed the Venetians back, leading to a successful defense of the siege of Padua. While Padua and other cities were a military football after this point, they generally supported the Venetians once they had tasted the alternatives to Venetian rule. Being second-class citizens in the early modern age was not an insult but a compliment because most conquered, suborned, or subject peoples were not viewed as citizens, political subjects, members of the political community at all. Thus Venetian rule, which would not meet modern republican standards, was quite excellent and relatively popular for the times. The

result was that popular revolts were usually in the favor of Venice and helped the Venetian military win the war (Norwich 1982, 390-404, and Boatwright 2011, 111-118).

Venice's diplomacy, not just its relatively moderate rule over the Terraferma and its military strength, truly saved it. The papacy aligned with Venice when it saw that its plan was rapidly leading to a full on partition of Italy by the foreigners in which it was not included. The other members of the alliance, other than Ferrara, aligned against France. However, once again, the Empire, the Pope, and Spain conspired against Venice even as it fought on their side against France. So Venice simply switched sides and fought alongside France and Ferrara. The Battle of Marignano was only a temporary victory for its allies, but for Venice, it was the final salvation from the coalition trying to dismember it (Norwich 1982, 414-433).

Faced with a massive coalition of enemies, diplomacy and smart allocation of resources defeated raw military strength for Venice. However, the republican institutions and the social contracts and bargains that underlaid them (including normative ones) ultimately saved the Republic. A non-republican regime, like Milan, would and did fall apart where Venice just barely could survive (Norwich 1982, 381-382, 431-432, and 437-438).

While Venice did not retain its former glory, gradually becoming a weaker power, it emerged from the war of the League of Cambrai relatively unscathed in terms of both its core interests and its operative independence. It got involved in a few other parts of the Italian Wars, but by 1530, it was mostly free to continue its own business without fear of major foreign depredations of its lands and people. While the rest of Italy had to deal with major wars for another 29 years, Venice was very peaceful in its Terraferma, though it still had major wars with the Ottoman Turks left to fight. However, those were colonial wars and

much less dangerous the core populations in the city, Dogado, and Terraferma of the Republic of Venice (Norwich 1982, 449-461).

The importance of class balance is another important theme in the example of Venice. Ensuring that every class had a stake in the success of government and the polity was essential to surviving the crisis of the early 16th-century intact. If that balance had been as skewed as America's is today, with the complication of racial politics mixed with class activism, would it have survived? One could argue that class was more important because Venice was ethnically/ racially more uniform than our American society, but it was more diverse than most contemporary societies and yet still survived. The underlying issue was often class even when ethnicity, race, or religion appeared to be the main issue.

For example, Venice was also religiously tolerant, extraordinarily for its times, until strong anti-Jewish legislation was put into effect in 1777, almost at the end of the Republic. A very Catholic country, Venice tended to tolerate Protestants, Orthodox Christians, and especially Jews to a very high level. Orthodox Christians had their own churches, Jews had their own synagogues, and Protestants though not openly, had at their own chapels. The Republic's officials ensured that the majority of population remained Catholic, but the occasional "all but open" Protestant was tolerated like nowhere else in Catholic Europe. There was an expulsion of Jews from the city in 1395, a generation after the Jews were encouraged to move to Venice from Mestre in 1374. There were identifying markers such as yellow clothing required and some of their property rights were curtailed. The residency rules were soon relaxed and it seems that many of their rights were restored. Even in many of its colonies, not known for a great many freedoms in this period, Greek Orthodox and Jewish inhabitants had relatively great freedom of religion. Overall, Venice was the most

religiously tolerant regime of the time in the Greater Mediterranean region (Norwich 1982, 272-273, 508-510, 602, Crowley 2011, 246-247, and King 1999, 229-230).

Class issues often surfaced underneath the ethno-religious battles, particularly relating to the Jews. Relative Jewish affluence was sometimes cause for repression due to envy by lower classes and class peers alike, but it also allowed the Jewish community to have more power than it would otherwise have, as inter-communal connections due to class were also important. Thus when class stability is suborned by racial/ethnic concerns, the republic is in more danger, but when racial/ethnic/religious concerns are addressed but also subsumed within a class framework that is otherwise healthy, the republican can remain stable. However, that is two questions instead of one for America- are class issues being suborned by other forms of identity politics in a troubling way and more fundamentally, is America's class system fundamentally sound enough that the rhetorical and policy linking of these issues to class even matters?

Over time, the Republic's institutions became somewhat less effective, but never decrepit or despotic except perhaps at the very end of the Republic. On the other hand, its inter-class contract was based upon mutual prosperity and the opening of new markets in the Americas and the East Indies, neither of which involved Venice, and the continuing defeat of Venetian forces in the colonial wars with the Ottomans in the eastern Mediterranean, meant that there was less economic leverage for the regime. Still, the population did not become greatly impoverished largely because the elites and cittadini themselves tended to veer away from the aristocratic decadence and extravagance of other groups. If they had not done so, they would not have survived politically, so this was less a matter of superiority per se as a matter of habit and careful maintain of the social contract. As a result the poor rarely revolted,

rioted, or had a serious civic problem and the use of the secret police was relatively rare and while strict, not truly authoritarian (Norwich 1982, 464-488, 506-517, 542-574, and 637-638).

C. Collapse of the Republic, Mechanisms, Themes, and Conclusions

However, the French Revolution destroyed the Republic for two main reasons. Firstly, the Republic promised greater rights, true human rights, than the common people outside of the cittadini middle class could hope to achieve. The revolutionaries promised the outer cities true dependence and full freedom rather the republican patriarchy they had become used to and prospered under, for the most part. The ideas of the Revolution made the popular party at Venice, the disenfranchised as well as those outside of the bureaucratic classes, angry in a real way and a massive scale for the first time in centuries. However, the Revolution provided more than ideology, it provided an army. The French Revolutionary army was not merely providing propaganda and aspirations to the prospective revolutionaries of Europe it was supporting them with an invading army. The Venetian Republic was defeated by the one-two punch of an ideology of liberation that trumped the freedoms of limited republican human protections and raw military force. In about a year from the beginnings of hostilities between the Republic and France, Venice agreed to surrender and form a popular regime (Norwich 1982, 608-633).

However, the irony of the French Revolution was that republicanism and revolutionary liberties were in the long term crushed rather than vindicated by it. A French regime soon encompassed all of Italy, including the lands that had once been the Venetian Republic. The masses were at first satisfied with the Italian revolutionary republics, because they thought

that a unified independent Italy, long the dream of many among the common people (and many elites outside of Venice) would become a reality. However, they soon found out that the French wished to dominate them, unlike the local Venetian aristocrats. As a result, the French-controlled republics eventually became official kingdoms. The French deigned to build a French colonial empire in Italy and the rest of Europe. However, they were defeated and driven back. The results of all this aspirational thinking and exercise were foreign domination in the Veneto and Friuli and renewed foreign domination essentially everywhere else. Even where the foreign powers did not colonize or re-colonize Italy, they supported monarchs who in no way supported or represented their constituents. From the pope, to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, to the King of Naples, the rulers were dupes of the foreign powers. The French Revolution had done what the monarchists had tried for centuries to do and had failed; to destroy the last republic, independent Venice of the once free Italy. Even after Italy was unified and free from foreign domination in the mid-19th century, it was still significantly less in keeping with republican values until at least World War I and became a modern republic (in both name and substance) only in 1946, after the abolition of the monarchy, the fall of Fascism, and the end of World War II (Norwich 1982, 622-634, Wikipedia, "Italian unification", in its entirety, Muir 1998. In its entirety, and Najemy 1999, 313, and 320-321).

Class dynamics were disrupted critically by the French revolution and the republic fell. The small republic could not defend itself militarily either. But it could not extend its territory anymore for fear of risking its republican institutions. And yet its long, successful run as a mostly liberal republic was an excellent one. If one could, as Madison suggested create a larger, more diverse, stable and strong country using the republican model, then

perhaps it could survive what the Venetian Republic could not. Even the internal class issues would not have surfaced if the nation's borders could be protected from the French.

The alternative hypothesis of Aristotle that the middle class is crucial to republican development is really part of my argument. That symbiosis is nowhere clearer than in the Venetian case. The system relied on the middle classes, the *cittadini* and other important parts of the mercantile and bureaucratic classes between the poor and the nobles, to survive. The middle class or classes were indeed pivotal, but not strictly because they were the idle class but because they allowed for intergroup dialogue, transactional politics, and a bridge between wealthy and poor. Also horizontally, the middle classes of the various parts of the Republic, particularly in Venice and the Veneto, produced both connections between like-minded interest groups and checks on elite power. Once again, Aristotle fits into my model more than he challenges it.

As for the heterogeneity argument, Venice was able bridge gaps of ethnicity, language, and region easily, when it had the will and institutional machinery to do so. It ruled over Friuli, Istria, Dalmatia, and the Veneto well when it felt like it, usually when things had gone bad but then order was restored. Heterogeneity was less a barrier or problem and more of a wrinkle in the ability of Venetian bureaucrats to function. The will to integrate territory into the bureaucratic machinery was more of a problem than were cultural issues per se. Overall, Venice's tolerance and light touch in these regions worked well. Sometimes, like in Persia it could have been stricter in enforcing the rule of law, but did not want to impede regional cultural, social, and political systems. Thus sometimes it was too tolerant of local power structures which sometimes were oppressive of the local populations. However, over time,

Venice was able to hold the core regions of Friuli, Veneto, Istria, and Dalmatia together (Muir 1998, in its entirety).

In conclusion, Venice's republicanism was strange in several ways. It was originally a true republic of the Roman or Aristotelian type but soon become an oligarchy, at least in its formal institutions, though admittedly a broad one. It went from being a formal-institutional republic to a hybrid republic, in that it relied almost evenly upon both bureaucratic and formal representation to keep its non-dominating form. Without its complex bureaucracy, it would almost certainly have become an unrepresentative one-interest group dominant non republic. Without its formal political institutions, the bureaucracy would not have been ordered and stable, much like what happened to Persia. It remained both representative and stable only by the combination of the two forms of representation. Thus it was a hybrid republic.

And yet, it was a caste-like environment, especially after the 1290's, that does not fully conform to republican principles. The idea that only hereditary elites can hold the highest offices, that the only formal representation done will be that of the most elites, that some commoners do not even have basic citizenship, these are anathema to modern republicanism, as they should be. While it is reasonable for one city-community to be run this way, because of the innate interconnectedness and interdependence of the classes, in a large state, such a republic would be very oppressive, quickly devolve into class-based dictatorship, or both (Norwich 1982, 182-185 and 637-638).

This classical republic was very much in the minds of the anti-Federalists of the late 18th-century in America, who argued that a small republic might be feasible but could not work on a large scale. The Federalists, such as Madison determined that while republicanism

and representative government could work on a large-scale, for which they are most famous, they did agree that the model of republicanism had to differ from that of small republic. Venice, despite its territorial size, was very much a small republic, who relied on small versions of it, little subject republics, to extend itself in a republican way (Madison 2001, 42-48). Like Rome and Persia, before it, Venice was a wheel-and-spoke republic, with a clear center that was superior to the other parts, though still not dominant (at least at their republican heights). The founders of modern America believed that the wheel-and spoke model needed to be replaced by a federation of semi-autonomous, basically equal states, with a strong central government in which a wider variety of interest groups were formally represented than in earlier models. Thus, Venice's strength inspired American republicanism, but so too did its weaknesses. While much of what Venice accomplished is relevant to modern republics like the United States, its caste-based model will not do as model for other, new regimes such as that in Afghanistan (Madison 2001, 42-48, and Binetti 2011, 34, 38, and 50).

Despite its liberalism, Venice was a bit too caste-like for us modern Americans. Its ethics and politics of class balance however are still worth reflecting on. Also, a non-democratic republic is not a goal for us but for less politically and economically developed countries it can be. Class, race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual orientation, whatever identity divisions exist in politics all have to properly balanced, not just class. However, class is a good way of understanding many of these things and a more rational, liberal, and just way of organizing society and politics than many of these categories. By addressing the realities of class power even while reaffirming their centrality in social and political life, Venetians were able to deal with other identity cleavages as well. Americans can greatly learn from this model, even

though it's relatively strict socio-economic hierarchy and lack of democracy make less sense for us than it did for Venice or perhaps for a country struggling for any kind of non-dominating regime such as Afghanistan.

If Venice was an odd republic and unique, Florence shows us a more typical Italian republic, called a commune and how it too was flawed, but also a helpful model of representation and republicanism.

Chapter 5: Florence

A. A Typical Italian Commune

Florence, unlike Venice, was fairly typical of a classic medieval Italian commune (or *comune* in Italian plural *comuni*). A commune has become synonymous with a closely-knit community, often of idealistic or radical makeup. But an Italian commune was for the most part, simply a city-state, essentially independent of direct external control. Unlike Venice or the cities in the Middle Ages in southern Italy, the communes were technically part of just two states, the Holy Roman Empire and the Papal States. However, this association with the often amorphous medieval states generally protected them from external interference except by the theoretically controlling power. At the same time, the Holy Roman Empire and the Papal States would often attempt to interfere with the communes, or free communes, as they liked to call themselves, and even would fight amongst themselves. Only Venice amongst the northern and central city-states was not part of this socio-political communal framework, at least until Venice started conquering some of the communes itself (Najemy 1999, 313-314 and 319).

Although a commune was technically merely a self-governing, effectively independent city-state in this particular context, it soon became synonymous with a type of republicanism. A commune thus became synonymous with a city-republic of the Italian type, other than those in the Greek and Norman-influenced south and Venice. The specific type of republicanism in each commune varied based on the city, but tended in the beginning (around 1115) to be headed by multiple leading citizens (consuls, deliberately invoking the old Roman Republic), with the assembly of the people and more elite bodies also having a role. As these communes developed, a class conflict emerged, in which the middle classes

took political power from first the aristocratic, landowning elites and then from the common people. Ultimately, a form of communal republicanism emerged called guild republicanism, by which membership and participation in a guild was the only guarantee of direct political participation. The guild system involved a broad swathe of the population in most such cities, but over time, the right to political membership was increasingly restricted an oligarchic elite. The increasing divisions within the elites in most cities was complicated by the feud between the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire from the mid-12th-century on, resulting in the split in most communes between Guelphs (pro-Papacy) and Ghibellines (pro-imperial) (Najemy 1999, 313-316, particularly 314, and Menning 1999, 375 and 377).

What the Guelph-Ghibelline conflicts boiled down to were civil wars (and inter-city wars) between those most threatened by the Papacy (usually Papal vassals) and those most afraid of the Empire (usually Imperial vassals). However, within a city, large and powerful factions on both sides formed, with often elaborate family alliances binding factions together. While land-owning elites were often Ghibellines and the commercial and industrial guild members were generally Guelphs, it was often more complex than this. Florence, being largely, stronger, and more prosperous than most Italian communes, had a more complex version of this conflict, particularly from the 1260's on, after which the Empire was not the main secular power in Italy, but instead the Angevin-controlled Kingdom of Naples was, allied to the Papacy (Armstrong 1964, 1-23).

The Guelph-Ghibelline conflict illustrates what happens when economic and political power are so strongly associated with one another as to be almost fused. Class often determined one's party allegiances and shifting economic often meant shifting political alliances. Winners of the political game at minimum took from the losers some economic

benefits if not totally expropriated them. In a republic such as Florence, economic often affected who could vote and hold office.

In the 14th century, the conflicts among and between the cities led to the opportunity for local lords, or signore, to rise to power, essentially they were more similar to Greek tyrants in the ancient world than to feudal lords, with a exceptions, such as the lords of Milan, who rose to power earlier than the rest. The urban lord was not interested in returning power to the feudal lords, but could count upon agricultural aristocratic support in many cases. The lack of balance in the republican communes generally led to their fall and replacement by local strongmen who tried to keep the peace between various factions. These lords were the Signori (singular Signore) and the urban lordship became known as the Signoria, ominously the same name as the sovereign authority of free communal republics (Lubkin 1999, 137-138; Caggese 1964, 49-51, and Menning 1999, 375 and 377).

However, the rise of the Signori did not stop other, larger powers from imperiling the communes and in fact, Verona, Padua, Vicenza, Como and other places fell to stronger leaders, both principalities (the Pope and the Duke of Milan, ecclesiastical and secular princes in Machiavelli's diction) and republics, Florence and Venice. By 1400, five major powers in Italy controlled most of the land or at least influenced most of it: Milan, Florence, Venice, the Papacy, and the Kingdom of Naples. This led to a series of wars, settled by the Peace of Lodi in 1454, which led to mostly peaceful international scene until 1494, interrupted seriously only twice by intra-Italian warfare, in 1475-1478 and 1482-1484 (Machiavelli 1950, 23-30, Lubkin 1999, 139, Najemy 1999, 317-319, King 1999, 224-225, and Menning 1999, 379).

In 1494, the Italian status quo was first challenged then blown away by foreign powers, such as the French, the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, and Switzerland. By 1516, Milan and Naples were no longer truly independent and by the 1550's the Papacy and Florence were technically stronger but dangerously dependent on Spain. Only Venice, the odd city-state that had a different history from the true communes stayed a strong independent power after the Italian Wars ended in 1559 (Santosuoso 1999, 291-294, Lubkin 1999, 140, and Machiavelli 1950, 94-98).

Having set up this general pattern of history of the Italian communes, let us retrace our steps, in order to apply the pattern of the Italian communal republic directly of the example of the Republic of Florence. Florence was a communal republic that originally sprung up in the early 12th-century from the collapse of the large Marquisate of Tuscany. This was an Imperial territory with semi-independent status that extremely powerful in the 11th-century into the early 12th-century. Led by Margravina Matilda of Tuscany, this state allied with the Pope in the 1070's to defeat the Holy Roman Empire's first major attempt of the High Middle Ages to assert its theoretical dominance over Italy. The cause for local autonomy started by Tuscany continued into the 12th-century after Matilda died and her realm broke up into unofficial city-state-states, known as the communes of Tuscany (Brooke 1964, 64-70, 77-78, and 104, and Menning 1999, 375).

From around 1115 until the 1160's these city-states organized themselves on an ad hoc basis, eventually adopting the consular model of Rome and were generally inspired by the institutional and cultural memory of Rome. The writings of Cicero were probably the main surviving republican theory work surviving. Florence established an executive office of consul in purposeful imitation of the Roman Republic in 1138, a major turning point for it as

began to expand and gain control of more Tuscan land and the small city of Fiesole. In the mid-12th century, their quasi-independent status was first recognized by the Emperor, but they had to fight for it from time to time. After the Holy Roman Empire's second major attempt to control its territories in Italy failed in 1177 at the battle of Legnano, the right of the cities of Tuscany to be essentially independent communes was recognized. The system of government was broadly-speaking republican, where the Roman system of consuls, the assembly of the people, and more elite deliberative bodies being the model (Najemy 1999, 313, 316, and 318, Menning 1999, 375, Balzani 1964, 440-450, Previt -Orton 1964, 226-228, and Cicero 2009, in its entirety).

Florence was an economically-divided society, where class affected nearly everything and this led to the rise of the guild system of republican governance. In the 13th century, the *popoli*, at first most likely an alliance of the common people and rapidly growing guilds, but later representing just the middle class and the wealthy non-aristocrats, began working on excluding the aristocrats from power. From the mid-13th-century on these *popoli* formed a strong Guelph party, aligning with the Papacy against both domestic landowners and the empire's allies in Italy. The Ghibellines of Tuscany were usually landed aristocrats while the Guelphs included urban landlords, merchants, and more middle class individuals, including at times even the urban poor. The grand coalition of classes was used to hold off and reduce the power of the Ghibellines in Florence and throughout Tuscany more generally (Schipa 1964, 145-147 and 159-165, Previt -Orton 1964, 166-204, and Menning 1999, 375 and 377).

The defeat of the Imperial forces in 1266 and the rise of Angevin control in Naples, supported by the Papacy, changed the factional balance in Florence. The Ghibellines had mostly been defeated, but those that remained aligned with those Guelphs alarmed by the

rise of the French-leaning Angevins and their Papal allies and formed the White Guelphs. This party or faction split from the Black Guelphs, who remained aligned with the Papacy. This split, gradually growing from 1266 until 1300, led to trouble for the intellectual and poet, Dante Alighieri. Alighieri was elected a member of the Signoria, the council of nine members that was the highest political authority in the city. A moderate White Guelph with familial and social connections on both sides of the conflict, he reluctantly banished the leaders of both parties from the city. Later, due to his party allegiance, he was driven from the city in 1302 by the Black Guelphs. He never returned to the city and much of his *Divine Comedy* is about the deeply personal political struggle he experienced at the turn of the 13th-century in Florence (Armstrong 1964, 1-14, Caggese 1964, 49-51, and Menning 1999, 375 and 377-378).

The factional conflict eventually served the interests of the major guilds (*arte maggiori*) and sometimes also the minor guilds (*arte minori*). Each guild was a communal trade association of all practitioners within the city and its rulings were binding upon its members. To belong to a guild meant the ability to participate in government and politics in a meaningful and direct way. By the 1250's, guild rule was instituted but it may have been several decades before the guildless were excluded from all political decision making. In fact, by 1300, the aristocrats and the common people were as powerless as most of the Venetian population, with two key differences. Firstly, the Venetian aristocrats' interests were more cosmopolitan and diverse than those of the ruling classes in Florence. They did not always agree with one another and often needed to align with the *cittadini*. Secondly, the bureaucracy was so massive in the rapidly growing Venetian state that bureaucratic offices could provide representation and power for the directly excluded middle class in Venice. In

Florence, offices were increasingly controlled by the same classes that were directly represented, so that even indirectly, most Florentines had little to gain from the state (Menning 1999, 377-378 and 381-382; Caggese 1964, 64-66).

The result was that the new oligarchy was a commercial republic that still looked much like the older communal system but was essentially the rule of the guild corporations. Only guild members could hold office and no one was elected for office, instead everyone was selected by the allegedly random process of the borse (names were put in bags and selected). Even in Venice there was some degree of elective representation, but here the process was random. However, over time, the scrutinizers who were appointed over the borse rejected out most persons who could technically stand for office. Thus the supposedly broad oligarchy was often narrower than that of Venice, where after the Serrata, the oligarchical classes tried to keep their pool of participants stable rather than trying to bias the political elections for short term gain and long term political disorder. However, in Florence, the factions were just too opposed to each other to not cheat and thus polarization made everyday transactional politics impossible in many cases (King 1999, 225-227, Menning 1999, 378, and Najemy 1999, 314-315 and 317-318).

Before the dysfunctional politics of late medieval Florence could catch up with it fully, there were tremendous events occurring outside of Tuscany that filled the next generation after Dante with trepidation. As stated above, the Signori began to rise in many cities. The most troubling takeover ultimately was that of the Carraresi of Padua, a once-model commune, academic, medical and cultural center, as well as essentially the best northern analogue to Florence. The 1320's were a period of intense Ghibelline-Guelph conflict, but the Holy Roman Empire was trying (for the last time in earnest in the Middle Ages) to regain

control of northern Italy. The Ghibellines had support from Guelphic allies similar to Dante's White Guelphs. The argument that the urban Ghibelline Marsilius of Padua made on behalf of resumed overlordship of northern Italian communes by Louis of Bavaria, uncrowned Holy Roman Emperor, was that local autonomy was best preserved under Imperial rather than Papal overlordship. Dante himself had exposed similar if less enthusiastic beliefs. For Marsilius, the pluralism of the communal republic needed a strong hand to support, one that could support local liberty while also staving off Papal/Angevin domination and the rise of one-man rule in the cities (Caggese 1964, 49-51, Marsilius of Padua 1956, 3-49, 61-97, and 113-140, Reade 1964, 623-627, and Syros 2012, 15-18, 19-21, 23-24, 50-52, 85-96, and 100-113).

Marsilius of Padua, in many ways a precursor of the more overtly secular Machiavelli, wished to avoid class conflicts based upon the conflation of political and economic power by unifying all authority in a federation-like system with a central guarantor of authority (the Emperor) and unified, though republican local regimes that were not beholden to one class or faction (Marsilius of Padua 1956, in its entirety). Machiavelli's Discourses tend to also argue that class conflict, if contained within a balanced and psychologically unified state, can actually be a good thing (Machiavelli 1950, Discourses, in their entirety).

However, Louis of Bavaria, pursuing a policy first employed by Henry VII, a slightly earlier Holy Roman Emperor, actually supported the Scaligeri and others in their attempts to establish the rule of Signoria, and Louis was crowned only after a brutal march into Rome.

The Holy Roman Empire was too weak to hold on to its gains, but the Imperially-sanctioned Signori were now more entrenched and legitimated forever. It ultimately strengthened the Carrara family, which was already working hard to entrench itself as the

Signoria of Padua even before Louis's march. Marsilius of Padua's dream of Imperial federal power overarching and supporting smaller republics foaled and backfired so much that Padua, so much like Florence, would not see republican rule restored until it was conquered by Venice (Armstrong 1964, 46-47, Caggese 1964 49-55, Marsilius of Padua 1956, in its entirety, and Syros 2012, 19-20).

B. Decline of the Commune and Rise of the Medicis

Within half a century, Florence was measurably on its way to join Padua in republican oblivion. The dysfunctional politics of late medieval Florence led to a lack of recognition of the common person's anger at failing to be represented at all in government. The War of the Eight Saints from 1375-1378, war against the Pope, did not harm the foreign relations of Florence long-term but it did lead to domestic hardships that led to a social revolution in 1378, the revolt of the Ciompi. The Ciompi were woolworkers not represented by the powerful wool guild and in fact were exploited by that guild and the whole guild system. When the plentiful Ciompi revolted, other guildless workers revolted, supported by landed elites and even some guild members. A member of the Medici family was a noble who supported this revolt and managed to remain unscathed by it. For four years, the system was reformed to benefit the guildless, but the guilds with some support from the aristocrats, in 1382 launched a counter-revolution and returned to the status quo. The crushing of the revolt was successful in keeping the working class down but now everyone was aware of the huge socio-political cleavage in society. The elites again separated into landed and guild classes, though the Medicis founded a bank and thus were now part of the citizen or guild class. By the 1420's, the major guilds decided to restrict participation in government to themselves,

with only minor representation by the minor guilds. This was a significant narrowing of the republican franchise, such as it was (non-elective and restricted). In 1426-1427, they were narrowly thwarted when the early Medicis aligned with the minor guilds to defeat the motion. The Signoria (the ruling council) and its supporting bodies were persuaded not to restrict the franchise further, thanks to the efforts of the early Medicis, which would help them rise soon. The new tax on the powerful people established by the Signoria was yet another part of the struggle of power that was to allow the Medicis to take power, supported by the common people (Caggese 1964, 49-51, 66-69, and 75-76, Menning 1999, 375 and 377-378, Menning 1999 (House of Medici), 84-85, Staley 1906, 54, 58-59, 61-62, and 604 and Najemy 1999, 314 and 315-316).

The crisis in 1427 led to the fall of the Republic of Florence as it had stood since the age of Dante. Within six years, the elites divided into pro-Medici and pro-Albizzi camps. Cosimo de' Medici was exiled in 1433 but brought back into the city by a popular revolution in 1434. From 1434 on, Cosimo ruled the city of Florence, as an officially private citizen, a first among equals, but not an official politician. He was smart enough to run things behind the scenes and not to interfere directly with the republican institutions of government. However, he controlled the borse and effectively, the republic was over. However, it had been ailing for a long time (Menning 1999, 378 and Menning 1999 (House of Medici), 84-86).

In some ways, the balance between the factions was better under the first Medici regime than under the true republic of Florence. However, this balance was between the various elites, the middle class, and the common people. It did not bind the ruling Medici house at all. This is not a law-like way to govern a society and it fails even to qualify as a bureaucratic

republic, as it had significantly less checks and balances than did the Roman Principate. And yet, despite being a true non-republican autocracy, despite officially being the Republic of Florence, this regime was still superior to the later Medici regimes. The name of the Republic and the traditions and institutional memory of it actually were the only substantive restraint on the Medici's' power (Menning 1999, 379).

The Medici's were not unchallenged in the period of their first rule. The Pazzis launched a massive attack upon them in 1478 (the Pazzi Conspiracy). Other foreign and domestic were weathered by the regime, which had strong popular support in many quarters. However, in 1494, the first French invasion that sparked the Italian Wars led to the fall of the first Medici regime. The Medici ruler was overthrown and a power vacuum formed, into which republican factions entered and competed for power. Girolamo Savonarola, a Catholic preacher from another Italian city, became the dominant political force for the next few years. He was a firm supporter of a restoration of true republican rule, but he also advocated a more radical form of republicanism that allowed the common people a greater say in government. He was also very anti-materialist, and orchestrated a great bonfire, in which many books and priceless artifacts were destroyed, usually with the consent of the owners. Botticelli and other prominent artists sided with him at this time. He also was followed by prominent anti-Medici politicians such as Pietro Soderini's brother. The Savonarolist movement was not strictly speaking anti-Papal but the condemnation of worldly riches antagonized the Papacy and eventually, Savonarola was executed in 1498 by his opponents in Florence supported by the pope. He was vilified after his life was over, but the extent of his radicalism and fanaticism was actually quite exaggerated by his enemies during his lifetime and afterwards (Clarke 1999, 440-441 and Menning 1999, 379).

At his core, Savonarola believed in a return to best principles and traditions of Republican Florence, a religious restoration that directly merged with republicanism, and an improvement on the older republican model. Pietro Soderini eventually picked up the ashes of the Republic after 1498 and was named Gonfalonier for life. He was not a dictator but similar to the Doge of Venice, a country that the Soderini regime soon modeled Florence's political institutions upon. The Great Council of Florence would be more inclusive than the old guild-dominated system but would still not be a democracy by any stretch of the imagination. The second Florentine Republic was a very broad-based oligarchy or in fact a mixed government with popular and oligarchic elements. Soderini's Secretary of War, Niccolo Machiavelli created a native militia to replace the heavy reliance on mercenaries by Florence. From 1506 on, the citizen's militia was the core of the Florentine army, though mercenaries were not completely forbidden. The Pisan war, from 1495-1509, was finally won by the militia, but the Florentines proved unable to defeat major foreign forces. In 1512, the Imperials and Spanish restored Medici rule to Florence, replacing the pro-French Soderini republican regime (Menning 1999, 379, and Machiavelli 1950, xxv-xxix and 49-55, and Najemy 1999, 317-318).

The second Medici Regime was only firmly in power from 1513 until 1527 and was often run by family members of the ruler, who was the pope in Rome. Florence was run like a colony or dependency of Rome and this regime was much more autocratic even than the first Medici regime. This regime was not as popular as the first one and was overthrown in 1527 after Rome was sacked by the Imperial-Spanish army. However, the third Florentine Republic was unable to stand up to the Imperial-Spanish army in the campaign of 1529-1530 and fell to 1530. The third Medici regime was even harsher than the first two and became the

Duchy of Florence soon after it consolidated its rule. In the 1550's, the now complete autocracy overwhelmed the Sienese republic with help from the Spanish army and became the Grand Duchy of Tuscany soon afterwards as a result (Najemy 1999, 318-319, Menning 1999, 379, Menning 1999 (House of Medici), 87, Santosuosso, 291-295, and Machiavelli 1950, xxix, 94-98).

C. Themes and Conclusions

The Florentine model of government, in fact the entire communal model of government, was flawed because it did not correctly balance power within the elite class and well as among elite and non-elite forces. To some extent this balancing had happened accidentally in Venice, but even so, some of the balancing there in terms of institutions was intentional. Partly because the aristocrats were defeated violently rather than through compromise and partly because Florence had enough wealth that inter-interest group coalitions outside of the elite were unnecessary, Florence and many other communes created narrow coalitions of cliques or factions rather than more complex, shifting coalitions. As a result, the alliances were often fixed and permanent instead of uncertain, preparing the way for permanent polarization. Once, a solid core of powerful elites was in control, they began to marginalize first their enemies, then those of their allies whose interests were most divergent from their own. This process led the new disfranchised and disaffected groups to seek an elite protector. In Florence, this was the house of Medici, in other cities similar Signori rose to power. When the rise of the one over the few benefitted the many more than popular government, the republic fell. In Venice and in a few of the communes, the elites were often divided into strong but reconcilable factions whose interests were sufficiently divergent but also similar to create unpredictable alliances depending on issue, meaning that polarization

was not beneficial to anyone, as exiling or defeating one house could be costing you a potential ally tomorrow. Also, the Venetians had a diverse and broad enough oligarchy to have far-sighted senators and other leaders who recognized that alliances with the *cittadini* and even appeals to the common people were necessary to serve both internal and external political conflicts unscathed. Institutional and socio-economic structures were key, but so too was good personal leadership and wisdom in keeping the state both intact and republican (King 1999, 223-230, and Menning 1999, 378-379).

Additionally, most communes got so used to intra-communal violence that republican virtues and values could never really be taken seriously. In Florence, Guelphs and Ghibellines never learned to view the political community, however diverse, as a single political unit. Venice, however, took fright at early internal struggles and created a system stable enough to procreate its values, virtues, and lessons to new generations, creating a virtuous cycle of republican transaction, cooperation, and non-violence (for the most part). However, Florence and most other communes created a vicious cycle of power-hungry factions, violence, and a lack of republican virtue.

The Aristotelian model of government and everyday ethics argues that habituation can be good or bad depending on what is being habituated. If civil conflict is cyclical, repeated, and almost continuous, it becomes a habit, almost a reflex. If factional infighting is relatively rare, factional mediation and the rule of law and justice are habituated instead republican virtues of pluralism, non-violence, and inter-interest group collaboration are fostered. Admittedly, sudden changes can upturn the Aristotelian applecart, but for the most part, a republican society that is properly habituated to good institutions, norms, and practices will

not destroy itself, and even have a chance to hold on against external aggression (Aristotle 1984, *Politics*, in summary and Aristotle 2004, *Nicomachean Ethics*, in summary).

The guild system is incredibly seductive in terms of governmental model. It is disciplined, orderly, and allows all members of the same profession a theoretical voice in government. However it is rigid, class and profession-based and always tends towards exclusion. It is representative and popular but not democratic at its core. It also leads to intense polarization of interests and a lack of non-class-based institutions and civil society mechanisms to bridge the gap between interest groups. Putnam, in his famous comparative study of northern and southern Italy, assumes that the connectedness of the medieval and Renaissance city and the civic functions that existed back then directly contribute to both the political and civil society factors today, what he calls social capital. However, despite much of Putnam's approach being correct and admirable, there is a serious problem in this approach. The communes of northern and central Italy, such as Florence were based upon the principles of exclusion, class warfare (often literal), and a strict socio-economic order characterized by oligarchical political arrangement (albeit a broad oligarchy). The question then must be raised: is the Putnamian civil society and political order of today also inherently oligarchical (Putnam 1993, summary)?

Of course Venetian civil society and political order were in some ways even more oligarchical and certainly caste-like in terms of socio-economic rigidity, so this critique is not about stability (since Venice was stable) but normative desirability. How does democracy, even in its republican, representative or even mixed government forms, jive with a Putnamian civil society model? How also does it work with the small environs of the Italian city-state?

Aristotle's theory of the middle class does relatively badly in the Florentine case. The middle class was strong and the republic collapsed. Moreover, the republic fell partly because the middle class was strong. Thus, Aristotle is wrong that a strong middle class is the necessary and sufficient answer to republican strife. However, my theory that checks and balances, which often are but do not have to be related to the middle class or classes in society, fits Florence much better. Polarization, racial, ethnic, partisan, regional, or socio-economic, or a mixture of these, is death to a republic. Florence became polarized, radicalizing the middle class. As Aristotle would say, the middle class ceased to form its function in the healthy state, with predictable results. However, he may not have been able to predict that the middle class was not only radicalized but largely self-radicalized. Whenever strong factions form, they refuse to talk the other side but become increasingly introverted and radical, and where no common identity and institutions can force intergroup dialogue, there will be the terrible consequences of polarization. When the middle class goes the system collapses, because it is often the last interest group to radicalize or controls the last institutions to be left uncompromised.

As for the ethnic heterogeneity argument, Florence was very homogeneous ethnically, but collapsed utterly. Class heterogeneity did it in as easily as racial or ethnic polarization, perhaps more so, because the common identities used masked the diversity, while a more obviously diverse culture and society might have led to the proactive creation of institutions to deal with the pluralism rather than cover them up. Here the polarization was so final and violent because the classes never tried to come to an understanding about the division of society into classes, while ethno-racial representative politics could have come to a different result. At least, this shows ethno-racial (and religious) heterogeneity is no more dangerous

than socio-economic and partisan/factional polarization. At most, it may in fact show socio-economic and factional polarization not be in the long-term even more dangerous the health of a republic because it does not have cultural markers like linguistic or ethnic diversity do.

Madison created much of the infrastructure of modern America in light of the problems of faction, both in Thucydides' Greece and in Machiavelli's Florence/ Italian city-states in general. Madison believed as most elites always have, that the common people were unfit to rule the state and thus direct democracy or even a popular form of representative democracy, was out of the picture. However, Madison was aware that a class-based regime amounting to a rigid oligarchy was bound to fail in such a large and diverse country as America. It worked in Venice because of that country's small-scale, its unique socio-economic situation, geography, and above all, luck. In many other places, small republics were unsuccessful, even at their optimum size. Elites form factions and they can be as devastating as inner-class factions. Factions need to be played against each other, to ensure maximum uncertainty of partners in any given issue debate. Venice had done a fairly good job of this, but more factions were needed in a large republic to accomplish in America what was accomplished in Venice (Thucydides 1972, in its entirety; Machiavelli 1950, in its entirety, and Madison 2001, 42-48).

Allowing the common people, essentially the middle class (the *cittadini*-equivalent) the franchise was a major concession of populism, but not for populism's sake. More voices in government meant more factions and more factions meant more uncertainty in government. And uncertainty meant a lack of radical action and the need for compromise and transactional politics for any meaningful action at all. Of course such a system required additional levels of government as a failsafe should inaction occur at the top or central level.

Thus a federation, which was politically necessary anyway due to America's history and geographical extent, was important. The federal government represented so many factions that inaction could happen often, but the states and the local governments could support it. States had factions but less of them and would be more effective but could be checked by the whole nation, including the federal military, if they became rebellious. Local governments were like communes or city-states and could be the building blocks of the consistent states. Thus a minimum of three government levels could check each other but also reinforce each other should one or both of the others fail. As a result no longer did small states have to rely on semi-independent vassal/subject states to safeguard the representation and autonomy of non-elites outside of the core territory. The country became a federation of smaller republics that had great domestic autonomy and representation at multiple levels of government. However, despite Madison and others' genius, the basic ideas of republican law and order within the city-state come from ancient times, reinforced by the Italian communes and Venice. One could never get to modern America without the example of many medieval, Renaissance, and Early Modern states of Italy.

Guicciardini, an influential political theorist and historian from Florence, echoed the view of Paolo Sarpi, Contarini and other Venetian republican theorists that Florence had been too democratic to function. Machiavelli disagreed, arguing that it had not been democratic enough. However, the lack of a strong active middle class other than the upper middle class bourgeoisie, the forced de-politicization of the landed aristocracy and the disenfranchisement of the poor led to a very unstable state, as Aristotle would have predicted. Furthermore, Florence was run more imperially than republican when it dealt with conquered cities, much more so than Venice did and was less honest about his power and control. Florence was not

too democratic or not democratic enough; it was not bureaucratic enough, law-like enough or balanced enough to be a stable republic. It was more balanced than many other communal republics but could not compare to Venice as a republic (Najemy 1999, 315-321, especially 318 and 320-321).

Allowing political and economic power to become intertwined was a major flaw of the Florentine model. Machiavelli tried to form an alliance of the classes and factions, much as Marsilius of Padua had tried before in Padua and elsewhere, but they both failed, with predictable results. Both theorists warned about the military problems of weakness, division, and relying on troops not dedicated to the cause. They both also served as real-life examples of theorists who also promulgated pragmatic public policy solutions. Florence shows us that theory and practice should always be thought of together by the theorist whenever possible, though matching up has been proven here to be very difficult. Military strength and the unity that aids it are essential to the health of a republic, while concentrated, unified political and economic power is very dangerous. Economic and political power must be balanced off each other while keeping class and factional conflict under control and the populace unified enough to create a strong military under the political authority. This is helpful both to consolidated republics like the U.S. or Italy or aspiring republics such as Afghanistan.

Chapter 6: Conclusion- Making the Best Practicable Regime

A. Introduction of the Conclusion

Republicanism is, as had been argued, an ideology and pattern of practice designed to produce republics. It is thus a practical system of political thought and thus has many practical applications in today's world. The republic is a better place to be. It is not a panacea, an ideal Platonic utopia nor "simply settling". It is in fact a family of best practicable regimes in the Aristotelian sense. The standard republic, neither democratic nor liberal, but still more representative than dictatorships and more liberal than non-republics, is the best practicable regime for previously low-performing regimes or places where no stable state has existed before at all. The liberal bureaucratic republic is the best practicable regime for those regimes and states that have a stronger social community situation and/or civil society. The democratic republic is best used in its liberal form, the liberal democratic republic. This would be the highest form of the best practicable regime, in advanced, well-established states such as the United States.

The two main concerns of this conclusion chapter are the criteria for determining which version of republic is best for each developing state and which version should be applied to certain prominent cases in today's world. Civil society groups, governments, comparativists, and political theorists all can plan institutional design through the theory of republicanism promulgated and supported through case study evidence in this dissertation. Afghanistan, Iraq, Bolivia, and the Ukraine are all prominent cases of states in need of better regimes.

This chapter looks at how to diagnose which form of republic is most helpful to the people of each state and then apply those standards to these four cases.

B. The Criteria for Diagnosing which Type of Republic is Best

There are some countries that cannot support republics. However, all people deserve a republic, the solution sometimes is divide state into countries that are culturally, social, politically, and economically defensible. The worst and weakest states are often the easiest to break up. A less extreme solution is the all but partition (or soft partition) in which a state is broken into its defensible countries without full-on legal independence for its constituent parts. Essentially this turns the nation into a confederation of countries. A third solution in this vein is to turn a centralized state into a less centralized state. This can mean making a unitary state into a federal one or simply devolving power to the regions while still remaining technically unitary.

Once the level of centralization of the regime is determined, the level of potential republican development must be assessed. Some countries need for lack of a better word, a constrained strongman (it is rare for these sorts of countries to have a strongwoman). The leader would be a strong executive but not an accountable dictator. Let us look back at Persia. Xerxes was a tough man and often harsh but he was not unconstrained. Today, there are far worse strongmen than him. Admittedly, some of the reactions of Xerxes do not meet today's sensibility requirements and we would hope that a modern Xerxes would not cut up the son of a detractor but find a better way to deal with those issues. Imprisonment was invented in the interim and may be a better solution.

The strongman would not be a conventional dictator because of three major constraints:

- a. the level of decentralization/federalization implemented,
- b. an independent judiciary, and
- c. a diverse and semi-autonomous bureaucracy broadly representing the various interest

groups in the country. This type of regime will be based on the standard republic model, adding in some electoral/legislative checks of power where possible.

Other states, better off than the first categories, may not be ready for democracy per se but do not need a great founder/re-founder to hold them together. Here a more collective leadership, with legislative checks of power and hopefully some electorally legitimate process would be implemented, on top of the three checks and balance systems already included in the standard model. The judiciary would be even stronger here, and civil society groups would be freer to express their support of various positions and interest groups, protected by a firm, written constitution. The liberal values of strict due process, free speech and expression, and even importantly, freedom of conscience/religion, would be strongly enforced in this system. This is the liberal republic model.

The best case scenario would allow for a smooth transition to eventual democracy. This is the liberal democratic republic model. All of the second model's assumptions would hold, except the judiciary might have to loosen its grip a bit to allow to greater democracy. Electoral process would become paramount in this model and having a vibrant multi-party liberal and electoral democracy would be the goal, while never walking away from the standard republican checks and balances- bureaucracy, judiciary, and fragmentation of geographic power. Not every country needs decentralization but it is to be expected in most diverse states.

The three models could also be viewed as stages of political development for the worst performing states. Once the first level is achieved, one works on the second level, then the third level. It is based on the idea that democracy; while a wonderful thing to have, does not

spring up from the ground and needs several stages of development to be truly consolidated, at least in most cases.

The criteria for determining which level of republicanism to start with involve several questions. How much conflict has this country experienced in its history, particularly recently? What caused those conflicts (regime type, ethnic struggle, race, socio-economics, language policy, religion, et cetera)? How does the diversity of the country function to promote or frustrate good governance (it is not safe to assume that high diversity is bad for a state or regime)? How are the various groups distributed geographically (this measures feasibility of decentralizing based upon demographic concerns, which is sometimes but not always the solution)? What is the state of the civil society in the country? What are the political institutions like? Are they healthy? Can they constrain powerful social forces that are deleterious to basic human protections? And of course, is this country even viable?

A high-conflict country, particularly with demographics-fueled conflict, weak political institutions and civil society, with strong, destructive social forces and a potentially non-viable state will usually need to start with the first model of republicanism- standard republicanism. A state with social forces largely under control with reasonable but still moderately weak political institutions and with weak-to-moderate civil society, where inter-group conflict is at least mostly under control, can start working on the second phase of political development. A state with these factors, but also with a stronger civil society/interest group structure and at least somewhat stronger political institutions and/or less recent conflict can start on the democratic phase right away. However, if the political institutions are too strong, the state is already a developed liberal democratic republic and might not need our help. So there are four phases of political development according to this

republican model, assuming a state is in bad enough shape to need all of them. Let us call them the four phases, the infant phase- where the basics of republicanism are learned, the adolescent phase, where liberalism is learned, the young adult stage, where democracy is learned, and the mature stage, where the most important concern is maintaining the system (which is very important to remember).

C. Assessing the Four Modern Cases

Now, let us use our criteria to diagnose what type of republicanism each of our four modern case countries should initially pursue. Our cases are Iraq, Afghanistan, Bolivia, and the Ukraine.

Iraq is a country teetering on the edge of disintegration. We can assume that the disassembling stage, which prefaces our first normal phase of political development, must be applied. Either Iraq is rendered into a confederation of various states, based on sectarian concerns, or becomes a set of entirely independent states. To avoid international conflict having the constituent states of Iraq remain in a vague confederation is probably the best option. Each state would be independent except in certain types of foreign affairs and military matters would be bifurcated between the confederal and state levels. Rather than divide Iraq into three parts, as is often proposed however (Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd), which is likely to cause great conflict on the borders, I propose four new states. Kirkuk would join the Kurdish state but Mosul (Nineveh) would be joined with Saladin and Diyala Provinces into a state. Baghdad and the south would form a Shiite state and Anbar would remain its own state. Some revenue sharing might be needed between the states to keep them peaceful. All

of this assumes that ISIS is defeated in the occupied Sunni areas (Beauchamp 2014, maps 1-27).

Iraq's four newly all-but-independent states would be at different stages of political development according to my model. Kurdistan, with a reasonable amount of civil society and political development and with significant control over powerful social forces like ethnic strife, can probably start working at the third phase, though some work on liberalization would have to be done early, perhaps concurrently with democratization. The Shiite state, which has enough social control, political development and civil society development for liberalization but is still not developed enough for democratization, would start working on the second phase. The two Sunni states would have to start at the first phase, because they are so devastated by conflict. Anbar would make the quicker transition into the second phase because its division is primarily tribal while the ethno-religious diversity of the Central Sunni state would take a longer process of republicization, aided by international organizations and other countries. A Machiavellian strongman with constraints upon his power will be needed here for a while, as opposed to the quick transition into the liberal phase of development for Anbar (Beauchamp 2014, maps 1-27).

Thus Iraq needs to be cut apart into four parts, a third phase Kurdistan, a second phase Shiite state, a later first phase Anbar, and an early (worst-case) first phase Central Sunni state. The parts through the Iraqi Confederation would be able to help each other, resolve disputes, and communicate with one another.

Afghanistan is actually easier to solve than Iraq, partly because ISIS does not have to be defeated first and the Taliban are potentially willing to negotiate. However, Afghanistan is a large, diverse place with strong tribal and traditional loyalties. Decentralization carries the

risk of fragmenting into unaccountable chiefdoms or petty warlord-states. However, decentralization is an important way of initiating transactional politics at the deep grassroots level, particularly with the Taliban and other potential opposition groups. The current regime of President Ghani and Vice President Abdullah is actually a good start. The head is healthy, but the body is not. To form a proper country, a federal model is best. This would not be like the confederal model Iraq needs or a strong central government but something in between. The monopoly on legitimate military force must be placed with the federal army and the federal government must ensure that the military bureaucracy is broadly representative of the people. Then and only then can a federal constitution formally acknowledging the truth on the ground- that power is already fragmented- be established. The idea is to use the federal power to constitute better regional polities, which will then help ensure decent administration at the local level. A top-down approach is a good idea because it is the healthiest part of the political culture in Afghanistan right now. The federal regime is at the second phase and can begin working at the third phase federally but local and regional government has to start at the first phase, probably the later part not relying strictly on local strongmen. The idea is to build federalism from the ground up with help from above and international organizations and countries. The federal units would be provinces not ethnically or religiously derived zones (Pillalamarri 2015; Fisher 2015, 14 and 27-30).

The Ukraine is a nation at war, both with Russia and itself. It has several major demographic groups, though many scholars would say (incorrectly) that it is less diverse on average than the first two cases. Western Ukraine has a strong Greek-rite Catholic population as well Ukrainian Orthodox worshippers independent of the official Ukrainian church supported by Moscow. In the central part of the Ukraine, the people are Orthodox

and ethnically and linguistically Ukrainian but split between the rebel and official churches. In the east, the divide is between the Ukrainian and Russian languages and further east between ethnic Ukrainians that speak Russian and ethnic Russians that speak Russian. Usually a Russian speaker of either ethnicity will religiously affiliate with the Moscow-backed church. So, the main demographic groups in the Ukraine are a. ethno-linguistically Ukrainian Catholics, b. ethno-linguistically Ukrainian Orthodox members in resistance to Moscow, c. ethno-linguistically Ukrainian Orthodox members in union with Moscow (religiously not always politically), d. ethnic Ukrainians linguistically and religiously Russian, and e. ethnic Russians (CIA World Factbook 2015; Wikipedia 2015).

These three dimensions: religion, language, and ethnicity, definitely cut Ukraine up into more than two or three easy to identify regions. Additionally, there is no reasonable way to divvy up the territory in deference to demographic concerns, though like in Afghanistan, using previously existing administrative divisions is vastly preferable than new demographically-gerrymandered regions. Each oblast or province would gain the same kind of autonomy from the government, either federalism or a lesser version of autonomy. There would be no special autonomous zones or regions as this often convincing the regionalists to become separatists. For regions mostly under Russian Army/separatist control, the Ukraine would establish governments for them but only exercise jurisdiction within their zone of control. Instead of trying to compromise and give special rights to the separatists, the government should let them fester while setting up their autonomy, federalism scheme everywhere else. Once the separatists' captives see what they are giving up by not rejoining the country, they will force the separatists to rejoin without demanding asymmetrical rights. The autonomy, even if it is full federalism, must be symmetrical, that is no region feels it has

a special right to more power as opposed to its neighbors. The regions being based on the current provinces means that demographically-mixed areas would need to make the social, economic, and political compromises necessary to make their little polities work. Written constitutions for all regions will be needed negotiated primarily at the regional level but with national and international oversight. The central government is ready to enter the third phase of development, but the regional governments need to start at the second phase, though they are still one level ahead of Afghanistan (CIA World Factbook 2015).

Bolivia is the least extreme of the four cases. It is rated an electoral democracy by most indexes and a liberal or full democracy by others. However, Evo Morales, its President has been accused of illiberal and sometimes even undemocratic actions. His opponents want to decentralize the country even federalize. After rather strongly, even brutally fighting back against this plan, Morales has actually seemed to embrace it to an extent. However, his plans seem to indicate an asymmetrical decentralization or federalization that would leave most pro-Morales parts of the country under direct central government rule. Ironically, this will not strengthen his rule but cause further division of the nation into unitary western Bolivia and federal eastern Bolivia. Instead of giving a potential ideological victory to his opponents, Morales could simply federalize the whole country. From a position of strength Morales would be able to ensure that the nation had a strong federal government, help shape the federal and even the state/provincial constitutions, and keep a strong unified military, both representative of the diverse people of Bolivia but also loyal to him (Centellas 2010).

As a result, Morales would be less powerful over time, but much more secure in power. He would not have to fear his enemies acting violently and could fight for his policies state by state as well as at the federal level. This decentralization would ensure the first phase of

republicanism by itself and the second phase would be much easier to work on. Bolivia is not a liberal democracy as of now, but has enough of the elements of an electoral democracy to help the second phase be completed. The third phase of true democracy will take much longer to work, because of Morales's desire for power within the republic. So, Bolivia can quickly finish the first and second phases because of its republican foundation under Morales but that same foundation will make it harder to democratize in the third phase.

Thus, my system has diagnosed all four states and recommended the pathways each should take on the road to republicanism. Iraq needs to be gutted at a state, turned into a confederation and least some of its parts have to start at the beginning of the process. Afghanistan and Ukraine need to federalize or otherwise decentralize, but largely from the top-down. They also are at the central government level past the most rudimentary stages of the process. Bolivia is in the best shape and can complete the first two broad phases of development easily, but will have more trouble with the third phase. There are examples of states that do not need to decentralize to become republics, but as these four examples show, federalization or something like it is the norm with this basic kind of model.

D. Conclusion of the Conclusion

To review my basic theory, a republic is a regime that is characterized by a (relative) lack of domination by any one interest group or actor, mostly non-violent competition for power among various interest groups/factions, the ability of factions/interest groups/individual actors to continue to legitimately play the political game even after electoral or issue-area defeat and some measure of effectiveness. A republic can be bureaucratic, electoral, or (ideally) a little bit of both. Bureaucratic republics prevent domination by ensuring checks

and balances in bureaucratic institutions like the military or civilian institutions such as public food and welfare distribution and educational agencies. Electoral republics use official elected positions such as deliberative bodies especially legislatures to block the domination of the polity by interest groups and individuals. A hybrid republic does both. Republics can be liberal and democratic and should aim to be. Lastly, I have just developed the political developmental process for modern republics in the standard, liberal, and democratic phases.

What is exceedingly important to emphasize in closing is the fourth phase of political development in republics- the maintenance phase. Republics in ancient and medieval history fell because they could not be maintained. The first chapter explores how this comes to be and the primary case studies of this dissertation explicate these ideas further. Institutions decay over time if they do not remain vital to the republican polity and are also updated to adjust to new needs and political realities. The exemplar model used in this and other studies, just as is Pettit's, is the Roman republic. The republic did not grow with its physical size, it did not work hard to integrate new interest groups, specifically the dangerous all-volunteer military and the various Italian ethnicities and thus had a series of crises that allow for ambitious men to take over and establish autocratic regimes. The United States, a very successful liberal democratic republic, should not ignore Rome and other examples, such as how the bureaucratic republic of Persia never worked hard to create controls over regional bureaucracies and better political control over social impulses. Political polarization could be lethal to the republic, as it stops the vital active forces of transactional politics, leads to more antagonistic relations between interest groups and encourages ambitious executives to weaken age-old checks and balances.

The maintenance phase never ends, unlike the other three phases (at least hopefully). A disengaged electorate, an unrepresentative military and civilian bureaucracy, highly polarized political branches, and a lack of accountability for autocratic behavior in foreign policy are the main problems at the federal level, but at the state level too there are problems. Political polarization, though not quite as strong as at the federal level, is corrosive here too, plus a lack of transparency or even media coverage of state legislatures is potentially devastating for any republic, let alone a liberal democratic one. The state courts systems are threatened either by elected judges and district attorneys or by the court-packing of courts through appointment by partisan governors. The independent judiciary, the strong legislature, even the state bureaucracy can be affected by polarization, a lack of transparency, and a popular belief in extremely powerful executives. And yet, the American republic is actually far from a disaster. Part of the solution is simply civic education- remind kids and adults alike of the need to support the republic through participation, activism, running for office, voicing dissent, and most importantly, listening to opposing viewpoints. If civic education is made a priority, the republic will be much better off because of it.

To end this dissertation, let us briefly review the four main empirical cases and how they both support the main ideas of the dissertation and help us deal with the two alternative hypotheses.

Assyria showed us how a republic can turn into a despotic non-republic quickly when economic and socio-political conditions change rapidly. The base of support for the old regime eroded and so a new regime arose and never looked back. The foundations of the republic can be vulnerable to such sudden shocks. Persia showed us that logistics, technology, and infrastructure are keys to the stability of a republic. Non-domination without

effectiveness and stability is anarchy. It is essential to balance the checks and balances that limit and separate power and the efficient governance of the people that provides law and order. Venice showed us that republics can work for a long time, albeit under specific circumstances often unique to each case. Venice's model worked well for it but needed to be amended by thinkers like Madison to work for large, diverse places like America. Florence showed us that Aristotle was partially wrong, that in fact a strong robust middle class could be radicalized and thus de-stabilize the republic rather than strengthen it. Institutional balance, not merely class balance is required to maintain a republic.

Furthermore, Assyria, Persia, Venice, and Florence all show that the argument that one should wait for a state to be consolidated before attempting to produce a republican state is false. This is much like the idea that one should wait for economic prosperity and development before attempting political development of the democratic or republican type. However, generally speaking it is easier to start the process of republican political development early in state development and that is much harder to turn a consolidated non-republic into a republic. Either a non-consolidated state or a state in great crisis is usually a better place to attempt republican political development than full on autocracies. Obviously a state with some tradition, institutions, or belief structures already supporting democratic or republican governance is also helpful in political development.

Assyria developed its republic in its primordial stage and once this was lost, the consolidated autocracy was never shaken or moved. Persia also developed its republican features in its formation and early consolidation. Venice traces much of its republicanism from the beginning and developed along the republican path rather than having to switch gears to the republican model. Finally, Florence developed in the vacuum of Tuscan power

after Matilda's death and so its best republican features did not come after the consolidation of the state but when the state was collapsing everywhere except in the towns. The instability of the state often helps republics, particularly when the instability is all around the town but the town or city itself in an eye in the storm. Florence remained stable while the Tuscan countryside broke down, Venice developed free from the ravages of the mainland, but near to it. Anshan was a safe harbor in a terrible time of international conflict. The Assyrian city-state was also peaceful but surrounded by troubling historical circumstances. Thus, the rise of the republican state flourishes where a strong political community and a weak formal state both exist. The pre-existence of the consolidated state is not required or helpful, and may even be harmful to republican political development.

As for alternative hypotheses to explain the causes of greater basic human protections, Aristotle's middle class-based theory came out relatively well in my analysis, but it is not an alternative hypothesis so much as it is part of or superseded by my theory. Class balance is one major factor that leads to the social balance and compromises needed to maintain the republic. However, it is merely one major factor out of potentially many. Institutional balance often relies on class balance but is not guaranteed by it. Transactional politics requires different groups to see themselves at potentially working with other groups for common goals from times to time rather than have strict, permanent alliances. Full-on factional polarization, across racial, class, ethnic, religious or ideological lines is devastating for the republic's institutions and thus the republic itself, regardless of how big the middle class is at the time.

As for the heterogeneity hypothesis, it utterly failed as an alternative hypothesis because it could not explain a single case equally or better than my theory did. Assyria did not fall

apart because of ethnic heterogeneity; it in fact fell apart when it was becoming more ethnically homogenous. Persia likewise was less successful when it was more ethnically and religiously homogenous, because institutions broke down. When the institutions were working properly, the high ethnic heterogeneity was if anything an asset. Only when the fail-safes of the system fell apart did the system fall apart and it has little to do with heterogeneity. Venice's success was due to a small size rather than strictly cultural heterogeneity. More diverse than many other Western European societies, Venice was more pluralistic and tolerant than them as well. Where Venetian republican institutions were extended effectively, heterogeneity was not an issue. Where institutions were not effectively extended, it was not due to ethnic heterogeneity but a lack of will exert political pressure to change old patterns (Muir 1998, 24-28, 35-37, 156, and 171). Florence was as homogenous as republics come and it still fell, in fact its lack of diversity may have destroyed it because the only factions were based on class and they had little in common with one another in terms of interests. As a result, there is little to believe in the ethnic heterogeneity argument.

In sum, republics are better places to be than non-republics. They are the lands of compromise political and often social, pluralistic and usually diverse, where partisan ideology is not the only or even primary ideology of a majority of citizens or subjects. The republican ideology itself is important in creating the norms, laws, and institutions that make a republic form, consolidate, and maintain it. Republics can be harsh but usually fair and reasonably just and they are the building blocks of the best practicable regimes the liberal and liberal democratic republics. A girl in Afghanistan wanting to be able to openly learn to read and write, safely go out in public, speak her native language, and practice her religion would understand that the republic is a better place to be than where she is now or has been

recently. The best aspect of the republic is that it can be built upon, because it is the foundation of the whole set of best practicable regimes. Rather than try to create democracy from nothing or hope an illiberal, majoritarian democracy can become a liberal one, the republic-based system of political development is a vastly better concept. Modern liberal democracy relies on republics, so why not start with republics and build upon that foundation over time. The provision of food, housing, clothing, and other basic welfare items as well as freedom of religion and from discrimination and conflict come best through the republican model, even before it becomes truly liberal in the second phase.

Thus liberal democracy and republicanism are not two essentially dissimilar things. Illiberal democracy and republicanism are, I would argue dissimilar enough as to be of two different substances. However, a similar, dualistic theory of liberal democracy and republicanism is inappropriate. My model is monistic, that is it assumes that the core purposes of liberal democracy and republicanism are largely compatible and/or similar. Furthermore, the model is monistic because good republics always strive to become liberal democracies, which almost always tend to also be republics.

It is important to remember that liberal constitutionalism and republicanism are not dissimilar things either and that the tradition that brought us Machiavelli and Marsilius also eventually brought us Madison. The Roman-Italian tradition, which itself developed from Aristotle, fed into the liberal constitutionalist theories popular in the Anglo-American school, particularly Madison. Locke and Hobbes are not really in the liberal constitutional tradition as often believed but to the extent that Locke does belong, his contributions are best understood within Madison. At the end of the day, we need to view republican theory as a long history stemming from Aristotle, through Cicero, medieval Italian communalism,

Marsilius, Machiavelli, Venice, and into the Anglo-American world, resulting in the grand synthesis of Madison. So it is not that the traditions are at odds or even different, but really part of one large republican tradition, originating as the historical republics of both electoral and bureaucratic types, in the Greater Mediterranean world.

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