ABSTRACT

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Terrorism studies have increased following the attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. While a great deal of research has focused on the influence of state-sponsored counterterrorism strategies on terrorist activities, limited attention has been directed towards examining the influence of non-state actors on terrorist organizations (TOs). This dissertation seeks to assess the role that an influential but often overlooked player may have on terrorist activity: the non-governmental organization (NGO).

Many TOs and NGOs engage in similar campaigns, primarily providing services or advocating for a shared constituency or minority that experiences suffering at the hands of a majority, usually the state. Both TOs and NGOs require the support of the constituents in order to maintain group legitimacy, fundraise, and recruit. In addition, both vie for media attention in order to publicize the issue, radicalize the larger community, and exert pressure on the state. Public support and

attention is limited and difficult to acquire, placing TOs and NGOs in competition. As such, within the rational choice and game theoretic frameworks, when faced with an NGO competitor, TOs are hypothesized to adjust their activities in order to gain constituent support, media attention, and to eliminate the competition.

Using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), this dissertation assesses the influence that Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Committee of the Red Cross, and local NGOs have on TOs in Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey between 1987 and 2011. Results from autoregressive Poisson and negative binomial models demonstrate limited support for the hypothesized relationships. NGOs appear to have a marginal influence on TO activities in Algeria, an extremely limited impact in Lebanon, and no relationship in Turkey. Overall findings suggest two conclusions: NGO activities, in general, do not appear to escalate TO violence and NGO campaign activities specifically focused on de-escalating TO violence appear to be ineffective in these three countries. Replication is needed in additional countries to substantiate these findings.

THE UTILITY OF NGO INTERVENTIONS: INFLUENCES ON TERRORIST
ACTICVITY

By

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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

"Read thousands of books and I will power myself with knowledge. Pens and books are the weapons that defeat terrorism." ― *Malala Yousafzai at the opening of the new Library of Birmingham.*

Terrorism rips communities and cultures apart and leaves a path of destruction in its wake. While the devastating consequences of terrorism are relatively well known and well researched, we still know very little about what determines the frequency of terrorist attacks and the factors that lead to an escalation in behaviors. This dissertation seeks to assess the role that an influential but often overlooked player may have on terrorist activity: the non-governmental organization. The rational choice/deterrence and game theory frameworks suggest that, when presented with a competitor, an individual or group will alter behavior in order to eliminate or best the competition. It is hypothesized that terrorist organizations will view non-governmental organizations as competitors for constituent allegiance, community support, and scarce resources. As such, it is hypothesized that non-governmental organizations' presence and activities will contribute to a terrorist organization's decision to engage in, increase, or decrease violent activity in an attempt to present itself as a viable competitor and to overcome the competition.

Key Players and Underlying Dynamics

Following the developers of the Global Terrorism Database, terrorism is defined in this dissertation as the intentional use of violence or threat of violence by a

non-state actor, motivated by a political or social goal, intended to send a message to a larger audience and carried out outside the parameters of international humanitarian law (LaFree et al., 2014). Terrorism is often the response to a perceived injustice or inequality (Ehrlich and Liu, 2002). Terrorism can arise in conflict zones where an oppressor, frequently a state actor representing the ethnic or cultural majority, undermines or disregards the rights and freedoms of the oppressed, usually a cultural or ethnic minority (Adamson, 2005; Flanigan, 2006). Within a domestic context, this persecuted community is typically a part of the citizenry, but maintains a unique identification as part of an oppressed constituency.[1] In response to a dynamic of oppression, a terrorist organization (TO) may form or take up residence, with the stated purpose of achieving policy change, autonomy, or freedoms and recognitions for the disadvantaged or minority community (Lichbach, 1987). From the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) to the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), many TOs declare that their mission is to represent and defend the defenseless, often by any means necessary.[2]

TOs are not the only organizations that operate with the goals of defending an oppressed constituency (Ly, 2007). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are often mandated to protect human and civil rights, to ensure dignity and security for all world citizens, and to hold oppressors accountable for their actions (Eriksson and

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[1] The distinction between citizenry and constituency will be made throughout the dissertation. Members of the constituency are most likely part of the citizenry but not all citizens are part of the constituency.

[2] The main motto of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) is "long live the Bangsamoro nation. Victory or to the graveyard" (Moro National Liberation Front, 2014). The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was originally founded with the purpose of creating a sovereign state for the minority Tamil people (Tamil Eelam, 2013).

Sadiwa, 2008). Persecuted communities in a conflict area can, therefore, attract the attention of NGOs, in addition to capturing the interest of a TO.

While NGOs and TOs may share the same goal of alleviating suffering for a persecuted community and may share the same adversary of the state actor, majority community, or oppressor, they differ considerably in the tactics they choose to employ (Flanigan, 2006). The act of terrorism requires, by definition, the use of violence or threat of the use of violence (Post, 2004). TOs, therefore, are organizations that have formed around the supposition that violent action is a powerful and acceptable means of affecting change. NGOs, on the other hand, are required, by definition, to maintain a non-criminal status and, as such, are not permitted to engage in violent action (Willetts, 2002). In addition, NGOs maintain their legitimacy partly due to their choice of using non-violent means to promote change.

Therefore, in a conflict area, the constituents of an oppressed community may have two "heroes" arise: TOs and NGOs. Although these two groups may share some similarities and, logically, may improve their chances of campaign success through an alliance, they are inherently at odds with each other. NGOs cannot align themselves with a violent partner without losing credibility in the eyes of supporters and the international community; support for NGOs often arises specifically due to the fact that they employ non-violent and diplomatic tactics (Willetts, 2007). Along the same lines, NGOs and TOs are also structured differently; while NGOs are generally accountable to their board of directors, their members and, ultimately, the nation state within which they area registered (Gibelman and Gelman, 2004; Lehr-

Lehnardt, 2005), TOs are autonomous and typically lack comparable parameters of accountability (Foster, 2001). An alliance on behalf of the oppressed would require navigating these organizational differences. In addition, NGOs often seek a goal that is less extreme or more compromising than the TOs' goal and, therefore, is incompatible with TOs' ideal outcome (Morgan, 2004). TOs may also view the NGOs as part of the problem; NGOs are representatives of a majority community that the TOs may perceive as being a contributor to an oppressive situation (Clarke, 1998). Many NGOs originate in the western world and, to the TOs, NGOs are outsiders and they can symbolize unwelcome western influences (Wright, 2012). The polio vaccination campaign in Pakistan provides a ready example; international humanitarian NGOs are actively engaged in an anti-polio campaign, but the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the local TO, rejects their services, claiming that the health care workers are spies for the United States government and the polio vaccine is a ruse designed to sterilize Pakistani children (Fox News, 2012). Therefore, NGOs and TOs are not natural allies and their active participation in a conflict area may lead to organizational dispute, rather than to organizational compromise and collaboration.

Both NGOs and TOs rely on the support and approval of the disempowered or disenfranchised community (Flanigan, 2006). Support from this community is essential; without some level of allegiance from the oppressed constituency, campaigns to promote change lose legitimacy (Murdie and Stapley, 2013; Slim, 2002). The organization loses power and authority in a given campaign if their presence and support are unwelcome. Beyond legitimacy, TOs and NGOs need the constituency's support if they are to survive (Bloom, 2004; Findley and Young,

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2012). Their financial resources and membership relies on the donations and

allegiance of the oppressed community. Shining Path (SL) in Peru illustrates this key

point; Shining Path made little effort to win the support of the constituency and,

instead created a climate of fear in the local population. The villagers allied

themselves with the state, took up arms, and actively opposed SL's presence

(Flanigan, 2006). The capture of SL's leader in 1994 marked a pivotal moment in the

decline of the TO; however, academics posit that the lack of local support contributed

substantially to the demise of the organization (Boliver, 2005; Kay, 2007).

Given that NGOs and TOs are unlikely to align with each other, the need to

solicit support from the same constituency makes them competitors. They may vie

for the scarce resource of constituent attention, approval, and participation (Murdie

and Stapley, 2013). The members of the oppressed community are left with the

option of allying with the TO, a local body that often has representatives in their

community, but employs the use of violence, or to ally with the NGO, often an

international body that may only have a temporary presence, but uses less

controversial and more diplomatic means of seeking change (Stapley, 2014).[3] There

are additional options available to the constituents as well, such as remaining neutral

or allying with the repressive majority actor. Regardless of what the public ultimately

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[3] One option not discussed in this dissertation is the fact that the local community may ally with both
NGOs and TOs. As will be discussed further in chapter three, it is posited here that TOs view the
dynamic between themselves and NGOs as a zero-sum game. Constituent support of one organization
equates to a lack of constituent support of another organization. Therefore, while citizen support of
both groups may be possible, it is argued here that this potential dynamic does not play a prominent
role in TO decision-making.

opts to do, the TO and the NGO are engaged in a competition for constituents' allegiance.[4]

Do NGOs Really Matter?

The previous section outlined the dynamics that may exist between a TO and an NGO. It is upon this backdrop that we return to the original focus of this dissertation: identifying the influence that NGOs may have on TO activity. The argument that NGOs will have an impact on TOs has relevance if there exists a reasonable expectation that the constituents will choose to support the NGO over the TO. If, however, there are no logical grounds upon which to expect that the constituents will support an NGO, the likelihood that NGO activity will have any influence on TO activity is diminished considerably. This expectation requires two supporting arguments: that the TO activity is unacceptable or undesirable to some of the constituents and that the NGO activity is acceptable or even desirable to some of the constituents.

Terrorism: The push factor

Terrorism is costly, causing a great deal of harm to a country, its citizenry, and to the oppressed constituency. It has political, social, and economic consequences that stretch beyond the immediately recognizable aftermath of violent incidents. The long-term outcomes of terrorist activity can include military action, suspension of rights, civil and political distrust, and war. Additional consequences can affect political stability, economic vitality, and international relations.

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[4] NGOs and TOs may also compete with other similar groups (i.e.: TOs compete with other TOs and NGOs compete with other NGOs). However, this dissertation will focus primarily on the competition that arises between TOs and NGOs.

The short and long-term impacts of these effects are ultimately borne by the citizenry, domestic and global, as they experience the loss of health and well-being, freedoms and liberties, and stability and security following an attack. As part of the citizenry, the constituency can bear the general burden of these outcomes along with the rest of society. In addition, the constituency can become directly caught between the TO and the oppressor as the two forces engage in an escalation of violence in the constituents' territory (Kay, 2007). Finally, the constituents may face increased persecution as the oppressor seeks to punish the constituency for the actions of the TO. An example of this can be found in the 2006 Lebanon War when Shia Hezbollah members crossed the border and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers (Kattan, 2006; Norton, 2007). Israel retaliated, leading to 34 days of warfare, resulting in the death of more than a thousand people and the displacement of an additional million people; the majority of the victims were members of the Shia constituency.[5] A further example is provided by the Uigher Muslims in China. China is officially recognized as an atheist state and has a history of religious persecution (Taylor, 2014). Uigher extremists have rallied around a campaign for religious freedoms, causing the Chinese government to clamp down on religious expression, further marginalizing the Muslim community.

Bearing the brunt of these outcomes can facilitate a punitive attitude amongst the constituency, leading to overall rejection of and active abhorrence towards terrorist groups (Angus Reid, 2011a, 2011b, 2012). Oppressed communities can become incensed to the point that the public will willingly give up liberties and may even bear arms and engage in physical force in an attempt to eradicate violent

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[5] As elaborated upon in chapter four, the Shia community is a persecuted minority in Lebanon.

political expression or threats to stability and security (Davis, 2007; Davis and Silver, 2003). Constituent groups may form and can become quite prominent and established in their regions (Carey et al., 2013). An example includes the Sahwa or Awakening Council in Iraq; this Sunni group formed in response to the aggressive anti-government activities perpetrated by Sunni TOs such as Al-Qa`ida in Iraq and its predecessor, Tawhid and Jihad.   These TOs were rallying for the creation of an Islamic state, yet endangered and frequently targeted members of the Sunni constituency (Freeman, 2008; The Hindu, 2013).[6] In this case, the public has chosen to ally itself with the state, rather than the TO. In addition to the Sahwa Council, researchers have documented more than 300 militias that have taken up arms in defense of the state in the face of violent uprisings, often TO-led (Carey et al., 2013).

Non-violent action: The pull factor

Oppressed communities may choose to ally with the state when faced with harmful terrorist activity, potentially taking up arms, but they may also choose a non-violent and diplomatic approach to affecting change by aligning themselves with an NGO. In addition to being a nonviolent alternative, NGOs also offer the potential for success. Many important historical achievements for a given constituency have been the result of a campaign of non-violent civil resistance, and many of these effective campaigns have been spearheaded by NGOs mandated to protect human rights and supported by NGOs designed to serve a humanitarian function (Boli and Thomas, 1997; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Stiles, 2006). These campaigns are often times successful in regions where violent means have failed to promote positive change.

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[6] The Sahwa Council is funded by the United States military. This civilian group operates primarily as pro-government paramilitary unit that fulfills many of the same roles as its primary funding agency.

Academics posit that the success of these campaigns is partially due to the participation advantage that they have over TO campaigns; there are less barriers in place restricting the constituents from forming an alliance and, ultimately, achieving their goals (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). East Timor in the late 1990s and early 21st century provides a ready example; the people, working with the support of local and international NGOs, ousted Indonesian soldiers and achieved recognition of state independence (Hunt, 2004). Further examples exist with the Iranian revolution in the late 1970s, during which a campaign of non-violence succeeded where a campaign of violence failed; the People Power movement in the Philippines that ousted President Marcos in the 1980s, during which international NGOs were pivotal in training the local communities in effective non-violent action; and the restoration of democracy in Chile in 1990 (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Clarke, 1998). All of these campaigns were aided or led by NGOs. Examples such as these illustrate that NGOs can be effective allies in promoting change through nonviolent means.

Research Questions

As summarized in the previous sections, both NGOs and TOs are potentially powerful advocates for an oppressed community. However, TOs can cause harm to the constituents, making them a less appealing ally in the struggle for rights and freedoms or independence, particularly when presented with a viable alternative. As such, given that NGOs and TOs are in competition for the support of the constituency, it is reasonable to posit that the arrival of an NGO in a conflict area and/or the activities that the NGO engages in, particularly in relation to the constituency, will have an impact on the TOs ability to accrue support and,

ultimately, ensure group survival. Therefore, it is rational to speculate that the TO will respond to the NGO presence, altering activity in order to eliminate or best the competition or to present itself as a more appealing ally to the constituents.

These suppositions point to several key research questions. The broadest query is whether NGO presence and activity has an influence on TO activity. If a relationship is evident, the next goal is identifying the particular NGO activities that exhibit a relationship with subsequent TO activity. In addition, it is possible that specific NGO measures are more likely to elicit an escalation in TO activity, while others may serve to decrease it; identifying the directional impact these factors have is of particular interest. There is a multitude of possible ways to address these questions; however, it is posited here that rational choice/deterrence and game theory are appropriate models within which to start to tease apart the influence that NGOs may have on TOs in conflict areas.

Theoretical Framework

The rational choice/deterrence perspective suggests that the perceived benefits of a given terrorist action may outweigh the consequences of public harm and negative public opinion (Clarke and Felson, 1993; Cornish and Clarke, 1986). This theory suggests that terrorist groups are rational and weigh the costs and benefits of a given activity, selecting a course of action that has minimal costs or maximal benefits; this is the utility function and can include components that TOs value such as group survival and public impact (Becker, 1968; McCarthy, 2002). The game theory model is an extension to the rational choice model. This perspective considers the choices and strategies available to an opponent or competitor and the subsequent

payoffs based on opponent's choices. By this logic, terrorists may make different decisions after considering the possible actions available to their competitors. Therefore, these two complimentary perspectives suggest that terrorist organizations consider costs, benefits, and competitor options and, as such, select courses of action that minimize costs, maximize benefits, and strategically bests competitors.

When applying rational choice to terrorism, it is necessary to identify the various factors that would be included in a TO's utility function. While harm to its affiliates and constituents are two possible consequences, there are additional costs, such as loss of membership, resources, and support. The benefits need to subjectively outweigh these costs in order to rationally perpetrate terror. These benefits may include recruitment potential, economic viability, policy change, and overall group survival.

In regards to game theory, TOs need to consider the presence and role of NGOs and, amongst other things, whether they share a similar campaign and constituency, have a physical presence, and are capable of capturing the attention of interested parties. Possible TO courses of action need to be weighted with regard to the options available to NGOs, whether those actions will bolster or undermine the NGOs, and how the NGOs may respond. The effects of a course of action on NGOs and their potential response may serve to accentuate or diminish the immediate utility of violent activity. For example, if the TO targets civilians, this may reduce civilian support for the TO, freeing the citizenry up to ally with a nonviolent advocate.

As will be elaborated upon in the chapter three, the role that possible competitors and adversaries play in a TO's utility function has been the focus of some

academic research. However, attention has been given primarily to the role of the state or government actors and the role that non-governmental actors play has been, for the most part, overlooked. This oversight can affect the predictive ability of any deterrent measure; if NGO activity has a significant relationship to TO activity, attempts to decrease or eliminate TO activity need to take NGO factors into consideration.

Overview of the Present Study

This dissertation is guided by rational choice and game theory to address the above-mentioned research questions to assess the relationship between NGO and terrorist activity. It uses monthly time-series data of terrorist incidents in three countries between 1987 and 2011. While non-governmental actors can include any number of communities or collectives, the following analysis will focus on the impact that human rights and humanitarian NGOs have on terrorist activity. The study investigates the influence of international and local NGOs on the frequency of violent terrorist activity in selected regions. The international NGOS included in the analysis are the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Human Rights Watch (HRW), and Amnesty International (AI); and the role that they and local NGOs play in the number and target of terrorist attacks in Lebanon, Turkey, and Algeria is examined.[7] These areas are occupied by one or more dominant TOs, including the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting

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[7] As described further in chapter four, the international NGOs included in this dissertation are selected for their size, their reputation, and for the duration and diversity of their activities. The countries of interest are selected for a variety of reasons, including NGO presence, diversity in TO orientations and campaigns, and availability of data. Lebanon and Turkey also have notable and long-standing oppressed communities that TOs have defended over time. TOs in Algeria, on the other hand, do not traditionally advocate for the citizenry. Algeria is included in the analysis as a control and comparison for countries that do have the traditional oppressor/oppressed/advocate dynamic.

(GSPC), and Al-Qa`ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) in Algeria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey. The selection of these NGOs and the specific countries and their TOs limits the generalizability of the results; however, as one of the first empirical studies designed to look at the relationship between NGO activity and subsequent TO activity, these countries, their TOs, and the selected NGOs serve as an important starting point to better understanding the relationship between these entities.[8]

Chapter two provides an overview of the context within which NGOs and TOs arise in defense of an oppressed community, the differences and similarities between NGOs and TOs, and the dynamics that can arise between them. Chapter three summarizes the rational choice/deterrence and game theory frameworks that inform the hypotheses tested by this dissertation. The chapter also includes a review of the relevant theoretical literature. Chapter four is devoted to the specific countries, NGOs, and TOs that are the focus of this dissertation. The chapter presents a qualitative summary of the development of oppressed communities in Lebanon, Turkey, and Algeria, and the TOs and NGOs that respond to that oppression. Chapter five summarizes the data used in this study as well as the methods chosen to analyze the hypothesized relationships. Chapter six presents the results of the analysis, while chapter seven provides concluding thoughts concerning the results.

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[8] To the best of this author's knowledge, only one other study has assessed this relationship. In 2013, Murdie and Stapley published an article assessing the relationship between aggregate global NGO numbers and terrorist attacks.

Relevance of the Study

The breadth and depth of the impact of NGO activities is a relatively unknown component in a terrorist group's utility function. Select NGO activities may carry little weight while others may be highly influential (Murdie and Stapley, 2013; Stapley, 2014). Given that NGOs can be active in regions that are subject to terrorist activity and engaged in campaigns similar to those of TOs, there is value in assessing the relationship between NGO measures and subsequent violent group behaviors. These NGO measures may be influential in a variety of ways. As demonstrated in chapter three, some policy measures implemented and enforced by government actors are more effective than others (e.g., Dugan et al., 2005; Enders et al, 1990; LaFree et al., 2009); perhaps this difference is partially informed by the unrecognized activities of non-governmental actors. In addition to complimenting or undermining state policy, NGO activities may be independently influential (Murdie and Kakietek, 2012). It is unknown, for example, if particular NGO activity, such as sending delegates to conflict zones, media coverage, or campaign work targeting an oppressor or a TO, serves to incite terrorist activity. If it does, NGOs can be better prepared to deal with the consequences of particular actions. In addition, null findings can better inform resource allocation; if NGOs have no influence on TOs, their funds may be better invested elsewhere. Finally, if particular NGO tactics and activities de-escalate terrorist activities, identifying and prioritizing these tactics would be an important step for human rights and counter-terrorism policies.

CHAPTER 2: The Key Players

Both terrorist and non-governmental organizations can arise in defense of an oppressed community. This chapter elaborates on the context within which these organizations may form around or become involved in conflict, as well as the characteristics of non-governmental and terrorist organizations and their shared similarities. In addition, this chapter further develops the perspective that these two types of organizations are competitors for scarce resources and constituent support.

The Context

Many armed conflicts around the world are a fight over group inequalities stemming from ethnic, religious, or economic differences amongst communities (Stewart, 2002). These inequalities may indicate a majority/minority divide, within which the minority community is disadvantaged (Dahrendorf, 1958).[9] Oftentimes, the majority/minority division can also be viewed as a dynamic between an oppressor and the oppressed (Cooper and Berdal, 1993; Dahrendorf, 1988). In these cases, the majority instigates a campaign of tactical violence targeting the minority or it simply seeks to quell the distinctive nature and needs of the minority community. This dynamic lies at the center of many armed conflicts and revolutions that permeate national and international relations (Dahrendorf, 1988; Vold, 1958). While history is replete with case studies of this particular majority-led dynamic, some ready examples include the Nazis in Germany, the Serbs in Bosnia, or the Hutus in Rwanda;

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[9] Not all conflicts arise from a majority/minority divide and not all majority communities are in a position of power in a given region; however, this dissertation will focus on the typical armed conflict, as outlined above.

in these extreme cases, an oppressive majority community sought to eradicate a minority group due to religious, cultural, or ethnic differences (Staub, 1999).

While majority-led conflict is a traditional scenario, an alternative dynamic exists when a minority group, or a perceived oppressed community, organizes in opposition to the majority, in an attempt to gain power, recognition, rights and privileges (Hannum, 1996; Marx and Engels, 1848). This may result if a distinctive group seeks autonomy, sovereignty, or economic, cultural, and religious independence from a larger population. Examples of this minority-led resistance are apparent in the Tibetan campaign for autonomy in China or the Basque separatist movement in France and Spain; in these cases, armed conflicts arose from a minority-led struggle to gain independence from a sovereign state (Silva, 1975; Smith, 2008).

These conflicts, whether majority- or minority-led, may capture the attention of the national and international community (Cooper and Berdal, 1993). Many outsiders will maintain neutrality and refrain from becoming involved in the struggle. However, while the nexus of the conflict will remain with the oppressor and oppressed groups, a second circle of active participants may arise from the national and international communities. This second circle of participants, a group that may be affected in varying degrees by the conflict, will relinquish a position of neutrality, opting instead to 'pick a side' (Altfeld and Mesquita, 1979). This group can be conceived of as the advocates; those that ally themselves with the majority in support of a campaign of oppression or those that align themselves with the minority in support of a campaign for sovereignty or freedoms.

While the advocates of the oppressor or majority are certainly of interest and include well-known and important conflicts such as state support of the Hutu people in Rwanda (Kuperman, 2000), this dissertation will focus on the advocates of the constituency, or the oppressed community, specifically in conflict areas where state actors disregard the rights of a minority group.[10] These advocates can take many forms, all of which share a vested interest in protecting or representing the minority constituency. One of the more readily identifiable advocacy groups that can form around conflict is the terrorist organization (TO); this group is willing and able to employ violence in order to promote change and/or protect a constituency (Ziemke, 2009). Another easily identifiable group that may form or organize itself around an minority group is the non-governmental organization (NGO); this group sits on the other end of the tactical violence spectrum and adheres to a strict policy of non-violent action while still sharing similar goals and campaigns with the TOs (Lehr-Lehnardt, 2005). This chapter will focus on the roles and dynamic of these two groups in conflict areas.

<div align="center">Terrorist Organizations: Their Role and Their Relevance</div>

There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, partially due to the diversity in legal definitions employed across countries (Golder and Williams, 2004); however, there are some key characteristics that are used by academics and analysts to determine whether a given event should be labeled as a terrorist incident. Generally speaking, a terrorist event is one that involves the use of, or threat of the use of, violence with the intention of sending a message to a larger audience in order

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[10] Ideally, future work will assess the dynamics of oppressor advocates; however, given the potential complexity and nuances of the dynamic, the inquiry is beyond the limited scope of this dissertation.

to promote political, social, or economic change (LaFree and Dugan, 2007). Acts that are perpetrated without intention or by state actors are usually not considered to be terrorist incidents.[11] TOs, therefore, are organizations that engage in terrorist activity and, as organizations, share connections between individuals and hierarchical components, with the goal of drawing attention to perceived injustices and affecting change through the use of strategic violence (Jackson, 2006).

Likely partly due to country-specific definitional differences mentioned above, there currently exists no globally accepted list of designated TOs and, as such, the sheer number of TOs is open to debate (Schmid, 1983). However, many countries have created their own formal list, populated by groups that engage in acts of terrorism, as defined by their legal system. The Unites States, for example, has a list of more than 50 foreign groups that have been identified as terrorist organizations, although this number changes as groups are added or removed (United States Department of State, 2012a).[12] Other institutions operate with a working list of several hundred to several thousand TOs, depending on whether the list is populated with groups that are currently active or were active in recent times (Schmid, 1983; START, 2013). Therefore, an accurate estimate of TOs at any given point in time may range from less than a hundred to several thousand.

TOs may fulfill many purposes and functions but most TOs operate to serve the interests of their constituencies or, specifically, the minority or oppressed

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[11] There are exceptions to this expectation, as noted in the following paragraph.
[12] Ironically, Iran lists the United States Army as a foreign terrorist organization, running counter to the generally accepted criterion that TOs cannot be state actors.

community mentioned previously.[13] As noted by Flanigan (2006), terrorist groups

are often created in response to exclusion and suffering; the terrorist group serves to

protect and fight for the marginalized group. Whether the group is inherently

nationalist-separatist or religious extremist, the goal of the group is, for the most part,

designed to yield benefits for oppressed community members (Lichbach, 1987).

Terrorism seeks to achieve these goals by "undermin(ing) the prestige of the

government, …demonstrat(ing) the possibility of struggle against the

government…arous(ing) in this manner the revolutionary spirit of the people and

their confidence in the success of their cause" (Narodnaya Volya, as cited by Hewitt,

1990: 146). The manner in which a TO aims to achieve these goals differs

considerably amongst groups and nearly three out of every four TOs do not survive

their first year (LaFree, 2010). However, some TOs are successful to varying

degrees, leaving an undisputed lasting impression on the national and international

communities.

TOs can be well-organized and permeate multiple institutions within a given

nation-state; some even hold political offices, offer educational and financial

incentives to a community, and serve as social, religious, and cultural leaders (Levitt,

2004; Tavernise, 2006). These TOs have succeeded in establishing themselves as

reputable and respected organizations to the local community. Hamas in the

Palestinian territories offers a ready example of the power and prestige that a

designated TO may hold. While the group employs terrorist tactics against Israel, it

also serves as a democratically elected leader of the territories, as a religious

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[13] Many TOs do not advocate for an oppressed constituency but, instead, form in response to
ideological differences or institutional chafing.

movement providing services and support to the Palestinian community, as a provider of social services, and as the law and order enforcer for the region (Gunning, 2007). The Irish Republican Army (IRA) offers another example of a successful and effective TO; the IRA was integral in the formation of the Irish Free State in 1922, forever changing the political and demographic face of the region (Victoroff, 2005). Hamas and the IRA are indicative of the relevance that a TO may have in gaining power and leaving an impression. However, TOs are not the only influential advocate of a given constituency; NGOs also serve this function.

Non-Governmental Organizations: Their Role and Their Relevance

While there is a great deal of diversity in the way that NGOs are defined, there are some qualifying criteria that are presented in the academic literature. An NGO is, in the most general sense, an organization that operates independently of any given nation-state (Claiborne, 2011). The independence of NGOs allows them to theoretically fulfill their given mandate free from government pressure and influence. In addition, NGOs tend to be non-profit and are often funded by the local and/or global community, minimizing the impact of any given corporate interests (Haque, 2011). Lastly, NGOs, in theory, are not criminal organizations and, as such, remain within the purview of the law, thus maintaining a non-violent agenda (Willetts, 2011).

In addition to these basic criteria, authors have noted some additional attributes. Boli and Thomas (1997) identify some principles inherent in NGO ideologies, particularly in regard to NGOs that operate on the international stage. They posit that NGOs are built on a foundation of universalism, individualism, rational voluntaristic authority, the dialects of rationalizing progress, and world

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citizenship.[14] NGOs have a range of responsibilities and agendas, although they tend to cluster into several key areas of concern, including health, infrastructure, development, education, refugee services, basic needs, environmental concerns, and human rights (Spar and Dail, 2002). NGO tactics for achieving specific goals are diverse and include such activities as education, enforcement, empowerment, documentation, lobbying, preventative work, and assistance (Eriksson and Sadiwa, 2008; Welch, 1995).

In 1997, scholars noted that, while NGOs were, at the time, important local and global actors, they were less well-conceptualized than the other key actors, such as states and corporations (Boli and Thomas, 1997). However, in the past 15 years, NGOs have started to take a more prominent role in the academic literature, partially due to the rapid growth in their numbers. Sources speculate that there is approximately 1.5 to 2 million NGOs operating within the US alone (The Economist, 2000; U.S. Department of State, 2012b). In regards to NGOs that operate in multiple countries, there are estimated to be between 40,000 and 50,000 international NGOs (Farris, 2013; Hortsch, 2010); this has increased from 29,000 in 1995 (The Economist, 2000). The growth in the number of local and international NGOs has been termed "a global associational revolution" (Salamon, 2010: 167).

Not only are practitioners and researchers intrigued by the growth in NGO numbers, they also acknowledge the influential position that NGOs hold domestically

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[14] Universalism assumes that humans have similar needs and all humans can join and benefit from NGO activity (Boli and Thomas, 1997). Individualism is the expectation that all participants are individuals, rather than collectives. Rational voluntaristic authority assumes that authority is informal and achieved through rational procedures, rather than external legitimation. The dialects of rational progress require the application of science, professionalism, and a degree of expertise, with a focus on development. Finally, world citizenship assumes that everyone is bestowed the same rights and responsibilities.

and internationally. Spar and Dail (2002: 172) summarize the current academic

position regarding NGOs when they posit simply that "*NGOs have power.*" This

statement is justified; the role that NGOs have played and continue to play in political

and social affairs is striking. They have become an integral part of the drafting of

laws and treaties, they are essential to the collection and distribution of development

aid, and they serve as a representative for the general public and a buffer from the

government (Clarke, 1998; Spar and Dail, 2002; Welch, 1995). In addition to power,

NGOs also have a highly visible presence (Michael, 2002; Raustiala, 1997). Their

presence can be detected in such pivotal moments as the drafting of the Landmine

Ban Treaty, the restoration of democracy in Chile and the Philippines, and the

abolition of torture, amongst many other local and global victories.

Non-Governmental Organizations and Terrorist Organizations: Similarities and

Differences

NGO presence in such campaigns as the abolition of torture is indicative of

the primary function of many NGOs in conflict-ridden regions. NGOs generally

serve a humanitarian function, providing services and relief, or a campaigning

function, advocating for the betterment of society, specifically for marginalized or

minority communities (Lucas, 1992). In conflict areas, their activities and presence

are designed to benefit an oppressed constituency located in that area. Therefore, the

goals of the NGOs may be very similar to the goals of the TOs. They are both

seeking to affect political and social change at a national and international level in

order to alleviate the suffering of an oppressed people or to facilitate the

independence and freedoms of a minority group (Adamson, 2005). An example of

these similar campaigns can be found with the Kurdish people. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have active campaigns focused on Kurdish safety, security, and political and cultural freedom. On the other hand, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a recognized terrorist group, is also focused primarily on the political and cultural freedoms of the Kurdish people, as well as the creation of an autonomous Kurdistan.

While NGOs and TOs may have similar campaigns, they diverge in the selection and implementation of political activities. It can be posited that violent activity is simply an extreme option on a continuum of tactics for political change (Flanigan, 2006; Wright-Neville, 2010). This perspective requires that terrorism be acknowledged as a strategic tool deployed with the intention of gaining media attention and drawing international recognition of a particular issue or grievance. Once terrorism is conceived of in this way, the line between NGOs and TOs becomes blurred, differentiated mainly by the presence or absence of violent and coercive activities.

While the violent/non-violent distinction between TOs and NGOs is informative, it is not definitive (Willetts, 2002). Some advocates of violence employ other non-violent and pro-social tools. Two of the more notable examples, Hamas and Hezbollah, are organizations that have developed separate branches of activity, including a militant and a social-services/charity branch (Levitt, 2004; Prusher, 2000). Engaging in assistance or philanthropic activities in addition to militant work serves several functions, including advertising terrorist ideals (Ly, 2007), gaining sympathizers and allies amongst the constituents (Flanigan, 2006), moving the

populace along a continuum of social acceptance, and gaining political support in the rare cases where the TO also has a political branch (Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, 2009). Interviews with TO charity and political workers provide support for the supposition that philanthropic activities garner community support and acceptance (Flanigan, 2008).

In summary, NGOs have increasing presence, power, and standing in the political and social process. They can affect change at a national and international level. They may engage in campaigns and strategies that are similar to those engaged in by TOs, differing only in the deliberate and intentional use of violent tactics. Meanwhile, TOs may also have presence, power, and standing. They also can affect change on a local and a national level. In addition, they too may engage in charitable activities that mimic the activities of NGOs with the purpose of gaining social acceptance and support. While the position of NGOs and the similarities they share with TOs may be of interest, more is needed to predict that NGOs may have an impact on the TOs decision-making. Despite the fact that TOs and NGO activities seem to run parallel to each other, evidence that they share a point of dynamic interplay is missing. This interplay can be found in the natural competition that may form between NGOs and TOs.

Non-Governmental Organizations and Terrorist Organizations: Conflicts and Competition

The reliance on the same constituency suggests that NGO activities would interact and conflict with TO activities. With few exceptions, the campaigns of the different organizations depend upon a broader constituency that requires the aid and

attention of the organization; without a broader constituency, the organizations' lose their substantive value and appeal (Brown and Kalegaonkar, 2002; Crenshaw, 1981). Specifically, in areas where both NGOs and TOs operate, they can rely on the constituents for legitimacy, funding, recruits, and attention. In regards to legitimacy, the organizations' status depends on a supportive constituency, as the organization maintains its legitimacy only if the oppressed community welcomes its support (Nemeth, 2013; Paul, 2009). If those they are supporting reject their activities, both NGOs and TOs will lose credibility. Public rejection from a constituency can lead to group extinction (Flanigan, 2006; Gvineria, 2009). In fact, research evidence suggests that TOs may even engage in an escalation in violent tactics in order to recruit, mobilize, and win the support of their constituents (Bloom, 2004).

As mentioned above, organizations, for the most part, rely on the resources that the oppressed community and its supporters grant them, such as funding. In order to receive monetary support from the constituents, organizations need to remain in good standing and favor with those individuals; a failure to do so could lead to the financial demise of a group (Alymkulova and Seipulnik, 2005). While NGOs refuse to accept government or corporate funding (Willetts, 2002), TOs generally lack the legitimate opportunity to receive this kind of funding, leading them to elicit support, oftentimes through illegal means (Linn, 2005).[15] With limited financial resources, the organizations' financial survival is partially or fully at the mercy of the constituents and their supporters.

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[15] TOs may also elicit support through legal or legitimate means, such as community donations and charities (Jamwal, 2002).

Organizations also rely on the constituents and their supporters to populate a base of volunteers (Wymer Jr. and Starnes, 2001). For NGOs, limited funding creates the need to solicit volunteers or staff members willing to operate within a lower pay structure. TOs, on the other hand, require disposable recruits to execute violent actions, as each risks being arrested or killed, leaving an ever-present need to acquire more volunteers (Bloom, 2004; Nemeth, 2013). In addition, the number of members, supporters, and volunteers attached to a given organization can impact the power and influence an organization wields (DeNardo, 1985). Politicians and policy makers are more likely swayed by the arguments of many than by the arguments of a few.

A further potential area of competition between NGOs and TOs involves the media. A common strategy for affecting political and social change requires stimulating media coverage and visibility in order to gain name and issue recognition (Adamson, 2005; Frey and Luechinger, 2002; Fussey, 2011). Media coverage may be effective at soliciting public support of TOs in select circumstances, such as when messaging resonates with pre-existing audience grievances (Lemieux and Asal, 2009) or the media describes the TO in a favorable way (Weimann, 1991). Media coverage and the manipulation of social media can be perceived as a crucial component to TOs and their recruitment and information dissemination strategies (Wilkinson, 2007). Given limited media attention, organizations may find themselves competing for media coverage around particular issues (Scott, 2001). In addition, messages by the media could be biased in favor of one organization over another (Andrews and Caren, 2010). In fact, the media could even completely subjugate the activities of one organization by only reporting the other organization's activities (Scott, 2001).

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Therefore, the media is a tool by which to inform and influence the constituents and, as such, is a valuable resource.

One further area to consider is the content and target of the NGO campaign. While NGOs and TOs may advocate for the same constituency and, ultimately, campaign around a shared antagonist, an NGO could also publicize that the TO is harmful to the constituency, particularly if the TO engages in violence that results in casualties amongst the oppressed community. NGOs might emphasize the negative impact the TO has on the public and offer pleas for TO withdrawal or alternatives to TO activity (Duffield, 2006). Many of the larger human rights NGOs have engaged in such campaign practices (Spar and Dail, 2002). For example, Amnesty International released a series of reports and articles criticizing Hamas' activities in Gaza and calling on Hamas to cease all violent activity and comply with the NGOs nonviolent campaign strategy (Amnesty International, 2009). In a similar vein, Human Rights Watch actively campaigned against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in DR Congo, Uganda, Central African Republic, and Southern Sudan, appealing to the governments and militaries of the LRA-affected nations to investigate and persecute LRA actions (Human Rights Watch, 2010). These active campaigns have resulted in an increase in public interest and condemnation of the TO (in the case of HRW and the LRA) and an upsurge of TO counter-criticisms directed towards the NGO (in the case of AI and Hamas) [Associated Press, 2009]. Therefore, NGO interest in TO activities could be viewed as threatening to the TO and, thus, can elicit a response.

The shared need for legitimacy, funding, recruits, and media attention, paired with the potential for NGOs to publicly criticize the TO, lays a foundation upon which to predict that NGOs will have an impact on TOs; however, this argument only has merit if it can be reasonably argued that TOs believe that the constituents will view NGO activities as an attractive alternative to TO activities. As mentioned previously, both NGOs and TOs have the power to influence and both groups are attractive allies. However, TOs also cause a great deal of devastation that could increase the appeal of NGOs, possibly legitimating NGOs as a competitor whose presence warrants a response.

The Push Factor of Terrorism: Severing Ties with the Constituents

Terrorism is a costly event that has social, political, and economic consequences. These consequences have an immediate and direct impact on the citizenry, in general, and the TOs' constituency, in particular, including long-term influences that can cause hardship.[16] Perhaps the most readily identifiable consequence of terrorism for the citizenry is the number of fatalities and injuries accrued from attacks. The U.S. State Department reported that, in 2013, there were more than 9,700 terrorist attacks targeting non-combatants worldwide, resulting in more than 17,800 fatalities and 32,500 injuries (United States Department of State,

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[16] As mentioned in the previous chapter, this dissertation focuses on domestic conflict that relies on an oppressed/oppressor dynamic, which requires the presence of a marginalized or persecuted community. The members of the oppressed community are often members of the citizenry, but are a unique subgroup in that they experience marginalization that is not shared by the citizenry as a whole. The consequences of terrorism may impact the constituency directly through, for example, targeted attacks and counter-attacks or geographically-concentrated social and economic upheaval. Terrorism may also affect the constituency indirectly through consequences levied at the citizenry as a whole, such as national security measures and political instabilities. Consequences that affect the constituency directly or indirectly (through the citizenry) will be viewed as a push factor.

2013). More than one quarter of all attacks targeted private citizens and property, while the remainder of the attacks was distributed across 19 other target types.[17]

In addition to physical repercussions, terrorist attacks have short- and long-term economic consequences that can also adversely affect the TO's constituency. Beyond the immediate costs of medical care and structural damage, terrorism can influence the financial status of a nation-state (Enders and Sandler, 1991). This can be seen in such economic indicators as the tourism industry, investment practices, and the value of goods, services, and stocks (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008).

Researchers have determined that terrorism can have a significant impact on tourism as the likelihood of personal violence targeting international visitors' increases. Enders and Sandler (1991) assessed the impact that transnational terrorism had on tourist activities in Spain and the subsequent financial repercussions of such incidents between 1970 and 1988. They calculated that transnational terrorism deterred more than 140,000 tourists from visiting Spanish territory. During the same period, continental Europe lost approximately $16 billion in tourist revenues as a consequence of terrorism (Enders et al., 1992).

In addition to tourism, terrorism can also impact other economic indicators, including employment, foreign direct investment, goods, services, and stocks. Greenbaum and colleagues (2007) assessed the impact of terrorist attacks on business and employment, concluding that the growth of employment and business formation and expansions were negatively impacted during the year following a violent attack.

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[17] As elaborated upon in chapter five, it is extremely difficult to determine the proportion of casualties that originate from oppressed communities; however, it is reasonable to assume that some portion of victims are members of terrorists' constituency.

One study demonstrated that terrorism in Spain reduced foreign direct investment by more than thirteen percentage points per year, translating into real net declines of nearly $500 million (Enders and Sandler, 1996). In the Basque region, the gross domestic product decreased ten percentage points as a consequence of terrorist activities, in comparison to a synthetic control area (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). In a cross-national analysis of 110 countries, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) determined that an increase in terrorism risk resulted in a decrease in foreign direct investment; a standard deviation increase in the former was related to a five percent decrease in gross domestic product.

In more general terms, terrorism influences budgetary considerations, leading to a greater investment in military and security expenditures at the expense of necessary services, such as education and housing (Blomberg et al., 2004; Gupta et al., 2004, Sidal, 2008). In the U.S. health sector, for example, an increasing amount of the budget is being allocated for bioterrorism research at the expense of more pressing and prevalent issues, such as substance abuse and infectious disease prevention (Sidel and Levy, 2003). In 2002, funding was diverted from AIDS research campaigns and redirected for use in the creation of anthrax vaccinations (Sidel and Levy, 2003). Along the same lines, defense spending has been steadily increasing over the past decade. In 2011, the U.S. allotted 20 percent of the federal budget to defense and security and only two percent to education (Office of Management and Budget, 2013). This is in direct contrast to public opinion, which indicates a strong preference for a cut in defense spending (Kull et al., 2012).

A final consideration is the social and psychological consequences of terrorism for the constituents and the citizenry. Living in areas of escalated conflict can impact levels of fear and life satisfaction. In addition, counterterrorism measures can lead to the temporary suspension of basic rights or privileges, leading to resentment, frustration, and a lack of trust in government (Haque, 2002; Neria et al., 2011). In two separate studies, Frey and colleagues (2004, 2009) assessed measures of life satisfaction in areas of the European Union subject to terrorist activity, concluding that the effects of terrorism had a sizeable impact. Abenheim and colleagues (1992) and Amir and colleagues (1998) assessed the psychological health of surviving victims of terrorist attacks in France and Israel, respectively. Both analyses indicated that a non-trivial portion (18-30 percent) of the sample suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

As the previous paragraphs illustrate, the collective impact of terrorism on the constituents and general citizenry can be, to put it lightly, quite extreme. This may amount to a general consensus amongst constituents and members of the citizenry that terrorist activity is unwelcome and undesirable, causing the public to adopt a punitive attitude towards those that engage in violent activities. A poll conducted in the U.S. indicated that approximately half of the respondents, regardless of political orientation, supported the notion that the U.S. could kill citizens abroad if there was strong evidence that they were engaged in terrorism (Angus Reid, 2011a). More than two thirds of Canadians and Britons celebrated the death of Osama Bin Laden in 2011 (Angus Reid, 2011b). A large-scale survey in Australia in 2007 demonstrated that more than half of the respondents supported the indefinite detention without trial of

individuals with suspected links to terrorism (Roberts and Indemaur, 2009). Polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country (2009), an area plagued by nationalist-separatist terrorist activity, indicated that members of the oppressed constituency abhorred violence and advocated non-violent dialogue and many outright rejected the activities of the local TO, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA).

While the public may form punitive opinions towards TOs, they may also choose to engage in violence in response to TO presence and activities. In some regions, such as Pakistan and Iraq, members of the constituency and general public have chosen to take up arms in opposition of terrorist activities, meeting violence with violence (Freeman, 2008; The Hindu, 2013). Active civilian-led campaigns to quash TOs can become prevalent in these high-conflict areas, as the citizenry organizes in protest of a TO presence.

Such extreme responses as civilians arming themselves, paired with the economic and social consequences of terrorist action, illustrate the point that the constituency may not welcome the TO as an advocate. This suggests that TOs may be disadvantaged when a nonviolent advocate in the region campaigns for the shared constituency. Put simply, given a choice, the desired constituency might abandon the TO in favor of the NGO because the latter uses nonviolent strategies that reduce harmful effects. TO tactical methods can be 'off-putting' to a constituency and the presence of an attractive competitor, such as an NGO, may impede a TOs chances of winning the support of the constituency even further. This suggests that the TO, for the sake of survival, needs to counteract NGO presence and activities, with the goal

of convincing the oppressed community that the TO is a better ally than the NGO and/or with the goal of forcing the NGO to leave.

Research Questions

The previous sections have laid the foundation for a series of research questions. While both TOs and NGOs arise to defend a minority or oppressed community, each relies on different types of tactics that might appeal to or repel those that they support. The combination of scarce resources and the presence of a competitor suggest that NGO activity may impact TO activity. Therefore, a key question of interest is whether a change in NGO activity is related to a change in TO activity.[18] If NGOs become active in a region or with a TO constituency, does that impact TO activity? If NGOs increase or decrease activity, does that also lead to an increase or decrease in TO activity? Finally, if NGOs become inactive in a region, do TOs attack less often? This dissertation will attempt to provide more detailed insights than currently exist on the relationship between NGO activity and TO activity in conflict areas. The rational choice/deterrence and game theory models, outlined in the next chapter, provide a framework within which to form testable hypotheses about the directionality of these potential relationships.

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[18] It is worth noting that there is, to this author's knowledge, only one study that has attempted to answer this question. Murdie and Stapley (2013) conducted preliminary analysis of the relationship between the annual count of NGOs around the world and the frequency of terrorist attacks using a time series model with the year as the unit of analysis. Their results indicated that there was a positive relationship between the two measures over time, leading them to conclude that NGO proliferation can increase terrorist activity. While this study is informative and serves an exploratory function, it raises more questions than it answers, such as: which NGO activities contribute to this positive relationship and is the effect region-specific? Ideally, this dissertation will help provide answers to these questions.

CHAPTER 3: Theoretical Framework

As the previous chapter stipulated, NGOs and TOs may both arise to defend an oppressed community. The two sets of organizations may share a constituency and similar goals but will deploy different tactics with varying levels of success. These organizations inherently compete with each other for scarce resources, including community support, attention, and means. TO group survival may hinge on maintaining an uncontested and solitary presence in a conflict area. As such, it may need to vie to maintain its base of support as NGOs move into and become active in its region.

The following chapter provides the theoretical framework within which to examine this potential relationship between NGOs and TOs. Beginning with a summary of the rational choice/deterrence model and followed with an introduction of a game-theoretic model, the chapter then outlines their assumptions and applies them to terrorist behaviors. This process leads to hypotheses about the relationship between NGO activity and TO activity, which are presented at the conclusion of the chapter.

Rational Choice, Deterrence, and Game Theory

Rational choice/deterrence theory grew out of the propositions of early reformers such as Bentham and Beccaria. Bentham ([1789] 1948) presented the principle of utility, stipulating that humankind was ruled by the two masters of pleasure and pain. As such, humans were inherently self-interested and would operate in ways that would increase the likelihood of pleasure or decrease the

likelihood of pain. Beccaria (1764) authored a treatise addressing punishment within the criminal justice context; he advocated for a punitive system based on the principles of rationality, positing that punishment need only be swift, certain, and proportionate in order to deter behavior. According to Beccaria, extreme punitive response was unnecessary and ineffectual. In general, these early contributions laid the foundation for the concept of deterrence and rational choice. Specifically, deterrence is premised on the assumption that humans are rational and self-interested; they will alter their behavior when threatened with appropriate punishment. Deterrence is a key component of rational choice, which posits that humans will weigh the costs and benefits of a given behavior, opting for a course of action that minimizes costs and maximizes benefits (Clarke and Felson, 1993; Cornish and Clarke, 1986). Increasing the costs of a particular activity should deter the individual from engaging in it (see Nagin, 1998, for a review of deterrence research).

Modern expressions of rational choice/deterrence theory often take an economic slant, focusing specifically on utility in a quantitatively expressed format (Becker, 1968). Actors navigate their options by assessing the expected utility of a given act in light of a variety of measures of uncertainty. There is, however, a great deal of inconsistency across people, as the individual actor will be influenced by her orientation to present and future, her attitudes towards risk, how well-informed she is about the costs and benefits, in addition to a host of other considerations (McCarthy, 2002). Despite these caveats, researchers have found that there is some predictive validity in employing an economic analysis of the maximization of utility (Crenshaw, 1992; Victoroff, 2005).

Game theory is another addition to the rational-actor theoretical family. Game theoretic-models recognize that rational decisions do not occur in a vacuum (McCarthy, 2002). Specifically, game theory employs the use of mathematical models to analyze dynamics and resulting decisions/actions that occur between two or more parties (Enders and Sandler, 1995). Key to the model is the recognition that one party's potential action or strategy can alter the value of the choices available to the other party. The assumption inherent in this model is that the actor or player is rational and intelligent; her actions are determined by considering the options available to the other player and the utility intrinsic in each choice (Myerson, 1991).[19] This can be a zero-sum game, which occurs when the losses or gains of one player balances the losses or gains of another player (e.g., if constituencies withdraw support from TOs in order to support NGOs) or a non-zero-sum game, which occurs when a loss or gain does not equal zero or is not balanced with the other player's outcomes (e.g., when constituencies can support both NGOs and TOs) [Barron, 2013].

Applied within a terrorist context, a rational choice- and game-theoretic orientation would, therefore, suggest three key points: 1) terrorists are rational 2) they weigh the costs and benefits of terrorist action versus no action and 3) they consider the presence and prospective actions of their competitors. In order for terrorist action to occur, the benefits of an attack must outweigh its costs, the benefits of attacking must outweigh the benefits of inaction, and the perceived utility is informed by the presence of competitors. This can be expressed as a comparison of utility functions:

$$u(\text{terrorist action}) > u(\text{no action}) \tag{1}$$

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[19] Intelligence refers here to the player's knowledge of the game and ability to infer subjective probabilities (Myerson, 1991).

The next sections will assess the validity of these assumptions in light of the research literature.

Support for the Assumption that Terrorists are Rational

Regarding the first assumption, terrorists have, at times, been presented by media and politicians as irrational, although this attribution usually refers to international rather than domestic terrorists (Merari, 2010; Powell, 2011; Richardson, 2007). For example, Senator Warner, following the September 11 attacks in 2001, stated "those who would commit suicide in their assaults on the free world are not rational and are not deterred by rational concepts" (cited by Atran, 2003: 1535). In a similar vein, CNN commentator Fareed Zakaria suggested that Iranians were not "crazy" because "over the past decade, there have been thousands of suicide bombings by Saudis, Egyptians, Lebanese, Palestinians, and Pakistanis, but not been a single suicide attack by an Iranian" (Zakaria, 2012).

Caplan (2006), in contrast, notes that the reputation of irrationality is likely encouraged by the public conception that terrorist belief systems are improbable and extreme which, he argues, is not an indication of abnormality.[20] In support, Crenshaw (1981, 1992) posits that terrorism is the expression of the deliberate and strategic choice of the rational group with legitimate goals seeking payoff; as such, psychopathology is not a motivating factor, nor highly prevalent, however unlikely the achievement of terrorist goals may appear in light of the methods chosen. In addition, research has demonstrated that psychopathology is the exception, rather than

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[20] Caplan (2006) identifies three markers of rationality, including responsiveness to incentives, narrow self-interest, and rational expectations.

the rule, in terrorism.[21] Hassan (2001) interviewed approximately 250 terrorists, associates, and family members, determining that, in general, terrorists did not appear to display signs of abnormality. Post and colleagues (2003) interviewed 35 Middle Eastern terrorists and found no indication of psychopathology or irrationality in the group. Even amongst suicide bombers, the term martyrdom has been employed in a deliberate attempt to distance the suicidal act from the assumptions of psychopathology that are traditionally associated with suicidal tendencies and to recast it in the light of self-sacrifice and deliberation (Hoffman and McCormick, 2004). As Miller (2013) notes, the majority of the research community has rejected the position that terrorists are irrational, in light of this and other evidence.

Support for the Assumption that Terrorists Weigh Costs and Benefits

The second assumption, that terrorist weigh the costs and benefits of a given action, has elicited a fair amount of attention in the literature. This research has tended to focus on the effects of policy on terrorist activity and a variety of considerations that influence the effectiveness of state-sanctioned action. These studies, overall, provide support for the assumption that terrorists do weigh costs and benefits; specifically, policy measures designed to decrease or increase the attractiveness of given activities do appear to affect terrorist behaviors.

Changes in policy that influence the utility function of a given activity tend to cluster around target-hardening, punitive measures, and conciliatory measures. Target hardening, a deterrent measure that aims at decreasing the chances of success, has been studied sparingly but with some rigor (see Lum et al., 2006, for a review).

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[21] The exceptions tend to be lone case studies, such as Theodore Kaczynski, also known as the Unabomber. He suffered from paranoid schizophrenia.

Enders and colleagues (1990) assessed the effectiveness of the installation of metal detectors in airports on the frequency of skyjackings. Their results indicated that, following installations in 1973, there was a significant decrease in skyjacking episodes. This suggested that would-be skyjackers were influenced by the installation of metal detectors, perceiving this as a measure that would decrease chances of success. However, results demonstrated a corresponding increase in assassinations and hostage-takings, indicating that individuals redirected their attention to less-risky methods of achieving their goals. Dugan and colleagues (2005) also assessed the effectiveness of measures of increased apprehension in an airport setting, including metal detectors and increased security at passenger checkpoints. Their results supported earlier studies indicating that increasing the perceived likelihood of detection served as a deterrent for non-terrorist hijacking attempts. Enders and Sandler (1993) assessed the effectiveness of the fortification of U.S. embassies at three different periods of time. Similar to the airport findings, their results indicated that fortification measures decreased attacks against U.S. interests, but increased assassinations.

In addition to target hardening or decreasing the chances of success, deterrence measures may focus on raising the costs of a given action through punitive measures. Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare (1994) assessed the effectiveness of military retaliatory strikes in Israel, concluding that unexpected retaliation led to a short-term decrease in terrorist incidents. Dugan and colleagues (2005) evaluated the effectiveness of the imposition of strict hijacking laws in Cuba, concluding that an increase in consequences led to a decrease in hijackings diverted to Cuba. However,

some punitive measures appear to be less effective (Nevin, 2003). Analysis of British counterterrorism interventions demonstrated minimal success in deterring Republican-motivated strikes in Northern Ireland (LaFree et al., 2009). Out of six interventions studied, including four aggressive military strategies, three interventions led to a backlash effect,[22] two had no notable effect, and one had a marginally deterrent effect. The authors suggest that intervention characteristics can undermine state legitimacy.

Policy measures based on the rational choice model may also take the form of increasing the benefits of non-terrorist actions. Dugan and Chenoweth (2012) assessed the effectiveness of such conciliatory government actions in comparison to the more traditional repressive government policy of raising the costs of terrorism. Their results indicated that repressive government action can lead to an increase in terrorist activity or a backlash effect. In addition, they found that periods of high levels of conciliatory action led to a decrease in terrorist activity, while low levels were less successful. The effectiveness of increasing the benefits of non-terrorist activity has not been tested extensively, but these early findings support the position that increasing the benefits of non-action may be just as relevant, if not more so, as increasing the costs of action or decreasing the likelihood of the success of action.

This brief summary of key studies illustrates that the assumption that terrorists weigh the costs and the benefits of their actions is, for the most part, supported empirically. While academics cannot know what terrorists are thinking, they can make inferences based on terrorist behavioral responses. Whether target-hardening or

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[22] Backlash refers to an increase in terrorist incidents in response to policy implementation or enforcement when a decrease is the desired outcome (LaFree et al., 2009).

increasing the threats of select punitive measures, these behavioral responses indicate that governments can influence terrorist decision-making through policy and practice. This supports the use of the rational choice framework for the prediction of terrorist activities. The final assumption inherent in the theoretical model applied in this dissertation refers to the stipulation that terrorist organizations consider the actions of their competitors when selecting a strategy or course of action: this assumption is guided by the game theoretic model.

Support for the Assumption that Terrorists Consider their Opponent's Strategies

Crenshaw (1987) stated that "terrorism is explained as the result of an organization's struggle for survival, usually in a competitive environment" (13). This quote suggests that terrorist groups are *cognizant* and *responsive* to the presence of competitors. In regards to cognition, TO decision-making cannot be directly observed and, therefore, it is difficult to provide empirical support for the supposition that competitors play a role in a TOs selection of a course of action. However, theoretical modeling suggests that TOs are cognizant of competitors, thus providing some hint to the factors that terrorists deem important. In addition, evidence suggests that the TO will interpret the presence of a competitor as a zero-sum game or, specifically, that a gain for the competitor will equate to a loss for the TO. As for responsiveness, case studies suggest that TOs not only consider the presence of competitors, but adjust behavior in order to undermine or eliminate the competition. Each of these will be addressed below.

Given the fact that terrorist decision-making is not a process that can be observed by outsiders, researchers have built a variety of models that assess the

factors deemed relevant to terrorist decision-making when faced with a competitor, particularly state actors and, to a lesser extent, rival organizations (e.g., Chlebik, 2010; Sandler and Arce M., 2003). The models serve as a guide to help identify and map out the considerations inherent in the decision-making process, and suggest several elements that inform terrorist actions. Sandler and colleagues (1983) assessed state-TO negotiation processes around hostage-takings and concluded that TOs consider government concessions in previous events when selecting a course of action. Lapan and Sandler (1988) posited that terrorist negotiations were informed by government credibility and reputation. Additional researchers added considerations of opponent deterrence strategies and target selection informed by target attractiveness, the probability of success, and punitive response (Sandler and Arce M., 2003; Sandler and Lapan, 1988; Sandler and Siqueira, 2006). Finally, researchers have concluded that terrorist actions are often guided by the desire to signal TO strength by engaging in terrorist attacks (Lapan and Sandler, 1993; Overgaard, 1994). Therefore, scholars have determined, through theoretical modeling, that TOs consider the history and reputation of a competitor, the probabilities of successes and failures in light of a competitors' presence and response, and the competitors' assumptions about the TOs own abilities.

While theoretical modeling provides support for the hypothesis that a TO will consider the presence of a competitor and adjust its strategy in response, the nature of that strategy is informed by whether the TO considers the dynamic to be one of a zero-sum game (a gain for the competitor is loss for the TO, indicating that a rivalry may be strategic) or a positive-sum game (the gain for the competitor can be a gain

for the TO, indicating that an alliance may be strategic). Evidence suggests that TOs are guided by a perception of a zero-sum game. Sandler and Siqueira (2009) present a theoretical model built around the TO perception that rival activities detract from TO resources and support. Their model was specific to factions within an organization but can be extended to include rival organizations as well. Mohammad (2004) applied this model in an explanatory fashion to escalating terrorist violence or the intensification of zero-sum terrorism cycle (IZSTC) in the Middle East, concluding that the expectation of terrorist perceptions of a zero-sum game when faced with rivalry has utility in explaining TO actions. Weinberg and Richardson (2004) engaged in a similar analysis of the presence of third party rivals in escalating violence in Northern Ireland, suggesting that TOs perceive the presence of other organizations as a source of competition for resources, support, and attention. While these studies suggest that TOs consider competitors and are locked in a zero-sum game, case studies provide further support for this supposition.

The case studies demonstrate that different TOs that have altered their behaviors when faced with a competitor. Shining Path (SL) and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) provide a ready example of inter-group rivalry. Both TOs were radical communist organizations in Peru in the 1980s and 1990s (Ellenbogen, 1999). Although SL was the largest and most successful TO operating in Peru at the time, SL viewed MRTA as a competitor, particularly given that the MRTA engaged in splashy operations, or "urban spectacular", such as high-profile kidnappings (McCormick, 1992: 9). As a response to MRTA, SL altered its own operations by expanding its urban presence in an attempt to win the support and

loyalty of the urban poor. In addition, SL would frequently attack MRTA positions in order to undermine or weaken the organization (McCormick, 1987). Therefore, when faced with a competitor, SL adjusted its strategy in relation to the constituents and towards the competing TO.

Along the same lines of competitor dynamics, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) formed as a breakaway group of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the 1970s (Shirlow et al., 2010). The INLA was opposed to an IRA 1972 ceasefire and formed with the goal of continuing a political campaign but pairing it with an extremist militant presence. The IRA viewed the INLA as a threatening faction and, in response, started a targeted campaign to eliminate INLA leaders and destabilize the group. In 1977, the IRA assassinated the founder and leader of the INLA, Seamus Costello, successfully weakening the INLA. Thus, similar to SL in Peru, the IRA perceived the INLA as a competitor and adjusted its strategy in order to eradicate the INLA.

While the examples provided above indicate that a TO will respond to a TO competitor, Hamas activities during the Palestinian-Israeli peace process provide an example of TO response to non-TO competitors. Between 1993 and 2001, Hamas attacks clustered around six major events integral to the peace process; these included such events such as the signing of peace accords, treaties, and agreements (Kydd and Walter, 2002). Researchers suggest that the TO took advantage of the fear that each party carried to the negotiation process and carried out attacks in order to escalate apprehension and disrupt the process (Kydd and Walter, 2002). As such, these

attacks served the purpose of playing one competitor off another in an attempt to derail peace negotiations.

This brief summary provides support for the application of game theory to terrorist activity. Theoretical modeling suggests that TOs consider the presence and strategies of their opponents. In addition, modeling and case studies indicate that the TO perceives the competition as a zero-sum game. Finally, case studies illustrate that TOs will alter their strategies and behaviors in order to respond to perceived competitors. The following section briefly presents some of the potential costs, benefits, and opponent considerations that may influence terrorist strategy and action selection.

Potential Costs, Benefits, and Considerations included in the Utility Function

Academics have identified a variety of potential benefits that are salient for the TO.[23] Some of the most cited benefits include recruitment opportunities and increasing constituent support; these are highly significant requirements for the sake of group survival (Bloom, 2004; Crenshaw, 2001; Oots, 1989). As such, terrorism can serve a direct and indirect recruitment and support-building function. Whittaker (2001) and Wright (2006) note that large-scale attacks elicit immediate and direct responses from potential recruits. A widely publicized terrorist attack may inspire individuals primed for radicalization to join a TO as they witness the impact a TO can have on the public and policy makers.

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[23] It is important to note that terrorist group members generally prioritize group success and survival over individual personal gain and, as such, the utility of a given action will be impacted by costs and benefits relevant to the larger group (Dugan and Chenoweth, 2012). Therefore, a TO model would be weighted more by organizational considerations and less by individual-level costs and benefits.

Some potential recruits, however, are more difficult to engage. One way of eliciting support from these more difficult audiences is to incite anger directed towards a shared foe, such as the government (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). This tactic follows the logic that the constituency and the general public will become enraged with the government if the government uses violence and excessive control that affects the oppressed and the citizenry. Nevin (2003) elaborates on this process, noting that TOs may stage terrorist events with the specific intention of eliciting a repressive response from state actors or opponents. Depending on the nature of the repressive response (such as suspension of rights, oppressive military presence, and indiscriminate attacks), the responder's action may enrage the public, leading to a willingness to support and join terrorist groups.

A further benefit relates to the potential long-term impact that terrorism can have on policy change, particularly for conflicts rooted in nationalist or ethnic struggles (Lutz and Lutz, 2009). As noted by Victoroff (2005), the terrorist activities of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) helped facilitate the creation of the Irish Free State in 1922. During the 1980s, Hezbollah engaged in an active suicide bombing campaign, contributing to the withdrawal of foreign forces and facilitating Shia control of portions of Lebanese territory (Crenshaw, 2003; Hoffman, 2002). Academics have argued that the decolonization of areas such as pre-Israel Palestine and Cyprus following World War II are due, at least in part, to successful terror-based campaigns (Enders and Sandler, 2006; Hoffman, 2006). In both Palestine and Cyprus, repeated terrorist attacks by Jewish militants made continued military presence too costly. The Basque region in Spain is another example of a partial

success. The area has been granted levels of autonomy by the government as a measure designed to weaken public support of the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) [Shabad and Ramo, 1995]. These and other successes provide some indication that policy change can be achieved through the strategic application of political violence.

In addition to the group-relevant benefits of terrorist activities, there are also many readily identifiable costs. One consideration for the terrorist organization is the loss of members through death and the need to keep an active pool of new recruits; this is particularly salient for groups that use suicide volunteers. The cost of loss of life may be too great for the individual to inspire volunteers and, to offset these perceived costs with an incentive; some groups offer generous death benefits to surviving family members (Caplan, 2006).[24]

The TO may also consider the cost of diminishing power caused by waning numbers through the process of incarceration. Le Vine and Salert (1996) assessed the effects of arrests on the incidents of terrorism amongst Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) members. They concluded that arrests led to a robust and significant decline in terrorist activities, demonstrating a deterrent effect, or a shift in the willingness of the organization to sacrifice members. Along similar lines, Ross and Gurr (1989) posit that a significant decline in Canadian terrorism in the 1970s was due to the deterrent effect that arrests and incarceration of Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) members had on the organization.

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[24] It is worth noting, though, that for some groups, loss of life is a form of martyrdom or ultimate sacrifice, with the expectation that suicidal acts will result in community veneration and, in some cases, a glorious afterlife (Kruglanski et al., 2009; Pedahzur et al., 2003). This can serve as a recruitment tool amongst reticent members or sympathetic allies (Bloom, 2004).

Another potential cost of terrorist action, and one that is central to this dissertation, is the resulting reduction in the level of constituency support, which can lead to the downfall of a terrorist organization (Flanigan, 2006). Terrorist groups can lose public favor if their tactics are not strategic or effective, or if the backlash has consequences for the constituents (Dugan et al., 2008). As mentioned previously, organizations will go to great lengths to increase public support, including inciting violent government response that would incense the oppressed community (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008) and offering public services that are comparable or an improvement upon the services provided by the government (Flanigan, 2006). Hezbollah in Lebanon demonstrates how far groups will go to win public support from the constituents; this particular terrorist organization has developed a charity branch that provides health care, media, and credit programs, among other services, to the marginalized Shia population (Tavernise, 2006). Hamas also carries out comparable activities in Palestine, offering aid, employment, educational and medical support (Levitt, 2004).

In summary, there are a variety of group-specific costs and benefits that revolve around issues of campaign success and organizational survival. These considerations may underlie many or all of the cost-benefits analyses that the organizational leaders or collectives engage in when considering future activities. These factors may also be weighted by recognition of the other key players that influence the likelihood of a given cost or benefit, such as state actors or, more relevant to the focus of this dissertation, potential competitors. The choices available to those competitors and the interactional dynamic between action and response can

influence outcome decisions. As outlined in the previous chapter, one of those potential competitors that may be salient to a TO when weighing the costs and benefits of a given course of action is the NGO. The remainder of this chapter will focus on the hypothesized relationship between NGO activity and TO activity, within the rational choice and game-theoretic frameworks.

<center>Returning to the Research Questions and NGOs</center>

As this chapter and the previous chapter outlined, there are theoretically-supported reasons to expect that NGOs matter to TOs. NGOs have influence and power, they compete for media attention, funding, and the support of the constituency, and they can undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of a TO campaign. TOs are rational bodies that weigh the costs and benefits of a given action or inaction; they are influenced by a variety of considerations, including the activities of a competitor. Finally, there is evidence that the TO, when presented with a rival for constituent support, engages in a zero-sum game and adjusts its strategy in order to undermine the rival (Sandler and Siqueira, 2009).

Given this dynamic, it is reasonable to predict that an NGO's *physical presence*, whether temporary or permanent, in a given conflict area focused on an oppressed constituency shared by a TO will have an impact on TO activities. It is also reasonable to hypothesize that NGO *campaign content*, particularly if it is focused on the harmful nature of TO activities or showing support for a shared constituency, may have a direct or indirect effect on TO activities. In addition, competitive NGO *service provision* may also impact TO activity, as it liberates a constituency from being beholden to a TO. Finally, *media activity,* defined as media

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coverage of NGO activity, may also have an impact, as NGOs and TOs vie for the attention and approval of the oppressed and international communities. Applying the rational choice and game theory frameworks lead to directional hypotheses concerning the relationship between NGO and TO activity.

For the sake of ease and transparency, the following hypotheses are crafted around a specific set of possible NGO characteristics and activities, while the TO activities are built around a set of potential responses. Regarding NGOs, their activity can be measured in a variety of ways, including their physical presence (campaigning within the conflict area for a short period of time or establishing a permanent presence in a conflict area), the focus of their campaign (focusing exclusively on the well-being of the constituency through advocacy work or actively campaigning against the TO), service provision (providing competitive services), and media activity or coverage (a low presence or high presence in media coverage). TO responses can be expressed in a variety of ways, including the characteristics of the attack (frequency) and the target (targeting the constituency, the oppressor, or the NGO).

To elaborate, this dissertation follows in the footsteps of the World Bank and draws a distinction between campaigning NGOs and service provision NGOs (also called operational NGOs) (Willetts, 2002; World Bank, 2012). These delineations are based on variations in function and goals. Campaigning NGOs promote long-term change through advocacy work and lobbying efforts, while service provision NGOs provide short-term services, such as aid and community support, that are designed to offset a long-term deficiency (Spar and Dail, 2002; Willetts, 2002). While there are

other forms of classification based on such NGO attributes as geographical location, religious foundations, and volunteer- and donor-based staffing and funding (Vakil, 1997), the simple dichotomy between campaigning and provision work is applied here. And, while some NGOs fall into both categories, the organizations selected for this dissertation here fall squarely into the campaigning category (Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International) or the service provision category (International Committee of the Red Cross). The first and second sets of hypotheses refer specifically to campaigning organizations, while the third hypothesis refers to service provision organizations. The fourth hypothesis refers to both.

Campaigning NGO's Physical Presence

Campaigning organizations may have three readily-identifiable levels of proximity: 1) they may campaign for a constituency from afar, maintaining a presence in their home country exclusively and advocating from there, 2) they may campaign from afar, but send delegates to the conflict area for short periods of time, in order to bear witness and advocate on the ground, or 3) they may maintain a long-term active campaign presence within the conflict area, usually through the establishment of an organizational office or clinic (Global Policy Forum, 2013).

Rational choice and game theory would suggest that the level of TO activity would vary depending on the NGO's proximity to and presence in the conflict area. Outbidding is a concept often applied to inter-group competition; outbidding implies that one group will up the ante in order to gain an advantage over or outbid another competing group (Bloom, 2006; Findley and Young, 2012). Although this is typically applied to TO versus TO (Bloom, 2004; Findley and Young, 2012; Kydd

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and Walter, 2006), the same concepts can apply with TO versus NGO. The logic is as follows: as NGOs become more active and entrenched in a conflict area, they become more salient and accessible to the constituency. This can alter constituency response and allegiance to the TO as they are given the alternative option of the NGO as a new "hero" leading to a shift in support and resources (Kydd and Walter, 2006). As such, the TO may be required, for the sake of group survival, to raise the costs for the NGO of maintaining a presence in the conflict area.[25] By deterring an NGO from maintaining local proximity, the TO might aim to eliminate the competition altogether, make the NGO seem less reliable than the TO, or emphasize that the NGO is an outsider (for international NGOs) and may vacate at any time (Bloom, 2006). In addition, the TO may opt to decrease the harm they cause to the specific constituency or the general citizenry through target selection and attack type (Lilja, 2009). By minimizing civilian collateral damages, the TO might aim to present itself as a less-harmful option or a benevolent ally (Lilja, 2011). Finally, the TO may choose to escalate activities against the oppressor that is negating the rights and freedoms of the constituency (Kydd and Walter, 2006). This will demonstrate to the constituency that the TO is focused on the issue at hand and effective at targeting those responsible.

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[25] An example of this tactic can be found in the multiple attacks against international NGOs perpetrated by Al-Shabaab in November, 2011, in Somalia. Following the attacks, Al-Shabaab stated they were banning 16 aid organizations from Somalia (BBC, 2011).

Hypothesis 1A: An increase in physical presence of a campaigning NGO within a conflict area will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting NGOs.[26]

Hypothesis 1B: An increase in physical presence of a campaigning NGO within a conflict area will lead to a decrease in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the citizenry.[27]

Hypothesis 1C: An increase in physical presence of a campaigning NGO within a conflict area will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the oppressor.

NGO Advocacy-Related Campaign Content

In addition to the proximity of the NGO, the content of the NGOs campaign may also elicit a response from the TO. There are two clear campaign foci that NGOs may employ. Firstly, the NGO may campaign solely for the betterment of the constituency, focusing on the party responsible for depriving the citizenry of rights

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[26] It is logical to posit that the physical presence of a select NGO will increase attacks targeting that specific NGO. However, the hypotheses included in this dissertation stipulate that the activities of one NGO can affect TO responses to all NGOs. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the concept of general deterrence dictates that attacks targeting a single NGO will serve to deter other NGOs. Secondly, attacks against NGOs are rare events; it would be analytically questionable to include attacks against a single organization as an outcome variable, given that these may occur only once in several decades and, therefore, may only result in a single data point, depending on the time period of interest.

[27] As mentioned in previous chapters, it is important to note the distinction made here between the constituents and the citizenry. Members of the constituency, for the purposes of this dissertation, are all members of the citizenry but not all members of the citizenry are members of the constituency. However, as mentioned in chapter one and two, terrorism can affect a constituency directly through targeted attacks and outcomes, or indirectly, through attacks and outcomes affecting the general citizenry, of which the constituents belong. In addition, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to separate out attacks targeting the citizens from attacks targeting the constituents. For these reasons, all hypotheses directed towards the members of the constituency will extend to all members of the citizenry.

and freedoms. Secondly, the NGO may also perceive the activities of TOs as harmful to their shared constituents and, as a result, may focus some of their resources on attempting to change or eliminate destructive TO activities (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2007). The first scenario involves an advocacy-only campaign while the second scenario involves the NGO incorporating the TO in their campaign by adding an anti-TO component.

A shift in campaign foci from no campaign to advocacy work or anti-terrorist work may elicit a response from a TO. Regarding advocacy work, a shift from no advocacy to an advocacy campaign indicates an increasing interest on the part of the NGO in the well-being of the constituency. This interest is a necessary component for constituency allegiance to an organization and, thus, may give the oppressed community an alternative to TO allegiance and support (Parker, 2011). Meanwhile, incorporating the TO into an active campaign serves to vilify the group in the eyes of the public (e.g., Muslims against Terrorism, 2013). If the constituency accepts this as the identity of the TO, the TO loses legitimacy and credibility as a defender of the oppressed (Parker, 2011). As such, the TO will likely lose support of the local and the international community and, thus, their group survival and power will be threatened.

Within the rational choice and game theory framework, it is predicted that the TO will alter activities in response to these different campaign foci. Similar to the expected response to NGO proximity, the TO may choose to target the NGO in an effort to dissuade it from either campaign focus. By this logic, if campaigning for a constituency or against a TO puts NGO representatives at risk, the NGO may choose

to shift campaign focus away from the TO or the constituents as a protective measure. In addition, the TO may escalate activities against the original antagonist, increasing the frequency of attacks. In the case of advocacy work, this presents the TO as an effective ally and a viable alternative to NGO allegiance. In the case of anti-terrorism campaign content, this may serve to shift focus back on to the main target, the oppressor, and away from the TO. In addition, this could evoke a repressive response from the majority, serving to remind the constituency of the party responsible for their plight and eliciting a punitive response from the public. Finally, the TO may decrease attacks against the citizenry in an effort, in the case of advocacy work, to present itself as benevolent and, in the case of an NGO anti-terrorism campaign, to undermine the new-found TO identity as an oppressor.

Hypothesis 2Ai: An increase in NGO focus on constituent advocacy within the NGO campaign will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting NGOs.

Hypothesis 2Aii: An increase in NGO focus on TO activity within the NGO campaign will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting NGOs.

Hypothesis 2Bi: An increase in NGO focus on constituent advocacy within the NGO campaign will lead to a decrease in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the citizenry.

Hypothesis 2Bii: An increase in NGO focus on TO activity within the NGO campaign will lead to a decrease in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the citizenry.

Hypothesis 2Ci: An increase in NGO focus on constituent advocacy within the NGO campaign will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the oppressor.

Hypothesis 2Cii: An increase in NGO focus on TO activity within the NGO campaign will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the oppressor.

NGO Service Provision

As mentioned previously, not all NGOs actively campaign around a given issue or, if they do, it is the not the majority of their mandate or their effort. Some NGOs, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), focus on service provision primarily, such as health care, education, counseling, and reuniting families. It is posited here that these NGOs can elicit the same kind of response from TOs as campaigning organizations.

Service provision can serve to alleviate the suffering of an oppressed constituency. In areas where the main provider is the state or the oppressor, an alternative provider can solicit the support and favor of the affected citizenry by offering these same services (Flanigan, 2006). In these cases, NGOs may garner allegiance from the public simply by offering an oppressor-free alternative. However, as mentioned previously, some established TOs, such as Hamas or Hezbollah, also offer oppressor-free social services and charitable support to members of a constituency (Levitt, 2004; Prusher, 2000). This seemingly generous activity has great utility for a TO. First and foremost, service provision can act to

indebt an oppressed population to an organization, offset negative opinions about the TO stemming from their violent activities, and help the TO gain acceptance from the larger community (Flanigan, 2006). In addition, providing services can be paired with advertising terrorist ideals to the citizenry, helping a TO gain political support if they serve a political function in a given region, or serving as a recruitment tool (Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, 2009; Ly, 2007).

As noted by Hasenfeld (1987), whether a client has access to services from elsewhere determines the amount of power that a provider has over that client. In conflict areas, members of an aggrieved constituency may not have many options for social services, medical aid, and financial reparations. A TO with capacity to provide these services unchallenged has a greater likelihood of winning the support of the public; however, if there are alternate service providers available, the TO loses power over the constituency (Flanigan, 2006; Murdie and Stapley, 2013). As such, if an NGO that has the capacity to provide competing services were to take up residence in a conflict area, eliminating that competing organization would benefit the TO in its quest to gain public support. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that a TO would target the specific offending NGO in an attempt to deter it from maintaining a presence. It is also reasonable to expect that the TO would target all NGOs in order to give the specific NGO the impression that NGOs, in general, are at risk.

Hypothesis 3: Increasing the physical presence of a service provision NGO will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting NGOs.

NGO Media activity

A final consideration relates to the coverage that the NGO receives from the media around a shared issue or constituency. As mentioned in the previous chapter, media attention is posited to be integral to the survival and success of a campaign (Adamson, 2005; Frey and Luechinger, 2002; Fussey, 2011). The volume and content of media coverage can influence the degree of importance an audience places on a given issue (Entman, 2004; Willnat, Graf, and Brewer, 2000; McCombs, 2013). Organizations may operate under the assumption that mass media coverage gives an impression of the effectiveness, popularity, and power of a group (Weimann, 1983; Weimann, 2004). As such, media can be perceived as influencing such factors as the public and private support granted to the organization, as well as its recruitment potential and longevity.

A substantive portion of NGO work is dedicated to capturing media attention through, amongst other measures, press releases and press conferences, country reports, and protests (Fenton, 2010; Josephson, 2013; Waisbord, 2011). The level of success that an NGO achieves at capturing media attention can impact the attention a TO receives. If an NGO has a significant coverage in the media, this may lead to a decreased focus on the TO in the media, due to limited space and limited perspectives (Zhu, 1992). In addition, NGO media coverage may be indicative of its ability to present the version of the conflict that is compatible with its goals (Joachim, 2007). As such, NGO media activity may serve to undermine TO messaging and impact.

Given the dynamics between organizational survival and success and the media, it is logical to expect that the TO will respond to an increase in media

coverage of NGO activities. The TO may seek to secure a place into the media

headlines, displacing the NGO, by using tactics and activities that the media would

find enticing, such as increasing casualties (Fussey, 2011). As such, the TO is

expected to increase the frequency of attacks, in a bid to capture attention. In this

case, it may not be strategic to shift focus towards or away from the constituency, the

majority, or the NGO, but simply to focus on whatever is most likely to produce

media headlines.

Hypothesis 4: An increase in NGO overall media coverage will lead to an

increase in the frequency of TO attacks.

In summary, there are reasonable grounds, within the rational

choice/deterrence framework, to expect that the presence of NGOs in a conflict areas,

the content of their campaigns, their provision of services, and their media activity

will have an impact on TO activity. NGOs may influence the frequency of TO

attacks, as well as the attack target. The following chapter will present a qualitative

look at the selected countries, TOs, and NGOs that will be used to test these

hypothesized relationships.

CHAPTER 4: Countries, Terrorist Organizations, and Non-Governmental Organizations

This chapter examines the countries included in this dissertation and the terrorist organizations that operate within their borders. As mentioned in previous chapters, the three select countries are Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey. These countries are chosen for a variety of reasons. They have high levels of terrorist activity with a great deal of variation; established terrorist organizations currently and historically operate within their borders; oppressed groups and the issues prompting terrorist activity vary across the countries; and, finally, preliminary data are available for all three counties.[28] Algeria, as elaborated on below, is an exception to the oppressor/oppressed/advocate dynamic introduced in chapter two; TOs have occasionally championed the citizenry, but this is not a consistent trend. Algeria is included for the sake of comparison with the countries that do have this dynamic.

For each country, the most active TOs are summarized in this chapter. Over the last three or more decades, Algeria has had three main TOs (the Armed Islamic Group [GIA], the Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting [GSPC], and Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb [AQLIM]) operating within its borders, and Turkey and Lebanon have each had one main active TO (Kurdistan Worker's Party [PKK] and Hezbollah, respectively).

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[28] As described in chapter five, this dissertation uses precursor data for the Government Actions in Terror Environments (GATE) database. GATE has collected or is currently collecting data on 11 countries.

In addition to providing a background summary of the chosen countries and their prominent TOs, this chapter also provides information on the three international NGOs that are included in the study: Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The organizations are chosen for a variety of reasons, including their sheer size and reputation, their long history as active and effective organizations, their variety of tactics and goals, and their diversity in presence and activities within and between Algeria, Turkey, and Lebanon. These characteristics increase the likelihood that the NGOs will catch the attention of TOs and, thus, elicit a response (Stapley, 2014). These organizations are prominent in the media, are vocal in their opposition of TO activity, and they are effective at soliciting membership and resources from affected communities and their supporters (Murdie and Stapley, 2013; Stapley, 2014). Finally, analysis indicates that these NGOs do elicit a response from TOs (Murdie and Stapley, 2013).

Local NGOs may also share some of these characteristics and can serve an influential role (Stapley, 2014). Therefore, local and unnamed human rights NGOs involved in campaigns focused on the conflict areas of interest are also included in the final analyses. However, these groups are diverse, sometimes short-lived, and often unnamed in the media and, as such, a summary of their history and work is not provided here.

Opening Observations

Before summarizing the countries, NGOs, and TOs of interest, there are two important observations that should be made. Recall the dynamic of oppressor and

oppressed that was introduced in chapters one and two: a hero arises in response to an oppressive group abusing an oppressed group. While Lebanon and Turkey offer sound examples of this dynamic, particularly in reference to the Shia and Kurdish populations (elaborated on below), Algeria falls outside of this demarcation. The general citizenry has been, at times, oppressed by both the government and the TOs; thus making them a constituency to only the NGOs and not the TOs. To elaborate, the TOs operating within Algeria are reacting to ideological or institutional differences (e.g., the importance of an Islamic state and national and global jihad), not fighting for an oppressed population. At specific times, the citizenry, which typically fills the role of the oppressed, has been intentionally targeted by a TO in a manner similar to what would be expected for an oppressor: the citizenry is seen as part of the problem. Therefore, Algeria does not provide a defensible example of the TO/NGO/constituency relationship. However, the inclusion of Algeria is deliberate and potentially beneficial; its inclusion allows for intra- and inter-group comparison and it functions as a control country. In addition, the relationships between NGO and TO activity in Algeria can be compared to similar relationships in Lebanon and Turkey, where the constituency is firmly established. These comparisons allow for a better assessment of the nuances of the hypothesized relationship between oppressor, oppressed, and the hero. Specifically, returning to the basic tenets of game theory, if there is no shared constituency that creates a competitive dynamic between the NGO and TO, does the activity of the former have any relationship to the activity of the latter? In sum, although the oppressor/oppressed dynamic does not apply when the TO is not civilian-oriented, the inclusion of Algeria allows for an assessment of NGO

influence in the absence of this dynamic, as well as a comparison with countries that follow a more traditional dynamic of oppression.

A second observation refers to the selection of NGOs. Recall that HRW and AI serve as active human rights or campaigning organizations, but ICRC stands out in that it is a humanitarian or service provision organization. The inclusion of ICRC, particularly in light of the service role that Hezbollah plays in Lebanon, serves a unique analytical function. Specifically, it allows for assessment of the influence of service provision organizations in areas where the local TO is filling a similar provision role, such as is the case in Lebanon. Before providing an overview of these NGOs, the background and history of the chosen countries, their conflicts, and their TOs will be provided.

Turkey, Kurds, and the PKK

The roots of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey can be traced back nearly a century to the fall of the Ottoman Empire (Cornell, 2009). After World War I (WWI), Mustafa Kemal, also known as Ataturk (the father of Turks), took office as president (Kucukcan, 2003). Seeking a modern and united Turkey, Ataturk rejected the Sevres Treaty created by the Allies following WWI; adopting it would have reduced Turkey to one third its current size and created an independent Kurdish country (Phillips, 2008) or created a binational state (Kucukcan, 2003). Instead, Ataturk rallied the citizenry and eventually succeeded in replacing the Sevres Treaty with the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, which incorporated the founding principles of the

new Republic of Turkey.[29] The Lausanne Treaty ensured that minority status was determined by religious, rather than ethnic, characteristics and it stipulated that the population would need to assume a civic national identity based on being Turkish. The expectation was that Kurdish people would adopt a Turkish identity (Cornell, 2009).

In 1925, the Kurdish people rebelled, seeking an independent state; but they were quickly suppressed (Phillips, 2008). Over the next 15 years, there were 18 revolts across the country, leading to a draconian response from the state (Kucukcan, 2003). Kurdish language was banned, as was cultural expression and Kurds in select areas were deported to other areas of the country. Kurdish identity was forcibly removed and they became "mountain Turks" (Ozcelik, 2006: 136).

In the 1950s, the tides shifted slightly and Kurdish identity came to the forefront again. Through increased access to education, the rise of a multi-party system, and shifts in traditional ties, a subset of Kurdish intelligencia arose and became active in political spheres, allying with the left-leaning Turkish Labor Party (TLP), the first party to acknowledge the existence of Kurds (Ozcelik, 2006). However, the emphasis within the TLP and the elites was on integration, rather than autonomy or separation; this emphasis persevered throughout the Cold War. During that time, the Kurdish regions of the country became the most impoverished and underdeveloped regions in the country, riddled with civil strife and neglected by the state (Barkey, 1993; Cornell, 2009).

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[29] The Republic of Turkey was built on six principles, including: republicanism, reformism, populism, nationalism, secularism, and statism (Cornell, 2009: 33).

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In the 1960s and 1970s, radical student groups rallied in opposition to the activities of the Turkish government (Barkey, 1993). The Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) formed in 1978 as an offshoot of one of these early radical groups (Ergil, 2000). The PKK, originally driven by a Marxist-Leninist ideology, focused primarily in its first few years on the need for a proletarian revolution (Phillips, 2003). By the time of its first violent attack in 1984, the PKK had shifted its attention to the creation of a Kurdish state, recognizing this as the first necessary step in the establishment of a greater Kurdistan (Ozcelik, 2006). Led by a near cult-like personality, Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK embarked on a long and violent 30-year campaign to gain Kurdish cultural recognition, autonomy and, at times, independence.

The PKK demanded allegiance from the Kurds, stipulating that a failure to support the organization was an expression of loyalty to the Turkish state (Phillips, 2003). This created some level of disillusionment amongst the citizenry (Cornell, 2009). In addition, members of the PKK would often target Kurdish elites, including teachers, doctors, and businesspeople, causing a further divide between the organization and the people (Criss, 1995; Phillips, 2003). However, the government's response to the TO, described below, helped win public favor for the PKK.

In response to attacks targeting state representatives, such as government figures, military personnel, and state buildings, the government implemented martial law in several Kurdish areas in the late 1980s, declaring a state of emergency. Military operations were initiated and intensified, some including death squads, and suspected PKK members and sympathizers were targeted, although the fatalities often

included an uninvolved citizenry. In addition, the government implemented a policy

that forcibly displaced villagers thought to be providing shelter or support to the

PKK; nearly 400,000 villagers were evacuated. Further restrictions were placed on

the Kurdish identity, including publications, language, and broadcasts (Ozcelik,

2006). The government-led activities solidified support for the PKK in opposition to

the government (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997; Cornell, 2009).[30]

Beyond civilian allegiances, the PKK was problematic for Turkey for a

variety of reasons. In addition to promoting violence and contributing to civil strife,

the activities of the PKK and the state response to the TO also compromised Turkey's

position within the international community (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997). Although

Turkey had aspirations to become a member of the European Union, the conflict

made Turkey an unattractive prospect (Ozcelik, 2006). In addition, the state-led

response to the PKK that resulted in the deaths and displacement of thousands of

citizens violated international human rights expectations, souring relationships with

neighbors and western nations. Finally, the conflict devastated the Turkish economy,

impacting tourism, foreign investment, and internal stability. By the 1990s, Turkey

was hard-pressed to eliminate the PKK with whatever means possible.

In a move to attack the PKK at its heart, the Turkish government turned its

attention to Öcalan. Öcalan had previously fled to Syria, an ally of the PKK, in

response to military crackdowns and had been conducting operations from there

(Phillips, 2003). Turkey threatened to suspend Syrian access to water supplies from

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[30] Not long after the formation of the PKK and the state crackdown, international human rights and
humanitarian NGOs took an active interest in the Kurdish plight, prompted mainly by the actions of
the oppressive regime and partially by the violence employed by the TO. This will be summarized
further below.

the Euphrates River unless Syria designated the PKK as a terrorist organization and committed to handing Öcalan over to the Turkish government; Syria complied with the designation. Öcalan fled Syria and was eventually captured in Nairobi and handed over to Turkish security in February of 1999 (Ergil, 2000). He was convicted of treason and sentenced to death in June of 1999.

Once captured, Öcalan modified the PKK campaign considerably (Kline, 2004). In immediate response to his arrest, PKK members and Kurdish citizens protested across Europe, attacking embassies, engaging in self-immolation and hunger strikes, hostage-takings, and suicide bombings (Ergil, 2000; Phillips, 2003). However, in August of 1999, Öcalan, in an unexpected move, demanded that the PKK shift its focus from the militant to the political.[31] Specifically, he called for the withdrawal of PKK forces from Turkey,[32] stipulating that the organization should desist in armed attacks, and he commanded that senior members surrender to Turkish authorities (Marcus, 2007). PKK members complied.

Over the next several years, the PKK limited its militant activities, but maintained an active presence in training camps in Iraq (Marcus, 2007). Under pressure from the international community, Turkey eliminated the death penalty and, by default, commuted Öcalan's sentence to life imprisonment. The Turkish government also began making some concessions regarding the Kurdish dilemma, although the pace and content were unsatisfying to the Kurdish people and the PKK. Kurdish-language broadcasting was permitted, but took several years to implement;

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[31] Some sources speculate that this call for a shift in focus and tactics was actually part of a bartering process between Ocalan and the Turkish government as Ocalan attempted to suspend his death sentence (Marcus, 2007).

[32] The PKK maintained training camps in Iraq; Ocalan commanded that the PKK withdraw to these camps (Kline, 2004).

the same applied to Kurdish-language classes. In addition, Kurdish-friendly political parties were disbanded, under the charge that they had links to the PKK. In 2004, in frustration of the minimal political concessions granted the Kurds and in a move to reassert PKK-relevance, Öcalan released a statement calling for an end to the ceasefire.

Following Öcalan's suspension of the cease fire, attacks perpetrated by or affiliated with the PKK escalated, coming to a peak in 2012 (Tezcur, 2012). To the surprise of the international community, Öcalan called another ceasefire in March of 2013 and, once again, commanded that the PKK withdraw from Turkey (Letsch, 2013). The months between Öcalan's proclamation and the writing of this dissertation have been laden with tension, as the Turkish government is slow to demonstrate further concessions to the Kurdish people and the PKK is reluctant to withdraw.

<div align="center">Lebanon, the Shia, and Hezbollah</div>

Lebanon has a long history rooted in religious clashes and conflicts. During the 19th century, the Maronite Christian population emerged as the favored community, above the Druze (a Shia branch), Sunni, and the Shia populations (Makdisi, 1996). The Maronites, along with support from the minority Druze elites, succeeded in gaining European support for a system of community delineation based on religion, rather than region or kinship; these sects were called taifas. These religiously-orientated divisions would continue to maintain legitimacy throughout Lebanese society for the next two centuries, permeating social and political spheres.

Grand Liban, later to become Lebanon, was created in 1920, following the end of WWI and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Makdisi, 1996). The Maronites continued to hold a place of prominence, while the Sunni population overtook the Druze community as next in a position of power. The Republic of Lebanon, under French rule, was formed in 1926 and officially granted the majority of power to the Maronites; the new constitution mandated that confessional groups or taifas would be represented proportionately in government (Saab and Ranstrop, 2007). This was further codified in the National Pact of 1943, which granted Lebanon independence from France; the Pact stipulated that future presidents would be Maronite, prime ministers would be Sunni, and the Speaker of Parliament would be Shia (Makdisi, 1996).

Following independence, Lebanon was gripped by sectarian tension. Muslims were becoming demographically favored over Christians and secular groups were motivating politically, demanding change (Saab and Ranstrop, 2007). The religious elites were reticent to incorporate these perspectives and representatives into the political system for fear that it would result in a radicalized Muslim nation. In addition, regional development was inequitable and portions of the population, mostly Shia, were sinking deeper into a state of disadvantage and poverty. In response to these conditions, students and workers began protesting in the 1970s, calling for civil rights and privileges, and militant activity began to crop up (Makdisi, 1996). In 1975, Lebanon sunk into civil war that persevered until 1990 (Barak, 2007).

The civil war was based on a sectarian divide as a mostly rightist Christian population opposed a mostly leftist Muslim population (Saab and Ranstrop, 2007).

On this backdrop, Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978, then again in 1982, taking up

active occupation of the southern parts of the country, traditionally the Shia regions,

for the next 18 years (Murden, 2000). The invasion was carried out for a number of

reasons, including creating a security or zone between Israel and Lebanon-based

Syrian and/or Palestinian adversaries. This period of conflict was devastating for the

country; casualties were estimated to be around 150,000, hundreds of thousands of

people were displaced, and approximately one third of the population fled the

country; the majority of these victims came from the Shia community (Barak, 2007).

While the Shia community was the poorest community in Lebanon, they were

also the fastest growing. In an attempt to gain a foothold in the government, Musa al-

Sadr formed the first Shia political party, the Harakat al-Mahroumin (the Movement

of the Dispossessed) in the early 1970s (Haddad, 2006). The party included a

military wing called Amal, which focused on challenging the political elite through

the use of violence (Bazzi, 2007). Amal also targeted Israeli forces in the south,

leading to heavy retaliation (Haddad, 2006). The fighting destabilized the Shia

constituency even further, causing them to relocate en masse to the impoverished

southern suburbs of Beirut, also known as the "misery belt" (23). In 1978, al-Sadr

disappeared and Amal shifted focus to advocating for a democratic pluralism or

integration into a larger Islamic nation, although it continued to engage in some

militant activities.

Hezbollah, also known as the Party of God, was founded in Iran in the late

1970s (Haddad, 2006). Established as an extremist Islamic organization, it was

heavily supported by Iran, who viewed it as the defenders of the Shia people

(Schbley, 2000). Hezbollah became active in Lebanon in the 1980s, in response to the Israel occupation and the plight of the Shia community (Haddad, 2006). Its effective use of political violence and strong leadership was appealing to the Shia community and Hezbollah grew quickly in size as its constituency increased, populated by the dispossessed and the impoverished. As advocates for the oppressed and a movement of the disadvantaged, Hezbollah engaged in a low-level war with Israel that continued throughout the civil war and the signing of the Taif Accord and beyond (Murden, 2000).[33]

The Lebanese civil war, which led to near total state collapse, drew to a close in 1990, following the signing of a new National Pact, the Taif Accord (Makdisi, 1996). Crafted by Syria and Saudi Arabia, the Accord recognized the Syrian relationship with Lebanon, codifying Syria's role as the guarantor of security (Atlas and Licklider, 1990). In addition, it stipulated that militias disarm and dismantle, with the exception of Hezbollah, which was recognized as a legitimate national resistance movement serving to oppose Israel occupation (Bazzi, 2007).[34] Further, the Accord validated the pre-existing political structure based on confessional affiliation, requiring that political offices be occupied by representatives of the Maronite, Sunni, and Shia communities, although it granted more political power to the Sunni community, at the expense of the Maronites (Atlas and Licklider, 1990; Murden, 2000). While the Accord was opposed on several fronts, leading to high-

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[33] NGO interest and activities in Lebanon developed parallel to the formation of Hezbollah. The Israeli occupation, the plight of the Shia people, and the TO response prompted human rights and humanitarian NGOs to becoming involved from afar and on the ground. This is outlined further below.
[34] It is important to note that Hezbollah was considered a terrorist organization by several nations at the time of the Taif Accord and continues to be labeled a terrorist organization by several large governing bodies, such as the United States and the European Union (Pawlak and Croft, 2013).

casualty inter-Maronite skirmishes, the Accord was signed into law in September, 1990. By 1991, Beirut had been demilitarized and the existing militias had turned in their weapons, with the exception of Hezbollah.

Hezbollah continued a low-level war with Israel following the signing of the Accord, (Norton, 2007). In 2000, following 18 years of violent confrontations and outright opposition, Israel withdrew from Lebanon, vacating the "zone of domination" that it had held in the southern region of the country (Murden, 2000: 34). With the end of the civil war and the removal of Israeli threat, Hezbollah underwent a transformation, maintaining a militant branch, but also shifting resources towards the formation of a political and a social services branch (Haddad, 2006; Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, 2009). While Hezbollah had begun providing social services to the Shia community early in its existence, it had not played an active political role until Israeli withdrawal (Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, 2009). By 2006, Hezbollah had established itself as a key political player and social service provider, taking a prominent role in the government and eclipsing services offered by the state in impoverished regions of the country (Flanigan, 2006). Not only did Hezbollah gain legitimate political control of portions of southern Lebanon, but it became a member of the Lebanese Cabinet in 2005 (Bazzi, 2007). In addition, large portions of the population, particularly the Shia community, looked to Hezbollah as their primary provider of health, education, and social services, including everything from compensation for material loss from natural disaster to a financial credit or lending institution (Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, 2009). While Hezbollah's political and

services branches took prominence, its militant branch faded from the spotlight until July of 2006.

On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah led a cross-border attack and abducted two Israeli soldiers with the intention of exchanging them for prisoners (Norton, 2007). This led to a retaliatory attack by Israel, prompting 34 days of warfare between Hezbollah and Israel. More than a thousand people were killed and more than a million civilians displaced in the conflict, which officially ended with a ceasefire on August 14, 2006 (Kattan, 2006). The 34-day war served as a reminder that Hezbollah, while politically and socially benevolent, still had the capacity and the resources to engage in large-scale and destructive militant activity.

Algeria, the Islamic State and Citizenry, the GIA, GSPC, and AQLIM

Modern conflict in Algeria began with the French occupation of the country in 1830 (Toth, 1993). Centuries of Islamic identity and practices were abruptly displaced under French control, leading to decades of civilian unrest and growing discord. Following WWI, the citizenry engaged in a variety of political protests; the government responded by implementing stricter laws and enforced them through military crackdowns, contributing to civilian deaths and further citizen distrust (Ageron and Brett, 1997). Radical elements of the population began to collaborate around the use of political violence in response to French colonial rule and military oppression. These underlying tensions came to a head in 1954, when Algerians launched an attack on the French on All Saints Day, leading to the beginning of the Algerian War for Independence (Horne, 2006). The following eight years were marked by mass casualties and continued violence between the French military and

radical opposition. A cease fire was eventually declared in 1962, shortly followed by Algerian independence from France (Harmon, 2010).

The National Liberation Front (FLN) formed from the anti-French liberation movement and, upon French withdrawal, took power as the new fledgling government (Harmon, 2010). The FLN, although underscored with some Islamic ideals, advocated a secular-nationalist agenda, crafted after Nasser's one-party model from Egypt (Botha, 2008). As such, Algeria became a one-party system with power concentrated in the military elite. The Islamic population objected to the secular policies advocated by the state and chafed under military rule. In 1982, the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA) was formed by discontented Islamists willing to engage in political violence. However, MIA activity dissipated following the assassination of the MIA leader, Bouyali, in 1987 and, more importantly, government concessions in 1988 (Harmon, 2010). In October of 1988, the FLN acquiesced to public demand, allowing for multi-party elections.

In 1989, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the first Islamic political party, was founded (Zouine, 2002). In 1990, the FIS won municipal elections and, in 1991, won the majority of the first round of legislative elections, gaining 188 seats in the National People's Assembly, in contrast to the 15 seats won by the FLN (Harmon, 2010). Unwilling to allow for such a blatant victory and reticent to surrender a secular state, a military junta took control, effectively preventing the FIS from winning the elections. Over the next few months, the military banned the FIS, incarcerated its leaders, overthrew the President, and detained thousands of civilians with ties to Islamic activism.

In response to repressive military rule, radical groups within the FIS and

beyond turned to violence and, in 1992, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) was founded

as an umbrella to the different militant factions arising in the battle for a multi-party

Islamic state (Hafez, 2000).[35] The GIA was established under the mandate that

armed jihad was the only way to successfully acquire the desired Islamic nation. This

stipulation created a rift between the GIA and the FIS; the latter advocated for

political reform (Filiu, 2009). In addition, the GIA, although originally focused on

the military regime, declared war on the civilian population in 1994. The GIA

condemned the citizenry for not engaging in jihad and labeled them infidels and

"supporters of apostates" (Hafez, 2000: 587). In response to the GIA's extremist

views, in 1994, the FIS formed its own armed branch, the Islamic Salvation Army

(AIS), declaring that armed jihad was one way, but not the only way, of achieving an

Islamist state, thus allowing for political reform (Filiu, 2009). It also publicly

condemned the strategy of targeting civilians and succeeded in recruiting some

members of the GIA to its own forces (Hafez, 2000). To counter, the GIA began

targeting the AIS and the next several years were marked by an overall increase in

violence, as well as an increase in attacks against civilians and amongst militant

groups.

Attacks against civilians and inter-group fighting undermined the credibility

of GIA and, in 1995 and 1996, several jihadi groups severed ties (Hafez, 2000;

Laremont, 2011). In 1997, the AIS declared a ceasefire and the government

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[35] Similar to Lebanon and Turkey, NGO interest focused on Algeria around the same time that the
larger, more developed TOs were forming. However, access to Algeria was extremely limited and
government-controlled; as such, many NGOs had to observe and campaign from afar. This is
summarized further below.

responded by creating an amnesty program for militants that met certain criteria. By 2000, the AIS had disbanded and several GIA militias had agreed to comply with the ceasefire. This was, however, not the end of the armed jihad in Algeria. Out of the remnants of the GIA arose the Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC) [Filiu, 2009].

In 1998, the GSPC was founded with an explicit commitment to avoid civilian casualties and focus exclusively on the military junta (Filiu, 2009). Bin Laden and Al-Qa'ida expressed approval for GSPC policies relating to civilian targets, introducing an opportunity for dialogue between the two groups.   By 2000, the GSPC had adopted the Al-Qa'ida goal of global jihad, in addition to GSPC's early objective of national jihad (Harmon, 2010). Over the next several years, the GSPC began to expand operations into the Sahelian neighboring nations and, due to a change in leadership, began to target civilians again. The United States invasion in Iraq in 2003 and the perceived success of Al-Qa'ida in Iraq's response helped solidify ties between Al-Qa'ida and the GSPC and, in 2007, GSPC officially joined forces with Al-Qa'ida, becoming Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) [Filiu, 2009]. This marked a turning point in campaign focus, as global jihad took priority over national jihad and attacks shifted to incorporate Al-Qa'ida-typical tactics, such as suicide bombings (Cristiani and Fabiani, 2011).

AQLIM continues to operate in Algeria in present time. It has three strategic objectives, including the overthrow of the Algerian government (national jihad), the creation of an operational base in the Sahel region, and the targeting and overthrow of western governments, such as France and Great Britain (global jihad) [Laremont,

2011). AQLIM seeks to achieve its strategic goals through the targeting of symbols of government and military oppression, although collateral damages often include civilians (Filiu, 2009). The number of active members is estimated to be approximately 1000, led by an Algerian native called Droukdel, but coordinated through a central shura council (La Sage, 2011). The organization is also known for its involvement in the drug trade and for a variety of kidnappings for ransom, although these activities are conducted for the sake of group survival rather than political change. These dalliances aside, the crux of AQLIM is armed jihad (Laremont, 2011).

Following a number of highly dramatic and successful attacks on the heels of its inception in 2007, including attacks on the United Nations and Constitutional Court, the frequency of AQLIM attacks and the number of casualties resulting from those attacks have dropped perceptibly, minimizing the influence the organization has on national considerations (Laremont, 2011). In addition, AQLIM has not reached its promised capacity in relation to its international footprint. Specifically, one aspect that made AQLIM an attractive addition to the Al-Qa'ida family was its ability to operate beyond its borders; this is one area that the organization has not succeeded (Cristiani and Fabiani, 2011). While AQLIM has carried out attacks in other nations and continues to target international targets within its border, it has not flourished in the Sahel region, nor has it successfully solicited membership from other Islamist groups operating in the region. Despite these issues, AQLIM remains the dominant TO in Algeria and the surrounding Sahel region.

Amnesty International (AI)

AI was founded in 1961 by Peter Benenson, a British lawyer and recent

Catholic convert (Buchanan, 2002). Benenson was inspired by a newspaper article

about two Portuguese students imprisoned for raising their glasses, as a protest

against the Salazar regime, in a toast to liberty in a restaurant in Lisbon (Scoble and

Wiseberg, 1974; Snyder, 2012). He published an opinion piece reflecting on it in the

Observer on May 28, 1961, titled "The Forgotten Prisoners"; in it, he profiled six

prisoners that had been imprisoned for their religious or political beliefs and he

advocated for an "Appeal for Amnesty, 1961" (Snyder, 2012). The Forgotten

Prisoners article was reprinted in media outlets around the world, leading to an

unexpected outpouring of support for Benenson's appeal (Buchanan, 2002).

In response to the positive reaction, Benenson assembled a collective of

intellectuals and lawyers that committed to launching a campaign focused on drawing

attention to the plight of prisoners of conscience (Buchanan, 2002). In July of 1961,

the collective, comprised of individuals from several European countries and the

United States, met in a restaurant in Luxembourg to discuss the future of the

campaign. They established a volunteer workspace in Benenson's law office in

London and devised the "Threes Network" (Amnesty International, 2013). The

Threes Network required that each national group select or adopt three prisoners from

diverse regions and political backgrounds on which to focus efforts. Efforts, at this

early stage, entailed writing letters to governments, prisoners, and their families, and

providing relief support (Hopgood, 2006; Snyder, 2012). The goal of the letter-

writing campaigns was to secure the release of the prisoner. In addition, these early

networks would also serve as observers for their adopted prisoners, traveling to areas of incarceration to research and report human rights abuses.

The organization was officially named Amnesty International and its statutes were formalized at a second meeting in 1962 in Belgium (Buchanan, 2002). It was determined that AI would focus exclusively on those who had been incarcerated for their political or religious beliefs (Snyder, 2012). The organization was dedicated primarily, in those early years, to prisoners in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Czechoslovakia, Ghana, and Rhodesia. Within several years, AI had expanded considerably to include several other countries and, by 1967, it consisted of 550 independent branches operating in 18 countries. Collectively, six years after its inception, the organization had adopted approximately 2,000 prisoners and had facilitated the release of nearly 300 prisoners (Amnesty International, 2013).[36] Each branch continued to operate under the Threes Network model and their primary method of promoting change continued to be letter-writing campaigns and fact-finding missions (Snyder, 2012).

Over a fifty-year period, AI expanded its mandate to include campaigns dedicated to draft resisters, the death penalty, torture, political killings, aboriginal suppression, refugees' rights, women's rights, child soldiers, the arms trade, and countering terror with justice (Amnesty International, 2013). AI received consultative status from the United Nations and the Council of Europe in 1967, was granted the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977 and, more recently, became a consultant for the Organization of African Unity (Amnesty International, 2013; Scoble and

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[36] Given that there was no further mention of the Portuguese students in AI literature, it is unlikely they were released early due to AI pressure.

Wiseberg, 1974). It broadened its focus to include social, economic, and cultural rights, committing to protect all freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Clark and McCann, 1991). By 2011, it had played an integral role in the Declaration on Torture, the creation of the International Criminal Court, the International Bill of Rights, and a United Nations resolution for a moratorium on the death penalty (Amnesty International, 2013). With three million members in 150 countries, including Algeria, Turkey, and Lebanon, the AI had grown to be the world's largest human rights organization.

AI has had an active presence in Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey for several decades. The organization first became involved in Algeria in 1992, sending delegates on fact-finding missions until May of 1996, when it was denied access (Amnesty International, 2003). Continuing to campaign from afar, the organization maintained an active watch on the Algerian conflict, through press releases and country reports, until it was granted access again in 2000; this access proved to be temporary, as it was suspended again until 2003. AI's attention in Algeria has been on civilian deaths and disappearances perpetrated by the state and by militant groups, torture, and women's rights. The organization's primary form of campaigning in Algeria consists of fact-finding missions through delegate visits, press releases, country reports, and letter-writing campaigns.

AI began work in Lebanon and the surrounding region in 1985 (Khayyat, 2000). It received permission from the Lebanese government to open an office in Beirut in May of 2000. For purposes of safety and security, the campaign focus in the Lebanese office was not directly related to Lebanese issues; instead, it centered on

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regional issues. Meanwhile, AI groups in the surrounding region, such as Tunisia, Kuwait, and Morocco, as well as AI international, spearheaded Lebanon-specific campaigns. AI's attention in Lebanon has been directed towards state- and militia-perpetrated violence against civilians, particularly the Shia communities, rights of due process, illegal detentions and war crimes, and, more recently, refugees' rights (Amnesty International, 2013).

AI began campaigning in Turkey in the late 1970s, briefly opening an office before closing it again following a military coup in 1980 that led to the incarceration of thousands of political activists (Turkish Daily News, 2002). Between the 1980s and the early 21st century, AI restricted its onsite activities to sporadic delegates' visits. Eventually, the organization petitioned for, was denied, petitioned again, and finally received permission to re-open an office in Istanbul in 2002. Unlike Lebanon, the AI Turkey office does campaign on local, as well as regional, issues (Amnesty International, 2012). The main method of promoting change in Turkey is through letter-writing campaigns, lobbying the government, street protests, media releases, and country reports. The core areas of focus in Turkey include ethnic and cultural rights, particularly for the Kurdish people, state-perpetrated violence, women's rights, the death penalty, and refugees' rights. AI continues to maintain an active presence in Turkey, as it does in Lebanon and Algeria.

Human Rights Watch (HRW)

HRW was founded in 1978 under the name of Helsinki Watch (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Its formation was partially in response to the signing of the Helsinki Accord in 1975. The Accord ratified western recognition of post WWII territorial

modifications in return for Soviet commitment to comply with certain humanitarian

expectations, including obligations to recognize and protect freedom of thought and

expression, religion and communication, and observance of international agreements

concerning human rights (Montgomery, 2002). The Accord prompted the formation

of several human rights organizations within and beyond Soviet borders, motivated

by the intention of holding Moscow accountable for the stipulations contained in the

Accord. Moscow responded with force, arresting, imprisoning, exiling, and deporting

members of the growing dissident movement. Andrei Sakharov, a nuclear-physicist-

turned-activist, was one of the recipients of targeted Soviet response; he was

internally exiled, prompting his 1978 appeal for international support.

Robert Bernstein, the head of Random House, developed an acquaintanceship

with Sakharov and, in the mid-1970s, he met with Sakharov in the Soviet Union to

discuss publishing Sakharov's memoirs (Montgomery, 2002).[37] In 1978, Bernstein

responded to Sakharov's appeal for support, launching the Helsinki Group. He

sought membership from establishment elite, successfully giving the fledgling

organization a high degree of influence and respectability.

Bernstein was not the only one to respond to the appeal for international

support. Parallel watch groups sprang up in countries like The Netherlands, Norway,

and France. Bernstein began endeavoring to unite the various groups into a singular

international Helsinki movement (Montgomery, 2002). His efforts came to fruition in

September of 1982; representatives of 18 countries met in Bellagio, Italy, to officially

formalize and launch the Helsinki Human Rights Committee. Over the next several

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[37] Following the meeting, Bernstein formed Fund for Free Expression, an organization committed primarily to the publication of banned works from dissident authors, which would eventually hold a prominent place in the HRW structure.

years, the organization broadened its parameters to include Americas Watch, with a focus on the developing conflict in Central America; Asia Watch, monitoring the human rights issues arising from Burma, North Korea, and Vietnam; Africa Watch, with particular attention to sub-Saharan Africa; and, finally, Middle East Watch, in 1989, with an emphasis on activities in Algeria, Israel, Syria, and Iraq (Human Rights Watch, 2013). The various "Watch Committees" were formally recognized as Human Rights Watch in 1988.

The next several decades were marked by a change in campaign content as HRW expanded to incorporate a variety of different human rights foci. Issues included, but were not limited to, child soldiers, sexual and domestic violence, refugees' rights, women's rights, sectarian conflict and ethnic cleansing, terror tactics, and health (Human Rights Watch, 2013). HRW's early tactics were mainly comprised of "naming and shaming" state actors through direct dialogue and media coverage (Hafner-Burton, 2008). Over time, HRW diversified its tactical spectrum to include on-site monitoring and research, crafting reports documenting human rights violations, lobby work, and social organizing (Human Rights Watch, 2013).

Many of HRW's tactics and strategies proved to be successful. Organizational accomplishments included membership in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the implementation of the Ottawa Treaty, prohibiting the use of landmines (Human Rights Watch, 1999). In recognition of the importance of this victory, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 (Human Rights Watch, 2013). HRW also played a key role in the treaty to ban cluster munitions. In addition, HRW commits time towards and resources for

the Fund for Free Expression, which administers support to authors who were persecuted for their work (Thomas and Beasley, 1993). By 2014, HRW had approximately 400 staff members, including researchers and country experts, with active campaigns in 90 nations, including Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey.

HRW's activities in Algeria and Lebanon began with the formation of Middle East Watch in 1989. Algeria was given early priority over Lebanon by the fledgling Watch Committee; emphasis on Algeria was the result of the death of 500 civilians following a riot and a repressive government response (Montgomery, 2002). The organization began intensive monitoring of the Algerian government and the violent Islamist groups active at the time, sending its first delegate in 1990 to lobby and research allegations of abuse (Human Rights Watch, 1990). Over time, HRW formed Algeria-specific campaigns around electoral transparency, censorship, and Islamist attacks against civilians resulting in death, torture, and disappearances (Human Rights Watch, 2013). [38]

Early interest in Lebanon was restricted to the Syrian-occupied portions of the country (Human Rights Watch, 1990). The first few years following the inception of Middle East Watch was devoted to monitoring Syrian forces within Lebanon and civilian detention, disappearances, and torture. HRW was denied access to the conflict areas, and monitoring and research consisted primarily of witness testimony and one unofficial visit to Syria. HRW made its first official visit to Lebanon in 1992 and, by 1993, had shifted focus to state crackdowns on freedom of press and freedom

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[38] It is interesting to note that, in 1996, the Algerian government suspended access to the country for many large human rights NGOs, including AI. Access was not reinstated until 2000. HRW was one of very few human rights NGOs permitted access during this period; HRW representatives visited twice in 1997 and once in 1999. The delegation was carefully monitored and accompanied by a military escort while in the country.

of assembly, as well as Israeli and Hezbollah conflicts and resulting civilian casualties (Human Rights Watch, 1994). By the mid-1990s, HRW's focus on Lebanon became overshadowed by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but took priority again by the beginning of the 21st century (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Tactics included lobbying the government, receiving testimony, field research, observing state activity, and outreach. In 2006, HRW opened an office in Beirut and, in 2010, it launched a Beirut Committee, bringing together experts with a focus on local issues (The Daily Star, 2010).

HRW interest in Turkey arose before its activities in Lebanon and Algeria. Turkey was one of the nations that the Helsinki Watch group was committed to monitoring. In keeping with the Helsinki theme of state accountability, HRW focused its early attention on government abuses in Turkey, particularly in relation to freedom of expression and assembly, torture, and illegal detention of Kurds (Human Rights Watch, 1989). By 1990, HRW had conducted its first set of delegates' visits with a shifted focus on the living conditions and treatment of the Kurdish people (Human Rights Watch, 1990). Campaign parameters broadened over the next several years to include terror-related activities, counter-terrorism measures, forced civilian evacuations, and women's rights. Tactics included lobbying, meeting with prisoners and evacuees, field research, and soliciting international support. HRW continues to maintain an active presence in Turkey, as it does in Lebanon and Algeria.

<div align="center">International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)</div>

The ICRC has its early roots in the Franco-Austrian war. In 1859, Henry Durant, a wealthy young Geneva-based businessperson, observed a battle in

Solferino, Italy (Eboe-Osuji, 2006). Noting the minimal attention given to the wounded combatants, Durant responded by organizing local residents in an effort to provide impartial medical aid. Following the war, Durant appealed to European political and military leaders to coordinate the provision of impartial aid to injured combatants. The Geneva Society for Public Welfare responded to the appeal in 1863, forming a committee of five individuals titled the "International Committee to Assist the War Wounded" (Hutchinson, 1996). In October of 1863, the Committee convened a conference in Geneva, attended by 16 countries and several organizations. The conference concluded with the drafting of a set of resolutions relating to the operation of the Committee chapters, their neutrality and impartiality in providing medical aid, and their interactions with 'belligerent' armies.[39] It also presented several recommendations to governments, including extending patronage to medical workers, declaring neutrality for medical personnel, and adopting a uniform sign and flag with the red cross to mark medical activity.

The Committee convened a second conference in 1864 with the goal of converting the recommendations from the first conference into a binding convention (Eboe-Osuji, 2006). Fifteen European countries and the United States were represented at the conference and their efforts formalized into the Geneva Convention treaty of which twelve of the attendees signed off on; the remaining countries had not been granted the authority to do so from their governments. The Convention ratified the early recommendations of the International Committee, codifying a variety of articles referring to neutrality and practices in conflict areas (Hutchinson, 1996). The first Geneva Convention treaty was eventually signed by 57 countries, including the

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[39] Belligerent refers to an occupying force.

Ottoman Empire, although this signatory was received only after the International Committee agreed that the Red Cross emblem suggested in the Convention be replaced by a Red Crescent in Muslim countries (Eboe-Osuji, 2006).

Following on the heels of the successful Convention, the Committee formally changed its name to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1875 (Hutchinson, 1996). National Red Cross committees or societies began forming in countries around the world and the ICRC gained repute and popularity. In 1901, Durant was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, although he no longer held a position of authority with the ICRC (Libaek, 2003). As this award indicated, the ICRC had gained international renown; however, it was not until WWI that the organization fully demonstrated its merit.

During WWI, the ICRC provided medical and financial support to combatants (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2013). It also facilitated communication between soldiers and their families and participated in the exchange and release of thousands of soldiers (Libaek, 2003). The ICRC monitored compliance with the Geneva Convention, reporting violations to the offending country, visited prisoner camps to observe conditions, and took a position of protest against the use of chemical weapons. WWI marked a turning point for the ICRC, expanding the parameters of its expected activities beyond providing medical aid and further augmenting its importance in areas of armed conflict. Following WWI and later conflicts, the Geneva Convention was modified to incorporate conditions concerning the use of chemical weapons, treatment of sea- and air-based armed forces, civilian populations, and civil wars (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2013). In

1917, the ICRC was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize, to be followed by a second and third Prize during and after WWII (Libaek, 2003).

Following WWII, the ICRC established seven fundamental principles that guided and continues to guide its activities and the activities of the various Red Cross and Red Crescent societies; these principles include universality, humanity, impartiality, independence, unity, neutrality, and volunteerism (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1995). Its mandate to participate extends to armed conflicts between and among nations and its responsibilities include providing medical care for armed combatants and civilians, observing compliance with the Geneva Convention, protecting civilians, locating missing persons, monitoring the conditions of prisoners of war, codifying international humanitarian law, and acting as an intermediary between warring groups (Forsythe, 1997; International Committee of the Red Cross, 2014). The organization is careful to delineate its activities from those of human rights organizations and the politicized activities of advocacy work; the ICRC is explicit in its humanitarian-only function, ensuring a position of neutrality upon which the organization was founded (Sayapin, 2009; Studer, 2001). One hundred and fifty years after its foundation, the organization is recognized as the largest humanitarian movement, with a current or historical presence in every nation in the world, including Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey.

ICRC began its activities in Algeria during the 1954-1962 War of Independence (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2013). During that time, the organization focused primarily on visiting prisoners in Algeria and aiding refugees in relocation to Morocco and Tunisia. ICRC access to the country and its

prisoners was suspended in the 1990s, but was reinstated in 1999 (Amnesty

International, 2003). ICRC has maintained a steady presence in the country since that

time, opening a delegation[40] in Algiers in 2002 and an office and physical

rehabilitation center in Rabouni in 2007 (International Committee of the Red Cross,

2013). ICRC activities in Algeria consist mainly of visiting detainees incarcerated in

prisons and police stations to ensure humane treatment, as well as documenting

violations and providing recommendations of suggested improvements to authorities.

In addition, ICRC and the local Red Crescent Society affiliate provide first aid and

assist in the reunification of families. Finally, they work with the Algerian

government to implement international human rights law, serving as advisors and

experts.

ICRC's work in Lebanon is similar to its activities in Algeria. It opened a

delegation in Beirut in 1965, an office in Tyre in 1977, and an office in Achrafieh and

Jounieh in 1978 (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2008). With the

exception of a temporary suspension of activities due to continuing threats to the

safety of its delegates between 1988 and 1989, the ICRC has maintained a steady

presence in the country for 45 years. During that time, the organization has focused

on providing medical aid to the recipients of violence stemming from armed conflicts,

as well as visiting detainees in order to observe the conditions of imprisonment and

facilitate communication between prisoners and their families (International

Committee of the Red Cross, 2013). The organization has facilitated the repatriation

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[40] A delegation, in ICRC terms, involves a collection of often-times international representatives who reside indefinitely in a conflict area serving as observers and representatives of the organization. A delegation differs from an office in that a delegation is not a static construct rooted in geography with administrative parameters; instead, a delegation is a defined by dynamic tasks and responsibilities (Troyon and Palmieri, 2007).

of Lebanese nationals living in Israel, as well as restoring family ties severed by armed conflicts. More recently, ICRC, along with its local affiliate, the Lebanese Red Cross Society, has assisted in the transfer and care of Syrian refugees fleeing the recent conflict in Syria.

ICRC's presence in Turkey began much later than its activities in Lebanon and Algeria. In 2003, with the permission of the Turkish government, the organization opened a temporary mission in Ankara with the primary goal of supporting ICRC work in Iraq (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2010). Its limited Turkey-specific efforts entailed serving as advisors of international humanitarian law for the Turkish government and military forces and engaging in local education campaigns. The mission closed in 2012 at the request of the Turkish government; the Iraqi situation had evolved to a point that the Turkish government felt it no longer required a geographically-proximate ICRC presence (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2012). Any continued dialogue with the Turkish government is maintained through the Geneva office, as ICRC no longer has a presence in the country.

Next Steps

This chapter provided a brief summary of Lebanon, Turkey, and Algeria and the NGOs and TOs that operate within their borders. Although this was far from an exhaustive review, the goal was to present a qualitative look at the oppressors, the oppressed, and the advocates that manifest in the three nations of interest, in order to provide the reader with a cursory introduction to the context upon which the potential relationships examined in this dissertation are built. The next chapter shifts focus,

presenting the methods and the means by which these potential relationships are

analyzed.

CHAPTER 5: Data and Methodology

      This chapter discusses the data and methodology that are used to examine the

relationship between NGO activity and TO activity. The section begins with a

summary of the hypotheses, followed with a review of the dependent variables, the

frequency of terrorist incidents, and the dataset, the Global Terrorism Database

(GTD), from which the dependent variables are acquired. This is followed by an

introduction to the main independent variables, *NGO campaign content, NGO activity*

in the media (media coverage), NGO service provision, and *NGO physical presence*

in conflict areas, and the sources that are used to create this set of variables, including

precursor data to the Government Actions in Terror Environments (GATE) dataset,

media searches, and website searches. The chapter also provides an outline of the

control variables that are included in the analyses, along with a summary of their

sources, including the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) database,

the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Polity data, and the Center for Research on

the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT).

The section concludes with a description of the statistical models and analyses that

are used to test the hypotheses introduced in chapter three and summarized below.

Revisiting the Hypotheses

      Recall that there are several specific sets of hypotheses that are addressed in

this dissertation. The first set relates to the physical presence of a campaigning NGO

in an area occupied by an active TO.[41] The hypotheses presented below reflect the

expectation that the physical presence of a campaigning NGO will be threatening to

the TO and will result in an increase in targeted attacks against the NGO in an effort

to deter it from maintaining a physical presence. It is also hypothesized that attacks

against the oppressor will increase as the TO attempts to present itself as a more

effective ally to the constituents. In addition, it is hypothesized that attacks against

the citizenry will decrease, as the TO attempts to present itself as a less-harmful ally.

Hypothesis 1A: An increase in physical presence of a campaigning NGO

within a conflict area will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting

NGOs.

Hypothesis 1B: An increase in physical presence of a campaigning NGO

within a conflict area will lead to a decrease in the frequency of TO attacks targeting

the citizenry.

Hypothesis 1C: An increase in physical presence of a campaigning NGO

within a conflict area will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting

the oppressor.

The second set of hypotheses refers to the content of the NGO campaign

work. Specifically, NGOs may focus on the oppressor and the constituents

exclusively or may incorporate a focus on the TO into their campaign message. A

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[41] As mentioned in a previous chapter, it is important to maintain a distinction between a campaigning NGO and a service provision NGO. While there are organizations that serve both purposes, this dissertation focuses on NGOs that fall exclusively into one category over the other. Campaigning organizations focus on providing long-term changes in order to eliminate an issue, while provision organizations provide short-term services that temporarily alleviate an aspect of a larger issue (e.g., such as providing medical services, therapeutic services, food and supplies, versus attempting to change policy or government practices, which is the purview of campaigning organizations). The first and second sets of hypotheses refer specifically to campaigning organizations (Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and local human rights organizations), while the third hypothesis refers specifically to NGO service providers (ICRC). The fourth hypothesis refers to both groups.

campaign focus on the oppressor and oppressed community serves to inform the constituents that there is a new potential ally and benefactor available. This can threaten the TO if the citizenry chooses to support the NGO over the TO. In addition, a campaign focus on the TO can be perceived as threatening by the TO, since it would serve to vilify the TO and compromise the legitimacy of the TO in the eyes of constituents. Therefore, it is hypothesized that an increase in NGO attention focused on the oppressed community or the TO will lead to an increase in attacks targeting NGOs as a means to deter NGOs from actively campaigning. Further, it is hypothesized that the TO will increase attacks against the oppressor, in an attempt to shift attention back to state or military and to present itself as an effective competitor for community allegiance. Finally, it is hypothesized that attacks against civilians will decrease, in an attempt to counter any new-found public identification of the TO as an oppressor, in the case of anti-terrorist campaign, or to present itself as benevolent, in the case of an advocacy campaign.

Hypothesis 2Ai: An increase in NGO focus on constituent advocacy within the NGO campaign will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting NGOs.

Hypothesis 2Aii: An increase in NGO focus on TO activity within the NGO campaign will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting NGOs.

Hypothesis 2Bi: An increase in NGO focus on constituent advocacy within the NGO campaign will lead to a decrease in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the citizenry.

Hypothesis 2Bii: An increase in NGO focus on TO activity within the NGO campaign will lead to a decrease in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the citizenry.

Hypothesis 2Ci: An increase in NGO focus on constituent advocacy within the NGO campaign will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the oppressor.

Hypothesis 2Cii: An increase in NGO focus on TO activity within the NGO campaign will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the oppressor.

An additional hypothesis addresses the physical presence of NGO service providers. Many TOs offer resources and aid to the constituents, which serves the purpose of making the citizenry beholden to the TOs, offsetting any reference to the TO as a harmful force, and soliciting community support. In countries where TOs do offer services, NGOs that provide similar services can release a population from their dependency on a TO. In countries where the TO does not provide services, the presence of a provision NGO can still serve to sway public opinion, as the constituents develop a dependency on the NGO. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the physical presence of a NGO service provider will increase attacks targeting NGOs as the TO attempts to deter the NGO from maintaining a presence.

Hypothesis 3: Increasing the physical presence of a service provision NGO will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the NGO.

The last hypothesis refers to the overall presence of the NGO in the media. Both TOs and NGOs seek to attain media headlines; organizational survival and

support depends on preserving a public presence. Given that media headlines are limited in number, this can create a competitive dynamic for attention. As such, it is hypothesized that NGO presence in the media will increase the frequency of TO attacks as the TO vies for media attention.

Hypothesis 4: An increase in NGO media activity will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks.

Separate models are run for each of the sets of hypotheses and for each country; each model incorporates the specific outcome variables that are relevant to a given hypothesis. These models are summarized further in the remainder of the chapter (and are available in Appendix A), along with the sources of data and the variables that are used to test these hypotheses and the analytical method that is appropriate for the research questions posed in this dissertation.

Dependent Variables: The Global Terrorism Database

The dependent variables employed in this dissertation include the frequency of terrorist incidents overall and for specific target types, as captured by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD is the largest and most comprehensive incident-based terrorism dataset in the world. It provides data from 1970 through to 2013[42] and currently reports on more than 125,000 global incidents, including both within- and between-country attacks. The GTD consists of more than 120 variables providing information about the location and date of the incident, the targets and perpetrators involved, the weapons used and outcomes of the incident, as well as the motives underlying the attack (LaFree, 2010). The GTD is open source and readily

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[42] At the time that this dissertation is being written (2014), 2014 data are being collected and coded for the GTD.

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available through the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) located at the University of Maryland (UMD).[43]

The GTD consists of four generations of data collection, also known as GTD I, II, III, and IV; the generations denote periods of collection that are facilitated by different parties.[44] Collection efforts historically and currently involve content searches of open source newspapers and other media sources from around the world, along with searches of government and military reports (for a detailed summary of collection techniques, see LaFree et al., 2014).

The operational definition of terrorism shifted slightly between the GTD I and GTD II, as did the variables included in the dataset. The GTD I was based on the following definition of terrorism: "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (LaFree and Dugan, 2007: 184). Although the GTD I erred on the side of inclusivity, acts perpetrated by the state were excluded, as were acts of violence between guerilla groups and the military. The GTD II sought to preserve the original GTD I data while also improving upon the quality of the data and rigor of data collection methods moving forward. A set of criteria were developed that mirrored the original definition but included additional parameters. There were two levels to the criteria; the first level consisted of three criteria that must be met for inclusion into the GTD, while the second level consisted of three additional criteria,

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[43] http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
[44] GTD I includes data from 1970 through to 1997 and was collected by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services (PGIS) [LaFree and Dugan, 2007]. GTD II covers data between 1998 and 2007 and was collected by the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS). GTD III was collected by the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) and includes 2008 data through to the end of October of 2011 (LaFree, 2010).The separation of the four generations of data collection is not a publically recognized practice; however, GTD researchers use this delineation as a method of quality control between generations.

of which at least two must be met to warrant inclusion. The first level criteria

include:

1.   "The incident must be intentional—the result of a conscious
       calculation on the part of a perpetrator."

2.   "The incident must entail some level of violence (including violence
       against property) or the threat of violence."

3.   "There must be sub-national perpetrators." (LaFree and Dugan, 2007:
       188)[45]

The second level criteria include:

1.   "The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or
       social goal."

2.   "There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or
       convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than
       the immediate victims."

3.   "The action must be outside of the context of legitimate warfare
       activities; that is, the act must be outside the parameters set by
       international humanitarian law." (LaFree and Dugan, 2007: 188).

While the shift from the GTD I to the GTD II was marked by several large

changes, the shift from the GTD II to the GTD III did not substantively alter the data

set. The transition between the GTD III and the GTD IV also did not entail

substantive changes to the content of the data, although data collection methods were

dramatically altered (Jensen, 2013). Specifically, collection efforts were moved in-

house to be conducted by START researchers. While incidents continued to be

identified through media sources, the sheer volume and diversity of the media sources

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[45] It is important to note that this definition ignores state-based terrorism. While it is unlikely that state
attacks would be influenced by NGO activities, applying this definition eliminates the option of
exploring this potential relationship.

ballooned. Previous generations of GTD collection had entailed targeted searches of well-known media sources and news aggregators; the fourth generation entailed downloading more than a million articles a day, then using filters to limit the pool of potential sources to a few thousand promising candidate sources containing reference to specific terrorism-related terms (LaFree et al., 2014). Casting the net wide and then narrowing it had a notable effect on the data; incidents increased perceptibly between the legacy data and in-house collection efforts. The amount of increase that is due to legitimate spikes in terrorism versus data collection methods is unknown.

The Global Terrorism Database within the purview of the research question

Use of the GTD data requires that several key coding decisions be made concerning the years to be included in the analysis and the potential recoding of data; these decisions revolve around overcoming potential data weaknesses and ensuring that the final dataset is well-equipped to address the primary research questions. First and foremost, the analysis is restricted to the years 1987 through to 2011, depending on the country of interest. At the time that data were being collected for this dissertation, the 2012 GTD data were not yet released to the public. While the data could have been included later, they were excluded from this dissertation because it is unclear whether the increase in measured attacks in 2012 reflects TO activity or net-widening.[46] In addition, 2012 data are missing values for several key control variables discussed later in this chapter; at the time of writing this, many data collection agencies had only released values up to and including the end of 2011.

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[46] The last two months of 2011 data were collected in-house at START as well; however, these collection efforts extended only as far as collecting the media sources, not locating original incidents. The incident listings for these two months originated from the same collection agencies as were responsible for GTD III data, minimizing any variability between collection efforts in 2011.

The years that are included in the analysis differ across countries, as they are determined by the availability of the data. Lebanon and Turkey have the longest periods of analysis, beginning in June of 1987. Although it is ideal to begin analysis several years earlier in Lebanon (to capture the effects of Israeli interests taking up residence in the country) and Turkey (to capture the full extent of PKK activity from the first attack onwards), the Reuters archive, a major contributor to the independent variable, is unavailable prior to June, 1987.

While the Reuters archives are available between mid-1987 and 1990 for Algeria, the Algerian analysis begins with the 1991 data because, prior to 1991, the terrorism incident data are unreliable. The years between 1982 and 1988 in Algeria were marked by sporadic civil conflict, yet the GTD reports zero attacks meeting terrorism-related criteria.[47] This is likely due to coding error by PGIS; subsequent retroactive media searches conducted by this author failed to produce reliable event data that could be used to supplement the dataset. In addition, several control variables are missing Algerian values for years prior to 1990. Finally, the 1989-1990 period was a relatively quiet period in Algeria, as the first multi-party elections were undertaken. It was not until the military junta took control in 1991 that violent conflict appeared again. Given that the conflict in the 1980s is missing in the GTD and it is unclear whether the lack of incidents in 1989 and 1990 are due to limited data collection or to a period of calm, analysis is restricted to the years of conflict that appear to be well captured in the GTD. Therefore, analysis is limited to 1991 through

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[47] A watershed moment in Algerian civil conflict was the bread riots of October, 1988, when the public began attacking government symbols (Botha, 2008). The government was forced to declare a state of emergency and responded with force. The GTD does not currently report a single incident for this period of conflict. However, these missing incidents have been identified and will be added to the GTD in 2015.

to 2011; additional media searches provided by this author support the trends and numbers reflected in the GTD data for these years.[48]

It should also be mentioned that 1993 is excluded from the analysis because START researchers were never given the incidents from that year from Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services (PGIS), the company that collected the GTD I data. It is likely that PGIS lost those cases during an earlier office move. Researchers employing the GTD dataset have argued the merits of attempting to find ways to supplement these 12 months of data, but that has yet to happen. As such, this author follows in the footsteps of others by removing the year from analysis, setting that period of time as missing (see, for example, Dugan and Chenoweth, 2012).

A further issue with any large dataset is the potential impact of missing values. Fortunately, the terrorist incident variables selected for this analysis are relatively complete. There are no missing values for date or country. There are, at first glance, a number of attacks that have an unknown target; however, this is substantively different from a missing value. As in most cases, this indicates the discovery of an explosive device in a public area; in these incidents, coding the attack as having an unknown target does not indicate missing info but, instead, that there are more than one potential targets.

Despite the weaknesses mentioned above, the GTD is an ideal dataset with which to examine terrorism-related relationships. There are very few missing values in the variables of interest, the extensive timeframe of the dataset allows for several decades of analysis for all three countries, and the measures are appropriate to

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[48] Review of local Algerian newspapers during this period produced very few additional incidents.

examine several facets of terrorist activity. The variables included are listed in Table 1 and are briefly summarized below.

GTD variables

This dissertation uses a monthly unit of analysis. The primary outcome of interest is the frequency of attacks or the count of the number of attacks in a given month. Several of the hypotheses are structured around particular targets. In order to assess the impact of NGO activity on terrorists' targeting specific entities (for example, the oppressor/state/military), specific groupings of target types that are relevant for each hypothesis are created and monthly counts of attacks targeting these groupings are coded. The original GTD data contains 22 potential target types; these are recoded into the following categories: the state/oppressor, the oppressed, and the competitor. Incidents that include *military*, *police*, or *government* (*general* or *diplomatic*) as a target type are included in the oppressor/ state variable. Incidents that include *NGOs* as a target type are included in the competitor /NGO variable. Finally, incidents that target *private citizens and property* are included in the oppressed /civilian variable.[49] Incidents directed towards other targets are omitted from all models, other than the model addressing hypothesis four (the potential

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[49] It should be noted that several target types included in the GTD overlap, particularly in relation to the *private citizens and property* target type (LaFree et al., 2014). For example, an attack on a business or educational institution may also be an attack on civilians. If there are civilian casualties, this will be included in the coding strategy and, thus, will be included in the dependent variable measuring attacks targeting civilians. However, if there are no civilian casualties, the incident will not include a civilian target type and, as such, will not be included in the civilian analysis. This coding decision is appropriate if, for example, the TO targeted a business or educational institution in order to target corporate interests or undermine western education, but becomes problematic if the TO is actually targeting the patrons of the school or business. Unfortunately, in many cases, it is nearly impossible to differentiate these TO targeting choices from media sources alone and any attempt to infer terrorist intentions may be arbitrary. As such, for the sake of simplicity, incidents that do not include a given target type will not be included in the dependent variables used for this dissertation even though the attack may have been directed towards one of the targets of interest for this dissertation.

relationship between all NGO media coverage and all TO attacks). The dependent

variables included in the models are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Dependent variables and definitions

Variables	Definition
Dependent variables for models addressing NGO physical presence	
Number of attacks - state	Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting police, government, and military
Number of attacks - civilians	Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting civilians
Number of attacks - NGO	Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting NGOs
Dependent variables for models addressing NGO campaign content	
Number of attacks - state	Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting police, government, and military
Number of attacks - civilians	Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting civilians
Number of attacks - NGO	Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting NGOs
Dependent variables for models addressing NGO service provision	
Number of attacks - NGO	Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting NGOs
Dependent variables for models addressing NGO media activity	
Number of attacks	Monthly count of terrorist attacks

There are several observations and decisions concerning target type that

should be noted. Specifically, determining the target of an attack can be a difficult

endeavor, given the complexity inherent in this determination (LaFree et al., 2014).

The intended target and the affected victim may not be one and the same and the

former may not be readily identifiable. As such, media will report on those affected

by an attack and not necessarily those targeted by an attack. Therefore, the coded

target type will, in some cases, fail to capture the intended recipient. The potential

discrepancy between target and victim may also be indicative of a diffusion of

conflict, as TOs lash out at available targets, rather than strategic ones.

In a similar vein, there are often multiple targets included in a single incident

(LaFree et al., 2014). An attack on a mosque with civilian and military casualties, for

example, will include three target types: religious institutions, private citizens, and military. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine from media sources the intended target for these multi-target incidents. Oftentimes, prioritizing one target type over another in a coding strategy is arbitrary and subjective. As such, this dissertation takes advantage of the fact that the GTD records as many as three target types for each incident. With the exception of the variable measuring the frequency of all attacks, the remaining dependent variables (attacks targeting the state, civilians, and NGOs) are coded as 1 if any of three target types coded for a given incident includes one of the types of interest. This results in the possibility that an incident may be coded twice for two separate variables (e.g., the mosque attack would be included in the attacks targeting the state variable and the attacks targeting civilians variable); however, over counting is not an issue given that no model includes more than one of these variables at a time.

An additional coding decision stems from the difficulty of isolating subgroups from the citizenry at large. While it is hypothesized that NGO presence and campaigning activity will decrease attacks that directly affect members of an oppressed constituency, it is difficult, if not impossible, to isolate those attacks that targeted only members of that group from attacks targeting the general population. In addition, there is unavoidable overlap between the constituents of terrorism and the general citizenry. Members of the constituency in domestic conflict are often also members of the citizenry and attacks targeting the citizenry can have direct and indirect impacts on the constituents. Therefore, members of the general public (citizens) are treated as proxies for the constituency.

One additional consideration relates to the inclusion of all terrorist incidents, regardless of TO attribution. Specifically, the hypotheses tested in this dissertation do not apply to TOs that are not defending a constituency. Therefore, the inclusion of all TO attacks, regardless of group affiliation and constituency-orientation, can introduce measurement error. With that acknowledgement in mind, this dissertation does incorporate all attacks, regardless of group affiliation. There are several points that can be made to justify this decision. The first point speaks to the inclusion of attacks that have no TO affiliation. Specifically, about half of the attacks in Lebanon and about one third of the attacks in Turkey are not attributed to a TO. [50] The decision made by this author is, in the face of uncertainty, to practice inclusivity. Terrorist attacks are rare events and, as such, the exclusion of attacks that cannot be attributed to a particular group dramatically narrows the number of attacks eligible for analysis. More importantly, of the incidents that do have group affiliation, the overwhelming majority of these are attributed to the TOs outlined in chapter four, their affiliates, or other TOs that operate in support of a constituency. This suggests a high likelihood that attacks with unknown perpetrators also follow this trend.[51]

The second point speaks to the inclusion of attacks perpetrated by TOs other than those listed in chapter four. The decision to include these stems from the observation that most of the attacks captured in the GTD in these countries during the period of interest are attributed to TOs that are directly linked to constituency

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[50] Given that Algeria is included specifically because it violates the TO-constituency dynamic, this discussion will focus exclusively on Lebanon and Turkey.

[51] As a sensitivity test, in addition to models that includes all incidents, a second set of analyses are run in Lebanon and Turkey using a dataset that excludes all incidents perpetrated by undisclosed attackers. In Lebanon, *attacks targeting civilians* become too rare to analyze quantitatively. Any notable results are discussed in chapter six.

campaigns.[52] In Lebanon, for example, approximately 500 attacks between 1987 and 2011 are attributed to a TO. Approximately 300 of those are attributed to Hezbollah while the bulk of the remainder are attributed to other TOs that defend the same or similar constituencies, such as the 16 January Organization for the Liberation of Tripoli and Amal. The remaining attributions, for the most part, provide generic characteristics only, such as "Palestinians" and "extremists". Given the decision to practice inclusivity in the face of uncertainty, these incidents are included. Specifically, these generic attributions do not rule out the possibility that the TO was defending a constituency.

In contrast, in Turkey there are small subsets of incidents that are attributed to non-generic TOs that are not historically oriented around a constituency. However, these particular TOs have periodically allied with a constituency-driven TO, which casts doubt on the assumption that their activities are free from consideration for an oppressed minority (Cline, 2004; Leezenberg, 2003). Of the approximately 1600 attacks that are attributed to a TO, more than three quarters are attributed to the PKK or Kurdish activists and the remaining one quarter are attributed to a variety of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary groups, such as Dev Sol and a later iteration of Dev Sol known as Devrimici Halk Kurtulus Cephesi (DHKP/C). While these latter groups are not normally wedded to a particular constituency, they have allied with the PKK and carried out attacks in partnership and support of the Kurdish campaign, particularly in the 1990s when they were most active (Cline, 2004; Leezenberg,

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[52] An additional set of analyses are conducted in Lebanon and Turkey that only include incidents perpetrated by a known TO that advocates for a constituency. In Lebanon, *attacks targeting civilians* become too rare to analyze quantitatively. Any notable results are discussed in chapter six.

2003). As such, it is defensible to keep these incidents in the analysis, given that they

may have been prompted by a temporary allegiance to the Kurdish constituency.

Primary Independent Variables

The independent variables of interest, measures of *NGO activity,* are culled

from a variety of sources, including precursor data for Government Actions in Terror

Environments (GATE) database, targeted media searches, and NGO website searches.

NGO activity is broken down into four separate components: 1) *campaign content*, 2)

physical presence, 3) *service provision presence,* and 4) *media activity (media*

coverage). Recall that a distinction is being drawn between these four measures of

activity and the impact they are predicted to have on TO activity. These measures tap

into unique constructs; NGO campaign content is a measure of NGO interest in the

shared constituency and/or in the TO as an oppressor, physical presence is a measure

of an NGO's temporary or permanent proximity to a conflict area,[53] and media

activity is a measure of media coverage focused on the NGO and, as such, a measure

of an NGO's ability to dominate the public's attention. Finally, service provision

presence is a measure tapping into the presence of a service provision organization.

Populating these variables consists of searching for information on all four measures

within each month in the media sources and websites summarized below. Regarding

campaign content, particular attention is paid to the subject matter of the NGO

campaign message and whether it focuses generally on improving the quality of life

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[53] All NGO physical activity is assumed to be temporary unless there is evidence of the establishment
of functional long-term infrastructure, such as an office. Fortunately, a search of a sample of media
sources (see footnote 39 for a description) indicates that media sources are detailed about the nature of
the physical activity (e.g., "delegates *visited"*, "the group established an *office*", or "ICRC set up a
clinic". In addition, country and activity reports available on NGO websites provide detailed accounts
of the physical activities of the NGO in the country of interest; these reports serve a primary function
of determining whether a given physical activity is temporary or permanent.

for the constituent through advocacy work and/or criticizing the oppressor, or focuses specifically on criticizing the TO.[54] Regarding physical presence in a given country, particular attention is paid to whether the presence of a campaigning NGO is temporary or permanent. Along a similar vein, service provision is a measure of the active temporary or permanent presence of a service provision NGO in a conflict area. Finally, media activity is the accumulation of all media stories that are prompted by the NGO in relation to the country of interest, regardless of content. These variables, their definitions, and their sources are summarized in Table 2.

Reuters archives (precursor to the GATE data)

The GATE database is a comprehensive collection of variables relating to state response to TOs and to their constituents or sub-state actors (Dugan and Chenoweth, 2013). GATE currently provides public data on government actors and actions within Israel between 1987 and 2004. The primary investigators and a team of research assistants are actively gathering data on a variety of additional countries, including Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey; the data for these countries spans from June, 1987, through to the end of 2012. The GATE data is collected from sources available through the Reuters archives.

GATE researchers, as part of their data collection process, downloaded all lead sentences from the Reuters archives that included the key words *Algeria*,*

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[54] While campaign content and physical presence are often integrally intertwined, they are independent constructs. An NGO may be present in an area but not be actively campaigning for a given constituency. Along the same lines, an NGO may be actively campaigning but not maintain a physical presence in a region of interest. HRW, for example, rarely makes country visits and only has a permanent presence in 18 countries; however, it has active campaigns advocating for citizen security and safety in more than 100 countries. On the other hand, many western-based NGOs have offices and, thus, physical presence, in countries that are not often a target of the NGO campaigning activity (e.g., France, the United States, and Switzerland).

Table 2. Primary independent variables (monthly measures) and definitions

Variables	Definition
Primary independent variables for models addressing campaigning NGOs' physical presence (Reuters, LexisNexis, NGO websites)	
Human rights NGO physical presence - temporary	NGO temporary presence in a conflict area in a given month (0,1)
Human rights NGO physical presence – permanent	NGO permanent presence in a conflict area in a given month (0,1)
Primary independent variables for models addressing NGO campaign content (Reuters, LexisNexis, NGO websites)	
Human rights NGO campaign content - advocacy	Pro-constituent campaign work in a given month (0,1)
Human rights NGO campaign content – anti-TO criticism	Anti-TO campaign work in a given month (0,1)
Primary independent variables for models addressing NGO service provision (Reuters, LexisNexis, NGO websites)	
ICRC presence - temporary[55]	NGO temporary presence in a conflict area in a given month (0,1)
ICRC presence – permanent[56]	NGO permanent presence in a conflict area in a given month (0,1)
Primary independent variable for models addressing NGO media activity (Reuters, LexisNexis)	
All media activity	NGO prominence in the media coverage about the conflict area during a given month (count)

Leban*, and *Turk*.* A lead sentence is the opening sentence of a written document that serves to provide a summary of the remaining material while also grabbing the reader's attention. Lead sentences provide an efficient and reliable way of accessing the content of a given article (Dabaj and Gumus, 2012). In this case, the set of lead sentences were extracted to a text file and then passed on to this author.

The text file is searched for key words relating to NGOs including: *human rights, humanitarian, civil rights, social justice, activis*, NGO* (case sensitive),

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[55] It is important to note that an NGO may have a temporary and a permanent presence in any given month. Using ICRC as an example, the NGO may maintain an active office in one area of a country, yet engage in visits to other conflict-ridden areas of the country. Both are hypothesized to elicit a response from a TO.

[56] In Algeria, this variable is a count variable of the number of offices/clinics open in a given month. It is a dichotomous variable for Lebanon and Turkey. There is not enough information available to create a count variable for the latter two countries.

governmental, Amnesty International, Red Cross, Red Crescent, ICRC, Middle East Watch, protest, and *watchdog.*[57] Relevant articles are then coded in two waves. The first wave consists of looking for sentences that cite NGOs directly and relate to their campaign activities; this is for the purposes of coding the *NGO campaign content* variable. The second wave consists of identifying articles that refer to the movement of NGOs, delegates' visits, and office openings and closures; this is for the purposes of coding *NGO physical presence* in the country of interest. Examples of distinct sets of sentences are as follows:

> *Amnesty International accused Algerian government security forces on Thursday of widespread torture and urged the authorities to shed light on the fate of hundreds of reported missing people.* (NGO campaign content advocating for the citizenry)
>
> *Human rights group Amnesty International condemned Moslem rebels in Algeria on Tuesday, accusing them of continued human rights abuses on a wide scale.* (NGO campaign content critical of the TO)
>
> *Three members of Amnesty International arrived in Algiers on Tuesday on the first visit by a foreign human rights group to violence-torn Algeria in five years.* (NGO temporary physical presence)

Finally, all measures of campaign content are used to create an overarching measure of media reports directly referencing the work of NGOs in the conflict area;

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[57] Search terms were selected from a multi-stage process. The author downloaded all articles that included one of the three NGO names and one of the three terms *Algeria*, Leban*, and Turk** from LexisNexis. The search was restricted to a sample of articles published between January 1, 2014, and March 31, 2014. The articles were skimmed and duplicates and irrelevant articles were discarded. Relevance was determined by whether the article was discussing NGO activity in the country of interest. This resulted in a collection of 22 articles that provided information on either campaign activities or physical presence *in the body of the article*. The body of the article was then compared to the lead sentence and the final list of key terms was created from the lead sentence. Key terms were restricted to common nouns referring to NGOs. The list included any terms that were used in the lead sentences of three or more relevant articles. Three articles appeared to be a reasonable benchmark of inclusion; anything less than that would have produced extremely broad search terms, such as *meeting* and *group*. It should be noted that common verbs were also collected; these are referenced in Appendix 2 and are used for coding the *campaign content* variable. Application of these 'action terms' is discussed further below.

this is for the purposes of coding *NGO media activity* in the country of interest.

Media activity is a variable constructed from the *physical presence* and *campaign*

content variables. It is a sum of the dummy values of the following measures:

campaign content (general support of the constituents and specific criticisms of the

TO) for HRW, AI, and local NGOs, as well as *temporary physical presence* of HRW,

AI and ICRC in a given month. The values on the scale can range from a low of 0

(all of the other variables are coded as 0) to a high of 9 (all dummy variables are

coded as 1). It is important to note, however, that some of the data points captured in

the *campaign content* variables do not come from media sources but originate,

instead, from NGO websites. These data points are excluded from the *media activity*

variable, since information available through an NGO website is inconsistent with the

hypothesis.

Articles that cite NGOs or make reference to their active campaign content are

coded for several variables including: a) whether the cited NGO is one of the two

campaigning groups of interest (HRW or AI) or an unnamed or local human rights

NGO b) whether the content of the NGO citation is in reference to advocacy work

and general support for the constituency (which can include criticizing the oppressor

on behalf of the constituents) or c) is in reference to harmful TO activities.[58] Articles

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[58] The decision to code a lead sentence as 1 for the *campaign content* variable is determined by the presence of several key action terms. An action term is the verb used in a sentence where the NGO is the primary subject (e.g., HRW demanded…). As described in a previous footnote, this author created a sample of three months of full articles from *LexisNexis* that were searched for content and relevance. A list of all key action terms included in the articles was created and separated into two groups: neutral and advocacy/criticism. Reuters lead sentences are reviewed and *campaign content* coded 1 if the sentence contains one or more of the advocacy/criticism action terms. The recipient of the action term determines whether campaign content is in general support of the constituency or specifically critical of the TO. If a Reuters lead sentence contains only a neutral action term, the full body of the article is located and a search conducted for an advocacy action term. If no term is found in the complete article, *campaign content* is coded as 0. See Appendix 2 for a list of action terms.

that reference NGO physical presence in the country of interest are coded if they are one of the two campaigning NGOs (AI or HRW) or the service provision NGO (ICRC) of interest to this dissertation and coding captures whether the presence is temporary (a fact-finding mission or a delegates' visit) or permanent (establishing an office or clinic).

While the Reuters lead sentences provide a good first step towards establishing NGO campaign content, media activity and physical presence in the countries of interest, they are limited. There are two significant shortcomings to the Reuters data: it potentially overlooks the content of local papers which, arguably, may have as large an impact on local TO activity, and they are restricted to lead sentences only, potentially masking substantive material in the body of an article that is excluded from the lead sentence. Measures are taken to overcome both of these shortcomings.

Other data sources

Reuters is a reputable source that is recognized as one of the largest newswires in the world; however, it tends to focus on the stories that have a national or international audience in order to appeal to its client base (Dewland, 2010). As such, it is possible that a search of more localized media sources would produce additional references to NGO activity in the media. In order to address this possibility, additional search strings are run on LexisNexis[59]. LexisNexis provides access to both large and small media sources, including numerous localized sources

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[59] Factiva is the media search engine that provides access to Reuters. LexisNexis is selected in place of Factiva in order to obtain a greater range of sources and to limit repetition with the Reuters lead sentences.

that are region-specific.[60] In order to limit the sheer number of potential sources, the

search is restricted to newspaper sources between 1987 and 2011; this eliminates

court documents, company profiles, and law reviews. The search strings that are used

are similar to those cited above, including reference to a country and the series of

descriptors listed previously.

While a general LexisNexis search serves to supplement the Reuters data

regarding NGO activity, a more targeted LexisNexis search can also help overcome

some of the shortcomings of the Reuters data. Specifically, it is possible that the

Reuters lead sentences mask potentially substantive material captured in the body but

not captured in the first line of the article. Therefore, Reuters' articles with

suggestive lead sentences that do not contain enough information to warrant coding

are isolated and located. An example can be found in the following lead sentence:

Algeria has approved the opening of a branch of the London-based human

rights organization Amnesty International which said its priority there was to work

for the abolition of capital punishment.

The sentence suggests that AI will be establishing a permanent presence in

Algeria, but does not provide enough information to determine the timeline. This

article and others like it are located, the content of the complete article are scanned,

and, if the material is found to be relevant, the data are coded accordingly. However,

as the sentence cited above illustrates, some articles require even further follow-up; in

this AI/Algeria example, the author succeeded in tracking down the complete article.

The body of the article suggested a potential timeline but confirmation of the time

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[60] According to the LexisNexis website, it provides 22 percent more local sources than other
collections.

that an office was established is still necessary. This final confirmation can be accomplished through NGO website searches.

As a last measure, the websites of the three NGOs are scoured thoroughly for information pertaining to press releases (for all three NGOs) and country reports (for HRW and AI).[61] These are reviewed for content and, if appropriate, coded for inclusion. While these releases and reports often describe NGO physical activity, including delegate visits to conflict areas and the establishment of temporary and permanent offices, additional content searches of the websites are conducted in order to identify NGO physical movements not captured in the releases and reports. These searches indicate that the information found on the websites is less reliable or unavailable in the earlier years. While all three NGOs appear to have publically-accessible rich archive data that provides physical activity data points (country visits and the establishment of offices) dating back to 1987 and beyond, country reports and press releases appear to only be available from the early 1990s to present time for HRW and mid-1990s to present time for AI. Given that these are only a supplement to the Reuters and local media data, this is less of a concern than if they were the only source of measures of NGO activity.

<center>Control Variables</center>

In addition to the dependent and independent variables summarized above, a variety of control variables are included in the analyses in order to minimize the possibility of omitted variable bias. Exclusion of key variables that are related to both NGO and TO activity could produce biased results. The control variables

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[61] ICRC does not provide traditional country reports but, instead, offers operational summaries.

chosen for the model are selected because previous research has demonstrated that they influence terrorist activity and could be linked to NGO activity. These variables include social and economic indicators (Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Piazza, 2008), governance measures (Campos and Gassebner, 2013; Krueger and Laitin, 2008), demographics (Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Piazza, 2008), the number of active TOs in a conflict area (Nemeth, 2013), and natural disasters (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2013; Fisher, 2014).

The majority of the control variables are provided by the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) database. Unfortunately, the WDI only provides annual data on key indicators for Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey. Therefore, it should be noted that the model controls for yearly fluctuations in specific variables, rather than monthly fluctuations. These will likely lead to smaller standard errors than if monthly data were included, indicating the possibility of Type I error. However, there are no reliable monthly counts that cover the years included in the analyses, leaving annual data as the best option available for the models.[62]

The first set of control variables sourced from the WDI describes country demographics. This includes a continuous measure of *urban population*, or the percentage of the total population that is concentrated in an urban center, as well as a continuous measure of *population density*, which assesses the average concentration of citizens per square kilometer of habitable land. An additional continuous variable measuring *population growth* is incorporated into the models; this measure reports the change in population in relation to the previous year. These measures are included for several reasons. Firstly, an increase in and concentration of the

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[62] The final models cluster by year to adjust the standard error of the control variables.

population indicates the potential for an increase in offenders and targets, as well as a greater likelihood that the two will overlap (Cohen and Felson, 1979). This can impact the frequency of terrorist attacks. Secondly, population growth can lead to environmental degradation and resource depletion (Preston, 1996). In addition, research has demonstrated that overcrowding can increase aggression; it can lead to competition for limited resources on an individual and aggregate level (Ramirez, 2003). Therefore, population measures may indicate a worsening situation for an oppressed constituency as communities vie for land use and political favors, capturing the attention and influencing the activities of both TOs and NGOs.

The next set of WDI indicators includes economic variables. Economic fluctuations can indicate instability in the market and limited employment possibilities, as well as a devaluation of investments and assets. While circumstances such as these can impact a population at large, communities that are already experiencing displacement and economic insecurity will lack the resources that can serve as insulation against financial fluctuations. Therefore, economic losses can indicate that an oppressed constituency, often members of the impoverished class, is experiencing further deprivation. Advocacy organizations, including both TOs and NGOs, may increase their activities in defense of a disadvantaged group in such circumstances. In support of these speculations, research has demonstrated a relationship between shifts in economic security/stability and terrorism (Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Piazza, 2008). In addition, providing relief and alleviating economic hardship holds a place of prominence in many NGO campaigns (Welch, 1995). Therefore, in order to control for these potential influences, a measure is

included for *GDP*. This is a continuous variable of the gross domestic product per capita of a given country in current (2012) U.S. dollars.[63] In addition, *unemployment*, an indicator of the percentage of the labor force that is unemployed, is included; however, data is only available for Turkey and, therefore, the variable is excluded from the Algeria and Lebanon models.

Population health is an additional area of concern. Within a country, changes in public health over time can indicate shifts in industrialization, access to medical and nutritional services, and the introduction or cessation of an epidemic. Disadvantaged groups often experience the brunt end of industrial shifts, limited access to health care and poor conditions that facilitate that spread of disease and illnesses. Research has demonstrated that health measures can influence the likelihood of terrorist attacks (Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011), while it can also attract the attention of humanitarian organizations that provide medical services and other forms of service provision. Therefore, several proxies are sourced from the WDI that measure birth and life expectancies. A continuous measure of *infant mortality rate*, as measured per 1,000 lives, is included in the models, as is *life expectancy at birth,* or the average life span in number of years.

A final set of WDI control variables relating to military presence and expenditures are included in the analysis. A continuous measure assessing the percentage of the gross domestic product dedicated to *military expenditures* is

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[63] GDP values for 1987 are not available for Turkey and Lebanon. Given that the analysis began in July of 1987, this equates to six missing data points for each country. Although it would be ideal to replace these missing values with the average between 1986 and 1988, 1986 values are also not available. Therefore, 1987 GDP is populated with values from 1988 GDP.

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included, as is a measure of the percentage of *military personnel* in the labor force.[64]

Within the context of this dissertation, these are particularly salient variables, given

that the military is often seen as the oppressor of a given constituency. Increases in

the percentage of military personnel and in expenditures dedicated to the military can

indicate a growth in the presence of the perceived oppressor or can aggravate

outstanding grievances concerning the resources that a given nation will grant to its

military branch, often at the expense of services offered to the general public. In

support of this supposition, research has demonstrated a positive relationship between

proxies for military activity and subsequent terrorism (Gassebner and Luechinger,

2011). In addition, many NGOs have active campaigns that focus on increasing the

resources committed to social services through reductions in military expenditures, on

behalf of disadvantaged communities (Today's Zaman, 2010). Therefore, an increase

in military personnel and costs can motivate NGOs and TOs to take action.

A proxy for governance characteristics is also included in the models for all

three countries. This measure is provided by the Political Instability Task Force

(PITF) Polity data. The Polity data allows for a measure of *democratic orientation*,

or the determination whether a country is more autocratic versus more democratic

(Marshall et al., 2009).[65] The Polity scores range from -10, indicating a fully

autocratic country, to +10, indicating a fully democratic country. The rationale for

inclusion of this variable is simple; autocratic leadership can have a destabilizing

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[64] The *military personnel* variable is missing values between 1987 and 1990 for Lebanon and Turkey. Given that the analyses for both countries begin in mid-1987, this results in two and a half years of missing data. In order to address this, the average value for the next three years (1990-1992) is calculated and inserted as a replacement for the missing values.

[65] The *democratic orientation* variable is dropped from all Lebanon models due to missing values (more than fifty percent of the values are coded as missing). It is not missing any data for Turkey or Algeria and, therefore, is included for both of these countries.

effect on social structure (Vugt et al., 2004). As such, the citizenry can experience social unrest, loss of rights, services, and freedoms, and a diminished or unpredictable quality of life. Such instability can incite civilian revolt, as well as international attention and patronage directed towards the impacted citizenry. In support of this, studies have shown that regime characteristics can impact terrorist activities, increasing TO attacks and fatality counts (Campos and Gassebner, 2013; Krueger and Laitin, 2008). In addition, responding to adverse regime orientation or political instability is central to the work of both human rights and humanitarian organizations (Torres and Anderson, 2004).

Natural disasters may also impact both TO and NGO activities. Natural disasters can devastate a population, leading to a variety of social and economic ills, health problems, and damages. Researchers note that the brunt of natural disasters tends to fall on nations that are already economically or politically unstable and that the aftermath of a disaster can further aggravate this instability (Cavallo and Noy, 2010). For the reasons mentioned previously, including access to health care, a lack of financial buffer, and a failure on behalf of the state to serve the interests of all the citizens equally, disadvantaged communities may bear the burden of a catastrophe. A failure on behalf of the state to respond to the needs of an oppressed community can incite a response from TOs (Fisher, 2014), while the devastation of a community in the aftermath of a disaster can capture the attention of an NGO. In support of these postulations, Berrebi and Ostwald (2013) assessed the relationship between natural disasters and terrorism in 170 countries over a 38-year period. They determined that there was an increase in terrorism following natural disasters, although the response

differed for domestic and transnational terrorism. They concluded that natural disasters can leave a governing body vulnerable and open to transnational terrorism, while poor government response following a disaster can incite a population to respond violently, creating an opportunity for domestic terrorism to flourish. Regarding NGOs, there are numerous service provision groups that operate solely in response to disasters, offering aid and relief to the impacted citizenry (the ICRC, for example, is well-known for disaster relief work). In order to control for the potential influence of disasters on both NGO and TO activity, monthly data is sourced from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), sponsored by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). A dichotomous variable is created for whether there is a *natural disaster* in any given month. Natural disasters could include geophysical, meteorological, hydrological, climatological, and biological events; the more common events appear to be earthquakes, floods, and storms. If a natural disaster spanned more than one month (as in the case of an epidemic or a drought), all relevant months are coded as witnessing a natural disaster.

The models also include a measure of the *number of active TOs* in a given year; this is included as a control for inter-group competition. Specifically, studies have shown that an increase in the number of TOs can facilitate inter-group competition that is related to increased violence (Nemeth, 2013). In addition, an increase in TOs can draw the attention and focus of NGOs as more TOs may be an expression of increased social unrest on the behalf of an oppressed community or may be an indicator of further constituency oppression at the hands of the TOs. In

order to address this potential dynamic, the *number of active TOs* variable is included, which consists of a count of the number of unique TOs listed each year in the GTD.

Additional control variables included in the analysis are a set of *GTD collection generation* variables. This ensures that changes in the collection period and method have a minimal impact on the resulting analysis. Specifically, two dummy variables are created for GTDI and GTDIII, with GTD II as a reference category. These variables are coded as 1 if the period of interest coincides with a particular collection period.

Two sets of additional dichotomous variables are included in country-specific models in order to control for the TO-specific characteristics unique to that country. These include a set of dummy variables addressing the shifts in TO-attitudes towards civilians in Algeria and a dummy variable that serves to control for the period of TO-state negotiation that occurred following Öcalan's arrest in 1999 in Turkey. In order to justify the inclusion of these variables, a brief summary of both country- and TO-specific dynamics is necessary.

As summarized in chapter four, Algerian TOs have, at times, rallied for the civilian population and, at times, against it. Between 1990 and 1994, the TOs neither sought to protect nor to punish the general population. However, in 1994, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the primary TO in Algeria at the time, declared war on the civilian population in response to the perceived failure of the citizenry to engage in national jihad. Other groups objected to this position, leading to several years of inter-group conflict, which began to dissipate in 1997 with the declaration of a ceasefire. By mid-1998, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC) [the

former GIA] made a commitment to protect the citizenry in its fight against the

military junta and, eventually, its campaign for global jihad. These periods can be

loosely separated into three time-dependent samples: January of 1991 through to June

of 1994 (no civilian orientation), July of 1994 through to August of 1998 (an anti-

civilian orientation), and September of 1998 through to present time (a pro-civilian

orientation).[66] Therefore, in order to control for the influence of civilian orientation,

two dummy variables are included in the Algeria models, including an *anti-civilian*

orientation and a *pro-civilian orientation* variable (no civilian orientation is the

reference category).

In regards to Turkey, 1999 through to 2002 was a period of exceptional

circumstances for terrorist campaigns. Specifically, Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of

the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), was captured in February of 1999, imprisoned,

and sentenced to death. His sentence was eventually commuted to life imprisonment

in August of 2002. During this period, Öcalan used his organization's activities as a

method of negotiation and, at different points, called on the PKK to increase and

decrease its attacks in order to support his own legal and political mediation process.

In order to adjust for this, a variable controlling for the *period of negotiation*

beginning in the summer of 1990 and ending in the beginning of 2002 is included in

the Turkey models. A summary of these and other control variables are included in

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[66] January, 1991, is selected simply because it is the first month of analysis included in any Algerian model and it should be noted that TO ambivalence towards the citizenry predates the beginning of 1991. In July, 1994, the GIA released its first set of demands directed towards the citizenry with the threat of violence if the citizenry failed to comply. In September of 1998, the founder of the newly-formed GPSC released his first of a set of statements regarding protecting and defending the citizenry from the military junta.

Table 3 and an exhaustive summary of the variables included in each model is

available in Appendix A.

Table 3. Control variables and definitions

Variables	Definition
Control variables	
GDP	Gross domestic product per capita (annual, continuous)
Unemployment (Turkey only)	Percent of the labor force without employment (annual, percentage)
Urban population	Percent of total population in an urban center (annual, percentage)
Population density	Average number of citizens per square kilometer of land (annual, continuous)
Population growth	Percent change in the population size from previous year (annual, percentage)
Infant mortality rate	Infant deaths per 1,000 births (annual, continuous)
Life expectancy at birth	Average expected lifespan (annual, continuous)
Military expenditures	Percent of the gross domestic product spent on military expenditures (annual, percentage)
Military personnel	Percent of military personnel in the labor force (annual, percentage)
Democratic orientation (Algeria and Turkey only)	Scale of democratic versus autocratic orientation (annual, scale)
Natural disaster	Natural disaster occurrence (monthly, 0,1)
Number of active TOs	Number of active TOs in a conflict area (annual, count)
GTD generation (I and III)	GTD data collection generation (monthly, 0,1)
Civilian orientation (Algeria only – pro and anti)	Period of pro- or anti-civilian orientation (monthly, 0,1)
Negotiation period (Turkey only)	Period of TO-state negotiation (monthly, 0,1)

Methods

The primary question of interest to this dissertation is whether the activities of

NGOs at time one (*t*) will have a relationship to the activities of TOs at time two

(*t+s*).[67] In order to address this research question, the models included in this

dissertation incorporate a series of count variables measuring terrorist activity over

successive (monthly) time points, or time series data. The use of count variables and

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[67] In these models, *s* represents the number of lags. While most models include a one month lag, there are several models that include a two month lag and, as such, cannot be denoted by a specific number.

time series data narrows the choice of analytical methods considerably. The models presented in this dissertation employ autoregressive Poisson regression (ARP) as the primary analytical method. This selection is informed by two key considerations, primarily overdispersion and autocorrelation. In regards to the former, terrorism is a rare event and, thus, is modeled best with a Poisson distribution. However, the Poisson distribution is a single parameter model and is subject to overdispersion (Heinen, 2003). As for autocorrelation, time series data are not collected randomly and, as such, suffer from dependency in the error terms. ARP, fortunately, corrects for both overdispersion and autocorrelation.

It is worth noting that, while the use of time series data indicates that there will be dependency in the error terms, there are also theoretical justifications to expect autocorrelation and, thus, to require an analytical model that corrects for it. Specifically, both rational choice theory and game theory place an emphasis on the importance of past actions shaping present activities, specifically the previous successes and failures of both terrorist and competitor actions and strategies (Enders and Sandler, 1995; Nemeth, 2013). As such, we would expect that error terms at t would influence $t+s$.

Given the reasons cited above, the omission of y_t as a predictor in the models can lead to biased standard errors. Therefore, the ARP method is appropriate to test the research questions and resulting hypotheses presented in chapter three. While ARP is suitable, a secondary option is the negative binomial (NB) regression with lagged dependent variables. This method is also used in this dissertation in order to test the robustness of results.

The ARP regression is written as follows:

$$Log(E(y_{t+s})) = \beta_{0} + \alpha_t \circ y_t + \varepsilon \tag{2}$$

where y is the monthly count of terrorist attacks, t indicates the

measurement is for the current month, and $t+s$ indicates the measurement is

for s months following the current month (s may be one or two months later,

depending on the model). The logistic distribution function at time point t is

captured by α_t, where $\alpha_t = log(\beta_1\, NGO\ activity_t + \beta_2\, controls_t)$, while $\alpha_t \circ y$

presents the autoregressive term. The ε is the error term, which is assumed to

be a Poisson distribution with mean $\lambda > 0$.

Recall that there are eight hypotheses in total. The first set of

hypotheses references an NGO's physical presence in an area of interest,

which may be temporary or permanent.

1a) $Log(TerrorismNGO_{t+s}) = \beta_0 + \alpha_t \circ y_t + \varepsilon$

where: $\alpha_t = log(\beta_1\, NGOphysicalpresence_t + \beta_2\, controls_t)$

H_{1a}: $\beta_1 > 0$

1b) $Log(TerrorismCivilians_{t+s}) = \beta_0 + \alpha_t \circ y_t + \varepsilon$

where: $\alpha_t = log(\beta_1\, NGOphysicalpresence_t + \beta_2\, controls_t)$

H_{1b}: $\beta_1 < 0$

1c) $Log(TerrorismOppressor_{t+s}) = \beta_0 + \alpha_t \circ y_t + \varepsilon$

where: $\alpha_t = log(\beta_1\, NGOphysicalpresence_t + \beta_2\, controls_t)$

H_{1c}: $\beta_1 > 0$

The second set of hypotheses refers to TO responses to NGO campaign content. Campaign content may be operationalized as advocacy work or anti-terrorism work. These models read as follows:

2a) $Log(TerrorismNGO_{t+s})= \beta_0 + \alpha_t \circ y_t + \varepsilon$

where: $\alpha_t = log(\beta_1 NGOcampaigncontent_t + \beta_2 controls_t)$

H_{2a}: $\beta_1 > 0$

2b) $Log(TerrorismCivilians_{t+s})= \beta_0 + \alpha_t \circ y_t + \varepsilon$

where: $\alpha_t = log(\beta_1 NGOcampaigncontent_t + \beta_2 controls_t)$

H_{2b}: $\beta_1 < 0$

2c) $Log(TerrorismOppressor_{t+s})= \beta_0 + \alpha_t \circ y_t + \varepsilon$

where: $\alpha_t = log(\beta_1 NGOcampaigncontent_t + \beta_2 controls_t)$

H_{2c}: $\beta_1 > 0$

Two additional hypotheses are a) increasing NGO service provision will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the NGO and b) an increase in NGO media activity will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks. These models are as follows:

3) $Log(TerrorismNGO_{t+s})= \beta_0 + \alpha_t \circ y_t + \varepsilon$

where: $\alpha_t = log(\beta_1 NGOservices_t + \beta_2 controls_t)$

H_3: $\beta_1 > 0$

4) $Log(Terrorism_{t+s})= \beta_0 + \alpha_t \circ y_t + \varepsilon$

where: $\alpha_t = log(\beta_1 NGOmediapresence_t + \beta_2 controls_t)$

H_4: $\beta_1 > 0$

An additional analytical consideration is the lag in time between the primary independent variables and the outcome variables. The appropriate lag time is assessed using a variety of measures and the most conservative lag is applied.[68] For many of the models, this lag time is limited to one month, although several models require a lag time of two months. This decision is supported by the literature on terrorism that indicates terrorist attacks require, at a minimum, two to six weeks of planning before successful execution (Brym and Araj, 2006; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). As such, NGO activity that takes place in a given month is more likely to incite a TO response in the following month or two.

In summary, the data used for this dissertation come from a variety of sources, including the GTD, EM-DAT, GATE precursor data, and the WDI. These sources are supplemented with searches of media sites and NGO sites. The data are analyzed using an autoregressive technique that assumes a Poisson distribution, corrects for autocorrelation, and allows for an overdispersed variance. The following chapter will present the results from the analyses.

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[68] Potential lag times are assessed through use of the Durbin-Watson test in STATA, as well as the insertion of multiple lags or autoregressive terms in the models in order to see where significance is achieved. Each model is assessed with a minimum of six lags as a starting point.

CHAPTER 6: Results

This chapter presents the results for the models outlined in chapter three and summarized in Appendix A. The section begins with a description of the summary statistics for TO and NGO activities in each of the three countries of interest. This is followed by a review of the model results as they pertain to each of the hypotheses presented in chapter three.

Summary Statistics for Algeria

Terrorist activity in Algeria is measured with four different variables: overall terrorist attacks[69], attacks targeting civilians, the state, and NGOs. The distribution for each of these variables is summarized in Table 4 and the descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5.

All four measures of terrorist activity are count variables. In regards to overall terrorist attacks, this measure has a minimum of zero incidents per month for eight out of 240 months or approximately three percent of the observed months. Overall attacks have a maximum of 63 attacks for one month out of 240 months or for approximately 0.4 percent of the observations. The average number of overall attacks is approximately 11 attacks in a given month, with a standard deviation of 8.37, demonstrating a good deal of variation. Overall attacks are skewed to the right. Nearly 50 percent of the monthly observations record 14 or fewer attacks while 90 percent of the observations report fewer than 21 incidents.

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[69] As noted in previous chapters, overall attacks include attacks targeting state, civilians, and NGOs, but also include attacks targeting other groups, such as media representatives, religious figures, and businesses.

Table 4. Distribution of terrorist activity in Algeria[70]

Incidents	Overall attacks	%	Attacks targeting civilians	%	Attacks targeting the state	%	Attacks targeting NGOs	%
0	8	3.33	43	17.92	32	13.33	237	98.75
1	7	2.92	43	17.92	23	9.58	3	1.25
2	9	3.75	36	15.00	35	14.58	0	0.00
3	15	6.25	35	14.58	24	10.00	0	0.00
4	12	5.00	14	5.83	24	10.00	0	0.00
5	12	5.00	12	5.00	20	8.33	0	0.00
6	16	6.67	14	5.83	24	10.00	0	0.00
7	14	5.83	6	2.50	9	3.75	0	0.00
8	12	5.00	7	2.92	12	5.00	0	0.00
9	14	5.83	3	1.25	5	2.08	0	0.00
10	15	6.25	8	3.33	8	3.33	0	0.00
11	19	7.92	3	1.25	6	2.50	0	0.00
12	6	2.50	3	1.25	3	1.25	0	0.00
13	12	5.00	2	0.83	2	0.83	0	0.00
14	10	4.17	0	0.00	1	0.42	0	0.00
15	5	2.08	1	0.42	1	0.42	0	0.00
16	7	2.92	0	0.00	3	1.25	0	0.00
17	8	3.33	2	0.83	4	1.67	0	0.00
18	6	2.50	1	0.42	1	0.42	0	0.00
19	7	2.92	2	0.83	0	0.00	0	0.00
20	1	0.42	1	0.42	2	0.83	0	0.00
21	2	0.83	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
22	4	1.67	1	0.42	1	0.42	0	0.00
23	4	1.67	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
24	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
25	2	0.83	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
26	2	0.83	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
27	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
28	2	0.83	1	0.42	0	0.00	0	0.00
29	2	0.83	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
30	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
31	1	0.42	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
32	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
33	2	0.83	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
34	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
35	1	0.42	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
36	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00

[70] The distribution results reported in Table 4 are truncated at 36 incidents; however, there are additional single observations of overall attacks at 38, 48, and 63 incidents. Attacks targeting civilians had additional single observations at 38 and 51 incidents.

Table 5. Summary statistics of all variables included in Algeria models

Algeria variables	Measurement	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Dependent variables					
Terrorist attacks	Count	10.933	8.37	0	63
Attacks targeting civilians	Count	4.100	5.77	0	51
Attacks targeting the state	Count	4.758	4.36	0	22
Attacks targeting NGOs	Count	0.012	0.11	0	1
Independent variables					
All NGO media activity	Count	0.866	1.10	0	5
Human rights NGO media activity advocating for the constituents	Count	0.566	0.84	0	3
Human rights NGO media activity criticizing TOs	Count	0.112	0.36	0	2
Human rights NGO temporary presence in a conflict area	Count	0.079	0.27	0	1
Human rights NGO permanent presence in a conflict area	Count	0.000	0.00	0	0
Humanitarian NGO temporary presence in a conflict area	1/0	0.108	0.31	0	1
Humanitarian NGO permanent presence in a conflict area	Count	0.637	0.77	0	2
Control variables					
GDP per capita	Continuous (divided by 10,000)	0.254	0.12	0.142	0.527
Urban population	Continuous	62.801	6.18	52.867	72.865
Population density	Continuous	13.607	1.27	11.291	15.855
Natural disaster	1/0	0.170	0.37	0	1
Democratic orientation	Scale	-1.350	2.99	-7	2
Population growth	Continuous (percentage)	1.708	0.32	1.306	2.461
Infant mortality	Continuous	28.195	7.52	17.8	40.9
Life expectancy	Continuous	69.101	1.12	67.003	70.751
Military expenditures	Continuous (percentage)	3.230	0.67	1.231	4.345
Military personnel	Continuous (percentage)	2.80	0.54	1.69	3.41
GTD generation 1	1/0	0.300	0.45	0	1
GTD generation 3	1/0	0.150	0.35	0	1
Number of active TOs	Count	2.091	0.89	1	4
Anti-civilian orientation	1/0	0.667	0.47	0	1
Pro-civilian orientation	1/0	0.208	0.40	0	1

Attacks targeting civilians have a minimum of zero incidents for 43 months or approximately 18 percent of the time and a maximum of 51 attacks for one month or approximately 0.4 percent of the time. The average number of attacks targeting civilians is four incidents in a given month and the standard deviation is 5.77. This demonstrates adequate variation in the variable. Attacks targeting civilians are highly skewed to the right with nearly 90 percent of monthly observations reporting nine or fewer incidents.

The state attacks variable has a minimum of zero incidents for 32 months or approximately 13 percent of the time and a maximum of 22 attacks for one month or approximately 0.4 percent of the time. The average number of attacks targeting the state is five incidents in a given month and the standard deviation is 4.36, demonstrating variation in the dependent variable. Attacks targeting the state are also highly skewed to the right; 90 percent of the monthly observations reported 10 or fewer incidents.

Attacks targeting NGOs are extremely rare. Out of 240 observed months, nearly 99 percent or 237 months record no incidents. There is only one attack per month for the remaining three months. The average number of incidents per month, therefore, is extremely small (.01 attacks) as is the standard deviation (0.1). As will be discussed in the latter half of this chapter, this limited variation makes quantitative analysis with this dependent variable problematic.

Similar to TO activity, NGO activity is operationalized as a series of unique variables designed to address the research question and subsequent hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses (hypothesis 1a, 1b, and 1c) refers to the impact that the

physical presence of a human rights or campaigning NGO, such as AI or HRW, is

predicted to have on terrorist incidents in a conflict area. An additional hypothesis

relates to the impact that the physical presence of a service provision NGO, such as

ICRC, will have on TO attacks (hypothesis three).[71] Physical presence is separated

into two measures: temporary presence (a delegation visits an area) and permanent

presence (an organization establishes an office or clinic).   For service provision

NGOs (ICRC), temporary and permanent presence measures are operationalized as

dichotomous variables indicating whether ICRC has a physical presence (1) or

physical absence (0) in a conflict area during the observed month.[72] For human rights

organizations, the presence measure is a scaled variable with a minimum value of 0

and maximum value of two. This variable includes the physical activities of both AI

and HRW and, thus, is given a value of two when both NGOs are in the area in the

same month.

In regards to a temporary presence, human rights organizations are

temporarily on site for 19 out of 240 months or for eight percent of the time. At no

point do HRW or AI have a temporary presence in the same month. ICRC has a

temporary presence for 26 months or 11 percent of the observed months. Results

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[71] This hypothesis relates to the temporary and permanent presence of a service provision organization
and subsequent attacks targeting NGOs. While the latter is too rare to justify quantitative analysis, a
qualitative comparison can be made. However, there is also value in assessing the quantitative
relationship between the activities that service provision organizations engage in and attacks targeting
civilians and the state. These assessments do not relate directly to a given hypothesis but can serve to
determine if service provision organizations have a different impact on TO activities than do
campaigning organizations.
[72] It is important to note that NGOs can maintain both a permanent and a temporary presence in a
country in any given month; this statement is premised on the assumption that maintaining a
permanent presence (i.e.: the existence of an office space or clinic) is substantively different from
visiting a conflict area (i.e.: visiting a prisoner or refugee camp). While the former indicates a base of
operations that allows the NGO to maintain a permanent existence, the latter is a measure of
organizational contact with oppressed communities and the general citizenry. Therefore, NGOs may
maintain a permanent presence for decades yet still elicit diverse responses from a TO due to their
temporary activities in conflict areas.

regarding temporary presence in Algeria should be interpreted with caution given that temporary visits are relatively rare.

Algeria is unique in relation to the permanent presence variable in the sense that the state was reluctant to allow NGOs to establish a permanent office within the country during the period of interest. Neither AI nor HRW maintain a permanent presence during the observation period, although it is unknown if this was due to a lack of organizational interest or state resistance. ICRC, however, was permitted to establish both offices and clinics over the period of study and the dates of these institutional achievements are well documented. Therefore, ICRC's permanent presence in Algeria is operationalized as the number of active offices and clinics in operation in a given month. Results indicate that this count ranges from a minimum of zero for 131 months or approximately 55 percent of the observed months to a maximum of two permanent sites for 44 months or approximately 18 percent of the observations. The average number of permanent sites in operation in any given month is 0.67 with a standard deviation of 0.77.

A second set of hypotheses (hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c) relates to the content of an NGO's campaign: whether the organization is advocating for the constituency and/or directly criticizing the TO in a given month. It is important to note that NGOs may engage in both forms of campaign work in a given month and, as such, these two different campaign foci have been separated into two variables in order to assess the impact of specific and unique content. These two variables incorporate the campaign content of three NGO groups: AI, HRW, and local/unnamed human rights

organizations.[73] A value of zero indicates that there is no human rights campaign

activity focused on the constituents or the TO in a given month, while a value of three

indicates that HRW, AI, and local NGOs were all campaigning in a given month.[74]

ICRC is not a campaigning organization and, therefore, data was only collected on

AI, HRW, and local NGOs.

Results indicate that human rights NGOs do not engage in advocacy work for

149 out 240 months or 62 percent of the time. At least one NGO is advocating 24

percent of the time, two are advocating approximately nine percent of the time, and

all three groups are advocating approximately four percent of the time. As for anti-

TO campaign content, human rights NGOs do not engage in this campaign activity

for 217 months or approximately 90 percent of the time. At least one NGO engages

in it eight percent of the time, while two NGOs employ this kind of content

approximately two percent of the time. It does not appear that all three NGO groups

engage in anti-TO work in the same month.

The last hypothesis (hypothesis four) addresses the relationship between

measures of all media activity and the frequency of all terrorist attacks. The media

variable is a cumulative value for media activity of local NGOs, HRW, AI, and

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[73] This latter group (local and unnamed NGOs) captures media reports that reference human rights
NGO activity that is attributed to an NGO other than AI or HRW. Approximately 92 percent of the
data points refer specifically to local NGOs while the remainder refers to NGOs that are referenced
without being named (these are cross-checked with AI and HRW activities and all observations that
bear a resemblance to AI or HRW and, thus, may be referring to either NGO, are eliminated from the
dataset in order to avoid double-counting of the same incident of NGO activity). Given the prevalence
of local NGOs in this group, the grouping is referred to as local NGOs, although there is a small
unnamed component.
[74] Separate analyses are also conducted on each of the human rights NGO groups to tease apart the
nuances of these relationships. Interesting results are commented on and included in the Appendix.
However, the main analysis uses a campaign content variable that includes all three groups. This is
due to the fact that the effect of the activities of one NGO can mask the effect of another NGO and,
therefore, leaving one of these groups out of the model may lead to omitted variable bias.

ICRC, including both measures of campaign content, as well as temporary presence.[75]

Thus, the minimum value for this scaled variable is 0 (there is no reported media

activity in a given month) and the maximum possible value is nine (the temporary

presence of all human rights and humanitarian NGOs are reported in the media in the

same month that advocacy and anti-TO campaign activity is reported in the media).

Results indicate that there is no media activity for 117 out of 240 months or

approximately 49 percent of the time. The maximum reported value for media

activity is five and this is reported for three months or for slightly more than one

percent of the reported observation periods.[76] This variable is skewed to the right

with a monthly average of 0.86 and a standard deviation of 1.10.

Summary statistics for the control variables included in the Algeria models are

summarized in Table 5. The next section will present the descriptive statistics for the

Lebanon dataset.

Summary Statistics for Lebanon

Similar to Algeria, terrorist attacks in Lebanon are measured by four count

variables, including all terrorist attacks, attacks targeting civilians, the state and,

lastly, NGOs. A summary of the distribution of these variables is reported in Table 6

and descriptive statistics for these and other variables included in the Lebanon

analyses are reported in Table 7.

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[75] All observations that are sourced directly from NGO websites are removed from this variable.
Given that permanent presence indicators were all collected from NGO websites, this variable has been
excluded from Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey media activity variables.
[76] A score of 1 occurs in 69 months, a score of 2 is reported in 35 months, a score of 3 is present in 10
months, and a score of 4 is reported in six months.

Table 6. Distribution of terrorist activity in Lebanon

Incidents	Overall attacks	%	Attacks targeting civilians	%	Attacks targeting the state	%	Attacks targeting NGOs	%
0	89	31.56	200	70.92	124	43.97	275	97.52
1	50	17.73	48	17.02	72	25.53	7	2.48
2	24	8.51	22	7.80	26	9.22	0	0.00
3	14	4.96	7	2.48	22	7.80	0	0.00
4	25	8.87	4	1.42	10	3.55	0	0.00
5	16	5.67	0	0.00	6	2.13	0	0.00
6	8	2.84	0	0.00	8	2.84	0	0.00
7	9	3.19	0	0.00	5	1.77	0	0.00
8	7	2.48	0	0.00	1	0.35	0	0.00
9	6	2.13	0	0.00	1	0.35	0	0.00
10	5	1.77	0	0.00	1	0.35	0	0.00
11	9	3.19	1	0.35	1	0.35	0	0.00
12	4	1.42	0	0.00	2	0.71	0	0.00
13	4	1.42	0	0.00	1	0.35	0	0.00
14	1	0.35	0	0.00	1	0.35	0	0.00
15	3	1.06	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
16	1	0.35	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
17	3	1.06	0	0.00	1	0.35	0	0.00
18	1	0.35	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
19	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
20	1	0.35	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
21	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
22	2	0.71	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00

The measure of all terrorist attacks reports a minimum of a zero incidents for 89 out of 282 observed months or approximately 32 percent of the time. The maximum number of attacks is 22 incidents which are reported for two separate months or approximately one percent of the time. The average number of attacks reported in any given month is 3.59 and the standard deviation is 4.51, demonstrating some variation in the measure. This variable is skewed to the right with 90 percent of the observed months recording 10 or fewer attacks.

Table 7. Summary statistics of all variables included in Lebanon models

Lebanon variables	Measurement	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Dependent variables					
Terrorist attacks	Count	3.539	4.51	0	22
Attacks targeting civilians	Count	0.496	1.05	0	11
Attacks targeting the state	Count	1.592	2.53	0	17
Attacks targeting NGOs	Count	0.024	0.15	0	1
Independent variables					
All NGO media activity	Count	0.957	1.31	0	9
Human rights NGO media activity advocating for the constituents	Count	0.609	0.81	0	3
Human rights NGO media activity criticizing TOs	Count	0.117	0.41	0	3
Human rights NGO temporary presence in a conflict area	Count	0.127	0.35	0	2
Human rights NGO permanent presence in a conflict area	count	0.751	0.83	0	2
ICRC temporary presence in a conflict area	1/0	0.102	0.30	0	1
ICRC permanent presence in a conflict area	1/0	0.996	0.05	0	1
Control variables					
GDP per capita	Continuous (divided by 10,000)	0.478	0.23	0.101	0.914
Urban population	Continuous	85.331	1.68	80.901	87.247
Population density	Continuous	334.505	57.43	260.859	428.425
Natural disaster	1/0	0.011	0.10	0	1
Population growth	Continuous (percentage)	1.983	1.36	-0.190	4.844
Infant mortality	Continuous	17.780	6.79	8.3	30.7
Life expectancy	Continuous	74.409	3.24	69.390	79.558
Military expenditures	Continuous (percentage)	4.795	1.43	1.187	7.979
Military personnel	Continuous (percentage)	6.191	1.22	4.586	8.243
GTD generation 1	1/0	0.404	0.49	0	1
GTD generation 3	1/0	0.159	0.36	0	1
Number of active TOs	Count	3.659	4.25	0	15

The variable measuring attacks targeting civilians indicates a minimum of zero attacks for 200 out of 282 months or for approximately 71 percent of the observation period. The highest recorded number of incidents in a given month is 11 attacks which is observed for one month or 0.35 percent of the time. The average number of attacks per month is 0.49 and the standard deviation is 1.05, demonstrating some variability. Attacks targeting civilians is highly skewed to the right with nearly 90 percent of the observation months reporting one or fewer attacks.

A third variable measuring TO activity is attacks targeting the state. This count variable reports a minimum of zero attacks for 124 observation months or 44 percent of the time. The maximum number of attacks is 17 incidents in a given month which occurs for one out of 282 months or 0.35 percent of the time. The mean number of attacks is 1.59 and the standard deviation is 2.53, indicating some variation in the dependent variable. Attacks targeting the state are highly skewed to the right with 90 percent of the 282 observation months reporting four or fewer attacks.

The last TO activity variable is attacks targeting NGOs which, similar to Algeria, appears to be an extremely rare event. Approximately 97.5 percent of the observation months or 275 out of 282 months report no attacks targeting NGOs. Only seven months or approximately 2.5 percent of the time period of study records a single attack targeting an NGO. The average number of attacks per month is 0.02 and the standard deviation is 0.15. As will be discussed further in the chapter, the rarity of these kinds of attacks makes quantitative assessment problematic.

NGO activity is captured by the same set of variables as is used for the Algerian analysis; specifically, measures assess the temporary and permanent

physical presence in a conflict area, campaign content advocating for the constituency

and criticizing the TO, and overall media activity. Physical measures are either

dichotomous (humanitarian NGOs) or count (human rights NGOs). Regarding the

human rights NGO temporary and permanent presence measures, if either AI or

HRW are present in a given month, the variable is coded as one and if both are

present, the variable is coded as two. Overall media activity is a cumulative value of

the campaign content values and temporary presence values (as captured in the

media) for AI, HRW, local NGOs, and ICRC.

Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, and hypothesis three address the temporary and

permanent physical presence of an NGO in a conflict area; the first set refers to

campaigning NGOs, such as AI and HRW, and hypothesis three refers to service

provision organizations, such as ICRC. In regards to temporary presence, or the

presence of a delegation, human rights NGOs do not have a presence for 248 out of

282 observed months or for approximately 88 percent of the time. At least one

human rights organization has a temporary presence for 32 months and both AI and

HRW have a temporary presence for two months. ICRC has a short-term presence in

conflict areas for 29 months or ten percent of the 282 months of interest.[77]

As mentioned previously, NGOs can maintain both a permanent and a

temporary presence in any given month (this statement is premised on the assumption

that the existence of an office space is substantively different from visiting a conflict

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[77] As noted in the Algeria summary, the only hypothesis relating to ICRC is addressing the relationship
between service provision presence and attacks targeting NGOs. However, attacks against NGOs are a
rare event and, thus, unsuitable for quantitative analysis. Instead, a qualitative assessment will be
presented of the relationship between these two variables. In addition, although this does not relate to
a specific hypothesis, the relationship between service provision presence and other attacks will be
assessed. These results will be compared with similar results for campaigning organizations in order to
gauge if there are substantive differences in how TOs respond to the two groups of NGOs.

area). ICRC illustrates this point. It maintains a permanent presence for 281 out of

282 observation months or 99.6 percent of the period of study[78]. While this makes

quantitative analysis highly problematic, it does not eliminate the value of assessing

ICRC's visits to areas hosting oppressed communities such as refugee and prisoner

camps.   Therefore, the analysis will only assess ICRC's temporary presence and not

its permanent one. Human rights NGOs, on the other hand, only have a permanent

presence for 140 months or slightly less than 50 percent of the 282 months of study,

with one NGO present for 68 months, or 24 percent, and both NGOs present for 72

months, or 26 percent of the period. Therefore, Lebanon models include both

temporary and permanent presence variables for human rights NGOs.

The next set of hypotheses (hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c) refers to the predicted

impact of campaign content on TO activity. Campaign content is measured by two

separate count variables; these variables measure whether, in a given month, a human

rights NGO a) advocated for the citizenry or b) criticized a TO. Given that ICRC is

not a campaigning organization, it is not included in the data collection efforts;

however, AI, HRW, and local NGOs are included.

In regards to advocating for the constituency, results indicate that at least one

or more NGOs are engaged in advocacy work for approximately 44 percent of the

study period. One group is engaged for 86 months or 30 percent, two groups

advocate for 28 months or 10 percent, and all three groups are in engaged in advocacy

work for 10 months or approximately three percent of the time. As for anti-terrorism

campaign work, this occurs with less frequency than constituent advocacy work.

Human rights organizations only engage in anti-terrorism work for 26 months or

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[78] The ICRC office closed for one month in January, 1989, due to threats to staff members.

approximately nine percent of the period of interest. At least one group focuses on TOs for 21 months, two groups for three months, and all three groups for only two months.

Hypothesis four predicts a relationship between all NGO media activity and all terrorist activity. The media activity variable is a cumulative value of the campaign content variables and temporary presence variables for a maximum possible value of nine (this maximum occurs if media sources report local NGOs, HRW, and AI engaging in advocacy and anti-TO work during the same month, as well as AI, HRW, and ICRC reporting a temporary presence in a given month). Results indicate a highly skewed variable; 132 months report no media activity, 88 months record a score of one, and 34 months are coded with a score of two.[79] A maximum of nine is reported for one month. The expected value of any given month is 0.957 with a standard deviation of 1.31.

Descriptive summaries for the control variables included in the Lebanon analysis are included in Table 7. The next section focuses on the summary statistics for the TO and NGO activity variables included in the Turkey analysis.

Summary Statistics for Turkey

Terrorist activity for the Turkey analysis is measured in a manner similar to Algeria and Lebanon. The concept is operationalized as four separate count variables: overall attacks, attacks targeting civilians, attacks targeting the state, and attacks targeting NGOs. The distribution for each of these variables is summarized in Table 8 and summary statistics are reported in Table 9.

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[79] A score of three is reported for 13 months, a score of four for eight months, a score of five for three months, a score of six for two months, and a score of seven for one month.

Table 8. Distribution of terrorist activity in Turkey[80]

Incidents	Overall attacks	%	Attacks targeting civilians	%	Attacks targeting the state	%	Attacks targeting NGOs	%
0	47	16.67	141	50.00	91	32.27	276	97.87
1	43	15.25	57	20.21	56	19.86	6	2.13
2	32	11.35	33	11.70	37	13.12	0	0.00
3	26	9.22	21	7.45	28	9.93	0	0.00
4	28	9.93	11	3.90	9	3.19	0	0.00
5	16	5.67	6	2.13	9	3.19	0	0.00
6	7	2.48	4	1.42	4	1.42	0	0.00
7	11	3.90	3	1.06	7	2.48	0	0.00
8	2	0.71	1	0.35	7	2.48	0	0.00
9	5	1.77	2	0.71	3	1.06	0	0.00
10	5	1.77	0	0.00	3	1.06	0	0.00
11	3	1.06	1	0.35	4	1.42	0	0.00
12	8	2.84	1	0.35	1	0.35	0	0.00
13	5	1.77	1	0.35	2	0.71	0	0.00
14	3	1.06	0	0.00	2	0.71	0	0.00
15	3	1.06	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
16	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	0.71	0	0.00
17	4	1.42	0	0.00	1	0.35	0	0.00
18	1	0.35	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
19	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
20	2	0.71	0	0.00	2	0.71	0	0.00
21	1	0.35	0	0.00	1	0.35	0	0.00
22	2	0.71	0	0.00	2	0.71	0	0.00
23	1	0.35	0	0.00	1	0.35	0	0.00
24	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	1.06	0	0.00
25	1	0.35	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
26	4	1.42	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
27	3	1.06	0	0.00	2	0.71	0	0.00
28	1	0.35	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
29	1	0.35	0	0.00	1	0.35	0	0.00
30	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	0.71	0	0.00
31	1	0.35	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
32	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
33	1	0.35	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
34	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	0.35	0	0.00
35	1	0.35	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
36	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
37	3	1.06	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
38	2	0.71	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00

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[80] Truncated at 38.

Table 9. Summary statistics of all variables in Turkey models

Turkey variables	Measurement	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Dependent variables					
Terrorist attacks	Count	7.730	12.46	0	84
Attacks targeting civilians	Count	1.301	2.04	0	13
Attacks targeting the state	Count	3.755	6.52	0	42
Attacks targeting NGOs	Count	0.021	0.14	0	1
Independent variables					
All NGO media activity	Count	1.244	1.06	0	4
Human rights NGO media activity advocating for the constituents	Count	0.843	0.84	0	3
Human rights NGO media activity criticizing TOs	Count	0.071	0.26	0	1
Amnesty International permanent presence in a conflict area	1/0	0.404	0.49	0	1
Human rights NGO temporary presence in a conflict area	Count	0.290	0.49	0	2
ICRC temporary presence in a conflict area	1/0	0.039	0.19	0	1
ICRC permanent presence in a conflict area	1/0	0.372	0.48	0	1
Control variables					
Urban population	Continuous	64.254	4.16	55.15	71.409
Population density	Continuous	81.428	8.43	66.484	94.926
Natural disaster	1/0	0.258	0.43	0	1
Democratic orientation	Scale	7.553	0.82	7	9
Population growth	Continuous (percentage)	1.488	0.18	1.239	1.936
Infant mortality	Continuous	33.427	15.58	12.9	64.1
Life expectancy	Continuous	69.362	3.65	62.787	74.540
Unemployment	Continuous	9.127	1.83	6.5	14
Military expenditures	Continuous (percentage)	3.261	0.65	2.283	4.142
Military personnel	Continuous (percentage)	3.201	0.56	2.300	3.959
GTD generation 1	1/0	0.404	0.49	0	1
GTD generation 3	1/0	0.170	0.37	0	1
Number of active TOs	Count	4.127	2.56	0	9
Negotiation period	1/0	0.146	0.35	0	1

The overall terrorist attacks variable has a broader range in Turkey with a

minimum of zero attacks reported for 47 months out of 282 observations months or

approximately 17 percent of the period of study. The maximum number of attacks in

a given month is 84; this is reported for one month only or .03 percent of the observed

period. The average number of expected attacks in any given month is 7.73 with a

standard deviation of 12.46, demonstrating a good deal of variation. The distribution

is heavily skewed to the right with 90 percent of the months reporting 22 or fewer

attacks. Unlike other countries, there appears to be several outlier values for this

variable in Turkey.[81]

Attacks targeting civilians are relatively scarce in contrast to overall attacks.

Fifty percent or 141 of the observation months report no incidents. The maximum is

13 incidents reported for one month only or 0.3 percent of the observation period.

The average number of attacks targeting civilians in a given month is 1.30 and the

standard deviation is 2.04, demonstrating necessary variability. This measure is

heavily skewed to the right with approximately 90 percent of the observation months

reporting three or fewer incidents.

Attacks targeting the state are more frequent than attacks against civilians.

The minimum reported value is 0 attacks for 91 months or 32 percent of the study

period. The maximum value is 42 attacks for one month or 0.3 percent of the 282

observed months. The mean value is 3.75 attacks in a given month with a standard

deviation of 6.52, showing a great deal of variability in the dependent variable. As

appears to be the case with all of the dependent variables, attacks targeting the state

are heavily skewed to the right with some outlier values. More than 90 percent of the

observation months report 10 or fewer attacks.

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[81] These outlier attack numbers include 63, 67, 70, and 84 attacks reported in a single month.

Similar to Algeria and Lebanon, the independent variables included in the Turkey models include measures of physical presence, campaign content, and overall media activity. Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, and hypothesis three all predict relationships between the physical presence of an NGO and subsequent TO activity. The first set of hypotheses refer to campaigning/human rights organizations (AI, HRW, and local NGOs) while hypothesis three refers to service provision/humanitarian organizations (ICRC). For human rights organizations, the temporary physical presence variable is a count variable of the number of NGOs in the area in a given month with a maximum value of two if AI and HRW are both present. In regards to the permanent presence measure, HRW does not have a permanent physical presence during the period of interest but AI does and, therefore, the human rights permanent presence variable is a dichotomous variable measuring whether AI is present (1) or absent (0) in a given month. For service provision NGOs, the physical presence variable is operationalized as a dichotomous variable measuring whether ICRC, in a given month, has a temporary presence in a conflict area and a second dichotomous variable measuring whether the NGO has a permanent presence in the form of an office or clinic in any given month.[82]

In regards to temporary presence, human rights NGOs report a temporary presence for 77 out of 282 months or approximately 27 percent of the time. One NGO is present for 72 months and both AI and HRW are present for five months. ICRC has a temporary physical presence in conflict areas for 11 months or four percent of the time period. As for permanent presence, both AI and ICRC have similar patterns of permanent presence in Turkey. AI has an established office space

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[82] Having a presence is coded as 1 while an absence is coded as 0.

for 114 months or 40 percent of the period of study, while ICRC has an office or clinic in operation for 105 or 37 percent of the 282 months of interest.

Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c refer to the impact that campaign content may have on TO activity. Similar to Algeria and Lebanon, campaign content is captured by two separate count variables: whether human rights NGOs are a) advocating for the constituents or b) criticizing the TO. The count of each measure includes data on HRW, AI, and local NGOs. The value of the variable reflects the number of groups reporting the particular kind of campaign content with a possible maximum of three. Results indicate that human rights organizations engage in advocacy work approximately 59 percent of the time with one group engaged in advocacy work for 106 months or 38 percent of the time, two groups advocating for 51 months or 18 percent, and all three groups advocating for 10 months or approximately three percent of the period of interest. While advocacy work is relatively common, anti-terrorism work is rare. Human rights organizations report anti-terrorism work for only 20 months or approximately seven percent of the period of study and at no point are AI, HRW, and local NGOs engaged in anti-terrorism work in the same month.

The final hypothesis, hypothesis four, is focused on the relationship between all NGO media activity and all terrorist attacks. Similar to Lebanon and Algeria, the media activity variable is a cumulative total of the campaign content and temporary presence variables with a maximum possible value of nine. The minimum value of media activity is a score of 0 which is present 28 percent of the time or for 78 months out of 282 observations months. Although the highest score possible is nine, the highest recorded level of media activity is a score of four which occurs for six months

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only or for approximately two percent of the period of study. The variable is skewed to the right with a score of one occurring in 107 months, a score of two for 53 months, and a score of three for 38 months. The average expected score in any given month is 1.244 and the standard deviation is 1.067.

The control variables included in the Turkey models are summarized in Table 9. In addition, this chapter includes a section that briefly summarizes and compares the control variables within and across the countries. Before moving on to the controls, a brief comparison of the distributions of the primary independent and dependent variables between countries is undertaken. Comparing variables across countries provides contextual background that can influence confidence in model results.

<center>Dependent and Independent Variables across Countries</center>

This section will provide a brief overview of the similarities and differences in the distributions and trends of NGO and TO activities between Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey. This is followed by a snapshot summary of the control variables, both within- and between-countries. Identifying variations within- and between-countries provides a premise upon which to determine how differences in country models may be due, to some extent, to differences inherent in the activities and context of the specific country.

Figure 1 presents the annual average of monthly counts of terrorist attacks in the three countries of interest. All three countries display different trends in overall TO attacks. As the figure illustrates, Algeria is subject to an increase in overall attacks in the early- to mid-1990s, followed by a notable spike in 1997, then a decline

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and relatively stable pattern for the remainder of the assessment period. Lebanon also

has relatively higher levels of terrorism in the 1990s, but the trend declines until a

brief spike in 2008. Turkey, on the other hand, increases in overall attacks until the

mid-90s, then declines, with the exception of a brief spike in 1999. One notable

characteristic is the differences in annual averages of overall attacks between the

countries. With the exception of the spike in the early 1990s, Turkey maintains a

relatively low attack average, as does Lebanon. Algeria, on the other hand records

high averages throughout the period of interest.

Figure 1. The annual average of monthly TO attacks.

Breaking these overall attacks into specific target types reveals some

interesting patterns. As illustrated in Figure 2, the increase in attacks in the early

1990s in Algeria is driven by attacks targeting the state while the spike in 1997 is

almost exclusively attacks targeting civilians. Lebanon's increase in attacks in the

late-1980s and early-1990s and the uptick in the late-2000s is driven, in a large part,

by state targets. Turkey's trends also appear to be driven, in large part, by attacks

targeting the state; civilian attack numbers are notably small. This indicates that,

while TOs in Algeria fluctuate in their targeting choices, Turkish and Algerian TOs

have less variability.

Figure 2. The annual average of monthly attacks targeting civilians and the state in
Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey.

Looking next at NGO activity, as presented in Figure 3, overall media activity

follows a trend similar to TO activity in Algeria. There is fluctuations in NGO media

activity in the early-1990s, a spike in the later-1990s, then a gradual and subtle

decline. Lebanon presents a different picture: while terrorism is higher in the 1990s

and then declines in the 2000s, media activity fluctuates but remains relatively low

through the 1990s and most of the 2000s. The spike in TO activity in the late 2000s

is matched by a similar spike in NGO media activity. Turkey media activity differs

from TO activity in the sense that it increases in the late-1980s and maintains a

relatively steady presence, with the exception of a slight decline in the mid-2000s.

These distributions indicate clear differences in NGO media activity across countries.

Figure 3. The monthly media activity score averaged per year for Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey.[83]

In addition to media activity, on-site temporary presence also shows a good

deal of variability between and within countries. Figure 4 displays the number of

months per year that NGOs visited conflict areas within the three countries. In

regards to Algeria, human rights NGOs made the majority of their visits throughout

the 1990s, with only a few visits in the early and late 2000s. ICRC, in contrast, only

visited once in the early 1990s, not visiting again until the late-1990s, at which point

the NGO engaged in five years of near-continuous visits. Between 2005 and 2010,

ICRC only visited conflict-areas in Algeria twice. In Lebanon, human rights NGOs

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[83] It is important to remember the media variable is a cumulative value for media activity of local NGOs, HRW, AI, and ICRC, including both measures of campaign content, as well as temporary presence. Thus, the minimum value for this scaled variable is 0 (there is no reported media activity in a given month) and the maximum possible value is nine (human rights NGOs and humanitarian NGOs had a temporary presence and human rights NGOs all engaged in campaign activities, *as reported in the media*).

made sporadic visits throughout all decades of analysis with no discernable pattern.

ICRC demonstrates little variation as well, visiting relatively consistently throughout

the 1990s and 2000s. Finally, in Turkey, while human rights NGOS visited with

some regularity, there were notable spikes in presence in the mid-1990s, around 2000,

and from 2005 onwards. ICRC visits, on the other hand, were few and far between,

although they are relatively spaced with no obvious clustering.[84]

Figure 4. Number of months per year that NGOs visited conflict areas in Algeria,
Lebanon, and Turkey.

In regards to campaign content, each country again displays a unique trend, as

presented in Figure 5, which reports the number of months per year that NGOs

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[84] Comparing the permanent presence of NGOs within and between countries would be ideal; however,
given that there is great deal of variability in whether an NGO had a permanent presence within a
given country during the period of interest, comparison is difficult. Therefore, the comparison will be
restricted to temporary presence only.

engaged in advocacy or anti-TO campaign work. In Algeria, advocacy work is

clustered in the early and late 1990s and in the latter half of the 2000s. In Lebanon,

the main clusters of advocacy work are in the late 1990s and late 2000s. Turkey

shows a great deal of advocacy work throughout the entire period, although it is less

consistent in the 2000s. In regards to anti-TO campaign content, this activity is more

prevalent in the 1990s in Algeria and relatively limited in the 2000s, with the

exception of a spike around 2003. Anti-TO work is very rare in Lebanon, although

the majority of activity is clustered in the years following 2005. Finally, criticism

direction towards the TO is also rare in Turkey and appears to have three peaks: the

early 1990s, the late 1990s, and the late 2000s.

Figure 5. Number of months per year that NGOs engaged in advocacy or anti-TO
campaign work in Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey.

These distributions indicate a level of variability in NGO presence, campaign

content, and media attention that is contingent on the country and the period of

interest. This mirrors the variability shown in TO activity between countries. In essence, NGO and TO activity demonstrate notable differences across countries. This is important because it rules out the possibility that TO or NGO trends are global and, thus, driven by factors not easily measured on a national level. Comparisons of the control variables indicate wherein some of those country-specific factors may lie.

<center>Control Variables within and across Countries</center>

As summarized in chapter five, there are 12 control variables incorporated into all models, including measures relating to economic stability (GDP per capita), population concentration and growth (urban population, population density, and population growth), citizen health (infant mortality and life expectancy), military presence and prevalence (military expenditures and military personnel), natural disasters, data collection generations (GTD generation one and three), and TO group competition (number of active TOs).[85] This section will present brief overarching observations about the trends of these variables within and between countries.

Figure 6 presents the trends of the different control variables in each country.[86] As is clear from the individual graphs, there is a great deal of variability between countries and within countries over time. GDP, urban population, population density, life expectancy, and infant mortality follow similar trends in the three countries of interest with the first four trending upwards and infant mortality

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[85] There are six additional control variables that are incorporated into select models, including a measure of democratic orientation (not available for Lebanon), unemployment rate (only available for Turkey), dummy variables for pro- and anti-civilian orientation (only available for Algeria), and a dummy variable for negotiation period (only available for Turkey).

[86] The only variables not included are the GTD generation variables and the natural disasters measure. Trend comparison has little value for these dichotomous variables. In regards to natural disasters, however, it is worth noting, however, that Algeria reported natural disasters for 41 out of 240 months, while Lebanon only reported three disasters during the 282 months of interest. Turkey, on the other hand reported 73 months of disaster over a 282 month period.

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trending downwards. Despite these similarities in trends, there are some notable

differences between countries. Specifically, it is interesting to note the difference in

mean values of population density and urban population; the graphs indicate that

Lebanon is a great deal more densely populated in comparison with Turkey and

Algeria. GDP also behaves differently for Turkey; Figure 6 illustrates more

variability in this measure in Turkey than in Algeria and Lebanon.

Figure 6. Distribution of control variables in Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey.

The remaining control variables, including population density, military measures, and the number of active TOs, show a great deal of variability within and between countries; there are no notable overall trend similarities for all three countries. In fact, many of the control variables in Algeria and Turkey more closely

mirror each other while Lebanon presents unique trends not replicated in the other countries. Algeria and Turkey show similar trends for military expenditures, population growth and, to some extent, military personnel, while Lebanon fluctuates unpredictably. All three countries oscillate a great deal in the number of TOs active in a given year.

The graphs included in Figure 6, therefore, suggest two main observations: there is variability in within-country characteristics over time and there are differences between countries in these same characteristics. These observations support the expectation that comparisons within and between countries need to take into account these contextual and time-dependent factors when assessing the relationship between NGO activity and TO activity. They also support the supposition that differences in the country models will reflect observed differences. The next three sections will present model results for each of the three countries of interest.

<center>Main Findings: All Countries</center>

The following sections will present and describe the relationships between NGO activity and TO activity within each country. Before delving into those details, an overview of the general findings is reported here. Table 10 summarizes these findings and presents the predicted and observed relationships within each country.

Hypothesis one predicts that an increase in campaign-oriented NGO presence, both temporary and permanent, will result in a decrease of attacks targeting civilians and an increase in attacks targeting the state. As is shown in Table 10, there is only partial support for this hypothesis. Specifically, NGO presence, whether temporary

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Table 10. All hypotheses, predicted relationships, and observed relationships

Dependent variables	Primary independent variables and predicted relationship (+ or -)			Observed relationship (+ or -) and observed significance		
				Algeria	Lebanon	Turkey
Attacks targeting civilians	Human rights NGO conflict-area presence (hypothesis 1)	NGO temporary presence	(-)	- *	+	-
		NGO permanent presence	(-)	N/A	- ‡	-
Attacks targeting the state		NGO temporary presence	(+)	+	-	-
		NGO permanent presence	(+)	N/A	-	+
Attacks targeting civilians	International Committee of the Red Cross conflict-area presence (comparison for hypothesis 1)	NGO temporary presence	(-)	+	+	-
		NGO permanent presence	(-)	-	N/A	-
Attacks targeting the state		NGO temporary presence	(+)	-	+	+
		NGO permanent presence	(+)	+	N/A	+
Attacks targeting civilians	Human rights NGO campaign content (hypothesis 2)	NGO advocacy	(-)	+	+	+
		NGO criticism	(-)	+	+	+
Attacks targeting the state		NGO advocacy	(+)	+ ‡	-	-
		NGO criticism	(+)	+	+	+
All attacks	Media activity (hypothesis 4)	All NGO media activity	(+)	+ ‡	-	-

or permanent, does not appear to influence attacks targeting the state in the manner predicted for any of the three countries. In contrast, results indicate that there is some support for the impact of NGO presence on attacks targeting civilians. Temporary presence is significantly related to a decrease in attacks targeting civilians in Algeria, while permanent presence is marginally related to a decrease in attacks targeting civilians in Lebanon. ICRC is also included in Table 10 for the sake of comparison

of the potential influence of advocacy versus service provision organizations. ICRC-specific results do not provide any further support for hypothesis one, nor do these results suggest significant differences in TO responses to humanitarian versus human rights NGOs.

Hypothesis two addresses the potential relationship between NGO campaign content, both advocacy work and anti-TO work, and TO attacks targeting civilians and the state. This set of hypotheses predicts that both forms of campaign content will decrease attacks targeting civilians and increase attacks targeting the state. Table 10 results indicate that there is little support for this hypothesis across countries. Contrary to expectations, campaign content of any kind appears to have a *positive* relationship with attacks targeting the civilians. In regards to attacks targeting the state, only advocacy work in Algeria appears to be marginally related.

Hypothesis four predicts a positive relationship between media activity and the frequency of terrorist attacks. As reported in Table 10, there is marginal support for this hypothesis in Algeria only. There does not appear to be a consistent relationship in Lebanon or Turkey.

It is interesting to note that, although there is very little support in the various models for any particular hypothesis, Table 10 indicates that the majority of significant relationships are found in Algeria, followed by Lebanon. The Turkey models do not provide support for any of the hypotheses.

Results for Algeria

The next few sections present results for the Algeria-specific model. As an introduction to these model results, Figure 7 provides an overview of the frequency of

TO attacks and NGO activity within Algeria over the time period of interest. In order

to present a digestible visual aid, data points represent quarterly measures (3 month

increments). TO attack data points report the number of attacks over the three month

period, while the NGO data points represent a 1/0 measure of whether a given NGO

activity is present. As the figure illustrates, there is no easily identifiable pattern

between any particular NGO activity and TO activity. The nuances of these

relationships will be elaborated upon in the following sections.

Figure 7. Frequency of TO attacks and the presence of NGO activity over quarterly
periods in Algeria.

Hypothesis one: NGO physical presence

As mentioned previously, hypothesis one states that increases in the physical

presence of an NGO will be related to increases in attacks targeting NGOs and the

state and decreases in attacks targeting civilians. Although hypothesis one refers only

to human rights organizations, results from ICRC are also included to serve as a comparison between campaigning and service provision organizations. As mentioned previously, the only physical presence measure for AI and HRW is temporary presence. Full model results are presented in Table 11 and 12.

Table 11. Estimated coefficients and standard errors for autoregressive Poisson models: hypothesis one and human rights NGOs in Algeria

	Human rights NGO conflict-area presence			
	Attacks targeting civilians		Attacks targeting the state	
NGO temporary presence	-0.4964* (0.228)		0.1517 (0.156)	
NGO permanent presence	N/A/		N/A/	
GDP	-21.6410** (6.490)	N/A	-3.3237 (4.401)	N/A
Urban population	2.0099‡ (1.137)	N/A	-3.2686* (1.280)	N/A
Population density	-1.7668 (4.512)	N/A	-2.3943 (3.931)	N/A
Natural disaster	0.0853 (0.136)	N/A	-0.2550* (0.127)	N/A
Democratic orientation	-0.1889* (0.078)	N/A	-0.1636*** (0.050)	N/A
Population growth	1.8933 (1.986)	N/A	7.8828*** (1.583)	N/A
Infant mortality	2.2591** (0.854)	N/A	-0.8690 (0.845)	N/A
Life expectancy	9.4826 (6.249)	N/A	17.0643*** (4.863)	N/A
Military expenditures	-0.3381 (0.352)	N/A	-0.3317 (0.274)	N/A
Military personnel	1.1639*** (0.312)	N/A	-0.9134** (0.341)	N/A
GTD generation 1	0.5869‡ (0.323)	N/A	0.6500 (0.550)	N/A
GTD generation 3	-2.8565** (1.065)	N/A	0.6056 (0.790)	N/A
Number of active TOs	0.1724* (0.081)	N/A	-0.0378 (0.069)	N/A
Anti-civilian orientation	-0.3011 (0.476)	N/A	-0.8899** (0.340)	N/A
Pro-civilian orientation	-0.8265 (0.592)	N/A	-0.7527 (0.688)	N/A

‡ $p \leq .10$; *$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .01$; ***$p \leq .001$ (one-tailed tests)

Table 11 presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the temporary presence of human rights NGOs in Algeria and attacks targeting the state and civilians. The first thing to note is that there appears to be a significant relationship between temporary presence and attacks targeting civilians. The estimated coefficient (β=-0.4964) can be interpreted as an incident rate ratio of 0.88, or a decrease of 0.88 terrorists incidents targeting civilians per month (p<.05), holding all else constant.[87] [88] The second thing to note in Table 11 is the coefficient for temporary presence and attacks targeting the state; while the coefficient is positive and, thus, is in the predicted direction, it does not achieve significance in the model.

In addition to attacks targeting the state and civilians, hypothesis one also addresses the potential relationship between the presence of campaigning organizations and attacks targeting NGOs. Given that attacks targeting NGOs are an extremely rare event in Algeria, quantitative analysis is not possible. However, there are some limited conclusions that can be drawn from graphing the frequency of both variables. Figure 8 presents annual measures of presence and TO activity.[89] As is clear in Figure 8, there appears to be no support for the hypothesis that there is a relationship between human rights NGO presence and attacks targeting NGOs. There are only three reported attacks against NGOs in Algeria during the period of interest

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[87] The incident rate ratios (IRRs) are reported for significant relationships. IRRs are calculated as an exponentiated coefficient value. Before exponentiating the coefficient, the coefficient can be interpreted as such: with a one unit change in NGO activity, the difference in the logs of the TO activity is expected to change by the coefficient estimate. In the case of temporary presence and attacks targeting civilians, the coefficient indicates that, in a given month, when an NGO has a temporary presence, the difference in the logs of expected attacks targeting civilians is expected to decrease 0.4964 units, holding all else constant.

[88] The negative binomial model also reports negative results, although the coefficient does not achieve significance (β=-0.1894, SE=0.1365).

[89] It would be ideal to present a graph with monthly measures, rather than annual measures. However, the resulting image is difficult, if not impossible, to interpret, given the number of months included in the analysis. This also applies to figures 9 and 10, and comparable Lebanon and Turkey figures.

and, while one attack closely follows NGO presence (in 2011), the second attack is

isolated from NGO presence, and the third attack occurs the month after the gap in

data in 1993.

Figure 8. Human rights NGO temporary presence and attacks targeting NGOs in
Algeria: hypothesis one.

Estimated coefficients and standard errors for the relationship between ICRC

presence and targeted attacks are presented in Table 12. As mentioned previously,

hypothesis one refers to campaigning organizations only and, thus, ICRC is excluded

from these predictions. However, a model of the impact of ICRC temporary presence

on attacks targeting civilians and the state has been included for the sake of

comparison. Results indicate that ICRC does not significantly impact incidents

targeting these two groups. It is of interest, however, that the direction of the

relationships is only compatible with theoretical expectations when the presence is

permanent and counters expectations when it is temporary.

Hypothesis two: Campaign content

The second set of hypotheses addresses the potential relationship between an

Table 12. Estimated coefficients and standard errors for autoregressive Poisson models: hypothesis one and International Committee of the Red Cross in Algeria

	International Committee of the Red Cross conflict-area presence			
	Attacks targeting civilians		Attacks targeting the state	
NGO temporary presence	0.1564 (0.169)		-0.1457 (0.172)	
NGO permanent presence		-0.0749 (0.318)		0.1929 (0.222)
GDP	-22.8848*** (6.480)	-22.3421*** (6.873)	-3.1101 (4.415)	-4.5078 (4.694)
Urban population	2.2257‡ (1.295)	2.1565 (1.317)	-3.4547** (1.287)	-3.3194** (1.277)
Population density	-2.0385 (4.516)	-2.0626 (4.685)	-1.6360 (3.989)	-1.6718 (3.993)
Natural disaster	0.0670 (0.137)	0.0649 (0.138)	-0.2592* (0.128)	-0.2638* (0.128)
Democratic orientation	-0.1796* (0.079)	-0.1879* (0.080)	-0.1668*** (0.050)	-0.1616*** (0.050)
Population growth	1.9000 (1.994)	1.8733 (2.071)	7.9253*** (1.589)	8.0493*** (1.604)
Infant mortality	2.3923** (0.860)	2.3332** (0.865)	-1.0432 (0.851)	-0.9070 (0.850)
Life expectancy	9.6567 (6.275)	9.6516 (6.315)	15.9995*** (4.941)	16.2480*** (4.978)
Military expenditures	-0.3017 (0.354)	-0.2982 (0.356)	-0.3698 (0.273)	-0.3801 (0.273)
Military personnel	1.1172*** (0.315)	1.1063*** (0.319)	-0.8591* (0.343)	-0.8056* (0.351)
GTD generation 1	0.5438‡ (0.327)	0.5705‡ (0.328)	0.6534 (0.550)	0.6127 (0.550)
GTD generation 3	-3.1008** (1.063)	-2.9545* (1.167)	0.6937 (0.791)	0.3938 (0.847)
Number of active TOs	0.1691* (0.082)	0.1619‡ (0.085)	-0.0580 (0.070)	-0.0431 (0.072)
Anti-civilian orientation	-0.3562 (0.478)	-0.3494 (0.482)	-0.8485* (0.350)	-0.8569* (0.348)
Pro-civilian orientation	-0.9037 (0.595)	-0.8689 (0.597)	-0.6680 (0.694)	-0.6611 (0.690)

‡ p ≤ .10; *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (one-tailed tests)

NGO's campaign content, both advocacy and anti-TO content, and subsequent TO activity. Similar to hypothesis one, predictions differentiate between attacks targeting civilians, NGOs, and the state; an increase in any form of campaign content is predicted to decrease attacks targeting civilians and increase attacks targeting the

state and NGOs. This set of analyses is specific to human rights organizations (AI, HRW, and local NGOs).

Table 13 presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the autoregressive Poisson models addressing hypothesis two in Algeria. In regards to attacks targeting civilians and the state, there is evidence that both advocacy work and anti-terrorist work appear to incite a response from TOs. However, the response for each measure of campaign content is, unexpectedly, positive for both civilians and for the state. Specifically, holding all else constant, results indicate that advocacy work increases attacks targeting civilians ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$=0.0965, IRR=1.11); these results would have been marginally significant with a two-tailed hypothesis.[90] Criticism levied at the TO also appears to increase attacks targeting civilians but the impact is trivial. As for state attacks, campaign content coefficients are in the predicted direction, although only advocacy is marginally significant ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$=0.1352), and can be interpreted as IRR=1.23, or an increase of 1.23 attacks per month (p<.10).[91]

Hypothesis two also incorporates a prediction concerning attacks targeting NGOs. Figure 9 provides annual points of NGO campaign activity and TO attacks. As can be seen in Figure 9, the frequency of these incidents and human rights NGO campaign content, both advocacy and anti-terrorist work, does not provide support for the prediction that content influences NGO attacks. Specifically, there is no notable relationship between either measure of campaign content and subsequent violence directed towards NGOs.

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[90] The negative binomial coefficient is similar ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$=0.961, SE=0.0662) but would not have reached significance with a two-tailed test.
[91] The negative binomial coefficient is similar and significant ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$=0.1635, SE=0.0547, p<.01).

Table 13. Estimated coefficients and standard errors for autoregressive Poisson models: hypothesis two and hypothesis four in Algeria

	Human rights NGO campaign content				NGO media activity
	Attacks targeting civilians		Attacks targeting the state		All attacks
NGO advocacy	0.0965 (0.059)		0.1352‡ (0.057)		
NGO criticism		0.0925 (0.116)		0.1512 (0.129)	
Media activity					0.0566‡ (0.031)
GDP	-23.6042*** (6.503)	-22.8410*** (6.523)	-3.6778 (4.372)	-2.4628 (4.353)	-10.6991** (3.534)
Urban population	1.9773 (1.286)	2.0290 (1.291)	-3.4926** (1.269)	-3.3416** (1.264)	-0.4874 (0.880)
Population density	-1.2421 (4.505)	-1.6749 (4.516)	-1.5952 (3.919)	-2.6115 (3.897)	-2.9903 (2.596)
Natural disaster	0.1091 (0.142)	0.0579 (0.137)	-0.2192‡ (0.128)	-0.2566* (0.126)	-0.0984 (0.102)
Democratic orientation	-0.1724* (0.078)	-0.1827* (0.078)	-0.1496** (0.050)	-0.1712*** (0.049)	-0.1666*** (0.042)
Population growth	2.1967 (1.993)	2.0839 (1.999)	8.1109*** (1.577)	7.9109*** (1.573)	5.3699*** (1.215)
Infant mortality	2.2247** (0.854)	2.2687** (0.858)	-1.0384 (0.838)	-0.8953 (0.834)	0.5790 (0.556)
Life expectancy	9.0949 (6.283)	9.5208 (6.302)	16.2702*** (4.9869)	17.4354*** (4.845)	12.3560*** (3.550)
Military expenditures	-0.2503 (0.354)	-0.2861 (0.355)	-0.2995 (0.272)	-0.3583 (0.271)	-0.0925 (0.234)
Military personnel	1.0391*** (0.322)	1.0932*** (0.320)	-0.9909** (0.341)	-0.9074** (0.338)	0.4357* (0.189)
GTD generation 1	0.6371‡ (0.331)	0.5305 (0.331)	0.7722 (0.548)	0.6255 (0.548)	0.9004*** (0.229)
GTD generation 3	-3.1549** (1.064)	-3.0484** (1.070)	0.5964 (0.782)	0.7835 (0.781)	-1.0901‡ (0.609)
Number of active TOs	0.1715* (0.083)	0.1675* (0.083)	-0.0313 (0.069)	-0.0348 (0.069)	-0.0060 (0.050)
Anti-civilian orientation	-0.4034 (0.481)	-0.3421 (0.481)	-0.9115** (0.340)	-0.8148* (0.338)	-0.2646 (0.248)
Pro-civilian orientation	-0.7567 (0.597)	-0.8783 (0.596)	-0.5377 (0.686)	-0.7033 (0.678)	-0.7203‡ (0.383)

‡ $p \leq .10$; *$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .01$; ***$p \leq .001$ (one-tailed tests)

Figure 9. Campaign content and attacks targeting NGOs in Algeria: hypothesis two.

Hypothesis three: Service provision

Hypothesis three predicts that the presence of service provision organizations will increase attacks targeting NGOs. Given that AI and HRW are campaigning organizations, this hypothesis is specific to ICRC presence only. As mentioned previously, attacks targeting NGOs are rare events and, therefore, quantitative analysis is not feasible. However, some preliminary qualitative or descriptive analysis can be provided.

Figure 10 presents the relationship between annual ICRC presence and attacks against NGOs. First, ICRC permanent presence does not appear to have a notable relationship to TO attacks (if it did, the graph would indicate a cluster of attacks following the beginning of ICRC's permanent presence). Second, the relationship seems to be as follows: temporary ICRC visits are followed by TO attacks. Third, this relationship is likely artificial or driven by something else entirely, given the time lag between isolated NGO visits and TO attacks. Specifically, it appears that the gap between NGO visits and attacks targeting NGOs is, on average, approximately two

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years. Theoretically, there is no reason to expect that an NGO visit at one point would elicit a violent response two years later. Therefore, there appears to be no support for hypothesis three in Algeria.

Figure 10. Distribution of International Committee of the Red Cross presence and attacks targeting NGOs in Algeria.

Hypothesis four: Media coverage

The last hypothesis refers to NGO media coverage in relation to a conflict area. Specifically, hypothesis four predicts that, as NGO media activity increases, so too does terrorist activity. Estimated coefficients and standard errors for the autoregressive Poisson model results are presented in Table 13 and demonstrate marginal significance. Specifically, an increase in media activity results in an increase of 1.06 terrorist incidents in a given month ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$=0.0566, p<.10), holding all else constant.[92]

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[92] The negative binomial coefficient is similar and marginally significant ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$=0.0641, SE=0.0379, p<.10).

Control variables: All models

This section will provide general observations concerning the influence of the control variables included in the Algeria models. Table 14 presents the number of models that report significant or marginally significant relationships between a given control variable and a) attacks targeting civilians or b) attacks targeting the state. The maximum number of models that can display a significant relationship for each attack type is five.[93]

Table 14. Number of models (maximum of five) displaying a significant relationship between the control variables and the dependent variables in Algeria

	Attacks targeting civilians		Attacks targeting the state	
Relationship direction	+	-	+	-
GDP		5		
Urban population	2			5
Population density				
Natural disaster				5
Democratic orientation		5		5
Population growth			5	
Infant mortality	5			
Life expectancy			5	
Military expenditures				
Military personnel	5			5
GTD generation 1	4			
GTD generation 3		5		
Number of active TOs	5			
Anti-civilian orientation				5
Pro-civilian orientation				

There are two overarching observations that can be made. Firstly, the same variables, for the most part, appear to be influential across models. Secondly, these variables have vastly different results for different target types. The first observation suggests that these measures are salient and the exclusion of them would have biased the results. The second observation provides support for the proposition that TO

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[93] The five models are human rights NGO temporary presence, ICRC temporary and permanent presence, and advocacy and anti-TO campaign content. The media activity model has been excluded, given that it looks at all attacks, not civilian or state attacks.

targeting decisions are driven by diverse and unique considerations. Specifically, it appears that, with the exception of one variable (democratic orientation), all of the remaining significant control variables are either significant for only one target type or significant for both target types but report opposing directional influences for each target type. This suggests that decisions to target civilians are driven by different considerations than decisions to target the state. These same relationships will be assessed in the next section with the Lebanon context.

<center>Results for Lebanon</center>

This section of the chapter present results for the Lebanon models. Figure 11 provides an overview of the frequency of TO attacks and NGO activity within Lebanon over the time period of interest. Data points represent quarterly measures, TO attack data points report the number of attacks over the three month period, and the NGO data points represent a 1/0 measure of whether a given NGO activity is present each period. As the figure illustrates, there is no easily identifiable pattern between any particular NGO activity and TO activity. The details of these trends will be elaborated upon in the following sections.

Hypothesis one: NGO physical presence

The hypotheses that are applied in the Lebanese and Turkish context are similar to those that guide the Algerian models. Hypothesis one consists of a set of predictions relating to the impact of human rights NGOs' physical presence, both temporary and permanent, on subsequent terrorist activity.[94] The estimated

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[94] In order to avoid redundancy, the details of hypotheses are not repeated in the Lebanon or Turkey results sections.

Figure 11. Frequency of TO attacks and the presence of NGO activity over quarterly periods in Lebanon.

coefficients and standard errors for the models testing these relationships are presented in Table 15. There are three observations that can be made about the results presented in the table. The first observation is that temporary presence seems to have no notable impact on TO activity. Secondly, permanent presence or establishing an office demonstrates a negative relationship with TO attacks. Finally, this relationship is in the predicted direction and marginally significant for attacks targeting civilians only. Specifically, an increase in permanent presence is related to a decrease of 0.22 attacks targeting civilians per month ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$=-1.4957, p<.10).[95]

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[95] The negative binomial model produce similar results ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$=-1.6325, SE=0.542, p<.01).

Table 15. Estimated coefficients and standard errors for autoregressive Poisson models: hypothesis one and human rights NGOs in Lebanon

	Human rights NGO conflict-area presence			
	Attacks targeting civilians		Attacks targeting the state	
NGO temporary presence	0.1541 (0.324)		-0.0088 (0.231)	
NGO permanent presence		-1.4957‡ (0.783)		-1.0190 (0.605)
GDP	-13.8680* (6.094)	-15.3047** (5.488)	2.4931 (2.429)	0.8481 (2.556)
Urban population	-5.0852** (1.970)	-5.4215** (1.873)	-1.1883 (1.002)	-1.4355 (1.001)
Population density	-0.0732 (0.054)	-0.1084‡ (0.057)	0.0017 (0.031)	-0.0078 (0.031)
Natural disaster	-0.2490 (1.339)	-0.2983 (1.295)	-0.0152 (0.747)	-0.0358 (0.747)
Population growth	-0.6248* (0.261)	-0.5605* (0.251)	-0.3509* (0.143)	-0.3412* (0.147)
Infant mortality	-3.7832** (1.258)	-3.6647** (1.155)	-1.4616* (0.654)	-1.4654* (0.647)
Life expectancy	-3.4876‡ (1.874)	-1.8146 (1.986)	-2.7466** (0.992)	-2.0633‡ (1.069)
Military expenditures	0.2134 (0.173)	0.2164 (0.168)	-0.0141 (0.085)	-0.0183 (0.084)
Military personnel	0.3860 (0.340)	0.1668 (0.336)	-0.4154** (0.155)	-0.4998** (0.164)
GTD generation 1	0.4863 (1.169)	1.3818 (1.206)	-0.0164 (0.520)	0.2929 (0.545)
GTD generation 3	3.2743* (1.352)	2.7594* (1.207)	-0.1134 (0.566)	-0.1727 (0.567)
Number of active TOs	-0.0439 (0.086)	-0.0184 (0.079)	0.1162** (0.037)	0.1180** (0.037)

‡ $p \leq .10$; *$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .01$; ***$p \leq .001$ (one-tailed tests)

In addition to attacks targeting civilians and the state, hypothesis one also includes predictions regarding incidents targeting NGOs. Similar to Algeria, these incidents are rare, making quantitative analysis problematic. Therefore, the relationships between this dependent variable and the presence variables included in the Lebanon analyses are graphed and qualitatively assessed. Figure 12 presents annual measures of presence and TO activity. As is apparent in the figure, there is

very little evidence of a relationship between NGO presence and attacks targeting

NGOs. The majority of the attacks are clustered in the beginning of the period of

interest (four out of seven attacks occurred in 1988 alone), while NGO temporary

presence tends to be clustered in the middle and end of the period of study. This

appears to be the case for both temporary and permanent presence.

Figure 12. Human rights NGO presence and attacks targeting NGOs in Lebanon: hypothesis one.

Results for the impact of ICRC presence are included for the sake of

comparison and the estimated coefficients and standard errors are presented in Table

16.[96] As is shown in the table, results indicate that ICRC's temporary presence does

not have a significant impact on TO activity targeting the state or civilians, although

it does have a consistently positive relationship.[97]

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[96] ICRC maintained a permanent presence in Lebanon during the whole period of study, with the exception of one month when the NGO closed operations due to threats; therefore, permanent presence is removed from the analysis.

[97] As mentioned in chapter five, the final analyses do include all TO attacks, regardless of group attribution. However, additional analyses are conducted with two smaller data sets that exclude a) unknown TOs and b) all TOs that do not advocate for a constituency. Once unknown TOs are removed, ICRC temporary presence appears to have a positive and significant relationship on attacks targeting the state in Lebanon. However, restricting the dataset further in order to only include TOs that advocate for a constituency eliminates this relationship.

Table 16. Estimated coefficients and standard errors for autoregressive Poisson models: hypothesis one and International Committee of the Red Cross in Lebanon

	ICRC conflict-area presence			
	Attacks targeting civilians		Attacks targeting the state	
NGO temporary presence	0.5146 (0.329)		0.2553 (0.227)	
NGO permanent presence		N/A		N/A
GDP	-13.3421* (6.022)	N/A	2.7702 (2.425)	N/A
Urban population	-5.0104* (1.950)	N/A	-1.1579 (0.999)	N/A
Population density	-0.0784 (0.054)	N/A	-0.0015 (0.031)	N/A
Natural disaster	-0.2018 (1.339)	N/A	0.0048 (0.747)	N/A
Population growth	-0.6041* (0.258)	N/A	-0.3367* (0.143)	N/A
Infant mortality	-3.6176** (1.251)	N/A	-1.3874* (0.653)	N/A
Life expectancy	-3.0865 (1.879)	N/A	-2.5560* (1.001)	N/A
Military expenditures	0.2256 (0.171)	N/A	-0.0087 (0.084)	N/A
Military personnel	0.3726 (0.335)	N/A	-0.4211** (0.155)	N/A
GTD generation 1	0.6250 (1.166)	N/A	0.0475 (0.526)	N/A
GTD generation 3	2.9467* (1.341)	N/A	-0.2438 (0.576)	N/A
Number of active TOs	-0.0419 (0.086)	N/A	0.1186*** (0.037)	N/A

‡ $p \leq .10$; *$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .01$; ***$p \leq .001$ (one-tailed tests)

In summary, it appears that there is very limited support for hypothesis one in Lebanon. Specifically, while the relationship between advocacy NGOs' permanent presence and attacks targeting the civilians is marginally significant, the relationship between NGO permanent presence and attacks targeting the state is non-significant and in the direction opposite predictions. In addition, NGO temporary and permanent presence appears to have no notable relationship with attacks targeting NGOs.

Hypothesis two: Campaign content

Hypothesis two addresses the potential relationship between the content of an NGO's campaign and subsequent TO activity. Estimate coefficients and standard errors for the models testing this set of hypotheses are presented in Table 17. As is evident in the table, there are no notable relationships between campaign content and TO activity in Lebanon.[98] In addition, graphing the annual relationship between NGO campaign content and attacks targeting NGOs, as presented in Figure 13, suggests a null relationship. All attacks targeting NGOs took place during periods of advocacy work; however, 1991 is the only year that did not report some level of this kind of campaign content.[99] In addition, while the majority of attacks occurred during periods of anti-TO campaign content, the majority of periods of anti-TO work does not also report attacks on NGOs.

Hypothesis three: Service provision

Hypothesis three predicts a positive relationship between the presence, both temporary and permanent, of a service provision organization (ICRC) and attacks targeting NGOs. This is assessed through graphing the relationship and observing any potential patterns that emerge, as presented in Figure 14.

In regards to ICRC temporary presence and attacks targeting NGOs, as Figure 14 illustrates, there is a lack of an easily identifiable relationship between the two variables and, thus, the hypothesis does not appear to be supported. Attacks targeting NGOs are clustered, for the most part, in the late 1980s (four attacks in 1988 and one

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[98] It is interesting to note that the relationship between anti-TO campaign work and attacks targeting the state is positive and significant in the negative binomial model (β=0.2183, SE=0.054, p<.001)

[99] Recall that 1993 is missing from the data.

Table 17. Estimated coefficients and standard errors for autoregressive Poisson models: hypothesis two and hypothesis four in Lebanon

	Human rights NGO campaign content				Media activity
	Attacks targeting civilians		Attacks targeting the state		All attacks
NGO advocacy	0.0471 (0.162)		-0.0281 (0.109)		
NGO criticism		0.2600 (0.255)		0.1901 (0.183)	
Media activity					-0.0107 (0.057)
GDP	-13.9624* (6.129)	-13.8037* (6.248)	2.4952 (2.421)	2.7516 (2.467)	-2.4444 (2.368)
Urban population	-5.0341* (1.988)	-5.0500* (2.008)	-1.2303 (1.015)	-1.1133 (1.007)	-2.0095* (0.835)
Population density	-0.0703 (0.055)	-0.0702 (0.055)	0.0008 (0.031)	0.0025 (0.031)	-0.0184 (0.025)
Natural disaster	-0.2461 (1.345)	-0.2515 (1.363)	-0.0256 (0.748)	-0.0123 (0.749)	0.1097 (0.525)
Population growth	-0.6248* (0.262)	-0.6106* (0.267)	-0.3549* (0.144)	-0.3276* (0.145)	-0.3736* (0.125)
Infant mortality	-3.7806** (1.272)	-3.7657** (1.284)	-1.4858* (0.660)	-1.4057* (0.657)	-1.9617*** (0.548)
Life expectancy	-3.5595‡ (1.877)	-3.5552‡ (1.903)	-2.7560** (0.990)	-2.7190** (0.991)	-2.8369*** (0.842)
Military expenditures	0.2082 (0.174)	0.2117 (0.176)	-0.0121 (0.085)	-0.0173 (0.085)	0.0136 (0.070)
Military personnel	0.3847 (0.341)	0.3983 (0.348)	-0.4139** (0.156)	-0.4163** (0.157)	-0.1668 (0.143)
GTD generation 1	0.4372 (1.175)	0.4230 (1.194)	0.0053 (0.527)	-0.0554 (0.527)	0.3449 (0.472)
GTD generation 3	3.2723* (1.358)	3.4302* (1.403)	-0.1142 (0.567)	-0.0247 (0.579)	1.4600* (0.604)
Number of active TOs	-0.0430 (0.087)	-0.0479 (0.089)	0.1155** (0.037)	0.1170** (0.037	0.0409 (0.036)

‡ $p \leq .10$; *$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .01$; ***$p \leq .001$ (one-tailed tests)

in 1989), while NGO activity does not appear until the early 1990s. In addition, the majority of years that report ICRC temporary presence do not also report attacks targeting NGOs.

Hypothesis four: Media coverage

Hypothesis four addresses the potential impact that NGO media activity may have on the frequency of all attacks. The estimated coefficients and standard errors

Figure 13. Campaign content and attacks targeting NGOs in Lebanon: hypothesis two.

Figure 14. Distribution of International Committee of the Red Cross temporary presence and attacks targeting NGOs in Lebanon.

of the autoregressive Poisson model, which are presented in Table 17, do not provide support for the hypothesis. The relationship is in the direction opposite predictions and the coefficient is small and insignificant. Therefore, there is no evidence that NGO media activity has an influence on the frequency of TO attacks in Lebanon.

Control variables: All models

Table 18 presents the number of models that report significant or marginally

Table 18. Number of models (maximum of five) displaying a significant relationship between the control variables and the dependent variables in Lebanon

	Attacks targeting civilians		Attacks targeting the state	
Relationship direction	+	-	+	-
GDP		5		
Urban population		5		
Population density		1		
Natural disaster				
Population growth		5		5
Infant mortality		5		5
Life expectancy		3		5
Military expenditures				
Military personnel				5
GTD generation 1				
GTD generation 3	5			
Number of active TOs			5	

significant relationships between a given control variable and a) attacks targeting civilians or b) attacks targeting the state. Similar to Algeria, the maximum number of models that can display a significant relationship for each attack type is five.[100]

As is evident in Table 18, the control variables included in the Lebanon models behave in a manner similar to those included in the Algeria models. Specifically, many of the same variables maintain significance for the majority of the models, illustrating the importance of their inclusion. In addition, many of these variables have a significant relationship with one form of targeted attack but not for the other. In fact, there are only three control variables that influence both civilian and state attacks, while the remainder are either non-significant or influence only one of the two targeting types.[101] This provides support for the supposition that targeting decisions are informed by diverse factors. The influence of these control variables will also be assessed in the Turkey analyses.

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[100] The five models are human rights NGO temporary presence, ICRC temporary and permanent presence, and advocacy and anti-TO campaign content. The media activity model has been excluded, given that it looks at all attacks, not civilian or state attacks.
[101] These three variables include population growth, infant mortality, and life expectancy.

Results for Turkey

Figure 15 provides an overview of the trends in TO attacks and NGO activity in Turkey between 1987 and 2011. The figure reports quarterly periods, TO attack data points report the number of attacks over the three-month period, and the NGO data points represent a 1/0 measure of whether a given NGO activity is present each period. The details of these trends will be elaborated upon in the following sections.

Figure 15. Frequency of TO attacks and the presence of NGO activity over quarterly periods in Turkey.

Hypothesis one: NGO physical presence

The same hypotheses that are applied in the Algerian and Lebanese context are applied in the Turkish/Kurdish context. Hypothesis one assesses the impact of the physical presence of a campaigning NGO on the subsequent activity of a TO. The estimated coefficients and standard errors for the models testing hypothesis one are

presented in Table 19.[102] It is interesting to note that, for the most part, the

relationships are negative. Despite this directional trend, the table reports null

findings only. Graphing the relationship between presence and attacks targeting

NGOs provides some support for the hypothesized relationship between NGO activity

and attacks targeting NGOs. As Figure 16 illustrates, the majority of incidents

targeting NGOs may occur during periods of NGO activity. In addition, three of the

six attacks occurred within one or two months of a period of NGO temporary

presence. [103]

ICRC is included as a comparison between the influence of campaigning and

service organizations on attacks targeting the state and civilians. The estimated

coefficients and standard errors are reported in Table 20. Similar to human rights

NGOs, ICRC's presence appears to have no notable impact on either type of targeted

attack. Therefore, it appears that the temporary or permanent presence of both human

rights and service provision NGOs have no impact on TO activity in Lebanon with

the possible exception of attacks targeting NGOs, although this requires further study.

The next section will assess the influence of campaign content on TO activity.

Hypothesis two: Campaign content

Hypothesis two references the predicted impact of NGO campaign content on

TO activity. The estimated coefficients and standard errors for the autoregressive

Poisson models are presented in Table 21. These results indicate that campaign

activity does not influence TO activity in Turkey. This conclusion is not dependent

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[102] Recall that only AI had a permanent presence in Turkey during the period of interest. Therefore, while the temporary presence variable includes both AI and HRW, the permanent presence variable only includes AI activity.
[103] Two attacks occur in 2001 and, therefore, the graph only shows five attacks while six are reported.

Table 19. Estimated coefficients and standard errors for autoregressive Poisson models: hypothesis one and human rights NGOs in Turkey

	Human rights NGO temporary presence and Amnesty International permanent presence			
	Attacks targeting civilians		Attacks targeting the state	
NGO temporary presence	-0.1175 (0.168)		-0.1586 (0.122)	
NGO permanent Presence (AI)		-3.5289 (3.109)		0.2623 (1.480)
GDP	-0.1008 (2.136)	3.1188 (3.446)	3.2016‡ (1.774)	3.0943 (2.239)
Unemployment	-0.1451 (0.171)	0.1038 (0.275)	0.0390 (0.146)	0.0292 (0.185)
Urban population	-3.5756*** (0.914)	-4.3230*** (1.217)	-2.8081*** (0.730)	-2.8147*** (0.755)
Population density	5.7105*** (1.496)	5.6543*** (1.670)	4.5860*** (1.079)	4.5913*** (1.142)
Natural disaster	-0.0467 (0.180)	-0.0261 (0.187)	0.0206 (0.127)	0.0429 (0.128)
Democratic orientation	0.8284*** (0.247)	1.1689** (0.380)	0.6650** (0.225)	0.6753* (0.268)
Population growth	39.2453‡ (20.613)	47.3482‡ (25.150)	34.8380* (15.349)	34.8110* (15.579)
Infant mortality	-3.9960** (1.469)	-4.1733* (1.709)	-3.0318** (1.030)	-3.0642** (1.073)
Life expectancy	-24.3179** (7.733)	-23.3765** (8.738)	-18.7977*** (5.325)	-18.9718*** (5.788)
Military expenditures	-1.4499 (0.925)	-1.7335 (1.155)	0.5805 (0.613)	0.6056 (0.624)
Military personnel	-0.5362 (0.486)	-0.5435 (0.514)	-0.7108* (0.340)	-0.6387‡ (0.341)
GTD generation 1	-0.6728 (1.136)	0.3562 (1.508)	-1.1121 (0.769)	-1.1748 (0.855)
GTD generation 3	-0.2288 (0.756)	-0.8291 (0.942)	-1.3571‡ (0.767)	-1.3003 (0.829)
Number of active TOs	0.3143** (0.107)	0.4581* (0.180)	0.3735*** (0.082)	0.3598*** (0.092)
Negotiation period	3.0652** (1.044)	2.2187‡ (1.275)	1.2811* (0.606)	1.3210 (0.803)

‡ *p* ≤ .10; *p* ≤ .05; **p* ≤ .01; ***p* ≤ .001 (one-tailed tests)

180

Figure 16. Human rights NGO temporary presence, AI permanent presence, and attacks targeting NGOs in Turkey: hypothesis one.

on the particular target type; the table reports null findings for both advocacy work and anti-terrorism work.

Figure 17 maps out the annual points of attacks targeting NGOs and anti-terrorist campaign content.[104] Although there is no consistent relationship between these two measures, it is interesting to note that the majority of the attacks overlap with anti-TO work. However, the actual attacks followed anywhere from 4-10 months after a period of anti-TO campaign content, suggesting that the latter does not influence the former, given that there is no theoretical reason to expect a four- to ten-month lag in TO response.

Hypothesis three: Service provision

Hypothesis three refers to the potential influence that the presence of a service provision organization (ICRC) may have on attacks targeting NGOs. Figure 18 plots the annual measures of TO attacks targeting NGOs and ICRC temporary and permanent presence in Turkey. As is clear in the figure, there does not appear to be an

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[104] Advocacy campaign content was not included given that, for at least one month out of every year, a human rights organization engaged in advocacy work.

Table 20. Estimated coefficients and standard errors for autoregressive Poisson models: hypothesis one and International Committee of the Red Cross in Turkey

	ICRC conflict-area presence			
	Attacks targeting civilians		Attacks targeting the state	
NGO temporary presence	-0.1704 (0.319)		0.0613 (0.201)	
NGO permanent presence		-1.2195 (1.933)		0.0187 (1.101)
GDP	0.1349 (2.146)	1.0369 (2.746)	3.2597‡ (1.810)	3.3129 (2.066)
Unemployment	-0.1294 (0.171)	-0.0515 (0.227)	0.0444 (0.148)	0.0472 (0.169)
Urban population	-3.6027*** (0.915)	-3.9268*** (1.109)	-2.8383*** (0.741)	-2.8356*** (0.799)
Population density	5.7073*** (1.503)	5.8663*** (1.617)	4.5189*** (1.096)	4.5295*** (1.101)
Natural disaster	-0.0109 (0.185)	-0.0299 (0.183)	0.0341 (0.133)	0.0438 (0.128)
Democratic orientation	0.8555*** (0.245)	0.9620** (0.302)	0.6985** (0.228)	0.6982** (0.257)
Population growth	40.0518‡ (20.732)	44.5646‡ (24.063)	34.3774* (15.614)	34.6069* (16.152)
Infant mortality	-4.0318** (1.478)	-4.2603** (1.650)	-3.0036** (1.047)	-3.0157** (1.063)
Life expectancy	-24.4037** (7.779)	-25.0364** (8.345)	-18.5131*** (5.411)	-18.5859*** (5.421)
Military expenditures	-1.4118 (0.927)	-1.6714 (1.102)	0.6101 (0.621)	0.6215 (0.640)
Military personnel	-0.4861 (0.483)	-0.5126 (0.496)	-0.6429‡ (0.342)	-0.6378‡ (0.341)
GTD generation 1	-0.6682 (1.134)	-0.2515 (1.377)	-1.1143 (0.781)	-1.1188 (0.858)
GTD generation 3	-0.2617 (0.758)	-0.4409 (0.852)	-1.3344‡ (0.779)	-1.3480‡ (0.800)
Number of active TOs	0.3108** (0.107)	0.3680* (0.144)	0.3675*** (0.083)	0.3661*** (0.096)
Negotiation period	3.0558** (1.048)	2.9078** (1.050)	1.2151* (0.614)	1.2302‡ (0.634)

‡ $p \le .10$; *$p \le .05$; **$p \le .01$; ***$p \le .001$ (one-tailed tests)

Table 21. Estimated coefficients and standard errors for autoregressive Poisson models: hypothesis two and human rights NGOs in Turkey

	Human rights NGO campaign content				Media activity
	Attacks targeting civilians		Attacks targeting the state		All attacks
NGO advocacy	0.0470 (0.086)		-0.0394 (0.062)		
NGO criticism		0.1797 (0.223)		0.0121 (0.159)	
Media activity					-0.0051 (0.042)
GDP	0.1057 (2.144)	-0.0597 (2.135)	3.2470‡ (1.814)	3.3279‡ (1.795)	2.1979 (1.464)
Unemployment	-0.1305 (0.171)	-0.1350 (0.171)	0.0403 (0.148)	0.0486 (0.147)	0.0258 (0.120)
Urban population	-3.5583*** (0.916)	-3.5602*** (0.915)	-2.8733*** (0.744)	-2.8392*** (0.740)	-2.6694*** (0.613)
Population density	5.6220*** (1.498)	5.5727*** (1.499)	4.5780*** (1.102)	4.5263*** (1.096)	4.4072*** (0.926)
Natural disaster	-0.0280 (0.180)	-0.0293 (0.180)	0.0468 (0.129)	0.0438 (0.128)	-0.0802 (0.114)
Democratic orientation	0.8429*** (0.246)	0.8621*** (0.246)	0.7026** (0.229)	0.7011** (0.228)	0.6560*** (0.186)
Population growth	38.7940‡ (20.646)	38.8651‡ (20.623)	35.0682* (15.659)	34.6489* (15.575)	29.9159* (13.188)
Infant mortality	-3.9354** (1.473)	-3.9363** (1.470)	-3.0592** (1.052)	-3.0157** (1.045)	-2.9509*** (0.896)
Life expectancy	-23.9080** (7.748)	-23.7776** (7.741)	-18.8084*** (5.439)	-18.5705*** (5.407)	-18.4141*** (4.637)
Military expenditures	-1.3960 (0.926)	-1.4406 (0.925)	0.5999 (0.623)	0.6186 (0.620)	0.2669 (0.543)
Military personnel	-0.4817 (0.484)	-0.4838 (0.484)	-0.6471‡ (0.342)	-0.6366‡ (0.342)	-0.3861 (0.292)
GTD generation 1	-0.6873 (1.137)	-0.6109 (1.139)	-1.0915 (0.784)	-1.1108 (0.781)	-0.9176 (0.656)
GTD generation 3	-0.2809 (0.763)	-0.1970 (0.755)	-1.3119‡ (0.787)	-1.3493‡ (0.778)	-0.9361 (0.602)
Number of active TOs	0.3087** (0.107)	0.3100** (0.107)	0.3706*** (0.083)	0.3667*** (0.083)	0.2732*** (0.068)
Negotiation period	2.9909** (1.043)	2.9968** (1.041)	1.2475* (0.617)	1.2250* (0.613)	1.5336** (0.559)

‡ $p \leq .10$; *$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .01$; ***$p \leq .001$ (one-tailed tests)

Figure 17. Campaign content and attacks targeting NGOs in Turkey: hypothesis two.

Figure 18. Distribution of International Committee of the Red Cross temporary presence and attacks targeting NGOs in Lebanon.

easily identifiable relationship. Half of the TO attacks occur one or more years following temporary presence and only one attack occurs during a period of permanent presence.[105]

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[105] There are six attacks in total. Two of the attacks occurred in 2001 and, as such, look like a single attack in the figure.

Hypothesis four: Media coverage

The last hypothesis addresses the potential relationship between NGO media activity and the frequency of all terrorist attacks. The estimated coefficients and standard errors for the autoregressive Poisson model are reported in Table 21 and indicate that there is no support for hypothesis four in Turkey. Specifically, the relationship is in the direction opposite theoretical expectations. These model results are similar to the results from the other models indicating that NGOs have no influence on TO activity in Turkey.

Control variables: All models

The control variables included in the Turkey models are similar to those included in Algeria and Lebanon.[106] The control variables included in the models suggest two conclusions: 1) many of them are significant and, thus, influential for TO activity; and 2) in comparison to Algeria and Lebanon, there is less target-specific differences in the influence of the variables. These relationships are summarized in Table 22, which presents the number of models (with a maximum of six) reporting a specific directional relationship between each control variable and TO attacks.

As Table 22 illustrates, many of the same variables have the same significant directional influence across models, namely population measures, democratic orientation, health measures, the number of active TOs, and a period of negotiation between the state and a TO leader. However, there were a few variables, including GDP, military personnel, and the GTD coding generation, that are influential for one

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[106] The exceptions to this statement are the unemployment and negotiation period variables, which are absent from all countries other than Turkey, and the democratic orientation variable, which is absent from the Lebanon analyses.

Table 22. Number of models (maximum of six) displaying a significant relationship between the control variables and the dependent variable in Lebanon.

	Attacks targeting civilians		Attacks targeting the state	
Relationship direction	+	-	+	-
GDP			4	
Unemployment				
Urban population		6		6
Population density	6		6	
Natural disaster				
Democratic orientation	6		6	
Population growth	6		6	
Infant mortality		6		6
Life expectancy		6		6
Military expenditures				
Military personnel				6
GTD generation 1				
GTD generation 3				5
Number of active TOs	6		6	
Negotiation period	6		5	

target type but not for the other. This indicates that, although there are some target-specific differences, unlike Algeria and Lebanon, it appears that many of the control variables are influential regardless of the target type.

In Summary

This chapter presented the results of the hypotheses and the models that were introduced in chapter three and chapter five. The first section of this chapter reviewed descriptive statistics for all variables included in the models. This was followed with a summary of quantitative model results and qualitative assessments of distributions between key independent and dependent variables. The next and final chapter provides concluding thoughts on the meaning and implications of these model results. It also identifies policy implications, limitations of the analyses, and elaborates on analytical possibilities and next steps that fall outside the purview of this dissertation.

CHAPTER 7: Discussion and Conclusions

This chapter discusses the findings regarding the relationship between NGO activity and subsequent TO activity. The chapter begins with a review of the results for each of the hypotheses across Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey. This is followed with a discussion of the limitations inherent in the analyses conducted for this dissertation. These limitations lead into a discussion of prospective future research prompted by the work undertaken here. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of potential policy implications.

What was done

This dissertation originated with a short media story. In 2011, BBC reported that, in Somalia, Al-Shabaab engaged in a sequence of attacks targeting international NGOs. The string of attacks ended when Al-Shabaab stormed aid offices, informed the agencies that 16 NGOs were being banned, and ordered staff members to leave. This article (and others reporting on the same incidents) provided the grounds upon which a suspicion was born and developed. The research questions that arose from this suspicion were simple: do NGO activities influence TO activities and, if so, how? A careful review of the literature by this author did not turn up any existing body of empirical work that asked the same question or provided a pool of ready information about the nature or direction of this potential relationship.[107] However, theory and

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[107] The one empirical piece by Murdie and Stapley (2013) was published the year following the formulation of this dissertation topic.

general terrorism-related empirical results offered a premise upon which to tease apart the nuances of a potential relationship between NGOs and TOs.

Media coverage and general knowledge suggested that NGOs and TOs advocate for the same constituents, share similar goals and grievances, but use different methods of 'negotiation'. Game theory and rational choice provided the framework upon which to develop the expectation that the differences in tactics would take priority over compatible goals and grievances, leading to a natural competition, rather than a convenient alliance, between the two groups of organizations. Game theory suggested that, while NGOs and TOs both need constituent support, media attention, funding, and recruits in order to ensure group survival and success, they are locked in a zero-sum game of competition. As such, rational choice theory suggested that the TO would choose a course of action likely to eliminate or undermine the competition and increase the chances of gaining support and attention from the constituents and the public at large. Putting these different pieces together suggested a series of hypothesized relationships between NGO activity and TO activity. In general, increases in NGO activity were predicted to result in increases in attacks targeting the state and NGOs and a decrease in attacks targeting civilians.

These hypotheses were tested within three different countries selected specifically for their range of constituent issues, TO presence, and relationships with NGOs. As expected, results varied between Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey. Despite these differences, very limited support was found across and within these countries.

What was Discovered

Although Algeria did not neatly fit theoretical expectations, given that the TOs and NGOs did not share a common constituency for the majority of the study period, Algeria reported the greater number of significant relationships when compared to the other two countries. While there was some limited evidence of a relationship between presence, campaign content, and media activity in Algeria, Lebanon only reported a marginally significant relationship for one measure of presence, while Turkey did not report a single significant relationship for any of the models. In addition, there were some notable similarities and differences across these relationships. NGO presence variables had select negative and significant influences on attacks targeting civilians in Algeria and Lebanon, as predicted, but this was reported for temporary presence only in Algeria and permanent presence only in Lebanon. In regards to campaign content, model results indicated a positive relationship with civilian attacks, regardless of the country and the type of content, despite the expectation that these relationships would be negative. The only measure of campaign content that displayed the expected relationship was advocacy work and attacks targeting civilians in Algeria.

In sum, model results did not, for the most part, conform to expectations. In fact, there was very limited and inconsistent support presented in the three countries for the hypothesized relationships. These outcomes beg consideration and explanation. There are two possible reasons underlying the discordance between expectations and outcomes. The results may be accurate but the expectations may be

flawed or the results may be flawed and the expectations may be accurate. While I

advocate for the former, I fail to reject the latter.

<center>Flawed Expectations?</center>

This dissertation was built around the assumption that NGOs matter to TOs in

the grand scheme of things. However, this might be a generous stipulation or an

assumption that requires further refinement. While NGOs are proliferating at an

impressive rate and have notable long-term impacts on shifts in practices and policy,

as the ban on landmines and the treaties on torture illustrate, these influences are the

end result of, in many cases, years of negotiation and effort (Maxwell et al., 1998;

Spar and Dail, 2002). NGO interest in an issue does not signal immediate shifts in

the landscape of oppression. TO presence, on the other hand, can elicit an abrupt

response from interested parties, such as governments and enforcement agencies

(Bolz et al., 2011; Cohen et al., 2002). Previous research suggests that TOs consider

these short-term actions and reactions as more relevant to their strategy and do not

prefer an incremental or elongated process (Crenshaw, 1987; Pape, 2003). This

observation suggests the possibility that NGO activities will be perceived as non-

threatening to TOs, if TOs are operating with a short-term action-reaction model of

change.

While TOs may disregard NGOs due to the sheer time-intensive model of

change that NGOs employ, TOs may also fail to regard NGOs as effective advocates.

TO actions can and have resulted in landmark moments of attention and concessions.

As events such as the hostage-taking in Munich during the 1972 Olympics, the

bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 in Yemen, and the attacks on the World Trade

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Center and other U.S. sites in 2001 illustrate, TOs have been successful in affecting global policy and practice with a single incident (Montague, 2012; Wright, 2006). NGOs, on the other hand, may not necessarily share comparable moments of infamy and influence (Frank et al., 2007; Hearn, 2002). To the active observer, this would suggest, on the surface, that NGOs are an ineffectual global player, undermining their threat as a competitor.

If TOs perceive NGOs as sluggish and ineffective at promoting change, it is logical that TOs project this impression onto the constituents, potential funders, and recruits. Research shows that organizations will project their opinions on to their audience, assuming the audience shares the same opinion as the organizational body (Gunther et al., 2001; Marks and Miller, 1987). Therefore, if the TO views the NGO as ineffectual and slow-moving, the TO would expect that the constituents and other potential supporters would share the same opinion, further minimizing the threat that NGOs pose to TOs.

In sum, there are grounds upon which to posit that the null findings of this dissertation are an accurate reflection of the lack of TO interest in NGO activities. This does not undermine the theoretical frameworks summarized and applied in chapter three, but it does suggest that NGOs may simply be an invisible player in these conflict areas. At least they might be invisible to TOs, which might work more towards their advantage than disadvantage.

Having said this, there are some methodological shortcomings inherent in the analytical choices made for this dissertation that suggest an alternative explanation for the null findings; simply that NGOs are influential but that relationship cannot be

captured in the areas chosen for this dissertation or with the variables included in the models.

Flawed Results?

There are several notable limitations that potentially affect the results of this dissertation. These relate to the generalizability of results and the validity of the measures employed. Regarding the former, the analyses were restricted to three countries and the TOs that operate within those borders. As such, while the results may speak to the relationships inherent in those countries and those specific TOs, they cannot be applied to other contexts.

An additional consideration stems from the frequency of NGO attacks in other countries. Incidents targeting NGOs are relatively rare events but these are more common in countries not included in this dissertation. For example, the GTD reports more than 100 attacks with NGOs as the primary target in Afghanistan during the period of study included in this dissertation. Somalia and Pakistan both report approximately 70 attacks. This dissertation offered very little in the way of identifying the particular relationship between NGO activities and attacks targeting NGOs, given the rarity of these types of incidents. Analyses carried out in countries where these attacks are more prevalent may produce interesting and revealing results.

Omitted variable bias is also a concern that requires acknowledgement and some discussion. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the control variables played a prominent role in target selection. Several key variables were significant for one target type only or, in many cases, for both civilian and state attacks, although some of these changed directions depending on the target. This denotes the importance of

the controls that were included, in general, but also suggests that hypotheses that are crafted around particular target types must consider the contextual variables that may influence those specific targeting choices. The literature suggests at least one potential omitted variable based on research focused on target selection: religious tensions (Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Tavares, 2004; Piazza, 2006). In addition, previous studies suggest an additional variable not employed in this dissertation that, although not target-specific, has been identified as an important determinant of terrorism in general: ethnic tensions (Abadie, 2006; Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Goldstein, 2005). Both of these tensions underlie the oppressor/oppressed dynamics presented in chapter two and, as such, are assumed to be relevant for both TOs and NGOs, although different tensions are prominent in different countries. The assumption built into this dissertation is that these tensions are constant when, in fact, they may fluctuate considerably. In addition, while one kind of tension is prominent in the countries of interest,[108] the other kind of tension can certainly arise periodically, contributing to oppressive dynamics and capturing the attention of TOs and NGOs alike. As such, the relationship between NGOs and TOs may be partially driven by these tensions and a failure to include measures that parse out these effects may lead to bias in the results. If TOs and NGOs both respond in kind to changes in tension, this change may mask subtle influences that NGOs have on TOs, leading to inflated standard errors and Type II error. Unfortunately, these measures were not readily available for the countries and years selected for this dissertation.

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[108] Religious tensions underlie the dynamic of oppression in Algeria and Lebanon while ethnic tensions underlie dynamics in Turkey.

A final area of concern relates to the validity of measures employed in this dissertation. Firstly, while the analyses included several different measures of NGO activity, there are additional operationalizations that may have more effectively tapped into NGO interest in a conflict area. These could include such public-record variables as NGO spending on a conflict-area campaign, the number of press releases published around a campaign, social media presence, or protest and lobbying activities. These are just a few options but each of these provides an additional metric of NGO activity that may further compliment the variables included in this dissertation.

Secondly, there are further parameters that could have been placed on the terrorism variables in order to refine the relationship. Incidents were not selected with consideration for such factors as whether all GTD inclusion criteria (summarized in chapter five) were met or whether the original GTD coder expressed doubts about labeling a given incident terrorism. Specifically, the GTD includes a variable called *doubt terrorism proper* (DTP) that indicates whether there is doubt that an incident is pure terrorism. The grey-area cases considered to meet DTP requirements are often suspected of being purely criminal acts, unintentional, or incidents of intra- and inter- TO violence. There is no reason to expect that NGO activity facilitates crime, unintentional violence, or internecine activity and, as such, the inclusion of these grey-area cases could have obscured the impact of NGO influence, potentially increasing standard errors and leading to Type II error.

Therefore, while there are justifications supporting the position that NGOs may not matter to TOs, the limitations inherent in this dissertation do not eliminate

the possibility that NGOs are influential, if assessed in a different context with additional variables and an alternate analytical strategy. As such, one of the main findings here is the need for additional research.

Future Research

There are several areas of future research that would be valuable to explore. As mentioned previously, replicating the analyses carried out for this dissertation in other countries, particularly areas with high frequency of attacks targeting NGOs and variations in the oppressed/oppressor dynamic, would be highly beneficial in establishing the nuances of the relationship between NGO and TO activity. In a similar vein, the results of the analyses conducted here provide little support for the hypothesized relationships; replication in additional countries could aid in corroborating these findings or undermining them. Either outcome serves to further flesh out the dynamics between NGOs and TOs.

As mentioned earlier, although the possibility of Type II error cannot be ruled out, it is the position of this author that the results reflect flawed expectations. Specifically, while Lebanon and Turkey demonstrate a majority of null findings, Algeria reports some significant relationships. This suggests that NGOs may matter to TOs in certain contexts but not in others. Algeria is unique in the sense that the TOs are not defending a constituency but are defending an anti-western ideal. Therefore, perhaps TOs do not respond to NGOs as potential competitors but do respond to them as representatives of unwelcome western influence. This would suggest that, in areas where the TO is defending a constituency against a local threat (e.g., national state actors), NGOs may have little relevance. However, in areas

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where a TO is advocating for an Islamic caliphate, for example, international NGOs may elicit a response. Replication of the analyses included in this dissertation should be conducted in countries that present a ready example of an anti-western dynamic, such as Syria or Iraq, in addition to countries that encapsulate the oppressor/oppressed dynamic outlined in chapter two.

In addition to replication in other countries, future analyses could consider a variety of other actors that may play a role in the oppressor/oppressed dynamic, including diplomatic institutions such as the United Nations and its many branches, such as the World Food Programme, the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and Children's Fund (UNICEF). These actors, although not NGOs, can serve a function similar to those fulfilled by NGOs in conflict areas, but do not require the support of the constituents and other resources that NGOs and TOs need for survival and success. However, diplomatic institutions oftentimes have a unique relationship with NGOs; they may be allies, NGOs may share membership in the diplomatic institution, or NGOs may serve as advisors (Martens, 2004). Therefore, the TO may perceive diplomatic institutions as a threat nonetheless, due to perceived ties between the institution and NGOs. As such, the presence of diplomatic institutions may serve to aggravate tensions between NGOs and TOs.

In summary, future research needs to focus on replicating the analyses carried out for this dissertation with different contexts and actors. Until replication occurs, however, there are some preliminary policy implications that can be drawn from this dissertation. These are summarized below.

Policy Implications

There are two clear policy implications that arise from the results of this dissertation. On a positive note, NGO activities, in most cases, do not appear to incite violence. On a less-positive note, NGO campaigns directed towards minimizing TO activity do not appear to have the intended effect.

In regards to the first implication, of the 35 models included, only two reported a marginally significant increase in violence following an increase in NGO activity.[109] Specifically, NGO advocacy work and media coverage were related to increases in TO activity in Algeria. Meanwhile, the remaining 33 models were insignificant or related to a decrease in attacks. Therefore, contrary to concerns expressed by the academic community (e.g., Murdie and Stapley, 2013; Stapley, 2014), NGOs do not appear to incite violent response from TOs, at least in Lebanon, Turkey, and to some extent, Algeria.

Regarding the second implication, one of the variables included in this dissertation was a measure of NGO anti-TO campaign work. This variable captured if, at any point in time, an NGO directly criticized or campaigned against the TO. The majority of these activities consisted of directly appealing to the TO to halt violent activity, to begin a peaceful negotiation process, and to cease any violence directed towards the citizenry. Unfortunately, it does not appear that this is a useful tactic. Criticizing the TO was related to an increase in attacks targeting both the citizenry and the state in all three countries, although these relationships were insignificant. It appears that anti-TO campaign work is a poor use of resources and

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[109] Finding two positive results out of 35 models is about what would be expected by chance (p=0.057).

investment in such a strategy may even make matters worse in the conflict area of interest.

Conclusions

In summary, this study assessed the relationship between NGO activity and subsequent TO activity in Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey. It was hypothesized that an increase in a variety of NGO measures would lead to an increase in attacks targeting the state and NGOs, and a decrease in attacks targeting civilians. Results did not support these hypothesized relationships, for the most part, although there was some support found for physical presence in Algeria and Lebanon, and advocacy work and media coverage in Algeria. While this suggests that NGOs may not matter to TOs, at least not enough to alter TO behavior, there are some limitations to this dissertation that prevent drawing a strong conclusion, such as generalizability and validity of measures. Instead, these results suggest the need for further research in other countries, particularly areas with a greater frequency of NGO attacks and different contextual and political factors. Despite the need for replication of results, there are some tentative implications that arise from this dissertation. The first is that, for the most part, NGOs do not appear to incite violence from a TO when NGOs take an active interest in a conflict area and, as such, NGOs may not need to consider this when choosing a strategy. The second implication is that NGO investment in an anti-TO campaign appears to be a poor use of resources, given this does not decrease TO violence. Perhaps this unfortunate consequence is another avenue for future researchers to explore.

Appendices

APPENDIX A: Models, Variables, and Definitions

Variables	Definition

Models addressing NGO physical presence (hypothesis one)

Dependent variables

Number of attacks - state	Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting police, government, and military
Number of attacks - civilians	Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting civilians
Number of attacks - NGO	Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting NGOs

Independent variables

Human rights NGO physical presence - temporary	NGO temporary presence in a conflict area in a given month (0,1)
Human rights NGO physical presence – permanent	NGO permanent presence in a conflict area in a given month (0,1)

Control variables

GDP	Gross domestic product per capita (annual, continuous)
Unemployment (Turkey only)	Percent of the labor force without employment (annual, percentage)
Urban population	Percent of total population in an urban center (annual, percentage)
Population density	Average number of citizens per square kilometer of land (annual, continuous)
Population growth	Percent change in the population size from previous year (annual, percentage)
Infant mortality rate	Infant deaths per 1,000 births (annual, continuous)
Life expectancy at birth	Average expected lifespan (annual, continuous)
Military expenditures	Percent of the gross domestic product spent on military expenditures (annual, percentage)
Military personnel	Percent of military personnel in the labor force (annual, percentage)
Democratic orientation (Algeria and Turkey only)	Scale of democratic versus autocratic orientation (annual, scale)
Natural disaster	Natural disaster occurrence (monthly, 0,1)
Number of active TOs	Number of active TOs in a conflict area (annual, count)
GTD generation (I and III)	GTD data collection generation (monthly, 0,1)
Civilian orientation (Algeria only – pro and anti)	Period of pro- or anti-civilian orientation (monthly, 0,1)
Negotiation period (Turkey only)	Period of TO-state negotiation (monthly, 0,1)

Variables	Definition

Models addressing NGO campaign content (hypothesis two)

Dependent variables

Number of attacks - state	Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting police, government, and military
Number of attacks - civilians	Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting civilians
Number of attacks - NGO	Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting NGOs

Independent variables

Human rights NGO campaign content - advocacy	Pro-constituent campaign work in a given month (0,1)
Human rights NGO campaign content – anti-TO criticism	Anti-TO campaign work in a given month (0,1)

Control variables

GDP	Gross domestic product per capita (annual, continuous)
Unemployment (Turkey only)	Percent of the labor force without employment (annual, percentage)
Urban population	Percent of total population in an urban center (annual, percentage)
Population density	Average number of citizens per square kilometer of land (annual, continuous)
Population growth	Percent change in the population size from previous year (annual, percentage)
Infant mortality rate	Infant deaths per 1,000 births (annual, continuous)
Life expectancy at birth	Average expected lifespan (annual, continuous)
Military expenditures	Percent of the gross domestic product spent on military expenditures (annual, percentage)
Military personnel	Percent of military personnel in the labor force (annual, percentage)
Democratic orientation (Algeria and Turkey only)	Scale of democratic versus autocratic orientation (annual, scale)
Natural disaster	Natural disaster occurrence (monthly, 0,1)
Number of active TOs	Number of active TOs in a conflict area (annual, count)
GTD generation (I and III)	GTD data collection generation (monthly, 0,1)
Civilian orientation (Algeria only – pro and anti)	Period of pro- or anti-civilian orientation (monthly, 0,1)
Negotiation period (Turkey only)	Period of TO-state negotiation (monthly, 0,1)

Variables	Definition

Models addressing NGO service provision (hypothesis three)

Dependent variables

Number of attacks - NGO	Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting NGOs

Independent variables

ICRC presence - temporary	NGO temporary presence in a conflict area in a given month (0,1)
ICRC presence – permanent	NGO permanent presence in a conflict area in a given month (0,1)

Control variables

GDP	Gross domestic product per capita (annual, continuous)
Unemployment (Turkey only)	Percent of the labor force without employment (annual, percentage)
Urban population	Percent of total population in an urban center (annual, percentage)
Population density	Average number of citizens per square kilometer of land (annual, continuous)
Population growth	Percent change in the population size from previous year (annual, percentage)
Infant mortality rate	Infant deaths per 1,000 births (annual, continuous)
Life expectancy at birth	Average expected lifespan (annual, continuous)
Military expenditures	Percent of the gross domestic product spent on military expenditures (annual, percentage)
Military personnel	Percent of military personnel in the labor force (annual, percentage)
Democratic orientation (Algeria and Turkey only)	Scale of democratic versus autocratic orientation (annual, scale)
Natural disaster	Natural disaster occurrence (monthly, 0,1)
Number of active TOs	Number of active TOs in a conflict area (annual, count)
GTD generation (I and III)	GTD data collection generation (monthly, 0,1)
Civilian orientation (Algeria only – pro and anti)	Period of pro- or anti-civilian orientation (monthly, 0,1)
Negotiation period (Turkey only)	Period of TO-state negotiation (monthly, 0,1)

Variables	Definition

Models addressing media coverage (hypothesis four)

Dependent variables

Number of attacks	Monthly count of terrorist attacks

Independent variables

All media activity	NGOs were prominent in media coverage about the conflict area during a given month (count)

Control variables

GDP	Gross domestic product per capita (annual, continuous)
Unemployment (Turkey only)	Percent of the labor force without employment (annual, percentage)
Urban population	Percent of total population in an urban center (annual, percentage)
Population density	Average number of citizens per square kilometer of land (annual, continuous)
Population growth	Percent change in the population size from previous year (annual, percentage)
Infant mortality rate	Infant deaths per 1,000 births (annual, continuous)
Life expectancy at birth	Average expected lifespan (annual, continuous)
Military expenditures	Percent of the gross domestic product spent on military expenditures (annual, percentage)
Military personnel	Percent of military personnel in the labor force (annual, percentage)
Democratic orientation (Algeria and Turkey only)	Scale of democratic versus autocratic orientation (annual, scale)
Natural disaster	Natural disaster occurrence (monthly, 0,1)
Number of active TOs	Number of active TOs in a conflict area (annual, count)
GTD generation (I and III)	GTD data collection generation (monthly, 0,1)
Civilian orientation (Algeria only – pro and anti)	Period of pro- or anti-civilian orientation (monthly, 0,1)
Negotiation period (Turkey only)	Period of TO-state negotiation (monthly, 0,1)

APPENDIX B: Action terms

Advocacy action terms
The presence of the terms will warrant coding the article for campaign content.

Accused
Advocated
Appealed
Called for
Claimed
Criticized
Demanded
Expressed concern
Slammed
Stressed
Urged

Neutral action terms
The presence of the terms will not warrant coding the article for campaign content

Concluded
Issued
Noted
Reported
Said
Stated

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